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Contents

Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Questions and Problems

DAYA KRISHNA
Jaipur

Kant's doctrine of categories is well known and it may seem too late in the day to raise any new problem or questions about it. Yet, the power and fecundity of a great thinker perhaps consists in that it can challenge anew and arouse the reader from the dogmatic somnambulism that is the consequence of the way he has been taught the thought of a great thinker.

Kant's doctrine of categories is *not* 'independent' of his doctrine of judgement. Kant, it should be remembered, articulates first his thought about the subject in his 'table of judgements' and then, later, develops his doctrine of categories in his 'table' of categories. The latter, therefore, may be taken as 'founded' in the former and 'deriving' its specificity and content from the former.

The 'table of judgements', as given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*[1] is the following:

1. *Quantity*: Universal, Particular, Singular
2. *Quality*: Affirmative, Negative, Infinite
3. *Relation*: Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive
4. *Modality*: Problematic, Assertoric, Apodeictic (p. 107)

The 'table of categories', on the other hand as given by Kant is the following:

1. Of quantity — Unity, Plurality, Totality.
2. Of quality — Reality, Negation, Limitation.
3. Of relation — Of Inherence and Subsistence
   Of Causality and Dependence
   Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient).
4. Of modality — Possibility—Impossibility
   Existence—Non-existence
   Necessity—Contingency. (ibid., 113)

The two may be correlated in the following way:

1. *Quantity*:
   - Universal — Unity
   - Particular — Plurality
   - Singular — Totality
2. *Quality*:
   - Affirmative — Reality
   - Negative — Negation
   - Infinite — Limitation
3. *Relation*:
   - Categorical — Of Inherence and Subsistence (*substantia accidencet*)
   - Hypothetical — Of Causality and Dependence (*cause* and *effect*)
   - Disjunctive — Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)
4. *Modality*:
   - Problematic — Possibility—Impossibility
   - Assertoric — Existence—Non-existence
   - Apodeictic — Necessity—Contingency

A comparison of the two tables reveals problems which do not seem to have been paid sufficient attention for, if they had been attended to, serious questions would have been raised about Kant's doctrine of the categories. Even a cursory glance at the two tables suggests that it is the concepts of quantity, quality, relation and modality that appear to be more fundamental as it is under these that sub-classifications have been made in both the 'table of judgements' and the 'table of categories'. *Prima facie*, it is the 'table of judgements' which is more fundamental, as in Kant's own sequence the 'table of categories' is derived from it and there seems to be some sort of correlation between the two. Yet, a closer examination reveals problems and does not, *prima facie*, sustain the notion of categories as they have usually been understood in the context of Kantian philosophy.

The correlation between the category of 'unity' and that which is called 'universal' in the 'table of judgement', under 'quantity' is strange as even if a 'universal' judgement is taken as uniting the plurality or multiplicity under it, it does not do so either by destroying or denying the differences

and is, in fact, something that sums up in an additive sense, if the term 'universal' is taken to mean that which is conveyed by the term 'all' in the context of such judgements. 'All', it should be remembered, is of two types: one, where it is the result of an enumerative induction which however large, is still denumerably finite. The other which is a real 'infinity' suffers from all the problems of definition first and second, of induction. In both cases the 'all', as it quantifies the subject of a proposition, conveys the sense of a 'totality' and not of 'unity'. It is an aggregate or collection of single individuals who have been unified into a class by being brought together under it.

This, it may be said, is to take an extentional view of 'all' and not to see it as determined by connotation or property by virtue of which those individuals have been brought into togetherness in the class. This, however, would be to treat the term 'universal' not as quantifying the subject in a judgement, but to treat it as something analogous to a Platonic idea or a *jāti* in the Nyāya sense where the 'universal' is more real than the individuals which 'illustrate' or 'imitate' or 'participate' in it. As Kant is self-consciously obtaining his 'table of categories' on the basis of his 'table of judgements' he cannot treat the universal judgement under the heading of 'quantity' in the sense in which Plato used it.

The same problem seems to arise with his category of 'totality' which is the correlate of what is termed as 'singular' in the 'table of judgements'. To think of an individual as consisting of a 'totality' is not to see him/her as an individual for, to be an individual is not to be an aggregate of parts, but to have a unity which is not only over and above these but permeates them in an essential sense.

The division under 'quality' seems to raise a slightly different problem as, though there can hardly be any question regarding the correlation between the 'table of judgements' and the 'table of categories', in this case, there seems little justification for the nomenclature of the categories that have been given for them. There seems hardly any justification, for example, for the category of 'limitation' which itself is supposed to be correlated with what has been called in Kemp Smith's translation as 'infinite' in the 'table of judgements'. The German original for this is 'unendlich'. The term 'infinite' is very strange as it does not occur in the usual 'table of judgements'. Kant in his explication of the characterization has taken recourse to what in traditional logic was used as a technique or 'trick' for converting or changing a negative proposition into an affirmative

one. His own example is, 'The soul is not-mortal' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 108). Kant's reason for calling it 'infinite' in his own words is as follows:

> Since the mortal constitutes one part of the whole extension of possible beings, and the non-mortal the other, nothing more is said by my proposition than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain over when I take away all that is mortal (ibid.: 108).

The reason for calling the correlate category as 'limitation' under the heading 'quality' is, in Kant's own words, 'The infinite sphere of all that is possible is thereby only so far limited that the mortal is excluded from it, and the soul is located in the remaining part of its extension' (ibid.: 108). But a category of understanding in Kant, as usually understood, is that which *inevitably* functions in the process of understanding as the activity of 'understanding' itself is constituted by it. But if it is so, it does not seem, at least *prima facie*, that the category of 'limitation' occurs in this way in all acts of understanding as, normally, one seldom says that 'Soul is not-mortal'.

There is an additional problem in respect of what Kant has called 'Reality' which corresponds to 'affirmation' in the 'table of judgements'. If 'Reality' is the category that corresponds to 'affirmation' then it is 'unreality' that should correspond to that which is called 'negative' in the 'table of judgements'. It is the dichotomy 'real-unreal' which should correspond to that which is conveyed by 'affirmative-negative' in the 'table of judgements'. But it is not so. What corresponds to negative judgement is not 'reality' but negation in the 'table of categories'. That Kant is not averse to such dichotomous characterization is evident in his formulation of the categories under the headings of 'relation' and 'modality'. Under the former, he gives the following dichotomous divisions: substance-accidenc, cause-effect, and community (reciprocity between agent and patient). Under the latter, he gives 'possibility-impossibility', 'existence non-existence' and 'necessity-contingency'. Each of these dichotomies raises problems specific to itself, but the central issue that it raises for the notion of category is that, in case it is taken seriously, the category itself will have to be conceived as essentially 'dichotomous' in character. This, if accepted, will affect the nature of 'understanding' or thinking which would then necessarily have to be dichotomous in character.

Kant himself, in his discussion of categories, has complicated the subject by distinguishing between categories of 'quantity' and 'quality' on the one hand, and those of 'relation' and 'modality' on the other. Not only this, he has distinguished between general and transcendental logic and has suggested that as far as the latter is concerned, it is the third category which is important as it synthesizes in itself the other two which belong to the general logic alone. This, if accepted, would result in their being *only* four categories under the four headings as the other ones will be synthesized within these. There would then only remain the categories of totality, limitation, 'reciprocity' between agent and patient or 'community' and 'necessity-contingency'.

Kant's own observations in this connection are interesting; he writes,

> Further, it may be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first.
>
> Thus *allness* or *totality* is just plurality considered as unity; *limitation* is simply reality combined with negation; *community* is the causality of substances reciprocally determining one another; lastly, *necessity* is just the existence which is given through possibility itself (ibid., 116).

This reminds one of Hegel where the third term in the triad is supposed to be the synthesis of the thesis and the anti-thesis which are successive positions which thought inevitably takes in its movement. Kant, it should be remembered, also uses the term 'dynamical' to indicate the distinction between the categories under the headings of 'relation' and 'modality' from those under 'quality' and 'quantity' which he calls 'mathematical'. This division between the categories of 'quality' and 'quantity' on the one hand and those of 'relation' and 'modality' on the other plays havoc with Kant's notion of the category as, in principle, there can be no distinction between categories which renders some more important than the others. Kant, however, does not seem to have seen this, just as he does not appear to have realized what effect his observation on the third category as combining the first two would have on the notion of category itself.

Kant writes about the above distinction in the following manner, 'The first of the considerations suggested by the table is that while it contains four classes of the concepts of understanding, it may, in the first instance, be divided into two groups, those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group

with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.'

The categories in the first group I would entitle the *mathematical*, while those in the second group, the *dynamical* (ibid., 116). Kant seems to be suggesting in this formulation that while the categories in the first group, that is, those under quantity and quality relate to the *notion* of object as such, while those in the second group are concerned with relations between objects on the one hand, and their relation to the understanding on the other. Perhaps, what he wants to suggest is that the categories under '*relation*' relate to relation between objects while those under '*modality*' are concerned with the relations which these have to the understanding itself. The category of 'cause and effect', and of 'substance' and 'accidence' are obviously concerned with the relation that obtains between two objects or events and between a substance and a property.

The third category under this heading, that is, the category of 'community' or 'reciprocity' between agent and patient does not *prima facie* seem to make sense and Kant himself seems to feel some problem about it, particularly as it seems to be correlated to the disjunctive judgement in his system. He writes, for example:

> Thirdly, in the case of one category, namely, that of *community*, which is found in the third group, its accordance with the form of a disjunctive judgement—the *form* which corresponds to it in the table of logical functions—is not as evident as in the case of the others (ibid.: 117).

Kant takes recourse to a strange strategy to justify the notion of the category of 'community' along with that of the disjunctive judgement with which it is associated and which, *prima facie*, does not seem to be correct. He writes:

> To gain assurance that they do actually accord, we must observe that in all disjunctive judgements the sphere (that is, the multiplicity which is contained in any one judgement) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinate concepts), and that since no one of them can be contained under any other, they are thought as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, each other and so as determining each other, not in one direction only, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate—if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and conversely (ibid., 117).

The fourth heading under 'modality' contains the following categories under it, each of which is dichotomous in character and is related to its corresponding table of judgements given earlier. The dichotomous character of these categories seems, however, to be radically different from that which obtains under the heading of 'relation'. There the dichotomy is not exactly a dichotomy as the two are related essentially in such a manner that both have to obtain in order that the thought may complete itself. One can not have cause without having an effect and even a substance without having a property and even in the case of community, if we accept Kant's interpretation of the disjunctive judgement, the one half without the 'other' half. As against this, the categories under 'modality' have a different character as there one has to choose between the dichotomous pair as they can not simultaneously obtain either in thought or in respect of that which the thought is about. We can not think, in principle, that something is both possible and impossible, or that it exists and does not exist, or that it is both necessary and contingent. Nor can we think that something can have these characters simultaneously predicated of it. In fact, Kant himself does not think that the categories under the heading 'modality' can be treated at par with those under other headings, that is, 'quality', 'quantity' and 'relation'. He writes:

> The *modality* of judgements is a quite peculiar function. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgement (for, besides quantity, quality, and relation there is nothing that constitutes the content of a judgement), but concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general (ibid., 109).

This is in straight contradiction to what Kant himself had said about the categories under the headings of relation and modality as distinct from those under the headings of quality and quantity. According to him, as quoted earlier,

> those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group (that is relation and modality) with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding (ibid., 116).

Thus besides the earlier distinction between the categories under the headings of 'quality' and 'quantity', he now makes a further distinction between those of 'relation' and the ones under 'modality'. It is not clear

however, what exactly Kant means by the relation of copula to thought in general.

The situation becomes even more perplexing and strange if one remembers that, for Kant, the dichotomous category of 'existence–non-existence' occurs under 'modality' and so does that of 'possibility-impossibility' and 'necessity-contingency'. But, 'necessity', strangely, is for Kant not what is usually understood by the term in philosophical literature. Rather, it is a logical relation between the conclusion, the premises and results from the apprehension that the former 'follows' from the latter. According to him:

> The apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding, and therefore as affirming *a priori*; and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Since everything is thus incorporated in the understanding step by step in as much as we first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic—we are justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so many moments of thought (ibid., 110).
>
> [Der assertorische sagt von logischer Wirklichkeit oder Wahrheit, wie etwa in einem hypothetischen, im Vernunftschluss/das Antecedens im Obersatze problematisch, im Untersatze assertorisch vorkommt, und zeigt an, dass der Satz mit dem Verstande nach dessen Gesetzen schon verbunden sei, der apodiktische Satz denkt sich den assertorischen durch diese Gesetze des Verstandes selbst bestimmt, und daher a priori behauptend, und drückt auf solche Weise logische Nothwendigkeit aus. Weil nun hier alles sich gradweise dem Verstande einverleibt, so dass man zuvor etwas problematisch witeilt, darauf auch whol es assertorisch als wahr annimmt, endlich als unzertrennlich mit dem Verstande verbunden, d.i. als notwendig und apodiktisch behauptet, so kann man diese drei Funktionen der Modalität auch so viel momente des Denkens überhaupt nennen.[2]]

Kant, it seems, has forgotten that in case the first premise is a hypothetical judgement and the second is assertoric in respect of the antecedent in the hypothetical judgement, the conclusion *does not* reassert the assertoric in the second premise, but the consequence that was asserted problematically in the first premise. The necessity thus is seen as belonging to the consequence *in its relation* to the antecedent which was asserted

problematically in the first premise, and is now seen as a necessity, *because* of the positive assertion of the antecedent in the second premise.

Also, strangely, Kant seems to conceive of the major premise of the traditional syllogism in a hypothetical form when, traditionally, it was always conceived of as categorical in nature. This, however, anticipates the modern reformulation or translation of the universally quantified statement in terms of an 'if-then' implication which is always hypothetical in nature. The mistake, it seems, is there in Kant's original formulation itself where it is not clear whether he is referring in the conclusion to the antecedent asserted in the minor premise or the consequence asserted in the conclusion.

The problems that thus arise in respect of Kant's Doctrine of the Categories may be summarised as follows:

1. Is there a fundamental difference between the categories under 'quantity' and 'quality' on the one hand, and those under 'relation' and 'modality' on the other?
2. Is there a basic distinction between the categories under 'relation' and those under 'modality' as seems to be suggested by Kant's treatment of the latter?
3. What is the exact status of the third category in each group, which seems to have been specifically added by Kant to the list enumerated earlier by Aristotle? Is it a '*synthesis*' of the first two categories in the list and if so, is it to be treated as the only 'real' category under that heading. In case the latter alternative is accepted, will there be only four categories in Kant's Doctrine, that is, those of, totality, limitation, reciprocity between agent and patient and necessity-contingency?
4. Is the category of 'necessity' under 'modality' to be understood as Kant wants us to understand, that is, as a relationship between the conclusion and the premises in a formal deductive system. If so, what is its relation to the category of 'causality' which is supposed to correspond with the hypothetical judgement in the 'table of judgements'?
5. What shall be the status of 'contingency' in the dichotomous pair 'necessity-contingency' under 'modality' and how is it different from 'possibility' which also has been given under 'modality'?

6. How can 'causality' be an independent category in Kant if it is only the third category which is supposed to be 'real', as it is a synthesis of the first two and, if so, it is the category of 'reciprocity between agent and patient' which will be the 'real' category and not the category of 'cause and effect' which will, in this perspective, only be an abstract 'moment' in the process of thinking which proceeds from the first to the second category and then culminates in the third.
7. In case 'causality' is not an independent category what happens to the Kantian enterprise of 'saving' the enterprise of knowledge from Humean scepticism which it is generally supposed to be.
8. What exactly will be the relation between 'causality' and 'necessity' which was supposed to be one of the central problems which Kant is said to have dealt with in his system?
9. What exactly is the function of the category of 'limitation' under 'quality' and the infinite judgement which corresponds to it in the 'table of judgements'?
10. What exactly does Kant mean by the category of 'reciprocity' which corresponds to the disjunctive judgement under the heading of 'relation'?
11. What exactly is the relation between the categories of 'totality', 'limitation', 'reciprocity' and 'necessity'? How do they constitute the process of understanding as unless this is clarified Kant's notion of categories will make hardly any sense.

Besides these, there is the additional problem which arises even in the context of the usual understanding of the doctrine of categories in Kant. These relate to two questions:[3]

1. Whether all the twelve categories apply simultaneously in each act of understanding, or *only* one of the categories under each of the headings is so applied?
2. In case it is the latter, what determines the *choice* of the category to be applied in a particular act of understanding?
3. In case it is the former, how can opposed categories be simultaneously applied in the same act of understanding of the phenomenon concerned?

The doctrine of categories in Kant is one of the most discussed topics in the history of western philosophical thought since it was first propounded

and has exercised tremendous influence inspite of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. The questions and problems raised above suggest that the doctrine needs to be examined in detail so that a fresh attempt can be made at 'understanding' it once again.

Notes and References

1. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan & Co., New York, St. Martin's Press, 1963, p. 107.
2. Herausgegeben Von Ingeborg Heidemann, Philipp Reclam Jun. Stuttgart. 1966, p. 145.
3. These two questions were raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of the *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 3 and the following persons had taken part in the discussion:
   - Sri Kaushal Kishore Sharma
     JICPR, Vol. XII, No. 3.
   - Professor Herbert Herring
     JICPR, Vol. XII, No. 3.
   - Dr. Rajendra Gupta
     JICPR, Vol. XIV, No. 1.

Kant on Categories: Forward and Backward

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture,
Kolkata and New Delhi

At the very beginning of this discussion I must confess two things. One, I am not a Kant specialist. Second, given my other commitments currently, I do not have the time and attention expected of a serious writer to do justice to Kant's view on Categories and their highly entangled characteristics as found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR) and other relevant works. Even then in response to Professor Daya Krishna's [now onward DK] interesting paper, 'Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Questions and Problems' and as requested by him, I am making some ten brief remarks, which are hardly more than remarks, on this important subject.

One: many, if not most, of the problems raised in DK's short paper could be better understood if one bears in mind the Kant is a systematic, not analytic philosopher. To understand his main ideas in the Doctrine of the Categories (articulated in the First and Second Editions of the *Critique*), one is required, in fairness to Kant, to situate, his seemingly criticizable views within the system of Critical Philosophy. DK's treatment of Kant's Categories, I find, is almost entirely confined to 'Analytic of Concepts': Chapter I, which is concerned mainly, if not only, with Metaphysical Deduction of Categories.[1] In these pages, as we know, Kant is concerned with what is known as Metaphysical Deduction. Unless this form of Deduction of Categories is read together with the Transcendental Deduction of Categories, Chapter II of *Transcendental Analytic, Analytic of Concepts*, and followed by the *Analytic of Principles*, Book II, Chapter I, *The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*, our understanding of Kant's views on the complex subject tends to remain not only unclear but also confusing. I do not like at all to suggest here that a connected reading of Metaphysical Deduction, Transcendental Deduction

and Schematism removes all our answers to the question of the concerned problems.

Let me first express my unhappiness with Kant's choice of an awkward, rather inelegant, word like 'Deduction' in the related context of *extraction*, *derivation* and *application*. Close reading of his own text convinces one that these are the tasks which he took upon himself in order to discharge both forms of Deduction as complemented by Schematism as unified image-building craft and ascribed to imagination. It seems Kant himself was not quite unaware of the clumsiness of the expression. It is therefore in the Second Edition of the *Critique*[2] he offers some clarificatory considerations. Apparently it is from jurisprudence that he borrows the word, 'Deduction'. Jurists called upon to distinguish the question of right (*quid juris*) from the question of fact (*quid facti*) are expected to *prove* both. This matter of proof in jurisprudence is given the name Deduction. In the logico-epistemic context of the *First Critique*, Kant tries to show the way of establishing the *applicability* of Pure Concepts to objective reality and therewith their empirical significance. Application is intended to be construed as proof.

Two: I must briefly indicate why I am not in favour of reading Kant's Doctrine of Categories as found in Metaphysical Deduction (Book I Transcendental Analytic) in isolation without relating it to its subsequent chapters and the Transcendental Deduction (Book II, *Analytic of Principles*) and also Schematism (Chapter I of Book II). It must be noted that all these topics are consecutive and at times unnecessarily repetitive. It may be recalled here that much of the Metaphysical Deduction is a subsequent insertion (in the Second Edition of the *First Critique*) and, as stated earlier, followed up by the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism. This ordering of the faculties of the mind is intended to highlight the duality of understanding and sensibility and also to clarify how without their cooperation Categories cannot be brought to bear upon the empirical objects. Empirical judgements are due to cooperation between intuition and concepts.

Three: however, this is not to deny that the *general* functions of understanding can be looked into in relative abstraction from the modes of sensibility. In fact, formal logic addresses itself mainly to this task. While some writers credit formal logic as a complete account of those forms

under which we make judgements, irrespective of their content, many others do maintain that the very exercise to separate completely the forms from their content is fated to fail. A thought presented by Kant also widely shared is that these forms themselves provide us the cue to the necessities under which understanding is connectable with, and applicable to, experience. Ordinarily this investigation is not undertaken by the logician interested in ascertaining the truth-conditions of judgement and the formal validity of inference. By raising this issue Kant thinks that he has been able to derive 12 'Pure Concepts of Understanding or Categories'. Each of these Categories is credited to have an application in experience if true judgements of the forms are to be made.

Those who find the Metaphysical Deduction as marked by blemishes generally speaking, highlight the untenability of the supposed distinction between 'the formal' and 'the material' drawn by Kant. A logical study of confirmation, probability and epistemic modalities cast grave doubt on the advisability of the said distinction. The supporters of the logic of ordinary language also question this distinction from another point of view.

Once this supposed distinction falls through, the Kantian programme of the Metaphysical Deduction of Categories is sure to fail in its main mission. From their mere forms neither judgemental truth nor inferential validity can be reliably derived.

Besides Kant's claim that logical functions of judgemental features 'specify the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive invention of its power' has also been challenged. Apparently, in this extravagant claim Kant has been unduly influenced by Aristotle's logic and his *Doctrine of Categories*.[3] All types of empirical objects, particularly those dealt with by quantum physics, for example, are not amenable to the Categories enumerated by Kant following Aristotle, nor does this enumeration seems to be complete.

Four: the Categories derived in the Metaphysical Deduction are said to be pure because of their proclaimed *complete* abstraction from the modes of sensibility. Their origin is traced only to the faculty of concepts. In order to follow the significance of the Categories in their application to experience, requiring the cooperation of, and complementarity between, understanding and sensibility, one is expected to interpret the so-called pure Categories in terms of the general forms of sensible intuition. And in this precisely is the importance of Schematism, which makes the

transition from pure Categories to Categories in their application, bringing in the temporal implication of the pure Categories. The special importance of time is to be attributed because of its involvement in the premises of the reasoning of both the Deduction and Principles.

We may remind ourselves, at this stage, that Kant's aim is to show how *synthetic* judgements are possible *a priori*. According to his own self-imposed limitation, he has to do this job without resorting to the doctrine of *innate* categories or pure concepts of the classical, pre-Kantian rationalists Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff. Further, he has to show that these pure Categories are applicable to the empirical world and are therefore informative or synthetic. By *synthesis* he understands the act of putting different representations together and of grasping what is manifold in them. As synthesis cannot take place without representations, it is to be presumed that representations themselves are to be given empirically (for example, in physics) or *a priori* (in mathematics). It is to such a synthesis, to the act of putting different representations together in a unified connectedness, that Kant directs his attention in his search for the origin of human knowledge.

> Synthesis in general ... is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis *to concepts* is a function, which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so-called.[4]

The points to be noted here are three-fold, namely: (i) the *manifold* of pure intuition, (ii) *synthesis* of this manifold by means of the imagination, and (iii) categorical *unity* of synthesis due to understanding. None of these factors works in isolation but only in unitary connection, and what is most important to note in understanding the origin of knowledge is the hidden role of the concept which universally serves as a rule for holding intuition, imagination and understanding in their togetherness. Without this synthetic unity of our consciousness—though obscure or imperfect in our empirical self-consciousness—knowledge and its partly unified layers, cannot be made intelligible. The *generation* of intuition, *production* of imagination and *judgemental functioning* of understanding fall apart and fail to converge on knowledge of object if this principle of transcendental apperception is not presupposed. It is said to be presuppositional as it is

not derivable from any other higher level principle. The discerning reader of Kant can hardly fail to note that, notwithstanding his disavowal, his views of both understanding and imagination have traces of innatism in them. His characterization of the power of imagination as 'blind but indispensable function of the soul' and his emphasis on the *spontaneity* (or unconditioned freedom) of understanding and reference to the implicit and incomplete underpinnings of both imagination and understanding make the point sufficiently clear.

Five: (i) sense intuition, (ii) imagination, in both its forms, productive and reproductive, i.e. memory, and (iii) understanding are not isolable, still a separate power of judgemental knowledge. What explains their togetherness and sustains their functional efficacy is transcendental self-consciousness of the knower. Kant uses different expressions for this very basic idea, basic not only to his *First Critique* but also to the *Second Critique* and the *Third Critique*, namely, transcendental unity of apperception and the 'I think' principle. This principle, often proclaimed to be supreme by Kant, has two main aspects in it,—non-availability as an object of knowledge and its unifying contribution to make objective knowledge possible.

Kant speaks of three original sources, capacities or faculties of the soul which 'contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience [but] cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely *sense*, *imagination*, and *apperception*'.[5] To *sense* is ascribed the *synopsis* of the manifold *a priori*; synthesis of imagination contains this manifold and imagination is endowed with the capacities of forming schema or image, facilitating the application of categories to empirical objects; and the unity of apperception, being itself original and foundational in character, holds all syntheses together. All these faculties, though *transcendental* in their form are admittedly capable of *empirical* employment.

In support of his doctrine of the original synthetic unity of apperception, Kant argues to the effect that unless this principle, 'I think' accompanies all human representations, the representations as such, would not be thinkable. This amounts to saying 'that the representations would be impossible' or at least nothing to an enduring or self-identical person. This representation is an act of *spontaneity* and cannot therefore be ascribed to sensibility. He refers to it by different names, like 'pure apperception', 'original apperception', 'I think' and 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness'. Self-ascription of any representation is impossible without pre-

supposing this principle of self-identity.[6] Under this synthetic and *a priori* unity of apperception is subsumed the analytic unity of apperception. Analysis without synthesis makes no sense to Kant. Without this principle of the synthetic unity all employment of the Understanding turns out to be impossible, objective unity and self-consciousness remains inexplicable and even objective unity of the human understanding of Nature itself, the domain of scientific knowledge, remains an enigma.

What is more, without the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception, the sharability of our common understanding of the empirical world in general becomes problematic, if not impossible. The importance of this supreme principle is further argued by Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic.[7] There he explains it as the rational doctrine of the soul. The empirical doctrine of the soul, Kant claims, rests on 'the single proposition "I think" '. Without this principle, he apprehends, our thinking about ourselves would lead either to the mistaken *substantive* theory of soul or to the untenable *associationist* theory of mind. These two hypotheses are obviously rejected by Kant and mark his departure from Locke and Hume. The additional reason for him to subscribe passionately to this theory of self-consciousness is to uphold the fact of objectivity of knowledge and its intersubjective sharability. In his words, 'although the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed among many subjects, the subjective "I" can never be divided and distributed, and it is this "I" that we presuppose in all thinking.'[8] It reminds us, once again, that 'I', the supreme knower, Can itself be never *known* but only *thought*.

Six: I think, one should take cognizance of the Kant scholarship of the relatively recent past as found, for example, in thinkers like Karl Popper,[9] J.N. Findlay,[10] P.F. Strawson[11] and Jonathan Bennett.[12] All of them, deeply familiar with Kant's views and arguments, have more or less critically referred to his doctrine of Categories. Popper's main criticism of Kant's doctrine of Categories is that, though *a priori* in a rather weak sense, Categories are not to be taken as *necessary*, necessarily truth-ensuring, in character. The application of Categories to Nature cannot uniformly ensure the latter's *conformity* to the categorical framework as envisaged by Kant. Popper has a supporting collateral argument to the effect that the supposed unity or accordance between intuition (the sensible), imagination (the imaginable) and understanding (the judgeable), a fall out of transcendental deduction, must not be taken subjectively and literally.

Additionally, he knocks out the Kantian theory of transcendental unity of apperception, which seems to him a speculative superimposition from above. He is not against speculation as such but insists that it must be informed and regulated by what is empirically given in experience [Kant's empirical intuition]. He criticizes Kant's *purity* claim of Reason specifically from this point of view. The power of imagination moreover is not to be taken as neatly tied to the understanding above and intuition below. Imagination is credited with the character of creativity and explorative power which must not be confused with Kant's own characterization of imagination by 'spontaneity' or freedom due to the supervenient transcendental, 'I think' principle.

Disentangled from, (i) the 'I think' principle, i.e., transcendental unity of apperception, (ii) the spontaneity claim of imagination, (iii) order-imparting [space and time] forms of intuition, and (iv) the supposed unitary capacity of the triple synthesis (in intuition, in imagination and in understanding), the proclaimed power of the Categorical framework of Kant's 'Pure reasons' to make Nature possible, marked by its laws, appears to be weak, inadequate and open to challenge by the 'surprising' or 'unforeseeable' structures and sub-structures of Nature. Kant's hope that the mind succeeds in imposing its own framework on Nature was destined to be dashed by the post-Kantian development of science. Kant's own firm commitment to Newtonian Mechanics was uncritical, clearly justificationist in its all complexity and entirely.

The Categories of Kant, on Popper's interpretation, turn out to be only independent hypotheses purported to guide the scientist to map the anticipatable secrets of Nature, which are really there, and explore its yet-to-be disclosed and non-isomorphic structure. The Categories of Understanding and the Laws of Nature are not bound by any 'pre-established harmony' and that explains why the laws of one scientific (e.g. the Newtonian) paradigm are found to be invalid, at least partially, in other paradigms (e.g. the Einsteinian and the Quantum). The structures and substructures of Nature, as articulated in macro and micro laws, are not monotonously repetitive or replicative as Leibniz thought and in a different way Hegel believed. Leibniz and Wolff before Kant and Hegel and many Neo-Hegelians after Kant maintained that the human mind, a prototype of the archetypal Mind, makes Nature possible. Criticizing this pro-justificationist and uncritical approach, Popper argues that this facile generalization regarding the Mind-Nature relationship is not borne out by the

highly non-linear history of science. In effect, Popper's reformulation of the doctrine of Categories, criticizing Kant's views on the subject, is bound to remind one of Hans Vaihinger's *Philosophy of As-IF*.[13] Weaker surrogates of Categories are said to be 'regulative ideas' (Kant), 'hypothesis'/'conjecture' (Popper) and 'heuristic fiction' (Vaihinger), in that order. On Categories, Popper takes a stand that lies in between Kant and Vaihinger. Another interpretation of Kant's theory of Categories regards these as (historical age-specific) 'absolute presuppositions', which though deserving of serious attention have unfortunately remained neglected for a long time. Traces of this view of Collingwood are found both in Popper and Kuhn.[14]

Seven: the application of Kant's categorical framework may be profitably viewed both progressively and regressively, the words 'progressive' and 'regressive' being understood in a value-neutral and descriptive-epistemic sense. The question addressed is: how is the process of knowing (forward and backward) to be followed. In the progressive view, the forms of sensibility and imagination figure primarily. The regressive condition, rather the prime and foundational one, is transcendental self-consciousness. This foundational concept being a pre-supposition of cognition, is not itself available in our cognition. Yet without its working as a condition, the categorical framework itself cannot be applied to the empirical world, constituting it as an *objective* unity (of Nature).

The frequently heard maxim that 'understanding without sensibility is empty and sensibility without understanding is blind' may be easily refined without departing from Kant's overall epistemic apparatus as available in the *First Critique*, notwithstanding its serious limitations. If the progress of knowledge from self-consciousness via understanding and mediated by imagination is viewed in intuition, it becomes clear that there is a sort of continuity, although the supposed continuum appears stratified to Kant. It is on this ground that many sympathetic critics of Kant like Findlay highlight Kant's indebtedness to Leibniz and Wolff, specially the former.

But it must be pointed out that Kant, unlike them, drew a very important line of distinction between ontology and epistemology. His phenomenalist orientation, partly due to Berkeley and largely due to Hume, obliges him to reduce drastically, if not reject altogether, the ontological commitments of classical rationalist, including even those of Locke. In order to

firmly establish his credentials as a phenomenalist *via-à-vis* the world of science he dispenses with not only the ontological argument for God but also leaves behind (what he considers) the dispensable baggage of the body and mind as substances, defended by many thinkers from Descartes to Locke. But the left-behind ontological dualism of the predecessors reappears in Kant in the form of noetic dualism, the alleged divide between 'the phenomenal' and 'the noumenal'. The application of categories to the phenomenal world has been possible, at least that is Kant's claim, primarily because of its noumenal back-up, i.e., foundational and functional support of the transcendental self-consciousness. This support is not confined only to the level of understanding, but also makes its presence felt in imagination by its creativity and in intuition by its quasi-spontaneity. One has to recall here that in Kant's theory of knowledge, the role of sensibility is not purely passive. It is not purely receptive either, and that is to be attributed, though in a largely mediated form, to the foundational consciousness and its function.

Eight: it seems to me that for his phenomenalist tilt he should not be accused of positivism or radical empiricism. Kant's self-description that he is both an empirical realist and transcendental idealist[15] has certainly a point to it, despite his obvious ambiguity. If, on the one hand, he gives up the realistic claim of his epistemology, his position comes perilously close to some phenomenalistic features of Berkeley and Quine. If, on the other hand, he snaps his tie with *transcendental idealism* he cannot explain the unity of understanding, imagination and intuition and their conjoint application to the world of sense and science.

Kant's transcendentalism is certainly different from that of both Berkeley and Husserl. While Berkeley's God is existential and the perpetual perceiver of the phenomenal world, ensuring its objectivity, Husserl principle of Transcendental Subjectivity, though totally devoid of any existential import, is the growing (or horizonally expansive) ground of inter-subjective sharability of the world of all sciences, natural as well as cultural. In contrast, Kant's principle of understanding, whether constitutive or regulative, has no *actual* application without the given of the world of space and time in sensibility. If the said condition remains unfulfilled, i.e., the sense-given is not there, then pure understanding, aided by imagination, can only have the *pure* schema of *possible* experience.[16]

Kant's argument purported to block understanding's ability to access its own functional and transcendental pre-conditions is understandable. In jurisprudence it is said that the fountain of justice, God or King, cannot be made the subject of the concerned judicial process. An analogous consideration might have weighed with the juridically disposed Kant. Certainly, there are other considerations underlying his cautious steps *towards* the bounds of sense. Even more cautious is his approach to what lies *beyond* the bounds of sense. Or, one may say, he made no approach at all to the *beyond*, i.e., what is not given in sense. At the same time, interestingly enough, Kant cannot altogether do away with the idea of *transcendental object*. While one understands Kant's reticence about affirming the existential God in official Theology, one, familiar with his works on Aesthetic and Ethics, is persuaded of Kant's necessity for espousing the idea of transcendental object without which the very talk of aesthetic *judgement* or ethical *judgement* would make no sense. Additionally, it may be pointed out here that Kant, committed to empirical realism, cannot even foreclose the question *within* natural science. He faces the question: if underlying the empirically real there is not anything like transcendentally real, there is little sense in talking of empirical realism unless its distinction from, and relation to, transcendental idealism underneath or beyond it is not explicated.

Nine: the tension, which I indicate above, runs throughout Kant's theory of knowledge, at every stage of its progress and regress. For very understandable reasons Kant is not prepared to talk of, still less refer to, what may be called, transcendental realism. To him, the reals, which are truly transcendental, are not epistemically available due to the subjective conditions attending the categorical framework. This is because, as we are told, one can judge only what is *represented* in sensibility and of which one can make schema, image or, what may be called, model. Without schema and sense representation, it has been pointed out that the categorical framework as formulated by Kant cannot be applicable to any empirical object. The object which is *not* empirical, i.e., transcendental by implication, has no representation in sensibility and of this the knower cannot form any schema and therefore it cannot be judged. To put it differently, judgement is synthesis of representations, which can be applied. An object can be judged both singularly as well as generally, i.e., in terms of rule. On this issue, Bennett's examination of Kant linking him with

Wittgenstein (on *rule*) seems instructive. Bennett is one of those modern writers on Kant who liberally, not necessarily always very faithfully, draws on his predecessors and older contemporaries like Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume and his successors and contemporaries like Wittgenstein, Ryle, Ayer, Quine, Strawson, Quinton and Warnock. Bennett himself approvingly identifies Kant's transcendental idealism with phenomenalism. It is true that Kant's notion of bodies in space lends itself to this sort of interpretation. But there are several other parts of Kant's doctrine which prevent total assimilation of the objectivity of an empirical object under transcendental subjectivity. The case *for* assimilation cannot be made out at all without interpreting the paradigmatic subject, i.e., the self, as phenomenal.

This pro-Wittgensteinian programme of dispensing with the *reality of self* is sure to be rejected by Kant. He may be, in fact is, opposed to the suggestion of accepting the Lockean notion of self as a surd or 'know-not-what'. But, Kant, unlike Wittgenstein, is under a compulsion of recognizing self, admittedly as a presuppositional condition for epistemic synthesis, for making knowledge possible.

Strawson, himself a committed realist, is understandably critical of portraying Kant's idealism as a form of phenomenalism.[17]

Finally, the greatness and eminence of a philosopher does not necessarily consist in the perpetual tenability of all or even some of his doctrines and their supporting arguments. When the extensive literature on the Veda and Vedanta, the Pre-Socratics and Plato, for example, are recommended as classics for compulsory reading, it is nobody's contention that everything contained therein is correct and accords with modern knowledge in the received sense. And equally valid is the view that without reading the classical thinkers and the modern greats one cannot hope to have a clear understanding of the modern philosophy and philosophically informed scientific knowledge. Kant is great not because all his doctrines have survived the critical scrutiny of his successors including the modern thinkers and writers. I, for one, would hasten to add that Kant's own views spanning over five decades had undergone significant change as it would be evident from his works, for example *Universal Natural History and Theory of Heavens or An Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Entire World-Edifice* (1755)[18] to *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786),[19] *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1787),[20] *The Critique of Judgment* (1987)[21] and *Opus*

postumum (1796–1803)[22]. In *Opus postumum*, Kant tries to show, among other things, that by using the categorical framework and the concept of forces one can derive not only the most general laws of mechanics but also detailed categorization of the forms of matter and its forces. Intriguingly enough, in the latest stage of his life Kant returned to the most comprehensive themes of his philosophy and attempted to develop the final statement of the transcendental idealism. His observations like, 'the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy is that which unites God and the World synthetically under one principle' is bound to reopen his earlier commitment to noetic dualism. This is because the said 'one principle' is none other than human freedom. What he aims at establishing is that the world of our experience is organized by categorization and laws of our own mind, and that God is the representation of our own making, giving ourselves the moral law through reason.

The mechanical determinism which characterizes his early writings had undergone considerable change mainly due to his increasing concern with issues of ethics and religion. His sustained and repeated attempts to reconcile natural determinism with moral and spiritual freedom is clear from all his writings, particularly those of the last phase of his life. Some of his views on the realm of values, religion and politics, especially freedom, underwent so fundamental a change that he did not allow the publishing of many of his last writings before his death. For example, the voice of the passionate defender of freedom in Kant which was lustily heard in 1776 at the time of American War of Freedom and again in 1789 at the time of the French Revolution went off the air when the Prussian Government, headed by Frederick William, frowned upon his views on Church and Religion and the post-Revolutionary sanguinary events in France, largely due to Danton and Robespierre, leading to the *coup* of Napoleon (1799). To take another example, when Fichte in his extra-zeal to extend 'the spirit' of Critical Philosophy wanted to proclaim himself as Kant's true successor, rejecting the latter's fundamental distinction between 'empirical realism' and 'transcendental idealism', Kant openly dissociated himself from the idealism of Fichte and disputed his self-description as the consistent inheritor of the Kantian legacy. Fortunately Kant, who died in 1804, did not have to read Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*,[23] published in 1807, in which the former's *subjective* Categories of the Understanding was 'uncritically' extended to the *objective* World while

emphatically doing away with Kant's own cherished distinction between 'empirical realism' and 'transcendental idealism'.

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Synthetic Reason, Aesthetic Order, and the Grammar of Virtue

NICHOLAS F. GIER

Department of Philosophy, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho 83844-3016

Leibniz gave the name 'Combination' to what he considered to be the most important philosophical discipline: 'true logic' or 'metaphysics'.[1] This 'art of discovery', as he also called it, is synthetic not analytic. As Leibniz states: 'It is better to produce a synthesis, since that work is of permanent value, whereas when we begin an analysis on account of particular problems we often do what has been done before.'[2] As early as his *De Arte Combinatoria*, Leibniz envisioned a universal alphabet of human thoughts in which one could combine basic terms-concepts and achieve in the end complete knowledge of all things. The fact that Leibniz calls this synthetic logic, art, links his concerns with the art of the virtue aesthetics discussed later in this paper.

Kant also believed that synthesis rather than analysis was the first step in knowledge,[3] and Husserl followed Kant in maintaining that synthesis is 'a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness.'[4] Heidegger claimed that every time we use the copula we are representing a synthetic act.[5] Wittgenstein's central concept of a synoptic view (*Übersicht*) also makes synthesis primary. For example, he believed that a mathematical proof was an *Übersicht* that 'exhibits a fact of synthesis to us'.[6]

The etymology of the *logos*, the Greek word behind 'reason' and 'logic', shows that the idea of synthesis is at the origin of these words. The Greek *logos* is the verbal noun of *lego*, which, if we follow one root √*leg* means 'to gather', 'to collect', 'to pick up', 'to put together', and later 'to speak or say'. We already have the basic ideas of any rational endeavour. We begin by collecting individual facts and thoughts and put them together in an orderly way and usually say something about what we have created.[7] This will eventually lead us to connect logic and grammar in the second section.

Heidegger inspired me to look at the Greek origins of *logos,* but his emphasis on 'laying' does not come from the root √*leg*. Rather, it comes from the root √*lech* as in *lechos*, the marital cough, although obviously the idea of coming together is combined with lying down. According to Heidegger, the pre-Socratics understood *logos* to be the 'Being of a being',[8] that which made a thing what it is. In addition, *logos* as Being is a primordial 'collectedness' (*Versammlung*);[9] it is that which makes everything hang together and intelligible. Heidegger concludes that the pre-Socratics anticipated the transcendental function of Being as a Kantian condition for the possibility of experience.

In Section II we will see that Husserl and Wittgenstein share Heidegger's transcendental method and the concept of *logos* as grammar. Section III will link synthetic reason to aesthetic order and will delineate the differences between rational order and aesthetic order. Section IV will propose that the best use of synthetic reason is in value theory, in particular the aesthetics and grammar of virtue. This means that practical reason can be seen as the moral form of synthetic reason. Before all this, however, let us first develop the concept of synthetic reason more thoroughly.

I

Except for Parmenides the pre-Socratics did not appear to follow any logical principles. Aristotle thoroughly criticized them, especially Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, for this deficiency. It is, however, the synthetic nature of Heraclitus' *logos* and Anaxagoras' *nous* that I wish to make central to my argument. It is significant that Aristotle called his logic *Analytics*, so let us call the logic that conforms to traditional rules analytic reason, and let us call the mode of thinking drawn from the etymology of *logos* synthetic reason. Furthermore, synthetic reason is descriptive rather than prescriptive, a way to understand how people actually think rather than how they ought to think. Synthetic reason, therefore, is a natural ally with the descriptive method of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's phenomenology.

The Logos Christology of the Book of John, obviously influenced by Heraclitus and Philo, is an instructive example of synthetic reason. The famous prologue begins: 'In the beginning was the *logos*, and the *logos* was with God, and the *logos* was God.' The standard English translation of *logos* is Word, following the basic meaning of *lego* as to say or speak. In other words, God is the author of the logic of the world, and his son

is the expression of this logic. Furthermore, in the Genesis account of creation, God speaks, or as Leonard Bernstein has suggested, sings the structure of the world into being.[10] In Christian theology, Christ is the one who orders the world; he is the one who puts it together, gives it meaning, and then redeems it from its fallen state. As Paul states: 'For in him all things were created ... and in him all things hold together' (Col. 1:16–17).

With the rise of modern science and mathematics, the words reason and logic took on, except in the case of Leibniz and the Hegelians, a strict analytic meaning. The Latin *ratio*, the translation of Greek *logos*, became mathematical ratio, and modern *logos* became the rigorous deductions of formal logic and mathematics. Logic and reason were closely tied to incontrovertible proof, syllogism, and other forms of exact demonstration. Therefore, to analytic reason the God-man of the Incarnation is just as absurd as a round square and involves making the same type of logical mistake. Equally unintelligible is a cosmic *logos* reconciling all opposites in a grand synthesis.

Let us now define the concept of synthetic reason more carefully and in more detail. At the most fundamental level it deals with the order of the human mind and the structure of the world. By this definition, humans are rational because they are able to put the world together (*lego*) in a certain way, a way that makes 'sense' (*Sinn*) to them. An individual does not have to be able to do a mathematical proof or construct a syllogism in order to be rational in this sense. As we will see, for both Husserl and Wittgenstein all one has to do is to put word-meanings together in grammatical order and communicate them to another person.

Synthetic reason would obviously include mythological constructions, for this is still the predominant way in which people put their world together. Therefore, synthetic reason bridges the gap between *mythos* and *logos*. In myth we see the passive interpretation of *logos*: the world and its order are already laid out by God or a divine agent, or it is simply just there. Humans then are exhorted to conform to this pre-established order, and to celebrate this union through ritual and magic. These individuals do not actively put the world together; rather, they passively submit to a *fait accompli*. As Leibniz states: 'Human-combination can only imitate and imperfectly reproduce divine Combination.'[11] One etymology of the world religion is *re-lego*, with the clear implication that religion involves saying the creed or taking the sacrament over and over again.

The active form of synthetic reason is a modern or postmodern phenomenon, the best examples being artists of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Breaking away from religious iconography and traditional schools, modern artists actively shape new 'worlds' or new ways of looking at the world. Cezanne, for example, rejected the laws of perspective and replaced it with an innovative method of colour modulation. The active view is also found in contemporary physics where the difference between a particle and a wave does not lie in 'reality out there,' but lies in the human perception and instrumentation. Wittgenstein's synthetic reason recognizes the role of one's 'point of view' (*Betrachtungsweise*) or one's *Weltanschauung*. What we learn as children is a *Weltanschauung*, a historical-cultural way of viewing the world, a 'world-picture' (*Weltbild*) as Wittgenstein sometimes wrote. As he states: 'A proposition may describe a picture and this picture [can] be variously anchored in our way of looking at things, and so in our way of living and acting.'[12]

II

Wittgenstein's synoptic view and his idea of *Weltanschauung* are closely related and both are founded in the more general concept of grammar. Both Husserl and Wittgenstein believe that grammar is more basic than formal logic. When discussing the grammar of colour, Wittgenstein concludes that there seems to be a 'construction of logic which [does not] work by means of truth functions'.[13] Husserl also speaks of grammar at the most fundamental level where the 'questions of truth, objectivity, objective possibility are not yet relevant'.[14] In the unpublished, 'Big Typescript' of 1933, Wittgenstein state and 'phenomenology is grammar' and gives this discipline the same transcendental method as Husserl and Heidegger do: 'What belongs to grammar are ... the conditions necessary for the understanding of sense.'[15]

A good case can be made that Wittgenstein was influenced by Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, of which he definitely knew and most likely had read. In their early periods, both philosophers reacted so strongly to psychologism that they steadfastly maintained that the meanings to which words in ordinary language refer were objective entities, and that there were *a priori* laws that controlled their possible combinations.[16] Just as the logical syntax (=grammar) of the *Tractatus* represents the possible configurations of objects (=meanings), Husserl's laws of grammar 'provide

pure logic with the *possible meaning-forms*.'[17] These laws do not separate the true from the false; rather, they allow us to distinguish combinations of meanings that make sense (*Sinn*) from those that are nonsense (*Unsinn*). Therefore, at the level of philosophical grammar, logical incompatibilities such as round square and man-God are grammatically in order and represent units of meaning. Only ungrammatical phrases such as 'and king but' are *unsinning*.[18] From the standpoint of facts, however, a round square is an absurdity (*Widersinn*).

Sometime in the early 1930s, Wittgenstein moves away from Husserl's position, and this is perhaps the reason why he uses the word phenomenology only for a short time. (Wittgenstein did not realize that his revised phenomenological grammar had much in common with the linguistic phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.) It is clear that Wittgenstein gives up the idea of a universal grammar in favour of many different meaning worlds governed by language games and forms of life. Wittgenstein now calls the rules of grammar 'arbitrary' and 'conventional' and that which has sense corresponds to the rules of the language-games being played.[19] Meanings are no longer atemporal, ideal entities—meaning is now use. Therefore, we have the possibility of parallel lines meetings as *sinnlos* in Euclidean geometry, but *sinnvoll* in Riemannian geometry. The concept of indeterminate subatomic particles is without sense in Newtonian physics, but has sense in quantum mechanics. Each of these systems produce 'true' sentences, because truth and falsity depend on one's *Weltbild* or on agreement in 'forms of life' (*Lebensformen*).[20] Husserl's own distinction between *Sinn* and *Unsinn* allowed him to accept many different types of sense, but he would never have embraced a pluralism of truths.

III

Leibniz, Kant, and Husserl never gave up *a priori* rules of thinking, but Wittgenstein fully embraced the synthetic reason that we have so far delineated. There is obviously no advantage in this type of reasoning if we want to distinguish valid and invalid arguments or if we are to determine what the truly objective facts are (if this indeed is possible). As a purely descriptive method, one cannot expect this sort of result from synthetic reason. Merleau-Ponty, however, proposes that synthetic reason can become

the basis for an appreciation of cultures not informed by Euro-American analytic reason. He explains that it was Hegel who:

> ... started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason which remains the task of our century. He is the inventor of that reason, broader than [Kantian] understanding, which can respect the variety and singularity of individual consciousness, civilizations, ways of thinking, and historical contingency, but which nevertheless does not give up the attempt to master them in order to guide them to their own truth.[21]

Some of Wittgenstein's most bitter criticism is found in his 'Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*.' Here he berates Frazer for his use of analytic reason and his failure to properly understand the values of the non-European life-worlds that he studied. Wittgenstein believes that language-games and forms of life, regardless of their content and internal coherence, are autonomous systems with their own sense and their own ways of distinguishing between truth and falsity. As Wittgenstein told a class in 1932: 'A style gives us satisfaction, but one style is not more rational than another.'[22] We will appropriate this idea of cultural style for the aesthetics of virtue discussed in the next section.

While synthetic reason may not be normative for philosophical and scientific argument, it may very well be normative in value theory. Scientists working on the cutting edge go with their intuitions, putting together the most elegant and sometimes daring new theories. Synthetic reason and aesthetic considerations most definitely play a role in the origins of scientific theories, so Leibniz is correct to claim that the 'art of discovery' is synthetic. Scientific theories, however, must be eventually tested by appeal to evidence and formal logical rules. Artists and persons of virtue share the same creative origins but rightly resist any such testing by the canons of analytic reason.

Let us now relate synthetic reason to the distinction between rational order and aesthetic order.[23] (Here rational is used in the analytic sense.) By abstracting from the particular, rational order is ultimately indifferent to concrete individuals because it generates the rule of complete substitutability. For example, *p's* and *q's* can stand for any word in any natural language, just as the one physical atom can take the place of any other atom without changing the whole. Morally this idea of substitution finds its ultimate expression in the interchangeability of the sovereign in Kant's

Kingdom of Ends. An equivalent uniformity is obtained in the modern bureaucratic state where individuals are levelled and made abstract by social rules and regulations. Even libertarians who criticize the welfare state for these indignities share the same axiom of social atomism with their social utilitarian opponents. The social atom of classical economic theory can take the place of any other economic agent regardless of circumstances.

Aesthetic order, on the other hand, focuses on the concrete individual so much so that there can be no substitution and no interchangeability. This applies to the work of fine art as much as the person of great virtue. This means that something aesthetic is ordered primarily in terms of internal relations, the basic elements being dependent on one another. By contrast, physical or social atoms are externally related, independent from their environments. (The dependent relations of paired subatomic particles indicates an organic rather than mechanical model for contemporary physics.) Again Kant serves as the contrast in moral theory: rational autonomy requires independence from the emotions, the body, and the environment. Even though Aristotle is the source for the idea of rational autonomy, this actually applies only to the intellectual virtues and only when he holds that the highest good is pure contemplation. It is important to remember that Aristotle joined reason and the passions in moral virtue and he argued that these virtues are the unique self-creations of practical reason. Any view that ignores the constitutive role of the passions is bound to be numb (anaesthetic) and will fail to do justice to experience.

Theoretical reason would give us an arithmetic mean between excess and deficiency, and it would fulfil the criterion of universilizability in deontological ethics. Moral agents will have exactly the same duties, so moral rationalism also conforms to analytic reason's rule of substitutability. It should be clear, however, that such a theory cannot determine any individual action. For example, one might hold that it is always wrong to eat too much but only individuals themselves can find the mean that is right for them. (It is interesting to note that this decision is not simply a subjective whim, but it is governed primarily by objective factors such as body size, metabolism, and general physiology.) Aristotle saw moral virtues as relative means derived not from a universal moral calculus but from a careful process of personal discovery. Aristotle's *phronēsis*, therefore, could be seen as the moral expression of synthetic reason and its creative aspects further augment our case for an aesthetics of virtue.

Analytic reason establishes rational order by reducing the whole to a simple sum of parts, while aesthetic order is synthesized from particulars in such a way that its unity is organic and immune to complete analysis. Rational order is ruled by universal laws—either physical or moral—while aesthetic order is created by imprecise rules of thumb, by emulating the virtuous person or master artist, or ideally self-creation by practical reason. Rational order can be articulated in clear language, but no one can tell us explicitly how to be a good person or a great artist. Rational order involves a 'knowing that' whereas aesthetic order is produced by a 'knowing how'; the former can be said and cognized, the latter can only be shown in practice. Demonstrating the synthetic nature of Buddhist epistemology, David J. Kalupahana, says that Buddhist perception is a 'putting together and knowing,' while conception is a 'putting together and speaking,' and 'if they are things "put together" any attempt to discover essences in them would be futile.'[24]

Rational order is the result of what I have called the either/or dialectic of traditional logic. This dialectic commenced with Socrates and his insistence on speaking (*lego*) through (*dia*) issues and sorting out various categories thoroughly (yet another meaning of *dia*). David Hall finds it ironic that even though traditional dialectic vigourously sought out all differences and disjunctions, it is ultimately committed to sameness and not difference. As he states: '... dialectic (the presumed paradigm of "on the contrary" or "on the other hand") is made to serve the ends of communion ... its aim is consensus; and such an aim is, in principle, destructive of diversity.'[25] Hall's thesis is that only the principle of aesthetic order, with its focus on the situated concrete individual, can serve a new metaphysics that respects diversity and novelty. It is interesting to observe that Hall finds Hegel's synthetic dialectic just as inimical to diversity as Socratic analysis, while we have seen above that Merleau-Ponty promotes Hegelian rationality as one that can 'respect the variety and singularity of individual consciousness.' To further confuse the issue, it is only fair to admit that liberal democracy, a political philosophy based on social atomism, has been the most successful social framework for cultural diversity.

IV

Applying the concept of aesthetic order, Hall and Ames portray the Confucian sages as virtuoso performers who create their own unique style of

appropriating the social patterns (*li*) of their community. This achievement is both moral and aesthetic because it results in the embodiment of the good (*li*) and the personal creation (*yi*) of an elegant, harmonious, and balanced heat-mind (*xin*). In another paper on Confucian virtue ethics, I have argued that the Confucian concept of *yi* has instructive parallels to Aristotle's concept of practical reason.[26] It is also important to observe that the Chinese *li* and *dao* join *dharma*, *rita*, and *logos* as the great normative doctrines of world culture. In fact, neo-Confucian philosophy transformed the early *li* of social customs to a rational principle that makes everything the thing it is, something clearly equivalent to Heidegger's interpretation of pre-Socratic *logos*. More relevant to our topic is recent scholarship relating Confucius to Wittgenstein, particularly the suggestion that rituals of *li* can be seen as Wittgensteinian forms of life. As Hall and Ames state:

> [*Li*] are a social grammar that provides each member with a defined place and status within the family, community, and polity. *Li* are life forms transmitted from generation to generation as repositories of meaning, enabling the youth to appropriate [*yi*] persisting values and to make them appropriate to their own situations.[27]

Confucian philosophers believe that one becomes virtuous by choreographing every movement of one's life in a veritable dance of virtue. This means that sages literally 'image' the virtues in their bodies in what Flint Shier has called a 'physiognomic perception of virtue.'[28] Modern European philosophy has always held that since virtues are internal properties there can be no objective theory of the virtues. But even Hume agreed with the Confucians that we can clearly perceive the shame of vice and the glow of virtue. (Even though Hume argued that virtues were secondary qualities just as colour, sound, and taste are, secondary qualities are just as perceptible as primary ones.) The Confucians, therefore, anticipated the rejection of the Cartesian dichotomy of the inner and outer that is now well attested in pragmatism, phenomenology, process philosophy, and Wittgensteinian philosophy. Perhaps this is what Wittgenstein means by the enigmatic phrase 'meaning is a physiognomy', a motto that expresses his semantic holism and his doctrine of intentionality.[29] The clear implication is that meaning is based on aesthetic order rather than a strict rational order of words relating to objects regardless of their context.

Let us now take Wittgenstein's concept of style and the holistic grammar of forms of life as a way to develop an aesthetics of virtue. In his discussion of the physiognomic perception of virtue, Schier offers an explanation of why we experience endless fascination for Van Gough's *Peasant's Shoes*, but nothing at all comparable to this state in the same type of real shoes, even if expertly displayed in a folk museum. Schier claims that in the painting we perceive a unique 'style of agency' that captures us in a profound way that the museum shoes do not. As he argues: 'The deposits of agency in action and creation must be aesthetically relevant, not only as determinants of what we are to appreciate (sonnet, painting, etc.), but as objects of aesthetic appreciation in their own right.'[30] Schier's concept of style of agency explains the difference between the value of the fine arts and moral self-creation as compared to the value of craft arts of shoemaking, etc. In each we recognize a style of agency that is distinct and admirable on a different level than the manufacture of useful goods. Schier's argument augments our understanding of Wittgenstein's concept of style, giving us a way of seeing it as something unique, and it also allows us to go beyond the view of meaning as mere usage.

Returning to Wittgenstein's linking of style and rationality, we need to realize that he is speaking of cultural not individual styles. For Wittgenstein forms of life are culture specific not individual specific. (The exceptions appear to be hope and other specific emotions as forms of life.) This is part and parcel of what some commentators have called Wittgenstein's conservative cultural solipsism and what I have called his descriptive phenomenology of forms of life. Linked as it is to synthetic reason such a philosophy can only describe not prescribe or criticize. For example, there appears to be no Wittgensteinian critique of racist language-games and forms of life. The racist can simply reply: 'This is what we say and this is what we do.'

A similar problem confronts those who wish to appropriate Confucian philosophy for contemporary purposes. Confucius proclaimed that he was not an innovator and all that he wanted to do was reintroduce the customs of the ancient Zhou dynasty. Even though no one, even today's Chinese themselves, could make Zhou rituals the norms, commentators have located an idea of self-creation within norms that can be readily applied to contemporary ethics. This is the concept of *yi*, the ability to make a personal appropriation of *li*, that was discussed at the beginning of this

section. Interestingly enough, Confucius and Schier help the Wittgensteinian bridge the problem of cultural styles and individual agency, while Wittgenstein goes beyond the Confucians in embracing a pluralism of cultural norms.

The joining of individual style and craft excellence could be found in any number of examples. Even though judges interpret the exact same set of laws, their judicial decisions will have a very distinct personal style and character. Similarly, even though violin virtuosos are reading the exact same musical score, each one of them will give the piece a unique interpretation. We should assume that the dances the Confucians performed had a set choreography, but we could easily imagine each having particular styles as varied as all ballerinas do. A Confucianism aesthetics virtue is also just as role specific as these examples from the fine arts are. Even though the younger brother may have his own particular style of deferring to his elder brother, he has no freedom not to defer or take on other roles not appropriate to *li*. Similarly, violin players do not switch to the French horn while performing their concertos. Even within these constraints it is obvious that creativity is not only possible in active synthetic reason and its aesthetic products but also in passive synthetic reason as well. The means that there can be individual creativity within the most rigid normative structures.

Just as Aristotle's relative means does not lead to ethical subjectivism, Confucians maintain an objective and normative morality. Using 'right reason' (*orthos logos*) Aristotle declared that for actions such as murder and adultery there is no personal mean at all. Right reason also tells us that eating too much is always wrong, but the right amount is always a personal determination based on objective needs and conditions, such as temperament, body size, metabolism, and other physiological factors. The Confucians agreed with Aristotle: moral objectivity is founded firmly in the very nature of things. For them cultural *li* is the moral expression of the order and regularity of Heaven such that, as Confucius claims, 'Heaven is author of the virtue (*de*) that is in me.'[31]

A critic might respond that Confucius' appeal to Heaven simply does not answer the completely plausible alternative that social norms are conventions that have arisen out of millennia of social practices. One rule of *li*, specifying the material of a ceremonial hat (one that Confucius himself did not follow), is obviously purely conventional, but many other social norms are such because they have, as one reader of this paper

commented, 'run up against the hard realities of life.' Although Wittgenstein is not entirely consistent on this point, he once said that rules of a game are 'mere' conventions, but grammatical rules are not because they have an 'application to reality.'[32] Wittgenstein is more of a foundationalist than we ever thought when we remember that all of us stop 'when the spade turns' or when we discover the bedrock after the cultural rivers have removed their sediments. In *Zettel*, Wittgenstein admits that nature does ultimately have something to say, and it is clear that opposed to Heidegger's existentials some of Wittgenstein's forms of life have a biological foundation.[33]

When one thinks of the question, 'Which came first—moral rules or virtues?' the obvious answer is that virtues came first. Moral imperatives are abstractions from thousands of years of observing loyal, honest, patient, just, and compassionate behaviour, whereas moral prohibitions have come from negative experiences of the vices. One could argue that the expression of moral rules requires language and one could argue just as persuasively that virtues manifested themselves in prelinguistic human beings. (For example, strong circumstantial evidence for compassion among the Neanderthals can be joined with the hypothesis that they were unable to articulate basic vowel sounds because of the structure of their vocal tract.)[34] At the same, however, one can still appeal to the normative force of the universal moral law without giving up the priority of virtue. We have seen that Confucians can show Wittgensteinians how individual styles can be reconciled with cultural norms, while the Wittgensteinians can embrace the obvious truth of many different sets of cultural *li*. Finally, abstract universal law, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, could determine which of the specific *li* is detrimental to general human welfare. Perhaps we are now able to respond to the players of the racist language-game mentioned above.

Even if we have solved the problem of moral normativity, the critic might press another point: the view proposed here confuses facts and values and illicitly derives the Ought from the Is. These well honoured distinctions are the result of the dichotomizing tendency of modern European philosophy. Here subjects were distinguished from objects; the inner was carefully demarcated from the outer; and precepts were strictly separated from concepts. Both a Confucian and a Wittgensteinian could respond that these dichotomies are not found in experience but are abstracted from it. Confucian process philosophy and its rejection of absolute

existence—either material, mental, or spiritual—also undermines any firm distinction between the physical and the psychological. Buddhist process philosophy accomplishes a similar fusion. Kalupahana argues that if the ontological Is is defused so is the moral Ought, which is no longer 'an absolute command or necessity, but a pragmatic call to recognize the empirical existence and adopt solutions to whatever problems are associated with it.'[35]

Wittgenstein would say that each area of human life has a grammar, a set of mostly unspoken rules, and each of us would have a style of agency in carrying out those rules in the total game of life. The fact that Wittgenstein claimed that even a vulgar Neapolitan gesture had a grammar fits well with the idea of the physiognomic perception of virtue.[36] The grammar of virtue, following the Confucians, would be as subtle as the most elaborate choreography. Using Wittgenstein, Herbert Fingarette has argued that the best way to understand the importance of Confucian *li* is in terms of performative language and gesture.[37] Therefore, performance art should be explored as the best model for a contemporary aesthetics of virtue. Following the distinction between rational and aesthetic order, the knowledge here would be one of knowing how rather than knowing that. It is a grammar that can only be shown and performed and not cognized and said.

Returning finally to the aesthetics of virtue, the craft versus fine art distinction is neither a difference of kind nor an elitist hierarchy of the latter over the former. Rather, it is a difference of degree and there will be a continuum from craft excellence on one end to free normless creativity on the other. One could say that even the artists of the Renaissance and later periods remained within the cultural norms of their times. Only in the later nineteenth and twentieth century have artists broken completely with social standards. Here Friedrich Nietzsche and Oscar Wilde are the proponents of an aesthetics of virtue that break the bounds of what is culturally accepted. Nietzsche said: 'To "give style" to one's character—a great and rare art'; and Wilde exclaimed 'to become a work of art is the object of living.'[38]

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The Foundations of Modern Liberalism: Inscription of Art and Morality in the Perspective of Modern Metaphysics

BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA
Department of Philosophy, Lucknow University, Lucknow 226 007, India

The aim of the present essay is to establish two very simple theses.

1. The liberal vision of society is based on the inscription of art and morality within the perspective of modern metaphysics.
2. The liberal vision can be made actual only by going beyond that vision.

These two theses bring out the contradiction inherent in the liberal society. So in a way it is being argued that the actuality of liberal vision requires the delicate and fine balancing of contradictory elements. The meaning of certain terms used in the title and the statement of the first thesis should be understood: By 'art' we do not mean what one finds collected in museums; 'Perspective' is also not used in the sense in which it is used in Lalit Kala academies; By 'morality' we do not mean what our leaders preach. These terms are used in much broader senses here, for example, 'Perspective' is used in the sense of 'angle of vision'; 'Art' is used in the inclusive sense, which it had from Protagoras to Thomas Aquinas; art is any activity concerned with *making*. This sense of art is preserved in the word 'artificial'. 'Morality' is used in the inclusive sense, which it had from Socrates to Thomas Aquinas; morality is anything concerned with *doing* as distinguished from *making*. Morality in this sense includes politics as well. The distinction between *making* and *doing* will be introduced in the due course of our argument.

I. THE STATE OF NATURE

A part of our first thesis is that modern liberalism is based on the perspective of modern metaphysics and thus links liberalism essentially with individualism. Hence modern liberalism is in fact liberal individualism. What however, is the perspective of modern metaphysics? According to

the metaphysics of modernity the distinction between subject and object is central to cognitive experience. Only that experience has a cognitive function where the distinction between subject and object is available, so that one can say that the subject is experiencing the object. If in the context of an experience the distinction between subject and object is not available, then that experience has no cognitive role and is treated as mere feeling. Hence, this distinction can be said to define, distinguish, and identify the cognitive experience from other experiences according to modernity. The entire modern metaphysical tradition, which began with the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter, tried to clarify the nature of subject and object and the epistemic relation between the two. It is interesting to note that in spite of their differences both empiricism and rationalism analyzed experience at length in its epistemic role. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spinoza, and Leibnitz grappled with this problem of Cartesian dualism, but the tradition reached its zenith and culmination in Kant's *Critique Of Pure Reason*. In this *First Critique*, Kant tried to determine the transcendental condition of maintaining the distinction between subject and object.

Kant realized that to maintain the distinction between subject and object—subject standing in epistemic relation with the object—there is a necessity of accepting the fact of the object affecting the subject, i.e. the fact of receptivity in the subject. But according to Kant mere reception of manifold intuition by sensibility is not enough for a cognitive consciousness. These intuitions must be so formed and understood that it is an experience of object. The condition for this is that all experience be ascribed to a unitary self-conscious subject. The condition for this in turn is that the intuition be formed according to the forms of sensibility, i.e. space and time and that intuition so formed be understood according to the categories, the most important of which for us being the substance and causality, so that for Kant the object of epistemic experience is a substance in space and time governed by laws of causality. The subject is conceived as the transcendental unity of apperception, which is not only the self-conscious unity of manifold experience but also of unity in time.

Be it noted that the subject/object distinction of modern metaphysics is not the same as the conceptual distinction between the 'knower' and the 'known' inherent in the epistemic situation. It is more than that. According to modernity, the same thing cannot be the subject and the object simultaneously of any knowledge. But the generalized distinction does not

exclude this possibility. For the Nayāyikas the self can be both *pramātā prameya* of the same knowledge. Similarly, *dvā sūparṇā* are also identical but distinguished due to the limiting adjuncts of the one. St Augustine also makes a distinction between mind as knower and mind as known, yet it is one and the same mind in two different roles. Similarly, Socrates could exhort, 'Know thyself.' But this exhortation can make no sense in the context of the modern conception of knowledge since the knower and the known, i.e. the subject and the object have to be two, ontologically and can never be identical. We will be making use of this ontological difference between the subject and the object as accepted by the moderns as one of the premise in our argument.

Thus the perspective of the subject—subject as explained above—is the perspective of modern metaphysics.

Precisely at a time when the subject-object distinction was being articulated by Descartes (1596–1650) another master of modernity, Hobbes (1588–1679), was also developing a conception of civil society commensurate with the articulation of the cognitive experience. He was developing an idea of the individual in the state of nature from which society is constructed artificially through the individual's will and contract. In the contract tradition, the idea of the state of nature is an analytic postulate accepted without any arguments to be used as a premise to arrive at desired conclusions.

I shall try to develop the simplest analytical connection between the subject-object dichotomy of epistemic experience and a conception of the state of nature as Hobbes describes it, which was later taken over by Locke and Kant for developing their political philosophies of individualist mould. When any member of society takes the stance of the subject, i.e. conceives himself as subject to get knowledge of society; i.e. conceives the society as the object of knowledge, then he must reflect himself out of the society, out of all social relations, since the transcendental condition of the epistemic relation as determined by modernity requires that the duality of subject and object be maintained. To maintain the duality of subject and object, i.e. himself and society, the subject must conceive of himself as a being outside the society. That is to say when any member of society conceives of himself as the subject of the experiential relation of which the object is society, he must reflect himself out of all social relations, i.e. he must conceive himself as an individual who can exist

independently of society. This is the transcendental requirement of looking at society from the perspective of the subject.

Any member who by taking the stance of the subject reflects himself out of all social relations as also when he conceives of each member of society as a subject, he reflects each of them out of all social relations and hence conceives of them all as individuals. So the logic of the perspective of the subject leads inevitably to the collapse of society, the society is reflected out of existence, since each member is conceived as an individual. This is the reason why modernity cannot admit the ontological autonomy of society and admits only the primacy of the existence of individuals and thereby begets metaphysical individualism in philosophy. Together with society, by similar arguments, both tradition and history get dissolved as no one belongs to tradition and history.

The concept of individuals standing in no social relations to each other, and also without tradition and history, is the concept of the state of nature in political philosophy generated by the analysis of cognitive experience of society from the perspective of modern metaphysics.

So far we have shown how through the perspective of modern metaphysics when brought to bear upon society, we are led to individualism.

II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAKING AND ACTING AND THE INSCRIPTION OF ART AND PRACTICAL REASON IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SUBJECT

To examine art and morality in the perspective of modern metaphysics, we will have to look first at the history of another distinction, i.e. the distinction between acting or doing (*agere*, *πράττείν*) and making (*facere ποιείν*). To put it differently, we will have to look into the history of the distinction between *praxis* and *poeisis*.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle begins with the distinction between actions which are ends in themselves and actions which have ends different from these activities themselves and these ends are produced by these actions as consequences. The distinction is further elaborated as the distinction between *phronesis* and *techne* in Book VI of *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Phronesis* is practical reason and hence for Aristotle, ethical action is that action whose excellent performance is an end in itself and it is performed for no further end.

Let us begin with the relevant quotation from Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book VI:

> ... making and acting are different so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence they are not involved one in the other, for neither is acting making, nor is making acting. Now since architecture is an art, and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of capacity to make. Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and the practice of an art is study of how to bring something into being something that is capable of being or of not being, and the cause of which is in the producer and not in the product. For it is not with things that are or come to be of necessity that art is concerned, nor with natural objects (because these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting.

From this quotation it is clear that Aristotle is making a distinction between acting and making in a manner, which makes them mutually exclusive categories. For Aristotle, actions whose excellent performance is an end in itself and the actions that are performed for the sake of ends apart from them, form mutually exclusive categories. The former is the subject matter of morality while the latter is the subject matter of art.

The earliest distinction between making and doing occurs in Plato's *Charmides* where Chritias points out that making is not doing, a craftsman may 'make the thing of others' but at the same time be doing his own business.[1] To distinguish *ποιείν* (making) from *πράττειν* (doing) was a difficult job for early Greeks because *πράττειν* meant doing or acting but ποιείν was used for both acting and making. *τί ποιείζ* usually meant 'what are you doing?' But with a direct object (a house, ship, statue, etc.) it meant making or creating. To add to the confusion, έργα meant both deeds (as objects of *πράττειν*) and material 'works' as of a sculptor, builder, etc. (as objects of *ποιείν*), to say nothing of tilled lands.[2]

To distinguish acting from making is not to be sophistical. We know how Plato made use of the metaphor of art to rebut the various proposals about justice brought forward in *Republic* by Socrates' opponents, but he finally settles on an understanding of justice which is far from being an art, rather it is based on doing or acting (*πράττειν*). For Plato justice consisted in 'performing the functions of station' (Το *αϋτον πράττειν*). Aristotle realized the significance of this distinction and hence he elaborated

and used it extensively. For him, the political and the moral are concerned with doing or acting and not with making. The distinction between making and doing refers not to a distinction between the two verbs but to the distinction between two schemas of action, the structures of which will be elaborated now.

St Thomas Aquinas comments upon the point made by Aristotle in the passage quoted above in the *Summa Theologica* under the question, 'Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art'. He comments:

> The reason for this difference is that art is the 'right reason of things to be made', whereas prudence is the 'right reason of things to be done'. Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ, as stated in *Metaphysics IX*, 16, in that making (*facere*) is an action passing into outward matter e.g. to build, to saw and so forth; whereas doing (*agere*) is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. to see, to will and the like ... consequently, it is requisite for prudence ... that man be well disposed with regard to the end, and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. On the other hand, the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves, whereas art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite.

A little further on he writes, 'The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man.' In his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*, Aquinas again makes the point, '... wherefore Prudence, which is concerned with man's good (*human bona*) of necessity has the moral virtues joined with it ... Not however Art, which is concerned with exterior goods (*bona exteriora*).'

These quotations make it amply clear that art is concerned with making (*facere*, ποιείν) which results in modification of external matter, and morality has nothing to do with it, only the principles of evaluation of product are involved in it. Morality is concerned with acting or doing (πράττειν, *agere*) which abides in the agent himself and requires rectitude of appetite unlike making.

The idea of making as explained by St Thomas Aquinas became the basis for understanding the idea of production in economics, and the idea of 'action passing into external matter' was elaborated as 'labour being embodied in the external object' and it gave rise to the labour theory of value accepted by many economists.

What happens when this distinction is inscribed within the perspective of the subject? For this we have to call Kant as our next witness. Let us see how the distinction between making and doing gets elaborated in his writing. Kant elaborates the distinction between *facere* and *agere* in following words.

'Art is distinguished from nature as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (*opus*) from operation (*effectus*).

By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art, that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their creator that we ascribe it as art.'[3]

It is significant that for Kant 'making' (*facere*) is an action done with free will and hence it is properly a human action. But activities falling under the category of *agere* are not recognized as human action at all. This is an important consequence of inscribing the distinction between making and doing within the perspective of the subject.

But let us recall that Aquinas places willing (*voluntas*) under acting or doing (*agere*). Willing (*voluntas*) falling under acting or doing (*agere*) must be distinguished from willing falling under making (*facere*). Because of this shift of the category of willing from doing (*agere*, πράττειν) to making (*facere*, ποιείν) made by Kant there occurs a change in the idea of morality. For Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas, morality is concerned only with acting or doing (*agere*, πράττειν), but according to Kant morality is concerned only with making (*facere*, ποιείν) as the activities falling under *agere* do not qualify as human action since they are not done with free will in his view, rather they are merely natural operations. From Aristotle to Kant there is a great shift in the schema of how morality is involved in human action. This shift in the schema of morality is the consequence of the inscription of morality in the perspective of the subject.

The ground for this shift was prepared by Pico della Mirandola (1463–94). In *Oration on Human Dignity* (1486) this shift is apparent in his

report of God's instructions to Adam, which completely inverts Aquinas's position on the nature of moral action:

> Thou constrained by no limits, in accordance with thy own free will, in whose hands we have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the world's center that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, *so that with freedom of choice and honour, as though the maker and moulder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou mayest prefer*. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into lower forms of life, which were brutish. Thou shalt have the power of thy soul's judgement, to be reborn into the higher forms which are divine.[4]

Pico conjoins freedom with production. He presents the activity of self-limitation involved in morality in terms of 'making and moulding'. Kant inherits Pico's legacy.

So we have to understand these two consequences: what making amounts to when it occupies the whole space of human action ousting *agere* to nonhuman natural operations and what morality becomes in the context of this new understanding of what is a basically human action.

III. MAKING (*FACERE*, ποιεῖν) AS THE ONLY SCHEMA OF ALL HUMAN ACTION

To attribute an act of making, in the perspective of the subject, to a person is first of all to impute the consequences of this act for the future, that is who has made is also he who will admit the fault if any, in the thing made, who will repair the fault, who will bear the blame for the faulty product. In other words, he is the bearer of sanctions. He is brought into the dialectic of praise and blame for the product. That is to say the person is responsible for the ends he chooses to bring about as a consequence of his action.

Here we need to understand the dialectic of praise and blame associated with making properly. Let me quote from the *Summa* again:

> I answer that art is nothing else but the right reason about certain works to be made. And yet the good of these things depends not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this way or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman as such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with speculative habits. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry; even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we observed.

In another place in the *Summa* we read, 'Art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good ... wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art.'

Since the attribution of act of making to a person is to regard him as the bearer of sanctions in case the product is faulty, it requires placing the person before the consequences of his act, i.e. before the product. The person is referred back to the moment prior to his act of making as one who not only acted but also could have acted otherwise or who could have made otherwise or who could have given other form to the external matter, or who could have chosen some other end. This conviction of something being done freely is not a matter of observation according to Ricoeur. He is being declared after the fact, as the one who could have made otherwise, the 'after the fact' is the backlash of the attribution of the thing made to the person. He, on whom we put the consequences or the product, is declared free and we discern this freedom as already at work in the incriminating act. As Kant makes it clear in the third antinomy, a causal series of events already on its course requires, to explain the sufficient cause of its being on course, that there must be a spontaneous first cause without any natural necessity of causality.

> But since the power of spontaneously beginning a series in time is thereby proved, it is also permissible for us to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beginning themselves, and so to attribute to their substance a power of acting from freedom.[5]

Hence at this point of attribution of power to act otherwise that one can say that the person has committed the act of production. This movement from in front of to behind the responsibility is essential according to Ricoeur.[6] It constitutes the identity of the moral subject through past present and future. He who will bear the blame is the same as he who now takes the act upon himself and he who has acted. He posits the identity of him

who accepts the future responsibility of action and him who has acted, and the two dimensions i.e. future and past are linked in the present. The future of sanctions and the past of action of production committed are tied together in the present of avowal by himself and attribution by others. That is to say the ego remains identical throughout from initiation of action to bearing of sanctions if any. So the maker is conscious of his own identity. He is a self-conscious person.

The ego remains identical throughout and one is conscious of this when he conceives himself as making things in a world, which consists of objects, which are substances in space and time and are governed by the law of causality. This is the burden of Kant's transcendental deduction. The self makes things in the world by knowledge of causality operating in the substance of objects in the world, which becomes the basis of technology. Because of the kind of knowledge available to the subject, as shown in the *First Critique*, the subject necessarily acts as a maker as no other mode of action is permissible given the limitation on the knowledge.

Let us explain further. 'I could have acted otherwise', this avowal is the implication of the act by which one implicates to himself the responsibility of a past act. Hence this avowal is the avowal of power, i.e. I have the power to act otherwise or to give other forms to matter. This is the power of acting according to the representation of an idea in his mind. This power is the will. So production is an act of will as Kant has accepted in the passage quoted before. Will operates through knowledge of causality operating in the substance.

How does one detect this power? This awareness that one could have done otherwise is closely linked to the awareness that one should have done otherwise. It is because one recognizes his 'ought' that he recognizes his 'could'. 'Ought' serves as the detector: if one feels or believes or knows that he is under obligation it is because he is a being that can act, not only under the impulsion or constraint of desire and fear, but under condition of a law which he represents to himself. This 'to act according to *representation* of law' is something other than 'to act according to law' as such. The former involves will as power but the latter involves no such thing.

The will as power can be exercised only with the subject object distinction. The will as power is attributed to the subject and action passes as the form of the object, i.e. the action done by the subject produces change in the form of the object. So because of the argument given above will as power can operate only with knowledge of causality governing substances in space and time, which gives rise to technology.

The earliest and the most original elaboration of will and freedom in relation to power occurs in Augustine. The word 'will' is generally used in modern literature for free will as power which has been elaborated above. Kant uses the term *Willkür* for this kind of willing. When *making* is inscribed in the perspective of a subject it occupies the whole space of human action ousting other categories of action from that space; and the will with which an action is performed is the power to achieve the ends it chooses.

IV. THE SHIFT IN THE SCHEMA OF MORALITY

To find out what the shift in the schema of morality amounts to let us analyze the Aristotelian Thomistic notion of doing or action (*agere*, *πράττειν*) and its imputation to person. Aristotle has explained the attribution of voluntary and involuntary action in *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book III. Even though he elaborates the concepts of 'preference' (*προαίρεσίζ*), of deliberate choice, of rational desire, he does not elaborate the notion of freedom because for him all voluntary action need not involve *προαίρεσίζ*. It was only Saint Augustine who first elaborated the idea of freedom and will as power as claimed above. The word 'will' is generally not used when explaining the voluntary/involuntary distinction made by Aristotle. Now let us have a look at Aristotle's distinction of voluntary and involuntary action. Aristotle writes: 'Actions are regarded as involuntary when they are performed under compulsion or through ignorance. An action is compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind that the agent or patient contributes nothing to it, i.e. if a voyager were to be conveyed somewhere by the wind or by men who had him in their power.'[7] He further explains,

> Every act done through ignorance is non-voluntary but it is involuntary only when it causes the agent subsequent pain and repentance ... An act is not properly called involuntary if the agent is ignorant of his advantage for what makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in choice nor ignorance of the universal, but particular ignorance, i.e. of the circumstances and objects of the action for it is on these that piety and pardon depend, because a man who acts in ignorance of any such detail is an involuntary agent.[8]

And so, 'If an involuntary act is one performed under compulsion or as a result of ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be one of which originating cause lies in the agent himself, who knows the particular circumstances of his action."[9]

In this quotation from Aristotle it must be noted that for him an action done through ignorance is involuntary, 'only when it causes the agent subsequent pain and repentance', and this ignorance is the ignorance 'of the circumstances and objects of the action' and he further clarifies that on this particular ignorance 'pity and pardon depend'.

According to Aristotle voluntary action need not involve any choice. He writes,

> Now choice is clearly a voluntary thing, but the two words have not the same connotation: that of 'voluntary' is wider, for both children and animals have a share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and we call action done on the spur of the moment voluntary, but not the result of choice.[10]

According to the third century anti-pope, Hippolytus two stoics Zeno and Chrysipus

> ... also insisted that every thing is in accordance with fate; and they employed examples like this: a dog tied to a cart which it wants to chase will chase it and be dragged (*helketai*) by it, doing its own will but with necessity, viz. fate, and if does not want to chase the cart, it will simply be forced to. The same is true of men, if they do not want to acquiesce they will simply be forced to accept their destiny.[11]

In the story if the dog does not will to chase the cart, yet he is dragged nonetheless, then the dog is not free to will not to chase. Now, whether we call the will of the dog to chase the cart, if he so wills, as free according to the understanding of freedom explained earlier is immaterial. What matters is that it is a voluntary act according to Aristotle's idea. The thinkers who accept that will is compatible with the omnipotence of God generally have this kind of will (*voluntas*) in mind and they have to take the necessity imposed on the will (*voluntas*) by divine omnipotence in a sense which does not destroy this kind of willing. The necessity imposed on the will by divine omnipotence, therefore, cannot be understood in the sense of necessity as understood in the modernity, rather this necessity is more like a moral necessity, after all supreme being and the supreme good

is one and the same. When Aristotle is talking of the knowledge of a particular situation of action, then that knowledge is not to be conceived of as knowledge of the empirical reality of moderns, rather it is knowledge in the sense of the Socratic dictum, 'virtue is knowledge', which gets elaborated by Aristotle in the sense of *phronesis*, so that no one does wrong or evil knowingly, and hence no one does evil voluntarily, as accepted by both Socrates and Plato. Hence all wrongdoing is involuntary and hence done out of ignorance.

This particular knowledge involved in moral action is the knowledge of *nomos*, since settled *nomos* is the presupposition of *phronesis*. What is *nomos*? Nomos comes from *nemein*. In Greek, *nemein* is to assign, to apportion, to distribute, or to dispense. So originally *nomos* is the assignment contained in the dispensation of Being. Only this assignment is capable of supporting and obligation. It is this assignment of directions that are law and rule for man. For the original Greek mind, law was not something fabricated by human reason.

This kind of will (*voluntas*) operating through the knowledge of nomos does not depend on the idea that one could have done otherwise, rather it operates by knowing the necessity operating in the situation one finds himself in, due to dispensation of Being, and discerning this necessity one adjusts his will to be a harmony with this necessity, there by taking the originating cause of action on himself and the action abides in the self only, after all it is only self-adjustment and not a modification of the situation one finds himself in. This is how the act, which is a doing (*agere*), is performed. This adjustment of will or *voluntas* is not subsequent to knowing and understanding but part of or moment of this knowing itself.

In making, will is conceived as power to do this or that, i.e. one conceives himself as one who could do this or that. This depends on the perspective from a point in time when the action has already begun and the question is to whom this action is to be attributed. The answer may be an avowal by the person himself or the accusation by others.

In contrast, in acting the alternatives if any are presented as possibilities of the situation, about which the agent does not have full knowledge, and hence about which the agent has doubt and selection or choice is nothing but the removal of this doubt by gaining knowledge of the real possibility of this situation which the agent realizes in himself. This depends on the perspective from the point in time prior to the commencement of action.

So it involves neither avowal by the agent nor accusation by others at this point, rather one plunges directly into the action in knowing the real possibility of this situation.

In acting, the adjustment of will or *voluntas* is not subsequent to knowing or understanding involved in acting, but part or moment of knowing itself. Hence this knowing and understanding the situation is being and going together. The doing is the event of appearance of being through knowing. Just as one God is thought of as a Trinity of existence, order and motion, so the substantial unity of soul or mind, which is a reflection of trinity, exhibits existence, knowledge, and will as belonging together. To find one is to find the others also.

In this knowing, the consciousness involved is the consciousness of witness or spectator who is not an individual with a point view of a subject. The metaphor of Christ in the trinity of knowledge refers to this witness consciousness. Christ the martyr is the witness consciousness preserved in the etymology of the martyr. This consciousness of spectator is alluded to in the idea of Theoros, the Greek god who has no other function than being a witness to the sacred festival, from which Greeks derive the word *theoria*, which subsequently changed to theory of the moderns. In the Indian Vedic tradition also, the highest knower is the *sākshi cetanā* (the witness consciousness). Kant uses the idea of spectator in the very first paragraph of the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* to establish the unconditioned worth of goodwill. Utilitarian tradition also made use of this notion of spectator to justify the principle of utility. Be it noted that the spectator is not the modern scientific observer; rather the spectator is one who interprets, as one does in hearing a communication.

According to Augustine, the mind as witness by discerning the order of the situation, which encompasses the whole cosmos with its history hierarchically ordered on the scale of being and goodness, returns to itself, itself as a part of the situation, to pass judgement on itself as mind known and orders the love of the mind to adjust to the order of the situation. The mind has no option not to adjust and not to realize the natural order created by the God.

So in this kind of willing (*voluntas*), the knowledge of the particular situation encompassing the whole cosmos becomes the originating cause of action of self-adjustment in man.

In this consciousness subject and object coalesce. That is to say the agent belongs to the situation, the order of the God, and hence to the God himself. So knowledge of the situation, the order of God, the God himself is also self-knowledge.

In this kind of willing although the originating cause of action lies in the agent, yet it properly is the event of appearance of Being. When action abides in the agent it is event of being. Hence the agent is not a self-conscious being in the modern sense but a self who is completely engrossed in the task at hand.

The duality of mind, the mind as knowing itself, i.e. the spectator, and the mind as being known to itself form a never-ending circle of self-knowledge, which therefore is a task, but a task that is never fully achieved. This was how originally the moral action was performed.

Although originally morality was concerned with a kind of action that excluded making, with the inscription of morality in the perspective of subject it becomes concerned with making only. Hence morality loses its character of knowledge of necessity operating due to assignment of Being; rather it becomes self-willed side constraint both on actions and the ends, which are sought to be achieved as consequences of these actions. Be it noted that this 'will' involved in the self willing of the law is the inscription of *voluntas* in the perspective of subject and hence it is different from the *Willkür* i.e. will involved in making. Kant christens this new kind of will as *Wille*. When pure *Wille* is present it necessarily acts according to the law, because it could not have acted otherwise given its nature. But since the only mode of human action recognized by the moderns is the mode of making, the self-willed law is interpreted by the moderns as the law made by human reason. Though both art and morality relate to the same kind of action they relate to action differently in the new schema according to the moderns. That is to say art and morality do not relate to mutually exclusive categories of action any more but they relate differently to the same action. Art relates to action via the technically practical rules, which connect the action to the end sought to be achieved through that action and hence it gives rise to hypothetical imperatives only. So when we perform action for the end to be achieved as a consequence of this action, we relate to action in the mode of art. Morality relates to the same action as side constraint not to be violated and as constraint on ends that can be achieved. Since action for the moderns is modelled on making which involves *Willkür*, it is entirely the business of art, but morality that involves *Wille* is not directly involved in action as it relates to action indirectly. Kant explains the distinction thus,

> ... The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, in so far as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty *to do or to refrain from doing* as one pleases. In so far as it is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one's action it is called choice (*Willkür*) ... . The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject's reason is called the will (*Wille*). The will is therefore the faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action (as choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining the choice to action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; In so far as it can determine choice, it is instead practical reason itself[12].

So when we determine our choice for the sake of following the law disregarding the end to be achieved by the action chosen, we relate to action in the mode of morality and it gives rise to the categorical imperative. This is what morality becomes when it is inscribed in the perspective of the subject.

V. THE LIBERAL VISION

In the state of nature man is endowed with both *Willkür*, i.e. the power of choice and *Wille*, i.e. practical reason. The faculty of free choice makes it necessary to have society and the faculty of giving laws autonomously makes it possible to have society provided the free choice is exercised according to laws of autonomy.

Let us take a closer look at the conception of the normative will with its categorical imperative. The laws of autonomy dictated by *Wille* for *Willkür* is the law of kingdom of ends: so act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of kingdoms of ends. We bring the kingdom ends into existence by following its law of autonomy. Kant explains,

> I understand by a 'kingdom' a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity we shall be able if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings and also from all the content of their private ends to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also the personal ends which each may set before himself), that is, we shall be able to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principle.[13]

The imagery that is evoked by the metaphor of kingdom of ends as explained by Kant above is that of many individuals pursuing their divergent ends or goals but living together under common laws. This imagery follows from the new understanding of man as maker and the new interpretation of morality.

If only the right to liberty to pursue the goal of one's choice is admitted within the laws then we have a vision of a liberal society. We will see that Kant adds this liberty subsequently. Hobbes started with the right to this liberty in unlimited extent and later restricts its extent by the laws of nature. Although the extent of liberty that he finally admits satisfies no liberal hence they have not admitted him as having a vision of a liberal society, but the structure of society is exactly the same as that of a liberal society, i.e. individuals pursuing their own ends within the limits set by the sovereign who does not impose any single conception of the good but only restricts the choice.

Why has liberty become so significant? The answer is that the subject who has knowledge of objects necessarily conceives himself as a *homo faber* endowed with a faculty of free choice, who chooses his own goals and achieves them through *techne* as argued before. Such *homo fabers* in the state of nature necessarily encounter interference from other *homo fabers* due to their attempt to achieve their goals through *techne*. So each *homo faber* needs freedom from interference from others to achieve his goals. This is how freedom becomes the central concern of modern political philosophy. Such freedom can be enjoyed by *homo fabers* only if every one is willing to follow the principle of right: 'Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of every one else in accordance with a universal law is *right.*'[14]

What is the status of the liberal vision of society in the state of nature? To answer this question we have to understand the argument a little closely. All the important modern natural law thinkers like Hobbes, Locke attribute will and knowledge of law of nature to the new interpretation to individuals in the state of nature. But they give no argument for this. It was only Kant who realized that will and natural law is neither the object of cognitive experience or knowledge of the moderns nor has he proved

that it is a transcendental condition of the cognitive experience, so it must have an independent deduction. Although he had opened up the possibility it was only a possibility of will established by the third antinomy. For the *First Critique* 'will' remained a problematic notion. Kant laboured through the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* for a transcendental deduction of will. Ultimately, the transcendental deduction or the very heart of the deduction amounted to a single terse line in the *Groundwork*,

> I assert that every being who cannot act except under the idea of freedom is by this alone—from a practical point of view—really free, that is to say for him all the laws inseparably bound of with freedom are valid just as much as if his will could be pronounced free in itself on grounds valid for theoretical philosophy.[15]

The reality of freedom of will and the validity of its principle is realized not by entering into an epistemic experiential relation with the will but the very acting it out is its reality. When the subject that is an individual acts he brings the will together with its laws into being.

In the transcendental deduction of the will, Kant had proved at once too much which threatened to undermine his theoretical edifice. Not only is the reality of will realized in the very acting out of it but also the laws associated with freedom are being realized in this acting out. So in a way the deduction succeeds to prove the reality of will conceiving itself as making laws in a kingdom of ends. This is not what Kant had to prove. He had to prove the reality of an individual will and not a social will. If he has succeeded in proving the reality of social will then he has refuted the application of the angle of vision of the subject to society. But he accepts the idea of state of nature for the purposes of political philosophy, which depends on looking at society from the point of view of a subject. So how can he get out of this contradiction?

Kant gets out of this contradiction by bifurcating the will into *Willkür* and *Wille*: a distinction, which Kant's translators ignore; but it has given scholars of Kant a difficult exegetical problem of making sense out of this bifurcation. We have already explained the genesis of the distinction earlier, now, the logical basis of this distinction within the framework of modern political philosophy is examined. Kant takes *Willkür* to be the executive will, which chooses ends and executes them. He needed to prove the

reality of this will only if he wanted to be consistent with his individualism. But he succeeded in proving also the *Wille*, the normative will, the faculty of giving laws autonomously. This is the distinction of the will that is in being and the will that is a norm to be. This is the distinction that goes by the name of is-ought gap or fact-value dichotomy in the literature of modernity. This distinction is no doubt very essential to modernity.

When the *Wille*, i.e. the normative will comes into competition with empirical desires for control of *Willkür*, the *Wille* or the practical reason appears as an obligation and the idea of 'ought' emerges. What is objectively necessary according to pure practical reason is subjectively contingent according to *Willkür* affected by empirical desires and interests. This is how the normative order is conceived. So the liberal vision is what we 'ought' to realize in the state of nature. It is not in being in the state of nature.

Not only that, to bring in a Hobbesian distinction, the law obliges *in foro interno* only in the state of nature and it does not oblige *in foro externo* there. That is to say in the state of nature there is an obligation merely to wish to follow the law but there is not obligation to follow the law through external action. Hence the law does not exist in the sense that individuals follow it in action in the state of nature. Modern natural law thinkers conceive of the natural law in this sense, since the condition of following the law of nature do not obtain in the state of nature. Hegel's idea of *moralitat* captures this idea more accurately. In Taylor's words, 'With *moralitat* ... we have an obligation to realize something that does not exist, what ought to be contrasts with what is. And connected with this, the obligation holds of me not in virtue of being part of a larger community life, but as a rational will.'[16] Contrasted with this is what Hegel calls *sittlichkeit*, i.e. the moral obligation that one has to an ongoing community of which he is a member. In Taylor's words,

> The crucial characteristic of *sittlichkeit* is that it enjoins us to bring about what already is. That is a paradoxical way of putting it, but in fact common life which is the basis of *sittlich* obligation is already there in existence. It is in virtue of its being an on going affair that I have these obligations and my fulfilment of these obligations is what sustains it and keeps it in being. Hence in *sittlichkeit* there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between *sollen* and *sein*.[17]

So the status of the liberal vision of society is that it is not actual in the state of nature. But because of practical reason we are under an obligation to bring it about. It is an ideal for the establishment of which we ought to act.

VI. THE COERCIVE POLITICAL ORDER

As we have seen Kant uses the metaphor of kingdom of ends for explication of one version of the categorical imperative. It has intrigued Kant scholars as to why should Kant formulate one version of the categorical imperative in terms of what he calls 'Kingdom of Ends'. Why should the moral relationship among autonomous wills be modelled on the relationship that will be borne to one another by members of an ideal political association? The answer is that society can be generated from the state of nature if and only if the persons in the state of nature have an effective goodwill, i.e. *Willkür* following the categorical imperative of *Wille*; and this in turn requires the existence of monopoly of coercion. That is to say, society generated from the state of nature has to be a political society, i.e. a society based on coercion. Hence it has to be a modern state. Why?

According to Kant, individuals in the state of nature are unsocial.

> He also has great tendency to live as an individual to isolate himself, since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own idea. He therefore expects resistance all around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to others.[18]

In a Hobbesian vein, Kant argues, 'Through the desire for honour, power or property it drives him to seek status among his fellows, whom he cannot bear, yet cannot bear to leave.'[19] In the absence of coercive public laws by which each can be given what is due to him and secured against attack from others, the insatiable desire for possession or even power among human beings, enviously competitive vanity and social incompatibility reigns supreme. The state of nature of Kant turns out to be the Hobbesian state of war when men act by *Willkür*.

It is an empirical fact that human beings act in a violent and malevolent manner and that they tend to fight among themselves for pursuing the ends set by *Willkür* in the absence of external coercive sanctions. But Kant is not satisfied with this contention, for in his *Critique of Practical Reason* he had argued for the effectiveness of the respect for the moral law to determine action overcoming the impulse of empirical desires. So if individuals have effective respect for the moral law, then how can there be conflict? Or to put it differently, hadn't Kant solved the problem already? Isn't it the case, if everyone acts as the practical reason dictates, i.e. if *Willkür's* private ends are limited by maxims, which are fit to be universal law of nature, then the violence of nature can be avoided?

Kant gives a transcendental argument to show that why mere limiting of private ends of each by himself through the moral law cannot solve the problem of violence in the state of nature and hence the problem of existence of law also cannot be solved in the state of nature.

> It is not experience from which we learn the maxim of violence in human beings and of their malevolent tendency to attack one another before external legislation endowed with power appears, thus it is not some deed that makes coercion through public law necessary. On the contrary, however well disposed and law-abiding human beings might be, it still lies *a priori* in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings, people and the states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has his own right to do what seems right and goods to it and not to be dependent upon another's opinion about this.[20]

That is to say if every one is acting according to what he conceives as his moral duty then no one is secure from coercion of others, hence there is no law in existence in the state of nature. Both Hobbes and Locke prior to Kant also recognized the culprit to be this right of private judgement in the state of nature. So it becomes a prior requirement of reason or moral duty, 'to adopt the principle that one must abandon the state of nature in which everyone follows his own desires and unites with every one else ... in order to submit to external public and lawful coercion.'[21] This is the demand of *Wille* on *Willkür*. This is what the moral law or the categorical imperative commands persons to accept as duty, since it is the condition of making it possible to follow his moral duty for every one without coming into conflict with each other so that a kingdom of ends is possible.

The principle on which a public lawful coercion is based is the Universal principle of Right stated earlier: 'Every action which by itself or its

maxims enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.' The principle of right states the condition of the restriction of the individual freedom with the use of coercive sanctions in the civil society. Even though this principle puts a person under an obligation to restrict his freedom, it does not require that this obligation be recognized as a motive for so restricting the freedom. This fact makes the principle of right a principle of political obligation and not a moral obligation. That is to say Kant argued that we have a moral duty to take upon ourselves the legal duty and the universal principle of right is only an application of the universal principle of morality as laid down in the categorical imperative to the sphere of law or external coercive relations. So the vision of a liberal society is in fact a vision of a society in which members stand in mutually coercive external relation.

VII. THE HOBBESIAN SOVEREIGN

The all-important question now is how can this coercive political order be translated into an actual order? Thus far our analysis develops the argument by which vision of liberal society is arrived at. But—how does one abandon the state of nature of unite with every one else?—is the question that marks a turning point and shows how the actuality of the liberal society necessarily depends on elements, which are antithetical to the liberal vision.

The answer is given by Hobbes. To unite with every one else

> ... is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or an assembly of men, to bear their persons and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever he that so bears their person shall act, or cause to be acted in those things which concerns the common peace and safety, and their in to submit their wills, everyone to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: *I authorize and give up my right of governing to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition that you give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.*[22]

According to Hobbes the essence of civil society is, 'one person whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the ends he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.'[23] And for Hobbes, 'he that carries this person is called sovereign.'[24]

So we can say that according to modernity, subjection to a single sovereign is the ground of social unity. And as the act of authorization through the covenant makes it clear, the sovereign is above the law, not bound by law yet he has the supreme power to make laws, and here comes the idea of positive law. The law posited by the sovereign is the positive law of the realm.

Here it may be argued: Why should the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty be admitted within the liberal theory? Why not Kantian popular sovereignty, or Rousseau's sovereignty of the general will, or Locke's sovereignty of the majority? The reason is that all these theories presuppose the corporate existence of people in society while that is precisely what the theory of sovereignty is supposed to account for. That is to say these theories beg the question immediately. Only a Hobbesian sovereign seems to serve the purpose of accounting for the corporate unity of all individuals in the society within the conceptual resources of modern liberalism.

Natural law lawyers argue that although the sovereign lays down the positive law, yet the positive law cannot be binding unless it conforms to the natural law, since it is to make possible the following of natural law that the sovereign is instituted in the first place. So the positive law can have the force of law only if it conforms to the natural law. That is to say the positive law ought to conform to the natural law to be obligatory. But the natural law theorists must face the question of how to make the sovereign legislate according to natural law within their scheme of things. That is to ask: How can the sovereign be limited within the conceptual apparatus of modern liberalism? In their philosophy, there can neither be higher authority nor the right of revolution to make the sovereign conform to the law of nature. The latter option is not available since revolution is a corporate act and all corporate acts have to be authorized by the sovereign.

There is no history either to pin one's hope on it to produce the natural law state. There is no custom or tradition to limit the sovereign. The original liberal Locke, whom we recognize as the father of the theory of limited government no doubt failed to limit the real sovereign, i.e. the majority in his theory. And we also know how Madison in the *Federalist Papers* was worried about the tyranny of the majority when Locke inspired the founding fathers of the American Constitution.

We must face another more fundamental question, namely whether the sovereign can be established or state can be founded from the state of nature by institution in the manner described by Hobbes above. The answer is in the negative. To institute a sovereign by mutual contract is the moral obligation of each individual in the state of nature. Yet reason tells the individual that in the state of nature it is in his own self-interest not to discharge this obligation (The Empirical Argument). Even if it is in his self-interest to discharge this obligation what is the guarantee that others will discharge their obligation to enter in the contract (The Transcendental Argument). The condition of discharging the moral obligation will arise only if there is already a sovereign in existence. So the moral obligation to institute a sovereign through contract can be discharged only if there is already a sovereign in existence. Hence infinite regress follows. So the sovereign cannot be established by institution. And consequently, liberal civil society cannot be established by institution. What is the way out?

VIII. THE MACHIAVELLIAN POLITICAL ACTOR

Remember that this argument is going on in the consciousness of the subject who has taken the stance of the subject to society and conceives others as subjects and conceives them all as individuals in the state of nature and is still grappling with the question of how to create the liberal civil society. And Hobbes also supplies the answer that the institution of the coercive political order is just an imaginary analytical idea to determine what are its elements. Kant will also agree with Hobbes on this point that the state of nature is a hypothetical idea of reason and not an historical state of affairs. Actually, the sovereignty is established by acquisition or conquest according to Hobbes.

Hobbes of course tries to analyze the acquisition of sovereign power also in terms of contract which turned out to be a failure. It was Machiavelli who really understood the dynamic of the acquisition of sovereign power.

The subject who has taken the stance of the subject to society is the Prince, the individual with a will to power or will to found the republican state, i.e. endowed with *virtu* as conceived by Machiavelli. The person, who had taken the stance of a subject towards society, had merely conceived others as individuals but they were never individuals. They (excluding himself) were in society, a mere natural mass of society. The mass of society, a natural phenomenon was there in front of him to get knowledge of, the knowledge formed and categorized, the knowledge of causality operating in society in space and time, the knowledge of empirical necessity. It is only through the knowledge of empirical necessity of causality that will can operate, the Prince can operate.

The Prince wants to beat his own *fortuna* by the stick of *necessita*. The Prince wants to overcome the Greek tragedy that is being enacted with him by *fortuna* for which he comes out of the natural mass of society to take it in his own hands by the Machiavellian prescriptions. Machiavelli scholars have noted the lonely figure of the Prince buffeted by *fortuna*, deciding because of his own *virtu*, i.e. will or dynamic vital power to create and maintain the republican state with the help of *necessita*, the causal power, which is the means of bringing the sluggish masses into the form required by *virtu* to beat *fortuna*.

> It is the picture of Man, stripped of all transcendental good qualities, left alone on the battle field to face the daemonic forces of Nature, who now feels himself possessed too of a daemonic natural strength and return blow for blow. In Machiavelli's opinion, *virtu* had a perfectly genuine right to take up any weapon for the purposes of mastering Fortune.[25]

The morality of good will and natural law can come into play only after the state has been founded and secured and the sluggish masses brought into the form required by *virtu*, i.e. the masses have become plural individuals in a liberal state.

It is interesting to note that Machiavelli is the first thinker to cast his political actor, i.e. the Prince in the mould of an artist or an artificer. 'Clearly *homo faber* is the role in which Machiavelli is forever casting his hero.'[26] In Machiavelli's writings, the announcement of his prescription as to what the political actor has to do is generally preceded by either the clause beginning with the pronoun *whoever* (*chi* in Italian) followed by a verb of volition or an 'If' clause with a verb of desiring writ large. So for

Machiavelli these prescriptions—to use Kantian language—are hypothetical imperatives announcing technically practical rules. And then occasionally he passes the moral judgement on the same actions prescribed for the political actor. 'Doubtless these means are cruel and destructive of all civilized life and neither Christian nor human and should be avoided by everyone.'[27]

Before Machiavelli, no thinker took political action to be a *making* (*facere*). Rather it was taken to be a doing (*agere*). We have a clear statement from Aquina's *Commentary* on the *Politics* which is also faithful to Aristotle's thought:

> So our present science (politics) is a practical one; for reason not only knows but creates the City. Furthermore, reason can operate about things either as *making something* (per *modum factionis*), in which case its action passes on to the external material, as we see in the mechanical arts of the smith and the shipwright; or by *doing something* (per *modum actionis*), in which case the action remains intrinsic to the agent, as we see in *deliberation*, *making choice*, *willing*, and all that pertains to moral science. It is clear that political science, which is concerned with the ordered relationship between men, belongs, not to the realm of *making* or factitive science, or mechanical art, but rather to that of *doing* or the moral sciences.

But we have seen how Machiavelli has shifted the categories. And all subsequent modern political philosophers have followed him. Both liberal and non-liberals like Hegel and Marx have cast their political actors in the role of *homo fabers*. If my argument is correct then within the conceptual apparatus available to the modern philosophers, the liberal vision can be achieved only by political action based on Machiavellian prescriptions. Yet, that there is a great discrepancy between liberal aspiration and the Machiavellian prescriptions. While liberal vision is a part of modern morality, Machiavellian prescriptions are formulated from the point of view of art only. Not only that they contradict each other. The contradiction is due to the fact that liberal aspiration is based on the assumption that every one is an individual, while the Machiavellian Prince acts by dropping this assumption and taking only the Prince to be the individual subject and everyone else to be a natural mass of matter belonging to nature. Hence there is a glaring contradiction between the liberal vision and the model of political action to achieve it. No doubt the modern

liberals have paid more attention to the ideal and no attention to the political action to achieve it.

So we are left not only without any hope of embodying natural law in positive law but also end up being manipulated by the Prince. If our deduction is correct, the modern political actor is a *homo faber*, but *homo fabers* cannot succeed in establishing a liberal state.

The above argument shows the structure of the modern mind as it has developed over the centuries, and hence it must be part of every modern psyche. The political activism of a modern political agent undermines what he intends to bring about. Hence political action is a pretence for modernity and even if it is not pretence, there is a gap between the intention that we think we have and the real intention. How can this gap be closed? How can we achieve the authentic being to indulge in political action?

Staunch liberals like Kant explicitly reject Machiavellism. Yet, unwittingly in a passage Kant gives away the hidden Machiavellian face that lies behind the mask of modern liberalism. It is worth quoting the passage at length:

> The origin of the supreme power for all practical purposes is *not discoverable* by the people who are subject to it. In other words, the subject *ought not* to indulge in *speculations* about its origin with a view to acting upon them, as if its right to be obeyed were open to doubt (*ius controversum*). For since the people must already be considered as united under a general legislative will before they can pass rightful judgement upon the highest power within the state (*summum imperium*), they cannot and may not pass any other judgement other than that which is willed by the current head of state (*summum imperans*). *Whether in fact an actual contract originally preceded their submission to the state's authority (pactum subjectionis civilis), whether the power came first and the law only appeared after it or whether they ought to have followed this order—these are completely futile arguments for a people which is already subject to civil law; and they constitute a menace to the state.* For if the subject, having delved out the ultimate origin, were then to offer resistance to the authority currently in power, he might by the laws of this authority (i.e. with complete justice) be punished, eliminated or banished as an outlaw (*exlex*) ... .[28]

It is unmistakably the Machiavellism behind liberalism which is making Kant so nervous about the question of the origin of the state, be it liberal or non-liberal.

IX. REVISIONIST LIBERALISM AND NATION

How can the question of origin be blocked as desired by Kant? The question of origin can be blocked provided we push the Prince we have deduced back into the society from which he emerged to become an individual in the state of nature. Only by interpreting the transcendental ego as a social being can the question of origin can be blocked and the space for authentic political action be opened.

The early revisionist liberals and legal positivists made one such attempt. These thinkers realizing the difficulty involved in embodying natural law in positive law and establishment of sovereignty in the state of nature, criticize the idea of natural law, state of nature, natural rights, etc. as a figment of imagination and ignore the question of how to make the positive law conform to the natural law and the question of how to establish sovereignty or how to make a society of a particular form. They took the society as already existing. But they were handicapped because they accepted modern metaphysics and individualism. So the existing society turns out to be nothing more than interaction of individuals. If society is taken as an interaction of individuals then the identity of society must be based on the identity of the sovereign. That is to say, society is nothing but subjection of all to a determinate sovereign as argued before. Bentham is quite explicit on this point,

> Where a number of persons are supposed to be in the *habit* of paying obedience to a person, or assembly of persons of a known and certain description (whom we may call governers or governors), such persons together (subjects, and governors) are said to be in a state of political society.[29]

The laws laid down by the sovereign are the positive law of the land or the commands of the sovereign are the laws i.e. positive laws. These laws are binding independent of whether they embody morality or not according to positivists. But these thinkers face a problem from another direction. Sovereignty is of necessity unlimited if based on individualism alone. But a liberal society must have a limited sovereign. According to Bentham sovereignty can be limited by express convention, by religious

or political considerations, and by its division. Before him Bodin also argued for a limited sovereign. According to Bodin sovereignty can be limited by natural law, *leges imperii* and property. But these limitations create problems. If political society is defined in terms of subjection of all to a sovereign then the society cannot have laws or instruments which can bind the sovereign, and if the sovereign is limited by law or instrumentality of whatever kind then these laws and instrumentalities of society and the society have an existence and identity independent of the sovereign, rather the sovereign is created and limited by the laws and instrumentalities of the society. But modernity cannot account for such societies, which can have an identity independent of a determinate sovereign.

If my argument is correct then our prior belonging to a society with customs and history sustains the liberal political order. This society is the nation. From the very beginning of the emergence of the modern era, although theoretical philosophizing went on in terms of individualism and the structure of the modern state but the real burden of the social unity and identity was borne by the nation. The nation is a historical and political idea. Even modernity, individualism and liberalism by becoming national mores and ethos succeeded in establishing and controlling the sovereign or the state. Hence it was not by accident that the idea of nation-state emerged with modernity. Theoretically, modernity has no theoretical tools to understand what it means to belong to a nation or a tradition or a history, yet it cannot do without it unless modernity wants to degenerate into fascism. Fascism's appeal to nationalism (even this was not genuine) is not the same thing as the sovereign or state being sustained and controlled by the nation. Fascism by equating nation with state—even while advocating nationalism was advocating pure statism and the leadership principle became supreme.

So we must face the question what does it mean to belong to nation, tradition, and ethos or even to the world? This has become the paramount question in the postmodern era after the holocaust in Europe. This was the question that was uppermost in Kant's mind when the French revolution began for achieving liberty, equality and fraternity, the liberal ideals, even before he witnessed the reign of terror in France.[30] This was the question that Hegel tried to solve in his *The Philosophy of Right* after witnessing in horror the reign of terror that was let loose in the form of political action to achieve the liberal ideals.

To answer this question both Kant and Hegel had to go beyond the liberal foundations. We also have to move beyond liberalism to answer this question.

Let me end this essay with a word of caution. Liberal vision to be actual requires a fine balancing of state, which is an artificial political power structure, on the one hand and nation, which is a natural historical cultural solidarity, on the other. If the power of the state is used to *fabricate* a nation, which nationalism as a political ideology envisages, we render the nation impotent to control the power of the state. If the national mores and ethos become so entrenched as to be beyond the pale of the power of the state, then the state is rendered impotent. Both the alternatives spell doom for liberal vision since in the liberal vision, the power of the state must be limited and at the same time the liberal political order is envisaged to be a coercive political order in itself. India as a nation state suffers from both the maladies simultaneously.

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Capabilities and Universality in Feminist Politics*

KANCHANA MAHADEVAN

Department of Philosophy, University of Mumbai, Vidyanagari, Kalina, Santacruz (E), Mumbai 400 098

> In every society the degree of female emancipation (freedom) is the natural measure of emancipation in general.—Fourier 1876: 216
>
> ... the emancipation of women means not only establishing formal equality and eliminating male privilege, but overturning concrete forms of life marked by male monopolies.—Habermas 1987: 393

Recent critiques of modernity have inculcated a sensitivity towards cultural differences between the western and the non-western worlds. This in turn has generated a suspicion towards the effectiveness of universality in articulating the woman's question in non-western contexts.[1] Martha Nussbaum, however, goes against this trend to affirm the centrality of evaluative universalism for feminist politics (Nussbaum 1992, 202–46; 1995, 61–72; 1998, 775–76). The latter, she argues, could be gleaned from the historical backdrop of human activities without referring to metaphysical absolutes. Nussbaum has developed a universal conception of human functions, which she sees as especially relevant to the so-called developing countries. For a normative appeal to cultural differences could result in reproducing the deficiencies of a given cultural paradigm. In countries such as India, the prevailing traditional norms often prevent women from having access to a decent quality of life that is acquired through social functioning. Hence, in addressing the problem of gender parity in the Indian context, Nussbaum recommends a universal, or essentialist approach, which delineates the capabilities that are common to all, instead of focusing on differences.

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The following paper aims at interrogating Nussbaum's position. It begins with a short sketch of Nussbaum's good-oriented feminist theory. The paper proceeds to evaluate whether an emphasis on the realization of nonmetaphysical goals is compatible with the aspirations of feminists. It finally initiates a dialogue between Nussbaum's teleological approach and the procedural, or deontological approach, of Jürgen Habermas from the point of view of feminist concerns in India.

I. NUSSBAUM ON GENDER AND CAPABILITIES

Nussbaum adopts a universal notion of personhood, which following Aristotle, conceives of the human being as a potential for further development. The potential in question, consists of functions that would allow for personal continuity. Moreover, it is a highly inclusive notion of personhood derived from a socially shared tradition of myths, stories and imagination (1995, 72–74). The capabilities to function, required for the good life, do not atomize individuals into separate units. Instead, individuals are viewed as parts of the larger community, where their functioning matters to themselves and their community. In this respect, Nussbaum approvingly quotes Aristotle: 'Capabilities allow ... anyone whatsoever to do well and live a flourishing life' (81). Thus, against liberal individualism of the Rawlsian type, Nussbaum closely relates the community and the person (92–93). However, although Nussbaum takes the organic notion of *polis* into account, she rejects Aristotle's metaphysical underpinnings.

Capabilities

Nussbaum delineates two thresholds of functioning. The first aims at providing the very bare minimum for being alive as a human being: Anything below the first threshold is a life of abject misery (81–82). Nussbaum does not discuss this basic minimum level in detail, but only provides a few examples of those who have fallen below this threshold. Examples of people below the first threshold include: those in a vegetative condition having lost all consciousness; those who have lost the capacity to feel, interact and think with others; those unable to engage in practical reasoning and those who experience a very severe absence of mobility that makes speech impossible (81–82). According to Nussbaum, public policy should not merely provide for the bare minimum demanded by the above threshold, but should make life worth living. Most women

have, indeed, crossed the first threshold indicated above. However, they have not managed to attain the capabilities for a flourishing human life. Nussbaum's second threshold lists the following capabilities as ingredients of a worthwhile life and targets of public policy:

1. The capability to live to the normal end of life, rather than encounter premature death has the backdrop of death as the limit to human life.
2. All human beings have the capacity for a non-metaphysical experience of the human body in the need for food and drink, shelter, sexual desire and mobility. From this, Nussbaum culls the capabilities for health, nourishment, shelter, sexual satisfaction, reproductive choice and mobility.
3. The ability to avoid unnecessary pain, in order to pursue pleasure, is derived from the capacity that all humans have for pleasure and pain.
4. The cognitive capacities for perceiving, imagining and thinking provide the capabilities for the same.
5. The ability to have attachments, to persons and things outside oneself, is derived from the limit of vulnerability as infants and subsequent growth through care.
6. The capability to form a specific conception of good with regard to one's own life is derived from the capacity for practical reasoning.
7. The capacity for affiliation with other human beings leads to the ability to be involved with others in social interaction.
8. The capacity for relatedness with the environment and other animal species supplies resources for the ability to live in concerned relation with the environment.
9. The capacity for leisure and humour implies the ability to the same.
10. All human beings have a capacity for separateness from others. Hence, rather than fuse all individual identities together, their distinct identities should be maintained. This provides the basis for the capability to live life without interference from others in personal choices such as speech, marriage, reproduction and employment.

10a. There is also, among human beings, a capacity for strong separateness. Further, this capacity is the outcome of all societies

> fostering a sense of belonging that is not directly shared with all others. This provides the backdrop for the ability to cultivate personal property, in balance with the demands for social equality, instrumental for adequate functioning (76–80, 83–85).

In the above working list, the capabilities articulate a conception of the good on the basis of capacities that are already given to human beings. The list, which is both evaluative and revisable, provides the basis for developing a sense of autonomy, dignity and emotional well-being necessary for being a person (86).

The individual and the community, according to Nussbaum, have a reciprocal link. Hence, the malfunctioning of capabilities, as in bad health or nutrition, demands a political responsibility on the part of the social order. Nussbaum sees social inequality as the outcome of capability failure, which is exemplified in the marginalization of women (96–104). Hence, according to Nussbaum, any kind of systematic subordination of ethnic groups etc. is incompatible with the acquisition of such an equality in capabilities. Women have been prevented from acquiring the second threshold of capabilities for centuries as a result, both women and society exhibit a lack of functioning abilities. A flourishing human life demands that the central goal of all public planning should be the enhancement of the second threshold of capabilities (86–92). Further, like the Rawlsian difference principle, Nussbaum concludes that any inequality in distribution above the threshold should be tolerated, only if it enables people to cross the threshold.

Indian Context

Women in developing countries such as India and Bangladesh have acute experiences of the lack of capabilities. According to Nussbaum, this is because they face many cultural obstacles that inhibit their reaching the second threshold (66–67, 91–92, 94, 100, 102). Nussbaum gives the examples of a Bangladeshi woman Saleha Begum, and an Indian woman Metha Bai, to show how the distribution of capabilities matter (91). Saleha Begum after a certain amount of struggle on the domestic front, exercised her right to work to get herself salaried employment that provided her with better capabilities. Metha Bai's family, on the other hand, has prevented her from working. As a result, she has not been able to acquire the necessary capabilities for an autonomous and dignified life. Nussbaum fears that she would become one of the missing women some day.[2] Hence,

Nussbaum advises women to fight for participation in the workforce by resisting the culturally held belief that the deprivation of capabilities is natural. According to Nussbaum, human capabilities exert a moral claim to be developed. Those who do not develop capabilities,

> are like actors who never get to go on the stage, or a musical score that is never performed. Their very being makes forward reference to functioning ... we believe that certain human endowments have a claim to be assisted in developing, and exert that claim on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on government (88).

Hence, provisions should be made for social support, whereby material, educational and other capabilities are provided especially to women.

Nussbaum's approach is valuable in many ways. It concentrates on the substantive differences of capabilities that exist between women and men. Hence, unlike liberal theory, it pays heed to the socialization processes that that underlie gender differences and can, hence, address gender parity in historical terms. Secondly, Nussbaum's stress on universality is also valuable. For it does not view the differences between men and women, or the cultural differences among women as automatically liberating. Nussbaum perceptively recognizes that differences could often produce a low quality of life for women. In the case of India, cultural specificity has often been a temptation for feminists who are critical of western imperialism. Nevertheless, a large part of the affirmation of cultural specificity ignores how women are oppressed by it. The example of Roop Kanwar's sati shows how tradition comes at a very severe price for women. The accused party in the Roop Kanwar sati case have been acquitted by a court of law.[3] Hence, a distinction between valid and invalid practices should be made regardless of cultural specificity. Feminist politics, in any cultural context, demands such a distinction, in its attempt to transcend the socially accepted oppressive practices. Thus, Nussbaum is certainly on track in recognizing the need for a universal criterion that would allow for a critical evaluation of culturally prevalent norms.

However, it is precisely due to these constructive points that Nussbaum's identification of universality with essentialism becomes superfluous. Cross-cultural evaluation of validity is conducted by understanding gender as a social construct in the presence of cultural differences. This reveals that the notion of universal validity need not be a fixed essence. Nussbaum's position, moreover, has many dilemmas from the perspective of a feminism

that seeks to reorganize society along the lines of justice. These problems, which centre on the priority of the good in moral theory and the adequacy of instrumental rationality, are discussed in what follows.

II. THE PRIORITY OF GOODS REVISITED

There are certain methodological ambiguities that emerge from Nussbaum's starting point of the good-life. Nussbaum assumes that the normative character of her list of capabilities is self-evident. Nevertheless, their contextualization reveals certain difficulties regarding the relation between the distribution of capabilities and just procedures.

Capabilities and Procedures

The stress on the acquisition of goods does not necessarily imply a collectivized social struggle. It is quite possible to attain these in a localized way as Saleha Begum has done. Saleha Begum resisted her family's cultural opposition to get herself paid employment outside the domestic sphere. Metha Bai, on the other hand, has been locally less successful in acquiring these capabilities. Nussbaum seems to identify cultural differences, particularly in the Indian context, as being the primary obstacle to the acquisition of capabilities. Hence, there is a tacit emphasis on local struggle to acquire these universal capabilities. However, it is quite possible for women to attain Nussbaum's second threshold of capabilities, by overcoming cultural hindrances in an atmosphere of unjust social-economic arrangements. As a result, despite their distribution, the exploitative social-relations that underlie capability failures could continue to thrive. Again, politically powerful advocates of cultural authenticity in India would have no problem with women acquiring the index of functioning capabilities specified by Nussbaum. Moreover, the specifically oppressive features of Indian culture have also given women capabilities. For example, professional women in India, who enjoy the privileges of the labour of slum-women, do so due to the persistence of the caste system, albeit in an informal guise. The privileged women, as well as, the slum women do attain the measure of capabilities listed by Nussbaum and function within the parameters of the good life. Thus, challenging cultural hegemony on a local level does not adequately problematize the social and economic arrangements that encourage the coexistence of premodern attitudes along with modern ones. The latter condition of imbalance is not an arbitrary one: It reflects a history of colonization, as well as, a checkered economic development in the context of global inequality. Hence, although the distribution of functioning generated by capabilities ought to benefit both the individual and the society, this may not happen. For a deficient social order could become strengthened through the attainment of capabilities. The larger issue of the political and economic processes that marginalize women has to be addressed in resisting cultural domination. This requires critique with an emphasis on participatory and democratic decision-making procedures, which would allow for the separation of the positive and negative aspects of culture. Thus, Nussbaum overlooks the issue of just distribution procedures due to her cultural emphasis. She merely claims that public policy should have capability distribution on its agenda. But, it is unclear how existing governmental structures could live up to the tasks assigned by Nussbaum. In the developed world, the welfare state is in charge of distribution, whereas in the developing world, non-governmental organizations perform this task.[4] Both cases are severely limited by the paternalistic premise: Someone else decides the measure of capabilities required by poorer women, under highly inequitable conditions. In the words of Seyla Benhabib, 'Aristotelian social democracy would have to be both social and democratic' (1995, 255). This requires a balance between capabilities and just distribution procedures.

The orientation towards expert decision is tacitly present in Nussbaum's writings. Nussbaum commendably recognizes the need for interrelating theory and practice and the role of philosophy in this endeavour. She also sees the need for philosophy in public life (1988, 777). Yet Nussbaum's philosophers do not enter public life like ordinary citizens, but as experts who deliberate and make policy along with other economists, non-governmental organizations, government etc. (777). Thus, Nussbaum advocates a politics of preferential treatment[5] for women to allow them equal access as men to education, work, health, etc. With the intervention of non-governmental organizations, individual cases of women have certainly improved from starvation level to one of moderate income. However, it has not resolved the problem of structural barriers that deprive women of access to capabilities. Further, given that there are numerous differences among women's social conditions, their experience of discrimination varies. Hence, if specialists are to interpret and distribute goods there is the danger of autocracy. The interpretation of gender-specific working conditions by experts could reinforce stereotypes, even if the experts in question were spokeswomen for feminism (Habermas 1996, 423, 426).

Further, women could also be placed under the tutelage of the organization that provides them with capabilities. Moreover, it is not clear how women can achieve equality, on par with men, under the given male-dominated institutions of society and economy. The local acquisition of private autonomy alone does not strengthen the position of women in the public sphere. To enable women to acquire power in the public sphere, private freedom would have to be construed as co-original with public freedom. In this one would be following Habermas where '... the realization of basic rights is a process that secures private autonomy of equally entitled citizens only in step with the activation of their political autonomy' (1996, 426). In a post-metaphysical context, philosophy is not an expert enterprise but an activity of critical thinking that is done by ordinary people. Such a conception of philosophy will enable women, especially those who are marginalized by race and class, to think for themselves without the domination of experts.

Presuppositions of Capabilities

A second set of problems in Nussbaum's position concern the presuppositions that underlie her capabilities list. She claims to derive her list from the myths and other values in tradition, since there is no ordered metaphysical scheme to fall back on in the manner of Aristotle. However, it is unclear how these capabilities can be automatically derived from myths. The latter also contain values that are antithetical to women's development. Roop Rekha Verma's analysis of feminity in the Hindu tradition shows this lucidly.[6] Nussbaum would certainly not want traditional notions of feminity, whether Indian or western, to be reflected in her capabilities list. A glance at Nussbaum's list reveals a liberal tilt analogous to that of Rawls's primary goods. Rawls offers a theory of justice, which provides a method for the distribution of what he sees as primary goods. The latter are resources that most persons would want since they are instrumental in the attainment of particular goods. Rawls specifies the primary goods as the right to basic liberties of thought, expression, the access to opportunities and powers, self-worth and the right to accumulate property. These general goods should be distributed, according to Rawls, by employing the impartial procedure of the original position.[7] At first sight there seems to be a similarity between Rawlsian primary goods and Nussbaum's capabilities, as both are goods that need to be equitably distributed. This similarity is striking notwithstanding Rawls's procedural

emphasis. However, Nussbaum distinguishes her capabilities from Rawlsian primary goods on the following grounds:

1. Against Rawls's 'thin theory of good', Nussbaum claims to provide a 'thick vague theory of the good'. The latter, unlike Rawls's primary goods, are not just means to ends that lie outside them, but are intrinsic ends that constitute human life.
2. Further, Nussbaum's capabilities are not mere possessions, whose acquisition by a passive subject is an adequate index of autonomy. Citing the example of a homebound middle-class housewife who does not function despite having possessions, Nussbaum sees capabilities as functioning or expressive abilities. Unlike possessions, capabilities treat human beings as active agents whose growth will be stunted when denied.[8]

In his recent work, Rawls has responded to communitarians who like Nussbaum allege that his liberalism subscribes to a foundational subject (1996, 27). Rawls has argued that his political liberalism merely articulates a political conception of justice (10), without committing itself to any metaphysical doctrine as Enlightenment liberalism does (xl). Rawls arrives at his conception of justice by the method of reflective equilibrium, which involves coherently balancing the intuitions that are culturally found. His conception of personhood, in congruence with his conception of justice, is political rather than metaphysical (29). Unlike Enlightenment liberalism, natural sciences and social theory, Rawls does not offer an ultimate account of a fixed human nature. Rawls's political conception of personhood is derived from the cultural notion of a citizen, who is a fully cooperating and participating member of society. Such a member has the moral powers of a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity to form conceptions of the good. This in turn implies the power of reason, which consists in the capacity for judgement, thought and inference. The conventions of political citizenship provide the basis for the Rawlsian notion of autonomy, which is not an abstract right devoid of social relevance. Citizens are free in having the moral power and the power of reason to form, revise and rationally pursue their conception of good (30). Secondly, citizens are entitled to make claims on their political institutions to pursue their conception of the good (32). Finally, free citizens also take responsibility for their goods. Thus, citizenship is a role that is played out in a historically located well-ordered society, much like

actors in a play (27). There is no ontologically given entity of an asocial self that is hidden beneath this role. The Rawlsian conception of personhood is closely linked to a well-ordered society. All citizens in such a society share and obey the same principles of justice. The socio-political institutions of such a society (its basic structure) are public and satisfy the basic principles of justice. Since the identity of Rawlsian individuals is acquired in purely social contexts, there is no foundational subject lurking in Rawls's political liberalism as alleged by communitarians. Further, Rawls defines his notion of autonomy as a political one, rather than a moral one. The latter, which presumes a foundational subject prior to society, can be attributed to Kant or Locke. Feminists who have critiqued Rawls, as defending an abstract subject of right, ignore the conventionalist background that underlies Rawlsian autonomy. Rawls's recent work, emphasizes the method of reflective equilibrium that enunciates the convictions underlying forms of life, in order to leave everything as it is. The Rawlsian person is not atomic in a metaphysical sense. Nonetheless, there is a culturally-derived atomism underlying Rawls's political personhood. Rawlsian liberalism privileges the individual over the society and offers the criterion of personal autonomy as the primary arbiter of conflicts. This is clear from Rawls's definition of political justice as having normative commitment to what he sees as a democratic culture of 'reasonable pluralism'. The latter consists of a dualism between a political sphere on one hand, and a plurality of comprehensive doctrines on the other; this dualism is defined by Rawls as cultural, rather than philosophical. 'Reasonable pluralism' is not merely an arbitrary 'fact of pluralism' resulting from brute forces or personal likes and dislikes (36–38). Rather, the pluralistic culture of a democratic society is one where the diversity of comprehensive doctrines emerge from the free use of human reason. Any insistence on one shared comprehensive doctrine could have the danger of endorsing an oppressive use of state power. The distribution of primary goods aims at allowing each individual to pursue his or her private good. Rawls affirms a pluralistic theory of the good where each person can form his or her own conception of the good that is radically different from that of others: Thus, there is a basic incompatibility between the wide variety of comprehensive doctrines associated with the numerous goods. The incommensurability of private goods reflects an atomic premise that there cannot be shared goods, since each individual has his or her own unique conception of good. The notion of freedom is undoubtedly reciprocal at

the level of citizenship. But it is not reciprocal enough to give persons the scope for sharing their conceptions of good. It is precisely this individualistic current in Rawls that makes him unsuitable for the purpose of feminist politics. For cultural individualism and the many varieties of incompatible comprehensive doctrines have often been the source of women's oppression. The stress on individual rights has led to the negation of women's experiences, which have often been confined to the domestic sphere. From the feminist point of view, the public validity of reasonable pluralism has the consequence of advocating women's right to self-fulfilment by following the comprehensive doctrine that they choose to. It does not bother to inquire into the material obstacles that have hindered women from cultural fulfilment. Metaphysical doctrines also contain many exclusions, of women, dalits, workers, slaves *et al.* that would be antithetical to a democratic culture. Reasonable pluralism, moreover, assumes metaphysics to be bereft of history in its failure to address why certain metaphysical doctrines have a cultural domination. Further as Kant has demonstrated, there can be two opposing metaphysical doctrines that are both very reasonable. Hence, Rawls ought to make a positive commitment to freedom or right, rather than equate democratic culture with the proliferation of metaphysical doctrines. Given its cultural autonomy, the doctrine of reasonable pluralism is not very adequate for the purpose of transforming the institutions that hinder women from attaining the same measure of freedom and equality as men.

Despite the differences between Rawls's primary goods and Nussbaum's capabilities, there are similarities between them. Although Nussbaum advocates a 'thick theory of the good', it is difficult to see how some of the items in her capabilities list can function as anything other than means to further ends. For example, item six in her list of capabilities prescribes that human beings should form their own conceptions of good through critical reflection. Again, the last item on the list specifies that each human being should be able to lead his or her life without interference from others. Clearly, Nussbaum's capabilities to function cannot be said to have intrinsic value, since they lead to other goals. Furthermore, Rawls's so-called thin theory of good is hardly 'thin', considering that it constitutes the liberal life-style of possessive individualism. Nevertheless, Nussbaum distinguishes her position from that of Rawls by saying that wealth and income have intrinsic value according to Rawls, whereas she sees these as having instrumental value (1992, 234). But, as Nussbaum herself notes,

all of Rawls's primary goods have instrumental value. Hence, Rawls cannot be said to uphold income to have intrinsic value. These tacit affinities notwithstanding, the significant differences between Nussbaum's and Rawls's construal of goods is that Rawls sees goods as resources, whereas Nussbaum sees them as functions. However, despite this difference, they both treat goods as cultural givens. Indeed, as Nussbaum herself says, '... the liberal view and the Aristotelian view converge in more ways than one might initially suppose' (225). Thus, she observes that Rawls's moral powers are not individual outputs, but are acquired in contexts of sociability. Nussbaum's capabilities and Rawls's primary goods are derived in similar ways. Rawls has acquired his goods exclusively from the western tradition by using the methodology of reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971, 46–48). Nussbaum has analogously derived her list of capabilities from tradition, though she would not confine her list to the western world alone. It is perhaps this hermeneutic turn to tradition that is responsible for the intersections between Rawls's and Nussbaum's list of goods.[9]

Although Nussbaum distances herself from liberal atomism, there are many liberal currents advocating a Rawlsian type of reasonable pluralism running through her list. Consequently, feminists wanting to place economic issues on the agenda would have an uneasy alliance with Nussbaum. For example, the right to pursue private goals plays an important role in items six, nine, ten and ten a. of Nussbaum's development list ignoring that liberal privacy has often been incompatible with feminist concerns. The whole notion of non-interference in personal choice represents the perspective of privileged propertied men, who assume themselves to be self-sufficient. This classical liberal view of personal choice has been called into question by feminists.[10] For it ignores the labour of women in the domestic sphere who have made personal choice possible for men. Moreover, the liberal conception of personal choice overlooks the social conditions that play a role in the kinds of choices that are made in private. For example, women may or may not exercise reproductive choice in the context of stringent material conditions. Again, it ignores that the choice of employment made by Saleha Begum is not entirely a personal one. Economic exploitation of gender stereotypes have often confined most women to nurturing jobs in the public sphere as well.[11] This demonstrates that stereotypical notions of feminity play a role in domestic sphere and the economy. Most women who cross their domestic thresholds do exercise their capability to work, albeit from an exploited position. Thus,

women's entry into the economy does not imply that they are necessarily more autonomous, dignified or have acquired emotional well-being.

The existence of domestic injustice shows that there is a need to challenge the notion of privacy to bring the injustices that prevail there into the public sphere. Nussbaum takes note of the domestic dimension only when it involves exercising the personal right to self-expression. She points to the absence of problematization of the domestic sphere in Rawls's theory. Yet, Nussbaum's own problematization of domestic relations is narrow. She cites the example of the Japanese husband whose leisure capabilities come at the expense of depriving his wife of the same (1992, 204, 234–35).[12] Clearly, the social relations between genders that leads to this state-of-affairs and that is strengthened by the same needs to be addressed in this context. The equitable balance of capabilities to function can not come at the expense of another. The idle domesticated wife experiences a capability loss in not expressing herself in the sphere of economy. Nussbaum, therefore, recommends that husbands and wives should exercise their capabilities equally in the domestic sphere and the public sphere. However, Nussbaum overlooks that domestic violence could occur despite shared work. There are no categories in Nussbaum's approach to make public the violence that prevails in private. Secondly, shared domestic work between husbands and wives need not mechanically translate itself into equalized gender relations in society. For the various domestic units in a liberal society occupy economically unequal positions. Hence, most women who work outside the domestic sphere are exploited not by their families but by a male-dominated economic set-up. This is primarily because they are economically underprivileged. After all, a large part of women's cultural oppressions are connected with the devaluation of labour: This includes unpaid domestic work, poorly paid public work, insecurity and sexual harassment at work, being recipients of welfare or self-help programmes. These gender-neutral spots in Nussbaum's theory stem from her assuming the constituted side of liberal societies to be valid. Nussbaum, like Rawls, severs the domestic sphere from that of the state and the economy. In order to overcome these limits, feminists who struggle for the acquisition of goods will have transcend the local level to a collective one, for democratized claims over the resources, as well as, the production of resources in society. This will prevent an inequality among women in rising towards the threshold of capabilities as desired by Nussbaum. The liberal approach tends to overlook

the historical dimension of personal choices made. Hence, there is an exceeding emphasis placed on individual freedom, which may not be suitable for feminists. In a post-metaphysical world, Nussbaum derives her list of goods from the practices of tradition, of which liberalism is very much a part. But assuming the paradigm of liberalism to be absolute, Nussbaum's list does not fit in easily with feminists who have long-term goals of challenging the structural inequality responsible for gender disparity. In effect, Nussbaum has to clarify the criteria by which she chooses the list of capabilities that requires development. As Wolf has pointed out, this clarification is needed, given that it assumes the controversial superiority of individualism over participatory social activities (1995, 105–15). Nussbaum's list of capabilities is a mixture of liberal values such as privacy, and what following Sartre could be called the facticity of liberalism.[13] The latter consists of the circumstances of environment, biology and social conditions, etc., in which autonomy can be exercised. However, as Benhabib has perceptively argued, the move from human condition to its validity cannot be mechanically made without translating the human condition into moral insight (1995, 254). This requires the transformation of the human condition, rather than its absolutization.

A large part of the problems discussed above concern the methodological issue of starting out with a substantive conception of good in political theory.[14] The foregrounding of telos, whether absolute or fallible, results in privileging the subject-object model of instrumental rationality. The latter privileges the needs of a solitary subject, by relegating the intersubjective equations between the various subjects, who employ such a rationality, to the background. Yet from the feminist point of view the emphasis on instrumental rationality is quite problematic, since a large part of women's problems are the outcome of the denial of interrelations. For example, the denial of the relation between the domestic sphere of work and the economic sphere of work results in an ideology that privileges the latter over the former. This ideology is particularly operative in areas where underprivileged women seek self-employment. Again, the instrumental primacy of the subject-object relation has been gender-blind in ignoring the objectification of women's subjectivity. As Benhabib has observed, ignoring the dimension of intersubjective relations with regard to capabilities leads to a 'non-Aristotelian spot' (1995, 255). For Aristotle, praxis is the highest activity precisely because it involves common deliberation with others. Nussbaum, could end up in such a 'non-Aristotelian spot' because the question of the good life is of paramount importance to her. Despite Nussbaum's claims to the contrary, a nondemocratic set-up could accommodate a flourishing human life.

III. PROCEDURAL FEMINISM

Linguistic Proceduralism

Procedural rationality eschews the starting point of substantive goods to focus on the notion of a right procedure for securing goods. Consequently, it can address the structural inequalities that have led to capability failures, wherein the procedures that can prevent such failure are taken into consideration. Immanuel Kant initiated the procedural approach as an appropriate one in a pluralistic, post-metaphysical world. Rather than privilege any givens, whether metaphysical or non-metaphysical, procedural rationality provides a method of willing that would allow its participants to interpret the good. Since the emphasis is on the participants who employ the procedure, this approach can address the issue of the democratization between its participants. However, Kant's own procedure of the categorical imperative faces the limitation of solipsism due to its thought-experimental character.[15] Rawls's reformulation of procedural theory suffers from the added burden of having to justify the primary goods that he builds into it. Communitarians, such as Nussbaum, are suspicious of procedural theories because they assume all procedural views to be necessarily predicated upon the premise of an atomized subject. Yet as Marx has observed, although idealism has developed the activity side of the human being, human activity need not necessarily have idealistic underpinnings (1967, 400–401). The twentieth century linguistic turn has demonstrated the social and historical rootedness of activity, through the replacement of the consciousness model by language. Habermas's linguistic articulation of a non-subjectivist procedural theory is important from the point of view of feminism. For it moves beyond the parameters of possessive individualism of merely bargaining for goods, to address the conditions of a just social order, where women and men could collectively deliberate their goods.[16] Habermas has observed that in the socio-ontological aspect of the dispute between communitarians, who start with the good, and liberals, who start with the right, one could proceed with communitarians by understanding individuality in socialized contexts (Habermas 1993, 91). But, this does not entail jettisoning the Kantian tradition of according priority

to the right. Habermas's discourse ethics offers a method for interpreting goods by linguistically reformulating the procedural turn.

> Discourse ethics occupies an intermediate position, sharing with the 'liberals' a deontological understanding of freedom, morality, and law that stems from the Kantian tradition and with the communitarians an intersubjective understanding of individuation as a product of socialization that stems from the Hegelian tradition (ibid., 91).

Habermas rejects the liberal atomistic approach to subjectivity in seeing the relation between individual identity and contexts of socialization as mediated by linguistic practice (ibid., 91). This evokes the basic insight contained in Kant's refutation of idealism. Kant critiqued Descartes's problematic idealism, premised upon an undifferentiated cogitating subjectivity. In his critique, Kant demonstrated that the phenomenon of immediate self-consciousness is not tenable, by showing how individuation presupposes the subject's distinctness from subjects in the external world.[17] Various philosophers in the twentieth century, such as Gilbert Ryle, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, have emphasized this Kantian insight.[18] The turn to language, in contemporary postpositivist philosophy and continental philosophy, aims at ushering in an intersubjective approach.[19] The search for the latter is guided by the urge to find a way out of the dualistic aporias of the consciousness model. The human being, as a language-user, is enmeshed in a web of activities. Language is woven into the various social forms of life such as political, familial, economic and the cultural. Human beings learn language in social contexts through formal and informal means. As Habermas has pointed out, the language-user who employs speech-acts directs them towards a hearer (Habermas 1987, 72–76). The speaker and the hearer recognize themselves as individuals in the context of the shared linguistic background. Consequently, individual identities are not dissolved by absorption into the wider social arena, but are acquired and developed in the social context. The speaker, while addressing the hearer, cannot predict the responses of the hearer. In so far as the hearer listens to the speaker, she or he does not refuse the language game, but participates in it. In engaging herself or himself with the speaker, the hearer is free to assent or dissent by critically assessing the speaker's claims. Hence, there is no blind reproduction of the social order in this process of symbolic interaction. Habermas's theory of communicative action has developed the link between the processes of individuation and socialization, to show that aberrations in socialization can affect individuality and vice versa (Habermas 1992, 149–204; 1993, 114).

This approach is useful from the feminist point of view. Women's peripheral status should be understood to be the outcome of the inequalities and distortions in the socialization processes. The complete structure of mutual interaction through communication, marred by a systematic one-sided violence of particular interests, has prevented women from engaging themselves in speech acts. Since speech-acts are not givens, they are often not found in their perfect form. Habermas's procedure, called the ideal speech situation, prescribes that disputes be settled by a dialogical commitment to the norms of freedom and equality of its participants (Habermas 1993, 56). It aims at mutual recognition and interaction by means of actual dialogue amongst all those who are affected by the disputed issue. Women have experienced capability losses on a large scale because of the fissured web of recognition and interaction. Therefore, Habermas's procedure would enable its participants to comprehend the specificity of women's inequality and the differences among women stemming from race, class and caste. The ideal speech situation could also help explore the marginalization of women by examining the non-dialogical relationship between existing liberal institutions in the West, and semi-liberal ones in the non-western worlds. Thus, the acquisition of goods cannot be a question of instrumental rationality alone: All women do not require the same capabilities. Hence, the distribution of capabilities will have to be publicly ascertained by a linguistic procedure in which all women can participate regardless of the structural barriers of inequality. This is especially relevant from the point of view of universal feminist politics. For women have been historically treated as passive recipients of interests, rather than active interpreters of their lives.

Despite his defense of the priority of the right over the good, Rawls is critical of Habermas's procedure (Rawls 1996, 424–32). Habermas's formal and universal procedure merely prescribes the process of rational will-formation, leaving questions of content open to the participants of the procedure. According to Rawls, an exclusively formal procedure is concerned with legitimacy and not justice in merely addressing the issue of how an institution comes into existence. A ruler can be unjust despite acquiring office through a legitimate procedure. Rawls argues that similarly, a formal procedure could be very legitimate, but insensitive to the substantive concerns of gender, race and environment. Hence, although a

legitimate procedure could maintain a well-ordered society, such a society would eventually weaken when justice is sidelined for long periods. Rawls cites the condemnation of slavery and oppression of women in the United States as substantive checks to injustice. According to Rawls, Habermas's formal procedure fails to offer any relevant criterion for evaluating norms. In order to correct such a deficiency implicit in formal procedures, Rawls suggests that the procedure should have a substantive commitment (ibid., 430–431). Further, a procedure in order to be just would have to refer to the traditions of the communities from which it emerges. In which case, 'It fails to be properly formal and truly universal, and thus to be part of the quasi-transcendental presuppositions ...' (ibid., 432). The term substance could denote a metaphysical doctrine, as Rawls has observed (Ibid., 379, 431–32). However, it could also refer to the specific contexts and interests of a given procedure. Habermas's proceduralism, like those of Kant and Rawls, professes to be non-substantive in the sense of eschewing metaphysical doctrines. This is because its deontological spirit upholds the right to be prior to the good. However, Habermas's procedure does not attempt to be non-substantive in the sense of disregarding interests. Discourse ethics requires contextualization, but this would have to be done by the participants themselves. Given the inexhaustibility of variegated situations, the theorist is in no position to democratically articulate a single context for all times. Hence, Habermas minimalizes the theorist's function to one of providing a formal procedure that is, nevertheless, flexible enough to be adapted to a wide variety of situations. Universality is precisely the ability of the procedure to transcend the given context. Thus, the procedure, in question is repeatedly employed, rather than employed just once. The latter eventuality poses the danger of a legitimacy devoid of justice. Institutions, in order to be just have to constantly pass the test of democratic accountability. Secondly, Habermas's procedure is normatively committed to the notion of autonomy where personal and public autonomy are co-original. Since, individuals acquire their identity in social contexts, neither society nor individual should be privileged; on the contrary, the reciprocal relation between the society and the individual should be stressed. Rawls's procedure severs this link with its accent on personal autonomy and its normative commitment to the debatable notion of 'reasonable pluralism'. Finally, although Rawls aptly notes the need for anchoring procedure in forms of life, he ignores that given its critical role the procedure cannot be completely absorbed by forms of life. Rawls

permits such an absorption by his assumption that the United States has accomplished the ideals of gender parity and racial equality. An empirical sensitivity reveals the contrary. Habermas's procedure, unlike that of Kant and Rawls, is not conducted in the thought of persons, but is effected in the public domain of linguistic activity. Consequently, it has a cross-cultural commitment to autonomy, avoiding the parochialism of reproducing the presuppositions of a given culture.

Rawls, like the communitarians, also raises an epistemological objection against Habermas's espousal of a universal theory of right.[20] He detects a tacit substantive core in Habermas's procedure (Rawls 1996, 426). Habermas sees the identity of subjects as linguistically constituted through inhabiting socio-cultural forms of life. According to Rawls, Habermas derives norms from the facts of language by evoking the institutions of the western world. Rawls's objection relies upon the arguable premise that the linguistic turn is necessarily historicist. Habermas resorts to linguistic activity to facilitate an effective contextualization of his procedure and give it an intersubjective dimension. In doing this, language's interrelation with history, socio-economic practices, etc. is taken into consideration. This is done for the purpose of connecting norms with the real world, rather than merely endorsing the status-quo as valid. The role played by circumstances in shaping human identity would have to be comprehended to change their oppressive aspects. Historicism assumes that a given epoch's self-definition is accurate. It also assumes that there is only one definition that a given epoch has of itself. As Rawls has himself noted, society does not have a tight unity considering that there are diverse groups who inhabit it. One might add that this diversity is not just cultural, but also economic. In which case, a historicism which endorses the prevailing order is blind to existing inequalities.

The tension between facticity and validity, upheld by Habermas, emerges from his specific conception of language (Habermas 1996, 9–17). According to Habermas, language is not an event or occurrence, that is codified into a finite system of signs (Habermas 1990, 69–70). Rather in a pragmatic tone, Habermas sees language as an incomplete and fallible intersubjective activity. Linguistically acting subjects, raise validity claims that are assertive, interrogative, etc. In this, they direct themselves to other linguistic subjects and thus act communicatively. Such a communicative action entails presuppositions such as that of the freedom and equality of all those who are involved in and affected by the validity claim that is

raised. The validity claims that are raised transcend the context in which they are raised (Habermas 1996, 18). The tension between facticity and validity is not a fact about language as Rawls avers (Rawls 1996, 426). Rather, the facticity of language is splintered by the tension between idealizations and the reality to which it refers (Habermas 1996, 19). Thus, Habermas overcomes the dilemmas created by the positivist conception of a wide gulf between facts and values. The latter sees facts as a category that is accessible to sense observation without requiring any interpretation. Consequently, H.L.A. Hart and Magaret Macdonald, abandoned the project of normative political philosophy. As is well-known, Rawls resurrected the normative study of justice under the influence of Quine's post-positivist analytic philosophy in the early seventies with his work, *A Theory of Justice* (1973). However, by locating normativity in culturally given facts, the Rawlsian alternative also presupposes the fact-value gulf. Rawls characterizes Habermas's notion of language as 'quasi-transcendental'. Indeed, Habermas follows the Kantian transcendental method of clarifying the presuppositions of speech, rather than a positivist method of empirically describing language. However, unlike Kant, these presuppositions do not rely upon a metaphysical world. They are rationally reconstructed through a critical dialogue with psychologists, sociologists and linguists (Habermas 1990, 1–20). Such a dialogue aims at avoiding the ethnocentric prejudice associated with contextualism. Although Habermas's reconstruction has an empirical point of reference in everyday speech, it critically advances to the presuppositions of this activity (Habermas 1987, 114–116). This reconstruction is done from the active perspective of a participant, rather than a passive observer standpoint. The substantive elements of a form of life cannot be rationally reconstructed. For such a reconstruction proceeds communicatively by the investigator's participation in a form of life rather than through a monological description. Moreover, the various presuppositions of speech are also the subject of further revision through dialogue. Therefore, they are not absolute first principles. The method of rational reconstruction, unlike Rawls's descriptive and historicist method, is critical and normative.[21]

Nussbaum would not adhere to the relativistic implications of the position from which the above objection is made. Yet, both Nussbaum, with her communitarian leanings and Benhabib, with her position of discourse ethics, uphold that the given institutions of modernity that have originated in the West are valid.[22] Benhabib openly maintains that the western world

is the origin of the democratic decision-making processes. Since Nussbaum's list of capabilities reflect a liberal slant, her position tacitly assumes western institutions to be the normative point of departure. She also identifies semi-liberal societies, such as India, as primarily having a cultural problem in rising up to her capabilities list. Furthermore, her positive characterization of India also relies upon a stereotypical contrast between Indian women and western women. Nussbaum is certainly on track in seeing that a genuine international feminism should not only focus of western women, but also include poor women of the developing world on its agenda (Nussbaum 1998, 788–89). However, Nussbaum seems to perceive capability failure as a peculiarly Indian syndrome. In this, she overlooks that western women are not a privileged lot with automatic access to jobs, etc. The location of gender in contexts of class and race reveals that capability failure is an issue in the western world, as well. Secondly, Nussbaum professes that her contact with India has resulted in her realizing the worth of self-sufficiency, human dignity and community. There are several ambiguities in the so-called Indian values mentioned by Nussbaum. Although Nussbaum rightly sees the significance of women's economic independence, it is not clear whether this can be termed as a peculiarly Indian problem. For western women certainly don't inhabit a utopia in facing acute problems of domestic violence and unemployment. Further, the definition of self-sufficiency as independence from men is quite worrisome given that feminist politics should transform men, as much as, women. For women and men do not live apart from one another, but inhabit the world together. The segregation of women's work from that of men often results in stereotyping and discrimination. Underpaid work done by women in nursing, primary education or the electronics industry illustrate the injustices associated with this approach. Again, if self-sufficiency implies that women should enter the economy in order to develop, as Nussbaum often indicates, it is oblivious to the harsh effects that the capitalist economy has had on women's lives. Moreover, self-sufficiency cannot be defined in a Gandhian fashion since it is based upon essentialist definitions of human beings.[23] In the context of the specific issue of women's oppression, which has diverse ramifications, self-sufficiency has to be linked with autonomy. In which case, self-sufficiency cannot be attained by women's psychological motivation without addressing the democratization of the larger institutional structures. Similarly, if Nussbaum wants to achieve her professed goal of providing the term

'dignity' with the Kantian meaning of the intrinsic value of human life, she would have to probe deeper into its relation with democracy and autonomy. Again, community, which Nussbaum identifies as an Indian value, reflects a premodern social organization of a shared comprehensive good.[24] It may provide emotional sustenance to Indian women at times, but it is also the source of their oppression. Membership in a community did not save Roop Kanwar from sati, but on the contrary led to it. Nussbaum claims the western women draw support from heterosexual, romantic relationships and nuclear family ties. But they also suffer from the resultant ill effects in unemployment, discrimination and harassment at the work-place, domestic violence, date rape, etc. The same holds for many Indian women who inhabit the nuclear family. Hence, instead of falling back upon the prevailing bonds of community or family, feminists need to advance towards newer forms of solidarity. This in turn entails struggle with a commitment to autonomy and egalitarianism. The assumption that freedom is a realized ideal in the West is present in Rawlsian contextualism as well as, in the universalism of Nussbaum and Benhabib. Such a view ignores the exclusion of women, racial minorities and the labouring classes from the decision-making processes that effect their lives. It turns a blind eye to the social criticisms of institutions that have played a large part in shaping universal moral theories.[25] Hence, following Kant, morality should not be identified with anthropology (Kant 1983, 22–23). Rather than treat procedural rationality as given, its nexus with power should be analyzed since the world is not a perfect place (Alcoff 1995, 231–32). The identification of the western world as the origin of autonomy divides the world into two neatly carved halves: the West and its other. Such a dichotomy plays a central role in a large part of the post-modernist inspired cultural feminist opposition to universality that Nussbaum separates herself from. Freedom acquires a moment of origin in the institutions of modernity when it is treated as an accomplished reality. Yet it is precisely because the metaphysics of origin has been subject to scrutiny that the possibility of autonomy has been opened up, despite its drawbacks, by procedural theory.

The procedural approach is especially relevant in the context of feminist concerns in India. A good-oriented approach is not appropriate for the climate of heterogeneous cultures with wide structural inequalities prevailing in India. For in articulating a substantive set of goods, there could be the danger of suppressing cultural heterogeneity or of reproducing the

existing paradigm of socio-political inequalities. Again, a teleological approach could ignore the complex social and economic processes that generate capability failures on a global scale. This is turn has the danger of allowing distribution patterns that are controlled by experts to address the problem at hand. The procedural approach, in contrast, allows for openness between multiple cultures and provides norms for critically reviewing the prevailing social structures. By enabling its participants to introduce the substantive contexts of debate, it allows for a democratic decision-making process that rejects the paternalistic premise of experts such as social workers, government representatives, business managers. Indeed, given the complexity of the Indian social formation, the procedural approach with its emphasis on critical intersubjectivity prevents feminists from falling into the scylla of 'assimilation "to us"' (unique Indian culture) or the charybdis of 'conversion "to them"' (West).[26] Alcoff has rightly pointed out that a universally applicable theory need not be equated with colonization (Alcoff 1995, 233). The status of underclass women in India is linked with the global inequality generated by unchallenged capitalism in a post cold war world. In this, Indian women share the common experience of exploitation with their western counterparts. The underlying impulse of universalism is the urge to transcend one's national boundaries, rather than an imperialist imposition of one form of life over another. The solution to cultural imperialism is not an equally stultifying relativism that merely reinstates injustice. Universalism is the spirit of critical evaluation of one's own form of life with an openness towards another's form of life and a commitment to democracy. The woman's question, which has been articulated with a lot of force in contemporary times, is compatible only with such a spirit of universalism. In the words of Alcoff then, 'Martha Nussbaum has argued that this relativist collapse can be avoided by understanding our universal theories as historically rooted and fallible' (Alcoff 1995, 233). However, as Alcoff herself recommends, a procedural version of rationality could help sharpen Nussbaum's goals more consistently (ibid., 233).

Beyond Habermas

Despite its merits, Habermas's theory does pose some problems for feminists. As Calhoun has pointed out, Habermas's construal of dialogical interaction reproduces the classical liberal divide between the public and private sphere (Calhoun 1996, 454–57, 459). Habermas rigidly demarcates

between the systemworld and the lifeworld. He defines the systemworld as the organized realm of goal-oriented, instrumental action. The public state administrative system and the private economic system are materially reproduced by the media of power and money in the systemworld (1987, 154). The lifeworld is the prepolitical realm of human interaction and experience, governed by the communicative action implicit in human speech. Habermas structurally divides the lifeworld into the fields of culture, society and person. This division corresponds to the propositional, illocutionary and intentional aspects of speech acts. This structural distinction is tentative and revisable. The informal organizations of the private family and public sphere, located in the lifeworld, perform the tasks of symbolically reproducing culture, society and personality. This symbolic reproduction is a critical and constructive one, since it presupposes the communicative action that is implicit in speech acts (137–38). Hence, Habermas does not wish to regard the lifeworld as a naturally given area. Yet, there is a tendency in Habermas's writings to treat the various formations that prevail in the lifeworld as having spontaneously emerged. Habermas's account of individuation, as occurring through the socialization processes within the modern nuclear family, assumes that the lifeworld is an autonomous sphere. For, according to Habermas, a functioning nuclear family represents a pure realm of communicative action. Habermas also seems to suggest that feminists are equipped to challenge patriarchy because they happen to participate in the division of labour that has given them domestic confinement! Their relegation to the domestic sphere has equipped women with the unique 'contrasting value' of communicative rationality that men who participate in the economy and the state as workers do not have.[27] Thus, prior to entering the systemworld, individuals are viewed as having well-constituted identities. In this account Habermas, like Rawls and Nussbaum, ignores the relation between the institutions in the lifeworld and the systemworld.[28] The domestic sphere is not a perfect zone of communicative action, which is precisely why many women have been forced to enter the economy. Further, the notion of an incorruptible domestic spot has overtones of essentialist origins of feminity that can be annexed by conservative political groups.[29] Such an outcome would clearly be antithetical to feminist struggles that aim at challenging, as Habermas himself observes, concrete forms of life dominated by men in a non-metaphysical world (Habermas 393). Moreover, Habermas regards the pathologies in the lifeworld as effects of its colonization by the

systemworld. The latter has consolidated itself through modernity's emphasis on the 'dark side' of purposive rationality (Habermas 318–31, 355–73, 385–86). But, culture, society and personality, which are reproduced through the modern nuclear family and the public sphere, have certainly not sprung up autonomously! On the contrary, these formations in the lifeworld have simultaneously emerged with the capitalist economy and the liberal state. Hence, the pathologies prevailing in the lifeworld are not consequences of a one-way colonization process by the systemworld. There is a reciprocal relation between the systemworld and the lifeworld. For the liberal economy and the state would not have emerged without the concomitant formations of the public sphere and the nuclear family. Consequently, feminists should not valorize the lifeworld as the field of communicative action. Furthermore, feminists cannot engage themselves with the metaphysical project of unearthing complete identities that are already formed in the lifeworld. In order to do justice to the conventionality of language and history, which makes transformatory feminism possible, feminists will have to strive for the creation of space in which dialogical interaction is performed. In this, as Calhoun suggests, identity and interest formation should be treated as formed, not in single, but in multiple and interconnected public spheres (Calhoun 1996, 457–59, 461–62). Moreover, the intersections between the lifeworld and the systemworld should be comprehended in this multiplicity where the formation of a subject's identity is never complete or consistent. This is because the various contradictions that prevail in society also enter into the identities of individuals. Hence, feminist theory should strive towards the procedural interpretation of needs. This would involve criticisms of the social arrangements generating capability failures, cultural representations of feminity and partriarchal notions of public space. Such social criticism on the theoretical level would have to be connected with the practice of creating new public spaces of egalitarian pluralism. The latter, in being devoid of capitalist exploitation and sexual division of labour, would enable women *and* men to co-operatively make human history.

NOTES

1. Mohanty (1997), Spivak (1993) and Tharu (1989, 1997) tend to identify universality with Eurocentrism. Interestingly, Rorty marshals Eurocentric arguments to advocate contextualism as a move suitable for feminists whose task he sees as one of novelty (Rorty, 1998, 202–27).

2. Sen has defined missing women as those who are listed in the census but do not survive due to inadequate food, health and social services (1990).
3. A discussion of the legal aspects of this case is contained in *Cover Story* (1996).
4. Nussbaum specifically mentions non-governmental organizations among other policy makers (1998, 792). Her favourable report of women's work in India also pinpoints to the non-governmental organization, SEWA.
5. The turn, 'politics of preferential treatment' is derived from Habermas (1996, 420).
6. Verma has shown how self-negating traits are glorified in the traditional Hindu conception of feminity (1995, 433–43).
7. Rawls, as is well-known, recommends the distribution of primary goods by using the method of original position (1973, 90–95).
8. Nussbaum has lucidly discussed the distinction between liberalism and Aristotelianism (1992, 214–15, 225–26, 232–34).
9. Rawls would in fact agree with Nussbaum that the distribution of primary goods should respect the diversity in capabilities (1996, 182–190). In replying to Sen's criticism concerning the alleged abstract distribution pattern of primary goods (182–90), Rawls points out that primary goods are flexible, since they are not things. Thus, if women's health is worse off than that of men in a given society, they are certainly entitled to a larger share of primary goods. This is consonant with Nussbaum's estimate of Rawls's difference principle. In her subsequent work, Nussbaum has observed the similarity between Rawls's primary goods and her capabilities: Both are necessary for acquiring specific goods that individuals harbour (1998, 770).
10. The feminist critique of the contractarian subject is contained in the writings of Seyla Benhabib, Iris Marion Young, Carol Gilligan, Judith Butler and Linda Nicholson, among many others.
11. Ninety per cent of the workforce in the electronic firms in Mumbai's Santacruz Electronics Export Promotion Zone (SEEPZ) are women. The Government of India adopted the policy of allowing many multinationals located in the West, Japan and S. Korea to utilize the components manufactured in India. Women are preferred in the electronic industry because of their supposed nimble fingers and ability to withstand monotonous work. Moreover, they are also looked upon as pliable workers who will not go in for union activity. Needless to say there is severe exploitation of these women—long hours, surveillance, poor pay, risky part-time and temporary employment and termination for any kind of union activities. Women in SEEPZ are also exposed to many health-hazards. This clearly shows that a mere emphasis on employment, that is oblivious to the presence of free markets and exploitation of labour, only reinforces women's exploitation (Annucio 1996; Ghiara, 1994a, 1994b; Rajalakshmi, 1999). Again with reference to the example of women in Bangladesh cited by Nussbaum, there is severe exploitation of women's labour in the garment industry of which ninety per cent of the 1.2 million workforce are

women (Mahmud, 1996). These examples depict the links between women's exploitation and a globalized market economy. Contrary to Nussbaum, they also show that women suffer from capability failure subsequent to their entry into the economy. Hence, the cultural obstacles specific to the Indian context, which prevent women from occupying non-exploitative and autonomous positions in the public sphere are not independent of the economic situation. The 1991 census reveals that 52.11 per cent of the total population is literate, out of which 63.86 per cent consists of men and 39.42 per cent is made of women (Statistical Profile on Women Labour, 1993). The section that is deprived of literacy does enter the market albeit as cheap labour for the world's corporations. At the other end of the spectrum about 11 per cent of the Fortune 500 board seats are occupied by women (Six Decade Wait, 1998).

12. There is constant reference in Nussbaum's writings to domestic hindrance in the Indian context. This makes it appear as though the primary obstacle to Indian women's emancipation is their inability to participate in the economy. But Nussbaum ignores the participation of women in manual jobs, domestic work, servicing and the unorganized sector: A participation that often entails part-time and temporary jobs that are done for unequal wages without adequate child-care or medical facilities and sanitation (Jadhav 1995).
13. Sartre has significantly shown that the relation of subjects to the world is not one of knowledge, but of being (1956, 127–33). The contingent dimension of this relation makes the transformation of both the subjects and the world possible. Hence, 'Without facticity consciousness could choose its attachments to the world in the same way as the souls of Plato's *Republic* choose their condition' (Sartre 1956, 131–32). Benhabib has observed the strong parallels between Nussbaum's capabilities and Hume's notion of the circumstances of justice (1995, 254). One could add the assumptions in Rawls's original position to this list.
14. The expression 'methodological issue' is derived from Benhabib (1995, 255).
15. Many sympathetic critics of Kant, such as Rawls and Habermas, have responded to this problem by reconstructing Kantian proceduralism without its metaphysical trappings of the noumenon and phenomenon.
16. Habermas has made this point in several works (1990, 66–68; 1993, 8–17). The replacement of consciousness by language is not a mere shift in the medium of reflection. Rather linguistic proceduralism transforms the problem from that of individual will-formation to collective will-formation (1993, 15–16). This is because the other human being is not encountered in imaginary reasoning or 'virtual' action, but in real action through actual dialogue: 'This reality of the alien will belongs to the primary conditions of collective will formation' (Ibid., 16).
17. The problem with Kant's own position is that he construes this interrelation within the consciousness paradigm.
18. Of course, not all philosophers have defended the possibility of philosophy after the linguistic turn. For instance, Ryle (1949), Heidegger (1962) and

Wittgenstein (1958) and many post-structuralists abandon philosophy so as to leave the many forms of life undisturbed.

19. Habermas has explicitly elaborated the connection between disenchantment with metaphysics and the turn to language (1992, 44–51).
20. Habermas has termed this as the epistemological objection levied by communitarians against proceduralists upholding universal rights (1993, 91–92). Rorty (1989, 57–61; 1998, 217–18, 223–25) also shares this historicist premise with Rawls and the communitarians.
21. Rawls's objection could apply to Habermas if he upheld constraint-free communication to be an institutional fact.
22. Although Benhabib has critiqued Rorty's division of the world into 'we liberals' versus 'them', she reintroduces this dichotomy in identifying the West as the origin of free institutions (1995, 252–54).
23. Gandhi's metaphysical conception of a person as constituted by a body, mind (*manas*), the spiritual aspect (*atman*) and a unique psychological make-up (*svabhava*) forms the basis of his doctrine of self-sufficiency and social organization (Parekh 1997, 38–50, 75–91). On this view, human nature's unique features are fully-formed prior to socialization. Consequently, autonomy is not primary. The construal of a fixed human nature has often been the source of women's oppression. Tharu has lucidly shown how Gandhi upheld the notion of feminity, an amalgam of the sacred and self-sacrifice, as a political instrument for saving the Indian nation from alien rule (1989, 262). The notion of feminity summarized by Verma (1995), has been a part of mainstream Indian representation of women. Hence, the goals of feminist politics would be better served by turning to a post-metaphysical context, where autonomy is upheld as a positive norm. Rawls points out that it could be objected to him that the absence of a metaphysical statement could be metaphysical statement. In his defense, Rawls claims that if at all metaphysics has a presence in his political liberalism, it is very implicit one. Therefore, it does not play a decisive role in the argument for liberalism. Rawls takes such an objection seriously because he uses the term metaphysics to refer to both substantive doctrines and generalizations. He does not restrict metaphysics to absolute systems concerning the universe as a whole. Hence, even Habermas's theory despite being non-foundationalist is for Rawls a comprehensive doctrine. But the term metaphysics need not have such a wide connotation. If it is used in a restricted sense to refer to doctrines that advocate an ontological first principle, universal and normative points of reference are not necessarily metaphysical.
24. As Rawls has pertinently distinguished, a well-ordered society differs from both a community and an association (1996, 40–42). An association is oriented towards specific purposes, while a community is a specialized association in being additionally unified by a comprehensive doctrine. Neither of them allow for the 'reasonable pluralism' that Rawls sees as fundamental in a democratic culture. The Rawlsian society is self-sufficient and closed: That

is, it has space for a variety of goals in life and its occupants enter it by birth and depart it by death without any prior identity. Such a well-ordered society does not have any purposes or aims the way associations or communities do. There are certain problems with the Rawlsian conception of society. As this paper has argued, the doctrine of 'reasonable pluralism' as a primary feature of democracy does not do justice to autonomy. Further, Rawls's society in a typically liberal vein treats the economy as a private contract of individuals. Despite these problems Rawls's definition of society is useful for its non-teleological slant.

25. Chomsky is an example of this type of criticism (1988).
26. The expressions, 'assimilation "to us"' and 'conversion "to them"', have been derived from Habermas (1993, 105). Alcoff has an analogous discussion of this point (1995, 233).
27. Habermas distinguishes between middle-class protests and new social movements in the lifeworld. However, he does not follow through the implications of this distinction for a heterogeneous approach to the lifeworld (1987, 394).
28. Rawlsian public reason differs from Habermas's public sphere in having an institutional character (1996, 212–54). For Rawls, public reason is the deliberation exercised in the institutional sphere of politics by legislators, executives such as presidents, judges, candidates during election time and citizens when they cast their vote (ibid., 382 n.13). This conception of public reason cannot be suitable for feminists because it relies upon the premise of the validity of existing institutions. Indeed, it is because women, working-classes and ethnic minorities are often marginalized from political power, judiciary and other existing institutions that the woman's question is raised. Hence, rather than turn to the formal and informal public spheres that prevail, feminism has the task of creating an egalitarian public sphere.
29. Contrary to Rawls, it is Habermas's conceptualization of the lifeworld, rather than his linguistic turn, that is responsible for fusing the tension between facts and norms.

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Quantum Physics and the Problem of Existence: Do Elementary Particles Exist?–I*

S. LOKANATHAN

956, 12th Main Road, HAL II Stage, Bangalore 560 008

1. INTRODUCTION

Philosophers have argued about the existence and reality of matter for centuries. One may not expect the final answers to such questions. But it does seem to me a sterile exercise if even the style of the debate does not change, let alone the issues raised.

Modern physics, especially physics of the elementary particles, has been a fertile field not merely to re-examine these questions but also to confront some of these with empirical data. New technology has enabled scientists to perform delicate experiments that pose challenges for theorists in the field, as well as for philosophers of science.

The article discusses issues of interpretation in the physics of microparticles (atoms, electrons, etc.) under two broad sections. The first gives an account of the 'discovery' and study of some of these and emphasizes the cumulative nature of our belief in these entities. I shall argue that despite the complex edifice of theoretical constructs required to interpret empirical data, there is no fundamental difficulty in believing in the existence of these particles.

The second section describes briefly the current theory of the dynamics of these particles, the so-called Quantum Mechanics (QM), and some of its bizarre predictions. This theory has been remarkably successful not merely in explaining experiments but also in initiating an array of new technologies. Despite this, it calls for extremely strange interpretations that not merely challenge common sense but pose serious philosophical questions. Some of the predictions of QM were in the realm of thought experiments which highlight these questions. In the last few decades, modern technology has permitted experiments to be performed that almost

*Part II will appear in a later issue.

replicate the conditions of these thought experiments. As of now, these agree with QM. For all that, the philosophical issues are so challenging that one must seriously consider alternative interpretations even if they only replicate the predictions of the conventional orthodoxy of QM.

2. DO ELECTRONS (OF ATOMS OR OTHER MICROENTITIES) EXIST?

I often start a course on modern physics to undergraduates with the question, 'why do you believe in atoms?' The question generally startles them. It is amazing what a few years of indoctrination, euphemistically called teaching does. It removes such questions from the ambit of debate. I am not sure that some of my colleagues in the profession of Science approve of raising them in the class room. I could almost hear them cautioning: Start solving equations and such conceptual problems will take care of themselves. Such questions are metaphysical and could harm scientific training!

Perhaps one should avoid dividing persons into categories of Scientists and non Scientists because I believe there is a near continuum of views and these categorizations generate a hostile climate; non professionals are wary of the power and the arrogance of a few in this profession. There is, for example, the rather extreme view of Feyerahend[1] that 'Science is just one of the many ideologies that propel society and it should be treated as such'. The view that Science flows from facts has long gone out of fashion with Popper delivering a near death blow to induction. If, on the other hand, Science does flow from theories constructed by the human mind, then to what extent is it concerned with real things and not just constructs of the mind? To put it bluntly, is Science in the business of 'discovery' or of 'invention'? In the present context, then, are atoms mere inventions of the fertile minds of Scientists?

The question of the 'existence' of material objects is noticeably prominent in the case of sub-microscopic entities such as electrons, neutrinos or quarks basically because the 'distance' between an actual experimental observation and the interpretation in which these entities play an important role is large and a fairly complex theoretical construct is often required to bridge the gap between observation and inference. Such a large gap raises the question whether alternative constructs are not possible to achieve the same goal. The very meaning of the 'existence' of these submicroscopic entities then becomes obscure.

I have chosen four examples for discussion: atoms, electrons, neutrinos and quarks. These four in the order mentioned, pose an increasing challenge to our belief in their 'existence' and an increasing distance between a theoretical construct and interpretation of empirical data.

3. ATOMS AND QUANTUM THEORY

Although the atomic hypothesis has a very long history, unqualified acceptance of the 'existence' of atoms emerged relatively recently, in the two decades spanning the dawn of the twentieth century. One of the problems in discussions on their 'existence' is that one is not always clear about the sense in which the term is used. For example, for early Greek philosophers, an atom was simply the smallest unit of matter and could not be broken further. This 'atom' is not the atom we know today.

For the chemist Dalton,[2] the atom was the smallest piece of one element that combined with another, in chemical reactions. Usually, the number of atoms of each element so combining was small; for example, water results from 2 atoms of hydrogen combining with 1 atom of oxygen. Dalton's hypothesis was then able to produce quite dramatic agreement with data such as the fact that a compound such as water always formed with fixed quantities of its components.

An important ingredient of Dalton's hypothesis was the notion that all atoms of an element were identical;[3] indeed he explicitly stated this. It is said that the Greek philosopher Plato had argued that only particulars are observed by our senses and universals, such as the 'atom of hydrogen', are an abstraction of our construct. Quantum theory (and its later version, QM) brought a significant change in the notion of such identity. In classical physics there is no principle that prevents small variations of structure and it is arguable that classifying a large collection of atoms as oxygen would indeed be a mental construct. Quantum theory imposes discreteness as a fundamental feature of matter. Since atoms can only exist in discrete states, labelling a collection of atoms as 'oxygen' has empirical significance. Moreover, there are even more profound consequences of such an assumption of identity (of oxygen atoms or of electrons, etc.). QM predicts empirical consequences of such identity and they have been verified in experiments.

Perhaps the most important step in our belief in atoms is the quantitative predictions of atomic theory. Here 'progress' assumes a very simple

meaning. Empirically determined numbers—even if the measured property in question had originated as a mental construct are measured over the years with such improved accuracy that their very (repeatable) values assume crucial tests of our faith. For atomic hypothesis, perhaps the most significant is the so-called Avogadro number.[4] This is the number of molecules (which play the role of atoms in a chemical compound) in a defined quantity of all gases. This very large number was known to be of the order of 10^{23} (i.e. one followed by 23 zeros) in the nineteenth century. Einstein, in 1905, not merely produced an atomic explanation for the so-called 'Brownian motion' but his explanation led to a determination of Avogadro number with accuracy. Thus, although the idea of atoms had been around for millenia, physicists think of Einstein's work as the crucial vindication of the atomic hypothesis.

For all that, Brownian motion,[5] even with Einstein's explanation would hardly be accepted as a discovery of atoms in common parlance. Compare this, for example, to the discovery of Jupiter's moons by Galileo in 1610. It was true that the telescope had come into use only a few years before and there was resistance in the 'unfolding' of the sub-microscopic entity; the atoms required a sophisticated theoretical construct as compared to looking though a telescope. In modern physics 'discoveries', are often a cumulative process.

4. THE ELECTRON

The first sub atomic particle to be discovered was the electron, a discovery commonly credited to J.J. Thomson just before the end of the nineteenth century. It took time for its acceptance even among professionals. By contrast, in the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists were often ahead of experimentalists, predicting particles and enticing experimentalists to look at them.

The subsequent history of experiments on the electron is one of such unfolding 'progress' that it is difficult to class it as a mere ideal in the sense of the early philosophers. Still, it is only in retrospect that one now puts a date to the discovery of the electron, to the results published by Thomson in 1907. For some two decades, workers studied the properties of gas discharge in particular the so-called 'cathode rays' that streamed in the discharge tube. Crookes demonstrated that these rays appeared to be affected by charged bodies placed in their vicinity. Zeeman studied the

effect on spectral lines of magnetic fields around the source. H.A. Lorentz, remarkably, had gone to the extent of postulating the existence of light charged particles which interacted with the magnetic fields to produce the alterations in spectra that Zeeman observed. Indeed to the modern young physicist, used as he/she is to the prediction of yet another particle, the rather slow evolution of the idea of the electron seems an exercise in more than abundant caution.

What then was special in J.J. Thomson's work? There were, in my view, at least three features. The observation was direct-deflection of cathode rays by electric field. Thomson tried several cathode materials and could show that the effect was more or less the same and finally, Thomson could make a good measurement of the ratio of mass to the charge of the particles making up the cathode rays. This last feature was very important in that it showed that the particles that came out of various cathodes were quite similar. The idealization of this notion that all these particles (to be called electrons) were to have exactly the same mass to charge ratio may have started as a construct of a theoretical model but it was over the years to be subjected to more and more exacting tests of accuracy.

Moreover, it is difficult to think of a number such as this coming out of a theoretical construct and yet have almost the same answer in a variety of experiments and by a variety of observers. Currently, the charge of the electron is known to an accuracy of a part in several million. The electron has many other measurable properties; one called the 'g' factor, which is related to its magnetic properties has been measured to a phenomenal accuracy of a few parts in 10 million-million. Such measurements surely are not necessary to convince one of the reality of its 'existence' but are stringent tests of theories (in this case of quantum electrodynamics QED).[6]

Over the years the electron hypothesis has been extraordinarily fertile in its explanatory and predictive capacity. The electron is a crucial constituent of the atom and of theories of the atom to follow. The basis of electronics and semiconductor technology is the understanding of the dynamics of the electron in various situations.

5. NEUTRINOS

The story of the neutrino perhaps will throw some light on the elevation of a hypothesis to an acceptance of the particle as a real thing. It was

proposed by Pauli as a possible solution to difficulties in understanding beta decay, the emission of electrons (and positrons) from radioactive nuclei. The most apparent difficulty (but not the only one) was that the decay of a nucleus to another of different nuclear charge seemed to be accompanied by the emission of the electron (or one position) and nothing else was detectable. This raised the question of how energy was conserved in the process because much of the energy was unobservable. Pauli's hypothesis was that the unobserved part of the energy was carried off by a neutral particle (i.e. not electrically charged) subsequently called the neutrino.

The scepticism that such a hypothesis aroused perhaps best illustrates the conservative attitude of scientists. The proposed particle was to be endowed precisely with those properties needed to explain the experimental anomalies. The particle was not charged else it would have been detected by methods easily available then.[7] If it had a mass at all it was probably of the order of or less than the electron mass and it had to be endowed with an intrinsic angular momentum (usually called spin) which was needed to explain the angular momentum difference between the radioactive nucleus and the observed decay products and it was to interact extremely weakly with nuclear matter since it would otherwise have been detected by means similar to the detection of a neutron (also an electrically neutral particle).

As mentioned, the crisis that made Pauli come up with this drastic suggestion was the apparent violation of conservation laws of energy and angular momentum. While faith in these conservation laws was strong it was perhaps not quite so firmly rooted as to accept a new particle whose existence was to be inferred on such tenuous grounds. Pauli probably was aware of the difficulty and did not send this suggestion in the usual manner of communicating it to a journal but rather sent it in a letter (in 1930) humourously addressed as 'Dear Radioactive Ladies and Gentleman' to a conference he could not attend. It was unlikely that such frivolity was acceptable then (or now) in the proposal of an important new idea to professionals except from an eccentric genius such as Pauli was.

Why then was the hypothesis taken up seriously within a short time? One reason perhaps was that the new Quantum Mechanics had been formulated and the theory was waiting as it were to solve problems. The theory of beta decay, incorporating Pauli's neutrino was formulated by Fermi in 1934. The success of this theory in explaining a variety of

experimental data was to create a much greater confidence in the neutrino as a real thing. The war slowed down research in pure physics but immediately after the neutrino was a favourite as the missing particle in other phenomena, with as decays of the newly-discovered mesons. One particle now called the muon, was even allowed the luxury of two neutrinos (or rather, a neutrino and an anti-neutrino) among its decay products. Such was the confidence already built in its existence, that there were remarkable speculations about the nature of the interactions of the neutrino with the other known particles to be called 'weak interactions' in due course.

Nevertheless, there were experiments, extremely difficult to carry out designed to exhibit more direct evidence for a neutrino. It was not until 1956 that an experiment using reactor neutrinos to initiate a reaction whose products were identified, was performed.[8] The experiment was regarded as more direct evidence for the neutrino than the ones offered hitherto.

The next stage was in 1956 was when reactions in which the neutrino was a participant indicated violation of a symmetry called parity. This was a crucial step in the development of a theory of 'weak interactions' culminating in the so-called 'standard model' which is now the current orthodoxy in particle physics. It also initiated intense activity among experimentalists to probe properties of the neutrino. Indeed by now there was so much confidence in the 'existence' of the neutrino that a proposal was made (and soon carried out) for the use of neutrino beams from the accelerators which opened up a vast array of experiments in particle physics.[9] The first crucial discovery in these experiments was the observation that there were two types of neutrinos (later one more type was to join the family). In the last decade, experiments seem to indicate that it is extremely unlikely that there are more than three types of neutrinos. The latest important discovery is that at least one of these neutrinos has a non zero mass as inferred from experiments on neutrino oscillations.

This very brief account of experiments investigating the properties of neutrinos is to show that our faith in the existence of this very elusive particle was not a sudden event but a series of important steps. Each step is irreversible in the growth of our knowledge in the sense that after the experiment it is progressively more difficult to think of the neutrino family as a mere theoretical construct.

6. QUAKRS

The example of quarks is rather more difficult. Initially proposed as basic constituents of matter (of protons and neutrons, in particular) the hypothesis seemed a natural one from certain symmetry and other theoretical considerations. Before 1964, particles such as protons and neutrons (and others which together with protons and neutrons are called hadrons) were treated as elementary particles. There were two reasons for looking for more elementary objects.

First, by then a large number of particles had been observed in experiments. Recall that a few decades before, only electrons and protons were known. In the persistent search for principles by which this large list of particles could be 'grouped' into families, an elegant scheme was prepared which envisaged these particles as composites made of basic units named quarks. Originally, just three types of quarks were proposed, current theory accommodates six of them. There is good experimental evidence by now for all six.[10]

The problem was that no experiment showed their existence in free form. In fact, their non appearance in free form could even be built into a theory. Thus quarks as present theory envisages, exhibit properties as constituents of protons, neutrons, etc. but will never emerge in isolation.

The second reason for the emergence of the quark model was that many of the well known properties of particles (e.g. the charge distribution within a proton and its magnetic moment) could be understood fairly simply if they were thought to be make of quarks. A crude analogy to understand this is the following. Imagine two gunny bags, one filled with sand and the other with a single piece of wood. Assume both are of about the same weight and we cannot see what is inside. If we tried to push the bags, we shall find that the sand bag is much harder to move. The main point of this crude analogy is this: we can sense inner degrees of freedom of the sand bag (the large number of sand particles can jiggle around within) by observing the response of the bag to an external disturbance. Experimental evidence for quarks is thus based on the response of particles like neutrons and protons to collisions (the external force).

The quark, then, differs from other micro entities in that it cannot (it seems) be observed in isolation. If this is a big price to pay for belief in its existence, the fecundity of the quark hypothesis is quite rich. For example, although quarks cannot escape confinement from a free proton

or a neutron, it was easy to envisage conditions under which quarks (and other objects called gluons) which mediate forces between quarks could move freely within a nucleus composed of protons and neutrons. There is recently, experimental evidence for such matter, a soup of quarks and gluons, called Quark Gluon Plasma (QGP).

Moreover, the quark hypothesis probably has the power to explain features of the early universe, i.e. its evolution within a fraction of a second after the so-called 'Big Bang'. These theoretical studies are still in developing stages and the prediction will have to be tested on a cosmological scale.

The quark story, then brings in a new dimension to the notion of existence of micro entities. It plays a part in the explanation of phenomena which range in SCALE from the microscopic to the cosmological, a truly mind boggling range.

To sum up, the idea of existence of micro particles does not require a very big change in our criteria of acceptance even though techniques of observation and their interpretation have become considerably more complex. This however, is not the case when we come to the basic dynamics of these particles as described by Quantum Mechanics (and its subsequent sophisticated versions).

Notes and References

1. Paul Feyeraband. Philosophy of Science Ed. by F.D. Klemke et al. Buffalo. N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988, p. 10.
2. John Dalton's original paper: 'New System of Chemical Philosophy' was published in 1842. It is reprinted in *The World of Physics*, Vol. I, pp. 613–20. (Ed.) Jefferson Hane Weaver, New York: Simon Schuster, 1987.
3. It turns out that phenomena such as superconductivity and superfluidity depend fundamentally on 'identity' of microparticles.
4. Avogadro's number came from his conjecture, published soon after Dalton's works that equal volumes of gases at the same temperature and pressure contain the same number of molecules.
5. A botanist, Robert Brown in 1828 observed (under a microscope) the zigzag motion of tiny pollen grains suspended in a liquid.
6. It must not be assumed that physicists are ready to jump to such idealizations at the first opportunity, as it were. In the late fifties, particles called strange mesons (among others) were discovered: one particular type called *K mesons* seemed to have about the same mass in various observations; and yet some disintegrated to one set of particles and some to others. In those early days,

physicists were cautious enough to call them K_{e2} $K_{\mu 2}$, etc. although they were shown, later, to be the same particle which has different 'modes' of decay.

7. Recent experiments suggest that they do have a very small mass.
8. See for example, the reminiscences of Otto F. Frisch in 'Nuclear Physics in Retrospect', Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, p. 66.
9. The experiment, performed in 1962, was then a gigantic undertaking using tens of tons of steel cannibalized from a naval cruiser. This was necessary to 'filter' unwanted particles to yield a relatively pure neutrino beam. Today neutrino experiments use even more grandiose ideas using the earth, for example, to perform the work of the steel in the first experiment. Unlike the laboratory source in that experiment, which was performed using an accelerator (at Brookhaven National Laboratory), the source of these neutrinos is quite extra terrestrial).
10. The six quarks are labelled u (up), d (down), c (charm), s (strange), t (top) and b (bottom). These picturesque names have little connection to our conventional usage of these words.

Language as Dialogue: Towards a Redefinition of Modernity

T.V. MADHU

Lecturer in Philosophy, Sree Sankaracharya University, Kalady, Eranakulam, Kerala 683 574

The concept of knowledge with which we are familiar is a concept closely associated with the enlightenment project. The base metaphor of enlightenment, obviously, is light. It symbolizes the lightness of true knowledge which is contrasted to the darkness of false knowledge or ignorance. Knowledge conceived as light stands for the power of the human mind to create the vision of a better life. Ignorance, in contrast, confines the human mind to the established life situations resisting critical reflection. The idea of enlightenment implies the project of overcoming ignorance; a project, as Kant describes, that releases man from the status of 'immaturity'. By 'immaturity' Kant means a certain state of our mind that compels us to be submissive to someone else's authority. Obviously, to be mature is to have the courage 'to use our own understanding',[1] to have the ability to make our rationality free from the external constrains and to use it in the light of the requirements for satisfying our needs. Knowledge, thus, as conceived of in the context of enlightenment is rational knowledge. Rational knowledge undoubtedly is not passive; knowing rationally means not simply a fuller understanding of the given state of affairs. It also means allowing man to have crucial influence on the existing state of affairs. It is supposed to help man to expand his/her power to technical control; to know something in this regard means man has the power to control and manipulate it. In short, enlightenment has defined knowledge as power.

It is generally believed that such a definition of knowledge finds its most powerful philosophical articulation in the works of Immanual Kant, especially in his three *Critiques*. Conceiving enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority, Kant realized the necessity of a critique; its

role being that of 'defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped'.[2]

It goes without saying that knowledge for Kant is not passive representation. To know is not merely to represent things. It is to make judgements in accordance with certain categories that are *a priori*. Knowledge is 'presentational', not merely representational. It involves construction rather than the mirroring of reality. Epistemology, for Kant, is a critique that enquires into the transcendental conditions that make such a construction possible.

Kant assumes that his transcendental scheme radically challenges the category of representation that entails the classic subject/object structure of knowledge. Subsequently, he claims that his attempt in providing a central place to the subject that constructs rather than represents the world around brought a Copernican revolution in the field of philosophy and that this revolution represents the true spirit of enlightenment/modernity. This paper makes an attempt to argue against this claim. In the first section, I will examine Kant's programme of reformulating epistemology and argue that it implies the genesis of a linguistic project, the epistemic paradigm of which is not radically different from the subject/object paradigm of classical epistemology. In the second section, I attempt to argue that it is by going beyond the representational concept of language that modernity can be viewed in a different manner. My strategy here will be to put forth Habermas's model of language as dialogue that provides a framework for a critique of Kant's idea of reason and also for redefining modernity.

I

As mentioned earlier, Kant's attempt of reformulating epistemology consists of replacing the classical representation thesis with the concept of judgement. Judgement, for Kant, is the primary unit of knowledge where both reason and experience merge together; i.e., to experience is to make judgements and to judge is to judge in accordance with certain concepts derived from certain fundamental categories that are presupposed by experience itself. As a matter of fact, Kant's celebrated synthesis of empiricism and rationalism is founded upon this concept of judgement, the

concept that claims to resolve the apparent contradiction between reason and experience.

It is not simply the case that Kant introduces the concept of judgement as yet another epistemological category. Rather, his attempt is to emphasize the primacy of judgement in the process of knowing. This idea of the primacy of judgement, as I understand, marks a turn—which can be called a linguistic turn—in philosophy. Kant's purpose could be described as a linguistic project, or, more specifically, an ideal language project based on the analysis of propositions or judgements. I do not argue that what Kant was advocating is primarily a linguistic thesis, but that his thesis implies the sense that a subject's encounter with the world of phenomena is primarily and necessarily mediated through language.

Reformulated in the above manner, it can be argued that Kant's critique that maps out the necessary preconditions of human experience is actually a critique of language. It attempts to answer two fundamental questions: (i) what are the conditions that make language—the linguistic construction of reality—possible, and (ii) what are the limits of language. Kant assumed that the fallacies of traditional metaphysics arose mainly due to two reasons: (1) its failure to understand the process of knowing necessarily as a linguistic process based on judgements, and (2) its failure to determine the limits of language. With regard to the first reason, it attempted to view the fundamental categories of understanding as wholly abstract and independent of experience. With regard to the second, it attempted to describe the supposed nature of reality *in itself*, to speak about the unspeakable.

It is clear from the above that Kant's idea of language is the idea of a closed system of cognitive representation. Closed, in the sense that it is not open to the world *in itself*. It begins with the subject and ends with it, leaving the object as unknowable. It is true that this concept shattered the classical model of knowledge conceived as a medium of passive representation by endowing the cognizing subject with new productive powers. But does it really alter the whole subject/object structure of representation?

I would claim that it does not. Kant's dismissal of the classical representation model consists of excluding the object-domain as something unspeakable that lies permanently beyond the level of representation. But, by this exclusion, Kant does not attempt to leave the problem of objectivity out of question. Rather, he deals with it in a different manner. He

assumed that objectivity is to be conceived as a moment of the cognizing subject. It is obtained when the judgement expressing a relationship between facts is in accordance with the categorical framework of the subject's cognitive apparatus. In other words, objectivity consists not in its being independent of cognition, but, rather, in the mechanism of cognition itself. This is to say that Kant's idea of language is essentially cognitive and the basis of its objectivity is still the cognitive act of the subject. By introducing the idea of the primacy of language, he could only replace the subject/object framework of classical representational epistemology with a new scheme where objectivity is to be comprehended in terms of subjectivity, in terms of the structures of consciousness as such. Obviously, this new scheme, since it still operates within the horizon of subjective consciousness, is necessarily an epistemological one.

Language understood in the cognitive sense is a formal system that helps human subjects to manipulate empirical facts. It is guided by 'technical interest', as Habermas called it, seeking knowledge as information that extends control over the physical phenomena and facilitates manipulation. It is this concept of language/knowledge that provided the framework for the natural scientific method to which enlightenment thinkers were largely attracted. In the light of the above discussion, it can be rightly said that it is Kant who paved the way for such a positivistic concept of language that provided the methodological framework for linking reason to science and that based on this linkage there emerged, for the first time, a widely accepted view of future built with the aid of scientific knowledge.

It goes without saying that the concept of cognitive language is part and parcel of the project of enlightenment modernity. But is it the case that the whole project of modernity is to be understood merely in terms of this concept; that the idea of modernity is to be reduced to the idea of scientific reason?

I prefer to answer this question in the negative. Reason has a still broader application than that of pertaining to the assessment of instrumental actions that is guided by the technical interests of the human being. It has to be understood properly by expanding its scope beyond the domain of instrumental action to include a wider dimension in which people interact with each other and form 'rational' agreements. Expanded in this manner, reason can be viewed as being embedded in communicative action that is guided by another human interest (practical interest, as Habermas

called it) in expanding intersubjective understanding. When we restrict the province of reason to the instrumental domain, what we actually do is to withdraw it entirely from the province of intersubjective interaction. Intersubjective interaction also is necessarily mediated by language, not by cognitive language but by language understood as communication.

II

Conceiving language as cognitive is a matter of epistemology. Such a conception results necessarily in a representation-thesis, either of the classical empiricist manner or of the Kantian subject-centric manner. The way out is to cross the boundaries of epistemology and to see language not as a system of representation, but as intersubjective communication. Conceiving language as a matter of communication has been one of the major preoccupations of hermeneutics. This kind of a hermeneutic move was initiated in a visible fashion early in the twentieth century, both in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of philosophy in the way of a shift in attention from ideal language to ordinary language, and in the continental tradition (as with Heidegger and Gadamer) with the emphasis on the concept of intersubjective agreement. Jürgen Habermas has also moved in the same direction. Drawing insights from these traditions, Habermas attempts to develop a theory of communication that provides him with a framework for redefining modernity. I shall briefly present some of the fundamental features of Habermas's approach in this section with a focus on the problem of how this approach enables him to reject the Kantian model and to redefine modernity.

What is crucial to Habermas's project of redefining modernity is the fundamental difference between two approaches to language: (i) (Kantian) subject-centric approach, (ii) intersubjective approach.[3] The first one can be characterized as epistemological, and the second one as hermeneutic. Habermas assumes that the very affirmation of modernity is predicated on this distinction, and 'a critique of epistemology, especially the category of the subject, is at the same time a critique of modernity'.[4]

The principle of reason that operates within the horizon of subjectivity, Habermas argues, is circular in nature. Any approach that relies on such a principle necessarily results in a kind of decontextualization of reason, i.e., in treating reason as something abstract and bracketed from its inherent social embeddedness. Reason isolated from the 'life-world' is pure yet

distorted. Kant's reason, Habermas claims, is a distorted one. It is permanently closed, the 'other' being irrevocably excluded from it. It is, to be precise, monologic. In Habermas's own words, reason 'as reduced to the subjective faculty of understanding and purposive activity corresponds to the image of an exclusive reason'.[5]

The way Habermas chooses to rectify the philosophy of subjective reason is to replace it with a reason embedded in communication. Reason, embedded in communication, is a property of discourse, fully expressed in the shared practices of communicative actors. Language understood as communication is essentially intersubjective; instead of excluding the 'other', it recognizes the 'other' as its essential moment. It is not a domain of representation, but a medium of doing things through communication with the 'other'. As such, to speak a language means being able to enter into a dialogue using it in the context of everyday life in accordance with the norms and conventions of the language-community.

As we have seen earlier, in the Kantian paradigm the question of objectivity and truth could be comprehended only in terms of the structure of subjective consciousness. For Habermas, on the contrary, it is tied to the question of dialogic validity. Dialogic validity, obviously, is an idea rooted in the Habermasian notion of discursive rationality. What is implied in it is the assumption that truth is not to be conceived as an axiom; it is a term brought into play in debates and factual disputes, in argumentation. More precisely, truth is rooted in the structure of communicative action, vindicated only through the affirmations of communicative actors as they reach understanding and consensus through the process of argumentation. In the perspective of the philosophy of subjective consciousness, truth resides 'within', whereas in the perspective of intersubjective communication it is conceived as something 'outer' or 'public'.

To replace the 'inner' with the 'outer', 'private' with the 'public' is to mark a turning point in the history of philosophizing. In other words, it amounts to the replacing of the traditional mode of philosophizing with the new mode in which the focus is no longer on the so-called 'inner truth', but precisely on the question of how truth is produced in the public sphere, as the property of intersubjective agreements. Philosophy that starts, not from consciousness but from language—language conceived as communicative interaction not as a cognitive system of representation—is the philosophy of dialogue. Being dialogical, it implies the spirit of democracy. Habermas wants us to view modernity as also implying the

dialogic-democratic potential. The Kantian paradigm that has been wrongly identified as the paradigm of modernity reduces language to the subjective faculty of representation and purposive activity. This concept of language corresponds to the concept of instrumental reason; it is 'exclusive' and hence monological. It is this monological reason that has been the target of attack of the so-called post modern/post structuralist critics. Communication is necessarily dialogical and 'one cannot be concerned with it, without, in principle being able to enter the dialogue'. The shift from monologue to dialogue is a paradigm shift and this shift, Habermas assumes, opens up a new period in the philosophical discourse of enlightenment/modernity.

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Montaigne's *Essays* Considered as Philosophy

DURGALAL MATHUR
40, Nehru Path, Krishna Nagar II, Lal Kothi, Jaipur 302 015

Montaigne is known to the English-speaking world primarily as the creator of the literary *genre* called the 'essay'. Those who have no access to French literature in the original and read about Montaigne as the inventor of the 'essay' in Histories of English Literature may legitimately rank him with the best *littérateurs* who have stood the test of time. But Montaigne's fame is not limited to the creation of the essay alone; he is a profound thinker who 'donna aux hommes une haute leçon de sagesse' (gave a lofty lesson of wisdom to the people) of France during a period of torment in its history, thereby marking the 'maturity of the French Renaissance in the writing of a prose work of capital importance'. Montaigne, says George Saintsbury, differs from others in two aspects: '... the audacious egotism and frankness with which he discourses of his private affairs and exhibits himself in undress; secondly, the flavour of subtle scepticism which he diffuses over his whole work.'

Though the creation of the essay as evidence of Montaigne's originality has been recognized unhesitatingly, little is generally known of the whole achievement of this man. His frankness and subtle scepticism 'are susceptible of a good deal of misconstruction' and have been misconstrued. Historians of French literature have called him a (penseur) 'thinker' whose influence has been wide and profound, but have reservations in treating him as a philosopher. 'Montaigne n'est pas un veritable philosophe' (Montaigne is not a genuine philosopher) say Castex, Surer, and Becker because his thought is very 'mouvante' (agile, shifting) in order to be encapsulated into a system. Yet, Montaigne's profundity is acknowledged and the development of his mind or thoughts discernible in broad and clear outlines. 'It is possible to discover in the *Essays* an art of living, a political and religious doctrine, a programme of education.'

However, a patient study of the *Essays* along with other writings will show that the aforementioned remarks of critics are an underestimation of Montaigne's total achievement. He may not be considered as a philosopher

in the usual sense of the term: a philosopher with an evolved and fully reasoned system with fixed and rigid concepts of Man and the Universe. But the term 'philosophy' cannot be restricted to mean only that. A thinker can have a philosophy without identifying himself with any current of thought or system of thought and thus have an approach or attitude displayed in his interpretation of life. Montaigne possessed a thorough knowledge of the Greek and Latin writers whom he quotes extensively in his writings in appropriate contexts. His essays recall the Greeks who understood and defined philosophy as the love of wisdom and wisdom has perhaps been best defined by T.S. Eliot as 'uncynical disillusionment'. Montaigne is undoubtedly a true philosopher in this Greek sense. His essays are replete with insights and observations of the profoundest kind made more authentic with the most appropriate quotations from his favourite authors of the past. His mind has been noted to have evolved from Stoicism to Scepticism (or half-scepticism) to self-analysis, self-assessment, self-investigation, and what the French call *examen de conscience*, which makes Montaigne a precursor of modern psycho-analysis. This study of his own mind raises its own problems for scholars because it overlaps confessions of all kinds and observations collected under what Baudelaire wrote as *Fusées*, (Fireworks), *Mon coeur mis à nu* (My heart laid bare), and the *Carnet* (diary): an area full of intricacies and not easily distinguishable from each other. In fact, he is rightly hailed as a pioneer in literary self-analysis in a familiar, charming style. Professor P.M. Jones, in his brilliant study entitled, *French Introspectives from Montaigne to Gide* has discussed this problem in detail. If Montaigne lived through the phases of Stoicism and Scepticism (recognized as important channels of philosophical thought in the West) even tentatively and on the fringe, he cannot be dismissed as not entitled to the title of a true philosopher in the Greek sense of the term. Supporting this view, Geoffrey Brereton says, 'yet beneath this naive charm of language there lies a considerable philosopher'.

What seems to me to have deprived Montaigne of the claim to being a real philosopher is the reader's impression that the three books of his Essays almost exclusively concentrate on ethics and concrete problems of life rather than on abstractions of metaphysical speculation. One wonders, especially in the contemporary context, whether it is more useful and sincere to speculate and argue about the existence of the soul or try to prove logically or in any other way the existence of God. Montaigne does

refer to the perennial problem of reason versus intuition and rejects reason as an inefficient instrument for knowing truth or reality. Having done so, he also steers clear of formulating abstract categories to prove the unprovable. His half-doubt prompts him to concentrate finally and mainly on experience and self-analysis. With all the pitfalls and difficulties of this method of knowing truth, namely egoism, biography, judgement, comprehension, etc. he comes out fairly successfully in his endeavour at an impartial and clinical self-analysis. There is of course no systematic account of it, yet, as Professor Louis Cazamian says, 'a central subject has gradually won the first place, and stamps the broken development with an implicit unity; what the author is out to give us is a full portrait of one man—himself ... and this was the capital innovation.'

Not only this unity 'of spirit and treatment', as Saintsbury observes, 'The exploration of one consciousness, if penetrating enough, reaches the common background of human nature; and what fascinates us is the bearing of the analysis on the mysterious world which we all carry within ourselves.' This admirable combination of unity, universalization, and absence of abstractions gives his ethics a power and attraction still unmatched by even the most renowned philosophers. His favourite medal is struck with the inscriptions 'Que sais-je?' (What do I know?) on the observe side (and not, as is common with oriental philosophers 'Who am I?' or 'That Thou Art') and on the reverse 'Je m'abstiens' (I restrain myself or restraint). Montaigne's work is thus 'a monograph on a human being' who finds 'most definite task in a collaboration with the moralist.'

II

In Montaigne one of the deeper veins of French thought comes to the surface and will be a prominent feature in the classical make-up; in many ways he is the counterpart of Pascal and Descartes: his *doute provisoire* is no preliminary stage but a soft pillow for a sensible head to rest upon. In spite of the famous medal he caused to be struck and his motto, *Que sais-je*? it would not be quite accurate to regard Pyrrhonism, which he certainly accepted for a time, as his definite attitude. Nevertheless, he found the essence of his conclusions upon life in the relativity of all things human. Man is 'merveilleusement vain, divers, et ondoyant ...' (Man is astonishingly conceited, multiform, and vacillating). 'Nous ne voulons rien librement, rien absoluement, rien constamment' (We will nothing freely, nothing absolutely, nothing

> firmly). Reason is no unvarying and sure test of truth; to trust it absolutely is to build on sand—though Montaigne in his last essays is a little less critical of it. When all is said, there is nothing permanent but God. (Cazamian)

Pascal criticized Montaigne for intellectual timidity and Descartes for having wished to erect a philosophical system without God. Since Montaigne's influence is recognized on both and they are studied as eminent French philosophers, Louis Cazamian clinches the issue with the connection he establishes between them in the quoted passage. If Montaigne is not taken as a genuine philosopher, at least his essays can be considered as philosophy while recalling to mind Everette W. Knight's study of Husserl, Baudelaire, Sartre, Gide, and others in her book entitled, *Literature considered as philosophy—The French example*. This practice is what the modern writers have resorted to: propagating philosophy through literary works.

Montaigne learnt Latin by conversation as a living language and Greek as a 'kind of amusement'. His teacher and members of the household all spoke Latin. He was a boarder at the College de Guyenne at Bordeaux, but its discipline disheartened him. At last he studied Law at Toulouse after 2 years of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts in Bordeaux. He had experience of an active life as a magistrate from 1554–1571 followed by an active retirement from 1571–1580. At the age of 21 Montaigne was named adviser to the Cour des Perigueux, and 3 years thereafter to the Parliament of Bordeaux. 'The multitude of laws, their contradictions, the inanity of judicial procedures prompted Montaigne's criticism and the cruelty of punishment revolted him. Towards 1558, Montaigne developed an intimate friendship with Etienne de la Boétie, a young humanist magistrate with Stoician ideas, who had written a treatise against the tyranny of power entitled, 'Discours de la servitude volontaire' (Discourse on voluntary servitude) and who wrote verse and translated Plutarch and Xenophone. As La Boétie died prematurely, Montaigne felt the most piercing shock of his life and 18 years later he wrote about his memory of this great friend and edited his works.

The second half of the sixteenth century was a period of unrest; therefore there is nothing surprising in the apparent blunting of appetite for higher things and the adoption of a sceptical attitude towards life. 'In this state of matters a few persons, of whom Montaigne was incomparably the most important, philosophized sceptically about life,' says Saintsbury.

The Stoic ring is clearly audible in Montaigne's motto of restraint. In his essay on the education of children he quotes from Epicurus: 'Let not the youngest shun philosophy or the oldest grow weary of it. To do so is equivalent to saying either that the time for a happy life has not yet come or that it is already past.' Again,

> The mind that harbours philosophy should, by its soundness, make the body sound also ... Why, philosophy's object is to calm the tempests of the soul, to teach hunger and fever how to laugh, not by a few imaginary epicycles, but by natural and palpable arguments.

Though Montaigne deliberately embraced Stoicism, it was a doctrine quite opposed to his temperament and remained only a passing phase of his life. 'Ce nonchalant, qui répugne à l'effort, a appris, au contact de La Boétie, à admirer d'austérité des Stoiciens.' (This listless man, who feels loath to work, had learnt on contact with La Boétie to admire the austerity of the stoicians.) The study of Seneca and Lucan enhanced his zeal and Cato d'Utique was before his eyes the ideal human type. Montaigne tries to believe that virtue demands 'un chemin âpre et épineux' (a bitter and thorny path). He also believed in the efficiency of a rigid rule in order to escape misfortune. He developed with a grave eloquence some noble commonplaces on the will which triumphs over suffering, over death, for which the sage knows to prepare himself by pondering constantly.

The inchoate but inborn proclivity towards self-examination gradually gains momentum. Facts displace speculation. His fundamental aim is to portray himself in depth in such a way that the truth of his famous observation becomes evident:

> Je propose une vie basse et sans lustre, c'est tout un. On attache aussi bien toute la philosohie morale à une vie populaire et privée que à une vie de plus riche étoffe. Chaque homme porte la forme entière de l'humaine condition.
>
> (I present a humble life, without distinction, but that is no matter. Moral philosophy, as a whole, can be just as well applied to a common and private existence as to one of richer stuff. Every man carries in himself the complete pattern of the human nature.)

Montaigne is here speaking about the human condition, not human nature. These are two different entities. Brereton's translation of the last sentence is 'each man bears the complete stamp of the human condition' and

significantly discussed this under the chapter entitled *The Outline of Man*. This by no means is an easy task, however sincere and honest the intention. With all the difficulties incidental to pure or clinical self-analysis such as straying into autobiography, unconscious egoism, an intermingling of judgement and comprehension, the analytical content can be separated from the encompassing irrelevancies. 'It was in order to tame the chimeras of his mind that Montaigne invented essay-writing,' says P.M. Jones. The mind experiences immense difficulty 'in trying to keep the object definitely in focus'.

III

Gradually, therefore, Montaigne was weaned away from the austere doctrine of stoicism as a reaction against it. His scepticism, which 'is altogether *sui generis*' (Saintsbury) naturally displaced stoicism. 'It is not exuberant, like that of Rabelais, nor sneering, like that of Voltaire, nor despairing, like that of Pascal, nor merely inquisitive and scholarly, like that of Bayle.' Plutarch displaced Seneca. At the same time, his judgement became extremely independent. During his tenure as a magistrate, he had observed the absurdity of civil wars, of fanaticism and became hostile to all dogmatism. 'Le doute envahit sa pensée' (doubt overwhelmed his mind) and he adopted the aforementioned device for his model. This scepticism is clearly seen in his *Apologie de Raymond Sebond* wherein Montaigne undervalued rationalism and comes to the startling conclusion-paradox that the 'brute stupidity of the animals armed with their instincts surpasses' 'tout ce que peut notre divine intelligence' (all that which can be our divine intelligence). Man is utterly incapable of attaining truth. Science or knowledge is useless and vain and philosophy a tissue of contradictions; our lives resemble a dream and the essence of things is inaccessible to us.

Henceforth, Montaigne stopped his quest in any system of truth or of life. All knowledge is useful only as far as it relates to our lives and 'se ramène ... à rendre compte do nos opinions ou de nos goûts' (comes back to render an account of our opinions or of our tastes). Nothing should be taken by the student on simple authority or trust. 'Only fools are certain and immovable', adds he with the quotation from Dante as a footnote: 'It pleases me as much to doubt as to know' (*Inferno XI*. 93). The boundaries of his open mind are further extended and all experience is welcome. In his essay on the education of children he asserts: 'The most manifest sign

of wisdom is a constant happiness; its state is like that of things above the moon: always serene'. Philosophy must calm the 'tempests of the soul'.

He preserved his independence jealously. He even neglected looking after his daily affairs and office work. He refused to live in the court. He was a refined epicurean and struck a moderation and balance between physical and mental pleasures. He enjoyed life and its pleasures even to intensity. Yet his considered view is moderation and obedience to nature's laws. He leans heavily on the ancients and his essays are replete with quotations from Latin writers for the most part.

IV

Having passed through the two stages of Stoicism and Scepticism, Montaigne concentrated his attention on the study and analysis of his own mind. The Penguin edition presents the *Essays* of Montaigne stating in the blurb:

> In his *Essays* Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) penned a portrait of himself in a frame of timelessness. Following an entirely new, non-chronological method of autobiography, he set out to test his responses to situations and to ascertain the permanence of his impressions and opinions. Against a brilliant range of subjects—from cannibals to physiognomy—the man displayed is objectively detached, tireless in his search for truth and at all times restrained. His essential modesty is revealed nowhere more clearly than in his famous medal with its inscription *Que sais-je*?

That Montaigne developed as an introspective of the most searching kind from the two superseded stages of Stoicism and Scepticism is not a subject for wonder as these also have self-analytic or introspective elements. Introspection as a psychological instrument for exploring the mind has been studied by several writers on Montaigne. It is seldom of the purest kind and overlaps autobiography. But, Montaigne says: 'Most things were unknowable except one, that is one's own self.' This exploration has its own validity and trustworthiness and its own dangers. Montaigne is, on the whole, free from egoism and false pretence and any insincere pose. According to P.M. Jones, introspection means 'the disinterested investigation of a mind by itself'. It precludes the systematic approach of philosophers and technical approach of the psychologist. It also excludes reflection, speculation, reverie, rumination, fantasy, dreams, also unconscious

revelations. Therefore, true introspection means, 'the conscious examination of a mind by itself'. Montaigne very carefully uses the word 'constater' (statement of fact) for what he is trying to do in the study of his own mind. It is this quality of his analytic product which keeps its universality and truthfulness. Montaigne's essays, if studied as a whole, are very likely to make us ponder whether he is simply and exclusively only a literary artist who invented a very popular *genre*. Though the record of his analysis can easily be misinterpreted and mistaken as fragmentary, there is a perceptible coherence of his thought which is seldom without its penetrating insights. It will not do to dismiss him as not being a genuine philosopher; also to trace his immense influence on writers and philosophers like Pascal, Descartes, Shakespeare and Baudelaire, and yet to halfheartedly entitle him to the latter category won't do. Since the modern existentialist thinkers like Sartre, Camus and others have been recognized as both artists and philosophers and thoroughly studied as such, there is no illegitimacy in studying Montaigne's *Essays* as philosophy of a profound and coherent kind. Consider a few observations and insights chosen at random here for the simple reason that it is a problem of not what to select but what to omit. Montaigne looks upon life, says Saintsbury, 'with a kind of ironical enjoyment, and the three books of his *Essays* might be described as a vast gallery of pictures illustrating the results of his contemplations.'

The stoicians considered death as the aim of life. Montaigne called it an aberration: man need not always think of it. For Montaigne death is the end, i.e. cessation of life, not its end or aim. He taught that, death is nothing to be afraid of. Says he:

> We trouble our life by thoughts about death, and our death by thoughts of life. The first saddens us, the second terrifies us. It is not for death that we are preparing, it is too momentary ... If we have not known how to live, it is wrong to teach us how to die ... To contemplate death in the future calls for a courage that is slow, and consequently difficult to acquire. If you do not know how to die, never mind. Nature will give you full and adequate instruction on the spot. She will do this job for you neatly.

Again, comments G. Brereton:

> To his most constant question—How should a gentleman live and above all, face death?—he finds the answer in Epictetus: With the dignity and resolution acquired by the exercise of both reason and will. With these two weapons one can conquer the weaknesses of the natural man and school oneself to face the inevitable 'philosophically'.

As for life, Montaigne doesn't want it to be left to chance. The whole wisdom of Montaigne is contained in a great principle: submission to Nature, i.e. to the profound exigencies of our life. Nature is both our sweet guide and nourishing mother. 'Encore faut-il entendre ses conseils, et voilà bien la grande utilité de la connaissance de soimême' (We must listen to its advice, and there is the great usefulness of the knowledge of one's own self). His call is back to Nature.

Finally, Montaigne reconciles himself totally with life as given by God. In his essay on *Experience* he says:

> For my part then, I love life and cultivate it in the form in which it has pleased God to bestow it on us. I do not go about desiring that it should be free of the need for eating and drinking ... I heartily and gratefully accept what nature has done for me ... It is a wrong against that great and omnipotent giver to refuse, nullify, or spoil her gift. Being herself all good, she has made all things good. All things that are according to nature are worthy of esteem.
>
> Of philosophical opinions, I embrace for preference those that are most substantial, that is to say most human, and most natural to us ... Philosophy is, to my mind, quite childish when it preaches to us in hectoring tones that a marriage of the divine and the earthly, the reasonable and the unreasonable the harsh and the indulgent, the upright and the crooked, is an unnatural alliance; that carnal pleasure is brutish and unworthy to be enjoyed by the wise man.
>
> That is not what our master Socrates says, himself a teacher of philosophy. He values the pleasures of the body, but he prefers those of the mind, as having more strength, stability ease, variety, and dignity ... For him temperance is the moderator, not the enemy of pleasures.

Montaigne regards the good and evil as 'consubstantial with our life'. Our existence is impossible without this mixture, and one side is no less necessary to us than the other. 'Evils have their life and limits, their sickness and their health'.

Good and bad fortune are two sovereign powers. Montaigne recognizes destiny as the stronger power which controls us and rules us. Yet in his essay on Democritus and Heraclitus, he argues how, '... things in themselves

are cut by the mind to its own conceptions'. Human wisdom cannot fill fortune's role. Thus our good and our evil depend only on ourselves. All experience is welcomed and Montaigne reaches the most coveted stage of a philosopher's development: disinterestedness. In the essay on *Experience*, he says as much:

> I bid my soul look upon pain and pleasure with the same level gaze—since it is as wrong for the soul to expand in joy as to contract in sorrow—and with the same firmness, but to greet the one cheerfully, the other austerely, and, in so far as it can, to try as hard to cut short the one as to prolong the other. A sane view of good will result in a sane view of evil ... Plato couples them together, and maintains that it is a brave man's duty to fight equally against pain and against the immoderate charms and blandishments of pleasure.

This philosophy makes Montaigne assert: when in danger I do not think about the means to escape; rather I think how little it matters whether I escape or not.

The *Essays* are crammed up with such profound and rare insights which cohere into an original kind of ethical philosophy of life steering clear of abstractions.

'These three attitudes', says Brereton, 'of Montaigne were each developed by later writers, but it is important to remember that he himself evolved no philosophic system. He was simply concerned with seeking a practical philosophy, concordant with experience.' Thus, Saintsbury also:

> Although ... Montaigne has many sides, his most striking peculiarity may be said to be the mixture of philosophical speculation, especially on ethical and political topics, with attention to the historical side of human life both in the past and in the present.

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Yājñavalkya's Teachings on the Means to Immortality

N. JAYASHANMUGAM

No. 7, I Cross North Extension, Surya Kanti Nagar, Pondicherry 605 003

1. THE TWO VERSIONS

If there is any thinker who frequently appears in the chapters of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, it is doubtless the majestic figure of Yājñavalkya. If from the Upaniṣad we know him to be an earliest exponent of Vedānta, from his words of profound wisdom we know the Bṛhadāraṇyaka to be the most prominent text of Upaniṣads. He is a *ṛṣi* who lives with his two wives Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī. Of the two ladies, the first is distinguished by the title Brahmavādinī (expounder of a doctrine of Brahman). She is of the view that a seeker of immortality has no use for wealth and actually uses no wealth. This is the reason why, when Yājñavalkya informs her of his proposal to divide his property between her and Kātyāyanī, she says that she does not know what to do with that by which she cannot become immortal, *yenāhaṁ nāmṛtā syām kimaham tena kuryām* (2-4-3). Having thus expressed her utter distaste for wealth, she asks him to teach her the way to immortality, the way he has known through his personal experience, *yed eva bhagavān veda tadeva me brūhi* (Ibid.). This provides an occasion for Yājñavalkya to expound the doctrine of immortality, a doctrine as old and profound as the Vedas.

As we all know, Yājñavalkya's exposition is found in two versions, one in chapters 2–4 and another in chapters 4–5. Though the versions generally agree with each other, they do differ with regard to certain important points. This however does not mean that there is a conflict between the two inspite of their general agreement. Wherever the two versions differ, the difference is due to the fact that one says something which the other has left out. Thus the two versions are identical as well as complementary.

If we try to assess the contribution of 2–4 and 4–5 to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, we discover that they draw the boundary lines within which all other discourses in the text are to be placed and interpreted. Professor Raghavachar, in his study of the Upaniṣad, has come to the same

conclusion. He observes: 'The entire dialogue containing Yājñavalkya's teaching to Maitreyī occurs twice in the Upaniṣad (2–4 and 4–5) with only slight variations. Yājñavalkya seems to open his philosophy with it and conclude with it. It is the *upakrama* and the *upasaṁhāra*. All the intervening discourses are to be interpreted, it seems, in the light of this introduction and climax.'[1] Therefore the key to a right understanding of the entire text of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka is to be found in Yājñavalkya's discourses to Maitreyī.

2. RENUNCIATION: PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

The relation between immortality and wealth can be understood in two ways: (i) while immortality concerns Ātman, wealth concerns Anātman; (ii) while immortality is inward and psychological, wealth is outward and physical. According to the first, they are opposites and exclude each other; according to the second, they are distinct but not divorced from each other. For the purpose of an explanation of the latter, immortality may be taken in the sense of something having an eternal essence, and wealth in the sense of something possessing a tangible form. We know that essence and form are but two aspects of the same thing. We also know that while its essence is inward, its form is outward. If immortality and wealth are viewed thus, they go together and are related to each other as the inward essence and the outward form.

We may speak of two types of wealthy persons, one seeking immortality with the necessary qualification and another seeking the same without the qualification. The qualification consists in having a real desire for immortality. When Maitreyī asks whether she can become immortal through wealth, *kathaṁ tenāmṛtā syām* (2-4-2), she puts herself in the first category and wants to know whether she can realize the goal through using her wealth as a means thereof. By asking the question she intends to announce that she cannot reach immortality through wealth. Though her intention is clear, it is not clear why she thinks that immortality cannot be reached through wealth. There is only one clue that can help us here—her title Brahmavādinī. We may suppose that she has two conceptions, one metaphysical and another practical. Metaphysically, she is called Brahmavādinī because she is known to favour a doctrine according to which Brahman alone is worthy of attainment and all else being Abrahman is unworthy of it and therefore to be renounced. Practically, if wealth is

Anātman, then it cannot be a means to immortality which is Ātman. Possession of wealth will force the possessor to seek only things of its type i.e. *anātma-vastus* (material things) and not immortality. And she can escape its influence only through dispossession. If we accept these as her two possible conceptions, then they explain why Maitreyī thinks that she cannot reach immortality through wealth and also why wealth is distasteful to her, *kim ahaṁ tena kuryām* (2-4-3). Her dualistic position of Ātman and Anātman is taken for granted not only here but in other parts of the dialogue too.

In answer to Maitreyī's question whether she can become immortal through wealth (2-4-2) Yājñavalkya says two things: (i) the life of a person who possesses wealth will be like that of wealthy people; (ii) immortality is not possible through wealth, *amṛtatvasya tu nāśāsti vittena* (Ibid.). On the face of these two, Yājñavalkya agrees fully with Maitreyī's view of wealth and immortality. If this is true, how can he say that not only wealth but all other things are to be loved for the sake of Ātman *ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* (2-4-5)? Evidently, he does not see any opposition between wealth and immortality; on the contrary, he sees that the two can go together, even as the form and essence of an object. In other words, he does not subscribe to the dualism of Ātman and Anātman. How is it then that he agrees with Maitreyī and yet has a completely opposite view of wealth and immortality?

Though Yājñavalkya speaks words that seem to support Maitreyī's view, he really speaks something else. For he answers her question not from her point of view but from the point of view of a wealthy person who seeks immortality without the necessary qualification (2-4-2). Now we shall go back to his answers. (i) He says that the life of a wealthy person will be like that of wealthy people. What do they do in their life? They generally seek only material things. And when they happen to seek immortality, they are under the delusion that they can become immortal without having the necessary qualification. Therefore, like them, the wealthy person will be doing these two things in his life. (ii) The genuine desire (*āśā*) for immortality arises by itself and not through anything else, much less wealth. Therefore wealth cannot create the desire in the mind of the wealthy person. It is in this sense that the desire for immortality is declared to be not possible through wealth, *amṛtatvasya na āśā asti vittena*. Note the difference between the words used by Maitreyī and Yājñavalkya—*amṛtā syam* by her and *amṛtatvasya āśā* by him.

Immortality consists in knowing Ātman, for Ātman is immortality. Conversely, mortality consists in being bound by ego, for ego is mortality. Ego uses not only wealth but everything else in the world for its satisfaction and aggrandizement. Immortality is won by the desire for the immortal Ātman. But the desire arises spontaneously and never depends on any external circumstance. However, material possessions can play a vital role in the case of a person who has the desire for immortality. For they are not opposed to immortality which is Ātman. They arise from and abide in Ātman. If, out of the desire for immortality, ego is surrendered by surrendering all to Ātman, then all possessions help the renouncer a great deal in moving away from his ego and fixing his attention more and more on Ātman. They help in destroying the delusions of ego and crippling the ego itself by making it less and less effective. Thus they help in strengthening the seeker's original desire and fitness for immortality. However, they cannot get rid of the ego, even as they cannot create the desire for immortality. Dissolution of ego takes place only when the vision of Ātman arises, *paraṁ dṛṣṭvā nivartate* (Gītā, 2–59).

Now we shall have a close look at Yājñavalkya's words (2-4-5). They emphasize four important things: (i) the things on which our life depends—husband, wife, sons and others including wealth; (ii) our attitude towards them—they are regarded as objects to be loved for their own sake, *sarvasya kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* (Ibid.); (iii) prohibition of love of things for their own sake, *na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* (Ibid.); (iv) prescription of love of things for the sake of Ātman, *ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* (Ibid.). First, Yājñavalkya draws our attention to the fact that wealth is not the only thing on which we depend, but there are so many other things also like husband, wife, sons, etc. They too are necessary for our life. Second, we love them for their own sake, i.e. we love them for the sake of the benefits which our ego derives from them and by which it fulfils its desires and increases its worth. Third, when it is prohibited from loving them for their own sake, the ego loses its force and effectiveness. Fourth, the prohibition results not in the rejection of the objects of love but of the ego behind them. When the ego alone is prohibited and not the objects of love, for whose sake are they to be loved? For the sake of Ātman. This is Yājñavalkya's instruction.

Here Yājñavalkya makes a momentous distinction between two ways of renunciation, physical and psychological. The first consists in physically

renouncing all objects of love, while the second in renouncing them mentally and not physically. His recommendation to Maitreyī is that she practise psychological instead of physical renunciation. Love is good and objects of love are also good. But what is not good is ego and love of objects for the sake of ego. For what makes one mortal is ego and love of ego and not wife, sons, wealth, etc. or love of these objects. Therefore, when ego is renounced, both love and objects of love are preserved and transferred from ego to Ātman. As a result, all are loved for the sake of Ātman. Yājñavalkya does not favour physical renunciation which rejects the world and love for the world for the sake of getting immortality.

The Īśa Upaniṣad speaks of the world renounced through a wrong view thereof, *tena tyaktena*. But it does not approve of this physical renunciation. Therefore it calls upon the seeker of the Lord, *upāsaka*, to accept and enjoy the world, *bhuñjīthā*. However, it takes care to insist that the enjoyment must be free from the desires of ego, *mā gṛdhaḥ* (verse 1). It is clear from this Upaniṣad that it favours psychological and not physical renunciation. It is in pursuance of this ancient tradition that Yājñavalkya advises Maitreyī to seek immortality through inner and not outer renunciation.

In Yājñavalkya's view one can have wife, sons, and all other things and love them too, but yet one can be immortal. For immortality consists in having no ego and looking upon all as Ātman's possessions and loving them for Ātman's sake.

3. LOVE OF ĀTMAN AND LOVE OF ALL FOR THE SAKE OF ĀTMAN

If all is to be loved for the sake of Ātman, it is possible only when there is love of Ātman. But then how to develop the love? The first condition is to eliminate the love of ego. It is eliminated when all is considered to be not the possessions of ego and not the objects to be loved for the sake of ego. This is implied in the declaration that all is to be loved not for its own sake. The next is a positive condition: Ātman is to be realized, *ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ* (2-4-5). Through what is Ātman to be realized? *Śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditation). To learn of Ātman from authentic sources such as the Upaniṣads is *śravaṇa*; to get rid of all errors of understanding and arrive at the true import of words is *manana*; to pass from the words to the reality of Ātman behind them is *nididhyāsana*. Ātman, thus discovered through both negative and positive means, is

found in its eternal essence beyond space and time, names and forms. Now there is love of Ātman, but there is no means of extending the love to all we find here, for all exist in space and time, possess names and forms. Therefore Yājñavalkya suggests a third means—through seeing all (*darśanena*) as having come from and staying as the possessions of Ātman (*ātmanaḥ*). Through what is all this to be realized thus? It is again through hearing (*śravaṇena*), reflection (*matyā*) and understanding (*vijñānena*). If the pure Ātman is known from scriptures, the Ātman as the source and support of the world is known from the same scriptures. It is for this reason that *śravaṇa* and the rest are mentioned twice. If all is thus realized, then all this is known, *idaṁ sarvaṁ viditam* (2-4-5) i.e. all are truly known as objects to be loved for the sake of Ātman. Not only has Yājñavalkya taught that all be loved for the sake of Ātman but he has given the needed means to put the teaching to practice.

Yājñavalkya's words in 2-4-5 have been mutilated beyond recognition by traditionalists. Śaṅkara says that the purpose of 2-4-5 is threefold: (i) to create a distaste for all in Maitreyī's mind, *virāga* (SB., 2-4-5); (ii) to teach that Ātman alone is to be loved and nothing else, *etadātmaiva priyonānyat* (Ibid.); (iii) to show that *śravaṇa* and the rest are used for two things, one for realizing Ātman (*samyagdarśanam*) and another for destroying all things superimposed on Ātman by Avidyā, *upamardanārtham* (Ibid.). If we strictly go by the wording of the text (2-4-5), there is hardly any evidence for Śaṅkara's interpretation. First, if the purpose of the text were to create distaste for the world, it would not repeatedly insist on loving all for the sake of Ātman, for distaste and love are opposites. Moreover, when Maitreyī herself has disclosed her distaste for material possessions (2-4-3), there is no point in saying that Yājñavalkya tries to create distaste in her mind. But the fact is that he tries to remove distaste from her mind through love. Second, when the text says that all are to be loved for the sake of Ātman, it clearly means that there are two things to be loved, Ātman and the world. It is impossible to deduce from the text that Ātman alone is to be loved and nothing else. Third, *śravaṇa* and the rest are mentioned twice for two different purposes. In the first instance the purpose is realization of Ātman. In the second instance, the purpose is some other thing realized through Ātman. The words *idaṁ sarvaṁ viditam* do not speak of knowing all through destruction of all superimposed on Ātman by Avidyā, but speak of knowing them simply through Ātman. Even if we grant that the above words suggest knowledge arising

out of destruction of all, it is admittedly against the sense and spirit of the previous statement that all is to be loved for the sake of Ātman. *Śravaṇa* and the rest are mentioned twice in the text (2-4-5) and in both cases the results are positive and mutually distinct—*ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ* and *idaṁ sarvaṁ viditam*.

4. THE CONSEQUENCE OF WORLD-NEGATION

With her mind well set on the view that wealth is to be dispossessed by a seeker of immortality, Maitreyī is just one step behind the eventual outcome: like wealth, everything else is to be dispossessed, because the world is not-Brahman, *abrahma-rūpa*; the distaste for wealth will naturally end as the distaste for the world and finally as the negation of the world. In order to prevent her from heading towards this extreme exclusiveness Yājñavalkya is concerned to show Maitreyī an inevitable result that arises from world-negation.

Yājñavalkya points out to Maitreyī the fate of one who knows all—*brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* and the rest—as *anyatrātmanaḥ* (2-4-6), the fate of being given away by the world, *parādād*. The expression *anyatrātmanaḥ* admits of two interpretations: (i) Śaṅkara takes it to mean 'otherwise than as of the essential nature of Ātman' (*ātmasvarūpa vyatirekeṇa*); (ii) it may also be taken to mean 'elsewhere than in Ātman'. Strictly speaking, the second is more faithful to the text than the first, for it agrees with the literal sense of the original expression. The words *yaḥ veda* (he who knows all in this manner) are also capable of giving two meanings. What is the condition of the person who thus knows the world elsewhere than in Ātman? Is he a knower or a non-knower of Ātman? It is possible for him to be either a non-knower or a knower. He sees the world elsewhere because he has not known Ātman. As he has not known Ātman, he is unable to relate the world to Ātman. We may also say that he sees the world elsewhere because he has known Ātman. He has known Ātman in pure essence alone and not in cosmic extension. In pure essence Ātman is beyond space and time, name and form; therefore he is unable to see in Ātman a world existing in space and time and possessing name and form. Now we have to find out whom Yājñavalkya has in mind when he speaks of *yaḥ veda*.

One of the methods that help us in choosing the right interpretation of a phrase such as this is the consequence to which a provisional interpretation

of the phrase leads. If it results in promoting consistency in the text, it is accepted as the right one, otherwise it is given up. Therefore, we shall provisionally accept Śaṅkara's interpretation and see the consequence. He takes *yaḥ veda* to mean a person who has not known Ātman and, therefore, sees the world as *anyatrātmanaḥ*. But with this view he is unable to consistently explain the word *parādād* which says something very important about the wrong knower of the world. To speak the truth, he explains the word *parādād* by saying that the world turns the wrong knower backwards, *parākuryāt*. It is a gloss on the word but not an explanation. Therefore, his followers have tried to develop *parākuryāt* into an explanation.

Vidyāraṇya, the author of the *Anubhūtiprakāśa*, says that *parākuryāt* means 'turning the wrong knower away from liberation', *kaivalyāt*' (2-15-31). Even this explanation does not help much. The wrong knower is already ignorant and has not attained liberation. This is the reason why he sees the world as *anyatrātmanaḥ*. Therefore, there is no point in saying that the world excludes him from *kaivalya*. If we take that the world excludes him from an opportunity to become free on some future occasion, we do not understand how this opportunity depends on the world. Even if we ignore this point, we are confronted with another difficulty, perhaps a more serious difficulty. It is the nature of all ignorant men to see all as *anyatrātmanaḥ* and there is no exception to the rule. If, on account of this, they are refused the possibility of freedom, then no one will be able to become free of ignorance. The meaning of *parādād* is clear, but the word does not go with the meaning given to *yaḥ veda*. As a result, the provisional interpretation given to the phrase must be given up as unsuitable.

Now there is only one alternative—to take *yaḥ veda* in the sense of a knower of Ātman. We shall now see whether it promotes consistency in the text by putting a suitable interpretation on *parādād*. The knower has known Ātman in pure essence which is devoid of space and time, name and form. When he sees all—*brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, the worlds, the gods, the Vedas and what not (4-5-7), he notices the discrepancy between Ātman on the one hand and the things of the world on the other. For all are qualified by names and forms and conditioned by space and time. In other words, they are Anātman. Therefore, he sees the world elsewhere than in Ātman, *anyatraātmanaḥ*. Yet he lives in the world as a creature among creatures. As he is to the world, so is the world to him. This is the law of the world which none in the world, even if he is a knower of Ātman,

can violate without paying for the violation. Therefore Yājñavalkya discloses the consequence that awaits the knower of Ātman, namely, all here give away him, *parāduḥ* (2-4-6). We can understand the full significance of *parādād* only when we know how and to whom he is given away by the world.

Before we proceed further we shall refer to a well-known form of meditation called *nirvikalpa samādhi* which in later times is recognized as an important means to the knowledge of Ātman. There are two stages in the *samādhi*, *savikalpa* (with option) and *nirvikalpa* (without option). Through *savikalpa* one attains knowledge of Ātman, but here union with Ātman is subject to option. The option consists in completely excluding the world and becoming identified with Ātman or in alternating between Ātman and the world. But *samādhi* becomes *nirvikalpa* (without option) when the knower of Ātman concentrates exclusively on Ātman through a total elimination of the world. He now sees everything elsewhere than in Ātman. By doing so he withdraws himself from the world, from his body and mind to the point of their absolute petrifaction and enters Ātman. The literature on this form of *samādhi* records that he who has reached Ātman in this way cannot return to his physical life or to the world of active existence. For him return to outer life is not optional. After a short duration of three weeks following his entry into Ātman, his body falls dead.[2] From this we gather the following relevant points: (i) the foundation of *nirvikalpa samādhi* is that one must see Ātman alone and all elsewhere; (ii) when he excludes all, he is excluded from the world, from his mind and senses and even from living in his body; (iii) his exclusive method forces him to eventually leave the body itself and plunge into the depth of Ātman. In Yājñavalkya's language this is giving away of the knower of Ātman by the world, *parādād*.

Now we shall go back to the questions how and to whom the knower of Ātman is given away by the world. The process of giving away consists in being excluded little by little by the world; the knower is given away to Ātman by being forced to eventually depart from the world and plunge into the object of exclusive knowledge. According to Yājñavalkya, knowledge of Ātman is sought not for the sake of withdrawing from the world and losing oneself in the nameless and formless condition of Ātman but for something positive and constructive—for extending the love of Ātman to all things and loving them for the sake of Ātman. Therefore, he

wants Maitreyī to avoid the fate of being given away by the world and take care not to reject the world under the notion that it is Anātman.

When Yājñavalkya speaks about the fate of the exclusive knower of Ātman, his is certainly not a solitary voice. The expression *nirvikalpa samādhi* is not found in any of the authoritative Upaniṣads which include the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. However, there are evidences to show that this spiritual condition is known to the Upaniṣads and also prohibited by them through condemnatory remarks. There are two passages, one from the Īśa and another from the Taittirīya, which provide the evidences. The Īśa says that he who delights in the knowledge of Ātman to the exclusion of the world faces dissolution in the darkness of exclusiveness, *bhūya iva te tamaḥ ya u vidyayām ratāḥ* (verse 9). The relevance of this teaching to Yājñavalkya's word *parādād* is considerably increased by the fact that this verse (verse 9) appears in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka also (4-4-10). The Taittirīya says that if one knows Brahman (Ātman) to be non-existent in the world i.e. to be not extended in names and forms, one becomes non-existent i.e. one dissolves himself in the Brahman (Ātman) by losing his name and form, *asanneva sa bhavati* (2-6-1). In order to emphasize that the knowledge of Ātman should not be allowed to bring about a premature departure from the world, the Īśa declares in a categorical voice that one should desire to live a hundred years, *jijīveṣet śatam samāḥ* (verse 2). Yājñavalkya's warning that the exclusive knower of Ātman will be renounced by the world seems to issue out of an ancient tradition upheld by the teachers of Vedānta.

Yājñavalkya seems to be plainly saying that the knower of Ātman who utterly excludes the world is prohibited by the Vedas themselves when he declares that they give away him, *vedastam parāduḥ* (4-5-7). This raises a very important question: the knower of Ātman has known Ātman only through the help of the Vedas i.e. through hearing their words (*śravaṇa*) (2-4-5); if so, why do they disown him? They do so for two reasons: (i) He has indeed benefited by the Vedas, but he regards them as one of the objects found in the world and so sees them elsewhere than in Ātman. In accordance with the law of the world (the renouncer being renounced by the world), the Vedas disown him. (ii) There are passages in the Vedas, as we saw above, which prohibit a knower of Ātman from utterly excluding the world. Hence they uphold their teaching by rejecting him in an exemplary manner. From this we understand how Yājñavalkya follows the tradition very closely and meticulously.

From the above discussions we may see that the phrase *yaḥ veda* (4-5-7), as understood by us, has contributed in no small measure to a proper interpretation of *parādād* and, through this, to a deeper understanding of the relation of 2-4-6/4-5-7 to all that have gone before. We understand that the two instructions given by Yājñavalkya (2-4-5) are equally important and when the second one is disregarded, the fate of being rejected by all becomes inevitable. Therefore we must retain the interpretation put on *yaḥ veda* and treat it as valid.

Scholars brought up in the way of the traditionalists may find it difficult to accept the view that Yājñavalkya is not in favour of seeking knowledge of Ātman to the exclusion of the world. The traditionalists say that Yājñavalkya is a great renouncer and an advocate of world-renunciation. The scholars must understand that it is a myth invented by the traditionalists and maintained by them. The scholars may argue that the traditionalists are right, for they are guided by Yājñavalkya's formula *neti netyātmā* (not this, not this Ātman) (4-5-15). As is imagined by the traditionalists, the formula of Ātman does not deny the world but denies limitation of Ātman by the world. Positively, it affirms Ātman's superiority to the world, *satyasya satyam* (2-3-6). By any stretch of the imagination Yājñavalkya cannot be taken as a supporter of the view of world-negation.

5. THE INDESTRUCTIBLE LAW OF ĀTMAN

Yājñavalkya's formula of knowledge is this: first, to know Ātman in its pure essence, *ātmā* (2-4-5); second, to know the abode of Ātman to be in the world, *ātmanaḥ* (Ibid.); third, to know all this as the manifestation of the eternal essence of Ātman, *idaṁ sarvaṁ yad ayam ātmā* (2-4-6). He who knows Ātman according to this formula is an all-knower, *sarvavit* (3-7-1), an upholder of the indestructible law of Ātman, *anucchitti-dharmā* (4-5-14).

Now Yājñavalkya tries to amplify his formula of knowledge through two examples, one is an example of a lump of salt dissolved in water, *saindhava-khilya* (2-4-12) and another is an example of a mass of salt that has appeared out of sea water, *saindhavaghana* (4-5-13).

(i) When a lump of salt is thrown into water, it dissolves into water. As a result, the water becomes saline in taste. There is no particle of water which does not have this saline taste. There is Being that has become

huge, *mahad bhūtam*, by assuming infinite forms, *anantam*, and extending endlessly, *apāram*, in space and time. In other words, the world comes into existence when Being (*bhūtam*) has become (*bhūtam*) this immense universe (*mahad bhūtam*). Being is conscious substance and the world that has come out of the Being is a multiplicity of conscious forms (*prajñānaghana*), a multiplicity where all forms without exception are conscious in nature (*prajñānaghana eva*). This is what we are supposed to understand of Being on the analogy of the lump of salt dissolved in water.

(ii) The word *saiṅdhava* means a product of *sindhu* (sea). The mass *saindhavaghana* is maḍe up of salt particles and all the particles taste saline without exception, *kṛtsanaḥ rasaghanaḥ*, whether they are taken from inside or outside. In the same way, the Ātman which is a mass of infinite forms (*anantam*) and extended in boundless space and time (*apāram*) has appeared out of the original Ātman beyond space and time. The distinctions of inside and outside cannot be found in the mass of forms, because the mass is entirely conscious in nature, *kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana eva*. In other words, the world which is a manifestation of Ātman is composed only of conscious forms.

Thus both 2-4-12 and 4-5-13 speak of the world coming from and abiding in Ātman. Though the forms are conscious like Ātman, they put on the appearance of inconscience which is an accidental outcome of manifestation, as in the case of a bronze statue which, in the process of creation, comes to have many accidental features, but is free of them at the end of creation. It is referred to as a condition overtaken by death, *mṛtyunābhipannam* (3-1-3). The inconscience is removed in two successive stages, first by awakening the individual soul to Ātman abiding in eternal oneness and then to the same Ātman extended in the multiplicity of forms. When the soul is released from ego and united with the One, it destroys its ego-connections with form, *tany anuvinaśyati*, and comes forth as an entity separated from similar connections with all beings that are the becomings of Ātman, *etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya* (2-4-12/4-5-13). As a result, he sees Ātman in pure essence but not in cosmic extension. He sees the world elsewhere than in Ātman. He cannot extend his love of Ātman to all—wife, sons, material possessions and the rest. Therefore Yājñavalkya says that he has arrived at a knowledge of Ātman but not a knowledge which is complete, *na pretya saṁjñāsti* (Ibid.).

Now Maitreyī says that she is confused by the words *na pretya saṁjñāsti*. Her difficulty arises from her dualism. According to her theory, except Ātman all else is Anātman; therefore when Ātman is known, the knowledge cannot but be complete, *saṁjñā*. Hence, Yājñavalkya draws her attention pointedly to the indestructible law of Ātman, *anucchitti dharmā* (4-5-14), the law by which Ātman is not only in eternal essence but also in manifestation of the essence, not only in the timeless One but also in the Many extended in time. He knew already that she might commit mistakes of this type. Hence his instruction was that she should give concentrated attention to his words, *nididhyāsasva* (2-4-4). But, it seems, she disregarded his instruction. For her mind was surely clouded by her dualism.

6. ĀTMAVIDYĀ AND MADHUVIDYĀ

By seeing the world elsewhere than in Ātman, the knower of Ātman finds the world to be Anātman, a world characterized by the sense of otherness, *anyatva*. It is a world where all are others and all dealings are other-to-other dealings: other (*itaraḥ*) sees other (*itaram*); other smells other; other tastes other; other speaks to other; other hears other; other thinks of other; other touches other; other knows other (4-5-15). In other words, it is a world where every one is alienated from every one else. This, according to Yājñavalkya, is illustrative of a duality which is false, *dvaitam iva* (Ibid.).

It is wrong to jump to the conclusion that Yājñavalkya dismisses all duality as false (*mithyā*). Where everyone is other to everyone else the relation is one of false duality. This is because the world is seen elsewhere than in Ātman. If, on the contrary, the world is seen as originating from and abiding in Ātman, then the world will be characterized by another type of duality in which the sense of otherness is entirely absent. As distinguished from the other type, this will be a duality of the real type. There cannot be a world which does not abide in Ātman and which is devoid of all duality. Even as the world must abide in Ātman, duality there must be in the world, but a duality of the real type.

Traditionalists speak of three types of dualities—*vijātīya bheda*, *sajātīya bheda* and *svagata bheda*. But we have to note that there is a fourth type too, a type recognized long ago by the great Yājñavalkya. We may ask: how can there be a duality without the sense of otherness? We may even

dismiss such a conception as totally impossible. This is because we are bound by the traditional classification of dualities and believe that no other conception is possible.

Take any of the three types mentioned by the traditionalists. First, *vijātīyabheda*. It is a duality between two distinct classes, as between a stone and a man. Second, *sajātīyabheda*. It is a duality between two distinct individuals, as between a man and another man. Third, *svagatabheda*. It is a duality between two distinct parts in an individual, as between ears and eyes in a man. In all of them the relation is one of otherness. But according to Yājñavalkya, there is another type of duality not conditioned by the relation of otherness. We may ask whether such a duality is ever possible. Yājñavalkya invites our attention to a mass of salt, *saindhava-ghana* (4-5-13). It is a mass consisting of salt particles. While the particles differ from one another as particles, having their own independent forms, they simultaneously exceed themselves and abide in the essential oneness of saline taste. This illustrates a unique type of duality characterized by oneness. In order to distinguish it from the traditional types it may be called *atigatabheda*. The salt example is intended to tell us that the world abiding in Ātman has dualities, but all the dualities are rooted in the oneness of Ātman. Yājñavalkya is a non-dualist because his non-dualism excludes the dualities of the false type conditioned by otherness. He recognizes the dualities pervaded by the sense of oneness, but this dualism is not final, for it is dependent on the ultimate oneness of Ātman. In this sense also he is a non-dualist. He is a non-dualist in yet another but a more fundamental sense, because he believes only in the reality of Ātman besides which nothing else exists.

We know that the indestructible law of Ātman is binding upon all who seek Ātman. Therefore, a seeker cannot stop with knowing Ātman in its essential oneness. He must also know Ātman in manifestation of its essence. Instead of seeing the world elsewhere than in Ātman he must practise *śravaṇa*, etc. and see the world as originating from and abiding in Ātman. When he succeeds in doing so, he realizes that all is verily the becoming of Ātman, *sarvam ātmaivābhūt* (2-4-14/4-5-15). All sense of otherness disappears from the world and oneness alone is seen everywhere. He finds that all dealings of the world are dealings based on the sense of oneness: Ātman sees Ātman; Ātman smells Ātman; Ātman tastes Ātman; Ātman speaks to Ātman; Ātman hears Ātman; Ātman knows Ātman. His love of Ātman is extended to all; he loves all for the sake of

Ātman. One may see or smell, but it is an occasion for Ātman to exchange love for love of Ātman. If love becomes the law of living in the world, it will be a life of sweetness and delight, *madhu*. Mortal life with its fear, hatred and hostility disappears; it gives place to immortal life, *amṛtatvam*, characterized by fearlessness, sympathy and helpfulness. Now *ātmavidyā* fulfils itself in *Madhuvidyā*. This is the theme of the Madhu Brāhmaṇa (2-5).

A seeker of Ātman must seek Ātman completely. He must love Ātman and love all too for the sake of Ātman. If there is anything to be renounced, it is ego and its delusions and not the world. A knower of Ātman is happily related to all—wife, sons, material possessions and what not. This is the teaching of ancient Vedānta, a teaching of which Yājñavalkya is a monumental example. This is the knowledge he taught to Maitreyī.

Notes and References

1. S.S. Raghavachar, (1972), *Sri Rāmānuja on the Upaniṣads*, p. 67.
2. Swami Vivekananda, (1972), *Complete Works*, Vol. VII, p. 140.

Is Chomsky's Linguistics Non-Empirical?: A Reply to the Current Orthodoxy

More than ten years ago I published a paper entitled *Explanation—Explication Conflict in Transformational Grammar*.[1] In that paper, I had argued, as against the received view, that transformational grammar (here after TG) does not *explain* but rather it *explicates* the notion of a correct sentence. This calls for a total revision of the empirical foundation of TG. The idea of explanation is wrongly attributed to TG which is not a scientific theory and it lacks adequate empirical foundation. Methodologically, a more acceptable formulation will be to reconstruct TG as a system of explication like logic with a normative (non-empirical) foundation of its own.

Subsequent to this, I published my second paper entitled *In Defence of Autonomous Linguistics*,[2] which was a response to the criticism labelled against my earlier paper by Amresh Kumar.[3] After a long time in one of the recent issues of *JICPR*, the controversy over the non-empirical foundation of TG was again revived by my illustrious friend Professor A. Kanthamani.[4] He critically examined both my earlier papers and rejected the central thesis that TG has a non-empirical foundation. He finds my earlier pursuit 'vague'. The arguments that I have used to prove my standpoint are of 'no consequence' and are 'too simplistic'. The main lacuna being that I have 'failed to locate the exact issue' and have thus given a 'totally distorted picture of Chomskyan Linguistics'. Together with these remarks, I have been also reminded that I am unaware of the recent debate in the West on this issue and I am 'ignorant' of the cognitivist turn of Chomsky's linguistics. These remarks indicate the force, the rigour and the sharpness of his critique. I think it would be improper if I fail to respond to this provocation. I am grateful to Kanthamani for giving me the opportunity to examine this old controversy recast in a new vocabulary by him. For to do this, I shall adopt the two-fold strategy. First, I shall examine Kanthamani's charges against me. Second, I shall try to situate the problem of the empirical/non-empirical foundation of Chomskian linguistics in a new context.

I. EMPIRICALITY: AN UNDISPUTABLE ISSUE?

The central thrust of Kanthamani's critique is to show that the foundation of Chomskian linguistics is unquestionably empirical. As he argues, this is beyond any dispute and therefore, any attempt to disprove it will be an exercise in futility—'a farce' showing 'a complete lack of understanding of Chomskian linguistics'. In order to substantiate his claim, he first used a general argument pointing out the vagueness of the target of my inquiry. He thus dismissed my entire project by boldly proclaiming that the empiricality of linguistics cannot be vague since the notion of empiricality itself is not vague. This, indeed, is a strange argument signifying nothing. The notion of empiricality may not be vague but that does not justify that the empiricality of linguistics cannot be vague or cannot be questioned. The two are different and there is no one-to-one relation between them.

In view of this initial clarification, let me now tackle the problem that I have posed. The problem which I have addressed is: In what sense should linguistics or better Chomskian linguistics be called empirical? Kanthamani's position in this respect is that whether or not linguistics is empirical will be decided on the ground whether there are explanations in psychology or not. To this, Kanthamani's answer is in the affirmative. That is, there are explanations in psychology, and since linguistic explanations are psychological explanations, linguistics is empirical on this ground. However, the only difference is that linguistics being a 'soft' science its explanations are not same as physical explanations. This takes us to the heart of the problem to which I respond in the following way.

Empiricality Claim Examined

Regarding the claim that TG has an empirical foundation, what will be the best way to examine this claim? A clear formulation of this problem is found in Chomsky's own writing. Here is a passage (which has been quoted in my earlier paper) from Chomsky which expresses in no uncertain terms the definite methodological commitment of Chomsky.

> A grammar of a particular language that can be considered to be a complete scientific theory will seek to relate observable events by formalizing general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs, and providing a demonstration that certain observable events follow as consequences of these laws. In a particular grammar, the observable events are that such is an utterance and the demonstration that this observable event is a consequence of the theory ... consists in stating the structure of this predicated utterance on each linguistic level, and showing that this structure conforms to the grammatical rules or laws of the theory.[5]

The analysis of this passage reveals certain important truths. They, in fact, suggests a way indicating how the empirical foundation of Chomsky's theory of grammar may be evaluated. The first thing that strikes us, after analysing the passage, is that Chomsky is committed to a particular model of explanation found in the positivist philosophy of science. The kind of explanatory procedure that he is suggesting confirms to the D-N model of explanation. The second thing to be noted is that since TG confirms to the D-N model of explanation, TG can be claimed to be a scientific theory at par with empirical theories of natural sciences.

Event and Law

The above quoted passage from Chomsky suggests that there are two concepts which are crucial to the scientific foundation of TG. They are: the concept of event and the concept of law. Chomsky takes individual utterances as observable events conforming to grammatical rules or the laws of the theory. He asserts this by following the line of reasoning found in the D-N model of explanation. This is where the whole comparison is under question.

The laws of the D-N model are concerned with an explanation of natural events or phenomena. A simple example of such a law is: 'Metal expands when heated'. The natural event which it explains are the individual case of metal-heating resulting in expansion. Following Chomsky's pronouncement, we must say that the same scenario must be equally applicable to TG. Accepting this is not a problem provided we are clear as to what characterizes the notion of event and the notion of law in TG. I first take the notion of event. The question to be clarified here is: If TG is to be interpreted as a law in the same way as the laws of the D-N model, what must be the natural events it explain? Are the events of TG, the individual utterances made possible by a language? Of course, from Chomsky's admission it is obvious that individual utterances are the observable events of language. However, to hold this view will be in sharp conflict with the central distinction on which the entire conceptual organization of TG depends. This is the well-known Chomskian distinction between competence and performance in language. TG is primarily

concerned with linguistic competence and thus, accordingly, the theory of TG explicitly excludes utterances from the study of grammar because utterances belong to performance. If utterances are not explained by TG, what is it that it explains? What are the object of TG explanation? Chomsky sees them as the intuitive linguistic judgement of the ideal speaker-hearer. They are judgements pertaining to grammaticality, meaningfulness, ambiguity, contradiction, analyticity, etc. of sentences in language. It is obvious that these judgements are not events in the sense in which they are understood in the D-N model.

From the notion of event I now go to the notion of law. Since the former is explained by the latter one must have a clear idea about the nature of their interaction. Suppose, we take intuitive linguistic judgements as events, what must be the nature of the statements which purport to explain these events? In the D-N model these statements are called statements of regularities. They are called laws on the basis of the extensive confirmation they receive. However, the possibility of falsification of law is not ruled out. The law could cease to be a law if a counter instance is found to it. Do we find the same possibility with regard to TG? To answer this, we need to first ask: Do intuitive judgements admit of falsification in the same sense as events in the D-N model? Chomsky insists that what grammar describes are not 'summaries of behaviour'[6] or a description of regularities only. They are rules which describe the native speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language. As such they are infalsifiable by definition. Of course, Chomsky may still hold that what is falsifiable is an individual candidate grammar, so that the place of laws in the D-N model is taken by grammars. But this parallelism does not hold. Grammars can not be construed as laws of the D-N model. Laws are falsifiable, because they are descriptions of regularities. A regularity may be violated, but grammars, not being statements of regularities, are inviolable. This is so because they are descriptions of the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language. Finally, what can violate a grammar if it is already a description of knowledge. The answer is: Anything that does not describe the knowledge correctly and accurately is not a grammar. A grammar is, thus, by definition correct. This provides the basis of the argument that grammar is non-empirical.[7]

The above account offers a short description of my critique of the empirical foundation of TG. I have only spelt out the strategy that I have adopted in my earlier papers to argue my point. The idea of bringing the

D-N model into the picture is not my speculation. It is Chomsky, who has suggested it as a part of his methodological pronouncement. Accordingly, I have examined the concept of event and the concept of law and tried to show the total incompatibility between the two models. The conceptual edifice on which the empiricality of TG stands can be thus no longer tenable. Unfortunately, Kanthamani has completely missed this crucial aspect of my argumentation which almost forms the foundation of my critique.

The Cognitive Turn

Kanthamani has accused me of being ignorant of the fact that linguistics is a sub-field of cognitive science. This is Chomsky's characterization of linguistics which essentially follows from the empirical/psychological claim of his theory.

The force of Chomsky's argument lies in his well-known thesis that TG involves a 'causal conception of mentalism'. To elaborate Chomsky's contention, grammatical rules are psychologically real because they describe the workings of the underlying mental mechanisms which are responsible for the speaker's utterances of sentences. This is how TG offers a causal explanation of speech, in terms of mental/cognitive mechanisms that underlie speech. This may be called the causal conception of linguistics based on the causal conception of mentalism. In such a formulation, linguistics can indeed be a sub-field of cognitive psychology/cognitive science.

However, this picture of linguistics or TG does not have much significance for me. I am not denying the mentalistic/cognitive basis of language. But my difficulty is: Can TG be competent to show that linguistic communication is a causal consequence of some underlying mental mechanism? This question is, particularly, important in view of my earlier analysis where I have shown that there is no clear conception of event that TG explains nor does it have a notion of law in the same sense in which it is understood in scientific methodology. Accordingly, to say that '*S* is grammatical' is not to say that an event *e* has occurred. '*S* is grammatical', on the other hand, is entailed by the rules of *G*. The grammaticality of a sentence is thus to be distinguished from the causal mechanism that produces the utterance of a sentence. The former involves a formal deductive relationship which is defined by a grammar *G*, whereas the latter involves a causal explanation which seeks to show how certain mental processes

are responsible for the production of *S*. These two specify the two different domains as having two distinct jobs to perform.

The above analysis shows the conceptual error that causal mentalism of TG makes. It may be argued that on the same conceptual ground, the claim that linguistics is a sub-field of cognitive science may be questioned. This position is logically untenable. In view of this analysis, neither can Kanthamani say that I have suppressed a premise in my argument against the empiricality of TG nor can he say that I am ignorant of the cognitivist perspective of TG. Of course, I may not be as well informed about cognitive science as Kanthamani is. But that is beside the point. However, the cognitivist perspective of TG involving causal mentalism is a conceptually untenable position. Hence, I am indifferent to the cognitivist turn of TG. Finally, this whole analysis makes it obvious that there is no clear sense in which TG may be claimed to have empirical foundation.

Grammar and Psycho-Grammar

In continuation of the point discussed above, I would now like to make a brief remark on the position taken by Alexander George[8] in connection with the status of linguistics. I am discussing this because Kanthamani himself has used the argument of Alexander George to support his position. But, unfortunately, this whole endeavour has failed because it was misdirected and thus it did not serve the purpose. It is true that George made a distinction between speaker's grammar and speaker's psycho-grammar. But why is he making this distinction? This is the crux of the very issue on which I agree with George. To come back to the point, the distinction between grammar and psycho-grammar arises due to a certain fundamental conceptual distinction between them. In George's argument, the grammar must be conceptualized as a mathematical object having an abstract nature, which is not confined within the limits of space-time coordinates. In this sense it is a formal system which mechanically generates syntactic structures. As against this, there is psycho-grammar which embodies a speaker's knowledge of the grammar. It characterizes, 'features of a speaker's mind in virtue of which the speaker knows these facts about his or her language that are determined by the grammar'. These two have two different domains of inquiry exhibiting, what George calls, 'a world of difference' among themselves. Grammar *perse* is not the description of the knowledge mentally represented by the speaker. It is thus possible to articulate the speaker's grammar without saying anything about how it is represented in the speaker's mind. The articulation of the former, as he says 'leaves open' the articulation of the latter—the psycho-grammar. Along with this argument he further claims that this conceptual distinction between grammar and psycho-grammar is very often overlooked. A glaring example of this confusion will be found in Chomsky himself. In his writings, the two notions of grammar are not always kept apart. Since he identifies the speaker's grammar with the mental representation of it, the task of grammar is thus thought to be concerned with 'mental processes that are beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness' (Chomsky). George argues that this entire stand of Chomsky is vitiated by the same conceptual confusion. A generative grammar, by definition, cannot be concerned with a speaker's mental processes and thus it can not characterize his or her mental representation.

In view of this argument, I would wish to know that in what sense does George's thesis nullify my claim. In fact, contrary to what Kanthamani said, George's thesis supports my contention. I am not against the mentalistic basis of language, but, from this, it does not follow that grammatical inquiry and psychological inquiry into language is the same. These are two different inquiries based on a fundamental conceptual distinction between the two. But, of course, there is one difference that I have with George. He still holds the claim that grammar and, for the matter, any abstract object can be subjected to empirical inquiry. In this respect, the arguments offered by him are neither very clear nor very convincing. As I understand, he retains this claim as a possibility and as a part of the methodological commitment of a formalistic theory.

Coming back to my argument, I have insisted that a grammar, due to its intrinsic conceptual nature, is necessarily non-empirical but from this it does not follow that linguistics, in general, is non-empirical. I have accepted the possibility of psycho-linguistics as an empirical inquiry—an inquiry into the mental processes involved in the understanding of a language. I am only suggesting a conceptual distinction between a grammar and its psychological counterpart. This position indeed, is the same as that of George. I am afraid Kanthamani has neither gone through my paper nor through George's paper carefully. As a result, he has come to a conclusion which is not tenable. This is especially true in view of my agreement with George on the basis of the conceptual distinction that he has made.

Epistemological Nature of Normativity

Kanthamani's next accusation is that I have not examined Chomsky's critique of normativity of rule following. From the standpoint of the methodological foundation of TG, the basic problem that I have posed is: Empiricality Vs Normativity. The specific arguments of Chomsky against normativity, as cited by Kanthamani, do not have a significant bearing on the present issue. They are too general and, therefore, they do not seriously affect the argument structure that I have constructed in favour of normativity. As I understand from Kanthamani's presentation, Chomsky's main difficulty with the notion of normativity is that it is too vague and it cannot be approached systematically. Kanthamani used this view against my normative reconstruction of TG. One thus faces the question: How could a notion as vague as normativity be the foundation of TG?

I think the above perception is wrong. Normativity has been seen solely through the context of social facts and thus it has been reduced to a sociological notion only. Social facts are vague and, on the same consideration, the notion of normativity has been also regarded as vague. Contrary to this position, I have emphasized the epistemological nature of normativity. In the context of the present debate, the epistemological issues involving normativity are crucial because the problems that we are confronting here are essentially epistemological. In this respect, the important notions are: the notion of intuitive knowledge, the notion of a correct sentence and the notion of a grammatical theory. Along with the notion of normativity, Kanthamani also summarily dismissed these three notions without seeing the inseparable connection between these notions and normativity. I shall give a brief account of these notions in order to show that the normative reconstruction of TG is a viable epistemological alternative. This is particularly true in view of my earlier argument against the empirical foundation of TG.

The central component of the normative interpretation of TG is the notion of a correct sentence. What is a correct sentence? 'Correct sentence' is a normative notion. It should be distinguished from utterances which may be understood as events in space and time. Since they are distinguished from utterances, a sentence is thus said to be correct or incorrect, not by what people actually say, but by a rule. The rules decide when a sentence is correct or incorrect. What is the relation between a rule and a sentence? The relationship involved here is a necessary one. It is because of this necessary relationship rules cannot be falsified. To explain,

a rule can be rejected if it is found that it does not distinguish, in the same way as native speakers do, between sentence and non-sentences in a language. To reject a rule is not to falsify it. The reason is in the context of a falsification, the notion of a counter evidence is crucial to it. Whereas, the same is not true of rules of language. To cite the example of a rule: 'In English the definite article precedes the noun' is not falsified in view of the token sentence:* 'Girl the came in'. This sentence is not a counter-instance to the rule. We do not consider it to be an utterance. The reason is since the sentence uttered is incorrect it can never be regarded as genuine counter-instance leading to the falsification of a particular grammatical hypothesis. The normativity of TG follows from the normative nature of linguistic data, i.e., sentences. This constitutes the first level of normativity where the normativity follows from the data itself, because the former cannot be eliminated from the latter.

The next level at which the presence of normativity can be felt is the notion of intuitive knowledge. The notion of intuitive knowledge is to be necessarily seen in relation to the notion of correct sentences. Chomsky, right from the beginning, has emphasized this aspect of knowledge which is expressed by his phrase 'the native speaker's intuition of his language'. Thus, a native speaker, for example, can recognize the ambiguity of the sentence, such as, 'Flying planes can be dangerous' on the basis of his knowledge that the sentence may have more than one sense. This knowledge is an intuitive knowledge by virtue of which a speaker can judge whether a sentence is correct or not. He can judge grammaticality, ambiguity, synonimity and the other semantic properties of a sentence. This roughly indicates what is meant by the speaker's intuitive knowledge of language. In the light of this knowledge, one can say that the fundamental concern of TG is to describe this knowledge. In specific term, its pre-occupation is with the native speaker-hearer's intuitive judgements regarding grammaticality, ambiguity, and such other features. This is the same as to say its pre-occupation is with the notion of a correct sentence and not with the utterance-event in space and time.

This intuitive knowledge has been characterized as a theoretical knowledge in my papers. In relation to this, TG should be most appropriately described as a theoretical description of this atheoretical knowledge. This is how the theory—atheory distinction comes most naturally since this distinction is embedded in the conceptual foundation of TG. It may be thus said that it is not a derived distinction as Kanthamani thinks. Similarly,

the notion of normativity is not external but internal to the conceptual/methodological framework of TG.

On the Autonomy of Grammar

It is equally important to remind Kanthamani that the autonomy of linguistics does not directly follow from the view that grammar is a system of explication like logic. These are two independent claims. The constural of TG as a system of explication arises due to the normative reconstruction of TG.

I think Kanthamani has failed to see the significance of the autonomy question involved in linguistics. I have posed the autonomy question by separating synchronic linguistics from its psychological counterpart. I have argued that the study of language should be made independent of the psychological study of how do we acquire language. Accordingly, a distinction can be made between the *what-question* and *how-question*. The former concerns with the study of language *per se*. At this level, we are essentially concerned with questions like: What are the principles involved in the formulation of an interrogative sentence in English? or, What are the properties of a particular Bangla sentence? Whereas, the latter question (how-question) is concerned with the acquisition of language and, is thereby, concerned with: How are the principles and properties of sentences in a language acquired, perceived, produced, etc.? This, indeed, is a radical departure from the official stand taken by Chomsky. The distinction that I am making is keeping with my earlier argument that a grammar must be distinguished from its mental representation since they form the two different domains of inquiry. In this context, I am also amazed to see a statement made by Kanthamani saying that I am questioning the very possibility of synchronic linguistics. I wonder on what ground is he saying this? If I am defending anything at all it is synchronic linguistics. My major thrust is that grammar as a synchronic description of language is not concerned with utterance-events in space and time.

Some Sweeping Remarks

a. Chomskian Holism: Kanthamani claims that the best way to evaluate the empiricality of Chomskian linguistics will be to see whether 'Chomskian linguistics is holistic and naturalistic in Quine's sense within which the issue is currently raging'. As an elaboration of this statement he further says that we 'need notions like under-determination and translatability for throwing light on the status of linguistics'.

In order to find out the empirical status of Chomskian linguistics, why should we try to find out whether it is holistic or not? Frankly, this whole suggestion is unintelligible to me since the context in which it has been used has never been properly explained. The same is not true of Quine when he talks about holism as against the verificationist theory of meaning.

Now coming to the present controversy, it may be pertinently asked: In what sense can the Chomskian system be called holistic? Since Kanthamani has mentioned Quine in this context, I suppose, he must have Quinean holism in his mind. But what purpose will it serve? As I understand, the issue of holism does not have a direct bearing on the problem that I am discussing. Kanthamani should know that I am not suggesting any verificationist approach to Chomsky's theory. The problem that I am posing is indifferent to the verificationism/holism controversy in Quine. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that the Quinean holism may not be an ideal choice since it may still retain the essence of verificationism at its background. It is not at all clear in what precise sense holism can be helpful in deciding the empirical status of Chomsky's linguistics.

b. Chomskian Naturalism: Equally problematic is Kanthamani's proposal that we must see whether Chomskian linguistics is naturalistic in Quine's sense. It is well-known that the expression 'naturalism' does not have any clear cut meaning. Quine, Chomsky and Wittgenstein all of them may be said to be holding the naturalistic theory of language and mind. But it is interesting to note that none of them is holding the same sense of naturalism. Naturalism has different shades of meaning and thus it is possible to have varieties of naturalism. In the same way, Chomskian mentalism is considered by Chomsky himself as a variety of naturalism. The proposal whether Chomsky's linguistics can be naturalistic in Quine's sense has a serious implication. It assumes that both of them uphold a similar form of naturalism. This is not true. The reason is that one important component of Quine's naturalism is behaviourism. Chomsky will not accept behaviourism in any form. Chomsky's naturalism will have an obvious problem if it is pushed to Quine's naturalism. They are two different forms of naturalism though there may be agreement between the two on certain aspects. Unless this proposal is properly explained, I do not

know how far it will be helpful to throw light on the empirical status of Chomsky's linguistics.

c. 'Underdetermination', 'Translatability' and Chomsky-Quine Debate: Kanthamani, however, does not leave his proposal totally unexplained. Once again, almost by a sweeping stroke he mentioned the need for taking notions like 'underdetermination' and 'translatability' into account while talking about the empirical status of Chomsky's theory. However, as in the earlier cases, here also, he did not provide any clarification of these notions nor did he explain in what sense these notions would better serve the justifying of an empirical foundation of Chomsky's linguistics. This is particularly true in view of the Chomsky-Quine controversy. This controversy shows the uncertain nature of Chomskian linguistics as a scientific theory. I would like to make a brief comment on this controversy in order to clarify the point that I am making.

To set the problem historically, one of the major implications that follow from Quine's indeterminacy thesis is that it challenges the theory construction in linguistics. As Quine argues, a theory of language can be shown to be impossible on the same ground on which translation is impossible. To establish this, Quine[9] gave the example of phrase boundary. In the sentence 'The man you met read the book I wrote' there are two substrings—'the man you met' and 'the book I wrote', in which both of them are grammatically recognized as two phrases. But the same is not true of the substring 'met read the'. In Quine's explanation, there is no fact of the matter involved in a case like this. It is precisely on this ground, namely, that there is no fact of the matter, that led Quine to object to the construction of a theory of language (explaining the particular linguistic phenomena on the basis of the rules of grammar which assign phrases in one or another way in mental representation). The question of whether a particular rule is right or wrong does not arise here since there is no objectivity of the situation against which such questions can be determined. The idea of having a theory of language is thus automatically ruled out. The case of physics, on the other hand, is decidedly different from linguistics. It is always objectively possible to have a theory in physics though it will be necessarily empirically underdetermined. As Quine goes on arguing, in Physics we can have a tentative theory within which competing individual hypotheses can be compared and evaluated on the ground of methodological considerations like predictive adequacy, explanatory power, etc. but the same is not true of linguistics where a tentative theory of language is not permitted within which rival analytical hypotheses about linguistic universals can be compared and evaluated.

Chomsky sharply reacts to this Quinean thesis and finally rejects it on the ground that indeterminacy is not a special problem of linguistics, it is a special problem of physics as well. To cut the story short, the Chomskian argument against Quine is that theory of translation is a part of the theory of nature and, further, being a part of the theory of nature it is underdetermined by evidence. This led to the conclusion that if indeterminacy of translation is thought to be the result of under-determination of nature, then the Quinean claim that in the study of language there is no fact of the matter regarding right or wrong does not hold. Its status will be like that of a physical theory which though underdetermined by evidence nevertheless represents a realistic point of view.

As we can see from this brief account, Quine and Chomsky uphold two diametrically opposite standpoints regarding the scientific status of the theory of language. Now one who is interested to defend either Quine's or Chomsky's view must offer proper justification for the view that he is holding. Without such justification it will be an expression of a mere preference without significance. Similarly, Kanthamani's proposal regarding the incorporation of notions like 'underdetermination' and 'translatability' is more of an expression of a preference rather than an argued position. As we can see from our brief account, the Chomsky-Quine debate is an unresolved debate which assumes the possibility of multiple interpretations. In fact, the subsequent discussions on this debate confirms this truth. These discussions show the many-sided nature of this debate. To overlook this will lead to a sweeping generalization distorting the real truth.

d. Competence and Creativity: The next sweeping remark made by Kanthamani is to do with my criticisms of two central notions of Chomsky, namely, 'competence' and 'creativity'. He dismissed the whole argument literally in one stroke consisting of two parts: First, my critique of these two notions is based on the distinction between action and event and second, this distinction, however, has no consequence since my arguments against competence and creativity are not formulated in terms of action but in terms of events. That is all that he said against my critique of Chomsky's notion of competence. To my utter surprise, I find that this

highly charged remark has been made without any justification. Moreover, I wonder why this queer way of looking at this issue arises when the issue has been formulated so clearly. I am saying this because I do not see any relevance of the point that Kanthamani is making. My critique of 'competence' and 'creativity' is not based on action/event distinction. Its main thrust, on the other hand, is to point out the conceptual incoherence found in Chomsky's formulation of these two notions. Chomsky does not uniformly express his position on competence and creativity. This results in conceptual ambiguity and I have only presented it. Where is the distinction between action and event come in? This issue has been raised in connection with intuitive linguistic judgement where I have argued that intuitive linguistic judgements are not events. I have then argued that since intuitive linguistic judgements are associated with normativity and intentionality they should be better characterized as actions rather than events.

e. GB Theory and Geame Theoretical Semantics: Kanthamani stressed the need for directly examining the empirical claims of Chomsky's theory for example, in the case of Chomsky's GB theory. The empirical claim as he suggests, '... depends on how one interprets the philosophical (empirical) significance of this theory.' In this connection, he finds game theoretical semantics to be highly significant because this interprets GB theory 'only as a variant methodology of a logical grammar and try to subsume it under quantification and co-reference.'

The present remark, like the earlier remarks, does not make much sense since it is not supported by any clarifications. One fails to understand the new point that he is making. However, from whatever little I understand of his remarks, I feel that the game theoretical semantics has been overplayed. In this respect, I particularly refer to Jaakko Hintikka's paper *Logical Form and Linguistic Theory*.[10] Certainly, Hintikka appreciates Chomsky's attempt made in the GB theory to spell out logical form (or, what Chomsky class LF) of natural language sentences. However, he pointed out, in no uncertain terms, some of the major shortcomings of Chomsky's conception of LF. The following two fundamental difficulties are pointed out by Hintikka.

The first difficulty is to do with the dependence of LF on the surface form of the sentence. It is, as Chomsky puts it, 'derived directly' from such a structure. Hintikka argues that LF may not be always determined

by the surface structure. For representing the logical form the entire structure of a sentence may be involved. In his game theoretical semantics, the logical form of the sentence is not, therefore, restricted to the surface structure alone. The whole approach is based on the idea of a semantical game G (S) as associated with a sentence S.

The second difficulty is closely related to the first which is about the use of first-order logic by GB theory as the framework of a logical form. As Hintikka argues, by restricting logical form to this framework, the GB theory offers, as he says, 'a hopelessly restrictive and distorted idea of what the logical form of the sentence realistically looks like'. To elaborate, 'scope' and 'co-reference' (or 'binding') are the two notions that play a crucial role in the first-order logic. These two notions are expressed through formal notation for quantifiers, namely $(\forall x)$ and $(\exists x)$. The quantifiers based on the ideas of binding and scope are used for the purpose of representing the logical forms of natural language sentences. Hintikka's argument that quantifiers can be so used presupposes the idea that natural language semantics must operate by means of the notions of binding and scope. In this respect, one of the main tasks of GB theory may be said to formulate the syntactical conditions in which an expression of a natural language can be either bound to another (i.e., co-referential with it) or occurs in the scope of another (i.e., governed by it).

Hintikka argues that the basic presupposition on which the first-order language is based is not tenable. The reason is that two of its crucial notions do not play a 'significant role as basic feature of the semantics of natural language'. To prove the point, Hintikka tried to show the various discrepancies that are found between natural languages like English and first-order languages. The two languages do not operate semantically in the same way. I do not know whether Chomsky has responded to these criticisms or not.

In view of what is stated above, it is sufficiently clear that there is a basic difference between Chomsky and Hintikka in their approaches to LF. In this connection a particularly significant point is that, according to Hintikka, Chomsky's representation of LF is not empirically close to natural language. In fact, I doubt how far game theoretical semantics is of substantial importance to the GB theory. That is the reason why I feel that Kanthamani has overstated the case of game theoretical semantics. His sweeping generalization is an evidence of this.

II. THE AUTONOMY OF GRAMMAR: ARGUMENT FROM LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE

In the above, I have examined the objections that Kanthamani has raised against my work. In the present section, I shall give an independent argument to prove that the questions concerning language are not psychological questions. In other words, this will be an attempt to establish the autonomy of grammar from the point of view of linguistic structure.

The argument for linguistic structure says that an inquiry into grammar is a formal science having a goal and a domain of facts of its own. Accordingly, the goal of a linguistic theory is to give an account of the facts pertaining to the grammatical structure of the sentences. This will, in other words, offer an explication of facts pertaining to grammaticality, ambiguity, synonymity, analyticity, etc. These facts are essentially linguistic facts which should be distinguished from other extra linguistic facts related to language. The following sets of examples from Chomsky (as quoted by Katz and Postal in their paper entitled, *Realism Vs Conceptualism in Linguistics*)[11] will reveal the notion of a linguistic fact. On the basis of this, I shall argue the distinctiveness of a linguistic fact—a fact about the grammatical structure of a sentence. It is only by recognizing this distinctiveness that we could recognize the distinctive character of linguistics, namely, the autonomy of linguistics.

1. The sentences, (a) and (b) are grammatical while (c) and (d) are not:
   (a) Have you a book on modern music?
   (b) The book seems interesting.
   (c) *Read you a book on modern music?
   (d) *The child seems sleeping.

   Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures*, p. 15.

2. The phrase *John* is the direct object of the verb *please* in the sentence (a), whereas in the sentence (b) *John* is the subject of the verb *please*.
   (a) John is easy to please.
   (b) John is eager to please.

   Chomsky, *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory*, pp. 34–35.

3. If the sentence (a) is true, then the corresponding sentence, (b) must be necessarily true.
   (a) John killed Bill.
   (b) Bill is dead.

   Chomsky, *Prospects for the Study of Language and Mind.*

4. The proposition expressed in the sentence (a) is a truth of meaning independent of empirical fact.
   (a) Whoever is persuaded to sing intends/decides to sing.

   Chomsky, *Language and Problems of Knowledge*, pp. 33–34.

The above sentences express facts covering different aspects of sentential structure, such as, syntactic and semantic. One can also include sentences expressing facts regarding phonological structure. It is important to note here that as facts they are not disputable but what is disputable is the conception that one holds about these facts. Regarding the fact stated in 1 to 4, linguists will view them differently. Accordingly, they will have different approaches to explain these facts. Regarding this, the Bloomfieldian position is that these facts about sentences should be more appropriately seen as facts concerned with actual utterances. It is a position which offers a physicalistic interpretation of language and accordingly, interprets sentences as utterances. A completely opposite position is found in Chomsky whose refutation of Bloomfieldian linguistics marks the beginning of a new era in linguistics. It is a position which argues that facts about sentential structure are facts about human psychology.

As we can see, the facts are same but they are viewed differently in the two competing traditions of linguistics. Is there anything wrong with these different ways of conceiving linguistic facts? Katz and Postal have argued that both the positions have committed a similar kind of error. Chomsky has rightly questioned the Bloomfieldian linguistics on the ground that it has failed to distinguish between linguistic competence and linguistic performance or the knowledge of language and the exercise of it. This failure leads to a distortion of grammar because the idealized knowledge which grammar embodies is distorted by various extra-linguistic or performance factors, such as, memory limitations and others. This has been the criticism levelled by Chomsky against Bloomfieldian linguistics. But Katz and Postal pointed out that a similar criticism can be also levelled against Chomsky. Chomsky has failed to distinguish between the

knowledge of language and the language itself. This has led to a view which considers language as part of the neuro-physiological system of the brain. It essentially consists in identifying language as mental representation. This gives rise to a distorted picture of language because grammar, as Katz and Postal put it, becomes 'a contingent matter of human psychology'. Psychological claims are empirical claims and as empirical claims they are contingent. By the same consideration one can say that since linguistic claims are based on the operations of the human mind they are empirical, and hence, contingent. It is evident that in this picture of language there is no room for necessary connection as exhibited in the grammatical structure of language. On the other hand, a remarkable fact of language is that there are sentences which are necessary purely on a linguistic ground. It cannot be explained on any other ground except language/grammar. The notion of necessity cannot be surrendered, and on the other hand, its acceptance demands that a distinction must be made between the knowledge of language and the language itself. I shall now explain the significance of the notion of necessity and necessary connection. I shall do it in order to show that linguistics has a non-empirical nature and thus it should be distinguished from its psychological counterpart.

Let us go back to the examples expressing facts about the grammatical structure of sentences. In this connection, I specially mention the example which consists of the following two sentences:

(a) John killed Bill.
(b) Bill is dead.

What does this example show? This is an example showing a relation of valid linguistic entailment, namely, analytic entailment. If (a) is true (b) cannot be false. The necessary connection that it exhibits follows from the grammatical structure of the sentences. An inquiry into language itself will tell the ground of this necessity. It is the semantic structure of grammar that explains this necessity. The entailment from (a) to (b) may be explained in the following two steps. The first step consists in showing that the meaning of the expression *dead* is contained in the meaning of the expression *kill*. This is done by explicating the decompositional relation holding between the meanings or senses of *kill* and *die*. This way you can show that the containment relation is a part of semantic structure of the quoted sentences. Hence, the relation between (a) and (b) is necessary.

The second step follows from the idea of containment and it is thus argued that due to this contaminant there cannot be any model by which (a) is true but (b) is false.

The above way of explaining the necessary connection holding between (a) and (b) cannot be applied in the same way if the sentences are interpreted in psycho-biological terms. The reason is that if the semantic relation is conceived as a part of the mind/brain it becomes empirical and hence contingent. To accept semantic relation as contingent implies the necessary relation between (a) and (b) can be always thought of other than what it is. In this scenario, we cannot thus hold our earlier claim that there is no model on which (a) is true but (b) is false. In fact, in this interpretation the opposite is possible where we can conceive of a model on which (a) is true but (b) is false.

The argument from linguistic structure shows that there are properties which are intrinsic to grammar/language and thus they cannot be reduced to anything which is non-linguistic in character. On a logical ground it questions the reductionistic move of modern linguistics. Grammar as non-empirical enterprise must thus be kept separated from psychological enterprise. This speaks for the autonomy of grammar.

Coming back to Kanthamani's critique, I would now like to ask him what is the exact issue that I have failed to locate? As I understand, for Kanthamani, the exact issue lies in defending the empirical/scientific claim of Chomsky's theory. But, unfortunately, what Kanthamani did not realize is that the exact issue to be located is decided not on the ground of any dogmatic assertion but on the ground of conceptual consideration. I am afraid, my illustrious friend Professor Kanthamani is doing exactly the same. The only difference is that it is not the traditional but the modern scientific orthodoxy that he is out to defend. Orthodoxy, whether religious or scientific, is conceptually same expressing the same medieval spirit.

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Department of Philosophy,
University of Hyderabad

AMITABHA DASGUPTA

Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being: A Critique

1. INTRODUCTION

Professor Eliot Deutsch elicits appreciation for his brilliant analysis on the levels of being, especially on the concept of 'subration' in his *Advaita Vedānta* (*A Philosophical Reconstruction*). Though he makes this analysis within the fold of Advaita Vedānta, he divides existence (Reality) into three levels in his own way, that is, different from the traditional Advaita. The three levels of being for him are: (i) Reality, (ii) Appearance, and (iii) Unreality. Reality is that which cannot be subrated by any other experience. Appearance is that which can be subrated by other experience. Unreality is that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experience. Advaitins also do the same but they do not accept Unreality as a level of reality. The concept of levels of being depends on the characteristics

of 'Reality', namely, (i) its ability to subrate Appearance, and (ii) it being unsubratable by other experience. In other words, the validity of the whole analysis of levels of being is accepted only when it is established that the 'Reality' subrates other experience and the same cannot be subrated by any other experience. If it can be proved that other experience subrates 'Reality' and 'Reality' cannot subrate other experience, then the so-called 'Reality' fails to be 'Reality' and thereby the whole edifice of the concept of three levels of Reality crumbles down. An attempt is made in this paper to establish that the Advaita 'Reality' admitted by Eliot Deutsch cannot be the ultimate reality from the following arguments against the concept of levels of being, namely, (i) 'Reality' cannot subrate Appearance, (ii) Appearance subrates non-dual mental experience, and (iii) Unreality cannot be a level of Reality.

2. REALITY CANNOT SUBRATE APPEARANCE

'Reality' becomes ultimate reality only when it is not subrated by other experience and also when it could subrate the other experience. It means to say that recognizing something as ultimate reality is based on the criteria, namely, its ability to subrate Appearance and the same being unsubratable by any other experience. If any experience is not subrated by any other experience then the ontological referent of that experience is called the ultimate reality. It is now necessary to understand the concept of subration and its application in order to examine the criteria of the ultimate reality.

2.1 Concept of Subration

According to Eliot Deutsch, 'subration' is a *distinctive mental process* whose distinguishing feature is a revision of judgement about something so that the former judgement is radically denied by a new judgement that is based on fresh insight of experience.[1] Subration involves: (1) a judgement about some object or content of consciousness (a material thing, a person, an idea), (2) the recognition, in the light of another kind of judgement that is incompatible with the initial judgement and the initial judgement is faulty, and (3) the acceptance of a new judgement as valid.[2]

2.2 Nature of 'Reality'

Eliot Deutsch holds the view that, by the criterion of subration, the 'Reality' is, that which is when the subject/object situation is transcended.

The Real is that which is the content of non-dual spiritual experience. It is the timeless, unconditioned oneness of being. The Real is (*nirguna*) Brahman.[3]

2.3. Impossibility of Application of Subration

Eliot Deutsch opines that, subration is a distinctive mental process whose distinguishing feature is a revision of judgement about something so that the former judgement is radically denied by a new judgement that is based on fresh insight or experience. He admits the 'Reality' is a non-dual and trans-mental experience and Appearance is a mental experience. Subration between any two mental experiences is possible and acceptable, for, one can be aware of accepting a new judgement and denying the former judgement passed on the same object. Since subration is a mental process it should happen only in the realm of mental experience. But subration between a trans-mental experience and a mental experience, for instance, subration of Appearance by 'Reality', is a unique case unlike other cases of subration. If Eliot Deutsch argues that 'Reality' is not a trans-mental experience but only a mental experience, then, his admission, namely, 'Reality' is a non-dual spiritual experience, becomes invalid. For, non-duality cannot be non-dual when the existence of the mind is admitted along with it. Thus one needs to accept 'Reality' as an experience beyond mind. If subration is necessarily a *mental process*, then, one may suspect whether such a mental process is possible with regard to a trans-mental experience. It is important now to examine whether subration is possible between 'Reality' and Appearance (real existent[4]). We hold the view that 'Reality' which is a trans-mental experience cannot subrate Appearance, that is, mental experience and the same is established in the following arguments.

2.4. Experience of 'Reality' cannot be Communicated to the Level of Appearance

If Eliot Deutsch argues that non-duality is a trans-mental experience then, he should explain how this experience, which subrates Appearance, is communicated to the mind. It can be said that non-duality cannot communicate itself to the mind for such communication is not explained in the Advaita Vedānta. It is important now to examine whether the subration of Appearance takes place while one is in a non-dual experience, that is, 'Reality' or in Appearance itself. If Eliot Deutsch thinks that the non-dual

experience is somehow communicated to the mind in the state of Appearance then, it implies that subration of Appearance cannot take place while one is in non-duality. For, the requirements of subration; namely, (i) judgement about some object or content of consciousness, (ii) the recognition in the light of another kind of judgement, that is, incompatible with the initial judgement, that the initial judgement is faulty, and (iii) the acceptance of the new judgement as valid; are all mental activities and since there is no mind in non-dual experience, it can be said that subration of Appearance cannot take place while one is in non-duality.

If 'Reality' cannot subrate Appearance when one is in non-duality, due to the absence of the requirements of subration then, alternatively, Eliot Deutsch should accept that subration of Appearance takes place while one is in the experience of Appearance. The position, namely, Appearance gets subrated by 'Reality' while one is in Appearance, requires a transfer of the experience of non-duality to the level of Appearance. If non-dual wisdom is not communicated to the mental level then the same cannot subrate the Appearance even while one is in the state of Appearance. If non-dual experience is communicated to the mental level then the subration of Appearance by 'Reality' may be possible. But if such communication is accepted then one ought to admit the existence of mind in non-duality. However, the existence of mind in non-duality is not accepted by Advaitins, for, according to Advaita Vedānta, non-duality is pure consciousness which always exists (*nitya*) and mind, which is different from non-dual *ātman*, fails to exist continuously. If non-duality is said to have communicated itself to the mind then there must be a special way for the transfer of non-dual experience to the other states. Since Advaita Vedānta does not admit any specific communication of non-dual experience to the mind in other states of experience, it can be said that non-duality cannot reveal itself to the mind in other states. Also the problem here is that if non-duality can communicate itself to the mind by itself then there is no need for any effort for liberation.

Alternatively, if one thinks that the mind obtains non-dual experience by being conscious of the absence of objects, and that such non-dual experience may subrate Appearance in the state of Appearance itself then, we say that the non-dual mental experience caused by an awareness of the absence of the objects cannot subrate Appearance. For, if one accepts the position, namely, non-dual mental experience subrates Appearance then, the content of the non-dual mental experience, that is, the conscious mind,[5]

alone will be regarded, as 'Reality' and therefore, the Advaitin's non-dual *ātman* cannot be treated as the ultimate reality. The Advaitins do not accept the position, namely, that non-dual *ātman* is not the ultimate reality and therefore, they cannot recognize non-dual mental experience caused by an awareness of the absence of the objects such as 'Reality'. Thus Eliot Deutsch must concede, for the foregoing reasons, that non-dual experience cannot be communicated to the mind in the state of Appearance and therefore, his 'Reality' cannot subrate Appearance either while one is in non-duality or in the state of Appearance.

2.5 Formation of Judgements is not Possible

It can be said that 'Reality cannot subrate Appearance for the other reason also, that is, the subrating judgement which is essential for subration, cannot be formed either in the non-duality or in the Appearance. Advaitins hold the view that two judgements are required for any subration, namely, (i) subrating judgement which denies the former judgement and upholds the latter judgement based on a new experience of the same object, and (ii) subrated judgement which is an initial faulty judgement passed on the same object.

We argue here that since, all judgements are made only by mind and the mind in absent in non-duality, it is impossible to form a subrating judgement that is, 'this is not Appearance but only non-duality,' while one is in non-dual experience. Also, since non-duality cannot be communicated to the mind in other states of experience, it is impossible to form a subrating judgement even at the level of Appearance. Thus the foregoing arguments go to prove that the Advaitin's non-duality is neither a mental nor a trans-mental experience. There cannot exist an experience, which is neither mental nor trans-mental, and therefore, such non-existent 'Reality' advocated by Eliot Deutsch cannot subrate Appearance.

Alternatively, if Eliot Deutsch accepts that the mind exists during the non-dual experience then we agree with him by exposing our view, namely, non-dual *ātman* is not required for attaining the non-dual experience. For, it is a fact that when the mind is conscious of the absence of objects there arises non-dual experience which is of the nature of bliss and peace and sufficient for liberating one from suffering (*duḥkha nivṛtti*). We will try to establish in the following argument that Appearance can subrate 'Reality.'

3. APPEARANCE SUBRATES NON-DUAL MENTAL EXPERIENCE

The Advaitins believe that the presence of the Appearance causes *duḥkha*, because the state of Appearance is understood as an illusion of 'Reality' (*Nirguṇa Brahman*) and therefore, one ought to subrate Appearance, in other to get rid of suffering. According to them, 'Reality' subrates Appearance. But we have proved in the foregoing arguments that 'Reality' cannot subrate Appearance. Thus 'Reality' loses its status, as the ultimate reality for it could not subrate Appearance as Eliot Deutsch thinks. It implies that even Appearance also fails to be empirical reality (*vyāvahārika sattā*). It will be shown in the following arguments that if 'Reality' is not 'Reality' and Appearance is not Appearance and 'Reality' cannot subrate Appearance then the so-called Appearance can subrate the so-called 'Reality,' that is, non-dual mental experience.

3.1 Definition of 'Unreality' Applies to Advaitin's 'Reality'

Subration needs to happen within the realm of the mind for all judgements, recognitions and valuations, which are essential for the operation of the concept of subration, is possible only when the mind is in a functional state. Any assumed non-dual experience beyond mind cannot subrate any other experience for it is not possible to have judgements, valuations, etc., within such trans-mental experience. Nor can such trans-mental non-dual experience be subrated by any other experience, for the following reasons: (i) the absence of the mind in trans-mental 'Reality,' (ii) no other experience is present either directly or by way of memory in the trans-mental non-dual experience, and (iii) since trans-mental experience cannot exist directly or by way of memory in the other states of experience it cannot be subrated by other experience. Thus it can be said that the definition of 'Unreality,' namely, that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experience, is applicable for the trans-mental non-dual experience and therefore, the same becomes non-existent.

However, the Advaitins attempt to prove that such non-existent, assumed, trans-mental, non-dual experience is the highest reality. In support of the same, Eliot Deutsch admits that subration requires the presence of an object or content of consciousness that can be contradicted by other experience: Reality as non-dual, in terms of a phenomenology of experience as well as by definition, denies the possibility of there being some other 'Object', that could replace it.[6] In other words, it can be said that since it is not possible to have any other object or experience in the non-

dual experience, the non-dual experience cannot be subrated by any other experience and therefore, the non-duality is the ultimate reality. Thus Eliot Deutsch tries to declare that the non-dual experience is the highest reality because it cannot be subrated by any other experience due to the absence of any other object or experience within the non-dual experience.

3.2 Absence of Objects in Non-Duality Does not Mean Unsubratability of Advaitin's 'Reality'

A question may be raised against the opinion of Eliot Deutsch, namely, does the absence of objects in a given experience mean that, that particular experience is unsubratable? According to Eliot Deutsch, subration requires the presence of an object or content of consciousness that can be contradicted by other experience. If there is an absence of other objects in a given experience then it does not mean that, that particular experience is unsubratable. Rather, it can be said that the concept of subration is not operational within such experience without the presence of any other object. Inapplicability of subration does not mean unsubratability of the given experience. If it is accepted that an absence of the other experience is the mark of unsubratability of non-dual experience then it can be argued that Appearance (real existent) also is unsubratable by non-dual 'Reality'. For, when one is in the state of Appearance (duality), the experience of non-duality is absent and therefore, Appearance is not subratable by non-dual experience because the same is absent.

But Eliot Deutsch defines Appearance (Real existent) as that which can be subrated only by 'Reality' (non-duality). We have already proved in the foregoing arguments that 'Reality' cannot subrate Appearance. Thus it can be said that the absence of object in non-dual experience does not mean that the non-dual experience is unsubratable. Rather it can be said that the Advaitin's 'Reality' is not suitable for the application of the concept of subration. Thus one needs to deny the concept of Advaita 'Reality' and accept the position, namely, non-dual experience arises when the mind becomes aware of the absence of the objects.

3.3 Non-Dual Mental Experience can be Memorized in Appearance

What happens to non-dual mental experience when one comes back to the state of Appearance from non-dual experience? It cannot be argued that it is not possible for one to come back from non-dual experience for, there will not be proof of the existence of non-dual experience unless one comes back from it and communicates the same to others. Thus it must be accepted that one can come back from non-dual experience to the state of Appearance and communicate the same to others.

If non-dual experience is trans-mental experience then it cannot be memorized in the state of Appearance for, there is no way of communicating it to the mind. As long as one perceives duality in the state of Appearance, the non-duality cannot directly exist for it is contradictory to say that one has knowledge of both duality and non-duality in the same place at the same time. But if non-dual experience is accepted as a mental experience, then the same can be memorized in the state of Appearance. Thus it can be said that a direct experience of duality and a memory of non-duality are available in the state of Appearance, when one comes back from non-duality to the state of Appearance. Since it has been established in the foregoing arguments that non-dual 'Reality' cannot subrate the duality of Appearance, a question may be raised that is it possible for Appearance to subrate non-dual experience? We hold the view that Appearance can subrate the memory of the non-dual mental experience while one is in the state of Appearance.

3.4 Formation of Judgements is Possible

Subration requires two judgements, namely, (i) subrated judgement, and (ii) subrating judgement. If 'Reality' subrates Appearance then the subrated judgement is: 'this is Appearance' and subrating judgement is: 'this is not Appearance but only Reality.' Where does this subration take place? It cannot takes place either while one is in the state of Appearance or in the non-dual experience itself. For, we have already proved that: (i) if non-dual experience is trans-mental then the same cannot be brought to the state of Appearance for want of communicating instruments within trans-mental non-dual 'Reality'; (ii) if non-dual experience is mental experience then the existence of non-dual *ātman* cannot be maintained for, the existence of mind within non-dual reality implies duality within 'Reality'.

However, we concede that the memory of non-dual mental experience can be brought to the state of Appearance. An Advaitin may argue that the memory of mental non-dual experience may subrate Appearance while one is in Appearance. But we hold the view that the memory of non-dual experience in Appearance cannot subrate Appearance. For, the memory of non-dual experience, that is, the memory of the awareness that there are no objects whatsoever in non-dual experience, cannot subrate the duality

of Appearance while one is in the state of Appearance. Because one is conscious of the objects in Appearance and the memory of non-dual experience cannot replace the objects for, it is contradictory to say that the duality is not duality but only non-duality. In other words, it cannot be said that the presence of the objects is not real but only the absence of the objects is real while one perceives duality. For, it is a fact that there are only objects of duality in Appearance but not the absence of the objects. This in turn leads to the possibility of subration of the memory of the non-duality by Appearance.

If Appearance subrates the memory of non-dual experience then the subrated judgement is: 'I remember that this is non-dual experience caused by the absence of the objects' and the subrating judgement is: 'this is not the non-duality caused by the absence of the objects but only the presence of the duality of objects.' It can be said with regard to the subrated judgement that, such subrated judgement as, 'I remember that this is non-dual experience caused by the absence of the objects,' can be formed by using one's memory of non-dual experience caused by the absence of the objects when one gets confused by the teachings of Advaita Vedānta. The subrating judgement, namely, 'This is not non-duality but only duality' is also possible for one perceives duality while one is the state of Appearance.

It is contradictory to say that the duality, which is under perception in the present moment, is negated by the memory of the past mental non-dual experience caused by the absence of the objects. Rather it can be said that the past memory of non-dual mental experience is false for one perceives the objects at the moment. It is just as in the case, when one wakes up from deep sleep, one realizes and accepts the duality of the Appearance and negates his state of deep sleep, so also when one comes back from non-duality one realizes and accepts the multiplicity of the world and negates his non-dual experience. Thus it can be said that Appearance can subrate the memory of non-duality.

3.5 None of the Four Levels of Experience is Ultimate Reality

If an Advaitin takes the definition of ultimate reality as 'that which is permanent and unchanging is the ultimate reality,' then, we say that neither the states of non-dual experience, namely, dreamless sleep and conscious non-dual experience, that is, absence of the objects, nor the states of duality, namely, waking and dream, that is, presence of the objects,

stand for the ultimate reality. For all these states are changeable and do not exist continuously. The distinction among the levels of experience is made either by the presence of the objects or by the absence of the objects. Neither the states of presence of the objects nor the states of absence of the objects are constant and permanent. But, since all judgements and evaluations are confined only to the waking state, one may tend to think that the world of duality stands always as real. Since the waking state is changeable and impermanent, the world of duality cannot be the ultimate reality. Just because man, some how, is not aware of the presence of the objects in such states as, deep sleep and non-dual experience, these states cannot be said to be permanent states for, they are impermanent and therefore, they cannot be the ultimate reality. Dreamless sleep and non-dual experience may be blissful and peaceful in nature but being blissful and peaceful cannot make these states the ultimate reality. The attainment of bliss and peace may be the highest human goal but it does not mean that the states of bliss and peace are the ultimate reality. Being blissful and peaceful is different from being the ultimate reality.

It has been established in the foregoing arguments that non-duality cannot subrate Appearance and Appearance can subrate the memory of non-duality. This implies that Appearance subrates not only non-duality but also other states of experience, such as, dream and deep sleep. If one accepts the definition of ultimate 'Reality' given by Eliot Deutsch, that is, 'Reality' is that which cannot be subrated by any other experience, then Appearance has to be treated as the ultimate reality. For, it is proved that Appearance is not subrated by any other experience and the same subrates all other states of experience. But, since the state of Appearance also is impermanent and changeable along with the other states, the same cannot be taken as the ultimate reality. Thus it can be said that the concept of subration cannot determine the ultimate reality and therefore, the same cannot be helpful in the pursuit of liberation.

4. UNREALITY CANNOT BE A LEVEL OF REALITY

Eliot Deutsch introduces Unreality as one of the levels in his classification of three levels of being. He thinks that Śaṁkara implicitly accepts Unreality (*tuccha*) as a level of reality. We will refute the view of Eliot Deutsch on the Unreality in the following explanation.

4.1 Position of Advaita on Levels of Being

The inquiry into the three levels of reality (*sattātraya vicāra*) is one of the methods in Advaita Vedānta to establish *nirguṇa* Brahman as the one and only non-dual reality. Depending on the concept of sublation,[7] the Advaitins categorize reality[8] into three levels, namely, (i) Empirical reality (*Vyāvahārika sattā*)[9], (ii) Phenomenal reality (*Prātibhāsika sattā*)[10], and (iii) Absolute reality (*Pāramārthika sattā*)[11]. The Advaitins also refer to another category, namely, Absolute non-existence (*tuccha*),[12] only to show that none of the three levels of reality is absolute non-existence. But *tuccha* is neither accepted as a kind of reality nor as one of the three levels of reality in Advaita Vedānta.

4.2 Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being

Contrary to the Advaitic position, Eliot Deutsch, while reconstructing Advaita Vedānta, introduces absolute non-existence as one of the realities in his classification of three levels of reality. Eliot Deutsch, though, aware of the Advaitic classification of three levels of reality, thinks that Śaṅkara implicitly accepts the level of 'unreality'.[13] He tries to give his own classification of 'levels of being' and includes 'Unreality' as one of the 'Three Levels of Reality' which for him, are (i) Reality, (ii) Appearance, and (iii) unreality.

According to Eliot Deutsch 'Reality' is that which cannot be subrated[14] by any other experience.[15] Appearance is that which can be subrated by other experience.[16] He divides 'appearance' into three sublevels, namely, (i) real existent, (ii) existent, and (iii) illusory existent. The first one comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated only by 'Reality'. He thinks that the sublevel of the 'real existent' is not clearly formulated in Advaita literature.[17] The second comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated by 'Reality' or by the 'real existent'.[18] The third one comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated by all other types of experience.[19] The 'Unreality' for him is that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experience.[20]

4.3 A Critique

Eliot Deutsch seems to have been more enthusiastic in reconstructing the Advaita notion of three levels of reality, rather than understanding and adhering to the Advaitic purpose of such an inquiry, while he introduces 'Unreality' as one of the three levels of being. It is necessary for one to realize the reason for Advaita to speak of three levels of reality while it accepts only one reality, that is, *nirguṇa* Brahman.

The Advaitins have three methods of explaining there philosophy, namely, (i) *Ekasattāka Dṛṣṭi Vāda*, (ii) *Dvisattāka Dṛṣṭi Sṛṣṭi Vāda*, and (iii) *Sṛṣṭi Dṛṣṭi Vāda*. These explanations are offered in accordance with the qualification of the persons. According to the Advaitins, the *mumukṣus* are classified into three, namely, (i) *Uttamādhikāri*, (ii) *Madhyamādhikāri*, and (iii) *Adhamādhikāri*. The first of the above method is meant for the *Uttamādhikāri*. According to the *Ekasattāka dṛṣṭi sṛṣṭi vāda*, Brahman-*Ātman*, which is non-dual, alone exists always and nothing else. If at all anything other than Brahman seems to exist then, it is one's own imagination. Thus the individual's imagination becomes responsible for the appearance of duality in non-duality. According to the Advaitins this is the most difficult way to understanding Advaita philosophy.

It is hard to understand the position that there exists only non-duality while one is seeing the duality. In order to make it easy for the sake of *madhyamādhikāri*, the Advaitins introduce the second method, namely, *Dvisattāka dṛṣṭi sṛṣṭi vāda*. This method upholds the view that duality exists only as long as one perceives it, but in fact duality never exists. Thus, the *prātibhāsika sattā* is ascribed to the appearance of the duality of the world in this method. The *prātibhāsika sattā* is mentioned only to say the *mumukṣu* that the duality never exists and appearance of it is caused by one's imagination. This duality disappears when one realizes and keeps oneself in non-duality. Thus this system admits of two levels of reality, namely, (i) *Pāramārthika sattā*, that is, Brahman-*Ātman*, and (ii) *Prātibhāsika sattā*, that is, world of duality.

It is also difficult for most of the people to understand the theory, which advocates the existence of the world as long as one perceives it, for people always keep using the things of the world for their needs, such as, to satisfy hunger, etc. In order to make the *adhamādhikāri* understand Advaita, the third method, namely, *Sṛṣṭi dṛṣṭi vāda* is established. This theory, unlike *Dṛṣṭi sṛṣṭi vāda*, advocates three levels of reality. According to it, *Īśvara* (Brahman) causes duality by His power of *māyā*. The people mistake this illusory creation of duality for non-duality. The question arises that, if the world is an illusion then, is this world an illusion like other illusions such as dream? If the Advaitin says yes, then the difficulty such as that that which has been raised in the case of the

Dvisattāka dṛṣṭi dṛṣṭi vāda where the world is only *prātibhāsika sattā* occurs.

The Advaitin, therefore, distinguishes dreams and such illusory objects as snake on rope, etc., from the worldly physical objects in *Sṛṣṭi dṛṣṭi vāda*. Since the empirical objects are used as real entities for worldly needs and are not sublated by any other objects, they are ascribed of a reality called *vyāvahārika sattā*, which is distinct from *prātibhāsika sattā*.

But there arises another question that if world is an illusion on Brahman then the world becomes ontologically non-existent when one realizes the substratum, that is, Brahman. This leads to further problems, such as, if the world becomes non-existent then what happens to the daily needs of a *jīvanmukta*? Advaitins in order to solve this problem and also to strengthen their philosophy of world illusion on Brahman, distinguish all illusory objects both of *prātibhāsika sattā* and *vyāvahārika sattā* from the absolute non-existence, what they call *tuccha* which is defined as that which can never exist and can never become an object of cognition. All illusory objects including the world cannot be called *tuccha* for they can be objects of cognition. Thus the Advaitins make a distinction between *Pāramārthika sattā* and the 'illusory objects and world,' between *tuccha* and 'illusory objects and world' and between worldly physical objects and illusory objects.

The purpose of introducing the 'Unreality' is only to say that the 'objects of illusions and the world' are not *tuccha* but they have some level of reality. This being the position of Advaita, Eliot Deutsch introduces 'Unreality' (*tuccha*) as one of the three levels of being. The acceptance of 'Unreality' as a kind of reality by Eliot Deutsch appears as a demonstration of his ignorance of Advaita. Gauḍapāda is of the opinion that, childish persons fail to know Brahman by predicating It with such attributes as existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence and absolute non-existence.[21] Śaṅkara also exclaims that, if these (so-called) learned men act as veritable children on account of their ignorance of Ultimate Reality, what is to be said regarding those who are, by nature, unenlightened.[22] Since the reconstruction of the levels of being by Eliot Deutsch appears only as a childish act, as admitted by Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda, one can imagine how Eliot Deutsch commits a grave mistake in accepting *tuccha* as a kind of reality and introducing it as one of the three levels of reality.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

An Attempt is made in this paper to show that the Advaita 'Reality' admitted by Eliot Deutsch cannot be the ultimate reality. In order to establish the same, three arguments have been raised against the concept of three levels of being, advocated by Eliot Deutsch, namely, (1) Reality cannot subrate Appearance, (2) Appearance subrates non-dual mental experience, and (3) Unreality cannot be a level of reality.

An examination of the criteria of the ultimate reality is conducted in the first argument. It is shown that the concept of subration cannot be applied to 'Reality' as long a one believes that 'Reality' is a trans-mental experience. This point of view is also supported by the argument that if non-duality is a trans-mental reality then the same cannot be communicated to the other states of experience due to lack of communicating instruments within non-duality. Further, it is pointed out that if non-duality is a trans-mental experience then the requirements of subration namely, (i) the subrating judgement, and (ii) the subrated judgement cannot be formed while one is in the trans-mental non-dual experience. All these arguments go to prove that Reality cannot subrate Appearance.

Secondly, it is argued that the Reality explained by Eliot Deutsch, does not stand for the definition of the ultimate reality and the same is suitable for the definition of Unreality. Then the opinion of Eliot Deutsch on the unsubratability of 'Reality' has been dismissed. Later, it is established that application of the concept of subration is possible only to the memory of non-dual mental experience while one is in the state of Appearance. It is shown that the memory of non-dual mental experience cannot subrate Appearance either while one is in non-duality or in Appearance. In the same place, it is argued that Appearance can subrate the memory of non-duality while one is in the state of Appearance because of the possibility of the formation of the subrating and subrated judgements in the Appearance. Also, it has been established that the concept of three levels of being and the concept of subration in Advaita Vedānta cannot determine 'Reality' as the ultimate reality.

Lastly, the significance of the classification of three levels of reality in Advaita Vedānta has been explained in order to show that unreality cannot be a kind of reality and the same cannot be included in the concept of three levels of reality.

Notes and References

1. Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta* (*A Philosophical Reconstruction*), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Paperback, 1988, pp. 16–17.
2. Ibid., p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 20. According to Eliot Deutsch, The Real Existent is a kind of Appearance, which comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated only by 'Reality'.
5. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, A Critique on the Concept of *Jīva*, Volume XVII, Number 2, January–April 2000, pp. 117–141.
   We hold the view that there is no need for a non-dual *ātman* distinct from body-mind-sense complex in order to explain the conscious nature of the body and the conscious mind is sufficient for explaining the same.
6. Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta* (*A Philosophical Reconstruction*), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Paperback, 1988, p. 19.
7. Parasurāmapantula Lingamūrty Gurumūrty, *Sītārāmānjaneyasamvādamu*, pp. 201–1 *Telugu Ṭīkātātparyavivaraṇasahitamu*, Vavilla Ramaswami Sastrulu and Sons, Chennai, 1934.
   Sublation is known as destruction in a technical sense. Destruction is mainly of two kinds, namely, (i) *Dhvamsa*, and (ii) *Bādha*. *Dhvamsa* is the destruction of physical objects generally found when such methods of destruction as breaking, burning the objects, etc., are used. *Bādha* is also a kind of destruction generally applied when illusory objects are destroyed by the dawn of the right knowledge of their substratum (*adhiṣṭāna*).
   Niścaladās, *Vicārasāgaram*, p. 145, Translated into Sanskrit by Vāsudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vāsudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library committee, Tanjor, India, 1986.
   Bādho nāma aparokṣa mithyātvaniścayaḥ
   Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, 3.2.4, p. 346, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988
   Vaitathyam bādhyamānatvāt.
   S.S. Suryanarayana Sastry, *Philosophies and Philosophical Works*, 'On the Nature of Sublation,' pp. 191–6.
   For Suryanarayana Sastry, sublation is sublimation.
   Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta* (*A Philosophical Reconstruction*), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1988, p. 15.
   According to Eliot Deutsch 'sublation', which he tried to reconstruct as 'subration', is the mental process whereby one disvalues some previously apprised object or content of consciousness because of its being contradicted by a new experience.
8. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 3.2.4, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998, pp. 346–7.
   pāramārthikastu nāyam saṁdhyāśrayaḥ sargo viyadādisargavadityetāvat pratipādhyate| Na ca viyadādisargasyāpyatyantikaṁ satyatvamasti| Prāktu brahmātmatvadarśanādviyadādi prapañco vyavasthitarūpo bhavati| Saṁdhyāśrayastu prapañcaḥ pratidinaṁ bādhyata iti|
9. Niścaladās, *Vicārasāgaram*, p. 145, Translated into Sanskrit by Vāsudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vāsudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986.
   Yasya padārthasya brahmajñānamantarā na bādhaḥ, kimtu brahmajñānenaiva bādho bhavati tasya vyāvahārikasattāvatvena vyapadeśaḥ| Brahmajñānetarābādhyatve sati brahmajñānamātra bādhyatvaṁ vyāvahārikasatvamiti yāvat| Sa ca satteśvara sṛṣṭapadārtheṣvasti| Yato dehendriyādi prapañca rupeśvarasṛṣṭerbrahmajñānamantarā na bādho bhavati, kimtu brahmajñānenaiva bhavati| Tramādīśvarasṛṣṭapadārthā vyāvahārikasattākā iti jñeyam|
10. Ibid., p. 146.
    Brahmajñānetara bādhyatvam prātibhāsikatvam| Tādṛśam satvaṁ yatrāste sa prātibhāsikapadārtha ityucyate|—Prātibhāsikaḥ = Pratītikālamātrasattākaḥ|—Pratītikālamātrabhāvinaḥ padārthasya prātibhāsika sattocyate|
11. Ibid.
    Kālatrayābādhyatvam = Pāramārthikasatvam| Caitanyamekameva na kadāpi bādhyata iti pāramārthika sattā caitanyasyaiva|
12. *Tuccha* is used only to show that any content of our experience can never be absolute non-existent and such content deserves some kind of reality depends upon its scrutiny by applying the concept of sublation.
13. Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta* (*A Philosophical Reconstruction*), Note No. 10, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Paperback, 1988, p. 26.
14. Ibid., p. 15.
    Eliot Deutsch tries to reconstruct 'sublation' in Advaita Vedānta as 'subration' and prefers to use the same for 'sublation'.
15. Ibid., p. 18.
16. Ibid., p. 20.
17. Ibid., p. 26, Note No. 10.
18. Ibid., p. 21.
19. Ibid., p. 23.
20. Ibid., p. 24.
21. *Māṇḍūkhyopaniṣad Gauḍapādakārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya.*, 4.83,
    Astināstyasti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti va punaḥ calasthirophayābhāvirāṛṇotyeva bāliśaḥ.
22. Ibid.
    Yadhyapi pandito bāliśa eva paramārthatattvānavabhodhāt, kimu svabhāvamūḍho jana ityabhiprāyaḥ.

ICPR Senior Research Fellow
9C, Blue Beach Road, Neelangarai
Chennai 600 041

M. Prabhakara Rao

How Useful is the Notion of 'Family Resemblances' in the Context of the Arts?

It may be worthwhile to return to Morris Weitz's influential paper[1] which can claim to be a trend-setter in analytic aesthetics. What Weitz does here is what he thinks Wittgenstein would have done if he had been confronted with the task of finding a definition of art. Following in the footsteps of the latter, Weitz argues that natural concepts of the sort, 'language', 'games',—and 'art', too—cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient condition (or, essential property) though one may get around the problem by invoking the idea of 'similarities' among all the members that are classified under each of the natural concepts cited here. Thus, Weitz:

> The problem of art is like that of the nature of games, at least in these respects: If we actually look and see what it is that we call 'art', we will also find as common properties—only strands of similarities, knowing what art is not apprehending some manifest or latent essence, but being able to recognize, describe and explain those things we call 'art' in virtue of these similarities.[2]

But 'similarities' to what? If the answer is, other works of art, then one might ask for the basis on which these other works are regarded as works of art. Weitz anticipates the question and therefore invokes the notion of paradigm cases of art. The idea is that since art is an expansive concept, its application cannot be rigidly closed in terms of a strict boundary around it. Newer and unfamiliar cases may seek a title to art, and on the basis of their similarities to the accepted cases of art one should be prepared to extend the use of the term 'art' in respect of these cases. But what 'similarities' should one be looking for? For, there can be different points of consideration from which to decide what should count for similarity or otherwise. Take, for instance, books. It is possible to classify them in different ways: subject-wise, language-wise, appearance-wise and so on. Similarity in each case would be different from the others. All philosophy books, say, would share a similarity in respect of the subject of study, but may not do so if the point of consideration is thickness, printing quality or binding, etc. If, for example, the classification is based on the language they are written in then in respect of their subject-matter or quality of binding they may not share any similarity. Any reference to 'family resemblance' or 'strands of similarities' must be related to some *specific* context or point of consideration. This point has been made with great rigour and cogency by B.R. Tilghman.[3] He rightly points out that it is quite meaningless to look for 'similarities' in a general sense which is abstracted from any specific context. In the case of art, Weitz's suggestion that we may classify them on the basis of similarities to the accepted works of art would not make much headway if the specific context or the point of consideration is not clearly defined.

Another related point that Tilghman focuses on is that the specific role of a definition of art is not merely to provide a criterion for classifying various things *as* art but rather to give an *explanation* for such a classification. We may indeed imagine situations and contexts where it may be possible to classify without an understanding as to why such classification is made or is valid. For example, on a visit to the gallery where Duchamp's '*Fountain*' is kept as an *exhibit* though near look-alike objects (i.e., urinals) are quite likely to be found in the toilets. Further, I may even tell my young son that it is a work of art implying thereby that it is not to be touched or used by the child fearing any such attempt that the child may think of making. But for all this I myself may not be quite convinced as to why it should be classified as a work of art. What is called for is an explanation for such classification in the absence of which one would remain in persistent doubt about the matter. No doubt many such unconventional and wayward looking objects are called art, but why they *are* called so is what one would like to have explained. In view of this, Weitz's offer of an explanation in terms of 'similarities' or 'family resemblances' would be facile and inadequate. The point is that even after being told about the classification of an object as an art object, one may still meaningfully ask: 'But is it art?' which is 'a demand for explanation of the thing as art and a plea to be shown that what is relevant is an understanding and appreciation of it as art'.[4]

While it does seem quite ingenious of Tilghman to turn the tables on Weitz by developing an argument that is well-grounded in a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* he does not seem to address a difficulty that arises here. It may be outlined in the form of the following question: What may count for an explanation? Perhaps we could draw here a line between the two sorts of cases that will help us understand the point. When, for example, the works of Cezanne, Matisse and other impressionist painters first appeared on the scene people

generally felt quite puzzled about their merit as art. However, the explanation that was given by the Formalists (Roger Fry *et al.*) required one to look for and appreciate the plastic qualities or the formal elements in these works. As an explanation this proved quite *useful* as it paved the way for enhancing the aesthetic sensibility and for admitting a new genre as art. This also provided a new approach to the appreciation of a whole lot of earlier works which had remained hitherto unexplored. The explanation here satisfies the following conditions: (i) it makes us *see* an aspect in respect of which some works can be appreciated as of artistic merit, and (ii) it *shows* the basis on which the new works can be related to all the earlier works as of artistic merit. So we have an idea of what kind of explanation we should be looking for. Now, as we have said before, it is not enough to classify something as a specimen of art, we should be also asking for an explanation for why we classify it so. If such explanation is not forthcoming mere classification is not of much avail. But what kind of explanation can one expect for acclaiming Duchamp's *Fountain* as a work of art? Of course, one cannot undo history. It remains a fact of history that at some point of time Duchamp's *Fountain* and many such *object trouvé* (found objects or readymades) were admitted into the prestigeous precincts of art galleries. But, is there an explanation available for such decision? What we are suggesting is that classification of things—as indeed of works of art—is possible even in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of the sort indicated above. So the condition of 'family resemblances' may provide a way of classifying things as art but the methodology cannot be turned into an *explanation* for accepting the objects so classified as works of art.

Dealing with the notion of 'family resemblances', we are faced with another difficulty. There is a sense of 'resemblances' or 'strands of similarities' in which most works which are repetitive in nature would also get classified together with those that inspire such practices in the domain of art. And to extend this point, even fakes and copies of original works of art would come under the same class on the basis of their close mutual resemblances. In other words, classification on the basis of similarities does not allow for drawing a distinction between original meritorious works of art and those that are copied, faked or badly made works. If we go by the criterion of resemblance then what better candidates for the title 'art' can there be than all the copies of famed original works of art?

In conclusion, we may briefly summarize the points: (a) Resemblances or similarities among works of art can be meaningfully invoked only when we clearly specify a definite context for such point of consideration. In abstraction from a context the notion of similarity does not make much sense. (b) Resemblance may be used as an useful criterion for *classifying* things as art, but this *alone* would not suffice. Classifying works of art is a kind of exercise that may be carried on without sufficient understanding as to *why* they should be so classified. What is called for is an explanation for such classification. (c) Even if resemblance be taken as a criterion for classifying art it may be quite natural to ask, 'But, is it art?' implying thereby either a demand for an explanation or a sense of puzzlement for which no explanation may be adequate or sufficient as a rationale for calling something art. Thus the notion of 'family resemblances' is no help for providing understanding about why something should be called 'art'.

Notes and References

1. Morris Weitz, 'The Role of Theory in Esthetics', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 15, 1956.
2. Ibid.
3. B.R. Tilghman, *But Is It Art?*, Blackwell, 1984.
4. Ibid.

Senior Fellow, ICPR Ranjan K. Ghosh

Roy W. Perrett: 'History, Time and Knowledge in Ancient India' in *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History*, Vol. 38, No. 3, October 1999.

Perrett has published an interesting and scholarly paper 'History, Time and Knowledge in Ancient India' in the journal: *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* (Vol. 38, No. 3, October 1999). The paper has certain merits. It has effectively met the critic's charge that there was no history in ancient India. It validly conceded that there was no historiography or scientific history in ancient India. But, it is pinpointedly remarked in the paper that lack of scientific history or historiography was

also not traceable in any ancient civilization including that of Europe. The accountability of ahistoricity, in the Indian context, may be traced to various factors. He, of course, does not take into account all such factors. In the paper, he is primarily concerned with what is called a philosophical explanation for the occurrence of ahistoricity and, in that context, he has taken into account certain indigenous metaphysical theories which are offered and he has found those to be not satisfactory. Rather he has held that no metaphysical explanation for the accountability of ahistoricity is traceable in the Indian context. According to his view, a philosophical explanation in terms of epistemological theorization can be properly located so far as the thesis of ahistoricity is attributed to ancient India. He, however, remarks that no significant value was attached to history in ancient India and for which he has tried to locate certain philosophical explanations in terms of epistemological theories.

I

Let me, at the outset, evaluate the remark that the ancient Indians 'did not particularly value history.'[1] The very fact (which Perrett accepts) that there is definite evidence of something like 'literary genre of history' amply justifies the point that the ancient Indians valued history. The reference about '*itihāsa*' in the Veda, composition like *Rājatarangiṇī*, *Mahāvaṃsa*, the Pali Chronicle of Sri Lanka (of a later period) has been cited by Perrett. In addition to all these sources, one can locate a number of *vaṁśānucaritas* of kings, dynasties and therein the conditions of the ruled subjects as well as the general conditions of the kingdom or the governed states which are abundantly available in different parts of the country.[2] There is, for instance, the presence of *Mādalā Pānji* (temple chronicle) at Puri narrating the chronological historical accounts of Orissan kings and their dynastic rule and of Shree Jagannātha temple. Similar temple records are also available in different parts of the country. However, those chronicles contain incoherencies in narrating events and their sequences; besides those also include stories and legends. From such sources, by way of comparative cross-references, some indirect indications are made available about the social conditions and the political functioning of the people living in the concerned areas. Even in the general literary sources like *kāvyas* and *mahākāvyas*, there are indirect references about people and their socio-political and religious settings. Of course, as hinted, the objective

historical facts and the ornamental literary imaginative narrations are not kept distinct and quite often those are found to be overlapping.

But the iconographic records, the discovery of copper plates, stone and metal inscriptions, palm-leaf manuscripts, coins etc. found in different sources help the historians to a great extent to formulate objective historical linkage in varied periods. In this manner the history of ancient India (along with its different parts) is brought out somewhat satisfactorily. Of course, one can question the full authenticity of those indirect findings on the ground that those sources are not originally recorded in a scientific manner. As such, those do not truly depict the historical facts. But then, what is the sense of pure objectivity of absolute truth in any field of enquiry? Is not the presentation of any report found from historical records (even if genuine) imbedded with a subjective mode of reference? Is not pure objectivity a Utopian myth? Is it not the case that history written about the modern period with the background of all scientific procedure and mechanism, in some cases, lacks objectivity to a certain extent so that there is the practice of revising or rewriting modern history? A historian, while composing history, is not completely free from his likes and dislikes and those do, in some way or other, influence his writings. However, the degree of subjective import, in all such cases, has to be definitely taken into account.

Whatever that may be, from all this it is not correct to remark that the Indians of the ancient period did not value history. They did value it; but the manner of their recording the historical data was not adequately methodical and scientific. It is a fact that history as an independent social science with an autonomous methodological criterion, mode of enquiry and investigation has not been developed during that period and for that one can take into account various factors. But, from all this to conclude that the ancient Indians did not value history seems to be not fair.

II

Perrett considers the issue of time. In certain circles, the neglect of historicity of the ancient Indians is attributed to their philosophical conception of time. It is said that the Indian philosophical notion of reality is directed towards eternity or timelessness. Some have thought that the theory of cyclic time, found in certain Indian religio-philosophical sources, has caused the growth of an indifferent attitude towards the ordinary

notion of time. The Advaita Vedāntin's conception of Brahman as the ultimate reality is held to be beyond time (*trikālabādhita*). The Vedic authoritativeness is accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas on the ground that it is authorless and also timeless.

Perrett has not accepted this stand on the ground that the Buddhists as well as the Jainas (though they very much belong to ancient India) did not accept the authority of the Vedas and, even then, they too have not given 'great importance to history'. Further, the eternality of the Vedas, that is accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas is challenged by the Nyāya and the Sāṁkhya. The Vedāntins, though accepting the non-authorship of the Vedas, regard those to be ultimately unreal; so also the cyclic notion of time is not necessarily a move against time for the cycles of change occur 'within linear time'.[3]

Now, it is not clear as to how certain philosophical theories challenging the metaphysical reality of time (time as unreal/time as not ultimately real) affect the legitimacy of historicity. When a philosopher, as metaphysician, builds up a metaphysical theory, he is surely not challenging the ordinary notion of time. He has the clear sense of demarcating time, i.e., in the context of accepting the sequence of past (*bhūta*), present (*vartamāna*) and future (*bhaviṣyata*). What he is interested in is rather to move beyond the physicalistic framework of conceptual order and he attempts to conceive of a metaphysical framework in which certain concepts that are used in the physicalistic framework are found to be obsolete or redundant. Whether he is right or wrong in his mode of reasoning is, of course, a different issue. But, surely, his metaphysical view does in no way stand in affecting either positively or negatively what goes on at the ordinary level. To say philosophy is responsible for ahistoricity is as good as saying that the sun is responsible for the good or evil that somebody does with the use of sunlight. One may use the sunlight for the purpose of cooking food or for setting fire to ones neighbour's house; for that the sun cannot be held responsible.[4]

For instance when Zeno takes motion to be unreal, Parmenides takes Being as real, Plato holds universals alone as real or, in the same spirit, Śaṅkara maintains *jagat* as *māyā*, their views are to be judged at their respective contextual background. They all seem to have raised conceptual or logical issues about certain notions which ordinarily one does not find to be that important. The former, for instance, is not interested in the issue whether Mars has three or five moons. But his disinterestedness in

the issue does not stop the astronomer from investigating about the number of moon that Mars has. Similarly, the classical Indian philosophers' different views on time (even if those are very much different from the ordinary notion of time) have no clear impact on the issue of ahistoricity attributed to ancient India.

The Advaitins' advocacy of *māyā* is distinctly at a philosophical level. The ordinary notion of space and time is never challenged by the Advaita. The Advaitins (so also the dārśanikas of other schools) do have a *guru paramparā* (tradition of authoritative masters of particular philosophic standpoints) that is based on chronological factors. One can even say that the *guru paramparā* clearly reveals that the philosopher is aware of historical recording to a considerable extent and, as such, he cannot be blamed for the phenomenon of ahistoricity that is attributed. The dārśanikas move to different places to establish and popularize their point of view. All this could not have become possible if they would have rejected time and space in the actual setting. The issues which they raise about *avidyā/adhyāsa/māyā* are purely of conceptual significance. That, in no way, is designed to affect the empirical validity or factual significance of the spatio-temporal framework. If Bergson's concept of time as *duree* much different from the ordinary notion of time and McTaggart's view that time is unreal do not give rise to the revision or cancellation of historicity, then why the ancient Indian philosophers' point of view, specially the Advaita Vedāntins' talk of *māyā*, is held responsible in this regard is difficult to appreciate.[5]

It is said that in certain classical Indian philosophical source 'the ideal human type is outside time'.[6] But, if by 'the ideal human type' is meant *jīvan mukta*, then certainly that is not the case either at the Upaniṣadic stage or in the Advaita Vedānta context. In *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, it is clearly held that the *jīvan mukta* is he who is controller of all *kāmas* in the sense of sensuous desire/impulse, greed and attachment based on craving. He is very much in the world but not of the world as Hiriyanna remarked.[7] He never denies the empirical reality of space and time, only he is not too much concerned or attached with those in the egotistic sense. As Karl H. Potter says, he has maximum involvement with minimum attachment.[8] He has postulated a valuational framework which he seeks to concretize in the empirical living as far as possible and that is why *mukti* is advocated while one is alive. That means, it does not have trans-emipirical but empirical significance. In Vedāntic source, one indispensable feature

attributed to the *jīvan mukta* is: he is to work for the welfare of all without having any *moha* (delusion or improper attraction) and *vāsanā* (undesirable tendency or craving). In the *Gītā* it is said that the *mukta* is *sthitaprajña* who performs *lokasaṅgraha* (welfare of the people). If this is so, then how can the Vedānta be viewed as denying the empirical reality of space and time? Yes, *mukti* is declared as ultimate reality (*pāramārthika sattā*); but that, I think, is in terms of highest value (*parama śreyaḥ*) not cancelling the factual world of existential set up. It is rather directed towards the change of psychological attitude (*bhāvanā*) of craving. It strives to attain the state of balanced compositeness as much as possible under the situational set up.

What is said about the *jīvan mukta*, the same can also be advanced *mutatis mutandis* with regard to the Mādhyamika position that *nirvāṇa* is not different from *saṁsāra*.[9] For the Indian philosophical tradition, *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* as valuational ideal is, of course, not derived from the empirical source; but nevertheless, it is about the person here in full concreteness. Value is never sought to be dehumanized at least in the dārśanika frame of reference. *Mokṣa/nirvāṇa* as ideal value may be atemporal (to use Perrett's expression) but that has to be both recognized and pursued by men here in the worldly concrete setting. That is why there cannot be any such sharp radical opposition between empirical fact and transcendental value in the ancient Indian philosophical perspective. Values emulate and those are to be followed and practiced in the empirical setting. It is, of course, the case that Perrett has not accepted the thesis that Indian metaphysical theories concerning time or *māyā* affect historicity. But his reasons are primarily based upon showing certain incompatibilities found in the descriptive sources and not on the typical philosophical reasonings as pointed out here.

III

Then Perrett takes up the issue of the unchangeability of consciousness *vis-à-vis* the temporality of consciousness. He, in this connection, refers to the view of J.N. Mohanty. He agrees with Mohanty with a condition that many '—though by no means all—Hindu philosophers associate *ātman* with pure, non-intentional consciousness, a consciousness without a content'.[10] He further refers to the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophy showing that there one cannot bring the notion of non-intentional consciousness

and, as such, their metaphysical point of view cannot account for the lack of interest in historicity in such tradition. He also refers to the *Dharma Śāstra* and the Epics where *dharma* and *mokṣa* are regarded to be a continuous process and thus the sharp opposition between the atemporal ideal of *mokṣa* and the temporal ideal of *dharma* is set aside. So that is one more clear instance which he thinks goes against J.N. Mohanty's observation in this regard.

Now it is not known as to why, in general, it is held that 'for Hindu thought, consciousness is above change'.[11] The Nyāya, for instance, admits consciousness (*caitanya*) as an accidental property (*āgantuka dharma*) of *ātman*. It is associated with *ātman* so long it is bound by the atoms (*aṇu*). In the state of *apavarga* (note the Nyāya never uses the term: *mokṣa*) *ātman* withdraws itself from the atoms and also thereby consciousness (which is an emergent product of *ātman* being associated with *aṇu*) ceases. This account clearly reveals that, at least for the Nyāya metaphysical stand, consciousness never is viewed as unchanging and unintentional. So also *apavarga*, in that philosophical context, cannot mean atemporal since it is said to happen at a particular point of time when *ātman* becomes dissociated from *aṇu*.

It is not the case that all the so-called[12] orthodox Indian philosophical schools have accepted *mokṣa* as the ideal.[13] It is not that they have simply different notions of *ātman* but also their account of the ultimate ideal remains noticeably distinct. While for the Sāṇkhya, the ideal is only *atyanta duhkha nivṛtti* (absolute cessation of suffering) and that is termed as *kaivalya*, for the Vedāntins in general, it is *mukti* in the sense of attaining a positive state of bliss or *ānanda*. The term *mokṣa* has a typical doctrinal association only with the Śaṅkara Vedānta though in the later phase one finds the term being used in a broader sense, rather loosely. So also one finds the use of the word *nirvāṇa* (a typical concept of the Bauddha *darśana*) in both Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā treatises of a later period. For the Śaṅkara Vedānta, *mokṣa* is not a state to be attained anew. It is already there (*prāptasya prāpti*); only after the cessation of *avidyā/māyā/adhyāsa* it is revealed. That is why it is somewhere explained in terms of the analogy of solar and lunar eclipse. It is interesting to mark here that for the Bhakti Vedāntins even *mokṣa* is not aspired to. 'The *bhakta* keeps on saying to the Lord, it is enough for me to love you. I do not want the final fruit of *mokṣa*'.[14] Hence *kaivalya, apavarga, mokṣa* are, as a matter of

fact, presented as different ideals and to bring those all under one notion, *mokṣa* definitely appears misleading.

With regard to the ethical import of the orthodox darśanas, it is seen that *mukti* (which is treated as *mokṣa* in certain circles) as the ultimate value (*parama artha/śreya*) need not be construed as opposed to *dharma*. Mark: *artha* is used here not in the sense of wealth or object of possession, not an epistemic object of reference, not meaning of a word or sentence but as essence (*sāra*) or the preferable. True, *dharma* and *mokṣa* are distinguished in the context of *catuḥ-varga puruṣārtha*. The Advaitic reference to the distinction between *dharma* and *mokṣa* is to be understood contextually. *Dharma*, in the sense of mere performance of rites and rituals as prescribed in the *Pūrva Mīmāṁsa* is not approved. It is not accepted as necessary means for the attainment of Brahman. But there is absolutely no implication in the Advaita view that the person desirous of attaining *mokṣa* should be callous or indifferent to moral or ethical norms. If *dharma* is understood as the practice of moral value in a universal plane (not simply being confined to a narrow limit of particular individual's choice or a group's interest at the cost of others), then such meaning attributed to *dharma* is never opposed to the notion of *mokṣa*. It is, in this light, clear that in the Śaṇkara Vedānta, *mokṣa* is not antagonistic but is rather the outcome of *dharma* in the pervasive sense. It can also be maintained that *mokṣa* as *parama puruṣārtha* is this-worldly (*laukika*, otherwise the *jīvanmukta* would have been plainly impossible in that *dārśanika* framework) and it does not mean anything over and above the three other values (*artha, kāma* and *dharma*) but a proper harmonious and synthetic blending of the three values. And, in that sense, *mokṣa-prāpti* is obviously temporal (since it happens here and now within spatio-temporal dimension (*atra Brahma samasnute*) though *mokṣa,* as the ideal, remains as atemporal. It is not that *dharma* as ethical value can be construed as a means for *mokṣa* simply because moral value is itself *sui generis* and autonomous and is never in need of a sanction from another higher value. That is why *mokṣa* cannot be logically treated as recalcitrant to *dharma*.[15]

It seems then that the phenomenon of ahistoricity which is noticed in the context of ancient India cannot be treated as causally dependent on various metaphysical theories that are developed as *darśanas*. Perrett, however, has no disagreement with this stand; but his mode of arriving at this stand seems to be clearly different from mine and appears to be not quite forceful. Metaphysical positions have been developed in a different

plane by means of being shaped and regulated by some sort of philosophical logic and the criteria which are employed there need not have any clash with the criteria employed in the physical plane. It is true that the philosopher as metaphysician uses certain terms and expressions which are already in use in the physicalistic framework. But he uses them with a different signification to suit his own purpose so that a different *dṛṣṭi* or point of view emerges in the philosophic realm and that becomes perhaps conceptually illuminating.

IV

Perrett, then, moves on to establish his own view holding that ancient Indian philosophical theories developed in the epistemological front have definite bearing on the ahistoricity phenomenon. In this connection, he refers to *pramāṇavāda* (theory concerning the means of knowledge). *Pramāṇa*, according to him, stands both for evidence or justification of knowledge and also a metaphysical (causal) route to validate such justification of knowledge-claims. Since, at the moment, the discussion advanced by Perrett is at the epistemological front, one can set aside the metaphysical theorization. Now coming to the epistemological dimension of *pramāṇa*, Perrett goes by the popular prevailing view that the Cārvākas have admitted *pratyakṣa* (perception) as the only means of knowledge. Here it can be pointed out that at least the *suśik-ṣita* Cārvākas led by Purandara have accepted *anumāna* in addition to *pratyakṣa*. However, there is a condition that is laid down in that context. *Anumāna*, if it is formulated in this empirical (*laukika*) plane, i.e. to infer fire from smoke, then that process of reasoning is acceptable and there *vyāpti* is very well accommodated. But when inferential reasoning is moved from empirical to transempirical then such a mode of reasoning is not acceptable to the Cārvākas.[16] However, this is not a major issue at the present point of the discussion.

Then Perrett takes up the issue of memory (*smṛti*) not being accepted as a means of knowledge. He thinks that there are three reasons for that: (1) *smṛti* does not give novelty or newness; (2) knowledge is true by a way of corresponding to the object and in *smṛti* the corresponding object is not there; (3) *smṛti* is incapable of making its object known independently; it reveals object only through past impressions. In short, memory is not included under *pramāṇa* on the ground, it is not presentative (*anubhava*) but representative (*pratyānubhava*). In other words, it is not

new but repetitive in character. Perrett, it seems, is under the impression that avoidance of memory as a means of knowledge has perhaps guided the ancient Indian philosopher not to accept *itihāsa* as a *pramāna*. And the philosophical indifferent attitude towards *itihāsa* has caused a negative attitude towards historicity.

But, first of all, it is to be noted that in Indian epistemology, knowledge (*pramā*) is defined in terms of truth characteristic.[17] By verbal or linguistic ruling one cannot say that he knows but what he knows is false or is not there. Knowledge carries the sense of objectivity. (Note the Nyāya declaration: *pramā* is *yathārtha jñāna*.) This point is more or less accepted by other schools also (vide Śaṅkara's saying that *jñāna*, in the sense of *pramā*, is *vastutantra*). Then another condition is added with regard to *pramātva* (validity) by some, i.e. *anadhigatatva* (novelty). It is pointed out that knowledge is not only objective but it must be informative. It must be something more, i.e. it must enlighten us about something which we had not known about before. In other words, knowledge based on experience must be informative and carries the sense of objectivity. Roughly speaking, this formulation fulfils the criteria for all empirical knowledge and the empirical or synthetic statement is supposed to be true (in the sense of being objective) and is supposed to be informative or stating something new. If there is any doubt about the objective claim of any empirical knowledge-statement then, of course, there is scope for further investigation and scrutiny. And, if it is found that the knowledge-claim advanced in the statement is not upto the mark then the knowledge-claim is withdrawn. And, as such, the definition: the knowledge must be true and new remains intact.

Perrett apprehends that by excluding memory, the Indian epistemology has negative impact upon historical statements. Because historical statements depend upon memory of past records and events. If memory is not a source of knowledge then history by only repeating the past records cannot be a source of knowledge. But, I think, this apprehension is groundless. *Smṛti* as *adhigata* is not included under *pramāṇa* only in the scheme of *darśana*. It is the repetitive character of memory which does not at all become informative or revealing certain new facts or findings. That is why it (*smṛti*) is excluded so far as the definition of *pramā* is concerned. In historical records there is the description about the nation/political state, its ruling subjects, their social conditions etc. and the description is arranged in a chronological order. To put it simply, it is more or less a

faithful, objective record of the past. It is not repetitive in character because for the people (for whom it is composed) it becomes informative and illuminating. It is never like memory-statements. People do not know about the past by recollecting. They are rather informed about the past by the historical records. So, that becomes knowledge for them.

The Indian philosopher does not discuss *itihāsa* as a separate means of knowledge, in the sense that it is already covered under the accepted types of *pramāṇas*. One can even say, with certain specification, *itihāsa* can be subsumed under *anumāna*. Historians, finding different data, advance a cross-referential testing and whichever data are found to be commonly present through such type of testing, are taken as authentic and put as the valid record. So, in a specific sense, inferential tool is applied here. But *smṛti*, being repetitive to the person concerned, is not admitted as knowledge. If I remember that I went to Cuttack yesterday which in fact is true then really I do not now know anything but I simply repeat what I already knew. The memory statement points to my going to Cuttack which I already experienced. Yes, my memory-statement may be informative to someone else if he had no idea about my going to Cuttack yesterday. But, then, for him it is not a memory-statement, it is a statement of fact derived through my memory. It is worth noting here that though *purāṇa, itihāsa* etc. are not included under the category of *dārśanika pramāṇa*, those are, nevertheless, accepted as *vidyā* and are duly given recognition in the general Vedic source.

It may be relevant to point out here that the ancient Indian philosopher did not include *purāṇa* and *itihāsa* under *pramāṇa*. Because their purpose is only to carve out what, in their epistemic framework, is the minimum logical requirement for making a cognitive expression significant as *pramā* (or imparting knowledge). The investigation has precisely a logical mode. *Purāṇas* which mostly deal with mythical stories and legends are often a source of entertainment and may also be somewhat instructive from a socio-moral point of view; but, by all these, (those works) cannot be treated as imparting knowledge in the sense of informing about the objective phenomenon. So, sticking to that logical criterion, the Indian philosopher has moved on in his epistemological analysis. But, thereby, the independent growth and development of subjects like *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *rasa*, *jyotiṣa*, *nātya* and a host of other *vidyās* are not at all checked by the intellectual tradition (*bauddhica paramparā*).

Perrett, next, moves on to discuss and critically evaluate the status of *śabda pramāṇa*. He takes it for granted that *śabda pramāṇa* is 'taken to be the means for justifying the scriptural authority of the Vedas.'[18] Now here a point needs to be clarified. No doubt, for the Hindus (who, in certain circles, prefer to be addressed as *Sanātana dharmī*), the Vedas are the only fundamental religious source. Of course, the *Bh. Gītā*, though technically is classified as *smṛti*, is also treated as important as the Veda, because it has been created as containing the essence of the Veda for the entire mass. As people belonging to different religions have their own religious scripture and they have their full faith/belief in the sayings of their scripture, so also it goes with the Hindus as far as the Vedas are concerned. It is based on the frame of unquestionable faith. It is, in that context, immaterial for them whether the Vedas are composed by *Puruṣa* (here usually it is taken as *Īśvara* and is translated as God) or the Vedas are not composed by *Puruṣa/puruṣas* but are heard by the great seers (*ṛṣis*) of the past immemorial through certain divine source like Divine Commandment. So far, the religious adherence and commitment to the Vedic scripture is unconditional and unquestionable. There is absolutely no scope for any argumentation or critical thinking. Thus in religious frame-work, dogmatic adherence is a matter of appreciation and not depreciation.

But, in the field of Indian philosophy (*darśana*) and at the context of epistemology (*jñāna-mīmāṁsā*), when one comes across the issue of knowledge (*pramā*) and its justification (*prāmāṇikatā*), these matters cannot be taken up or settled without prior critical analysis (*samikṣā*) and logical argumentation (*sutarka*).[19] If perception (*pratykṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) etc. are advanced with the support of certain rational frame-work, then there is no plausible sense as to why the same criterion of rationality be not applicable to *śabda/śruti* while it is treated as a *pramāṇa*. Indeed the Mīmāṁsakas (both *Pūrva* and *Uttara*, as *dārśanikas*, have given primary importance to the Vedas. Quite often, it is found that they have given citations from *śruti* or the Vedic sources (*iti śruteḥ*). Both the Vedāntins (including the Śaṁkarites) and the *Pūrva* Mīmāṁsakas have taken this approach. But here a point is also to be noted. While a Vedāntin, for instance, quotes *śruti* in support of his point of view, he does that only insofar as that particular portion which is found in agreement with his philosophical position. And he sets aside other *śruti* passages that do not favour his point of view, either saying those are loose expressions not to

be taken seriously or those are not of ultimate significance. In this context, the dispute between *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* Brahmavādins is worth noting. When there are some descriptions about Brahman available in the Vedāntic sources, the *nirguṇavādin* (who can never accommodate any *guṇa* or attribute to Brahman by his own logical framework) maintains that such Vedāntic expressions refer only to *vyavahāra* (practical convenience) not to *paramārtha* (ultimate significance). On the contrary, a *saguṇa Brahmavādin* emphasizes only on such Vedāntic expressions to justify his stand which support the view that Brahman is *guṇayukta* and not *guṇaśūnya* (devoid of qualities). And, whenever there is found a Vedāntic passage only referring to Brahman as devoid of any quality (*neti neti*), the *saguṇa-vādin* does not feel shy to hold that such expressions only mean exclusion of bad (*manda*) qualities (meaning thereby the good qualities do refer to Brahman). Such philosophers, it is clear, are not basically interested to justify *sruti*; their primary or perhaps sole aim is to establish the validity of their own philosophy (either the Advaita or the Viśiṣṭādvaita and so on) on independent logical ground. *Śruti* is taken into cognizance almost as an initial starter. It is needless to say that *tarka* (intellectual debate in the sense of *bauddhica vicāraṇā*) plays a vital role in the classical Indian philosophizing. In this connection, the well-known maxim '*vāde vādena jāyāte tattva bodhaḥ*' (i.e., philosophical viewpoint can be accomplished through intellectual debate alone) is quite pertinent.

This will suffice I think, to indicate that the philosopher or *darśanajña* (not religionist) is not at all committed to the unconditional acceptance of the Vedas. He is with the Vedas only to the extent they support of his *dārśanika* stand. *Śruti* has a tremendous deep-rooted establishment in the dharmic psyche. Therefore, certain *darśanajñas* (like the Mīmāṁsakas—both *Pūrva* and *Uttara*) have preferred not to hurt the sentiment of the popular mass and have tried to accommodate the Vedas as far as possible, i.e., so long as their point of view does not clash with that. But, there are also occasions when they do not feel hesitant to throw scriptural affinity and stand independently. In this connection, Śaṅkara's cautious remark that a thousand *śruti vākyas* cannot change a pot to a piece of cloth is worth considering. Take the case of the Sāṅkhyas. They have accepted *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*. But their interpretation is clearly not scriptural (*avaidica*). Vācaspati, while commenting on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, has unambiguously defined *sruti pramāṇa* as *vākya janitam, vākyārtha jñānam*.[20] It means knowledge of the sentential meaning arrived at through

the analysis of sentence. In other words, *śruti/śabda pramāṇa* is the method of logico-linguistic analysis. It is not the knowledge of object (*artha*) but the knowledge of language-meaning (*vākyārtha*) which is obtained by the method of language analysis. It is, to put it another way, the knowledge of word and not of the world.

Even, in case of the Nyāya *darśana,* the term: *āpta* seems to have been misrendered as 'trustworthy expert'.[21] The issue of trust or no trust is a psychological point that occurs at a specific context. Suppose Mr. X is already accepted as a great authority on ancient Indian history. His findings and observations are found to have been accepted so far on the basis of probability of high degree. So on the next occasion, if he spells out some further new observations concerning ancient past then, prima facie, his observations are very likely to be trusted on the basis of his past successful record. True, this is perfectly sound. But supposing what he observes now is countered by a fresh new scholar who is not so much authoritatively established in the concerned field, but the scholar's observations are grounded on more relevant data and records. Then, in that case, normally the expertize and trustworthiness so far attributed to Mr. X can no longer justify his observations to be acceptable. That means, *prāmāṇikatā* depends upon the correct account of description of the point/state-of-affairs as it is, not upon trustworthiness. Perhaps this is the notable basis because of which the Nyāya has justifiably defined *āpta* as *yathārtha vaktā* (the person making a true statement). And truth of the statement lies not on the speaker but on the correct description of the point at issue.[22] So here the question of justifying Vedic or scriptural utterances as trustworthy seems to be at least beyond the scope of *dārśanika vicāra* (philosophic consideration).

Perhaps this is the reason why the Naiyāyikas have deliberately introduced *laukika śābda* and, even there, they move to the extent of asserting that anybody can be treated as *śābdika pramātā* or *āpta* irrespective of his credency or past record provided what he claims is found to be objective and true. That means justification of a knowledge-claim depends on the true account of the situation and not otherwise.[23] In that case, the whole point boils down to either perception or inference. If it is about the present situation, then perception is the final deciding point and if it is about past or future then inference can be made applicable. That implies *śabda*, as a *pramāṇa*, can no longer be understood as testimony either in the secular or in the *Vaidika* sense. For, in the latter case also, even if it is said that

the Vedas are composed by God, there is no independent way of verifying that except accepting those being God's utterances and as such, can never be false; that is done again not by independent reasoning but by simple faith on divine source. All these discussions reveal that the Nyāya account of *śabda pramāṇa* cannot be rendered in terms of authoritativeness. Since the Nyāya accepts it as an independent *pramāṇa*, other than perception, *anumāna* etc., it is understood differently in the same scale and never as trustworthy statement derived from scripture. It can be rather placed as a means for verbal or linguistic knowledge as per the Nyāya logical framework. In this line (similar to that of the Sāṅkhya), the Nyāya takes *vākyārtha jñana* into prominence and even moves forward to place certain conditions for meaningful employment of linguistic expressions, i.e. *ākānkṣyā, yogyatā, sannidhi* and *tātparya*. These conditions are nothing but syntactical and semantic conditions that the words or sentences must adhere to in order to be meaningful and communicative. If this aspect of the Nyāya epistemology is well taken into consideration, then the Nyāya account of *śabda pramāṇa* can be well rendered as the method of logico-linguistic analysis towards the meaning of the discourse. *Yathārthatā*, in that context, may fruitfully signify the correct presentation of the concerned meaning. Adherence to the Vedic statement is perhaps granted out of courtesy, only to satisfy the popular religious sentiment, so also bringing the concept of *Īśvara* in the later Nyāya phase to accommodate the theistic longing.

Perrett has referred to the case of *aitihya* (tradition).[24] Yes, *aitihya* is not accepted as a *pramāṇa* but not simply by the Nyāya; rather by all schools of the classical Indian philosophy. They all reject it on the ground that simply on mere belief if something has been accepted because it is handed down since generations, it cannot be treated as knowledge; it needs to be independently investigated, examined and tested.[25] Both the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya are almost on the same line so far as this point is concerned, and that is why they cannot accept the Vedas as authentic. They, therefore, have their independent line of formulations. The later Nyāya, as pointed out before, accommodated the Vedic utterances because of those being the utterances of Īśvara for extra epistemological considerations, to satisfy the theistic craving. But so far as *prāmāṇikatā* is concerned, *aitihya* and the Veda seem to be not on different footings unless one is not prepared to disown a dogmatic bias.

In case of Śaṅkara Vedānta too, there have already been attempts at interpreting *śabda pramāṇa* as not scriptural authority but some sort of logico-linguistic analysis.[26] Whatever may be the fate of such new enterprise, one thing seems at least clear in the context of classical Indian epistemology that *śabda* or *śruti* can never mean unconditional acceptance of the Vedas on the basis of sheer faith. That can never be possible so long as one regards *śruti* as a *pramāṇa* in the context of *yathārtha jñāna* or *pramā*. It must be based on independent reasoning like any other epistemic *pramāṇas*. There is a clear distinction between the Vedas being accepted as unconditional gospel truth in the dharmic circle and certain Vedic lines and passages as justifiable on *dārśanika* or philosophical ground. To miss this vital distinction is to invite vagueness and unclarity.

Perrett has referred to the episodic use of the term 'know' in the context of Indian epistemology.[27] True, the word 'knowledge' has variety of usage. In certain cases it is used as occurent word; in others it is used as disposition. In some cases it is used ostensively and in some others it is used performatively. To know Kalidas is not the same as to know how to cycle. I do not think the ancient Indian epistemologist is unaware of this analytical subtlety or he does not find different uses significant. But when he goes on to assess the validity of justification of knowledge, he emphasizes on *yathārthatā* and then, in that context, *yathārthatā* can be rendered both in terms of product-objectivity and even process-objectivity. Knowing how to cycle means having the capacity to ride the cycle. And that can be displayed. If there is a demand, knowledge, in that case, means the ability to display and it can be tested if so required. The very process of cycling itself is taken here as *artha* or object. The term 'object' need not necessarily be understood as meaning a static entity.

Now, summing up the discussion, it can be pointed out that Perrett has established the point that there is clear evidence of history in ancient India. He is also right in holding that there is no clear show of historiography or scientific history in the ancient Indian source. It can be supplemented, in this connection, that not only in case of history but also in many other areas like geography, economics, political science and other such allied social sciences, ancient India, had no clear evidence of methodological studies. But it is not sufficient to conclude from this that the Indians of the past had no knowledge of these subjects or they did not value studying these subjects. In fact, the ancient Indians, because of their acquiring skill in navigation moved not only towards south-east Asian

countries like Ceylon, Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia but even to South America through the Pacific Ocean to establish the Maya civilization there (as some forcefully claim). They had regular maritime trade activities in the eastern part of India, i.e., Bengal, Orissa, Andhra and Tamil Nadu. So, on the basis of this, it can be held that geographical studies and trade including commerce were doubtlessly within their reach. And they did value all these areas of study and learning including history. It is, therefore, not correct to say that for ancient Indians historical interpretation belongs to 'a zero category'.[28] History was valued but the continuous study either in history or in other similar branches of learning as referred to above could not be carried out and the whole enterprise was not sustained primarily because of lack of socio-economic conditions that remained for centuries together due to political oppression. Not only history, geography, economics, trade and commerce but even in other fields like mathematics, literature, grammar and inclusive of philosophy where impressive amount of scholarship belonging to their past readings are found to have been properly evidenced, the continuous and systematic growth or development were not possible due to factors already indicated here. At all stages of foreign rule, there has been perpetual oppression of indigenous learning in all branches and its prominent specimen became noticeable in the British rule, when the teachers appointed in Sanskrit toles (pāthasālās), teaching different disciplines in original Sanskrit were very low-paid and were looked down upon in contrast to the teachers who were appointed in English medium schools and colleges for Indological Studies (like Sanskrit, Philosophy etc.) having mostly a second-hand knowledge about such subjects through undependable English translations.

So, for the phenomenon of ahistoricity, it is not prudent enough to find its source in the ancient philosophical studies. Philosophical discussions carried on in the past, at least to my mind, are in no way responsible for this intellectual lacuna. *Darśana* has not been adequately studied in an independent manner carefully, discriminating it from the religious and theological hangovers. This is neither good for *darśana* nor also for *dharma*. *Dharma* (in the sense of religion) always strives to move beyond the present state of existence in some way or other. If the ancient Indians found human life to be full of sorrows and sufferings, the Christians for instance found it as bound with sin and aspired for atonement. *Dharma* tries to build a framework of faith and belief in the supernatural realm of divinity where the human soul may find its solace and fulfilment. But, in

darśana different concepts with which a human being has his empiric transaction are analyzed in a logical and systematic procedure, so that surface-level ambiguity is set aside and depth-level clarity is attained in the conceptual framework. Whether he is successful or not remains an open issue. But, in any case, philosophical theories, either in the areas of metaphysics or in epistemology, it seems, have little (either positive or negative) impact in the historical studies.[29]

Notes and References

1. Vide Perrett's article (under reference), p. 312.
2. Vide different *abdhas* (temporal eras) introduced by the Hindu kings, emperors, referring to their own dynasties. In this connection, vide D.C. Sirkar's significant work: *Indian Epigraphy,* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965.
3. Ibid., p. 314.
4. Vide, in this connection, Vinoba Bhave's view in his *Talks on the Gītā*, London: Ruskin House, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Museum Street, 1960, p. 63.
5. Here, by the Indian philosophical point of view, only the dārśanika sources (*śāstras*) are meant and not the sources of the Hindu or Jaina or Bauddha religion.
6. Op. cit., (Perrett) p. 314.
7. Vide his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*; London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958, p. 297.
8. Vide his *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies,* Delhi: E.E.C., Prentice Hall of India (Private) Ltd., 1965.
9. 'The limits of *nirvāṇa* are the limits of *saṁsāra*. Between the two there is not the slightest difference whatsoever (*Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā*, 25: 20). This is also cited by Perrett; but not with the emphasis of this interpretation.
10. Op. cit., (Perrett) p. 315.
11. Vide J.N. Mohanty: *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 190–92 (also referred to by Perrett, p. 315).
12. I have deliberately used the term 'so-called' in case of orthodox schools because the criterion which is employed for dividing the schools into orthodox and heterodox is not consistently adhered to while enlisting different schools under *āstika* (orthodox) type. For instance, the Sāṅkhya clearly repudiates authority of the Vedas (*anuśrava)*—vide the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*-2 of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The Vaiśeṣikas do not admit the Vedas as authentic. The Nyāya and even the Yoga darśanas like the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣikas have their independent origin (as founded by Gautama, Patanjali) and, as such, never claim Vedic support or allegiance.
13. Note Perrett's remark, op. cit., p. 315.

14. Vinoba Bhave: *Talks on the Gītā*, op. cit., p. 263.
15. For a further discussion of this point, see my latest book: *Perspectives of Value in Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2000.
16. For this, see S.N. Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. III (Delhi edn.) 1975, p. 536 and also my paper: 'Śabda Pramāṇa from the Cārvāka Point of View' published in *Perspectives in Contemporary Philosophy* (Ed. D.K. Chakravarty) Delhi: Ajanta Books, 1998.
17. Vide Perrett, op. cit., p. 318.
18. Ibid., p. 318.
19. *Sutarka* is to be carefully distinguished from *śuṣka ṭarka* (dry logic chopping or bare argumentation) which is primarily engaged in argument for the sake of argument without aiming at arriving at a valid point. It resembles, to some extent, with *vitaṇḍā*.
20. For the Sāṅkhya's account of *śruti pramāṇa* see my book: *Analytical Studies in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy*, Bhubaneswar: Utkal University, 1977 and also my work: *Indian Philosophy, An Analytical Study,* Delhi, Ajanta Books International, 1980.
21. Perrett, op. cit., p. 319.
22. Here Nyāya's '*tadvati tat prakārakam jñānam pramā*' may be noted.
23. It may be noted here, the analytical philosopher John Hospers has said that an authority can at best be said as a secondary source of knowledge but not primary because ultimately the truth of the statement of an authoritative person depends upon the true account of the concerned fact and not on the authoritative record of the person concerned. See his *Introduction to Philosophical Analysis,* New Delhi: Allied Publishers Ltd., 12th reprint, 1998, p. 136.
24. Ibid., p. 319.
25. It is interesting to note here that in the sphere of history also one does not simply rely on the record just available from the source of the past. It too independently scrutinizes the validity of the claim of that record by way of critically comparing with other sources already available and then applying the principle of general consistency arrives at a probable conclusion that is valid for all practical purposes. Vide, in this connection, Vācaspati's critical remark on *aitihya* in his *Tattva-kaumudi* (Tr. Professor G. Jha), Pune: Poona Oriental Series, No. 10, 1965.
26. Vide, in this connection, G. Misra: *Language, Reality and Analysis,* New York: E.J. Brill, 1990 and his: *The Advaita Conception of Philosophy—Its Method, Scope and Limits*, Bhubaneswar: 1976 and also my review of the same in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* Poona: Vol. VI, No. 4, 1979. Vide also G.C. Nayak: *Philosophical Reflections,* Delhi: ICPR publication through Motilal Banarsidass, 1987. It is, however, to be noted that while G. Misra is the pioneer in interpreting *śabda pramāṇa* as only logico-linguistic analysis and treats Śaṅkara to be an analyst having the basis of revisionary metaphysics,

G. Nayak takes *śabda pramāṇa* as logico-linguistic analysis with some reservations. He is not prepared to treat the term *śruti* in Śaṅkara Vedānta, on all occasions, as meaning logico-linguistic analysis. In some cases, the term refers to the Vedic utterances also, despite the very presence of analysis of language (*vākyārtha vicāraṇā*) in other contexts.

27. Ibid., pp. 319–20.
28. Gerald James Larson's views on this issue, quoted by Perrett, ibid., p. 311.
29. I have written this paper while I was a visiting Professor to Paris under the Indo-French Cultural Exchange Programme in 2000. I am grateful to the Foundation de la Maison des Sciences de L'Homme for providing me necessary facilities and allowing me to utilize the MSH library.

BIJAYANANDA KAR

Professor of Philosophy (Retd.)
House No. AM/26, VSS Nagar
Bhubaneswar 751 004, India

Can *Upamāna* be Regarded as a '*Svatantra Pramāṇa*' in Nyāya System

The subject of this note is to show that though *upamāna* is accepted as a *svatantra pramāṇa* in the Nyāya system yet, the way it is developed in the commentaries, we find no place left for its 'independence'.

Among the Naiyāyikas, Bhāsarvajña (AD 950) was the first who realized this problem and 'dared' to include *upamāna* in *śabda pramāṇa*. Surprisingly, the subsequent commentators of the *Nyāya Sūtras*, despite Bhāsarvajña's indication exposing this problem, overlooked it and kept an explicating and expanding the definition of *upamāna*, as given in the *Nyāya Sūtras*, in a way which complicated the problem further rather than resolving it.

Gautama, in his *Nyāya Sūtra*, does not give any criteria explicitly for the independence of a *pramāṇa* but this is indirectly indicated in the denial of *Aitihya*, *Arthāpatti*, *Sambhava* and *Abhāva* as separate independent *pramāṇas*. In sutra 2.2.2 he clearly admits that any *pramāṇa* which is reducible to some other *pramāṇa* or *pramāṇas* cannot be regarded as a separate independent *pramāṇa*, 'शब्दऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावादनुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तर भावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः' Here he denies the status of *Aitihya* as a *svatantra pramāṇa* on the basis that it is reducible to *śabda pramāṇa* and *Arthāpatti*,

Sambhava and *Abhāva* also can not be accepted as separate independent *pramāṇas* because they are reducible to *Anumāna pramāṇa*. (For detailed discussion see *Pramāṇa Chatuṣtva Parīkṣā* in 2.2.) So, keeping this discussion in view, it can be legitimately said that according to *Nyāya Sūtra* a *pramāṇa* can not be regarded as independent if it is 'dependent' on other *pramāṇas* or is incorporated in other *pramāṇas*.

The commentaries on *Nyāya Sūtra* do accept this denial of *Aitihya* etc. as *svatantra pramāṇa* on the grounds given by Gautama, but their treatment of *upamāna pramāṇa* appears to involve contradictions in their discussion as, though they agree with Gautama's criterion for independence of a *pramāṇa*, yet they accept the role of *pratyakṣa*, *śabda* and even *saṁskāra*, *smṛti* in the process of *upamāna* while explicating the definition of *upamāna* given by Gautama.

Firstly, Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* may be seen as he seems to be the initiator of this whole controversy. The *Sūtrakāra* defines *upamāna* as 'प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्' (1.1.6) which simply means that the knowledge by *upamāna* is that which is accomplished by some *prasiddha* similarity. What is meant by *prasiddha* exactly is a matter of separate discussion but it is clear that every similarity can not be accepted as the *sādhya* of *upamāna* unless it fulfils some condition or conditions which is referred to by the term *prasiddha*.

Vātsyāyana, in his *bhāṣya*, elaborates this definition but in his elaboration he, surprisingly, introduces other *pramāṇas* as essential, integral parts of *upamāna*. In his own words, 'यथा गौरेवंगवय इत्युपमाने प्रयुक्ते गवासमानधर्मम् अर्थम् *इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात्* उपलभमानो अस्य गवय शब्दः संज्ञेति संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्ध प्रतिपद्यते इति।' (Bhāṣya on Sūtra 1.1.6, p. 13 Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, ICPR, New Delhi). If this form of *upamāna* is accepted, we can say that *upamāna* includes two steps: (i) hearing or reading the similarity statement, and (ii) actual sense contact with the object to be known, that is, *gavaya*, and that would mean including *pratyakṣa*, which is the other independent *pramāṇa* and the *pratyakṣa* too, is to be of the object which is to be known by *upamāna*. Vātsyāyana, here, escapes the obvious question that when the object to be known is already 'available to one's senses' (इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षात् उपलभमानो) why can it not be regarded as perception because, according to Nyāya, perception is when there is sense contact between the object to be known and the knower? 'इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षात् उत्पद्यते यज्ज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम्' (Bhāṣya on Sūtra 1.1.4).

The arguments of Vātsyāyana and other commentators to 'free' *upamāna* from this defect are quite unsatisfactory as they seem to miss the crux of the matter. What they try to do is only to prove that '*upamāna* is different from *pratyakṣa*' and in order to prove this, they give the obvious argument that in this case *saṁjñā*, that is, name is supplied by previously heard statement as Vācaspati Miśra I writes, 'न च वाक्यं विना प्रत्यक्षमात्रात्' (p. 163, Tīkā on Sūtra 1.1.6). But, they did not even try to deal with the 'real' problem of the 'role' of *pratyakṣa*. The basic question as to why it does not affect the independence of *upamāna*, remains unanswered. The only effort in this direction, though not satisfactory, is that of Vācaspati Miśra who tries to bring out the role that *pratyakṣa* plays in *upamāna*. He argues that in this case what one perceives is the 'similarity with cow' and not the *gavaya* which is the object to the known by *upamāna*. In his words, 'गवयशब्दवाच्यतया प्रत्यक्षदृश्यमानगोसादृशस्य गवयत्वसामान्यविशेषवतः पिण्डस्य प्रज्ञापनमुपमानम्।' (p. 162, Ṭīkā on Sūtra 1.1.6). But, as one can see it does not help to resolve the difficulties as similarity is taken as a quality or dharma as Vātsyāyana said, 'गवासमानधर्मम्' (Bhāṣya on 1.1.6, p. 13, Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, ICPR, Delhi) and if the *artha* or object which possesses the quality of 'being similar to cow' is not *gavaya* then what else it can be? And, it will be meaningless to assert that here, one perceives the quality and not the object to which the quality belongs. Vātsyāyana has himself clearly written in this regard, 'यदा खल्वयं गवासमानधर्मम् प्रतिपद्यते, तदा प्रत्यक्षतः तमर्थं प्रतिपद्यत इति।' (Bhāṣya on 1.1.6).

Thus, we can legitimately say that the whole problem arises from the fact that the Vātsyāyana had introduced perception as a necessary condition in the very definition of *upamāna* and left no way to exclude it completely so that it, that is, *upamāna* could be established as an 'independent' *pramāṇa*.

After Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra I posed more serious problems for the independence of *upamāna* as a *pramāṇa* in the Nyāya tradition. Uddyotakara, while elaborating the concept of *upamāna* writes, '*आगमाहित संस्कारस्मृत्यपेक्षं* सारुप्यज्ञानम् उपमानम्। यदा हि अनेन श्रुतं भवति यथा गौरेवं गवय इति प्रसिद्धे गोगवयसाधर्म्ये *पुनर्गवयसाधर्म्यं पश्यति प्रत्यक्षम्*। ततस्तस्य भवत्ययं गवय इति।' (Vārtika on 1.1.6). One can very well imagine the 'independence' of *upamāna* as a *pramāṇa* after the acceptance of such constituent elements as *smṛti*, *saṁskāra*, *āgama*, etc. in it. Also, here the term

'*āgama*' is puzzling as generally it refers to the authoritative non-vedic texts in the Indian tradition.

The other subsequent commentator, Vācaspati Miśra too does not lag behind in complicating the matter further as he writes: 'सा च यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति *आप्तवाक्यात्*' (p. 162, tika on 1.1.6).

It is surprising to find such 'strange' statements as quoted above in the whole Nyāya-system on the one hand, and an attempt to establish the independence of *upamāna* on the other, without seeing the contradictions involved therein. All the individual contributions to elaborate the concept of *upamāna* exist but none of these raise any objection against these statements which in fact weakens the *upamāna's* foundation.

A reference to one more prominent Naiyāyika during the period from Vātsyāyana to Vācaspati Miśra seems 'essential' in this context, namely, Jayanta. Jayanta's discussion on *upamāna* is quite interesting as he seems to make some new points. Firstly, he clearly distinguishes between the old Naiyāyika and neo-Naiyāyika concept of *upamāna*. According to him for the old Naiyāyikas *upamāna* is, 'सारुप्यप्रतिपादकमतिदेशवाक्यमेवोपनानम्' in which a person is only told that '*gavaya* is like cow' (p. 128, Nyāya Mañjari, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1936). It is the new naiyāyika who introduces *pratyakṣa*, *śabda* and *smṛti* in it, अद्यतनास्तु व्याचक्षते श्रुतादिदेशवाक्यस्य प्रमातुरप्रसिद्धे पिण्डे प्रसिद्धपिण्डसारुप्यज्ञानमिन्द्रियजं संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिफलमुपमानम् ... वनेचरपुरुषकथितं यथागौस्तथागवय इति वचनमनुस्मरति स्मृत्वा च प्रतिपद्यते अयं गवयशब्दवाच्य इति। (Ibid., p. 129). But like his predecessors, he also did not raise the question of the 'role' of *pratyakṣa* and *smṛti* in the process of *upamāna*. Instead, in order to provide it more support he tries to show the utility of *upamāna* in the *mokṣa-śāstra* (Ibid., p. 132).

If we closely examine the whole discussion from Vātsyāyana to Udayana, we find that all of them seem to confuse two separate but related issues. The first contention is that *upamāna* is not a *svatantra pramāṇa* because it is a type of *pratyakṣa* only and the second is that *upamāna* is not a *svatantra pramāṇa* because *pratyakṣa* is 'necessarily' involved in its very definition. While discussing the independence of *upamāna* or its difference from *pratyakṣa*, they all discuss the first issue, that is, *upamāna* is nothing but *pratyaksa* only and in their denial they think that they have established *upamāna* as a *svatantra pramāṇa*. We have seen that Jayanta's discussion in this regard along with Vātsyāyana, Uddhyotakara, etc. who also treat the matter in a similar way. None of them attend to the

fundamental problem that *upamāna*'s independence is basically challenged by the fact that they are accepting *pratyakṣa* etc. as a necessary constituting step in it. Here, one should not take the fact that the *hetu* in *anumāna* is also necessarily to be perceived as, in that case the object to be known, that is, fire remains 'unperceived' throughout the process of knowing by *anumāna*. As far as *dṛṣṭānta* is concerned that also does not involve the *pratyakṣa* of that 'particular' fire which is being known by *anumāna* but rather other instances of fire in general. So, in spite of the fact that perception is necessarily involved in *anumāna*, it remains an 'independent' *pramāṇa*.

Thus, in the light of the above discussion, the Naiyāyikas should either establish *upamāna* on different, stronger grounds in such a way that it need not incorporate other *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa*, *śabda*, etc. in it or give up its acceptance as a '*svatantra*' *pramāṇa* as Bhāsarvajña did, who included it in *śabda pramāṇa*.

Bhāsarvajña (AD 950) did not pose the problem in the same way but at least he seems to realize that the form in which the Naiyāyikas had developed *upamāna*, till his time, had not left any independence for it. He argues that 'यथा गौस्तथा गवय' is in the form of a sentence so it should be included in *śabda* and if on the ground of its being a 'different type of sentence' it is regarded a separate *pramāṇa* then *vidhi-vakya* or *arthavāda*, etc. should also be considered in the same way (p. 417, Nyāya Bhūṣaṇa, Saddarsana Prakasana Pratisthana, Varanasi, 1965). Not only this, he also argues for his agreement with the 'real' contention of *sūtrakāra*.

In any case, it is not possible to discuss here all the arguments and counter arguments in this regard within the Nyāya system. But, it would suffice to say that after reflecting upon the statements of the various Naiyāyikas, the present Naiyāyikas should accept that their definition of *upamāna* needs a restatement if it is to be regarded as a *svatantra pramāṇa*.

6/76 S.F.S. Agrawal Farm
Mansarovar, Jaipur, Rajasthan 302 020.

RACHANA SHARMA

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya on *Swaraj in Ideas*: Some Problems and Reflections

I

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) has emphasized on the fact that if one's mind is confined within one's culture, it is called 'cultural subjection'. The cultural subjection is possible when one's traditional ideas are superseded without comparison or competition by 'new cast' representing a foreign culture. This culture subjection is nothing but 'the slavery of spirit' according to KCB. This assimilation should not be taken as an evil, but it may positively be necessary for a healthy progress and it does not mean a lapse of freedom. When he forsakes this and becomes open-minded, he suddenly discovers himself in a 'new form' which is compared to his 'rebirth'. This so-called rebirth is Swaraj in *Ideas*.[1]

KCB has tried to raise some questions about our stated broad-mindedness or attitude towards western culture and education. How far have we assimilated our western education and how far does it operate as an obsession? As far as the former is concerned, some of us have obviously assimilated the alien culture after an interaction made possible by an 'open mind'. It cannot be said that the ideas existing in western culture are simply imposed on our 'unwilling mind', rather we had asked for this. An assimilation of the alien culture occurred after considering its main spirit by means of our Indian mind.[2]

It is also true that some of us do not welcome or resist the new ideas of the alien culture. If this be the case, there is no vital assimilation. In spite of this, the new ideas, as KCB observed, indirectly or silently influence our mind and they are 'imaginatively realized'. As these ideas come from the rich and strong life of the West, they induce in us a 'shadow mind' which acts like a real mind except in the matter of genuine creativeness. The possession of such a 'shadow mind' is not the chief aim of the persons belonging to India. They should enjoy the distinctive Indian contribution in the fields of philosophy, literature, etc. to the culture of modern world with the help of an open-interaction of ideas of the West, though the Indians should retain their '*vernacular mind*'. But unfortunately, such an open-interaction of ideas did not occur much among Indians. That is why, a prescription for the critical judgement of other ideas existing in the alien culture is inevitable to attain a *Swaraj in Ideas*.[3] On

account of exposure to world movements and a fair acquaintance with the principles of western life and thought our own position is not completely defined. Hence, we either accept or repeat those ideas which the western thinkers have expressed judgements on. We generally feel bitter without any proper reason, and we do not have any assessment of our own.[4]

An interaction between eastern and western ideas is possible through effective contact which comes into being only through philosophy. In Indian philosophy, the synthesis of Indian and western thought is hardly to be found as from the standpoint of Indian philosophy there exists nothing like judgement on western systems. On the other hand, some critical appreciation of Indian philosophy has been made from the western standpoint. If modern Indian philosophers are to philosophize at all, it will give rise to confrontation between Indian and western thought. Hence their is an attempt to 'synthesize or a reasoned rejection of either'.

Modern scholars alone can undertake the task of discovering the soul of India, and the task of realizing the Mission of India through philosophizing. The same job is accomplished by genius through art. So far our education has not proved helpful in understanding ourselves, the significance of our past and our mission in future. Because our real mind is driven out and replaced by a 'shadow mind' that is not rooted in our past.[5]

The 'hybridization of ideas' attained through education and the influence of western institutions on our life creates distress in our present situation, which can be compared with *Varṇasaṁkara* as depicted by the Hindus. The idea of one culture cannot chiefly be translated into another cultural language. Though it is true yet there is room for '*an adjustment and synthesis*' within limits of different cultures and ideals. We have to change ourselves to match the situation. It there is a case for patchwork without adjustment or with a mechanical adjustment, it is described as an evil by KCB, as no ideal demands entire devotion. If different ideals of the East and West are taken into account for the purpose of synthesization, it is not to be taken as evil.

It is not true that a synthesis of our ideals with those of the West is always required in every case. There are some ideals of the West which may be respected from a distance without having a special relevance for us. There may be some western ideals which have a partial effect or appeal for us due to their affinity with those of ours. If the said synthesis is demanded, the foreign ideals are to be assimilated with our own but not

vice-versa without surrendering our individuality (*Svadharme nidhanain śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ*).[6]

If there can be found a method or a beautiful way of expression for our own ideals, it has to be accepted. It would be totally unreasonable to disregard it simply on the ground that it has its origin in a foreign country. Such cases are not to be taken as the surrender of individuality. A foreign god has to be regarded as our own just as we regard our *guru* without considering his community. We can show regard or appreciate the new ideal if it is considered through our actual ideal or our old reverence. The ideas found in foreign language are to be understood if they are expressed in our own language. In order to reject and accept a foreign idea a genuine translation into our ideas is needed. To achieve *Swaraj in Ideas* it is necessary to break the barrier of new caste, to come back to the culture of the real Indian people and evolve a culture along with them suited to the native genius.[7]

In order to attain this stage we should possess a mind which can respect and accommodate foreign culture by its expansion capacity. Here KCB has referred to three types of mind: shadow mind, vernacular mind and mind after the attainment of *Swaraj* in ideas. When an individual's mind attains *rebirth* by way of the attainment of *Swaraj* in ideas, the vernacular mind is not lost, but remains as 'luminous' due to the retention of individuality. The superficial influence of the foreign culture on human mind gives rise to 'shadow mind', which is completely lost after the attainment of *Swaraj*.

II

From the coinage of the term '*Swaraj*', KCB perhaps wants to convey that at this stage our minds retain their 'own forms' which is otherwise called by him as 'self-determination'. This *Swarāj* is the actual nature of a man regained through the interaction with other cultures. Through this an individual can evaluate himself and defend his position. As a consequence he becomes proud of monarchy in ideas not being a slave to others. A monarch remains in his kingdom encountering the rivals with courage without losing his individuality. In a like manner, if our minds can assimilate other cultures through interaction without being slave to it, it attains monarchy in the domain of ideas where there is no room for narrowness

or *kūpamaṇḍūpatā*. The power or boldness attained through a broad mind can provide us self-determination or *Swaraj* in the true sense of the term.

It seems to me that Professor Prasad has slightly misunderstood KCB's position. He states—

> behind Bhattacharyya's (or any one else's) insistence on the importance of synthesising Indian (or Eastern) and Western thought, there exists his unavowed or undeclared belief in the superiority of western thought and culture. Indian thinking has to assimilate and synthesise Western thinking, its *svarāj* has to be judged in terms of its relationship with the latter.[8]

I believe this is not a correct assessment of KCB's position. KCB has emphasized the phenomenon of assimilation of Indian and western thought *not* because he thinks western thought and culture is superior but as he believes that, unless our own culture is adjudged in comparison to that of the West, it is not exhibited as something having its own self-luminous properties (*svadharma*). It is self-governed (*svarāja*) as it is governed by its instrinsic property (*svadharma*). If KCB had upheld the superiority of western culture, he would not have cautioned us not to lose our individuality by becoming a slave to it. Rather KCB has shown his broadmindedness by way of admitting that each and every culture has good qualities peculiar to it which may be brought within our own fold through interaction. KCB is not of the opinion that in western culture each and every thing is good and has to be imitated. It is true that we can better assess our own culture if it is compared to that of other societies. We can 'feel' the richness of our own culture even after its comparison with some other culture considered as inferior to that of our own. Interaction with other cultures and the adoption of some good elements from these does not imply that they are superior. It is also not correct to say that no western philosopher or thinker has exhibited any serious concern for assimilation or synthesis of western with eastern thought.[9] For, we find a few western thinkers who have shown their respect and interest in eastern thought. We may mention here the names of T.S. Eliot, Charles Moore, H.H. Ingalls etc.

Professor Daya Krishna while focusing on the interaction between these two cultures, thinks that it is not for all justified future times the people belonging to these cultural areas should be confined without the range set for them by their past. That is why, a radical alteration in our attitude to

both the traditions is necessary in order to achieve *swaraj in Ideas*. We have to de-identify with both and treat them only as take-off points for our own thinking.[10] KCB however, is of the opinion that assimilation is good without losing our individuality or being a *slave* to another. There is thus no pure de-identification of the both as suggested by Professor Daya Krishna, as a little psychological leaning to our own culture remains. There is a lesser objectivity if such a cultural bias is present. The synthesization is not for losing our own, but for the betterment or for proving that our own culture is *Swarāj*.

The term '*Swaraj*' may be explained in another way. One who is self-ruled is called an adherent of *Swarāj*. If an individual is determined by his own principles or governed by his own self, he becomes luminous with his own glow and fearlessness (*abhiḥ*). An individual, being self-ruled, can extend himself to others by way of bringing them under one Self. KCB has laid emphasis on accepting the good principles of western culture, which may be called *ātmīkaraṇa* (bringing under the domain of Self), but this does not imply a surrender of ourselves as slaves to them. It may be argued that KCB perhaps has suggested a one-way traffic, i.e. principles in other cultures may be brought under our own but a lack of flow in the other direction. Actually when some good principles of some other culture are brought into the fold of our culture, it is described as *ātmīkaraṇa*. This phenomenon of *ātmīkaraṇa* may be described in two ways, extension of Self to others and incorporation of others in one Self as can be found in the *Bhagavadgītā*—'*sarvabhūtasthamātmānaṁ sarvabhūtāni cātmani*' (i.e. extension of self to others and bringing others under one self).[11] Hence, the charge against KCB that this theory is a kind of one-way traffic does not stand on grounds of logic. We do not want to be self-centred, but to extend ourselves instead, which is basically highlighted by KCB.

What KCB is trying to say does not concern any truth in the transcendental world. To him our Indian minds should be made broader, but not orthodox so that we accept what is good in a foreign culture or 'reasonably reject' what is bad. Such ideas have been admitted by Rabindranath Tagore also who believes in a free exchange of our ideas with the west. The relevant portion is as follows: '*Paścime āji khuliyāche dvār sethā hate save āne upahār/ Dive ār nive melāve milive yāve nā phire ei bhārater mahāmānaver sāaratīre*'[12], i.e. 'All are bringing present from the West as the doors of it are opened. On the bank of the Ocean of the greatmen of India nothing would go unrewarded, as there is free-exchange of ideas by

way of giving and taking.' KCB said that foreign ideals are to be assimilated without surrendering our cultural individuality and in this context he had quoted a *śloka* from the Bhagavadgītā—*svadharme nidhanaṁ śreyaḥ*, etc. to justify his own philosophical position. Personally feel that what the *śloka* signifies is not relevant here. This *śloka* was spoken by the Divine Teacher when highlighting the importance of what duty meant for a particular caste (*varṇāśramadharma*). Here KCB has taken the meaning of the *śloka* in a broader context. To him, Indian culture has got its glamour, sanctity and antiquity. Even to embrace death is good for the protection of the sanctity of Indian culture. To adhere to other's religion is dangerous (*paradharmo bhyāvahaḥ*). Even if the broader notion of *svadharma* is taken into account, the second part of the *śloka* cannot be admitted. While prescribing a path of synthesization of foreign cultures with our own and advocating the adoption of what is good in other culture, KCB's acceptance of the statement—*paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ* i.e. other's religion dangerous leads to some contradiction. Any culture, if endowed with some good principles, cannot be described as 'dangerous', but it should be taken as efficacious to enrich our own culture.

However, there is a point through which KCB's position can be defended. KCB always is of the opinion that the good elements of other's culture are to be utilized to enrich our own, but it should be borne in mind that KCB is always against the complete surrender of our individuality. Whatever is good in other culture has to be accepted, but not at the cost of our own which is luminous through its own grace. To follow another culture while neglecting our own is described as '*dangerous*' (*bhayāvahaḥ*), which has to be discarded somehow. Instead of this the term which was originally used in the context of the performance of duty of a particular caste is not relevant here. Krishna said that there is no better *dharma* than to fight (*dharmāddhi yuddhācchreyo'nyatkṣatriyasya na vidyate*). It implies that even if a *kṣatriya* embraces death for the performance of his duty, it is better no doubt, but the performance of other's duty under this context is dangerous from the moral standpoint. KCB's statement is made not in such a context, but in a different one where he prefers to accept what is good in another culture. The acceptance of *paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ* cannot be taken in the context of *swaraj* as defined by KCB.

As stated earlier, 'cultural subjecting' as coined by KCB has got a special importance. It is not at all desired by KCB that one should follow

the foreign culture blindly, so as to become a slave to it. For him the image of India and its culture has to be protected against a colonial attitude.

The fact that KCB has brought the concept of *varṇasaṁkara* into the context of a hybridization of ideas attained through education and the influence of western institutions on our life may be objected to. This objection can be removed in the following way. Actually, the concept of *varṇasaṁkara* has been used here as a metaphor. Just as *varṇasaṁkara* occurs if a marriage takes place between two different *varṇas* such as *Brāhmaṇa* and *Kṣatriya*, in the same way our own culture becomes defective of *sāṁkarya* (mixture) due to the over-influence of western culture. If this be the case, our own cultural identity which has its greatness and sanctity of its own would become affected by the defect of *sāṁkarya* (amalgamation).

KCB is of the opinion that as far as western culture is concerned, we should have either to 'synthesize or a reasoned rejection'. In this context KCB does not say anything about our own culture. There is every change of a pre-attitude or some sort of bias to our own culture while KCB prescribes a 'reasoned rejection' or a synthesis of western culture. Can such an attitude be employed to our own culture? Is everything in Indian culture connected with our well-being? Answers to such questions, however, are not found in KCB. As far as my knowledge goes, if there is a prescription of 'reasoned rejection', there should be the same for 'reasoned acceptance' also. If not, there would again arise the problem of 'cultural subjection' as said earlier. It is not to be taken for granted that whatever exists in Indian culture is good. That is why, reason plays a prominent role in the case of acceptance also, which is unfortunately not explicitly mentioned in his thesis.

We may recall here the comments made by Professor Sisir Kumar Ghosh on justifying KCB's philosophical position. For him

> 'The continuity of culture, an examined life, calls for re-appraisal. A hotch-potch synthesis is not so essential. A synthesis of our ideals with western ideals is not desirable in every case. There is a case for the pure and unique, for minute particulars that need not be lost in a Universal grey. Internationalism is not necessarily better than nationalism, not in every case'.[13]

In this connection Professor Prasad's suggestion should also be kept in view. For him reason may be reverential (*sutarka*) and non-reverential

(*kutarka*),[14] which has to be rejected somehow. Hence, KCB wants to emphasize the reason reverential to Indian tradition (*sutarka*) which has to be applied for this purpose.

Professor Prasad has raised the problems of understanding the key-terms like 'induce', 'shadow mind', 'real mind', 'genuine creativeness', etc. To him, 'these and most of his key-terms look like very attractive, beautiful keys but one is not told how and on which locks these keys can be used. Therefore, he may even doubt if they can open any lock at all.'[15] This remark is not at all tenable. Each and every thinker has his own way of expressing himself with the help of self-formulated technical terms that are essential to express the meaning of what he wants to say. These key-terms, though not easy to understand, are not at all unintelligible. A serious pondering over his philosophy reveals them and thereby it is known which key is essential to open which lock. These key-terms are more or less explained in the earlier portion of this paper.

KCB has made a short but important remark on the discovery of the soul of India. One way to discover the soul of India, as he thinks, is through philosophizing. In this connection, 'philosophizing' means extending our selves through hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) as admitted in the *Upaniṣad*. The second way of realizing the mission of India is through art by expression of genius. Though the mention of this is very casual, it is a beautiful remark, if it is considered seriously. There are two ways of transcending these worldly phenomena—*yoga* or *nidhidhyāsana* and art. KCB has taken art as the medium of understanding the soul of India. When an individual's soul is united with the soul of India, 'right understanding' or 'realization' is possible. Art has been taken by KCB as an instrument to this union, which opens a vista of our tradition. Any type of art, viz., literary form of art, paintings, music, etc. can conjoin a person with such a power to overcome the narrowness of the mundane world due to the achievement of 'something more' which is described by Rabindranath as 'surplus' in man, disinterested pleasure (*lokottara ānanda*) by Abhinavagupta, *Rasa* by the Upaniṣadic seers and KCB himself.

Though this view is presented to understand the soul or mission of India, one could raise this question: Is it not narrowing the function of art and its scope? Art is such a medium through which an artist who is described by KCB as 'genius' can extend himself to the world. In other words, it can unite an individual's self with self existing in the whole

world (*viśvātmā*), which is admitted by Rabindranath. Under these circumstances an individual may harmonize between himself (*viśeṣatava*) and the universe (*viśva*). KCB has not drawn our attention to this aspect of breadth.

In reply to this, KCB might defend his position by saying that someone may have developed a theory of *swaraj* against those who have already acquired a 'shadow mind' against our own tradition and in favour of a western one. In this context he is of the opinion that harmonization of two cultures is prescribed by way of rejecting our 'shadow mind' as well as 'cultural subjection'. He has accepted that in each and every culture there are some good things that are to be accepted while not becoming a slave to them as happened in the case of Madhusūdana Datta. He somehow has developed a 'shadow mind' towards western culture after ignoring the value of our rich tradition. Subsequently, he realized his mistake of ignorance (*avahelā*) of our culture which is, he realizes, full of various types of precious jewels, as stated in a Bengali poem which runs as follows: '*he vangabhāṇḍāre tava vividha ratan*', etc.

KCB's intention is to make others aware of our own glorious rich culture while not neglecting others, but taking what is good in them. This situation, if attained, is the real attainment of *swaraj* in ideas which is really a 'rebirth'.

Problems raised by Dr Arindam Chakraborty may be replied in the following manner. First, is *swaraj* in Ideas necessarily a re-birth, i.e., always preceded by a state of slavery? Is it something to be attained like *mokṣa*?[16] I believe that the concept of rebirth may be taken in a slightly different sense in the present context. As stated earlier it is to be taken as 'the re-orientation of our glorious rich culture' after assimilating good virtues from other cultures. Though the structure of our culture is old, it is in the new form with new virtues and glamour which is metaphorically called a 'rebirth'. This is certainly not a freedom from slavery because our culture was neither enslaved nor dependent on others. Through interaction with others our own culture is polished, upgraded and more prominent. In other words, it becomes self-ruled in the realm of ideas. This new position is not a liberation or *mukti*, because there is, I think, no sense of absolute relief or freedom or the attainment of absolute pleasure. This achievement is certainly a positive gain which is very much temporal. After a certain period a time may come when we need re-upgradation of our culture in the same way and hence it can never be equated with *Mokṣa*.

Secondly, it is true that the new generation of the educated Indian middle class tend to lead even a daily life deeply influenced by western standards. Do they perceive western culture as foreign?[17] In reply it may be suggested that if an individual thinks that western culture is his own, it is due to his broader attitude through which he has accepted good principles of the west and by way of doing this he had identified himself with this, which is also a kind of *ātmīkaraṇa* (bringing other cultures under the domain of Self). This phenomenon is a healthy one if he does not become a slave to them. To think of western culture as our own is not to be seen as an outcome of our slavish attitude but of our *ātmīkaraṇa*, which is very much desired by KCB.

Notes and References

1. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, *Swaraj in Ideas*, *The Visvabhāratī Qtly*, Vol. XVV, Nos. 3 and 4.
   Henceforth, *Swaraj in Ideas*.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 4, 1984, p. 507. Henceforth—*IPQ*.
9. *IPQ*, p. 508.
10. Ibid., pp. 564–65.
11. *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* 6/29.
12. Rabindranath Thakur: *Sañcayitā*, p. 507, Visvabharati, 8th ed. 1379 (B.S.).
13. *IPQ*, p. 514.
14. Ibid., p. 496.
15. Ibid., p. 490.
16. Ibid. p. 589.
17. Ibid.

Department of Philosophy,
University of North Bengal,
Dt. Darjeeling 734 430.

Raghunath Ghosh

Agenda for Research

1. Is there any concept analogous to that of *Mokṣa* in the Western Philosophical tradition? The fact that almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy accept it suggests that this concept, or something similar to this, is necessarily involved in the process of philosophical reflection itself. But its 'absence' from such a major philosophical tradition as that of the West suggests that it is purely contingent even if the Indian mind considers it otherwise. The investigation may reveal a larger 'inter-civilizational' concept comprehending the different and 'differing' insights of the two traditions and suggest a shift in the thinking about this *puruṣārtha* in the Indian tradition.

Nandanam House, P.O. Kidangoor
Angamaly 683 572
Kerala

N. Usha Devi

2. The doctrine of categories seems central to western philosophical thought and deserves to be studied in detail from Plato onwards. The relation between the categories of Plato as given in the 'SOPHIST' and those of Aristotle as given both in *Categoriae* and *Metaphysics*, and of subsequent thinkers such as Kant and, later, Ryle and others in modern times, needs thorough-going study.

Daya Krishna

Focus

1. Philosophical writing in India is generally assumed as being confined to either the English or the Sanskrit language. Normally, no one expects any significant philosophical activity to occur in any of the other Indian languages. However, a book published some 20 years ago draws the reader's attention to the existence of philosophical writing in Indian languages. Edited by Professor V.M. Bedekar, the book *Philosophical Writings in Fifteen Modern Indian Languages* is published by Continental Prakashan, Vijayanagar, Pune, 1979 (p. 342, Rs. 45). The information provided in this book covers the period upto 1975 only. The contents need to be up-dated so that information regarding any work that has been done later in these languages is also available.

2. In recent times philosophical thinking seems to have increasingly focused on its relationship with the actual concerns of life so that it may become, or at least appear to be, relevant to the day-to-day business of 'living'. In classical times however, its relation to wisdom was similarly emphasized or, as in India, to mokṣa or nirvāṇa. The recent trend, however, seems to be substantially different from the earlier search for 'relevance'.

   The following works may be taken as representative of a trend in this direction.

   (i) *JOURNAL*
   Philosophy as a way of Life, The *MONIST*, Vol. 83, No. 4.

   (ii) *BOOK*
   Philosophy Practice: An Alternative to Counselling and Psychotherapy, by Shlomit C. Schuster, Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport CT 06881, USA 1999, p. 207.

   (iii) The Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Philosophical Practice, ed. W. van der Vlist, Doorwerth, The Netherlands: The Dutch Society for Philosophical Practice, 1997.

3. The grounding of the knowledge of *Dharma* on the one hand and of *Brahman* on the other is positively done in the *Śruti* or the Vedas by Jaimini in the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* and *Bādarāyaṇa* in the *Brahma Sūtra*, respectively.

   Surprisingly, the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kaṇāda seems to do just the opposite. It establishes the authority of the *Śruti* on the basis of the fact that it gives us a knowledge of *Dharma* and hence has to be regarded as authoritative. The *Sūtra* reads as follows:

   तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम्।

   It may be noted that the term used is *āgama* which covers not only the Vedas but also other texts deemed as authoritative by other traditions in India. The attempt to deny the exclusive authority of the Vedic texts for determining the nature of either *Dharma* or *Niḥśreyasa* and *apaverga* and extend the scope of such authority to other foundational 'texts' in the tradition by the use of the term *āgama* seems to have been made time and again in the tradition, as is evidenced by the *Āgama Prāmāṇya* of Yāmunācārya later. But to find the term *Āgama* being used in the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda is significant and one may try to find if there is any such usage earlier to the one presently discussed.

4. There is a New Translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood in the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant, Cambridge University Press, 1998 (Paperback reprint 1999–2000), p. 785.

   The Introduction to this new Edition and Translation is remarkable for its comprehensiveness and delineation of the successive steps in Kant's formulation of his philosophical position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Most of the 'pre-critique' writings of Kant are mentioned in detail and their philosophical position explicated in a manner that would be of interest to most students of philosophy, particularly as they are interesting on their own account independently of the fact that Kant gave up many of these in the final formulation of his position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

1. Some problems regarding the Nyāya mode of analysis of sentences

   The Navya Nyāya appears to see sentences as essentially relational in character, and as a relation is usually supposed to be between two entities, its analysis starts with a distinction between terms which are related to each other and are technically known as *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*. The distinction is based on the way the relation is 'seen' as connecting one thing with another and hence is bound to be relative in character, depending on the way one 'sees' the relation. The distinction is bound to be relative in another sense also. There can, in principle, be no such thing as an *anuyogin* or a *pratiyogin* independent of the way the relation is thought to hold between the terms. Thus, the same term in the same sentence can be seen either as an *anuyogin* or a *pratiyogin* depending on the way the relation between them is seen. Normally, the sentence structure itself suggests the way the relation is to be seen, but there are cases in which how one should look at the situation is left open to interpretation and, if so, the distinction between the terms will become indeterminate or arbitrary in character. The 'choice' in such a situation will significantly determine the 'meaning' itself, as what is regarded as an *anuyogī* or a *pratiyogī* determines the meaning of the relational character in terms of which the sentence is to be understood. But, would not such relativity of *Śābdabodha* affect the realistic character of Nyāya substantially?

2. What does the term '*buddhi*' mean in Nyāya? In the Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.6. it is defined as *upalabdhi* or *jñāna*. But in case it is so, it can not be understood as intellect or the faculty of reason in the sense in which it is usually understood in the philosophical context.

   However, as Nyāya accepts the notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*' propounded in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1.2.3, it is not clear how it can make sense if it is not understood in the sense of intellect or reason. The phrase means that something is relative to *buddhi*, or is not 'independent' of it and if it is so, the term will have to be understood in

the sense in which it is used in the other schools of Indian philosophy.

It needs to be clarified, therefore, what the term exactly means in the Nyāya tradition?

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

A RAMAMURTY: *Philosophical Foundations of Hinduism*, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, pp. 216.

The creative impetus of the early Hinduism resulted from the interaction of the two traditions, the loka and the veda, which are the two aspects of the same reality. In fact, all the major traditions in India are in some manner related to Hindu thought and social order. But since we have developed a common belief that for the origin of any civilizational development, we always need two forces opposed to each other, therefore the struggle of the two opposites is seen as an essential part of the development of any nation or society. The dualist schools of Indian philosophy too, subscribe to this view of life. But not in the sense of thesis and antithesis. The Upaniṣads do not view the two as distinct and separate but on the contrary as the splitting into two halves of the same reality (*Atmanam dvedha Patayat, Brh. Up.* 1.4.3). We see this twin principle as '*Mithun*' or one-in-two.

The canonical Hindu scriptures composed of hymns, sacrificial rites, liturgical directions, forest meditations and the intellectual intuitions of the Upaniṣads constitute Śruti. Precisely, what is heard by the seers is accepted as infallible divine revelation by the Hindus. The later part of the Hindu traditional literature is Smṛti: what is remembered on the basis of Śruti-experience. In his great epic, '*Raghuvaṁśa*', Kālidāsa confirms this when he says '*Śruterivatham smṛtiranvagacchat*' (2-2) which means Smṛti follows the path of Śruti. Actually, ever since, the period of the Brāhmaṇa texts, there was a need for reading new meanings into the old Vedic texts, and the viniyogas or applications of the old hymns to the new changing divinities. This process was responsible for the systematic development and origin of the Smṛti literature in India, which was professedly based on the Śruti. So the continuity of the tradition of divinities of the Vedas was maintained by the Smṛti with a little moderation.

Professor Ramamurty, while examining certain essential aspects of the Hindu philosophical thought in detail, seems to have missed this aspect. He interprets the relevance of Smṛti thus: 'The validity of Smṛti is bound by time and space and other circumstances (*paristhiti*)' (p. 187). The

validity of Śruti, the divinely inspired truth or wisdom, is not conditioned by any cultural or social factors or by space and time' (p. 186). This kind of interpretation needs closer examination. The great works of old and new Upaniṣads include all the Vedas in the pale of *aparā vidayās* and all the *aparā-vidyās* are bound to be influenced by time and space.

The author begins with an analysis of Śruti and Smṛti and shows that the development of Hinduism is a result of a constant interaction and mutual influence of the two traditions. Curiously enough, he falls into the trap of dialectic or antinomial thought which has become more or less fashionable among the modern Indian thinkers. I think to follow the beaten track of the modern western mind has become the hackneyed practice of the modern Indian intellectuals who also try to create the oppositional discourse the way westerners do. Often, we overlook the fact that it is the Śruti tradition which flowered into the Smṛti tradition. We find so many evidences in the Brāhmaṇa texts and the Dharmaśāstras which affirm the strengthening of the Śruti by the Smṛti. Dharmaśāstras are of the view that whenever during the *vyavahāra* (legal procedure or contest at law) there is conflict between the Śruti and the Smṛti, the Śruti shall prevail upon the Smṛti.

'*Śruti, Smṛti virodhe to Śrutireva garīyasī*'. Manu corroborates Śruti as Veda and Smṛti as *Dharmaśāstra*—'*Śrutistu vedo vijneyo dharmasastram tu vai Smṛti*' (2–10).

The fact is that it is rather difficult for modern scholars to appreciate the centrality of the sacrificial and ritualistic experience of the Indian tradition. The oldest Upaniṣad like the Bṛhadāraṇyak and Chāndogya pronounce that even the concept of Brahman or Absolute reality arose from the search into the meaning of the sacrifice and dharma. Spirituality and dharma have never been separated from life, so that an alienation of the Spiritual from Dharma may not destroy the inner substance of man. In Hindu Dharma, all the phases of human existence merely are the expressions of the Divine.

While exploring the philosophical foundations of Hinduism, Professor Ramamurty delves deep into the flux of the Hindu ethos and offers this conclusion:

> However the Smṛti tradition by adopting the world-view of Śruti, which has shaped the basic character of Hinduism, has become an integral part of Hinduism. Therefore, Hinduism is one in its spirit and basic outlook or world-view ... the basic vision or world-view of Hinduism asserts itself as and when any sectarian form of religious life and worship tries to dominate the Hindu religious life or Hinduism (pp. 208–209).

According to the Vedic world-view all that is there is a manifested form of the Divine. The various forms of its manifestation reveal the glory of the divine and the divine is more than its glory and is all inclusive (see Puruṣasūkta, Ṛgveda. p. 109). The other part which constitutes the second half of the Vedic world-view is Dharma, which is inherently present within all phenomena and is immanent within all. In this sense, Dharma is not conventional morality though it is not opposed to morality (p. 115). This world-view of the Śruti adapted by the Smṛti-tradition appeared in India to serve or suit its sectarian theological needs. Professor Ramamurty is very clear in his exposition of the term 'world-view'. 'A world-view represents the meaning given by a tradition to human existence and to the world' (p. 84).

While explaining the foundations of Hinduism, the author takes liberty in defining the term Smṛti. He takes Smṛti in a wider sense and includes all the Āgamas, Purāṇas, Itihāsa, Tantras and all other forms of later religious literature in the Smṛti which sounds somewhat strange when seen in the context of the oriental Sanskrit tradition. In Indian philosophy, we find that Śruti or Nigama and Āgama fall into the category of most powerful pramāṇas (means of knowledge). Smṛti which is produced by mere saṃskāra exists in the absence of the thing recollected. Hence it is not included in the pramāṇas independently. But the Āgamas like śaiva, śākta and vaishṇava, etc. do not fall within the pale of Smṛti, as they are independent pramāṇas.

Another significant question has been rasied by the author and it relates to the absence of mokṣha in the Upaniṣads. He asserts, 'We do not find the concept of moksha as the meaning of human existence either in the Vedic Samhitās or in the Upaniṣads' (p. 47). In support, he further claims (pp. 194, 200), 'We do not find in the Veda the concept of mokṣha in any form ... . The idea of mokṣha, which is not explicitly expressed in the Upaniṣads, is basically negative in its import, as it means getting rid of or being freed from something, it does not state in positive terms the meaning of divine life' (p. 200). Here one would strongly differ with the author as he totally goes against the spirit of the Upaniṣadic śruti. There are several passages in the Upaniṣads which clearly support the view that

liberation is possible in this very life. Those who realize Brahman become immortal and those who don't, revolve in the cycle of birth and death (see Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6-4-14). Similarly, there is the other famous text which is very often quoted in support of mukti or mokṣha, viz. '*tasya taavadeva ciram yāvan na vimoksye atha sampatsye*' (see Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6-14-2). Those who are not conversant with the true spirit of the Upaniṣads are likely to misinterpret that there is no scope for moksha in the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara raises this question in his commentary on Brahmasūtra. Moreover, although the Upaniṣads do not use the term 'moksha' time and again, yet they do discuss and talk of the term 'Amṛtam' in the sense of 'Moksha' repeatedly, which gives rise to Śamkara's concept of 'jīvanmukti' and the Vaisnavite's concept of 'videhamukti'. But if Professor Murty chooses to interpret the Upaniṣadic spirit in the light of Tantra, Āgama or Smṛti, saying 'that the world is a manifested form of the divine, whether the divine is conceived in personal or impersonal terms' (p. 107), then there could be no objection to that.

However, in 'The Philosophical Foundations of Hinduism' Professor A. Ramamurty displays genuine visionary talent and erudite scholarship especially in the present context of contemporary researches in Hindu philosophy and religion. Some misprints like 'tyagam' in place of 'tyagaḥ' (see p. 5) and 'kecit' in place of 'kvacit' (p. 47) and the presentation of *pūrvapaksha* as a *siddhāntapaksha* from the Śankara's commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (see p. 48, fn 15), do indicate the need for a little careful checking.

Though one may disagree with Professor Ramamurty's critical procedure or an attempt to set up an antinomy between Śruti and Smṛti, yet one cannot help but agree with his basic conclusion that the acceptance of the world-view of the Śruti, by all the Hindu traditions is the motif representing the unity in the ethos of India's religious or philosophical diversity.

Kalidasa Professor of Sanskrit RAMAKANT ANGIRAS
Panjab University, Chandigarh

DEEPTI DUTTA: *Sāṁkhya—A Prologue to Yoga*, Khanna Publishers, Delhi, 2001, pp. 220, Rs. 350.

The Sāṁkhya system of philosophy is one of the fundamental streams of philosophical speculation in India. It can be traced back to the seventh

century BC. Its first proponent, the great sage Kapila who was considered the incarnation of Brahma was believed to have flourished during this period.[1] Though this system forms the foundation of many a system of Indian philosophy, it has not yet become current in an effective way among the public. Its ideals are to be found in the Mahābhārata and some Purāṇas in a scattered way. *Sāmkhyakārika* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is the basic text available on this studies on this system are rarely found. In this context, the present work occupies a praiseworthy place.

The author Dr Deepthi Dutta has arduously attempted what only a few persons including Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Swami Hariharānanda tried effectively to evaluate and develop. Īśvarakṛṣṇa developed the ideals of Sāṁkhya in the Mahābhārata and some of the Purāṇas and the Upaniṣads into a systematic form. Swami Hariharānanda followed them and tried to make this system a living tradition. The author herself has attempted to relate this system with Yoga and thereby to establish the importance of Sāṁkhya, a work which is commendable in this modern scientific age. She has cited many verses on Sāṁkhya from the Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgīta for illustrating the influence of Sāṁkhya on the Yoga system. Her assessment on the Sāṁkhya-Yoga ideas and the twentyfive Tattvas as forming the essential background of spirituality which is also accepted by later philosophers though in different ways, enables the work to receive much attention.

The origin of Sāṁkhya can be traced to the revolt against the ritualistic culture apparent in the Brāhmaṇa portion of Vedas, which encouraged sacrifices and similar rituals for the attainment of heaven and other objects of pleasure. Gradual developments included the inclusion of animals and even human beings as objects of sacrifice, following a reinterpretation of Karmakāṇda leaving all its symbolic meanings. Against such evil practices, there developed the Sāṁkhya system and Buddhism which highlighted in Jnanakānda. The Upaniṣads present knowledge as the true means for attaining the highest goal in life. They stand for the attainment of the self through renunciation and spiritual perfection.

The book under review is divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduces the main doctrines of Sāṁkhya philosophy. As it is pointed out, Sāṁkhya is a 'philosophy of knowables' in its true sense. It guides man to acquire supreme knowledge which is possible also to the human mind. Sāṁkhya is rightly pointed out as 'Ānvīkṣikī Vidyā' in its literal meaning.

The author exaggerates 'Saṅkara's attempt to explain away the Sāṁkhya terms in many Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgīta (p. 5) due to the absence of a serious understanding of Advaita philosophy. Śaṅkara always treats all sciences with respect. But he shows intolerance towards any kind of artificial interpretation of the Vedas or Purāṇas. He interpreted them in the Advaitic way with natural and easy methods. His views are direct and attempt to eradicate all doubts in their very essence. The doctrines of Advaita never mislead or misguide anyone who approaches them. Śaṅkara received the literal meanings of the word 'Sāṁkhya' and other technical terms in this philosophy. He was more convinced of the grave differences of view presented in many Upaniṣads from those of the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy. To quote a small example, Mahattattwa and Buddhi are separate entities in the Kathopaniṣad, but they are synonymous in Sāṁkhya. Convinced of the difficulties in explaining such terms from the view point of Sāṁkhya, Śaṅkara intelligibly disclosed their real meaning by neglecting their interpretations by means of classical Sāṁkhya. His commentary on the Brahmasutras. I.V. and on the 6th chapter of Chāndogyopaniṣad reveal his reasons rejecting the Sāṁkhya doctrines.

The second chapter deals elaborately with the nature and objectives of Sāṁkhya: '*Yā Vidyā Sā Vimuktaye*' itself explain the core of Sāṁkhya Philosophy. The author highlights the transition of earlier theistic Sāṁkhya to an atheistic one in the later period. This chapter also includes a brief analysis of the three-fold pain and a way for its removal as the knowledge of the Tattvas or principles. The elaboration of pain as *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika* deserves attention.

The author seems to be at crossroads in her interpretation of original Sāṁkhyam principles. An inclination towards Advaitic views can be seen in some places where Swami Hariharānanda is quoted. As an example, the correlation between '*avidyā*' and '*viparyaya*' on p. 38, needs more clarification. While commenting on the 46th verse of Saṁkhyakarika, Sri Vacaspatimisra states, 'विपर्यय: अज्ञानमविद्या'. But in the commentary of the 47th verse, *avidyā* is described by him only as a part of *viparyaya*. Besides this, the view of Swami Hariharānanda that '*avidyā* and *abhiniveśa* are one' seems to be a diversion from the path of Sāmkhya and expresses some sort of Advaitic influence which describes the partlessness of *avidyā*. Bhojadeva in his *vrtti* to the 9th *sutra* of the second chapter of Pātañjalayogasutras, defines *abhiniveśa* as the natural clinging to material life in the fear of death. It differs from *avidyā*. Thus Hariharānanda's view does not seem to be reconciled with Sāṁkhya or Yoga.

While describing Sāṁkhya in the Bhāgavata, the author puts forth the view that Kapila believes in the Lord both with and without the attributes. This seems to contradict with the famous Sāṁkhyan conception of Purusa as 'पुष्करपलाशवन्निर्लेप: पुरुष:'. The contradiction in this view creates a suspicion that the compiler of Sāṁkhyasutras and the one who engaged in conversation with Devahuti in Bhāgavata are different persons. In Sāṁkhya, Puruṣa has the only one form of pure consciousness. Then his concept as saguṇa by Kapila lacks clear explanation. Otherwise, such a conception can be enunciated in a clear way only in the realm of Advaita Vedānta. The author should have considered this fact more seriously and carefully. For making these points clear, it was necessary to bring out a comparative study on some points in which Advaita Vedānta and Sāṁkhya hold similar views.

Later Sāṁkhya is called Yoga in many places of the book. But it seems improper to correlate them. The Yoga system postulates a creator God whereas Sāṁkhya does not recognize such a principle. Also 'Sāṁkhya is the way of salvation by knowledge while Yoga is that of striving or dutiful action in a spirit of disinterestedness'.[13] Therefore Patañjali's Yoga is to be treated as different from later Sāṁkhya. Professor M. Hiriyanna in his 'Outlines of Indian Philosophy' describes some aspects in this regard. According to him, the later Sāṁkhya is a modified form of the earlier one. Vijñānabhikṣu in his commentary on the Sāṁkhya sutra modified the doctrines contained in them so as to bring them closer to Advaita Vedānta. This modified version is to be called later Sāṁkhya.[4]

Avidyā which is clearly exposited in Yogadarśana lacks such a clarity in Sāṁkhya. It is described as the cause of suffering and as beginningless. If it is a beginningless wrong notion it should be real only in the relative sense. The oneness of the reality cannot be negated and *Puruṣa* described as plural will be relegated to a lower position. Hence it seems very essential to clarify the viewpoint of *Avidyā* in Sāṁkhya by the author. Patañjali considers *Avidyā* as the lack of awareness of reality and says that *Avidyā* gives forms to objects. This also clearly points out to an absolute knower.

Chapter III deals elaborately with the means to attain the supreme goal of discriminative knowledge in supporting texts. The author has genuinely referred and analysed the various texts related to the aspects of Sāṁkhya leading to liberation. It seems that many of the Saṁkhyan ideas are

related to other philosophical schools. Dr. Dutta has elucidated different aspects of self-culture which seems to be a desirable endeavour.

The last chapter deals exclusively with Pātañjaladarśana. Actually, Pātañjaladarśana involves the means to attain mental and physical discipline and thereby Kaivalya. Here in this context, the Pātañjalasāṁkhya exposited seems certainly beyond the need. What is in fact needed is a complete presentation of Sāṁkhya system (working as the prologue) necessitating the yogic means.

The appendix given in the last part serves as a guide to understand the nature of the metaphysical pattern of the Sāṁkhya-yoga.

A careful observation of the book leads to the conclusion that the author is much too eager to deliberately combine Sāṁkhya with Yoga and to develop it as a complete system. It is already established that Yoga is only a practical discipline whereas Sāṁkhya deals with moral discipline theoretically. So a more detailed explanation is needed for establishing the claim that Sāṁkhya is the prologue to Yoga.

Notes and References

1. Yoga and Indian Philosophy, Karel Werner, p. 81. Indian Philosophy, Radhakrishnan, p. 254.
2. Sāṁkhya Tattvakaumudi Ed. by Dr. Gajanana Sastri, Mauslagaonkar Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi, p. 243.
3. Indian Philosophy—Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, p. 344.
4. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 269.

Nandanam House, P.O. Kidangoor N. Usha Devi
Angamaly 683 572, Kerala

A.K. Saran, *Illuminations*, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi, 1996, pp. 131, Rs. 80.

This is, in a sense, a sequel to the author's earlier memorable work, *Traditional Thought an Axiomatic Approach*, in which he had deeply probed the basis of our approach to truth and existence, to reality, establishing that all effort to know reality requires a true understanding of the source of everything. Hence the need to go back to the roots, to truths eternally inscribed in the nature of things. It is a going back to tradition

in the true sense in which tradition is 'neither old nor new, modern nor anti-modern. It is eternal, universal and sacred.' as was pointed out by the Dalai Lama in the Foreword to that book. In this sequel, *Illuminations*, however, the change in the level and mode of discourse is somewhat like that from 'the ultimate' to 'everybody'. There is a radical shifting of planes, from the purely speculative philosophic to the humdrum world of practical realities. For what he is now setting forth is an institutional, ongoing project to remedy the seriously flawed noetic sensibility and cognitive approach of his contemporary fellow Indians. He calls it, 'A School for the Regeneration of Man's Experience, Imagination and Intellectual Integrity'.

The book is in two parts. The first, a masterly presentation—what he calls the Argument—is a succinct but a remarkably in-depth probing of the contemporary conditions—and the need of a School to redeem the lost noetic sensibility, as well as a consideration of the methods and objectives of the proposed School. The second part consists of 125 quotations—texts which have a crucial role to play in the School's programme.

The basic issue is that the present-day higher education in India has totally failed, and that the universities and other establishments are working towards the perpetuation and reinforcement of the deadening of the mind and imagination. Research and scholarship are becoming the enemy of insight and understanding. At the same time, the ruling political and cultural elite is only interested in strengthening the inertia and promoting intellectual degeneration. So that there is no real prospect of any true transformation being effected. In short, we continue to manifest what our erstwhile colonial masters had dinned into our ears, namely, that as a people we are forever incapable of any theoretic consciousness. Could we think of an informal educative device that would help turn young intellectuals' minds in the right direction?

Meanwhile, as a global phenomenon, modern man rejecting his 'creaturely status' seeks the power to recreate himself and the universe 'in order to master the universe *sans* Self-mastery.' This his acceptance of a demiurgic anthropology has produced the deadening of man's noetic sensitivity. In this necrophilic situation the project of the School is a hope (and a prayer, just as well). Redeeming of our originary noetic sensitivity is central to the plan for the School.

The plan of the School is simple. To put it in the author's own words: A small group consisting of post-graduate students from different

universities and a few scholars both from and outside academia with varying degrees of familiarity and intellectual affinity with the aims of the School will be invited to live together at a carefully selected place for a period of two to four weeks or so. The idea of living together is important. What we have in mind is something deeper and richer than simply the requirement that the participants should be lodged at one place and breakfast, lunch, and dine together. We envisage not only a gathering together but an 'ingathering' of participants. There should be a general feeling for the goodness of living a shared life, the intellectual deepening and enrichment being an integral part of it. Thus:

> An anthology of passages and sentences from diverse sources has been made. This will serve as a kind of source-book from which twenty to thirty texts will be selected .... These will be circulated to members of the School in the hope that each one of them will be hit hard by one or other passage, perhaps by several. The community setting and the presence of scholars of different levels and types of intellectuality are then expected to provide help to each and all the participants in delving deep into the meaning and reach of the quotations that have struck and disturbed him/her. The idea is not to inform but to form the mind anew, to de-sediment renew and redeem the experience, the feeling-life and imagination-realm of the participants.

There is a good deal of unlearning and opening of minds involved. To free the minds already conditioned in favour of modernity it would be necessary to get out of the tradition-modernity antithesis or dichotomy and to create a free uncluttered intellectual space. Moreover, it is essential to restore the internal relation between knowledge and action, theory and practice, thinking and living, and above all, to think originally and 'upstream'. As to methods and techniques, the author believes, in the main, the best would emerge from actual practice and experience of the School itself. It is however recognized that the lecture method with its inescapable linearity would not be so successful in touching the roots of one's being as meditation on an insight that has caught one's attention. The lecture-method may however, be used sparingly.

The School does not aim at propagating any doctrinal system but it is not so much a-doctrinal as a pre-doctrinal programme. It aims at the restoration of man's originary noetic innocence, and that wholeness of being by which such innocence is protected and sustained. The passages

(texts) selected and distributed to participants may or may not exactly shock them but would certainly compel them to examine the very basis of their accepted thought system. The purpose is to show the participants that the felt 'strangeness' of the texts is really a reflection of our unexamined familiarity with modern thoughtways. This should lead to a deep pondering of what is brought into question by the encounter. The effort, through discussion and question-answer sessions, would be to let each participant work out the chain of implications of the texts that have caught his/her attention. Fundamentally, it should be a criticism from within.

During this time there will be meetings of the whole group at meal times and other informal encounters without any pre-planning. The principle governing the learning and teaching is that each participant becomes genuinely involved in the enterprise. 'The idea is, therefore, the minimum teaching and maximum dialogical and multilateral interaction, sometimes diffuse, at others focused and carefully directed .... The whole point is to build up in the School a *milieu* that will sting, stir, inspire the participants to reflect and think, trying to go to the root and truth of things.' And as a follow-up experience, such of them as wish to pursue the insights gained could join *The Coomaraswamy Centre* that is proposed to be established before long.

Further, to illustrate how penetrating a thought process may be evoked by focusing the mind upon the 'texts', Professor Saran takes up two of them for a sampling—Emerson's 'Language is fossil poetry' and Aron's 'Totalitarian movements are orthodoxies without doctrine.' And he tentatively works out the possible direction the discussions might take. Some brilliant *deep-delving* in the basics and implications of the two texts brings up at the end two very important issues. Firstly, grappling with Aron's insight into the nature of the totalitarian socio-political systems one experiences a profoundly unifying illumination from seeing its close kinship with Emerson's proposition: 'Language is fossil poetry.'

Secondly, the whole discussion has an immediate bearing on the telos, nature and procedures of democratic theory and practice in our time—especially 'the reigning trinity of the Indian ideology: Democracy, Secularism and Socialism'. On this issue, the author has no qualms in roundly declaring that the promise of political and economic revolution borne by the Indian Independence Struggle has been falsified, that the claim of operating a politico-economic system in which the people become the ultimate legitimizing authority is a total lie, and that the people have been

in the hands of the educated rich middle class elite who have betrayed them to serve their own narrow, short-sighted, foreign interests.

In fact, it is the abject failure of the Indian academic intellectual class to undertake any serious examination of how the basic goals of our Republic have come to be diverted, diluted, and subverted. Finding a solution for this peculiar Indian situation is not the whole issue. The School that is being projected aims at a larger goal, that of arousing in the student a deeper noetic sensibility so that he is brought to realize that he has been living by *pseudo-absolutes* and *pseudo-relatives*, and is possibly moved towards a whole-hearted acceptance of our creaturehood, with an unswering loyalty to the eternal in us. This transformation of the consciousness to a deeper noetic sensitivity is obviously a large, deep and far-reaching aim. Would a loosely organized discussion of certain texts bring about a virtual transformation of that nature? Again, 'assuming that the School did not wholly fail in this aim, how could this help the huge multitude of people in this vast country to make a dignified response to the wretchedness which is our condition today?'

In fairness it must be said that the author himself raises this question and he leaves it open-ended. There is none of the make-believe with which we cover-up the daily reality staring us in the face, in order to salvage our consciences. There is intense clarity of perception to be able to learn from the failure of what is admittedly a task of an experimental character. The basic assumption is, there are some intellectuals among the Indian *elite* who will rise above their class interests, attaining to a true awareness of the whole. The School seeks to assist in the emergence and growth of such a group. Though the effort may be experimental however, a few among the students may be charged and may enkindle others so that a missionary movement develops by 'chain-enkindling', influencing different levels of people in society. True, the idea of the School appears to the wordly-wise too idealistic altogether. Yet one can imagine, a noble venture, set up by a dedicated intellectual, derives initial impetus from its provenance, takes root, and eventually with working experience grows into such a movement.

No doubt the success of the scheme would depend entirely on the quality and the mental preparedness of the participants it is able to draw. And those who will represent 'the Faculty' in that School will need to possess something of the inner enrichment that distinguishes Professor Saran himself. And that indeed would be a rarity.

In a way, this little book poses a challenge to Indian intellectuals—minds nourished mostly on western ways of thinking. What can one do to alter the entire direction of thinking and feeling of emerging generations in the country? As a much-quoted remark of Franz Kafka—included in this book states, 'A book must be an ice-axe to break the sea frozen inside us.' This requirement is admirably fulfilled by the book which might wake us up with the urgency for action or assault us with unresolved doubts in the mind. More likely, one may feel remorse for having misjudged the truth of things that this little book sharply brings into focus.

50, Yoginagar Society, Fatehganj V.Y. KANTAK
Baroda 390 002

ANAND C. PARANJPE: *Self and Identity in Modern Psychology and Indian Thought*. New York: Plenum Press, 1998, pp. 416.

Students of psychology, both in the West and East, who are dissatisfied with the gaps in psychological knowledge of the self, accumulated through the positivistic mode of inquiry, may find Indian traditional thought presented here relevant for such psychological understanding.

The volume contains seven chapters each with detailed notes. Setting the context of the inquiry, the author proceeds to review different theories for conceptualizing the Self in western and eastern literature. Interestingly, in both the traditions two opposing views are found. One supports a kind of 'immutable' basis for selfhood while the other denies any such basis. Interestingly, the self had and has been a central concern in different disciplines ranging from religion to theories in behavioural sciences. In psychological theories, such as behaviourism, self could not find a place in the experimental study of behaviour. On the other hand cognitive theories could see its relevance in understanding intrinsic mechanisms and processes underlying overt responses. However, the positivistic epistemology could not allow cognitive theories to explain self as ever changing yet maintaining self sameness at the same time. A comparison of the absolutist, relativist and pluralist epistemologies has led the author to favour pluralistic views for a better understanding of the self and identity.

Mainstream psychology still carries the western thesis of 'self contained individualism' as propounded by the philosophy of enlighenment. For the sake of scientific study three aspects of behaviour have been envisaged and the self has been regarded as a cognitive structure monitoring the information processing. In the Indian tradition, the author has noted the shades of Individualism and the three aspects of personhood as *Jnata*, *Bhokta* and *Karta* as being equivalent to cognition, affection and connation. This seems to be a superficial similarity as the western view of individualism and three aspects of personhood do not provide a holistic picture, whereas the Indian trilogy of mind and the concept of individual provides a holistic view complementing and correcting the fragmentation of personhood.

Citing the work of William James, Cooley, G.H. Mead, and Freud, Paranjpe reached the obvious conclusion that the different definitions and diverse perspectives of self have created confusion and sometimes a misunderstanding. To avoid the confusion the author has selected a strand to compare and contrast the western and eastern views on self. The famous trilogy of mind served this purpose where self has been described as knower, enjoyer-sufferer and serving the agentic function. Even this trilogy in the mainstream psychology has been well accepted. In its effort to emulate natural sciences the discipline of psychology tried to objectified personhood, and related aspects of the self. A fractured picture of the self thus emerged as self-esteem, self-concept, self-actualization, self-image, self-identity, ego-enhancement, and so on. All these separate aspects of the self have been operationalized and measured by respective tests. Psychotherapists and counsellors find these aspects of self useful to help their mental patients. These concepts and measures have become so popular that self has become a marketable commodity in the capitalist society. Dissatisfied with the positivistic epistemology and treatment of self in psychological research a number of psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists have resorted to alternative epistemologies against a universal foundation of knowledge. Such efforts have led to classify western and eastern culture as 'self-contained individualism' and 'ensembled individualism'. These formulations paved the way to look different theories on self in a hermeneutic or interpretive mode. In this framework, the Indian and western mode of understanding provided the author to note interesting parallels and differences between hermeneutic approaches of

psychoanalysis and Advaita Vedanta. In both the traditions denial and affirmation of self have been noted.

Accepting the interpretive role of different perspectives the author selected Erickson and Advaita Vedanta in order to explicate personality theories from the perspective of similarity and differences between West and East in formulation of self and identity. The salient similarity between the two views has been noted as their thrust on techniques of change in self. The difference between the two lies in their ontological stands. Erickson employs a dualistic conception of reality whereas Advaita Vedanta posits a monistic view of reality. The author is of the opinion that Ericksonian and Advaita Vedantic views are meaningfully comparable to the existential and subjectivistic approaches in contemporary personality theory. The Vedantic concepts of self and identity are certainly relevant in the modern times as the search for inner peace and need to overcome egoism have been accepted as the prime goal of psychotherapy and counselling techniques. Ericksonian and Advaita Vedantic perspectives are considered as complementary as they answer the riddle of selfsameness in the mists of the changing self. Erickson's model is a developmental one emphasizing maintenance of a sense of unity in diversity of selves and of self sameness in the face of changes across the life cycle. Advaita Vedanta maintains that the true self (Atman) does not change. It is the ego which is misconstrued as self and keeps on changing.

Subsequent chapters of the book deal with self as knower, sufferer/enjoyer and agent. This trilogy helps the author to compare the western and eastern psychological thinking. In modern psychology, cognition, connation and affect have been accepted as three aspects of personhood. Self has been treated as cognitive schema monitoring the self-related information. The elaborated description of cognitive structure and processes in contemporary western psychological thinking presents an account of the changing self but could not provide a proper account of self sameness. A review of cognitive constructionists and social constructionists has led the author to make an effort to interpret Advaita Vedantic views of perception and cognition 'in the language and idiom of cognitive constructionism' (p. 187). Many of the psychologists may not agree with an imposed analysis of the Advaita Vedantic views of the self as knower but one has to agree that without distorting Vedantic views the author could not accomplish the commendable task of demystifying the Indian philosophical views and making them intelligible even to postmodern

world. Interestingly, in the elaborated discussion of emotions in the two traditions including the constructionist approaches the author has not applied constructionist analysis to understand the Vedantic, Sāṁkhya, yoga and natya sastra. Such analysis would have enriched our understanding (see Jain 1994).

The issue of causality has been elaborated upon in the context of Aristotle's four causes and the subsequent debate in the natural science view of knowledge. This debate resulted in the two opposite poles—one advocating free will and the other complete determinism of human action in the western tradition. In contemporary psychology, after the 1960s, one can note acceptance of human agency. Controversy over 'Autonomous' versus 'Plastic' man finds no place in the Indian worldview, where the doctrine of Karma covers 'lawfulness within the material as well as the moral domains' (p. 327). Thus, in both the traditions events in the entire universe are regarded as governed by laws of causality, however, in the Indian worldview causality extends beyond the natural world to the moral domain. The western worldview of science has created a wide gulf between the natural and moral domains. The law of Karma has been considered as a principle, unlike the empirical hypothesis which is in principle falsifiable. Thus it is not a law in the Newtonian sense of causality, rather it is a notion of causality in the Kantian sense—*a priori*.

The last chapter of the book presents the distinctive features of traditional western and Indian views of person, self, identity and consciousness in order to point out convergence, and divergence of the two traditions. Schematic presentation of Plato's notion of levels of reality and Advaita Vedantic views of person and reality has led the author to compare formulations of the Becoming and Being states in the life cycles of human beings. In both the views, the lower and higher order states has been accepted. In western tradition diological reasoning has been considered as the way to discover the principles of unity in diversity and sameness in change. Both Plato and Vedantists agree that through diological thinking one can reach out to the higher level of reality, but Vedantic views accept the limitation of reasoning as it does not help in self actualization of the fourth state of consciousness. Fourth state of consciousness is beyond cognition where true self is realized. The methods of natural sciences have their limitations in the study of experiences in the fourth state of consciousness since the distinction between knower and known is said to be absent in this state. Psychology cannot deny the study

of subjective experiences and therefore, the study of higher states of consciousness. For such a study alternative methods and different epistemologies are needed. The present book has an important contribution in this direction.

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Deptartment of Psychology Udai Jain
Barkatullah University, Bhopal 462 026, M.P.

Sri Dharmapal: *Bhārat ka Swadharma*, Vagdevi Prakasana, Bikaner, 1994, pp. 103, Rs 65.

Sri Dharmapal (born in 1922) had participated in the struggle for independence and was associated with a village development organization near Rishikesh which was established by Mira Ben. He had been the Secretary and President of the Association of Voluntary Organizations of Rural Development successively (1955–63) and later supervized the work of the research wing of Akhil Bhartiya Pancayat Parisad for two years.

He is well known for several of his works including: *Civil Disobedience and Indian Tradition* (Biblia Impex, 1971); *Indian Science and Technology in the 18th Century*—Some contemporary Indian accounts (Biblia Impex, 1971); *The Madras Pancayat System*—A general assessment (Award, 1973); *The Beautiful Tree*; *Indigenous Indian Education in the 18th Century* (Biblia Impex, 1983). His researches have aroused considerable interest and some seminars have also been held to discuss his ideas.

The present book—*Bhārat ka Swadharma*, consists of three lectures commemorating a lecture series in the name of late Dr Chhagan Lal Mohta in September 1987. The lecturers were organized by the Bikaner Proudha Siksana Samiti.

In the first lecture the author announces the themes of these three lectures: thus the first proposes to deal with the experience of losing our independence and consequent reflection of our intellectual elite on it and some of the conclusions that they seem to have drawn from this. The

author believes that even today we think about ourselves, our country, society and polity as did the earlier intellectuals. He also proposes to talk about the preparatory attempts of the Britishers during their launch for world victory and also about European psyche. In the same context he discusses the foundation on which British society rested and what was the state of education, knowledge and technology in that period in the British society.

The second lecture describes our social structure, system of education, social institutions, polity, religious order and the structure of our folk mind as they obtained in the later half of the eighteenth century, that is, before the encounter with the Europeans. He presents, in this lecture, some data and statistics relating to education, science and technology, wages of labour and social relations in that period.

In the last lecture he considers the possibilities which the future may have in store for us in the light of our past and present. What options are available to us? What kind of solutions could possibly be considered in relation to the various problems that we face? Which alternative should we choose that would be straight and free from crookedness? How can we get rid of the inferiority complex that we have come to develop over the years as a consequence of the defeat that we suffered at the hands of the foreigner? These are some important questions which Sri Dharmapal addresses in his third and the last lecture.

There are some significant conclusions to the long research that Sri Dharmapal made of the eighteenth century Indian society and also his view of the global perspective be presented in his first two lectures. Since the third lecture investigates the possible solutions and directions to which we may look forward for discussion and since this investigation assumes the conclusions of the first two lectures, it would be convenient, if I confine this review to a résumé of the third lecture. This, of course, would require a mention of some points made in the first two lectures.

There are two very significant claims which have for their support serious and meticulous research, on which are based author's recommendation in regard to what he calls 'Swadharma of Bharat'. The first is: our intellectual and ruling elite have always underestimated the potentiality of the people at large or what he would like to call 'larger society' and have kept this segment of people at an arm's length. The elite thought that for centuries remained in the dark and were ignorant. We did not have our own government. Social structure was stagnant. This society was

considered as backward in science and technology. Education was confined to a few. The few had no rapport with the masses.

Secondly, our intellectual and ruling elite believed that the English and European civilization was superior in several respects, especially in science and technology. They had progressive movements and their society and polity were based on equality and order. Consequently, they were prosperous (p. 38). We lost our independence because we were backward, our masses were ignorant, superstitious, credulous and habituated to several irrational and unsocial practices. So they needed to be educated and transformed according to the Western model.

In the first two lectures, the reader gets the impression that the rupture between the masses and the elite was a consequence of the encounter that our elite had with the English and the Europeans. In the third lecture, however, we are informed that this rupture had come about 800 years back, i.e., when the second series of Muslim invasions began (p. 76). Intellectuals became intimate with the ruling elite and had driven away from the people at large in a process that continued to grow. This conclusion invites two comments.

First, it would have been more convincing if the author had given, at least in passing, some examples of a better rapport between the masses and the elite before the invasions of the Muslims. The fact that there were invaders before the Muslims also—Shakas and Huns, for example is not considered. What sort of relation had existed between the elite and the masses then? Secondly, if it is granted that the rupture between the masses and the elite had already taken place then the contention that the rupture had come about after the encounter with the English and the Europeans becomes weak. Moreover, doesn't the very concept of *elite* involve some distance from the masses? Though the fourfold division of Indian society remained more of a prescription rather than an actuality—so far the extent was concerned, yet how did this concept of a fourfold division compare with the distinction between the elite and the masses? Didn't a distance existed between the *sudras* and the three varnas on the one hand, and the brahmins and the other three varnas on the other?

The allied claim that after this later encounter, the elite had come to form a model of the society, which was more or less, Western remains intact. While the author has tried to show that thinkers, statesmen and even reformers such as Raja Rammohun Roy, K.C. Sen, Rabindranath Tagore, even Vivekananda and Dayananda were either influenced by the

Western culture or were cut off from the people at large in the country, it is difficult to believe, inspite of what the author says, that these thinkers had absolutely no faith in the potentiality of the people on the one hand and had derived little sustenance from the indigenous culture on the other. Moreover, how can one deny that the ill treatment meted out to widows, polygamy, denial of female education, child marriages, sati practice were already there when the reform movements began. Untouchability against a certain segment of society and the practice of having the sweepers carry human excreta on their head and the denial of entry into temples so far as the sudras were concerned, were the accepted facts against which Gandhiji too fought throughout his life. Even if the inspiration was derived from Christianity and the European culture, one may ask, what was wrong in assimilating good if it were found elsewhere also? The author believes that our reform movement having its inspiration from Christianity and the European model shows no awareness of the fact that there already existed a potential in the larger society and a capacity for self-management and self-correction (pp. 77–78). If this belief had substance, how is it that even today, at least in the rural sector, some of the ills against which several reform movements were launched in nineteenth century and onward, continue to persist?

There is yet another claim, namely, that our statesmen failed to guess the colonial and exploitative designs of the Britishers. Further, both our elite and statesmen or ruling class had little understanding or knowledge of the state of society in England and Europe and were innocent of the aggressive, exploitative and cruel approach of the few who ruled these societies besides the low state of education at the popular level and the lack of a very highly evolved technology. It is still more surprising that the state of education, technology and human relationships as it obtained in our country in the early eighteenth century and in the earlier periods, was hardly known to our intellectual elite. This state being apprehended in a negative way coupled with a growing admiration for the western model, generated an inferiority complex from which we are still not free completely.

A consciousness of defeat becomes a barrier in the effort to restore an ailing society to its health. It should be realized that such defeats had occurred in all civilizations and our fate was no special device. What is necessary is to understand how defeat came about, to analyse its causes and prepare ourselves for future contingencies in a proper way. With

discipline, hard work and directed effort we can get our former health back and can attain excellence (p. 74). The author remarks that an approach of not using people as instruments and our belief in human goodness prevented us from adequately defending ourselves and this could have been one of the causes of our defeat at the hands of aliens.

It is curious that the author gathered most of his data and statistics regarding the state of education, technology and human relationship in our country in the early eighteenth century from the documents relating to several surveys made by the British in Bengal, Madras, Bombay and Punjab during 1790 to 1882 (pp. 40–45). These surveys reveal facts of which we are little aware. It is said that almost every temple, mosque and village had a school. The number of students and teachers was quite large. They came from all sections of the society. Some of the teachers belonged to the so-called backward classes. There was some percentage of girl students as well. In respect of technology, again on the basis of British writers and scientists, it is said that a better quality of steel was produced in this country, the high quality of cloth produced was well known, besides high efficiency was attained in works involving leather, bamboo, precious metals such as gold and silver, precious stones and wool, etc. Indigenous medicine could treat cases of poisoning, broken bones, and many other serious disorders. Agriculture, irrigation and allied fields of soil chemistry, weather moods and animal husbandry were also well understood as is revealed from the efficient practices then prevailing. Town planning and water management are being recalled now. Social structure and human relationship existed in a more or less harmonious and cohesive form. Women at home were responsible for maintaining various *samskaras*, customs, rules of cleanliness, rearing the children, worship and festivities, home keeping both functionally and aesthetically.

How did things deteriorate then? The author states that the western elite and rulers largely treated the people as tools for their own ends even in their own society and this is what they did wherever they went (p. 87). Such an approach led to a systematic deterioration and decay of Indian institutions and technology. We failed to check the process because neither we knew about our own society nor had we any understanding of the Western intentions.

The author suggests that we should get rid of this cultural amnesia and thereby do away with our inferiority complex. He thinks that Gandhi was the only person who understood the West on the one hand and our own

civilization on the other, in the right way. In contrast he holds Jawaharlal Nehru as responsible for a total misunderstanding in the relation between economics and culture which, of course, was due to his Western training. He maintains that it is history and philosophy which determine polity and in turn polity determines economics. He alludes to a Japanese project named 'Kogyo Aiken' launched in 1884. In this project the top-most significance was assigned neither to capital nor rules and regulations but to self-force and self-will, for it is these latter which enliven the former and make them effective (pp. 75–76).

The Japanese and Chinese succeeded in assimilating the best from the West without giving up the strength and potentiality of their own spirit and culture. However, the author is not completely pessimistic and hopes that the thousands of the young men and women who he thinks have understood the West properly, have also mastered their disciplines and will have faith in the indigenous potentiality of our culture and people at large. They have a much better rapport with people. He further suggests some measures which he thinks can determine the orientation of our youth.

He believes that the 80 per cent of our production still depends on the experience and know-how of the rural people. He proposes that the rural segment should have the freedom to follow the practices familiar to it. People know their needs and also know the ways to meet these needs. The freedom to follow their own thought, practices and provision of necessary implements would lead to further refinements and better results and, this may makes it possible for the Western knowledge and the knowledge of the larger society in India to come closer and enter into a fruitful dialogue (94). The small urban sector may be permitted to have its Western needs met by its own techniques acquired from the West. Some of the techniques that have come from the West such as electricity will have to be transmitted to a larger section also (94).

The various projects undertaken during the last few decades must undergo constant assessment without their being given up or stopped completely. New steps and changes should be introduced when the assessment and evaluation are complete. Rural learnings, practices and crafts should be relied on and should be given necessary support without domination or control (99).

Our dharmic texts and metaphysical texts should be read afresh and should be re-interpreted. The idea that whatever the older authorities had stated or claimed was final should be given up. But it should also be

realized that experts belonging to other cultures or society cannot be final arbiters of our spiritual and religious heritage (100).

Sri Dharmapal has some significant comments to make in the context of culture which need be discussed more thoroughly in the perspective of inter-cultural awareness. There seem to be two diametrically opposed directions as far as the inter-cultural perspective is concerned. From one point of view, it is almost impossible to understand properly an alien culture. A modified view suggests that while it may be possible to understand the other culture it is not possible to share it or have it translated into one's own culture.[1] According to the other view, the core of all cultures consists of some common values, while it is due to historical contingencies that a culture acquires a specific particular form and thus appears different from other cultures.

According to Sri Dharmapal an understanding of the universals of culture is no understanding. An attempt to understand a culture in terms of universal or common elements merely reveals intellectual laziness (pp. 80–81). A culture has an internal conscious tradition consisting of its cognitive structures, memory and saṁskaras, and meanings and values that direct thought and action (82). Thus the understanding of any event or action cannot be traced to a mere objective system of things. It must have for its proper function a penetration into the subjective system of internal conscious stream also. Sri Dharmapal also remarks, that the internal system and the external system while working together in the context of every event or action are autonomous too. In the same sentence, surprisingly, he also states that they depend on each other in a deeper sense and are really identical. Perhaps the difficulty involved, has not escaped his attention. He explains that what he wants to say is that both have the same significance (pp. 81–82). Earlier he has stated that it is language which embodies in itself the specificities and expresses them (p. 81).

With this background he has pin-pointed seven differences between Indian and Western specifities (p. 83). One of these is: in the West it is believed that truth, goodness, beauty can be known only through a mediatory agency such as a prophet or son of God, while in India on mediatory agent is necessary. As soon as this comparison is made, the reader is reminded of the important place that the 'guru' occupies in the Indian tradition. Besides it would be possible to indicate that in both of these cultures there has been a class of people—priests and pundits, who claimed exclusive knowledge of the sacred and moral texts and who thought that

people cannot acquire such knowledge without their help and guidance. Moreover, in both the cultures, one finds attempts by many to get free of this mediatory agency. In contrast, a more specific characteristic pointed out by the author and is to be found in our Indian culture which is not available elsewhere is the threefold schema—*satvika*, *rajsika* and *tamsika*, which is one of the basic ways underlying our cognitive structures. As would be obvious to the knowledgeable reader, the five-fold *kosa* theory, the distinction between the permanent and the transitory, and four-fold *purusarthas* point to some other basic conceptual configurations. It would be very interesting to go further in the question of the seven-fold differences, but this would be beyond the requirement of this brief review.

The remark made by the author earlier that we cannot rely on alien authorities for the interpretation of our culture indicates that he believes, at least to some extent, that only natives can have a proper insight into their tradition. If that is so, we can be sure more of the peculiarities of our culture than the characteristics of Western culture. And if this is right then the listing of the peculiarities of Western culture as done by the author cannot be very reliable. The postulate of an inner stream whether conscious or not, again, would prevent the understanding of the other culture in a proper way. Further, we assume while talking about a culture, that it is something stable, well defined, distinguishable like one person from the other and pure in the sense that no other element ever became integral to it. To me, such an assumption seems to be questionable, much more questionable when we are thinking of our cultural tradition which is supposed to be very ancient and which has permitted any number of external people and their ways to be assimilated, of course, not in entirety, in one stream which is varied and multicoloured.

Yet, Sri Dharmapal has given lot of material compelling a fresh look at our present situation in the light of recent history and his theses are highly thought-provoking. For these reasons alone, the book must be read by anyone who is concerned about the future of the country.

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10/588 Kaveripath, Mansarovar
Jaipur 304 020

R.S. Bhatnagar

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Project on British Idealism in India

Professor William Sweet of St. Francis Xavier University, in Canada, is currently engaged in a 3-year research project for a book on the possible influences of British Idealism on Indian philosophy and political thought.

One of his principle objectives is to identify which Indian philosophers and thinkers were influenced by the British idealists, to see how and why there was such an influence, and why this influence declined. He is particularly interested in cases where philosophers (or those with philosophical training) were active in both academic and political life.

He would be grateful for the help of readers of the *JICPR* in this project.

He is interested in collecting information concerning:

1. Departments of Philosophy (list of teaching faculty, awards to students, program and course syllabi, authors and titles of PhD and MA theses) from the late 19th century until 1950.
2. Copies of examination papers in philosophy and politics from this period.
3. Histories of University Philosophy Departments, or of Universities that might contain a chapter on their Philosophy Departments during this period.
4. Papers and letters of philosophers/philosophy staff associated with the universities until 1950.

He is also very interested in establishing contact with professors, currently teaching or retired, who are interested in the history of Indian philosophy of the period, or in British Idealism, or with scholars who might otherwise have an interest in this project.

He has acquired some information on these topics during several prior visits to India, but there are undoubtedly materials in archives or in private hands which would be relevant.

If readers have any advice on any of these matters, or on other issues that might be relevant, please contact him at:

Professor William Sweet,
Department of Philosophy
St Francis Xavier University
Antigonish, Nova Scotia B2G 2W5
Canada
e-mail: wsweet@stfx.ca; fax 1 902 867 3243

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā	
ई	ī	
ऊ	ū	
ए,अे	ē	(long)
ओ	ō	(N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ	and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ	
ञ्	ñ	
ण्	ṇ	(or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ऌ	ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ	ḷ
ഴ	ḷ.
ൺ	ṇ
ർ	ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seũṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

cöoperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.

(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.