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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

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Part 1

Wittgenstein's Phenomenology of Everydayness: A Hermeneutic Look

SATRUGHNA BEHERA

Lecturer in Philosophy, UGC-Academic Staff College, Sambalpur University,
Jyoti Vihar 768 019

Philosophy does not end with the destruction of the 'houses of cards' or with 'uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense'. Philosophical discourse still continues to explore a 'new way of looking' and a new method in human understanding. Presumably, Wittgenstein favours this objective in his long process of the philosophical investigation. His later investigations and reflections, especially, explore new foundations which deal with the practices of everyday life. These practices of everyday life consist in people's activities and views on the one hand, and the interconnections between habits, customs and institutions on the other. These new foundations are treated as most essential for the comprehension of language and its use. Wittgenstein, in fact, not only focuses on our practical lives but also criticizes attempts about the nature of reason or the facts about the world. More so, he further challenges representationalist accounts of our relation to the world by criticizing traditional theories of meaning and understanding. According to him, since we have no clear access to forms and categories of pure reason or to intuitions of essences our starting point must be a description of our day-to-day situations in the world. Since descriptive contents are pre-reflectively given to us, this position represents nothing but a kind of 'phenomenology of everydayness'. This paper attempts to highlight how far Wittgenstein's thoughts ensure such a thesis which interests many recent thinkers to read Wittgenstein from various points of view.[1] However, while understanding the ideas associated with Wittgenstein, the paper will focus upon the idea that his perspective for entertaining the thesis of phenomenology of

everydayness leads us to characterize his philosophy of language and life as transcendentally holistic and hermeneutical.

1. THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAYNESS

Wittgenstein's philosophical reflections towards phenomenology of everydayness are to be found in the 'philosophies of life' which in fact, dominantly characterized much of the German thought at the turn of the 20th century.[2] With the collapse of idealism, signalling the ascendancy of positivist science associated with a growing sense of 'loss of meaning' a natural paradigmatic shift was in terms of the attempt to understand the world of contingent and temporal flow of life. Such attempt is quite revealed in Schopenhauer's demand that philosophy begins with a 'hermeneutic' of concrete life-forms, Herder's and Humboldt's treatment of language as an expression of life, Lotze's 'teleological idealism' which explains the 'real' in terms of what is valuable for life, Marx's emphasis on the basic needs of life, Nietzsche's call for life-affirmation, and the neo-Kantian's definition of truth in terms of its value for life. Moreover, the vitalisms, energisms and biologisms associated with the immensely influential *Lebens philosophie* movement evolved into the 'philosophy of existence' and later into 'existentialism', and all these justify to the appeal of this concern with rooting philosophy of life. In this philosophical journey human life becomes the pivotal concept which is primarily acted upon by thinkers who were really interested in explaining the proper significance and relevance of the human life.[3] There was a natural influence of this trend upon Wittgenstein, especially in the beginning of his later philosophy.[4] Rudolf Haller aptly observes,

> Not that Wittgenstein was about to give up his *idée fixe* that the essence of the world is made accessible by the discovery of the true nature of its description. Also in his later investigations, he held to the idea that grammar is what makes essence accessible. However, it was no longer the theory of proposition that was to be burdened with the achievement of this task. In the place of the theory of the proposition, a set of interconnected concepts was introduced, among whose key members were: the use of expressions, *the language*

game, in which words or signs find their usage, rules of usage; and *common judgements and common ways of acting.*[5]

It follows that in his later investigations Wittgenstein brings into the fore the basic purpose of our philosophical involvement into everydayness. The idea of everydayness is the source of our various daily activities, forms of life. According to him, it is to get out of the *Luftegebaude* (castles floating in the air) of theorizing, to be free from 'conceptual prejudices' and jargon of speculative metaphysics and to get 'back to the rough ground' (*PI*, Sects. 118, 107) of our concrete, ordinary grasp of language in use. Our words and expressions have meaning only in 'the stream of life', in the whole 'tapestry of life', but not in a 'sublime' logic beyond life. When we look for justification for our uses, practices, we find that what we simply do in living is actual 'bedrock'. This 'bedrock' constitutes the ground on which our language moves and our intelligibility of language becomes possible. There is nothing deeper than life which could describe it. In fact, the concern with life philosophy helps to display Wittgenstein's method in dealing with philosophical problems. Wittgenstein observes that philosophical problems arise from misunderstanding of the proper grammar of language, from speculative reflection and illusory interpretation. He tries also to dissolve these problems by providing descriptions of how things show up for us in the course of our ordinary, pre-reflective lives. To this effect, he contends that 'we must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place' (*PI*, Sect. 109). Here, it is to notice that Wittgenstein's frequent references to the 'primitive' in his later writings serve as reminders of the unnoticed features of ordinary life that make our linguistic uses intelligible. This position really represents the description of everydayness and the description of everydayness serves as a basis for disclosing features of our linguistic activities that explicitly represent our forms of life. This descriptive account of our linguistic activities, as T.R. Schatzki says, represents a good expression of Wittgenstein's phenomenology of everydayness.[6] Although Wittgenstein officially eschews any 'craving for generality', his method of philosophizing has often been compared to a transcendental argument in the way it moves from plain features of our lives to the background conditions that make those activities possible.[7] The

concepts of language-game, grammar, and form of life may be described as identifying those general features of our lives which make our activities possible.

Besides, Wittgenstein owes us an explanation as to how human communication entails human form of life in the sense it represents a language-game. Each language-game represents essentially an order of human communication, a form of human activity. To this extent, he rejects all theoretical programmes and thus provides a new sense to human situations by emphasizing on description. He goes beyond the traditional picture of representationalism and claims about the conditions for the possibility of our daily activities. Since the traditional representationalist picture is so deeply ingrained in our thinking and language, Wittgenstein deploys plausible therapies and de-structuring to help us bypass the assumptions that arise when language 'goes on holiday' or when we adopt a theoretical stance towards life.

Thus, as can be seen, Wittgenstein's reflection on the art of describing language games displays his novel attitudes towards the nature of a philosophical method. He says:

> Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs (*PI*, Sect. 496).

This remark exalts his true position according to which description of the actual use of expressions provides neither a pragmatic nor a causal explanation of linguistic uses. Rather, this description is phenomenological to the extent it is related to the form of representation itself. So he says:

> The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things (*PI*, Sect. 122).

What emerges in Wittgenstein's writings is essentially an understanding of the human form of life in which the perspicuous representation of language itself would be possible. However, this reflection undermines the assumptions of traditional philosophy and gives the way for the recent thinking on the matter in question.[8]

2. EVERYDAYNESS, UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING

Wittgenstein's treatment of the language is a treatment of meaning and understanding of the language in relation to our world of experience. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* starts with an exploration into the referential relationship of things with words. In this connection, his main concern has been to understand the world and to locate the possibility of intelligibility. To solve this problem he attempts a commonsense way of accounting for our understanding which presupposes 'the model of ostension' (*PI*, Sect. 293). According to this model, we start out in life finding ourselves surrounded by objects and we then learn the names for those objects through ostensive-training. Thereafter we know what objects of the type are. Our understanding of the world is built up from such instances of learning of the meaning of words. This traditional account of language presupposes the representationalist picture of ourselves as minds related to objects, and then tries to explain our understanding in terms of mental processes linking words to things. In this process knowing the meanings of words becomes possible. However, Wittgenstein does not favour this position. He argues against every aspect of mental account of the basis for our understanding. Rejecting any form of privacy including 'Cartesian-privacy', he suggests that although our understanding of meaning of words includes ostensive definitions, in those cases the learner already knows 'what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word' and 'the post at which we station the word' (*PI*, Sect. 29). Moreover, the meaning of a word can not be reduced to the object it signifies nor to the intention on the part of the speaker. Rather, the meaning of a word is determined by the rules of usage. This is not to say that Wittgenstein replaced the traditional objects of the realist with the formal rules of language and syntax. He is principally concerned with what we *do* with language rather than what language *is*.

Hence, Wittgenstein's reflections lead to an inversion of the traditional order of explanation. According to him, we can learn words in grasping what objects are only if we already have an understanding of the world, an understanding itself rooted in a prior mastery of language. The important fact is the pre-understanding embodied in our 'mastery' of standard patterns of discrimination and articulation in a

familiar life-world. Phenomena in the world and can stand out as counting for us in certain ways only because we have some mastery of what Wittgenstein calls the 'significance' or 'importance' of the ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. So he tellingly remarks 'what is happening now has significance in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance' (*PI*, Sect. 583). Words have meaning and can be understood only within 'intelligible situations'. But in that case the intelligibility of things can not be explained atomistically in terms of isolated identifications. Rather, they can be explained holistically within the system of language. The holistic view presupposes that language is an open system which collectively relates its sentences to our sense-experience.

The point being argued here is that this holistic background of understanding gives ground on which we can find out or identify facts only against the backdrop of a prior sense of how things can count as significant in our lives. Wittgenstein suggests that when we attempt 'to define the character of what you are calling a fact' (*RFM*, p. 381), the world in which we find ourselves is always already organized into intelligible, meaningful contexts which determine what facts there can be. In this connection, Wittgenstein's domination of the traditional conception of grounding is expressed in his famous slogan:

> What has to be accepted the given, is—so one could say—forms of life (*PI*, p. 226).

This remark can be well understood in connection with what Wittgenstein says about following a rule. He criticizes the assumption that there must be inner mental rules guiding our actions. He holds that rules have to be interpreted in following them. But these interpretations do not determine meaning. This position leads to Saul A. Kripke attributing a Humean form of scepticism to Wittgenstein by describing this state as the paradox of following a rule.[9] Wittgenstein himself, however, undercuts such a paradoxical position by simply pointing out that it is due to our 'misunderstanding' about the grasping of a rule. The grasping of a rule is misconceived as an 'interpretation' and so it leads to the 'illusion of interpretations'.[10] In this connection Wittgenstein suggests: 'This merely shows what goes to make up what we call

"obeying a rule" in everyday life' (*PI*, Sect. 235), and 'What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases' (*PI*, Sect. 201). Moreover, Wittgenstein rightly points out,

> If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say 'This is simply what I do' (*PI*, Sect. 217).

Here, Wittgenstein brings to the fore what may be called the underlying frame of reference of our semantic interpretation. This exclaims grammatically our own identity as culture-bound humans. Wittgenstein argues that 'To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs (uses, institutions) ... To understand a language means to be master of a technique' (*PI*, Sect. 199). This indicates that action gets its significance not from inner accompaniments, but from its place within the background of regular practices, techniques and customs of a cultural community. However, community reference does not limit Wittgenstein's position to any communitarian view[11] of understanding of the language or to any single community-based language. It does not also end in cultural relativism. Rather, it refers to a 'consensual cultural framework' in which our conception of language operates. As we are initiated into a communal life-world, we become turned into those ways of responding that make up the background of intelligibility embodied in the 'common ways of acting' of our culture. Wittgenstein says, 'What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of actions, the background against which we see any action' (*Z*, Sect. 567). Our actions are, thus, rule-governed, coherent and meaningful. Their position in the entire fabric of our practices is asserted by the fact that they represent our forms of life.

Wittgenstein's attempt differs from both conventionalist's and empiricist's viewpoints. He accepts the 'common agreement' as the basis of our shared form of life. Language rests on it. So it is not a contingent fact which is conventionally secured. It is rationally guaranteed.

Here, Wittgenstein is inclined to remind us frequently that agreement which is vital to human language is an agreement in form of life (*PI*, Sect. 241). Moreover, this conception of shared forms of life points to a way of envisioning the self which provides an alternative to the representationalist model. According to Wittgenstein, what defines our identity as subjects or human-selves is not our capacity for conscious representation, but, rather, our mode of 'representation', i.e. our ways of expressing ourselves in the mesh of a public world. This is mostly ascertained by his enticing arguments against the possibility of a private language in refusing object-designation stance of our sensations. The force of his arguments is to lead us to move against 'Descartes' dogma of dualism' and to shift from thinking of the mental as something 'inner' represented by our words to thinking of it as what is presented or expressed in our daily lives. Looking at this perspective, we exist as 'meaningful expressions' in a shared life-world rather than as minds representing objects.

Thus, Wittgenstein's investigation of our everyday lives providing a portrayal of human situations, describes the self as subject, not as a mind-representing object, simply has no role to play. The self as subject appears as an ongoing 'happening embedded in a public life-world whose actions give significance to its location. This is the reason which prompts Wittgenstein to say: 'The human body is the best picture of the soul'. For him, to grasp the situatedness of our lives within a background of life expressions of our natural history is to see that the mental or anything 'hidden' metaphysical about it can be made intelligible without recourse to a 'yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium' (*PI*, Sect. 308). He further says, 'Only surrounded by certain normal expressions of life is there such a thing as an expression of pain. Only surrounded by an ever more far reaching expression of life, such a thing as the expression of sorrow or affection' (*Z*, Sect. 534). For him, the contextualization of our lives in a cultural world, our existence as interpreters on the text of our culture's ways of interpreting things implies that there can be no access to brute, uninterpreted 'facts' about independently existing objects to be used in justifying or explaining our practices. At the same time, however, the description of everydayness lets us to see that our lives and the world are already

intelligible, and therefore, do not need any philosophical explanation or grounding.

3. LANGUAGE, GRAMMAR AND EVERYDAYNESS

What Wittgenstein's philosophical reflections convince us of is that his main purpose is to make a 'grammatical investigation' of our preoccupied conceptions and beliefs. Wittgenstein argues that our ordinary language plays a significant role in representing our shared sense of ourselves and the world around us. According to him, we are bewitched by our intelligence because of entangled 'knots in our understanding'. He attempts to open these knots through the key concept of grammar which takes care of our language and practices as opening a field of intelligibility. Language as the medium in which our understanding of ourselves and our world is maintained, articulates and represents our involvement to shared forms of life. It defines our own being as meaningful expressions. Our ordinary language games make manifest our real participation in the customs and practices of our public world. But language games do not merely formulate an understanding we could just as well have without language. For language constitutes our ways of encountering things and interpreting ourselves. We are able to have certain sorts of feelings and to identify things in our life-situations as significant because of the mastery of what Wittgenstein calls the 'grammar', i.e. the background articulation of our possibilities of understanding or the pre-structures of the language-games we learn in our life-situations. That is, perhaps, the reason Wittgenstein says, 'Essence is expressed by grammar' and 'grammar tells us what kind of object anything is' (*PI*, Sect. 371, 373).

It is, of course, not easy to have a precise conception of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar, though Wittgenstein has frequently used it in his later writings. He has even written a book with the title of *Philosophical Grammar*. However, what it seems from his writings is that he uses the concept of grammar in a wider sense by construing it as a system which defines the conditions for our language use and intelligibility which is embodied in the regular practices and contexts of our daily life. In this connection, explaining Wittgenstein's concept of grammar, Professor R.C. Pradhan aptly observes that 'Our grammar constitutes

what we call the natural history, since the latter can be derived from grammar. There is no independent natural history except the one we derive from the conceptual network projected in the grammar.'[12] Here, grammar does not stand at a distance. Rather, it represents the conceptual map of the language-games which enmesh our forms of life. So, for Wittgenstein, what is to be accepted is part of the 'grammatical framework on which the working of language is based'. The 'framework' or 'scaffolding' that makes our all linguistic activities possible is found not by conceptual analysis, but by describing actual functioning of the language, i.e. what we really do and think in language. This implies the 'network of rules', so far as rules constitute the 'grammatical multiplicity' of our language. But this 'grammatical multiplicity' of our language can not be thought of as justifying or explaining our language-games. If this way of construing Wittgenstein's notion of grammar is accepted, the grammar might be treated as a network of constitutive rules which is expressed in our actual rule-following cases,[13] which guides our ways of speaking and thinking in ordinary language.

It follows that the institutional aspect of language becomes obvious as we realize that we are members of a tradition that permeates all that we do and say. The intelligibility of language itself follows the path of custom and habit, of rules and regularities. 'The regularity of our language permeates our lives,'[14] says Wittgenstein. And so the thought arises that whoever can get 'behind' the rules or whoever can glimpse the reverse side of the mirror could also grasp the form of life in its essence. But Wittgenstein eschews the search for a speculative or theoretical route: 'No one can push beyond the rules, because there is no Beyond' (*PG*, IV, 24). Is this just another way of saying that the rules themselves provide a final justification for our language-games? Are they the foundation we see? To these questions, Wittgenstein's answer would be that 'grammar is not an account book of language' but it only describes the conditions in which the intelligibility of language becomes possible. In this sense, there is nothing wrong to think that rules constitute language-games which include regularity of the activities given by our culture. Hence, Wittgenstein once remarks:

> What belongs to a language game is a whole culture. In describing musical taste you have to describe whether children give concerts,

whether women do or whether men only give them, etc., etc. In aristocratic circles in Vienna people had [such and such] a taste, then it came into bourgeois circles and women joined choirs, etc. This is an example of tradition in music.[15]

It directs our attention to the effectiveness of tradition, to the totality of rules and practices which provide our lives. From it, we have not only our picture of the world, but also the conviction that it is not necessary to question beyond the forms of life embedded in it. If this is the case, then the form of life represents a foundation only insofar as the network of convictions inside of which we carry on must rest upon it. Wittgenstein significantly notes that 'Much of what we are doing is a question of changing the style of thinking'[16] and 'it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false' (*OC*, Sect. 94). Insofar as this inherited background changes, our judgements and forms of life change. But these changes occur within the framework. Nonetheless, to inquire after the ground and justification of a form of life within that form of life results in nothing but a nonsense question. Hence, Wittgenstein rightly suggests that:

> You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there—like our life (*OC*, Sect. 559).

Wittgenstein compares this background of understanding to a 'world-picture' or a 'mythology' which entreats to 'a system, a structure' of taken-for-granted convictions (*OC*, Sect. 102). Professor R.C. Pradhan observes that 'the mythology which the grammar describes contains the principles constituting reality' and 'the frame of reference which revolves around our life contains the world-picture that gives us the concept of our world and of our relation to the world.'[17] But the frame of reference is not constituted of a 'web of beliefs' or 'set of judgements'. Rather, it is something that is embodied in those shared practices we come to express as we become initiated into the forms of life pervaded in our culture. To substantiate this background of understanding Wittgenstein says, 'it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting which lies at the ground of the language-game' (*OC*, Sect.

204). The ground of our beliefs and practices 'is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting' (*OC*, Sect. 210). Thus, for Wittgenstein, language embodies a grammar which constitutes our sense of reality and grounds our beliefs and ways of doing things. This is perfectly revealed in the following remark:

> What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes (*PI*, Sect. 415).

However, what is crucial to see in this background of understanding is that, for Wittgenstein, grammar can not itself be grounded by appeal to any extra-linguistic facts. According to Wittgenstein's famous thesis of 'autonomy of grammar',[18] since every attempt to justify grammar by appeal to 'facts' about reality itself presupposes the correctness of grammar in question, any such attempted justification begs the question. Insofar as our grammar constitutes what can be said to be reality for us, there is no exit from language to non-linguistic 'facts' about ourselves or our world which could ground the grammar we have. Grammar is also not accounted by the notion of reason since the notion of reason is itself a normative concept. To justify one normative concept by another norm yields nothing. Moreover, what Wittgenstein intends to remind us is that 'I can not use language to get outside of language.'[19] But this does not imply that we create our language-games or their grammar. Because 'a language-game does not have its origin in consideration [or reflection]. Consideration [or reflection] is part of a language-game' (*OC*, Sect. 391). Hence, though language may look 'arbitrary' to the extent that 'the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous' (*Z*, Sect. 320) what, thus makes possible our everyday assertions and denials, testing and disconfirming, explanations and justifications is the framework of our common ways of living which shows our cultural patterns and changing facts of those patterns. Wittgenstein's interest in the framework of our common ways of living is not an interest in anthropology, however. It is only from within a philosophical standpoint that this framework becomes important.

4. AVAILABILITY OF A HOLISTIC AND HERMENEUTIC PERSPECTIVE

Now with the above observations, Wittgenstein's phenomenology of everydayness which is explained as descriptions of language-games and of forms of life leads us to think that his account is anti-dualistic, transcendentally holistic and hermeneutical. Wittgenstein obviously argues against the opposition between subject and object which exalts the traditional distinction between idealism and realism. This distinction has always been parasitic for its sense on the representationalist picture of our situation, according to which reality is either 'out there' independent of us, or 'in here' within the mind. But, for Wittgenstein, the representationalist model is a misleading dilemma of either realism or idealism. Since neither realism nor idealism could help us for a successful representation of the linguistic phenomena and also for ascertainment of certainty, we have to take a middle way escape from both the horns. According to Wittgenstein, we can not explain our activities by recourse to extra-linguistic facts, but neither can we consider the possibility that all there is, is language or mind as opposed to getting in relation with the facts. Rather, what we need is a perspicuous representation of linguistic facts constituted by the background of our grammar.

Given that, Wittgenstein's sense of 'perspicuous representation' exalts a perspective of holism which appears in his convergent pictures of our transactions with the world as constituted by a background of understanding embodied in our practices and represented by our language-games. For Wittgenstein, as we see, the 'essence' of anything (what makes it the object it is) is defined by the 'grammatical multiplicity' of our language games. What things are is inseparable from their place in the contexts of significance opened up by the linguistic customs, conventions, and practices of our life-world. This position explicitly exclaims a holistic frame of language in which both the theoretical and practical aspects of language indicate in the direction of the totality of language. But in no case it need be the case that the holistic frame is shaped in the hurly-burly of empirical facts and of their causal explanations. Rather, if these facts are to be treated as linguistic facts and all justifications of them, they form an organic, transparent totality.

One result of this holism is that understanding always operates within a 'hermeneutic circle'.[20] In a hermeneutical circle our traditional concepts need interpretations which form a part of a critical de-constructed process. But interpreting something is not merely a naysaying. Rather, it is at once both 'destructive' and 'constructive'. In this connection, denying something, we also affirm something. Wittgenstein's idea of philosophy as a deconstructive measure is compatible with hermeneutics as an act of interpretation for the simple reason that the latter is always a dialectical movement between continuity and discontinuity as well as event and structure. That is to say, interpretation always follows the old to fashion the new, i.e., in a nutshell, it is the appropriation of tradition. In Wittgenstein's example, a chemist's investigations are made possible by the fact that he 'has got hold of a definite world-picture, not of course one that he invented: he learned it as a child.' This world-picture 'is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned' (*OC*, Sect. 167). Yet, since a world-picture or mythology 'may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift' (*OC*, Sect. 97), there is no unchanging foundation that depicts the grammar we have. Wittgenstein does not deny the concept-formation and any change of our mode of thinking. He does not prohibit one from thinking about alternative concepts other than the existing one or alternative forms of life other than our own. In this connection, he only suggests that, 'For here life would run on differently—what interests us would not interest them. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which essentially different concepts are imaginable' (*Z*, Sect. 388). But, here, what we necessarily need for this is that these imaginable concepts must be satisfied with our common understanding and communication.

It follows that Wittgenstein's observation of phenomenology of everydayness is hermeneutical to the extent that it undermines the prospects of finding a final explanation or justification for our lives. For he constantly reminds us of 'the groundlessness of our believing', the change of even our most central 'mythology' and the seemingly 'arbitrary' nature of our core beliefs. But, according to Wittgenstein,

this groundlessness does not lead to sceptical resignation or perpetual uncertainty. As he tellingly remarks:

> The difficult thing here is not to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognise the ground that lies before us like life (*RFM*, p. 333).

Recognizing that the foundation of our beliefs and activities in our shared forms of life and in the 'common behaviour of mankind' can throw us back on to the grounds we do have, i.e., our patterns of upbringing, natural primitive responses, capacities for picking up skills, and so on with an essential respect for their indispensability. Paul Seabright favours this point of view in a good sense when he says, 'meanings are not in the head but in the world.'[21] This exclaims that our practices as guided by the steady and regular 'expression of life' of our cultural world, and to realize that, since our shared forms of life constitute our identity and interpretation of it, there is no way to regard them as arbitrary impositions or as mere excess baggage with no real connection to who we really are. To that extent we are really caught in such a 'hermeneutical circle' that enables us to realize that this 'circularity'[22] is an enabling condition which first gives us access to our lives.

To conclude; Wittgenstein seems to be closer with the hermeneutics of tradition-mediation as delineated in his later writings. If this would be the case, it would be impossible to have a misinterpretation of his methodology which is purely descriptive, but not interpretive. He proposes linguistic-intelligibility as a transcendental representation, and arrives at a transcendental holistic description of human culture. His key concepts of 'language-game', 'form of life', 'natural history', 'mythology' and 'grammar' ascertain his position in placing our thought in the close possible contact with the river of change flowing from the heart of a system of 'common behaviour of mankind. That is, since for Wittgenstein philosophy is as a critique of language, his descriptive account of everydayness is, thus, grounded in transcendental holism and hermeneutics.[23]

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1. See, for example, D. Bloor, *Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), K.O. Apel's 'Wittgenstein and the Problem of Hermeneutic Understanding' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments* Vol. IV (ed.) Stuart Shankar (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 70–103, J. Lear's 'Transcendental Anthropology' in *Subject, Thought and Context* (eds) P. Pettit and J. McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Rudolf Haller's 'The Common Behaviour of Mankind' in *Questions of Wittgenstein* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), pp. 114–27, S. Hilmy's *The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), etc.

2. See Nicholas F. Gier, *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology* (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1981), Chap 3. Gier attempts a convincing exposition of Wittgenstein's affinities with life-philosophy.

3. See Herbert Schandelbach, *Philosophy in Germany: 1831–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) for an effective estimation of the concept of life in German thought.

4. All Wittgenstein's textual reference would be made in this paper according to the abbreviations as: *B.B.: The Blue and Brown Book* (Oxford, 1960), *PI: Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1958), *PG: Philosophical Grammar* (Oxford, 1974), *RFM: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (Oxford, 1978), *OC: On Certainty* (Oxford, 1969), *Z: Zettel* (Oxford, 1967).

5. See Rudolf Haller, 'The Common Behaviour of Mankind' in his *Questions of Wittgenstein*, pp. 115–16.

6. See T.R. Schatzki's valuable discussion of Wittgenstein's method as a 'Phenomenology of the Everyday' in 'The Prescription is Description: Wittgenstein's View of the Human Sciences' in *The Need for Interpretation*, (eds) S. Mitchell and M. Rosen (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities, 1983).

7. See Richard Rorty, 'Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments' in *Nous*, 5 (1971), pp. 3–14, Charles Taylor 'The opening arguments of Hegel's phenomenology' in *Hegel: A Collection of Essays*, (ed.) A. MacIntyre (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1972), Lynn Rudder Baker's 'On the very idea of a form of life' in *Inquiry*, 27 (1984), pp. 277–89, and also see Professor R.C. Pradhan's *Language and Experience: An Interpretation of the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Anu Books, Meerut, India, 1981).

8. See, for instance, Rorty's 'Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments' and Taylor's 'The Opening Arguments of Hegel's Phenomenology'.

9. See Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language—An Elementary Exposition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). Also see my book, *Rule-Scepticism: A Study in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein and Kripke* (Anu Books, Meerut, India, 2000), Chapters II and III.

10. See S. Behera, '*Rule-Scepticism—A Study in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein and Kripke*, pp. 71–7.

11. Ibid., Chapters III and IV.

12. See Professor R.C. Pradhan, 'A Note on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Grammar' in his *Truth, Meaning and Understanding: Essays in Philosophical Semantics* (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 140–53.

13. See S. Behera, *Rule-Scepticism*, Chapter II.

14. See L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Color*, G.E.M. Anscombe (ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), p. 303.

15. See L. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Cyril Barrett (ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), p. 8.

16. Ibid., p. 28.

17. See Professor R.C. Pradhan, 'A Note on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Grammar' in his *Truth, Meaning and Understanding*, p. 151.

18. Ibid., pp. 146–9. Professor Pradhan's illuminating insights on the thesis of 'autonomy of grammar' indicate a very striking feature of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar in particular and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in general.

19. See L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, R. Rhees (ed.), (Trans.) Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 54.

20. See Professor R. Sundara Rajan, 'The Essential Contestability of Social Sciences: A Hermeneutic Perspective' in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. I, No. 1 (1983), pp. 1–12, Professor Sundara Rajan claims that we cannot avoid an ultimate appeal to a common understanding of the expressions. This is one of the aspects of what is called the hermeneutical circle.

21. See Paul Seabright, 'Explaining Cultural Divergence: A Wittgensteinian Paradox' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 84, (1987), p. 22.

22. Its central idea is the Wittgensteinian image of human being who is bound by various kinds of not easily separable relationships with other human beings and the world. Here, human understanding is inextricably connected with action. Consequently, our common understanding changes our way of life; but also our way of life has a great impact on the contents of our common understanding. In this connection, see Professor R. Sundara

Rajan, *Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* (ICPR Publications, New Delhi, 1991), Chapters 1, 2 and 9.

23. This essay is a modified version of my paper entitled 'Wittgenstein's Phenomenology of Everydayness: A Hermeneutic Look' which was presented at the ICPR National Seminar on the theme *Hermeneutics as a Philosophical Method* held at the Department of P.G. Studies and Research in Philosophy, R.D. University, Jabalpur, 25–27 March 2001. In this connection, I owe my gratitude to Professor S.P. Dubey, Professor Chhaya Rai, Professor D.N. Tiwari, and, especially, to Professor R.C. Pradhan, Member-Secretary, ICPR, New Delhi, for their appreciation and suggestions to make necessary modifications.

Eclecticism—A Compromise or An Emergent Synthesis?

PRATIBHA KHANNA

Professor, Department of Education, D.D.U. Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur

The working out of philosophy to guide ones life process is an inevitable activity for a rational being such as man. Now the question arises that how does man reach his philosophy. A close look reveals that ones philosophy is made up of the sum of the truths one sees. Thus if the truths are many and varied, the resultant philosophy will be eclectic rather than a consistent, comprehensive entity.

A.N. Whitehead (1997: 201) asserts that, 'a philosopher of imposing stature doesn't think in a vacuum. Even his most abstract ideas are to some extent, conditioned by what is, or what is not known in the time when he lives.' Thus not many of the great thinkers are perfectly typical in their beliefs, which leads to eclecticism in their ideas. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), for example, is not a pure Naturalist but as a Realist he believes that there is a reality beyond nature even though unknowable (Durant, 1948: 316). Hence, many great thinkers have plural strands in their philosophy because their intuition makes them accept truth wherever they may find it. In other words they are unclassifiable. Aristotle (384–322 BC) is an apt example, being an Idealist having a scientific temper quite like a Realist (Durant, 1948: Ch II).

This unclassifiable quality is a prevalent trait of not just thinkers but also of most contemporary systems of thought not because of their greatness but because of their sophistication, their knowledge of the history of thought and their striving for originality. The difference between the original thinker and the eclectic in this respect is rather gradual, since no degree of originality can safely ignore the history of thought, or decline taking from whatever source what it finds true. Aristotle then may be regarded as an eclectic and St. Thomas Acquinas (1225–1274) who created a compound of Aristotle with Christian theology, still more so. It is this trait, which has led to James S. Ross's

(1972: 83) assertion that Pragmatism is a link between Idealism and Naturalism.

ECLECTICISM REDEFINED

The *New Penguin English Dictionary* (2000) defines eclecticism as a composition of elements drawn from various sources, various doctrines, method or styles. Hocking (1939: 486) defines it as, 'the assemblage of beliefs from various sources into a composite philosophy.' These definitions point at an eclectic compromise arrived at by selecting aspects of opposing theories and taking a position somewhere between them. Bigge (1971: 1) is of the opinion that this elective, selective borrowing, from various outlooks and arranging them into a 'mosaic' or 'patchwork', which is available for one to draw upon as the need arises, is the basic weakness of eclecticism. A person dedicated to it, he says, has no defensible systematic basis for knowing when to use discrete aspects of respective positions, thus the choice of outlook and method for each situation is largely a matter of whim or chance.

Hocking (1939: 488) contends that 'ones first business as a knower of the world is accumulation', that, 'it is always a self that accumulates and self is a unity which cannot forever live or face the prospect of living with mental disorder'. Therefore, he says, a rational self cannot rest unless he discovers a single principle uniting the scattered insights or truths into an inclusive whole, a worldview, a philosophy to live by.

Radhakrishnan (2000: 1) agrees that, 'Man cannot rest in an unresolved discord. He must seek for harmony, strive for adjustment. His progress is marked by a series of integration, by the formation of more and more comprehensive harmonies.' This integrationist approach thus, will lead to an emergent synthesis which is the call of the hour.

Bigge (1971: 1), says that an educator in embracing an educational philosophy has three possible choices. He may conform rigidly to one systematic philosophy or he may eclectically, selectively borrow from various systems and arrange his ideas into a mosaic or he may develop an 'emergent synthesis'. Clarifying this concept he says that an emergent, 'is something novel which appears in the course of evolution of ideas, it is not a compromise but a genuinely new systematic outlook which benefits from knowledge of previously developed philosophies.'

Such an emergent outlook, when it reflects the results of the interplay of conflicting ideas and arrives at something new, is a synthesis. Thus an emergent synthesis is achieved by selecting and modifying knowledge from already developed systematic philosophies. This, we may say is the final resting-place for a rational, albeit an eclectic thinker.

THE FIRST STAGE OF PHILOSOPHY

Eclecticism then, is a natural result of the way of reaching philosophy in which the age believes, the prevalent beliefs which are peculiar to no one school of thought. It is the way of putting experience first and letting categorization into a coherent whole follow along. Thus, a degree of incoherence or disorder in ones philosophical outlook does not condemn it, but rather depicts its immaturity. William James (1842–1910) is an example in whose thought Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism and Mysticism coexisted without achieving consistency. Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy has also been described as naturalistic in its setting, idealistic in its aims, and pragmatic in its method and programme work.

THE ASSEMBLAGE OF THOUGHTS

Eclecticism, the assemblage of thoughts, from various sources into a composite philosophy has been frequently resorted to by thinkers who have greater ingenuity than originality, who lack explorative spirit but possess a sensitive docility in appropriating the thoughts of others. Thus, according to Hocking, 'eclectic' is a term in philosophy not of the highest honour. It is applied to such thinkers as Philo of Alexandria, Simplicus, Cicero, Horace, and Victor Cousin (Hocking, 1939: 486). French philosopher and educator Victor Cousin (1762–1867) stated this principle in support of eclecticism, that, each system is but incomplete and that in reuniting all incomplete systems we should have a complete philosophy. This principle presupposes that all philosophical truths of the world have already been proposed and it is left to the present philosophical mind to judiciously select and assemble. Actually philosophy is a dynamic rather than static discipline, thereby rejecting this principle.

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THE COLLECTOR'S STAGE

Yet again, eclecticism is a preliminary stage of philosophy—the collector's stage (Power, 1970: 144) which is characterized by the virtue of toleration—toleration for others' point of view, typical of an incompletely certain mind. A completely certain mind on the other hand, would not vacillate from belief to disbelief, from one opinion to another. Thus eclecticism and scepticism would be closely aligned, because one who takes something from every side necessarily discounts each side in its totality. According to Hocking, mental hospitality is in danger of finding itself encumbered with an ill-fitting assortment of beliefs, composed of fragments from various types of philosophies as there is 'something in all of them'. Eclecticism, thus, as a worldview is a naïve and impressionistic hodge-podge which is the result of inexperienced thinking. Here 'universal hospitality' is the affirmative side of 'universal doubt'.

ECLECTICISM LEADS TO CONSISTENCY

Thus, eclecticism may be a necessary first stage of accumulation to go through but it cannot be the final resting place of thought because no rational mind can fail to find an overt or latent consistency in their scattered insights of truth, thereby giving their worldview a principle of unity. Ones philosophy is not ones collection of beliefs, rather it is ones principle to live by, and a philosophy to guide life must necessarily be a cohesive whole.

METHOD OF REACHING CONSISTENCY OF PRINCIPLE—INDUCTIVE

The dialectic or inductive method is the way of achieving this principle. The dialectic method of Plato and Socrates was a form of mental experimentation; wherein the various hypotheses considered would be those which were upheld in the current philosophies of the day. Each hypothesis would be argued to its logical conclusion, thus each philosophy would contribute its quota to the final result or the true hypothesis or the 'dialectic survivor'.

Hegel (1770–1831) applied the inductive method to the history of philosophy and found the various divergent philosophies begetting one

another and giving way to their synthesis. In this way valid elements of the opposing types of philosophies are preserved in the final result. That is, examining and accepting divergent viewpoints, one arrives at ones own worldview. Thus, is achieved a worldview, a philosophy of vast empirical and historical richness.

In short, it may be said that no matter what ones philosophy is, it will necessarily correspond with one or more of the prevalent types of philosophy for they present on fundamental questions, the metaphysical, epistemological and axiological, the possible alternatives. Thus, we cannot avoid bringing the various 'isms' into our collection of thoughts. There is no wishing them away. But this does not mean that every school of thought would be an addition of heterogeneous truths, or a compromise. Rather a synthesis of these divergent truths will lead to a principle—the eventual principle of ones philosophy to hold—a rescue from eclecticism. Since each human being is both universal and unique, the principle so arrived at would also be both universal and unique. Universal, as sharing a world of sense, of thought and of history with others of his kind and unique in seeing it from a position and light peculiar to himself. So his principle of philosophy would also be unique and universal at the same time. Rather it will be unique first, arising out of his intuition of reality and universal later as he tries to express or convey it, which are at once his duty and his happiness.

SYNTHETICAL TRENDS IN PRESENT TIMES

A marked tendency in present-day thought seems to be a desire to examine various philosophies in the belief that any school of thought which holds, or has held, a large number of people in its sway must have some measure of truth. In this process a synthetic doctrine is formulated for us. We are truly eclectics, in that we select doctrines that appeal to us emphasizing their likenesses rather than differences and lumping them together with a view to constructing common principles.

Clear examples of this synthetic trend are visible in religious thoughts. Whereas the nineteenth century was an age of schism, the twentieth seems to be an age of reunion with various branches of Christianity moving towards a comprehensive reunion. Politics provides yet

another example of this trend seen in the breaking down of rigid party distinctions, paving the way to coalitions. Coalitions are the order of the day and that is why it has been said that politics makes strange bedfellows. Thus, two ideologically opposing factions come together and unite for a common purpose of governing. In the same way divergent philosophical principles motivated by a common purpose of guiding life must necessarily move towards a unity of principles, an emergent synthesis.

ECLECTICISM IN EDUCATION

The same eclectic and synthetical activity is evidenced in educational practice. Hardly any schools can be labeled as truly Montessori, Kindergarten, Dalton or Basic. This is a result of our genius to allow new ideas to permeate the old, to keep what has been of value in the old thus moving towards a more enlightened educational practice.

The same synthetical trend is also visible in educational theory. If the guiding philosophy is synthetic, it follows that the aims of education will also be synthetic and comprehensive. It also follows that the curriculum will be broad-based and the methods of education varied. In this way, neglecting nothing of value that any important school of thought may have to contribute, we hope to arrive at a comprehensive philosophy of education, which will be inclusive rather than just eclectic.

In the field of education today, Eclecticism is indicative of a harmonious blend of diverse philosophies. Each of the philosophical schools of Idealism, Naturalism, Realism, Pragmatism and Existentialism having some idea of import to contribute to some area of education such as the aims, content or methodology. If John Dewey's (1859–1952) view that 'education is the continuous reconstruction and reorganization of experience' is accepted, it points towards a dynamic educational process that no rigid philosophy can guide (Power, 1970: Ch XVI). Also for a philosophy to be dynamic it must be amenable to change and this change will be guided by the particular worldview prevalent at that particular time. Such a philosophical stand cannot but be hospitable to other views, thus providing a fertile ground for Eclecticism.

Moreover, no education system is deduced from a particular philosophy because no system of thought can be considered complete in itself or totally correct. Rather in the words of Ross (1972: 85) 'Most educational systems draw their sustenance from more than one school of philosophical thought, they are to a greater or lesser degree eclectic.' In matters of education, therefore, it is difficult to arrive at definite conclusions, as there is a great variety in assumptions. By implication it also becomes difficult to talk about a philosophy of education in absolutes only, that is, making a claim that there can be only one philosophy of education or that one philosophical position is better than another.

A consideration of the aims of modern education would lead us to a study of several schools of philosophical thought at the same time (O'Connor, 1967: 8–9). The Idealistic contention that education should lead to 'self realization' or realization of the potentialities of an individual cannot be ignored, but modern education cannot limit itself merely to individual development; it must further seek to develop the individual to make him capable of contributing his mite to society. Thus the aim of 'preparation for life' or 'vocational development aim' of the Realist philosopher comes to the fore in educational practice today. Responsible citizenship is the call of the hour, not just at the national level but internationally too, hence Pragmatism as a school of philosophy supporting this aim cannot be ignored. A synthetic trend is thus visible as modern education derives the aims and objectives that are to guide it from various sources of philosophy.

The content of education today, shows the same synthetical trends as it grows more and more broad-based including within its ambit the natural sciences advocated by Naturalism, the social sciences emphasized by Pragmatism and vocational preparation education supported by Realism. Idealism, not to be outdone in this race for contributing to the content of education, is knocking at the doors of educational content with its ancient sciences such as Astrology, and Vedic 'Karmkand' etc.

Methodology is an area of educational philosophy influenced by Pragmatism with its utilitarian and practical methods of education (Power, 1970: Ch. XVI). The child-centered and psychological methods

of Naturalism also contribute their mite to the area of methodology in modern education.

The education of the present times can only be summed up as one in which the entire context of any pupil's educative experience is changing fast and constantly. The very idea of a complete preparation for life is becoming illusory, and education can only be of conditional value in the light of kaleidoscopic new situations (Thakur, 1977: 64). New items of learning claim priority, new constellations of subjects provide new insights and the primacy claimed by science and technology is already being challenged by the human and social sciences. In such a scenario Eclecticism, leading to an emergent synthesis, alone can guide us and form the basis of our education system.

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Fichte—The Forgotten Philosopher

DAYA KRISHNA

Jaipur

Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* was published in 1789 in Leipzig, Germany, just eight years after the second edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was published in that country. Yet, while Kant's work is known all the world over, Fichte's is still an unknown quantity, hardly known even amongst the cognoscenti who are supposed to be familiar with western philosophy in general and modern philosophy in particular.

It is time that this deficiency is remedied, and the recent new translation of the work by Peter Heath and John Lachs and published by the Cambridge University Press, 1982, provides us just the opportunity for doing that.

Fichte's is a strange work, perhaps unique in the history of philosophy as it takes us, step-by-step, through the process by which 'thinking' reaches the conclusion in a dialectically developing manner, reminding us both of Plato in the way that Socrates develops his argument in the *Dialogues* and of the manner in which Hegel unfolds the progress of Reason in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.

But Plato, though he knew of Dialectics, did not use it systematically. His was a piecemeal approach, taking each concept individually and trying to understand it through an analysis which was dialectical in nature. Hegel's, on the other hand, was a systematic approach but it started from 'Being' or rather what Aristotle called 'Being-qua-Being' or 'Pure Being' which was neither 'this' nor 'that' and hence was as good as 'Nothing'.

The 'Being' of Hegel, however, though the most 'universal' of 'universals' has no 'self-evident' certainty in it as it is not 'self-grounded' as Spinoza's 'Substance' or Descartes' 'Dubito' or rather 'Cogito' as he called it. The difference between the two is enormous, even though it

has not been noticed, Spinoza's 'Substance' has only a 'definitional necessity' while that in Descartes is an 'existential' one. The real ontological argument in Descartes is the one relating to the self and not the one relating to God, even though he thought otherwise.

Fichte opts for the Cartesian move but grounds it in the self-certifying necessity of logic without which self-reflective thought which is another name for 'philosophy' cannot move. For him, 'I think' is secondary to 'I am' and the latter reflects and is reflected in the logical law of identity which Aristotle had formulated as 'A is A' or as Fichte puts it 'A = A'. The former, that is 'I am', is more fundamental for him than the latter, as the latter only formulates the former at the reflective level. But this formulation can only be in the form 'I am I' or 'I = I' which surely is different from the foundational existential reality embodied in the statement 'I am'.

Kant had already drawn attention to this distinction but did not know what to do with it. He had made a four-fold distinction in this context. Besides the 'self-as-it-is-in-itself', he had drawn the distinction between 'I-as-I-appear-to-myself', 'I-as-I-am-conscious-of-myself' and what he called 'I am'. The last, strangely, as Fichte recognized, is not a judgement proper or rather not a judgement at all. He called it a 'thetic judgement', perhaps because it is a sheer assertion without any predication at all. It is what he called the 'self's positing of itself' which, like the 'performatives' of Austin, brings into 'being' that which it talks about. Perhaps, the word 'posit' does not convey exactly what is meant and the word 'assert' or 'affirm' would convey better the sense conveyed by the German word 'Setzen'.

In any case, once one starts with the absolute self-certitude of 'I am', the problem is what to do next. It should be remembered at this point that the 'I' being talked about is not a substance as it has no properties. In this, it is unlike Spinoza's substance which is supposed to have 'attributes' and cannot be thought without them.

But what is perhaps even more important than this is that the 'I' of the 'I am' is not an 'object' of reflection or reflective awareness as then it would become in Kantian terminology either 'I-as-I-am-conscious-of-myself' or 'I-as-I-appear-to-myself'. In fact, one wonders what Fichte, or even Kant, would say to the formulation 'I am I', as the second 'I'

is not exactly a predicate nor the pure self-positing of the self as the first seems to be. It is *not* a 'posit', but a positive assertion analogous to that of the 'I am' but of a radically different kind, though seldom seen as such and usually confused with it. It is, to use Kant's term, 'I-as-I-am-conscious-of-myself', half-way on the road to 'seeing' oneself as an 'object', but not yet achieving that 'objecthood' which comes with what has been called the 'empirical ego'.

Fichte does not clearly distinguish between these different stages as Kant does. But he is aware of the complexity involved in the assertion or 'positing' which Kant is not. The assertion is an 'act', a 'determination', a 'limitation' and hence points to, or rather presupposes in the Kantian 'transcendental' sense of the term, that which is 'unbounded', 'undetermined', 'infinite' and yet which itself has become to some extent at least the 'opposite' of these by the very fact that 'I am' has been asserted or posited. Yet, it is not clear to what extent it has been 'limited', but *only* that it *must* have been so limited by the very fact of the situation. Fichte introduces the notion of 'divisibility' or 'quantitative limitation' to denote this.

Kant had already opened the way to this by his strange and enigmatic postulation of the judgement he called 'infinite' which occurs under the heading of 'quality'. This judgement is a strange concoction as it is, in a sense, both affirmative and negative at the same time. Taking a cue from Aristotelian logic, where a technique was invented to change a negative proposition into its corresponding affirmative, Kant picked up the same but 'saw' in it what the Aristotelians had not seen. The negative predicate which was formed out of the negation and *affirmed* of the subject contained practically an infinite multitude of membership '*excluding*' only those which belonged to the class which the negative judgement had *denied* of the subject. Any negative predicate formed from 'p' such as 'not-p' will contain in it everything except 'p' and hence will be 'infinite' in character. The judgement 's *is* not-p' unlike 's is p', therefore, was said by Kant to be 'infinite' or '*unendlich*' as he called it in German. But he also saw that inspite of its being 'infinite' it introduces a limitation and hence called the corresponding category 'limitation'.

Fichte saw the transcendental possibilities of the Kantian innovation and suggested that the counter-assertion or the counter-positing of 'not I' was involved in the very positive assertion of 'I am' which was the primordial fact one encounters when one embarks on the process of self-conscious reflective activity which was 'reflective' in character and hence was called philosophy. But the moment one sees this, one is faced with the problem of the interrelationship between the two and the quantity and extent of the influence, effectivity or determination of each by the other.

Kant had opened the way for that also. In his discussion of judgement and categories under 'Relation', he had mentioned the categorical, the hypothetical and the disjunctive judgement along with the corresponding categories of inherence, causality and reciprocity respectively. Inherence, it should be remembered, is a relation between substance and 'accidence' while causality is a relation between cause and effect. As for 'reciprocity', at least for Kant, it is *not* what is called 'circular causation', but a direct result of the fact that the disjunctive judgement *divides* the totality into two parts through unbounded negation which, though excluding each other because of this, still form a totality which exhausts the universe, at least logically. Kant, of course, did not anticipate the logical possibility of 'non-exclusive' disjunction accepted in modern logic, nor did he see that pure dichotomous division does not obtain in the empirical domain as there it always gives rise to fuzzy boundaries, an observation that has given rise to what are called 'fuzzy logics' in recent times.

But Fichte somehow seems aware of this, as he continuously talks of the shifting boundaries between the 'I' and the 'not-I', or the self and the not-self. The very notions of quantitative and qualitative variation within and between the self and the not-self involve this. Besides, the continuous transition and variation in the use of the concepts to describe the shifting shades of the interrelationship attests this. And, everything comes in a pair, for it is a *relation* between the self and the not-self where each is defined by the other, at least within the framework of Kant's critical philosophy which he unreservedly accepts. But there still remains an asymmetry between the two which Fichte does not know how to deal with.

The asymmetry is two-fold: the first relating to the indeterminate, almost infinite extent of anything that is defined purely negatively by exclusion, the second by the fact that 'freedom' seems to belong *only* to the self or the 'I' which in asserting or positing itself proclaims it as loudly as anything can. The '*am*' of the 'I am' does just that. The 'free act' which evidences this freedom is, as Fichte is careful to point out, without any 'object' just as the 'I' which is posited has no predicate. This is the most primordial ontological 'performative' to use a term from Austin, on which everything seems to be based at least in a phenomenological existential perspective whose first draft Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* is, long before Husserl used the term and laid claim to be the original founder of that type of 'philosophizing' in philosophy.

But in spite of these basic asymmetries, there is a strange element in Fichte's thought which not only mitigates, but runs counter to it as it tends to nullify the 'opposition' produced by the analysis. The very fact that there is a primordial 'act' involved in the assertion or positing of the self implies, for Fichte, that the self must have been 'formed' or 'determined' by this act to some extent and hence must have had an element of 'passivity' which is opposed to it. In fact, at a deeper level, even though Fichte does not seem to see it at least as clearly as he could have, the not-self or the not-I is within the 'self' or the 'I', or rather an integral part of itself. But if it is so, the 'opposition', though genuine at every level, is ultimately secondary as even its possibility is sustained by the underlying unity which supports it. Without this underlying unity, the opposing elements would fall completely apart and thus cease to be opposites, as to be 'opposite' they have to be conjoined and 'felt' to be such. And, it is this 'feeling' that provides the dynamic force for the attempt at its overcoming which leads Fichte's thought in a direction that Kant never took.

The dynamic direction that this gives to his thought makes not only the boundary between self and not-self ever-changing but brings imagination and time into the picture which is perhaps unique in the history of thought on the subject.

Kant had already brought both in the centre of philosophical discussion, but not in the way Fichte did. Time, for him, was an *a priori* form

of inner sensibility, but not of the infinite outward movement of the self in its striving to resolve the opposition it continuously encounters in its 'reflection' on itself which is an intrinsic and inalienable feature of self-consciousness.

But self-consciousness does not have only the so-called 'outward' movement necessitated by the awareness of the not-self and the 'conflicting oppositions' this awareness engenders but also that 'reversion' or 'turning back' into itself which is another side of the same situation. Fichte does talk of this but does not see that this involves as much an 'infinite' movement 'inwards' as the outward movement about which he writes so eloquently. Perhaps he did not do so as the distinction between the 'self' and the 'not-self' cannot be drawn sharply in the inward direction and is, in any case, relative in character. This point has been grasped and powerfully argued for in some traditions of Indian philosophizing as that of *Sāṁkhya* but in Fichte it is, or ought to be, a necessary consequence of the insight that the self and the not-self are related by a 'reciprocal inter-determination' which affects them at every level.

The 'feeling' which gives rise to this perennial attempt at a 'reconciliation of opposites' is not that of pain or suffering, as has been asserted *ad nauseam* in the Indian tradition, but rather that of 'dissatisfaction' with what one apprehends 'reflectively' as obtaining at every level of self-consciousness, There is thus felt a 'drive' arising from within and a 'demand' shaped by 'imagination' resulting in a 'longing' for 'something', a sort of 'know-not-what-I-want' impelling one 'outward' and 'onward' into the future and thus getting involved or caught in the endlessly stretching infinity of time.

But neither the 'demand' nor the 'longing' is ever satisfied as it always meets a 'check', to use Fichte's phrase, and results many a time in the self's reverting back to itself in what he calls the 'return-journey' by which the self seems to seek itself. Both the 'journeys' are in a sense 'unending' though, for some reason, Fichte does not seem to think so about the latter. Perhaps, this is because he had started with the self-as-positing-itself or the 'I-am' as asserting itself. But this, though 'absolute' and 'unconditioned' in a certain sense, finds also a 'check' not in any external sense, but within itself as, firstly, the 'act' is hardly

an act as it has no power of any kind and, secondly, the so-called 'I' is as empty as it can be. The 'act', to use Fichte's phrase, has no 'object' or rather end or purpose or 'objective' and hence the question of 'being efficient' or 'effectivity' cannot even arise. As for the 'I', it has not and can have no predicate and hence is as 'vacuous' as the 'act' which it is supposed to perform.

It is not that Fichte is not aware of this but, basically, he does not know what to do with this. Is this the 'real' self which one has to 'realize', the self which has no predicates and no 'object' as it alone *is*, without even the sense of the 'I' which, as he sees rightly, has to have a 'not-I' to distinguish itself from. This, for him, is sheer nothing, though he also calls it 'the absolute' many a time. But even if one accepts that this equation of the 'absolute' with 'nothing' is correct, as accepts that this equation of the 'absolute' with 'nothing' is correct, as Hegel said later of Spinoza's 'substance', there still remains the problem as to why in the 'striving towards an ever-extending infinity', it is *only* the not-self that demands or requires that it 'ought' to be moulded or shaped or patterned according to the 'ideals' or the so-called 'categorical imperative' which is involved, for him, as for Kant, in the very notion or idea or reality of the self.

One reason for this may be that, at the level of reflection, where alone philosophy exists, everything has to be seen as a not-self, as the so-called 'self' is only a formal logical, or rather 'transcendental', presupposition which also somehow seems to be 'existentially' real because of the sense of the 'I' which, though perpetually changing in its reference being an 'indexical' expression like 'this', projects an illusory sense of substantiality providing the 'self' with an ontological being distinct from the not-self.

But the idea of the not-self would have to be analyzed more carefully, if this way of seeing Fichte is accepted, as what we would actually have on our hands at the phenomenological-existential level is only the not-self masquerading as 'self'. This, however, Fichte could not do as, unlike Kant, he started not with the 'given' of sense-experience or even what both he and Kant call 'presentation', but rather with the self-as-positing-itself, the correlate of what Reason finds in itself at the foundational level, the law of identity in which it articulates itself as 'A=A'. This is what Kant had meant by 'transcendental

unity of apperception' and which (the self) Fichte sees as providing the unshakable fundamental unity that synthesizes *all* the oppositions and contradictions that his analysis discloses in the course of a work that should have been a landmark in the history of philosophy, but which somehow has been forgotten for reasons best known to those who have written on it.

Fichte tried to present the views propounded in his *Science of Knowledge* in a clearer and more intelligible manner in his subsequent writings, the two of which have recently been published under the title *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy* edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale, published by Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1998. He seems to suggest a slight shift in the emphasis as he now seems to accord primacy to practical reason over the theoretical; something that had begun to be evident at the end of the *Science of Knowledge* itself. The theoretical reason, according to Fichte, reveals itself in the activity of reflective 'reverting' of self-consciousness on itself as it tries to understand what exactly happens in the movement and structure of consciousness where alone philosophy arises and has its being. The practical reason on the other hand reflects on the primordial act by which the self posits or asserts itself and the dialectics thus engendered between itself and the not-self which indefinitely extends in the outward movement of consciousness, the successive stages of which he has tried to delineate to some extent in the latter part of the *Science of Knowledge* itself. Fichte's enterprise has to be carried further and as he perhaps suggests, both the 'outward' and the 'inward' movements are two sides of the same consciousness, one of which is called 'practical' and the other 'cognitive' or theoretical.

A Resurrection of Mates' Problem*

SIVAKUMAR ELAMBOORANAN

21, First Street, Thirumudi Nagar, Pondicherry 605 001

In the second section of *Synonymy and the Analysis of Belief Sentences*,[1] Hilary Putnam offers a solution to a problem that Benson Mates raises[2] for Rudolph Carnap's proposal[3] to use the notion of intensional isomorphism as an explicans for synonymy.[4] The general idea behind Carnap's suggestion is that two sentences are synonymous if they are *intensionally isomorphic* with each other. Carnap's effective definition of 'intensional isomorphism' may be stated as follows:

> If S and S* are sentences that are grammatically constructed in the same way from corresponding constituents having the same intension, then S and S* are *intensionally isomorphic* with each other.

Let us say that two sentences that are constructed to the specifications of this definition are C-intensionally isomorphic. Further, let us agree that by 'Carnap's Proposal' we mean:

> Two sentences are synonymous if they are C-intensionally isomorphic with each other.

Mates' problem shows that Carnap's Proposal may not be workable because contexts exist in which substitution of an expression occurring in a sentence by another expression that is C-intensionally isomorphic with the first expression does not result in a sentence that is synonymous with the first sentence, even though both sentences are C-intensionally isomorphic. Mates' example will clarify this. The sentences

(1) Whoever believes that D believes that D

and

(2) Whoever believes that D believes that D*

are C-intensionally isomorphic, and therefore synonymous on Carnap's Proposal, if D and D* are also C-intensionally isomorphic. Given that (1) and (2) are synonymous, one bears the same attitude to the proposition expressed by one of these sentences that she may bear to the proposition expressed by the other. The possibility that one could doubt that (2) while not doubting that (1), though, suggests that (1) and (2) may not be synonymous despite their being C-intensionally isomorphic. Carnap's Proposal to explain synonymy in terms of intensional isomorphism, therefore, may have to be abandoned. This is just Mates' problem for Carnap's Proposal.

Essentially, Putnam's solution to Mates' problem consists in modifying Carnap's definition of intensional isomorphism in a way that precludes the intensional isomorphism of (1) and (2). Putnam's modified definition is:

If S and S* are sentences that have the same logical structure and their corresponding constituents have the same intensions, then S and S* are *intensionally isomorphic* with each other.

We will say that the sentences that are constructed to the specifications of Putnam's modified definition are P-intensionally isomorphic. Based on this modified definition, Putnam proposes a variant of Carnap's Proposal:

Two sentences are synonymous if they are P-intensionally isomorphic with each other.

Let us call this 'Putnam's Proposal'. We will have more to say about P-intensional isomorphism and Putnam's Proposal shortly.

For now, suffice to say that Putnam modifies Carnap's definition of intensional isomorphism in such a way as to make it impossible to hold that (1) and (2) are P-intensionally isomorphic, making it impossible to get Mates' objection off the ground. For, if (1) and (2) are not P-intensionally isomorphic, Putnam's Proposal will not entail that they are synonymous. Putnam therefore suggests that P-intensional isomorphism should replace C-intensional isomorphism as the explicans for synonymy.

I wish to argue here that Putnam's Proposal, based on P-intensional isomorphism, while it succeeds in meeting the criticism prompted by the particular kind of belief-context sentences that Mates discusses [(1) and (2)], succumbs to a version of the Matesian criticism in other kinds of oblique-context sentences (§ II).[5] I will therefore hold that Putnam's proposal must be rejected (in § III). First, however, I will reconstruct Mates' objection to Carnap's Proposal and discuss Putnam's answer to it (§ I).

I

Consider two C-intensionally isomorphic sentences D and D*. Following Putnam, let us take D to be 'All Greeks are Greeks' and D* to be 'All Greeks are Hellenes'. Putnam assumes that 'Greek' and 'Hellene' are synonyms, though it is sufficient for his purpose to assume that they are co-intensional. Given that 'Greek' and 'Hellene' are co-intensional, it follows that D and D* are C-intensionally isomorphic. By Carnap's Proposal, their C-intensional isomorphism also makes them synonymous. And given the C-intensional isomorphism of D and D*, we have that (1) and (2) are in turn C-intensionally isomorphic and so, again by Carnap's Proposal, synonymous.

However, the possibility that one could doubt that (2) without doubting that (1) indicates that in fact these two sentences are not synonymous. To make this point forcefully, Putnam considers the sentences

(3) Nobody doubts that (1)

and

(4) Nobody doubts that (2).

Now (1) and (2) being C-intensionally isomorphic, it follows that (3) and (4) are also C-intensionally isomorphic, and so by Carnap's Proposal, synonymous. Since it is practically certain that nobody doubts that (1), Putnam takes (3) to be true. Somebody could doubt that (2), though, and this would make (4) false, leaving us with two synonymous sentences having opposite truth-values. On the strong reading of synonymy—that synonymous sentences are interchangeable in attitude—and other oblique-contexts, substitution of (1) for (2) in (3) [or (2) for

(1) in (4)] preserves the sense, and so the truth-value, of (3) [or (4)]; i.e., (3) and (4) must have the same truth-value. But since (3) and (4) have opposite truth-values, they cannot be considered synonymous. Carnap's Proposal, therefore, may have to be abandoned if no suitable solution to Mates' problem can be found.

This objection seems all the more powerful when we recognize that any notion which purports to explain synonymy will suffer the same fate as intensional isomorphism at Mates' hands. For, the validity of Mates' argument is not affected if 'intensionally isomorphic' is substituted by any proposed explicans for synonymy, even the term 'synonymy' itself!

Given the felt synonymy of terms like 'Greek' and 'Hellene', however, the synonymy of (3) and (4) must follow on Carnap's Proposal; and if (3) and (4) turn out to be synonymous, we are committed to the untenable proposition that synonymous sentences can have opposite truth-values. As Mates points out, we are forced to deny the synonymy of 'Greek' and 'Hellene', in fact the synonymy of any two words, if we take this argument seriously.

However, Putnam's intuition about the felt synonymy of words such as 'Greek' and 'Hellene' seems undeniable. He therefore proceeds to deny that the synonymy of (3) and (4) follows from that of 'Greek' and 'Hellene' in the light of Putnam's Proposal. This proposal, again, is simply that two sentences are synonymous if they are P-intensionally isomorphic with each other. His definition of 'intensional isomorphism' precludes the intensional isomorphism, and therefore the synonymy, of (3) and (4). Recall that his understanding of 'intensional isomorphism' is:

If S and S* are sentences that have the same logical structure and their corresponding constituents have the same intension, then S and S* are *intensionally isomorphic* with each other.

He says that this modified definition is motivated by the greater plausibility of the thesis

(h) the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure

than of the thesis

(g) the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts.

How does this meet Mates' criticism? While 'Greek' and 'Hellene' are (taken to be) synonyms, Putnam's choices for D and D*, viz., 'All Greeks are Greeks' and 'All Greeks are Hellenes', now are not P-intensionally isomorphic because they differ in their logical structures; whereas D is an instance of a logically valid schema, D* is not. Thus (1) and (2) are also not P-intensionally isomorphic because they differ in their logical structures; therefore neither are (3) and (4). This enables Putnam to hold that (3) and (4) need not be synonymous, and so there is nothing surprising about the possibility of their having opposite truth-values. This, according to him, explains the possibility of doubting that (2) while not doubting that (1).

Even if we choose D and D* in such a way that they are P-intensionally isomorphic, e.g., 'Socrates is the wisest Greek' and D*, 'Socrates is the wisest Hellene', the P-intensional isomorphism of (1) and (2) will not follow from that of D and D*. For (1) and (2) now fail to satisfy Putnam's definition of intensional isomorphism. In fact (1) and (2), simply by the difference in their logical structures inherent in their construction, could never be P-intensionally isomorphic whatever distinct expressions we may take D and D* to be. Preventing (3) and (4) from being P-intensionally isomorphic thus seems to effectively stall Mates' criticism.

II

But this is too quick. It is true that (1) and (2) differ in their logical structures, but this fact does not provide sufficient reason to depart from the standard position that the intensional isomorphism of two (or more) sentences is a function only of the intensions of their corresponding constituents. In other words, the mere fact of the difference in the logical structures of (1) and (2) does not warrant a revision of Carnap's very definition of intensional isomorphism. We are not given an independent argument that establishes (or even an independent reason to think) that the difference in the logical structures of (1) and (2) gives rise to their non-synonymy.

In tailoring the revision of Carnap's definition of intensional isomorphism to prevent the intensional isomorphism, and hence the synonymy, of (1) and (2), Putnam seems to be assuming beforehand that (1) and (2) are indeed not synonymous. Further, his re-definition makes it appear that any two sentences that are P-intensionally isomorphic may be taken as truly synonymous sentences and immune to Mates' criticism. Whether Putnam actually thinks this or not, the interesting point here is that even P-intensionally isomorphic sentences are subject to a version of Mates' criticism.

Suppose, again, that 'Greek' and 'Hellene' are co-intensional, and let D be 'Aristotle was a Greek' and D*, 'Aristotle was a Hellene'. D and D* clearly satisfy the conditions laid out in Putnam's definition and are therefore P-intensionally isomorphic. Therefore by Putnam's Proposal, they are synonymous.

Now consider the sentences:

(5) I believe that D
(6) I believe that D*
(7) I do not doubt that (5)
(8) I do not doubt that (6).[6]

Since D and D* are P-intensionally isomorphic, and since (5) and (6) do not differ in their logical structures, (5) and (6) must be held to be P-intensionally isomorphic, and therefore synonymous. This together with the fact that (7) and (8) also do not differ in logical structure entails the P-intensional isomorphism of (7) and (8). Therefore, (7) and (8) are also synonymous by Putnam's Proposal.

It is now a simple matter to reconstruct a version of Mates' criticism. While I have no doubt whatsoever that Aristotle was a Greek, I could well have doubted that he was a Hellene. Of course, I do not now doubt that (6) because I have learned the word 'Hellene' and am informed of its synonymy with 'Greek'. But we could easily imagine that I do not doubt that (5) though I doubt that (6). In any event, whether I know the word 'Hellene' or not—this is incidental to the main lines of argument—the possibility of my doubting that (6) without doubting that (5) is open. In other words, (7) and (8) might have opposite truth-

values though they are synonymous even on Putnam's stricter definition of 'intensional isomorphism'.

An attempt may be made to defend Putnam by holding that (7) and (8) cannot differ in truth-value, i.e., that it is impossible to doubt that (6) while not doubting that (5). This strategy is akin to Church's argument,[7] which shows that it is impossible for one to really doubt that (2) while not doubting that (1), however strongly that person may claim to have such a doubt.

While this is a powerful argument, it is illegitimate as a defense in the present context because Putnam himself seems to think that one could doubt that (2) [or (6)] without doubting that (1) [or (5)]. His redefinition of intensional isomorphism seems to be engineered to make it possible for such doubts to be entertained without damaging Putnam's Proposal.

In fact, we may even say that he cannot deny the possibility of entertaining the doubt that (6) while not doubting that (5) because if he did deny it, he would have to deny the possibility that one could doubt that (2) while not doubting that (1). And such a denial, because it blocks Mates' problem, would render his whole exercise of re-defining intensional isomorphism pointless.

Now one could say that Putnam is not committed to denying the possibility of doubting that (2) while not doubting that (1) just because he may wish to deny that possibility of doubting that (6) while not doubting that (5). For, he could deny the latter possibility on the grounds that (5) and (6) do not differ in logical structure, but not be committed to denying the former possibility because (1) and (2) do differ in logical structure. But this reasoning appeals to his incorporation of the notion of logical structure into the definition of intensional isomorphism, which is just what we are calling into question.

Thus (5) and (6) generate a version of Mates' problem for Putnam's Proposal, just as (1) and (2) generate Mates' problem for Carnap's Proposal, viz., the problem that two intensionally isomorphic belief-context sentences cannot be synonymous because one can bear different attitudes to the propositions expressed by each of them. It is now clear that as an explicans for synonymy, P-intensional isomorphism is no less vulnerable to Matesian criticisms than C-intensional isomorphism.

III

The upshot of all this is that Mates' criticism does not depend so heavily on (1) and (2) as it may seem to. In other words, the real issue raised by Mates' criticism is not so much that (1) and (2) pose a problem for Carnap's explanation of synonymy. Rather, Mates' problem raises questions about the more fundamental issues of whether a suitable explicans can be found for the notion of synonymy, i.e., whether Carnap's or Putnam's proposal is workable, and whether synonymous sentences are at all interchangeable in belief- and other oblique-contexts.

Assuming that truly synonymous sentences are interchangeable in all contexts, and assuming that it is possible to find an explicans for synonymy like the one Carnap offers, we must have an explanation for the (apparent) failure of substitutivity of some synonymous sentences in oblique-contexts.[8] One kind of explanation would assume that Carnap's explicans for synonymy is inadequate, and therefore stands in need of modification. It is clear that this is the kind of explanation that Putnam attempts.

However, as has been amply demonstrated, Putnam's modification is not one that would satisfy Mates.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

  * I am indebted to Kenichi Fukui, Gary Kemp and Nathan Salmon for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. Hilary Putnam, 'Synonymy and the Analysis of Belief Sentences', *Analysis* 14 (1954), 114–22. (Original Title: 'Synonymity, and the Analysis of Belief Sentences'.)
2. In Benson Mates, 'Synonymity', *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, 25 (1950), 201–26.
3. Rudolph Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity* (University of Chicago Press, 1947).
4. Unless otherwise noted, 'synonymy' is taken in its strong sense, according to which synonymous expressions are freely interchangeable in all sentences including oblique-context ones, without affecting the senses, and thus the truth-values, of the sentences in which the substitutions are made. For obvious reasons, this interchangeability does not apply to expressions in quotations unless the interchanged expressions are identical.

5. Putnam's Proposal has encountered criticism from other quarters, too. See, e.g., Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, *Propositions and Attitudes* (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 13, fn. 10.
6. Those who object to (5) through (8) in propositional-attitude contexts on grounds that they invite complications associated with present tense sentences with 'I' as the grammatical subject can use such sentences as: (5*) Jones believes that D; (6*) Jones believes that D*; (7*) Smith does not doubt that (5*); (8*) Smith does not doubt that (6*). The argument holds for sentences (5*)–(8*) as well.
7. Alonzo Church, 'Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief', *Philosophical Studies*, 5, 1954, pp. 65–73.
8. For example, one could follow Church's line of argument which essentially holds that sentences such as (1) and (2) or (5) and (6) are indeed synonymous and that Mates' problem does not really exist. Or one could deny one or more of these assumptions and hold with Burge that any explanation of synonymy, however accurate it may be, cannot guarantee successful substitutability of synonymous sentences in oblique-contexts because such substitutability is not merely a semantical matter. (See Tyler Burge, 'Belief and Synonymy', *Journal of Philosophy* 75 [1978], 119–38.)

Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*: Some Remarks on its Contents*

K. VASUDEVA RAO

44, Anandavan, A/6 Paschim Vihar, New Delhi 110063

Jainism is one of the ancient religions of the world. It is at least as old as the Vedic religion. Its origin is unknown. It is often stated that Jainism was founded by Varddhamāna Mahāvīra, the Jaina prophet.[1] However, Jaina tradition holds that there were 23 earlier *tīrthaṅkaras*[2] and they had propagated Jaina religious philosophy in the past. Whether all the 23 *tīrthaṅkaras* were indeed historical persons or only imaginary personages is open to discussion. A general tendency of some historians to trace the origin of their religion to hoary antiquity thereby eliciting greater esteem for the faith has tended to strengthen the scepticism. However, the historicity of Rṣabha, Ariṣṭanemi and Pārśvanātha cannot be questioned seriously. The origin of the faith is thus pushed back to 1500 BC and perhaps even further. Extant canonical literature is however, not older than 300 BC. It is generally agreed that *ācārāṅgasūtra* and *sūtrakrtāṅgasūtra* are the oldest works available now. Within these two, the section *śrutaskandha* of each is said to be the earliest (Jacobi, pp. xli–xliv). These works are in Prakrit and were composed after Mahāvīra, i.e. after *c.* 500 BC. These works describe only ascetics' religious practice known from early works (*pūrvas*) which seem to have been lost.[3] No details on the practice prescribed to the lay followers are found in these works. Probably there was considerable flexibility in the praxis of Jaina householders according to their profession, social status and economic condition. In any case, it is not to be inferred that there were no norms of religious conduct for the Jaina laity. Possibly the ascetics' conduct was perfected from that of lay followers and based on commonly shared philosophical ideals.

The *tattvārthādhigama* or *tattvārthasūtra* (*ts*) of Umāsvāti is the last among the canonical works. It was written in not earlier than the first century BC and not later than the 4th century AD (Sanghavi, pp. 6–12). It is in Sanskrit and in the form or *sūtra*s (terse aphorisms).[4] It differs from the earlier works in several important aspects. We shall refer to some of them briefly in the following paragraphs.

At the time of Umāsvāti the major religious groups shared a few important tenets which made considerable interaction possible. In as much as the body is ephemeral all the pleasures experienced by it are not lasting. Everlasting pleasure is possible only after attainment of *mokṣa*, i.e. liberation from the cycle of birth-death-rebirth. At the doctrinal level Jainas believed that the universe with its infinite number of individual souls and non-living materials is eternal. In other words, there is no concept of divine creation. In fact Jainas are atheists. Jainism considers that acquiring *karma* that makes the soul impure is a physical process. Suffering due to binding of *karma* is also a natural physical consequence. There are thus no gods who punish bad deeds and reward good deeds. As a corollary they hold that each soul can attain *nirvāṇa* by getting rid of *karma.*

According to Johnson (pp. 23–31) 'early Jainism' was exclusively the code of religious conduct to be followed by ascetics. The 'archaic asceticism' emphasized a theoretically perfect *ahiṁsā* as the ideal doctrine and necessary step to realize *mokṣa*. By implication, it is suggested, Jainism before Umāsvāti had a narrow audience. Further, Johnson suggests (pp. 79–90), Jainism before Umāsvāti did not accommodate even the householders who followed a blemishless socio-religious conduct. According to his view *ts* for the first time introduced a doctrinal change so as to accommodate a milder code of conduct for the lay followers. Johnson, however, ignores some alternative views. In as much as they are equally, or perhaps more, acceptable it is necessary to dwell on them. Firstly, it is possible that a properly codified *śrāvakācāra* in Prakrit existed ever since Jainism as a religion was founded though the works were not preserved until writing became common. The ascetics' code, on the other hand, survived at least in oral tradition preserved by a continuous lineage of preceptors and proteges. The oral tradition of formally codified *śrāvakācāra* was un-

derstandably denied the advantage of perpetuating monastic institutions where it could have been preserved and subsequently rendered into a written document. A second possibility is that the codified *śrāvakācāra* was subject to frequent modifications according to individual needs and responding to the impact of other rival religions. In either case it is wrong to conclude that an attempt was made for the first time by Umāsvāti to modify the ascetics' code so that emotional needs of lay followers were met.

I. PURPOSE, AUDIENCE AND STYLE

It may be noted at the outset that *ts* is in Sanskrit, the language of learning used by Brahmin scholars. In as much as Jainism had to be defended against the polemical onslaughts of other faiths there was the need for an authoritative work that was comprehensive and understood by scholars of different faiths. Sanskrit was therefore chosen, probably for the first time, by Jaina philosophers. The *sūtra* format was intended to exhibit scholarly aplomb and to match the scholastic excellence of the works such as *vedāntasūtra*s, *yogasūtra*s and *pāṇinīyasūtra*s. Thus *ts* is a comprehensive advanced treatise on the entire Jaina *siddhānta*.

Johnson (p. 80) contends that Umāsvāti perceived the need to integrate the religious practice of Brahmins with Jaina *śrāvakācāra* while preserving the identity and unique features of Jaina doctrinal framework. This is a valuable suggestion. In fact it is clear that there has always been a continuing give-and-take process in matters of religious practice between Jainas and the followers of Vedic Hinduism. Idol worship, which was not prescribed in archaic *śrāvakācāra*, was taken from that of the Hindus. Conversely, adopting vegetarianism and eschewing even the *hiṁsā* connected with *yajña*, the most venerated socio-religious ritual of Aryans, was under the influence of Jaina society. Relaxation of the puritanical code of Jaina ascetics and providing for *anuvrata* (*ts* 7: 13–17) was obviously to show others that Jaina asceticism is not merely a freak individualistic soteriology. It provides for graded steps towards the ultimate goal through the fourteen *guṇasthāna*s. Umāsvāti's intention is thus to defend Jaina tradition against criticism by rival schools and not to introduce 'internal' reform of ethics.

II. THE CONTENTS OF *TATTVĀRTHĀDHIGAMA*

A careful reading of *ts* reveals that it is a comprehensive treatise on Jaina philosophy. As in other contemporary religions *mokṣa* was the principal aim of Jaina religious conduct. The titles *tattvārthādhigama* and *mokṣaśāstra* clearly indicate this. Further, the very first *sūtra* (*ts* 1:1) defines the way to liberation as the integration of right belief and right knowledge with right conduct. These are known as the three jewels (*ratnatraya*) of Jaina philosophy. The entire treatise is an outcome of very penetrating thoughts and their statement in precise *sūtras*. However, there are two chapters of *ts* (chapters 3 and 4) that stand out as frivolous elaboration of deviant thoughts. Clearly, these chapters do not measure up to the high standard of philosophical cogitation characterizing the other eight chapters.

An objective and unbiased evaluation of the two chapters (3 and 4) comprising 'Jaina cosmology' is undertaken in the next section. It is pertinent to add here a note on how the cosmology has been received by scholars of Jainism so far. Devout followers accept it as *sarvajña*'s own words, i.e. the truth revealed by *tīrthaṅkaras*. On this premise it has to be accepted without question. Others have noted it as an embarrassing aspect of Jaina theory. However, they gloss over it by saying that its significance lies in its historical value and use in comparing other ancient cosmologies (Sanghavi, pp. 81–2). A critical study of *ts*, however, ought to take a bolder stand and decide if it deserves a place in a profound philosophical treatise. Characterizing the cosmology as incredibly absurd will no doubt raise the eyebrows of many contemporary scholars. It is therefore necessary to justify the reasoning behind the judgement. It is pertinent to note here that the Jainas have set the healthy tradition of objective discussion of 'established' beliefs as illustrated by *dharmaparīkṣā* of Amitagatyācārya, an eleventh century author.[5]

In any ancient work on any academic subject it is found that there are certain views that are obviously unacceptable in the light of present knowledge. It does not necessarily follow that all such views were unacceptable even when they were originally expressed. Some of them, however, could have been unacceptable even when first put forth. On careful perusal such views would have been considered incongruous

even by those who expressed them. We have thus two classes of discredited statements and theories depending chiefly on the seriousness with which they were put forth. Obviously, one ought to be careful in deciding the value of any theory or statement in ancient works. The criteria that may be used in evaluation of such theories and statements are given below with a few illustrative examples.

1. Stories of Miracles

Many incredible anecdotes are associated with the lives of persons whose historicity is not in doubt. Gautama Buddha is said to have cured incurable diseases. Jesus the Christ is said to have come alive, i.e. resurrected, after his death and burial. An example from the Jaina lore may be added. Varddhamāna Mahāvīra is said to have been first conceived in the womb of Devānandā, a Brahmin woman. Subsequently the embryo was transferred to the womb of Triśalā, a Kṣatriya woman (Jacobi, p. xxxi). Anecdotes of this kind are not to be, and have never been, taken literally in a serious academic discussion. Examples of this kind can be multiplied; however, those already given shall suffice to illustrate a category of imaginary 'facts' found in religious books.

2. Scientific Theories

A few examples of scientific 'facts' and theories are given below, with hints about how they were conceived. These are pertinent since we can compare them justifiably with the 'cosmological' description given in *ts*. The ancient idea of a flat earth as the centre of the universe was primitive 'common sense' and observation. The theory of four humours and its Ayurvedic counterpart, viz. the theory of *tridoṣa* as the cause of diseases are other examples of this sort. It was based on the symptoms of some diseases now interpreted in a different way. Though the theories seemed valid when they were propounded they stand discarded now. Chemists in the 18th century believed that combustion of a substance was due to the release of something from it. This was based on some 'gut-feeling' and inaccurate observation. Georg Ernst Stahl, an 18th century chemist, called it phlogiston. An inconvenient observation that in some cases there was an increase in the weight of

a substance on combustion was explained away by assuming that phlogistan had 'negative weight'. Soon, however, it was proved that the essential process of combustion is combination with a gas, subsequently named oxygen. The phlogiston theory was abandoned without regrets as it was obviously flawed. Phlogiston now remains only in books on modern philosophy as a handy example of non-existent substance (*asatpadārtha*).[6] Darwin, the renowned 19th century biologist believed that very minute ('undetectable') particles called pangenes bear the hereditary attributes. It was supposed that they are present in all cells of the body. They were believed to be carried in circulating blood and to accumulate in germ cells thus carrying the hereditary traits to the next generation. In as much as virtually all the characteristics of the body as a whole are inherited this belief seemed to be valid. Subsequently, however, the mechanism of inheritance was studied in carefully executed experiments and found to be a chemical, now called deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). The theory of pangenes was then readily dropped by biologists. It must be noted that the discredited theory did not retard the progress of science because the attitude of post-renaissance scientists was to respect established facts and not the cult of famous persons. Darwin's stature as a scientist and great thinker was not diminished by rejecting this theory. The examples noted above indicate how knowledge progresses by rejecting discredited theories though they were first proposed with all seriousness.

3. Inherently Flawed Theories

A hilarious theory was proposed by an 18th century naturalist to account for the variety of organisms living on the earth. According to the theory, God created parts of animals—heads, ears, teeth, limbs, hooves, etc.—and released them on the earth. By the action of the 'universal principles', love and hate, random combinations resulted of these organs. Very abnormal combinations (e.g. only ears or just teeth and eyes and nothing else) could not survive. Those that survived then reproduced giving rise to the different kinds of animals now populating the earth. In the 18th century there was nothing wrong in assuming God's mediation in the creation of animal types. Yet assuming that separate organs were created and released was neither a gut-feeling nor

imaginable on any reason. In fact most historians of biology consider this theory a satire and nothing more serious.

III. THE STATUS OF CHAPTERS 3 AND 4

Examples of discredited 'facts' and theories illustrated in the previous section can guide us in assessing the veracity of the so-called Jaina cosmology and the propriety of its inclusion in a serious work on philosophy.

Let us first consider the socio-religious milieu in which the ideas expressed in the two chapters were probably narrated. Jainas' atheism mentioned earlier has always been a vulnerable point especially in debates with Hindu philosophers. In virtually all religions of the world atheism has been rejected as irreligious. The concept of punishment of sinners in horrendous hells and rewarding the virtuous with fabulous pleasures in heavens is shared by almost all religions including Jainism. Yet the Jaina philosophers had to defend their faith because as atheists they could be criticized as irreligious. Probably some defenders of the faith decided to show that they also had an elaborate scheme of reward and punishment for *punya* and *pāpa* respectively, comparable to, or even better than, what Hindus have in their religious faith. The seven *naraka*s (*ts* 3:1) correspond to the seven 'layers' of the imaginary lower world of Hindus.[7] How the number and spatial arrangement of heavens (*ts* 4: 19–20) was arrived at is difficult to imagine. What constitutes the chapters 3 and 4 of *ts* is obviously written in a spirit of one-upmanship, uninhibited by the need of factual foundation and logical restraint. The only 'logic' is that it provides a grandiose scheme of consequences for *karma* graded from the worst *pāpa* to the highest *punya*. It fits in the overall scheme of Jaina *siddhānta* wherein complete liberation is through shedding of all *karma*.

A number of questions arise on suggesting that the two chapters were interpolated by some overzealous defenders of the faith. These relate to the time of insertion and the probable author(s) of the spurious parts. Further, adequate evidence has to be adduced to justify the conclusion that the two chapters are spurious.

The cleavage of Jaina faith into *digambara* and *śvetāmbara* branches has been traced to pre-Christian era.[8] Yet both sects accept the author-

ity of *ts*. They have provided their own respective *bhāṣya*s and *vārttika*s.[9] The two disputed chapters appear in *śvetāmbara* as well as *digambara* recensions, albeit with significant differences as will be noted below. From this it seems that the two chapters were interpolated not much after the original text of Umāsvāti was written.

A comparison of the two chapters dealing with living (*jīvadravya*; chapter 2) and non-living (*ajīvadravya*; chapter 5) on the one hand, and the two chapters of which the veracity is questioned on the other, will show that the latter are lacking in philosophical seriousness that characterizes the former. The scheme of classification of living organisms on the basis of their organs of perception (*ts* 2: 23–4)[10] and the modes of reproduction (*ts* 2: 32–6) are such as are mentioned with admiration even by professional biologists of today. Similarly, the idea of *alokākāśa*, the space without *dravya*s (*ts* 5: 12–13; 17–18), the concept of *dharma* and *adharma dravya* (5: 1; 17–18) and the description of atoms (*aṇu*s) and molecules (*skandha*s; *ts* 5: 25–8; 32–6) are highly intellectual exercises, worthy of admiration even by modern physicists. Many statements of Umāsvāti regarding the living and non-living existents have since been shown to be inaccurate or even plainly wrong. Yet their significance and the penetrating intellectual activity underlying them cannot be denied. The concept of *dharma* and *adharma* as universal media of motion and stability are striking examples of deep thinking comparable with any other in the history of science. It is true that the idea now serves no useful purpose just as that of ether, the universal medium for the propagation of electromagnetic waves. Yet their significance remains undiminished. For comparison one may take the baseless assumptions on the 'geography' of the different parts of *madhyaloka* (*ts* 3: 7–18) and *naraka*s (*ts* 3: 1–6), the life expectancy (*ts* 4: 30–53), and social orders (*ts* 4: 4–5; 11–20) of their denizens and the methods of gratifying sexual urge (*ts* 4: 8–10).

From this it is impossible to believe that the disputed chapters could have been written by the author of the original *ts*. On balance it seems that the contents of the disputed chapters represent unchecked imagination and hilarious narration.

It is possible to give a few counter-arguments to defend the veracity of the 'Jaina cosmology'. Devout followers of the faith can say that

ancient sages who wrote the canonical texts had some deep insight that enabled them to 'see' what ordinary people cannot. Obviously this cannot be accepted. If the 'seers' had visualized such things as would soon be proved absurd, their 'vision' was no better than hallucination. Another argument could be that the level of knowledge about the physical world in the days of Umāsvāti cannot be expected to have been comparable with what we have at present. The 'cosmology' in *ts* was, it may be maintained, based on 'folk knowledge' available then. Granting that this is reasonable, it must be pointed out that the authors of *bhāsya* or *vārttika*s ought to have found something wrong with the two chapters. In particular, Akalaṅka (c. 7th century AD), the author of *rājavārttika* and Vidyānanda (c. 9th century AD), the author of *ślokavārttika*, could not have been unaware of the work of Āryabhatta I who questioned the idea of a flat earth and proposed a heliocentric model of the universe. (For details of the state of astronomy in ancient and medieval India see Balachandra Rao, pp. 30–58 and Bose et al., pp. 92–8). It may be noted here that a *vārttika* in particular is expected to discuss not only what is said in the *sūtra*s but also what is not said and even what is wrongly said.[11] Clearly these later authors did not question the validity of the *sūtra*s for fear of being considered heretics. In any case, Umāsvāti could not have been so naïve as to believe in the contents of chapters 3 and 4.

The contention that chapters 3 and 4 constitute a later insertion can be fortified if adequate internal evidence is found. The irrelevance of the disputed chapters is suggested by *ts* 1:4 which reads '*Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, saṁvara, nirjarā* and *mokṣa* constitute *tattva*.' In a previous *sūtra* (*ts* 1:2) it is stated that faith in the basic principle, *tattva*, is the right belief. The word *tattva* in *sūtra* 1:2 obviously refers to that in 1:4 as also in the title of the book. Knowledge has to be right in the first place. Merely possessing right knowledge does not lead to right action. It is the proper integration of knowledge with natural proclivity that counts.[12] In other words, conviction does not imply blind faith. It must be emphasized that, taken separately, right belief and right knowledge are like the fabled cripple and blind. In the light of this clarification we can interpret *ts* 1:4 and perceive its significance. The definition of *tattva* in the present context and the context

of the whole work, viz. *tattvārthādhigama*, seems to be embodied in this *sūtra*. The word *tattva* as used by most other philosophical schools has a different connotation: it is the nature of itself (*tat + tva*). What cannot be reduced to simpler objects of comprehension, and what can be comprehended only in its own unmodified nature is *tattva*. This generally accepted meaning is not implied here.[13] In Jaina philosophy the word *dravya*[13] stands for what in other schools is implied by *tattva*. Thus *ts* 1:4 is not a definition of irreducible elements of comprehension; it only signifies the different aspects of knowledge essential for attaining *mokṣa*.

Another point to be noted here is that the word *tattva* in *ts* 1:4 is in the singular. The use of singular number here (as also in the word *tattvārtha*, *ts* 1:2) is to suggest that all the seven aspects of it are to be taken together.[14]

Now the significance of *ts* 1:4 stands out clearly. It is an enumeration of the subsequent chapters and their titles. It may be noted that the aspects of *tattva* in *ts* 1:4 are enumerated in exactly the same sequence as that of the corresponding chapters, viz. 2 and 5–10. It also implies that the description of *naraka*s, *madhyaloka* and *svarga*s was not intended to be included in Umāsvāti's *ts*.

Some commentators enumerate two additional aspects of *tattva*, viz. *pāpa* and *puṇya*, besides those in *ts* 1:4. According to Dośi (p. 19) these are related to *āsrava* and *bandha*.[15] In any case considering them as additional aspects of *tattva* in interpreting *ts* 1:4 is not justifiable.

As noted earlier, although there was a clear division of the Jaina faith into two sects, viz. *śvetāmbara* and *digambara*, *ts* is considered to be a canonical text by both. There are, however, some differences between the recensions adopted by the two sects. The difference is not only in the total number of *sūtra*s but also other modifications. A comparison of the number of *sūtra*s is set out in the accompanying table. We can notice that there are only minor differences in the texts of chapters 1, 2 and 5–10 whereas the differences with respect to chapters 3 and 4 are striking.

The minor differences arise due to corruption during oral transmission in different monastic schools and in manual copying of the text. Deletion of one or two *sūtra*s by incorporating their substance into

Table: Number of *sūtra*s in *tattvārthādhigama* of Umāsvāti

Chapter Number	Recensions*	
	Śvetāmbara	Digambara
1	35	33
2	52	53
3	18	39
4	53	42
5	44	42
6	26	27
7	34	39
8	26	26
9	49	47
10	7	9

*Digambara recension from Dośi and Śvetāmbara recension from Sanghavi.

another *sūtra* or addition of a few *sūtra*s by elaboration of words in existing *sūtra*s or the elevation of some part of the *bhāsya* to the status of *sūtra*s are the sources of other minor differences. In any case, they do not introduce any major alterations in contention. On the other hand, the differences found in the texts of chapters 3 and 4 adopted by the two sects are striking. In chapter 3 of the *digambara* recension a block of 21 sutras has been added after the eleventh *sūtra* of the *śvetāmbara* text. It seems significant that the added *sūtra*s are not intended to strengthen any tenets accepted by the *digambara* sect; they merely give some trivial 'geographical' details such as names of regions, their dimensions and names of denizens' social classes. In other words, though the addition is substantial, it has no doctrinal basis. The details added are such as could have been included in the *bhāsya* or *vārttika*s. In the case of chapter 4 the differences are of a complex nature though without a doctrinal basis. For the *sūtra* 29 of the *śvetāmbara* text consisting of a single word (*sthitih*), and the subsequent three *sūtra*s there is in the *digambara* text a single long *sūtra* followed by another which is in fact a modification of *sūtra* 37 of

svetambara recension. In all, the *digambara* text has 11 *sūtras* fewer than the *śvetāmbara* one in chapter 4.

A question that naturally arises in this connection is about the authorship of these spurious chapters and the identity of those who introduced the substantial differences between the texts of the two sects. Another pertinent question is about when the two chapters were added. Since the interpolated chapters appear in the same position in the recensions of both sects it is obvious that they were written by a single author who commanded the respect of the entire Jaina community. The wide variation in the texts without doctrinal justification implies that two or more persons have dabbled in re-editing the texts of the two chapters after they were interpolated.

Regarding the author of the interpolated chapters, nothing can be said with any degree of certainty. All that seems clear is Umāsvāti is very unlikely to have written them. Grdhrapiccha is another name that is often mentioned as the author of *ts*. According to *digambara* tradition it is another name or epithet of Umāsvāti (Sanghavi, pp. 3 and 72–8). This view is rejected by the other sect. There is also a statement that *ts* was written by Umāsvāti and others (Sanghavi, p. 76). At present nothing seems to be clear in this matter. The present study, however, shows that the disputed chapters could not have been authored by Umāsvāti. Further, though it is not proposed even by remote implication that Grdhrapiccha interpolated the two chapters, it is suggested that this name is not to be overlooked until the status of these chapters is finally clarified.

IV. CONCLUSION

Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra (ts)* is no doubt a work of great merit. It shows clearly the scientific outlook of ancient Jaina thinkers. As may be expected, Jainism was under the influence of other contemporary religious philosophies. Probably in response to the elaborate Hindu scheme of *pāpa* and *puṇya* being rewarded with punishment and incredible pleasures, some overzealous defender of Jainism inserted two chapters (viz. 2 and 3) in the text of *ts*.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

NOTES

*Dedicated to the memory of (the late) Sri Jinaraja Sastri, Siddhavana Gurukula, Ujire, Karnataka.

1. Prophet is the person chosen by God to speak for Him, or by Divine inspiration. In this sense the word is inappropriate for *tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra. According to Jaina tradition *tīrthaṅkaras* are not sent by God; they acquire the status by their own efforts. A *tīrthaṅkara* is one who creates a blemishless passage through life.

2. Transliteration of Sanskrit and Prakrit words is generally following the system adopted by the *JICPR* with a few modifications. Anglicized words such as Sanskrit, Prakrit, Brahmin, etc. are used in their commonly used spelling. Dropping the final 'a' is the general practice in Hindi and not in Sanskrit or Prakrit. So 'Jaina' is preferred to 'Jain' here. All Sanskrit/ Prakrit words are in *italics*. The s in plurals and 's or s' of possessive case are not italicized so as to avoid possible errors like *tamas* being taken for the plural of *tama*. There are no separate upper and lower case letters in Sanskrit/Prakrit and therefore no upper case letters are used even when mandatory according to English usage. However, the capital initial letter in proper names is retained when the words are used as English words and printed in roman. Diacritical marks are, however, added in order to avoid possible anglicization of pronunciation.

3. Old Jaina literature consisting of fourteen *pūrvas* is not available now. It had already been lost when *tattvārthādhigama* was written (Johnson, p. 20). The *aṅgas* in Prakrit were composed later. Umāsvāti's *tattvārthādhigama* is probably the first canonical text to be written in Sanskrit. It is commonly called *tattvārthasūtra* because it is in *sūtras*, i.e. cryptic aphorisms.

4. A *sūtra* is brief (*svalpākṣaram*), unambiguous (*asandigdham*), significant (*sāravat*), of universal application (*viśvatomukham*), devoid of unnecessary words (*astobham*) and unexceptionable (*anavadyam*).

5. Amitagatyācārya (11th century AD) wrote a somewhat polemical work, *dharmaparīkṣā*, to expose the utterly incredible stories of Hindu *purānas*. It may, however, be noted that Amitagati did not mention the 'Jaina cosmology'. Though silence does not imply approval, it does not indicate rejection either.

6. The favourite examples of Indian philosophers are *śaśaviṣāṇa* (a rabbit's horns) and *ākāśakusuma* (flowers growing in the sky, not on plants).

7. The seven layers of the lower world in 'Hindu cosmology' are *atala, vitala, sutala, rasātala, talātala, mahātala* and *pātāla*. The last one is also said to be *nāgaloka*, the abode of serpents.

8. According to K.V. Mardia (p. 6) the cleavage occurred in 300 BC. Others believe that it existed even before *Mahāvīra*.

9. The commentary called *bhāṣya* is to elaborate the *sūtras* (defined in note 4) using the words in the *sūtras* as well as additional words of the commentator. A *vārttika* is generally a critical commentary on *sūtras* dealing with what is stated, not stated and wrongly stated in them.

10. The chapter and *sūtra* numbers (e.g. *ts* 3:1 for *tattvārthādhigama*, chapter 3, *sutra* 1) are as in Saṅghavi's book.

11. Without conviction, merely possessing knowledge does not elicit the appropriate action. Virtually all smokers are aware of the fact that tobacco is injurious to health. Yet, only a few, i.e. those who have *samyagdarśana* on this fact, can quit the habit.

12. The words *paramārtha, dravya-svabhāva, para-apara dhyeya, śuddha* and *parama* are synonyms of *tattva* (Muni Suśilakumāraji, pp. 188–9).

13. For a definition of *dravya,* see *ts* 5: 1; also Nemicandra's *dravyasaṅgraha,* 1:1.

14. The significance of using *tattva* in the singular is often ignored by commentators (e.g. Sanghavi, pp. 5–6). Dośi (p. 21) states that the singular indicates that the *jīva* can acquire purity by acquiring the knowledge of the seven aspects of *tattva* and avoiding the idea of differences among them. This, however, seems far-fetched.

15. According to Umāsvāti, *pāpa* and *puṇya* are the result of *yoga*, which is defined as the good and bad activity of the body, speech and mind (*ts* 6: 1–4 in Sanghavi).

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Part 2

The Structure of Belongingness to Nation:
A Brief Study of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*

BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA

Department of Philosophy, Lucknow University, Lucknow 226 007
E-mail: binodagarwala@rediffmail.com

A NEW BEGINNING IN THE *CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT*

If my argument in 'The Foundations of Modern Liberalism: Inscription of Art and Morality in the Perspective of Modern Metaphysics'[1] is correct then our prior belonging to a society with customs and history sustains the liberal political order. This society is the nation. From the very beginning of the emergence of the modern era, although theoretical philosophizing went on in terms of individualism and the structure of the modern state but the real burden of the social unity and identity was born by the nation. Nation is a historical and political ideal. Even modernity, individualism and liberalism succeeded in establishing and controlling the sovereign or the state by becoming national mores and ethos. Hence it was not an accident that the idea of nation-state emerged with modernity. Theoretically modernity has no theoretical tools to understand what it means to belong to a nation or a tradition or a history, yet it cannot do without it unless modernity wants to degenerate into fascism. Mind you fascism's appeal to nationalism (even this was not genuine) is not the same thing as the sovereign or state being sustained and controlled by nation. Fascism by equating nation with state—even while advocating nationalism—was advocating pure statism and leadership principle became supreme.

So we must face the question what does it mean to belong to nation, tradition, and ethos or even to the world? This is the question that has become paramount in the postmodern era after the holocaust in Europe. This was the question that became uppermost in Kant's mind when the French Revolution began for achieving liberty, equality and fraternity, the liberal ideals, even before he witnessed the reign of terror in France.

His *Critique of Judgement* is an attempt to answer this question. Especially the second part of *The Third Critique* refers to the French Revolution. Mind you, Kant is elaborating the structure of belongingness by assuming its existence without saying how individuals can be brought to belong to nation after they have constituted their subjectivity and individuality.

To understand the next step in our argument we need to understand the idea of *symbol* and *symbolic representation* according to Kant. He calls rendering of concepts in terms of sense as hypotyposis (presentation, subjectio sub adspectum). All hypotyposis is two-fold. Either it is schematic or else it is symbolic. *A priori* concepts of the understanding corresponding to which adequate sensible intuitions are available require schematic hypotyposis. The concept, which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, requires the symbolic hypotyposis. 'In the latter case the concept is supplied with an intuition such that the procedure of judgement in dealing with it is merely analogous to that which it observes in schematism. In other words, what agrees with the concept is merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself. Hence the agreement is merely in the form of reflection, and not in the content.'[2]

Kant further explains the idea of symbol by distinguishing it from schemata.

All intuitions by which *a priori* concepts are given a foothold are, therefore, either schemata or symbols. Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, presentations of the concept. Schemata effect this presentation demonstratively, symbols by the aid of an analogy (for which recourse is had even to empirical intuitions), in which analogy judgement performs a double function: first in applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, secondly, in applying the mere rule of its reflection upon that intuition to quite another object, of which the former is but the symbol.[3]

Kant distinguishes both schematic representation of a concept of understanding and symbolic representation of an idea of reason from mere marks of a concept. 'Marks are merely designations of concepts by the aid of accompanying sensible signs devoid of any intrinsic connection with the intuition of the object. Their sole function is to afford a means of reinvoking the concepts according to the imagination's law of association—a purely subjective role. Such marks are either words or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs, simply as expressions for concepts.'[4] But in contrast to marks, both schematic and symbolic representations are modes of 'intrinsic connection with the intuition of sensation'.[5]

But the important question is why does he need symbolic representation of ideas of reason? To find an answer to this question we have to first find out why he needed schematic representation of concepts of understanding in *Critique of Pure Reason*. There he raises the question: 'How, then, is the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible?' He answers, 'Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.'[6] Similarly, the ideas of reason can be employed for performing their (regulative) function only through their symbolic representation or symbols. In the case of practical reason ideas like morally good or right etc. have the function of production of proper will or action respectively. This function of production of proper will or action can be performed only when they have symbolic representation. Mind you, the symbols are only for reflection, but without these symbols for reflection there can be no production of good will or right action, as without the symbolic representation, the idea of morally good and right cease to be functional, as they have no intrinsic connection to intuition of sensation. 'But to call for a verification of the objective reality of rational concepts, i.e., of ideas, and, what is more, on behalf of the theoretical cognition of such a reality, is to demand an impossibility, because absolutely no intuition adequate to them can be given.'[7]

Kant made it clear; 'a monarchical state is represented as a living body when it is governed by constitutional laws, but as a mere machine (like a handmill) when it is governed by an individual absolute will.'[8] But from this it should not be concluded that he is advocating any organic theory of constitutional state. For he clarifies, '... but in

both cases the representation is merely *symbolic*. For there is certainly no likeness between a despotic state and a handmill, whereas there surely is between the rules of reflection upon both and their causality.'[9] And no doubt there can be 'no likeness' between a constitutional state and a living body either for Kant. There is likeness only 'between the rules of reflection upon both and their causality.' But Kant laments, 'Hitherto this function has been but little analyzed worthy as it is of a deeper study.'[10] His *Critique of Judgement* is a preparation for that study. So let us follow that study according to Kant to discover the structure of belongingness to a natural community, which is the constitutional state, rather than the making of an artificial society, which is the despotic state as the two symbolisms make it clear.

I. THE DISINTERESTED SPECTATOR AND REINTERPRETATION OF STATE OF NATURE

To recover the structure of belongingness is to transform the issue posed in the state of nature. Let us recollect that ethical commonwealth with God as its head can be established only when every one acts from the motive of duty or good will. But in the state of nature in spite of each individual having the will to follow the moral law and the law of right, the homo fabers face the problem of social unity because each decides what is right and good independently of the opinion of others and hence encounters opposition of others and fails to get their agreement.

How did this problem arise in the first place? Why is man deciding what is right and good independent of the opinion of others? It is because he has taken the stance of the subject to society—taking society as an object of his knowledge—so that he is conceiving each member of society to be an individual—including himself—without social ties. So in his estimation each person in determining his will is determining it independently of the opinion of others. So this perspective of the subject—subject in relation to society as an object—has to be given up in the estimation of will of others. So what stance has to be taken up? The perspective of the impartial and rational spectator has to be taken up. In the very first paragraph of the first chapter of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant writes, '... a rational

and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will ... .' So it is only an impartial and rational spectator who can estimate a good will or a pure will according to Kant.

Not only that in the *Critique of Judgement* Kant declares: Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good ... .[11] Why does Kant need the beautiful as the symbol of morally good? The moral law by itself does not close the choice of the action in the situation where it declares any maxim to be fit to be the universal law. The moral law can judge only the fitness of the maxim to be the universal law. But it cannot tell which maxim must be taken up in the situation. The maxim must be taken up sizing up the situation by the aesthetic judgement of beauty. Mind you the aesthetic judgement of beauty is most suited to do this job, as it is a reflective judgement and not a determinant judgement. For Kant, 'Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is given, then the judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. This is so even where such a judgement is transcendental and, as such, provides the conditions *a priori* in conformity with which alone subsumption under that universal can be effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective.'[12] So the selection of the maxim must be left to the reflective judgement of beauty in the situation, which is a judgement without any kind of interest by the disinterested spectator, while the task of testing it for universalizability from the point of view of taking an interest in action is the job of practical reason. The practical reason is nonfunctional without the assistance of aesthetic judgement of beauty, because it lacks a determinate action by itself; while aesthetic judgement of beauty is pointless without the assistance of practical reason, as it is a disinterested judgement without any interest in the actuality of the object of judgement. The relation between aesthetic taste and moral sense is stated thus:

> ... taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through the intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it is this

rendering also, and the increased sensibility founded upon it, for the feeling which these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that are the origin of that pleasure which taste declares valid for mankind in general and not merely for the private feeling of each individual.[13]

The relation between the two is almost similar to the relation between the concept and intuition in the context of theoretical reason. Here taste functions analogous to the sensibility and practical reason functions analogous to the understanding. Recollect that schematism of pure categories of understanding is the first step in effecting the conjunction of sensible intuition and *a priori* categories. Similarly symbolization is the first step towards bringing in a conjunction of the maxims of the self of the sensible world with the moral law of the self of the intelligible world.

Be it noted that it was only Greek mind, which related truth, beauty and goodness. For Aristotle $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ (good) and $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ (beautiful) have the same meaning, and the only difference is that $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ (beautiful) is a more inclusive term. $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ (good) refers to action only, but $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ (beautiful) is used *also* where no action or movement is involved.[14] Both Socrates as well as Plato before Aristotle noted the close connection between $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ (good) and $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ (beautiful). So when Kant brings in the rational and impartial spectator in the context of good will then it indicates that the subject matter he is trying to recover and open for discussion is the same as Socratic-Platonic will which can do no wrong.

Let us analyze what is involved in taking the beautiful as the symbol of the morally good. We have already seen that for Kant the symbol and that which is symbolized both have analogous rules of reflection and causality. The very first rule of reflection on the beautiful is that it produces delight in the disinterested spectator. So it is not the stance of the subject to an object but the stance of the spectator to a spectacle without regard to its objective existence that is primary in the estimation of the good will. Generally Kant is held guilty of subjectivization of aesthetics.[15] But to say only that, is not a proper reading of the third critique of Kant. He in fact is trying to overcome the subjectivity of man through aesthetics in the *Critique of Judgement*. But as any analogy works both ways, if Kant was trying to overcome subjectivity

through aesthetics there was a tendency of subjectivize aesthetics too. Hence the state of being of a disinterested spectator became just a stance or the point of view of the subject. But how can an individual take up the stance of the disinterested spectator, i.e. how can an individual achieve the state of being of the disinterested spectator, after he has his subjectivity constituted and is aware of himself as a subjective individual, is not told by Kant. That remains a problem. If he knew that, the problem of existence of moral law can be solved. He only elaborates the structure of belongingness given the stance of the disinterested spectator.

When we take the stance of the disinterested spectator to the society, then one is completely engrossed in the social spectacle and it does not objectify society and even if one takes everyone to be such engrossed spectators, the social spectacle is not reflected out of being, since the spectator and the spectacle are not two distinct and separate ontological entities, rather they belong together as one being.

So the first aspect of our belongingness to society is that we do not take a stance of a subject (against an object) but the stance of disinterested spectator to the society, i.e. we are engrossed in the social spectacle without objectifying it. The knowledge which a spectator has, is distinguished by Kant from the knowledge which the subjective self has. The subjective self has only knowledge of nature, but the knowledge that a spectator has is called '*worldly knowledge*'. Kant explains, 'The most important object in the world, to which man can apply all progress in culture, is *man*, because he is his own ultimate end. To recognize him, therefore, in accordance with his species as an earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called *worldly knowledge*, even though he comprises only one part of the creatures of this earth.'[16] Knowledge of *man*, and indeed precisely with respect 'to what *he* makes, or can and ought to make of himself as a freely acting being,' i.e., *precisely not* knowledge of man in a 'physiological' respect, which is mere part of nature, is here termed knowledge of the *world*. Knowledge of the world is synonymous with pragmatic *anthropology* (knowledge of the human being). 'Such an anthropology, considered ... as *worldly knowledge*, is then not yet properly called *pragmatic* when it contains knowledge of *matters* in the world,

e.g., of animals, plants, and minerals in various lands and climates, but when it contains knowledge of man as *citizen of the world*.'[17] For Kant 'world' means precisely human existence in historical being with one another, and not the appearance of the human being in the nature as a species of living being. This becomes especially clear from the turns of phrase that Kant takes recourse to in clarifying this social concept of the world: 'knowing the world' and 'having class [world]'. Kant explains, 'for the first (the human being who knows the world) merely understands the game as a spectator, whereas the second has *played along with it*.'[18] Here world is the term for the social 'game' or play of human spectators. Such an engrossed spectator is not a reflectively self-conscious person and not an individual standing apart from society, rather in his self-forgetfulness he essentially belongs to society through his speculative consciousness.

If this is true, then how are we to interpret the state of nature? Isn't it a state of no society? For Kant it is wrong to interpret the state of nature as the state of no society. The state of nature is not opposed to society; it is opposed to civil society. That is to say it is opposed to society with a constitution conforming to the principle of right. Kant writes, 'In the state of nature, there may even be juridical forms of society—such as marriage, parental authority, the household and such like.'[19] He explains the state of nature in the following words:

> A condition that is not rightful, that is, a condition in which there is no distributive justice, is called a state of nature (status naturalis). What is opposed to a state of nature is not (as Achenwall thinks) a condition that is *social* and that could be called artificial condition (*status artificialis*), but rather *civil* condition (*status civilis*), that of a society subject to distributive justice.[20]

So for Kant the state of nature is a state of society without any externally enforced law or right. Now we have a society in which individuals already have a corporate existence independent of a determinate sovereign. Now there is the possibility of taming the Machiavellian Prince and the Hobbesian sovereign to have a liberal state within the Kantian scheme of things. Be it noted by taking society as already in being Kant is explaining how 'I will' of law can be translated into

external action. He is not answering the question how 'I ought' can become 'I will'. This recovery of society is not possible without the dismantling of the subjectivity of man, which is the unquestioningly given datum for Kant. So long as the subjectivity and *Willkür* are not dismantled, the society will remain in the state of nature.

II. TASTE AND THE COMMUNICATIVE SOCIETY

What kind of society is this, which is in the state of nature? What kind of society is it in which the disinterested spectator is engrossed? What kind of society is this, which can establish and limit the sovereign power?

To answer these different versions of the same question, let us look at the second rule of reflection on the beautiful, which says, 'The beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is represented as the *object of a universal* delight.'[21]

This follows from the first rule of reflection according to Kant. 'For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground of delight for all men. For, since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or any other deliberate interest), but the subject feels himself completely *free* in respect of the liking which he accords to the object, he can find as reason for his delight no personal condition to which his own subjective self might alone be party. Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one.'[22] When the disinterested spectator finds any object delightful then the object is delightful independent of all interest of the person. Hence the ground of delight obtaining in the object is valid for all persons.

This presence of universality in the estimate of the disinterested spectator makes his estimate a judgement of taste. Through this judgement of taste Kant is overcoming the subjectivity of man established by his First Critique. In §8 of *Critique of Judgement*, when Kant claims 'In a judgement of taste the universality of delight is only represented as subjective,' he is not attempting at subjectivization of

aesthetics; rather he only wants to deny the *objective universal validity* of judgement of taste. But when he says the judgement of taste has *subjective universal validity*, he is trying to overcome the *subjectivity* of man by attributing *universal validity* to his judgement of taste nonetheless.

This universality that one disinterested spectator can demand is only from all others as spectators. It is not an empirical universality. Since interested subjects (who have taken the stance of subject to an object) may not agree with the estimate of the spectator. They may not find the spectacle delightful from their interested point of view. Of course, it may, also, be the other way round. It may also happen that others have taken the stance of the spectator while a person himself has failed to take up that stance and hence others may not agree with his estimate. 'It may be a matter of uncertainty whether a person who thinks he is laying down judgement of taste is, in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is what is contemplated in his judgement, and that consequently, it is meant to be a judgement of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the expression 'beauty'. For himself he can be certain on the point of his mere consciousness of the separation of everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the delight remaining to him; and this is all for which he promises himself the agreement of everyone—a claim which, under these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were it not that he frequently sinned against them, and thus passed an erroneous judgement of taste.'[23] So in taking the stance of the disinterested spectator one speaks in agreement with a *universal voice*. But how can the universality of voice through mutual correction be achieved? What are its conditions? To answer this question let us find out what is involved in aesthetic delight. Kant writes:

> To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is quite different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more to its feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and

> estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind (*Gemüt*) is conscious in the feeling of its state.[24]

Be it noted when a person is conscious of a 'representation with an accompanying sensation of delight' then three things happen: (1) the representation under consideration is referred to his 'feeling of life', (2) the feeling founds a capacity for discrimination and estimation which makes no contribution to knowledge, and (3) this capacity of distinction and estimation compares the representation with the complete capacity for representation.

According to Kant in the aesthetic delight no concept is involved. So he argues:

> The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general. Now a representation, whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a source of cognition at all, imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations.[25]

But this aesthetic delight must be universally valid. So this state of free play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must admit of universal communication. Otherwise cognition, as a definition of the object with which given representations (in any subject whatever) are to accord, will not be the one and only representation which is valid for everyone.[26] He further writes:

> As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgement of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite concept, it can be nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these are in mutual accord, as is requisite for cognition in general); for we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for a cognition in general must be just as valid for every one, and

consequently as universally communicable, as is any indeterminate cognition, which always rests upon that relation as its subjective condition.[27]

What is more fundamental: the pleasure or the universal communicability of this pleasure? Kant argues that if the pleasure in a given object is the antecedent, and the universal communicability of this pleasure is all that the judgement of taste is meant to allow to the representation of the object as a consequent, then such a sequence would be self-contradictory. For a pleasure of that kind would be nothing but the feeling of mere agreeableness to the senses, and so, from its very nature, would possess no more than private validity, as it would be immediately dependent on the representation through which the object is given. Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgement of taste, must be fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its consequent.[28]

> Nothing, however, is capable of being universally communicated but cognition and representation so far as appurtenant to cognition. For it is only as thus appurtenant that the representation is objective, and it is this alone that gives it a universal point of reference with which the power of representation of every one is obliged to harmonize. If, then, the determining ground of the judgement as to this universal communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective, that is to say, to be conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation *to cognition in general.*[29]

So according to Kant the aesthetic judgement of taste postulates the universal communicability of the 'quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally.'[30] For Kant this postulate is necessary not only for aesthetic judgement of taste but also for the act of knowing.

Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e., the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise.[31]

It may be recollected Kant defines 'taste as the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept.'[32] For Kant communication and connection between concept of reason and intuition are related. 'The aptitude of men for communicating their thoughts requires, also, a relation between the imagination and the understanding, in order to connect intuitions with concepts, and concepts, in turn, with intuitions, which both unite in cognition. But there the agreement of both mental powers is according to law, and under the constraint of definite concepts. Only when the imagination in its freedom stirs the understanding, and the understanding apart from concepts puts the imagination into regular play, does the representation communicate itself not as thought, but as an internal feeling of a final state of the mind.'[33] And Kant concludes, 'Taste is, therefore, the faculty of forming an *a priori* estimate of the communicability of the feeling that, without the mediation of a concept, are connected with a given representation.'[34]

It may be recalled that the idea of state of nature is arrived at when we try to make the society an object of cognition and as cognition presupposes communicability of feeling of attunement of cognitive faculties, so we can say the society in the state of nature is fundamentally a communicative society. The disinterested spectators are communicating with each other to achieve universality of voice. A communicative society is a nation. Karl W. Deutsch writes, '*A large group of persons linked by such complementary habits and facilities of*

communication we may call a *people*.'[35] A nation is characterized by 'the presence of sufficient communication facilities with enough complementarity to produce overall result.'[36] To generate a modern liberal state Kant needs to presuppose the existence of nation in the state of nature.

Commensurate with what has been said, the second aspect of our belongingness is we are in communication with others in order to achieve agreement on the issue of communication. Kant makes clear that the whole discussion of the judgement of taste is geared towards the establishment of the communicative society, in § 41 on 'the empirical interest in the beautiful'. There Kant writes, 'And if we admit that the impulse to society is natural to mankind, and that the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e., sociability, is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature intended for society, and one, therefore, that belongs to humanity, it is inevitable that we should also look upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our feeling to everyone else, and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural inclination of everyone is set.' So for him, 'Further, a regard to universal communicability is a thing which everyone expects and requires from everyone else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself.'[37] Hence for Kant the highest point of civilization is reached when a society, 'Makes this work of communication almost the main business of refined inclination, and the entire value of sensation is placed in the degree to which they permit of universal communication. At this stage, then, even where the pleasure which each one has in an object is but insignificant and possess of itself no conspicuous interest, still the idea of its universal communicability almost indefinitely augments its value.'[38] It is by universal communicability of quickening of feeling of life that we participate in common life of the people, which is the most fundamental aspect of our sociability.

III. SENSUS COMMUNIS (COMMON SENSE) AND NATION

What are other features of our belongingness to the nation or the common life of the people? Let us analyze the third rule of reflection on the beautiful, which says, 'Beauty is the form of *finality* in an

object, so far as perceived in it *apart from the representation of an end*.'[39] What it means is that the communicative social spectacle in which the disinterested spectator is engrossed has the form of purposiveness apart from any representation of its purpose. Kant explains:

> The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the subject attending a representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure itself, because it involves a determining ground of the subject's activity in respect of the quickening of its cognitive powers, and thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of cognition generally, but without being limited to a definite cognition, and consequently a mere form of the subjective finality of a representation in an aesthetic judgement. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither resembling that from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But still it involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving a continuance of the state of the representation itself and the active engagement of the cognitive powers without ulterior aim. We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself.[40]

Since the free play of faculties and the consequent communication has no purpose such that when it is achieved then the play and the consequent communication will come to an end, the form of finality involved in beauty says nothing but that the form the play of faculties has and as a consequence the form that the communication has is what is intended here and hence whose continuance apart from any end is what is meant by the form of finality involved in beauty and this continuance of the play of faculties and communication is ensured through the *causality* of recognition of this form of finality in the free play of faculties and communication. The consciousness of this causality is what is felt as pleasure according to Kant. 'The consciousness of the causality of a representation in respect of the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may here be said to denote in a general way what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for converting the

state of the representations into their opposite (for hindering or removing them).'[41] Hence we belong to the nation—nation as a communicative society—because our engrossment in it as disinterested spectator is strengthened by our interpretation of its form, which reproduces itself through this interpretation itself.

At this stage of the argument the engagement of the individual in the continued preservation of this primordial communicative social unity is not based on his recognition of it being a perfect society. 'Beauty, therefore, as a formal subjective finality, involves no thought whatsoever of a perfection of the object, as a would-be formal finality which yet, for all that, is objective: and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good, which represents both as differing only in their logical form, the first being merely a confused, the second a clearly defined, concept of perfection, while otherwise alike in content and origin, all goes for nothing: for then there would be no specific difference between them ... .'[42] What is the basis of preservation of this communicative society? Kant writes:

> For since abstraction is made from this unity as end (what the thing is to be), nothing is left but the subjective finality of the representations in the mind of the subject intuiting. This gives a certain finality of the representative state of the subject, in which the subject feels itself quite at home in its effort to grasp a given form in the imagination, but no perfection of any object, the latter not being here thought through any concept.[43]

So the feeling of being at home in this communicative society is what keeps it in being as an on-going affair according to Kant. The feeling of being at home—pleasure or the consciousness of life—precedes even its recognition through concepts as to what it is by its members.

Kant introduces a distinction between two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, a conception of perfection of the object is also presupposed. 'Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects which come under the concept of a particular end.'[44]

In light of the above distinction we can say a nation, as an ongoing affair, is a free beauty for Kant.

The last feature of our belongingness is to be discovered by the fourth rule of reflection on the beautiful, which says, 'The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a necessary delight.'[45] What it means is explained by Kant:

> The judgement of taste exacts agreement from every one; and a person who describes something as beautiful insists that every one ought to give the object in question his approval and follow suit in describing it as beautiful. The ought in aesthetic judgements, therefore, despite an accordance with all the requisite data for passing judgement, is still only pronounced conditionally. We are suitors for agreement from everyone else, because we are fortified with a ground common to all. Further, we would be able to count on this agreement, provided we were always assured of the correct subsumption of the case under that ground as the rule of approval.[46]

We cannot rest with disagreement in communication in society; the quest for agreement in society must go on since common sense assures its possibility. Common sense is the ground of agreement in society. Kant writes, 'The judgement of taste, therefore, depends on our presupposing the existence of a common sense. (But this is not to be taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.) Only under the presupposition, I repeat, of such a common sense, are we able to lay down a judgement of taste.'[47]

Be it noted that for Kant the common sense is 'the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.' What kind of an effect is this? Kant explains:

> However, by the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence

upon its judgement. This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate.[48]

The public sense called common sense is effected by the free play of faculties through communication, which in turn becomes the basis of agreement. What reason do we have for postulating such public sense? Kant gives the reason:

... a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts. But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. However, there must be one in which this internal ratio suitable for quickening (one faculty by the other) is best adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally; and this disposition can only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts). Since, now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense: it follows that our assumption of it is well-founded. And here, too, we do not have to take our stand on psychological observations, but we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism.[49]

So the last element discovered regarding our belongingness to nation is that we must seek agreement in communication since it is guaranteed by the fact that we have common sense. Since common sense is collective public reason it requires well-stocked memory. Kant writes:

There is no employment of our powers, no matter how free, not

start afresh with the crude equipment of his natural state, would not get itself involved in blundering attempts, did not those of others tie before it as a warning. Not that predecessors make those who follow in their steps mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking in themselves for the principles, and so of adopting their own, often better, course.[50]

Be it noted Kant makes a distinction between following a precedent and imitating a precedent. He explains, 'Following which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert upon others ...'[51] So to belong to a nation we must follow precedent set by exemplary authors. That is to say we have to accept validity of authority to belong to a nation. For Kant acceptance of authority, for the purpose of following but not of imitation, does not violate the principal tenets of enlightenment, which enjoin us '(1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently.'[52]

IV: GENIUS AND THE REFORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM OF STATE OF NATURE

Now that we have unravelled the structure of belongingness to a nation, which is in the state of nature according to Kant, let us reformulate the problem of state of nature. Be it noted that belongingness to a nation is necessary presupposition of a person having knowledge and hence of his being a subject. But when the person looks at the nation to which he belongs from the point of view of his subjectivity, he finds it in the state of nature precisely because his belonging to the nation is not predicated upon it being an ideal or perfect society. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, which constitutes the subjectivity of man—from the point of view of which he looks at everything including the nation to which he belongs—makes clear, 'A constitution allowing *the greatest possible human freedom* in accordance with laws by which *the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others*—I do not

first projecting a constitution but in all its laws.'[53] This idea—the idea of a constitution based on the principle of right—is a necessary element of the idea of kingdom of ends or the kingdom of God according to Kant. Establishment of a constitution based on a principle of right will require solving the problem of nationality. '... a nationality is a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of its members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make enforcement of its command sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them.'[54] And the problem of control of this power is how to ensure that individuals, including the wielder of power, while making a moral determination of his will, determines his will in such a manner that he is sure of agreement of others or at least can rightfully demand the free agreement of others. Are we adequate for solving these problems? Have we enough capacity to actualize these ideas? This is the question that is answered in the *Analytic of Sublime* in the *Critique of Judgement*.

The mathematically sublime in nature makes us aware of our supersensible vocation. Kant claims, '... the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self—the subject); and this feeling renders, as it were, intuitable the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty of sensibility.'[55] According to him the aesthetic judgement in its estimation of a thing of nature as mathematically sublime refers the faculty of imagination 'to reason to bring out its subjective accord with ideas of reason (indeterminately indicated), i.e., to induce a temper of mind conformable—to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it.'[56] In the representation of sublime in nature the mind of the subject feels itself set in motion. In the feeling of sublime in nature, 'The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself, yet again for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out such an effort on the part

of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility.'[57]

Kant makes it clear that the above ideas of the kingdom of ends, the constitution based on the principle of right etc., give us the basis of feeling of sublime. 'For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation.'[58] Kant defines, '*Sublime* is the name given to what is *absolutely great*.'[59] On the basis of this definition he argues: 'If, however, we call anything not alone great, but, without qualification, absolutely, and in every respect (beyond all comparison) great, that is to say, sublime, we soon perceive that for this it is not permissible to seek an appropriate standard outside itself, but merely in itself. It is a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence it comes that the sublime is not to be looked for in the things of nature, but only in our own ideas.'[60] According to Kant, 'in the practical sphere, the greatness of a particular virtue, or of public liberty and justice in a country' are such 'standard[s] given *a priori*, which by reason of the imperfections of the judging subject is restricted to subjective conditions of presentation *in concreto*.'[61] Hence Kant maintains, 'It is, in other words, for us a law (of reason), which goes to make us what we are, that we should esteem as small in comparison with ideas of reason everything which for us is great in nature as an object of sense; and that which makes us alive to the feeling of this supersensible side of our being harmonizes with that law.'[62]

The dynamically sublime in nature also makes us aware of our supersensible vocation. In the dynamically sublime in nature, 'the irresistibility of the might of nature forces upon us the recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature, but at the same time reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of nature, and discover a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and brought into danger by external nature.'[63] That the dynamically sublime in nature has a social dimension is brought by the example he gives of the dynamically sublime. 'War itself, provided it is conducted

with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has some-
thing sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a
manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the
dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet
with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace favours the pre-
dominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-
interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character
of the nation.'[64] Ultimately for Kant, 'Sublimity, therefore, does not
reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own mind, insofar
as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within,
and thus also over nature without us ... .'[65]

Once the sublime in nature has made us aware of our capacity for
the supersensible vocation, the next step is to show us the way to fulfil
that vocation. Even before the analysis of the sublime is opened Kant
has already made preparations for this. Kant introduces the notorious
distinction between the free and dependent beauty before he opens the
analysis of sublime in nature. This distinction has been found to be
dangerous for theory of art.[66] But as a preparation for the question of
nationality it makes perfect sense. Nation is a free beauty. The problem
is to transform it through the art of man to a dependent beauty the
perfectly good state or a state with a constitution based on principle of
right. But what kind of art is this?

Ultimately the problem of nationality can be solved only if each
individual while making a moral determination of his will, he deter-
mines his will in such a manner that it is also a beautiful determination
of will since the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good for Kant.
In beautiful determination of will, will is not a free beauty but depend-
ent beauty according to Kant.

After completing the discussion of deduction of judgement of taste
in §42 entitled 'The intellectual interest in the beautiful' Kant declares,
'One, then, who takes such an interest in the beautiful in nature can
only do so insofar as he has previously set his interest deep in the
foundations of the morally good.' Interest in the beautiful in nature
is—to use a Kantian phraseology—the (reflective) *ratio cognoscendi*
of moral feeling (while moral feeling is the *ratio essendi* of interest in
the beautiful in nature, through reflection). Previously in greater detail

he explains, 'I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in the
beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in estimating it) is always
a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is at
least indicative of a temper of mind favourable to the moral feeling
that it should readily associate itself with the contemplation of na-
ture.'[67] What reason can be given for this? It must be looked for in the
contention of Kant:

The fact is that our intuition and reflection must have as their con-
comitant the thought that *the beauty in question is nature's handi-
work*; *and this is the sole basis of the immediate interest that is
taken in it*. Failing this, we are either left with a bare judgement of
taste void of all interest whatever, or else only with one that is
combined with an interest that is mediate, involving, namely, a ref-
erence to society; which latter affords no reliable indication of morally
good habits of thought.[68]

*The interest in natural beauty is related to moral concern with respect
to it being a product of art of nature but not with respect to it being
a free beauty.* A person concerned deeply with moral goodness is
interested in natural beauty with respect to its production by nature
because the production of good will is also a production of beautiful
will since beautiful is the symbol of morally good. So to solve the
problem of establishing a civil society from the nation in state of
nature man has to learn the art of nature as exhibited in the production
of natural beauty. Fine art is the art of nature for Kant. 'Nature proved
beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be
termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it
has the appearance of nature.'[69] And now he declares, 'Fine art is the
art of genius.'[70]

We noted in 'The Foundations of Modern Liberalism: Inscription of
Art and Morality in the Perspective of Modern Metaphysics'[71] that
Kant makes a distinction between art and nature. We also noted that
Willkür is the free choice associated with *making*, which is the concern
of the *technically practical* doctrine. But what can be said regarding
determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* as that is the problem of determina-
tion of moral will in the state of nature. It is the problem of *morally*

practical doctrine. Now Kant makes a conditional statement, 'if the dexterity of the will in acting according to laws of freedom, in contradistinction to nature, were to be also called an art, it would necessarily indicate an art which would make a system of freedom possible like the system of nature. This would truly be a Divine art, if we were in a position by means of it to realize completely what reason prescribes to us, and to put the idea into practice.'[72] Why is he making this conditional statement? Why is he in doubt? The reason is that the proficiency of choice in accordance with laws of freedom must simultaneously be beautiful. That is to say the determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* must also be beautiful through reflection. This requires genius according to Kant.

'Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.'[73] For Kant the genius is a favourite of nature. Kant identifies four aspects of genius which make him special: '... genius (1) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given ... and that consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) ... its products must at the same time be models, i.e., be exemplary; and, consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e., as a standard or rule of estimating. (3) It cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature ... (4) Nature prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only insofar as it is to be fine art.'[74] So determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* must be a fine art through reflection in the state of nature. Be it noted for Kant proficiency in fine art is not a sufficient condition for having good will, i.e. having *Willkür* determined by *Wille*. But it is (reflectively) necessary that determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* be a fine art.

'Fine art is an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature.'[75] According to Kant, 'A product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature. Nevertheless the finality in its form must appear just as free from the constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. Upon this feeling of freedom in the

play of our cognitive faculties—which play has at the same time to be final rests that pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature.'[76] The art, which has the appearance of nature, is not mechanical art but fine art. Since the distinction between art and nature is the distinction between activities done with free will and activities done without free will, when Kant says that art must appear as nature what he is demanding is that an action done with free will must not appear as having been done with free choice, rather must appear as an operation of nature or activity of nature. What Kant is struggling to recover is the mode of human action which has been obliterated from the point of view of the subjectivity of man, i.e. *doing* or *acting* as accepted by both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas in distinction to *making*. The determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* cannot be a making of a *good will*, rather it has to be a *doing* in Aristotelian-Thomistic sense. It cannot be *poeisis* but *praxis* it must be.

What is most important here is that the artist does not appear to have laboured under the constraint of the rule, even though it was there. What Kant is saying is that there is no *necessitation* of *Willkür* by the law of *Wille*. When everybody takes the stance of the disinterested spectator there is effortless determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* or practical reason. This effortless determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* results not in a *making* which is a *homo faber* act, rather it results in *doing*, which is a non-*homo faber* act. But can Kant succeed in recovering fully the concept of *doing* or *acting* which is a non-*homo faber* acting?

V: THE AESTHETIC IDEA AND THE RECONCILIATION OF FREEDOM WITH POWER

How is this effortlessness in determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* possible? How can genius help here? Genius belongs to nature while *Willkür* and *Wille* belong to the realm of freedom. How can the determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* be beautiful?

To answer these questions Kant makes use of the notion of aesthetic idea. The aesthetic idea 'sets the *Gemütskräfte* [powers of mind: the

imagination and understanding] into a swing that is final, i.e. into a play that is self-maintaining and strengthens the powers for such activity.'[77] Kant further defines:

... by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible. It is easily seen, that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which, conversely, is a concept, to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate.[78]

Kant further clarifies:

In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, annexed to a given concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that no expression indicating a definite concept can be found for it one which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is indefinable in words and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit (soul) also.[79]

In Kant's opinion an aesthetic idea serves a rational idea as a substitute for logical representation. Since autonomy of will is a rational idea, which no intuition can present, we need aesthetic idea for its presentation in intuition. It is only a genius through aesthetic idea that produces a 'second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature,' which works nature up 'into something else, namely, what surpasses nature,' which is freedom or autonomy of will. The totality of inclinations, desires, aversions, abilities, name what you may, which nature gives us, we can through genius, reorganize them to represent freedom which then becomes the basis of activity.

Aesthetic idea, specifically rational aesthetic idea rather than the normal aesthetic idea, performs this task by supplying 'rules for establishing a union of taste with reason, i.e., of the beautiful with the good—rules by which the former becomes available as an intentional

instrument in respect of the latter, for the purpose of bringing that temper of the mind which is self-sustaining and of subjective universal validity to the support and maintenance of that mode of thought which, while possessing objective universal validity, can only be preserved by a resolute effort.'[80]

With genius we can effortlessly invent, dispose and eloquently express our life as an aesthetic idea corresponding to free will given the nature that we have. But how this is done, its rule cannot be one set down in a formula and serving as a precept—for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Hence the rule must be gathered from the performance, i.e., from the product, which others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it serve as a model, not for imitation, but for following.[81]

So for Kant genius is a talent for (fine) art. So it produces a definite idea of the product—as its end. The end here is the production of a good will. '... [S]ince ... reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary.'[82] But reason cannot do this without following the example set by the genius through aesthetic idea. That is to say even to follow a moral law we need to work up our life activity into an aesthetic idea following the example set by the genius.

According to Kant 'Taste ... is the discipline (or corrective) of genius.'[83] When genius is corrected by taste of disinterested spectator, 'It introduces a clearness and order into the plenitude of thought, and in so doing gives stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture.'[84] The reason for this is that '... taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through the intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it is this rendering also, and the increased sensibility, founded upon it, for the feeling which these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that are the origin of that pleasure which taste declares valid for mankind in general and not

merely for the private feeling of each individual.'[85] The genius disciplined by taste is not a *homo faber*, rather he is a non-*homo faber* man. 'This makes it clear that the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of the moral feeling. For only when sensibility is brought into harmony with moral feeling can genuine taste assume a definite unchangeable form.'[86] To use Kantian phraseology moral feeling is the *ratio essendi* of interest in the beautiful in nature through reflection (while interest in the beautiful in the nature is the [reflective] *ratio cognoscendi* of moral feeling).

Now we have a way out of the impasse of the state of nature. Now we have the possibility as well as know-how to transform the nation into a civil state, provided we become geniuses guided by taste. Be it noted, for Kant, genius, like nature, creates exemplary work 'unconsciously' embodying the aesthetic idea corresponding to the good will, without consciously applying rules, but by following and not merely imitating models from the past. Turning men into geniuses is not a task for us, as it cannot be done consciously as the genius is the favourite of nature. We noted before, Kant has no knowledge how to overcome the subejctivity of man as required to turn him into a genius guided by taste. He leaves it as the telos of nature. He must prepare the teleology of nature. But he will establish teleology of nature in a manner where he will fail in recovering fully the idea of non-*homo faber* act. It can be recovered only if we recover the Greek experience.

According to Kant, the genius has limitation compared to the scientist in their functioning. 'The talent for science is formed for the continued advances of greater perfection in knowledge, with all its dependent practical advantages, as also for imparting the same to others. Hence scientists can boast a ground of considerable superiority over those who merit the honour of being called geniuses, since genius reaches a point at which art must make a halt, as there is a limit imposed upon it which it cannot transcend. This limit has in all probability been long since attained. In addition, such skill cannot be communicated, but requires to be bestowed directly from the hand of nature upon each individual, and so with him it dies, awaiting the day when nature once again endows another in the same way—one who

needs no more than an example to set the talent of which he is conscious at work on similar lines.'[87]

Now the question we have to face is: Have we, long ago, reached the limit of the extent to which the civil constitution can be actualized as the aesthetic idea of common life? Kant's answer is in the affirmative.

> There was an age and there were nations in which the active impulse towards a social life regulated by laws—what converts a people into a permanent community—grappled with the huge difficulties presented by the trying problem of bringing freedom (and therefore equality also) into union with constraining force (more that of respect and dutiful submission than of fear).[88]

How did they achieve the limit of union of the two: force and freedom?

> And such must have been the age, and such the nation, that first discovered the art of reciprocal communication of ideas between the more cultured and ruder sections of the community, and how to bridge the difference between the amplitude and refinement of the former and the natural simplicity and originality of the latter—in this way hitting upon that mean between higher culture and the modest worth of nature, that forms for taste also, as a sense common to all mankind, that true standard which no universal rules can supply.[89]

What Kant has in mind is that the happy harmony of freedom and force was possible in the nation, which had strengthened its channels of mutual communication and education. Kant is here referring to the Greek experience embodied in the genius of Plato and Aristotle. Not only that he is arguing for the recognition of the political significance of the authority based on knowledge—knowledge as virtue, not power— which is the real element that keeps the society together in harmony. Political authority cannot be legitimately instituted without prior recognition of authority based on knowledge in society. Genius is such authority.

Unless we follow the Greek experience as a model no civil state can be achieved. 'Hardly will a later age dispense with those models. For

nature will ever recede farther into the background, so that eventually, with no permanent example retained from the past, a future age would scarce be in a position to form a concept of the happy union, in one and the same people, of the law-directed constraint belonging to the highest culture, with the force and truth of a free nature sensible of its proper worth.'[90] Hence for Kant *Humaniora* (Humanities) as represented by Greek model is the sociability embodied in nation that is appropriate and necessary to sustain a civil state.

VI. ORGANIC BODY AS THE SYMBOL OF CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND TELEOLOGY OF NATURE

Kant describes the relation between the determination of will by law and the end—kingdom of ends—achieved thereby in contradictory terms.

But although for its own sake morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will, it is quite possible that it is necessarily related to such an end, taken not as the ground but as the [sum of] inevitable consequences of maxims adopted as conformable to that end. For in the absence of all reference to an end no determination of the will can take place in man, since such determination cannot be followed by no effect whatever; and the representation of the effect must be capable of being accepted, not, indeed, as the basis for the determination of the will and as an end antecedently aimed at, but yet as an end conceived of as the result ensuing from the will's determination through the law (finis in consequentian veniens). Without an end of this sort a will, envisaging to itself no definite goal for a contemplated act, either objective or subjective (which it has, or ought to have, in view), is indeed informed as to how it ought to act, but not whither, and so can achieve no satisfaction. It is true, therefore, that morality requires no end for right conduct; the law, which contains the formal condition of the use of freedom in general, suffices. Yet an end does arise out of morality; for how the question: What is to result from this right conduct of ours?—is to be answered, and towards what, as an end—even granted it may not be wholly subject to our control—

we might direct our actions and abstentions so as at least to be in harmony with that end: these cannot possibly be matters of indifference to reason. Hence the end is no more than an idea of an object which takes the formal condition of all such ends as we ought to have (duty) and combines it with whatever is conditioned, and in harmony with duty, in all the ends which we do have (happiness proportioned to obedience to duty)—that is to say, the idea of a highest good in the world for whose possibility we must postulate a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent Being which alone can unite the two elements of this highest good.[91]

The contradiction is too glaring in the first line itself: 'morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will,' yet will must be determined by 'maxims adopted as conformable to that end.' How can will be determined by 'maxims adopted as conformable to that end' unless that end is represented prior to the determining of the will? If morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of will, how can the will be determined by maxims conformable to that end? Isn't Kant contradicting himself? If 'the law, which contains the formal condition of the use of freedom in general,' suffices for moral determination of will, then the actualization of the kingdom of ends cannot be attributed to man, rather an omnipotent God will be its maker. If the God is the maker of kingdom of ends then man's participation in its production is like the production of beehives by bees, i.e. man's participation in its production is just instinctive action reaction of nature. So when man morally determines his will by 'the law, which contains the formal condition of the use of freedom in general,' he is participating in the production of kingdom of ends out of natural instinct like bees producing beehives. Isn't Kant getting into contradiction? If we keep in mind that moral determination of will is a kind of fine art of genius under the discipline of taste, then the contradiction vanishes. Moral determination of will turns out to be an art under the aspect of nature, which is fine art.

Now let us find out what exactly is the nature of man's participation in the transformation of a nation into a civil state, which is part of the ultimate end, i.e. the kingdom of ends. Since man's participation is natural, like the activities of bees, for understanding the nature of

man's participation in achievement of this end, it is needed that teleology of nature be legitimized. The Greeks accepted teleology of nature. Its constitutive claim in the knowledge of nature has been destroyed by modern science as exhibited by the transcendental conditions of knowledge exposed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

But Kant encounters a difficulty in establishing the teleology of nature. In his view, 'A thing is possible only as an end where a causality to which it owes its origin must not be sought in the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose capacity of acting is determined by conceptions.'[92] But this causality is not natural. 'But the causality, so construed, becomes the faculty of acting according to ends—that is to say, a will; and the object, which is represented as only deriving its possibility from such a will, will be presented as possible only as an end.'[93] But the formative activity of nature cannot be explained as production through will. 'We do not say half enough of nature and her capacity in organized products when we speak of this capacity as being the *analogue of art*.'[94] Since this kind of causality of will is not to be sought in nature, he gives a new definition of a natural or physical end: '... a thing exists as a physical end *if it is* (though in a double sense) *both cause and effect of itself*.'[95] Provocatively Kant is drawing attention to examples like the production of a tree, where 'the genus, now as effect, now as cause, is continually produced and in the same measure produces itself and so preserves itself genetically.'[96] Kant distinguishes the natural production from art by taking the same example of a plant. 'The plant first prepares the matter that it assimilates, and bestows upon it a specifically distinctive quality which the mechanism of nature outside it cannot supply, and it develops itself by means of a material which, in its composite character, is its own product. For, though in respect of the constituents that it derives from nature outside, it must be regarded as only an educt, yet in the separation and recombination of this raw material we find an original capacity of selection and construction on the part of natural beings of this kind such as infinitely outdistances all the efforts of art.'[97] This natural production goes beyond art. For Kant this productive activity of nature is analogous to life. 'But nature, on the contrary, organizes itself, and does so in each of its organized products—following a single pattern, certainly,

as to general features, but nevertheless admitting deviations calculated to secure self-preservation under particular circumstances. We might perhaps come nearer to the description of this impenetrable property if we were to call it an *analogue of life*.'[98] But Kant cannot pursue this analogy too far without introducing soul into nature, which he cannot accept. Hence for him, 'Strictly speaking, therefore, the organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality known to us.'[99] But he pursues this analogy of living being for reflection on the formative activity of nature.

Kant declares, 'Things declared as physical ends are organisms.'[100] He explains the idea of organism in the following words:

In such a natural product as this every part is thought as *owing* its presence to the *agency* of all the remaining parts, and also as existing *for the sake of others* and of the whole, that is as an instrument, or organ. But this is not enough—for it might be an instrument of art, and thus have no more than its general possibility referred to an end. On the contrary the part must be an organ *producing* the other parts—each, consequently, reciprocally producing the others. No instrument of art can answer to this description, but only the instrument of that nature from whose resources the materials of every instrument are drawn—even the materials for the instruments of art. Only under these conditions and upon these terms can such a product be an *organized* and *self-organized being*, and, as such, be called a *physical end*.[101]

According to Kant, 'An organized being is, therefore, not a mere machine. For a machine has solely *motive power*, whereas an organized being possesses inherent *formative* power, and such, moreover, as it can impart to material devoid of it—material which it organizes. This, therefore, is a self-propagating formative power, which cannot be explained by the capacity of movement alone, that is to say, by mechanism.'[102]

It is in this sense that an organic body is the symbol of a constitutional state. In a footnote to this passage quoted above, he writes:

We may, on the other hand, make use of an analogy to the above mentioned immediate physical ends to throw light on a certain union,

which however, is to be found more often in idea than in fact. Thus in the case of a complete transformation, recently undertaken, of a great people into a state, the word *organization* has frequently, and with much propriety, been used for the constitution of the legal authorities and even of the entire body politic. For in a whole of this kind certainly no member should be a mere means, but should also be an end, and, seeing that he contributes to the possibility of the entire body, should have his position and functioning in turn defined by the idea of the whole.[103]

According to Kant the notion of natural causality according to ends is not 'a constitutive conception either of understanding or of reason, but it may be used by reflective judgement as a regulative conception for guiding our investigation of objects of this kind by a remote analogy with our own causality according to ends generally, and as a basis of reflection upon their supreme source.'[104] Kant had already explained before that the teleological estimate is a principle of orientation, and admitted 'with a view to bringing (nature) under principles of observation and research by *analogy* to the causality that looks to ends, while not pretending to *explain* it by these means. Thus it is an estimate of the reflective, not of the determinant, judgement.'[105] There is no conflict between the reflective principle of teleology of nature and the practical principle by which men act as moral agent. Since in the organic body as a physical end parts 'in their collective unity reciprocally produce one another alike as to form and combination, and thus by their own causality produce a whole, the conception of which, conversely—in a being possessing the causality according to conceptions that is adequate for such a product—could in turn be the cause of the whole according to a principle, so that, consequently, the nexus of *efficient causes* might be no less estimated as an *operation brought about by final* causes.'[106]

The significance of what Kant claims is two-fold. On the one hand Kant has succeeded in drawing attention to man's participation in transformation of nation into a civil society as *doing* or *acting* in Aristotelian-Thomistic sense, since he conceives this transformation not as a technical problem; on the other hand he recovers the place of scientific knowledge if the civil society is to exist. For Kant the teleology of

nature *must* subordinate the principle of mechanism of nature if the telos is to be achieved.[107] That is to say the scientific research into the causality of nature cannot be indiscriminate and unlimited, it must be guided and controlled by reflective judgement of teleology of nature if the ultimate end is to be achieved. 'Our *right to aim at* an explanation of all natural products on simply mechanical lines is in itself quite unrestricted. But the constitution of our understanding, as engaged upon things in the shape of physical ends, is such that our *power* of *meeting all demands* from the unaided resources of mechanical explanation is not alone very limited, but is also circumscribed within clearly marked bounds.'[108] By these two claims what Kant wants to recover is the idea that state grows naturally as was the case with *polis* in Aristotle's political philosophy. Be it noted that the idea of 'organism' and of the 'organic' is a purely modern, mechanistic-technological concept, according to which naturally 'growing things' are interpreted as artifacts that make themselves. That is to say within the mechanistic-technological conceptual horizon the naturally growing common life of people is interpreted as organic body politic, because within this horizon the naturally 'growing thing' is interpreted as artifacts that make themselves, and the artifacts that make themselves are organisms. Hence, even though Kant needs the notion of *doing* or *acting* in Aristotelian-Thomistic sense, but he fails in recovering it fully. To recover *doing* or *acting* in Aristotelian-Thomistic sense we have to recover specifically the Greek essence and concept of φνσις and φρόνησις as elaborated by Aristotle.

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Kant on Categories: The Two 'Deductions'

R.C. PRADHAN
Indian Council of Philosophical Research
New Delhi

Kant's doctrine of categories has received philosophical attention right from the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*[1] till today. It has remained at the centre of critical discussions on the First Critique. There has been a continuous debate going on regarding the nature and the relevance of the Kantian doctrine of categories, especially the relevance of the two 'Deductions' in Kant's First Critique. In this connection, mention may be made of the two pieces of critical writing that recently appeared in the pages of the *JICPR*: namely, Daya Krishna's 'Kant's Doctrine of Categories: Some Questions and Problems'[2] and D.P. Chattopadhyaya's 'Kant on Categories: Forward and Backward'.[3] In these two writings there has been an attempt to look at the problem of categories in Kant's philosophy from a critical angle. It appears that everything is not well, not only with Kant's scheme of categories but also with the two 'Deductions'. It is to be noted that Kant's First Critique claimed to have achieved a breakthrough in philosophy based on these two 'Deductions'.

In this paper I would like to argue that Kant's Transcendental Deduction is still relevant so far as the notion of science is concerned, as science is a critical and rational enterprise and that scientific knowledge itself is a matter of rational reconstruction. Considered from this point of view, the transcendental foundations of knowledge in human reason cannot be ruled out.

I. THE IDEA OF TWO 'DEDUCTIONS': PROLEGOMENA TO TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Kant's transcendental philosophy in the First Critique hinges broadly on the two Deductions of categories, namely, the Metaphysical

Deduction and the Transcendental Deduction. While the Metaphysical Deduction is concerned with the logical derivation of the categories from the judgement-forms, the Transcendental Deduction is concerned with the justification of the application of the categories in experience. Thus while the former is a matter of formal logic, the latter belongs to what Kant calls transcendental logic. Formal logic 'abstracts from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general' (*CPR*, B80). Thus formal logic or general logic, according to Kant, deals with the pure formal rules of thought and not with anything that is subjective and psychological in nature. Logic has been treated since Kant as a formal discipline. However, Kant distinguishes formal logic from transcendental logic since the latter, unlike the former, deals with the *a priori* knowledge of objects. Transcendental logic is the logic of the rules of knowledge of objects. That is why it is not completely indifferent to the content of knowledge. In this respect, 'unlike general logic which has to deal with both empirical and pure knowledge of reason, it concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason *solely insofar as they relate* a priori *to objects*' (*CPR*, B82) (italics added). What is to be noted here is that transcendental logic is epistemologically motivated such that it studies only the *a priori* rules of knowledge of the world.

In view of the above, it is necessary for Kant to introduce the two Deductions into his logical investigations. The reasons are two-fold: (1) the categories or the *a priori* concepts have to be identified and located in the human understanding which is presupposed by both general and transcendental logic as the source of the concepts and rules, and (2) the categories have to be legitimized as the source of knowledge of the objects. While the categories can be discovered only through a Metaphysical Deduction, their legitimization through application in experience has to be undertaken by a transcendental undertaking called the Transcendental Deduction. Deduction for Kant is another name for proof or justification, as Chattopadhyaya[4] rightly points out seeking its origin in the jurisprudential concept of right. The fact that Kant seeks to justify the epistemic claims in the legitimate realm of logic and reason cannot be overlooked by philosophers. There

is a well-defined scope of validation of concepts in Kant's logical and epistemological enterprise.

But the important point to be noted in this regard is that the Metaphysical Deduction itself is not sufficient to provide the clue to transcendental philosophy. Metaphysical Deduction is introduced as the 'Analytic of Concepts' (Book I of Transcendental Analytic) 'in order to investigate the possibility of concepts *a priori* by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and by analyzing the pure use of this faculty' (*CPR*, A66/B91). Thus Metaphysical Deduction has a purely logical role in following up 'the pure concepts to their first seeds and dispositions in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they are developed, and by the same understanding are exhibited in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them' (*CPR*, B91). Thus there is evidence to show that the Metaphysical Deduction is a logical enterprise which provides the 'discovery of all pure concepts of the Understanding' ('Analytic of Concepts'—Chapter I) which is necessarily linked to the logical functions of the understanding in judgements. The Understanding seeks not only the completeness of the categories lying within its logical structure but also the completeness of the judgement-forms lying within the faculty of the judgements themselves. Thus it links the categories to the judgement-forms in order to logically derive the complete table of categories.

Metaphysical Deduction is followed by Transcendental Deduction in Chapter II of 'Analytic of Concepts' only to show that it is the latter which is crucial to the employment of the categories in experience. Kant is understood to have made it the fulcrum of his transcendental philosophy precisely because for him there is the necessity of proving that these categories alone make experience possible and that they are legitimately employed by understanding in experience. That is why 'the transcendental deduction of *a priori* concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognized as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of thought' (*CPR*, A94). Transcendental Deduction alone can vouch for the principle that categories alone account for the possibility of

experience of the world. Thus the primacy of the Transcendental Deduction in Kant's transcendental philosophy cannot be overemphasized.

II. DEFECTS IN THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION

The Metaphysical Deduction has been open to criticism right from the beginning because it reveals the inadequacies in Kant's conception of logic. First of all, the table of categories which Kant derived from the table of judgement-forms has remained the weakest point in his transcendental philosophy. The table of categories and judgements has major flaws as pointed out by Daya Krishna[5] and Chattopadhyaya[6]. Secondly, Kant has remained too much under the influence of Aristotle in his Theory of Categories. Though he has transformed the categories of Aristotle from ontological entities to logico-linguistic entities, he has not succeeded in liberating them from the Aristotelian conception of logic and language which remains tied down to the subject-predicate syllogistic logic. The flaws found out in Kant's table of categories are mostly attributable to the Aristotelian notion of judgement and judgement-forms.

Kant has classified the judgement-forms into four heads, namely, of quality, of quantity, of relation and of modality, there being three kinds of judgements under each head. This scheme has raised doubt as to whether there is any underlying principle in this classification or it is a matter of convenience. There seems to be a principle in this classification as Kant wishes to make a complete list of judgement-forms which excludes nothing that the faculty of judgements can admit. But the principle is largely guided by the Aristotelian concept of judgement with subject-predicate structure. All the Kantian judgement-forms are subject-predicate in structure including those under relation and modality.

The main problem with the table categories is that it is not an exhaustive one, though Kant claims that it is complete in every sense. Chattopadhyaya[7] rightly points out that this table does not accommodate such concepts as Einstein's space-time, relativity and other quantum concepts because it is too much tilted towards the Newtonian concepts such as space, time, substance, causality, etc. There is no doubt that Kant is basically wedded to a Newtonian world-view like

most of his contemporaries. This itself gives a very narrow and restrictive base to his theory of categories. The Newtonian world-view is, according to some, outmoded and so must be replaced by non-Newtonian world-views.

Kant's problem is that he calls his system of his categories absolutely complete whereas, looked at from the contemporary point of view, this is not the case. His metaphysical deduction is therefore not successful as it has not made any provision for revision of this system. It is the system of categories that needs revision and not the categories themselves because some of the Kantian categories are still relevant, e.g. substance, causality, necessity, existence, etc. In any system of thinking, we may have to retain some of the concepts, if not in their original form but at least in some extended form. If some of the Kantian categories like community, limitation, etc. have outlived their utility, as Daya Krishna[8] points out, there is nothing to be surprised at. These concepts seemed to have relevance in Kant's metaphysics of the world but in course of time they have been replaced by other concepts such as space-time continuum, relativity, sub-atomic particles, etc.

Kant's appeal to the faculty of judgements to derive the categories is more or less correct because categories can have only a conceptual source which includes our language and judgements. Thus the metaphysical deduction of concepts from the human mind and language is perfectly intelligible and Kant's basic insight is vindicated. But the idea of judgement accepted by Kant needs revision in the light of our conception of language and logic. Kant is wedded to the Aristotelian idea of logic and judgement and therefore he has failed to discover quantifiers in logic which Frege discovered later. From Aristotle to Frege there has been a radical transformation of logic. Kant has failed to anticipate the developments of logic after Aristotle. Therefore he has no idea of modern logic, especially the logic of propositions. This would have made him realize that logical form of propositions is not peculiarly subject-predicate and that logic is radically ontology-free.

III. PRIMACY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

It is the Transcendental Deduction which dominates Kant's epistemological enterprise, since the categories themselves have to be logically

linked with the possibility of experience. Kant's greatest contribution lies in his providing transcendental justification for the conceptual tools which we possess in the acquisition of knowledge of the world. The following definition of Transcendental Deduction may be closely studied:

> The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate *a priori* to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction; and from it I distinguish empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its *de facto* mode of origination (*CPR*, A85).

Thus Transcendental Deduction aims at providing the much-needed link between the *a priori* concepts with the objects, that is, to establish that 'they must be recognized as the conditions of the possibility of experience' (*CPR*, A94).

The idea that the categories must be *a priori* related to objects given in experience contains the genesis of the Transcendental Deduction which ensures the search for the legitimacy of the categories in experience. This process of legitimization of the categories takes place in the reasoning itself because in this process the categories are traced back to their *a priori* origin in the human understanding. This process reverses the process of empirical deduction by abstracting the categories from experience itself such that the categories do not exist independent of experience. Thus they lose their *a priori* status and become contingent in nature. Such contingent concepts, according to Kant, can never account for the *a priori* possibility of knowledge.

Empirical deduction is found to be inadequate because it does not go beyond experience as it abstracts the categories from experience itself through an inductive reasoning. This method of generalizing from experience does not help because it misses the *a priori* concepts which are the most crucial elements in our knowledge of the world. Knowledge, according to Kant, consists of *a priori* concepts which are presupposed by experience and cannot therefore be derived from the latter. As Kant puts it, 'concepts of objects in general thus underlie all empirical knowledge as its *a priori* conditions. The objective validity

of the categories as *a priori* concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and *a priori* to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought' (*CPR*, B126). Empirical deduction cannot explain how this necessary relation can be established between the concepts and the object of experience.

Empirical deduction can at best show how certain concepts can be inductively arrived at but these concepts may not be the ones Kant is searching for as the most fundamental concepts. The inductive concepts are limited to what is empirically available and so cannot be thought other than through their origin in experience. This itself puts a genetic limit on their non-empirical availability. But the Transcendental Deduction is precisely meant for ruling out the genetic limitation of the most fundamental concepts of our knowledge. These concepts have to be so stationed that they are applicable in experience but cannot for that matter be derived from experience. The Kantian strategy is to locate these concepts in a transcendental space outside the realm of experience. This space he calls the understanding or the faculty of judgements. This faculty is taken to be universal and so the categories which are embedded in it must be applicable necessarily throughout the realm of human knowledge.

Now the question arises whether Kant's transcendental move of locating the categories in the understanding will not amount to some kind of innatism[9] which, if proved to be true, will seriously undermine the move. That is to say, Kant may be bringing back psychologism through the backdoor which he wishes to throw out through the front door. Kant's method, however, is clearly against innatism if it is purely an empirical and psychological theory. Kant wants to avoid both psychologism and empiricism because both are against the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. His argument against the psychologist and the empiricist, like Locke and Hume, is that they have missed the very idea of a Transcendental Deduction because they are only interested in demonstrating how the concepts like cause, substance, etc. arise from experience. This results in undervaluing these concepts as they are not found to be necessary for making knowledge possible. The concept of

causation has been shown by Hume to be based on a psychological custom or mental association and thus has been reduced to at best a psychological association. Kant has disapproved of this method precisely because he thinks that justice has not been done to the concept like cause in Hume's philosophy. Kant writes, 'To the synthesis of cause and effect there belongs a dignity which cannot be empirically expressed, namely, that the effect not only succeeds upon the cause, but that it is posited through it and arises out of it. This strict universality of the rule is never a characteristic of empirical rules; they can acquire through induction only comparative universality, that is, extensive applicability. If we were to treat pure concepts of understanding as merely empirical products, we should be making a complete change in (the manner of) their employment' (*CPR*, A92).

The idea of providing a transcendental or non-empirical justification for categories is singularly Kantian because for the first time it occurs in the First Critique. Kant introduces the idea that unless we keep a space for a logical deduction of the categories with the aim of justifying them in the objective arena of human knowledge, we cannot escape scepticism on the one hand and subjectivism on the other. First of all, we cannot refute the charge that human knowledge is not based on firm foundations because there are no necessary laws or principles which can account for the necessity and universality in human knowledge without introducing *a priori* concepts and rules. Secondly, without the latter we cannot overcome the subjectivity of our sense-experience which comes flooding into our mind. These experiences which are received by our faculty of sensibility need an *a priori* order in terms of the forms of sensibility, namely, space and time. Thus there is already a synthesis of the sense-manifold in making them subsumed under space and time. Then again they are subsumed under the conceptual forms supplied *a priori* by the faculty of judgements. This involves a transcendental synthesis of the sense-manifold under the categories which results in the formation of knowledge. Thus Kant is aware that our knowledge of the world is not a mere jumble of sense-data nor is it a mere play of concepts. There is a deeply underlying process of synthesizing the raw data from experience in terms of the forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding.

IV. THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION

Kant makes the Transcendental Deduction revolve around the concept of the transcendental unity of apperception because it is the latter which is found to be the source of the objective unity of our experience of the world. Unless we give a foundational status to this principle in Kant's philosophy, we cannot understand how Kant could make the objective unity of the world possible at all. Kant not only needs to explain how there is unity in human knowledge but also how there is unity in the world that we know. Chattopadhyaya[10] has done well to have made it a pivotal principle in Kant's epistemology, since, according to him, 'without this principle of the synthetic unity all employment of the Understanding turns out to be impossible, objective unity and self-consciousness remains inexplicable and even objective unity of the human understanding of Nature itself, the domain of scientific knowledge, remains an enigma.'[11] In view of this the idea of the transcendental unity of apperception remains a fundamental idea in Kant's First Critique.

But the question that may arise here is: Is this principle of self-consciousness a construction by reason or is it pre-theoretical? If it is a construction by reason then it cannot be different from any other principle like the principles of psychology. In that case Kant would not have the concept of self or 'I' or the idea of unity of consciousness. This would undermine his grand project of making the unity of the world intelligible. If it is otherwise, it has to be presupposed that the transcendental unity of apperception is pre-theoretical and that it is given *a priori*. This is exactly the option that Kant accepts by declaring that the understanding and its categories all presuppose such a unity of consciousness. It is because if there is no unity of consciousness, there cannot be any unity in the synthesis of the sense-manifold undertaken by the understanding in terms of the categories.

What is the nature of this unity of self-consciousness which is responsible for the unity in the world? This question arises because the unity of self-consciousness is the most difficult concept to grasp in the absence of concrete details as to how it operates vis-à-vis the understanding and imagination. Kant is opposed to an empirical unity of self-consciousness because that is a mere psychological phenomenon and

therefore cannot explain how unity in the world is possible. The subjective sense of the unity of self-consciousness is an unnecessary appendage to the higher-order transcendental I-consciousness. The latter is the more fundamental and original unity of self-consciousness which ensures unity in the object known. Kant writes: 'The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense—through which the manifold of intuition for such (objective) combination is empirically given' (*CPR*, B140). The transcendental unity of self-consciousness ensures a necessary unity in the object of knowledge because of the synthesis of the sense—manifold in terms of the categories.

Kant calls this unity of apperception the 'original' and the 'pure' apperception because it is the one that is already presupposed by sensibility and understanding. It is the 'I think' which accompanies all judgements concerning the world. It is the ground of all judgements but itself is not an object of judgement. That is, it itself is not a matter of synthesis though it makes all syntheses possible. This is the reason why it is called the 'original' unity of apperception. It makes all elements of knowledge-sense (manifold as well as the acts of imagination and thought) belong to one self. This transcendental condition is so indispensable that it is called the 'first principle of understanding' (*CPR*, B139).

In spite of Kant's elaborate effort to make the above concept clear especially in the second edition of the First Critique, there remains the lingering doubt as to whether Kant is anywhere near explaining why he has introduced so many concepts like apperception, understanding, imagination and sense to explain the phenomenon of knowledge. Do we really need so many concepts to explain how we know the world? If self-consciousness is the source of understanding and imagination, is it necessary to make understanding and imagination also the source of the categories? Besides, is it necessary to introduce imagination as an additional source of synthesis apart from understanding? Will this not lead to a problem of division of labour between understanding and

imagination? Apart from the fact that imagination is a function of understanding and therefore is not a faculty by itself, it is to be noted that there is no special function of imagination which Kant needs to introduce.

The transcendental unity of apperception is strong enough to bear the entire transcendental burden of knowledge because it is through this unity alone that knowledge takes a unified form. It is this unity of knowledge which is at the heart of Kant's epistemology as he has to explain how knowledge grows from mere perception to judgement with the help of the categories under the direction of the transcendental unity of apperception. Thus the transcendental method of knowledge analysis shows that no knowledge is possible if there is no unifying self-consciousness and also the unifying principles embodied in the categories.

V. LAWS OF NATURE: IS THERE A TRANSCENDENTAL SOURCE?

Kant's derivation of the laws of Nature from the transcendental unity of consciousness deserves mention as it has been subjected to criticism, especially by Popper.[12] Popper's criticism is directed at the Kantian assumption that there is a harmony between Mind and Nature and that the categories are a reflection of this harmony. The main point of argument is that the categories do not mirror Nature and that they are only prescriptions or maps as to how to understand Nature.[13] This view attributable to Popper shows that categories are not designed to mirror the ontological structure of the world. They do not reflect or picture what the world exactly is. This further shows that there is no pre-established harmony between human Understanding and Nature.[14] This is a reiteration of the criticism that Kant has assumed too much about the power of the human mind to 'make Nature'. All that mind can do is to anticipate Nature rather than mirror it. Mind and language possess the categories of the objects encountered in the world, not because the objects are made by the mind in the ordinary sense of the term but because it anticipates the kinds of objects there are in the world.

Kant is supported by many contemporary philosophers like Putnam[15] in his endeavour to do away with classical metaphysical realism which supposes that the structure of the world is independent of the human

mind and that the categories deposited in our language have no role to play in the shaping of the cognized world. This myth of the mind-independent world has been rejected by Putnam,[16] for example, in his argument that there are no readymade objects in the world as all objects are necessarily infected by concepts. This shows that we cannot take it for granted that the Kantian hypothesis about the categories is wrong. What is definitely wrong is that there are only twelve categories through which we act on Nature and that Nature responds to these categories alone. Mind designs new conceptual maps according to the demands of Nature and thus fulfils the obligation of making Nature conform to human understanding.

Kant tackled the problem of metaphysical realism through his oft-quoted, but mostly misunderstood, distinction between the phenomenon and noumenon, that is, between appearances and the thing-in-itself. This distinction has been the most controversial in Kant's writing because it has not been understood in the way it should have been. The noumenon or the thing-in-itself is not another object or thing to be subsumed under the categories of substance, causality and so on. The idea of thing-in-itself is a limiting idea that makes a logical distinction between what is given in experience and what can never be. The latter keeps open the possibility that there is a realm beyond sense-experience and that it does not fall within the scheme of the categories. Categories themselves have a transcendental origin and so have to be rooted in the transcendental self. The phenomenal self as well as the phenomenal objects presuppose a thing-in-itself or the noumenal reality which is to be presupposed by our knowledge. Thus Kant could not have dispensed with the thing-in-itself if we understand it in the right Kantian sense. Thus metaphysical realism cannot be true as long as it is logically possible to entertain the idea of the noumenon.

Kant combines transcendental idealism with empirical realism for the obvious reason that for him the world is neither completely independent of the mind nor is it completely dependent. It is partly dependent on the mind and partly independent. In the part in which it is dependent, it is shaped by our categories and so there is the possibility of an idealistic understanding of the world. But there is empirically a gap between mind and the world. It is in this part that the world is

empirically real. Kant could not have overlooked the fact that the empirical world is out there and exists in its own right. But at the same time he could not have denied that the world is transcendentally dependent on the human mind given that he has admitted a noumenal self. Chattopadhyaya rightly observes, that 'if ... he (Kant) snaps his ties with transcendental idealism he cannot explain the unity of understanding, imagination and intuition and their conjoint application to the world of sense and science.'[17] That is to say, if there is no transcendental route to knowledge, the unity of knowledge in science and common sense cannot be accounted for. Kant, in spite of his great respect for empiricism, cannot cease to be a transcendentalist idealist.

Kant's transcendental idealism has been brought by his critics perilously close to phenomenalism of the Berkeleyan kind by sheer misunderstanding of the Kantian position. While Berkeley has had no advantage of a transcendental method, he could correctly see that the realism of the metaphysical sort is in no unenviable position with regard to the status of the world. However, he wrongly concluded that the world is nothing but a cluster of our ideas. Phenomenalism thus keeps no gap between the world as such and the ideas in our mind. Kant is obviously unhappy with such an uncritical idealistic metaphysics because there is no safeguard against the possible collapse of the objective world into subjective ideas.

Kant is against the subjectivist argument that the world has nothing in it except our ideas. Our ideas are not all fundamental and are not given *a priori*. Only some are genuinely seated in the *a priori* faculty of thinking; therefore there is no reason why we should take all our ideas as the source of our knowledge of the world. Kant is interested in the *a priori* source of our knowledge of the world. That is because he wants to prove that synthetic *a priori* knowledge of the world is possible.

VI. SYNTHETIC *A PRIORI* KNOWLEDGE

The greatest challenge to Kant's transcendental thesis comes from the analytic thinkers who oppose the very idea of synthetic *a priori* knowledge like the positivists. The main argument of the logical positivists is that knowledge is either analytic *a priori* or synthetic *a posteriori*,

that is, there is either knowledge through concepts or through experience and not both. Therefore the question of there being synthetic *a priori* knowledge does not arise. According to the positivists, the Kantian thesis that mathematics and natural sciences have synthetic *a priori* knowledge is wrong because in neither are *a priori* judgements possible. Mathematics is a formal science and so all its judgements are analytic in character. Similarly, natural sciences are out and out empirical and so there could be no place in them for *synthetic a priori* judgements.

Kant's plea for synthetic *a priori* judgements has been faulted because of its reliance on the subjective source of space and time in the case of mathematics and the source of the scientific concepts like causality and substance in human reason. In the former, there is emphasis on the idea that space and time are forms of sensibility and so mathematics has an *a priori* origin in man. This has arguably made the Kantian idea of mathematics subjective in that we have to know human nature for understanding mathematics. This way of looking at mathematics is unacceptable to the contemporary analytic thinkers for the obvious reason that mathematics is a part of our formal language and so it can yield only formal truths. Similarly, in sciences there is no idea of subjective source of the concepts and laws. All these concepts are located in language and are applied in all experiential contexts. There is no direct derivation of these concepts from the human reason the way Kant has depicted. Even the abstract concepts of science are objectively derived form some other concepts deliberately adopted for the purpose of scientific investigation. Thus Kant's elaborate transcendental deduction of the categories is rejected by the logical positivists.

However, logical positivism has not evaluated Kant's thesis in the right spirit. It has caricatured Kant more often than not. The fact that they have found subjectivism in Kant is enough to suggest that they have missed the transcendental arguments which Kant has adduced in favour of his thesis. Kant's argument is not that mathematics is derived from subjective experiences, but that mathematical propositions are valid only on the condition that they apply *a priori* to the world of appearances which are given in space and time. If space and time were unrelated to human nature, then it would be impossible to relate them

to the world that is presented to us in our experience. For Kant mathematics is not a formal science but is a science with necessary truths in it which apply *a priori* to the world. In this sense Kant is interested in the transcendental foundations of mathematics and not in its subjective sources.

Kant's idea that synthetic *a priori* truths are available in science is likely to be less acceptable to contemporary thinkers, let alone to the logical positivists, because the notion of science has changed considerably after Kant. Science has not only been freed from its traditional Cartesian-Newtonian mould, but also has been made more and more paradigm- or framework-centric such that the scientific truths are no more absolute truths like metaphysical truths but are pragmatically chosen heuristic principles applicable in given frameworks. Science has been made more responsive to social demand after Thomas Kuhn introduced the idea of incommensurability[18] of the scientific paradigms. The immediate effect of such a programme-centric notion of science was that Kant's theory of absolute and necessary truths in science had to be abandoned. And therewith the idea of synthetic *a priori* truths must go because in the new scenario there can be no place for absolute truths in science.

Even then one cannot disregard Kant's contribution to philosophy of science and human knowledge in general. His idea that science is a gift of human mind rather than of Nature suggests that science cannot be detached from its man-centric character. Science in that sense is the critical response of man to Nature. Because of its human-centric character, science has to have its roots in human nature and thus must carry forward the human interests like certainty in knowledge, the revisability of the conceptual frameworks and the ultimate goal of reaching the truth in its multi-dimensional aspects. Contemporary science has not abandoned the whole of Kant's philosophy because reason still plays a critical role in science and truth has not been thrown overboard.[19] As long as the concepts of reason and truth are relevant, Kant's transcendental philosophy will continue to be relevant.[20]

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Kant and Wittgenstein on Space, Time and Number

GANESH PRASAD DAS

Professor of Philosophy, Utkal University, Vanivihar,
Bhubaneswar 751 004, Orissa

In this paper I propose to take up the question as to whether number can be the basis independent of or along with space and time for identification and re-identification of objects. According to Kant and also P.F. Strawson, space and time provide a synthetic unified framework of reference, identification and re-identification of particulars. The number system appears to be a natural, simple and economical mode of reference as numbering of vehicles, telephones and credit cards show. Kant thinks that number cannot be put alongside of space and time. The question is whether an infinite series of numbers provides a unified framework of positions for possible particulars to occupy and fit in, or whether a unified system of actual particulars arranged in space and time is a pre-existent condition for the system of numbers to be applicable. In other words, the question is whether particulars stay situated with the distinctive characters of their own, or space and time themselves provide the basis for their distinction without any distinctive characters of their own. I propose to advocate a view that emerges from the views of two critical philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein. I shall make reference to the views of Leibniz and Frege to enrich and add clarity to the discussion.

According to Kant, space and time constitute the forms of intuition. A judgement has two components, one due to the faculty of intuition (the i-component, in short) and the other due to the faculty of understanding (the u-component, in short). The i-component provides reference to a thing, person or event and the u-component provides the description of it in terms of attributes that it has or/and relations that it bears to other particulars. What is referred to is a particular in the mode of mere existence and its attributes and relations are general

characteristics or universals ascribed to the particular. The particular is identified and distinguished from other particulars on the basis of its location in space and time. Its location in space and time does not, however, confer on it spatial and temporal characteristics. That is to say, although a particular has occurrence and occupancy in space and time, it does not have spatial and temporal properties as it has the properties of colour, sound, smell, touch and taste. Objects do not exist in their own right. They are, in a sense, created by the mind. They are created even as the categories of understanding—they are twelve in number—are applied to the manifold of intuition when that has occurrence and occupancy in space and time.

Kant would not, I think, have any objection if we make a distinction between formal properties and material properties of objects and say that space and time constitute the formal properties and colour, etc., constitute the material properties of objects. But, again, there is a distinction between an object having the possibility of being coloured, etc., and an object being actually coloured, etc. Accordingly, it can be said that the possibility of being coloured, etc., constitute the formal properties of objects along with space and time. It would be clear in the sequel that I have brought this distinction to bear upon Kant with a view to showing whether and how Kant makes an advance upon Locke and whether he could be made to advance a step further to accommodate Wittgenstein's view in this regard.

The distinction between formal properties and material properties of objects might appear not to be different from Locke's distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities of things. The all-important distinction between the concept of object pertaining to the critical philosophies of Kant and Wittgenstein and the concept of thing pertaining to the empirical philosophy of Locke and his followers is not touched upon for the time being. According to Locke, who seeks to put a stamp of philosophic approval on Newtonian physics, there are some qualities which are inherent in things and there are some other qualities which are not inherent in, but are due to factors external to and conditioning them. Colours, etc., are, according to Newtonian physics, due to vibration of particles in air. But then both the primary

and secondary qualities belong to things or, things are bearers of qualities of both the sorts.

Kant does not intend to resurrect Locke's distinction in a modified idiom. He does not say that a thing or an object is the locus or bearer of space and time as properties. The latter as forms belong to the human mind. According to Kant, mind is a totality of functions of different faculties. Intuition or perception is one, understanding is another and imagination, which is in between perception and understanding, is still another. The faculty of intuition is the locus of space and time. Space and time are the forms through which intuition takes place. Whatever colour, whatever sound, etc., an object might be said to have, it must have reference and identity in space and time. These sensible properties could be attributed to that and that alone which is identified in space and time. An object could be identified and re-identified not because it bears sensible properties, but because it is located in space and time.

It would be relevant to recall here Leibniz's doctrine of identity of the indiscernibles. Monads are distinguished from one another on the basis of their point of view. It would not be incorrect to say that space and time constitute the distinctive point of view of each monad. According to Leibniz, space and time are not real substances; they are not attributes of real substances either. Space is nothing but orders of co-existing things or phenomena, whereas time is nothing but the orders or arrangement of successive things or phenomena. Individual substances or monads are sole realities. Space and time cannot belong to monads. Space is not the mutual exclusiveness of monads. It is simply the order of co-existence presupposed in the grouping of the phenomenal things. It is thus an ideal thing. Similarly, time is an ideal thing.[1] Number is ideal as well. Space and time taken together constitute the order of the possibilities of the whole universe. This spatio-temporal order is compatible with what actually exist as well as with what possibly could exist. Space does not mean any particular situation, place, or body and time does not mean any particular succession of phenomena. Space is the indefinitely applicable relation of co-existence, whereas time is the indefinitely applicable relation of succession. In each case, the things or the phenomena that are related with one

another or constitute an ordered series might have been other than what they are. The reason is that they are merely orders of possibilities. However, the order is not an actual one apart from some related or ordered things. Space and time by themselves are abstractions, not actual things. In this respect, space and time resemble number. Numbers are indifferent to whatever can be numbered.

Although space and time enable us to distinguish things, the things are nonetheless distinguishable in themselves. Of course, we do not readily distinguish things by themselves. Although the diversity of things is accompanied by the diversity of place and time, the exact determination or identification of the diversity is not a matter of place and time. It is important to note that we make a distinction between one place and another and one time and another by the help of the things. Monads differ from one another not on the basis of quantity, but on the basis of quality. Space and time are quantitative. Number is clearly quantitative. Hence monads are without numbers. It is the finite things that are counted with numbers. Hence monads are infinite.

Kant does not say that space and time are ideal as Leibniz does. According to him, space and time are empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Making use of the distinction between the possibility and actuality laid down by Leibniz, Kant observes that space and time are applicable to possibilities as well as actualities. They are empirically real insofar as their applicability to actuality is concerned and they are transcendentally ideal insofar as their applicability to possibilities is concerned.

Kant, however, does not consider number to be like space and time. 'Number is,' he says, 'simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition.'[2] According to him, number does not constitute a form of intuition, but it comes under the category of quantity. In Kant's idiom, Leibniz would have said that all the three concepts, space, time and number, constitute either the forms of intuitions or the categories of understanding. But then Kant would insist that numbers would not be required to make reference. Space and time would be quite adequate for this purpose. Number along with other general characteristics would be needed to say what the things

that are referred to appear to be. To say that there is one thing or there are two, twenty or a hundred things would be a specification of what is referred to. The specifications of a particular presuppose location of the same in space and time and assignment of number to particulars would be an abbreviated device of specifying them. Instead of specifying the spatial and temporal quantities of things and phenomena in order to identify them, the identification can be done simply by numbers provided that both the speaker and the hearer have foreknowledge about the interchangeability of the modes of reference in question.

Wittgenstein says that in a sense, objects are colourless.[3] He further says, apparently inconsistently, that space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of object.[4] The apparent inconsistency between these two statements vanishes when we find that for Wittgenstein the distinction between form and content that Kant makes with a view to achieving clarity is useless. According to him, the object is both form and content.[5] That is to say, the form of the object constitutes its content. The form of the object is the possibility of occurring in states of affairs.[6] All the possibilities are given once and for all, a new possibility cannot be discovered later.[7] We have said before in connection with Kant that objects can be numbered and that numbers are abbreviated modes of reference. But, according to Wittgenstein, objects cannot be numbered. There is no meaning in saying that there are two, twenty or a hundred objects. If one says that there is an x and there is a y, one has already said thereby that there are two objects. If one says that there are three objects, then one has already said thereby that there is an x, there is a y and there is a z. A reference or reference and description of objects involve the concept of number. Hence, according to Wittgenstein, number is a formal concept belonging to language that is used to refer to and describe the objects of the world.

It would be relevant here to state the view of Frege on number. According to him, numbers are neither spatial, nor physical, nor yet subjective like ideas. They are non-sensible, yet are objective. Numbers, he says, are objects that belong to concepts. They are not properties of concepts; they are not properties at all. Numbers are objects that are assigned to concepts. What are being numbered are not a set of objects, but a concept. In the statement, 'Jupiter's moons are four',

it appears as if the statement predicates *four* of *Jupiter's moons* where the latter is considered as a set of objects. This is not the right view according to Frege. The logical form of the statement is that *the number of Jupiter's moons* and *four* are identical. The 'is' in 'is four' is not the ordinary predicative 'is'; it is the 'is' that asserts identity as in the statement, 'Columbus is the discoverer of America.' Frege, thus, makes it amply clear that number is not an extra dimension over the above the dimensions of space and time in tracking down an object. Number is, so to say, a silent partner of space and time insofar as the referring function of a judgement is concerned.

According to Kant, the architect of critical philosophy of the first phase, objects are created but not discovered to be out in the world as finished products in their own right. Objects come into existence even as judgements are made about the world. The i-component and the u-component of a judgement correspond to its subject and predicate parts respectively. The subject part involves the application of the ideas of space and time. The predicate part involves the application of the categories of understanding. The category of totality involves the idea of number. According to Wittgenstein, the architect of critical philosophy of the second phase, objects are the substances of the world, actual and possible. For him, the distinction between form and content, on the one hand, and that between reference and description, on the other, would not only be extra baggage but create confusion too. According to him, a proposition is a concatenation of names whose meanings are objects. Space, time, number and possibility of being coloured, etc., are form of objects and they are their content too.

Space, time and number are thus the very conditions of human intelligibility. To make a judgement is to refer to something uniquely by means of the demonstratives of the type 'this' and 'that'. The demonstratives, in their turn, carry the ideas of 'here' and 'now'. Unique reference to other things is secured by expanding from this point to different places and different times. A world that is not capable of being spread out in space and time in a unified way cannot be made intelligible. Hence, space, time and number are the parameters within which objects are identified, distinguished and concatenated with other

objects to make judgements about the world of things, persons and events.

Strawson thinks that numbers are less capable than space and time for identifying and re-identifying particulars although they are well entrenched in the conceptual system. They are not related to things, persons and events with the required degree of precision and exactness.[8] But one may be inclined to think that it is numbers rather than space and time which are related to these particulars in a rampant way and that too with precision and exactitude as numbering of vehicles and telephones and credit cards, etc., all over the world show. It could, however, be said in reply following Strawson that unity and continuity as well as individuation of particulars in space and time are prerequisites for allotment of numbers for their easy identification and re-identification to cater to different practical needs. But then it must be remembered that Strawson and also Kant, according to Strawson, are doing 'descriptive metaphysics' and trying to find out the conditions under which something can be called an empirical particular. Wittgenstein is concerned in TLP with the particulars that all the possible worlds must have in common. Spatial objects cannot be imagined to be outside space and temporal objects cannot be imagined outside time, but objects of Wittgenstein are logical and hence transcendental. It is a tautology, but a significant one, to say that logical objects are there in 'logical space'.

In an article entitled, 'Vidyaranya on Philosophical Investigation', Ganeswar Misra claims that according to Vidyaranya, a fourteenth century Vedantin, space, number and endurance in time are the very forms of understanding. But Misra has not corroborated this claim by citing lines from Vidyaranya. J.N. Mohanty, editor of the book in which the article has been republished, comments that he could not identify the text in the *Vivarana-prameya-samgraha* which Misra possibly had in mind in making this claim.[9] If the view could be found from any of Vidyaranya's works, then that would be very interesting and illuminating indeed.

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5. TLP, 2.025.
6. TLP, 2.0141.
7. TLP, 2.121 and 2.123.
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A Note on Theoretical and Practical Reason in Kant

R.K. GUPTA

ZB-5, Sah-Vikas, 68, Patparganj, Delhi 110 092

In this note, I wish to respond to Daya Krishna's Notes and Queries 2 and 4 in *JICPR*, Volume XIX, Number 1, January–March 2002, p. 243. I wish to respond to them together, not separately.

One may call Kant's first critique *Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason*, and his second critique *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*.

Pure theoretical reason consists in giving the form of knowledge. Here we have forms of sensibility and forms of understanding. Here we also have Ideas of Reason, which arise from our illegitimate use of understanding beyond sensibility. Pure practical reason consists in giving the form of morality. This is our being able to will the maxim of our action as a universal law. Thus these forms of reason are distinct from one another. But they have this in common that they both are a source of universality.

Pure practical reason is distinguished from practical reason which is not pure. The latter deals with means required for the attainment of an end, which may be actual or possible. An actual end is one which we all desire; this is happiness. A possible end is one which we may or may not desire. In connection with pure practical reason, we have Laws of Morality. In connection with practical reason dealing with means required for the attainment of an actual end, we have Counsels of Prudence. In connection with practical reason dealing with means required for the attainment of a possible end, we have Rules of Skill. While the Laws of Morality are categorical in character, both the Counsels of Prudence and the Rules of Skill are hypothetical in character.

Is morality a subject of theoretical understanding, or rather of pure theoretical reason, and thus subject to the limitations which it imposes? Form of morality, as we have seen above, is given by pure practical

reason, which is distinct from pure theoretical reason having its own form. Further, there are no moral sensible intuitions, no moral sensible data, which could be subject to the limitations which pure theoretical reason imposes. As a result, we can say that the answer to the question just mentioned must be in the negative. However, there is something else here. The form of pure practical reason has to be applied to facts of experience in order to obtain particular moral laws. But these facts of experience are already subject to the form of pure theoretical reason. As a result, there must be a meeting point between the form of pure practical reason and the form of pure theoretical reason in obtaining particular moral laws. Kant himself takes cognizance of such a situation. He says, '... between the realm of natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical employment of reason), just as if there were so many separate worlds, the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second: still the latter is *meant* to influence the former—that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world, the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom.' (*The Critique of Judgement*, translated by J.C. Meredith, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1952, p. 14.)

A Short Note on the Inner Sense and the Three (or Four) Notions of 'Self' in Kant

DAYA KRISHNA

Jaipur

The distinction between the 'outer' and the 'inner' is at the centre of most philosophical thinking, including that of Kant who made a distinction between 'outer' and 'inner' sensibility and argued for space and time as the *a priori* transcendental forms of them respectively. But the basis of this distinction is not clear as it is rooted in the prior distinction between body and mind which itself is constructed on the basis of this distinction. The distinction also is spatial in character and can hardly be applied to that which is experienced as time. Time can not have a distinction between 'inner' and 'outer', but only that of 'before' and 'after' which, as Mctaggart showed, is different from 'earlier' and 'later'.

Kant's notion of 'sensibility' and the corresponding distinction between outer and inner sense is based on the senses which the body has and through which we are supposed to receive sensations from the world 'outside'. It is assumed that the body plays no 'active' role in receiving what is given from the world outside which itself is known or constructed in terms of that which is supposed to be received from it. The idea that the bodily senses are totally passive in this process is a mistake as not only the senses play a negative restrictive role in what is received but also a positive role in giving it a shape which is not exactly spatial as Kant thought but also qualitative in character as even the relations between two or more qualities received from the same sense are organized in different ways, not to speak of the relationship that is established between the sensations received from different senses.

The real problem, however, in Kant is with the notion of the 'inner sense'. What does the 'inner sense' sense? And how is it distinct from

that which is sensed by the 'outer' sense? Normally, the 'material' or the content of the inner sense, at least at the first level, is supposed to be just that which is received from what are called the 'outer' senses. However this material is transformed or translated in terms which, at first, are neither purely sensory nor non-sensory. Image is perhaps the best example of this. Kant has treated this problem in his doctrine of reproductive and productive imagination.

At the level of productive imagination that which is received from outer sensibility is transformed into a memory image which is recognized as similar to what was apprehended by the senses. On the other hand, in the reproductive imagination the relationship with the senses is freed and imagination becomes more active in building something on that basis which still has a relationship to what was apprehended before. The transition from productive imagination to the formation of the concept which completely frees itself from the image is the next step and perhaps the object of the inner sense may be conceived of in terms of memory, imagination and concept as related to that which is received from the outer senses in the first place.

At each of these levels the element of activity increases and the element of passivity becomes less and less, though it is always present there.

But the story of the inner sense cannot stop here as the object of the inner sense cannot be 'only' cognitive in nature. After all, there are such things as feelings, pleasures, pains and acts of will or effort which also are sensed by the inner sense. These latter cannot be ascribed to outer sense unless Kant wishes to distinguish between the affective, conative and cognitive aspects in the received realms of sensation themselves. Even then these will have to pass through the same activity of transformation which the sensations from the outer senses have to pass through.

The real problem however occurs when the phenomenon of self-consciousness arises. In this case there is only consciousness which is the 'object' of self-consciousness. One may remain satisfied with the provisional analysis that we have given in the background of Kant's analysis of the distinction between outer and inner sensibility. But if all these become themselves an object of consciousness then there is

a radical transformation in their nature as not only that which is received from the outer and inner senses but these senses themselves become objects of a reflective awareness which changes them in a way we do not quite understand. The consciousness now becomes aware of that 'active' element which was involved in both the outer and inner senses at all levels. This is the activity of consciousness which now becomes central to the understanding of all that had occurred at earlier levels and Kant seems to describe this as the unifying activity of consciousness, though he uses the term apperception in this context. This activity of unifying of whatever is received at any level, according to Kant, is the heart of what is called knowledge at the human level. But Kant seems to suggest that all this activity occurs almost spontaneously before the real activity of understanding begins at the conceptual level. It is here, and here alone, that the categories come into play and judgement is formed and what we call distinctively human knowledge arises. It is in the context of this 'knowledge' that a radical transformation of all knowledge that occurred at pre-judgemental level occurs. The earlier, pre-judgemental knowledge, may perhaps be assumed to occur at the level of animal consciousness also.

At this point in his thought, Kant encounters a problem which has not been the focus of attention amongst those who have been interested in the thought of this great thinker. This problem occurs because at the level of self-consciousness, 'self' itself becomes an object to itself. Strangely, Kant distinguishes here between 'self as an object of intuition' and 'self as an object of thought', a distinction which normally has not been made in philosophical thinking on this issue. Perhaps, Kant is trying to point out once again the distinction between that which is intuitively '*given*' and that which is an object of '*thought*', this time in the context of the 'self', implying thereby that while the former has to be necessarily involved in time, the latter can only be conceived as being determined by the categories which are presupposed by all that occurs as the object of thinking.

Kant has an added problem and that is in connection with what may be called the problem of the unity of the 'self', a problem which occurred in the context of what may be called the unity of 'appearances'. Self also 'appears' as do other things and hence has to be

that which is sensed by the 'outer' sense? Normally, the 'material' or the content of the inner sense, at least at the first level, is supposed to be just that which is received from what are called the 'outer' senses. However this material is transformed or translated in terms which, at first, are neither purely sensory nor non-sensory. Image is perhaps the best example of this. Kant has treated this problem in his doctrine of reproductive and productive imagination.

At the level of productive imagination that which is received from outer sensibility is transformed into a memory image which is recognized as similar to what was apprehended by the senses. On the other hand, in the reproductive imagination the relationship with the senses is freed and imagination becomes more active in building something on that basis which still has a relationship to what was apprehended before. The transition from productive imagination to the formation of the concept which completely frees itself from the image is the next step and perhaps the object of the inner sense may be conceived of in terms of memory, imagination and concept as related to that which is received from the outer senses in the first place.

At each of these levels the element of activity increases and the element of passivity becomes less and less, though it is always present there.

But the story of the inner sense cannot stop here as the object of the inner sense cannot be 'only' cognitive in nature. After all, there are such things as feelings, pleasures, pains and acts of will or effort which also are sensed by the inner sense. These latter cannot be ascribed to outer sense unless Kant wishes to distinguish between the affective, conative and cognitive aspects in the received realms of sensation themselves. Even then these will have to pass through the same activity of transformation which the sensations from the outer senses have to pass through.

The real problem however occurs when the phenomenon of self-consciousness arises. In this case there is only consciousness which is the 'object' of self-consciousness. One may remain satisfied with the provisional analysis that we have given in the background of Kant's analysis of the distinction between outer and inner sensibility. But if all these become themselves an object of consciousness then there is

a radical transformation in their nature as not only that which is received from the outer and inner senses but these senses themselves become objects of a reflective awareness which changes them in a way we do not quite understand. The consciousness now becomes aware of that 'active' element which was involved in both the outer and inner senses at all levels. This is the activity of consciousness which now becomes central to the understanding of all that had occurred at earlier levels and Kant seems to describe this as the unifying activity of consciousness, though he uses the term apperception in this context. This activity of unifying of whatever is received at any level, according to Kant, is the heart of what is called knowledge at the human level. But Kant seems to suggest that all this activity occurs almost spontaneously before the real activity of understanding begins at the conceptual level. It is here, and here alone, that the categories come into play and judgement is formed and what we call distinctively human knowledge arises. It is in the context of this 'knowledge' that a radical transformation of all knowledge that occurred at pre-judgemental level occurs. The earlier, pre-judgemental knowledge, may perhaps be assumed to occur at the level of animal consciousness also.

At this point in his thought, Kant encounters a problem which has not been the focus of attention amongst those who have been interested in the thought of this great thinker. This problem occurs because at the level of self-consciousness, 'self' itself becomes an object to itself. Strangely, Kant distinguishes here between 'self as an object of intuition' and 'self as an object of thought', a distinction which normally has not been made in philosophical thinking on this issue. Perhaps, Kant is trying to point out once again the distinction between that which is intuitively *'given'* and that which is an object of *'thought'*, this time in the context of the 'self', implying thereby that while the former has to be necessarily involved in time, the latter can only be conceived as being determined by the categories which are presupposed by all that occurs as the object of thinking.

Kant has an added problem and that is in connection with what may be called the problem of the unity of the 'self', a problem which occurred in the context of what may be called the unity of 'appearances'. Self also 'appears' as do other things and hence has to be

unified in the same way as they demand unification. But here the unification demanded is that of the subject itself, even though it 'appears' to itself.

The transcendental unity of apperception thus may be supposed to operate at both the levels of the 'subject' and the 'object', and if it does so, then its role will have to be considered differently when it operates in relation to what appears as object and that which occurs when it operates in relation to the 'self' itself which also appears as an 'object'.

Kant in this connection has made a distinction which has not generally been noticed. He writes that, 'On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself but only that I am. This *representation* is a *thought* not an *intuition.*' (*Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 168) ('Dagegen bin ich mir meiner selbst in der transzendentalen Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellungen iiberhaupt, mithin in der synthetischen urspriinglichen Einheit der Apperzeption, bewusst, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie ich an mir selbst bin, sondern nur dass ich bin. Diese Vorstellung ist ein Denken, nicht ein Anschauen' (German original, pp. 196–7).[3,4]

Kant in this sentence seems to make a distinction between '*erscheine*' and '*Anschauen*' which are translated as 'appear' and 'intuition' respectively, a distinction which is not very clear even though Kant seems to build his whole philosophical edifice on this distinction. The English translation of these words as given in the 'Cassell's *New German and English Dictionary* by Karl Breul seems to suggest that the contrast is between 'passivity' and 'activity' on the one hand and the 'self-evidence' of the latter as against the former, on the other. There is also supposed to be a 'contemplative' element in what is called *Anschauen* or 'intuition' which seems to go against the active element implied in its translation as 'look at'. In any case the contrast, even if it is accepted, can never lead to the conclusion that Kant seems to suggest. In other words, intuition or *Anschauen*, in whatever sense it may be taken, can never ensure '*indubitability*' just as 'appearing' or *erscheine* can not. The 'appearing' of appearance is as indubitable as that which is 'intuited' except perhaps in the sense that the former, by definition,

seems to have an 'external' reference in it, while the latter seems to be self-contained and self-sufficient so that, at least *prima facie*, no external reference is required or suggested by it. Perhaps Kant seems to imply that those objects of the inner sense which do not arise in the context of that which is apprehended by the 'outer' sense and thus have an essential independence from it, have a 'self-evidence' about them because of this 'lack of reference' to anything 'outside' themselves which is an essential feature of all that is derived from what he calls the outer sensibility. But, then, there will be a lot which will be intuitively self-evident in the light of the 'mind' or that which is apprehended by the inner sense, a fact which Kant is not prepared to grant in his system for, if the above analysis is accepted, the distinction between the 'phenomenon' and the 'noumenon' could not be maintained in their case. Kant, unfortunately does not seem to have dealt with this problem in the context of the 'contents' of the inner sense. The one place where he comes perhaps closest to the discussion of the issue is in the sentence quoted above where he deals with the problem of the awareness of 'self' itself. But he explicitly rejects this interpretation of the phrase 'I am' when he says that 'this *representation* is a *thought*, not an *intuition.*' But if it is a 'thought' then it obviously has to be like all other objects of thought, i.e. subject to the categories of understanding and in this case to the *a priori* form of inner sensibility, i.e., time. In case Kant wishes to suggest that this understanding could only apply to 'I am' then he will have to make clear the distinction between the two in a sharper and more focussed manner than he has done in the text quoted above.

One way of understanding Kant's contention is perhaps to see the paradox of 'I am' as pointing simultaneously to the self 'as it appears to itself' and 'as the self as it is in itself'. It is this 'in-between' character that creates the complexity and the paradox in the character of self-consciousness, but it is there, and it *has* to be accepted that consciousness has *only* the *a priori* form of inner sensibility and *not* that of outer sensibility. But besides that it also is the ground of the transcendental unity of apperception within itself. This transcendental unity of apperception cannot be ensured except by the self as it is in itself, for 'time' in itself, as Kant understood it in the *Analytic* is

different from the way it was presented in the *Aesthetic*, a fact pointed out by Professor N.V. Banerjee in his work on Kant entitled, *Kant's Philosophy of the Self*.[1] According to him, 'he (Kant) ... comes to view them (space and time) atomistically by stating that the *a priori* intuitions of space and time are of as manifold a character as empirical intuitions. 'Space and time,' he says, are represented *a priori* not merely as forms of sensible intuition but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold (of their own)' (p. 62). The phrase 'intuition of the manifold' seems to be misleading as the manifold, in Kant, can only 'appear' and not be intuited. Kant may have used the word 'intuition' in this context, but that would be a loose usage and not strictly correct, if the distinction between 'intuition' (*Anschauen*) and 'appearing' (*erscheine*) is seriously taken note of. But, then, what can be 'intuited' in Kant in the strict technical sense of the term? Perhaps, nothing except that which according to the quotation given above, is intuited in three different ways, two of which are directly known to us and the third implicitly implied by them.

There is another problem in respect to the word 'appearing' or '*erscheine*' as what 'appears' can, and does, disappear, a fact conveyed by the term '*Verschwinden*' in German. Unfortunately, not only that which 'appears' disappears, but also that which is 'intuited' disappears also. Everything 'disappears' and as far as 'disappearing' is concerned there is no difference between what 'appears' and what is 'intuited'.

The situation is generally saved by recourse to the contention that 'self' can never be unconscious of itself, as it is in its very nature to be conscious, 'something' with which it is identical as they are two terms having the same reference. This is the hard core Advaitic position and Kant comes closest to it when he maintains that the 'sense of the "I"' inevitably accompanies all acts of self-consciousness and thus is, in a sense, the foundation for all of them.

Kant thus makes a three-fold distinction in our knowledge of the self. Besides the distinction which is usually made between 'I as I am in myself' and 'as I am conscious of myself,' there is the third one which he articulates as 'I am'. There is a fourth distinction which he also makes in the sentence quoted above wherein he makes a distinction between, 'as I am conscious of myself' and 'as I appear to myself.'

The distinction may perhaps be understood in the following manner; the self as I am in myself is the noumenal self about which nothing can be said; the self as 'I appear to myself' is what is usually called, the 'empirical self' or the empirical ego. Besides these the self as indicated by the phrase 'I am' is perhaps the self that is continuously intuited and is merely another name for self-consciousness. The fourth notion which is formulated by him in the phrase 'I am conscious of myself' and deliberately distinguished from as '*I appear to myself*' seems to suggest a distinction between the substantive awareness of the self which is indicated by the phrase 'I am' and the self as characterized by consciousness, or as determined by it, indicated by the phrase 'I am conscious of myself.'

The complex and conflicting formulation which Kant is forced to make suggests the problem not merely in respect of the 'self' whose consciousness is attempted to be articulated here but also applies to the whole realm which is indicated by the term 'inner sense'. On one side the richness of the self is indicated by the 'inner' whose apprehension is indicated by the term 'inner sense'. The term will make no sense as it is not only 'unified' as everything else has to be according to Kant, but also '*owned*' by the 'self'. The inner life which is apprehended by the inner sense has to be owned by the self, a fact which becomes clear in the context of the moral judgement which applies not so much to the action that one does, but the being that one '*is*'. Kant saw this but, strangely, did not see its significance in the way he might have done. After all, the formal characteristic of the will which is supposed to become moral when it is determined by the sense of 'good' or 'ought' or 'duty' is not the content of willing that determines the moral quality of the will but something else. Kant, however, did not ask himself what this 'something else' is and why it should be confined to the realm of willing only. Ultimately, it is the quality of consciousness which, when it becomes the object of self-consciousness, is found to be not as it 'ought to be'.

This is the heart of the matter. It is not only that which is apprehended as an 'object' in any of its forms or at any of its levels that is judged by the self in terms of values, or ideals which are not only cognitive in character, but the self also when it becomes an object of ones consciousness, that is so judged.

To talk of 'self', however, merely in terms of the 'quality' of its consciousness as most of the thinkers who have belonged to the moral and spiritual traditions of the world have done, is insufficient as it is the whole realm apprehended by the inner sense which has to be seen in those terms also, as it is not only necessarily 'owned' by the self but also constitutes it in a sense which has not been appreciated by the philosophical traditions of the world. Without the content of the inner sense, self will be as 'empty' as in Kantian terminology, the concepts are supposed to be without the percepts. The mere sense of the 'I', whether articulated in the phrase 'I am' or as 'I am conscious of myself' will leave us with an empty shell which is as meaningless as the so-called categories which have nothing to apply to. In fact, the situation here is worse as the categories are at least differentiated from one another and hence have some sort of a vague generalized abstract meaning which one can understand even when there is no 'specific' content for them, a situation that is totally absent in the consciousness of 'I am', if there is no content whatsoever in it.

The distinction that Kant has used may be seen as the dividing-line between what the Advaitic and some of the non-Advaitic traditions in India have tried to say in the context of their thinking about the self. They have tried to fill the 'emptiness' of the truth conveyed by the utterance 'I am' by metaphysical claims which try to deny the 'emptiness' by suggesting that consciousness does not need any 'content' to be self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled. This, however, is to transgress the 'limits' that Kant had set for thinking by his 'transcendental critique' and hence has to be seen as talking about something which may be trans-human but can never be regarded as 'human' in the way as human consciousness knows itself with all the limitations from the body and the mind and the intellect and the reason and the imagination which have their own dimension in the realms of knowing, willing and feeling.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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On Binod Kumar Agarwala's Response to Daya Krishna's Essay on Kant's Categories

R.S. BHATNAGAR

10/558 Kaveripath, Mansarovar, Jaipur 302 020

Dr. Binod Kumar Agarwala's (BK's) hermeneutic response to Professor Daya Krishna's (DK's) essay on Kant's doctrine of categories[1] is an excellent erudite and lucid exposition of a very important part of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (*CPR*). He makes some interesting comments and suggestions in respect of hermeneutics in the beginning. He himself employs a hermeneutic strategy in presenting Kantian text. Some of his important claims are: the table of judgement as given in the so-called metaphysical deduction does not offer the clue for the discovery of categories; the table of the forms of judgement as given in the so-called metaphysical deduction is not a table in general logic but in transcendental logic; the table of the forms of judgement is not meant to specify the categories. The term 'real' does not mean 'existence', it is used in the sense of 'whatness' rather than 'thatness'; both judgement and concept have a common source of origin, which can be discovered not in metaphysical deduction but in transcendental deduction and schematism.

I first want to react to BK's hermeneutic strategy. The hermeneutic principle that he mentions in the beginning and which he shows to be traceable to Kant himself is based on the distinction between 'what a philosopher describes' and 'a philosopher's description of it'. The two may be discrepant with each other, and it may turn out that the 'description' may not represent correctly what the author wanted to describe. The message derived is that a description should not be taken at its face value. Accordingly, BK comments that commentators on Kant (including DK) have 'failed to dive beneath the words of Kant to grasp the idea he was trying to convey ...' (2)* As a result DK failed

to understand what Kant wanted to say about the clue in his expression 'the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding'.

BK's quotes from Kant, Gadamar and Stendhal seem to indicate a point quite different from the one on which they are intended to be glosses. When Kant illustrates his point, discussing the distinction between rational knowledge and historical knowledge, he seems to be saying that so long as certain data remains unrelated to principles on which it could be organized, it remains merely external and is not subjectively appropriated and does not constitute rational knowledge. Kant remarks that a science or a system has an organic structure. The idea lies in reason like a seed and allows a natural unity to the various parts of the system holding them together. Writing from the point of view of an author (rather than from the point of the reader) Kant says it is really not a happy thing that one goes on collecting all kind of material having some hidden ideas, instead of having a clear idea and then articulating the whole in accordance with reason (*vernunft*). This may as well be applicable to a reader who gets entangled in details and finds them unintelligible till one is able to get a glimpse of the idea which informs the details. This later consideration is different from the earlier one. In the first case, the 'description' remains inadequate to the 'idea', while in the later case the 'description' has an organic relation with the idea it articulates. The later seems to be Kant's actual intent for he is talking about the architectonic of his own system. It is difficult to make out how Kant felt about his own work. As is well known he was working on his project for more than a decade and then he tried to systematize all his thoughts within a period of five months in order to bring out *CPR*. While feeling secure about his insights he may still have been unsatisfied with the system as it had worked out. He must have thought it essential for the reader to relate his architectonic with what he called the seed idea. But how could one get at these seed ideas when in his own words they 'were scarcely accessible even to a *mikroskopishchen Beobachtung* (microscopic observation)'.[2]

In itself, what Kant had said, is important and can be taken as useful hermeneutic advice. In fact BK's paper can be said to be a good illustration of its application. But organizing data on principles is not the same as to have an access to the idea of the author though the two

may go hand in hand. The quote from Gadamer points to something quite different. Quoting Schleirmacher, Gadamer is pointing to an understanding which is better than that of the author himself. His remark suggests that a reader can enrich a content (the text) while understanding an author by explicating something which escaped the attention of the author himself. A real understanding of an author would involve all these points and so they may be present complementing each other, but they have to be distinguished from each other.

Let us revert to the explicit point which BK makes quoting Kant in the first instance. In order to understand an author one should try to look for the idea that the author wanted to convey. As a matter of fact the attempt to understand is to go beyond what is given—read between the lines as they say. However, no attempt seems to have been made to see what such an attempt would actually imply. It presupposes a notion of privileged access to author's mind. The question is who can claim to have such an access? And how such a claim be verified? (This seems to be author's hermeneutic circle.) One way to verify such a claim would be to go to the given text, related texts, once, twice or as many times as it would satisfy the reader. Something like this, BK himself has done. To press his point, he quotes Kant profusely and sometimes he does so more than once. DK also did it. Of course, the texts quoted are not always the same though they are taken from one and the same author. In any case, this much is clear that the 'description' has to be taken into account in order to get at what the author wanted to 'describe'.

There is yet another serious consideration which merits attention. The way BK has presented Kant, evidently makes Kant more intelligible. What remains implicit becomes explicit. What seems to present problems on one reading, becomes clearer after reading BK's presentation. Problems seem to dissolve, so to say. The impression one gets after going through BK's rendering carefully is of a perfect, flawless theory which Kant had propounded. Kant's presentation cannot be further improved upon. No deviation or modification is necessary. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have now been placed in a proper way and the puzzle has now vanished completely. Now, as soon as we accept this picture, another puzzle comes to the surface. How come,

that philosophy did not stop at Kant? It is common knowledge that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon was found inconvenient by some of the later philosophers. BK might say that he has been talking about the points which were raised by DK only and that there are problems in *CPR* which do not relate to categories. However, my suspicion is that his manner and spirit of approaching Kant may, then, result in stating that Kant was right in whatever he claimed and proved and a reader must be more humble and serious while studying Kant.

On the other hand, continuing my point, Hegel found even the doctrine of categories in Kant needing emendation and transformation, though he himself worked on some of the Kantian insights, the triadic set to name one. The fact that philosophy moved ahead of Kant, shows that there was more to it than what Kant saw, understood and wrote, part of it was brought out by the post-Kantians. Was not Schleirmacher right when he pointed out that understanding an author may take us beyond him?

Now let us approach some of the claims made in the paper. The paper begins with the comment 'A common mistake most commentators on Kant's so-called metaphysical deduction of categories make is to take the table of forms of judgements as such as the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding. Professor Daya Krishna is no exception ...' (1) As a result the major part of the paper is devoted to tell us where to look for the clue. BK suggests that between the table of forms of judgement and the table of pure concepts of understanding there is a third thing as the origin of both tables. If this is understood, then the concepts of quantity, quality, relation and modality would also be found as not more fundamental categories.

BK first presents the claim that the table of forms of judgements as given in the metaphysical deduction, is not the table of judgement in general logic but a table in transcendental logic. Distinguishing transcendental logic from general logic, Kant had written, 'General logic abstracts ... from all content of cognition, i.e., from any relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another,[3] i.e., the form of thinking in general' (B79, A55). Transcendental logic, however, also considers the value or content of logical predicate. A science 'which would determine the origin,

the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called transcendental logic, since it has to do merely with the laws of understanding and reason, but solely insofar as they are related to objects *a priori* and not, as in the case of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of reason without distinction' (*CPR* A57, B81–82). In BK's words, 'transcendental philosophy investigates this element of object-relatedness involved in knowledge,' he adds, transcendental philosophy also does not investigate the element of object-relatedness in its entirety rather it investigates only the mode of object-relatedness with respect to its possibility *a priori* (4). BK adds three more formulations: *a priori* ontological constitution of objectivity, *a priori* foundation of the possibility of the objects standing over against the knowing subject irrespective of the object known, *a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in object-relatedness (4). These formulations follow in an uninterrupted sequence and seem to intend to state the same thing. Later BK uses the expression 'object-relatedness' only. Now, in the first instance these formulations do not have the same import. Secondly the expression 'object-relatedness' itself is not a happy one. BK seems to have used it having in view Kant's expression 'from any relation of to the object'. But Kant has also used the expression 'from all content of cognition'. As against the general logic, transcendental logic has been characterized by Kant as dealing with the value and content of the predicate, of course, in relation to object of cognition. Transcendental philosophy assumes the relationship between subject and the object and deals with the content of the judgement in its entirety that is in terms of its form as well as content. Hence the term object-relatedness is less clear and more misleading than Kant's own formulations.

Now, let us consider the claim that the table of the forms of judgement is a table of transcendental logic and not a table in general logic. BK's contention is that in the four numbered paragraphs following the table, 'Kant explains why he has introduced three-fold division of each group in contrast to traditional division of forms of judgement into two divisions in each of the groups ... in this discussion he is not disregarding the object-relatedness involved in judgements. If he disregards all object-relatedness then the table will be a table of forms of judgements

in logic in general and each of the groups will involve only division into two kinds and not three kinds. The three-fold division of each group is possible precisely because the object-relatedness of the judgement is taken into account and hence the table is a table for forms of judgement in transcendental logic' (6).

BK has thoroughly studied the relevant passages and has quoted them profusely, yet certain points have escaped his attention. First, BK quotes the first sentence of section 9, in which the table of forms of judgement is given. It says, 'If we abstract from all content of a judgement, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgement can be brought under four heads each of which contains three moments.'[4] If Kant says that he is considering mere form, abstracting from all content of a judgement, then how can we construe the following table of forms of judgement as in transcendental logic? BK may retort, but Kant is talking of the three moments in each division and that is not found in general logic, for as we can see, from his words above, he thinks that in the following paragraphs Kant has introduced three-fold division in each group. Now, when Kant discusses why he allows a special place to singular judgement while it is assimilated by the logicians in the universal judgement, he seems to be introducing a three-fold division. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same can be said with regard to infinite judgement in the next paragraph. However, if we consider the divisions entitled 'Relation' and 'Modality', we do not find Kant adding any form to any of these two divisions, implying thereby, that he has adopted them as they are found in the general logic. Though he views these forms in his own way, he gives them his own interpretation without modifying their basic import. Thus the claim that the table of forms of judgement is, in fact, a table in transcendental logic, cannot be supported by the consideration that Kant has introduced three-fold divisions in *all* the four divisions. Kant's own way of presentation is responsible for confusion.

But the more precious claim that BK has made is to point out the mistake that interpreters or commentators commit in thinking that the clue to discovering pure concepts or categories of understanding can be found in the table of forms of judgements as such. BK has devoted

very close attention to the first six paragraphs of section 10 preceding the table of categories and meticulously explained the various kinds of syntheses involved in the various stages—from the manifold of intuition to the transcendental unity of apperception, and the role of imagination in various ways. As he suggests, right in the beginning there is 'some third thing' which would give us the clue to the discovery of the pure concepts. Discussing the fifth paragraph, BK remarks that 'we have pure concepts when the productive synthesis of imagination in intuition and reproductive imagination of synthesis in understanding are united in a common function of judgement. The former gives content to concepts while the latter gives only the form of concept. This common function is what Kant will later call *the synthesis of recognition in a concept*, which brings the unity of the previous two syntheses through original apperception. This common unity introduced by this common function, i.e., this unity, in its most general expression Kant entitles the pure concept of understanding' (13).

While explaining the passage which BK quotes in this section, in which Kant is enumerating the three conditions—the manifold of intuition, pure synthesis of this manifold through imagination and categories which give unity to this pure synthesis, BK has coalesced the account of deduction as given in the first edition (normally included in any available edition—the second edition of the *CPR*, within the chapter of 'Transcendental Deduction of Categories') with the text that he is discussing presently. As is well known Kant had re-written the deduction, for he thought that the earlier version delineated a subjective process which would have been more properly placed in psychology. That is why, towards the end of the passage on page B152, distinguishing productive imagination from the reproductive one, he wrote 'reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, those of association, and that therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology' (B152). In fact the phrase 'synthesis of recognition in a concept' occurs only in the subjective account of deduction (in the first edition). Its being used 'later' can be understood in that sense because

it happens to be given in the present text later—as preceding transcendental deduction.

However, the quest for the clue is not yet over. It is 'in the sixth paragraph,' BK tells us, that Kant finally 'reveals the clue to the discovery of all categories from the table of judgements, which is also the third synthesis' (13). He quotes the full paragraph. There Kant tells us that the 'unity to the various representations in a judgement' and 'unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition' are given by the same function and by the same operation of the understanding. Ignoring his own term 'finally', BK again looks for what this 'same function' could be. He then discusses a possibility which he gives up later. He considers Kant's statement about reflection. 'Reflection (reflexio) ... is that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which ... we are able to arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge; and only by way of such consciousness can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another rightly be determined' (*CPR* A260, B316). But, thinks BK, 'reflection cannot introduce a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold intuition in general'. Kant's passage relating to reflection occurs in the beginning in the 'Appendix on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental'. This text is devoted to an evaluation of Leibnizian effort to construct an intellectual system of the world (*CPR* A270, B326). The concepts or ideas of reason discussed here are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and finally matter and form. Obviously the notion of reflection, as dealt with in this section, does not offer us even a possibility of a possible alternative. BK could have easily left it out and saved some ink.

As is evident BK is still not satisfied and the search for the 'same function' or the 'clue' continues. Even after stating that 'reflection' will not do, he uses the term again, presumably in a general sense. He writes, 'Since one or other reflection itself is the content of pure concepts of understanding it cannot be the function of understanding which gives unity to synthesis of functions of reflection as content of the

categories' (15). It is evident that 'reflection' here is not a 'state of mind' as it occurs in the passage quoted from the 'Appendix'. But that is not an important issue. BK suggests that some more 'primordial function of understanding which resolves into reflection as well as synthesis, and corresponding to which the unity is also more primordial which resolves into reflective analytic unity of form of concept and judgement and also synthetic unity of content of concept and judgement, that is the source of pure concepts of understanding' (15). And he believes that to find this primordial function 'we have to go beyond the metaphysical deduction' (15). He reiterates that this function is the synthesis of recognition in a concept. Now, as was pointed out earlier, this could be possible only if we go to subjective deduction. But then in a strange move BK after pointing to the synthesis of recognition, quotes Kant, remarking that Kant could hence conclude (and here follows a quotation not from the subjective deduction, but from the last paragraph just before the table of the categories, i.e., metaphysical deduction), 'in this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgements. For these functions specify the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory of its power' (*CPR* A79, B105). Still more strange is the conclusion 'the source of the origin of pure concepts of understanding.' Says BK, 'Kant's intention is to make use of transcendental table of judgements to lay bare *the source*[5] of the origin of pure concepts of understanding, i.e., pure synthesis and to be sure about the completeness and division of categories as they originate in synthesis.' One wonders what happens to the mistake pointed out in the opening of the paper.

Not only this, just a few lines later in his section 6.2 BK remarks that the specificities of categories cannot emerge at the stage of metaphysical deduction by simply looking at the forms of judgements even if the three-fold synthesis is taken into account. He suggests that the specificities could be seen emerging only when Kant had shown that they had an application in knowledge and when the unities of consciousness represented by each category acquired a temporal form. In

other words, it would not be possible to talk of the specificities of the categories before we were through the transcendental deduction and schematism. Now, if BK intended to point to the *specific application* of each category then it would, of course, be necessary to go through the schematism. Then we would have arrived at what Kant had called the principles of pure understanding. This does appear to be BK's intent when he points out that one had to go to the chapter II of the Analytic. But the context in which this issue comes up does not seem to require this. Specificities are *presupposed* in the application of the categories. Read the first sentence of section 26 of *CPR*. 'In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the *a priori* categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking, in the transcendental deduction, however, their possibility as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited (*CPR* ss 20, 21, B159). This statement of Kant renders BK's elaborate and admirable effort redundant.

Writing about the affirmative judgement, BK remarks that Kant 'does not use the term reality to mean existence in opposition to unreality or nonexistence'. 'The concept of reality is equivalent to the Platonic idea as that pertaining to a being what is understood when I ask: Ti estin, *what* it is? as distinguished from: Hoti estin, that it is' (16). He refers to B182. Since he has not given this passage as a quotation, it would be convenient to have it before us. Says Kant, 'Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the concept of which represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of the two thus takes place in the distinction of one and the same time as either a filled or an empty time' (*CPR* A143, B182).⁶ I do not think we can construe the meaning of this passage in the way BK suggests. The reference to time in Kant's passage, granting that time is generated itself 'in the apprehension of the intuition' (*CPR* A143, B182), prevents us from identifying Kant's notion of reality with that of Plato. In 3.5, BK elaborately clarifies the difference between the categories of modality and the categories of the other three divisions after Kant. Kant himself has done it well and the difference is quite intelligible. The difficulty

is not about the distinction between the two types of categories, but regarding the understanding of the notion of category itself. If the categories of modality are not adding to the content of cognition and are merely concerned with the relation between the object and the thought or faculty of cognition, can they be called categories in the same sense in which Kant calls categories of quantity, quality and relation categories? DK's paper is basically concerned with the understanding of the notion of category. The problems arise with respect to the various usages Kant has put this notion to; whether the various usages are compatible with each other or not remains a problem.

I am thankful both to BK and DK for giving me an opportunity to go back to a great thinker once again.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

*This and other such numbers in brackets refer to the pagination of BK's paper before publication (as it was kindly provided to me by the Editor).
1. *JICPR*, XVIII, 4, pp. 1–12.
2. *Critique of Pure Reason* (*CPR*), A834, B863.
3. It is not clear how a logical form can be considered *in relation of cognitions to one another*, if in the form content is left out.
4. Quotes from Kant are given as found in BK's paper. If I use a quotation not found in BK's paper it is taken from a recent translation of *CPR* by Guyer and Wood.
5. Emphasis added.
6. *CPR*, translated by Guyer and Wood.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

The Search for a Naturalistic Basis of Consciousness

1. THE INDIAN INTUITIONIST ARGUMENTS

The purpose of the article is two-fold. First, to capture certain mile-stones in the search for a naturalistic basis of consciousness especially in the last 'decade of consciousness' (1990–2000). Secondly, to sound a note of alarm to many aspiring Indian writers to exercise restraint in their approaches to Indian theories of consciousness and not to overdo anything in their zeal to have a final word in the search for a natural-istic basis of consciousness. My response comes in the wake of the recent claim to solve the 'hard problem' of consciousness by a 'transfusional' method suggested by the Advaitic Theory (Menon 2001: 109). I wish the writer would search for more science than traditions, if she ever wants to put up a case for a Sankarite solution in the 'context of the recent interdisciplinary scientific perspectives'. The only tirade it spawns in the whole article is that the distinction between hard and easy problem is not understood by Chalmers (1995) and hence it needs a 'redefinition', from a Sankarite point of view. The author hastens to tell us how Chalmers could have learnt, if only he had put his heart into it, from Sankarite analysis of I-Consciousness (that is to be distinguished from I-ness, by virtue of its pure I-ness [see her f.n. 14]) so as to understand the way in which the hard and easy becomes 'transfusional and even volatile' (109). Dr Sangeetha Menon's purpose is to attack the hard and easy distinction on the one hand and to suggest a solution to the harder problem of I-consciousness on the other from the advaitic point of view.

For this, Menon (2001) uses a pre-theoretical or what is called, 'intuition-pump argument', with a very low-level intensity, so as to drive home the point saying that we have an underlying Cartesian substratum which is what is decisively rejected by every one in the area of research. Menon is not alone, but at her worst in attempting to build a bridge between mind and world by positing an ontology of the

mind and an ontology of the world, lining them with laws (nomic?) of Pure Consciousness. For Menon, this is the strategy to attack the harder problem of I-consciousness (my-ness facts?). So also, she is joined by a host of substratum-defenders who coin bizarre concepts like 'minded beings' (biologically, minded-bodies?) advocated by no less than a distinguished writer Professor Pradhan, which will reduce us to mental substratum as a fact by a strange reductio even if we don't have a body. The analogy is obviously to embodied minds, and the question that bears analogy here is 'Do we have disembodied minds?' Likewise, it could be asked: Do we have disminded bodies (corpses)? I think that such intuitionist pump arguments will hardly serve any purpose in the context of naturalistic accounts and should therefore be rejected without any qualms (Cheruvalath et al. 2001).

It is easy to understand why writers are overzealous when they ought not to be. They bring the articles sans arguments to journals, which have a certain reputation. There is no harm in getting them published but we are not to expose our ignorance on matters scientific. Especially when what we write becomes rather wonky in the light of major scientific evidence widely discussed in Journals. Let us retell some stories that come from cognitive neuroscience. Ned Block and Stalnaker (1997) open their contribution by saying that consciousness is a mystery. The problem is about the extension of scientific credentials to attack the last frontier of science. The 'hard' and 'easy' distinction comes in its wake precisely to convey how resisting is the problem towards science than others. The hard problem is characterized as the problem of bringing the explanatory gap between accounts of causal-functional and the phenomenal experience suggested by the subjectivity of experience into a full circle. The problem of explanatory gap is either staged to be closed or it is not. It was held that consciousness or the subjective character of experience escapes the net of all functional explanations. Currently, the debate moves on to a level with the question as to whether such an explanatory gap is a cognitive illusion or it is not, thus arguing for both sides (Tye 1999). In the Indian context, the explanatory gap between the real science of consciousness and the so-called 'science of consciousness' with the Vedantic ordnance, can never be brought to a close, unless and otherwise the harder

problems like self-luminous consciousness, purity of consciousness, dreamless sleep (*susupti*), unity of consciousness are tackled. What are the prospects of adopting a *susupti* view of consciousness?

2. THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH

We owe to Ned Block a distinction between Access (A) Consciousness (attitude towards propositions, of the form 'I believe that p') and Phenomenal (P) Consciousness (what it is like?). The former suggests a set of straightforward problems whereas the latter does not. So, the former is justifiably more naturalistic. Physical world is causally closed but mental world is not. The What-it-is-to-be Argument *à la* Tom Nagel (1974) wants to come to grips with what it is like to be in that experience for an organism and still continues to restrain philosophers from swearing the path of panpsychism. I think this was effectively countered by the recent HOT (Higher-Order Theories) which make a very useful two-tier distinction between 'creature' and 'state' consciousness that should serve as a very useful tool today. The former denotes an overall state one is in, being awake or being in coma. The other classifies one or other state and it is used as a 'type-identifier'. The most interesting variant of this tries to define consciousness in terms of being conscious (Rosenthal 1990). While the creature consciousness is further classified into the intransitive, transitive and self-consciousness, the state consciousness is classified into phenomenal, functional and standing (dormant) versus occurrent (active) consciousness. It is difficult to know whether the division of labour about creature and state roughly entails yet another division of labour, namely the distinction between intransitive and transitive consciousness. Such a rough distinction is derived from the understanding of consciousness *simpliciter* (x has consciousness/x has lost consciousness) and one can perceive his stream of consciousness, on the one hand, and that one is conscious that he has a state consciousness, on the other (Carruthers 2000). The latter is sometimes identified with saying that consciousness is consciousness of; a better variant attempts to define consciousness in terms of being conscious. The notion of phenomenal consciousness has come to the centre stage with the lead given by Ned Block who holds that phenomenological consciousness is experience.

Exploring the neurobiological basis of consciousness, Crick and Koch (1990) defined consciousness as oscillation patterns in the 40-Hz range in the relevant group of neurons. As acknowledged by Menon, Roger Penrose also locates in the quantum activity in microtubules (protein structures). One can treat them as very sophisticated variants of identity. Just as Water is discovered to be H_2O and pain is vibration of C-fibres, we may succeed in locating the naturalistic basis of consciousness. Identity arguments pass muster only on condition that some form of Leibniz Law, given as $a = b \rightarrow (Fa = Fb)$, is valid. All these myriad formulations, along with the identity theory and functional explanations (Samuel Guttenplan calls them coalescing strategies), suffer on the bedrock of either identity and/or on mental causation or on both (Seager 1999). The well-known standard Kripkean objection is that such identities must be necessary and since they are not, the identity breaks down.

That is, they all fail on the front of generation problem: how technicolour phenomenology arises from grey soggy matter (McGinn 1989). As against this, it is argued that our minds are forever cognitively closed (by virtue of their very nature) and hence consciousness will remain as mysterious as forever (McGinn 1991). We have no idea of the crucial finish line or privileged finish line. No ghost, no beetle in the box. If not a single homunculus, why not competing hierarchies of homunculi, it is asked (Dennett 1991). Dennett's pandimonic theory of consciousness favours a gappy view of phenomenology rather than a unified view of phenomenology. The opposition between gappy and unified consciousness remains an unexplored territory.

PDP (Parallel Data Processing) research stands in direct support of the idea of identity. A similar fate of identity awaits the neural net theory *à la* Churchland suggested by connectionist paradigms (Churchland 1989), which results in a vector-coding theory of neuronal architecture. Mind is, accordingly, a massively parallel data processing machine connected by neurons. An operative presupposition here is that we can reduce philosophy of science to a connectionist paradigm. The configuration of synoptic weights of neurons dictate a set, that is, a set of partitions that constitutes a specific conceptual framework. They are one of the many millions of alternative possible frameworks.

As theories proliferate, such possibilities increase. The cue is taken from pluralism of scientific theories (Cf. Feyerabend). But the identity problem is thought to be overcome by turning the cross-level identity (genes are identical with chunks of DNA) into one about inter-theoretic relation (inter-theoretic reductionism) supported by recent accounts of science (Churchland 1986). Churchland contends that we have no means to hold that genes are caused by chunks of base parts of DNA. This refutes the Searlean hypothesis that there is a connection principle which explains how brains cause conscious states.

For Churchland and Ramachandran, the 'filling-in' is explainable in terms of convergence after many trials, or in terms of back-propagation of error theory. Nevertheless, it is open whether parallel data processing can explain conceptual plasticity of the human experience (Kanthamani 2000). The input vectors pass through that speculative configuration of synoptic weights, called hidden layer neurons. For connectionist researchers of Churchland's persuasion, the problem of superimposition (Sankara's Problem of Illusory Appearance) can be tackled by the training of the network by the 'error-nudging' algorithm. This is only half of the story. We have to be told that it aspires towards convergence. This is a teleological point that remains to be the other half of the story. The claim is made that such error-nudging activity is evidenced in recurrent rather than feed forward networks. This is so because, the recurrent networks receive more contextual information to correct the errors. The strong presumption here is that these recurrent networks can be utilized to study not only the garden variety plasticity but also can be extended to study pivotal plasticity, that is evidenced in the disappearance of consciousness in deep sleep. If this is agreeable, then there appears to be a congenial answer in the form of a novel naturalistic hypothesis for the Indian analysis of consciousness. But the objection here is that it is doubtful whether PDP can explain all the variants of plasticity that lie in between the above two extremes on the spectrum.

Connectionists no doubt counterpose their paradigm against the sentence-crunching model which reduces mind to a set of propositional attitudes couched in the language of mentalese. The cognitive modelling is either sentence-crunching or connectionist number (synoptic

weight) crunching, and not both. Whereas the Fodorian mentalese tackles Sankara's problem in terms of disjunction (rope or snake), the connectionists favour a conjunction (rope and snake converging after repeated trials on either one over a temporal scale). Connectionists divide into those who favour representation with rules and representation without rules, thus giving rise to an impression that all connectionist modelling is reducible to a non-linear rather than a linear modelling, at least in an intuitionist sense (Churchland 1995: 113). Paul Thagard (1998), for example, maintains that while connectionist models are part of representative models, the dynamic non-linear model should be seen as 'just an adjunct to connectionism rather an alternative to it' (172). A non-linear system is 'one in which even the tiniest of difference in its current state will quickly be magnified into very large differences in its subsequent state' (Churchland 1995). Its philosophical equivalence holds that the sum is more than its parts.

The strongest objection to the assumption that there is boxological, self-luminous or a pure consciousness underlying all our experiences is given as follows. Against the abstract experiencehood, that is assumed to be the underlying substratum of all our experiences almost *a priori*, it is argued that if this were so, then even this paper on which I write will also have pure consciousness (101). That we have an super-intentional stance, to twist a Dennettian idea for another purpose, has already been laid to rest by Ryle's earlier disparaging criticism. One thus turns to waking-sleeping-dreaming argument to bolster up a case for a substratum theory. As far as my knowledge goes, no Indian has critically enquired into the naturalistic basis of such an argument. Flanagan (2000), for example, sums up his study by saying that dreams are on the non-adaptive side of our adaptation, they are mental spandrels (just like architectural spandrels), and the light it throws may not be significant enough.

3. THE WAKING-SLEEPING-DREAMING ARGUMENT

Current evidence shows that the 40-Hz range has been supported in the case of waking state and the dream state (Llinas and Ribary 1993). That is, such oscillation patterns also characterize REM (Rapid Eye Movement) sleep. So, it follows that sleeping and waking stages have

something in common, and are not to be distinguished as such, from a strictly naturalistic point of view. But the division of labour motivates yet another question, namely whether we experience dream in the way we experience while being awake. MEG (Magnetoencephalogram) data reveals a robust 40-Hz waveform during wakefulness as well as dreaming. From this, it is too much to hazard a conclusion saying that this refutes the hypothesis that dreams are not experiences. The reason is that there are phenomenological commonalities as well as phenomenological differences between the waking and sleeping states. The only natural conclusion, therefore, is to distinguish two kinds of consciousness rather than two levels of consciousness (Flanagan 2000: 104). In deep sleep, called delta sleep, they cease, however. There is what is called cognitive shutdown.

Churchland (1995) reports that all representative functions cease at this level. Nevertheless, the distinction of 40-Hz does not help us to distinguish these stages, because a certain globality is agreed on at all these stages. (Fig. 1 and 2; courtesy Paul Churchland) While being awake, the oscillations are overlaid by the brain's coding activity as it is open to perceptual environment. In delta sleep, the amplitude remains minimal, because the coding activity is absent. In the dream sleep, the coding activity reappears, and the subject is conscious of a representation without the actual environment. Given the assumption that our brain is a recurrent network, its collective activity assumes a polymodal character precisely for the reason that it has information bottlenecks in the pathways at the intralaminar nucleus (Fig. 3 and 4; courtesy Paul Churchland) thus strongly supporting the non-linear character of a unified consciousness. Churchland rounds off his account with what he calls a logically possible neurocomputational account of consciousness by saying that the brain itself is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective. However, this is not a pointer towards any lack of opposition between the subjective stance and objective environment. It only hypothesizes how the brain is to be coupled with its perceptual environment, in whatever real or imaginary senses. This agrees with Dennett's pandemonic variety, but couched in a different mode of explanation. The phenomenon of non-linearity and

Fig. 1. (a) Cortical activity during the waking state. (b) Cortical activity during deep sleep. (c) Cortical activity during REM sleep. (Thanks to Rodolfo Llinás.)


Fig. 2. A simple recurrent network.

Fig. 3. The fan-out and fan-in axonal projections that connect all areas of the cerebral cortex with the intralaminar nucleus of the thalamus. The returning pathways are marked with dashed lines. (Adapted from Rodolfo Llinás.)


Fig. 4. (a) The multilayer neural network that constitutes the retina of the human eye. (b) An electronic recreation of the retinal network, this time in a multilayer silicon chip. It has 50×50 cones. (Adapted from Carver Mead.)

coupling patterns along with lack of subjectivity tell much against the received traditions we cherish.

But Indians want to take it beyond all these things. They posit yet another level called dreamless sleep. How do we phenomenologically know that we sleep with dreams or sleep without dreams? Is dreamless sleep a conceptually viable notion and supportable by current science. We can only assume that NREM (non-rapid eye movement) might support it. So, it may be argued that NREM comes closer to *susupti* stage but it is unconscious. Do we want to hypothesize that being conscious is closer to being unconscious, in the light of the failure to know what is to be in a consciousness state of an organism? It is unconscious but may be it is experimentally rich. The latter clause is of hardly any help here. No one knows what it is to experience then, let alone a *susupti* stage. This much is agreed to by distinguished writers. Describing it as 'non-dreaming state' (Churchland 1995) is not to support a first-person or experiential point of view but to analyze it from a third-person or objective point of view. Dream Sceptics like Dennett raised the question whether our dreams are experiences, and if so, what kind of experience is this. It nourished the question earlier raised by sceptics like Malcolm asking whether we have any fact of the matter to verify dream experiences. Now, to make it viable, the standard Indian Intuitionist Pump Argument goes through the following motions:

1. The Spotlight/Inner Scan View: I have my experience because I experience it (it is experienced by I or more charitably, it experiences).
2. The Epistemological Claim; I'm conscious of not being conscious (as I'm in deep dreamless sleep).
3. The Dreamless Sleep Intuition: I'm conscious even in my dreamless sleep stage (*susupti*).
4. The Conclusion: I have Pure Consciousness which is not experienced or consciously felt.
5. The Transitive (*Déjà vu*) Step: The Pure Consciousness is a self-luminous, undifferentiated, joyous state.

(1) may be taken as saying that our introspection is a kind of metaspectation or a sensing of the ones own sensing of the world

(Dretske 1993). Hence, it is a particular variant of HOT. The second is a negative variant of I'm conscious of being conscious (matured HOT) and any support to this is also the support to (3). But, (3) is a harder one in that none of the solutions to the first two will have a direct application to it and thus it is a stumbling-block. One is compelled to concede that the whole argument should, if at all, go through without (3), even if it is so, it is without a modicum of success. In that case, you need a premise about HOT. That is to say, without the added purity of consciousness, assumed by the last step, it could sustain a HOT. When (4) becomes a real poser asking why an unnecessary religious conclusion on the narrative of dreamless sleep, it becomes a real threat to (5). (5) builds up on the wrongly-arrived at conclusion with certain pretensions of naturalism (true in case if all the above are true, which they are not), or else, it begs a crucial question. Fundamentally, there is something counterintuitive in deep-sleep luminosity.

Professor Ramesh Kumar Sharma is yet another tactical Vedantin of the Shankarite hue who does not want any stone unturned. He however frankly admits that we cannot tell what it means to be asleep when we are asleep (210). *A fortiori*, we cannot tell what it is to mean dreamless sleep when we are in dreamless sleep. How to resolve the impasse? Sharma (2001) then takes a plunge into naturalistic resources for support to (5). And hence he can be credited with a desire to search for scientific evidence, however scant they might be. But given his vedantic credentials, and being a stout defender of the *status quo*, he would rather prefer to claim on the premise that NREM is also dream-like so as to derive the conclusion that *susupti* is a state which has pure and unalloyed joy and self-luminous consciousness with capitals. Thus, for him, there is an empirically supported proof for *Suddha Caitanya* (pure, non-individuated, undifferenced, amorphous, undifferentiated Hegelian type of universal self). Q.E.D. Hegel is to pardoned for not seeking his absolute self *via susupti* stage. Sharma invariably thinks that his position is supported by H.D. Lewis, McTaggart, and a host of others. Apart from its vagueness, such arguments can never meet Malcolm-like sceptical claims or the ones coming from Daniel Dennett who doubts whether dreams are experiences. He cannot hope to undercut science. There is nothing wrong in positing NREM unconscious state

but the question whether it is the self-luminous *sui generis* level strains credulity. A close reading will reveal that the jump cannot be justified and so it can hardly stand in support of his claims.

The perennial Indian dilemma is that either we must turn western science into pulp or we must turn to traditions for succour. They must hold that they are unconscious and self-luminously conscious or else they will have to concede that they are unconscious, but still somehow conscious. Are we capable of a naturalistic bent? Can Sharma get support from other sources? One likely source is from sleepwalking. Is it true that the claim that it is both conscious as well as unconscious is supported by this? Unfortunately, what goes against the grain is that people who sleepwalk are in their deepest stage of sleep and they fail to recall their somnambulistic adventure upon awakening. The question is whether they were conscious. We cannot guess that they were totally unconscious. They were conscious. But they cannot remember anything because they were unconscious. Does it mean that people who sleepwalk are in *susupti* stage? It only shows that memory interferes with our recall. That shifts the problem to memory where there could be evidence to show why this is so. What is clear from the above upshot is that there appears to be something counterintuitive to posit *susupti* stage as the *last* stage that lies close to pure I-Consciousness.

I do not think that anyone can show that whenever I am in deep sleep, I have deep consciousness and other times I do not. *Ex-hypothese*, there is something counterintuitive about this. That is, dreamless sleep is naturally monitored in which case it signifies no such experiential content whatever, or it is simply absurd. I wish to suggest that an independent argument should be motivated for sustaining the *episteme* of mystical consciousness without circumscribing it *via* stages of sleep which ought to serve only as a point of illustration. One cannot argue that such reflections are rare in western literature. We refuse to see and assess their significance. We only desire to make the vaunted premise to do the work for the traditions. We hardly have any support from brain studies in favour of this hypothesis. It remains at a speculative level at present, despite the disclaimers. Ramesh Kumar Sharma is keen to turn it into a phenomenological claim. He wants to claim that it is a stage in which:

1. I was aware of nothing during the sleep.
2. I know nothing.
3. Consciousness can know its absence.

A more charitable interpretation says that

4. Consciousness knows that it is ignorant.

4. THE ZERO EPISTEMIC SUPPORT

What epistemic support can one gather from (1) to pass on to (2)? Besides, this turns all the what-it-is-like-to-be arguments into *ersatz* what it is to be arguments. So they have an in-built vagueness. The question that is to be answered here is whether such an epistemic claim will get scientific support. Searle seeks naturalistic support but not for pure consciousness. Sharma's identification of NREM with dream-like states (he is supported by the *Encyclopaedia of Psychology*) must be understood as casting aspersions on the very distinction between REM and NREM. If they are also dream-like, then why make such a distinction at all? Obviously, he is wrong. NREM has a mark of being unconscious. But people who sleepwalk are conscious, but they are 'experiential blanks' (Churchland 1995). How fruitful is the suggestion to go beyond Churchland's conclusion stated in the above paragraphs so as to state that we regain our original luminous consciousness? The current state of research on dreams and sleep support only a deflationary hypothesis, which rules out any explanation. After a close examination of evolutionary explanation, Flanagan (2000) finally concludes that to call it as providing a causal conduit for self-identity amounts to theorizing in a vacuum.

The whole issue of sleep mentation is thus very unclear. Sleepwalkers are unconscious and enjoy no experience. But they engage in reasonably complex or even remarkably complex interactions with the world. What does it point to? It does not indicate that there is consciousness in the pure form. It only says that their memory interferes upon wakening. In other words, they are perfect zombies or they are less than animals. If at all there is anything, there is sensory awareness as it is in the case of waking. Even if we grant there is persistent consciousness, we have no evidence to support such a hypothesis. We have to concede that he was conscious but this system was functioning

in isolation from any other part of the brain that generates consciousness. If anything, it does not point to a higher consciousness. This much is clear from empirical evidence from Churchland which shows how information links are cut off. What grounds are there to believe that this is the seat of the soul which neither western science nor Searle-like thinkers have failed to notice? We can theorize that it is a fundamental feature of the world and not exclusively that of the experiencer.

Let us call this the Generation Problem which requires us to explain how consciousness is generated out of ways in which the brain is functioning. If the above description is strikingly true, then we will have to hold that there is nothing interesting to say of what it is to be in a state of consciousness. The generation problem reveals how wrong we are in our diagnosis about the inadequacies of the so-called hard problem (99) called the generation problem, in which it cannot be identified with the content of any consciousness. People whose visual cortex has been cut continue to have experiences of colour and light. If the above remarks are to some extent convincing then the five-stage intuition pump argument that is purported to explain the non-reductive character of a Sankarite theory of consciousness is a non-starter. Let us look at this for a while before we proceed.

  Stage 1 The Cartesian Step: I
  Stage 2 The Realistic Assumption: It
  Stage 3 The Non-reductive Step: 'It', is experienced by me.
  Stage 4 The Panpsychistic Step: 'It', that which is experienced and
            'I' who experiences 'It' are not opposed to each other.
  Stage 5 The Ontological Resolution Step: 'It' is resolved in 'I' and
            'I' alone remains.

In what sense the non-reductive step is not reductive, is not clear. Step 4 simply denies the opposition between I and It, but not in Churchland's sense as seen above. This can hardly entail panpsychism in any sense. Step 5 hardly takes us beyond Step 1. It only puts forward an unargued case for a Cartesian view of the Soul.

5. THE HARDER PROBLEM OF UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

No doubt, both Menon and Sharma hanker after the unified self, which was in question ever since Kant made the unity of apperception as

transcendental. Hume, James and Ayer made the subject to be a constructed entity. What disparate processes can give rise to felt unity? Do we have a completely unified or partially unified self? The notion of co-consciousness (two conscious states occurring in one and the same consciousness) cannot be taken for granted unless and until proper explanation is provided. Co-consciousness may not be a transitive relation; if it is non-transitive then the principle of co-consciousness will turn out to be false. Since there is no evidence for a principle of indexed agglomeration which states that if 'I' is conscious of that *p* and 'I' is conscious of that *q*, then 'I' is conscious of that *p and q*, the question about the unity of self is still open. The falsity is supported by empirical evidence from split-brain (Commisurotomy) patients conducted by psychologists (Peacocke 1994). They are ready to grant only a weakly unified consciousness. The strongly unified consciousness could however be experimentally simulated under controlled conditions (by producing a fake transitivity). Apart from the difficulty of understanding the unity, we have not much empirical evidence to construct how the various functions of the brain are coordinated before the split brain experiments or discoordinated after such experiments. The conclusions from a split brain patient to normal subject risks what is called our intentional stance. Our cognitive system is *au fond* unified but we can confabulate a unity from information received from many parallel sources. There appears to be a dilemma caused by the imminent conceptual difficulties of split-brain patients. The dilemma is that the unity, partial or not, is caused by factors in both cases. Where then is it to be located? My hunch is that the unity is harder than we seem to presuppose.

I have discussed *saksi* or Witness Consciousness (WC) which requires HOT theories to develop a frame (Kanthamani 2001). Some amount of reflection is called for. That is, WC may be witnessing a consciousness in which case it may be regarded as a species of HOT. May be, it is a substrate of consciousness, and hence it is other than HOT. Or else, it does not witness owing to its purity and hence its phenomenology does not allow you to get at it except through *deja vu* experience, or else again, the activity of witnessing swings from one end to another in which case it is a simple non-dualistic wonder. Like

Carruthers, characteristically, Professor Ram Prasad of Lancaster University also calls it 'reflexivity', but he further qualifies it by the term 'self-reflexivity' and supports it by showing how it strips away the individual loci (2001: 386). Reflexivity is innocuous since that can be captured by HOT. But Prasad goes further so as to proclaim: 'the self is the consciousness auto-reflexively available within apparently predetermined parameters (ibid.). This is nothing but intuitionist pump again. Again, admitting it to be sheerly factual (389), he wonders whether the hard problem could not be solved by this conceptual possibility (390) such as the one he gives in his intuitionist pump argument which accepts 'transparency' or 'luminosity' (389). So, WC is auto-reflexive. This reminds us of the more coherentist phenomenology enunciated by Bina Gupta (Kanthamani 2001). What does it prove? Nevertheless, one may take it that this only proves that some form of HOT might be true. This much is only a pointer. What is clear from the above is that the Indian intuitionist pump arguments commit a 'mystical fallacy' and will benefit no Indian student. This is also my conclusion.

It is not the conventional phenomenology which defines consciousness as consciousness of, but it defines consciousness in terms of being conscious. The former will carry the burden of implication from state consciousness towards creature consciousness, while the latter does not. It brings out a rapport between conscious state and its corresponding thought. HOT theories, in one sense, stipulate that we have scanners to see the inside of the mental functions. Obviously, they require a strong argument from introspection. Will HOT theories help Indians to fill the credibility gap? They make two claims: consciousness is a state rather than a substance-like creature consciousness. It is transitive in that I am aware of my mental states. Thirdly, I have phenomenal experience. Can all these things be bundled together to sponsor a viable naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness is a question that waits for an answer as at present. The crucial issue among the many variants of HOT theorists is whether they can afford a creature type of consciousness without allowing misrepresentation on its part. If misrepresentation is allowed, then creature consciousness is not conceptualized. If it not allowed, then we have no idea of the cognitive function

of any organism. So, the tangle of problems reminds us of the Sankarite problem of illusion, which stipulates that there are phantoms in the brain. The exact relation between creature and state consciousness hangs in this balance.

6. THE THREE WORLD ARGUMENT

Look at the three world problem as dealt with by a galaxy of writers, whom Menon quotes for a further refurbishment. Popper (World 1, World 2, World 3) integrates all the three by calling attention to epistemology without a subject while leaving the autonomy of the World 3 intact. Eccles (1991) uses psychons (some sort of mental units) to connect Popper's mental world 2 to physical world 1. They are neurologically sophisticated counterparts of dendrites in the brain (Guven Guzeldere's introduction). This only shows that there is mental experience of the physical world, and hence no different from any one of the above, say Churchland's. It might lead towards a form of interactionism. Churchland also rejects World 3. For Penrose, the physical world is a projection from the platonic world (3) and the mental world arises from part of the physical world, by virtue of the quantum activity of microparticles in the brain. And the mental world grasps the third world. Either they all form a fundamental feature of the world or at least one of them must be more fundamental than others. We are on the look out for a sort of panpsychism. Seager (1999) wants to decide in favour of information as the fundamental feature of the theory of consciousness. None of them uses the three world concept to sustain a view attributed to Willis Harman (Physical, Mental and the World of Pure-I). For Menon, the use is guaranteed in the following way. (1) Physical, (2) mental, and (3) fundamental laws linking these two levels (97), thus following more probably Eccles. She is perhaps too well-informed to discuss this, or perhaps she thinks that her readers are so well-informed that she need not thrash out these issues. Does Menon want to claim that there are nomic laws for pure consciousness and they provide a *faktum* for a panpsychistic universe?

A final point that divides Menon from Sharma and Prasad. Menon complicates her argument by using *sabda*, as a translinguistic tool (104ff) which brings about the Atman-Brahman unity through a semantic

ascent or semantic transcendence which cannot differentiate I and the It and thereby *Nirvikalpa Caitanyam* is presented in the non-dual state. Given the rancourous state of the interpretation of *sabda*, I think, no Sankarite has ever succeeded in integrating the overture this will have towards a non-dualistic stance. This is the real challenge to us who are Indians. We can no longer claim the following: If two Sankarites differ among themselves, it makes science, and when two Chalmers cannot agree, naturalism is undercut. This bears proof enough that our indigenous theories are theorizing in a vacuum with least consideration for naturalistic explanations.

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Professor and Head   A. KANTHAMANI
Department of Philosophy
University of Calicut
Calicut University PO 673 635
E-Mail: a_kanthamani@hotmail.com

Is Elimination of Folk Psychology Possible?

Folk psychology, as a subject matter of research has been developed distinctly in the field of philosophy of mind. For many years, philosophy of mind had little to say about intentional psychological states such as beliefs, desires, emotions and motives. It is only with the arrival of cognitive science, that first order theoretical domain became the object of philosophical analysis. Accordingly, philosophical interest has shifted from sensational phenomena such as pain and sense data to intentional psychological phenomena such as beliefs and desires etc.[1]

Folk psychology [FP] is a conceptual framework or network of principles used by ordinary people to understand, explain and predict their own and other people's behaviour and mental states.[2] It consists of concepts pertaining to our propositional attitude states and practices connecting these mental attitudes to each other, to perceptual stimuli and to action. As it lacks scientific basis some thinkers argue that FP should be eliminated. Hence in this paper I wish to examine the various arguments which are for and against FP and thereby we can establish Folk psychology.

There are three kinds of explanation related with this subject. Firstly, any concept or generalization ordinary people use in their FP practices is fair game for inclusion in FP. The other view is that FP includes the assumption that there are persons with attitudes identified by propositional content. Between these, there is a middle view, according to which FP includes concepts of the propositional attitudes and

various qualitative mental states, but not concept of traits or personality characteristics. Among these, the views which have identified the relevant scientific theory, deriving from neuroscience, have focused on the claim that FP will be eliminated. Chruchland and Stich have been the major exponents of the eliminativism. For Chruchland, FP is probably false and the entities it postulates nonexistent if it does not reduce 'smoothly' to neurophysiology through linking statements between psychological and neuropsychological types.[3] It is said that FP is something like a theory, consisting of a variety of generalizations or laws connecting mental states with other mental states, and mental states with behaviour. His approach towards the problem, known as 'Theory-Theory', tries to explain FP practices by arguing that it is a theory not merely in some abstract, platonic sense, but on the other hand when people engage in folk psychological practices, they do so at least partly in virtue of having such a theory.[4]

This assumption is challenged by Goldman with his Simulation view. He maintains that we explain and predict our own and other's behaviour not by adverting to a folk psychological theory but by engaging in a form of mental simulation.[5] In other words FP practices are largely based upon a capacity to utilize our normal decision-making capability in simulation mode. This capability stands at least in part on a Practical Reasoning System. We predict and explain behaviour by running the system 'off-line', that is decoupled from our 'action control system'. Besides, to predict another person's behaviour, we imagine ourselves in the other person's situation and then decide what we would do. That is, we use our Practical Reasoning System in an 'analysis by synthesis' mode to explain why someone acted in the way he or she did. Alison Gopnik also supports this view by claiming that people make inferences as to their own mental states using the same theory they use to infer mental states in others. But simulation theorists do not deny the fact that people have intuitions about folk psychological platitudes. Instead it might be possible to systematize those intuitions by constructing a theory that entails them. But this theory would be an FP on the external reading. Thus this assumption leads to the claim that the eliminativist must opt for an external account of FP.[6] Eliminativists reiterate that FP fails to give us any grasp of how learning occurs or

of the mechanism of memory.[7] Raising this kind of objection is just to forget that we are dealing with a commonsense or folk theory, which as such lacks the comprehensive and systematic concerns of scientific theorizing. And a failure to explain is not at all the same as an explanatory failure, as Peter Carruthers remarks.[8]

A crucial objection against FP is that it has not changed in essential aspects throughout recorded human history which is a form of stagnation and infertility indicative of degeneration and strikes one as especially perverse. Even though the basic procedures for explicating and anticipating human actions and reactions have remained stable for centuries, it is reasonable to take it as a testimony to the good performance of FP. In the case of 'infertility' this again fails to catch the difference between folk theory and scientific theory. The major difference between them is that the 'explananda' for scientific theories are themselves usually general, whereas FP is intended for application to the conduct of particular individuals.

It is pointed out that FP stands in 'splendid isolation' and is not reducible to any scientific theory.[9] With relation to isolation, the problem which needs to be solved is, the problem of explaining how the sort of intrinsic content which intentional states have can be realized in naturally occurring systems. And as far as 'reducibility' is concerned, we do not find a clear reduction. It is not any threat to the unity of science or the ultimate sovereignty of physics that we do not. The overall impression it makes is that, the ultimate arbiter of the reality of folk psychological entities and the truth of folk psychological generalization is science. It is refuted on the ground that, the probative and epistemic situation in favour of FP is so strong that scientific proof is irrelevant to assessing its ontological and truth claims.

A different type of criticism is put forward by Stich, that folk psychological categories, especially the categories of beliefs, cannot be defended empirically.[10] Although empirical research is relevant to various aspects of commonsense, the empirical case against commonsense psychology has been both misdescribed and overstated.[11] It is misdescribed when philosophers suppose that commonsense can explain internal mechanisms and then criticize it for failing to do so. And when philosophers take particular neuro-physiological discoveries to

reveal the would-be scientific status of commonsense, then it is overstated. It is opposed to the idea that commonsense psychology is revisable as a whole like the view of Quine.[12] It may conceal the fallacy of composition; because Quine defends his point on historical grounds. In contrast to the cases of theory change, there is no such basis of any societies ever having abandoned the commonsense conception of persons with intentional states.

Another serious charge leveled against FP is that folk psychological explanations are likely to turn out to be generally inaccurate or inferior to alternative theoretical explanations of human behaviour in terms of neurophysiological processes, the eliminativists agree with John Searle that 'the brain is all we have for ... representing the world, and everything we can use must be inside the brain.'[13] At the same time they think that FP agrees with Searle.

Searle seeks truce with FP by reevaluating it. He gives a list of some propositions of FP. They are as follows:

1. In general, beliefs can be either true or false.
2. Sometimes people get hungry, and when they are hungry they often want to eat something.
3. Pain is often unpleasant. For this reason people often try to avoid it.[14]

For him these propositions are more like constitutive principles of the phenomena in question. Since they are constitutive, not empirical, the only way to show them to be false would be to show that they have no range of application. For example, commonsense tells us that our pain is located in physical space within our bodies, i.e., a pain in the foot is literally inside the area of the foot. But it is false. Even such an extreme falsehood does not—and could not—show that pain does not exist.

Certainly, Churchland is correct in arguing that folk psychological discourse is theoretical in the sense that it is descriptive. But he lacks specific philosophical interpretation of the term 'theoretical' to establish his eliminativism. In order to reject FP, he supports connectionism. This is also not fair. For connectionist theories fail to explain the elimination of theoretical references to propositional attitudes. Similarly, Horgan and Woodward refute Churchland's claim by saying that

it is simply fallacious, representing nothing more than a dogma of eliminative materialism. They also advocate that Stich's 'modularity requirement'—that psychological states must be identifiable with naturally isolable neurophysiological states if they are to be accorded ontological status—is too stringent. All that is required of legitimate theoretical posits such as contentful psychological states is that they be identifiable with neurophysiological states whose components are naturally isolable. They assert that this is the only reasonable reductive constraint that can be imposed on any form of scientific theory.

In brief, all the available evidence indicates that it is difficult to reject FP. It is true that folk practices neither aim to reveal the details of the underlying mechanism, nor does the apparent success of either practice depend on its revealing such details. This does not mean that FP is ripe for replacement or elimination by scientific psychology. Both of these are not competitors.[15] For, the domain of scientific psychology includes the domain of FP. There is no reason to believe that scientific theory won't have the cognitive resources to do the requisite describing, explaining and predicting.

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Research Scholar, Dept. of Philosophy   REENA CHERUVALATH
Calicut University, Kerala 673 635

The Nature of the Language and the Problem of Analysis—A Discussion

Analysis, in a very general sense, is a process of mentally breaking down of a whole (object) being studied into its components. It is a process or a method of obtaining knowledge of a synthetic whole or unit through division into atomic parts. Analysis of a concept, in view of its popular conceptualization at various stages, clarifies confusion, contradictory tendencies, inadequacies, incompleteness, etc.; that occur in them. The purpose of analysis is the clarification of thoughts. In the realm of concepts or beings revealed in the mind, analysis, as a method, is applied for mentally dividing them on the basis of different logic based not only on explanation of their nature but their relation with language also. My concern in this paper is to discuss the possibility of analysis of concepts in the views of the theories: 1. of a signified independent of language, and 2. of a signified infused with language.

1. A MEANING INDEPENDENT OF LANGUAGE

Theorists of this view define language as references representing things and thought or as marks/designations (written or verbal) that stands by proxy for the things. It varies from community-to-community, even from person-to-person in the same language community. According to this theory, concepts are abstracted-beings; they are abstracted by mind from the perception of the individuals in their several occurrences and instances. In very brief, concepts, for this view, are the beings or thoughts that are independent and transcendental to the language.

As we have mentioned earlier, language, according to this definition, is confined to language-tokens, and a meaning, for it, is that which the language refers or points to. The meaning, in this view, is a transcendental-signified, a meaning independent of language (the signifier). Now, if we consider analysis from this point of view of language, it may be accepted that the meaning is known by reference to language but then how can the analysis of a language be the analysis of a meaning if it is a transcendental signified. As the signified, in this theory, is transcendental to language, it is not presented before us for analysis. In such a situation, language can be analyzed but that analysis cannot be the analysis of the meaning and, thus, the analysis will be a purposeless activity. There must be a cognitive base even for a purposeless activity of analysis also but as the theory accepts language as tool, it has no cognitive base. Not only that, but as the language in a language analysis cannot be the object of itself, analysis of language will not be, logically, possible. If the cognitive base is denied, what will then serve as the object of analysis and on what ground will it be analyzed? As instantaneous tokens are not beings of awareness in nature, they cannot be analyzed. If, somehow, we accept that it can be done, the analysis will be the analysis of the language only and not the analysis of a transcendental—signified. Nevertheless, if the meaning is taken as independent and transcendental to the language, the analysis of the language could not be the analysis of the signified and the signified would not be a concern of philosophical analysis as it is transcendental to the language.

It is a trivial way of taking language as confined to speaking and hearing or to writing tokens and reading them only and the meaning as that which is referred to or is represented by the tokens/marks because, unlike what the former theory says, both of them are cognitive-beings. They cannot be the objects of philosophical reflection if they are not cognitive beings.

Psychological analysis of a signified transcendental to language is also not possible. Somehow, if psychological analysis of it is accepted for a while, then it will be an analysis neither of the language as it is not the object of that analysis nor of the signified as it is independent from the language. However, in such a situation, the only conclusion one can properly derive based on this theory, is that analysis of language stands by proxy for the analysis of the meaning.

2. A MEANING INFUSED BY LANGUAGE

Language, in this theory, is defined as that which is the expresser and the expressed or illuminater and the illuminated; that is, which reveals itself first and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. If it is so, then the language, as defined in the former view, stands instrumental only in revealing the language as defined in the latter view. In the latter view, language infuses cognition.[1] It is a revealing/expressing unit, a unit of awareness in nature. In this sense, it, as *Bhartrhari* says, is *sphoṭa*[2] or *madhyamā-śabda* that is not a representative of meaning but expressive of itself and of its meaning. With this brief note on language and meaning, let us come to the discussion on possibility of analysis.

According to the latter view, concepts are not abstracted but are inner, indivisible and self-restrained beings. For this view, abstraction implies unnecessary intrusion of the individual or metaphysical substances which are abstracted and the minds which abstract them. The being abstracted so, as it is not self-restrained in character, requires a cognitive base for its revelation; if otherwise, it will not be known so. According to this theory all concepts, including that of the language and the meaning, are beings revealed by the language. In very brief, the concepts are confined to the beings of language and meaning non-

differently revealed by it. What are revealed/figured in the mind are beings infused by the language.

In view of the second, as language and its meaning are inner beings or ideas out of which the latter is non-differently revealed and is infused by the former; the analysis of the former is taken as the analysis of the latter also. Although it accepts analysis as an artificial breaking down scheme, it, unlike the former, does not apply the logic of proxy-analysis[3] but that of expression analysis[4] of the meaning.

Analysis, in philosophy of language, is considered important for clarification of thoughts and is given more importance by those philosophies which take language and meaning as indivisible units, not only as clarification of thoughts but as the process of making the individual understandable through parts acquired by the division-device also. Analysis is needed, a must, in three situations:

1. When the language is not clearly apprehended. Language is not clear when it is not revealed either by inadequacy of the tokens through which it is manifested or by ontological impregnations and other allegiances.
2. When the meaning is not clear. A meaning is not clear when the language is not clear and when there is confusion or absence of proper observation of the use of the language by elders or by the proper cognition of the speaker's intention involved in the use of the language.
3. When the two are indivisible or complex wholes and cannot be made understandable to one who can understand them only piecemeal.

No philosophical thinking is possible without analysis. An indivisible cannot be understood or be made understandable without it and, thus, cannot be the object of philosophization. It is artificial because the indivisible, as such, is not analyzed by it. It is a device because it is through it that the indivisible is made an object of communication and philosophical reflection. *Bhartṛhari*, for whom *sphoṭa* is the language, i.e., a unit of awareness in nature or a self-restrained concept for the manifestation of which language-tokens (verbal utterances/noises or written letters/words/sentences) serve as instrumental, has given place to two sorts of analysis.

1. Grammatical Analysis

It is a technique of artificial division (*apoddhāra*) through tokens by which indivisible *sphoṭa* is artificially divided into components (words/roots/suffixes/prefixes, etc.). More specifically, an indivisible sentence is syntactically analyzed into its parts, that is into nominal (*nāma*), verbal (*ākhyāta*), prefixes (*upasarga*), particles (*nipāta*), post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*) and suffixes and their meanings are decided through different derivations. One is free to derive a word in any way and his freedom is justified if the meaning of the text, by his derivation, is not deviated from. It is through the divisions that the sentence and its meaning are explained as a synthesis of the parts analyzed which help in the revelation of the indivisible sentential-meaning.

2. Philosophical Analysis

According to it, analysis is a technique of mentally breaking down, understanding and presenting thoughts/concepts, not only in view of the concepts as conceptualized by different popular theories but in view of them as figured in the mind in communication also, in their different predicates so as to get the concept clearly apprehended in its entirety and, thus, providing with clarification, conception and wisdom. Viewing analysis from this point of view, the form of analysis called *apoddhāra* is only a step in a broad sense of it for clarification and conception.

As per the latter description, language and its meaning, being indivisible, cannot be understood by a beginner and cannot be explained by the wise or philosophers without analysis. Analysis is a philosophical activity, a reflection on the objects of cognition through which the indivisible is made understandable. As all cognition is cognition shot through and through by language, no meaning is acceptable independently of or isolated from it. Although the meaning revealed non-differently by language is indivisible, it is the object of analysis. Mind can analyze only those beings that figure in it by language. For example, atoms are indivisible but expressions such as half of the atom, quarter of the atom and what part of an atom is connected with what part of another atom, etc. are made possible only by taking them as beings figured in the mind. The language and its meaning are the object

proper of cognition and analysis as they are beings revealed by the language in the mind and, hence, infused by the language.

Critical Estimate

The language, if defined as references representing things and thoughts or as marks/designations (written or verbal) standing by proxy for the things and, which for *Bhartṛhari*, is *Vaikharī-śabda* is not self-operative. It requires a cognitive base for its own acceptance and operation.

The philosophies that take the language as representative of the meaning assume that the analysis of language is, by proxy, an analysis of meaning but as the meaning, for them, is transcendental to language, how can they claim it to be the analysis of that which is independent and isolated from the language. The transcendental-signified will remain transcendental not only to the language but to the signified obtained by proxy-analysis also and, thus, analysis of the transcendental-signified will be impossible. Meaning, in this theory, is a transcendental unit and is not given for analysis and to consider analysis of a transcendental signified through that which is analyzed (language) is not a sound assumption.

Isolated from the language, no meaning is possible and nothing can be revealed if the language is not revealed first as the language reveals every intelligible being. Thus, the meaning is not an ontological but a cognitive being, a being revealed non-differently by the language in the mind. It is on the basis of non-difference of language and its meaning as cognitive beings that the analysis of the language could be the analysis of the meaning also.

As analysis of language is made by language, the questions arises: Is language a transcendental-signifier? Is it different from the transcendental-signified or is it a transcendental-signified? Are the two non-different? If the two are independent, how can the analysis of the former be the analysis of the latter? What will be the object and purpose of analysis?

Can it be a philosophical activity if it is confined to the analysis of language-token?

In the former definition of the language, it is the language and not the meaning because the language, according to it, can never be the

meaning. The theorists do not accept the concept of a transcendental-signifier. The transcendental signified is different, rather, independent from the language. The analysis of a language (if it is language-token) without a transcendental-signifier as its constant content, is not acceptable as per the logic of analysis of their own. If the transcendental-signifier, for a moment, is accepted as the object of analysis, language will not be its object but it is a fact that, in an analysis, we analyze a language by taking it as the object. How can a transcendental-signified which is not assigned for analysis be the object of analysis of the language by the language? It is aphilosophical to put a set of tokens in a set of different tokens and then to study them through their different components with which linguists occupy themselves.

The purpose of clarification of the meaning by the analysis of the language will be defeated if the meaning is taken independently from and transcendental to the language. Not only that, but both of the analysis of language by the language and that of the analysis of the meaning by the language will not be possible if the language is taken as material tokens and the meaning as independently from the former. No incentive of analysis is possible in the absence of the beings figured in the mind by the language and no being for analysis is possible in isolation from language because analysis is a reflective activity in which language infuses cognition. The objects of cognition are the beings revealed non-differently by the language and those revealed by language in the mind serve as incentive for expressions: they are only objects of analysis.

In view of the second definition of the language, analysis of language by the language is possible only if it as an idea or thought-object and it as language-token is taken in view. In that case, the language as idea is analyzed through language-tokens. Not only that but as language, in a cognition by the language, reveals itself first, it stands as the expresser (*vācaka*) of the language expressed (*vācya*) non-differently by it. The expressed the language reveals non-differently, stands as the object of the analysis. As the two are non-different, we, as per expectancy, analyze the signified through its signifier and then the signified is revealed non-differently by the language through which we analyze it. This theory has a textual ground in *kārikā* 44 of the first

part and in *kārikā* 6 of the *Jāti-samuddesaḥ* of *Vākyapadīya*. According to the former, an expression comprises two sorts of beings:

1. Tokens that are the cause of manifestation of the language as idea (real-language), and
2. The real-language which when manifested expresses itself and its meaning as well.

According to the latter, the real language (*svā-jāti*) is known first when it is manifested by the tokens and, then, its signified is revealed non-differently by it. This signified, in case of study and analysis of language by language, is the real langauge itself as it serves as the object of analysis. As these are beings cognitive in nature, the former, with the expectancy of analysis of the latter, stands as means and the latter as the object of analysis and vice versa. This explanation does not provide only a logic for accepting the analysis of language by language but explains properly the analysis of the signified by language also.

If language is confined to tokens (written or verbal) and if meaning is a transcendental-signified, a meaning independently of the language out of which none is in the capacity of figuring as both the language and the meaning, there is no possibility of change of their status and, thus, of analysis of any. Out of them, the former could not because it is only a tool and the latter would not because it is pure meaning, which can never change that status.

Now coming to an examination of the latter view, a most critical and serious question can be levelled against the indivisibility theory of language and the meaning. If these beings are indivisible, how can they be analyzed? Even if it is accepted that they, as such, cannot be analyzed and due to the artificial device of analysis we are helped in understanding it through piecemeal scheme, the question that arises significantly in respect of the language and meaning acquired through analysis is that if the language is indivisible then the meaning acquired by analysis is also indivisible and, thus, they also require to be analyzed further for understanding in piecemeal scheme. Analysis will be a fruitless process and a purposeless process can achieve nothing. In reply to this question, it can be said that there is no doubt that not only the meaning but also the language (words, suffixes) acquired by analysis

is also indivisible unit of the indivisible language and meaning, for they are also units of awareness in character. They are not divided actually by analysis.[5] Analysis, for this view, is made through the divisions of tokens and is an artificial remedy for understanding the indivisible units through parts. Though the indivisible, as such, is not divided, the parts are taken as real for practical purposes because it is only through them that the indivisible is made clearly apprehended.[6] Philosophers and the wise analyze the indivisible knowledge, for grammar and practical purposes based on the concepts as they are revealed in the mind in communication. Analysis helps in putting the indivisible into intellectually derived divisions and, thus, makes it understandable through artificially derived predicates of it. The cognition of it as a synthetic whole, through predicates, attributes or other parts, helps manifestation of the indivisible. Manifested so, its nature is revealed in its clarity and distinctness from which the meaning is revealed non-differently. Knowledge, even of and by a sentence, a word or a letter, is indivisible and can be analyzed by intellect for a clear understanding of those who can understand it only piecemeal. All predicates and attributes through which it is interpreted are intellectual devices helping the understanding of the indivisible as a synthesis of the parts and, thus, they are not useless.

Conclusively, it can be said that the meaning, in both of the theories, is a unit; a synthetic unit in the former while an indivisible unit in the latter. Both of the theories accept analysis as a process for a clear understanding. The meaning, in the former theory, is independent from and transcendental to the language while the language infuses it, in the latter. If the meaning is not taken as infused by the language the analysis of the language will not be the analysis of the meaning. Nonetheless, the analysis of the former will not be possible if it is not a cognitive-being because the mind can analyze only those beings which figure in it as the object of analysis and all that figure in the mind are beings revealed by and shot through and through by the language.

If thought is taken different from the language, as the theorists of the former view accept, the language will not be a thought and then it will not be an object of analysis. The thought cannot be analyzed by

the language being independent from it. The analysis of a signified transcendental to and independent from language, which in their view is analyzed, is a deviated logic.

Analysis can be a philosophical activity only if the object and the means of it are cognitive beings. Mind can analyze only those beings which figure in it. The language also figures in cognition by language and what figure in the mind are indivisible cognitive beings, that can be conceived as per expectancy of analyzing, as both the language and the meaning as well. As per expectancy of analyzing, cognitive being of the language serves, respectively, as the object of analysis of the language by the language and of the meaning of it as well. Thus, the problem of analyzing the language by the language and that of the meaning is explained consistently well in the second theory.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuvidhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate. Vākyapadīya* 1, 123.

2. *Sphoṭa* in philosophy of *Bhartṛhari*, is the real language, the language. It is an inner, indivisible and ubiquitously given being having awareness in nature which when manifested by tokens (Vaikharī = the language we speak, write, hear and read) reveals itself by which its meaning is revealed non-differently.

3. The term *'proxy analysis'* means a process in which what is analyzed is language and what it stands for is a being transcendental and independent from language. For this theory, a transcendental being of a signified is required as a constant content to serve as the basis of analysis. If this is so there must be a transcendental-signifier and only in that case the analysis of language by language can be explained consistently. As the theorists do not accept the concept of transcendental language, there is no possibility of analyzing language by language. I have used the term 'proxy-analysis' for the view of those who take language as representative of the meaning and thus the analysis of language, for them, represents the analysis of meaning.

4. By the term *'expression-analysis'* I mean the analysis of the meaning as it figures in the mind non-differently by the language. It is the view of those for whom the language expresses and infuses cognition. The meaning is non-different from the language. As the two are non-different, the analysis of the former, for them, is the analysis of the latter. It is analysis in terms of the language.

5. Indivisible *sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* are the units of awareness in nature and there is no possibility of any actual division of such units of awareness in character.

6. *Upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānāmapalāpanaḥ. Astye vartamani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate.* VP.2/238.

L.N.M. University   D.N. TIWARI
Darbhanga 846 004

Agenda for Research

Many of the concepts talked about, discussed and used in philosophy function at a level of abstraction which not only take them out of all their varied contexts by treating them primarily as concepts rather than as 'this' or 'that' concept but also treat them in total isolation from one another. This is one reason why philosophers encounter the same problem, no matter what they are trying to discuss. In case this is realized, philosophical discussion might take a clearer shape as then one would realize that one is not discussing the specific concept but rather the problem arising from the conceptual nature of the concept itself.

But as there *are* problems relating to the specificity of the concept which need to be discussed and debated, it would be fruitful to be aware of this and take discussions at this level in a different direction. Here the applicability of the concept becomes a crucial factor as many disciplines dealing with a 'subject-matter' relating to these disciplines organize themselves around a cluster of concepts the way they are actually used therein and this may provide a substantial clue to find what these concepts really stand for and the way they are related to other concepts and the manner in which they function in the organization of knowledge in that field.

There is, however, a history of the knowledge enterprise in different fields and the application of concepts along with their interrelation and interaction with other concepts over a period of time, thus indicating something which is ignored in most discussion of these concepts by theoreticians and philosophers alike.

It would, therefore, be an interesting undertaking to choose a few concepts and study their application in a particular field of knowledge and the interrelationship with other concepts in that field of study as a process occurring over a period of historical time. In case the reasons for the change are investigated it would give us some idea about the 'necessities' determining our understanding of the problem and the influences which bring about change in that understanding.

Jaipur   DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

1. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* refers to light and sound as a 'model' of physical reality and in case it is taken seriously, it might help us not only in understanding the Buddhist notion of reality, but also suggest a different idea of material reality than is generally found either at the commonsense or sophisticated level.

The paradigmatic example of matter is generally that of stone, a well-demarcated 'something' that occupies space, is inert and incapable of motion or any other activity on its own. Light or sound do not occupy any fixed position in space as they are continuously spreading, moving and expanding in 'waves', each wave giving rise to the next and thus simultaneously 'ceasing to be' and giving rise to that which is homogenous and similar to it, by ceasing to be.

This, strangely, also seems to be the character of consciousness, though the continuous movement that occurs in it because of either external or internal factors, can be stopped or at least affected to some extent by its own attempt to do so. In this perhaps lie the beginnings of 'Yoga' which, of course, does not and can not stop with the achievement of just this stoppage.

2. *Ṣaḍadarśana Samuccaya* of Haribhadra Sūrī is well known to students of philosophy and it has generally been said that it does not mention Vedānta as a school of Indian philosophy in it. *This is just not correct*, even though I myself had written it in a controversial paper entitled 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD', published in the *JICPR Special Issue*, 1996, pp. 201–7. He refers to Vedānta in his chapter on Mīmāṁsā and calls it Uttaramīmāṁsā and designates those who subscribe to it as Vedāntins and the doctrine they propound as *Brahmādvaitavāda*. However, he does not discuss in any detail either the doctrine or the arguments in the chapter concerned, which deals primarily only with the Pūrvamīmāṁsā which is called Jaiminīya.

Surprisingly, he gives some information about the Vedāntins of those times, divided as they were, according to him, into four sects, or four

stages, the two of which are still known to some extent at least. The distinction between those who are known as belonging to the category of *Haṁsa* or those who belong to the category of *Paramahaṁsa* is familiar still, though few would know that the latter could take their food from any house, including those of the *Śūdras*. The other two were called *Kutīcara* and *Bahūdaka*. These two were supposed to wear *brahmasūtra* (a strange term which seems to indicate something different from the yajñopavīta which was supposed to be worn by those who followed *pūrvamīmāṁsā*) and also *Śikhā* or the tuft of hair on their head. The former two categories, that is Haṁsa and Paramahaṁsa, did not have the *Śikhā* or wore the *Brahmasūtra* as the other two did.

The whole text is interesting from many points of view and gives an intimate picture of the way philosophers lived at that time. A comparative study of the doctrines as propounded in the book might help to locate the developments that occurred later in the doctrines of many of these schools, a subject about which not much seems to be known as what is generally known is an ahistorical, static picture of the schools' position as if it had no internal differences or changes within it.

Interestingly, Haribhadra Sūrī knows both Kumārila and Prabhākara as he mentions them by name in his discussion of Pūrvamīmāṁsā. On the other hand, he does not seem to know Śaṁkara at all or any other thinker of the Vedānta school earlier to him.

This suggests that though Vedānta was known as Uttaramīmāṁsā and the doctrine it propounded was known as *Brahmādvaita*, it had not yet crystallized into a separate recognized school of philosophy till his time.

Jaipur   DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

1. What exactly is the difference between *Saṁyukta Samavāya*, *Samaveta Samavāya* and *Saṁyukta Samaveta Samavāya*? What were the reasons for postulating these different *Samavāya*? Are these objects of perceptual apprehension as *samavāya* is supposed to be, or a matter of inference? In case it is the former, is the difference between them perceived also?

2. What is the exact difference between *pramāṇa* and *premeya* and *hetu* and *sādhya*? Normally the first pair is used in a wider sense, while the other is used in a narrower sense confining it to anumāna only. But this restriction is arbitrary, for just as *hetu* has to be different from *sādhya*, so also *pramāṇa* has to be different from *premeya*. Otherwise, the justification would be fallacious. But then, how can the idea of *swataḥprāmaṇa* be valid? One can not be a prāmaṇa for oneself, at least in the same context, just as *hetu* can not be its own *sādhya*.

3. Pratyaksa has been accepted as a *pramāṇa* by all schools of Indian philosophy, and yet it is not clear how it can be a *pramāṇa* without being subsumed under *anumanā* as in case it is a *pramāṇa*, it has to function as a *hetu* for something which is *premeya* so that it may provide a ground for the latter. This, it may be said, will apply to all the *pramāṇas* and not just to *pratyaksa* alone and, if so, each and all of them have to be treated as instances of *anumāna* having internal differences between them. The problem then, will be to have a *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* of *pramāṇa* in general and a *viśeṣa* or differentiating *lakṣaṇa* of all the different *pramāṇas* accepted in a system. And in case this is done, the theory of *pramāṇas* in the Indian tradition would have to be recast substantially.

Jaipur   DAYA KRISHNA

4. (i) Is *buddhi* in Nyāya knowledge, cognition, apprehension or awareness? If yes, as stated in the Nyayasutra, then how to

distinguish between the means of knowledge and the result of knowledge? In the light of this definition, the Nyāya realism is difficult to be defended.

(ii) Moreover, would it be correct to hold *saṁśaya* (Doubt), *viparyaya* (Error), *smṛti* (Memory) and *svapana* (Dream) as types of *buddhi* or *jñāna*?

(iii) Can there be no understanding without an object? If not, how can the subject be known?

(iv) Can it also become the object of buddhi? If yes, then how to distinguish between the subject and the object at that moment?

'Abhyudaya', 295, Sect. 15/A,   SHASHIPRABHA KUMAR
NOIDA (U.P.) 201 301

REPLIES TO QUERIES

1. What exactly does Wittgenstein mean by the word 'fact' in the *Tractatus*? Is it the referent of an atomic proposition and if so, has the world, constituted as it is by atomic facts, no actual relations between them except those 'superimposed' by the logical connectives which alone 'connect' the atomic propositions? *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 3.

Comments

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein introduces two words for 'fact': *tatsache* (1.11–2) and *sachverhalt* (2.0122–2.0124). *Tatsache* is translated as 'fact' and *sachverhalt* as 'state of affairs'. While the former may be understood as a complex of facts, the latter may stand for atomic facts, which are independent of each other (2.061). In this sense we can say that the world is constituted of atomic facts which are without any actual relation between them.

Atomic facts are so called because they are ontologically independent of one another, since from the existence or non-existence of one, nothing can be inferred about the existence or non-existence of another (2.062). That is, an atomic fact is unrelated to other atomic facts. However, all the atomic facts together constitute the world (2.04). They are in the logical space (1.13).

The atomic facts or the states of affairs are represented or pictured by the atomic or elementary propositions. Each atomic proposition stands for an atomic fact. This is how a neat pictorial relation is established between the atomic propositions and the world (4.21).

As regards the relations among the facts which arise in the logical space, if not in the ontological space, the *Tractatus* introduces a mechanism of connection *via* the logical space. The logical space is a mosaic of relations as the 'world divides into facts' (1.2). This is because the world is represented in a truth-functional language. Language imposes division on the world. That is why there is a network of relations not only among the facts but also among the propositions. However, relations are out and out logical since they are established by connectives and are imposed on an ontologically discrete world.

Space and time themselves are logical relations among the facts and not among the things which constitute the atomic facts. Atomic facts or states of affairs are concatenations of objects (2.0272–2.032). The objects themselves are not in space and time. They constitute the unchanging substance of the world (2.021, 2.023).

Indian Council of Philosophical Research   R.C. PRADHAN
New Delhi

2. 'What is the difference, if any, between abhāva and anupalabdhi? Reply to query published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 2.

Abhāva and Anupalabdhi get significance primarily in the premises of epistemology relating with Pūrvamīmāṁsā and so also with Advaita Vedānta in the realm of Indian philosophy. There is indeed difference in the implications of these two terms. A keen observation into the analytical outlook of both Mimāmsas (Purva and Uttara) reveals their epistemological uniqueness and clarity in interpretation of the process of cognition so that one can discriminate true knowledge from the false ones.

Knowledge in its empirical realm represents the particular modes of mind—stuff that is constantly subject to change. Among those modes, similar ones are classified into respective divisions in the epistemological interpretations of philosophy. Hence, separate types of knowledge

have to originate from distinct means of knowledge. According to the observations in Pūrvamīmāṁsa and Advaita Vedānta, the process of knowledge is to be analyzed in consonance with human experience. Human beings experience the knowledge of existence and non-existence of objects in the empirical world. The senses along with the mind lead one to the knowledge of objects existent in nature at a limited particular time and space. Generally, philosophers consider this process alone to theoretize the means of knowledge. But apart from this, one has to recognize the experience of non-existence of objects enquired by one within the limitations of particular space and time even without sense-activity. Mind also fails to find out the enquired particular thing and thereby one cognizes the non-existence of that thing. Thus affirmative as well as negative types of knowledge have prominent place in human life. These two contradictory types of cognition cannot be originated by similar means of knowledge. In this way, analyzing human experience of knowledge in a reasonable way, Pūrvamimāṁsa and Advaita Vedānta dared to put forth a unique means of knowledge named anupalabdhi. The essence of the knowledge arising from this means of knowledge is negation that brings a uniform kind of voidness in human mind though related with various objects and affairs. Therefore this means of knowledge is not divided into many subdivisions as is done with the case of other affirmation-sensing means of knowledge.

As the terms indicate, 'Abhāva' and 'Anupalabdhi' have different meanings and implications. Upalabdhi refers to human cognition and hence anupalabdhi refers to the absence of it. As a means of valid knowledge, this is defined in Vedāntaparibhāsā as follows:

ज्ञानकरणजन्याभावानुभवासाधारणकारणमनुपलब्धिरूपं प्रमाणम् ।

Here itself, it is evident that the means of knowledge is named Anupalabdhi whereas the knowledge arising from this means refers to 'abhāva'. Abhāva is absolute non-existence which embraces the whole universe. Everywhere one can experience the non-existence (abhāva) of things which are absent there. When it is mentioned particularly and brought to peculiar occasion, it reforms itself into a valid knowledge originated from a valid means. Here the relevance of Anupalabdhi can

be disclosed. All other means of valid knowledge bring the cognition of existing objects whereas Anupalabdhi alone is competent to make man conscious of the non-existence of familiar objects in particular space and time.

Advaita Vedānta, though it advocates the non-dual Brahman as the sole reality and considers the whole universe as false, does not hesitate to admit the fact that Brahman is to be realized while living in this world itself. Therefore, up to the attainment of true knowledge, one should consider the world and the objects in it as real and valid. In such a context, one should examine and analyze ones own experience not in a superficial manner, but with deep concentration and justice. This is the inspiring factor of this system behind the analysis of various types of knowledge and their means while considering their underlying distinctions. This is why Advaitins refute the view of Naiyayikas that negative invariable concomittance leads to negative inference. Negative knowledge arising out of inference cannot be justified, for, anumāna occurs first in the mind, which brings cognition in a positive manner. Common man's experience of knowledge also puts forth the fact that the mind brings the knowledge of existing objects and affairs or once experienced in an existent form. Possessing this nature of analyzing facts in their utmost depth. Advaita Vedānta rejected the Buddhist view of non-recognition of savikalpaka pratyakṣa. In this way, if one penetrates into the nature and purpose of pramāṇas, it can very well be asserted that there should be the recognition of six pramāṇas which can engage in the production of different kinds of knowledge. Moreover, such an interpretation, being reasonable and all-embracing, could not affect the true principle of Advaita Vedānta because according to this system, the universe where these means of knowledge are valid is merely relatively real. The relatively real is incapable of nullification of the absolutely real principle. Therefore there need not be hesitation in admitting all those whatever can work as the means of valid knowledge. It will not undervalue any philosophical system. On the other hand, this true and honest interpretation increases the value, relevance and public acceptance of the system. Advaita Vedānta is undoubtedly successful in this regard which presents and analyzes empirical affairs in a true and just way. Hence they consider Anupalabdhi as a separate

pramāṇa for acquiring the cognition of the non-existence of particular objects and affairs in the world. In this way, 'व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः' is not a blind following of the facts and doctrines proposed by Bhāttamīmāṃsakas. But with due reflection and observations, Advaita recognizes almost all empirical theories put forth by Bhāttas.

Angamali (Kerala) N. USHA DEVI

REVIEW ARTICLE

Foucault, the Philosopher Who Declined to Reveal His Name

S. PANNEERSELVAM

Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, Chennai 600 005

I

In France, the newspaper, *Le Monde*, on April 6–7, 1980, published an interview with Michel Foucault, wherein he opted for the mask of anonymity—the philosopher who declined to reveal his name—in order to demystify the power society ascribes to the 'name' of the intellectual. He rarely talked about himself. He is a thinker who found his personal life uninteresting and always wanted to remain anonymous. When asked the question, why has he chosen anonymity, Foucault replied as follows:

> In our societies, characters dominate our perceptions. Our attention tends to be arrested by the activities of faces that come and go, emerge and disappear.
>
> Why did I suggest that we use anonymity? Out of nostalgia for a time when, being quite unknown, what I said had some chance of being heard. With the potential reader, the surface of contact was unrippled. The effects of the book might land in unexpected places and form shapes that I had never thought of. A name makes reading too easy.[1]

Foucault (1926–1984) was born in Poitiers. After his school education he joined the Ecole Normale Superieure to study philosophy under Merleau-Ponty, Jean Hyppolite and Althusser. He was a member of the Communist party for a short period and left it in 1951. After graduation,

he moved from philosophy to psychiatry and history. He worked for his doctorate on the history of madness, which is the basis for his first major work, *Madness and Civilization*.[2] In the year 1960, he was appointed as the head of the department of philosophy in the University of Clermont-Ferrand. During this period he wrote the book, *The Order of Things*.[3] He moved to the University of Paris during this period. In 1970, he was appointed to the chair of the history of systems of thought at the College de France and taught there till his death in 1984. He is the one who has influenced the fields of history, philosophy, literature and literary theory, the social sciences and even medicine.

Foucault as the leading French intellectual of his times identifies with different socio-political causes. He supported the prisoners and prison reform, the socially marginalized such as immigrants, mental patients, conscripted soldiers—thus developing a new form of social activism. As in Wittgenstein, in Foucault also we find two periods, the earlier and the later. Foucault in the 1970s turned away from the methodological concerns, which he was preoccupied with in the 1960s. In the earlier period, *Discipline and Punish*[4] and the essays and interviews collected in *Power/Knowledge*[5] were published and in the later period, i.e., from 1978 to 1984, the three volumes of *The History of Sexuality*[6] and other interviews and essays were published.

The Critical theory as well as French poststructuralism has made an impact in the postmodern philosophy. This is because of Horkeheimer and Adorno, who allowed the philosophers to take the critical theory in their own direction. The best examples are Habermas and Foucault. McCarthy argues that French poststructuralism is an alternative way of continuing the tradition of critical theory. Though there are some parallels between these two movements, the Frankfurt school did not have an influence on French thought. Though Foucault admits that he never once heard the name of the Frankfurt School mentioned by any of his professors, he admits that there had been direct historical connections. He says:

Now, obviously, if I had been familiar with the Frankfurt School, if I had been aware of it at that time, I would not have said a number of stupid things that I did say and I would have avoided many of the

detours which I made while trying to pursue my own humble path—when, meanwhile avenues had been opened up by the Frankfurt School. It is a strange case of non-penetration between two very similar types of thinking, which is explained, perhaps, by that very similarity. Nothing hides the fact of a problem in common better than two similar ways of approaching it.[7]

The year 1968 is very important in the French political thought. The events that took place in this year led to substantive reflections on the practice of cultural criticism. Commenting on this Foucault says that it created a consciousness of Marxism 'decline as a dogmatic framework' and its 'powerlessness ... to confront a whole series of questions that were not traditionally a part of its statutory domain (questions about women, about relations between sexes, about medicine, about mental illness, about the environment, about minorities, about delinquency).'[8] Foucault's books like, *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* explain that he was interested in the intellectual history and the empirical historical questions. His opposition to humanism is seen in *The Order of Things*, wherein he shows that man is an invention of recent date; and one perhaps nearing its end.[9] Foucault suggests that humanism and reason have functioned in the west as definitive, exclusionary terms. He questions the very possibility of a pure other. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault says the excluded are never outside. He says that the society's or epoch's identity is formed vis-à-vis what it forcefully excludes. He says: '... there is no outside. It takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the other. It saves everything, including what it punishes.'[10]

He argues that the concept of human nature is a product of a particular historical situation, a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge, which arose at the time of Enlightenment. He says: 'If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared ... then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.'[11] He analyzes the 'discovery' or 'discursive practice', which is a rule-governed set of statements in which a community of human beings embodied what it thinks of as 'knowledge'. A discursive practice, according to him, is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined

a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciate function.[12] By saying that the discursive practices are historical, Foucault makes it clear that they are not found in all communities at all times and in all paces, but belong to a particular phase in the historical development of a particular community. This means that there can be no criteria of truth and falsity, which apply outside a particular discursive practice. There are no universal standards or logic or rationality. If the different discursive practices are found at different periods in history, one cannot look at history as progress towards objective truth.

Foucault was initially interested in the archaeology, and adopted the Nietzsche's concept of genealogy. He says that it is the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralizing owners which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a society such as ours.[13] Foucault argues that genealogy deals with the subtle historical and social conditions, which bring about the institutions in which the unconscious rules are accepted. The set of unconscious rules which interested Foucault were those which basically constitute the discursive practice of modern or post-Enlightenment. In his writings starting from *Madness and Civilization*, he has been dealing with the diversity of human natures. He explains how in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the nature of human behaviour was studied under the State power, in the name of experts or science. For example, madness is redescribed as mental illness and subjected to medical control. Bodily illness was studied by the experts. Another example according to him, is the sexuality, which has been taken over by science. The point which Foucault makes here is that since the Enlightenment period, an idea has grown that human beings do not simply have to obey the law in their external behaviour, but have to be normal, healthy, well-adjusted people. Slight change in this norm is always policed by scientific management which is accepted because it induces pleasure, forms knowledge and produces discourse. In *Madness and Civilization* Foucault talks about the incarceration of the insane through institutions of our own making that enable us to distinguish between truth and madness and the marginal

and the normal. Here, Foucault is concerned with three things, namely, the political economy of madness, representation of madness in art and literature and the relation between madness and science.

His essay 'What Is Enlightenment?' published posthumously is a commentary on Kant's famous essay with the same title, published in 1784. The essay of Kant approached Enlightenment as humanity's coming of age. But now Foucault argues that this aspect of Enlightenment is in tension with humanism, which consists in fixed concepts of human nature. This genealogical critique of humanism restricts the possibilities of what we can be as human beings. Writing on this, Foucault says: 'It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysic that has finally become since; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.'[14]

Foucault argues that there is no objective truth. His aim is to liberate us from the idea that humanism is objectively truth and so make it possible to explore new ways of 'being, doing and thinking'. Though he is not interested in formulating a new theory of human nature, he boldly rejects all the theories thus making the space for the new possibility. Foucault not only practiced the craft of genealogy, but also attempted to describe what is involved in doing a genealogy. His article, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' written in 1971, presents, following Nietzsche, genealogical analysis as being primarily opposed to the search for 'origins'.

II

In the book under review,[15] the authors, Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato and Jen Webb offer an introduction to Foucault with regard to his understanding of knowledge, power, subjectivity and sexuality. The authors, mainly belonging to the Cultural Studies and Creative Communication Departments, have presented Foucault's ideas in a clear manner, though very briefly. The publisher, Motilal Banarsidass, has brought out the first Indian edition of the book in 2001, originally published by Allen and Unwin in 2000. The book also gives a glossary of the technical terms used by Foucault. In chapter one, a general introduction to Foucault's works is given. Foucault challenged all the main fields. Derrida attacked the disciplines of literature and philosophy,

Deleuze was against psychoanalysis, Baudrillard against political economy, but the uniqueness of Foucault is that he questioned all the fields and disciplines. His contribution to medicine, public health, social work, law, economics, criminology and prison management cannot be underestimated. The book undertakes a study of Foucault's works against the backdrop of three concepts, namely, knowledge, power and subjectivity.

Marxism and phenomenology are the two movements which influenced him mainly. Similarly, the structuralism and psychoanalysis made an impact on him. With regard to the influence of structuralism on Foucault, the authors say that it offered two major advances over Marxism and phenomenology. For example, the structuralist understanding that meaning is relational helped him to develop his rejection of absolutist theories. '... Words, events, ideas and activities did not mean anything in themselves—they only made sense when related to other events, ideas and activities.'[16] Also Foucault derived his notion of 'the death of the subject' from structuralism. Nietzsche's views on truth, knowledge and power shaped Foucault's thought to a great extent. Also Enlightenment influenced him. His difference with Kant is known through his article, 'What Is Enlightenment?' It can be said that by the Enlightenment, he was influenced both in the negative and positive sense. All the above movements and thinkers shaped the theoretical development of Foucault. In chapter two, the authors deal with the issues, namely the concept of 'epistemes'. The epistemes are the periods of history organized around and explicable in terms of specific world-views and discourse. According to him, knowledge and truth are not essential and ahistorical, but are produced by epistemes and hold that episteme together. This means for Foucault, knowledge and truth are tied up with the way in which power is exercised in our age and are caught up in power struggles. Foucault talks of three main epistemes: (1) the renaissance, (2) the classical, and (3) the modern. What is interesting is that he does not see a linear development from renaissance to modern age. Renaissance, he contends, is the 'age of resemblances' which is traced back to God or Nature, but in modern age, man is responsible for knowledge. Foucault's book *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, examines how epistmes work and speak themselves through

the production of 'discursive formations'. The discursive formations, according to the authors, are the organizing principles of an episteme. They work to make speech possible, organize ideas or concepts, and produce objects of knowledge.[17] The authors are of the view that Foucault's approach to the notions of the order of things and epistemes constituted a new way of looking at 'the history of ideas'.

In chapter three of the book, Foucault's views on discourses and institutions which can be seen in his book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, are discussed. He talks about discourses, which can be understood as a series of events. He points out that what comes between ourselves and our experience are the grounds upon which we can act, speak and make sense of things.[18] Foucault is interested in language as a whole, i.e., discourse. Discourses are nothing but language in action. Our actions and thoughts are regulated and controlled by these discourses. 'Discourses can be understood as language in action: they are the windows, if you like, which allow us to make sense of, and "see" things. These discursive windows or explanations shape our understanding of our selves, and our capacity to distinguish the valuable from the valueless, the true from the false, and the right from the wrong.'[19]

Foucault rejects the idea of self-governing subject. Especially the western societies project the image of the self-governing subject, thus showing that they are different from the primitives of terrorists, aliens and cyborgs who do not have control over their thoughts and actions. Foucault always engaged himself in critical reflection on various issues. He points out that there is always a shift in his philosophical, political and cultural perspectives. Though Foucault rejects the idea of a self-governing subject, it has been attacked by historians like, Robert Hughes, who argue that it would lead to the idea that we are not in control of our own being. He says:

In the late 1980s, while American academics were emptily theorising that truth, language and the thinking subject were dead, the longing for freedom and humanistic culture were demolishing the very pillars of European tyranny. Of course, if the Chinese students had read their Foucault they would have known that repression is inscribed in all language, their own included, and so they could have

saved themselves the trouble of facing the tanks in Tiananmen Square.[20]

Foucault argues that though public institutions like schools, colleges, universities etc., fail to uphold their values of truth, it is these values upon which they are judged. These institutions are tied to truth. Discourses, according to Foucault operate as forms of language, and work through various institutions and are associated with 'games of truth' working within fields such as science and government to authorize what can be judged as true or untrue. Writing on this, Foucault says that a game of truth is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedures, may be considered valid or invalid.[21]

Foucault's understanding of discipline and instruction forms the theme of the fourth chapter of the book. Foucault's examination of power can be applied to disciplinary institutions and practices. His book, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* is a detailed study of the role of disciplinary institutions and the birth of prison, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe. To explain how the modern society organizes itself, he relates it with the notions like micro-power, disciplinary institutions, panopticism, etc. Discursive formation and practices work on bodies, according to Foucault. 'Power shows itself on a subject's body because various events or happenings are "written" on the body—they shape the way we perform, or act out our bodily selves.'[22] We are taught from childhood onwards the two different behaviours for men and women which are written on our bodies. This means that our bodies have been trained to account for social values. All discourses write on the body, or shape the ways in which bodies are understood. Here power works at a micro-level. This micro-level power is associated with discipline, which is depicted in the above work of Foucault. Discipline acts in two ways; one is tied to punishment and the other to a body of skill and knowledge. In the first one, discipline is used as a verb, an action, which we perform, in disciplining a disobedient child, for example. In the second sense, it is a noun, a set of qualities, which we need to develop for any recognition, a professional football player, for example. In the first one, discipline is a negative force, tied with punishment, whereas in

the second, it is a positive force, tied with self-empowerment and achievement. This distinction makes Foucault say that knowledge is something that makes us its subjects, for the main reason that we make sense of ourselves by referring back to various bodies of knowledge.

Discipline according to Foucault works through a system of punishment and gratification. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 'prison' was used as a central disciplinary site. It was a disciplinary site in which the coercive force of disciplinary power could be used in a direct and overt way. The prison as a micro-society had its own experts, hierarchies, ranks, and network and its own codes of conduct, protocols and procedures.[23] Foucault talks about panopticon as one of the ways of discipline. It was Bentham who developed this concept in the eighteenth century. Panopticon is a tower placed in a central position within the prison. The guards would be able to watch every cell and the prisoners from the tower which was designed in such a way that the prisoners would never know whether they are being watched or not. Here the prisoners would assume that they could be observed at any moment and would adjust their behaviour accordingly. The authors very rightly point out that the 'panoptic gaze' and other disciplinary procedures emerged at a historic moment when it had become necessary to produce a pliable, healthy and sober workforce to service the factories of the Industrial Revolution.[24] In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault talks of different modes of disciplinary power, which were prevalent throughout the social body and modern western cultures. By explaining that his approach is different from the methods that analyzed power in terms of force imposed from above, Foucault shows that discipline works through a series of quiet coercions working at the level of people's bodies, shaping how they behave and how they see the world.

In chapter five, the authors deal with *The History of Sexuality* in which Foucault explains how power dominates people and how knowledge sets them free. Foucault believes that knowledge and truth arise out of power struggles and they legitimize the power.[25] His notion of power can be understood as technologies that were developed at the same time as, and out of, the human sciences, and which were used for analyzing, controlling, regulating and defining the human body and its

behaviour. He says that after the renaissance period, the notion of power held by one or many is replaced by bio-power. With the emergence of human and social sciences, the human body is considered as an object of knowledge. But he admits that bio-power has not completely regulated bodies and behaviour because it always produces opposition and resistance. 'Power is successful in "writing" people, but the effects are not what was intended.'[26]

In Foucault, the 'governmentality' occupies a significant place. This forms the subject matter of the sixth chapter of the book. Foucault's elaborate views on governmentality and liberalism can be seen in his essays and lectures·delivered in the 1970s. This was the period when he was working on the book *Discipline and Punish*. The governmentality talks about the ways of conducting ourselves, the relationship we have with our own bodies and other bodies that constitute society. It is a 'body of politics', according to him. Foucault examines the ideas and practices of governmentality and also how far it is possible for us to have an understanding, negotiation, etc. He talks of how we have two models of governmentality, the social contract and the social warfare. Foucault believes both are produced by different historical circumstances. Thus both versions of society and power are not truths about society and hence he rejects both. He develops a new version of governmentality, otherwise known as his notion of 'liberalism', which is the result of the relationship between governmental, legal and economic contexts. The liberalism of Foucault brings an awareness of the need to involve civic society and here power is not possessed by a group or individual but passes through different stages, which results in transformation. Thus Foucault's liberalism, according to the authors, is important for two main reasons. First of all, it deals with the change in Western Europe from a particular notion of governmentality as a 'reason of state', thus putting an end to the monopoly over state security and prosperity. It means that the civic society plays an important role. Secondly, when power passes·through various stages as a result of which it is transformed and rerouted.[27]

Foucault in his detailed study of historiography examines the different historical societies from the ancient Greek to the European societies up to twentieth century. How does his historiography differ from

the conventional historiography? This is the major point that is discussed in chapter seven. According to the authors, Foucault's approach to the study of history was archaeological and genealogical. One of his criticisms against the traditional method of writing history is that this modern form of history writing, started in the early nineteenth century, and that this period also experienced the dramatic increase in European colonization. Foucault explains the problems with regard to the dialectical history developed by Hegel. First of all, such a view of history tries to justify European colonial practice as involving the clash of an advanced civilized west with the rest of the world, which was considered as barbaric and backward. Secondly, it tries to understand history in terms of great ideological belief systems like liberalism, capitalism, socialism, etc. Thirdly a dialectic conception of history tries to understand history in terms of a grand or totalizing vision. This synthetic view of history is replaced by a pluralistic view of history, according to Foucault. Thus Foucault admits multiple beginnings, pauses, gaps in history. This means history according to him should be studied in terms of discontinuity and disjuncture, rather than continuity and conjuncture.[28] Foucault very clearly states that the conventional historiography always begins with a unified subject. Such a historiography marginalizes and silences women, indigenous and colonized people. They are only supporting actors; they cannot be the makers of history. It thus divides people into subjects and object, active and passive, the colonizing and the colonized people. Against this, Foucault develops the concept of 'subjugated knowledge'. It is a form of knowledge which has been subjugated, or buried, under the official or dominant forms of knowledge that emerge within a social order. As a part of the colonial project, the ways of knowing in science, history and government have been buried. For example, the colonizing forces have always tried to suppress the struggle of the colonized people. In this context, the authors discuss how Edward Said had applied the Foucaultian ideas to colonial practice in his book *Orientalism*. Said explains 'how colonial practice was based on the construction of Oriental people as being less civilized than people in the West, and hence needing to be colonized and governed by others.'[29] One can see how Orientalist discourses established a set of binary opposites as follows.[30]

Western people	*Oriental people*
Civilized	Barbarous
Active	Passive
Progressive	Backward
Subjects of knowledge	Objects of knowledge
Individuated	Unindividuated

The traditional or conventional historiography ignores the history of the oppressed and the backward and the colonized. The subjugated knowledge helps to sustain the colonized people in their struggle against colonizing forces. Foucault is interested in creating a history of the different modes by which human beings are made subjects. He says that the goal of his work has not been to analyze the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis, but to create a history of the different modes by which in our culture, human beings, are made subjects.

Now what is the 'subject' according to Foucault? This question is raised and answered in chapter eight. It must be remembered that Foucault was not consistent with regard to his concept of 'subject'. Due to the influence of Nietzsche, he also in his earlier period considered the idea that the subject is dead. But in his later period, he explains how people, i.e., subjects, are active in 'crafting' or negotiating their identity.[31] The self is created through 'technologies of the self'. The authors explain the foundations for the technologies of the self. They raise two questions, namely, who is the subject and how can we recognize others and ourselves as subjects. They examine the question from the time of the Greeks upto the present to show that there is something new with regard to this. For example, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault examines this question. Also in *The History of Sexuality* by presenting different understandings on the subject, he shows that the subject is not natural, but takes different focus due to different historical periods. '... rather than being the force and active organizers of society, we are products of discourses and power relations, and take on different characteristics according to the range of subject positions that are possible in our socio-historical contexts.'[32]

What is human nature? Is it based on divine law or reason? Foucault argues that the subject cannot pre-exist the social order for the reason

that it is constituted by social rules, which are dominant. He talks about the death of the subject for this reason. He contends that the notion of human being is historical. He is the product of discourses, institutions and relations and always can change according to the circumstances. 'The kind of subject or person we are in different places and times depends on the rules, discourses, and ideas in a culture which determine what can be said, thought and done, and on the social and historical context in which we live.'[33]

In his early writings, Foucault was of the view that subjectivity is shaped by the way in which individuals' bodies are acted upon by disciplinary technologies. He believed that the human body is central to the question of who the self is, because individuals are classified in terms of these bodies and their bodily functions. This led him to examine how the body is managed, organized and disciplined in institutions such as prisons, schools or hospitals. To explain this relation between the body and institutions, he uses the term, 'bio-politics'. The bio-politics is the study of how and why government institutions are interested in managing human bodies. A study of body is important for the government because it becomes an object of social concern, e.g., populations. In this context he says that a politics of disciplinary site, like government, establishes 'discursive norms'. What happens here is that different standards are prescribed for a genuine subject. The standards decide who are normal and who are not. The normals are the subjects and others are not. Foucault makes a case study of European governments' treatment of insane people. In and around the thirteenth century, madness was considered a vice and in the eighteenth century, this wrong conception has changed and is understood as a condition that was in opposition to reason. Foucault says that there are technologies of classifying, disciplining which is based on the production of subjectivity. There is what is called the 'naming process'. An important prerequisite for this is that in order to be a human, one must have a name that denotes an identity that is distinct from everyone else. This naming process makes us subjects by naming and identifying what we are not through technologies of differentiation. This sort of differentiation, which is made by Foucault no doubt, reduces human beings to 'docile bodies'.

In his later works like, *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault talks about the ethics of the self. He employs his technologies of the self to achieve perfection, happiness, purity and wisdom. He says that the technologies of the self are ways of attempting to live the truth, tell the truth and be changed by the truth. Foucault talks about three main technologies of the self or the method of achieving subjectivity. The first one is 'Senecan' which is a series of techniques, which allow us to examine how our thought is tied with the rules of the society. The second is concerned with the understanding of the relations between our inner thoughts and our inner impurity. This is the early 'Christian hermeneutics', whereas the third is the 'Cartesian mode' that studies the extent to which our thoughts represent reality. It must be admitted that though Foucault rejects the notion of true self, he argues that we can work on ourselves to reinvent ourselves as subjects better fitted for living with the self and with others.[34]

In chapter nine the authors deal with Foucaultian understanding of the history of thought on sex and sexuality. *The History of Sexuality* examines how the notion of subjectivity is based on the body. Sex according to Foucault, is a social construct, and an effect of power and knowledge. His notion of 'micro-power' explains how discourses write the body or shape the ways in which bodies are understood and function. For him, sex is a form of knowledge as well as a physical activity and it involves ones relations to the self as much as ones relations with others.[35] What is interesting is that Foucault uses sexuality to classify the subjectivity. The reason for this is that it focuses attention on the person rather than the act and also establishes the ground for people to be understood. This means for Foucault, the body is the site or the local centre or power-knowledge. The final chapter of the book explains the Foucaultian understanding of the subject by considering Foucault's later writings where one can see the shift from power to the ways in which human beings become subjects. He talks about how the individuals can cultivate themselves through the 'arts of existence' which not only allow us to become self-determining agents, but also provide the grounds for us to challenge and resist power structures. He states that the subject is not a substance but a form.[36]

III

Foucault's masterly description of the bifurcation of reason—the bifurcation of reason at a given moment is something important in the postmodern context. Habermas appreciates Foucault for this. But Foucault argues that he is not speaking about *one* bifurcation of reason but more about an endless, multiple bifurcation—a kind of abundant ramification.[37] Reason according to Foucault is self-created which means that human beings develop forms or conceptions of rationality as part of their larger project of evolving an understanding of themselves given specific historical conditions. Foucault is interested in the historicity of reason and not in the theory of reason which Habermas is interested in.

Similarly, Foucault's transition from archaeology to genealogy and his notion of power is also important in the present political and historical contexts. But Habermas poses the following question: 'What, then, are the grounds that determine Foucault to shift the meaning of this specific will to knowledge and to truth that is constitutive for the modern form of knowledge in general, and for the human sciences in particular, by *generalizing* this will to knowing self-mastery into a will to power per se and to postulate that *all* discourses can be shown to have the character of hidden power and derive from practices of power?'[38] Habermas himself answers the question by arguing that if one takes the question of episteme, one never masters it. He says that this is precisely the reason for Foucault to go without the concept of episteme altogether. 'When he (Foucault) gives up the autonomy of the forms of knowledge in favour of their foundation within power technologies and *subordinates* the archaeology of knowledge to the genealogy, that explains the emergence of knowledge from the practices of power,'[39] says Habermas. But Habermas' criticism is that the concealed derivation of the concept of power from the concept of the will to knowledge in Foucault is systematically ambiguous. He says that the trace of the philosophy of subject is not completely absent in Foucault. 'Genealogical historiography is supposed to be ... the functionalist social science and at the same time historical research into constitutive social science.'[40] Habermas further says: 'Foucault did not think through the aporias of his own approach well enough to see how his theory of

power was overtaken by a fate similar to that of the human sciences rooted in the philosophy of the subject.'[41] Though Habermas supports Foucault's critiques of subjectivity and the institutions of modernity, Habermas at the same time argues that Foucault has no standpoint from which to criticize modern institutions and has no basis for ethics and politics. Similarly, if it is said that all attributes of truth and falsity are relative to discursive practices, it must be understood that Foucault's understanding will also be relative to a particular discursive practice.

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K.P. Jog and Shoun Hino: Sureśvara's Vārtika on Jyotis Brāhmaṇa—
'Advaita Tradition Series' Vol. II, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pri-
vate Limited, Delhi, First edition, 2001, Rs 950

This volume in the series called 'Advaita Tradition', edited, translated
and annotated jointly by K.P. Jog and Shoun Hino ranks eleventh in
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Brāhmana, Purusavidha Brāhmana, Saptānna Brāhmana, Śiśu and
Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmana, Ajātaśatru Brāhmana, Khilakānda with Half-
Verse Index and Yajñavalkya's dialogues with Ārtabhāga and others.

Sureśvara, an immediate disciple of Śankara, is the most revered
figure in the history of Advaita after Śankara. Well known as
Vārtikakāra, Sureśvara wrote two great Vārtikas one on Śankara's
bhāṣya on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and another on the *Taittiriya
Upanisad*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad* as its name suggests is
voluminous among the Upanisads. It is great not only in size but also
in contents and theme. This Upanisad belongs to the Śuklayajurveda
and is in two recensions, the Mādhyandina and the Kānva named after
the two Vedic Sakhas; but the difference between the two texts is very
little. The Kānva recension is in seventeen kāndas or books and the
Mādhyandina in fourteen. In writing his monumental commentary,
Śankara has adopted the Kānva recension.

Out of the one hundred chapters of the *Śuklayajurveda-Brāhmana*,
which for that reason is called *Śatapatha-Brāhmana*, this Upanisad
really consists of eight Adhyāyas or chapters. The first two chapters
have not been commented upon as they are not concerned with self-
knowledge. Each of the Adhyāyas is divided into forty-seven sections
called Brāhmaṇas further sub-divided into paragraphs of Kandikas.
Another division of the whole work is into three Kāndas—*Madhukānda*,
Yājnavalkyakāṇḍa or *Munikāṇḍa* and *Khilakāṇḍa* each containing two
chapters. This Upaniṣad is of great importance from the Advaitic stand-
point for it is here that we have the great saying (*mahāvākya*)—*Aham*

Brahmāsmi, which like *tat tvam asi* occurring in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, teaches the fundamental identity of the inner self with the Supreme Self. Śaṅkara's commentary on it is naturally extensive and its importance could well be known from what his pupil, Sureśvara, describes while explaining it as 'clarifying the teaching of the entire Veda.' The avowed objective of Śaṅkara in writing this commentary was to refute an old view, that according to the Upaniṣad, the ultimate Reality was a unity in difference. As a result of this the *bhedābheda* type of Vedānta disappeared from the philosophic scene of India. Before commencing his *bhāṣya* on this Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara has written a brief introduction. Sureśvara wrote Vārtikas on both *bhāṣya* as well as this introductory portion. The latter is designated *Sambandha-Vārtika* and the former is called *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya-Vārtika [BUBV]*. The *Sambandhavārtika* consists of 1,136 verses and it is an elaborate inquiry into the relation between ritualistic action and liberating wisdom. The *Vārtika* on the *bhāṣya* of the Upaniṣad is approximately ten times the size of the *Sambandhavārtika*, thus comprising about 11,150 verses. The *Vārtika* has several glosses, *Śāstraprakāśikā* by Ānandagiri (Ānanda-jñāna) *Nyāyakalpalatikā* by Ānandapūrṇa, *Nyāyatatvavivaraṇa* and *Araṇyavṛttisambandhokti*. The first two have been summarized by Vidyāraṇya in his *Vārttikasāra* which was later abridged by Maheśatīrtha in his *Laghusaṅgraha*. Sureśvara's Vārttikas on the two Upaniṣads has earned him a significant position in the tradition of Advaita. The *Vārtika* is not merely an interpretative work; it is almost in the nature of an independent work but following a line of thought already enunciated and widely accepted. Sureśvara was intimately acquainted with Śaṅkara's position and was in perfect resonance with it. A *Vārtika* is a metrical work that proposes to inquire into not only what has been explicitly said (*ukta*) but what has been left unsaid (*anukta*) and what has been inadequately or improperly said (*durukta*) in the original. Thus a *Vārtika* not only explains the original text but also supplements it by offering, wherever necessary, alternative interpretations not provided in the original. As the author of *Vārtika*, one can understand how Sureśvara has done the work of elucidation and amplification (*ukta* and *anukta*). But what is difficult to understand is Sureśvara's position of explaining what is improperly said by the author of the *bhāṣya*. Considering

Sureśvara's relation to Śaṅkara, as a devoted disciple, there would not have been anything that is improperly said. It is because it is from this divine master that Sureśvara has received instruction and has obtained the Gaṅgā of liberating knowledge. One convincing explanation which R. Balasubramanian offers in his Introduction (pp. 11–12) to the *Taittirīya Vārtika* is on the basis of Ānandagiri's explanatory note to the opening verse of the *Taittirīya Vārtika*. He states, 'Assuming that a certain explanation given by Śaṅkara has not been well stated to suit the spiritual aspirant who may be dull witted, Sureśvara it may be said, offers an alternative interpretation, which can be justified from the standpoint of a particular category of eligible persons.' In fact this view has even got the sanction of Sureśvara, as he himself points out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika* [1-4-402] which states:

> That mode of interpretation by which there would arise the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is valid in Advaita. And modes of interpretation differ considering the fact that the tastes of pupils differ.

As mentioned earlier, of the remaining six chapters of this Upaniṣad, leaving the first two which are not concerned with self-knowledge, the *Jyotir-Brāhmaṇa* forms the third section of the fourth chapter. It is a lengthy one, and Sureśvara's *Vārtika* on it has 1975 verses. The third chapter, as also the fourth, relates to Yājñavalkya and it is here that we have the dialogue of Yājñavalkya with the assemblage of Brāhmaṇas such as Aśvala, Ārtabhāga, Bhujyu, Uṣasta, Kahola, Gārgi, Uddālaka and Śākalya. Answering these Brāhmaṇas who attacked him with volleys of questions, Yājñavalkya proved himself to be the best knower of Brahman. The first section of the fourth chapter explains through a story instruction about Brahman with reference to the deities that preside over the vocal and other organs. In the second section Yājñavalkya describes the three states of the self. The third section which records the celebrated dialogue between King Janaka and Yājñavalkya discusses through reasoning the three states of the self described in the previous section. The book under review is Sureśvara's *Vārtika*, on the famous dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya. Herein Janaka raises the question as to what may be the transcendent light on the basis of which the individual soul acts. After suggesting the luminaries like the

Though with regard to the phrase *durukta* in the definition of *Vārtika* a convincing explanation is being given, still there are occasions when Sureśvara can be seen to hold differences with Śaṅkara's interpretations. Such differences are found mentioned in his *Vārtikas* on both the *bhāṣyas—Taittirīya* as well as *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. The differences although minor have been identified and referred to by Shoun Hino and K.P. Jog in their translation of this *Vārtika*. One such instance is mentioned in the present volume (Verses 12–14, pp. 4–5). In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.11 which states that Yājñavalkya goes to meet Janaka, Śaṅkara understands part of the passage to read '*sa mene na vadiṣya iti*' and interprets it as Yājñavalkya thinking 'I will not say anything to the king.' Sureśvara however, interprets the text in a different manner so as to read 'I will converse with him' (*sam enena vadiṣya iti*) and he also states that his interpretation is more satisfactory as there is no reason given why Yājñavalkya would not wish to speak with Janaka. Elsewhere Sureśvara differs from Śaṅkara by stating that sannyāsa or renunciation pertains to all three social classes, and not just to Brāhmaṇas alone, while Śaṅkara holds the view that it is meant only for the Brahmanas.

Apart from the discussion relating to the three states of the self Sureśvara, devotes attention to the criticism of the *dehātmavāda* of the Cārvākas (*BUBV,* 116–123 and 262–266) and the denial of inference as a *pramāṇa* by the Cārvakas in verses 144–149 and 156–159).

Another important feature of this text is Sureśvara's detailed discussions on the views of Buddhists; Vijñānavādins and Kṣaṇikavādins in particular. Thus his refutation of the views of Bāhyārthavādins are found in verses 461–472, those of the Vijñānavādins in 473–478 and 521–530, and those of the Kṣaṇikavādins in 477–478 and 586–618. The *apoha* theory of the Buddhists has attracted Sureśvara's attention in verses 768–791 and the views of Śūnyavādins in verses 792–807.

Further Sureśvara has devoted some space for discussing Bhartṛprapañca's view of *bhedābhedavāda* and its criticism. A careful study of the whole text reveals beyond any doubt that Sureśvara has displayed remarkable skill in presenting the views of the rival schools of Vedānta and also in their refutation. This is clear from his exposition of the *bhedābheda* theory, the nature of *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi*

as a means of comprehending it, nature of different *pramāṇas* etc. Without ignoring the readings of the Mādhyandina recension of the Upaniṣad, Sureśvara supports each of his explanations with relevant Upaniṣadic authority and in doing so he has analyzed the various semantic aspects of the basic text.

Incidentally we come across frequent instances of cross-quotation in Sureśvara's works. For instance the first pāda of verse 694 of the *Brahmavallī* section of *Taittirīyavārtika* and the first pāda of verse 474 in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika*, are similar but the context in which they occur are entirely different. While the former relates to validity of injunctive texts, the latter occurs in the context of Sureśvara's explanation of Vijñānavāda.

In the book under review the Sanskrit text is beautifully printed in Devanāgarī characters. The style of the original text being concise, its English rendering is also both lucid and precise. There are many notes under each verse and there are also explanations inserted now and then in the midst of the rendering. This will be of considerable use in the study of the work. In translating as well as in drawing up the notes, the authors have closely followed the authoritative commentaries of Ānandagiri and Ānandapūrṇa, so that no doubt can arise about the dependability of the explanations as well as variant readings adopted by them. Summarizing the ideas contained in one or more verses, sub-headings have also been provided. A select glossary of technical terms used in peculiar senses by Sureśvara along with references is appended at the end of the book. Sureśvara's *Vārtika* is oft-quoted by all the post-Śaṅkara writers. The half-verse index running to about a hundred pages provided at the end would make it easy to identify the text when it is being quoted in other texts.

The addition of a detailed table of contents describing the subject matter of the verses and a general index would greatly enhance the value of the book for purposes of reference. The work is a valuable contribution to the literature on Advaita, and it deserves to be carefully studied by all serious students of Advaita.

1, Appu II Lane, Flat No. 7, Ganga Vihar   S. REVATHY
Mylapore, Chennai 600 004

S.K. SAXENA: *Hindusthani Sangeet and a Philosopher of Art, Music, Rhythm and Kathak Dance vis-à-vis Aesthetics of Susanne K. Langer*, D.K. Printers, 2001, pp. x + 383.

The book under review can be divided into five sections: Preface, Acknowledgements, four chapters containing main thesis, Bibliography and Index.

In the Preface the author has frankly admitted that his study on Western Aesthetics starts only to get familiar with their analytic ways of looking at the problems concerning art for the better understanding of Hindustani music, rhythm and *Kathak* dance and to have a comparative estimate between two traditions on the Philosophy of Art in general and Hindustani music in particular. It is, I think, a very laudable attempt by the author to locate the differences and similarities between theories of art originated in two different cultural traditions. One may know the Indian theories of art or Western theories of art individually, but there is rarely an opportunity to have a comparative estimate between these. The author has satisfied our intellectual need in this respect.

In the initial portion of the book the author has thrown some light on the concept of art in general. He believes art to be the expression of conceived feeling. To Langer artistic expression is symbolic as symbol acts as a vehicle of *ideas*. This has been criticized by the author. It is said that in Hindustani music the note may indicate *but not express*, because the latter suggests a relation or projection. He has beautifully drawn a clear distinction between their indications and expressions. Such is the case with our classical dance, *nrtta*, that is 'a skilful creation of ever more various rhythmic patterns within and across the chosen cycle.' The author has also opposed the view of Langer in connection with art as a symbolic representation with some convincing arguments, is very praiseworthy and philosophically satisfactory.

Langer's view on the creation of art is also criticized very nicely with the help of some convincing arguments. To Professor Saxena, 'creation of art' does not mean 'making of things'. The materials used lose their original and independent character just as bodily power, light and gravity etc. are lost in a perfect dance. Langer argues that a work

of art is a mere appearance, but not as an appearance of any hidden reality. The author is of the opinion that mere appearance is not the monopoly of the region of art, but in natural phenomena like rainbows, mirages etc. we find these mere apparent things. We generally feel delighted in these appearances. Hence they sometimes create aesthetic delight in ones mind. Through the above metaphors the author has tried to convince us that the things, though apparent, must have some aesthetic value of their own.

Langer has made a distinction between art and language, which has been logically illumined by the author. He has devoted much time and energy to discussing organic form and rhythms. To him rhythms can remain in temporal sequence without damaging life. Accentuation is a principle of everyday talk and rhythm in the region of *Sangeeta*. It reminds me of Rabindranath who told in his *Śeṣer kavitā* that punctuations, though apparently seem to be hindrance of language, become ornamental to it.[1] Such is the case with the rhythm of music. To him no literal 'livingness' is there where a rhythmic pattern appears to be negotiating basic tempo *(laya)* mischievously. This point reminds me of some significant functions of it. *Tāla* or time-measurement is highly important in Indian music, because it 'regulates' the duration of the musical sounds. Here sounds, being regulated by the *tāla*, give rise to melody. If a *mātrā*, which is a unit of *tāla*, is not strictly adhered to, it cannot generate melody due to the absence of the said 'regulation'. Regarding *laya* it is said that it is the father of music and *śruti* (connect note—intervals) is the mother. The mother is generally entrusted with the nourishment of the child and she shows her affection by way of nourishing it without keeping any limit. Hence a child may be spoiled due to the 'excessive' love shown by her. The father has the responsibility of seeing to the all-round development of the child no doubt, but at the same time he will see that the child is not spoiled by the indulgence shown by the mother. Keeping this in view he lays down some rules or puts some restrictions on the child so that his progress can be assured. In order to check the indisciplined character of the child the father may adopt some methods of guiding and directing the activities of the child so that he can be made disciplined. The function of *laya* is just like that of a father. *Laya* makes the notes

disciplined so that they do not go beyond their limit, which is the precondition of the origination of melody. A wild forest given by nature can be converted to a well-decorated garden with the help of some planning and care given to it. The function of *tāla* and *laya* is exactly the same. It is known from our experiences that if one sound is repeated regularly with rhythm (*tāla*), it makes a man fall asleep. Sometimes the rhythmic sound of an engine or the rhythmic sound of the waves of the sea may create a soothing sensation.[2]

Langer accepts tension as one of the characteristic features of art. In Hindustani music there is no glimpse of tension. In the initial stage *ālāpa* of the *dhruvapada* manner is distinguished by the charm of tranquil passage. Langer is of the opinion that the essence of art is to express the life, which is felt. To her the expression of life in art is not literal, but indirect and analogous. She has introduced an important aesthetic concept—*transformation*, which is possible in Hindustani music also. In an exposition of *rāga sohni* the *tāra ṛṣabha* is projected gently and is held on for some time 'as a beam of a flower opens up gently to the rays of the sun'. The metaphor of a beam of flower opening up gently to the rays of the sun to get us acquainted with the phenomenon of transformation is really to be appreciated.

To Langer the import of a work of art is to be known by an act of logical intuition, which is not a method, but an event. It is a kind of insight giving rise to sudden emergence of meaning. Criticizing this view the author has pointed out the fact that there is a distinction between the attitude of singer and listener towards a particular music. For the singer's part a successful music is to some extent spontaneous while a connoisseur would appreciate the same by saying that the *rāga* moves us—*rāg chā gayā hāi*. It is not uncalled for if it is said that even if there is an insight or intuition, it is of two types—*kārayitrī* belonging to the former and *bhāvayitrī* belonging to the latter. Even an *ālāpa* is an embodiment of spiritual repose and mental tranquility. Langer seems to identify impression with producing sentiments in the spectator or listener or connoisseur (*sahṛdaya*). The author differs from her on this point also. To him the evocation of feeling cannot be the only way in which a work of art can impress us. In Hindustani music a connoisseur (*sahṛdaya*) is impressed by the structural symmetry of a *bandish*.

To Langer poetry creates 'a world of its own' in which we are to look at, but not to live in due to its illusoriness. In other words, poetry creates an illusion, which means the projection of something, which is not at all a part of given reality. Had it been a part of reality, it would not have been illusory.

The author has shown some points of departure from the basic view of Professor Langer that 'pain is a symbolic expression of the felt harmony of life completely lived'. First, expression alone cannot be the essence of art, but intuition is also inseparable from expression. Moreover, the intensity of absorption in the act generates *Rasa*—the aesthetic enjoyment. This absorption is due to some *tādātmya* or self-identification with the object. It reminds me of the view of Abhinavagupta who accepts the notion of identity out of self-involvement. Due to the self-identification with the feelings of the hero, a connoisseur loses his individuality and forgets his personal this-worldly matters. The real appreciator of an art-object is called *sahṛdaya*. The property of being a *sahṛdaya* lies in the fact of being identified with feeling of the poet or singer. The artist creates an art, the appreciator realizes it and being *sahṛdaya* he recreates the poetry or song in his own self (*yo'rtho hṛdayasaṁvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ*).[3] It is said earlier that one becomes identified with object (*tanmayībhavana*), which may otherwise be called 'objectified subject'. Again, when it is said that subject must extend itself to the object (*pramātṛbhāvavigalana*), it may be called 'subjectified object'. To Viśvanātha also the subject sees himself in the object being identified with it ('*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānaṁ pratipādyate*').[4]

The second chapter of the book is devoted to the theory of music with special reference to Langer and Hindustani music. To Langer art is a symbolic projection of the forms of human feeling and hence the art of music may be taken as a vehicle of such projection. Her concept of 'commanding form' in music has encouraged us to look at the concept of *rāga* in a new way. The author has criticized Langer's view that music is an occurrent art in the following way. The occurrent of music in its presentation goes on for the time being, but what is contemplated is not a complete object but a process or occurrence. In Hindustani music sometimes spontaneous changes are brought into

music explicitly and audibly without disturbing *rāga* and *tāla*. Hence though all music is occurrent in nature, Hindustani music can be described as having special occurrences. To Langer the movement is the essential and dominant appearance of music. But what will be the ultimate ground of the aesthetician's cognition? First, it is the personal experience of listening to music and secondly the language used by the musicians, critics and connoisseurs about art.

The etymological meaning of the term *rāga* follows from the root *rañj*, i.e., a *rāga* is that which colours or charms the mind. The same meaning is expressed elsewhere in a slightly different way, which is as follows. The sound, which attracts and makes an impression upon the mind of the living being, is known as *rāga* (*rañjako janacittānāṁ sa ca rāga udāhṛtaḥ*).[5] Apart from this the author has put forth three more definitions of *rāga*, which is followed by the description of the *rāgas* like *lalitā*, *rāmakeli* etc. Langer afterwards has shown how music is related to our life. The function of music is to organize our conception of feeling and it shows how our different emotions are interrelated. The melodic form called *purīyā* may create a feeling of the grief of separation of love called *viyogaśṛngāra*, but it cannot show a shift to the opposite feeling of the joy of reunion in love called *saṁyogaśṛngāra*. Hence music can be an excellent vehicle of different expression of emotions much better than ordinary language. In this chapter some basic problems like whether music is non-representational, whether the import of music is symbolic etc. have been discussed.

In the third chapter the author has spent much time on '*Imaging Time in Music*' with special reference to Langer and Hindustani music. Langer is of the opinion that 'rhythm is a symbolic projection of life as felt'. This view, the author believes, is always supportable, because the audience likes the exposition of rhythms by drummers as it is taken to be appealing by itself. We do not think that it is good as it is connected to our personal life. In music rhythm appears as 'regulation' of abidance at some chosen notes. The articulate form, regulated space and accentuation are taken as the main determinants of the creative work in our rhythm. *Laya* is not only the pace at which the musician moves from one note to another, but the length of time also. In the same way rhythm in Hindustani music determines the pace of singing

and helps in accuracy of *rāga* through *laya*. An account has been given of three types of rhythm—rhythm of orientation, rhythm of abandon and rhythm of simultaneity.

Langer has also pointed out some negative and positive sides of rhythm. Normally the essential character of rhythm is the repetition of any distinct and recognizable event at equal intervals of time. But to her all rhythms are not repetitive or periodic. In the performance of modern dance a movement is hardly repeated, but every motion of dance must be rhythmic. So far as the positive side of rhythm is concerned, it is related to function rather than time. To her a rhythmic pattern arises whenever the completion of one distinct event appears at the beginning of another. It is nothing but the preparation of a new event by the ending of a previous one.

Considering all these the author has proposed to offer a new definition of rhythm, which is very precise and worth pondering. A rhythm must be associated with factors like regular recurrence, contrast and balance etc. In the portion 'Is time in music unique?' Langer shows that inward tensions and outward change ... daylight, routines etc. furnish various incoherent temporal data, which is really unique in character. The concluding chapter deals with magic in movement as reflected in Langer's view on dance, specially *Kathak*, in India. Langer also deals with the concept of dance and its relation to music. Dance cannot be quite independent of the rhythmic aspect. To Langer gesture is the basic abstraction of dance, which is expressive of some *rasa* (aesthetic enjoyment). Gesture is not the same thing as *mudrā*, which has got some meaning and hence it is called symbol, which does not express the dancer's own personality. In criticizing Langer the author has shown his departure. To him gesture cannot be regarded as the basic abstraction of dance. Generally the gesture is not found at all regarding footwork. Regarding 'movement' in *kathak* dance the author has defended Langer. Though dance is dissimilar to what we see and hear in the real world, we do not find anything odd about it. A performance of dance can surely thrill us if it is really an art. If it had been odd to us, it would have generated a disinterested and impersonal feeling.

The author has taken Langer as his *Pūrvapakṣa* in the field of music and dance. Hence he has partially rejected, partially modified and

sometimes substantiated his view, which is a precondition of a philosophical thesis. Apart from this he has made comparative remarks on the music and dance as found in the West and in Hindustani music and *kathak* dance, which is not at all an easy task. To do justice to the topic discussed it is essential to have a thorough knowledge of the practical and theoretical sides of music and dance, which, I believe, the author possesses. Hence it is a pioneering work in the field of music and dance. The author has shown his excellence in explaining the technical terms in music and dance like *ṭhekā*, *tatkār*, *ṭhumri*, *tritāla*, *tarāṇā*, *patākā*, etc. On account of this it has been possible for an ordinary reader also to understand the philosophy of music and dance.

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Department of Philosophy,   RAGHUNATH GHOSH
University of North Bengal,
Dt. Darjeeling 734 430, West Bengal

T.S. RUKMANI: *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa of Śaṅkara*. First Volume—*Samādhipādaḥ and Sādhanapādaḥ*. Second Volume—*Vibhūtipādaḥ and Kaivalyapādaḥ*. Edited with English Translation, Critical Notes along with English Translation of Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* and *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, Rs 1400 (set of two volumes).

All systems of Indian Philosophy, barring the Cārvāka, are oriented towards *mokṣa* or liberation from the trammels of transmigratory

existence. Detachment from objects of enjoyment here and in a hereafter (*vairāgya*) and self-knowledge (*jñāna*) are the important constituents of the course of discipline taught in common in all the systems of philosophy, vedic as well as non-vedic, for attaining the goal of *mokṣa*. The Sāṅkhya school considers that the intuitive knowledge of the distinction between the Puruṣa and prakṛti is the means to liberation. But it is silent in regard to the method of acquiring the intuitive knowledge. The disciplinary means of attaining the latter have been elaborately dealt with in the Yoga system.

The promulgator of the Yoga system is reputed to be Hiraṇyagarbha. In the *Bṛhad-Yogayājñavalkya-smṛti* (12.5) it is stated that none other than Hiraṇyagarbha of ancient days is the propounder of Yoga. Patañjali is only the redactor of this system. In other words, he is only an exponent and not an explorer. This is known from the expression '*anuśāsanam*' in the aphorism, '*atha yogānuśāsanam*'. This means '*śiṣṭasya śāsanam anuśāsanam*', i.e. exposition in the sense of elucidating something previously expounded.

The *Yoga-sūtra* consists of four chapters dealing respectively with the nature of *samādhi*, the means of acquiring it, the supra-normal powers resulting through it, and the nature of the ultimate goal of life, i.e. *mokṣa* or *kaivalya*.

Many commentaries have been written on the *Yoga-sūtra*. The earliest and also the most valuable is the *bhāṣya* of Vyāsa. This served as the basis for all the subsequent commentaries on the *Yoga-sūtra*. The commentary known as *Vivaraṇa* on the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* is attributed to Śaṅkara. Dr Rukmani in this work under review has brought together the *Yoga-sūtra*, the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* and the *Vivaraṇa* with English translation and critical notes. This makes the work remarkably self-contained.

Dr Rukmani in her Introduction to the work raises the issue of Śaṅkara's authorship of the commentary, *Vivaraṇa*. Her predecessors in the study and edition of the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* with *Vivaraṇa* attributed to Śaṅkara, Professor Rama Sastri and Krishnamurti Sastri seem not to be bothered about the attribution to Ādi Śaṅkara of this *Vivaraṇa*. In their Madras Government Oriental Series Edition, they seem to proceed on the assumption that Ādi Śaṅkara was the author of the

Vivaraṇa. Western scholars in general, and Trevor Leggett in particular make the same assumption. Dr Rukmani examines this issue with a scholarly interest and she brings to bear on her examination her wide-ranging knowledge of Sanskrit literature, sacred and secular. She has proved that Ādi Śaṅkara is not the author of the *Vivaraṇa*. In this connection, she draws pointed attention to the reference to Vācaspati Miśra in the *Vivaraṇa*. Miśra was decidedly later than Ādi Śaṅkara and has written a classical commentary on his *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*. The *bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra* (4.30) makes reference to the state of *jīvanmukti*. The *Vivaraṇa* does not deal with this in detail. Dr Rukmani argues that Śaṅkara has elaborately dealt with the concept of *jīvanmukti* in his *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*. If he were the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, he would have definitely dealt with this in great detail. This shows that he is not the author of the *Vivaraṇa*.

The translation into English of the *sūtras*, the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, and the *Vivaraṇa* has been done with great care and much understanding. Translation is a tricky art and one is apt to be tripped up easily. Sanskrit and English belong to the Indo-Germanic family of languages. But Sanskrit remains in its original state and has not undergone the processes of expansion, growth, and change that English has undergone. One has thus an exceedingly difficult task in attempting at translating ancient Sanskrit into modern English. Dr Rukmani has gallantly tackled her task as translator. The copious footnotes added at the appropriate places explain many points that are likely to be unfamiliar to the reader, and they enhance the value of the work. They also bear witness to the detailed knowledge she possesses of the Yoga school. Her acquaintance with the subject is remarkable and her intimate knowledge of it makes the translation one of unexceptionable accuracy. She has already published the translation of the *Yoga-Vārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu in four volumes. The world of scholars has deepest esteem for Dr Rukmani, and the present work adds admiration to esteem. We salute Dr Rukmani for bringing out a work of such outstanding critical scholarship as the book under review and look forward to more such scholarly works from her.

A very mild criticism. The arrangement of the various texts on each page should be changed. Subheadings like 'P' for Patañjali, 'Vy' for

Vyāsa-bhāṣya, and 'V' for *Vivaraṇa* would help the reader to identify the various texts more easily than by looking at the size of type used for the different items.

No. 19, First Cross Street   N. VEEZHINATHAN
CIT Colony, Mylapore
Chennai 600 004

RAJNISH KUMAR MISHRA: *Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literary Analysis*, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd. (year not mentioned), pp. xx+292, which includes Glossory of Conceptual Sanskrit Terms (58 pages), Bibliography and Index

The book under review contains a Preface by the author, an introduction by Professor Kapil Kapoor, organizer of the Shastra Group at Jawaharlal Nehru University and four chapters on 'Philosophy of Language and Competing Indian Theories of Meaning', 'Reality, Cognition and Expression in Buddhist Thought', 'Buddhist Theory of Meaning (Apohavāda)', 'Meaning and Literary Analysis: An Example Study of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey"', followed by a concluding chapter.

The work professes to offer a first in-depth exposition of Buddhist theory of meaning (*apoha*) against the vast backdrop of Indian linguistic thought and shows how this time-honoured theory is positioned vis-à-vis the current issues and assumptions in language. It surveys the evolution of *apoha* theory especially in the context of four main philosophical schools, viz. Ābhidharmika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. On the above basis, the author significantly sets out a cognitive, epistemological model for literary analysis and illustrates the applicational aspects of this model with analysis of Wordsworth's poetic masterpiece 'Tintern Abbey'. He has selected this poem as it is highly valued for its rich contents and its loftiness of feelings and ideas, etc. I have not been much impressed by the selection of Wordsworth's masterpiece for explaining *apoha*, but the authors always have their choice. He is emphatic that Buddhist theory of meaning (*apoha*) has a distinct place in the literary world and it transcends

the barriers of time and space with its own strength. He refers to the chapter on *apoha* as the 'soul' of his work (Conclusion, p. 208).

Mishra's claim that his small work is almost the first of its kind (Preface, p. viii) may be questioned by some scholars as a number of articles and monographs are written on and related to this important theory. It may be pointed out that Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma Kośa bhāsya* (VI. 4, p. 334, Pradhan's edition) also mentions it. But the theory was in seminal form. However, the great followers of Vasubandhu and Nāgarjuna, viz. Acharya Dignāga and Dharmakīrti expanded and further developed it. But it cannot be denied that the seeds of the theory were found in Buddha's early discussions also, although the Master may not have directly talked about it. And the theory was in tune with the Buddhist doctrine of non-substantiality of reality including that of language. There is a lot of material on *Śabda*, *artha* and *dharma* (the last divided into *dravya* and *adravya*) in the texts and long controversies about them in which different sects present their own views but there is no challenge to the basics of Buddhist thought which subscribes to impermanent and non-substantial nature of phenomena.

Now a few suggestions: It would have been better if along with 'abbreviations', bibliographical information of works quoted was also given on the same page for easy accessibility for reference material. Also, the glossary of Sanskrit terms should have been arranged in Sanskrit alphabetical order insteed of Roman one.

On the whole, R.K. Mishra's work is based on important literary source materials and is valuable for reinterpretation of the Buddhist theory of meaning. It has a good bibliography of ancient as well as modern works related to the main topics discussed in the present work.

Sugata Kutir   N.H. SAMTANI
Plot 5, Jhulelal Colony, Mahmoor Gunj
Varanasi 221 010

SAGARMAL JAIN (Ed.): *Saman Suttam*, Bhagwan Mahavir Memorial Samiti, 1999, pp. 289, Rs 100

Saman Suttam is a book the publication and preparation of which brought '*the best of satisfaction*' to Ācārya Vinoba Bhave and whose acceptability '*to the entire Jaina community*' was certified by Muni Śrī Vidyānandajī, Muni Śrī Sushil Kumarji, Muni Śrī Janakavijayajī and Muni Śrī Nathmalji (now Ācārya Mahāprajñaji) alongwith Shri Jinendra Varniji and Shri Vinobaji.

It is an orderly and brief compilation of the essential principles of the Jainas' religion and philosophy. There are four parts and forty-four sections containing 756 verses in all. As Jaina philosophy, like many other philosophies of India, deals with religion also, the first part deals with religion under the heading '*Source of Illumination*'. This covers the ethical system of the Jainas, though a part of it is carried over to the second part also—*Path of Liberation*. The third and fourth parts deal with *metaphysics* and *theory of relativity*. It has, thus, become an ideal textbook for beginners. It is authentic also because it follows the dictum of Mallinātha: नामूलं लिख्यते किञ्चित् ।

It was really a difficult task to compile a work on Jaina religion and philosophy which could be acceptable to all the sub-sects of the Jainas. Śrī Jinendra Varni, who incidentally happens to be the first teacher of Jainism of the author of these lines, could perform this task because of his deep-rooted detachment from any sectarian outlook. It was perhaps to give this work a non-sectarian form that references to Gāthās, which were given in the earlier version published under the title Jinadhamma, have been omitted in this later version, 'Samana Suttam', so that the quotations from Digambara-Śvetāmbara sources could intermingle by nīra-kṣīranyāya and not by tila-tandula-nyāya.

Prakrita was considered to be simpler than Sanskrit, when it was a living language, though it is not so for the modern readers. In the Hindi version of Samana Suttam, the Sanskrit version of Prakrit Gāthās was also given. In the present English version, the Sanskrit version has been replaced by the Roman transliteration of Prakrit itself. Retaining the Sanskrit chāyā could have been helpful in making the work more intelligible to a larger number of readers amongst Indologists. This

could have been done even if it meant a little increase in the volume of the work.

The translators of the work should be congratulated for using as simple English as possible. This is in keeping with the old tradition of Jaina Ācāryas as against the pedantic tendency of some of the Ācāryas of the middle ages.

Some minor defects, like spelling the title of the book as 'Saman Suttam' in place of 'Samaṇa Suttaṃ', could be rectified in the next edition.

I do not not know why this work has still not found its rightful place in the syllabi of various institutions and universities. I have used it as a textbook of Jainism for beginners and found that it works very well, specially because of its freedom from difficult technical terms which were framed during the middle ages when Ācāryas tried to condify Jaina philosophy in an organized system of logical coherence.

Professor, Department of Jainology   DAYANAND BHARGAVA
Jain Viswa Bharati
Ladnun (Rajasthan) 341 306

G.C. NAYAK: *Mādhyamika Śūnyatā: A Reappraisal of Mādhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research: New Delhi, 2001, pp. xi + 93.

In this intensely argued discussion Professor Nayak, who has a long and admirable career in teaching, writing and administrative service in India, sets the record straight concerning the proper assessment of Nāgārjuna's position, a position that has been mischaracterized by some (Harsh Narain) as nihilist and by others (Th. Stcherbatsky; T.R.V. Murti) as absolutist. *Śūnyatā*, Nāgārjuna's chosen term characterizing the actual nature of things, is not emptiness or voidness, nor is it the Absolute. It is useful to have collected in one place the reasons for once and for all rejecting these two misunderstandings on the part of past (or in the case of Narain, near-present) writers, although I hardly

think the establishment of the correct interpretation of the term is by now news to students of Buddhist thought as it once was. Nayak is certainly correct in reminding us that Nāgārjuna meant by the term *śūnyatā* the essencelessness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of things and neither their nonexistence nor any mystical, superior status. By 'essencelessness' what is being rejected is the notion that anything is independent of causes and conditions, that there are any permanent entities.

But Nayak is not content merely with setting the record straight on the score. He has other opponents in mind whose opinions on related matters he finds inadequate. Ninian Smart is taken to task for suggesting 'How can one really have loving benevolence for empty beings?', introducing a topic which leads Nayak to an extended assessment of how Mādhyamika is no less insistent than Advaita Vedānta on the implications for morality and altruism being exemplified in the liberated person, whether *bodhisattva* or *jīvanmukta*. He finds fault with Ganeshwar Mishra for seeming to undervalue the morality of Advaita (and by implication of Madhyamaka as well) when Mishra suggests that the ignorance (*avidyā*) which blocks one from liberation is 'a mere linguistic error or confusion', that Śaṃkara's philosophy is merely linguistic analysis.

I find myself convinced by Nayak certainly as regards the main argument and also with most of the reasons he gives for his conclusions. Perhaps the most telling parallels he draws are with the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein: as he quotes Wittgenstein, 'Philosophy leaves everything as it is', which Nayak adduces to help justify his contention that the enlightenment gained by the liberated person 'has no conflict with our normal awareness', that 'the only difference between the enlightened person who is free and the unenlightened one who is in bondage is that the former remains undisturbed and patient through all his afflictions caused by *prārabdha* whereas the latter is impatient and suffers on account of this.' The conclusion drawn is that the liberated Madhyamaka or Advaitin is perfectly capable of, and indeed ideally situated for, the loving benevolence towards others that Smart finds lacking in an 'empty being'. Nayak's point seems well taken in the context of Madhyamaka and Advaita: does it extend as well to all the other *darśanas* that comprise the panoply of Indian

viewpoints on liberation? Mahāyānists and Advaitins claim not, but if Nayak's explanation is correct his conclusion can, I think, be generalized to cover all the classical systems.

Department of Philosophy   KARL H. POTTER
University of Washington
Seattle, W.A. 98195, USA

YOHANAN GRINSHPON: *Silence Unheard: Deathly Otherness in Pātañjala-Yoga*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2002, pp. 156

At a time when yoga has become a worldwide industry and when the term 'yoga' can be found in every dictionary and encyclopaedia in almost every language (after 'Yiddish', perhaps, and before 'Yugoslavia') numerous books dealing with yoga are published every year. Most of them are connected to the 'Yoga industry', i.e. to yoga as practice or 'opium of the masses'. Very few are dedicated to yoga-philosophy and even less actually say something that we have not heard before about a subject of which almost everything has already been said. Such is Yohanan Grinshpon's 'Silence Unheard'.

In his book, Grinshpon tells us a 'story' or creates a 'myth' regarding the Yoga-Sūtra. He depicts Patañjali, the 'author' of the text, as a Sāṅkhya philosopher fascinated by the figure of the 'Silent Yogi', deeply absorbed in meditation, making him the live embodiment of the Sāṅkhyan 'kaivalya'. According to Grinshpon, listening to the Yoga-Sūtra one can (and should) hear two voices: the voice of the meditating yogi ('silence unheard') and the (louder) voice of the philosopher, imposing his Sāṅkhyan philosophy on the mysterious figure of the yogi who has totally renounced the world. The voice of the yogi is barely heard, yet—claims Grinshpon—it echoes from within the lines, especially the lines of Patañjali's third chapter: the Vibhūti-Pāda. 'Silence Unheard' is about the 'Silent Yogi's' voice, which has been underestimated and even suppressed—says Grinshpon—by all the bhāṣyakāras of the Yoga-Sūtra, from Vyāsa onwards. This voice has not been discussed—he further claims—as it reflects 'another world', 'foreign', unfamiliar, which threatens the foundations of the familiar,

'secure' world that we have worked so hard to create. Meaning that above and beyond his discussion of the Yoga-Sūtra and its 'hidden voice', Grinshpon raises the question of our relationship with the 'other'. Common ways of relating to an 'other' would be to ignore, suppress or pretend that it did not exist, or—on the other hand—'familiarize' it, assimilate it into the framework of 'tradition' thereby take its edge off, mute its (silent) voice completely. Both ways, claims Grinshpon, have been used with regard to the third chapter of the Yoga-Sūtra, by both classical and modern commentators. Some have not said a thing when it came to the siddhis (and Grinshpon shows who, where and regarding which sūtra); others have chosen to explain the Vibhūti-Pāda away, relating to the siddhis as mere by-products (marginal, almost infantile) and perhaps even a hindrance on the way to spiritual liberation. Grinshpon asserts that it is only the 'other', being unfamiliar, which might 'tell us' something new about ourselves, about the so-called 'familiar world'. He therefore suggests postponing judgement with regard to the 'other', not being in such a hurry to 'familiarize' it; but rather, to try and listen to it, try to hear the silence.

Let's come back to the story of Patañjali the philosopher, watching the 'silent yogi', also referred by Grinshpon as the 'dying yogi'.[1] Contemporary yogācāryas and quite a few scholars[2] will reject Grinshpon's story and claim that Patañjali could not have been but a yoga practitioner. Yet, Grinshpon himself is aware of the fact that he is doing nothing but telling a story, which will enable him to 'dig' the Yoga-Sūtra thoroughly (philosophically and philologically) and find out whether the 'archeologists' before him have not forgotten anything essential. The assumption behind Grinshpon's story is that since we do not have any biographical or historical information about Patañjali (or 'Patañjali'); and since his sūtras are often enigmatic and raise questions regarding human experiences (i.e. the siddhis), completely ignored by commentators, past and present—his story of the 'silent yogi' cannot be regarded as less 'logical' than any other 'story'. And for Grinshpon, every interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra is necessarily based on one 'story' or the other. His story is not less 'logical' then, and far more interesting, as it takes into account the Vibhūti-Pāda, until now neglected by commentators and scholars alike. It also enables Grinshpon

to deviate from the 'usual' (Advaitic rather than Sāṅkhyan) message of the Yoga-Sūtra, regarding yoga as integration, harmony, 'the union of the individual soul with the absolute one'.[3] Grinshpon indeed strongly claims against such a pastoral picture of the yoga, asserting that for Patañjali, the very basic human condition ('life') is nothing but a chronic disease and that the only 'remedy' for such a disease would be total disintegration, i.e. 'death'. Yoga then, not as a means for improving one's life (and definitely not one's lifestyle), but quite the opposite: yoga as 'life-negating' attitude. One has to remember though that Grinshpon refers only to the Yoga-Sūtra tradition, and does not discuss the Yoga tradition in general. He phrases 'a plea for holistic presentation of the Yoga-Sūtra',[4] but refrains from depicting 'a holistic picture' of Yoga as such, which should include not only the Yoga-Sūtra, but also the Bhagavad-gītā, yoga in the Buddhist and perhaps the Jain traditions, the Haṭha-yogā literature etc. The only one I can think of who has taken such a philosophical challenge upon his shoulders is Mircea Eliade in his 'Yoga: Immortality and Freedom'.

Grinshpon concludes his book with 'An exercise in rereading and rewriting', or in other words with his very own translation of the Yoga-Sūtra. He presents every sūtra in the original Sanskrit, gives a 'raw' or literal translation and later on a 'polished', 'edited' one.

Take for example Yoga-Sūtra 1.15:

dṛṣṭānuśrāvika-viṣaya-vitṛṣṇasya vaśī-kāra-saṃjñā vairāgyam

Grinshpon translates it literally as follows:

Detachment is awareness of mastery of one free of attachment to things heard about and seen.

He then 'polishes' the translation into:

Observing dissociation from objects, the yogin feels powerful and free;

and later gives it a 'final polish':

Detachment is independence and freedom.

By revealing the 'process of translation', Grinshpon shows us that every translation cannot be but an interpretation, an attempt to 'familiarize'

the 'other'. He further shows how difficult it is to see through a translation (as difficult as hearing the silence of his 'dying yogi' through the 'verbalization' of Patañjali and his commentators). This is true not only regarding the Yoga-Sūtra or ancient Indian texts but regarding ancient texts in general. We have all known it, it is nothing new. And yet again, as Yudhiṣthira has told the Yakṣa, 'Everyday people die, but those left behind (alive) continue to think that their day will never come.' There is something about 'polished' translations which makes us forget, and Yohanan Grinshpon's book is a good reminder.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The image of death cannot be divorced from the Indian notion of renunciation. Take for example the term 'uparata', which is often used to characterize the ascetic: 'uparati' means 'silence' and at the same time 'cessation' or 'death'. Or take into consideration the 'passage-rite' into saṃnyāsa. Here, the sādhu-to-be actually performs his death-ritual. From now on he is released from every ritual activity, his marriage comes to its end and his property is divided between his successors or creditors. From now onwards he is 'dead' as far as 'the world' is concerned.
2. Take for example G. Feurstein, who claims that Patañjali 'was clearly an adept of yoga with a penchant for philosophy' (*Encyclopedic Dictionary of Yoga*, London: Unwin, 1990, p. 258).
3. Pandit Ushrbudh Arya, *Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali with the Exposition of Vyāsa*, Pennsylvania: The Himalayan International Institute of Yoga Science and Philosophy of the USA, 1986, p. xii.
4. Grinshpon, Y., *Silence Unheard*, pp. 37–51.

Department of Philosophy   DANI RAVEH
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv 69978, Israel

ASHA MUKHERJEE, SABJUKALI SEN (MITRA) AND K. BAGCHI (Eds.): *Civil Society and Indian Cultures, Indian Philosophical Studies-IV*, Washington DC: The Council of Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001

There is a major difficulty in discussing civil society in India, not because civil society exists or does not exist in the country, but

because of the assertion that civil society already existed prior to its emergence in the West. I am referring to 'civil society' as the term stands naming a particular form of social organization that emerged under a certain socio-historical milieu. Many scholars in the developing countries, largely in India, tend to propound the latter thesis. The problem is not with civil society but with the issue of appropriating the claim of *origin*. Often argued in a similar line amongst the philosophy community in the country is that existentialism as a school of thought already existed in India prior to its emergence in the west. The apparent reference is to Buddhism. (It is to be seen if concepts are discovered or invented.) The book, sensibly, does not carry any such statement by any of the contributors. Of course, there are references to ancient social organizations in India having a closer form of collective organizational structure to civil society as understood today. That sounds perfectly sensible. With no such tall and controversial claims mentioned above, the book deals with all precision with both the theoretical and practical issues relating to the form and content of civil society.

The book is a collection of articles on civil society with Indian experience except for the one by K. Bagchi. It ranges from ancient forms of social movements like Buddhism, Jainism and Tantrism, to the contemporary experiences as conceived by visionaries like Tagore and Gandhi. The articles in the section on 'Civil Society and Modern Indian Political Life' evoke serious thoughts. The section discusses in detail various socio-political issues faced by contemporary India. Though the 'Introduction' mentions supposed depiction of Bengali experience as the highlights of contemporary civil society in India, the included chapter on Gandhian perspective paints a larger picture of civil society experience which is not only theoretically sound but enjoys practically a larger success story. In addition to varieties of depiction of Indian experience most of the authors have initially tried to deal with theoretical issues related to the conception of civil society and its possible experiences. K. Bagchi's article deals exclusively with this problem.

What has been understood by most of the authors about the conception of civil society, adhering to the original conception as the term emerged, is the humanist, individual enterprise of the civil society programme. Its Indian version is traced in Tagore's and Gandhi's

visions of ideal society and peoples' collective participation in social organizations and movements. It has also been argued by some of the authors that these visions as enacted in contemporary India, during the height of colonial rule, have been interestingly derived from the classical Indian theories and social movements. Though it has not been mentioned in detail, one may see the spirit of revivalism playing the role of *élan vital* to bring out the conceptions of *sarvodaya*, *satyagraha*, *hind swaraj* (Gandhian), and *visva bharati* (Tagore) in the modern Indian social life. Both Gandhi and Tagore have been shown as propounding humanist philosophies in their respective social constructs highlighting the importance of both the individual and the collective, as well as significance of classical Indian worldviews. One may see the importance of the Indian conception of *vasudheiva kutumbakam*, *sarva dharma sambhava*, and *ahimsa* as the cornerstone of Indian sociocultural lives.

Regarding the above-mentioned historicity of influence, reference may be made to S.K. Pathak's presentation on ancient India's socioreligious practices highlighting the underlying philosophical contents of the Vedic and post-Vedic systems. Contemporary focus of the civil society on individual tolerance and social flexibility can draw their basis from the four systems of worldview/movement the country has had, viz. Vedas, Buddhism, Jainism and Tantra. Historical emergence of *gana* as a form of social system has been brought in, referring to the mode of social integration through clustering peoples with different professions and livelihoods during the early Vedic time. The argument aims at highlighting the idea of tolerance and co-existence as has been experienced by the people of this land. Relevance of the idea becomes all the more pertinent in our time which is more or less marked by social conflict and tension, not for India alone but for the entire world. Several other concepts like that of Jaina *anekantavada* and Buddhist *pudala* go to promote the idea of accommodating contesting viewpoints and civic awareness inspite of strong social stratification. More concrete social practices highlighting this worldview have been shown in the Buddhist social model that allows participation of different autonomous clans (*gotra*), and the Tantric assimilative fold which encompasses and preserves different small social identities and

practices under its banner. Though the author accepts existence of internal conflicts within those social systems, it is indeed intriguing to see a mainland India culturally existing as one unit with all its pluralities and differences. One is reminded of the most appropriate definition of India as 'unity in diversity'. All said well, it at times seems that too much good has been said about too many things. Perhaps the author could also highlight the concepts of 'untouchability' and 'caste-hierarchy' which counters the ideals of civil society.

Coming to twentieth century India, reference to civil society experience is best projected by Tagore's and Gandhi's worldviews and their corresponding experiments. George Pattery highlights the formulations of Gandhi as an alternative to the already-existing narratives that explain Indian social system. Pattery exposes the stereotyping in the construction of two 'master narratives' that dominate the present sociological thinking in the country: one, Dumont's caste hierarchy and its totality, followed by another colonial narrative of inherent conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims with the British playing the role of a neutral mediator. The influence of these two narratives among the academic circles, in some ways, is so strong that today it is almost impossible for social and political thinkers to talk of the Indian social system without referring to caste and religious conflicts. Gandhi's conception of *swaraj* and *sarvodaya* has been seen as the alternative, where freedom of the individual is related to collective welfare. Individual freedom has been seen best exercised towards showing concerns for the other so much so that social relationship instead of being controlled by market forces is determined by social affection. The paper further highlights the element of 'suffering' in *satyagraha* in realizing the above goal as the unique formulation which can serve as a role model towards conflict resolution. Gandhi's model is shown as an answer for the entire globe. However, the only difficulty in the paper is that the author refuses to look or speak of the social evils. Perhaps the Gandhi-Ambedkar debate could throw light on the issue of 'master narratives'. Not to argue further, that may not be very appropriate in the present discussion on civil society.

Though Asha Mukherjee's article adheres to the same thesis, the methodology employed is different. Gandhi's critique of modernity has been highlighted with special reference to *Hind Swaraj*. Argument on

critiquing modernity begins with critiquing individualism. It seems that the author has presupposed individualism as the cornerstone of modernity, so much so that the concept of 'one man, one vote' has been brought out as a practice to be critiqued. The alternative apparently is suggested of 'republican tradition of group society'. This is an argument which will offend many. Perhaps a distinction needs to be made between individualism as a philosophical category from individualism as an economic programme. The two, though related, are neither identical nor synonymous.

Sibnarayan Ray and Shyamal Sarkar portray the picture of civil society painted by Tagore as one of the unique experiments. Tagore's conception of civil society is seen as one of the most ideal forms of civil societies formulated and conceived in Indian soil. Tagore himself had written about civil society and its relevance in the Indian context. His emphasis on people-oriented social formations going into the roots of village life shows his concern for a deep-rooted civil society experience and a people-centric social set up. The authors have highlighted Tagore's emphasis on village life as the life force of Indian social structure, that real India lies in the village. This is where Tagore and Gandhi meet though their commitments towards life and world were distinctly different. While one emphasized so much on universal brotherhood even critiquing nationalism, the other was the torchbearer of the Indian freedom movement. Gandhi's being named 'father of the nation' highlights the difference. Yet emphasis of both on the importance of village life shows their genuine concerns for the upliftment of the majority rather than of a select few. It is unfortunate that post-independent India moved ahead with its development policies contrary to the one envisaged by the two visionaries.

As if there is a pre-determined fate for every idealist, Tagore had a gloomy, dark, pensive end. Sibnarayan Ray goes into the conflict that Tagore faced between his two creations: Santiniketan and Sriniketan. Tagore created the two institutional models to concretize the vision that he had—unity of all cultures and worldviews, and emphasis on development of rural life. Interaction of the two creations was envisaged with a motive to blend rural simplicity with high intellect, and finally blending of all cultures to evolve a universal culture. Unfortunately Tagore saw before his death, as much as he saw the establishment

of these institutions, the decay of the same. Perhaps the ideals he visualized were too high for others to conceptualize, not to talk of realization. The author saw the reasons behind inability to blend Santiniketan and Sriniketan in the brahmanic cult of the former. Tagore's vision of *Visva Bharati* as a civil society experience remained a dream partially realized.

However, stark concrete issues of social conflict have been brought out by Anupam Gupta and Sanjeeb Mukherjee. Gupta, while tracing predominance of the state over the society in India, brings out the irony of non-fulfilment of public needs in the areas of food, health and sanitation. Post-independent India saw emergence of a strong state and its subsidiary support, the political parties. In the process society could not evolve, as in the west, the process of civil society movement. On the other hand, the state, which became all powerful with the control of public finance bearing responsibility of fulfilling social needs, fails to come up to the expectation. The author sees an inherent contradiction in the structure itself that the very nature of state cannot fulfil the requirement of social needs. He feels that need of the social wants can be understood by the integrated social groups (civil societies) only. This formulation however invites serious debate. It is apparent as one goes through the next article by Sanjeeb Mukherjee. Mukherjee, tracing the history of liberal tradition, comes out, and rightly so, with the individual-centric nature of civil society. That civil society presupposes the pursuit of self-interest by a free and atomic rational self either individually or through mutual agreement. In the process undue importance has been given to the idea of individual freedom undermining the state and the society. This of course will remain an all time debate between the liberalists and their counterparts.

While most of the authors adhere to the original conception of civil society as aiming at humanist, individual and universalistic philosophy, K. Bagchi has presented a contrary view with an interesting note. He argues that the very concept of civil society as a rational human effort logically denies any space of freedom. Bagchi's main line of argument is that conception and explanation of civil society should not be seen under one fixed paradigm. He does not use the term 'paradigm' extensively perhaps to avoid any controversy currently debated among

the Indian academia regarding borrowed concepts from the west with the same paradigm that explains different social phenomena uniformly. Though Bagchi does not argue in this line, his plea for 'open-ended, contextual, historical and specific reason' aims at alternative formulation of civil society experience, of an alternative paradigm. The argument is initiated with an attack on the monolithic conception of reason, where reason is seen only in terms of abstract operation, not giving cognisance to concrete contexts, in which alone realization of liberty of individuals and groups is possible. This is an inherent contradiction Bagchi has brought out. The root to this contradiction is traced in the philosophical tradition in the west—in the rationalist philosophies of Leibniz and others, the imprint of which remains even in Locke and Mill. Bagchi criticizes the very propounder of civil society itself for falling into this contradiction. He sees Locke's twin doctrines of 'like reason' and 'community of nature' in Law of Nature as forced creation where uniformity is over-proportionately highlighted against the voice of dissent, ignoring any possibility of dissenter not sharing the *regimented* reason. This paper calls for further reflection by the contemporary scholars of social justice.

Overall, the book gives a picture of civil society experiments (not necessarily experience) in the country, the concept as it is derived from the west and blended with traditional Indian ethos. However, failure of the emergence of successful civil society in the country, though not directly expressed, seems to be the underlying message given by most of the authors. This does not, of course, dishearten the initiative of starting new ones. In fact, present-day voices of women's rights, minority rights, preservation of environment, proper governance, etc. have been echoed through civil society groups howsoever small they are. This itself is a positive sign of civil society experience in India. One may trace the historicity to Gandhi and Tagore if one so desires. The book can be of interest to all those who are concerned with social issues in India, both theoretical and empirical.

Department of Philosophy   BHAGAT OINAM
North Eastern Hill University
Shillong 793 022

R.R. PANDEY: *Amṛtasya Putrāḥ: An Encounter with Globalization and Post-Modernity*, Kala Prakashan, Varanasi, pp. 234 (including Preface), 2001, Rs 500

The book under review is a precise and attractive presentation of Indology. The concepts dealt with in the book are approached philologically and hermeneutically. Indology is the treasure of Indian wisdom comprising minutest analysis and explanation of the problems concerning all aspects of excellence of life on the earth with an obvious purpose of onward march, even of those who are deprived of divinity. As such, it consists of a lively philosophy of unity and integrity with all diversity.

It is very difficult to claim that a monograph is inclusive of all specific characters and values constituting Indology. Volumes and volumes sometimes fall short of providing even the salient features in precise form. In such a situation, the criteria of a successful monograph on Indology, are decided on the basis of a specific field, scope, method and finally a specific purpose to be fulfilled by that.

The book under review is a collection of fourteen scholarly articles, arranged in an order, viz. 1. Amṛtasya Putrāḥ, 2. The concept of God in Indian Philosophy: A Critical Analysis, 3. An Advaitic appraisal of the concept of Sākṣi, 4. The concept of Titikṣā as the central theme of Bhagavadgītā, 5. Rāja-Yoga: An Advaitic Elucidation, 6. An Advaitic Appraisal of Vinobā's Concept of Self-Rule, 7. Secular concepts in the world religions: An Advaitic Appraisal, 8. Concepts of Karma and Sansāra in Indian and Japanese Culture, 9. The concept of Loka Saṅgraha as the socio-cosmic ideal of Bhagavadgītā, 10. The future of Indological studies, 11. Ideal of global human unity, 12. Scientific temper and Advaita Vedānta, 13. Some reflections on Śāktopāsanā with special reference to Śrīvidyā, 14. The validity, rule and philosophy of Purāṇas, written, from time to time, by Professor R.R. Pandey, a distinguished scholar of Advaita Vedānta, on the problems of Advaita philosophy, religion and culture.

As a reader of the book I feel that there is a unity of thought underlying the articles assembled in the book under review. This unity could have better been reflected if the articles in the book would have been arranged more carefully, that is, if the 8th article would have

been placed before the 7th. The 12th, 14th and 13th articles should have been placed before the 10th, 11th and 12th in sequence respectively and the 10th and 11th articles should have been placed as the concluding articles instead of the 13th and 14th respectively.

The book, as such, is a good presentation of Hinduism in modern and comparative perspective and shows the author's wide knowledge and vast consultation of the original texts of both of the traditions of the East and the West. The author has taken great pains in surveying the Indological concepts of Ṛṇas, Varṇāśramas and the fulfilment of Puruṣārthas in view of three 'Ys', that is, Yajña, Yoga and Yātrā (Tīrtha). These are means easily available even to an ordinary Hindu for getting immortality, a life of the spirit and a spirited life and that is, perhaps, the reason why the book has the title *'Amṛtasya Putrāḥ'*. The author has very beautifully shown the importance of the system of yajña in Indological introduction of divine life. The importance of the concept of serving fire, deities, that is divinity in all and the auspicious achievement by the yajñas can very well be observed while going through the articles in the book. The author is a veteran Advaitin and accordingly he has emphasized the importance of Vedāntic Yoga or Dhyāna—Yoga together with elements of Pātañjal Yoga. The cultural and religious importance of Yātrā or Tīrtha is explained well by the author as one of the important factors in achievement of the Puruṣārthas in Hindu-life. The Hindu takes it as Mokṣakāraka (liberating) to visit and worship at the shrines established by great Śankarāchārya. Accordingly, the author concludes the first chapter by the statement 'whether it is I.T. or B.T. it is sophistication only in skill not in wisdom. Nevertheless, the postmodern era is in urgent need of wisdom. Hindu vision is rooted in the wisdom'.

The author of the book is famous for his philological and hermeneutic approach to Indology and that is evident even from his other writings namely—*Man and Universe*, 1978; *Samagrayoga*, 1988 and *Scientific Temper and Advaita Vedānta*, 1991. His philological and hermeneutic approach to various Indological issues, in the present book, are very elucidating in understanding the import of different Indological concepts in their socio-cultural life as visualized by the time of the concerned texts.

The book has obviously two-fold purpose. It puts excellence of socio-cultural philosophy of Indology over Western rationality emphasizing the former not only as a way to life of the spirit (Amṛta) but also as an alternate to the depravation and tension caused to the life-world by the western trend of marketization promoted by globalization and postmodernity on one hand and presents the former in such a picturesque way that a reader is deeply involved in experiencing the socio cultural practices of Indian excellence and comes out with satisfaction and pride in the spiritual tradition on the other hand.

In the second article the author has interpreted even the great saying like 'Tattvamasi' in a way that fits with the immanent and transcendent nature of God and tries to reconcile the concept of re-incarnation with the concept of God which is a unique contribution of the author in the book. In the second and third articles the author has shown his complete agreement with the observations in late Professor R.K. Tripathi's book *Problems of Philosophy and Religion*, 1987, that the reality in Advaita is immediacy. The author, has distinctly observed immediacy of two sorts and has commented that 'conditional immediacy is extrinsic, while unconditional immediacy is intrinsic. The former is the immediacy of objects while the latter is of the subject. However, the objective and subjective modes of immediacy have not been explained to the extent warranted for the justification of such distinctions.

The fourth article considers Titikṣā, as the central concept of Bhagavadgītā and that is obviously a new observation attributed to the learned author initially initiated in *Samagrayoga*, 1988. The author's contention that the purpose of the Bhagavadgītā can well be understood only through the strict observation of titikṣā, as the central concept of it, has significant merit.

Fifth is an article on Rāja-yoga. It has its importance not only in its philological approach but also in elucidating Vedāntin-yoga, differentiating it from Pātañjal yoga and even so in the context of modern ascriptions of Vivekānanda, Vinobā, etc. Throughout the discussion in the article the author's mastery over the original texts and his comparative mind can well be observed.

In the sixth article the author has successfully shown that Vinobā's philosophy of sarvodaya is rooted in his ideation of Self-rule (Svarāja)

in which each feels his own rule, as all, in his philosophy, are the same spirit. Vinobā has been evaluated by the author as dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivādī (according to it, how the author defines the appearance of the world depends on the vision we have of it).

In articles 7, 8 and 9, the rarely attempted and less explored concept of socio-cosmic secularist vision of Vedānta has been discussed and even so in view of the achievements made by the great personalities of the contemporary world.

Article 10 deals with the future of Indological studies. It gives an introduction to incessantly increasing, at least five trends of Indological study by Indian and Western scholars of recent times. First trend comprises, specifically, Vedāntapārijāta of Swāmī Karapātrī, Paramārthadarshanam of M.M. Rāmāvatāra Shukla, Bhāratīya Sanskriti evam Sādhanā by M.M. Gopīnāth Kavirāja, commentary on Śataślokī and Mādhurī on Pañcalakṣaṇī by Pt. Badarī Nāth Shukla and the works of Swāmī Yogendrānanda. The second includes the work of K.C. Bhattāchārya, R.D. Rānāde, T.R.V. Mūrtī, T.M.P. Mahādevan, C.D. Sharmā, R.K. Tripāthī, A.C. Mukerjī, B.L. Atreya, K.C. Bhattāchārya, K.S. Mūrtī and S.S. Roy. The third, namely, materialistic turn includes the works of Debī Prasād Chattopādhyāya, Kośāmbī, Dāṅge, Mukerjī, Namboodarīpāda and R.S. Sharmā promoting Neo-Cāravākian thoughts. The fourth, namely, Indian linguistic analysis includes the names of G.N. Shāstrī, K.A.S. Iyer, T.R.V. Mūrtī and in Western Linguistic group the names of K.J. Shāh, Dayā Krishna, S.S. Banerjī and Rajendra Prasād have been enumerated with a remarkable comment on Professor Dayā Krishna's arrival home. The author writes 'the entire group has started advocating the relevance of traditional Indian Philosophy. Dayā Krishna, once a great antagonist of Indian philosophy, is now perhaps the greatest champion of restoring the great legacy of traditional Indian Philosophy.' (pp. 161–2).

In article 11 the author has approached the concept of man philologically and hermeneutically and has come to a conclusion that man's nature is not only a principle but also a capacity to become aware of, to give account of himself and his existential situation. In view of the observations of the author to come out of egoistic values and actions to realize the Vedāntic goal of all in one and one in all, a

state of total identity with humanity, is the ideal of global humanity for the welfare of which everything should be sacrificed. Article 12 is extracted from an independent book, 1990, by the same author and is included in the present book with a view to emphasize the integral vision of life advocated by the author as the Vedāntic Culture.

Much less has been written, in modern idioms, on Upāsanā (meditation) in the light of Śrīvidyā. The credit goes to the learned author who for the first time, in article 13, has made it available, in modern idiom, for the modern readers interested in learning this meditative method, not only of purification of the psycho-physical organism, but of awakening of spirituality to the extent of realization of the spirit also. The author has not only pictured well the different symbolized images (Mudrās) of Goddess Kālī but has interpreted their cosmic significance as the divine object of meditation also.

Introductory outlines of approximately eighteen Purāṇas namely Brahmapurāṇa, Padma, Viṣṇu, Vāyu, Śrīmadbhāgavat, Nārada, Mārakandeya, Agni, Bhaviṣya, Brahmavaivartya, Liṅga, Vārāha, Skandha, Vāmana, Kūrma, Matsya, Garūṇa, Brahmānanda, and their validity and role has been given in brief in article 14. The author has stressed to learn them on a scientific basis in the light of modern research as he thinks that mystery of wisdom is very much presented there.

The presentation in the book is lucid and is matched with the philological and hermeneutic approach of the author to the subjects discussed therein. There are some proof errors in the book. The title at the top of pages of article 7 has been continued even as the top title of the pages of the article 8. Also, Sanskrit words and sentences quoted from the text are not italicized.

Conclusively, the book is recognizably a scholarly presentation of some of the very important concepts of Indology and is highly useful not only for scholars of Indian philosophy and religion but for those who are desirous of being acquainted with the pride of traits of Indological studies also.

Professor of Philosophy,   D.N. TIWARI
L.N. Mithila University, Darbhanga 846 008

Books Received

1. P.S. Roodurmun: *Bhāmatī and Vivarṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta: A Critical Approach*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 297, Rs 495.
2. Abdul Latief: *Philosophical Reflections*, Mulberry Publications, Kerala, pp. 163, Rs 75.
3. Anant Kumar Giri: *Building in the Margins of Shacks: The Vision and Projects of Habitat for Humanity*, Orient Longman Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2002, pp. 293, Rs 475.
4. M.T. Ansari: *Secularism, Islam and Modernity: Selected Essays of Alam Khundmiri*, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2001, pp. 308, Rs 250.
5. N.C. Panda: *Cyclic Universe*, Parts 1 and 2, D.K. Printworld Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2002, pp. 456, Rs 1600 per set.
6. Kala Acharya: *Buddhānusmṛti* (A Glossary of Buddhist Terms), Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2002, pp. 281, Rs 425.
7. Asha Mukherjee, Sabujkali Sen and K. Bagchi (eds.): *Civil Society in Indian Cultures*, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington DC, USA.
8. Arvind Sharma: *Modern Hindu Thought—The Essential Texts*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 383, Rs 575.
9. Pradyumana Kumar Jain: *Jaina and Hindu Logic*, Vols 1 and 2, Research Books, Delhi.
10. R. Balasubramanian: PHISPC Volume on Advaita Vedānta, PHISPC, Dist. by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, pp. 696, Rs 1200.

Recent ICPR Publications

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
ए,ऐ	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi: (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals
Anusvāra

(˙) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ	ṅ
ञ	ñ
ण	ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate
Visarga

(:) ḥ

Consonants
Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not djña
ॡ	lṛ and not lṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and specific) characters

ள	ḷ
ழ	ḻ
ண	ṇ
ற	ṟ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḻa (and not Choḷa),

Minnarpuvanaṅgālam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous
Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced.

e.g. *jñānai* and not *jñnai*

Seūna and not Seuna

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dāgaba* and not *dagaba* veve or vève and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names
These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tilevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations
There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works
Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.