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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

A Long Essay on Donald Davidson's Coherence Theory

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In his essay 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'[1] Davidson offers an excellent critique of foundationalism and a rather unusual defence of coherentism. His version of coherence theory depends for its defence on his view that coherence yields correspondence and that correspondence is possible without confrontation.

I

We have reasons to believe that most of our beliefs are true because most of our beliefs cohere with many others. Here comes Davidson's transcendental argument. Had the beliefs not been true, i.e., had they not corresponded to reality, they would not have cohered with one another. This shows the connection between beliefs' correspondence with reality and their coherence with other beliefs. Coherence is a fact which can be made intelligible only on the assumption that beliefs correspond to reality. This coherence theory of truth, however, does not amount to a coherence theory of knowledge, for true beliefs alone are not sufficient for knowledge. In order to have knowledge the person having a coherent set of beliefs must be in possession of sufficiently good reasons to believe that his beliefs are coherent, and therefore, true.

For a proper understanding of the above-mentioned theory let us mention a few points at the very beginning.

(1) What Davidson is here concerned with is not propositional coherence but coherence of beliefs or of sentences held true by someone who understands them. This is a break from tradition. If one speaks of propositional coherence then one can speak of two equally coherent sets of propositions which are negations

of each other. And in such a case both the sets will have to be regarded as equally true, if one acknowledges propositional coherence as the criterion of truth. To prevent this absurdity Davidson has recourse to coherence of beliefs. Of course the problem of mutually incompatible coherent propositional sets might also affect the coherent belief-sets. This shows that coherence by itself cannot guarantee truth. We will see as we proceed that coherence is to be explained and buttressed by the causal basis of beliefs, correct interpretation of others' speech and correct attribution of beliefs and other propositional attitudes to other people. Let us elaborate this point a little more. Every belief that we acquire at a particular point of time starts acting like an inhibitor of future beliefs—it somehow starts determining which beliefs we shall entertain in future. Each belief that is consistently added to the belief-sets we already possess rules out the possibility of having many other beliefs. My act of believing sorts out, as it were, from all the consistent state-descriptions, i.e., descriptions of the possible state of the world and tends towards just one such state-description. But what guarantees that the state-description which I so believe after all such sortings is true of the world? Is there no threat of my coherent beliefs not yielding truth? In answer to this Davidson says that though mutually incompatible state-descriptions cannot be true, and though we cannot give a hundred per cent guarantee, yet it is highly reasonable to believe that the majority of our belief sets are true of the world because we all seem to share our beliefs. Let us add just one point here. As long as we cannot reach a completely consistent set of beliefs all the beliefs in the set cannot be given equal weightage. Some have to be acknowledged as more important than others. And coherence with these beliefs creates a presumption in favour of the truth of cohering beliefs. But a very important question here is: What is coherence? In a weak sense coherence can be said to be no other than absence of logical inconsistency or just equivalent to logical consistency. But in a strong sense inferential relations of various sorts, explanatory relations, relations

of mutual support are supposed to be indispensable for defining coherence.

(2) The coherence theory advocated by Davidson is a theory regarding the test or criterion and not the nature of truth. Coherence only tells us that the coherent beliefs are true, the nature of truth being constituted by correspondence of beliefs with reality. Davidson, however, is not interested in any definition of truth. In his opinion truth is beautifully transparent as opposed to belief and coherence which invite opacity. Since Quine it is well established that belief contexts are opaque. Coherence also produces opacity for it cannot be defined except in terms of modal concepts like necessity, possibility, etc.

(3) Of course, although correspondence constitutes the nature of truth it does not need confrontation of beliefs with reality for no such confrontation makes sense. There is a deep metaphysical connection between beliefs' correspondence with reality and their coherence with other beliefs. This connection is proved, as has already been said, by a transcendental argument. In a very important sense, believing is rooted in being. The nature of believing is such that it is always oriented towards bridging the gulf between itself and reality. That is why though any given belief of ours might be false each and every belief of ours cannot be false.

(4) Davidson's theory of coherence as the test of truth, however, does not by itself amount to a coherence theory of justification or a coherence theory of knowledge. For ones beliefs might cohere, and therefore, might be true, but one may not have reasons to believe that beliefs are coherent and true. Thus one might lack justification for the truth of ones beliefs. Again, it might happen that one has reasoned belief in the coherence of beliefs but one does not appreciate ones reasons. In such a case, one lacks knowledge or at least lacks knowledge that one has knowledge. Thus having true beliefs is not sufficient for knowledge. According to Davidson what brings truth and knowledge together is meaning. He points out that on his truth-conditional theory of meaning to know the meaning of a sentence

is to know its truth-conditions. Actually Davidson here elevates Tarski's theory of truth to a theory of meaning. This, of course, needs a lot of clarification into which I am not entering in the present paper.

II

In what follows we shall discuss the above point in detail. Meaning or more exactly knowledge of meaning makes possible, at least in part, communication with our fellow beings successful and 'Successful communication,' says Davidson, 'proves the existence of a shared and largely true view of the world.'[2] In other words, we do generally correctly understand what people mean when they utter some sentences. How is this made possible? In interpreting others' speech we are guided by the principle of charity. We are charitable to others in reading our own standards, our own logic in their propositional attitudes. This charity is not an option on our part, it is forced on us. The point of the principle is to make the speaker as intelligible as possible. And in order to do so we cannot judge that the speaker entertains concepts or beliefs radically different from our own. If we are to make sense of a speaker's speech it is a methodological necessity that we take him to be like us. That is to say, we cannot choose to read in a different logic, a logic different from our own in the speaker's utterance. Such a choice, if we could ever have it, could only lead to the disastrous consequence of complete breakdown of communication. The speaker's beliefs and desires, hopes and fears, ambitions and aspirations are by and large like ours—we have no alternative but to admit this. In one word, we cannot jump out of our skin. The idea of jumping out of our skin is unintelligible. For in order to make it intelligible we have to jump out of our skin. To put the above succinctly, we have to graft some logic onto the speaker's utterance. Unless we are able to do so the machinery of understanding will fail to operate, for understanding is a matter of meaning and meaning is a matter of truth-conditions and truth-conditions of a sentence are determined by the logical form of the sentence. And the speaker and the interpreter can detect different logical forms in a sentence uttered by the speaker on a certain occasion only at the cost of incorrect interpretation. Since incorrect interpretation is an

exception rather than the rule the speaker and the interpreter must share the same logic. Davidson is of the view that the idea of radically alternative logics makes no sense. For the possibility of alternative logics can be understood only in terms of our own logic. But then they can no longer be radical alternatives. To quote Davidson, '... our interpreter cannot accept great or obvious deviations from his own standard of rationality without destroying the foundation of intelligibility on which all interpretation rests. The possibility of understanding the speech or actions of an agent depends on the existence of a fundamental rational pattern, a pattern that must, in general outline, be shared by all rational creatures. We have no choice, then, but to project our own logic on to the language and beliefs of another.'[3]

Putting the speaker thus in our shoes we are able to understand what the speaker means when he utters a certain sentence and what beliefs he entertains on the occasion of a given utterance. It should be added here that Davidson is a holist in his theory of beliefs. One belief cannot be ascribed in isolation to a person. Attribution of a specific belief rests on assumptions about many other beliefs which would support and be supported by that belief. Thus beliefs are identified and described only within a dense pattern of beliefs. 'I can believe a cloud is passing before the Sun, but only because I believe there is a Sun, that clouds are made of water vapours, that water can exist in liquid or gaseous form and so on. If I suppose that you believe that a cloud is passing before the Sun, I suppose you have the right sort of pattern of beliefs to support that belief and these beliefs must be enough like my beliefs to justify the description of your belief as a belief that a cloud is passing before the Sun. If I am right in attributing the belief to you, then you must have a pattern of beliefs much like mine.'[4] This shows two things. One is—we cannot hold/attribute beliefs that are not sustained by other beliefs. We always hold a group of beliefs that hang together. The other is—right attribution of beliefs to others presupposes agreement of others' beliefs with my beliefs.

Moreover, '... widespread agreement is the only possible background against which disputes and mistakes can be interpreted. Making sense of the utterances and behaviour of others, even their most aberrant behaviour, requires us to find a great deal of reason and trust in

them. To see too much unreason on the part of others is simply to undermine our ability to understand what it is they are so unreasonable about.'[5]

The above reminds us of Wittgenstein (Proposition 156, *On Certainty*).

> In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind.[6]

If my judgements or beliefs differ entirely from others, i.e., if I totally disagree with others then I cannot even make a mistake for who is to judge then that this is a mistake.

Agreement which thus makes for correct interpretation does not, however, make for truth. What guarantees that our shared or concurred beliefs are true? What protects us from massive error? Is it not possible that we understand one another on the basis of shared but erroneous beliefs? Is it impossible that both the speaker and the interpreter are entertaining false beliefs always and everywhere? Davidson answers that this can happen some of the time, but not all the time, that our beliefs must be true by and large. Even objective error is possible only in a setting of largely true beliefs.

He offers the following argument for it. For an interpreter 1 to interpret a speaker S, 1 must share many beliefs with S. Now if this 1 is omniscient then all his beliefs are true. Therefore, if 01 understands S at all, then S's beliefs are by and large true because they are by and large the same as 01's beliefs. If all/most of our beliefs are false, the 01 would fail to understand or correctly interpret us and this is to deprive the 01 of his omniscience. Hence it is impossible that the majority of our beliefs, not to speak of all the beliefs, are, false.

Davidson is not saying that the 01 is an actually existing entity. He only claims that the idea of an 01 is not absurd or unintelligible. But we could not make sense of this idea if our beliefs were not largely true. We *can* make sense of this idea. So our beliefs are largely true. The 01 knows everything about the world. So he perfectly understands us. That is, there is nothing incorrect in his understanding. And this understanding presupposes a large number of common beliefs. These

beliefs cannot be false. So our beliefs are largely true. Massive error about the world is simply unintelligible. To give intelligibility to it we have to suppose that there could be an 01 who correctly interpreted someone as being massively mistaken and this is impossible. The logical force of the idea of 01 lies in the fact that knowledge makes for understanding. The more we know (about the world) the better is the scope for understanding. To satisfy Quine Davidson must say that understanding is limited to a determinate core surrounded by a large penumbra of indeterminacy. P.F. Strawson wrote in a personal letter[7] that Davidson's notion of an 01 makes no sense, for omniscience taken strictly would exclude any need for interpretation. An omniscient being by definition, just knows everything including what speakers believe and what meaning they attach to their sentences.

This does not seem to be tenable. The most important question here is: Is it possible that the Omniscient being knows that a speaker's beliefs are all false about the world? If it is possible, then he also knows that the speaker's beliefs are all different from or disagree with his own beliefs. But we know that disagreement can be understood only against a background of agreement. Hence the speaker's beliefs can't all be different from the Omniscient being's beliefs, and as a result the former can't be all false. On the contrary, as we have been arguing, they are mostly true.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Kant also held the view that successful communication and coherence of judgements of different individuals are the criteria of truth which is defined by Kant as agreement of knowledge with its object. Kant says: 'The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is ... the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason. For there is then at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgements with each other, notwithstanding the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground, namely, upon the object, and that it is for this reason that they are all in agreement with the object—the truth of the judgement being thereby proved.'[8]

III

Let us go back to Davidson. Correct interpretation of other's speech provides one thread of Davidson's argument. The other thread goes as follows. The sceptical question is no nonsense. But this question cannot be raised at all unless the sceptic is able to identify and interpret others' beliefs. In order for the sceptic to argue that most of others' beliefs are false he has to assume *that* other people believe and *what* other people believe. This identification is made possible by the causal basis of beliefs. To elaborate, the identification of the nature and content of others' beliefs is made possible to a large extent by reference to the complicated causal chains leading to the beliefs. We start with prompted assent. On a given occasion I find a person assenting to a particular sentence. I argue with myself. Had I been he, I would have assented to this sentence if I had such and such beliefs, and I would have such and such beliefs if such and such causes were operative. So I infer that the other person must be having such and such beliefs with such and such contents.[9] We find in our own case how we are caused to believe things. On this basis we infer in the case of others that similar beliefs are produced in them by similar causes. If my belief and your belief, says Davidson, were not systematically caused by the same objects and events, then your utterance could not mean what mine does. If we are to make sense of others' speech it is a methodological necessity, Davidson has said, that we take a great many of his beliefs to be prompted in regular fashion by the environment in which we find them to arise in ourselves. 'Communication begins where causes converge ...'[10]

Making sense of others' speech means correct interpretation of the same. Correct interpretation presupposes shared beliefs. And shared beliefs are largely true.

No further reassurance, remarks Davidson, is needed. All that is needed is a recognition on our part that beliefs are by their very nature true. This veridical nature of beliefs can be established by reference to what determines the nature and content of belief, i.e. the cause of belief, its relation to other beliefs and other propositional attitudes, and its relation to meaning.[11] The role played by the casual factors is such that '... given the identities and contents of our beliefs, they could not possibly be globally false, for if they were generally caused in some way other than the way they are in fact generally caused, then they would have different contents and identities, they would not be the beliefs they are, they would be about something else.'[12]

That veracity is built into the nature of beliefs is specially borne out, Davidson argues, by the fact that belief and meaning are interrelated. Meaning depends on belief. What a sentence as uttered by a speaker means depends partly on the external circumstances that cause it and partly on the relation of this sentence with other sentences held true by the subject. These relations among sentences uttered and held true by the subject can be understood only in terms of beliefs. The interpreter interprets the speaker's sentence to mean such and such because he thinks that the speaker has such and such beliefs. Davidson holds that the interpreter cannot assign meaning to the utterances made by the speaker independently of ascribing beliefs to him. To be precise, attribution of one set of meanings to the sentences held true by a subject yields one set of beliefs, attribution of another set of meanings yields another set of beliefs and so on. Thus meaning depends on belief. Again, belief depends on meaning. The complicated structure of beliefs cannot be grasped except when expressed in language, i.e. in sentences. Now one has to know the meanings of sentences the speakers use to express and describe their beliefs, in order to have an idea of the nature and content of belief. To quote Davidson: 'If all we have to go on is the fact of honest utterance, we cannot infer the belief without knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief.'[13]

IV

Since belief and meaning are thus interlocked, in order to explicate their nature we should begin with something which assumes neither meaning nor belief. Like Quine, Davidson begins with the acts of prompted assent and dissent as basic, acts which are caused by events within the ambit of the speaker. The speaker assents to a sentence or he dissents from a sentence. It is possible to know *that* a speaker assents to a sentence or that he dissents from a sentence without

knowing what the sentence as uttered by him means and without knowing what belief the speaker is expressing by uttering the sentence. But this assent or dissent which is more or less observable is determined by at least two factors: (1) the meaning assigned to the sentence by the speaker; (2) beliefs entertained by the speaker about his circumstance. These two, belief and meaning which are unobservable are central to linguistic understanding. When the interpreter interprets the sentence assented to by the speaker he is assigning some meaning to the sentence, and he is attributing some beliefs to the speaker.

Such attribution of beliefs is possible because a speaker cannot systematically deceive his would-be interpreters. For in order to deceive others the deceiver must, in the first place, make himself understood. But he can be understood only when we are not deceived by what he says. Deception must begin with some correct understanding regarding at least the meaning of the sentences uttered by the deceiver for the purpose of deceiving, and correct understanding regarding the beliefs sustaining that meaning.

To put the above point in a slightly different way. Deception is parasitical on wrong understanding. Wrong understanding is parasitical on right understanding. And right understanding means right ascription of beliefs to the deceiver and right assignment of meaning to his utterance. Ascription of beliefs can be right only when it is guided by certain factors as dictated by certain principles. Two factors are worth mentioning. One is internal coherence. The other is consonance of the speaker's beliefs with the interpreter's beliefs. The principle of rationality which is a component of the principle of charity tells us that I can ascribe only those beliefs to a speaker which are not in conflict with my beliefs. I must be charitable enough not to ascribe beliefs to others which I would not ascribe to myself. Thus the hearer is not in a position to say that the speaker, the deceiver in this case, holds beliefs that are different by and large, from his own. But unless he can say this he can never be deceived, though to begin with, the deceiver and the deceived must share many beliefs with each other. Systematic deception, thus, defeats itself.

V

It follows as a consequence that it is in principle possible for us to determine what speakers mean by their utterances and what beliefs they entertain while making some utterances. Besides, in the exercise of ascription of beliefs causality plays an important role. The interpreter cannot discover the speaker to be largely wrong about the world. For he attributes beliefs to the speaker according to the objects and events in the external world which are supposed by the interpreter to cause the speaker's beliefs. This is connected with the following fact. Communication between the speaker and the interpreter is possible because the interpreter's beliefs cohere with the speaker's beliefs. But why is it that their beliefs cohere? The reason is: they are caused by the same objective conditions. In one word, the precondition of communication is shared beliefs and the precondition of shared beliefs is identical or similar objective causal factors responsible for the formation of beliefs.[14] But is it not possible, one may intervene, that the interpreter is wrong in identifying the causes of the speaker's beliefs and thus wrong in identifying the beliefs themselves? Davidson does not rule out this possibility, but he hastens to add that this can happen some of the time, not all the time. True, the interpreter as well as the speaker are fallible human beings. But just like systematic deception, systematic mistake in ascription of beliefs makes no sense. And if this makes no sense neither does it make sense that all our beliefs are false about the world.

On Davidson's argument, thus, causal conditions and coherence with other beliefs (as well as relation of beliefs with meaning and other propositional attitudes) are equally important determinants in the identity and truth of beliefs.

Presumption in favour of the truth of a belief '... increases the larger and more significant the body of beliefs with which a belief coheres, and there being no such thing as an isolated belief there is no belief without a presumption in its favour.'[15] And it is impossible that a whole body of beliefs is false, though any single belief can be doubted and given up as false. We are reminded of Russell here who said, 'It is of course *possible* that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some element of doubt. But

we cannot have *reason* to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief.'[16]

VI

To substantiate and to reinforce his position Davidson addresses himself to global scepticism of the senses. To answer the sceptic we have to begin with occasion sentences, i.e. sentences 'whose causes to assent come and go with observable circumstances' (Davidson). These sentences express basic beliefs where the cause of belief and the object of belief converge. Not in every case can the utterance of a sentence be said to evince a belief which is caused by what the belief is about. So we try to get our foot-hold on occasion sentences to which we tie certainty for here the chances of having erroneous beliefs seem to be eliminated. The credibility of other sentences depends upon the way they are related to occasion sentences. But even here we face two difficulties:

(1) Not all occasion sentences are on a par. Some occasion sentences are more credible than others. Not to speak of variation in credibility in different circumstances, even in the same circumstance one occasion sentence may be more credible than another.

(2) Credibility of occasion sentences also depends upon their relation with other occasion sentences and non-occasion sentences. If in a certain situation one occasion sentence fails to cohere with other sentences in the network of sentences then we will be hesitant to accept the occasion sentence under consideration as credible. Suppose on a certain occasion one says 'It is so hot', and the next moment he says 'Please bring me a blanket', 'Please switch off the fan'. In such a case we are at a loss to assign any credibility to the utterance of the sentence 'It is so hot'.

Thus if occasion sentences are themselves quicksand, what, then, are we to rely upon? The answer consists in saying that we must be able to distinguish between occasion sentences and occasion sentences. Some occasion sentences can be more observational than others. Some could be so credible that scepticism has to retreat in their face.

To distinguish between degree of observationality of occasion sentences, however, we have to develop some internal criterion. For if we fall back upon some external criterion, if, for example, we appeal to sensation or sensory stimulation then we will invite the problems of sensationism, problems of confusing between a causal role and an epistemic role given to sensation. We shall shortly discuss these problems.

But even when taking help of internal criteria we take refuge in some occasion sentences; one may argue, the possibility of incorrect interpretation is not ruled out. The same stimulus may elicit two different responses from two different persons. '... even in the simplest cases,' observes Davidson, 'it is clear that the same cause (a rabbit scampers by) may engender different beliefs in speaker and observer, and so encourage assent to sentences which cannot bear the same interpretation.'[17] As a result there is every chance of breakdown of communication. Quine hoped to cope with this problem by turning from rabbits (external objects resorted to by Davidson) to patterns of stimulation as causing beliefs. He held that the meaning of an observation sentence is determined by the patterns of sensory stimulation that would cause a speaker to assent to or dissent from a sentence. Without going into the question of preferring one approach to another (Quine's approach and his own) Davidson maintains that we can meet the problem only holistically. Being guided by the principle of presenting the speaker as intelligibly as possible in the light of his actions, utterances and station in the world we arrive at the conclusion that we can be right in our interpretation of most of the utterances, though the possibility of incorrect interpretation cannot be ruled out sentence by sentence. So we have to admit that there can be mismatches between cause and content of occasion sentences. Davidson writes: 'About some things we will find him (the interpreter) wrong, as the necessary cost of finding him elsewhere right. As a rough approximation, finding him right means identifying the causes with the objects of his beliefs, giving special weight to the simplest cases, and countenancing error where it can be best explained.'[18]

VII

Davidson calls his theory 'mild coherence theory'. But the most distinctive feature of a coherence theory is present even in this mild form. This feature is: Nothing can justify a belief except another belief or a number of beliefs. The source of justification of beliefs cannot lie in another ilk, i.e., in anything other than a belief. In spite of this we can have knowledge of a public objective world. Philosophers in search of a different epistemological basis, e.g., the testimony of the senses, end up with scepticism. They fail to explain how sensations justify beliefs in sensations. It is true that sensory stimulations are part of the causal chain that leads to belief. But a cause is not a reason. And in epistemology we are concerned with reasons and not causes. Davidson has no objection to Quine's doctrine that through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces we are *caused* to believe about things in the objective world. But the question 'How are these beliefs justified?' remains. Quine is wrong when he says: 'The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in aiming at his picture of the world.'[19] According to Davidson appeal to sensation is of no help in answering the question of justification. For

(1) There are no beliefs which have the same epistemic content as the corresponding sensations. That is, there are no beliefs which collapse into sensation. Beliefs are characterized by the use of concepts whereas concepts are conspicuously absent in sensations. That is why there are no beliefs which are sensations in disguise.

(2) Even if there be such beliefs which do not exceed in content the corresponding sensations, i.e., beliefs which merely report the occurrence of sensations, they are of no help as they are unable to transcend the subjectivity ingrained in them, and hence cannot justify any inference to an external world. Nor do they require any justification, for the existence of such beliefs entails their own truth. If the beliefs exist the corresponding sensations are occurring. Hence if the beliefs exist they cannot but be true. And the beliefs which are left over, beliefs which do require justification, Davidson adds, are justified by other beliefs.

(3) To avoid the above impasse one may say that it is not sensation as such but the awareness of having sensation that justifies belief in sensation. But it is difficult to construe awareness of sensation except as a belief of a sort. Hence, once again we are proposing that belief justifies belief.

(4) Being unsuccessful in the above one may try a bolder tack. Sensations can be thought to justify beliefs which go beyond what is given in sensations in the following sense. Suppose under a certain condition a person is having the visual sensation of a green light flashing and is having the belief that a green light is flashing. Is this belief justified? If it is, how? We usually offer the following argument for the justification of the belief.

People do not normally have the sensation of green light flashing unless green light is flashing.

The person is having the sensation of green light flashing.

∴ Green light is flashing.

Here justification is given by me, the onlooker, by reference to my belief in a connection between a state of affairs and a sensation caused by it. The believer himself cannot be justified in believing that a green light is flashing unless he has a belief about the causal connection between something objective and the sensation he is having. For it might happen that the person is having a certain sensation but he believes that he is not having the sensation. In this situation the mere having of sensation would not justify him in believing that such and such state of affairs exists. In other words, if sensation is to play a role in justifying at all then that can be done only from the vantage point of the onlooker who is entertaining beliefs about the connection between sensation and the world outside.

Thus Davidson shows that sensory causes can never serve as epistemic evidence for our beliefs. He is giving up the idea of evidence in the foundationalist sense. It is only between propositional attitudes that a logical or epistemic relation of justifier and justified can hold, for it is only in the case of propositional attitudes that the question of truth and

falsity arises. Sensation is not a belief or a propositional attitude. So it cannot stand in any epistemic relation with a belief. It is misleading to say like Quine that 'surface irritations ... exhaust our clues to an external world.'[20] Sensation can be given the role of a justifier only at the cost of a confusion between cause and reason, between causal intermediaries and epistemic intermediaries.

Davidson thus thinks that the foundationalist fails to answer the question regarding justification of beliefs. The coherentist can give an argument to show that someone with a more or less coherent set of beliefs cannot be wholly mistaken. Had our beliefs been not coherent with one another, linguistic understanding and communication with our fellow beings would have been impossible. Hence our beliefs are coherent and therefore true. And there is presumption in favour of the truth of every belief that coheres with the rest of the coherent set of beliefs.

VIII

Let us now consider some objections that have been raised in recent times against Davidson's theory.

Ernest Sosa in his paper '"Circular Coherence" and "Absurd Foundations"'[21] comments that he is not denying the truth of Davidson's main positive conclusions or the suggestiveness and value of his main arguments but it is not clear to him how the two threads of Davidson's argument, viz., one along the track of right interpretation and the other along the track of causal basis of beliefs, are intertwined.

I think the connection between the two threads of the argument can be understood after Davidson as follows. In order to interpret the speaker rightly the interpreter has to ascribe some beliefs to him, beliefs which are not widely different from his own. And he can ascribe only those beliefs whose identity and content are known to him. This identity and content of beliefs is determined by their causal basis. Hence knowledge of the identity and content of beliefs can be had only when one has knowledge of such causal basis.

Thus, as has been discussed earlier, correct interpretation presupposes agreed or coherent beliefs, and beliefs that cohere can be identified and explained by the causal root of the same.

Richard Winfield[22] has raised an objection against my presentation of Davidson's argument. According to Davidson, I have said, commonality of beliefs is to be explained in terms of their correspondence with reality. Again while discussing the causal aspect of Davidson's argument I have pointed out that commonality of beliefs is to be explained in terms of common causal factors generating the beliefs, Winfield's question is: Are the above two theses equivalent? If not, what is the relation between them?

Let me try to answer the question. The two theses are certainly not equivalent though Davidson himself subscribes to both. Davidson tells us that if we are to make sense of others' speech it is a methodological necessity that we take a great many of his beliefs to be prompted in regular fashion by the environment in which we find them to arise in ourselves.[23] Correct interpretation, in other words, presupposes commonality of causes or, more explicitly, commonality of causes is at the root of agreement of beliefs and agreement of beliefs is at the root of correct interpretation or successful communication. Thus common beliefs are due to common causes.[24] This means that common beliefs are *causally* explained in terms of common objective factors. This is one thing; the other thing is that common, agreed, coherent beliefs are explained in terms of correspondence to reality. The *reason* why our beliefs cohere or my beliefs cohere with others' beliefs is that they correspond to reality. This is *rational explanation*. These are two different theses, but they can very well go together. I am aware that here I have entered into a very controversial area of Davidson's philosophy. But it is not possible to discuss that controversy here. I can just say that I find it difficult to accept Davidson's theory that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. Peter D. Klein's criticism in 'Radical Interpretation and Global Scepticism'[25] deserves serious consideration for Klein thinks that Davidson's argument against the sceptic is a misfire. In Klein's opinion, Davidson has provided a good reason for thinking that our coherent beliefs are true in the main and this Davidson thinks is a reason for rejecting global scepticism. Klein argues rightly that satisfaction of the truth condition does not entail satisfaction of the justification condition, and unless Davidson is able to show how some true beliefs amount to knowledge, i.e., how they are

justified, he is not able to answer the sceptical challenge. Davidson seems to hold that, Klein argues, if some beliefs are true and we know that they are true then the justification condition is, so to speak, automatically satisfied. This is improper.

My response is that Klein is not doing justice to Davidson. On the very first page of his paper Davidson has told us that in order to have knowledge the person having a coherent set of beliefs must be in possession of sufficiently good reasons to believe that his beliefs are coherent and hence, true. Again, in the last paragraph of his paper Davidson writes that although he has left almost untouched the task of specifying the conditions of knowledge, he has shown that justification for a belief must come from the same totality of belief to which it belongs. Coherence of beliefs is the test of truth of beliefs in general. But the question is: Do we have reasons to believe that our beliefs are coherent and therefore, true? The answer is in the affirmative. We have noted, just before considering the critics' objections that had our beliefs been not coherent with one another linguistic understanding and communication with our fellow beings would have been impossible. Since both of these are possible we are justified in believing that our beliefs are true. Of course, it is true that some beliefs may not be adequately justified and, therefore, may fall short of knowledge.

Another objection related to the above is raised by Klein. '... it is a cornerstone of Davidson's account of methodologically basic beliefs,' writes Klein, 'that what they are about is a matter of causal interaction of the world with the speaker. There is no "internal" content of a belief which determines its meaning. Rather its meaning is fixed by the principle of maximizing truth (and other principles such as simplicity) and by causal interaction of the world with the speaker ... . Thus Davidson's view avoids the possibility of the mismatch between the content of beliefs and the objects of beliefs.'[26] In brief, it is the equation of the content and the typical cause of beliefs which guarantees that the basic beliefs are true in the main. But the sceptic would immediately ask, argues Klein, how do we know that there is a causal order which is such that events of a given type, are typically correlated with events of another type? To presuppose that we have such an important bit of knowledge about the external world is something unwarranted on the part of Davidson who is attempting to answer the global sceptic.

Klein actually goes to the extreme when he says: 'If I am right about the structure of Davidson's argument and the concept of belief inherent in it, then we could know *a priori* that if there are beliefs, then they are true in the main. But in order to know that there are any beliefs, we would have to know at least one very important truth about our environment, namely, that there are events outside of our bodies which are (causally) correlated with states of ourselves. Any argument employing a single premise entailing the claim that there are such correlations would be ineffective against the global sceptic. For it would presuppose that we have some of the very knowledge whose existence is to be established by the argument.'[27] I am inclined to give a Quinean sort of response to the above. It is simply preposterous to expect that we have to give a presuppositionless account of knowing, that our everyday knowledge derived from ordinary experience and knowledge acquired from scientific discoveries are to be given up.

The sceptic, we have already noted, cannot set out unless he grants *that* we believe and *what* we believe. Had we been devoid of beliefs and such other propositional attitudes the sceptic would have no problems to begin with. Davidson never questions the existence of beliefs, hopes, desires and such other propositional attitudes. And why should he? Granted that there are beliefs he devotes himself to the task of explaining the origin, identity, content, truth and falsity of beliefs in particular, specially to the task of explaining why the totality of our beliefs cannot be false. My simple point in defence of Davidson is that if there is nothing upon which the sceptic and Davidson can agree, then there is no possibility that they will disagree on any other point.

Simon Blackburn[28] has a very precise objection to Davidson's response to the sceptic. He asks: Is it not a belief on our part that our system of beliefs is controlled by the world? If it is so, Davidson fails to explain satisfactorily how the controlling is actually done.

My reply to the above is also precise, or at least, I think so. Yes, it is a belief on our part which coheres with other beliefs of my system.

We cannot get outside of our beliefs—we can't help it. The belief that our beliefs have a causal connection with the external world is not, however, an unproved assumption on Davidson's part. He takes great pains to prove it. We have discussed this at length. Having proved it, it is now rather simple for him to argue that since this higher-order belief is coherent with other beliefs, since it is the best possible explanation of the identity and content of other beliefs, there is high presumption in favour of the truth of this belief.

IX

Even after what has been discussed so long, a question may linger in ones mind regarding the difference between foundationalism in general and Davidson's version of coherentism. Basic beliefs, i.e., beliefs expressed in occasion sentences which occupy a central position in the network of beliefs are supposed by Davidson to be the best possible answer to the sceptic. Is he not, then, ascribing an epistemic priority to the basic beliefs? If he is, is he not subscribing to some form of foundationalism.

To get the right answer to the above question we have to look back to Davidson's theory once again. The first thing about the theory is that even the basic beliefs which Davidson appeals to are not sacrosanct. They are basic not in the sense that once and for all they serve as foundations upon which the entire edifice of knowledge is built up. They are more like Neurath's 'protocol sentences'. They are not epistemically, not metaphysically, but methodologically basic. We cling to them because they are the least suspect and they are least suspect because in them objects and causes converge. Davidson gives up the distinction between observation sentences evincing basic beliefs and other sentences evincing non-basic beliefs as epistemically significant. In his theory there is no concept of building the structure of knowledge storey by storey, no concept of beginning as there is in the foundationalist picture. Knowledge is not grounded upon something that counts as an ultimate source of evidence. It is an intellectual error to look for a *certain* basis for all our beliefs. In the foundationalist theory the basic beliefs are treated as states of knowledge themselves. To have these beliefs is to have a complete, guaranteed, unfailing hold

on the objects to which they are directed. All other beliefs are founded upon them and thus justified in varying degrees.

The above discussion helps us to pinpoint the differences between Davidson's theory and contemporary foundationalism.

(1) Each individual basic belief of the foundationalist is born with truth. Truth is guaranteed or secured in their case in the sense that each one of them is supposed to be infallible, incorrigible and indubitable. To question the truth of basic beliefs is to question the foundations and no pyramidal structure can be erected upon such foundations, or even if erected is bound to fall to the ground no sooner than it is built. To compromise with the strength of foundations is to compromise with foundationalism as such. 'Weak Foundationalism' is no foundationalism. Davidson, on the other hand, raises questions even about his 'methodologically basic' beliefs. The possibility of incorrect interpretation is not ruled out even here; the fate of being mistaken may befall even a basic belief. Truth is guaranteed in no individual case. No single, isolated belief can be shown to be certainly true. Each of our beliefs can be false, but not every belief can be false. We can deal with the problem of error only holistically, and not belief by belief. At the very start of doing epistemology we find ourselves in a raft (which is more or less seaworthy) on the open sea. There are no non-verbal rocks to which the raft is tied. We try to make the raft stronger and stronger and our journey more and more safe and comfortable by repairing the raft here and there while depending for the time being on the less weak and less vulnerable parts. Chisholm says that on Neurath's view the epistemologist is to be compared to a sailor 'who unable to return to dock, must reconstruct his vessel on the open sea and is therefore forced to make use of the best constituents that are at hand.'[29] We cannot abandon the entire set of beliefs in one stroke and start anew. Actually we start from the middle and go round and round and the story of belief unravels itself. Foundationalists, on the other hand, start from the base which is so strong to ever need any repair and go up and up and build up the two-

storeyed building of beliefs. The upper storey of this building is inhabited by indirectly or mediately justified beliefs, the directly justified beliefs of the lower storey being anchored to some non-verbal rocks. The raft of the coherentist, on the other hand, has only one floor where all beliefs are equally justified in the qualitative sense of the term 'justified'. No distinction can be drawn between immediately justified and mediately justified beliefs, though beliefs may vary in their degree of justifiedness. It may also be added here that what counts as basic beliefs in Davidson's theory is not perhaps the same as the basic beliefs acknowledged by the foundationalist. Even the sentence 'Here is a rabbit' can satisfy Davidson as exemplifying basic beliefs. But a foundationalist like Chisholm (and he is in good company of many others) would require beliefs like 'I am appeared redly to', 'I seem to have a headache' to occupy the exalted position of basic beliefs.

(2) All beliefs, Davidson points out, are identified directly or indirectly by their causes. But the causal story is not the story of justification. '... a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified.'[30] Between our beliefs and objects in the world there are causal intermediaries but no epistemic intermediaries. If we understand the causal story then we know how the epistemic story is to be told. Beliefs are causally produced in such a way that they cannot but be largely true, provided they concur with other beliefs. In contrast to the above the foundationalist understanding of the justification/knowledge situation is that it is epistemic intermediaries which bring the would-be knowers in contact with the outer world.

* * *

I am indebted to a number of philosophers who have enabled me to write this essay. First and foremost, it is not possible to express in words my gratitude to my teacher Late Professor Pranab Kumar Sen of Jadavpur University but for whom I could never write what I have written here. I happily recollect the extremely exciting and animating lectures delivered by him on Davidson's paper 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' to a small, fortunate audience who gathered in his office once in a week for months in a row in 1993. I am also thankful to Sen's daughter Ms Madhucchanda Sen, now my colleague, whose presence during the lectures helped me in correcting my mistakes on a number of occasions. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Friday Group of Calcutta Philosophers who never miss the chance of criticizing a paper from all possible viewpoints and thus help the author in improving it. I gratefully acknowledge their contributions to this paper.

Notes and References

1. Published in *Truth and Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, ed. Ernest Lepore, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1986.
2. 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', in D. Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 201.
3. 'The Structure and Content of Truth', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 6, June 1990, p. 320.
4. 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p. 200.
5. 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p. 153.
6. L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Harper Torch Books, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1969.
7. The letter was written to Ms Madhucchanda Sen of Jadavpur University, Kolkata in 1994.
8. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, A 820–21, B 848–49, Translated by N.K. Smith, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1963.
9. This is just a repetition of the old truth that we cannot understand others if we cannot understand ourselves.
10. 'The Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p. 318.
11. 'Beliefs like other propositional attitudes supervene upon some behavioural, biological, physical and neurophysiological phenomena.' This does not mean that beliefs and such other psychological phenomena are reducible to some more basic phenomena, physical, biological, etc. The point is that in order to understand beliefs we have to turn to these non-psychological phenomena upon which beliefs are supervenient.
12. E. Sosa, '"Circular Coherence" and "Absurd Foundations"' in E. Lepore, ed., *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, p. 395.

13. 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretations*, p. 142.
14. Davidson has said that communication begins where causes converge. Here one may object that we do find cases where communication gets through but there is no convergence of causes. An example can be found in Keith Donnellan's referential use of a definite description. In a party a person X says to another person Y, 'The man with the glass of martini in hand is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.' The definite description 'the man with the glass of martini in hand' is not true of the man, he is actually holding a glass of water. Nevertheless Y perfectly understands who X is referring to. Hence X is able to communicate with Y even though the objective situations causing their beliefs are different. This objection can be answered in different ways. The first way is as follows. The definite description which forms a part of the sentence here is irrelevant, i.e., irrelevant to the proposition which is being conveyed here. In a purely referential use the propositional content does not include the descriptive content of the definite description. A second way goes as follows. It is not true to say that causes diverge in this case. The hearer believes and believes truly that the man is holding a glass of water. His belief is caused, let us say, by the presence of the glass of water. The speaker believes that the man is holding a glass of martini. What is the cause of this belief? There is a glass, the glass contains something liquid, and this liquid appears like martini and so on. So in the objective situation there are some common causal conditions.
15. 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p. 319.
16. *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, p. 12.
17. 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p. 318.
18. Ibid.
19. *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1965, p. 75.
20. *Word and Object*, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 22.
21. Published in E. Lepore, ed., *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.*
22. Richard Winfield raised this objection when in Kolkata he was attending the weekly sessions of the Friday Group of Calcutta Philosophers where I was presenting an earlier version of this paper.
23. Davidson is here referring to the principle of charity.
24. On Davidson's view objects and events in the world cause our beliefs. But the matching of cause and content is found in the case of basic beliefs alone. The object *directly* produces a basic belief. But the identity of

cause and content in the literal sense is not present in non-basic beliefs—but even there the object must enter causally by way of appropriate relations into the causal process generating the belief. Otherwise we cannot account for their truth.

25. Published in E. Lepore, ed., *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.*
26. Ibid., p. 379.
27. Ibid., p. 386.
28. While giving a talk at Jadavpur University in 1994 he raised this objection, though the context was different.
29. 'Protokollsatze', *Erkenntnis*, Band III, (1932–33), p. 306.
30. 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p. 311.

Against Relativism: Re-engaging Putnam

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Putnam did not reject all forms of relativism. He accepted conceptual relativism. According to him, relativists commit many mistakes when they put their theory into practice. He tried to rectify the defects of relativism and provided a new form of the theory which is known as 'internal realism'. 'Internal realism' holds that the world does not exist outside our conceptual domain. He charts an epistemological path that attempts to avoid extreme relativism. Yet, there are traces of relativistic elements in his epistemology. His 'internal realism' is not free from all sorts of problems. My aim in this paper is to discuss his position on relativism, and determine whether Putnam's internalism entails a problematic form of relativism.

PUTNAM ON RELATIVISM

There are five features of Putnam's epistemology. He developed these features primarily in his book, *Reason, Truth and History*. All these features are not the same in nature. The first, second and fifth features of his epistemology are anti-relativist, and the third and fourth are partially relativist. The five features are:

- (1) In ordinary circumstances, there is usually a fact of the matter as to whether the statements people make are warranted or not.[1]
  (2) Whether a statement is warranted or not is independent of whether the majority of ones cultural peers would *say* it is warranted or unwarranted.[2]
  (3) Our norms and standards of warranted assertibility are historical products, as they evolve in time.[3]
  (4) Our norms and standards always reflect our interests and values. Our picture of intellectual flourishing is part of, and only makes sense as part of, our picture of human flourishing in general.[4]

(5) Our norms and standards of *anything*—including warranted assertibility—are capable of reform. There are better and worse norms and standards.[5] Our norms and standards can be *reformed*.[6]

Putnam, in his *Reason, Truth and History*, argues that relativism is inherently problematic. It is problematic in the way Plato understood it. It is a self-refuting theory. As Putnam says:

> That (total) relativism is inconsistent is a truism among philosophers. After all, is it not *obviously* contradictory to *hold* a point of view while at the same time holding that *no* point of view is more justified or right than any other?[7]

According to Putnam, Protagorean relativism lays down that 'No utterance has the same *meaning* for me and for anyone else.'[8] He understands Plato's argument against Protagoras to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the following kind. When Protagoras claims 'X', Protagoras means:

> I think that X, 'but if he means this, then he should mean, I think that I think that X' ... ad infinitum. However, Putnam claims that this interpretation of Plato's argument is not a good one as it stands.[9]

Plato's argument shows only that Protagoras's views *can* be applied to itself and repeated *ad infinitum*, but not that it *must* be so repeated. According to Putnam:

> Plato has noticed something very deep ... A *total* relativist would have to say that whether or not X is true *relative* to P, is *itself* relative. At this point our grasp on what the position even means beings to wobble, as Plato observed.[10]

The relativist might say to Putnam that there is the threat of the regress that he mentioned. But 'it is not one that makes the initial statement of the doctrine unintelligble.'[11] Putnam might say that 'to say that whether or not X is true *relative* to P, is *itself* relative' (i.e., that it *itself* is culturally relative).[12]

Responding to this objection Putnam claims that it is not the regress alone that renders the doctrine unintelligible. It is rather that the notion that the relativistic justification of a relativistic system of evaluating knowledge claims simply does not make sense. It is the idea that a

relativist can be a relativist about *everything*, including the justification for ones own relativistic claims, that Putnam finds bizarre. This is the bizarre notion that, Putnam claims, Plato understood. However, that a notion is bizarre may not be enough reason to reject it.

Putnam claims that Wittgenstein has an argument against relativism that follows in the tradition of Plato's analysis of Protagorean relativism. He claims:

> The form of relativism Wittgenstein was concerned to attack is known as 'methodological solipsism'. A 'methodological solipsist' is a non-realist or 'verificationist' who agrees that truth is to be understood as in some way related to rational acceptability, but who holds that all justification is ultimately in terms of experience that each of us has a *private* knowledge of ... every statement has a different sense for every thinker.[13]

Putnam's understanding of Wittgenstein's argument against relativism runs as follows:

(a) 'The relativist cannot ... make any sense of the distinction between *being right* and *thinking he his right*'.[14]
(b) If 'the relativist cannot ... make any sense of the distinction between *being right* and *thinking he his right*,' then, 'there is ... no difference between *asserting* or *thinking* on the one hand, and *making noises* (*or producing mental images*) on the other.'[15]
(c) If 'there is ... no difference between *asserting* or *thinking* on the one hand, and *making noises* (*or producing mental images*) on the other,'[16] then, 'I am not a *thinker* at all but a *mere* animal.'[17]
(d) If, 'I am not a *thinker* at all but a *mere* animal,'[18] then, 'to hold such a view is to commit a sort of mental suicide.'[19]
(e) 'To hold such a view is to commit a sort of mental suicide.'[20]

The fact is that no philosopher wants to commit mental suicide, according to Putnam. If Putnam's rendition of 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' is sound, then this unfortunate conclusion will be the result of relativism. Is this argument sound? According to Putnam, the relativist will attempt to show that Wittgenstein's argument against relativism is unsound by pointing out that premise (a) is false. How does the relativist do this? According to Putnam, he will 'borrow the

idea that truth is an *idealization* of rational acceptability. He might hold that X is true-for-me *would* be true provided I observed carefully enough, reasoned long enough or whatever.'[21] However, according to Putnam, the relativist would have the following difficulty; 'Subjunctive conditionals ... are like all statements, interpreted differently by different philosophers.'[22] The relativist would merely be making a claim that 'I *think* that this view of rational acceptability qua subjunctive conditional is true', or 'this view is true-for-me'. But this simply proves that premise (a) in 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' is true.

Putnam considers two ways in which the relativist might try to make sense of subjunctive conditionals. The relativist first might try to understand them in a 'metaphysical realist' manner. However, according to Putnam, to do so, the relativist would have to recognize '*one* class of absolute truths, and so has to give up being a relativist.'[23] The relativist might try to understand subjunctive conditionals in a second, 'non-realist or "internal" realist' fashion, that is, as understood 'in large part by grasping their *justification* conditions.'[24] The 'internal' realist, according to Putnam understands 'truth (*idealized* justification) as something we grasp as we grasp any other concepts, via a (largely implicit) understanding of the factors that make it rationally acceptable to say that something is true.'[25] Putnam claims that the internal realist position on truth is 'objective' and not 'subjective'. It is not one of 'correspondence to a "ready-made world"', but is rather, to use Nelson Goodman's words, 'primarily a matter of fit,'[26] fit of 'versions' and 'a world', where these versions have some role 'in making the world' they fit.[27]

According to relativism, even this putatively '*objective* "fit"',[28] is done away with. 'Thus, the relativist cannot understand talk about truth in terms of *objective* justification-conditions.'[29] Therefore, the relativist's attempt to show that premise (a) is false, by showing that one can make a distinction between being right and thinking that one is right, fails. It fails simply 'because the relativist has no *objective* notion of rightness for these conditionals any more than he does for any other sort of statement.'[30]

There is a second way in which the relativist might argue against the soundness of 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism'. The relativist could claim that relativism does not, in fact, hold premise (a) to be true at all. By saying that 'this doctrine is right' the relativist simply means that 'This doctrine is right relative to x, where x is culture, beliefs, conceptual schemes or whatever.' Thus, within a community or culture, the claim that 'This doctrine is right' is perfectly clear,[31] and the implication in premise (b), that there is a difference between asserting something and making noises, fails.

Putnam might respond to this objection to 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' by arguing that, regardless of whether the relativist appeals to an individual or a culture, the conclusion of 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' still follows. There is simply noise made within a group of people. There is mental mass suicide.

A third way that the relativist might want to argue against 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' is to put forth a form of relativism to which 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' is immune. As it explains:

> *Objective* versions of relativism ... insist that there can be objective reasons within a framework of presuppositions ... don't seek to deny that there *is* objective knowledge, but rather to give an account of what that objectivity consists in. Accepting the framework itself is not a matter of being right or wrong, but of training or enculturation. But once accepted, the application of its standards is objective, and doesn't depend on what people think.[32]

Preston claims that Putnam's use of 'Wittgenstein's argument doesn't touch any realistic version of objective relativism.'[33] This kind of relativism can distinguish between thinking one is right and being right. It can maintain 'the idea that relative truth is idealized rational acceptability within a framework, and the idea that the objectivity of rational acceptability within a framework consists in the objectivity of what really *does* follow from the framework principles.'[34]

The conclusion in 'Wittgenstein's argument against relativism' above implies that a consistent relativist cannot treat himself as a speaker or a thinker. Presumably, this is what it means to commit a sort of mental suicide. By simply making ones own claims about relativism, the relativist shows that it is a presupposition of thought itself, and that some

kind of objective 'rightness' exists, and this, we would add, shows the self-defeating nature of relativism.

PUTNAM ON CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM

Putnam's epistemology shows that he argues against relativism in order to demonstrate the truth of the first two features of his epistemology. We will focus on an apparent problem between the first and the fourth features of his epistemology mentioned in the last section. The problem is this: There is usually a fact of the matter as to whether the statements people make are warranted or not. Our norms and standards always reflect our interests and values. For any subject S and any proposition P, there is some 'fact of the matter' which justifies, non-relativistically. At the same time, that standard will 'always reflect' S's interests. Thus, it appears that any standard for justification or knowledge or rationality for that matter is both dependent on and independent of S. Does this lead to relativism? Putnam does not think so, since in the fifth feature of his epistemology, he claims that standards themselves, although dependent on S, can be reformed. But is 'reformed' here being used in a descriptive or a prescriptive sense? Laws can be reformed qua changed, and they can be reformed qua improved.

Putnam's resolution of this apparent problem is manifest through his account of what has been called 'internal realism' or 'conceptual relativity'. Here the question is whether the conceptual relativity is considered as problematic as epistemological relativity which is propounded by Putnam.

It may be objected that the criticisms of Putnam's views focussed on 'metaphysical' issues, and thus have little bearing on epistemological ones. The reason that certain metaphysical issues will be the focus here is due to the fact that these metaphysical issues are those on which the epistemological ones rest. Putnam himself recognizes that there is a deep connection between metaphysical and epistemological issues of his 'internal realism'. He says:

> Of course, from my point of views, the 'epistemological' and the 'ontological' are intimately related. Truth and reference are intimately connected with epistemic notions; the open texture of the notion of an object, the open texture of the notion of reference, the open texture of the notion of meaning, and the open texture of reason itself are all interconnected. It is from these interconnections that serious philosophical work on these notions must proceed.[35]

PUTNAM ON 'INTERNAL REALISM'

Putnam's goal is to do justice to our sense that knowledge claims are responsible to reality without recoiling into metaphysical fantasy. What kind of metaphysical fantasies does he have in mind? He mentions Nelson Goodman's 'irrealism' or Michael Dummett's 'anti-realism'. Also, he mentions the views of 'identities across metaphysical worlds' and 'the absolute conception of the world' of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and Bernard Williams. Putnam takes a sort of middle path between these two views. He calls the former 'irresponsible relativism' and the latter, 'reactionary metaphysics'. He describes his middle path as 'Aristotelian realism without Aristotelian metaphysics'. He also calls it:

> Deweyan realism 'insofar as Dewey tried to' retain something in the spirit of Aristotle's defense of the commonsense world, against the excesses of both the metaphysicians and the Sophists, without thereby committing ourselves to any variant of the metaphysical essentialism that Aristotle propounded.[36]

According to Putnam, metaphysical realism is false; but this does not entail relativism, rather there is a middle path between these two. Putnam's argument is two-fold. First, he claims that the 'traditional' metaphysical realist position fails. Second, he claims that relativism is not entailed by this failure. My argument here is that Putnam's argument against traditional metaphysical realism does not succeed. He replaces traditional metaphysical realism, by 'internal realism' or 'conceptual relativism'. It is itself problematically self-defeating in a relativistic manner.

Putnam indicates that William James also tried to generate this kind of 'internal realism' about the commonsense world that was free from 'the excesses of traditional forms of metaphysical realism'.[37] Putnam examines the failure of the traditional metaphysical realist position in the light of William James's realism. Putnam takes from James the

view of realism without the traditional metaphysics. Putnam says that, according to James, 'The public world we experience is not a "ready-made" world ... no single unique description is imposed upon us by non-human reality.'[38]

The point to be examined here is the implication that Putnam's rejection of the traditional metaphysical realist's criticisms of James's account as 'metaphysical fantasy' has on Putnam's epistemology. The 'fantasy' in question is the traditional realist's view that 'there is a totality of "forms" or "universals" or "properties" fixed once and for all, and that every possible meaning of a word corresponds to one of these "forms" or "universals" or "properties". The structure of all possible thoughts is fixed in advance—fixed by the "forms".'[39]

Although the issues Putnam discusses are questions in the area of perception, Putnam's view is that reference and perception are tightly related problems regarding the relation between our mind and the world. Putnam indicates that the issue in theories of perception and theories of reference are basically the same.

Putnam agrees with the traditional realist that there is an independent reality, and that we have a cognitive responsibility to do justice to whatever we describe. However, he is quick also to distance himself from the traditional metaphysician by claiming that be recognizes a '*real* insight in James's pragmatism, the insight that "description" is never a mere copying and that we constantly add to the ways in which language can be responsible to reality.'[40]

The metaphysical realist would not need to express any naïvete about meaning and think that 'the meaning of a word is a property shared by all the things denoted by the word.'[41] The metaphysical realist could construe meaning in terms of a range of properties that are contained in a concept, and a word's meaning is constrained by the range of properties contained in that concept. When has a word been used correctly? A word is used correctly just in case one grabs the thing which is in his grasp. How is this done? It is done with an account of an awareness of the identity of universals in a perceptual experience. When you see the match of the universals in the percept and in the concept in a perceptual experience, the concept is fulfilled by the percept.

There are two ways in Putnam's claim that traditional metaphysical realist's talk of reality as a totality of fixed and determinate 'objects' is incoherent. First, the traditional metaphysical realist could simply try to specify what is meant by objects, and show that, in every case that Putnam presents, these things do count as objects. This seems like a long and arduous task for the traditional metaphysical realist. Perhaps an easier path for the traditional metaphysical realist is to do away with the talk about fixed objects. The talk about 'objects' could be replaced with that about instantiated universals. The traditional metaphysical realist could talk about the totality of instantiated universals, and claim that many of these instantiated universals are instanced as determinate objects, and others are not. There would still be a fixed totality to which our concepts could correspond, but this fixed totality in some way does fall into definite objects and in others, not. The metaphysical realist might claim with respect to the beans spilled on the table, the beans on the table have certain properties which make these things beans, instead of bananas or mice. These properties are intrinsic to the beans themselves, and are what allow us to recognize that they exist and that they exist as beans.

Putnam claims that it is a metaphysical fantasy that there is totality of forms. What is Putnam doing in this criticism? He seems to be saying that reality is a certain kind of way about the world. Yet, is this description itself fixed once and for all? Is this the way the ontological universe is? If so, then Putnam's claim is self-defeating. This seems to be a bit of relativism with which Putnam is saddled, in spite of his claims that his views avoid it. What has been shown till now is that there are good rejoinders to Putnam's objections to traditional metaphysical realism, and that Putnam's own views are self-defeating and thus, incoherent.

NORMATIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY: PUTNAM CONFRONTS RORTY

The debate on 'objectivity' has taken a different dimension in the post-modern age. It stands on radical departure from the traditional way of understanding the notion. The traditional way of understanding objectivity, knowledge and truth is absolute in nature. This position has been questioned by Rorty in his critique of the absolute nature of

objectivity. Rorty's idea of objectivity is not independent of human cognitive activities. It is man-made. In this context, we will see how Putnam confronts Rorty's theory of objectivity.

Both Putnam and Rorty have rejected traditional objectivity. But Putnam's notion of objectivity is not a radical form of objectivity. He has rejected the traditional form of realism, which is based only on the correspondent theory of truth. He does not, however, reject realism altogether. Putnam has accepted conceptual relativity, which implies that everything we accept as real is relative to some conceptual structure. According to Putnam, there must be some empirical levels for knowing the truth. Thus knowledge and truth are not absolute, but exist within a certain theory.

Putnam, while speaking about Rorty's relativism, points out that in Rorty's argument 'true' and 'false' are reduced to mere marks indicating with whom we agree and with whom we disagree. Rorty claims that the same consideration holds when we make normative evaluations or judge what constitutes rationality. Normative evaluations are said to be trans-community evaluations. However, in essence, they are disguised expressions of communal preferences. Consequently, they are not universally binding. This is so because norms are not ahistorical. They are historically defined. Normative authority is not transcultural, but is intercultural. When we come to rationality, we find that the same communal considerations play a role in determining what constitutes rationality. The question about rationality and irrationality cannot be decided in absolute terms, the reason being that they are invariably relative to culture. According to Rorty:

> ... there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society—ours—uses in one or another area of inquiry.[42]

Rorty claims that his theory is 'almost, but not quite, the same as ... "internalist conception of philosophy".'[43] He tries to establish a kind of solidarity which is based on a local objectivity. Rorty's theory of truth is based on communal solidarity. However, Putnam does not agree with this idea. He claims to be preserving the realistic spirit, but he takes Rorty to be 'rejecting the intuitions that underlie every kind of realism (and not just metaphysical realism).'[44] Putnam, therefore, says that Rorty's pragmatism is a kind of self-refuting relativism. It is based on a deep irrationalism.

A debate arises from Rorty's 'pragmatism' and 'Putnam's limit theory of truth'. Putnam opines that Rorty's pragmatism is purely a relativistic notion. Rorty, however, disagrees with this. He insists that the notion of pragmatic truth he is advocating is constituted by human linguistic practices.

According to Rorty, we are not 'discussing perennial and eternal problems'.[45] He attempts to 'debunk claims to knowledge by creating a permanent neutral framework for inquiry and thus for all of culture.'[46] He also rejects the framework that will provide 'non-historical conditions of any possible historical development.'[47] Rorty then attempts to bring probably both into the social milieu in which it is born. His motive is to reconstruct a normative image of the discipline by changing the way philosophers describe and practice their craft 'in the hope of forgoing a new form of intellectual life.'[48]

Putnam, however, disagrees with Rorty in this conception of philosophy. He writes:

> It is a fact about our present culture that there is no philosophical unanimity in it: we do not all accept any one philosophy, and certainly we are not all relativist. Moreover, this is likely to continue to be the case for some time. Rorty himself would very likely regard this lack of philosophical unanimity as a very good feature of our culture, and one which he would like to preserve. But if, as a matter of empirical fact, the statement 'the majority of my cultural peers would not agree that relativism is correct' is true, then, according to the relativist's own criterion of truth, relativism is not true![49]

Putnam is uncomfortable with Rorty's 'ethnocentrism'. Rorty says:

> There is nothing to be said either true or rational apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justifications which a given society—*ours*—uses in one or another area of inquiry.[50]

It is easy to read 'ours' as an endorsement of radical relativism. However, in the same place, Rorty says that 'A theory according to which truth is simply the contemporary opinion of a chosen individual or

group ... would of course be self-refuting.' For this reason, Rorty asks that he is not to be read as advancing any positive theory of truth.

For Putnam, intuitions about criticism and fallibilism must be explained by recourse to a limited notion of truth. But, for Rorty, it is our intuitions about the regulative role of truth that are to be explicated, and it is in terms of the notion of criticism, or *conversation* that this is to be achieved. We are driven to fallibilism on the latter view, not by the suggestion that we cannot be certain if our current versions approximate some ideal, but rather by the hope that, by continuing the process of critical inquiry we may some day develop versions which solve, or circumvent, current problems. Rorty says, 'To say what is rational for us now to believe may not be *true* is simply to say that somebody may come up with a better idea.'[51] According to this view, inquiry is not motivated by the fear that our current versions are wrongheadedness from some ideal perspective, but rather by the hope that better times may be ahead. The search for truth is better construed as a search for better humane ways of relating to our surroundings. The process is one of perpetual reconstruction in which the criteria embodied in our practices are reinterpreted in the light of new examples. In both the cases, we are likely to speak of progress. However, in neither case is the progress measured. New theories, by providing new exemplars, give new content to our general vocabulary of theoretical virtues and new interpretations of what theoretical merit consists in. In so doing, they at once exemplify and redefine those virtues by extending the application of our evaluative terms to new contexts.

Putnam claims that Rorty defends radical relativism. However, this would mean that Rorty holds some evaluative criteria—those of his culture peers. On the basis of the interpretation offered here this accusation is misplaced. Rorty is not suggesting that cultural standards are ultimate epistemic principles. He is denying that the regress of justification can be halted in this way at all. It is his rejection of a transcendental point of view from which to judge ultimate authority that lies behind his ethnocentrism.

Pragmatists claim that truth is a species of good. Putnam says, truth has no content apart from our practices. His form of objectivity is an admixture of pragmatism and realism. His new form of realism is

known as 'internal realism'. The world is internal to our conceptual scheme. Putnam's idea of truth is not in a radical sense absolute. It is a moderate kind of absolutism. Rorty tries to reduce objectivity to solidarity. Putnam has rejected Rorty's notion of solidarity, which is posed against objectivity. He says, inquiry provides our practices with universal aims. There are no aims of inquiry beyond those of historically constituted inquirers. Inquiry is the search for solutions.

CONCLUSION

Putnam strongly argued against relativism, and offers arguments that defeat relativism. His own epistemology is not immune from the very difficulties he criticizes in relativism. The key cause of this difficulty is due to his claim that knowledge claims and their evaluation involve to some extent the interests of the individual. His claim that interests are relevant in knowledge or truth leads to his defense that the connection with reality which knowledge needs to transcend any particular individual or culture is internal to the conceptual scheme of that individual or culture. Even if Putnam accepts that some form of relativism is correct, then the very idea of absolutism cannot be ruled out from his philosophical path.

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Moral Commitments and the Transformation of Politics: Kant, Gandhi and Beyond[1]

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It is precisely the same as if I sought to fathom how freedom itself is possible as the causality of a will. There I abandon a philosophical basis of explanation, and I have no other. I could, no doubt, proceed to flutter about on the intelligible world, which still remains left to me ... the world of intelligences; but although I have an *Idea* of it, which has its own ground, yet I have not the slightest *acquaintance* with such a world, nor can I ever attain such acquaintance by all the efforts of my natural power of reason. My idea signifies only a 'something' that remains over when I have excluded from the grounds determining my will everything that belongs to the world of sense: its sole purpose is to restrict the principle that all motives come from the field of sensibility, by setting bounds to this field and by showing that it does not comprise all in all within itself, *but there is still more beyond it; yet with this 'more' I have no further acquaintance.*

—Immanuel Kant (1964),
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 130–31

If Kant also held that understanding the political project of world society was a necessity for human development in the long run, it seems to me that anthropology is best seen as a means to that end, as a branch of humanistic education, rather than as politics, the active construction for a better world for all of us to live in. This concern with self-in-the-world requires us to transcend the barrier between each one of us as a subjective personality, and society represented as a remote impersonal object. In order to pursue this

goal the world has to be imaginatively reduced in scale and our subjectivity expanded so that a meaningful link can be established between the two.

—Keith Hart (2000), 'Reflections on a Visit to New York'

THE PROBLEM

At the turn of the millennium, one of the most important challenges that confront us is the challenge of an integral remoralization of life as 'morality gets no clear status in the constitution of a structurally differentiated lifeworld' (Habermas 1987: 92) now. The differentiation of societies and fragmentation of subjectivities which are celebrated with the postmodern celebration of difference have failed to realize the moral bond that exists and ought to exist among us at the mid-point of differences. What to speak of realizing the moral bond in manifold webs of relationships, contemporary movements in discourse and society show very little awareness that most of the dilemmas we face today are moral dilemmas and thus we now need a new moral language to talk about and realize our identities and intersubjectivities. Contemporary challenges urge us to rethink our problems morally and 'universalize our interests' from a normative point of view by the establishment of moral communities at different levels of the work of self, culture and society. But while there is an epochal challenge of remoralization of our lives by discovering the bonds that connect the self and the other and the 'ties that bind the fate of an individual to that of every other—making even the most alien person a member of one's community' (cf. Habermas 1990: 20), our preparation in both discourse and practice to respond to these challenges and create transformative bases leaves much to be desired. A case in point here is the way we continue to think about morality by making it an adjunct to politics and will to power. Western philosophical tradition from Plato to Hobbes, and even upto Rawls, is characterized by a 'politicization of morality'—'the attempt to derive moral principles from political considerations' (Edelman 1990: 108). In such accounts of morality, 'the purpose of moral practices is to secure and maintain for men mutually advantageous social arrangements' and 'the content

of "morality" ... is a product of the polis' (ibid., 9). But the task of rethinking at the turn of the millennium urges us to realize: 'In none of the accounts of morality belonging to this tradition (i.e., the tradition of politicized morality) are the needs, interest and desires whose satisfaction is at issue themselves characterized as specifically 'moral' needs, interests or desires. That is to say, we do not begin with any moral discrimination concerning them. The conception of morality at the root of these accounts itself rules out that possibility' (ibid.). And the fact that we cannot even for a moment renunciate power even while talking about the imperative of responsibility comes out clearly in the following lines of Hans Jonas: 'It must be understood that we are confronted with a dialectic of power which can only be overcome by a further degree of power itself, not by quietest renunciation of power' (1984: 141).

The hegemony of such an approach to morality where power is an over-arching concern rather than moral bond as an end in itself should not be surprising as acquisition of power has been considered the be all and end all of emancipation in modernity. Power, politics and empowerment have provided determinant frames of self-constitution and social emancipation in the modern world so that everybody now wants to drink the 'nectar' of power and nobody is concerned with the direction that power ought to take and the transformative ends it must serve. This modernist preoccupation with power has now received a new lease of life from an interlocutor such as Michael Foucault whose disciples assert that there is no escape from the circle of power and counter-power and any project of a 'good life' which is determined to put power in its place and strives to actualize an unconditional ethical obligation of the self to the other is doomed to failure to begin with. But in Foucault himself, we also find a realization of the limitation of power in ensuring human emancipation as he himself writes: 'In fact, I have especially wanted to question politics—the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a pre-established political outlook and do not tend to the realization of some definite political project' (Foucault 1984: 376). In fact, questioning the modernist faith in politics and power in ensuring human emancipation constitutes another significant challenge before us as we enter a new millennium. The integral challenge

of remoralization of life with which we began this conversation calls for a moral transformation of the field of politics and a moral transmutation of the valorized will to power where power becomes not an instrument of domination but one of *Bhakti* whose objective is to enhance human functioning and capability and facilitate the dawn of a more dignified relationship here on Earth. As Hannah Arendt would tell us, to have power is to act 'in concert, on the basis of making and keeping promises, mutually binding one another, covenanting' (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 178).

If moralization of life and transmutation of the logic of power are singlemost challenges facing us now, then Immanuel Kant and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi provide us important insights and resources to come to terms with these challenges and help us go beyond by creating transformative bases of action and reflection. As we take a step towards realizing this goal of an integral remoralization of life Kant and Gandhi offer us assuring friendship and hold our hands and take us beyond the dead-end where we are condemned at present. When we read them we find that they talk to us directly and talk to us of a new possibility—a possibility of autonomy, Swaraj, moral duty, and the promotion of the possibility of Nature of humankind. Unlike much of the discursive utterances of the present in academic philosophy and outside, they talk to us in an evocative language which stings us, moves us, animates us and provokes us to rethink ourselves and be worthy of new moral relationships. When Immanuel Kant writes in the concluding lines of his epochal *Critique of Practical Reason*: 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe ... : *The starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*. I do not seek or conjuncture either of them as if they were veiled obscurities and extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence,' it moves us to touch both the within and without and be a seeker in this great pilgrimage of life. To connect this with the calling of moral commitment, the subject of our conversation here, Kant tells us that the journey towards the 'moral law within me' begins with my invisible self, my personality, and displays to me a world that has true infinity, but which can only be detected through the understanding,

and with which ... I know myself to be not ... merely contingent, but [have] universal and necessary connection.' Furthermore, this journey 'infinitely elevates my worth ... in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even the entire world of senses ...' (quoted in Guyer 1992: 1).

But the moving significance of Kant lies not only in urging us with his heart-touching words to be ever wakeful to the imperative of moral responsibility in our lives, he also passionately strives to transcend the Machiavellian distinction between morality and politics and moralize politics. When the whole modern movement was celebrating politics as an end in itself, we owe it to the indefatigable courage of Kant that: 'true politics can never take a step without rendering homage to morality' and 'all politics must bend its knee before the right' (Kant 1957: 96). In this devotion to moralization of politics, Kant shares an evolutionary agenda with Gandhi who was to appear on the human scene 150 years later and provide a new language of politics and morality. The present chapter discusses this devotion to moral commitment and transformation of politics in Kant and Gandhi. It is not merely interested in a comparison and contrast between these two masters and cataloguing their similarities and differences. It discusses their role in remoralization of politics and presents the zone of convergent illuminations they both share. They, no doubt, have differences but there is a need to go beyond the surfaces in holding the hands of these two interlocutors since pure reason in Kant is not the functionalist reason of modern positivism and religion in Gandhi 'consists not in outward ceremonial but an ever-growing inward response to the highest impulses that man is capable of' and to be true to religion, for Gandhi, 'one has to lose oneself in continuous and continuing service of all life' (Iyer 1990: 159).

MORAL COMMITMENTS

Kant tells us in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* that 'if any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should *conform* to the moral law—it must also be done for the sake of the moral law ...' (1964: 57–8). Furthermore, 'A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes ...; it is good through its willing alone—

that is, good in itself' (ibid.: 62). Even if it accomplishes nothing, 'it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself' (ibid.). Kant urges us to realize that to be moral is to do ones duty without 'some purpose or self-interest' (ibid.: 65). In fact, this disinterested pursuit of duty constitutes the core of Kant's categorical imperative: 'To tell the truth for the sake of duty is something entirely different from doing so out of concern for inconvenient results; for in the first case the concept of the action already contains in itself a law for me, while in the second case I have first of all to look around elsewhere in order to see what effects may be bound up with it for me' (ibid.: 70). Kant further tells us: '... *pure* reverence for practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give way because it is the condition of a will good in itself, whose value is above else' (ibid.: 71). Distinguishing between hypothetical imperative and categorical imperative, Kant tells us: while in the first 'I ought not to lie if I want to maintain my reputation', in the second 'I ought not to lie even if so doing were to bring not the slightest disgrace' (ibid.: 108). Furthermore, universalizability of ones will is a very important characteristic in the consideration of categorical imperative: 'Act as if the maxin of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature' (Guyer 1992: 320).

'The categorical imperative clearly requires a kind of impartiality in our behaviour, we are not permitted to make exceptions for ourselves, or to do what we would not rationally permit others to do' (Schneewind 1992: 322). It requires us to be virtuous for which we must be 'acting for the sake of the good of another' or for our own 'perfection' and 'viewing these ends as morally required' (ibid.: 323). In order to understand both the duty to others and the need for universalizing our will, we cannot have a better evocative example than the following one offered by Kant (1964: 91) himself:

> [A man is flourishing] but he sees others who have to struggle with great hardships (and whom he could easily help); and he thinks 'what does it matter to me? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven wills or as he can make himself; I won't deprive him of anything; I won't even envy him; only I have no wish to contribute anything to his well-being or to his support in distress:' But although it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in harmony with this maxim, yet it is impossible to *will* that such a principle should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will which is decided in this way would be in conflict with itself, since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself.

For Kant, human beings must be treated as ends in themselves, '*not merely as a means* for arbitrary use by this or that will ...' (ibid.: 95). When they are used as a means, it constitutes a 'violation of the rights of man' which Kant condemns (ibid.: 97). Moral commitment for Kant requires reverential conduct of life in what Kant calls *Kingdom of ends*: 'For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself' (ibid.: 101). But in the Kingdom of ends, the human person is a maker of ones law. The human person has an autonomy and it is the unique contribution of Kant in helping us realize that even while obeying a moral law as a categorical imperative one is not obeying an external command but one obeys a law which one has oneself enacted. In the words of Kant: 'But the law-making which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity—that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth—for the appreciation of which—the word "reverence" is the only becoming expression. *Autonomy* is therefore the ground of the dignity of the human nature ...' (ibid.: 103).

Kant celebrates autonomy in the conduct of moral life and distinguishes it from heteronomy which is in conformity to a standard. Kant's idea of autonomy is akin to Gandhi's idea of *Swaraj* but these do not bind human beings in the chains of possessive and annihilating individualism but create a creative and transformative mid-point between the self and the other, the subjective and objective, individual and society. As Kant himself writes: 'Hence the principle of autonomy is never to choose except in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as universal law' (ibid.: 108). The emergence of this mid-point between the subjective and the objective clearly comes out in Kant's third critique, the judgement of taste:

'We rely on our innermost feelings of pleasure alone when estimating the beautiful—an aesthetic judgement is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective—and yet we claim for the deliverances of taste a suprapersonal import. We believe it to be binding for all subjects and not merely for the one on whose experience it is based' (Schaper 1992: 375).

A commentator of Kant writes that 'Kantian morality is communitarian, not individualistic' (Wood 1992: 407). But this is a limiting way of looking at the enriching possibility embedded in Kant's approach to morality which transcends the dualism between communitarianism and individualism. In Kant there is a creative conversation between the two at the centre of which is the autonomous, autonomy-seeking and autonomy-realizing moral agent. It is a tragedy of western modernity that this aspect of Kant's thought has remained underdeveloped as latter day Kantians and defenders of Enlightenment such as Jurgen Habermas have looked at it with derision the reflective nature of the solitary individual and have been overpowered by an anxiety to make this reflective solitary individual a part of the discursive formation of will (cf. Habermas 1990a). But in this while discourse has certainly triumphed, the capacity for reflection and the ontological depth of autonomy that Kant had hinted at has certainly taken a back seat.

Though there is a problem in the above commentator's communitarian/individualistic prism to look at Kantian morality, he is certainly on surer grounds when he writes: 'Each of us has the vocation of furthering the moral good of others, and each stands in need of others for our own moral progress' (ibid.: 407–8). For Kant, this makes us members of a moral community. 'Though membership in a moral community must be non-coercive, each individual has a moral duty to join with others in such a community. Kant describes this as a '"duty sui generis" because it is not a duty of one individual to others, nor even a duty to oneself but a duty of the human race to itself to fulfil its common vocation to progress as a species' (ibid.: 407–8). What Kant writes below reflects his contagious evolutionary zeal:

> It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it must also *harmonize with this end*. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the *maintenance* of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the *promotion* of this end (Kant 1964: 97–8).

But, Kant makes clear that the realization of this capacity for greater perfection depends upon our strivings. To put it in the words of seekers such as Sri Aurobindo, evolutionary march of Nature and History depends upon the *sadhana* of the seeking souls. In his 1784 essay, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', Kant maintains that 'it is not possible to decide through experience whether the human race's history shows it to be improving morally, getting worse, or vacillating endlessly between good and evil' (Wood 1992, 408). But Kant makes clear that the only way we can look at this question is by looking at '*our vocation to better ourselves* (both individually and collectively)' (ibid.: 408; emphasis added).

Kant makes clear that in this vocation to better ourselves in the pursuit of our moral commitments, there is a need to make a break from our clinical preoccupation with what he calls 'personal happiness'.[2] Kant, again, tells us movingly: 'Out of love for humanity I am willing to allow that most of our actions may accord with duty; but if we look more closely at our scheming and striving, we everywhere come across the dear self, which is always turning up; and it is on this that the purpose of our actions is based—not on the strict command of duty, which would often require self-denial' (Kant 1964: 75). But Kant fails to explicitly state that self-denial itself can constitute a source of happiness or what Gandhi calls 'joy' for moral agents. What Kant calls self-denial is akin to what Gandhi calls suffering but in case of Gandhi, 'A life of sacrifice is the pinnacle of art and is full of true joy' (Iyer 1990: 382). 'Such life is the source of ever fresh springs of joy which never dry up and never satiate' (ibid.). Gandhian suffering can redeem Kantian pure reason as Gandhi tells us: 'The conviction has been growing upon me, that things of fundamental importance to the people are not secured by reason alone, but have to be purchased with their suffering. Suffering is infinitely more powerful ... for converting the opponent and *opening his ears, which are otherwise shut, to the voice of reason*' (Gandhi quoted in Narayan 1968: 202; emphasis added).

Both Kant and Gandhi tell us that moral laws have an autonomous existence in our lives. Gandhi tells us: '... morality dwells in our hearts. Even a man practising immorality would admit that he has been immoral. A wrong can never become right. Even where a people is vile, though men may not observe the moral law, they would make a pretence of doing so; they thus are obliged to admit that moral laws ought to be observed. Such is the greatness of morality' (Gandhi 1971: 300). Kant also tells us almost in a similar vein: 'There is no one, not even the most hardened scoundrel—who, when presented with examples of honesty in purpose, of faithfulness to good maxims, and of kindness towards all (even when these are bound up with great sacrifices of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he too might be a man of like spirit. He is unable to realize such an aim in his own person—though only on account of his desires and impulses, but at the same time he wishes to be free from these inclinations which are a burden to himself' (Kant 1964: 122).

While morality is rooted in pure reason in Kant, in Gandhi it is rooted in the purity of our hearts. But this openness to human heart in the pursuit of moral commitments is not missing in Kant as well. As Allen Wood interprets, for Kant, 'The legislator for a moral community must be someone whose will is in harmony with all moral duties, and someone who "knows the heart" so as to judge each individual's inner disposition' (Wood 1992: 407). And what Kant himself writes seems as if these are the words flowing from the heart of Gandhi: 'But this is the concept of God as moral ruler of the world. Hence a moral community can be thought of only as a people under divine commands, i.e., *a people of God, under the laws of virtue*' (quoted in Wood 1992: 407).

Gandhi's meditations on morality also reflect the disinterested performance of duty of Kant. Gandhi tells us: 'In the path of morality there is no such thing as reward for moral behaviour. If a man does some good deed, he does not do it to win applause, he does it because he must' (Gandhi 1971: 275). And what Gandhi writes below sounds so much like Kant but which reiterates the devotion to duty which has to be part of our moral life: 'Just as an action prompted by the motive of material gain here on earth is non-moral, so also another done for

considerations of comfort and personal happiness in another world is non-moral. That action is moral which is done only for the sake of doing good' (ibid.: 286).

Recent discussion of moral consciousness has drawn our attention to the dimension of a 'post-conventional' morality in self and society where ones moral consciousness is not a mere appendix to social conventions and one is able to differentiate oneself 'from the rule and expectation of others' and differentiate ones 'values in terms of self-chosen ethical principles' (Cortese 1990: 20; also see, Habermas 1990a). Both Kant and Gandhi also point towards this. Gandhi writes: '... it is a rule of ideal morality that it is not enough to follow the trodden path. We ought to follow the path which we know to be true, whether it is familiar or unfamiliar to us' (Gandhi 1971: 280). Kant's foregrounding of autonomy in the work of moral laws and his adoration of reflective judgement in his third critique as compared to the determinant judgement of the first critique which has the danger of making moral action one of 'simple subsumption' (Schaper 1992: 369) also points to the post-conventional and radical critique of moral commitments in his agenda.

Gandhi's submission that to be moral is to follow the path of truth urges us to realize that what is law of truth in Gandhi is the law of morals in Kant. In both the paths there is the need to be a servant of ones conscience and none else. Gandhi writes, '... the etymological meaning of conscience is true knowledge. Conscience means listening to the inner voice' (Iyer 1990: 22). Gandhi tells us: 'You have to stand against the whole world although you may have to stand alone. You have to stare in the face the whole world although the world may look at you with bloodshot eyes. Do not fear. Trust the little voice residing in your heart' (Narayan 1968: 78–9).

Both Kant and Gandhi tell us that the path of morality is the path of the pursuit of an ideal which has an intrinsic significance as a guiding frame and star of our life even though we may not realize our ideals fully. For Gandhi, 'The day humanity ceases to believe in ideals, it will descend to the level of the beasts' (Iyer 1990: 131). It is interesting that while Kant talks about mathematics while enunciating the domain of a pure ideal, Gandhi talks about Euclid's geometry. In the

words of Gandhi: 'No one can draw a right angle, yet Euclid drew it up in imagination and gave the engineers a measuring rod by which the world has progressed' (Iyer 1990: 132). But Gandhi also tells us that in the pursuit of ones ideal there arises the need for compromise at many junctures but one has to draw a line how far one can compromise. In the words of Gandhi: '... I ever compromise my own ideals even in individual conduct not because I wish to but because the compromise was inevitable. And so in social and political matters I have never exacted complete fulfilment of the ideal in which I have believed. But there are always times when one has to say thus far and no further, and each time the dividing line has to be determined on merits' (Iyer 1990: 186). Thus in the pursuit of morality, Gandhi leaves room for flexibility and is not a proponent of ideological orthodoxy. His morality is the morality of an exemplar, it is not of an ideologue (cf. Rao 1996).

But beyond a point, one cannot compromise ones moral conviction and, for Gandhi, one should be prepared to die for the sake of truth and morality. But this death should be a non-violent death 'without anger, without fear and without retaliation' (Iyer 1990: 278). Giving the example of Bhakta Prahallad, Gandhi writes: 'For the sake of truth, he dared to oppose his own father, and he defended himself, not by retaliation by paying his father back in his own coin, but in defence of truth, as he knew it, he was prepared to die' (Iyer 1990: 283). By embracing the bullets of his assassin without any malice, Gandhi urges us to understand the integral link between morality and martyrdom, a link which is missing in Kant and the new-Kantians such as Habermas who confine themselves only within the safe world of 'weak transcendental idealizations' (Habermas 1996: also see, Uberoi 1996).

But both Kant and Gandhi urge us to understand the integral link between moral commitment and aesthetic development of individuals. For Gandhi, art must aid in our 'moral and spiritual elevation' (Iyer 1990: 156). Aesthetic sensibility also helps us refine our moral commitments in Kant: 'He who has taste shows by his preferences that he values what is beautiful and abhors what is ugly. Having taste is not like having an extra sense, nor like exercising a special intellectual power. It is the ability to respond with immediate pleasure and unclouded

vision to beauty in nature and in art, and, further, to communicate this pleasure to others who are capable of sharing it. Communicable pleasure, moreover, informs an attitude of wonder to the world, and he who feels it does not satisfy to possess the objects of his pleasure' (Schaper 1992: 371–2).

Gandhi establishes an integral link between morality and spiritual religion as he writes: 'So long as the seed of morality is not watered by religion, it cannot sprout. Without water it withers and ultimately perishes. Thus it will be seen that true or ideal morality ought to include true religion. To put the same thought differently, morality cannot be observed without religion. That is to say, morality should be observed as a religion' (Gandhi 1971: 313). But as is clear from the above lines, Gandhi's meaning of religion is different from the conventional sectarian approach to religion and includes the ideal morality and therefore we can hope to attain it only through harmony with this will' (ibid.: 406–7). Thus for Kant God is important in moral commitment because it helps the agents to obey their duties as God's commands. But while the God of Kant is a hypothetical God the imagination of which performs a utilitarian function for the sake of morality, the God of Gandhi is an ever-present and unfolding Reality who holds our hands in our moral acts and is a witness to our non-violent death. For Gandhi, the courage for moral action comes from the belief that 'God sits in the hearts of all and that there should be no fear in the presence of God' (Iyer 1990: 273).

For Gandhi, moral action should be animated by the *tapashya* of the soul-force and the renunciation of Yajna. As we have seen, Kant speaks about self-denial while talking about moral duties but this can be enriched by the Gandhian devotion to Yajna. For Gandhi: 'Yajna means an act directed to the welfare of others, done without desiring any return for it, whether of a temporal or spiritual nature. "Act" here must be taken in its widest sense and includes thought and word, as well as deed. "Others" embraces not only humanity, but all life' (Iyer 1990) Gandhian agenda of non-violent Yajna can help us overcome the anthropocentrism of Kant. As Gandhi urges us to realize: 'All our prayers, fasting and observances are empty nothings so long as we do

not feel a live kinship with all life. But we have not arrived at that intellectual belief, let alone a heart realization' (Iyer 1990: 244).

While rights and duties are significant words which move us in Kant, duty is an animating word in Gandhi. There is a remarkable convergence between Kantian emphasis on Right and Gandhian emphasis on duty and both emphasize that unconditional service to the other is the core of the moral action. For Kant, 'Right ... is the totality of conditions under which the will of one person can be unified with the will of another under a universal law of freedom ... . Every action is right which, or the maxim of which, allows the freedom of the will of each to subsist together with the freedom of everyone' (Kersting 1992: 344). But Gandhi is a critic of the rights-based approach to morality and urges us to realize that we should be concerned only about our duties and once we do our duties, rights cannot but follow. In the words of Gandhi: 'As a young man I began life by seeking to assert my rights and I soon discovered I had none, not even over my wife. So I began by discovering and performing my duty by my wife, my children, friends, companions and society and I find today that I have greater rights, perhaps than any living man I know. If this is too tall a claim then I say I do not know anyone who possesses greater rights than I' (Iyer 1990: 388). Of course it must be noted here that Kant is speaking of Right not rights which includes Gandhi's emphasis on duties. But the fact that observance of duties requires self-purification as a continued striving in the life of the moral agents is stressed more poignantly by Gandhi than Kant.

CRITIQUE OF POWER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICS

The agenda of moral commitment that Kant and Gandhi have outlined before us is not meant to remain as pious words and ideals to be ceremoniously uttered but to transform the foundations of our lives. Moral commitment in Kant and Gandhi is an integral commitment and permeates all the boundaries of our lives, breaking down many a barrier and creating new configurations of intimacy. Both Kant and Gandhi passionately strove to transform the bases of politics with the insights and commitments of morality.

In his 1795 monograph, *Perpetual Peace*, Kant invites our attention to 'this stern moral task' (cf. Beck 1957: x) of transformation of politics. Kant begins by stating: 'I can easily conceive of a moral politician, i.e., one who so chooses political principles that they are consistent with those of morality, but I cannot conceive of a political moralist, one who forges a morality in such a way that it conforms to the statesman's advantage' (Kant 1957: 37). Kant further tells us: 'When a remediable defect is found in the constitution of the state or in its relation to others, the principle of moral politician will be that it is a duty, especially of the rulers of the State, to inquire how it can be remedied as soon as possible in a way conforming to natural law as a model presented by reason: *this he will do even if it costs self-sacrifice*' (ibid.; emphasis added). Kant condemns those politicians who cannot live up to this task of moralization: '... the moralizing politician, by glossing over principles of politics which are opposed to the right with the pretext that human nature is not capable of the good as reason prescribes it, only makes reform impossible and perpetuates the violation of law' (ibid.: 39). For Kant, 'Instead of possessing the *practical science* they boast of, these politicians have only *practices*; they flatter the power which is then ruling so as *not to remiss in their private advantage, and they sacrifice the nation and, possibly, the whole world*' (ibid.; emphasis added). Kant's critical engagement also draws our attention to the lack of moral responsibility on the part of professional lawyers: 'Their task is not to reason too nicely about the legislation but to execute the momentary commands on the statute books. They make a great show of understanding *men* (which is certainly something to be expected of them, since they have to deal with so many) without understanding *man* and what can be made of him, for they lack the higher point of view of anthropological observation which is needed for this' (ibid.).

Kant urges us to realize that these politicians and lawyers have 'political honour which cannot be disputed—and this honour is aggrandizement of their power by whatever means' (ibid.: 41). Kant gives a clarion call: 'Let us put an end to this sophism, if not to the injustice it protects, and force the false representatives of power to confess that they do not plead in favour of the right but in favour the right (ibid.:

42). The false representatives of power should realize that political maxims must not be derived from 'volition as the supreme yet empirical principle of political wisdom, but rather from the pure concept of the duty of right, from the ought whose principle is given *a priori* by pure reason, regardless of what the physical consequences may be' (ibid.: 45).

For Kant, 'the pure principles of right' have an objective reality which should influence politics, 'the empirical politics', as Kant calls it (ibid.: 46). For Kant, 'The rights of men must be held sacred, however much sacrifice it may cost the ruling power. One cannot compromise here and seek the middle course of a pragmatic conditional law between the morally right and the expedient. All politics must bend its knee before the right. But by this it can hope slowly to reach the stage where it will shine with an immortal glory' (ibid.). Protection of the 'rights of men' is not a matter of 'philanthropy' nor is it a matter of 'benevolence' but is a matter of 'an unconditional and absolutely mandatory duty' (ibid.: 52). In the words of Kant: 'One who wishes to give himself up to the sweet feeling of benevolence must make sure that he has not transgressed this absolute duty' (ibid.).

Kant stresses the integration of politics and morality: 'All maxims which *stand in need* of publicity in order not to fail their end, agree with *politics and right* combined' (ibid.: 53). Kant helps us understand this: 'For if they [maxims] can allow their end through publicity, they must accord with the public's universal end, happiness; and the proper task of politics is to promote this, i.e., to make the public satisfied with its condition. If, however, this end is attainable only by means of publicity, i.e., by removing all distrust in the maxims of politics, the latter must conform to the rights of the public, for only in this is the union of goals of all possible' (ibid.).

Kant urges us to realize that while 'objectively, or in theory, there is no conflict between morals and politics', subjectively there is one. This, for Kant, lies in the 'selfish propensity of men (which should not be called "practice", as this would mean that it rested on rational maxims)' (ibid.: 45). But Kant urges us not to lose our hearts at this but to utilize this conflict as an eternal reminder of our duties. The words of Kant: '[This subjective conflict] should serve as a whetstone

of virtue, whose true courage (by principle, 'Yield not to evils, but go against the stronger') in the present case does not so much consist in defying with strong resolve evils and sacrifices which must be undertaken along with the conflict, but rather in *detecting and conquering the crafty and far more dangerously deceitful and treasonable principle of evil in ourselves*, which puts forward the weakness of human nature as justification for every transgression' (ibid.; emphasis added). Thus the ultimate objective of moralization of politics is to conquer 'the crafty and far more dangerously deceitful and treasonable principle of evil in ourselves.' This is akin to Gandhi's emphasis on conquest of self as a transformative basis for the remoralization of politics. Gandhi tells us: 'To me political power is not an end but one of the means of enabling people to better their condition in every department of life' (Iyer 1990: 127). Its objective is to bring about 'self-regulation' and a 'state of enlightened anarchy' where 'everyone is his own ruler' and 'he rules himself in such a manner that he is never a hindrance to his neighbour' (ibid.: 127). In Gandhi, *Swaraj* is at the heart of politics which brings together both self-determination and self-restraint. In the words of Gandhi: 'The word *Swaraj* is a sacred word, a Vedic word, meaning self-rule and self-restraint, and not freedom from all restraints which "independence" means' (Narayan 1968: 440). Swaraj as the pursuit of politics means both 'inner freedom' (ibid.: 44) as well as the objective conditions of freedom such as freedom from colonial slavery, patriarchy, and market exploitation. For Gandhi, 'The people of Europe have no doubt political power but no Swaraj' (Iyer 1990: 106).

Politics with morality at its heart has to realize, Gandhi tells us, that capture of power is not its most important objective and 'Political work must be looked upon in terms of social and moral progress' (*Collected Works*, Vol. 85: 368). And moral progress is the 'progress of the permanent element in us' (Iyer 1990: 94). Gandhi further tells us: '... to regard adult suffrage as a means of capturing political power would be to put it to corrupt use' (ibid.: 217). The objective of moralized politics is to provide transformative guidance to power and this can be done through non-violent struggle and *Satyagraha*. In the words of Gandhi: 'By its very nature, non-violence cannot "seize" power, nor can that be its goal. *But non-violence can do more; it can effectively control and*

guide power without capturing the machinery of government. That is its beauty' (quoted in Narayan 1968: 446). Gandhi further urges us to realize: 'Passive resistance is always moral, never cruel; Passive resistance seeks to rejoin politics and religion and to test everyone of our actions in the light of ethical principles' (Iyer 1990: 90).

Later on Gandhi establishes the transformative link between morality and politics through the practice of *Satyagraha*. Reflecting on this towards the end of his struggle, Gandhi shares with us that while passive resistance is more passive and hides a repressed will to violence, *Satyagraha* is an active will to truth and embodies an uncompromising determination to fight for its sake and to lay down ones life for its cause. For Gandhi truth is God and non-violence is an integral part of *Satyagraha*. In the words of Gandhi, 'The word *Satyagraha* should be understood here in its etymological sense. There can be no insistence on truth where there is no non-violence' (Iyer 1990: 384). For Gandhi, 'Non-violence is soul-force or the power of the Godhead within us. We become Godlike to the extent we realize non-violence' (Narayan 1968: 153). Furthermore, '*Ahimsa* is not merely a negative state of harmlessness, but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil doer' (ibid.: 154). Civil disobedience in Gandhi is an expression of love which is an important political manifestation of the integral morality of *Satyagraha*. Civil disobedience is a struggle against the system of power which annihilates human dignity and strives to transform it with a spirit of love. It is the embodiment of a 'resolute refusal to bend the knee to an earthly power, no matter how great, and that without bitterness of spirit in the fullness of faith that the spirit alone lives, nothing else does' (Narayan 1968: 228). For Gandhi, 'Disobedience without civility, discipline, discrimination, non-violence is certain destruction. Disobedience combined with love is the living water of life. Civil disobedience is a beautiful variant to signify growth' (ibid.: 213). Furthermore, civil disobedience 'emphatically means our desire to surrender to a single unarmed policeman. Our triumph consists again in being imprisoned for no wrong whatsoever. The greater our innocence, the greater our strength and the swifter our victory' (ibid.: 210). While engaged in the moral politics of *Satyagraha*, Gandhi urges us to realize: 'Whilst on the one hand civil disobedience

authorizes disobedience of unjust laws or unmoral laws of a state which one seeks to overthrow, it requires meek and willing submission to the penalty of disobedience and, therefore, cheerful acceptance of jail discipline and attendant hardships' (ibid.: 207).

KANT, GANDHI AND BEYOND

While civil disobedience is central to Gandhi's moral of action. Kant is ambivalent about it. This ambivalence comes clearly in the following lines of Kant: 'The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him ... . But the same person nevertheless does not act contrary to his duty as a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts on the inappropriateness of even the injustice of these levies' (Kant 1959: 87/88). Despite the courage of criticism, Kant's support for the logic of a government in power is in need of rethinking, reconstruction and transcendence today especially in the face of the epochal challenge of radical democracy whose hour now has come. Kant writes: 'But only one who is himself enlightened, is not afraid of shadows, and has a numerous and well-disciplined army to assure public peace, can say: "Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only obey". A republic could not dare say such a thing' (ibid.: 91). Kant is also ambivalent about the full realization of democratic civil freedom as he writes: 'A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of civil freedom, on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity' (ibid.: 91–2).

While Kant is ambivalent about civil disobedience and the grant of comprehensive civil freedom, his disdain for revolution is total. Understandably, writing after the French Revolution, Kant fails to realize that revolutions can be non-violent as well. But what is striking and incomprehensible is that Kant fails to realize that violent revolutions are responses to the indignities of the system. Therefore the following lines of Kant require a critical rethinking from us: 'If a violent revolution engendered by a bad constitution, introduces by illegal means a moral legal constitution, to lead the people back to the earlier constitution [it] would not be permitted; but, while the revolution lasted,

each person who openly or covertly shared in it would have justly incurred the punishment due to those who rebel' (Kant 1795: 38).

The disdain for revolution has a long legacy in Western constitutional thought which is most clearly evident in the recent works of Jurgen Habermas. If Kant was fighting with the ghost of the French Revolution, Habermas is fighting with the ghost of Marxism and the fall of the Soviet system. Habermas tells us in his recent *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions Towards a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* '... democratic movements emerging from civil society, must give up holistic aspirations to a self-organizing society, aspirations that also undergirded Marxist ideas of social revolution' (1996: 372). Habermas wants to put civil society in its place and have less grand goals: '... civil society can directly transform only itself, and it can have at most an indirect effect on the self-transformation of the political systems; generally it has an influence on the personal programming of this system' (ibid.). But this is a limited programme of reconstruction which does not have the courage to radically interrogate the system itself.

To be fair, Gandhi does share Kant's disdain for violent revolution and Habermas' antipathy towards Marxist social revolution. But Gandhi does not limit revolution to violent revolution alone nor does he limit it to the socio-political one. The most important revolution for Gandhi is the personal revolution of the actors, revolution in their modes of life, in their style of life as it embodies non-violence and satyagrahic struggle for swaraj, the experiment with truth as Gandhi called it. But like Kant Gandhi also has a filial attitude to law and authority and likens the relationship between rulers and people to one between father and son. Such a filial attitude to authority now needs to be transcended by a spirit of radical democracy. What Gandhi writes below also requires a critical rethinking from us as we pursue the agenda of an integral remoralization of life: 'Reasoned and willing obedience to the laws of the state is the first lesson in non-co-operation. The second is that of tolerance. We must tolerate many laws of the state, even when they are inconvenient' (Narayan 1968: 205).

NOTES

1. Paper presented at the Seminar on 'Gandhi and Kant', jointly organized by the Gandhi Peace Foundation and the Max Mueller Bhavan, New Delhi, January 23–24, 1998. I am grateful to Professor Mahendra Kumar, Peter Sewitz, Jayashree Sonecha for their invitation and hospitality and to the participants of the seminar, particularly to Professors Mrinal Miri, Ramashray Roy, Makarand Paranjape and Prakash Sarangi for comments and criticism. I am also indebted to Professor C.T. Kurien for his insightful comments on this paper.
2. In the words of Kant (1964: 110):

   > The principle of *personal happiness* is, however, the most objectionable, not merely because it is false and because its pretence that well-being always adjusts itself to well-doing is contradicted by experience; nor merely because it contributes nothing whatever towards establishing morality, since making a man happy is quite different from making him good and making him prudent or astute in seeking his advantage quite different from making him virtuous; but because it bases morality on sensuous motives which rather undermine it and totally destroy is sublimity, in as much as the motives of virtue are put in the same class as those of vice and we are instructed only to become better at calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice being completely ruled out.

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Grammar, Logic and Mathematics: Foundations of the Civilizations Man has Built

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Civilizations are rooted in the capacity for self-reflection, or self-conscious reflection on that which man naturally does, or finds himself doing. And, some of the most natural things man finds himself doing are 'speaking', 'thinking', 'counting' and 'measuring'. Much of this activity is crude, incohate, almost inarticulate. Man's speech is almost like that of animals: at least, that is the way it appears to those who do not know the language. A tower of Babel, someone said. Well, it is almost that. Walk a few miles towards the countryside and you do not understand the language you thought you knew. What the linguists call 'dialect' is a theoretical concept coined for certain cognitive purposes. What actually exists is language and language alone, one that one understands and the others that one does not.

But if one is asked 'What one speaks of', one can hardly answer with assurance or certainty. One has to 'speak' to reply and one was already speaking when one was asked, and even when one speaks, the other may not understand. What one speaks is 'speech' to the other, something that is 'spoken', something that is an 'object' to be 'listened to', to be 'understood'. And, the fact that one *can* understand makes one feel familiar with, share to a certain extent the other's living reality, participate in it and thus 'build' a 'world' which otherwise would not have been there.

Language, thus, when 'spoken' builds a 'world' which those who 'understand' inhabit as they live in it. The world so built, is not built once and for all. Rather, it is built and re-built continuously, each speaker adding to it something 'new' and thus changing it to a certain extent, opening possibilities that did not exist before and sometimes 'closing' those that existed earlier.

Language that is 'spoken', however, is not the same as the language that is written even though both are called 'language'. The former is the one that one lives with and lives in, the latter is an 'accident' that may occur or not occur. And even when it does occur it takes a long time for it to become a primary, integral part of life. Total literacy is a rare thing in any society, and even when it does occur only a few 'live' in it.

The distinction is well known, as also the discussion regarding the primacy of the one over the other. The permanence, independence and the context-free character of the language that is written have been emphasized, perhaps over-emphasized, by its protagonists. The counter-evidence presented by the achievement of practically the same characteristics in the oral tradition, particularly as presented in the Vedic and the Āgamic texts of India, is generally ignored or underplayed or, at times, even flatly denied as being possibly true on empirical grounds. What is, however, even more surprising is to find the demand for a specification of the 'hidden' context of what is written in order that its mask of impersonality may be removed and it may be revealed as what it is, a product of its time, space, culture and person. Who wrote what, when and where and for whom are the standard questions asked these days as unless these are known, one cannot start assessing the value, worth or authenticity of the text concerned. The Marxist critique had at one time dismissed the past products of a whole culture or civilization as 'class-products', just as today they are branded as 'brahmanical' or 'colonial' in character. At another level, the demand is to reveal your 'location' as if that were to determine the 'truth-value' of what you say, forgetting that it is always a minority and therein only a very few persons that engage in such an exercise and that they normally do not get much benefit out of it.

The transition from 'speech' to 'writing' has, however, another dimension which has been totally missed in this discussion. It is the conferment of a metaphysical dimension to language, a sort of 'ontic' being which, in spite of its ambiguity, it can never lose from now onwards. Language now has a 'being' of its own, a palpable 'objectivity' demanding to be respected, deciphered, cogitated, understood, and this process is 'unending', almost 'infinite'. The task of understanding

the 'world' takes a back seat to that of understanding what man has said. God's world becomes secondary to that created by man, and man henceforward is fascinated by his own 'self' as reflected in what he creates which is, and has to be, primarily linguistic in character. The history of the exegesis of texts from the earliest times and the controversies surrounding them is an evidence of this.

But what 'writing' introduces is something even more than this. After it comes into being, there arises a new distinction among men. The distinction between the literate and the non-literate, those who can read and those who cannot. The distinction does not vanish, as is generally thought, by the achievement of literacy on the part of one, as not only the task of 'understanding' a language is 'unending', but the languages themselves are indefinitely many, diverse and various. One 'knows' the fact of 'illiteracy' amongst those who are literate, but one always hides from oneself the fact that there *are* languages one cannot decipher or read and that they are, and shall always be, far more than those that one knows or can hope to know.

But the other languages remain always the 'other', and even though the task of 'understanding' ones own language is 'unending' one feels that one belongs to the class of those privileged few who are engaged in this exercise and can engage in it. The exclusiveness and the distinction is already there, but language has not yet become the 'object' of study which it will become when instead of asking what does it mean, one will ask what it is? To ask this question is to look at language in a new way and, strangely, to look at oneself also in a way one had not looked at before. The 'being' of language in which one was totally immersed when it was only spoken, and which became a little distinct and distant, and even mysterious, when one 'saw' it as written, or even as 'orally fixed' through repeated memorization as in the case of the Vedas, now reveals a regularity and a structure as if it possessed a real being of its own like other 'beings' of the world.

The discovery that language has a 'grammar' which can be deciphered and articulated has momentous consequences for man and the society and culture in which it occurs. Pāṇini's is a classic example, though there does not seem much awareness of the far-reaching impact that his discovery had not only on the civilization wherein he had

lived; but on the brahmanical personality that was shaped from that time onward. To be an 'Indian' was to speak and write in the Pāṇinian way, no matter if you were a Buddhist or a Jain or even a Cārvāka. And, if you did not, you could not be counted amongst the class of those who were regarded as 'educated' in the country, even if you knew some other language and could write that very, very well as many did, say, in Prākṛt.

But grammar is not the only thing in which the self-consciousness of a civilization may take shape and, in turn, shape the 'personality' of that civilization. Thought which articulates and embodies itself in language may itself become an 'object' of reflection and one may ask the question what makes one spontaneously say, or judge, that what the 'other' has said is 'wrong', or what the other is saying does not 'follow' from the grounds he is giving for it. Logic is the usual name given for this though, perhaps, the term 'Pramāṇa Śāstra' or 'Pramāṇa Vidyā' as given in the Indian tradition expresses the idea better.

This, in a sense, is even stranger than the discovery of grammar, as language is at least an 'object' in some sense as it is 'heard' or 'seen', while it will be difficult for anyone to think of 'thought' in these terms. Yet, this has taken place, for man is not only a 'talking animal', but one who argues all the time. To make this 'arguing activity' itself an 'object' and 'see' it in terms of 'right' or 'wrong', 'correct' or 'incorrect', 'valid' or 'invalid' is a strange exercise as one thereby exposes oneself, ones 'subjectivity' to a determination by something which claims a universality which language cannot do.

Language, as everybody knows, is always some particular language and the grammar that one discovers is confined to it alone. One may talk of universal grammar, but what one has is always the grammar of a particular language, even if one may regard it as the only language in the 'real' sense of the term as the Pāṇinians did in India.

But there is a deeper difference between logic and grammar besides the universality of the former and parochiality or provinciality of the latter. The former can brook no exceptions, no deviations as the latter can. A fallacy is a fallacy, and cannot be treated as a variant or dialect in the manner that linguists have preferred to accept them even when they have formulated the grammar of their language. The search for

universals of language or universal grammar is, ultimately, a search for that universal logos which logic tries to discover and which the specific particularity of language can never accept as its 'being' lies in its 'particularity', a fact known to every creative writer in that language.

The rendering of the activity of 'thinking' into an 'object' for critical reflection and the search for those universal principles which determine and distinguish 'valid' from 'invalid' thinking opens a new dimension in the history of a civilization. Aristotle is the famous name in the western tradition, just as Gautama's is in the Indian tradition. What is the name of the Chinese in this context is difficult to say. Did the Chinese develop a grammar of their language or a 'logic' comparable to the one developed in Greece or India is not easy to determine. Yet, there remains a nagging suspicion that if there is a civilization, it must have had something analogous to these, as otherwise it will not be able to achieve that 'objectivity' in respect of itself which is necessary for it to become a civilization.

The 'objectification', however, creates a dilemma as it results in a new bondage from which man wants to be free. The seeking for freedom from 'grammar' is expressed in many ways, some of which are even legitimized as exceptions or what Pāṇini calls '*apavāda*' in his system. But as those who speak do not much care for the grammarian, the latter imposes his rules through what he calls 'education' on the one hand and through building what may be called a socio-cultural hierarchy based on linguistic usage resulting in the creation of a new elite based on what Pātanjali called '*sādhu prayoga*' which roughly may be translated as standard prescribed usage both in speaking and writing of the language concerned.

A still different kind of freedom, however, is sought by the creative writer who does not much care for either the Pāṇinian or the Pātanjalian formulation as he can easily observe all the 'rules' they formulate but is not satisfied by what is produced by their observance, for, what results is something 'dead', lacking the life-breath which makes the language vitally and vibrantly alive and thus 'life-giving' to the listener and the reader alike.

Freedom, however, has a meaning only if there *is* something to be 'free' from or to do or to achieve or to bring about a state which is

worthwhile in itself, something that is 'good' or 'beneficial' or both; in short, something that is meaningful, fulfilling and joy-giving to the beholder and the creator alike. There has, therefore, to be what every creative artist knows, an 'intertia' which resists as it is already there and has a nature of its own which has to be respected if it has to 'accept' the creative impulse which, at least for it, comes from 'without'. This is the problem of motion, but in other realms there is something analogous to it, and the more one knows the 'laws' or the 'ways of working' of the material one has to deal with, the greater is the resistance in it which presents a challenge to one to actualize what one imagines to the extent of ones own abilities whose limits are never known.

The cycle is unending and the game of 'bondage' and 'freedom' that it involves has seldom been seen for what it is. The problem that is posed by the rules that self-consciousness discovers in the realm of 'thinking' is, however, of a radically different kind. They, in a sense, constitute the norm or the standard which determines what 'ought' to *be* and the impulse or the desire to seek 'freedom' from them is a desire either to go back to a condition where self-consciousness did not obtain and one lived, as an animal does, according to 'rules' or 'laws' or 'something' that was immanent in ones being or to remain self-conscious, be aware of the rules, 'see' their relevance or irrelevance in the context of concrete situations, be prepared to modify, reformulate and even violate them if the occasion demands; in short, be 'free' in respect of them in a responsible manner which emanates from the fact that whatever the 'rules' or 'laws' that self-consciousness has discovered, they can never be complete, or invariably productive of the 'good' or the 'beautiful', or even the 'true' through their observance by man in his behaviour.

This truth which is only vaguely felt by the creative writer and the thinker in the context of grammar and logic respectively become clear when one reflects on mathematics as a self-conscious seeking or discovery of the humankind. Unlike grammar or logic it is not generally considered to be the result of a self-reflection on the part of a more or less pre-existent activity of his such as that of 'speaking' or 'thinking'. But mathematics is also the result of such a self-reflection, though it

is not generally seen as such because we do not have two distinct names for the activity that is 'reflected' upon and that which results as a consequence of the activity of reflection. 'Counting' is the activity that is reflected upon and which, as everybody knows, gives rise to that which is known as 'arithmetic'. Russell is supposed to have said that this way of understanding mathematics is a mistake and it is false, if taken literally, as it would confine it to that which is countable in principle and to that alone. But mathematics is far wider and deals with that which can not be counted in the sense in which one counts chairs and apples. But, in spite of this, what Russell has forgotten is that even 'counting', when reflected upon, gives rise to a 'world' which one would not have become aware of if one would not have reflected on it, just as one would not have become aware of 'grammar' or 'logic' if one had not reflected on language or thought.

What one discovers to ones amazement and surprise through a reflection on 'counting' is the realm of the 'infinite' and the 'truth' about it. What can be counted are things, not numbers, which always extend beyond those one has counted and one need not, and usually one does not, pay attention to this. But the mathematician does, and it is he who, like the grammarian or the logician, makes the 'ordinary' human being aware of the 'mystery' that lies all around him and in which he is immersed each time he speaks or thinks and argues or counts.

The self-articulation of the realm of mathematics is as unending as those of language and thought, and the 'unendingness' of the discoveries therein are as baffling as anything can be. After all, why should not 'knowledge' in the field of linguistics or logic or mathematics cease to grow? The illusion of 'finality' has gripped these subjects many a time but man's mind has refused to accept the constraints imposed by the rules or the laws or the 'absolutes' discovered therein. Languages continue to proliferate, many of them die, still others 'refuse' to be deciphered and those that are supposed to be 'living' increasingly lose 'intelligibility' even amongst those who consider themselves linguists and talk of 'universals' of language. As for logic, 'thinking' does not seem to care much for the 'fallacies' it unearths all the time and the rules it formulates for thinking to be as 'correct' as it can be. And, what seems even stranger, thinkers flout them all the time and sometimes

even invent reasons for justifying their violation or, at times, invent new logics to expose the limitation and inadequacies of the 'old'. The logicians themselves have now begun to see the limitations of the older formulation and responded with the creation of all sorts of logic whose 'use' and 'relevance' they alone can understand. Perhaps, they think that their task, like that of the pure mathematician, is the creation of as many alternative systems as possible, so that they may be available for possible use by anyone who needs them. The wares should be available in the logician's shop as they are supposed to be in that of the mathematician's.

But the mathematician's enterprise seems essentially different from that of the logician's as the former seems to throw light on a realm which is designated by the term 'number' while the latter's does not, at least *prima facie*, seem to do so in respect of 'thinking' or 'thought' or 'reasoning' with which it appears to be concerned. The concern of course is not to 'describe' that which is studied as that would be to lapse into 'psychologism' but to find rules which if followed, would lead to reasoning whose correctness or validity or 'truthfulness' would depend on the fact that the rules have been followed.

The problem of formal correctness is analogous to that of 'grammatical correctness' and both seem to be related to their being prescriptive rather than descriptive in character. But the recent extensions of the realm of logic and its attempt to build different kinds of logic in order to 'accommodate' all sorts of different kinds of 'thinking' seems to suggest something different. In this process of 'accommodation', logic seems to be patterning itself on those developments in mathematics which started with the creation of non-Euclidean geometries in the nineteenth century. All reasoning begins to have a character of 'if, then' where even the rules of derivation may be made as flexible as one likes. One subtly assimilates it thus to the realm of fiction and art on the one hand and to that of sports and games, on the other.

But the extensions of logic have somehow not proved as fruitful or given as 'surprising' results as those that were found in mathematics. One reason for this is that the realm of mathematics was itself the result of innumerable such extensions in the past. Long before the rise of non-Euclidean geometries, the discipline had seen its extension in

directions and domains which are usually designated as negative, rational, irrational, complex, transcendental and transfinite by students of the subject. But whatever the nature or direction of the extension, it brought 'infinities' into the very 'being' of that which seemed finite and limited to the 'unmathematical' eye.

The story of the journey from 'irrational' to 'transcendental', or 'transfinite' is one where each step forward resulted in puzzlement, paradox and wonder leading to the question whether to believe or not to believe in the 'reality' of what was discovered. The latest attempt to exorcize all the troublesome questions by chanting the *mantram* of 'constructivism' is to forget that, in a sense, everything is a collective human construct over historical time except that 'x' which is a residuum, a known-not-what, a 'something' leftover called by different names such as 'nature' or matter or that which is 'given' as presupposed by human construction to occur and that to be a 'construct' does not mean to be 'unreal'. And, *qua* 'construct', the infinity of positive integers whether construed as an infinity or not, to use the technical distinction introduced by some recent theorizers on the subject, is what we ordinarily do not encounter in the world. There are no infinities in the world and yet the moment we see it with the eyes of mathematics it appears surrounded and submerged in a sea of 'infinities' which the mathematician is still trying to fathom after millennia of effort since he stumbled upon it.

All civilizations discovered the puzzling, paradoxical mysteries of language, thought, counting and measuring but they were not *equally* struck by them. Nor did they see each of them as 'objects' to be understood and studied and create *Śāstras* or scientific disciplines on the basis of their study. Yet, at least one of them had to be formulated and treated as a paradigmatic model of what 'knowledge' meant in that culture. Man had to see himself self-consciously as an 'object' and try to understand himself in order that the breakthrough from culture to civilization could occur. But what shall be made an 'object' and wherein shall man see himself mirrored in terms of knowledge must have been an 'accident', an accident that determined the character of that civilization.

Civilizations, then, may be distinguished by the fact whether grammar or logic or mathematics first achieved the *Śāstric* form or that which is nowadays called 'science' and whether man conceived of himself and reality primarily in 'linguistic' or 'logical' or 'mathematical' terms. The quantitative-calculative view embedded in the last is at variance with the ones embedded in the former, and so also is the notion of 'infinite' involved in it different from the one that is encountered when one is struck by the phenomenon of self-consciousness in man.

The last, however, is a negation of all the three we have mentioned, and as the latter constitute what we have called 'civilization' as it is a result of the way man sees himself 'objectively' in terms of the one or the other, the '*history*' of any civilization may be seen as the result of a tension or conflict between that which negates and that which is negated and the way it is negated.

The other side of the story is the influence of that which is negated on that which negates it. In other words, how objectification of consciousness in the field of grammar, or logic or mathematics *changes* the consciousness when it reflects on itself, after the objectification. The mirror reflects and the reflection changes that which was reflected in the mirror. Those who have questioned this have been deceived by the objectification and have forgotten that nothing is static in the situation, the mirror or the reflection or that which is reflected. A little retrospective look at history would have been sufficient to convince anyone of this. But philosophers 'live' in a 'timeless' world where 'history' just does not exist. Yet 'history' does or at least the 'history' of philosophy does to which the philosopher who 'refutes' past philosophers attests by this very fact. And if history exists, so does the interaction between the successive 'objectifications' in which man has tried to see himself objectively and the 'subjectivity' that tries to do this in time.

Śabda Pramāṇa in Sāṁkhya

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The Sāṁkhya system, like most of the other systems of Indian philosophy (barring Cārvāka, Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika), has accepted Śabda (verbal testimony) as a valid source of knowledge. However, the question arises as to the exact interpretation of śabda pramāṇa in this system. Just as there is controversy with regard to the origin of Sāṁkhya—whether it is Vedic or anti-Vedic—similar conflicts are there regarding the exact implication of verbal testimony in this system. Does it imply Vedic scriptures as the source of knowledge or not? A meticulous study in this context shows that the prominent interpreters of Sāṁkhya philosophy are in favour of including Vedic testimony under śabda pramāṇa of Sāṁkhya. However, one group of thinkers opposes this view on the ground that Sāṁkhya is anti-Vedic in origin and character. The present paper, through an exposition of the views of both camps, and on the basis of a brief study of the origin and development of Sāṁkhya, purports to arrive at the conclusion that śabda pramāṇa in Sāṁkhya definitely includes Vedic statements provided (emphasized by later Sāṁkhya) they conform to reason.

One unfortunate thing about Sāṁkhya, one of the most archaic systems of Indian philosophy, is that most of its original literature is lost to us. The earliest available authoritative book is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* which flourished around the second century AD. The Sāṁkhya account depicted in it is recognized as the classical form of Sāṁkhya. Now, in *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, which is a short and compact form of the Sāṁkhya doctrines (comprising seventy-two verses only), we do not find any detailed discussion about the means of knowledge there. The terms which have been used there denoting verbal testimony are Āptavacana and Āpta-śruti. We first come across the term Āptavacana in the fourth verse where perception (dṛṣṭam), inference (anumānam)

and verbal testimony (āptavacana) have been mentioned as the three valid sources of knowledge (pramāṇa):

Dṛṣṭamanumānam āptavacanam ca ... tribidham pramānam iṣṭam.[1]

In the fifth verse, the author provides the definition of āptavacana as *āptaśruti āptavacanam ca*. We do not receive any further elucidation of śabda pramāṇa in this work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In such a case, we have to depend a great deal upon the commentaries of the scholars. Gauḍapāda, one of the renowned commentators of *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, interprets the definition in the following way:

Āptasca śrutisca āptaśrutih, taduktam āptavacanam iti.[2]

While by āpta, Gauḍapāda means teachers or ācāryas like Brahmā etc., śruti, in his view, stands for the Vedas. Hence this mode of knowing, in his view, arises from the utterances or statements of teachers as well as the Vedas.

Another eminent commentator of the text is Vācaspati Miśra. He, however, interprets the term āptaśruti of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in a different manner. By āptaśruti, he means that revelation (śruti) which is āpta, i.e. right. For him āpta is an adjective of śruti. He prefers to translate śruti simply as revelation, not specifically Vedic revelation, although we observe that ultimately by śruti, he signifies the Vedic assertions only on account of their intrinsic validity (svata prāmānyata). However, at the outset he defines śruti as:

śruti vākyajanitam vākyārthajnanam.[3]

Śruti stands for that cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence. The example through which he endeavours to explain the process of acquisition of vākyārthajnana also establishes that śruti for him means utterances of experienced persons, not necessarily Vedic statements. He exemplifies the process as follows: An experienced person directing another experienced person utters the sentence 'Bring the cow' and the second person acts accordingly. A third person hearing the sentence of the first person and watching the consequent action of the second person infers that the action must be due to the understanding of the sense of the words. Thus he recognizes the connection between the words used and their meanings and

thereby acquires the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence. Through this example, Vācaspati Miśra demonstrates how śabda jñāna results in the wake of perception and inference. His explanation justifies Īśvarakṛṣṇa's placing of āptavacana (śabda) after perception and inference. In this connection, we may refer to the Sāṁkhya-sūtra (a composition of 15th century AD) version of the three different ways of acquiring knowledge of the meaning of words. The three ways mentioned there are as follows:

Āptopadeśo vṛddha-vyavahārah prasiddha-pada samānādhikaranyam iti ...[4]

In the first case, knowledge is acquired through the information of a reliable person (who is competent to provide the meaning of the words). In the second case, usage of the old or experienced person leads to the knowledge of the words constituting a sentence. This means has been referred to and illustrated by Vācaspati Miśra. In the third case, we know the meaning of the words of a sentence because of their association with the word the meaning of which is already known.

However, inspite of defining śruti as simply vākyārtha jñāna, in the very next paragraph, Vācaspati Miśra holds that śabdajñāna is self-sufficient in its authority because it is brought about by the statements of the Veda:

Apauruṣeya-vedavākya-janitatvena ... yuktam bhavati.[5]

In his view, since Vedic scriptures are not utterances of any human being, they have no chances of being vitiated by any human defects. This actually shows the Vedantic legacy of Vācaspati Miśra. Although this view is not in parity with the definition and explanation of śruti in the previous paragraph (Para 40), still this seems to be the ultimate view of Vācaspati Miśra. He confirms it by holding that smriti of (Manu etc.), purāṇas and history are also valid sources of knowledge, but their validity is entirely due to their basis in the Vedas. It is on this very ground that he denies the validity of other scriptures, viz. those of the Bauddha, Jaina and the materialist systems. Vācaspati Miśra resorts to the same ground when he accepts Kapila's Sāṁkhya philosophy as authoritative. He is of the opinion that Sāṁkhya philosophy is

no original creation of Kapila. It is only the reproduction of his memory of the Vedas which he learnt in his previous lives.

All these comments of Vācaspati Miśra reinforce that by Śruti, he ultimately means the Vedic revelations, not the statements of reliable persons. With regard to this point, we notice a sharp difference in the Nyāya system. Gautama, the founder of Nyāya, defines verbal testimony in *Nyāya Sūtra* as Āptopadeśa, i.e. communication from a trustworthy person. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on *Nyāya Sūtra*, clarifies that a trustworthy person is the speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating what is directly known by him. Hence Āpta, in Nyāya view, he highlights, is equally applicable to the seer, noble and barbarian (meaning thereby a person without Vedic practices).[6]

Now, we turn to that group of thinkers who subscribe to the view that śruti in Sāṁkhya does not stand for the Vedic scriptures. The supporting ground of their view is that Sāṁkhya is anti-Vedic in its origin as well as nature. Richard Garbe, J.N. Mukherjee, Yakub Masih and (Late) D.P. Chattopadhyaya are some of the thinkers pursuing this line of thought. These thinkers, in general, stress upon the fact that the entire foundation of Sāṁkhya philosophy is independent reasoning. It has nowhere tried to establish its doctrines on the basis of the Vedas. On the contrary, they point out, there is open criticism of Veda in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* (second verse). There it is held that the Vedic means for the eradication of suffering are nothing better than the ordinary means because the Vedic means are impure, lead to short-lasting effects and are based on inequality. The implication of this verse, in their view, is that the Sāṁkhya condemnation of the Vedic ritualism evidences for its lack of faith in the Vedas.

According to J.N. Mukherjee, Sāṁkhya philosophy is originally the ruling philosophy of the pre-Buddhist Epic culture of India. In his view, it is in reaction against the superrational authority and the ritualistic ethics of the Brāhmaṇas that Epic culture comes into being. The rationalistic and atheistic trends of Sāṁkhya, he thinks, represents this culture.[7]

Richard Garbe observes that the fundamental thoughts of Sāṁkhya—the dualism of puruṣa and prakṛti, the doctrine of three guṇas, the

denial of God and the necessity of discriminating knowledge—are not to be found in the Brāhmaṇas and Āranyakas. He harps on the rationalistic, atheistic and dualistic character of Sāṁkhya which he finds irreconcilable with the theistic, monistic and idealistic teachings of the Upaniṣads. The recognition of the supremacy of puruṣa over prakṛti as well as the acceptance of the Vedic śruti as valid means of knowledge, in his opinion, distorts the original form of Sāṁkhya. He criticizes the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* on this ground:

> Even in the Sāṁkhya Sūtra themselves the Sāṁkhya doctrine no longer appears in its original unadulterated form; for they seek to explain away the points of discrepancy between themselves on the one hand and the teachings of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta on the other.[8]

D.P. Chattopadhyaya makes great efforts to establish the materialistic nature of Sāṁkhya as contrasted with the spiritualistic nature of the Upaniṣads. In his contention, the spiritual principle puruṣa has not been recognized as a separate principle in the original form of Sāṁkhya, which is found in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* and *Mahābhārata* (the Pañchaśikha account). In these two early forms of Sāṁkhya, he points out, puruṣa is only the conscious part of the Avyakta Prakṛti. He attempts to prove that Sāṁkhya philosophy having prakṛti, the unconscious material principle as the first cause of the world, cannot be based on śruti, i.e. the direct revelation of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. Like Garbe, he also argues that the later Sāṁkhya thinkers, by including śruti or Vedic testimony as a valid means of knowledge, differ from the original position of Sāṁkhya. He says,

> Therefore, those later exponents of the Sāṁkhya, trying to justify their position also by appealing to the authority of the Scriptures, deviated from the original Sāṁkhya and made surreptitious compromises with the Vedānta.[9]

Yakub Masih also endeavours to establish the anti-Vedic character of Sāṁkhya by quoting Sāṁkhya versions from the Mahābhārata. For example, he quotes the following Sāṁkhya account presented in the *Mokṣa Dharma: 201* (P.C. Roy tr.).

> The efforts for the acquisition of knowledge, however, arise from a sentiment for avoiding both happiness and misery. The ordinances about sacrifices and other observances, that occur in the Vedas, are all connected with desire ... . That man who, from desire of winning happiness, walks in the path of acts which are of diverse kind, has to go to hell.

Hence, Y. Masih comments:

> Even in early forms in Mahabharata XII, it has anti-Vedic notes.[10]

An analysis of this line of thought brings to light the fact that some of these thinkers have explicitly denied the place of Vedic scriptures in Sāṁkhya. In their view, the recognition of śruti as a pramāṇa in *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* or *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* is only a later interpolation due to the influence of Vedānta philosophy. Other thinkers have implied it on the ground of the anti-Vedic origin and nature of Sāṁkhya. Under such circumstances, whether verbal testimony in Sāṁkhya stands for Vedic scriptures or not depends on the decision about the nature or origin of Sāṁkhya. A meticulous study in this regard reveals to us that Sāṁkhya philosophy, as we find it in *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, is not the original form. This philosophy has undergone a long period of development until it reaches its classical form in *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*. Although Sāṁkhya in any of its forms has not accepted the ritualistic part of the Vedas, yet it has not been opposed to the intellectual part of it, i.e. the Upaniṣadic part. Notwithstanding the fact that the main trend of the Upaniṣads is monistic, theistic and spiritualistic, there are many scattered and fragmentary ideas in the Upaniṣads, which can be held to contain the germs of Sāṁkhya philosophy. These ideas have been plucked and knitted together into a systematic form by the early Sāṁkhya thinkers. To exemplify this fact, we may focus on a few ideas from some Upaniṣads. For example, in the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (1:4:3), we come across the idea of dual principles of two opposite characters as necessary for the creation of offspring, which might have developed into the Sāṁkhya concepts of puruṣa and prakṛti. In the Muṇdaka Upaniṣad, the reality of our everyday world is supported. For example, in the para (1:1:8) ... *Annāt prāṇa manaha satyam lokāh* etc. The word *annam* used here can be taken for the primordial

matter or prakṛti of Sāṁkhya, which is the ultimate basis of the entire universe. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* seeks to establish the truth and reality of the world by tracing its origin to the supreme self, the ultimate reality:

Tat sṛṣtvā tad eva anupraviśat (2:6:1)

The Upaniṣadic division of the Ātman into Jīvātman and Paramātman, we may hold, has helped the atheistic form of Sāṁkhya to grow in course of time. Jīvātman has been presented as the only active agent who alone knows the world, and experiences pleasures and pains of the world, while the Paramātman (God) is wholly passive or inactive, thus minimizing the importance of God (Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad, 4th chapter, 6th para).

In *Katha* and *Svetāsvatara* Upaniṣads, we come across references to many other principles of Sāṁkhya such as avyakta, pradhāna, guṇas, ahankāras and so on. However, all these notions are interpreted there from a theistic point of view and in relation to the practice of Yoga. Thus we find that the fundamental Sāṁkhya elements in their germinal forms are strewn around in different Upaniṣads. Consequently, we think, it will not be wrong to hold that Sāṁkhya philosophy stems from the Upaniṣads.

Although the original works of the ancient Sāṁkhya thinkers are lost to us, we can retrieve their thoughts from extant literature like Mahābhārata, Gīta, some of the Purāṇas and Saṁhitās. In *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, we obtain an account of Sāṁkhya which is the discourse of Kapila to his mother Devahūti. In *Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā* also, we find a summary of *Ṣaṣtitantra* which has been referred by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as the work of Ādimuni Kapila. Both these accounts provide us with a Sāṁkhya which is theistic and monistic in spirit. In this original Sāṁkhya, although puruṣa and prakṛti are recognized as dual principles, they are conceived as constituent parts or powers of the Supreme Spiritual Being. Therefore, dualism, though recognized, is not ultimate there.

In the Mahābhārata, we discover both theistic and atheistic forms of Sāṁkhya. In the Pañchaśikha version presented in the twelfth book of Mahābhārata, we find an atheistic and semi-dualistic form. Puruṣa and

prakṛti are recognized here as forming one category, while the world evolves out of this unmanifest prakṛti whose conscious part is puruṣa. Here the self is neither pure consciousness, nor does it remain outside the sphere of phenomenal creation. There is no God to guide the flow of creation or evolution. A similar version of Sāṁkhya is obtained from the *Caraka-saṁhitā* also. In the Gīta, we notice for the first time that the dualism between kṣetra (prakṛti) and kṣ etrajna (puruṣa) is stressed. This dualism is more explicitly recognized in Arāda's Sāṁkhya philosophy (*Buddha Carita*) later in this period. However, in all these texts, dualism is emphasized only under the background of theism. Now, over a long period of time, both the elements of dualism and atheism have developed and culminated in the classical form of Sāṁkhya. After classical Sāṁkhya, we reach the period of later Sāṁkhya which mainly consists of *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* and the commentaries on it. The prominent commentators are Aniruddha, Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Mahādeva, etc. In this period, we notice an attempt at reconciliation of Sāṁkhya thoughts with those of Vedānta.

Thus we observe that Sāṁkhya, at different stages of its development, has undergone changes of form. Although dualism is there in all versions of Sāṁkhya, it is suppressed somewhere under the supreme self and somewhere under the prominence of matter or prakṛti. Whereas in some of its forms, Sāṁkhya is theistic, in some others it is atheistic. We have found that both these trends—idealism as well as realism, theism as well as atheism in germinal form—can be traced in the Upaniṣads. Hence when we take into account the process of development of Sāṁkhya, it cannot be held to be anti-Vedic in nature.

When Sāṁkhya passes beyond its initial stage and reaches the second stage of its development, we find emphasis on the discipline of knowing. Knowing has been recognized as the means of salvation. Gīta designates the process of knowing as jñāna yoga or Sāṁkhya yoga because until then Sāṁkhya has not differentiated itself from the general yogic tradition. This differentiation begins with the growing stress on the discipline of intellectual comprehension of the enumerated principles rather than the practice of yogic techniques. Teaching and learning follow as a corollary of knowing. This trend leads to the recognition of reliable authority as a valid means of knowledge. It

includes a variety of sources, e.g. old Vedic speculation, Upaniṣadic notions of the self and so forth. In this new trend, the summum bonum of life has been the discriminative knowledge of puruṣa and prakṛti. This line of thought easily guides the way to classical Sāṁkhya.

The above study of the origin and development of Sāṁkhya, though in brief, discloses that it is not opposed to the Vedas in so far as the Vedic intellectual pursuit is concerned. As the ultimate end of Sāṁkhya is the knowledge of its principles, it can by no means deny the importance of scriptural texts which contain the germs of its principles. However, classical as well as post-classical Sāṁkhya manifest a critical, logical and rational attitude towards the scriptures. In the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, we have observed, all throughout, attempts to prove its doctrines rationally. When we turn to the interpreters of *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* and *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*, we observe the same attitude. Vācaspati Miśra through his criticism of the non-Vedic scriptures, corroborates that the Vedic assertion must be free from inner contradictions and must be verifiable by other means of knowledge. Implying this, he comments:

> *Ayuktatvam ca eteṣam vigānat vichinna mulatvāt pramāṇa viruddhārtha abhidhānacca ...*[11]

Aniruddha, in his commentary on *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*, quotes a verse, which is translated as follows:

> Huge giants do not drop from heaven simply because an āpta or competent person says so. Only sayings which are supported by reason, should be accepted by me and others like yourselves.[12]

Dr S. Radhakrishnan has also pointed out the critical and rational stand of the Sāṁkhya with regard to Vedic revelations. In Sāṁkhya view, he states, the authenticity of revelations is to be judged by reason. As he puts it:

> The Sāṁkhya is aware that there are other systems which profess to be revealed, and so argues that reason will have to be employed in finding out which courses of revelation are true and which are not.[13]

Thus later Sāṁkhya thinkers, we notice, emphasize the rational application of verbal testimony—Vedic or secular. They bring attention towards proper understanding and interpretation of the scriptures. Such

rational approach by no means implies the non-recognition of scriptures as a valid means of knowledge. Since the historical study of Sāṁkhya unveils its roots in the scriptures, it is very much reasonable to think that Sāṁkhya recognizes śruti as a valid authority.

Notes and References

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Reinventing Professor B.K. Matilal's Philosophical Logic

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Does the late Professor Matilal commit a *faux paus* when he tried to implant a philosophy of language for Indians thus taking us away from *ancilla theologie*? (Staal 1989). The tri-*Vishnu* Steps he uses to characterize Indian philosophy are, *ancilla theologie*, *lingua philosophica*, the tantric/ritual language. Sensing a rancour between the first two, Professor Ganeri unflinchingly recently suggests two emendations: Indian philosophy is not spiritualistic, and second, formal logic will help it grow in the proper direction (Ganeri, 2001). However they go contrary to earlier assumptions, for example those pursued by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. There arose what can be called a new 'logical turn' in Indian philosophy, to be nurtured by the analytical traditions of the west. Its exact sense lies in between a logical theory of inference (*anumana*) and an analytical philosophy of language (*sabdabodha*). At the outset, it looks as if one cannot deride him for setting up a new paradigm of analytical philosophy of language joined by a host of others in an ongoing enterprise. This was to be called the Matilal-Sen-Shaw analytical paradigm (1985). While Staal invariably thinks that artificial languages of *vyakarana* is a *sine qua non*, and hence Indian philosophy of language should come from *lingua philosophica* and so it is to be called Sanskrit philosophy of language, others take the above new wave seriously. For many Indians, there is nothing wrong in cutting the umbilical cord from the so-called *vyakarana* traditions which is, therefore, left for philologists to ponder over. All these inevitably give the impression that we are to blow a pure *Sabda* announcing an analogous theory of meaning, thus freeing ourselves from the last vestiges of culture (Billimoria, 1988). But for Matilal, since *sabdabodha* provides the modicum of interface for grammar and logic, it should be

christened as the foundational philosophy of language. The theory of logical inference is to be erected on this.

Can a theory of meaning that inquires into how to explain *a* means *b* transcend the barriers of culture? Similarly, translation too has recognizably a philosophical dimension. What exactly is the way in which one can distinguish between culture-free and culture-bound philosophies of language? Does philosophy of language then sponsor translation as a Quinean means of verbalizing across cultures? Is it plausible that naturalized epistemology be a stumbling block for a universal logic? (Simon Evnine, 2001). Is relativism thereby inevitable? Do Dummettian assumptions inaugurate culture-free philosophy of language? While the obvious answer is yes, Matilal's use of them does not sponsor a similar answer. Such questions are never raised but they seem to be imperative. Can Bhartrhari's *sphota-dhvani* or *sphota-nada* be given the credit it richly deserves for the contributions towards philosophy of language? Is it possible to counterpose the atomism of *Mimamsas* to the apparent holism of Bhartrhari? If Prabhakara's *anvitabhidana* account of related or connected designation, as against Bhatta's designation-and-then-connection view of *abhihitanvaya* compositionality, is to be 'logically separated' from Fregean line of sentence-holism, do they still provide a rival account to the syncategorematicism view of understanding *vyakarana*? Does *sabdana* warrant an idea of language-ing and therefore expound a language-cognition hypothesis anticipated by modern cognitive science? If anyone thinks that such questions require precise answers within the Indian perspective of philosophy of language, then it is necessary to reinvent Matilal's philosophical logic.

We are grateful to Matilal for turning us in the direction of taking philosophy of language as a foundational subject along the lines of Dummett and translatability as an occasion for founding a hybrid discipline of philosophy of language *à la* Bhartrhari once and for all. Barring a few, no one questions the viability of such an enterprise today. Today, we have to acknowledge that Matilal was a founder of the Indian analytical paradigm. Now he wants to add another feather to his cap for founding of the Indian formal logic. Just as logic and philosophy of language are complementary disciplines in the west, it

must also hold good in Indian traditions as well. If all philosophy turns to analysis, the comparative philosophy also must become comparative analytical philosophy. This is the rationale that lies behind Matilal-Sen-Shaw model of comparative analytic paradigm which stands or falls with the answers to the above queries.

Michael Dummett has bequeathed us with three sonorous assumptions about the paradigm. His first assumption is that by analyzing language we can analyze thought. Language and thought have identity of structures. They do not outstrip each other. It puts a premium on the relative use of language. His second assumption is that theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. Fixing the meaning of a sentence is much more than stating its conditions of truth. That is, it enables us to attribute a thought to others for the simple reason that we all share a similar capacity to speak and understand. Turning it on its head, it should be read as that a theory of understanding is what should give meaning for *Sabda*. His third assumption is that the theory of meaning should tell us what it is to know about the meaning of a sentence in terms of the way we assert them to be verifiable.

The first assumption shows how thought and language is to be given a holistic content so much so that the specific relation between *vacaka* and *vacya* lends credence to a specific language-world identity, or better, a word-world identity. The second assumption inaugurates *Sabdabodha* as a species of an epistemology of understanding. The third assumption brings together language and cognition so as to bolster up the idea that there is no languageless cognition.

The first assumption therefore entails no design of the language-world relation as such, but only a kind of identity. The structures of language and the structures of thought are identical. This is rather a purified form of identity of structures of language and structures of the world. Wittgenstein identified it with a sort of isomorphism. The identity Matilal uses is the identity between word and object. Within the framework of *Nyaya*, it stands for the dictum that states that whatever is knowable is nameable. We must pause to consider what happens when some entity is not nameable. It is also knowable. *A fortiori*, whatever is knowable is nameable is to be taken as analytic. This conveys a sheet-anchor for absolute idealism. A probe reveals that

this works at three levels. The categories of appearance and reality allow that we can express the inexpressible or the ineffable in the domain of language. Before we consider the other two domains, it is appropriate to acknowledge Matilal's contribution to the *Navya-Nyaya* theory of negation. Efforts to subsume it under four-cornered negation only warrant that we have to make a fresh start in understanding negation in Indian logic.

Let us first explain this with the help of Shaw's lemma, which considers the contrapositive of the above. Whatever is not nameable is not knowable. Professor J.L. Shaw's lemma concludes that such a contrapositive as implausible, for the very reason that it is nameable implies a larger set which includes both empty as well as non-empty objects. Once their co-extensiveness is ruled out, there is a way to regard *abhava* non-existence as some sort of existence (subsistence?), but not in the usual sense. But for Matilal, the analysis should proceed in a different way. That is, the absence of knowability is a descriptive name which continues to denote an entity. That is, the absence must be the absence of a real entity. That is, if we say that

The pot is not blue,

it is symbolized as

M has $\sim s$

where the property has an internal negation. This negation requires Leibnitz's law of indiscernability (two objects are alike if they have the same properties) to understand that it is a case of difference $M \neq s$. While negation is absence, difference is the denial of identity, and so negation is to be construed as the denial of identity. In propositional terms, y has x is to be translated into y has the constant absence of the constant absence of x, with a quantifier stated as

(y) (y has the constant absence of the constant absence of x).

If it is granted, then Udhayana's or Gangesa's construal of y has potness boils down to

(y) (y has the constant absence of the difference from pot).

Matilal is right to think that in such a case, the sentence 'rabbits' horns do not exist' asserts that it is everywhere in the universe, bolstered up by the *anyathakhyathi* theory of error. It makes no difference that nothing is both a rabbit and horn-possessing (nothing is both a square and a circle) is equally an assertion. Matilal caps it by making use of Russell's technique of definite description to reformulate the sentence that the absence of knowability is not present in y as

knowability $\neq$ the absence of any absence that may occur in y

and calls this a trivially true or analytic whereas

knowability is the absence of any absentee that occurs in y

must be understood as a contradiction.

The absence of x has a locus. So, if the presence x occurs in a locus, then it is equivalent to asserting that the absence of absence occurs in a locus. Just as the present King of France is meaningful, the absence of knowability is also meaningful. But if we say that the absence of knowability occurs in y, then it is false. It is trivially true if you assert that absence of knowability does not occur in a locus. That is, the presence of knowability occurs even in the absentee of a locus. It is suggested that the most appropriate way of translating 'Hare's horn does not exist' requires the following form:

Not (the Hare's Horn exists)

On parity with the above, we formulate the above sentence as

Note (the absence of knowability occurs in a locus)

If this is supposed to explain the category of *abhava*, as found in hare's horn does not exist, then given the fact that it is a negative existential, it will be explained as nothing is both a hare and a horn. Or else, nothing is the absence of knowability and has a locus. The former cannot be taken as an analysis of non-existence because it must vanish upon analysis (Lycan, 2000). But the latter must then be taken to be different from the above, in which case it is not analyzable by using Russell's theory. In other words, nonexistence as *abhava* cannot be explained by this technique of Russell's logic. All knowable are

nameable but not all nameable are knowable. An amended version of another of Shaw's lemma should then be read as follows:

Q (Hare-Hareness) Q (Horn-Hornness) Q (Hare, Q (~Horn, (hornness))

Or else, it must be expressed as

(Q (Q (Hare-Hareness) Q (~Horn-Horness))

which means that

Q ((Q (Hare-Hareness) Q (Horn-Horness)) = Q ((Q (Hare-Hareness) Q (~Horn-Horness))

This gives the following:

Q (Locatee-Locus) = Q (~Locatee-Locus) is trivially true or analytic.

Applied to the other two domains of grammar and logic, the result would be termed as follows. In grammar, it allows that we can say the unsayable. In the domain of logic, we can affirm and negate.

A second important assumption that simply follows from the first is a sort of holism which simply states that thoughts occur in a mind. It is far from asserting that sentences form a network. But sentences, their locus in mind, all form a network of activities. It is rather a ramified variety that is of comparable interest to a combinatorial account of understanding as revealed by the celebrated acquisition-manifestation argument (Kanthamani, 1993). The above identity of subject and object, along with others, give hostage to a ramification of semantic holism. Understood thus, holism has something to do with the way the thoughts are articulated. This is what is called *sphota-nada* which therefore represents the inner speech and external articulation. The holistic constraints act on the very exercise of translatability and translations are impossible not for Quinean reasons but for the way they offer a proof of the above identity. That is, they act in holding together the *Pasyanti-Madhyama-Vaihari* levels of articulating the inner speech. Understood thus, the notion of *Sphota* is a sort of inner speech, a kind of Fodorian mentalese which originates in some Eternal Verbum. The possibility of realism is ruled out *ab initio* here and *a fortiori*, all predicates are predicates of this eternal origin. This is unashamedly a

species of absolute idealism. The imperfect predicates are due to bad translation. The bad effect of translation here is traceable to the way language distorts reality and thus lending credence to a new twist to the paradigm by advocating the following thesis. There is a tyranny of language which not only distorts the above identity, but also throws the relation between word and object out of gear. This appears to be a negative feature not shared by analytical paradigms which are poised to design word-world relation. It offers an escape route to the dictum which states that language has an ultimate reality. The ultimate reality can be phrased as: language arising from consciousness. This is what is echoed in language-thought hypothesis in Bhartrhari.

A corollary of the above assumption is that language is cognition and cognition is language. Just like Karna's in-born armour, they accompany each other. Just as there are no language-less thoughts (John McDowell), there is no language-less cognition. *Nyaya* asserts that whatever is knowable (*prameya jneya*) is sayable (*abhideya*). Bhartrhari's language-cognition hypothesis, on Matilal's reading has two versions, namely the strong and the weak. The strong version asserts that all cognition occurs in language. The weak version directly entails that some thoughts do not occur in language. Immediate is the conclusion that the ineffability lies outside of language and since this is shown rather than said, an extended version of the weak is to be okayed. To a great extent, Bhartrhari anticipated the current version of language-thought hypothesis within cognitive science advocated by Peter Carruthers (1996). He also has two versions such as

NN_s = all thoughts occur in language
NN_w = some thoughts occur in language

The second version directly entails the view that there are thoughts at the unconscious level. Unfortunately, Carruthers disbands the above hypothesis now. The question about the relation between language and thought requires a more complex treatment from an empirical point of view.

The second assumption entails that the speaker-hearer's understanding can avail of the *reductio* of each other's views by allowing them both to say the sayable as well as the unsayable. This is the way the

central feature of logic is introduced. That is, it is not required to introduce a distinction between language and a language about the language (metalanguage). The sentence '*what I say is false*' is a paradoxical sentence. So it was found to distinguish between language and the language about language. In the version of Matilal, the opponent can say 'what you say is false' and since this is sayable this does not generate any paradox. This winds up the second option. The second option is that supposing I write, 'The sentence written on the board in Room No. 114 is not true,' are all sentences false without knowing that I am in that particular room where some true sentences are also written. Then one has no use of the distinction between language and metalanguage. The third option is simply to reject the distinction. May be Indian logic requires it for the very purpose of defining logic (*Tarka*) as refutation of ones opponent (*vadavidhya*). According to my understanding, *vadavidhya* steers a middle course between *sabda* and *anumana*. That is it is sandwiched in between *sabda* which is not to be classified as a theory of inference and inference which is not to be subsumed under western syllogism. Matilal provides a proof structure of refutation which is to be discussed below.

Once we lose the distinction between language and metalanguage, then one can augment the express powers of language to say the unsayable. Even an acceptance and denial could be couched without contradicting each other. The Jaina logic admits that x is *avaktavya*. That is, both x is and x is not. Thus what lies outside of the natural language can be reached by taking the thoughts beyond. Once the expressive powers are increased, one can express the inexpressible. It follows that the correct way of understanding the ineffability of mystical experience is to take it as a warning against the trivialization of the language of the mystics. This is what Matilal terms as the logical illumination of mysticism. Just as

I am hungry (T) = I am hungry (F)

can both be true as well as false for different indexicals (I/he), and its general form is

p is true = p is false

that can be taken as a tautology.

The importance of the distinction between language and metalanguage is understood by considering sentences which contain the truth predicate as

What I say is not true.

If it is true then the sentence says that it is not true and hence it is false. On the other hand, if it is false, this is what it asserts and hence it is true. So it is necessary to make a distinction. But for Matilal, we can say that

Every *bhava* is empty

or

All such statements are empty.

The question whether such a statement is empty or not will evoke the following answer. That is, if it is, it is not, if it is not, it is. It need not necessarily be so. The distinction between these statements is not sanctioned by any such distinction between language and metalanguage.

Elsewhere, according to Nagarjuna, Matilal states that the refutation of p is not incompatible with the refutation of $\sim p$.

In other words,

p is not incompatible with $\sim p$

That is,

p is compatible with $\sim p$.

Likewise, Matilal avers that to assert that

Brahman is impredicable

cannot require any tool like Russell's theory of types to deal with impredicable properties. Now the question whether the predicate impredicable is predicable or not is solved by some other means. If it is predicable, it is not. If it is not then it is. So a vedantin's only means of defending it must assert that Brahman is impredicable where but impredicable is not predicable. All these complexities are found in the central idea of refutation in Indian logic.

The third assumption is simply a follow-up of the second in that it cannot accommodate the language-metalanguage distinction, and so, it presents *sabdabodha* as the viable theory of meaning. Gangesa's account of *sabdabodha* itself bears the following formalization:

(Knowledge of the word-elements + knowledge of their meaning) → (Hearer's knowledge-episode from *Sabda*)

This is supposed to conform to the formula:

proposition + compositionality + truth-condition (assertibility conditions) → Knowledge of the meaning (understanding)

advanced by the realist (anti-realist) account of meaning. If we add the acquisition and manifestation to the antirealistic account, it will inevitably result in a theory of other ascriptions. Such a theory is supposed to tell us how to ascribe beliefs to others as part of the identity between a theory of meaning and a theory of understanding. According to Staal's observation, the former view would be open to objection as it is not as sensitive to metalinguistic consideration that pervades much of the western philosophies of language as the latter. But Matilal's intention is different. He wants to take an unusual step of subsuming *sabda* under inference. Matilal stipulates that our anumana is Aristotelian and our philosophy of language is Dummettian. This is a strange result. Moreover, it cannot serve as an epistemology of understanding in which the cognition of meaning in terms of truth-conditions is in central focus. We have to raise a question whether the above formula gives new vistas to an Indian epistemology of understanding (Kanthamani, 1991) in the light of the above remarks on truth, falsity and negation. All these things are presented as a counterpart to the centrality of logic which supports a theory of logical inference. The logical theory is presented *au fond* a theory of refutation, a theory of *reductio ad impossibile* in which the opponent is refuted in debate. There is no point in arguing that this should be distinguished from *reductio ad absurdum* (Cf. Professor S.R. Bhatt). The former deduces contradiction and proves the falsity of the given assumption, whereas the latter stipulates that the contradiction of the original assumption is true.

Matilal's proof tries to capture the notion of sophistical refutation in the first sense, but ends up with neither.

A study of the underlying structure reveals that it is only a proof for a tautology which holds that the contraposition is trivially analytic. That is it proves that asserting the antecedent of a conditional and inferring its consequent is just equivalent to asserting the negation of the consequent and inferring the negation of the antecedent. One person's *modus ponens* is literally another person's *modus tollens*. If all these things augur well without any other adjuncts like subject-predicate form of propositions, propositions and truth, the way is open for western logic to infiltrate into its Indian counterpart.

That is, such a theory of inference is not properly grounded unless it goes via a theory of propositions, a theory of truth-values as well as a theory of subject-predicate proposition. But Matilal refuses to subscribe to this. He invariably thinks that Indian logic is as much global as western. Hence he starts with an analysis of the subject-predicate proposition. The wrangle over the locus-locatee model bears ample testimony that there must be something like subject and the predicate. Nothing deters us from believing that *lingua philosophica* cannot be amenable to such a treatment. There is more than one way of formalizing the model. Thus the subject-predicate proposition is not one that is settled for a final run. The major obstacle here is that the terms of the propositions are said to be uniformly possessing a universal and hence the structure reveals an unnecessary complexity. Matilal introduces the Q-notation stipulating it to do the function of relation and thus adding an unnecessary complexity as shown by the following formalization. Taking the qualificand-qualifier model to be symbolized as Q (a, b), he offers the two rules. The first rule reads as

(1) Q (a, b) · Q (a, c) → Q (a (b c))

That is, if a is qualified by b and it is also qualified by c, then it is qualified by band c. But the last one can be modified as Q (a (b · c)) or we shall say Q (a, b and c) where there is a clear ambiguity of 'and'. To explain: a is qualified by b, a is qualified by b and c. The ambiguity consists in reading a as qualificand and b and c as qualifiers. When qualifiers are treated as variables, and qualificanda are treated as

constants, the uniformity is not preserved. This is what is seen in the bracketing notation which is already used for Q-notation.

Knowing this fully well, Professor Shaw suggests a compromise: we can translate the sentence *Raktum puspam* as

$$Q\ (Q\ \text{(flower-flowerness)}\ Q\ \text{(red-redness)})$$

Thus turning the above sentence which reads as

$$Q\ \text{(Flower (Flowerness and Redness))}$$

he further suggests that the following is yet a third alternative namely that

$$Q\ \text{(Flower-Individual) (Flowerness and Red colour))}$$

Matilal, after agonizing over these formalizations, settles on identity. The following motions evidence this. Staal issues a note of caution for the recursivity, the remedy for which is to be sought in Russell's theory of types:

(1) The mango is sweet.
(2) The mango is sweetness-possessing.
(3) (There is) sweetness possessing-ness in mango.
(4) (There is) sweetness in the mango.
(5) So, sweetness-possessing = sweetness.
(6) Therefore, mango = sweetness-possessing.

If Matilal's intention is to identify predication with identity then it can hardly be hoped that the difficulties are overcome. Should we accept that the fate of subject-predicate sentence within the above model results in some form of identity? That is we take the predicate of being y as identical with the subject x. But this looks a far cry from holding that every word is to have a qualifier, however long a sentence might be. The above rule becomes an abbreviation for Q (flower-flowerness) is (second-order) qualified by Q (red-redness). This is second order qualification. Prefixing another Q will lead to third order. In retrospect, it appears we cannot grant sign-signified model which is acknowledgeably neither Indian nor western.

It is at this juncture, Shaw proposes another radical emendation. That is consider the qualificand-qualifier as relational structures taking the property of being something as relational to the qualificand, and if

not it is conversely relational. The new lemma suggested here is to treat both the property of being existing, and the property of being non-existing as properties but conversely related. Now using property quantification, we can achieve that the non-existent property of being a hare's horn will have

$$\text{A. (horn R1 hornness) R2 (hare R3 hareness)}$$

$$\text{B. } (\lambda x)\ (x = \text{the hare's horn})$$

Since R2 is a converse relation in A, the above sentence is false. The cognition of meaning is captured by B. Therefore, it is in the metalinguistic form. This is no doubt a far cry from explaining *abhava* from the Russellian point of view. The primary purpose however is assumed to make clear subject-predicate structure thus:

$$\lambda < \text{(flower R } (\lambda x)\ (x = \text{the property of being a flower})) >$$

In what sense does the above sentence that contains predicate, relation and identity have an edge over the Q-notation discussed above? The λ-notation is an echo of Quine's account of existence which defines existence with identity thus:

$$(\exists x)\ (x = a)$$

The lambda-notation is purported to capture all manner of existence including non-existence. That is, it includes the actual beings like hare or horn, possible beings hare's horn, and the impossible beings like square circle. It transpires that Nyaya realism is a type of Meinongian realism. Is being an equivalent of existence? The answer is yes. If so, does it not become vulnerable to the charge of ontological slum? The real intention is to achieve a Quinean translation which translates 'Socrates drank hemlock' into 'the one who socratizes and he drank hemlock'; thereby making existence almost a neutral notion to any ontology. That hardly endears Quine's ontological relativity to Indian logic. That is, it matters if we hold that just as Rama is identical with the property of being Rama, square circle is also identical with the property of being a circle and the property of being a square. That is, the way to overcome a patent contradiction in the above phrases is to

resort to second-order lambda notation. Unfortunately, it needs a theory of types to sustain it.

Why circumnavigate? In Staal's proposal, the symbolization is applied straight, without assuming the major, minor term, to inferendum thus:

(1) $A\ (h, p) \rightarrow A\ (s, p)$

(2) $(x)\ (A\ (h, x) \rightarrow A(s, x))$

We can alter this to read for the negative also. For, introducing *sapaksa* and *vipaksa*, I submit, one must proceed in this direction rather than in the manner of putting up a flowchart as Matilal has done. It is difficult to understand why this is not considered to open us at least towards an alternative formalization with certain prospects. There is no reason why it cannot be pursued by adopting a bar on both of the variable p in the above formula:

$$A\ (h, \sim p) > A\ (s, \sim p)$$

and thereby put an end to the wrangle between different types of formalization.

Matilal's anxiety to present the *Nyaya* Model of inference as on par with Aristotle's syllogism appears to globalize western logic as seen in the following:

$$[(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx) \cdot Fa)] \supset Ga$$

Inevitably, it assumes the dictum of Aristotle (principle of all or none) with the addenda of minor and major terms. Nevertheless it binds us to our culture. Matilal characteristically observes: we face two kinds of problems; those which arise from within our language and those which arise from without, that is from western formal logic which stands in conformity with naturalized epistemology. The second is universal and it is our duty to conform our logic to western logic that gives us a universal conceptual system. But we cannot blame our language for its logic.

Notes and References

Thanks to Dr Murali (Madura College), Dr G. Mishra (Chennai), Dr Appan Ramanujan (Vivekananda College, Chennai), Dr Sampath (Vivekananda College, Chennai) and a host of others who urged me to sensitize many Indians about the contributions of these seminal thinkers, irrespective of whether they are right or wrong. This urge is behind this companion paper.

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Staal, J.F. (1995) 'The Sanskrit of Science' in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (23), pp. 73–127 deplores the fact that no Indian has followed his works on Indian Logic. It is high time that Staal's large corpus on Indian logic is collected and published by ICPR.

G.R. Malkani's View of Ajñāna

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Professor G.R. Malkani, an ardent supporter of Advaita-Vedanta hailed from Maharashtra. *The Metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta, A Study of Reality, Sin and Bondage* are some of his famous books. In his works he has supported almost all the theories of Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkarācārya.

The concept of māyā and ajñāna is a key-concept of Advaita-Vedanta. According to Śaṅkara, Brahman is the only reality. And the world is ultimately false, it is a kind of wrong perception like the rope-snake illusion. It is held by him that the appearance of the world is caused by māyā or ajñāna which is an indescribable power of Brahman. Thus, the concept of māyā occupies a pivotal position in Śaṅkara's philosophy. Professor Malkani has discussed this important topic in several of his papers and also in his book, *The Metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta*. Regarding the essential nature of māyā or ajñāna Professor Malkani's view is in full conformity with Śaṅkara. But he has offered some very important explanations on some of the problems concerning māyā-vāda.

The concept of dualism and non-dualism is a problem which is to be solved in order to establish Advaitavāda. The world of multiplicity is a fact experienced by us in our day-to-day life. Unless and until this world of multiplicity is denied or rejected non-dualism cannot be established. Professor Malkani points out that, 'Plurality of things is to be explained by unity and dualism by non-dualism. Advaita seeks to give this sort of explanation.'[1] In 'Śaṅkara's Vedanta it is maintained that the world of plurality has no objective reality, it is only an illusory appearance—a product of error which is erroneously perceived in non-dual Brahman, the ultimate Reality. Hence the philosophy of non-dualism is in fact a philosophy of Illusionism or māyā-vāda.[2]

According to Malkani māyā or ajñāna is the designatory concept for the explanation of the world appearance. It is not possible to deny the perception of the world. World must have objective reality. Now, if the world possesses objective reality then there must be matter as the basis of this objective world. Again, matter is nothing but sense-data. And if matter exists then the sense-data also exist. But actually the sense-data cannot exist by itself. The sense-data cannot change by themselves or continue to be the same sense-data by themselves. If the sensation changes the sense-datum also changes. Hence there cannot be some permanent matter behind the sense-data because it cannot be said that sense-data exist yet cannot be perceived. Actually the reality of the sense-datum implies the reality of spirit, not of matter. Matter cannot exist independently of the spirit. Hence the world is ultimately illusory because the basis of the world, i.e. matter, does not exist at all. This illusoriness of the world is designated by Malkani as māyā. According to him māyā is not an explanatory concept. In his view, māyā cannot explain the world-appearance. He argues that error occurs, but no one can say why error occurs. 'It is an ultimate irrationality ...'[3] the power of error is called māyā in Advaita Vedanta. Śaṅkara, however, uses the term avidyā (māyā) to denote both error and its cause. In T.R.V. Murti's philosophy also we find that māyā is not an explanatory concept. Murti says, 'Māyā is not an explanation, much less a derivation of the lower from the higher (we may leave this jugglery to Hegel). The mystery remains. In fact, "māyā" is the most expressive term for the mystery of such so-called derivation.'[4] According to him the correct thing is that the lower is not identical nor different from the higher.

This view of Malkani seems to correspond with the view of Swami Vivekananda also. Swami Vivekananda also confirms that māyā is not a view to explain the mystery of the world. Māyā is nothing but a description of these worldly happenings.[5]

As to the relation between māyā and Brahman, Malkani opines that māyā is a power of Brahman by which it creates the illusory world. The world has a subordinate reality. It is real within time. The world is relative, it is not absolute like Brahman. According to Malkani Brahman is the ground of the world. Now, there are two kinds of

subordination. Firstly, the part is subordinate to the whole. Secondly, the illusory is subordinate to the real. Malkani says that the subordination of the world to Brahman is not like the part and the whole because Brahman has no parts. According to Malkani the subordination of the world to Brahman is of the second type, i.e. the subordination of the illusory to the real. He maintains that the world is illusorily real and not real like Brahman. Hence there is no dualism to the world and Brahman. Brahman is the ground of the world. But this does not suffice to account for the existence of the world which we perceive in our day-to-day life. Malkani here asserts that though Brahman is the permanent ground of the world, there is another ground or cause of the world. That is māyā, which is the cosmic cause of the world. Māyā superimposes the illusory world on Brahman. 'The ground is the reality, the grounded is only an appearance.'[6]

Now, what is the relation between māyā and Brahman? If māyā is a power of Brahman, then there is internal difference in Brahman. On the other hand, if māyā is not a power of Brahman then there is, it should be admitted, the existence of both Brahman and māyā, which is sheer dualism. To solve this problem Malkani argues that the so-called power of Brahman, i.e., māyā, is not real. Māyā is illusory. Māyā as a power of error is true only for itself. It has no independent status both outside or inside Brahman. Like the illusory snake on the rope, illusory māyā is also grounded on Brahman.

It is true that this explanation of Malkani can satisfy ontological demand but logically such type of argument is not acceptable. Logically, there is, on the one hand māyā which is active and creative and on the other hand, there is Brahman who is inactive and not creative. And as a result this creative power cannot be totally non-existent. Malkani himself anticipated this objection and replies that Brahman is ontologically real in itself while māyā is ontologically depending on Brahman thereby in need of Brahman. But this explanation also cannot satisfy the logical mind. Our thought requires something more. Malkani admits that logically māyā will always be there as some kind of spiritual realization of the truth based on direct intuition—is needed to transform the intellectual recognition into the unquestioned truth of non-dualism. He explains with the example of awakening from a dream.

In our awakened state the dream state is cancelled. It is not logically cancelled but epistemologically cancelled. And with its complete cancellation it ceases to be a problem. Similarly with the direct intuition of Brahman when all unreal things are discarded the mind will be totally free from illusion. Māyā will be reduced to the status of *tuccha* or unreal, there will remain only Brahman. T.R.V. Murti has also the same idea in mind when he says, 'Intuitive knowledge of the Real (Prajñā) is the total negation of all views (dṛṣti).'[7]

Thus we find that the world caused by the illusory māyā is also illusory. And the illusory cannot be traced to anything real. It is wholly unaccountable by the nature of the things themselves as they do not stand by themselves as a content. For example, the illusory snake appears to be perceived. But when there is no more than illusion then it cannot be said that 'this snake' was really in the mind, because 'this snake' did not exist where it appeared to exist. This means that, 'this snake' was not this snake. It was an illusory snake. And the illusory is distinct both from the real and the unreal. Because all agree that both real and unreal cannot exist. Again the illusory is neither real nor unreal. It is not real because it does not really exist as a fact. And it is not unreal because it is not totally non-existent like the hare's horn. It is not merely nothing because it exists as something. And to designate this category which is neither real nor unreal Malkani like Śaṅkara regards this world as anirvacaniya. In the same way, māyā, the cause of the world which is also illusory is also anirvacaniya.

According to Malkani ajñāna is not the absence or abhāva of knowledge. It is not negative because when we negate something it implies that we must have the knowledge of the thing negated. Without the knowledge of the thing negated none can have the knowledge of the negation of that thing. Hence if ignorance is regarded as the 'negation of knowledge' then in order to be aware about ignorance we must know the thing before about which we are ignorant. But the knowledge of the thing contradicts the ignorance about that thing. That is why all the Advaita Vedantins including Malkani regard ignorance as positive, or bhāvarūpa. It is likened to darkness. Darkness is incompatible with light yet it does not mean absence of light because absence cannot be perceived. We can perceive both darkness and light in the same

way. Similarly ignorance is not absence of knowledge for absence of knowledge cannot be known but we know the ignorance. Hence ignorance, like darkness, is positive.

Malkani accepts different types of ignorance. As the object of ignorance differs from context to context so there cannot be common and general ignorance. Moreover, the knowledge of a particular object can remove the ignorance of that particular object only and not the ignorance of other objects. Malkani has divided ignorance into mūl-avidyā and tūl-avidyā. Mūl-avidyā is ignorance about Brahman and tūl-avidyā is avidyā or ignorance about the common objects of experience. The support of tūl-avidyā is the individual and its objects are the world outside. But mūl-avidyā is the cause of both the individual and the world hence they cannot be the support or object of mūl-avidyā. Brahman is the support or object of mūl-avidyā.

Ignorance cannot be known by any recognized source of knowledge. It can be known by the Sāksi only which is the pure intelligence. Ignorance is removed by intellectual knowledge or pramāṇa-jñāna of its object. Again to know ignorance intellectually we must have the knowledge of its context. This will naturally remove ignorance. Hence, only pure intelligence can know both knowledge and ignorance with their objects. And as a result there is nothing beyond the reach of pure intelligence.

Śaṅkara regards māyā and ajñāna as synonymous while some of the later Advaitins maintain some difference between māyā and avidyā. In Malkani's view also, māyā and avidyā are not two different entities, yet there is some small difference also. According to him, ajñāna emphasizes the power of ignorance, while māyā emphasizes the power of illusion. Error is possible only due to ignorance but this does not imply that there is any necessary relationship between ignorance and error. It is not that ignorant people always commit or perceive error. The fact is that ignorance is such that it prepares the ground for error or it is better to say that ignorance is the fertile ground for error. 'It is in this sense that ajñāna is said to be the ultimate principle of explanation for the appearance of an illusory world. Actually ignorance is not so much responsible for the illusory perception. It is māyā or the

power of erroneous perception which causes the illusory appearance of the world.'[8]

In this way māyā is the cosmic principle of illusion. It is a power which produces a world different from Brahman. 'The principle of māyā is therefore logically necessary. If Brahman alone is the Real, then what is not Brahman is all illusory or māyic.'[9] But being a power it cannot reside without a support. But the question is what is the locus or support of this māyā? Malkani replies that māyā resides in Brahman and functions as a power of Brahman. But what type of power is this? A power may mean a volition or it may mean erroneous perception. In Malkani's view, māyā is nothing but the power of erroneous perception.[10]

Objection is raised here that Brahman cannot be the seat of avidyā because then Brahman would have erroneous knowledge. Again individual being also cannot be the seat of māyā because it itself is caused by avidyā. Malkani replies that there is no question of the real existence of avidyā. It is like the illusory object which has no existence at all. It appears as existing and in that regard Brahman can be the seat of avidyā as appearing to exist. And as individual is nothing but Brahman hence there is nothing wrong in saying that avidyā resides in the individual and in Brahman. In fact, as avidyā is not a real entity hence its existing anywhere does not arise. This view of Professor Malkani is actually a just reply to the Advaitavādins who are diametrically opposed to each other regarding this problem. The Vivaraṇa school and the Bhāmati school which developed within the fold of the Advaita Vedanta school of Śaṅkarācārya are opposing and rejecting each other's view in this regard. While the followers of the Bhāmati school accept the jīva as the abode of avidyā, the Vivaraṇa school proclaims Brahman as its abode. But Professor Malkani's exposition can easily solve this discord. In this respect T.R.V. Murti's view is also the same as he too says, 'Avidya belongs to Pure Being, Brahman, as it cannot belong to any inert being (Jaḍeāvaraṇa-krtyābhāvāt); only a conscious being capable of knowledge can be ignorant ... . The object of ignorance is Brahman, for that is the object of ignorance which when known removes it.'[11]

According to some, avidyā is real, before its cancellation. Malkani criticizes this view by the argument: that which cannot exist externally, i.e. which is ultimately cancelled, can never exist at any time. Because if it exists at a particular time then there must be some cause in order to bring it into existence. But there is no cause of avidyā. Brahman cannot be the cause of avidyā and Brahman is the only reality, there is nothing besides Brahman. If Brahman is not the cause and still there is some cause then that cause is also illusory. And it is only an appearance not a real thing. Hence avidyā has no cause beyond itself. 'The very realm of causality is the realm of avidyā.'[12] Hence avidyā cannot have any cause and so it is beginningless in time.

Moreover, it is argued that as avidyā exists for some time and then it is cancelled it implies that there is both avidyā and Brahman at a particular time and then when avidyā ceases to exist, there remains Brahman alone. Again it is said that avidyā cannot be cancelled at a particular time by anything. If Brahman cancels it at a particular time, then Brahman would have cancelled it at the beginning. Again it cannot be cancelled by itself or anything produced by itself. Thus, the cancellation of avidyā is also not possible. Malkani here states that all these confusions arise due to the wrong interpretation that avidyā is something which has an objective existence. But in reality avidyā is not an objective reality, it does not co-exist with Brahman and its cancellation does not come in time. It is eternally cancelled. Because anything that exists in time is itself 'avidyāic'. Avidyā is no fact. In the words of Malkani, 'It would be suicidal even to suppose that there is a real cancellation of anything, for then this cancellation at least must be an ultimate fact'.[13] The being of Brahman who is the only reality is itself this cancellation.

Thus we find that according to Malkani, though the concept of ignorance occupies an important role in Advaitā philosophy yet it is no fact at all. It has no beginning and has consequently no end. It is, so to say, cancelled eternally in the Reality. And due to ignorance we think that the knowledge of reality is still to be achieved. And we think that there must be some effort to overcome error or ignorance. Actually both the error and the effort to overcome error are illusory. The true self which is not objective is the Absolute Reality. And the realm

of objective and the ignorance that cause the appearance of the objective are cancelled in the Absolute Reality. The Absolute Reality is all perfect. It does not require anything beside it.

This shows that Malkani has followed Śaṅkarācārya in his treatment of māyā and ajñāna. But he has not entered into the controversies found in the later Śaṅkara Advaitic school regarding some concepts of ajñāna. Rather he has tried to explain these points in his own unique way in order to solve these problems. Moreover, being a contemporary philosopher who is also well-versed in western philosophy, Malkani has explained the concept of ajñāna in a language which is easily understood by modern men, even a layman. He has also endeavoured to defend this very important concept from adverse criticism. And it must be admitted that Professor Malkani is very much successful in his endeavour.

Notes and References

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 148.
4. Coward, Harold (ed.), *Studies in Indian Thought*, p. 347.
5. Cf. Vivekananda Swami, *Bani O Rachanā Saṅkalan* (Bengali), p. 100.
6. Malkani, G.R., op. cit., p. 136.
7. Murti, T.R.V., 'The Spirit of Philosophy', *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan, p. 464.
8. Malkani, G.R., op. cit., p. 158.
9. Ibid., p. 148.
10. Ibid., p. 182.
11. Murti, T.R.V., *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 242.
12. Deshpanday, Sarad (ed.), *The Philosophy of Malkani*, p. 75.
13. Ibid., p. 76.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Interpreting Metaphysical Deduction: A Hermeneutic Response to Professor Daya Krishna's Essay 'Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Questions and Problems'[1]

Anāptā ye vaḥ prathama yāni karmāṇi cakrire/
V'irān no atra mā dabhan tad va etat puro dadhe//

Atharva Veda, IV, VII. 7 & V, VI.2

A COMMON MISTAKE

A common mistake most commentators on Kant's so called metaphysical deduction of categories make is to take the table of forms of judgements as such, as the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding. Professor Daya Krishna is no exception to this mistake. He argues, 'Kant, it should be remembered, articulates first his thought about the subject in his "table of judgements" and then, later, develops his doctrine of categories in his "table" of categories. The latter, therefore, may be taken as "founded" in the former and "deriving" its specificity and content from the former.'[2] Strictly speaking, this argument as it stands commits the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. Because of this mistake the origin of the table of forms of judgements becomes obscure and questionable and the deduction of the table of categories from the table of forms of judgement becomes more so and the specificities of the categories simply elude them. To put it in another way if one treats the table of forms of judgements perfunctorily and puts the table of categories next to it—as Professor Daya Krishna does literally in his essay—then one is simply left clueless as to 'the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding' because he, then, simply fails to see that the table of judgements is not at all the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding.[3] So we must ask: what exactly is the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding? If we take note of all that precedes the table of categories

in the metaphysical deduction then we notice that in between the table of forms of judgements and the table of pure concepts of understanding there is a third thing,[4] which makes us understand the origin of both the tables and relates the two and prevents us from taking concepts of quantity, quality, relation and modality as more fundamental pure categories. What is that third thing?

To answer this question one must understand the Kantian text with proper hermeneutic principle announced by Kant himself. He makes a distinction between what a philosopher describes and the philosopher's description of it, and claims that there may be discrepancy between the two. Kant writes, 'No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay even the definition which, at the start, he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognizable even under microscopic observation. Consequently, since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description, which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For we shall then find that its founder, and often even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that consequently they have not been in a position to determine the proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.'[5] Most of the commentators of Kant have failed to delve beneath the words of Kant to grasp the idea he was trying to convey and because of this failure one fails to discover what clue Kant was talking about when he employed the locution 'the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding'.

How can one rise to the level of rational knowledge of Kantian principles so that one does not remain at the level of historical knowledge[6] of mere words of Kant? Let us hear what Kant says in the context of his own discussion on Plato's ideas: 'I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary

conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.'[7] So to find out what Kant is doing in his critical works we have to understand him better than himself. This is the spirit in which I have tried to think through his text to get at what idea he was trying to convey and the reality that was the focus of his attention. But in our case in 'understanding better' no superiority is claimed. It only means 'understanding differently'. This spirit of investigation can be satisfied provided we investigate the Kantian text hermeneutically.

How does one proceed to understand a text hermeneutically? In a series of epithets of Viṣṇu in *Tripādvibbūtim. Up.* 7, 42 (*Om sucakrāya svāḥā/Om dhīcakrāya svāḥā//*) one comes across the compound *dhīcakrāya* 'who is possessed of circle of thought' and this circle of thought is *sucakra* 'well rounded'. So to understand the truth of text what we need is *dhīcakra* or circle of thought, which is well rounded, since it is the *sudarśana cakra*, i.e., a circle involved in the thought process of *darśana* by which the power of darkness of ignorance, which surrounds the truth of text, can be removed to reveal its truth. Be it noted that continental hermeneutic thinkers have already discovered in their own studies hermeneutic circle, involved in the interpretation of texts, which is well undertaken to avoid viciousness.[8] It is interesting to note that Parmenides in the poem (Fr. 1 line 29) to his poem speaks of 'the tremorless heart of well-rounded uncovering' (ἠμὲν Ἀληθειης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ). In Fr. 5 again he claims, 'It is a common point from which I start; for there again and again I shall return.' Comparing this with Heraclitus Fr. 103, 'In a circle beginning and end are common,' one can conclude that Parmenides is implying that his own thought is circular, i.e. Parmenides is undertaking a circular thought process. Regarding original philosophical endeavours Kant remarks, 'But these human endeavours turn in a constant circle, arriving again at a point where they have already been. Thereupon materials now lying in dust can perhaps be processed into a magnificent structrure.'[9] Isn't Kant referring to some kind of valid circular philosophical thought process, like the one undertaken by Parmenides, here? The circle of thought in understanding is the requirement that the

parts of the text must be understood in light of the whole text and the whole text be construed in light of the parts.

1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

To begin with it must be kept in mind that the whole, as part of which Kant discusses the 'the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding', is the transcendental logic as distinguished from logic in general. When we observe thinking *by setting aside thinking's reference to all objects*, then we will discover analytic rules which lie *a priori* in thinking itself and regulate its *general employment*. 'I understand by a canon the sum-total of the *a priori* principles of the correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge. Thus general logic, in its analytic portion, is a canon for understanding and reason in general; but only in regard to their form; it abstracts from all content.'[10] Such an investigation of the rules of the *general employment of understanding* is to be distinguished from establishing the rules of a specific employment of understanding. The former task is the business of *general logic*. Be it noted that general logic is the science of necessary laws of thinking which still stands in relation to objects in general, yet for logic in general it makes no difference which object is thus being thought and also we do not need to pay attention to thinking's *relation to objects at all*, although *this relation* belongs to it. Investigation of the rules of the element of object-relatedness involved in thinking is not the business of general logic. General logic ignores precisely *all kinds of object-relatedness* involved in thinking.

In contrast to general logic transcendental philosophy investigates this element of object-relatedness involved in knowledge. But transcendental philosophy also does not investigate the element of object-relatedness in its entirety; rather it investigates only the mode of object-relatedness with respect to its *possibility a priori*. In other words transcendental philosophy is concerned with *a priori ontological constitution of objectivity* or *the a priori foundation of the possibility of the object's standing over against the knowing subject* irrespective of the object known. In transcendental philosophy the task of a *critique* is to investigate the *a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in object-relatedness.

What is the mode of object-relatedness involved in knowledge, which is investigated with respect to its *possibility a priori*? According to Kant, 'In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed.'[11] That is to say that there are two modes of object-relatedness—immediate and mediate—involved in knowledge according to Kant. Immediate mode of object-relatedness is intuition and mediated mode of object-relatedness is concept. Both intuition and concept are *a priori* conditions of knowledge of objects. Kant writes, 'None the less the representation is *a priori* determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to *know* anything *as an object*. Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first, *intuition*, through which it is given, though only as appearance; secondly, *concept*, through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition.'[12] But transcendental philosophy is not concerned with all *a priori* knowledge, and hence it does not investigate intuition and concept in their entirety; rather it is concerned with the *a priori possibility* of intuition and concept. 'Not every kind of knowledge *a priori* should be called transcendental, but that only by which we know that—and how—certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely *a priori*. The term 'transcendental', that is to say, signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment.'[13] So for Kant *transcendental philosophy* 'treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of objects that *may be given* (*Ontologia*) ...'[14]

So Kant has to solve two problems. He has to argue for the *a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in both the immediate object-relatedness and the mediate object-relatedness. That is to say he has to argue for the *a priori* possibility of pure (*a priori*) intuitions and concepts.

For Kant space and time are the pure immediate object-relatedness whose *a priori* possibility is shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 'In the representations of space and time we have *a priori forms* of outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these the synthesis of

apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place at all. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves *intuitions* which contain a manifold [of their own], and therefore are represented with the determination of the *unity* of this manifold (*vide* the Transcendental Aesthetic).'[15] That is to say the exploration of the *a priori* element in the immediate object-relatedness of knowledge is the business of transcendental aesthetics.

How is *a priori* fixing of pure mediate object-relatedness possible? What are the rules of employment of understanding in relation to objects in general? It is the task for the transcendental logic to answer these questions. So this is the context in which the metaphysical deduction of the pure categories of understanding is undertaken. This has to be borne in mind while interpreting the metaphysical deduction.

2. THE TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF CATEGORIES

Where is the Clue?

The chapter on metaphysical deduction is entitled 'the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding' and it has three sections. Just before he begins his first section he makes it clear that he is looking for a single principle as his clue. 'Transcendental philosophy, in seeking for its concepts, has the advantage and also the duty of proceeding according to a single principle. For these concepts spring, pure and unmixed, out of the understanding which is an absolute unity; and must therefore be connected with each other according to one concept or idea. Such a connection supplies us with a rule, by which we are enabled to assign its proper place to each pure concept of the understanding, and by which we can determine in an *a priori* manner their systematic completeness. Otherwise we should be dependent in these matters on our own discretionary judgement or merely on chance.'[16]

It is also very significant that although the chapter on metaphysical deduction is entitled simply 'the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding' and he repeats this title before every section of the chapter. But there is discrepancy in the repetition. When the title of the chapter is repeated before the first section the adjective

'transcendental' is used: 'the transcendental clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding'. What does the addition of the adjective 'transcendental' signify here? It signifies according to our clarification of the logic in general and transcendental logic that the clue he is seeking is something that has to do with the *a priori* mediate object-relatedness involved in the knowledge. Even though in the title of the chapter and its repetition before the second and third sections the adjective 'transcendental' is not used but the content reveals that there too he is concerned with the transcendental issues.

The first section is entitled 'the logical employment of the understanding'. But the adjective 'logical' here represents not something pertaining to logic in general; rather it pertains to transcendental logic. Since transcendental logic is concerned with mediate object relatedness of knowledge Kant in this section explains what the element of mediate object-relatedness is. 'Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgement is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgement there is a concept, which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. Thus in the judgement, 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility.'[17] So both judgement as well as categories are representations which mediately relate to object. The distinction and correlation between the judgement and categories need to be clarified.

Kant explains what he means by concept, '... concepts rest on functions. By "function" I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought ...'[18] Similarly Kant also explains what he means by judgement, 'all judgements are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a *higher*

representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby much possible knowledge is collected into one.'[19] The higher representation, which is not an immediate representation, is the concept. Hence Kant could write, 'Now the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them.'[20] That Kant is here talking within the transcendental logic and not logic in general is once again made clear by bringing in the element of object-relatedness involved in judgement and concepts. 'But concepts, as predicates of possible judgements, relate to some representation of a not *yet* determined object ... it is therefore a concept solely in virtue of its comprehending other representations, by means of which it can relate to objects.'[21] After these clarifications Kant at the end of the section one reverts to the issue of the clue. Mind you the clue is the third thing in between judgement and concept and that is what he calls 'functions of understanding' as 'concepts rest on functions' and 'judgements are functions of unity'. So now he announces where we can look for the clue, 'The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be discovered if we can give an exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgements. This can quite easily be done as will be shown in the next section.'[22]

But what does one find in the next section, i.e., the second section, which is entitled 'the logical function of the understanding in judgements'? Kant begins with the declaration, 'If we abstract from all content of a judgement, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgement can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments.'[23] But what follows is neither a table of various functions of unity, nor a table showing how various forms of judgement arise from functions of unity, rather what Kant presents is a finished table of forms of judgements. What follows this table of forms of judgement are four numbered paragraphs each of which deals with one of the four groups. But no paragraph discusses the character of the group that is thematized. There is no explanation of what quantity, quality, relation, and modality is in this section. In these four numbered paragraphs Kant explains why he has introduced three-fold division of each group in contrast to the

traditional division of forms of judgement into two divisions in each group. But this becomes apparent that in this discussion he is not disregarding the object-relatedness involved in judgements. If he disregards all object-relatedness then the table will be a table of forms of judgements in logic in general and each group will involve only division into two kinds and not three kinds. The threefold division of each group is possible precisely because the object-relatedness of the judgement is taken into account and hence the table is a table of forms of judgement in transcendental logic. When he calls it a 'transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgements'[24] he has this in mind.

It is in the third section entitled 'the pure concepts of the understanding, or categories' we are finally told what the function of unity is and what is the clue to the discovery of pure concepts of understanding, which lies in between the transcendental table of judgements and table of categories. This he does in the first six paragraphs of the third section before he gives the table of categories. These six paragraphs merit very close reading. So let us do it now. We will quote each paragraph and interpret it.

Productive Synthesis of the Imagination in Intuition

> General logic, as has been repeatedly said, abstracts from all content of knowledge, and looks to some other source, whatever that may be, for the representations which it is to transform into concepts by process of analysis. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding. In the absence of this material those concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty. Space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind—conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects. But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name *synthesis*.[25]

This paragraph introduces the distinction between the manners in which logic in general and transcendental logic deal with concepts. General logic deals with only the form of concept as it abstracts from all content knowledge, i.e., abstracts from all object-relatedness involved in knowledge and the process it employs is the process of analysis. In contrast to this the transcendental logic deals with the matter or content of the concept, i.e., it deals with the *a priori* object-relatedness, which is obtained through the manifold of *a priori* intuition and the function it employs is synthesis.

According to Kant, 'We must distinguish in each concept between *matter* and *form*. The matter of the concept is the *object*, while its form is *generality*.'[26] In the *Critique of Pure Reason* also he repeats the same point. 'We demand in every concept, first, the logical form of a concept (or thought) in general, and secondly, the possibility of giving it an object to which it may be applied.'[27]

If we keep in mind the above distinction between form and content of concept then as far as logic in general is concerned the concept is 'a *general* ... or a *reflected* representation'.[28] The concept 'is a general representation or a representation of what is common to several objects.'[29] Conceptual representation is 'a representation *insofar as it can be contained in several different things*.'[30] Be it noted that the idea of commonality also presupposes the idea of difference as that which is common is common to many things, which are different from each other. 'A representation which is to be thought as common to *different* representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something *different*.'[31]

In the first paragraph of the third section of metaphysical deduction, which we are interpreting, Kant says representations are transformed into concept by analysis. But what is analysis? This question is asked by Kant in his *Logik* in the words, 'And here the question arises: *Which activities of understanding constitute a concept* or—the same thing—*belong to production of a concept from given representations?*'[32] There he answers that three activities of reflection, abstraction and comparison are involved in it.

It is the activity of reflection undertaken by understanding which gives rise to concepts of any kind as far as their form is concerned.

'The *logical* origin of concepts—original only according to their form—consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to many objects (*conceptus communis*) emerges as that form which is required by the power of judgement.'[33] What is reflection? Reflection is 'the deliberation of how various representations can be contained in one consciousness.'[34] For generation of concepts we need two more functions of understanding, i.e. comparison and abstraction. 'In order to make concepts out of representations, one must be able to *compare*, *reflect*, and *abstract*. For these three logical operations of understanding are central and general conditions for the production of each and every concept.'[35] But Kant makes an important observation on reflection as a function of understanding in *Critique of Pure Reason*. '*Reflection* (*reflexio*) does not concern itself with objects themselves with a view to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge and only by way of such consciousness can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another be rightly determined.'[36] Although reflection is a function of understanding that is involved in concept formation yet it by itself does not give rise to concepts; it only helps us in discovering the subjective condition, which gives rise to concepts. That is to say it only gives rise to form of the concept but the full concept will require the matter of concept too, which is not given by reflection by itself.

Reflection brings into picture in advance the technically-practical interest[37] of the subject to achieve his subjective ends whatever they may be in the context of concept formation. Comparison and abstraction is guided by this technically-practical interest brought in advance by reflection. Keeping this interest in view on the basis of reflection we can explicitly disregard 'the respect in which given representations are different'[38] on comparison. That is to say reflection brings into view the technically practical interest of the subject in achieving subjective ends, with regard to which the many representations are to be compared. Be it noted the many representations are compared not only for noting the respect in which they differ so as to disregard it but also

to render the unity transparent wherein the many as different agree with one another. But this aspect is not emphasized in logic in general as that is the business of transcendental logic. He brings synthesis as the function of understanding in transcendental logic. Hence it makes sense why Kant deviates from the traditional usage of the term 'abstraction'. According to Heidegger, 'Traditionally, before Kant and again after Kant and still today, one uses the word *abstracting* to mean: abstracting from *something*, to put something aside, to remove something and to pull something out.'[39] So he complains, 'By contrast Kant alters the usual meaning of the expression "abstract".'[40] But Kant cannot use the term abstraction in this usual sense since what is abstracted in this sense is the *unity wherein the many as different agree with one another* which is the function of synthesis of imagination, a function, which Kant has not yet introduced at this stage. It will emerge after the process of abstraction is over logically. Hence for Kant, 'The term *abstraction* is not always used correctly in logic. We are not supposed to say: abstracting *something* (*abstrahere aliquid*) but abstracting *from something* (*abstrahere ab aliquo*).'[41] Concept will be formed after the process of abstraction is over logically. Hence according to Kant, 'By making abstraction we *do not arrive at* a concept.'[42] For Kant 'Abstraction is only the *negative* condition under which representations can be produced which are generally valid.'[43] And now Kant concludes, 'Hence one should actually call abstract concepts *abstracting* concepts (*conceptus abstrahentes*), i.e., one in which several abstractions occur. The most abstract concept is one which has nothing in common with what differs from it. This is the concept of *something*. For what is different from this concept is *nothing* and has nothing in common with something.'[44]

The content of a concept or mediate object-relatedness is possible through synthesis. But synthesis requires a manifold to be synthesized. 'Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding.' What Kant wants to say here is not that transcendental logic has an *a priori* givenness of space and time from transcendental aesthetics, rather what he wants to say is that mediate object-relatedness dealt with by transcendental logic is

firstly of the nature of a 'lying before it' and this 'lying before it' constitutive of the object in general is possible due to the manifold of space and time. This 'lying before it' is constituted through synthesis of the manifold of *a priori* intuition. So for Kant space and time themselves involve synthesis, which is of a different nature than the synthesis involved in *a priori* concepts. 'Space, represented as *object* (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains *combination* of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only a manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (cf. §24).'[45] How can synthesis belong to sensibility? It is possible because imagination is involved in sensibility. 'Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subject condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to *sensibility*.'[46] How can imagination belong to sensibility? Let us find out.

Imagination as the Common Root of both Sensibility and Understanding

Kant writes, in the chapter on 'The Architectonic of Pure Reason' in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely to outline the *architectonic* of all knowledge arising from *pure reason*; and in doing so we shall begin from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems, one of which is *reason*. By reason I here understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge, and am therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical.'[47] Here Kant is talking about reason in the inclusive sense, i.e., inclusive of

both theoretical and practical use. Here he is merely contrasting the reason from sensibility, as these are the two stems, which the common root of all knowledge throws out by division. Kant does not tell what the common root is. In the very beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he also talks of these two stems without telling what the common root is. 'By way of introduction or anticipation we need only say that there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, *sensibility* and *understanding*, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root.'[48] What is this common root? In the transcendental deduction we hear, 'There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, *sense*, *imagination*, and *apperception*.'[49] Here Kant is taking over the psychology of Aristotle's *De Anima*, where he distinguishes *aesthesis*, *phantasia* and *noesis*. The third faculty Kant introduces here is imagination, *phantasia*. Is it the common root of the other two? How does this third faculty stand *vis-à-vis* the other two? 'A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience.'[50] The faculty of imagination is not a third stem as it stands in necessary connection with the other two faculties and unites them. So we can conclude the faculty of imagination is the common root of the other two faculties. That is to say for Kant both sensibility and understanding are two forms of imagination itself so that Kant can distinguish imagination as distinct from both sensibility and understanding and at the same time can take the latter two as involving imagination. Since according to our interpretation not only imagination belongs to sensibility, rather sensibility is a stem of imagination; it is a form of imagination. Hence synthesis can belong to sensibility and synthesis of the manifold of

space and time can take place. Be it noted the idea of object in general synthesized through the synthesis of space as an object is nothing but the synthesis of the idea of 'lying before it'. This synthesis is variously named as *figurative* synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*),[51] synthesis of productive imagination[52] *synthesis of apprehension in intuition* etc.

Reproductive Synthesis of Imagination

Kant introduces a second kind of synthesis under the garb of a general definition of synthesis in the second paragraph of the third section under consideration.

> By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is *pure*, if the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time. Before we can analyze our representations, the representations must themselves be given, and therefore as regards *content* no concepts can first arise by way of analysis. Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge, and unites them to [form] a certain content. It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge.[53]

Here Kant is explaining synthesis in its connection with analysis. It may be recalled, analysis as the logical acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction which constitute the form of the concept cannot expand the content of a concept: 'as regards *content* no concepts can first arise by way of analysis.' But 'synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge, and unites them to [form] a certain content.' Thus synthesis of a manifold is what 'first gives rise to knowledge' as far as its content is concerned.

Here although it appears as if Kant is giving a general definition of synthesis involved in intuition, imagination and understanding, but a careful reading will reveal that it is not so. Since the manifold has to

be given prior to this act of synthesis empirically or *a priori* it is different from synthesis in intuition of which he talked in the first paragraph. Similarly it is distinct from the synthesis of understanding as is made clear in the next paragraph.

> Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis *to concepts* is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called.[54]

Although Kant is distinguishing synthesis of imagination from synthesis of intuition and understanding yet how can he write as if he is giving a general characterization of synthesis? The reason is that he takes imagination both in the broad sense where even sensibility and understanding are its two stems and at the same time he distinguishes imagination from these two. In the synthesis of imagination the manifold is gathered together in a unity in imagination. This synthesis is named reproductive synthesis of the imagination, or synthesis of reproduction in imagination.[55]

What is Imagination?

What is imagination? '*Imagination* is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present.*'[56] Or again, 'Imagination (*Facultas imaginandi*) is a faculty of *perception* in the absence of an object.'[57] The word (German word) *anschauen* (to intuit) is related to *schauen* (to look upon). '*Anschauen* thus refers ... to the sphere of the visible, but with a peculiar indeterminate direction towards what is there to be seen. Thus the word was first used for the mystic's vision of God (*Gottesschan*).'[58] We can trace the *Gottesschan* 'back to the Latin *Videre deum per essentiam* which characterizes the *status beatitudinus* and, from there, back to the Latin equivalents for the Greek *nous: intellectus* and *intelligentia.*'[59] And hence 'The corresponding Latin terms take us back to the Classical conceptual world of *logos*, *nous*, *dianoia*, *theoria*, and *phronesis.*'[60] So the faculty of

imagination also comes from this semantic field in Kant's writing. It can be confirmed directly. In Parmenides' fragment-4 *nous* is that faculty 'through which you look steadfastly at things which are present though they are absent'[61] or through which you 'See securely ... things absent as though they were present.'[62] In fact Kantian faculty of imagination is the faculty called *nous* by the Greeks. Be it noted, Kant takes over *phantasia* from the triad *aesthesis*, *phantasia* and *noesis* but elaborates in a way to assimilate it with the last in the triad; and *noesis* is elaborated as understanding, i.e. σύνεσις in his own triad of faculties.

So far Kant is talking about synthesis without distinguishing empirical from *a priori* or pure synthesis. Now he will deal specifically the pure synthesis.

Pure Synthesis

> Pure synthesis, represented in its most general aspect, gives the pure concept of the understanding. By this pure synthesis I understand that which rests upon a basis of *a priori* synthetic unity. Thus our counting, as is easily seen in the case of larger numbers, is a synthesis according to concepts, because it is executed according to a common ground of unity, as, for instance, the decade. In terms of this concept, the unity of the synthesis of the manifold is rendered necessary.[63]

In the second paragraph Kant has already explained that a synthesis is *pure*, if what it unifies is the manifold that is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time. The expression 'represented in its most general aspect' represents the formal aspect of a concept explained before and hence means the same as 'brought to a concept'. Pure synthesis, represented in its most general aspect specifies this synthesis with a view to that which always gives unity to this synthesis. When pure synthesis is reproduced in imagination then it relates to imaginative synthesis of a kind of unity which can be rendered in terms of time as Kant will show in schematism and analytic of principles. This synthesis of unity gives rise to *a priori* synthetic unity, which is the basis of pure synthesis. So the content of a concept is an imaginative synthetic unity, which can be rendered in terms of manifold of time. When Kant says, 'In terms of this concept, the unity

of the synthesis of the manifold is rendered necessary' what he means is that the necessity involved in the empirical synthesis of the empirical manifold given in sensible intuition is accounted for and guided by this *a priori* synthetic unity of manifold of time which is the content of a pure concept. The pure concept or categories spring from the imaginative synthesis, which is related to time. Hence categories cannot be read off the table of judgement simpliciter as Professor Daya Krishna tries to do. No doubt he fails. How can then one arrive at the table of categories starting from the transcendental table of judgements? What is the clue for this derivation? Kant will tell that in the sixth paragraph. But before we come to that let us interpret the fifth paragraph first.

Be it noted that pure synthesis requires *a priori* synthetic unity. This pure synthesis, giving rise to concepts, renders transparent the necessity involved in the required *a priori* unity of synthesis.

> By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept—a procedure treated of in general logic. What transcendental logic, on the other hand, teaches, is how we bring to concepts, not representations, but the *pure synthesis* of representations. What must first be given—with a view to the *a priori* knowledge of all objects—is the *manifold* of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the *synthesis* of this manifold by means of the imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding.[64]

Be it noted, the difference between the logic in general and transcendental logic is now explained once again. General logic through analysis involving reflection, comparison and abstraction brings different representations under one concept, i.e., different representations get the form of a concept. In other words general logic brings a given manifold in advance into the unity. In this process the concept *a priori* becomes applicable to many. But transcendental logic brings pure synthesis of representation to concept, which gives unity to the content

of the concept. In this process the concept *a priori* becomes applicable to determinate object that is to say it constitutes the *a priori* object-relatedness in the knowledge. Kant systematically enumerates what is involved in the constitution of *a priori* object-relatedness: (1) the manifold of pure intuition, (2) pure synthesis of this manifold through imagination, and (3) categories which always have synthetic unity as their content. That is to say apart from both productive and reproductive synthesis of imagination a third function is also required for knowledge. That is to say we have pure concepts when the productive synthesis of imagination in intuition and reproductive synthesis of imagination in understanding are united in a common function of judgement. The former gives content to concepts while the latter gives only the form of concept. Only when these two are united in a common function of judgement we have pure concepts. This common function is what Kant will later call *the synthesis of recognition in a concept*, which brings the unity of the previous two syntheses through original apperception. The common unity introduced by this common function, i.e., this unity, in its most general expression, Kant entitles the pure concept of the understanding.

After this clarification Kant finally in the sixth paragraph reveals the clue to the discovery of all categories from the table of judgements, which is also the third synthesis.

> This same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying *a priori* to objects—a conclusion which general logic is not in a position to establish.[65]

The clue to discovery of all pure concepts of understanding lies in the 'same function', which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement* and also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition* because this unity, in its most general expression, is entitled the pure concept of the understanding. What is the 'same function' Kant is talking about? What function gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement*? What function gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*? The answer is given in the second sentence. Hence the second sentence here is very crucial so let us interpret it. In it we hear of 'the logical form of a judgement'. What is logical form of a judgement? We have seen earlier what is logical form of a concept but not what is logical form of a judgement. For Kant, 'Judgement is the representation of the unity of consciousness of various representations, or representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept.'[66] With this definition of judgement Kant brings in a distinction between form and matter in the judgement. '*Form* and *matter* belong to every judgement, as basic constituents. The *matter* of a judgement consists in the given knowledge which is bound up with the unity of consciousness in judgement. The *form* of a judgement consists in determining how various representations as such [as various] belong to *one* consciousness.'[67] Unlike the form of concept where representations are brought to unity in such a manner that the concept still remains applicable to many, the form of judgement is the determination of how the multiplicity of representations belong to *one consciousness*. The expression 'analytic unity' represents the unity established among many representations through analysis consisting of reflection, comparison and abstraction; and hence it represents the form of concept explained before. So it appears as if Kant is saying that 'same function' he is referring to is the operation of reflection since reflection produces analytic unity in the concept and also '*Reflection* (*reflexio*) ... is that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge; and only by way of such consciousness can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another be rightly determined.'[68] But the problem is

reflection cannot introduce a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. The problem can be solved provided we keep in mind that Kant is not dealing with all concepts but pure concepts of understanding in this passage. Kant brings in the idea of concepts of reflection in one of his works according to Heidegger.[69] Kant writes, 'All concepts in general, no matter from where they may take their matter [*Stoff*], are reflected representations, i.e., reflected into the logical relation of their applicability to the many. However, there are concepts whose whole meaning is to be capable of being subordinated, as one or the other reflection, to any representation that occurs. They can be called concepts of reflection (*conceptus reflectentes*). And because any kind of reflection occurs in judgement, these concepts will comprehend absolutely the mere activity of understanding, which in judgement applies to relation as the ground for the possibility of judging.'[70] *Conceptus reflectentes* are nothing but *pure concepts of understanding*.[71] Since one or other reflection itself is the content of pure concepts of understanding it cannot be the function of understanding which gives unity to synthesis of functions of reflection as content of the categories. It is some more primordial function of understanding which resolves into reflection as well as synthesis, and corresponding to which the unity is also more primordial which resolves into reflective analytic unity of form of concept and judgement and also synthetic unity of content of concept and judgement, that is the source of pure concepts of understanding. To discover that function we have to go beyond the metaphysical deduction. As mentioned before this third function is the *synthesis of recognition in a concept*, which brings the unity of the previous two syntheses through original apperception. It is the same function called synthesis of recognition of a concept of the understanding, which gives both analytic unity of all forms of reflection in judgement as well as synthetic unity of content of all concepts. Hence he can conclude:

> In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as, in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgements. For these functions

specify the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers.[7]

Contrary to common belief among Kantian scholars Kant does not what to *derive* the table of categories from the table of judgements as both have their origin in a common source. Rather Kant's intention is to make use of the transcendental table of judgements to lay bare the source of the origin of pure concepts of understanding, i.e., pure synthesis and to be sure about the completeness and division of categories as they originate in synthesis. If at all we can speak of derivation of table of categories from the table of judgements then the context of object-relatedness in judgements as the business of transcendental logic as well as the synthetic unity of original apperception through threefold synthesis has to be brought into the picture.

Where to Look for the Specificities of Categories?

Specificities of the categories cannot emerge at the stage of metaphysical deduction by merely looking at the form of judgements even if the threefold synthesis is brought into the picture. To discover the specificities involved in each category two more tasks need to be performed. The first other task is to show that pure categories can indeed have application in knowledge (the transcendental deduction) and thereby to establish the limits of the sphere of the applicability of them. The second task is to give temporal form or schema to the unities of consciousness represented by each category; as argued above each of the categories represents through the reproductive synthesis of imagination a unity which can be rendered in terms of time. Only after that the specificities of each category can be made visible. This task of making transparent the specificities of categories Kant undertakes in the Chapter II, entitled 'System of all Principles of Pure Understanding', of Book II entitled 'Analytic of Principles' of the Transcendental Analytic. So to understand the specificities of categories we have to take help of the system of all principles of pure understanding. If we go through this chapter it becomes clear that Kant derives the specificities of categories bringing in the pure synthesis of understanding.

3. REPLIES TO SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED BY PROFESSOR DAYA KRISHNA

With the above clarification in mind let us examine the points raised by Professor Daya Krishna. Here we intend not to discuss all the questions raised at the end of the paper, but to deal specifically with the main issues Professor Daya Krishna raised in his paper before he lists his questions and to respond to a question if it is related to the issue discussed. The three last questions will be discussed nonetheless even though they are a class apart.

Universal Judgement and Category of Unity

He, first of all, questions the correlation between universal judgement and category of unity. Nominalist or extensional reading of the universal judgement and a Platonic or Nayayik realist reading of the universal judgement are the only two alternatives assumed by Professor Daya Krishna. But *unity wherein the many as different agree with one another* is the function of synthesis of imagination. Any universal judgement empirical or otherwise precisely is based on this *a priori* concept. Nominalist or extensional reading of the universal judgement and a Platonic and Nayayik realist reading of the universal judgement are not the only alternatives as assumed by Professor Daya Krishna. He has simply not taken note of the conceptual reading of the universal judgement. He has failed to read the universal conceptually precisely because he has not brought in the functions of understanding into the picture.

Singular Judgement and Category of Totality

Similarly correlation between singular judgement and category of totality becomes obscure for Professor Daya Krishna because he has failed to bring in the pure synthesis into the picture. Unless all the impressions of the house in time in its totality is available in one consciousness in judgement to make the predicate large apply to this totality one cannot have the singular judgement 'the house is very large'. Be it noted the experience of the totality of house is not given in one impression but is given through a series of impressions in time. There has to be synthesis of imagination unified by the category of totality to make the singular judgement about the house attributing a

predicate to it. This point Kant makes clear in axioms of intuition. 'All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.'[73] 'I entitle a magnitude extensive when the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole.'[74] Hence the intuition of a house for judging according to a concept (an empirical concept) will be available only via the category of 'totality' according to Kant.

Reality According to Kant

Complete misunderstanding of Kantian terminology vitiates the discussion of category of reality in relation to affirmative judgement. Reality for Kant is not the reality in the sense of reality/unreality of contemporary English. In contemporary English reality/unreality dichotomy is the same as existence/nonexistence. But Kant does not use the term reality to mean existence in opposition to unreality or nonexistence. He is not using the word reality in the sense in which we take it when we talk of the reality of the external world for example. Kant distinguishes category of reality from the category of existence-nonexistence. Since for him real is what pertains to the *res*, 'reality' is 'thingness', 'thing-determinateness'.[75] The concept of reality is equivalent to the concept of the Platonic idea as that pertaining to a being what is understood when I ask: Ti estin, *what* it is? as distinguished from: Hoti estin, *that* it is. The what-content of the thing is what Scholasticism called the *res* and Kant is taking 'the real' only in this sense and he uses the noun 'reality' in the corresponding sense of 'whatness' of a thing. Affirmative judgement attributing a predicate to some thing enlarges or specifies the 'whatness' of the thing. Hence affirmative judgement corresponds to category of reality. But negative judgement denies certain attributes to the 'whatness' of the thing. It does not deny the reality of the thing nor does it declare it to be unreal. So what can correspond to negative judgement is not the so-called category of 'unreality' rather 'negation'. In anticipations of perception Kant explains, 'Now what corresponds in empirical intuition to sensation is reality (*realitas phaenomenon*); what corresponds to its absence is negation = 0. Every sensation, however, is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually vanish.' Unreality will be absence of all reality in the object, i.e., absence of all sensations in intuition of object. But what a negative judgement says is absence of some reality, i.e., some sensation in an intuition of object. Hence the category operative in the negative judgement is not unreality but negation. Be it noted the possibility of negation arises because nothing in the phenomenal world has all reality; each object has some reality. Be it noted for Kant too like Plato reality admits of degrees.

Strangeness of Kantian Terminology

According to Professor Daya Krishna, 'the term "infinite" is very strange as it does not occur in the usual "table of judgements".'[76] This strangeness arises because he is taking Kant's table of judgement to be the usual table of forms of judgements in logic in general. But Kant's table of forms of judgements is a transcendental table of forms of judgements in transcendental logic where object-relatedness is paramount as explained before. In the very first sentence of the paragraph no. 2 Kant explicitly mentions, 'In like manner *infinite judgements* must, in transcendental logic, be distinguished from those that are *affirmative*, although in general logic they are rightly classed with them, and do not constitute a separate member of the division. General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even though it is negative); it enquires only whether the predicate be ascribed to the subject or opposed to it. But transcendental logic also considers what may be the worth or content of a logical affirmation that is thus made by means of a merely negative predicate, and what is thereby achieved in the way of addition to our total knowledge.'[77] This worth refers to the object relatedness involved in knowledge. It is in this paragraph that Kant refers to the table as 'transcendental table of all moments of thought in judgements.'[78] So he is exploring something new, which was never explored before. This context of transcendental logic has been completely overlooked by Professor Daya Krishna in his discussion of correlation between infinite judgement and category limitation.

But Professor Daya Krishna will find this bringing in of transcendental logic as only an objectionable muddling factor. He writes regarding Kant, '... he has distinguished between general and transcendental logic and has suggested that as far as the latter is concerned, it

is the third category which is important as it synthesizes in itself the other two which belong to the general logic alone. This, if accepted, would result in there being *only* four categories under the four headings as the other ones will be synthesized within these. There would then only remain the categories of totality, limitation, 'reciprocity' between agent and patient or 'community' and "necessity-contingency".'[79] Professor Daya Krishna is taking Kant's table of categories as a combination of two tables of categories: one table of categories of four groups with two members (the first two members of corresponding groups in Kant's table) each of general logic and another table of categories of four headings with one member, which is a synthesis of the two members of the corresponding group of the previous table (or the third member of the corresponding group of Kant's table), under each head of transcendental logic. This is an erroneous reading of Kant's table of categories. The entire table is a table of categories in transcendental logic. It is not the case that each group in Kant's table of categories has first two logical categories and the third a 'real' category. The difference between the logical table of categories with four groups of two members each of general logic and the transcendental table of categories with four groups of three members each in transcendental logic is that the categories in the logical table abstract from all object-relatedness in knowledge while the categories in Kant's transcendental table do not abstract from object-relatedness in knowledge. It is precisely because the categories take into account the object-relatedness that the third member has to be introduced in each group.

It is only when the categories are treated in the aspect of object-relatedness that the third can arise by the combination of the first two in each group. So it is not the case that Kant in his table considers the first two in each group as 'logical' categories and the third in each group as the 'real' category as Professor Daya Krishna calls them.[80] But as it will be shown in the next section Kant does not take the third category of each group as a 'real' category. His meaning and usage of the word 'real' as explained above (section 3.3) is different. So this takes care of the questions raised in paragraph numbered 3.[81]

Categories Under Modality

The greatest difficulty Professor Daya Krishna encounters is in understanding the categories under modality. He fails to understand why Kant on the one hand includes categories under modality together with categories under relation under *dynamical* categories to distinguish from categories under quantity and quality classed together as *mathematical* categories yet go on to distinguish on the other hand categories under modalities even from the categories under relation, later together with mathematical categories constituting a class by itself distinguished only from categories under modalities.[82] When Kant distinguishes categories under modalities from all other three kinds of categories taken together then he describes the distinction as follows:

> The *modality* of judgements is a quite peculiar function. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgement (for, besides quantity, quality, and relation there is nothing that constitutes the content of a judgement), but concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general.[83]

When categories under quantity and quality are classed together under *mathematical* categories and distinguished from categories under modality and relation taken together under *dynamical* categories then Kant characterizes the distinction as follows:

> ... those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group [*that is relation and modality*] with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.[84]

Professor Daya Krishna finds in these two distinctions as characterized above a 'straight contradiction'.[85] The root of the problem is lack of proper hermeneutics. If the problem is put in the context of the whole of *Critique of Pure Reason* what Kant says regarding modality makes perfect sense.

In the refutation of the ontological proofs for the existence of God Kant writes, '"*Being*" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in and

of themselves.'[86] This thesis includes two assertions according to the brilliant analysis of the notion of 'being' in Kant by Heidegger.[87] The first is a negative one, which denies to being the character of a *real* predicate, in no way, however, denying to it the character of a predicate in general. In accordance with this, the positive assertion of the thesis that follows it characterizes being as 'merely the positing'. For Kant the word 'real' in 'real predicate' still has its original meaning explained before. Hence 'real predicate' means that which belong to a *res*, to a substance, to the substantive content of a thing. A real predicate is such as belongs to the substantive content of a thing and can be attributed to it. We represent and place before ourselves the substantive content of a thing in its concept. *Existence*, i.e. being, is 'obviously no real predicate' provided we think of the word 'real' in Kant's sense. When Kant claims 'The *modality* of judgements is a quite peculiar function. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgement (for, besides quantity, quality, and relation there is nothing that constitutes the content of a judgement), but concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general,'[88] then in its first part which is a negative thesis what Kant is claiming is that none of the modality of being: being possible/impossible, being existent/nonexistent, and being necessary/contingent is a real predicate.

What is called being, then? Kant answers with the affirmative assertion in his thesis: Being 'is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in and of themselves.' 'Thing' here means something for which Kant also uses the word 'object' or '*Gegenstand*'. If positing of a thing means standing against the subject as an object, then what does the phrase 'or of certain determinations' mean? If we answer this question then we can understand what Kant means in the quotation above on modalities in the second part, which is a positive thesis regarding modality, when he claims that it 'concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general.'[89]

'*Being*' means position, positedness of a thing, i.e., posited by thinking as an act of understanding. But this positing can only posit something as object, i.e., as something brought over against us, and thus bring it to a stand as something standing over *against* us [*Gegenstand*],

if something that can be posited is *given* to our positing through sensuous intuition, i.e., through the affection of the sense. Only positing as positing of an affection lets us understand what, for Kant, the being of things means. This means: Being, and therefore also the modes of being—being possible, being actual, being necessary—do not say anything about *what* the *Gegenstand*, the object, is, but rather about *how* the object is related to the subject. With respect to this 'how' the so-called concepts of being are called 'modalities'.

To understand the specificities of categories of modality we have to take help of the postulates of empirical thought. Kant himself begins his clarification of the 'postulates' of empirical thought in general with the statement: 'The categories of modality have the peculiarity that, in determining an object, they do not in the least enlarge the concept [namely, that of the subject of the sentence] to which they are attached as predicates. They only express the relation to our faculty of cognition.'[90] Hence according to Heidegger in the predicates of being possible, being actual, and being necessary there lies a 'determination of the object'. In these 'certain' determinations something is stated about the object in itself. That is to say these are various 'determinations' of object in its objecthood, i.e., its objectivity, i.e., its 'standing-over-itness' as object. With regard to its 'standing-over-against-ness' [*gegenständigkeit*], with regard to the existence peculiar to it there can be various determinations, but these determinations are not with regard to its reality, i.e., its substantiality or 'what-being-ness'. For Kant 'being' as 'being possible', 'being actual', 'being necessary', is not a real predicate, but it is a transcendental predicate. The *being possible* of an object consists in the positedness of something in such a way that this latter '*agrees with*' what is given in the pure forms of intuition, i.e., space and time, and is, as thus given, capable of being determined according to the pure forms of thought, i.e., the categories. The *being actual* of an object is the positedness of something possible in such a way that what is posited '*coheres with*' sensuous perception. The *being necessary* of an object is the positedness of what '*is connected with*' the actual according to general laws of experience. In each of the modalities there prevails the positing of a relationship—different in each instance—to that which is requisite for the existence of an object

of experience. The modalities are predicates of the relationship required in each instance. The principles that these predicates explain require that which is requisite for the possible, actual, or necessary existence of an object. This is also the explanation of 'the value of the copula in relation to thought in general.'[91]

In contrast to categories under modality all other categories included under quantity, quality, and relation are real categories in the sense explained above. That is to say all the categories under quantity, quality, and relation relate to the *res* or 'what-being' of the thing. This takes care of Professor Daya Krishna's second question, 'Is there a basic distinction between the categories under "relation" and those under "modality" as seems to be suggested by Kant's treatment of the latter?'[92] Be it noted Professor Daya Krishna's[93] understanding that only the third category of each group is 'real' category according to Kant is mistaken. This belief is due to misunderstanding of the idea of 'real' in Kant as explained above.

Mathematical and Dynamical Categories

But isn't the distinction between mathematical categories, i.e., categories falling under quantity and quality, and dynamic categories, i.e., the categories falling under relation and modality, related in the same way to the distinction between 'essence' and 'existence', 'what-being' and 'that-being', the 'thingness' and its existence, contradicting the special treatment of categories under modality as distinguished from all the other three groups of categories taken together as explained above? At first sight, taking the explanation of the distinction between the mathematical and dynamic categories quoted above in isolation, it will appear contradictory to the special treatment of categories of modality only. The quotation under consideration says to repeat once again: '... those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group [*that is relation and modality*] with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.'[94]

The mistake arises in the first glance because one tends to focus on the words 'in their relation either to each other or to the understanding' in the quotation above as if that is the characterization of 'dynamical' and then construct a characterization of the 'mathematical' by ones own fantasy as Professor Daya Krishna does. His explanation of the difference between mathematical and dynamical is in the words: 'Kant seems to be suggesting in this formulation that while the categories in the first group, that is, those under quantity and quality relate to the *notion* of object as such, while those in the second group are concerned with relations between objects on the one hand, and their relation to the understanding on the other.'[95] But this is a wrong reading. For the mathematical categories are said to be concerned with 'objects of intuition' but by no means can one read 'notion of object as such' as the same as 'objects of intuition'. The 'notion of object as such' itself is a construction of understanding as Kant argues in his transcendental deduction. So he is reading 'objects of intuition' as 'object of understanding'. If we want to avoid this error we have to focus on the words 'with objects of intuition' and 'with the existence of these objects' in the quotation above, for the contrast between them provides the differentia between the mathematical and dynamical categories. To interpret this contrast we have to follow the hermeneutical principle of part and whole.

If we follow the hermeneutic principle of part and whole and situate the quotation in the entire critical corpus the contradiction vanishes and the distinction makes perfect sense. The distinction mathematical/dynamical is applied not only to the categories but also to various items like principles (of understanding),[96] synthesis,[97] regress[98] and sublime,[99] and this distinction occurs also in the explanation of distinction between the 'world' and 'nature' in the context of antinomies.[100] So to interpret the distinction mathematical/dynamic let us take recourse to the application of this distinction to sublime. Kant writes, '... the analysis of the sublime obliges a division ... namely into the *mathematically* and the *dynamically* sublime. For the feeling of sublime involves as its characteristic feature a mental *movement* combined with the estimate of the object ... . But this movement has to be estimated as subjectively final (since the sublime pleases). Hence it is referred through the imagination either to the *faculty of cognition* or to that of *desire*; but to whichever faculty the reference is made, the finality of the given representation is estimated only in respect of these faculties

(apart from end or interest). Accordingly the first is attributed to the object as a *mathematical*, the second as a *dynamical*, affection of the imagination. Hence we get the above double mode of representing an object as sublime.'[101] This quotation makes it clear that the distinction of mathematical/dynamic is due to the distinction of faculties to which the object is referred to: faculty of *cognition* or of *desire*.

Keeping the above distinction in mind let us read the distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical categories: '... those in the first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second group [*that is relation and modality*] with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.'[102] The mathematical categories are claimed as concerned with object of *intuition*. Intuition, whether empirical or pure, is related to faculty of receptivity, i.e. sensibility as content or form. So the faculty in respect of which the object is concerned in mathematical categories is *sensibility*. But the group of dynamical categories is characterized as concerned 'with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.' Let us interpret these words. We have already explained existence for Kant is positively characterized as positedness in being posited by thinking as an act of understanding. So the dynamical categories are those concerned with objects as posited by acts of understanding with respect to each other or with respect to the faculty of thought itself. So here also the distinction of faculties to which object is referred to is involved. But is the distinction between faculty of cognition/faculty of desire similar to the distinction between sensibility/understanding to merit the same name of distinction: mathematical/dynamical? The answer is in the affirmative. In both the distinctions the first is passive while the second is active. Faculty of cognition in comparison to the faculty of desire is passive while the latter is active. Similarly sensibility is merely receptive faculty and passive with respect to understanding, which performs functions like synthesis, reflection, etc. Hence there is validity of the terminology mathematical/dynamical. This interpretation of the mathematical/dynamical fits in well with other applications of this distinction too. So this distinction is different from the distinction between the categories under quantity, quality, and relation together,

which apply to what-being of the thing and the categories under modality which apply to that-being of the things. Hence the above-mentioned contradiction vanishes.

But as Professor Daya Krishna does not follow the proper hermeneutic principle, not only did he fail to understand the differentia between mathematical and dynamical categories but also he finds this distinction only as a complicating factor in the discussion of categories. In his opinion, 'Kant himself, in his discussion of categories, has complicated the subject by distinguishing between categories of "quantity" and "quality" on the one hand, and those of "relation" and "modality" on the other'[103] and he concludes regarding this distinction that it 'plays havoc with Kant's notion of the category as, in principle, there can be no distinction between categories which render some more important than the others.'[104] Professor Daya Krishna arrives at this conclusion by an erroneous reading of distinction between mathematical and dynamical categories as distinction between the importance of categories. The distinction is in terms of the faculties to which the object is referred in applying the categories as explained above. So we have to answer his first question, 'Is there a fundamental difference between the categories under "quantity" and "quality" on the one hand, and those under "relation" and "modality" on the other?'[105] in the affirmative.

The Category of 'Necessity-Contingency'

As I mentioned earlier the greatest difficulty Professor Daya Krishna encounters is in understanding the categories under modality. No doubt for him, 'The situation becomes even more perplexing and strange'[106] when he comes to the discussion of the category of 'necessity-contingency' which falls under the group of modality. In this state of perplexity and confusion he finds, 'But, "necessity", strangely, is for Kant not what is usually understood by the terms in philosophical literature. Rather, it is a logical relation between the conclusion, the premises and results from the apprehension that the former 'follows' from the later.'[107] After quoting a passage from Kant to support this contention through his comments on this passage suddenly in a state of perplexity Professor Daya Krishna draws another conclusion, 'Also, strangely, Kant seems to conceive of the major premise of the traditional syllogism in

a hypothetical form when, traditionally, it was always conceived of as categorical in nature.'[108]

Not only are both the claims of Professor Daya Krishna regarding Kant's position erroneous and lacking in textual support, but also he is perplexed and confused, because he discusses the passage in complete disregard to the context. In the entire discussion under point 4 by Kant[109] from which Professor Daya Krishna quotes, nowhere does Kant thematize or allude to traditional syllogism in general to warrant any opinion regarding what Kant seems to think regarding the major premise of the traditional syllogism. Professor Daya Krishna is under an illusion when he quotes the passage from Kant. The quoted passage is:

> The apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding, and therefore as affirming *a priori*; and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Since everything is thus incorporated in the understanding step by step—inasmuch as we first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic—we are justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so many moments of thought.'[110]

On this passage Professor Daya Krishna makes the following comments:

> Kant, it seems, has forgotten that in case the first premise is a hypothetical judgement and the second is assertoric in respect of the antecedent in the hypothetical judgement, the conclusion *does not* reassert the assertoric in the second premise, but the consequence that was asserted problematically in the first premise. The necessity thus is seen as belonging to the consequence *in its relation* to the antecedent which was asserted problematically in the first premise, and is now seen as a necessity, *because* of the positive assertion of the antecedent in the second premise.[111]

And immediately draws the conclusion:

> Also, strangely, Kant seems to conceive of the major premise of the traditional syllogism in a hypothetical form when, traditionally, it was always conceived of as categorical in nature.[112]

What does this show? Doesn't this show that Professor Daya Krishna is taking the quoted passage as a discussion about traditional syllogism in general? Otherwise he cannot draw the conclusion. But the question is: Is Kant discussing traditional syllogism in general in the passage quoted? Let us look at the sentence preceding the passage from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* above. The sentence is as follows:

> Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent is in the major premiss problematic, in the minor assertoric, and what the syllogism shows is that the consequence follows in accordance with the laws of the understanding.[113]

So the entire passage runs like this:

> Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent is in the major premiss problematic, in the minor asertoric, and what the syllogism shows is that the consequence follows in accordance with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding, and therefore as affirming *a priori*; and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Since everything is thus incorporated in the understanding step by step—inasmuch as we first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic—we are justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so many moments of thought.[114]

Kant is explicitly discussing only hypothetical syllogism not syllogism in general. So when Professor Daya Krishna ventures to give an opinion regarding what Kant seems to think regarding the major premise of the traditional syllogism he is under the illusion that the passage quoted by him from *Critique of Pure Reason* is about traditional syllogism in general. This illusion arose because he failed to take note of just one sentence, which preceded the quoted passage. If Professor Daya Krishna does not take into account just one preceding line then it is too much to expect that he will take into account the entire context of discussion, which is transcendental logic.

Keeping in mind that Kant is discussing only hypothetical syllogism that too in transcendental logic where object-relatedness of judgement and categories is paramount and the relation between judgement and categories is via the pure synthesis of understanding, let us find out whether Professor Daya Krishna's argument to show that Kant is taking 'necessity' as 'a logical relation between the conclusion and the premises', and 'results from the apprehension that the former "follows" from the "latter"' is correct. No doubt our conclusion will be in the negative since as explained above the *being necessary* of an object or the 'necessity' of being of an object is the positedness of what '*is connected with*' the actual according to general laws of experience as explained in the section 'Categories Under Modality' (p. 135).

First of all in all the numbered paragraphs from the section 2 of the chapter on 'The Clue to the Discovery of Pure Concepts of Understanding' from which the passage under consideration is taken, Kant is merely showing why he has introduced three-fold division of each group in contrast to the traditional division of judgements into two divisions in each of the groups. Consistent with this general intention in the passage under consideration the conclusion states: 'Since everything is thus incorporated in the understanding step by step—inasmuch as we first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic—we are justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so many moments of thought.'[115] That is to say he is merely showing the correctness of inclusion of three items: problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic under the group of modality in the transcendental table of forms of judgements. He is not telling us anything about the character of necessity.

In the sentence in which the word 'necessity' appears to have been explained he has claimed: 'The apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding, and therefore as affirming *a priori*; and in this manner it expresses logical necessity.' Here he is merely claiming that 'apodeictic proposition ... expresses logical necessity'. There is no claim that it is a relation between conclusion and premises. The reason given for why the apodeictic proposition expresses logical necessity is that it 'thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding' which is the same as 'inasmuch as we first judge something problematically, then maintain its truth assertorically, and finally affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictic'. So when apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding' it does so as combined with the problematic. Apart from hypothetical syllogisms only disjunctive syllogisms have problematic proposition in the major premise. The standard traditional syllogism do not have problematic proposition in the premises unlike the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism. So Kant could not have sustained his argument had he wanted to show that necessity is a relation between premises and conclusion arguing via the combination of problematic with assertoric to generate apodeictic proposition and therefore to generate the 'necessity' involved in it and then take it as applicable to all kinds of syllogism.

It is precisely because Professor Daya Krishna himself is reading his modern logical ideas in Kant which do not fit with Kant's words that he finds Kant's argument faulty and he complains in his comments on Kant's passage, 'Kant, it seems, has forgotten that in case the first premise is a hypothetical judgement and the second is assertoric in respect of the antecedent in the hypothetical judgement, the conclusion *does not* reassert the assertoric in the second premise, but the consequence that was asserted problematically in the first premise.'[116] And he opines, 'The mistake, it seems, is there in Kant's original formulation itself where it is not clear whether he is referring in the conclusion to the antecedent asserted in the minor premise or the consequence asserted in the conclusion.'[117] If we read the passage of Kant merely as arguing for the correctness of inclusion of three items under the heading of modality, and showing how the first two are combined by understanding to generate the third item then his choice of example is correct and has succeeded in showing all he wanted to demonstrate. What he needs to make clear is just the visibility of the three modalities in proper sequence in a valid syllogism and nothing more to carry his argument.

Can we take Professor Daya Krishna's construal of the argument in the passage of Kant under consideration, 'The necessity thus is seen as

belonging to the consequence *in its relation* to the antecedent which was asserted problematically in the first premise, and is now seen as a necessity, *because* of the positive assertion of the antecedent in the second premise'[118] as decisive? In the face of such clear statement by Kant in the third postulate, as to what he means by 'necessity', i.e., third moment under modality, 'That which in its connection with the actual is determined in accordance with universal conditions of experience, is (that is, exists as) *necessary*',[119] and without any argument from Professor Daya Krishna to refute this claim of Kant, his construal of Kant's passage under consideration has to be rejected.

Other Questions

Most of the questions asked by Professor Daya Krishna in the numbered paragraphs[120] are situated in a distorted and faulty horizon of understanding. For example questions under paragraph no. 4[121] are based on the erroneous understanding that Kant takes 'necessity' 'as a relationship between the conclusion and premises in a formal deductive system.' Similarly questions in paragraph nos. 6–8 are based on multiplicity of errors, like misunderstanding of Kant's meaning of 'real', taking erroneously each group of Kant's table as consisting of first two abstract logical 'categories' and a third so-called 'real' category, neglecting the context of transcendental logic, etc. To be able to ask meaningful questions, according to Gadamer, 'one must want to know, which involves knowing that one does not konw.'[122] Professor Daya Krishna's questions arise not from his desire to gain insight from Kant, but from his desire to demolish Kant through his superior knowledge.

Similarly the three last numbered questions[123] are also based on a distorted horizon of understanding. Kant no doubt talked of acts and functions of understanding but he never talked about the identity of the act of understanding, which can enable us to count how many categories are involved in each act of understanding or how many acts of understanding are involved in the application of a single category. Does an identity of an act of understanding make sense in the context of Kant's critical philosophy? Is a judgement 'All bodies are heavy' an outcome of single act or a multiplicity of acts of understanding: reflection, comparison, abstraction, empirical synthesis of apprehension in intuition, empirical synthesis of reproduction in imagination, pure synthesis of apprehension in intuition, pure synthesis of reproduction in imagination, synthesis of recognition in an empirical concept, synthesis of recognition in a pure concept etc.? Is my conceiving this reply a single act of reply to Professor Daya Krishna's paper? Or is it multiple acts of reply to various points raised in his paper? So without first making clear what is an act, the act, single act of understanding, it is meaningless to discuss how many categories are involved in a single act of understanding or how many acts of understanding are involved in the application of a category. Rather it must be realized that the question of identity of action is not relevant when performance is issuing forth, as is the case with Kant. But identity of action becomes an issue when responsibility is fixed or accusation is made *post facto*, and that is not the context of Kant in discussing acts of understanding. Accusation or responsibility fixing in the context of acts of understanding became popular only with Popperian scholarship initiated by Karl R. Popper in his *Open Society and Its Enemies*.[124]

Even if we reject Professor Daya Krishna's dilemma yet the issue of choice of categories to be involved in knowledge will remain. Fortunately Kant has given the criterion of choice himself. According to Kant, 'Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationnis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the law-giver of human reason.'[125] What are the essential ends of human reason to which all knowledge is related by philosophy as a science? According to Kant, 'Essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view of the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can be so described. Essential ends are therefore either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are necessarily connected with the former as means.'[126] So Kant divides essential ends into one ultimate end and all others as subordinate ends, which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end. What is the ultimate end of reason as distinguished from subordinate ends? 'The former is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy.'[127] The skill is necessary for the ultimate end. Kant gives an explanation of the idea of skill and principles

involved in it in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. There he writes, 'Everything that is possible only through the efforts of some rational being can be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and consequently there are in fact innumerable principles of action so far as action is thought necessary in order to achieve some possible purpose which can be effected by it. All sciences have a practical part consisting of problems which suppose that some end is possible for us and of imperatives which tell us how it is to be attained. Hence the latter can in general be called imperatives of *skill*.'[128] So the subordinate ends are the numerous subjective ends to achieve which we develop skill through the knowledge of technically practical rules derived from theoretical philosophy. So theoretical philosophy as a science is at the service of *technology* to achieve all sorts of subjective ends. The reason concerned with the subordinate essential ends is, therefore, theoretical reason or to put it in another way one can say that theoretical use of reason is concerned with subordinate essential ends. So the choice of category in specific knowledge generated by theoretical reason depends on the subjective ends for which scientific knowledge is required.

Notes and References

1. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, pp. 1–11. In my present essay I have assembled certain reminders from the German tradition of Kant scholarship, as exhibited by Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt and others, to dispel common mistakes and errors made by scholars steeped in Anglo-American analytic tradition when they try to get a grip on Kant's texts. I always found these reminders helpful in lectures on Kant.
2. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 1.
3. Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1997, p. 178.
4. Ibid., p. 178f.
5. *Critique of Pure Reason* [abbreviated as *CPR* hereinafter], tr. Norman Kemp Smih, A834, B862.
6. For Kant 'Historical knowledge is *cognitio ex datis*'; while 'rational knowledge is *cognitio ex reprincipiis*'. Kant explains the distinction elaborately. 'However a mode of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside (and this in the form in which it has been given to him), whether through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case of general knowledge) through instruction. Anyone, therefore, who has *learnt* (in the strict sense of that term) a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head, and, so to speak, at his fingers' ends, has no more than a complete *historical* knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another. He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen *out* of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man.' In contrast to the historical knowledge, 'Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles—the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.' *CPR*, A836 f, B864 f.
7. *CPR*, A314, B370. After Kant this principle was adopted by Fichte *Werke* VI, p. 337. Subsequently this principle was also elaborated by Schleiermacher. In Gadamer's words, 'Thus Schleiermacher asserts that the object is to understand a writer better than he understood himself, a formula that has been respected ever since and in the changing interpretation of which the whole history of modern hermeneutics can be read'; *Truth and Method*, tr. William Glen-Doepel, Sheed & Ward, London, 1975, p. 169. Since Schleiermacher, others, including August Boeckh, Stenthal and Dilthey have also accepted this principle. 'The literary critic understands the speaker and poet better than he understands himself and better than his contemporaries understand him, for he brings clearly into consciousness what was actually but only unconsciously, present in the others'; Stenthal, *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin 1881. Even Martin Heidegger accepts this principle: 'We not only wish to but must understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves. Only thus shall we actually be in possession of our heritage'; *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. by Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p. 111. Heidegger explicitly uses

this principle of understanding in his *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1997; see also Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 169–71; and also O.F. Bollnow, *Das Verstehen*.

8. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 153, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 235–40.
9. Vorländer (ed.) *Kants Antwort an Garve, Prolegomena*, p. 194.
10. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [henceforth referred to as *CPR*], A796, B824.
11. *CPR*, A19, B33.
12. *CPR*, A92, B125.
13. *CPR*, A56, B80.
14. *CPR*, A845, B873.
15. *CPR*, B160.
16. *CPR*, A67, B92.
17. *CPR*, A68f, B93f.
18. *CPR*, A68, B93.
19. *CPR*, A69, B93f.
20. *CPR*, A68, B93.
21. *CPR*, A69, B94.
22. *CPR*, A68, B94.
23. *CPR*, A70, B95.
24. *CPR*, A75, B98.
25. *CPR*, A76f, B102.
26. §2 of lectures on logic.
27. *CPR*, B298, A239.
28. *Logik*, §1 [Cassirer, VIII, 399].
29. *Logik*, §1, note 1 [399].
30. Ibid.
31. *CPR*, B134, note.
32. *Logic*, §5.
33. Ibid., §5, note 1.
34. Ibid, §6.
35. Ibid.
36. *CPR*, A260, B316.
37. This is the 'universal interest' Kant is talking about in the context of theoretical reason in the very first paragraph quoted from Kant in our section 'A Common Mistake' (p. 109) bearing footnote no. 5 above. Also see section 'Other Questions' (p. 146).
38. *Logik*, §6.

39. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 159.
40. Ibid., p. 160.
41. *Logik*, §6, note 2 [Cassirer, VIII, 420].
42. Ibid., §6, note 3.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., §6, note 2.
45. *CPR*, B160 note.
46. *CPR*, B151.
47. *CPR*, A835, B863.
48. *CPR*, A15, B29.
49. *CPR*, A94.
50. *CPR*, A124.
51. 'This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, may be entitled *figurative* synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*), to distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general and which is entitled "combination through the understanding" (*synthesis intellectualis*). Both are *transcendental*, not merely as taking place *a priori*, but also as conditioning the possibility of other *a priori* knowledge.' *CPR*, B151.
52. 'But the figurative synthesis, if it be directed merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in the categories, must, in order to be distinguished from the merely intellectual combination, be called the *transcendental synthesis of imagination* ... . But in as much as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense *a priori* in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the *categories*, must be the transcendental synthesis of *imagination*. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application—and thereby the ground of all its other applications—to the objects of our possible intuition. As figurative, it is distinguished from the intellectual synthesis, which is carried out by the understanding alone, without the aid of the imagination. In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the *productive* imagination, to distinguish it from the *reproductive* imagination ... .' *CPR*, B151–2.
53. *CPR*, A77f, B103.
54. *CPR*, A78, B103.

55. 'The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction. And as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever—of those that are pure *a priori* no less than of those that are empirical—the reproductive synthesis of the imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination.' *CPR*, A102.
56. *CPR*, B151.
57. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, §28 (italics added), trans. Mary J. Gregor, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974.
58. Gadamer, *Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, pp. 158–9.
59. Ibid., p. 159.
60. Ibid.
61. See Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971, p. 42.
62. Vlastos, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1946, 72f.
63. *CPR*, A78, B104.
64. *CPR*, A78f, B104.
65. *CPR*, A79, B104f.
66. *Logik*, §17.
67. Ibid., §18.
68. *CPR*, A260, B316.
69. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 170f.
70. *Reflexionen II*, 554.
71. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 171. To refer to the table of twelve categories of understanding Kant himself uses the expression 'our table of concepts of reflection'. *CPR*, A270, B326.
72. *CPR*, A79, B105.
73. *CPR*, B202.
74. *CPR*, A162, B203.
75. *CPR*, B182.
76. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 3.
77. *CPR*, A71f, B97f.
78. *CPR*, A73, B98.
79. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 5.
80. Ibid., p. 9.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 7f.

83. *CPR*, A74, B99f.
84. *CPR*, B110. Words in italics added.
85. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 7.
86. *CPR*, A598, B626.
87. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. by Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, pp. 27–49.
88. *CPR*, A74, B99f.
89. Ibid.
90. *CPR*, A219, B266.
91. *CPR*, A74, B99f.
92. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 9.
93. Ibid., p. 10.
94. *CPR*, B110. Words in italics added.
95. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 6.
96. *CPR*, A236, B296.
97. *CPR*, A429ff, B557ff.
98. *CPR*, A560, B588.
99. *Critique of Judgment*, §24ff.
100. *CPR*, A418f, B446f.
101. *Critique of Judgment*, §24.
102. *CPR*, B110. Words in italics added.
103. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 5.
104. Ibid., p. 5.
105. Ibid., p. 9.
106. Ibid., p. 8.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid., p. 9.
109. *CPR*, A74ff, B99ff.
110. *CPR*, A76, B101.
111. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 8f.
112. Ibid., p. 9.
113. *CPR*, A75f, B101.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 8.
117. Ibid., p. 9.
118. Ibid., p. 8f.
119. *CPR*, A218, B266.
120. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 9f.
121. Ibid., p. 9.
122. *Truth and Method*, p. 326.

123. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, p. 10.
124. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1945, Vols. I and II.
125. *CPR*, A839, B867.
126. *CPR*, A840, B868.
127. *CPR*, A840, B868.
128. 41/415. Page numbers refer to the second German edition and the edition issued by the Royal Prussian Academy in Berlin respectively.

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Ethics in Professional Practice—A Response to Dr Rajendra Prasad

Social relationship is construed in two ways—primary and secondary. Relationship in the primary group comprises personal relationship. Such relationship is informal and intimate. It includes family members, friends or companions. In other words, primary relationship is not just for any one purpose. On the other hand, secondary group relationship is formal as the contact here is for some specific purpose. For example, when one comes in contact with a doctor, a teacher or a lawyer it is for some specific purpose, for some specialized service.

Today, due to interdependence and increasing complexity of society, man's life is dependent, to a large extent, on his fellow men. It has created numerous new forms of problems in a highly complex social order where long range, immorality is possible. Nevertheless, specialization brought benefits which no one wishes to minimize. But increased specialization and division of labour and enormous expansion of man's knowledge in different fields, have altered human relationships in different dimensions. In view of the changing social order, such as ours, a host of new moral problems crop up. Since the prevailing moral codes had been devised in the days of hand manufacture we need a set of revised moral codes for the present social order. Such moral codes would help man to overcome the strain and inconsistency

between the material aspects of social life and the codes of social control.

It appears that in view of the difficulties which modern man faces in daily life in his professional and specialized dealings with old moral code which was formulated mainly in view of primary relationships, hundreds of professional groups devised their own code of ethics since 1890.[1] Codes of professional ethics have emerged as important means of social control as they define professional conduct for the new member and help keep the old member on track. Apparently due to such consideration, Dr Rajendra Prasad has written the article 'Ethics in Professional Practice' which has appeared in his book *Varnadharma, Nishkama Karma and Practical Morality*.

PRASAD'S POINT-OF-VIEW

For Prasad there are three prominent components of a professional. These are (a) expertise in his profession, (b) some sort of relationship between him and the recipient of his service, and (c) his right to charge some remuneration for his services to their recipient.[2] All the three components, as Prasad himself agrees, are interlinked.

Prasad does not agree with the popular contention that the professional expertize is always in some useful or desirable area. For him a profession can be intentionally developed with a moral as well as immoral objective. 'There is nothing in the concept of profession which restricts the application of the term to an expertize with a morally or non-morally, noble aim.'[3]

A professional should not only be an expert in his area but it is also his duty to keep his expertize up-to-date.[4] That is, he must keep abreast of up-to-date advances in the field of his/her specialization. Outdated expertize would cause more harm than good to the recipient of his/her service.

Regarding professional-client relationship, Prasad is of the view that although a professional sells his services which the client buys, still the professional has an upper hand as the client feels obliged to him. The source of such feeling lies in expertize or knowledge on the part of professional which the client lacks; this elevates the professional to a superior position. Perhaps, taking a cue from Harold H. Titus' article

'Professional Ethics' which is published in his book *Ethics For Today*, Prasad contends that the professional's superior position paves the way which could lead to exploitation of the client. As Titus says:

> The more specialized the knowledge the higher the skill, and the less the public knows about the quality and the technical aspects of the work, the greater the opportunity for abuses to arise. Consequently, the need for developing and maintaining high standards of conduct is greater. Such standards will need to be concerned not only with the relations of the professional man to other members of his profession but—chiefly, indeed—with his relation to the public interest and welfare.[5]

Prasad avers

> ... in a professional life there is a large scope for the professional to adopt immoral practices to extract money from his client, without letting him know that he is being cheated.[6]

Prasad contends that a professional can cheat others and the whole society as well, by taking his client into confidence and obliging him in injudicious ways. Hence, '... it is necessary that professionals have a very high general morality'.[7] Only persons with high general morality would be able to desist from 'non-use' or injudicious use of their expertize.[8] Here by 'non-use' Prasad means the use of expertize without proper commitment or seriousness. Injudicious use of expertize is in a way the use of a skill against the accredited norms of the profession concerned. If the professional's general moral conscience is mature he would desist from treating his client as a means of his benefit. 'The Kantian principle, "Do not treat any person only as a means" is very relevant to a professional situation in which one person seeks the help of another.'[9] Respect for personhood of the client, should be inherent in a professional as the client reposes his trust in the former. Faith in the professional's ability is a way to honour him both as a person and as a professional.

> This means that expertize may make one a good professional, but alone it does not make him a morally good professional. To qualify for being the latter, he has to treat his clients not as a means, or objects but as persons. To be a morally good person he does not have to be a professional. But if one is a professional, then if he is not a morally good professional, he would not be a morally good person ... a weak professional would be a good moral agent if he is morally good in other respects and takes up only such cases which he can completely handle.[10]

The ideal of professions is public service and not the monetary gain as the purpose of profession is not to make money but to promote health or knowledge or any other moral area of human interest. However, Prasad asserts that one joins a profession or becomes a professional in order to earn ones living. Therefore, he has the right to get the remuneration for his service from the recipient of the same.[11] Prasad's standpoint apparently reflects the ideas of Titus crystallized in the following lines:

> The profession is, of course, a means of livelihood, and the professional man needs and is justified in demanding compensation which will permit him to maintain a comfortable living, to dress well, and to purchase such books, magazines and equipment as will enable him to perform his work well and to contribute to community enterprises. Without these, success will be difficult. Without a reasonable expectation of such a standard of living it would be difficult also to attract the right type of person to the profession. The ideal of the profession, however, is public service, not monetary gain.[12]

For Prasad the distinctive feature of a professional man is the priority of rendering his service on the assurance of receiving fees and charges; this makes him primarily responsible to his employer for providing services for which he has been appointed and is being paid. But the professional is also indebted and therefore responsible to the society itself as he had utilized the resources of the society in order to get the expertize. Even the free service rendered by a philanthropic with pure humanitarian motive is, although praiseworthy, but, according to Prasad, not totally free service. Because in the past he has utilized the resources of society and is therefore expected to repay. As Prasad contends, 'Anybody, who does some free social service does not do it completely gratis, he repays to his society for what he has received

from it.'[13] Therefore, everyone who is able to engage in some productive enterprise has the moral duty to render his services to the needy. Acquiring a useful skill, according to ones talents is ones duty to ones own self, while rendering his services in some useful direction to the society is his social duty. Moreover, Prasad doesn't consider it morally wrong if one changes ones profession due to change in interest.

Further, every profession has its own peculiar problems of conduct. A doctor finds himself in situations where his only court of appeal is his own conscience. A statement representing the best judgement of his profession, may be a great aid. Should the teacher tutor his pupils only for pay? In the light of the experience of the past, his professional code defines the situation for him. The dignity or the standing of the profession is dependent upon the confidence the public has in it. Again, there are situations which tend to illustrate a conflict between professional and general ethics. But in any case professional norms must conform to the norms of general ethics. Hence, Prasad does not find it proper to make compromises against general ethics in favour of ones profession. Compromise in favour of ones profession serves to satisfy ones self interest. But, it is wrong not only according to ordinary but professional morality, also. Because the moral character of an action is decided not only by the goal but also by the means which is adopted to fulfil the goal. 'A norm or goal which is immoral or infected with immorality through the means used, cannot be the norm or goal of any professional, as it cannot be the norm or goal of anybody.'[14] As the professional code is applicable only to the members of a particular profession, a professional can observe the norms of his profession quite well but he might be inept or 'pretty loose'[15] in observing the rules or principles of general morality but not vice-versa, i.e. persons who strictly observe the norms of general morality would easily and strictly observe the rules of professional code. 'In fact every principle or rule of professional code of conduct can be shown to be grounded in some principle or rule of general morality.'[16] Therefore professional and general morality may be depicted as part and whole. Professional life is a part of ordinary life, and a professional works under the general cover of ordinary ethical practice.[17] Hence an action which is

wrong according to general ethics cannot be shown to be right under the purview of professional ethics.

> ... but to look closely into ordinary commonsense, ethics, because professional ethics flourishes under its overall supervision and protection. The latter cannot survive if it conflicts with the former. Therefore, if any time professional ethics seems to contradict or go against ordinary ethics, it is extremely likely that the discordance between the two is apparent and not real, and that it can be shown, or ascertained, that it is not real by looking into both as they actually function in real human situations.[18]

Lastly he concludes:

> Professionals play very important roles in maintaining the health and happiness of the society they belong to. They can perform their roles well only by sticking to their professional morality for which they have to have a strong base in general morality. This is why I have been insisting that professional morality can flourish only under the protection of or with the support of general morality.[19]

CRITIQUE OF PRASAD

(i) At the very beginning Prasad has mentioned four types of dentists to explain the situation of a professional. He has also pointed out the positive and negative aspects of each of them and concludes that a patient would desire a professionally competent doctor who is affordable. Additionally, the patient would expect that he should not be treated only as a source of income. However, Prasad has seemingly missed one more possibility. In spite of all the above-mentioned characteristics, at times, a doctor might not come upto the patient's expectations. Suppose a doctor has to perform a serious operation for which the patient has spent lots of time and money as he wishes the operation to be performed by the said doctor. The doctor is also keen enough to handle the case. At the last minute the doctor gets information regarding some ailment in his own family. He doesn't know whether the situation is serious or not. Still he cancels all of his appointments for the day and rushes home. And even if the situation is

equally serious, what should the doctor do? Should he perform the operation for which the patient is eagerly waiting, which his profession demands, or simply give preference to his kith and kin. Prasad has not discussed this circumstance which a professional and client may face.

(ii) While clarifying the concept of a professional Prasad has distinguished between 'desirable morally oriented and undesirable immorally oriented profession'. If these two terms are different having different connotations, of course Prasad has not used them synonymously, there shall be four alternatives. As the opposite of 'desirable' is 'undesirable' and that of 'morally oriented' is 'immorally oriented', the four possible alternatives are as follows:

(a) desirable morally oriented
(b) desirable immorally oriented
(c) undesirable morally oriented
(d) undesirable immorally oriented.

Can Prasad cite any example of action in the category (b), i.e. desirable immorally oriented, or (c) i.e. undesirable morally oriented? Can any example be cited wherein the action or goal or idea is undesirable and morally oriented, or desirable and immorally oriented. Again regarding the rest of the two alternatives (a) and (d), I do not know what he means by 'desirable moral' and 'undesirable immoral'. Does he mean that which is desirable is moral and that which should not be desirable is immoral. I think as an analyst he has committed the same mistake as that of the psychological hedonist's failure to distinguish between 'desired' and 'desirable'. Prasad is not clear as to what professions are 'immoral' and hence he is not able to distinguish them from 'moral professions'. For him, 'moral professions' cannot be labelled as those which bring forth desirable ends. But he asserts the normative requirement of a professional enterprise as that which ought to achieve desirable end. Now if an enterprise culminates in a desirable end through wrong means, what would Prasad call it; moral or immoral? For example, some egalitarians try to bridge the gap between rich and poor through muscle power. What would Prasad call the profession of robbing persons of their rich harvests if it is in abundance to them for the

sake of feeding the hungry millions of the society. Will such act come under professional enterprise?

(iii) The change of profession involves the following issues:

(a) is the change for the betterment or good of the society?, or

(b) is the change simply for the betterment of ones own status and financial advantage?

Prasad has rightly sanctioned (a), whereas he has rejected (b). But Prasad did not discuss an allied issue. Could the person who has changed his profession, be mediocre in his original profession but a genius in the other? Does it not imply that he is expressing the full potential of his self by changing his profession which elevates his status? Prasad has not dealt with the issue from this angle; and so let us come back to the main issue, i.e. professional issue.

(iv) Prasad cautions against making compromise in favour of ones profession. In other words, for the advancement of professional practice it is wrong to protect certain selfish interests. 'To make what is ordinarily wrong professionally right, seems to be revolting to our moral common sense.'[20] In addition to Prasad's contention I wish to say that the codes of professional ethics must be sufficiently definite and up-to-date, in which public needs and interests should be prime. Even the protection of professional rights should be allowed insofar as it does not hamper public interest. It would help the professional to decide the line of his conduct in response to his 'conscience'.

(v) Lastly, the relationship between professional and general ethics has been depicted as part and whole. But it is not the question of part and whole. Nevertheless, it is a question of general ethics covering all professional ethics. There could not be a situation in which professional ethics and general ethics would have conflict with each other. As a person is one, so his ethics in relation to his society and his profession would be covered by general ethics. There may be a situation where it may be difficult to decide the priority, e.g. the recent seeming conflict in medical ethics where a dead child is allowed to breathe with the help of a machine.

Moreover, persons with strong general morality turn out to be righteous in their profession also. It appears that professional and general

morality has been construed in the light of the basic Indian ethical concepts of *sadharana dharma* and *swadhrama*.

OBSERVATIONS

The basic tenet of professional ethics is the promotion of human welfare and thereupon progress of civilization.

(i) So professional ethics consists of rendering specialized service to the needy. It would be made possible only when the specialized personnel devotes full concentration in ones area. Meaning thereby, one should be set free from bothering about ones own livelihood to the extent that ones liabilities are not ignored and as such a professional should be assigned the right to charge remuneration in accordance with his services.

(ii) The discussions in the preceding sections make it clear that the basic problems associated with professional ethics are connected to the above-mentioned factor, i.e. 'right to charge some remuneration for service'. It leads a profession towards business which is guided by the principle of getting as much as possible and giving as little as possible in return.

(iii) Undoubtedly, material incentives have their place in human life and the enjoyment of material satisfactions will continue to be a spur to greater activity. But material incentives must have as their purpose, social well-being rather than acquisitiveness and accumulation. Such considerations have also been of paramount importance in traditional Indian thought. Indian seers insist that the two aspects of social life, viz. economic (*artha*) and emotional (*kama*), must be controlled and directed by such motivations which would make life in society not only just but also free from misery. Attaining wealth illegally and indulging in enjoyments that have no social sanction invariably make man unhappy. It is only when his actions are based on *dharma* or the laws of society that man can find happiness. Indian thought stresses two principles. Firstly, the guiding motives of any action must be capable of universal application. Secondly, since God is to be found in every man, no man must be used as a tool for the furtherance of another's selfish purposes. Laws and customs of any society must always be judged in the light of such considerations.

In situations where it is difficult to decide on a particular code of conduct in professional ethics, one has to be very careful to take a decision which does not come in conflict with the general code of ethics. Although the concept of professional ethics has been thoroughly analyzed by Dr Prasad, he leaves many important points not discussed in the subject, which have been mentioned earlier.

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The Other Evil

I distinguish between an active, and a passive performance of an evil deed. I define the former as when a person is himself the author of an evil deed, when he himself conceives, plans and executes it. I define the latter as when a person is himself not the author of an evil deed, but when, while being a witness to it, he does not take the requisite steps towards preventing it. I call this latter the other evil.

In the *Mahābhārata*, Yudhishthira loses the entire Pandava wealth, all his brothers, himself, and then Draupadi herself in a game of dice with the Kauravas. Duryodhana now wants Draupadi to be brought to the *sabha* and to serve the Kauravas as a *dasi*. Vidura says that this cannot be done. For, as Yudhishthira had lost himself first, he had no right to stake Draupadi, and therefore she had not become a *dasi*. Duryodhana still sends for her. Vidura does not take any further steps towards stopping it. We can say that, while Vidura takes a theoretical stand in the matter, he does not go on to take a practical stand as well. In a straightforward way, we can say that, while he deserves our admiration for his theoretical stand, he is guilty of performing an evil deed in the passive sense for not taking a practical stand as well.

However, I find myself confronted with a question here. Let me suppose that Vidura is primarily a man of learning and does not have much of practical capacity. Let me say that, as a man of learning, he takes that theoretical stand; but, as not having much of practical capacity, he does not go on to take a practical stand as well. The question is: is Vidura *really* guilty of performing an evil deed in the passive sense for his practical inaction? Or, is his practical inaction excusable, by virtue of the fact that he does take a theoretical stand and does not have much of practical capacity? One may find worth exploring the various conditions under which a person's action or inaction would be excusable. If the answer to the second question mentioned above is in the affirmative, as it could well be, then that would give us one of these conditions. The condition is this: practical inaction on the part of a person, who is primarily a man of learning and does not have much of practical capacity, and who takes a theoretical stand against a perpetration of evil, would be excusable. The matter would be different,

if this person was not even prepared to take a theoretical stand. The ideal thing would be that he took a theoretical stand, and did his best to overcome his practical incapacity, leading him to take a practical stand as well. In that case, what he did would be admirable through and through, and not just excusable.

What I have said in the previous paragraph may be seen as a defence of a practically inactive man of learning under certain conditions.

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How Reliable is Our Memory of Early Childhood?

All recording of the past must be a reconstruction, unless like Thucydides or Julius Caesar the writer is a participant in the war he is describing. This applies not only to history but also to biography and even more to autobiography. We know that every new biographer feels the urge to re-interpret the materials available to his predecessors. This is especially the case with the biographies of famous personalities whose correspondence and other primary sources are available for scrutiny.

Paul Addison published an authoritative biography of Churchill in 1992. This was followed by Geoffrey Best's biography in 2001. But no less an authority than Roy Jenkins, an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, felt the need to present a new version in 2002. He admits that nearly all the facts about Churchill are on record in the official *Life* and secondary literature is vast. But facts are only the basis ingredients of biography. It is the interpretation that makes the difference. Jenkins observes, for example, that Churchill, 'Worked hard, of course, earning colossal sums from his journalism and books.' But Jenkins draws attention to the reckless extravagance, that repeatedly plunged him into debt, 'Given his love of the gambling table of the Riviera and his partiality for louche (i.e. sinister) companions with strings of women friends, the respectability of his marriage to Clemmie seems oddly out of key.'[1]

Autobiography confronts us with a more formidable challenge. The poet Wordsworth who attempted to write his autobiography in verse enters the following caveat about the earliest portion of his autobiography:

> I began
> My story early, feelings as I fear,
> The weakness of a human love, for days
> Disown'd by memory[2]

The poet acknowledges that he had no personal memory of his early childhood. His account is based on the recollection of others. He has reconstructed second-hand information. It should be noted that his mother died when he was only eight years old.

W.B. Yeats, the poet, states that his 'first memories are fragmentary and isolated and contemporaneous.' He adds that 'it seems as if time had not yet been created, for all thoughts are connected with emotion and place without sequence.'[3]

The tricks played by memory of early childhood are exposed by the philosopher A.J. Ayer:

> To hold a true belief about an event in ones past experience is not sufficient for remembering it. There is still a distinctive factor lacking. If someone whose word I trust describes an incident in my past of which he was a witness, I may be fully persuaded that the incident occurred.

So far the argument seems straightforward but there is a complication which Ayer goes on to point out:

> I myself remember very little about it which, judging by the evidence available, may very well be true. Now it sometimes happens that a belief of this sort transforms itself into a memory.[4]

If ones memory can be transformed by the evidence of others then the dividing line between real memory of ones past and other people's belief about ones past is blurred.

Julian Bell, the grand-daughter of the painter Vanessa Bell confesses that she was only eight years old when her grand-mother aged 81 died. She loved her grandmother but had few memories of her 39 years after her death. This is followed by an analysis of the word 'memory':

> If, that is, a 'memory' is some kind of private mental property. The picture I have of her may be faintly tinted by first hand experience, but its contours come from public documentation.

There is the family photo album to efface the distinction between personal memory and the photographic recording of the past. Ones parents' recollections of ones childhood can transform ones own memory:

> Looking over the snapshots of your childhood; it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish the savour of your primary experience from all parental talk overs that have developed and transmuted the family story.[5]

Moreover aesthetic considerations affect the structure of an autobiography. Stephen A. Shapiro points out that truth in autobiography is no mere fidelity to fact or conformity to 'likeness', to the way one appears to others, but rather the projection of a story of successive self-images and recognition or distortions of these self-images by the world; it is the story of identity as the tension between self-image and social recognition.[6]

So far we have been dealing with cases of unavoidable distortions of memory, owing entirely to natural or aesthetic causes. The discovery of some of the hitherto unpublished letters of Sigmund Freud, however, cast a new light on the subject. It seems that Hans Israels, a Dutch researcher, stumbled across the transcripts of nearly 300 of Freud's letters which were not accessible to Freud's earlier biographers from Ernest Jones onwards.

From these letters it appears that Freud was a liar who wilfully distorted the history of the 'cures' of his patients. It turns out that the patients had not, in fact, been cured by Freud's treatment in spite of his claims to the contrary. Besides his patients did not 'spontaneously confide stories of sexual abuse.' These letters reveal that Freud had to force them (his patients) to admit the veracity of the scenes he himself hypothesized:

> ... His misrepresentation is so gross, so blatant, that one wonders how he could reasonably have hoped to put it over.

What is relevant for the discussion of memory follows soon after this introduction:

> (It is) wrong again that Freud's patients ever spontaneously told him pseudo-memories of infantile sexual seduction; it was Freud himself who extored these scenes of perversion, despite his patients' vehement protests.

Thus memory of early childhood can be tampered with wilfully by a psychoanalyst as unscrupulous as Freud.

But to return to the unreliability of ones memory of early childhood. A paradox stares us in the face. Around the age of four or slightly later the memory becomes very retentive, more so than the memory of the later years of ones life. Nehru's first recollection is of the age of five or six:

> One of my earliest recollections is of (i.e. his father's) temper, for I was the victim of it. I must have been about five or six then ...

John Stuart Mill tells us:

> I have no remembrance of the time when I began to learn Greek; I have been told that it was when I was three years old. My earliest recollection on the subject is that of committing to memory what my father termed vocables ...

While these two features of memory require documentation, the third is so common that we can all verify it from our own experience. In our old age we may forget what happened the day before but we can recount with precision what happened from the age of five to seven or eight (the exact age may vary from person to person). The present writer remembers his school days in pre-Partition Hoshiarpur, even the names of the brightest and the most notorious members of his class but is often taken aback when accosted by an old student whom he taught in the 'eighties.

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Note: The present writer was struck by the absence of any reference to the Indian conception of 'memory' but after checking up the dictionary he found that the Sanskrit for 'memory', 'smriti' had an entirely different sense. It is opposed to 'sruti'. While the former means 'what is remembered', the latter means 'what was heard' or directly revealed. Thus 'smriti' also means 'inspired'. It includes the Puranas and the epics, the latter refers to the Vedas.

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Nyaya—Realist or Idealist: Response to the Reaction this Note Received

As Professor Arindam Chakravarti explained, knownness in all that exists can be explained either taking recourse to God's knowledge or through the undetailed generic knowledge of all things that we possess. But, his view that jneyatva, according to Nyaya, can not be 'the possibility of being known' as it 'cannot draw such modal distinctions

between actual and possible knowing with a straight face' does not seem to be acceptable. For, the school draws such distinctions between actual and possible in some other contexts. For instance, it holds that causality is of two kinds, namely, 'phalopadhāyakatvam', i.e. actually causing the effect and 'phala-janana-yogyatā', i.e. the capacity which is associated with the possibility of causing the effect. Similarly, jneyatva also can be of two types. One is 'actually being an object of a knowledge' and the other is the 'possibility of being an object of a knowledge'. Thus, all the things may be considered as jneya though some of them are not actually objects of knowledge of any human being.

Regarding the jnataika-satta of pleasure etc. his view is absolutely correct. The Nyaya School holds that these qualities of atman may exist without being known by him. I was under the influence of the Vedanta Schools when I stated like that and I regret the error.

Commenting on my statement 'these external objects are always jneya in the sense that they are objects of some knowledge by the moment by which they come into existence, Professor Ramesh Kumar Sharma raises some questions. He asks, 'does "some knowledge" mean knowledge by human beings or by all creatures whether human or non-human or such knowledge as God's?' If the concept of knowability covers God's knowledge also, he thinks that the phrase 'by the time by which they come into existence' would be meaningless. For, 'since God is omniscient, He already knows which objects are to come into existence and which are not'. In short, God would be knowing even those objects which have no existence and thus jneyatva, the definition of entities in general, would be applicable to a non-existent and hence a non-entity also. If non-human creaturely knowledge also is included in the concept, he remarks that 'we will have to assume that the objects, by the time they come into being, are necessarily known by one creature or the other and all this may embarrass the Naiyayika'. He further remarks that if the concept of jneyatva is extended to God's knowledge or animal knowledge, 'the allied concept of "nameability" will pose its own problems'. He questions, 'will God first know and then name the objects or do so simultaneously or not name them at all feeling there is no need to do so? Again, how will the concept of nameability fare as regards the knowing of animals?' He seems to

suggest here that if God knows first and then names or does not name at all, then there will be the absurdity that there are objects which are jneya but not abhidheya (nameable) at the same time. However, he is not clear about the problem, if we hold that God knows and names the object simultaneously. If the concept of jneyatva also involves animals' knowledge, his criticism seems to be that animals can only know, but cannot name.

To this criticism I would like to react as follows:

The term 'jneya' in Sanskrit, may mean either that which is actually an object of a knowledge or that which is capable of being known. In fact, the English term 'knowability' can not be considered as an appropriate English synonym of the word 'jneyatva', as it can only mean 'capability of being known'. When the Naiyayika holds that jneyatva is a definition of all the entities, both the meanings are acceptable to him. When he says that the objects are capable of being known, he does not mean that they may exist without being known. The knowledge which is a part of jneyatva, need not, according to him, be restricted to human beings' finite knowledge. It may be God's or animals' knowledge also. By admitting so he is never in any embarrassing position. Though God's knowledge is eternal and hence does not have even a vestige of temporality, nothing prevents it from grasping the temporal objects. Being omniscient He would know the objects as past if they are no more, as present if they have come into existence and as belonging to future if they have yet to come into existence. If God's knowledge because of its eternality cannot grasp the temporal objects, how can He be regarded as omniscient? Similarly, the objects are known only by those creatures, human or animal, if they are around when the objects come into existence. Anyway it does not mean that whenever an object comes into existence some creature will necessarily be there. Thus, what I mean by the term 'some knowledge' is 'any knowledge' either that of God or that of creatures—human or animal.

When thus in the concept of jneyatva, we include the knowledge of God and animals, the apprehension that the concept of nameability also would pose some problems is baseless. By the term 'abhidheya' what the Naiyayika means is that all the things in the world are the objects of the denotative function of a word. To be more clear, it only

means that all the objects are capable of being denoted by a word. A denotative word need not be a proper noun as the English word 'name' would normally suggest. It may be a common noun or even a pronoun. Therefore, the questions such as 'will God first know the objects and then names' etc., and 'how can the animals name an object' etc. are quite irrelevant here. One thing that must be noted here, is that unlike the term 'jneyatva' the word 'abhidheyatva' would only mean the capability of being denoted by a word and not also 'being actually denoted by a word'. For, according to Naiyayikas words come into existence only when they are uttered and we cannot imagine that whenever an object comes into existence there will be some human being uttering a word to denote it. God, in the Nyaya school, does not have a body and therefore we cannot argue that He would utter a word to denote it.

Both Professors Sharma and Dravid strongly object to my characterization of Sankara's Advaita as idealistic. Both of them, in support of their objection, mention Sankara's Bhashya on the Brahma Sutra 2.2.28–31. I think I owe some explanation in this regard.

In his Adhyasa Bhashya, which is considered as the introduction to the entire Brahma Mimamsa Shastra, Sankara, enunciating the cardinal doctrine of his school, states in unambiguous terms that the relation between vishaya and vishayin, i.e. object and its knowledge which is nothing but consciousness, is ādhyasika—the relation in the form of super-imposition. Mainly basing on this view, the later Advaitins, in their attempt to establish the unreality of the world, employ the inference—'the world is unreal as it is an object of cognition, just as the silver superimposed on the conch-shell'. Here, by 'drshyatva', i.e. 'being an object of cognition', what is actually meant is drg-adhyastatva or 'being superimposed on the cognition'. The illustration of 'sukti-rupya' also confirms this explanation. It may be argued here that as per the Advaita school, the objects are superimposed only on the pure consciousness (śuddha cit) and not on the cognition of it and this makes the difference between the sukti-rupya and the world. But, the school holds that there is only one consciousness and the cognition of the world is not different from it. The same consciousness, when it becomes conditioned by the vrtti, reveals the object. The point that is

being made here is that the relation between the cognized and the cognition, as per the Advaita school, is none other than the relation of super-imposition and hence, in spite of his strong rejection of the Yogacara school, Sankara is of the opinion that objects *do not have existence independent of that of the cognition.*

As a matter of fact, Madhusudana Saraswati upholding the 'drshti-srshti vada', i.e. 'the theory of creation in the form of cognition' explains it as

द्रष्ट्रन्तरावेद्यत्वे सति ज्ञातैकसत्त्वम्

(Advaitasiddhi, p. 533), i.e. 'being unknown to the other knowers and having existence only being known'. It is very clear here that according to the Advaita school, just as sukti-rupya is private to the viewer, the worldly objects are very much private to the knower. Madhusudana Saraswati is also very much aware that this position appears to be very much in contradiction to Sankara's rejection of the Buddhist view. He remarks:

> ननु 'जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चित् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा। अविद्या तच्चितोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः।।' इति प्राचां वचनेन, बौद्धं प्रति प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिना विश्वस्य स्थायित्वप्रतिपादनेन च सूत्रभाष्य विवरणादिग्रन्थेन विरोध इति चेन्न। अनाद्यतिरिक्तसृष्टिविषये एव दृष्टिसृष्टिस्वीकारात्। कारणात्मना स्थायित्वस्वीकाराच्च। तावतैव बौद्धाभिमतक्षणिकत्वनिराकरणोपपत्तेर्नाकर विरोधः। (ibid.)

He also foresees the accusation that this view might be of his own imagination and not acceptable to Sankara and earlier Advaitins. Perhaps, responding to such an accusation he further remarks:

प्रत्युत आकरेषु बहुशो दृष्टिसृष्टिरुपपादितैव (ibid.)

According to him, the view that objects have independent existence etc. is just for those of whom the eligibility is of a lower order.

... मन्दाधिकारिविषयत्वात्। (ibid.)

I think the points made above are sufficient to show that the Advaita school considers itself as idealistic and I have not committed the

mistake of conflating two points of view—that of the individual subject and that of the whole race of thinking beings.

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Agenda for Research

The largest part of Tattvacintāmaṇī of Gangeśa comprises of Śabdakhaṇḍa consisting of two parts, the first part containing 525 pages, the second containing 860, totalling 1391 in the Chaukhamba Edition, Varanasi 1990 (reprinted from the earlier Asiatic Society Edition published from Kolkata). As against this, Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa comprises 925 pages and Anumānakhaṇḍa only 650 pages. The latter two parts have been computed on the basis of the Tirupati edition which alone is with us, while the former is from the Chaukhamba Edition published recently. Even if one allows for some difference in comparing the Chaukhamba with the Tirupati edition there can be little doubt that the Śabdakhaṇḍa occupies a significantly substantial portion of the text known by that title.

What, however, is strange is that at least on a prima facie view it seems to be more concerned with the Mīmāṁsā discussion of the subject than the way it was defined and discussed in the Nyāya Sūtras or the subsequent discussions on it in Vātasyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra-I and Udayana. The second part of the khaṇḍa deals almost exclusively with the issues discussed in the Mīmāṁsa tradition on the subject. The very first chapter in this part is on *Vidhivādaḥ*, an issue which reminds one of Mandana Miśra's well-known Mīmāṁsa text on the subject. This is followed by *Apūrvāvādaḥ* (p. 163), *Śaktivādaḥ* and *Jātīśaktivadaḥ* (p. 266), *Samāsavādaḥ* (p. 92), *Ākhyātavādaḥ* (p. 28), *Dhātuvādaḥ* (p. 7), *Upsargavādaḥ* (p. 6), and Pramāṇa Catuṣṭaya Prāmāṇyavādaḥ (p. 6). Perhaps he should have started with the last one in case he discusses the issue of the pramāṇatva of Śabda and its place among the other four pramāṇas accepted by Nyāya.

The list of the topics suggests that Gangeśa is primarily concerned with the Mīmāṁsā discussion of the subject on the one hand and the Grammarian's discussion of them on the other. The issues raised by Gautama in the Nyāya Sūtras are discussed in the Part I devoted to the subject. It, however, does not seem to be concerned with the notion of the āptapuruṣa which occupies such a central place in Gautama's definition of *Śabdapramāṇa* and on which Ācārya Samantabhadra wrote a full book called *Āptamīmāṁsā* later. He also does not seem to be concerned with

the distinction between *svara* and *varṇa* which plays a significant role in the discussion in the Nyāya Sūtra.

Gangeśa, in fact, discards Gautama's definition altogether and substitutes his own for it. It reads as (प्रयोगहेतुभूतार्थतत्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रमाणम्). The views on the topic that are discussed are those of Buddhist, old Mīmāṁsā and Prabhākara. Besides these, he discusses only the issues relating to *ākāṁkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *āsatti*, *tātparya* and *śabdānityatā* in Part I of his work.*

Gangeśa's treatment of Śabdapramāṇa, therefore, needs an intensive study to find how far his discussion departs from the discussion on the subject from Vātasyāyana to Udayana. In case Gangeśa has significantly departed from the tradition in the discussion of this pramāṇa, the same should be highlighted and its influence on the later thinkers including both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas should be a matter of interest and study. The two key questions which need to be answered in this context will be:

1. How did the Nyāya thinkers after Gangeśa react to his formulations and try to reconcile them with the earlier discussion on the subject, and
2. How did Mīmāṁsakas reply to the attack of Gangeśa on their position?

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*षडदर्शन समुच्चय, Bharitya Gyanpeeth, Varanasi, 1970, p. 76.

Focus

1. Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* has seen 'beauty as a symbol of morality' (Section 59, J.H. Bernard's translation, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1964, p. 196). Morality, for Kant, is supposed to be a purely formal quality of 'willing' when it wills the 'good' and, if so, how can beauty which is necessarily sensuous and uniquely individual symbolize something which can never be sensuous or individual, in principle? In case it is argued, as Kant seems to do, that there is a 'universal' element in the apprehension of beauty as it is the 'object' of a 'disinterested' spectator, would it imply that a perceptual object, in Kant's system, can have also a 'universal' element in it which is as directly apprehended as the 'particular' or the 'individual' that is apprehended by the senses?

2. Haribhadra Sūrī's *Ṣaḍadarśana Samuccaya* is a well-known work, particularly as it is perhaps the first survey of Indian philosophy written by an Indian in Sanskrit as early as the eighth century AD. Yet, some of the *Saṁpradāyas* mentioned in it have not attracted the attention they deserve, perhaps because they did not develop into full-fledged schools of Indian philosophy and were not regarded as such even in his time. Still, the fact that he considered them of sufficient importance to mention in his work denotes that, in his time, they must have acquired sufficient following and influence to deserve this mention. These occur almost at the very beginning of the work and are called *Ajñānavādaḥ Vainayikavādaḥ*, and *Lokavadāḥ*. The first one seems to be a Jain saṁpradāya which seems to have arisen in the context of the controversy about the *Āptapuruṣa* being a *sarvajñaya* and the fact that Ācārya Samantabhadra in his *Āptamīmāṁsā* had contended that Mahāvīra alone could be regarded as such. The followers of the doctrine seem to have argued that it was impossible to determine whether Mahāvīra was actually a *sarvajñaya* or not, and that the observance of the Jain precepts did not depend on a settlement of the issue concerned.

Similarly the other two schools seem to argue that 'practical living' has little to do with theoretical contentions and hence should be detached from them. It may be noted that the third one, that is, Lokavādaḥ is

different from the Lokāyata which is treated by Haribhadra Sūrī as a full-fledged philosophical school along with Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṁkhya, Jain, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā which add up to seven and not six as mentioned in the title. But what is important to note is that not only is *Vedānta* not mentioned but also Yoga as a separate school of Indian Philosophy.

The importance of the different systems may be gauged both from the sequence in which schools have been discussed and the number of pages devoted to them.

1.	Buddhism	37
2.	Nyāya	76
3.	Sāṁkhya	7
4.	Jain	245
5.	Vaiśeṣika	23
6.	Mīmāṁsā	29
7.	Lokāyata	12

Interestingly, Haribhadra Sūrī not only gives the views of these philosophical schools, but also gives picturesque details of the way they led their life. The Naiyāyikas may find the following of particular interest, and wonder whether the present-day Naiyāyikas could call themselves so, *if* the way of living described in his work was supposed to be an integral part of being a Naiyāyika.

ते च दण्डधराः, प्रौढकौपीनपरिधानाः, कम्बलिकाप्रावृताः, जटाधारिणः, भस्मोद्धूलनपराः, यज्ञोपवीतिनः, जलाधारपात्रकराः, नीरसाहाराः, प्रायो वनवासिनो दोर्मूले, तुम्बकं बिभ्राणाः, कन्दमूलफलाशिनः, आतिथ्यकर्मनिरताः, सस्त्रीकाः, निस्त्रीकाश्च। निस्त्रीकास्तेषूत्तमाः। ते च पञ्चाग्निसाधनपराः, करे जटादौ च प्राणलिङ्गधराश्चापि भवन्ति। उत्तमां संयमावस्थां प्राप्तास्तु नग्ना भ्रमन्ति।

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Notes and Queries

NOTES

The Nyāya view of knowledge is so strange, both in psychological and epistemological aspects, that in case it was really held by them it would make not only their own analysis of knowledge impossible, but any other view of it also. Knowledge presupposes at least a relative stability and identity of the object to be known along with that of the process by which it is known. In case the analysis destroys the possibility of this at its very foundations, it cannot reasonably build the theory of knowledge which it itself has made impossible.

Nyāya seems to do just this and, what is stranger, doesn't seem to realize this. What is perhaps even more strange is that those who write on Nyāya and explain it to others do not see the contradiction involved and seem happily oblivious of the incompatibility and try to propound and defend both.

Knowledge, or 'cognition' is supposed to be 'episodic'; each momentary episode followed by another which, if true, would hardly distinguish the Nyāya position from that of the Buddhists. How can such momentary episodic knowledge-events ever give rise to the notion of an 'object' which is not only perceptually apprehended, but in which the universals or the *sāmānya* or the *jāti* is apprehended also? Not only this, the latter Nyāya also seems to contend that everything that is a *Padārtha* has to be known 'perceptually', including not only *Sāmānya* but also *Samavāya* and *abhāva*.

The Nyāya is also supposed to be concerned with the theory of *Pramāṇa* which includes *anumāna* or inference. But how can one ever establish or even conceive of the relation of *Vyāpti* on which inference is supposed to be based, if that through which it is to be apprehended is itself momentary and episodic in character? *Nyāya*, logically speaking, can accept no relation except that of succession where the latter is supposed to 'destroy' the former. The use of the word 'destruction' is unwarranted as the latter, as what is 'happening', is necessitated by the analysis itself and no 'causality' is required to explain why what is happening is 'happening'.

Ultimately, the simple question is: can such a view of 'knowledge-events' be maintained without making the object of knowledge also 'momentary' and 'episodic' in character? The distinction between *nirvikalpaka*

and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* could also not be maintained as the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* will have to share the same characteristic ontologically. Nor can the *vyāpti* which is the basis of *anumāna* be held because the very possibility of inference has been destroyed by the ontological analysis of knowledge as a momentary event in a process which is unending. The recourse to the Buddhist notion of *vikalpa* either at the level of perception or at the level of *anumāna* will be as unavailing unless some sort of dualism is metaphysically accepted which the analysis itself prohibits.

I think it is time that those who write on Nyāya become aware of the problem and deal directly with it and also try to tell how the Nyāya position is different from that of the Buddhist and why it doesn't share the same defects as the latter is supposed to suffer from.

QUERIES

1. What exactly does Wittgenstein mean by the word 'fact' in the *Tractatus?* Is it the referent of an atomic proposition and if so, has the world constituted by atomic facts no actual relations between facts except those superimposed by the logical connectives which alone 'connect' the atomic propositions?
2. What is the exact word connoting the idea of identity in Sanskrit language? Does the word *abheda* or *tādātmya* or *abhinna* connote the same idea? If not, what do they mean?
3. What exactly is the meaning of *Kalpnāpoḍham* in the Buddhist definition of *Pratyakṣa?* Is it the same as is meant by the term *nirvikalpaka?* If so, what was the necessity of this characterization as what is sought to be conveyed was already done so by the term *nirvikalpaka*. On the other hand, if it means what is conveyed by the term *savikalpaka*, where was the necessity of doing so either.

   The same problem arises with the addition of the characteristic *abhrāntam* by Dharmakīrti to Dignāga's characterization. If *Pratyakṣa* is *nirvikalpaka*, it can not but be *abhrānta*. On the other hand, if it is *savikalpaka* it cannot be *abhrānta* unless Buddhism is prepared to accept that something can be *savikalpaka* and still be *abhrānta*. In the Buddhist tradition, can one be mistaken about that which is 'vikalpa' or that which is an object of *Kalpanā* or *Vikalpa?*

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

R.C. PRADHAN: *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2001, pp. xx + 516, Rs 650.

The title of the book *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy* itself calls for comment. The title gives the impression that the author is going to discuss only the recent developments in analytic movement implying thereby that he is going to leave out of account the non-recent developments in this movement. Be it noted that adjective 'recent' qualifies 'developments' and not 'analytic philosophy'. But when we look into the contents of the book we find that it deals with more or less the whole of what is universally recognized as analytic philosophy and not merely the later developments in it. May be the redundant word 'recent' is used in the title not so much to distinguish periods in the analytic movement but to highlight the recentness of the analytic movement as a whole, a distinction to older movements in the history of philosophy, like idealist movement, rationalism, empiricism, etc. This latter reading of the title finds some confirmation in the very first sentence of the introduction of the book where he describes the aim of the work, 'The present essay aims at bringing out the landmark developments in recent analytic philosophy' (p. xiii). Be it noted the adjective 'recent' qualifies the whole of analytic philosophy and not a period in the movement in this sentence. But unfortunately the author, in the very next sentence and what he writes after that takes back what he has claimed in the first sentence. 'It is meant to weave together the most important concepts and theories that have shaped the course of the history of analytic philosophy in the *last several decades or so*. Analytic philosophy, like any other movement in philosophy, has a history of its own and thus has different phases of its development. But the focus of this essay is not the historical development of analytic philosophy, but the concepts and the ideas that have been foundational to the development of analytic philosophy. Thus the aim of the present attempt is to bring together the diverse concepts under the single

framework of philosophical analysis as it has been practiced by philosophers *in the last few decades of this century*. However, the conceptual background for the essay is the fall of logical positivism and the rise of the Wittgensteinian and post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy'[1] (p. xiiii). Be it noted the author is not at all clear about the temporal horizon of his task. Sometimes it is *last several decades or so* but it also reduces to *last few decades of this century* but the 'last few decades of this century' immediately expands to cross the mid 20th century to encompass even 'the fall of logical positivism'. In fact the author is not even aware when the oscillating pendulum of his time horizon has crossed the time period of logical positivism and has even encompassed the much earlier logical atomism in its fold and joined hands with Frege so as to span the entire century. And now hardly any phase in the history of development of analytic philosophy is left out from the scope of study in the book, contrary to what the author wants to do.

Let us forget about he temporal horizon of the task at hand and concentrate on the nature of the task to be performed. The author wants to study 'the concepts and the ideas that have been foundational to the development of analytic philosophy'. But in the last chapter the author writes with derision, 'The search for the foundations of knowledge has been the occupational disease of the traditional epistemologists like Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. Analytic philosophers are no exception to this.'[2] Disease is what one will not like to catch, be it occupational or otherwise. If one could get inoculated against the disease it would be much better. Yet surprisingly the author instead of inoculating himself, which he could have done easily, deliberately contracts the disease, by deciding to write the book. But how is he going to study these foundational concepts? He is going to study them so as 'to bring together the diverse concepts under the single framework of philosophical analysis' (p. xiii). But one looks in vain for 'the single framework of philosophical analysis' in the entire book. Why has the author failed to clarify and develop 'the single framework of philosophical analysis'? The reason is not far to seek. He writes, 'Analytic philosophy is not only a method of philosophizing but also a system of thought presenting a world-view, though not in the way the classical system-building metaphysical philosophy is' (p. xiii). This claim raises the hope that probably the author is going to present some kind of world-view through the foundational concepts of analytic philosophy. But that hope is dashed completely in the next sentence, 'In fact, analytic philosophy is responsible for popularizing the view that philosophy does not construct a metaphysical system' (p. xiii). There cannot be any world-view without a metaphysical system presented through the foundational concepts of a discipline. Then what kind of systematization does the author have in view? He explains, 'Nevertheless, analytic philosophy presents a systematic view of the concepts of language, meaning, reference, truth, mind, world, etc., which together constitute the corpus of philosophical analysis' (p. xiii). That is to say the author is going to give us a systematic view of the whole corpus of analytic philosophy. A systematic view of even a disjointed list of items can be made for example viewing them alphabetically, or according to the place from which they are gathered, or according to who gathered them, etc. So the systematic view of the corpus of analytic philosophy is not to show any systematic connection between the various concepts dealt with in analytic philosophy, but merely clubbing together chapterwise according to the convenience of the author certain concepts and their analysis by various analytic philosophers who have cared to analyze them. So by 'the single framework of philosophical analysis' and 'systematic view of the concepts' the author means no more than 'in a single volume' and 'chapterwise presentation of concepts' which he conceived under some single plan which we will unravel shortly.

The author has landed himself in writing a book on certain issues studied by philosophers in Anglo-American universities in the twentieth century under three overlapping but divergent philosophies. The three studies are as follows: (1) Philosophy of Language, which is the philosophical study of the language especially its structure, grammar, semantics, etc., so that at the deeper level it merges with linguistics, (2) Linguistic Philosophy, which is the study of philosophically important concepts by analyzing the linguistic usage of the words and phrases related with or expressing the concept under study, and (3) Analytic Philosophy, which analyzes philosophical concepts but not necessarily

via the language but it may undertake analysis of a different kind based on experience as in logical positivism, or based on ontological constituents of the objects or facts presented by concepts or sentences as in Frege and logical atomism.

Professor Pradhan is unable to make up his mind whether he is writing a book dealing with analytic philosophy, linguistic philosophy, or philosophy of language because he is unable to keep hold of the distinction between the three studies. When the author writes, 'Nevertheless, analytic philosophy presents a systematic view of the concepts of language, meaning, reference, truth, mind, world, etc., which together constitute the corpus of philosophical analysis,' he appears to equate analytic philosophy with the philosophy of language. He is quite explicit, 'So analytic philosophy in general is very much concerned with the understanding of the structure of language. Besides meaning, the other concepts which have engaged the philosophers' attention are the concepts of reference and truth which have, along with meaning, brought out the logical structure of language. That is the reason why analytic philosophy has in general posed the questions of meaning, truth and reference in the context of the overall structure of language' (p. xiv). While this passage equates analytic philosophy with the philosophy of language, suddenly by turn of the phrase he shifts and equates analytic philosophy with linguistic philosophy in the very next sentence, 'The linguistic orientation of philosophy has been the cornerstone of analytic philosophy' (p. xiv). What is this linguistic orientation? 'The search for the roots of our understanding of thought and reality in language can broadly be called the "linguistic turn"' (p. 3). Explaining this linguistic turn further the author writes, 'It is again a philosophical assumption that the logical structure of language is the universal content of language which has to be studied by philosophers. In this universal content are to be found conceptual connections and the network of the categories which are of paramount importance for philosophy. So, the task of philosophy is to analyze the logical structure of language and to display the conceptual connections underlying them' (pp. 6–7). Professor Pradhan is equating analytic philosophy to analysis of concepts and their interconnections through the analysis of the medium of language. But when it comes to describing the concepts

of action, will, etc. specially in the last chapter there is no trace of philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy. It is really surprising that even while describing the concepts of action and will he never mentions J.L. Austin, who has undertaken linguistic analysis of concepts related to action in his famous essays like, 'A Plea For Excuses' and others collected in his *Philosophical Papers*.[3] But unfortunately without describing the results of linguistic analysis of concepts related to action and will Professor Pradhan prefers to present the views of Stuart Hampshire and Donald Davidson on action perfunctorily in order to combine them with the view of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (p. 468) so as to arrive at a combined single concept of action. So Professor Pradhan does not stick to his equation of analytic philosophy with philosophy of language or the linguistic philosophy but takes it in a much broader sense in the last chapter.

Why is Professor Pradhan unable to hold on to the distinction between the philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy, and analytic philosophy and yet continue to believe that he has some kind of single framework of analysis? To find an answer to this question let us look into the model of action Professor Pradhan finds in analytic philosophy. The single model of action he presents is 'that actions are the bodily manifestations of the inner will' (p. 467). 'The will of the agent is the inner motive of action because the intentionality of actions is derived from the fact that the agents have a will which is independent of the facts in the world. Will involves planning, motivation and goals to be achieved' (p. 468). 'The description of an action involves the agent, the purpose and goal of the agent, etc.' (p. 467). In agreement with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche Professor Pradhan also agrees with the view, 'the human will is the power that can change the world itself' (p. 468). So he believes, 'The world is constantly being shaped and made by the power of the will' (p. 468). That is to say in this model a human being, independently of what happens in the world, setting the goal with will to modify the world, performs action to achieve that goal. Had Professor Pradhan taken into account the linguistic analysis of concepts related to actions, he would have corrected this one-sided and defective concept of action, which is an *a priori* assumption

derived from Kant, rather than from any kind of analysis of concepts, linguistic or otherwise.

This is confirmed by what he says in the next section. 'Kant did show that moral will is *a priori* and that it is part of the rational structure of the human mind. Hence, for him, ethics is a study of the categorical imperatives issuing from the moral will. The moral will is autonomous in that it does not depend on the world for its existence. Modern moral philosophers do recognize the importance of the autonomy of the moral will and so take it for granted that morality requires a will that is free by nature' (p. 470). Then he goes on to add, 'Analytic ethics makes it a necessary presupposition of moral studies that the language of morality must have its root in the autonomy of the will. The analysis of moral language reveals ...' (p. 470). Here Professor Pradhan is referring to the linguistic analysis of moral concepts. But this contention of Professor Pradhan goes contrary to the claim and practice of linguistic analysis. One of the two requirements in the selection of field where linguistic analysis can be undertaken is that it is not influenced by any philosophical theory. The requirement is formulated by Austin thus: 'At the same time we should prefer a field which is not too much trodden into bogs or tracks by traditional philosophy, for in that case even "ordinary" language will often have become infected with the jargon of extinct theories, and our own prejudices too, as the upholders or imbibers of theoretical views, will be too readily, and often insensibly, engaged.' Then he goes on to make a plea for linguistic analysis of excuses in words, 'Here too, excuses form an admirable topic; we can discuss at least clumsiness, or absence of mind, or inconsiderateness, even spontaneousness, without remembering what Kant thought, and so progress by degrees even to discussing deliberation without for once remembering Aristotle or self-control without Plato.'[4] So Professor Pradhan oblivious of the conditions imposed by linguistic analysis as to where it can be used, makes the sweeping claim that the linguistic analysis of moral concepts presupposes autonomy of the will. R.M. Hare when he refers to Kant's theory of morality in the first chapter of *Language of Morals*, he was not taking Kant's views as the presupposition of his analysis of moral language. Rather he was comparing his findings from the analysis of

moral language with the findings of Kant from the analysis of ordinary reason. The analytic thinkers did not read Kantianism in their analysis of moral language, or at least that was not their intention, contrary to what is claimed by Professor Pradhan. So it is not analytic thinkers who make the mistake of reading Kantianism in the field of their investigation, rather it is a blunder which Professor Pradhan makes.

It is the desire to read some kind of Kantianism in the whole of analytic philosophy which constitutes the so-called 'single framework of philosophical analysis' of Professor Pradhan. He makes it clear in the opening sentences of the first chapter. 'Analytic philosophy in its method and content resembles the Kantian Copernican Revolution and hence it can be called the Second Copernican revolution in philosophy. It is, broadly speaking, the philosophical study of thought and experience as expressed in language. It explores the structure and limits of thought and experience within the bounds of language' (p. 3). This analogy is theoretically flawed from the very beginning and hence Professor Pradhan not only failed in developing any so-called 'single framework of philosophical analysis' but also failed to hold on to the distinction between philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy, and analytic philosophy.

Kant never put any limitation on thought and experience. In his critique of pure speculative reason he showed the limitations of 'knowledge', which in Kant's philosophy stands for what we will call mathematico-empirical sciences. This for him does not constitute any kind of limitation of thought and experience. Apart from the experience involved in mathematico-empirical sciences, he admitted the fact of moral experience, for he went on to talk of 'fact of reason' in his critique of practical reason, and in the critique of judgement he admitted the reality of the experience of the beautiful and the sublime. Mind you for Kant both morality and aesthetic experience involve thinking. Even though Kant limits knowledge in his technical sense to the phenomenal world he never claimed that the thing in itself is 'unthinkable' or that we can have no experience of it. God can be experienced as the conscience; an internal tribunal in man and similarly the experience of freedom in action is the experience of the thing in itself, although we have no 'knowledge' of either God or freedom. So Professor Pradhan

misrepresents Kant's position when he implies that Kant has explored 'the structure and limits of thought and experience' in the analogy above. That Kantian position is misinterpreted is clear when he uses locutions like 'the limits of conceptual constructions as Kant has shown'. Kant did not show any limitations of conceptual constructions; he showed the limitations of knowledge, using the word 'knowledge' in the technical sense he gave to it. So the analogy is flawed from the very beginning since it is based on misreading Kant's position.

The analogy breaks down even in the case of Frege, the very first analytic thinker Professor Pradhan takes to buttress his analogy. 'Frege, being one of the founders of analytic philosophy, was of the view that philosophy is a critique of pure thought as expressed in a pure language' (p. 9). 'Frege, like Kant, is concerned with the universal and necessary structures of thought and experience as expressed in the network of judgements' (p. 10). Professor Pradhan is aware that the analogy does not hold good. 'Whereas Kant is interested to show the limits of human knowledge by demonstrating the *a priori* structure of categories and principles, Frege is concerned with exploring the conditions of thought in general insofar as they are logically possible at all. He is not interested in the conceptual limitations of human experience as such because he is out to determine the limits of all logical thoughts' (p. 10). Professor Pradhan appears to think that the difference between Kant and Frege is shift from epistemology to logic. 'In this sense, Frege goes beyond Kant in determining the limits of all logical thoughts and language. In a sense, he is also concerned with the *a priori* foundation of thought but he is not worried about the applicability of thought in experience, since for him thougnt as found in the pure domain of logic and mathematics is the pure thought having nothing to do with the world of experience as such. The domain of logic and mathematics is the domain of logical necessity which is to be defined not in terms of its determinate relation to experience but in terms of any conceivable structure of thought. So, instead of Kant's synthetic *a priori* principles of thought, we have the purely *a priori* laws of logic that govern any possible thought and language. This shift from epistemology to logic marks the departure which the analytic critique takes from that of Kant's, though there is continuity in the idea

that philosophy must study the limits of thought and language' (pp. 10–11). In this claim Professor Pradhan is misrepresenting the position of both Frege and Kant. It will come as a surprise to Frege if someone were to tell him that in his logical investigations 'he is not worried about the applicability of thought in experience' or 'for him thought as found in the pure domain of logic and mathematics is the pure thought having nothing to do with the world of experience as such.' As far as Kant is concerned he himself makes a distinction between general logic and transcendental logic. When we observe thinking *by setting aside thinking's reference to specific objects*, then we will discover analytic rules which lie *a priori* in thinking itself and regulate its *general employment*. Such an investigation of the rules of the *general employment of understanding* is to be distinguished from establishing the rules of a specific employment of understanding. The former task is the business of *general logic*. In contrast to general logic, transcendental philosophy investigates this element of object-relatedness involved in knowledge. But transcendental philosophy also does not investigate the element of object-relatedness in its entirety; rather it investigates only the mode of object-relatedness with respect to its *possibility a priori*. In other words transcendental philosophy is concerned with *a priori ontological constitution of objectivity* or *the a priori foundation of the possibility of the object's standing over against the knowing subject* irrespective of the object known. In transcendental philosophy the task of a *critique* is to investigate the *a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in both the immediate object-relatedness and the mediate object-relatedness. So when Kant shows limits of knowledge he is showing the limits of object-relatedness in thought. The thought, which is not so object related extends beyond the limits, and this non-object-related thought has primacy in Kant's transcendental philosophy. Frege's investigations are just the general logical investigation as conceived by Kant. They come nowhere near to Kant's Critical investigations in transcendental philosophy. So to read any kind of Kantianism in the whole of analytic philosophy is bound to lead to misinterpretation of the views of analytic thinkers.

The fact is that only Strawson's *Individuals* had some limited analogy to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, which he subsequently used to

give a linguistic interpretation to Kant's first critique in his *The Bounds of Sense* which was less an interpretation and more of reconstruction of Kantian transcendental philosophy. In the process Strawson did much violence to Kantian thought. Be it noted the descriptive metaphysics, which is the basis of analogy of his thought of Kant's is arrived at not through linguistic analysis but when he abandons it. 'Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy. But the discriminations we can make, and the connections we can establish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding ... . The structure he (the metaphysician) seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged. He must abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him as far as he wishes to go.'[5] Similarly in P.M.S. Hacker, in his *Insight and Illusion* giving more emphasis on certain portions of *Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus* and *Investigations*, tried to read some kind of Kantian transcendental philosophy in Wittegenstein with limited success and validity. But neither Strawson nor Hacker made a sweeping generalization that the entire analytic philosophy is disguised Kantianism. Any way, Professor Pradhan is not given to any moderation in his claims, which are generally very sweeping. He writes, 'The idea of critique nonetheless makes itself manifest at various stages in analytic philosophy after Frege though the Kantian leanings are not very clearly demarcated' (p. 11).

How tenuous, the Kantian analogy is visible in the treatment of Kantianism in Wittgenstein. Professor Pradhan writes, 'The Kantian leanings are however very clear in Wittgenstein's writings. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* bears testimony to the fact that the idea of critique is in the very background of the study of the logical structure of language initiated by him' (p. 11). But as evidence of the Kantian leanings in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* he cites 4.0031: 'All philosophy is a critique of language (though not in Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.' In the cited evidence except for the common sounding word 'critique' there is nothing common between Kant and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is using critique in the

sense of 'showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one', i.e. critique is a critique of the apparent logical form of the proposition. But Kant's idea of critique explained above comes nowhere near it. So to read Kantianism in Wittgenstein on the strength of the use of the word 'critique' in the latter's writings is as silly as thinking that water must be flowing by the institution because it is called 'bank'.

Professor Pradhan explores one more analogy between Wittgenstein and Kant. '... Wittgenstein like Kant is convinced that the domain of empirical science is a limited domain and that there is a realm of reality that is beyond the empirical language and reality ... Kant made room for what is known as the intelligible reality or the noumenon for the possibility of ethics and religion. This is the Kantian solution to the Witttgensteinian question that science does not solve all problems of life' (pp. 20–21). He further claims, 'In fact the *Tractatus* commits itself to the view that there is the realm of the mystical which posits a realm of the unsayable reality. This realm is that of freedom of will and its obedience to the will of the Divine. Wittgenstein very unambiguously tells us that without the mystical even our understanding of the world is not possible. Thus there is a harmony between the logical understanding of the world and the mystical realm of the will both influencing each other in the formation of unity of thought' (p. 21). When he discusses logical positivism he writes, 'But what distances Kant from the positivists is the latter's idea of knowledge and language ... Kant had a wider view of language which could accommodate the language of metaphysics ... At least from the point of view of meaning, Kant is not averse to the idea that there is a higher level of language-use where truths of the religious-ethical and metaphysical kind can find a legitimate place. Thus it could be said that the positivist's theory of language failed to give a comprehensive account of language and meaning' (p. 16). Isn't Wittgenstein's position vis-à-vis Kant exactly like the logical positivist's position vis-à-vis Kant as far as limits of language are concerned? For Wittgenstein anything beyond scientific description of the world is the realm of the unsayable and hence the realm of silence; and any attempt to speak about this realm is going to result in nonsense. Doesn't Kant extend the limits of meaningful

discourse and thought beyond Wittgensteinian limits? So isn't Professor Pradhan in this exploration of analogy between Kant and Wittgenstein committing the fallacy of *suppresio veri and suggesio falsi* if the exploration of analogy between the logical positivist and Kant is taken as the standard of exploration of analogy. Or is Professor Pradhan using varying standards of analogy when comparing Wittgenstein and logical positivists with Kant?

Let us forget the comparison with respect of Language. But let us see whether the realm of the unsayable of Wittgenstein is comparable to Kant's unknowable or with logical positivists nonsensical. Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* writes: 6.45 'To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole. *Feeling* the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.' 6.522 'There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest.* They are what is mystical.' If the two are read together isn't Wittgenstein saying the same thing as what logical positivists said analyzing the nonsensical moral judgements that they express or make manifest feelings and emotions? For Kant the realm of morality and will was not merely the realm of feelings but much more than that. So Wittgenstein's position on the mystical is near to logical positivists and less close to Kant. But Professor Pradhan has been so blinded by reading Kantianism in analytic philosophy that he has no eyes left for relevant similarities and differences. Mind you everything is comparable to every other thing with respect to some aspect, and similarly everything is different from every other thing in some aspect, but the essential thing in philosophy is to see the relevant similarities and differences.

Hence although Professor Pradhan is under the impression that he is treating analytic philosophy through 'the single framework of philosophical analysis' but it is nowhere visible in the treatment of topics. This so-called 'single framework of philosophical analysis', i.e. presupposition of Kantianism in analytic philosophy has only helped the author in selecting and organizing the topic chapter-wise in a book but it has not helped him in showing the interconnection of ideas and topics in what he takes as analytic philosophy.

Because of his sweeping claims and not paying attention to the actual views of thinkers he makes grave factual errors. Even while

describing the nature of moral values in the last chapter Professor Pradhan has failed to take adequate note of the linguistic analysis of moral concepts undertaken by C.L. Stevenson in his *Ethics and Language* and R.M. Hare's *Language of Morals*. As a result he makes certain factual errors too in presenting the views on ethical concepts in sweeping generalizations. For example he claims, 'But contemporary analytic ethics has moved away from the distinction between facts and values. The recent moral philosophers have either rejected it completely like the emotivists or have revised it in such a way that they have rejected the objectivity of values without compromising on the objective nature of moral judgements. Hare's prescriptivism has shown that moral language remaining objective, we can give up the cognitive theory of objective moral values' (p. 471). It is a plain factual error to claim that emotivists completely reject the distinction between facts and values. Similarly it is plainly wrong to claim that Hare in any way revised the distinction to weaken it in any way or to move away from it, as Professor Pradhan seems to imply. This is not an isolated case of factual error; the book is replete with them. To take another example, Professor Pradhan claims, 'Traditionally, mathematical knowledge as well as empirical knowledge are claimed to have secure foundations in the self-evident truths as found in the writings of Descartes, Locke and Kant' (p. 454). This claim is factually incorrect as far as Kant is concerned. Kant never took mathematical knowledge to be founded on self-evident truths. For Kant mathematical judgements are synthetic *a priori* judgements. Hence mathematical knowledge is based on his metaphysical and transcendental exposition of space and time and not on any self-evident truth. Similarly empirical knowledge is grounded in synthetic *a priori* judgements validated through metaphysical and transcendental deduction of categories by Kant.

Professor Pradhan's exposition at places is quite incoherent. On page 112 one paragraph ends with the sentence, 'Thus it is wrong to think that philosophy searches for an ideal language when it ought to be concerned with the logical form of language in general for the sake of the clarity of meaning.' But the very next paragraph begins with the sentence, 'The concept of logical form of language inevitably leads to the idea of a formal language in the sense that the logical form can be

displayed only in a formal language.' These two claims are contradictory and this contradiction cannot be balanced unless the catch lies in the difference between 'ideal language' of the earlier sentence and 'formal language' of the latter sentence. The author has not clarified the distinction anywhere in the book. Rather in the paragraph on page 112 whose beginning sentence was quoted above, after a few lines, the author writes, 'Though the early Wittgenstein himself' discouraged the idea that logic is concerned with the ideal language and not with natural language, the idea gained ground that the interest of philosophy was ultimately in formal language.' Here Professor Pradhan is using the words 'ideal language' and 'formal language' interchangeably. Similarly the chapter from which the two sentences are quoted begins with the words, 'Formal language philosophy could not adequately represent language in its multi-faceted aspects, in its contextuality and modality because of its inherent tendency to abstract language from its natural setting. This gave rise to a revolt against the very idea of an ideal language and ushered in what is now well known as the ordinary language philosophy' (p. 109). Here too the words 'formal language' and 'ideal language' are used interchangeably. This is not an isolated case of incoherence; the book is full of incoherencies between what he says at one place and what he says at another, as was shown in the case of our discussion of the title itself.

Sometimes Professor Pradhan is incoherent even in the course of a single sentence. Take for example the sentence, 'The words stand for objects and the sentences stand for thoughts which are either true or false' (p. 156). If words stand for objects then the sentence has to stand for something, which is some kind of concatenation of objects; if sentences stand for thoughts then the words must stand for some kind of constituents of thought; but to claim in the same breath without any explanation that words stand for object and sentences stand for thoughts is to commit a contradiction. This incoherency is symptomatic of Professor Pradhan's thought, which prevents him from grasping Frege's sentence referent. Describing Frege's theory of reference Professor Pradhan writes, 'Frege introduces a distinction between sentence-reference and word-reference ... . The ordinary proper names stand for the objects in the world, whereas the property or predicate-names stand for

properties or predicates. Thus the world contains both objects in the ordinary as well as logical sense. But the sentence-reference seems to puzzle Frege as he offers the curious logical objects called truth-values as the referent of the sentence' (p. 157). Since Frege takes it that words refer to objects belonging to the world, and then to be coherent he must make the sentence stand for something, which obtains in the world. Mind you truth-values obtain in the world not in thought or language. There is nothing curious or puzzling here. But logical atomists like Wittgenstein took the further step of clarifying and extending Frege's position. Since Wittgenstein took all words to be names standing for objects, to be coherent he made sentences, which are concatenations of names, standing for or mirroring facts, which are concatenations of objects. But Professor Pradhan is not given to such kind of coherency of thought. He is quite capable of claiming in the same breath that words stand for objects but sentences stand for thought as shown above.

Analytic thinkers were very notorious for their clarity inviting some such comment from opponents, 'Clarity is not enough.' Professor Pradhan in spite of being an analytic thinker saved himself from this notoriety, as clarity is not the hallmark of his writing. The first casualty of the sweeping generalizations he makes is the clarity of thought. Take for example the passage describing the linguistic turn: 'The linguistic turn takes place at two levels. At the first level, the very concept of philosophical activity turns linguistic as there is now the emphasis that language alone is the subject matter of philosophical thinking. At the second level, the philosophical critique undertakes the study of the structure and limits of language in order to determine the structure of thought and the world. It is at this second level that the substantial questions of analytic philosophy begin to appear' (p. 4). Is the distinction he is drawing clear? The answer is in the negative. Isn't language the object of study at both levels? Isn't linguistic analysis involved at both levels of investigation? Can we take the first level as being non-critical and as not involving limits while the second level is critical and finds limits? The answer is that this distinction is not valid as every finding about language arrived at through linguistic analysis expressed in a grammatical proposition sets limits to what can be thought and expressed in language according to Professor Pradhan and

hence investigations of both the levels are critical and involve finding the limits. But if the intention is to draw the distinction between the philosophy of language and linguistic analysis then it is done very badly.

If the above aspects of the book *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy* by Professor Pradhan are discounted, what remains is an incomplete elementary encyclopedia of issues studied by philosophers in Anglo-American universities in the twentieth century under the heading philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy. So it can be a good source book for beginners albeit an incomplete one, in philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy provided it is used carefully. When the author ventures to give his own views he is neither coherent nor very clear. These should be carefully overlooked. When the author tries to make a case for some sweeping generalization by making passing references to the views of philosophers, without evidence, he generally fails and he is not very reliable regarding the views he attributes to philosophers. Here the readers are advised to forget the generalization and check the views attributed to thinkers with the original sources for correctness. But Professor Pradhan is best when he focuses on the views of thinkers and gives the summary presentation of views with evidence without mixing his own views. These summary presentations of views of logicians like Frege, Quine; logical atomists like Russell and early Wittgenstein; linguistic thinkers like Strawson and later Wittgenstein; and philosophers of language like Tarski, Kripke, Davidson, etc. on various issues will be of immense help to beginners.

Notes and References

1. Emphasis through *italics* added.
2. P. 447.
3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961.
4. J.L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', *The Philosophy of Action*, ed. by Allan R. White, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 25.
5. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, Methuen, London, 1959, pp. 9–10.

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B.N. Ray (ed.): *John Rawls and the Agenda of Social Justice*, Anamika Publishers & Distributors (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 2000, pp. 564, Rs 900.

John Rawls—like Amartya K. Sen, who subsequently moved from quantity to quality—moved from utility to justice. In fashioning this passage, they quietly drafted an important cryptic comment on the two key notions of the modern framework, namely, utility and quantity, which the liberal paradigm so vociferously emphasized and fondled. This is notwithstanding J.S. Mill who in deference to Bentham did include quality amongst different utilities within the fold of Utilitarian doctrine, symbolically stated by spurring the difference between pig satisfied and Socrates dissatisfied. This passage undertaken by Rawls and Sen, though verily meant returning to revisit those terms, which played an important role in shaping the classical thought; it however, did not involve their embracing those aspects of the classical philosophy of Plato (for justice) and Aristotle (for quality), which was critiqued by the modern philosophy. This ingenuity of returning and yet not relapsing into regression—a trap, which has victimized Alasdair MacIntyre's positive program of returning to the 'classical tradition' though notwithstanding his important critique of the project of Enlightenment—is remarkable. This, in fact, constitutes one of the subtle differences between attempts of Rawls and Sen on the one hand and MacIntyre on the other. This remarkable stance is not recognized in the available scholarship on these thinkers. This is not so much as the laxity in the scholarship but seems to reveal the modern West's attitude towards their classical tradition. Even the editor of the volume under review who need not inherit this attitude which is a part of modern Western ambience, nevertheless goes as far as Rousseau and Kant and not further. For instance, in his Preface, while referring to the fundamental status of justice for Western political theory does mention Plato. He notes how subsequently justice has 'gradually disappeared as the centre of political theory to be replaced by sovereignty, property, rights, power, class, and the like' (p. 7). This, he says, has changed with the publication of *A Theory of Justice*. In this context, the editor does not state the modificatory nature of the term justice from Plato to Rawls. So a classical term like justice is radically modified, shedding most of its elements and is installed within the gaps of modern liberal thought.

The book under review contains nineteen essays already published earlier in journals and books by eminent philosophers on Rawls's political philosophy. In addition there is a Preface and another article entitled, 'Re-Reading Rawls' by the editor. These essays by the well-known authors include: Rawls's own famous essay entitled, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', which clarifies the ambiguity associated with his earlier work *A Theory of Justice* namely, the alleged metaphysical and epistemological shades or implication, and declared that it is to be taken as 'political' and it is meant as 'practical'. He sets aside 'philosophical as well as disputed moral and religious questions ... not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important and recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically' (p. 74). This essay clarifies the non-abstract nature of the original position that is central to Rawls. It also spells out his agreements with the liberalism of Kant and Mill and his differences from them regarding how 'the value of full autonomy is specified by a political conception of justice, and not by a comprehensive moral doctrine' (p. 87). He thus avoids the 'sectarian doctrine' (p. 86) of classical liberalism represented by Kant and J.S. Mill.

The essay by Brian Barry entitled, 'John Rawls and the Search for Stability', shows how Rawls's later book *Political Liberalism* 'threatens to obscure' the 'most significant contribution' of *A Theory of Justice* 'to political philosophy produced in this country' (p. 138). Providing an exceptional instance of the sovereignty of the reader over the author, Barry in his essay maintains how the 'later Rawls attributes to the Rawls of *A Theory of Justice* errors that he did not in fact commit' (p. 100). The essay by George Klosko entitled, 'Political Constructivism in Rawls's *Political Liberalism*', while accepting the claim in this later book regarding the distinctiveness of the method of 'political constructivism' which is best suited to bridge the 'ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies' and to ground an 'overlapping consensus', nevertheless points out that Rawls has not adequately defended this method (p. 144). The essay by Patrick Neal entitled, '*Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?*' responding to Rawls's claim that his justice as fairness is not metaphysical but political, maintains that it is

'not political either' but 'was and remains ... theoretical formulation' which is unable to 'reflect fully on and incorporate successfully into itself the problem constituted by this polar democracy' (p. 174). Making a similar claim regarding the unrealistic status of state in Rawls, Milton Fisk elucidates Rawlsian state as 'idealized' and not 'actual'.

The essays by Charles Kelbley, Sheldon S. Wolin and Roberto Alejandro highlight different aspects of the difference between *A Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*. Kai Nelson discusses the difference between Rawls and C.B. MacPherson with reference to the notion of classless society. Stephen Mulhall's essay contests Rawls's imposition of the separation between the sphere of the political and that of the non-political as 'schizophrenic' (p. 276). The essay by Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis embarks on finding out 'whether Rawlsian type of construct can be defended against libertarians without falling prey to communitarians' (p. 330). Subsequent to her trenchant criticism of Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* in her essay 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice,' (*Ethics*, 1989) Susan Moller Okin in her essay included in this volume persists with her criticism and lays bare in the process the gendered aspects in *Political Liberalism*. Taking the debate behind the individualists and communitarian, Michael J. Sandel reformulates it by asking, 'whether rights can be identified and justified in a way that does not presuppose any particular conception of good' (p. 404). Amartya Sen's essay discusses the informational basis of justice. The essay by Alasdair MacIntyre presents a common critique of all liberals including Rawls and Nozick. Unlike Barry, Samuel Scheffler claims *Political Liberalism* as a 'major contribution to [the] project of liberal self-understanding' (p. 465). The last two essays in the volume by Habermas and Rawls provide the best illustration of critical philosophical debates, where Habermas unveils some key limitations in Rawls, to which he has responded while conceding some of the observations made by Habermas.

Here let me make two observations, one on Rawls and another on the volume under review. One of the significant aspects of Rawls's political philosophy is his sensitivity to criticism, which caused him to make significant changes, which consisted of moving away from his earlier positions. In fact, Neal in his essay warns that Rawls must be

careful in rendering his notion of justice politically, lest it becomes Hobbesian (p. 197). While the communitarians criticized *A Theory of Justice* for being too unrealistic and universalistic, *Political Liberalism* has angered liberals for diluting the liberal program. The changes he made are not enough for feminists. This pull and push process reminds one about the precariousness of thought with reference to ones adversaries. Modifying W.B. Yeat's lines one may say that Rawls may have to tread carefully because he is treading in the midst of mutually exclusive extreme positions. In these theoretical extremities like individualism, communitarianism, when one goes near to the other, one moves farther away from the one behind, and there is no way one can pull these together once for all. This moving near and going far away reveals the sensitivity and open-endedness and also the vulnerability of thinkers like Rawls.

Regarding the second point about the volume in the last paragraph of the Preface the editor by way of justifying the compiling of this volume says:

> Especially this volume will be of immense value to Indian scholars and social activists who are seriously engaged in the ongoing debate concerning the nature of India's democratic polity and will help utilise the Rawlsian framework to analyse the most contested issues such as secularism, democracy, social justice and human agency (p. 11).

One would have thought that this positive recommendation of utilizing the Rawlsian framework to analyze the contested issues in India has also to take into active consideration the 'thoroughly historicist and antiuniversalist' stance in later Rawls. For instance, Rawls, in his essay in the volume leaves the question of extending his general political conception for different kinds of societies open, and says:

> Whether justice as fairness can be extended to a general political conception for different kinds of societies existing under different historical and social conditions, or whether it can be extended to a general moral conception, or a significant part thereof, are altogether separate questions. I avoid prejudging these larger questions one way or the other.

Distinguishing his theory from earlier liberals he says:

> ... justice as fairness differs from traditional moral doctrines, for these are widely regarded as such general conceptions. Utilitarianism is a familiar example, since the principle of utility, however it is formulated, is usually said to hold for all kinds of subjects ranging from the actions of individuals to the laws of nations (p. 70).

It is necessary to pay careful attention to these indecisions, acknowledge the intended historical locations, and take note of the extent of universalism allowed by the text. We may have to work out theoretical extension to use them outside the purview envisaged by the text, otherwise we may be seriously undermining the purposes of these philosophies and expose them to vulnerabilities that were not intended by the author.

There are some spelling mistakes that are not too harmful; but not the one on page 508, line 8 where the word 'unclear' is typed as 'nuclear'!

The selection in the volume displays a wide range of significant critical posers on Rawls's political philosophy that includes: critiques within political theory, from the critical liberal frameworks, communitarianism, feminism and critical school. This shows the editor's familiarity with the Rawlsian scholarship, which is wide and extensive.

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A. RAGHURAMARAJU (ed.): *Existence, Experience and Ethics*, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 2000, pp. 372, Rs 480.

This book is a collection of essays in honour of Professor Sultan Ali Shaida. Professor Shaida who retired from I.I.T. Kanpur after a long and distinguished career. The volume covers a wide range of philosophical issues. It includes contributions not only by philosophers but also by scholars from other disciplines like social science, literature and religion. This variety and wide canvas in the volume is quite

befitting considering the wide range of academic interests exhibited in Professor Shaida's writings. These include existentialism, aesthetics, ethics, literature and philosophy of religion.

The book is divided in three sections titled 'Existence', 'Experience' and 'Ethics'. It is obvious that the essays in the book do not represent a central, cohesive theme. Rather separate, often related, issues are approached by scholars from diverse philosophical standpoints and adopting different methods of philosophizing. This, in one way, can be said to constitute the strength of the book because it is able to offer something of interest to a wide cross-section of readers. The wide range of issues discussed in a way makes up for the absence of connectivity throughout the volume. It is extremely difficult to touch upon all the essays, 21 to be precise, even briefly. I will restrict myself to brief comments on a few of these in accordance with areas of my interest.

The first section, the editor points out, is devoted to 'different interrogations of the autonomous individual existence postulated by modernity' (p. 2). The essays in this section take a critical look at the egocentricity and its consequent reductionism in philosophical discussions following Descartes where 'I' or the cognitive self becomes the starting point and centre of knowledge and certainty. S. Hegde situates his discussion within the problematic dimensions of Indian philosophical tradition's self-understanding. A. Raghuramaraju's paper explores dimensions of discourse on rights and Bhargavi Davar talks about the need and significance of writing phenomenology of mental illness. The issue of inter-subjectivity and the relation between 'I' and 'You' also receives attention. Margaret Chatterjee emphasizes the need to take into account the relationship between 'I', 'You' and the communal 'We'. She argues that the intimate relation between 'thou' and 'we' is acknowledged by Buber when he says, 'Only men who are capable of truly saying Thou to one another can truly say We with one another' (p. 27). Chatterjee concludes that Buber's strength lies in his ability to 'reconcile proximity and duality, individuality and community, identifying the subtle textures of horizontal relationship in the homespun fabric of everyday life' (p. 30).

Amitabh Das Gupta's paper is devoted to a critique of the physicalists' position about mental states. He begins with a juxtaposition of two conflicting points of view available in contemporary philosophy of mind. One holds that mental phenomena are actually a species of the physical while the other maintains that it is an essential property of mental phenomena to be non-physical. Das Gupta argues that the two positions are not conflicting but complementary. He concurs with Searle that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain and its reduction is not possible; in its case 'its reality is its appearance' (p. 49). The task before philosophy of mind today, he says, is to 'develop a scientific approach to mind without negating the essentialist intuition' (p. 47). Grammatical mistakes at several places in the paper are rather irritating (pp. 31, 33).

The section titled 'Experience' is devoted to issues relating to aesthetic experience. Patnaik concerns himself with essential aspects of 'miscommunication' and elucidates these with the help of two stories of Milan Kundera. Hasna Begum discusses the logical sequence between G.E. Moore's ideas on ethics, aesthetics and human existence and relates the discussion to Shaida's unpublished writings. Bijoy H. Boruah and Rekha Jhanji take up the interesting question of the close relation between art and life. Both argue that art has a close relation with human experience and yet manages to go beyond it. Boruah thinks that selective arrangement of the elements drawn from real life enables art and literature to achieve this. He quotes with approval James's comment 'Art is essentially selection, but it is a selection whose main care is to be typical, to be inclusive' (p. 159). Boruah concludes that the selective arrangement in art is guided by universal and deep elements of human experience and in literature it is directed towards unrealized values and meanings buried in the depth of human experience. Jhanji directs her attention towards the debate between the purists and integrationists. She finds both incomplete. Purists reduce art to 'an empty form' while integrationists reduce it to 'didactics'. Art, she states, is never divorced from the 'unity and harmony' of life situations as experienced by people. Jhanji concludes that artists draw sustenance from their experience of life situations and at the same time they help others to understand life through their works.

The third section of the book is devoted to ethics and includes six papers. The distinction between fact and value and the question of the objectivity of ethical principles is the focus in the papers of Jagar Pal and Vanlalnghak. V.T. Sebastian attempts to build up a case for locating values in the lived world adopting a phenomenological perspective. P.K. Roy's paper draws our attention to 'agent-centered' ethical theories of Plato and Gandhi as against 'act-centered' theories of modern times. Bhatt devotes himself to an argument in favour of limited universalizability of moral principles, which takes care of the ethical rights of different social groups, specially the minorities. The point is well taken. The difficult task, however, is to specify these rights and duties within a just social context. Gautam directs his attention to a critique of liberalism and individualism. The 'individual centric ethos', he says, is 'isolationist' and ignores the fact that a human self acquires its 'identity' and 'worth' in and through relationships with others. To me it seems that the demands of individual autonomy can not be ignored. The really difficult question in this context is to harmonize the two aspects of human existence, man as an individual and man as a social being. Community interests can not be allowed to crush individual autonomy and at the same time smooth, cohesive functioning of society also can not be sacrificed.

The last section is a short one and addresses itself to ethics as applied to philosophy of religion. This section has only three essays. All the three focus upon the issue of religious pluralism and the need for inter-faith dialogue. Goutam Biswas draws a distinction between two senses of 'dialogue'. Discursive dialogue proceeds through understanding of doctrine and discourse but the non-discursive dialogue demands a silent existential sharing of the religious concern. Thus '... dialogue is not only conceptual and trans-conceptual but also pre-conceptual' (p. 344). Inter-faith dialogue in this sense demands going back to the moments of religiosity and understanding the experience, which lies behind religiosity. Syed Vahiduddin begins with an admission of the inevitability of religious diversity; it is 'a necessity born of the human situation'. This diversity, however, should not be perceived as a 'curse' (p. 341). It should be celebrated since the encounter of one religion with another always enriches human culture. Asgar Ali Engineer

also devotes himself to making a case for religious tolerance and accommodation. His arguments involve several highly problematic and controversial claims. He acknowledges the importance of faith and belief in religion but at the same time makes a distinction between healthy and blind faith. He states that religion, when properly understood, has no room for religious authoritarianism. He also claims that the value systems of different religions do not conflict with each other, rather they 'complement' and 'supplement' each other. I would like to point out that distinctions between what is truly religious and what is superstitious, between what is essential and normative and what is peripheral and contextual in a religion, tend to be prescriptive and depend on the particular preferences of the one making the distinctions. Even if it were granted that different religions actually share a great deal, it cannot be denied that they also differ significantly and quite often conflict with regard to their belief systems as well as moral and social prescriptions. To ascribe all such conflict either to a lack of understanding of religion or to vested interests is symptomatic of a refusal to meet the challenge of religious pluralism head on. Liberal thinkers often tend to take a romantic view of religion, highlighting its salutary aspects and ignoring its exploitative, divisive and destructive aspects. Still this kind of exercise has its merits since it shifts the emphasis from differences to similarities. The three essays mentioned above attempt to come to terms with religious pluralism and see the positive aspects of it. However these also demonstrate the gap between how liberal, secular intellectuals understand religion and how it actually functions in the lives of common people.

The wide canvas of the book makes sure that it has something to offer to every reader. Many of the essays leave scope for more critical discussions. One may get a feeling that the author has skirted around or not touched upon the really hard questions on the issue being discussed. The appearance of the book and the quality of printing are good. However, the proof reading leaves much to be desired. There are quite a few spelling and grammatical mistakes. Sometimes important statements of the writer's position are incorrect. If a biographical essay about Professor Shaida's life and philosophical journey and a list of his

important writings were included in the book, it would have greatly enhanced its value.

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SOM RAJ GUPTA: *The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man*, Volume IV, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 2001, pp. 797, Rs 995.

I

This is the fourth volume of Professor Som Raj Gupta's great-hearted endeavour to translate and re-interpret the *Prasthanatrayī* for the modern man. And this happens to be a difficult part of the entire undertaking. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* that it treats is, as the Preface puts it, 'perhaps the most contemplative among the principal Upanisads, and for this very reason the hardest to understand.' It may strike one as a strange mingling of naïve and fanciful elements with what may appear to be relatively direct philosophic statement. And it is only through an intent lingering upon the richly evocative symbolic imagery that we could get to the comprehensive vision the Upaniṣad presents. Again, the text is an odd conglomeration of various discourses. There are elements of narrative, analogical and mythic discourse occurring at various levels. One risks losing sight of the deeper dimensions of that vision. It often happens that the seemingly simplistic elements turn out to be the most sage and serious! This kind of oddness is related to an important feature of Upaniṣadic thought and idiom. As the commentator himself explains it:

> The Upanisads can easily move from the commonplace to the sublime, from prosaic human concerns to visions of gods and revelations of the sacred. The secular and the sacred are not for them opposites—the sacred is the secular in its depth and the secular is only the apparent look of the sacred.

There was a suggestion that this investigation might take the form of a comparative study of the *Chāndogya* vision with modern philosophy.

The author, however, rightly did not countenance the idea, since the term 'comparative philosophy' is inclined to invest modern thought with a certain legislative authority. On the other hand, he preferred the old tradition of Vedic dialogue of *vada* in which a genuine *vadin* lets every point of view possess and occupy him by turns along with its existential moorings. The author has carried out his task in this spirit of imaginative sympathy. There was also a reason why any compromising with the modern philosophic discourse and its highly abstract conceptualizing doctrinaire approach had to be avoided. For that would have, in a sense, defeated the very purpose of the entire enterprise. The core principle implicit in this investigation, repeatedly emphasized in the commentary is totally opposed to the modern scientific approach to knowledge. To quote from the last references to it in this text: 'We know a thing only by becoming it, not by remaining aloof from it.' Again, 'Brahman within the heart is dark, deep, inscrutable. I cannot *know* it as I can know an object. I can only be it, and being it know it fully. For that is how one can know a thing by being it.'

It is indeed a marvel how despite such divergences the commentary is able to present the essence of the *Chāndogya* in terms that the modern reader can respond to with ease and earnestness. The author's is a remarkably cogent unweaving of the complex fabric of discourse—cogent and convincing for the modern reader. His is a simple, direct and lucid use of language. As far as possible he keeps it uncluttered with philosophical jargon, with a steady eye on the sort of intellectual ambience a modern thinking mind is apt to feel at home in. It is almost as though he has been able to evolve a style of discourse free and open for his own purpose.

In the commentary certain dominant features are noteworthy. The sub-title of the series makes the point that the translation and re-interpretation is being undertaken for 'the participation of contemporary man'. So for one thing, whatever is of special influence in the thought-currents in modern man's life would be kept in view. Important trends in Western philosophic thought like that of Kant are constantly being referred to, and more particularly existential thought of a Heidegger, a Wittgenstein, a Derrida, a Foucault, and so on. Side by side, there is an acute awareness of the delusory foundations of our science and

technology-based civilization and the self-complacency, the arrogance, the insensitivity that it breeds. The constant refrain is that of the totally negative role the modern civilization plays in our spiritual quest. It is hostile to that quest, in fact, downright malignant as the following passages would reveal:

> Our modern civilization has only replaced God with man, made of him a God, woven myths about his independence of the world reducing the latter to an arena for the display of his technological heroism!
>
> The power that science has given to man, that result of collective intellectual effort, has made us all asleep to the truth of mortality. Can this insensitiveness, this ignorance sustain this civilization which is not even prepared to talk about our loneliness, our morality, not to speak of facing it? Few civilizations have been as this humanistic civilization; it does not remember that to be human means to be mortal.
>
> We are so much bewitched by the petty and degrading success of technology that we have forgotten the true creative springs in life. We have killed God in us. Humanism is our greatest sin.
>
> This is our modern civilization, wedded neither to the world nor to life, but to illusions that cannot but be tragic. It is hard to imagine a civilization so deeply and consciously committed to absurdity, to triviality, to irrationality. Reason that has made it so unreasonable cannot be sane reason. One feels insulted, personally insulted, as it were, to find humanity so crude and so insensitive, a whole civilization so tragic because so powerful!

But, of course, the prime concern remains the probing of the Upanisadic text with the utmost regard for authenticity. The author has preserved the purity of the symbolic force of the imagery. Indeed, often enough, one might sense an echo of his own personal spiritual experience as an undercurrent that adds to its veracity. However, the eight chapters of the *Chāndogya* present a highly variegated fabric of discourse that is in itself a major challenge which is squarely met.

All this makes for a balanced blend which is consistently maintained throughout the vast disquisition. One can only try to mention a few

salient aspects chapterwise to serve as a random sampling—with a fuller account of the discussion in the later chapters—all of which receives detailed interpretation in the commentary.

Chapters I and II: These deal with the *Udgita* and the sacred syllable '*AUM*'.

Chapter III: The Upanisads ask us to rest content with the genuine truth about experience, with the truth of its unconceptualizability, its conceptual immeasurability. We are to give ourselves up to it without concepts, the way that makes one flow out of oneself into the sky; to become the sky.

Myth as narrative is fully awake to our ontological impoverishment. The modern world has become strangely insensitive to the depth and mystery of things. Hence it is unresponsive to myth which makes us aware of the before and after dimensions of our presence which is never a presence.

Chapter IV: Janasruti's virtues are all dependent on others while Raikva is just solitude—sort of an outcast. His cart moves; so does the *jagat*. Having shed the worldly mode of being, Raikva has become the all, the self of all, a sharer and sustainer of their being and their good.

Regarding Satyakāma Jabālā, the son of a truthful woman, the *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* tries, unsuccessfully to gloss over the truth of the birth of Satyakāma who is more eligible for acquiring sacred knowledge than the narcissistic brahmans. When he spoke the truth, Gautama said, 'None but a brahman could utter words like these, truthful words no non-brahman could utter.' His companions were cows, bulls, swans, diving-birds, etc. who educated him, became his teachers. Satyakāma once a seeker of truth later becomes a dweller in it. The teacher Satyakāma ever remains himself—ever remains revelation.

Chapter V: Man is a duality constituted and negated by the *other*, the other as the world and community. He lives so conducted by *otherness* because he so appropriates a part of the world, with the body as his self. With the fall of the body the world does not die; another body is appropriated to perpetuate the tensions and misery.

The chapter concerns the three courses open to man: (I) Men and women who live opting out for a contemplative mode of life, having surrendered their selfhood, meditate on the *Brahman*, become wayfarers

of the bright Northern path going up to the *Hiranyagarbha*. (II) Those of virtue who, replete with faith, are devoted to holy acts, and practice rituals and participatory piety become wayfarers of the smoky Southern path and rise up to the Lunar world. (III) The householder men and women who live like worldlings acting out their natural desires and instincts take another body, are reborn in the world.

Symbolism of the Wandering Cloud: The pious dewellers of the moon-world, when the power of their good acts is exhausted fall to become 'wandering clouds', and then they are re-situated and placed as beings in the world.

Chapter VI: His father *Āruni* said to *Śvetakatu*: 'Just as, my child, by knowing one lump of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the transformation being but a name originating from *vāc*, from speech, the reality being only clay ... .' The *vāc* functions at a pre-level, as it were. *Vāc* creates not the world but the raw material for the senses to transform it into the sensible world. So *vāc* is the creative act, the act of Prajapati who transforms himself into creation to know himself. The *vāc* was the Word, and the Word was the creator and the creator was the Word. When the Word transforms itself into names then the world emerges with its forms, those *others* of names. Hence the equation of phenomena with names.

The word that we speak and understand is not the creative word but only the communicative word. Even what we ordinarily term 'creative language' remains primarily communicative. The creative element in it is made to submit to and integrate with the communicative speech.

When a man is, as they say, asleep he is suffused with Being, attains to his own. He then has attained to his self, gone to his own being. In sleep lies the source of our life; it restores us to our wholeness. Death is nothing else than sleep that puts an end to all the agony of us mortals. We ignore sleep, we would not dive into its depths, would not live it. Our concern remains tied to the waking state and what it reveals. Sleep is never integrated into our lives. We have to accept the truth that our living does not lie out there in the world but in ourselves.

Chapter VII: The commentator calls this 'the most difficult chapter in the entire Upaniṣadic canon: The story of Nārada and Sanatkumāra—the five-year old 'ever youthful one'. There is no way to the highest

goal of life, salvation, other than self-knowledge *parā-vidyā*. Even Nārada, the seer among the gods gifted though he was in acquiring all other kinds of knowledge, missed the essence of it all. He gives Sanatkumāra a very long list of 'what I have studied and know.' But Sanatkumāra's response is, 'Verily all that you have studied is but *name*. You are a knower of holy acts and *mantras*, yet you have remained ignorant of the self, the *atman*. To know a name is not the same thing as knowing the named. Names are not self-referential. They are other-referential. Language itself points out to something beyond itself, though it can never reveal that something. Always moving towards it, it never reaches it; it is a search for Being that it can never find. Yet man would stick to the act of interpretation, the act that conceals when it reveals. The result is that man moves on from one interpretation to another interpretation, continuing this process ever and always. But the fullness of Being, the *bhuma* is distant as ever.'

Nārada says, 'I am only a knower of *mantras*, the holy Vedic acts alone, not a knower of what it really is.' We can know it if we do *upasanam*, meditation, on *Name*. We have to first isolate it from its referent, from the entire context of its possibility within the already interpreted world. We have to de-contextualize, suck it off from all relationships in the discourse, look at it as the thing itself, the thing we seek. The word would then become the symbol of being—an identity, a being, and take the name that has itself as its referent, having been released from the entire context of its possibility called the 'world'. One has to isolate it also from the entire structure of language, contemplate it, do *upasana* of it, identify oneself with it, and meditate on the Name as *Brahman*.

Sanatkumāra is wise and Godlike because he knows not only life but also death. He is a five-year old child who has a wisdom which only his innocence could command, wisdom that perceives all as ONE, life as well as death, knowledge as well as ignorance. This prophet of innocence—innocence alone is wisdom for him, not knowledge—makes no distinction between bondage and liberation, between *samadhi* and wakefulness. Our perceptions are not innocent revelations. Selective, biased and prejudiced we are in relation to them. When we do not through the process of choosing distort them or draw 'rational'

distinctions among them, our gaze will have become the gaze of a no-person—a gaze calm, impersonal, choiceless. And that will make the mind pure—because it will be purified of the impurity called 'I'.

Chapter VIII: The last chapter centres attention on the nature of the soul, the self, the *atman*. To realize Brahman, the goal of life, one must go seeking the self, the *atman*, located in that small space within the lotus of the heart. In upholding man's achievement of that quest and commanding a move towards it, it brings the entire investigation to a meaningful close. In this little space within ones heart dwells all that dwells in the cosmic space and more, as the Primodial *Purusa* (of the *Purusa Sukta*) extends it by a ten-finger breadth. Man has to dwell in and die into that small space to become the full. The implications of the nature of this self and the prime importance of the quest itself are variously spelt out. This space of the self within is the genuine infinity of the *Brahman*. The Upaniṣad makes no distinction between what is within, without and the transcendental *Brahman*, the Absolute.

The man who has become that tiny space within the heart has become both each and the all, because he is already dead before his actual death and knows the creative springs that flow out from death, that home and source of life. The *Sruti* would have people orient themselves to the contemplation of the self. It is a matter of regret for the *Sruti* that all man can desire is there in his self and yet the desires of man have falsehood for their cover. *Avidyā* makes them outward oriented. Because the untruth carries them away from their own true being. 'We cannot possibly translate all our desires into realities. Only those desires that come to terms with what we find as reality can have any chance of fulfilment ... . But the man who has become nothing to become the all, has according to the Upaniṣad, nothing beyond him. If by chance in his thought-free state a desire arises it cannot but fulfil itself. This is the paradox about this humility, this nothingness that it is all power.' In sleep there remains no *other* to set limits to oneself. If one could become in the state of wakefulness this infinite expanse of nothingness nothing would remain beyond ones reach.

When this transformation of ones little individuality happens, the Yogic tradition says, the Yogic fire descends from the crown of the head to the heart. 'Sleep is only an imitation of this bliss, a poor

shadow of this tiny infinity. If people could but be this nothing, if they could live as deprived and naked as sleep is, they would turn into fullness itself, for in this impoverishment abides all plenitude.' To sleep is to abide in ones truth and being. No, sleep does not suspend my being; it only conceals it. Sleep is the time when man becomes suffused with Being, with his own self. 'Even a man who does not know this also attains to *Brahman* in the heart in sleep, unites with Being.' But he does so without knowing it!

'Sleep, Death, Fullness, Being, Liberation are all one. But only the man who dies before his death can know this. For others, those who cling to life, sleep is a mere absence and death a mere negation.' The Vedanta interpretation attributes truth or reality, to *Brahman* alone, not to man and his world. To a calm, fret-free disposition, on opening out, the world and man reveal themselves as unreal and the depth in them, the unnameable depth alone as real. We have to find what we seek, the *satyam*, the self in the deepest depths within us. That is the call, the cry of our being. 'The Upaniṣad seems to give full approval to Yoga, the meditation on the Name.' It is no use saying, we do not find that self, the *atman* in us, for we ever cry for it; that self is present in us as our goal. At this point, the Upaniṣad quotes the mythic narrative which mingles in the discussion.

Both gods and demons came to know all this from tradition and said, 'Let's seek that *Atman*. Maghavan (Indra), king of the gods, and Virochana, king of the demons approach Prajapati with faggots in their hands as disciples, after fulfilling ritualistic pre-requisites. Each understands Prajapati's instructions in accordance to his own innate capacity. Ultimately, Maghavan instructed by Prajapti step by step comes to understand the position correctly. He is told that the Upaniṣad instead of simply saying, 'the body is mortal' says, 'it is ever in the grip of death' because the latter statement causes a greater sense of existential insecurity among people than the former; so that mankind may distance themselves from 'I am the body sense'. He also learns that though the body is the abode of the serene, the immortal, the self, it however, resides in this experiential abode without sharing the mortal nature of the body, of the organs, of the mind, or any of their qualities.

II

Despite his larger interests and pre-occupations such as discovering the relevance of this Upaniṣad for modern man's life, the Commentator hasn't neglected careful checking of the *Śaṇkara bhāṣya* with the Upaniṣadic text. He finds it often misleading, because, instead of a passive hermeneutics with a spirit of self-submission that the *Sruti* demands, Sankara attempts to offer a conceptually self-consistent interpretation. Sometimes he does not respond to the rich symbolism fully and tends to perfunctorily dismiss the issues. Again at times, his Brahmanical ritualism appears to get the better of him so that this present commentator is obliged to protest: 'I do not understand why *Śaṅkara bhāṣya* should resort to unsound philosophical considerations where a deep contemplative opening out is called for. Is this *bhāṣya* Sankara's own work?' Such discrepancies are numerous and dispersed throughout the volume. Each time the lapse is carefully noted in detail.

One can cite for a sampling the well-known case of Satyakāma Jabālā's truth-speaking mother, in Chapter IV, claiming that she had got her son when she was young and did not know who his father was. The situation has rich social and even profound spiritual implications as the woman stands supremely honest and vindicated and Satyakāma entirely worthy of her truthfulness. All of which Śaṅkara fails to bring out. Instead, he hedges and dodges and tries unsuccessfully to gloss over the truth about Satyakāma's birth—that he was the son of a slave girl presumably bought and sold by many. Her son whom no one could ever think of giving his name could not be admitted into the social system approved by the *smṛtis*, the post-Vedic codes of conduct. Thus the *Śaṅkara bhāṣya* does not always bring out the deeper resonances of the Upanisadic words though they may be in accord with his own vision. It is an instance of his theoretical pre-occupations interfering with his perception. The question of the authenticity of those portions of the bhāṣya where the main concern is to make the *Sruti* conceptually and doctrinally self-consistent arises. 'This naturally gives rise to the question whether this commentary on the *Chāndogya* is the work of the reputed sage. But I leave this question open; to go into it will mean exceeding the concern of the present work,' says the author.

The real problem is the peculiar quality of Upaniṣad articulation—the mythic narration, the symbolic significations, the image used for contemplation are all meant to 'awaken the contemplative man within us.' On the surface, all this might appear to the modern reader very naïve and simplistic. True, when properly probed it reveals profound truth. But how to make it also understandable, intelligible to modern minds? We are now far too much distanced from that kind of discourse, being, so to say, hand-in-glove with conceptual discussion whereas the *mantric* or mythic discourse goes beyond it.

'We believe in knowledge in viewpoints, in methods, logic ... . The observer is the centre for us, the discourse, the viewpoint, the hypothesis ... we will ever remain object-oriented and miss the self we are. For us the moderns the real is out in the objective world, not in us. Yet we would grasp it, possess it, but would not consent to *be* it.'

The commentator struggles to keep close to his central purpose. If one aims at contemporary man's participation one will have necessarily to consider those modern philosophical movements and thought-currents which have one way or another influenced, moulded and shaped modern man's frame of mind and habits of thought. We should not be surprised to find that the entire investigation is permeated, as it were, with the positive and negative aspects of the dynamic trends of present-day philosophic thinking. And especially existentialist thought and experience in general is present all the time whether in the background or in the foreground. What is more, it is not just the theoretical or conceptual element so much as the actual feeling and 'living' of it that makes its impact throughout.

In fact, the Existentialist experience helps re-inforce the Upanisadic when in consonance with it. At the same time, this juxtaposition serves to set off the element of the Upaniṣadic distinctiveness when the two present a total contrast to each other. Very early in the book, almost at the beginning of the Upaniṣad where *AUM* is identified with *Udgita* as the supreme Self, a passage broadly hints at the area of congruence between the Upaniṣadic experience and existentialism:

> Man and world in this account are taken as one reality. The Upanisad refuses to countenance any distinction between the objective and the subjective. When we talk of our knowledge of the external world we

start our discourse with an unwarranted assumption that there are such independent domains as the internal and the external. We have to realize that the distinction we draw between the external and the internal does not reflect a fact, a given state of affairs. It is simply mere projection of our self-centred disposition ... . This understanding, this realization—existential and immediate—that the body is not my property but belongs to the world, is a thing among things. This realization marks the first step towards meditation of *Aum* as *Udgita*.

Again, the same point receives emphasis throughout: 'There are no such beings as man and the world. There is only man-world, but as a man-world articulating its inadequacy as man-world ever crying for an unknown state which it would be. Man and the world are not in man-world, they inhere in each other ... . Of the two polarities modernity has given pride of place to the world, to the *there*. The world appears *there*, appears objective. The otherness of the world there is constituted by a particular disposition relative to it. No observation, no calculation, no science can establish the absolute *otherness* of the world and eliminate man as a disposition relative to it.'

In the same way, our act of naming seeks to hypostatize phenomena. But our names and their referents are ever-to-be's and so are the phenomena they refer to or constitute. Names and their referents are not self-existing things. They are coming-to-be's in relation to each other. Derrida as is well-known has admirably captured all these ideas in his well-known concept of *differance*. The world as *differance* is an unhappy world, constituted by man-world duality. Here man cannot be himself but he *would* be himself. That is the ruling passion of his life. Since man is a deferment, a being ever to be, he seeks to be a being-in-himself in and through the phenomena of the world which as the *other* of man seems to have greater stability than himself.

Although all this indicates that the Existentialist movement is helpful in understanding Upaniṣadic experience, the two are at variance and intrinsically hostile in their fundamentals. Modern thinkers like Existentialists argue, the world's body that I take myself to be cannot be me. My thoughts are not unique to me; they are not exclusively mine—not even my feelings nor my sensations. They are all

contaminated by *otherness*, owe their beings to it. I see myself to be a sociality or a communality. There is nothing in me that can be equated with a self. Hence many thinkers would deny the self for there is no core in things or in us; I cannot find myself as a self. I am only an interpretation. 'Thus the lead given by Wittgenstein ends up in this situation where we have only knowledge but nothing to know.' So that though there are certain points of proximity between Existentialist thought and Upaniṣadic experience, this denial of the self sets them wholly apart.

In between, the author takes in his ambit a wide range of modern philosophic thought along with Upaniṣadic thought, for notable aspects of proximity and divergence. For instance, it is remarked that the language of the *Chāndogya mantras* does not indulge in 'Kantian splitting'. The Upaniṣads will readily concede that experience is not all temporality; there is also permanence involved in it. 'So much of Kantianism they will readily countenance ...' However, 'for Kant the ethical thinker, the rational individual is the end.' Just as, for Wittgenstein 'Man is essentially a doing communicative being, a being that exists as a relationship ... .'

There is also another feature very appropriately and effectively accommodated in the meantime: In three instances, analogical parallels are drawn upon from English poetry in the explication of *mantric* texts. These are from poetry of the Romantic Revival which, one recalls, had strong bearings close to Upaniṣadic experience. So that the incidents involved have vivid identification marks. Which, so to say, endows them with an additional dimension of 'lived' experience. Thus the Upanisad describes how men and women of virtue and participatory piety in the world, on their death rise up to the Lunar world. And when the residue of their piety is exhausted they fall into the region of the man-world to become the 'wandering cloud'. The wandering cloud is not yet an individuality, which it will be shortly. Yet this unconscious cloud that stands still heedless of the winds blowing appears to move freely as if imbued with life. At this point, the author likens it to Wordsworth's 'Leech Gatherer': 'Motionless as a cloud the Old Man stood/That heareth not the loud winds when they call/and moveth all together, if it moveth at all.' The position is, 'Man' is yet to become

a placed, situated being moving from existential de-situatedness to existential situatedness. It is as though in the 'Leech Gatherer' Wordsworth has instinctively impersonated that wandering cloud (*abhram*) in its Upaniṣadic meaning!

Similarly, in the same general context, Coleridge's own epitaph on himself: 'Stop Christian passerby, stop, child of God!' is quoted as poignantly expressive of the deep misery that even a man of virtue, a poet who sought praise and fame must suffer—the only escape being that 'If we live our mortality, die before our death, only then will we truly come to life.' The third literary reference used—Hamlet's soliloquy 'To be or not to be'—is however in a different key and is used far more extensively and in-depth.

Hamlet's anguished state for which there is no hope of redemption, is now looked at from a totally shifted and a new point of view. He looks upon death as the only escape from the endless misery of life and the world. Death means for him more the horrid mode of dying itself rather than the state we enter upon our death. He has just a fleeting glimpse of that state as a sleep-like repose. 'To die—to sleep, No more;' it is an end to life's nightmare, 'a consumation devoutly to be wished.' The central point is that Hamlet does not stop to contemplate either sleep itself, or death as sleep. He does not do *upasana* of either. His attention is wholly given over to the horror of living in such a world as ours. Like most of us, he looks upon sleep and death in terms of *absence* and not in terms of a *presence*. This tragic insight, the Upaniṣad would say, could turn into a redemptive vision if we contemplate our falling asleep to the body and the world in the spirit of *upasana*—all serene without a self-reference. Then we come to be ourselves when we are not—which is the paradise we daily visit in our sleep. Yet we recognize it not. We think of it as a withdrawal from our being. Why should we daily seek it? Why should this withdrawal from our being restore us to ourselves? We look at sleep only as a preparation for the business of life. The Upaniṣad asks us to contemplate sleep as death, as a negation of life that is restorative.

We accept the truth that our being does not lie *there* in the world but in ourselves in that *nothingness*. If we welcome sleep in this spirit when we awake from that nothingness, that sleep, that death, we will

find that that alone was blessedness, meaning and plenitude. Thus, finally Hamlet's question: 'To be or not to be' comes to be reframed into the affirmation: 'The question is to recognize how not to be is to be.'

Towards the end of the last chapter there is, as it were, a summing up which brings to a close what has been implicit in the entire investigation: How and why it is that the body cannot be the body without the embodied self. The body is mortal, not only mortal, it is always *ever-to-be*—it never comes to be itself. One can visualize this as an ambiguous situation. We are ever and always *presences to be*. Our being is ever and always a 'deferred being'. For the breathing and living man, this state where his being is ever in question is a tragic situation. There is this anguish, this existential poverty, this bereavement from oneself, for life is negation of presence; it is mortality, a movement towards death. We do not become the being we seek to be, do not become a presence because our life is a negation of it. We are afraid of life, life which is nothingness. How to escape from this frustration and the wounds it inflicts on man? Even in our deep sleep it is only suspended. The desire remains; the frustration remains.

As the commentator points out: 'A deep wordly spirituality, this Upaniṣad, *Chāndogya*, teaches, a wordly spirituality that undoes our mortality.' 'Where is one then to find the place for ontological rest?' 'In,' says the Upanisad, 'the disembodied state ... One becomes that when one does not assert oneself through space but flows into it and spreads out with it.' The other way is that of being the Wandering Monk, the embodiment of displacement, of living insecurity, of a pilgrim with no progress, no destination. Throughout the disquisition the emphasis is on coming to the state of nothingness, in the worldly sense, while alive and so 'dying before ones death'. Death is not a curse for one, the Upaniṣad in effect says; it is a blessing. 'Through the discipline of Yoga man willingly and consciously does to himself what death does to the ordinary man.'

Many a passage of the book, like the following, leaves a deep, lasting impact: 'The unreality of man and the world is the "gift" of a vision, it is not a "position" that our discursive thinking can establish convincingly. It is a "gift" because any one who has had a glimpse of

that vision, that of the unreality of the world and of his own, cherishes it much more than our so-called reality, our daily truth—so deep is its beauty, so holy the calm it bestows upon him and so joyous the freedom it promises. Who would not be undone by that unreality, by that beauty, by that freedom? The truth of "He who seeketh life shalt lose it and who loseth it for my sake shalt find it" is realized only by the man who finds himself and his world mere passing shadows.'

From the stylistic point of view, here is a discourse which succeeds in bringing home the essence of the Upaniṣadic and the Yogic experiences to an intellectually inclined modern mind—something perhaps never attempted before with such uniqueness.

50, Yoginagav Society, Fatehganj V.Y. KANTAK
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Books Received

1. *Explorations in Philosophy: Essays*
   J.N. Mohanty
2. *Amrtasya Putrah: An Advaitic Encounter with Globalism and Post-modernism*
   R.R. Pandey
3. *Measurements and Quantum Probabilities*
   M.D. Srinivas
4. *Understanding Foucault*
   Geoff Denahar
5. *Being and Meaning*
   Sebastian Alackapally
6. *पातञ्जल योग एवं जैन योग का तुलनात्मक अध्ययन*
   Aruna Anand
7. *Karma: Rhythmic Return to Harmony*
   V. Hanson, R. Stewart and S. Nicholson
8. *In Defence of Freedom*
   Amlan Datta
9. *Philosophy: Modern and Postmodern*
   Raghwendra Pratap Singh
10. *The Ways of Understanding the Human Past*
    D.P. Chattopadhyaya
11. *Prakrti in Samkhya-Yoga*
    Knut A. Jacobsen
12. *Reflection on Meta-Reality: Transcendence, Emancipation and Everyday Life*
    Roy Bhaskar
13. *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal: Mind, Language and World*
    Janardon Ganeri

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
ए,अे	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ
ञ्	ñ
ण्	ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ॡ	ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Ḳṛṣṇa* and not *Ḳṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ	l̤
ഴ	l̤.
ൺ	ṉ
ർ	r̤.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.

(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.