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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Identity, Difference and the Problem of Reflexivity and Explanation

DAYA KRISHNA
Jaipur

The problem of identity which inevitably involves the notion of 'difference' within itself, has been the central concern of all philosophical thought from the beginning. So also has been the relationship which it has to time and consciousness which introduce a radically different dimension to the problem as they bring in the notion of 'change' within the notion of 'identity' itself. Self-consciousness introduces yet another dimension as it raises the problem of the identity of 'consciousness' seen as an 'object' along with that which is an object to it. Consciousness is generally supposed to be of 'something' which is an 'object' to it and, when such a consciousness becomes an object to self-consciousness the 'object' is introduced at two levels. The first level consists of that which is an 'object' to consciousness and the second consists of this whole complex constituted by 'consciousness-and-object' when it becomes an object to self-consciousness.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that one has to distinguish between the identity of the different relations which obtain between these different 'wholes'. There is first the identity of the object which becomes related to some other 'object'; then there is the problem of the identity of the relation between these objects which may be two or more in number. Then, there is the problem of the identity of the relation between consciousness and the 'object' or 'objects' which it is conscious of.

Besides this there is, of course, the problem of the identity of consciousness to which the object or objects are 'objects' in the epistemological sense of the term. At still another level, there is the problem of the identity of the relationship between self-consciousness and the 'consciousness' which is an 'object' to it.

The problem of the identity of self-consciousness introduces a new dimension as there the 'difference' is introduced in the very notion of identity, particularly at the 'existentially' experienced level. There are other

complications and qualitative differences at each level which we may ignore for the present.

This may appear to be too complex a formulation but it is an ever-present feature of the reality as it is 'lived' by everyone in everyday life. The awareness of 'self' occurs at the level of 'self-consciousness' and it is here that the whole drama of mutually influencing interrelationships is played to the amazement and bafflement of all the observers, including the self which is both the 'observed' and the observer at this level. To 'self-consciousness' the consciousness, which is always a 'consciousness-of-object or of objects-in-interrelationship', appears primarily in terms of its relationship to them. And, as they in their own turn are primarily seen in terms of their relationship to one another, their consciousness has to be seen in terms of the relationship to this relationship. It is a second-order relation whose primary content is the first-order relationship because of the object apprehended by it. The relationships are mutually transforming where the characters and qualities of the apprehending consciousness are determined in a sense not normally understood by those who have thought about it.

The occurrence of self-consciousness, on the other hand, introduces a tangential dimension which radically alters the whole situation in an independent way.

The relationship amongst physical objects is spatial and is determined by forces that are describable in physical terms. These are studied in the physical sciences. To the apprehending consciousness, however, these appear primarily in spatial terms and give rise to an aesthetic awareness that perceives them as 'forms' in formal relationships. To the active consciousness they are felt in terms of the resistance they offer to one in the context of action one wants to perform. The resistance is felt as something that is there independently of us, and which has to be taken into account, whether one likes it or not. The interaction between the practical and the aesthetic, or the active and the contemplative attitudes in the context of perception has seldom been noticed, particularly in relation to the physical world in which we live. This is as true of the world created by man as of the natural world, even though it is difficult to draw a clear-cut boundary between them.

A physical object is constituted or constructed in terms of all the qualities which the human senses endow on the world which is apprehended through them, and through them alone, at the human level. The extension

of these qualities beyond the apprehensible level is experientially irrelevant even if physics assures us that they are there.

The relationship which consciousness apprehends amongst physical objects thus is bound to consist of the relations amongst their qualities of colour, sound, taste, touch and smell alongwith those that are spatial and temporal in character. The temporal relations, of course, pose a problem of a different kind as they assume a succession of the states not only in the object or objects apprehended but also a succession in the states of consciousness along with the memory of what had happened before with the added awareness that they occurred before.

Kant was aware of this problem, but he did not see that the same problem arises in the context of simultaneous apprehension of different objects separated in, or by, space. The simultaneity of apprehension requires as much the unification of diversity and annulment or suspension of differences as does the succession in time. Annulment of spatio-temporal differences in consciousness and their unification in it without destroying the distinctions, however, meets a difficulty in the fact that consciousness itself is involved in time, a fact that is 'known' only in self-consciousness.

The objectification of consciousness that occurs at this level renders it a character whose intrinsic ambiguity makes it difficult to understand as it *simultaneously* makes it a subject and object at the same time. As 'object' it has all the characters of 'objecthood' in the sense that it has not only properties of its own and the relationships that it has to the sensuous object at the first level along with the spatio-temporal relations among them, but also an awareness of the inadequacies and imperfections in respect of both the qualities and relations that it has in both directions.

There are thus three orders of relationship which themselves may have an indefinite multiplicity and variations within them. The first order, of course, is that of 'object' apprehended by the senses with all the qualities and relationships amongst them. But as at the primary level, 'objects' are not only perceptual but also those which are conceptual or imaginary or even linguistic or symbolic in nature, the realm of 'object' is so diversified that it is not easy to take hold of it in its totality.

The diverse 'worlds' constituted by different kinds of 'objects' have not yet been mapped or investigated except in the context of what has come to be called 'varieties of reference'. The primacy accorded to objects which are, or can be, apprehended through the senses has stood in the way of all such attempts as it is difficult not to think of all other types of

objects as not being objects in the real sense for the simple reason that they seem to have only a derivative reality, or as abstractions from the primary living concrete world of objects which gives them whatever reality they have as they can be understood only in reference to them. But as everyone knows their distinctive being refuses to be reduced in such a way and the history of the cognitive enterprise of man may be seen in the perspective of this essential conflict which is irresolvable in principle, though the dialectical conflict between them has given rise to what we know today as 'knowledge', whether of nature or man or anything else.

Yet, there is another dimension of this conflict which has not been noticed at all. This is the conflict between different 'worlds' of non-sensuous objects that primarily arise in the context of the human understanding of the 'world' constituted by man's seeking for the understanding of this world.

The relationship between 'objects' of different levels is in fact a relation between different 'worlds' in which man lives. And, men may be distinguished by the 'world' they habitually live in, even though the world created by sense perception remains the 'common world' in terms of which they recognize and negotiate with each other. Yet, though this provides the common meeting ground, it does not result either in the meeting of minds or hearts or of a feeling that they are 'wayfarers' or pilgrims on a common journey seeking something which gives meaning to their life or provides that from which they draw their spiritual sustenance which distinguishes them from all other living beings who also 'live'.

The relationship between objects of the perceptual world is thus spatio-temporal and aesthetic on the one hand and causal-functional on the other. All these three types of relationships relate to consciousness in diverse ways. But the two primary relationships that consciousness has to them may be described as 'passive' and 'active'. Each type of relationship of them has some element of the other in a subdued and marginal manner. The former results in what has been called *bhokatṛtva* in the Indian tradition. In other words, it is the attitude of enjoyment which begins to have a more active element in it as it becomes more subtle and sophisticated. This may give rise to a still more active attitude which seeks to transform the objects and their relationships in such a way as to yield more and more subtle, sophisticated and complex 'pleasures'. But except in the case of visual and auditory 'worlds' the 'pleasure' received never crosses the

quality of just being a sensation and hence fails to achieve the aesthetic quality which requires its overcoming, or at least minimization as a necessary prerequisite for itself.

The aesthetic relationships which affect consciousness so powerfully at the perceptual level seem missing in 'objects' at other levels, though feelings of 'relevance' and 'appropriateness' seem to be present there. But even these seem to be absent in the context of 'objects' that are apprehended in dreaming and day-dreaming, even though they are felt as pleasant or unpleasant and, at times, even as morally degrading or undesirable.

The autonomy and relationship between these different 'worlds' in which man lives have not been a subject of phenomenological study, but they are all connected by the consciousness which freely moves amongst them. The relation of consciousness to them, and their relation to consciousness thus assumes a centrality which subsumes and transforms all other relationships that obtain between 'objects' of a particular realm and those that obtain between the realms. The consciousness that is at the centre of all these relationships is, however, not a monadic consciousness. It inhabits a world where there are other 'living beings' which also possess consciousness and amongst whom there are many who share the same human characteristics that one has.

The relation of consciousness to objects is not the same as the relations between 'objects', and the relation of self-consciousness to consciousness is also of a very different order.

The three different orders of relationship and the relationships amongst them are radically affected by the fact that amongst 'objects' there are not only 'living beings' which possess consciousness, but also persons who, besides being conscious are also self-conscious and hence have the diverse order of relationships that any such being possesses. The 'world' constituted by persons with self-consciousness is, however, arbitrarily divided in terms of gender and hence the relationships between them are constituted not only by the fact of self-consciousness, but also by the fact that the 'self' is seen in terms of 'gender' and identified with it. The bifurcation in terms of gender is found in most living beings and its relation to the maintenance of the species through reproduction is fairly well established. But the transformation that this 'divide' undergoes at the human level and the problems that it gives rise to have seldom been articulated by thinkers who have reflected on the human situation. The conflict between 'sex' and 'reproduction' is writ large on the human

consciousness. This, at the level of self-consciousness, becomes so foundational that amongst human beings, for example, it is impossible not to think of oneself as either the one or the other. It is true that the bare sense of 'I-ness' does not, or may not, involve this. But the moment one thinks of the 'I', one cannot but think of it in terms of gender which again is understood in bodily terms. The point is that there is no such thing as sheer identity at either the level of consciousness or self-consciousness. At the level of consciousness, it usually is in terms of 'this' most of the time. What happens to this at the level of 'I-consciousness' is difficult to say, but there is what may be called a 'species-identity' or identity in terms of the species to which one belongs, a fact which is evident at least in the behaviour of the animal concerned. But it should be remembered, that one generally denies 'self-consciousness' to animals who are usually 'granted' only consciousness in case they belong to higher levels. There is, however, not only a sense of identity in terms of the 'species' to which one belongs, but also the awareness of the identity of the 'other' as belonging to ones own species or to a different one. The consciousness of the 'other' belonging to the same species as ones own is, however, always differentiated in terms of the gender to which the other belongs. It is not clear, however, if the differential identity in terms of 'gender' operates in the case of the members of the other species which are recognized as belonging to a species different from ones own. At the level of self-consciousness on the other hand, the 'gender identity' operates not only with reference to the 'I' when it becomes an object to reflexive thought, but the 'other' is also 'seen' in the same way and that too at the 'individual' level. This is important as the whole world created by this foundational 'gender-identity' at the individual level both in terms of the 'I' and the 'other' has not been seen as defining the human situation in a way that no other identity does.

The relations between the individuals in terms of gender which cannot be 'disowned' or 'denied' at the level of thought, whether at the level of consciousness or at the level of self-consciousness, has not been the subject of serious reflection either amongst philosophers or 'seekers' of the spirit up till now. The Buddha and the Mahāvīra show in their discussion that they always treated the others not as just the 'other', but as man or woman leading to such discrimination between them which cannot be regarded as just or even human on either moral or spiritual grounds. The identification of the self and the individual 'other' in terms of gender is so

irreducible that it is openly visible even at the highest level of spiritual realization, even amongst those who are seeking complete de-identification with all 'objectification' at any level whatsoever. In fact, the identification becomes transparently obvious when the 'other' happens to be of a sex different from ones own. The gender identification however, occurs only at the level where one 'thinks' of oneself and not at the level where one is only conscious or aware of oneself. The level of 'awareness' is not the level of thought, specially when it is taken to be in the form of *vṛttis* and as constituted of *vṛttis* in the sense in which it is generally understood in the yoga tradition.

The consciousness that remains does not have any *specific* object or content, but still formulates or articulates as 'I' in the sense in which Śaṁkara used the term. The 'I' of Descartes on the other hand, is so enmeshed in the *vṛttis* indicated by the term 'cogito' that it cannot occur without them and hence the Cartesian individuality of the 'I' is radically different from that of Śaṁkara. Śaṁkara does not say 'I think, therefore I am' as Descartes does. For him, the self is the referent of the term 'I' independent of any content that is thought by it. In fact, it is the only constant that is ever present in the varying variegated play of content. But whatever the difference, the 'I' of Śaṁkara is still linguistic in character and as languages are plural in number the formulation of the 'I' or its articulation cannot but be in the language of the person who utters it to himself or herself. The gender may be transcended or de-identified, but not the language which constitutes, so-to-say, the spurious identity of oneself.

The problem of plurality of languages has not been dealt with in philosophy in the way it deserves to be. After all, there is no such thing as language but *only* languages and it will be strange for anyone to assert that the 'ahaṁ' *pratyaya* of Śaṁkara has to be in Sanskrit alone. Yet, this obvious absurdity is found in almost all philosophical reflection in Sanskrit as, for some reason, they self-consciously regard Sanskrit as the *only* language even though they knew that there were others.

The 'I' of the awareness thus, cannot be the 'I' of any specific language, but of that which is trans-linguistic in character. But then one will have to accept that the 'thought' or even 'awareness' at the level of self-consciousness has to be trans-linguistic in essence. This will give rise to problems which, at the present level, seem impossible to solve without postulating something non-linguistic which takes shape in the form of

language, but which is not ordinarily accepted in our lives. Bhartṛahari's postulation of the levels of speech beyond the *vaikharī* attests to this, but they require an ontology to support it which will hardly be acceptable to anyone, as it will destroy the foundation on which the whole world of thought and action is 'lived' by man.

Yet, whatever the problems raised by the necessity of postulating trans-linguistic level of thought, the problem raised by the trans-linguistic nature of the 'I' is radically different. The sense of 'I-ness' will have to be treated as coeval with consciousness or as an intrinsic feature of it. Consciousness, thus, will have to be treated as an I-consciousness, or a consciousness that is always, first, of an 'I' or just bare 'I' and not of anything else that is distinct from itself. The 'I-consciousness', however, will have to be seen as split in two, depending on the primacy of the 'consciousness' of the 'I' in it. The consciousness of 'I' is different from the 'consciousness-as-I' even though it may be difficult to distinguish this at first sight.

The distinction is important as the consciousness of 'I' already objectifies it in a sense which the 'I-consciousness' does not. The latter is entangled and even identified with consciousness in a sense in which the earlier is not and can never be. In fact, consciousness has to be 'I-consciousness' and there will be no difference in it from inconscient matter if it were not to be so. The consciousness of the 'I', however, involves a bifurcation and duality which involves an 'identification' with the 'other' in the most intimate way possible. This is suggested by the Sāṁkhya notion of *ahaṁkāra* which is supposed to be both the result of this identification and its presupposition. The prakṛti, it should be noted, cannot have *ahaṁkāra* by definition as it is supposed to be unconscious in nature. But, then, does *puruṣa*, or the pure consciousness have *ahaṁkāra* in it? For the *sāṁkhya*, it just cannot have it. Yet, it should have it if it is to be distinguished from *prakṛti* in its system. The *ahaṁkāra* or sense of 'I-ness' will, of course, have to be different from the identification with the other and that is what we have tried to indicate by the term we have used above.

The Indian thinkers have struggled with the problem, but failed to come to terms with it because they did not see the distinction made above. Neither the advaitins nor the sāṁkhyans knew what to do with pure consciousness which, just because it is 'pure', cannot have any content or object in it, even if this object be itself. The idea that pure consciousness has to be *nirviṣaya* results in the manifest absurdity that consciousness cannot be aware of itself as this will make it an object to itself and thus

destroy its purity. The idea that it is *svaprakāśa* or self-luminous does not and can not help to retrieve the situation, for if there is nothing to illuminate, what can illumination do? The idea of *dṛṣṭā* in Sāṁkhya fails for the same reason, though it could be saved if the *puruṣa* in the state of liberation, could be credited with the awareness of *prakṛti* and its complete difference from it. The standard interpretation of Sāṁkhya, however, prohibits this and makes it collapse into the advaitic position; a point we have argued and pointed out elsewhere.[1]

Buddhism is not supposed to accept any idea of 'self' or what we have called the 'I-consciousness' in it. But this is to think that 'I-consciousness' can only be there if the 'I' is conceived of in a substantive manner. But this just is not the case. Neither the 'consciousness of the "I"' nor the 'I-consciousness' need be conceived of in a substantive manner. Basically both are a consequence of the reflexive nature of self-consciousness and the Buddhist self or the 'I' may be thought of in the manner of William James as a dynamic continuous flow of consciousness where each succeeding moment preserves and continues the process onward with additions, subtractions and modifications in which a series of 'I's' succeed each other providing continuity with change in both the consciousness of the 'I' and the 'I-consciousness'.

The Naiyāyaika sees the dilemma more clearly and opts for the position, that the self is 'unconscious' or rather loses consciousness or reverts to non-conscious state in liberation, as the least trace of consciousness in it will force it to have an object or a viṣaya in it. Udayana's is the classic formulation of this position as he self-consciously puts the advaitic realization of the self only as one step lower than that of Nyāya in his presentation of the subject.

But in whatever way the situation is interpreted the 'interpretation' arises from the same set of facts as existentially experienced. The interpretation, of course, affects the experience in its turn, creating an inner tension between the experience as it is experienced and the way it should or 'ought' to be experienced if the interpretation is accepted.

The history of the dynamic interplay between the 'experience' and the 'interpretation' in the various sādhanās called yoga in the Indian tradition is yet to be written. But beyond the two radically different forms that self-consciousness takes because of the fact that it is what it is, there is the third hidden dimension which paradoxically reveals itself only when self-

consciousness relapses back into consciousness, a fact which happens all the time.

Consciousness, it should be remembered, is not self-conscious all the time. In fact it cannot remain so, at least at the human level that we alone know of. Yet, the consciousness into which the self-consciousness relapses is not and can never be the same as a consciousness that has never become self-conscious. The former has not only the 'memory' of self-consciousness in it, but also the actual possibility of becoming self-conscious once again within it.

The dynamic and dialectical interplay between self-consciousness and consciousness, however, is different from the interplay between consciousness of the 'I' and the 'I-consciousness' discussed above. The two interplays define and structure the human situation in such a way that they radically transform the problem of identity and difference as discussed in philosophical traditions up till now, whether they be those of the East or the West.

The roots of the identity thus lie in the 'I-consciousness' and the 'consciousness of the I', and at a deeper level in what we called the possibility of the 'I-consciousness'. The sense of difference lies therein also, but the identity is not only more fundamental, but it is that which makes the distinction and the difference possible. The consciousness of the 'I' makes the objectification possible and thus becomes the basis of that primal distinction which provides the foundation of all difference later. But it is the relation between the 'I-consciousness' and the 'consciousness of the I' that is the basis of that identity-in-difference which becomes the paradigm or the ideal exemplar for all such relations at other levels. But neither the identity nor the difference nor the identity-in-difference, is of one type as has generally been believed in the discussion on the subject. Nor, for that matter, has the nature of 'real relations', both existential and non-existential, been considered from this perspective. The identity of relations, or their difference or the identity-in-difference between them has not been the subject of consideration and discussion as it should have been in the philosophical literature on the subject.

The relation between objects is continuously changing and as it is generally not symmetrical, it changes in different ways for entities between which the relation obtained earlier. The complexity introduced by relations which require more than two terms is baffling in itself but the dramatic change it introduces in relations that require only two terms is

staggering indeed. The whole realm of society, polity and law is full of examples suggesting such situations and if one wants to find how 'chaos' can be created by a seemingly insignificant change in one of the relationships and order re-emerging, if at all, we may find better examples in these realms than in nature where physicists, chemists and mathematicians have tried to discover it.

Identity is thus rooted in consciousness, and not in 'self-consciousness' as is generally held by almost everybody. But there it is implied as it should be, for the moment it becomes explicit it dirempts or divides itself into the 'I-as-object' and that to which it is an 'object', the latter being necessarily presupposed by the 'objecthood' in which the 'I' is apprehended. The so-called *ātman* or the self or the pure 'I' or the *puruṣa* or the witness-consciousness is always there as the necessary presupposition of the act of objectification which becomes transparent at the level of self-consciousness alone. The 'objectification', however, declares aloud the reality of difference and its transcendence in the reflexive act of self-consciousness without its annulment in any way whatsoever.

The problem of 'identity' and 'difference', thus cannot be understood without 'seeing' that identity is always more fundamental and the difference more 'real' at the phenomenological level of human experience which alone is relevant as the basis of discussion. At the level of theoretic cognition, on the other hand, the identity turns into the unity that unites the multiplicity in the act of cognition, which articulates itself in a sentential or propositional form at the human level. The transformation of the identity into the unity and of 'difference' into a plurality or multiplicity ensures that the cognitive enterprise of man is rooted in a foundational identity that belongs to consciousness at the human level where it achieves self-consciousness in a unique way.

The 'identity' and the 'unity' on the one hand and the 'difference' and the multiplicity on the other get fused at the level of feeling where phenomenological-existential experience undergoes a transformation that has not been noticed up till now.

The identity of the relationship with the world of objects at all levels however is a function of the identity of ones relationship with oneself. And as the nature of this relationship to oneself happens to be, so is the nature of the relationship to everything else. The relationship to oneself is, however, itself differentiated in terms of knowing, feeling and willing and so also is the relationship to the world of objects which is modelled

on this relationship. The converse influence of the relationship to the world of objects on the relationship of the self to itself, though always there, is mostly a subsidiary element in the make-up of the personality at the adult level. Perhaps, the growth of the personality may be seen in terms of an increasing lessening of this converse determination of the self's relation to itself by its relationship to the world which consists of an intrinsic plurality and diversity of objects.

The primary relation, however, at all levels is in the mode of feeling as consciousness itself has to be seen and understood in terms of this basic fact for the simple reason that if there were to be no feeling, there will be no difference between inert matter and everything else that is supposed to be 'living' and 'conscious'. But the elements of knowing, and 'willing' undergo a radical transformation as the consciousness and self-consciousness of feeling develops at different levels. Knowledge is seen as that which can possibly bring about changes in feeling-states through the action based on it. At the centre, however, there is always the feeling which both knowledge and action subserve in their different ways.

This, however, is not to suggest that hedonism is the truth of consciousness as Yājñavalakya argued long ago, or as Sidgwick tried to do self-consciously avoiding the 'naturalistic fallacy' inherent in it.

The world of feelings is too much associated with pleasure and pain in the popular mind and even great thinkers have not been able to escape it. But even a little reflection on ones own experience will reveal that it is not so and a 'look' at the life of others around one should confirm this. What will not appear as 'unnecessary' to one who really seeks pleasure in the accepted sense of the word? And, why make a distinction between pleasure and happiness and joy and all the other words which try to convey what cannot really be conveyed by words? As for pain, who has counted its myriad forms or the shades of suffering one goes through in life?

The point is that the world of feeling is uncharted, unmapped, unexplored except by the poet or the novelist or the artist who is generally lost in forms that evoke something that is inexpressible except through what is created by him. The thinkers, specially the philosophers, see it as too 'irrational' to be taken hold of by 'reason' which is the only tool they possess to understand the reality around them. The subjectivity of feeling militates against the 'objectivity' of thought and its passionate existential intensity contradicts all that reason stands for.

To equate the 'feeling-world' with pleasure and pain will be as correct as to equate knowledge with mere sensation or action with the reflex response one involuntarily makes all the time. It is, of course, true that like sensation and the reflex muscular response they provide the foundation and the basic reference-point of all the complex construction built on that basis and that their basic roots lie in the body remains unquestioned at the human level. But the freedom and the distancing from the body is as evident here as in the case of knowledge and action and 'reductionism' is as much a fallacy here as there.

The problem of identity and difference, however, assumes a different form in the case of the world of feelings than it does in the case of knowledge and action. The identification with the world of feelings and the almost total submergence in it is a feature that is not to be found in the same way in either knowledge or action. Strangely, feelings at every level seem to mean the whole world to us and yet they remain dumb in a sense which is bewildering when contrasted with the unendingness of what is said about the realm of knowledge by man.

Identity in the realm of feeling, as in that of knowledge and action, comes from those deep underlying processual dynamic structures that give shape and direction to these in the constant process of change that seems to be such a permanent feature of consciousness at the surface level. But identity in terms of feeling provides not only the baseline on which identities of knowledge and action are formed, but is also more foundational and basic to the human person as it not only *relates* one to oneself but to others and the world in such a way that one relates to the 'world' through the others and to the others through the world in a manner where each reinforces the other in a complementary way.

Knowledge, except in the case of self-consciousness, is always of the 'other' and action, except in the case of meditation, contemplation or *upāsanā* is always in terms of an externality where some end in the outside world is sought to be achieved. The body may seem an exception, but as it has both an 'inner' and an 'outer' at the same time, both cognition and action in its case share the same dual character at the same time. Feeling on the other hand, is distinctly different in this regard as, at all levels, it refers only to the self and is generally identified with it, even when it is negative as in the case of pain when the body that feels it rejects it totally.

The world of feeling does not seem to have either difference or identity within it in the same sense as is found in those built around knowledge and action. Nor is the relation of the complex construction within the realm related to pleasure and pain the same as that which is found in knowledge and action. Their relation to the basic units out of which they are built is totally different. The difference emanates from the fact that feelings are not related to self and the object in the same way as sensations and reflex responses appear to be related to knowledge and action. Neither the subject nor the object seem to be of any importance in comparison with the relationship that seems to obtain between them. The preponderance of the object as in knowledge and of the subject as in action is annulled and a relation of equality seems to be established between the two. But this is a 'seeming' only, an illusion fostered by the fact that a relation has to have terms in order to exist. But the fact that it is an illusion is easily realized when the feeling disappears and the terms between which it obtained are seen as hanging apart, having no 'meaning' apart from the relation which obtained between them. Something seems to have evaporated or vanished which lent them the 'realities' they felt as belonging to them. They are still there, but only in the context of knowledge and action, bereft of the magical transformation which the feeling relation had endowed them with.

The problem raised by negative feelings on the one hand and unbelievable preponderances of the object in the drama of love, including friendship, raise problems for the above formulation which seem intractable at first sight. But if the nature of the object in the latter case were to be seriously reflected upon, the situation will not seem as desperate or the problem insoluble as it may have seemed in the first instance. An art object is not an 'object' in the usual sense of the term. Nor is a person an 'object' when it becomes a 'term' in a 'feeling relation' with someone who appears to be an 'other' but is not felt to be really so. The 'other', it should be remembered is not an 'object' either, or even a 'subject' in the epistemological sense of the term.

The case of an art object may, of course, be regarded as a content of the world of feeling as it is an 'object' not only embodying and concretizing feeling in itself, but also as being the creator of feeling without which it will not be what it is. In fact, it points to and evidences a fact that feelings themselves have a relative, dynamic aspect as they not only give rise to other feelings but engender that creative impulse which wants to express

them in such a manner that they be fully apprehensible to all the faculties in man, including the sensory ones. This makes the world of feeling not only transcend the subjective in which they are considered to be inevitably involved, but gives an intersubjective objectivity which is available as a source of creative arousal in others in the same way as the ordinary natural world does. The dynamic and expressive nature of feelings leads in a way that is both subtle and invisible to the construction and constitution of an intersubjective world where feelings create the being of those that are related by it.

This may appear trivial or even tautologous to many, but it does so only by forgetting what the world would be if there were no feelings in it. The relations between beings that are living are constituted by and in terms of feeling and feeling alone and both cognition and action are subservient to it. The 'ego-centric' or 'self-centric' or 'I-centric' description of feeling where the other is treated as the object and hence has to be granted, at least at the human level, an independent subjecthood, occurs because of the illusion that 'I' am the centre of the world constituted in this way. The truth is otherwise. I am not the centre, but only one of the terms in a relationship where the other is not only as important as 'I' but even more than it.

The two-term relationship as the paradigm for the understanding of feelings is only a convenient fiction or an institutionalized necessity as the binary treatment seems easy to handle in most domains one deals with. Besides this, there is the strange fact that intensity, depth and quality in this realm can only be realized between two persons, even though they require a supportive atmosphere from others around them.

The independence of feelings, or the desire for independence in this realm, may seem to be jeopardized by this, but it does so only because it is forgotten that, as we pointed out earlier, the world of feelings is not a 'self-enclosed', 'self-sufficient', still world which does not seek or demand a growth of itself in all dimensions in the same way as do other seekings of man. The seeking of a relationship is as much a 'seeking' as anything else, and a feeling-relationship is not an achieved stage of 'being' as most people seem to think. It requires a continuous striving or *sādhanā* to fulfil the immanent ideal or *puruṣārtha* involved in it. The illusion itself is at the root of the frustration and disappointment which inevitably befalls all those who share the illusion and make them into what may be called

'sceptics' of the realm of feelings, a term which up till now has not been used in this context.

The interactive realm of feelings, both in its dynamic and expressive aspects, gives rise to the socio-cultural realm in which institutional structures provide a quasi-permanent base to the realm where individuals and collectivities help in giving an 'objective', substantial dimension to a world which is primarily and inevitably 'subjective' in character.

The negative aspects of feeling create a problem of their own which is generally ignored in most discussions of the subject. Some analyses, specially those arising from the perspective of religion, tend to emphasize only these and neglect the positive aspects which fill the imagination of those who strive to create a world of feeling that is independent and autonomous in itself. *Rāga*, *dveśa* and *moha* are the usual Indian terms for them, though there are many others which have found expression in the psychological and literary texts devoted to the subject. 'Negativity' in the realm of feelings, however, is basically parasitic on the positive aspect though, as is the case with *abhāva* in the realm of cognition, it may begin to dominate the consciousness which apprehends the world primarily in its terms. The negativity which affects the world of feelings is far more pervasive and dangerous as it affects both knowledge and action and poisons them at their source which happens to be consciousness itself.

Consciousness has the threefold aspect with feeling as its core and awareness as its centre, the one looking inward or being inward, the other looking outward and becoming all that it is aware of in a sense which is difficult to specify but not difficult to understand. As for the third aspect, it is silent but ever-present, a possibility that can always turn into an actuality by a movement which no one understands. Awareness and feeling are always there but that which 'hides', and by hiding or even desiring or attending or shifting the focus of attention brings about a change, no one understands. Yet, it is as palpably there as awareness and feeling are, and the moment it becomes active, it assumes a centrality in that it affects the other two radically.

The relation between the immanent dynamics of feeling and the impulse towards expression and this third aspect of consciousness which is generally known as 'will', is not easy to understand as they appear to be independent of each other, even though the latter affects the former in unforeseen ways. There is an autonomy of the aspects which yet seems to be subservient to the third aspect which claims a sovereignty or superiority

for itself as it is the hidden power of the aspects themselves. The tradition has called it *śakti* or the Force that lies coiled within consciousness and can awake spontaneously or be aroused by effort when needed.

The roots of identity and difference thus lie within these aspects of consciousness and their interrelationship along with the changes that self-consciousness introduces in them with the coming into being of what we have called the 'I-consciousness', 'the consciousness of the I' and the interactive interrelationship between them. The identity and the difference that originate from these and percolate down to all the other levels and get differentiated and diversified in this process are radically affected by the almost *a priori* modalities which consciousness has in dimensions of knowing, feeling and desiring or wanting or willing. Each of these has elements of the other but, inspite of this, seeks a purity and *purśārtha* of its own, unmixed or even uncontaminated by that which is immanently involved in the other.

The identities and difference in the realms of knowing, feeling and desiring, are thus, not the same and, in fact, cannot be the same because of the very nature of the differences between them. But as each of these have objects of their own which are not only different in the nature of their 'objecthood' but also have identities and difference of their own, we have thus, the most complex and complicated picture where, at the human level, all these are sustained by a unity which has to respect the identity and difference of each at every level in such a way that it does not compromise the 'basis' of any one because of partiality towards another.

Yet, the variation and variety of personality structures at the lower level is not limited or bounded in any sense, not only because of the tendency and temptation of each to assert itself at the expense of others or to dominate over them and at times even to deny them altogether, but because of the changing relationship at the most fundamental level from where both identity and difference emanate, that is, at the level of consciousness and self-consciousness described above.

Identity thus predominates and pervades at the existentially 'lived-through' experience of the 'I-consciousness' in all its modalities, while difference is that which matters most at the level of 'object-consciousness' or where the consciousness is not only 'centred' in the object but is determined by it in a predominant manner. The doctrines of *apoha*, *abhāva* and *anekānta* attempt to capture this 'difference-centrality' in different ways, while Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta articulate the identity-centric

thought and experience in their different ways. The 'feeling-centred' construction of various *bhakti* schools, some of which are found in non-advaitic Vedāntic saṁpradāyas, seem to have a strong combination of identity and difference at the existentially experienced level where neither predominates or prevails over the other, but both are held in an equal balance giving a strange flavour to their utterances which sometimes seem to emphasize the one and sometimes the other. It is the creative poets who capture this quality of their experience in *bhajans* in all the Indian languages, and not the philosophers who have written on it in their learned treatises. The 'object-centred' thought is found predominantly in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and there 'difference' reigns supreme.

Consciousness as it moves outward thus encounters and experiences more and more of difference and enjoys it while as it 'withdraws' into itself, experiences an identity that is different at different stages of the 'return journey'. But as the 'return' and the 'withdrawal' are only temporary, the 'inward' and the 'outward' journey alternates and while the self is constituted by both, it is only the philosopher who is taken in by it and argues for the one or the other, as is evidenced by the long debate between the advaitins and the non-advaitic Vedāntins on the one hand and the advaitins and the naiyāyikas, on the other. It is time that futile debate is ended and the insights of both the camps are used to think and articulate the problem of identity and difference in other fields such as that of action, imaginative creation, ritual and acting in the context of a dramatic performance, to name only a few.

Note and Reference

1. 'Is Iśwarakṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-kārikā Really Sāṁkhyan?', *Philosophy—East and West*, July 1968.

The Comparison of Civilizations: Louis Dumont on India and the West

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Every civilization is carried on the network of a society, and it is impossible in practice to study a civilization and its society apart from each other.

—Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History: Reconsiderations*, p. 282

The India of caste and *varna* teaches [the West] hierarchy, and this is no little lesson.

—Louis Dumont, 'A fundamental problem in the sociology of caste', p. 164

Modern civilization has the unique advantage of commanding a relatively good knowledge of many other civilizations and cultures; comparison is the fulcrum.

—Louis Dumont, *From Mandeville to Marx*, p. 11

From a comparative point of view, modern thought is exceptional in that, starting from Kant, it separates 'is' and 'ought to be', fact and value. The fact has two consequences: on the one hand this specific feature requires to be respected in its domain, and one cannot without serious consequences presume to transcend it within modern culture; on the other hand, there is no need to impose this complication or distinction on cultures which do not recognize it: in the comparative study one will be considering value-ideas.

—Louis Dumont, 'The anthropological community and ideology', p. 233

Louis Dumont's objective in his monumental *oeuvre* was to treat the social anthropological (monographic) study of particular societies and cultures as not only an end in itself but ultimately, and more importantly, as a means to the sociological (generalized) understanding of the human condition. The key element of his method was comparison. The comparative method in Dumont's hands became a series of productive 'confrontations'—a dialectic—across time and space. I will try in this essay to briefly illustrate his method by outlining the course of Dumont's studies within and across civilizations.

Recalling the early years of his career in the late 1930s as a clerical worker in the French section of the Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires in Paris, he approvingly mentions the endeavour of keeping a 'scriptureless humanity ... alive in its diversity' (see Galey 1982: 13). An interest in cultural difference was at that early stage established as the foundation stone of the multi-storeyed intellectual edifice that he was to build over the following fifty years. There could hardly have been a better, more productive, way of developing this interest in cultural diversity—and indeed to recognize it in the first instance—than to proclaim the comparability of local, regional and national cultures and eventually of transnational civilizations. The concept of levels was central to this enterprise, each level of observation and study and the comparison being the 'stepping stone' (Dumont 1971: 60) to another. Moreover, along with other structuralists—Dumont came to know Lévi-Strauss's work at the Musée—he came to believe that the deeper the differences between two cultures, the greater the likelihood that comparing them will yield significant understandings of both and of social life generally. Without generalization the task of comparison is incomplete.

In the original edition of *Homo Hierarchicus* (1967a), in which he presented a sociological model of Indian (Hindu) society—and indeed of Indian civilization generally—to the French reading public, he affirmed that, for his theoretical orientation, he was deeply indebted to the French tradition of sociology (1980: xlv). Within this tradition the comparative approach had been employed with impressive effect by Emile Durkheim himself in his *magnum opus*, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915) and by other members of the *Année Sociologique* group. As for Dumont, he acknowledged the influence of Celestin Bouglé (1971), from whom he derived the defining principle of the caste system. It was Marcel

Mauss, however, above everybody else, whom Dumont recognized as his mentor.

Dumont actually became Mauss's student in the mid-1930s. Mauss was, of course, a comparativist *par excellence* and a Sanskritist too (see, e.g., Mauss 1970). Specifically and crucially, Dumont responded positively to Mauss's teaching that 'it is through our own culture that we can understand another, and vice versa'. Such a stance implied in the first place 'an assumption about the unity of mankind', but that by itself is rather vague and therefore further entails the 'study of differences' (Dumont 1986e: 189–90). The moot point is how a focus on difference may be prevented from producing absolute separation in effect even when the notion of the unity of mankind insures against such a slide in principle. In short, how do we connect, by what procedure? More about this below.

Dumont at the beginning of his anthropological journeys also knew of the work of other comparativists such as Georges Dumézil, with whom Dumont discussed his early interest in an Indo-European comparison of dragons (see Galey 1982: 14). This interest curiously took shape during his years as a prisoner of war in the early 1940s. These were by no means wasted years, for Dumont not only improved his knowledge of German by translating three German ethnographic studies of French folk culture into French, but also learnt Sanskrit. After the end of the war (in 1945) he also learnt Tamil and Hindi. Needless to emphasize, his interest in learning languages (he wrote in both French and English) sharpened his comparativist sensibility.

The first major field study in which Dumont engaged, while the learning of Indian languages was in progress, was that of the French folk cult of Tarascon which he carried out on behalf of the Musée. Published as a monograph, *La Tarasque* (1951), one already sees in it his eye (and ear) for ethnographic detail and his commitment to contextualization and the holistic approach—the local Tarascon seen in relation to Mediterranean Christianity. His exploration of aspects of Indian society and culture, whether primarily based on fieldwork or on textual studies—both sources were drawn upon in complementarity rather than mere juxtaposition—continued and refined this early approach.

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Dumont's cultural and educational background in France had sensitized him to the empirical presence of the individual in society and of the

normative value of individualism. His preparatory studies had already got him ready to encounter the group (caste) rather than the individual in India. This difference was to create problems for a comparison of the two cultures. For a start, there was no escape from caste, however, and it was a South Indian subcaste, namely the Pramalai Kallar of Tamil Nadu, that he chose to study. The individual here was submerged in the group, but the local group itself was not an autonomous but an embedded entity. To quote Dumont: 'All castes of a given culture area—[such as] the Tamil language area—rest on fundamental common institutions. These institutions must be discovered under individual diversity, and they constitute, along with the caste system itself, the social morphology of the civilization in question' (1986g: 3). The aforementioned task of discovery entailed intra-civilizational comparison.

Why did Dumont decide to go to South India instead of North India? He has clarified that, before he set sail for India, he believed that it was the encounter of the Aryan-speaking people of the north with the southern Dravidians (again a linguistic category) that had been responsible for the genesis of post-Vedic Hinduism and the socio-cultural configuration of classical India: a subject of considerable interest in the intellectual circles of France, Germany and Britain. More immediately, the principal promoter of Dumont's fieldwork in India was the Indologist Louis Renou (see Galey 1982: 14). In later years Dumont considered his early assumptions about Indian cultural history 'primitive' and excessively 'culturological', and blamed the state of scholarly opinion of the times for them. Moreover, studies of Dravidian culture were less common as compared to the Aryan, and it seemed a good idea to choose a non-Brahman caste—North India was believed to be the *locus classicus* of the Brahmans—as the point of entry into this under-explored domain (see Madan 1999: 476). Underlying the choices that were made, a consistently comparative perspective (Aryans compared to Dravidians, North India to South India, Brahman castes to non-Brahmans) is noticeable.

The scholarly product of two years of intensive fieldwork in South India was a monograph which was completed in 1954 (Dumont 1957a). Like all good ethnography it was local but the comparative perspective, as we shall see below, was not absent. The experience of fieldwork had, however, obviously confirmed what Dumont had learnt from Mauss, namely that what the people being observed 'believe and think' is as important as what they are seen to be doing. In other words, what a people

do must make sense to them, even if it does not to the observer. It is, therefore, the intellectual obligation of the observing anthropologist to inquire into these configurations of meaning—the internal or first order interpretations of social behaviour—without abandoning his own understanding of the observed social act.

It is obvious that a complex methodological procedure is proposed. An early and seminal statement of the same is found in Dumont's 1955 inaugural lecture at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (6th section), Paris, 'For a sociology of India'. Here Durkheim's teaching is recalled namely that 'social facts ... are at once things and representations', and an adequate method for their understanding is said to be the one evolved by social anthropology, which insists that 'the observer sees things from within (as integrated in the society which he studies) and from without' (1970c: 7). Dumont acknowledged E.E. Evans-Pritchard's notion that the movement from the indigenous interpretation to the anthropological is one of 'translation', but cautioned:

> In this task it is not sufficient to translate indigenous words, for it frequently happens that the ideas which they express are related to each other by more fundamental ideas *even though these are unexpressed*. Fundamental ideas literally 'go without saying' and have no need to be distinct, that is tradition. Only their corollaries are explicit (ibid., emphasis original).

We see here the structuralist distinction between 'latent' and 'manifest' structures, and note the implication that this distinction is itself a relation. In other words, it is imperative that we recognize the fact that several interlinked levels of social facts and their understanding are involved. From the immediately observable level of social behaviour we move to its indigenous (first order) interpretation, and then derive from such interpretations the underlying but unstated assumptions, which may be assumptions about how things are (ontology) or about how they ought to be (value preferences). And yet the external (non-native) observer may find the observed phenomena elusive (alien) until he constructs his own second order interpretation of them, which is informed by prior cognitive categories derived from his culture and his discipline (social anthropology or comparative sociology). Comparison here thus involves a series of confrontations. Social action is confronted by and confronts ideology; internal understanding is confronted by the external; within the external

understanding, the lay is confronted and eventually superseded by the professional. But the professional is not autonomous or unchallenged.

Let me recall here Dumont's formulation of the predicament of the Western anthropologist—the original anthropologist was of course a Westerner—in an insightful 1979 essay (see Dumont 1986f). The social scientist, he wrote, is exposed to the ideologies that are prevalent in his society. In the case of the Western social scientist, an absolutely crucial ideology is that of individualism, and this is 'fundamentally opposed ... to the principle of anthropology and all sound or thorough sociology' (ibid.: 204). This principle, according to Dumont, has to be holism: 'a comparative sociology, i.e. a comparative view of any society, is holistic' (ibid.: 213). It follows that the anthropologist (and the sociologist) 'should agree to distinguish between his absolute convictions [normally derived from the 'surrounding ideology', for no person invents his own personal ideology] and his specialized [professional] activity' (ibid.: 205). To distinguish between the two points of view— 'man thinks by distinctions' (ibid.: 225)—entails comparison and the establishment of a relationship in terms of a grammar of values. In fact, the relationship may be conceptualized in terms of 'hierarchy', which is essentially 'the encompassing of the contrary' (ibid.: 227) and is, therefore, marked by tension.

More precisely, Dumont argues that the elevation of the individual to the status of being the bearer of value in Western society, is a 'mental construct' rather than a 'physical phenomenon'—empirically the individual as an agent is of course present everywhere. Consequently, society has come to be seen as an aggregative phenomenon and its sociological study is focused on the 'interaction of individuals' (1970e: 134–5). It is in this manner that the prevalent social ideology encompasses and defines the sociologist's specialized (professional) activity. The social anthropologist's view from 'without' (outside) in relation to the natives' view from 'within', therefore, could constitute an 'impediment to comparison' if the society under study does not entertain an ideological position about the individual similar to or, at least in consonance with, the corresponding ideology of Western society. This indeed is according to Dumont (and not him alone) true of India.

The organizing principle of Hindu society, Dumont notes, is *dharma* or social order, which is part and parcel of the universal order: 'in the traditional Indian view there is no separation between man and nature and the human order is realized by conforming to the universal order' (ibid.:

142). And the 'man' of Indian conception is a 'dyadic subject', because interpersonal relationships are conceived 'as internal to reality, as its core'. 'Instead of an indivisibility (the individual), the subject is a totality of opposites, empirically multiple, ontologically one' (ibid.: 141).

Given the conflict between the external and internal points of view on the nature of the 'elementary unit' for the purpose of social anthropological study, is one left with the conclusion that comparison is not possible and that intercultural dialogue and understanding are not available to us? Characterizing such a position as solipsistic and an invitation to domination, Dumont emphatically declares: 'Cultures not only *can* be made to communicate, they *must*' (1970f: 161). But how? The answer is: 'the two societies [the Western and the Indian], while so directly opposed in their ideal[s], in reality may have much in common; there might well be something of *dharma* in modern society, something of the Individual in the counterpart' (1970e: 141). The individual as the bearer of value—as the occupant of a normative role—does find a place in Hindu (Brahmanical) thought except as the renouncer. The argument, as formulated by Dumont, proceeds as follows: (i) 'the society must submit and entirely conform to the absolute order'; (ii) 'consequently the temporal, and hence the human, will be subordinate'; and (iii) 'while there is no room here for the individual, whoever wants to become one may leave society proper' (1970d: 59–60). In other words, one ceases to be a householder. This does not mean, however, that the renouncer becomes socially irrelevant. From his own point of view, it is only his own spiritual progress, his freedom from all social ties—from choice-making in an arena of social obligations—that matters. But from the point of view of the society that lets him and indeed urges him to leave, he emerges as a critic, a reformer, and a teacher—indeed as a 'creator of values' (ibid.: 46). And, therefore, 'the secret of Hinduism may be found in the dialogue between the renouncer and the man-in-the-world' (ibid.: 37; see also Madan 1987).

The individual has been identified in both the Western and the Indian cultures, but this does not yet mean that comparison has been rendered unproblematic, or the contrast of the cultures diminished. A critical difference survives: while in the West the individual is in the world, in India he is outside it, 'at least in principle' (ibid.: 45). The West too has known the individual-outside-society, but that is a premodern idea. Among 'the first Christians', as Dumont calls them, the individual as value was located outside the social and political domains: he was 'outworldly' in

contrast to modern 'inworldly' individuals. Drawing upon his knowledge of the Indian institution of renunciation, Dumont argues that 'individualism could not possibly have appeared in another form and developed otherwise from traditional holism, and that the first centuries of the history of the Church showed the first lineaments of the accommodation to the world of that strange creature [the outworldly individual]' (1986c: 51). With the Reformation, which 'picks the fruit matured in the Church's lap' (ibid.: 59), and particularly with Calvin's elaboration of Luther's thesis regarding salvation, the individual, even while seeking religious merit, locates himself within the secular world and also submits to the established political authority. As Dumont puts it: 'The field is absolutely unified. *The individual is now in the world, and the individualist value rules without restriction or limitation*. The inworldly individual is before us' (ibid.: 53, original emphasis).

With the foregoing brief remarks about the comparison of three types of individuals, one Hindu and two Christian, and thereby of two civilizations, I have already proceeded from Dumont's methodological premises to his substantive studies—to his comparative sociology. I will now highlight selected conclusions of these studies of aspects of Indian and Western civilizations.

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The Pramalai Kallar are a subcaste. Much that is true of them is true of all Kallar subcastes and some of it is also true of other castes/subcastes of Tamil Nadu that are of the same or comparable ritual and social status. Understanding is here obtained through an inside-out movement. Castes that rank higher or lower in the social hierarchy also share many values, beliefs and practices with the Pramalai Kallar by virtue of participation in a common regional, Tamil, culture. Tamils themselves are one of the four major linguistic groups, each numbering millions, that together comprise the Dravidian culture of South India.

A widely shared social organizational feature of the Dravidian South is what used to be called 'consanguineal' or 'cross-cousin marriage' (marriage of a boy/man with his mother's brother's daughter). Intensive fieldwork combined with careful reading of the available ethnography and Lévi-Strauss's seminal work on 'the elementary structures of kinship' (1967), originally published in 1949, enabled Dumont to provide a new interpretation of the preferential form of marriage among the Dravidian

peoples. The method was comparison within the region (at the caste/subcaste and local levels) and the substantive conclusion was that the so-called consanguines, or cross-cousins, are properly conceived of as predetermined affines. Under the prevailing regime, marriages are not merely episodic events, but enduring arrangements between wife-giving and wife-receiving lineages. Affinity (the relationship established through marriage) could thus be said to be inherited or transmitted from generation to generation and in principle permanent. Dumont (1957b) proposed therefore that marriage in South India, being of distinctive character from what it is in the West, should be called 'marriage alliance'. The contrast was further stressed later when he wrote that, in the West, 'affinity ... merges into consanguinity for the next generation ... [and] is *undervalued in relation to it*' (1983: vii, original emphasis).

At the time of the first publication of the relevant monograph (1957b), Dumont stated the conclusion that marriage alliance was 'the fundamental principle of South Indian kinship' (1983: 104). Absence of any reference to the character of marriage in North India was apparently due to the fact that no major studies of the subject based on fieldwork were available, although some Indological studies did exist. His own fieldwork in a North Indian village began only that year and he would not have arrived at any definite conclusions.

Dumont addressed the issue of the North-South comparison only ten years later (Dumont 1966). He then noted that although interkin marriage is not allowed, and the institution of marriage alliance is absent, other evidence is available about the relations between wife-givers and wife-takers (such as an asymmetrical flow of gifts from the former to the latter) to indicate a stress upon affinity that appears to be a pan-Indian phenomenon. This consists, he wrote, 'in the valuation, and in the consequent elaboration and ordering or patterning of affinal relationships. This valuation is, of course, consistent with the caste system insofar as ... membership [in a caste] depends upon the [caste] status of both parents, and thus upon marriage' (1966: 113). In his discussion of South India, Dumont had earlier pointed out that the principle of alliance was also 'fundamental' in relation to caste, since endogamous marriage was its basis. Hence the conclusion: 'marriage is crucial on both levels of caste and kinship, ... it constitutes in a sense their articulation' (1983: 104).

The conception of a comparative sociology and its method are here complete. North India is distinguished from South India through

interregional or intra-civilizational comparison but, in the next move, both North and South are accommodated within a pan-Indian emphasis on marriage, even at the cost of playing down the differences between them. This emphasis serves to bring out the contrast between India and the West (inter-civilizational comparison). Thus, he observes that it is ironical that the equalitarian Westerners 'practice subordination—the relation between consanguinity and affinity is exactly ... a *hierarchical relation*—while South Indian people, who live in a hierarchical society, ... make a simple, straightforward, symmetrical distinction between them' (1983: vii, emphasis original).

The idea of hierarchy—the encompassing of the contrary—lies at the very core of Dumont's most ambitious work, namely *Homo Hierarchicus* (1967a, 1970a, 1980). As is well known—given its status as a modern classic—the book is an analysis of the caste system. The presence of castes everywhere, he had earlier said (Dumont 1970c), was a token of the civilizational unity and distinctiveness of India. *Homo Hierarchicus* opens with civilizational contrasts being placed at the very centre of the inquiry. 'The caste system is so different from our own social system in its central ideology,' Dumont wrote, 'that the modern reader is doubtless rarely inclined to study it fully.' Moreover, 'the very authors who have devoted books to it have more often tried to explain the system as an anomaly than understanding it as an institution ... . More is necessary: the conviction that caste has something to teach us about ourselves' (1980: 1). Put differently, this meant that caste must be taken seriously as a civilizational scheme or mode and not be treated as a product of social 'degeneracy' (see Madan 1999: 478). The question that arises here is why Western observers and thinkers have been so negative about caste. Dumont's answer is that the unquestioning acceptance of equality as an ideal is responsible for this. The bearer of the values of Western civilization knows equality or, its binary opposite, inequality. He does not think in terms of hierarchy and fails to ask 'to what extent [equality] runs contrary to the general tendencies of societies, and hence how far our society is exceptional, and how difficult it is to realize this ideal' (1980: 20).

Ethnocentrism is a universal failing and scholars suffer from it no less than lay persons. The tendency is to make sense of the unfamiliar by comparing it to the familiar. Needless to emphasize, this procedure introduces category assumptions into the interpretation and may distort it. Thus, no less an intellectual than Max Weber conceived of caste, as

Dumont notes, as 'a particular kind of status group (German *Stand*) or estate, in the sense of the three estates of the *Ancien Régime* of France' (ibid.: 26). The idea that 'caste is a limiting case of social class' (ibid.) is widespread. What this does is to obscure the fact that, viewed from within Hindu society, religious values are crucial to an understanding of caste in a manner that renders uncritical comparisons with modern (Western) society—and for that matter with the so-called primitive society—misleading. In Dumont's view, the sociocentricity of the Western observer makes him introduce considerations of power where religious values are primary; similarly the interests and perspectives of the individual are introduced where the group and holism prevail.

An authentic effort at understanding Indian civilization through a focus on the fundamental and ubiquitous institution of caste, according to Dumont, must begin with first principles chosen by Indians themselves, but should not stop there. The dialectical method requires that the first principles, or ideology, be confronted by practice, and the view from within be confronted by the view from without. The external (Western or any other) perspective is not eliminated, but relocated in the structure of the argument as a particular possibility that might illumine other such particulars, rather than as a universal tendency. Instead of 'classification', which brings down social and cultural diversities to the level of the lowest common denominator, a more heuristically productive procedure is 'typification', which enlarges rather than narrows the framework of comparison, and produces understanding through contrasts (or controlled comparison) (see Dumont 1967b).

Following a methodological first principle that he himself had earlier enunciated—'a sociology of India lies at the point of confluence of Sociology and Indology' (1970c: 2)—Dumont focused on the notion of ritual purity, which he derived from both the Indological tradition and extant ethnography, as the point of departure for his analysis of the caste system. Others too—notably Bouglé (1971), who derived the hierarchical separation of castes and their interdependence from it—had identified this idea as crucial, but Dumont's handling of it (although indebted to Bouglé's formulation) was innovative. He disowned any interest in the search for causes: 'I do not claim that the opposition between pure and impure is the "foundation" of society except in the intellectual sense of the term: it is by implicit reference to this opposition that the society of castes appears consistent and rational to those who live in it' (1980: 44). The opposition,

it must be added, is neither mere difference or simple social gradation: it is hierarchical, that is the impure is both opposed to as well as included in the pure. Put as a general principle, hierarchy is '*the principle by which the elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole*, it being understood that in the majority of societies it is religion which provides the view of the whole, and that the ranking will thus be religious in nature' (ibid.: 66, original emphasis).

Having grounded himself thus, Dumont proceeded to demonstrate that the various aspects of the caste system—marriage rules, dietary regimes, hereditary occupational roles, etc.—can be derived from the necessary and hierarchical coexistence of ritual purity and its opposite impurity. By his interpretation, caste is different from other forms of social stratification through the 'disjunction' of ritual status and secular (politico-economic) power within the social system. Secular power, although opposed in principle to ritual status, is encompassed by it.

Homo Hierarchicus is neither an historical account of the caste system nor an explanation of it in merely behavioural (interactional) terms. It is rather a logico-deductive 'experiment' (ibid.: xiii) to derive the form (or 'structure') of the 'system' from 'a single true principle' (à la Descartes) (ibid.: 43). Since castes exist 'from one end of the country to the other, and nowhere else', pointing to an empirical 'unity of India' (1970c: 4), the underlying ideology—'a system of ideas and values' (1980: 36)—signifies a civilizational perspective. The ideology does not explain everything, although it encompasses the social reality, nor does the observation of actual behaviour reveal everything. A 'residue' remains which can only be explained through a 'confrontation of ideology and observation' (ibid.: 77). Thus, the exclusion of power from the notion of status leaves unexplained empirical evidence of the exercise of authority. To understand it, the principle of hierarchy although applicable is incomplete: it is 'completed by dominance' (ibid.: 183). But the first principle may not be abandoned through the elevation of economics and politics to a level on par with or above religious values. Doing so would amount to 'a misconstruction of Indian civilization' (ibid.: 388). When such an equation is seen to occur in fact, it can only be termed the pretentiousness of power.

Internal comparison is thus built into Dumont's model of the caste system. An external comparison also is indicated, in the assertion that castes are found in India and nowhere else, and is required for a complete

understanding of the phenomenon. The argument is completed by providing an answer to the crucial question: 'Are there castes among non-Hindus and outside India?' (ibid.: 201–16). So far as communities adhering to other (non-Hindu) religions (notably Indian Muslims and Christians constituting respectively about 13 and 2 per cent of the total population) are concerned, Dumont's contention is that caste is found among them in 'more or less attenuated forms ... . A non-Hindu group cannot be regarded as independent of the environment in which it is set, as really constituting a society by itself, however strongly its values push into this direction' (ibid.: 210).

Pushing comparison outside the subcontinent to consider traditional Sri Lankan social organization, Dumont acknowledges the presence of 'all the characteristics of caste' but notes that 'the king has remained the centre both of group religion ... and of political and economic life': 'the supremacy of the priest [standing for religious values, notably ritual purity] is an Indian fact which has remained unexportable' (ibid.: 216).

What is of deeper significance in the context of the present essay is the paradigm of inter-civilizational comparison that Dumont presents, hierarchical Indian society versus egalitarian Western society. As he puts it, the task is to 'set the two types face to face' to show that 'explicit and valorized ideas in the one case' are 'by contrast, subordinate or unrecognized in the other'. Each type comprises the same elements, but the manner of their arrangement is different, even irreconcilable. To wit, hierarchy (separation and interdependence) as a value *is opposed to* equality (in a framework of economics and politics); holism ('society taken as a whole', 'man as society'), to individualism ('man as individual'); subordination of economic and political interests to religious value, to relegation of religion to the private domain (individual life); individualism as renunciation ('individual outside-the-world'), to holism as totalitarianism (ibid.: 232–3). To leave the characterization in the foregoing mutually exclusive form would be 'mechanical': it is important to note that 'the pole of opposition which is not valorized is none the less present, each implies the other and is supported by it'. Thus, 'the tendency to hierarchize still exists [in modern society]', although occasionally in 'ferocious and morbid' forms (e.g. as racism) (ibid.: 265). It follows that if the two civilizational perspectives are reversed, hierarchical society will illumine egalitarian society and *vice versa*.

The final conclusion (taken from an earlier essay included in *Homo Hierarchicus*) runs as follows:

> Comparative sociology requires concepts which take into account the values that different societies have, so to speak, chosen for themselves. A consequence of this choice of values is that certain aspects of social reality are clearly and consciously elaborated, whilst others are left in the dark. In order to express what a given society does not express, the sociologist ... must ... have recourse to societies which have expressed those same aspects. A general theory of 'inequality' ... must be centred upon those societies which give it a meaning and not upon those which, while presenting certain forms of it, have chosen to disavow it. It must be a theory of hierarchy in its valorized, or simple and direct forms, as well as in its non-valorized or devalorized, or complex, hybrid, covert forms ... . In so doing one will of course in no way impose upon one society the values of another, but only endeavour to set mutually 'in perspective' the various types of societies. *One will try to see each society in the light not only of itself but of the others* (ibid.: 266, emphasis added).

Having started at home in Europe, Dumont set out on a voyage of discovery to India, only to return home to discover Europe in its own varieties of civilizational unity and diversity.

* * *

The holism and hierarchy of traditional Indian society enabled Dumont to problematize the individualism and equality of modern Western society. He queried: 'how and why has this unique development that we call "modern" occurred at all' (1977: 7)? It was, in his judgement, nothing less than a '*revolution of values*'. In all traditional (pre-modern) societies, 'the relations between men' had been 'more highly valued, than the relations between men and things. This primacy is reversed in the modern type of society, in which relations between men are subordinated to relations between men and things' (ibid.: 5). The reversal entailed in a manner of speaking the subversion of the whole of society and its replacement by the parts, namely self-oriented, choice-making, rational individuals operating in compartmentalized and specialized domains of activity.

The paradigm shift had its beginnings in the late eighteenth century (Dumont suggests 1776, the year of publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* as a convenient date) and was consolidated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The political and the economic were separated through the severance of 'the link between immovable wealth and power over men', and 'movable wealth becomes autonomous'. Symbolizing the dominant role of the economy in society, 'the market and its concomitants' within the political philosophy of 'liberalism' acquired almost a 'sacrosanct role' in society. In Karl Polanyi's well-known formulation, this was indeed 'the great transformation' (ibid.: 6; see Polanyi 1957).

Focusing on the ideology underlying this transformation, Dumont describes its progression through a careful consideration of the views of several social thinkers, notably Francois Quesnay (France), John Locke (England), Bernard de Mandeville (the Netherlands), Adam Smith (Scotland), and Karl Marx (Germany), all makers of the modern ideology. It was Quesnay who introduced the idea of the economic domain as 'a consistent whole', although he believed this holism to be 'the projection on the economic plane of the general conception of the universe as an ordered whole' (Dumont 1977: 41). In other words, Quesnay's was a basically traditional position, notwithstanding the bow to the conditional autonomy of the economic domain. Locke of course preceded Quesnay, but he had already gone further in the direction of the separation of economics from politics, illustrated best by his conceptualization of the notion of 'property' within an individualistic framework. 'What is essential is that, with property, something that is exclusively of the individual is made central to a realm of consideration and facts that was governed by holistic, hierarchical considerations' (ibid.: 53). In Locke, Dumont writes 'Morality and economics provide, in the "law of nature", the basis on which political society should be constructed'. In other words, 'politics as such is reduced to being an adjunct of morality' (ibid.: 54).

With Mandeville a critical transition occurred: value and fact were separated. In his *Fables of the Bees*, private vices bring about public virtue in the form of activity and prosperity, not by any internal logic but by skilful political management. From a careful examination of the import of the *Fable* and of Mandeville's views on the nature of morals and society, Dumont concludes that Mandeville disjoined hedonism from morality and established 'the primacy of the relation of man to goods over the relations between men—if not in principle, then in the actual life of

a large and powerful society' (ibid.: 81). Material prosperity thus became a self-certified moral end.

Mandeville is important in relation to Adam Smith's curious notion of the 'Invisible Hand', of how in the economic domain the apparently selfish pursuit of particular interests by individuals unwittingly yields the common good (ibid.: 61). Crucial to Dumont's argument is Smith's 'stress on labour as a measure of value' and his 'preference for the definition of value through exchange' (ibid.: 92). The consequence of this orientation is that man is presented as the creator of wealth in relation to the material world. The full potential of value thus created by man is realized through exchange. In sum, 'we have here the elevation of the individual subject, of man as "self-loving" labouring-and-exchanging, who through his toil, his interest, and his gain works for the common good, for the wealth of nations' (ibid.: 97).

In his detailed discussion of Marx that follows, Dumont shows the logical steps by which the 'material conditions of life', already a central idea in Smith and in the burgeoning economic ideology of the West, are given explanatory value by Marx. For him production is *the* human activity *par excellence*: 'production in the economic sense is used here as the prototype of a much wider category that tends to encompass the whole of human life. Relations between men are subsumed under a term that properly designates relations to things' (ibid.: 156). As Marx himself put it, 'Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc. are only *particular* modes of production and fall under its general law' (ibid.: 155). The 'paramountcy' of the economic domain, conceived of as the infrastructure in relation to the other domains, the superstructure, is explicitly asserted. Indeed, 'Marx can be said to have brought economic ideology to its accomplishment' (ibid.: 169). Economics, it will be noted, has become economic ideology and as such is irreversible—it is, in Max Weber's famous phrase, modern man's 'iron cage' (see Weber 1930).

From the traditional Indian perspective, this is an inversion of values, for there the moral order (*dharma*) encompasses the unified politico-economic domain (*artha*): value and fact remain integrated in a holistic configuration. To call it non-modern, instead of traditional, would amount to the illegitimate imposition of the categories of one ideology upon another, a procedure that Dumont rejects.

By the time Dumont completed his exploration of the genesis and triumph of economic ideology, the link between individualism and equality had receded into the background. Further studies were devoted to the elaboration of the idea of individualism (see Dumont 1986a). The 'global' (general, 'most common') ideology of individualism, constitutive of Western civilization, having been described, he finally focused on the comparison of national cultures. 'It is a fact that modern ideology takes notably different forms in the different languages or nations or, more precisely, in the different subcultures that more or less correspond to these languages and nations' (1986b: 15–16). To stress and illustrate the point, a Franco-German ideological—in fact cultural—contrast was formulated in stark terms (1986c: 130–1).

> On the French side I am a man by nature and Frenchman by accident ... . [T]here is nothing but a void between the individual and the species ... On the German side ... I am essentially a German, and I am a man through being a German: man is immediately acknowledged as a social being ... . Therefore, while the French were content with juxtaposing nations as so many fragments of mankind, the Germans acknowledging the individuality of each nation, were preoccupied with *ordering* the nations within mankind in relation to their value—or to their might.

Dumont's last book, *The German Ideology* (1994), while sustaining the Franco-German contrast—in fact refining it to make room for interaction within the framework of modernity—focuses on the German variant of the modern ideology.

In doing so, the method fashioned and employed in the earlier works is strongly reaffirmed as 'the fire of comparison' (ibid.: viii) and restated as follows (ibid.: 216):

> My aim here has been to elucidate an ideological configuration and some of its factual concomitants ... [I]n my view the study of such general representations requires three conditions: (1) they should be identified through comparison; (2) they should be considered in a long-range historical perspective; (3) the analysis should follow a hierarchical method, going from the global level to the local and not the reverse.

On the substantive side, Dumont explains that the beginnings of the divergence between the two national cultures are traceable, in significant measure, to the fact that the German version of the Enlightenment was religious in contrast to the French which was secularist. In the setting of Lutheran Pietism and Reformation, the German variant of individualism

emerged as a cultural category par excellence, distanced from the French (Western) variant, in which the socio-political domain was crucial under the influence of the Revolution. But the political category was not absent in the German ideology: the belief that the German state had a vocation to dominate the world took care of that. Both the variants were the outcome of the 'interaction' (or dialectic) of a 'world civilization' (universalism) and particular national cultures (ibid.: 36 *et passim*).

The 'idiosyncratic formula' of German ideology was the combination of community holism and self-cultivating individualism. In this context, Dumont presents a detailed and insightful analysis of the ideal of 'self-cultivation' (*Bildung*) expressed through an extraordinary intellectual and artistic blossoming in Germany between 1770 and 1830, which was marked by the growth of community consciousness defined culturally. Dumont warns the readers of his book at the very outset that whatever he has to say about the German ideology is about 'yesterday and before', and disclaims any knowledge about 'the Germans of the present day' (ibid.: 3).

From the methodological point of view, a reference back to Dumont's work on India is in order at this point: he himself stresses the continuity (ibid.: viii). As in the Indian case the principal concern is with the articulation of ideology, and with the tension between principle and actuality, but the latter is not altogether neglected. The 'preoccupation' with principles is considered typical of the French intellectual tradition. Thus, the predominant ideology is said to be that of the Left, but the subordinate Right, although 'ideologically impotent, has been empirically powerful in the long run' (ibid.: 209). Dumont's relative lack of interest in the happenings of the present day, whether in India or in Germany, is an expression of this preoccupation. Not that he does not consider contemporary changes in the caste system: in fact, he provides an insightful analysis in terms of a world of 'relations' and interdependence being replaced by competitive 'substances' or blocks (1980: 222). But the manner he does so—interestingly as an exercise in comparison between the past and the present—results in a devaluation of the same: change is said to be confined to the ideologically subordinate politico-economic domain (ibid.: 228; see also Madan 1994: 61–71, Madan 1999: 479).

As for the German-French contrast, it has immense philosophical import that can only be noted here. In Dumont's own words, 'How, without contradiction, can we acknowledge the diversity of cultures and at the same time maintain the universal idea of truth-value? I think it can be done by resorting to a ... complex model ... where truth-value would figure as a "regulative idea", in the Kantian sense' (1994: 34). Such an exercise is not, however, taken up in the book. Indeed, it ends with a rhetorical question that once more and—as it turned out—for the last time underlined Dumont's fascination for the comparative study of ideologies (ibid.: 235).

> That these two countries, each bound to its idiosyncrasy, are impervious to that of its neighbour, should not cause surprise. But is it not pathetic to see each of them neutralize its own experience in order to salvage the ideological framework in terms of which the country has been wont to think of itself and the world over a great length of time?

* * *

My aim in this essay has been limited to an exposition of Dumont's approach to the study of cultures and civilizations. More precisely, I have concentrated on outlining the scope and strategies of the comparative method at his hands. The method was clearly intended to produce results in the form of understandings, in the first place, of particular cultures through an internal or controlled comparison across social space (localities/regions) or across time. The scope of comparison was expanded in the next move to cover the civilizations comprising the local, regional or national cultures. Throughout the effort was to enlarge and deepen understandings by focusing on distinctions (typification) rather than on common features (classification), deferring the exposition of commonalities to yet another, higher, level (generalization). Comparison of social behavioural patterns was subordinated to, or—one might say—carried out in terms of, values and ideas. The data for comparison, whether of social interaction or of ideologies, were derived from ethnographical and historical sources. An account, even a summarized one, of Dumont's substantive conclusions at any level (micro, meso or macro) is beyond the scope of this paper. Such references to it as occur here are only illustrative, and pertain much more to India and the India-West comparison than to the West and the France-Germany comparison. Limitations of both my competence and space are responsible for this restriction.

There is general agreement among interested scholars about the immense importance of the questions that Dumont posed. The methodology employed and the substantive conclusions arrived at by him have been the

subject of a voluminous, vigorous and fruitful debate over the last fifty years. Critics have perhaps outnumbered adherents. Some of the main points of criticism may be mentioned here to indicate their purport.

(1) It is arguable that the emphasis upon 'value-ideas' characteristic of Dumont's method has led to a relative devaluation of 'interests' as these find expression in everyday life, and a certain distortion of the existent social reality has occurred. In the case of India, it has been complained, the pre-occupation with ideology has yielded understandings that are essentially upper caste (brahmanical) in character: the voices of the oppressed and exploited lower castes are not heard. Similarly, a preoccupation with stability and religious values respectively precludes an accurate understanding of contemporary social change and economic and political forces operative in society. The emphatic exclusion of the concerns of the Germans of today is equally problematic in the context of assessing the continuing relevance of particular 'value-ideas' in Western society. Also, as in the case of India, internal social differentiation (notably by class) in relation to the affirmation of the dominant ideology is disregarded.

(2) In the contrastive interpretations of the value premises of the Indian and Western civilizations, the necessary relationship of hierarchy and holism is more readily acceptable than the relationship of individualism and equality. The rhetoric of the Revolution in France may well have held both these values to be supremely and equally important. Societies characterized by a capitalist economy, itself an expression of individualism (opportunity, enterprise, competition, achievement, etc.), are, however, characterized by class divisions and socio-economic inequalities.

(3) The Dumontian typifications are not only over-schematized, they are also essentialist. If the 'value-ideas' of hierarchy and holism are fundamental in Indian civilization, then it does not exist independent of them. This is indeed what Dumont said about the notion of structure in the context of caste: it exists or does not exist, it does not change (1980: 219). The critics consider such characterizations as a present-day reproduction of the nineteenth century typology of the Occident and the Orient—'ourselves' versus 'the others'.

(4) In arriving at the India-West contrast, Dumont seemingly endorses another nineteenth century idea (associated primarily with Hegel and Marx), namely that India 'in the absence of the individual' has a past but 'no history' (1970e: 143). A consequence of this conclusion (it is really an assumption) is that history as a source of data seems to suffice in the case

of Europe, but needs ethnography to complement it in India. A timeless India (tradition) is compared with a historically dynamic West (modernity).

Limitations of space preclude a discussion of the foregoing and other queries directed at Dumont by his critics. It is also not necessary to do so for the purpose of this essay. The fact that I consider the Dumontian approach to the study of civilizations a most valuable and novel contribution does not mean that all one has to do is to mechanically borrow his categories and procedures. He invites emulation rather than uncritical imitation. In my own study of the ideologies of secularism and fundamentalism in India (Madan 1997), I identified 'religious traditions' within the setting of Indian civilization (Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism), and examined them with a view to finding out if they harbour ideas comparable to those of 'secularism' and 'fundamentalism' as these have been formulated in the West in the context of Christianity. The dualism of the latter, expressed in the dichotomy of the sacred and the profane (or secular), is not exactly echoed by the former. Nor is the passage of cognitive categories from one civilizational matrix to another (anticipated in the hopefulness of the Enlightenment universalism or as an historical inevitability) unproblematic. To say so does not, however, mean that cultural traditions are insulated phenomena and that inter-civilizational communication does not occur. Nor did Dumont think so. To hold otherwise would mean falling into the suffocating trap of cultural solipsism and denying what for an Indian is undeniable: namely that India has throughout the twentieth century responded creatively, if not always thoughtfully and successfully, to the call of tradition and to the invitation of modernity.

POSTSCRIPT

The quotation from the concluding volume of Toynbee's *magnum opus* occurs first among the epigraphs, not because there is any significant similarity between Toynbee's and Dumont's approaches, but primarily because as a sociologist I consider it a most promising point of departure. Moreover, my interest in the comparative study of civilizations was awakened when I discovered the first six volumes of *A Study of History* during my days of studentship at the University of Lucknow in the early 1950s.

As a matter of fact, Toynbee's and Dumont's approaches have hardly anything in common that is significant. In spite of the claims to be a historian with a scientific empirical approach, Toynbee was more a religious

visionary and a prophet than a historian. His method was eclectic and, it seems to me, inspirational, illustrating through selective evidence conclusions promulgated at the very beginning of the project, rather than arrived at at the end of it from a critical examination of the available data. He was a system builder receptive to criticism in respect of points of detail rather than the essentials of his *a priori* argument. (Volumes VII to X do mark a major shift, however. See Geyl 1962). But there was great erudition in the books combined with brilliance of style, a fascination for literary classics, and vast knowledge of anthropology—all of which made for instructive and pleasurable reading. Whatever Toynbee wrote about what he called the Indic civilization—and this was considerable—served only to illustrate the general pattern of 'genesis', 'growth', 'breakdown', etc., and did not probe deep into the sociological character of Hinduism or Buddhism in the manner of, say, Max Weber (1958).

In many ways, however, my prior acquaintance with Toynbee's work prepared me for my encounter with and deep appreciation of Dumont's contributions. This encounter began with the reading of what Dumont wrote first, namely the ethnography of a South Indian community. It proceeded step by step to what he did next, and next, gradually widening the focus of inquiry from the local (a Tamil subcaste) to the regional (Dravidian kinship), the inter-regional (North-South comparison of marriage rules), the civilizational (India defined by holism and hierarchy), and the inter-civilizational (India and the West: holism–hierarchy versus individualism–equality). All this has of course been discussed above in the present essay. Suffice it to add here, Dumont was more genuinely an empiricist combining fieldwork observation with textual study, and inductive inference with deductive reasoning. He saw himself as a craftsman, even as an artisan at work, together with others, attempting to build an edifice, ever willing to discard and start again. He was deeply distrustful of system builders. I have not found any reference to Toynbee anywhere in Dumont's work.

If the comparison of civilizations is the subject and considering that Dumont was a cultural-social anthropologist, it may well be asked, as indeed Daya Krishna has (in a personal communication), 'What about Alfred Kroeber?' Some similarities with Dumont (and of course Toynbee, see Sorokin 1952) are at once apparent. He too began locally (all good ethnography is local), among the Zuni Indians studying kinship and clanship among them. He spread his inquiries wider in course of fieldwork time to

write about the cultural and natural areas of native north America. He engaged in ethnographic and archaeological fieldwork in the Philippines and Peru respectively. For our present concern, his magnum opus is *Configurations of Culture Growth* (1944).

The focus of *Configurations* is what Kroeber called 'high cultures', how these change and grow, and the role 'creative geniuses' play in this process. This reads very much like Toynbee with his concepts of 'civilization' and 'creative minority'. Also, he too conceptualizes high cultures in terms of beginnings, developments, peaks, declines, and freezes (his terms). It should be noted that Kroeber completed his book in 1939, by when the first three volumes of Toynbee's *Study* had been available for some years.

In the specific and, for us, the most immediate context of India, Kroeber and Dumont are poles apart in terms of principal interest, method, and conclusions. Kroeber did write about caste (see Kroeber 1930), but not with much insight, defining caste as a special form (closed) of social class. This was the very approach (of seeing institutions everywhere in terms of comparable western institutions) that Dumont was to repudiate. In *Configurations* Kroeber is primarily concerned with the intellectual and artistic aspects of creativity, as also its material and practical dimensions. Alongside the Indian he considered what he called the Greek, Christian and Occidental high cultures as also the Arab-Muslim and the Chinese.

Apart from the vagueness of his key concepts (most notably 'high-value culture pattern') and an explicit Eurocentric bias, Kroeber's knowledge of India is derived entirely from secondary sources in western languages. His conclusions often are highly debatable if not bizarre. To give but one example: 'Since 1200, little of a very high cultural order has been accomplished in India' (1944: 648). And whatever was achieved earlier was either borrowed (mathematics from the Greeks) or inferior to European achievements (Gupta art 'unrelieved by Mediterranean strains') (ibid.: 179, 257, et passim). Kroeber's contribution lay in bringing literate cultures, or civilizations, within the purview of anthropological inquiry, not in any innovative method or insightful conclusions.

Much later contributions by American anthropologists to the development of appropriate concepts and methods for the study of Hindu culture, which have mainly come out of the University of Chicago, most notably those by McKim Marriott and his students (see Marriott 1990), owe a great deal to Dumont's warning against category assumptions and his

emphasis upon the importance of native categories of thought. Like Dumont's own work, these studies are based on solid ethnography and an acquaintance with the textual tradition. They have however gone far beyond his theoretical framework and approach to cast a suspicious eye on his own western assumptions and rationalist/intellectualist methodology. Whether these contributions carry the comparison of civilizations forward to a higher level of abstraction by focusing on difference rather than similarity (for example, Hindu thought is said to lack the notion of the 'bounded individual' and, instead, elaborates the idea of the 'permeable *dividual*'), or postpone it to a future time when the pretensions of western social science will have been corrected, is a subject of current debate in Indianist studies, and obviously beyond the scope of the present essay.

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I am deeply indebted to Professor Daya Krishna for many conversations in recent years in the course of which he always insisted on the importance of 'dialogue' between intellectual traditions. In fact, his pointed questions about Dumont's work provided the original impetus for the writing of this essay. I now know I have raised more questions in his mind than given answers to his earlier ones. Thus, he would consider it imperative to consider Dumont's works on India alongside Max Weber's classic (although in significant ways flawed) study of caste and Hinduism (Weber 1958). This is a promising but difficult project, to be taken up seriously and not trifled with. But, as Dumont always insisted, intellectual work is a collective and ever-expanding and ever-deepening endeavour.

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Postmodernism and History

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Beginning with renaissance and enlightenment, modernity has been used as the all-embracing yardstick to interpret contemporary society and culture. The perception of the hegemonic and static character of modernism in the face of the rapidly changing situation, led some philosophers to question the adequacy of this conception. Thus was born what is known as Postmodernism. The emergence of Postmodernism as the culture and philosophy of the present times, has given a new meaning to the theoretical languages and production of objects of knowledge within social science.

It is difficult to define Postmodernism because Postmodernists see nothing as fixed or solid nor is it a united movement belonging either to left or right or centre. Like modernity its meaning has been changing continuously and it is not without contradictions.

The Postmodernist philosophy emerged during the heyday of capitalism marked by media consumption, consumerism and extraordinary economic productivity of the 1950s and '60s. This is to be viewed against the situation where communism failed to provide the alternatives it had claimed to, and critique of capitalism by the Western Marxists and the feminists had broken down notions of progress, harmony and optimistic belief in reasonableness or rational man. In this phase of modernism, human beings came to be valued only as objects and smaller group identities based on gender, race, ethnicity etc., received prominence against the universal class identity of the proletariat. So, relativism and scepticism came to mark the epistemological and methodological practices, and the construction of objects of knowledge resulting from wide acknowledgement by thinkers like Michel Foucault, Derrida, Braudillard, and J. Lyotard, collectively referred to as Postmodernists, of 'incommensurability of reality to concepts'. It is the systematic eradication of intrinsic values of culture in the phase of liberal market capitalism which Postmodernism expresses.

In this, they built on the pattern of Nietzsche, a German Philosopher of the 19th century, who had announced the death of god (theological meta-narrative) and Heidegger's antihumanism, and announced the death of secular 'meta-narratives'.

J. Lyotard characterized Postmodernism as expressing the death of centres and displaying the 'incredulity towards meta-narratives'.[1] 'Death of centres' means that old organizing frameworks centring around Europe or identities like ethnicity or gender are no longer regarded as legitimate and natural frameworks but as temporary fictions useful for articulation of not universal but particular interests. Postmodernists celebrate existence of differences, variety and diversity for their own sake. Since there is no foundation or reality to which thought can be subject and since even self is divided, there is no standpoint from which to impose a unity on spontaneous diversity of existence.[2] The 'incredulity towards meta-narratives' means scepticism towards universal themes of reason and science and certaintist discourses built upon them. The major systems of religious, political and cultural ideas such as capitalism, socialism, liberalism etc. which underly social and political institutions and practices, are rejected as impracticable.

Defoundationalism apart, Postmodernism defines itself negatively representing the postivist phase of Marxism, Structuralism, Positivism and above all, Enlightenment, questioning their basic premises.

Postmodernism is basically a reaction to and an extension of modernity. It questions the project of modernity on the ground that truth and rationality are always socially and discursively constructed, and their validity and applicability are necessarily limited to their particular contexts. They have no general or universal import.

Holding such views, Postmodernists claim that truth is dependent on somebody having power to make it true and not allowing something from being said. Each society has its general politics of truth, that is, types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements and techniques and procedures accorded value in acquisition of truth. It believes that search for objective knowledge is at worst a desire to dominate and control.[3] In fact, it is power that produces knowledge. To quote, Foucault, 'Power and knowledge directly imply one another that there is no power relation without correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power-relation.'[4] Language is all we can know about the world and we have access to no other reality. Knowledge and meaning are culturally differentiated, always mediated by a specific language. Reality consists in words, images and metaphor that are used to describe it, not in use of reason. By deconstructing the picture, one has made of reality, one can expose its foundations. Deconstruction is made necessary by the tendency to privilege favoured conceptual scheme by grounding them in some source of meaning outside language. Thus the concept of rationality is no more ideal or privileged than any other concept.[5]

Hence, we do not need a theory of knowledge at all. This position is based on an epistemological relativism which claims that in principle human thought can not transcend its social moorings making no claims that are transcultural or transhistorical. Thus the very criteria demarcating true and false, science and myth, and fact and superstition are a part of the tradition of modernity and hence could not be legitimized outside of this tradition. This means privileging of the notion of difference based on the absence of unity on the basis of any real interests.

The Postmodernist ideas about knowledge, truth and objectivity have radically influenced the way history is written. Postmodernists characterize history as a discourse in which truth is a device to regulate interpretations with practices of containment, in which right to speak is restricted to experts, i.e. guardians of knowledge. The management of discourse in this way, restricts our access to the past and structures our narratives of that past. Believing in these, Foucault, one of the leading exponents of Postmodernist thought, ventured to subvert dominant epistemology and recuperate suppressed margins of history. He wanted to dissolve an ordered meta-history into a myriad of smaller unruly histories of dissent and heterogeneity. Disregarding the notion of a continuous vision of history, Foucault recognized the imprint of aspects of social identity (including gender, age, ethnicity) upon the constitution of subjectivity. Foucault's main objective was to create a history of different modes by which human beings are made subject. The subjects are located within an intricate web of power-relations, in which exercise of power leads to modification of certain actions by those exposed to that power.

Based on these notions, Postmodernists believe that anything can be made to look good or bad, useful or useless simply by being redescribed and it is that 'redescriptive turn', claims Richard Rorty,[6] that has encompassed history. The past can be infinitely redescribed by historians from

various backgrounds in their own way, in the way Nietzsche said, 'So I willed it'.

The condition of Postmodernism has produced a multiplicity of histories to be variously used or abused. It has meant combining and recombining of various methodological, epistemological and ideological assumptions and perspectives so that the resultant history is expressive of no essence. So, whatever interpretations are there, they are not on the basis of methodological corrections but they are aligned to dominant discursive practices.

All this has meant historiographically led and methodologically informed deconstructionism querying the notion of historians' truth and the concept of past as notional or real world.

Influenced by the Postmodernist ideas of Foucault regarding knowledge and power and celebration of the marginal, the historians of subaltern schools attempted to create a historiography from below, defining localized and marginal identities as fragmented, popular and more authentic because they are indigenous and belonging to a sphere less penetrated and organized by colonial and western discourses.[7]

There is deliberate extraction of popular from the mass of the subordinated and the silent, the criterion for the extraction being articulations of resistance, defiance or negativity vis-à-vis 'Colonial State'. Thus, David Arnold's article on the Indian plague,[8] dramatizing the body of the colonized as a site of conflict between colonial power and indigenous people, Gautam Bhadra's 'Mentality of Subaltern'[9] displaying intricate linkages between idioms of domination, subordination and revolt and Sumit Sarkar's 'Kalki Avatar of Vikrampura'[10] exposing perceptions of madness and multilayered meanings show clear influence of Foucault-Derridean Postmodernism.[11]

However, the Postmodernist approach to history is not without contradictions and weaknesses. By claiming to have exposed historicity of all values and knowledge they deny the very existence of causal analysis and with it any idea of making history. Their theory of epochal change based on the denial of history is a contradiction associated with a kind of pessimistic thinking. Since there are no systems and no history susceptible to causal analysis, we can not get to the root of powers that oppress us and can not aspire to some kind of united opposition. The most we can hope for is a lot of particular and separate resistances. While emphasizing marginal, it ignores intricacies of integration of world economy in the

capitalist system, the way trans-national capital infringes state sovereignty and autonomy.

Further as the language is regarded as the terrain of power, domination and repression embodied in particular social institutions and since society is discursively constructed, there is no social basis outside language for any real resistance. Although subaltern studies reject meta-narratives, their own conditions of existence and emergence remain primarily within meta-narrative. Their exclusion of analysis of role of class, caste and kinship-identity in favour of culture as the only basis of understanding the subalterns, ignorance of the process through which change takes place in any society and its culture and treating changes as merely the effects of power-relations lead only to a methodological individualism, not allowing any kind of programmatic politics, ignoring also is commonalities among people based on material conditions and the fact that identities are never a fixed case.[12]

While criticizing Marxism because of its project of human emancipation, totalizing impulses and delegitimizing demands of women, blacks, gays and others because of their non-accessibility to economic reductionism, Postmodernists ignore marginalization and delegitimization of Marxism by capitalism. Interestingly, Marxism was also a critique of the capitalist system, a point ignored by Postmodernists.

Notwithstanding these, the Postmodernists' dismissal of the essentialism, celebration of the marginal and the view of history as discursive practice that enables present-minded people to go to the past and reorganize it appropriately to their needs instead of it as a subject aiming at real knowledge of the past, can make visible aspects of the past that were hidden, overlooked or sidelined producing fresh insights into the present.

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Dialectical Dialogue: From Dialogue to Dialectic

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The present paper is an attempt to develop dialectical dialogue that could be used as a method to facilitate a dialogue between persons, identities, ethnicities, communities, cultures and civilizations. It could further be used to resolve the differences between environmentalists or ecologists, feminists, secularists, and the like. Dialectical dialogue has evolved out of the philosophical development from the dialogues of Socrates (c. 470–399 BC) to the dialectic of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). The roots of dialectic, I will try to show, can be found in the dialogues of Socrates which have been compiled in the works of Plato (c. 428–348 BC). I shall expound and examine the nature and status of a dialogue—not in general but specifically that of Socrates—and bring out its stimulating characteristics that could have helped the emergence and growth of dialectical thinking. The philosophical legacy of Socrates, Kant and Hegel could further be developed into a dialectical dialogue, which could be used as an effective method to resolve present-day problems.

In the above, I have mixed a great many issues together. In what follows, I will try to sort them out. For the sake of clarity and precision, I propose to divide this paper into three parts: Part I, To expound Socrates' method of dialogue with its characteristic features of consensus and contradiction; Part II, To develop the dialectic of Kant and Hegel with the operative terms of contradiction and sublation; Part III, To develop dialectical dialogue with its operative terms like dialectic (differentiation and self-differentiation) and dialogue (conversation and communication with other cultures).

Before I come to Part I of the paper, I would like to answer the question—why, at all, do we require a dialectical dialogue? As a matter of fact, the ancient world was finite in terms of its socio-economic conditions, scientific developments, historical and cultural products. Socrates' attempt to define knowledge, virtues, etc. by means of a dialogue was

confined within the limits circumscribed by the history of the time. The modern world was infinite in terms of ideology, scientific and technological developments, logocentrism, foundationalism, essentialism and teleology, unified world order, rationality, conceptions of morality and justice, etc. The dialectic of Kant and Hegel was confined to understand, comprehend and even transform the modernist notion of reality. The postmodern world has again shrunk into finite propositions in terms of anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism and anti-teleology, fragmentation, irrationality and plurality of ethnic identities, linguistic identities, etc. Our present-day world has entered into the age of Information Technology—the internet and cyberspace—and globalization—with new markets, tools, institutions and rules—both at the level of production and consumption. We are faced with a series of crises. There is inner chaos that is experienced in ones inability to live in harmony with oneself. There is the social chaos that is experienced in ones inability to live in harmony with others. There is environmental crisis of polluting the planet, the elimination of species and destruction of forests and vegetation. There is also the metaphysical chaos arising from the experience of ones sense of separation from the rest of the universe. In the ancient world, the Indians, the Chinese, the Greeks lived without much contact with one another and in that sense there was pluralism. But each culture regarded its principles to be universally valid. The *Ṛta* of the *Vedas*, the Platonic *Forms*, the *Tao* of the Chinese—all claimed to be universal. Without their knowing it, they agreed that as in the cosmos, so in the human order *Yatha pinde, tatha Brahmande*. Today the world is one; the Chinese, the Indians, the Europeans or the Americans mingle in academia and in the market place. Modern science and technology has played the most important role in bringing the people so close to each other. And hence we need dialectical dialogue to understand each other. We also need a dialectical dialogue to comprehend scientific and technological developments. There have been three stages of the development of modern science in the last century—the development of quantum mechanics in the twenties; the development of molecular, cell and DNA biology through the eighties, the development of computers, information, automation, brain sciences and human genome, all in a piece through the '90s. Modern technology, far from being more labour saving, has taken man out from the Planet Ocean and has hinted at the possibility of establishing interplanetary relations. We need, not only to comprehend this technology dialogically, but also to participate

with it dialectically. Particularly with the rise and development of modernity; science, technology and philosophy have always been complementing one another. The works of Albert Einstein, Arthur Edington, Werner Heisenberg, Julian Huxley, Erwin Schrodinger, Neils Bohr and others support this contention. Philosophy needs scientific foundation to give a deeper and more correct explanation of natural and social phenomena. Science also needs philosophical justification to relate and evaluate the technological products and scientific theories with the *cultures* and *values* on the one hand and with the aspirations and goals of the people on the other. This, however, has given rise to the problem of cultural pluralism, which today reigns supreme, and it requires a dialectical dialogue not only to understand the other culture but also to participate in them. Thus dialectical dialogue could be used as a method to understand the multipolarity, complexity, plurality and fragmentation of the postmodern world.

I would like to state at the outset that dialectical dialogue will not simply be *dia-logued* (as in the case of Socrates) but *multi-logued*, accepting pluralism and repudiating monism or absolutism (as in the case of Hegel). With this brief clarification, I come to Part-I of the paper.

PART-I

A dialogue is a process of conversation, argumentation and mutual supplementation of ideas between two individuals. With dialogue, a method has evolved in which the encounters with other thinkers are essential. It is just opposed to a monologue, which can formulate nothing but a dogma. The ideas I formulate to defend my standpoint must confront with other approaches, must give expression to other thinkers *as others*, and not as possible elements of a system in which I can recognize my own thought. Other thinkers must be permitted to speak as others on the same subject. I am and remain only a participant.

We come across such instances in the dialogue of Socrates. Here the totality of moments of participation comes to be on a specific subject. Two or more than two thinkers exchange their ideas through argumentation with the aim of the *search for truth*.

It is the search for truth that provides food for thought and thus thinking is stimulated. In Plato's *Theaetetus*, for instance, in discussing the question of the nature of knowledge, Theaetetus advances an ostensive

definition. He says that sciences like geometry, astronomy, harmony and calculation are knowledge. Socrates examines this definition thus:

Socrates: Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberty of your nature make you give many things, when I am asking for one simple thing.
Theaetetus: What do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates: Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning. When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?
Theaetetus: Just so.
Socrates: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?
Theaetetus: I do.
Socrates: In both cases you define the subject-matter of each of the two arts?
Theaetetus: True.
Socrates: But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question; we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?
Theaetetus: Perfectly right.
Socrates: Let me offer an illustration; suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing—for example, what is clay? And we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?
Theaetetus: Truly.
Socrates: In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of 'clay', merely because we added of the image-makers, or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?
Theaetetus: He can not.
Socrates: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of art or science of making shoes?
Theaetetus: None.
Socrates: Nor of any other science?

Theaetetus: No.
Socrates: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is 'what is knowledge?' and the replies, 'A knowledge of this or that?'
Theaetetus: True.
Socrates: Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth—what sort of clay is not to the point.[1]

And this way, the dialogue goes on. Socrates is often portrayed as seeking definition of particular excellence: courage in the *Laches*, soundness of mind in the *Charmides*, piety in the *Euthyphro*, or excellence in general in the *Meno*. The only method which is followed here is dialogue. Professing perplexity in the process of dialogue, Socrates goads another person into offering an account of the excellence, but refuses to be satisfied with examples, insisting on a general characterization that can be used to tell whether something is, indeed, an example of that excellence. When an account is offered, Socrates presses the other party with questions requiring a 'yes' or 'no' answer, and by means of inferences drawn from the statements to which the other party is committed, Socrates drives him into contradiction. Another definition may be tried, or occasionally the other party may be given a chance to change his answer to one of Socrates' questions. In either case another contradiction results and the dialogue eventually ends with the participants in the same state of perplexity as Socrates.

In a dialogue, it is the view of the other *as the other* or the *contradiction*, which is the operative term. But a dialogue is possible only when both the speakers maintain a fundamental consensus, i.e. both the speakers '(a) speak and (b) listen, (c) aim at truth (d) understand each other's language (e) understand each other's way of thinking (f) and do not live in two worlds whose contents totally differ.'[2] These elements prepare a meeting ground for a dialogue to be possible. As speaker, I am successful when my words elicit a response. Total silence or applause interrupts or ends my speaking. The listener who assimilates what I have said can produce an answer, which can stimulate me in return. My listener becomes speaker and vice-versa. Master and pupil exchange places.

In Socrates' dialogues, we thus find two characteristic features; namely, consensus and contradiction. These are the two operative terms for the possibility and development of ideas under the method of dialogue. Absolute consensus is nothing but a dogma. Absolute contradiction leads us nowhere. It is only under a certain degree of consensus that a certain amount of contradiction is entertained and thinking is thus stimulated. With this, I wish to come to dialectic in Kant and Hegel in Part-II of the paper.

PART-II

In dialogue, as stated above, there is a sophisticated use of logic in pretending to prove false or ungrounded views of the opponents. And this is the meaning which Kant attributes to dialectic. Just as in Socrates' dialogues with Theaetetus, there is a movement of thought through criticism; similarly, dialectic, for Kant, is the critical movement of thought, or, the self-criticism of reason itself. In dialogue, both the speakers are related to each other like the subject and the predicate in a proposition; in dialectic, reason is both the subject and the predicate of the critique. Dialectic is inherent in the nature of reason itself. In the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes, 'Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge, it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its power, it is also not able to answer.'[3]

Similar is the situation in the process of dialogue too. Several definitions are offered, but due to one or other contradiction arising, the dialogue eventually ends with the participants in a state of perplexity. In dialectic, Kant discusses such questions which human reason can neither comprehend nor reject. Reason can not comprehend those issues because it can not present them in reality. Reason can not avoid those issues, because they arise out of the very nature of reason itself. These are called the antinomies of pure reason. Kant, here, presents a critique of reason itself in order to resolve certain contradictions which create a conflict of reason with itself.

It is in the discussion of the antinomies that Kant does justice to his general claim that human reason investigates various series of conditions in an attempt to discover the absolutely unconditioned. He expounds four

antinomies. In each antinomy, there is a thesis with supporting arguments and an antithesis with supporting arguments. By conjoining the two, we come across an antinomy, an apparent contradiction.

Although Transcendental Dialectic is the third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, its main problems are the fundamental pre-occupation of the critical philosophy. The first two sections hinge on his answer to one question: How is scientific knowledge possible and to what extent? The answer, Kant found, lies in his formulation of synthetic *a priori* judgement. As synthetic, it amplifies the concept of predicate and is thus more than a mere tautology. As *a priori*, it expresses universality and necessity. What we require in science, according to Kant, is such ampliative knowledge with the characteristics of universality and necessity. But scientific knowledge, Kant warns, has a limit; i.e. it can not pretend to apprehend what is beyond experience. This is the point where we come to Kant's exposition of dialectic.

In the context of dialectic, Kant's contributions to German philosophy consist in his attempt to draw a distinction between 'understanding' and 'reason', and, to give an insight into the nature of our attempt to apply our concepts to the absolute unconditioned. The crux of Kant's dialectic consists in exposing those tendencies which attempt to overstep the experience, and, thus to precipitate into antinomies. Such a tendency, in Kant's terminology, is characteristic of traditional metaphysics. Kant argues that the absurd results of the antinomies can only demonstrate that metaphysicians must give up the attempt to 'know the infinite'. Therefore, metaphysics is not possible, what is possible is physics.

What is central to Kant's dialectic is one of the fundamental tendencies of Socrates' dialogue; i.e. contradiction. Under the title Antinomies of Pure Reason, Kant formulates four pairs of contradictions—finite and infinite, simple and complex, causality and freedom and conditioned and unconditioned. Kant, however, leaves these contradictions unresolved. And by doing so, he draws a limit to the extent of knowledge. Reason is never in immediate relation to objects given in sensibility. It is understanding that holds sway in Kant's epistemology. Reason is required as the indispensable corrective to the deficiencies of understanding. Since there are four main heads in which categories are divided, there will be four kinds of absolute totality and four kinds of search for a complete series of explanatory conditions, right upto the absolute unconditioned. First, there is the search for a complete series of objects in space and a complete

series of events in time. Second, there is the search for a complete series of parts of matter. That is, we begin with some material object and attempt to divide and sub-divide it into its constituent parts, so obtaining a series of simpler and simpler parts of matter. The third and the fourth searches are for two kinds of complete causal series, consisting of a given event, the cause of that cause, and so on. In every case reason urges us to pursue the search until the series of conditions is completed, until we reach the absolutely unconditioned that requires no further explanation. But reason, in every case, despite arguing rigorously from apparently true premises, arrives at an antinomy, a contradiction. Reason comes to such an embarrassing situation because it uses the categories of understanding separating them from sensibility, i.e. without corresponding sensible intuitions.

Kant, in his formulation, however, fails to incorporate the other characteristic of Socrates' dialogue, i.e. the moments of consensus. It is precisely due to this failure that Kant could not resolve the antinomies. He over-emphasized the moments of contradiction, but ignored the significance of a meeting ground between two contradictory concepts. Kant's dialectic is therefore not as dynamic and alive as Socrates' dialogues are.

It goes to the credit of Hegel to recognize the significance of identity in every moment of contradiction. The strikingly new interpretation of Hegel's dialectic consists in his attempt to incorporate logic into it. It requires two lines of argument: first, showing that a given category is indispensable; the second, showing that it leads us to a characterization of reality which is somehow contradictory. Hegel, in fact fuses these together. This has a certain amount of resemblance to the characteristic features of Socrates' dialogue. Just as, for Socrates, it is only consensus and contradiction that keep a dialogue in continuity; similarly, for Hegel, the operative terms for dialectic are 'sublation' *aufheben* and 'contradiction'. Hegel's dialectic is thus in many ways analogous to Socrates' dialogue.

Despite such similarities, there are certain fundamental differences between Socrates' dialogue and Hegel's dialectic. The amount of consensus in Socrates' dialogue is not, and can not be, the same as sublation in Hegel's dialectic. Moreover, contradiction in Hegel's dialectic is radically different from the contradiction in Socrates' dialogue.

Sublation, in Hegel's dialectic, means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary. The deduction of

categories from one another in the *Science of Logic* shows that all lower categories are sublated into the higher ones and they have a direct reference to the wholeness. To substantiate this point, I would like to take up Hegel's analysis of Kant's position on 'understanding' and 'reason'. Hegel undoubtedly acknowledges Kant's Transcendental Dialectic as his greatest contribution to philosophy; both for its basic distinction between understanding and reason and for its insight into the nature of our attempt to apply our concepts to the absolute unconditioned. The Kantian antinomies effected the fall of the previous metaphysics by examining the finitude of the contents of the categories. But for Hegel, the function of understanding—through the process of abstraction—is to present contradiction between individual and universal, identity and difference, and so on. And the realm of reason seeks to unify that which the understanding has divided. Reason shows that the function of understanding—to define things in terms of their isolation—constitutes a process of abstraction. The function of reason is to make manifest the concrete relation in which an idea, a concept or a reality subsists. Kant argues that the function of reason is to draw a limit to the extent of the categories of understanding. Hegel's criticism of Kant's concept of reason consists in the fact that while recognizing its dialectical characteristics, reason fails to overcome the antinomies between finite and infinite, etc. Hegel however regards reason as the indispensable corrective to the deficiencies of understanding. In the process of unifying the opposites, reason sublates the finite and the infinite, so that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. This wholeness in which the contradictions are sublated, Hegel terms as the 'Absolute', the 'Truth'. Hegel says, 'The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature.'[4]

The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, however, does not adequately furnish the whole dialectical process through which the knowledge of the Absolute, the Truth, is possible. Its formulations are given in the *Science of Logic* with an exhaustive formulation on the notion of contradiction. Hegel says, '... everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things ... contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only

in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.'[5]

It may be recalled that for Socrates, human thought develops by the elimination of contradictions in the process of dialogue; but for Hegel, contradiction is internal to each term. Hegel continues, '... internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity is not as yet a thing. Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradictions within it and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradictions within it.'[6] Hegel concludes near the end of the *Logic* that there is nothing, whether in actuality or in thought, that is as simple and abstract as is commonly imagined. 'Nothing exists as brutally given and simply possessing one or two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is just first and primary and on which other things depend without mutual relation ... what appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and mediated.'[7]

Hegel, thus, rules out the possibility of the elimination of contradictions once and for all. And with it, Hegel's dialectic deviates from Socrates' dialogue. And this is how Hegel incorporates logic into dialectic. The traditional belief, that human thought develops gradually with the elimination of contradictions, is central to Kantian philosophy. This is the reason why Kant separates logic from dialectic. Hegel is fundamentally opposed to this view. He applies his dialectic in the *Science of Logic* to the gradual explication and development of not only of the 'separation' but also of the 'connectedness' between one category and another.

In the process of the deduction of categories from one another, Hegel arrives at the 'System of Subjective Logic' which is the third division of the *Science of Logic*. Hegel, here, develops the concept of subject which is the same thing as the doctrine of Notion in which the categories of Being and Essence are merged into a unity. With Notion, we come to the point where subjectivity is the true form of objectivity. Hegel's analysis of it goes in the following schema:

> The true form of reality requires freedom. Freedom requires self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth. Self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth are the essentials of the subject. The true form of reality must be conceived as subject.[8]

The Notion presents an objective totality in which every particular moment appears as the 'self-differentiation' of the universal that governs the totality. That is to say, every particular moment contains, as its very content, the whole, and must be interpreted as the whole. For explanation, let us refer again to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where 'the true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development.' The Notion designates the general form of being in which being, through development by means of contradiction and sublation, realizes its essence. At the same time, Notion expresses the free subject, which adequately represents the true being. The free subject exists in a movement of this self-realization. Hegel calls the highest form of this self-realization—the *Geist*.

The *Geist* in its final form is the 'free-subject', the Notion. Its otherness and negation is the object, being. And both the Notion and its otherness are constantly overwhelmed by the ontological conceptions of Hegel's absolute idealism. Hegel's *Science of Logic* thus ends where it began, with the category of being. This, however, is a different being that can no longer be explained through the concepts applied in the analysis that opened the Logic. For, Being now is understood in its Notion, that is, as a concrete totality wherein all particular forms subsist as the essential distinctions and relations of one comprehensive principle—the Absolute Truth.

It may here be recalled that just as Socrates' dialogue, due to contradictions, eventually ends with the participants in the same state of perplexity as it had started; similarly, Hegel's *Logic* and with it his dialectic ends where it began. This similarity is, evidently, because of the similar driving forces operating behind the possibility and progress of both dialogue and the dialectic. What is central to Socrates' dialogue and the dialectic of Kant and Hegel is their idealism. In his dialogues, the kind of questions Socrates is occupied with are generally the questions of ethics—justice, truth, courage, etc. He is known to be the first philosopher who shifted philosophical questions from the questions of physics to the questions of ethics. And the kind of interpretation and definition, if at all, we come across in Socrates is confined within the general frame of idealism as such. And the stimulating characteristics of Socrates' dialogue—consensus and contradiction—represent the key terms of the dialectic of Kant and Hegel. This again is the development within the general frame of idealism. With this we wish to come to Part-III of the paper.

PART-III

This is the appropriate place where I should expound dialectical dialogue. Dialectic as developed by Kant and Hegel is theory loaded and an elevated concept. Its pre-theoretical surrogate is obtainable in Socrates' dialogues. Dialectical dialogue will incorporate, absorb, sublate and even transcend the features of dialogue and the dialectic together. It is dialectical in its formulation. It means that dialectical dialogue will incorporate all contradictions, oppositions and differences between one culture and another, and will try to transcend and sublate them, so that it becomes all inclusive and can evolve a global culture. *Ones* identity (linguistic, ethnic, cultural, etc.) could be identified and shaped only by means of a dialogue through its exposure to and experience of the *other's* identity of the same or the neighbouring culture. An identity is therefore identical within differences. This is the principle of the unity and the struggle of opposites. The being of an identity is being-with and being-in-contrast-with-other identities. Dialectical dialogue will address the problems not in abstraction like Kant and Hegel, but in terms of the social nexus, spatio-temporal frame, earthly existence, historical and actual life of human culture and civilization. Dialectical dialogue is dialogic in its comprehension, so that ones views can participate with those of the other. It will not simply be a dia-*logos*, such binaries as East and West, Indian and Ionian, Oriental and Occidental; rather, it will be multi-*logos* which fits into the multipolarity of the world order. Multi-*logos* could be between one and many, between persons who are living and those who are not. 'One can well imagine simulated conversations also between the persons who are *all* dead. The historians, archaeologists and anthropologists are, in different ways, engaged in this sort of conversation and communication between the peoples and cultures which have disappeared from the face of the earth. It is not without reason that the historians speak of *contemporaneity* of history, suggesting that the historians and the themes of their history, involving individuals and cultures of the past, are in a sense contemporaneous. To them the past is living, relives in their thought, and is not something dead.'[9] It also could be used in the morals and the conceptions of good which are said to be relative to cultures, even large cultural identities—the cultural universals—have now disintegrated into smaller ones, i.e. multiculturalism or cultural pluralism. This forces us to go into the radical revision through multi-

loguing, if not total rejection, of the dia-loguing East-West or Indo-European approaches.

To bring the paper to a close, it can be said that the conceptual development from dialogue to dialectic in Socrates, Kant and Hegel is rich and intense all along. However, in the changed intellectual climate, we have to evolve a method of dialectical dialogue which can incorporate Socrates' dialogue on the one hand and the dialectic of Kant and Hegel on the other. I would like to point out that dialogue as a philosophical method developed by Socrates still stimulates thinkers to incorporate them into their own methods. Kant and Hegel attempted to substitute dialogue with dialectic within the general form of idealism. This, in no way, undermines the changes and developments introduced by Kant and Hegel with reference to their specific philosophical systems. However Hegel's *aufheben*, with the doctrine of spirit, could be reduced to the symbol of an 'idealizing mastery'. Dialectical dialogue is deeply rooted on the reality of human existence in terms of their identities, ethnicities, cultures and civilizations.

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Ecological Ethics: A Value Paradigm

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Ecological ethics is concerned with the moral relations of human beings with their environment. Environment is everything around us, living, non-living, plants, animals etc. However, it is worth noting that it is only a part of the entire spectrum of environment. The environment is not merely a collection of living and non-living things but an intricate connection (link) between these various elements. Living beings absorb energy and material from the environment and convert these into living matter. After death their bodies are decomposed back to the original matter. Water evaporates and becomes clouds and then precipitates back in the form of rain or snow. It is these linkages and exchanges that define the essence of ecology.

Over millions of years a phenomenal equilibrium has been maintained between the various linkages of nature. Like any other system, there are limits to the amount of disturbance it can sustain and once the limit is crossed it is unable to regain the balance. According to the idea of 'the balance of nature', the species populations of each biotic community, and ultimately all species encompassed by the Earth's biosphere form an integrated order of harmonious relationships among themselves. The steady equilibrium of this system as a whole works to the mutual benefit of living things. Apparently, a biotic community is considered as a kind of supraorganism, whose well-being is preserved by harmony among all the units within the community, much as the well-being of an individual living thing is preserved when all its organs and tissues perform their various biological functions in the proper manner. The loss of balance can also lead to the loss of productivity and can also have a backlash that can threaten our crucial life support systems as our very existence depends on the environment. The air we breathe, the food we eat, the water, the minerals and construction materials we use—everything comes from nature. Hence any impact on the health of the environment is of great concern for us.

Some of the developments of modern science seem to have made the universe very much easier to understand than it was earlier. Moreover, such scientific revolutions have, apparently, benefited humanity by advancing levels of comforts, health, wealth and leisure. However, we find that morality and prescriptions for a good life, by and large, do not occupy any significant place in it. Undoubtedly the birth of scientific knowledge saw the growth of humanism and a belief in mankind's rational powers. However, it appears that the growth of science rather than emphasizing the rational powers of man, has vastly extended the means of exploitation of animals and nature by him. With the success in the advancement of scientific knowledge and its application to industries, man developed an arrogant attitude to conquer nature, which led to some unforeseen consequences. With the greatest control of the natural environment, man has so intervened in the natural process that the original balance of nature is apparently being lost. Agreeing with this idea, Peter Singer argues that 'by depleting the ozone layer and increasing the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere we have already brought about the change ... (Thereby) we have deprived nature of its independence and that is fatal to its meaning. Nature's independence is its meaning, without it, there is nothing, but us.'[1]

The aim of ethics is to find out: what is good for man? In search of the answer to this question man considered himself to be the centre of his thinking and thus became over-conscious of his own existence. Immensely benefited by scientific revolution, human beings became oblivious of the fact that in the universe every creature has a rightful share in what is given by nature. While espousing the existential value of humanity as uppermost, plants and animals have been assigned only utility value. Anthropological culture developed in such a way that species in the universe, other than man, were supposed to exist as long as they served the interests of man. Human beings in order to secure and promote their existence, growth and comforts, have been resorting to indiscriminate exploitation of their environment. Little concern and care was shown for those which were of no utility to man. On the other hand, those which were supposed to have utility value for man, have been exploited to their convenience. Cruelty to animals and large scale deforestation are being perpetrated in man's interest.

Although the basic problem of ethics is to find out: what is good for man?, it has been felt that the good for today may be bad for tomorrow.

Moreover, what is good for the present generation may be devastating for the future generations. Hence, ethics is concerned with value because values constitute an order. One thing is more valuable than another leading to the conception of positive and negative values. Human beings give direction to their lives on the basis of their own values as value is central to human action.

A person's value system, does not comprise merely the personal preferences. Nor is it a simple unstructured series of likes and dislikes, of desires and aversions, of positive and negative responses to the world. Recognition of value makes one interpret that one automatically gets the right to share in that value. Man believes that he has a right to a thing because of its value to him. The recognition of a value implies an obligation to seek it. The field or area of obligations is co-extensive with the realm of values and rights and obligations are correlative. That something has value implies either it has value for oneself or it has value to something else.

The centre of moral universe revolves around human beings as they are the only morally significant features of this world. As a moral being we have duties towards oneself and others as well. The basic duty towards ones own self is that of self-preservation. Additionally we have duties towards other persons to behave in such a way that does not harm the fabric of society.

This idea has been made explicit by Paul W. Taylor in his book *Respect for Nature*. He has presented a lucid distinction between moral agents and moral subjects. 'A moral agent ... is any being that possesses those capacities by virtue of which it can act morally or immorally, can have duties and responsibilities and can be held accountable for what it does.'[2] On the other hand moral subjects have been defined as '... any being that can be treated rightly or wrongly and toward whom moral agents can have duties and responsibilities.'[3]

Human beings, the only moral agents, can at the same time be moral subjects also. Meaning thereby that they not only have duties and responsibilities towards others, but they are themselves beings with regard to whom others have duties and responsibilities. As moral agents they can treat others rightly or wrongly but as moral subjects they can be treated rightly or wrongly by others. However, moral subjects are of the nature that good or evil can be done to them. Such entities include all living organisms. On the other hand, inanimate objects do not have good of their

own. Hence they cannot be treated rightly or wrongly as they are not moral subjects.

Thus, from moral point-of-view, animate and inanimate objects are clearly distinct. We owe no duties to inanimate objects but we have duties with regard to them. This is for the reason that harm to them may harm animate beings including people to whom we have duties. As so, the ethical significance of inanimate objects is paramount as the destruction, modification and preservation of inanimate objects affects the well-being of moral subjects. Accordingly we should refrain from upsetting the ecosystem as it has a kind of value which we should seek to sustain. But how to explain our duties towards rocks and trees, and how to treat mosquitoes and earthworms rightly or wrongly? What to do if our duties towards plants and animals conflict with our duties towards our fellow human beings? Here it will be worth mentioning that there is a lot of contradiction among *Homo sapiens* themselves. First of all the inner and outer configuration of each individual's life situation makes him crave for mental or internal harmony. Again in the family relationships, conflicts and struggles emerge at various levels. An important point here revolves around the status of women. Particularly in developing societies this status is still far from satisfactory and women tend to be relegated to an inferior position. It appears that in the West the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, perhaps to compensate for past injustices. A harmonious balance between the two is needed. Beyond the family circle there are various areas of conflicts such as in religious communities, caste groupings, professional associations, political bodies and so on. Modern man necessarily interacts, with a wide spectrum of social groupings. Each one of these areas can contribute to the growth of social cohesion, but can also be a source of acute conflict as we see from our own experience in India and other countries. Further, nation state which is the most powerful form of social organization has, of course, achieved great progress and cohesion. But, it has also resulted in endless conflicts between nations and between various ethnic, linguistic and political groups within nations. Hence, this earth appears to be a collection of objects; some of them conscious, some not conscious but all the same an aggregate, a plurality of separate individuals. Moreover, the growth of weapons technology has been so awesome that not only the human race but the life of this planet can be destroyed within a few seconds. Even a non-nuclear conflict like

the Gulf War caused massive casualties and appalling damage to the biosphere and environment of our planet.

Such an atomistic picture is enough to give the impression that moral issues would be competing and mutually contradictory clashes of separate individuals, each pursuing its interests, is inevitable. With this backdrop, it is imperative to find a peaceful resolution of such disputes which would lead towards a sane and equitable world civilization in which the scarce resources of planet earth are used in such a way as to ensure the necessary material and intellectual inputs for all human beings to live a decent life. The other is the path of conflict and disharmony which will inevitably result in the destruction of life on earth. However, ecology has made it possible to apprehend the same earth as an articulate unity. It is an inner link that binds the whole into a single family and cuts across all barriers of nationality or religion, caste or creed, sex or social status. It appears to be able to establish harmony and peace at social, national and international levels. It is not merely a mystical vision or an idealist utopia. Moreover, it has become a sheer necessity for the very survival of the human race. Such integrated holistic philosophy looks upon human existence as a rare gift which must be utilized both for inner development and for the welfare of society and the world. This places tremendous responsibility upon the human being as he finds himself forlorn amidst several layers of conflict.

As a member of Earth's community, man finds himself in a common bond with all the different species of animals, plants etc. that have evolved over ages. On the other hand, self-preservation, the basic principle of all living things, makes him aware of his dependence upon the soundness and integrity of the ecosystem. The very survival of *Homo sapiens* requires certain ecological balance in their relations with other living beings. They share this aspect of reality with all non-human species as the physical survival of man as a living organism is explainable by the same laws and theories that account for the physical survival of other species. Our ecological relations with non-human animals and plants and our need for an environment free of pollution are not at bottom any different from what has been found to be true of other forms of life on Earth. K.M. Munshi also supports this idea in his book *Our Greatest Need* as he says that:

> This equilibrium can be maintained by preserving the integrity of the Cycle of life, 'Jiwan Chakra'. I am no scientist but the more I have

thought about this, the more clearly it has appeared to me that Life's Cycle, in its two aspects hydrological and nutritional, is at the root of the unity of Man and Nature, without which life on earth must become extinct.[4]

At this juncture one may suspect that the ecological ethics is ultimately grounded in human interests, not in those of non-human natural entities. However the question of ultimate value is a very sticky one, for environmental as well as for all ethics. One has to bear in mind that there can be no values apart from an evaluator, as if all value lies in the eyes of the beholder. Therefore, the value that is attributed to the ecosystem is dependent upon some variety of morally and aesthetically sensitive consciousness. While things may only have value because we or someone values them, they may nevertheless be valued for themselves and for the contribution they might make to the realization of our interests as well. Children are valued for themselves by most parents. Money, on the other hand, has only an instrumental or indirect value. But which sort of value does the health of biotic community and its members have? It is quite difficult to segregate the two general sorts of value—the one of moral significance and the other merely selfish. Nevertheless, something that may be valued in both ways at the same time is the subject of consideration. For example do people treat their pets just like their children for the sake of themselves, or like mechanical appliances, because of the sort of services they provide to their owners? Is a healthy biotic community something we value simply for the reason we are so utterly and so obviously dependent upon it not only for our happiness but for our very survival? Hence the relational perspective does not exempt *Homo sapiens* from moral evaluation in relation to the well-being of the community of nature taken as a whole. It makes us aware that we are an integral part of the natural universe. In a way it takes us out of ourselves and shows us that we belong to a vast scheme which transcends the interest of man and we feel that there is some kind of value in the world beyond the human and the animal. Things can only relate to each other through making up a whole together. It expands the frontiers of the relationality of the human community to the greatest relationality of all biotic and abiotic members of the biosphere. A concept of cosmic family has been envisaged. Verily humanity is expected to mould its behaviour patterns so that human beings can fulfil their obligations towards the vast family and honour all

relations while deriving benefits from the resource pool of their cultural and physical environments.

The issue of contemporary crisis has been framed in terms of relationship between development and environment but, in fact it extends to the vision of a human life rooted in co-operation and contentment, peace and non-violence. It emphasizes a harmony between man and man, and between man and nature. That is how the Gandhian view of sustainable development, in the wake of environmental crisis is expected to starve the malady. And this in turn is in consonance with the ethos of our ancient culture, as evident in our religious and other literary texts. One possible way to solve environmental crisis could be '*Sarve bhavantu Sukhinah*' which implies rejection of capital intensive, machine oriented and import based economy, because those Western notions of development foster a style of living and a value system that are intrinsically opposed to it. Moreover there should be equal concern for the well-being of all objects, rational human beings to animals, animate and inanimate. That basic thrust if properly understood and applied, would solve the environmental crisis to a great extent. Peter Singer seems to support this thesis when he says that the basic idea of a true ecological ethics is to foster the consideration for the interests of all sentient creatures, which includes future generations also. His following lines are suggestive:

An environmental ethics rejects the ideal of materialist society in which success is gauged by the number of consumer goods one can accumulate. Instead, it judges success in terms of the development to one's abilities, and the achievement of real fulfilment and satisfaction. It promotes frugality, in so far as that is necessary for minimising pollution and ensuring that everything that can be re-used, is re-used.[5]

Hence, it goes beyond the utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the greatest number and must be a foundation of our paradigm. In order to achieve this common good, a society must be built on the principle of subsidiary and its obverse. That is, it should neither abrogate authority upwards for what can be done at the lower level of a community, nor abdicate responsibility downward, for what must be done at higher levels. It means both a devolution of authority and power downward, as well as an assumption of the responsibility for co-ordination and communication upwards. However, without a sense of local community, it is difficult to ascertain such rights and obligations. But a community comprises of

individuals. Ecological ethics requires an attitude of respect for the biosphere to be expressed by ones character. When a moral agent has developed firm, steady and permanent dispositions, he is able to deliberate and act consistently. Paul W. Taylor rightly says:

> The attitude of respect is embodied or expressed in their character and conduct to the extent that their character fulfils the standards, and their actions are in accordance with the rules. It is indeed a test of the sincerity and depth of one's moral commitment in taking that attitude whether one acknowledges the ethical requirements imposed by those standards and rules, and holds oneself responsible for abiding by them.[6]

The common good, regenerative and purposeful technology, must be elaborated further into a character of human rights and cosmic duties. Though rights are, indeed basic, they must be checked and balanced by the second which can be found in the Indian tradition of *dharma*, as the performance of duty that keeps the world in right order and harmony. These must be extended to collective rights and duties in a manner that does not alienate individual ones.

> *Dharma* is thus, a cosmic phenomenon and not merely a human phenomenon. But man, as a part and parcel of nature and as self-conscious active participant in the process of nature, has his duty to perform by what he preserves the ecological order which includes the inanimate and the animate existence, as well as mankind. *Ananda* or happiness lies in this *dharma* or *adharma*. The opposite of it is destruction, ignorance and misery for all concerned.[7]

To sum up, ecological ethics sees the relationship between man and nature as constitutive of human essence, and thus, it acquires a moral force and authority. Human wants, skills and talents are seen as conditioned by, and serving the needs of participation with nature and to become a part of nature. Thus, we, human beings, tend to know the world not as a subject of which nature is an object, but as we are subjects which belong to the world. Such a participatory relation is of utmost importance. It is only in this sense that Aristotle remarks that 'everything ideal that has a natural basis can be understood properly'.[8] Moreover the Indian ideals of *Lokasamgraha* or well-being of all, and *Sarvabhuta hite ratah*[9] (person whose actions are intended for the *hit* or well-being of all) ought to be incorporated in ecological ethics. If it is translated into action, it would

automatically eliminate the forces of evils that disturb ecological balance. Hoping for the best let's take to heart the moral from a verse[10] of *Bhumi Sukta*:

विश्वंभरा वसुधानी प्रतिष्ठा हिरण्यवक्षा जगतो निवेशनी।
वैश्वानरं बिभ्रती भूमिरंग्निमिन्द्रऋषभा द्राविणे नो दधातु।।

All-sustaining, treasure-bearing, firm staying-place,
gold-breasted, home of all moving life,
Earth bears the sacred universal fire,
may Indra and Rishava give us wealth.

Notes and References

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3. Ibid., p. 17.
4. K.M. Munshi, *Our Greatest Need*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, p. 83.
5. Peter Singer, op. cit., p. 286.
6. Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature*, p. 169.
7. A.G. Javadekar, 'Philosophical Ecology', in *Problems of Indian Philosophy*, ed. S.P. Dubey, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, Vol. III, p. 317.
8. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, vol. 1: 1028.
9. *Sri Bhagwadgita.*
10. *Bhumi Sukta*, in Abinash Chandra Bose, *Hymns From The Vedas*, Asia Publishing House, Mumbai, 1665, p. 365. The verse means: 'The Mother Earth, who carries within her the all encompassing fire, who gives us nutrition, who is full of gems and riches, who supports all living organisms and provides living space for all, may she continue to nourish and protect us.'

The Three Functions and Unity in the *Ṛgveda*

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This paper examines the curious condition whereby in the *Ṛgveda* is presented concurrently devotion to many individual deities and awareness or knowledge of One supreme Principle or Power of which the deities are manifestations and which inheres in men also. Many scholars have touched on this theme with different approaches in greater or lesser detail and Karel Werner gave a good exposition of it in his article *From Polytheism to Monism* ... (1989). Here I shall examine some additional aspects of this and use additional material from the *Ṛgveda* utilizing also a few hymns from the *Atharvaveda*.

The New Comparative Mythology adopting and developing Dumézil's tripartite structure (religious sovereignty, physical force and fertility, each having correspondence in the class of priest, warrior and commoner or producer) has opened up many avenues of investigation. E. Lyle usefully sums up many of these areas both in her own work and that of others (1996: 101–8) even if too generally. However, one area still provides opportunities for exploration—the *Ṛgveda* (RV hereafter) itself, which is our present subject. Moreover, the trifunctional system has a theoretical aspect which is taken as wholly true and of universal application can, like any other theory that is taken as the one and only truth, become a procrustean bed that distorts (and perhaps kills) real understanding. Dumézil himself left room for development and expansion: 'However important, even central, the ideology of the three functions may be, it is far from constituting all the shared IE heritage that comparative analysis can glimpse or reconstruct' (1958: 89). But other, subsequent comparativists (and at times even Dumézil himself) ignore the limitations of the tripartition and apply it indiscriminately. Thus one scholar applies this system to the Greek deities and writes: 'Athena represents 2, and in particular 2.1 ... We have already seen her elsewhere in Greece, as the embodiment of the Indo-European "trifunctional" goddess. She has this role in the *Odyssey*, taking care of Penelope, just as in the *Mahabharata* Shri is linked to

Draupadī' (Baldick 1994: 42). Now Śrī (=Shri) is not merely *linked* to Draupadī, she is with one part of her embodied in Drupada's daughter (*MB* I, 61, 95 and 189, 45) and, whatever else she may do as goddess Śrī (next to nothing in the main story of the *MB*), she has no connection with war and scheming like Athena. The same scholar tells us that Apollo who, as an archer, should 'belong to concept 2' but does not because 'the Greco-Roman world did not see the use of the bow as real, manly fighting'; the use of the bow 'belonged originally to hunting, which as a source of pleasure and food is part of concept 3': so Apollo belongs to concept 3, since he is also 'god of music and the art' (ibid., 43). We must then ignore the fact that Apollo is a much more competent fighter than wargod Ares (who never once wins) and also has almost exclusively the epithet *hekēbolos* 'who-attains-his-aim/far-shooter'. But what will cause real wonderment in classicists is the scholar's statement that 'the key to the *Iliad* lies in the recognition that Apollo and Artemis are replicas of the Divine Twins' (ibid.). C.S. Littleton for his part, following Dumézil, attempts to convince his readers that the two Pāṇḍavas Sahadeva and Nakula, projections of the twin Aśvins, belong to the third function (!) and are reflected in the Trojan Hector and Paris, sons of Priam, who are also of the third function—i.e. fertility or production (1970: 234–6); and we must forget that the two younger Pāṇḍavas are princes, *kṣatriyas*, i.e. by definition warriors, as Hector certainly is, although he has the aspect of sovereignty and reason as well. From these examples it should be obvious that a fervent and rigid application of the tripartite system impedes rather that enhances understanding.

The three functions in the *RV* have been identified in various publications (e.g. G. Dumézil 1940 and 1968–73; J. Puhvel 1989) but it does not seem that the complexity of the situation has been sufficiently appreciated, nor has the aspect of Unity in the *RV* been taken into account or sufficiently noted. The first function in Vedic religion is almost invariably taken to be represented by Varuṇa and Mitra. At first sight this is correct since they are *samrājau* 'imperial lords', they are dispensers of justice and guardians of the cosmic Order *ṛta* and they are invoked together in nineteen hymns and in numerous other passages (e.g. I, 136, and 137; V, 62–72; etc.). However, there is also Aryaman who may be regarded as a minor Āditya but is very closely associated with Mitra and Varuṇa in a distinct triad. He is in fact invoked with both over sixty times. It has been noted correctly that he represents the continuity and solidarity of the

community (Littleton 1982: 134), but Aryaman has a more subtle aspect. One hymn, addressed to the Ādityas (II, 27), mentions in stanza 1 the three of them, then *Bhaga* 'Provider', *Dakṣa* 'Skill' and *Aṃśa* 'Lot, Portion' and in stanza 14 Indra; but the other stanzas deal mostly with the attributes of the three. Here is stressed their unison as they are of one accord (st 2; cf also VIII, 26, 11); they support 'three earths, three heavens', display mighty, attractive greatness through the cosmic law *ṛta* and have three 'holy functions' *vrata* (st 8), unfortunately not described. We learn nothing about these three functions from hymn I, 41, also, which is addressed to the three gods together: certainly, they protect from calamities and foes and they grant health, wealth and children, but then so do other deities. When we look at other hymns, such as invoke the three gods separately, we discover that they have more than three functions.

Since Varuṇa and Mitra have been frequently described, analyzed and appraised, we shall devote a few additional observations to Aryaman. Certainly he lacks the rich personality and traits of an Indra or Varuṇa, but neither is he one of 'a motley lot of abstractions, of varying chronological age and clearly lumped together by systematizing theologians', as Puhvel describes the minor Ādityas (1989: 47). He must have been of some importance, otherwise he would not have been preserved as *Irmin* among the Norsemen, *Ariomanus* among the Gallic and *Eremon* among the Irish Celts and *Areimene* among the Mycenaeans. In India he rose in importance in the *Brāhmaṇas* but waned in the post-Vedic pantheon. In the *RV* he is, like Bhaga and Pūṣan, associated with pathways and promotes prosperity and concord in marriage. His path is also that of Mitra and Varuṇa, 'smooth and thornless' (*suga-* and *anṛkṣara-*: II, 27, 6), yet in some hymns he is the companion (*ari*, same stem as *ar-*, *arya-*) or guide/protector of the man on the path: 'mighty Aryaman's path' I, 105, 6; Aryaman 'with path unimpeded' X, 64, 5. The path is not only a physical, geographical one, but also perhaps one of esoteric, ethical and spiritual advancement, and Aryaman would seem to be the force that brings harmony and secures any particular stage in this inner movement. In the Wedding Hymn, X, 85, 23 and 36, he is a patron of marriage with Bhaga, Pūṣan and Savitṛ; so strong is this function of his that Agni himself is addressed (V, 3, 2) as 'Aryaman as regards maidens ... a kind friend' who makes 'wife and lord one-minded'. Aryaman seems to embody a force of harmony not only of the male and female, but also in *ṛta* 'cosmic order', of which Mitra and Varuṇa are especially the guardians. Indeed, his name

is cognate with GK *h-armo-zō* and *h-armo-n-ia*[1] 'harmonize', and with similar derivatives from the stem *ar-* and the root √*ṛ* which gives *ṛta*. He with Mitra and Varuṇa have established the year, month, day and night, the sacrifice and the *ṛc* 'holy verse' (VII, 66, 11). In 35, 3 Aryaman is said to 'manifest manifold' *purujāta*—and in VII, 36, 4, he yokes Indra's horses—in yet another act of bringing about harmony. Thus, since he promotes concord and harmony, his presence in the triad Mitra-Varuṇa-Aryaman is not fortuitous.

Wherever one looks in the *RV*, there is hardly an aspect of the world, whether on earth or in heaven, at the human or divine level, individual or universal, that is not threefold or trifunctional. Here are some random examples: Agni has three births (I, 95, 3), three heads (I, 46, 1), three powers, three seats, three tongues, three forms (III, 20, 2). Then 'the bull omniform has three breasts, three udders' (III, 56, 3). 'Savitṛ surrounds thrice the mid-air (*antariksa*) with might, the three sky-regions and the three spheres of light, sets in motion the triple heaven and the triple earth, and protects us with three ordinances (*vrata-*: IV, 53, 5). The river-goddess Sarasvatī is said to have 'sprung from three sources' (VI, 61, 12), and so on. The aspect of triplicity is expressed also in the very structure of the Gāyatrī stanza—three lines of anuṣṭubh, i.e. 3 × 8. Then a hymn addressed to the Aśvins (VIII, 35) has 24 stanzas and is divided into 8 sections of 3 stanzas, each section having the same refrain in the last hemistich; 21 stanzas have the same penultimate line and the last three (22–24) have their own penultimate hemistich. (I can't help wondering how such a hymn would have sounded when recited thousands of years ago by men who could intone it with the right accents and measures, and what would have been the effect.)

Although this triplicity may seem excessive and even tiresome, especially if one reads many hymns at one go, it does not seem to be superstition, mania or mechanical repetition. It has validity in that it stems from a deep-rooted conviction in the Vedic *ṛṣis* that the Cosmos is indeed tripartite in its broad structure (heaven, mid-air or mid-sky and earth) and that everything in it reflects this threefold aspect. (After all, physics today tells us that all phenomena in the world are governed by three forces.) This conviction is not expressed explicitly or systematically anywhere in the *RV*. But here we must not forget that the *RV* is not a compendium of myths, a philosophical treatise, a theological tractate, or epic narrative. True, the hymns contain such elements, more so in the tenth Maṇḍala, but

for the most part they are hymns lauding or invoking deities. The many tantalizing hints and references, or brief descriptions of incidents that leave so much unsaid, obviously imply a broad cultural background from which the poets draw material but which they do not present in any systematic exposition and so leave us with many questions. Why, for instance, did Indra have such a difficult birth, and did he commit patricide? Who was Bhujyu (and others) whom the Aśvins saved? Who really were the Ṛbhus and how exactly did they become immortal? What were the ordinances or laws which Varuṇa proclaimed? And so on. The hymns naturally contain in myth, symbol, poetic image or straight description, many of the ideas from this wider cultural background[2] but not the whole of it. Wendy O'Flaherty puts it succinctly: 'The *Rig Veda* has no true mythology; it is written out of a mythology that we can only try to reconstruct from the Rig Vedic jumble of paradoxes heaped on paradoxes, tropes heaped on tropes' (1981: 18). We know this only too well since so many stanzas seem to us elliptic, obscure, unintelligible, mystifying.

Aware of this difficulty, some scholars try to supercede it by explaining events in the hymns in terms of modern experience. Thus Jaan Puhvel writes of the Aśvins: 'On an earthly level their legendry details feats that in our own culture are ascribed to Coast Guard helicopters, sheriff's posses, human or veterinary paramedic teams, and physicians dealing in restorative and rejuvenative cures' (1989: 58). Such statements have validity of course, but they do not explain or elucidate, because we know how a helicopter or a rejuvenative cure works, but we have no real notion how the Aśvins performed their miraculous deeds. Did such wondrous feats actually occur? Or were they very common events which ignorant minds embroidered into myths and fairy tales infusing into them fantastic supernatural powers? It may be easy to reply 'yes' or 'no', but how can we know for certain?

Paradoxically Puhvel gives an interesting pointer. Commenting on the obscure Roman goddess *Dīva Angerona*, who was connected with the winter solstice on 21 December and commanded silence on her devotees, he refers to the Vedic priest Atri as follows:

> When the sun had been blacked out by the eclipse demon Svarbhānu, Atri (*RV* 5:40:6) 'found the sun hidden by darkness ... by means of the fourth formula [*brâhma*—"holy utterance"].' Elsewhere it appears that this mysterious 'fourth' was silent meditation, as opposed to varieties of

the articulated word (vāc-), and that Atri thus rescued the sun by the mystic power of silence (1989: 153).

The *bráhman* is, of course, 'holy utterance' and 'prayer' and even 'holy rite'. Yet it is also a power beyond all these. The hymn on liberality, X, 117, 7, says *vádan bráhmā́ ávadato vánīyān*, which some mistranslate as 'the brahman that can be expressed in words outweighs the silent brahman' (Miller 1974: 56); obviously this is the masculine Brahmán, the supervising priest who would correct mistakes at the sacrifice and needs to speak rather than be silent. No, Puhvel refers to the *ácittaṃ bráhma* 'the inconceivable brahman (*RV* I, 152, 5) or *tád bráhma pūrvácittaye* 'that brahman which is to be considered first' (VIII, 3, 9). What is this inconceivable brahman that should be first in the poets' consideration? What is this power of silent prayer or meditation, as Puhvel calls it? Jan Gonda examined in detail the many aspects of *bráhman* in the Veda (1950) and we shall return to this subject later. At present we shall follow a different direction bearing in mind that it is not only Atri that employed it. Other priests or sages performed wondrous deeds with its aid. With this very power *bráhma-ṇā* (instrumental) the priest and ṛṣi Vasiṣṭha helped King Sudās defeat the confederation of the ten hostile kings (*RV* VII, 33, 3): but it should be noted here that Vasiṣṭha's brahma-power invoked Indra and this deity defeated Sudās's enemies. Another word used in VII, 33, 1, is *dhī* usually translated as 'holy thought, meditation, prayer' and the like (MSD). Following J. Gonda, J. Miller translates this as 'spiritual vision' that, converted into a hymn, affects both the human and the non-physical entities (1972: 56). Gonda's full definition of *dhī* says, in fact: 'This is not "Kunst" but may be "vision" in the sense of "faculty of evoking by the power of inspiration or imagination specific mental pictures and realizing these so as to create concrete objects' (1963: 101). *Dhī* and its derivative *dhīti-*, i.e. 'materialized vision' (Gonda, ibid: 195), are both used of the artisans Ṛbhus to accomplish their own miraculous works (rejuvenation of the Parents, creation of a cow, division of a chalice into four, etc.) and thus attain godhood and immortality in the Mansion of the Sun God, that is *agohya* 'cannot be hidden' (I, 20, 2–4 and 110, 2–4; IV, 36, 4); the brahma-power is mentioned in IV, 37, 7^3 and 'power-of-mind' *manas* is used in III, 60, 2 and IV, 33, 9. What is this spiritual power?

This force, manifested by the seers does not seem to differ much from the power wielded by some gods like Indra or Varuṇa. The word *māyā* is

generally associated nowadays with illusion and, no doubt has, and had, this sense too. In the *RV* it almost always signifies 'supernatural power' or 'magic', as is often translated; more precisely it seems to mean 'creative measuring knowledge', since it derives from √*mā* 'measuring, fashioning'. Indra with *māyā* stops the overflowing waters of the river Vibalī (IV, 30, 12) and with the same 'magic' sends to slumber 30000 Dāsas (IV, 30, 21). *Māyā* as 'creative force' or 'measuring knowledge' is presented in V, 85, 5: 'I shall proclaim this mighty māyā of glorious Varuṇa, the great Lord (*asura*), who stood in the sky and measured out the earth with the sun as the measure-unit.' However māyā is possessed by demons also, Dāsas or Dasyus. Thus the Aśvins, who are famed for their 'magic' (*māyā*—VI, 63, 5) free sage Atri by 'offsetting the magic forces (*māyāḥ*) of the malignant Dasyu' (I, 117, 3). Vṛtra and Namuci, two other famous demons, are said to possess māyā. Whoever has māyā and uses it is called *māyāvín*. In an ambiguous passage (IX, 83, 3) even the Fathers (*pitáraḥ*) seem to be called *māyāvínaḥ* 'māyā-possessors'; some take this to refer to the gods but syntactically and semantically it could just as correctly apply to the Pitṛs who often participate in the creativity of the gods (IV, 2, 15–6; VII, 76, 4–5; X, 64, 14). This creative māyā is used by men also, at least poets in *RV* X, 71, 5. But in hymn IX, 83, 3, the māyā of the Fathers is not their own (or the gods', if these are meant), but someone else's: 'his' *asya* (in st 3) refers here to 'the spotted Bull' *pṛśnir ukṣā́*, the impregnating Male who is Soma. Here then the implication is that the Fathers (or gods) have and use this power by grace of Soma who in this hymn represents the foremost (*agriya*) Authority. Elsewhere (VI, 63, 3) Mitra and Varuṇa use māyā to make heaven rain down, but here again it is not their own but someone else's: in this instance it belongs to the great lord (*ásurasya*) while the next stanza says that their māyā is lodged in heaven (*divi śritā́*), so that the asura may be Dyaus, or whoever. Gonda collects much material and makes many other illuminating observations on *māyā* in his extensive studies (1959: 119–94; 1965: 164–97). The point I wish to make with these passages is that māyā is a universal (divine) power which can be used by any human and non-human entity and does not belong exclusively to this or that god or class of being.

Like māyā *asuratvá* 'lordship, godhood' is also a universal power. Some scholars see a conflict in the *RV* between *devas* and *asuras* who correspond to invading Aryans and retreating natives (Parpola 1988; Shendge 1977).[4] Obviously they ignore that on several occasions the two nouns are

used appositionally, as in *námobhir devám ásuram duvasya*, 'adore with salutations the god lord [Rudra]' (V, 42, II) or in *mahắntā mitrắvaruṇā/ samrắjā devắv-ásurā*, 'great Mitra and Varuṇa imperial-lords [being] 2-devas, 2-asuras' (VIII, 25, 4), or in full semantic identity as in *mahád devắnām asuratvám ékam*, 'single is the great asurahood of the devas' (III, 55, 1 refrain to all stanzas), or in *tắ hí devắnām ásurā*, 'these two [Mitra and Varuṇa] asuras of the devas' (VII, 65, 2). 'Looking at the problem statistically, the term *Asura* is used with good connotations 59/60 times, and 12 times with the connotation of evil' admitted Shendge (p. 49); she might have added that the 12 times occur mainly in the late hymns. In later texts, of course, the term *asura* does denote 'demon'. For the purposes of our study we can ignore those few pejorative uses of the term.

The neuter *asuratvá* is used interchangeably with the neuter *asuryá* both meaning 'lordship, godhood'. It is through this supreme universal power that gods are gods, devas or asuras. Varuṇa, Mitra, Rudra, Agni et al., are asuras in that they partake of, or are infused with this asuratva/ asurya. This is encapsulated clearly in the phrase *mahád devắnām asuratvám ēkam*, 'single is the great asurahood of the gods' (III, 55, refrain). That the seers knew fully of Unity as being the Primary and most supreme cause of all divine, human and inanimate phenomena is obvious, apart from III, 55 and the *Nasadīya Sūkta* (X, 129) which will be examined below, also by I, 164, 6 by VIII, 58, 2 and X, 114, 5 where the One is spoken of in many ways under many gods' names. The passages in different Maṇḍalas indicate that the idea of Unity as the primal originative Principle of creation is not, as scholars like A.B. Keith grudgingly conceded (1989: vol. 2, 446) a late development of Vedic speculative thought but rather that it runs parallel with polytheism, which, in some of its aspects may well have been dependent on Monism.

The idea of a unitary 'godhood' common to all the gods is unique to the RV among the early IE extant texts. This is not insignificant but the implications must be left for another discussion.

This very idea can now be seen to be at the basis of some otherwise incomprehensible or apparently confused aspects regarding the gods in the *RV*. To begin with, this explains the multiplicity of deities, which multiplicity is of course as infinite as manifestation itself while every case of manifestation entails naturally *asuratva*. Now polytheism would appear most naturally in conditions of multiplicity—and multiplicity (many worlds, many things, many people, many of anything we may imagine) has been

with us for a very long time. What would it be like to have absence of multiplicity? What would be like the condition of Unity? ... We do not know. And why and how would that original Unity become or give rise to multiplicity and polytheism? This we do not know either, but we can surmise that it is only in the latter situation that we meet all the paradoxical, intriguing and sometimes vexing relations and peculiarities of gods. Thus Agni is in general regarded as the son of Dyaus and Pṛthivī (III, 2, 2; etc.), though he is also said to have been produced by Tvaṣṭṛ (I, 95, 2) or the Waters (X, 19, 6) or the Dawns (VII, 78, 3) or Indra-Viṣṇu (VII, 99, 4) and so on—*yet* Agni is described as 'Father of the gods' (I, 69, 1), twin brother of Indra (VI, 59, 2) and brother of Varuṇa (IV, 1, 2). Agni is also identified with other gods (or others with him), e.g. Varuṇa and Mitra (II, 1, 4; etc.) or the Sun (III, 2, 14; etc.), while hymn II, 1, 3–7 mentions twelve distinct identifications and stanzas 10–12 six more. Presumably it is all due to Agni's *devata* 'godhood'[5] which *all truly share* (I, 68, 2)—but some unawareness (or forgetfulness) by some *ṛṣis* of older or distant colleagues' hymns should not be ruled out. At this point, of course, the tripartite structure loses the last vestige of relevance it may have had; nor is it even remotely helped by such a statement as 'from Aditi was generated Dakṣa, from Dakṣa indeed Aditi' (X, 72, 4)—nor is this a slip or error because the very next stanza says that the gods were born of Aditi who was Dakṣa's daughter! However, we should remember that when such statements are left behind and the notable fluidity in the Vedic gods' functions ceases, tripartition has its validity for the general world-order as seen in the divisions of *brahma* (or celestial), *kṣatra* (or aerial), and *viś* (or earthly)—so long as it is not regarded as the sole truth.

It is worth examining also one god's own description of his identification with others. In IV, 42, Varuṇa declares some of his attributes (1–2) then proclaims 'I Varuṇa am Indra ... I Tvaṣṭṛ knowing all beings' (3). It is interesting that he acknowledges that his primary godly powers *were given* to him: *máhya tắny asuryắṇi prathamắ dhārayanta*/(IV, 42, 2). In a similar vein, Indra declares his identification not only with gods but also mortals, albeit seers like Vāmadeva: 'I was Manu, I was Sūrya. I am the wise ṛṣi Kakṣīvān ... Kutsa ... wise Uśanās' (IV, 26, 1-).[6]

Here I should hastily refer to Karel Werner's 'Multidimensional View of the Vedic Religion' (1989). In this article, acknowledging R. Otto's relevant work and other scholars', Werner showed that the older 'evolutionary view of religion' certainly did not apply to Vedism. 'In place of

a linear notion of evolution of the Vedic religion from lower to higher stages we shall then have', he wrote (p. 13) 'a structural notion of synchronicity, of simultaneous coexistence of multiple stages and layers of the Vedic religion'—in other words, all levels from Monism down to Polytheism at once! The presence of many levels implies message with many meanings, corresponding to these levels more or less. This 'multivalency' of the Vedic message had already been taken into account by Yāska's *Nirukta* VII, 1–2, positing three interpretations—*ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika*: the first relates to the true self of man and of everything, the essential or 'spiritual' aspect; the second relates to the *bhūtas*, the beings of this material world wherein spiritual essences are embodied; the third is the 'divine' intermediate world of the deities. (The native tradition distinguished between these three levels of the creation or the cosmos and held that every phenomenon had in its constitution each one of these three aspects and so participated simultaneously in all three cosmic levels—which are not exactly the three functions of the New Comparative Mythology.) Werner showed how inadequate was the 19th century notion that the Vedic deities were personifications or deifications of natural phenomena or 'abstractions of action' (pp. 20–1) and adopted Otto's 'hidden power of the numinous' (p. 21). In Werner's own view: 'from the earliest time there was in the Vedas a dynamic notion of reality as pulsating between the dimensions of the unmanifest and the manifest, the numinous and the phenomenal. This process of pulsation was itself understood as going on on different levels and time scales: on the scale of cosmogonic cycles of ... manifestation and reabsorption ... on the scale of periodic ritual renewals of the existing cosmos ... in the New Year rites; and on the scale of constant momentary flow of support and sustenance to the phenomenal from the depth of the numinous, both on the general and individual level ... Although some notion of this all-embracing oneness must have been present in various degrees in the minds of virtually all Vedic people, the concern for it in the sense of aiming at the full personal vision of this ultimate reality—in other words, the drive towards the ādhyātmika understanding and apprehension of reality—was then, as in all other times, limited to a minority. Far more interest was directed towards the diverse lower forces of manifestation issuing from the one power behind the scene' (p. 23).

As I endorse fully Werner's views, whatever I have written so far should be read in this light. To go back to our themes of one god identifying himself with another's nature and function, there are many more examples, but I shall complete this examination with a few instances of parallel or identical functions—which, again, in their own way, confound neat tripartition. Thus the Aśvins are the professional if not the exclusive healers, who also rejuvenate sage Cyavana (I, 116, 10), yet the Ṛbhus perform a similar deed rejuvenating the Parents, i.e. Heaven and Earth (I, 20, 8; IV, 33, 3). Then, the creation of sky and earth, or other parts of the universe, is ascribed to different deities: Agni (I, 67, 3), Tvaṣṭṛ (I, 95, 5; III, 55, 19), Soma (VI, 44, 23–4), Indra (II, 12, 1–3; VIII, 3, 6) and others, including the Aśvins (X, 24, 4–5); but in III, 38, 2, it is human sages (*kavi-*) who 'firm-minded and well-behaved, fashioned heaven ... then bespangled the two worldhalves (*rodasī*) for high-dominion' (st 2–3). So we have run a full circle back to the powers of the human sages. After all, it is only through their testimony that we know anything at all significant of the Vedic Civilization.

Now it would seem that the human power of 'silent meditation' or 'effective prayer', the *bráhman* on the one hand, and the 'creative force' or 'magic power' of the gods, the *māyā* and the divine estate itself, the *asuratva* or *devata* on the other, are not in effect very different. In fact, the statement must be put emphatically in positive form: the human and the divine powers are one and the same. And we arrive at this not merely from the similarity in the results of their impressive artistry, applied to the cosmic canvas. When Indra proclaims that he is seer Kakṣīvat (or any sage: IV, 26, 1), he is saying in effect that his own divine force/substance is in the sage also, otherwise he could not possibly identity with him. After all, as VIII, 83, 8 declares, men and gods are brothers borne in the same mother's womb.

Let us now focus a little more on men and gods. We discern a scale of being with different levels, as might be expected. Somewhere at the lower end (at the bottom, if we want our picture clearmost) stand ordinary men, without special powers or gifts, the mass of average humanity—and not much below them, animals and plants. Then, and it is quite a jump this, there are men with some divine attributes, like the three Ṛbhus, or men of very fine qualities, like the ṛṣis (poets, seers, priests), to whom gods are naturally attracted, or who invoke and bring gods to their presence, be it sacrifice, battle or other circumstance (e.g. IV, 24). Finally, and this is no meaner leap, there is the level of the gods and of men like the Ṛbhus who became gods, or of men like Atri and Vasiṣṭha who can command the

gods' good services. Using the terms of classical mythology we could describe the three levels respectively as men, demigods and gods, but this obviously would not be very accurate. Nor would the trifunctional system be very useful for all the reasons mentioned so far. Moreover, in the Vedic tradition we find a fourth function, lower than the producers, that of *sūdras* (*RV* X, 90, 12), the servile class which seems to consists of such people as refuse to perform properly their function of priest, warrior and producer. The fourth function was, to the best of my knowledge, first mentioned by A. and B. Rees who found that the three classes of people did not cover adequately the various human activities in the Celtic culture of Ireland (1961: 113ff); they even suggested a fifth function to cover the '*five* peoples' of Ireland and the 'Five kindreds' of Rig Veda (i.e. the five Aryan tribes, *pañcajanāḥ* or *pañcakṛṣṭayaḥ*). N.J. Allen too (1987) argues for an additional function for everything 'other' than the three of Dumézil's. Neither of them corresponds to what I propose here. Yes, in fact, there is also a fifth function, higher than the priest, which is a class of men that have risen above the functions—like Viśvāmitra who, being a warrior king, became a ṛṣi and the Ṛbhus who, being artisans, became gods. So, although broadly speaking the three functions are generally established in society, nonetheless there are functions or levels outside the three—in fact there seem to be five in Vedic texts and society, though this division is not analyzed or mentioned in any hymn. Now the RV frame has in addition an important difference in showing a clear recognition of an element, force or substance, that runs right through all the main levels (and any intermediate gradations), originates at a yet higher level and is one and the same.

Here open out several avenues deserving exploration. Indeed, some of them have been explored repeatedly in the past. First, there are other intermediate levels between the main ones and the powers manifest at the different gradations. Then there is Euhemerism, the notion that all gods were originally men who exhibited unusual, even supra-human, capacities, performed great deeds and were subsequently deified. Also the idea that by special education, by graded esoteric or spiritual practices and unselfish actions, a man can cleanse his own being and reach or return to[7] divinity. There is enough material in the *RV* to deal with all these ideas—and the last one is very attractive—but I shall concentrate on the thread that runs through those main levels of being and unites them. The hymns

themselves do not refer to or analyze any such scheme, but they allude to this unity explicitly and implicitly.

The human power that is akin to the divine māyā or *asuratva* is, we saw, the fourth condition of inner prayer called *bráhman*. This very noun becomes in later Vedic texts, mainly the Upanishads, the name for the Absolute, the Supreme Mystic Spirit and First Cause of the whole universe. The notion of the Absolute is not absent from the *RV*, of course, though no such name appears. This now is a little higher than or beyond the concepts *asuratva/devatva* and the like: it is their very origin. The *Nāsadīya Sūkta*, the *Creation Hymn*, as it has come to be known (X, 129), is one of the better known ones and in it is found the Absolute, or more precisely That Single-One, *tad ekam*, which is before creation, before time and space, before immortality and death, before the existent and the non-existent with all its potential existents (st 1–2). From that One evolved all this universe.

But before we review that process, we need to spend a lengthy glance at stanza one and particularly the word *ambhas*, which is invariably rendered as 'water', 'ocean' or something fluid like that. For many years my mind wonders (and sometimes screams) WHY? The last pada reads: *ámbhaḥ kím-āsid gáhanam gambhīrám*. Of course, *ambhas* is connected with *abhra*, *ambara*, and *ambu* all denoting 'cloud, sky, rain, water'. So all translations give simply 'water' or 'ocean' and leave it at that. O'Flaherty's translation 'Was there water, bottomlessly deep?' without even one note appended to the line (1981: 25) is fairly typical. *My main objection* was—how could the stanza refer to water here when in padas a and b neither existence itself (*sat-*) nor 'farthest heaven' *vyomā paro-* are admitted? Moreover, another water (*salila*) is mentioned in st three: but here also the sequence of nouns *tamas*, (*apraketam*) *salīla*, *tuchya*, that is darkness of inertia, undifferentiated *salīla* and emptiness, makes the relatively concrete fluidity of water as *salila* is usually rendered, a strange intermediate companion with non-material 'darkness inertia' and 'emptiness'. (Here O'Flaherty does give a note but it contributes little to our understanding.) Certainly the waters are cosmogonic or theogonic and the gods are said to manifest from them (*adbhyáḥ*) as well as from Aditi and Pṛthivī (X, 63, 2), but the generation of gods is, as X, 129, 6 states 'subsequent to the emanation of this Cosmos', *arvág devā́ asyá visarjanena*, so the *āpaḥ* in X, 63, 2 have little to do with *ambhas* or *salila* in X, 129, 1 and 3. Certainly, Varuna is connected with waters (usually āpaḥ) but his

appelation *ambhaḥpati* (in MSD) is not in *Ṛgveda*. I should waste no more time and state that I think *ambhas* here means 'potency' ('power, fruitfulness': MSD)—a meaning that in no way grates against other contextual information; moreover, it is consonant—more so than 'water'—with the dhātupāṭha definition √*ambh=ábhi śabde* 'sounding' (Katre 1967: 75). Even Jeanine Miller, who always approaches the *RV* with respect and great sensitivity, here seems to go off the mark translating 'waters' (*ambhas*) and linking this with 'all ancient mythologies' (1972: 68)[8] which give at this cosmogonic stage water, as in the Judaic *Genesis* and the beginning of the Mesopotamian *Enūma Elish* (*MM* p. 233). However, what NE or other texts say about this should in no way affect, and certainly not prejudice, ones mind regarding the *RV*.[9]

In that state of undifferentiated potency, only That Single-One breathed *ānīt* (='pulsated, vibrated'?) of Its own without (the presence of) air, 'and other than That, beyond that, was naught else' (2). In that primordial Unity, out of Its own *tapas* 'power-of-transformation' emerged the creative or generative Power (Principle or God).[10] Unto that arose fully entwined in the beginning *Kāma* 'desire', which was the first germ of mind: in other words, as I take it, that seed-desire sprang up and blossomed out into Mind. From that naturally thereafter evolved the entire universe with all its worlds and beings, including the gods—though even the divine Overseer *adhyakṣa* in highest heaven *parame vyoman* probably does not know why, how or whence all this came to be, since this entire creation *vi-sṛṣṭi* (or emanation, one-*vi*-of many) arose prior to the Overseer himself (6–7)! This exclamation mark is placed as an indication of admiration and agreement with the Vedic poet who very sensibly and humbly points out that we cannot hope *to know* or *comprehend* those very early steps in Manifestation, described in words that are products of Mind, while Mind itself is a fairly late product; the same would apply to scientific terms and mathematical symbols since they too are products of Mind.

Mention of That Single-One is found also in some hymns referred to earlier. In VIII, 58, 2 for example (a hymn to *Viśve Devās*), after a series of analogies with Agni, Sūrya and Uṣas, the poet concludes *ékam vā́ idáṃ ví babhūva sarvám*, 'being One, it became variously (*ví*) this All (and Everything)'. A similar acknowledgement of the One Absolute but in a slightly less conventional presentation is found in the enigmatic (literally as well as metaphorically) hymn I, 164; stanza 6 asks about 'the One (*ekam*), who is the form of the Unborn (*ajásya rūpé*) established apart the

six regions of space'; stanza 10 refers again to 'the One' *ekaḥ* and stanza 15 to the 'single-born' *ekajá*—as distinct from those born in pairs; stanza 46 then unambiguously states 'the poets speak of It, being One, in many ways naming It Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan'.[11] Then again, III, 54, 8, speaks of the separateness and diversity of phenomena (*janiman* 'creature, genus') but concludes 'One Whole governs what is fixed and mobile, what walks and flies, this manifest multiplicity (*víṣṇaṃ víjātám*)'.

The 'Unborn *aja*' is another term for the Absolute in the *RV*: it supports heaven (VIII, 41, 10) and earth (I, 67, 5) and the six realms of space (I, 164, 6), and it 'has on its navel (*nābhi-*) the one in whom/which all the worlds are established' (X, 82, 6). The term has a similar use in the *Atharvaveda* and in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, where it describes directly the *ātman* (IV, 4, 22). The word *aja* means of course 'goat' also and so we meet deliberate or coincidental word-play as in *RV* X, 16, 4. The term is extended to *Aja Ekapād* 'the unborn one-foot' or 'the One-footed goat' (II, 31, 6; VI, 50, 14; etc.), a mysterious deity that is invariably invoked in the hymns together with *Ahi Budhnya*, another mysterious deity (dragon of the deep), except X, 65, 13, where Aja Ekapād is mentioned alone. In *AV* XIII, 1, 6, he is mentioned again in connection with Rohita as the one who makes firm heaven and earth with his strength. Some scholars think Aja Ekapād is or represents the lightning form of Agni and few the Sun (Keith 1989: 137). Werner says 'the cosmic "one-legged goat" (aja ekapād) could then be interpreted as a symbol of the "one quarter", i.e. the manifest part, of reality as distinct from its three transcendent parts' (1989: 19). These interpretations do not seem to me to be mutually exclusive, but rather to support and deepen one another; for manifestation entails light and the one quarter of the timeless Supreme that becomes the manifest creation can be apprehended as such only in the revealing luminosity of the Sun or of the lightning, the luminosity being a quality of the manifesting Absolute itself.

Just as important for our discussion, the *aja* is that part in man (as in all manifest creation) that is truly and eternally the real Man[12] and would be the same Unborn in every deity as well. This unchanging part of Man is embodied naturally in the gross physical body *śarīra* and so arise the individual human beings in the world. The aja is the embodied *puruṣa* (X, 90) while the *śarīra* is the material sheath that gets born, consisting of gross elements, and declines and perishes at death. The individual is also a colourful personality with varied characteristics—cleverness, care, agility,

compassion, pride, generosity, avidity and so on, and their opposites. These qualities would presumably belong to man's Mind *manas*, in a broad sense that covers both intellectual and emotional functions. Then, between *manas* and *aja* comes *tanū* (*RV* VII, 86, 5; X, 15, 14; etc.), a subtler body that is being constantly reshaped or transformed and at death appears as a luminous form (X, 14, 8). It may be that Werner is right in discerning only three divisions—*śarīra*, *tanū* and *aja* (1978: 279–80). Certainly, *AV* XI, 8, 33 suggests a threefold division at the time of death, 'There it goes with one [part], there it goes with one [part], here it abides with one [part]', but the exact meaning is unclear. One the other hand *RV* X, 16, 3 suggests a manifold division (eye to the sun; breath *ātman* to wind; oneself according to ones traits *dharma* to heaven or earth; to waters, or among plants with ones members). Thus here I differ as I think significant the placement of *manas* within man (*AV* X, 2, 19) and, much more so, the call upon *manas* to return in *RV* X, 57, 3 (*máno nú á huvāmahe*) and, of course in X, 58 (*yát te yamám vaivasvatám máno jagā́ma*: 'thy Mind that has gone to Yama, son of Vivasvat' ... etc.). *Manas* and *tanū* are moreover juxtaposed in *RV* X, 183, 2. They are also juxtaposed in VI, 9, 4/5: the immortal [element in man] (*ámartyas*) growing strong/great in *tanū-* (instr), which is the next stanza, 5, seems to be presented as *dhruvā́m jyótir*, 'a steady/firm light placed for vision', and is accompanied by *manas*, 'the mind swiftest of all that fly'—and this light can hardly be the sun, as most translators think (O'Flaherty 1981: 116–7, n 8; but not so Johnson 1980: 18), since it 'is placed' parallel with *manas* and in the poet's heart (st 6). So I prefer to assign to the mental body (=*manas*) the elements *asu* 'life', *vāc* 'speech', senses like *cakṣu* 'seeing, eye' etc., and also qualities like *manyu* 'passion', *mitra* 'friendship', *dāna* 'giving', *dveṣas* 'hostility' etc. The body of Manas, which at death survives and leaves the material body *śarīra* (as indicated in *RV* X, 57 and 58), provides the incessant stream of a man's experiences that are his immediate reactions and responses to external stimuli, while *tanū* itself would seem to be the repository of the essence of all the different experiences as well as of the capacities or powers with which a man (or a god[13]) is endowed. Thus the recording of sin and its dissolution seems to be effected through this *tanū* (ibid., st 2), presumably 'spirit' or 'finer body beyond mind' which has and can give true knowledge or better information. This *tanū* is said to be under the protection of Soma (VIII, 48, 9; cf. VIII, 1, 17–19 and n 13). S. Kak attempts to connect some finds of

modern neuroscience with the Vedic understanding of Mind (2000). M. Eliade again, taking *manas* as 'spirit' or 'soul', links some of the *RV* hymns, with shamanism, i.e. the calling back of a sick or dying man's soul (1972: 414).

How does this scheme of human personality fit in with all we examined earlier? ... In fact, we have arrived at this scheme, not because it is described anywhere in the *RV*, but because we followed through all the various elements we examined earlier. The *RV* itself gives no scheme of any kind for the overall frame of the human personality: whatever there was, it is taken for granted as common (or not) knowledge. Thus we can only hope to find confirmation for the scheme broadly outlined in these pages (and largely derived from Werner's pioneer work) in scattered passages in the hymns. We have gathered some passages, but obviously more work will need to be done in this area. To a large extent our scheme finds some confirmation, not only in the *RV* itself but also in some hymns of the *Atharvaveda*, like X, 2, and XI, 8. *AV* X, 2, 31 calls the human embodiment 'a city of the devas unconquerable' while hymn XI, 8 describes in detail over a long sequence of stanzas how various elements, forces, attributes and functions gather and arrange themselves within man's organism, then at last stanza 32 says that the wise man regards as Man himself (=*puruṣa*) the *bráhma-* and that all other forces in him are *devatās* 'deities', abiding there as cattle within their pen. Brahman, the inmost silent state, is the key: it is before the movement of desire, before mind and prayer and utterance; it seems to be the stillness of That Single-One when naught else existed (*RV* X, 192, 2). It is no accident that this very term will denote the Absolute in the Upaniṣads. I don't think I am exaggerating or reading too much, if I state that it already has something of that quality in some hymns both of the *AV* and the *RV*. Indeed, this was perceived long ago by Keith who wrote, 'But in many passages it seems as if Brahman must be taken rather as a holy power than as prayer or holy rite' (1989: 446). Thus when demonic danger threatens an embryo in the womb, the seer invokes Agni to destroy the demon and Agni shall or may do this 'with the aid of *brahman-*' (instr: *RV* X, 162, 1–2). When again war and weaponry are detailed and lauded in *RV* VI, 75, the poet closes with the final stanza 19: *bráhma várma mamā́ntaram*, 'my inmost armour is brahman'.

In connection with this we should note *AV* VII, 1, 1: 'They who by reflection (*dhīti*=vision) led the beginning of speech, or they who by mind

(*manasā*) spoke truths (*ṛtāni*), having increased (*vāvṛdhānāḥ*) by the third brahman, realized (*amanvata*) by the fourth the name of the cow-of-plenty [i.e. the true nature of the Source of all].' Here we have explicitly the four levels or stages of Speech of the theories of the later grammar philosophers; this is clearly present in the four divisions of Speech *Vāc* in *RV* I, 164, 45 (and the other attributes of *Vāc* in X, 71 and X, 125).

Agni Vaiśvānara is often presented as a unitary force appearing at different levels within man's constitution, like brahman or the power of speech. The very epithet *vaiśvānara* denotes 'what belongs, or is within, men', i.e. the divine fire in all men, which is also within all forms, the substratum as it were of the entire creation—in earth, plants, waters, stones, cattle, horses, in heaven and midspace (*AV* XII, 1, 19–20). Earlier in connection with the juxtaposition of *tanū* and *manas* we mentioned *RV* VI, 9, a hymn about the inspiration Agni Vaiśvānara eventually gives to the poet (st 6). As W. Johnson writes, it is through 'mystical participation' in a fire-sacrifice that the poet 'receives from Agni the inspiration he so desired' (1980: 17, 20). The light of inspiration is placed within the poet's heart (*hṛdaya āhitam*). So Agni is not only the fire on the altar but also a divinity within man. Ears and eyes (inner hearing and seeing) rush to this light in the heart, says st 5: even the gods turn directly to this 'one source of inspiration' *ékaṃ krátum*, the gods being presumably, as in *AV* XI, 8, man's inner faculties, now soaring to this light. Agni becomes 'the god among gods' (I, 31, 9). The seers perceive this inner god through mind *manasā* (III, 26, 1): he reflects truth, raises the offering and reveals heaven, evidently within man. This aspect has been noted by several scholars. Jeanine Miller examines Agni in a lengthy essay as a representation of the Absolute, a divine flame that, as hymn I, 31, 7 declares, purifies and raises day by day the mortal to the immortal (1972: 121–151). 'Agni, dormant in undeveloped man, links "heaven" and "earth" in awakened man' (p. 124). She cites many relevant verses from the Vedas but one hymn of two stanzas from the *AV* is worth reproducing here: VII, 61 is a prayer to Agni that 'We, through *tapas*, kindling the fire of spirit ... listening to the Veda, may grow in wisdom and long life.' *RV* VI, 9, 3 says that Agni Vaiśvānara is 'protector of the immortal, moving here below [in one form] yet observing above in another'. Gonda, Miller, Johnson (and others) regard Agni as representing the unitary force of consciousness that vivifies and watches over all the functions within man—

appearing as energy and motion at the lower level and as observation and inspiration at a higher, leading finally to immortality.[14]

Agni most decidedly is not the mere fire burning on the altar nor is the oblation only burnt flesh and other material objects thereon. This is made abundantly clear in other hymns, like VI, 16, 47: 'Agni, to thee we bring with our hymn (*ṛcā*) this offering formed in our heart; to thee let these be oxen, bulls and cattle'. (Cf. also III, 26, 8 and X, 91, 14.) Finally Agni is likened to the Unborn One explicitly: '[Agni] is seated in the secret place; men, full of vision, find him here, when they have sung the holy words formed in their heart. Like the Unborn, he has sustained the wide earth and with truthful words propped up the sky' (I, 67, 2–3).

I shall conclude this essay with three observations, being aware that I have raised and left unanswered several questions;[15] but, no doubt, somebody will carry on from this point at a more appropriate time. First then, to return to the first part of the title, the tripartite system begins to break down when applied to the *RV* and, if applied too rigidly, it soon proves inadequate and irrelevant. The reason is, I think, the fact that it has no provision for a Primal Unity from which all divine and mundane phenomena arise and proliferate. In addition, although most Vedic deities have their specific, fairly well-defined functions, at the same time they share or usurp or interchange functions thus displaying a fluidity not found in Greek or Norse mythology. The Vedic seers discerned the *asuratva* or *devatva*, the unitary power, behind the multiple forms which are the products of *māyā* 'knowledge and illusion'; unlike us, our rigid categories and our mechanical gross perception, they could see anyone of their deities operate sometimes at one level, sometimes at another—*ādhyātmika*, *ādhidaivika* or *ādhibhautika*, which is also a tripartite structure but emphasizing the inner, spiritual dimension of the numinous. Very close to this aspect is, further, the incomplete picture we have of some deities. For instance, the Aja Ekapād (discussed above) is given as a celestial deity in *Nirukta* (V, 6) whereas almost all modern scholars concur that it is an aerial deity of the mid-sky region (*antarikṣa*): the latter conclusion certainly seems correct on the available data in the texts, but perhaps the ancients had more information. We simply don't know. And this applied practically to all Vedic deities.

The second observation also relates to the Primal Unity and the intellectual and cultural achievement of the *RV*. The Greeks of the Archaic period and before obviously had no concept of a supreme Unity, although

the figure of Zeus often was presented at least as a supreme Authority (West 1998: 88ff; Laks and Most 1997: 17–8). It took them several centuries of philosophical enquiry into the nature of things before they arrived in the fifth century at a clear idea of the Unity of Being with Parmenides, Melissos of Samos (KRS 249–52, 393–9) and later Plato. The other IE traditions will not acquire this concept, not until they have embraced Christianity. Not so among the Vedic people. As Keith, somewhat grudgingly, conceded 'India developed the conception of a power common to the various gods, just as there was admitted the unity of the gods even by the time of certain Rigvedic hymns' (1989: 446).[16] In fact, it is only reasonable to suppose that, given the presence of the concept of the Absolute, or the common Power, in the *RV* hymns, all the other ideas connected with this concept, whether evolutionary as in the Sāṇkhya system or monist as in Vedānta, existed in some form or other at the time of the hymns. Naturally, there must have appeared innovations, refinements and development of some kind with the passage of centuries, but the major philosophical doctrines did not 'evolve' or 'develop' out of 'primitive' concepts in the hymns. Johnson, who takes for granted the dates c. 1200–1000 for the *Ṛgveda* composition, finds many developments (sometimes reversals, as with the idea of two birds on the fig tree in *RV* I, 164, 20–2 and Upanishads, on pp. 59–61) from Ṛgvedic images and concepts to Upanishadic and classical ideas (e.g. transmigration, on pp. 90–5); he uses for the Ṛgvedic ideas the terms 'archaic speculation' (p. 61) and 'serious pre-philosophical inquiry' (p. 109) which are in effect just polite forms for 'primitive', implying absence of 'real philosophical thought' or 'real scientific knowledge'. Be that as it may, the later ideas, doctrines or systems appear to have been present, even if only in spermatic forms, at the time of the composition of the *RV* hymns in the fourth millennium. And there is really nothing very remarkable in such a judgement when the available evidence in the hymns is examined dispassionately—when the hymns themselves are examined afresh and without the prejudices entailed in notions like 'primitive' or 'barbarian', or even 'non-christian',[17] prejudices which, it should be stressed, tend to become much rarer in recent scholarship.

The third observation again relates to the Primal Unity which appears as an astonishing spiritual quality in the Indo-Aryans of those remote times in the fourth millennium and perhaps much before. Obviously, when the IE speakers that emerge from the mists of pre-historic Europe and

come to be known as Greeks, Celts, Germans etc., they are barbarians, fond of fighting, pillage and conquest—and this is reflected in their early literature. The *RV* hymns also speak frequently of fighting and battles. Here however, as we saw, the weapon of protection and victory is more often than not the *brahman*, the mystic power inherent in (ritual and) prayer, an inner force of the mind or the soul, not perhaps different from the power of faith through which miracles are performed by the saints of Christianity. This notion of Unity of Being, a Universal spiritual Power in which man partakes with his own self is, of course, absent from all other IE branches. But, at the same time, perhaps because this supreme Unity is unmanifest, without form or quality that can easily be conceptualized, and therefore cannot readily be worshipped in itself, there were the many deities, all of them manifestations of That Single One, that could be conceptualized, invoked, praised and worshipped: this aspect was, of course, common to all IE religions. Thus the Vedic Aryas, far from being primitive and bloodthirsty barbarians, deifying out of incomprehension and fear such natural phenomena as the storm, sunshine, night and day etc., would seem to belong among the most highly civilized people on earth, with a civilization that consisted not so much of material artefacts as of inner spiritual power.

NOTES

1. The Greeks do introduce aspiration in some cases: cf S *aśva*, L *equus*, OE *eoh*, Ir *ech*, all 'horse' and so Gk *h-ippos*.
2. A Culture or Civilization is primarily ideas and attitudes and secondarily artefacts, tools and weapons.
3. This is found with the same meaning in several other hymns, not connected with Vasiṣṭha or the three Ṛbhus: I, 164, 35; VI, 75, 19; X, 67, 23, X, 114, 8 etc.
4. H.H. Hock examines in detail 'God Guys' and 'Bad Guys' and rejects simplistic clashes between Aryans and natives (1996).
5. Just as from *asura* we have *asuratva* so from *deva* we have *devatva*, as we might expect of an enchanting and civilized language. There is no refrain for *devatva* like that of *asuratva*, but we can surmise its effect is not very different.
6. For what it is worth, we ought perhaps to note here that it is a situation quite the reverse of what we find in the Egyptian *Pyramid Texts* or the *Book of the Dead*. There the mortal man, usually the Pharaoh but later also any nobleman, identifies himself with some high deity by pronouncing the formulaic descriptions whereby the deity lists his attributes and so the mortal unites with him

and ascends to the sky, the sun, the stars, or whatever state. See spells 215, 412 etc. in *Pyramid Texts* or spell 36 etc. in the *Book of the Dead*, both translated by Faulkner 1969 and 1985. There is no hint of any funerary ritual in the *RV* hymn: on the contrary it is the god himself who identifies with the mortal seers!

7. It depends on ones religious or philosophical viewpoint.
8. Miller translates the entire hymn, pp. 64–85.
9. I have given elsewhere the fourth millennium for the composition of the bulk of the hymns and c. 3100 for the completion of the arrangement of the *RV* as we have it (Kazanas 2000). Sumerian literature emerges in the first quarter of the third millennium (*MM* 1–2) and cannot therefore be regarded as influencing the *RV*.
10. For convenience I combine here *ābhu* and *ekam*. For *tapas* are given 'austerity, heat, brooding' and the like; I prefer 'power-of-transformation' because it is a more reasonable meaning and it is close to the dhātupāṭha definition √*tap-a aiśvarye* (Katre 1967: 86) 'power, domination'.
11. Of course, in some passages it is the Sun or a celestial Bird that is referred to, but both can be seen to be symbols for the one Absolute. No doubt the description of Hiraṇyagarbha in X, 121 also can be similarly construed, providing not only the 'one Lord of creation ... giver of life (*ātma*) and strength (*bala*) ... the sole life-breath (*asu*) of the gods' (1–7) but also the one 'whose shadow is immortality and death' (2), the one beyond opposites that is their source and transcendence.
12. Here I follow Werner (1978: 278 and 288, n 3) in the interpretation of this hymn X, 16, 4. O'Flaherty follows the well-trodden route (1981: 49ff) that has a goat being burnt in the funeral pile. Undoubtedly here also there is word-play on *aja* 'unborn/goat' and one meaning need not exclude the other. J. Miller also like Werner takes it that Agni acts internally and 'matures' the man.
13. There are many references to gods' *tanū* (I, 85, 3; 165, 11; II, 35, 13; IV, 51, 91; VII, 100, 1; etc.). In some passages it may mean ordinary 'form' or 'aspect, appearance', though not of course 'gross body'. But the word seems to have the technical connotation given here in *RV* VIII, 1, 18, where Indra is said to grow strong in his *tanū* through the song of praise. So also in II, 35, 13 where the Offspring of Waters *Apāṃ Nápāt* is said to move 'as if with the *tanū* of another'; and in IV, 51, 9, where the Dawns move shining with unchanging lustre, with radiant forms, the suggestion being that this *tanū* of the Dawn is immutable. Apart from all this, we saw earlier that some gods themselves acknowledge their powers to be gifts while some hymns state this explicitly. So it is not unreasonable to suppose that the gods have a subtler body or aspect in which reside their divinity and specific attributes.
14. O'Flaherty (1980: 46) completely misinterprets Agni seeing him as 'the "sun inside you umbilicus" ... the internal fire (Agni Vaiśvānara), which converts nectar into mere semen'. This scholar does not adduce any evidence for this view from the hymns and seems obsessed by fertility and sexuality, copulation, defloration, castration and the like (passim).
15. I am acutely aware, for instance, that the hymns imply a code of ethics, fairly detailed and extensive, which has as basic tenets truth-speaking, non-stealing, generosity and similar virtues, but which is not formulated systematically anywhere.
16. Keith, in all the innocence of the cultural milieu colouring his own mentality, betrays precisely these prejudices when he writes 'If we accept, *as we should*, the view that individual powers are older in conception than manifestations of a universal power ...' (our emphasis) and brings in 'that power which in Melanesia is denoted by *mana*, among the Hourons by *orenda*, and variously in other parts of the world' (1989: 446); surely Melanesians, Hourons and other peoples of a similar period or similar culture furnish no criteria whatever for the *RV*.
17. Ibid.

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The Sāṁkhya Argument for the Self and Some Related Issues

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I

Perhaps no school of Indian philosophy is as fantastic both in presentation and content as Sāṁkhya, specially as preserved in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's short classic, *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*. And (speaking generally) few original treatises have received less imaginative and more scholastic interpretation, even though none may seem according to one's taste less satisfactory. The overall situation then is one of disquiet and despair. Though universally regarded as a dualism, the Sāṁkhya thought, as it gradually unfolds, begins to exhibit features which, at least in their implications and on the surface, appear to undermine the peculiar sense in which that dualism is understood, and hence render the task of summing up and placing its thought in more perspicuous terms relatively difficult. Also, while the system takes obvious pains to explain some of its doctrines, some others it leaves unaccounted for, either taking them as too evident or viewing them as something of an unresolvable puzzle. This is true perhaps of no other Sāṁkhya teaching as of its conception of the self and its nature. And let it be said in the very beginning that no other school of the Indian tradition seeks as much as Sāṁkhya to delineate the metaphysics of self in 'rational' terms. The doctrine of the manyness of selves which makes the system pluralistic too, is also attempted to be grounded in reason rather than upon faith or optimism. My first object then is to explore and critically examine the Sāṁkhya concept of the reality and character of the self and some issues related therewith.

The necessary existence of the self (*puruṣa*: consciousness) is part of what is usually supposed to be the metaphysical dualism of classical

This paper is dedicated to my wife who has made it possible for me to live all this while.

Sāṁkhya, the other necessary pole of this dualism being represented by *prakṛti* (primordial, non-conscious materiality). Though in principle these two supposedly permanent realities—*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*—are conceived as existentially independent of each other, this manifest world which is said to be the differentiation into twenty-three basic cosmic/psychological *tattvas* (entities) of the unitary *prakṛti* itself, is held to be contingent upon *prakṛti*'s association (or proximity: *saṁyoga or-sannidhāna*) with *puruṣa*. It is noteworthy that Sāṁkhya perceives this necessary reference to the self as deriving from the (unconscious) teleology which the system thinks as being implicit in *prakṛti*'s unfoldment of itself as the variform experienceable world: such an enjoyable world, Sāṁkhya believes, requires a conscious experient in the form of the self who is for that reason called *bhoktṛ*. The postulate thus is that the world as the end-product of *prakṛti*'s movement is not a chance happening: it not only has a cause, but also a reason or an end. Expressed a little differently, *prakṛti* as the world-ground presents itself in articulate form (*vyakta*) so that we, in so far as we are selves, can see or enjoy it (*bhoga*). (The word 'enjoy' is throughout generally used to mean 'experience' in its widest sense.) But since enjoyment invariably brings, speaking psychologically, boundedness with it which entails pain, the self feels impelled to strive for freedom from this pain (*apavarga*). The said purposiveness of *prakṛti*'s evolution then turns out to be (chiefly) two-pronged: experience and salvation. Thus for Sāṁkhya the End is at once the source of (*prakṛti*'s) movement and its *telos*. Consequently it deserves mentioning that since experience of the world is, in Sāṁkhya, not a passive affair, it is considered capable of producing, under appropriate conditions, such reflective knowledge of the true nature of the *tattvas* as enables the self to realize or apprehend, albeit through *buddhi* or 'mind' itself (with which it gets falsely identified), its essential distinction from *prakṛti* both in its 'noumenal' form as *pradhāna* and in its manifest (phenomenal) form as world, and gain back its splendid wholeness and isolation (*kaivalya*). Thus within the conceptual lattice of Sāṁkhya, the existence of the self too, far from being an accidental accretion, has an in-built necessity attaching to it, which necessity, needless to say, is connected with its nature as consciousness. So far, then, Sāṁkhya thought appears to be unique in Indian metaphysical thinking, for perhaps here alone the ultimate principles are conceived in terms of rational necessity. The world exists because it cannot but exist, the same holding, *mutatis mutandis*, for the self. *Prakṛti*, as the seed-bed of the

world of names and forms, and *puruṣa* as the spiritual principle of consciousness, which together make up the totality of all that is, need each other (*ubhayoritaretarā apekṣā*), if but in their own ways, even though it may seem that from a certain point of view, the world in that it has an 'other' (*para*) relative to which it becomes manifestly actual, is not an absolute actuality.

It ought to be mentioned in passing that the positing of an intelligence capable of not only enjoying but also *knowing* truly the world of objects and their *tattvas* which in the first place make it up, becomes otiose unless the world be conceived as intelligible in principle. There cannot be individual unities at the human level unless such unities be admitted at the non-human or non-conscious worldly plane too, with which the individual centres of consciousness perforce interact as evolution takes on a distinct and definite shape.

With these remarks as providing the needed conspectus, the stage is set for studying the basic premise on which the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*'s (*SK*) argument for the existence of the self rests. The Kārikā 17,[1] wherein this argument is set forth, runs as follows:

> The *puruṣa* (self) exists, (i) because composites (are observed to) exist for another; (ii) because this other (i.e., *puruṣa*) must be distinct or opposite to the three *gunas* (combined with what this entails as stated in Kārikā 11[2]); (iii) because this other must serve as a governing factor or basis; (iv) because of the need for a (conscious) enjoyer; (v) because there is a basic inclination (in the light of their suffering) towards liberation (in all conscious beings).

The first point to note is that this is the only verse in the *SK* in which a direct attempt has been made to establish the reality of the self. Secondly, most of the grounds cited here are premised upon the assumption that there is an immanent teleology in *prakṛti*. Thirdly, the *SK* thinks it proper not to appeal to the testimony of experience itself, whether immediate or introspective, and so prefers inferential reasoning to demonstrate the necessity of the self.[3] That this is so becomes obvious when we consider that (ii), (iv) and (v) refer to aspects of the self which appear susceptible to being immediately known in reflection which yields awareness of the cognized objective world as being other than the self (*triguṇādiviparyayāt*), of the self as enjoying or experiencing that world (*bhoktṛ-bhāvāt*), and of the self as striving for liberation. Our suggestion is not that as a matter of

fact Sāṁkhya may not have had experiential derivation of certain concepts at all in mind when thinking of these grounds. In fact it is possible that there exists a suppressed empirical premise in the Sāṁkhya reasoning, which Sāṁkhya perhaps would not mind calling to aid if pressed to justify admission into its system concepts such as that of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, sense-organs, *manas* (etc.) or even self. What is significant is that Sāṁkhya instead prefers a metaphysical route in that it argues to the self's reality from the existence of *prakṛti*, whose assumed active nature suggests the idea that it subserves, in the final analysis, the interests of the self. It appears that in the eyes of Sāṁkhya, even if experience can be trusted to testify to the existence of the self, the *necessity* of that existence, which its dualistic doctrine requires, needs an argument more fundamental than the former can presumably provide. In other words, the arguments must proceed by presupposing the purposiveness inherent in *prakṛti*, of which mention has already been made. Hence it is difficult to agree with the view voiced by G. Feuerstein that 'The classical proofs adduced for the existence of the self must ... be looked upon as afterthoughts to consolidate what originally constituted an experiential (but not empirically observable) datum.'[4] And needless to say, independently of the relative merit or soundness of the whole host of arguments Sāṁkhya puts forth—a question upon which we shall not presently attend—the Sāṁkhya procedure looks unexceptionable in principle, considering the speculative nature of its metaphysics, which surely has to accommodate some of the school's other important teachings, which either are beyond empirical justification or are thus accountable only partially and contingently.

Now, even on a superficial reading of the grounds adduced in the Kārikā 17 above, (i) i.e., *saṁghātaparārthatvāt*, (iii) i.e., *adhiṣṭhānāt*, (iv) i.e., *bhoktṛbhāvāt*, and (v) i.e., *kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteḥ* constitute more fundamental grounds than (ii) i.e., *triguṇādiviparyayāt*, while (i) and (iii) are more of an inferential nature. *Saṁghāta* incidentally stands both for *prakṛti* in its primordial state and its product, the manifest body, which latter is supposed to be the tabernacle of the individual self. The body, which is a composite of five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*), is produced to be the object of enjoyment for the self and so is assumed to be an aggregate of *buddhi*, etc., which all represent enjoyable elements (*asti puruṣo yasyedaṁ bhogyaṁ śarīraṁ bhogyamahadādisaṁghātarūpaṁ samutpannamiti*).[5] The self consequently cannot but be distinct from the body; it is something in which the body realizes the two-fold purpose of

its existence. It is important to note that as *saṁghāta* the body exemplifies what is called 'organic unity', as contrasted with a unity which is mechanical. The body is an organic unity not just because it is a whole differentiated into parts, which it without doubt is, but because in it parts cannot be understood without reference to their contribution to (the character of) the whole entity. In the second place, there is in the case of the body a reciprocal dependence between the existence of the parts and the existence of the whole such that the characteristics of the diverse parts (in our context, the evolutes such as *mahat*, *ahaṁkāra*, sense-organs) cry for a teleological explanation in terms of some end or objective associated with the whole. (For this reason perhaps some philosophers treat the notions of 'organic unity' and 'inner teleology' as more or less interchangeable, though the point is thought debatable.) The second ground mentioned in Kārikā 17, *triguṇādiviparyayāt*, cannot, in our view, make sense unless it is considered against the background of the first reason: *saṁghātaparārthatvāt*. It is because *prakṛti* and (in our context) the psycho-physical organism—the body—have, as *saṁghāta*, already been asserted to serve the ends of an entity which is distinct from them and which therefore cannot be another *saṁghāta* (*asaṁhataḥ paraḥ*)—in which case we shall be launched on an infinite series—that the assertion contained in (ii) that the self must be the reverse (*viparyaya*) of the *triguṇādi prakṛti* and, derivatively, of the body, becomes intelligible. I say this because (ii) does not seem to be aimed so much at proving the existence or necessity of the self, as its character as something simple or non-composite (*asaṁhata*). The self's nature as an 'other' must differ from that of the tripartite primal matrix or the (tripartite) manifest body and so cannot have as its constituents the three *guṇas*: not implicated in the tripartite process it cannot be an object of experience. The term *adhiṣṭhānāt* representing the third argument is an expression of great import. What is non-conscious (*acetana*)—i.e. *prakṛti* (cf. *SK* 11)—but is at the same time meant to satisfy something else's (the self's) purpose, cannot but have that self itself as a governing factor, this 'governing factor' meaning two things: one, the propeller of the evolutionary process[6] without whose conjunction the latter cannot start off, and second, the conscious substratum underlying and controlling, as subject, the objective body which is object to it, being meant for it, both in terms of its instrumentality and experienceability. Vācaspati's explanation too is here, by the way, noteworthy: *yat sukhaduḥkhamohātmakaṁ tat sarvaṁ pareṇa adhiṣṭhīyamānaṁ dṛṣṭam.*

Vācaspati here appeals to common intuition to make the argument look meaningful and easy of comprehension. The fourth proof—*bhoktṛbhāvāt*—of course rests on the assumption, already referred to, about *prakṛti* (alongwith its manifestations) as being in nature the provider of enjoyable material to some sentient enjoyer: what is enjoyable cannot itself be the enjoyer, for that involves, in the words of Vācaspati, 'the anomaly of things operating upon themselves' (*svātmani vṛttivirodha*). The objective world thus, including the (*bhogya*) body, even though it is not the cause of the self, does constitute a reason good enough for there to be a self. The fifth and last ground, *kaivalyārtham pravṛtteḥ*, though apparently a commonplace as far as Hindu thought is concerned, is important from the Sāṁkhya point of view. This standpoint is that *prakṛti* 'produces' the world and the body not just that the self may have something to enjoy (experience) but also because they supply the conditions—one of these conditions being the potentially discerning *buddhi* itself—for the permanent release from pain. This latter becomes understandable as the self in the process of enjoying the world (which is both painful and pleasurable) gets ensnared into it and all that it implies. And belief in the possibility of permanent salvation being a basic assumption with almost every school of Indian philosophy, the argument in itself makes very plausible sense.

Now I have no doubt in my mind that given Sāṁkhya's initial and basic premises, almost all the above arguments are fairly weighty and strong. Indeed, even while purporting to prove the existence of the self, they give you some idea of what *prakṛti* is (supposed to be) like. That is not the whole story, however. But before we turn to the other side of the picture, it would be worthwhile if we attend to some important observations which K.C. Bhattacharyya, for instance, makes as part of his understanding of the self question in Sāṁkhya. I choose Bhattacharyya's views for particular reference, for among the modern interpreters it is above all he who has ventured to make a philosophical, and not merely exegetical, attempt to reconstruct the Sāṁkhya metaphysical thought even detailwise, being impelled surely by, among other things, the well-known fact of the unfortunate discontinuity in the school's commentarial tradition and the consequent obscurities surrounding even the real meaning of many of its doctrines.

Of the five proofs (given in Kārikā 17 and) dwelt upon above, Bhattacharyya selects specially two as the foci of his attention: (1) *saṁghātaparārthatvāt*, and (2) *adhiṣṭhānāt*. These two he calls inferential

grounds 'proper',[7] presumably meaning that these grounds do not as such rest on or provide for any direct knowledge or apprehension of (the existence of) the self. Now, while this is already a perplexing view to take—for Bhattacharyya appears to give the impression that the other three proofs are founded on some kind of direct (experiential) evidence—Bhattacharyya complicates matters when he says that '[i]t [the self] is known *immediately* in reflection and is *not* really inferred.'[8] And though he certainly adds that 'Inference may indeed help in rising to and clarifying the reflection—which has been shown to be transcendental reflection in Sāṁkhya,'[9] he does not help in making the issue perspicuous beyond doubt when he intimates us just a line before, that by this (Sāṁkhya) self he means the self 'which is pure consciousness, *not* embodied consciousness nor consciousness of a content having the form of the object.'[10]

Before I discuss some of the difficulties connected with Bhattacharyya's undoubtedly serious observations, I must confess to my inability to understand what he means by 'reflection' or, more specifically, 'transcendental reflection' as used here, which according to him yields knowledge of the self. The notion of 'transcendental reflection' is of course encountered in Kant,[11] and Bhattacharyya admits to having borrowed it from the German philosopher. It is possible, nonetheless, that Bhattacharyya, even though taking it from Kant, invests the term with a connotation of his own. I say so because the context in which Bhattacharyya makes use of these notions hardly permits, strictly speaking, grafting of the Kantian meaning (see note 11 above) onto them. So at this stage I would prefer to defer consideration of this matter, and call attention, instead, to some other pertinent points.

Now if I am not utterly mistaken, it appears that Bhattacharyya in the above fails to see that there are two separate issues involved here. One relates to the Sāṁkhya attempt to show that there is such a thing as self as metaphysically distinct from *prakṛti*, and the second concerns the true 'nature' of this self. Those familiar with Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* will recall how nicely he separates these distinct issues when replying to the question that if, as he claims, everybody is aware of the self then where is the need to know it, which need too Śaṅkara emphasizes[12] (*tasmād brahma vijijñāsitavyam*). The Sāṁkhya self may in its true nature be pure, undifferentiated consciousness which may or may not have a necessary relation to one or another body. But if it is immediately known in reflection, as Bhattacharyya avers, this reflection is, on Sāṁkhya

terms, inconceivable without a body for the simple reason that it is the body which has, among its constituents, *buddhi* (along with *ahaṁkāra* and *manas*) which alone in Sāṁkhya really stands for the knowing function or (even) agency, even though it exercises this function only upon consciousness' association with, or 'reflection' in it. Indeed, it is upon *buddhi* that the job of revealing the subtle (*sukṣma*) distinction—which already exists but remains blurred due to congenital error—between the self and *prakṛti* mainly devolves (cf. *SK* 37) when conditions for this discriminative knowledge are propitious: *saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaraṁ sukṣmam*. In other words, even if it be admitted—though *SK* remains silent here—that the self is known in reflection or 'transcendental reflection', it cannot be justifiably said to be known except as embodied, even though that leaves the issue of its being *conceived*, in reflection, as capable of being disembodied unaffected. What we mean is that even when it is presumably gradually dissociated from all that the body stands for, it yet cannot think of itself as not actually inhabiting the body. We have noticed that in Sāṁkhya the self is needed *also* to act as a superintending or controlling force (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the body it occupies, for it is only by controlling and using the body—though it does not merely use it—as an instrument that it can hope to realize its purposes, which purposes constitute the rationale of the body. If therefore the body, though also an object, like other external things, to the self, is not unlike the latter, disposable (whatever be my attitude towards it) unless I have put myself outside the pale of the prākṛtic world by achieving permanent freedom at the end of my embodied existence, there is nothing to be wondered at. The possible deepening of dissociation from the body,—what can also be called the inner transcendence of the self—, even when it is admitted as conceivable, does in no wise alter the bare or minimal fact of the union of the self and the body, which union cannot but make some difference to the 'fate' of both of them: though distinguished they are not separated so long as the earthly existence lasts. Hence it is that *SK* has to concede that *buddhi* (*liṅga*) appears as consciousness-laden, while the conscious self appears, as embodied consciousness, to take the role of an agent.

That my surmise is not wrong and my misgivings about Bhattacharyya's presumption about the Sāṁkhya conception of self-knowledge not unfounded, is confirmed by the following further statement of Bhattacharyya's: 'The self is known as actual in *all* reflection but as embodied.'[13] Certainly

not much effort is needed to show the obvious inconsistencies obtaining in Bhattacharyya's thoughts on the issue, referred to so far. The chief difficulty with his viewpoint seems to be (i) that he looks indecisive about the nature of the Sāṁkhya arguments meant to prove the self's existence, and (ii) that even if he is clear about the Sāṁkhyan orientation of those grounds, he finds himself unable to resist the temptation of seeking some other more direct basis for the self, whether in reflection or in something analogous. That this is indeed so becomes evident when even while rightly emphasizing that (in Sāṁkhya) '[t]he self is never known by itself: there is properly no intuition of the self',[14] Bhattacharyya feels persuaded, that in *some*, though not perhaps further definable way, we do come directly to know the self as subject: 'We know the self not as object but in knowing the distinction of the object from it or knowing the object as distinct from it.'[15] In other words, at least so long as we are beings with a body, we know our self in its essentially non-object or subject-character in a situation of intentional—whether the intentionality is that of *buddhi* or of consciousness or even whether it is cognitive or otherwise—turning towards something which is contemplated as object and so as distinct from ourselves. To sum up Bhattacharyya's vision of this particular Sāṁkhya issue, it would seem that his view is chiefly along phenomenological lines, which fact perhaps explains his reluctance to summon the aid of any (alleged) psychological apparatus or process which may be involved in such 'reflective' knowledge (of the self as he often speaks of) and which might well serve as an explanation of the same. It would be unfortunate if my criticism of Bhattacharyya's view is taken as betraying my mistrust in his move to prove the existence of the self in terms of our reflective (or intuitive) apprehension of it. In fact it is possible that I agree with him broadly. My only submission is that his view, however significant, does not seem to represent the Sāṁkhya standpoint and so is not true to its fundamental postulates.

The Sāṁkhya stand on the question of the experiential intuition of self seems very clear. The self here is neither self-manifesting as it is in Advaita Vedānta, nor susceptible to mediate or introspective (or reflective) knowledge. There is at least one important commentary of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* I know of—the *Yukti-dīpikā* (*YD*)—which attempts to account for this fact about the self. Explaining why the self is considered as non-composite (*asaṁhata*) and so as something whose interests the non-self composites like body (*asti ca ayaṁ śarīralakṣaṇaḥ saṁghātaḥ*)

subserve, the *YD* says in no uncertain terms that had the self not been so (i.e. *asaṁhata*), it would have been known in perceptual experience like other composite particulars.[16] I am not suggesting that this explanation is wholly adequate or satisfactory—for so far as I can conceive, the self's apprehension in an experiential way cannot in itself just be dogmatically denied—but only that this is the view some Sāṁkhya teachers take. The meaning perhaps is that if the self is really simple and so (inevitably) without parts or differentiate, a measure of indeterminateness is bound to attach to its character which makes its experienceability a difficult proposition to entertain, rendering thereby inferability as something more in tune with the Sāṁkhya principles. The self is surely consciousness, but a consciousness which is not conscious of itself. No wonder, then, that the self is considered from the point of view of phenomenological reflection as almost indistinguishably fused with the non-conscious *buddhi*, which because of its *sattva*-dominated nature becomes the natural receptacle of the self's shadow (*cicchāyā*).

The correctness of this hypothesis is partly confirmed when we take into account the views of such interpreters of Sāṁkhya as Vijñānabhikṣu. In Vijñānabhikṣu's opinion, which he shares with Aniruddha,[17] the real grounds by which Sāṁkhya seeks to demonstrate the existence of the self are three, and furthermore, inferential in nature: (1) *saṁghātaparārthatvāt*,[18] (2) *triguṇādiviparyayāt*, and (3) *adhiṣṭhānāt*. This view is obviously at variance with that of Bhattacharyya, for instance, who counts (2) (i.e. *triguṇādiviparyayāt*) as an aspect of the self which is directly known in reflection. But while this is so, there is one major complication which Bhikṣu's further stance introduces. It is that even while regarding (1) as an inferential ground, Vijñānabhikṣu feels no compunction in holding that this ground does not discount (as may be commonally supposed) the possibility that the self can be perceived,[19] even while leaving the question of the kind of perceptual apprehension of which the self is capable unexplained. It seems that Bhikṣu, in taking this view, wants to back up the inference-based 'proof' of the metaphysical necessity of the self, by an experiential evidence so that the issue is more acceptably clinched so far as the bare reality of the self is concerned.

Now I think while there is no harm in adopting this procedure, it does leave the issue of Sāṁkhya's real intention in the matter unclarified. Before I proceed to explain my meaning, I must admit that Bhattacharyya's view, which I have above criticized, may, on a certain reading, seem to bear

some affinity with Bhikṣu's view on the issue of the knowledge of the self, even though the *modes* and *meanings* of this 'apprehension' (Bhattacharyya's 'transcendental reflection') as envisioned by them are apparently divergent and of course untransparent. After all both of them seem to think that inferential grounds may and do need supplementation by direct knowledge of the self, for such knowledge is in their view generally likely to have greater appeal. What is important, however, is that our problem does not end with the realization of this need: it leaves unanswered the nagging question as to how experiential or 'reflective' knowledge of the self as being distinct from *buddhi* (etc.) can lead to an appreciation of the teleological reasoning contained in most of the grounds the *SK* cites, and how, further,—what is of utmost importance—can this knowledge of the self as distinct from the not-self lead to a proper understanding of the true and complete nature of *prakṛti* and its evolutes, *tattvas*, which understanding can alone act as preparatory exercise for that life of the self which is characterized by the lived discriminative wisdom (*sattvapuruṣānyathākhyāti*). Both Vijñānabhikṣu and Bhattacharyya, for all the toil they bring to bear on the issue, seem to fail to demonstrate how the self—or shall we say, the *buddhi*?—even after it has at a very primary level known itself to be different from the object presented to it, comes finally to judge (1) that there has been (mis-) identification with *buddhi*, and all that it represents (which indeed is the cause of its pain), and (2) that it has been due to a deep-seated error (*aviveka*), which has obscured from it its true mutationless nature, which in addition to consciousness is its chief aspect in contrast to the ever changeful *tattvas* or their ground *prakṛti*? Surely it does not seem that it is possible for the self to perceive, through reflection, *prakṛti* as proved or defined as something necessary, necessary for the self. But if so, are we not confronted with a situation in which the so-called discriminative knowledge remains, in the end, incomplete as regards the character and necessity of the two ultimate principles, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*? It is an unfortunate fact about the evolution of Sāṁkhya thought that these grave and disturbing questions have not even been properly raised, let alone attempted to be answered.

Before I move further, I want to enter one caveat. It is this. If enjoyability (*bhogyatva*) is considered as an essential property of the manifest world—and therefore by implication of its cause, *prakṛti*—, which property becomes the main Sāṁkhya plank for arguing to the need for the self, then the Sāṁkhya dualism acquires a clear idealistic strain, for then the world

is not just ideally or even incidentally present to one or another self but exists *so that* the self can see it. It is a world then which, though it is transcendent of consciousness, exists for the consciousness or the self. Thus even though its *esse* is not its *percipi*, its reality is nonetheless meant to be enjoyed by the self and so, as already pointed out, has its *raison d'etre* in the self: it is a world which is a world-for-self. Hence it is that as long as the (so-called) transcendental character of the self remains obscured from view and the empirical consciousness keeps calling the shots by being operative, the really seer-self is spoken of as being of the same form (*sāyujya*: the Yoga phrase) as the psychomental mutations. It is this *sāyujya*, incidentally, which occasions such self-*buddhi* entanglement which becomes the cause of ceaseless pain, in search for freedom from which the self is spurred to reflect and realize its real distinction from *buddhi* and with that from the world which the latter presents to it. The upshot of the above point is that *if* Sāṁkhya strictly and faithfully follows the logic of its own argument for the self, then the supposed dualism of Sāṁkhya ceases to be a dualism, e.g., of the Cartesian sort where the gulf between the immaterial unextended thinking soul (*res cogitans*) and the spatial or extended (physical) body (which represents matter as *res extensa* or extended substance) remains unbridgable despite the 'fact' that human beings exist as 'inexplicable' combinations of these two contrary substances. It is true that human inexplicability does not imply objective non-existence, yet at least so far as Sāṁkhya dualism is concerned, a reciprocity, though its 'why' remains obscure, seems to exist between the self and the world in both of its forms which, if we for the moment forget about the slightly controversial salvational aspect represented in the last argument, makes that dualism much more respectable and of course explanatorily adequate by making the world and the self find the meaning of their existence not in themselves but in each other. They may both be diverse and qualitatively different realities, yet the necessity of their existence cannot be explained without reference to each other. This dictum is true not only of the self and the body at the ordinary worldly plane of enjoyment, but even at the radical metaphysical plane. Hence the beginninglessness of the association of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. There can be no association if there is no room for its possibility, and its possibility cannot become an actuality unless there exist conditions, however inaccessible to the human mind, which play their role in effecting the latter. It is a dualism, then, which, unlike some other varieties of dualism,

is in its logic governed by, above all, the (assumed) inner teleology which launches *prakṛti* on its determined course under the aegis of, and in the interest of, *puruṣa*.

One last word. It must be borne in mind that what we have said above derives largely from the Sāṁkhya argument itself set forth in Karika 17, even if it may seem to be discordant with some other important things Sāṁkhya may have to say about *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

II

After discussing the Sāṁkhya reasons for postulating the self—which, to recapitulate, all reduce to one basic premise, that the very idea of tripartite evolution remains unintelligible in the absence of a separate and distinct principle of consciousness—we must now turn to consider what to all appearance is the most disquieting feature of the system's treatment of the issue when taken in its completeness, namely the unannounced retraction of those very grounds as *no* real grounds, by bringing forth a conception of the self which is in spirit basically at variance with the picture that emerges from those arguments. Indeed, the Sāṁkhya move is so enigmatic that it eludes every attempt to fathom the Sāṁkhya motive—which without doubt is far from trivial—for introducing and arguing for the existence of the self which it incontrovertibly does in *SK* 17. The inexplicable inconsistency of the Sāṁkhya thought becomes especially apparent where its doctrine of self and its relation to *prakṛti* is concerned. Indeed, it is even doubted whether the relation of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is real or an imagined projection born of error which knows no beginning.

Now, after giving its reasons for the plurality of consciousnesses (or selves), a topic not to be discussed presently, the *SK* intimates us in Kārikā 19 that the self or *puruṣa*, since it is devoid of most of the (defining) characteristics of *prakṛti*, whether in its manifest or noumenal form, is a passive witness (*sākṣitva*), is isolated or alone (*kaivalya*), is indifferent because not involved in the transactions of the three guṇas (*mādhyasthya*), is an onlooker or spectator (*draṣṭṛtva*) and is incapable of being an (active) agent (*akartṛbhāva*).[20] Sāṁkhya says so perhaps because all change-involving activity is conceived as basically the special function of *buddhi* which becomes differently modified according as the presented object differs, this ongoing, if sometimes gradual, specification of the *buddhi* demonstrating to the self at hand the variations in, and the variegated

nature of, its objects. What, then, is left for the self to do is nothing more than being what it is described as in the preceding. But if so, it is plain that in one stroke this Kārikā takes away from the self most of what was given to it in Kārikā 17. In Kārikā 20 an attempt is made to make the self appear as an agent of the totality of experience and action but through a device which looks at once devious and paradoxical and makes the task of giving the completer Sāṁkhya notion of self a semblance of coherence and expositing its full significance within the Sāṁkhya scheme very much difficult. In the first place, Kārikā 20 preaches that consciousness (or self) intelligizes *buddhi* by (as some like Vācaspati say) being reflected in it, which reflection is made possible by its (consciousness') association (*saṁyoga*) with that first *sattva*-dominated evolute of the primal cause, *prakṛti*. Due to this intelligization *buddhi* (or *liṅga*) appears, to begin with, *as if* invested with consciousness, while at the other end that proximity causes consciousness (self), which being non-intentional in essence is inactive (*udāsīna*), to appear *as if* characterized by agenthood or activity. In other words, all active operation including that of knowing—and of course of ratiocinative discernment—truly belongs to *buddhi* (etc.) and is only metaphorically (*upacāra*), and hence necessarily mistakenly, ascribed to the self whose nature as pure, unchanging consciousness obviously makes it recalcitrate its assimilation to the concept of agenthood with all its inescapable experiential mutations. As already briefly alluded to, this *as if* is used in the said Kārikā to stress the false nature of the identification of the self with *prakṛti* (*buddhi*), which according to Sāṁkhya has, as already remarked, its source in *avidyā* or *aviveka* (non-discriminating awareness) which accompanies every fresh inhabiting of the body. No wonder that this *avidyā* is understood as bondage itself. (The exact state of bondage one is in is determined by where one perceives the self to lie.)

Now the most important question, which has struck very few interpreters, is that if the above account is the real or more real Sāṁkhya teaching which supersedes everything else said before and after, then the grounds contained in the Kārikā 17—*saṁghātaparārthatvāt*, *adhiṣṭhānāt*, *bhoktṛbhāvāt*, etc.—either turn out to be no grounds or else at best prove a self which is but of little consequence to the Sāṁkhya doctrine as it comes to be recast on different occasions subsequently. This recasting is extremely intriguing, considering that *puruṣa*, its supposed *adhiṣṭhāna* (cf. the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* quotation above), being in timeless conjunction with *prakṛti*, acts not only as its final cause but also as the *telos* of the latter's

manifestation into an objective (enjoyable) world. If *prakṛti—buddhi*—is really meant for itself, even so far as *bhoga* and *apavarga* are concerned, then the self, though it might still be needed as a catalyst for *prakṛti*'s evolutionary march, ceases to be an explanation of the much-flaunted inner purposiveness of *prakṛti* as also its (so-called) organic unity at the level of the body. The self, then, which is the real object of proof of *SK* 17 ends up as a monumental appearance. Since, however, appearances do not need proof—for it is the realty lurking behind their veil which needs proof—the exertions of *SK* 17 come to a naught. No subsequent patchwork either by the text itself or by its commentators to demonstrate the substantial relevance of the self seems then to carry much conviction.

My meaning mainly is that while it may still be possible for Sāṁkhya to prove, albeit through a different sort of reasoning than employed in Kārikā 17, that the self exists, it would not be a self which *prakṛti* as conceived by Sāṁkhya really needs. And the consequence of this all, rarely foreseen, is that in the absence of a necessary (even if eternal) self *prakṛti* forfeits all that it is invested with on the Sāṁkhya view, and survives at best as a contingent reality which, though a fact, may not have been there at all. We are then left with two realities, which or one of which, though theoretically assumed as necessarily presupposing the other in respect at least of the evolved world—nay even at the individual plane—, are practically finally left as bare 'facts' without any metaphysical explanation to ground them in—something of which the system otherwise makes its starting point.

Now although the grave paradox outlined above in no wise means that there is, properly speaking, no experience of the (experienceable-regarded) world or that there is no real pain from which freedom is wished, it does mean that these two things are not somethings which happen to the soul proper. Unreal as states of the self, *bhoga* and the ensuing pain are real as states of the (intelligized) *buddhi*, which though a subject in virtue of being the *real* experient-agent, is ironically called object (*dṛśya*: the Yoga expression), i.e., object to the self (*dṛk*: the Yoga expression, the analogue—*draṣṭā*—of which is available in the *SK*). The non-discernment (*aviveka*) which in the system is thought to be at the root of experience and pain is regarded there as self-caused and so ultimately inexplicable much like the Vedāntic *avidya* which conceptually owes much to the Sāṁkhya notion.

Without delving into the host of issues which the Sāṁkhya view, collectively represented in Kārikās 19 and 20 raises, for fear that at this point they might constitute a digression, I must, at least as an initial reaction, confess to my inability to understand the real Sāṁkhya motive not so much for denying the self any real agency—though that too raises questions of its own which cry for a principled explanation—but for denying it any real (and not apparent) and meaningful connection with the *buddhi* which as *pradhāna* is otherwise supposed not only to be ever interwined with it (until perhaps the release of a certain individual *puruṣa*) but also has it as its *adhiṣṭhāna* which triggers its evolution. In other words, the question is, if the self is to be saved, lest its nature and glory as pure consciousness be compromised, from being even remotely implicated in the transactions of the world and of course of the body (of which too it is the proclaimed *adhiṣṭhātṛ*), and is needed, as it turns out, just to lend the services of its sentient presence, perhaps even without its being aware of this role of its, why should the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* undertake to demonstrate its existence on grounds that are soon to turn into a matter of form or as designed to prove a self which in terms of those grounds is only an 'as if' self. This, incidentally, is a point at which the difficulty, always great, of reconciling what Sāṁkhya actually says with what it ought in consistency to have said, becomes insuperable. For, as already hinted, on subsequent terms the real self in Sāṁkhya willy-nilly ends up being more of a postulate than a rationally argued entity. Lest the preceding statement be misunderstood, it is necessary to clarify that our suggestion is not that a philosophy must always try to prove what it believes. It is rather that it cannot afford to have it both ways, namely to try to prove, through argument, a certain proposition about something, and advance explicitly a contrary position about the same thing without any requisite and convincing explaining. In this light, the argued-for self, far from being an aid to an understanding of the (asserted) doctrine of *prakṛti*'s purposiveness, becomes in the end its supreme embarrassment; it fails to explain quite, who really enjoys in the sense of being materially affected by it, the material *prakṛti*'s dance. If this dance is for *prakṛti* itself, as is the clear implication in the *SK*, why have a mock enjoyer at all. The logical consequence is there for all to see: a world which is supposed to involve both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* in a certain relationship, however temporarily finally, ends up being a sundered world, the said relation between the two principles remaining an inexplicable puzzle.

It is a massive puzzle because without (conjunction with) *puruṣa* there can be no world and yet *puruṣa* is in effective terms said to have nothing to do with it. And if there are many selves or *puruṣas*, as the Sāṁkhya philosophy further holds and argues, they all turn out to be (self-enclosed) islands lying in splendid isolation from each other, resembling somewhat the Leibnizian monads, with no common experienceable world serving as a bridge between them. In fact, to put it bluntly, Leibniz's windowless (because unrelated fundamentally) monads seem to enjoy, from one point of view, a clear superiority over the Sāṁkhya selves in so far as they reflect a common universe from a point of view, which, though strictly their own, is real and not an appearance: the commerce between the metaphysically unrelated selves and the universe is actual. The Sāṁkhya self in contrast has no point of view, and though it is said to be 'reflected' in *buddhi*, it does neither reflect over nor contemplate the finally sorry world which the *buddhi* presents to it when embodied. The situation, ironically, is one of a tragi-comedy. When *SK* 20 intimates that the (non-conscious) *liṅga* (*buddhi*, etc.) appears as if pervaded by consciousness (*cetanāvadiva*) through its relation with the conscious self, one is left wondering, to whom does the *liṅga* appear thus? To the *buddhi* or to the self? If to *buddhi*, then the question is, how does the (non-conscious) *buddhi* know, phenomenologically speaking, that though it is insentient, it now has the appearance of being a conscious entity thanks to its union with the self, of which too perhaps it becomes conscious. And if to the self, then the question is: how does the self which, according to Sāṁkhya, even though always conscious, has no awareness of itself as such, come to know (1) that because of its relation with *buddhi* the latter takes on the appearance of consciousness, and (2) that it itself, even though not knowing that it is not, unlike *buddhi*, an active agent, acquires the appearance of being such an agent thanks again to the (other-ended) relation with *buddhi*. Needless to say, this single question which arises in the wake of what the above Kārikā states is an enormous one, and remains so far unanswered satisfactorily.

This is not the only paradox relating to the Sāṁkhya self, however. A different aspect of the issue pertains, firstly, to the divergence of views among various commentators, and, second, to the overtly contradictory positions held by the very same interpreter on the notion he is concerned to explicate. To deal satisfactorily with all such rather formidable problems is an exacting task. And yet a serious reader of this great system of

thought is under obligation to attempt, within the resources at his command, a treatment of at least some of these, which is more than perfunctory. I seek then to focus attention on a few of the tangled issues by giving due regard to textual exegeses, without however allowing, hopefully I suppose, the philosophic interest to be affected beyond certain limits. That what I say is not wholly without substance, is shown by the fact that within the 'official' Sāṁkhya tradition itself the deceptively perplexing character of some of the central doctrines of the school was felt by none else than the famous Vijñānabhikṣu himself, however insufficient his own solutions in turn may have been regarded as being. My concern therefore is not so much with the question of the adequacy of the Sāṁkhya account of the nature of reality, specially of the self, but with that of its internal necessity, and of its cogency for us. To put it differently, our intention is to take the Sāṁkhya commentators/interpreters on their own terms as consistently and truly as lies within us.

We have seen above that there are reasons to believe that the *SK* refutes its own doctrine concerning the existence of, and need for, the kind of self it conjures from the standpoint of its own premises. The commentators however are by and large sympathetic, sometimes emphatically, to the subsequently advanced *SK* doctrine that the self as enjoyer, agent, etc. is so only figuratively, that in fact it is an unconcerned seer-watchman. But their claims as expositors of the real Sāṁkhya standpoint notwithstanding, they are seen to be in a bind when their views on the same issue are found to be in conflict with each other. This is shown by even a superficial examination of their utterances, which task I now proceed to undertake, if only briefly and broadly.

One of the renowned commentators of the *SK*, Vācaspati Miśra, when commenting on the Kārikā 17, gives as his firm view (in endorsement of the reasons for self stated therein), that the self (*ātman*) is the real *adhiṣṭhātṛ* of the body, more specially the *buddhi*, which is of the nature of pleasure, pain, etc. (*sukhaduḥkhamohātmakam cedaṁ buddhyādi*), for the simple but important reason that *buddhi*, etc., being of the above character, must of necessity have such a controller or propeller, as a chariot has in the form of a charioteer (*yathā rathādi yantrādibhiḥ ... tasmādetadapi pareṇādhiṣṭhātavyam*). Likewise in his elucidation of the ground, *bhoktṛbhāvāt*, he leaves no one in doubt as to his view of the Sāṁkhya expression: since *buddhi* etc. are of the nature of pleasure, pain etc., they can*not* themselves be the sufferers (enjoyers) of these experiences, for

that (in his view) would amount to *svātmani vṛttivirodha*. This contingency then forces upon our mind the need for the entity called self to whom alone these expressions can properly belong in the sense of *affecting* him, if only because he is himself not of the nature of pleasure or pain.[21] The real import of Vācaspati's view is that pleasure cannot please itself, nor can pain be painful to itself. They can be so only to an actual conscious subject.

Now what is of crucial importance is that immediately hereafter Vācaspati refers to a view held by some 'others' (*anye tvāhuḥ*), that the word *bhogya* as an adjective of *buddhi*, etc. means not 'enjoyable' or 'sufferable' as pleasure and pain are supposed to be, but (just) *dṛśya* (capable of being witnessed or watched) and that therefore the self cannot perhaps be an enjoyer in the standard sense but only a witness (*draṣṭā*).[22] It should be clear that the upholders of this latter view interpret *bhoktā* as *draṣṭā* and *bhogya* as (simply) *dṛśya*, guided as they seem to be by Sāṁkhya's own doctrine propounded in *SK* 19 referred to above. And it is also clear that Vācaspati, by attributing this view to 'others', consciously seeks to distinguish his own view from it which he apparently finds exceptionable. But while this is so, when we turn to his gloss on *SK* 19, we are struck by the conspicuous inconsistency which creeps in in his explication of certain important attributes predicated of the self. That the said inconsistency is present in the Kārikā itself can scarcely be doubted. But what is of importance is that Vācaspati explains the terms *sākṣin* and *draṣṭā* with a view to emphasize the *subject*hood of the self, which according to him derives from its being conscious and non-object (*cetanatvena aviṣayatvena ca sākṣitvadraṣṭṛtve darśite*). Secondly, without so much as intimating us in what way *draṣṭṛtva* as subjecthood differs from *sākṣitva* as subjecthood, he explains the *sākṣin*-subject as one to whom objects are presented (*darśitaviṣaya*).[23] One thing is clear, though, namely that this interpretation is not in itself incompatible with what is stated either in the Kārikā 17 itself or in Vācaspati's commentary thereupon; for one cannot be an enjoyer unless one is a subject in the first place in the ordinary sense of that term. The real problem from Vācaspati's point of view is the term *mādhyasthya*, by which he understands the unconcernedness or indifference (*udāsīnatva*) of the self which supposedly results from staying unaffected by pleasure on pain. For, what passes comprehension is that a subject (*sākṣin*, *draṣṭā*) to whom objects—which include *buddhi*, etc. and pleasure and pain which characterize their nature—are presented should

be perceived as unaffected by them and so really resigned. It is also plain that an indifferent conscious being cannot be an enjoyer or experient (*bhoktā*) either, though as noted above, Vācaspati, in his explanation of Kārikā 17, appears firmly convinced that that is precisely what a self necessarily is because with this, in his view, is tied the nature of the non-conscious *prakṛti* as *bhogya*. Besides, if the self always remains unconcerned or unaffected, a number of grounds adduced in Kārikā 17 to prove its existence are rendered utterly inconsequential. Not only this, the self's alleged *mādhyasthya* comes into clash with the inner logic of *prakṛti*'s self-manifestation, and its own consequent quest for release from suffering—which according to Sāṁkhya is painful only to the extent it affects us adversely (*duḥkhatrayābhighātād*: *SK* 1).

But these incongruities apart, Vācaspati's overall endeavour appears to be aimed at reconciling the contents of the Kārikās 17 and 19 so that they, though at variance, do not undermine the basic doctrine of the Sāṁkhya philosophy.

This is not the case, however, with some other commentaries. In the now celebrated *Yukti-dīpikā*, for instance, where no ground given for the self in *SK* 17 has been interpreted metaphorically, the assumed *adhiṣṭhātṛtva* (of the self) as a proof of the latter's existence is treated, enigmatically enough, in the way of a metaphor (*arthe tadupacārāt*); and this is done in response to the (opponent's) query whether the said *adhiṣṭhātṛtva* would not involve the contingency of agenthood accruing to the self, which latter is palpably denied by Sāṁkhya. What is more puzzling is that the *bhoktṛtva* ascribed to the self, which appears to entangle the self in the worldly affairs much more deeply than his *adhiṣṭhātṛtva*, is explained in a normal way, much as Vācaspati does. In other words, for the *YD*, while the self as a controller has only a shadowy existence, as an 'enjoyer' (*bhoktā*) it enjoys a *real* existence. And the startlingly interesting part is that yet the self's (metaphorical) 'controllership' is invoked to make the fundamental point that in the absence of such a controller *prakṛti*'s evolution into the manifold world would end up being just an accidental affair without any innate governing purpose, and so would render the other (self-evident) principle—viz. that a combinational unity (*saṁghāta*) is necessarily other-oriented—completely otiose. The *YD* obviously glosses over the all-too important point that while Sāṁkhya does not mind denying the self *real* agenthood, it may find it extremely difficult to reduce its *adhiṣṭhātṛtva* to virtually a fake idea: for after all without the self as controller both at the

primordial level as well as at the level of the visible body, *prakṛti* forfeits its rationale both as *avyakta* and as a manifest world (*vyakta*), even though it may continue to exist as such for all time as a matter of contingent fact.

It is noteworthy that no other pre-modern commentary perceives in the arguments of *SK* 17, whether represented by the notion of *bhoktṛtva* or that of *adhiṣṭhātṛtva*, metaphor rather than reality. To cite a few instances, in addition to *Tattva-kaumudī*, the *Sāṁkhya-vṛtti* (of approximately sixth century AD), though it does not elucidate the term *bhoktṛtva*, thinking it perhaps as quite obvious in meaning, observes in its explication of *adhiṣṭhātṛtva: ataḥ paśyāmo'sti puruṣa iti yena adhiṣṭhitaṁ pradhānam mahadādi sampādayati iti* (It is because *puruṣa* acts as its controller or superintendent that *pradhāna* is able to bring into existence the objective world beginning with *mahat*, etc.). In a similar vein Gauḍapāda says through an example: Just as a chariot, yoked with horses capable of leaping, galloping, and running, functions when controlled by a charioteer, so does the body function when controlled by the self (*yathā ... rathaḥ sārathinā'dhiṣṭhitaḥ pravartate tathā ātmādhiṣṭhānāt śarīramiti*). Further, it is not just a coincidence that no important commentary thinks the 'enjoyerhood' of the self to be an appearance at least in the context where this notion is invoked, which reason in my view is alone sufficient to prove that spirit is essential. However, whether or not the *YD* explanation of self's alleged 'controller-ship' as a mere appearance (because of its *upacāratva*) represents truly the import of the argument concerned, there is little question that the self's *adhiṣṭhātṛtva* does raise the enticing issue of whether for this reason *puruṣa* should not be considered as active—a question, incidentally, which the *YD* raises as a *pūrvapakṣa*.

Though the answer to this last question is contained in *SK* 20 (see above), where *buddhi* is asserted as appearing to be conscious and the self as appearing (since *udāsīna*) to be active (*karteva*), both of which propositions raise insuperable difficulties, a surprise is in store for us as we pass to the (very next) Kārikā 21, where the meaning of the indisputable association (*saṁyoga*) of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is under consideration. The explanation runs thus: the association of the two, as of a lame man and a blind man, is for the purpose of *prakṛti* being contemplated (lit. seen) as such by *puruṣa*, and for the release of the *puruṣa* (from three-fold suffering). From this association (it is said) proceeds the creation.

In his brief gloss here, Vācaspati suggests that *pradhāna* being a *bhogya* requires a *bhoktṛ* and this need of its is satisfied by the existence of

puruṣa: nay the existence of *puruṣa* as a *bhoktṛ* even justifies the 'enjoyability' of *prakṛti*.[24] It is their association therefore which makes possible the creation which brings both *bhoga* and *apavarga* for the self.

The meaning of the Kārikā is really illuminated by *Yukti-dīpikā*'s observations which are remarkable for the light they throw upon *puruṣa*'s and *prakṛti*'s need for each other. Explaining the words, *pangvandhavat ubhayorapi saṁyogaḥ*, the *YD* observes roughly as follows: The consciousness exists in the self even prior to its relation with the body. Just as the power of burning in fire and that of cutting in an axe does not get manifest in the absence of something to be burnt or cut, consciousness is manifested only at the time of contact with the body; therefore *pradhāna* is needed. Likewise *pradhāna* too being incapable of doing anything itself and as if not having performed its activity will be useless without the favour to *puruṣa* and so needs the *puruṣa*. The authorities call this contact in the form of mutual expectancy as potential bondage. ... *Puruṣa* inspite of its being conscious would not be the subject (*upalabdhā*) in the absence of the object without *pradhāna* and hence stands in need of the latter.

Further, like Vācaspati, the *YD* states that the creation of *tattvas* like *mahat*, etc. proceeds when caused by the mutual expectancy of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* in the form of the enjoyer and the enjoyed.[25]

Now, at least on a superficial view and, further, unless an illicit insertion is introduced—a practice not uncommon with the schoolmen—the above Kārikā well seems to put a lie to the contention of Kārikā 20 which makes a case for the two-fold appearance or make-belief. Even if it be granted that the self in fact is an unconcerned witness, the point remains that its witnessing cannot but involve contemplation of *prakṛti*'s or *buddhi*'s nature as absolutely distinct from its own, consequent upon which alone final release becomes possible. And if we stretch the logic of this contemplation to its limits, it is hard to gainsay that the self cannot begin to reflect over its distinction from *buddhi*, unless in the first instance it is affected by what *buddhi* consists of or has to offer it, which it spontaneously, as it were, accepts and enjoys. Now whether this 'enjoyership' implies agency is, for me at least, a matter of terminology, unless of course *akartṛtva* is *interpreted*, à la Vācaspati, as 'non-productive'[26] (in contrast to the productive *prakṛti*). For unless one acquires at least a semblance of real agenthood, the notion of being a *bhoktṛ* is drained of all content: the proposition that a *bhoktṛ* is not aware that he is a *bhoktṛ*

and also of what he is as a *bhoktṛ*, sounds incredible. I say this because unless it is an enjoying agent, even if this characteristic accrues to it as a result of its association with *buddhi*, as many hold, the self cannot strictly feel bound and so start in its quest for liberation. I am not suggesting that a union of materiality and consciousness or a conflation of their respective functions is not possible. But I do wish to emphasize, as I have already done above, that this confounding and so the related appearance must and can appear as such only to a conscious being who in Sāṁkhya is nothing but the self. At the epistemic level error and its correction must belong to the same entity who may subsequently realize its real (metaphysical) character, if the error happens to be connected with the latter.

Finally, what is of great consequence is the view attributed to Sāṁkhya that the association between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is illusory—a view which follows from the central doctrine that this association (of the self and *prakṛti*) is from the first conditioned by *avidyā*. This position, if really Sāṁkhyan, radically undermines Sāṁkhya's own basic teaching that the purpose-ridden evolutionary march of *prakṛti* not only takes place under the aegis of *puruṣa* but also finds its highest fulfilment in the service of that *puruṣa*. In other words, the alleged unreality of the relation between the two deprives *prakṛti* of the only justification it has for its existence and self-manifestation. Indeed, with the experienceable world becoming directionless, the notions of necessity of *bhoga* and the consequent search for freedom from pain are drained of all content and meaning with the result that even spirit is reduced to a grand abstraction. In this light one cannot help remarking that the self-avowed Sāṁkhya dualism becomes inexplicable on its own terms: the inherent logic of that dualism ceases to receive appropriate sustenance from its amended doctrines and the Sāṁkhya philosophy ends up being a 'metaphysical romance'. If this single circumstance coupled with the subsequently expressly stated Sāṁkhyan conviction (cf. *SK* 62) that it is in fact *prakṛti* which gets bound or released, threatens Sāṁkhya's otherwise unparalleled vision and has its logical culmination in the Vedāntic doctrine of *māyā*, there is nothing to be surprised at.

(*To be continued.*)

NOTES

1. '*saṁghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayādadhiṣṭhānāt/puruso'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteśca//*'.
2. *SK* 11: '*triguṇamaviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṁ prasavadharmi/vyaktaṁ tathā pradhanaṁ tadviparitastathā ca pumān//*'.
3. Compare Gauḍapāda's comment on *SK* 17: '*avyaktavat puruṣo 'pi sūkṣmaḥ, tasyādhunā anumitāstitvaṁ pratikriyate*'.
4. George Feuerstein, *The Philosophy of Classical Yoga* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 15.
5. Gauḍapāda on *SK* 17.
6. Gauḍapāda in his comm. on *SK* 17 quotes the now lost *Ṣaṣṭitantra*: '*puruṣādhiṣṭhitaṁ pradhānaṁ pravartate*'.
7. K.C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. I, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya (Kolkata: Progressive Publishers, 1956), p. 193. (Hereafter cited as *SP*.)
8. Ibid., p. 192. Italics mine.
9. Ibid., pp. 192–3.
10. Ibid., p. 192. Italics mine.
11. In the Appendix following Chapter III of the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements', Kant introduces the term 'transcendental reflection' as follows:

    > All judgements, ... and indeed all comparisons, require reflection, i.e. distinction of the cognitive faculty to which the given concepts belong. The act by which I confront the comparison of representations with the cognitive faculty to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other, I call *transcendental reflection*.

    I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (1st ed. 1929; repr., London: Macmillan, pbk., 1973), B 317 (pp. 276–7).
12. '*yadi prasiddhaṁ na jijñāsitavyam. atha aprasiddhaṁ, naiva śakyaṁ jijñāsitumiti ucyate—asti tāvad brahma ... sarvasyātmatvāt ca brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ. sarvo hyātmāstitvaṁ pratyeti, na nāhamasmīti. ... ātmā ca brahma. (Opponent): yadi tarhi loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddhamasti, tato jñātamevety ajijñasyatvam punarāpannam.* (Reply): *na; tadviśeṣaṁ prati vipratipatteḥ*.' *B.S.S.B.* 1.1.1. In other words, though the self exists and is also known as existent, there is divergence of opinion as to its nature—which question is taken up in the *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2. onwards with Śaṅkara's discussion of it in his commentary on these sūtras.
13. *SP*, p. 192. Italics mine.
14. Ibid., p. 191.
15. Ibid.
16. *YD* (under Kārikā 17): '*sati hi saṁghātatve devadattādivad ayaṁ puruṣaḥ pratyakṣyata eva upalabhyeta*' (p. 77).

17. Aniruddha's *Vṛtti* and *SPB* under *SS* 1.140–142.
18. *SPB* under *SS* 1.66.
19. Bhiksu, *SPB* under *SS* 1.139: '*saṁhataparārthatvāt puruṣasya ityuktasūtreṇāpi vivekānumānamevābhipretaṁ, na tu tatra puruṣasya sarvathaiva apratyakṣyatvamabhipretamiti*' (p. 131).
20. Vācaspati and some other commentators of *SK* interpret '*akartṛbhāva*' as meaning 'non-productive', which of course the self in the Sāṁkhya view is, since distinct from the productive (*prasavadharmī*) *prakṛti*.
21. '*bhoktṛbhāvena bhogye sukhaduḥkhe upalakṣayati. bhogye hi sukhaduḥkhe anukūlapratikūlavedanīye pratyātmamanubhūyete. ....tasmad yo 'sukhādyātmā so' nukūlanīyaḥ pratikūlanīyo vā, sa ca ātmeti.*' *TK* under *SK* 17.
22. '*anye tvāhuḥ: bhogyā dṛśyā buddhyādayaḥ. ... bhoktṛbhāvāt draṣṭṛbhāvāt, dṛśyena draṣṭuranumānāt.*' *TK* under *SK* 17.
23. In elaboration, Vācaspati adds: '*prakṛtiḥ ... svacaritaṁ viṣayaṁ puruṣāya darśayati iti puruṣaḥ sākṣī.*' Objects after all cannot be presented to something which is unconscious and an object itself.
24. '*tadanena bhogyatā pradhānasya darśitā. tataśca bhogyaṁ pradhānaṁ bhoktāramantareṇa na saṁbhavati iti yuktā'sya bhoktrapekṣā.*' *TK* under *SK* 21.
25. '*prāgapi kārya-kāraṇa-sambandhāt puruṣe caitanyaṁ avasthitam. tad yathā agner dahanaṁ paraśocchedanamasati dāhye chedye ca na vyajyate. tatsannidhānasamakālameva tu vyajyate. ityataḥ pradhānam apekṣate. tathā pradhānamapyantareṇa puruṣopakāraṁ svakādasamarthamaniṣpannakāryasamaṁ cetitamanarthakaṁ syad ityataḥ puruṣam apekṣate. tatra ubhayoritaretarā apekṣā taṁ saṁyogam adhikārabandham āhur ācāryāḥ ... tathā puruṣaḥ satyapi cetanatve nāntareṇa pradhānamupalabhyābhāvādupalabdhā bhavediti pradhānamapekṣate. ... pradhānapuruṣayor hi bhoktṛbhogyabhāvāpekṣanimitto 'yaṁ tattvasargo mahadādiḥ ... .*' *YD* under *SK* 21 (pp. 89–90)
26. Vācaspati on *SK* 19: '*vivekitvād aprasavadharmitvāt ca akarteti siddham.*'

SELECTED REFERENCES WITH ABBREVIATIONS

1. Aniruddha, *Vṛtti* on *Sāṁkhyasūtras* in *Sāṁkhyadarśana* of Kapila, as published with Vedanti Mahadeva's *Vrttisāra*, Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhaṣya* and Nāgeśabhatta's *Bhāṣyasāra*, by Janardana Shastri Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.
2. Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, ed. K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye. Poona: University of Poona, 1965.
3. *B.S.S.B.: Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.
4. Gauḍapāda, Commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, trans. into English with Notes by T.G. Mainkar, 2nd rev. and enlar. ed. Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1972.

5. *SK*: *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as published with Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī*, under the title *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, trans. into Hindi with a Hindi commentary *Jyotiṣmatī* by Ram Shankar Bhattacharyya, 2nd enlar. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976.
6. *SPB*: *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu in Janardana Shastri Pandeya. (See Ref. 1)
7. *SS*: *Sāṁkhyasūtras* of Kapila in Janardana Shastri Pandeya. (See Ref. 1)
8. *SYD*: *Sāṁkhyayogadarśana*, ed. Goswami Damodara Sastri. (See Ref. 13)
9. *TK*: *Tattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, in Ram Shankar Bhattacharyya. (See Ref. 5)
10. *TV*: *Tattvavaiśaradī* of Vācaspati Misra in *SYD*. (See Ref. 13)
11. *VAB*: *Vijñānamṛtabhāṣya* (*on Bādarāyana's Brahmasūtras*) of Vijñānabhikṣu, ed. Kedar Nath Tripathi. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1979.
12. *YD*: *Yuktidīpikā*, an ancient commentary on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, ed. R.C. Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.
13. *YS*: *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali, as published with Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya*, and the commentaries *Tattvavaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Pātañjalarahasya* of Raghavananda Sarasvati, *Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu and *Bhāsvatī* of Hariharanandaranya, ed. under the title *Sāṁkhyayogadarśana* by Goswami Damodara Sastri. Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, reprint, 1990.
14. *YV*: *Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu in *SYD*.
15. *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, Part I, ed. Vasudeva Laxmana Sharma Pansikar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

Sentential-Meaning: *Bhartṛhari's* Arguments on the Controversy Between Word-Theories *(Padārthavāda)* and Sentential-Theory of Meaning (*Vākyārthavāda*)

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The aim of *Bhartṛhari's* philosophy of language is to explain communication. The fact that 'Communication is accomplished by sentential-meaning' is accepted by all popular Indian theories dealing with concept of meaning, though, on the concept of sentence and also on the very general meaning of it (*Vākyārtha*), they themselves differ a lot. *Bhartṛhari* is a sententialist-holist and as such he has established the theory of indivisibility of language and meaning by refuting *Padavādin's* theory.

The purpose involved in writing this paper is to clarify *Bhartṛhari's* position regarding controversy between *Padavāda* (theories of language based on interpreting sentence and sentential-meaning as a construction out of words and word-meaning respectively, i.e., *Abhihitānvayavāda* and also as mutually connected word-meanings, i.e., *Anvitābhidhānavāda*) and *Vākyavāda* (theory which views indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning). By *Padavādins*[1] we mean *Mīmānsakas, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Bauddhas* and some *Vaiyākaraṇas,* who deny the independent being of sentence and who interpret the sentential-meaning on the basis of *padas* (words) and *padārthas* (word-meaning) by following 'expression precedes relation' and 'relation precedes expression' respectively as theoretical maxims. The controversy between *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* is popularly studied by the scholars of Indian philosophy but very little has been written by modern scholars on the controversy, over sentential-meaning, between *Padavāda* and *Vākyavāda* in general and on *Bhartṛhari's* arguments from the side of *Padavādins* and counter-arguments from the side of *Vaiyākaraṇas* in particular. It presents the subject popular at the time of *Bhartṛhari* before the controversy of

Kumārila and *Prabhākara* but relevant for recent philosophical reflections on language and meaning.

The discussion on the subject is presented in the paper in four sections.

Section one comprises different theories of sentential-meaning popular at the time of *Bhartṛhari* (5th century) and his own arguments against them. Section two discusses his theory of indivisibility of sentential-meaning (*Pratibhā-Vākyārtha*).

Section three consists of some specific objections of *Padavādins* as put by *Bhartṛhari* against indivisibility theory of sentential-meaning and their reply from the side of *Bhartṛhari* and his commentator *Puṇyarāja.*

Lastly, we have concluded that *Abhihitānvayavāda* is proper from the point of view of teaching language to the ignorant and children, *Anvitābhidhānavāda* is convincing from the point of view of understanding the purpose of expressions and figurative meaning while *Bhartṛhari's* theory of indivisibility is justified not from the point of view of analysis and synthesis only but that of cognition and communication also.

I
BHARTṚHARI'S CRITIQUE OF *PADAVĀDINS* THEORIES OF SENTENTIAL-MEANING

Bhartṛhari has mentioned at least five types of theories related to *Padavādins,* has critically examined them and has found them self-contradictory and disputed themselves in explaining *Vākyārtha.* The mention of these theories specially in the second part of *Vākyapadīyam: saṅsarga* 2/42, 2/55, 2/416, 2/428, *Saṅsṛṣṭa* 2/418, *Nirākāṅkṣapadārtha Vākyārtha* 2/416, *Kriyāvākyārtha* in 2/326, 2/414, *Prayojana Vākyārtha* 2/113; is significant.

An account of these five types of *Padavādins* theory of *Vākyārtha* criticized and refuted by *Bhartṛhari* as put by *Puṇyarāja*[1] is as follows:

1. *Saṅsarga* (association or relation of word-meanings as *Vākyārtha* (sentential-meaning).
2. *Nirākāṅkṣa Padārtha Vākyārtha* (word-meanings reposed and retiring expectancy for the completion of a sense as sentential-meaning.
3. *Prayojana Vākyārtha* (purport or the intention as sentential-meanings—*Vākyārtha*).
4. *Saṅsṛṣṭa Vākyārtha* (mutually related word-meaning as sentential-meanings—*Vākyārtha*).

5. *Kriyā Vākyārtha* (word-meaning causing imperative to do or not to do some action as *Vākyārtha*).

All of these five types of sentential-meaning are different theories of *Padavādins* which are grossly grouped by *Puṇyarāja* (11th–12th Century) into two groups of *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* according to their nature in meeting with the controversy of interpreting the nature of understanding construction of sentential-meaning in terms of 'expression precedes relation' and 'relation precedes expression'. Theories No. 1, 2, 3 are based on describing sentential-meaning by assuming 'expression precedes relation' while the latter two are based on 'relation precedes expression'. As the nature of relation varies and is not determined in any of the cases of 'expression precedes relation' and 'relation precedes expression' and as communication is accomplished by the whole as a unit without the performance of relating, *Bhartṛhari* has refuted their view of *Vākyārtha.* For him[2], there is no part in a meaning which is indivisible unit and as meaning is not a syntactical but semantic unit of the nature of awareness and as there is no possibility of real division in awareness, the *Vākyārtha,* for him, is the indivisible flash of awareness which is divided artificially by intellect to make the indivisible understandable to the ignorant and children and, thus, he propounds a different theory of sentential-meaning which in his own terminology is *Pratibhā-Vākyārtha.*[3]

Before coming to the discussion on the concept of *Vākyārtha,* it is necessary to mention that the theorist's interpretation of the problem of *Vākyārtha* is inevitably related with their view regarding convention. It can, undoubtedly, be said that their differences of looking at *Vākyārtha* differently are based on their assumptions regarding convention. The role of convention in communication is highly applauded by some Indian and western philosophers of language. *Wittgenstein,* the great western philosopher of language, accepted convention as the meaning of words and sentences. His lines 'Don't ask for meaning, ask for the use,' is always quoted by scholars of philosophy of language. For *Wittgenstein,* the meaning of an expression is convention or how the word or expression is used in various contexts. *Bhartṛhari's* conception of role of convention in language communication is however quite different from that of *Wittgenstein.* For him, convention is neither the meaning of a word/sentence nor does it produce meaning of a word/sentence. A meaning for *Bhartṛhari,* is always a meaning of language which is naturally fit for conveying a

number of meanings (*sarve sarvārtha Vācakāḥ*). He opines that convention or observation of the use of words for a certain meaning only specifies the use or it delimits a meaning out of different meanings of the word/sentence. Convention functions as regulative or as a restrainer to the fitness of the word to a certain meaning but the meaning in every case, is always the meaning of language.[4] The observation of the use of expression specifies only the meaning conveyed popularly by the word/sentence. In other words, convention specifies that the expression or word in the expression is restrained to the popular meaning among the various meanings likely to be expressed by that word or expression. Thus, convention for *Bhartṛhari*, is instrumental in restraining the fitness of the word/sentence on the basis of which a fixed meaning is known by a fixed word/sentence. If the fixed meaning is not conducive to a use then other meanings of it are decided as known by imposition of the primary meaning on different meanings on the basis of apposition, similarity, context, etc.

Now the problem: Whether convention is observed there with words or with sentence, is a very central problem of Indian philosophy of language, the solution of which gives rise to various rival theories of language in general and in Indian semantics in particular. The differences of *Abhihitānavayavādins, anvitā-bhidhāna-vādins* and *Akhaṇḍa-vākyārthavādins* are fundamentally rooted in their different views regarding convention. For *Abhihitānavayavādins*, what a child observes as a unit of meaning, by the use of elders, is a word, and, hence, they accept words as independent units and, on the basis of it as the primary unit, they explain the sentence and sentential-meaning as an outcome of a get together of the word and word-meaning respectively. *Anvitābhidhānavādins,* though, they also assume word as the primary meaning conveying unit, accept convention with sentential-meaning but they explain sentential-meaning as mutually related meanings of the words. They don't believe in the existence of sentence independently of words as a meaning conveying unit. Sentential-meaning for them, is not the meaning of a sentence but of words which when used convey mutually related word-meanings. Mutually related meaning or sentential-meaning is the meaning conveyed by words and, hence, there is no need to accept sentence for explaining the sentential-meaning.[5] For *Vaiyākaraṇas,* communication is accomplished neither by one-to-one get-together of word-meaning nor by mutually related word-meaning but by indivisible sentential-meaning. The expressor of the sentential-meaning is neither association of words nor the words

having mutually related meanings but indivisible sentence. On the basis of accomplishment of communication in day-to-day practices *Bhartṛhari* elucidates that convention is established there with indivisible sentences which are the indivisible expressor of the indivisible units of communication, i.e. sentential-meanings.[6]

1. Theory of Abhihitānvaya *(Theory of Expression Precedes Association)*

For a group of *Mīmānsakas* and *Naiyāyikas* who consider word (*pada*) as an independent meaning-conveying unit, sentential-meaning is nothing but an association or a synthesis of meaning of words expressed in a syntactical structure. For them, the words express first their own independent meanings and, then, by expectancy, proximity and compatibility the words meanings are associated and that association is called by them as 'sentential-meaning'. The act (*Vyāpāra*) of get-together of word-meanings results (*phala*) as *Vākyārtha* which is a newly emerged meaning over and above the meanings of words. These theorists do not accept sentence and the sentential-meaning as independent units of communication. For them, there is no sentence separate from words and that there is no sentential-meaning separate from word-meanings. Sentential-meaning for these theorists, in general, is not an expressed (*Vācyārtha*). They distinguish *Vākyārtha* (sentential-meaning) from *Vācyārtha* (expressive-meaning). *Vācyārtha,* for them, is the meaning of words because words are only expressive. How do they explain *Vākyārtha,* in fact, is a question on which different *Abhihitānavayavādins* reflect differently. An attempt is now being made below to discuss theories falling under the category of *Abhihitānvayavāda* in the light of the forms of it as analyzed by *Bhartṛhari* in *Vākyapadīyam* and his commentator *Puṇyarāja.*

1. *Saṅsarga Vākyārtha*

Padavādins who accept association of words (*Padasaṅghāto vākyām*) as sentence define sentential-meaning as *saṅsarga* (relation of meaning of words). It is a popular form of *Abhihitānvayavāda* frequently referred to by *Bhartṛhari* in the context of interpreting rival theories on *Vākyārtha.* According to interpretation '*abhihitānām padārthānām anvayaḥ Vākyārthaḥ*' the meanings expressed by words in an expression are cognized first and, then, such known word-meanings are connected together by expectancy, etc. This *Saṅsarga* (connection or association of word-meanings, *Padārthas*) is *Vākyārtha.*[7] If *Vākyārtha* is neither the expressive-

meaning of a sentence nor the expressed of connected words, nor even the meaning of words, how is it then, known as meaning at all? For *Saṅsarga-vādins, Vākyārtha* is suggested when different word-meanings, as resurrected in memory, are associated or connected together by expectancy, etc. The theorists do not feel any need to accept sentence as an independent expressor for explaining sentential-meaning. The words independently express universals and when these universals are associated in memory, sentential-meaning which is individual (over and above the meaning of words) is cognized as one emerged out of association.[8] For example,[9] the meaning expressed by the word '*Vīraḥ*' is '*brave*', a universal-quality and that of the word '*puruṣaḥ*' is man, universal-noun (*puruṣattva*) but when these words are expressed in a particular form (*Vīraḥ puruṣaḥ*) these two concepts are connected as qualifier-qualified for an individual meaning 'a brave man' who stands as a common base (*Samānādhikaraṇa*) of both of the meanings of words '*Vīraḥ*' and '*puruṣaḥ*'. For this theory, the words after expressing their independent meanings disappear but their meanings, as resurrected in memory, are associated and this association is the sentential-meaning. The expressive-meaning, in this theory, is the meaning of words and the association of them is known as sentential-meaning.[10] *Saṅsarga* or sentential-meaning, as *Kumārila Mīmānsakas* say, is known by *Lakṣaṇā* or secondary signification of the words and the factors like expectancy, etc., are instrumental in associating them only. *Naiyāyikas* who do not accept any need to *Lakṣaṇā* for explaining *Saṅsarga* as sentential-meaning (*Vākyārtha*), object to *Mīmānsaka's* theory of *Lakṣaṇā* for interpreting sentential-meaning. According to them, if the cognition of *Saṅsarga* by *Lakṣaṇā* is accepted, then all *Vākyārthas* will be figurative (*Lakṣyārtha*) and, then, it will not be accepted as authority (*Pramāṇa*). Sentential-meaning for them, is the word-meaning connected together by the factors like expectancy, etc. However, *Saṅsarga,* for both of the schools, is *Vākyārtha* and is known as association after the cognition of the expressive-meaning (*Vācyārtha*) of words (expression precedes association). They do not accept *Vākyārtha* (sentential-meaning) as *Vācyārtha* (expressive-meaning) either of a word or of a sentence but as an outcome of the association of word-meanings.

II. *Nirākāṅkṣa-Padārtha Vākyārtha*

Vākyārtha is the word-meaning (*Padārtha*) exhausting expectancy involved in the cognition of a complete unit meaning. The word-meaning (universal),

if qualified by other word-meanings, is reposed for an individual meaning when, by expectancy, it is connected with the meanings of other words of the expression. This reposed-meaning by the word is known as *Vākyārtha. Saṅsargavādins* take association (*Saṅsarga*) as the sentential-meaning while *Nirākāṅkṣapadārthavādins* do not take association but the meaning of word-reposed for an individual meaning as *Vākyārtha.*[11] For example, the words '*Rāmaḥ*' and '*gacchaṭi*' in the expression '*Rāmaḥ gacchaṭi*' (Rāma goes) express their own meanings first and then, by expectancy for a connected meaning, their meanings are reposed for an individual meaning (*Viśeṣa-Viśrāntārtha*). This *Viśeṣaviśrāntārtha* is *Vākyārtha.* A number of actions may be expected from the agent (*Rāmaḥ*) but when connected with the action '*gacchati*' the expectancy for the sort of action is removed. Similarly, the 'action' '*gacchati*' is expected by any agent but when connected with agent (*Rāmaḥ*) the expectancy for any other agent except *Rāma* is removed. Thus, the word-meaning removing expectancy for a complete meaning is *Vākyārtha.* The word-meaning for these theorists is *Vācyārtha* (expressive-meaning) and a qualified *Vācyārtha* (word-meaning) is *Vākyārtha.* The *Vācyārtha* is qualified by the connection of other word-meanings. In *Saṅsargavāda* the word-meanings are mutually expected while in *Nirākāṅkṣa-padārtha-vākyārthavāda,* there is extinction of expectancy for a qualified meaning when a *padārtha* is reposed for individual meaning which is known not by expectancy but by inference.[12]

III. *Prayojana Vākyārtha*

For this form of *Abhihitānvayavāda,* the meanings of words (*Padārthas*) are expressive-meanings and the meaning of a sentence is purport (*Abhidheyaḥ padasyārtho vākyasyārthaḥ prayojanam*).[13] The meaning of a word is what is expressed by the word and the sentential-meaning is what is intended in use of the words in a syntactical structure. Clarifying *prayojana* as *Vākyārtha, Ambākartrī Tīkā* of *Raghu Nath Sharma*[14] gives the example of the expression '*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*'. The expressive-meaning of the word '*Gaṅgāyām*' is on the river '*Ganges*' (stream of water) and the meaning of the word '*ghoṣaḥ*' is residence. The expressive meanings of words (universals) are cognized first. As 'stream of water' cannot be the substratum (*Adhikaraṇa*) of residence of a family, it is by purport of the expression that the meaning of the word '*Gaṅgāyām*' connected with *Ghoṣaḥ* is known as the 'residence on the bank of the stream of water (*Gaṅgātaṭe*)'. Thus, for this theory, intention of the speaker involved in

using the words is the sentential-meaning which is known neither by expectancy nor by association but by intention involved in the use of the expression.[15] Had the intention or purpose of the speaker been otherwise, the expression could mean 'boat'. In brief, this theory assumes that words express their independent meaning by their natural power (*abhidhā-śakti*) and their connection (*Saṅsargārtha*) is known by the cognition of the intention of the speaker involved in the use of the word for communicating meaning. If we accept *Vākyārtha* as the intention of the speaker, the question concerning the role of words for such meanings, arises. How is the intended meaning known by words? *Kumārila* in *Tantra-Vārttika* accepts that *Prayojanārtha* is known by *Lakṣaṇā* (secondary power of the words). For *Naiyāyikas, Vākyārtha* is the intended meaning to be known through the word-meanings (associated) with the help of the factors like expectancy, compatibility, proximity, etc. *Vaiyākaraṇas* think that *Vākyārtha*, if accepted as *Lakṣaṇārtha*, will not be a source of veridical knowledge. Rather, all verbal knowledge will be memory cognition if sentential-meaning is accepted as the meaning known by the secondary force of the words.

Māhima-Bhaṭṭa in his famous work *Vyaktiviveka* has rejected *Lakṣaṇā* as the cause of the cognition of sentential-meaning and has accepted that *Vākyārtha*—the intended meaning of the words used in a syntactical structure—is known not by *Lakṣaṇā* but by inference. *Vākyārtha* is not always a figurative meaning though it may, in some cases, be figurative. If we accept *Vākyārtha* as figurative meaning, it will not function as authority (*Pramāṇa*) but if we accept that a sentential-meaning (purport) is known by inference or is inferred by the meanings of the words cognized first, then, there will be a need neither for *Lakṣaṇā* for interpreting sentential-meaning nor will there be any occasion for doubting the authority of it.

Now, on the basis of the exposition of different forms of *Abhihitānvayavāda,* we can say that all the forms discussed above admit, in some or other way, that *Vākyārtha* is not *Vācyārtha. Vākyārtha* for *saṅsargavādins* is the association of word-meaning, for *Nirākāṅkṣapadārtha-vākyārthavādins,* it is the reposed meanings of words retiring expectancy, and, for *Prayojanavādins,* it is the purport lying in using the expression (words) and is known by *Lakṣaṇā* (in case of *Kumārila*) or by inference (in case of *Naiyāyikas, Vākyārtha* is inferred on the basis of the word-meanings). They all are grouped in *Abhihitānvayavāda* because they, in general, accept that the words are

independently expressor and their expressed (meanings) are known first and then they are associated for a unitary particular meaning. They are differing on the issue of the cognition of association (*Vākyārtha*). For *saṅsargavādins, Vākyārtha* is known by recollection as the association of word-meanings as resurrected in memory while for *Nirākāṅkṣa Vākyārthavādins,* it is known by expectancy. Again, for *Prayojanavādins* it is known by *Lakṣaṇā-śakti* (in case of *Mīmānsakas*) and by inference (in case of *Naiyāyikas*) respectively.

An Examination of the Abhihitānayavāda

Abhihitānayavāda seems right if viewed on the pattern of teaching language to a child. A sentence is taught as a construction by a set of words used in a syntactical order and so is a *Vākyārtha* as an outcome of an association of different word-meanings related as qualifier-qualified, but this stand becomes untenable if observed from the point of view of convention and accomplishment of communication by language. Convention is communication-oriented and communication is accomplished by the sentence as unit whole without the awareness of parts, letters, words, etc. Convention is established there with sentences. As a complete unit of communication it is sentential-meaning which is known independently of the meaning of words.[16] As *Abhihitānvayavādins* accept word as an independent unit of language, their theory goes against the fact of convention and cognition by language in communication.[17] This theory also involves serious logical problems. If it is accepted that the word-meanings are independently cognized first and only then their connection is known afterwards by memory, the questions regarding the verity of verbal-cognition and the existence of an independent expressor of the complete sentential-meaning, naturally arise. What is the ground of connection? Whether connection is known by another sentence or word additional to those uttered previously? Are they connected one-to-one by the mind of the hearer? As no other sentence (apart from what has been uttered previously) is uttered, the first alternative is not possible. The word which is uttered cannot be the ground of cognition of connection which is not uttered.[18] If mind as connector of word-meanings is accepted as *Vākyārtha,* then *Vākyārtha* will be a construction of mind, and, hence, it will not be logically sound to view *Vākyārtha* as a construction out of word-meanings. The assumption of *Abhihitānvayavāda* that words express universals and in case of sentential-meaning universals, when connected, are reposed

for individual-meaning is not logically justified because it does not admit relation between the word-meanings.[19] How can a word fixed for a universal convey the individual? If it is said that universals (meanings) are removed when they stand for the individual, how can they be perceived if removed? There is no evidence for accepting their theory that universals are reposed for an individual. There is no justification in accepting that a word abandons its meaning when connected with the meanings of other words for sentential-meanings. The question regarding the whereabouts of the disappeared word-meaning also arise. If *Vākyārtha,* as over and above the meaning expressed by words, is accepted or if *Vākyārtha,* is accepted as a meaning without word, then on the basis of the same logic it can be said that word-meaning like sentential-meaning is also a meaning without word.[20] In order to avoid the problem of a meaning without word, it is said that *Vākyārtha* is a syntactical or logical connection between the words expressed in a sequence (and not the meaning of words themselves that suggests *Vākyārtha*) then it has to be accepted as the meanings of the sentence as mutually connected words but this may go against the fundamental position of *Abhihitānvayavāda.*[21] If *Vākyārtha* as *saṁsarga* (association) is explained on the ground of 'expression precedes relation' then, the question of associating word-meanings as sentential-meanings does not arise. If a sentence is accepted as the association of words in a syntactical rule and so is the word as the collection of letters, then the question regarding the meaning of a word as the association of meanings of letters arises and as *Padavādins* themselves deny the expressiveness of discrete letters, the meaning of words will not be possible by the same logic.[22] This may lead to an absurd position of atomism on the basis of which words will not be explained as the real independent meaning conveying unit. A problem may naturally arise—whether *saṁsarga* is the relation of words or of letters or of their meanings. How can connection which is non-verbal be taken as meanings if meaning is always a meaning of language?

In order to maintain the position of words as an independent expressor in a *Vākya* and, similarly, *Padārtha* in a *Vākyārtha, Nirākāṅkṣa-padārthavādins* say that even in a synthesized structure *padas* and *Padārthas* have independent existence but this position is also not sound. Just as even in writing we recognize the meaning of a word without yet being certain of its alphabetical composition, similarly, a sentence and sentential-meaning are an indivisible whole and the mind of a learner

proceeds thus in the first stage of understanding.[23] As we have seen earlier, the difference between *Saṁsarga Vākyārtha* and *Nirākāṅkṣavākyārtha* is that for the former word-meaning is not the sentence-meaning, while for the latter sentence-meaning is reposed word-meaning though both of the theories deny sentence as an independent expressor (*Vācaka*) and sentential-meaning as its independent expressed (*Vācya*). Now, it can be asked[24] if the word independently expresses word-meaning and as the expressed (word-meaning) is not qualified as individual sentential-meaning, how can the reposed word-meaning of the word be accepted as a certain qualified meaning, i.e. *Vākyārtha* without the help of some non-verbal factor? How can there be any expectancy for associating independent word-meaning? Can relation of word-meanings be determined by the word itself? If the relation is taken as fixed then that will go against the theory of expression precedes relation.

The assumption of *Prayojanavādī-Abhihitānvayavādin's* that the words express their independent meanings and the sentential-meaning is known by the cognition of the intention of the speaker involved in speaking words, is not defective if the *Vākyārtha* is not accepted as *Vācyārtha* (expressed). For example, the word '*ghoṣaḥ*' may be used for any meanings like house, village, family, boat, etc., and the word '*Ganges*' may be used for stream of water, bank of the river *Ganges,* cool and sacred place, but when the expression '*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*' is used, its meanings 'the village on the bank of the *Ganges'* is known as the meaning of the complete sentence. The meaning 'the village on the bank of the river *Ganges*', if taken as purpose involved in the use of the words '*Gaṅgāyam*' and '*ghoṣaḥ*' then the nature of the relation between the two will not be significant.[25] It will not be the meaning of the words independently or collectively and then it will be a figurative meaning which cannot be taken as authority (*Pramāṇa*), because the meaning which is revealed immediately by word can only be accepted as the authority even in inference also. If sentential-meaning is not accepted as expressed (*Vācya*), it will be difficult to relate different related sentences by expectancy.[26] For *Abhihitānvayavādins, Vākyārtha* is not known by the expressive-power of *vākya* because only a *pada* and not a sentence is expressive. *Vākyārtha* is a collection of word-meaning as resurrected in memory. Thus *Vākyārtha,* for them, is cognized not by *Śabda* (word or sentence) but by memory. Sentential-meaning as memory is non-acceptable not only to *Bhartṛhari* alone but to *Naiyāyikas* and *Mīmānsakas* also. If otherwise, they in that

case, will fail to explain the *āptatva* (authority) of expressions. If sentential-meaning is accepted as a cognition by expectancy, as *Nirākāṅkṣa-padārthavādins* accept, what will, then, serve as the cause of the expectancy in the absence of sentence as a complete meaning revealing unit? Not only that, but there will be no ground for the incentive to expectancy if sentence as expressor of sentential-meaning is not accepted as existing priorly. Expectancy is made extinct not by word-meanings but by sentential or complete-meaning. To accept that it is expectancy that operates for the sentential-meaning, is to reject the power of *Śabda* for the cognition of sentential-meaning[27], expectancy without a priorly known purpose is an impossibility and, thus, the cognition of a meaning (sentential) without a sentence is an unfounded theory.

In order to meet the problem of cognition of *Vākyārtha, Prayojanavādins* assume that the word-meanings are known by the expressive power of the word itself and sentential-meaning is known by *tātparya* or *Prayojana* (intention) involved in speaking. Their theory is also not sound because intention like association is not known by words themselves but by inference.[28] Intention is neither the expressed (*Vācya*) of a word (because the word expresses universal) nor of the sentence (because they do not accept sentence as expressor). To accept sentence as expressor is to deny their own thesis. They do not accept association as the meaning of sentence and, thus, the question of sentential-meaning as expressed remains unsolved. In brief, *Abhihitānvayavādins* are bound to accept *Vākyārtha* as figurative if they reject the existence of unitary sentence as expressor of a sentential-meaning, but it could be worse for them to accept its implications as mentioned above.

2. Anvitābhidhānvāda *(Theory of Association Precedes Expressions)*

Like *Abhihitānvayavādins*, this view also assumes words as independent units or expressors of meanings but unlike them, it assumes that words, in a use, do not express discrete meanings of their own but related word-meaning. In this theory it is held that although words have their own independent meanings yet when they are used for communication they express a related meaning which for them is *Vākyārtha. Anvitābhidhānavādins* believe 'association precedes expression' which is quite opposite to *Abhihitānvyavādin's* theory of 'expression precedes association'. The words for *Anvitābhidhānavādins* are not used for their discrete meanings but for mutually connected meanings. Association, for this theory,

is not an outcome of mental exercise or inference made on the basis of the expressed (word meanings as resurrected in memory) but is conventionally given. Convention is established by words expressing a mutually connected meaning and this mutually connected or construed meaning expressed by word is *Vākyārtha*.[29] Thus, sentential-meaning to this view, is the expressive-meaning of the word. The theorists do not make a distinction between *Vākyārtha* and *Vācyārtha* though they do not accept *Vākyārtha* as the meaning of a *vākya* as an independent unit of language. *Vākyārtha* is *Vācyārtha* and *Vācyārtha* is expressed not by sentence (because they do not accept sentence as a unit independently of a set of words), but by words expressing mutually connected meaning.[30]

In order to clarify the position of *Anvitābhidhānavāda, Prabhākara Mīmānsakas* give the example of a child learning a language. A child perceives the words uttered and the consequent activities performed by his elders and learns the use of language. The child hears the sentence '*gāmānaya*' (bring the cow) uttered by his elder and observes consequent activities performed by the elders and, thus, learns the meaning of the expression as an imperative to carry out the activity of bringing the cow. In other words, he understands that the whole of expression (*gāmānaya*) expresses the whole of expressed (an imperative to bring the cow). Similarly, he understands the expressions like 'bring the horse', 'bring the book', etc., and takes that the meaning of the word 'bring' is common to all the above expressions. He understands that the meaning of a word is cognized as related with something to be done or not to be done (*kriyā*). It is noteworthy here to say that *Bhartṛhari* does not believe in the existence of common-parts of an object of cognition by language. The word 'bring' in the expression 'bring a horse' is independent form the word 'bring' used in the expression 'bring a book' because of the differences of sentential-meaning and ultimately all the expressions are independent of each other in expressing their own meanings.

Forms of Anvitābhidhānavāda

Padavādins, who define sentence as '*ākhyātaśabdaḥ*' (the verb expressing the action to do or not to do is a sentence) *Pṛthak sarva padam sākāṅkṣam* (*all words of a set are individually sentence if expected connectedly for a sentential-meaning*) and *Padamādyam* (the beginning-word expressing construed meaning of the expression is a sentence), explain *Vākyārtha* as an expression of mutually connected word-meaning. For the former, verb

expresses mutually related meaning and, thus their theory of meaning is called *Kriyā-vākyārtha.* For the latter, the beginning-word expressors connected meaning and, thus, their theory is known as *Saṅsṛṣṭa-Vākyārtha.* Both of these theories will be discussed after a few steps but before that it is desirable to clarify, in brief, the differences of *Saṅsṛṣṭa-Vākyārtha* and *Saṅsarga Vākyārtha.* The difference between the two is that: *Saṅsargavākyārthavāda* accepts *Vākyārtha* as a meaning over and above the meaning expressed by words while *Vākyārtha,* for *Saṅsṛṣṭavākyārthavāda,* is related meaning (*Vākyārtha*) expressed by the principal word which is the *vācaka* (expressor) of an expression. For the former, *Vākyārtha* is not *Vācyārtha* while *Vākyārtha,* for the latter, is *Vācyārtha* also. Both of them accept *Vākyārtha* as a qualified meaning. For the former, this qualified meaning emerges out of association of word-meaning while for the latter words express a mutually related meaning. One thing which is common to all the Indian theories of meaning is that they accept that communication is accomplished by *Vākyārtha* and not by *Padārtha* though others except *Vaiyākaraṇas,* deny sentence as expressor (*Vācaka*) of the *Vākyārtha.* Now, coming to the exposition of the forms of *Padavādin's* view of *Vākyārtha* as analyzed by his commentator *Puṇyarāja*, we propose here to discuss two forms which may be grouped in this theory. A brief account of these two theories as mentioned by *Bhartṛhari* is given as follows.

I. Saṅsṛṣṭa-Vākyārtha (Vākyārtha *is Mutually Connected Word-Meaning*)

According to those who accept *Ādyampadam* (beginning word) and *Pṛthakasavrapadam sākāṅkṣam* (all words individually but connectedly expected) as sentence define sentential-meaning as *Saṅsṛṣṭa* (mutually connected word-meaning). This theory is based on the assumption that word-meanings, mutually related, are conventionally given (relation precedes expression). An expression is always an expression of mutually related meanings[31] and the expression is defined by the theorists as the beginning word (*ādyampadam*) which is the primary or central word of a set of words used in a syntactical rule. The beginning-word spoken conveys the given synthesis of word-meanings and this connected meaning conveyed by that word (*ādyampadam* or *Pṛthakasarvapadam Sākāṅkṣam*) is defined by these theorists as *Vākyārtha* (sentential-meaning).[32] The word expresses connected-meaning (*Vākyārtha*) and, hence, *Vākyārtha* is

expressive-meaning of the word (*Itarānvitaḥ padaḥ arthabodhakaḥ*). For example, the speaker speaks the word 'door' for the meaning 'shut the door' or 'open the door' and the listener cognizes the meaning 'shut the door' or 'open the door' only by the word 'door' which is only spoken. This shows that the speaker speaks the word conveying a related meaning and the listener understands the same if he hears the word. Even if the speaker speaks the complete sentence '*Dvārampidhehi*' (shut the door), the hearer knows the whole of the meaning (shut the door) only by the word '*dvāram*' (door) because the beginning word '*dvāram*', being the central word of the expression, expresses a qualified meaning (*Vākyārtha*). The uttering of '*pidhehi*' (shut) after the uttering of the word '*Dvāram*' ascertains or translates the meaning known by the word '*Dvāram*' only.[33]

The nominal word for *Naiyāyikas* is the principal word in a sentence and when it is uttered, it expresses not only a *Kartā* (agent) but individual (substance), universal, an action, an object, number, person and gender. For example, when the word '*Rāmaḥ*' in an expression '*Rāmaḥ paṭhati pustakam*' (*Rāma* reads a book) is uttered, it expresses an agent of the action '*paṭhati*', an individual which is one in number, masculine gender, first person and, thus, the whole specified meaning or related meaning (*Vākyārtha*) is known by the uttering of the nominal word '*Rāmaḥ*' only. Thus, the beginning word, which for the theorists is principal word expressing mutually related meaning, is '*Vākya*' and the connected meaning expressed by it is *Vākyārtha.* Mutually related meaning expressed by the beginning word (*ādyam-padam*) is *Vākyārtha.* The expression '*gāmānaya* (bring the cow) does not mean the relation of the meanings of the words '*gām*' (cow) and '*ānaya*' (bring) (related together by expectancy) but a mutually associated meaning '*Gāmānaya*' (bring the cow) given so before speaking. Mutual relation for this theory is not known by inference or by memory but is given as expressive power of the word and the connected denotation expressed by the beginning or principal word is *Vākyārtha.*

II. Kriyā Vākyārtha (*Action as sentential-meaning*)

Those who define verb as sentence (*Ākhyātaśabdo vākyam*) take an action as *Vākyārtha* (sentential-meaning) which is expressed by the verb (*ākhyāta*). The theory explains *Vākyārtha* from the point of view of an incentive to an action to be done or not to be done (*pravṛtti-nivṛtti)* caused by an expression. As action is expressed by verb, the exponents of this theory define it as sentence and action expressed by the verb as sentential-

meaning. An action is a specified meaning because the verb expressive of action also expresses an agent (because no action without an agent is possible), an object (because action cannot be possible without an accusation), time (an action takes place in a time on the basis of which present, past and future of the action is known), number (the action performed is specified as singular, plural, etc.), and a person (on the basis of which the person of the action is known). As a verb expresses a connected denotation or completed meaning, they take it as expressor of *Vākyārtha*.[34] The theorists explain the expression '*Rāmaḥ taṇḍulam pacati*' (*Rāma* cooks rice) by saying that the verb '*pacati*' itself expresses the connected meaning (of the other words—*Rāmaḥ* = agent and *taṇḍulam* = object). Words other than the verb are only instrumental in the ascertainment of the related meaning already expressed by the verb and their meanings being related with the action are also known by the verb alone.[35]

According to *Bhartṛhari's* exposition of this theory the means and accessories of an action to be expressed by a verb are fixed and that is why they are also cognized only by the verb. He writes '*Kriyā Kriyāntarādbhinnā niyatādhāra sādhanā. Prakrāntā pratipatṛṇām bhedaḥ Sambandha hetavaḥ*'.[36] It means an action is of a non-accomplished character and is different from other actions. It is always observed with a substratum (*ādhāra*) and the substratum of an action is called abode (*adhikaraṇa*). An action is performed by a fixed means (*Sādhanā*). The related meaning-agent, accessory, number, time, person of an action—known by the verb is *Vākyārtha* which can be interpreted in terms of *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti* caused by the cognition revealed in the mind of a hearer.

An Examination of Anvitābhidhānavāda

Now coming to an examination of the theory of *anvitābhidhāna*, it can be said that while *Abhihitānvayavādins* lay primary importance to the independent meaning of isolated words and assume sentential-meaning as a secondary signification emerging out of the association of independent word-meanings, *Anvitābhidhānavādins* emphasize sentential-meaning as of primary importance and explain words as expressive of connected denotation. It can be the merits of *Anvitābhidhānavādins* that sentential-meaning, for them, is *Vācyārtha* (expressive-meaning) and that communication is accomplished by it but the way they explain *Vākyārtha* opens

the door for many logical and cognitive problems. A brief account of the problems may be seen as follows.

To us, it does not seem legitimate as to why they reject the existence of sentence as construction by the association of words while they accept *Vākyārtha* as connected denotation of a word. They may reject the need of accepting *vākya* as an expressor of the related meaning but the problem is: if a word is accepted to have its own independent meaning (universal), how can it express mutually connected meaning? It is self-contradictory to accept that a word is expressive of its own meaning (*Padārtha* = universal) but expresses an individual (*Vākyārtha*). Two simultaneous denotations of a word are not acceptable because the cognition of two denotations is not accomplished simultaneously and in case of their consequential cognition the question regarding the nature of the meaning known afterwards arises. What is inferred or known by implication cannot be called denoted but inferred because a denotation is that which is revealed directly by the word in the mind. The assumption of connected (individual) meaning expressed only by a single word goes against the *Padavādin's* assumption of word as a unit expressive of an independent meaning of its own. It is contradictory to accept that the verb expressive of non-accomplished character at the same time expresses an accomplished character and the union of the two as well.[37]

The assumption of *Saṅsṛṣṭavākyavādins* that the beginning word (*pada*) expresses the meaning of whole sentence is not justified because, in *Saṅskṛta*, the words of a sentence are not independent and as such their order of place, if changed, changes neither the sentence nor the sentential-meaning. It will be difficult to determine not only the beginning word but the word expressive of the connected meaning also. For example, '*Rāmaḥ gṛham gacchati*', '*Gacchati Rāmaḥ gṛham*' and '*gṛham gacchati Rāmaḥ*' are the same sentence but from the point of view of the beginning words as sentence, they should be different sentences conveying different meanings. The meaning of the beginning words in all the cases mentioned above should not be considered the same because in that case they all will be synonymous and that is not acceptable to *Anvitābhidhānavādins* themselves. If the notion 'the beginning-word expresses *Vākyārtha*' is accepted, other words of the sentence will be useless and, then, it can well be asked: What is the need of other words if the whole meaning is expressed only by the first word spoken? If the beginning-word is not fixed (that a last

word may also be a beginning word), is it justified to reject the expressiveness of other words? The rejection of the expressiveness of words, other than the beginning-word, goes against the commonsense view also. It is not justified to accept a single-word (beginning word) of an expression as expressive and the other word of it as suggestive (*dyotaka*) at the same time. Not only that, but 'If the beginning-word is accepted as the expressor of connected-meaning (*Anvitārtha*) cognition of *Vākyārtha* must be accepted as revealed directly by that without any expectancy of hearing other words of the sentence but this is not the case. If it is accepted that the beginning-word expresses its meaning which helps to cause the memory of the meaning of other words then the connected meaning (*Vākyārtha*) conveyed by the beginning-word will not be an expressed-one but memory, and, this, again, will not be acceptable to *Anvitābhidhānavādins* who accept *Vākyārtha* as *Vācyārtha* (expressed) also.

While deciding *Vākyārtha,* it is necessary to observe that the tendency of words in a sentence is different.[38] *How can the beginning-word which for them is nominal or expressive of accomplished character express the meaning of a verb having a non-accomplished character? If it is accepted that action or an incentive to an action is intended by the expressions and the verb-word expresses action qualified by means and accessories, even then, the charge of associating meaning having opposite characters assumes significance.*

Padavādins aim at explaining *Vākyārtha* by assuming words as expressive of mutually connected meaning and encircle their arguments around showing how the words express qualified meaning, i.e. *Vākyārtha, Abhihitānavayavādins* assume that *Padārtha* is qualified by association accomplished on the basis of factors like expectancy, proximity, compatibility, etc., and, *Anvitābhidhānavādins* seem contented with assuming words as expressive of mutually connected denotation. To accept the meaning of a word (*Padārtha*) as *Vākyārtha* is to overlook the seriousness of the problem of *Vākyārtha* and to measure every sort of thing by the single measure (*māpaka).* It is suggested that the explanation of a complete indivisible cognition (*Vākyārtha*) logically requires an indivisible complete expressor and the existence of *Vākya* as a complete indivisible expressor cannot be denied. In order to throw sufficient light on the concept let us now begin with the concept of *pratibhā-Vākyārtha.*

II

AKHANDA-VĀKYĀRTHAVĀDA (SENTENTIAL-MEANING AS INDIVISIBLE FLASH OR *PRATIBHĀ-VĀKYĀRTHA*)

Different from the views mentioned above, a sentence (*Vākya*), for *Vaiyākaraṇas,* is an inner, indivisible and a real unit of language, i.e. *sphoṭa* and a *Vākyārtha* is what is non-differently revealed as a flash of awareness in the mind by *sphoṭa.* To this flash of awareness revealed by *sphoṭa* in the mind, *Bhartṛhari,* uses the word '*Pratibhā*'.[39] A few scholars of *Bhartṛhari's* philosophy interpret *Pratibhā* as mind or intellect and then they explain *Vākyārtha* as an object which figures in the *Pratibhā* as idea, i.e. *upacārasattā.* For them, sentential-meaning is actually an object of *Pratibhā* but ordinarily *Pratibhā* itself is called *Vākyārtha.* It hardly makes any difference if that which is flash of *Pratibhā* (mind = *Vākyārtha-Pratibhā-rūpa*) is identified with *Pratibhā* (mind) because even in that case *Vākyārtha* is *emphasized* as an idea or clear and distinct flash of awareness and *Bhartṛhari* accepts idea itself as *Pratibhā.* Before entering into the serious discussion on *Vaiyākaraṇa's* theory of meaning as *Pratibhā,* it can be said briefly that '*sphoṭa*', for them, is *vākya* and meaning it expresses non-differently in the mind is *Pratibhā.*

'*Pratibhā*' as the meaning of a sentence (*Vākyārtha*) is known as a being revealed non-differently in the mind by language (*sphoṭa*). But what is it in itself can be said neither as 'this' nor, as 'that' by indication because it is not a perceived entity. In the absence of perception, no concomitance is possible and, hence, it cannot be inferred. The same can be said about other proofs given for it also. But only on these grounds it cannot be denied. It, being consciousness, cannot be denied only on the basis of its imperceptibility. As a flash or awareness revealed by *sphoṭa* in mind, it is a veridical cognition. Even a rejection of it requires it (*Pratibhā*) as a veridical cognition of that. It is *antaḥ karaṇa-siddha* (self-proved).

K.A. Subramania Iyer[40] in his paper entitled *'Pratibhā* as the meaning of sentence' and also in his book entitled '*Bhartṛhari'* and *Fernando Tola* and *Carmen Dragoneti*[41] in their research paper entitled 'some remarks on *Bhartṛhari's* concept of *Pratibhā*' have tried to trace different meanings for which the word *Pratibhā* is used in Indian traditions. Here, we are not interested in the concept of *Pratibhā* as religious-experience, element of poetic creative-power, as poetic-imagination, as intuitive faculty, intuitive-mind, *Yogic Prajñā,* mystical knowledge, instinct, etc. and confine

ourselves to *Pratibhā* as meaning directly revealed by *sphoṭa*. *Pratibhā* as general meaning of all sentences or even words (if complete meaning is revealed by them), is cognition or awareness and as such non-different from *sphoṭa*. It is only from the sense of duality that from the point of view of language (expressor) it is called *sphoṭa* and from the point of view of meaning, it is called *Pratibhā* (expressed).

Pratibhā as meaning is a communicable being of awareness in character. The same *Pratibhā* is *revealed* and also communicated through different verbal-noises or sentence tokens. Expressions like '*Rāma* reads', '*Rāmaḥ paṭhati*,' and so on in different language-tokens reveal identical conception (*Pratibhā*) to the person familiar with those verbal noises or sentences-tokens. If sentence and sentential-meaning are not accepted as beings ubiquitously given and as that revealed by language in mind how do we know that they all are the same sentence revealing the same meaning? Those who accept utterances or sentence-token as sentence may not give a satisfactory answer to the question of identical cognition by different verbal noises. Even utterances in order to be identified themselves require revelation of the inner form of them. It is thought-object which is translated or rendered in different language-tokens and the question of translating sentence-token or verbal noises, as they are momentary and are totally different from community to community, does not arise. Suppose a sentence from a foreign language is put before me to translate into Hindi or *Saṅskṛta* language and if *Pratibhā* is not revealed by it, I cannot translate though the sentence is there before me. But it can be accomplished easily if *Pratibhā* is revealed by it in the mind. This idea is given in the mind and is revealed non-differently by indivisible, inner *sphoṭa* if the latter is manifested by the sentence-token given before me. *Pratibhā* as *Vākyārtha* is always to be known as *Pratibhā* or meaning (idea) revealed by language in the mind and is shot through and through by *Śabda* (*sphoṭa*). *Pratibhā*, in *Bhartṛhari's* philosophy, is taken to function for an incentive to an action to do or not to do if it is revealed.[42] No doubt, *Pratibhā* is the root cause of all the activities of living beings concerning what they have to do or not to do because, without it (meaning revealed in the mind), there is nothing which can give rise to an incentive to an action, it may be taken as the cause of the activities performed by the beings having instinctive or even stereotyped motivation but it cannot be identified with instinct or stereotyped motivation. In all the cases *Pratibhā*, as an incentive to an action to do or not to do something or as the cause of

an action is the flash revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa* which is ubiquitously given and that flash is marked by *Bhartṛhari* as *Pratibhā*. So far, we have discussed *Pratibhā* as a complete unitary meaning revealed by *sphoṭa* manifested by a medium like verbal-noises and gestures. It is obvious that throughout the discussion on *Pratibhā* as complete unitary-meaning or flash of awareness accomplished through mediums, we have always kept the accomplishment of communication in view and have come to the conclusion that meaning is cognized in ordinary communication (*Vyavahāra*) as a flash of awareness. If meaning is an idea or thought-object revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*, it is proper to name it *Pratibhā* or flash of understanding revealed by *Śabda*, and, then, it is also proper to accept the existence of meaning as *upacāra-sattā* (Being revealed or figured in the mind by language). It also seems proper to say that the cognition of meaning as *Pratibhā* (flash of awareness) figured in the mind by a sentence is always a veridical cognition, a unitary or complete, clear, distinct and revealed awareness, but, this exposition is limited to *Bhartṛhari's* discussion on *Pratibhā* as it is revealed in ordinary communication by language. As a grammarian his approach is not confined to the explanation of cognition revealed in communication only because on the basis of this outlook the cognition or *Pratibhā* of *Lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka* (who perform communication only through mediums) is only explained but the activities of those animals, insects and birds who do not speak our language and the cognition of *Lakṣaikacakṣuṣkas* revealed directly without mediums, i.e., verbal noises, as we find in the cases of *Yogins* and other gifted persons, cannot be explained. As a grammarian-philosopher *Bhartṛhari* has a goal of explaining the activities of all beings as communicated by language by a process of analysis and synthesis.

In order to explain such activities and cognition, he has written *kārikās* from 146 to 152 in which he has explained the activities of animals and birds and has observed that in consideration of the knowledge of do's and don'ts, no one can transgress the flash of insight which is either revealed directly by *sphoṭa* through verbal noises or through perception, recollection, etc., No activity, in a living being, is possible without *Pratibhā* (inner-flash). There is nothing except *Pratibhā* which can be accepted as the cause of the activities seen even in the animals and birds not speaking our language. Taking this matter of fact into consideration, *Bhartṛhari* has accepted *Svabhāva* (nature) also as one of the causes of revealing *Pratibhā*.

Apart from the *Pratibhā* as complete meaning to be cognized through the medium like tokens and gestures in ordinary communication, *Bhartṛhari* has mentioned its six kinds:[43]

1. as it is revealed in animals and birds by their very nature (*Svabhāva*);
2. as it is revealed in persons realizing their well-being by constant moral practices (*Caraṇa*);
3. as it is revealed in persons by the practice acquired parentally *(Abhyāsa-nimitta-pratibhā*);
4. as it is revealed to the *Yogins* without any medium (*Yoga-nimitta pratibhā*);
5. as it is revealed to one by his *adṛṣṭa* (the impression of the merits of previous lives, *Adṛṣṭa-nimitta pratibhā*); and, finally,
6. as it is revealed when handed down to one by the persons having gifted wisdom, *Viśiṣtopahita pratibhā*).

One can notice very well that the kinds of *Pratibhā* as meaning are chiefly based on *Bhartṛhari's* analysis of meaning as it is revealed through mediums and as it is revealed directly without mediums like gestures and verbal noises perceived by the audience. We are always conscious that *Pratibhā* in the present discussion is taken as meaning and not as mind, intellect or faculty of intuition (*Prajñā*). Our contention is that *Pratibhā* is not confined to congition making communication possible and that communication is not accomplished only by uttering and hearing as we find in the cases of newly born babies. A baby cries, laughs. Not only that, we also perceive its speaking organs vibrating. What except *Pratibhā* is the cause of these activities of it? *Bhartṛhari* believes in the idea of former births and elucidates that *Śabda* dispositionality in a new-born baby is given by its birth. Babies can not speak because their audio-visual-organs are not mature enough for speaking but they transmit meaning by crying, laughing and other activities. How is this transmission possible? *Bhartṛhari* says it is due to *Śabdabhāvanā = sańskāra* (precept) or the cultural arena of his spirit which is given in beings even in babies and mutes that *Pratibhā* in them is revealed. *Bhartṛhari* technically calls *sańskāra* by the term '*āgama*' (precept). According to commentators *Āgama* is of two kinds: (1) *Āsatti* (proximately), and (2) *Vaprakarṣa* (remotely). In case of cognition accomplished by those who know language-token of a community the *Śabda-sańskāra* or *āgam* (*sphoṭa*), manifested through hearing of verbal-noises, reveals *Pratibhā* because they are accustomed to know through verbal noises. This sort of revelation of *Pratibhā* is *āsatti* (proximity). On the other hand, *Pratibhā*, in cases of those who do not know language (verbal-noises) as in the cases of newly born babies, is aroused only by *Āgama* or precept (*Śabda-Bhāvanā*) itself.

Sphoṭa, for *Bhartṛhari*, is ubiquitously given. He, by the *Kārikā* '*Śakṣāt ... Śabdena Janitām Bhāvanānugamenavā. Iti kartabyatāyām tām na kaścitativartate*,'[44] elucidates that *Pratibhā* is revealed. (1) It is revealed by *sphoṭa* manifested by verbal noises (*āsatti*) as in the cases of verbal communication. (2) It may be revealed directly by *sphoṭa* as in the cases of *Yogins*. (3) It may be revealed by the precept manifested not by verbal noises but by the impressions of past lives as we find in the cases of babies, but, in all cases it is revealed by *Śabda* (*sphoṭa*).

On the basis of these different sorts of *Pratibhā, Bhartṛhari* finds himself in a position to explain not only the cognition revealed by language through tokens in communication and the cognition of *Lakṣaika cakṣuṣka* (seers and sages) revealed directly by *sphoṭa* without mediation of language-token in their minds but the activities of birds, insects, animals, babies, jewel-smiths, diggers and other extraordinary activities performed by gifted persons also. He is very bold in accepting that all cognition is cognition by *sphoṭa*. This *sphoṭa*, in cases of normal persons, reveals the cognition when manifested by verbal noises and in cases of superconscious persons it is directly revealed without any instrument like verbal noises or gestures whereas in cases of birds and insects and others not communicating through our language-token, it is revealed by different sorts of sounds, signs and gestures, but as a precept, it being ubiquitous, is present in all living beings on the basis of which incentives to do something or not to do are aroused in them. Thus, he propounds that the world of cognition is the world of flashes figuring in the mind. It is the flashes which in all beings serve as the cause of incentive to their all sorts of action (*Pratibhā mayam ayam viśvam*).

Pratibhā as meaning should not be misconceived as mind, *prajñā*, or as capacity to directly grasp the meaning. It figures in mind when communicated and grasped by the audience as a flash revealed in the mind by *sphoṭa*. This meaning, in lower beings, is taken as the cause of their instinctive activities, in superconscious beings it is their supersensuous cognition and in normal human beings it is the object of cognition figured in the mind by language. A number of scholars of *Bhartṛhari's* Philosophy have taken *Pratibhā* non-discriminatively as mind or *Prajñā* also but

as we have clarified earlier *Pratibhā* as mind can not be taken as the meaning.

Pratibhā as meaning is a cognitive unit and *Pratibhā* as mind or *Prajñā* suggests an ontological character but it is suggested that it, for *Bhartṛhari,* as a language philosopher, is the meaning, a clear distinct meaning revealed non-differently by inner-*sphoṭa* and only on this ground different sorts of *Pratibhā* revealed with or without tokens can be well explained as meaning. Meaning and mind ontologically may be identical because, ontologically, *Bhartṛhari* maintains 'one is all' but communicatively and cognitively meaning is cognized as revealed by inner *sphoṭa* in the mind and the mind is known by implication as an ontological base of the meaning cognized.

Jayanta's *Arguments Against* Pratibhā Vākyārtha

Jayanta's Bhaṭṭa[45] in his *Nyāya-Maṅjarī* has refuted *Bhartṛhari's* concept of *Pratibhā* as *Vākyārtha* (sentential-meaning). According to his exposition of *Vaiyākaraṇa's Pratibhā,* it (*Pratibhā*) is the object of *Śabda* and meaning is the object of *Pratibhā* and only in this sense that *Pratibhā* is called meaning. Now against this exposition of *Pratibhā*, *Jayanta* argues that though *rūpa* (form) is the object of eyes, yet the idea of *rūpa* (*rūpa-buddhi*) is not the object of eyes. Similarly *Pratibhā* is caused by *Śabda*, but it, as *Jayanta* says, is not the object of *Śabda*. External things cannot be overlooked. It is not right to say that as external things are not really existing, it is *Pratibhā* which is the object of *Śabda*. Hearing the sentence 'lion has come' different effects arise in the mind of different persons (brave, cowardly and indifferent persons). These effects are not caused by *Pratibhā* but by allegiance of persons to the arrival of lion existing in external world. It is not only the idea or cognition of lion but the arrival of external lion which is the cause of fear, etc., in persons. It is, *Jayanta* says, not proper to say that at that time the lion is not actually there because the sentences like 'the lion has not come' or 'I told a lie' are not heard, and, hence, there is no statement to contradict the presence of lion. *Pratibhā* cannot be accepted as meaning of *Śabda* merely on the basis of passions (*Vāsanā*). Differences of cognition are due to different allegiances to the things existing outside. Therefore, *Pratibhā* only as purpose (*tātparya*), says *Jayanta,* may be accepted as the meaning of sentence but it may not be accepted as a *Vācya* (expressed of the sentence = *Vācaka*). Now, it cannot be said that *Pratibhā* as *Saṅsṛṣṭa* (mutually connected-

expressed) is *Vākyārtha* because *Pratibhā,* as *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume, is an indivisible whole and is not a connected whole. According to *Jayanta,* a *Vākyārtha* is that which is known as the cognition of the purpose of using words.

Jayanta's *Objections Replied*

From the side of *Bhartṛhari* it can be said that *Jayanta's* argument, that *Pratibhā* is produced or caused by *Śabda* and that it is not an object (*Viṣaya*) or meaning of *Śabda*, is based on mistaking the word *Pratibhā*. *Pratibhā* is not produced or caused by *Śabda* but is given and is revealed non-differently by the latter and only in that sense *Pratibhā* can be taken as the object of *Śabda*. Meaning, unlike *Jayanta's* assumption, is not the object of *Pratibhā* but *Pratibhā* itself. The idea that 'meaning is the object of *Pratibhā*' is not acceptable to an extent to *Bhartṛhari*. Though he has not refuted the idea of meaning as the object of *Pratibhā*, yet it for him, is meaning itself. If we grant a metaphysical value to *Pratibhā* and then we explain meaning as its object, his philosophy of *Pratibhā* as meaning will be inconsistent. The reason is that he, as a language philosopher, is always conscious of the limits of philosophical reflections and is very prompt in showing that no ontological or metaphysical substance (being untouched by language) is the object proper of philosophical reflections. Thus, when we limit ourselves to his outlook, we find that he observes *Pratibhā* as a clear, distinct flash figured in mind by language as a meaning on the basis of which communication is accomplished. The cause of all incentives to do or not to do is *Pratibhā* which is revealed in the mind by *Śabda* and only in that sense it is called the object of *Śabda* and not otherwise.

It serves as the cause of an incentive to communicate itself through a speaker's utterances. Without figuring of the specified *Pratibhā* the expectancy to communicate through *Śabda* is not possible. Thus, from the speaker's point of view, *Pratibhā* is understood as the object of *Śabda.*

In cases *Bhartṛhari* recommends meaning as the object of *Pratibhā,* he takes *Pratibhā* as mind (*Prajñā*) and philosophizes that nothing can be said about the *Pratibhā* itself (as mind). *Pratibhā* as mind or *Prajñā* has been discussed with great clarity by *M.M. Gopīnātha Kavirāja*. As our approach is limited to exposition of *Pratibhā* as meaning, we suggest that though different *Pratibhā* revealed in the mind are all specific and distinct yet all of them being *Pratibhās* are called by the same word. This

interpretation of *Pratibhā* should always be kept in mind while evaluating *Bhartṛhari's* theory of meaning as the object of *Pratibhā* and we are sure that *Pratibhā* if looked at from this point of view, will not be confused as mind (*Prajñā*) as ontological being which is different from meaning as cognitive being, and, thus, it will be easy to distinguish between *Bhartṛhari's* view of *Pratibhā* as meaning and *Pratibhā* as mind.

Now, coming to the problem of *Pratibhā* as meaning or as a cognitive being, it can be said that *Pratibhā*, being indivisible flash revealed by the indivisible *sphoṭa*, is the idea or thought object which cannot be understood by the ignorant and children who can understand the indivisible only piecemeal and who understand a whole through steps and this stepping demands analysis. The *Vākyārtha,* which for *Vaiyākaraṇas,* is indivisible, inner-flash (*Pratibhā*) is analyzed into different *Padārthas* by the process of *apoddhāra,* and, then, the sentential-meaning is explained to them differently as a synthesis, purpose, association (of different *padārthas*) action, *bhāvanā*, etc. It can also be said that as explanations of indivisible *Pratibhā*, all the theories of sentential-meaning discussed in earlier pages are useful but it will be improper to accept any of the theories as the only principle or definition of *Vākyārtha. Pratibhā* is *Vākyārtha* and being indivisible, inner awareness, it is defined differently as *Saṅsarga,* purpose, etc., because an indivisible can not be defined otherwise. Definition itself is based on an understanding of part and whole and so is the definition of *Pratibhā.*[46]

Among the various ways of understanding *Pratibhā* (*Vākyārtha*) the theory of association supported by *Abhihitānvayavādins* seems proper from the point of view of teaching sentential-meaning to the ignorant through the association of word-meanings. The theory of mutually-connected-denotation supported by *anivitābhidhānavādins* seems convincing from the point of view of the interpretation of purpose of speaking words and figurative meanings while *akhaṇḍa vākyavādin's* interpretation of *vākyārtha* as indivisible flash seems cognitively justified from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition extinguishing further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning in ordinary communication. *Vākyārtha* figures in the mind not as one word-meaning added with other word-meaning and so on and so forth but as an indivisible flash and as the explanation of indivisible flash, other theories of sentential-meaning are also important.[47] The controversy is not related with supporting or denying sentential-meaning (*vākyārtha*) because all the theorists accept it. It is its explanations

that are the cause of differences. The theory of indivisible meaning as *Pratibhā* seems fit for explaining not the flashes figured or revealed in the mind by *Sphoṭa* through verbal noises or sentence-tokens and gestures only but for the direct flashes of *yogin's* or other gifted persons also. Sorts of flashes, according to us, can well be acknowledged as the differences of instinctive, rational, supra-rational, etc. Instinctive flashes of insects and animals are known by inference made on the basis of the observation of infra-rational activities of them, rational flashes are cognized as revealed by *Sphoṭa* when it is manifested through verbal noises. They are communicable flashes which when communicated by expressions cause veridical cognition. Supra-rational cognition are direct flashes, as they are seer's vision (*Ṛṣyaḥ mantra dṛṣṭāraḥ*) and are known by the observation of supra-rational divine activities performed by those gifted with it.

III

BHARTṚHARI'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST PADVĀDIN'S OBJECTIONS TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF *VĀKYĀRTHA* (SENTENTIAL-MEANING): A DISCUSSION

It is apparent from the discussion in the earlier pages that a sentence and sentential-meaning (*Vākyārtha*), for *Bhartṛhari*, are indivisible units. However, *Khaṇḍavādins/Padavādins* adopt a different view. For them, a sentence is nothing but a collection of words used in a syntactical order, and, thus, a sentential-meaning is a collection of word-meanings. *Bhartṛhari* in his *Vākyapadīyam* has very nicely put the arguments of *Khaṇḍavādins* and has evaluated them with a view to show how their arguments, chiefly based on the rejection of sentence and sentential-meaning as indivisible whole, are insufficient not only for refuting the indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning but for establishing their own theory also. An account of his discussion on the controversy concerning indivisibility is given as follows:

1. Rejecting indivisibility of sentence *Bhartṛhari* from the side of *Padavādins* argues that a sentence is not an indivisible unit but a get-together of words which themselves are formed by association of letters. *Bhartṛhari*, quite opposed to this theory of *Padavādins,* argues for individuality of sentence by putting forward two hypotheses: (i) whether a sentence is an association or collection of meaningless letters or of meaningful words; and (ii) whether the association of meaningless letters/meaningful words is meaningless or meaningful. If it is meaningless, then it will be of no use because it will be incapable of communicating, and,

hence, will not be accepted as a unit of communication. Alternatively, if the association is meaningful, then, the basic fallacy, as to how meaningless parts can form a meaningful whole (sentence), arises. Obviously the collection of meaningless letters, i.e., words, may either be meaningful or meaningless.[48]

If collection is meaningful it is a word and there are no parts in a word. A combination of meaningful words varies as giving rise to another meaning or not having any connection among themselves.[49] For example, the collection of *Gha* + *ṭa* = *Ghaṭa* is meaningful but its reverse collection *ṭa* + *gha* = *ṭagha* is meaningless. Thus a meaningful unit (word) can not be taken as an outcome of association of different meaningless units (letters); however, if the word is accepted once as a unit not made of parts but indivisible, then the same logic can be applied to sentence also, but even this is not acceptable to *Padavādins* who are *Saṅsargavādins* (constructionists).[50] The association of letters in a particular way may be meaningful, yet, in a different way, it may be meaningless or may be meaningful in all cases. If it is meaningful in all cases, then it will be proper to take them as different words conveying different meanings in different collections. For example, the collections of letters '*ra*' and '*sa*' as '*rasa*' and as '*sa*' and '*ra*' as '*sara*' are both meaningful but they are different words conveying different meanings, '*juice*' and '*pond*' respectively. The example shows that the nature of collection being uncertain needs to be decided, otherwise, the word and its meaning will not be determined.

As the collection of meaningless letters may be meaningful or meaningless, the collection of meaningful words may also be explained in two ways: (1) the collection, in some cases, may be meaningful because of its connection by expectancy; and (2) meaningless, in other cases, because of having connection not per expectancy. In order to clarify the position of the former alternative *Puṇyarāja*[51] has given the example of sentence *'Deodattaḥgām abhyāj* (*Deodatta* herds the cows in). The words used in the sentence are meaningful and their collection is also meaningful. For clarifying the latter alternative, he has given the example *'daśadāḍimānaya ṣaḍapūyā'*. The words of the set are not mutually connected. All the words of the set are separately meaningful but their combination is meaningless because they are not mutually expected. If words and sentences are not distinguished from letters or if they all are accepted to be of the same character, the letters, like words and sentences, will also be expressive,

and, then, they will also be mutually expected for the conveyance of the meanings but *Saṅghātavādins* themselves deny the expressiveness of letters.

2. If *Saṅghātavādins* say that a word is a collection of letters, then it may be asked whether the collection, less by one letter than the normal, is expressive or non-expressive?

Again, if it is expressive of meaning to be conveyed by the normal word, then it can be asked, whether the word, in its normal form, is expressive or the word, reduced by one letter from the normal, is equally expressive? Whether they are different words or the same? If they are not taken to be different, both of them will be separate expressors of the same meaning but this is not convincing. On the basis of the same meaning expressed by both of them, it may be said that they are one and the same but, then, the issue of their normal and abnormal form, whole and reduced form, should not take place. Explaining the issue of expressiveness of meaning of the word reduced by one letter, *Bhartṛhari* holds[52] that the complete (normal) or indivisible word is expressive. The word reduced by one letter when spoken, manifests the complete word (unit), in the mind of the audience and, then, the meaning is revealed by the complete word. Thus, the expressiveness of letters is cognitively unfounded.

3. If the word is analyzed into stems or roots and suffixes, then one of the two components of the word may be meaningful and the other may be meaningless and, if they are taken separately, can not combine as a connected word.[53] If the meaning of stems or roots and the meaning of suffixes are taken into consideration, there are two ways in which they may be interpreted. For example, the meaning '*kuṭīra*' for some is expressed when the word, '*kuṭi*' (only stem) is connected with '*ra*' (suffix) while for others the connection of '*ra*' with '*kuṭi*' is not required for expressing the meaning '*kuṭīra*'; and the meaning or '*ra*' is the same what is expressed by the word '*kuṭi*' as the word '*kuṭīra*' as a whole is expressive of its meaning.[54] However, in either way, the sentential-meaning can not be explained as the meaning of words. The suffixes are considered as meaning-conveying units only in rule but they have no meaning independently of the word. The word with suffix is a complete unit and it is only for explaining the meaning by analysis that the word is analyzed into stem and suffixes and then their meanings are also considered separately. We are not always aware of the components of words while speaking the words in any case ending and so is the case with sentences. *Bhartṛhari* is

of the opinion that letters and suffixes, etc., are not used as meaningful units in ordinary usage.[55] They are not used for communication which is accomplished only by complete units.

4. Explaining Padavādin's arguments regarding the separate existence of components of a compound, *Bhartṛhari* has observed that in cases of compounds and *Svārthika*-formation, the meaning they convey is not the same as is expressed by the components separately.[56] For example, the meaning of the compound '*Rājapuruṣa*' is not the sum total of the meaning of words '*rājan*' and '*puruṣa*' but '*Rājapuruṣa*' (i.e. the servant of the king) as an indivisible unit. Analyzing component words *Bhartṛhari*, from the side of *Padavādins* says that compound-words formed by components may be observed from two points of views:

I. There are some compound words having a fixed meaning, for example *śamīvṛkṣa*, *dāḍimīvṛkṣa*, etc. In these cases, the components convey the same meaning as is conveyed by the compound. The words '*śamī*' and '*vṛkṣa*' have the same basic meaning (tree) and their combination expresses that basic-meaning.[57]

II. There are some other compound-words the meanings of which are decided on the basis of the association of the meanings of their components by the device (association and disassociation = *anvayavyatireka*). For example, the compounds '*Saṅjñu*' and '*Prajñu*' in which the word '*Jānunī*' is fashioned after observing the use '*Jñu*' and, then, their meaning is inferred as '*Saṅjñyate jānunīyasya*' and *Pragatejānunīyasya*' respectively.[58] In addition to these sorts of interpretations of compound words, *Bhartṛhari* has given the example of such compound words the meanings of which are known independently of the meanings of their components. For example, there is no independent meaning of the component words '*gauraḥ*' and '*kharaḥ*' in the compound '*gaurakharaḥ*' and so is the case with '*Kṛṣṇasarpaḥ*' which expresses a meaning independently of its components '*Kṛṣṇaḥ*' and '*Sarpaḥ*'[59].

Though the compounds under example are added with suffixes (*sup*), yet there is no independent meaning of the suffixes and the meaning of the whole unit (compound) is comprehended independently of components-root/stem and suffixes. Defending the indivisibility of compounds and their meanings against *Padavādin's* constructionism it may be argued that the meaning of words (disappeared and then recollected and associated by memory) may be taken to be combined together for sentential-meaning by memory but this assumption may be suicidal for their own

theory because if it is accepted once, then all knowledge by language will be reduced to memory cognition. From the point of view of authority of verbal cognition it is better, as *Bhartṛhari* suggests, to accept compounds and sentences as indivisible and independent expressors of their indivisible meanings. For example, if a compound is taken to convey an aggregate, then the question as to how can simultaneous presence of unity and diversity, aggregate and parts be explained as the meaning of the components, arises. It is contradictory to accept that both of the meanings (synthesis and analysis) are simultaneously cognized by the component because no simultaneous cognition is possible.[60]

Raising the objection against independent word-meanings in a sentence, *Bhartṛhari* argues, if the independent word-meanings are assumed and then if sentential-meaning is taken as the connection of those meanings, how can the meaning of the components '*adhi*' of the word '*adhitari*' be taken to be in locative-case (*Sādhana*)? How can a *bahubrīhi* compound be accepted to convey a meaning for which a word is not uttered? For example, the components '*Citra*' and '*gauḥ*' of the compound '*Citragu*' do not convey the meaning 'the person having '*Citra gauḥ*'. Not only that but there are certain words the meaning of which is not understood through the association of meaning of their components as we find in the case of compounds like '*Saṅjñu*' and '*prajñu*'. Therefore, *Bhartṛhari* thinks it justified to accept that the whole compound as a unit, without the consideration of its parts, is the expressor of specific indivisible meaning.[61]

5. *Padavādins,* on the basis of the function to be performed by copulative (*dvandva*) compound have raised the objection against *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s theory of indivisibility. They argue if a sentence is an indivisible unit, how can a copulative compound be explained as expressor of the aggregate of the meaning of components? A *dvandva* is called so because its components convey their separate meanings. *Padavādins* may ask, if a sentence is an indivisible whole, how can the expression, '*Deodotta Yajñyadatta viṣṇumitra ca bhojyantām*', made of *Dvandva* compound be explained? If the meaning of the sentence is an indivisible whole, how is it possible to view the aggregate apart from individuals—*Deodatta,* etc.? The act of eating is to be performed by individuals—*Deodatta,* etc., and not by the aggregate, and, thus, the meaning of the sentence must be taken as the association of independent word-meaning. Answering the objection mentioned above *Bhartṛhari* argues that the word '*Gārgāḥ*' is a single word used in plural number and by Ekaśeṣa it conveys many meanings—

the son, the grandson, etc., of the *Gārga.*[62] Similarly, in the example of the *dvandva*-compound mentioned above, there is application of plural number and the compound conveys aggregate, yet the meaning is cognized through their association with the verb '*bhojyantām*' (with each individual) separately—*Deodatta*, etc., and acts upon each component of the subject denoted by the *dvandva.* Thus, *Bhartṛhari* shows that the meaning of component words, separately, is not required for explanation of the compounds of a '*dvandva*' type.[63]

For *Padavādins*, the general meaning of a *dvandva* is aggregate and it is by their nature that the words used in a *dvandva* are connected for individual meanings also. In order to make *Padavādin's* point clear, *Bhartṛhari* has given two examples. According to the first—in the expression '*Janapadatadavadhyoḥ*[64] the pronoun '*tad*' as *Padavādins* accept, is a component of the said *dvandva* and as such it stands for '*Janapada*'. It is only by taking '*tad*' for '*Janapada*' that the suffix is added. Thus, if the word is not taken as an independent unit, how can '*tad*' be called a pronoun and then how can the meaning '*Janapada*' be cognized by the word '*tad*'? Without accepting '*tad*' as a separate unit, how can it be taken to stand for '*Janapada*'? In order to answer these problems raised by *Padavādins, Bhartṛhari* elucidates that there is only an appearance of the pronoun '*tad*' in the cognition of the meaning of the compound '*Janapadatadavadhyoḥ*'. The word '*tad*' a component of the expression, appears to be the same '*tad*' popularly known as a *pronoun*, and, owing to similarity, the '*tad*' of the compound is taken as the same '*tad*' (pronoun) and, as *Bhartṛhari* says, the component '*tad*' may be taken for '*Janapada*' without distinguishing it from the pronoun '*tad*'. It can be said that in a *dvandva,* all the components of it are associated with the action (*Kriyā*) as we have seen in the case of example '*Bhujyantām*' in which the verb '*Bhuj*' is understood as associated with the components (*Deodatta* etc.) separately, but, the sentence remains indivisible because it reveals an indivisible meaning in the mind of the audience. Clarifying his own position on indivisibility of compounds or sentences, *Bhartṛhari* says that the action denoted by the verb '*Chidyatām*' (cut) in the expression '*Khadirascchidyatām*' is the single unit but it implies many sub-actions to be performed for the accomplishment of the action 'cutting', i.e. first, the bark of the tree then the stems, roots etc., are cut in sequence and the word cut (*Chidyatām*) denotes the unity of all those actions falling under the head '*cutting*'. Similarly, the sentence and sentential-meaning are

indivisible units and are explained on the basis of analysis as association of parts.[65]

6. Raising objection against indivisibility of compounds *Padavādins* may say that it is only by taking the words as independent units into consideration that compounds (*Samāsa*) are formed. For example, in some compounds, as in *avyayībhāva*, the former component is considered as primary. For example, *pratidine, upakṛṣṇam,* etc., in which the components '*prati*' and '*upa*' are taken as primary. In other cases, as in *'tatpuruṣa'*, the latter component is taken as primary (for example, '*Rājapuruṣa*') and in still other cases, as in *Bahubrīhi*, the meaning of neither of the components is reckoned but a different meaning altogether is considered as primary, for example, the word '*Pitāmbara*' in which the meanings of components *'pita*' and '*ambara*' are not taken as primary. On the basis of the logic adopted for explaining compounds by components, *Padavādins* object to the indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning by saying that the fact of primacy of the meaning of the former or the latter or neither of the components expressed by a compound can not be decided without taking words as independent units. Solving the problem raised above *Bhartṛhari*[66] elucidates that compound words actually express indivisible meaning which, for practical purposes, is explained in terms of their components, and then the primacy of former or latter component is decided grammatically. Illustrating indivisibility of the meanings of compounds, *Vaiyākaraṇas* take the help of their explanation of negative-compound (*nañ-samāsa*). The commentator *Patañjali*[67] has given three alternative explanations of the meaning of negative compounds. An account of his explanation of the negative compound *'abrāhmaṇa*' is given as follows:

i. If the component word '*brāhmaṇa*' of the compound *'abrāhmaṇa*' is taken as an independent expressor, it expresses '*Brāhmaṇatva*' and then the negative component 'a' will be expressive of 'void of' and, thus, the compound will be a '*bahubrīhi*' in which the meaning of neither of the components (the person void of *Brāhmaṇatva*) is considered primary; rather a third meaning '*kṣatrīya*' is known by the compound '*abrāhmaṇa*'.

ii. If the component '*nañ*' (a) is taken as compounded with *Brāhmana* (*Brāhmaṇatve nañ*), then the meaning of negative component 'a' will be primary and in that case the compound will be a *avyayībhāva.*

iii. If the word is used for '*Kṣatrīya*' and if, in order to express '*Brāhmaṇatva*' in him, the next component '*Brāhmaṇa*' is followed, then

the latter component conveying *brāhmaṇatva* will be *primary* (*Brāhmaṇabhinnāḥ brāhmaṇatvabhāvavan*). According to *Bhartṛhari* the negative compound '*abrāhmaṇa*' may be interpreted differently but the expressive sentence (*Vācaka*) will be the same. It is for the benefit of those who can understand the indivisible only piecemeal that the indivisible is explained differently on the basis of the analysis of meaning of components but there is no possibility of any actual division of the meaning which is an indivisible unit.

7. Exploring the issue *Bhartṛhari* illustrates that a negative sentence, the meaning of which is not cognized as an association of word meanings, expresses indivisible meaning. For example, he takes the sentence '*Vṛkṣonāsti*' (The tree does not exist) in which the word '*nāsti*' is used for negating the existence of tree (*Vṛkṣa*). *Padavādins*[68] may say that the meaning of the word '*vṛkṣa*' (tree exists) is connected with the meaning of the word '*nāsti*' (negation) in the mind, and if 'the existence of tree' in the mind is cognized first by the word '*vṛkṣa*', the question as to what does the word '*nāsti*' negate, arises. The negation of that which is cognized as already existent is self-contradictory. If the existence of the tree as idea or a being in the mind (*upacāra-sattā*) is accepted, it will hardly be associated with negation (*nañ*). The existent cannot be negated and if it is non-existent, there is no need for expressing the negation of an already non-existent. Thus, the word '*nāsti*' has no separate meaning—existence or non-existence. As the term '*nāsti*' independently of the term '*vṛkṣa*' is meaningless, the whole sentence '*Vṛkṣonāsti*' is taken as an expressor of the meaning 'the tree does not exist there'. The cognition of existence and non-existence of tree may not be comprehended simultaneously because no simultaneous cognition, for *Bhartṛhari,* is possible and, thus, the meaning 'the tree does not exist' must be the meaning of the whole sentence (*Vṛkṣonāsti*) as an indivisible unit. Clarifying the point further, *Bhartṛhari* says[69] if it is assumed that the whole sentence as well as its meaning are analyzed in the mind, then it will follow that the meanings analyzed within the mind are associated by the mind. In that case the associated meaning will not be the same as expressed by the words but simply a figment or that which is imagined by the mind. If it is not expressed (*vācya*) of an expressor (*Vācaka*), then how can a non-verbal entity be negated by the verbal expression (*Vṛkṣonāsti*). Thus, the negation of meaning (tree exists) fashioned by the mind would not be accepted as that revealed by the word *Vāaka* (negation). If it is said that

the cognition revealed by the word '*vṛkṣa*' (tree exists) of the expression '*Vṛkṣonāsti*' is falsified by the word '*nāsti*' (negation), how, then, can the cognition of negation be accepted as revealed because in that case the function of *nañ* (negation) is changed into falsification. If falsification of the 'existence of tree' is assumed as that cognized by the word '*nāsti*', 'the existence of tree' has to be accepted, and, thus, the word '*nāsti*' will not be expressive of negation but of falsification and on account of falsification (*mithyātva*), as the meaning of the word 'nāsti', the negation of the existence of tree cannot be accepted.[70]

If *Padavādins* argue that 'the existence of tree' is cognized separately from the cognition of 'the negation of the tree', then it will just be contradictory to assert the negation of the tree expressing existence and the question regarding two different cognitions by the same sentence will also arise. If it is accepted that the term '*nāsti*' functions independently without a reference to any substantive, then it may be used before the word '*vṛkṣa*'. If '*nāsti*' is used before the word '*vṛkṣa*', it will be expressive of 'negation of tree' and then it will be proper to accept that the use of the word '*vṛkṣa*' functions only for the ascertainment (*niyam*) and not for expression of any independent meaning.[71] This way the term '*vṛkṣa*' is taken as a restrictor and not as an expressor, and, thus, the sentence '*vṛkṣo nāsti*' stands as an expression which brings out an implied restriction, i.e. the component '*nāsti*' of which is expressive of meaning while the component *vṛkṣa* is useless.[72] In order to avoid the difficulties, *Padavādins* have no other alternative except assuming the sentence as an indivisible whole. The whole sentence, as an indivisible unit, is expressive of the indivisible meaning 'the tree does not exist'.

8. Taking complex formations (*Vṛttiyan*) into consideration, *Padavādins* criticize the indivisibility theory of *Vaiyākaraṇas*. They say if the independent meanings of words are not accepted, the alternative interpretations (*Vikalpas*) of complex-formations may not grammatically be possible. We have proposed to present an account of complex formations separately. Here suffice it to say that according to *Padavādins*, complex formations can not be explained if words as independent expressors are not accepted.

Answering the objection of *Padavādins, Bhartṛhari*[73] argues that as the meanings of components of a *bahubrīhi* compound are given up and the compound reveals indivisible meaning independently of the meanings of components, similarly, the compounds are indivisible units which are

explained as *Vigrah-vākya* and they express indivisible meaning irrespective of the meaning of its components. *Bhartṛhari* writes 'truth is indivisible' and only for the sake of grammar, the indivisible is explained through grammatical analysis. According to *Bhartṛhari,*[74] *Padavādin's* assumption that 'the meaning of words is decided through their analysis into root, stem, suffixes, etc., and, then, by compounding their independent meanings the meaning of the whole (word) is understood', is not justified because in some cases only roots are used for meanings and the meaning of suffixes is taken to be expressed by the root itself, while in other cases only suffixes are used for conveying meaning. In some other cases the root alone is not treated for meaning and the meaning conveyed by the root is considered as the meaning of the suffixes added with the root. In still other cases the meaning conveyed by a root is also considered as the meaning conveyed by both as a unit.[75] On the ground of this analysis, *Bhartṛhari* tries to show that the word is indivisible and it is for explanation of the meaning of the word that the word is analyzed into roots and suffixes and wherever there is a need, they are taken for support. For example the word '*iyat*' (this much) is only a suffix having no root and the suffix alone functions for meaning. The word '*ahan*' (killed) is a root having no suffix and functions for the meaning of suffix also. In some cases, the same meaning is expressed by two suffixes. For example the same meaning conveyed by the suffix '*sup*' is conveyed by the suffix '*tip*' also as we find in the word (*Bhavati bhu + tip + sup*). Thus, *Bhartṛhari* shows that the analytic treatment of meaning is not based on a fixed rule. The same meaning may be explained differently in different derivations and, thus, the words, roots, suffixes, etc., can not be accepted as independent expressors. They are acquired by grammatical analysis of the indivisible units.

The science of grammar occupies a function of interpreting indivisible cognition revealed by language on the basis of accumulation and option, association and disassociation and through the grammatical process, as *Bhartṛhari* conceives, the indivisibility remains ineffective.[76]

9. On the utility of the grammatical process *Bhartṛhari* has a holistic outlook. He accepts them as instruments for imparting wisdom to lay-men which they can't acquire otherwise. It may be asked if both ignorance and knowledge are opposite to one another, how can ignorance cause the knowledge? Answering the question *Bhartṛhari* says 'a cause exists prior to an effect and, thus, the issue of the connection of a non-produced effect

with the cause, does not arise. It is only by some device (*Vyapadeśa*) that non-produced effect is also thought of as that which is connected with the cause, similarly, ignorance is not foundational yet it serves as an instrument for the realization of knowledge.[77] The real is indivisible and it is for grammar that the unreal is taken as real. The unreal through continued practice occupies its place as the very structure of our being and that is why it appears as real in ordinary life. It is the habit of persons with the diversity, differences or divisions that we talk even of indivisible in terms of divisions. For example, atom by definition is an indivisible particle of a thing. It is imperceptible and, hence, can be proved only by reasoning, but those who are not aware of the nature of it may imagine parts—half of an atom, quarter of an atom, etc.—of it also. Not only that but such expressions as 'which part of an atom is connected with some part of another atom', is also used by them. They talk about the beginning of an eternal, the divisions of an indivisible, and so on. *Bhartṛhari* says the instrumental-real is taken by ignorance as foundationally real. The seekers of truth/the aspirants of truth/investigators into wisdom distinguish them all in order to remove the uncertainty and ignorance.[78] If word-meanings connected for sentential-meaning are taken as independent units and as there is no fixed rule for association, any word-meaning can be connected with any other word-meaning, and, then, it will cause difficulty in cognizing the true meaning of the sentence.

10. From the point of view of words as independent expressors, the sentence[79] '*Indrorlakṣmasmaravijayinaḥ Kaṇṭhamūlam Murārirdignāgānām Madamalamaṣībhāñji gaṇḍasthalāni, Adyāpyuravīvalayatilaka! Śyāmalimnānu—liptānyudbhāsantevada dhavalitam Kim ya śobhistvadīyaiḥ*' means—'O king! What is there whitened by your glory if the dark spot of the moon, the darkness of Lord Śiva's throat, the cheek of elephants and the colour black (*Kṛṣṇa*) all are still black'. But if the sentence as indivisible unit is taken into account, then, the sentence means 'O king! Your glory has whitened everything and that which are black are so by their very nature'. The example clearly shows that the understanding of meaning through words as independent expressors may be 'blame' but it may be 'praise' if the sentence as a whole is taken as expressor. If words and their meanings are taken as real, the meaning expressed by them must be the same as is expressed by the whole sentence, but this is not the case. With *Bhartṛhari's* view of sentence-holism, the meaning of sentence, as

indivisible whole, is observed to be different from its meaning explained through the collection of word-meanings.

IV

To sum up, we can say that arguments given by him in support of indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning are grounded on the cognition of meaning in usual communication. As the meaning is known as a flash of understanding, it is an indivisible whole. There is no question of parts in the awareness or the flash.

It can be said that *Anvitābhidhānavādins* and *Abhihitānvayavādins* while discussing the concept of *Vākyārtha,* have not come over their limitation of viewing meaning as realist's universal and individual. *Bhartṛhari* accepts sentential-meaning as specific awareness but his point of view of accepting sentential-meaning as specified object of awareness in nature is quite different from them. He is quite clear on the issue of word-meaning which is universal. Individual, according to him, is known by implication as the substratum of universal but while defining *vākyārtha* as *Pratibhā Puṇyarāja* emphasizes a new matter of fact. *Pratibhā* as such is awareness which cannot categorically be defined as individual or universal which are *upādhis* (adjuncts) of it. *Pratibhā* as awareness is not an ontological object but for the sake of grammar (*Vyavahāra*) it is interpreted as universal or individual.[80] Grammatically the meaning of the verb in a sentence is taken by *Vaiyākaraṇas* as the central meaning which is qualified by the meanings of the other words of the sentence and hence, individual but *Pratibhā* as such is an indivisible flash or awareness. Taking *Pratibhā* only this way that its foundational character can be estimated properly as indivisible knowledge.

Conclusively, it may be said that *Abhihitānvayavāda* is proper from the point of view of teaching sentence/sentential-meaning to children and the ignorant who can understand it only through association of word meanings, *Anvitābhidhānavāda* is convincing from the point of view of the interpretation of understanding the purpose of the expression and of figurative meaning while *Bhartṛhari's* theory of *Akhaṇḍavākyārtha* or *Pratibhā-Vākyārtha* is justified from the point of view of cognition retiring further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning and that of accomplishing communication without any performance of relating word-meanings or of thinking about relations as well. The number and kind of words,

their meanings and their association are not significant for this view of *Vākyārtha.* The length or sort of the size and shape is also not significant. The only significant matter for this theory is the revelation of a unit or complete meaning removing further expectancy involved in the completion of a unit meaning and that is why he has succeeded in interpreting even a single word as a complete sentence expressive of a complete sentential-meaning and a large number of apparent sentences as non-different from words. For this view a single word is a complete sentence if a complete sentential-meaning is revealed by that. The whole of the epic *Mahābhārata* or *Rāmāyaṇa* is a single sentence conveying a complete sentential-meaning. The sentential-meaning, for him, is indivisible flash of understanding, i.e. *Pratibhā*, for the understanding of which different theories of *Abhihitānvaya* and *Anvitābhidhāna* are useful for those who can't understand it otherwise and with such devices of analysis and synthesis the indivisibility of sentence/sentential-meaning is not affected. This line of thinking on sentence and sentential-meaning is quite in tune with holistic philosophy of *Bhartṛhari.*

* * *

I express my gratitude to Professor Daya Krishna for suggesting and asking me to write the paper. Most of the material for the paper was collected by me during my research project on *Bhartṛhari's* philosophy. I am thankful to ICPR for awarding the fellowship 1994–96 for the project.

Notes and References

1. Though *Bhartṛhari* has not mentioned any specific names of schools or of teachers belonging to the rival group of *Padavādins,* it is obvious that he has not only mentioned but has discussed different *Padavādin's* theories also on almost all the issues he takes for discussion in *Vākyapadīya*. His commentator's *Helārāja* (AD 980) and *Puṇyarāja* (AD 1000) for the first time have tried to identify those contents of *Padavādins.* According to *Puṇyarāja's* commentary on the second part of VP, *Mīmānsā* is the most important of *Padavādins* of *Bhartṛhari* while according to *Helārāja's Prakāśa* commentary on the third part of it. *Vaiśeṣikas,* some *Vaiyākaraṇas* (who deny indivisibility theory of language and meaning or who explain indivisibility of sentence and sentential-meaning on the basis of words and word-meanings as the real units) and *Bauddha* are important among *Padavādin's* of *Bhartṛhari.* As the commentators have not identified the names of the texts and the authors the statements of whom are referred to by *Bhartṛhari* as the statements of *Padavādins.* It has

become an important issue for many reasons for the scholars of our time to identify the names of the texts and their authors referred to by *Bhartṛhari* by the term *'Padadarśinaḥ'*. Professor *Dayā Krishna*, asked me to give a clear position of *Bhartṛhari's Padavādins*.

To identify different statements of *Padavādins* discussed by *Bhartṛhari* in VP for refuting, accepting or supporting them is a project of separate research and due to lack of space it is not possible to present any detailed account of his question in this paper. However, it may, perhaps, be of some help to present an account of the researches made on the issue by many scholars of VP.

K.A.S. Iyer 1969, p. 188, *G.N. Shastri* 1959, p. 83, M. Bairdeau 1964, p. 402, Coward (*Bhartṛhari* 1976, p. 129) and *B.K. Matilal* 1990, p. 106 have observed *Mīmānsā* as the prominent among *Bhartṛhari's Padavādins*. Many research papers presented by recent scholars at the first international conference on *Bhartṛhari* 1992, the proceedings of which were published in the first Indian edition by Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, edited by *Saroja Bhate* and *Johannes Bronkhorst*, are inspiring attempts in the direction. *Christian Litner*, pp. 195–213 and *John D. Kelly*, pp. 171–94 have shown *Bauddhas*, especially *Vasubandhu's*, influence on *Bhartṛhari*. *Johannes Bronkhorst*, pp. 75–94 has observed the influence of *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* on *Bhartṛhari*. *John Houben* in the first part of his paper 'Who are *Bhartṛhari's Padavādins'*, pp. 155–69, 1994 has come to *Mīmānsā* and in the latter part to some *Grammarians* popular at the time of *Bhartṛhari* for their *Padavādin* theories. No effort till now has been made to identify the texts and their authors, the statements of whom are referred to by *Bhartṛhari* for refutation, acceptance or support. In this circumstance, though it will be hasty to say (yet it can be said) that *Mīmānsā*, *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Bauddha* and the views of some *Vaiyākaraṇas* who deny independent being of sentence are his *Padadarśins* among whom *Mīmānsā* in the second part and *Vaiśeṣika* in the third part are important rival theories for *Bhartṛhari's* discussion in *VP*.

2. The controversy between *Padārthavādins* and *Akhaṇḍavākyārthavādins* is the concern of his discussions in *Vākyapadīyam*. Though he has not used the terms *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda*, he is seen well aware of the different types of theories popular at his time and which are grouped by *Puṇyarāja* only after *Kumārila's* and *Prabhākara's* controversy in *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda*.

   'Saṅsarge saṅsargavaśādviśeṣavasthite padārthe ca vākyārthe' bhihitānvayaḥ. Saṅsṛṣṭe kriyāyām cānvitābhidhānam—Prayojane tvabhihitānvaya eva. Pratibhāyām tvaikarasaiva pratipattiriti na tatra kācid abhihitānvayanvitābhidhānacarcā.' Puṇyarāja on VP 2/1–2.

3. *Śabdasya na vibhāgo'sti kuto'rthasya bhaviṣyati vibhāgaiḥ Prakriyābhedāmavidvān-Pratipadyate. VP* 2–13.

4. *Vyavahārāya manyante śāstrārtha prakriyā yataḥ. VP* 2–232.

5. *Sarvabhedānuguṇyam tu sāmānyamapare viduḥ tadarthāntara saṅsargādbhajate bhedarūpatām. VP* 2–44.

6. *Tāñca pratibhām na kincit prāṇimātram vyavahāre' tivartate. Y ataḥ sarvo' pi prānimātrasyetikartavyatārūpo vyavahāraḥ pratibhāmūlakeva. Ambākartrī* on *VP* 2/146.

7. *Pūrvairarthairanugato yathārthātmā paraḥ paraḥ. saṅsarga eva Prakrāntastathā'nyesvarthavastuṣu. VP* 2–411. Clarifying the difference of *Anvitābhidhāna* and *abhihitānvaya Puṇyarāja* writes, *'Taṭhātvabhihitānvayavādinaḥ Pūrvapūrvārthānugataḥ Saṅsargo Vākyārthaḥ, Anvitābhidhānavādinastūttarottara padārthāvagataḥ prathamatarameva saṅsṛṣṭa eva. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/411.

8. *Kevalena padenārtho yāvānevābhidhīyate. vākyastham tāvato' rthasya tadāhurabhidhāyakam. Sambandhe sati yattvanyadādhikyamupajāyate Vākyārthameva tam prāhuranekapadasaṅśryam. VP* 2/41–42.

9. *Tataḥ samudāye padānām parasparānvaye padārthavaśādyādhikyam Saṅsargaḥ ... yadatrādhikyam vākyārthaḥ sa iti. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/42.

10. *Tadyathā vīraḥ puruṣa iti vīratvapuruṣatvayorguṇa viśaṣajātiviśeṣayorekārtha samavāyapratipattipūrvakam sāmānyādhikaraṇyam vākyārthaḥ. Edārthā pekṣayā' dhika upajāyamāno dṛśyate. Anekapada saṅśrayam anekapadāśritam anekapada nimittakam, Padārtho pasthitidvārā' nekapadajñāpyamiti yāvat. Anekapada jñāpyatvā deva tam padārthayoḥ Saṅsargarūpam vākyārthameva Prāhurna tu padārthamiti. Ambākartrī* on *VP* 2/1–2, p. 9.

11. *Kāryanumeyaḥ saṅbandhorūpam tasya na dṛśyate asattvabhūtamatyantamatastam pratijānate. VP* 2/46.

12. *Kiṁ tarhi sarvabhedānuguṇasāmānyarūpo viśeṣāntarasannidhānā dviśeṣaviśrāntaḥ padārtha eva vākyārthaḥ iti ... Kāryeṇa padārthā nām viśeṣaviśrānti lakṣaṇenānumīyata iti kāryanumeyaḥ. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/46.

13. *VP* 2/113.

14. *Ambākartrī* on *VP* 2/1–2, p. 11.

15. *Na vākyārtha ākānkṣābhāsyaḥ kāryānumeyo vā, ... kintu Padārthaḥ padābhidheyaḥ vākyārthastu vākyasya prayojanamiti. Ambākartrī* on *VP* 2/1–2, p. 11.

16. *Na loke pratipattṛnāmarthayogātprasidhayaḥ. Tasmādalaukiko vākyādanyaḥ kaścinnavidyate. VP* 2/344.

17. According to *Abhihitānvayavādins* the word expresses universal and the expectancy for the completion of a specific meaning by which communication is accomplished is not extincted by universal. If a complete meaning is revealed even by a word or by a letter, it is the meaning of the sentence and not of the word isolately from the sentence.

18. *Na hi saṅsargasya jñānarūpo vyāpāraḥ śāstreṇa padāntaḥ śabdasaṅskāre kriyamāṇe nimitatvenāśrīyata iti nāsau padārthaḥ. Ambākartrī* on *VP* 2/42.

19. *Abhidheyaḥ padasyārtho vākyasyārthaḥ proyojanam. Yasya tasya na sambandho vākyānāmupapadyate. VP* 2/113.

20. *Aśabdo yadi vākyārthaḥ padārtho'pi tathābhavet. Evam ca sati sambandhaḥ śabdasyārthena hīyate. VP* 2/16.
21. This may go in favour of *Anvitābhidhānavādins* for whom sentential-meaning is the meaning of the word which conveys mutually connected word-meanings.
22. *VP* 2/205.
23. *Śabdasya na vibhāgo, sti kuto 'rthasya bhaviṣyati. Vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedamavidvān pratipadyate. VP* 2/13; see also *VP* 2/9–13.
24. *Sāmānyārthastirobhūto'na viśeṣe'vatiṣthate upāttasya kutastyāgo nivṛttaḥ kvāvatiṣthate.* VP 2/15.
25. *Na hi tasya sambandhasya svarūpamavadhārayitum śakyam. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/46.
26. Communication even according to *Padavādins* is accomplished by specific meaning, i.e. individual and not by universal.
27. *Artha pratibhāsasadṛśāyām smṛtāveva śabdānāmupayogaḥ śabdasyārthena saha sudūrameva viprakarṣaḥ tataśca katham śabdo'rtha mabhidadhītetyasatya eva śabdārthaḥ paryavasyati. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/417.
28. *Kāryānumeyaḥ sambandho rūpam tasya na dṛśyate. VP* 2/46.
29. *VP* 2/411.
30. *Sarvabhedānuguṇyam tu sāmānyamapare viduḥ tadarthāntara Saṅsargād bhajate bhedarūpatām. Bhedānākāṅkṣatastasya yā pariplavamānatā. Avacchinatti Sambandhastāṁ viśeṣe niveśayan. VP* 2/44–45.
31. Unlike *Abhihitānvayavādins* the theorists do not accept sentential-meaning as the relation (*saṅsarga*) but the meaning of the word which is fit for expressing mutually related meanings.
32. *Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/17.
33. *Yadyekenapadena sakalavākyārthasyā śeṣaviśeṣaṇakhacitasyāvagatiḥ tadottareṣām padānām niyamāyānuvādāya voccāraṇam syāt. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/18, see also *VP* 2/412.
34. *Ākhyātaśabde niyatam sādhanam yatra gamyate. tadapyekam samāsārtham vākyamityabhidhīyate. VP* 2/326.
35. *Kriyāvinā progena na dṛṣṭā śabda coditā prayogastvanuniṣpādī śabdārtha iti gamyate. VP* 2/124.
36. *VP* 2/414.
37. *Sarvam sattvapadam śuddham yadi bhāvanibandhanam saṅsarge ca vibhakto'sya tasyārtho na pṛthagyadi.kriyāpradhānam nāmnām sattvapradhānatā catvāri padajātānisarvametadvirudhyate. VP* 2/340–341.
38. *VP* 2/425–426.
39. *Vaiyākaraṇasyākhaṇḍa evaiko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭalakṣaṇo vākyam, pratibhaiva vākyārthaḥ. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/1–2.
40. *Bhartṛhari, K.A.S. Iyer*. Pp. 86–87, 1956.
41. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, edited by B.K. Matilal, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1990.

42. *Sākṣāt śabdena janitāmbhāvānānugamena vā Itikartavyatāyām tāṁ nakaścidativartate. VP* 2/146.
43. *Svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādṛṣtopapāditām. Viśiṣtopahitāṁ ceti pratibhāṁ, Śaḍavidhām viduḥ. VP* 2/152.
44. *VP* 2/146.
45. *Nyāya mañjarī*. Pp. 104–105.
46. *Idam taditi sānyeṣāmanākhyeyā kathañcana. Pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate. VP* 2/144.
47. Though *Puṇyarāja* observes that there is no utility or even any room for theories of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* in the theory accepting *pratibhā* as sentential-meaning, he writes, '*pratibhāyām tvekarasaiva pratipattiriti na tatra kācidabhi-hitānvayanvitābhidhāna carcā'. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/1. He is right in the context of those who can understand the indivisible directly without any analytical remedy but as we think theories of *anvitābhidhāna* and *abhihitānaya* are useful for learners and children in understanding the *pratibhā* (meaning) and that is the reason different forms of *Padavādins* theory have been discussed by *Bhartṛhari* in *Vākyapadīya.*
48. *VP* 2/205.
49. Ibid., 2/206.
50. *Anarthakānām saṅghātaḥ sārthako 'narthakastathā, varṇānām padamarthena yuktam nāvayavāḥ pade. VP* 2/205.
51. *Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/206.
52. *VP* 2/215.
53. Ibid., 2/207.
54. *Sārthakā narthakau bhede sambandam nādhigacchataḥ.*
Adhigacchata ityeke kutīrādinidarśanāt. VP 2/207.
55. Ibid., 2/210.
56. *Arthavadbhyo viśiṣtārthaḥ saṅghāta upajāyate. Nopajāyata ityeke samāsasvārthikādisu. VP* 2/208.
57. *Yutaḥ siddho 'rtho yeṣām te tathāvidhāḥ yathā śamīvṛkṣo dādimīvṛkṣa ityādayaḥ. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/209.
58. Ibid., *VP* 2/209.
59. *VP* 2/116 and *Puṇyarāja's* Commentary on it.
60. *Samudāyāvayavayorbhinnārthatve ca vṛttiṣu. Yugapad bhedasaṅsargo viruddhāvanuṣaṅgiṇau. VP* 2/218, and *Puṇyarāja* on it.
61. *Prajñusaṅjñīvādyavayavairna cāstyarthāvadhāranam. Tasmātsaṅghāta evaiko viśiṣtārthanibandhanam. VP* 2/220.
62. *VP* 2/221.
63. Ibid., 2/222.
64. *Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/223.
65. *VP* 2/224 and *Puṇyarāja* on it.
66. *Nanu vastubhūtāḥ śāstraprakriyāḥ kimitināśritā ityāḥ Śāstrātha prakriyāḥ kevalambudhānām vyutpādānāya. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/232 *śāstreṣu*

prakriyābhedairavidyaivopavarṇyate. Anāgamavikalpā tu svayam Vidyopavartate. VP 2/233.

67. *Mahābhāṣya.* 2/2/6.
68. *Vṛkṣo nāstīti vākyam ca viśiṣṭābhāvalakṣaṇam. Nārthena buddhau sambandho nivṛitteravatiṣṭhate. VP* 2/241.
69. *Aśabdavācyā sā buddhirnivarteta sthitā katham. VP* 2/242.
70. *VP* 2/243.
71. *VP* 2/244.
72. *VP* 2/245.
73. *Bahubrīhipadārthasya tyāgaḥ sarvasya darśitaḥ. VP* 2/228.
74. Ibid., 2/233.
75. See *VP* 2/229–232 and *Puṇyarāja's* Commentary on them.
76. *VP* 2/233.
77. *Anibaddham nimitteṣu nirupākhyam phalam yathā. Tathā vidyāpyanākhyeyā śāstropāyeva lakṣyate. VP* 2/234.
78. *Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/234.
79. Quoted by *Puṇyarāja* in his Commentary on *VP* 2/247.
80. *Sphoṭa lakṣaṇasya vibhāgo nāsti ... Pratibhārūpasyārthasya kuto bhaviṣyati Vibhāgaiḥ Prakriyābhedamiti bhedagrahaṇam hi tasyārthātmanaḥ śabdātmanaścābhinnasya pratipattidvāram. Pada Pratipattipūrvikā hi sāmānyaviśeṣavagrahaṇopāyā ... Kuśalastu pratipattā sarvameva bhedambhedānatikrameṇa paśyati. Puṇyarāja* on *VP* 2/13.

It is a apparent from *Puṇyarāja's* Commentary on *VP* 2/13, 14 that he indicates knowledge itself by the term *Pratibhā* and, thus, he is right in saying that there is no possibility of any application of universal or individual in knowledge itself. This is what is established by *Bhartṛhari* in *VP* 2/144 and by *Bhartṛhari* and *Helārāja* in the *jātisamuddeśaḥ* also. If *Pratibhā* as ontic reality is taken in view, even then there is no possibility of cognition of a reality which is not revealed by language. Different from these two positions mentioned earlier if *pratibhā* is taken as meaning in view, it is no more than a being the nature of which is determined by *Bhartṛhari* in *jāti samuddeśaḥ* as universal—more specifically as distinct universal causing incentive for particular activities.

Is *Dṛṣṭānta* Necessary in an Inferential Process?*

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Is *dṛṣṭānta* (*corroborative-example*) necessary for ascertaining *necessary concomitance* and thus in an inferential process? A negative answer to the question formulated above has been given by Jaina logicians and a Buddhist logician Ratnākaraśāntipāda. In this paper I shall, however, confine myself to Ratnākaraśāntipāda and shall show that while refuting the role of *dṛṣṭānta* he is very much within the framework set by Dharmakīrti.

The following five steps which *Nyāya* considers necessary in an inferential process have been reduced to three by Dignāga and to two by Dharmakīrti. It is to be noted here that Dharmakīrti, as I shall show, maintains that only one step is necessary for an intelligent mind. The five steps which Nyāya follows are:

1. Word is momentary (*pratijñā*).
2. Because it has origin—*hetu.*
3. A thing which has origin is momentary, for example, a pot—*udāharaṇa.*
4. A word has origin—*upanaya.*
5. So word is momentary—*nigamana.*

Dignāga while opposing the five-membered syllogism of *Nyāya* argued that the following three members are needed in an inference. They are: *Pratijña*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa*. 'Dignāga, however, objected to the inclusion of the fourth and the fifth. He was an advocate of three-member syllogism, i.e., of the first three.'[1] Dharmakīrti did not consider to state *nigamana* separately, for he thought that it is understood by implication either from the *hetu* and *udāharaṇa*, or, from the *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*. 'The conclusion is proved by virtue of the second and third, or the third and the fourth members, the fourth and the second member being identical in import. These two members are alone relevant and the conclusion,

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too, follows irresistibly from these two and, as such, need not be stated in so many words."[2] It is clear from the above that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, or at least Dignāga, consider *udāharaṇa* necessary in an inferential process. However Śāntarakṣita and his interpreter Kamalaśīla changed the situation dramatically. Śāntarakṣita points out that one has no reason to doubt the conclusion, if it follows from the *hetu* which follows the three-fold conditions. If on the other hand *hetu* does not fulfil three-fold conditions, the conclusion (nigamana) by itself cannot remove the doubt regarding itself.[3] Thus Śāntirakṣita has opened the way for Ratnākaraśānti who openly argues for the thesis that *udāharaṇa* is not necessary in an inferential process.

Ratnākaraśānti, in his Antarvyāptisamarthanam, encapsulates his thesis in the following verse: बाधकात् साध्यसिद्धिश्चेद्व्यर्थो हेत्वन्तरग्रहः । बाधकात्तदसिद्धिश्चेद्व्यर्थो धर्म्म्यन्तरग्रहः ।[4] The first half of the verse states that in case *the thing-to-be-inferred* is established by the source which states that presence of *the logical mark* (*hetu*) is contradictory in the absence of *the thing-to-be-inferred* (*sādhyaviparyyaye bādhaka pramāṇa*), then to consider *the logical mark* which subsists outside *the subject-of-inference* (*pakṣa*) is superfluous. He argues that as *necessary concomitance* in this case is ascertained in *the subject-of-inference* itself, and the *sādhya* is proved in *pakṣa* by the same source of knowledge which ascertains *necessary concomitance*, so it is superfluous to consider *the logical mark* which subsists outside *the subject-of-inference* (*pakṣa*).

The second half of the above-stated verse is the summary of his argument against his opponents. He argues that in case *the thing-to-be-inferred* is not established by *bādhaka pramāṇa*, as in the case of *external-concomitance* (*bahirvyāpti*), then it is useless to consider *the subject* (*dharmmin*) different from *the subject-of-inference* for the purpose of ascertaining *necessary concomitance*. In this case there arises the fallacy which, according to Ratnākaraśānti, is due to uselessness of our consideration of *the subject* different from *the subject-of-inference* (*dharmmyantara parigraha vaiyarthya doṣa*). He argues, as we shall see, that as *necessary concomitance* in the theory of *external-concomitance* is ascertained outside *the subject-of-inference*, so such a *necessary concomitance* cannot prove *the thing-to-be-inferred* in *the subject-of-inference*. Thus it is useless to consider the subject different from *the subject-of-inference*. Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasad Shastri states: 'In this case the

invariable relation of the smoke to fire, that is, vyāpti, is established from the example given, namely the kitchen. From thence it is transferred to the mountain, which proves the existence of fire in the mountain. But in the case of proving momentariness of all things, you do not get an example, and so the invariable relation between the thing which is to be proved, and the thing by which it is to be proved, cannot be established outside. This is a difficulty which the author has to face, and he faces it by declaring that such a relation need not be proved outside in all cases of inference.'[5]

We know that in order to ascertain *necessary-concomitance* both *the logical mark* (*hetu*) and *the thing-to-be-inferred* (*sādhyadharma*) should be known to us. Keeping this point in mind the theorist of *external-concomitance* may argue that as *sādhya* is already established while ascertaining *vyāpti* in the *pakṣa*, so there remains no role to play for the *hetu* which subsists outside the *pakṣa* and inference collapses in the theory of *internal-concomitance*. This argument may be raised by those who advocate that the third constituent of a syllogism, namely *udāharaṇa*, must be stated explicitly.

Ratnākaraśānti argues that in case *sādhya* is proved in *the subject* (*dharmin*) while ascertaining *necessary concomitance* there, then it certainly is an advantage in this theory. There are two possible answers to the question whether *sādhya* is established by the source which ascertains *necessary concomitance* in *the subject-of-inference* (*pakṣa*). Ratnākaraśānti argues that in case knowledge of the *sādhya* is ensured while ascertaining *necessary concomitance* then we are relieved from the necessity of considering *the logical mark* '*real*' in *the subject* other than *the subject-of-inference*. He says that to consider *the logical mark* different from the one which subsists in *the subject-of-inference* is not a habit that one must consider. It is not at all needed to consider the *hetu* different from the one which subsists in the *pakṣa*. If logic permits us then one must throw away the age-old practice of considering the *hetu* at two places, namely, at *dṛṣṭānta* and at *pakṣa*. This possibility rejects the role of *dṛṣṭānta* in *anumāna*. Another possible answer to the question formulated above is that *sādhya* is not established by the source which enables us to ascertain *vyāpti*. In this case, Ratnākaraśānti observes, the *hetu* cannot be declared redundant in this theory of *internal-concomitance* either. Suppose the source which enables us to ascertain *vyāpti* in *pakṣa* does not establish *sādhya* there, then subsistence of *hetu* has to be established in both the *dṛṣṭāntadharammin* (*corroborative-example*) and in the *sādhyadharmmin*

(*subject-of-inference*) to ascertain *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmattva* respectively. This is how one can, in this case, establish *the thing-to-be-inferred* in *the subject-of-inference*. The question which one must ask at this point is whether the dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* lies in one particular thing, such as pitcher etc., or the dispute lies in all things. If dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* lies in one particular thing, say 'pitcher', and *necessary concomitance* is ascertained in outside thing, say 'cloth', then *the logical mark* established in cloth becomes useless. But in case the dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* lies not in one particular thing but in all things, then both the theorists of *external-concomitance* and *internal-concomitance* have to establish the subsistence of *the logical mark* not in one particular thing but in all things. As dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred*, even for the theorists of *external-concomitance*, lies in all things, and *necessary concomitance* is ascertained by the theorist of *internal-concomitance* in one among them, so *the logical mark* cannot be declared as useless in the theory of *internal-concomitance*. As *necessary concomitance* is ascertained where there is dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred*, and wherever there is dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* is called *sādhyadharmmin*, so the locus where one ascertains *necessary concomitance* is *sādhyadharmmin* (*subject-of-inference*) not *dṛṣṭāntadharmmin* (*corroborative-example*). Raṭnākaraśānti argues that as *the things-to-be-inferred* is proved in *the subject-of-inference* while ascertaining *necessary concomitance* there, so *the logical mark* cannot be stated as useless and *necessary concomitance* so ascertained is *internal* not *external*. He states the above argument in the following words:

> यदि हि धर्मिणि व्याप्तिः सिध्यन्त्येव साध्यसिद्धमन्तर्भावयति। ननु लाभ एवैषः। व्याप्तिप्रसाधकादेव प्रमाणात् साध्यसिद्धेः सत्त्वहेत्वपाश्रयणप्रयासस्य निरसनात्। न हि व्यसनमेवैतल्लिङ्गान्तरानुसरणं नाम। अथ न व्याप्तिसाधकात् साध्यसिद्धिः। न तर्हि अन्तर्व्याप्तौ हेतुवैयर्थ्यमिति किमकाण्डकातरतया बहुतरमायासमाविशसि। द्वयं हि भवतः साध्यं दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि वृत्तिः साध्यधर्मिणि च। यथाक्रमं व्याप्तिपक्षधर्म्मत्वयोः सिद्धयर्थं। ननु यदा प्रतिनियते धर्म्मिणि विवादः, तद्वहिर्भूते च धर्म्मिणि व्याप्तिग्रहणं तदानीं भवेद्वैयर्थ्यं। यदा तु वस्तुमात्रे विवादः तदा सर्व्ववस्तुषु हेतोर्वृत्तिस्त्वयापि साध्या मयापि चेति कतमस्मिन् धर्मिणि हेतोर्वृत्तिसाधनं मम व्यर्थं भविष्यति। कथमिदानीं बहिर्व्याप्तिर्विवादधिकरणं भूत एवान्यतमस्मिन् व्याप्तिसाधनात्। तावन्मात्रलक्षणत्वाच्च साध्यधर्म्मिणः।[6]

Opponents may argue that the proposed source of knowledge, namely *bādhaka pramāṇa*, excludes *the subject* (*dharmmin*) from the set of the subjects where dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* is found. This dispute continues as long as *the thing-to-be-inferred* is unproved there. But as *the bādhaka pramāṇ*, opponents argue so, proves *the thing-to-be-inferred* there, consequently the dispute vanishes. They argue that we tend to infer *the thing-to-be-inferred* in *the subject-of-inference* because we are not certain of its availability. There must be dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* in *the subject-of-inference* before reaching to the conclusion, and dispute is possible only if there is uncertainty regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred*. It is this uncertainty regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* which, opponents argue, characterizes *the subject-of-inference* (*sādhya dharmmin*). As the uncertainty regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* is the defining characteristic of *the subject-of-inference*, and the proposed source of knowledge eliminates the uncertainty, so *the subject* (*dharmmin*) where *necessary concomitance* is ascertained is no more *the subject-of-inference*. Thus *necessary concomitance* ascertained there, opponents argue, is not *internal* but *external*.

Raṭnākaraśānti argues against his opponents that as *the thing-to-be-inferred* is established only with the help of *bādhaka pramāṇa*, so *the subject* (*dharmmin*) cannot be excluded from the set of *the subject-of-inference* in his theory of *internal-concomitance*. To exclude *the subject* to call it *external*, and then to ascertain the *necessary concomitance* there in order to establish *the thing-to-be-inferred* in the remaining members of the set, according to Ratnākaraśānti, is not at all logical. He argues that in case *the thing-to-be-inferred* is not established by *bādhaka pramāṇa*, but is established otherwise, then to consider *the subject* (*dharmmin*) different from *the subject-of-inference* (*sādhya dharmmin*) becomes useless. He argues that *bādhaka pramāṇa* does not dissolve the dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred*, consequently no *subject* can be excluded, and *the subject* which is an unexcluded one is certainly the *subject-of-inference*. The *necessary concomitance* ascertained there is an *internal* and not an *external* one. Thus opponent's thesis that *bādhaka pramāṇa* excludes *the subject* (*dharmmin*) by dissolving the dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred*, and the excluded *subject* is no more *the subject-of-inference*, according to Ratnākaraśānti, is ill founded. He maintains the above-stated thesis in the following lines: बाधकं प्रमाणं प्रवर्त्तमानमन्तर्गतमपि धर्म्मिणं बहिष्करोतीति

चेत एतदेव कथं भवतु बाधकेन प्रवर्त्तमाननैव तस्मिन् साध्य साधनात्। साध्यसंशयोपगमे साध्यधर्म्मिणि लक्षणोपगमादिति चेत् अयुक्तमेतत्।[7]

Ratnākaraśānti argues that *external-concomitance* is not possible in the case of *the logical mark* '*real*'. His argument is based on the assumption that *the thing-to-be-inferred*, namely *kṣaṇikatva*, has to be established not with regard to this or that particular thing but with regard to all things. He maintains that there are only two possible options open for his opponents. Either to hold that *the thing-to-be-inferred* is not established in *the subject-of-inference* with the help of *bādhaka pramāṇa* or to hold that it can be established in *the subject-of-inference* with the help of *bādhaka pramāṇa*. In the first option the fallacy of uselessness of considering *the subject* (*dharmmin*) different from *the subject-of-inference* is unavoidable. In the second option, as opponents themselves have shown, *the logical mark* subsisting outside *the subject-of-inference* becomes redundant, and consequently inference collapses in this case. As inference collapses in this case, so *the thing-to-be-inferred*, following his opponents, remains unestablished, so the doubt regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* could not be removed. As the doubt regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* could not be removed, so exclusion of *the subject* (*dharmmin*) from the set of *the subject-of-inference*, is not possible. The unexcluded subject, he maintains, is certainly *the subject of inference*, and the *necessary concomitance* ascertained there is certainly an *internal* not *external* one. *Necessary concomitance* ascertained in *the subject-of-inference* cannot be stated as an *external-concomitance*. If dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* lies in a particular *subject*, and *necessary concomitance* is ascertained outside of it, then it is very difficult to avoid the fallacy of uselessness of considering *the subject* different from *the subject-of-inference*. As *the logical mark* subsisting outside *the subject-of-inference* becomes useless in case one establishes *the thing-to-be-inferred* with the help of *bādhaka pramāṇa*, and it is not an obsession to consider *the logical mark* which subsists outside *the subject-of-inference*, so it is preferable to establish *the thing-to-be-inferred* with the help of *bādhaka pramāṇa*. He emphatically maintains that *external-concomitance* is not possible with regard to *the logical mark* '*real*'. Ratnākaraśānti maintains the above in the following lines of his *Antarvyāptisamarthanam*:

> बाधकमात्रात् न साध्यसिद्धिरित्यस्मिन्पक्षे धर्म्म्यन्तरपरिग्रहवैयर्थ्याभिधानात्। बाधकात् साध्यसिद्धिरित्यस्मिंस्तु पक्षे साधनवैयर्थ्यमापादितं। तस्माद्बाधकमात्रेण साध्यसिद्धौ न क्वचित् सन्देहनिवृत्तिः सन्देहानिवृत्तौ न बहिष्करणमवहिष्कृतश्च साध्यधर्म्म्येवेति तत्र व्याप्तिरन्तर्व्याप्तिरेव नेदानीं बहिर्व्याप्तेर्वार्त्तापि। तदियं बहिर्व्याप्तिरमुस्मिन् पक्षे कथं भवति यदि प्रतिनियते धर्म्मिणि विवादः। तद्बहिर्भूते च धर्म्मिणि व्याप्तिग्रहणम्भवति। तत्र च दुरुद्धरः धर्म्म्यन्तरपरिग्रहवैयर्थ्यदोषः। बाधकमात्रेण तु साध्यसिद्धौ हेत्वन्तरमेव व्यर्थं। अपि च सत्त्वहेतोर्विशेषेण न बहिर्व्याप्तिसंभवः।[8]

If dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* lies in all *subjects* (*dharmmin*) then our knowledge of *the logical mark* and *necessary concomitance* will establish *the thing-to-be-inferred* not in one particular *subject* (*dharmmin*) but in all *subjects*. So a particular *subject* must be mentioned for determinate reference. Ratnākaraśānti who was aware of this problem maintained that *necessary concomitance* is always ascertained with reference to that particular *subject* (*dharmmin*) where *logical mark* is noticed. The dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* cannot arise in *the subject* where *logical mark* is unestablished. As there is dispute regarding *the thing-to-be-inferred* in a particular *subject*, so our knowledge of *necessary concomitance* with regard to that *logical mark* refers to that particular *subject* where *the logical mark* has been noticed. If *the logical mark* would not have been seen there then dispute would not have arisen. For dispute cannot arise unless *the logical mark* is seen there. *The logical mark* '*real*' is seen in *the subject-of-inference* (*sādhyadharmmin*) otherwise dispute would not have arisen. So *necessary concomitance* ascertained there is certainly an *internal-concomitance* and has a determinate reference. This thesis has been argued by Ratnākaraśānti in the following sentence:

> यत्र हि धर्म्मिणि दृष्टस्य हेतोव्याप्तिः प्रतीयते तत्र तस्य व्याप्तिग्रहणमाख्यायते। दृष्टञ्च साध्यधर्मिणि सत्त्वमन्यथा विमत्ययोगादिति कथं नान्तर्व्याप्तिः।[9]

Theorists of *external-concomitance* may argue that *necessary concomitance* should be ascertained outside *the subject-of-inference* only, i.e. only in *corroborative-example*, so that there remains some function for *the logical mark* to perform. In this case it will be the function of *the logical mark* to establish *the thing-to-be-inferred* in *the subject-of-inference*. If *necessary concomitance* is ascertained in *corroborative-example*, opponents argue so, an appeal to *the logical mark* would not be superfluous. Ratnākaraśānti argues against his opponents and maintains that we do see *the logical mark* in *the subject* (*dharmmin*) and one cannot ignore *the*

logical mark which one has seen in *the subject* on an appeal from opponents. Opponents cannot argue either that *necessary concomitance* must be ascertained outside only in case one sees *the logical mark* in a particular *subject.*

Opponents argue that not only the *necessary concomitance* with regard to *the logical mark* seen in a particular *subject* but also the *necessary concomitance* with regard to *the logical mark* seen in both the *corroborative-example* and in *the subject-of-inference* is part of the *necessary concomitance* ascertained in *corroborative-example*. Opponents maintained this thesis because they thought that *logical mark* must be stated explicitly otherwise we cannot establish *the thing-to-be-inferred*. To preserve the role of *the logical mark* it was necessary for them to maintain that *necessary concomitance* is ascertained in *corroborative-example* as well as to maintain that *necessary concomitance* ascertained in *the subject-of-inference* is part of the *necessary concomitance* ascertained outside.

Ratnākaraśānti argues against his opponents. During his argument he mentions his two theses: (1) *The thing-to-be-inferred* is established by *bādhaka pramāṇa*, and (2) it is ascertained in *the subject* where *necessary concomitance* is ascertained. Ratnākaraśānti argues that if the above two theses can lead to redundancy of *logical mark* in his theory then the same is true in the theory of *external-concomitance* also. He argues that theorists of *external-concomitance* mention *the logical mark* along with an example and to cite an example has become a rule in their theory whereas it is not so. He considers 'whatever is real is momentary, e.g. pitcher' and maintains that the practice of using *the logical mark* along with an example, particularly in the case of *the logical mark* '*real*', is only a habit not a rule. This practice is meant only for the dull not for the intelligent. An intelligent person does not need an example to understand the *necessary concomitance*. The statement regarding *necessary concomitance* along with an example is superfluous. Example has been used by the teacher only to oblige the dullard. He concludes the argument with a verse which states that the example of a pitcher has been given for them who state example elsewhere. As the inference is not unsuccessful in case the example is not stated, so the same should be desired in the theory of *internal-concomitance* also. Ratnākaraśānti maintains the above-stated thesis in the following lines of the text:

तथापि साधनवैयर्थ्यनिषेधाय बहिरेव गृह्णीम् इति चेत् तत् किमिदानीं त्वदिच्छानुरोधात् धर्म्मिणि हेतोर्दशनमदर्शनमस्तु। दर्शनविशेषे वा बहिरेव व्याप्तिग्रहणव्यवस्थास्तु। उभयत्र दृष्टस्य व्याप्तिग्रहणेऽप्यस्ति बहिर्व्याप्तिभाग इति चेत्। ननु किमर्थमियान् भागो यत्नेन संरक्ष्यते। माभूत् हेतुवैयर्थ्यमिति चेत्। ननु यदि बाधकवृत्तिमात्रेण व्याप्तिग्रहणाधिकरणे धर्म्मिणि साध्यसिद्धेः साधनवैयर्थ्यमन्तर्व्याप्तौ तदेतद्बहिर्व्याप्तावपि तुल्यं। तस्माद् व्यसनमात्रं बहिर्व्याप्तिग्रहणे विशेषेण सत्त्वे हेतौ केवलं जड़धियामेव नियमेन दृष्टान्तसापेक्षः साधनप्रयोगः परितोषाय जायते। तेषामेवानुग्रहार्थमाचार्य्यो दृष्टान्तमुपादत्ते। यत् सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा घट इति। पटुमतयस्तु नैवं दृष्टान्तमपेक्षन्ते।[10]

The above stated view of Ratnākaraśānti is very much within the framework of Dharmakīrti's logic. He, in his *Pramānavārttikam*, maintains that *logical mark* alone is enough for an intelligent mind to prove *the thing-to-be-inferred*. He states: विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव हि केवलः।[11] He himself while commenting upon the verse maintains that example is given to corroborate the *necessary concomitance*, and in case the *necessary concomitance* is already known then there is no use of citing an example. यदर्थे दृष्टान्त उच्यते सोऽर्थः। सिद्ध इति किं तद्वचनेन तदा।[12] 'The example is stated for the purpose (of exemplifying the necessary concomitance between *the probans* and *the probandum*) and when this *necessary concomitance* is already known, what will the statement (of the example) serve?'

An example alone, according to the Buddhist logician Mokṣākaragupta, cannot establish the *necessary concomitance*. The example cited either in the case of *agreement* (*sādharmya*) or in the case of *difference* (*vaidharmya*) is not at all enough to ascertain *necessary concomitance*. If *necessary concomitance* can be ascertained with the help of an example then one should ascertain *necessary concomitance* even between an elephant and a donkey which one finds together by accident. He says that example is used only to recall the *necessary concomitance* which one has forgotten. I wish to close the paper with his statement from *Bouddha Tarka-Bhāṣā*:

यदृच्छया मिलितयोरपि करभगर्दभयोस्तथाभावप्रसंगात्। तस्मान्निदर्शनं नाम (दृष्टान्त उच्यते। स च) गृहीतविस्मृतप्रतिबन्धसाधकप्रमाणस्मरणद्वारेणैव हेतावपयुज्यते, न स्वसन्निधिमात्रेण।[13]

Notes and References

1. *Pramāṇavārttikam* (*Svārthānumāna*), *Dharmakirti*, Tr. S. Mookerjee and H. Nagāsāki, p. 7, Navanālandā Mahāvihār, Patna, 1964.
2. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, S. Mookerjee, p. 238, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975.
3. Tattvasaṁgrahaḥ of Śāntarakṣita with Pañjikā by Kamalaśīla, Ed. Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, pp. 512–13 and Sl. 1439 Bouddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968.
4. *Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts*, (henceforth S.B.N.T.) Ed. Maha Mahopadhyaya. Haraprasada Shastri, p. 109, Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. 1226, Kolkata, 1910.
5. S.B.N.T., Preface, p. vi.
6. S.B.N.T., pp. 109–10.
7. S.B.N.T., p. 110.
8. S.B.N.T., p. 111.
9. Ibid.
10. S.B.N.T., pp. 111–12.
11. *Pramāṇavārttikam* (*Svārthānumāna*), V. 27, S. Mookerjee and H. Nagāsāki.
12. Ibid., p. 127.
13. *Bouddha-Tarka-Bhāṣā*, Ed. and Hindi Tr. by Dr. Raghunath Giri, pp. 68–9, Prachya Prakasan, Varanasi.

Multi-disciplinary Research on Consciousness: What Philosophy Can Do

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I

Consciousness has been treated as an esoteric and mysterious subject and its study has been a pet subject for philosophers and mystics for a long time. However, in recent years, researchers from diverse subjects like literature and quantum mechanics (let alone psychology, neurology, computer science, mathematics etc.) are showing interest in the subject and are coming forward to share their findings with others.[1] Researchers from science disciplines often wonder why an obvious phenomenon such as consciousness has remained an enigma, though philosophers have been working on it for centuries. Some of them argue and few philosophers agree with them that there may not be anything philosophical about consciousness after all. At least this seems to be the general view expressed by researchers from non-philosophy disciplines in two recently held seminars.[2]

The paper attempts to demarcate the role philosophy can play in the multi-disciplinary research scheme. That will further clarify how it is possible to strategically interact with other researchers from disciplines who have different methods, terminology and modes of dialogue than theirs.

II

Let us try to locate some of the issues of the human conscious phenomena. *First*, consciousness are certain subjective (something *that it is like to be* that organism—Nagel[3]) and intentional (something *about/of* something—Brentano[4]) states individuals are often in. *Secondly*, a person to be in such a state, needs to have certain physio-chemical mechanisms (sense-

organs, neuro-chemical set-up, brain etc.)—which are prerequisite for the person to be in the conscious state. Besides, something (objects, events, occurrences or some earlier *conscious* states) is necessary for the person to be conscious *about*. *Thirdly*, when the person is in such a state, he generally exhibits certain patterns of behaviour.

A conscious state is a subjective state in the sense that it essentially belongs to the person who has it and is claimed to be a private state to the person concerned. If a person, for example, is conscious of a green object or has a sensation of pain, there is something for the person that *it is like to be have that* green sensation. And such subjective conscious states are always *about* something—the green visual sensation is *about* a tree. But the tree is not *about* anything. Therefore, such mental properties and states as knowing, feeling and willing are considered instances of consciousness. These are some pre-theoretical facts and manifestations about consciousness. It seems that consciousness is the result of the interaction among objects in the world, neurological processes and behavioural activities in the body in certain ways. However, the factors of consciousness are conceptually different in nature. For example, the green object, the *sensation of green* and the neurobiological processes association with green sensation and the linguistic behaviour in uttering 'This is green', when a person has the sensation of 'green', are different. Consciousness is not an object (matter) but is *about* object (matter). Consciousness is not physical, but arises out of physical processes.

Some of the pertinent problems of consciousness are: How is it that something that is not physical (consciousness) emerges out of something that is physical (brain and object)? Or how is it that brain gives rise to consciousness? Or how is it that something non-physical conditions the body to behave in certain ways? In other words, at what point of time and stage, do physical processes turn to be the subjective and intentional experience? Different aspects of the problem have appeared in different forms. Among them are the problem of the mind–brain relationship, the problem of whether mental phenomena fit into causal order, whether mind is immaterial. If consciousness is a feeling of something *that it is like to be* that organism, how is it possible for somebody else to know it?—the problem of other mind.

General statements about consciousness can be arrived at from given facts and the manifestations through two broad ways: (a) systematization through rational speculation, and (b) systematization through empirical

investigation. Philosophy employs the 'rational speculative method'. It is speculative, *a priori* and thought-experimental in nature. In this approach speculation is used along with thought-experiments to arrive at a theory of consciousness. The method checks the validity of statements of consciousness. On the other hand the method which tries to systematize the data through empirical investigation, uses the means of observation, description and realization. This is concerned with *describing* how exactly the process of awareness takes place in the physical parts and in its behavioural co-relates and subsequently realizing the state in a machine.

Theories of consciousness established through rational speculation, as we see in philosophy, lead to logically sound yet incredible problems which are rarely encountered in our daily life. On the other hand, theories developed in empirical sciences through the program of the localization of the conscious functions in the brain supported by computational models, though efficacious, are vitiated with conceptual and logical problems.[5] It seems that there is no adequate explanation of what consciousness is, how it occurs and how it is different from other facts. Thus, such an obvious fact as consciousness remains a mysterious, enigmatic and secret happening in the human body.

The mysterious nature of consciousness presents itself in various forms in various disciplines. Researchers from diverse disciplines have faced the problems in one form or other. For example, a person from literature will face the enigma of consciousness in the form of whether he can portray and convey the inner feeling (consciousness) of the character in an authentic way. Is he conveying the feeling of the character or the feeling as he *feels*. A person from an artificial-intelligence background will face the problem as the ultimate challenge to imitate it in a machine. Accordingly, they have tried to solve the problem for different purposes. A neurobiologist tries to solve the problem for better understanding of mental diseases and disorder. A person from artificial-intelligence will approach the problem towards building useful machines to imitate what we call conscious function and consequently to manipulate it. In Indian tradition it is believed that an adequate answer will lead us to the ultimate knowledge of 'who I am' and which in consequence leads to cessation of bondage and to gain liberation.

Because of the commonness and the multi-dimensionality of the problem, it brings researchers from various disciplines to a common platform to tackle the problem. In the multi-disciplinary set-up, researchers from

one discipline have to listen to and exchange ideas with researchers from other fields. For which they have to develop a common strategy, a common method and uniform language so that they can exchange ideas and views effectively by paying respect to the autonomy of their respective disciplines. What they are looking for is a theory of consciousness with the efficaciousness of factual study and the soundness of logic. We need to collect as much data about consciousness as possible but we also need a mechanism to co-ordinate those data and need to develop a common linguistic framework.

III

First, let us see how the empirical investigation handles the problem of consciousness. It will be pertinent to remember the fact that consciousness is a function in the body like other functions—some complicated (reproduction and digestion) and some simple (sneezing). Not so long ago, many other functions of the body were also mysterious to us. We did not have a good explanation of the functions, like reproduction, digestion, blood circulation etc. However, with the advance of biochemical sciences and better instruments, we have unveiled the secrecy of these processes to a large extent. Now we have a better understanding of the process in which the food disappears into our mouth, then goes to the stomach, then to the intestines and finally how the system rejects the unnecessary stuff and then it generates the necessary energy for the body to sustain. That is how we have demystified the once secret function of digestion. Perhaps consciousness is the next secret of the human body to be demystified in such a way.

From this we can argue that our understanding of consciousness should start with those inner and overt processes of the body which are associated with it. In the processes, *first*, we have to localize the conscious functions in the physical part starting from the sense-organs through the nervous system and brain in the conditioned set-up. The co-relations between what we call the conscious functions and the behaviours will also be a good starting point of the study of consciousness. Out of the data, patterns will be established and co-relations between behaviour and conscious action are established by using statistical tools, mathematical equations and case studies. *Secondly*, the localized function of the brain should be realized in an artefact to prove that provided such and such conditions

are fulfilled we can call an action conscious. The exhibition, simulation and manipulation of what we call the conscious function in an artificial set-up or laboratory can be called the scientific study of consciousness. The scientific study of consciousness consists of neurosciences (biology, genetics, medical science etc. for localization), the behavioural sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature etc. to establish the co-relations between conscious functions and the patterns of behaviour) and computation sciences. Though right now we do not know in detail how exactly the process takes place, but we *know* how it can be done. It is possible for us to describe, quantify and subsequently realize the conscious states in a machine.

However, consciousness is a typical function of the human being and is quite different from other functions of the body such as reproduction and digestion. Fortunately, we can study how the digestion process take place from an objective point of view, where digestion is not directly involved in its study. However, we do not have such a privilege in the scientific study of consciousness. In the study consciousness, the consciousness itself is presupposed. Therefore, it is contended that to know what consciousness is one has to go beyond consciousness. Since we cannot do that with our ordinary sense organs or with the help of science, we have to resort to *yogic* means like *sadhana* and *yoga*, to cultivate a certain state of mind and body. Through such means, we can have direct encounter of consciousness in the form of self or soul.

The scientific study of consciousness is circular, for consciousness is itself presupposed in its study. But do we have to go all the way to *yoga* to avoid such circularity and discredit science only on this ground? Moreover, on the same logic, the *yogic* study also is circular. One can reach the yogic transcendental state through some minimum consciousness. The problem of circularity in science does not seem to be a vicious one. There are examples of circular but good explanations in the history of philosophy and science—the problem of scepticism in philosophy and the problem of cosmology in astrophysics are two good examples.

This is how the secrecy of consciousness is revealed perhaps the way digestion is done. Thus, if the functioning of all neurons and the sets of neurons were to become known, there might be no need of abstract and speculative models for the functioning of consciousness. There would be no job left for philosophers to do.

IV

For the time being, let us keep aside the question whether scientific approach can explain the problem as to how physical gives rise to non-physical or does it help us to explain the simple fact of what it means to be in a conscious state of 'pain'. Let us assume that the empirical investigation is successful. After this gross oversimplification of the science of consciousness, let us see whether philosophers still have a role to play in the multi-disciplinary set-up. First, each of the participating disciplines must have generated lot of data, sometimes negating each other. Second, the term and language used in one discipline may not be relevant, or even understood, by researchers from other disciplines. For examples, the neurobiological language of 'C-firing' about pain will be poor material for a novelist to use to describe the meaning and richness of pain behaviour of a character; or the concept of 'social consciousness' may not be understood in the context of science. We need to develop a common enough set of terminology and a common linguistic framework for smooth exchange of ideas on the common platform.

Besides, we need to have a mechanism to choose the better and adequate description from amongst the available. It is true that we have to start our study of consciousness with the visible mark and agreed fact, but that will not help us to judge and evaluate those data and information.

For both the requirements, we need the experience of philosophers. First, let us see what is so philosophical about evolving the necessary linguistic framework for the joint strategy. The researchers will do their research, dialogue and argumentation by using the terms and words of their respective field. It may so happen that one set of terms used by a particular discipline may be incompatible with that of others. Thus there may be some confusion. The job of the philosopher is to remove such confusion. As soon as some discipline makes an assertion of consciousness, it can be formulated as a proposition in a language. The concept can be defined and the relationship among the concepts can be established. The experience of the philosophers will be of much help here.

Secondly, the study of logic with its different techniques to determine the validity of argument, avoiding different fallacies and circularity in the arguments will be in great need to choose better theories of consciousness. Again, suppose a layman wants to make sense of the findings of the whole thing, he needs some conceptual mapping and that comes from

philosophers. The factual questions require the description of the facts about consciousness in term of data, information, patterns etc. of what we call conscious functions. But when someone wants to make sense of those data, one is no more in the realm of science. Here one is doing the analysis of those data and establishing relationship between concepts, which is necessarily philosophical.

It may be argued that the logical aspects are very essential. But, that does not mean that only a philosopher can do that and a practising scientist cannot. The logical tracking is not a separate job and it simultaneously goes along with any systematic study. This argument is valid. But the argument at best proves that we do not need a philosopher to do that job. So there may not be any need of a philosopher to be appointed in a scientific research project along with a technical assistant to help in the laboratory. But it does not undermine the *job* of philosophy. The job of ensuring clarity and logic have to be there, and it does not matter who is doing it. But historically, since philosophers are doing it, it is fair to assign the job to philosophers. However, it should be kept in the mind that philosophers are not competing with scientists. The philosophers are not discoverers of truth, but only provide means to understand it. Scientists are good at their job. Philosophers can only look at it from a critical point of view. Thus, philosophers' contribution to the study of consciousness (for that matter of any subject) is in terms of logic and not in substance. They do not discover the landscape of consciousness, but only draw the conceptual geography of mental terms. The job of a philosopher in the multidisciplinary study is critical, constructive and catalytic.[6]

Notes and References

1. For a discussion on the major disciplines taking part in the study of consciousness and to see the nature of the interconnection among disciplines, see Gardner, H., *Mind's News Science*, 1985, Basic Books, New York, Chapter 3, pp. 36–7. Consciousness study has become a popular research topic also. Popular news magazines like *Newsweek* ('Mapping the Brain', April 2–9, 1992, pp. 44–50) and *Discover* ('What is Consciousness?', November 1992, pp. 95–106) have carried cover features on consciousness.
2. The first one was the First National Conference on 'Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness' held at the National Institute of Advanced Study, Bangalore from February 8–13, 1999. The other was the Round Table Discussion on 'Consciousness' organized by the National Brain Research Centre (NBRC), New Delhi at Allahabad on October 12 and 13, 2000. Both the

seminars were multidisciplinary in nature providing a forum for researchers from anthropology and neurology to zoology. Particularly in the second seminar, participants from the philosophy discipline were asked to spell out the role of philosophy in consciousness studies at the outset of the seminar.

3. For details see Nagel, T., 'What it is Like to be a Bat?', 1974, *Philosophical Review*, 83, pp. 435–50.
4. For Brentano's view on intentionality, see Gregory, Richard L., (ed.), 1998, *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford University Press, pp. 383–6.
5. See Sahu, Gopal, 'Consciousness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Framework', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 2000, Vol. VI, No. 1–2, pp. 1–14, for a detailed discussion of the kind of problems these studies on consciousness lead to.
6. An earlier version of the paper was discussed in the Round Table Discussion on 'Consciousness' organized by the National Brain Research Centre (NBRC), New Delhi at Allahabad on 12 and 13 October 2000. I am thankful to the organizers, particularly Dr. Vijayalakshmi Ravindranath, Director, NBRC, for giving me a chance to participate in the discussion.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Observations on Some of the Points Raised by Professor Daya Krishna While Discussing Whether Nyāya is 'Realist' or 'Idealist'

The explanation for the terms 'Realist' and 'Idealist' given by the western philosophical tradition, is more or less acceptable to the Indian tradition also. Yet, the Indian tradition unanimously admits that only the Vijñānavāda school of the Buddhists, and the Advaita School of Śrī Śankara, are the idealists and all the other schools including the Nyāya school are realists. This view, in my opinion, is quite consistent, for only the Vijñāna vādins and the Advaitins hold the view that all the objects are superimposed on the consciousness and hence they do not have separate existence apart from the existence of the cognition. This is explained by them with Rajju-sarpa illustration. The snake superimposed on the rope, does not have separate existence, apart from the existence of the rope. But, as per the Nyāya school, the objects are not superimposed on their cognition and hence, it is obvious that the school maintains that the objects do have an existence which is independent of the existence of knowledge. Hence, the Nyāya school is accepted by all, as Realist.

Now, the objection raised by Professor Daya Krishna seems to be this: *Jñeyatva* is held by the Nyāya school as a definition of all the objects. In other words there is not a single object which exists without being known. This means that the existence of the objects is entirely dependent upon their knowledge. This is nothing but idealism.

The Nyāya school may react to this objection, as follows:

Objects are of two types, namely external and internal. Except the special qualities of Self, such as knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, merit, demerit and impression, all the other objects of this universe are considered as external objects. These external objects are always *jñeya* in the sense they are objects of some knowledge, from the moment they come into existence. But, they also exist without being known by us. To explain further, when a jar comes into existence it may remain without being known by Caitra, but may be known by another person called Maitra. Even Maitra's knowledge will not be constantly apprehending the

jar. After some moments, he may forget about it. His knowledge may grasp something else. But, even then the jar may continue to exist. Thus, the jar, according to Nyāya, is not a superimposed object like Rajju-sarpa. Another important point is that according to Idealists the object of my cognition, cannot be that of another person's cognition. In the case of the Rajju-sarpa for example, the object of my cognition, can never be the object of another person's cognition. I alone may have the illusory cognition of Rajju-sarpa, while the others are seeing it as just Rajju. But, in the case of jar etc., external things, it is not so. Just as I can see it as a jar others also can see it as a jar. In other words, had external things such as a jar not had their existence independent of knowledge, they might not have been cognized by other persons. But, according to Nyāya, they are cognized not only by me, but by others also. Hence, the Nyāya school has to be admitted as Realist.

The point made above can be explained in a different manner also. As per the idealists, the object of a cognition, has existence so long as the cognition has existence. The moment the cognition ceases to exist, the object also ceases to exist. The external things such as jar, according to Nyāya, are not so. They might be existing even before the origination of any person's knowledge and they may continue to exist even after the cessation of its knowledge. At the same time, it would also continue to be having *jneyatva* as it is the object of some other person's knowledge, at least, God's knowledge. Thus, from a human being's knowledge-point-of-view, the existence of objects, is quite independent of those 'knowledges'. From the point of view of God's knowledge also, the Nyāya school can not be considered as idealist. For, as per the idealists, the existence of an object is co-extensive with the existence of the knowledge. The existence of Rajju-sarpa starts with the origination of its knowledge and comes to an end with the cessation of its knowledge. But, the existence of jar, for example, is not, according to Nyāya, co-existence with the existence of God's knowledge. For God's knowledge is infinite whereas jar etc., are finite. In other words, the existence of jar etc., is not co-extensive with the existence of God's knowledge. Therefore, even from the point of view of God's knowledge, the Nyāya school holds that the existence of objects are quite independent. It may be argued that the existence of eternal things such as space, time etc., is co-extensive with the existence of God's knowledge. But, even the existence of eternal things, as per the Nyāya school, is quite separate and hence independent. In fact, to be considered as

Realist, it is sufficient if some objects are admitted as having independent existence. When, as per the Nyāya, the non-eternal things are proved to be having independent existence, then it is obvious that it has to be considered as Realist.

Another point to be noticed is that as per the Vijñānavāda or the Advaita vāda, there may be a state in which pure consciousness without apprehending any object, can exist. But, as per the Nyāya, there cannot be a knowledge, whether that of God's or human beings', without having an object. In other words, just as *jnēyatva* is a definition of all the objects, saviṣayakatva or having a content, is a characteristic of knowledges. Therefore, if by simply admitting that all things are objects of some or other knowledge, they cease to have independent existence, then as no knowledge can exist without having a content, it will have to be admitted that the existence of knowledge, also is not independent, but absolutely dependent upon its contents. Therefore, just as a knowledge has independent existence, inspite of its being *saviṣayaka*, objects also have independent existence though *jñeyatva* is one of their main characteristics.

By the above discussion, it is clear that the external objects, as per the Nyāya school, have existence independent of knowledge. This is sufficient to show that Nyāya is Realist. Even among the internal objects such as the qualities of ātman, there are certain qualities like *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṁskāra*. They exist in ātman without being known by him. Of course, they are always objects of God's knowledge, but as already explained, their relation to God's knowledge is just *viṣayatā* and not the peculiar relation of *adhyāsa* or superimposition as maintained by the Indian idealists. Regarding the other qualities of ātman such as *jñāna*, *sukha* etc., the Nyāya holds that they have a peculiar nature of being *jñātaikasat*, i.e. they exist being known only. In other words, they cannot exist without being known by the self. However, the relation between these qualities and their knowledge, is not, according to Nyāya, the peculiar relation as maintained by the idealists.

I hope the above explanation is sufficient to bring out the difference between the idealists and the naiyāyikas. Yogi Pratyaksa and mānasa-pratyaksa also are certain types of cognitions but not having the peculiar relation maintained by the idealists, with their objects. Sāmānya lakṣana and jñāna-lakṣana are, according to Nyāya, just contacts between the sense organs and the objects to explain certain cognitions which cannot be explained otherwise.

For example, on seeing a jar we come to know of all the similar jars. When we see a sandalwood piece at a distance we immediately have a cognition—'This is fragrant'. These cognitions cannot be explained with the sense-object contacts that give rise to perceptual cognitions, in the normal course. Any way, these *pratyāsattis* have nothing to do with idealism and the Nyāya school will remain realist, inspite of these peculiar contacts and cognitions.

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In What Sense is Nyāya Realist? (Third Round): Response to Professor Prahlada Char

In an earlier submission I had tried to dispel the worry expressed by Professor Daya Krishna that Nyāya may not be realist because it does not draw a sense-reference distinction (see 'Why Nyāya Remains Realist: Second Round', this journal). Now that Professor Prahlada Char has responded to Professor Daya Krishna's deeper worry that because of their universal knowability thesis Nyāya may not deserve to be called realist, I wish to make my position on this clearer.

The usual response: that Nyāya does not insist that all that exists be actually known but only that it be knowable, does not really cut any ice. Nyāya cannot draw such modal distinctions between actual and possible knowing with a straight face (many of us suspect, with no embarrassment, that Nyāya has no room for the concept of unactualized possibilities). There are at least two senses in which all things are indeed actually known in Nyāya. First, as Prahlada Char shows, everything is actually known to God.

Secondly, a certain undetailed generic knowledge of all things is possessed by all of us ordinary mortals through our grasp of the universal reality (*sattā jāti*) with which everything is somehow connected. When we perceive that universal, through it, via the non-normal perceptual link called 'connection through a universal feature' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) we are even perceptually put in touch with all that is real. All

reals are, thus, in one aspect, known to us. In this regard I would mildly protest (contra Professor Prahlada Char) that even the imperceptible qualities of the soul such as dharma, adharma and saṃskāra are not necessarily unknown to us though they are necessarily unperceived. When I infer from a successful realling of a past event that in the intervening period I have had a memory-trace of it, or when because of my commitment to the Karma theory, I infer from any suffering that I must have had a demerit stored in my soul, I come to know the saṁskara or the adharma, or at least that there exists some trace or demerit which has caused this memory or suffering, though I can never perceive them or be acquainted with them.

In any case, I need not admit that a quality of my soul has to remain unknown to me in order to prove that I am a realist about such qualities. All I have to admit is that its existence does not depend upon or consist in my knowing of it. Prahlada Char is aware of this since he goes on to say that such occurrent qualities as cognition and pleasure/pain of the self, even when introspectively known by the subject are not related to our knowledge of them as the idealist thinks they are. Unfortunately, while making this point in the eighth paragraph of his discussion-note, respected Prahlada Char commits what I take to be a slight error. He concedes that Nyāya regards awareness and pleasure etc. to be totally knowledge-dependent or '*jñātaika-sat*', that they cannot exist unperceived.

This is not correct. Since Nyāya rejects the Prabhakara or Buddhist doctrine of the necessary self-aware character of awareness, in the very first moment of its origination both cognition and pleasure/pain do remain unknown. Indeed, as far as cognition is concerned, if one gets cognitively busy, distracted or otherwise pre-occupied one may never have the apperceptive *anuvyavasāya* after a particular perceptual cognition. One may simply fall asleep immediately after one has had a cognition. A *nirvikalpaka* cognition, for instance, never gets introspectively known. So it is not simply true in Nyāya that cognitions cannot exist without being known. Pleasures and pains are very much attention-grabbing (*tīvra-saṃvegi*) hence they routinely are registered as soon as they occur. But even for them it is logically possible that pleasure should occur without awareness of pleasure, at least for an initial moment and that one could fail to know the pain of the terminal moment of ones life because one did not live for the next moment to claim that pain cognitively: remember pain and knowledge of pain are distinct in Nyāya just as anything and knowledge of that thing

are. Yet all those missed pieces of knowledge, pleasure, pain, traces, merits and demerits that are unknown to me are actually known to God.

How, then, does Nyāya maintain its realism, its rejection of the idealist thesis that the existence of things depends upon or consists in our cognition of them? To explain that let me first set up an analogy. In a certain garden, each and every blossom may have a bee on top of it. It may, in fact, be impossible to find a blossom without a bee. But that would not incline us to suppose that the flowers in that garden are immanent to the bee, or bee-dependent. Analogously, every object in this world may be known and knowable (by, literally, God knows who). Yet not all objects need to be knowledge-dependent. In order for a flower to be a flower there need not be a bee on it. In order for an object to be that object, it need not be recognized or known by anyone. This world may be created by God—in some peculiar non-Christian Nyāya sense, and God may keep constant track of every bit of this world, but the items of this world are not dreamt up by God or imagined by Him. If they are really made to exist then they are accessible to but independent of even God's knowledge.

At this point, perhaps another distinction would help. We could distinguish between two kinds of cognition-dependence: causal and recognitional. An event or object is causally knowledge-dependent if it could not come into being without some knowledge-episode (not necessarily knowledge of that event or object) coming into existence first. True pleasure, for instance, is causally knowledge-dependent. I cannot be truly pleased by a perfume unless I first have perceptual knowledge of it. But notice that the knowledge upon which the pleasure depends for its existence is not knowledge of the pleasure.

A state or event or object is recognitionally knowledge-dependent if it could not exist unless it is recognized as existing by a piece of knowledge of that very state or event or object. A pleasure, according to Nyāya, is not recognitionally knowledge-dependent. Anumiti or inferential cognition, similarly is causally knowledge dependent but not recognitionally so. Unless we have knowledge of the pervasion and of the *sādhya-pervaded hetu's* existence in the *pakṣa*, inference cannot happen. But in order for the inference to exist in a mind, that mind need not be aware of that inference. And the point is that even when introspectively one is aware that one is inferring or has inferred, the inference and ones meta-cognition of the inference remain distinct. Together, yet distinct. Or better, together, hence distinct. Nyāya has a similar view about numbers. Without a certain

kind of counting cognition called '*apekṣābuddhi*' numbers do not come into being, but my perception of the number is distinct from this *apekṣābuddhi*. That is why I can be wrong in counting a hundred coins. If my cognition of number and the number were the same then whenever I would count hundred there would actually arise the number hundred in the relevant collection. But that is not Nyāya's view. Numbers are *apekṣā-buddhi-janya* and therefore causally cognition-dependent but are not recognitionally so, and that's why one could miscount.

In terms of this distinction, now I can state the view that Nyāya takes of the relation between truth and knowledge also, since the concept of truth as Prāmāṇya—a property only of cognitions, has also confused people about Nyāya's claim to be realist.

Just as the sweetness of a candy cannot exist without the candy, truth of a particular cognition cannot exist without the existence of that cognition. Remember that truth, even as a property of cognitions, is *not* an eternal natural kind or '*jāti*'.

Thus truth is causally knowledge-dependent. But a true awareness need not be known, let alone known to be true in order to be a true awareness. A distinct piece of inference from pragmatic success may certify the original awareness to have been true. But neither the original awareness nor its truth is dependent upon this separate recognition of truth. Thus truth is not recognitionally knowledge-dependent.

Udayana defines knowability, in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, as: 'the property of being related to some knowledge by the relation of causal generatorship'. X is knowable to the extent that X can or does causally generate knowledge of X. This precludes the possibility of X consisting of knowledge of X insofar as nothing can cause itself. The knowledge-independence of an object is most clearly appreciated when that object is known, because it is then that, in our utter externalist orientation, we manage to notice the object while not noticing our own knowledge of it. We do not need unknowability or finding a single unknown object in order to demonstrate knowledge-independence of objects.

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Comments on Professor Prahlada Char's Observations on the Question Whether Nyāya is Realist or Idealist*

Professor Prahlada Char's observations mainly concern the Nyāya concept of *jñeyatva* ('knowability') and the Vijñānavādin-Advaitin view of the external world, more specially the former. Since I have already dealt with the issue in some of its important aspects in my submission 'Nyāya Realism: Some Reflections' (*JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, January–April 1997, pp. 138–55), I will here content myself with making just a couple of comments on Professor Prahlada Char's remarks.

1. It is not wholly clear what Professor Char wishes to be taken as meaning when, after referring to the Nyāya distinction between 'internal' and 'external' objects, he says: 'These external objects are always *jñeya* in the sense [that] they are objects of *some* knowledge by the moment by which they come [in] to existence.' (Emphasis mine.) Does 'some knowledge' here mean knowledge by human beings or by all (knowing) creatures whether human or non-human or such knowledge as God's? It is easy to see that as we ask this, the concept of 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*) acquires a complication not generally foreseen. If the concept of 'knowability' covers God's knowledge too, as might be held by some, then what sense can the phrase 'by the time by which they come [in] to existence' mean, since by definition God's eternal knowledge (*nitya buddhi*) is free from any vestige of temporality which the said phrase implies. Also, God, in terms of His omniscience, already knows which objects are to come into existence and which not. On the other hand, if non-human creaturely knowledge is also included in the concept, then we will have to assume that the objects, by the time they come into being, are necessarily known by one creature or another. All this may embarrass the Naiyāyika. Not only this, the allied concept of 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) will pose its own problems when extended to God's knowledge or animal knowledge. Will God first know and then name the objects or do so simultaneously or not name them at all feeling there is no need to do so? Again, how will the concept of 'nameability' fare as regards the knowing animals? In view of these difficulties it seems plausible to hold that the notion of 'knowability' has its proper application only with respect to finite human beings. But if human beings can possess only finite knowledge

*I am grateful to the Editor for inviting me to write these comments.

(*anitya buddhi*), then the possibility that every time in the entire universe an object comes into existence, there is a human being around to know it seems very remote indeed. The only alternative is not to insist that objects come to be known by one or another at the time of their existence but to regard them as 'capable of being known' at any time after their arrival: they are always possible objects of knowledge. This at once clinches the issue—something which is explicitly admitted by Prahlada Char also—namely, that objects can exist even without being known by anybody. God's knowledge is thus simply not in question in the context.

I may here add that on the Nyāya view God too is an object of (inferential) knowledge. And it cannot be anybody's case that God during His entire existence has to be known by one or the other finite human being: there may be times when there is no human around to know Him.

2. In his remarks on the Advaitin position, Professor Prahlada Char appears to make the mistake of conflating two points of view—that of the individual subject and that of (generally speaking) the whole race of thinking beings. In an individual's misperception of (e.g.) a rope for a snake, the snake-appearance is of course private to him, but not so the (snake-) world in its condition of differentiation and separation as it appears to almost the whole of humanity. In the latter case the world-appearance has the status of an inter-subjectively confirmable 'phenomenal' reality and forms, unlike private illusions, a stable and orderly system of objects. And as an Advaitin would add, the world and its objects, to the extent they are known and felt to be external and independent of our knowing of them, are indeed external and independent. Any number of texts from Śaṅkara's own writings can be cited in support of the above contention, including not in the least his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* 2.2.28–31. Of course, presentation of the world in its character of plurality and differentiation is, in *final* terms, an illusion having its source in a fundamental error. But it does not affect its externality and independence *so long as* it is an experienced fact. In Yogācāra (-Vijñānavāda), on the other hand, this externality and independence itself is under question and is dismissed as a make-belief: a cognition does not point to anything outside itself. Of course, there is an apparent talk, in the latter school, of 'objects', but it is of 'object-form' (*viṣayābhāsa*) which the cognition assumes and not of objects external to and independent of our cognitions, no difference having been recognized between cognitions and (broadly speaking) their contents.[1] But, I may add as a needed codicil, nothing can appear as if it were

external if there was nothing really external somewhere. (This at least seems to be the teaching of common intuition.) And Śaṅkara duly provides for it in his scheme of things, being aware that externality as a felt fact needs to be accounted for. As he puts it in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.28: *na hi viṣṇumitro vandhyāputravadavabhāsata iti kaścidācakṣīta*. All this is of course common knowledge. Still I felt there was perhaps no harm if things were briefly put in their perspective.

3. Professor Prahlada Char's remarks such as: 'As per the idealists, the object of a cognition has existence so long [as] the cognition has existence. The moment the cognition ceases to exist, the object also ceases to exist' are also, so far as at least the Advaitin is concerned, open to objection. The Advaitin not only holds that so long as there is an external world all knowledge of it is intentional or object-oriented, but also that the world or its objects do not cease to be with the cessation of our knowledge of it or them. The Advaitin position *here* coincides, I suspect, with the Nyāya standpoint. In Śaṅkara and Advaita in general, the objects of knowledge generally are, unlike in the Yogācāra school, transcendent. As Śaṅkara concludes part of the discussion under *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.28: *tasmādarthajñānayor bhedaḥ*.

Note and Reference

1. To exposit a little, the Yogācāra doctrine in the main holds that a cognition possesses (splits itself into) a two-fold appearance: the appearance of an object (*viṣayābhāsa, grāhyākāra*) and that of itself as subject (*svābhāsa, grāhakākāra*), so that knowledge of an object is nothing else than the awareness of the cognition itself (*sva-saṁvitti*). Consequently, what is called an 'object' is really seen as immanent in the cognition and not transcendent, as it is in certain realistic schools.

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'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?' Comments on Professor Prahlada Char's Observations on the Issue

I am in broad agreement with Prahlada Char's observations on the above issue which has been discussed threadbare by many including myself. But

I would have liked the professor to have been more circumspect in some of his remarks and more emphatic in some others. For example I would strongly object to the characterization of Śaṅkara's Advaita as idealistic by Prahlada Char. In the Tarkapāda section of his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtras, Śaṅkara almost pooh-poohs the idealistic doctrine of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins. In view of this it would be almost irrational to treat Sankara's own philosophy as idealistic. No doubt it is true that the ultimate reality according to Śaṅkara is the unity of truth, bliss and consciousness but on this account it would be as inappropriate to regard Advaita as idealistic as to regard it as hedonistic or realistic. The only proper way to regard this doctrine is to treat it as what its very appellation means, viz. 'non-dualistic'. Neither any dualism like that of the real and the ideal nor even a monism of the idealist type has place in Śankara's Advaita.

Next, the one-sidedness of the necessity of the relation holding between cognition and its objects needs more emphatically to be brought out than is done in Prahalada Char's note. All cognition is necessarily the cognition of its object. An objectless cognition is a contradiction in terms but objects can very well remain uncognized throughout their existence or be cognized at one time and remain uncognized at another. This shows that the association between cognition and its object is necessary only for cognition because without its object cognition becomes formless. The object on the other hand is what it is on its own account, not because of its fleeting association with any cognition. If the object acquired its form from its cognition then, it would change from one cognition to another cognizing it, with the result that it would forfeit its very identity. Idealists maintain almost this very fact. According to them the form supposed to belong to the object is not its own. It is conferred on the object by cognition or perhaps the object with the form is nothing other than the cognition itself. As the Buddhist idealist Dharmakīrtī says, the internally experienced entity which is cognition externalizes itself and appears as an object to itself.

About the property, 'Jñeyatva' what Prahalada Char says is not wrong but it is neither very enlightening nor sufficient, 'Jñeyatva', is a Sanskrit term usually taken in the sense of 'the property of being a known entity'. Nyāya regards this property as 'Kevalānvayi' which means 'universal'. Everything is supposed to be endowed with this property because individually or generically every real thing can be regarded as known to

somebody or other. The brontosaurus for example is not known individually to anybody, but as an animal of gigantic size it may be supposed to be known to those who have heard this description of it. Such unavoidable knownness of everything is trotted out by Daya Krishna as an argument in support of the view that Nyāya is idealist. This argument is not met squarely by Prahalada Char although what he says about the variability of the relation of an object to its cognition is quite true. The fact is that there is a catch in the word 'Jñeya' which needs to be taken note of. The word precisely means 'that which is knowable' (which may or may not be known). The meaning 'that which is known' is however indiscriminately associated with this word. The universality of Jñeyatva is maintained by Nyāya mainly in the sense of 'everything being endowed by the property of knowability,' on the ground that all the different means of knowledge are definitely known. So whatever is real must be accessible to one or other means of knowledge that are known. Even if a thing may remain totally unknown throughout its existence and even thereafter, it can be treated as knowable if someone cared to use the right means of knowledge to know it. But simply because everything is accessible to the means of knowledge it cannot be treated as of idealistic character. Can everything be treated as of volitional or emotional character because it is desired or felt by somebody or other?

Knownness to God is another universal property that is regarded such because God is omniscient but God is omnipotent and omnivolent too. So 'being willed and wished by God' could also be treated as universal properties. The epistemic relation of everything to God's knowledge, will and wish may be regarded as necessary because these are viewed by Nyāya as the ultimate causes of everything. The western philosopher Berkeley advocated a direct and necessary epistemic relation between divine knowledge and the being of things. Such an extreme view of thing's nature cannot but lead to some kind of idealism. But Nyāya does not at all subscribe to such a view. It is true that unlike the relation of things to their common cognition their relation to God's knowledge is necessary. Despite this fact, things cannot be treated as ideal in nature. There are several reasons for this. First, if depending upon God's knowledge things become ideal in nature then it is omniscience that will have to be treated as the universal property of things. Second, things depend upon God's will and wish too so that they will have to have even volitional and emotional nature. Third, it may be maintained that only the existence of things

depends upon God's knowledge, not the being of things, because being is generic universal and it is regarded as eternal by Nyāya.

One final point, which was rather insufficiently dealt with in my own rejoinder published earlier, is this. There is an important difference not usually noticed between the relation of cognition to its object and the relation of the same object to the cognition. The former relation constitutes the very being of the cognition which is intrinsically 'the cognition of its object'. The relationship forms part and parcel of the nature of cognition. It is quite otherwise with the latter relation. The object remains related epistemically with its cognition so long as the cognition lasts. With the disappearance of the cognition the relation too disappears. The relation is only a relational property that the object temporarily acquires as a result of being apprehended by its cognition. This difference may best be illustrated by means of a simple example. A 'son' is always the progeny of his parents. So, 'being born of his parents' can be regarded as an essential property of the son. But this relationship to his parents cannot be supposed to constitute the very being of the son because the son is not just a son. He is a human being endowed with a psychophysical nature. Relationship to his parents is only a property of him.

It may be noted in this connection that cognition and absence or abhāva are two entities among the different entities listed by Nyāya which are intrinsically relational. Like cognition absence too is relational. An absence is always the absence of something which helps define the nature of the absence just as the object of cognition helps define the nature of its cognition. 'Being born of certain parents,' does certainly help define the nature of a son but as explained above the son is not just a son. His essential being consists in his psychophysical individuality.

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On Notes by Professor Rajendra Prasad: Can a Niṣkāma Karma Have Really No Effect?

Apparently Professor Prasad's Notes on 'Can a Niṣkāma Karma have really no effect', appears relevant but if we view the concept of niṣkama

karma in the constitution of the Gītā, several questions arise against Professor Prasad's observations made in his notes. Let me first summarize Professor Prasad's basic assumptions for further observation.

1. That niṣkāma karma is a cause and, thus, would produce an empirical effect and, hence, it can not be taken different from moral actions.
2. That desire is subjective and there is no proof to know that ones action is niṣkāma (desireless).
3. That it is a prescription and a prescription that cannot be acted upon would naturally become defunct.

According to the Gītā, niṣkāma karma (disinterested actions) can be performed in two ways. First, by considering oneself as a divine agent unconcerned with fruits which are not assigned to him (*nimittamātra bhavārjunaḥ*). Secondly, by spontaneity, of the wise or realizer, which is assigned as ones own true nature. Taking the former, in view, the issues raised there in Professor Prasad's notes seem worth considering while from the latter view it seems right to say that these assumptions of Professor Prasad are the result of his infatuation with moral cause-effect theory and can be reverted by placing the true position of the concept of niṣkāma karma.

To begin with the former view it can be said that it is easier to practice desireless actions by putting oneself in a position of an agent but for that reason his actions cannot be included among those causes effectuating moral effects because desires for such effects or such effects themselves are not the motivating factor in that case. Even the desire for practicing desireless actions may be taken as the motivating factor but for that reason desireless action may not be accepted as producing some moral effect because such a motivation is not for a moral effect.

In this presentation I have emphasized the latter view of niṣkāma karma for which the Gītā is a philosophy of realization of all is spirit and niṣkāma karma is the action of spirit and that is the only way for a doer to free himself from the circle of birth and death earned by desirous actions consequential to merits and demerits. With this preliminary note let us examine Professor Prasad's assumptions.

So far as the first assumption is concerned, as we say that there is no harm if we try to understand the concept of niṣkāma karma in view of cause–effect relation. In that case it may be accepted as a cause—a distinguished cause effectuating a distinguished effect. The Gītā means to

say that niṣkāma karma leads to redemption from the bonds of birth and death. But can we take niṣkāma karma as a cause similar to one effectuating moral effects and can redemption be taken as the effect similar to moral effects? Absolutely not. Because neither is niṣkāma karma a karma similar to an ordinary karma prompted by a desire and effort that effectuate an effect, moral or religious, nor is the liberation a position that requires desires and efforts for actions. Spontaneity is recommended by the text as the nature of the action of a liberated (*sthitaprajñya*). Spontaneous actions are defined as those in which there is involvement neither of any desire nor of any effort but as natural flow of consciousness of a *Niṣkāma karmī/sthitaprajñya*. As both of the concepts of the niṣkāma karma and of the niṣkāma karmī are different from moral actions, their effects and the doer neither of the two can be put in the same category of moral actions and their doer respectively. All desirous actions produce result, good or bad, to be enjoyed by the doer in this life and the life-after. According to the Gītā if one performs meritorious actions one earns merit on the basis of which one enjoys heaven and in case of evil one gets demerit and accordingly enjoys hell. Ultimately, after enjoying merits/demerits in heaven/hell, one has to be back in this world of birth and death (*kṣiṇe puṇye martyalokamaviśanti*, *Gītā* 9/21).

Unlike desirous actions there is no fear of earning merit or demerit by niṣkāma karma because of the reason that there is neither any desire nor any effort involved in those actions which according to the *Gītā* are neither an action of an unconscious person or unconscious action itself nor an effortful purposive action producing merits or demerits, but are natural flow (*vaibhavam*) of the spirit.

So far as the second assumption of Professor Prasad is concerned, it may well be mentioned here that the consciousness of a liberated one, for whom the niṣkāma karma is assigned as nature of soul, is beyond the subjective and objective world of ours and that to whom the question of subjective and objective, which is applicable only to test the validity of our empirical knowledge, is not applicable properly. The knowledge is self-veridical and one can test their validity by observing the nature of their actions different from his own also. The Gītā maintains the difference of the knowledge and action of a person with the sense of duality and desires and that of with a sense of unity and desirelessness in which the former is the case of moral-world with rational justifications and proofs while the latter transcends the bonds of morality. Here, it is necessary to

clarify that the Gītā does not mean that a niṣkāma karmī overlooks the merits of moral and immoral actions but that his actions, being natural flow of spirit, cannot be estimated by the criteria of being moral and immoral. These flows may be interpreted as moral or immoral but for the greater cause of establishing spontaneity as the nature operating creation, preservation and destruction as the universe, they are sports of the disinterested Krishna for the well-being of the universe (*Na me pārthā asti kartavyam triṣulokeṣu kincana. Nānavāptamavāptavyam varteva ca karmaṇi. Gītā 3/22*; see also 3/25).

The question as to how do we know that a person is non-desirous in his performances can significantly be asked. A person is known to be desirous by the action he performs. Here the desire-ness is inferred on the basis of perception of action done according to the desire. This is not the case with the actions performed by one who transcends the world of desire and non-desire. The question of differentiating, male and female and others implied, does not arise for those who have transcended the difference of bodies and realize the same spirit in all. Professor Prasad is right in saying that only he can know and not others about the desirelessness of his actions but his statement has superficially to do with correct position of verity of omniscience. However one can very well infer desirelessness of a niṣkāma karmī by observing the luminosity (*karmaṣu kauśalam*) of truth and beauty flowing from his soul as dynamism of spirit, the all-pervading Being. As these actions are determined neither by any desire, interest, purpose nor by other determinants, there is no fear of dropping off those actions in any adverse circumstances (*pratyavāyo na vidyate, Gītā* 2/40). Not only that but what a niṣkāma karmī does is followed up by the world as a proven way to the welfare (*sa yatpramāṇam kurute lokastadanuvartate, Gītā* 3/21).

In view of the third and the last assumption of Professor Prasad it can be said that niṣkāma-karma is not a prescription that cannot be acted upon and hence defunct but it, in the Gītā, is a spontaneous flow or overwhelming of the spirit of a niṣkāma karmī and, hence, it is natural action assigned to the spirit and not purposive. It is important here to note that the Gītā, unlike Śānkara-Vedānta, accepts natural/spontaneous actions of a *Jivana mukta* (liberated self) as its very nature and thus provides dynamism with the concept of it. It is dynamic and not static. As a *Jivana mukta*, in the Gītā, is *āptakāma*, *ātmārāma* and *Parama niṣkāma*, the question of any desire, to be fulfilled by actions motivated by those desires, does not arise in its case. Conclusively it can be said that niṣkāma karma is not a karma, as it is ordinarily taken, but natural flow of the spirit. As there is no desire, no purpose to be fulfilled by efforts, the question of 'ought implies can' does not arise significantly in case of the concept of niṣkama karmī and for that reason niṣkāma karma cannot be taken void. Niṣkāma karma is the natural flow of the niṣkāma karmī and this flow is not motivated by desire or by any effect and, hence, not only the charge of it as void is void but any attempt to include it in the field of morality is also void.

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Reply to Dr. Rajendra Prasad's Note Entitled 'Can a Nishkama Karma Have Really No Effects?' in *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January–March 2001, p. 242

A little bit of hermeneutical exercise and a correlation between two dominant theories of 'cosmic vision' (vishvarupadarsna) and 'motiveless action' (nishkama karma) would be inevitable if one were to meet the challenge which Dr. Rajendra Prasad has posed to modern writers on classical Indian philosophy. The theory of vishvarupa, which Krishna wants Arjuna to capture in the *Bhagavadgīta* and which is deterministic in its essence, maintains that the entire cosmic process has for its dynamics and organization Krishna, Purushottama or God himself. Nothing in the cosmic process would therefore fall outside the ultimate and absolute divine agency, transcendental to and engineering each one of its constituents. Vishvarupadarsana is delivered by Krishna to Arjuna in order to convey to the latter that he (Arjuna) is a tool or an instrument of Brahman (the total Reality), which Krishna personifies. Arjuna, like any individual, lies embedded in the cosmic system which is pre-set and pre-determined by Brahman. So far as the self-expression of Brahman is concerned, one has to watch it in the unfolding of cosmic history, the unfolding of the cosmos in history, the spirit of the history being Krishna or God himself.

The deterministic philosophy implicit in the metaphor of cosmic vision in the *Bhagavadgīta* is like the deterministic view put forth in the physicalist

and materialist theory of human consciousness so widely prevalent in the so-called 'Consciousness Studies' today. This deterministic philosophy, upheld by some of the eminent neuroscientists in the study of consciousness (such as, Daniel Dennett, Patricia Smith Churchland, Bernard Baars, Francis Crick, B. Libet, to name a few), states that the micro units of our brain—the neurons—possess chemical, physiological, biological properties which have been thrown up by the whole cosmic evolutionary process over which the only control that prevails is of the laws of nature. We are thus the products of this evolutionary drama and our decision-making, thinking, perceiving, imagining, feeling, desiring, and all other so-called 'mental' acts are given rise to by the basic neuronal networks within our brain. This 'scientific' knowledge is commensurate to the Brahmanjnāna (the knowledge of Reality) Krishna offers to Arjuna. Thus Arjuna is told that whatever his actions, motivated (sakāma) or motiveless (nishkāma), their real source or *raison d'être* is not he (Arjuna) himself but Krishna or God or Brahman (the creator of Time, History, Matter and Consciousness). There is no reason, Krishna appears to convey to Arjuna by means of the deterministic philosophy of vishvarupadarsana, why the latter should be tied to the 'moral effect' of his acts. The real authorship of Arjuna's acts, Krishna suggests to him, does not go to him (Arjuna) but to omniscient Krishna. Why should Arjuna's heart, Krishna seems to argue, carry the burden of having done right or wrong when he is made to do what he does by the ultimate and absolute divine power (by the 'neuronal firings' or 'neuronal oscillations', to use physicalists' terminology) and be responsible for the fruits of his acts which may emerge in this life or in the next life?

Vishvarupadarsana is, in the physicalist and materialist language of some of the pioneer researchers in 'Consciousness Studies', the vision one can be expected to have about the functioning of the neuronal networks at the foundation of human (mental) behaviour, all of these networks are not fully mapped out so far. This does not indeed mean that Arjuna is not aware of his freedom to fight or not to fight, but this awareness, Krishna tries to convince him, results from his abhimāna, i.e., his self-esteem, which for Krishna is the consequence of his naiveté or lack of Brahmanjnāna. Even this self-esteem, or/and naiveté, would result from certain types of neuronal firings.

Hermeneutically speaking, Krishna wants Arjuna to develop an attitude toward himself, toward his role in the Mahabhārata war, and realize the

fact that it is not he (Arjuna) who is the final maker of history. Arjuna is told by Krishna (God) that he is just an 'occasion' (nimittamātra) devised by Krishna for the fulfilment of a schema whose creator and energizer is Krishna himself.

Dr. Prasad's retort 'why does a nishkama karma not have a moral effect, does not seem to have been raised in the Indian philosophical tradition, what to speak of its having been satisfactorily, or even half-satisfactorily, answered' would lose its sharpness when one would observe that only a free action would invite a moral effect, and that the Brahmanjnāna which Krishna delivers to Arjuna would expect him to realize that as a part and parcel of the divine schema he is bound to act, not out of freedom but out of some sort of supernatural order. 'You are not the originator of history, Arjuna. You should abandon the pride that you are able to make it or unmake it. Do not be gleeful if the results of your acts take place as anticipated by you and do not be sorrowful if they go against your anticipations,' Krishna's advice to Arjuna, who according to Krishna a know-nothing like any one of us, would be.

Dr. Prasad's second and third points may overtly appear to be of psychological nature but they are discernible from the notion of cosmic vision (vishvarupadarsana). Surely, so far as the psychological truth is concerned, it is difficult to imagine that there could be a 'desireless' or 'motiveless' action. As Dr. Prasad points out, a desire in certain cases would be unconscious, or unknown to the agent of the action, or the agent could dwell in self-deception. However, whatever the status of the desire, if the agent who has developed the attitude of interpreting himself and his existence in the world as a result of his having captured the cosmic vision, or from the deterministic paradigm emanating from his adherence to physicalism or materialism according to which all the neuronal networks must be unfolded if one were to comprehend oneself and ones decisions, he would be convinced of his instrumentality in relation to the order of nature. With such knowledge, one would have to only surrender to the circumstances (as Krishna would advise Arjuna to surrender to the divine order) without being pre-occupied with the desire or motive or goal of his actions. He should thus be called a niskāma karmī, because with the death of his abhimāna, or of the sense of authorship, or of the ego, he would act with the desire or motive in him lying absolutely still. This is an ideal state (called by the *Bhagavadgīta* the sthita-prajna state) that would result from a person's being convinced that he is merely a speck in the entire

cosmic wheel, or, to use the language of physicalists and materialists in 'Consciousness Studies', a system neurophysiologically, neurobiologically and neurochemically pre-set by nature and its laws.

Arjuna is not free *not* to fight the war, just as any given person is not free to conduct himself in a way which is *not* prescribed by the neuronal make-up of his. The *Bhagavadgita* has extremely thoughtfully woven within it a determinism which is anchored in theism; the physicalists, materialists and naturalists have woven within their study of the neuronal chart of human beings a determinism whose final frame of reference is the complexity of nature.

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Why Inner Phenomena Are a Myth: A Response to Professors Sinari and Pradhan

I am grateful to Professor Sinari and Professor Pradhan for responding so promptly to my reply.[1] To take Professor Sinari's paper first: I found much of Professor Sinari's first response unintelligible and I am in the same position with regard to the second. Unfortunately, the Merleau-Ponty kind of language does not make sense to me and much of the paper is written in that vein. However, I will respond to those parts with which I can engage.

First, some major misunderstandings should be cleared up. Professor Sinari thinks I want to replace 'consciousness-language' (words such as 'intending', 'desiring', 'boredom', 'feeling', 'disposition', 'knowing', 'wanting', 'deciding') with function words. This is not the case. What I said was that such words *are* function words; they do not designate inner entities or phenomena. In their second and third person use, they evaluate behaviour. For example, a man who has lost his child sits by himself with a particular kind of expression, saying very little and we say 'he is depressed'. In their first person use, they are expressions. For example, an adult says 'I am in pain' when a child would cry. An adult tells a shopkeeper 'I want that shirt' whereas a child picks up an object it is interested in. It is not at all a question of replacing these words with something else.

How could Professor Sinari suppose that I think that *I* have succeeded in dissolving 'mental events', 'consciousness states', 'self-consciousness', etc.? It has been a commonplace of Anglo-Saxon philosophical psychology for decades that such words have no referent. He also asks how consciousness language has survived and grown through human history. The answer is that without these evaluations and avowals, there is no normal human life.

In what follows, I shall focus on two closely related passages in Professor Sinari's paper in order to bring out the contradictions in his approach.[2] Professor Sinari, like myself, is prepared to put writing an essay and brushing ones teeth in the same category but there is a fundamental difference between us. He raises the question of

> ... consciousness's directedness to different acts, the motivated thinking aimed at distinct anticipated results. The paraphernalia of brushing one's teeth, if dissected into minute individual activities (the picking up of the toothbrush, the spreading of a certain quantity of toothpaste on it, the moving of the brush over the teeth, etc.) surely hides an answer to the question 'Why should I brush my teeth?' just as writing a paper with all the skill that is seen to be essential for making its reading effective would conceal an answer to the question 'Why do I or should I compose this paper?' What coordinates the two distinct mental engagements is the meaning or meanings the agent bestows on them. The meaning-bestowal is an essential event without which neither of the two performances could be understood.[3]

Professor Sinari seems to treat 'mental engagements', 'consciousness's directedness to different acts', 'motivated thinking aimed at distinct anticipated results' and 'meaning-bestowals' as synonymous terms. In that case, as in his previous paper, his language makes too many specifications. He thinks that for brushing ones teeth, for writing an essay, for all purposeful activity, prior ontologically real inner acts are necessary. For the sake of convenience, let us call these acts of meaning-bestowal and ignore the other labels.

We could say that all behaviour is meaning-laden but this would be a grammatical point. If an action is not meaning-laden (e.g. sneezing) we would not call it behaviour. But Professor Sinari is going far beyond this. He claims that an individual cannot brush his teeth unless a prior, ontologically real inner phenomenon takes place—an act of meaning-

bestowal. His past training alone is not sufficient. Let us examine this concept more closely.

First of all, is the individual aware of the act? Professor Sinari's language in places suggests that he is, but this is quite impossible if the inner phenomenon is a necessary condition for the behaviour, for it is clear that we do brush our teeth without noticing such a phenomenon. So if it is a necessary condition, if it must happen and always does happen, it must be something hidden and Professor Sinari also hints contradictorily that it is hidden ('*hides* an answer'). Let us assume that it is hidden. How would Professor Sinari describe its content? I think his answer would be some such as the following: there is an act of meaning-bestowal to the effect that one must brush ones teeth because it is disgusting not to do so. But this propositional content simply restates the meaning of the training the individual has received. If some content is given which does not do this, the logical connection with the ensuing behaviour will be lost. This suggests that the act of meaning-bestowal has no true existence, that it is a redundant fiction. Even Professor Sinari will have to agree that the prior training is necessary, that by itself the act of meaning-bestowal is insufficient. But the foregoing argument suggests that the act of meaning-bestowal is redundant, and that the previous training is not just a necessary condition but also a sufficient one. Even if, in spite of the foregoing, we grant the act, we could have no conception of how the act brings about the behaviour in question and, incidentally, of how it may fail to do so. There is the problem, an old one in philosophy, of the incompatibility of domains: how can an immaterial phenomenon produce a change of *behaviour*? Some kind of causal mechanism seems to be envisaged, but since we have absolutely no conception of how it works, the suggestion is empty.

This suggestion of a causal mechanism leads on to an important consideration. Both Professor Sinari and Professor Pradhan appear to think that denying the ontological reality of inner states involves reducing human beings to the status of robots but the invocation of a hidden causal mechanism to explain behaviour has this very tendency. The idea that a mechanism of which the individual is unaware can determine his rational behaviour is inconsistent with the notion of rational behaviour, it undermines the individual's status as a conscious agent, it turns him into a robot.[4] Moreover, if it is a case of a hidden causal mechanism, it will not matter whether the content of the inner phenomenon has a logical

relationship with the previous training and the subsequent behaviour. This matters only if the content is something the actor is aware of, if it gives him a reason for acting in a particular way. What the content actually is remains wholly unclear, as also how it guarantees the result. Perhaps Professor Sinari will now want to substitute a physiological process for the propositional content but how do we make the transition from a physiological process to rational behaviour? And it would then no longer be a question of a *psychic* phenomenon. What all this means is that Professor Sinari is caught between a non-existent overt process and a redundant and unworkable hidden one.

The fact of the matter is that the individual has a reason for brushing his teeth: it is unclean not to do so; his previous training has taught him that. Nothing is gained by invoking a mediating mechanism, particularly one that seems to be unable to deliver the result.

If substantive acts of meaning-bestowal are necessary for purposeful behaviour to happen, would we not have a population explosion in the mind? Professor Sinari does not want to multiply his acts. In the case of brushing ones teeth, he thinks that one act of meaning-bestowal will be sufficient. But this is not a logical limit. As he himself notes, brushing ones teeth consists of minute individual acts. Each of these acts could be said to answer a purpose and therefore to require a prior act of meaning-bestowal.

After this, Professor Sinari relapses into Merleau-Pontese and I cannot follow him for a while. He then takes up the theme of writing an essay. He writes:

> I wonder how Dr. Ramachandra is so sure that there is no mental image in the mind of the writer of what he is going to write in the form of meanings, nuances, pre-perceptions, in the form of an impulse to express himself. These meanings, nuances and pre-perceptions are causative in relation to what the writer writes.[5]

I am little puzzled by Professor Sinari's talk of 'mental image' in the form of meanings, nuances, pre-perceptions and impulses. A mental image is a representation in the mind of something (a face, an object) and does not lend itself to such a wide use. It seems that Professor Sinari should have written 'mental images, meanings, nuances, pre-perceptions (whatever they may be) and an impulse to write'. To keep the discussion manageable, I shall discuss only mental images, meanings and nuances

and by meanings and nuances, I shall assume that Professor Sinari means both unworded thoughts and worded thoughts, that is words we visualize in the mind or utter to ourselves in the imagination. As in the previous case, Professor Sinari is thinking of a double process: a deliberate action must be preceded by a prior inner event. But this time the relationship is stated explicitly to be a causal one and the individual is (almost certainly) supposed to be aware of the inner event.

As we saw earlier, there cannot be a causal relationship here. A causal relationship is a necessary relationship but we know from our everyday experience that we can write without noticing such things. Since we are supposed to be aware of the events, the option that they are happening offstage (as is apparently the case with meaning-bestowals) is ruled out. This certainly means that there need be no prior inner events.

Why cannot what we write just emerge out of the background? Of course, images, unworded thoughts and imagined words may also emerge. Contrary to what Professor Sinari says, I do not maintain that these cannot precede (or accompany or succeed) the words we write down. But they need not, and when they do, they have the same status as the words; they are on a par with them. Both emerge out of a background and there is no causal relationship between them. The background in this case is the writer's previous training and his grappling with the subject he is discussing.

Take the instance of a musician who is elaborating a raga. The notes arise out of the background of his previous training in music and in the raga, and his previous practise. It would be absurd to maintain that the musician rehearses each and every note beforehand in the imagination. Both in this case of writing an essay and in the previous one, Professor Sinari is overlooking a background. He probably finds it inconceivable that the words could just emerge out of a background, without a mediating mechanism, but why does he not feel this difficulty in the case of inner events?

Perhaps another notion is at work: that prior inner events explain what is written down, because what is written down is somehow contained in the prior inner events, as the tree is contained in the seed. But we realize that this idea too is a misconception when we examine it more closely. There is no logical connection between say, the image of a published paper, which may precede my writing the paper and what I actually write. Again, I may suddenly 'know what I want to write' (an unworded thought)

and I proceed to write, but what I write is not contained in the thought, it does not exist fully there in some form. Knowledge is not awareness; I am not aware, when I have the thought, of the words I subsequently write down. Or instead, I may visualize words in the mind and proceed to write but what I write need contain only some of the visualized words and may contain many new ones, or may even be totally different or contradict what I have imagined. Such things cannot happen if there is a causal relationship. It is quite certain that nobody can visualize a whole paper beforehand in the imagination, that we write down an enormous number of words, which we were not aware of before in our consciousness. It can also happen that I write down the very words I visualize but we cannot talk of a cause here because I am not *constrained* to write them down; I write them down because I have a reason to do so. This is quite apart from the fact that we cannot have *occasional* inner causes of outer events.[6]

Moreover, although inner events happen, they are not ontologically real processes. My mental image is an image of whoever I understand it to be an image of, my unworded thought is a thought of whatever I understand it to be a thought of, my imagined words are whatever I understand them to be. I do not come to know who my image is an image of by observing it, I do not read off the words I visualize by observing an inner process. What is imagined depends upon the will; it has no true existence.[7]

Unfortunately I could only understand parts of what Professor Sinari wrote after this. However I shall make a few points. Professor Sinari asks where and in what state are my perceptions about myself as a writer, philosopher etc. In other words, he assumes that views must be in a place. This is obviously not the case. He thinks that the existence of self-consciousness is self-evident but in that case how can there be a controversy about it? It is *not* self-evident. Professor Sinari thinks that our enquiring into self-consciousness is enough to prove that it exists. Actually my initial inquiry was into whether there was such a thing as self-consciousness but even enquiring into self-consciousness in the strict sense would not prove its existence, only that we assume that it exists. Professor Sinari says that feelings have to be possessed by some consciousness-locus if they are to be meaningful occurrences. I would put the matter in this way: feelings can be meaningfully ascribed only to conscious human beings and the higher animals. But 'conscious' here does not denote a substantive phenomenon. It refers to a capacity to have experiences and these

experiences are of things in the world. Does Professor Sinari think that by function language I mean the scientific language used to describe physical processes? His last but one paragraph suggests it. I repeat that by function language I mean our ordinary psychological language.

To turn now to Professor Pradhan's response: I found his paper to be elusive also but I shall respond as best I can. Professor Pradhan stands by his view that the later Wittgenstein believed in the reality of the self and presumably other mental phenomena, that he was, in effect, a Cartesian. If he is right, he has achieved a Copernican revolution in Wittgenstein scholarship. This is most unlikely, although it is not inconceivable. In the present piece, I shall avoid this question and focus instead on Professor Pradhan's criticisms of my views and his elaboration of his own position.

In the first section, entitled 'Consciousness is Real, not a Fiction', Professor Pradhan says that 'I', 'self' and other mentalistic words do not designate or name anything. But he also says they have the function of signifying mental phenomena.

> For example, the word 'consciousness' does not name an entity called consciousness, but it characterizes a certain phenomenon which consists in being aware of something, in perceiving something and so on.[8]

So the word 'consciousness' does not name an entity called 'consciousness' but it signifies or characterizes a certain phenomenon called 'consciousness'. The difference between 'naming' on the one hand and 'signifying' and 'characterizing' on the other is not clear to me because in all three cases something is being identified. Professor Pradhan also insists that consciousness is a phenomenon and not an entity, but I do not understand how one can have a phenomenon without an entity. A phenomenon is a process or an entity that is manifested and if it is a process, the process will involve an entity, just as a deed will involve a doer.

Professor Pradhan thinks that I am right in saying that

> ... consciousness includes seeing, knowing, believing, imagining, thinking, etc. But this is to admit that consciousness is something to be characterized as real, that is, there is something called consciousness.[9]

He would no doubt be right if mine was a statement like 'wood includes davidar, pine, teak, bamboo etc.' But my statement was akin to 'words like "but", "although", "however", etc. belong to the category of conjunction'; it was a statement about the functioning of the word

'consciousness' and from this one cannot infer that consciousness is an existent. Perhaps Professor Pradhan will want to say that the conjunction function is real but it is not ontologically real. For example, a red traffic light is ontologically real but not the function it performs.

Professor Pradhan takes up the case of being conscious of an apple that is before us:

> ... not only there is the apple but also there is something else and that is that we are conscious of the apple. The fact of being conscious of the apple is what is being characterized as real ... there is some mental state of perceiving the apple ... If being conscious of something is a matter of language alone, then why should we talk of conscious human beings at all or why should we have talk of conscious states at all? There should be no language of consciousness; there should be the language of apples only.[10]

The fact is that in everyday discourse, we talk of being conscious of the apple only in very special circumstances, e.g. when someone is coming out of a faint. Outside philosophical discourse, talk of 'conscious states' is hardly ever heard. We do talk of seeing the apple and philosophers' talk of being conscious of the apple can make sense only if it means seeing the apple. My point is that although Professor Pradhan wants to characterize being conscious of the apple as an ontologically real phenomenon, being conscious of the apple is equivalent to 'seeing the apple' and the seeing is not an ontologically real phenomenon. A phenomenon is something, which is manifested, which we can experience and describe. Why does Professor Pradhan not draw the right conclusion from his utter inability to experience or to describe 'seeing' or 'consciousness'? Obviously there is a difference between the apple existing and our seeing the apple and that is precisely why we use the expression 'seeing the apple' on the infrequent occasions when we need to mark the difference. 'Seeing' here has a function; it does not signify an independent phenomenon. Incidentally, Professor Pradhan's assertion that 'the fact of being conscious of the apple is what is being characterized as real' misuses the word 'real'; facts are true, not real.

Professor Pradhan asks why we should have talk of conscious states at all if being conscious is a matter of language alone. It is worth repeating that we ordinarily talk of conscious states only in special circumstances. We do talk of seeing, hearing, thinking, fearing, hoping etc. but how can

we avoid doing so? The patterns these words identify, the significances they express, are impossible to ignore; they are what human life is all about.

What Professor Pradhan has written in the rest of the paper is somewhat obscure to me but I will respond to some parts. He writes:

> Professor Ramachandra has a behaviourist strategy to deny there are conscious states at all except the characteristic behaviour associated with the mental words ... mental language is behaviour—descriptive rather than designative of any entity called mind. If the mind would have an ontological reality, it would have been something inner and private.[11]

How is this expression 'conscious states' being used? What I was denying was conscious states and entities with an immaterial composition. But Professor Pradhan's first sentence implies that I think behaviour is all there is, that is, there is no difference between human beings and robots that perform the same acts as human beings. This is not the case. Matter is all there is but matter can be living or non-living, and human beings, the most complex form of living matter, see, feel, think, find situations worrisome or reassuring, fall in love with other human beings and so on while robots do not. If this is what is meant by 'conscious states', if by such states we mean states of experience, we cannot deny them, but we should remind ourselves that consciousness or experience is always *of* something.

Professor Pradhan says that I think that mentalistic language is behaviour-descriptive rather than designative of an entity called mind but I do not think mentalistic language is behaviour-descriptive. A statement like 'he grew red in the face, shook his fist and threw the book at me' is behaviour-descriptive but not mentalistic. 'He grew angry' is mentalistic but it is behaviour-evaluative rather than behaviour-descriptive; the behaviour is the criterion for the use of the words 'he grew angry'. It is true that it does not designate an entity called mind.

Professor Pradhan's last sentence suggests that he believes that the mind is not something inner but has ontological reality all the same. This brings us to a crucial difference between Professor Pradhan and myself. Professor Pradhan, like myself, does not believe in inner entities but unlike myself, he will not reduce mind to matter; it has some other kind of ontological reality. I do not know what reality this is; it seems to be a third

domain. I had the same difficulty when reading Professor Pradhan's first piece.

In the next paragraph, Professor Pradhan says:

> Mental phenomena need not be inner events to be real. Besides, they need not be designated to be expressed in language. Their reality lies in their being experienced and made available in language.[12]

The first sentence confirms that Professor Pradhan believes that mental phenomena are real but not inner, which again raises the question of what kind of reality they have. He also maintains that mental concepts express mental phenomena. This is not the case if, like Professor Sinari, he is thinking of a double process. The second and third person uses of mental concepts identify and evaluate patterns in the behaviour of others. The first person use expresses sensations ('I am in pain' etc.) or the meaning of situations for us ('I am furious' etc.). In both cases, mental concepts are about material phenomena. The expression 'mental phenomena' is a misnomer because there is nothing corresponding to it in the world. Pain, for example, is a condition of the body and this is what we express when we say 'I am in pain'. 'Anger' does not denote anything immaterial. A person behaves in a particular way and we evaluate his behaviour-pattern by saying 'he is angry'. I find a situation infuriating and I say 'I am furious'.

We turn now to the next section, 'The Mental is Something Rather than Nothing'. Well, the disjunctive function is not a nothing but it is not a something either. He says that 'the effort to eliminate consciousness proves infructuous because of the fact that the very act of elimination presupposes consciousness'.[13] Surely, all that this act requires is an eliminator in the form of a conscious human being. He says 'consciousness is a built-in feature of man'. Yes, but this is not an empirical proposition like 'the brain is a built-in feature of man'. It only means that our concept of a man is that of a person who is capable of having experiences, and experience is always *of* something. 'Experience' does not denote an independent phenomenon; it is a function word.

Professor Pradhan writes: 'no amount of explanation of conscious phenomena in terms of the material conditions can help.'[14] This statement only shows the strength of his prejudice in favour of a particular position. The paradigm instance of consciousness, as Paul Johnston points out, is seeing.[15] Now, insects can see and we have no difficulty (at least I have

none) in explaining this ability in terms of material conditions. Human beings are much more complex organisms but the same principle holds.

Professor Pradhan says that 'crying, laughing, enjoying, shouting etc. are ways of expressing our mental life which do not require language though most of our mental life finds expression only in a language'.[16] We could call such actions elementary forms of our mental life: 'elementary' owing to their non-linguistic character. But they do not express separate phenomena lying behind them: there is no double process; they are ways of interacting with the environment. Again, the language we use is not expressive of our mental life, but *is* our mental life; broadly speaking, what it expresses is the interest situations have for us. Professor Pradhan, it appears, is trying to infer, from the alleged existence of non-linguistic ways of expressing mental life, that we do not hypostatize the word 'consciousness' but I do not see why this should be so even if we grant the premise. He says that the fact that we do not say 'I am conscious' except in special circumstances does not mean that we are not conscious at all or that consciousness is nothing real. But although I see, think etc., seeing, thinking and other examples of consciousness are not phenomena in their own right, they are not existents and so they are not real. What are real are the things I see and think about, the sounds I hear etc. Professor Pradhan defends the concept of consciousness of consciousness but I understand it as little now as I did earlier.

The next section is called 'The Locus of Consciousness'. Professor Pradhan tries to prove that consciousness is ascribable only to the self and not to the body or soul. This distinction between self and soul is a puzzle to me, in spite of his explanations, as also exactly how consciousness can be located in the self. Since 'consciousness' is a function word only, there is no independent phenomenon of consciousness to be ascribed. Seeing, for example, is not a phenomenon, so there is nothing to ascribe. I think I have laboured the point sufficiently.

The next section is called 'Self as Non-Elusive'. Professor Pradhan criticizes my suggestion in my first paper that the expression 'I think' could be replaced by 'There is thought' but I abandoned the idea in my second article because we need to distinguish our activities from those of others. 'There is thinking here' would have the same function as 'I think'. It is this which is the role of 'I think' and other pronouns and not to act as indices to the self, as Professor Pradhan thinks. 'I' and other pronouns could be replaced by proper nouns; General De Gaulle used to refer to himself by his surname. Would Professor Pradhan be tempted in such cases to think that proper nouns are indices to the self? Incidentally, what exactly is the difference between indexing and designating?

After expounding his unorthodox views on Wittgenstein, Professor Pradhan closes with a section called 'Back to the Phenomena'. I am all for this but I think that material phenomena are all that there are. I fail to see how human beings can have forms of life in the sense that objects have form, although human behaviour could be said to constitute forms of life Professor Pradhan writes that 'we cannot conceive of life without consciousness'.[17] This is a grammatical remark, which is mistaken for an empirical one. A comparable remark would be 'we cannot conceive of a square which does not have four sides'. Our concept of a living being is that of a being who has experience. But 'consciousness' and its equivalent 'experience' are function words; it is what we are conscious of or experience which has ontological reality (except for images and worded and unworded thoughts which we are conscious of but have no reality and therefore are not *experienced*). Therefore, Professor Pradhan cannot conclude that 'consciousness is real as a mental phenomenon'.[18] There are no ontologically real mental phenomena of any kind.

Notes and References

1. Ramakant Sinari, 'The Internality of Consciousness Experience', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, pp. 158–63 and R.C. Pradhan, 'Why Consciousness is Not a Fiction: A Response to G.P. Ramachandra', ibid., pp. 163–71.
2. I have been greatly helped in my discussion of Professor Sinari's concept of a double process by my reading of Malcolm Budd, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, Chapters II, V and VI.
3. Sinari, op. cit., p. 159.
4. For discussions of the inappropriateness of the concept of cause in explaining human behaviour, see Paul Johnston, *Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy*, Routledge, London and New York, 1989.
5. Sinari, op. cit., p. 160.
6. Budd, op. cit., Chapter VI.
7. Ibid., Chapter V.
8. Pradhan, op. cit., p. 164.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 165.
11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 166.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Paul Johnston, *Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner*, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, pp. 207–8.
16. Pradhan, op. cit., pp. 166–7.
17. Ibid., p. 170.
18. Ibid., p. 171.

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Wittgenstein's *Unutterable*: A Response to Suresh Chandra's 'Some Remarks on "Wittgenstein on Religious Belief and Superstition"'

What follows is a response to Suresh Chandra's (hereafter SC) evaluation 'Some Remarks on "Wittgenstein on Religious Belief and Superstition"' (hereafter *SRWRBS*) of the unpublished article 'Wittgenstein on Religious Belief and Superstition' (hereafter *WRBS*) of the anonymous author, published in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, May–August 1997, pp. 153–64. SC's objections are so profound, at the first sight, that they virtually bracketed the article's publication. His evaluation succeeds in representing *WRBS* as a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's views on religion and superstition. My response analyses *SRWRBS*' allegations. This response is of course not on the behalf of the unknown author of *WRBS* but solely and purely an objection to SC's objections which is based on my interpretation of Wittgenstein.[1]

Among the many debatable aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy such as his concept of Private Language, Rule-Following, Scepticism etc., his views on religion and superstition have often been differently interpreted: the reason is—Wittgenstein's reluctance to write about religion and related subjects. He wrote little about religion underlying which was his *Tractarian* conviction that as religion transcends the world it belongs to the sphere of *unutterable* or that which can only be *shown* and not be *said*. The paucity of Wittgenstein's direct comments led to the wave of

arguments and counter arguments regarding Wittgenstein's views of religion, superstition and ethics: every argument claiming to represent Wittgenstein authentically. Wittgenstein's views on religion are contained in his *Tractatus*, *Notebooks*, 'Lecture on Religious Belief', 'Drury's Conversations with Wittgenstein', 'Lecture on Ethics', 'Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*' and *Culture and Value*. Of all these only 'Lecture on Religious Belief' is solely related to his views on religion. Among his other works one has to glean religious ideas which are scattered here and there. It is in this context that SC rightly points out that Wittgenstein used to make all kinds of remarks in all kind of circumstances.[2]

As Wittgenstein himself did not properly express his views on religion, there is no wonder that he is variously interpreted and profusely misinterpreted. Not only that his view on religion is misunderstood but equally susceptible has been his philosophy on language. Norman Malcolm in his *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* writes[3] that Wittgenstein was worried about the impression of his thoughts among his followers in the later thirties and early forties. He once even went to Moore, the then editor of the *Mind*, to suggest to him not to publish an article written by a lady, which according to Wittgenstein misrepresented his philosophical views. G.E. Moore did not accept Wittgenstein's suggestions upon which he was very angry. He unsuccessfully pleaded with Malcom and Anscombe to write a response to the said article. He thought of publishing his *PI* in mimeographic form but was later pacified and said that he would not be provoked by these events and hence would not publish his book prematurely. Moreover, Wittgenstein himself wrote in a letter to his friend Ludwig Von Ficker that he has misunderstood.[4]

Misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's thought was a fact in his life and it is unabated even after his death. There are instances when philosophers confessed that they misunderstood Wittgenstein. Two such well-known confessions are A.J. Ayer in *Wittgenstein* and John W. Cook in *Wittgenstein's Metaphysics*.

SRWRBS consists of 24 remarks; some of these are general statements about Wittgenstein and his philosophy and others are comments on and criticisms of *WRBS*. Initially I tried to take by the horns all the remarks but could not save myself from being superfluous. So I gave up the idea of commenting on each and every remark. Notwithstanding this I find it interesting to discuss some of the ideas of *SRWRBS*.

The following points of *SRWRBS* are debatable:

1. Father O'Hara and anthropologist Sir James Frazer exhibit the same attitude towards religious belief on the ground that both of them tried to provide scientific explanation to religious belief. (pp. 154–5) (evaluation no. 4)
2. 'Search for "sufficient" evidence for the existence of supernatural beings would make "religious fears" impossible. All fears, all terrors, all torments, will be the result of superstition.' (p. 157) (evaluation no. 11)
3. 'A magical practice is not qualitatively different from a religious practice.' (p. 157) (evaluation no. 12)
4. SC's view that according to Wittgenstein fear and trust are the characteristics of religious belief and superstition respectively. (pp. 158–60) (evaluation nos. 15, 16, 17)
5. His criticism of the thesis: 'Religious belief as a language-game'. (pp. 160–61) (evaluation no. 19)
6. 'If a religion is to be saved then certain beliefs must be considered as mere superstitions.' (p. 162) (evaluation no. 21)

Let me begin with the first point. SC in his fourth remark describes Wittgenstein's criticism of O'Hara in the *Lectures on Religious Belief* and Wittgenstein's criticisms of Frazer in 'Remarks on *Frazer's Golden Bough*'. O'Hara tries to support religious beliefs with the help of rational justification whereas Frazer denounces tribal religious beliefs as superstitious because they are irrational or unscientific. As O'Hara and Frazer both introduce some kind of rational justification for religious beliefs, Wittgenstein criticizes them. SC's concern here is to show that Father O'Hara and anthropologist Sir James Frazer exhibit the same attitude towards religious belief on the ground that both of them tried to provide scientific explanation to religious belief. He says that 'It is interesting to note that O'Hara speaks with the voice of Frazer and Frazer with the voice of O'Hara' (p. 154). SC is so engrossed in his attempt to establish the similarity in the approaches of O'Hara and Frazer that he forgets the differences underlying them. He also fails to note the difference between Wittgenstein's critique of O'Hara and Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer. For me a Wittgensteinian will not fail to note the difference along with similarities. In two respects there are similarities between O'Hara and Frazer's account of religious belief: (i) both admit rational justification for religious belief, and (ii) Wittgenstein criticizes both on the above point of their similarity.

The difference between the two is that Wittgenstein criticizes O'Hara's justification of religious belief and rejects Frazer's denouncement of religious belief. For Wittgenstein Frazer makes religious belief look like error as he searches for their scientific foundations and O'Hara's rational justification of religious belief makes them superstitious. For Wittgenstein a religious belief needs no rational justification as its support. '*Religion says: Do this—Think like that* but it cannot justify this and it only need try to do so to become repugnant; since for every reason it gives, there is a cogent counter reason.'[5] And 'I would definitely call O'Hara unreasonable. I would say, if this is religious belief, then it's all supersition.'[6] Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer's view that since tribal beliefs do not stand to the scrutiny of reason they are mere superstitions. According to Wittgenstein, Frazer's account is unsatisfactory as 'it makes these views look like errors.'[7] Wittgenstein criticizes O'Hara's defence of and Frazer's critique of religious beliefs. SC fails to note the difference in the approaches of O'Hara and Frazer, and Wittgenstein's criticism of O'Hara and that of Frazer.

Now, come to the second point given above. SC in his 11th remark rightly points out that the availability of 'sufficient evidence' for the existence of supernatural beings cannot be regarded as a criterion of a religious belief as its unavailability cannot make such beings to be superstitious. But his view that 'Search for "sufficient" evidence for the existence of supernatural beings would make "religious fears" impossible' (p. 157), is unfounded. He fails to note that in case of religion, sufficient evidence means self-evidence. Theism is based on *self-evident* beliefs and not on any kind of sufficient evidence. There is nothing wrong in the search for self-evident, self-revealing existence of the ultimate reality as we have behind us great spiritual tradition of such attempts. This kind of search does not make our conviction to be superstitious.

Let us take the third point into consideration. According to SC, the practices of magic and that of religion are qualitatively identical. Not only has it not been fully explained by him as to how and why he thinks so, the evidence supports the anti-thesis. He says that he would not like to go into the issue, as it is an independent issue. However, he suggests one reads *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough* but there is nothing in it which could establish the alleged identity. As different from SC's view, the

following account of D.Z. Phillips shows that Frazer treated magic and religion as of entirely different nature. According to Frazer, 'men turned from magic to religion because they saw that there was no relation between magical practices and the events which befell them. Instead of thinking that magic powers controlled the elements along with fortune and misfortune, he concluded that some far more powerful spirit must control all these things. In this way, belief in God is born.'[8] Thus, it does make sense to speak about changes in ones belief, i.e., alteration from magic to religion; it shows that there is a qualitative difference between the logic behind magic and logic behind religion. Moreover, the difficulty in accepting SC's position is that it obliterates the distinction between primitive religion and world religion.

Now let us see the above mentioned fourth point of view of SC. Issues, which underlie SC's remarks 15, 16, and 17 are: (a) whether fear or trust is the characteristic of a religious belief, and (b) whether Wittgenstein changed his ideas later on (i.e. when he came back to the academic philosophy from the school teaching)? The question is: Are there *two* Wittgensteins such as 'earlier' and 'later'? If 'yes' then is there any unity of thought between them? On the one hand, there are thinkers who hold that there are *two* Wittgensteins and if there is any similarity between them, it is superficial. These philosophers who criticize their opponents, i.e. those who do not believe so, look upon them with severe repugnance. On the other hand, there is the view that there is no such cleavage between earlier and later Wittgenstein. This latter view accepts the occurrence of changes in Wittgenstein's thinking but believes in the unity. SC belongs to the first group and that is why he leaves no stone unturned in the way of his criticism of those who believe in *one* Wittgenstein. In the 17th remark he says, 'The Writer of *WRBS* has not seen the progress of Wittgenstein's thought. In his *Lecture on Religious Belief* delivered in 1938, Wittgenstein thought that fear and torments, etc., are the grounds of religious belief. But a decade's time changed his views. He started thinking that the religious beliefs are groundless. What has grounds is superstition (p. 160).' And in the 15th remark he says that, 'Just after ten years of his (Wittgenstein's) lectures what was the genuine religious belief became a superstition. What was duck has now become a rabbit; a change in his view has occurred. He is viewing the same thing now differently (p. 158).' The question arises how for Wittgenstein, 'fear', which is the essence of religious belief in the *Lecture*, in the *Culture and Value* becomes the

substance of superstition? In order to support his thesis that Wittgenstein changed his views on the characteristics of religious belief and superstition, SC quotes Wittgenstein from *Culture and Value* 'Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of them results from *fear* and is a sort of false science. The other is trusting.'

My question is that why not, on the basis of the above quote, could religious faith be treated as resulting from fear and superstition from trust? I do not find any reason as to why this could not be done. In fact the groundlessness of religious belief does not occur to Wittgenstein only in *On Certainty* or *Culture And Value*, i.e. during the last two years of his life, as SC thinks. The very beginning of Wittgenstein's philosophical journey, i.e., *Notebooks* and *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* treats ethics and religious beliefs as transcendental in the sense that they are meaning of life and thus cannot be put into words. It is erroneous to say that for Wittgenstein religious beliefs, which were grounded in fear in 1938, relapsed into groundlessness in 1948. For Wittgenstein, from the *Notebooks* to *On Certainty* and *Culture And Value*, groundlessness or nonsensicality is the reason that they cannot be put into words; it is the very essence of religious beliefs.

Now let us consider the fifth point. SC's 18th remark is critical of the thesis—'religious belief as a language game'. He claims that his criticism of 'religious belief as a language game' thesis is much more radical than that of *WRBS*. He says, 'the genuine objection which can be raised against Wittgenstein has not occurred to the writer of *WRBS*. Wittgenstein's advice (i.e., make sure that your religion is a matter between you and God) is operative only within the context of God-believers. Suppose Drury is a Buddhist, then the advice is non-starter (p. 161).' SC's remark is an example of self-evident contradiction to the following view of Wittgenstein:

> Frazer's account of the magical and religious views of the mankind is unsatisfactory: it makes these views look like errors. Was Augustine in error when he called upon God on every page of the *Confessions*?
>
> But one might say—if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist holy man was—whose religion gives expression to completely different views. But neither of them was in error, except when he sets forth a theory.[9]

Thus, for Wittgenstein neither Augustine nor Buddhists are erroneous; his advice is operative even if Drury is a Buddhist.

Further, SC forgets that even those religions which do not believe in the existence of God, believe in some Ultimate Reality or Ideals. There are religions without God but there is no possibility of religion without ideal. Moreover, Wittgenstein's interpretation of 'belief in God' is different from that of Christianity. For him 'belief in God' does not mean belief in some kind of supernatural reality endowed with three 'omnis'—omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. Wittgenstein writes, 'To believe in God means to understand the question about the meaning of life.

To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.

To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.'[10]

Most of the Wittgensteinians uphold the similar view. For D.Z. Phillips, 'Coming to see that there is a God is not like coming to see that an additional being exists. If it were, there would be an extension of one's knowledge of facts, but no extension of one's understanding. Coming to see that there is a God involves seeing a new meaning in one's life, and being given a new understanding.'[11] Thus, in the case of the religion without God, such as Buddhism, the identification of worshipper with the ideal, the meaning of life, comes into force and thus even there Wittgenstein's advice to Drury plays its role.

Moreover, there have been attempts in the past as well to denounce Wittgenstein's thesis—religious belief as a language game. Such an attempt made by John W. Cook in his article *Wittgenstein and Religious Belief*. He says, 'My principal objection is to the idea that religion is a language-game (or perhaps that each religion is a language-game) and that because of the kind of language-game it is, religious believers are not to be thought of as necessarily harbouring beliefs about the world over the above their secular beliefs. I reject this position, not because I think that there are language-games and that religion happens not to be one, but because I find the very idea of a language-game to be indefensible. Put another way, I find myself out of sympathy with the recent idea that in philosophy of religion we ought to be discussing something called "religious-language" or "the kind of language involved in religious beliefs".'[12] Cook's main objection to Wittgenstein's notion of language game is that it 'is heavily freighted with metaphysics (p. 428).' Moreover, Kai Nelson's criticism of Wittgenstein's view of religion on the ground that it would be a mistake to treat religion as a distinct language game or form of life in his article 'Wittgensteinian Fideism'[13] is well known.

Thus, neither SC's criticisms of Wittgenstein's view of Religious Belief as a language game is sound nor is it based on any such novel grounds which could make it different from the criticisms in the past. For me these criticisms arise mainly because of misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's methodology—*to put everything as it is*.[14]

Now let us scrutinize the last point. One but the last sentence of SC's 21st remark reads—'If a religion is to be saved then certain beliefs must be considered as mere superstitions' (p. 162). SC is unmindful of the fact that for Wittgenstein religion constitutes its own 'form of life' which, unlike a medical prescription that saves the sick, cannot be saved or ruined through individual or collective efforts. A 'form of life' is something which is always *given* and which can neither be created nor destroyed. Of course, there are changes in a form of life but this is not because of any *effort*. It changes its shape on its own. I or all inhabitants of the form of life, which I share, cannot change it on their will.

The above discussion shows that at least some of the grounds on the basis of which SC evaluates *WRBS* are presumptuous. However, I do not wish to mirror *SRWRBS* to be a failure since that is against the very spirit of what I intend to show.[15] This, of course, does not mean that anything whatever written on Wittgenstein's view on religion, superstition and ethics could not be shown to be erroneous on the ground that any such attempt will certainly bring theorization which is against Wittgensteinian spirit. As this is true that anything and everything cannot be said to be Wittgenstein's attitude, this is also true that there is a region which vaguely presents islands of Wittgensteinian Greenland of different degrees which provides ample pasture for Wittgensteinians to discuss, debate and criticize each other so as to arrive at least at some further agreeable conclusions on those branches of philosophy such as aesthetics, ethics and religion where only scanty remarks of Wittgenstein are available. For me *SRWRBS* is not a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's views on religion and superstition but it is lesser green and at times exaggerating.

Although I have tried to debunk *SRWRBS's* demolition of *WRBS*, my deep appreciation for SC's forceful, honest, unpretentious, innocuous criticism and his implacable reply to his audience during seminars etc., is intact as ever.[16]

Notes and References

1. Let me state here that: (i) I do not claim that my interpretation of Wittgenstein is better than SC's or of any other interpretation but I feel that SC's evaluation of *WRBS* is not beyond criticism, and (ii) I believe in D.Z. Phillips' view that 'Philosophical puzzles cannot be answered on ones behalf by another, since even if another philosopher sheds light on the problems one is interested in, one must work through those problems for oneself if ones puzzlement is to give way to a new understanding.' (*Religion without Explanation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, p. 9)
2. See, SC, *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, May–August 1997, p. 154.
3. Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Memoir*, Oxford University Press, London, 1958, p. 59. For the details of this point see my article 'Wittgenstein: *Vyaktittva and Krititva*', forthcoming in the *Paramarsh*.
4. Wittgenstein's letter to Ludwig Von Ficker is quoted in Paul Engelmann's *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 143.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 34e.
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures on Religious Belief*, p. 59.
7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, p. 62.
8. D.Z. Phillips, *Religion without Explanation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, p. 31.
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, p. 62.
10. *Notebooks*, p. 74.
11. D.Z. Phillips, *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970, p. 17.
12. John W. Cook, 'Wittgenstein and Religious Belief', *Philosophy*, Vol. 63, No. 246, October 1988, p. 427.
13. See Kai Nelson, 'Wittgensteinian Fideism', *Philosophy*, Vol. XLII, No. 161, July 1967, pp. 191–209.
14. This has been the motto of Professor Ashok Vohra's book *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind*, Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1986. Professor R.C. Pradhan expresses the similar view. Quoting *PI*'s sections 124 and 415, he points out that Wittgenstein's 'Philosophy puts everything as they are and does not put any theoretical gloss on them.' 'Why Consciousness is not a Fiction: A Response to G. P. Ramachandra', *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, September–December 1999, p. 169.
15. I agree with Kripke's view that 'to attempt to present Wittgenstein's argument precisely is to some extent to falsify it.' Saul W. Kripke, op. cit., p. 5.
16. I am thankful to Dr. Devbrat Awasthi for his comments and suggestions.

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Reply to the Query 'If There Were No Snake At All, Would It Still be Possible to Mistake a Rope For a Snake' by Vivek Dutta, published in *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, May–August 2000

Mistaking is an epistemological problem. It, in *Advaita-Vedānta*, is a case of erroneous cognition wrongly taken as real. It is cognition of that which, as such, is not there but existing elsewhere. Mistaking is possible not only in cases where percipients and adjuncts are related to the external world of experience in waking but also in cases where there is no room for existence of any external thing. In dreams, the objects, which are internal to that state and not to that of waking, the consciousness itself takes different forms of percipients and adjuncts as well. The existence of the objects in the world of waking experience is not necessary for such a mistaking.

The existence or non-existence of an external snake makes no difference because, as I think, mistaking is concerned with the subjective element imposed on an objective thing. Similarity, identity or by identity through similarity are generally taken as the cause of imposition. On this issue, either *Advaitins* are not clear and uniformal or I do not understand them clearly.

Similarity is possible in cases where two different things are there in which the former is the substratum on which the latter is imposed due to sameness in certain qualities. The latter, that is the subjective element, is not confined to the objects of perception, inference, etc., and their memory.

Memory may be the memory of any object known previously by perception, inference, imagination, etc., or may be the memory of the dream element dreamt earlier. The consciousness, in dream, can take any form the concrete existence of which may not be found in the empirical world. The consciousness, in dream, is rather free and can take the form of a snake even if there would be no actual existence of snake in the world. The form dreamt earlier may come to memory and may act for the imposition on the rope due to similarity except biting which is specific only to snake. The similarity observed, in two different sorts of objects, is considered as the cause of their identity leading to erroneous cognition.

Mistaking by identity is possible only if the inverted object is identical to the object there. Inversion by identification may be the ground for

mistaking but may not be the ground for the distinction of the inverted and its substratum. In that case, there would be no expectancy for a correct understanding. Not only that but neither the erroneous cognition be identified, nor any expectancy, to sublate that, would emerge also.

There is occasion for difference between the two and, hence, for similarity in case of mistaking by imposition (*adhyāropa*). If we take the memory of the objects dreamt in view, it is very much possible to mistake the rope for the memory-snake dreamt in an earlier dream if the two are wrongly identified by some similarity between the two sorts of objects, that is between the object there and the dreamt-object brought out by memory. Conclusively, there is all possibility to mistake a rope for a snake even if there is utter physical absence of snake in the world and its contact by the senses.

Why do we name the memory of the dreamt object, as snake if there is no contact established earlier by the snake due to its utter non-existence in our world of empirical experience, is a different question. However, we can add here that the difference between the two serpentine forms of the rope and the snake as objects of cognition, is that the former which is motionless is inverted due to some similarity as of a moving serpentine that is, snake in a non-moving state. The imposition by similarity and identification of the object there (rope) with memory of the dreamt object (snake) may result in mistaking a rope for a snake even without the external existence of the latter.

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A Note on Karmic Justice

I congratulate Vibha Chaturvedi for boldly challenging the doctrine of Karmic Justice which most people (including many philosophers) take for granted. Her arguments are very cogent and need to be pointedly (and not vaguely) answered by those who believe the doctrine. I wish to comment on sections III and IV of her article 'Causality of Karmic Justice' in *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3.

Chaturvedi describes in great detail how the rightness or goodness of actions depends (even according to the Hindu dharma code) on a host of complex factors—the agent's caste and stage of life, who the agent is, the prevailing circumstances and even the gender (pp. 141, 143). Chaturvedi argues that all this 'introduces a very high degree of complexity' in moral judgements (p. 145), that it is 'far from plausible' that 'such a perfect matching' between a particular action and its reward or punishment 'can be brought about by [Karmic] causal connections' (p. 148), and that 'it is certainly not obvious that such a relationship exists' (p. 149). In other words, the moral life is too complex for the Karmic process to deal with. Chaturvedi rightly says that 'merely asserting a causal connection between good conduct and happiness on the one hand, and bad conduct and suffering on the other, is not enough'; 'specifications of the connection should also be given', but are 'most of the time not mentioned' in the dharmasastras (p. 143).

Chaturvedi further writes,

> Our ordinary experience does show that happiness or suffering of people is not always proportionate to the moral worth of their actions. Even supporters of the doctrine of karma admit this, hence the supposition of deferment of reward or punishment. (p. 151)

I would, to start with, like to point out that the supporters of the Karmic doctrine not only admit this absence of the merit-reward connection in our ordinary experience; it is largely *because of this* that the entire myth of previous lives has been concocted.

Now, the point I wish to make is that the Karmic theorists would not be much disturbed by Chaturvedi's talk about the high degree of complexity of moral life and the question of perfect matching between an action and its reward or punishment. They would say that the Karmic mechanism is sufficiently sophisticated and sensitive to take care of all this. They would further assert that, once you accept the reality of Karmic causality, it is not necessary for the Dharmasastras to give detailed 'specifications of connection' that Chaturvedi seems to require, because the Karmic system is, we may be assured, programmed to deal with specific cases. The question is, why should we *believe* in Karmic justice?

My contention is that there is no reason why we should. The doctrine is confused and absurd. In support of this I argue as follows.

1. Let us first take our ordinary present life. Suppose a person(P) has done a wrong action(W) and later, at some time, he undergoes some suffering(S) and another person(Q) has done a good action(G) and he has a piece of good luck or is happy(H). Human life being what it is, everyone, during ones life, suffers many times in one way or another and also finds something to be happy about from time to time. Therefore, unless it can be causally established that S was caused by W (e.g., that my hangover next morning was caused by my indulgence on the previous night) or unless a legal or quasi-legal authority (human or divine) decides and declares that S was the result of W, there is no way by which we can determine that S was the result of W. A similar point can be made about G and H. Thus, in our ordinary experience, there is no possibility of knowing which punishments connect with which wrong actions and which rewards connect with which good actions; indeed, there is no way of knowing whether wrong actions are ever punished and good actions are ever rewarded. This being the case, the question of whether the reward or punishment was 'proportionate to the moral worth of the action' cannot even arise. Which moral action and which reward or punishment?

2. Now let us talk of the otherworldly life. Let us grant for the sake of argument, that every person has had a series of consecutive earlier lives, P, Q, R, S, ... Suppose A is undergoing some suffering(B) in his present life. Was B the effect of some wrong deed—who knows what?—in life P or Q or R or S or ...? There is no way of knowing and, please note, no way of knowing *even if one remembers ones past lives*, which of course, most ordinary folk don't.

It is a basic principle of justice that one should know what ones crime was, but the Karma doctrine ignores this. It may be answered that this requirement is with regard to our earthly justice, whereas supermundane justice is different. However, if there is such a justice, it would be better than ours; it can hardly be worse than ours.

The Karma doctrine is a huge piece of fiction which is thought to be necessitated by the primitive and widespread, though no less stupid, belief that Reality must dole out rewards to the good and punishments to the bad, respectively. But Reality is no respecter of persons!

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Comments on Rudolf Brandner's Comments Published in *JICPR*, Vol. XVI, No. 2

Professor Rudolf Brandner tries to show that Daya Krishna's (hereafter DK) approach to understand Indian philosophy is fundamentally defective. He in his letter to DK not only explains his defect, but also tries to delineate the correct approach towards understanding Indian philosophy, or for that matter any other philosophy. According to him every culture or cultural tradition has its characteristic feature which is peculiarly its own. And he seems to think that this peculiarity or speciality of a culture cannot be understood by any method other than the one which is in 'empathy', as it were, with it. As, according to him, DK tried to understand the special feature of Indian philosophy with the help of what he calls the method of scientific-technological rationality, DK's approach in his opinion has been defective.

But I do not feel very happy about what Professor Brandner thinks about DK's approach towards understanding Indian philosophy. Let us first try to understand what the Professor takes this method of scientific-technological rationality to be. According to him this method originated in the West; so it can very well be called a method of the Western model. And even though this model according to him is not in perfect harmony with the Western tradition, it is surely a 'reconstruction of the fundamental principles of occidental philosophy and its religious traditions' (p. 143). (I fail to understand how this method is a reconstruction of the occidental religious traditions.) He also acknowledges that this method 'is unifying the entire humanity into one and only one *valid* (my italics) way of relating to things' (p. 142). But, despite this, he does not find it suitable for doing philosophy. And he feels certain that even DK 'must not have felt too comfortable writing the sentence: "Surely, the term *ānvīkṣikī* comes as close to it (= the word philosophy) as one may want it to be"' (p. 144). For him, philosophy cannot be *ānvīkṣikī* at all (p. 144).

Now, the question is: If philosophy is not *ānvīkṣikī* or any kind of critical analysis, what is it after all? It appears to me that according to the Professor philosophy is just an enterprise for understanding the basic spirit or genius of a cultural tradition in its pristine form and glory. He says, 'We need a very high level of competence for any attempt to conceptualize the different thinking traditions; and the central methodological

problem for me remains the phenomenological reconstruction of the basic concepts of each of these traditions. Put into strong terms I think that every application of a concept originated within the realms of one tradition on to the other is methodologically faulty and theoretically unacceptable' (pp. 144–45).

Thus, according to the Professor, the task before philosophy is to understand the essential conceptual structures of the different cultural traditions. And there must not be any attempt to change those structures, nor to impose them on to any other cultural tradition. But then the question arises: can this sort of approach be regarded as genuinely philosophical? It cannot be gainsaid that the conceptual structure of any *thinking* (my italics) tradition must contain some theoretical or cognitive belief or beliefs. And because no such belief can be subjected to any scientifico-rational examination as stipulated by the Professor, it can very well be any bizarre thing whatsoever. *Mokṣa* (taken literally and not metaphorically), Virgin Motherhood, Sonhood of God, Creation of the world by a Divine Decree, Noughting of Nothingness, etc., etc. are some examples of such bizarre things. And the Professor agreeing fully with the above approach has no hesitation in dubbing DK's attempt to show Indian philosophy as being not *mokṣa*-centred to be quite funny.

But then it is surely very lamentable that philosophy should be deprived of both its universal scope and its critical function. Human beings are after all rational beings and because of their rationality they can very well understand, communicate with and criticize one another. DK's understanding the Professor's letter and his understanding and criticizing DK's book could not have been possible, if there would have been no rationality in both DK and him. It should also be noted that their understandings of each other have been possible despite their belonging to two different cultures—DK to the Eastern and the Professor to the Western.

It will not be beside the point to mention here that whenever any question regarding the factual truth of any cognitive belief of any culture will arise, it is not a 'phenomenological reconstruction' that can clinch the issue. In all such matters it is only the science-based rational enquiry that can play the decisive role. How else can *mokṣa* (taken literally and not metaphorically) be authenticated or rejected, if not by a science-based rational enquiry? Cultures indeed have boundaries, but truth can hardly have any. A culture can very well give a style of life, but it cannot justify

that style by itself. In such matters it is only the critical reason or *ānvīkṣikī* that can foot the bill. Has not Professor Brandner himself taken help of critical reason in regarding DK's approach as defective? And was he not philosophizing when he was taking such help? I am afraid nobody can avoid rational enquiry or *ānvīkṣikī* if he really wants to do philosophy.

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Tarkasaṁgraha on the Definition of Knowledge: A Discussion Note

Annaṁbhaṭṭa in his *Tarkasaṁgraha* defines knowledge as under:

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्गुणो बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम्

which when translated into English in literal terms may be expressed as follows:

> Buddhi or knowledge is that quality which is a cause of all employment of words and is the same as jñāna.

This is explicated by him further in his *Dīpikā* in the following words:

बुद्धेलक्षणमाह-सर्वेति। जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानत्वमेव।

A free English rendering of this would be somewhat as follows:

> As the defining character of knowledge what it means is 'knowledgehood' which is apprehended in the after-cognition (anuvyavasāya) as the form 'I know'.

I

Now, it seems to me that, since in the main text (Tarkasaṁgraha) the defining character of knowledge is said to be that which causes the use of words or verbal expression, it boils down to saying the following:

> Whatever is *statable* alone is knowledge. (K1)

The explanatory sutra in *Dīpikā* speaks of ज्ञानत्व (knowledgehood) as the defining mark of knowledge, though it also makes an explicit reference

to the process of anuvyavasāya as an act of after-cognition as having the form 'I know' whereby one apprehends ज्ञानत्व (knowledgehood) in knowledge as and when it arises. This may be put in the form:

> Whatever has knowledgehood is knowledge and mark of which is the condition of it being statable. (K2)

It would be clear from both (K1) and (K2) that the statability condition is of the essence for something (rather, some state) to be regarded as knowledge. Thus it would not be wrong to say that (K2) provides the necessary support in favour of (K1).

I would now like to raise the following questions:

(i) Can the process of *anuvyavasāya* take place without the aid of the linguistic act of the form 'I know'?

(ii) Is *anuvyavasāya* a necessary concomitant of all cognition or knowledge?

The answer to (i) is clearly in the negative; for, *anuvyavasāya* involves an act of reflection of the preceeding act of cognition which can be carried out only by linguistic means. In other words, *anuvyavasāya* is necessarily a linguistic device.

Now, if the answer to (ii) is in the affirmative then it is clear that (K1) would follow necessarily. Incidentally, (K1) also resonates the famous dictum of Wittgenstein, namely, 'Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent'.

If, on the other hand, the answer to (ii) is in the negative, then the definition offered in terms of 'सर्वव्यवहारहेतु' would not count as valid.

Further, if (K1) is valid which I think is the case on the ground that in *stating* is implicitly contained the act of after-cognition (anuvyavasāya), then the Naiyāyīka would be hard put to account for the validity or rather even the possibility of the Nirvikalpaka as a state of knowledge.

II

In conclusion, I wish to offer the following comments:

(a) 'सर्वव्यवहारहेतु' points to a process of reflection which can be carried out only by linguistic means, and as a mark of cognition or knowledge it leaves out the possibility of any *non*-verbal cognition which seems to fly in the face of the Nyayāika holding anything as Nirvikalpaka form of knowledge—a pre-condition for the Savikalpaka knowledge to arise.

(b) This also makes it necessary to rethink the relation between the Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka forms of knowledge within the framework of Nyāya epistemology. If the Nirvikalpaka is to be regarded as a state of knowledge then the Advaitin's position, namely, that even the Nirvikalpaka can be linguistic (e.g., 'This is that Devadatta') should not be objected to by the Naiyāyīka if the definition of knowledge in terms of *statability* is to be accepted.

(c) Given the general position of the Nyāya on the nature and possibility of the Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as non-verbal knowledge (particularly, after Gangesa's exposition on the matter) it would amount to a contradiction to hold the definition of knowledge in terms of 'सर्वव्यवहारहेतु' etc. which, to my mind, definitely lays down statability as a defining mark of knowledge.

Senior Fellow, ICPR RANJAN K. GHOSH

Agenda for Research

1. The idea of God has been central to most of the western philosophical thinkers at least since Aristotle who talked of him as the 'unmoved mover'. In fact, the idea became so central that almost all of western philosophy after the coming of Christianity began to be known as Theology. Even in the modern period which is supposed to start with Descartes the concern with God has always assumed a central place till almost the beginning of the 20th century. Descartes had to find a way out of the 'closed circle' of the Cogito and this he did through the idea of God whose reality he established through his famous ontological argument which simultaneously ensured the reality of the world. In Spinoza 'substance' takes the place of god and, by definition, becomes the source of everything mental or physical, which follows from it with a 'necessity' as necessary as that of the theorems that follow from the axioms. For Leibnitz, God is the only reality as he is not only the 'monad of monads', but one which is 'pure activity' and which has the clearest representation of them all. In Kant, 'God' is necessary as he alone can ensure the relation between morality and happiness demanded by the moral consciousness of man. As for the British philosophers, both Locke and Berkeley are well known for the centrality of God in their system. It is only Hume who is a sceptic, but then he is supposed to be sceptical about everything else. As for post-Kantian thinkers, they substituted the term 'Absolute' for God, but it plays the same role as the latter. But something happens when Nietzsche who died in 1900 proclaimed that 'God was dead'.

   The real absence of God from philosophy seems to have started from the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. None of the great thinkers seems to be concerned with it. What exactly has happened to the philosophical enterprise of the west needs to be explored in this context. How could such a long tradition with a history of more than 2000 years suddenly cease from the consciousness of thinkers deserves investigation. The theologians, both Protestant and Catholic are, of course, still around, as everybody knows.

But they hardly have any 'presence' in the philosophical consciousness of the times.

2. The reflection on Arts in India has not been the subject of philosophical attention as it deserves to be. Nor has it been seen in the context of the change and development that it underwent at the hands of successive thinkers during the long period of its history. Even those who have written on the subject have primarily confined themselves to what has been called the Alaṁkāra Śāstra which has almost exclusively dealt with what has been called Kāvya in the tradition. The reflection on the other arts and their relation to what has been called the Alaṁkāra Śāstra has hardly been paid any attention. Nor has the reflection on the individual arts found the place it deserves, as perhaps they themselves lacked conceptual formulation in the texts devoted to them. The *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* is an exception in this regard as it not only deals with each of the arts in their autonomy, but also in their relationship with one another. There is also an awareness of their relation to the larger purposes of man which have been called the puruṣārthas in the Indian tradition.

   The *Tṛtīyakhaṇḍa* of the *Viṣṇudharmattora Purāṇa* should be of intensive interest and study to all those who are interested in the thinking about arts in this country. It opens with a declaration about the interdependence of the arts and then discusses literature, music, dance, painting, sculpture and architecture successively in that order.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

1. Fichte is a well-known thinker and yet his work has not attracted the attention it deserves. His major work *The Science of Knowledge* has recently been edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs and published by the Cambridge University Press, 1982 in its *Texts on German Philosophy* series. The work is a unique and rare exercise in philosophical thinking where the 'thinking' process itself is displayed and not just the results reached through it.

   The author takes off from Kant and strarts from the other end, i.e. from the self or the 'I-consciousness', and tries to deduce the whole structure of knowledge, including or rather encompassing both the 'theoretical' and the 'practical', and yet remaining within the limits set by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, though not perhaps very successfully. He gives concrete demonstration at every step of the dialectical nature of philosophical thought where the analysis breaks up the concept into 'opposites' which seem philosophically incapable of being united even though they must have been held in a synthetic unity in the concept earlier. The work provides a transition to Hegel who developed dialectics in a different manner and extended its scope in a way which was unimaginable to his predecessors. It is perhaps for this reason that Fichte's thought has not been paid the attention it deserved as he comes in between two great thinkers such as Kant and Hegel who have dominated the philosophical scene since they appeared there. Yet, he is perhaps a 'purer' philosopher as he is concerned more with 'thinking' rather than the results reached through it. The First Introduction to the work provides a remarkable understanding not only of his own philosophy, but also of philosophy in general.

   The second Introduction deals with the issues such as feasibility of the notion of 'thing-in-itself' or the distinction between phenomena and noumena and argues that even though they are generally regarded as integral parts of Kant's thought, they are essentially incompatible with it.

2. Attention is drawn to a work allegedly written by Aristotle or, in the opinion of some scholars, by one of his students, entitled 'Athenian Constitution' translated by P.J. Rhodes, and published by Penguin Books, 1984, p. 197. The work deserves serious attention on the part of all those who are interested in political philosophy and the problems that are faced in the building of a democratic polity so that tyranny may not occur.

   The work covers the history of the City State of Athens from the beginning of the sixth century BC to the fourth century BC (532–320 BC) when the work is supposed to have been written. It covers thus a period of little more than 200 years and documents the experimentation that the Athenian city-state made in trying to build a democratic polity and the problems that arise in the realization of such an enterprise at the institutional and the human level.

   As the very notion of democracy involves some sort of participation in the appointment of rulers and administrators, the problem of establishing criteria for the citizenship of the state arises as they are the persons entitled to have a voice in the functioning of the system. Another problem which arises is how long those who have been selected to rule and administer should be allowed to function in that capacity. The third problem relates to the adjudication of 'disputes' and how honesty, impartiality, and objectivity shall be ensured amongst those who are entrusted with that responsibility. The fourth perhaps is the waging of war and how those will be selected who are specially able to do so.

   The successive changes in these are of special interest, particularly those relating to the evolving of the jury system where neither the judges nor the clients could know in advance which case was to be decided by whom. There is also an interesting insight as to how the defeat in a war may lead a polity to change some of its structural features so that the 'defects' that perhaps led to the defeat may be overcome.

3. The awareness that there are diverse philosophical traditions, particularly the Western, the Indian and the Chinese has been haunting the philosophical consciousness for quite some time.

   But 'Comparative Philosophy' as it has been called, has not yet come into its own as the three great traditions in philosophy have generally failed to be seen in a unified perspective. The difficulty is perhaps unresolvable as each has a unique singularity of its own. A significant and fruitful attempt in this direction has recently been made by Professor Ben-Ami Scharfstein in his *A Comparative History of World Philosophy from the Upanishads to Kant*, State University of New York, 1998, pp. 683. A cursory look at the title and contents of the chapters will reveal both the scope and the exercise that the author has tried to achieve in this work.

Contents

4. Attention is drawn to the work entitled '*Nyāya Ratnam*'[1] by Maṇi Kaṇṭha Miśra who according to Potter's Bibliography, flourished around AD 1300 and thus was perhaps slightly earlier then Gangeśa who is assigned AD 1350 in the second edition and 1320 in the third edition.

   The interesting thing about the book is that it starts the discussion of the subject not with the way *padārthas* are given in the *Nyāya Sūtra* or the way and sequence in which they have been discussed in the earlier commentaries on the subject from Vātsyāyna to Udayana or even in Jayanta and Bhāsarvajñya. Instead, he starts with *Tarka* which is seldom considered as an independent topic deserving a separate discussion on its own. It is followed by a discussion on *Vyāpti, Upādhi, Pakṣatā* and *Parāmarśa* which hardly were ever considered as padārthas either in the Nyāya Sūtra or in the millennium-long discussion that occurred on it. These constitute almost one half of the book covering 134 pages out of a total of 249 dealing with other topics such as avayava, kathā, vāda, etc.

   Another important feature of the book is that it refers to *Mahāvidyā* which generally is not known as constituting any part of Nyāya at all. The work perhaps thus indicates an unorthodox tradition in Nyāya thinking which developed between Udayana and Gangeśa and of which even Bhāsarvajñya provides evidence to some extent.

NOTE

1. Madras Government Oriental Series No. 54, 1953.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

1. What exactly is meant by the term 'presentation' (Anschauung) in Kant and his successors in German Thought? Is it the same as 'sense-data' in early twentieth century British philosophy? If not, what is the difference? Also, what is its difference from 'intuition' which also plays such a significant role in Kant's thought?
2. What is the relation between theoretical and practical Reason in Kant?
3. Can 'morality' be the subject of 'theoretical understanding' and if so, shall the 'moral judgement' be subject to all those limitations to which all judgements are supposed to be in Kant's thought?
4. What is the difference in Practical Reason as evidenced in prudential action on the one hand and the one displayed in moral action?

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

MARIETTA STEPANYANTS (Ed.): *History of Indian Philosophy: A Russian Viewpoint*, ICPR, 1993, pp. x+236, Rs 150

I

The book under review can broadly be divided into four sections—'Foreword', 'Preface', articles by different scholars and a list of the contributors.

In the 'Foreword' Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya has respectfully shown his obligation to the team of Russian scholars for their significant contribution to the understanding of different Indian philosophical ideas. To Professor Chattopadhyaya they have shown refreshing insights into its mundane, socially rooted and scientific aspects after highlighting the Advaitic concept of *Māyā* and Buddhist concept of *Śūṇya* etc.

The Editor, Marietta Stepanyants, has given an account of the scholarship of the authors who are of different generations. The Editor has clearly and openly admitted that some of the writers are not free from the influence of Marxist ideology. In spite of this all the contributors have dedicated themselves to the service of Indian philosophy after following the original texts, for which we should remain grateful to all of them.

II

The first paper entitled: 'Ancient Indian Culture and Materialism' by Grigori Bongard-Levin deals with the role of *artha* in Indian culture especially according to *Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya, a treatise on material gain. According to his interpretation, even the Vedic principles are formulated considering the practical interests of the state. Kautilya attaches a primary importance to logical analysis to find out a suitable solution to practical human problems and justifying them through reasoning (*hetubhiranvīkṣamāna*). Kautilya has put *artha* above *dharma* and *kāma*, because *artha* is the basic law and guarantee of pleasure. It is said that if an individual rejects *dharma* as useless and accepts *artha* as useful, he is a *lokāyatika* (materialist). But at the same time it should be kept in mind that the Indian materialists did not favour the brutish hedonism. Pleasure through *artha* is the primary objective of them, provided it leads us to the world

of balance after keeping brutish hedonism aside. An effort to search for the primacy of materialism in each and every theory in Indian tradition no doubt opens a new vista.

The second paper on 'Logical and Methodological Schemes of Indian Religious Philosophy and Their Interpretations' by Andrei Terentiev is the result of intensive study on the *catuṣkoṭika* method adopted by Nāgārjuna or other philosophers to have the nature of Reality. Such a method is adopted in *Brahmajālasūtra*, a Pali text, as pointed out by Jayalilleke. Such a method of unveiling Reality is even found in *Lokāyata* texts. From this it can be said that *catuṣkoṭika* is the method, which is not discovered solely by the Buddhists. The main import of *syādvāda* by Jaina thinkers, which is similar to the multiplicity of Reality as endorsed by the Buddhists lies on the fact that the Jainas describe each of the proportions as incomplete, but they possess 'the own nature of complete expression' (*sakalādeśa*). This 'complete expression' means not a verbal utterance but 'a mystical synthesis of all the incomplete expressions', which is possible through the subject's spiritual evolution. Under such circumstances we find a transformation from logic to mysticism, and hence ultimately 'the philosophical methodology becomes a phase of religious theory'. The methodology is a ladder through which one can have a synthesized view through mystical revelation in the present context.

Valeri Androsov in his paper: 'Correlation between Philosophy and Religion: The Iśvaraparīkṣā in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasamgraha*' critically evaluates Śāntarakṣita's examination of the creative principles accepted in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Śāntarakṣita disagrees with the Nyāya view that a conscious cause remains behind the worldly diversities. He also repudiates the idea that at the time of dissolution only *Īśvara's* intelligence remains and other conscious manifestations disappear. To him people are endowed with memory and consciousness at this stage of dissolution, as they take rebirth when the world is reoriginated. The existence of an Omniscient (*sarvajña*) Creator is inferred by the Naiyāyikas from the fact of His Omnipotence, which is accepted in Buddhism also. Śāntarakṣita has referred to the fact of Buddha's omniscience in the last chapter of his treatise. However, the Mādhyamika-Svāntatrikas do not accept the Buddha as Omniscient *Īśvara*. For, the Buddha acquired great compassion and omniscience in innumerable births. From this it is proved that a human being may desire to be omniscient in this transmigratory state through his own karmic experience. However, the Naiyāyikas view is stated to be wrong,

because there is not a single positive example of His omnipotence in reality. That is why the whole world is stated to be directed by the mercy of the Enlightened one, for whom one can attain success in availing salvation and well-being. In this connection the fact of being omnipotent can also be questioned. The author would have raised many such questions, but unfortunately these are not dealt with. If He is omnipotent for the Naiyāyikas, how can the result of *karma* be justified? To the Naiyāyikas God creates the world after keeping the result of *karma* of an individual in view. If God is taken as omnipotent, He can provide some thing to an individual which is irrespective of an individual's action. If it were the case, there would arise the defects like *kṛtapraṇāśa* (non-attainment of the result of *karma* performed by an individual being) and *akṛtābhyāgama* (attainment of the result of *karma* not performed by an individual). If every action is dependent on God's desire, it may be asked whether this desire depends on *karma* of an individual or not. If God or His desire is bound by the *karma* of a *jīva*, He will have no autonomy, which is not the mark of omnipotence. If God's desire is taken as superior, *karma* may seem to be impotent having no power of its own. If *karma* is taken as superior, one could ask what function God serves. If God has no function, it will lose its godliness. If God and *karma* both are accepted as superior, God has to depend on *karma*. Hence He will be no longer be a powerful being or omnipotent due to the loss of autonomy. These philosophical problems are not discussed in this connection.

In the paper—'The Vaibhāsika Teaching on Determinants of Psychic Activity' the author, Valeri Rudoy, emphasizes on 'how a traditional philosophical treatise is meditated by religious doctrine and by *yoga* as prescribed in Buddhism.' To him a text is the embodiment of the synthesis of religion, *yoga* and philosophy. In this scholarly essay the author particularly examined the determinants of psychic activity with special reference to *Abhidharmakoṣa* (Part 1). The Vaibhāsikas believe in the transformation of consciousness from the cause and temporal to absolute, which is atemporal. The author has rightly pointed out that the traditional Buddhist psychology admits the mental processes—sensation, perception and imagination in relation to consciousness but not independently. They have accepted the eight stages in *yoga*, the final stage of which is the state of being devoid of mental distinctions. The additional characteristics of sense-organs, viz. the remoteness and the rapidity of perception (*dūrāśutaravṛtti*) as pointed out by Vasubandhu have also been endorsed by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. In this way the author tries to prove that without the study of Buddhist religious doctrines the traditional analysis of the problems of consciousness cannot properly be understood.

Victoria Lysenko in the valuable essay on 'The Atomistic Theory of Vaiśeṣika: Problems of Interpretation' has dealt with a very important concept of atomism admitted by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers and some interpretations on the same. With a brief introduction on the main features of atom the author has given much importance to the notion of indivisibility, which becomes a main property of atom. To the Vaiśeṣikas the combination of atoms (*paramāṇusaṁyoga*) is highly essential at the time of initial creation (*prathamasarga*) and this combination of atoms that are motionless in character is possible through the external impetus associated with unseen factors (*adṛṣṭa*) etc. The author has shown originality in interpreting the term '*pramāṇa*' as 'measuring' or 'embracing' or 'wholeness' as per etymology of the term and also the term '*parimaṇḍala*' as 'an absolute unit-value', the transcendental scale of the measures. The term '*parimaṇḍala*' cannot be described as 'circular' as it is non-spatial category to the Vaiśeṣikas who admit atom as imperceptible due to the failure of sense-organs to reveal it. Hence to the Vaiśeṣikas atom being an absolute object can be the object of yogic perception.

The paper entitled: 'Syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṁgraha and Tarkadīpikā' by Yelena Ostrovskaya is a masterpiece of writing on the historical development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the place of Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa in it. Many problems have been raised with regard to *Tarkasaṁgraha* and *Dīpikā* and their probable solutions have been suggested. Personally I would not think of such a thought provoking article on *Tarkasaṁgraha* and *Tarkadīpikā*, which are stated to be written for easy understanding of the neophytes (*bālānaṁ sukhabodhāya*), had I not seen it in this anthology. Like other treatises of Indian systems *Tarkadīpikā* comments on the Ultimate end or Emancipation which can only be attained through the elimination of false cognition by the true one. It is beautifully observed that Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa was neither a mystic nor an ascetic, but a rationalist having adequate respect for logic. The realistic attitude of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is mainly manifested in the distinction between attribute and the possessor of attribute (*dharma-dharmibheda*), which is found in each and every type of determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*). From this it follows that they do not accept the existence of an object, which does not come under the list of the seven

categories. To them the absence of sky-flower, *bandhyāputra* etc. cannot be taken for granted because their absentees are absurd entities (*alīkapratiyogikābhāva*). As these objects do not possess a relation called *dharma-dharmibhāva* and they cannot be included in any of the seven accepted categories, these concepts do not find entry into their logic. In Vedānta *dharmin* alone is accepted as real, because *ātman* is interpreted as ultimately Real. But in Buddhism the existence of *Ātman* is denied and there the descriptive languages are not taken as ultimately real but as imaginary ascriptions (*kalpanā*). The problem whether Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa's *Dīpikā* is a *ṭikā* or not is discussed at length and a conclusion has been drawn in favour of the relationship between these two texts as 'the same between a methodological plan and a monograph, the plan's concrete realization'. As an observer I personally suggest the term '*bhāṣya*' instead of *ṭikā* to the philosophical literature called *Dīpikā*, because it gives interpretation of what is given in the *Tarkasaṁgraha* and it serves the function of interpretating the text presented as a *sūtra*-form with the sentences framed according to the wordings of the *sūtra*. It is justified as per the definition of the *bhāṣya* also, which runs as follows: '*sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra vākyaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ/svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ//*' (V.S. Apte: *Students Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 405, Delhi, 1987).

Vladimir Shokhin is his article: 'Ancient Sāṁkhya-Yoga: An Aspect of the Tradition' has shown the contribution of the *Yoga*-teachers in general and Jaigisavya in particular. In the history of *Yoga*-tradition the text written by Jaigisavya has not attracted much attention of scholars. Vyāsa has not properly evaluated the position of Jaigisavya in his commentary on the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali-11/55. While critically evaluating the views of the contemporary thinkers, Jaigisavya's view is discussed in the said *bhāṣya*. To him he is the only thinker in this field who recommends 'the gather of all his thoughts' (*samāhṛtya kartuṁ*) and then to gather the senses. To him only an individual working through the practice of *yoga* can attain the highest state.

Alexei Pimenov has discussed the correlation of the philosophical and ritualistic aspects of Mīmāṁsā, which contains very interesting philosophical generalizations including two most significant theories on the *Pramāṇa* and the philosophico-linguistic interpretation of it. The author has thrown some light on the very basic notion of *Dharma* admitted by them as eternal, *apauruṣeya* and infallible, which is based on the second

sūtra of Jaimini (1.1.2.) and its commentaries. The meaning of the term '*artha*' as incorporated in the *Dharmasūtra* is interpreted as 'something useful or beneficial' as per Śabara which is very much praiseworthy. The epistemological portion (*Pramāṇa*) of this system was so strong that Dignāga, the celebrated Buddhist logician, recognized Mīmāṁsā as a separate significant philosophical school. In this context it would not be totally uncalled for if I mention its role in the Navya Nyāya text—*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, where Gaṅgeśa, a celebrated Navya Naiyāyika, took the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas as his major opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) due to their perfection and excellence in logical analysis of the epistemological problems. Before the advent of Navya Nyāya, Buddhists were the main opponents of the older school of Nyāya.

Natalya Isayeva has made some critical observations on the Saṁkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. To him the self-denial is not at all possible. If it is said that *Ātman* is not present, it is tantamount to accepting the existence of Self, which is the key-logic of accepting *Ātman* as a Reality. Self is sometimes superimposed on non-self in this empirical world, which is called *adhyāsa*. The author has mentioned that Saṁkara has accepted two levels of reality—Ultimate Reality (*pāramārthika satya*) and phenomenal reality (*vyavahārika satya*). From this one could raise a question: what would be the status of apparent reality (*prātibhāsikasattā*)? Is it not a reality at all? If it is not, how will Saṁkara explain illusion as *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* (as something different from both reality and unreality)? All these questions are left unanswered by the author. It is true that Saṁkara 'assigns the word a cataphatic role' as it is connected with approaching *Īśvara* or *saguṇa Brahman* (i.e., consciousness endowed with *Māyā*). All these linguistic exercises have no relevance to an individual who has realized the *Nirguṇa Brahman*, the Ultimate Reality. That is why the *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* (secondary characteristic features) of Brahman are applicable to God or *saguṇa Brahman* alone, but *svarūpalakṣaṇa* (i.e., essential characteristic features) of Brahman lie on the *Nirguṇa Brahman* alone.

Vsevolod Sementsov has beautifully interpreted the commentary of Rāmānuja of the *Bhagavadgītā*. The author has shown some logical paradoxes in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy so far as the nature of the Absolute is concerned. The Absolute to them is both subject and object simultaneously and it is non-dual having some properties etc. Methodologically the author had found some similarities with Plato's style of philosophizing. In

the *Gītābhāṣya* it is said that, though God possesses numerous good qualities, he is immutable. While justifying Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Vedic texts, the author has rightly justified various interpretations of the same texts. He thinks that Indian commentators teach their students not objective but concrete personal truth. Hence it may vary from person to person.

Vladislav Kostyuchenko in his paper entitled: 'The Modernization of Vedānta' has given an account of the Neo-Vedānta as propounded by Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghosh. Vivekananda has made an effort 'to identify the conclusions and method of Advaita Vedānta with those of modern science'. Saṁkara ontologically does not accept any statement which is authority-free and which is based on scientific approach. On the other hand, Vivekananda interprets *Vedānta* as a scientific religion. Sri Aurobindo also rejects *Māyāvāda* of Saṁkara due to some inconsistencies in accepting it. The author has analytically represented the philosophical excellence involved in the theories of evolution. Sri Aurobindo believes in the transformation of humanity into superhumanity. Both Sri Aurobindo and Vivekananda share a common view of an ideal of general emancipation and a society of the emancipated in a disembodied manner (*jīvanmukta*). To Sri Aurobindo only *yoga* can bring a man's perfection, which is not equivalent to *mokṣa*, but a peculiar amalgamation of *mukti* (emancipation) and *bhukti* (pleasure). In this way both the contemporary thinkers have given a modern interpretation of Vedānta.

In the essay 'Neo-Vedantism and Saṁkara's Concept of the Illusory Nature of the World' Olga Mezentseva has made an attempt to explain three different levels of existence: transcendental (*pāramārthika*), phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) and illusory (*prātibhāsika*) nature of the world. The author has surveyed different interpretations of *Māyā* given by Rammohun Roy, Dayananda Sarasvati, Aurobindo Ghosh, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi etc. Especially Gandhi's contribution lies in his rejection of Saṁkara's *Māyāvāda*, in interpreting various philosophical concepts relating to the meaning and purpose of life, considering *Śruti* and *Smṛti* to be equally reliable etc. In this way he has evaluated the contribution of Vivekananda, Rammohun Roy etc. so far as their non-Vedantism is concerned.

Marietta Stepanyants has evaluated Mahammad Iqbal as an Islamic reformer. Iqbal did not accept the view that intuition is isolated from reason, but they are interconnected. When a man's egoism reaches its

relative perfection, a man, Iqbal thinks, gets its place in the heart of the Divine Creative energy. At this stage, having a freedom of will, he is regarded as a creator, as a partner of God. Iqbal has accepted the *Sufi* interpretation of the relationship between good and evil that comes from God. It is contrary to what is stated in the *Koran*.

The philosophical and socio-political views of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad have been highlighted in a very precise and critical manner by Marietta Stepanyants. In the translation of the *Koran* into Urdu and in the commentaries Azad has admitted that all the commentaries do not represent the true meaning of the *Koran*, because they have always a biased opinion about it. That is why the *Koran* is distorted in course of time. He thinks that his interpretation of the same is represented in a simplified manner so that it is easily understood. The origin of the word '*Allah*' is the admiration of the Almighty Creator, which is expressed as '*Illah*', meaning 'wonder and the humbleness of man'. It is very much significant that Azad has emphasized the fact that the *Koran* regards justice and punishment as a result of an individual's action, but not as whims of God. Moreover, Azad has shown his originality when he, unlike Gandhi, allows violence in struggle and when he expresses the view that the main objective of religion is to bind people together. He thinks that at present religion has fallen into unworthy hands.

Alexei Litman draws our attention towards Radhakrishnan's Perennial Philosophy. Radhakrishnan does not subscribe to the view that a man is an 'intellectual animal' or 'thinking machine', but he thinks that 'there is something divine in every man', which is inherent in him. He attaches a great importance to morality of human being, which is founded on the principle—'faith and behaviour go hand-in-hand'. The author has mentioned Radhakrishnan's task of philosophy like explaining this world, truth constituting the essence of being etc., which have left some importance and uniqueness in philosophical methodology. He has also pointed out the scepticism as a valuable method, as it gives rise to inquiry, which reminds me of Vātsyāyana's observation on the importance of the category of doubt—'*Nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravarttate, api tu saṁśayite'rthe*' (i.e., logic cannot be applied to an unknown and determined object but to an object which is in doubt) on *Nyāyasūtra*—1.1.1. It substantiates the author's position.

The paper 'Neo-Hinduism: A Continual Duality' by Vladimir Melikov highlights reformatory trend in the ideas of Neo-Hinduism, which is found

in the philosophical works of M.K. Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Aurobindo Ghosh, and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. All of them have tried to renew religion as an instrument that can unite all sections of Indian society for the sake of the Nation's independence. Neo-Hinduism explains the traditional religious and philosophical conceptions in a new method and approach after considering the need of the society and human beings.

III

First, almost all the systems of Indian philosophy including recent Indian thinkers are represented in this Volume in a very analytic way. Apart from the traditional systems of Indian philosophy some of the essays have dealt at length with the economic value as promoted by Kautilya in this *Arthaśāstra* and by the *Lokāyatikas*. Hence it is really a history of Indian philosophy as it includes almost all dimensions and views of Indian thinkers starting from the ancient times to recent times, which deserves our praise. Secondly, though various scholars of Russia have contributed their articles on different subjects of Indian philosophy as per their understanding of the original texts, it is not proper to call it '*a Russian viewpoint*', which is the sub-title of the book. I do not understand in what respect this analysis of the texts is called '*Russian*'. Each and every theory having a solid logical foundation may be called *philosophical*, which is essential for an article being philosophical. I think analysis has no racial colour like Russian etc. At least I do not find anything special in all the articles, which may be described as Russian methodology. Though some of the writers are influenced by the Marxist ideology (*Preface*, p. x), which was dominant in Russia, it cannot be described as purely Russian due to having the existence of this ideology in other countries also. Thirdly, the book is not free from printing errors in spelling and diacritical marks, as for example *śarīra* printed as *śarira* (p. 134), *śāstrayonitvāt* printed as *sastvayonitvat* (p. 118), *yogyatā* printed as *yogutā* (p. 113), *apekṣābuddhi* printed as *apekṣābuddha* (p. 69) etc., which may kindly be corrected in the next edition of this book. Lastly, in spite of having these defects the book is a treasure house of the philosophical jewels of India, which should carefully be protected for our future generations. All the essays, being the result of sincere studies on the subject, open a new vista on traditional understanding of the philosophical concepts. Some of the problems concerning theories on the *Bhagavadgītā*, *Sāṁkhya-yoga*, *Vaiśeṣika*,

Samkarabhāṣya etc. are long cherished and discussed. I was personally enlightened with the answers after going through these. Other sincere readers, I believe, would be enlightened in the like manner. At last I congratulate the Editor and ICPR for preparing and publishing such a beautiful, priceless book.

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BART DESSEIN: *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya: Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions*, 3 Parts, Buddhist Tradition Series, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Rs 2000

The work concerned is the first annotated English translation of the Chinese version of Dharmatrāta's (4th century) *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*. According to the author, the text is the last of a series of treatises summarizing the *Sarvāstivāda* philosophy (which flourished in Bactria-Gandhara/Kashmir), and is based on Dharmaśreṣthin's (between 220 BC–AD 220) *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (commented on by Upaśānta of 3rd century in *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*). The next treatise in the series, Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, the author says, is a Sautrāntika revision of Dharmatrāta's Vaibhāṣika influenced treatise.

Besides rendering the English translation of the Chinese version (by Sanghavarman of 5th century) of the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (referred to as SAH hereafter), the first part of the book also contains a very brief introduction. In the introduction the author gives (i) a general description of Abhidharma works, and (ii) a doctrinal comparison of (a) both Bactria-Gandhara Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma works, and (b) other Sarvāstivāda treatises and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (referred to hereafter as AK). Readers will be especially benefited by the author's meticulous noting (pp. lxxi-lxix) of the points of agreement and difference between the SAH and the AK. The author speaks of twenty-one cases of divergence between the SAH and AK, six of which concern the actual doctrine. Some of them are as follows:

SAH (stanza 172) mentions seven contaminants (*anuśayas*). AK (I, ch. 5, stanza 1) mentions only six.

AK (I, ch. 5, 37–38) reduces the five groups of defilements (*kleśas*) of S.A.H. (stanza 200) to four.

AK (I, ch. 5, 47–8) reduces the ten outbursts of dormant passions (*paryavasthāna*) of SAH (stanza 207) to eight.

SAH (stanza 58) gives an account of ten factors arising with every defiled awareness (*kleśamahābhūmika*). The corresponding stanza in AK reduces the number to six.

Part II of SAH consists of extremely helpful and elaborate notes on the text of Part I. Readers will be immensely benefited by the Part III which consists of: (a) table of contents to the English translation of the Chinese text (Part I), (b) a Sanskrit Index of technical terms, (c) a Chinese–Sanskrit, an English–Sanskrit and a Sanskrit–English Glossary, (d) a General Index, (e) a concordance, and (f) a facsimilie of the Chinese text.

I would now attempt to give an extremely brief resumé of the contents of the corpus of the English translation of SAH (*a task that should have been done by the author himself*), with a view *both* to make the readers have some *general acquaintance* with the topics discussed in SAH and *to make some comments on the translation.*

We learn from the English translation of the SAH that the work is divided into eleven chapters.

A comparison with AK will reveal that the contents of chapters 1, 3, 4–7 of SAH have their counterparts in chapters 1 (*Dhātunirdeśa*), 4 (*Karmanirdeśa*), 5 (*Anuśayanirdeśa*), 6 (*Pudgalanirdeśa*), 7 (*Jñānanirdeśa*) of AK. Contents of chapters 2, 8–11 of SAH have been incorporated in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6 of AK. To be more specific, (i) contents of chapter 2 (*Indriyanideśa*) of AK grow out of the contents of chapters 2, 8 and 9 of SAH; (ii) some contents of chapter 3 (*Lokanirdeśa*) of AK grow out of those of 8–10 of SAH; (iii) contents of chapter 3 of AK grow out of chapter 8 (*Sūtravarga*) of SAH. We quote below a *very brief* outline of the contents discussed in the eleven chapters of the translation of SAH.

CHAPTER I, *DHĀTUVARGA*

In Kārikās 3–6 the *dharmas* are classified into *sāsrava* (impure) and *anāsrava* (pure). They are again divided into *saṃskṛta* (conditioned), and *asaṃskṛta* [unconditioned = *ākāśa* (ether), *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*]. *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is liberation through knowledge of the four noble truths by destroying impurities. This

cessation through knowledge is attained by *srotāpannas*, *sakṛdāgāmins* and *anāgāmins*.[1] *Apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is the liberation through the complete cessation of causes and conditions of *duḥkha* (suffering) and *jāti* (birth) by *meditation*.[2] Kārikās 7–21 classify the *saṃskṛta dharmas* into: (i) *skandha* (aggregates), (ii) *āyatana* (sense-fields) and *dhātu* (elements). *Skandha* represents the collection of *rūpa* (matter), *vedanā* (feeling), *vijñāna* (consciousness), *saṃjñā* (conception) and *saṃskāra* (conditioning factors).[3] *Rūpa* is analyzed in kārikā 15 as *varṇa* and *saṃsthāna* (configuration), *Śabda* (audible) is divided in kārikā 15 into (i) *upāttamahābhūmika*, viz. sound of the great elements which have the 'power of perception' (viz. sound of voice), (2) *anupāttamahābhūmikā*, viz. sound of the great elements having no 'power of perception' (viz. sound of wind, bell, etc.). It should be noted in this context that the literal translation of the word '*anupāttamahābhūmika*' is here misleading. The author should have commented that this sound is produced by unconscious material objects. *Gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste), *sparśṭavya* are analyzed in detail in this context.

Vedanāskandha (feelings of pleasure, pain), *saṃjñāskandha* (conceptualized perception) and *saṃskāraskandha* (which is unintelligibly translated as 'conditioning factors' in kārikā 7), but which really represents mental phenomena (like volition) associated with *vijñāna*, and *vijñānaskandha* (six forms of consciousness produced by the senses and mind) are expounded in this context.

Chapter I, in kārikās 8–15 also mentions the second classification of *saṃskāra skandha* as *āyatana* (usually translated as 'gateway of cognition', but vaguely translated as 'sense-field' by Dessein).

Āyatana is of 12 kinds: six *ādhyātmikāyatana* (internal 'sense-fields') and six *bāhyāyatana* (external 'sense-fields' = objects of five senses and *manas*). The *āyatana* classification rejects the conception of soul.

Kārikās 20–27 classify the *saṃskṛta dharmas* into eighteen *dhātus* (elements): (i) five senses + *manas*, (ii) corresponding objects, and (iii) six resulting forms of *vijñāna* (consciousness).

Kārikā 24 states the reason why the Buddha classified *saṃskṛta dharmas* into groups of *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*. [The preaching of (i) *skandhas*: for those under delusion (because of their dependence on fate), and are yet possessed of sharp intellect and desirous of having a brief introduction to the real nature of things; (ii) *āyatanas*: for those possessed of medium intellect, (iii) *dhātus*: for those who are ignorant regarding matter and awareness, and having dull intellect.]

In kārikās 27–50 the *dhātus* are grouped into diads and triads in accordance with their characteristics like visibility, resistance and moral qualities like good and bad. In the *kāmadhātu* (which Dessein unfortunately translates as 'the realm of sexual passion', neglecting thereby the better translation of it, 'the realm of sensual existence') all the eighteen *dhātus* exist. In the *rūpadhātu* (realm of form) only 14 *dhatus*, and in the *ārūpyadhātu* (realm of formlessness) only *manodhātu*, *dharmadhātu* and *manovijñānadhātu* exist. In discussing the group of triads, the text makes a diversion and discusses the different forms of *vyākaraṇa* (of answering questions) in kārikās 28–29. (i) Some questions are *ekāṃśavyākaraṇa* (analyzed by absolute affirmation), (ii) some are *vibhajyavyākaraṇa* (analyzed by dividing the question into parts), (iii) some are *paripṛcchāvyākaraṇa* (analyzed by asking further questions to the interlocutor), (iv) some are *sthāpanīvyākaraṇa* (analyzed by saying that the question is unanswerable). [Incidentally, the author's misleading translations of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are: 'elucidation': 'by absolute affirmation', 'by analyzing', 'by questioning' and 'by saying that the matter is to be avoided']. In elucidating the *sthāpanīyavyākaraṇa*, the English commentary remarks: 'one has to avoid (the question) ... Because, it is not proper. If ... there is the question, whether it is good to respect the child of a stone lady ... how can one answer? ... since a stone lady does not have a child'. (p. 43). The Sanskrit term *vandhyāputra/śīlaputraka* is normally translated as 'the son of a barren woman'. A stone sculpture may represent a lady with a child. The question asked, in that case would not be *sthāpanīyavyākaraṇa*. However, the question asked with regard to the child of a barren woman would be so, inasmuch as the concept of such a child is contradictory.

Kārikā 32 discussed whether *vitarka* (initial thought) and *vicāra* (sustained thought[4]) are associated with every *dhātu*. Kārikās 33–49 are devoted to a discussion of whether some *dhātus* are endowed with certain characteristics [viz. (a) having *ālambana* (support), having *avayava* (parts), being (i) *bhautika* (physical), *vipākaja* (a natural outcome), (c) capable of being abandoned (*heya*) with *darśana* (insight), with *bhāvanā* (spiritual path) etc.]

Kārikās 46–7 are devoted to a discussion of the functioning and non-functioning of the different sense organs in different *bhūmis* (stages of meditation). A substantial portion of the translation of the text, of kārikā

47 (also the kārikās following it) do not have any reference to the original Sanskrit/Chinese terms, resulting in the translation being incomprehensible.

CHAPTER II, *SAṂSKĀRAVARGA*

This chapter elucidates mainly the formation of *saṃskrtadharmas* depending on causes and conditions.

Kārikās 56–60 discuss the *caitasikadharmas* (factors arising with different awareness). They are classified as follows:

(a) Ten *mahābhūmikas* (general factors accompanying every consciousness) like *vedanā*, *cetanā chanda* (desire to do), *smṛti* (mindfulness) etc.
(b) Ten *kuśalamahābhūmikas* (good factors arising with every good awareness) such as *śraddhā* (faith), *apramāda* (heedfulness), *praśrabdhi* (tranquillity), *apatrāpa* (modesty) etc.
(c) Six *kleśamahābhūmikas* (factors arising with every defiled awareness), such as *mithyādhimokṣa* (false resolve), *ayoniśomanskāra* (unresolved awareness), etc.
(d) Ten *parittakleśabhūmika*, factors acquired with partially defiled awareness such as *krodha* (anger), *upanāha* (vengefulness), *māyā* (deceipt), *īrṣyā* (envy), *mrakṣa* (hypocrisy) etc. In explaining *īrṣyā*, the author wrongly translates *pūjā*[5] as respect: 'not standing the benefits, respect (*pūjā*) of someone else is called envy' (p. 99).
(e) Twelve *avyākṛta* (neutral) mental properties such as *kaukṛtya* (regret), *middha* (sleepiness) etc.

The *caitasika dharmas* are arranged further in kārikās 63–7, according to the different *bhūmis* (stages of meditation) in which they appear. [*Caitasika dharmas* in *kāmadhātu* are *kuśala* (good), *akuśala* (bad), *nivṛtyākāra* (obscured neutral). The *caitasika dharmas* in first *dhyāna* (trance)[6] of *rūpadhātu* are *mahābhūmikas*, *kuśalamahābhūmikas* etc. The stage between the first and second *dhyānas* is devoid of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. The stage from the second *dhyāna* upto *ārūpya dhyāna* is devoid of *vicāra*.]

A number of *cittaviprayukta saṃskaras* are discussed in kārikās 65–67. They consist of *prāpti* (acquisition), *aprāpti* (non-acquisition), *jāti* (birth), *jarā* (decay), *vyaya* (disappearance) (a) *asaṃjnī-* and (b) *nirodha-samāpatti* [meditative attainment (a) without conception and (b) of cessation],[7] *nāma* + *vyañjana* + *padakāya* (groups of names, syllables and sentences).

Kārikās 68–78 discuss the division of *hetus* (causes) into six classes, viz. *kāraṇa* (efficient),[8] *sahabhū* (*simultaneous*), *sabhāga* (homogeneous), *sarvatraga* (pervasive) and *samprayuktaka* (associated) *hetus*. The prose commentary on kārikā 75 explaining the last *hetu* does not refer to any original Sanskrit/Chinese source material and is consequently incomprehensible. Kārikās 83–88 discuss the four *pratyayas* (conditions) [viz. *samanantara-* (direct antecedent), *ālambana-* (supporting object), *adhipati-* (dominant) and *hetu-pratyaya* (general condition)]. As the author does not bother to give any Sanskrit/Chinese equivalents to English words used in kārikās 87–88, explaining *kāraṇa-hetu* and *adhipati-pratyaya*, the kārikās are consequently hardly intelligible.

Kārikās 89–95 are devoted to discussions (a) of *pariccheda* (limitations) of *nāma*, *rūpa* and *kāla* (time), (b) of the increase of matter from atom to gross objects, and (c) of the measures of beings like humans and gods, and of time.

CHAPTER III, *KARMAVARGA*

In kārikās 98–9 *karman* (actions) are analyzed as *kāyika* (bodily), *vācika* (verbal) and *mānasika* (mental). The first two are analyzed as *vijñapti-* (manifesting) and *avijñapti-* (unmanifesting) *karman* in kārikās 99–108. In explaining *avijñapti-śīla* the author makes some obscure remarks on p. 102: 'the three roots of merit ... is spoken of because of superiority as such formations as greed are as wind moves in timber and the sound of syllables.' *Avijñapti-karman* may be *kuśala*, *akuśala* and *avyākṛta* (neutral). There are 3 sorts of *avijñapti-karman* (kārikās 102–19): *saṃvara* (restraint), *asaṃvara* (non-restraint) and *naivāsaṃvara-nāsaṃvara* (neither). *Saṃvara* is of three sorts: (a) *prātimokṣa-* (restraint of observing moral precepts), (b) *dhyāna-* (restraint of meditation), and (c) *anāsrava-* (pure restraint). Kārikās 119–123 discuss how the above *saṃvaras* are terminated (as in perpetrating heinous offences called the *pārājikas*). *Anāsrava-saṃvara*, as discussed in kārikās 104–121 is the pure discipline of the *śaikṣa* (seeker) and the *aśaikṣa* (adept).

The *asaṃvara-karman* (kārikās 114–18) comprises the immoral acts, terminated by the acquisition of *prātimokṣa-saṃvara* and *cyuti* (death). In the absence of Sanskrit/Chinese equivalent terms, the translation (pp. 178–80, 188–90, 202–3) of kārikās 118, 127 and 138 and their commentaries remain difficult to comprehend.

Karman is further analyzed as: (a) *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *aduḥkhāsukha-vedanīya-karman* (actions with pleasant, unpleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant feelings), (b) *kṛṣṇa* and *śuklavipāka-karman* (actions with black and white retribution), and (c) various combinations of the two. It is to be noted that without further classification by the author, of the concepts of 'black' and 'white' retribution, the concepts remain vague.

Kārikās 138–58 give a description of *kuśala* and *akuśala-patha* (paths) of *karman*, their causes and effects (*adhipati-phala* = dominant fruit, *niṣyanda-phala* = natural fruit, *vipāka-phala* = fruit of retribution, *puruṣākāra-phala* = fruit of human effort and *visaṃyoga-phala* = fruit of disjunction).

Kārikās 164–71 describe the two *āvaraṇas* (obstructions): (a) *ānantarya-karman* (sinful actions because of which one goes immediately to hell,[9] viz. killing of mother, father, *arhat*, creating schism in *saṃgha* and causing the Buddha to bleed), and (b) *kleśa* (defilement).

CHAPTER IV, *ANUŚAYAVARGA*

The *anuśayas* (contaminants) are analyzed in kārikās 172–3 as 98. Six primary *anuśayas* are: *kāma* and *bhava-rāga* (attachment to sensual pleasure and existence), *pratigha* (repugnance), *dṛṣṭi* (contaminant view), *vicikitsā* (perplexity),[10] *māna* (pride), *avidyā* (ignorance). Kārikās 177–80 analyze different sorts of *dṛṣṭi*. Kārikās 176–7 mention that 36 *anuśayas* arise in *kāmadhātu*, and 31 *anuśayas* arise in the *rūpa* and *ārūpya-dhātus*. The English translation, in the context of explaining *sarvatragānuśaya* (p. 183), speaks of the sphere of *naivāsaṃjñī-nāsaṃjñī* as the 'sphere of neither identification nor -non-identification'. A better translation would be: 'neither conceptualization nor -non-conceptualization'. Kārikā 180–93 discuss how the *anuśayas* are developed with *ālambanas* and how they are abandoned (*heya*) through *darśana/bhāvanā* (vision/spiritual meditational practice). Kārikās 189–96 discuss various modes of development of *anuśayas* in the three *dhātus*. *Sarvatragānuśaya* of the 3 *dhātus* are developed by various supporting objects. However, when an *anuśaya* is with a pure *ālambana* it is not developed by it. The reason, the author says is: 'the object is disjunctioned' (*visaṃyukta*). The term 'disjunctioned' here, as well as in pp. 359, 369 and 389 should be replaced by the grammatically correct word 'disjoined'. [Similar grammatically incorrect words occur in other contexts of the text, viz. 'perfectioned' (pp. 324f) and 'it are'[11]].

Kārikās 200–14 are devoted to an exposition of some *anuśayas* grouped as *yoga* (entanglement), *ogha* (floods), *upādāna* (seizures),[12] *bandhana* (bonds), *saṃyojana* (fetters), *paryavasthānas* (envelopers), *mala* (defilement) and *upakleśa* (secondary afflictions). *Upādāna*, *upakleśa*, *paryavasthāna* and *mala* are analyzed in accordance with their different forms. Kārikās 220–4 give us a detailed study of how *prahāṇa* (abandoning) and *parijñā* (comprehension) of *kleśas* take place in six moments: in the rise of *pratipakṣa* (antidote) of the moment of attaining the four fruits of *śramaṇaship*,[13] and in the perfection of *indriyas*. *Prajñā* is twofold: *jñānaparijñā* (full comprehension without impurities) and *prahāṇa parijñā* (full overcoming by comprehension). This *prahāṇa* = overcoming through different sorts of *darśana* is discussed in kārikās 222–31. Pages 300–1 and 304–5, discussing some of them, are illegible.

CHAPTER V, *ĀRYAVARGA*

This chapter engages itself with a discussion of the āryas (noble ones like *srotāpanna* and the like) and the paths leading to liberation.

Kārikās 234–5 are devoted to the exposition of *bhāvanās* (meditation) which a person, qualified to be liberated through it, practices (by first practising *áśubha-bhāvanā* = contemplation on repulsive objects like the skeleton to which all beings are destined to be reduced and, thereafter, practising *anāpanasmṛti* = mindfulness on breathing in and breathing out).

Kārikās 234–42 review the four *smṛtyupasthānas* (application of mindfulness on the nature of body, feeling, awareness, etc.). Development of *smṛtyupasthānas* helps one to acquire the four *kuśalamūlas* (roots of merit), viz. *uṣmā* (warmth of intuition), *mūrdhaṇ* (summit of intuition), *kṣānti* (patience) and *laukikāgradharma* (the highest worldly factor developed by the worldling).

Kārikās 244–52 give us a description of the *aryas* as *śraddhānusārin* (faith follower), *dharmānusārin* (doctrine follower), *dṛṣṭiprāpta* (view attainer), *srotāpanna*, *sakṛdāgāmin*, *anāgāmin*, *kulaṃkula* (reborn in the same family), *saptapādaśivarviṣa* (the author comments, 'just as when bitten by the snake of seven steps', p. 337).[14] Kārikās 252–65 mention other classes of *āryas* depending on *gotra* (lineage), *indriya*, path of progress, striving with/without *virya* (vigour), also *aryas* as *ūrdhaṃsrota* (one liberated by going upward in the stream), et al. The author's

translation of the three kinds of *ūrdhaṃsrotas* as 'leaping' (*pluta*), 'half-leaping' (*ardhapluta*) and 'fallen in every place' (*sarvacyuta*) on p. 349 is unintelligible. He should have taken more care to explain the technical terms.

CHAPTER VI, *JÑĀNAVARGA*

This chapter gives a detailed description of different kinds of *jñāna* (knowledge) and the *avenika dharmas* (unique qualities of the Buddha).

Kārikās 287–307 discuss ten kinds of *jñāna* and their moral qualities. Among them are included *jñāna* of: *dharma* (the law of dependent origination), *saṃvṛti* (convention), *duḥkha*, its origin, cessation and the path to it, *paracitta* (other minds) and *kṣaya* (destruction) of all *saṃskṛta dharmas*. Kārikās 314–15 discuss the point that *darśana*, *jñāna* and *prajñā* are not always identical.

Avenika dharmas as discussed in kārikās 320–30 are: 10 *balas* (powers), 4 *vaiśāradyas* (confidences), 3 *smṛtyupasthānas* and *mahākaruṇā* (great compassion).

Kārikās 319–29 are devoted to a detailed enunciation of six *abhijnās*[15] (higher faculties of comprehension), three *vidyās*[16] (understanding).

CHAPTER VII, *SAMĀDHIVARGA*

This chapter deals with an exposition of different *samādhis* (concentration) [viz. *dhyānas*, *samapāttis* (meditative attainments)] and a few related topics.

In kārikās 341–3 we get a brief account of the four *rūpadhyānas* (trances of the realm of form). The first *dhyāna* contains (i) *vitarka*, (ii) *vicāra*, (iii) *prīti*, (iv) *sukha* (satisfaction), and (v) *cittaikāgratā* (undivided attention). The second *dhyāna* is devoid of (i) and (ii), and contains (iii), (iv) and (v), in addition to *adhyātmasamprasāda* (spiritual tranquillity). The third *dhyāna* contains, besides (iv) and (v), *smṛti*, *samprajanya* (tranquillization), *upekṣā* (equanimity). The fourth *dhyāna* is characterized by (iv), (v) and the neutral feeling of *aduḥkhāsukhatā*.

The stage prior to absorption in meditation is the preparatory pre-trance state of *anāgamyadhyāna*. According to kārikā 346, there is an intermediate state of meditative absorption known as *dhyānāntara*.

Kārikā 340 is devoted to an enunciation of the *śuddhaka* (clean) *dhyāna*, characterized as being *hānabhāgīya* (connected to falling back),

sthitibhāgīya (conducive to maintenance), *viśeṣabhāgīya* (connected to progress) and *nirvedabhāgīya* (connected to penetration). The translation of kārikā 343 and its commentary on the subject of the fourth *dhyāna*, having four members, remains difficult to comprehend without any reference to corresponding Sanskrit/Chinese equivalent terms.

Kārikās 347–8 are devoted to analyses of the *samādhis* of (i) *śūnyata* (emptiness), (ii) *animittata*[17] (signlessness) and *apraṇihitatā* (aimlessness).[18]

Kārikās 348–9 give an account of four *apramāṇasamāpattis* (unlimited meditative attainments), which are also known as *brahmavihāra* (= lofty behaviour of mind), viz. *maitrī* (loving kindness),[19] *karuṇā* (compassion), *muditā* (sympathy) and *upekṣa*.

Kārikās 357–9 analyze four forms of *arūpyadhyāna*, which are regarded as *mūla-* (fundamental) *dhyānas*. Kārikās 350–60 discuss the eight *vimokṣas* (liberations), eight *abhibhavāyatana* (states or spheres of mastery) and ten *kṛtsnāytanas* (state or spheres of totality).

CHAPTER VIII, *SŪTRAVARGA*

This chapter is devoted to a number of related but variegated topics. The deep meanings of several remarks of the *Tathāgata* (which were gleaned in the form of a *sūtra*) are sought to be analyzed in this chapter. The topics concerned are mainly: *dāna* (giving), *śīla* (moral precepts), *bhāvanā*. The points discussed *inter alia* are the related concepts of *pratītyasmutpāda* (dependent origination), fruits of *śramaṇa*ship, *avetyaprasāda* (perfect faith), *pañcagatyaḥ* (the five courses of being), the supremacy of *indriyas*.

Dāna and *śila* are discussed in kārikās 381–96. *Dāna* is motivated by proper *cetanā* (thinking)[20] associated with *kuśalamūla* and *alobha* (absence of greed). It consists of bodily and verbal *karman* and the given thing. *Dāna* is motivated by several considerations.

Again, *dāna* may be out of hope, fear, because of reciprocity, because of 'familiar'[21] regularity, for fame (*kīrti*), because of decorating the awareness (*cittālaṃkārtham*), for 'subjecting the awareness' (*pariṣkār* [ar] tham),[22] for following spiritual practice (*yogasambhārātham*).

Meritorious givings result in acquiring the fruit of *arhatship*, viz. *maitrīcitta* (awareness of loving kindness), *araṇāsamādhi* (*samādhi* without fighting), *darśanamārga* (the path of insight).

Kārikā 392 discusses the merit of giving to various persons, giving scriptural expositions (*dharmadāna*) and fearlessness (*abhayadāna*). Kārikā

396 says that *mahādāna* is teaching *śīlsaṃvara* (*prātimokṣa-* + *dhyāna-* + *anāsrava-* + *prahāṇa-saṃvara*).

Kārikā 399 discusses different forms of *bhāvanā*, viz. (i) *pratilambha* (that which is obtaining), (ii) *niṣevana* (that which is development), *aśubha-bhāvanā* and *anāpanasmṛti*.[23]

Kārikā 400 discusses the sixteen rūpa-heavens in accordance with *dhyānas*: (i) heavens of *braḥmapurohita*, *braḥmakāyika* and *mahābraḥma*; (ii) heavens of *paritta/apramāṇa* (of limited/unlimited ones), *ābha* (radiant ones), *ābhāsvara* (shining ones); (iii) heavens of *śūbha* (magnificent ones), *paritta/apramāṇa* (limited/unlimited), *śubhakṛtsna* (entirely magnificent ones); (iv) heavens of *anabhraka* (unclouded ones), *puṇyaprasava* (ones of increased merit), *bṛhatphala* (having great fruits), *atapā* (untroubled ones), *akaṇiṣṭha* (highest ones) etc. The four *arūpya* heavens are *āyatana* (spheres) of: *ākāśānanta* (unlimited space), *vijñānanta* (unlimited consciousness), *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā-āyatanas*.

Kārikās 401–2 deal with the seven *vijñānasthitis* (abodes where consciousness enjoys supreme satisfaction) and nine *sattāvāsas* (residences of gods who go to *nirvāṇa*).

Kārikās 403–9 discuss the *dvādaśaṃga* (twelve-membered) law of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In the English translation of the commentary of kārikā 409, discussing *sambandhikapratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination proceeding by connection), the author makes an unintelligible statement on p. 536: 'Because all members of existence are present in the period of a kṣaṇa being instantaneous is spoken of just as the *vijñānakāyaśāstra* says regarding the thing of decoration' (p. 536).

Kārikā 410 discusses kinds of *jāti* of humans and non-humans like *aṇḍaja* (born from womb), *upapāduka* (magically born), and five *gatis* (courses), namely human, gods, ghosts and hellish beings.

A detailed discussion on *caturāryasatya* and four *śrāmanyaphalas* (fruits of *śramaṇa*-ship) is taken up in kārikās 412–14. This is followed, in kārikās 415–16, by observations on the *kṣipra* (quick) path of the *śraddhānusāri* and the *dhandha* (slow) path of the *dharmānusari* (doctrine follower) which is marked by progress on satisfaction.

The discussion on *śraddhānusāri* naturally leads to an exposition, in kārikās 416–17, of *avetyaprasāda* in the Buddha, *dharma* and *saṅgha*. In discussing the characteristic marks that lead to *samādhibhāvanā* (development of concentration), the translation of kārikā 418 states: 'The acquisition of the knowledge of birth and death is *said*[24] to be called, knowledge

of vision'. The word 'said' should be dropped to facilitate reading. The author simply repeats in the prose commentary, after the kārikā, the expression: 'It is said that when the first trance is good, this is called "pleasant abiding in the present"' etc. 547), without making the effort to render the kārikā intelligible by quoting original Sanskrit/Chinese texts.

Avetyaprasāda is linked to other *bodhipakṣadharmas* (*dharmas* leading to enlightenment), viz. *smṛtyupasthānas*, *ṛddhipādas* (footings of supernatural power), *indriyas* of faith (*śraddhā* etc.), *boddhyāṅgas* and *mārgāṅgas* (members of enlightenment and of the path). All these *dharmas* can be reduced mainly to *prajñā*, *vīrya*, *samādhi*, *smṛti*, *prīti-upekṣā-praśrabdhi*[25]*-sambodhyāṅgas* and *sīlāṅga*[26] and *samayaksaṃkalpa* (right conceptualizing).[27] All these points have been discussed in kārikās 419–23. Kārikās 423–4 are devoted to analyzing the *bodhipakṣadharmas* as they are present in the different stages of spiritual endeavour and *dhyāna*. While talking of the second, third and fourth *dhyāna*, and *dhyānantara*, in kārikās 424–5, the author mentions that 'these trances are with 36, 35, 32, 22' (pp. 559–60). One is left in complete darkness with regard to what these numbers refer to.

Kārikās 433–42 are devoted to an enumeration of the *indriyas* (faculties) in the following way:

(a) five sensory *indriyas* and the internal *indriya*, *manas*, (b) *puruṣa* and *strī* (male and female) *indriyas*, (c) *sukha-duḥkha-* and *saumanasya-* (contendedness) and *-daurmanasya* (depression) *indriya*, (d) *upekṣā-śraddhā* and *vīrya-indriyas*, (e) *indriyas* of *ajñātamājñāsyāmi* (I shall come to understand the not yet understood), *ājñā* (understanding) and *ājñātavi* (one who has fully understood). Incidentally, kārikās 439–40 remain incomprehensible owing to the author's unwillingness to refer to Sanskrit/English texts. The same is the case in the context of explaining *bhavānāheya*, *dṛṣṭiheya* and *aheya indriyas* (pp. 578–9). The *indriyas* are so called as they have supremacy over their respective functions. The *indriyas* are characterized as being *śuddha*, *sārsrava*, *vipākaja* (arisen by retribution), *avyākrta*, *dṛṣṭi* and *bhavanāheya*, *aheya* in different stages of spirituality. *Indriyas* are also analyzed as necessary for the development of the different stages as *srotāpatti*, *sakṛdāgāmi* and *anāgami* stages of spirituality.

CHAPTER IX, *PRAKĪRṆAVARGA*

This chapter proposes to speak of the multiple miscellaneous (*prakīrṇa*) meanings of the *dharmas* concisely. Kārikās 450–7 discuss once again (see p. 258) the *cittaviprayukta-dharmas*, viz. *asaṃjñika-samāpatti* (meditational attainment without conceptual identification),[28] *samāpatti* (attainment connected with meditation), *nirodha*, *sabhāgatā* (companionship[29]), *pada-vyañjana-nāma-kāya*, *jīvitendriya* (faculty of life), *jāti*, *jarā*, *anityatā* etc.

Kārikās 458–9 add new dimensions of meaning to the *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* referred to on pp. 255–6. Kārikās 459–62 explain the *hetu-pratyaya* (cause-condition) theory: (i) *kāraṇa-* (efficient),[30] *sahabhū-* (simultaneous), *samprayuktaka* (associated), *sabhāga-* (homogeneous), *sarvatraga*-and *vipāka-* (retribution) *hetus*; (ii) *samanantara-* (direct antecedent), *ālambana-* (supporting object), *adhipati-* (dominant) *pratyaya* and *hetu-pratyaya* (causal condition).

A discussion of *citta-caittas* (awareness and accompanying mental factors) produced by the *pratyayas* and *nirodha-* and *asaṃjñī-samāpattis* occur in kārikās 461–3. As a species of *caitta*, *bhava-tṛṣṇā* and *vibhava-tṛṣṇā* (craving for existence and non-existence) are analyzed, and ways of abandoning them are discussed in kārikā 464.

Several topics which are already touched upon in the previous chapters are discussed in greater depth in kārikās 466–70. (The author does not bother to refer to the Sanskrit/Chinese material).

Kārikā 476 discusses *antarā-bhava* (intermediate existence between one life-series and the reappearance of it in another form), *bhava* (existence) at *pūrvakāla* (former time), *maraṇa* (death) and *upapatti* (re-arising).

Kārikās 488–90 give expositions of *samādhis* of *śūnya-śūnyatā* (emptiness of emptiness), *apraṇihitāpraṇihita* (aimlessness of aimlessness) and *animittānimittā* (signlessness of signlessness).[31]

Kārikās 492–3 examine the occasions on which the Buddha's and *śravāka*'s words become *kuśala/avyākṛta*. In the context of answering the question, when the *kuśalamūlas* are definitely free from *durgati* (woeful courses), then what is definitely fixed?, the author misleadingly says: 'Such [things] as giving are equal or different' (p. 654). In the absence of any Sanskrit/Chinese term referred to, I take it that the Sanskrit word translated as 'equal' is '*sama*', which should be translated as 'the same'.

CHAPTER X, *PRAVICAYAVARGA*, PART I

Kārikā 500 proclaims that although many factors have been already spoken of, about miscellaneous *arthas* (meanings), one needs to learn this chapter which makes further investigation (*pravicaya*) regarding these *aprameya vastus* (unlimited objects). This kārikā explains the different connotations of *braḥmacakra* having eight *aṅgas* of the path (traditionally known as the *aṣṭāṅgika mārga* like *samayakdṛṣṭi*, *samyaksaṃkalpa* etc.). In rotating, the *braḥmacakra* abandons some *heyas* (avoidables) and reaches some *udāra* (noble) stage. It rotates from *mṛdu* (minor) to *adhimātra* (excessive) stages. It takes *duḥkha* as *ālambana* and reaches *satya* (truth) = the summit of existence. The Buddha is a *dharmacakravartin*[32] as his *dharmacakra* traverses the four directions. According to kārikā 502, as the *aṣṭāṅgika mārga* (eightfold path) are all *ārya* (noble), the *dharmacakra* is said to be *braḥma-* (noble) *cakra*.

According to kārikā 503 *upavāsa* (fasting) is a state of abiding close to *saṃvara* (viz. not taking life, not taking what is not given, refraining from improper sexuality etc.).

Kārikās 504–6 analyze the different members of *śīla*, *saṃvara* and *vrata* (religious vow). *Saṃvaras* are, as practicised by *bhikkhu*, *bhikkhuṇī*, *upāsakas*, *upāsikās* et al.

Kārikā 507 distinguishes the (a) case where there is a body (as an egg, or as in the womb) but it does not act and the (b) case of the body of the *arhat* in the *ārūpyadhyāna* which is also inactive.

Kārikās 508–9 discuss various sorts of *garbhākrānti* (descent into the womb) and *durgati* (falling into woeful courses). *Samayakasam buddha*[33] enters into, stays in and comes out of it with knowledge. *Cakravartins*, *pratyekabuddhas*[34] have only knowledge of entering and staying in the womb. All other beings enter and stay in the womb unknowingly.[35] The second form of entering the womb is due to the person's entering the womb with *aviparīta-saṃjñā* and *adhimokṣa* (vaguely translated by the author as, 'non overturned conceptual identification and resolve'). The third form is due to the person's entering and staying in the womb with *aviparīta-saṃjñā* and *adhimokṣa*, but leaving it with *viparīta-saṃjñā* and *adhimokṣa*. These four different forms are characterized by the presence of factors like: (i) right knowledge, accuracy (*śuddhatā*) and resolve, (ii) cleanliness,[36] but *not* seeking knowledge/inaccuracy but seeking knowledge, (iii) good but inaccurate *karma*.

According to kārikā 510, only the *bāliśa* (fool) falls into *durgati*, not the *srotāpana*. Kārikās 511–14 deal with *āhāra* (food), viz. (i) *kavāḍika*,[37] (solid) and *sparśa-* (contact) *-āhāra* (which nourish the body[38]), (ii) *manasañcetana-* (representative cognition) and *vijñāna-āhāra* (which nourish future existence). In the *preta* (ghosts), *aṅḍaja-gati*, and *ārūpyasamāpatti*, the third form of *āhāra* is in the increase. *Devas* of *rūpa-* and *kāma-gatis* nourish on *kavāḍika* and *sparśāhāra*.

Kārikās 515–17 concern themselves with 'taking refuge' (*śarana*) and *avetyaprasāda*.

Kārikās 521–22 discuss different forms of *pratilambha-* (obtaining) *bhāvanā*, namely that which is *niṣevana-* (development) which is *pratipakṣa-* (antidote[39]) and which is *vinirdhāna-* (removal[40]) *bhāvanā*. The English version of the prose commentary of kārikā 522 is unsatisfactory, especially when it said, 'four sentences are to be made' (p. 687). It should read: 'One can make four observations here'.

Kārikās 523–46 discuss different forms of *citta*, such as that of the *śaikaṣa* (seeker), *aśaikṣa* (adept), those of the *prāyogikacitta* (awareness through application), those of *upapattilābhika* (*citta* acquired by genesis), those of *airyapathika-* (leading to deportment), those of *śailapasthānika-* (like that of an artisan[41]) and those of *nirmāṇacitta* (magic awareness). Incidentally, the English translation of neither kārikā 539 nor its commentary refers to any original Sanskrit/Chinese terms.

Kārikā 547 gives a brief exposition of the *saddharma* (right doctrine) of the Buddha consisting of *Āgama* (*Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma*) and *Adhigama*.

Kārikā 548 discusses the *vajropama* (diamond-like) *-samādhis*. Kārikās 548–54 deal again with *abhijñās*, *ṛddhipāda*, *indriyas* and *antrābhava*.

PART II

Kārikās 556–8 discuss the *kalpas*, especially the *antarā-* (intermediate) *kalpa*. They discuss not only the destruction of *kalpas*, but also that of the different *rūpadhyānas*. Unfortunately, the author resorts once again to misleading translation. For example, he translates '*antardhāna-kalpa*' as 'broken *kalpa*'. It should be translated as a '*kalpa*' of 'destruction'/'dissolution'. In answering the question, why does this *kalpa* not reach the fourth *dhyāna*?, the author says that '*śūddhāvāsas*' (beings of clear residences) also do not *arise* lower' (p. 732). The expression 'arise lower' is both unhappy and grammatically incorrect. The quoted translation should

be replaced by the expression, '*śuddhāvāsas* are not born/go down in a lower stage'.

Kārikās 558–60 discuss the various conditions of the disturbance of the mind[42] and *parihāṇa* from progress. The minds of *srotāpanna* etc. are subject to disturbance, but not so the mind of the Buddha. According to the author, 'He is not with a gradual *parinirvāṇa* (p. 737). He should better point out that the Buddha's mind is unchanging. According to the author there are 3 forms of *parihāṇa:* (i) from that which is acquired (*prāpta*), (ii) from that which is not acquired yet (*aprāpta*)[43] [a rather bad way of expressing the 'stage which is opposed to progress'], (iii) from the enjoyment (*upabhoga*).

Kārikā 561 is devoted to a discussion of the concept of a *bodhisativa* (who is so by virtue of meritorious deeds and is endowed with 32 primary and secondary characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) and *anuvyañjaka* [like (i) certainty to attain enlightenment, (ii) being free from woeful courses and not being masculine, (iii) from lower lineage (*gotra*), (iv) capacity to remember previous births, and (v) having wish upto *uṣṇīṣa*].

Kārikās 562–66 analyze the meaning of the doctrine (*vāda*) of *sarvāstivāda* (everything exists), and the different forms of the doctrine, depending on the difference in modes, characteristic marks, state and mutual difference of *dharmas* in past, present and future.

CHAPTER XI, *DHARMAKATHĀ*

The translation of '*dharmakathā*' as 'discussion' is an unhappy one. In this chapter, which should be known as 'conclusion', certain questions, to test the reader's comprehension of the text are asked, and right answers to them are given.

Let us draw a brief sketch of such questions and answers: In kārikā 571 the reader is asked, who, when *saṃvṛti* is acquired, does not acquire any 'progress'? The answer: 'The state of *pṛthakjanatva* (worldliness) of *ārūpyabhūmi*, which is *naivasaṃvarnāsaṃvara*', does not progress (if the original Sanskrit is, as suggested by the author, *Vaiśeṣika*, then, to translate it as progress is misleading) as it is in the supreme realm.

Kārikā 572 asks: Is there the acquisition of fruits of *śramaṇa*ship by the *ārya*, free from faults, whereby conditioned good factors are acquired, and this is practised assiduously (*āsevita*)? The answer, as suggested by the translation, hardly seems to be satisfactory.

In answer to the question (kārikā 573), regarding the stage of the path of disjunction, it is suggested that at the moment of 'getting disjunctioned' (correct form, 'getting disjoined), ... the devotee abides in diamond-like *samādhi*' and is 'free from all faults' (p. 766).

In answer to the question (kārikā 574), regarding the state of falling back of the fetters of the second *dhyāna* by the *arhat*, it is answered that this falling back is with mixed spiritual practice. Neither the question, nor its answer, as suggested by the translation seems to be satisfactory.

The question is asked (kārikā 575) regarding the existence of a good factor acquired in the path of vision of truth by an *ārya* which has a supporting object and this *ārya* does not see the object. Answer: at the limit of higher realization of *duḥkha* and in subsequent knowledge in the relation to frustration, there is no knowledge of supporting object, as this takes the realm of *kāma*, as the supporting object.

In answer to a question regarding non-attachment of a fruit in spiritual progress, kārikā 576 states that the noble person, having acquired the fruit of the first trance is not without attachment to that trance.

Kārikā 577 asks: is there abiding in the proximate path, the acquiring of all cessation, whereby defilement is contrary to these, and is thereby not a pure view? The answer, as registered in the translation, is unclear.

Kārikās 578–9 raise questions regarding the possibility of cessation of defilement acquired by the one with non-attachment, whereby there is no abandoning of defilement. It is answered that when acquiring such an abandonment in the realm of *kāma*, the latter is not abandoned, as it was abandoned previously.

In answer to a question regarding the existence of a clean stage which is acquired, whereby one is not with attachment, and not with falling back, and does not depend on the path of vision (kārikā 579), it is suggested that being with non-attachment in the first *dhyāna* with subsequent knowledge to the path, the fruit of *anāgāmin*ship, one acquires pure second trance, but is still with non-attachment, and not with falling back.

Question asked (kārikā 580): is there acquisition of what was never acquired yet,[44] and the acquisition of silence, whereby something is not abandoned and acquired? The answer in the translation hardly seems to be an answer.[45]

In answer to a question regarding the eight forms of acceptance, and the acceptance of the seven knowledges (kārikā 581), it is answered that

in reaching such a stage the person does not see the specific nature of patience, and also does not see the associated factors.

In answer to a question posed in kārikā 582, it is said that signlessness of signlessness is not the final transmigration ever acquired yet.[46] It is with an impure supporting object. Having as its object uncalculated cessation (*apratisaṃ-khyānirodha*), it is said to be with an object that is its limit. Because of the attainment through the noble path of emptiness, it is said to be something that routs good factors.

Kārikā 584 deals with the question: Is the noble one, being free from desire of six stages (of *kāmabhūmi* etc.) also settles this fruit, but does not settle the pure trance? The answer, as it emerges in the translation is unclear. Besides, instead of 'settling the fruit', one should say, 'fruit realized in a decisive way'.

Kārikās 585, 587, 590–2 deal with questions (and their answers) regarding factors that are (i) included in the *dhātus* (answer not clear), (ii) with a three-fold specific nature, (iii) with a multiple nature, (iv) homogeneous and arising, abiding and abandoned similarly with a partially homogeneous factor, and (v) associated (that are partially homogeneous). Kārikā 586 raises (and provides answer to) a question regarding one kind of *dhātu*, that when being extinguished, is not produced in trance. Kārikās 588, 593–7 ask questions (and provide answers) regarding: (i) feeling (*vedanā*, settled and unsettled), (ii) *anāgāmins* (arising simultaneously in one stage), (iii) steadfast ones (who both experience one existence), (iv) the acquisition and abandonment of three gates of liberation (abiding in one moment), and (v) fruits of *śramana*-ship. Neither the questions quoted above nor their answers, in the translation, are clearly stated.

We quote some of the numerous printing mistakes (which are not due to the publisher's inadvertence and carelessness, in case the text was *camera-ready*).

p. 32, penultimate line, 'be' (instead of 'by')
p. 40, line 11, 'If' (instead of 'It')
p. 61, line 22, 'from' (instead of 'form')
pp. 337, (lines 5, 6), 365 (lines 27, 28, 32), 'śrotaāpanna' (instead of 'śrotāpanna')
p. 672, (line 1), 'descend' instead of 'descent'.

I have come across several English expressions in various pages of the English translation which seem to be cumbrous and incorrect:

pp. 61–2, 'mutual different', 'mutual equal' (should be 'same').
p. 65, 'non-arisen'.
pp. 250, 326, 386, 407, 454, 536, 671, 688, 'it are'.
p. 138, 'implicated'.
p. 418, 'This is said to be this possible'.
p. 687, (para 6), 'The first sentence are', 'the second sentence are' ...
p. 710 (para 6), 'awarenesses'.
p. 739 (kārikā 559) 'that which is not acquired yet'.

On a number of occasions the English translation of the Sanskrit term seems to be wayard:

p. 418, 'sthānabala' and 'asthānabala' are translated, without obstensible reason, as 'possible' and 'impossible'.

I have quoted earlier, a number of passages in the translation which do not refer to any corresponding Sanskrit term, nor to the original Sanskrit source. This may give the wrong signal/impression that the translator (author) lacks a complete and thorough acquaintance with the original Sanskrit texts.

I have already expressed my reservation about the translation of terms and expressions from the Sanskrit sources. This infelicitous situation could possibly have been due to the author's reliance on the Sanskrit–English translation of *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy* (ed. K. Potter), volume on Buddhism.

Notes and References

1. See p. 261, n. 13.
2. For a detailed discussion of these *nirodhas* one should look up AK, I, 6. The author himself should have provided a detailed discussion in his Notes.
3. It can be translated as 'volition' in this context.
4. A better translation would be 'investigation'.
5. It really means 'worship'.
6. A better translation would be 'meditational absorption'.
7. The English translation ought to have given some more interpretation of the 2 *samāpattis*.

8. Since the Buddhist does not believe in causal efficacy (*vyāpāra*) the term efficient cause is a little misleading here. (See *Tattva-saṅgraha*, Vol. I, *Kārikā* 517–22.)
9. Dessein translates this as 'proximate and irredeemable action.' This is rather vague in meaning.
10. A better translation of this term is 'doubt'.
11. See pp. 386, 407, 454, 671, 688. For similar incorrect words, see p. 687 ('first sentence *are*', 'second sentence *are*').
12. It is usually translated as 'clinging'.
13. This refers to the fruits of *srotāpanna*ship (the state of the beginner in the spiritual path) *sakṛdāgamin*ship (the state of advanced seeker in the spiritual path who needs to be born only once, again, before being liberated), *anāgāmin*ship (the spiritual seeker who does not need to be born again for being liberated).
14. This is a completely baffling statement. The author is probably referring to the *srotāpanna* who has to be born seven more times in *saṃsāra*.
15. *Ṛddhis* (supernatural powers), *divyaśrotras* (divine years), *cetaḥparyāya* (knowing others' mind), *pūrvanivāsasmṛti* (knowledge of former existences), *cyutyutpāda* and *sarvakṣaya-jñāna* (knowledge of birth, death and destruction of impure influences).
16. *Pūrvanivāsa*, *cyutyutpāda* and *asāvakṣaya-jñāna*.
17. State of freeing ourselves from *nimittas* like sound, smell, *strī* (femininity), *puruṣa* (masculinity), *jāti* (birth) etc.
18. It is usually translated as desirelessness.
19. It is usually translated as all embracing love.
20. A better translation is, 'intention'.
21. This is possibly a printing error. Perhaps the term refers to the regular offering to elder family members and ancestors, in which case it could be translated as 'familial'.
22. A better translation is 'for the purification of the *citta*'.
23. The author should have devoted more space in explaining these 3 concepts, than translating them literally.
24. Italics mine.
25. Tranquility.
26. Member of moral precept.
27. *Samyaksaṃkalpa* should be translated as 'right determination'. 'Conceptualizing' is inappropriate in the epistemic context.
28. The author wrongly translates it as 'absence of conceptual identification'.
29. The proper translation is, 'homogeneity'.
30. Since Buddhists do not believe in efficacy (*vyāpāra*) of momentary *dharmas*, 'efficient cause' is a misleading expression. (See *Tattvaṃgrapañjikā*, pp. 176–7). A better translation is, 'the general causal condition' whose presence allows, in general, causal processes.
31. See p. 263 above.

32. The one who sets the wheel of *dharma* in motion.
33. The fully awakened one.
34. The monk who attains *Nirvāṇa* for himself without any spiritual guide.
35. '*Asaṃprajanya*' is translated by the author as 'without comprehension'. A better translation would be 'unknowingly'.
36. No Sanskrit equivalent given.
37. *Rūpa-* and *ārūpya-dhātus* are without them.
38. *Saṃsvedaja* (moisture-born) and *tiryakyoni* depend on them.
39. The author does not explain what the *bhāvanā* is an 'antidote for'.
40. The author's translation of this term as, 'expulsion' hardly makes sense. Incidentally, '*vinirdhāna*' is spelt wrongly in the note (p. 516).
41. It is misleadingly translated as 'awareness of craftmanship'. It really refers to the technical awareness (like that of an artisan). On p. 691, the author wrongly translates '*samantara pratyaya*' as 'direct condition'.
42. According to the misleading English translation, 'dismemberment of limbs'.
43. How can one fall back from that which is not acquired *yet*? Again, the term 'yet' is superfluous.
44. 'Yet' is superfluous.
45. 'Yet' is superfluous.
46. 'Yet' is superfluous.

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NYANAPONIKA THERA AND BHIKKHU BODHI (translated and edited): *Numerical Discourses of the Buddha*,.New Delhi: Sage Publications India Private Limited, 2000, Rs 295 (paperback)

This is an anthology of *suttas* from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. It is mainly composed of fundamental moral preachings meant for the people in general. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, the collection of numerical discourses of eleven chapters (*nipāta*), is a portion of the *Sutta Piṭaka*. The discourses are termed numerical by the translators as those retain the structure of the original *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. The book is published on behalf of the International Sacred Literature Trust which aims at bringing out translations of certain original texts of different faiths which have the potency to inspire, enlighten and even transform mankind. The original USA edition of the book appeared in 1999 and the Indian edition was released in 2000. A complete English translation of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* was published by

the Pali Text Society under the title: *The Book of the Gradual Sayings* in 1932. The present anthology makes a wide-ranging selection from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, specially emphasizing on the practical aspect of the Buddhist teaching.

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is highly acclaimed by the Theravādins. The present anthology, according to the translators, is a selection that includes about a fifth of the original text. The *suttas* are provided with titles by the translator in order to give some idea about the subject-matter that the *suttas* deal with. The translation is appended with notes for explaining unclear points raised in the text. Originally the translation was made by late Ven. Nyanaponika Thera and later on it is supplemented by Bhikkhu Bodhi.

In his introduction, Bhikkhu Bodhi holds that the Buddha neither claimed himself to be a divine incarnation nor a prophet; but claimed himself to be an Awakened person who, by his own effort and insight, attained the state of purification of which humankind is capable (vide p. 12 of the book under reference). The Buddha is not revered as God to be loved, worshipped and obeyed (vide p. 13). For the Buddha, *nibbāna* is due to understanding and wisdom. The mystical trace of ecstatic realization is not emphasized at least in the Theravāda tradition that gives more weight on actual learning of the nature of things than on any metaphysical speculation.

Bhikkhu Bodhi has stated that the Pali Canon (inclusive of *Aṅguttara Nikāya*) imparts messages both for temporal welfare and for spiritual uplift (vide p. 23). That means there are clear instructions to be followed by the monks and also the lay followers. There are varied moral instructions which are quite relevant for the lay followers at the mundane level. An impression has been created as if there is sharp dichotomy between mundane welfare and spiritual progress. The Buddha's teachings pointing to the transcendence of conditioned existence which is regarded to be very much different from the mundane plane of daily living. Bhikkhu Bodhi admits the difference of two orders and suggests that Buddhism contains messages for both.

But, it can be observed, in this connection, that if the sharp difference between spiritual and mundane is accepted as legitimate, then their being together in Pali Canon, even if true as a matter of fact, cannot be defended reasonably. The impression has been made that spiritual progress is meant for the monks and the mundane welfare is for the householders. But such

a rendering of the early Buddhist point of view, I think, does not become rationally satisfying. For, it unnecessarily brings in a chasm within the fold of Buddhism. A definite suggestion has emerged that spiritual quest is diametrically different from mundane requirement. Spiritual uplift is held as the highest and because the lay followers cannot move to that level on account of their conditioned living, they have to remain content in the mundane affairs. And, mundane welfare is not identical with spiritual uplift but rather somewhat inferior in the evolutional scale. Such a radical bifurcation and gradation of higher and lower put the Buddhist stand into difficulties of inequality and unhealthy discrimination.

I think there is a better way of presenting Buddhism, particularly the early Buddhism of Theravāda type. It can be held that the order of the monk has been set up to spread and propagate the noble teachings of the Buddha to the people at large. The monks, while preaching, should be honest, cultured and socially disciplined. They are not supposed to indulge in any form of social instability and create any occasion for public unrest. But that does not imply that they are alone competent and eligible for spiritual refinement of any transcendent variety. Rather, within the fold of Buddhism, there is no indication for embracing any metaphysical or transcendental speculation. It is, as already conceded by Bhikkhu Bodhi, out and out practical and empirical. Its concern is to have cessation of human suffering at the mundane level. And this is of common concern for both monks and householders. True, a disciplined monk becomes illustrious, whom the lay followers may accept as the source of inspiration. But, so far as the spiritual or moral uplift is concerned, the householder being occupied with the mundane affairs is not debarred from spiritual or moral excellence. In fact that is the aim for which he goes to the monk for guidance. And it is never the case that he is to forsake his mundane living. A householder can equally be morally illustrious. Buddhism recommends a thorough transformation of psychological attitude and temper through the inculcation of knowledge/wisdom (jñāna/prajñā). The order of the monk is set primarily to guide and monitor the ordinary people in the path of practical reason concerning morality. The householders are also expected to observe both private and social morality and, in that, the guidance from the monks is considered as fruitful. But unlike the monks, they are to take a different course in which the social order is not disturbed. They are to move for steady continuance of the human race without violating the socio-moral fabric and ecological balance.

In other words, both monk and householder are expected to follow the spiritual path of moral discipline in their own way without having any conflict. Regard for mundane affairs is not to be construed as something anti-spiritual. There need not be any discrimination of higher and lower between monk and lay follower with regard to the practice of morality. May be, he is engaged in one form of life and the common man is set in another. But so far as spiritual uplift is concerned, it is open for everybody. Otherwise why should a householder be interested in that? He is not supposed to be an escapist in order to have spiritual uplift. There is the advocacy of escape (*nissaraṇa*) so far as the world of gratification and sensuality are taken into account (vide pp. 75–6, 149–50 and 154–5) and not the mundane world altogether. The householder is not debarred from having spiritual enlightenment only because he is a householder and not a monk. The spiritual realization of moral excellence seems to be clearly open both for monk and householder without any discrimination. Attainment of *nibbāna* is open for all, with no hindrance (vide pp. 261–3).

In Buddhism, the *Dhamma* or the moral order is accepted with highest regard (vide pp. 45–6). Even the Buddha himself is to acknowledge the supremacy of *dhamma*. This clearly reveals that Buddhism is much away from any sort of personal God of theological root. This important point resembles to some extent with the recognition of the principle of *ṛta* (found in the Vedas) which also has subsequently been presented in such doctrines like *karma*, *adṛṣṭa* and *apūrva*. Nobody is above *ṛta*, whether man or god (*mantrādhina devatāḥ*).

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* refers to the control and avoidance of excessive use of 'I-making, mine-making' (vide p. 48). There is a clear and critical attitude developed against all sorts of egocentric tendencies and those are considered as obstacles in the path leading to enlightenment. This point is important. It is strikingly similar to the Vedic/Vedāntic critical note against egoistic thought (*asmitā bhāva*).

Mostly the Buddha has been presented by some scholars as anti-Brahminic. He has, according to a certain established circle, been pictured as moving against Brahmins. But this presentation is found to be not authentic. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (vide pp. 57, 142–5), the Buddha has made a subtle but important distinction between two Brahmins: the real or acceptable and the pseudo or the rejected. When the Brahmin is 'impassioned with lust, overwhelmed and infatuated by delusion' etc. he is never, of course, adored; but when he abandons 'lust, hatred and delusion'

etc. *nibbāna*, to him, 'is directly visible'. This clearly reveals that the Buddha is not at all opposed to the Brahmin who is morally sound and has no negative role to play for social stability and progress. The Buddha is critical about moral lapse. And wherever it occurs, whether in case of a Brāhmaṇa or a Caṇḍāla or any other *varga*, the Buddha raises his voice against that. It can be derived from this that the Buddha is not against different classification made at the social level; only he is critical about any such rigid categorization based on irrational and immoral foundation of birth and heritage. The *Gītā*'s doctrine of *varṇa* based on *guṇa karma bheda* is not found to have any conflict with the Buddhistic approach.

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is filled with moral preachings expected to be followed by the lay followers in their respective social set up. The procedure to be adopted for a successful married life, the proper use of food, wealth, respect to superiors, practice of tranquility, keeping balance in having ones own good and another's good etc. are touched upon with utmost care and sincerity (vide pp. 96–104, 215 and 259). The moral virtues discussed therein seem to have perennial significance.

It has been usually taken for granted that the monks, nuns etc. of the monastic order are to follow the path of renunciation while the householders are to remain active in the mundane plane. Such a view seems to be quite unfounded when one stares at the authentic sources. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (vide p. 201) an elucidation has been made with regard to the distinction between inaction and action. It shows that the Buddha never opts only for inaction in contrast to action and vice versa. In a sense, he favours inaction and in another sense he favours action. His saying, in this regard, has deep moral implication. Inaction or renunciation does not connote, in the Buddhist framework, complete cessation of action. Nor does it suggest a total sense of *vairāgya* or detachment towards life. It, on the contrary, means abstinence from doing bad karmas, indulging in evil conduct. Evil thoughts, expressions and deeds are not entertained. In this sense only there is prescription for inaction. The Buddha, it is said, also gives prescription for activity insofar as people practise 'good conduct in deeds, words and thoughts'. In other words, such actions which promulgate moral sense in deeds, words and thoughts are never disparaged but, on the contrary, are very much entertained. This clarification, as noticed in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, dispels the baseless, critical remark against Buddhism that it advocates life-negation and escapism and is completely apathetic towards the goodness of life.

The Buddhist denial of essence and permanence gives rise to the famous doctrine of *anātmavāda* and *niṣvabhāva*. There is no permanent enduring *ātmā*. There is only stream of experience, ever changing and flowing having no substantial identity. This talk of *niṣvabhāva* (inessentiality) later on gives rise to *Śūnyavāda* by the Madhyamikas—an important formulation of the Mahāsanghikas.

The Buddhist doctrine of *Śūnyavāda* has been viewed differently by the scholars. While traditional thinkers treat *śūnya* as mere nothingness or nullity, some modern scholars (vide Professor T.R.V. Murti's *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*) give a metaphysical justification of *Śūnyavāda* by pointing out that it does not mean 'no reality doctrine' but only 'no view about reality'. Other scholars (vide Professor G.C. Nayak's *Philosophical Reflections*) treat *śūnya* neither as metaphysically void nor as positive but as the result of analytical dissection of the whole conceptual framework. It has no metaphysical axe to grind.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, a reference is made about *śūnyatā* or annihilation which is found to be quite interesting and pertinent. It is stated (vide p. 201) that the Buddha declared himself to be an annihilationist insofar as he taught 'the annihilation of greed, hatred and delusion'. That means, *śūnyatā* has a definite purposeful use in the moral context as far as Buddhism is concerned. It is not so much either to stabilize or to destabilize any metaphysical status of annihilation nor is it simply engrossed in limiting itself to mere conceptual illumination at the intellectual discursive front; but its primary or rather sole concern is perhaps to elevate and boost the moral sense so that there is the prospect for peace for the entire mankind. This reference from the text is definitely revealing and illuminating. It puts properly the concept of *śūnya* in Buddhist perspective and has deep valuational significance.

The translators have taken care to provide a good translation of the original text which is accessible both to the experts and also to the general readers. The language is simple without affecting its theoretical content. The translation is appended with notes, bibliography, a glossary and index. The work is, on the whole, a good addition to the stock of the Buddhist scholarship.

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ANJALI MITTAL: *Hindustani Music and the Aesthetic Concept of Form*, D.K. Printworld (P.) Ltd., New Delhi, 2000, pp. vii + 174, Rs 360

I. The book is written by a scholar who is trained in Hindustani music and has attempted to understand this art form philosophically and thus deserves appreciation for the very attempt that she has made, as understanding of Hindustani music as an art form is a subject that has not received the attention of the philosophers as yet. I am just reminded here of a book by Dr. Mukund Lath titled *Sangeet Evam Cintan* which is an exceptionally beautiful and thought-provoking book as the author has tried to understand the nature of 'thought' with the help of some concepts available and applicable in the area of Hindustani music, and thus understanding philosophy in musical terms. Dr. Mittal in her attempt at a philosophical understanding of music has primarily dealt with only one specific concept of 'form' as she believes that in Hindustani music, it is not the 'emotive expressiveness' rather 'form' which is a much more pervasive feature. Though we find her extending this rejection of emotive expressiveness to literature as well, it is too weak a rejection and is not the main thrust of the book. The basic theme has been finally developed in the fifth chapter which covers more than half of the volume of the book within which discussion along with lengthy illustrations are available as to how aesthetic form can be perceived in Hindustani classical gāyana as in *Khyāl*, *Dhruvapada*, *Dhamār* etc. The effort is painstaking; to put a *bandiśa* in musical notations to explain its 'form' and its beauty theoretically is very difficult. Equally difficult is the format in which it is explained for a person to grasp unless one has good training in Hindustani music so as to understand all its variety and technicalities, subtleties and niceties. Here are some of her views on the subject.

Dr. Mittal pronounces her work as falling in the area of philosophical aesthetics, which, she thinks, is distinct from psychological, socio-cultural and metaphysical (p. 2). The author thinks that traditional Indian aesthetics is metaphysical and as such non-philosophical (p. 2). She believes that conceptual linguistic analysis is one of the meaningful ways of doing aesthetics philosophically, the other one is phenomenological. For her, art is significant because it opens up for our contemplation a whole new world of feelings, forms and images. In art what is expressed is inseparable from the medium in which it is expressed and that makes art non-translatable. Artistic 'creation' is different from 'making' but originality is

not a necessary feature of good music rather the fact that it creates disinterested delight in a listener (p. 5). Art is real, as it first becomes a matter of our sense experience before we appreciate it and as it also creates actual good effect on the listener as well as on the artist, but it is not real in the sense of its being used for some worldly purpose. The question of truth has some significance in the form: Is this music true to the demands of *svara*, *rasa* and *tāla*? Is the musician at work true to the way of a master? As to the role of knowledge in art the author says it enables us to contemplate and realize some emotions better than what we do in everyday life. Switching over to the phenomenological way of doing aesthetics, she accepts their view that art is 'emergent' but adds that some planning always remains integral to it as is clearly evident in Indian classical music. The listener constitutes by interpreting an art work; it is 'experiencing as', i.e., stripping the object of all its relations and properties that make it significant in life and purely understanding it as an object having some possibilities. Phenomenology in this context, uses the term performance and rightly so (the author believes) as performance suggests some overt doing and art is, therefore, not an idea as Croce or Collingwood believes it to be. An onlooker makes a collaborative effort which begins with decoding of work, arriving at his own reading and thus reconstituting on the basis of what is striking in the object. Finally what remains is a residue of meaning as sheer remembrance of the experience. A listener can't get into the images of the artist, but forms images of his own.

Readers will excuse me for stating too many ideas that involve basic issues of aesthetics in a breathless fashion. But then all these ideas have been presented in seventeen pages of the book and so cannot have much of discussions, or counter perspectives or their critical examination which a student of philosophy inevitably expects who is aware of serious philosophical debates on all these issues. Those writers whose works the author has mentioned have distinct perspectives of their own and all of them cannot be grouped together before careful and critical examination of their contentions and approaches. For example, one has to see what compatibility and consonance is there between linguistic analytical approach and hermeneutical approach to art. It is striking to note the author's statement that metaphysical questions about art are non-philosophical as if philosophy and metaphysics are mutually exclusive terms. I feel the author could have avoided stating philosophical positions uncritically. What follows is the brief summary of what is substantial in the book as I understand it.

Every art object, as art creation, has two elements within itself: form and content. When some matter like colour is used creatively, it makes content of a painting and thus becomes medium of an art. From the point of view of a *sahardaya* content is whatever is found in the work of art when contemplated upon. Form is an arrangement of the aristic content made effectively, that gives the work a unity, completeness that includes coherence, consistency, balancing to create the atmosphere that gives distinctness to an art creation. A sound, sung in a creative manner, by giving emotive and decorative character to it makes it a svara whose effective arrangement with other svaras makes it a *rāga*. Out of form and content which one is significant, is a question dealt with by the author in some detail and though she says that both are significant as they always remain interwoven with each other, [as Pater says that 'the understanding can always make this distinction of form and content yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it.'] perhaps, for the author it is the form, which is a 'composition' that makes a piece of art aesthetically moving. It is more true for Hindustani music than any other art form. Any aesthetic appreciation of music involves appreciating its beauty. The word beauty means that a form is accessible and acceptable to perception and/or imagination; and that it is or can be the object of contemplation and disinterested delight, as distinguished from mere amusement, gratification of need or desire and sublime feeling. Any aesthetic appreciation of music involves beauty as well as sublimity as giving the impression of limitlessness as well as grace.

The author further attempts to explain the knitwork (a word coined by the author) of musical form [ch.v] in the context of north Indian music. Here she deals with two basic constitutive forms, that is, *Tāla* and *Rāga*. The author points out that *rāga* seems to be fundamental as one can recite a *rāga* without *tāla*, but since it can also be said vice-versa, she considers the question: Is rhythm an independent art? The answer depends upon what criteria of art one accepts. According to Langer, an art which has unique material of its own, has its distinct primary creation and also evaluation criteria, is an independent art. The author accepting the criteria says that rhythm stands all these criteria and hence is an independent art. Here she comes out with a brilliant exposition of how *layakāri* can have aesthetic form and has discussed the criteria of its evaluation. Leaving aside the question at this juncture whether Langer's criteria of an independent art is philosophically tenable, let us see, having accepted the criteria, how rhythm is looked upon as an independent art by the author.

According to Dr. Mittal *Tāla* is a distinct form, as it is an organization of *mātras* and *bols* in a *laya*, wherein the organization finally reverting to *sama* makes the rhythm cycle complete and forms what is called a '*thekā*' (laya means aesthetic pace, mātra a measured quantity, *sama* a focal beat). The author then goes on to illustrate, with the help of few *Torhās* actually played by artists in Hindustani music, how the *bols* themselves when organized and patterned, create a particular aesthetic effect. *Layakāri* is not only a variation in pace alone which can be seen as a mathematical device of accelerating the pace, it is also a beautiful mutual disposition of parts, winsome grouping of *bols* with some formal grace that makes it aesthetically meaningful. This *layakāri* involves one aspect which can be learnt by way of training in the tradition, but the other one, the artist has to create on his own. The player having the notion of time in his mind and reaching right up to the *sama* with perfect accuracy, making variation with a formal grace, proper segmentation of *bols* and displacement of *zarab* (the impact) from first *bol* to another, reinforcing the pace—the manner of movement itself creates the aesthetic form. The author explains how *anāgat* variety, *viṣama* compositions create special effect of impressiveness, depth, flow and alacrity. Since *thekā* is a measured cross-sections of *mātrās* within which the basic composition is to be played, it has an identifiable form and also evaluating criteria of its own. *Tāla* is therefore, the author concludes, an independent art. Let me now present the author's ideas on *rāga* form in Hindustani classical music.

Etymologically *rāga* means that which charms the mind or soul: it is *ranjan* through *dhvani* or *svaras*. Every *rāga* has an element that can be captured objectively because it has well-defined identifiable pattern but the other one, the melody of a *rāga*, though not purely an objective criterion, is an essential element of *rāga*. In music we find a passage of sound over different notes at a regulated pace. It is interesting to see that charm of a *rāga* is due not only to its unity and internal organization of the *svaras*, but a *svara* itself has a beauty of its own; *svara* is, a sound decorated, sung perfectly so as to bring out its purity with some emotive expressiveness. Sweetness of a *svara* is often enjoyed by everyone, and that explains the universal appeal of this art form, and thus can be called an 'immediate' quality. But *svara* also has mediate qualities that can be appreciated by a trained listener alone, the expressiveness, suggestiveness, depth, purity etc. Now, if the appreciation of aesthetic quality of a *svara* too needs what we call '*Dīksha*' in our tradition, one can very well

assume how essential it is for understanding and critical appreciation of a *rāga rupa*, which is an organized but complex form of *svaras*. *Svaras* of a *rāga* have to be related in a particular manner in the form of *sūta*, *mīnda*, *gamak* and *lahak*, which are in fact the formal ingredients with the help of which an artist is able to produce the aesthetic effect. It should be noted here that for the author '*rasa*' is not the result of a *rāga* that is sung, but *rasa* is the look of the full blown personality of *rāga* itself. All ornamental flourishes have to be coordinated properly so as to maintain the true form of *rāga*. Thus, form is the skilful and intense inner integration of the elements of a work of art; tones, rhythms, formal graces, linguistic content (if it is sung) and the text of composition, all contribute in developing *rāga* that is aesthetically moving. It is interesting to note that amidst this expansion of *svaras* accompanied by rhythm, one finds the artist making a pause, deliberately; a flow is here studded with pauses. The artist creates an aesthetic tension by pause that helps him as well as the listener to imagine. Thus pause amidst *svaras* forms the very structure of music. As soon as recital of a *rāga* begins, its initial structure is opened up, the artist goes on looking forward, imagining how to create new patterns and the listener gets set to receive what comes next; hence to both, the form of music is dynamic. *Ālāpa* of a *rāga* gives it an expansion and even sublimity, whereas *Tāna*, as an arrangement of *svaras*, weaving different patterns decoratively, confirms the *rāga rupa* and suggests an orderliness, and articulateness.

The remaining 50 pages of the book are finally devoted to illustrate how *Dhruvapada*, *Dhamār* or *Khyāl* can be sung aesthetically and what variation or change can make them look unaesthetic. The author also presents linear diagrams of some *tanās*, but they do not add to what has been said earlier, rather they cannot reveal those characteristics of a *tāna* which one often finds in a recital of a *rāga*; a *tāna* as circular or spiral, showing curvatures, revealing flow of a stream, thunder of clouds or sparkling of light. The concluding chapter makes comparison between *Dhruvapada* and *Khyāl* gāyana that ends up with a final statement that many subtle details of felt life, even our experience of space or time can be projected in music with telling effect and thus the author concludes, 'it is indeed difficult to think of any other art which could be said to be equal to music in respect of appearing lifelike without necessarily making any explicit reference to life.'

Art as a creative expression necessarily involves 'originality' is a proposition which does not stand in need of establishment, but according to the author it is non-essential even for good music. It surprises one all the more because the author herself has attempted to see music compositions not as finished products but as in process; (and that is one specificity of music which is not found in any other art form, i.e. the process of creation itself creating aesthetic experience) wherein the listener himself is an active participant. Now if there is no originality in the presentation or recital of a *rāga* howsoever intricately designed and well sung that may be, will not create aesthetic impression as it will fail to awaken the imagination of the listener. (Using a traditional term such an artist can be called 'Kalāvant' and not 'Kalākār'.) I think Dr. Mittal, having appreciation for phenomenological approach to aesthetics, should have seen it more clearly than anyone else.

The central contention of the author that form is a *pervasive* feature of Hindustani music is undoubtedly true as it holds true of music *per se* and even other arts like painting or sculpture, particularly when form is understood as 'composition', an effective arrangement of the content that is aesthetically appealing, or that which gives completeness or unity to an art work. One can see that this idea of form is too general. Having borrowed the articulation of the concept of form from western aesthetics the author has tried to illustrate how form can be perceived in Hindustani music. She could have moved further in the direction of *articulating the specificity of the idea of form itself* in Hindustani music. One such attempt has been made by Dr. Mukund Lath in his *Sangeet Evam Cintan* (1994) wherein he has not only tried to see how *Ālāpa* and *Dhun* which are two variations of form reveal distinctive character of our music but has also shown how theoretically potential these are as 'ideas' as they can help us understand trends of 'thought' and 'culture'. This is one way of understanding ones own tradition creatively, Dr. Mittal surely can find many more if she pursues the matter further by remaining within the traditional conceptual thought itself which, as everyone knows, is so rich and vast.

If music is lifelike, it cannot be only form that makes it so. In music, form and emotive expression both remain integrated. I think it is emotive expressiveness along with form that contributes to what is distinctive of our music, that is, its melodic nature. (It is true of Khyāl gāyana and more so of thumri gāyana and even our folk music.) For a brilliant exposition of this idea, I would like to refer here to two lectures, delivered by one

of the greatest classical singers of our times, Pandit Omkarnath Thakur, titled 'Rāga Aur Rasa' (originally delivered in Gujarati at Mahārāja Sayāji Rao Tritīya Svarna Mahotsava and later on published in its granthmāla). I have a feeling that having read it, perhaps, the author would like to think afresh about this issue, and that would be only enriching her own ideas which are latent in her presentation but not so well bloomed.

The author has rightly pointed out that *Rāga* form is more basic than *Tāla* form of the music. One can extend this idea further by relating it to the potential of the medium in which they are expressed as it is the potential of a medium, which carries a range of possibilities within itself. As everyone knows, a Sitār has more potential for innumerable compositions being played on it with more intricacies and subtleties than a Harmonium (although a Harmonium player may have better creative imagination), and human voice has still more potential than a Sitār. *Tāla* as a form of music has limitation in this sense; *tablā* or *mridanga* have lesser possibilities of imaginative expression and secondly, if music primarily aims at *rasa*, *tāla* form is apparently less impressive than the *rāga* form.

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ERNESTO GRASSI: *Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism: Four Studies*, Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, Binghamton, New York, pp. 105

This book is a collection of lectures Grassi delivered and has for its focus the philosophical presuppositions of Italian humanism and of Heidegger's humanism. Grassi gives brief sketches of the humanist thesis of Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444), Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–75), Coluccio Salutani (1331–1406), G.B. Vico (1668–1744), Giovanni Pontano (1426–1503), Albertino Mussato (1261–1329) and Cristoforo Landino (1424–98), known for philosophical contributions which antedate Heidegger's 'metaphysics of Being and beings'. Grassi sees in the Italian humanism of the Renaissance time the dominant sparks of what Heidegger later on calls the doctrine of unhiddenness, and the horizon of 'openness' in which man and his world appear.

It is not easy to define humanism. For Grassi the humanist tradition 'should not be discussed as a purely literary question ... but we must approach (it) also from the standpoint of its philosophical significance and importance today.' Grassi says that humanism is 'the rediscovery of man and his immanent values.' He appreciates Heidegger's thesis (in the latter's lecture 'The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking') concerning the end of philosophy, i.e., the end of that philosophy in which 'the process of rational inference' predominated. The problem of the unhidden, openness, *Lichtung* (clearing), which is a far more basic and far more original problem, was marginalized in that philosophy. Heidegger repudiates the primacy of the rational process in traditional metaphysics and celebrates the poetic, metaphoric idom, which, according to him, 'possesses the original power to clear a path.' The path is toward Being. The humanist approach, Heidegger suggests, is bound to fail if it does not acknowledge the originality, the profundity and the primacy of the question of our experience of Being. In his famous *Letter on Humanism* (published in 1947), Heidegger states that the word 'humanism' in traditional philosophy has put the accent on the essence of man as its beginning. Heidegger advises a reversal of this process and the placement of the question of Being over and above our concern for man. He writes in the *Letter on Humanism* that 'man must, before he speaks, let himself first be.' He insists on the primeval nature of the problem of Being. He says: 'Being is closer to man than beings (the term 'beings' suggests, in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, those things which have for their habitat Being—thoughts, rocks, animals, works of art, machines, etc.).'

Grassi develops the Being-beings relation, originally stated by Heidegger in his *Being and Time*, extremely skilfully. He says, in total agreement with Heidegger, that Being is totally 'empty' since it is predicated of all beings. Being is brought into our thinking and language in its most universal form of 'is'. Thus, in its two senses of 'isness' and 'emptiness', Being is 'singular and one'. Besides, Being is most easily comprehensible, is easily accessible through beings with which we are in contact while living in the world, is named whenever we use nouns, adjectives and verbs. At the same time, Grassi agrees with Heidegger that every attempt to define Being fails, since every assertion about Being goes astray—the assertions about Being are, as a matter of fact, about 'beings'. No metaphysics is possible, Grassi remarks, if we remain immersed in beings. It is by staying limited to beings as science does that traditional philosophy,

as Heidegger has pointed out, has met with an end. What traditional philosophy tried to do is to express Being within 'the realm of logic'—this is the realm where the principles of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle rule.

Grassi is highly influenced by Heidegger's contrast between scientific or 'logical' language and 'human language', i.e., the language which makes use of images, metaphors and analogies. This contrast is helpful to us, according to Grassi, to understand the spirit of Italian humanism where the relationship between the world and thought cannot be regarded as a logical relation. Referring with very visible esteem to Dante, Grassi remarks that 'the experience of the poetic word is the origin of human historicity'—'let that which (language of the people) has within itself as something possible and hidden come out in the open'. In his *La Divina Commedia* (written in the fourteenth century) Dante criticized Latin as an 'artificial' language, a predominantly 'grammatical' one, containing poor metaphors. Dante was a great celebrator of poetry, the metaphoric idiom, for him it is the poet who brings out the hidden, it is the poetic language of the writer that throws open the 'way for historicity'. Grassi places Dante at a very high rung of the humanist culture in Italy and shows how Italian humanists (Bruni and Boccaccio, in particular) had imbibed Dante's thesis that poetry reveals the reality 'that lies behind a veil', that poetry brings reality to light, that poetry makes reality 'to appear in unhiddenness'. Grassi is full of admiration for some of the lucid descriptions Boccaccio makes about the primordial character of poetry in human communication. Boccaccio had said that the poetic fable 'proceeds from the interior of god', that not many people are gifted with the 'inspiration of the sublime', that poetry gives voice an 'original force or power', that poetry possesses an 'inventive character'. For Boccaccio, the 'sacred' character of poetry cannot be discussed since this character has a transcendental origin. Undoubtedly one of the most inviting qualities of Grassi's lectures is that they move around the central idea—so clearly visible in the writings of Italian humanists, of Heidegger, and of all those philosophers for whom the rationalistic approach of Descartes and his attempt to woo sciences are responsible for the death of philosophy—that somehow Western philosophy fell into that oblivion of Being often manifest in the reason-bound, code-bound and rule-bound style of thinking and speaking/writing. Grassi has something instructive to say about what he calls 'the original, pictorial script of the Eastern languages.' He says that the

metaphor in these languages 'is changing under the influence of the basic rational code that is infiltrating from the West.'

In Heidegger, as in Italian humanists, there is a marriage, call it metaphysical if you like, between the primacy of Being and the primacy of poetry. The essence of the word is the most basic problem in Italian humanists' tradition. Grassi clearly represents this tradition. While writing on Pontano and Vico, he shows that 'the experience of wonder as creativity' is the starting-point of a poet, it is the starting-point of the process of 'uncovering'. While Heidegger has spoken here of Being's claim on man manifest in the origin of language, for Mussato it is the poet as a *vates*, a prophet, who acquires a new meaning and transmits it by using a literary metaphor. Mussato, Grassi points out, was a humanist, a statesman and historian of uncommon talents, and regarded poetry as a divine art. Like Mussato, the early humanists in Italy tried to free themselves from the preeminence of rational thought and logical truth. Heidegger appropriated this spirit in later Europe.

Finally, it is necessary to mention that Grassi's reflections on early Italian humanists and on their philosophical postulates would be of great value to the students of European humanism, and his elegant mapping-out of Heidegger's theory of Being and Heidegger's humanism contains insights of which a student of European existentialism must take note. Grassi has wonderfully woven in his lectures not only the originality of the poetic idiom as against the rational, methodical idiom but also the more difficult symbiosis of Being, poetry, the question of the origin of language, and the primordial humanness on which Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the spirit of early Italian humanism remain anchored.

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T.R.S. SHARMA: *Toward an Alternative Critical Discourse*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Rastrapati Nivas, Shimla, 2001

Professor Sharma's book is an insightful study of ancient Indian theories on aesthetics that shows acute awareness of both past and recent aesthetic and critical discourse in the West. More important, the ancient theories are discussed in a contemporary idiom and are illustrated with examples

from both Indian and Western literature. The book, thus, successfully contemporizes ancient Indian aesthetics as an alternative aesthetic discourse which can be successfully applied to both Indian and Western works. But in doing so, Professor Sharma is careful no to make simplistic comparisons between the East and the West. Although he takes *rasa* (aesthetic emotion) as his central paradigm, he competently analyses other aesthetic concepts like *rīti* (style), *alaṁkāra* (figurative language), *vakrokti* (indirection) and *dhvani* (suggestion) both in the light of *rasa* and Western literary theory. Most important, he presents original insights into traditions parallel to the Sanskrit tradition in South India, which very few earlier works on Indian aesthetics have done. In his final chapters, based on the *rasa-dhvani* theory, he provides an ingenious Indian framework for translation of texts from one language to another. In all, this short book is a lucid though brief exploration of different facets of Indian aesthetics in the background of Western literary theory.

In his 'Preface', Professor Sharma points out that *rasa*, in Indian aesthetics, can be considered as a 'master metaphor'. Since its use in Bharata's *Nāṭya Śāstra* in the second century AD it has been taken up again and again by different critics and has been interpreted and reinterpreted. Thus, it has been able to sustain itself in time and in change. It has also managed to enrich itself. It is for these reasons that *rasa* may be the most competent concept for use in contemporary aesthetics. Professor Sharma also highlights the emotive content of Indian aesthetics and its similarities to certain concepts in the West: 'Indian poetics, preponderantly then, theorizes literature in relation to emotions ... His (Bharata's) aesthetic has created a conceptual space wherein one can juxtapose Indian theories and their Western counterparts ... (13–14).'

In his first chapter on 'Critical Practice and the Practice of Criticism', Professor Sharma looks at the Indian scene in relation to critical discourse and tries to place his own writing within that context. He locates a disjunction in the practices of the senior and junior scholars of English literature in India. The young scholars are the 'radicals', taking in the new theories from the West like Deconstruction, Psycholanalysis and Postmodernism with their indeterminacies and uncertainties. The senior scholars and teachers are the 'conservatives' who react strongly to these new trends. Similarly, in a spatial context, the centrally located educational institutes accept the new trends, while in the various other institutes around the country, the old British canons of Humanism and Newcriticsm are

being taught. If the conservative school smacks of obsolescence, the radicals are always in fear of losing their ways. One has to 'first appropriate, assimilate the novel theories coming from the West,' and only then is it possible to 'incorporate some of the novel ideas into (ones) own indigenous ways of thinking (19).' Professor Sharma also points out that the plight of the Sanskrit departments are no better which are, mostly, confined to the boundaries of Sanskrit criticism and never look outwards. Thus, the scope for interaction between Indian aesthetics and Western theories remains unexplored for most part. This is the 'middle space', where some work is being done, but Professor Sharma is extremely suspicious of the nature and quality of work being done. According to him, 'not much basic research (is) being done about the alleged language revolution ... nor any attempt to investigate ancient Indian theories of language and rhetoric in the context of recent Western theories (22).' What faces Indian scholars is the predicament of the Postcolonial. One problem is, in trying to erase ones colonial past and return to ones past 'somewhat self-consciously', can one to attempt to use it in a 'nuanced manner (to) counter the impact of an aggressive appropriative alien culture? (23)' The other crisis is, 'how does (one) use the First World elite theories to understand the Third World phenomena, and how does (one) negotiate his self-alienating learning based on Western liberalism and his desire to find his bearing in a national culture? (23).' Professor Sharma's own writing is located within the same critical predicament. He sees two ways of decolonializing oneself. The first is to take Eurocentric theories that are appropriate to our context and to use them to overthrow Eurocentrism. The other way, which he considers more difficult, is to 'dig into ones cultural past ... and see if the ancient concepts, interrelated as they are, can be redefined, redrafted in a context where all concepts undergo historical metamorphosis (24).' Professor Sharma finds his own writing more distinctively in this second tradition. He focuses his attention of the *rasa* theory, its emphasis on emotion and links it to the Western notion of the 'discourse of the body', since the body is the seat of all emotions. He locates the integration of mind and body in the context of the medieval *Bhakti* movement. Thus, drawing attention to the Western dichotomy of mind and body and the predominantly 'cerebral' Western aesthetics, he points out that the alternative Indian aesthetics 'draws attention to a new mode of perception ... (and) returns the business of criticism to the body and its emotions (28).'

In his second chapter, 'All About Emotions', Professor Sharma uses illustrations both from ancient Indian classics (Kalidasa, Vasavanna) as well as from Western works (Dostoevsky, Dickens, Eliot, Stevens) to explore emotions/reason and mind/body in the two cultures. Professor Sharma illustrates the Western dichotomy between emotion and reason with Dickens's *Hard Times* and Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*. Dickens critiques the Victorian obsession with reason in the context of education. Dostoevsky focuses on the Western man's problematization of the self in the context of emotion versus reason. Shifting his focus, he refers to Kalidasa's *Meghadutam* which 'visualizes love only in the larger frame of nature's green, rock and river (31).' 'The human and the natural overlap ... there is no attempt at self-definition apart from nature (32).' Professor Sharma questions the dichotomy between reason and emotion that prevails in the West and argues that only after that would it be possible for one to locate a new relation between emotion and reason—something which prevails in the Indian episteme. Professor Sharma traces the Western suspicion of emotions to Plato and then to Kant. He refers to Aristotle and the Stoics, as well as to modern theorists of cognition to point out that the strong Western belief that emotions mess up ones moral life, can be contested. He quotes Jean-Luc Nancy, who complains that 'there has never been any body in philosophy (37)'. However, today bodies are claiming their 'right to reflective space' in the West. In such a context, one can look at *rasa* theory afresh with its emphasis on the body; for the *sañcāribhāvas* are various bodily signs that outwardly manifest emotions. Leading towards such a logic, Professor Sharma explores the ambivalent space that bodies and emotions occupied in Indian culture (39). In Indian tradition the body decays. However he locates a positive approach to body in the *bhakti* (devotion) cults and the Yoga systems. In Sāṁkhya, also, he locates a grand metaphor for the relation between body and mind in *Prakriti* and *Purusa*. What Professor Sharma neglects is the Buddhist notion of the body in the context of the 'no soul' theory which problematizes the body/soul dichotomy. He also neglects the Tantric systems where the body is a microcosm of the cosmos. Professor Sharma, then, takes up the issue of morality and emotions in the context of the *puruṣārtha* or the four values, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. He contends that emotions and human goals are closely linked and the *puruṣārtha* provide a moral structure for the regulation of human emotions. In this context, Abhinavagupta's discussion of the *Santa rasa* is very significant.

Though Professor Sharma mentions it elsewhere, here also one can point out that the different emotions can finally lead to a state of *sama* (calm or peace) that prepares one for *mokṣa*. Thus, the realization of *mokṣa* can not only come through reason it can also come through emotions.

Professor Sharma, next, points out that the relation among emotions is not random or arbitrary. They have a logic or grammar of combination all their own depending on appropriateness. The *Nāṭya Śāstra* deals elaborately with emotions that are complimentary and emotions that are inimical. It also points out which emotions are appropriate for which characters. Professor Sharma then goes over the concept of *rasa* as expounded by Bharata, and then, by other aestheticians. In the *Nāṭya Sastra*, *Rasa* has a strong gastronomical connotation—of sap, juice or essence to be realized. However, for Abhinavagupta, it holds a distinctive metaphysical connotation and transports the reader/audience to a state of *ananda* or bliss. According to Bharata, *rasa* requires three elements for its communication—the cause (*bībhāva*), the response to the cause (*anubhava*) and the dominant emotion that the entire work communicates (*sthayibhava*). There are also accompanying psycho-physiological states or emotions that, along with the *bībhāvas* and *anubhāvas* lead to the *sthāyi* (48–50). Professor Sharma analyzes these concepts briefly, illustrating them with examples drawn from both the cultures. He also discusses how different emotions can subsist in a work though one emotion dominates the work, in reference to Ānandavardhana's analysis of the *Mahābhārata* (55–56). He points to the evocative, experiential and the phenomenological aspects of the *rasa* theory and shows its close similarity to Readers Response theory. He devotes the last section of the chapter to the analysis of *bhakti* (devotion) *rasa* and links it to the medieval *bhakti* movements of India.

'Crossing the Thresholds of the Unsayable', the third chapter, deals with *dhvani* theory in the background of other theories like *alaṁkār*, *guṇa-rīti*, *vakrokti*, *aucitya*, etc. Alaṁkāra (figures of speech/thought) which according to Bharata are four in number, over the centuries grew to be 124 by the 16th century. *Alaṁkāra* (ornament) using visual metaphor considers that the bare body of the text must be embellished to make it beautiful. But the other meaning of the word is 'that which is adequate (69).' In this context it can be linked to *aucitya* or that which is appropriate. Appropriateness is decided on the basis of *gunas* (appropriate qualities) and *dosas* (flaws to be avoided) in the context of a literary work. *Vakrokti* (indirection or obliqueness) as opposed to *svabhāvokti* (straight-

forwardness) has strong similarities to Formalism and is linked to the concept of *rīti* or style. However, after *rasa*, the most outstanding concept in aesthetics is that of *dhvani* (suggestion or resonance) of Ānandavardhana. Traditionally, words are considered to operate at three levels—*abidhā* (denotation), *lakṣaṇā* (indication) and *tātparyaśakti* (the ability to cohere meaning inspite of dissonance). Abhinavagupta talks of a fourth power, *dhvani*—the power to suggest or resonate that which is unsayable. Abhinavagupta elaborates the theory of his master and both agree that *dhvani* comes through most distinctively when the literal or the referential sense cooperates with the suggested sense (75). Professor Sharma illustrates *dhvani* both in the context of Indian poems as well as Keats, Yeats and Shakespeare. In the final section, Professor Sharma applies the theory of *dhvani* to contemporary advertisement and links it to the role of suggestion in social myths as discussed by Barthes in *Mythologies*. Using *dhvani* to advertisement, he points out that 'In the combative form of advertisement things are hinted at and suggested subtly. *Dhvani* operates ... through creating a verbal hypnotism is advertisement (83).' However, Professor Sharma's discussion is sketchy and though he briefly differentiates between *rasa* and *dhvani*, Abhinavagupta's notion of *rasa-dhvani* (*rasa* realization through suggestions) is not taken up comprehensively.

Professor Sharma's fourth chapter, 'Where Windows Become Mirrors', is a significant contribution that locates alternative aesthetic perspectives in the background of a culture dominated by Sanskrit aesthetics. Here, Professor Sharma explores aesthetic concepts that developed independently of Sanskrit in Tamil—another very ancient language—and then talks of how Tamil was, later, influenced by Sanskrit aesthetics. Implicitly, postcolonial notions of centre and periphery come in. However, Professor Sharma rejects the 'imperial' (Sanskrit) and 'subaltern' (Tamil), oppressed and oppressor framework as simplistic. 'For Tamil developed its own ingenious indigenous ways of coping with, accommodating, and appropriating notions, concepts, and aspects of grammar from Sanskrit (90).' Cultural and linguistic exchange took place between the two cultures. In this background, in Tolkappiayam, the earliest Tamil text there is mention of *rasa* theory. The Dravidian culture was rich with dance and music.

Who took from whom? Professor Sharma leaves the question unanswered. Tamil, he admits, absorbs from Vedic culture, yet, it also retains its linguistic independence and develops its own lexicon. The earliest literature, *Sangam* literature, is devoted to the twin motifs of love and war. *Akam* poetry deals with phenomenological experience of the landscape of love, flowers and feelings while *puram* deals with the heroics, the exterior portraying the society as a whole (92, 99). The post-*Sangam* period of epic poetry (200–600 AD) sees the influence of northern culture. Besides, this was also a period of ethical works where not much else was written. Later poetry followed a three-fold division of subject matter—*aram* (virtue), *porul* (matters concerning polity) and *imbam* (love). The next significant phase, according to Professor Sharma, was that of *bhakti*, a grass-root movement, beginning roughly around the sixth century AD (100–103). *Bhakti*, he argues, is a Tamil movement, which, by the 17th century AD had encompassed the whole of India. Thus, it was a 'Tamil innovation developed within a Tamil context—an innovation on what Tamil had taken from Sanskrit, and for which no Sanskrit parallel to such a movement existed (109).' Thus, Professor Sharma sums up the relation between the two cultures as a two-way process, and does not take recourse to a Postcolonial framework to explore Tamil aesthetics.

Professor Sharma's final chapter, 'Indian Poetics and Translating Literary Texts', is an original approach to translation using a combination of concepts from Indian aesthetics. In the background of Western translation theories, Professor Sharma points out that a translator faces four major problems, which he insightfully compares to four major schools of aesthetics in India. *Rasa*, the essence, is the 'shaping principle' working through the text and shaping it. *Rasa* gives the overall orientation of the text. *Rīti*, on the other hand, is the stylistic working within the text—the phonetic and syntactic limits which the text enacts, performs (113). This must be taken into account when one translates. The third dimension is *alaṁkāra*, the figures of thoughts within a text. *Dhvani* is the fourth dimension, 'a metalinguistic reality, a force-field of meanings, often culture specific (115).' This is the most elusive and difficult element to understand and capture in translation. However, according to Professor Sharma, this four-fold framework covers most of the problems that can be raised in a translation and he argues his case admirably.

In all, *Toward an Alternative Critical Discourse*, though a short work, and more a collection of related essays than a intrinsically organized work, is a work of both remarkable insight and scholarship.

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Books Received

1. *Hermeneutics Method. The Universal View Point in Bernard Lonergan*
   Ivo Coelho
2. *Fusion of Horizons: Socio-Spiritual Heritage of India*
   Krishna Roy
3. *Acting as a Way of Salvation: A Study of Rāgānugā Bhakti Sādhna*
   David L. Haberman
4. *Hindustani Sangeet and a Philosopher of Art, Music, Rhythm and Kathak Dance Vis-à-Vis Aesthetics of Sussane K. Langer*
   S.K. Sexena
5. *A New Look at Past Lives*
   Judy Hall
6. *Philosophy of Physics*
   Mathew Chandran Kunnel
7. *Philosophy in Classical India*
   Jonardon Ganeri
8. *The Hindu Mind*
   Bansi Pandit
9. *Limits of Rightness*
   Michael Krausz
10. *The World Speaks to Faustian Man*, Vol. IX
    Som Nath Gupta
11. *The Elements and the Trend of Civilizations*
    Pranab Kumar Chatterjee
12. *A Survey of Post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta*
    Ravindra Kumar Panda
13. *Ānandabodhayati (Life and Philosophy)*
    Ravindra Kumar Panda

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,अे ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Ḳṛṣṇa* and not *Ḳrishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc.
etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ன ṉ
ழ ḻ
ண ṇ
ற ṟ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.