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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

McTaggart's Thoughts on Belief, Fact, and Truth

RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA
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Seductively loaded as they are, the words 'belief', 'fact', and 'truth', which are all closely related, have for long been subjects of debate and discussion; and though they are among the notions whose explication is always likely to yield philosophical dividends, it is by no means easy to determine their precise meaning or their mutual connection. There are, besides, a whole lot of allied issues involved such that the task becomes further formidable. I have therefore tried to make it somewhat more manageable by delimiting the subject to but one philosopher, McTaggart,[1] though without meaning to exclude all reference to certain other philosophers' views as and when it seemed relevant within the space at my disposal.

I think it would be fair to begin by noting a few preliminaries. One basic article of faith with McTaggart is that, whatever be our epistemological views, we dwell, as knowing beings, in a two-fold state of knowledge and error. It is surely pathological to believe that all human beliefs are necessarily false, just as it is as dogmatic to hold, à la (e.g.) Protagoras, that all human beliefs are true. According to McTaggart, there is both knowledge and error (*NE*, II, 509),[2] a contention which has a warrant even in common intuition. Besides, as he would like to add, whatever be its necessary and sufficient conditions, knowledge itself can exist primarily—and only derivatively otherwise—within the knowing subject, just as wherever or whatever be the cause of error, error itself can only belong to the erring subject (*NE*, II, 520). In its simplest form, then, knowledge is a mental state or a state of awareness. If one knows or claims to know something it would be plainly presumptuous to suggest, even as a bare possibility, that he is not at all aware of that thing. Yet it is obvious, all awareness is not knowledge. It is always something more which turns mere awareness into knowledge. This 'more' however need not always signify the addition of some content to the content of which one is already aware; sometimes it is merely a recognition or confirmation of the content

known or claimed to be known as *indeed* known, in the light of certain conditions or evidence or whatever.

TRUTH-BEARERS: BELIEFS OR PROPOSITIONS?

To McTaggart knowledge is 'true belief'. This simple view of knowledge is more or less acceptable to all except perhaps to the dogmatic sceptic. There is a relation between belief and knowledge which philosophers regard as unseverable. Knowledge, they say, always entails belief. (It would, for example, be palpably odd to say that I know that *S* is *P* but I do not believe that *S* is *P*.) The relation between the two is, however, of one-sided dependence, and this is easily seen as we ponder the fact that while one may believe something to be true, one may actually be mistaken about it; that is, one may not be knowing it really. Beliefs, of course, are required to prove to be true (because of the in-built truth claim they make), but they do not cease to be beliefs even when they are or turn out to be false. Knowledge, on the other hand, must be answerable to truth and ceases to be knowledge when it does not square with it.

Now if knowing entails believing, and if knowing is basically a subjective act or state, then believing too must be regarded as primarily a subjective act or state. This may not be all there is to belief—as this is not all there is to knowledge—but this is what a belief is minimally and ineluctably.

In modern times the question has often arisen as to what it is of which truth and falsity can truly be predicated? McTaggart too considers the question at some length and concludes that primarily it is beliefs which are true or false (*NE*, I, 8). If knowledge is undivorceable, in the sense noted above, from belief and if, further, the very *raison d'etre* of knowledge consists in its answerability to truth, then truth (and therefore falsity too) cannot but be a property of beliefs primarily. If at this point, the question be asked, why should we be interested in truth?, the only answer that seems possible to give is: because we are interested to know how the world is. The very search for a (right) definition of truth presupposes the belief or (shall we say?) the faith that there is such a thing as truth. Question this belief and you are landed in absolute scepticism. Indeed, the importance of this view about beliefs as the bearers of truth-value is perhaps better seen when contrasted with (e.g.) Alfred Tarski's language-centred approach which he adopts while developing his semantical notion

of truth.[3] Tarski's worry is to find a definition of truth which would explain the sense in which *sentences* in the object-language could be regarded as being true or false. And there too he thinks it problematic to apply the predicates 'true' and 'false' to any sentences except those which belong to certain kinds of formalized (ideal) or senitized languages: natural languages are to him infected with hopeless contradiction(s). Naturally this medication has not been taken kindly by those who take their stand on natural language, their main contention having been that a natural language's harbouring 'contradictions' has its source in an illicit assimilation of a natural language to a semantical system. Be that as it may, it seems to us that McTaggart's (or for that matter any philosopher's) choice of beliefs as the kind of items which are true or false is basically much more satisfactory than Tarski's so far as fundamental philosophical questioning is concerned. (Of course McTaggart would say that a sentence is true if and only if it functions as the verbal expression of a true belief.) Indeed, one basic objection to Tarski's view has been that it entertains in principle the idea that there would still be a truth as to how things are even if there were no mind in the universe to think about them. And, certainly one drastic (even if unintended) consequence of such a view can easily be the assumption that 'truth' is an altogether redundant notion serving no useful function in philosophy and so frankly dispensable. (In the sentence '"Snow is white" is true in *L* if and only if snow is white', which itself belongs to a metalanguage, 'is true' according to some philosophers would add no further content to the object-language sentence named as 'Snow is white' in the former.) It is true that, to be fair to him, Tarski's account does retain truth-predicates, but this is done on a strictly (stronger) metalinguistic level. Again, though thinkers like Karl Popper[4] have extolled Tarski's definition (which the logician couches in terms of the semantic notion of 'satisfaction') as a rehabilitation of the classical correspondence theory of truth, Tarski does not really seem so much as to offer a definition of 'truth' as a definition of the metalinguistic technical term 'true in (a formally specified language) *L*'. Indeed philosophers have contended that the 'equivalence principle' in Tarski's work is *philosophically neutral*. The truly philosophical problem in their view is *not* that we don't understand 'Snow is white', but rather that we don't understand '*what it is to understand* "Snow is white"'. And about this (they say) *T* says nothing.[5] Someone may here cite, on Tarski's behalf, the following from his 'Polemical Remarks':

> I do not have the slightest intention to contribute in any way to those endless, often violent discussions on the subject: 'What is the right conception of truth?' I must confess I do not understand what is at stake in such disputes ...[6]

And we must confess our inability to see what philosophical advance is made by Tarski on the customary correspondence theory by making 'true' only a metalinguistic property applicable to *sentences*.[7] At any rate, McTaggart feels persuaded that in a perfectly indubitable sense there can be no truth or falsehood unless there are conscious beings to entertain beliefs, even if there always were, and would always be, facts which would have made, or would make, the relevant beliefs true, had they existed.

There is a received view which maintains that in their primitive sense, the adjectives 'true' and 'false' apply to propositions. McTaggart for one rejects this view and goes on to question the very reality of propositions. Of course the notion of 'propositions' is itself quite murky and has often meant different things to different people. We will scuttle discussion of these various meanings of the word and concentrate briefly on what McTaggart understands by it in the main and his subsequent rejection of them on the ground that they are superfluous. Since McTaggart's own discussion of propositions, though important, is elaborate, we shall, for the sake of brevity, try to highlight only those few aspects of it as have direct bearing on our theme. To be sure, as Broad complains, McTaggart does not technically start by explaining his meaning of the term 'proposition', but if one ignores trivial verbal niceties, then one finds one principal thought running through most of what McTaggart says on the subject, namely what he later on expresses by representing a proposition 'as ... a non-existent reality which is true or false *independently* of our beliefs' (*NE*, I, 23). (My italics) McTaggart discusses the claim of propositions to be counted as real not just *as such*, but in the larger metaphysical context of whether there can be things, which, even though non-existent, are real—something which compounds the difficulty of estimating the depth and scope of his critique of propositions, and which therefore should not be underestimated by one interested in the details of that critique. And the conclusion at which he arrives after a well-reasoned argument is that the domain of reality and the domain of existence in fact coincide so that it is improbable that there are things which do not exist but are real (*NE*, I, 7). Armed with this fundamental assumption (which I for one think to be

basically sound), McTaggart examines the issue of propositions and judges that they do not exist, and so cannot be real. Beliefs on the other hand exist and are therefore real; they are actual mental entities. Be it noted, we are here concerned (to repeat) with that sense of propositions in which they are (literally) taken to be public, epistemologically neutral, and constant entities such that they can become the object of different attitudes. Thus *X* may believe a proposition *P*, *Y* may deny it and *Z* may merely wonder about its truth or falsity. From this it is concluded that irrespective of the difference in (propositional) attitudes, it is the *same* something which is under reference here. This common referent, present alike, simultaneously or otherwise, to the consciousness of *X*, *Y*, and *Z* cannot be a fact, for while *X* believes it, *Y* and *Z* do not; and of course it cannot be a mental state, for mental states are by definition subjective states and so neither public nor neutral. It is then concluded that propositions must have a being of their own, a being which transcends the limitations so much characteristic of beliefs and judgements. ('Subsistence' is sometimes the word philosophers use to characterize the kind of being propositions are thought to possess.) Indeed, philosophers, when they talk about propositions, generally see nothing wrong or extraordinary in the idea that there can be or are propositions which have never been or will never be entertained or thought about, let alone believed or asserted.[8] And yet who can deny that some of them may be true: after all truth does not depend upon its being known! To illustrate the point at issue, a certain number of ants have existed on the earth between the death of King Ashoka and the death of Empress Noor Jahan. The possibility that someone has entertained any beliefs (or assumptions) on the subject seems extremely remote. But even if there had been some belief (or assumption) about it, the likelihood of its having been true is a matter of conjecture. And yet, the proposition theorist asks, can it be denied that there must be some number such that it would be true that it is the actual number of those ants? Now if there were no propositions, nothing could be true about this number except beliefs (and assumptions). It is urged, then, that the fact that there is a truth even when there is neither belief nor assumption, proves the reality of propositions.

Not only this. The argument in support of propositions could well be expressed by their proponents in a more fundamental form. Granting hypothetically that every truth should be known, is it not obvious, they may query, that a (belief's) truth is not relative to its being known? '*S*

is *P*' (if true) derives its truth not from my belief in it; rather my belief that *S* is *P* is true *because* it is true that *S* is *P*. And from this the proposition theorists conclude that truth is independent of belief. It is 'objective', and a thing is not made true by our believing it to be true. There is, then, something true besides beliefs, and this something must be propositions.

None of these contentions, however, seems to have much force for McTaggart. It is true, he says, that in his opinion nothing is true but beliefs. But this proposition, he adds, leads to none of the unsavoury consequences which are thought to follow from it. Even though truth, he points out, is not conceivable as independent of beliefs, there is something else which is independent of beliefs—namely the facts to which the (given) beliefs correspond (*NE*, I, 16). For a content to be true it is necessary that it be believed, though that in itself is not enough to make it true: what is further required is that it correspond to some fact or facts. This is how McTaggart disposes of one principal argument in favour of propositions.

There is, besides, another grave objection to which the traditional proposition theory in its general form seems exposed—it relates especially to false propositions. Such propositions are thought to be propositions which do not agree with facts. But is falsehood or error by any chance conceivable independently of an erring (or pretending!) subject? As we have said in the beginning, whatever be its cause, error itself (according to McTaggart) can only belong to the subject who errs. On a theory which does not accept this doctrine, false propositions would be *ipso facto* reduced to so many objectified errors and falsehoods detached from the mistaking subject.[9]

Now if error cannot be anywhere else except in the erring subject, truth too, as we have already said, cannot have its locus except in a knowing subject. It is a conscious subject who holds or comes to hold both false and true beliefs. From this it follows that the question of truth is not one which can be approached impersonally or neutrally. All said and done, then, the subsistent proposition remains an illegitimate and unreal abstraction. It should be remembered that McTaggart does not deny, in fact he explicitly upholds, that there are two aspects to a belief, one the subjective (or intentional) act of believing, and the other, the content believed. But the content believed, he would contend, cannot properly be separated from the subjective act of believing. Belief or assertion is not something

external to a content: a content is a content *as* it is believed or asserted. And if by proposition be meant the content which is believed or asserted, McTaggart would have nothing to say against it. His repudiation of (the reality of) propositions is thus confined—what is of great importance in itself—to that sense of theirs in which they are looked upon as non-actual realities which are true or false in independence of our beliefs.[10] It is only when the content is abstracted or severed from the belief and set up, by hypostatization, as an entity having its own independent existence (and inhabiting some 'third realm', different both from the world of facts and the world of mind) that problems begin to surface. If the subjective element of the belief is taken away, the truth disappears with it and we find ourselves left, not with timeless, non-existent and true propositions, but only with facts which themselves are not true (even though they decide the truth of beliefs) and which may or may not be timeless and which are always existent (actual) in one sense or another (*NE*, I, 38). Besides, unlike Russell, McTaggart would not for example say that to believe that *p* necessarily means to believe the *proposition* that *p*. Russell, as we know, formed this conviction on the ground that one expresses or states one's belief that *p* by means of the words '*p*' or the proposition that *p*. Indeed he went on to suggest not only that when animals believe that *p* they do something analogous to believing the proposition that *p* but (occasionally) also that they actually believe the proposition that *p*.[11] (A similar assumption has led W.V. Quine to maintain that though mice don't speak English, it is not erroneous, however unnatural, to 'treat a mouse's fear of a cat as his fearing true a certain English sentence.')[12] It should be obvious that such a doctrine, with the philosophical admonition it carries, can have no appeal for McTaggart, for, on his view, which might be called absurd by such moderns as Richard Rorty, there is an (incurable) direct encounter between mind and reality. The proposition theory, on the other hand, sets up a smokescreen of intermediate (McTaggart would call them 'bastard') entities between the mind and the world. We conclude, then, that in terms of the ontology of the situation—and that is what primarily counts here—the so-called neutral or impersonal meaning of the constative is an artificially abstracted content and so stands for no actual object of thought, though its utility for the formal logician need not be questioned: the latter's concern after all is not with questions of existence.

THE NOTION OF TRUTH

We must now turn to the other question, namely what constitutes truth, or to be more specific, what is it that renders a belief true? (The question of false beliefs will be examined later.) McTaggart summarily dismisses any theory which makes the truth of a belief (or proposition or whatever) consist in its coherence with other beliefs (or propositions or whatever). Nor does truth lie, in his view, in a belief's completeness or in the possession of a systematic nature (*NE*, I, 9). While these characteristics, or some of them, may serve as criteria of truth, they cannot, says McTaggart, determine the truth of a belief. 'The only belief which can be made true by the coherence, or completeness, or systematic nature, of any belief *M*, is the belief that the belief is coherent, or complete, or systematic' (*NE*, I, 9).

It is obvious from McTaggart's phraseology that the object of his rejection here is the famed coherence theory of truth. The exponents of this theory, speaking quite generally, look upon the truth of a belief or a proposition as consisting, not in its relation to something which it is about, but in its harmony or compliance with other beliefs or propositions in a unitary system. The so-called 'facts' to which the correspondence theory appeals for determining truth—and therefore true beliefs—are, on the coherence theory, nothing but those propositions (or judgements) which have been admitted as true and are therefore beyond reproach or doubt. With its idealist adherents especially, the theory takes on a peculiar form. (That McTaggart should attack that theory is quite an interesting fact in itself, for McTaggart is himself an idealist and avowedly preaches what he calls 'ontological idealism'.) These philosophers generally maintain that reality is one vast organically interconnected whole and that anything or any portion of it which we make the object of our knowledge or thought, or even otherwise, is (in principle) not an isolated or isolable bit of content such that it can stand on its own metaphysically or epistemologically, but rather has its place, essentially and necessarily, as a part of the total system. A thing is what it is only in, or in virtue of, its (coherent) relationship with the rest of the universe. And the universe is only one, not two. The question of truth, consequently, is not relative to whether a thought of ours agrees with or represents reality, but whether it is a part of the whole fabric of reality. (It will be noticed that it was this intuition which, among other things, contributed to the idealistic doctrine

of 'internal relations' and to the further conclusion that any change in any part of the universe somewhere leads to a change in everything else which constitutes the universe, our possible lack of knowledge of this 'fact' notwithstanding.) The emergent perspective, then, is to view the world holistically and to undermine any suggestion which takes its stand on the possibility of an adequate account of a part taken singly or isolatedly. (The idea was indeed somewhat tempered by the degrees-of-reality- and degrees-of-truth-talk of thinkers like F.H. Bradley.) No single proposition (or judgement) can therefore be true (or false) without all others being true or false. Coherence therefore goes beyond mere consistency. A set can, for instance, be called coherent only when its members stand, to use A.C. Ewing's words, 'in some positive logical relation of entailment to each other.'[13] To call a set consistent, on the other hand, usually means that the members can all be true together, though it is not necessary that they are. Consistency, however, remains a necessary condition of coherence: a set is not coherent unless there is a logical possibility of its constituents being true *together*. A proposition is therefore true only when it coheres with the rest of the system which involves, as a system, the relationship of reciprocal dependence and entailment over the whole web of reality. Brand Blandshard expresses the idealist conception in the following succinct way:

> That view is that reality is a system, completely ordered and fully intelligible ... [A]t any given time the degree of truth in our experience as a whole is the degree of system it has achieved. The degree of truth of a particular proposition is to be judged in the first instance by its coherence with experience as a whole, ... all-comprehensive and fully articulated, in which thought can come to rest.[14]

Little wonder, then, that such a truth becomes that reality itself. Enunciating such a view, Bradley remarks:

> Truth is an ideal expressive of the Universe, at once coherent and comprehensive. It must not conflict with itself, and there must be no suggestion which fails to fall inside it. Perfect truth in short must realize the idea of a systematic whole.[15]

By way of a critical remark on the coherence theory, we may first point out that coherence as an ideal to be achieved by a theory of reality (or truth) is not, cannot be, a bad idea in itself. After all we often employ

coherence as a criterion to judge whether or not an account of a certain state of affairs chimes with what we already know or judge of the real. Any two propositions about the same reality have to be consistent: this is the minimum condition of their being both true. Of course they may both be false, but that would be due to their failure to satisfy other conditions; and this holds even of scientific theories. Any scientific hypothesis, if it is not compatible with those other scientific theories which we have already determined or assumed to be true, will have to be given up as false. To be sure, the hypothesis in question may in fact be true; but in that case we shall be obliged to give up, or at least modify, depending upon the degree of incompatibility, our earlier hypothesis. Any two incompatible hypotheses cannot both be true, though they can well both be false. Some system-talk therefore does get introduced when we reflect on the nature of truth at a wider level. But—and this is the rub of the matter—even the most complete or comprehensive system which claims to guarantee the truth of other propositions on the ground either that they cohere with itself or that they are logically implied by some of its own propositions, must also *as a whole* be true and valid. This validation cannot come simply from its coherence with still other propositions; that will engender a vicious infinite regress. There has therefore to be some such ultimate and initial proposition which is true or valid *independently* of the system. This proposition can either be self-evident or grounded in some indisputable fact (or reality) which therefore explains the notion of truth before the system attains its validity on the basis of its coherence with that proposition. The point, in other words, is that even if it be possible that all 'true propositions' are mutually interrelated in certain essential ways, this is of no aid in explaining the meaning of truth, unless we know that meaning already. And it goes without saying that to know that meaning *is* to know (besides other things) that truth does not simply reduce to 'true propositions'. Thus while reality may well be consistent, and coherent too in a very considerable measure, its sheer givenness or factuality is always something more than mere coherence. In fact, as critics have argued, it is perfectly conceivable that there be more than one mutually exclusive but internally equally consistent and coherent system. In that event the question of adjudication would become supremely relevant. We may note that this internally (or even otherwise) felt demand to adjudicate remains as forceful and compelling even in the case of the logical positivist protagonists of the coherence theory, who otherwise vigorously repudiate the idealist conception of reality.

Likewise McTaggart rejects any theory which makes the truth of a belief consist *in a relation to the knowing subject* (*NE*, I, 9). I surmise that the allusion here is to a version of what is called the pragmatic theory of truth. Sometimes it is thought (says McTaggart) that some beliefs are true because they work for us, or because they give us satisfaction, or because they seem self-evident to *us*. None of these characteristics however can truly help in determining the nature of truth, though they, or some of them, may well serve as criteria of truth.[16] There is one exception, though. The only beliefs which are rendered true by their relation to the knowing subject are beliefs about *that* subject. Likewise the only belief which is rendered true by the working for me of a belief *B*, or by its satisfying me or by its being self-evident to me, is the belief that the belief *B* does work for me, or satisfies me, or is self-evident to me (*NE*, I, 9). Before we leave the matter here, a side remark seems called for. It is that in a certain indubitable way the pragmatic theory shares with the correspondence theory the conviction that it is reality or the actual world which is the final arbiter of truth. The difference between the two, however, is—and this is what is of vital importance—that the pragmatic theory makes practical expediency, whether it has limited application or extends over the whole body of experience, the principal characteristic of truth and so conceives reality essentially in subjectivist or relativistic terms. In opposing the theory, therefore, McTaggart has in mind this essential psychologism of its, which naturally finds expression in its notion of truth too.

McTaggart's own view is that what makes a belief true is the relation of correspondence in which that belief stands to a 'fact'. Consequently truth as a characteristic of beliefs is defined by McTaggart as 'a *relation* in which the belief stands, and which is a relation of correspondence to a Fact' (*NE*, I, 10).[17] (My italics) Thus the only thing that makes my assertion (e.g.) that the table in front of me is oblong true, is the *fact* that there is a table in front of me and that it possesses the characteristic of oblongness. The expressions 'relation' and 'correspondence' in the above definition McTaggart leaves undefined, regarding them as indefinable. Even the 'sort' of correspondence that constitutes truth is left undefined, though McTaggart is quick to warn that not all kinds of correspondence will do. It is just that, or a certain, kind of correspondence that matters. He, however, defines fact 'as being either the possession by anything of

a quality, or the connection of anything with anything by a relation' (*NE*, I, 10). The expression 'anything' in the definition includes, says McTaggart, both 'substances' and characteristics. There are, then, besides beliefs, facts, and it is agreement with the latter which alone renders particular beliefs true. (Beliefs themselves are also facts in their own right so that a relation to them *as* facts may make further beliefs such as e.g. 'I have a belief that *p*' true, should the need arise to make this further assertion.) This crucial point is often missed or only partially recognized, and so needs emphasis. Since on any version of the correspondence theory it is agreement with facts (or reality) which gives truth to the beliefs (or statements), the independent and distinct reality of facts, and hence of the *things* about which they are facts, has to be admitted. It deserves pointing out that in thus conceiving the matter, McTaggart's approach is through and through ontological. He is careful not to anchor his distinction between things and facts epistemologically, i.e., as dependent upon what can or cannot be experienced. The distinction, in other words, is not imposed upon the world by the nature of human consciousness. Commitment to truth as correspondence thus may seem to involve commitment to one or another form of realism—the doctrine that the world or objects have an objective existence independently of our experience or knowledge of it (or them). We therefore find the view put forward by Hilary Putnam[18] that the metaphysical realist, or what he designates as the 'externalist' perspective of truth, is mistaken because it represents the God's Eye point of view, in contrast with what he calls the 'internalist' perspective according to which (in his view) the question, *what objects does the world consist of*? is one which it makes sense to ask only within a theory or description, unwarranted because deeply relativistic. It is to be noted that, as applied to statements, the correspondence theory is an account of truth that brings our use of language, especially the making of statements, into harmony with the realist doctrine that we have cognitive access to the mind-independent (or discourse-independent) exterior world.

It would be noted that his approach being not basically language-centred, McTaggart's definition of fact steers clear of the disputable point—a point specially stressed in later times by Strawson[19] in his well-known debate with J.L. Austin[20] on the issue—that facts are invariably wedded to 'that'-clauses, a conclusion which led Strawson at least (as in opposition to Austin's position, that facts are part of the world) to declare facts as 'pseudo-entities' and therefore as not really belonging to the world,

which according to him consisted only of things. ('The world is the totality of things, not of facts.') I may here add, albeit in passing, that even if the assertion of the necessary linkage between facts and 'that'-clauses be a fact (though this too I think can be qualified by pointing out that there can be different sorts of *that*-clauses), it need not follow that facts are therefore redundant entities and so have nothing at all to do with the world. Not only this, it clearly seems possible to show that one can talk about a fact without the actual or even mentally imagined use of a *that*-clause. Thus e.g. one can express 'It is a fact that the table is square' by substituting an equivalent form of words 'This table being square is a fact'. If the table is not square but oval or of some other shape, then either form of expression would be a vacuous designation to which no fact answers. So whether the world in the end consists only of things and not facts, is an issue which is not easily decidable and besides depends upon the standpoint from which we consider it.[21] One thing however stands certain, namely, that no *real* sense can be made of truth-talk without reference to fact-talk.

Lest still some doubt persist as to McTaggart's notion of facts, one may use P.T. Geach's[22] way of explicating it through an idea taken from Frege. Thus we may think of a certain *function* that assumes bodies as 'arguments' and facts about bodies as 'values'. If this function is represented by the letter 'Φ', then e.g. the cup's being on the table will be Φ (the cup, the table) and Alexanders's being on Bucephalus, for example, will be Φ (Alexander, Bucephalus), and so forth. On account of being values of the same function, all these facts will have a common pattern or shape; but this is not a separable entity that 'subsists', the reason being that a function is precisely not dissociable from its arguments and values. In fact, as Geach adds, even if we acknowledge the numbers mentioned in '120 is the factorial of 6' as identifiable entities, we shall not have to recognize the Factorial as a further entity, nor may we feel any temptation to do so.

As regards the relation of correspondence, it may be protested[23] that this relation which is said to hold between true beliefs and facts, which latter make these beliefs true, must also be analyzed further if the correspondence theory is to be saved from the charge of triviality, or even meaninglessness. This however seems to us an unfair demand (even while agreeing that there is no harm in trying). Not all relations admit of analysis in expected ways, and yet it can't be denied that we are quite often able to have an (undeniably) intelligible intuitive grasp of them. This dictum

is in our view as much true of the 'colourless' (correspondence-) relation as it is of 'is true to' or 'is faithful to' or even 'pictures', all of which expressions are supposed by philosophers like Davidson[24] to represent the relation in question in a much more specific and exact manner. Indeed, we note that not only McTaggart but even some other correspondence theorists confess to their inability to delineate the alleged relation beyond merely recognizing it and admitting it. G.E. Moore, for example, writes:

> I confess I don't know how to describe the property which belongs to all truths and *only* to truths: it seems to me to be a property which can be pointed out and seen, but if it can be analysed, I don't know how to analyse it.[25]

Writing in the same vein, he remarks:

> The essential point is to concentrate attention upon the relation *itself*: to hold it before your mind ... If you are not acquainted with this relation in the same sort of way as you are acquainted with the colour vermilion [when you hold it before your mind], no amount of words will serve to explain what it is.[26]

Russell of course tried to spell out the correspondence-relation in terms of what can fairly be called structural correspondence, which meant, among other things, that beliefs and facts exist but only as real things 'related together into individual units'. But this too has failed to satisfy writers like W.E. Johnson who thought that corresponding to a single fact there is, or may be, an indefinite number of distinct propositions. (In fact, we notice, Russell himself later on expressed scepticism as to the successfulness of his theory.) And the problem of negative facts in particular has been thought to threaten the plausibility of Russell's talk of (total) structural correspondence. And as for Wittgenstein, another great contemporary exponent of the correspondence theory (cf. his *Tractatus* (*T*)), he too, from that point of view, fared no better. He too does not go much beyond postulating structural agreement between (his) true propositions and (his) facts by introducing 'logical form' which according to him (true) propositions as 'pictures' (which pictures are according to Wittgenstein themselves facts [cf. *T* 2.141] much like McTaggart's beliefs) share with facts or what they represent—reality. (And this logical or (pictorial) form can, Wittgenstein affirms, be only seen and noticed and not asserted or described.) It is then not a special flaw of McTaggart's account that he is

unable to specify or explicate the exact or full meaning of the correspondence relation. On the other hand, it merits attention that both Wittgenstein[27] and McTaggart subscribe explicitly to the picture theory, though McTaggart accepts the designation only by way of a figure of speech and with due qualifications.

C.D. Broad thinks it 'at best doubtful' whether McTaggart's conception of fact can take care of the fact that there are lions and that there are no dragons.[28] Now if I understand Broad's undoubtedly important point correctly, it seems to me that his scepticism with regard to the appositeness of McTaggart's definition of fact derives from his mistaken notion—which in turn stems from his failure to perceive the relevant McTaggartan doctrine in its true perspective—that the statement that 'There are lions' asserts *only* the existence of (the entities called) lions and does not specify any extra characteristic of theirs which on McTaggart's conception it must if it is to be true or false. (After all one part of McTaggart's idea of Fact has it that a thing about which a certain fact(s) holds must have some further characteristic beyond mere existence.) Broad thus omits to notice the all-too important point that in terms of McTaggart's principles, the (so-called) existential statement 'There are lions' already asserts that there are existents, however indeterminate, which possess, in addition to 'existence', the *additional* (descriptive) characteristic (a universal) of being lions, and would be true if there is a fact answering to it. And if we combine it with another basic principle of McTaggart's metaphysics, namely that whatever exists must have at least one characteristic other than existence which is true of it so that it gets a nature which bare existence cannot give it (cf. *NE*, I, 59), Broad's misgivings turn out to be unfounded. A mere *that* without a *what* would be for McTaggart a complete blank (cf. *NE*, I, ch. 5).

As for Broad's second example, namely the statement 'There are no dragons', McTaggart, I suppose, might give a two-fold reply. Firstly, he would say that the assertion is false since it stands in a *relation* of non-correspondence to all the existent facts. (See below.) His second reply would be that if you grant the principle that a thing can be described without being real, then a description—and here he shares Russell's view (as enunciated in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Ch. 16)—need not have a real referent in the world. What it means, in sum, is that the statement 'There are no dragons' means that the things called dragons are unreal, and would be true only if 'dragons' is read as a description

which describes nothing (*NE*, II, 629). But even if our reply to Broad's criticism, based on our partial reconstruction of McTaggart's doctrine, is found deficient or otherwise untrue to McTaggart's real meaning, I have no doubt in my mind that his definition of 'fact' has few parallels in terms of clarity and even adequacy. That this is so becomes evident when we juxtapose it with that notion's explication, in more or less similar terms, given by some other noted philosophers. Thus Donald Davidson writes:

> Philosophical interest in facts springs partly from their promise for explaining truth. It's clear that most sentences would not have the truth value they do if the world were not the way it is, but *what* in the world makes a sentence true? *Not just the objects to which a sentence refers ..., but rather the doings and havings of relations and properties of those objects; in two words, the facts.*'[29]

It is true that Davidson himself is opposed to fact-talk (cf. his talk of 'correspondence without confrontation'), but he does not hesitate to acknowledge in the above passage that this is how those committed to such a talk conceive of 'facts'.

In a similar vein Wilfrid Sellers observes:

> Facts [are] items of the form something's being thus-and-so or something's standing in a certain relation to something else.[30]

Before them there is Russell speaking the same language:

> The things in the world have various properties, and stand in various relations to each other. That they have these properties and relations are *facts*, and the things and their qualities or relations are quite clearly in some sense or other components of the facts that have those qualities or relations.[31]

And it is undeniable that Wittgenstein too would essentially agree with the above conception of fact.

The context requires us to say a word about McTaggart's view on the ontology of facts. McTaggart subsumes all facts under the category of the existent. They are, however, existent because, and therefore to the extent, the things about which they are facts are existent. ('A fact exists when the thing about which it is a fact is existent.') (*NE*, I, 10). The reality of facts then is, on McTaggart's account, logically derivative. Lest the word 'derivative' look bothersome, it must be clarified that what is meant is

simply that facts, in McTaggart's ontology, are not first in the order of actual existents; that place belongs to substances. However, since substances (or particulars), on McTaggart's conception of them, *must* have qualities and relations, they inevitably will have facts holding about them. Thus even if the world were to consist of things, as some (like Strawson) hold, any minimally adequate descriptive picture of the world would be impossible without a statement of facts about those things. Facts then exist as much as the objects about which they are facts: existence according to McTaggart cannot be a matter of degrees: whatever exists, exists in the full sense of the term, not more or less.

It would be well to mention here in passing that on McTaggart's notion of facts most of the latter-day quarrel over whether there are facts or not would seem to be so much beating about the bush. Specifically, even if we decide to put the matter in sentence terms, à la Tarski, the advantages of the McTaggartan-like view of truth become obvious. Thus the sentence

> 'India got independence from British rule in 1947' corresponds with the facts

is equivalent to the sentence

> It is a fact that India got independence from British rule in 1947,

and this latter is evidently equivalent to

> India got independence from British rule in 1947.

With these equivalences established, we can even have, if we like, the Tarski equivalence also:

> 'India got independence ... in 1947' is true if, and only if, India got independence in 1947.

Note that we have arrived at this equivalence by employing the notions of 'correspondence' and 'facts'. Fact-talk therefore is not just sham or otherwise dispensable. Indeed, some of the opposition to facts seems historically to have derived from the doctrine (which McTaggart for one rejected) at one time held by some of McTaggart's contemporaries at Cambridge and perhaps even elsewhere, that a fact has parts (the Cambridge expression was 'constituent') corresponding to the syntactical parts of the relevant sentence. But it is one thing to oppose a certain way of conceiving facts (or some of their further features) and quite another to dismiss them as needless encumbrances. And the same holds for

correspondence. Indeed, it is significant that, whatever be the philosophical fall-out of his approach, Tarski himself thought of his semantic theory as a sort of vindication of the correspondence theory and further felt that a formal definition of truth (like the one he attempted) should not be false to our pre-theoretical intuitions about what it means for a sentence to be true. It is our view that these basic intuitions (which incidentally we find preserved in Aristotle's famous formulation of it, which too Tarski heartily endorsed) which inform the (classical) correspondence theory are right in the main, one of them surely being that it is *something in the world* which makes a belief (or a proposition, sentence etc.) true or false. Hence it is that when someone like Strawson says, 'Of course, statements and facts fit. They were made for each other. If you prize the statements off the world you prize the facts off it too; *but the world would be none the poorer*'[32], one feels like replying that if statements (our beliefs) are to go, it is the *truth* which will go with them, not facts, which, if they exist, were or will always be there. Much the same thing can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, with regard to (e.g.) Davidson's objections to facts. While to say, as he does, that '(t)he definition of truth in terms of [Tarski's] satisfaction deserves to be called a correspondence theory because of the part played by satisfaction'[33] is unexceptionable, Davidson fails to show that this satisfaction in terms of 'facts' cannot deliver the goods. If a fact means, *this is how things are*, and if this is what a sentence means to say (as Davidson too would agree), then it is not understood how can fact-talk be really avoided in the context of the correspondence theory, specially when Davidson himself feels that the notion of satisfaction succeeds in explaining 'the property of being true' 'in terms of a relation between language and *something else.*' Surely, this 'something else' cannot but mean objects with certain characteristics, and if so, facts in the sense noted above do willy-nilly enter into the picture.[34] To sum up, the correspondence theory preserves intact both the *about*ness of a belief or statement and the *objectivity* of truth, which no other theory of truth is as competently able to take care of. (By objectivity what we here mean is that any (belief-) statement with a truth-claim can, in principle, be intelligibly and properly expressed as points of view held by subjects of experience(s) other than oneself without necessarily ceasing to refer to the same fact or state of affairs. This remains the case whether it is the external things or personal experiences, to which latter a certain privacy is supposed to attach, which are being talked about.) Hostility to this theory sometimes stems from its

apparently unsophisticated simplicity. Another reason responsible for opposition to the correspondence theory is the widespread but erroneous notion that a viable theory of truth should also provide for a criterion of true belief, of well-founded rational belief. But this too is to conflate two clearly separate issues.

NON-EXISTENT (OR NEGATIVE) FACTS

The issue of negative facts has always been something of a puzzle for philosophers, Plato not excepted (cf. his *Sophist*, esp. 236E ff.; also *Theaetatus* 189A). Part of the puzzle originates from the fact that the problem has many ramifications which quite often are relative to the vantage-points from which the philosophers dealing with it view it. Though no one normally denies that we do, in common discourse, often talk about various species of non-existent or fictional things, opinions begin to sharply diverge when the basic ontological question, whether or not negative facts or facts about non-existent objects actually exist, is raised in right earnest. In what follows I shall limit myself just to indicating briefly McTaggart's special view in the matter, which though perhaps closer to someone like Wittgenstein's, differs fundamentally from the position adopted, for instance, by Bertrand Russell, Gustav Bergmann and others. To the question whether there are facts about things non-existent, McTaggart of course replies in the clear negative: such 'facts' are for him one great ontological misconception. But before we outline his position in some of its key specifics, it would be helpful to begin by a brief allusion to Russell's thought on the issue.

If the belief that all the facts the world is made up of *can* be divided into two segments, the positive facts and the negative facts, neither of which by itself exhausts the totality of them, is what makes you an upholder of negative facts, then Russell turns out to be one such thinker. At a certain period of his philosophical career, Russell held the doctrine (cf. his 'Philosophy of Logical Atomism') that there were negative facts alongside the positive ones, both of which obtained whether there is a mind to know them or not. Thus Russell would typically say that if it is true that Johnson is not a dog, then there is a fact (or state of affairs) in the world that makes it true, namely, Johnson's not being a dog. But let us take Russell's own example. He observes:

> I have assumed in all that I have said hitherto that there are negative facts, that for example if you say 'Socrates is alive', there is corresponding to that proposition in the real world the fact that Socrates is not alive.[35]

And further:

> I think you will find that it is simpler to take negative facts *as facts*, to assume that 'Socrates is not alive' is really an objective fact in the *same sense* in which 'Socrates is human' is a fact.[36]

It should be clear from these passages that Russell thought of the world as comprised both of positive facts and negative facts.[37] Now, at the very first sight this proposition seems quite dubious if only for the reason that a negative fact is not something which can be said to exist in the same sense as a positive fact, or, say, a fact simply. Part of Russell's argument in their favour is that negative facts are needed to make non-negative propositions false, and negative propositions true. As is well-known, Russell's logical atomism is grounded in his basic conviction that a logically ideal language, by exhibiting the logical form of a natural language's sentences, can beget a correct ontology. And since the atomic sentences of such an ideal language can both be true and false, Russell feels the need to posit negative facts *in addition* to positive facts, which can render (false) atomic sentences false. After all falsity too, Russell seems to think, can (and ought to) be accounted for, like truth, only in terms of 'correspondence', there being in his view no such thing as 'failure' of correspondence. The false proposition that Socrates is alive cannot be made false unless we allow for the (existence of the) negative fact that Socrates is not alive. Likewise the true proposition that Socrates is not alive cannot be made true unless, again, we allow for this very negative fact. However, this consideration McTaggart for one would reject as untenable: the fact that Socrates is dead would in his view perform both the tasks without appearing to be negative. Not only this. False atomic sentences, McTaggart would contend, can be rendered false by their non-correspondence to all the (so-called) positive facts so that there is no need to posit negative facts. And needless to say, elimination of negative facts, if successful, would leave Russell with all of his false atomic sentences expressing the same thing, i.e. *nothing*. The source of Russell's error is perhaps to be found in his doctrines of the period—where the possible influence of

Frege seems clear—according to which a proposition is a 'name', leading thus to the view that a true negative proposition states or 'names' an existent negative fact. The negative fact exists because the negative proposition itself exists, just as the bearer of a name is supposed to exist in virtue of the fact that it is named. There is another implication of such a view, namely that 'not' is a name, and that among the logical objects which (or if they) exist and which can be named, there is the one signified by 'not'. But however it may be, philosophers have not taken kindly to Russell's contentions in the matter. One consideration which fuelled scepticism about the reality of negative facts has been that, as R. Demos puts it, 'negative facts are nowhere to be met with in experience': all our experience, it is argued, is of positive facts, and so all our knowledge of 'negative facts' has its actual source in the former alone. Therefore Demos goes on to caution us against taking a negative proposition 'at its face value', which appears to assert a fact in the same fashion as a positive proposition.

> Granting that there are no negative facts, then, in so far as a negative proposition is asserted of fact at all, the term of reference must be the world of *positive facts*.[38]

Demos has further important things to say, and it would be well to have a brief pause and reflect over them. As a part of his somewhat elaborate exercise, Demos goes on to provide an account of negative facts and propositions with a view to show why postulation of the existence of negative facts is wholly uncalled for. He mentions that any negation of a proposition (expressed through 'not') is a negation of its total content and not just an individual part of it. Thus if I want to negate the proposition 'All Hindus are vegetarians', I should say or write 'not (All Hindus are vegetarians)', rather than 'All Hindus are not vegetarians'. The right formula for negation therefore is: –(---).[39] This demonstrates beyond doubt that the 'content' of a negative proposition apart from '–' sign is positive. Demos then gets ready to define the process of negation. He points out that the change that occurs in a positive proposition p when it is negated is that there is a 'relational modification' of p so that the resultant proposition, $-p$, means 'opposite of' or 'contrary to' p.[40] Opposition seems to Demos to be an 'epistemologically primitive' notion, which he defines in the same way as some may define 'contrariety', namely as stating that two propositions opposed to each other (in content) cannot both be true or at

least one of them is false. (It needs mentioning that for Demos 'inconsistent' is also a right equivalent of 'opposite'.)

The conclusive stage of Demos' argument consists in his setting up an analogy between negative propositions and 'descriptions' as they are treated by Russell. Like a description mentioning an object without naming it (so that the object is not a constituent of the proposition), the negative proposition mentions a positive fact without explicitly naming it. And because there may be several propositions which do not chime with a given negative proposition, we can call the latter an *ambiguous* description, that is, as a proposition containing a phrase of the form: *a* so-and-so.[41] A negative proposition then gets defined thus:

> As such, a negative proposition constitutes a description of some true positive proposition in terms of the relation of opposition which the latter sustains to some other positive proposition.[42]

Therefore,

> Negative *knowledge* may be defined as knowledge of a true positive proposition by description in terms of its opposition to some other proposition.[43]

Negative propositions are thus viewed, like descriptions, as 'incomplete symbols' and so meaningless (in their apparent form) unless further supplemented. They also do not name an object, viz. a negative fact, just as descriptions do not name them (objects).

Apart from this there is another reason put forward by the opponents, namely that partitioning of facts into positive and negative ones is a counterfeit exercise, being only an artefact of natural language. So, much in the vein of McTaggart's solution, some recent writers have concluded that for Russell there was really no need to postulate the relation of 'counter-correspondence' (instead of non-correspondence) and hence no need to postulate negative facts as its other 'factual' term or relatum. In their view the (false) atomic sentences can easily and economically be made false by just a failure of correspondence.

As a last point, it is to be marked that a different source of Russell's above false move was perhaps that the logical atomist in him was reluctant to accept the existence of states of affairs which are *not* facts. But as we know from (e.g.) Wittgenstein's example, the one does not necessarily follow from the other. The Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* was perfectly willing

to adopt states of affairs without entertaining the existence of negative facts; in fact, he did positively reject the latter (*T* 2.04, 2.05, 2.06). To be sure, he sometimes does equate states of affairs with facts (cf. *T* 2), but he scarcely subscribes to the doctrine that there can be facts about non-existent states of affairs. If, as he says, it is the objects which make up the *substance* of the world, and if further, it is objects—by which (I take it) he means also properties and relations—which enter into a state of affairs like the 'links of a chain' (*T* 2.03), then it is clear that in his view there cannot be negative facts, the (positive) facts about existent things being enough to render (false) propositions false. Our conclusion, then, is that even if we accept the assumptions peculiar to the doctrine of logical atomism, the need for accepting negative facts does not prove to be compelling enough.

Let us now briefly turn to Bergmann, who too, as we mentioned, entertains the notion of non-actual or possible facts or states of affairs. Maintaining that every mental 'act' has two non-relational properties, namely a 'species'[44] (by which he means that which makes the act the kind of intentional act it is—e.g. a believing, a doubting, a perceiving, a fearing, etc.) and 'thought'[45] (by which he means something that [in our terminology] is believed, etc.), he says that one thought represents one fact. A true thought represents a fact; a false thought represents a 'possible' fact—the implication being that in addition to the existent states of affairs there *are* also the possible ones, like there are, say, square tables and oblong tables. Thus one of the relata of the connection can for Bergmann be, besides thought, a non-actual or non-occurrent (or merely possible) fact or state of affairs.[46] Even such a thing as Cantaur, according to him, represents a possible character. And a possibility for Begmann is a mode of existence.[47] Now this I think is a highly disputable move. For, even if it be allowed that 'mode of existence'-talk is perfectly all right, it passes comprehension how non-actual things or characters, even if possible in a certain unambiguous sense of 'possibility', can pass as existents like really existent things so that they become capable of making false sentences true. Secondly, even when admitting possibility-talk as legitimate, we have to distinguish between two things. One concerns the non-existent objects or characteristics about which an actual question of existence admits of being raised. A statement intending a fact or state of affairs called 'the table being oval', if false because the table is actually square, does not imply the absolute impossibility of the question whether it is

possible for a table or even the same table to be oval. On the other hand there are or can be non-existents about whom an actual question of existence cannot simply be asked. One here thinks of contradictories such as 'square circles' or 'Centaurs'. When one tries to combine in thought the property of squareness and the property of circularity, one finds their coinherence in a thing as unthinkable; the possibility of such a thing is ruled out from the first. Inevitably in such a situation, the 'mode of existence'-talk as understood by Bergmann begins to look greatly suspect.

McTaggart on the other hand refuses to concede possibilities any modality of existence apart from that of the actuals. Possibilities cannot exist as entities distinct from or independent of the actual world, or independently of their actualization. As already remarked, with McTaggart the domain of reality is coincident with the domain of existence. Consequently possibilities do not have a separate realm to inhabit such that they can be assumed to be real without existing. Whatever facts there are, are about the existent or the world of existent objects. McTaggart therefore ranks among those philosophers who have a bias in favour of the 'actual'. (This bias goes as far back as the tradition of 'priority of being' associated with Parmenides as in contrast with those philosophers, Heracleitean or Gnostic, who attribute to non-Being too an equal status.) Not that one cannot at all meaningfully talk of possibilities, but such possibilities, according to McTaggart, have to be rooted in actuality, i.e., as implicit in or implied by the actual existent. If a red triangle, for example, is possible it would be because a triangular shape does *not* imply the absence of redness. Similarly, whether or not Centaur represents a possible character would depend upon whether or not such a character is implied by any of the characteristics of the objects or the objects themselves which make up the actual world. Such facts about which characteristics are or are not implied by others have, very much like the characteristics involved in the facts, their determination only in the existential order. The world does not consist of two existential compartments, one that of the actual, and another that of the non-actual. There is no place in McTaggart for non-existent facts or states of affairs (*NE*, I, 23). It is only an actual fact which makes the belief about its possibility true. The truth of a belief does not depend upon the possible existence of that about which it is a belief. This much seems to be acknowledged also by Wittgenstein when he says that it is the totality of facts which determines what is the case, *and also whatever is not the case*' (*T* 1.12). (My italics) In fact he seems to echo

McTaggart's thesis—namely that facts exist because the things about which they are facts are existent—when he says that 'What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs' (*T* 2).

These important insights enable us to see another flaw in Bergmann's view of possibility when seen specially (i) as a 'mode' of existence, and (ii) as characterizing a fact. Needless to say, though they are very closely related, 'existence' and 'fact' are also different notions. It is facts which hold about things, not things about facts—assuming, that is, that logically there are facts apart from things. As McTaggart rightly points out, possibilities as such are not independent kinds of entity, but are by definition (a) unrealized, though realizable, and (b) realizable only if the nature of reality is such that it does not in principle preclude their occurrence. 'Possible facts' are by definition non-actual facts and so cannot determine the truth or falsity of a statement, whether it be 'There are Centaurs' or 'There are square circles.' Their notion is in fact worse than the notion of negative facts as they are conceived by the philosophers swearing by them. Second, if facts cannot but be about things, as even some sponsors of the view that they are wedded to *that*-clauses would agree, then, while the expression 'possible object' seems to make perfect sense, the expression 'possible fact' *as* understood by Bergmann appears devoid of sense. Our conclusion then is that possibility-talk, even if philosophically permissible and perhaps significant, can scarcely make effective a discourse centred specially on facts as we have understood them. Another important point that strikes one in the present context is, briefly, this. While on the one hand, the notion of existence (and hence an existent thing or fact) is logically inconceivable without possibility of existence, on the other hand—and this is of greater relevance here—no idea of possibility of existence (or a possible thing or character or fact) admits of comprehension without some prior intimation, on our part, of existence, however indefinable or indescribable the term 'existence' may in itself be. Indeed, we find Bergmann himself remarking that 'Possible entities cannot exemplify anything, either property or relation; otherwise they would not be mere possibilities.'[48] But if it is so, and if, as Bergmann himself further maintains, 'a particular exemplifying [not possibly, but actually] a universal is a fact, not a thing',[49] one wonders how Bergmann can talk in the same breath either of possibilities, or, more specially, of possible (and therefore non-existent) facts.

THE 'CORRESPONDENCE' RELATION: SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS

The correspondence-relation, of which we have spoken above, always takes (according to McTaggart) a belief and a fact as its relata. (In the case of false beliefs, the 'fact' to which the concerned belief is supposed to refer, is simply missing from the world. But to this subject we shall return later.) Naturally, then, truth (as a relation of correspondence) cannot be conceived independently of beliefs (*NE*, I, 16). And although it is not a sufficient condition, it is certainly a necessary one. This McTaggart tries to show by the following example.

> Take the case of a man who was selfish without his selfishness being suspected or contemplated either by himself or any other person. Then there would not be a real truth 'X is selfish', but there would be the real fact of X's selfishness. (*NE*, I, 16)

And he concludes:

> Our theory does not assert that the belief in anything is sufficient to make it true. It does assert that nothing is true unless it is believed, but there is nothing untenable in this when it is realized that besides being believed, it must correspond to a fact. (*NE*, I, 16)

In conceiving truth as a *relation* that links beliefs rather than as a *quality* which characterizes them or which they possess, McTaggart, even while viewing the matter as one of convenience, believes that a case can be made for choosing to call truth a relation. It is true that it is beliefs which are true or false. A moment's reflection however shows, says McTaggart's view, that the property of being true a belief derives from the fact of its standing in the relation. It does not stand in the relation because it has the quality. It is the relation which is logically prior, not otherwise. A belief's quality is, strictly, the quality of being a term in the relation. Consequently it is the relation which is fundamentally important and so has in McTaggart's view the natural right to bear the name of truth, specially when we find that we have no other name for the kind of correspondence that obtains between a belief and a fact (*NE*, I, 11).

It will be noticed that in the case of any true belief, if we are acquainted with its contents we find it sufficient to say that the belief (as one of the terms) stands in this relation to something. What this other term is we do not have to specify, for we know already what it is if we know what that belief is *about*. Thus the belief that the chair over there is brown can be

true only by being in correspondence to one thing—the brownness of the chair. It would be altogether unnecessary to say that the belief that the chair in question is brown is true of the brownness of the chair. McTaggart admits that this contingency may make the fact that truth is a relation less obvious; for in respect of any given true belief mention of one term, i.e. the other term of the relation, becomes superfluous. It does not, however, according to him, alter or undermine the fact that the relation is real.

It is interesting, perhaps even illuminating, to note that McTaggart allows his theory of truth to be called, 'with some appropriateness,' the picture theory of truth. He adds, however, with due cautionary note, that this can only be by way of a metaphor. He also further cautions, to forestall any misunderstanding on the issue, against confusing the picture theory with the so-called copy theory of truth. He admits that resemblance between two things on which the copy theory rests is a kind of correspondence. He however points out that not all correspondence is resemblance, least of all the kind of correspondence which (in his opinion) constitutes truth. This latter in fact does not even involve resemblance. Again, he explicitly admits that the copy theory, to the extent it conceives the truth of a belief as consisting in its relation to a fact and to the extent it thinks that relation to be one of correspondence, is closer, as compared with many others, to his version of correspondence theory. He, however, regards the copy theory as flawed in so far as it holds that the relation of correspondence involved is (basically) resemblance. Consequently he thinks it preferable and also more apposite to call his theory the picture theory of truth. A picture, though it gives information about the object pictured, does not do so by being an exact copy of the object. It may, for instance, represent, on a two-dimensional surface, a couple of figures of different sizes. But through this very way of representing it may quite tell us that the objects pictured are in fact a few three-dimensional animal bodies, of roughly equal size, standing at some distance from each other in a certain direction.

Among some of the similarities between the correspondence theory and the picture theory the following important one may here be serviceably mentioned. Truth of a picture is, in a significant sense, relational: we can decide whether a picture is or is not true only by knowing the other term of the relation, namely the object which the picture represents or seeks to represent. Relation of a picture is, therefore, in McTaggart's view, as good a metaphor for the relation of truth as can be found, even though, as he

admits, it does not exactly provide an *explanation* of the latter. He therefore warns against supposing that his theory can fully be explained (or understood) by just calling it a picture theory.

Here again McTaggart invites comparison with Wittgenstein whose picture theory of language (or shall we say, of truth, for in the right Wittgensteinian sense 'picturing' is a relation between a true sentence and a 'subsistent' state of affairs) bears close resemblance to McTaggart's view of the picture theory. Wittgenstein too, as already remarked, is a proponent of the correspondence theory. A picture is, in his view, like a sentence or a thought which is either correct or incorrect, true or false according as whether it 'agrees with reality or fails to agree' (*T* 2.21). As he further on remarks: 'In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality' (*T* 2.223), for 'it is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false' (*T* 2.224). Thus Wittgenstein too seems to hold that truth (and falsity) must be ontologically grounded. Unlike Frege, Wittgenstein does not distinguish between a proposition's (or thought's) sense and reference. A proposition's sense is the world to which it refers (or claims to refer). Facts therefore belong to the realm of reference, which is all that is the world. In fact (as hinted above) Wittgenstein goes on to postulate (something which he shares with Russell) complete isomorphism—for they both must have the same logical form—between the elements of a proposition (or a picture) and the objects of the world (which include properties and relations) (*T* 2.161; 4.022). Indeed, one suspects that Wittgenstein's picture theory represents a stronger version than McTaggart would like to allow his picture theory to be taken as. With Wittgenstein a feature of a sentence, say a predicate, can signify only a feature of the situation depicted, since everything that signifies can do so only by belonging to the same logical type as what it signifies. The coherence theory, on Wittgenstein's account, could be true only if there were no world or it had no substance, for it was only then that the sense of a proposition would depend on whether another proposition was true (*T* 2.0211).

FALSITY AND 'REFERENCE'

We must now turn our attention to a question which we have until now deferred, but without dealing with which no treatment of the problem of truth can be regarded as complete. This question relates to false beliefs.

In what precisely does the falsity of a (false) belief consist? But there is also a second question: can McTaggart's account, which does away with propositions, enable us to make sense of the statement that two persons had false beliefs in the *same thing*. For, needless to mention, as far as the proposition theorists are concerned, it would simply be a case of the same false proposition being entertained by two persons. We shall take up these questions in turn and in the process see that McTaggart's account of both of them turns, apart from the ontology, upon a certain assumption of his about the psychology of beliefs.

McTaggart has said that the truth of a belief does not consist in its coherence, or completeness or systematic nature, or in the fact that it works for me, etc. But neither does the falsity of a belief, in his view, consist in the absence of any of these. The absence of any of these may serve as a criterion of falsity; it cannot however constitute falsity.

Some people may toy with the idea of false facts and suggest that false beliefs (or false propositions) are beliefs (or propositions) which agree with false facts. (Bergmann, for instance, throws up this suggestion.) McTaggart would reject such an idea out of hand. Whether or not there are non-existent facts besides the existent ones, there cannot be, he will assert, false facts. Facts rather make beliefs true or false. Falsity, therefore, in McTaggart's view, must also, like truth, have a relation to facts (or reality). Like truth, falsity also has to be ontologically grounded. And since, as we have already seen, McTaggart rejects the idea of non-existent reality, falsity too on his view cannot but bear relation to the existent alone. It cannot of course be a relation of correspondence, for that would make the belief true. The falsity of a false belief derives, says McTaggart, from its relation of *non-correspondence* to *all* the existent facts (*NE*, I, 19). 'What makes a belief false is just that there is no fact anywhere to which it corresponds' (*NE*, I, 19). If I say 'The earth is flat', this is false because there is nothing which possesses both the property of being earth and the property of being flat at the same time. If I say 'The present Pope is a Hindu', this is false because there is nothing which while possessing the property of being a present Pope, possesses also the property of being a Hindu. The falsity of the above statements is determined not by their correspondence to any non-existent or negative facts but by their non-correspondence to the totality of existent facts—which from a certain point of view is all that holds true about reality.

This doctrine of McTaggart's can I think be further made perspicuous by considering an example borrowed from Russell. (We here use only Russell's example and avoid consideration of Russell's own typical views in the matter.) Russell says: 'The difference between a true and false belief is like that between a wife and a spinster.'[50] To be married is to stand in a relation of *being married* to someone, even when this 'someone' about whom a genuine query could otherwise arise, is not specified. The same however does not hold when we say 'Sheela is not married'. Here the question of 'someone' to whom Sheela is not married simply does not arise: the 'someone' is here not specifiable on further questioning which it is at least in principle, when we say 'Sheela is married'. In saying 'Sheela is unmarried', what is being asserted is that Sheela *fails* to stand in a relation of 'being married' to anyone; or, to put it more picturesquely, that Sheela stands in a relation of *not being married* (or *being unmarried*) to the totality of existing men, not not being married to *someone*. Likewise, a false belief in McTaggart stands in a relation of non-correspondence to all the actual facts, not to *some one* fact. The desperate view that 'A Correspondence Theory of Falsehood is more difficult to come by than a Correspondence Theory of Truth',[51] to which some writers feel driven, loses much of its force in the light of McTaggart's portrayal of false beliefs and their relation to the world.

It may be objected that it is an indisputable fact about *every* belief, true or false, that it *refers* to one or the other object, and that McTaggart's account of false belief, in so far as it rests on the postulation of their 'non-correspondence' (to the *existent facts*), is unfair to this fact, and so unsatisfactory. McTaggart is alive to this common supposition about (the character of) beliefs and the difficulties to which, in the opinion of its adherents, it is said to give rise if not properly accommodated, but feels certain that an explanation is available whereby it is possible adequately to take care of it and the alleged attendant difficulties. To this end he proceeds to invite our attention to two basic truths about beliefs, distinction between which, he says, is often neglected and so leads to misconceptions. The first of these pertains to what we may justly called the psychology of beliefs. Every belief, McTaggart says, 'professes' to refer to some object or fact and specifically to correspond to it in a *certain* way (*NE*, I, 20). But this, he adds, 'only means that every belief *professes* to be true, or, in other words, that to believe anything means to believe it to be true' (*NE*, I, 20). (My italics) McTaggart's meaning here plainly is that every

belief has a *truth-claim* built into its notion. What is believed is always *taken* or *presumed* to be true. To paraphrase the same in our own language, the question of truth (and falsehood) arises only in the context of actual (or possible) beliefs or assertions (which surely being expressible in language are inter-subjective and hence public), that is, in the context of truth-claims which are necessarily written into the notion of belief. The consequence of this is there for all to see: namely that the nature of truth is not susceptible of elucidation without taking into account the fact of the truth-claims. Thus my belief that p is, as it were, the belief that p is true. Notice the importance which here attaches to 'as it were'. To explicate, although beliefs are true or false, a belief as a representational state, considered just in itself, affords no distinction between truth and putative (or presumed) truth. To express the same figuratively, beliefs do not wear truth 'on their sleeves'. A belief says only, to express it in the Wittgensteinian way: 'This is how things stand' (cf. *T* 4.022). This claim (or presumption) may turn out to be false, but this does not alter the fact that the claim *is* made. And this is of great moment as a psychological fact about beliefs. But while all beliefs profess to refer to some object and so also to be true, it is only true beliefs which actually succeed in doing what they profess to (*NE*, I, 20).[52] In the case of false beliefs there is no such thing in the world as that to which they profess to refer, and so their 'profession' of reference comes to grief. But whatever be the ultimate fate of a belief, the said profession remains there as a necessary element in every belief *qua* belief. Without it a belief is not, though in itself it does not guarantee the truth of a belief. Indeed, as McTaggart would like to put it, were there not this putative truthfulness of all belief, we would land in absolute scepticism. *A belief cannot start with doubt about itself.*

The second important fact about beliefs is that every belief *actually* has, and not merely professes to have, a certain *relation* (of which we have already spoken above) to an actual (and not merely presumed) fact which determines its truth or falsity. And it scarcely needs saying, that in the case of true beliefs the relation is one of correspondence, while in the case of false beliefs the relation is one of non-correspondence. The relation however stands and cannot be wished away. These two truths about beliefs: their *professing to refer* to some fact(s) and their *actually* having a *relation* to some fact(s), are, says McTaggart, very often confounded and untenable conclusions drawn from them.

> The mistake arises from confusing the relation, which every belief *really* has, with the reference, which every belief *professes* to have, but which false beliefs have not. (*NE*, I, 20) (My italics)

In the case of true beliefs, the profession to refer and hence the claim to truth gets vindicated, while in the case of false beliefs the said profession meets with failure, for there is in reality nothing for them to refer to. McTaggart thus refuses to treat reference as a (sort of) relation, which conflation has often landed philosophers in insuperable difficulties. Reference in the context of belief is always putative,[53] while the relation, whether of correspondence or of non-correspondence, is always real. Relation, again, can only follow in the wake of a presumed reference, failure or success of this reference determining the type of relation which a belief will have to fact(s). Even when it comes to ascribing truth or falsity to beliefs or statements, we find it can be done in exactly parallel ways. But it would be an error to think that they—truth and falsity—are therefore equal in power or effect: 'true' signifies a correspondence between what we assert and the relevant fact(s), while 'false' signifies that what a false belief asserts does not correspond with any of the facts and is discordant with (some) truth regarding them. Falsity thus is, so to speak, presumed truth failed.

Now this doctrine has been stringently criticized by C.D. Broad, and I must make a mention of a couple of his significant observations. Broad thinks that McTaggart's view that every belief professes to correspond to a certain fact is a plainly metaphorical statement and makes no literal sense. 'Beliefs do not literally "profess" to do anything; it is only persons who can make professions.'[54] Now this criticism completely ignores the real spirit of McTaggart's view. What literal meaning, one would rejoin, can be attached to the oft-heard statement that language is communicative? For literally, and firstly, it is human beings who communicate and not language. So any adverse judgement which applies to the above view of McTaggart's must apply to this view about language too. And that would be a quite vain criticism in itself. But I think there is a direct way of answering Broad's protest. Beliefs are subjective events and are held by knowing subjects. If so, one can perfectly legitimately talk of 'beliefs professing to ...' even literally, for the statement is perfectly and without any loss of meaning translatable into the statement 'Those holding a certain belief presume their belief to.'

The second point of Broad's animadversion appears to be more weighty, though this too is in my view finally mistaken. McTaggart's statement, according to Broad, amounts to saying that anyone who believes, for example, that *S* is characterized by *P ipso facto* believes with regard to this belief that it corresponds to a fact. And this, says Broad, is 'quite certainly false'; it is false because it involves, Broad says, a vicious infinite regress. 'It would be impossible to believe *p* without *ipso facto* having a belief about one's belief in *p*. On exactly the same principle one would *ipso facto* have a belief about one's belief about one's belief in *p*; and so on without end.'[55]

Now this criticism clearly misses the mark. To illustrate, when I express a belief of mine by saying that the earth is flat, what exactly transpires? Nothing more than this perhaps: I believe that there is a thing called earth and that it possesses the property of being flat. It would be noticed that the words 'I believe that' prefixed to the original assertion do not represent a second belief about my first belief. At the most it is an explicit articulation of what is without doubt already implicit and also understood and *felt* that way. In saying, with or without 'I believe', 'the earth is flat', I make—or what is the same, my belief or assertion makes—a truth-claim. So in saying that all beliefs profess to refer to some fact, McTaggart means to say that all beliefs profess or claim to be true. In other words, there is an inbuilt truth-claim to a belief, which it would be foolhardy to treat as something *superadded* to it so that one has to say 'My belief that my belief ... etc.' And of course a truth-claim, however immanent in the act of believing, is not enough to make a belief true: that task clearly belongs to facts. But this McTaggart himself holds and takes great pains to explicate and emphasize. Broad's criticism is therefore unfounded and rests on his wholly false notion of what beliefs do or do not purport to say.

Indeed, the overall tidiness and elegance of McTaggart's understanding of the nature of belief is thrown into bolder relief when it is compared with the views of some other noted correspondence theorists of his time. By way of an example, I give below G.E. Moore's perception of the matter.

> To say that a belief is true is to say that the *fact to which it refers is* or has being; while to say that a belief is false is to say that the fact to which it refers is not—that there is no such fact. Or to put it another

> way, we might say: Every belief has the property of *referring to* some particular fact, every different belief to a different fact; and *the* property which a belief has, when it is true—*the* property which we name when we call it true, is the property which can be expressed by saying that *the* fact to which it refers *is*.[56]

It would be observed that while Moore is quite clear about what it means when we call a belief true—in fact he explicitly calls truth a relation (of correspondence) between belief and fact—he betrays lack of direction on the question of (the nature of) belief. (I am, however, far from suggesting that the question of truth cannot be discussed without a full analysis of the nature of belief, and here I am in agreement with Moore.) To say that every belief refers to a particular fact and that a false belief even while actually referring, as belief, to a particular fact, fails to find that fact is a plain contradiction. One can talk of failure properly only in those cases where there is a claim or an effort. If the 'fact' to which a belief refers turns out to be non-existent, as it does in the case of false beliefs, what is it to which the belief refers?; and refer it must on Moore's conception. To express the same a little differently, how can something to which a belief, *qua* belief, refers, be called a fact if it actually is a non-fact as is the case in the case of false beliefs. In fact it would seem that Moore's doctrine cannot be made consistent unless one allows for negative facts. It is to be noted that nowhere in the essay under consideration does Moore maintain that the non-existence of the fact to which a belief refers, deprives the belief of its belief-character; for on his terms it only renders the belief false. The belief that there are dragons does not cease to be a belief just because the 'fact' to which it refers is absent from the world.

This is not all. The difficulty gets further compounded when we find Moore conceiving 'reference' as a kind of relation. To quote him: 'Obviously this expression "referring to" stands for some relation which each true belief has to one fact and to one only; and which each false belief has to no fact at all.'[57] Without going into the question whether it is right to call 'reference' a relation, we may ask, firstly, if both true and false beliefs have a relation to a particular fact, and if, as Moore himself explicitly says, the relation in the case of a true belief is one of correspondence (to the fact to which it refers), what name could be given to the relation which a false belief has (to the fact to which it refers)? Secondly, if in Moore's view a false belief also must have a relation, what would be the

other term of this relation?; for, going by Moore's own words, the other term—the 'fact' to which the false belief stands in a relation—is missing from the world. Shall we then conclude that false beliefs have no relation at all to facts to which they refer? But in that case they will also cease to refer and therefore cease to be beliefs. Which means we will either have only true beliefs or no beliefs at all. And both are hard options.

To continue with the first point raised above, I am aware that Moore cannot be meaning that the relation which a true belief has to the fact to which it refers is the *same* which a false belief, even while referring to a 'fact' has to no fact at all. For Moore after all does have in mind something like the relation of non-correspondence as characteristic of false beliefs when he says: 'The property which we have identified with its [a belief's] falsehood is merely that of not corresponding to any fact.'[58] Carefully studied, this statement seems without doubt more promising; it is however hard to reconcile with Moore's previous view according to which the relation meant by 'referring to' in respect of false beliefs is one which a false belief '*has to no fact at all.*' (My italics) I say 'hard to reconcile', for, were this latter view to prevail, we should have the absurd consequence of a (false) belief having a relation of non-correspondence to a no-fact! Not only that, if two negatives cancel each other, we shall have a false belief having a correspondence-relation with a fact, and this contingency would make that belief true. Moore thus gets into a hopeless muddle from which no exit seems available.

There is a further aspect to the story. This may be put thus: If, as Moore holds, reference is a kind of relation, does not the whole proposition come down to this: that a false belief, since it has no such relation to any fact—'and which [relation] each false belief has to no fact at all'—has *no* real reference also? There is as such no harm in this; but, judged on Moore's terms, this fact would deprive (as already indicated) a belief of its status as belief. Furthermore, if reference were to be construed as a relation, then both true and false beliefs, since they both have reference to facts, would have the same type of relation to them; and assuming that this relation is correspondence, they will *both* either correspond to facts or not correspond to facts. The only alternative to this would be to say either (i) that there are existent facts and non-existent facts, or (ii) that there are true facts and false facts, or (iii) that there is a correct or successful reference and an incorrect or unsuccessful reference. To apply them one-by-one one will have to say that while reference to a fact is an inherent characteristic

of every belief, a true belief refers to an existent fact and a false belief to a non-existent fact; a true belief refers to a true fact and a false belief refers to a false fact; and lastly, in the case of true belief, the reference (to the particular fact) is correct or successful and in the case of false belief, the reference (to a particular fact) is incorrect or unsuccessful!

Let us now turn to the other question, namely, what sense can be made, if sense can be made at all on McTaggart's notion of belief, of the statement that two persons or the same person on different occasions had false beliefs in the same thing. To the advocates of the proposition theory the question does not pose much of a problem. If Ram and Krishna both believe that India won freedom from British rule in the year 1945 (and not in the year 1947 which in fact was the case) they would both be said to believe in the same false proposition and so be regarded as having the same false belief. To McTaggart however this would be unacceptable, not only because he rejects the reality of propositions but also because such a statement, though quite commonplace, would, in his opinion, strictly be erroneous for, as he says, 'two people cannot have the same belief, since a belief is a psychical fact which cannot be in two minds' (*NE*, I, 21). He therefore proceeds to offer his own account of the phrase 'in the same thing', which he thinks is consistent with his own special doctrines, for as he himself expressly recognizes, the phrase is not absolute nonsense. In his opinion two beliefs are beliefs in the same thing because, assuming that they are true, they both correspond to the same fact. The explanation cannot, however, hold in respect of false beliefs, for there, *ex hypothesi*, we have neither such fact nor such relation of correspondence. They seem, therefore, to be more problematic. It is here that McTaggart turns for an answer to one of his doctrines outlined above. Two false beliefs, he asserts, would be called beliefs in the same thing in virtue of the fact that they both possess a common characteristic which (according to McTaggart) consists in their *professing* to refer or correspond to the same fact. (In fact, as we have already noted, this characteristic is possessed by every belief.) Though the falsity (as indeed even the truth) of two beliefs would be determined by the kind of relation they have to fact(s) or reality, the profession of such a relation would be a common character of both of them and so would make them beliefs in the same thing.

There is also another side to the issue which is generally glossed over. This, says McTaggart, consists in the fact that when any two false beliefs profess to refer to the same fact, it is (so to speak) the *absence* of that very

fact which makes them both false. Ram's belief is rendered false by the absence from the whole of reality, of India's freedom having taken place in 1945. And it is the absence of the same fact which renders Krishna's belief also false. 'Two false beliefs are beliefs in the same thing when it is the absence of the same fact which makes both of them false' (*NE*, I, 21). This constitutes the second explanation of the phrase 'two false beliefs in the same thing'.

Now at this point a question is bound to arise, and it would be well if we consider McTaggart's reply to it. McTaggart has said that false beliefs have a relation of non-correspondence with all the existent facts. Now if this is a correct picture of the matter, then, to illustrate through the above example, both Ram's and Krishna's belief that India won its freedom from British rule in 1945, derives its falsity from its non-correspondence with all actual facts. But now comes a snag, which is that this characteristic of non-correspondence to all facts need not be the prerogative of only some, and in the present context, the above beliefs, for they may well share it with e.g. Ashok's (false) belief that Tagore wrote *Shrikant*. (The actual author of that Bengali novel was Sarat Chandra Chatterjee.) This difficulty McTaggart does attempt to meet and I think with considerable skill and even success, by pointing out that while the falsity of a belief has its source in the relation of non-correspondence with all actual facts, two false beliefs with different contents, even while all along sharing the *common* characteristic of non-correspondence with all actual facts, expressly differ (1) because they profess to refer to two *different* facts, and (2) because it is *the absence of different facts* which makes them false.

The emergent final picture can be summed up as follows. If two true beliefs are beliefs in the same thing, this means not only that they have a common quality of professing to refer to the same fact, but also that they actually correspond to the same fact. On the other hand, two false beliefs are beliefs in the same thing, if (i) they have the common quality of professing to refer to the same fact (which they share also with any two true beliefs in the same thing), and (ii) that they stand in a relation of non-correspondence to all actual facts. And lastly, (iii) even though all false beliefs (whether in the same thing or otherwise) have the common characteristic of having a relation of non-correspondence, they cannot be called beliefs in the same thing if it is the absence of different facts which makes them false.

Now this account of what are also sometimes called 'co-referential' beliefs makes me add a word by way of clarification. McTaggart's account of beliefs has been based, exclusively it seems, on their relation to the world. And I have no doubt that this indeed is as it should be, even if one were to disagree with him on matters of detail. I think, however, that one can fairly plausibly talk even of 'common content' in respect to any two or more beliefs, true or false, which are considered beliefs in the same thing, the only proviso being that those beliefs get expressed in a non-private language or form so as to be intelligible to more than one person. And I think it does not go against any of the things McTaggart has said about beliefs or facts. The common content of any two or more co-referential beliefs can I think be discovered by scrutinizing some inspectable identity of structure, i.e., of certain of the terms and elements which are exhibited by these beliefs when expressed in the above way. Thus if two persons assert that the earth is flat, we can know without knowing or even caring to know whether they are true or false, and without implying at all that their beliefs form the same mental state, that they assert the same something—flatness—of the same something, the earth. And this of course goes without saying that their truth or falsity cannot be ascertained without knowing whether the facts to which they profess to refer, are or are not.

C.D. BROAD'S CONCEPTION OF 'CORRESPONDENCE'

Before I close I must briefly take up for consideration C.D. Broad's account of correspondence to which he comes after rejecting McTaggart's treatment as 'unsatisfactory'. (A full examination of Broad's criticisms of other aspects of McTaggart's theory of belief, etc. is impossible here—it is a topic in itself.) Let me first deal with the destructive part of Broad's effort. After expressing his own allegiance to the correspondence theory, Broad finds McTaggart's account of the same defective in two respects.[59] Maintaining that it is judgements primarily—and not propositions which Broad too rejects—which are possessors of truth-value, Broad says: (a) judgements include disbeliefs as well as beliefs, and so a complete account of correspondence ought to deal with both (what, in his view, McTaggart's account fails to do); (b) while it is true—here Broad is referring to McTaggart's view—that a false belief corresponds to no fact, this is not the essential point. 'The essential point is surely its positive discordance with a certain one fact; its lack of correspondence to all other facts is trivial.'[60] Giving an example, Broad says that the (false) belief that Charles I died in his bed owes its falsity in no way to its lack of correspondence to the fact that Gladstone reduced income tax, but to 'its positive discordance' with the 'determinate' fact that Charles I died on the scaffold. Broad then sums up his own views on correspondence: 'Every judgement *refers* to a certain fact, and it is true if it concords with *this* fact and false if it discords with it.'[61] A little later Broad expresses the same doctrine thus: 'A judgement neither concords nor discords with any fact *except the fact to which it refers*; but it must either concord or discord with that fact, and it cannot do both.'[62]

Of the two criticisms made by Broad we shall ignore (a). It is not immediately relevant to the purpose at hand, and besides constitutes no special critique of McTaggart. So we turn to the point made in (b) which Broad sums up in the last quotation in the preceding paragraph.

Let us try to see what is 'a certain fact' to which the belief 'Charles I died in his bed' can be said to refer. It can't merely be, though it certainly implies that too, that there was a person named Charles I; nor can it be about the things which Charles I did, though in all likelihood he might have done quite a few things apart from dying. Again, it cannot merely be asserting the fact of Charles I's death, for this fact (if it is a fact) is a part of even the fact that he died on the scaffold. It then must be, as it undoubtedly is, the total (assumed) 'fact' of Charles I having died in his bed. Now, if this belief is false, and if its falsity depends (as Broad insists) upon its positive discordance with the actual (determinate) fact that Charles I died on the scaffold, then this latter cannot be the fact to which it may truly be referring, unless we hold that a belief refers to a fact and yet may be *said* not to refer to (or accord with) it. And that would be a plain contradiction. The only alternative would be to give different senses to 'referring to' but that Broad may find embarrassing. On the other hand, if we accept McTaggart's doctrine that every belief professes to refer to a fact and that it is only true beliefs which actually refer to it, the problem is considerably mitigated. For it is only then that it makes sense to say that a belief is false if it fails to concord, or positively discords, with the fact to which it professes to refer. And as already noted above, it is this success and failure in respect of profession of reference that determines a belief's truth or falsity.

Faced with this dilemma, Broad seeks to amend his doctrine in the following way: 'The fact to which a judgement refers is the unknown determinate specification of that relatively indeterminate fact which the maker of the judgement already knows and is trying to specify further.'[63] Thus Broad's point is that the maker of the judgement already knows, however indeterminately (or faintly), something of the 'unknown' determinate fact to which actually the (i.e. his own) judgement refers. Now let us take an example. Suppose I assert 'There are dragons'. If this is a judgement, it must either be true or false. Now the question is, (1) which one is the unknown determinate *fact* to which it refers and with which it must, upon Broad's theory, either concord or discord in order to be true or false?; and (2) which one is the 'relatively indeterminate fact' which I must already know and which I try to specify further by making the judgement 'there are dragons'?

But let us take another example, the one given by Broad and cited above. Suppose I say: Charles I died in his bed. On Broad's account, the unknown determinate fact to which this judgement refers can only be 'Charles I died on the scaffold'. Not only that. It is by unknowingly referring to this fact that my assertion seeks to 'specify further' the indeterminate fact which it actually knows and asserts, namely 'Charles I died in his bed'. This is what the judgement unambiguously asserts and is also aware of, while the actual fact 'Charles I died on the scaffold' is what the judgement is not aware of and yet (on Broad's theory) 'refers' to. And the beauty of this all is that Broad wants to tell us that it is the asserted content which is true or false. Why? Perhaps because this is the content which I consciously assert and which I think to be true. Broad is therefore under obligation to explain how, if his theory be right, can a belief refer to something (concord or discord with which determines its truth or falsity) and yet be *unaware* of it? For as we saw in the beginning, a belief's content—the so-called 'fact' to which it refers or professes to refer—cannot be something of which the believer is unaware: the content asserted (and its meaning) must be present to the consciousness of the person who makes the assertion. So in our view of the matter, the falsity of the judgement 'Charles I died in his bed' would be—and McTaggart would probably endorse it—determined not by the unknown determinate fact that 'Charles I died on the scaffold' to which according to Broad the judgement refers, but by (showing or knowing) the absence of this predicate from the totality of the predicates which hold of Charles I.

And finally, the essential point here is not so much whether the falsity of a belief consists in its non-correspondence to all facts or in its positive discordance with a certain determinate fact, but rather: why should it be a belief which is true or false? Plainly, because a belief—much like a perceptual cognition of an assertory type—seeks truth or aims to be true. And it is in its search for truth that it happens to make a truth-claim. There is therefore no getting away from McTaggart's doctrine about a belief's basic character.

Notes and References

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1. Most of the following discussion of McTaggart's doctrines is based on his *The Nature of Existence*. J. McT.E. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921); vol. II, ed. C.D. Broad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927). (Hereafter referred to as *NE*) All references to *NE*, whether in the body of the article or in the notes, are, in addition to the volume number, to section numbers as given in the two volumes. The numericals mentioned after the volume number therefore represent, *not* the page number, but the section number. The reader may note that the section numbers (like the chapter numbers, though unlike the page numbers) run consecutively through the two volumes. The first volume, I may mention, ends at Section 293.
2. Significantly, McTaggart adds that the proposition that there is no error is not self-contradictory, nor does its assertion involve a contradiction. It must be erroneous, however, for it is, he says, incompatible with manifest facts (*NE*, II, 510). Again, the proposition that no knowledge exists is, for McTaggart, not self-contradictory, though its assertion is. But this is enough to condemn it (*NE*, II, 509). See also ibid., fn. 1.
3. Alfred Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics', reprinted in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), and 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, trans. J.H. Woodger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).

4. Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 5th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 223. Popper, incidentally, calls the view that Tarski's theory is applicable only to formalized languages 'mistaken'. In his opinion, that theory can apply to any consistent and even to a natural language, 'if only we learn from Tarski's analysis to dodge its inconsistencies.' Also see *Addendum* 5 (pp. 398–9) there for further clarificatory remarks by Popper.
5. Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (1981; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 129.
6. Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth', in Linski, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
7. Strawson criticizes the semantic notion that to say that a statement is true is to make a (further) statement about a sentence of a given language on the ground that a translator would not treat a truth-claim as if it were a description of a sentence. P.F. Strawson, 'Truth', reprinted in *Philosophy and Analysis*, ed. M. Macdonald (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), pp. 261–2.
8. This is what Bolzano, for example, has in mind when he regards his 'proposition in itself' ('*Satz an sich*' in original German) as 'any statement whatever to the effect that something is or is not, irrespective of whether the statement be true or false, irrespective of whether any person formulated it in words, and even irrespective of whether it ever entered any mind as a thought.' Bernard Bolzano, *Paradoxes of the Infinite*, trans. from German by Fr. Prihonsky and furnished with a Historical Introduction by Donald A. Steele (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), Historical Introduction, p. 45. Compare Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), p. 165: 'A sentence [or a proposition] may be called "true" or "false" even if no one believes it, provided that, if it were believed, the belief would be true or false as the case may be.'
9. It is to be remarked that W.E. Johnson, who looked upon propositions as public and neutral (so that, as remarked above, there could be something for people to agree about, disbelieve, etc.), when pressed as to whether he was willing to admit the independent existence of false propositions, was liable to reply that propositions are not really detachable from the judgements (or assertions) of which they were the objective constituents. His propositions, C.D. Broad remarks, 'in fact seemed to be public and neutral on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and to be private and mind-dependent on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays.' 'On Sundays,' (Broad continues), 'they no doubt underwent a higher synthesis in which both these opposed characteristics were absorbed, transmuted, and reconciled.' C.D. Broad, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), pp. 69–70. (Hereafter referred to as *Examination*)
10. To set the record straight, let me quote McTaggart's own words: 'If, for example, propositions are maintained to be real as constituents of beliefs and not otherwise, then it would follow that such propositions would be existent, since it is impossible that a constituent of an existent thing should not itself exist.' *NE*, I, 23.
11. Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), pp. 84, 188. Also see Russell's 'On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean', reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge*, ed. R.C. Marsh (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956). P.T. Geach calls our attention to another basic flaw in the proposition doctrine, both in its modern dress and the old guise of the Stoic *lekton* or the medieval *enuntiabile*: 'there is a confusion between a unitary bit of *information* and a unit of *meaning*.' This is evident in the kind of explanation we often come across in those elementary logic books which employ the notion of Propositions. On the other hand, they regard propositions to be true or false in the primitive sense and (so) look upon the truth or falsity of beliefs, sentences, etc. as dependent upon the truth or falsity of some corresponding proposition. (For McTaggart's castigation of this idea see *NE*, I, Chapter 2.) On the other hand, we are told things like: the sentences, 'It is raining', '*Il' pleut*', and, '*Es regnet*' all express the *same* proposition: they are intertranslatable. But a moment's thought, says Geach, shows that to this common *meaning* no fixed ascription of truth or falsehood does really attach. The sentences, 'A bomb exploded in London today', said on Monday, and, 'A bomb exploded in London yesterday', said on Tuesday, *will* have the same truth-value, and may well be said to give the same *information*. Frege would find in them expressed the same thought (*Gedanke*), the difference in the words used compensating for the difference in time of utterance. 'But then this piece of information cannot be identified with the Proposition as object of belief or thought; for if a man is somehow muddled about the passage of time he may easily react to one sentence with belief and to the other with incredulity.' Geach therefore concludes that the idea of propositions as a class of non-actual entities is wholly confused. See P.T. Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), p. 41.

    There is much literature both in favour of and against propositions. Besides McTaggart's and Broad's (who preferred judgments as the bearers of truth-value), some other noted names who have criticized propositions, albeit in their own manner, are: Gilbert Ryle, 'Are There Propositions?', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 30 (1929–1930); J.L. Austin, 'Truth', *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd ed., ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, PB, 1979), pp. 118–19; G.H. von Wright, 'Demystifying Propositions', *Truth, Knowledge and Modality*: *Philosophical Papers*, vol. III (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). von Wright is however wrong in ascribing (ibid., p. 14) the proposition doctrine to C.D. Broad. For, Broad, as said above, preferred 'judgements' to propositions as bearers of truth-value (cf. Broad's *Examination*, vol. I, pp. 64 ff.), even while explaining their meaning in his own way.

12. W.V. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox*, rev. and enlar. ed. (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 194. See also his *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), p. 213.
13. A.C. Ewing, *Idealism: A Critical Survey*, 3rd ed. (Methuen, 1961), p. 229.
14. Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, vol. II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939), p. 264.
15. F.H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), p. 223. A better articulation of the Hegelian spirit is hard to come by in a philosopher who rarely if at all quotes or refers to Hegel by name.
16. Traditionally, the standard objection against the theory has been that it confounds the question of the nature of truth with the question of the criteria of truth. For details, see e.g. Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (1910; rev. ed., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), Chapter 5.
17. Aristotle's account of what it means to say that a proposition is true (or false) is supposed to be the first clear statement of the correspondence theory. He says: 'To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.' 'Metaphysica', 1011b, in *The Works of Aristotle*, trans. under the editorship of W.D. Ross, vol. VIII, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).
18. H. Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, pp. 49ff.
19. P.F. Strawson, 'Truth', reprinted in G. Pitcher (ed.), *Truth* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 32–53.
20. J.L. Austin, 'Truth', *Philosophical Papers*, Chapter 5. Also see Austin's 'Unfair to Facts', in *Philosophical Papers*. Here he clearly maintains that facts form part of the world.
21. I use the world 'standpoint' advisedly. To illustrate, Russell and Wittgenstein during their Logical Atomist period looked upon facts as the fundamental category, regarding things in the ordinary sense as constituents of facts. Now as we know, their reason for conferring this (fundamental) status upon facts was their view that it is the proposition that is the basic unit of discourse and of meaning, not the individual word (as someone like Aristotle thought), a view which was common doctrine with a number of philosophers of the period, particularly Frege, who, even though he thought facts to be dispensable items, yet made famous the dictum that it is only in the context of a proposition that a word has a meaning. There is no surprise then if it is facts which are considered by Wittgenstein (and Russell) as something that true propositions (or statements) state. The concept of facts thus comes to reflect a certain sort of words-world relation, which relation is what is in its implications being spelt out in the famous Wittgensteinian view that the world is the totality of facts and not of things. Facts must be the basic category of existents, if the above view of what is basic to language and meaning is to be true.
22. P.T. Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality*, pp. 39–40.

23. Cf. e.g. Lawrence E. Johnson, *Focusing on Truth* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), Chapter 3.
24. Donald Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 130.
25. G.E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 309.
26. Ibid., p. 279. Italics Moore's.
27. A special charge alleged against Wittgenstein's picture theory is that such a theory cannot give adequate account of existential, negative or universal truths. See Lawrence E. Johnson, *Focusing on Truth*, p. 60. In any case, this charge, I want to emphasize, cannot be legitimately made against McTaggart, for his theory sufficiently provides for such truths.
28. C.D. Broad, *Examination*, I, p. 57.
29. Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, p. 130. My italics.
30. W. Sellers, *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 128.
31. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 192. Italics Russell's.
32. Strawson, 'Truth', in G. Pitcher, *op. cit.*, p. 39. My italics.
33. Donald Davidson, 'True to the Facts', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 48.
34. If it be felt that Tarski and Davidson have said all that needs to be said by way of explication of the correspondence theory, M. Dummett comes out with this objection. To put it briefly, Dummett rightly points out (in common with McTaggart) that the heart of the correspondence theory is the idea that the world consists of mind-independent (or discourse-independent, if you wish) objects and facts. A sentence then can be true, on that theory, only if such a fact *makes* it true; and our comprehension of the sentence consists in our grasp of what the relevant (corresponding) mind-independent state of affairs is. So according to Dummett, neither Tarski's theory (which is neutral philosophically) nor Davidson's theory of what a meaning theory is has any consequence for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views.

    To the Davidsonian contention (which has been considerably popular) that understanding of one's language consists in a knowledge of the truth theory of that language, Dummett rejoins that the crucial question is, in what does this 'knowledge of the truth theory' itself consist? Michael Dummett, 'What does the appeal to use do for the theory of meaning?' in A. Margalit (ed.), *Meaning and Use* (Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 123–35.
35. Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 211.
36. Ibid., p. 214. My italics.
37. A reply to Russell was given at that time by Raphael Demos, 'A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition', *Mind*, 26, No. 102 (1917), pp. 188–96.

38. Demos, *op. cit.*, p. 189. My italics.
39. Demos, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–90.
40. Ibid., p. 190.
41. Ibid., pp. 191–2.
42. Ibid., p. 194.
43. Ibid., pp. 194–5.
44. Gustav Bergmann, *Logic and Reality* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 30, 32, 95.
45. Ibid., p. 95.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 248, fn. 12. About possibility Bergmann says (ibid., p. 248): 'I identify this ground [i.e. ontological ground] by saying that a sentence represents either a fact or a possible fact and making possibility in this sense a mode of existence.'
48. Ibid., p. 94.
49. Ibid., p. 181.
50. Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, p. 165.
51. C.J.F. Williams, *What is Truth?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 75.
52. All asserting, as another writer points out, has like other human activities, 'a telos or point and the telos of asserting is truth.' Graham Priest, *In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent* (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 77.
53. I think, following this lead (from McTaggart) one can pertinently suggest that the issue of 'reference' in the context of language needs to be treated as a separate issue.
54. *Examination*, I, pp. 70–1.
55. Ibid., p. 70.
56. G.E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, p. 267. Italics Moore's.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 277. My italics. Moore, though, adds that he would not be taken as insisting on the word 'correspondence'. He however has no doubt that some relation does exist. (Ibid., p. 279)
59. *Examination*, I, pp. 77–8.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 78. My italics.
62. Ibid. My italics.
63. Ibid.

Theistic Humanism—African Philosophical Tradition

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The term 'philosophy' is used only in the context of the tradition of the ancient Greeks as developed in the western civilization, hence there has been a controversy regarding the existence of what is called 'African Philosophy'. Similarly, western trained philosophers have rejected the application of the term 'philosophy' to Darshana (Indian philosophy) and Chinese philosophy. The Indians and the Chinese have had a long history of written tradition of philosophical world-views embodying their moral, ontological and cosmological explanations of life-here and life-thereafter. Yet Africa has had a mix of the oral and written traditions in different places of the continent and at different times. Denying the whole of Africa (including Egypt, and Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa) a written tradition is arguable much as the black Africa could be said to have had a long history of oral tradition.

This thesis X-rays the background as well as the great debate on African philosophy. In the Thesis, a name for African philosophy is adopted as 'Afraa' just in the fashion of Darshana, Confucianism, Taoism etc. and attempts are made to establish the 'philosophy' and 'intellectuality' in these traditions. Nonetheless these philosophies in time and places are subject to dialectics of history and materialism. It is also argued that the ideas embodied in the oral traditions of Africa or philosophically speaking 'Afraa' and that of the Indians or the Chinese have some philosophical contents.

Finally, it is argued that the apparent aberrant character of postmodernism in the quest for truths or truth cosmologies and ontologies is rather in consonance with much sought after truths in Africa, Confucianism, Taoism, Darshana etc. which is embodied in what I called Theistic Humanism, the philosophy of the African. Africa has an African philosophical

tradition distinct from the Asian philosophical traditions in its Africanness and conceptual technicalities and approaches.

BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE ON AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Early European travellers to Africa misconceived it as a dark continent without a religion and hence Africa, as a dark continent, was purportedly discovered by them. Yet the truth-value of this assertion can neither be established logically nor historically. What followed after the purported discovery of Africa was the systematic colonization of the continent and the consequent subjugation and exploitation of the people. Colonization with the subsequent neocolonialism and imperialism is a potent force which operates in many covert and overt dimensions like religion, politics, economics and so on. These imperialistic forces raped and assaulted African cultures and beliefs, of which religion is a part. Through the devastating process of acculturation, African psyche was distorted and intimidated.

The picture of Africa conjured by investigators and writers of this period is well illustrated by the *Berlin* newspaper. The newspaper says among other things:

> ... that before the introduction of a genuine faith and a higher culture by the Arabs, the native had neither political organisation, nor any religion, nor any industrial development, that the study of negroe race is a study of the description of their crude fetishism, the vulgar and repulsive idols and their squalid homes.[1]

According to the newspapers, Black Africa is a continent which has no mystery, no history. Emil Ludwig once said that Africans were savages who could not frame the idea of God (a philosophical concept). These and so many other vulgar propositions and phrases led to the denigration of African people, their cultures and religions with vulgar and ludicrous terms.

Western philosophers, especially those of the Renaissance and modern periods contributed mostly to this ideology of intimidation. Some of the statements and predicates encapsulating white superiority and black inferiority are as follows:

> The negroid variety is the lowest, and stands at the foot of the ladder. The animal character, that appears in the shape of pelvis is stamped on the Negro from birth, and foreshadows his destiny. His intellect will always move within a very narrow circle. If his mental faculties are dull or even non-existent, he often has an intensity of desire, and so of will, which may be called terrible. Many of his senses, especially taste and smell are developed to an extent unknown to the two races.
>
> —Gobineau[2]

> At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace the savage races throughout the world. At the same time, the anthropomorphous apes ... will no doubt be exterminated. The break will then be rendered wider, for it will intervene between man in some more civilized state ... than the Caucasian, and some apes as low as a baboon, instead of as at present between the Negro or Australian and the gorilla.
>
> —Charles Darwin[3]

> If their understanding is not of a different nature from ours, it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great application or association of ideas, and seemed formed neither for the advantages nor the abuses of philosophy.
>
> —Voltaire[4]

> There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturer among them, no arts, no sciences. ... Such uniform and constant differences could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men.
>
> —David Hume[5]

> ... incapable of contemplating any objective entity such as God and law ... Nothing remotely human is to be found in their (the Negroes) character. Extensive reports by missionaries confirm this and Mohammedanism seems to be the only thing which can, in some measure, bring them nearer to a civilized condition.
>
> —George Hegel[6]

> I will say then, that I am not or ever have been in favour of bringing about in any way, the social and political equality, of the white and

black races. That I am not, nor ever have been, in favour of making voters or jurors of Negroes, not of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people and I will say in addition to this, that there is a physical difference between the white and black races, which will ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality, and as much as they cannot so live, while they do remain together, there must be a position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man, am in favour of having the superior position assigned to the white race.

—Abraham Lincoln[7]

Our assailants are numerous, and it is indispensible that we should meet the assault with vigor and activity. Nothing is wanting but mainly discussion to convince our own people at least, that in continuing to command the services of the slaves, they violate no law divine or human, and that in the faithful discharge of their reciprocal obligations lies their duty.

—Edgar Allen Poe[8]

It is vain to deny that they (Blacks) are an inferior race—very far inferior to the European variety. They have learned in slavery all that they know in civilization. When first brought from the country of their origin they were naked savages and where they have been left to their own devices or escaped the control of the white race they have lapsed, to a greater or less degree in barbarism.

—Andrew Johnson[9]

Why increase the sons of Africa, by planting them in America, where we have so fair an opportunity, by excluding blacks and tawnys, of increasing the lovely white and red?

—Benjamin Franklin[10]

It will be seen that when we classify mankind by colour, the only one of the primary races, given of this classification, which has not made a creative contribution of any to our twenty-one civilizations is the Black Race ... within the first six thousand years, the Black Race has not helped to create any civilization.

—Arnold Toynbee[11]

The Negro is a child, and with children nothing can be done without the use of authority. We must therefore, so arrange the circumstances of our daily life that my authority can find expression. With regard to the Negroes, then, I have coined the formula: 'I am your brother, it is true, but your elder brother'.

—Albert Schweitzer[12]

Some errors and fallacies of identity were also committed by the western racists in an attempt to write the Black Africa out of existence with the following erroneous terms, primitive, savage, native, tribe, paganism, heathenism and idolatory.

Primitive: This is defined by the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* as 'Early; ancient; old-fashioned; simple; rude; original; primary ...'[13]. This term has been used to describe the ancient people of Africa as if there were no ancient periods in America, Britain, Portugal and Russia. There is absolutely no justification for referring to the Africans as primitive. The term should be applicable to all races in the ancient time before the dawn of modern civilization. To that extent, we have primitive Europeans, Australians and Egyptians.

Savage: Savage connotes backwardness and ignorance. A savage people are a people that are believed not to be civilized. This term was used by the white man to describe all the traditionalists in Africa. It shows sheer prejudice and lack of sympathy or understanding. Africa was said not to have had early civilizations. But there were early civilizations among all the races of the world. The point is that there were different types of civilization which could increase or diminish at some periods. According to Walter Rodney, at the peak of African civilization, western civilization was at its low ebb and when African civilization was dwindling, western civilization was increasing.

Native: This is one of the errors of terminologies of African ways of life. The Africans were described as being natives of their various homes and villages (another derogatory term). But the term 'native' connotes a people that live in the jungle in the underdeveloped places. Dictionaries define 'native' as 'one born, or whose parents are domiciled in a place; member of non-European or uncivilised race ...'[14] obviously this dictionary definition is a mixture of racism and eurocentricism. The fact is that 'native' as

applied to a person means that one is born into a particular place or domain. It does not really mean that only the Africans are natives in their countries.

Tribe: The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defined it as a 'group or people in a primitive or barbarian stage of development, acknowledging the authority of a chief and usually regarding themselves as having a common ancestor'.[15] But the *Advanced Learners Dictionary* defined it as a 'racial group, especially one united by language and customs, living as a community under one or more chiefs ...'.[16] The second definition which is an improvement on the first one has a racial undertone. When the white man decided to describe African ethnic groups as tribes, he meant barbarous groups of people without a culture and religion. But the term 'tribe' is not an acceptable term for describing traditionalists or a people living an African communal life.

Paganism: This term refers to somebody who lives in a village, although the term 'village' itself as applied to Africa only is derogatory. It is not only the Africans that live in the villages. Because the white man had erroneously described the Africans as pagan, they went further to describe their religion as paganistic. And that is why some Christians and Moslems described non-Moslems and non-Christians as pagans. Besides, the term paganism is based on the wrong premise that these Africans were not religious.

Heathenism: 'Heathen' means a dirty place or a dump hill where vagabonds or outlaws lived. This is the original and classical meaning of the term. But the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines it as 'one who is neither Christian, Jewish nor Mohammedan; unenlightened persons'.[17] First of all, this dictionary definition is biased by excluding the fact that Africans or some other races had religions. It must not be the case that any person who is not a Jew, a Christian or a Moslem is not enlightened.

Idolatory: This is another perjorative term being used to besmirch African culture and religion. Idolatory is derived from idol. An idol means a toy or an image. When the white men came they saw a lot of images and thought that Africans worshipped these images. But to Africans, these images are meant for concentration. 'Animism', a related term, can be applied to African religion and philosophy, not because they worship or revere empty objects, but because they believed that behind every being,

or object there is a vital power or soul. Also, fetishism, an equally wrongful terminology, is seen as a species of idolatory. Africans personify nature because they believe that there is a spiritual force residing in every object of nature. This is why the African religious practices, feasts and ceremonies cannot precisely be equated to magical and idolatory practices or fetishism.

It is against the above backgrounds and insinuations, coupled with the fact that philosophy today is western philosophy and in particular that of the renaissance Europe that philosophy of African origin is rendered by European philosophers as non-existent. Indeed the lateness in conceiving the formalization and teaching of African philosophy allowed room for the growth of western prejudice against anything called African philosophy. So much so that when the term of African philosophy was discussed in the early seventies of the last millennium, it was seen as unutterable or unspeakable since philosophy is western philosophy.

Following the intensity of the assertions of the protagonists of African philosophy, there arose equal and opposite contentions that there is no African philosophy. The issue in the debate centred around the existence and definition of the scope and the nature of African philosophy. In the great debate two broad schools were pre-eminent. One school of thought recognized the existence of African philosophy since according to it philosophy is also a world-view apart from being a critical and systematic reflection. Hence such works as *Bantu Philosophy* by Placid Temples, *Igbo Philosophy* by T.U. Nwala, Sedar Senghor's 'Negritude' and John Mbiti's work on *African Philosophy and Religions* are authentic studies on African philosophy. The other school of thought denied the existence of African philosophy and described the aforementioned works like *Bantu Philosophy* et al. as folk or ethno-philosophy. This school argued that philosophy is critical and scientific and adopts the philosophical model of the European renaissance. Among the protagonists of this school were Peter Bodunrin, E.A. Ruch, Odera Oruka, Henri Maurier etc. There was also the issue in the debate which points to the alleged African philosophy as the progenitor of western philosophy. It says that the ancient Greek philosophy which is western philosophy has its origin in Africa, particularly ancient Egyptian philosophy.

However at the close of the debate in the 1990s, African philosophy became accepted in most institutions and academic and philosophical circles

as a legitimate enterprise to be pursued severally or collectively from five standpoints:

(1) Ethno-philosophy
(2) Philosophy sagacity
(3) Nationalistic—Ideological Philosophy
(4) Egypto-philosophy
(5) Professional Philosophy.[18]

Instead of adopting these strands in toto, some scholars have, from their sense of history demarcated African philosophy into faces more or less similar to the above strands. T.U. Nwala would instead talk of the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary periods.

By the ancient period, T.U. Nwala means the ancient Egyptian philosophy and the African traditional philosophy. The ancient Egyptian philosophy included the philosophical and mathematical systems such as the Memphite Theology, Egyptian Mystery System, Atomism, Hermiticism. The traditional African philosophy is the 'folkthought', 'folk philosophy', 'group mind' or 'communal philosophy'[19] etc. It is precisely what is called Ethno-Philosophy. This philosophy is contained in the folklore, proverbs, idioms, myths, festivals, religious worship of the people. The works that exemplify the character of this philosophy include *Bantu Philosophy* by Placid Temples, *Rwandan-Bantu Philosophy of Being* by Alex Kagame, *The Mind of Africa* by William Abraham, *Igbo Philosophy* by T.U. Nwala, etc.

The medieval period includes the writings of Hermes Trismegistos known as the corpus Hermiticum, the western scholastic philosophers who were influenced by African philosophers and the Islamic philosophy in Africa.

The philosophic sagacity of Odera Oruka is associated with the reflective evaluation of thought by a sage (philosophical sage) who excels in his community because of his wisdom. Since we have a lot of wise men in the ancient and even in the modern period, this philosophic sagacity could be classified as traditional African philosophy. In other words philosophic sagacity is a species of the ancient and modern African philosophy. Even today, we have traditionalists and unorthodox physicians who could fall into this classification.

The modern period is the period of the practice of philosophy in Africa and by Africans. Among the philosophers of the modern period in Africa were Ibn Khaldun of Tunisia and William Amo of Ghana. Overlapping

with this modern period is the Nationalistic-Ideological philosophy which hosted such nationalistic philosophies like Negritude by Senghor, Consciencism by Nkrumah, Ujomaa by Nyerere etc.

The contemporary period in African philosophy overlapped with the nationalistic ideological philosophy because the period extended backward to include the nationalistic philosophers of the '50s and the philosophers of the 1970s onwards who were debating on African philosophy. The contemporary philosophers is a wider group including the professional and academic philosophers of today.

THE GREAT DEBATE

The quest to establish the philosophical import of religious world-view, myths and symbols in African culture as well as the meaning, the horizon, the legitimacy and the method of African philosophy in an age which can be described as the 'Age of Enlightenment' for African philosophy is a necessary dimension in the intellectual emancipation of Africa from eurocentric intellectual tradition.

In the study of African philosophy especially from the point of view of myths, religious views, rituals and symbols, we may not agree with David Hume that metaphysical knowledge is impossible, or with Carnap and Ayer, that metaphysical statements are meaningless. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein may be correct in asserting that metaphysical problems are due to misuse of language.

I wish, however to assert the philosophical import of religious world-view, myths and symbols and to reconcile the contending views arising from misuse of language on the question of 'African philosophy' and to argue that African philosophy is in a necessary stage governed by the paradigm of modern science. The point at issue here is the question of the philosophy in myths, folklore, proverbs and religious beliefs upon which, of course, the African philosophy hinges. One school of thought argues that the ideas expressed in myths and religious beliefs are philosophies in their own rights while the other school of thought argues that the ideas expressed in religious and mythical beliefs are ethno-philosophy and not philosophy in the real sense. I think that both schools of thought have created philosophical problems where there were none in the first place, by their lack of understanding of the trend of the history of philosophy of different races, and secondly by the language game where they apparently

disagree but in reality saying the same thing put in historical perspective. The problem with the disputants on African philosophy was that each shouts aloud without hearing the other even when all have relevant points to the progress of African philosophy.

Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji etc. argue that myths and proverbs could be sources or materials for philosophic studies but that method, if it is to be truly a philosophic study, must be critical and reflective. Professor Peter Bodunrin encapsulated some of these points in the following sentences.

> That there are rational, logical and respectable conceptual systems among Africans and other people once thought by Europeans to be mentally primitive is no longer the point at issue. But not every rational coherent and complicated conceptual system is philosophy. Science and mathematics are eminently rational, logical and to a large extent, consistent systems but they are not philosophical systems. I think that many ethnophilosophers mistakenly believe that all rational, logical and complicated conceptual systems are philosophical. I believe they were a wrong in this.[20]

Succinctly put, while Professor Peter Bodunrin and his likes see philosophy from the monist point of view, Professors Kwame Gyekye, K.C. Anyanwu, B.C. Okolo etc. see it from the liberal point of view.[21] The monist view is that philosophy should be critical and reflective while the liberal view is that it could be both uncritical and critical, and reflective and unreflective. While the monist school fails to appreciate the historical and dialectic nature of philosophy in being at a sage uncritical and at another critical, the liberal school fails to appreciate the self-criticism of philosophy in dialectic mood.

However, the points of the liberal school are worthy of note as far as the philosophical import of myth and symbol in African philosophy is concerned. According to K.C. Anyanwu,

> Philosophy should not be an academic matter but an expression of a people's culture. As a philosophy, its business is to articulate the principle by which the people can live as a whole man, and its concern is with what is meaningful and significant in experience. It is not a critical philosophy and critical philosophy cannot start unless there are existing material for it.[22]

He says that myths may embody ultimate insights and intuition of reality as experiences within a universe of aesthetic continuum. In African culture, myths are used to give certain topics or themes the character of parable or allegory. But in reality, parable or allegory has a direct reference to human beings, human situations or to society and it has moral, educational and philosophical interest.

The philosophical dispute concerning African philosophy on whether it is a philosophy or not seems to me to be a misuse of the language 'philosophy' and a language game which certainly talks of one and only one thing, that is, that African philosophy exists but that it has to start critically from the religious world-view of the African. The monist school cannot deny the relevance of myths in the study of African philosophy if they are fully aware that the ancient Greek philosophy is punctuated with myths, for instance, in Plato's *Republic*, Georgias, Phaedo and Phaedrus. In these works you have allegories and pre-scientific explanations of the universe and yet they are philosophies. The relevance of myth or religious world-view as a source or material for philosophic reflection has now been admitted by the monist school while philosophic criticism and reflection on the religious world-view has been accepted by the liberal school. So the debate is a mere language game that confuses prioritization of either criticism or noncriticism in philosophy when in actual fact philosophy demands that they be placed in dialectical and historical perspective.

Professor Peter Bodunrin argues that not all rational, logical and complicated conceptual systems are philosophical. But the goal of any philosophical enterprise (a critical philosophy in Bodunrin's sense) is rationality and, therefore, if any system rigourously strives to achieve that goal then it is philosophical. And philosophy in dialectical and historical senses demands a movement from one stage or rationality to another in obedience to changing circumstances. What is rational today may not be rational tomorrow. Since that is always the case, criticism and revision as demanded by the monist school becomes necessary. In African philosophy, the Paul Radin's 'Autochthonous intellectual class' and Gordon Hunning's 'Principle of synthesis' set the machinery in motion for self-criticism and revision. And William Abraham's distinction between private and public aspects of African philosophy shows that the public aspect is a criticized, revised and harmonized aspect of individual and private philosophies of the Autochthonous intellectual class. Therefore, the rationality of any system in an age is the philosophy of that age.

The rationality involved here is what K.C. Anyanwu calls the 'logic of aesthetics'. Logic of aesthetics is the unity and meaningfulness of individual's and community's experience in life. Lucy Mair and Raymond Firth may, therefore, be wrong in describing religions as irrational, unless they were using western scientific methodology as their parameter of rationality.

Universality and rationality are important concepts of philosophy. So how rational and universal is symbol in philosophy? Symbols in African culture have no special significance except on the basis of myths. So to establish the philosophical significance of myth implies the establishment of the philosophical significance of symbols and vice versa. Symbols can be simply defined as objects, words, language and sounds which more often than not have esoteric meanings.

> All words are spiritual, nothing is more spiritual than words ... Unless we fully realise the profound influence of superstitions concerning words, we shall not understand the fixity of certain widespread linguistic habits which still vitiate even the most careful thing.[23]

The history of philosophy is punctuated with the history of the relationship between language and reality. In African philosophy too, the power of spoken words is part of the natural philosophy of the black folks. We were told that language is a duplicate, a shadow-soul of the whole structure of reality. Hence, the doctrine of reality is called the Supreme reality or the divine soul substance.

Herclitus appealed to words as embodying the nature of things. He saw in language the most constant thing in a world of ceaseless change. For him the structure of human speech reflects the structures of the world. Aristotle believed that everything appeared to the modelled in its entire character on numbers and that numbers are the things in the universe. Pythagoreans were puzzled by number symbols. In fact Pythogoreanism passed from a doctrine of the world as a procession of numbers out of the one to the construction of everything out of number-soul, each claiming an immortal and separate existence. 'All sounds evoke indefinable and yet precise emotions in or, call down among us certain disembodied powers whose footsteps over our hearts we call emotion.'[24] Ancient beliefs may be dead, but the instinct or the hope is strong. In ancient Africa,

> ... man's greatest power is the power of words. By virtue of this power, he is capable of creating meaning and value, of transforming the world and himself, and of giving meaningful directive of material events ... words have the power to define and to compel. As a result, it is the vehicle of order, the principle of creativity and destruction.[25]

There is no doubt that African science derives much of its strength from the occult powers associated with the power of spoken words.

The common criticism on African ritual practice is that it is not scientific, or that it does not follow the model of western science, and so it is irrational. But it has been argued that the history of human thought passed through mythology, religion, magic to what is now called western science; so magic and animism could be phases in the history of human thought before the emergence of western science which to some is more rational. Religious world-views, myths and symbols are rational and coherent system as well as constituting a material or fabric for a philosophical and scientific world-view or Theistic Humanism.

The history of western philosophy shows that there is no way myths and symbols of ancient Africa cannot be seen as philosophy or cannot be made to be subject to criticism. Philosophers in the history of western philosophy are categorized according to their thoughts and periods. There is the period called the 'Age of Belief' during which we had philosophers like St. Augustine, Boethius, St. Bernard, St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Williams of Ockam, all of them medieval philosophers. In the 'Age of Enlightenment' (the 18th century philosophers) we had Berkeley, Locke, Hume, Kant and so on. In the 'Age of Ideology' we had 19th century philosophers like Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comote, Mill, Marx, Nietzsche and so on. And the 'Age of Analysis' or the 20th century philosophers include Pierce, Whitehead, Hume, Dewey, Russell, Wittgenstein, Sartre and so on.

If this historical sketch is anything to go by, we would notice that what the medieval philosophers in the 'Age of Belief' were doing was what African philosophers like Placid Temples, Alexis Kagans, John Mbiti and so on were practising as philosophy. Just as the mythological era in western philosophy provided material for philosophizing in the platonic and medieval period, so also the mythological era in African philosophy provided material for Temples, Kagans and Mbiti's works. On the other hand, perhaps what the 18th century philosophers in the 'Age of Enlightenment' were doing is what the analytical philosophers or the monists like Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji were propagating. Since the 20th cen-

tury analysis was a consequence of the 'Age of Reason and Enlightenment', this school of thought could be indirectly also calling for an analytic approach to African Philosophy.

In the end, what the liberal (or inclusive) school and the monist (or exclusive) school are asking is what sort of philosophy is African philosophy in this modern period. The answers to this question are that African myths and symbols constitute an African philosophy, and that African philosophy should be critical, progressive and scientific. This hopefully reconciles the liberal and monist schools of thought on African philosophy as well as dissolving the misuse of the name 'philosophy' in African philosophy.

The initial advocates of the non-existence of African philosophy in the persons of Professor Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji and so on were at best representing the analytic and western conception of philosophy. Yet even the analytical texture of philosophical enterprise is not totally absent in the works of the major exponents of African philosophy like Professors Kwame Gyekye, C.B. Okolo, I. Onyenwuenyi, K.C. Anyanwu, T.U. Nwala, Sophie Oluwole etc. Not totally indifferent to the methodological, analytical, logical and discoursive nature of philosophy, Professor Kwame Gyekye in his numerous works, but inaugurals on African philosophy, initiated and propagated a goal and method of African philosophy which, though very interestingly philosophical in method, is truly African in orientation. The show-case or case study of most of his works is the Akan culture of Ghana.[26] In every one of his works, he sermonizes and propounds in propositional forms that African philosophy exists and secondly that it must not be studied with western concepts and paradigms. Professor Gyekye wittingly or unwittingly drew a veil on the wasteful but fundamentally a dialectically, philosophically and progressively tortuous and long-drawn debates on the existence of African philosophy spanning through the '70s and '80s of the 20th century. The outcome is the establishment of a philosophy of culture, philosophy of African culture and the philosophy in myths, symbols rituals and the world-views of the African.

The dialectical precursors and antitheses in the whole debate speak volumes of themselves in Wiredu's *Philosophy and an African Culture*, Hountondji's *African Philosophy: Myth or Reality*, Bodunrin's 'Question of African Philosophy and Others'.[27] Here the monumental and positive contribution to African philosophy lies in the 'red sign' and 'warning shot'

shown to those who may want to stampede African philosophy on the road to anthropology and traditional religion.

Yet the flag for African authenticity and capabilities in the field of knowledge has been relentlessly and successfully kept flying by the volumes and upon volumes of the interlocutions of the likes of Professor Kwame Gyekye. Professor Chukwudum Barnaba Okolo's 'Negritude and a Philosophy of Social Action', 'African Philosophy and Social Reconstruction', 'Problem of Self in African Philosophy' and others are commendable theses on African philosophy.[28] Here mention must be made of Richard Wright's 'Investigating African Philosophy', Lancinay Keita's 'The African Philosophical Tradition', Henry Olela's 'The African Foundation of Greek Philosophy', all in Richard Wright's edited works. Professor Innocent Onyenwuenye's *African Origin of Greek Philosophy* is an establishment on African Philosophy.[29] Many other works including that of Sophie Oluwole, Sodipo, T.U. Nwala, J.I. Omoregbe, G. Sogolo, M. Makinde, Odera Oruka, Anthony Appiah, Safro Kwame, C.S. Momoh, Robin Horton, Barry Hallen, D.E. Idoniboye, K.C. Anyanwu, J. Asike, C. Nwodo, Olusegun Oladipo and so on, have contributed immensely to the theses on African philosophy.[30]

Proponents of African Philosophy have been able to address most of the problems raised in connection with African philosophy. With regard to the intellectual dilemma created for the African philosopher, there is nothing like that now because English or French languages are available as meta-languages for the study of substantive items and elements of African belief system. African philosophy in its traditional and contemporary setting is an enterprise propelled by love of wisdom to understand the truth, reality and essence of things in African metaphysical, epistemological, logical and ethical world-views. The pursuit of African philosophy is a legitimate enterprise from both the ideological, racial or ethno-philosophical points of view and what the African can contribute to human knowledge. African philosophy should however break the language and scientific barriers to showcase African traditional knowledge to the world philosophical and scientific community. Theistic Humanism is the scientific content of the totality of African philosophy as an offshoot of African religious world-views of myths, and symbols. The role of Theistic Humanism is to demystify African philosophy and scientisize all identified rituals and practices that are of cognitive, empirical and pragmatic significance.

AFRAA

The debate on the existence of African Philosophy is a wasteful exercise. It is rather an insult to a people who love, care for themselves, communicate, eat, walk and work, grow from childhood through adulthood to old age and die according to their individual collective destinies, to say that they don't have a philosophy. The term Greek Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy (Darshana) and East Asian Philosophy are measures of philosophical independence and origin of the thoughts and traditions of these peoples. After all, they have their respective world-views and cosmologies on matters of ethics, politics, law and science. Every people's life is shaped and influenced by the quadratic support of either religion, ethics, politics and epistemology (science). For some people, religion permeates and directs politics, ethics and epistemology. For others religion has been separated from the rest. One wonders how the ontotheological philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism and to some extent Darshana could be separated from their background religious cultures. Much as attempts by academic philosophers have been made to separate it from religion, yet the reality and spirit of African philosophy and epistemology is religious given expressions in folklore, proverbs, wise sayings and histories.

If we have western philosophy, Indian philosophy (Darshana), Chinese philosophy, then we must have African philosophy which I prefer to call Afraa. This concept of Afraa for African philosophy is not as well a religion for the whole continent of Africa as the practices (underlined by the same belief) differ from one black people to another. Afraa therefore is not a religion but with religious background as Confucianism and Taoism. Hence it is open to criticism and scientific analysis.

The concept of Afraa is derived from the multiplicity of concepts basically pronounced in African cultures and traditions. Without hesitation over the truths of history and belief, Africa is said to have been discovered by a person called *Africanus*[31] who was the Roman General in charge of the present Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. There is also the theory that Africa was named after the Ascended Master called Afra.[32] In each of the above names, Africanus and Afra, *a* and *f* vowel and consonant sounds as well as the element *Af* are common. It is also observed that *a* element is a frequent occurrence and a denominator of most African thoughts, languages, terms and concepts. The following names and concepts among others betray the pronounced vowel *a* in the philosophical and metaphysical traditions of the black Africa.[33]

Chaka	— Epic and legendary Zulu King
Amma (God)	— Dogon (Congo) Metaphysics
Ujamaa	— Swahili (Tanzania) Political Philosophy
Umunna	— Igbo (Nigeria) Political Philosophy
Okra (soul)	— Akan (Ghana) metaphysics
Afa	— Igbo system of Divination
Ifa	— Yoruba system of Divination
Ra (God)	— Egyptian metaphysics
Khat (body)	— Egyptian metaphysics
Ka (individuality)	— Egyptian metaphysics
Ba (heart-soul)	— Egyptian metaphysics
ab (heart)	— Egyptian metaphysics

Noting the overwhelming presence of *a* (vowel) in African metaphysical, religious, social and epistemological concepts, I have recognized, *Afr* in *Africanus* and *Afra* and *a!!* (emphasis mine) in most African concepts and terms as shown above to have AFRAA as the thought and practice of African philosophy. Afraa, is a continuum in the historical, idealist and materialist dialectics in time and space. In other words, Afraa, the African philosophy is progressive, scientific and critical as well as reflecting the metaphysical and political traditions of Africans. Like Ujamaa of Swahili Tanzania, Afraa is therefore derived from the root vowels and consonants of the concepts of Africa and African metaphysical, epistemological and social world-views.

Afraa encapsulates the whole range of the philosophical practices in ancient Egyptians and Black African traditions. The concept of *Africana* in the *Encyclopaedia of the African and African-American Experience* is the dream of W.E.B. Dubois, a Harvard-trained historian and sociologist. It is about the history, culture and social institutions of the people of African descent. However this concept of Africana is essentially for the African diaspora. Afraa is not Africana which according to Kwame Anthony Appiah is 'a scientific enquiry, but works against superstition, myth and solace of religious faith'.[34] Instead as a philosophy, religiosity and myticism, it covers the phases of religious, mythical and cultural beliefs to progressive and scientific enquiry.

THE QUESTION OF ORAL TRADITION

Definitely, if we are to produce African traditional philosophy and logic, we would be confronted with the problems of either first pursuing a perfectly written African language and secondly translating African proverbs and wise-sayings into a logically perfect African language from where one may distil out formal truths and logic. Walter J. Ong in his work *Orality and Literacy—The Technology of the Word* says that

> abstractly, sequential, classificatory, explanatory examination of phenomena or of stated truths is impossible without writing and reading.[35]

There is no gain-saying the fact that writing makes the management of knowledge more rewarding than orality does. He contends that to move from orality to writing is to move from illogicality to a rational state of consciousness, and from a state of mental chaos to a domesticated thought process of science.

Going by Robin Horton, ideas on 'Philosophy and Logic', 'open and closed predicaments', African proverbs and wise sayings would definitely not pass for logic or philosophy. For Horton, rational as African thought may be, there is a sense in which this includes among its accomplishments neither logic nor philosophy. He says, logic means 'thinking directed to answering the question, what are the general rules by which we can distinguish good arguments from bad ones?'[36] And philosophy means 'thinking directed to answering the question: On what grounds can we ever claim to know anything about the world?'[37] According to Horton, Logic and Philosophy in these restricted senses are poorly developed in traditional Africa. According to him only where there are alternatives can there be choice, and only where there is choice can there be norms governing it. He therefore concluded that these second order intellectual activities are virtually absent from traditional cultures, while logic and philosophy are characteristically present in all scientifically oriented cultures. We may accept the contention that logic and philosophy are poorly developed in Africa only in the light of classical and contemporary philosophy oriented in modern science and logic. The ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary philosophy in Africa is a trajectory which would definitely meet up with the expectation of Robin Horton. The burden on us is therefore to make African philosophy more critical and scientific and make, if possible, its rhetorical logic like proverbs, wise-sayings and/or divinatory statements amenable to modern science.

Against the above background we shall be faced with the following problems concerning logic and epistemology in African thoughts:

(a) abandoning illogical natural language for a logically perfect language.
(b) opening the closed predicament of African culture especially as it concerns its epistemology.
(c) Discarding orality for a perfectly written African language translatable to a logically perfect English language.
(d) Discarding myths for facts.
(e) Translating African proverbs and wise-saying into conditionals and categorical forms amenable to modern logic.

THEISM AND HUMANISM

Theistic Humanism is a philosophical principle or doctrine designating African ideas of man, universe and God. Hence the ideas of Theism and Humanism are jointly and inseparably applicable to African culture. Theistic Humanism is based on the belief that Theism and Humanism are both compatible and harmonious elements of black metaphysical and epistemological world-view. Theism is a 'philosophical and theological doctrine maintaining the existence of one personal god, creator of the universe'.[38] Humanism on the other level, 'is any system which puts human interest paramount'.[39] African culture is an example of a culture that is humanistic while at the same time holding the belief in transcendental beings like spirits, gods and so on. It is shown by this idea that though Humanism and Theism appear as contraries yet both can be true in African and Asian cultures.

African and Asian cultures are existentially pragmatic in their philosophies which are a medley of pantheism, polytheism and theism. Also polytheism, theism and pantheism were features of Peruvian, Aztec, African and Asian civilizations. These civilizations were preoccupied with not only the interest and welfare of man, but also with spiritualism. Here, spiritualism is for man and not man for spiritualism. This is the basis of agrarian and egalitarian cultures.

In African, Asian and other cultures, there is a common belief in the plurality of divinities. Most of these divinities and gods have specific functions in their relationship with man. For example, the Hindu Siva and Visnu are associated with reincarnation. In Africa, too, there is a god of

this and a god of that. It is interesting to note that in African and Asian mythologies, the lesser gods were either created by God or they were part of Him. In African thought, the supreme being, God, is conceived as a transcendental and immanent being. It is believed that the lesser gods were created by Him. Some Africans believed that the lesser gods emanated from Him. Most Hindus believed that the gods are symbols of one '*Divine Reality*'. In classical Buddhism too, several gods were worshipped. Some of these gods like Amitobha and Avalikitsvara were believed to be in the final analysis unified in the 'Absolute or the void' (Sunya). The idea of God in Buddhism might be controversial. But it is said that Buddha taught his followers that worship and sacrifices to god were useless. Ironically, the same Buddha was deified by his followers and worshipped like a god.

There are however some ideas in western philosophy very close to both Hindu and Buddhist cultures. Idealism in the West tends to suggest a belief in *Ultimate reality*. In naturalistic objective idealism, Leibniz talks of the existence of monads or invisible eternal principles governed by an *Ultimate principle*. In absolute idealism reality is a *Single Spiritual Absolute*. In Schelling's 'Philosophy of Identity', there is a union of the philosophy of nature and Transcendental Idealism through *Absolute Reason*. What it means is that the mind and thing-in-itself or subject and object are united in total identity as the *highest law*. Every finite thing is an appearance resulting from the departure from the standpoint of the absolute. Subject–object is the absolute knowing itself and yet nothing is outside the absolute. Similarly in Hegel's Absolute Rational idealism 'reality is the self-unfolding of the *Absolute idea* from God to His creation, and to return into itself'. And in Spinoza's monistic substantive naturalism, reality is a *Single* substance which God is. Finally, it is interesting to note that the Christian and Islamic idea of God is that of a *Transcendent* powerful and loving being.

There is the tendency to exclude or bar polytheism from philosophical and religious thought. This is because where a culture holds the belief in the plurality of divinities, there is often the ultimate principle. A paraphrase of the above conceptions of God will severally yield polymonotheism, pantheism and monotheism. Polymonotheism is the belief in plurality of divinities which are in the final analysis subject to one supreme being. This is identification of the supreme being (God) with universe. This is identifiable in the Buddhist's 'Absolute or Void', Schelling's 'Absolute Reason', Spinoza's 'Single Substance' etc. Monotheism is identifiable in Christian, Islamic and some other western philosophies.

The possible common cultural heritage of the Africans and Asians is therefore their belief in the plurality of divinities which is a medley of polymonotheism and pantheism. This means that these cultures believe in plurality of gods which were either created or governed by an ultimate being or principle or they were part of it. It is for this reason that it is possible that these cultures may not be atheistic as some people think. They are theistic as well as humanistic. Therefore I formulated the principle of doctrine of Theistic Humanism as possible Afro-Asian common cultural heritage. Some writers like Sir Edward Burnett Tylor and Emile Durkheim have described belief in divinities as a stage in the evolution to a higher culture. This is suggesting that belief in plurality of divinities is a lower culture compared with monotheism. Contrary to this thesis, belief in plurality of divinities is humanistic and existentially pragmatic.

In the realm of ethics, these cultures may not be said to be supernaturalistic. This is because, for example, in African ethics, a thing is not bad because God said it is not bad and good because He said it is good. Things are good or bad independent of the will of God. In the realm of spiritualism both cultures are also humanistic. African gods, spirits and ancestors were guardians of morality. They were ever-ready to ensure the continued existence of the society. It is said that Indian attitude to life is ascetic and world-denying. This is because Indian culture enjoins one to enjoy pleasure but only to the extent that it does not jeopardize one's life in the next realm of existence. According to Huston Smiths, India has not taken pleasure as life's highest value, but this is different from condemning enjoyment as itself evil. To the person who wants pleasures, India says:

> ... in effect, go after it, there is nothing wrong with it. It is one of the four legitimate ends of life. The world holds immense possibilities for enjoyment. It is awash with beauty and heavy with delights for our senses. Moreover, there are other worlds above this world where pleasures mount by a factor of a million at each successive round; we shall experience these worlds too at life stages in our becoming.[41]

The Humanism in Hinduism and Buddhism is that they extol the intellectual and spiritual self-control of men.

Theistic Humanism is a metaphysical principle deduced from the African world of gods, ancestors and spirits. Religion and Spiritualism permeates every facet of human existence in African and Asian worlds. Their ontologies are panpsychic. To the Indian peasant, 'virtually all religions from its rites and rituals to its ethical dictates, is presented as something that can protect his prosperity and good fortune, bring rain, heal the sick, and in general insure good fortune'.[42] In Africa, most diviners were 'believed to be under possession by spirits when engaged in divination, and doctors claim that they are chosen by spirits, taught medicine by spirits and guided in their profession of diagnosis and healing by spirits'.[43] Mahatma Gandhi was said to have been the spokesman for the conscience of mankind. In his autobiography, Gandhi wrote, 'such power as I possess for working in the political field was derived from my experiment in spiritual field ... truth is the sovereign principle'.[44] Here Gandhi was re-echoing the pragmatic and humanistic nature of Indian spiritualism. In Indian culture, one is constrained spiritually to refrain from doing things that are inimical to man.

In the African world of gods, spirits and ancestors, there was no police force to check evil and moral offence. Retribution or Nemesis was the metaphysical instrument of checking and punishing moral or civil or criminal offences. Similarly, in Indian culture the spiritual-order visits retribution to those who were greedy, wicked and who were not humane. This is what Max Mueller said about India:

> If I were asked under what sky the human mind ... has most deeply pondered over the greatest problems of life, and has found solution of some of them which well deserve the attention even of those who have studied Plato and Kant ... I should point to India. And if I were to ask myself from what literature we ... may draw the corrective which is most wanted in order to make our inner life more truly human a life, not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life again I should point to India.[45]

Theistic humanism underlines African and Asian egalitarianism, fair-play and justice. And it is a possible common basis for the struggle for justice by all third world countries. Theistic humanism is, therefore, the philosophy, in the belief in God, gods, spirits, ancestors, objects, myths, symbols and of the interest of man. The former are philosophical objects and the latter, that is man, is a thinking or philosophical subject. In African

philosophy, God, gods spirits, objects, myths, symbols and so on play vital roles as scientific objects and variables. Therefore, the philosophy of Scientific Africanism is the philosophy in myth, symbols and religious world-views of the Africans. Scientific Africanism is an African account of nature and how it works for man's utility. Science and technology cannot thrive in a vacuum, that is, in isolation from a metaphysical frame-work, and Africa's cultural heritage provides that much-needed metaphysics which will enable the move towards a scientific culture in Africa.

Since the dawn of freedom and decolonization, African renaissance and economic empowerment have been an empty slogan and discourse simply because of the lack of sciences and technologies, but precisely because of the lack of scientific thoughts that would coalesce into a world-view necessary for technological advances and challenges. A world-view, to say the least, determines the economic and scientific undertakings of a people. Consider the fact that a fixed universe informed the Newtonian Sciences or the quantum mechanic and dynamic universe informed the Quantum Relativity Theory of Albert Einstein, one begins to witness the sensation and puzzles generated by the relations between a world-view and the scientific thoughts of the ages.

African people in the communalistic and traditional thoughts have the challenge of science more than ever and hence require to revise and do a rethink of their metaphysical and epistemological world-views into a philosophical and scientific paradigm, which though may be theoretical, will go a long way to fulfil the dream of black renaissance in concrete economic and scientific terms. Theistic Humanism is semantically an amalgam of two seemingly incompatible propositions couched in two words—Theism and Humanism. Curiously but interestingly, in African philosophy, Theism and Humanism are phenomenological terms that have governed the African metaphysical and epistemological world-views. Precisely, the crystallization of African science or what may be modestly called 'African Scientific Methodology' is a hybrid of these two key concepts.

Philosophy is a rigorous and conceptual enterprise whose goals are scientific forethoughts, construction, destruction and deconstruction which ultimately leads to quantum leaps and advancement in human endeavours. Without this, the world would be ruled by mythologies of the ancient Greeks, Romans, Britain, America, Russia, Japan, France, India and Africa. Theistic Humanism has a scientific import and essence as against the

anthropological and religious Humanism. The threadbare notion or nature of the 'religious' makes a world of difference between the scientific philosophy immanent in Theistic Humanism and the unscientific world-view of religious humanism. However, this does not deny the fact that the African world-view is religious, meaning that Theistic Humanism is a necessary consequence of the latter.

The logic of Theistic Humanism is an aspect and parcel of African ontology and metaphysics. The relationship between Theism and Humanism can be read-off as a logical statement in the traditional square of opposition. The symbols T and H are well meaning representations of Theism and Humanism respectively. That is T = df = 'Theism' and H = df = 'Humanism'. The analysis of the ontology, logic and metaphysics of Theistic Humanism in the square of opposition could be well-captured in the categorical prepositions of A, E, I and O.

(All T is H) A	Contraries	E (No T is H)
Subaltern		Subaltern
(Some T is H) I		O (Some T is not H)
	Subcontraries	

Indeed as shown in the above square, Theism as represented by T, and H as represented by Humanism are subject and predicate propositions respectively even though each of them by definition have propositional explananda. These propositions are respresented in each of the categorical propositions A E I and O and their subject–predicate calculus reflecting different cultures and peoples. While A = df = 'All T is H' is typically that of the African question, E (No T is H) is close to that of most European cultures. It is not difficult to believe that I (some T is H) and O (some T is not H) could represent the world-views of some cultures. The dictionary definition of Humanism has a tendency to put Theism against it and this is aptly represented by E propositions. But the African philosophy in question is an A proposition contrary to E proposition. This indeed establishes the contingent and fallacious definition of Humanism as the contrary of Theism. This suggests that cultures, people and world-views have their respective definitions of Humanism.

Another line of justification of Theistic Humanism would appraise the logical nature of contraries like X is black and X is white. What this logically implies in Theistic Humanism is like saying X is Theistic and X

is Humanistic. What we then suppose to argue against is that 'X is Theistic and X is Humanistic are contraries'. So instead of saying that both can be false but both cannot be true, we rather suppose the existential imports of all propositions where both can be true. It is only agnostics or sceptics who would differ on this score in which case the issue of whether Theism and Humanism can be upheld together at the same time will not arise.

Another aspect of the fallacy of the Humanism opposition to Theism is seen in the implications of conjunction or disjunction in the relation between the former and the later. If Theism is opposed to Humanism it could be that it is a matter of Disjunction. Yet if Theism is true and Humanism is either false or true, the statement Theistic Humanism would still be true. Symbolically expressed as:

Theism	Humanism	Theism v. Humanism
T	F	T
F	T	T

On the other hand where a conjunction is implied, the truth of Theistic Humanism is overwhelmingly clear for a people that says 'yes' to both concepts. In the case where any of the concepts is not affirmed, contradiction results. This is however obtainable in western scientific world-views. Symbolically it is expressed as:

Theism	Humanism	Theism . Humanism
T	F	F

The conclusion arising from this discourse is that Theistic Humanism interpreted either as Theism v. Humanism or Theism (and) Humanism are logical statements not necessarily opposed to each other as may be interpreted by the dictionary.

THE SCIENTIFIC QUESTION OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Theist Humanism could be a questionable, unabsolute and critical philosophy that can subject other subsidiary thoughts and elements to question and criticism. Theistic Humanism is opposed to some aspect of traditional thoughts or rather that it has a tendency to falsify them. Now that the long and protracted debate on African philosophy has settled, philosophical and scientific world-view, an African epistemological and metaphysical world-view, that can best be represented by Theistic Humanistic philosophy is only, and only, a function of 'Philosophy' though

it is an African philosophical and scientific world-view. Philosophy can be defined as a scientific and theoretical study of objects and lives on earth and the outer spaces. This study is achieved through epistemological, logical, metaphysical and ethical as well as critical enquiry. Yet some have defined philosophy as either metaphysics or epistemology or ethics or science etc. depending on their theoretical predilections. Philosophy has been defined as 'love for wisdom'. Hence, a philosopher may be called a lover of wisdom. Philosophy is used to denote love of thinking, thinking attitude, reflective attitude towards life. A philosopher is interested in 'grasping essential nature of things'. Thus, philosophy was defined as a reflective and reasoned attempt to infer the character and content of the universe taken in its totality. We may say that philosophy is a resolute and persistent attempt to understand and appreciate the universe as a whole.[46] The question is how African philosophy can contribute to science. We are aware that most propositions of African traditional thoughts are mystical and esoteric. But some are objective enough to be of interest for the physicists. Theistic Humanism is interested in scientisizing propositions and concepts of African traditional thoughts like:

(a) Mystical Propositions and Concepts
  (1) Travelling by a spark of light in the air to the desired destination called 'Ikili' by the Igbo of Nigeria.
  (2) Witchcraft
  (3) Azande belief system
  (4) Ifa (Yoruba) belief system
  (5) Afa (Igbo) belief system

(b) Objective and Physical propositions and concepts
  (1) Use of pawpaw seed, pineapples, unripe pawpaw, lipton, sugarcane for the cure of malaria.
  (2) Use of bitter leaf, warm water and garlic to cure diabetes.
  (3) Use of lemon grass, grape, unripe pawpaw and unripe pineapple for the cure of typhoid fever[47] etc.

The questions to be raised in the scientific paradigm of Theistic Humanism are many: What is the world-view that informed these practices? Is it a science?, or can it be scientisized? Theistic Humanism presupposes that the metaphysical world that informed all these propositions is the belief in gods, ancestors, spirits and God and their roles in the enhancement of human interest. This philosophy is predicated on the non-physical dimension of reality and the notions of spirits, souls, ancestors, demi-

gods, and divinities are no less legitimate than notions about germs, genes, electrons, positrons and neutrons.

The problem with this world-view which philosophy and theistic humanistic or scientific paradigm is trying to tackle is how to make the hypotheses based on non-physical reality universal, have alternative, criticizable and recognizable beyond the frontiers of the world of gods and ancestors. According to Henry Johnson, science

> ... is empirical; that is based on observation ... It is theoretical; that attempts to summarize complex observations in abstract logically related propositions which purport to explain causal relationships in the subject matter ... It is cummulative; that is, theories build upon one another ... It is a non-ethical; ...[48]

It is the task of African philosophy and Theistic Humanism to answer the questions raised in the above definition of science. African science is possible if and only if it is scientific at both empirical and theoretical levels. The question again is, will both the empirical or theoretical criteria be satisfied at the same time? This is the demand of western science and a million question for African traditional thoughts.

CONCLUSION

It is hereby argued that Theistic Humanism is African philosophical world-view from where it is possible to develop a science or methodology. But there are certain challenges, to tackle which an attempt must be made for a successful advocacy of a scientific world-view. There is the need for African emergence in science and technological manpower more than ever. It is believed that an African renaissance must be preceded by scientific and theoretical philosophy which will act as a world-view. Theistic Humanism is theorized as the scientific world-view. It has to be defended and made to exist against scientific and philosophical scepticism. Africa has had a long history culturally, and its traditions never die hard as it has lived very long and outlived many. The philosophical world-views of many peoples and races have often been translated into scientific world-views. Take for instance the Renaissance philosophies of Rene-Descartes and Emmanuel Kant among others which formed the core metaphysical and logical substance of modern European science. Similarly personal philosophical and cultural views and experiences have often underlined many scientists' discoveries. Theistic Humanism is a philosophical-cum-

scientific world-view since it has for the greater part of its essence placed emphasis on man, and man for that matter is the object of science. In defence of this philosophical thesis, it is worrisome to be confronted by certain claims on African traditions by Robin Horton and others. These claims are:

> (1) Scientific thought has developed awareness of alternatives: traditional thought lacks such an awareness. (2) The theoretical tenets of traditional society are accepted absolutely and unquestioningly, those of science are held, if they are held at all, tentatively, conditionally and critically.[49]

For an optimistic view of African scientific emancipation, I have attempted to debunk these claims or at best assert that traditional thought has or can have awareness of alternatives and can be or are accepted tentatively, conditionally or critically.

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Is Epistemic Externalism Tenable?

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WHAT IS EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM?

According to Putnam, two people can have qualitatively identical minds and yet have different beliefs. What is Putnam's reason for holding this view?[1] Assume that there is alternative world which is qualitatively just like our world except that, in this alternative world, the entity which is called 'water' is *not* composed of H_2O molecules but has some other composition. (It consists of xyz.) Otherwise, what people refer to as 'water' in this alternative world is just like what we call 'water': xyz has precisely the same phenomenal properties as what we call 'water'.

Further, suppose that, in our world, $Oscar_1$ has a belief which, in English, is given by the sentence 'water quenches thirst'; and that $Oscar_1$'s counterpart in the alternative world—call this person '$Oscar_2$'—has a belief which, in *his* version of English, is given by the sentence 'water quenches thirst'.

Remember that, in every respect, $Oscar_1$'s mental contents are qualitatively identical with $Oscar_2$'s mental contents. (This follows from the fact that, with the above mentioned qualification, $Oscar_1$'s world, is, qualitatively identical with $Oscar_2$'s world.)

Do $Oscar_1$ and $Oscar_2$ mean the same thing by the words 'water quenches thirst'? In other words, do they express the same belief by these words? (Let us assume that they are both competent speakers of English and that they are speaking honestly.)

According to Putnam, the answer is *no*. $Oscar_1$'s statement, says Putnam, means that H_2O quenches thirst whereas $Oscar_2$'s statement means that xyz quenches thirst. So what $Oscar_1$ means is different from what $Oscar_2$ means, even though $Oscar_1$'s mental state is qualitatively identical with $Oscar_2$'s mental state.

So, concludes Putnam two people could have qualitatively identical minds and yet have different beliefs: what a person *means* is determined, not solely by his mind, but by also by objects that are *external* to his mind. Putnam is thus an *epistemic externalist.*

PUTNAM'S CONFUSION

Here is what I hold. If two people have qualitatively identical perceptions, then they *do* perceive qualitatively identical objects. What $Oscar_1$ perceives *is* qualitatively identical with what $Oscar_2$ perceives. $Oscar_1$ does not perceive H_2O: he perceives a representation or *analogue* of H_2O. (When you look at water, you don't see a lot of discrete molecules; you don't *see* H_2O. If you did, then everyone with good eyesight would know that water consisted of discrete molecules. When you look at water, you see a completely homogeneous substance.) Similarly, $Oscar_2$ does not perceive xyz; he sees some analogue thereof. The analogue that $Oscar_1$ perceives *is* qualitatively identical with the analogue that $Oscar_2$ perceives. Consequently, $Oscar_1$'s beliefs concern the same thing as $Oscar_2$'s. By Putnam's hypothesis, the only difference between $Oscar_1$'s beliefs and $Oscar_2$'s is that the former concern H_2O, while the latter concern xyz. So, since the former and the latter beliefs *do* concern the same thing, $Oscar_1$ *does* have exactly the same beliefs as $Oscar_2$. Consequently, Putnam's argument fails.

Now I must prove that, indeed, $Oscar_1$ and $Oscar_2$ perceive *analogues* of H_2O and xyz, and not H_2O and xyz themselves. I must prove, in general, that we sense-perceive, not external objects, but analogues thereof.

A sense-perception can only be described in terms of its *object*. But obviously there can be two qualitatively different perceptions of a single object at a given time. Hence, with regard to that object in terms of which the content of a given sense-perception is to be delineated, that object does not always coincide with the mind-independent entity which is, in some sense, given to the percipient by the perception.

Imagine the following situation. You look through a high-powered microscope. (You were not able to look at the object on the bench of the microscope *before* you looked through it. So, in that sense, you don't know what you are observing; you don't know whether what you are seeing is a pebble or a leaf or an insect's wing.) Let P be the resulting sense-perception. You describe what you see. Let D be this description.

D is a description of P. (By delineating what you perceive, you are delineating the content of the perception in question.) Assume that D is an exhaustive description of P. Next you look at some leaf with the naked eye. Let P′ be *this* sense-perception. You describe the content of P′. (In other words, you describe the leaf as it appears to you with the naked eye.) Let D′ be *this* description. (Assume that D′ is an exhaustive description of what you saw.) It turns out that what you saw through the microscope is identical with this leaf. In other words, it turns out that D and D′ are both descriptions of the same thing.

Do P and P′ have the same object? Well, by hypothesis they are both perceptions of the same object; they are both perceptions of a certain leaf. So, given this fact, it would seem undeniable that P and P′ have the same object. But at the same time, a perception cannot be described except in terms of its object, and P is given by a description utterly different from that by which P′ is given; from which, given that these descriptions are exhaustive, it follows that the object of P is different, qualitatively and therefore numerically, from the object of P′. So we have a paradox on our hands: P and P′ have the *same* object but they have *different* objects.

It might be thought that I am simply confusing connotation with denotation (as Mill would put it) or sense and reference (as Frege would put it): the two perceptions have the same object (or referent) but different senses (or contents). But this objection is untenable. As we have noted, a perception cannot possibly be described except in terms of its object; for a perception is, in a logical and not merely a causal sense, a derivative of its object. So, since the two perceptions are exhaustively described by different descriptions, it follows that the *objects* of these two perceptions are given by different descriptions. These descriptions are exhaustive. So the objects of these descriptions are different from each other.

Also, it cannot be said that P and P′ are perceptions of two different *appearances*. Perceptions do not have *appearances* for their objects. For a thing to appear to me *is* for me to perceive that thing. My perception of the thing *is* that thing's appearing to me; it *is* that thing's appearance (or, more exactly, it is an instance of that thing's appearance). Perceptions do not have perceptions for their objects; hence they do not have appearances for their objects. We perceive things, not appearances.

So we seem to have a genuine paradox on our hands: P and P′ do and do not have the same object. How is this paradox to be resolved?

This paradox forces us to adopt the following epistemology. In any given sense-perception, one is given, not some completely mind-independent object, but a kind of *analogue* of a mind-independent object. If the sense-perception in question is veridical—in other words, if it is not a delusion or hallucination—then this virtual object is counterbalanced by a completely mind-independent object; if not, then there is no such counterbalancing mind-independent object. P has some analogue for its object, and P′ has a different analogue for *its* object. But both of these analogues are analogues of the same mind-independent object (a certain leaf).

At first this epistemology might seem preposterous; but I remind the reader that we have been led to adopt it by the most sober of considerations. P and P′ are both perceptions of a certain leaf. But, being perceptions, P and P′ are such that it is not possible to state what properties they have except by stating what properties their respective objects have. (This point might seem to be the Achilles' heel in my argument. But surely it is a correct point. How could you possibly delineate the content of a perception except by describing the object of that perception?) The object in terms of which P is described has properties not possessed by the object in terms of which P′ is described. So P and P′ have *different* objects. But P and P′ are not completely disconnected from each other: they both provide information about some *single* object—a certain leaf. P′ provided information about the leaf's grosser structural properties (e.g. its overall shape), whereas P provided information about the leaf's finer structural features (its *internal* structure). So both P and P′ *bear* on some one object; but they *have* different objects. P and P′ have as their respective objects different *analogues* or projections of some single mind-independent entity.

Physical objects are obviously mind-independent, but analogues are not. Analogues are representations; and there would not be representations of things unless there were minds.

OTHER REASONS TO ACCEPT THIS EPISTEMOLOGY

There is independent corroboration for this epistemology. A non-veridical perception (a hallucination, a distorted or delusional perception) obviously has *some* object. A hallucination cannot possibly be a hallucination of *nothing*; a hallucination must have *some* object. This object cannot be unreal. There are only real objects. (What on earth would an unreal object be?) But clearly a hallucination differs in an essential respect from a veridical perception. The difference is *not* that the perception has an object whereas the hallucination does not; for, to reiterate, hallucinations have objects. (A person can always say *what* he was hallucinating. A 'hallucination' that had no object would not be a hallucination.) Rather, the difference is that the object of the hallucination is not, whereas the object of the perception is, counterbalanced by some mind-independent object. The snakes which a drunkard hallucinates are not counterbalanced by mind-independent snakes. But the pen which I see in my hands is (I should hope) counterbalanced by a real pen.

Also, if this epistemology is incorrect, then there is no way to explain how it is that we can learn *more* about objects with which we are already acquainted. Suppose that you are already acquainted with some particular rock. Obviously you can learn more about that rock by (e.g.) looking at it through a microscope. But if what were given to you in any one perception of the rock were identical with what were given to you in any other perception of that rock, then once you had had even a single perception of the rock, you would have nothing left to learn about the rock. But you *would* have much left to learn about the rock if you had had only one perception of it. So clearly what is given to you in any one perception of the rock is different from what would be given to you by at least some other perceptions of the rock. Further, there is clearly some reason to identify 'what is given to you' by a perception with the so-called 'object' of that perception. (Really, in this context 'object' and 'what is given to you' are synonymous.) However, in some cases there is also reason to *identify* the objects of two qualitatively different perceptions. There seems no way to avoid a paradox here except by advocating the epistemology set forth in this paper: two qualitatively different perceptions of (e.g.) a particular rock can have different objects in the sense that they are perceptions of different *analogues* of that rock; but these two perceptions have the *same* object in the sense that both of these analogues correspond to a single mind-independent object.

Analogues might be described as the *immediate* objects of sense-perception, and the mind-independent correlates of analogues as the *mediate* objects of sense-perception. Mind independent objects are known by first knowing these analogues: the properties of the former are deduced from those of latter. The latter are of course known immediately.

THE RELEVANCE OF THIS EPISTEMOLOGY TO EXTERNALISM

Let us now bring these considerations to bear on the view that two people can have different empirical beliefs even though the one person's mind is qualitatively identical to the other's. This view is based on a failure to distinguish the immediate from the mediate object of a perception. It is true that the content of an empirical belief can be delineated only in terms of the objects with which that belief is concerned; so it is true that what a person *means* when he expresses such a belief in language can only be delineated in terms of these objects. But an empirical belief is to be delineated in terms of these objects in the *immediate*, not the *mediate*, sense of the word 'object'.

Any three-year-old surely believes that water quenches thirst, but very few three-year-olds believe that H_2O quenches thirst. If Putnam is right, then given a three-year-old who believes that water quenches thirst but who does not know that water consists of H_2O molecules, in order to delineate the three-year-old's belief, it is necessary to mention H_2O molecules. From this it would follow that, if a professor of chemistry were to say 'there is no water in the swimming pool', the beliefs informing this remark would be identical with the beliefs informing that same sentence when uttered by a three-year-old. But that is patently false. So although the content of a belief cannot be delineated except in terms of its object, it is *not* the case that this object is some completely mind-independent entity. Rather, this object is some mind-independent entity *as represented* to the relevant subject; this object is the *immediate*, not the *mediate*, object of the relevant subject's sense-perception.

Let us once again consider Putnam's story. With regard to the belief which $Oscar_1$ expresses with the words 'water quenches thirst effectively', the *immediate* objects with which this belief is concerned are qualitatively identical to the immediate objects of the belief which $Oscar_2$ expresses by these same words. Hence what $Oscar_1$ *means* by these words is identical with what $Oscar_2$ means by these same words. (We are assuming that both $Oscar_1$ and $Oscar_2$ are using these words correctly and are speaking sincerely.) Now, sentences express beliefs: what a sentence *means* is determined entirely by what beliefs it can express. So the *meaning* of $Oscar_1$'s utterance is identical with that of $Oscar_2$'s utterance.

EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF NON-TRIVIAL EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATIONS

Beliefs about spatio-temporal objects are to be delineated in terms of the *immediate*, not the mediate, objects of sense-perception. A caveman's beliefs about the liquid he likes to drink are not to be delineated in terms of the concept 'H_2O molecule', for he has no idea what a H_2O molecule is. But his belief must be delineated in terms of *some* object. (For the content of a belief cannot be described except in terms of the objects which that belief concerns.) This object is, not H_2O, but a perceptible analogue of this entity.

This last idea may seem absurd. But it solves an important epistemological problem. The statement 'water is H_2O' is obviously non-trivial. If Putnam is right, then the word 'water' has always meant H_2O. If this is correct, then the sentence 'water is H_2O' has always meant 'H_2O is H_2O'. But this is obviously not true. The latter sentence is trivial. By contrast, the sentence 'water is H_2O' is not trivial. In general, if Putnam is right, and the content of any empirical belief is to be delineated in terms of the *extensions* of the terms occurring in sentential expressions of that belief, then all true identity-beliefs will turn out to be trivial. (By an 'identity-belief' I mean any belief given by a sentence of the form 'A is identical with B'.) For, given any true sentence of the form 'A is identical with B', both 'A' and 'B' have the same extension. But some identity beliefs are non-trivial. So how are identity-sentences to be analyzed?

Russell's Solution

The sentence 'water is H_2O' *seems* to say that two things—water and H_2O—are identical. According to Russell, this is not so. We must distinguish, says Russell, between that sentence's surface structure and its deep structure—between (to use Russell's own terms) its 'grammatical' and its 'logical form'. What that sentence *really* says is known when its *logical*, not its grammatical, form is known. Judging by its grammatical form, 'water is H_2O' says two things are one. But if this is what that sentence really meant, then it would be absurd or trivial, depending on whether 'water' and 'H_2O' were coreferential. But that sentence is neither absurd nor trivial. So we must unearth this sentence's logical form to see what it really says. This logical form, says Russell, is given by some sentence of the form: 'there is some x such that x has such-and-such characteristics;

moreover x also has thus-and-such characteristics.'[2] In general, according to Russell, non-trivial identity statements are all to the effect that some one entity has two different sets of characteristics or, put differently, satisfies two different descriptions.

One point must be made regarding Russell's analysis. For Russell, given any sentence of the form 'A is identical with B', what that sentence *really* says is accurately expressed only by some sentence that contains *no terms that have a sense*. (Consequently, that sentence will contain no terms *denoting mind-independent spatio-temporal objects*. For any such object can be given only through some appearance and, therefore, in association with some sense.) So a perspicuous rendering of 'water is H_2O' will contain only 'logically proper names'. A logically proper name is one that denotes its object *directly*, i.e. not through the medium of a sense or description. Why does Russell hold that all perspicuous sentences contain only logically proper names, and no names having a sense? Because, insofar as a sentence contains a term having a sense, its content is to that extent implicit: its surface structure conceals part of its content. An expression that has a sense is really equivalent to a description: descriptions are senses put into words. Descriptions are necessarily complex. (The simplest descriptions are of subject-predicate form; and such descriptions have two constituents.) So if a *single* word has a sense, that means that its content, which is complex, is not represented by its form, which is simple. So a perspicuous sentence can contain no terms having a sense. Consequently, a perspicuous sentence contains only logically proper names; it will contain no symbols synonymous with either 'water' or 'H_2O' or, for that matter, with any (non-indexical) noun. For all such expressions have senses.

What kinds of names are 'logically proper'? Only those that denote objects that are given to us *immediately*, i.e. are not known to us through any medium. Mind-independent objects are always known to us through a medium; so terms denoting such objects have senses. (A sense is the linguistic counterpart of a medium.) Consequently, only terms denoting certain kinds of mental contents lack senses. So, if Russell's analysis of sentences like 'water is H_2O' is correct, then this sentence must be synonymous with one that mentions *only certain kind of mental contents*.

What kind of mental contents could these be? Well, of what kinds of mental contents does one have *immediate* knowledge? Mental contents that are to any degree unconscious are not known immediately. So only

contents of consciousness can be known immediately. Only affects (sensations, feelings) and perceptions are wholly conscious. (For brevity's sake, let us refer to all such terms as 'sense-data'.) So only those terms that denote sense-data are devoid of sense. So, for Russell's solution to be correct, all empirical sentences—including empirical identity-sentences—must be translatable into sentences that are ultimately about sense-data alone.

Russell's solution is not tenable. Sentences that, so far as their surface structure indicates, seem to be about objects cannot in general be translated, without loss or alteration of content, into statements that are solely about sense-data. Basically, references to mind-independent objects ('gold', 'Socrates') cannot be eliminated in favour of references to mental contents. Why not? Because, as Frederick Waismann[3] and Clarence Lewis[4] have shown, any statement about an *object* entails an infinite number of truths about sense-data. No statement about sense-data will exhaust the content of a statement about mind-independent objects. So Russell's theory of reference must be rejected; for this theory of reference presupposes that object-statements are equivalent to sense-datum statements.

Frege's Solution

Frege's solution is to say: 'It is true that "water" and "H_2O" have the same referent. But these two expressions have different senses. That is why "water is identical with H_2O" is non-trivial while being true.'

Frege's analysis is not tenable. A sentence makes a statement about the *referents* of the referring terms occurring in it, and *only* about the referents of those terms. Fregean senses help us to figure out what proposition is being expressed; but they are not themselves part of this proposition. (The sense of 'Hesperus' helps us to figure out that sentences like 'Hesperus is lovely' are about some planet. But that sense is not itself a constituent of that proposition. 'Hesperus is lovely' is about a planet, not a sense.) So if, as Frege believes, the expression 'water' is functioning as a referring term in the sentence 'water quenches thirst', then in order to know what that sentence says, you have to know what the referent of 'water' is. But if you know what the referent of 'water' is, then—if Frege is right in believing that 'water' and 'H_2O' are just different names for the same thing—you *ipso facto* know that the referent of 'water' is H_2O. So, contrary to what Frege says, the words 'water' and 'H_2O' are *not* functioning as different names for the same thing. Hence, Frege's analysis fails.

In response to this, Frege could say that senses *are* constituents of the propositions they are associated with. But then Frege's solution coincides with Russell's; and in that case, as we have seen, it is untenable. Why does Frege's solution coincide with Russell's if we take senses to be constituents of the propositions they are associated with? If the *senses* of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are part of the proposition expressed by 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', they are only *implicit* in this sentence. To express the proposition in question perspicuously, it would be necessary to find some synonymous sentence containing *no* terms having senses. (For insofar as a sentence contains terms having a sense, its content is implicit.) Among nouns, only terms denoting sense-data lack sense. So 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' would have to be synonymous with some sentence about sense-data. But it isn't. So the senses of expressions cannot be part of the content of sentences containing those expressions.

My Solution

So what is the correct analysis of the sentence 'Water is identical with H_2O'? This sentence says that a certain perceptible entity (water) is *associated* in some way with a certain imperceptible entity (H_2O). In general, empirical sentences of the form 'A is identical with B' say that two different objects are associated with each other in a certain way. 'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus' says that two different perceptible entities (denoted by 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus') form two different segments of a single causal sequence. In a word, empirical identity statements say that two different entities are associated with each other in some way. (As for how the entities in question must be 'associated' with each other if the relevant identification is to be true—this depends on the context in question. We will get to this point in a moment.)

Perhaps the following reflection will lend credence to this view. Putnam takes it for granted that 'water' *refers* to H_2O and that, accordingly, water is, in some unconditional sense, identical with H_2O. 'After all', one might say, 'science says that water is H_2O. Who are we to gainsay science?' Before acquiescing to this, do the following thought-experiment. Imagine that you lived in a world where objects' *phenomenal* properties remained relatively constant, but where their microstructural properties changed all the time. So, in this world, the atomic and molecular structure of your desk would constantly be changing. At one moment, it would be composed of atoms having one number of electrons; at another it would be composed of atoms having a different number of electrons; and so on. But, despite this, your desk would keep the same phenomenal or macroscopic properties throughout all these micro-structural changes. (This is all logically possible.) In this world, would the expression 'my desk' have any stable meaning? Of course it would. The fact that your desk—and that desks and, indeed, *all* physical objects—were always changing, in fundamental ways, at the micro-structural level would not deprive expressions like 'desk', 'water', and 'bread' of their meanings. These expressions would function perfectly well in this alternative world. Why would they function well? Because, so long as objects' *macro*scopic properties remained relatively constant, words denoting objects would serve perfectly well as instruments of communication. Of course, what people called 'water' in this alternative world would always be changing in fundamental ways at the molecular and sub-molecular levels. But this would not prevent you from knowing what to do if I asked you for a cup of 'water'; it would not deprive the word 'water' of any meaning; and it would not render this word ambiguous.

In this alternative world, let us suppose, the liquid which people called 'water' would, at one moment, be composed of H_2O, at another moment of xyz, and at another moment of abc. In this alternative world, would it really be correct to *identify* 'water' with H_2O? No. For, in this alternative world, 'water' is *not* always H_2O, i.e. it is not always composed of H_2O. Would it then be correct to say that, in the alternative world, water was *sometimes* identical with H_2O, sometimes identical with xyz, and sometimes identical with abc? This would be incorrect as well. For if 'water' were *sometimes* identical with H_2O, and *sometimes* identical with xyz, then the referent of the word 'water' *would* indeed be changing constantly. But in a world where objects' micro-properties changed ceaselessly, and where these changes had no macro-effects, and where, as in our world, people were on most occasions interested in objects' phenomenal properties—in such a world, it would be desirable that the referents of terms like 'water', 'desk', and 'chair' *not* be determined by the micro-structural properties of objects. To put it more clearly, in such a world, it would be necessary, in order to avoid intolerable ambiguity, *not* to identify substances like water with their micro-structures and, more generally, not to individuate entities according to their micro-properties. For if one were to identify (e.g.) 'water' with H_2O in this world, it would render the word 'water' useless for all everyday purposes. This means that we needn't

identify water with H_2O; we do so only because, for certain purposes, it is convenient.

Whether x is to be identified with y is a matter of epistemic and practical convenience. For 'x is identical with y' to be true is not for 'x' and 'y' to be coreferential. For if they were, strictly speaking, coreferential then 'x is identical with y' would be trivial. Rather, for 'x is identical with y' to be true is for x and y to be different entities that are associated with each other in some way.

Exactly *how* a given identity-statement is to be analyzed depends on what *criterion of identity* applies in the context in question. To say that A is identical with B is, to repeat, to say that A is associated with B in some way. But the relevant sense of the expression 'is associated with'—the relevant criterion of identity—may vary from context to context. Is the car currently sitting in my garage (call this A) identical with the car that was sitting in my garage three years ago (call this B)? Well, in the last three years, I have changed the tyres, replaced the timing belts, and given it a new coat of paint. So if, in saying that A is identical with B, I mean that A and B have indistinguishable micro-structures, then A is not identical with B: by *that* criterion of identity A is not identical with B; A and B are not associated with each other in the right way. But if, in saying that A is identical with B, I mean that *most* of the parts of which A consists are the causal ancestors of parts of which B consisted, then A *is* identical with B: by *that* criterion of identity, A and B are identical.

So whether 'water is identical with H_2O' is true or not depends on the criterion of identity that is employed; and this in turn depends on pragmatic considerations. In some cases, 'water' denotes a substance with a certain micro-structure; in other cases it denotes a substance with certain phenomenal properties. Putnam's externalism presupposes that identity is an *absolute* notion—one that is independent of our pragmatic or epistemic concerns.

The expression 'is identical with' is ambiguous. In order for me to know what you mean when you say 'A is identical with B', I must know what criterion of identity you are employing. Usually context will make this clear; usually there is a tacitly understood criterion of identity. This creates the illusion that 'is identical with' is completely non-ambiguous. But it is ambiguous. The car sitting in my garage may or may not be 'identical with' the car that was sitting in my garage yesterday, depending on what criterion of identity is being used.

In a word, given a non-trivial sentence of the form 'A is identical with B', where 'A' and 'B' denote spatio-temporal entities, that sentence must mean—*not* that 'A' and 'B' are strictly coreferential, for then (*pace* Frege) it would be trivial—but that A and B are two different entities that are associated with each other in some way. The mode of association in question varies from context to context.

Under Putnam's analysis, if one says 'A is identical with B', what one means by 'A' must be what one means by 'B'. (Recall that, according to Putnam's externalism, 'meanings'—i.e. what people mean by expressions—are to be delineated, not in terms of the mental contents which people have in connection with expressions, but in terms of the mind-independent entities denoted by those expressions. So what a three-year-old means by 'water' is to be delineated by delineating the constitution of H_2O.) But if this is true, then people can only believe in the existence of trivial identifications. So Putnam's analysis is untenable. In order to arrive at a correct understanding of empirical identities, it was necessary to distinguish the *mediate* from the *immediate* objects of sense-perception. (Our empirical beliefs are to be delineated in terms of the latter, not the former.) Once this distinction is made, the foundation for epistemic externalism is thoroughly undermined.

Notes and References

1. The following anecdote is, in its essentials, taken from Putnam's classic paper 'Meaning and Reference' (*Journal of Philosophy* 70, 1963). Reprinted in *The Philosophy of Language*, second edition, A.P. Martinich, editor, Oxford University Press, 1990. All subsequent references to Putnam's views are really references to his views as *represented* in this paper. This paper may fairly be regarded as the *locus classicus* of the externalist position. So the criticisms here levelled against that paper may be taken as applying to externalism generally.
2. See Russell, 'On Denoting', reprinted in *The Philosophy of Language*, A.P. Martinich, editor, Oxford University Press, 1990.
3. See 'Verifiability'.
4. See *Mind and the World Order*.

Reflections on John Searle's Philosophy of Consciousness

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John R. Searle's contribution of everlasting value to the philosophy of consciousness has undoubtedly been his consistently held view that the ability 'to understand' is to be attributed only to human consciousness. He stirred up ripples in the philosophy of mind when he published 'Minds, Brains and Programs'[1] whose main design was to show that computer simulation of human mental activities are notably limited, although the computer, the paper admits, is an extremely powerful tool in the study of the mind. Searle distinguishes two sorts of Artificial Intelligence (AI) program; strong and weak. For the weak AI, according to Searle, the computer is a highly useful aid for building and testing hypotheses about human mental acts. But the supporters of the strong AI presuppose that an appropriately programmed computer can be said to possess all the characteristics of the mind. Searle makes it very clear in the paper that his aim is not to repudiate weak AI but to question the assumption of the strong AI contenders that computational techniques are capable of displaying cognitive states, such as, for example, understanding.

Searle does not sufficiently explain what he means by 'understanding'. In fact the philosophical strength of 'Minds, Brains and Programs' lies in Searle's unqualified assertion that machines, however sophisticated may be their technology, cannot acquire the ability of understanding. Although one may find much similarity between his notion of understanding and that of Kant, and indeed that of hermeneuticians today, Searle does not say that the activity of understanding he refers to has anything to do with the synthetic nature of understanding Kant has emphasized. One is able to discover, however, that Kant's famous tie-up between sensibility and understanding (or understanding as a faculty which integrates phenomena in perception and knowledge) is reflected in Searle's use of the term understanding.

It would be worthwhile to state two experiments used by Searle[2] to indicate that the ability to understand is exclusively human and that a computer which may operate like the human mind cannot be said to possess this ability. The first experiment Searle considers is conducted by Roger Schank of Yale and related to a visitor to a restaurant. The story narrated by Schank is as follows: a man goes to a restaurant and orders a hamburger. When the hamburger arrives the man sees that it is charred and uneatable. The man runs out of the restaurant angrily, without paying the bill and without paying any tip to the waiter. In another case, however, a man visited a restaurant and asked for a hamburger which, when arrived, pleased the man. When the man left the restaurant, he paid the bill and left a large tip for the waiter. Now, the obvious answers one would give to the question whether or not these restaurant visitors had eaten the hamburgers served to them would be 'No' in the first case and 'Yes' in the second case. Schank tried to show in his experiment that a computer, like any one of us, would give the same outputs when asked the same question.

Searle argues that even if it is granted that a computer, with appropriate input concerning the restaurant etiquette, answers the question 'Did the man eat the hamburger?' in two distinct situations exactly as we would answer it, it can hardly be said that the computer understands the stories of the visitors to restaurants.

The answers 'No' and 'Yes' concealed in the two restaurant stories respectively are discernible, according to Searle, to a computer. What he is not prepared to accept, however, is the fact that the circumstances in the two stories are amenable to the understanding of the computer, this understanding being the privilege of the human mind alone. The supporters of the strong AI would, unlike Searle, claim that the computer would have representations of the information regarding the restaurant environment and therefore would have no difficulty in understanding the restaurant stories as a human mind would understand them.

Searle's idea of understanding seems to entail what Kant has said about sensibility, intuition, knowledge, and, grafted on them, understanding. Kant underlined the creative function of the mind. For Kant, human knowledge arises from two main sources both of which are possible because of the unique constitution of the mind we are endowed with vis-à-vis the external world. The mind has the power of receiving impressions and these impressions go to constitute the representations of the objects in the

mind. And there could not be these impressions in absence of the sensibility (*Sinnlichkkeit*) and intuition. For Kant, no object would be given to us without sensibility, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Kant says that it is only from the united cooperation of that which constitutes the mind on the one hand and the thinkable object on the other that knowledge can arise.[3] Although Searle does not analyze in detail his idea of understanding, it can be observed that understanding for him is that operation of the mind which is ontologically embedded in the knower's subjectivity, in the transcendental and a priori position of human consciousness.

For reinforcing the theory that the act of understanding cannot be ascribed to a machine, Searle has extremely ingeniously conducted what is widely known as the 'Chinese room thought experiment.'[4]

The purpose of the Chinese room thought experiment is to find out in what way the knowledge one would have of the syntactical principles of a language could lie totally separated from the semantical parameter of the language. The language chosen for the experiment is the ideographic Chinese. The experiment is conducted as follows: an Englishman is enclosed in a room and supplied with sufficient material regarding the use of Chinese symbols. The Englishman in the room has no acquaintance with the Chinese, and the material before him is concerning the syntactical rules of the Chinese characters. Searle describes the Englishman's state of mind as not being able 'to recognize Chinese writing distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless squibbles.' The Englishman in the room is further given instructions in English about the correlation among Chinese symbols, and the instructions are gradually so advanced that he is now able to operate in a program of recognizing ideograms of a Chinese question. And with the aid of the English book of rules for the placement of Chinese symbols, the Englishman is able to construct answers to the Chinese questions. Searle argues that after the Englishman attains a certain amount of mastery over the use of Chinese symbols he is able to meet several Chinese questions with appropriate Chinese responses. At this stage, to any Chinese witness outside the room the Englishman's ability to answer in Chinese the Chinese questions based on stories given to him would not appear to be in any manner less than that of a native Chinese. That is to say, according to Searle the Englishman now behaves exactly like a computer whose input is the syntax of Chinese language and this input enables him to offer almost mechanically the

output of Chinese ideograms as answers. Yet Searle is very assertive about the fact that the Englishman, like the computer, does not understand the Chinese language since his knowledge is limited to only the syntax of that language. If an Englishman is told stories in English, or a Chinese native is told stories in Chinese, and they are asked questions in English and Chinese respectively, they would answer those questions with knowledge and understanding notoriously absent in the Englishman's answering Chinese questions or the Chinese's answering English questions or the computer's manipulation of the syntax of a language as its input and output. Searle points out repeatedly that the knowledge, understanding and 'intentionality' with which an Englishman would act inside the linguistic space of English language and a Chinese would apprehend Chinese are different from the syntactical familiarity of the Englishman with the Chinese or the Chinese's familiarity with the English. Thus what the Englishman reading and answering questions in Chinese with the help of the syntactical rules of that language written in English, and a computer, like one in Schank's experiment, reading and answering questions based on the story of the visitors to the restaurant, lack in is the knowledge and understanding of what Searle elsewhere calls the 'Background of Intentionality'.[5]

Searle repudiates the contention of the supporters of the strong AI that what matters really in the conduct of the computer is the learning and using a program (which is bound to be formal and syntactical) of language. Searle points out that a mere acquaintance with the rules for the use of the symbols of a language would not amount to the knowledge of that language. That is why the Englishman's familiarity with the rules of the Chinese syntax is similar to that of a computer whose input is syntactical rules, i.e., the rules governing the placement of symbols (ideograms in the case of Chinese language). Armed with such formal equipment, neither the Englishman or the computer can be said to know or understand the Chinese. Searle writes that 'whatever purely formal principles you put into a computer, they will not be sufficient for understanding' just as a human could follow the formal principles of the syntax of a language 'without understanding anything'.[6] According to Searle, we are not even sure that such principles are necessary or even contributory to an Englishman's understanding English, since in this understanding the Englishman may not operate with any formal (syntactical) program at all.

The term understanding plays a unique role in Searle's paper 'Minds, Brains and Programs'. His sweeping comment on the claim of the strong AI supporters that we could speak of the programmed computers' capacity of understanding stories (in Schank's experiment, for instance) is that 'the computer understanding is not just partial or incomplete; it is zero.'[7] It may appear that Searle takes the word understanding in its ordinary sense. Indeed we do use the word understanding in its ordinary sense in statements like 'Ram understands the text he is reading,' 'I understand why he said he is not interested in accompanying me to see a movie,' 'Matthew's wife understands why he looks so melancholic today,' etc. At the same time, Searle's rather frequent use of the term in 'Minds, Brains and Programs' and elsewhere in his works shows that he uses this term, and also the term 'intentionality', so widely employed by phenomenologists, phenomenologically-ontologically. It would be meaningless, says Searle, to attribute understanding to machines (cars, adding machines, thermostats, etc.). The transposition of the capacity-to-understand to any artifacts would be totally wrong (one could not, for instance, say legitimately that the door which automatically opens and closes understands instructions from its photoelectric cell).

The tie-up between consciousness and understanding, and also between consciousness and intentionality Searle has tried to establish throughout his works has the echo of Husserl's tie-up between intentionality and apprehension and their noetic intertwining in the ontology of the perceiving or knowing subject. For Husserl, the *apprehending* or *taking possession of* manifest in the act of perceiving turns again and again without a break, into *having in one's grasp*.[8] (Italics in the original.) Husserl writes: '... the intentional object is not only known in a general way and brought within the directed glance of the mind, but is apprehended and noted object.'[9] Despite his obvious admiration for the technology of computer building, Searle is very critical of the claim of the strong AI experimenters that a machine's manipulation of the symbols of a language is comparable to the human mind's learning of the use of the same entities. While writing about the distinction between a computer's handling of symbols and a human mind's implementation of the syntactical framework (in the Chinese room thought experiment, for example), Searle writes: 'Computation is a purely syntactical set of operations, in the sense that the only features of the symbols that matter for the implementation of the program are the formal or syntactical features. But we know from our

own experience that the mind has something more going in it than the manipulation of formal symbols; minds have contents. For example, when we are thinking in English, the English words going through our minds are not just uninterrupted formal symbols; rather we know what they mean. For us the words have a meaning, or semantics. The mind could not be just a computer program, because the formal symbols of the computer program by themselves are not sufficient to guarantee the presence of the semantic content that occurs in actual mind.'[10] One of the challenges posed to Searle by the experts in robotics at Yale is that if a computer is inserted in a robot whose movements it is directed to control, then the language of instruction forming its input will have to consist of not just uninterrupted symbols but have a meaning-referring or content-referring dimension. In other words, such a computer will have to understand and have 'other mental states' like 'perceiving, walking, moving about, hammering nails, eating, drinking—anything you like.'[11] Searle's viewpoint is that the computer fastened to the robot could be said to have 'perceptual' and 'motor' abilities (similar to Schank's restaurant-scanning machine), but would be without understanding or intentionality. Searle does not doubt that the computer's activity of manipulating a formal, syntactical framework would certainly bring about specific motor results and yet the computer would not 'know what's going on'. Searle holds that the computer, or the robot whose conduct the computer controls, 'has no intentional states at all; it is simply moving about as a result of its electrical wiring and its program.'[12] Formal instructions which manipulate symbols constituting the structure of a language—whether these pertain to Schank's machine answering questions about the visitors to restaurants, or they pertain to the placement of Chinese ideograms, or they are about a computer engineering a robot—possess no intentionality whatsoever and therefore no understanding.

Searle's use of the concept of intentionality, like his regular reference to the concept of understanding, is clearly an echo of the phenomenological dictum that consciousness is ontologically intentional. Searle has introduced into the discussion the idea of the Background of Intentionality. The background, according to him, figures in the form of a cluster of beliefs whenever consciousness is directed toward any objective situation. These beliefs are too many to be enumerated whenever the encounter of consciousness with the objectively given situation takes place. The word 'belief' is rightly used by Searle in its broadest possible sense and would

comprise the whole set of 'capacities, abilities, tendencies, habits, dispositions, taken-for-granted presuppositions' and the general 'know-how' about the concrete situation one runs into. Suppose, for instance, I have a plan to spend the coming vacation in Jaipur. The plan would have an extremely loaded background—viz., I have to trust that the future time to which the plan belongs will dawn, the money required for the fulfilment of the plan would be available, Jaipur would remain as glamorous as it appears to be now, the train or the plane or some other means of travel would take me there, etc., etc. In fact the concept of background brought into discussion by Searle for showing extremely forcefully that many elements of our psyche form the base of intentionality and lie intertwined with understanding overlaps the famous concept of *Lebenswelt* (Life-World) Husserl put forth.[13]

The background of intentionality, for Searle, is pre-intentional, in the sense that it defines the very being of a person whose rapport with the world and with himself is determined by it. Searle speaks of 'deep background' in order to indicate that this background is universally present in all individual minds whatever may be the cultures they are born in and they live in. The deep background is ontological—it denotes that man has inherited a certain style of consuming food, he depends on certain kinds of food, his life is inseparable from certain physical movements or practices; but what are called 'local cultural' patterns vary from culture to culture. The peculiar way of dressing, greeting (with folded hands in India, for example), preparing by cooking certain types of eatables, participating in specific institutions, etc., are a part and parcel of man's local or regional cultures. All this is absent in a machine, since its input has no capacity to appropriate any culture—neither the deep background nor the local culture.

The famous phenomenological dictum 'intentionality is the fundamental characteristic of the mental' is clearly reflected in Searle's philosophy of mind. Here is what Husserl took intentionality to be. 'Every intentional experience,' Husserl wrote, 'is noetic, it is its essential nature to harbour in itself a "meaning" of some sort, it may be many meanings, and on the ground of this gift of meaning, and in harmony therewith, to develop further phases which through it become themselves "meaningful". Such noetic phases include, for instance, the directing of the glance of the pure Ego upon the object intended by it in virtue of its gift of meaning, upon that which it has in its mind as something meant.'[14] Searle, however,

attributes 'intrinsic intentionality' to men and animals, while what he calls 'as-if intentionality' to inanimate things. If we say, for instance, that plants are hungry and would want nutrients, the intentionality attributed to them by characterizing them as hungry and wanting nutrients is, he says, by analogy and thus as-if. To hold therefore that plants have intentionality is a metaphorical way of suggesting that they behave like human beings and animals at least in certain respects, that they display emotions as if they were human beings or animals. The distinction between instrinsic and as-if types of intentionality is also conveyed by Searle by stating that the former is observer-independent but the latter is observer-dependent. When we anthropomorphize a knife, a chair, a machine, for instance, we put ourselves in the realm of the language of as-if intentionality.

As it has been suggested earlier, Searle's concepts of understanding and intentionality give rise to a theory that unlike the organization of a computer, the organization of human consciousness is autonomous, ontological, and a priori in its reflectiveness. Although he attempts to repudiate a dualistic approach to human reality and is a staunch supporter of the brain-causes-the-mind monistic viewpoint, he constantly hesitates to bestow on the neuronal network of the brain the 'inner' acts experienced by us so vividly in the form of aboutness, meaning, the synthesis of qualia and subjectivity. Thus there is a compelling urge in Searle to look upon consciousness as not totally reducible to, or explainable by means of, the neuro-physiological constituents of our existence. Notwithstanding his reluctance to tilt toward transcendentalism of the Kantian and Husserlian variety, the 'mystery' he sees about consciousness forces him definitely to go far from the pro-science positions of physicalism, behaviourism and materialism. No physicalist or, for that matter, no behaviourist or empiricist would subscribe to the idea that the capacity to understand and the directedness (or aboutness) which is the characteristic of intentionality are qualities of consciousness unexplainable by means of the neuro-physiological laws behind the entire system of neuronal firings. Francis Crick is right when he points out while commenting on Searle's *The Rediscovery of the Mind* that 'Searle does not address the problem of how neurons might (give rise to conscious states),' or how 'they could encode meaning.'[15] However, Searle does not feel shy to assert, as if in the garb of a physicalist, that the brain (the neuronal organization) is the cause of the mental acts. But when it comes to understanding and intentionality, which are central to cognition, knowledge, feeling and action, they are for

Searle not to be taken as the emergences of the neuronal network. Are they then agencies beyond the physical constitution of the brain?

Chapter 2, subtitled as 'The Mind as a Biological Phenomenon', of Searle's latest work, *Mind, Language and Society*, includes one of the most explorative passages representing his philosophy of consciousness. Searle makes it clear that he is neither a substance dualist nor a property dualist. He looks upon consciousness as 'an inner, subjective, first-person, qualitative phenomenon' and that 'any account of consciousness that leaves out these features is not an account of consciousness but of something else.'[16] It must be mentioned here that Searle is an extremely vitriolic critic of Daniel Dennett, the famous upholder of the physicalist thesis that mind is nothing but the brain. However, what appears to weaken the opposition of the two is the 'brain is the cause of the mind' position Searle so strongly adheres to, though with the proviso that 'consciousness is caused by brain processes and is a higher level feature of the brain system.'[17]

One would wonder why understanding and intentionality which Searle, like phenomenologists, has regarded as the ontological expressions of consciousness, could not be accounted for, if one takes Searle's commitment to the brain-is-the-cause-of-the-mind presupposition without any qualification, as the expression of the higher-level feature of the brain. However, the theory that understanding and intentionality are deducible from the mechanical arrangement of the neuronal networks is repugnant to Searle. This indeed was made amply clear by him first in his 'Minds, Brains and Programs' when he rejected the seemingly inferring capacity of Schank's machine and the computer-like behaviour of the Englishman's handling of the Chinese ideograms as not amounting to understanding at all. The key problem therefore is in what way Searle could oppose physicalism without at the same time going close to dualism, i.e., property dualism if not substance dualism.

Searle's attempt to evade dualism in his deliberations on the complexity of consciousness appears to be a forced one. *The Mystery of Consciousness* indicates how he writes like a concealed dualist. While mentioning the difficulties one would face if one were to infer consciousness from the brain events, he says: 'All our conscious life is caused by the lower-level processes, but we have only the foggiest idea how it all works.'[18] The brain sciences, he says, do not show how it all works. Searle is visibly conscious of the fact that we do not as yet know how the human

brain, consisting of over 100 billion neurons each of which has synaptic connections with the remaining neurons, conducts its processes to give rise to consciousness. At the same time, his bias against dualism crops up its head when he remarks that 'we have to abandon dualism and start with the assumption that consciousness is an ordinary biological phenomenon comparable with growth, digestion, or the secretion of bile,' despite the fact that 'many people working in the sciences remain dualists and do not believe we can give a causal account of consciousness that shows it to be part of ordinary biological reality.'[19]

Concerning the biological base of cognition where the neurophysiological and neurobiological functions are shown to be the cause of mental activities, Gerald Edelman's *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection* and *The Remembered Present* and Francis Crick's *The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul* voice the last word. Both the authors are intent on experimentally representing that the neurobiological and neurophysiological structure of the brain would contain the final explanation for the phenomenon of consciousness. For example, Edelman is well-known for having put forth the theory of 'maps'—these belong to neuronal organization. A map is an ensemble of neurons in the brain where points are systematically related to the points on the field of the receptor cells, such as the surface of the skin or the mechanism of the eye. The idea of the map is closely related to the ideas of the mechanism of selection of points and also to be the reentry of signals travelling back and forth in the whole domain of maps. Edelman works out massive input-output networks in the field of maps which are basically the patterns of neuronal relations, with a view to accounting for the perceptions and cognitions one could have—seeing a black cloud running up in the sky, a rabbit biting grass in its cage in a zoo, a child caressing her doll and dressing it up, the taste of good wine, the computer manipulation for typing on it whatever one wants to express. What is very significant in the theory of maps is that Edelman talks of two layers of consciousness accessible to the inner experience of every one of us: the primary consciousness and the higher-order consciousness.[20] The former is confined to simple sensations and perceptions one would get when one reacts to the stimuli coming generally from the external world, and the latter operates when one becomes conscious of, or conceptualizes, whatever one perceives (this ordinarily goes by the name self-consciousness) and one uses a language to verbalize it. These other peculiarities of Edelman's and

Crick's researches apart, the main conviction of both of them is that the explanation for the emergence of the mind and consciousness lies ultimately in our knowing the details of all the neurobiological units of the brain.

Edelman is prompt in recognizing that he is not able to deal with a large number of essential issues marshalled by D.A. Norman, for instance, in his celebrated *Perspectives in Cognitive Science*, although he does have neurobiological accounts of overtly psychological phenomena of perception, memory, learning and development. But Searle is forthright in his assessment when he points out that Edelman's biggest problem is how to explain primary consciousness, because he (Edelman) knows pretty well that the higher-order consciousness is built up out of processes that are already involved in primary consciousness.

Searle's viewpoint, and the supporting references he gives to the clearly psychological occurrences, show that he is close to those philosophers who have again and again emphasized the *mystique* of human consciousness and, grafted onto it, the notion of subjectivity. Searle is far from being an empiricist, a positivist, a behaviourist—his *Weltanschauung* is different from that of Daniel Dennett, or of J.J.C. Smart, or of Gilbert Ryle, or of W.V. Quine. At the same time, Searle would not openly support the exclusively subjectivist point of view—he is reluctant to abandon the scientific, unitary, objectivist paradigm for the study of consciousness. It is necessary to point out, however, that Searle has got something fundamentally phenomenological to say about the internality of consciousness-experience. Almost with complete identity with Husserl's statement that 'Consciousness is the greatest wonder of all wonders,' Searle points out that the neurobiological theories of consciousness do not explain how consciousness has developed the first-person or subjective perspective, that is, how it has thrown up the sense of being, the centre of knowledge, the sense of being the 'owner' of whatever happens to it, how it plays the role of the synthesizer or binder of the sensation and perceptions coming to it, how it posits itself as the meaning-giver, the interpreter. Consciousness carries the basic experience of being what it is, what it does, what it in its 'inside' is. As a communicator, or user of language, a unifier of what could otherwise lie scattered or diversified as sense-data, impressions, images, etc., consciousness has a certain field within which it does the mapping of whatever it runs into. As a matter of fact, Edelman's concept of maps which he uses in relation to neuronal bunches, and Crick's

'spotlight of consciousness', that is 'spotlight playing over elements in the nervous system,'[21] are the most carefully experimented-on microstructures designed to account for the inner and outer situations consciousness is aware of in its primordial intentional status.

In order to realize the strength of Searle's rejection of the neurobiological approach to our understanding of the primary and the higher-order consciousness, one has to invoke the poignancy of his concept of the background of intentionality. Searle very significantly characterizes the background as 'huge', and states that it is against it that one operates in the world and understands whatever one perceives. The background consists of beliefs, fears, hopes, capacities, abilities, dispositions, habits, tendencies, taken-for-granted truisms, and generally the 'know-how' of what has gone behind the back of one's mind, conscious and unconscious, before one thinks and acts. '... underneath conscious thoughts,' Searle writes, 'is a vast apparatus that is in a sense too fundamental to be thought of as just more beliefs and desires.'[22] Incidentally, the notion of background would be so central to the hermeneutic exercise philosophy of mind and philosophy of language would be expected to undertake in our time as their principal task. As famous hermeneuticians (such as, Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur) have pointed out, there is a close relationship between understanding and interpretation—both these processes are propelled and coloured by *Lebenswelt* (à la Husserl) or the background (à la Searle). It is impossible to cognize and understand anything (a text, a situation, a person, someone's life story, the face of an individual, the economy of a country, the role of castes in Indian society, etc., etc.) without interpreting it vis-à-vis the background one would have appropriated in one's mind. That is why, to interpret, in general, is to invite to the surface the meanings hidden in the interpretandum. Understanding and interpretation are inseparable from each other. Searle seems to admit that these qualities do not, and cannot, inhabit a computer.

Searle's portrayal of the inner structure of consciousness is clearly phenomenological. He highlights (1) the ontological subjectivity, of which understanding and intentionality can be seen as the basic constituents, and (2) the unified form of consciousness which posits itself in the worldly situations, to use the existentialist idiom, as an 'existing individual', a *Dasein*. For Searle, who undoubtedly echoes the phenomenologists' conception of consciousness, 'conscious states only exist as experienced by an agent.'[23] As a matter of fact, it is these ontological features implicit in

the constitution of consciousness that have made it impossible for a materialist to evolve a science of consciousness. Subjectivity, which is intrinsic to consciousness experience, signifies that consciousness occupies perpetually the first-person perspective, it has the sense of being the centre, the owner, the possessor of the entire drama of in-coming impressions that either emanate from or project themselves onto the empirical, physical world. So far as these impressions are registered on the field of consciousness they have a self at their basis. Incidentally, Crick has suggested that there is an evidence that neuronal oscillations in the 40-hertz range subserve different kinds of consciousness and that despite the fact that consciousness comes in many forms, there exists 'one basic mechanism underlying them all.'[24] Crick and Christof Koch also propose that subjective consciousness, despite its involving disparate brain functions, involves a basic common mechanism.

The first-person perspective of consciousness (what Thomas Nagel has called 'the subjective character of experience')[25] has always remained a challenge to reductionists. The first-person feeling, i.e., the feeling 'I am I' has always been, as phenomenologists and existentialists point out, the *sine qua non* of our being human, our being individual subjects, our being the unity and synthesis of whatever happens to us in the form of the representations of the perceived, the felt, the empirically given. The computational techniques that have been devised to simulate states of the mind have not yet been in a position to simulate the self-sense. The sense of self-identity, the sense that I am the experiencer of whatever 'happens' to or within my consciousness, including, as Nagel puts it, 'the internal fact that one day this consciousness will black out for good and subjective time will just stop (by my death),'[26] cannot be accounted for in terms of the non-conscious neuronal networks.

Actually the dualistic paradigm in the study of the mind-body relationship was immensely heightened when in 1974 Nagel pointed out that science is not able to portray, with its empirical, objectivist method, the subjective character of a mental experience. 'The fact that an organism has a conscious experience at all means,' Nagel wrote, 'that there is something it is like to be that organism.' He said further that 'every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective physical theory will abandon that point of view.'[27]

Searle is clearly appreciative of Nagel's subjectivity-based paradigm against the physicalists' and materialists' presuppositions regarding the brain-mind relationship. The anti-reductionist arguments are so sharp-edged in Nagel that he is hardly able to give up what clearly is seen as his existentialist stance. Here is what he would posit as a rebuttal to all forms of reductionist thesis: 'My own existence looms large at the centre of my prereflective world picture, since this life is the source and avenue of my understanding of everything else ... A world without me at any point in its history seems like a world with a crucial piece missing, a world that has suddenly lost its moorings'.[28] Nagel knows that too much emphasis on the subjective experience might lead one to embrace some kind of solipsism, but he confesses that he would not mind if 'a pale version of it remains.'

Consciousness as a unifying reality cannot be separated from consciousness as an exclusively subjective experience. Consciousness-as-the-synthesizer is as ontologically grounded as consciousness-as-subjectivity or consciousness-as-intentionality. The variegated, kaleidoscopic impressions my consciousness-in-relation-to-the-world collects have a locus and this locus has its own binding and blending operation that inevitably isolates it from other individuals' loci. There are, for instance, sense-data emanating from various environmental stimuli—visual, auditory, tactile, etc.—, they are cognized and identified in relation to all that is retained in the memory and recalled, there are also unforeseen shifts in attention, but all these have an anchor at their base, so to say. This anchor is the mysterious sense each one of us have of occupying the present in time and 'here' in space. In its two forms, called by Searle the 'vertical unity' and the 'horizontal unity', consciousness can relate itself to all sorts of experience, as if in one instant, spread over the bygone past and the anticipated future. The encirclement brought about by the vertical-horizontal unity is perpetually flanked by 'I', 'me', 'my' and speaks of the ontological freedom without which consciousness-as-subjectivity has no meaning.

As I have already pointed out above, Searle is visibly reluctant to call himself a dualist, since to be a dualist is considered today to be against the one-reality doctrine so firmly grounded in the age of science. However, Searle's constant denial that the microstructures in the brain could account for the complexity of mental phenomena, his attempt to single out human consciousness as possessing the unique properties of understanding and intentionality and subjectivity and synthesizing, his anti-reductionist approach in brain sciences, his tacit refusal to concede the self-sense to machines, are loud announcements assigning to consciousness or mind a place and role not exhaustible by the physics, the chemistry and the biology of the brain. That consciousness uses the brain as its 'seat' should not compel one, Searle seems to hold, to conclude that matter is the one and only foundation of the phenomenon of man.

Notes and References

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3. See Watson, John, *The Philosophy of Kant Explained*, James Maclehose, Glasgow, 1908, pp. 46 ff.
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13. See Pivcevic, Edo, *Husserl and Phenomenology*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1970, pp. 83 ff.
14. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas*, W.R. Boyce Gibson (trans.), pp. 241 ff.
15. Crick, Francis, *The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul*, Scribner, 1994, p. 282.
16. Searle, John R., *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*, pp. 3 ff.
17. Searle, John R., *The Mystery of Consciousness*, New York Review Book, New York, 1997, pp. 4 ff.
18. Ibid., p. 4.
19. Ibid., p. 6.
20. Edelman, Gerald, *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection*, Basic Books, New York, 1987, pp. 74 ff. According to Edelman, there are 'primary processes of development' or 'primary repertoire' responsible for

primary consciousness. Edelman develops the notion of 'primary consciousness' and 'higher-order consciousness' (the latter includes self-consciousness and language) in his *The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness*, Basic Books, New York, 1989, pp. 72 ff. For Searle's comments on Edelman, see his *The Mystery of Consciousness*, pp. 43 ff.

21. Crick, Francis, *The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul*, pp. 46 ff.
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23. Ibid., pp. 42 ff.
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Pictures of Reality*

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In this paper I discuss some of Wittgenstein's views about meaning. I say 'views', because in Wittgenstein one does not find any closely argued and systematically developed theory. One finds only *ex cathedra* statements or what his admirers are pleased to call flashes of insight.

I am concerned here only with the *Tractatus*. I am aware that Wittgenstein is supposed to have repudiated his earlier views in his later works; it may, therefore, be asked why I choose to flog a dead horse. My defence is that, unlike the deaths that occur in science, there are no dead horses in philosophy. Philosophical horses show a remarkable tendency to get resurrected, sometimes in a slightly altered shape, and it is not unprofitable to see their defects and weaknesses. Further, even if Wittgenstein has rejected his views, he has not given (as far as I know) any systematic arguments to show why they should be rejected. He seems to have simply turned his back on them. I am, therefore, trying to fill the gap and to show why they should be rejected. I have taken only a few of these views for consideration.

In addition to the *Tractatus,* for understanding Wittgenstein's utterances I have taken the help of Max Black's *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* (Cambridge, 1964) and G.H.R. Parkinson's *Saying and Showing* (The Open University Press, 1976). References to these two works as well as to the *Tractatus* appear in brackets at the relevant places. I have used C.K. Ogden's translation of the *Tractatus* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 6th impression).

I have put in square brackets [-] what I consider to be of secondary importance in my paper. It may be ignored on a first reading, assuming there will be a second.

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A warning. In dealing with Wittgenstein one has always to emphasize the word 'seems', for, due to his cryptic style of putting down his thoughts and his studied refusal to explain the meaning of his almost aphoristic sentences, one is very often not quite sure as to what he means. Besides, what I have to say is subject to correction by those who have made a deeper study of his writings as compared to my rather superficial survey.

WITTGENSTEIN'S *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

In order to understand Wittgenstein's views regarding meaning it is necessary to briefly see his *weltanschauung* or world-view. He says, 'Objects form the substance of the world'; they are the ultimate stuff of the world and they are absolutely simple (2.021). We are never told what they are or what their nature might be, except that it is essential to their nature that each of them can combine with others to form groups (2.011). Each of these groups is called an 'atomic fact' or 'what is the case' (2.01) or a 'state of affairs'. The combination of objects in an atomic fact is also called a 'configuration' (2.0272). The objects are also called 'entities' or 'things' (2.01). The capacity to become constituents of atomic facts is said to 'already lie' in the objects, and it is impossible to think of them apart from the *possibility* of this connexion (2.0121). This possibility is called 'the form of the object' (2.0141). We will return to this.

Different atomic facts make up a 'fact', and all the facts together 'the totality of facts', 'everything that is the case', is the world or reality (1, 1.1, 2.063). Wittgenstein insists that 'the world is the totality of facts, not of things' (1.1), because the combination of things—*that* they are so combined—is not a thing.

The only reason for not saying that the world is a totality of facts seems to be that, for Wittgenstein, 'the world' seems to include even the possibility of facts which are not actual facts. [The problem here is caused by the ambiguous word '*sachverhalt*', which means either 'possible fact' or 'actual fact', and the word '*tatsachen*', which means 'actual facts' (Black, 40–41). In 'the world divides itself into facts' (1.2), '*tatsachen*' is used; in 'the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case' (1.12), '*tatsachen*' is used; in 'the totality of existent atomic facts is the world', in 'the totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist' and in 'the existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality' (2.04, 2.05, 2.06), the word used is

'*sachverhalt(e)*'. The 'existence of atomic facts' and 'their non-existence' are called 'positive fact' and 'negative fact', respectively (2.06). Perhaps all that he means is that the world contains only positive facts and these indicate which would be the negative facts—facts which do not, but 'could possibly be the case' (Black, 40).]

An object is 'independent insofar as it can occur in all possible circumstances' and this possibility is its 'form of independence'; but since it *can* occur in an atomic fact, this is also a 'form of connexion' or 'form of dependence' (2.0122). The configuration of objects changes and is therefore a 'variable'. Objects 'hang one in another, like the links of a chain' (2.03) without, as Black puts it, 'bond, tie or connexion' or 'anything like what we call relations' (Black, 66), something like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which dovetail into one another. (Is Bradley looking on?) The way they hang together in any actually existing atomic fact is 'the structure of the atomic fact' (2.032) and the mere possibility of their so hanging together is the 'form' (2.033). Let me illustrate. The form of a sonnet would be a poem of 14 lines of iambic pentameter and divided into an octave of 8 lines followed by a sestet of 6 lines etc. Shakespeare's actual sonnet, 'Let me not to the marriage of true minds', has a structure.

Whether a certain atomic fact exists or not, makes no difference to any other atomic fact—'everything else remains the same' (1.21), so that from any elementary proposition which presents an atomic fact, no inference can be made to 'another entirely different from it' (5.134, 5.135). And yet, 'if I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts', for 'every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object' (2.0123), and 'in order to know an object, I must know ... all its internal qualities' (2.01231), that is, all those it must necessarily possess, qualities which 'it is unthinkable' for it not to possess (4.123). The 'power or capacity to combine with other objects in atomic facts' is the 'form of an object' (2.0141). Since we are not told what the objects are, we can throw light on these remarks by considering (with Black, 55) a physical analogy: if we know what a pencil is, we know some of the things with which it *can* combine, say, a pencil cap, but we cannot know, without experience, whether it is actually so combined or not. One may say, suggests Black (56) that Wittgenstein's 'objects' have what may be called 'logical shape'. Whether all this is a purely fanciful picture or comes dangerously near to a view of a totally interrelated universe such as held by the Idealists (who are anathema to Wittgenstein) is difficult to decide.

Wittgenstein believes that if you analyze complex facts into less and less complex facts you must finally come upon objects which compose them (4.2211) and which are absolutely 'simple' (2.02). 'Every statement about complexes can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts' until you reach rock-bottom, and then the complex is said to be completely described or analyzed (2.0201). This, according to Black, is logical atomism (207). Why does Wittgenstein believe there are simple objects not further analyzable? Because he thinks that if there were not, propositions would not have definiteness or determinateness, and by this he means they would not have truth-value, would not be either definitely true or false. Their meaning or 'sense' would depend on whether another proposition was true or false and that proposition would, in turn, depend on whether still another proposition was true or false and so on *ad infinitum* (2.0211). At least this is what I take his view to be, for these are, according to Parkinson, 'cryptic utterances, and more than one interpretation of them has been offered' (40). If this infinite regress were to take place, Wittgenstein thinks it would 'be impossible to form a picture of the world' (2.0212), that is, a picture that would definitely be true or false, for it would hang, as it were, in the air without touching solid ground. And Wittgenstein believes that propositions *can* be either true or false and that there is, as Parkinson says, 'no hazy intermediate region' (41) between truth and falsehood. Wittgenstein holds that a proposition '*shows* how things stand if it is true' and 'it *says* that they do so stand'; a proposition can definitely answer to a 'yes' or a 'no' (4.022, 4.023).

This belief in ultimate simples suggests a view of knowledge which has been called the 'linear view' by the Idealists. Knowledge is looked upon as a superstructure erected upon a foundation of indubitable elementary or basic propositions about not-further-analyzable entities. The Idealists, on the other hand, hold that knowledge grows organically and that there are no such incorrigible basic propositions. Russell and Ayer have found it difficult to decide whether there are or are not such propositions. I am not going to enter into this debate here.

This faith in the existence and possibility of simple entities which answer to 'names' in a proposition is, it must be stressed, just a postulate necessitated, Wittgenstein believes, by the determinateness of propositions: 'the postulate of the possibility of the simple signs is the postulate of the determinateness of sense' (3.23).

Wittgenstein introduces the phrase 'logical space'. 'The facts in logical space are the world' (1.13). This seems to mean that while 'things' are in actual (or physical) space (are they? since we are not told what they are), the fact—that they are so combined to form a fact—is not a 'thing' and so is in logical space. A proposition which says that so-and-so is the case, is in logical space. Logical space, one might say, is the province of truth-value.

So much for Wittgenstein's world-view.

PICTURES OF REALITY

'We make to ourselves pictures of facts' (2.1). Why? In order to understand them, which means to understand reality, because reality is the totality of facts (1.1). The picture that we make claims to depict facts in logical space (2.11, 2.201). The picture is said to be a model of reality (2.12); it is 'linked with' and 'reaches up to' reality (2.1511). All of which means that it is not just a fanciful creation of ours but is our way of understanding reality; the reference to reality is essential. The word 'picture' is very comprehensive for it covers a picture in the ordinary sense, a model, a map, a diagram, an architect's blueprint, a musical score and, indeed, anything which is composed of distinct elements which stand for, and correspond to, objects. The elements, being 'combined in a definite way', 'represent that the things are so combined with one another' in reality (2.13, 2.131, 2.14, 2.15). Mental images can also count as pictures (Parkinson, 20). It is further stated that in order to be a picture there must be something 'common' or 'identical' in the picture and the pictured (2.16, 2.161). This feature of the picture is called its 'form of representation' (2.17). The word 'identical' is misplaced, because, for instance, the white lines in a blueprint are not at all identical with the walls, doors and windows that they represent and the crochets and quavers in a musical score do not at all sound like the music they represent. Black, realizing this, suggests the word 'homologous' in place of 'identical' (91). What the picture and the pictured have really in common is only the structure and, indeed, Wittgenstein does speak of the 'structure' of the picture—'the connexion of the elements of the picture is called its structure' (2.15). More precisely, it is further clarified that if the picture represents a possible fact, a merely possible connexion of objects in the atomic fact, then the connexion of the elements of the picture is called a 'form' (2.151); if

the picture claims to represent an actually existing fact, it is said to have a 'structure' (2.15, 2.17, 2.033).

It is important to note that, according to Wittgenstein, the picture only represents a possible state of affairs in logical space (2.202). 'The picture represents its object rightly or falsely' (2.173), 'agrees with reality or not, is right or wrong, true or false' (2.21), and only indicates a 'possibility of the state of affairs' (2.203, 2.201). If, for example, I see a picture of a village inn, I can understand what it is about, what it means (this is the 'form of representation'), but it does not tell me that there is, as a matter of fact, such an inn somewhere with all the people and things in it as depicted. 'The picture represents what it represents independently of its truth or falsehood' (2.22). In order to understand what it is about I do not have to know whether it is true or false. Thus, the 'form' of the picture is simply its meaning or 'sense' (2.221).

[Wittgenstein talks of 'logical form' (2.18) and of the picture, therefore, of being a 'logical picture' (2.181), and says that 'every picture is *also* a logical picture' (2.182). This is misleading, because it suggests that over and above being a picture, it is also a logical picture. All it, however, means is that the different pictures would have different specific forms or qualities—a spatial picture has lines, areas, colours; a musical score has a five-line stave and wiggly little things on it—but, if a picture is to act as a picture, it must have a logical form, that is, a certain correspondence between the way its elements are combined and the way the objects are combined in the atomic fact it represents. This is clear from the statement 'not every picture is a spatial picture' added to 'every picture is also a logical picture' (2.182).]

[Not every picture is a picture in the Wittgensteinian sense. Abstract painting and modern dance do not depict anything. Asked what his dance meant, Merce Cunningham replied, 'What you see and what you hear'. What is called 'programme' music (depicting storms, running water, the clash of arms) can be called Wittgensteinian pictures, but 'abstract' music (sonata, symphony, fugue) does not mean or represent anything, but is simply what it is.]

The picture by itself is neither true nor false; it only depicts or means something, but does not give us a clue as to whether that something is a fact or not. Its truth or falsity consists in the 'agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality' (2.222). This 'cannot be discovered from the

picture alone' (2.224). How do we find out whether it agrees with reality or not? Of this later.

How do we know the sense of the picture, what the picture means? This is a very important question.

If it is a very realistic photograph or an accurate three-dimensional model, it would bear its meaning, as it were, on its face. But this does not happen in the case of, say, a contour map, a diagram of an electric circuit or a musical score. None of these look like what they mean. The relationship between each of them and what they mean is one, not of resemblance, but of correspondence (and not all correspondence is resemblance), where all that is common between the picture and the pictured is a certain pattern or a systematic one-one correlation between the elements of the one and the elements of the other. Put a musical score in the hands of a person who has never seen such a thing before and watch the result. Even hieroglyphics, on which Wittgenstein lays so much store to explain his views (4.016), though it contains several recognizable pictures, needed to be decoded. All non-pictorial 'pictures' are symbolic and the meaning of the symbols have to be learned. Even in the case of pictures proper, there is a difference (as Parkinson points out) between a lifelike photograph and a crude sketch, but both could equally well stand for what you mean. It is said that primitives cannot interpret a picture and even educated people are sometimes unable to make head or tail of an architect's plan. And (as H.H. Price has shown in great detail in *Thinking and Experience,* Ch. IX) the same picture (say of a dog) may mean dogs in general, a particular species of dog, a particular dog or even animal in general.

The question then is how a particular picture can mean any one of these things? 'The *Tractatus* does not discuss this point,' writes Parkinson, 'but the answer must surely be that *A is made to stand for B* ... . If it is asked, "Who makes it stand for B?" the answer is, "The picture maker or makers—one or more of the 'we' who (2.1) picture facts to ourselves"' (23). That is why an accidental blob of paint which might resemble an object will not count as a Wittgensteinian 'picture'; nobody has made it stand for anything.

It should be clear by now that Wittgenstein's persistence in speaking of 'pictures' is misleading and unfortunate. He is free to call any kind of symbolization a picture, but if we are to use the word with any attempt at precision, further problems arise. It is said that Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is specially designed to deal with falsity. A picture's

truth consists in the agreement of its sense with the real state of affairs (2.222); a false picture does not so agree, but it is still a picture (in Wittgenstein's sense) because it has a 'sense' or meaning. In other words, a picture can be false and yet be meaningful and, therefore, we must accept the distinction between truth and meaning. This is absolutely correct. But if we take the idea of picture or model seriously, does this theory work? If we draw a picture of the cat on the mat, it will, let us grant, mean the cat is on the mat; and if the cat is actually on the mat, our picture will be true. We now look out of the window and see that the cat is no longer on the mat. How shall we depict this? Should we draw a picture of the mat without the cat? But that will only mean that there is a mat; it will not mean that the cat is not on the mat. Should we draw a picture of the cat beside the mat? But that would mean that the cat is beside the mat and not that the cat is not on the mat and, if the cat is neither on the mat nor anywhere in sight, our picture will be false. But we want a true picture of the cat not being on the mat. There is no way of *picturing* a negative state of affairs, for whatever picture we make will be a picture of a corresponding positive state of affairs. We cannot do the trick unless we use a symbol (which is not a picture) for the idea of 'not'.

Because a picture's truth or falsity consists in the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, Wittgenstein infers (I suppose) that 'in order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality' (2.223). But this is a *non-sequitur*, because, as we have seen, not all agreement is resemblance, and comparison (if strictly understood) can be appropriate only, if at all, in the case of resemblance. A picture properly-so-called, may be compared with the original (if the original is available), but a contour map cannot be compared with the elevation of a mountain which it is meant to represent. In this latter case, it is not the actual map that is *compared* with what it represents; it is the meaning or 'sense' of the map, the way it is interpreted according to certain rules, that is sought to be *verified* in experience. To verify is not necessarily to compare and assess the similarities. Even in the case of pictures proper, how do you compare, today, a photograph of Wittgenstein with the original to be sure if it is a genuine representation of the philosopher? You do not because you cannot. What you would do is something quite different; guided by the meaning of the picture, you seek evidence to establish that the photograph is a genuine one. Let us take another case. Suppose you are in doubt whether the stone in your ring is a real diamond or a fake.

Making a picture of it and comparing the picture with the original will hardly be how an expert would proceed. He will prefer to gaze at the ring itself with his trained eye. Wittgenstein's statement that 'the truth or falsity cannot be discovered from the picture alone' (2.224) is obvious; of course experience in the form of seeking evidence will be required, but that is quite a different story from making a comparison. When we leave pictures, diagrams, musical scores etc. and come to propositions, the comparison myth is hopelessly out.

[Whether he intends to or not, or whether he is aware of what he is doing or not, Black condems the picture theory. He writes, 'In verifying a proposition, we do not look *at* it; when I wonder whether a given animal is a lynx, I look at the beast, but not at the words that express my question. ... Using words is not comparing them with anything', and 'because words are not iconic, the idea of "comparison" cannot be taken literally' (94). Then why not just drop it?]

THE PROPOSITION

In the class of 'pictures' propositions are also included (4.01). What Wittgenstein must mean here is 'sentence'—written or spoken words (the distinction of type and token may be ignored), which he calls a 'propositional sign' (3.14). It is the *meaning* of a sentence or 'propositional sign' that we should call a 'proposition', that which can be expressed through a variety of propositional signs. 'To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true' (4.024). [Absolute Idealists like Bosanquet use the word 'judgement' for what I have called the proposition here—judgement in its non-psychological sense, different from the act of judging. They use 'proposition' for what I have here called the sentence, because they hold that even questions, commands and exclamations are sentences.]

When Wittgenstein says 'the *logical* picture of the facts is the thought' (3), he means the 'sense', the meaning, the proposition, which is contained in any 'picture', be it picture proper, model, map or sentence; and he means to say that this 'proposition' (that so-and-so is the case) is 'thinkable'; 'we can imagine it' (3.001) ['The thought is the sense of the sentence' says Frege (quoted by Black, 96).] This is where the human mind comes in. To think of some fact is to entertain a proposition about it. To do this is, of course, to perform a psychological act, but the thought itself,

the proposition, which we think is not a psychological entity but the meaning which we hold before the mind (metaphorically speaking) by means of the act. 'The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks,' says Wittgenstein (3.02), by which he seems to mean that a 'thought', in the sense of a proposition, only conveys an unasserted possibility, a proposition held in suspension, as it were. It is that to which different attitudes such as belief, doubt etc. can be taken. Therefore, it should not, strictly, be expressed in the indicative mood but rather by the phrase 'that so-and-so is the case'. For example, 'Astrology is a science' is not a proposition but an assertion which says that Astrology is, actually, as a matter of fact, a science. Here an assertorical attitude is already taken, and, as such, the statement is either true or false. The corresponding proposition would be 'that Astrology is a science' or 'Astrology being a science', which could be asserted, believed, doubted etc. This difference between a sentence as an unasserted meaning and as an assertion is put by Wittgenstein thus: 'The proposition *shows* its sense', that is, 'how things stand *if* it is true', and 'it *says* that they do so stand' (4.022). (Of course, Wittgenstein should here be speaking of 'sentence' and not of 'proposition'.) In saying, 'In the proposition the thought is expressed perceptibly through the senses' (3.1), he obviously means 'in the sentence', because a sentence is made up of spoken or written words perceptible to the senses. This 'sensibly perceptible sign' or 'sign through which we express the thought'—that is, the sentence—is called 'propositional sign', and, says Wittgenstein, we use it 'as a projection of the possible state of affairs' (3.11, 3.12). 'Project' (*projizierem*'), a new word introduced here, can be taken as synonymous, says Black, with 'present' ('*darstellen*') or 'depict' ('*abbilden*') (99). All that Wittgenstein seems to say is that the propositional sign is to be understood, not simply as a visible, audible object, but in its aspect of conveying a meaning, its 'positive relation to the real world', that is, as an outward expression of meaning, proposition or thought.

Two points are very important. 1. A propositional sign (now always used below to mean sentence) is a symbol, something which stands for something else. It stands for, or expresses, a proposition or a possible atomic fact. The same can also be said about pictures, diagrams, maps, models, musical scores etc. These are all symbols conveying meaning. 'The possibility of propositions is based upon the principle of the representation of objects by signs' (4.0312).

2. Like pictures, models etc., the propositional sign also has a definite structure; it is 'articulated'. 'The proposition expresses what it expresses in a definite [...] way: the proposition is articulate' (3.251, 3.141). It is 'not a mixture of words', for 'its words are combined in it in a definite way' (3.141, 3.14).

It is not necessary for my purpose to go into the details of the composition of a propositional sign. 'In propositions thoughts can be so expressed that to the objects of the thoughts correspond the elements of the propositional sign' (3.2). In a complete analysis, these elements are 'simple signs' or 'names' (which linguists refer to as 'morphemes', the 'smallest units of thought', Black, 108) and, in a propositional sign, names represent objects. They 'cannot be analyzed further'; they are 'primitive signs'. 'The name means the object' (3.202, 3.26, 3.203). All this implies that in a completely analyzed proposition there is a one-one relation between the names and the objects [though Black says that to understand 'what such analysis would be like is formidable' (107)]. The way the names are combined, the 'configuration' in the propositional sign, 'corresponds [to] the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs' (3.21). It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein *postulates* names and he does this because he *postulates* that a proposition has a definite sense—'determinateness of the sense' (3.23) and that without this determinateness it could not have truth-value. This, according to Black, is 'a leading idea in the book' (112). The whole state of affairs, however, cannot be named; it can only be described (3.144).

The propositional sign, including 'the links between its elements and the objects for which they stand' (Black, 156), is called 'the logical place' (3.41), which phrase seems to mean nothing more than the 'sense' or meaning of the propositional sign. Each propositional sign (and therefore proposition) determines only 'one place in logical space' (3.42) and that is, of course, because every clearly articulated proposition is uniquely determinate. All the propositions that there possibly could be, whether thought by anyone or not, would make up the 'picture of the world' (3.01) and all the propositional signs in which they could be expressed make up 'the language' (4.001) of the world(?).

A 'propositional sign is a picture of its state of affairs' (4.032); 'like a living picture' it 'presents the existence and non-existence of atomic facts' (4.0311, 4.1) like any other 'picture'. How do we understand or grasp the meaning of a propositional sign? Since a propositional sign is a projection

of the possible state of affairs, getting at its meaning involves the 'method of projection' (3.11), which comes to nothing more than saying that we understand a sentence in any particular language according to some established rules of interpretation (rules of grammar and syntax).

However, Wittgenstein confuses matters when he writes, 'The essential nature of a propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. 'The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition' (3.1431). Black illustrates this with a quotation from Wittgenstein's *Notes on Logic*, which says, 'That this inkpot is on this table may express that I sit in this chair' [98, (3)d]. This could, of course, happen provided we agree to symbolize the chair by the table and Wittgenstein by the inkpot. Black writes, 'The "spatial objects" function just as words do in a sentence' (103). But this is exactly the way they don't. There is at least a similarity of pattern or structural similarity between the inkpot-on-table complex and the Wittgenstein-in-chair complex. Even in the case of a flat contour map and a mountain elevation and the case of a score and the musical sounds, there is a one-one relation though not a similarity. But there is neither a similarity nor a one-one relationship between a propositional sign and the atomic fact which it represents. Pictures proper, models, maps and, even to some extent, contour maps and musical scores do 'show', on the face of them, what they mean, but sentences do not do this at all. You cannot read off their meaning by merely looking at them or listening to them; you have to, as we saw, learn and use rules of interpretation. The relationship between sentence and atomic fact is not even accurately described by calling it 'homologous' (as Black says it is), for 'homologous' only means 'corresponding', and that is too general and vague and has a wide application. Of course the sentence corresponds to the fact it means; the question is, How? Certainly not by being a picture of it.

It is not as if Wittgenstein has not realized this, for he writes, 'At the first glance the proposition—say as it stands printed on paper—does not seem to be a picture of the reality of which it treats' (4.011); 'but', he at once adds, 'nor does the musical score appear at first sight to be a picture of a musical piece', nor do the spelled words resemble the spoken language. 'And yet,' he continues, 'the symbolisms prove to be pictures—even in the ordinary sense of the word—of what they represent' (4.011). Even a disciple like Black admits that 'this important remark can hardly be defended' and that even in the case of a musical score it is only a 'metaphor' to speak of it as a picture. Black adds, 'Wittgenstein seems to be aware that he has stretched the ordinary meaning of "picture"' (163). He does not seem to be aware of it and he has not just stretched the meaning; he has distorted it.

Still talking, a little later, about 'the internal similarity between things which at first sight seem to be entirely different, he explains that the similarity lies in the 'rule' by which you could construct a score from a heard symphony. 'The rule is the law of projection' (4.0141). We have already seen that symbols are understood by means of rules of interpretation (rules of grammar and syntax in the case of sentences) and I have also pointed out that this is quite different from the way you understand what a picture is about. Then why does Wittgenstein persist in using 'pictures'? But persist he does: 'the proposition is a picture of reality', 'a model of reality as we think it' (4.01) (also 4.021, 4.03, 4.032). He claims that in some cases there is obviously a 'picture', as in relational propositions of the form 'aRb'—'the sign is obviously a likeness of the signified' (4.012). But even here he is mistaken, because, for instance, 'Romeo loved Juliet' obviously does not look like Romeo loving Juliet. Wittgenstein admits that there are '*apparent irregularities*', yet he is not 'disturbed' by them, for they 'also picture what they are to express; only in another way' (4.013). This other way is so essentially a different way that it only succeeds in leading us astray.

It is interesting to see how Wittgenstein's admirers indulge in special pleading on his behalf. Black writes, 'Wittgenstein is using "pictures" in an ... analogical sense' in calling a proposition a 'logical picture', for 'the stress ... is upon the *invisible* logical form (the rules of use, we might say): it is there we must look for the essence of the picture and not in any physical resemblance between picture and what is pictured', and 'in spite of dissimilarity between the propositional sign and the fact, 'the essence of pictoriality is unimpaired' and 'the essence is revealed in the *general rule*' for 'transformation' (161–2). But, for one, the '*invisible* logical form', being invisible, cannot resemble anything at all, and, for another, to call a general rule a picture is inappropriate and misleading, and, for still another, Wittgenstein himself (4.01 to 4.013) defends his thesis that the propositional sign, the sentence 'as it stands printed on paper', is a picture; he is not talking of a form, visible or invisible.

John Wisdom, another of Wittgenstein's advocates, does not make Black's mistake of thinking that Wittgenstein is talking of forms or rules. Wisdom writes,

> Wittgenstein says that sentences picture facts. But hardly any, if any, sentences in ordinary language do picture facts. Wittgenstein does not want to assert that they do. He is trying to point out an ideal to which some sentences try to attain. He should, I think, have drawn our attention to the fact that some sentences do not try to attain this ideal. ('Constructions', p. 202, quoted by Black, 162).

As a matter of fact no sentences in ordinary language, not even those that use onomatopoeic terms, try to picture facts. There is no question of trying to attain, and falling short of, ideals, for the ideal, not being pictorial at all, is, in principle, unattainable. There is nothing in Wittgenstein about ideals and falling short of them.

G.E. Moore's advocacy is half-hearted:

> In connection with the *Tractatus*, ... he said that he had not at that time noticed that the word 'picture' was vague; but he still ... thought it 'useful to say "A proposition is a picture *or something like it*"' although ... he was willing to admit that to call a proposition a 'picture' was misleading; that propositions are not pictures 'in any ordinary sense', and to say they are, 'merely stresses ... that our uses of the words "proposition" and "picture" follow similar rules'. (*Papers,* p. 263, quoted by Black, 162–3).

Moore here obviously quotes Wittgenstein with approval, as if, after making some admissions, he has nevertheless put up a convincing defence of his use of the word 'picture'. Moore does not think it necessary to point out that our uses of 'proposition' and 'picture' do not in the least follow similar rules.

It may seem that I am making an unnecessary fuss over the use of the word 'picture' and that we should accept Wittgenstein's later admission that it was vague and misleading. Firstly, my contention is that it was not only vague and misleading, but downright wrong and that it is incredible that a great philosopher should not have seen this in a trice. Secondly, it is not just an eccentric use of a common word; the very concept of picturing leads to an important further consequence.

A proposition, by itself, is, according to Wittgenstein, neither true nor false. It is only a meaning which represents a possible state of affairs. 'Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of reality' (4.06). He says, 'In order to discover whether the picture is true or false, we must compare it with reality' (2.223). This was said, much earlier, in connection with pictures proper, models, scores etc. and now we are told 'Reality is compared with the proposition' (4.05). (What is meant, of course, is that the proposition is compared with reality.) Comparing a proposition with reality is given as a test or criterion of truth. We return, after a very long voyage, to the familiar old Correspondence Theory of Truth of the British Empiricists, except for the fact that they talked more in terms of mental images (which they called 'ideas') than of propositions and sentences. In so doing, I think they had a stronger case than the Wittgensteinians, for there is some plausibility in the idea of comparing mental images with reality, while to compare a sentence with reality is to attempt the impossible.

However, it has become clear that no horses in philosophy ever die. But I am not pursuing the Empiricists now. Returning to Wittgenstein, what is he talking about in the two statements just quoted above (4.06 and 4.05)? Does he mean propositional signs (sentences spoken or written) or propositions (the 'sense' or meaning of propositional signs)?

Meanings, being 'invisible forms', cannot be compared with the fact by being held, as it were, alongside of it. A meaning (as we saw earlier) gives directions regarding the steps to be taken in order to verify it and comparing one thing with another is not even one of these steps. The only things which could possibly be compared with actual physical reality would be a physical reality itself. It would not be patently absurd to talk of pictures proper, models, maps etc. being compared with things, though, even here, comparison is not always feasible (for example, in the case of past events). But to think that propositional signs or sentences could be compared in any meaningful sense with any things, events or anything else is totally absurd. Of course it is correct to say, as Wittgenstein does, that 'in the proposition there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents' (4.04). If you say 'The cat is on the mat', there must be a symbol for the cat, a symbol for the mat and a symbol to indicate the relation of being on. Not only this, but the structure must show that it is the cat that is on the mat and not the mat on the cat. But neither a single word nor the structure of this

sentence is anything that looks like, or can be compared with, the fact of the cat being on the mat. What could have made Wittgenstein cling so desperately to the word, and the idea of, 'picture' in giving us his theory of meaning? And what drives his apologists to go to such lengths to find excuses for him?

Modernity and Postmodernity

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In this paper, I shall furnish a brief note on the basic issues concerning modernity and postmodernity. Modernity breaks with the endless reiteration of traditional (classical) themes, topics and myths; and postmodernity operates at the places of closure in modernity, at the margins of what proclaims itself to be new and a break with tradition. To be modern means to search for new self-conscious expressive forms. To be postmodern is to marginalize, delimit, disseminate and decenter the primary and often secondary works of modernist inscriptions. It implies that the line of demarcation between modernity and postmodernity remains a matter of uncertainty because postmodernity operates at the edge of modernity.

In 1979, Jean-Francois Lyotard was assigned by the Canadian Government to compile, assess and critically evaluate the intellectual climate in the most advanced countries of Western Europe and the U.S.A. There Lyotard, as a point of departure, uses the term 'postmodern' to describe that climate. In *Driftworks*, for example, Lyotard inveighs against modernist reason as the main instrument of repression and stresses the freeplay of both language and action that leads to 'plurality of singularities'.[1] He proceeds to analyze the changes and transformations that took place since the end of the 19th century in the fields of philosophy, science, literature, politics, art, etc. This he terms as 'the crisis of narratives'. These narratives are the reflections of the modernist conceptual framework in which a criterion or a standard or a legitimation with reference to its own system is designed. This could be an appeal to a Grand Narrative such as the Dialectic of Spirit (Hegel), Emancipation of the Rational Subject (Enlightenment Rationality of Kant) or the Working Subject (Marx). As against this, Lyotard defines postmodern as 'incredulity towards metanarratives'. Any statement of conclusion needs to be placed in the context of valida-

tion criterion. Postmodernity is an end of the validation criterion. In *The Postmodern Conditipon: A Report on Knowledge*, Lyotard has emphasized on similar concern on developments in modern science, catastrophe theory, chaos theory and so on, all of which display, he thinks, the bankruptcy of traditional forms of epistemology.

Postmodernity could be defined as an 'attitude' or a 'mood' or a 'Movement'. Modernity could be defined as an 'ism'; i.e., 'a clear set of ideas' and a programme of action based on it. Postmodernity is not a systematic thing where you can develop concepts and relationships, precisely that is what the postmodernists are against. In modernity, everything is a system like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism', 'teleology', 'rationalism', 'freedom', 'logocentrism' and so on. I would like to dwell a little more on the question of what is the relation of postmodernity to modernity? No postmodernist will say that postmodernity is a denial of modernity. They say, it is a reconstruction, a reinterpretation, an attempt to give a new meaning to modernity. This is what the spokesman of postmodernity, Jean-Francois Lyotard says, 'The whole idea of postmodernity is perhaps better rethought under the rubric of rewriting modernity.'[2] Modern means something which is not traditional, 'To be modern is to break with the past and to search for new self-conscious expressive forms.'[3] The transition from the tradition to the modernity consists in the fact that the centre shifted from *religion* to *human reason*. The beginning of modernity can be traced to that intellectual fervour that spread in Europe from the middle of the 18th century. The French Revolution of 1789 was the high point in the spread of this intellectual-spiritual as well as political-economic-social ferment in western society. We have a long list of philosophers who are modern; such as, Descartes, Bacon, Galileo, Newton, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Compte and so on. The basic philosophical quests in modernism are that 'man can be an interpreter of the world' (Bacon), an observer of nature through an instrument such as the telescope and the mathematical foundation of the world (Cartesian-Galilean mechanics), Universal law of gravitation and the three laws of motion (Newton), 'understanding makes nature' (Kant), 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' (Hegel), 'the point however is to change the world' (Marx)—in a nutshell, one can shape and control the world through science is what inaugurates the modern world-view. Behind that drive there lies an absolute confidence in the capacity of unaided and autonomous human reason to solve all puzzles and remove the veil of mystery from reality. Reason

alone can bring the objective reality under human control through science and technology.

The postmodernity, on the other hand, wants to ignore even the present, in order to make a creative leap into the future untamed by laws, norms and institutions which are dominating the modernist society. Postmodernity is certainly not anti-modern in the sense of being backward looking. It does not want to reinstate the norms of religion and tradition which modernism repudiated. Nor does it wants to abide by the norms of modernity—especially the emphasis on system-prone thinking and logical rationality. The stalwarts of postmodernity are the irrationalism of Neitzsche, the structuralism of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, the cultural semiologist Ronald Barthes, the psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan, the poststructuralist Michel Foucault, the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, Levinas, Richard Rorty, critical theorists like Max Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas and others, but each in his own way.

What is held to be common to the disparate thinkers of postmodernity is a belief, though it is expressed in various ways, that in the present-day intellectual climate, we are observing a general crisis of 'philosophy'. In other words, we are facing 'a series of crises ... in which older modes of defining, appropriating and recomposing the objects of artistic, philosophical, literary and social scientific languages are no longer credible and in which one common aspect is the dissolution of the very boundary between the language and its object'.[4] S.K. White has suggested that what he calls 'postmodern problematic' consists of four interrelated phenomena: 'the increasing incredulity towards metanarratives, the growing awareness of new problems wrought by societal rationalism, the explosion of new informational technologies and the emergence of new social movements'.[5] Richard Rorty has brought the postmodern claim about knowledge, language and the world like this—the modernist assumption was that we had a 'glassy essence' that could be rationally perceived and interpreted through particular techniques and through which we could perceive the world, but postmodernism smashes that glass.

Given the above, postmodernity is, of its very nature, 'philosophical'. Let us take, for example, one of the key areas of postmodern discourse regarding philosophy—the notion of subjectivity. The postmoderns view modernity as having developed a particular view of this idea, beginning with (according to taste) Machiavelli, Descartes and/or Hobbes (I regard Descartes as the father of modernist subjectivity). As White has put it, '[in

modernity] the individual subject is conceived of as an isolated mind and will ... the modern world, says Derrida, stands under the imperative of giving a rational account of everything; or as Foucault more ominously puts it, of interrogating everything ... it manifests itself finally in the twentieth century as a "will to planetary order" [White is here citing Lyotard]."[6]

It may be pointed out that between postmodernity and modernity, there is a methodological gap. Things viewed from one method may not be the same if they are viewed from a different method. For instance, Hegel's method of appreciating history of philosophy is dialectical in which earlier systems are not annihilated but assimilated in the later, '... the relation of the earlier to the later systems of philosophy is much like the relation of corresponding stages of the Logical Idea; in other words, the earlier systems are preserved in the later ..."[7] But Derrida, however, says, '... the relationship between the ancient and the modern is not simply that of the implicit and the explicit ... My own conviction is that we must maintain two contradictory affirmations at the same time. On the one hand, we affirm the existence of ruptures in history, and on the other, we affirm that these ruptures produce gaps or faults (*failles*) in which the most hidden and forgotten archives can emerge and constantly reoccur and work through history."[8] Derrida retains the horizontal character of Hegel's dialectic without its teleology. For Derrida, writing always leads to more writing, and more, and still more; just as history does not lead to Final Struggle but to more history, and more, and still more. This is the episodic nature of history which Derrida is advocating.

Derrida's way of explaining history in terms of 'rupture' and 'mutation' falls widely apart from Hegel's way of analyzing history in terms of 'continuity' and 'negation of negation'. Derrida's account of history rests on the contention that reality follows diverse models which are mutually exclusive and are rich in conflicts. Consequently, totality or unity or rationality is shattered; and, pluralism, fragmentation, discontinuity and irrationalism are affirmed. But Hegel emphasizes on Logocentric notions with unified world order, rationality and human freedom.

In conclusion, we can say that Postmodernity rejects the norms of strict logic and rationality which characterize modernity. It attempts to transcend the contours of a system-prone thinking. At the *centre* of modernity are Foundationalism, Essentialism and Teleology which include such issues as human subjectivity (the *cogito*, the transcendental consciousness

and *Geist*), rationality, unity, science, morality, freedom and so on; whereas at the *margins* of modernity are such issues as madness, fantasy, demon, sexuality, pluralism, discontinuity, irrationality and fragmentation. Postmodernity underestimates the *Central* issues of modernity and overestimates the *Marginal* issues. In postmodernity, reality follows diverse models which are rich in conflicts, history is viewed from ruptures and mutations, and there is a radical negation of totalitarian thinking. In marginalizing, delimiting, disseminating and decentering the *Central* works of modernist inscription, the postmodernists, I feel, have expanded the horizons of modernity.

Notes and References

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Causality of Kārmic Justice

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That the doctrine of karma has had a very great influence in the Hindu tradition needs no proof. It is often regarded as a distinctive mark of Hindu thought. Barring a few exceptions, all schools of Indian Philosophy accept it in some form or the other. In general the doctrine states 'as you sow so shall you reap'. The principle that every individual has to bear the consequences of his actions in this life or the life hereafter is found in almost all religious traditions of the world. What make an important version of the doctrine of karma distinctive is that here the justice of reward and punishment meted out to an individual for his actions is dependent not upon a just divine being but upon strict causal connections between actions and their just results. The causal connections are supposed to operate on their own across successive lives of an individual and ensure that no one escapes the just deserts of his actions.

While the belief in the doctrine of karma has continued to influence the Indian philosophical thought as well as Hindu culture, I feel that adequate attention has not been paid to the complex dimensions of subjecting the individual's actions and the justice of their consequences for the agent to causal laws. We find that generally the impact of actions is discussed in the context of achieving liberation. The emphasis therefore is on getting out of the chain of actions and their consequences. But as long as the life of bondage or the worldly life continues, the connection between actions and their consequences remains and it is important to examine whether this connection can be regarded as causal. The present paper is an attempt to do that. My aim here is not an exegesis; nor is it to discuss the philosophical intricacies of the formulations of the doctrine or formulations of modalities of operations of the supposed connections between actions and their just reward/punishment. I propose to show that this doctrine, when combined with the system of varṇāśrama dharma leads to internal incoherence. Moreover it leads to a problematic conception of Nature; it leads

either to the conclusion that natural causality is identical with kārmic causality or to the conclusion that natural causality is subordinate to kārmic causality. Both these conceptions are fraught with serious difficulties. It is surprising that implications of the doctrine of karma for natural causality have not been subjected to a detailed discussion even in works where other aspects of the doctrine have been given in-depth and rigorous treatment.[1] It seems that it has generally been taken for granted that karmic justice can be subjected to causal laws without giving rise to serious philosophical difficulties regarding operations of natural laws. In my opinion this optimism is misplaced.

Before proceeding any further it is necessary to emphasize that such a doctrine is widely perceived as being a part of Hindu thought and culture and our analysis and critique is not merely a quixotic enterprise of attacking imaginary opponents (see section II). Almost all schools of Indian philosophy accept that the quality of the life and experiences of an individual in the present life are partly determined by his actions in the previous life and partly by his actions in the present life, and that, generally speaking, no one can escape the consequences of his actions, i.e., their just reward/punishment. However we do not find a clearly formulated theory to this effect; there are some loosely connected statements which can yield a doctrine. These statements in most cases need a more precise formulation and justification. The relation of actions and their results to rebirth is put forward to explain the inequities of life and occurrence of apparently undeserved suffering. There are different views on the questions as to how actions lead to their just consequences and what these consequences are. Some times God or the divine reality is said to ensure absolute kārmic justice. This view is quite close to the view found in other religious traditions that regard God as the divine dispenser of justice. However we also find a different view where actions are believed to lead to their just consequences on their own through causal connections, which ensure that every individual gets what he deserves in the light of his actions. Thus the quality of the present life and experiences of a person in Hindu tradition depends both on his actions in the present life and actions in his past lives. If rebirth is not accepted, a direct relation between a person's actions and their just rewards in the earthly life is supposed to exist; though some of the deserved consequences may be deferred to life hereafter and intervention by divine justice may be needed to ensure that nobody escapes what he deserves. But in Hindu thought the

happiness or sorrow one gets in the present life is a consequence both of actions performed by him in the present life and his actions in past lives. It is therefore possible that right actions in this life may be accompanied by sorrow and wrong ones by happiness as a result of consequences of actions in past lives.

It is important to note that the possibility of escaping or transcending the consequences of one's actions is clearly accepted in the Hindu thought. Bhakti traditions allow for this possibility through worship of the divine. There are several stories in Hindu mythology where a morally corrupt person, a thief or a prostitute, or even a vicious murderer, has been able to avoid the deserved punishment by invoking the grace of God. Moreover attainment of liberation is said to destroy the connection between actions and their results and bring to a halt the impact of one's actions, except that of prārabdha karmas. *Bhagavadgītā* teaches that not only attainment of right knowledge or devotion to God, but also performance of actions without desire for their results can enable a person to achieve liberation. However, as long as a person is not liberated, every action of his would lead to some consequences for him, which would be its just reward/punishment.

I

Although we make causal statements every day, it is not easy to define causal relation. Defining causal relation presents several philosophical difficulties. While it is not necessary to take into account all these for our purpose, it is necessary to outline some general features of what we regard as causal relation. Only then we will be able to say what kind of connections are required for kārmic causality. By 'kārmic causality' I mean the causal relation that is supposed to hold between actions (karma) and their consequences or results (karma phala) as reward and punishment for the agent. We will therefore indicate some features of the causal connection that are relevant for us.

After David Hume, it has generally been granted that causal relation is not logically necessary. It is an empirical relation and only experience tells us what things are causally related. Hume defined causal relation in terms of constant conjunction or regular sequence between two events 'x' and 'y' such that all events similar to 'x' and 'y' also have this relation. Hume went on to explain the necessity ascribed to causal relation by

means of psychological factors, but that is irrelevant for us. What needs to be noted is that the causal relation, on this view, holds between two kinds or types of events such that events of one kind invariably succeed events of the other kind.[2] Following Hume several philosophers have defined cause in a similar vein, specially the empiricists. J.S. Mill, for example, defines cause of a phenomenon as 'the antecedent or the concurrence of antecedents on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent.'[3] But such definitions face two major difficulties. First, we can find cases where the required regularity is present and yet we cannot assert a causal relation there. For example night and day have the required constant conjunction but it cannot be said that night is the cause of day or vice versa.[4] It may be argued here that this example still does not prove the inadequacy of the definition, since it requires not only that an event must be constantly conjoined with another event, but also that all the similar events must also be so conjoined. For example, night is a period of darkness and day a period of brightness but all periods of darkness are not followed by periods of brightness.[5] This way of answering the objection, however, gives rise to a major problem; the question of relevant similarities becomes crucial. How are these similarities to be determined? What degree of similarity and in what respects is to be taken as sufficient? If we take too narrow a view of similarity, we may end up with the position that no two events can be said to be similar, if we take two broad a view, any degree may be sufficient, which would clearly conflict with our considered judgements of causal relations.

The second major difficulty arises from cases where a causal relation appears to hold but the required regularity may not be there.[6] Suppose a fire is caused in a movie theatre because of a short circuit. Here it would be true to say that the fire was caused by a short circuit and yet in other places and at other times a short circuit may occur but may not lead to a fire. We had seen earlier that regular sequence theory of causation requires that all events of a type be succeeded by events of another type. But such regular sequence does not appear to hold between short circuits and fire in our example. One may say in defence of the regularity theory that it only requires that the relation should obtain in all cases of short circuits exactly similar to this one. Clearly similarity in these contexts is a problematic notion.

Universality and uniformity are two very important features of causal relation. When we assert a causal relation between two events, it is implied that all events similar to these in relevant respects will also have this relation. Uniformity implies that similar causes will always have similar effects. Thus asserting a causal relation in one case, say between 'x' and 'y', implies that such a relation holds between all events similar to these.[7] The universality and uniformity of the causal relation enable us to predict future events and manipulate causes to bring about desired effects, and give us the conception of a law-governed nature.[8]

In Indian philosophy some of the problems raised regarding causation are quite different from the ones discussed so far, for example, 'What is the relation of the material cause to its effect?' 'Does the material cause impart any essence to its effect or is it completely external to the cause?' 'Does the material cause actually turn into its effect or present only an illusory appearance?' 'Is the effect a new production or is it present in the cause from before in a potential form?' I will side-step these questions, since the problems of relation between actions and their results, which are being taken up in this paper, can be discussed without bringing in these controversies.

The Nyāya definition of 'cause', we find, is quite close to the regular sequence view of causation. *Nyāya-Vārtikam*, e.g., defines cause of something as a necessary and sufficient condition of that thing, such that in its presence the effect is produced and in its absence the effect is not produced.[9] In a similar vein, *Tarka-Bhāṣā* defines cause as an invariable antecedent, which is necessary for the occurrence of the effect.[10] Several other Naiyāyikas support such a definition of 'cause'. Some times the requirement of spatio-temporal contiguity between a cause and its effect is also added, requiring that the cause must be an immediate antecedent of its effect.[11]

We can thus explain causal relation through the idea of necessary and sufficient cause; 'x' is the necessary cause of 'y', if 'y' cannot take place unless 'x' takes place, and 'x' is the sufficient cause of 'y', if when 'x' takes place then 'y' also takes place. How 'x' brings about 'y', whether 'y' is potentially there in 'x' before coming into existence, whether 'x' has some causal energy or power through which it brings 'y' into existence are questions which we may ignore in the present discussion. Since we take the cause to be an invariable antecedent of the effect, it is clear that causal relation holds between two kinds or types of events and yields a general law. The causal connection, even though not a logically necessary relation (its denial is not logically self-contradictory), is yet universal in the sense

that it holds in all cases of a similar type, and necessary in the sense that its denial has very little or almost negligible probability. While discussing the problems of kārmic causality, we would rely on this general conception of causality.[12]

There is, however, a need to include mediate causes also in our discussion. Suppose 'x' invariably precedes 'y' and is the immediate antecedent of 'y', and 'y' invariably precedes 'z' and is the immediate antecedent of 'z'. If the requirement of cause being the immediate antecedent of 'y' is necessary, then 'x' is the cause of 'y' and 'y' of 'z', but 'x' is not the cause of 'z'. While 'x' here is not a direct cause of 'z', it is a mediate or indirect cause of 'z'. While discussing the doctrine of karma, the relationship between actions and their consequences can not be explained without bringing in mediate causes and causal chains linking actions to their consequences. Otherwise an action would be the cause of a thing only when it is the immediate antecedent of that thing. If so, in most cases, action would not qualify to be the cause of the result in question. In most cases the doctrine of karma posits intermediaries between actions and their consequences. A brief glance at philosophical discussions of modalities of actions leading to their results would be enough to support this. If actions bring about their just deserts through tendencies left in the soul (saṃskāra) or through the invisible or the unknown (adṛṣṭa) or through virtue or vice as the eventual cause of future happiness or misery, or through an unseen force (apūrva), actions are not immediate antecedents of their consequences.' Similarly, if actions are supposed to lead to their just deserts through intermediaries in the form of natural events or actions of other persons, again they are not immediate causes of their consequences. Moreover, wherever a considerable time gap between actions and their consequences exists, as implied in the idea of deferment of the realization of their results, then also actions can not be said to be the immediate antecedents of their just rewards or punishments.

II

Let me now come to the doctrine of karma. While most systems of Indian philosophy accept it in some form or the other, their views regarding its scope and the modalities of kārmic causality, i.e., how actions lead to their consequences or fruits vary substantially. The doctrine embodies the principle that every person must bear the consequences of his actions; the

quality of a person's life and experiences at any point of time is determined by his past actions. The most important aspect of the doctrine is its supposition that there is complete justice in the desert of one's actions. The individual gets only what he deserves by virtue of his actions and their is no escape from this. As already mentioned, I am going to consider only that form of the doctrine which holds that kārmic justice gets implemented through causal connections between actions and their consequences, without the help of a divine dispenser of justice.

Not all formulations of the doctrine of karma share the above-mentioned assumptions.[13] For example, in the *Mahābhārata*, not only one's actions, but Fate, Time and divine power are also supposed to determine the quality of the life of a person and his destiny. In the *Vedas*, transfer of karma is accepted, where one person can transfer the merits earned by his actions to another person. In theistic versions of the doctrine, God ensures that every person gets the consequences that he deserves in the light of his actions. Moreover, in Hindu mythology, several instances of curse (śrāpa) and boon (vardāna) can be found. These imply that kārmic causality can be interfered with to bring about the desired consequences bestowed upon a person by a sage or a divine being. However, systems like Yoga and Advaita Vedānta believe in inviolability of the law of karma and do not allow for transfer of karma. Given that there are such differences in the views on karma, a single universally acceptable formulation of this doctrine can not be given.

Before proceeding any further, let me address the question as to which actions fall within the scope of the doctrine. Generally, we regard only intentional purposive actions as objects of ethical evaluation. These include physical or bodily actions, actions pertaining to speech, ritualistic and sacrificial actions. Sometimes thinking, desiring etc. are also regarded as morally relevant actions entitling the agent to reward/punishment.[14] Moreover, not only acts of commission but also acts of omission entitle an agent to some consequences. Sometimes even unintended acts of omission are said to deserve punishment. For example, in the famous story of Śakuntalā she was put under a curse by the sage Durvāsā because she did not attend to him as she should have, since she was lost in thoughts of king Duṣyanta. The supposition that an act of omission starts a causal chain has problems of its own and when the omission is unintentional, it seems very implausible to say that the suffering it brings to the agent is a just punishment. For the sake of simplicity I shall confine my discussion

to intentional, purposive actions of commission, which are capable of being classified as morally right or wrong.

We find that most philosophical systems do not provide a clear and precise formulation of the doctrine of karma. However, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta are among those which do give a detailed theory of karma and rebirth. According to Pātañjali's *Yogasūtra*, a purposive intentional action creates a kārmic residue which is either meritorious or unmeritorious, depending upon the nature of the action. When a person dies, his unexhausted kārmic residues enter a new body. These residues determine the kind of body it is, the length of its life, and the affective tone of the experiences the person will have, i.e., whether his experiences will be pleasant or painful. Potter rightly observes that in this theory, the function of kārmic residues within a given lifetime is to provide the affective tone of experience; good residues produce pleasurable experiences, bad ones produce painful experiences.[15] Similarly, Advaita Vedānta holds that at every new birth the individual's soul brings with it the kārmic residues from his actions in the life just ended and lives before that. Those residues, which have matured and are determined to work themselves out in this life, determine, in conjunction with impressions (vāsanās), the length of his life under normal circumstances and the kind of experiences this person will have in life. Of course the quality of experiences depends on the actions in the present life also, which in turn leave some kārmic residues for the next birth.

The doctrine can be stated as follows:

(A) 1. Every intentional purposive action leads to some consequences for the agent.
2. The action is a necessary cause of these consequences.
3. The action leaves a kārmic residue, which upon maturation brings about the consequences; thus the action is the sufficient cause of the consequences.

(B) 1. Every intentional purposive action is either morally right or morally wrong.
2. Every right action (under normal circumstances) is a necessary and sufficient cause of some good consequences, every wrong action of bad consequences.
3. A good consequence is that which gives happiness to the agent, a bad one is that which gives suffering to the agent.

4. Happiness is the just reward of right actions and suffering the just punishment of wrong actions.

From the above it follows that a right action causally leads to happiness, a wrong one to suffering for the agent. Under normal circumstances an agent gets without fail the happiness/suffering he deserves in the light of his actions. Moreover, whatever happiness he gets is deserved by him on the basis of the moral worth of his actions.

It is widely accepted by the contemporary writers on Indian philosophy that such a doctrine is part of the Hindu tradition. M. Hiriyanna, S. Radhakrishnan, Rajendra Prasad, Daya Krishna, Rama Rao Pappu, K.H. Potter are a few examples. Hiryanna regards the law of karma as an ethical law which signifies that our lot in the present life is the absolutely just reward/punishment for our actions.[16] Rama Rao Pappu regards it as 'the law of moral causation' and thinks that since it is a law, we can 'know, predict, control and manipulate' it.[17] Rajendra Prasad also treats it as a causal law about actions and their consequences, namely pleasure and pain, implying that all the pleasure and pain that a person experiences is such that he deserves to experience them and them alone.[18] We can cite several other instances of such an interpretation of the doctrine of karma.

From the above discussion it is clear that the causal connection between actions and their consequences is regarded as giving an inviolable law stating that every person must bear the consequences of his actions in this life or another life. The lot of a person in life and the quality of his experiences are causally determined by his actions alone; the happiness or suffering a person has to face is due to his own actions and their just deserts. Thus it is not only implied that a person gets the happiness or suffering he deserves as a result of his actions, but also that whatever happiness or suffering accrues to a person is a consequence of his own actions alone. Therefore, even when a person's happiness or suffering may appear to be due to some natural phenomena or another persons' actions, it is really due to one's own actions only.[19] The importance of the law of karma consists in emphasizing not only that everyone ought to get what he deserves but that everyone actually gets only what he deserves in the light of the moral worth of his actions. Almost all philosophers have highlighted this aspect of the law of karma.[20]

The doctrine of karma admits the possibility of deferment of reward or punishment for one's actions. One may not get the reward of a right action immediately but in future or even in the next birth. Rather till such time

as one gets liberated, it becomes necessary that some kārmic residues remain at the time of death of an individual, because that is essential for rebirth. This shows how interpretation enters even at the stage of stating the law. Suppose it is said that the happiness an agent gets at this time is actually a reward for his action performed fifteen years ago, where it is not at all clear how this happiness is causally connected to the past action, such an assertion is clearly different from usual statements of causal connections. It is a common observation that quite often good people suffer while evil ones thrive, so the idea of deferment of reward and punishment is brought in to account for this apparently unjust state of affairs when straightforward causal connections between good deeds and happiness and evil deeds and suffering cannot be found. But this move raises questions about the nature and status of the supposed law of karma as well as makes it difficult to assert causal connections between actions and happiness or suffering.

A few things about the notion of consequences or fruits of actions (karma phala) also need to be clarified before we can proceed further. As already mentioned, the body one is born with, the length of one's life and pleasure or pain one experiences in life are cited as consequences of actions. In general, the physical and mental apparatus one is born with, circumstances of one's birth, even the caste (varṇa) one is born into, are also regarded as consequences of one's actions.[21] However, the specific consequences of each type of action are generally not mentioned, the emphasis being that right actions bring happiness to the agent, wrong ones bring suffering. It is to be noted that consequences are always for the agent himself. Thus 'consequences' here does not mean the changes that one's actions may bring about in things or persons around him; it is quite clear that one person's action can not have any consequences for another person. Good results would be those which bring happiness to the agent, bad ones those that bring pain or suffering to the agent. As regards the body and length of life, what would count as good result is also not clearly defined. It is therefore possible that in some instances we may find it difficult to say whether some kind of body or life is a good result or a bad one. The doctrine, however, does posit a causally necessary connection between right actions and personal happiness and well being. But this is not enough. Since the doctrine asserts causal connections between certain kinds of actions and certain kinds of results, a clear demarcation of these results becomes necessary. In case of sacrificial acts (yajña) specific

consequences of these are spelt out. But with respect to actions other than these, most of the time it is not specified which actions and which results are causally connected. Some of the Dharmaśāstras do specify results of kinds of actions and it is assumed that a clear, non-relative distinction between good and bad results exists. But this assumption is not tenable and needs to be argued for. Moreover, quite often discussions of the doctrine of karma do not clarify whether actions are supposed to be causally related to certain events, which in their turn are causes of happiness or suffering to the agent, or to happiness or suffering directly.

When we talk of right actions and their just rewards, evaluation is involved at two stages, and it requires norms or standards according to which evaluation is done. Firstly, to decide whether an action is right or wrong, and secondly, to judge what would be its just reward or punishment. It is sometimes argued that even if there be causal connections between good deeds and happiness for the agent and bad ones and suffering, these results cannot be called just reward or punishment for those actions, unless some one judges them to be so in the light of some norm. Rajendra Prasad raises this objection in his critique of the doctrine and says, '... unless the kārmic process involves some judging, evaluating or decision making, it will not be a process of apportionment of rewards and punishments and, therefore, of moral rewards and punishments.'[22] It is evident that evaluation in the light of some norm is implicit in the very idea of a right or wrong action and also in the moral idea of just reward or punishment for an action. It is a necessary condition of such evaluation that whosoever is making the judgement takes cognizance of the norm. Prasad thinks that necessity of evaluation in the light of norms rules out the possibility that actions and their just rewards can be subjected to causal laws, which operate on their own, presumably because Nature is incapable of making ethical evaluations. It is indeed correct to say that something cannot be regarded as a just reward for an action without the application of some norms relating to actions and their appropriate rewards. The concept of reward is distinct from the concept of consequence of an action. Therefore, consequences causally linked to actions do not automatically become their just rewards. In theistic systems (which accept God) this problem can be resolved by stipulating that God judges the appropriate reward for people's actions and ensures that they do get what they deserve. In atheistic (which do not accept God) systems or even in a theistic system where the law of karma is supposed to operate on its

own, the requirement of evaluation of actions and their just rewards seems to remain unfulfilled. A way to create the possibility of such evaluations in the doctrine of karma has to be devised for these systems. Theoretically it can be done by assigning this task to Nature itself, though it would amount to converting Nature into a rational being capable of making such evaluations and generating appropriate causal connections. How far such an idea is acceptable is a different matter. Even when we do not regard Nature as capable of making evaluations of just rewards and punishments for actions, we can still admit the theoretical possibility of regarding causal consequences of actions as their just rewards. Let us suppose that we make certain judgements regarding appropriate rewards for certain actions, independently of observing the actual causal consequences of those actions. On observing the ways of Nature we find that actually actions lead to what we have judged to be their appropriate rewards. In this case also the causal consequences of an action can be called its 'just reward'. In short, the fact that the doctrine of karma posits causal connections between actions and their consequences by itself does not rule out the possibility that these consequences be regarded as just rewards or punishments for those actions. Let me grant for the sake of the argument that evaluations of the kind required can be incorporated successfully in the doctrine of karma. I will now deal with a different question, 'Can the idea of a causal connection between an action and its just reward or punishment be made coherent in a system which makes code of conduct relative to several factors?' I propose to show that this cannot be done.

III

Granting that actions and their just reward can in principle be subjected to causal laws, provided, the requirement of evaluation of actions and their just reward in the light of norms is taken care of, let me outline the complex and problematic dimensions of the supposed causal laws. Kārmic causality would relate an agent, an action and a result. Moral evaluation is involved in case of both the action and the result, the former because the action is being judged as right or wrong and the latter because the result is supposed to constitute a just reward or punishment for that action. This feature introduces serious philosophical problems in subjecting actions and their rewards to causal processes.

Let me consider the question of rightness of actions first. A norm may declare an action to be right either in the light of the intention behind it or its consequences or both. (Even where right conduct is codified in terms of rules laid down by a scripture, such considerations remain important.) Such a norm may be universalizable in an unrestricted way, i.e., be of the form that a certain action is always right, whosoever be the agent and whatever be the circumstances in which it is performed. But generally such norms are universalizable in a more restricted sense and are of the form that an action is right for everyone when performed under certain circumstances. A norm may also have a restricted domain with respect to agents; it may be of the form that an action is right only when done by a certain kind of agent. In Hindu philosophy we find both kinds of restriction operating upon norms for right actions. Since the scheme of varṇāśrama dharma is held to be valid, insofar as the worldly life is concerned, by almost all schools of Hindu philosophy, duties and rules of conduct vary according to the caste (varṇa) and the stage of life (āśrama) of the agent. Moreover, quite often right conduct is made conditional upon several other factors also, like the time of action, status or position of the agent, the era to which the agent belongs etc. A cursory glance at diverse classifications of dharma, understood as duties and code of conduct, makes it amply evident that Hindu thought recognizes both kinds of rules of conduct, those valid for everyone and at all times, thus having unrestricted universality, and those relative to an agent's cast and stage of life, sometimes also relative to his office, the time in which he lives and circumstances prevailing at the time of action.[23] We can introduce another category here, namely, gender. Though not always specifically mentioned in the classification of dharma, it is clear that gender cuts across several of these categories. So duties for a man in the householder's life are quite different from duties for a woman at that stage of life. Similarly, most of the rules of conduct ordained for women remain the same whichever caste they may belong to, and specific duties assigned to castes are in most cases applicable only to men. Thus women are not ordinarily supposed to engage in warfare even when belonging to the warrior caste nor in trade or business activities when belonging to the trading caste.

The emphasis on following the code of conduct prescribed for oneself (svadharma), makes it clear that a person is always supposed to follow the dharma prescribed for him according to his caste, stage in life, etc. and any effort to switch to or adopt a code valid for persons of different caste

or stage in life is, in most cases, strongly disapproved of.[24] The Hindu system of classifying duties presents a peculiar combination of flexibility and rigidity. While on the one hand due importance is attached to an agent's station in life, circumstances, the demands of his profession and time he is living in, on the other hand, within each different category, the code of conduct is often strictly and rigidly laid out. It appears logical to proceed from the recognition that duties vary according to the agent's circumstances to the further conclusion that even within each classification, e.g., code for a certain stage in life or code for a certain profession, certain flexibility or interchangeability has to be introduced to do justice to the particular nature and circumstances of an individual agent. This has, however, not been done in most cases.

Like right actions, sins or evil actions have also been classified sometimes on the basis of the degree of their wickedness, for example, as deadly sins, big sins and minor sins, and sometimes on the basis of the kind of actions involved, for example as mental, verbal and bodily sins. Certain types of actions, namely those which violate the code of conduct valid for everyone, can be said to be wrong for everyone. However, as far as specific codes are concerned, what is right for one person may be wrong for another, so wrong actions arising from violating the code prescribed for oneself or adopting the duties prescribed for another would also vary from person to person.

Since the question of the ethical merit of actions is in most cases relative to the agents and their situation, the causal laws relating actions and their results would have to incorporate these complex dimensions of moral judgements about actions. The same actions when done by one would be right, when done by another would be wrong, therefore can not have the same consequences in the two cases. Thus, in case of a large majority of actions, the supposed causal connections would be required to relate an action, subject to an agent's specific caste and stage in life, with a certain good or bad effect, such that the same action in one case may lead to a good result, while in another to a bad result. Only in case of duties prescribed for all, or actions forbidden for all, truly universal causal laws relating an action to its good or bad result, irrespective of the agent may be possible. If a separate code for times of distress is recognized, it would necessitate the superseding of the necessary causal processes at certain times and under certain types of situations and introduction of fresh causal connections. The difficulty here is that causality, as we

understand it, is not agent relative. If the relation between actions and their just rewards is said to be causal, we need a notion of causality, where what the effect of a certain cause would be would depend on who the agent is. This notion of causality is different from the one outlined earlier. It needs to be clarified what kind of relation is involved here and whether it can be called causal, and if so, how it is different from causal relation as ordinarily understood.

As already discussed, causal connections between specific types of actions and specific types of results are most of the time not mentioned, except in case of sacrificial acts. However, in some Dharmaśāstras, some specific connections are laid out.[25] If there is to be a law of karma such that we can know, control and manipulate it to ensure a certain kind of future life, and use it to provide guidance for conduct, it is required that causal connections between different types of action and their results are clearly specified. Merely asserting a causal connection between good conduct and happiness on the one hand, and bad conduct and suffering on the other, is not enough; specifications of the connection should also be given. Unless an agent knows these causal connections in their entire complexity, he can not relate events in his life with his actions and consequently can not modify his conduct in the desired direction. Therefore, the law of karma will fail to have any motivational effect on agents.

Let me now come to the ideas of reward and punishment. These ensure retributive justice. The notion of deserved reward or punishment, includes not only a moral judgement on the action in question but also a judgement about appropriateness of a result to that action. Ordinarily judgements about retributive punishment for wrong doings, for example, have to take into account several factors, like whether the action was done deliberately in a cool and calculated manner or in the heat of the moment, whether the intention was to harm others or only to get benefit for oneself, not realizing that it may harm others. Take the case of killing another person. Killing another person with a deliberate intention and with the sole purpose of bringing some undue gain to oneself would definitely be considered more evil than killing someone inadvertently or in a fit of passion or under severe provocation. In some cases killing another person may not be considered a wrong action at all, as killing the other in self-defense or killing enemy soldiers in order to defend one's country against foreign invasion, or killing a dreaded terrorist to prevent him from killing innocent people taken as hostages. Any morally worthwhile legal system would

have to take into account such factors while deciding the appropriate reward or punishment for an action. Moreover, to have the intention to do a wrong deed but not actually carrying it out cannot be said to be as evil as having such an intention and executing it. In some cases however the intention may be all that matters.

The consequences of an action for other people are also generally very important for judging its just reward. If several people are killed by robbers while robbing a bank, the punishment would have to be far more severe than if only one person is injured or if nobody is hurt in the incident. Sometimes the consequences may not matter, for example, when one jumps into a river to save someone, hearing cries for help, but does not succeed in his effort because of a strong current or because that person is saved in the meantime by somebody else. The person in question is nonetheless entitled to reward deserved by a good action. On the other hand if doing one's duty brings about unpleasant consequences it may still be said that the agent is not entitled to any punishment. Kriṣna's exhortation to Arjuna in the *Bhagavadgītā* to fight the war even if it means killing his relatives and dear ones is a case in point. However, we cannot deny the fact that one is faced with a moral dilemma when one can foresee the unpleasant consequences of one's actions, even though the action is right. In case of wrong actions, consequences do seem to matter enormously; the degree of wickendess of the action may depend upon them and a judgement of an adequate punishment will have to take them into account.

Consequences of actions that are relevant for a judgement of appropriate reward or punishment may include not only the intended, but also the unintended consequences of one's action. If an act of commission or omission on the part of a person leads to severely bad consequences, even though unintentionally, these are bound to affect our judgement of the guilt of the person in question. For example, suppose that the negligence of a caretaker of a building leads to a major fire in which not only property but several lives are also lost, the approbation of guilt to the caretaker in this case would be much more than it would have been if the fire was minor and no lives were lost. How a person has to bear the burden of even those consequences of one's actions which are unintentionally produced, is beautifully depicted in the story of Daśaratha, the king of Ayodhyā and the father of Lord Rāma. The king accidentally killed Śravana Kumara while hunting, mistaking him from a distance to be a deer. His intention

was alright, the action in question, namely hunting a deer, did not constitute a wrong action and yet he was blamed for the death of Śravana Kumara and placed under a curse by the boy's old parents, which subsequently brought upon him separation from his son and intense suffering.

From the above discussion it becomes quite clear that the agent- and context-dependent nature of rules for right conduct introduces a very high degree of complexity in judgements of moral worth of actions by making several factors relevant to their moral assessment. The judgement of appropriate reward or adequate punishment for an action of a person would also necessarily depend upon such factors besides some others. Each action of a person would need to be judged individually for its moral worth and its appropriate reward. This raises serious doubts whether causal connections of a very general nature can be asserted between certain kinds of actions and certain kinds of results.

As discussed earlier, the doctrine of karma posits a causal relation between good deeds of a person and his happiness and evil deeds and his suffering. This adds another dimension to the complexity of supposed kārmic causality. What gives happiness to one person may be a cause of unhappiness to another. What makes a person happy depends to a great extent upon his inclinations, aspirations, situation, profession, goals in life, age and several other factors. While one person may derive enormous happiness from material prosperity, another may seek it from selfless service or increase in knowledge. Even if we grant that more or less similar things bring happiness to people, the difficulty remains. Happiness is subjective and a matter of degrees, so the same thing or gain may make one very happy but leave the other dissatisfied and unhappy. Getting 54 per cent marks in a school examination may make one student quite happy but make the other miserable, depending on their expectations and aspirations. Things that make one intensely happy in youth may leave one cold in old age. Since happiness is generally derived through certain means like wealth, satisfaction of desires, success in career, well-being of children, etc., and what makes a person happy varies from person to person, the plausibility of the kind of causal laws required by the doctrine of karma becomes even more questionable. It would not suffice, for example, to say that a promotion in one's career is the reward for a particular good deed of the person. If there is a positive correlation between an appropriate reward for an action and happiness of the person, this would also require a similar correlation between the moral worth of an action

and the degree of happiness experienced by the agent. Whether a promotion in one's career brings happiness to a person and in what degree is relative to the agent in question. Thus, causal connections between certain kinds of actions and certain kinds of gains or losses can only be possible if we assume that same things make everybody happy or unhappy and in the same degree. But this is clearly not supported by our common experience.

To recapitulate the discussion so far, I have argued that the supposed kārmic causality is very complex. One, it involves judgement of ethical merit of actions, which, in Hindu thought, is relative to an agent and his situation. Two, it requires decisions of appropriate and just rewards or punishments for actions, which are subject to several conditions. Three, it requires a correlation between just reward and happiness and just punishment and suffering for the agent, which again is subject to conditions and relative to the agent. If causal connections between right actions and their just rewards bringing happiness to the agent are to be posited, supporters of the doctrine of karma would have to show whether such causal connections can be plausibly asserted in the light of all these constraints, and if so, how.

IV

As already discussed, kārmic causality is supposed to ensure full justice of reward and punishment to agents in accordance with the moral worth of his actions. Thus, all the happiness or suffering a person gets in life becomes the appropriate reward or punishment of his own actions. Our experience tells us that a person's happiness or suffering can be due to at least three sources; one's own actions, natural processes for instance flood, rains, intense heat or cold, good weather, etc. and actions of other persons. Conversely, an action of a person can have some consequences for himself, for objects around him and also for other persons. According to the doctrine of karma, the quality of life and experiences of a person is dependent solely on his own actions. If so, anything which affects the quality of life and experiences of a person but which appears to be due to natural processes or another person's action would have to be explained in terms of his own actions. Let me now take one example of each kind and outline the difficulties involved in accommodating them within the purview of the doctrine of karma.

Example 1: Suppose a person Rakesh shoots another person Mohan with a revolver, injuring him seriously and incapacitating him. As a result, Mohan is unable to earn his livelihood for five years. Mohan's wife, children and parents face severe hardships and are extremely unhappy, both because of these hardships and Mohan's suffering. Rakesh is sentenced to seven years imprisonment for his action and that brings a lot of unhappiness and suffering to his family members. According to the doctrine of karma, the suffering faced by each individual in this case is due to his or her own actions, even though it may appear to be on account of an action done by another person namely Rakesh. Here Mohan's injury and handicap and Rakesh's act of shooting and his imprisonment etc. can be said to be the instrumentalities or means through which kārmic causality ensures that everybody gets appropriate punishment for his or her actions. A question arises, 'Does kārmic causality determine the instrumentalities through which a person would get his share of happiness or suffering, which is the just desert of his actions, or does it only determine that a person does experience his share of happiness or suffering, leaving it open by what means it is bestowed upon him?' In the present example, Rakesh's suffering is due to his own action, which also appears to be the cause of his family members' suffering and the suffering of Mohan and his family members. Suppose in conformity with the doctrine of karma we accept that Rakesh's suffering is due to his own action and Mohan's due to his own actions. We may now ask whether it is determined within kārmic causality that some past action of Mohan would bring him suffering at this point in his life through a gunshot injury inflicted by another person Rakesh? If so, consequences (karma phala) of Mohan's actions determine the present action of Rakesh. But then Rakesh's present action could not be said to have been done freely. Moreover, this would lead to the unacceptable conclusion that Rakesh's present suffering is due to Mohan's past actions and their just deserts and not due to his own action alone. We can imagine how such problems magnify if we try to explain the suffering of each affected person in this example in terms of his or her own past actions. We have seen earlier that quite often causal connections are asserted between certain kinds of actions and certain kinds of circumstances of birth, family and fortune. Here it seems that the doctrine of karma determines not only the happiness and suffering that are going to be one's lot, but also the circumstances that would engender them. A story from the epic *Mahābhārata* illustrates this point well. The

only son of a Brahmin woman Gautami was bitten by a snake and died. A snake charmer caught the snake and asked Gautami what punishment should be given to the snake. In the ensuing dialogue between Gautamī, the snake and the snake charmer, the snake says that he bit the boy on instructions from the Lord of Death. The Lord of Death comes and explains that he gave these orders to the snake because he was directed by Kāla (Time). Ultimately Kāla comes and says that all the events are actually the consequences of the boy's own actions, which had to give their result at a certain time through the instrumentalities of the Lord of Death and the snake. This interpretation raises serious philosophical difficulties for people's freedom of the will, more so when actions of one person become an instrument of ensuring kārmic justice to others. It also implies that kārmic causality determines that certain kinds of events would take place at a certain time so as to ensure distribution of appropriate reward or punishment to persons.

Suppose it is said that kārmic justice does not determine the means through which happiness or suffering are brought upon a person but only that the person does get happiness or suffering which he deserves. This would mean that kārmic residues and happiness/suffering would have to be taken as causally connected. In the present example Mohan suffers as a result of gunshot injury inflicted by Rakesh, but he might have faced similar suffering as a result of being hit by another person by a hard, pointed object or falling from the roof. On this interpretation, kārmic causality would need to ensure a perfect match between the deserved results of a person's actions and natural events/other people's actions. In the present example Mohan's suffering is due to the injury caused by Rakesh. So kārmic causality would need to ensure that Rakesh and Mohan are placed in this specific situation and not some other, such that Rakesh shoots at Mohan with his revolver. Moreover, it would have to ensure that people affected by this incident are those who deserved this suffering at this time. That such perfect matching can be brought about by causal connections between actions and happiness/suffering, operating on their own, seems far from plausible.

Example 2: Suppose a person, who is a rich farmer deserves certain unhappiness at a certain time due to his past actions. Suppose further that at this time his crops are destroyed as a result of inadequate rainfall. He suffers financial loss, fails to arrange the wedding of his daughter scheduled to take place at that time, and all these make him extremely unhappy.

Here the unhappiness, which is the due punishment for his past actions, is brought about through natural events. Again one alternative is to suppose that it was determined through kārmic causality that the farmer would get his due punishment through these particular natural events at this particular time. This would imply that operations of natural processes are subordinate to kārmic causality. The other option is to suppose that due punishment could be brought about through any one of the several possible natural events, for example, he could have suffered because of a massive fire where the harvested grain got destroyed, or through some disease which destroyed his wonderful crop, or some such other factor. If so, operations of kārmic causality would require that natural events like rainfall, spread of disease, fire, etc. occur at times and places such that they can ensure that people get what they deserve in the light of their actions. Again a perfect matching between natural events and deserved reward of affected persons would be needed. It is certainly not obvious that such a relationship exists. Therefore good reasons need to be provided to support this contention.

This brings us to the question of relationship between natural laws and supposed kārmic causal connections. Are these identical or different? If they are different, then the relationship between them needs to be explained. One view can be that the whole universe is actually governed by the law of karma, taking this to be the import of the idea of a 'morally ordered universe'. Rama Rao Pappu, for instance, seems to support such a view, when he observes that, 'It (the karma doctrine) is the principle of the ordered universe, the causal law which governs the world. It is thus a naturalistic principle.'[26] However, another possible interpretation is to regard the natural causal connections as distinct from the kārmic causal connections. Such a view also finds support in the classical Indian philosophy. Wilhelm Halbfass argues that natural causality and kārmic causality are not always taken to be identical in classical Indian philosophy. According to him, 'It is by no means simply taken for granted that the whole world is just a stage for ethically committed or soteriologically meaningful events, or that natural processes are necessarily governed by or subordinate to retributive causality. The realm of cosmology and even that of biology is not *eo ipso* coextensive with the realm of saṃsāra, that is, of retribution and of possible soteriological progression.'[27]

It is not within the purview of this paper to show which of the two above-mentioned interpretations of the relationship between natural and

supposed kārmic causality have greater support in the Indian tradition and what their inner complexities are. It would suffice to point out that both interpretations are beset with difficulties. It is by no means obvious that natural processes work to ensure retributive kārmic justice. Therefore, strong reasons, which do not already involve suppositions and interpretations parasitical upon the doctrine of karma, would need to be provided to support the idea of a 'morally ordered universe'. Such an idea cannot simply be taken for granted. Moreover, if the idea of 'a morally ordered universe', implies that Nature ensures kārmic justice through its processes, Nature would have to be regarded as capable of making moral judgements about actions and their appropriate rewards or punishments as well as of implementing such decisions without fail. This would require converting Nature into an omniscient, omnipotent being like God. If the role of judging people's actions and ensuring their just deserts to the agents through natural processes is ascribed to kārmic causality itself, this would seem to convert it into something like an omniscient and omnipotent being. A way out can be found by taking recourse to the theistic way of ascribing moral judgements of people's actions as well as the responsibility of ensuring retributive justice in the world to God. This, however, would destroy the distinctive character of the doctrine of karma insofar as the causal connections between actions and their consequences are supposed to be capable of ensuring kārmic justice on their own. Moral judgements of actions within the scheme of varṇāśrama dharma and other context- and agent-relative classifications of duties become extremely complex and it is by no means clear how the possibility of such judgements can be said to be built in the very functioning of Nature. In what sense can Nature be said to evolve or take cognizance of these complex moral codes, make required judgements and initiate processes to ensure full retributive justice? Moreover, the causal connections between actions and their results are supposed to be relative to agents and their situation. There is no evidence to support that natural processes have this kind of dependence. It is doubtful whether any connections possessing the kind of universality required by causal relations are possible in such a framework of morality except perhaps in respect of universal duties.

If natural causality and kārmic causality are not identical, then their relation needs to be explained. If they work independently, there is no ground to support the supposition that natural processes would work to ensure kārmic justice. It is possible that natural processes may work in a

way such that good people suffer and bad people flourish. Our ordinary experience does show that happiness or suffering of people is not always proportionate to the moral worth of their actions. Even supporters of the doctrine of karma admit this, hence the supposition of deferment of reward and punishment. This idea has its own difficulties. Much as we may wish that nature and life proceed in a way that people's happiness or suffering is in direct proportion to the moral worth of their actions, that it actually can be said to be so on the basis of the doctrine of karma remains far from clear.

I conclude this paper with the following considerations, which to my mind any consistent and well-knit doctrine of karma must address itself to and accommodate satisfactorily within itself:

- If kārmic justice is supposed to be executed without the intervention of a divine being, the doctrine of karma must show the possibility of moral evaluation of actions and their rewards or punishments within Nature.
- Within the framework of varṇāśrama dharma, universal causal connections between some type of actions and some type of results do not appear feasible because ethical merit of actions would be relative to the agent in question. Therefore, what results an action would have would also be relative to the agent. This becomes more pronounced when dharmas are classified, in addition, according to one's profession or family or age and the like. Since causal relation holds between types of events, it can not accommodate this feature.
- It must be clarified whether causal connection is sought to be established between certain actions and certain phenomena/events, which cause happiness or suffering to the agent, or directly between actions and happiness or suffering as their consequences. In either case, straightforward and uniform causal connections between right actions and happiness and wrong actions and suffering must be shown to be feasible in the light of the fact that what makes a person happy or unhappy, and in what degree, varies from person to person.
- In our experience a person's actions appear to produce good and bad consequences not only for himself but also for other people. They also affect objects around him, which in turn can cause happiness or suffering to other people. The doctrine of karma

must explain how to reconcile this fact with the contention that whatever happiness or suffering one gets is a result of one's own actions alone.

- The doctrine of karma, that is to say the version discussed in this paper, can be sustained only when it can either be shown that natural and kārmic causality are identical or that Nature acts in accordance with kārmic causality. This is a supposition, which must be argued for rather than assumed.
- If natural causality and kārmic causality are independent of each other, then there is no ground for supposing a positive correlation between good deeds and happiness and bad deeds and suffering. The doctrine of karma must give adequate justification for asserting such a correlation.

Notes and References

1. See O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, ed., *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) and Pappu, S.S. Rama Rao, ed., *The Dimensions of Karma* (Delhi, Chanakya Publications, 1987). In both works different aspects of the law of karma and its formulations in different schools of Indian philosophy have been discussed in detail. Yet only one paper in Flaherty's book, namely 'Karma, Apūrva, and "Natural" Causes: Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of Saṃsāra', by Wilhelm Halbfass takes up the question of relationship between natural laws and kārmic causality, that too briefly.
2. Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Biggs, Selby, L.A. (Oxford, University Press, 1958), p. 170.
3. Mill, J.S., *A System of Logic* (London, 1843), Book III, Chap. V, art. 6.
4. Thomas Reid points out this difficulty in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1969), p. 334.
   John Mackie provides several such cases in his paper, 'Causes and Conditions', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. II, 1965.
5. Thomas Brown gives this kind of argument by pointing out that often during a long sleepless night, the sensation of darkness exists without being followed by the sensation of light. See Brown, *Cause and Effect*, 3rd ed. (Andover, Massachusetts, Mark Newman, 1822), p. 170.
6. See Davidson, Donald, 'Causal Relations' in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXIC, 1967.
7. It is a further matter which law covers the relation between events that are causally connected and whether we know this law or not. Davidson argues that to be able to assert in a particular case that 'x' causes 'y', we need not know the covering law. If asked to justify why we regard this as a case of causal relation and not a mere correlation, for example, we would be required to bring in this law. But this much remains true that whenever we assert a causal relation between 'x' and 'y', the universality of this relation between all instances of 'x' and 'y' similar to these is implied.
8. For a conception of a law-governed nature, the inviolability of the law of causation is also required, which implies that there are no uncasued events in nature. Some philosophers make an exception in the case of human free will; decisions and choices of human persons are not determined by prior causes. Supporters of determinism challenge this. The compatibilists accept both that human decisions and choices are caused and that they are free, insofar as the causes lie within the nature of an agent. On this view the will is not free only when extraneous factors determine it.
9. 'Kāraṇam hi tadbhavati yasmin sati yadbhavati, yasminścāsati yanna bhavati.' *Nyāya-Vārtikam*, a commentary on *Gautama Sūtra* by Uddyotakarācārya, 1.24, (Calcutta, 1882) cited in Jhalakikar, Bhimācārya, ed. *Nyāya kośa* (The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1978), p. 224.
10. Miśrā, Keśava, 'yasya kāryātpurvabhavo niyatonanyathāsiddhaśca tat', *Tarka-Bhaṣa* (Banaras, 1704), p. 2, cited in Nyāya Kośa, op. cit., p. 224.
11. The difficulties in these definitions have been discussed at length in Nyāya texts. I am ignoring these here. My aim in this paper is limited; I attempt to present a brief characterization of causal relation by reference to both the modern Western and the classical Indian tradition.
12. Karl H. Potter argues that defining a cause in terms of regular sequence à la Hume, makes the causal relation too weak and reduces it to a 'merely empirical' relation. This model of analyzing causation, according to Potter, results in scepticism because the relation between cause and effect here is not 'strong enough to guarantee results'. Potter, Karl H., 'The Logical Character of the Causal Relation in Indian Philosophy' in Singh, Ramji, ed. *World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture* (Patna, Bharti Bhavan), p. 280. It is important to distinguish a causal relation from a mere correlation or a statistical correlation, but the causal relation still remains an empirical relation. However, it can generate results since it possesses what may be termed as factual necessity, i.e., while any true causal statement of the form 'a' causes 'b' can be denied without self-contradiction, yet as a matter of fact it is always true. The probability of any established true causal statement turning out to be false remains exceedingly slim.
13. A detailed and in-depth discussion of the law of karma elaborating the inner complexities and variations in its formulations in different Vedic texts, epics and philosophical systems can be found in O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, ed. *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, op. cit.
14. Manu, the ancient law giver, lists mental actions of coveting the property of others, thinking of what is undesirable and adherence to false doctrines under evil actions leading to bad results. See Rocher, Ludo, 'Karma and Rebirth in the Dharmaśāstras' in Flaherty ed., op. cit., pp. 62–3.

15. Potter, K.H., 'Karma Theory in Some Indian Philosophical Systems' in O'Flaherty, ed., op. cit., p. 244.
16. Hiryanna, observes, '... the Karma doctrine signifies not merely that the events of our life are determined by their antecedent causes, but also that there is absolute justice in the rewards and punishments that fall to our lot in life ... The Law of Karma accordingly is not a blind mechanical law, but is essentially ethical ...' *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1949, 1978), p. 48.
17. Rama Rao Pappu says, 'It is the law of "moral causation", good deeds bring good effects, bad ones bad effects.' He makes the following statements about the law:
    1. 'The law of karma is inviolable and rebirth is postulated to ensure full implementation of this law.'
    2. 'It is the principle of justice, in that it gives everyone his desert.'
    3. The law of karma enables us to explain 'social inequalities and even ultimate hereditary differences'.
    4. 'The law of karma implies that all the suffering a person faces is his just desert by virtue of his actions.'
    5. Since karma is a law 'we can know, predict, control and manipulate it'.

    Rama Rao Pappu also mentions the possibility of regarding the law of karma as 'The principle of ordered universe, the causal law which governs the world' and as 'the principle of sufficient reason' which explains why everything is what it is. Pappu, S.S. Rama Rao, ed. *The Dimensions of Karma*, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 3, 4 and 11.
18. Rajendra Prasad sums up the law of karma in the following three claims:
    1. 'every action produces some pleasure or pain,
    2. which and only which its doer necessarily experiences in the present or next life, because,
    3. he deserves or ought to experience them and them alone.'

    Prasad, Rajendra, *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality*, (New Delhi, I.C.P.R. in collaboration with Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1989), p. 221.
19. For a discussion of the difficulties arising from this view for interpretation of actions and their implications in social philosophy, see Krishna, Daya, 'Yajña and the Doctrine of Karma—A Contradiction in Indian Thought about Action' in *Indian Philosophy, A Counter Perspective* (Oxford, New York, O.U.P., 1991).
20. Chatterjee, S.C. and Datta, D.M., regard the law of karma as 'the law of the conservation of moral values, merits and demerits of action'. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1939), p. 18.

    Similarly, Morgan, K.W., says, 'The Law of Karma is a moral law corresponding to the physical law of causation. Just as the law of cause and effect works in the physical world, the Law of Karma works in the moral world'.

'The Nature and History of Hinduism' in *The Religion of Hindus*, ed; Morgan, K.W. (New York, Ronald Press, 1953), p. 22.

21. If the family one is born into is to be determined by one's past actions and if caste (varṇa) is by birth, that would also be determined by past actions. This would imply a constraint on the kind of actions a person ought to perform by virtue of his caste and would raise the question how far the person can be said to be free in this life.
22. Prasad says that we can call something 'x', a reward deserved by an agent 'a' for having done something 'y', if and only if there exists:
    (a) A norm of standard 'n' which 'y' fulfils or satisfies;
    (b) An agent who has the authority to assess 'y' in relation to 'n' and determine that 'x' is its appropriate reward;
    (c) An agent who has the authority to grant the reward 'x' to 'a'; and
    (d) The same self-identical person 'a' who is both the doer of 'y' and the receiver (or claimant) of 'x'.

    Prasad concludes that since the law of Karma is, '... an autonomous, causal law regulating the behaviour of nature, what a doer gets on account of his actions, i.e., as their consequences, cannot be called in a straightforward sense, rewards or punishments ...' Prasad, Rajendra, op. cit., pp. 228 and 231.
23. One classification of dharma that is provided is as follows:
    (a) 'Deśa-dharma' (dharma for a particular country or place)
    (a) 'Jāti-dharma' (dharma for a particular caste)
    (b) 'Kula-dharma' (dharma or traditions of a family).

    Another classification that can be found is as follows:
    (a) 'sāmānya', 'sādhāraṇa' or 'nitya' dharma (universal duties or rules of conduct valid for all persons and at all times: truth, nonviolence, discipline and control over senses, forgiveness, regard for parents and preceptor, good behaviour, looking after the guests, etc. are said to be valid for all.
    (b) 'viśiṣta-dharma' (specific duties): These are duties divided according to the caste and the stage of life of the agent. Sometimes specific codes relative to a particular office, for example, office of a king, or different ages, even times of distress are laid down. The last recognizes the fact that in times of distress all normal rules of conduct can be superseded. And yet the conduct for times of distress has also been quite often comprehensively codified, as for example in the epic *Mahābhārata* and by Manu. Circumstances that can be said to constitute times of distress are at times outlined in detail and the duties for different castes at such times laid down clearly. See Mackenzie, John, *Hindu Ethics* (London, O.U.P., 1922, reprinted in 1971), and Jauhari, Manorama, *Politics and Ethics in Ancient India*, (Varanasi, India, Bhartiya Vidya Prakashana, 1968), for a discussion of the ethics of ancient India.
24. The *Bhagavadgītā* observes that it is better to die while performing one's own duty than to follow another's. 'śreyānsvadharmo viguṇaḥ

paradharmātsvanuṣṭhitāt, svadharme nidhanam śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvaha.' *Śrimad-bhagavadgītā*, in Hindi, with Śankarācārya's commentary (Gorakhpur, Gita Press), ch. iii, sloka 35, p. 101. It means:
'Better is one's own law of works, swadharma, though in itself faulty, than an alien law well wrought out: death in one's own law is better, perilious is it to follow an alien law.' *Essays on Gita* by Sri Aurobindo, ed. Roy, Anil Baran (Pondicherry, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1954), p. 63.
Manu echoes the same idea:
'varam svadharmo viguṇo na pārakyaḥsvanuṣṭhitaḥ, paradharmeṇa jīvanhi sadyaḥ patati jātitaḥ' *Manusmriti* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1990, first published in 1983), ch. 10, sloka 97. It says, 'It is better (to discharge) one's own (appointed) duty incompletely than to perform completely that of another: for he who lives according to the law of another (caste) is instantly excluded from his own.' Buhler, G., tr. *The Laws of Manu, Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxv (Oxford, O.U.P., 1886, rep. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), p. 423.

25. See Rocher, Ludo, 'Karma and Rebirth in the Dharmasastras', in O'Flaherty, ed., op. cit., p. 63. It is to be noted that here also consequences mentioned are not absolutely specific and determinate. For example Manu says that a sinful mental action leads to rebirth in a low caste, evil verbal action leads to rebirth as a bird or a beast and wicked bodily action to rebirth as something inanimate. Each class of action has several members. Generally, even such broad connections are not provided in discussions of the doctrine of karma; only a causal relation between good actions and good results and evil actions and evil results is asserted.
26. Pappu, Rama Rao, op. cit., p. 3. He suggests that one way to interpret the doctrine of karma is to regard it as extension of the Vedic concept of 'ṛta'.
27. Halbfass, Wilhelm, 'Karma, Apūrva, and "Natural" causes', in Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, ed., op. cit., p. 272. Halbfass discusses at some length the problems that arise from the 'encounter and juxtaposition of karma and other contexts of causation'. He rightly observes, 'But although it may be argued that karma is directed towards a single all-comprehensive world-view, we cannot disregard the concrete historical varieties and deep-rooted tensions and ambiguities which remain with the theory even in its fully developed "classical versions".' p. 272.

Regarding *Sphoṭa*

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Recently, Professor Daya Krishna[1] has asked some questions regarding Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa*. The concept of *sphoṭa* has been observed by the scholars variously in a way that causes confusion in a proper understanding of it.[2] Here, in this paper, I have proposed to reply those questions relevant for a clear understanding not only of Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa* but of his holistic philosophy of language also.

Bhartṛhari is a sentence-holist. The basic argument that influenced his holistic theory of language most is found in Kātyāyana's *Vārtika 'Na vā śabdapūrvako hyrthe sampratyayaḥ* [The meaning is always a meaning revealed by *śabda* (language), on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 1/1/67, and in Patanjalī's *bhāṣya 'śabdapramāṇakāvayam, yacchabdāḥ tadasmākam pramāṇam'* (we are the upholders of the authority of language. What the language expresses is our guide,' *Mahābhāṣya*, *Paspśāhnika*, 1/1). Throughout the whole *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari is seen always conscious of maintaining that the philosopher's concern is confined to the objects revealed or figured in the mind by language, see, particularly, the statements—'*Kim asmākam vastugaten vicāreṇa. Arthaśca asmākam yaḥ śabdenābhidhīyate'*. Dīpikā on *Mahābhāṣya* 1/p. 28, '*Na so'sti pratyayo loke-Anubiddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bāsate*'. Vp. 1/123, '*Etām sattām padārtho hi na kaścidativartate*', Vp. 3/3/51]. In his commentary on Vp. part III, Helārāja has repeatedly reminded us of this fact. (See his statements—*Vaiyākaraṇānām śabdārtho'rthaḥ, śabdapramāṇakānām hi yacchbda āha tat paramārtharūpam*,' HR on Vp.3/1/11, '*sarva pārṣadam hīdam śāstram, iti, śabdārtho'rthaḥ*, HR on Vp.3/1/19, *tathā hi buddhyānirūpita vastuviṣayāḥ śabdaḥ, śabdārthaḥ; śabdyata iti kṛtvā*' HR on Vp. 3/3/41, *Iha hi vyākaraṇe na vastvārtho'rthaḥ apitu śabdārtho'rthaḥ*, HR on 3/9/1). For this kind of holism *sphoṭa* is a sentence and it is a unit of awareness in character. It is inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing-language and

reveals its meaning non-differently. Accordingly, all those entities which are not revealed by language i.e.; things-in-themselves are beyond the grasp of knowledge. In very brief, it is argument which serves as the basis of Bhartṛhari's theory of language as expression, meaning as philosophical-being (*upacāra-sattā*) and of non-difference and infusion of language and meaning.

In order to understand Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa* one has to be aware of the distinction he maintains between *Śabda* and *sphoṭa* and *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. Out of *Śabda* (with capital 'S') and *sphoṭa*, the former, for him, is an ontological-Being to which everything, including the latter, is ontologically subordinated. It is *paśyantī*, the *Śabda-principle*.[3] He does not accept *Parā* because of the reason that it is transcendental to verbal-cognition, and the reasoning based on it as well, and hence, it is beyond the scope of cognition by language, which, for him, is confined only to the beings revealed in the mind by language. *Paśyantī* is a metaphysical being. He accepts its being as the ontological substratum of the beings, revealed in the mind, by the latter that is *sphoṭa* which is a revealed and, hence, cognitive or intelligible-being (*Madhyamā-śabda*). Thus, *sphoṭa* is not identical to *śabda*. It, in Bhartṛhari, is the *śabda* at *madhyamā* level, the middle stage in the metaphysics of the *śabda-principle*. The *śabda,* at this level, is not an ontological but a cognitive-being. It is a concept, ubiquitously given as an indivisible idea, cognitive and communicable by nature.[4] It is universal but not a universal as an abstracted-being that is abstracted by several occurrences and instances of the *vaikharī-śabda* (language-token including verbal utterances/noises, written letters, words and sentences, symbols, signs and gestures). Helārāja observes: '*Asyām ca madhyamāvasthāyām parāmarśanātmā vācakaḥ śabdo'bhinncaitanyodrekātmikām vāgavasthāmatyajanneva svarūpavācyamukhena tatsambhinnamartham parāmṛśati sāmānādhikaraṇyena gaurayamarthaiti... sphutībhavatīetāvatī śabdavyāptiḥ*. Helārāja on Vp. 3/3/2.

Bhartṛhari maintains a difference[5] between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* out of which the former, for him, is a cognitive-being and, hence, foundational while the latter is instrumental only in manifestation of the former. The former is cognized independently of the latter while the latter, as the cause of the manifestation of the former, is inferred. The latter is perceived as verbal-noises while the former is known directly as revealed in the mind. The latter is produced by the former which is the cause of incentive not only of production of *vaikharī* but of expectancy of its articulation for

communication of the former also. Language-tokens, for Bhartṛhari, are only instrumental in the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Manifested so, it reveals itself and reveals its meaning non-differently.

Precisely, the *Śabda-principle* is the only ontological-Being at different levels of *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* out of which *paśyantī* is transcendental to other levels of *Śabda* but it is accepted, by him, as the ontological apposition of the *sphoṭa* revealed in the mind by itself. *Madhyamā śabda* is a cognitive being, a being of awareness by nature.[6] It is given and, in ordinary communication, requires to be manifested by language-tokens for its revelation. Manifested so, it reveals itself and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. It is on the basis of this view of language as cognitive-being that he philosophizes all cognition as cognition shot through and through by language.[7] It is the concept of *sphoṭa* as universal on the basis of which he explains the identical cognition by language in several occurrences and instances of the tokens differing from community to community. These sounds/tokens, as they are learnt by observation of their uses by the elders, are vivid in their shape, size, tone, accent, diction, pronunciation, etc.; differing from community to community or even from person to person in the same community, but the *sphoṭas* they manifest are constant.[8] It is this constant *sphoṭa* which is manifested by those garbs.

In connection to the levels of speech-principle it is notable, here, that Bhartṛhari's theory of these levels is based on cognitive ground. *Śabda*-principle, in his holistic philosophy, is the only Reality pervading all, in different forms and levels of being, known by different sources of knowledge, i.e., we know verbal tokens (*vaikharī-śabda*) by perception/inference, language as idea (*madhyamā-śabda* or *sphoṭa*) as a unit directly revealed or figured in the mind in communication and *Paśyantī*, being beyond our knowledge, is neither a perceived nor a revealed unit of awareness in nature. *Paśyantī* is known by implication or by presumption as the ontological substratum of the language revealed by itself in the mind. It is not a philosophical-object because it is not a being revealed, it is a metaphysical Being, an object of realization by *sādhanā*. *Sphoṭa*[9] is the depth of atomic utterances/noises, which die the moment they are born, but with a difference that there is no logical possibility of unity of sounds, uttered in a sequence, by synthesis either by themselves, as they can not do that or by mind because in that case the synthesized unit will not be the unit of them but of their impressions as resurrected in memory and,

hence, different. In case of it as a unit of memory all verbal cognition will be memory and this will be a case of underestimation of the foundational value of language in cognition. There is no possibility of them being synthesized themselves and that there is no possibility of simultaneous articulation or grasping of more than one sound atoms. Bhartṛhari has accepted two kinds of sounds, namely (1) *prākṛta*, and (2) *vaikṛta* out of which the latter is caused by the former. The former may be accepted as the depth of the latter.[10] But then what will serve as its cause? It is not self-caused but caused by the *sphoṭa* which is an indivisible unit of awareness given ubiquitously in the minds on the basis of which not only the expectancy for the production of sounds is made possible but which serves as the depth of them also. It is the *sphoṭa* on the basis of which cognition and communication are accomplished. As cognition, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is the self-awareness of the revealed or cognitive objects, it is always a veridical cognition.[11]

ETYMOLOGICAL DERIVATION

The term *sphoṭa* is derived by root *sphuṭ* which means manifested, displayed, burst-forth, opened, expanded, expressed, etc. In different derivations it is taken for different meanings. An account of its derivations is given as follows: 1. In the interpretation '*sphuṭati asau'rthaḥ sphoṭaḥ*' it is that by which meaning is revealed. In this interpretation *sphoṭa* is a meaning-revealing *śabda* ... According to interpretation '*sphuṭati sphuṭibhavati*' it is that which is revealed when manifested by verbal-noises. *Mādhavācārya* in his *Sarvadarśanasangraha* takes it as '*sphuṭyate Vyajyate varṇāḥ*' it is that which is manifested by phonemes. Konḍa Bhaṭṭa, in his *Vyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, has interpreted it as *sphuṭatyartho yasmāt*,' according to which it is the unit from which meaning is revealed. *Bhartṛhari* defines *Sphoṭa* as *'anekavyaktyabhibyangyā jātiḥ Sphoṭa*'[12] according to which it is universal revealed by itself when manifested by several individuals (*dhvaniyān)*. From the point of view of communication it is sentence explained as manifested by a set of language-tokens and from the point of view of learning language it is the letter/word-*sphoṭa* to be manifested by several occurrences and instances involved in articulations and, hence, universal in all cases.[13]

FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS

Many critics of *sphoṭa* have misunderstood the theory of *sphoṭa* and have considered it as a dead theory. They say that *sphoṭa* is a metaphysical entity and that it is not justified to intrude such an entity for explaining the problem of cognition by language. It is true that Bhartṛhari has observed *śabda* as a metaphysical reality and, in specific cases, he has accepted the metaphysical understanding of language as reference for explaining some grammatical concepts like substance but only on the basis of these instances it is wrong to evaluate his philosophy as a metaphysical theory of language as reference because it, for him, is expressive.

The basic problem of Bhartṛhari is neither to form a metaphysics of *Vyākaraṇa* nor to interpret a given system of metaphysics but to explain the cognition as accomplished in communication and even so only on the basis of cognition as revealed in the mind by language. Cognition is not possible isolated from language because it is revelation by language and the language can not reveal it if it is not an expressive unit. The language which is expressive by nature and which reveals it meaning non-differently, is real-language that is *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* is *śabda* ubiquitously given in the mind and it, when flashes forth, serves as the cause of incentive to articulations in the speaker and when manifested by hearing those articulations it reveals itself in the mind of the audience. Its meaning is revealed non-differently by it and, thus, its being and the being of meaning are cognitive beings, beings of awareness in nature and are non-different as the former is revealed by the latter.

It is ubiquity of *sphoṭa* on the basis of which communication is made possible and it is the concept of ubiquity of it that the charge of language as a private being does not arise in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Language is given ubiquitously in the mind of all and is revealed when manifested by tokens varying from community to community. The meaning is revealed non-differently by it. What is revealed in the mind is also a being cognitive and communicative by nature. *Sphoṭa* and its meaning, revealed by it, are only such beings and, for Bhartṛhari, they are only beings to which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are not only based on but are confined to also. They are only intelligible and, hence, philosophical beings. As *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is indivisible flash, a complete unit expressive of a complete meaning retiring further expectancy for a complete sense, it is taken, by him, as inner

and indivisible sentence (*vākya*). The sentence is only expressor (*vācaka*) which expresses its meaning (*vācya*) non-differently. An indivisible unit, as such, can not be understood by beginners and that it is artificially divided in to parts, that is words, and the words into stems/roots/suffixes, prefixes and letters, by grammatical analysis, for making it understandable to those who can understand it only through piece-meal scheme and their meanings are decided accordingly as parts of indivisible sentential-meaning.[14] The units derived by grammatical analysis are also taken as indivisible units universal in nature. In a very general sense they are universal because it is they on the basis of which identical cognition, by them, in several occurrences and instances is accomplished.[15]

In very brief, Bhartṛhari has observed *śabda* from two perspectives, namely (1) metaphysical, and (2) cognitive. Out of the two the former is concerned with language as language-token standing by proxy for the things of which it is a reference or mark. It is *vaikharī-śabda*. For the latter it is expressive by nature from which meaning is revealed non-differently. It is from the latter sense that it is called *sphoṭa* and is called *Pratibhā* from the sense of meaning it reveals. The world of *sphoṭas* and *pratibhās* is the world of *Upacāra-sattā* (beings/ideas figured in the mind by language) and it is the *Upacara-satta* which, for him, is the world to which our self-conscious or philosophical activities are confined. *Upacāra-sattā* as Bhartṛhari and, his commentator, Helārāja observe, in *sambandha-samuddesaḥ*, Vp. 3/3, figures equally as being and non-being as well (*Bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*) and that is why identical-cognition, not only by assertive but by negative expressions also, is accomplished.[16] The revelation of being and non-being is made possible because they are revelations by *sphoṭa* which, in his philosophy, is the only foundational/cognitive-being expressive by nature. It expresses its meaning non-differently.

The *śabda*, as an ontological being (*paśyantī*), is beyond not only from *vaikharī* but from *madhyamā-śabda* also. It is important, here, to note that what is known even by the word *paśyantī* is not the *paśyantī* as an ontological being but as *madhyamā-śabda*, i.e.; *sphoṭa*. The meaning which is revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa*, for Bhartṛhari, is *pratibhā*. Both of the *sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* are revealed and, hence, are secondary-beings (*upacāra-sattā*) with contrast to the primary beings. The only difference between them is that out of the two, *sphoṭa* is called so because it reveals itself, when manifested by tokens, and reveals its meaning non-differently (*prakāśya-prakāśaka*) and the latter is called *pratibhā* because it is revealed (*prakāśya*) non-differently by the former. *Pratibhā*, in Bhartṛhari, is not the mind or intellect but that which is revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*. As *sphoṭa* is also a revealed-being, i.e. a *vācya* in a verbal cognition, it is *pratibhā*. Indivisible *sphoṭa* is the language universal and *Pratibhā* is the indivisible meaning, universal in nature, and the two are eternally related as *vācaka-vācya*. There is no possibility of a *vācya* without a *vācaka* and a *vācaka* is called so only because a *vācya* is expressed non-differently by it. Conclusively, *sphoṭa*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is both the *vācaka*, as it expresses the *vācya*, and the *vācya*, as it reveals itself first, in a verbal-cognition. Taking this point in view that Vaiyākaraṇa's statement '*Pratibhāmayam ayam viśvam*' seems true to the holistic position of Bhartṛhari.

KINDS OF SPHOṬA

In *kārikās of Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari has mentioned the term *sphoṭa*, in general, without any distinction of its kinds. It is only in his *vṛtti* that three kinds of it are clearly mentioned as ascriptions on it due to its association with language-tokens through which it is manifested. Actually all *sphoṭas* are indivisible flashes and it is on the basis of a set of tokens, i.e., letters, words and sentences, through which it is manifested, that they are classified in different kinds of *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*.[17]

All *sphoṭas* are ideas/concepts given in the mind and the universals in their kind. It is according to their association with different sets of tokens that they are classified in different kinds. A *varṇa-sphoṭa* is accepted as the cause of identical cognition of a letter as letter in all its occurrences and instances. Similar is the reason behind *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*.[18]

As division of an indivisible is an impossibility, it is analyzed artificially and that it may be classified in more kinds for helping the beginner's understanding for understanding the indivisible but through these divisions and analysis the *sphoṭa*, itself, is not divided. However, Bhartṛhari has mentioned only three of its kinds as mentioned earlier. It is with Nāgeśa, the author of *Sphoṭavāda* and Kṛṣṇamācārya his commentator (in his *Subodhinī Tīkā*) that we find the mention of eight and more than eight, approximately twelve, kinds of *sphoṭa* with two primary, namely (1) *vyakti*, and (2) *jāti*. *Vyakti-sphoṭa* is divided in two: (1) *sakhaṇḍa*, and (2) *akhaṇḍa*. *Sakhaṇḍa-sphoṭa* is divided in: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa* is divided in: (1) *pada-sphoṭa*, and

(2) *vākya-sphoṭa*. Similarly, *jāti-sphoṭa* is divided in: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa*. The basic logic behind these divisions of *sphoṭa* is based on the view that *vyakti* (individual) like *jāti* (universal) is accepted as eternal and, thus, *varṇa*, *pada* and *vākya* in the theory of individualists are eternal archetypes of the fleeting atoms of sound. Again the *pada* and *vākya*, in the system of *vyākaraṇa*, are taken: (1) as indivisible units having no sequence, and (2) as units constructed out of association of letters and words respectively. From the constructionalistic point of view these units are depths of language-tokens on the basis of which identical cognition of them in their several occurrences and instances is accomplished.[19]

SPHOṬA AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTICAL-COGNITION

Verbal-cognition comprises identical cognition of the *sphoṭa* and the meaning it reveals non-differently. Identical cognition, only by fleeting instants of tokens, can not be possible because in that case they will either be discretely different atoms unable to form a word or a sentence or be different objects of cognition in all their occurrences. It is on the basis of *sphoṭa* as universal that Bhartṛhari explains not only the identical cognition of letter/word/sentence as so in their several occurrences and instances but the identical cognition of the meaning of them (a letter/word/sentence) also. The indivisible meaning can not be explained as the meaning of the association of tokens because the meaning is not an association but an expressed (*vācya*), a unit of awareness, indivisible in itself. Association itself requires to be determined and in that case verbal-cognition will be no more than inference. For explaining the expression of an indivisible meaning and the identical-cognition of the expression and the expressed an indivisible expressor is not only a logical necessity but a revealed fact because there is no possibility of accepting an awareness of a revealed character as made of association by several atoms. Identical-cognition of a word through different garbs and in several occurrences, its meaning and the relation between the two can be explained well only if *sphoṭa* as a constant content, capable of being manifested by tokens, in all their occurrences, as a self-restrained-being of awareness in character and as a being which reveals its meaning non-differently, is accepted. It is a universal concept, an idea, a thought-object which serves as the cause of identical-cognition by language in its several occurrences and instances.

Only on the basis of verbal utterances/noises no cognition is possible because cognition is not confined only to speaking and hearing. It is revelation of language and its meaning.

In clearcut words *sphoṭa*, as universal, is not the synthetic unity of discrete atoms of sounds/letters or of the words formed by them. Universal is not an outcome of abstraction or an abstracted entity—abstracted from several occurrences and instances of bit of tokens but an indivisible, inner, ubiquitously given and self revealed, and hence, self-restrained being of awareness by nature which reveals meaning non-differently. It is in this sense that it is derived as '*sphuṭatyartho yasmāt*'. There is no possibility of any division in awareness and as one awareness is different from another, one *sphoṭa* is different from another *sphoṭa*. As several awareness may have the same object or may have different objects according to which the sameness, identity and difference of them are distinctly known, several occurrences of any bit of language-token manifest the same *sphoṭa* and different bits of language-token in their several occurrences manifest their own respective *sphoṭas* on the basis of which identical cognition, by them, is accomplished. In this sense it is the universal not abstracted out of several occurrences of tokens but indivisible being of awareness in nature.

Sphoṭa, for Bhartṛhari, is indivisible flash. As it is manifested through language-token, it is taken differently as: (1) *varṇa-sphoṭa*, (2) *pada-sphoṭa*, and (3) *vākya-sphoṭa*. But it is not a fixed rule that a *vākya-sphoṭa* is called so because it is manifested by sentence-token and similar is the case with *varṇa-sphoṭa* and *pada-sphoṭa* because in some cases a sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*) may be manifested by a letter or by a single word-token and a letter or word (*pada-sphoṭa*) may require a number of sentence-tokens. Manifestation of *sphoṭas*, by them, varies from person to person as it depends on the fact as to how far the person is versed in communication. The basic reasoning of Bhartṛhari is that the long or short size and shape of the tokens are not significant in communication.[20] What is significant for communication is the revelation of *sphoṭa* because it is the *sphoṭa* from which meaning flashes forth non-differently.[21] *Sphoṭa*, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is universal and sounds/tokens are individual. He introduces the concept of gradual manifestation of *sphoṭa* by sounds in a successive order in accordance with the sequence of them.[22] In order to clarify it we may take the example of the word 'pot' and 'top'. The sound/letter 'p' when spoken restricts words to be started from other letters, 'po'

restrict all others which are not to be started from 'po' and finally, the uttering of the 't' excludes all others different from 'pot'. Manifested so, the *sphoṭa* 'pot' reveals itself and, then, reveals its meaning non-differently. Though the manifestation of all words and sentences can be understood in the same way it is not a fixed rule but relative to the fact as to how much the person is versed in communication. Accordingly, it may be revealed even without help of any language-token as in the case of cognition of *Yogis*. In some other cases it may be manifested only by a letter, a word, or by a sentence-token or may not be manifested even by a large number of sentence-tokens but in every case the cognition is revealed only when *sphoṭa* is revealed, i.e. cognition is the revelation of and by the *sphoṭa*. All *sphoṭas*, for Bhartṛhari, are distinct, they unlike the cognition by senses that is perception, inference, etc., reveal their nature first and, then, their meanings are revealed by them non-differently.[23] Thus, he is of the view that cognition is not a passive but an active awareness and this awareness can not be accomplished if the *sphoṭa*, which is *prakāśya-prakāśaka* by nature, is not expressed. In precise, *sphoṭa* is the cause of identical cognition by language, the unity of objects of verbal-cognition[24] and a constant content of the tokens, varying from community to community, by which they are manifested.

IS *SPHOṬA* INTRINSICALLY UNEXPRESSIBLE?

Such type of questions arise due to overlooking the distinctions of Bhartṛhari's concept of *śabda* and of *sphoṭa* which are not identical concepts in his philosophy. The unexpressibles in his philosophy are only those entities which are not expressed (*vācya*) and which are beyond the grasp of mind. *Śabda* (*paśyantī*) as an ontological reality, the mind itself, and the external things—physiological, psychological and others having ontic-being, are unexpressibles because they are not the expresseds of expressions and the expresseds of expressions are cognitive-beings revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* are also called so because they, themselves, are revealed beings; they are self-restrained beings of awareness in nature. In brief, all expresseds are universal and universals are only expressed by language which is also universal because it, as Bhartṛhari[25] accepts, reveals itself, first, in a verbal-cognition and, hence, it is not proper to say that they are unexpressible intrinsically or extrinsically. The terms intrinsic and extrinsic imply ontological character and

are not applicable to *sphoṭa* which, as such, is a cognitive being par excellence.

SPHOṬA AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS

It can be said that Bhartṛhari, on the basis of the concept of non-difference of *vācaka-vācya*, has succeeded not only in explaining the theory that all cognition is shot through and through by language but also in explaining the possibility of analysis of language by language and of translation of a content in different garbs without accepting the concept of a transcendental-signified which is accepted by ontologicians as independent not only from language but from the signified of the garbs of the translation.[26] In Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is the constant content capable of being manifested by different garbs which are only instrumental in the revelation of it.[27] Manifested by them, it reveals itself and its meaning as well. The token-words '*śvān*' in Sanskṛt and that of 'dog' in English, '*kuttā*' in Hindi manifest the same *sphoṭa* on the basis of which identical-cognition by those tokens is revealed to those who have observed their uses by elders. The knowledge of the original, the translated and their garbs are different but the object/content, i.e. universal or individual, is required to be the same for a good translation. The identical-cognition of the original and the translated is possible because of the universal revealed by the original and by the translated as well. In other words the constant-content is not the transcendental-signified but the signified (*vācaka*), revealed in its several occurrences in different garbs. The revelation of the same content that is *sphoṭa* through garbs differing from community to community, is the cognitive ground for a good translation and if, otherwise, or deviated it is a bad translation. Translating or rendering implies a constant, universal in nature, which according to Bhartṛhari, is *sphoṭa*, i.e. the signifier which reveals its signified (*vācya*) non-differently. The relation between the two is eternal fitness of the signifier. Such an eternal relation between a *vācaka* and a *vācya* is not possible in case of transcendental signified and, hence, it may be the signifier neither of the text as it is accepted by realists, as independently of language, nor of the signifiers in translating garbs. The signifier, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, is isolated from our allegiances but not from the language as it is itself the language which reveals the signified non-differently.

Analysis of language by language itself is a very intriguing problem for those who take language as marks that stand by proxy for the things.

Analysis can not be a philosophical activity if it is an analysis of language-tokens. It may be a self-conscious activity only if it is an analysis of language as thought-object. In the theory of Bhartṛhari it is not an analysis of language-token but of the indivisible *sphoṭa*, given in the mind, which serves not only as the basis of analysis of tokens but of that through which the indivisible *sphoṭa* is understood in an abstracted way also. Analysis of language for clarification of thought, i.e. meaning is also not possible if meaning is taken as different from language. As meaning, for Bhartṛhari, is the being revealed non-differently by *sphoṭa*, the analysis of language is inevitably the analysis of meaning or thought and vice versa; if otherwise, analysis of thought, independently of language, will be an impossibility and analysis of language independently of meaning, as ontological being, will be a purposeless activity and in that case the purpose of clarification of thoughts by analysis of language and vice versa will be defeated.

Conclusively, *sphoṭa* is not a collection of bits of verbal utterances/noises; it is not a memory element, not a synthesis by mind but a self-restrained unit of awareness ubiquitously given as an indivisible being, which when manifested by written/verbal tokens, reveals itself, and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. As written/verbal tokens, gestures etc., are produced by the *sphoṭa* and have a confined function of instrument in manifesting it only, *sphoṭa* may be termed the depth of them. Manifestation is not the cause of emergence of meaning because the meaning is always a being revealed by *sphoṭa* which reveals it only if it reveals itself first. As concepts/ideas, *sphoṭa* are innumerable sequenceless-units but are classified as *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa* on the basis of the association of bits of written/verbal tokens, gestures, etc., by which they are manifested. These *sphoṭas,* being the beings of awareness in nature, are cognitive-beings; they are cognized directly. *Paśyantī-śabda*, being transcendental to it, is not cognized directly but is known by implication made on the basis of *sphoṭas* as their ontological substratum. In Bhartṛhari's holistic philosophy *sphoṭa* are indivisible and, hence, it is actually not divided. Divisions are only artificial remedy by which the indivisible is made understandable to those who can understand it only through piece-meal. Cognitively, *sphoṭas* are infinite in number because cognition of and by all words/sentences are determinately and discretely accomplished; they are existentially the same level of secondary being (*upacāra-sattā*—the being revealed or figured in the mind by language).

As *sphoṭas* are universal-beings of awareness in nature and Bhartṛhari accepts 'universals in universal' there is no logical difficulty in explaining the non-difference of language and meaning on one hand and in explaining the identical-cognition of both the language and its meaning on the other hand. The *śabda*, as ontological substratum of awareness of awareness (ideas = *sphoṭa* and *pratibhās*) or as consciousness itself, is non-dual *paśyantī*, the flashes of which (*sphoṭas*) are innumerable beings of awareness in nature. Ontologically all are one indivisible *Śabda-principle.*

Now, we put the objections raised against Bhartṛhari's theory of manifestation of *Sphoṭa* and their solutions given by him and his commentators. The arguments follows thus:[28]

1. Manifestation requires *samānadeśa* (sameness of space). For example, the light of the lamp manifests only the things given in its compass but in regard with manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by *dhvani*, sameness of their space is not observed because the *vyañjaka* (manifestor-*dhvani*) is grasped by the auditory centre while the *Sphoṭa* is revealed in the mind by itself. According to the theory 'sky is space' verbal-noises are received in *ākāśa* (auditory centre) but *Sphoṭa* does not belong to it. As they are associated with different spaces, it is not justified to accept the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by *dhvani* and its reception in the auditory organ.[29] According to Bhartṛhari, this objection is not steady because the sameness of space is required only for the manifestation of corporeal things (*mūrta*) while both the *Sphoṭa* and the *dhvani* are incorporeal (*amūrta*) and that sameness of space is not required necessarily for the manifestation of *amūrta* (incorporeal) *Sphoṭa*. Not only that but even *mūrta* (corporeal) things like the sun, etc. manifest every thing belonging to different spaces in spite of being fixed in a particular space, similarly, the differences of space are not obstacles at all in the way of manifestation of the *Sphoṭa* by the *dhvani.*[30]
2. Critics of the theory of manifestation of *Sphoṭa* say that objects like pot, etc. are seen to be manifested by different manifestations like sun, lamp, crystal-stone and other lights also while the theory of manifestation of *Sphoṭa* accepts the manifestation of a fixed *Sphoṭa* by a fixed *dhvani*. Verbal noises causing manifestation of the *Sphoṭa* '*Gauḥ*' (cow) are different from that of the '*aśvaḥ*' (horse). 'That a fixed *Sphoṭa* is manifested by a fixed *dhvani*'

must not be an invariable or constant rule because some thing may be manifested by different manifestants. Bhartṛhari, against this problem says that as senses can manifest their fixed objects, for example, the eye has a fixed potency only for perceiving form and colour, auditory sense has the potency only to perceive sounds and so on, similarly, the manifestation of a fixed *Sphoṭa* by a fixed *dhvani* can be understood. As eyes cannot smell or as auditory sense cannot perceive forms and colours, similarly, any *Sphoṭa* cannot get manifested by any verbal-noises and, thus, it is justified to accept the manifestation of a fixed *Sphoṭa* by a fixed *dhvani*.[31] If otherwise, the communication will not be performed through them and for explaining regularity in accomplishment of communication it is inevitable to accept the manifestation of fixed *Sphoṭa* by fixed verbal-noises. However it is popularity of using noises that are conventionally taken as fixed to manifest the fixed *Sphoṭa*. In fact any *Sphoṭa* can be manifested by any set of verbal-noises as per the capability of the audiences, contact, etc.

3. According to critics, *Sphotavādins* do not accept any change in what is manifested with the change of manifestants (*abhivyañjaka*). Is it right to accept that the dark and deep of light do not cause any change in the manifestation of objects like pot, etc.? The critics say that *Sphoṭavādins* do not accept a change in *Sphoṭa* with the changes like increasing, decreasing, short, middle prolonged, etc. of *dhvaniyān*, but difference of word is observed with the changes of harsh pronunciation caused by the negligence of rules of *sandhi* (compound). Even the words in different strikes are different, and thus, it is not justified to accept that the manifested (*Sphoṭa*) is not changed with the change of manifestants (*dhvani*). Answering this objection Bhartṛhari says: as reflections *(Pratibiṁba)* of the same face in a concave mirror is observed to be high (*unṅata*) and in a convex mirror, it is low (*avanata*), in a sword, it is oblong and in saffron oil it is dark, similarly, *Sphoṭa* is taken to be different with the difference of reflecting mediums (sounds).[32] Refuting the atomist's position of the manifestation of speech by physical atoms, Bhartṛhari says that external concrete objects like mountain having unmeasurable quantity cannot be produced inside the diamond, mirror etc., having incompatible size. Similarly, *Sphoṭa* is manifested by *dhvani* but *Sphoṭa* does not change with the changes of *dhvani*.[33] According to Bhartṛhari the changes of *dhvani* which is the medium in the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* are wrongly understood in the *Sphoṭa* also, but, actually, there is no possibility of changes, caused by them, in *Sphoṭa* which is indivisible and sequenceless. This sequenceless *sphoṭa* is taken to be divided into letters, words and sentences with the differences of length, sequence, tone and variations in the form of strikes which are the properties of *dhvani* and through which manifestation of *Sphoṭa* takes place.[34]

4. Some critics of the theory of manifestation of *Sphoṭa* take it as a produced entity like pot, etc. It is produced by *dhvani* and, hence, not eternal. They say as transient objects like pot, etc., are manifested by lamp, etc. Similarly, *Sphoṭa* is a manifested object and, hence, transient. Defending his position of eternity of *Sphoṭa* Bhartṛhari says, it is not acceptable, in principle, that that which is manifested by transient entities are compulsorily transient. For example, universal which is manifested by transient individuals is eternal.[35] Those who deny universal as eternal accept it as transient in order to avoid the logical fallacy of *anaikāntika* (inconclusive irregular reasoning for which no instance is available, for enabling it to show its concomitance either by presence or by absence with the probandum) but they fail to avoid the fallacy of *Vyatire-kasiddha* (according to which the word will not be applicable to all of its instances and, hence, the unitary conception by the application of the word will not be explained).
5. Objecting to the theory of manifestation of *Sphoṭa,* Kumārila Mīmānsakas say: how can the revelation of cognition without manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by verbal noises be explained in the cases of the dumb, the deaf and children who have not yet learnt the art of speaking? For lack of hearing and speaking the accomplishment of manifestation of *Sphoṭa* will not be possible, and, hence, the cognition by the dumb and children may not be explained as possible. From the side of Bhartṛhari, it can be said that this is not at least a problem for those who believe in the eternity and given position of *Sphoṭa.*[36] The given *Sphoṭa* in a child or in a deaf person, acts on for cognition. The manifestation of *Sphoṭa* in their cases is performed by other instruments like signs and gestures. Not only that but manifestation of *Sphoṭa* is possible, in some

other cases as in the case of *Yogins*, even without any tool like verbal-noises, gestures, etc. It is only in ordinary communication that the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* is accomplished by verbal-noises. Here manifestation does not mean production but the permission of what was previously given as prevented. Manifestation helps in permitting. Manifested by noises the *Sphoṭa* reveals first its own nature and then reveals it meaning non-differently by itself. In any case, Bhartṛhari does not endorse manifestation only as sufficient ground for the revelation of cognition. Manifestation acts on *Sphoṭa* and the *Sphoṭa* manifested by verbal-noises, reveals itself and its meaning.

SPHOṬA AND EXPLANATION OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS LIKE *ABHĀVA* (NON-EXISTENCE) *ALĪKA* (NON-ENTITY) AND OTHER SUCH CONCEPTS

We frequently use words like hare's horn, barren's son, non-existent, etc., which have no referents in the world of experience. Those who are habitual to observe a referent for explaining words may take them as empty-concepts. In our opinion the term 'empty-concept' is ambiguous—and it is difficult to understand its meaning. If by 'empty concept', we mean the concept having no content or content-free awareness and if by content we mean attributes of things or things in themselves, i.e. referents, the being cannot be accepted as that revealed by language. On the contrary, it is obvious to all that these words (empty-concepts, etc.) are expressive by nature. In other words, they are expressive of their meanings. Do their meanings not figure positively in the mind when these words are heard? Do these words, when manifested by verbal noises, not reveal their meanings in the mind? If yes, how can objects of cognition revealed by these words be denied? Do they figure by words in the mind as empty-concept in contrast to concepts to content? In order to answer these questions, we may start our discussion by putting a counter question: does the cognition revealed by the word 'existent' figure positively and that of by the word 'non-existent' does not figure or figures otherwise? For Bhartṛhari meaning figures in the mind non-differently by *Sphoṭa*. The utterances 'existent' and 'non-existent' manifest their own *Sphoṭas* from which meaning is revealed non-differently. All words including negation, non-existent, non-entity, empty-concept, etc., express their own meanings. Distinctions of them as empty-concepts and concepts-with-content are opposed to the

cognition revealed positively by all words. Even the cognition by terms 'without content' or contentless, meaningless, etc. also figures positively in the mind as their expresseds (*vācya*) and what figures in the mind is a being, a thought object or an expressed being (*upacāra-sattā*). No verbal cognition is possible in such conception-free awareness. Just as illumination is the nature of light, just as the consciousness is the nature of mind, likewise *Sphoṭa* is the nature of each awareness. Even in an unconscious state, e.g. in sleep, there is persistence of the infusion with *Sphoṭa*.

They are not mental construction as Yogācāra-Buddhists say, rather, they are thought-objects or concepts for which Bhartṛhari uses the term *upacāra-sattā*. Can a concept as such be marked as an empty-concept? From the point of view of cognition as revealed by words such distinction of concepts are not founded. A concept, for Bhartṛhari, is not what is abstracted or generalized on the basis of the attributes that comprise the content of the things but that which is revealed non-differently by *Sphoṭa*. It is expressed of the expressor and it (*Sphoṭa*) being illuminating force, illuminates the meaning independently of attributes of the things or of things-themselves. Concept as a self-restrained being is given as an indivisible being. The concept revealed by *Sphoṭa* is an indivisible awareness and there is no other content of it except what figures in the mind. It is only for making this indivisible awareness understandable to ignorants and children that the concept is explained through artificial analysis made on the basis of contents of the objects.

The concepts, for Bhartṛhari, are universal—universal in the sense that identical cognition in all their instances and occurrences is accomplished. If it is said that in case of *abhāva* and other concepts like hare's horn, etc., there are no individuals for the inherence of universal in them; they, if universal, as the meaning of words is taken, cannot be meaning at all, and hence, these words would be meaningless. Solving this problem, Helārāja writes '*abhāvasyāpi buddhyākāreṇa nirūpaṇāt.*[37] According to this statement '*abdhāva*' in all its occurrences figures in the mind and, hence, the accomplishment of identical cognition by the word '*abhāva*' in its several usages implies it to be a universal. Not only that but on the basis of how the words present *abhāva* in the mind, it is classified into four of its kind (i.e. *Prāgabhāva*, *Pradhvansābhāva*, *anyonyābhāva* and *atyantābhāva*), and hence, '*abhāva*' as universal inhering in all its instances is admitted as its meaning.[38] Non-existence, in the philosophy of *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is not a counterpart of existence and, in communication, it is communicated not

as a counterpart of existence. In grammar, the dative case is taught with the verb *dadāti* (for example '*Viprāyagām dadāti*'). If there is negation of '*dadāti*' even, then the same case is applied as we see in the sentence *Viprāyagām na dadāti*. The same rule is taught for existence and is applicable to the non-existence also because the *sattā* (the communicative-being) of being and non-being, for him, is *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible-being).

JAYANTA'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST *SPHOṬA*

A brief account of Jayanta's arguments against theory of *Sphoṭa* may be given as follows:[39]

1. *Sphoṭa* cannot be accepted as a perceived fact because only the last letter of a word is perceived. The simultaneous cognition of letters of a word is not possible and, hence, it is not justified to accept the *Sphoṭa*, which for Vaiyākaraṇas is an indivisible *Śabda*. *Sphoṭa* being non-perceptible, cannot be proved by inference also because there is no occasion for concomitance (*Vyāpti*).
2. If Vaiyākaraṇas say that the *Sphoṭa*, like a letter, is an indivisible unit without a part (*ananśa*) it must be manifested only by the first letter spoken and then, the uttering of the rest of the letters of a word will be unnecessary. As partless letters are not meaning conveying units, partless *Sphoṭa* will also not be an expressor.
3. According to Sphoṭavādins, as Jayanta observes, *Sphoṭa* apart from the collection or set of letters cannot be accepted as a separate meaning-revealing word. Meaning is conveyed by the collection of letters heard in a sequence and as resurrected in the mind by memory and, thus, *Sphoṭa*, as a meaning-revealing word apart from the collection of letters, cannot be accepted on the basis of presumption also. *Sphoṭa*, which is not a perceived fact, is not required for meaning and conveyance of meaning may well be explained only on the basis of collection of letters which are perceived facts. Thus, on the basis of the ground mentioned above, Jayanta tries to show that expressiveness of *Sphoṭa* is not proved by perception, inference, presumption, etc. As it is not grasped by auditory sense, the *Sphoṭa* is nothing but merely a fiction and that the conveyance of meaning may be explained even by the utterances (letters) which are grasped by auditory sense.

VAIYĀKARAṆA'S SOLUTION OF JAYANTA'S OBJECTION AGAINST *SPHOṬA*

Answering the objections raised by Jayanta, it can be said from the side of Bhartṛhari that the *Sphoṭa* is not a memory-element over and above the *Śabda*. It is ubiquitously given and pervades auditory sense also. That is why the *Śabda* is cognized through auditory sense. Helārāja boldly says that *Sphoṭa* is a perceived fact. It is cognized as the *ālambana-pratyaya* (cause) of the cognition of meaning revealed in the mind through utterances/noises and that without accepting the *Sphoṭa*, it will be difficult to refer to it as imperceptible even.[40] Jayanta's idea of the word as a collection of letters spoken in a sequence is not proper. If we accept the expressiveness of collection of letters, as Jayanta accepts, it can be asked as to whether letters are expressive of meaning discretely or collectively? Bhartṛhari says: there is no expressiveness in 'P' or 'o' or 't' discretely and the discrete momentary letters cannot be uttered and perceived together simultaneously as the word 'pot'. Hence the word 'pot' is a unit not made of part p, o, t, but a unit without part and, cognitively, the unit as a whole without part is the expressive word. This expressive unit is inner word which is manifested progressively through the utterances heard in a sequence and when manifested it reveals itself and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. As hunger satisfaction is accrued progressively with swallowing each mouthful quantity of food and is fully satisfied after taking the last quantity, similarly, *Sphoṭa* is manifested progressively with the hearing of each phoneme and when manifested fully, it reveals itself and its meanings well. Thus *Sphoṭa*, as a meaning revealing unit, is not a collection of phonemes but an indivisible being of cognitive character. For the explanation of indivisible cognition, intertwined with language, indivisible *Sphoṭa* is inevitably required. It is a self-revealed being by which meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind. There is no part in meaning and, therefore, there is no part in *Sphoṭa* which reveals it.

KUMĀRILA'S OBJECTIONS AGAINST *SPHOṬA*

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathi Mishra, Nārāyaṇa Mishra and other Mīmānsakas have refuted Vaiyākaranas' concept of *Sphoṭa*. A brief account of the arguments against *Sphoṭa* as mentioned in *Mīmānsaśloka Vārttika*[41] is given as follows:

1. Experience does not allow it to accept Vaiyākaraṇas' view that *Sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes. How can the indivisible be

manifested by parts (letters)? It can be manifested neither by single letter nor by a collection of them and as such there is no need to accept *Sphoṭa* apart from the collection of phonemes resurrected in memory as *sanskāra* (impression), as the cause of cognition of meaning.

2. *Sphoṭavādins*, as Kumārila says, reject the expressiveness of not only letters but that of the collection of them, i.e. of *padas* also. However, they accept that *Sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes. Now the problem is: does each letter manifest *Sphoṭa?* If yes, it suffices to accept the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by only the first letters spoken and then other letters of the set will be useless. If the progressive manifestation of *Sphoṭa* by each letter in a sequence is accepted and it is taken that the *Sphoṭa* is fully manifested after hearing the last phoneme, then, as last letter is only perceived, it alone be the manifestor of *Sphoṭa*, and, hence, the idea of gradual and progressive manifestation of it, by the sequence of phonemes uttered, will not be justified and then the letters spoken first will be of no use in the manifestation of it also.
3. If *Vaiyākaraṇas* say that the last phoneme associated with the impression of the phonemes destroyed earlier manifests the *Sphoṭa* fully and clearly, then one is bound to accept all the potency (power) causing manifestation, only in the last phoneme and then the cognition of meaning on the basis of impression of departed letters (*Vyutkrānta-varṇa*) will not be possible. What is the need of accepting *Sphoṭa* apart from impressions for the possibility of the cognition of meaning? Even *Sphoṭavādins*, as Kumārila says, also feel the necessity of impression (*sanskāra*), for explaining the possibility of cognition of meaning. The cause of meaning, Kumārila argues, must be that after hearing of which meaning is cognized. The meaning is cognized after hearing the last phoneme uttered at last and associated with the impression of past phonemes as resurrected in the mind by memory, and, therefore, it is not justified to accept *Sphoṭa* apart from the collection of letters as meaning-revealing *Śabda.*
4. *Sphoṭa*, for Vaiyākaraṇas, is indivisible. Kumārila objects: if *Sphoṭa* is an indivisible unit of language then it may not be more than indivisible letters and, thus, he infers that *sphoṭa*, being non-different from the latter is not expressive of meaning—pot, etc. (*Sphoṭa artha vācakaḥ varṇabhinnatvāt ghatādivat*). *Sphoṭa* being non-different from the letters, is not expressive. He seeks no contradiction in the inference mentioned above and adds that *Sphoṭa*, different from letters, is not self-proved and, hence, it is not acceptable.
5. If *Sphoṭa* is an indivisible sentence accomplishing complete (indivisible) meaning then the question arises as to how can meaning (a whole without a part) be possible. Is a sentence having no letters and words possible? A sentence, without letters and words as Kumārila says, is *unthinkable.*

VAIYĀKARAṆAS' SOLUTION OF THE MĪMĀNSAKAS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST *SPHOṬA*

It may well be observed that *Mīmānsakas*' arguments against *Vaiyākaraṇas*' concept of *Sphoṭa* are based on their presumption that only a letter is indivisible, that it is not an expressive unit, that the impression, left by the fleeting sounds in the mind and collected as resurrected in memory is the cause of meaning, that a sentence is a get-together of words, that the sentential-meaning is the get-together of the meaning of words and that words are constructions out of association of letters. It can be asked, from the side of Vaiyākaraṇas, that if the word 'pot' is the collection of letters. P, O, and T, then, the meaning of the word 'POT' should also be the collection of the meaning of its component letters but Mīmāmsakas themselves do not consider letters as expressive and, thus, the meaning revealed by the word cannot be explained on the basis of the word as a collection of letters. The meaningless letters cannot discretely be accepted as expressive of meaning and if the letters are taken to be eternal, as Mīmānsakas themselves accept, what will be the manifestants of them? It is logically justified to accept that the universal (*Sphoṭa*) is manifested by individual letters but there is no ground to accept the manifestation of discrete letters. Is it not, logically, justified to accept that discrete individual is manifested by universal? If it is accepted that the spoken letters manifest each other, then it will be difficult to distinguish one from the other. In that case the function performed by individual should also be the same as performed by the universal and, thus, universal will not be distinguished from individual, and, then, universal apart from the individual will be a useless presumption. Without accepting generality as the cause

of identical-cognition even the individuals, as Vaiyākaraṇas assume, may also not be known as individual. Bhartṛhari says that there is no awareness of letters in the accomplishment of communication by *Śabda* and the meaning is revealed by the indivisible unit that is by *Sphoṭa* itself. The unity of discrete letters as they are not uttered simultaneously cannot be explained without *Sphoṭa* and as *Sphoṭa* is the meaning-revealing unit, the cognition of meaning cannot be possible without it.

Sphoṭa, according to Vaiyākaraṇas, is not a link (impression) between meaning and letters destroyed. It, in fact, is an indivisible being of *Grāhya* and *Grāhaka* by nature but Mīmānsakas have understood it differently in terms of impression which, for Vaiyākaraṇas, is transitory. Impressions are destroyed before conveying meaning and then how can the meaning be revealed by destroyed impressions? Meaning is non-differently revealed by *sphoṭa* which is eternally and ubiquitously given in the mind. *Sphoṭa* is not an object like pot, etc., which are perceived by senses, but is an indivisible cognitive being of awareness in character. It can not be called *abhāva* (non-existent) only on the reason of its imperceptibility. Consciousness, Bhartṛhari says,[42] is not perceived by senses but it can not be taken as non-existent. Similarly, *Sphoṭa* can not be taken as non-existent because it can be distinguished (*viśeṣya*) even by *abhāva* also. Existence, non-existence, etc., all are revealed by *sphoṭa*, i.e. non-existence is also revealed by *sphoṭa* and that is why it is known thus in communications.

Mīmānsakas' objection that the problem of substitution (*Pratinidhi*) of meaning of a word in a sentence which, for him, is based on the reality of word as the unit of language, will not be possible, if *sphoṭa* (which reveals a complete sentential-meaning) is taken as an indivisible unit. So far as the problem of substitution is concerned, Bhartṛhari does not deny it; rather, he accepts the reality of words for grammatical purposes. If once the words, acquired by grammatical analysis, are accepted as real for any grammatical operation, the purpose performed on their basis, their form, meaning, substitution of meaning and other related practical issues are considered real.

Concluding the whole discussion, it can fairly be said that *sphoṭa* can not be taken as an ontological being. It is called so because of it as a revealed/cognitive-being. As cognitive-being, *sphoṭas* are innumerable units. They are constant contents of cognition and serve as the unity/depth of several occurrences and instances of various sorts of tokens, used by

different language communities, helpful for manifesting the same *sphoṭa*. But it, as a unity, is neither a synthesis or abstraction nor a memory element like the *sansakāra* of the Mīmānsakas because it is known directly as a revealed-being. As an indivisible unit it is a complete unit and reveals a complete meaning retiring further expectancy involved in the completion of a complete sense. The indivisible *sphoṭa*, by grammatical analysis, is divided into different smaller units but, through these divisions, the *sphoṭa* itself is not really divided. The *sphoṭas* are manifested through different sets of tokens by the association of which they are taken primarily as of three sorts, i.e. *varṇa-, pada-* and *vākya-sphoṭa*. It is *varṇa-sphoṭa* when it serves as the universal of the letters, *pada-sphoṭa* if it serves as the universal of *padas* and *vākya-sphoṭa* if it is manifested by sentential-token. It may be categorized in many more sorts as per ones analytic scheme which varies from person to person, but by this analytical remedy the *sphoṭa*, as such, remains undivided in the holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari. There is no question of ontological diversity of them because they are cognitive beings. The question of ontological unity of them arises only by implication of *paśyantī* as the ontological apposition/substratum of them. *Paśyantī* is the ontological unity of cognitive *sphoṭas* and *sphoṭas* are the cognitive unity of language-tokens. As a cognitive depth of them they are universals and serve as the cause of identical cognition in all their occurrences and instances.

Notes and References

1. I am grateful to Professor Daya Krishna for asking some queries regarding Bhartṛhari's theory of *sphoṭa* in a letter very recently written to me. The letter reads as follows:
   'The idea of sphoṭa is supposed to have been postulated to account for the fact that a sound when it is uttered dies or ceases to be, and is succeeded by another sound, which in turn, dies also. And as this occurs continuously the problem arises as to how any meaning can emerge out of these atomic utterances where each dies the moment it is born. Is this understanding of sphoṭa correct? But, if it is so, how can it explain that it is intrinsically 'unexplainable'. Not only this, how can there be nine sphoṭas to account for a fact which in principle can never be more than of one kind or, the depth of sound is supposed to be of different kinds. Are these different kinds of depths?'
2. S.D. Joshi, in his English translation and notes of Sphoṭanirṇaya, pp. 36–40, Pune 1967, observes that Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa* in the context of meaningful speech unit but the whole (*sanghāta*) unconnected with

isolated phonemes. If we rely on Joshi's observation, sphoṭa will not be different from *sanskāra* of Kumārila Mīmānsakas. It, for Bhartṛhari, is a meaningful unit which reveals itself when manifested by language-tokens and reveals its meaning non-differently. Bhartṛhari writes '*kṛtsnamapi śabdarūpam prakāśīkṛtam yāvadsvīkṛtākāramanupagṛhītaviśeṣam buddhāvasanniviṣṭam tāvadanupalabdhenaiva ten vyavahāro na kaścidapi prakalpate* (no cognition and communication is possible if *sphoṭa* is not revealed). Vp. 1/82, Sampurnanand Sanskṛta Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1976. K. Kunjhunni Raja in *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Adyar, Madras, 1963, observes *sphoṭa* as integral linguistic symbol manifested by *prākṛtadhvani*, p. 120. He writes, 'It is, in fact, *prākṛta-dhvani* considered as a meaning bearing linguistic sign'. It is not clear as to why K. Raja uses the term symbol and linguistic-sign for *sphoṭa* which is not a sign or symbol but is that which is simply manifested by them. *Sphoṭa* can not be equated with *prākṛta-dhvani* which is caused by vocal-organs as per the expectancy to articulate but it can not be the cause of expectancy out of which it is itself produced. The cause of expectancy is the *sphoṭa* which is of awareness in nature and, hence, foundational. K.A.S. Ayer in *Bhartṛhari*, p. 180, Pune, 1969, is right in viewing that it is only in Buddhi-stage that the word can be called *sphoṭa*. In the pre-buddhi-stage it is the word '*śabdatattva*' which is used. In his observation on Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa*, Iyer takes it as inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing-being. One can not understand Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa* if one confines ones observations only to the first part of Vp. The second and the third parts of it take it as *vācaka-śabda* (expressor) which reveals its meaning non-differently. The issues pertaining to the different meanings revealed by it constitute the whole subject matter of these parts. The first part of it successfully differentiates *sphoṭa* from *dhavani* on one hand and from *śabda-brahman* and *paśyantī* on the other hand. It also clearly shows how it is manifested by *dhavaniyān*.

3. In Vp. 1/142 Bhartṛhari has mentioned three stages of *śabda* only. He has not mentioned *Parā* as a stage and in its *vṛtti* he has accepted *Paśyantī* as the highest reality (*śabda-brahman*). Helārāja, his commentator, in Vp. 3/2/11 clearly says that it is *śabda-brahman* (*Samvicca paśyantīrūpa parāvāka śabdabrahmamayīti brahmatattvam śabdāt pāramārthikānna bhidyate. Vivartadaśāyām tu vaikharyātmanā bhedaḥ. Tatra ca tadeva nityam jātyādirūpeṇa śabdavācyam*).
4. The term 'communicable by nature' is used in the sense that that which is awareness by nature can only be communicated through *dhvaniyān*. As *sphoṭa* is ubiquitous, the communication which is the accomplishment of cognition by language between speakers and audience, is made possible. This also indicates that language is not a private but given to all on the basis of which communication between them is made possible.
5. *Avikārasya śabdasya nimittairvikṛto dhvaniḥ, upalabdhau nimittatvamupayāti prakāśavat*. Vp. 1/94.

6. The *śabda* as cognitive unit, i.e. concept/idea, is universal which is called *sphoṭa* because it reveals itself first and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it afterwards. The whole discussion in *Jāti* and *sambandha samuddesaḥ* is based on the view that *śabda* is universal and the meaning it reveals is also a universal. Helārāja uses *Jātiśabda, Vācaka-śabda* and *sphoṭa* in the same sense. See HR on Vp. 3/1/7–8.
7. *Na so'sti pratyayoloke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte, anubiddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate*. Vp. 1/123.
8. Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/100.
9. *Śabdasyordhvamabhivyaktervṛttibhedam tu vaikrtāḥ, dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tairnabhidyate*. Ibid. 1/77.
10. *Dhavni* produced through the vibration of verbal-organs is *prākṛta* and it when replicated and triplicated is *vaikṛta-dhvani*.
11. See Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/104.
12. Vp. 1/93.
13. *Eka eva nityaḥ padābhivyangyo'khando vyakti sphoṭo jātisphoṭo vā vācako"gikārya itisiddhantaḥ*. Puṇyarāja on Vp. 2/29.
14. *Tasmādevam bhūtād vākyādabhedyānnirbhāgācchbdātmano varṇānām padānām cātyantamaviveka iti*. Vṛtti on 1/73.
15. For a detailed account of Bhartṛhari's concept of identical cognition, see the paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari's reply to Vaiśeṣika's objections to universal as the import of words' by the same author. *Darshana International*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, pp. 22–34, October 1997.
16. Bhartṛhari has discussed the concept and importance of *upacāra-sattā* especially in *sambandha* and in *Jāti-samuddesaḥ*. For an account of these chapters, see, 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of relation between Word and Meaning', *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 43–55, 1994, and *Darshana International*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, pp. 22–34, October 1997.
17. *Varṇapadavākyaviṣayāḥprayatnaviśeṣasādhyā dhvanayo Varṇa pada vākyākhyān sphoṭān punaḥ punarāvirbhāvayanto buddhiṣvadhyāropayanti*. Vṛtti on Vp. 1/82.
18. *Anekavyaktyabhivyangyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā*. Ibid. 1/93.
19. Ibid. 1/92.
20. Ibid. 1/103. See also Vp. 1/75–76.
21. Ibid. 3/3/32.
22. Ibid. 1/83–84.
23. The senses need not be cognized before they reveal the objects. They do so by their mere existence when they come in to contact with the objects. Unlike the knowledge by senses, *sphoṭas* do not reveal objects by their mere existence. They reveal themselves first before they reveal the meaning (object). Ibid. 1/56–57. Two types of *hetus* (causes) are associated with knowledge by inference: (1) *kāraka* (instrumental) for example, stick is the *kāraka hetu* in the production of pot, and (2) *Jñāpaka* (indicative) for example, smoke is the

jñāpaka hetu in the inference of fire on the mountain, and are separated after the accomplishment of knowledge but this is not the case with knowledge by language in which the latter is never separated from the former because language, for Bhartṛhari, infuses cognition.

24. 'Unity of object of verbal-cognition' means identical-cognition of the *sphoṭa*, which is a constant content in several occurrences and instances of the uses of bits of verbal/written-tokens, and the meaning revealed by it. For Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is also a revealed unit and, hence, an object (*vācya*) of cognition. In contrast with meaning as *vācya* (*pratyaya*), revealed non-differently by it, is designated as *vācaka* (*pratyāyaka*).
25. *Svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvairevābhidhīyate, tato'rthjātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.* Ibid. 3/1/6.
26. This is an observation in contrast to B.K. Matilal, who on the basis of transcendental signified as a constant content, denies the possibility of translation in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of non-difference of language (*vācaka*) and meaning (*vācya*). *The Word and the World*, pp. 122–3. Oxford University Press, 1990.
27. While dealing with the concept of *sādhutā* and *asādhutā* of the words, Bhartṛhari has clearly mentioned that by different sorts of garbs the real word (*sphoṭa*) is revealed and it is it from which meaning is revealed in the mind and communication becomes possible. He writes, '*Ambāmbeti yathābālaḥ śikṣamāṇaḥ prabhāsate, avyaktam tadvidām ten vyakte bhavati niścayaḥ*'. Ibid. 1/151.
28. Bhartṛhari has given different theories of manifestation of *sphoṭa* by air, atom and knowledge and has himself raised the arguments against the manifestation-theory of sphoṭa and has answered them. See, Ibid. 1/78–115.
29. Ibid. 1/96 and Vṛtti on it.
30. *Deśaikatvam deśanānātvamiti kāyavatāmeṣa dharmaḥ—Amūrtayostu dhvani śabdayordeśadeśivyavahārātikramāt satyapi deśabhedavikalpābhimāne naivā sautayorbhedo vidyata iti.* Vṛtti on Vp. 1/96.
31. Vp. 1/97–98 and Vṛtti on them.
32. Ibid. 1/99.
33. *Alpe mahati vā śabde sphoṭakālo na bhidyate, parastu śabdasantānaḥ pracayāpacayātmakaḥ.* Ibid. 1/103.
34. Ibid. 1/95.
35. *Iti kartavyatā loke sarvāśabdavyapāśryā, yām pūrvāhitasanskārobālo'pi pratipadyate.* Ibid. 1/121.
36. Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/34.
37. *Abhāvaścatvāraḥ ityatrāpi nirupakhyātvam sāmānyam kalpanīyam. Mahābhāsya dīpika*, 1/2/46.
38. *Nyāyamanjarī, Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa, pt. II. Vākyaprakaraṇa*, edited by B.P. Tripathi, S.S. University, Varanasi, 1979.
39. Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/95.

40. See, *Mīmānsāślokavārtika, Śabdanityatva and vākyādhikaraṇa*, pp. 884–1150, edited by K.S.D. University, Darabhanga with Hindi translation.
41. *Vākyādabhedyānnirbhāgācchabdātmano varṇānām padānām cātyantamaviveka iti.* Vṛtti on Vp. 1/73.
42. *Tasmāt sarvam bhāvovābhāvo vā sarvamiṣyate, natvavasthān taram kincidekasmāt satyataḥ sthitam.* Vp. 3/3/63, commenting on it Helārāja writes, '*Sāmvṛtten tu rūpeṇa sarvam bhāvātmakam, prathamānasya vastutvāt, avastunaḥ prathanāyogāt ... tathā ca vidyāvidyāpravibhāgamapravibhāgam brahma.*

Ontological Argument and Indian Religious Thinking

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Anselm's ontological argument for God's existence is, in brief, thus: We have an idea of God as the most perfect being, and perfection, without existence, would always be less perfect than the same with existence. Therefore God's existence necessarily follows from the idea of his highest perfection.

This argument has been variously criticized, from ancient times. Thinkers like Gaunilo and Kant said that, even granting that highest perfection includes existence, the idea of highest perfection could only necessitate the idea of existence, and not actual existence. Modern thinkers have added that only analytic propositions can be necessary, and existence is not an attribute as Anselm seems to think.

While the traditional criticism carries conviction, modern ones don't. If the non-analytic sentence, 'only analytic propositions are necessary' is itself claimed to be necessarily true, then it is false. The second argument is meaningless unless both existence and attributes are first carefully defined, which is generally not done.

It is commonly held that particular propositions have existential import while universal propositions have none. No absurdity follows if attribute is substituted for 'import'.

We can try to regard all the forms of existence discussed here as attributes. Thus—apparent reality is a function of appearance, f (a); practical reality is a function of the pragmatic, f (p); permanent reality, is a function of the immutable, f (I)—this is doubtful; space, is a function of the static, f (s); time, is a function of the dynamic, f (d); pure consciousness is a function of freedom, f (f)—this is doubtful. The doubtful cases relate to the ultimate reality, which, in its indeterminateness, can hardly be regarded as a function. The point is whether functions immutable and freedom have any meaning. As the ultimate being, it cannot be an attribute, as summum genus it cannot be a species.

What would be the position of Indian thinkers about the ontological argument?

It is obvious that everyone does not have an idea of God as the most perfect being, if only because most people are far from clear as to what constitutes perfection.

Again, because an idea of perfection would only include an idea of existence, even if we grant that highest perfection includes existence, it is best to start with nature of existence to prove it of God and this may also give us some idea of the nature of God's perfection.

The statement, 'perfection implies existence', is as vague as a statement like, 'Climate determines character'. There are so many factors involved in the latter that it would be very difficult to prove it, but it could be more easily falsified by producing equally dishonest men, for instance, from very different climates. Similarly to disprove that 'Perfection Implies Existence', it would suffice to show that a particular type of perfection does not entail a specific type of existence. For instance, logical perfection (p1) does not entail spatial form of existence (e5) in the table on page 190.

God's perfection itself can be regarded in many ways, viz., logical perfection, perfection in kindness, perfection in justice, perfection of being above dualities like subject and object, good and bad, perfection of being truth, consciousness and infinitude. Let us call them p1, p2, p3, p4, p5. We cannot regard God's perfection as a combination of all of them, for the first three may not be compatible with each other, and none of them may go with the fourth.

As in the case of perfections, existences are also of many types. Incidentally, an inquiry into these different types of existence might be of help in trying to get an idea of the types of existence and perfection that we may reasonably attribute to God, and their mutual relation. In Gandhian terminology, with a somewhat different sense, we shall have 'Truth is God', instead of 'God is Truth'.

Śankara recognized three types of existences, that which appeared but failed to withstand the test of practicality, like a shell that appears to be silver, that which served practical purpose, but failed to endure, like say 'Youth' and finally, that which endures always, pure consciousness according to Śankara. Let us put them as E1, E2, E3.

It will be seen that Śankara's concept of existence is static and modelled on space.

The Buddhist conception of what is really existent is quite different, as that which is capable of producing knowledge and activity, arthakriyākāritva. Clearly the concept of existence is dynamic and based on time. The Buddhist existent might appear as equivalent to practical reality of Śankara. But according to their theory of momentariness, Sautrāntika Buddhists believe that by the time its action takes place, the actual thing is extinct. In fact, the effect cannot appear without destruction of the cause, just as the sprout cannot appear without extinction of the seed. Therefore, the truly existent of the Buddhist might be called E4.

Next we have the existence of space, which is clearly not a thing, and yet not nothing. Without being a thing or like anything capable of impact and contact, it is yet the repository of all such things. That the existence of space is very different from that of things in space, can be seen from the fact that unlike things in space, we cannot ask about space as to where it is located. Clearly space cannot be located in space. If analogy can be of help here, like a dreamer's dream-space, the outer space may be taken to be located in cosmic consciousness. However, if dream-space itself be borrowed from outer space, this analogy will not hold. But, actually, dream-space may not be borrowed, external projection being the very condition of objectivity, without which there can be no wish fulfilment.

Space is infinite and unchanging like the ultimate reality (E3), and yet it is the repository of all objects of practical interest (E2). As told in Brahma Sūtra it is a link between the two levels, ākāshastallingāt. Its peculiar type of existence might be called E5.

Next moving to time, what is it, and does it itself move? There is a circularity involved in our conception of time. Time is inferred from changes and movements of things, and changes and movements of things are, in turn, explained in terms of time. As a matter of fact we have experience of movements and changes of things, and no objective experience of time.

Kant regarded time as a form of inner experience, and it may be the case that there is some sort of inner experience of time, specially when it hangs heavy. This might, however, be experience of weariness or ennui for those habituated to titillation of constant change, rather than of time.

Popularly, time is also supposed to travel in a straight line, and also thus shown in special theory of relativity. Past is supposed to lie behind, future in front, while the present makes up the origin. These fanciful ideas have probably no basis in fact.

If time had a direction, it could not be determined in space, for want of any reason for preferring one direction over others. Therefore, it has to be beyond space, as fourth dimension. But only pure consciousness, besides time, is known to exist beyond space, and as it is non-spatial, it can have no direction or dimension. Hence time, in it, can be no more than moments. This is the view of the Yoga system, according to which the whole universe passes through each moment, and can be known by concentrating on the moment.

Whatever be the status of time, its existence is unique, and might be called E6.

If space were located in space, the second space would require another space, and so on ad infinitum; therefore, space is not located anywhere, and hence, its is a non-locatable existence.

Things change over time, but does time itself also change? Popular opinion is not clear in this matter. Shakespeare wrote that to wonder about the nature of time was to waste time. This is practical man's commonsense attitude, whereby he chooses to go through life in complacent confusion.

The question is whether the change in objects in time is like a man walking on stationary ground or over an escalator that is itself moving. If time itself changed, it would require another time to change in, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, time itself does not change. If the above account were right, Omar Khyam's lines:

> One thing is certain,
> and the rest is lies,
> One thing is certain, that time flies,

would have to be amended thus,

> One thing is certain,
> and the rest may or may not be lies,
> One thing is certain, time never flies.

Plato, in Timeus, said that time is the moving image of eternity. It might be the image of eternity or Aristotelian Prime Mover that sets all things in motion, but, according to the above argument, it would not move itself.

The above arguments are based on the assumption that infinite regress is never admissible. But could it not be the case that infinite regress of the

above type is an essential aspect of infinite entities like space and time. In fact, it has been said in Upanishads, about the infinite, that 'when the whole is taken from the whole, the whole remains'. This means that even when the whole of space is taken, the whole of it still remains as remainder and when the whole of time is taken, the whole of time remains as a remainder. Therefore the former space could be located in the remainder space, and the appropriated time could move in the remainder of time. All this follows because, in infinity, a part is equal to the whole.

In case of consciousness no such problem presents itself. The consciousness of 'x' need not be backed up by an infinite series, 'conscious of conscious of ... conscious of x' because the same act of consciousness that cognizes x can also be self-conscious simultaneously. In fact self-consciousness appears to be the basis of consciousness of other things. Mirrors also reflect things and computers perform many seemingly intellectual operations. But they are not conscious precisely because they lack self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is also inseparably associated with freedom, and hence, is not conditioned by time.

Analogically, can it not be that time also not only brings about changes in all things, but also in itself? Rather, it may be that it brings about changes in other things by changing itself. And, similarly, space locates itself. In fact this approach is better than the former, because to talk of taking the whole of space or time is a rather loose way of talking. To speak of taking them is actually conceiving of them as finite and delimited.

However these problems might be resolved, it is obvious that space, time and consciousness have each a unique form of existence.

We had to refer to consciousness while considering space and time. It is very difficult to imagine what space and time could be without some sort of awareness or consciousness of them. We referred them to pure cosmic consciousness. It is called pure in the sense that it is not subject to any kind of mental mode or anything else. Next we have to inquire about cosmic consciousness and its existential status.

Whenever an organism develops a certain complexity, it also acquires some sort of consciousness. There appears to be a fountainhead of consciousness that can be partially tapped by any organism of a certain complexity. Using the analogy of transmitter and receiver, the transmitter here is everywhere, as it is itself beyond space and time, but is itself their resort.

This cosmic consciousness must be very different from its mundane manifestations that are affected by limitations of psycho-physical endowments of creatures, resulting in selfishness, distraction, passions, and vices. They therefore do not reveal the essential nature of consciousness that lights the scene, however partially. The cosmic consciousness is said to be single self-luminous awareness that neither rises nor sets.

It is also said to be of the nature of truth, knowledge, and infinity. Knowledge here is pure consciousness. It is true because it is not subject to time, and is as such unchanging. It is infinite because it is not delimited by spatial boundaries. This is the definition of perfection that we were looking for, and it already has existence as intrinsic to it. Let us call it E7. Thus writing down the different forms of perfections and existences, listed above, we have:

P1	E1
P2	E2
P3	E3
P4	E4
P5	E5
	E6
	E7

We saw that P1 does not entail E5. But P5 does entail E7 which includes E3. The above discussion should also make it clear that the more fundamental, lasting and universal existences are more and more subtle, less given to impact or contact, and less prone to arouse specific activity or knowledge. Madhusudana Saraswati in Advaita Siddhi regards the objects of practical world as false because they are objective (objects of perception), limited, and inert. Pure consciousness has none of these characteristics. Then the question arises whether pure consciousness can be self-conscious.

Śankara and specially his followers like Chitsuka are of the opinion that it cannot be self-consciousness. The fact appears to be that in pure consciousness, self-consciousness cannot be like that of finite beings, for whom it is delimited by awareness of psycho-physical adjuncts, and a distinction from the non-self. Self-consciousness in cosmic awareness is an awareness that excludes nothing as non-self. This is possible precisely because it does not reside in space and time, but they reside in it.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Metaphysics of Unobservables in Microphysics

INTRODUCTION

The external world is inhabited by observables and unobservables. By observables we mean entities which can be seen by the unaided human eye, e.g. chairs, tables, ice cubes. Unobservables, for the purposes of this article, are entities such as electrons, positrons, neutrinos, quarks, various fields, energy, force, potential, which cannot be seen either because they are too small or for some other reason. Unobservables play a crucial role in the theories of modern physics. They are also called theoretical entities. Results of observation are explained by referring to a realm of unobserved theoretical entities. One could say the unobservables are the backbones of a successful scientific theory. But what are these unobservables? Do they really exist or are they just theoretical posits? What can we know about them? According to a Polish philosopher, 'in contemporary science, the main epistemological problem concerns the existence of unobservables, of invisible entities postulated by many scientific theories' (Krajewski 1992).

These metaphysical questions are also discussed at length under the rubric of philosophy of science. For instance, on the topic of unobservables, philosophy asks about the legitimacy of extrapolation beyond the realm of the observable into the realm of the unobservable. How can the concepts that refer to the unobservable be meaningful to us? (Sklar 1992). In the same vein we could refer to the on-going realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science. A realist asserts that the theoretical terms of a mature scientific theory refer to entities which really exist and whose nature is independent of such a theory. Antirealism is the view that the structure of the world is ultimately not independent of the structure of our theories of the world (Klee 1997, pp. 208/9).

The field of microphysics (or subatomic physics) is described most successfully by quantum mechanics incorporating various unobservables. Not a single violation of its results has been observed so far. However, the interpretation of quantum mechanics has remained problematical.

Assertions of quantum theory are extremely counter-intuitive. Because of this shortcoming quantum theory is said to be an excellent theory in search of an interpretation. There are two rival interpretations currently under discussion: the Standard Copenhagen Interpretation and Bohm's Interpretation. There is a fundamental ontological difference but they are said to be empirically equivalent, predicting the same experimental outcomes. [If so, realists lose a strong point against anti-realists (Loewer 1998).] In short, we realize that the microworld with its unobservables, though successfully treated by quantum mechanics, is not easy to understand for one accustomed to deterministic classical physics which is so elegant and easy to visualize. However, since all measurements and observations take place in the macroworld, with macroscopic instruments, a proper theory of transition across the boundary (the cut) between classical and quantum worlds is required. Various solutions to this problem (decoherence; many worlds) can be found in advanced texts on quantum mechanics.

SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE

In this paper we discuss a few metaphysical questions that may arise to a layman wondering about the nature of the subatomic world. In order to achieve a manageable target we have chosen a short list of problems connected with unobservables. We may point out that the choice was made from a personal preference. Other important problems, of course, could have been chosen for the list. Secondly, we have tried to approach the problems somewhat naively, from the point of view of a layman whom we imagine to be a person with a strong urge to know without any ulterior motives, how things really are. Rather than providing definitive solutions, we hope in this article to draw attention to some of the open questions in the philosophy of microphysics. In this connection we would like to recall that metaphysical questions naturally and unavoidably arise not only in the minds of laymen, but also in the minds of working scientists with a philosophical bent. Although metaphysical problems cannot be definitively solved, a philosophical discussion of such questions can have a therapeutic effect on a troubled inquirer. Philosophy can help a frustrated mind to get peace, it can show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle as Wittgenstein put it. One has, however, to make a choice and take a position to get such peace.

Problem I: Divisibility of Matter, Atomism

One of the first mysteries that struck me as a child was whether one could go on subdividing a piece of matter, say chalk, on and on endlessly or whether there was a final stage, made up of the ultimate building blocks of matter. This problem remained unanswered in my mind, even after I read about vibrating and oscillating atoms and nuclei in popular books for children. Only much later did I learn that the problem was not new at all and had its origin in the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus in the 5th century BC. Also the general corpuscular philosophy of the 17th century which postulated indivisible, corpuscles moving randomly in a void, supported the view of Democritus. I realized, as I wrote in a recent paper: *Whether matter is divisible ad infinitum or not, is a metaphysical question, a point of view. In physics, the ultimate building blocks encountered depend on energy used for splitting the nucleus. ... Our beliefs about unobservables, unlike about tables and chairs can only be adjudged as corresponding or not to a theory, say, the quantum theory for the microworld* (Sanatani 1996). In the same vein, Rom Harré writes: *To use the concept of atom or whatever entities that resist analysis, is to commit oneself to a metaphysical position. If one is a metaphysical atomist the [further] analysis of one's atoms by someone else is not a refutation of one's position. It simply leads one to make a new identification of what it is to be atomic* (Harré 1989, p. 101).

According to modern theories of physics mass and energy are interchangeable. For example electrons and photons can transform into one another (electron-positron pair creation and annihilation). As we cannot assign any size or mass to the electromagnetic field (of which the photon is a unit), we cannot, strictly speaking, uphold an atomist point of view. As a result we can say that there is no limit to how finely we can dissect nature.

Problem II: Mostly Void

The next mystery about the microworld that struck me as a beginner was the fact, known since Rutherford's experiments on scattering in 1910, that the nucleus of an atom was thousands of times smaller than the atom itself, and yet contained most of the atom's mass, similar to a miniature solar system. This demonstrated that matter was not only composed of atoms and the void, but was mostly void. If all the void in my body were eliminated, I read with childlike awe, I would be reduced to a speck

hardly visible by a powerful microscope. Eddington wrote, a solid table was in reality more like a swarm of bees.

The picture of a table as a swarm of bees arises from a corpuscular picture of the electron. According to Hacking (Hacking 1983) subatomic particles are probabilistic entities, half-wave, half-particle. Once we realize this and accept the smeared out nature of electrons and protons as postulated by quantum mechanics, the idea that a solid body such as a table is mostly void, vanishes. Our confusion about the *real* nature of apparently solid bodies disappears.

A discussion of what reality means and what its relation to appearance could be, is the starting point of metaphysics. It is said that with the limited capacity of our sense perception we do not have access to *the real, objective* reality. Opposed to this view one might ask whether it is at all meaningful to talk about ultimate reality and whether we can obtain a knowledge of ultimate reality. Kant thought that the thing-in-itself (noumena) was unknowable.

With Eddington's description of the table as a swarm of bees in mind, we think we should give equal importance both to the scientific and the commonsense picture of the objects around us. Both types of objects exist. Putnam calls realism, with a capital R, the claim that only scientific objects exist. He rejects this view put forward by Husserl, Sellars and others. Putnam poses, instead, realism, with a small r, also called internal realism or pragmatic realism by him, which allows reality to commonsense objects like chairs, tables, ice cubes (Putnam 1987, p. 17). We find this proposal attractive.

Problem III: Wave-Particle Duality and Other Counter-intuitive Results of Quantum Theory

Despite the success of quantum mechanics we cannot forget the counter-intuitive nature of the standard interpretation. At the heart of the *mystery*, one could say, lies the superposition problem, typical of waves in classical physics, which one encounters when learning about the double-slit experiment in physics classes. The discussions directly lead to the problems of wave-particle duality, Heisenberg's Uncertainty relations, the collapse of the wave function and other problems associated with the new theory.

One of the big questions is whether quantum mechanics is good for the microworld only or does it apply equally well to the macroworld, the world of our direct experience as well. If the theory is a basic, fundamental theory, it should apply universally to both small and large objects. The fact that in the macroworld we do not encounter the probabilistic uncertainties of the quantum microworld also needs to be explained. A common explanation offered is the following. The interaction of macroscopic systems with the environment very quickly 'blurs' the superposition; the bigger the system, the faster this happens. Most of the times the scientists observe only the end result of this decoherence.

Alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics have been advanced, but none has been universally accepted. An alternative, much discussed since the 1990s, was put forward by David Bohm in 1952, based on earlier work by Schrödinger on pilot waves. Bohm's theory makes the same predictions as quantum mechanics but is realist, objective and deterministic and thus avoids many of the counter-intuitive features of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cushing 1994). One cannot, however, say that Bohm's theory is completely free from counter-intuitiveness. It is a non-local theory with some highly non-classical features. Thus quantum mechanics remains an excellent scientific theory, which has not been contradicted by an experiment so far but whose interpretation is still being debated.

Problem IV: Scientific Theories and Metaphysical Positions

One might describe the debate over the role of scientific theories an important part of modern philosophy of physics but the interest of a layman in the discussion may be only peripheral to start with. With the appearance of popular books in the market, however, many are drawn to the subject as they wonder deeper about the microworld. We therefore decided to comment briefly on it. On the nature of theories of modern physics, Davies and Gribbin (Davies 1992, p. 18) write: *At the heart of the scientific method is the construction of theories. Scientific theories are essentially models of the real world (or parts thereof), and a lot of the vocabulary of science concerns the model rather than the reality.*

When we come to the ontology of the entities of the microworld referred to by the theories, philosophers seem to be sharply divided into opposing camps. Very roughly, we can divide the proponents into realists and anti-realists, while other groups too exist: positivists, instrumentalists, empiricists, conventionalists etc. A scientific realist holds that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like and that the acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that

it is true. According to realists the objects of knowledge exist objectively independently of our mind. According to antirealists it does not make any sense to think of reality as it is in itself in abstraction from the way it is represented in human judgement. They maintain that the relationship between reality and human judgement is such that they cannot help but fit each other (Papineau 1987). A version of antirealism called constructive empiricism holds that science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is empirically adequate (van Fraassen 1991). Thus we see that there is no short, clear-cut answer to the question, *what is an electron*? Similarly, the question, *does the electron, or any other unobservable, exists, objectively independently of the observer?*, cannot be answered definitively. This is a typical situation when dealing with metaphysical questions. Robert Klee, in his recent book, concludes: when it comes to realism/antirealism dispute we often run out of arguments and are reduced to differences in personal temperament (Klee 1997, p. 238). So far as our own views are concerned, we prefer realism to anti-realism. Like Hilary Putnam we think that unless we accept a realist interpretation, the increasing predictive success achieved within the history of science would be a miracle. We believe the electrons and other sub-atomic entities which can be manipulated or experimented with (Hacking 1983) exist. Otherwise, how could we account for the fact that the magnetic moment of the electron has been measured by different experiments within an accuracy of 1 in 10^{10}?

CONCLUSION

A layman wondering about the world of atoms and electrons may hope to obtain definitive answers about their nature from a nuclear physicist. The answers of science, quantum theory in this case, are couched in a mathematical language and are in a sense strange. We cannot visualize some of the features attributed to the entities of the microworld, such as wave-particle duality of an electron, its spin and magnetic moment etc. If our layman then turned to a philosopher for clarification, he may not obtain more technical information about the electron, for example, but if he is patient, will receive a comforting response which might put him at ease. This might be called a therapeutic use of philosophy. As an illustration of this we have given a few examples of metaphysical problems.

Philosophy may not provide a definitive answer to our questions about the microworld, but it can lay bare the sources of our confusion and doubts and show us where we stand. The ontology of theoretical entities is an example of our confusion and doubt. Closely related to it is the interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the end we cannot avoid metaphysical questions. We are faced with alternative positions and must choose what appeals to us most. As mentioned above we hold, perhaps like most laymen and working scientists, a realistic outlook. We do not doubt the existence of subatomic entities even if their properties may not resemble the properties of anything we meet in the external world.

We also believe that it is best to accept tentatively theoretical entities as they are described in the best theory of the day without asking how they *really* are. We can just say how things appear to our senses (perhaps through our instruments). Many of the features attributed to the theoretical entities, neutrinos, quarks, photons etc., are unfamiliar. But this should not disturb us too much as the unobservables in physics we do not perceive directly. They are parts of a model. The properties attributed to the theoretical entities are helpful in the progress of science whether or not they are true.

We realize that in the light of the results of modern physics, we are forced to deny a solid, corpuscular character, what J.R. Lucas calls this-i-ness, to electrons and other subatomic particles. Lucas further says: *the loss of determinateness in our ultimate ontology is the concomitant of our abandoning determinism in our basic scheme of explanation* (Lucas 1993).

The fact that a *completely* satisfactory solution may never be obtained as an answer to some of the fundamental metaphysical questions arising out of microphysics can be expressed by a metaphor. Consider a lump in the fully carpeted floor of a room. This lump can perhaps be smoothed out with some effort, but the lump does not go away, it reappears in another place. Think of alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics.

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Strawson and Prasad on Determinism and Resentment

ON STRAWSON

'Freedom and Resentment' is divided into six sections. The central question of the article is stated in a variety of formulations in the sixth and the ninth paragraphs of Section IV (pp. 10–11). On analysis, the question separates out into three different orientations: of eventuality, of rational incumbency, and of possibility. To paraphrase:

> *Would* a belief in determinism lead us to abandon reactive attitudes and adopt the objective attitude?
>
> *Should* a belief in determinism lead us to abandon reactive attitudes and adopt the objective attitude?
>
> *Could* a belief in determinism lead us to abandon reactive attitudes and adopt the objective attitude?

Strawson never entertains the question of eventuality.[1] Instead, he focuses on its two prerequisites. To these, his answers are invariably in the negative, sometimes landing on the side of rational incumbency (no rational reason why one should adopt the objective attitude) and sometimes on the side of possibility (not possible to adopt the objective attitude and sustain it). Strawson's argument in regard to the Question of Adoption is the central argument of the essay, but it is also important that we understand why he raises the question and how he gives background to it by bringing up and elaborating on the notion of reactive attitudes.

Sections I, II, and VI concern the on-going argument between compatibilist determinists (who affirm determinism and morality) and incompatibilist determinists (who affirm determinism while denying morality[2]). Strawson reformulates these positions as optimistic determinists and pessimistic determinists, hinting at his own leanings on the subject. Strawson also briefly mentions sceptics (who neither deny nor affirm determinism or morality) and libertarians (who deny determinism and affirm morality). All four of these groups, Strawson says, claim to understand what determinism is (while disagreeing about the precise definition). Strawson, on the other hand, admits to ignorance on the subject of the definition of determinism.

In a quasi-dialogue, Strawson provides a capsule of the optimist/pessimist disagreement. To paraphrase:

> optimist: Despite determinism, moral judgement and punishments are desirable because they deter and regulate.
>
> pessimist: Moral judgment and punishments imply guilt, which implies responsibility, which implies freedom, which implies the falsity of determinism (which we both agree is true).
>
> optimist: Freedom, yes, but only in the sense of *freedom from* (limitations), which does not imply the falsity of determinism.
>
> pessimist: No, *freedom to* is also necessary for responsibility.
>
> optimist: Okay, but freedom in the sense of deciding and intention is not incompatible with determinism.
>
> pessimist: Why does freedom in this sense justify judgements and punishments?[3]
>
> optimist: [Silence]
>
> pessimist: You need another kind of freedom, and it will contradict determinism.[4]

Strawson is not satisfied with the optimist's silence and, in the end, suggests that he continue the dialogue as follows:

> optimist: No, it is not a matter of freedom. I said in the beginning that morality is necessary because it is socially indispensable.
>
> pessimist: But that's so cold.
>
> optimist: The web of attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of the moral life as we know it are such that ...[5]

And so Strawson has the optimistic determinist saying that: (1) morality is possible in the face of determinism (no justification for this),[6] and (2) it is desirable because we couldn't be human without it. Strawson says that the problem all along is that neither the optimists nor the pessimists (nor the sceptics) have given enough thought to the complexity of human morality. In Sections III and V and the first half of Section IV, Strawson attempts to unravel one fundamental part of this complexity.

In Sections III and V, Strawson introduces the concept of the reactive attitude (or range of such attitudes).[7] The reactive attitude is non-detached, he says, by which he means that it occurs as part of normal human interaction. Let's set up an example and use it for as long as it is profitable. Person A bumps person B. Person C witnesses. The expectation of all three of these people, in keeping with normal moral attitudes, is goodwill, or regard, on the part of each for all of the others. When A bumps B, B immediately wells up with resentment, having seen no apparent reason for the bump. C witnessing the bump, and also seeing no obvious reason for it feels a sense of moral disapprobation. A, who holds the same general normative values, also has a feeling about the event. Strawson provides names for each of these types of reactions: B has a *personal reactive attitude*. C has *moral reactive attitude*,[8] and A has a *self-reflective attitude*.

Strawson's reason for bringing up the reactive attitude is to demonstrate that human beings are profoundly involved in all manner of inter-personal relations. These relationships presume goodwill, or regard, on the part of all participants for all of the others and are essential to the coherence of normal human society. We constantly manifest our attitudes and actions in our relationships with others, and others base their reactions in a large part on their perceptions of our attitude at any given time. For instance, if A's bumping of B followed A's telling of a joke and was accompanied by a wink and a chuckle, B, sensing that A meant no harm, would likely feel no resentment at all, and might even manifest a jocular attitude, himself. We live in a web of such attitudes and reactions as a part of normal life, Strawson says. Some of the attitudes we may see manifested are goodwill, affection, esteem, contempt, indifference, and malevolence. Depending on how we view the justification of these attitudes, we may ourselves react with gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, or hurt feelings (in no particular order).

Integral to his discussion of reactive attitudes is Strawson's treatment of occasions for the inhibition of the reactive attitude, which he presents in the second half of Section IV and the eighth paragraph of Section V. He offers a hypothetical case of the manifestation of an unadjusted lack of goodwill, which is reasonably met with resentment (on the part of B) and disapprobation (on the part of C). There are certain circumstances, he says, under which these actions are often withheld. For instance, going back to the case of A bumping B, A may have done so accidentally, or unknowingly; he could have been pushed, or perhaps he meant it as a way of assisting B. In any of these cases, B would rightfully withhold resentment (and C withhold disapprobation). These we may call *act-exempters*. Likewise, A may temporarily have 'not been himself', or may have been under great strain, or may have been acting under post-hypnotic suggestion. In any of these cases, B may feel that A was not responsible for his action and so may not harbour resentment (and C would withhold disapprobation). This is an instance of exempting the person rather than the act, and we may call the reason for inhibiting the reactive attitude a *short-term person-exempter*. There is another general kind of person-exempter, the *long-term person-exempter*.[9] This would justify B's withholding resentment (and C's withholding disapprobation) because of A's extended abnormality. A could be a child, or a hopeless schizophrenic; his mind may have been systematically perverted, or he could have been acting under uncorrectable compulsive behaviour.

To withhold the reactive attitude is to have what Strawson calls the objective attitude. With the objective attitude, we do not regard people in the normal human way, although the attitude may be emotionally toned with such emotions as repulsion, fear, pity, or love. We adopt the objective attitude in order to manage, handle, cure, train, or avoid, etc., another person. Strawson emphasizes that the objective attitude is adopted only under rare circumstances and that it precludes normal reactive attitudes and feelings. He says that although the reactive and objective attitudes are not mutually exclusive, they are profoundly opposed. Note that forgiveness as pardoning (though it looks like a withholding of blame), since it is counted above as itself a reactive attitude, should not be construed as switching to an objective attitude.

The issue that began this discussion was whether determinism is compatible with free agency. Up to now, Strawson has talked about neither. The assumption of the pessimist, he says, is that if determinism were

believed to be true, the believer (B or C) would be justified in adopting the objective attitude and would withhold normal reactive attitudes, since A would not be able to be held responsible for his actions due to their being determined. As to the Question of Adoption, Strawson offers answers at several different points. I will list summaries of them below to get the full range of complexity, first providing a capsule answer and its orientation.

(a) negative, not a rational incumbency/possibility:

> it would not follow from the truth of determinism that anyone who caused an injury *either* was quite simply ignorant of causing it *or* had acceptably overriding reasons for acquiescing reluctantly in causing it *or* ..., etc. The prevalence of this happy state of affairs would not be a consequence of the reign of universal determinism, but of the reign of universal goodwill.

I must admit that I am not sure exactly what Strawson is saying here. He seems to be suggesting that, having introduced his three inhibitors of the reactive attitude, that any adoption of the objective attitude will occur *only* under circumstances of the presence of at least one of these inhibitors. If this assumption were to hold,[10] then for a determinist, in circumstances in which none of the inhibitors were operative, the adoption of the objective attitude would not rationally follow. From this argument, we can conclude that an affirmative answer to the Question of Adoption would not be a (rational) incumbency. I could be misinterpreting the argument, however, because Strawson actually says, 'we cannot find, here, the *possibility*[11] of an affirmative answer.'[12]

(b) negative, not a rational incumbency: the only justifiable long-term person-exempter is 'deep-rooted psychological abnormality—or simply by being a child.' Since determinism does not make abnormality the universal condition, it cannot act as a long-term person-exempter. There are two possible objections to this argument. First, we could demand a justification for his claim of only one kind of long-term person-exempter. Second, suppose determinism were universally believed to be true, and all believers were pessimists, hence adopting the objective attitude. In such a case, all Bs and Cs would be compared to what Strawson identifies as normal conditions, abnormal. And so, in a sense, determinism *would* make abnormality the universal condition.[13]

(c) negative, not a possibility: 'the only possible form of affirmative answer' entails determinism making abnormality the universal condition. Although Strawson does not deny that this is possible *per se*, he does say that it is 'practically inconceivable'. I take this to mean that in some possible world it might be conceivable, but not in this world. No new justification is offered.[14]

(d) negative, not a possibility: Strawson says that regardless of one's belief and the validity of the theoretical ground for it, human beings are incapable of 'a sustained objectivity of interpersonal attitude'. The reason is that humans are incapable of the isolation it would entail.[15]

(e) negative, not a rational incumbency: when we adopt the objective attitude in the case of person-exempters, we do so only in the occurrence of long-term person-exempters (abnormal people) and short-term person-exempters (normal people). In neither case is the reason a belief in determinism. Therefore, 'we cannot, as we are, seriously envisage ourselves adopting a thoroughgoing objectivity of attitude to others as a result of theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism.'[16] This, Strawson says is the culmination of his train of arguments. We can see from the foregoing arguments, that Strawson seems to be the bearer of a certain conservatism; since the normal situation is such that determinism is not an inhibitor, then it could never be an inhibitor. The basis of this seeming conservatism is Strawson's (at certain places in the article) intransigent dichotomy of reactive and objective attitudes. I'll bring this up for further discussion at the end of the paper, but suffice it for now to point out that if the objective and reactive attitudes could be shown to *both* be normal human attitudes under all conditions and could be held simultaneously, then determinism would not be isolating, and therefore could be rationally incumbent upon the committed determinist.

(f) negative, not a possibility: Strawson tacks on two further points. The first is that 'the human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes ... is part of the general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review.' Strawson says explicitly that the real question is the rational incumbency of adopting the objective attitude, given a committed belief in determinism. Then, he immediately counters that such a question is, itself, irrational, because of the reason given just now in the quotation.[17]

(g) negative, not a rational incumbency: The second point is that, even if human beings were capable of adopting a sustained objective attitude

(now he is entertaining the question he just said could not be entertained), the only (not the primary) consideration would be 'the gains and losses to human life, its enrichment or impoverishment.' So even if it were rational from the point of view of a belief in determinism to adopt the objective attitude, that reasoning would be trumped by the reasoning which concludes that life would be too impoverished as a result. If rationality were the vehicle of decision-making, however, one would have to at least entertain the determinist's case for adopting the objective attitude. If the adoption of the objective attitude were concluded to be reasonable, and if it were also concluded that not adopting the objective attitude were also reasonable, given the reason of impoverishment of life, then a further criterion would have to be given for choosing the latter over the former. Strawson would say that the criterion is that a human life is always better than an inhuman life, and that the sustained objective attitude is inhuman.[18]

(h) negative, not a rational incumbency: The above arguments were all given in regard to the personal reactive attitude. These next three arguments extend the above rationales to the moral and self-reflective attitudes. This argument is an extension of (a). Only the three inhibitors justify the objective attitude. A belief in determinism does not universalize any combination of the three inhibitors. Any talk of determinism is therefore irrelevant.[19]

(i) negative, not a possibility: Extension of (d).[20]

(j) negative, not a possibility: Reiteration of (f). Strawson says that 'it is not in our nature (to be able to) adopt the objective attitude indefinitely. On this basis, he says that it is useless to even ask the question.[21]

(k) negative, not a rational incumbency: Strawson tacks on a reiteration of (g), commenting, 'for those convinced that the truth of determinism ... really would make the one choice rational, there has always been the insuperable difficulty of explaining in intelligible terms how its falsity would make the opposite choice rational.' Here I take Strawson to be saying that if one accepts that determinism is an acceptable justification for adoption of the objective attitude, then one must also explain how it is that one's disbelief in determinism is adequate justification for adoption of the reactive attitude. Strawson seems to believe that this is a very strong point, but I fail to see how a belief in determinism requires one to justify a premise in regard to a disbelief in determinism. In fact, it is a rather gross non-sequitur, unless I have misconstrued the thrust of the comment.[22]

This concludes my summary of Strawson's article.

ON PRASAD

Like Strawson, Prasad admits agnosticism in regard to the definition of 'determinism'. Unlike Strawson, Prasad offers a minimal definition of 'determinism', because, he claims, it is necessary to resolving the issue in question. His minimal definition is: 'when an agent does something, it is not possible for him to have avoided doing it or to have done something else.'[23] Likewise, he finds a definition of 'responsibility' also necessary, and offers one: 'we can call a man responsible for having done something if and only if we at least believe or assume that he could have done something else if he had chosen or wanted to and that he could have so chosen or wanted.'[24] Notice that his definitions make determinism and responsibility direct opposites: 'determinism' means no choice, and 'responsibility' requires it. For the duration of this summary of Prasad's article, I will assume these two definitions.

Strawson separates his article into handy sections. Since Prasad does not, I have taken the task on myself and have come up with thirteen sections, mostly according to discrete arguments. I'll address them in order, focusing for the most part on the arguments, themselves.

I. Summary of Strawson and Negativist Argument[25]

According to Prasad, there is a type of moral sceptic who would assert that nobody can be said to be responsible for any action of his. A determinist who believes that nobody is responsible for their actions is, in this sense, a negativist. Strawson's claim is that any definition of determinism is irrelevant, but if a definition of determinism results in nobody being responsible, this seems to figure significantly in regard to the viability of the reactive attitude, Prasad argues.

Prasad picks up very quickly on Strawson's equivocation in regard to whether morality is possible in the face of determinism.[26] Strawson must come up with definitions that will reconcile these two, or be forced to abandon one of them.

II. Summary of Strawson and Preliminary Remarks[27]

No discreet arguments against Strawson.

III. Futility of Blaming Determined Actions[28]

Rather than feelings or attitudes, Prasad prefers to deal with the *expressions* of attitudes and feelings. The reason for this lies in his claim that it is in the logic of the reactive attitude that expression of attitudes or feelings entail the hope and possibility of influencing the other person's behaviour. To paraphrase:

> Hope of influence implies belief of influence; belief of influence implies belief in the possibility of influence; belief in the possibility of influence equals belief in an agent's ability to change.[29]

In other words, Prasad is making a similar exclusionist claim to Strawson's claim that *only* the inhibitors can justify the adoption of the objective attitude. Prasad is claiming that *only* a belief in the possibility of influencing another's actions can justify the reactive attitude. Hence, Prasad says, a determinist, believing that no one can influence anyone else's actions, would be irrational to continue the reactive attitude. However, Strawson claims, loudly and clearly, that there is another justification for continuing the reactive attitude—it is the only human thing to do. As I pointed out in (g), in order to resolve conflicting claims to rationality, a further criterion must be chosen. Strawson would say that humanity trumps all. Prasad would say that adherence to the implications of determinism trumps all. Without a common criterion, it's left to the reader to choose.

IV. The Logical Argument[30]

In this section, Prasad formalizes Strawson's argument for the irrelevance of determinism to the Question of Adoption, which we found in (a) and (h). Prasad offers the argument in two forms:

> (1) If any one of the three types of inhibitors exists, then it is inappropriate to feel or have any reactive attitude.
>
> It is not that if determinism is true, at least one of the three inhibitors exists.
>
> Therefore, it is not that if determinism is true, it is inappropriate to feel or have any reactive attitude.[31]

This argument is invalid, Prasad points out, because the conclusion could be false even if all the premises were true.

(1a) Add one premise to the above argument: 'if it is inappropriate to have the reactive attitude, then at least one of the three inhibitors exists.'[32] Although this makes it a valid argument, it is still not a good argument. The reason, Prasad says, is that while the argument is supposed to prove the conclusion given in (1), the first premise of (1) and the added premise actually assume the conclusion. It remains to be proved that determinism is not an inhibitor or that the three types of inhibitors exhaust all inhibitors (determinism implying none of them). So, Strawson's mistaken assumption is that determinism cannot be valid simultaneously with the existence of an inhibitor.

V. Determinism and the Pragmatic Commitment[33]

This section consists mainly of an elaboration of the argument given in Section III. Strawson emphasizes our participation in and commitment to inter-personal relationships. Prasad dubs this the 'pragmatic commitment'. Other than this nice turn of phrase, the argument contains nothing new. Adherence to the pragmatic commitment in the face of a belief in determinism is found to be irrational because we only adhere to the pragmatic commitment for reasons of influencing others. Determinism obviates that, rendering the pragmatic commitment facile. This argument runs into the same rational logjam as before, with no resolution.

VI. Self-Nature and Defining Determinism[34]

Strawson makes the reasonable claim that the commitment to inter-personal relations is part of human nature, implying that any extended deviance from this commitment is impossible. Prasad accepts this claim of the make-up of human nature and adds two of his own: by nature we feel uncomfortable with conceptual incompatibilities and seek to resolve them; by nature we tend to have a preferred world-view. Prasad now offers the examples of the theist and the Hindu, two types of people who are committed to a belief in the world-view of deteminism.

Of course, they are faced with a conceptual incompatibility: on one hand they are committed to determinism (which implies the suspension of inter-personal relations), and on the other they are committed to inter-personal relations. Prasad draws two conclusions from this dilemma. First, the person must abandon the reactive attitude or reveal a complete logical

insensitivity. Second, a definition of determinism can no longer be put off by Strawson. The person is forced to choose one world-view over another, and the only way to do so is to engage in a thorough evaluation of each. A thorough evaluation necessitates, at least, a definition of determinism. Hence, Strawson cannot just blithely ignore it.

The second of these conclusions seems valid to me and jibes well with the conclusion reached in Section I. The first conclusion seems unwarranted, with Prasad assuming that the person will, after thorough evaluation, choose the world-view of determinism over the world-view of human interaction. No justification is offered.

VII. Duality of Human Nature[35]

We saw that Strawson says that the objective attitude and the reactive attitude are, if not mutually exclusive, profoundly opposed. Prasad suggests that we follow Hume and proposes a 'built-in duality in our nature'. Any lack of communion between the two sides of our nature, he says, is as likely to impoverish as the inhibition of all reactive attitudes.

VIII. Equivocation of Concept of Rationality[36]

In this section, Prasad takes up the issue of the incompatibility of rationalities that we have faced twice already in his article, in Sections III and V. This time, however, he offers a clever method of resolving them, by subdividing the rational incumbency orientation. He says that there are two different criteria of rationality—utility and consistency, or coherence. Strawson, Prasad says, asks the Question of Adoption with the second criterion in mind, then answers it with the first in mind. It is not unacceptable for Strawson to answer the question with the criterion of utility, but he has still left unanswered the question in regard to the criterion of consistency.

Prasad has an excellent point here, but he is also assuming that the consistency criterion is at least as important as the utility criterion. If Strawson claims, as he does, that the utility criterion takes precedence over all others, then Prasad needs to offer a reason that it doesn't.

IX. Calculating Gains and Losses[37]

Here, Prasad adopts Strawson's argument to turn it against him. He assumes the criterion of utility and extends it. Suppose, he says, one accepted that the reactive attitude is most reasonable based on the criterion of utility. What if one then acquired a belief in determinism? On the criterion of utility, he would realize that the reactive attitude is useless in the sense that it could effect no changes in people.

I think Prasad needs to take this argument one step further. Strawson could easily sweep this objection away simply by appeal to the criterion of humanity—the reactive attitude is the only human way. If Prasad could show with the criterion of utility that determinism would render even humanity hollow by showing that it is just an illusion anyway, he would remove Strawson's trump card. Strawson would then be forced to cling to an illusion, which he may very well choose to do, but this would put him on even thinner ice.

X. What is Human Nature?[38]

Prasad makes two important arguments in this single paragraph. Strawson claims that human nature requires the reactive attitude. Prasad contends that there is an Indian theory of human nature that claims just the opposite. According to this theory, it is possible to suspend the reactive attitude and withdraw into oneself.

The second argument is that, according to the same theory, not only is it possible, it is desirable.

Strawson takes it as given that the reactive attitude is both necessary and desirable. Prasad has provided a counter-example to both.

XI. Human Nature is Irrational[39]

Prasad says that if we choose to retain reactive attitudes in the face of a belief in determinism for the reason that they are ingrained in our nature, then we admit that our nature itself is irrational. And so the high regard that Strawson accords our nature for being committed to inter-personal relations would be tainted forever by the stain of irrationality.

This is assuming that retaining the reactive attitude in the face of determinism is irrational, which Strawson is not yet compelled to admit.

XII. Rationalizing the Reactive Attitude[40]

This is Prasad's response to Strawson's argument (k). Prasad interprets the argument the same way I do and responds that the 'opposite choice' is not a choice at all—it is the current state of affairs—and, therefore, does not require justification.

XIII. Summary[41]

Restatement of two points:

- 'Determinism' requires a precise definition.
- It is an empirical claim that determinism is never an inhibitor. The counterexamples of the theist and the Hindu disprove the claim.

Strawson's Response:[42] In his response, Strawson graciously concedes two points to Prasad: (1) that Prasad's Logical Argument (Prasad, Section IV) effectively undermines Strawson's claim of the irrelevancy of determinism, and (2) that determinism needs to be more precisely defined.

Strawson does not concede, however, the optimist's ground. Instead, he offers his own minimal definition of determinism: 'every event has a cause'. Notice that this minimal definition differs significantly from Prasad's minimal definition ('when an agent does something, it is not possible for him to have avoided doing it, or to have done something else'). Now when Strawson claims that free agency is possible, we can see why Prasad insisted that one's definition of determinism would make such a great difference.

Evaluation and Comments: Generally speaking, Strawson offers four separate arguments to support the optimistic determinist viewpoint:

(1) *Inhibitors only* (contra-objective): Only inhibitors can justify the objective attitude, and determinism is not an inhibitor. Therefore the reactive attitude is saved (since the objective attitude is not necessitated by determinism). See arguments (a), (e), and (h).

(2) *Humans incapable* (contra-objective): By nature, humans are incapable of sustaining the objective attitude for long. Therefore the reactive attitude is saved (as the only alternative). See arguments (d) and (i).

(3) *Appeal to humanity* (pro-reactive): The reactive attitude is the only desirable attitude for reason of its superior humanity. See arguments (f), (g), and (j). An offshoot of this argument is contra-objective in its claim that determinism entails universal abnormality, and is therefore inhuman. See arguments (b) and (c).

(4) *Rationalizing the reactive* (contra-objective): Anyone who supports the pessimistic determinist must justify the objective attitude, and in doing so must also justify the reactive attitude from the premise of the falsity of indeterminism. See argument (k).

We can see from this capsule summary that Strawson never really offers a compatibilist argument, an argument that explains how determinism and free agency are compatible. Instead, he shows that they cannot be incompatible by demonstrating: (1) that the reactive attitude (an implication of free agency) is natural and desirable, and (2) that the objective attitude (an implication of determinism) is not natural, not desirable, not sustainable, and not compatible with the reactive attitude.

When Prasad sets out to challenge Strawson, he concentrates his effort on incompatibilist arguments, showing that determinism and free agency are incompatible. His arguments can be grouped as follows:

(1) *Analytic argument* (contra-reactive): By definition, determinism precludes free agency. See Sections I and VI.

(2) *Irrationalism* (contra-reactive): Given a belief in determinism, choosing the reactive attitude would be irrational. See Sections III, V, VI. An offshoot of this is the *failure to respond argument* (pro-objective): Strawson raises the Question of Adoption in the logically (in terms of consistency) rational sense, then fails to answer it, leaving the irrationalism argument untouched. See VIII.

(3) *Against inhibitors only* (pro-objective): The *inhibitors only* argument is invalid. See Section IV.

(4) *Against humanity* (pro-objective): It is actually Strawson's conception of humanity that is impoverished. See Sections VII and XI.

(5) *Argument from utility* (contra-reactive): Assuming the criterion of utility, the reactive attitude would be useless since no influencing goes on. See Section IX.

(6) *Against incapability* (pro-objective): It's not empirically true that humans are incapable of sustaining the objective attitude. See Section X.

(7) *Against rationalizing the reactive* (pro-objective): The reactive attitude, as normal, does not require justification. See Section XII.

We can see that four of Prasad's seven types of arguments [(3), (4), (6), and (7)] are targeted directly at Strawson's four types of arguments. According to my evaluations of Prasad's arguments above, at least one argument of each type is successful, except for Section VII of type (4), which I will get to shortly. In addition to countering Strawson's arguments, Prasad offers three types of his own [(1), (2), and (5)] against Strawson's support of the reactive attitude. Prasad does not deny that the reactive attitude is desirable, but he does deny that it is natural or rational

in the face of determinism. Prasad's least successful forays are his irrationalism arguments (2) and his argument from utility (5). In these arguments, he attempts to attack the desirability of the reactive attitude, but since Strawson always hoists the flag of humanity, the only way for Prasad to capture the flag is to attack the *arguments from humanity*.

This is a tough nut to crack, especially since Prasad, himself, expresses approval at certain points. His argument in Section XI, that human nature is irrational, is a dismal failure because Strawson is not compelled to concede the point. His argument in Section VII, the duality of human nature, is much more tantalizing.

Prasad's comments on this subject are very brief, a short paragraph. All along, Prasad has been accepting without question two of Strawson's deepest presuppositions: that human nature is naturally reactive, and that attitudes and emotions are rational. In bringing this paper to a conclusion, I will comment on each of these presuppositions.

Prasad suggests in Section VII that Strawson's conception of human nature is essentially dualist, that there is a reactive side and an objective side, and they are separated by an incommunicable gulf. Prasad then offers a Humean model as a richer alternative. Hume said that reason would be a slave to passion, that only emotions compel us to action. Reason is important, as well, and both must function together to get the most out of life.[43]

The problem with bringing Hume into the picture is that he upsets the delicate balance of terminology that Strawson has established and Prasad has, until then, hewn to. Strawson has opposed the objective attitude with the reactive attitude, both of which are reasonable. Hume, on the other hand, brings in this unruly power of the unreasonable and even suggests that it is integral to a normal life. Throughout their articles, both philosophers have shunned the irrational as categorically undesirable.[44] In fact, this *gestalt* shift in terminology is one thing that recommends Strawson's treatment. That doesn't exonerate him, however, from a further oversight.

In a footnote on p. 13 of his article, Strawson nearly broaches the topic. He puts forth the suggestion that perhaps the more objective one's attitude, the more rational the person. This tells me that he hasn't quite made the shift from rational/emotive to objective/reactive. In fact, he tentatively agrees with the suggestion and leans towards the reactive-as-emotive side of the dichotomy.

I would like to turn the reader's attention to a section of Strawson's paper that I have put off until now, the last paragraph of Section V (pp. 19–20). In this paragraph, Strawson admits to the crudity of his schema and seeks to mitigate it by offering the complex example of parents interacting with children (and psychoanalysts interacting with patients).[45] The importance of this passage is the borderline case of parents' attitudes towards kids: 'parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing of young children cannot have to their charges either kind of attitude in a pure or unqualified form.' The parent must be constantly shifting back and forth between the objective attitude and the reactive attitude because the young child is alternately capable of manifesting normal human attitudes and incapable. It is at this borderline that the weakness in Strawson's model of the human mind shows itself most clearly. If we look back at all the objective-attitude inhibitors, if they involve only one possible potentially blameworthy agent, and if physical mishaps and well-meaning intentions are discounted, then the only reason for inhibiting resentment is a psychological incapacitation. What is a psychological incapacitation? Strawson doesn't say explicitly what the nature of it is, but what can it be other than a temporary or permanent case of irrationality? We cannot have normal reactive inter-personal relations with unreasonable people. In the case of young children, it is exactly their unreasonableness that prompts us to take on the objective attitude towards them and manage them.

I submit that Strawson's schemata in which normal people are always reasonable is unrealistic. I cannot think of going through a single day in which I was completely rational at every moment, and when I witness other people, the same appears to be true for them. Notice Strawson's examples of normal reactions by offended parties or beneficiaries: gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, hurt feelings.[46] In my experience, of these five attitudes, only one of them is completely voluntary—forgiveness. This may explain why it is taken up as a worthwhile example by both Strawson and Prasad. The other four do not appear to me to be purely rational. I think that in addition to Strawson's or Hume's language, Sartre's language might also add a needed dimension to this discussion. The other four attitudes seem to me to be pre-reflective. And I think that very few people would disagree with the claim that for a large part of every person's life pre-reflective emotions arise due to habit, mood, prejudice, and a number of other factors that are generally taken to be non-

rational in nature. I believe it is the rare case that one is in full rational command of one's attitudes and emotions.

There is much more that can be said about this topic, and I won't attempt to exhaust the discussion here. I just have one more qualm to express, and I hope it is rational. Although I have sided with Prasad in most of the arguments, I find one unresolvable puzzle in his article. When he assumes determinism and denies free agency, how can he intelligibly discuss whether it would be rational or not for a person to take on the objective attitude or the reactive attitude? If determinism (in Prasad's sense) holds, there will be no cause for talk of rationality, and no amount of discussion will change anything. Everything would just march forward, inexorably. Perhaps to an outside observer (if that were possible) people would appear rational, but how would Prasad's article propose to change behaviour? I suppose it could if it led to a new deterministically rational decision to change to the objective mode. Prasad is insistent that Strawson provide a definition of determinism. I would like to see Prasad's *explanation* of determinism such that we can intelligibly talk about rationality and irrationality. I think it may be possible, and I think it would be fascinating.

Notes and References

1. Except, perhaps, in the article's penultimate paragraph, in which he tries to imagine a future state of human sciences which makes all reactive attitudes obsolete.
2. Those who affirm morality obviously affirm both the possibility and the incumbency of it. In regard to those who deny morality, they could be denying either its possibility or its incumbency.
3. A lower animal, for instance, is considered to have the power of decision and intention but is at the same time determined.
4. pp. 2–4.
5. pp. 20–22.
6. It is not clear how one can justify the possibility of morality without a freedom that will contradict determinism. For instance, how is it that we determine that morality is desirable, and then how is it that we *choose* morality over non-morality? Strawson seems to be saying that our choosing morality on the basis of the optimist's argument is a free choice, which could contradict determinism. If it is not a free choice, but we decide on some determined bases, the question becomes much more complex.
7. Strawson usually refers to the reactive attitude in the plural and the objective attitude in the singular, although he allows for plurality and singularity of both. For consistency's sake, I will use the singular unless context suggests otherwise.
8. Strawson actually has several names for this second attitude: moral, reactive, vicarious reactive, and impersonal reactive. Although Strawson appears to prefer 'vicarious', using it more often, I will use 'moral' here, since that is what Prasad prefers.
9. The 'exempter' terms were suggested informally by Arindam Chakrabarti.
10. He provides no justification for the assumption.
11. My italics.
12. Argument and quotations on pp. 10–11, paragraph 7 of the section.
13. Argument and quotations on p. 11, paragraph 8 of the section.
14. Argument and quotations on p. 11, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the section.
15. Argument and quotation on pp. 11–12, second sentence of paragraph 11 of the section.
16. Argument and quotation on pp. 12–13, paragraph 11 of the section.
17. Argument and quotation on p. 13, paragraph 12 of the section.
18. Argument and quotation on p. 13, paragraph 12 of the section.
19. Argument on p. 18.
20. Argument on p. 18.
21. Argument and quotation on p. 18.
22. Argument and quotation on pp. 18–19.
23. 'Reactive Attitudes, Rationality, and Determinism', p. 350.
24. Ibid., p. 350.
25. Through the third paragraph on p. 350.
26. See footnote 6.
27. Through the first full paragraph on p. 353.
28. Through the second paragraph on p. 356.
29. p. 354.
30. Up to the first full paragraph on p. 362.
31. p. 358.
32. p. 359.
33. Up to the first full paragraph on p. 368.
34. Through the first full paragraph on p. 370.
35. The single paragraph at the bottom of p. 370 and continuing on to p. 371.
36. The two full paragraphs on p. 371.
37. Through the first full paragraph on p. 372.
38. The single paragraph at the bottom of p. 372 and continuing on to p. 373.
39. Up to the first full paragraph on p. 374.
40. First full paragraph on p. 374.
41. To end.
42. Appended to 'Reactive Attitudes, Rationality, and Determinism', pp. 430–32.

43. P.K. Sen argues that even the urge to be logically consistent and to avoid contradiction is a passion. See his *Reference and Truth*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1991.
44. Strawson the less so, since he is willing, as Prasad notes, to sacrifice consistency rationalism for utilitarian rationalism. He hints at his cognizance of this in his footnote on p. 13.
45. At the end of this example, Strawson takes an odd tack by suggesting that the concept of determinism itself is unintelligible because it would be 'grotesque' to suggest that a child's behaviour moves from the determined to the undetermined as he matures. This is an unnecessary argument. A determinist would hold that the child's behaviour is *always* determined, right through adulthood.
46. 'Freedom and Resentment', p. 4.

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A Staccato Response to Brian Bruya's 'Strawson and Prasad on Freedom'

My 'Reactive Attitudes, Rationality and Determinism',[1] a piece discussing P.F. Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment'[2] and some other ethical writings, primarily and extensively the former, has elicited discussions on it from many, appearing in some books and journals. But Bruya's is the most elaborate. I did not respond to the others, hoping, though not very hopefully, that some of their readers would. And, this, I still believe is not an unhealthy academic habit. Others' comments did not prompt me to have a second look at mine, but Bruya's have, at least to check it here and there, because I have to respond to it in black and white on account of the friendly and fierce insistence of the editor of *JICPR* and to do that not later than the publication of Bruya's because he intends to publish both, Bruya's and my response to it, in the same issue of *JICPR*.

I would respond to Bruya in a staccato manner, commenting on, or taking up, the points he has made, as and when they catch my attention while reading his, and not in any hard and fast systematic way. I would, of course, avoid commenting on the same point again and again even if it occurs at more than one place in his.

On reading Bruya's presentation of Strawson's position in 'Freedom and Resentment', I felt tempted, on some occasions, to defend Strawson against him. Similarly, on reading his account of my appraisal of Strawson's, I felt equally tempted to comment afresh on the latter. But I resisted, or stifled, the temptation, since, yielding to it would, in all probability, have led me to write another lengthy piece on Strawson, though the one Bruya is discussing is in no way not lengthy (as it consists of thirty pages).

I must make clear at the outset, and it would be visible to anyone conversant with the style of writing in the practice of present-day Anglo-American analytical philosophers, that both Strawson and I have written in the general framework of what is loosely called ordinary language philosophy, using logic, he undeclaredly and I declaredly, in the service of establishing or defending our claims and counter-claims. Since my criticism of his position is very much like a quarrel among the members of a large family, it can quite naturally seem to many to be a bitter one as it does to Bruya who calls it 'one of the most trenchant'.[3] But Strawson, I think, as it appears from his response to it, recognizes the familial nature of our dispute and therefore does not consider my criticism as an outrageous one from an alien.

Bruya begins with making a general point to the effect that both Strawson and I proceed under 'the reactive/objective dichotomy' which is 'impoverished and is itself in need of a broadening perspective'.[4] Strawson does proceed under this dichotomy, and this is the main reason for my using it. I do not want to complain that Bruya does not show how it is impoverished and how it can be broadened, though on both the counts the complaint would have been genuine. I would only re-assert that I do not notice in it any impoverishment which may make it unworthy to be used for making the points and counter-points Strawson and I have tried to make. The dichotomy is complete in the sense that we may treat an individual, either as a person, or as an object. These are the only two categories under which we can think of him. We cannot treat him as neither, nor as both in the same respect at the same time and at the same place. We react with him the way we do when we have a reactive attitude only if we treat him as an individual or a person, as one with whom we can have a communicative relationship. But if we treat him as a thing, an object, we cannot have any reactive attitude towards him. Similarly, to think of someone as unfit to be the subject of any reactive attitude is also,

to all intents and purposes, to treat him as an object, and the latter cannot be the subject of a reactive attitude, moral or non-moral. It is for this reason that to be completely 'objective', or indifferent, to someone is taken to be more humiliating than even treating him as a hateful creature. Doing the former is to treat him as a mere thing which is not fit even to be hated. I have been arguing, against Strawson, that a belief in determinism would disallow the believer to have any reactive attitude towards anyone, and therefore the belief would matter. There is any point in our having a reactive attitude towards what one has done only when we believe that it is in principle possible for him to modify his behaviour, if he chooses to, in the light of his knowledge of our attitude and this we cannot do if we believe that he is determined and not free to do what he does, i.e. when we believe that determinism is true.

Bruya takes Strawson as offering 'a modified compatibilism', the theory that the belief in determinism and the belief in human free agency are compatible and I contest it 'over a precise definition of determinism' though neither of us give a precise definition but only minimal definitions which are very different and our disagreement is very much due to the difference between our minimal definitions.[5]

Strawson cannot be taken as advocating compatibilism, even a modified one, and therefore I am neither contesting his compatibilism, nor myself advocating one. Strawson's is a much stronger position which claims that a belief in determinism is irrelevant to one's experiencing a reactive attitude because human beings, having the nature they have, would continue having reactive attitudes even if determinism, defined in any way whatsoever, were true and they believed that it was true. The compatibilist, on the other hand, holds that, on some definitions of it, it would be incompatible with free agency and therefore with anyone's having a reactive attitude. Therefore, by doing some tinkering with the concept of determinism, or with that of free agency, he makes the two compatible with each other, and thereby a belief in determinism compatible with having reactive attitudes. If Strawson's claim is valid, if determinism is irrelevant, then the question of its being compatible or incompatible with free agency, or with having a reactive attitude, would not arise. I have contested its irrelevance by showing that a rational person, who believes in determinism, would have no reason to experience or express a reactive attitude towards anyone and that this proves that a belief in determinism is not irrelevant to having a reactive attitude.

It is true that Strawson does not define determinism because his thesis is claimed to be true no matter what determinism is taken to mean. Therefore, to refute his claim, I too do not need to define it and when I need to state what I mean by it, I only state what it ordinarily or primarily means, i.e. what it means as per ordinary use of it in ordinary language. Thereby I ensure that Strawson cannot deny it. On the other hand, if he needs to deny it to protect his thesis of its otioseness, it would mean that at least on one definition or meaning of it, i.e. on its ordinary use, it is not irrelevant to one's having a reactive attitude. This would only confirm my claim that he cannot deny it because denying it would disprove, and not protect, his thesis.

On page 206, while discussing, what he calls my argument from the futility of blaming determined actions, Bruya takes me to be making, as Strawson is, the exclusivist claim 'that only the inhibitors can justify the adoption of the objective attitude'. That I do not make such a claim is clear from my insistence that in addition to Strawson's inhibitors, there is another condition also which justifies it, and this condition is nothing other than the belief in determinism. Strawson cannot by definition rule out this possibility because it would mean that he assumes the very thesis—that determinism is not an inhibitor—which his analysis aims at proving. Secondly, my pointing to the classical Indian philosophical view—that one ought to cultivate an absolutely objective attitude towards everything, living or non-living, i.e. he ought to cultivate having no reactive attitude towards anything whatsoever, because only then he would be able to free himself from the otherwise ceaseless process of birth-death-rebirth—is only to say that here is held a possibility of something very different from any one of Strawson's inhibitors working as an inhibitor, as a sufficient reason for becoming absolutely objective. My pointing to it does not mean or imply that I accept it as a faultless claim. In fact I am very critical of this view. But still it is relevant to Strawson's claim that only his inhibitors can cause or lead to an objective attitude.

I have been maintaining that the belief in determinism is a conclusive reason for not having a reactive attitude. Therefore, one who is a rationalist and a believer in determinism would desist from having any reactive attitude and thereby would be a counter-instance to Strawson's claim that the belief in determinism would make no difference to our having reactive attitudes the way we normally have them. He banks on his, or the Humean, conception of human nature to the effect that human beings are by nature

such that they would keep having reactive attitudes even if they believe in determinism. My argument is that it is also human nature to do, at least sometimes, things for doing which one has a conclusive reason and to abjure doing things for not doing which he has a conclusive reason. And, when he seems to have not done something for which he has what we think to be a conclusive reason, quite often the fact of the matter is that there is something else which he considers to be a conclusive reason for not doing it.

Bruya's complaint is that I do not give a precise definition of being a rationalist and neither does Strawson, nor do I give a definition of determinism which both of us accept, and that is very basic to our dispute or disagreement. But a definition, or an understanding, of what being a rationalist is, is implied in what I have said in the essay he is commenting on and in what I have said above. It is simply that he would be a rationalist who has the ability to recognize that something, say, R, is a reason for doing something say, A, when R is a reason for doing A, to ascertain which conditions should R satisfy to be a reason for doing A, to notice the logical oddity involved in not doing A when R holds good, to respect the practice of doing a thing for doing which he has a reason, to feel the need of justifying or explaining why he did not do for doing which, as some others think, he had a reason to do, etc. etc. These are all involved in the commonsense, ordinary, use or understanding of 'being a rationalist'. This notion of being a rationalist Strawson would not deny, and he does not in his response.

If the belief in determinism is a reason for suspending all reactive attitudes, then certainly one, who entertains this belief, must suspend reactive attitudes if he is a rationalist because he has a reason for doing that. If he does not, then we would naturally call him irrational, or that he is not sensitive to the logical oddity involved in continuing to have reactive attitudes for not having which he has a reason in his belief in determinism. Therefore my drawing this conclusion is not 'unwarranted' as Bruya claims (p. 208).

I have talked about determinism and meant by it something. What I have meant by it is also what it ordinarily means in common usage, namely, that if one is determined to do whatever he does, then it is not possible for him to have done something other than what he actually does. This meaning of determinism Strawson does not explicitly deny, nor does he say anything which implies that he would deny it. Perhaps he does not need to affirm or deny it because he holds that it would not affect the human habit of having reactive attitudes, even if it is true under any meaning whatsoever which may be given to it. My contention is that under the meaning given above, a meaning which is the meaning it has in the use of grassroot users of language, it would affect the rationalist's practice of having reactive attitudes. Therefore, in a sense I have not given, nor has Strawson, a precise definition of determinism, but in a sense I have also said enough to make my claim against Strawson, in a plausible, may be not in a probative, sense valid.

Bruya finds an unresolvable puzzle in my position which he expresses in the interrogative 'when he (Prasad) assumes determinism and denies free agency, how can he intelligibly discuss whether it would be rational or not for a person to take on the objective attitude or the reactive attitude?' (p. 214). There is no unresolvable puzzle here because there is no puzzle. I do not assume determinism and do not deny free agency. I have not discussed the truth or falsity of determinism, nor the possibility or impossibility of free agency. I have been only maintaining that *if* one believes in determinism, then, if he is a rationalist, he would notice in his belief a conclusive reason for taking the objective attitude, i.e., for not taking any reactive attitude and therefore would take the objective attitude, i.e. stop taking any reactive attitude. This can be said *about* the believer by any outsider. It can be said even by a determinist or by the believer in determinism himself. Then, the determinist, or the believer, would have only to add that whatever is said by him here is itself determined and is not a speech act denoting or connoting free agency. What I have said with regard to his puzzle may not seem to him fascinating, as he expects it to be. But this is a fact about all logical results. When seen as they are, they look so familiar, or not-strange, that one wonders why they were not so seen before. As Wittgenstein says, there is no place for novelty in logic, and I would add, there is no place for anything fascinating in the result of a logical analysis because some strangeness in a thing is necessary to make it fascinating.

Notes and References

1. P.K. Sen and R.R. Verma (ed.): *The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson* (ICPR, New Delhi, 1995), pp. 346–76.
2. P.F. Strawson: *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (Methuen, 1974).
3. Abstract, p. 1. (This response was written on the basis of Bruya's typescript that had an abstract consisting of nearly two pages, and in it he had made

some of his most important and pointed remarks. The abstract is not included in the printed version.)

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 2.
6. See Chapters 1 to 3 of my *Varanadharma, Niskama Karma and Practical Morality: A Critical Essay on Applied Ethics* (D.K. Printworld, New Delhi, 1999), and Chapters 13 and 14 of *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality* (ICPR, New Delhi, 1989).

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Can Consciousness be Explained?

Some recent issues of this *Journal* carry a continuity of the debate on consciousness, which filled nearly twenty-seven pages of discussion. The overall impression it makes is that the debate is very much low-key as none of the discussants came forward to see it in the light of recent empirical evidences within cognitive studies. None of the discussants have contributed anything to the advancement of knowledge, as they are oblivious of recent developments. The sterility of the debate is much evidenced in the pattern of arguments presented by them.

In what follows, we shall make a few observations so as to make clear that consciousness can not be bracketed any longer by science as a mystery. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to propose some important arguments, which shall ensure that consciousness can not exist independently of the brain process. This goes radically against many of the views expressed or assumed by discussants about the independent nature and existence of consciousness. We wish to examine each one of them and the conclusion would be made on our own readings of their views.

Professor P. Ramachandra who started the discussion obviously with a Rylean flavour argued, in his paper '*Is there such a thing as self-consciousness*'?[1] that, consciousness is a fiction, later modified to function word and there is nothing ontologically real about it. One can agree if he is against the view that consciousness is independently real. But his main contention is that consciousness is not an empirical category. It is not a grammatical category and there is no fact of the matter. Invariably, he drew support from Humean/Wittgensteinean standpoint. Hume failed to discover self. So also Wittgenstein. For Professor Ramachandra, nothing

happens inside a human being to which terms like consciousness and experience can refer. He explains:

> When we see an apple, the seeing or consciousness or experience is of the apple; the seeing or consciousness or experience is not a separate something in the mind, some primordial mental stuff, there is no such stuff.[2]
>
> The inner world, introspection and mental entities [in the sense of things made up of some special mental stuff, as opposed to an apple one sees or a pain one has] are all mirages.[3]

But what all the available evidence points to is that, consciousness is not as much a fiction as he wants to hold, in spite of his Wittgensteinean and Humean stances. Thinking that science is incapable of explaining or any other empirical phenomena probably reveals the limits of our imaginations, rather than these fundamental metaphysical barriers to human cognition.

There are at least three forefronts of research which directly contribute towards the explanatory potentials of consciousness; they are:

(a) Group A regards consciousness as shrouded in mystery. They are called mysterianists. It is not that they all consider consciousness as a mystery but science can not explain this, so much so that they accept that there is an 'explanatory gap'. Consequently, some non-reductive accounts pursue arguments of the form: what-it-is to be—in a state of consciousness and answers it by holding it to be non-reductive.

(b) Group B are reductivists who pursue some form of reductionism, but since no form of reductionism is viable, they follow a form of non-reductive materialism.

(c) Group C proposes to understand consciousness and the thought process occur there in relation to language, which represents the state-of-the-art in consciousness regards.

Professor Pradhan replies to the paper *Is there such a thing as self-consciousness?* by remarking that:

> One must accept that there is nothing like constructing the self ..., consciousness is an autonomous reality so far as its logical conceivability is concerned.[4]

His response is downright ordinary and it is oblivious of any investigation that is currently carried on within cognitive-science. He questions with a streak of innocence.

The question to be raised here: by what arguments are these statements to be supported? If we examine these arguments, we will find that Pradhan uses the same hat trick: it is grammatical and therefore it is independent. One can not but reject this as an absurd argument. He argues that the grammatical position of the self is not independent of its own reality.

Pradhan's package characterizes the curt dismissal of Hume as hackneyed on the grounds that it will also presuppose consciousness. May be it is a contradiction. He thinks that one cannot be denied without self-consistency. But does it follow that one should give up pseudo-talk of denying the self? Pradhan theorizes: self is a primitive, pretheoretical concept underlying our logic and experience. He also remarks that it is the subject that is the locus of consciousness and not any material body. Inevitably, this forces Pradhan to give an ontological/logical status to consciousness. What kind of purpose will be served by this kind of reflection is puzzling to us. He does not tell us: what it is to be a subject?

Professor Rajendra Prasad, who has no sympathy for any esoteric metaphysics on the other hand, shows in his paper '*Must Consciousness be Non-referential?*'[5] a strange tendency to distinguish the grammar from empirical reality. But he has reason to detest Ramachandran's conclusion. He starts by saying that he wants to test the following conjunction: we are conscious means we are conscious of something, i.e., this something is that we are conscious of being conscious (even if there is no consciousness). Now he raises the following question; are they both grammatical and not empirical?

The preferred answer is that it is both grammatical as well as empirical, a conclusion which concurs with Pradhan's. However the need for testing arises because we are sometimes conscious of objects which do not exist.

Professor Prasad reiterates that to be conscious is ordinarily to be conscious of something. This is of course asserted in any account of phenomenology, whose implications we are still at a loss to understand. Invited by such considerations, Professor Ramakant Sinari also borrows the same phenomenological argument, but adds an ingenious twist that, introspection confirms the act of self-consciousness. He is then obliged to explain how this 'act' is to be understood without positing consciousness. Professor Sinari levels a serious charge against Ramachandra, by posing the question whether there is an intentional arc in Ramachandra, even when he writes this particular piece: if so Ramachandra is conscious, which is what he wants to deny. Therefore, he is apparently self-contradictory.

It seems absurd to think that consciousness is different from the body. There is a possibility that we might succeed in closing the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain operating with reference to the best explanation on phenomenal consciousness itself. We may also suggest that the connection between these two is analogous to the way electromagnetic fields are irreducible to, but necessarily connected with the behaviour of charged particles and gravitational fields with the behaviour of masses, as Nagel remarks.[6]

Consider Churchland's view. He denies all the reductive theories and favours a new type of productive strategy which is known as the Inter-theoretic Reduction. In this type of reduction it is not meaning that is being preserved. The only alternative to inter-theoretic reduction is epistemic stagnation or the outright elimination of old frameworks as wholly false and illusory. This is fundamental to Churchland's theory of neural networks, which is considered to be the neuro-biological equivalent of consciousness. On this view the vector transformation in recurrent artificial network will substantially illuminate how our brains work, and how that feels to the organisms that have them.[7] Besides, what is called the recurrent network possess descending connection that recycle information about part processing back to earlier levels, influencing their current processing. Recurrent nets are more realistic biologically, since such descending connections abound in brain circuitry. This brings what is called consciousness closer to biology.

Churchland uses this idea to refute the non-reductive account of consciousness, all of which claim that consciousness is over the above bodily states. That is to say it is something that is not reducible to this. In other words this comes closer to refuting a view, which holds that consciousness, has an independent reality. To assert this is to claim two subsidiary claims, namely that consciousness is an independent state and it is ontologically real.

These are pointing out that, no one has succeeded in locating consciousness in the brain, does not mean that it can be located in the subject. It also shows that consciousness is not having an autonomous reality. Certainly, it is a kind of function of the brain.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1, Sept.–Dec. 1997.
2. Ibid., p. 83.
3. Ibid., p. 85.
4. *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, Jan.–April 1999.
5. *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1, Sept.–Dec. 1997.
6. Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, 1986, Oxford University Press.
7. Paul M. Churchland, *The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul a Philosophical Journey into the Brain.*

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On What It is Like to be a Human Being: Towards an Alternative to Ramchandra Gandhi's Model of Self-awareness

In his book, *The Availability of Religious Ideas*,[1] Professor Ramchandra Gandhi addresses the philosophico-religious question: Who am I? In Gandhi's opinion, being myself amounts to being a human being. He asks whether there are distinctive phenomenal experiences that reveal the nature of the concept, 'I' or 'human soul'. Hence the question: What is it like to be a human being? Gandhi has a straightforward answer to this question: There is nothing that it is like to be a human being. For him this is a pseudo-question. The aim of this paper is to challenge this view of Gandhi. I shall argue that this question is a meaningful one, and it is possible to answer it in the affirmative.

Before proceeding to demonstrate that a phenomenology of the self is a possibility, I shall briefly consider, in the first section, why Gandhi thinks the question to be a meaningless one. Despite Gandhi's negative answer to the question, he says that human beings are self-conscious. So it becomes imperative to see how this is possible. I shall discuss Gandhi's model of self-awareness and bring out its inadequacies in the second section. I shall argue, in the third section, that there are two different senses in which the question 'What is it like to be a human being?' can be understood. Gandhi tacitly grants that there is something it is like to

be a human being in these two senses of the expression 'what it is like to be'. In the course of this discussion, I shall develop an alternative to Gandhi's model of self-consciousness, and argue that there is a third sense in which the expression can legitimately be used. I shall conclude the paper in the fourth section by showing that self-awareness is not just a mode of being as Gandhi conceives it, but is a mode of knowing as well.

1. A PSEUDO-QUESTION

In Gandhi's opinion, to be meaningful, the questions of the form 'What is it like to be an x' must fulfil two conditions (p. 12): (1) x must be an experiencer. (2) Whatever is x should not *only* and *merely* be an x. The condition (1) stipulates that there must be conscious experiences on the part of x about which the question is raised. Obviously, a human being has phenomenal experiences. Therefore, the first condition is satisfied. The condition (2) springs from Gandhi's epistemological commitments. He believes that knowledge arises by a process of comparing and contrasting of one's inward experiences. Therefore, to answer the question 'What is it like to be a human being?' we must be able to find out distinctively human experiences and compare and contrast them with our other experiences that are non-human. But none of our experiences are non-human experiences. Each of our experiences, by virtue of being our experiences, is a human experience. That is, *qua* human experiences, each of them is logically on par with our other experiences. 'So we cannot call to mind some of our experiences, to the exclusion of others, and say "*That* is what it is like to be a human being"' (p. 15, italics Gandhi's). In addition, we can not compare and contrast our experiences with non-human experiences such as feline or canine experiences and find out what is distinctively human about our experiences, because feline or canine experiences are not inwardly accessible to us. As a result, 'there is no inward contrast available to us between a mode of being which is "our" mode of being and a mode of being which is not our mode of being' (p. 16). So the question, 'What is it like to be a human being?' can only be answered by a being who can also become various other things in addition to being human. But a human being is only and merely a human being. That is, as the condition (2) is flouted, the question is non-significant and cannot be answered.

However, we tend to think intuitively that the question 'What is it like to be a human being?' is a meaningful one. If it is a pseudo-question, this intuition has to be explained away. In Gandhi's opinion, the intuition results from a formal similarity, which this question shares with a set of meaningful questions. Questions such as 'What is it like to be a pilot?', 'What is it like to be a sick man?' or 'What is it like to be an old man?' are not nonsensical questions for two reasons. First, there are experiences associated with being a pilot or being a sick man. Second, a pilot, for instance, is not only and merely a pilot. He can perform other roles in life, such as being a cyclist, being mountaineer, being a swimmer etc. He has distinct experiences corresponding to each of these roles he performs. He can compare and contrast his experience of being a pilot with his other experiences and identify which of his experiences are, in an illuminating way, tied up with his being a pilot. Therefore, the question 'What is it like to be a pilot?' is a meaningful question. But this is not true of the question, 'What is it like to be a human being?'

Though the question of what it is like to be a human being cannot be answered, Gandhi does not maintain scepticism regarding the existence of self. He does grant the reality of self. His point is that the knowledge of self, or the notion of being myself, is not attained through normal epistemic activities—the activities by which we come to know the external world. For me to have knowledge of the external world, phenomenal experiences must mediate. But the notion of self is not attained by means of a process, which involves inward experiences. In other words, I do not cognize my self. If so, how do I come to grasp the nature of the concept 'I'? In Gandhi's opinion, the nature of 'I' is revealed not through inward experiences but through philosophical analysis.

2. A MODEL OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

It is a fact that I am a self-conscious being—a fact that cannot be denied. Gandhi thinks that this fact somehow generates the illusion that I know what it is like to be myself through my inward experience (Cf. pp. 19–20). However, a closer look at Gandhi's theory of self-consciousness suggests that it is not exactly the fact of self-consciousness that is responsible for this illusion. The problem, rather, lies with the model of self-consciousness generally taken to be at work. Many philosophers view self-consciousness to be the result of an exercise in introspection. I come to know

myself or intimately grasp myself in an act of looking into myself or scanning the content of my mind. I am said to be self-conscious if I become aware of myself in this way. Gandhi, however, does not consider this to be a viable model of self-consciousness: 'The conviction that I am myself is not gained by attention or introspection ...' (p. 29). Gandhi does not deny the process of introspection. Through introspection we come across sensations or ideas. However, one cannot become aware of oneself through introspection for two reasons. First, self is not a *thing* that can produce the experience of self. So there is no idea or sensation of self. And self in itself does not become part of the content of one's mind. So introspection does not reveal what it is like to be a self, and one fails to identify self through introspection. Second, if I were to find myself introspectively, that would lead to infinite regress, because my self that finds itself through introspection must itself be discovered through introspection and so on and so on.

Since self-awareness is not accounted for by the introspective model, Gandhi provides an alternative model. Gandhi does it by specifying how one becomes aware of oneself in day to day life: I become aware of myself when another person *addresses* me. I become aware of myself when I become an audience: 'When I am addressed by somebody, a speaker, I am *uniquely picked out, I am non-referentially identified, I am called forth* ...' (p. 25, italics Gandhi's). That is, 'I' in my purity is identified, and as a result, I come forth or become self-conscious. In other words, the concept 'I' or being self-conscious is the result of my being considered as 'you', an audience.

In this model, to become self-conscious I must be uniquely picked out. The meaning of being 'uniquely picked out' or 'non-referentially identified' can perhaps be better elucidated with reference to the opposite situation, the situation in which I address you. When I address you, I consider you simply as being yourself, as a unique bare particular. When I address you, I do not refer to you, I just *mean* you. Similarly, when you address me, you just mean me without identifying me referentially or under any description. You consider me as a unique bare particular and not as a certain sort of being. When I am addressed, an *appeal* is made to me and I come forth. Therefore, according to Gandhi, 'the concepts of "I", "me", have their seat in the experience of being vocatively picked out' (p. 27).

There is, however, a problem. True, I become aware of myself when another person addresses me. But that is not the whole story. And Gandhi

admits that I become aware of myself. I become aware that I am, even when I am not actually addressed by another. Gandhi's view is that if I become self-conscious without actually being addressed by another, then such self-consciousness must be understood as occurring in soliloquy. But 'soliloquy' here is not used in the ordinary sense of the term, i.e., my talking to myself. The problem with the ordinary way of understanding soliloquy, according to Gandhi, is that it leads to infinite regress. For to talk to oneself one has to address oneself. 'But to address oneself one would have to invite oneself to ... attend to oneself. This is impossible' (p. 31, see also p. 33). Gandhi tries to overcome the regress problem by developing an alternative conception of soliloquy. He does this by providing a role for imagination within the 'address model' of self-consciousness. That is, when I become aware of myself in the physical absence of the other, I imaginatively create an 'other' and conceive the other as addressing me. Thus '[t]he conviction that I am myself ... is understood only in the context of an act of imaginative communication' (p. 29). This imaginative recreation of 'the experience of being regarded as a soul' is the basis of my conviction of self-identity that is the core of self-consciousness (p. 5). The conviction of self-identity is the same as the thought that I am: 'The conviction of self-identity is the thinking of the thought "I", it is the thinking of the thought that I am myself, or, quite simply, that I am' (p. 28).

This conviction of self-identity is not a function of my memory. Despite severe memory loss, I may ask the question, 'Who am I?' The very question presupposes the conviction of self-identity, which is not reducible to the knowledge that one is so and so. The conviction, rather, is the product of imagination (pp. 127–8). That is, I imagine that you take an audience stance towards me. Therefore, asking the question, 'Who am I?' according to Gandhi, is to imagine that somebody is asking the question, 'Who are you?' (pp. 31–2). This imaginary 'you' does not have to be an embodied addresser (p. 38).

We have noted that self-consciousness is the same as thinking the thought 'I'. Thinking the thought 'I' is an act of imagination: I imagine that I am being addressed. When I address you, I consider you simply as being yourself, as a 'unique but bare particular' or a soul.[2] When I address you, I do not refer to you, I just mean you. Similarly, in self-consciousness, I imagine that I am being regarded as being my self, a unique bare particular. I imagine that I am non-descriptively, non-predicatively identified. That is to say, I am not identified as a particular sort of being. To grasp the structure of the act of imagination which is calling oneself 'I' or 'I, myself' is to 'grasp the attributelessness of the mode in which I—imaginatively—posit myself as an object of another's act of addressing' (p. 32). In self-consciousness, or in thinking the thought 'I', I do not name an entity that I find in introspection. Self-consciousness is not an act of introspection. Nor is my self an entity which can be referred to by a name. If self were an entity and 'I' were the name of that entity, naming that entity 'I' would lead to infinite regress. Gandhi says: 'If "I" were, *per impossibile*, to be the name of anything, it would have to be the name of the person who was naming himself—but that would have to be the name of the person who is naming the person ... who is naming himself' (p. 24). Hence, 'I' that occurs in thinking the thought 'I' is not a name (p. 24).

In Gandhi's opinion, in an actual situation of being addressed, the thought 'I am called' arises in me. On the other hand, in an imaginative situation, one's apprehension of oneself is a truncated experience in the sense that the thought 'I' is an incomplete version of the thought that *I am called*. This truncated experience symbolized by the expression 'I' may give the illusion of a self, existing in isolation from other actual or possible selves (p. 29). The thought 'I' is always the thought that I am called by an imagined (or actual) 'you'. So, for Gandhi, 'The thought "I am called" and the thought "you" are full experiences of the soul' (p. 30). In a sense we may say that in the thought 'you' 'I' is present, and similarly, in the thought 'I' 'you' is present. The thought that I am myself cannot be separated from the act of imagining that I am being addressed (Cf. p. 29). It is inseparable from thinking the thought symbolized by the expression 'I', 'me', etc. Self-consciousness is a *sine qua non* for reflective thinking. It is produced by an act of imagination. Thus, for Gandhi, the act of imagination generates 'the possibility of reflective thought' (p. 29) and hence self-consciousness.

Inadequacies of the Model

We have noted that on Gandhi's model I become self-conscious in either of the two ways: First, I become self-conscious or aware of myself when you address me. Second, I become self-conscious when I imagine that you address me. In what follows I shall point out a few difficulties inherent in the model. I shall examine, first of all, how Gandhi's model fares *vis-à-vis* introspectionism. I shall argue that Gandhi's model is not free

from infinite regress that haunts the introspective model. When you address me, I am uniquely picked out and I come forth. In such circumstances, I realize my uniqueness. So Gandhi says that I do not acknowledge my own uniqueness. Rather my uniqueness is being acknowledged and as a result, I realize my own uniqueness. On the other hand, if I were to acknowledge my own uniqueness, then that would lead to infinite regress. Gandhi says, 'I cannot acknowledge my own uniqueness. For in order to do that I shall have to acknowledge the uniqueness of myself acknowledging the uniqueness of myself ... Infinite regress here' (p. 27). But does Gandhi's introduction of one's being imaginatively addressed resolve the problem of infinite regress? It does not seem so because in this case too, I will have to identify myself. What I do in imagination is that I address myself through 'you'. Unfortunately, introduction of an imaginary 'you' does not help me overcome the problem of infinite regress. Gandhi says that I *imaginatively* create another, 'you', and imagine this imaginary 'you' addresses me. Consequently, *I* become aware of *myself*. But whether I am addressed by an actual or imaginary 'you', *I* will have to realize *my own* uniqueness, *I* will have to identify *myself*, *I* will have to become aware of *myself*. The moment we grant any sort of dichotomy within the self, infinite regress is bound to happen. That is, if the division of self into experiencing self and experienced self, naming self and named self, addressing self and addressed self, or acknowledging self and acknowledged self leads to infinite regress, so is the case with division of self into uniqueness-realizing self and uniqueness-*realized* self. In other words, for me to realize my own uniqueness when addressed, *I* shall have to realize *uniqueness of myself* whose uniqueness will have to be realized by *myself* and so *ad infinitum*. In this respect Gandhi's model does not seem to have any advantage over the introspective model of self-consciousness.

My next objection against Gandhi's model is that it does not explain self-consciousness. Whatever plausibility this model seems to exhibit springs from the fact that *self-consciousness is somehow assumed*. Take the situation of my being actually addressed. If you address me by my name and if I respond, it would mean that I am already aware of *myself* as well as *my* name. Without this self-awareness I would not be able to respond to your call. Further, to identify my own name I should have minimal self-consciousness. This presupposition of self-consciousness appears in various ways. In Gandhi's opinion, I become aware of myself when you address me because the thought 'you address me' is generated

in me. But such thoughts can occur only to a being that is already self-conscious or is convinced of its self-identity. The conviction of self-identity, for Gandhi, is 'nothing but sense of being uniquely picked out, of being called forth ...' (p. 27). But how could the *sense* of being uniquely picked out occur to a person if the person does not already have the conviction of self-identity? The same is true of the situation where I imagine that you address *me* and as a result, I come forth or become self-conscious. To posit myself as the object of addressing by an imagined other would presuppose my having a sense of myself who could stand in the relation of being addressed to the imagined other. The notion of self-identity required in relating myself to the imagined other would, undoubtedly, be much stronger than what is presupposed in my being actually addressed.

There are other problems associated with Gandhi's model of self-consciousness. For me to be self-conscious, I imaginatively respond to an imaginative act of addressing. Therefore, I must exit prior to my imaginative responding as the subject of the imaginative act. If I come forth or become self-conscious only when I respond to a call, would the 'I' that imagines that you address me be a self-conscious 'I'? If this 'I' is self-conscious, then for it to become self-conscious, it has to imaginatively respond to an imaginative call and so on *ad infinitum*. On the other hand, if the 'I' which imagines is not self-conscious, then what is this 'I'? Could it be a presupposition? If this is a pre-supposition, then what is it the pre-supposition of? Pre-suppositions are invoked when something given is to be accounted for. The given in this case is the act of imagination. Can this act be attributed to a pre-supposed 'I'? It does not seem to be the case, for if imagination is an act, then the agent of this act would be aware of his act of imagination. This awareness would not be possible without the self-consciousness of 'I'. If so, 'I' can not be a pre-supposition. A pre-supposed 'I' would be an unconscious 'I' but an unconscious 'I' would be a meaningless notion, as an 'I' which is not self-conscious is no 'I' at all.

We have noted that, for Gandhi, one's apprehension of oneself in the act of imaginary addressing is a truncated experience. But Gandhi owes us an explanation here. Why and how does my apprehension of my self get truncated? Gandhi's model does not provide an answer. Without an explanation, his theory of self-consciousness does not fare well.

3. WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE A HUMAN BEING

In the light of the foregoing discussion of Gandhi's model of self-consciousness, let me re-examine Gandhi's question. My goal here is to argue that, given his framework, Gandhi is bound to accept that there *is* something it is like to be a human being. As already seen, questions of the form 'What is it like to be an x?' presuppose that there are experiences on the part of x or that x is an experiencer. Depending upon how we construe the term 'experiencer' the question can be understood in two distinct senses. In the first sense, 'experiencer' may be one whose mental states have qualitative features, raw feels or what are today called 'qualia'. That is, as a result of an encounter with an object in the external world, say a red flower, if one comes to have the states such as being appeared-red-to, being smelt-sweet-to, being felt-smooth-to, etc., one is said to be an experiencer.

It can be seen that even in Gandhi's model, in arriving at the conviction of self-identity, one has to undergo experiences akin to these. In order to see this, let us remind ourselves of what Gandhi's conception of soul is and then try to find out the 'experiences' that lead one to the conception that one is oneself a soul. Since one arrives at the concept of 'I' or the conviction of self-identity in acts of addressing, Gandhi explicates the notion of soul in terms of the acts of addressing. The idea of soul, for him, is '*the idea of that as which we imaginatively see one another in acts of addressing one another*' (p. 4, emphasis Gandhi's). To be a soul, therefore, is to be the object of an act of addressing (p. 37). One cannot see oneself as a soul; one can only see oneself being *regarded* as a soul, either actually or imaginatively, in the acts of addressing (p. 33). When a person is addressed, he is uniquely picked out. Hence to be a soul is to be uniquely picked out in the acts of addressing. Since the person addressed is being minimally cared for, to be a soul is to be 'the object of a minimally caring attitude' (p. 37).

It can now be seen that there is something it is like to be a soul or a human being. What it is like to be a human being is to have the experience of being the object of an actual or imagined act of addressing. As one is being addressed and uniquely picked out, one becomes aware of one's own uniqueness. Thus in being addressed, 'one experiences the uniqueness of oneself', (p. 27) gets the 'feeling' of 'being a special creature' (p. 38) and is 'undergoing the experience of being minimally cared for' (p. 37). To have the experience of being uniquely picked out is to have the experience of being regarded as a soul, a unique bare particular. The idea of the experience of being regarded as soul seems to be lurking in Gandhi. For instance, he says: 'I suffer the profound *experience* of being regarded, not as a certain sort of creature, but as myself, a soul, a unique but bare particular; not a material or immaterial being, but, quite simply, as myself' (p. 5, emphasis added). Thus it is in having this experience of being regarded as a soul that one knows *what it is like* to be a human being. And we may say that in being regarded as a soul one becomes *conscious* of oneself being oneself. Nevertheless, Gandhi refuses to accept this. In his opinion, I cannot become 'conscious of myself as being myself.' My question, in this regard, is the following: When I am actually or imaginatively addressed, do I not become conscious of myself as a soul, as an addressee or as someone towards whom an audience stance is adopted? If I am nothing but a soul, a unique bare particular, then I become aware of myself as myself in the acts of addressing. Therefore, to have the experience of being regarded as a soul is what it is like to be a human soul.

In the second sense of the term, 'experiencer' is synonymous with the term 'knower'. One is said to have experience, when one possesses knowledge. Upon having an experiential encounter with a flower in the world, I come to know that there is something, which is red, fragrant and smooth to touch, etc. Empiricists believe that one comes to propositional knowledge of this sort as a result of experiences in the first sense. In Gandhi's model, it seems that the knowledge that I am occurs to me in a similar way. He admits that the 'experience of being vocatively picked out ... is at the root of the conviction of self-identity' (p. 38). Because of the experience of being uniquely picked out, 'one becomes charged with the conviction of one's uniqueness' (p. 27). True, the conviction of self-identity is not a sensation that is experienced. Nor is it an emotion that is suffered (Cf. p. 28). Yet it is through experiences of being uniquely picked out that one reaches the conviction of one's uniqueness or self-identity. In other words, the experience of being uniquely picked out gives rise to the knowledge of self-identity. But Gandhi resists the idea that self-consciousness is a mode of knowing. Despite this resistance Gandhi sometimes views 'self-consciousness' synonymous with some sort of 'inward knowledge'—knowledge which is holistic in nature (p. 18). So it does not seem that Gandhi denies self-knowledge in the strict sense. There is indeed self-

knowledge. When I become the object of the act of addressing, I know that *I* am being addressed. I know myself to be a unique being, to be myself. But this knowledge, for Gandhi, is nothing other than *awareness* of myself as myself, or being myself. Perhaps the reason why he thinks self-consciousness is not a mode of knowing is that my knowledge or awareness of my self is not an experience of an object or an entity called 'self'. Self-awareness does not amount to one's knowledge or ignorance of facts about oneself. What this would mean is that since being aware of oneself is not an intentional or representational state, it is not a state of knowledge. Nonetheless one is aware of oneself, one is aware that one *is*, and there is a good sense in which self-consciousness can be regarded as self-knowledge. If so, Gandhi is under an obligation to accept that there *is* something it is like to be a human being. What it is like to be a human being is to have the conviction of self-identity, to have the knowledge that one *is*.

An Alternative to Gandhi's Model of Self-consciousness

In section two, we have taken note of a few problems in Gandhi's model of self-consciousness. The model fails to avoid the trap of infinite regress. If at all this model seems to have any semblance of plausibility, that is because it presupposes self-consciousness. In this respect the role assigned to imagination takes us no further. The theory seems to be a narrow one. Self-consciousness can neither be explained nor defined just in terms of actual or imaginative addressing alone. All these force one to look for an alternative. The alternative I suggest below specifies the third sense in which the expression 'what it is like to be a human being' is significant.

When does one become self-conscious? An obvious answer to this question is that when one engages oneself in some act or other. Such acts may be one's thought acts, speech acts or other intentional acts involving one's body. All of them can make one self-conscious. My being self-conscious in an actual or imaginary situation of being addressed is just an instance of this general truth. When a person is addressed, it might seem that one just passively suffers an experience, the experience of being vocatively picked out. But to the extent I am self-conscious, I engage in an act—the thought act that you address *me*. Similarly when I address you, the thought/speech act '*I* address you' occurs. In both cases the I-thought is generated and I become self-conscious. That is to say, Gandhi's address-response model of self-consciousness is a special case of my being rendered self-conscious in my speech acts or thought acts.

Having said this, I have not specified why my acts should make me self-aware. I shall clarify my point taking up the case of thought acts. Each occurrent thought that I have has an obvious intentional content. It is about something or is directed to an object of my thought. At the same time I am aware of the occurrence of my thoughts. That is to say, in addition to *intentionality*, my thoughts have another important feature, viz. each of them has a unique capacity to reveal itself. This feature of thought-acts I shall call 'reflexivity'. The term is not understood here in relational terms. To be more specific, reflexivity should not be construed as anything akin to the grammatical category of relation exhibited by a sentence whose subject term and object terms are co-referential as in the statement 'John loves himself'. In such cases, there is indeed a conceptual dichotomy between subject and object though they refer to the same thing. By reflexivity, on the other hand, I mean the capacity of each thought act to reveal. Just as light does not require any external factors to illuminate it, so also the occurrence of a thought is self-illuminating. That is, each of my conscious thoughts is a reflexive thought and it is the very nature of conscious thinking that it is reflexive. The reflexivity or self-illuminating aspect of the thoughts, in my opinion, is generally characterized as subjectivity. On this account, a thought or experience is subjective only if it is reflexively accessible. And it is this self-illuminating aspect of my thought, which is symbolized by the expression 'I'. To put it differently, the feature of reflexivity of each of the thoughts constitutes what we call 'I'. If thoughts cease to have reflexivity 'I' cease to be.

Gandhi's expression, 'the thinking of the thought symbolized by the expression "I"' seems to be a misnomer. A thought must be intentional, which means it must be directed towards something other than itself. If the thought 'I' is non-referential, non-descriptive and non-predicative, it cannot be a thought at all in the strict sense. Therefore, the so called I-thought should be reconstructed as not the thought proper, but the reflexivity that invariably accompanies any instance of occurrent thought. Any thought act is inevitably self-illuminating. This is not to say that the self has an independent existence from thought acts and the function of thought acts is to reveal the self-substance existing prior to the thought acts. In other words, the idea of the self is none other than the idea of reflexivity.

In my opinion, the construal of the notion of self as a sort of reflexivity accompanying my thoughts and acts is compatible with Gandhi's overall scheme. One consequence of the dependence of reflexivity or subjectivity on occurrent thoughts is that if the thought disappears, reflexivity too disappears. That Gandhi is committed to such a view is evident from his observation:

> ... if I am dying, slipping into what I would, without intelligibility, be constrained to take to be irreversible unconsciousness, the notion of *myself* or the notion of *I*, would *begin to cease* to be available to me. There would be a growing incapacity to think the thought 'I'—or any other thoughts, such as the thoughts 'you' or 'he' (p. 40, emphasis Gandhi's).

Similarly, Gandhi's 'non-substantival' view of the self may be better understood as reflexivity accompanying each thought. This reflexivity is not 'a *something* but not a *nothing* either' (p. 5). It is not a nothing as it is an undeniable facet of our very being.

The reflexivity of thoughts explains the sense of belongingness or ownness that accompanies them. One does not find any free-floating thoughts or experiences. Each experience belongs to somebody, an 'I'. The moment an experience is given, it is a '*my* experience'. In other words, notion of self or 'I' accompanies each of my experiences. This again is a fact of our being which is somehow accessible to us. In a way, this reflexivity and the sense of ownness or belongingness is one and the same.

The reflexivity or the sense of ownership of one's thought, I think can be characterized as the feature that demonstrates that there is something it is like to be a human being. Because of the reflexive feature of my acts and experiences I know what it is to be a human being. A human being is an experiencer as well as an agent. The experiences, thoughts, and acts strike as *mine* precisely because of their intrinsically self-illuminating or 'I-revealing' feature. This 'I-revealing' feature or sense of ownership of thoughts and experiences is *like* some thing. Since this feature constitutes the 'I-ness', it is something *for* me.

4. MODE OF BEING AND MODE OF KNOWING

Time and again Gandhi emphasizes that I do not have an intimate understanding of myself in self-consciousness. The reason is that self-consciousness is not a mode of knowing, nor a mode of understanding. For each mode of knowing there must be certain phenomenal experiences corresponding to them. But there are no experiences corresponding to the self. Therefore, self-consciousness is not a mode of knowing. But self-consciousness is an undeniable fact of our life. And Gandhi views it as a mode of being. The most important feature of this mode of being is that it is 'unitive' or 'holistic' and not 'fragmentary'. 'If self-consciousness were fragmentary it would be *consciousness* circumscribed by the range of its objects, and not the unitive mode of being that it is' (p. 18). Gandhi considers scientific knowledge to be fragmentary in the sense that scientific knowledge is nothing other than the various modifications of consciousness by various physical objects. So, knowing basically is the process of modification of consciousness. In self-consciousness, on the other hand, there is no modification of consciousness. Therefore, self-conscious is not a mode of knowing. As there is no modification to self-consciousness, it is considered to be holistic in character.

My argument so far has been that self-consciousness should be understood in terms of reflexivity—the self-illuminating character of thought or experience. Thus understood, self-consciousness is as much a mode of knowing as it is mode of being. Objective modification of consciousness is a *sine qua non* of scientific or empirical knowledge; but it is not a condition of any knowledge whatsoever. Self-consciousness is that unique knowledge which involves no modification of consciousness. One's own being or oneself cannot be an *object* to play the role of a modifier of consciousness. One's own being or self is never objectively presented to consciousness, for self and consciousness are one and the same. The self-knowledge is nothing other than, to use Gandhi's phrase, the 'conviction of being-one, and of being oneself' (p. 23). The self-knowledge, the knowledge that one is oneself or that one *is*, is *subjectively* accessed in the reflexive mode of consciousness.

We may agree with Gandhi that self-consciousness is a mode of being. But we must note that it is not just any mode of being. This is not an ordinary mode of being like being a table, being a tree, etc. It is a very peculiar mode of being. Similarly, when I say that self-consciousness is a mode of knowing, I do not mean that it is an ordinary mode of knowing like knowing that grass is green or that snow is white. Rather it is a peculiarly unique way of knowing. There is nothing surprising about it given the fact that the phenomenon known is also of a special nature. In

short, it is the very nature of this phenomenon that it is *both* a mode of being *and* a mode of knowing: it is the mode of knowing oneself. However, it must be noted that this knowledge is not knowledge about the self, but knowledge that the self *is*.

Self is revealed in each of my experiences and is at the same time a pre-supposition of my experiences. It is both transcendent and immanent. It provides both formal and material unity for my experience. In short, in self-consciousness, both ontology and epistemology merge; both existence and essence coalesce. The talk of a mode of being makes no sense unless certain essential properties are attributed to the being. So self-consciousness reveals not only *that* one is but also *what* one is. This knowledge resulting from the self-revealing characteristics of one's experiences may rightly be called what it is like to be a human being. Gandhi is not justified in denying this rather self-evident aspect of human existence.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Ramchandra Gandhi, *The Availability of Religious Ideas* (London: Macmillan, 1976). All page numbers within the text refer to this work.
2. Gandhi's thesis that soul is a unique bare particular seems to be an odd one. A unique bare particular is not something which I come across in my day to day life, but rather a metaphysical assumption of a certain sort. In addressing you, I do not consider you just as a unique bare particular but something more than that. My very act of addressing is not compatible with the assumption that you are a unique bare particular. For me you are of course unique—but not a *bare* particular—you are a unique particular of a certain sort. In addressing you, in having conversational relationship with you, I consider you a being who can respond to my act of addressing—a unique particular who can be in conversational relationship with me. In other words, in order to have

communicative relationship with you, I must consider that you are a communicative being like me. Just as 'I come forth as myself' (p. 5) in response to a call, I believe that you too would come forth as yourself in response to my call. This is the reason why I do not address any inanimate objects. Even if I address such an object, I imaginatively at least consider it a communicative being or to use a current terminology, I take an 'intentional stance' towards such an object. So in addressing you I identify you as a unique *communicative* being not as unique bare particular. Similarly when you address me, I undergo the experience of being a unique communicative being or a person.

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Agenda for Research

Kant's discussion of the categories and their relation to the table of judgement needs to be closely looked at once again as such a study will reveal unbelievable gaps or even downright mistakes in our understanding of the nature of categories in Kant's system.

Attention is specially drawn to the category of 'limitation' which is a correlate of the 'infinite' judgement under the heading of *Quality* and the category of 'reciprocity' which is a correlate of the disjunctive judgement in Kant.

The whole discussion from page 104 to page 119 in Norman Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, should be seen in this connection.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Aristotle in his book *De Interpretatione** has discussed, amongst other things, the issue of 'truth' and 'falsity' and argued that these predicates can only be applied to expressions where there is a definite assertion or denial of something indicated by the verbs 'is' and 'is not'. The discussion anticipates Tarski's well-known contention that 'truth' or 'falsity' can only be predicated of sentences and not of things. The following, for example, tries to express this view in as clear a manner as one would like it to be:

> Thus names and verbs by themselves—for instance 'man' or 'white' when nothing further is added—are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false. A sign of this is that even 'goat-stag' signifies something but not, as yet, anything true or false—unless 'is' or 'is not' is added (either simply or with reference to time).

DAYA KRISHNA

**De Interpretatione*: J.L. Ackrill. 'The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, The Revised Oxford Translation'. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series LXXI. 2., Princeton University Press, p. 25.

Notes and Queries

(1) Do Jains accept *anekāntikatā* in the field of *ācāra* as they do in respect of knowledge and reality? In case they do not, does the term *samyaka* connote something radically different in the context of *Caritra* than it does in the case of *Darśana* and *Jñāna* in the well-known *sūtra* on the subject in Umaswati's *Tattvārtha Sūtra*?

§4. किं तर्हि? तत् त्रितयं समुदितमित्याह—
सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः ।।१।।

What is the difference between Darśana and Jñāna in the above *sūtra*?

DAYA KRISHNA

(2) I would like to know if any research has been done on the concept of and thinking behind भाव (भवति इति भावः।), when it is used in conjunction with other words such as रसभाव, षड्जपञ्चमभाव, स्वभाव, etc. The implication of भाव as अस्तित्व (being or becoming) and अवस्था, स्थिति (state), as distinct from its use as a मनोवृतिविकार (emotion or feeling), or इच्छा [intention (whether acted upon or not)], is of considerable significance to musical thought.

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PRABHAKAR PHATAK

Review Article

Doing Advaita—Malkanian Way

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The book* under review is a commendable engagement to rediscover the philosophy of a contemporary thinker who worked towards re-interpreting Indian philosophy through a new model. Since Malkani and his writings are not well known to the academia in philosophy, this book fills a long felt need to present his scattered thoughts in a single volume. The insightful Introduction by the editor, Sharad Deshpande, brings out the unique perspective of Malkani as a philosopher.

I

The Introduction consists of the Editor's exploration into Malkani's contribution to Indian philosophy in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular. In order to understand the spirit of Malkani's thinking, it is important to know the background that is revealed by the author himself. Unlike the Vedāntic expositions based on texts, Malkani admits that his writings are neither text-based nor treated from an orientalist's pespective. He claims to have approached the Vedānta as a free and independent thinker with a desire to modernize its format, which the modern man can appreciate and understand as a living system. He had little knowledge of Sanskrit and less acquaintance with śāstras. Though he studied the *Brahma-sūtra* under a Pundit, he never affiliated his thinking with any *prasthāna* or some author of repute. He claims to have understood the system as a true seeker, and his views are based on his own interpretation that cannot be rejected as not genuine.

It is against this background that the present volume has been designed by selecting thirty-four essays authored by Malkani dividing them into

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SHARAD DESHPANDE: *The Philosophy of G.R. Malkani*, published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1997, pp. xxxiv + 433, Rs 375.

four well-designed sections. The first section, 'Logic and Epistemology', has seven essays on topics like knowledge, its validity and invalidity, and śruti as revelation. In the essay 'Intellect and Intuition', Malkani analyzes these two concepts and poses two questions to clarify the idea. The questions are: 1. Is intuition a distinct mode of knowledge as compared to thought? 2. Is there an intuition of ultimate reality? He formulates a definition of intuition as 'an immediate non-relational mode of knowledge which comes after the perception of relations.' It means that the knowledge which involves the distinction of the subject and object is not intuitive knowledge. If intuitive knowledge has content there will have to be distinction of the subject and the object within it, and we can no longer speak of this as non-relational. As per the definition given above, intuition cannot be spoken of as a specific mode of knowledge without content. But, how can we accept it? This objection can, however, be met if we say that the intuition itself is the reality, and hence it knows nothing apart from itself. In this sense, it is ever realized and is the ground of all knowledge. To the second question, Malkani replies that if there is an intuition of ultimate reality, that reality cannot be distinct from the intuition of it. An intuition that we do not have at present can be different from the intuitions that we do have, and if it has content, it cannot be non-relational, as it would involve subject-object distinction. Hence there cannot be any intuition of the ultimate reality, if it is an intuition which we did not have. The essay tries to analyze the state of Advaitin's idea of impartite mode (*akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti*) as against the modal knowledge (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*) of Viśiṣṭādvaitin. The analytical interpretation which Malkani gives is quite interesting. Without engaging in the dialectics of either school, he concludes that 'either the intuitiveness of our nature is itself the ultimate reality, and there is no need to try to know it in any other way than that in which it is already known to itself, or there is no other ultimate reality that can be intuited in the aforesaid manner' (p. 8).

The second essay 'The Self in Relation to Knowledge' deals with the same theme from a different angle. It addresses two questions: 1. Is the self a real substance needed to account for knowledge, or a formal unity only? 2. Is knowledge identical with the self or distinct from it? If it is the latter, is it a quality of the self? As to the first question, Malkani proves that the self is a substance as it is existent in the presence as well as the absence of the objects as in the case of deep-sleep. He points out that knowledge, not being objective, needs a spiritual substance and that is the

self. The self alone knows, and the reality of knowledge implies the reality and substantiveness of the self. For the second question, he points out that knowledge constitutes the essential intelligence of the self. The apparent distinctiveness of knowledge from the self that knows is false and is only relative to the objects that are known. In the third essay, Malkani distinguishes the philosophical investigations from scientific investigation. Unlike a scientific question, the answer to a philosophical question is contained within it; it is resolved from within as the philosophical process of thinking is based upon a critique of the very empirical statements. The problem arises because we confuse reality with certain empirical characteristics, which do not belong to it.

II

The next essay entitled, 'Philosophical Truth' is the general presidential address delivered at the IPC session at Patna in 1949. It deals with the content and method of Indian philosophy. Here he provides useful suggestions for doing philosophy in a more meaningful manner. He makes a candid confession as to how philosophers conceal their ignorance in their conceit and shows that there is scope for presenting the subtle philosophical thinking in simple language without clothing it in jargon or making verbose statements. Malkani holds that philosophical questions have a romantic and personal touch of their own, and they can be made more interesting. One more notion he attacks is the modern day thinking that Indian philosophy is stagnant, unprogressive and tinged with religion. Malkani looks at the format of the religion that tackles most of the important philosophical problems in the Indian context. In this sense, Indian philosophy is not only a view of life but also a way of life. To Malkani, a philosophy which vacillates between alternative views and which regards ultimate truth as unattainable is no philosophy whatsoever. Rather, it is an intellectual pedantry having no practical value at all.

Next he addresses the oft-stated objection that Indian philosophy suffers from theological bias and servility to the world of scriptures which Western philosophy is free from. Malkani says that as regards Indian philosophy, the question of stagnancy or progression does not arise at all. It should be enough if we search within it for the key to the highest form of living truth. In its search for timeless truth, philosophy also aims at providing guidance in transcending problems concurrent in that age. A

philosopher may not address an immediate problem for which he is not equipped, but he can show the way to a wholesome life, transcending the smaller problems that a society may encounter. Malkani holds the view that the fundamental philosophical questions and answers remain the same though they are grafted with modern nomenclature to suit different ages. Philosophy is the perception of the common in an uncommon way, an insight into a new set up without changing the existing set up. It addresses the truth that is absolute as there cannot be something which is comparatively true or half true. Dealing with the idea of truth proposed by logical positivists, Malkani says that the truth proposed by them would lead to solipsism and that the whole exercise is just a lingual formalism. If there is nothing non-verbal that may be known, then language has no meaning. There is thus a reality beyond the realm of word and higher than the word that uses the word as an instrument. It may be spoken of, but it cannot be literally meant by any word. In the context of knowledge, we might say that the reference beyond the word is only substantiated by knowledge. This knowledge must be a non-verbal awareness since word cannot itself be the last word. He also shows the inadequacy of the rationalistic explanation evolved by Hegel.

The objective of philosophy is to evaluate and resolve the goal or goals it proposes. In this sense, the function of reason in philosophy is analytic and constructive. Malkani shows that truth has pre-eminence in any philosophical system, and in Hindu systems it is understood as knowledge, possessing the efficacy to redeem one from ignorance. That is the reason why so much importance is given to metaphysics to the complete exclusion of ethics (p. 43). He contends that truth is not an extraneous characteristic of knowledge, so that one piece of knowledge needs to be confirmed by another. It is self-validating (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*). It is the pure realm of thinking or reflection, *jñānam brahma.* In subjective emotions and objective perceptions there is possibility of distortion; hence in order to establish a case of knowledge free from illusion, we have to do away with these types of perceptions. Malkani asserts that the theories of truth given by Western philosophers are based upon the idea that we know truth when we know something empirically. He, however, maintains that there cannot be any theory of truth unless we know what truth is. It is the result of discrimination, self-criticism and negation. The ordinary 'I' is the beginning of this process of search that would culminate in the transcendental 'I' understood as truth and knowledge.

The essay on 'Philosophical Truth' is the quintessence of the philosophy of Malkani which intends to highlight that Advaita is not *a philosophy*, but *the philosophy* which has the features superior to any philosophical thinking in the world. The scope for disagreements from his views can be many, but that does not affect his erudition in the least. Most of the other essays in this book, I must say, deal with the ideas we already find in this essay. Here the style of Malkani is unique as he does not quote texts nor use metaphorical expressions, but brings out the profound truth of Vedānta in simple and clear terms.

III

The subsequent essay, 'Validity and Invalidity in Knowledge', deals with the *prāmāṇyavāda* in Indian Philosophy, especially in Vedānta. In the West, we have theories of truth, but in India, we deal with this in a different way examining whether validity or invalidity is internal to knowledge or external to it. There is nothing new in this essay as in traditional Vedānta the idea of validity is treated in the similar manner. One thing that may interest the readers is his idea of illusion. He holds that there is nothing called pure illusion. In other words, there is an element of truth in all illusions.

The essay 'Authority of the Śruti' deals with śruti as a *pramāṇa*. Here Malkani tries to clarify certain issues that are discussed by S. Radhakrishnan in his *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (pp. 615–16) wherein he says: 'The ṛṣis are not so much the authors of the truth recorded in the Vedas as the seers who were able to discern the internal truths by raising life spirit to the universal spirit.' Radhakrishnan does not deal with the *pramāṇa* which is in operation for a seer to perceive such a realtiy. Malkani tries to deal with this by saying that if we accept the transcendental being, Brahman, to be true, then it cannot be known through any empirical method of knowing. It has to be known through a revealed text or śruti that is necessarily impersonal. Such a text has to stand on its own right as beginningless and authorless. It may be heard or communicated, but never made. We may find out the validity of these texts, but we cannot argue that śruti cannot lead us to the truth or that it is not a method of knowing.

It would not be out of place if I present the views of J.N. Mohanty in this regard who argues that the concept of *apauruṣeyatva* is the concept

of primacy and autonomy of the *eminent text* over the subjective intention of the author.[1] This is a new way of looking at the problem. Coming to Malkani, the problem still remains; his arguments suffer from the fallacy of interdependence. Śruti is the *pramāṇa* for Brahma-jñāna; and if we accept Brahma-jñāna, we have to accept śruti as *apauruṣeya*. One may ask the question: how do we accept Brahman to be truth? The issue is ticklish, and explaining in the way that Malkani does; it is difficult to formulate the arguments in a sustained manner.

The last essay in this section is on 'Ajñāna'. That has been co-authored by three stalwarts of Indian Philosophy of yester years, viz. G.R. Malkani, T.R.V. Murti and Ras Behary Das. The essay elaborately discusses the idea of illusion, its locus and content. The interesting part of the essay is the discussion on the logical validity of indeterminability or *anirvacanīyatva*. The conclusion is that illusion is similar to non-existence. As to the locus of ajñāna, they view that neither the jīva nor Brahman can be the locus. For them, the important question is not where avidyā really resides, but where it appears to reside. Since avidyā is not real, it does not matter where it resides. Brahman being the only reality, avidyā can appear nowhere else except Brahman. The removal of avidyā, i.e. *avidyā-nivṛtti*, does not involve any process in time as there is nothing to be negated, and all that exists there is the absolute Reality which is one without a second. They strongly hold the view that the distinction, which is made on different planes of reality, justifying the reality of error, has no metaphysical significance. Since the Absolute is eternally accomplished, the error and the efforts are as much illusory as the knowledge which is going to come. This issue has been a source of controversy in Advaita, and most of the Advaitins contend that the ontological status of avidyā is that it is neither real nor non-real.

IV

The whole volume traces a single theme, i.e. Advaita, with the exception of the 'Essay on Suicide' in which Malkani examines the problem from a different angle and pleads for a sympathetic attitude towards the concept of suicide. First of all, he points out that the act of suicide is not a crime. There are situations when the power of endurance gives way, and the man's sense of value overrides his desire to live. We cannot make any value judgement over such action. Nor can we ascribe insanity to such a

person, as it may not be the case always. We have made heroes out of the people who have committed suicide at the last minute to escape being caught alive by the enemy. Malkani elucidates the attitude of the Christian Church which condemns suicide. He says that a coward continues to live but he dies everyday. Much better is the man who would not continue to live a coward, but prefers to die for once, even if it be by his own hands (p. 119). Malkani also shows the spiritual implication of the idea of disembodiment when persons of great spiritual attainments have died by certain means which may be spoken of as suicide. I am tempted to cite the example of Vinoba Bhave who preferred to pass away by refraining from taking any kind of food in accordance with the religious sanctions of Jainism. One more example can be found in the *Raghuvaṁśa*; the kings in the race of Raghu left their bodies through some Yogic Samādhi.[2] Malkani says that these people prepare for death as a great celebration of their lives, and one cannot be accused of preparing for suicide in these cases. Here it may be noted that Malkani never prescribed suicide as a way out, but wants us to look at the idea with sympathy and not condemn it blindly.

In the two subsequent essays Malkani discusses the idea of 'Creation and Illusion'. While dealing with illusion, he argues that the belief in the existence of matter rests on a certain misapprehension, and asserts that the analysis of the empirical world would prove that it was not real at any time. This is the extension of his idea on illusion; and it also shows his emphasis on the metaphysical reality. The analysis is impressive as in Advaita we can always answer the question 'Why did the God create the world?' by saying, 'Where is the world?' But mostly, the Advaitic literature has the purpose of enlightening the man who is ignorant. Malkani is indifferent towards this aspect of the tradition.

The next essay 'Intuition of the Self' discusses the exact content of self-knowledge and draws the conclusion that in a regressive analysis of self-knowledge, there is no possibility of the consciousness of 'I' in respect of mere apprehension, as apprehension is always distinguished by its objective content. Hence it must necessarily be postulated beyond certain limits and cannot be an experienced fact. The subsequent topic discussed in this text is 'Reality and Value' in three parts. Employing different models of analysis, Malkani tries to prove that value is reality showing the need and validity for correlating the highest value and the highest reality. Extending this logic, we may argue that real happiness would not be a

passing state of being, nor can it be confined to any state at all; and the infinite happiness of our true self is not an empirical fact. In this sense, it is timeless. Malkani resorts to the analysis of *ānanda-mīmāṁsā* as done in Advaita following the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* though he avoids any such reference.

V

In the next essay Malkani shows that reality is not an absolute 'something' that has a meaning independently of our experience of it. The real consciousness or pure subject does not have a reality with a known content beyond the ordinary framework of causality. The reality is the cause itself and is uncaused. Malkani shows how a system of consistent idealism would deny object or object-relatedness. Such a conclusion is evident, the reason being that, if the object is, it does not exist independently by its own right. It is inexplicable and derives its being by pointing to, and depending on, the absolute Reality, viz. the consciousness. The essay that follows entitled 'Comparative Study of Consciousness' examines conciousness from different standpoints, from that of the materialist Cārvāka to that of extreme idealists like Advaitins. Malkani shows how the thinking, reasoning and the like, which can be spoken of as mental life, needs a non-mental awareness as its basis. He analyzes the universal consciousness conceived by Western idealists and shows how they fail to distinguish between awareness which is the basis of thinking and thought which is a function of the mind. Hence Malkani says that on the basis of the means of knowledge we can say that empirical knowledge is different from transcendental consciousness. For Kant, the formal or logical element in knowledge is transcendental. But truly, there is nothing transcendental in Kantian approach as it does not address the question: how is criticism of knowledge possible? Malkani's view that the pure consciousness is the reality *per se* and that it is the proof in itself shows the profundity of his analysis.

In the next essay (no. 20) Malkani deals with knowledge as the means to liberation. He brushes aside the Western idea that philosophy satisfies an intellectual curiosity. He says that it is purposive in the sense that it shows the way to liberation. The initiation to such knowledge does bring about a notion of difference between appearance and reality, and enunciates a search for the absolute self. This knowledge which is one's own

being is co-terminus with bliss, whose mundane form is the empirical happiness. It comes from the understanding of the reality of one's own self. Malkani says: 'Self-love is a vice, if it differentiates between you and me. But it is the highest virtue, if it has reduced these differences to unreality, and based itself upon a recognition of the unity of all beings and its inherent joyfulness' (p. 202).

In 'Temporal and the Eternal' Malkani brings in the Advaitic idea of appearance and reality. He gives a critique of history and time, and drives home the theory that all these are the causations of māyā, which itself is uncreated. The essay 'Ontological Reflections' in its four parts brings home the idea of reality employing rigorous philosophical reasoning. Here Malkani distinguishes between being and necessary being on the basis of the analysis of appearance and reality that helps one to understand the highest reality in which one finds one's natural native being. This section comes to an end with the last essay 'Philosophy of Life' which contains his conception of worldview. He shows how science cannot replace philosophy as science deals with the world of the senses. To the objection that in India, philosophy is not done in the same spirit as in the West, Malkani says that philosophy is designed as a pursuit to lift man from the trivialities of everyday life and from the struggle of existence. This shows his studied preference for Vedānta as the most profound system, which satisfies all the requirements that the word 'philosophy' stands for.

VI

'The Problem of Proof' and 'Philosophical Explanation' (two parts) are the first three essays in the third section dealing with philosophical method. Malkani analyzes the nature of proof on the basis of perceptual evidence and shows that the ultimate ground for perceptual evidence is 'I', which is the real ground of all proof. There cannot be any rational explanation for the actual, and hence there is a need to look beyond the visible world of appearances. In illusion, instead of the snake determining my perception of it, I now know that my perception determines the snake. It is the subjective confusion as well as subjective error that account for the illusory appearance of the snake. When this confusion is set aside, the power of māyā is gone. Malkani extends this explanation to the cosmic level and says that in Advaita this illusion is the cause of all the creation that is illusory. Here we find a slight drift from his earlier stand which seems to

be a compromise in holding the Brahman-centric analysis in Advaita. The 'Inexplicability in Philosophy' which is the last essay in this section tries to analyze 'inexplicability' extending the arguments put forth in the last two essays. Malkani seems to be thinking that there is no explanation is equally a valid explanation for which Advaitic world stands as an example.

VII

The last section in this book deals with Malkani's appreciation and criticism of the ideas of a few of his contemporaries like K.C. Bhattacharya, P.T. Raju, D.M. Dutta and Daya Krishna. Reacting to the essay 'Concept of Philosophy' of K.C. Bhattacharya, Malkani gives Advaitic dimension of the problem of doing philosophy and clarifies the idea of self-evidence in philosophy on the basis of the concept of *svaprakāśakatva*, which alone can explain the idea of self-evidence in philosophy transcending the idea of subject and object. Commenting on the essay 'Two Different Traditions of Pure Philosophy' of P.T. Raju, Malkani pleads that, if we want to do pure philosophy it is wrong to imitate the European way and method. He observes that we must disentangle ourselves from the European traditions before we appreciate anything Indian. Logic by itself is powerless to establish the hard fact of the nature of the ultimate reality, and Malkani shows the limits of logic saying that given the fact that logic is a tool, it proves nothing and disproves nothing (p. 413). Hence he prescribes that a critique of our experience is possible if we raise our experience to a higher level which cannot be criticized, since it is self-evidently and absolutely free. It is Vedānta according to him that has the capacity to renovate and give method to Indian philosophy.

The next essay is a critique of D.M. Dutta's 'Inward and Outward Advaita'. Here, Dutta says 'The inward search for reality in man and the inner realization are logically incomplete without the outward search.' Malkani, with his self-centric stance, finds that Dutta's explanation is reversing the order of approach and order of importance. He notes that, after the inner realization, no outward search is necessary. He takes up two mahāvākyas, 'All this is Brahman' and 'Thou art that' for analysis. He argues that the former leaves at the problematic stage as we do not know what Brahman really is, excepting certain descriptive formulae given by the scripture. The latter gives us the *aparokṣa-jñāna*, the inner realization.

It implies that, only when the outer is completely transcended, the truth stands revealed in all its completeness.

The last essay in this book is Malkani's criticism of Daya Krishna's views on *adhyāsa*. Malkani admonishes Daya Krishna for his views that 'I am not this' is the basic form of error or *adhyāsa* in Advaita Vedānta which, he feels, has been adopted from Sāṅkhya school. Malkani criticizes saying that *adhyāsa* implies an ontological exercise leading to a positive assumption that Śaṅkara talks about[3] and not in a way Daya Krishna puts it. It may be pointed out that the idea of *adhyāsa* can have epistemological implications as shown in the definition of Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*.[4] The purpose of *neti neti* (not this, not this) is for the purpose of negating everything that is superimposed on the Absolute. If what Daya Krishna says is right, then Advaita will fall a prey to Sāṅkhya, which maintains difference all through, whereas Advaita does away with all difference. Daya Krishna is indifferent to the idea of Brahman, which does not have a parallel in Sāṅkhya. A staunch Advaitin that Malkani is, he bluntly overturns Daya Krishna's views. The difficulty with Daya Krishna is that he fails to understand, like many before as well as after him, the subtlety of the basic position of Advaita. Nevertheless, Daya Krishna must be given due credit for forcefully supplying motivation to look into the unexplored areas of Indian philosophy based on authentic primary sources. He is the 'Uddyotakara' (the infuser of illumination by his criticisms) of the present day scenario in Indian philosophy. One thing which I notice in him is that he is so overpowered by the desire for a critical approach to Indian philosophy that at times he is simply unable to see the difference between authentic and superficial criticisms. But the fact that even way back in 1965 Daya Krishna was quite alive to the issues in Indian Philosophy becomes evident in his critical essay and pungent remarks.

VIII

Now I come to the Introduction by Sharad Deshpande, the editor of this volume, who has devoted considerable space to a welcome examination of what is not well-known about Malkani. The Introduction starts with a life sketch of Malkani and the philosophical activity at the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, founded by Pratap Seth and Vallabhdas in the first half of the last century.

I have no hesitation to say that Deshpande has done a laudable work by collecting valuable essays of Malkani, who lived through and for Advaita. As Sharad states at the outset, there is essentially only one topic; i.e. Advaita, treated in the four sections of this volume. He provides an analysis of the contents of each chapter and shows how Malkani was ingrained in Advaita Vedānta, not as a traditional system but as a living system. Sharad reads Hegelian influence into the writings of Malkani. I prefer to say the reverse. Malkani perceives Advaitic similarities in Hegel, Bradley and others. But the analysis adopted by him has not been all that Indian always. He has employed Western models as well to analyze certain Advaitic concepts. Sharad shows that in Malkani's doing philosophy, be it ontology, or ethics, or the theories of *adhyāsa*, or methodology, or a criticism of other's views, the inner flow of Advaita cannot be gainsaid.

IX

As far as the source books in Vedānta are concerned, we find three types of writings in India. The scholars who emphasize on primary source, like S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, T.M.P. Mahadevan, and R. Balasubramanian, hold that Indian philosophy has to be done following its own methodology, not by depending on the Western models. Balasubramanian is of the opinion that it is wrong to inject alien models to Indian philosophy for understanding and interpretation; we have the strength of the native hermeneutics which we should explore for the analysis of the systems. Needless to say, his plea that the teachers of Indian philosophy should know Sanskrit to handle the primary source material has fallen on deaf ears. The second type of scholars are those who take sporadic ideas from secondary source books of Indian Philosophy and give their own interpretation with a lot of brainstorming logic and discursive language. They think that at no point of time there is anything called philosophy in India and that the Indian systems, for being worth the name, have to adopt some Western model and methodology. Scholars of the last type have clear understanding of the tradition and they explain the systems in their own way with profundity of thought and clarity in expression. I would like to place Malkani in the last group of scholars who did Vedānta for the modern man without losing the rigour of logic and brilliance of interpretation. It is a mark of his scholarship that he takes trouble repeatedly to rethink his ideas in the light of newly discovered ideas and puts forth his

views in interesting ways so that any student of Vedānta would appreciate and understand the contents. The logic he employs is all his own, though the traces can be found out here and there in the traditional Vedāntic texts.

Lastly, one strongly feels that the task still remains incomplete till the other essays of Malkani are published. There cannot be a better person to do this than Sharad Deshpande. The book carries a foreword by no less a person than Daya Krishna who too feels that Deshpande should find time to write the history of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner to evaluate the signal contribution it has made to the development of philosophy in this country.

There are a few misprints in the text and such slips as there are could have been easily spotted and corrected. A little more care should have been taken in putting diacritical marks on the technical terms in roman script. An index at the end would have enhanced the usefulness of the book. On the whole, this volume represents an indological study which is erudite, careful, not problem shirking, and stands as a specimen of modern thinking in Vedānta. I am tempted to say that I have enriched my knowledge by reading this book, and I feel that all those who study Advaita should read this book to have an acquaintance with a different methodology Malkani proposes to pursue Advaita Vedānta.

Notes and References

1. J.N. Mohanty, 'Philosophy and Tradition', *Indian Philosophy and History,* Ed. by S.P. Dubey, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, p. 167.

   The view of Ganeswar Mishra can be cited in this regard. He opines that the whole exercise in Vedānta is nothing but an analysis of language and that liberation is liberating oneself from this language. This shows the influence of the analytical school on him and accounts for Mishra's being so uncharitable towards traditional Vedānta. R. Balasubramanian told this reviewer that Ganeswar Mishra changed his views towards the later part of his life and accepted the traditional Vedāntic view.
2. *yogenānte tanutyajām, Raghuvaṁśa* of Kālidāsa, 1.8.
3. See *ahamidaṁ mamedamiti ... loka-vyavahāraḥ, Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Here the statements 'I am this' and 'This is mine' are affirmative in nature.
4. See Srinivasa Rao, *Perceptual Error: The Indian Theories,* University of Hawaii Press, 1999, pp. 110–12.

Book Reviews

N.S.S. Raman: *Methodological Studies in the History of Religions: With Special Reference to Hinduism and Buddhism*, Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla, 1998, Preface + pp. 255.

Human belligerence towards religions other than one's own started from time immemorial and has continued till today. But a new spirit of dialogue is now emerging, and with it the new foundations for the study of religions of the world is being laid (p. 2). The main problem in such a study is regarding the method or methods to be adopted for it. The book offers a critique of such a methodology/methodologies for the study of world religions (with special reference to Hinduism and Buddhism).

The author notes that such a study should not aim at: (i) a study of Comparative Religion (as the former forces comparison where grounds for comparison do not exist); (ii) a study of Comparative Philosophy of Religion (as a religion consists not only of theological, metaphysical, cosmological doctrines but also of a history, a system of cults and rituals, a social organization etc.). Comparative Religion then, in the author's view, is to be replaced by 'Religious Studies', or more exactly, 'Religionwissenschaft' (although it is a little different from pure scientific study) which would take account, objectively, of the various aspects of each religion in their doctrinal, historical, ritualistic, social, scriptural and symbolic aspects (p. 4). The author emphasizes here a method outlined by what Mircea Eliade called 'total hermeneutics', a totality of perspectives of world religions. It includes a study of: (1) theological, cosmological and metaphysical doctrines; (2) the inner structure of religious experience; (3) anthropology, enthnology and sociology of religion; (4) symbolic aspects of religious experience and actions (what Mircea Eliade calls hierophanies, i.e. manifestations of the sacred expressed in symbols, myths etc.); (5) historical perspectives of religion; (6) religious experience as expressed through painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dance, drama, epic poetry; and (7) manuscriptology (which is, in the author's opinion, helpful in sifting the authentic from the interpolative distortions and also in determining the proper historical perspective).

The author has used Hinduism and Buddhism as special objects of studying religious phenomena as illustrative of the methodology he advo-

cates. Because of the uniqueness of each religion, the author suggests, no single methodology can be prescribed for the study of various world religions. What he prescribes is 'methodological pluralism'. He illustrates this methodology in chapters III and IV.

Chapter I of the book is focussed on 'Religious Studies in India and the West: Challenges and Perspectives'. [It is to be noted here that a major defect of all the chapters, including the present one, is that there are no sections or subsections in them. The author divides the chapters with the help of the Roman alphabets, A, B, C, D, E, F, ..., without giving any clue as to what these divisions are supposed to represent. The reader is expected to engage in the unnecessary task of surmising what each division is supposed to discuss. The task is made doubly difficult because of the author's habit of indulging in diversions from the main topic.]

The author regrets that with the exception of one or two, more than 200 Indian universities have not introduced a study of religion in their curricula (p. 35). 'The view held in some quarters that our secular ideals do not fit in with the study of religions', Professor Raman suggests, 'is wholly unjustified' (p. 35). Departing from the conventional connotation of the term 'secular', the Indian constitution has used this to connote an attitude that gives respect to all faiths and beliefs. A new orientation and direction has, Professor Raman suggests, to be given to Indian universities and schools (in humanities) by the introduction of religious studies, as it will meet the demands of a secular and pluralist society (p. 40).

The methods adopted by traditional scholars of Europe (who are prejudiced against non-Christian religions) in the study of Indian religions have been critically examined in this chapter with a view to suggesting a more rigorous (and less value-oriented) methodology. Although Professor Raman has recognized the pioneering work of western scholars like the missionaries, academic men and civil servants, he has nevertheless suggested that most of them suffer from parochialism and Euro-centricism. He regrets that British university intellectuals have shown a colonial ruler's or a Christian missionary's interest in Indian culture and religion (p. 25). Compared to these intellectuals, other European and North American scholars have an unbiased interest in the study of Indian religions. The liberal trend of thought in twentieth century Europe and America favours a friendly dialogue between eastern religions and Christianity. Special mention has been made here of the Chicago School of Divinity of the USA (with Joseph Kitagawa, Joachim Wach and Mircea Eliade as frontrunners in this

trend), Professor John Hiek of England (who recommends a new 'God-centred' approach to the study of religions in place of the 'Christianity-centred' one) (p. 29).

Chapter II, 'Basic Issues in the Methodology of the Study of Indian Religions', emphasizes the importance of the study of religions in a historical perspective. Since what the scholars are concerned with here is *spiritual* history and not political or social history, the data available here are not just the empirical ones. Much of the data of spiritual history is mixed with the symbolic and mythical. The historian of religion, Professor Raman observes, 'must show a sound knowledge of the doctrines and traditions involved in the interpretation of the "facts" of spiritual history' (p. 56). The author deviates from the main topic in this chapter ('Basic Issues in the Methodology...') when he criticizes the nineteenth century Bengali intellectuals (pp. 58–9) for their enthusiasm for the synthesis of Christianity and Hinduism.

In chapter III, 'Understanding Hinduism: A Methodological Critique', the author emphasizes the importance of a critical study of manuscripts of the Hindu religion (including those of the *Vedas,* the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Rāmāyana*, the *Māhābhārata*, the *Bhāgāvata* and other *Purāṇas*, *Manusmṛti* and other *Dharma Śāstras*) for the interpretation and reconstruction of religious texts of that tradition (pp. 90–100). This critical study is especially needed in order to sift the authentic from the spurious. The need to distinguish the genuine from that of doubtful origin also dominates the author's underscoring the importance of studying Hindu religion (representing a panorama of numerous beliefs and practices) from a proper historical perspective (pp. 101–11).

While the author acknowledges the contribution of western and Indian anthropologists and sociologists in unearthing a proper perspective of Hinduism, he is nevertheless critical of the objectives of some of them who neglect the value of the spiritual experiences and the transcendent dimensions of religions (pp. 112–15). It must be pointed out, however, that the author misrepresents the proper objective of 'demytholization' (pp. 116f), in this chapter, which he equates with stripping religions completely of their mythologies. Those who advocate demytholization are only keen on showing that mythology is to be understood, not as history, but as representing a tradition of unfolding to the simplest understanding, by means of imaginative pictures, the deeper significance of some items of mundane experience.

'During the last one hundred and fifty years', Professor Raman remarks (in chapter IV, 'A Critique of the Methodologies of the Study of Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism'), 'much has taken place in the Indian soil to revive interest in Buddhist studies' (p. 145). Both European (mainly archaeologists and epigraphists who investigated into the Aśokān inscriptions) and Indian scholars contributed much to the rediscovery of Buddhism. This rediscovery eventually led to the establishment of institutions of higher learning of Buddhist studies.

Archaeological investigations into the history of Buddhism have led to the opening of research into various phases of the development of Buddhism. A careful study of the Pāli Buddhist texts, the author points out, is essential to the reconstruction of the original teachings of the Buddha. Exclusive reliance on Sanskrit texts, deprives the scholar of a total perspective of Buddhism.

Incidentally, the author makes some controversial remarks in his exposition of the historical perspective of Buddhism. (1) He remarks that the vast spectrum of Buddhism split into a number of schools and sects makes one doubt whether Buddhism really does represent a unity (pp. 151f). He even goes to the extent of maintaining that there is *some* justification of some scholars claiming that Mahāyāna had very little to do with the original Pāli canon (pp. 171–2). (2) He contends: 'No wonder then that the Buddhism after the 10th century also started regarding the Buddha ... as an incarnation of Viṣṇu' (p. 187). Perhaps the author's intention is only to emphasize the influence of non-Buddhist beliefs on Mahāyāna doctrines, which no one probably would deny.

Professor Raman does a good job in asking scholars working on Buddhist history not to work with a biased ideological background (e.g. that of a Marxist sociologist) (p. 163). Professor Raman also deserves our gratitude for asking scholars to exercise caution in their tendency to regard some schools of Buddhism as being almost identical with: (i) religious schools like the Advaita Vedānta (p. 173), or with (ii) the philosophy of subjective/Hegelian idealism (pp. 183–5 and 200–2), or (iii) with the Humean or Kantian philosophy (pp. 156, 185). We would also like to express our gratefulness to Professor Raman in pointing out that there is historical suggestion that monks belonging to different Buddhist schools lived together practising the same Vinaya rules and accepting the same canonical texts (p. 173).

Although the book adds a valuable dimension to religious studies, it nevertheless suffers from the following shortcomings (which should be taken care of):

(1) The author often indulges in repeating the points he wants to make. I list below some of the glaring repetitions:

(a) The author warns scholars against using value-oriented and pejorative terms (like 'primitive', 'tribal') repeatedly on pages 9, 38, 54, 64, 72, 73, 106, 111, 117.

(b) Suggestion that the old method of Comparative Religion is to be abandoned in favour of a total hermeneutics is repeated unnecessarily on pages 4, 11, 27, 28, 72, 76, 79, 90, 133, 197, 200f.

(c) The author's recommendation for an unbiased objective study of religions is repeated on pages 5, 31, 32, 54, 81, 118, 119, 120, 125–6.

(d) The statement that 'Europe discovered Buddhism and gave it back to India' is repeated on pages 11, 48, 145–6.

(2) Professor Raman often deviates from the main objectives concerned. As examples I quote below a number of such irrelevant digressions.

(a) A discussion about the apathy of Indian civil servants to intellectual pursuit on pages 59–60, 65 has really no connection with the methodological studies of religions.

(b) Polemics over the issue of whether 'holy wars' were recommended by Christianity and Islam, on pages 108–10, are irrelevant to 'Understanding Hinduism: A Methodological Critique'.

(c) It is irrelevant to discuss the basic characteristics of the 'bhakti' movement (pp. 128–9) in the context of stressing the importance of a study of Hindu art and architecture.

(d) A discussion of Ambedkar's conversion of a number of oppressed Indians to Buddhism, on pages 149–50, is not relevant to 'A Critique of the Methodological Study of Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism'.

(e) An account of the exploitation by political masters of the multi-religiosity of colonies, on pages 65–6, seems to be uncalled for in the context of 'Basic Issues in the Methodology of the Study of Indian Religions'.

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER: *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. Ralph Manheim, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, first Indian edition: 1999, pp. 214, Rs 225.

I

Heidegger (1889–1976) is one of the original thinkers of the twentieth century who has made a tremendous impact on other thinkers of the century. In the post-modern thinking the role of Heidegger is highly significant and he has considerably influenced thinkers like Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, Derrida and others. Born in Messkirch, Baden on September 22, 1889, he studied Roman Catholic theology, mathematics and philosophy at the University of Freiburg from 1909 to 1913, taught at Marburg from 1923 to 1928, became Professor of philosophy at Freiburg in 1928, and died in Messkirch on May 26, 1976.

Between 1927 and 1930, Heidegger wrote five books. The first of these works, *Being and Time*[1] (1927) was a critique of western philosophy. Heidegger believes that from the time of Plato to Husserl, the nature of reality has been misinterpreted and misrepresented. This mistake, otherwise known as the 'metaphysics of presence', is the centre of attack for Heidegger. The main purpose of *Being and Time* is to inquire into the meaning of being. Twenty years later he claimed that the book was incomplete due to the failure of language.[2] When *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*[3] was published two years after *Being and Time,* there was a speculation that the task begun in 1927 would be fulfilled. But 'Of the Essence of Truth' and 'What is Metaphysics?' explain that a radical shift in method has occurred in the three years since the publication of *Being and Time*. Heidegger had dropped the fundamental ontology from his agenda and replaced it with history of Being that emphasizes the participation of human beings in the 'happening' of Being. Several significant reforms took place in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which finally led into an important work, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*[4] (1935). Such works as *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (1935), 'Letter on Humanism' (1946) and *On the Way to Language*[5] (1957), to name a few, remain focussed on the question of Being, but develop this thematic presentation in a different way. In his inaugural lecture 'What is Metaphysics?' delivered among the scientists at Freiburg in 1929, he was concerned about the concept of Being and metaphysics. Here he did not talk about metaphysics but elucidated a metaphysical question, so that

metaphysics might *present itself* to us. In the first part of the above lecture, he dealt with the question of nothing. It is not easy to discard the question of nothing when we talk about the question of being. He further argued that science is concerned with being and not with nothing. For Heidegger, the experience of nothing is a prerequisite for being. This is the reason why he says that nothing and being belong together. Heidegger's question of being aims at revealing the ontological sense of human existence. He tries to demonstrate the ontological priority of the question of being by deriving his arguments from Plato to Husserl. It is the most fundamental question for him. Three important readings, namely Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Brentano's 'On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle' and Carl Braig's 'On Being: An Outline of Ontology' have shaped his concept of Being.

Heidegger reconstructed Aristotle's doctrine of being. For Aristotle, the question of being is the first and a fundamental question that a philosopher should investigate. Heidegger also has shared this view though he was not satisfied with the answer given by Aristotle with regard to the question of being and wanted to know the fundamental sense of being from which the other senses are derived. Heidegger in *Being and Time* makes an attempt to answer the question of being. First of all one should know how to ask the question of being properly and thus his book is only the way to the clarification of the fundamental ontology, a way that we must seek and follow. In many of his later works he argued that we could not provide an answer to the question of being at all. Heidegger's notion of metaphysics also differs from Aristotle's notion of metaphysics. For Heidegger metaphysics is fundamental to a cultural era as a whole, but for Aristotle it is only fundamental to the sciences because it provides them with their first principles and causes. For Heidegger each historical epoch has different metaphysical foundations, but for Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, metaphysical principles should be valid for all periods because they are necessarily true and *a priori*. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger also supports the end of metaphysics. The end of metaphysics, of course, for him, does not mean that we simply stop producing metaphysical systems. The end of philosophy (metaphysics) is rather the place in which the totality of its history is gathered in its most extreme possibilities.

In the history of philosophy, Heidegger will be remembered for many reasons. His impact on various fields like literary theory, environmental studies, social sciences and aesthetics prove his importance. Also, in him,

there is a relation between work and life. His political stance influenced his philosophical thinking considerably. He believed that a philosopher should merely think one thought. He was always connected with the biographical fact that he was a supporter of Nazism. His involvement with the Nazis has been described as 'the thorn in Heidegger's side', by Zimmerman. He joined the National Socialist German Workers Party in 1933, when he took charge as the rector of Freiburg University. When the book *An Introduction to Metaphysics* was written in 1935, he was a supporter of the Nazi regime. His involvement with the National Socialist movement played a role in his writings directly or indirectly at three levels. First, in 1946 after the war, when he was stripped of his professorship. At the second level when he published the above work, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* in 1953, and at the third level when his famous rectoral address of 1933, published in 1983 was criticized by historians like Hugo Ott as a contribution to the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power. The book, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, was published in the year 1953, though he had delivered these lectures in the summer term of 1935. This eighteen-year gap caused him to change some of his views about the National Socialist movement. He tried to distinguish between vulgar Nazism and the 'inner truth and greatness' of the Nazi movement. He says: 'The works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism but have nothing whatever to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global technology and modern man)—have all been written by men fishing in the troubled waters of "values" and "totalities"' (p. 199). But this 'change' in him was not acceptable to thinkers like Habermas. In the *Frankfurt Allegemeine Zeitung* (July 25, 1953) Habermas asked the question whether Heidegger's later philosophy did not declare National Socialism innocent of its crimes. This means that Heidegger's works cannot be separated from his political error or blunder and his philosophical thoughts to a large extent were shaped by his political link.

Language is the house of being, according to Heidegger. This made some to argue that, for him language and being are one. It is argued that being *is* the house and hence being is language. This is also reflected in his 'Letter on Humanism' where he says: 'Thought gathers language in simple demonstrative saying. Language is thus the language of being, as the clouds are the clouds of the sky',[6] 'Language is at once the house of being and the dwelling of mankind'.[7] This is familiar from the interpretation

of being in terms of dwelling proposed by him in the *Being and Time* and developed in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Here one can see the shift in his thought from Dasein to language. Thus the book deals with the convergence of language and Being. After 1930, Heidegger turned towards the interpretation of particular western conceptions of Being. He argues that in contrast to the reverent ancient Greek conception of Being, technological society followed an attitude which deprived Being and human life of meaning. The later philosophers lose the deeper meaning of Being, which the early Greek philosophers reached, says Heidegger.

II

The book, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* deals with a series of lectures delivered by Heidegger in 1935 at the University of Freiburg, which mainly discusses the problem of being. First published in German in 1953, the work translated into English by Ralph Manheim and published in 1959, now for the first time appearing as an Indian edition, deals with four main chapters. According to Heidegger, the main issue of the whole history of human thought is to understand the notion of being. Thus he discusses two issues at length, namely, the meaning of being and the history of man's understanding of being which is explained through language. Very rightly he says: '... words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are' (p. 13). Language, especially poetic language, emerges to play a crucial role as the 'house of Being'. Thus in this book, Heidegger deals with the close link between language and being. Heidegger says: 'Only poetry stands in the same order as philosophy and its thinking, though poetry and thought are not the same thing ... Poetry, like the thinking of the philosopher, has always so much world space to spare that in it each thing—a tree, a mountain, a house, the cry of a bird—loses all indifference and commonplaceness' (p. 26). This passage and many other passages in Heidegger's writings show the relation between poetry and philosophical thinking that acknowledge very little aspect of science.

The first chapter, 'The fundamental question of metaphysics', deals with the question namely, why are there essents (existents, things that are) rather than nothing. This question is the most fundamental and the deepest of all questions. 'It takes into account of everything that is present but also

everything that ever was and will be' (p. 2). Heidegger considers that this question is also the deepest one because it asks why are there essents and on what grounds does it stand. Heidegger's later conception of Being is expressed in this book and thus it is a journey from *Being and Time* (1927) to *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935). This long journey of eight years caused Heidegger to rethink the question of being. The question, 'why there is something rather than nothing' is the starting point. This is the question with which he had concluded his inaugural lecture in 1929. This question is the most fundamental one, because it opens up the possibility of transcending the totality of beings to their ground, namely, Being. 'The question is asked only in this leap; it *is* the leap; without it there is no asking' (p. 6). He analyzes the question from the Christian standpoint. Heidegger's destruction of the Christian view is explained here as follows: 'Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth has the answer to the question 'why are there essents rather than nothing?' even before it is asked: everything that is, except God himself, has been created by Him. God himself, the increate creator, 'is'. One who holds to such faith can in a way participate in the asking of our question, but he cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer and taking all the consequences of such a step' (pp. 6–7). He says that Christianity reinterprets the being of the essent as created being. 'For the original Christian faith, philosophy is foolishness. 'To philosophize is to ask, "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" signifies: a daring attempt to fathom this unfathomable question by disclosing what it summons us to ask, to push our questioning to the very end. Where such an attempt occurs there is philosophy' (p. 8). For Heidegger, to ask the question of being means nothing less than to retrieve the beginning of our historical-spiritual Dasein and to transform it. This causes him to explain the role of philosophical thinking, which can never find an immediate echo in the present. It cannot be directly learnt like manual and technical skills and also that it cannot be directly applied. Philosophy cannot directly bring a historical change; it can do it only indirectly. To ask the question, 'Why are there essents rather than nothing?' is to philosophize and to philosophize is to inquire into the *extra*-ordinary. It is an extraordinary inquiry into the extra-ordinary. Thus philosophy differs from other disciplines and faiths.

Justifying the title, Heidegger says that 'Introduction to metaphysics' means an introduction to the asking of the fundamental question. But the fundamental questions do not exist as stones or water; neither do they

exist like ready-made things. Fundamental questions are not like things that lie and stand somewhere. Heidegger argues that in the question, 'why are there essents rather than nothing?' the part 'rather than nothing' is only an appendage because with 'why are there essents' the question is complete. Heidegger explains later how the part 'rather than nothing' is not a mere appendage. But first he starts with the assumption that the part 'rather than nothing' is an appendage and proceeds to show later that it is not. His argument goes as follows: The question is actually asked with the first part of the interrogation. The later part can be dropped because simply it says nothing. This means that there is nothing to be asked further with this 'nothing'. Science does not deal with nothingness. A man who says something about nothing becomes unscientific, according to science. Heidegger argues that quite often we wrongly believe that scientific thinking is the only rigorous thought and it must be the standard of philosophical thinking. All our scientific thought is nothing but derived forms of philosophical thinking. 'Philosophy never arises out of science or through science and it can never be accorded equal rank with the sciences' (p. 26). Philosophy stands in a totally different realm and order and only poetry stands in the same order as philosophy and its thinking though poetry and thought are not the same thing. He argues that for science to speak about nothing is an absurdity whereas for philosophers and poets, it is not so. Philosophers and poets see it interesting to talk about nothing and hence the phrase, 'rather than nothing' is not a mere appendage but an essential component of the whole question.

In the second chapter, Heidegger studies the grammar and etymology of the word 'Being'. Being and the essence of being are always discussed together. Both express themselves in language. The essence of being and essence of language are also talked of together. What is the grammar of the word 'Being' (*Sein*) and what kind of word is 'being'? These two issues disturbed him considerably. Heidegger traces what the word 'Being,' meant for the Greeks through the examination of Greek language because language is also an essent. This helps him to characterize the fundamentals of the Greek view of being. The Greeks viewed language as something essent, in line with their understanding of being. Essent is that which is permanent and represents itself as such. Grammar represents language in being. Since Greeks viewed language as something essent, it has a close relation with being as such. Here Heidegger supports the importance of language stating that in writing the spoken language comes

to stand. He says 'Language stands in the written image of the word, in the written signs, the letters, *grammata*' (p. 64). As a result of this, grammar represents language in being. But Heidegger's above analysis of language faces one difficulty. In language, the spoken part is equally important, which has been ignored by him. Hence the following statement cannot fully be accepted.' '... through the flow of speech language seeps away into the impermanent. Thus, down to our own time, language has been interpreted grammatically' (p. 64). The western metaphysics relies upon a series of oppositions—between mind and body, the intelligible and the sensible, culture and nature, male and female, the signifier and the signified and in the case of language, writing and speech—in which one pole is elevated above the other, but can only be so prioritized through denegrations of its dependence on its contrary, which generate a fundamental incoherence. Here, the opposites are not maintained in dynamic tension, but are placed in a hierarchical order which gives the first priority. This causes thinkers like Derrida to say that at the point at which the concept of *difference* intervenes, all these metaphysical oppositions become non-pertinent. Heidegger's study of the etymology of the word 'Being' is very interesting as it shows how the word has to be analyzed. The verb of the word *sein* has three stems. First, the oldest, the actual radical word *es,* or Sanskrit *asus,* the verbal form meaning 'life', 'the living', 'that which from out of itself stands' and 'which moves and rest in itself'. The second is *bhu*, *bheu*, or the Greek *phuo* meaning 'to emerge', 'to be powerful'. The third is the German *wesan* or Sanskrit *vasami*, meaning, 'to dwell', 'to sojourn', 'to belong'. Thus from the three stems, we gain three initial concrete meanings, to live, to emerge, to linger or endure. Taken individually, they cannot represent the being. Thus the etymology of the word is a compromise and a mixture of three different radical meanings and none of these independently determine the meaning of the word 'Being'.

Heidegger in Chapter Three of the book discusses the question of the essence of being. The distinction between being and non-being is essential in order to understand the importance of being. Being is not an empty word and it belongs to every essent. No essent as such would disclose itself in words. To speak of an essent is to understand in advance as essent, i.e., to understand its being which is expressed in language. No doubt, the understanding of being resides first and foremost in a vague, indefinite meaning and yet remains certain and definite. It is because the understanding of being always remained obscure, confused and hidden

and hence must be elucidated and disentangled. Heidegger claims that his *Being and Time* for the first time in the history of philosophy raised the question of the meaning of being. According to him, the disclosure of being is essential and without it, we are not human race. Everything belongs to being. Heidegger undertakes a study of the word 'being' so as to assign its place. To understand the word, we may have to differentiate its word form, word meaning and thing. With regard to the word 'being' and its inflections, it can be said that all the words lying within its sphere, word and meaning are more dependent on what is meant than in the case of other words. But the fact is that 'being' itself is dependent on the word in a totally different and more fundamental sense than any essent. He says: 'In each of its inflections the word "being" bears an essentially different relation to being itself from that of all other nouns and verbs of the language to the essent that is expressed in them' (p. 88).

The discourse of being is studied under four distinctions, namely, (1) being and becoming, (2) being and appearance, (3) being and thinking, and (4) being and the ought. It is the study of being in relation to other concepts. The concepts are different from being but belong intrinsically to being also. This forms the crucial fourth chapter of the book wherein Heidegger tries to show how being is different from other concepts so that the importance of being can be understood. Being is delimited from something else and in this determination it already has determinateness. It is delimited in four interrelated respects. The distinctions have an inner necessity and are not accidental. The first two distinctions, namely, between being and becoming, and being and appearance were developed by the Greeks. The third distinction, i.e., between being and thinking, took actual form in the period of modern philosophy though the seeds for this were sown by Greek philosophy itself. It is the most complex and problematic distinction. The fourth distinction, namely, being and the ought, completely belongs to the modern period and is the most dominant distinction of all. But all the distinctions are internally linked and these fourfold distinctions are based on the historical order in which they are shaped.

Now let us see how Heidegger analyses these distinctions. The distinction between being and becoming stands at the beginning of the inquiry into the study of being. Parmenides approached the being of the essent as becoming. He traces the original beginning from Parmenides' saying that *noein* (to think) and *einai* (to be) belong together. He compares this with Sophocles' *Antigone* and says that the essence of man in Parmenides is

grounded in the opening of the Being of beings. After Parmenides and Heraclitus, the Greek thought had fallen away from this original revelation of Being. Because of this fall, human thought has gained supremacy over Being and is concealed. The question of Being aims at restoring Being to its primacy. The distinction between being and appearance is one of the oldest and most important in philosophy. This distinction means the real in contradistinction to the unreal; the authentic against the inauthentic. The apparent is which from time to time emerges and vanishes, it is the ephemeral and unstable against being which is permanent. 'Being means appearing. Appearing is not something subsequent that sometimes happens to being. Appearing is the very essence of being' (p. 101). For the Greeks, appearing belongs to being. This means for them, the essence of being lay *partly* in appearing. Truth is inherent in the essence of being. To be an essent is to appear on the scene, to take ones place, to produce something. On the other hand, non-being means to withdraw from appearing, from presence.

The above distinction takes Heidegger to the third namely, the distinction between being and thinking which is predominant in western philosophy. Here he deals with the importance of logic and the unity and separation between being and thinking. He evaluates the question how thinking was understood in the beginning by analyzing the word *logos* and *physis*. 'Being in the sense of *physis* is the power that emerges. As contrasted with becoming, it is permanence, permanent presence. Contrasted with appearance, it is appearing, manifest presence' (p. 125). Heidegger explains the inner bond between *logos* and *physis* in the beginning of the western philosophy with an interpretation of Heraclitus who extensively speaks of *logos* in Fragments. Heidegger extensively deals with the characterization of the *logos* as Hearaclitus thought it. He mentions two significant points. First, there can be true speaking and hearing only if they are directed in advance toward being, the *logos*. Only where the *logos* discloses, the phonetic sound becomes a word. Only where the being of the essent is heard, a mere casual listening becomes a hearing. This means that those who do not grasp the *logos*, are not able to hear or to speak. Only those who can master the word, are the poets and thinkers. The others, according to him, stagger about in their obstinacy and ignorance. Secondly, because being is *logos*, it is basic gathering, and not mass and turmoil. While discussing the distinction between being and thinking, Heidegger argues that thinking is subjective, the subject, whereas being is

objective, the object. In other words, the relation of thinking to being is that of subject to object. Thus the distinction between the subject and object is always maintained. But it was Parmenides who argued that thinking and being are the same, which has been accepted by the western philosophy in general. But Heidegger claims that different interpretation has to be given for this identification of thinking with being. The correct understanding of the relation is to say that there is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being.

The distinction between being and the ought plays an important role in Heidegger's thought. The distinction between these four is shown as follows:



The diagram shows that in opposition to becoming, being stands eternal permanence and in opposition to appearance, as mere semblance. The distinction between being and thinking is downward whereas the distinction between being and the ought is upward. This means that thought is the sustaining and determining ground of being while being is surmounted by the ought. The ideas constitute the being and the supreme idea stands beyond being. This means that being itself, not as such but *as idea,* comes into opposition to something other, on which being is dependent. The supreme idea has become the model of the models. Ought is opposed to being when being defines itself as idea. In this section, one can see Heidegger's critique of the notion of value and of its presence in the philosophy since Kant and particularly, Fichte. Heidegger argues how the notion of value was important even for philosophers like Nietzsche. His *Will to Power* is nothing but a 'revaluation of all values'. For Heidegger, the liberal democracies of the west and the Workers' State of the Soviet Union are more nihilistic than National Socialism itself which, after all, contains an 'inner truth and greatness'. He says: 'From a metaphysical point of view, we *are staggering*. We move about in all directions amid the essent, and no longer know how it stands with being. Least of all do we know that we no longer know. We stagger even when we assure one

another that we are no longer staggering, even when, as in recent years, people do their best to show that this inquiry about being brings only confusion, that its effect is destructive, that it is nihilism' (p. 202). But it is a point of dispute when he claims that the western civilization takes us to technological nihilism whereas National Socialism offers a new paradigm that could give our culture a new understanding of being.

III

Now let us see whether Heidegger had really succeeded in answering the question of being which is his primary concern in this book and also in all other writings. We always know the being only in our questioning. Everything depends on the fundamental question namely, why are there essents rather than nothing and how it stands in relation to being. It is understood from our discussion that being and the understanding of being are not a given fact. He made it clear that being is not an empty word and has a determinate meaning, which is shown by the four distinctions mentioned above. The above distinctions clearly explain that being is delimited against becoming, appearance, thought, and ought.

Heidegger closes the book with the saying that the true problem is what we do not know and what, insofar as we know it *authentically*, namely *as* a problem, we know only *questioningly*. His further remarks are interesting: 'To know how to question means to know how to wait, even a whole lifetime' (p. 206). The benefit one achieves through this cannot be counted in terms of numbers. What is essential, according to Heidegger, is not the number but the right time, i.e., the right moment and the right perseverance. In *Gelassenheit (Resignation)*, published in 1959, he says that thinking requires resignation. 'We should do nothing, but wait', he says. Thus according to the later Heidegger, the question of being is not a question of being we should attempt to answer. It is a question of being we should learn to ask properly and with resignation. This makes clear his position that we cannot answer any question about being. He only teaches us to know the right kind of questioning attitude. To ask any question about being is nothing but this attitude.

But the fundamental question remains unanswered. Has he really explained at last the meaning of the question of being? Scholars answer the question in the negative. For example in his introduction (written in 1949) to the book, *What is Metaphysics?* (written in 1929) says that philosophers

have passed over the question of being with the self-assurance. The inattention to the question of being is because of the fact that we are abandoned by being. 'We do not yet understand the question of being', says Heidegger. Being had concealed itself. These diversified views of Heidegger about being caused scholars to say that he has not clarified the meaning of the question of being. Also he has not given any answer to the question of being. The question of being has not been answered at all. It is a basic question, and the only question, which he is confronted with throughout his life. Another drawback with regard to his notion of being is that his later works show that we are unable to answer the question of being. Time and again he had been saying that we simply do not understand the question of being. But at the same time he claims that the question of being is the most important question man can ask.

No doubt Heidegger has a mission. He wanted to redeem a civilization that had sold out to technology and science. All the time he was concerned with the question of being. His approach is remarkable and unique. Hannah Arendt very rightly wrote: 'Heidegger never thinks "about" something. He thinks something.'[8]

Notes and References

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RAVI RAVINDRA, *Christ the Yogi: A Hindu Reflection on the Gospel of John* (Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1998), pp. xi + 244, Paperback, $ 14.95.

There have been efforts by Christians from Asia, as well as Europe, in the context of religious dialogue, to interpret their inner faith experience and doctrine, from the horizon of the language, worldview and the experience of other faiths. There have been also attempts by the followers of faiths other than Christianity, to interpret Christian doctrine and gospel from the point of view of their own inner religious experience and doctrine. Undoubtedly, the book under review, *Christ the Yogi,* by Ravi Ravindra is one such masterly attempt by a Hindu to *get into* or *cross over* (to borrow an expression from Paul Knitter) to the heart of the Christ-experience.

The author achieves this by delving into the mystical depths and symbolic grandeur of the fourth gospel, considered to be the Christian *Veda*, through the hermeneutical tool of 'vertical reasoning', which surrenders itself to the text of the gospel, in its universality and the sublime nature of its authorship. The self-consciously and avowedly *esoteric* and not *exoteric* (pp. 65–6) hermeneutical slant of the reading of the gospel assumes also the spiritual sensitivity, inherent to all human beings. It is assumed that this sensitivity, though present in different degrees in human beings, would help the author and the readers, to ascend to the higher levels of meaning implied by the author of the gospel, transcending the merely rational level of understanding (pp. 4–7).

This less churchly, none the less sensitive reading of the fourth gospel, in an Upanishadic hermeneutical mode, brings into relief the supreme *identity* of Christ and the Father, as revealed in 'Father and I are one', avoiding exclusive identification of the Father, with this or that person. This could serve as a methodological lead and eye-opener to those who have imprisoned faith-experience and themselves in epistemological frameworks built on the numeric of the 'uniqueness' and 'universality' of Jesus, the saviour (pp. 3–4).

The esoteric and *intratextual* reading of the mystical gospel has as its *semantic axis*, the *yoga of Christ,* from which the book derives the name. This yoga is nothing but the transformative journey of Jesus of Nazareth from being the son of man, to becoming the Son of Man, and finally the Son of God. Only in the consciousness of his union with the Divine, he proclaims himself to be the *I AM*, the divine name *par excellence*,

indicating his supreme identity with the Father (Jn. 14: 6). This *yoga*, which makes Christ into a *Yogi*, is no flight into the ideal *gnosis*, but an ongoing process of descent into the *flesh* of humanity, and ascent to divinity, in a journey of self-emptying (Jn. 14: 24), reaching up to the crucifixion. The Crucified of the Christian faith, actually is the *Crucifier*. He constantly challenges the inner circle of his disciples, as well as outsiders, to be on his path of self-emptying (p. 152), ascending to higher levels of integrated energy (pp. 173–5), and coming under the power of the consciousness of the *I AM* (p. 154), becoming Sons of God (p. 209), a new creation (p. 225), like him.

The unfolding events of the gospel, dramatic in tone and content, are contemplatively captured by the sensitive author, in the light of this *trial* by the Crucifier, of his disciples and others. The measuring rod of the Messiah is the *I AM* potential, which each and every human being is called to realize.

In the unfolding drama or trial, John the Baptist stands as the one, who is on the level of *buddhi* (integrated intelligence), which can see the workings of the Spirit, but not yet reached the *Atman* level, to speak the language of the *Gita*, employed by the author (pp. 22–4). Peter stands on trial twice, once when he denied Jesus, in his fear and forgetfulness, overestimating his own level of consciousnees (pp. 201–3) and the other time, on the shores of the lake, on the post-resurrection dawn, after the second miraculous catch of fish. This time over Jesus strengthens him to overcome his fear and take up the task of leadership of the followers of Jesus, after Peter shed his ego and pretensions to self-knowledge and allows himself to be known by Christ (p. 231). Other characters like Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea are also found wanting, as they are yet heavily weighed down by their egos, failing to follow the inner call, under tyranny and fear, psychological markers of the two dimensions of time, past and the future.

In the esoteric reading of the author, the role of the beloved disciple, traditionally assigned to John the Evangelist himself, is given over to Lazarus, whom Jesus loved (p. 131) as he was the closest to Jesus, in his death to the ego and in the fight against the Prince of Darkness and death. The raising of Lazarus from death, is read as an awakening of him by Jesus, from spiritual slumber, which Lazarus was aware of, but could not overcome by himself, except through the help of Jesus from Above, whereby he opened the door of *I AM* for him (pp. 134–8). The narratives

of the healing of the blind man, as well as the raising of the dead man, according to the author, indicate the need of spiritual awakening, for the cosmic purpose of fighting the powers of Darkness (p. 130). Mary, the sister of Lazarus, whom also Jesus loved specially along with her sister Martha, is portrayed by the author as having journeyed a long way in the way of sacrificial love, which takes one to the shores of *I AM* consciousness (pp. 215–20). Another enchanting portrayal is that of Thomas, the Doubter, who insisted on believing by touching the flesh of Jesus, but who was awakened by Christ, to the level of the Spirit, where Thomas is enabled to recognize the true nature of Jesus, see the Father in Jesus (pp. 223–4).

Intertextuality is at play throughout the text. Standing under it, the author crisscrosses between sites as diverse as the apocryphal literature like the gospels of Philip, Peter and Thomas, and Meister Eckhart on the one hand, and Patanjali, Plotinus and Eliot's *Four Quartets,* on the other. This intertextuality, apart from bearing witness to the wide erudition and the integral spirit of the author himself, has served the cause of what Raimon Panikkar would call *mutual fecundation*, in the context of his dialogical hermeneutics. It means that the experiential grasp of the teachings of another religion *brings forth, brings to light* the hitherto hidden treasures of one's own religion.

In the light of the *Bhagavad Gita* and *Enneads* of Plotinus, we arrive at new readings of the familiar terrain of the fourth gospel. Themes such as the Prologue, virginal birth, water into wine, temple and body, woman caught in adultery, betrayal by Judas, nay, even the motifs like crucifixion, resurrection and the bestowal of the spirit take on new meanings. Even if one does not read the entire book, a meditative and open-hearted reading of at least some of these themes, in the company of Christ, the *Yogi*, will open his/her eyes to path-breaking insights, if not lead him to an entirely transformative experience. And the book is just about that—being led by the Spirit to new possibilities and readings, without encaging the Spirit in a particular cultural mode and its expressions (p. 4).

The crucifixion of Jesus is read as a 'rite of passage to a higher state of being, an initiation and a payment, which alone will bring him to oneness with the Father' (Jn. 14: 28; p. 199). Further, 'his going away also seems to be required for the sake of the disciples' (Jn. 16: 73; p. 199). Seen against this cosmic necessity in the Spirit, of the death of Jesus, the role of Judas in the drama, leading to the death of Jesus, is being read

differently by the author. Judas was not a traitor or betrayer in the sense traditionally understood. Rather, he was the worthy one found by the Master, to be the custodian and deliverer of his tradition, the one who is to hand over the very heart of the *Yoga* of Christ to posterity. The role of Judas was to be that of a midwife of the spirit, at the end of Jesus' ministry, as John the Baptist was at the beginning of it. Unfortunately, in the final test, Judas, could not resist the temptation of pride and forgetfulness, the ultimate and essential weapons of Satan, who himself is a servant of God (pp. 197–8). Judas could not take on the mantle of Christ, as he could not yet undergo the sacrificial baptism of egolessness, following his Master's way. Though this reading of the crucifixion and the 'betrayal' by Judas do not seem much different from the traditional one, it lends itself to be a hermeneutical antidote to anti-Semitism, which has started raising its ugly head once more in several parts of the world, especially in the European Union.

After attempting at the contemplative re-reading of the mystical gospel, in which the original author of the gospel tried to capture the *I AM* nature of Christ, the Crucifier, in the forms developed beside the Jordan, Ravindra reaffirms the need for a re-writing/re-communication of the same Christ-experience. 'Other forms, developed beside the River Yangtze or Ganga, rather than by the River Jordan, expressed in the feminine mode of the Mother and the Daughter, rather than the masculine one of the Father and the Son, may be utilized by other writers of genius at other times and places to convey the Unsayable' (p. 244). This challenge is addressed by the author himself, as the attempts at a re-reading of the experience of the resurrection by the disciples, by making use of the concept of subtle bodies, prevalent in Hindu and Buddhist traditions, and more especially, the tradition of four-fold bodies (*kayas*) of Tibetan Buddhism (pp. 218–25). In the same re-reading of the resurrection, the author reaffirms the traditional role attributed to Mary Magdalene, highlighting her relationship of special love for the Lord, and of the Lord for her (pp. 215–18). This re-reading of the resurrection and Mary's role in it might suggest new frontiers for Christian eschatology and feminism.

This esoteric and mystical reading by Ravindra of the fourth gospel will surely continue to impel the Christians and others to be on the path of the saviour, to be crucified by him on the cross and 'to seek, until they find'. It will alert them to answer the call of Jesus, 'Your work is to allow me' and to always begin again and again, to come to the deathless beginning

of the *I AM,* of spiritual realization, of doing the work of Christ (pp. 230–4).

As I conclude the review of this inspiring and elevating book, which will be long remembered for its spiritual penetration and its potential for being a bridge between traditions, may be my Christian and subaltern leanings, urge me to place some queries to Ravindra in particular, and to potential readers in general. They are by way of *hermeneutical suspicion* or proposal for a *forward of the text,* to borrow from the textual hermeneutic of Paul Ricoeur. Was/is Christ and his teaching marked by elitism, even if one not based on pedigree and socio-economic hierarchy, but on the esoteric nature of his very teaching? (p. 195). Was it in the understanding of Christian faith that it was in accordance with God's will that the general masses should not comprehend the subtle truths and thus should not believe in Christ? Was it that Christ risked too much by trying to impart the higher truths to unprepared masses? (p. 149). I think not. Immersion into an *esoteric* reading of the text, to the complete exclusion of the *exoteric* reading, forces Ravindra to force elitism on Jesus and his teachings, in whom even the spiritually unsearching and the temporally marginalized found solace and liberation. Before the empire, it was dangerous to be a Christian (p. 180), precisely because it provided for the subalterns, the porter and the prostitute, a vista of liberation. The Word(s) become flesh, was not the monopoly of a select group of esoteric and elite Gnostics.

Ravindra's reading affirms that following the path of the spiritual is not to flee from the world. That would be negating the very logic of the incarnation of Christ. Internal ordering and the inner spiritual development of the disciple are a precondition for a concern for social justice, and not opposed to it (p. 180). The author's affirmation of the social concern of even the fourth gospel, which is mystical in nature, that too, in and through his esoteric reading, is commendable. But one is left wondering why a book written after the 1990s, and which is remarkable for its intertextuality, just passes in silence, over the emergence of Liberation Theology and its impact on the world's thinking and praxis, a phenomenon, which has been acknowledged from late 1970s. My firm belief is that *forward text* of *Christ the Yogi* stands to gain much by absorbing into its texture the stream of subalternity and liberation. This subaltern transformation of the text and texture of a bridgemaker text like *Christ the Yogi*, together with its searching author might give rise to a Hindu Theology of Liberation, as some hope and long for. It is indeed a hope which

must find fulfilment, for the world in general, and India, in particular, where the Pundits are wont to reduce reality, religion and knowledge to the enlightenment *in* and *of* consciousness, to the neglect of social involvement and praxis. Perhaps the author could take inspiration from the late George Soares Prabhu, renowned biblical scholar and theologian and others like him. They were indeed inspired by the theology of liberation, but went beyond the mere structural slant given by the Latin Americans. They took up the challenge of constructing a truly Indian liberative hermeneutical framework, by integrating the dimension of personal liberation, attained through the *yoga* which frees one from aggression (*dvesa*), fantasy (*moha*) and greed (*lobha*), as a condition for and an expression of the structural praxis. Indeed a home-brew in the recipe of the *Gita*, but socio-politically oriented, to empower the downtrodden of India, the tillers of the soil and the breakers of stones, with whom and in whom the God is in struggle (Tagore, *Gitanjali*).

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RISHI KUMAR MISHRA: *Before the Beginning and After the End (Beyond the Universe of Physics: Rediscovering Ancient Insights)*, edited by Vyvyan Cayley. Rupa & Co., in association with Brahma Vidya Kendra, New Delhi, 2000, pp. xxii + 568, Rs 395.

The book is divided into nine sections containing in them in all twenty chapters, plus one more of reflections, and two Appendices. Section One, 'Introduction', though not counted as one, is a chapter by itself introducing the main thesis of the book. Section Two, Introducing '*Veda*' and the *Vedas*, comprises the first chapter entitled: The *Vedas*, A prologue. Section Three, Beyond the Universe of Physics, contains eight chapters from the second to the ninth. The titles thereof are: the Beginning of the Journey; Prajāpati, the First Individual; Jīva, Īśvara and Parameśvara; Yajña, Meaning and Significance; Who is the I?; The Universe, Inside and Outside; Inside the Supraphysical Universe; and the Space-Time Continuum. Section Four, 'The Seer-Scientists and the Gods', contains four chapters from the tenth to the thirteenth, with their titles: God, Gods and God-

desses; Pure Intelligence and Absolute Consciousness; Vishnu and His One Thousand Names; Indra and Vishnu, Two Warring 'Gods'. Section Five, 'Vedic Insights and Their Practical Applications', has two chapters, the fourteenth and the fifteenth, with the titles: Harnessing Our Untapped Potential, Retraining Body, Mind and Intellect; and The Science of Health and Longevity. Section Six, 'Tools of Learning', comprises four chapters from the sixteenth to the nineteenth, entitled: Definitions, Concepts and Metaphors; The Word and Meaning, The Importance of Grammar in the Study of the Vedas; Language and the Seer-Scientists of the Vedas; Methods of Analysis. Section Seven, 'Distortion of Meaning', contains one chapter, the twentieth, called The Vedas, Distortion and Misinterpretation. Section Eight, 'Before the Beginning and After the End', contains an unnumbered chapter with the title, Reflections. Section Nine, 'Appendices', consists of two appendices, viz., One, Excerpts from Vedic Aryans and the Origins of Civilization, A Literary and Scientific Perspective by Navaratna S. Rajaram and David Frawley; and Two, Issac Asimov's short story, The Feeling of Power. Then follows the Glossary, the Bibliography, About the Author, and the Index.

The author of this work gained some acquaintance with ancient Indian scriptures from his father who was a Sanskrit scholar and religious practitioner. He had completely discarded that world as 'obscurantist' and was gripped by 'modern' ideas and philosophies, including atheism and Marxism. In the course of the thirty years of his career as a journalist, he rose to become the Editor-in-Chief of India's only left-wing daily, *The Patriot*, and the weekly newsmagazine *Link*. He was elected as a Member of the Indian Parliament (Upper House) from 1974 to 1980, and worked closely alongside the late Prime Ministers Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. In 1990, he became Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of the Observer Group of Newspapers, viz., *The Observer of Business and Politics*, published simultaneously from Mumbai and Delhi. He has visited France, Greece, UK, USA, Germany, Russia, Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Pakistan, Italy, Switzerland, Cuba, Portugal, Poland, Thailand, and China, among other countries. During these visits, he has met with presidents, prime ministers, ministers, academics, intellectuals and other public figures.

Contrary to the usual norm of a disciple searching for a learned mentor, the author was actually discovered by his Guru Pundit Motilal Shastri, who, having sown the seeds of powerful cosmic view, installed in him

deep insights into the lost meaning of the eternal Vedic Mantras. The disciple was shaken from his deep-rooted modern beliefs of atheism and Marxism. The guru, the teacher, turned everything upside down, and having sown the seeds of a powerful cosmic view, and ushering him into a new lease of life, he asked the disciple to go back into the world in which he was immersed, to internationalize what he had learned and then communicate it to the world. His was the most difficult task. It was a challenge to continue the process of learning, testing, verifying and deepening the knowledge without withdrawing from the demanding responsibilities and challenges of normal existence. This book is a result of over thirty years of that rigorous process.

His objective is to bring to light the great scientific truths contained in the Gītā. This book presents to its readers an additional dimension of union with intelligence, the Buddhi-yoga, focussing on a perspective of life within the universe as a fusion of awareness, action and intelligence. The work also indicates the paths and methods too achieve such fusion, not only for the individual but also within the context of the cosmos and its regulatory energies. Readers with a natural and keen interest in the pursuit of scientific thought (*vijñāna*) will be fascinated by this exploration of far deeper and broader perspectives as of the Gīta.

We are at present at a challenging juncture in human history. Modern man cannot quietly accept that we have reached a dead end in our quest to discover the ultimate reality of our existence. Overawed by the intoxicating advance of modern science, so dramatically symbolized by man's flight from earth into space and to distant planets, we have somehow missed out on the exhilarating results of the incisive inquiries made earlier in our history, viz., those into the mysteries of nature and the process and forces that create, sustain and ultimately subsume us. We have also ignored the laws of nature, living according to who would have ensured harmony amongst human beings and between humans and nature.

Several thousand years ago these secrets were unravelled and some of the eternal laws of nature were discovered, and handed down from generation to generation for the well-being of all. But, subsequently, some of them that followed in the course of the dark ages lost that great trail of scientific discovery and profound knowledge blazed by the great scientists of the Saraswati civilization that flourished in the catchment area of the gigantic river Saraswati, which dried up and disappeared underground following a prolonged spell of drought and natural calamities, during

which life in the area was totally disrupted and a massive relocation of the population occurred.

As to the cause of this grave tragedy in human history, the author has deliberately avoided exploring that aspect in detail, lest it might divert attention from the central objective of the work which is to give his readers a glimpse of the forgotten insights contained in the texts known as the Vedas, the most ancient records of human inquiry into the mysteries of the universe. They are endowed with profound thoughts and penetrating expositions, but have suffered grave and sustained distortions throughout history. In fact, the body of knowledge, consisting of four principal compilatory (*saṁhitā*) and six auxiliary (*vedāṅga*) texts known collectively as the Veda Śāstra, explores the fundamental mysteries of our universe. Using rigorous methods of examination and evaluation, the seer-scientists of the Veda provide us with answers to such questions as to how did the cosmos originate and what is its future, as to what it is made of, as to who is the 'I', the individual self, and as to what is its place in the universe. These answers satisfy the deeply felt need of human beings to understand the nature and purpose of life on earth.

They explain what maintains the existence of the cosmos and what will happen after it ceases to exist. They unravel the relationship between causes and their effects and between human actions and the fruits of these actions. They explain how energy is the foundation of matter and how matter is ultimately transformed into energy. They identify the nature and roots of ignorance and give us the means to remove them. They explain the principles, processes and factors of creation, of all that comes into being, in both microcosm and the macrocosm. They analyze what comprises the human being and how it is different, and in which respect not different, from other species. In this way they take us from the gross to the subtle step by step; from body to mind and then to intellect, explaining the basis on which all these three function.

They provide deep insight into the properties, faculties and characteristics of objects and beings. They lay bare the inner attributes of an individual and explain their interplay. They explain the true meaning of time, space and direction and their interrelationship. They reveal nature to us and the continuous changes which occur in it, simultaneously guiding us towards the unchanging foundation upon which these changes occur. Lifting the curtain, as it were, they make these insights meaningful for

life, weaving them into *Dharma,* an intricate tapestry of ethics, duties, functions and guidelines.

The viewpoint presented in the book differs fundamentally from the interpretation of the *Vedas* by the western experts, most notably the British and German 'Indologists' who have translated, interpreted and commented upon these texts. This work also breaks new ground in several important aspects, which differ from India's traditional scholarship of the subject. But since the debate about the sustained and widespread distortion of the Vedas extending over a very long period of a couple of centuries and explained concisely in a separate chapter, is not central to this work, it is rather left to other historians, Vedic scholars and experts.

This corpus of knowledge, known by the name of the *Vedas* is no mere exertion in metaphysics, philosophy or spirituality, as is obvious from the fact that it has led to the development of numerous subsidiaries of considerable practical importance, including subjects like anatomy and medicine, architecture and town planning, meteorology and astronomy, language and linguistics, music and dance, statecraft and economics, social engineering and jurisprudence, psychology and physiology. These branches of applied learning served one of the most ancient peoples with a highly developed civilization and culture for thousands of years. What they contain is knowledge of the supraphysical world, which is intimately connected with our world because the physical universe evolves from it and is an integral part of it.

This work thus attempts to introduce the reader to the unexplored treasury of humankind's ancient insights, opening up fascinating vistas, offering glimpses of the origins of the universe, and transporting us to a forgotten era when the human mind had attained dazzling heights and delved deep into the mysteries of existence. In the process the author has endeavoured to avoid the pitfall of merely expressing our own ideas in the language of a foreign culture. He has followed up this exploration of the Vedic spirituality in its pure form, by uncovering the real meaning of the terms falsely interpreted by Western scholars as 'gods' and 'goddesses', supporting them with extracts from the ancient texts. He has further examined the practical application of Vedic insights, using the two examples of the sciences of *Yoga* and *Āyurveda*, the traditional Indian health system.

Turning his attention next to the tools of learning prescribed by the seer-scientists, he has investigated the Sanskrit language as employed to

both reveal and protect the truths contained within the Vedas, as well as their methods of analysis. And in the chapter entitled 'Reflections', he has given us an experiential interpretation of the message of the Vedas and a fundamental appreciation of their depth and subtlety.

In Appendix One, Rishi Kumar Mishra has given an excerpt from the book entitled *Vedic Aryans and the Origins of Civilization: A Literary and Scientific Perspective* by Navaratna S. Rajaram and David Frawley. Thus, while exposing the background scene of the British and German scholars like Max Mueller and others, he also enlightens us to the views of distinguished American mathematicians and historians of the science, like the late A. Seidenberg who traced the unique origin of mathematics to a class of late Vedic texts called the Śulbasūtras. The very existence of elaborately planned cities like Harappa, Mohenjo-daro and others presupposes extensive knowledge of geometry going back well into the third millennium BCE. Thus the whole idea of Vedic mathematics as borrowing from Alexandrian Greece vanishes without trace. The importance of exactness of thought at the highest level of abstraction was recognized also by the Indians as the Upaniṣads as well as the Sūtra works of Pāṇini and Patañjali make evident. Many of the structures and cities of the Indus Valley presuppose considerable knowledge of geometry nearly a thousand years before Old-Babylonia and the Eyptian Middle Kingdom. The spiked wheel with seven fellies, the five spiked wheel, the three axles, the three hundred spokes, etc., commonly occur in metaphor in the Ṛgveda. Astronomy from its very beginnings was put to the service of the sacrificial ritual, making it an indispensable part of the priestly craft. As Le Mee says: precious stones or durable materials, like gold, silver, bronze, marble, onyx or granite, have been used by most ancient people in an attempt to immortalize their achievements. Not so, however, the Aryans. They turned to the most volatile and unsubstantial material of all, the spoken word, and out of this bubble of air fashioned a monument which for more than thirty, perhaps forty, centuries stood untouched by time or the elements. The pyramids have been eroded by the desert wind, the marble broken by earthquakes, and the gold stolen by robbers, while the Veda is recited daily by an unbroken chain of generations, travelling like a great wave through the living substance of mind.

In the Second Appendix, entitled 'The Feeling of Power', which is a short story by Isaac Asimov, which illustrates the phenomenon of the loss of acquired skills through their prolonged non-use. It is a metaphor for the

tragic neglect of the 'skills' of wisdom and knowledge in the Vedas concealed by the obscurations of relatively 'modern' scholars and thus denied us over the past centuries.

At the end of the book, the author has given an alphabetical Glossary of Sanskrit terms beginning with the word 'Abhidhā', and ending with 'Yogyatā'. It is followed by a Bibliography listing about forty-three books referred to by him. And, finally, he has given a very useful alphabetical Index, which contains the names of authors, works and topics referred to, or discussed in the book.

This book thus presents to its readers a rare opportunity to delve into the fundamental mysteries of the universe.

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā	
ई	ī	
ऊ	ū	
ए,ऐ	ē	(long)
ओ	ō	(N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ	and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ	
ञ्	ñ	
ण्	ṇ	(or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ऌ	lṛ and not lṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ	ḷ
ഴ	ḷ.
ൺ	ṇ
ൿ	ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seüṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.

(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.