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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Gestalt Theory and Tacit Knowing

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One of the most interesting features of Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge is the claim that all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. This view is partly derived from Gestalt theory whose overriding principle is that the whole dominates the parts and that it is possible to comprehend the whole without paying explicit attention to its parts. This paper examines how Polanyi uses Gestalt concepts of perceptual integration to formulate his theory of tacit knowing.

Whereas science is generally thought to be concerned with the breaking of wholes into their component parts, Gestalt theory teaches that the only way to understand the coherence or pattern of an object is to integrate its parts. Polanyi draws upon Gestalt concepts of perceptual integration to formulate a theory of scientific knowledge. However, in contrast to Gestalt, which involves the equilibration of certain bits to form a coherent shape, Polanyi sees science as a deliberate integration aimed at discovering order in nature. The integration of parts into wholes is the backbone of Polanyi's theory of scientific knowledge. This integration requires the active involvement of the person knowing.

Using numerous examples from diverse fields, Polanyi has shown that when we immerse ourselves in the clues or particulars of perception we are able to gain knowledge of the whole. In doing so, we do not lose sight of the particulars, but we become aware of them in a subsidiary manner. In other words, we come know them in the object that we recognize or the activity that we do. This leap from the particulars to their joint meaning is a tacit operation. We cannot explicitly say how it is done. This is the tacit dimension of knowing that Polanyi is talking about. When we become aware of parts only as pointers to something else, we are said to become aware of them in a subsidiary

manner. To be aware of something subsidiarily, says Polanyi, means that we are not aware of it in itself but as a clue or instrument pointing beyond itself (Polanyi 1958: 44). Most things are not the focus of our direct attention. Words, graphs, maps and even myths, for example, are merely pointers to something else (Polanyi 1958: 40). They are clues or instruments pointing beyond themselves.

Polanyi contrasts subsidiary awareness with focal awareness. Focal awareness refers to our attention to or knowledge of an aggregate of details as a meaningful whole. It is important to note that these two kinds of awareness are mutually exclusive. In fact, it would be self-contradictory to be both subsidiarily and focally aware of the same particulars at the same time (Polanyi 1958: 56–7). Besides, while focal awareness is necessarily conscious, subsidiary awareness may vary over all degrees of consciousness.

THE STRUCTURE OF TACIT KNOWING

Polanyi has cited numerous examples to demonstrate that we can know more than we can tell. Most of his examples are those pertaining to knowledge how. We recognize a face we know among a million, yet we cannot tell by what means we know it. We know how to swim, but we cannot tell by what mechanism we keep afloat; we can recognize the moods of a human face yet we cannot tell by what signs we do so. A chicken sexer succeeds in sorting out newborn chicks by sex without being able to say what the visual feature is upon which he relies. We could enumerate many more examples but these are sufficient to show what Polanyi means by tacit knowledge.

In order to understand the dynamics of tacit knowing, we shall consider an experiment in subception described by Polanyi. He reports an experiment in which a person was presented with a number of nonsense syllables (Polanyi 1964: 55–7). After being shown certain of these syllables, an electric shock was administered on the experimental agent. After some time, the subject showed signs of anticipating the shock at the sight of the 'shock syllables'. Asked what made him anticipate the shock, the experimental agent could not tell what made him expect it. He failed to identify the shock syllables yet he relied on them for anticipating the shock. Polanyi concludes that the subject must have

acquired 'a knowledge similar to the one we have when we know a person by signs we cannot tell' (Polanyi 1964: 56). The subject's knowledge of the shock-producing syllables is said to have been tacit. He failed to identify the particulars (in this case the shock-producing syllables) because he was aware of them 'only in their bearing on the electric shock' (Polanyi 1964: 57).

The experimental agent was 'relying on' the shock-producing syllables in order to 'attend to' the electric shock. Consequently, Polanyi refers to that which we 'rely on' as the *proximal* term because it is close to us. On the other hand, he refers to that which we 'attend to' as the *distal* term because it seems to be at a distance from us.

Polanyi distinguishes four aspects of tacit knowing. First, we have the functional structure. By this, he means that the function of the subsidiary knowledge of the particulars is to direct us to the understanding of the whole. In other words, the functional import of tacit knowing is to guide us from the proximal, interiorized particulars to the whole, which is their joint purpose and meaning.

The second aspect of tacit knowing is the phenomenal aspect. By this term, Polanyi means that when we move from the proximal (the parts) to the distal (the whole) the former is transformed and acquires an integrated appearance. In short, the parts change their appearance when viewed in terms of the whole and a pattern can be discerned.

The integration of clues into an intelligible pattern gives meaning to these clues. This is the third aspect of tacit knowing. Polanyi refers to it as the semantic aspect. Viewed as separate entities, the particulars tend to be meaningless but when we integrate them, we endow them with meaning.

From these three aspects of tacit knowing—the functional, phenomenal and the semantic—Polanyi deduces a fourth aspect. This aspect tells us that our subsidiary awareness of the particulars leads us to the comprehension of something real. This, according to Polanyi, is the ontological aspect of tacit knowing.

In addition to these four aspects of tacit knowing, we also find that the structure of tacit knowing is triadic (Polanyi 1969a: 181). First, we have the target, which may also be called the problem. Secondly, we have the particulars, which we are only subsidiarily aware of, and

finally we have the person who links the focal target with the subsidiary clues. It is important to note that the linking process is carried out by a conscious mind. It cannot be done mechanically. It is a personal achievement. We emphasize this point because Polanyi's theory of knowledge is a theory of personal knowledge. He believes that the knowing subject has a crucial role to play not only in the holding of knowledge, but also in its shaping. The knower acquires knowledge by tacitly integrating subsidiary clues into a focal whole.

The important point to be noted at this stage about the theory of tacit knowing is that because we always attend from some set of subsidiary clues, we can never make our knowledge wholly articulate or subject it to a complete critical scrutiny. As Polanyi puts it:

> Subsidiary or instrumental knowledge, as I have defined it, is not something known in itself but a known in terms of something focally known, to the quality of which it contributes, and to this extent it is unspecifiable. Analysis may bring subsidiary knowledge into focus and formulate it as a maxim or as a feature in a physiognomy but such specification is in general not exhaustive. Although the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton-classer can indicate their clues and formulate their maxims, they know more things than they can tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars; and not explicitly as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is therefore ineffable, and the pondering of a judgement in terms of such particulars is an ineffable process (Polanyi 1958: 88).

Polanyi continues to tell us that it is possible for the relationship of the particulars jointly forming a whole to be ineffable even when all the particulars are explicitly specifiable. The point is that although we can at times identify the particulars forming a whole, that does not mean that we can tell how these particulars are related to one another in order to form the whole. If we pay explicit attention on the parts, we lose sight of the whole.

TACIT KNOWING AS INDWELLING

The body plays a very important role in Polanyi's epistemology. He divides the universe into two. The first part consists of our body with

which we identify ourselves, and the second part consists of those things that are not part of our body. Our body is the instrument by which we know the world. According to this view of the body, we make sense of the world by 'relying on our awareness of the impacts made by the world on our body and the response our body makes on these impacts' (Polanyi 1964: 62). Consequently, we can only know the world by making contact with it. We know our body, says Polanyi, 'by attending to it from our body; and our body differs from all other objects by being the only collection of things which we know only exclusively by attending to them in themselves' (Polanyi 1964: 62). In fact, the knowledge of our body is the paradigm of tacit knowing; 'it is the subsidiary sensing of our body that makes us feel that it is our body' (Polanyi 1969a: 183).

Polanyi's view of the body has very striking similarities with that of Merleau-Ponty. In his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962), Merleau-Ponty has underscored the important role that the body plays in our experience of the world. He argues that the body cannot be experienced as an object because it is the medium through which we experience other things. He maintains that the body is invisible and intangible insofar as it is the one that sees and touches. He writes:

> I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, work round them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 91).

When we comprehend the whole, we are said to interiorize or assimilate its parts, to 'indwell' those parts. This internalization of parts deprives them of their character as external objects. They become part of us. Polanyi is very explicit on this point. He says:

> Indeed, whenever we experience an external object subsidiarily, we feel it in a way similar to that in which we feel our body. Hence we can say that in this sense all subsidiary elements are interior to the body in which we live. To this extent we dwell in all subsidiary experienced things ... . Meaning arises either by integrating clues in our own body or by integrating things outside, and all meaning

known outside is due to our subsidiary treatment of external things as we treat our own body. We may be said to *interiorize these things or to pour ourselves into them*. It is by dwelling in them that we make them mean something on which we focus our attention (Polanyi 1969a: 183).

According to the theory of tacit knowing, indwelling is a logical relationship that links life in our body to the knowledge of things outside. When the parts of the external world are interiorized, they function in the same way as our body functions when 'we attend from it to things outside' (Polanyi 1964: 63). It is by assimilating the particulars that we are able to achieve a meaning of the whole. But of course we cannot literally assimilate particulars, and make them part of ourselves. What Polanyi means is that we assimilate concepts of the particulars, and that after a time an abstract concept emerges which we consider to be the whole. According to this view, we live in the particulars, which we comprehend in the same way as we live in the tools and probes, which we use. The 'dwelling in' that Polanyi is talking about here 'forces us to participate feelingly in that which we understand' (Polanyi 1969a: 148–9). Indwelling is an important aspect of every cognitive situation. The degree of indwelling, as Polanyi has shown elsewhere, increases gradually as we move from the exact sciences to the life sciences. It reaches its highest peak in the humanities.

Tacit knowing is not to be confused with deduction. These are two distinct modes of inference. One of the major differences between them, as Polanyi points out, is that whereas in tacit inference subsidiaries (particulars) are made to bear upon a focus, in logical deduction two focal items—the premises and the conclusion—are joined together. But perhaps the most important distinction between the two is the fact that tacit integration can only be carried out by a conscious act of the mind. Unlike logical deduction, tacit integration cannot be mechanically performed.

From the foregoing, we can see the shortcomings of the objective ideal of knowledge—the dangerous objectivism that Polanyi's epistemology is primarily aimed at repudiating. This false ideal, which is both mechanistic and reductionist, ignores the fact that we are endowed with tacit integrative powers, which enable us to discern coherence in

nature. All knowledge bears the mark of the knowing subject. Only persons are able to know because all knowledge involves the use of our tacit integrative powers.

CONCENTRATION AND LOSS OF MEANING

Another very important aspect of the theory of tacit knowing is the claim that concentration on the particulars makes the pattern, or the whole, disappear. The meaning of a comprehensive entity is effaced when its particulars are scrutinized in detail. Meaning requires a person who can integrate clues into a coherent pattern that he or she can see as meaningful.

Polanyi gives numerous examples of loss of meaning arising from concentrating on the parts of a whole or the clues of a skilful performance. If a pianist focuses his attention on his hands or on the individual notes, he gets confused and may have to stop. Loss of meaning due to specification explains why so many pre-historic sites were only discovered when flying by aeroplanes was introduced yet so many generations had walked on the same sites without noticing them (Polanyi 1975: 40). It would appear that these generations had failed to notice the whole (the sites) because they were observing the particulars from close quarters. They could not therefore integrate them into a meaningful whole. The pilot observing historical settlements from the air is aware of the parts in a subsidiary manner. He is aware of them only as pointers to a comprehensive entity. On landing, his attention is shifted from the particulars as parts of a whole, to the particulars in themselves. This leads to a loss of meaning.

Another example, which shows the dangers of making the subsidiarily known details the objects of focal attention, is that of riding a bicycle—an instance of knowledge how. A mathematical description of what happens at every moment as a cyclist adjusts the curvature of his bicycle path in proportion to the ratio of his imbalance over the square of the bicycle's velocity is unknown to most cyclists. Such knowledge, Polanyi says, 'is totally ineffectual unless it is tacitly known—unless it is simply dwelt in' (Polanyi 1975: 48).

These examples show the limits of pure analysis as a method of acquiring knowledge. We understand things by integrating their

disjointed parts, by simply indwelling them and not by giving explicit attention to their parts. Such kind of reductionism is particularly destructive in psychology and biology. We shall look at what Polanyi considers the shortcomings of such extreme reductionism in the next two sections.

TACIT KNOWING AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

The theory of tacit knowing gives us a clue as to how we know other minds and the nature of the relationship between the mind and the body. Using this theory, Polanyi is able to bridge the Cartesian gap between the self and the world.

According to this theory, we know other minds by indwelling within the specifiable particulars of their external manifestation. When we tacitly integrate subsidiary clues of a person's behaviour, we are able to know his mind. In Polanyi's own words:

> We know other minds by dwelling in their act—as a chess player comes to know the mind of the master whom he is studying. He does not reduce the master's mind to the moves that the master makes. He dwells in these moves as subsidiary clues to the strategy in the master's mind, which they enable him to see. The moves become meaningful at last only when they are seen to be integrated to a whole strategy. Moreover, a person's behaviour in general becomes meaningful only when integrated to a whole mind (Polanyi 1975: 48).

From this quotation, we learn that we know another person's mind not by observing his actions, but by tacitly integrating these actions. These actions when jointly integrated point to the existence of a mind.

Polanyi disagrees with behaviourist psychology, which claims to understand the operations of peoples' minds in terms of their manifest behaviour. He accuses behaviourists of failing to distinguish between 'observing the working of a mind as mere events' and 'reading them as the signs of a mind's working'. The former, he says, is a detached observation whereas the latter is a convivial appreciation (Polanyi 1957: 483). In Polanyi's view, we cannot keep track of a person's mental manifestations 'without watching them as pointers to the mind from

which they originate' (Polanyi 1969b: 135). The point that Polanyi is making here, and I think he is right, is that behaviourists are wrong in equating the mind with its workings. The mind and its manifestations are two distinct things. The mind is the source from which our behaviour springs. Polanyi would have no quarrel with the behaviourist if 'the pieces of behaviour which correspond to the presence of a mental state would be focally known' (Polanyi 1969b: 203). He rightly points out that, on the contrary, these pieces of behaviour are known subsidiarily. They are known as clues to mental states.

Thus Polanyi's main quarrel with behaviourists lies in their attempts to replace all reference to mental states by descriptions of the behaviour by which these states are known to us. The theory of tacit knowing clearly shows the inadmissibility of behaviourism. It shows that we cannot wholly shift our attention to the fragments of conscious behaviour. These fragments, as we have already seen, must be known in a subsidiary manner. They must be known as clues to mental states. In trying to explain the mind in objectivist terms, behaviourists commit the fallacy which Polanyi calls pseudo-substitution. The fallacy consists of 'using objectivist terms which are strictly speaking nonsensical, as pseudonyms for the mentalistic terms which they are supposed to eliminate' (Polanyi 1969b: 204). Some of the terms that behaviourists use to cover the mentalistic terms include stimulus, response and control.

Concerning the mind-body relationship, Polanyi invokes his two kinds of awareness—subsidiary and focal—to show the structure of this relationship. He urges that the body seen focally is the body while seen subsidiarily it is the mind. It would appear that for Polanyi whenever we integrate the pieces of a person's behaviour a higher level of reality emerges and it is this level that we refer to as the mind or consciousness. Any attempts to specify these pieces of behaviour would destroy the mind. The relation between the mind and the body seems to have the same logical structure as the relation between clues and the image to which the clues are pointing.

BIOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM

From our exploration of the theory of tacit knowing, we can now understand why Polanyi criticizes modern biologists and particularly

molecular biologists. These biologists hold that living things can be fully understood in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry that govern their component parts.

Molecular biology has been very successful in studying life up to the molecular level. The discovery of the DNA molecule, the universal basis of heredity, is regarded as one of molecular biology's crowning achievements. This astounding success has led some biologists to declare that molecular biology is the only form of biology that is worth studying.

Although many biologists have attempted to reduce biology to mechanistic materialism, it is important to note that all the important theories and laws of biology were formulated quite independently of physics and chemistry. What these biologists refuse to acknowledge publicly is that living things can be comprehended only by attributing to them a purposiveness, which cannot be made explicit at the physico-chemical level. Polanyi reports the story that circulates among biologists to the effect that 'teleology is a woman of easy virtue, whom the biologist disowns in public but lives with in private' (Polanyi 1964: 67).

Biology, according to Polanyi, should be understood as an instance of life examining itself. He argues that to describe life in terms of physics and chemistry would be like interpreting Shakespeare's sonnets in terms of physics and chemistry. Such an interpretation would be meaningless. The point is that living things are comprehensive entities and their meaning is lost if we reduce them to their smallest elements.

'Physical and chemical investigation,' Polanyi says, 'can only form part of biology by bearing on previously established achievements such as those of shapeliness, morphogenesis, or physiological functions' (Polanyi 1957: 482). Taking a frog as an example, Polanyi shows that its physical and chemical topography could not tell us anything about it as a frog. The reason for this is that apart from the principles governing the frog's atoms and molecules, there are other principles that are irreducibly teleological. Polanyi is very emphatic on this point. He writes:

> The achievements which form the subject matter of biology can be identified only by a kind of appraisal which require a higher degree of participation by the observer in his subject matter than can be mediated by the tests of physics and chemistry (Polanyi 1957: 482).

He further says:

> An attempt to de-personalise our knowledge of living beings would result, if strictly pursued, in an alienation that would render all observation meaningless. Taken to its theoretical limits, it would dissolve the very conception of life and make it impossible to identify living beings (Polanyi 1969a: 152).

The dangers posed by an objectivist and reductionist biology should not be underestimated. Such biology corrupts our conception of man as a moral being. Man viewed in mechanistic terms is reduced to a complex organism whose operations could be predicted by physicochemical laws. Polanyi seeks to correct this view. Biology has to be understood as a science that involves a high degree of personal participation. The knowledge of life is henceforth to be understood as a 'sharing of life, a re-living of life, a very intimate kind of indwelling' (Polanyi 1969a: 150–51).

Looking at the DNA, which is a molecule said to contain the secret of life, Polanyi argues that the patterns of its organic bases are not reducible to physics and chemistry. Reducing the DNA molecule to its physical and chemical level would destroy it as an information conveying code. David Holbrook supports this view when he says that 'the pattern by which the DNA transmits information cannot be derived from the physical or chemical laws and must be understood in other terms' (Holbrook 1977: 43). And as Polanyi himself further says:

> Whatever the origin of a DNA configuration may have been, it can function as a code only if its order is not due to the forces of potential energy. Just as the arrangement of a printed page is and must be extraneous to the chemistry of the printed page, so the base sequence in a DNA molecule is and must be extraneous to the chemical forces at work in the DNA molecule (Polanyi 1975: 172).

But Polanyi was not the first person to address the question of biological reductionism. Theodosius Dobzhansky in his *Mankind Evolving* (1964) observes that although there is much to be learnt from molecular

biology, it is not the only biology worth studying. He maintains that life should be studied at all levels. He remarks:

> The laws of Mendel, of gene segregation and recombination, are not deducible from any of the glorious achievements of chromosome and gene chemistry. And they need not be so deduced; Mendel's laws and much else in biology have been discovered through studies on organismic level. Biology moves both downward and upward—from the organismic to the molecular and from the molecular to organismic level (Dobzhansky 1964: 83).

This quotation reveals that Dobzhansky, like Polanyi, is not opposed to molecular biology as such. Dobzhansky is only opposed to the view that life can be reduced to mere matter—to physics and chemistry. And as George Kneller says:

> ... although life is based on inanimate matter, it posseses properties that do not belong to its separate inanimate constituents but only emerge when these constituents are arranged in certain ways. These biological properties are peculiar to whole entities—to the cell, the organ, or the organism—and can be discovered only through the study of these entities (Kneller 1978: 148).

Another thinker opposed to the mechanistic reductionist view in biology is Fritjof Capra. In his popular book, *The Turning Point* (1982), he criticizes molecular biology, which he says is based on the Cartesian world-view. He castigates modern biologists for what he considers their narrow and fragmented approach to life, arguing that their approach cannot account for living systems as wholes. He points out:

> Biologists are busy dissecting the human body, and in doing so are gathering an impressive amount of knowledge about its cellular and molecular mechanisms but they still do not know how we breathe, regulate our body temperature, digest or focus our attention. They know some of the nervous circuits, but most of the integrative actions remain to be understood. The same is true of the healing of wounds, and the nature and pathways of pain also remain largely mysterious (Capra 1982: 95–6).

Like Polanyi, Capra is drawing our attention to the limitations of reductionism as a method for studying living things. Living things are too complex to be understood through analysis alone. Capra is calling for a change in our approach to the study of living things.

He believes that change will come from medicine because the functions essential for an organism's health cannot be explained in terms of physics and chemistry. This revolution will only come about if we abandon the belief that organisms can be completely described in terms and properties and behaviour of their constituents. Turning his attention to the phenomenon of healing, Capra criticizes modern medicine for failing to treat the patient as a whole person. He observes that like modern biology, modern medicine is based on the Cartesian model. It concentrates on the separate parts of the human body thereby running the risk of losing sight of the patient as a person. Such an approach, as Capra further says, reduces health to mere mechanical functioning and cannot therefore deal with the phenomenon of healing. The phenomenon of healing should be understood holistically for it involves interplay among the physical, psychological, social and environmental aspects of human condition.

The main problem with modern medicine, as Capra sees it, is its failure to distinguish between illness and disease. Capra looks at disease as a condition of a particular part of the body and illness as a condition of the total human body. Today's medicine has tended to concentrate on disease rather than on illness. Doctors are today mainly concerned with treating a particular tissue or organ without considering the whole body, let alone considering the psychological and social aspects of the patient's illness. Capra is criticizing modern medicine because it is only concerned with the alleviation of physical symptoms while ignoring the root cause of illness. He is therefore calling for a change in which biomedical research will be integrated 'into a broader system of health care in which manifestation of human illness are seen as resulting from the interplay of mind, body and environment and are treated accordingly' (Capra 1982: 164–5).

Of course some people may not totally agree with what Capra is saying especially with regard to the distinction he makes between illness and disease, but one cannot fail to see that the direction he is

taking is in line with that of Polanyi. They are both calling for a new orientation in our understanding of life processes. Living things are to be viewed as comprehensive organic entities, as whole whose operation principles cannot be accounted for by the laws of physics and chemistry alone.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, we can see that Gestalt theory has helped Polanyi expose the inadequacies of reductionism, which is a logical corollary of the objectivism that he is rejecting. We have seen that attempting to explain wholes by giving explicit attention to their parts is destructive of whole areas of knowledge. Polanyi's dynamic conception of knowledge offers an interpretation of meaning. It tells us that knowledge is acquired through an act of comprehension, which consists in merging our awareness of a set of clues into our focal awareness of their joint significance. Thus integration is the basic act of meaning construction and of coming to know. The theory of tacit knowing is particularly relevant to the science of biology for it entails a rejection of the view that living things can be fully explained in non-teleological terms alone. This theory teaches us that we cannot speak meaningfully of living things without using the notion of achievement. Polanyi is right in pointing out that to reduce biology to physics and chemistry is to neglect the distinctive characteristics of living systems, as self-maintaining, self-regulating, developing and reproducing mechanisms. We have also seen that the causal-analytic method that biology has taken over from the physical sciences is inadequate to its task for it gives us little understanding of living things and their activities. Although a number of other scholars have drawn our attention to the limitations of this method, we are indebted to Polanyi for being the first to explore in detail and with authority the negative consequences of a purely reductive analysis.

But perhaps the most important lesson to be learnt from Polanyi's holistic epistemology is that epistemology and psychology are closely related and that it would be difficult to separate them. Contemporary philosophers of science such as Karl Popper (1979) have called for a separation of the two. However, as our study of Polanyi has shown, an

investigation of the psychological processes that are involved in the scientist's cognitive construction of reality can shed light on epistemological questions. His transposition of Gestalt psychology into a theory of knowledge and his conception of knowledge as a personal integration of subsidiary clues into a focal whole places the knowing subject back into the discussion of epistemological questions.

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A Theory of the Self in Hermeneutic Philosophy

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The concept of the 'self' as the metaphysical reality persisting through all changes has witnessed serious criticism in recent philosophy. Hermeneutic and deconstructive discourses abound with such discussions. While the traditional rationalistic model with the supremacy of the *Cogito* gets marred with the hermeneutic claim that man is not only a rational being but also a 'willing, feeling and imaginative being (in the midst of others)',[1] this very logocentric foundation is severely rocked by deconstrution.

The Cartesian mind-body dualism is portrayed by hermeneutic philosophy as '*being-there* that we are'. The attempt is to bridge the schism between mind and matter. But deconstruction, on the other hand, in its critical fervour, attacks the principle of duality itself which, in fact, distinguishes philosophy as a privileged discourse among the others. According to deconstruction, in all dichotomies, like speech-writing, identity-difference, inside-outside, one conjunct is considered to be superior to the other. And on the same principle rests the idea of the 'self' as the 'same identity'.

Although the self under the 'metaphysics of presence' faces strong criticism by deconstruction, one still finds constructive tones in hermeneutic philosophy. Thus, while the theorization of the self is an impossible venture into the deconstructive stream, one can construe such a theory within the hermeneutic purview.

My concern in this paper is to explore the possibility of a theory of the self and self-understanding within the hermeneutic tradition. I begin with extrapolating a very fundamental notion of hermeneutics, namely, the notion of 'mediation'.[2] It is fundamental because every hermeneutic enterprise necessarily requires some point of mediation. It has been rightly put by Page that the hermeneutic view of understanding

'stresses the presence of some form of necessary *mediation* in the process of understanding.'[3] This mediation is characteristically linguistic; for a hermeneutic activity is all about understanding the meaning-impregnated human reality. Understanding, in other words, is shot through with language or sign-systems because the life-world is, in some sense, constituted by linguistic symbolic categories and images. Understanding is thus taken to be mediated by the world conceived in linguistic or symbolic terms.

The idea of 'linguistic mediation' characterizes understanding as a cognitive faculty. But beyond this epistemic feature, the fundamentality of 'understanding' is construed ontologically. Heidegger points out that 'understanding' is an ontological attribute—a mode of existence. It is not just that a human subject employs understanding in its epistemic relation with the life-world; the fundamental fact is that human subject understands itself in its worldliness.

Although the 'ontological reversal' of understanding is much more primordial, the epistemology of interpretation or the methodical role of hermeneutics is conceived as a mode of understanding human existence. In the post-Heideggerian period this point has been put up by Gadamer and very strongly by Ricoeur.

What is commonly stressed is that a philosophical enterprise into the nature of 'being' or 'self' cannot do away with the epistemological inroads to understanding. In other words, interpretation of symbolically constituted human reality is an essential detour to self-understanding. Ricoeur strongly contends that the epistemology of interpretation, which he terms the 'long and ardous' route, is essential to the ontology of understanding. The similar tones are echoed in Gadamer when he claims that 'Being which can be understood is language.'[4] The claim here is that since the world is linguistically or symbolically constituted, the self is bound to be represented as textured by language; whence it follows that the link between self-understanding and language is intimate. This idea of linguistically mediated understanding has been developed by Gadamer and Ricoeur differently in their theories of 'dialogical' and 'narrative' understanding respectively. The two theories also espouse two accounts of the 'self' and 'self-understanding'. In the following two sections, I delineate these two accounts

which pave the way towards contemplating a comprehensive theory of the self.

I

In this section I lay out the central claims of Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy and argue that a possible theory of the self emerges out of it. Following the footsteps of Dilthey and Heidegger, Gadamer also admits that 'understanding' is the most primordial feature of human existence. He defines understanding as essentially linguistic. What gives it a linguistic character is its immanent 'as-structure' which means that we always perceive things from a certain standpoint 'as-something' and not as mere brute, a-linguistic facts.

Linguisticality is further characterized by Gadamer as having a communicative structure. That is to say, language is not a tool to be used in the judgemental mode; rather the fact is we live in it, grow with it. We find ourselves situated in a socio-historical reality fabricated by a particular language. And the mode of our understanding is conversational; for the language intrinsically is conversational. Hence, our understanding of overselves takes place in and through the communicative or dialogical encounter. In other words we live in and through dialogue.[5]

What is crucial about dialogue is its inherent logic of 'question and answer'. It is a dialectical interplay of 'give and take' relationship, that is to say, the participants engage themselves actively and not passively. Another characteristic feature of a genuine dialogue is that participants do not make superiority claims over one another, instead, the dialogue exercises its own power, as it were, its own being. From beneath the dialectical process the 'matter' or 'truth' under discussion comes to the surface and enables the participants to reflect upon their judgements. The 'truth' however let itself show only when the interlocutor (be it a person or any other hermeneutic object) is treated as an actual participant in a dialogue. It would have to be something like a conscious being, as it were, a 'thou' capable of eliciting responses and questions in a dialogical encounter. A genuine dialogue is a platform for enlarging the horizon of ones understanding in the light of multiple life-worlds that it opens up. For example, a hermeneutic reading of a text

as a dialogical encounter not only reveals its sense, its syntactical form, but also its referential dimension—the semantic existential framework. However, the semantic possibilities can be appreciated by the interpreter only when he listens to the claims made by it.[6]

That we should lend ears to what the other person says is not only a requirement of a genuine dialogue. The fundamental point here is that it is the basis of our own understanding, our own being. It is for this reason Gadamer considers it obligatory to appropriate the tradition transmitted to us as a 'thou', a living being, in order to make sense of our own historicity. We are essentially participative beings in the ongoing conversation of mankind and our understanding is due to the feature of dialogicality. The fact that we are historically situated in some socio-cultural realm is a fact about our participative or dialogical nature which survives on the communality of thought or meaning.

The point about the realm of common understanding is an ontological claim about the fundamentality of communicative understanding or consciousness which Gadamer terms 'effective-historical-consciousness'. It is this communality of thought which we owe naturally in a historical flow of consciousness that unites the 'I' and 'thou'. The communal nexus between 'I' and 'thou' does not guarantee complete understanding of the other, but signifies that the other is not a total stranger to us. In fact, the commensurability thesis assumes a dialectic, a tension between the familiar and unfamiliar, identity and difference, proximity and distance. 'Differal', in short, is the very essence of the thought.

Gadamer accepts this tension to be constitutive of all understanding. Understanding, for him, does not mean overcoming the distance between the past and the present, between the alien and the familiar, but listening to the claims made by the other, thus building a communicative bridge between 'I' and 'thou'. This communicative linking which presupposes the shareability of common thoughts that we naturally receive in the historical flux, conditions our 'self-understanding' or 'self-disclosure'. In essence, our understanding of the other, be it a tradition or the text, is a necessary prelude to our own understanding. The 'other' in the communicative nexus determines the 'I' or the self-understanding.

To sum up, the dialogical mode of understanding is a mode of being. Our identity is a 'communicative' identity insofar as dialogue is an event of communication. The inseparable 'I-thou' relationship is an internal subjective correlate of communicative or dialogical event. We can say that the unity of the individual self is a synthetic unity in the sense that the self partakes of the conversational unity of mankind. Since the individual's existential identity has its locus in the dialogical nexus the self can be said to have a dialogical constitution.

II

While Gadamer considers hermeneutic conversation to be that locus of self-understanding, Ricoeur develops a thesis of narrative understanding in this regard. The central claim of his theory of narrative understanding is that life essentially is textured in story-forms. The temporality of life is not just an errant succession of events, but it inherently possesses a narrative quality. Ricoeur calls this feature 'pre-history' or 'pre-figuration' (similar to Heidegger's notion of 'pre-ontological' or 'pre-figuration') which needs articulation in the form of a narrative text or discourse. The pre-figured, loosely textured reality of life attains meaningfulness in the act of telling a story about oneself. The pre-narrative stage of life, in a way, awaits the narrative synchronization by virtue of which a meaningful order of life is made apparent.

The work of configuration or 'emplotment', as Ricoeur calls it, is however not to corrupt the facts and thus become guilty of interpretative colouring. Though creative imagination does enter into an act of configuration, what prevents the misrepresentation of lived-reality is the essential pre-narrative structure. We experience the temporality of our life-episodes in a narrative bent of mind. The thread of life, so to say, is a narrative one.

But why then is narrative rendering at all desirable when life itself is textured in story-forms? Ricoeur's answer is that a story is a 'story told' or 'story recounted'. The act of telling a story is the articulation of the loosely configured 'lived-stories'. And for him the transition from the untold and repressed stories to the story told is an expression of a 'quest for identity'. In telling the story of ones life a person appropriates his identity. Ricoeur contends:

> The individual can be said to be entangled up in stories which happen to him before any story is recounted. The entanglement then appears as the pre-history or the story told, the beginning of which is chosen by the narrator ... the stories that are told must then be made to emerge out of the background. As they emerge, the implied subject also emerges too (1991, p. 30).[7]

The emergence of self-identity in the form of narrative identity is a result of the actual story which a person configures out of discrete and heterogeneous experiences of life. The narrative mediation in this sense has a cognitive potential. The movement from the pre-narrative, inchoate state towards the narrative interpretation of life is manifestive of the deepest desire of mankind to achieve stability against the fluidity of time. It is this desire for order, unity and stability that constitutes the very essence of the self and of self-understanding. And attaining self-understanding is a matter of understanding oneself in the narrative mode as having narrative identity.

However, the stability brought about by narrative ordering is intrinsically dynamic. For it is an organized temporal structure and not the static identity of sameness (*idem*) as a metaphysical substance persisting through temporal contingencies. Rather, the identity question is that of self-hood (*ipse*) of an agent—a moral agent, who Ricoeur says, is an 'acting and suffering' being.

What emerges from the exposition of two theories is the dual characterization of the self or self-understanding. Gadamer portrays the 'self' as having the dialogical constitution. The 'thou' is a necessary detour to appropriate ones own understanding. The theory focuses upon the 'outer', 'public', dimension of self-understanding; for 'I' is an integral correlate of the 'I-thou' existential matrix.

Ricoeur, on the other hand, illuminates that alongside our involvement with the 'other' in the communal space of language, we also have our life of self-involvement in the reflective space of individuality. There is the inner self with its personal space of being oneself, engaged in introspective reflection upon the myriad of contents of its lived-temporality and thereby articulating a more or less coherent structure of its own subjectivity—which is known as ones personal identity.

Thus, Ricoeur's theory focuses upon the subjective, personal dimension of self-understanding.

III

Having expounded the two accounts of self-understanding, I stress that Gadamer's theory of dialogical self-understanding needs to be supplemented with Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity. My argument is that his theory leaves out that essential dimension of human subjectivity which Ricoeur is rightly emphasizing. For Gadamer the subject, being a participant in the dialogical situation, is a product of the 'effective-historical-consciousness' in the continuity of which his self-understanding grows. As a result, the subjectivity or consciousness is delimited by what may be termed the collective subjectivity. It hardly concerns Gadamer whether there can also be an exploration into the patterns of self-constitution or individual subjectivity independently of the socio-communal, communicative-dialogical encounter of self-understanding. And it is not just possible or plausible; it is also a necessary direction insofar as an adequate comprehensive theory of self-understanding is concerned.

In order to justify that Gadamer's theory needs to be supplemented with Ricoeur's, I elaborate upon two notions—'effective-historical-consciousness' and 'making of history' dealt with by Gadamer and Ricoeur respectively. The examination of these two concepts paves a way towards conceiving a comprehensive theory of the self.

In Gadamer's view, our understanding of ourselves is correspondingly determined by our individual entrenchment in a community of co-participants roughly sharing a certain world-view and partaking of social customs. From this point of view, there is no transcendental epistemological point of vantage from where one can attain objective knowledge about human reality. Since our understanding is grounded in historical consciousness there cannot be a 'pure' consciousness purged of the tradition. Gadamer describes this mode of consciousness as 'effective-historical-consciousness'.

The consciousness of historical continuity is a hermeneutic experience and not an intuitive knowledge. This experience derives its cognitive significance from an immanent reflectivity that self-understanding is

finite; for it is delimited by its historical rootedness. Although a hermeneutic experience reveals that self-understanding is a ceaseless reflective process of *bildung*, it can be argued that justice cannot be done to it if it is defined in terms of 'effective-historical-consciousness' only. For if effective-historical-consciousness is to be taken as the chief determinant of our understanding of ourselves, our self-consciousness would appear to be the representation of ourselves as being 'appropriated' by history. We would then be ontologically identified as beings shaped by the causal power of history. Although this is true, this is only half the truth. But what is the other half of the whole truth about ourselves and about self-understanding?

Granted that we are to be understood as products of history, the other fact still remains that we are the *makers* of history. The continuity of the past in the present cannot overshadow the fact that we are the *agents* of history in so far as we are 'acting and suffering beings'. If it is true that the past questions us before we question it, it is also true that the past answers us to the extent we question it. We make the past 'answerable' to us by adopting a critical stance towards it; it is as though we assert our effective individuality over tradition from the centre stage of our living present.

Although Gadamer acknowledges the 'mediation' of present in any instance of hermeneutic experience and this is clearly displayed in his notion of 'fusion of horizons', his emphasis is on the continuity of the past or tradition which makes the 'present' what it is today. In fact, it is the continuity of the past or tradition as a 'thou' that constitutes the dialogical patterning of our understanding.

If the continuity of historical consciousness indicates the presence of 'otherness' in understanding. The concept of 'fusion of horizons' can be utilized to assert the authenticity of the 'present' and thereby that of the individual being who construes his identity in his conscious reflective act of configurating his lived-temporality. The fusion of horizons is a testimony to the historical agents' appropriation of history—a testimony to the effectiveness of the individual in bringing about the conversational unity against the backdrop of the diversity of allegiance to tradition. In Ricoeur's words, 'effective-history, we might say, is what

takes place without us. The fusion of horizons is what we attempt to bring about' (1983, p. 221).[8]

Given that the fusion of horizons is not a happening but is actively accomplished by us endorses that the present has to be considered a significant and active moment of the entire continuum of history with the past and the future as the two outmost moments. The 'present' is to be deemed as the historical present that mediates between the inherited tradition (or the past) and the horizon of expectation (or the future). It is only in structuring of this kind of a grand narrative that we can truly appreciate the dialectic of the ontology of 'tradition-boundedness' and the disclosure of ontic possibilities.

Gadamer overplays the fact of our receptivity of the past; the ontology of 'effective-historical-consciousness' gains ascendancy over the notion of the 'historical present'. In Ricoeur's hermeneutic philosophy we find the grand narrative structure of historical consciousness is shown to be constitutive of the three temporal modalities, namely, being affected by the past, the historical present and their relations to the future. Ricoeur here alludes to Heidegger's idea of 'making present', however differently.

In Heidegger the 'making present' is just another moment in our circumspective concernful existence, but Ricoeur adds to it the idea of 'initiative'. The moment of initiation as 'I can', 'I do' is a moment of decision and action.

Not only does Ricoeur attach the idea of initiation, he also complements it with Mearleau-Ponty's idea of the 'lived-body' which bridges the gulf between the physical and the psychical, between the cosmic exteriority and reflective inferiority. Thus, Ricoeur's concept of 'historical present' along with the notions of 'initiative' and 'lived-body' changes the profile of historical consciousness. It recuperates the subjectivity, the 'acting and suffering' beings *vis-à-vis* historical embeddedness.

IV

In the light of the above discussion, I argue that Gadamer's idea of 'effective-historical-consciousness' is largely responsible for underlining the communal dimension of self-identity. In as much as this dimension

is considered primordial, ones self-identity or subjectivity is virtually shaped by the historical past or tradition. One is thus a product of history, and oneself is always a being solely in virtue of co-participating with others in a perennial communicative praxis. Though an individual subject understands himself in and through his participation in the ongoing dialogue, he also discovers his 'self' through an inward reflective journey into his own lived-temporality. With respect to this undeniable phenomenon of human subjectivity, I stress that Gadamer's notions of the 'self' as a participative being in the communal space needs a theoretic account of the inner personal dimension of self-identity as a necessary supplement.

Ricoeur's idea of the self as a narrative construct, and the self's identity as narrative identity, aptly characterizes the interior structure of the self as a single subject—that is the structure of subjectivity itself. That emergence of *is* a 'singular narrative' is a fact of self-identity in addition to the fact that the formation of self-identity necessarily depends upon the influence of larger cultural narrative. The appropriation of oneself in a conscious act of narrative configuration does not negate our historical rootedness. In fact, this singular narrative or story of an individual life cannot be imagined independently of its embeddedness in a larger, meaning-giving structure, but at the same time, the subjectivity of this narrative is not therefore reducible to that of larger structure of intersubjectivity. It is this irreducible, essential individuality of self-conception that demands the representation of the self in a narrative mode. One might say that this singular narrative is personal in the sense of being *intra*-subjective.

However, raising the question of the structure of self-conception for a personal identity-profile does not imply contemplating individual subjectivity as ontically distinct from that of the collective subjectivity. Indeed, the whole issue is to provide an adequate dual-aspect characterization of the human subject. It is not the case that there exists some kind of a private 'monological' self as the interior counterpart of a public dialogical self located in the space of collective subjectivity. The fact of the matter is not dualism about selves, but dualism about aspects of the self.

Thus, the conclusion I arrive at is that the two distinctive identity-profiles of self-representation are not to be mistaken for two ontologically distinct self-conceptions. Rather, the distinction is to be recognized in terms of aspect dualism. It is the conception of one and the same self as essentially marked by two interpenetrating existential features of dialogicality and narrativity that together constitutes a comprehensive theory of the hermeneutic self.

Notes and References

1. Dilthey, Wilhelm (1976), *Selected Writings*, edited and translated by H.P. Rickman (Cambridge University Press).
2. The concept of 'mediation' here differs from the Hegelian idea of 'total mediation' which culminates in the total self-knowledge of the absolute mind. The hermeneutic mediation does not claim attaining a point of perfection; it instead promotes the proliferation of semantic (existential) possibilities.
3. Page, Carl (1991), 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and its Meaning for Philosophy', *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 35, pp. 127–36.
4. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975), *Truth and Method*, translated and edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming (Crossroad: New York), p. 432.
5. The primary motivation of Gadamer's theory of hermeneutic conversation is to bridge the Platonic gap between knowledge and language. Plato conceives knowledge as a property of being and distinguishes it from the medium through which it can be communicated. In Gadamer's view, knowledge is not a property of being but is very much a subjective process that involves the attitude of the knower. He draws out this crucial point from Socrates' dialogical model of knowledge which essentially demands the participation of the interlocutors.
6. Gadamer considers 'hearing' primary because in hearing one cannot 'hear away' the object. Hearing is conceived cognitively subtler than the other senses because it makes an essential claim about itself by establishing a communicative link between ourselves and the tradition that we inherit.
7. Wood, David (ed.) (1991), *On Paul Ricoeur*, Routledge: London and New York.
8. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1976), *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, translated and edited by David E. Linge (University of California Press).

On Wittgenstein's Attack on the Doctrine of Simples

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The present paper contains an attempt to show that Wittgenstein's arguments against the doctrine of simples are not fatal to Russell's doctrine of simples.

Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* advances a number of arguments against the doctrine of simples. Russell never recognized *Investigations* as a serious philosophical work. According to him,[1] the negative doctrines of this work are unfounded. But surprisingly he admitted the cogency of one of the arguments against the doctrine of simples advanced by Wittgenstein and his followers. This argument forced him[2] to admit that there is no reason either to assert or to deny that simples may be reached by analysis. I shall, however, try to show that even this argument of Wittgenstein has failed to achieve its purpose, and that Russell could easily refute this argument.

Wittgenstein criticizes the doctrine of simples from two different angles. First, he tries to show that it makes no sense at all to speak of absolutely simple entities. Secondly, he questions the merit of analysis of complexes into simples in philosophical thinking.

I

Wittgenstein offers two arguments to show that it makes no sense at all to speak of absolutely simple entities. His presentation of these arguments is sketchy, and we have to analyze them to understand what they really intend to prove.

It appears that one of the arguments of Wittgenstein intends to show that what we get by analyzing a complex being is simple relative to that complex being but not absolutely simple. An absolutely simple

being is one which is not further analyzable, and there is no reason to suppose that there is such a being.

> ... What are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?—What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms?—'Simple' means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'.[3]

Wittgenstein assumes that the advocates of the doctrine of simples take the term 'simple' to mean something that is not composite. As the idea of simple is conceived negatively in terms of the idea of complex, to understand what the advocates of the doctrine of simples mean by 'simple' we have to understand in what sense they use the term 'composite'. Thus, Wittgenstein asks: in what sense 'composite'? An entity is regarded as composite if it is analyzable. Now, if 'simple' means 'not composite', a simple being would be one that is not analyzable. But there is no reason to suppose that there are entities which are not analyzable. A chair is, for instance, analyzable in terms of bits of wood, bits of wood in terms of molecules, molecules in terms of atoms, atoms in terms of electrons, protons and neutrons, and so on. If we carry analysis in this way, we may get certain units which are not at present analyzable; but they may at any moment turn out to be capable of analysis.

Russell admits the force of the above argument. As it is logically possible that complex things are capable of analysis *ad infinitum*, it cannot be logically established that there are ultimate simples which are incapable of analysis. Again, we cannot empirically know whether there are entities which are simple in the sense that they are unanalyzable. For what appears to be simple at present may subsequently turn out to be capable of analysis. That is why Russell[4] came to think that, although many things can be known to be complex, nothing can be known to be simple. Thus, he abstained from asserting that products of analysis are simples. But he did not abstain from emphasizing the merit of analysis, and tried to modify his doctrine in such a way so that the question whether the products of analysis are simples becomes unnecessary.[5]

The other argument of Wittgenstein tries to establish a different point. The terms 'complex' and 'simple' are used in different senses. The term 'complex' has different senses, because complex beings are analyzable in different ways. Consequently, what we get by analyzing a complex being in a particular way are simples in a particular sense of 'simple', and it may be complex in a different sense. As any product of analysis is simple relative to a particular sense of 'simple', it makes no sense to speak of an absolutely simple entity.

Wittgenstein says that there are different kinds of complexity. 'Multi-colouredness is one kind of complexity; another is, for example, that of a broken outline composed of straight bits.'[6] As there are different kinds of complexity, the term 'complex' is used in different senses in different language-games. We cannot, therefore, ask the question 'Is this object composite?' outside a particular language-game. And the answer to the question whether something is simple or non-complex depends on what we understand by 'complex'.[7] In that case there can be nothing that is absolutely simple. Consider the following passage from Wittgenstein's *Investigations*:

> We use the word 'composite' (and therefore the word 'simple') in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. (Is the colour of a square on a chessboard simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of rainbow? ...)[8]

A chessboard may, for instance, be regarded as a complex entity in the sense that it is at a particular moment of experience analyzable in terms of certain empirically distinguishable properties—white colour, black colour, square shape, etc. In that case a property like white colour would be regarded as simple. But Wittgenstein points out that white may be regarded as complex in a different sense. It is complex in the sense that it consists of the colours of the rainbow. Of course, we cannot empirically distinguish the colours of the rainbow from white colour on a surface that is called white surface; but when a beam of light is reflected from a white surface and passes through a glass prism, it is separated into a spectrum with red light deflected least and ultra-violet most. Perhaps it is thought that the colours of rainbow are

potentially present in white colour, and thus the colour white under specific circumstances gives rise to the colours of the rainbow. However, if white is regarded as simple or non-composite in some sense but complex in some other, it cannot be regarded as absolutely simple. We may sum up Wittgenstein's second argument as follows.

'Complex' and 'simple' have different senses. What the advocates of the doctrine of simples cite as examples of simple are simples in a particular sense but complex in some other sense. So, they are not absolutely simple.

I shall try to show that none of the arguments of Wittgenstein is fatal to Russell's doctrine of simple. First I shall offer my argument and then try to establish the premises of my argument. My argument is the following.

The term 'complex' has different senses. An analysis of different senses of the term 'complex' reveals that there is a particular way of analysis corresponding to each sense of 'complex', and that complexes are not capable of analysis *ad infinitum* according to each way of analysis. What Russell in the context of his doctrine under consideration regards as complexes are complex in a particular sense. Russellian complexes are complex in the sense that they are analyzable in a particular way. Products of this type of analysis are not further analyzable. So, they are simple or non-complex in a particular sense of 'complex'. They may be complex in some other sense of 'complex'; but this cannot be a charge against Russell, because neither does his doctrine imply nor does he explicitly assert that the products of his analysis cannot be complex in some other sense of 'complex'. Thus, Wittgenstein's second argument fails. Again, as what Russell regards as products of analysis are not further analyzable in a particular sense of 'analysis', Russellian complexes are not capable of analysis *ad infinitum*. Hence, Wittgenstein's first argument fails. Of course, complexes may be capable of analysis *ad infinitum* in some other sense of 'analysis'; but this cannot constitute a charge against Russell, because in the context of his doctrine under consideration he speaks of a particular process of analysis. The products of this analysis may be regarded as absolutely simple or ultimate simple in the sense that they are non-further-analyzable ultimate products of analysis of complexes in a particular sense of 'complex', but not

in the sense that they are not complex in any customary sense of the term 'complex'. However, I have not anywhere in Russell's books found that he has used the expression 'absolutely simple' or 'ultimate simple' to refer to the products of analysis. In his earlier writings he has used the term 'simple' without any qualification.

I shall now try to establish the premises of the above argument. I shall begin with an analysis of three different senses of the term 'complex', and show that there is a particular way of analysis corresponding to each sense of the term 'complex', and that complexes are not capable of analysis *ad infinitum* according to each process of analysis. (1) An entity is regarded as complex in the sense that it is analyzable into certain parts which are physically separable. A table is, for instance, complex in the sense that it consists of and is analyzable into different parts—its legs, the top, etc. We can physically separate these parts by performing certain physical operations. We can break up each of these parts into further parts by performing further physical operations. Thus, a being, which is complex in the sense that it is analyzable into physically separable parts, may be capable of analysis *ad infinitum*. (2) An entity is regarded as complex in the sense that it is at a particular time analyzable into certain properties (specific shade of colour, shape, size, etc.) which are empirically distinguishable but not physically separable in fact. A table is, for instance, complex in the sense that it is at a particular moment of experience analyzable into certain empirically distinguishable properties—specific colour, shapes, etc. Again, a chessboard is complex in the sense that it is at a particular time analyzable into different empirically distinguishable properties—black colour, white colour, square shapes of different sizes, etc. These properties are empirically distinguishable at a particular moment of experience but not physically separable in fact. We cannot, for instance, physically separate the colour of an object from its shape, but still its colour and shape are empirically distinguishable. Now, an entity, which is complex in the sense that it is at particular moment of experience analyzable into certain empirically distinguishable properties, is not analyzable *ad infinitum*. Products of this type of analysis are certain distinguishable properties which we can directly identify in a complex at a particular moment of experience, and at that moment one cannot directly identify

some other property in any one of these products. Consequently, products of this type of analysis are not further analyzable on logical grounds. Of course, we can get a new property of an entity other than the properties which are empirically distinguishable in it at a particular time if we perform some physical operation on it, but it is not empirically distinguishable in that entity at that particular time, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as an actual or possible product of analysis of that entity in the particular sense of 'analysis' under consideration. Again, a property under certain specific conditions may give rise to certain other properties, but these 'other properties' cannot be regarded as the products of analysis in the sense of analysis under consideration, because we cannot directly identify the latter in the former at a particular moment of experience. Whether the colours of a rainbow are potentially present in white or not, we cannot empirically distinguish them from white on a surface that is called white surface. It follows that these colours are not products of analysis of white colour in the particular sense of 'analysis'. (3) A being may be regarded as complex in the sense that it, under certain specific conditions, gives rise to certain properties which are not empirically distinguishable in it at a particular moment of experience. These properties are thought to be potentially present in that being, and so it is conceived as complex in the sense that it is analyzable in terms of these properties. Thus, white is complex in the sense that the colours of the rainbow are potentially present in it, and that it is analyzable in terms of the colours of rainbow. Avoiding metaphysical controversy regarding potentiality, it may be said that what we call white are in a complicated way causally related to the colours of the rainbow, and consequently that the term 'white' refers to not only a simple observational property but also a causal law and causal or dispositional property. Thus, what is actually referred to by the term 'white' is complex in the sense that it is analyzable in terms of observational property, causal or dispositional property and causal relation. Now, an entity is analyzable indefinitely in this sense of 'analysis'. A being is analyzable in terms of its causal properties, each of these properties is further analyzable in terms of certain other causal properties, and so on indefinitely. (Here we must note a point. Russell considers the term 'white' as a simple symbol. It may be true that in

ordinary language 'white' is used to refer to a complex of observational and dispositional properties. But Russell's doctrine is not at all concerned with what we mean when we use the terms of ordinary language. He proposes to construct a technical language for a technical purpose by giving a particular name to each empirically distinguishable property. And here we are not concerned with whether what the names of ordinary language refer to are simples, but with whether what the names of Russell's language refer to are simples.)

What Russell in his later thought has regarded as complex is complex in the second sense of the term 'complex' discussed earlier in this paper. In his later work he proposes to 'abolish what are usually called "particulars", and be content with certain words that would usually be regarded as universals, such as "red", "blue", "hard", "soft", and so on.'[9] In this work he[10] identifies a particular with a bundle of properties, which are presented as one complex gestalt, presented at one particular moment of experience, and says that his analysis needs one proper name for the complex whole and other proper names for parts. And what he regards as analysis is 'the operation by which, from examination of a whole W, we arrive at "P is part of W".'[11] Here P, the product of analysis, does not refer to the products of physical operation (or physically separable parts) and to causal or dispositional properties, but to empirically distinguishable parts or properties, and the operation by which we arrive at 'P is part of W' is not physical operation but empirical examination. All these may be evident from the following passage:

> There are complexes composed of compresent qualities. I give the name of 'complete complex of compresence' to a complex whose members are all compresent with each other, but not all compresent with anything outside the complex. Such complete complexes take the place of particulars, and in place of such a statement as 'this is white', we have 'whiteness is constituent of a complex of compresence' consisting of my present mental content.[12]

Products of physical operation are not constituents of a complex of compresence consisting of a person's mental content of a particular time. Moreover, when we get a product of physical operation of a

complex, the appearance of the complex changes due to the operation and we get one or more new complexes. We cannot get a product of physical operation from a complex without destroying the complex. So, a product of physical operation of a complex cannot be a product of analysis of that complex in Russellian sense. Consequently, Russellian complexes are not complexes in the sense that they are physically analyzable. Again, a causal or dispositional property is also not a constituent of a complex of compresence consisting of a person's mental content of a particular time. Thus, Russellian complexes are not complexes in the sense that they are analyzable in terms of causal properties. They are complexes only in the sense that they are analyzable in terms of empirically distinguishable properties which are presented as one complex gestalt in a person's experience at a particular time. This type of complexes are analyzable in a particular sense of 'analysis'. I have already shown that products of this type of analysis are not further analyzable on logical ground. So, they are simple or not complex in a particular sense of 'complex'. Thus, Wittgenstein's second argument fails: Again, as Russellian complexes are not capable of analysis *ad infinitum* Wittgenstein's first argument fails. It follows that Russell need not abstain from asserting that products of his analysis are simples.

Wittgenstein tries to show that products of analysis are not absolutely simple. But we may ask the Wittgensteinian question: In what sense are they not absolutely simple? If Wittgenstein says that 'simple' and 'complex' have various senses, and that a product of analysis is simple in a particular sense but complex in some other sense, then my reply is: the products of Russellian analysis are simple or not complex in a particular sense. If he says that the products of Russellian analysis are not absolutely simple because complexes are capable of analysis *ad infinitum*, then my reply is: Russellian complexes are not capable of analysis *ad infinitum* in a particular sense of 'analysis'. Hence both the arguments of Wittgenstein fail to refute Russell's doctrine of simples.

II

Wittgenstein offers another set of arguments which question the merit of analysis of complexes into simples. He speaks of two forms of language. In one, composite objects have names, and in the other, parts

are given names and the whole is described by means of them. Symbols of the former can be analyzed in terms of the symbols of the latter. But Wittgenstein tries to show that such analysis not only does not serve any useful purpose in practical life but also distorts reality. Hence, the language of simple symbols cannot be claimed to be more fundamental.

Wittgenstein[13] points out that when we use a term to say something about a complex entity we do not specially think of its parts. For example, when someone says, 'My broom is in the corner', he does not specially think of the parts of the broom, and he does not really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed on the brush. Thus the analysis of complexes into simples does not really reveal what people really mean when they use complex symbols, and consequently a sentence containing complex symbols cannot be replaced by certain sentences containing simple symbols.

This argument does not prove anything against Russell's doctrine. In the first place, what Wittgenstein in his example regards as the products of analysis (broomstick, brush, etc.) are not products of Russellian analysis. The products of Russellian analysis are not physically separable parts but empirically distinguishable properties. Secondly, Wittgenstein's argument is based on the assumption that the analyst holds that analysis of complex symbols in terms of simple symbols reflects what people really mean when whey use complex symbols. But Russell is not at all concerned with what people really mean or think of when they use complex symbols. He[14] is only asserting that all the facts asserted by the use of a complex symbol can be asserted by the use of simple symbols in terms of which the complex symbol is analyzed.

Wittgenstein[15] raises another point. Suppose, someone, while giving an order, says, 'Bring me the broomstick and brush which is fitted onto it' instead of saying 'Being me the broom'. This appears to be an odd way of giving an order. Adopting such an odd way of giving an order is useful if the hearer understands the analyzed form of the order better than the unanalyzed form. But the analyzed sentence, according to Wittgenstein, achieved the same as the ordinary one, but in a more

roundabout way. Thus, analysis of complexes in terms of simples has no practical utility.

This argument, if at all directed to Russell's doctrine, is based on wrong assumptions. Russell[16] himself says that the purpose of constructing a technical language in philosophy is not the abandonment of ordinary language in favour of certain odd ways of speaking. His purpose is to understand the nature of the world-structure and the relation between language and the world. Again, Russell does not anywhere suggest that the analysis of complex symbols in terms of simple symbols provides a better understanding of the meaning of complex symbols in ordinary context. Rather, he suggests that simple symbols determine the meaning of complex symbols. For instance, what we understand by a broom is composed of a broomstick and a brush, and it will not be regarded as a broom without the brush or the broomstick. Thus, the meaning of the symbols which stand for a broomstick and a brush determine the meaning of the symbol which stands for a broom. (In this example the simples are not Russell's 'simples', still it shows what Russell really suggests.)

Wittgenstein points out a further problem of analysis. A whole is something more than its parts obtained from analysis. Something is lost when a whole is sought to be analyzed. It is, therefore, unique and unanalyzable. As an illustration Wittgenstein speaks of the French tricolour. 'Think of the cases where we say, "This arrangement of colours (say the French tricolour) has a quite special character." '[17] Such a special character does not belong to any of its elements obtained by analysis. This character is lost when it is analyzed. Thus, to analyze is to distort reality.

How do we know that something is lost when a whole is analyzed into parts? This is not possible to know without analyzing the whole. Thus, the worth of analysis is that it gives us knowledge not otherwise obtainable. However, nothing is lost when we apply Russell's method of analysis to analyze a whole. According to Russell, the operation by which, from examination of a whole W, we arrive at 'P is part of W', is called analysis. Now, consider a complex—an arrangement of colours that is called the French tricolour. Let us call it F. Call its characteristics P_1, P_2, P_3, etc., and its special character P_s. We may observe

and examine the complex called the French tricolour, and analyze it as 'P_1 is part of F', 'P_2 is part of F', 'P_s is part of F', and so on. Nothing is lost in this analysis. The special character of a complex is lost if we disturb the arrangement of its properties by physical operation or by something else. In that case we get a new complex which is analyzable in terms of a different set of properties.

Russell proposes to construct a language by giving a particular name to each empirically distinguishable property. The above-mentioned arguments of Wittgenstein try to show that this is not the fundamental form of language in the senses that an analysis of the other forms in terms of its symbol cannot catch what people mean when they use other forms, cannot give us better understanding of what is said by using the other forms, and so on. But Russell never claimed that his language is fundamental in the sense that it gives us everything. It is fundamental in the sense that its simple symbols are the smallest number of words in terms of which we can describe the empirical world. All the complex symbols which we use to describe the world are definable in terms of these simple symbols.[18]

III

An analysis of Wittgenstein's arguments against the doctrine of simples may give the impression that these arguments are not at all directed against Russell's doctrine of simples. But since he at the beginning of his criticism of the doctrine of simples refers to Russell's 'individuals' and his 'objects' (*Tractatus*), we may assume that at least some of his arguments are directed against Russell's doctrine. In that case I shall conclude that he was arguing against certain false interpretations of Russell's doc ne.

Notes and References

1. B. Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (London: Unwin Paperback, 1985), pp. 160–1.
2. Ibid., p. 164.
3. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), Sec. 47.
4. Op. cit., note 1, p. 123.

5. Ibid., p. 123, see also p. 165.
6. Op. cit, note 3, Sec. 47.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. B. Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: Unwin Paperback, 1985), pp. 94–5.
10. Ibid., p. 94, see also p. 330.
11. Ibid., p. 327.
12. Op. cit., note 1, p. 127.
13. Op. cit., note 3, Sec. 60.
14. Op. cit., note 1, p. 166.
15. Op. cit., note 3, Sec. 60.
16. Op. cit., note 1, p. 126.
17. Op. cit., note 3, Sec. 64.
18. Op. cit., note 1, pp. 125–6.

Living with Values: Reflections on Modernity and Morality

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Our traditional value perspective, famously known as theory of *Purusārtha*, aims at the purification and perfection of human beings as noble creatures among the creatures by asserting the four cardinal values such as *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Moksa*. Our traditional value perspective has emphasized the moral and spiritual perfection and it takes us to a state of realization in which four cardinal values act interdependently by providing a common principle of living. Modern social reformers and leaders have often latched on to the traditional value perspective and its customary provisions, challenging *Purusārthas* by common dharma ethic. But, though still inconclusive, their challenge shows how India today seeks a situation both through its traditions and the positions to let people approximate good living and claim for human values which may be suitable for the same with the help of rethinking of present social reality and reformation. But in this case, our craze for material consumption and the over-impact of scientific authoritarianism distinctly constrains such a spirit by establishing the rule of ritual exclusion, social dismissal, injustice and impurity. The main objective of this paper is to highlight the spirit of moral and spiritual attainment which remains highly receptive as a fundamental goal to human beings over and above material prosperity and scientific vision. This paper also presents the view that the spirit of modernity does not encourage the clash of values between our tradition and modern science, and this view is presented in the light of a comprehensive unity of spirituality and science.

TRADITION, HUMAN LIFE AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS

Hindu tradition has always pointed at a central issue: how can one lead a good life? A necessary and sufficient access to good living by all humans may be considered as a moral need or a basic human right. As a corollary in an egalitarian civil society it also means that there is equal opportunity and fairness for everyone in securing good living, including for the poor, marginal and weak. Similarly, the right to good living can not be limited to the socially dominant of the biologically fittest. A democratic welfare state must ensure a uniformly just and equitable system and the inculcation, possession and instruction of moral values and human ideals for all its different constituent groups and communities. But at the end of this modern century most nations, international organizations and intellectual bodies still treat these as 'non-attainable hopes' so far as our socio-cultural moral conditions are concerned. The right to good living is nowhere near a globally assured universal political-legal right of people. Rather, the concern of good living is quite asserted as an event of personal commitment to have a decent living with own moral consciousness. Moral consciousness, Professor Daya Krishna aptly observes, follows from moral events which a man experiences in his daily life or from the situations in which he is involved.[1] He says:

> ... Moral consciousness is a troubled consciousness, the guilty consciousness *par excellence*, for it makes one continuously *feel* that one is not doing all that one could or ought to do for others. Even in the pursuit of knowledge or the creation and appreciation of works of art, or while engaging in sheer fun or play or social get-togethers or sport, one has to *forget* the immense misery in the world, and the only way one *justifies* it to oneself is that these activities are perhaps indirectly helpful in alleviating the misery of mankind to some extent and that, in any case, one cannot do much to help mankind.[2]

So nobody can assure good living to all and even all can not be able to wipe out odd conditions which are responsible for violating the right to good living. Odd conditions of our social space have been the source of immorality and have intensified inhuman anti-social moods and actions with increasing harmfulness to peaceful living. In certain cases

the increasing social dependence, inequity and injustice have become cause for disharmony and revolutionary tension. These conditions today globally produce massive irritation, on the one hand, and the total factors of war and terrorism on the other.

Human good living availability is thus subject to enormous factors, both subjective and objective, more often because of human factors than natural disasters and calamities. As a matter of realization human good living is conditioned by at least two sets of values, one morally ideal or universal and the other contextual and practical. Both sets of distinctions are at the heart of Indian—traditional and modern—debates surrounding human interests and availability of values which are treated as sole conditions for human good living. The issue of the right to good living is even more elusive and uncompromising. If the assurance of good living debate in India today rests on the presence of human values, then human values availability within the present environment rests, as surely, on several concurrent moral, religious and cultural criteria that Hindu minds except.[3] But the question central to this paper is: how do these two distinct cultural trends, i.e., traditional as well as modern, today relate to the right to good living issues in India? Both often exist and works in India under either mutual denial, separation or obviation. Even when recalled together, the two cultural trends remain separate, confined to their own distinct spheres of concern. If the modern social reality dominates ideals of good living or moral aspects of human life, then we need our traditional values as may be in a refined manner to shape our living morally satisfactory and perfect. However, the fact of today is to realize the effectiveness of both trends which are now indispensable for our existence, development and sustenance. For this reason, we may avoid the open ideological conflicts between the two or any one-sided judgement on them. With regard to good living, we experience, Professor Daya Krishna has evidentially pointed out, a cluster of interrelated Hindu cultural constructs with contemporary Indian approaches, traditional and modern especially on the issues of natures of man, nature of life, moral entitlement, values and human rights.[4]

Although Indian cultural responses to modernity are far from final, they nevertheless repeatedly show a distinct cultural 'bridge-work',

evident more in social life than in conceptual schemes and philosophical ideologies. Human values availability and possession issues also reflect the same pattern. That is, while Indians have upheld modernity, they have also pragmatically accepted the traditional values rooted in spiritual preachings inherently present in our past classics. Under such conditions a moral assessment may be made with regard to Hindu cultural ideals, conceptions and practices. While assessing them from both within and without, a genuine thinker may better ascertain how the two domains, i.e., the traditional Indian way and modern, human needs get differentiated by social contexts, crises and conditions. When considering the Hindu traditional approach to issues of access to good living and human values, we encounter two basic questions. First, what is its internal/moral/cultural language on matters concerning the natural origination and availability of human values, and what are the major forces that limit and constrain good living and sustenance in society? Second, how close are the cultural ideals and ideas to actual local conditions and conflicts on the one hand, and to the modern liberal right to good living goals and debates, on the other?

Today's Hindus, however, culturally self-isolating, can not insulate themselves from these issues any longer. Rather, they must critically examine their own operating cultural assumptions, attitudes and practices. Good living and the degradation of moral value issues in India today are seldom so simple that one could squarely blame either the Hindu traditional system or the modern state of living with welfare policies and programmes. Simple ideological oppositions between tradition and modernity, the underpinning of many an academic debate, also simplify and distort the overall Indian social and pragmatic sensibilities. Such debates often overlook internal differentiation and underestimate not only the social resilience of Indians, but their eye on fairness as well. They often enhance people's capability for social care, moral esteem, resourcefulness and practical ingenuinity while facing adversity and odd situations. The Indian value system, i.e., *Purusārtha*, aims to draw and to show the best in the man more than an empirical explication of the standard of human life.[5]

Without denying or keeping aside the fact of disvalued conditions in our social space we may explore the sense of Indian ethos with its

actual roles, meanings and limitations. We now realize that although every major Indian religion and system of thought asserts its distinct ideology—a philosophy, a system of morality and values, a sense of good living, disallows social justice and inhuman practices in any form, they still fail to present an explicit picture/model of human life/code of belief and conduct for reaching the highest goal. Spiritually speaking, the highest goal in the Indian case, i.e., *Moksa*, is prefixed with its metaphysical commitment. The tradition of Indian belief and knowledge has ever tried to explore one ultimate reality, i.e., *Brahma/Parmabrahma*, and individual attainment/realization of this ultimate reality. The Hindu religion ever speaks about an ethics or value system without any presumed bias for reaching the final perfection. Even we can not underestimate this sense by experiencing the diversity of Indian culture. But this diversity which is empirically true to all does not keep us far from our final goal. Rather, participating in diversity drives us to such a state, i.e., a state of unity, which meaningfully asserts an open mind to see the truth in proper light by omitting and shadows and prejudices.

TWO CULTURES: SPIRITUAL AND SCIENTIFIC

We encounter a good form of cultural pluralism and consequently we have variety of values. In contemporary discussion on culture and values, what we are convinced of is that all cultures (both traditional and modern) that we encounter in the Indian context, in principle, may be categorized and move themselves under two major cultural perspectives, such as the culture of spiritualism and the scientific culture. The scientific culture, in the broad sense of the term, represents the culture of progress and material prosperity and, on the other hand, the culture of spiritualism represents the culture of spiritual perfection. The thrust of the scientific culture is the idea of progress that enjoins a constant search for new values of all kinds, intellectual and otherwise. This is the spirit of modernity which is governed by modern science and technological advancement. Science is an eternal quest for the understanding of secrets of nature. This requires building new structures and paradigms of our scientific explanation of the world. This spirit expresses itself in an onward movement, in building ever larger and more

complicated structures. Herein lies the speciality of this model of culture. It accumulates more and more complex structures of the plan and patterns of life and the world. There is, therefore, progressive unfoldment of the new visions of life in the new settings of the scientific culture. For there is no resting place in its onward movement towards the future. The future promises even better life in a better world. However, in contrast to the idea of progress in the scientific culture, there is what may be called purpose and perspicuity of this progress in the culture of spiritual perfection which lies in the 'striving for highest ideal (*vimoksa*)' with personal purification and perspicuity. The quality of good living is more closely linked with this spirit than with the web of material prosperity. This typically brings modern man to the idea of tradition as the storehouse of human values along with the highest goal for which he strives. That is, he seeks freedom from the world-picture that captivates his mind. He needs such values which can save him from this captivation. Here the idea of freedom stands for clarity of understanding or intellectual perfection and the consequent sense of standing above the scientific culture. The latter sense is the sense of transcending the scientific world-picture and its attendant value-system. Scientific civilization creates its own value-system in the ideas of progress and progressive acquisition of the material resources. This model of progress thus makes man more and more inclined towards the gross products of our civilization and contributes towards the pollution of the human spirit, especially towards separating man from his tradition, from what is final and eternal.

The foreseen fact is that the two cultures of progress and spiritual perfection stand in sharp contrast to each other. While the one stands for the spirit of conquest, the other stands for withdrawal from the race for adventures. One stands for scientific knowledge and the other for spiritual wisdom. Scientific culture ensures outward-looking life of action while the spiritual culture recommends the life of quiet contemplation. In scientific culture the values of life lie in the intellectual excellence and its other modes of manifestation such as in art, religion and science. The age of reason represents the height of this culture as it leads to the progress of all aspects of human life in all possible spheres. According to Ernst Cassirer, this is the dominant culture of

enlightenment in the west.[6] To this is opposed the culture of spiritual perfection and the freedom of the human spirit. The latter is not opposed to reason and science as such, but it opposes the rationalist and the scientific bias of the age. It stands against the spirit of scientization of every aspect of life. It undermines the very strategy of reducing all enquiry into an enquiry of rationalization and justification. The contrast of the cultures lies thus not so much in form but in content. Both are products of the age of enlightenment but, whereas one seeks explanation of everything, the other searches for the essence in contemplative description; the latter as the enquiry into meaning and the value of existence whereas the former still searches for the causes and the grounds in the scientific age.

No doubt, the modern world including Indian space is governed by science. Scientific temperament and outlook have become a natural possession of modern man. True to say, science will never succeed in destroying the spiritual urge in man in spite of his large material craze. Acharya Vinoba Bhave writes:

> Many are under the illusion that the science of spirituality has reached perfection and now there is no room for any improvement. Modern scientists, however, are humble and they declare that science will never reach perfection. Though we are contemplating a trip to the moon, they say, and though we have succeeded in sending an artificial satellite in an orbit around the earth, yet the knowledge that we have obtained hardly relates to an infinitesimal fraction of the infinite universe. Just as science is growing every day and will continue to grow hereafter with every new scientific discovery or invention, spirituality also continues to make progress with every new experiment undertaken.[7]

The message of this passage is neither to over-emphasize science nor to heighten the spirituality. It, rather, indicates to a model for harmonious presence and progress of both science and spirituality. In the face of such a model, extreme scientism seems to be harmful to mankind and, similarly, radical spiritualism will drive us to mystical fantasies spoiling human possession of natural reason. What seems to be morally relevant is a comprehensive unity. In this unity there remains a

central core which is the same and which makes a relation between scientific culture and the culture of spirituality possible. The core of this unity lies in *Sarvodaya*. As Professor J.N. Mohanty observes:

> *Sarvodaya*—to mention one of Vinobaji's favourite themes—is born out of the union of *Ātmajnāna* and *Vijnāna*. This equation expresses Vinobaji's faith that *Sarvodaya* is a modern creed to meet the needs of the modern man ... Ancient self-knowledge teaches, amongst other truths, the identity of all selves and the ethics of love and 'renunciation'. 'Give up the "I" and the "mine",' teaches the Vedānta. Science, it could be said in general, inculcates the ideas of evolution and progress; a sense of history and an awareness of the historical situation, a collective point of view and a feeling for the temporal needs as contrasted with the purely spiritual aspirations. The *Sarvodaya* outlook on life combines these two.[8]

Besides, spirituality in the Indian case tells us of certain unique aspects of human life. Spirituality points to truth that includes unity and sanctity of life. The belief in unity of life is not sufficient. Unity of life is a very abstract thing and it may not have that strength to stimulate us and lead us to right thinking. There are many things for which we have to use tests other than the unity of life. Simply agreeing that life is one is not enough. Spirituality demands that one should have faith in absolute moral values, not relative moral values.[9]

Spirituality of the modern variety[10] stresses on the need to join the hearts of the different peoples of the world to form a common world-culture which can make us 'appreciate the plurality of faiths not as a curse but as a necessity born of the human situation.'[11] Since the scientific culture, as noted above, stands for the culture of progress, it is marked by the symbol of the wheel. The concept of progress is marked by the symbol of wheel as it presupposes time. 'The Indian culture as a whole,' A.N. Balslev says, 'makes profound and profuse use of this symbol in a variety ways. It is tied up inextricably with the life and culture of the Hindu-Buddhist world. To the participants of this culture the wheel captures the pole of experience which allows one to arrive at a notion of law, that which makes prediction possible. The Buddhist tradition makes the symbol a vehicle of Buddhist thought. The

message that the symbol of the "wheel of becoming" (*Bhava-Cakra*) has been transmitting for the past 2500 years is not any idea of mechanical repetition of individual destiny, externally imposed. On closer examination it can be seen that the emphasis is on the inexorability of the moral law, *karma*, involving and implying ideas about rebirth and salvation.'[12] Imperatively, it is significant to note the fact as A.N. Balslev writes further, 'The theories of time developed at that stage of philosophical growth which saw the rise of distinct Schools of Indian Philosophy. The contrast of views in awe-inspiring. If at the one end of the scale there is a unitary view, there is a pluralistic view at the other end; if some maintain the objective, independent reality of time, others question it.'[13]

Thus, in the Indian context tradition is not a static concept. Rather, tradition involves its own elements of progress. To say this, the culture of spirituality as the foundation of our tradition creates new values like of the scientific culture, and so moves as the culture of value-seeking and of self-realization. The idea of value-seeking and the value of self-realization is linked with man, traditional or modern, since ultimately the supreme value of being a human lies in the understanding of the value of life. Life-patterns of humans reflect the values that they like or dislike. Life-patterns constitute the value of life and the value of life is something that is manifested in culture but is not amenable to causal and scientific explanation. Thus there is a protest against the so-called scientization of human culture and value-system.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTEGRATED PARADIGM

Modernity tells us the truth that morality of man depends upon both science and spirituality. As a human being, man has power to rationalize everything as well as the power to inculcate faiths upon certain things. In the process of living he may encounter conflicts or dilemmas between reason and faith, science and tradition, but he can not denounce or underestimate any one of them. Man, like a bird, has two wings—science and spirituality—and he needs both together for his happiness and good living. The design of every machine provides for two forces, one to generate energy for movement and the other to guide and control it. One cannot work without the other. Once Acharya

Vinoba remarks, 'we walk with our feet and not with our eyes, but the eyes show us where to go. Self-knowledge is the eye, science is the feet ... . Nothing can be done in the world without science, but science cannot go in the right direction without self-knowledge or spirituality.'[14] Spirituality is needed today because man has acquired immense power of science. Science has taught us open-mindedness, rationality and value-flexibility but these concepts will be weakened if they do not significantly access the existence of identity of human beings. If everything in this world is purposive and goal-oriented, science cannot go on and work without a purpose. If this purpose is to seek the well-being of the mankind, and if, in turn, mankind's well-being completely depends on the assertion and realization of 'innerness', it would be a great damage to us for thinking that science and spirituality move in opposite directions. In this connection what actually is proposed by Vinobaji is, as Professor J.N. Mohanty puts it:

> Consistent with his general attitude Vinoba Bhave does not regard man's self-knowledge as immutable. He condemns that type of spiritual thought which regards truth as known, without residue, which leaves no room for further explorations, and which sees no line of spiritual perfection that has not been realized. On the other hand, he would recommend to the protagonists of spiritual life an ever receding, unattained, but progressively attainable, ideal in the manner of the scientist. He would like the spiritual speaker to get rid of self-complacency and face new possibilities of development and new lines of advance. It is his conviction that 'only a tiny portion of the possibilities of self-knowledge has been realized by mankind'. Therefore, like science, self-knowledge also has to grow far beyond what the ancients had realized.[15]

It is worthwhile to observe that three forces are working in this scientific age. The first is 'spirituality' which moulds human life. The second is 'science' which, besides changing the external, influences the internal life as well and requires man to rise above his mind. The third force that can prove effective is that of morality of 'faith'. The morality of faith may vary from person to person, but its ultimate concern is to bridge the gap between the external and internal, i.e., between the

empiricality of the world of science and the transcendentality of human mind or spirit. In Indian culture, though the morality of faith seems to dominate human thinking and understanding and creates a value-system (*Purusārtha*) where at the centre the role of men is clearly defined. According to our tradition man is defined as a finite body with an infinite soul and our saints and peers explore this nature of man.

Modernity is a reflection of scientific world-picture which does not denounce, but includes the rationalization of spirituality. The rationalization of spirituality means to bring out the universal character of human-beings barring all temporal attitudes, desires, beliefs, etc. The universal character of human-beings denounces the diversity which is phenomenal in nature and asserts the unity of life consequently. Unity of life, as it can be said, is a product of consciousness and follows from both science and spirituality. We discover this truth with a better hope. The hope is that science/the scientific culture and spirituality/the culture of spiritual perfection could combine and lead the world to greater harmony and happiness. Under the present circumstances, both scientific knowledge and spirituality would prove very helpful to man to lead a peaceful life. Just as in an automobile, there is an accelerator, manipulating whether its speed can be increased or decreased, and a steering wheel which gives a direction to it, similarly spirituality will show the direction to humanity and science will move in that direction with speed. Of course, this analogy shows us man's intimate relationship with the culture. However, as Professor Daya Krishna rightly observes:

> The relationship between man and culture is thus as diverse as the ways in which man himself may be conceived. And the fact that man himself may be conceived in different ways, and that each of these different conceptions has a profound influence on the way a society and culture shape themselves, is perhaps the most important thing that can be said about man himself. Yet, once this is admitted, the central issue begins to relate to the question of alternative ideals of man and society and the ways in which any particular ideal may be justified or validated as against others. The diversity of cultures is, in a sense, standing evidence of the diversity of ways in which man has conceived of himself and the literate civilizations have left an

impressive record of the continuous debate about the different ideals which men had conceived and of which these civilizations were an embodiment, to some extent or other.[16]

One must see the implications of this passage the movement one is inclined to discover the worth of many ways of man's relationship with culture. Since on the eve of modernity we talk about a world-culture, the whole truth lies in the study of man and his forms of life. Human life is complex and has many facets and forms. There may be some justification for this claim, yet one may also insist that in spite of this 'manyness' of human life, there is a higher form of life, i.e. to say in terms of a divine life/perfect life/happiest life, in the sense of that is the source of morality and values. This hope would play a crucial role in defining man, be it scientific or spiritual, and, perhaps, which is truly grounded in the historic consciousness of a tradition.

AN UNENDING ISSUE

Science is now warning man that the mental equipment is no longer sufficient and that he must now build his life on a scientific foundation. Man holds in his hands the power of the atom, the very building block of creation, and at the same time the energy of which can destroy the creation itself. For life or death, the atom is in man's hands. Science and spirituality together can bring heaven down to earth, but science allied with violence can bring ruin. It is just because science has made so much of progress that spirituality has assumed so much importance. If we want science to go on developing, we will have to accept spirituality for our complete living. In this context we must regard the moral maxim: 'No peace today, no life tomorrow'. Adherence to spirituality would display our commitment to commandments and precepts involved in the tradition and values which are developed from the commitment. Consequently, spirituality would compel the realization of the necessity of observance of individual and social morality and thus it will ultimately prevent the misuse of scientific inventions and power and will create a peaceful global atmosphere in which our good living and sustenance will be continued. Bertrand Russell in his essay entitled 'The Future Shock' published in 1914 states that 'At present

science does harm by increasing the power of rulers. Science is no substitute for virtue; the heart is as necessary for a good life as the head.' The virtue is, indeed, provided by the culture of spirituality. To promote and foster virtue-impulses is the function of spirituality which is an inherent moral instruction of Indian tradition. The ideal of humankind is not differently defined in the name of modernity; modernity is itself within the tradition.

Besides, the present pragmatic mood for a critical inquiry concerning the issue of the values and value-relativism is to be emphasized for stimulating a reappraisal of the question of cultural pluralism. To acknowledge cultural pluralism as an empirical phenomenon is not necessarily to assume the stance of a relativist; for that one requires additional arguments. Relativism, however, is one amongst the various possible theories which try to make sense of pluralism, just as its very opposite, i.e. essentialism, also claims to be able to account for this phenomenon. What essentially prompts this discourse on pluralism in the cultural context, as Professor Mrinal Miri indicates, is the need that the members of various cultural communities have to achieve a higher level of critical self-understanding by placing themselves in a larger context which inevitably involves certain basic values as objective ones.[17] One may very well claim that values have a cultural-base for their origination, sustenance and decay. In short, culture breeds values and values are meant for human beings who live with what exactly constitutes the values in the cultural context is indispensable for understanding the very idea of value-relativism.

The need for an intellectual involvement with the question of value-relativism seems to be intimately tied with any attempt to understand the contemporary world—a network of complex and complicated issues which amongst others also has its cultural dimension.[18] Evidently, it is no adequate description of the present global situation to say that the nuclear age is a post-orthodox era. Tradition has been changed and conventions have been revived according to time for human beings. We live with a new culture—located by multi-culture space. Cultures, indeed, are major sources of ideas which provide meaning and a sense of direction for human existence. They play an important role in how a people constitute a sense of living and a sense of goodness.

They are important factors in the continuing power of group identities. They not only unify, they also divide. The purely theoretical aspects of the issue of cultural-pluralism and the possibility of value-relativism need to be examined in the light of this awareness.[19]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. H. Bhattacharyya, 'Indian Ethics' and also see cf. M. Hiriyanna's 'Philosophy of Values' in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III, H. Bhattacharyya (ed.), 2nd Edition, (Kolkata: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1953), pp. 620–44 and pp. 645–54 respectively.
4. Daya Krishna, *The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought About Man, Society and Polity*.
5. On this point of discussion of course, there are differences among contemporary Indian thinkers in their views and interpretations. See, for example, Daya Krishna's 'The Myth of the *Purusārthas*' (*JICPR*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1986), R. Sundara Rajan's 'Approaches to the Theory of *Purusārthas*' (*JICPR*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1988), Rajendra Prasad's 'The Theory of *Purusārtha*: Revaluation and Reconstruction' and 'The Concept of *Moksa*' in his *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality* (New Delhi: ICPR Publications, 1989), V. Shekhawat's 'Origin and Structure of Purusārtha Theory: An Attempt at Critical Appraisal' (*JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1991), etc.
6. Ernest Cassirer, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to Philosophy of Human Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), and for an evidential discussion on mutual influence and relationship between scientific culture and the culture of spiritualism as virtually represented by West and East respectively, see Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990).
7. Vasant Nargolkar, *The Creed of Saint Vinoba* (Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), pp. 263–4.
8. J.N. Mohanty, 'The Mind Behind Bhoodan: Shri Vinoba Bhave's Land-Gift Movement' in J.N. Mohanty's *Essays on Indian Philosophy*, (ed.) P. Bilimoria (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 171–2.
9. M. Hiriyanna, 'The Philosophy of Values' in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III.

10. For example, cf. A.N. Balslev's 'Religious Pluralism and Relativism: The Possibility of Inter-Religious Communication' in *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1991), pp. 57–72.
11. Syed Vahiduddin, 'Reflections on the Diversity of Religious Life' in *Existence, Experience and Ethics*, (ed.), A. Raghuram Raju (New Delhi: D.K. Print World (P) Ltd., 2000), p. 340.
12. A.N. Balslev, 'Religious Pluralism and Relativism: The Possibility of Inter-religious Communication', p. 66.
13. Ibid., p. 64.
14. Vinoba Bhave, *Third Power* (Varanasi: Sarva Seva Sangha Prakashan, 1972), pp. 47–8.
15. J.N. Mohanty, 'Science and Self-Knowledge' in *Essays on Indian Philosophy*, pp. 178–9.
16. Daya Krishna, 'The Study of Culture' in his *The Art of the Conceptual* (New Delhi: ICPR Publication, 1989), p. 268.
17. Mrinal Miri, 'Plurality of Cultures and Multiculturalism' in his *Identity and the Moral Life* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 80–92.
18. Michael McGhee, 'Facing Truths: Ethics and the Spiritual Life' in *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1971), pp. 39–55, and also see Mrinal Miri's 'Science and Prescience' in *Identity and the Moral Life*, pp. 70–79.
19. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Daya Krishna for his insightful comments and suggestions on the earlier draft of the paper which have enabled me to modify, and to reformulate certain ideas of the paper.

A Limitation of Kaplan's Version of the Rule of Exportation[1]

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The restriction on the rule of exportation imposed by Kaplan in section IX of 'Quantifying In'[2] is intended to block certain anomalies in this rule originally proposed by Quine.[3]

According to Quine, if, e.g.,

(1) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy

is a true sentence, and if 'the man in the brown hat' denotes a person by name 'Ortcutt', one may export on the term 'the man in the brown hat' to a purely referential position, i.e., to a position which is outside the scope of the believes—that operator, and substitute 'Ortcutt' for it. Thus we may infer from (1).

(2) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy.

In section VII of his 'Quantifying in', Kaplan exposes one limitation of this rule. It is plausible for Ralph to believe that the shortest spy is a spy without having any idea of who the shortest spy is. Assuming that there is someone who is the shortest spy, we could export on 'the shortest spy' in

(a) Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy

to a purely referential position to obtain

(b) Ralph believes of the shortest spy that he is a spy.

Exportation is intended to validate the inference that there is someone (or something) of whom an agent believes something if he believes that, e.g., the man in the brown hat is a spy. Kaplan's counter-example shows that unrestricted exportation does not work because there are

situations in which an agent, here Ralph, believes that someone is such-and-such without therefore believing of a particular person that he is such-and-such.

Kaplan corrects this deficiency of exportation by introducing the notion of 'representation'. Briefly, a term α represents a person (or thing) to an agent iff α denotes that person (or thing), α is a name *of* that person for the agent, and α is a (sufficiently) vivid name. Kaplan proposes that exportation should be allowed only if both the agent believes that α is such-and-such, and α represents the relevant person (or thing) to the agent.[4]

The modified version of exportation now blocks the inference from (2) to (1) in a situation in which 'the man in the brown hat' does not represent a person to Ralph. And given what 'representation' is, we therefore cannot export on 'the man in the brown hat' in (1) if it denotes the 'wrong' person, or if it is not a sufficiently vivid name of the relevant person for Ralph. Further, we cannot export on 'the shortest spy' in (a) to infer (b) because this term is not a name *of* the shortest spy for Ralph.

While this is a vastly improved version of the original rule of exportation proposed by Quine, I wish to suggest here that this version sometimes proves too restrictive. Specifically, I will attempt to build a case that shows that Kaplan's version of exportation does not allow us to infer that an agent has acquired a belief about a person when it is clear from the situation that the agent does indeed believe something about a person; this will be in part II. First, however, I will briefly present Quine's account of exportation and Kaplan's considerations in modifying Quine's rule.

I

In 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', Quine relates the story of a person named Ralph who thinks highly of a well-respected member of his community, Ortcutt, whom Ralph has seen once at the beach. Ralph has also seen a certain person in a brown hat under suspicious circumstances. Ralph does not know who the person in the brown hat is, but he comes to believe that he is a spy. As it turns out, the man in the brown hat is just Ortcutt, but Ralph is unaware of this fact.

Now Ralph is willing to assent sincerely to the sentence 'Ortcutt is no spy', and so believes that Ortcutt is not a spy, Thus, the sentence

(3) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy

is true. Of course, it is also true that he believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy; i.e., (1) is true.

Quine then asks the question that defies a direct answer: Is this man Ortcutt such that Ralph believes him to be a spy? Quine's solution is based on a distinction between two senses of belief. One notionally believes (n-believes) *that* someone/something is such-and-such, while one relationally believes (r-believes) *of* someone/something that (s)he/it is such-and-such. To illustrate, Ralph n-believes that Ortcutt is not a spy, n-believes that the man seen at the beach is not a spy, and n-believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy. But it is not true that he n-believes that the man in the brown hat is not a spy, or that he n-believes that Ortcutt is a spy, or that he n-believes that the man seen at the beach is a spy.

To move from an n-belief report to an r-belief report, Quine proposes a rule of exportation according to which we may infer from

(I) β believes that Φ_{α},

and

(II) $\forall\gamma$ (β believes of γ that *it* = α)

(III) β believes of α that Φ_{it}

where 'it' is anaphoric on α. Thus we may infer (2) from (1). A crucial difference between (I) and (III) is that α occurs in what Quine calls a purely referential position in (III) but in a referentially opaque position in (I). This prevents the substitution of terms co-referential with α for α in (I), but allows such substitution for α in (III). The idea behind so forbidding and permitting substitution of α, respectively in (I) and (III), is this. Since (I) is taken as asserting a two-place relation between an agent and an intension, substituting a term co-referential with α for α would change the intension which the agent is in a relation with, and so is disallowed. However, (III) is construed as asserting a three-place relation among an agent, an intension and the individual denoted by α; substitution of α with any term co-referential with α here does not affect the relation which obtains among these three entities. Thus, 'the

man in the brown hat' or 'the man seen at the beach' may be substituted for 'Ortcutt' in (2), but no substitutions may be made for 'the man in the brown hat' in (1).

Quine exploits these notions in examining various answers to his question, but our concern here is only the exportation rule—let us call Quine's version of the exportation rule Q-exportation. Exportation is intended partly to facilitate the plausible inference that one believes of someone/something that (s)he/it is such-and-such. So in Ralph's case, we may infer by Q-exportation from (1) and (3) that he believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, and also that he believes of him that he is not a spy.

As Kaplan points out in 'Quantifying In', one problem with Q-exportation is that it allows exportation even when Ralph notionally believes that someone is such-and-such without believing this of anyone in particular. Thus Q-exportation allows the inference from (a) to (b) even though Ralph does not believe of anyone in particular that he is a spy while believing that the shortest spy is a spy. Further, Q-exportation makes no allowance for an agent's state of mind in attributing to him beliefs about an individual. The inference from (3) to (1) by Q-exportation that Ralph believes Ortcutt not to be a spy and that Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy attribute to Ralph contradictory beliefs about Ortcutt. Q-exportation therefore seems to imply that Ralph actually believes contradictory things of Ortcutt.

To block such counter-intuitive cases. Kaplan proposes a new version of exportation that we will call K-exportation. Crucial to K-exportation is the notion of 'representation', which in turn involves the notions of 'vividness' and of 'a name being *of* someone for a person'.

Briefly, a name is *of* an individual for a person only if that person has been in epistemic contact, direct or indirect, with the individual denoted by the name. A name of an individual is *vivid* for an agent only if the agent's mental state is at a certain threshold of clarity which enables him to 'see' that the name resembles the individual denoted by it; it is a further requirement of a vivid name that the individual it resembles to an agent actually exists. On Kaplan's view, a name must be *of* an individual for an agent, and must be vivid for that agent if he is to acquire a belief about that person or thing.

Kaplan employs these notions in the definition of 'representation' thus: A name *represents* an individual to an agent iff (i) the name denotes that individual, and (ii) the name is *of* that individual for the agent, and (iii) the name is a (sufficiently) vivid name of that individual (for the agent). Symbolized, this would be $R(\alpha, x, a)$ where α is the term denoting x, and a is the agent.

He then proposes his version of exportation, viz., given that an agent believes that someone/something is such-and-such, and given that the term occurring in the 'believes-that' context represents the person/thing denoted by the term to the agent, we may infer by exportation that the agent believes of that person/thing that it is such-and-such. Let us call this K-exportation. Essentially K-exportation consists in the replacement of (II) in Q-exportation with $R(\alpha, x, a)$.

That K-exportation is an improvement over Q-exportation is indubitably clear when we notice that the former blocks exportation from (1) to (2) and from (a) to (b), both of which are cases in which Q-exportation yields unintuitive consequences. The inference from (1) to (2) is blocked because 'the man in the brown hat' is not a sufficiently vivid name of Ortcutt for Ralph; and that from (a) to (b) is blocked because 'the shortest spy' is not a name *of* the shortest spy for Ralph. While K-exportation succeeds in blocking these unintuitive inferences, we will now see that it sometimes cannot be applied to infer that an agent believes something about a person/thing, though the situation strongly suggests that the agent does believe of a person/thing that (s)he/it is such-and-such.

II

Take the following story. Bernard Ortcutt is the reclusive mayor of the town in which a certain Ralph lives. Now Bernard has a more gregarious identical twin by the name of Bertrand Ortcutt who also lives in the same town. Given their natures, Bernard often has Bertrand stand in for him at public functions since Bertrand easily passes for his twin brother Bernard.

Since this deception has been carried on for so long that none of the people now in the town know the truth about the twins, they believe (n-believe and r-believe) that Bertrand is indeed their mayor. In fact,

all of Ralph's friends not only believe that Bertrand is their mayor, but they even do not know that Bertrand has an identical twin who is the real mayor. Ralph's friends have all met Bertrand, the man who they think is mayor, and learning that Ralph also wants to meet the mayor, they introduce him to Bertrand as 'the mayor of the town'.

It is important for our purposes to note that Ralph is introduced to Bertrand as 'Bertrand' and as 'the mayor of the town' several times by his friends so that the term 'the mayor of the town' comes to be both a name *of* Bertrand for Ralph, and a vivid name of Bertrand for Ralph. Up to this point, Ralph has been in no kind of epistemic contact with Bernard, does not know him or anything about him, and, of course, does not know that Bertrand's twin is Bernard.

One night, Ralph sees Bernard for the first time when the latter is rifling through some papers in a file marked 'Top Secret', and mistakes him for Bertrand. Knowing that the mayor has no business going through those sensitive papers, he acquires the belief that he is a spy. Thus the following sentence is true.

(4) Ralph believes that the mayor of the town is a spy.

But it appears that here we cannot perform K-exportation on 'the mayor of the town'. No doubt the term 'the mayor of the town' is a name *of* Bertrand for Ralph, and further, it is a vivid name of Bertrand for Ralph. To be able to export on this term to Bertrand, however, 'the mayor of the town' must also *denote* Bertrand, which it clearly does not; 'the mayor of the town' denotes the mayor of the town who happens to be Bernard. Thus, 'the mayor of the town' does not represent Bertrand to Ralph, and so we may not K-export on this term in (4) to Bertrand.

On the other hand, while 'the mayor of the town' denotes Bernard, this term is neither a name *of* Bernard for Ralph nor is it a vivid name of Bernard (though it is a vivid name of Bertrand) for Ralph. Thus, 'the mayor of the town' does not represent Bernard either to Ralph, and so K-exportation to Bernard is also blocked.

Given the circumstances of the story, however, it seems clear that by virtue of believing that the mayor of the town is a spy, Ralph has indeed acquired a belief about someone. Who the person is, or persons

are, who Ralph believes to be a spy may be subject to debate. Perhaps Ralph believes of the man who he actually sees going through those papers, Bernard, that he is a spy. Or, perhaps, he really believes of the man he 'had in mind', Bertrand, that he is a spy. Perhaps, again, he both believes of Bertrand that he is a spy and believes of Bernard that he is a spy even though he does not know that he has beliefs about two persons. What seems uncontroversial, though, is that Ralph does believe of someone that he is a spy; a fact that K-exportation prevents us from expressing.

Now one may object that just because K-exportation does not facilitate the inference from (4) to the fact that there is someone of whom Ralph believes that he is a spy, it does not follow that K-exportation blocks all means of inferring that there is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy. And so long as K-exportation does not disallow every way of inferring that there is someone of whom Ralph believes that he is a spy, it cannot be considered objectionable. After all, the main purpose of an exportation rule is to enable the inference, where plausible, that there is some individual/thing of whom/which an agent believes something.

This objection may be illustrated with the help of the sentence:

(5) Ralph believes that the man who was introduced to him as mayor of the town is a spy,

where 'the man who was introduced to him as mayor of the town' ('him' = Ralph) denotes Bertrand. Further, this term may be considered a name *of* Bertrand for Ralph if we assume that Ralph so mentally dubbed Bertrand on one of the occasions when he was introduced to Bertrand; the term would then also be a vivid name of Bertrand for Ralph. Given these three facts, the term 'the man who was introduced to him as the mayor of the town' represents Bertrand to Ralph, and we may therefore K-export on it in (5) and substitute 'Bertrand' for it. This would give us:

(6) Ralph believes of Bertrand that he is a spy.

However, the thrust of our argument against K-exportation is that it should allow inferences to r-belief constructions from n-belief

constructions *whenever* such inference is appropriate, rather than allow such inferences only in some cases and not in others. Let us amplify this point by first adding the following details to our story.

Ralph is so shocked to see Bernard indulging in this shameful deed that he whispers in disbelief, 'The mayor of the town is a spy!' Ralph's imprudent whisper alerts Bernard to his presence. Bernard realizes that the game is up for him if he lets Ralph leave the place alive. So, at the very instant at which Ralph has uttered that fatal sentence, Bernard shoots him dead.

Thus, Ralph's last words—to which he no doubt would have sincerely assented if only Bernard had left him alive for us to question—were 'The mayor of the town is a spy', which expresses his last belief that the mayor of the town is a spy. Apart from this, we may assume that Ralph had no time to form any new beliefs relevant to this story; in fact, we will stipulate that Ralph forms exactly this new belief in his last moments, and none others that are relevant to the present context. His final set of beliefs relevant to his case, therefore, includes only those that have already been attributed to him plus this last new belief.[5]

Given these additions to the story, Ralph's only additional death-throes belief that is new to his existing set of beliefs (those relevant to the story we are considering) is, presumably, that the mayor of the town is a spy. In his lifetime, he does not come to have an n-belief about the person he sees rifling through those papers under any conception other than 'the mayor of the town'. Thus (4) is still true, and as before, we cannot export on 'the mayor of the town' in (4).

The difference that this modification to the story makes, though, is that there is no way left to employ K-exportation to express the fact that in his last moment, Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy. Thus is because, as we just said, the only relevant set of n-beliefs that Ralph has at the time is that the mayor of the town is a spy, and this term is not here open to K-exportation. Hence K-exportation is of no avail in arriving from (4) at the plausible conclusion that Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy.[6]

It is noteworthy that Ralph's predicament can be put to work against Q-exportation, too. Q-exportation allows us to infer from (4) that Ralph believes of the mayor of the town that he is a spy, and so infer that

Ralph believes of Bernard that he is a spy. But this pays no attention to the person Ralph had in mind when he acquired the belief that the mayor of the town is a spy. Though it is plausible that Ralph has unwittingly acquired a belief about Bernard, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that Ralph has acquired a belief about Bertrand also, but Quine's account entirely neglects to take this complication into consideration. Thus, though Q-exportation allows the inference from (4) to

(7) Ralph believes of Bernard that he is a spy,

it must be considered defective because it does not accommodate Ralph's belief regarding Bertrand.

All this is not intended to show that K-exportation is not an improvement on Q-exportation, just because neither satisfactorily handles the case we are discussing. As we said earlier for other reasons, K-exportation is a vast improvement on Q-exportation. The present case presents at least one additional reason to believe that K-exportation is undoubtedly an advance on Q-exportation. The former prudently does not attribute to Ralph a belief either about Bernard or about Bertrand when it is unclear who the person/s is/are of whom Ralph believes that he is a spy. On the other hand, Q-exportation does not even take account of the problems in determining the object(s) of Ralph's belief when he sees Bernard, instead allowing us to indiscriminately infer that Ralph has a belief about Bernard.

The point we hope to press, though, is that K-exportation needs to be further refined because it sometimes does not provide a way of determining the object(s) of a person's belief even though it is clear from the context that a belief has been acquired.

Notes and References

1. I am indebted to Nathan Salmon for reading several drafts of this paper, and to Rolf Eberle for giving detailed comments on the penultimate version.
2. David Kaplan, 'Quantifying in', *Synthese* 19.
3. W.V.O. Quine, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', *The Journal of Philosophy* 53(5).
4. This is weaker than what Kaplan actually proposes, which seems to be that this is an *analysis* of the 'belief-of' claim. In other words, Kaplan's

account of belief constructions is to be taken not merely as a logical consequence of exporting on terms in such constructions, but as synonymous with those constructions. For our purposes, however, what is crucial is that Kaplan is offering a modified version of Quine's rule that ostensibly always yields intuitively correct conclusions when applied to appropriate contexts.

5. We may further stipulate that he has no time to form from his existing beliefs any further beliefs that follow, e.g., as simple logical consequences of his existing beliefs.
6. It is possible that in a variant scenario, Ralph acquires the deathbed belief, e.g., that the person he sees rifling through those sensitive papers is a spy. If this had been his last belief, K-exportation would perhaps allow the inference to the conclusion that Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy. However, the fact that K-exportation is valid in these scenarios does not detract from its inadequacy in the present case, where we stipulate that the only conception of Bernard that Ralph's final set of relevant beliefs allows is 'the mayor of the town'.

Saṁvāda Gaṇit or Pṛatīka Ānvīkṣikī - II

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The first part of this paper was published in JICPR, *Vol. XVIII, No. 1. Sections 1 and 2 and Equations 1 to 22 can be found there.*

3. In the special kind of schema called *tarka*, the D/U-*vākya* is replaced by an evertrue *siddhānta* called *kāraṇatā siddhānta* (the other one generally mentioned along with it is *prayojanatā siddhānta* admitted by most indigenous cosmologies[1] with variant interpretations of purpose). The ever true *kāraṇatā siddhānta* was symbolized earlier as (x) (y) $<\hat{K}_{\hat{N}}>_{xy}$ in (15). However, if we keep the order of terms in mind, then the *kārya* is said to be a *samavāyi* of *kāraṇa* and not the other way round so that the correct symbolism for this *siddhānta* is actually (x) (y) $<\hat{N}_{\hat{K}}>_{xy}$. Argument-units such as *tarka* in which this proposition replaces the D/U-*vākya* allow us to *discover* the *causes* without which no satisfactory system of knowledge is viable. Thus the regularity accepted as genuine in *pramāṇakaraṇa* is further sought to be investigated in *tarkakaraṇa*. We may ask why is *linga* (such as *dhūma*) regularly associated with *lingī* (such as *agni*)? Or, specifically, why does *dhūma* arise from *agni* at all? We thus explore deeper and deeper layers of regularity by means of *siddhi*-by-*tarkakaraṇa*—and also find reasons for occurrence of *apavāda* in regular situations. *Tarkakaraṇa* may thus also be spurred by such situations as why is there fire but not smoke, or, why is there smoke but not fire?

An example of *tarkakaraṇa* in Sāṁkhya Siddhānta is: '*Baṁdha kārya hotā hai, hareka kārya kā kāraṇa hotā hai, atah baṁdha kā kāraṇa hotā hai*'. And in Ārogya Śāstra: '*Vyādhi kārya hotī hai, hareka kārya kā kāraṇa hotā hai; atah vyādhi kā kāraṇa hotā hai*'. In these *yuktis*, we have employed a cosmically universal *siddhānta* instead of D/U-*vākya* and reached a conclusion. A similar notation for cosmically

universal *siddhānta* can be $S^*(P_f)$ so that the above one will be $S^*(N_K)$, and the form of the above *yuktis* will be,

$$U(V_K)$$
$$S^*(N_K)$$
$$\text{----------},$$
$$\therefore U(V_N)$$

which provides the rule of inference,

$$U(V_K) \,.\, S^*(N_K) \vdash U(V_N) \qquad (23)$$

The *discovery* that there must be *some* cause would, however, be incomplete without the *identification* of cause which proceeds in two steps: '*Jab* p_1 *hotā hai tabhī* q_1 *hotā hai, jab* p_2 *hotā hai tabhī* q_2 *hotā hai ādi; atah* p, q *kā kāraṇa hai*'; and 'p_1, q_1 *kā kāraṇa hai*, p_2, q_2 *kā kāraṇa hai ādi; atah* p, q *kā kāraṇa hotā hai*'. In the first step, we identify a *saṁyoga* relation between p_1 and q_1 etc., which are *terms*, and reach a particular conclusion, yet retaining the *saṁyoga* relation between its terms. In the second step, however, we make further observations employing *bahuviṣaya-bahupṛekśaka utsargakaraṇa* and reach a universal conclusion of which the terms have *samavāya* relation from particular premises with terms related by *saṁyoga* relation. This transition is something like the transition in *upamānakaraṇa*, (13) and (22), where we had discovered a *new tādātmya* or *samavāya* relation in the conclusion from premises having *sādṛśya* relation only. Thus, here we discover a *samavāya* relation in the conclusion from premises with *saṁvāya* relation only. These two steps can be formalized as follows:

$$(y)(p^1_{y_1} \cup q^1_{y_2})$$
$$(y)(p^2_{y'_2} \cup q^2_{y'_2})$$
$$\text{----------}$$
$$\text{----------}$$
$$\text{\_\_\_\_\_},$$
$$\therefore p_N \cup q$$

providing the rule of inference,

$$(y)(p^1_{y_1} \cup q^1_{y_2}).(y)(p^2_{y'_1} \cup q^2_{y'_2}) - - \vdash (p_N \cup q) \qquad (24)$$

$$p^1_{N_1} \cup q^1_1$$
$$p^2_{N_2} \cup q_2$$
$$\text{----------}$$
$$\text{----------}$$
$$\text{\_\_\_\_\_},$$
$$\therefore U(p_N q_K)$$

providing the rule of inference,

$$(p^1_{N_1} \cup q^1_1).(p^2_{N_2} \cup q^2_2) - - - - \vdash U(p_N q_K) \qquad (25)$$

The above being only *kevālanvayī* variety, we can have *kevalavyatirekī* and *anvayavyatirekī* varieties also which will provide us further rules of inference.

A variant of the above situation is that of *sāhcarya* employed frequently in Ārogya Śāstra. Thus if, say q_1 increases when p_1 increases, and q_1 decreases when p_1 decreases; q_1 decreases when p_1 increases and q_1 increases when p_1 decreases; or vice versa, the same situation as above obtains and we can infer by *utsargakaraṇa* that p_1 is *kāraṇa* of q_1.

A method known as *pariśeṣa* was first employed by Vaiśeṣika Siddhāṅta in establishing *śabda* as *guṇa* of *ākāśa*. The same can be employed for discovery of causal relation also. In this method, exhaustive enumeration of *all* the *known* possibilities is made and then all except one are discounted by reasoning, so that the one that remains, by elimination of alternatives, has the relation. This method has also been employed in Ārogya Śāstra. Thus, for example, '*vāt se vyādhi hotī hai yā pitta se vyādhi hotī hai yā kafa se vyādhi hotī hai; yah vyādhi pitta se nahīn ho sakatī aur kafa se nahīn ho sakatī; atah yah vyādhi*

vāt vikāra se huī hai'. This involves identification of one of several possible causes of a complex phenomenon. The method can also be employed for discovery and identification of one cause such as, '*tridoṣa yā mithyā āhāra yā ati-āhāra yā hīna āhāra yā prajñāparādha vyādhi ke mūla-kāraṇa ho sakate hain; tridoṣa yā mithyā āhāra yā ati-āhāra yā hīna āhāra vyādhi ke mūla kāraṇa nahīn ho sakate; atah prajñāparādha vyādhi kā mūla kāraṇa hotā hai*'. The symbolic form of this kind of *tarka-karaṇa* is generally this:

$$E_f \vee F_f \vee G_f \vee H_f$$

$$\sim F_f \cdot \sim G_f \cdot \sim H_f$$

$$\therefore < E_f >$$

which provides the rule of inference,

$$(E_f \vee F_f \vee G_f \vee H_f \text{ ---}) . (\sim F_f \cdot \sim G_f \cdot \sim H_f \text{ ---}) \vdash E_f \qquad (26)$$

[*Prakārāntar pratiṣedha* of Sāṁkhya Siddhānta has a similar structure.]

Tarkakaraṇa thus employs the above methods of *siddhi* in order to discover the causes and to explain subsequently *why* a thing is so or a case is so. Thus illuminated by *pramāṇakaraṇa* and guided by *yuktikaraṇa* and *tarkakaraṇa*, we probe deeper and deeper in order to explain more and more facts enlarging the system of knowledge incorporating more and more cases of regularities in cosmology. This process is likely to lead us to ultimate cause(s) and ultimate purpose(s) of all the *kāryas* in the cosmos.

4. In our theory of proposition,[2] it was shown that *apavāda*-propositions are of many kinds and these always refer to a parent universal proposition which is maximal and true. Now, the usual interpretation that 'existential' propositions are true if *at least one* case exists cannot be acceptable here for the claim that, for instance, there is at least *one kṛṣaka* which is *apariśramī* is made by '*yah kṛṣaka apariśramī hai*' which is a singular-*apavāda*-proposition so that the *apavāda*-

proposition proper, as quantified by *kucha*, has to be interpreted as being true only when there is *more than one apariśramī kṛṣaka*. Thus, only a proposition such as '*kucha kṛṣaka apariśramī hain*' can be said to be an *apavāda*-proposition which is, however, only a particular-*apavāda*-proposition. Again, it is only several particular-*apavāda*-propositions (say, obtained by observing different regions) that can provide us a 'universal-*apavāda*'-proposition such as '*kucha kṛṣaka apariśramī hote hain*', which alone is strictly speaking a 'restricted universality' or *apavāda niyama* serving as addendum to the parent universal proposition. Symbolizing the first kind of proposition as $P^1_{\bar{q}}$ and the second kind as $(\exists_x)(P_{\bar{q}})_x$, we have the following schema by *utsargakaraṇa*,

$$P^1_{\bar{q}}$$

$$P^2_{\bar{q}}$$

$$P^3_{\bar{q}}$$

$$\therefore (\exists_x)(P_{\bar{q}})_x$$

which provides a rule of inference,

$$P^1_{\bar{q}},\ P^2_{\bar{q}},\ P^3_{\bar{q}} \vdash (\exists_x) < P_{\bar{q}} >_x \qquad (27)$$

When several particular-*apavādas*, say in different regions, are observed, we are able to argue that,

$$(\exists_x)(P^1_{\bar{q}})_x$$

$$(\exists_x)(P^2_{\bar{q}})_x$$

$$(\exists_x)(P^3_{\bar{q}})_x$$

$$(\exists_x)(\exists_y) < P_{\bar{q}} >_{xy}$$

which then provides the rule of inference,

$$(\exists_x)(P^1_{\bar{q}})_x \cdot (\exists_x)(P^2_{\bar{q}})_x \cdot (\exists_x)(P^3_{\bar{q}})_x \vdash (\exists_x)(\exists_y) < P_{\bar{q}} >_{xy} \qquad (28)$$

Now, insofar as *one* universal-*apavāda* or 'restricted universality' does not by definition falsify an *utsarga*-proposition or 'unrestricted universality' but rather is acceptable as addendum to it, neither a singular-*apavāda*-proposition nor a particular-*apavāda*-proposition can contradict the maximally universal or just-universal propositions being *siddha* by means of one or many of the methods of *siddhi* delineated above. In the present system of logic, then, a maximally universal affirmative proposition can be falsified *only* by a maximally universal counter-affirmative proposition. However, we can not make such a claim for just-universal propositions for although grounded in empricio-practical self-evidentness, these can mislead us in crucial situations (such as the 'sun orbiting the earth'). Similarly, the falsifier of a universal-*apavāda* proposition, which generally ought to be counter-affirmative, would be a negative of counter-affirmative proposition such as '*koī bhī kṛṣaka apariśramī nahīn hotā*', though we never *seek* to falsify *apavādas* but rather seek to *eliminate* these by discovering deeper maximal universalities!

5. An important aim of *samvāda* is to dispel *saṁśaya* and eliminate *viparyay*, the latter to be eliminated by allowing true propositions only in the system of knowledge by recourse to *pramāṇa siddhi*. The question, however, remains: How can *saṁśaya* be dispelled? *Saṁśaya* can be pure or mixed, the former having the logical form $P_q \vee \sim P_q$ and the latter $P_q \vee F_g$. This *saṁśaya* represents a situation of disjunction; either P_q is true or P_q false, either P_q is true or F_g is true. That is to say, it represents a situation where it cannot be *decided* what *is* the case. The persistence of such a situation is obstructive to the situation of *siddhi* or *swīkārya saṁsthiti* and unavoidably lands *saṁvāda* in *uttarottara prasaṅga* even when *saṁśaya* remains within the bounds of rules of discourse and is not *asaṁśaya* or *atyantasaṁśaya*. It is yet this legitimate *saṁśaya* which compels us to proceed with *prakriyā siddhi* by *sthāpanā-pratisthāpanā-vipratisthāpanā-prativipratisthāpanā* ... . Legitimate *saṁśaya* is thus a condition of *prakriyā siddhi* without which

no *siddhānta* is possible. We humans thus find ourselves in a deep predicament; we aim at dispelling *saṁśaya* and yet we cannot do without it! In a sense, then, the indispensability of legitimate *saṁśaya* on the one hand and the endless pursuit of dispelling it marks the fundamental limitation of human knowledge situation.

When we mark out a clearly defined logical-All for ourselves, however, we *exhaustively enumerate* all that there is providing us a non-infinite *conjunction* of the reals. This, then helps our disjunction also to be exhaustively enumerable which thus exhausts *all* the logically possible cases providing a *decisive* enumeration and bringing under control, so to say, the situation of indecision. Thus, for example, when it is said that *śabda* is *guṇa* of either *ātmā* or *mana* or *pṛthivī* or *jala* or *vāyu* or *agni* or *ākāśa* or *dik* or *kāla*, we have exhausted all that is logically possible and ensured our *saṁśaya* to be a legitimate mixed *saṁṣaya*, not an open-ended one such as in $P_q \vee F_q \vee G_q$ ... . Thus the marking out of a logical-All and the consequent possibility of exhaustive disjunction allows the method of *pariśeṣa* on the one hand and the construction of *dvividhā* or dilemma on the other hand. Because of this possibility of exhaustive enumeration, *saṁśaya* is made to commit suicide, so to say, in a *dvividhā*. Thus the situation of disjunction here proves valuable, the idea being that if we can show that all exhaustively enumerated alternatives involve this or that *fallacy* (or violation of rules of discourse), then the alternatives have to be rejected as not producing a situation of acceptance or *swīkārya saṁsthiti*. Even then, however, *saṁśaya* manages to dog us for a *dvividhā* itself can be illegitimately constructed giving rise to a paradoxical situation. Thus, for example, '*yā to puruṣa sakāraṇa hotā hai yā akāraṇa hotā hai, yadi sakāraṇa hotā hai to kāraṇa-ajñātatā doṣa hotā hai, yadi akāraṇa hotā hai to kāraṇatā siddhānta asiddhi hotī hai; atah puruṣa siddhānta asiddha hotā hai*'. Such *dividhās* arising out of illegitimate *saṁśaya* cannot be refuted by the usual device of *pratisthāpanā* by replacing the *vidheyas* of premises and the conclusion by their complementaries for that would amount only to side-tracking the criticism. The *dvividhā* therefore *seems* to suggest a contradiction within the knowledge-system and raises the problem of ensuring the *consistency* of the system. The problem was thus tackled by discovering the method of *aniṣṭa*

prasanga whereupon if any proposition violates any of the general rules of discourse or the ones specific to the knowledge-system, it cannot be admissible in the system. Thus, '*yadi puruṣa sakāraṇa hotā hai to puruṣa kārya doṣa hotā hai, puruṣa kārya nahīn ho sakatā; atah puruṣa sakāraṇa nahīn ho sakatā*'. This can be symbolized as,

$$\begin{array}{l} U(P_N) \supset D \\ \sim D \\ \hline \therefore \sim U(P_N) \end{array},$$

where D stands for *doṣa* and N for *sakāraṇa*. Further, '*kārya kā kāraṇa hotā hai our akārya kā akāraṇa hotā hai, puruṣa akārya hotā hai; atah puruṣa akāraṇa hotā hai*', which can be symbolized as,

$$\begin{array}{l} S^*(K_N) \\ S^*(\overline{K}_{\overline{N}}) \\ U(P_{\overline{K}}) \\ \hline \therefore U(P_{\overline{N}}) \end{array}$$

These *yuktis* then provide the following inference rules,

$$\{U(P_N) \supset D\} \vdash \sim U(P_N) \tag{29}$$

$$\{S^*(K_N) \cdot S^*(\overline{K}_{\overline{N}}) \cdot U(P_{\overline{K}})\} \vdash U(P_{\overline{N}}) \tag{30}$$

6. It is precisely the occurrence of such apparently logically paradoxical situations in knowledge systematization that prompted Indian logicians quite early to search for more comprehensive logical principles in the direction of a *complete* system of logic. Some of them rejected entirely the possibility of systematization of rational cosmology (Nāgārjuna) while others sought to explore more comprehensive conditions of such systematization. This became possible due to long-drawn experience of cosmological *saṁvāda*. Thus, Bauddha

cosmologists first rejected the fundamental universal principles of Ārṣa cosmology, such as '*mūla tattva nitya hote hain*', and defended the contradictory universal principles, such as a '*koi bhī tattva nitya nahīn hotā*'; while the Jaina cosmologists sought *alternative* principles in which contradictory descriptions themselves could be accommodated. Even Bauddhas seem to have taken an optimistic stance later suggesting exhaustive enumeration of all that which is logically possible. Therefore, although the series (*sat*), (*asat*), (*sadasat*), *a*-(*sadasat*), (*sadasat-a-sadasat*), ... seems unending, it can be terminated—in the light of simplicity—at the fourth step hoping that a sufficient number of all the logical possibilities in the cosmos have been enumerated. Similarly, Jaina analysis of all possible descriptions can be reinterpreted as exhaustive enumeration of all possible descriptions/perspectives allowing us to reach logically possible maximal perspective as conjunction of a logical-All, hoping that this would be sufficient for description of the entire cosmos. A description *can* be true under certain conditions and its contradictory *can* also be true under some other conditions. Moreover, the conjunction of an affirmative description and its contradictory can also be true *at the same time* under some other conditions. Finally, the contradictory of such conjunction itself can be true under some other conditions. Thus, we reinterpret the exhaustive enumeration of all possible descriptions as only four-fold, cutting out the rest as translogical: p_q, $\sim p_q$, $p_q \cdot \sim p_q$, $\sim (p_q \cdot \sim p_q)$ which may also be put as: p_q, $p_{\bar{q}}$, $p_q \cdot p_{\bar{q}}$, $\sim (p_q \cdot p_{\bar{q}})$, hoping that the last will include in it the 'unsayable' as well.

Thus symbolizing *sat* as s_1, *asat* as s_2, etc. we have,

$$\sum_{n=1}^{4} S_n,$$

enumerating *all that which* is logically possible, symbolizing such enumeration. Now, if we try to *describe* these 'four varieties' exhaustively enumerating all that there is, we shall have four sets of descriptions so that let p_q be the description of s_1, p_{q_2} of s_2 etc. which will have four possible values, namely *satya*, *asatya*, *satyāsatya* and *asatyāsatya*. Thus

$$\sum_{m=1}^{4}(p_{q_1})_m,\ \sum_{m=1}^{4}(p_{q_2})_m,\ \sum_{m=1}^{4}(p_{q_3})_m,\ \sum_{m=1}^{4}(p_{q_4})_m,$$

where m enumerates the fourfold values. When unpacked, these provide us the fourfold system of logic:

a) Logic-s_1, or *sat saṁvādagaṇita*:

$$p_q, p_{\bar{q}_1}, p_{q_1}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_1}, (p_{q_1}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_1})$$

b) Logic-s_2 or *asat saṁvādagaṇita*:

$$p_{q_2}, p_{\bar{q}_2}, p_{q_2}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_2}, \sim (p_{q_2}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_2})$$

c) Logic-s_3 or *sadasat saṁvādagaṇita*:

$$p_{q_3}, p_{\bar{q}_3}, p_{q_3}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_3}, \sim (p_{q_3}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_3})$$

d) Logic-s_4 or *a-sadasat saṁvādagaṇita*:

$$p_{q_4}, p_{\bar{q}_4}, p_{q_4}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_4}, \sim (p_q\cdot p_{\bar{q}_4})$$

For example, the true propositions in L-s_1 will be of the type '*prḳrti sat hotī hai*'; in L-s_2, '*Nṛśṛanga asat hotā hai*'; in L-s_3, '*śabda sadasat hotā hai*'; and in L-s_4, '*avyakta a-sadasat hotā hai*'. These four logical systems then jointly equip us for *saṁvāda* on sufficiently entire cosmos, that is, these allow sufficiently exhaustive *saṁvāda*. This suggests that we are required to give *at least sixteen* sets of descriptions for sufficiently exhaustive treatment of regular cosmos hoping that all the logically possible regularities will have been accommodated. That is to say, these logics are *sufficient* for making explicit the *dharma* or *ṛta*, that pervades the cosmos, in entirety, eliminating, hopefully, the paradoxical situations as considered above. Various perspectives/positions get assimilated in these logics and let us briefly work out one by taking an example common to all indigenous trends. Thus, for example, it is true that I remain awake under certain conditions and it is also true that I sleep under certain conditions. Further, it is also true that I remain awake as well as sleep at the same time under certain conditions such as in yoga-sleep, and, finally, it is equally true that it is not the case that I remain awake as well as sleep under certain conditions

such as in *samādhi*. If I were then required to describe all these situations with my person as the subject of investigation, I shall have to resort to Logic-s_1. Now, the counter-affirmative of '*yah nidṛā hai*' is '*yah anidṛā hai*' of which the negative is '*yah anidṛā nahīn hai*'. Thus,

p_{q_1} ≡ '*yah nidṛā hai*' ≡ $V_d^1 \equiv E_{f_1}$ (say)

$p_{\bar{q}_1}$ ≡ '*yah anidṛā hai*' ≡ $V_{\bar{d}}^1 \equiv F_{f_2}$

$p_{q_1}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_1}$ ≡ '*yah yoganidṛā hai*' ≡ $V_d^1 \cdot V_{\bar{d}}^1 \equiv G_{f_3}$

$\sim (p_{q_1}\cdot p_{\bar{q}_1})$ ≡ '*yah samādhi hai*' ≡ $\sim (V_d^1 \cdot V_{\bar{d}}^1) \equiv H_{f_4}$

Logic-s_1 would then consist in providing proofs for truth of these propositions employing various rules of valid inference (in a four-valued logic) so that the final description of my various states will be $(E_{f_1}\cdot F_{f_2}\cdot G_{f_3}\cdot H_{f_4})$.

7. In the section of *yuktikaraṇa* above, we have discovered the conditions of *validity* of *yuktis* or argument-units provided that the truth of premises is guaranteed. Thus in all these seventeen *forms* of *reasoning*, if the premises are true, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true and the forms are thus valid forms of reasoning from which concrete analogues depicting/composing actual situations can be constructed. Now, in some of these forms, all the four kinds of relations are allowed between the terms of the premises, at least in principle, while in others only one kind of relation is allowed between the terms of the premises. Thus, in a full-blown *saṁvāda gaṇita* as presented here, various formal characteristics of each of these two sets of forms of reasoning need be investigated in detail. All these forms seem to follow some general 'rules'. Thus, for example, from any '*sāmānya*' term in the premises a lower-degree '*sāmānya*' term can be deduced from all of these whereas a higher-degree '*sāmānya*' term can be derived only in, say (14) and (15). If a just-universal/numerally-universal/temporally-universal proposition and a *siddhāṅta* occur as premises, then a just-universal/numerally-universal/temporary-universal proposition can be derived in all the *yuktis*. Further, in such *yuktis*, the *siddhāṅta* terms need not have the same relation as the *hetuvākya*- terms have; also no *upanayavākya* is required

in their complete proofs. A feature of Hindi language is that the phrase '*kā*' occurs in both kinds of propositions: the ones of which terms have *samavāya* relation as well as those having *tādātmya* relation. For example, '*gulāb kā phoola hai*' is a *tādātmya*-proposition and '*kārya-kā kāraṇa hotā hai*' is a *samavāya*-proposition. Thus, we are allowed flexibility in interpreting the relation of *kā* according to our suitability. Since some *yuktis* make better sense under *samvāya* interpretation, while others make better sense under *tādātmva* interpretation we should choose the interpretation in the light of this feature.

Now, in (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (26), (27), (28), (29) and (30), all relations between the terms of premises are allowed, but in (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24) and (25) only one kind of relation between the terms of premises is allowed. It would thus be interesting to unpack these latter forms and discover the relations allowed. Form (19) is,

$$\sim (x)(B_{p'})_x \vdash U(B_{\bar{p}}),$$

and the relation between B and p′ is $\cup$ and so it is between B and $\bar{p}$, so that,

$$\sim (x)(B \cup p')_x \vdash U(B \cup p').$$

The relation of the premise is preserved in the conclusion and the *uddeśya* term is also preserved—only the *vidheya* term changes to its complementary.

Form (20) is,

$$\sim U(M_j) \vdash U(M_o),$$

where j and o are constants occurring always with variant *uddeśyas*. Here too the relation between M and j as well as between M and o is $\cup$, so that,

$$\sim U(M \cup j) \vdash U(M \cup o).$$

Here too, the relation of the premise and the *uddeśya* term is preserved in the conclusion; only the constant j changes into constant o.

Form (21) is,

$$\sim (\exists_x)(P_m)_x \vdash (\exists_x)(P_o)_x,$$

where m is much like the constant j but has slightly different sense. Here also the relation is $\cup$ so that,

$$\sim (\exists_x)(P \cup m) \vdash (\exists_x)(P \cup o)_x.$$

Here also the relation and *uddeśya* of the premise are preserved in the conclusion.

A remarkable feature of all these three forms is that a single, negative premise yields an affirmative conclusion. (We have the advantage of having *abhāva* as a *vidheya* here. The conclusion could also be made negative if '*bhāva*' as a *vidheya* is adopted; but that is generally not preferred by logicians.)

Form (22) is,

$$U(H_b) \cdot U^*(B_g) \vdash U(H_g),$$

in which the terms of the premises depict the relation $\subset$ and those of the conclusion depict the relation $\supset$, so that

$$U(H \subset b) \cdot U^*(B \subset g) \vdash U(H \supset g).$$

In this form, the recurring term, namely b/B, is eliminated in the conclusion of which the terms also have a new relation.

Form (23) is,

$$U(V_K) \cdot S^*(N_K) \vdash U(V_N),$$

in which one of the premises is a *siddhāṅta* and N and K constants occur as *uddeśya/vidheya* terms. If we unpack this form, the following relations are depicted:

$$U(V \supset K) \cdot S^*(N \supset K) \vdash U(V \supset N)$$

Here too, the recurring term, namely K, is eliminated in the conclusion of which the terms have the same relation as the terms of *siddhāṅta* have (which may be taken to be a rule). The *yukti* remains valid even when we have variable terms instead of the constants, so that the form of the argument is quite general.

Form (24) has already been presented in unpacked form which is,

$$(y)(p^1_{y_1} \cup q^1_{y_2}) \cdot (y)(p^2_{y'_1} \cup q^2_{y'_2}) \ldots \vdash (p_N \cup q).$$

In this form, the premises are temporally-universal propositions in which the terms are related by $\cup$; conclusion is a particular proposition in which the relation between terms is preserved but the *uddeśya* acquires a '*mark* N', that is, acquires the feature of becoming a *kāraṇa* though we are not yet in a position to claim whether 'q' is arising accidentally from the *kāraṇa* or is its *kārya*. This sort of claim becomes possible after subsequent *utsargakaraṇa* as in form (25),

$$(p^1_{N_1} \cup q^1_1)\cdot(p^2_{N_2} \cup q^2_2) \ldots \vdash U(p_N q_K).$$

Here the relation between terms of the conclusion changes; a new relation is discovered as different from that of premises, and the *vidheya* term also acquires a 'mark K', that is, acquires the feature of becoming a *kārya*. Here, from particular propositions we are able to derive a just-universal proposition as conclusion.

The following characteristics of these seventeen forms may thus be remembered:

a) In forms (14), (15), (19), (20) and (21), the relation between terms of the premises is preserved in the terms of the conclusion.
b) In forms (22) and (25), new relation different from the one present in the premises is discovered in the conclusion.
c) In forms (16) and (17) a new *uddeśya* or *vidheya* term is discovered in the conclusion.
d) In forms (18), (22) and (23), the recurring term of the premises is eliminated in the conclusion.
e) In form (30), three premises occur and the recurring term between one of the *siddhāntas* and the other premise gets eliminated in the conclusion.
f) In forms (27) and (28) we are able to derive, by *utsargakaraṇa*, (counter-affirmative) particular *apavāda*-proposition from singular (counter-affirmative) *apavāda*-propositions, and from particular *apavāda*-propositions as premises, a 'universal' *apavāda*-proposition as conclusion.

8. Considerations in this essay present a definite picture of *saṁvāda gaṇita* or *pratīka ānvīkṣikī*, the most significant aspect of which is that

gaṇita consists in the symbolization/formalization of underlying principles or 'laws' of *saṁvāda* which have already been made explicit or *sphuṭa* in the Saṁvāda Śāstra by evolving criteria of *pramāṇakaraṇa*, *siddhi* etc. which further help is developing logical techniques such as *yuktikaraṇa*, *tarkakaraṇa*, *parīkśā*, *aniṣṭaprasanga*, etc. These techniques in turn allow us to fathom deeper causes, identify these and preserve the consistency of knowledge-systems so systematized. A logically sound cosmology with minimum *apavādas* and maximum span is the aim of cosmological *saṁvāda* and it is expected of *saṁvāda gaṇita* to facilitate this. In order to achieve this goal, *saṁvāda gaṇita*, as guided by Saṁvāda Śāstra, adopts the following strategy:

a) Symbolize the proposition preserving at the same time its relational structure. This helps achieving clarity and precision about means of genuine knowledge and criteria of *truth* of propositions.

b) The criteria of truth of propositions themselves involve the idea of *siddhi* by *utsargakaraṇa* or *anumānakaraṇa* or *upamānakaraṇa* which thus provides criteria of *validity* of argument-units though involving only particular propositions. When symbolized, these make explicit the property of *transitivity* within the argument-unit under definite conditions. Thus, for example, in *utsargakaraṇa*, the *natural* situation of agreement amongst all humans without exception regarding perceptual experiences allow us to reach a *surer* proposition from less sure statements and accept the former as *siddha*. The less sure statements being the premises, we are thus enabled to say that the conclusion *derives* from the premises by *utsarga*. Or, the inference by *utsargakaraṇa* is said to be a *valid* inference. Or, the schema is said to provide a *proof* for the conclusion. Similarly, in *anumānakaraṇa*, the natural situation of *anumāna* or 'inferring' from certain perceptual experience by a *mediating dṛṣṭānta* (as occurring due to empirico-practical self-evidentness) by all humans without exception, allows us to reach *sure* as well as *new* genuine-knowledge/proposition and accept it as *true* on the condition that the perceptual-evidential proposition is true, the *dṛṣṭānta* being ever-true. These being the true premises, we are thus enabled to say that the conclusion *derives* from the premises, or, that *anumāna* is *valid* inference, or, that the schema *proves* the conclusion. Similarly, in the natural situation of *upamāna*, we allow a '*śrutānta*' to

replace the *dṛṣṭānta*, all other conditions remaining the same, and validly infer a conclusion. These methods of *siddhi* then provide us simple rules of inference which are universally true and which can be employed for such inferences by all humans without exception. Some of these rules then lay down the conditions of *truth* of propositions, whether particular or just-universal or maximally universal; while other rules lay down the conditions of *validity* of inferences made.

c) The groundwork of basic, errorless genuine-knowledge thus having been created, further errorless genuine-knowledge is generated by discovery of more abstract principles that are maximally universal or cosmically universal irrespective of whether these are made explicit from some natural situations obtaining in humans or not. This is achieved by *yuktikaraṇa* in which the premises as well as the conclusion are just-universal or maximally universal propositions that have already been presumably proved by the above methods. Thus, in *yuktikarana*, we take the truth of premises for granted and concentrate on the conditions of validity of argument forms so that the derivation of a true conclusion may be ensured. The property of transitivity is kept intact in *yukti* by modelling it on the above methods of *siddhi*. Thus, the first premise has to be an already proved proposition therefore true, and the second proposition has to be a *dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa*, the former being empirico-practically self-evident and the latter being always a just-universal or maximally universal proposition proved by *utsargakaraṇa*. This procedure allows us to reach maximally universal propositions some of which are true in all systems. We further adopt the procedure of *pṛkriyā siddhi* exposing such propositions to criticism and defense, and when the defense is successful, to call such propositions *siddhāṅtas*, being well-tested and well-established therefore true with much greater surety. Therefore, one seeking to construct a cosmology or knowledge-system, proceeds by propounding affirmative just-universal or maximally universal propositions by *yuktikaraṇa*—called *sthāpanā*; makes these available for criticism whereupon counter-affirmatives of the above propositions are sought to be established by *yuktikaraṇa*—called *pratisthāpanā*; and then the systematizer defends by establishing the negatives of these counter-affirmative propositions—called *vipratisthāpanā*; and the process goes on.

d) As *pṛkriyā siddhi* is thus symbolized by us and some ever-true *siddhāṅtas* are got hold of, these can be deployed as second premise, instead of D/U-*vākya*, in *yuktikaraṇa*, in order to discover the causes (and purposes). This is the procedure of *tarkakaraṇa*. The causes (and purposes) are further *identified* in this procedure by various techniques such as *anvaya*, *vyatireka*, *sāhcarya*, *pariśeṣa* and *prakārāntara pratiṣedha*. In this way, it becomes possible to explore deeper and deeper, reaching ultimate cause (and purpose) by proper rules of *siddhi* or valid inference. Thus, we are enabled to construct more and more comprehensive knowledge-systems by demarcating the logical-All and laying down the rules of proper discourse and criteria of proper scepsis.

e) The possibility of *pṛkriyāsiddhi* on the one hand and that of *saṁśaya* or scepsis on the other, often makes us commit fallacies of reasoning or *saṁvāda doṣa* which arise either by violating the general rules of discourse or by violation of fundamental presuppositions (such as that of a two-valued logic or of demarcation of logical-All) of *specific* systems of knowledge. This requires working-out of *consistency* of knowledge systems and definite conditions/criteria of such consistency. The logical techniques of *dvividhā* and *aniṣṭa prasanga* are thus discovered which allow us to show, whenever the criticism is unjust, that certain rules of discourse have been violated or the fundamental presuppositions of the specific knowledge-system have been overlooked.

f) Such a situation, however, necessitates the search for more comprehensive logics, new ways of demarcating logical-All, new criteria of *sat* and *asat* and thus of truth and falsity. Building of such cosmologics—suitable for more and more satisfying cosmological *saṁvāda*—presupposes satisfactory *theory of proposition* and *theory of proof/ argument-unit/yukti*. The concept of *apavāda*-proposition is thus central to such cosmo-logics which consider all that which is logically possible and all its logically possible descriptions. These require the working-out of criteria of when exactly an *apavāda* can be said to be *apavāda* proper and when can it be said to falsify *strictly* the parent, cosmically-universal, affirmative proposition. Search for such cosmologics and criteria of falsifiability of propositions within these is, therefore, the ideal of *saṁvāda gaṇita* so as to make possible a logically

sound cosmology with minimum 'universal-*apavādas*' or 'restricted universalities'.

The justification of *saṁvāda gaṇita* consists in this that it facilitates clear and precise generation, presentation, appraisal and establishing of more and more satisfactory cosmologies. Since cosmology is the most comprehensive of all sciences, if *saṁvāda gaṇita* facilities it, it would facilitate *any* limited systematization of knowledge or *sidhāṅta-taṅtra-karaṇa* or *sūṭrakaraṇa*. Our search for multiple *saṁvāda gaṇitas* enriches the inventory of logical methods and techniques to such a degree that we can *choose* a specific logical apparatus for specific knowledge-systematization, whether in medicine or Ārogya Śāstra, or ethics-and-law or Dharma Śāstra, or politics-and-law-and-economics or Artha Śāstra, or aesthesis and artistic creativity or Nātya Śāstra-Vāstu Śāstra. In a sense, then, the fundamental problems of *saṁvāda gaṇita* no longer remain the search for conditions of truth of propositions or conditions of validity of proof or conditions of consistency of knowledge-systems *as such*, but those of proper demarcation of logical-All, proper definitions of *sat* and *asat*, most adequate number of values of propositions and truth, validity and consistency *relative* to such logical systems!

Notes and References

1. Is there a symmetry between *kāraṇa* and *kārya* on the one hand and *kārya* and *prayojana* on the other hand? Since most of the cosmologies admit of ultimate *prayojana* like ultimate *kāraṇa*, can we say that a *samavāya* relation obtains between *prayojana* and *kārya* just as it obtains between *kāraṇa* and *kārya*? If such a relation does indeed obtain, then the structure of *yukti* for both will be the same—only a new constant, say P, for *prayojana* will be required to be introduced. Then, from a 'purposive fact', we shall be able to discover the underlying purpose and then provide a *telic explanation* of why the 'purposive fact' is so. Thus '*dukha hotā hai; atah puruṣa-kaivalya hotā hai*' represents the discovery of *prayojana*, namely *kaivalya* and '*Puruṣa kaivalya hotā hai, atha dukha hotā hai*' is the teleological explanation of suffering. This suggests that our conduct remains geared to a *prayojana* even if we are not able to *think it up* and this inability keeps us saved from 'determinism'.
2. 'Theory of Proposition or *Vākya*', *JICPR* XV (2), 1998.

Identity Through Necessary Change: Thinking About 'Rāga-bhāva' Concepts and Characters

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This essay is an attempt to explore the question of the identity of changing objects. It is, however, a banal truism to speak of the question of identity as one that involves change, for if there were no change, there can be no question concerning identity. The question, indeed is: what is it that remains the same through change? But, identity, with this question in mind, is usually understood as something which remains the same *despite* change. Difference is, thus, taken in some sense as accidental or contingent to identity; in some sense 'seeming' or unreal, something that just *happens* to an object, while identity persists and makes a thing *that* thing, in a non-contingent sense. What we attempt to put forward here is that the relation of change to identity can be considered in a quite different light, with a focus, which is not usual: there are identities, we can contend, where difference is not contingent but *necessary* to identity; the identity in such cases is *formed* and maintained through a process of change. How is such an identity to be understood? This question, I think, presents a most tantalizing aspect of the problem of identity. Reflection on it can also afford us a new centre of attention for viewing the relation of change or difference to identity. The present essay is an attempt at such a reflection, where the objects of reflection are identities of what might be called self-consciously created objects, which are also dynamic in nature. The chief *ālambana* for thought here is *rāga*, which classical Indian musicians create. In *rāga* we have an enticing case of identity, where the *rāga* is necessarily formulated through a process of palpable, self-conscious change called *ālāpa* in order to retain sameness. Reflection on *rāga* leads us to other analogous objects: dynamic objects, where

identity is the result of a necessary process of *ālāpa*-like change, a change which *aims at* creating identity, an identity that cannot be imagined without change. With a mind to a deeper, more immanent understanding of such an identity, we move on to consider the identity of the objects of the act of reflection itself: that is, abstract or pure concepts, or ideas, where a dynamic process of change is as essential to identity as in *rāga*s. Like *rāga*s, we argue, the identity of concepts is unimaginable without a necessary self-conscious *ālāpa*-like process, as can be tellingly seen on considering the identity of the concept of 'identity' itself. The concept of 'identity' is here taken as a significant, self-reflexive example of conceptualizing as such, and shown to be a process as ingrained in change as the process of *rāga*-making. In our deliberation here, *rāga* is the chief basis of considering such identities. But one can see that identity as conceived in such a manner has a large scope and even extends to the identity of an individual as a self-conscious, self-creating human person. Our discussion reaches out to such an identity, too, but in terms of persons as imaginary characters, for reasons that come out during the course of our deliberations and follow from our focus on the *rāga*.

Let us ask ourselves a question that arises naturally in trying to understand *rāga*s: What do we mean by speaking of the 'same' *rāga* in spite of an inbuilt plurality of distinctly different formulations, which a *rāga* by its very nature has?

There is a problem here, which calls for reflection. The 'same' *rāga* appears to be made of two opposing elements that seem to basically contradict any idea of sameness: one, a specific well-structured, delimited, form, and the other, an *ālāpa* or improvization, nurtured in willful change. The very conception of *rāga*, thus, seems to battle against the idea of identity. Yet we do identify a *rāga* in the plurality of its formations. And in creating it through *ālāpa*, we are earnestly intent on creating an individual identity for it, distinguishing it from other *rāga*s.

What is this identity that not only accommodates but also invites change and plurality? This is the question we shall try to look into.

*Rāga*s are, on the one hand, as we know, described, identified and learnt through well-defined structures. They consist of a network of relations between a select series of tones or *svaras*, arranged within

distinct scales or '*thāt*-s'. Or, to use a more expressive analytical term, '*melakartās*': a term that may be paraphrased as, 'a series of select *svaras*, together forming an octave, which in different combinations of ascending and descending arrangements (*āroha* and *avaroha*) have the potential of giving rise to different *rāga*s.' But whatever term we might use, there is still an oversimplification involved here, since not all *rāga*s can be fitted into a tight and distinct '*thāt*' or '*melakartā*' form. Still, the *melakartā* analysis holds in general, and can be modified or extended to include more complex *rāga*s. In any case, the important thing about *rāga*s as structures is that they are specific patterns; patterns, which can be analyzed and understood as distinct from any *ālāpa* through which they might be elaborated. The *rāga* pattern is 'given' and forms the basis of a free and open *ālāpa* or improvized elaboration according to a set of rules, which assume the pattern, but allow room for imagination. The *ālāpa* and the pattern can be discerned as distinct, and, indeed, the *rāga* as a pattern can be recognized without any *ālāpa*, as in film-songs or Rabindra Saṅgīta. Yet, in the music of *rāga*-making, *ālāpa* is central to the making of what we call a *rāga*. We formulate a *rāga* through *ālāpa*, not apart from it, and we identify two formulations as that of the same *rāga*, not only despite *ālāpa*, but through it. The *rāga* we identify in a fixed composition is a *rāga* only by courtesy. A *rāga* proper, rendered through *ālāpa*, always remains open to a different *ālāpa*; so that no one rendering of a *rāga* can be identified, in principle, as *the rāga*.

How is plurality of *ālāpa*, which inevitably incorporates change, related to the identity of the *rāga* as *the rāga*? What, in other words, is the relation between the (seemingly) battling duality, *ālāpa*, and a 'given' singular structure, that forms the basis of identity in *rāga*-making? How is this identity to be understood? These are the questions I wish to take up here. They suggest larger issues regarding identity in general, and will take us beyond *rāga*-music, but my focus still remains *rāga*. I hope that my discussion of *rāga* and the peculiar complexities of its identity will raise interesting questions regarding the matter in general.

Unlike scored or pre-notated music, a *rāga* does not have a blueprint that can be and is supposed, ideally, to be duplicated in every

presentation. Even this can raise questions of identity, because any living duplication invites change. Yet the identity here can, at least in principle, be said to be a simple matter. The identity of a *rāga* is obviously more complex (that is why it intrigues and invites question). *Ālāpa* or improvization is immanent to a *rāga*. Yet we portray the same *rāga* again and again, making a point to distinguish between correct and incorrect presentations. The care with which a *rāga* is formulated as a distinct, unique entity is best illustrated in the thoughtfulness with which we distinguish it from other *rāga*s that resemble it and share strong formal traits with it. This also, tellingly, points at the emphasis that *rāga*-music puts on the specificity of a *rāga* as a distinct entity. An obvious and explicit basis of identity is the strong given structural individuality of *rāga*s, yet looking at *ālāpa*, this cannot be the whole of the matter. The given structure of a *rāga*, its individual pattern and rules of formation, no doubt, form the basis of 'correctness' as well as ground for retaining sameness in different presentations. But there is more to it as we shall see. Identity in a *rāga* cannot be restricted to a given pattern or even rules, since a good *ālāpa* reweaves them in its own way, and a great *ālāpa* can even transform them. No doubt, musicians—and *rasikas*—pay careful attention to the given in a *rāga*, but *rāga*-making is an imaginative, creative activity which seeks in a *rāga* a deeper individuality or identity than that which lies on the surface. It seeks *rāga-bhāva*, which reaches beyond the given. The given structure of a *rāga* is only a part or aspect, or 'facade' of the *bhāva* of a *rāga*.

This is the reason that *ālāpa* is central to building a *rāga*. Tradition tries to restrict *ālāpa*, too. But however schematized *ālāpa* might become due to conventions and the conforming process introduced in musical practice by specific *gharānā*s, *sampradāya*s or *guru-paramparā*s, it always retains openness. We thus find that even as tradition extols orthodoxy and conformity, it also, at a more meaningful level extols the ideals of innovative, creative, individualist *rāga*-making. To be 'true' to a *rāga* is to be true to its *bhāva*, and this is a complex ideal that cannot be contained in any *given*, whether a 'correct' pattern or a 'correct' tradition.

This suggests a tension between a given stable form and an innovative change-instilling movement at the very centre of the culture of *rāga*-making. The two foundational elements of the process of *rāga*-making: a 'given', formally delimited structure and *ālāpa*, which opens it up, have been at the heart of *rāga*-music since its inception. Together these conflicting elements introduce a friction, which has also been a seed of vitality in the history of *rāga*s, giving the culture and tradition of *rāga*-music an in-built dynamism, a protean spirit; and to *rāga*-forms, a sense of dynamic identity, which we will seek to explore and articulate.

*Rāga*s are rooted in history. Even within living memory, we experience *rāga*s changing over time. In addition, we find certain *rāga*s gradually going out of currency and new *rāga*s replacing the old. Our musical lore and our ingrained habit of thought have learnt to ignore this change. We maintain a myth of unchanging eternity even as we keep changing our *raga*s inevitably through the duality of the process we embrace in making them. We believe, especially today, that *rāga*s have continued unchanged almost from time immemorial. We are taught to disregard, even dismiss as inconsequential, the dynamic, 'historical' nature of *rāga*s, preferring the idea, or rather the illusion, of stability. But *Saṅgīta-śāstra*s, which we do revere, should dispel the illusion. They have a long history and an acknowledged chronology that takes us back reliably into *rāga*-history over a millennium at the least. The *śāstra*s bear clear witness to change: both in particular *rāga*s and even in the total corpus or repertoire of *rāga*-forms over a time. We discover that not only did individual *rāga*s change, but also that entire new sets of *rāgas* replaced older sets within a few generations. And this, the available records evince, happened more than once during the last seven or eight hundred years. The famous musicologist Śārṅgadeva writing his *Saṅgīta-ratnākara* in the thirteenth century, records and describes a large repertoire of *rāga*s, dividing them into two distinct groups: the older, 'traditional' *mārga raga*s and newer forms, which he calls '*Rāga*s that are now current' (*adhunāprasiddha rāga*s). The older *rāga*s were, apparently, relatively frozen forms handed down from the past. We do not know how purely they were preserved in Śārṅgadeva's day and how free was the nature of *ālāpa* in them. The more critical part of the

repertoire of *rāga*s was the set of *adhunāprasiddha rāga*s, or contemporary *rāga*s current during his time. They were, evidently, forms living through free *ālāpa*, which seems to have been similar to our own, and were, hence, variable in nature. By the 14th century when Kallinātha wrote his commentary on Śārṅgadeva's famous work, many of these 'current' *rāga*s had indeed changed, almost beyond recognition. Kallinātha observes that a number of *adhunāprasiddha rāga*s of Śārṅgadeva's days were no longer current in the form described by Śārṅgadeva, and were not identifiable through Śārṅgadeva's descriptions. Interestingly, for Kallinātha this was not a flaw (a *dūṣaṇa*) in *rāga*-music, but a merit, a value to be cherished (a *bhūṣaṇa*), because *rāga*s, for him, were dynamic by nature—they were not sacred, but '*deśī*' forms, nurtured in change. About two centuries after Kallinātha, by the 16th century, the *rāga*s 'current' during Śārṅgadeva's days had gone completely out of currency being replaced by a totally new set of *rāga*s. The same process has happened once again since then, and if we look historically at the *rāga*s current today, it is unlikely that more than a handful go back to the 16th century in the form in which they are now current. This raises the question, when does a *rāga* lose its identity? But we will not go into this knotty question here, limiting ourselves to exploring identity, not the loss of it—loss of identity in a protean form does not seem as surprising as the fact it is there at all. What is it, we could ask, that continues in the culture of *rāga*-making keeping the tradition and ideal of *rāga*-identity alive while *rāga*s change over time. Certainly the ideal of a *raga*'s identity in *ālāpa* continues even as *raga*s change or go out of circulation. Other continuities include elements such as a general, overall, musical approach: basic rules, norms, styles, ideals and usages of *ālāpa* with which individual *rāga*s, whatever their specific form, are articulated in musical practice. Such continuities are, indeed, part of any culture and are rooted not only in ideals and approach, but also in convention and standardization of practice. So we have *gharānā*-like conventions along with formalized *rāga*-rules to limit change. This is analogous to standardization of a language through conventions of educated usage, which, like *gharānā*s, also inspire ideals of stability.

And yet, however conventionalized it might become, *ālāpa*, like language, retains an open core rendering *rāga*s effectively dynamic. *Rāga*s will change as long as they are made through *ālāpa*.

More important than convention in circumscribing *ālāpa* is the *rāga* itself. For, *ālāpa* has a *distinctive* character in *rāga*-making, a matter that needs to be stressed. *Ālāpa*, as such, is not confined to *rāga*-making. It covers a much wider area. Jazz has *ālāpa* or improvization; so has much music in our own country, which is not *rāga*-music. We are all familiar with the kind of *ālāpa* associated with folk *dhun*-s rather than *rāga*s that is part of the repertoire of many accomplished musicians. Such a non-*rāga ālāpa* is, we also feel, much freer than *rāga-ālāpa*, much less rule-bound, allowing adventurous digressions into capricious phrases using any group of notes that might create a pleasing or striking effect. A *rāga* does not permit this. It demands in the *ālāpa* a proper attention to its given structure or pattern: what has been called the '*nāda-rūpa*' of a *rāga*, that is, the distinctive rule-bound web of *svara*s that build up its individual form. To understand the distinction meant here between *rāga-ālāpa* and *ālāpa* in general, look at the distinction in musical usage between '*baḍhat*' in general and '*rāgadārī*'. '*Baḍhat*' is a more universal term meaning improvization as such; it can be a term describing any kind of free musical elaboration. '*Rāgadārī*', on the other hand, is *ālāpa* carefully oriented towards the formulation of a specific *rāga*. In such an *ālāpa*, the given form of a *rāga*, its *nāda-rūpa*, regulates the *ālāpa*. *Rāgadārī*, one could say, is open, imaginative elaboration, which willingly limits itself to the specificity of a pattern.

This opens it to a search for a deeper something within the pattern: an aspect or level of identity of which the pattern becomes the seed, so to say. For, *rāgadārī* is not just a quantitative elaboration of a pattern of *svara*s through a set rules of permutation and combination. It is a deeper activity in which a given pattern becomes the basis of exploring and seeking a 'felt' identity, a process in which the pattern is opened up in meaningful ways. The aim is to create *rāga-bhāva*. *Rāga-bhāva* is the term in use for the felt identity of a *rāga*. A *rāga* without *rāga-bhāva* is believed to be only the shadow of a *rāga*. The given, basic pattern which forms the seed of the *rāga-bhāva* has been called the

nāda-rūpa of a *rāga*. *Rāga-bhāva* may be said to be the inner identity of the *nāda-rūpa*, an identity sought and created by musicians through *ālāpa*. This is why it has plural possibilities, since different musicians seek the *bhāva* of a *rāga* in different ways.

Literally the phrase, '*nada-rūpa* of a *rāga*' means the '*rāga* as it sounds'; it refers to the *rāga* as 'a perceived, concrete, aural object'. This, in musical convention, is the given pattern of *svara*s constituting a *rāga*. *Nāda-rūpa* may also be described as the skeleton or frame that achieves flesh and spirit in *rāga-bhava*. The role of *rāgadārī* is to flesh out the *nāda-rūpa* and give it an inner 'self', so to say; or, in other words, impart to it a *rāga-bhāva*. A *rāga-bhāva*, then, can be justly said to be the 'true' identity of a *rāga*. Without *rāga-bhāva* what we have is a *nāda-rūpa*, which is only the potential of a *rāga*, not a *rāga*.

The question of the identity of a *rāga*, then, can be seen as: What is *rāga-bhāva*?

In the discussion to follow, I will not use the word '*rāga-bhāva*' but replace it with '*bhava-rūpa*' as a synonym, in order to make it parallel to '*nāda-rūpa*', so that the distinction between the two is more conspicuous. The term *nāda-rūpa* is an old term known from an important text: it was used by the seventeenth century musicologist, Somanātha in his *Rāga-vibodha*, to distinguish the *svara*-structure of a *rāga* from its *dhyāna*, in which a *rāga* is conceived as a kind of supernatural deity. In the words of Somanātha, the *dhyāna* gives the '*deva-rūpa*' of a *rāga*. The term '*bhāva-rūpa*' does not occur in older texts. But neither does the term, *rāga-bhava*, used today by *rasikas* and musicians. Yet the idea of an inner, felt form of a *rāga* has been central to the aesthetic of *rāga*-making for centuries and is in a profound sense contained in the very musical approach which makes the culture of *rāga*-making what it is.

To ask, what is the *bhāva-rūpa* of a *rāga*, implies another question which could be taken up first, namely, how does *bhāva-rūpa* relate to *nāda-rūpa*? What makes it possible for a delimited *nāda-rūpa* to become the 'seed' of a *bhāva-rūpa*? How, that is, is *nāda-rūpa* conceived and 'grounded' as pattern to give it such a potential?

We have spoken of *bhāva-rūpa* as the flesh and spirit of a *nāda-rūpa*. One might, somewhat less metaphorically, like to refer to it as

the 'content' of a *nāda-rūpa*. But speaking of a duality such as that of 'form' and 'content' is not appropriate in this context, since in music there is no content, only form. The form itself, one might say, is the content. The duality of form and content is most marked in literature, which uses language, where the distinction between word as sound and word as meaning, grounds the distinction between 'form' and 'content'. In music, however, where there is only sound, any 'meaning' that is felt has to be grounded in sound itself. And yet, a profound distinction is felt in *rāga*s between an inner and an outer *rūpa* despite an obvious absence of a duality such as that between form and content. The intriguing question still would be that if a distinction between an inner and outer appears as illogical here as a distinction between form and content, how can such a distinction be meaningfully made, and how can we articulate it?

I will attempt an answer. First by speaking of how the nature of *rāga*-rules ground a process that enables an 'opening up' of a given *rāga*-pattern for creative exploration. Then I will take up two analogies, very different from each other, which, I think, might, together, help to understand the kind of entity that a *bhāva-rūpa* is: its complex, dynamic and plural identity. To think in analogies appears to be a meaningful approach in this context.

The *nāda-rūpa* or the given *rāga*-pattern can be seen to have two aspects as is also implied in the descriptions above. What we have is a laid pattern of *svara*s and a set of given relationships between *svara*s formulated as rules that allow the relations to be 'activated', so to say. A *nāda-rūpa* is not a 'composition' that can be sung or played by itself, where the *svara*s are 'fixed' or 'frozen' in a relationship. Even to be formulated as a discernible pattern, the *nāda-rūpa* needs a musical endeavour, an *ālāpa*-like effort, to acquire any aural, musical form at all. So if someone asks, 'show me the basic form of *rāga* x', the *rāga* will have to be shown through some actual musical movements, assuming the pattern and needing a kind of *ālāpa* to bring it out. This rudimentary process itself is unfixed and can—and does—adopt multiple ways. The rudimentary *ālāpa* needed to articulate the pattern itself, is not really *ālāpa* but a display of how the rules work, like showing how a game of cards might be played. Such a *rāga*-setting

ālāpa assumes a richer 'understanding' of the *rāga*, but it cannot really be called *rāgadārī*, or even really an *ālāpa*; its purpose is just to give a 'basic' sketch of the *rāga*. Now, if one were to display the *rāga* meaningfully as a felt musical entity, *rāgadārī* will come into play and attempt to present the *rāga* as a *bhāva-rūpa*, not just a *nāda-rūpa*.

We could rightly speak of a duality of *ālāpa* here: one which could be called an 'outer' *ālāpa*, which is concerned merely with the setting up of the *rāga* as a structure, its 'correct' form, and the other, which reaches deeper into the structure, exploring its spirit. I can imagine *rasikas* who might not like to call the *ālāpa* that aims merely at depicting the *nāda-rūpa*, really *ālāpa*, yet *ālāpa* it still is, however rudimentary, even unmusical it might be, because the *rāga* could have been displayed in a different way. But, surely, *rāgadārī* it is not. For, *ālāpa* in *rāgadārī* assumes the *nāda-rūpa*; it does not display it separately. *Rāgadārī* is like a discourse in a language where the rules of sentence making are taken as assumed and not needing a display. A display may perhaps be needed only if a serious breach of 'correctness' were to occur. Or, perhaps, it may be needed if a *rāga* were new or lesser known. *Rāgadārī*, in truth, is a seamless process where no duality between *nāda-rūpa* and *bhāva-rūpa* is felt; it consists of a single, uninterrupted weave. Just as a discourse has.

So, the distinction we are making here between *nāda-rūpa* and *bhāva-rūpa* might even seem merely analytical, a purely conceptual and not an actual distinction. There is, one could assert, no distinction of outer and inner in a *rāga*. But the distinction is more than analytical, as one can see in the teaching and learning of *rāga*s, where the *nāda-rūpa* is presented through a rudimentary *ālāpa*, in order to show the distinct form of the *rāga*, its *nāda-rūpa*, which could then form a doorway to *rāgadārī*. We may also distinguish between the *nāda-rūpa* and *bhāva-rūpa* in the *rāgadāri* of a musician when we want to think of what she/he is doing *with* the *rāga*. We find critics doing this.

Still, it has to be granted that in the process of creating a *bhāva-rūpa* for a *rāga*, *rāgadārī* weaves a unitary, unbroken fabric, where a *nāda-rūpa* is not separately discerned. *Rāgadārī* as a creative effort subsumes the *rāga*-pattern, not needing to display it separately. But it also assumes the pattern. It follows—and self-consciously so—the rules

forming the pattern, although it is not, and cannot as imaginative *ālāpa*, be a mere external following of rules. In fact, it is deeply felt in the *rāga*-tradition that *rāga*s are not built on *rāga* rules, which are in truth deduced from the practice of living *rāga*-music. There is again a similarity with language and its grammar here. Rules of language assume language, and are brought out reflexively as *vyākriyā* or analysis. The *vyākriyā*, interestingly, also reveals that the rules of a language do not bind it as is shown by the necessity of exceptions or *apavāda*.

But once the rules are there they become part of our self-conscious understanding and use of language. They bind language, standardize it, make it possible to teach it systematically, even to non-native users, and give it stability. But they now can also be transcended more self-consciously by creative users. In *rāga*-music, what the *śāstra* and its *vyākriyā* do is to bring out *nāda-rūpa*s as patterns and rules, fix them as closely as possible so that they can be described, learnt and become the basis of the identity of a *rāga*. But once the *vyākrīyā* is there, we can also see more self-consciously that the purpose of *nāda-rūpa*s is to provide ground for *bhāva-rūpa*s: to be the doorway for an interior space where *ālāpa* can move in. We can now also treat the rules themselves imaginatively, changing them, modulating them to treat *rāga*s differently or to create new ones. We can even systematically enlarge the scope of rules to expand the span of possible *rāga*s (and thus of possible *bhāva-rūpa*s), as did Venkatamakhin with his notion of 72 *melakartā*s.

And so, although it is true that in music, including *rāga*-music, no distinction can be made between form and content, we may yet choose to call the *bhāva-rūpa* the content of the *rāga* to distinguish it from the *nāda-rūpa*, for it 'fills out' the *nāda-rūpa*, or is 'poured into' the *nāda-rūpa*. Or, one could put the matter differently. One can be a *pariṇāma-vādī* and say that the *nāda-rūpa* itself is not mere form but a felt, significant form, and that creating *bhāva-rūpa* is the act of manifesting or bringing out the significance inherent in the form. But in any case the key role of *rāgadāri* will have to be granted as a necessary act, an act without which a *rāga* can have no *bhāva-rūpa* and is not really a *rāga*.

The rules that mark the *nāda-rūpa* of a *rāga*, like those of language, are 'enabling' rules. They enable *ālāpa* to create a *bhāva-rūpa*. They

may be likened not only to rules of language but also to those of games. They set up a potentiality or a 'space' for an 'inner' movement, permitting freedom for such a movement, a movement, which, indeed, will be absent without the rules. We can see that without the 'skeleton' or, rather, the 'seed' of a *nāda-rūpa* and its associated language-like or game-like enabling rules, there will be no space for *ālāpa* and the creation of a *bhāva-rūpa*.

The analysis of a *rāga* into a *nāda-rūpa* may also be meaningfully seen as an attempt to discern a core or nucleus form, which gives rise to a multiplicity of *bhāva-rūpa*s, which yet remain moored in the same *rāga*, thus forming a core, which also is the centre of identity of a *rāga*. This is a compelling analytical tool, one could feel, by which the *rāga* tradition transmits *rāga*s as potential *bhāva-rūpa*s. Identity in a *rāga* has not only to be created but also sustained in practice. With a complex object like *rāga*, pure forms, which inherently incorporate an improvized 'inner' plurality, the *nāda-rūpa* analysis seems an ideal way of transmission. It is like the preservation of seeds.

The art of *rāga*-making, it should be clear from the above discussion, is in many ways quite different from other arts. Works of art, usually, have an identity as single, definite objects (whatever the indefiniteness of their 'meaning'). They are also said to be the unique product of a unique imagination. *Rāga*s do not fit into this description. A single *rāga* is not a single definite 'work', nor does it have a single individual creator. A *rāga* would not be a *rāga*, if it were to have a single unchangeable form, such as a symphony, or remain the work of a single individual in the usual sense in which a work is said to 'belong' uniquely to a painter, poet or sculptor and the like. A *rāga*, on the contrary, even when created by an individual musician, as it often is, is not 'hers/his' in the same sense that a poem or a novel is. A *rāga* would not be a *rāga*, if it could not be sung or played by anyone competent to do so and create a *bhāva-rūpa* for it. The identity of a *rāga*, in this sense, is quite in contrast to the concept of the art-form as something 'unchangeably unique', both in terms of a creation and a creator. When we generally think of a work of art we think of it as something that was created once for all and as something that should, ideally, remain so for our contemplation in the shape that its creator gave it, whose genius the work inimitably expresses. We, therefore, strive to keep poems, paintings, buildings and sculptures by great artists undistorted. But a *rāga* is different. We strive to change it all the time, through a constant process of *ālāpa*. A *rāga*, moreover, once cognized as a *rāga*, becomes the free property for anyone who might like to sing or play it. And different musicians will do so differently; they will, indeed, be expected to do so, creating *bhāva-rūpa*s with their own *ālāpa*, individual style and vision—their *gāyakī* or *bāj*. And yet a *rāga* retains an identity through all this, for as long as it lasts. And that is why the question of its identity poses a more than ordinary puzzle.

It was in order to grasp such a dynamic identity in difference that we turned to rules. The 'same' rule is naturally open to multiple actualizations. With a rule-created entity one can reasonably imagine the presence of identity in multiplicity. There can be rules that restrict freedom but, contrarily, as we saw above, they can also have an enabling quality, as do rules of language, games or *rāga*s. Let us look at *rāga*-rules more closely.

Rāga-rules as we said earlier, assume a *svara*-pattern; they are, as we have also said, grounded in such a pattern. The pattern is generally given in terms of *āroha* (select *svara*s in an ascending configuration within an octave) and *avaroha* (descent). *Rāga*-rules both assume this pattern and create it as a dynamic entity. They carve out individual paths of movements for the *ālāpa* to move in. This is the *chalan* of a *rāga*. *Chalan*-s can be simple or complex, more open or more hedged in, and we have 'bigger' or 'smaller' *rāga*s, the bigger being relatively more open, with more space for alternative movements. But this is a relative matter and in principle, all *rāga*s have an inner space for alternative movement. The rules which create the *chalan* of specific *rāga*s can be seen as 'particular' *rāga*-rules. Particular rules are more apparent—we learn them in learning *rāga*s; and so, also more immediate. They are also relatively more dynamic and amenable to modulation.

These particular rules are themselves grounded in a larger or wider set of rules. We can, indeed, distinguish two distinct elements, or levels, one might say, in the rules of *rāga*s. These can be distinguished as 'particular' and 'universal' rules. The two, as we can imagine, are interwoven in practice and the distinction is matter of analysis. And

yet, the distinction is vital in understanding what it is that gives an 'interior' to a *nāda-rūpa*.

The more universal or general set of rules, as we have called them, are those which are associated with *rāga*s as a whole. They form, so to say, the basis of the realm of *rāga*s as such—creating, in other words, the very possibility of *rāga*s as a genus of rule-formed entities. Rules of *chalan* pertaining to single, individual *rāga*s assume the universal rules.

Indeed, the 'openness' of particular rules, permitting *ālāpa*, derives from the universal rules, which are also more 'static' and stable—they continue, while particular rules, and the *rāga*s they make, change. The relation between the particular and the universal may be likened to that between laws and norms of justice.

The rule, which may be said to be the most universal, is the 'definitive' rule (or *rāga-lakṣaṇa* to use the ancient word), which says that *rāga*s are formed through two qualities that one could apply to any set of *svara*s, namely *alpatva* (making a *svara* or group of *svara*s weak) and *bahutva* (making *svara/svara*s strong). What this means is that of all the *svara*s used in any *rāga*, some are to be stressed, others not. This may be said to be a rule for *making* any structure at all out of what would otherwise be pure uniformity and monotony devoid of any pattern whatever. The *bahu svara*s in ancient *rāga*-making were particularized and spoken of as *vādī* and *saṁvādī*, because these were *svara*s that also stood in a natural harmonic relation with each other. But *vādī-saṁvādī*, though we still speak of them, are ancient notions which are not central to *rāga*-making in practice today; the *chalan* is more important, which provides a complex pattern of *alpa* and *bahu* within a distinct pathway.

The *alpa-bahu* rule is, clearly, the foundational realm-making rule. It can obviously be particularized in any number of ways (as the history and practice of *rāga*-music also shows). It has an openness of possibilities, which it retains in—or, rather, transmits to—its particular formulations as singular *nāda-rūpa*s. What a *nāda-rūpa* does is to regulate *alpatva* and *bahutva*. And this can be done in ways ranging from the more 'open' to the more circumscribed—as some examples might more palpably reveal. *Rāga*s such as *Mālkaus*, do not really have

a given rule concerning *alpatva* and *bahutva* pertaining to particular *svara/svara*s (the rule, which it is supposed to or even 'decreed' to have—*sa vādī, ma saṁvādī*—is one which can be broken with impunity), and a musician is free to set up his own pattern/patterns of *alpatva* and *bahutva* without loss to the identity of the *rāga*. This was patently brought out in a concert called *Navarasa Malkaus*, held some years ago, where different *svara*s of the five *svara* structure were used as key or '*jīva*' *svara* by different musicians to create the *rāga*, enriching its possibilities rather than losing or loosening its identity. On the other hand in *rāga*s like *Sūhā*, *Bahār* and *Basant* there are special and particular rules organizing *alpatva* and *bahutva* in abundance of detail, channelling musical movement into more circumscribed paths. The degree of openness regarding *alpatva* and *bahutva* is one major basis for the distinction between 'smaller' and 'bigger' *rāga*s. But however circumscribed it might be in some *rāga*s, the *alpa-bahu* rule yet remains a general rule open to multiple interpretation.

Another general rule lays down that no *rāga* can be formed with fewer than five *svara*s of an octave, and that no *rāga* should use all *svara*s that an octave can have. The *alpatva-bahutva* rule concerns the organization of particular *chalan* patterns within particular *rāga*s. The present rule provides the basic condition that any selection of *svara*s must fulfil if it is to form a *nāda-rūpa*, since any *nāda-rūpa* in order to form the basis of *ālāpa* must possess an adequate span capable of accommodating a musically satisfying *chalan* or *antaramārga* ('inner pathway', to use a more ancient word). It also opens up the possibility of any number of *nāda-rūpa*s. Given the rule, we can see that the number of imaginable *rāga*s is immense. Only a handful of the possibilities are actualized. At any particular time, the current repertoire of *rāga*s is bound to be a very small set of *rāga*s that can possibly exist. Assuming the number of *svara*s to be seven, some old texts, indeed, enumerate the number of *rāga*s one can have given this rule. The answer, as one can imagine, runs into a few hundred thousand. If we take the number of *svara*s to be more than seven, which they are, the possibilities will multiply into millions. We must bear in mind, however, that the numbers laid down in the rule, 'at least five *svara*s' or, 'not all the *svara*s' are not strictly mandatory; the intention behind the

rule is not a fiat concerning how many *svara*s a *rāga must* have, but the articulation of a simple principle for creating sufficiently rich yet singular structures. If the use of fewer, or, contrarily, all available *svara*s can yet succeed in providing significant *nāda-rūpa*s that satisfy that criteria of richness and individuality, they can be freely set up. We find that there are, and have always been, 'good' *rāga*s like *Mālashrī* with four or even three *svara*s of the octave (Matanga, the great *rāga* theorist, writing some time between the 5th and the 7th centuries, also notes the possibility). And to take an example from the other end of the limiting span, we have *rāga*s like *Bhairavī* and *Pīlū*, which can be played and sung without dropping a single *svara*. It is their *chalan* that gives such *rāga*s their individuality.

Rāga-making rules also reveal the ideal nature of *rāga*s: allowing possibilities, they oblige the musician to interpret rules, and this interpretation essentially involves the exploration of musical meaning. Since a *nāda-rūpa* has to be shaped through *ālāpa*, its 'being' essentially involves 'becoming'. *Rāgadārī* is intent not only upon what a *rāga* is as a given pattern, but even more so upon what it can be and should be. A musician looks towards not only correctness but also aptness and propriety in interpreting the rules of a *rāga*, which involves the creation of significance and not just structure. *Rāgadārī* aims at revealing in a *rāga* its ideality, which leads beyond any purely given form. This is why no actual rendering of a *rāga* ever exhausts the *rāga*, and a different, and perhaps more meaningful, rendering of it is always possible.

What the rules do, then, is to create single *nāda-rūpa*s that can have multiple *bhāva-rūpa*s, all identifiable as 'that *rāga*'. This is a self-consciously created identity. Let us take an analogy here to understand such identity. A *bhāva-rūpa*, we might say, is somewhat like a concept or an idea. An idea differently expressed, in different words, is yet identifiable as the 'same idea'. It would, in fact, not be an idea or a concept if it could not be so expressed. This analogy is, I think, helpful in understanding the plurality of a *bhāva-rūpa* as well as its ideal nature. Let us take the concept or idea of 'identity'. What we are asking for, one can say, is the identity of the concept of 'identity'. This would need an exposition requiring elaboration—which can be reasonably called an *ālāpa* in thought—that can be validly done in multiple ways

to expound the same concept. One could here object and say that the logical statement or formula, 'p is p' gives us 'identity' and needs no elaboration. But a simple question will open the formula up for inspection and demand exposition: true, 'p is p' is called an identity statement, but does it really give us the idea of identity; does it not on the contrary, assume identity, presuppose it as given? If someone wanted to know what the concept or idea of identity is, would it do to say, 'identity is identity', on the lines of 'p is p'? 'P is p' can make no sense without an exposition: it is indeed part of a certain way of conceiving identity, a conception that needs to be expounded if we want to understand it. And we can still question it and open the way for a very different understanding and exposition of the idea of identity. We can, like the Naiyāyika, assert that a statement such as 'p is p' is meaningless, for it is just a pointless tautology: Why say 'p is p' when 'p' is enough to give us 'p'? Is 'p' not identical with itself? Why add 'is p'? What does the addition give that is more than 'p'? The only purpose of the addition of 'is p', one can argue, could be to avoid 'p' being misidentified with something it is not: a 'not p'. So would it not be better to say: 'p is not, not p'. If one were to object here and say, 'not, not p' is the same as 'p', or, in other words, is identical with it, the statement would still need an exposition, for it could raise an objection, which cannot be answered without an exposition: 'not, not p' cannot be identical with 'p', since 'not, not p' is an *apoha*-like distinguishing statement, which assumes a world of 'not ps' which it then negates; 'p' alone cannot do this. Arguing thus, one could assert, to identify, is to differentiate; 'p is p' cannot do this, but 'not, not p' can, since it presupposes other entities (or at least one other entity) than 'p', namely, a 'not p', which it negates in order to target 'p', even though 'p' be nothing but a notional place name. As an identity statement, 'not, not p', assimilates the concept of 'difference', in order to arrive at 'non-difference' or identity; neither 'p is p' nor 'p' in itself can do this. Hence, such a *pūrvapakṣa* can argue, even a formula-like statement of identity should be expressed as 'p is not, not p' and not as 'p is p'. One could reply by saying that what 'p is p' does is to try and ground identity as a purely logical principle in the simplest of forms without reference to anything else. But even a logical principle is grounded in

thought and needs exposition, or assumes one, of which it is a crystallization (somewhat like a *nāda-rūpa*, one could say). And an exposition of identity, clearly, will have to assimilate the concept of 'difference' (and other relevant concepts) in dealing with the concept of identity or else it might be found inadequate even as a principle. It will have to, like an *ālāpa* in thought, explore the conceptual identity of 'identity', taking a formula such as 'p is p', as if it were a *nāda-rūpa*, and expound it into an adequate *bhāva-rūpa*-like coherent weave. And this can, obviously, be done in plural ways.

I will not proceed further with this line of thought except to reassert, as an implication, that an exposition is necessary if any concept such as 'identity' is to have any meaning at all. Such an exposition, moreover, will presuppose a field of expositions and a tradition of expositions with which and within which it will be formulated. Other expositions can play the field in other possible ways, provided they do so in a relevant and creative manner. The analogy with *rāga*s is transparent.

Plurality, in fact, can be detected deeper than concepts. It can be seen as an aspect of any search for meaning. It is certainly present in the most palpable sense of meaning, namely the meaning of words. It is part of the very nature of language. The 'same' meaning can be expressed in different words, in a number of possible ways. Indeed, if it could not be so expressed it would not express a meaning at all but be just a string of sounds (or syllables)—as Kautsa argued more than twenty-five hundred years ago. He made the point that the Veda has no meaning, because its words—or rather, its set of syllables—and their order is fixed. Therefore they can have no meaning (and so cannot even be called words), because any set of syllables that are words have a meaning that can be expressed in different words (or a different word-order) even in the same language, and that if this cannot be done what we have is not meaning but just sound (or script). The parallel with *rāga-bhāva* is here plainly suggested. Nothing can be said without words, and yet, it is what is said, the meaning (or the idea) that is eminent over words, and gives meaning to words—and one might even go so far as to say—makes them words. Analogically, one can say that there can be no *bhāva-rūpa* without a *nāda-rūpa*, but it is the *bhāva-rūpa* which gives meaning to the *nāda-rūpa*, and indeed calls for it, since a *bhāva-rūpa* needs a *nāda-rūpa* to manifest itself.

This analogy is, I think, meaningful in understanding the same *rāga* as inherently plural through its *bhāva-rūpa*. The analogy also reveals *ālāpa* as a 'thinking', reflexively ratiocinative activity, which it indeed is. However, it brings in language, and has snags. Language has a basic difference with music. Language can be transparently separated into words and meanings or ideas, in other words sounds (or scripts) and sense, where the one has no necessary or inherent relation with the other, and the two can be perceived as distinct entities. This cannot be done in music where structure and sense (or meaning, or 'significance' if one likes), are two aspects of a single perceived entity. Moreover, though similar in its ideal quality to a concept, the *rāga* is yet more individual in some essential ways. Concepts can travel from one language to another; being in words, they can be translated. *Rāga*s cannot be translated; indeed, it amounts to almost a category mistake to speak of 'translation' in the context of *rāga*s. *Rāga*s, like other musical forms are confined to a specific musical tradition and culture, even though, as we know from the Indian experience, there can be more than one tradition of *rāga*-making, where *rāga*s may be 'borrowed' from one another: the Hindustani tradition, as we know, has taken many *rāga*s from Karnataka, and the other way round; *rāga*s have also travelled from the middle-east to India. One may, perhaps, also speak of a *rāga* remaining the 'same' in some essential sense even within different cultural traditions as we do of a concept; but it is also true that *rāga*-making is not a universal human phenomenon, in the sense that concept-making is.

The analogy with concepts also does not do justice to *bhāva-rūpa*s as felt entities. So it would be interesting to reflect a little more and think of other analogies, which could be suggestive of this aspect of *rāga*s. The word *bhāva* means, 'feeling' or 'emotion'. *Bhāva-rūpa* (or the word that it represents here, namely, '*Rāga-bhāva*'), then, could be taken to be a qualitative concept as opposed to *nāda-rūpa*, the purely structural aspect of a *rāga*, which can be quantified. Indeed, the *nāda-rūpa* does not even have to be demonstrated through some kind of singing or playing in order to be displayed in a quantified or 'measured' manner. A description of it, in terms of the *svara*s it uses and the

overall rules of formation applicable to it can be enough. And through the *nāda-rūpa* we can recognize the *rāga* to which it belongs. Sketching a *nāda-rūpa* through a listing of its *āroha* (ascending notes), *avaroha* (descending notes), and some typical movement of its *chalan*, is often enough to lead to recognition. More description of usage or performance practice, such as is found in text-books, namely, more detailed combinations and phrases specific to a *rāga*, make the quantification surer, leading to a readier identification (descriptions such as *sañcāra*, *melana*, *pakaḍa* and the like, here come to the mind, or what Bhatkhande and others notate as 'typical *ālāpas*' in particular *rāgas*, a kind of notation practice, which goes back to Matanga—5th–7th centuries AD). Such a detailed verbal delineation of a *rāga* goes beyond the mere sketching of a *nāda-rūpa*, and it leads us more surely to cognize a *rāga* as 'that specific *rāga*'. To use a phrase from Abhinavagupta (a thinker and musicologist of the 10th–11th centuries) a *tad-Rāga-dhī*, or knowledge of a *rāga* as the particular *rāga* ('tat'-*Rāga*), can be had from a 'measured' report of it.

And yet, any such description has to be grasped in a larger perspective that reaches beyond descriptive knowledge to a musical comprehension, an experience of a *rāga* within a living tradition. Without such a living awareness, the descriptive knowledge, too, remains barren, even meaningless, being devoid of any real reference. And, needless to add, a living knowledge of a *rāga* assumes knowledge of *rāgas* not just as *nāda-rūpa* (in however extended a sense) but also as *bhāva-rūpa*, a felt entity brought to life through an actual *ālāpa*, not just a description of it: it assumes, that is, the knowledge of *rāgas* as a qualitative structure apart from something merely quantifiable. This is also clear from the fact that the descriptive knowledge of a *rāga* helps us to recognize only those *rāgas*, which we have heard, and not unheard *rāgas*. Descriptions of *rāgas* in ancient texts cannot really be 'read' as *rāgas*, but only shadows of them.

The idea of *rāgas* as living forms is deep-rooted in the *rāga*-tradition itself. *Rāgas* have been likened to women and men. An old and (well-known) story speaks of how Nārada visiting the abode of Viṣṇu discovered men and women with distorted limbs crying in pain, who turned out to be *rāgas* and *rāginīs* badly sung by him. This strongly

suggests an analogy. A *rāga* is like a living person, a human being. We can thus imagine it with a similar duality of an inner and an outer form, both merging into one another, as it were. Also, as with a person, who is one among other persons within a living milieu consisting of a web of inter-relationships, a *rāga*, too 'lives' with other *rāgas* within a similar web of 'living' links. Moreover, as with persons, so with *rāgas*, 'knowing' them is an evocative, evolving, open-ended process with the prospect of a gradual deepening.

The similarity can be seen from the other end, too. We can—as with *rāgas*—identify a woman or a man (that is, have a *tat-strī/puruṣa-dhi*) from a physical description of her/him, a description, which can be made more definite by adding facts about who she/he is socially, how she/he behaves, how she/he is 'placed' among other persons, and similar external 'facts'. Such identification can as surely target a particular woman/man, distinguishing or selecting her/him from among other women/men, as it can a *rāga*. But, it is also true, that this is not really the way to know a person. It is just outward acquaintance. For a real understanding, we need a more vital identification; we need to be able to empathize with the person, know her/him as a specific agent with a specific 'felt' being. Similar things are true about *rāgas*. *Rāgas*, as we have argued, have an exterior and an interior in their *nāda-rūpa* and their *bhāva-rūpa*, and we truly know a *rāga* only in knowing its *bhāva-rūpa*. For the sake of distinction, we could, meaningfully, make the old distinction here between 'knowledge' and 'understanding'. Knowledge is concrete and quantific, and grasps something in a causal, 'scientific', measurably descriptive situation. 'Understanding' calls for living and felt, existential knowledge. The difference has also been put as the distinction between knowing from without and knowing from within. With persons—and with *rāgas*—what matters is 'understanding', or knowing from within. In the context of musical experience, which is always a living context, *rāgas* exist as *rāgas* only through 'understanding'.

Another thought might help to grasp the kind of distinction between knowledge and understanding that is intended here in the context of *rāgas*. Let us come back to a *rāga* we know only from an old text; a *rāga* no longer sung or played, but of which a fairly detailed description is available. We know, that is, its *āroha*, *avaroha*, its *chalan*, its

usual *ālāpa* and the like and even have notations of some compositions in it, of the kind one finds, for example, in Bhatkhande. In other words, let us assume that we 'know' the *rāga* as what we might call an extended *nāda-rūpa*. Can this give us the *rāga*? It cannot. What it could give us at best is the possibility of a *rāga*, a possibility which can be realized only within a living musical tradition of *rāga*-music, into which the *rāga* could be inducted through the imaginative efforts of a musician/musicians. Without such an induction or living transformation, we shall not be able really to grasp it as the kind of entity it is intended to be. And once the *rāga* is 'brought to life' within a living *rāga* tradition, it will be one among other *rāga*s with which it will react and be shaped in seeking its own distinctive identity. It will be differently realized by different musicians, who will keep modulating and changing it in the process. One can protest here and say that for a good musician or *rasika* the actual playing or singing of *rāga* is not really necessary. She/he can imagine it as a living thing from its description with the aid of her/his musical imagination. But such 'pure' imagination, too, if possible, would need a living musical practice within which it can work and give a cogent body and life to the *rāga* in question. Otherwise the 'imagination' we are thinking of, would be a mere shadow of itself: a mere fancy. Inducting an 'old' text-given *rāga* into a *rāga*-tradition is, in fact, no different from introducing a new *rāga*. It will have to be given a *bhāva-rūpa* by the person who conceives it and then that *rāga* will necessarily be a 'public' entity with multiple possibilities that could be differently realized by different musicians. One can, indeed, make the strong assertion that a *rāga* has to be *necessarily* induced into a living tradition of *rāga*-making to be really a *rāga*. Here again a *rāga* is like a concept. What would an 'imagined' concept be, if it could not be presented in living thought for ones own inspection and that of other thinkers? Induction into a living *rāga*-culture is the only possible way in which a *rāga* can have a *bhāva-rūpa*, apart from just a 'dead' *nāda-rūpa*.

But let us come back to the old equation of *rāga*s with persons. I think, we have an analogy here that can be further reflected upon. This ancient metaphor provides a basis for understanding *rāga*s musically as 'living' and 'felt' entities. The famous musician Pandit Omkar Nath

Thakur has, in his Baroda lectures, delivered more than half a century ago, and published as *Rāga ane Rasa*, stimulatingly argued along these lines, making the traditional metaphor of *rāga*s as women and men the basis of a deeper and more potent conception in musical terms. Indeed, we seem to have here a more appropriate understanding of *bhāva-rūpa* as a *felt* unity than we have in the earlier analogy with concepts.

Tradition has itself elaborated upon the idea of *rāga*s as women and men. The conception, evidently, goes back to the 13th–14th century when *rāga*s and *rāginī*s began to be pictured as human-like semi-divine beings, and were painted as such in sets of paintings known as *rāga-mālā*s. By the 15th–16th centuries they shed the little divinity that was attached to them and became plain women and men, with an appropriate change in their portrayals by painters. *Rāga*s and *rāginī*s began to be pictured now as *nāyaka*s and *nayikā*s, pursuing the vagaries of love in various, though somewhat 'typical', situations and attitudes. The number of *rāga*s depicted in painted *rāga-mālā*s grew with time (later *rāga-mālā*s consist of more than 200 women and men, grouped into large families of a number of wives and a husband along with sons and daughters-in-law). It became a deeply entrenched tradition.

But the *rāga-mālā* tradition as it has come down to us is also rather simplistic, even naïve—though, no doubt, it has produced many, sensitive and moving works of art. Musically, however, the idea is not only vague, but also elusive and incoherent. It was also not really taken seriously in the musical tradition, as distinct from the tradition of painting. Pandit Omkar Nath Thakur was the first person to do so. What I would like to do here is not to deliberate on what he has to say, but to take the old analogy into a newer direction.

*Rāga*s as women and men in traditional *rāga-mālā*s are rather disappointing as men and women. They do not even seek to convey the impression of vital, protean characters. They are conceived as flat and typically conventional *nāyikā*s and *nāyaka*s, one-dimensional, narrow and frozen. They rarely step out of the confines of routine *śṛṅgāra*. Unfortunately, even Omkar Nath Thakur takes the picture of *rāga*s as *nāyaka-nāyika*s and the confines of *śṛṅgāra* rather seriously.

Not only are *rāga*s as *nāyaka-nāyikā*s 'limited' as 'persons' in *rāga-mālā* paintings, they make persons inert. They are single, static

representation of a *rāga*, with a predictable and almost hieratic iconography. This leads us away from *rāga*s as vibrant musical entities rather than towards them. A focal aspect of *rāga*s is that they are not only open to change, they are actually created through change, while retaining an identity (a *tad-rāga-dhī*). This is why women/men are a good metaphor for them. *Rāga-mālā*s, do not do justice to the metaphor.

But, however we might take the metaphor (or analogy), there could still be a problem here. It is easy to see that we have a problem of duality here somewhat similar to the one we had with language, and one could even think, in a more acute sense. Women and men have a duality of body and mind—or a body and a soul (or spirit, or what you will), two entities, *categorically* different from each other. This militates against assimilating them to *rāga*s, where the duality *nāda-rūpa* and *bhāva-rūpa* is a duality within a unitary fabric of pure form. Yet, it is *possible* to conceive of a 'person' without such a duality. We *can* think of her/him as an inner embodied in an outer, as we usually do.

We can do this, if we take the analogy not of persons as such, but of imagined characters, such as we have in literature. Here the body-mind duality assumes a unity in imagination. With created characters it is easier to see a person as an interrelated and uninterrupted duality of an 'outer' inseparably linked with an 'inner' being. An imagined character, like a *rāga* created through *ālāpa*, presents us with a being where an outer aspect may even be said to 'merge' into an inner quality. The physical presence of a character is part of his total presence. Like the *bhāva-rūpa*, character appears to subsume an outer body—a *nāda-rūpa*—into a qualitative whole.

A good musician, one also feels, builds a *bhāva-rūpa* with the same kind of touch and empathy for opening out an individual identity as does a novelist or playwright building a character, integrating change and creating space for expansion. The difference, patently, is that *bhāva-rūpa*s are more abstract entities, not related to the world of human living—or the 'human condition', as it has been called—as directly as characters are. In this they are more like concepts. Yet they are created with the same existential intentionality as are characters. They have a concept-like weave, but a felt existential weave, closer to character.

One might raise an objection here, remarking that even if this be true, the analogy still does not work because *bhāva-rūpa*s are necessarily plural. In fact they are *doubly* plural, because they not only allow different formulations by a single musician but also permit—indeed require—this to be done by different musicians. Characters, on the contrary, are singular creations, by a single creator. But this is not really true. The kind of plurality that a *rāga* has, can be seen in characters, too. Although characters in most 'modern' novel or play-writing are tied down to a single creator, and a single 'formation', this is not necessary to the conception of character. Let us take a more 'traditional' framework and we will find hosts of identical characters being differently envisioned by different creators. The Faust of Marlow and Goethe comes readily to mind. The question whose Faust is 'Truer' is not relevant here (indeed as a character Faust is imaginary right from the beginning, even if there may have been an actual person called Faust). The question whose Faust is greater, is also irrelevant for the analogy; the same could be asked of the same *rāga* as envisioned by different musicians, expecting the same kind of answers. The point is that a character retains a clearly recognizable identity despite quite different treatments. And Faust is not the only example. Distinct creations with the same character treated quite differently by different authors can be found all over the world—take the Śakuntalā of the *Mahābhārata* and of Kālidāsa, for another example, closer home.

Yet we can still see obvious differences between *bhāva-rūpa* and character. The same character can be conceived with a quite different body. But a *rāga* cannot be so dissociated from its specific *nāda-rūpa*. It is tied down to an actual single physically perceivable 'body' in an unambiguous sense. Also, a *rāga*, unlike character, cannot become a non-perceptual being detached from a living milieu and live in imagination alone as a character can.

And yet the analogy is forceful. No analogy, if we enter into the details of it, can give us that which we are seeking to capture. But an analogy has a living power which a pure conceptual understanding can never have, for concepts as universals naturally tend to move away from the actual; even more so from a 'living' actual like a *rāga*. To understand complex identities such as those of *rāga*s, and other such

felt entities with a recognizable 'outer' woven into an 'inner' dynamic being, analogies are certainly more perceptive. Like concepts they also allow us to think through them, not only with them. Moreover, we can play around with them more malleably than with concepts. To understand *rāga*, thus, as 'character' straightforwardly allows us to see *bhāva-rūpa* as distinct from *nāda-rūpa* yet incorporating it. For, remark, that even though it may be possible for a character to live purely in imagination as it does in novels, yet character, too, cannot be really dissociated from a body. Not only are characters always conceived as embodied, they are conceived as having an 'appropriate' body, one that suits the tenor of the character. This becomes even perceptibly clear when a novel is dramatized or made into a film. We then choose an actress/actor with certain 'suitable' bodily traits, which will 'go' with the character.

One can still object, pointing out that even though this be granted, the relation between a character and its embodiment is yet a somewhat 'external' relation, and nowhere near as deep and essentially inseparable as between the *nāda-rūpa* and the *bhāva-rūpa* of a *rāga*. In film and in theatre, the same character can be played by quite different actors, and the same actor can represent quite different, even contrary, characters, in different roles. But the same *bhāva-rūpa* cannot be embodied in different *nāda-rūpa*s. (Though, there are some questions and reservations here, or rather qualifications regarding this contention, which I will take up later.) To put the matter briefly, the *bhāva-rūpa* cannot be without its specific *nāda-rūpa*, whereas character can retain its 'character' without a specific body; it can, indeed, be portrayed, understood and empathized with without any real presence of a body, and we can do so not only in fiction but with people no longer alive, and whose bodily traits may be entirely unknown.

One could reassert that *imagined* characters, inhabiting novels or acting plays always have a body. We can, as pointed out above, imagine a character without thinking of a *specific* body for it. And yet, as also pointed out, we do not think of it as a disembodied being, like, for example, the soul. So, even though there may not be a one-to-one correspondence between a body and a character, still a character is always thought of as having a body. Such an embodiment can be understood, as we have said, as an inseparable relation between an

'inner' and an 'outer'. But it can also, perhaps more aptly, be understood as a relation between a *sūkṣma* (subtle) and a *sthūla* (gross) aspect within the same being, implying gradations in the relation between the inner and the outer: a relatively more *sthūla* tapering towards a relatively more *sūkṣma*, making the relation between the two a matter of degree, rather than that of a radical distinction such as between mind and body or body and soul. *Nāda-rūpa*, seen as the *sthūla* aspect of a *sūkṣma bhāva-rūpa*, can be grasped as both embodying *bhāva-rūpa* as well as *leading to* it. The analogy with character now becomes even more substantial. In grasping character, too, bodily aspects such as physique, the physical presence, facial expressions, gesture, movement, and the like (body-language, or *hāva-bhāva*, one might say), lead gradually from the comparatively more *sthūla* to the more *sūkṣma*: temperament, moral nature, emotional disposition and the like. Changeability, while retaining identity, too, is a matter of more or less consequence among the *sthūla* and the *sūkṣma* aspects of character. We think of some aspects as more malleable that other aspects. In this respect, we make a keen distinction between *sūkṣma* or inner changes as opposed to more *sthūla* and outer changes. Changes in a character's physical form, gestures and even behaviour are thought of as comparatively 'outer' or minor changes, while changes in the more inner aspects, such as moral character, the quality of thought or feeling and the like, are considered core changes. We speak of the person being the same despite most *sthūla* or *sūkṣma* changes; viewing *sūkṣma* changes with a different eye. They are viewed more ideally. We speak of growth regeneration, deepening, broadening and the like of character, which are inner changes we seek and which are yet central to the identity of a 'person' or a character.

We can say *somewhat* the same thing about *nāda-rūpa* and *bhāva-rūpa*. The inner is not only the 'core' aspect of 'character' it may be also called the 'ruling' aspect in a whole where the physical is in an essential sense, internalized. The body as part of character is not a mere physical thing: it is a living entity, and the *sthūla* in it merges in a literally 'vital' sense with the *sūkṣma*. This may be observed in the effect that a change in inner character has on moulding the physical presence of person (not only in novels and plays but also in actuality).

The same, intriguingly, may be seen in the 'moulding' or 'shaping' relation that a *bhāva-rūpa* can have on its *nāda-rūpa*.

Let us look at this a little closely, for it is something which transparently reveals the independent potency of *bhāva-rūpa*. I have implied—as well as stated—above that *nāda-rūpa* is a thing fixed or 'given', while the *bhāva-rūpa* is malleable, indeed, multi-form. But this assertion (as I also said in passing), needs to be qualified. The *bhāva-rūpa* does exert an influence on the *nāda-rūpa*, just as inner change introduces changes in the physical presence of a character. The *bhāva-rūpa*, as inner is the centre of the *rāga* as a whole, and can be seen to reach into the outer while transcending it. An imaginative change in the *bhāva-rūpa* thus affects the *nāda-rūpa* of a *rāga*, too.

Examples may help the *rasika* here. Take *rāga Bihāg*. Its *nāda-rūpa* (in most current descriptions) stipulates the use of the *tīvra madhyama* with an oblique or *vakra* movement in the *avaroha*—'*ma (tīvra) > ga > ma (komala) > ga*'. That, in fact, is where, for many of us, is the charm of *Bihāg*. (I remember being especially enchanted by that turn of *svara*s when I first became acquainted with the *rāga*.) But we know that we can drop the *tīvra madhyama* altogether and yet have a substantial *Bihāg*, unmistakable as *Bihāg*. The introduction of *tīvra madhyama* in the *nāda-rūpa* does not change the *character* of the *rāga*: its *bhāva-rūpa*. Indeed, on the contrary, we think that it enhances it. It was, certainly, an imaginative insight into the possibility of the *bhāva-rūpa* that introduced the change. Historically, it appears, *Bihāg* began without the *tīvra madhyama*, as some old *dhrupad* compositions tend to show. The *tīvra madhyama* was introduced perhaps as a grace note—an *ālaṁkārika svara*—which later acquired a more focal position in the *nāda-rūpa*, because it was felt to enrich the *bhāva-rūpa*. But behind this lies a change in the conception of the *bhāva-rūpa*, a change made to 'enhance' the 'charm' of identity. One can quite plausibly imagine the opposite happening. *Bihāg* may have begun with a *tīvra madhyama*, and we can imagine a musician wishing to drop the *tīvra madhyama* in order to impart to *Bihāg* a more restrained and tidy character, doing away with the unnecessary, a move towards a kind of minimalism. I remember a conversation with Prabha Atre, when she made a similar point about another *rāga* of the *Bihāg* family, *Mārū Bihāg*. She put a question, which then seemed a little strange to me, but is very relevant for *rāgadāri*: is the *komala madhyama* in *Mārū Bihāg*, she asked, really necessary; can we not have *Mārū Bihāg*, and a better, more self-contained, *Mārū Bihāg*, without it? I was a little startled to begin with, but a little reflection showed that it is a deep and meaningful question. Because, although conventionally we do not think of the *rāga Mārū Bihāg* as devoid of *komala madhyama*, but that *svara* also seems part of special movement, which, if given up will yet not defeat the spirit of the *rāga*, and might even give its *bhāva-rūpa* a more well-knit form and a weightier character than it presently has. Take an actual example of such an important pruning or truncation in the *nāda-rūpa* of a *rāga*, to bring the point home. Take the case of the alluring Mewati *gharānā Jaijaiwantī*, which drops the *komala gāndhāra* altogether, otherwise a very dominant note in the *rāga*, a note for which it cannot be said that it is part of an *ālaṁkārikā* or inessential *prayoga*. The *Jaijaiwantī*, without the *komala ga*, still remains *Jaijaiwantī*, manifesting, aesthetically, a more austere possibility of its *bhāva-rūpa*. A similar thing might very well have happened with the *Bihāg*, which was made to give up the *tīvra madhyama* to explore a similar possibility, but the *svara* was later reintroduced. Even if this did not actually happen, the important thing is it is quite conceivable and that similar modulations can be imagined in the *nāda-rūpa* of *rāga*s without loss of identity, modulations which show the centrality and autonomy of the *bhāva-rūpa*, and its power over the *nāda-rūpa*. Such changes in the *nāda-rūpa* can be described as modulations made on the *nāda-rūpa* by the *bhāva-rūpa*. They are akin, one can see, to the changes made in the physical presence by change in 'inner' character. The *bhāva-rūpa* here can also be seen as the *sūkṣma* core pervading the *sthūla*, where a change in the 'character' of *sūkṣma* affects the *sthūla*. Or, to change the mode of expression from the ontic to the epistemic, we could say that it is the *bhāva-rūpa* on the basis of which we judge a change in the *nāda-rūpa* as 'relevant' or 'irrelevant'.

One might, if one likes, revert here to the earlier distinction made between knowledge and understanding. What allows a novelist to be free with a character is his understanding of its inner being, which permeates its outer physical embodiment or even the circumstances in

which it is placed. A novelist can often take an actual 'given' character he knows in life and put the character in quite different circumstances, with different bodily traits, while retaining the sum and substance of an identity. This is how we do get recognizable people, inhabiting a different body and quite different imaginary situations. But here also lies an important distinction between character and *bhāva-rūpa*. A *bhāva-rūpa* is not *as* independent of the outer *nāda-rūpa* as character is of the body. A *bhāva-rūpa* affects the *nāda-rūpa*, can modulate it to an extent, but it cannot 'inhabit' quite another *nāda-rūpa*; it cannot like a character assume a very different body altogether. It is much more essentially tied down to a *nāda-rūpa*. The wonder really is that in a *rāga*, which is pure structure or form, an interacting duality of an inner acting on the outer can at all be palpably made. Perhaps, any self-conscious creative process does two things by nature: it seeks some kind of identity—as it does through *rāgadārī*—and in doing so initiates a duality of an inner linked to an outer.

The two very different analogies we have discussed above, I believe, afford two different insights into the nature of *rāga* and its identity, insights which complement and complete each other, however disparate they might seem to be. Character provides a metaphor for the embodied aspect of *rāga* as a felt *bhāva-rūpa*, with an inner being merging into an outer 'body'. But character is perhaps weak as an analogy for the plurality of *bhāva-rūpa* (despite what we have said above), as well as its 'abstract' quality. Here the analogy of idea or concept seems more apt. This analogy focuses on *ālāpa* in *rāgadārī* and its key role in formulating an identity, where plurality is seen as necessary to it as an identity-seeking reflexive activity. It allows us to see *ālāpa* as a 'thinking', ratiocinative activity rooted in self-consciousness. Together the two different analogies, I think, suggest the identity of a *rāga* as a 'felt concept'.

A crucial distinction between character and *bhāva-rūpa* is that characters as imaginative entities reflect living human beings. We do not create living human characters (unless we speak of self-creation in some unusually profound sense); we only reflect them or recreate them through imagination. But *rāga*s are more palpably created by us. *Rāga*s assume us. Somewhat in the same sense as do concepts.

Praśastapāda's Mapping of the Realm of Qualities: A Neglected Chapter in Indian Philosophy

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Qualities are all that we know, and what else can we know but them. Yet, they are a most neglected subject in philosophical reflection. Locke might have distinguished between primary and secondary qualities, and others might have added the idea of tertiary qualities to them, but that is not to talk of qualities, but of their relation to consciousness. Even Buddhists who gave up the notion of 'substance' and denied its 'necessity' for thought, do not seem to have engaged in any in-depth exploration of the categorical variety in the realm of qualities, perhaps because they too were interested only in their relation to consciousness, as is evident in the vast Abhidhamma literature on the subject. As for the rest, it is substance, the 'know-not-what', the 'thing-in-itself', the *Ātman* or the *puruṣa* which is the centre of their attention. The Sāṁkhyanas do talk of *sattva*, *rajasa* and *tamasa* but, though considered as qualities or *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, they too are *defined* and understood only in relation to consciousness. The 'ego-centricity' or 'self-centricity' or 'consciousness-centricity' of philosophical thought, whether in the east or the west, seems to have ensured that 'object' which is constituted by its qualities and qualities alone, shall be treated as secondary and in a perfunctory manner, even when the 'self' or the 'subject' itself appears as such, that is, as 'object'.

The Vaiśeṣikas are a notable exception and Praśastapāda's treatment of the subject is challenging in more ways than one. He is said to have divided them on the basis of twelve different criteria which, however, are not as clear-cut as one would have wished them to be. Yet, there are interesting insights which, if critically reflected upon, may help us in thinking about the subject in our own times.

Praśastapāda's first criterion draws our attention to the radical distinction between qualities that are abstract or *amūrta* as he calls them and *mūrta* or concrete, a distinction that is different from the one drawn by Locke or Galileo in the western tradition. The former are grasped, so to say, by reason, while the latter are grasped by the senses. The latter are further divided by him into the inner and the outer senses, and even amongst the latter he distinguishes between those that are grasped by one sense alone and those that are grasped by more than one sense.

The distinctions, though clear at first sight, lead to difficulties and even inconsistencies which do not seem to have been seen by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, as the two have been clubbed together in the Indian tradition. In fact, even Praśastapāda does not seem to have realized them as will be evident if one closely examines the diverse criteria he has offered for distinguishing between qualities in his system.

First, what exactly is meant by the term 'inner sense' and what exactly are the 'qualities' grasped by it? Is it the same as *manasa* or what has been called 'mind' in the Western tradition? Also, is there only one 'inner sense' or are there more than one?

Similar problems bedevil the idea of qualities that are apprehended by more than one sense. Normally, each of the senses apprehends only the qualities that can be apprehended by it, and if one apprehends something through more than one sense, one is said to perceive or apprehend an 'object' to which those qualities belong. The 'qualities' themselves remain 'separate' in the sense that they are grasped by each of the senses singly and separately.

There is the additional problem regarding the qualities that are supposed to belong to a 'whole' which consists of parts. Praśastapāda makes an interesting distinction in this context between qualities which are the same as the qualities of the parts and those that are distinctly different from them. The latter are what have been called 'emergent' qualities and the 'wholes' to which they are said to belong, 'organic wholes'. But, though he makes the distinction, he does not make it clear whether these are sensuously apprehended or not. The question is important, particularly in the case of those qualities in the 'parts' that

are themselves sensuously apprehended. The problem will get still more complicated in case of 'wholes' whose parts have properties that are apprehended by different senses. And, in case the parts or at least some of them are supposed to have what Praśastapāda calls *amūrta* or abstract qualities, the so-called 'emergent quality' of the whole will itself be *mūrta* or *amūrta*, concrete or abstract, or an amalgam of both.

Abstract qualities themselves are not supposed to be grasped by the senses, but by reason. In fact, that *is* the reason why they are called 'abstract'. But in case they are apprehended in an object which is grasped by the senses, then the so-called *mūrta* or concrete object will have qualities in it which are grasped by reason, and reason alone, and thus will have to be thought of as *mūrta* and *amūrta* at the same time.

The distinction between *mūrta* and *amūrta*, though generally made, is not clear as nothing could perhaps be more 'concrete' than pleasure or pain, or desire (*icchā*) or say, the apprehension of a quantitative or qualitative relationship such as $2 \times 2 = 4$ or the 'aesthetic matching' between two spaces or two forms, or colours which occurs in architecture or painting. Yet, these are generally regarded as 'abstract' qualities even though they are as immediately apprehended as colour, smells, taste, touch or sound.

Perhaps, the distinction could be drawn in terms of what is grasped by the senses, whether internal or external, and what is grasped by *buddhi* or reason. Praśastapāda draws this distinction also, as well as the one between *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, or those that are universal and those that are particular. But he does not seem to see the relation between the two and, in fact, does not appear even to grasp the point of the distinction between 'reason' and 'sense' as he treats pleasure and pain, or even *icchā* and *dveśa* as grasped by the former. Interestingly, he also puts *dharma* and *adharma* in this category and suggests that moral qualities are grasped by reason and that this is what distinguishes man from all other animals with whom he shares other qualities belonging to them both. In contrast, the western tradition ascribes *only* the knowledge of 'universals' to reason and not that of values, even though the idealist tradition from Plato onwards tried to conflate the two. The attempt, however, was unsuccessful mainly because

mathematics was taken as the paradigmatic example of truth grasped by reason, a turn for which Plato himself has to be held responsible.

But, paradoxically, *buddhi* which may be regarded as the Sanskrit term for 'reason', is considered a 'quality' in the Vaiśeṣika system and is mentioned as such in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra 1.1.6. On the other hand, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are said to be 'dependent' on *buddhi* in the *Sūtra* 1.2.3 सामान्यँ विशेष इति बुद्धयपेक्षम. In other words, they do not have an 'independent' or '*nirapekṣa*' *sattā* of their own, as is asserted of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* in the *Sūtra* 1.2.8. Praśastapāda also puts *buddhi* in the category of *guṇa* and treats it as *amūrta* in his *Padārthadharma Saṁgraḥ* (*Praśastapāda Bhāṣyam*. Varanasi, Sampūrṇānanda Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya. 1977, p. 229.). Yet he also, like Kaṇāda, considers certain qualities as 'buddhyāpekṣā' but, surprisingly, he does not include *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* amongst them. For him, it is *paratva*, and *aparatva*, *dvitva* and *dviprathakatva* which have this characteristic (ibid., p. 239). He, of course, adds the term '*ityādi*' or 'et cetra' to suggest that there may be other qualities which share this characteristic also. But Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the text added *tritva*, etc. (ibid., p. 239). Like Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda, he does not see the problem posed by this. Nor does he seem to notice the fact that Praśastapāda's list does not include the ones given by Kaṇāda in the *Sūtra* 1.2.3. In his discussion of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* he does not seem to raise the question whether they are '*buddhyāpekṣā*' or not.

But the fact that both Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda make a distinction between entities whose 'existence' or 'being' can only be conceived of as 'being there' because of *buddhi* and those that are independent of it raises important issues for the *Vaiśeṣika* view of reality. The *buddhi*, it should be remembered, is explicitly conceived of as 'knowledge' in the *Nyāya Sūtras* where it is defined as '*upalabdhi*' or '*jñāna*' (1.1.15) and if certain entities come into being just because of this activity, then in each type of 'knowledge' one will have to distinguish between those elements which are there *because* of something being known and that which is known *because* it was there to be known. The author of the *Nyāya Sūtras* seems to be aware of this to some extent as evidenced in his definition of perceptual knowledge which he characterizes as *vyavasāyātmakam*, *avyapadeśyam* and *avyabhicāri* (1.1.4). Perceptual

knowledge, it is being suggested, need not necessarily have these characteristics, and in case it is so it cannot be treated as a *pramāṇa*. Something may be perceived and yet the resulting knowledge need not be a *pramāṇa*, as is well known in the case of perceptual illusion.

But once one accepts this, one will have to develop some sort of a theory of *pratyakṣābhāsa* on the analogy of *hetvābhāsa* even though, as far as I know, it has not been developed in the tradition, perhaps because of the fact that tradition itself is not clear as to what a *pramāṇa* is. The *Nyāya Sūtra* only enumerates the *pramāṇas* and does not give its *lakṣaṇa* which was mandatory for it if it was to follow its own practice in respect of the particular *pramāṇas* later on. In fact, if there can be a *pramāṇābhāsa* as is accepted in the case of *anumāna* and if it has to be extended to all the other *pramāṇas*, then one will have to give some criterion or criteria to distinguish between a *pramāṇa* which gives true knowledge and one which does not. One may define *pramāṇa* as that which gives *pramā* but that will be to give a circular definition and hence one will have to give some independent criterion of what is *pramā* and not just say that *pramā* is what is given by a *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa* is what gives a *pramā*.

It is true that circular definitions are not always considered vicious and some logicians have recently talked even of 'virtuous' circularity but the present circularity is *prima facie* undesirable and unless proved otherwise has to be avoided, if possible. Nyāya itself attempts to do so, at least in the context of *anumāna* explicitly and of *pratyakṣa* perhaps not so explicitly. The whole discussion of *hetvābhāsa* in the case of the former attests to this, as the inclusion of *doṣas* in the case of the *indriyas* does in the case of the latter. But the fact that *Nyāya* thinkers did *not* realize the necessity of making this distinction is shown by the fact that they did not draw it in the case of either *śabda* or *upamāna* which they *also* treated as *pramāṇa* in their system. Not only this, they did not even think of applying the notion of *doṣa* in the case of the internal sense or the *antarīndriya* through which one was supposed to apprehend pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, *dharma*, *adharma*, etc.

The idea of *doṣa* does occur in Nyāya and that too in a generalized fashion so as to be almost coterminus with *pravṛtti*. But, then the Nyāya thinker forgets that the whole *pramāṇa vyāpāra* is, and has to

be, inevitably carried on within this basic *doṣa* which destroys the distinction between *pramā* and *apramā* at its very foundations as everything becomes an *apramā* if one takes the contention seriously.

The so-called *pramā* ultimately becomes meaningless if *pravṛtti* itself is regarded as a *doṣa* by everybody, and even the criterion of *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* which is supposed to distinguish true knowledge from false makes no sense, if one accepts the equation given in the *sūtra* 1.1.2 of the *Nyāya Sūtra*.

The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, at least at the *prima facie* level, does not seem to make this move and hence does not seem to suffer from the apparent conflict between the two proclaimed *prayojanas* of the *Nyāya Sūtra*, that is, *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga*. It regards both *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* as the fruit of *dharma* and if *niḥśreyasa* is understood in the sense of the *Nyāya Sūtra*, then one will have to find how *apavarga* or *mokṣa* can be accommodated within that system.

Praśastapāda treats *dharma* and *adharma* as *amūrta*, *vaiśeṣika*, *atīndriya*, *akāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ*, *saṁyogaja*, *samānāsamānajātyārambhakāḥ*, *ubhayatrārambhakaḥ*, *kriyāhetavaḥ* and are *nimitta kāraṇa*, and *yāvaddravyabhāvitvam*.

Praśastapāda, it should be noted, places each of the *guṇas* that he has already listed in one or the other of these twelve categories, each of which consists of a pair. He is empirical enough to observe that some of them may belong to both the classes which generally exclude each other. In this he is closer to modern logic which admits in the case of relations properties that cannot be attributed in a clear-cut, exclusive 'either-or' manner to those relations as they can be done in other cases. It is the 'empiricality' of the relation that creates this problem in some cases, and it is strange that Kant did not see this in his discussion of the categories of understanding in his system.

Kant did not raise the question whether all the twelve categories have to be simultaneously applied in every act of judgement, or that only *one* out of the four sets of quantity, quality, relation and modality has to be applied in each case depending upon the 'appropriateness' or 'fittingness' of the category so chosen to the object concerned. Praśastapāda is not so concerned either, but he seems to believe that the heart of both epistemology and ontology is an understanding of the

qualities that we ascribe to substance and the exact characteristics that they have. He devotes a major part of his work to this exercise and its understanding, I believe, may provide a clue to an important aspect of Indian philosophizing which has not been paid attention up till now.

Kant, it should be noted, is not interested in 'qualities' at all. By that term he merely means, following Aristotle, whether the judgement is affirmative or negative. He adds the third alternative 'limitation' only to make the list threefold, forgetting that it has nothing 'logical' about it. In fact, the term 'quality' in the sense of predicate occurs under the heading of 'relation' where it occurs as 'Substance-Accident' and reminds one of the category of *samavāya* in the Vaiśeṣika system. Substance, it should be noted, is not an independent category in Kant; it occurs in a relational context and the 'name' for it is just the same as in the Vaiśeṣika system, that is, inherence. Even the other term of the relation, 'accident', does not make much sense as it not only does not distinguish between essential and accidental properties, but also between them and what may be called 'relational properties' which all are usually treated collectively as 'predicates' in traditional logic. Kant, strangely, has no 'real' relations under the category of 'relation' in his categorical scheme. 'Causality' and 'Reciprocity' are not judgemental relations, but are rather empirical in nature involving the notion of time which has already been treated as the form of inner sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Besides this, at least 'causality' involves the notion of 'necessity' which itself is a category under the heading of 'modality'. There is just no place in Kant's scheme for such simple relational statements as 'A is between B and C', a judgement which requires *three* substances to obtain and not one.

Praśastapāda, interestingly, brings in the notion of 'causality' in the understanding of 'qualities', but does so in a strange manner. For him, a quality can be seen in a causal context as being the product of qualities similar or dissimilar to itself, and as giving rise to other properties which may be *samānajātīya* or *vijātīya*, as the case may be. The Sanskrit terms practically mean the same as 'similar' or 'dissimilar' though, strictly speaking, they mean belonging to the same *jāti*, that is class or genus or universal, as the case may be. This, however, is to see the qualities in a dynamic context where they are seen as 'arising' and

'giving rise to' and thus being essentially related to time, involving almost a Buddhist way of looking at reality, something that no one would have dreamt of associating with the Vaiśeṣika way of looking at things.

But Praśastapāda is not wedded to time or obsessed by it as the Buddhist seems to be. He is equally aware of the 'space-occupying' character of qualities and distinguishes them on this basis as those which belong to the 'object-as-a-whole' or belong only to one specific part of it. The term used is 'pradeśa-vrttitva' and 'vyāpitvaṁ'.

A similar categorization of qualities occurs in respect of their relationship to the qualities of the parts of which the whole is constituted. The quality of the 'whole' may be the same as the quality of the parts, or different from it. The nature of the relation between these two, however, is not clear but judging from the emphasis on 'causality' in the classification adopted, one may surmise that it may be so.

The classification or categorization of qualities given by Praśastapāda, thus, deserves a closer examination than has been given to it up till now. At times, it seems that the qualities actually enumerated under the category do not illuminate or clarify the nature of the category. Sometimes, the fact that some qualities are included under both the categories adds further to the confusion. But, inspite of these and other limitations, Praśastapāda's exercise challenges us to think about the problem anew, for it is only the qualities that we know, and to 'know' more about them would certainly be desirable from all points of view. But, then, qualities, will have to be ascribed 'qualities', a doctrine that is expressly rejected by Praśastapāda in his own definition of quality as *dravyāśrītvaṁ, nirguṇatvam, niṣkriyatvam*. How could this definition be sustained in face of the detailed characterization of qualities by him, which, *prima facie* involves a manifest inconsistency, is the question which scholars and votaries of this school have to address themselves to. Not only this, how could he ascribe *niṣkriyatvam* to them when so many of his characterizations are based on *kāraṇatvam*. Terms such as '*kriyāhetavaḥ*', '*ārambhakartvam*', '*saṁyogaja*', '*karmaja*', '*akāraṇa*', '*kāraṇa*', etc. are freely used in the characterization of qualities that are extensionally enumerated by him, adding to those that were given in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* without adducing any reasons why he is doing so.

And, strangely still, he adds even to these in his explication of the categories under which he wants to include them. Many of these seem to be complex properties compounded out of other properties, built for some reason or another for some purpose. Such are, for example, उष्ण and अनुष्ण (241, 244, 246), एकत्व, एकप्रथकत्व, द्वित्व, द्विप्रथकत्व सासिद्धिक द्रवत्व (243, 247, 249). But it will be more difficult to explain such formations as (231, 238) and सासिद्धिक द्रवत्व (230, 249) and almost impossible to do in case of तलम परिमाणोतर संयोग (238) and ज्ञान (241). The last that is *jñāna* may be said to raise no difficulty, but if it is remembered that it is *not* included amongst the original qualities mentioned by Praśastapāda, and that *buddhi* which is supposed to mean the same as *Jñāna*, is mentioned *separately* in these lists, then its independent mention in the discussion of qualities would be seen as justifiably raising a problem in the context of Vaiśeṣika thinking on the subject. But whatever may be the case for *jñāna* no one, I hope, will dispute that there *is* some problem about the bizzare property concocted by the author of the *Padārtha-dharmasaṁgrah* where he mentions *tūlaparimāṇottarasamyoga* as a property. And, who would deny that *all* these properties involve having *another* property in respect of a property?

It may be said that such a construal of what Praśastapāda has said depends on a total misunderstanding of his contention in this regard. He is not saying that qualities have these characteristics, but that they reside in *dravyas* or substances that have these characteristics. This is clearest in the case of *mūrta* and *amūrta* which as Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa's commentary makes amply evident characterize the *dravyas* and *not* the *guṇas* to which they are mistakenly thought to belong. It is not *rūpa*, *raṣa*, *gandha* or *sparśa* which are *mūrta* but the substances or *dravyas* to which they belong.

The argument, or the explication, may be extended to all the other characterizations of qualities which Praśastapāda has discussed in his work. But, then, these will have to be treated as qualities, as *guṇas* of the *dravyas* and *added* to the list he has given. This, however, has not been done, as no list of the *guṇas* given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers includes them. Not only this, they are not *guṇas* in the usual sense.

They have some sort of a necessary dichotomous division between them. A *dravya* has to be either *mūrta* or *amūrta*. No *dravya* can be both, though a quality may belong either to one, or the other, or both.

These qualities, then, are radically different in nature from the others enumerated by him. They are categorical in nature, in that all *dravyas* shall have to belong to one of the dichotomous pairs mentioned by him in his discussion of the subject. They are also second-level qualities as the qualities mentioned by him have to belong to the *dravya* classified by him on this basis.

Understood in this way, Praśastapāda's classifications would be seen as providing ontological categories for the description of the qualities of the *dravyas* that are found in the world. But one problem would remain even then. He had defined *guṇas* not only as *nirguṇatvam*, but as *niskriyatvam* and many of these categorical qualities have been *defined* in such a way that they impose a 'causal' activity or function on the first-level qualities he had already enumerated in his work. In fact, one of the basic distinctions in this respect is between those which do not need these activities and those which do, that is, those which are '*akāraṇa*' and those which have *kāraṇatva* in them and, if so, they cannot be *niṣkriya* as defined by him. But even if someone attempts to save the definition by taking recourse to the same strategy as was adopted in the case of *mūrta* and *amūrta*, then one will have not only to *add* to the list of *karma* or activities originally enumerated in the system, but will have to treat them as typically different from them on the same ground, as given in the case of *guṇas* above.

There is, thus, a lot to challenge contemporary thinkers in the discussion of Praśastapāda on the subject. And, once one does so, one will find that many of the 'orthodox' positions ascribed to these thinkers need a radical revision in the light of their own work, i.e. the texts attributed to them. Besides this, they may also discover a lot of physics prevalent in those times and the problems it was raising for the thinkers of that age. The House of Vaiśeṣika needs to be opened once more and fresh air let in so that it may begin to house 'living thought' in it once again.

The Sāṁkhya Argument for the Self and Some Related Issues

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III

We pass now to consider in greater detail one of the most thorny questions connected with the Sāṁkhya philosophy. This is the question of the real or imposed agenthood of the self whose twin interests, *bhoga* and *apavarga*, *prakṛti* seeks to promote through its creation, the manifest world. This issue has traditionally been sought to be solved in mainly two ways: (1) the 'single reflection' theory advocated by, chiefly, Vācaspati, and followed by others, and (2) the 'mutual reflection' theory proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu, who finds Vācaspati's solution unsatisfactory.

To take up Vācaspati first, we saw above in our consideration of *SK* 20 that however inscrutable the whole proposition stated therein may be, all commentators take the two-fold appearance it posits literally and seriously. In fact, Vācaspati goes to the length of attributing this illusion—the illusion that the (inactive) self (consciousness) is active and that the (non-conscious) *buddhi*, etc. are conscious—to the proximity of self and *buddhi* (*bhrāntibījaṁ tatsaṁyogaḥ tatsannidhānam*). Consideration of the full implications of this comment of Vācaspati we shall postpone for the present. The immediate point to be noted is that instead of choosing the present and certainly more relevant occasion, Vācaspati prefers his gloss on Kārikā 5 to express his first ever statement of how he views the crucial agency problem and its resolution:

> The *puruṣa* indeed is conscious and has no contact whatever with pleasure, knowledge, etc.; he, on account of being reflected (*pratibimbita*) in the *tattva* called *buddhi* and so being identified

with it, appears to possess knowledge, pleasure, etc., which *in point of fact* belong to *buddhi* (intellect).[1]

This important statement is preceded by the following words: 'Since *buddhi*, being an evolute of *prakrti* is unconscious, its knowledge (*adhyavasāya*) is also unconscious like pot etc. Likewise, things such as pleasure, etc. which are modes of *buddhi* are also unconscious.' And yet, adds Vācaspati, 'this unconscious *buddhi* with its unconscious modes (knowledge, pleasure, etc.) appears as if possessed of consciousness because of the consciousness' reflection in it.' In other words, upon Vācaspati's interpretation, *bhoktṛtva*, which is cited as a proof of the reality of the self, is actually a function of *buddhi*, and only *assumed* to be that of the self thanks to its reflection in *buddhi*: the self is needed but as a passive presence meant to illuminate all mental transactions As such passive presence, and being further unsullied and contentless, consciousness *appears*, under the cloak of an active possessor, to acquire all content, whether subjective or objective, and so render the latter appear *as if* invested with consciousness (*acetanaṁ cetanāvadiva liṅgam: SK* 20).

Before we come to Vijñānabhikṣu's alternative proposal, it would be worthwhile to notice briefly and critically some key points that arise in connection with Vācaspati's attempted solution.

(1) The first point, which is clarificatory, concerns the likely query whether *buddhi* can in point of fact be conceived as capable of functioning as such without its (inherited) contact with consciousness, which contact is in Sāṁkhya said to be beginningless? *Buddhi*'s function, needless to say, consists not only in manifesting all objects whether constructed or caused, but also, as mentioned above, in manifesting what is called the primordial distinction of object from the self (cf. *SK* 62). This function according to Sāṁkhya *buddhi* cannot perform unless it is in some way intelligized, which it is said to be by the conscious self's association, whether the association be read (à la Vācaspati) as the latter's reflection in *buddhi* or otherwise. Thus it seems that if *buddhi* is to be treated as unconscious, it can be so only in respect of its emanation from the tripartite unconscious *prakṛti*, that is, in other words, in respect of its being a manifest form of the latter. And it is only thus that *buddhi*'s modes, knowledge, pleasure, etc. can be called

unconscious. Indeed, as noted above, Vācaspati himself alludes to this fact in his gloss on Kārikā 5: *buddhitattvaṁ hi prākṛtatvād acetanam iti tadīyo 'dhyavasāyo 'pyacetano. evaṁ hi buddhitattvasya sukhādayo 'pi pariṇāmabhedā acetanā.*

(2) The 'reflection' of consciousness in *buddhi* (*cicchāyāpatti*) of which Vācaspati speaks is more or less a language of metaphor, though often mistaken, and put forward by Vācaspati himself, as one of fact. Though the idea of non-conscious *buddhi* receiving the reflection of pure consciousness is not in itself contradictory, it is not a self-evident truth either and so needs something by way of demonstration. The true Sāṁkhya view seems to be that since *buddhi*, despite the fact that it is made up of three guṇas which in themselves do not possess knowerhood (*jñātṛtva*), is always of the form 'I know',[2] it is inferred that such a *buddhi* must be closely associated with some luminous entity (called self), which is responsible for its above-mentioned manifest, if indeterminate, form. It is this latter which gives it the appearance of being a conscious existent. And since it is believed that consciousness cannot really be transferred into the being of *buddhi*, recourse is taken to the metaphor of reflection (*pratibimba*), specially when this *buddhi* becomes so much like consciousness that it comes to be mistaken for the latter.

(3) This relatively indeterminate form 'I know' is often obscured by the (intellect's) awareness of the form 'I am the knower of the object', which latter, being more explicit or determinate, comes to be accepted as the *only* real form. In fact, to be more proper, the *buddhi*'s real form seems to be: 'I know myself' or, in other words, 'I know that I am'. It is this foundational, self-assertive, objectifying awareness which when combined with the explicit sense-awareness of an object, takes the form: 'I am aware that I am aware of, say, this tree.' 'I am the knower of the object'—this 'intellectual', object-oriented awareness is something which exhibits permanent (i.e. beginningless) association with the luminous self in spite of the fact that *buddhi* is non-intelligent in terms of its material causality. In the statement 'I am aware that I know *X*', the first half 'I am aware' can fairly be called *pratibodha*, the latter half '(that) I know *X*' being what is called *bodha* (cognition) or *pramāṇa*. The *pratibodha* obviously is impossible without consciousness. No

wonder then that in the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* (*YS*) 1.7, *puruṣa* has been called the *pratisaṁvedī* (loosely, reflector)[3] of *buddhi* (*buddheḥ pratisaṁvedī puruṣaḥ*). This *pratisaṁvedana* signalizes the necessity of the self, for it is *puruṣa* which (so to speak) reflects or moulds into its own light the modalities (cognition, etc.) of the *buddhi* and hence is said to know them. And if *puruṣa* appears indistinguishable from *buddhi*, it is because it remains unchanged in all the changing modes of the *buddhi*. Since every cognition (*vṛtti*) has its *pratisaṁvedana*—which derives from the fact that the self is *buddhi's pratisaṁvedī*—this state of *pratisaṁvedana* is what is called *pauruṣeya bodha*. For example (to repeat), the modality (*vṛtti*) 'I know *X*', which is a case of *pramāṇa*, is invariably echoable as 'I know that I know *X*'. This first part 'I know' represents *pauruṣeya bodha* in its articulate form; manifesting itself successively it culminates in the (apparently) actual *pauruṣeya bodha*, which is the self's witnessing of the *vṛtti* (mode). It must be remembered, however, that this *pauruṣeya bodha* is after all a modality of *buddhi* and is in no way part of the self which is far form being a real knowing agent.

The point of the above observations is that the manifest *buddhi*, never being during its proper life unassociated with consciousness, is never, in a manner of speaking, non-conscious or non-intelligent at the functional level. Consequently its modifications (knowledge, pleasure, etc.) also cannot practically be treated as unconscious; properly speaking, they are modes of the *buddhi* which is from the start presided over by consciousness (*puruṣadhiṣṭhita*).

Having made the clarificatory comment, I proceed to draw attention to certain notable inconsistencies which characterize Vācaspati's own interpretation. In the first place, his 'single reflection' doctrine as stated above is very hard to reconcile with his attempt to distinguish his view from that attributed by him to 'others', namely, that the self as 'enjoyer' (*bhoktṛ*) actually means self as only a seer (*draṣṭṛ*). For, as we saw at the very same place, he seems to ventilate, without equivocation, the view that the self is a real enjoyer directly and not through a detour in the form of its reflection in *buddhi:* the *unconscious buddhi* cannot enjoy its own pleasure and pain except on pain of operating upon itself (*svātmani vṛttivirodha*). The self's reflection in *buddhi*, even assuming

that Vācaspati is right in this, cannot be a substitute for the real enjoying self, which is what Sāṁkhya originally needs and attempts to *prove*. Secondly, while the other view is held to conceive even *bhoktṛtva* in terms of *draṣṭṛtva*, Vācaspati, as we again noticed, interprets even *sākṣitva* and *draṣṭṛtva* in a way which goes to emphasize the essential subjecthood of the self, at least so long as it is embodied. In fact, if Vācaspati is to be believed, it is only when it occupies a body that the self's *sākṣitva* and *draṣṭṛtva* as indicating his subject-character make any sense at all. And this subjecthood, one hardly need mention, is inexplicable, especially within the Sāṁkhya parameters, except through 'necessary' reference to the object(s) which it enjoys. It is evident, then, that Vācaspati is unable to offer a coherent view of the Sāṁkhya thinking on the matter, let alone remove the deep ambiguities which are already engrained in that system. The expression *darśitaviṣaya* used by Vācaspati apparently implies that the *draṣṭā* self-subject is not indifferent to the objects presented to it by *buddhi*. Indifference (*audāsīnyam*) in the present context means lack of concern even with regard to the tantalizing question whether there is a world of objects which needs to be known or experienced.

The equivocation in Vācaspati's thoughts on the issue is evidenced by certain of his views which he expresses while commenting on some other Kārikās. Thus, for example, in his comment on *SK* 55a (*tatra jarāmaraṇakṛtaṁ duḥkhaṁ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ*) he writes in anticipation of a *pūrvapakṣin*'s query—namely, if pain etc. are attributes belonging to *buddhi*, then how do they come to be associated with the *puruṣa*—that the word 'puruṣa', since it derives its meaning from the fact that it rests (*śete*) in the body or *liṅga* (*pūr*), it comes to experience suffering etc., which otherwise characterize *buddhi*.[4] In other words, it is its presence in the body which causes the spirit to be affected by misery, etc. It is surprising, though, that having said this, Vācaspati adds that the said attributes (misery, etc.) come to be related to *puruṣa* because *puruṣa* superimposes them (*adhyavasyati puruṣaḥ*) upon itself because of the absence of awareness, on its part, of its essential distinction from the *liṅga*.

That *prakṛti*'s evolution has as its objective the release of the self who really, and not apparently, gets affected by pain, is the import not

only of (the next) Kārikā 56, but is accepted as such in clear words by Vācaspati too. It is scarcely realized, however, that commitment to this doctrine renders true understanding of the Sāṁkhya insistence—which too Vācaspati supports whole-heartedly—on the (so-called) actually ever inactive and 'free' self a formidable task. Indeed, the above fact confirms the equivocation which pervades Vācaspati's interpretation (in fact that of even other commentaries) in a large measure. Raising the question that if *prakṛti* is the ground of the visible world, and if, further, *prakṛti* by nature is ever active, then the idea of the cessation of this world at least for the liberated self, to which Sāṁkhya uncontroversially subscribes, is rendered unmeaning, Vācaspati replies, though surely by way of comment upon the second line of the Kārikā, that *prakṛti* ceases in its operation as soon as it has effected a (particular) self's release.[5] It would be uncharitable however to treat the deep schism that seems to exist in Vācaspati's account as chiefly his contribution. For, to be fair to him, it must be said that the said schism is very much characteristic of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* itself. Thus, recanting the earlier position adopted by Sāṁkhya, *SK* 57 reiterates the generally accepted Sāṁkhya doctrine that the final objective of *prakṛti*'s self-differentiation is the release (preceded by enjoyment) of the spirit: *puruṣavimokṣa-nimittaṁ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya*. Though he rightly calls Vācaspati's explication of this Kārikā erratic, Ram Shankar Bhattacharyya's own explanation implying that the self's release is only an incidental objective of *prakṛti*'s evolution[6] (since *puruṣa* is already 'free' and unchanging), also leaves the real problem where it is, and so fails to explain why the *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā*, its own inconsistencies notwithstanding, should again and again talk, in unqualified language, of a teleology implicit in *prakṛti*'s self-manifestation. To enlarge upon what I am saying, I advert to *SK* 56, where it is maintained, as a fundamental teaching of *Sāṁkhya*, that the creation from intellect (*mahat*) down to the gross elements, is brought into being by *prakṛti* for another's (i.e. the self's) benefit, as if it were its own interest (*svārtha iva parārtha āraṁbhaḥ*). Gauḍapāda's comment here deserves notice: 'Just as someone ignoring his own self-interest or business, carries on those of his friend, so does *pradhāna*. The self makes no return to *pradhāna*. "As if for itself" (*svārtha iva*) means: not actually

for itself, but really for the sake of another's benefit. ... As it is said: *pradhāna* is like a jar, and having fulfilled the purpose of the spirit, it departs.'[7] The Kārikās 58 and 59 also expand upon the very same governing principle behind *prakṛti*'s evolution.

In conclusion then it must be said that *if* Sāṁkhya philosophy is serious in its postulation of an intrinsic necessity to *prakṛti*'s self-manifestation, then the self's *bhoga* and *apavarga*, in which alone *prakṛti*'s dynamic (rather than mechanistic) activity finds and can find its fulfilment, cannot, without contradiction, be treated as a mere appearance. And if they are not an appearance, then a measure of real enjoyership or agency has in principle to be admitted to the self, denial of which threatens to undermine one central teaching of Sāṁkhya. The same conclusion holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for Vācaspati's 'single reflection' theory which rests on that very denial of the self's agenthood. For, to put it a little differently, it should be plain that denial of *bhoga* and *apavarga* as the ends that necessitate postulation of the existence of *puruṣa* as their recipient inevitably leads to the denial of any real, as opposed to apparent, meaning to creation. And the dilemma to which this consequence gives rise is: If *prakṛti* is motivated by no real or specific interest, why should (1) the asserted orderliness of the creation, not to talk of the creation itself, not be treated as merely accidental, and (2) why should *prakṛti* ever cease its operation, which it is held to cease for the spirit which has attained release. Creation then would become not only beginningless, as indeed it is said to be,[8] but also without any 'final' end which it is supposed to achieve in the form of its departure upon a self's release.[9]

IV

I now take up for examination Vijñānabhikṣu's 'mutual reflection' theory (*anyonya-pratibimba*) which has as its backdrop Vācaspati's 'single reflection' theory and which is proposed by him as the only viable solution to the 'riddle' surrounding the self's agenthood. Since we cannot here enter upon all the details of the polemic, important and vigorous as they in their own right are, we shall try to be short with Vijñānabhikṣu's account which is aimed at making better sense of the Sāṁkhya attempt to ground the existence and necessity of the self in

the aforementioned two-fold purpose. One fatal objection to which Bhikṣu finds Vācaspati's explanation exposed is that Vācaspati's view fails altogether in the primary objective it sets itself, namely to account for the experienthood or subjecthood (*bhoktṛtva*) of the self and its quest for freedom from bondage. The principal contention of Vijñānabhikṣu then can be formulated thus: either the ideas of *bhoga* and *apavarga* are real or not real. In case they are real, as Sāṁkhya according to Vijñānabhikṣu unquestionably holds, then they, says he, cannot be the characteristics of a merely reflected self. A mere reflection has no reality so as to be the subject of a real predicate. Not being the owner of a real attribute, it can enjoy no real agent- or experienthood. It is on this single consideration—though others too are appended by him to buttress his main thesis—that Vijñānabhikṣu formulates his famed doctrine, that in addition to consciousness becoming reflected in the *buddhi* so that experience (by the intelligized *buddhi*) becomes possible, as Vācaspati indeed (rightly) envisages, the *buddhi* too with its modes (modifications) is reflected back in (the passive) consciousness such that the ascription of experience to the conscious self (the self's *bhoktṛtva*, in other words) acquires an intelligible meaning.[10] This meaning, asserts Vijñānabhikṣu, Vācaspati's doctrine fails to provide for or justify: *buddher eva pramātṛtve puruṣo na sidhyet.*[11] Vijñānabhikṣu's meaning, in other words, is that it is only due to error in the form of reciprocal reflection that there is the illusion of oneness between *buddhi* and *puruṣa* (*ekatābhrama*), as is found illustrated in expressions such as 'I am the agent,' 'I am happy,' 'I know,' etc. If we forget for the present the point concerning the illusion of identity, Bhikṣu's whole contention reduces to this: while the first reflection merely intelligizes the content of *buddhi* which is the object of knowledge, the second reflection causes the self to be the subject or agent of that knowledge by making it directly apprehend the *buddhi* along with its modifications (which latter represent cognitions of objects).[12] To elaborate a little, apart from the urge to do justice to the concept of proximity between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Bhikṣu also aims, by dint of the above doctrine, to justify and give content to the widespread common notion that the ends, *bhoga* and *apavarga*, can properly be the ends only of a conscious experiencing subject—an assertion which is

repeatedly made by the *SK* itself; a reflected self after all cannot possess true substantiality. If our primitive innate impulse to enjoy the world and seek freedom from the ensuing pain is to have, as dictated by the sheer logic of the circumstance, a conscious principle as its real subject, then the suggestion (by Vācaspati) that the self's reflection too can very well serve that purpose, reduces the *actual* consciousness' presence to a contingent fact devoid of much metaphysical significance. And it hardly needs mentioning that such a view (according to Vijñānabhikṣu), apart from lacking in explanatory power, compounds the problem more than it promises to solve. For isn't it Sāṁkhya's final view, Bhiksu seems to ask, that the self's existence has a necessity about it, given that there is a world and that it is of a certain sort. Additionally, Vācaspati's theory from a certain point of view fails to make the Sāṁkhya dualism seem internally consistent. Dualism implies two conditions, i.e. two terms or principles and not one, as well as the reality and equality of these two terms. Reduction of the self to its reflection is therefore to reduce the self to virtual unreality. (This is of course not to question that Vācaspati's solution has as an implied postulate—warrant for which is available even in *SK* 62 itself [see above]—a different doctrine, namely that consciousness is meant not *really* to meet the felt demand for an experient or a seeker of *apavarga* but to lend the service of its reflection so that the unintelligent if active *buddhi* may be intelligized and discharge its dual functions, otherwise illusorily referred to the self.)

Now there seems to be no doubt that Vijñānabhikṣu's castigation of Vācaspati's theory as basically defective has a good deal of merit. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that part of Vācaspati's failure derives from what *prima facie* seems to be *SK*'s own *volte-face*. Indeed, it is my view that Vijñānabhikṣu ought to have launched his attack, in the first place, on the Sāṁkhya recantation itself (cf. *SK* 20 and 62), by pointing out the very serious threat its teaching poses for the basic Sāṁkhya doctrine, and then tried a hermeneutic device which could facilitate a more coherent and plausible solution within the original framework of Sāṁkhya. Vācaspati's gloss on Kārikā 62 once again echoes his earlier affirmation: *bhogāpavargayoḥ prakṛtigatayorapi vivekāgrahāt puruṣasambandha upapādita iti sarvaṁ puṣkalam.* Our

worry here is, something to which Vijñānabhikṣu pays little attention, the key expression: *vivekāgraha*. Even forgetting for the present about the grave anomaly that infects the Sāṁkhya view on the whole issue, the question that arises is: if *bhoga* and *apavarga* are only mistakenly ascribed to the self, is this error itself real? It deserves to be noted that you cannot hold both propositions—one, that there is an erroneous attribution to the self of what does not belong to it, and two that this erroneous attribution itself is unreal or an appearance—in the same breath: nothing would be more self-contradictory. The saving grace, however, is that Sāṁkhya, unlike Advaita Vedānta, treats the said error as real, and as much real as the (embodied) self and *buddhi* (*prakṛti*), and of course its consequence, pain. Now normally knowledge and error are considered to be conscious experiences and so *prima facie* should belong to the self as conscious subject. The Sāṁkhya view, however, seems to reject this common perception when it conceives the intrinsically material or 'non-conscious' *buddhi*—which otherwise is an object from the point of view of the self—as such a subject, notwithstanding that it is said to need consciousness (or its reflection) as a necessary (causal?) condition to discharge its concerned functions.

Now if there is an immanent objective to *prakṛti*'s evolution in the form of *buddhi*, etc., and if the real subject both of knowledge and error, more specially the universal error called *vivekāgraha*, is also none else than *buddhi*, then extirpation of this error which constitutes the ladder to final release, also affects directly the fate of *buddhi* alone: it cannot be that disappearance of what is essentially *buddhi*'s error results in the release of the spirit—which in any case never really gets bound. But this contingency gives rise to the following very important question: Where does the *buddhi* (and the body), and by implication, *prakṛti* stand vis-à-vis the self in Sāṁkhya? Is it only *prakṛti* or the body which needs the self's presence to attain its intrinsic goals, or does the self also equally need the body for something more than unwittingly exercising mere 'nominal' effect on it, the nature of their relationship, whether contingent (empirical) or otherwise, notwithstanding? And if the self too needs the body, what for does it need it? Surely, it cannot be for any real interest of its own, for it has no such interest to realize *if* the Sāṁkhya characterization of its nature in *SK* 19

is to be believed. And if so, the self, quite contrary to what in one important respect Sāṁkhya maintains, survives at most as an existent, who, though without any life of its own (life here meaning the sum total of experiences and actions, good or bad, snaring or salvational), acts as an indifferent sustainer of *buddhi*'s life. The so-called *parārtha* of *prakṛti* then turns out to be nothing but a camouflage for its *svārtha*. And when we further find that even the pre-eminent task of discriminating (*viveka*) the self from itself (*buddhi*) is by Sāṁkhya assigned to *buddhi* itself—*saiva ca viśinaṣṭi pradhānapuruṣāntaraṁ sūkṣmam* (*SK* 37)—one looks askance as to what sense to make of the aimfulness which constitutes *the* rationale of the created world or for that matter of the body which is said to be the fleshly tabernacle of the self. The conclusion then becomes irresistible that Sāṁkhya, even when recommending in principle a dualistic doctrine fails not only to justify it even on the metaphysical grounds which it adduces, but also to explain the true nature of the (reciprocal) relationship that is said to exist between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, or self and body, and its impact on both the relata in any very plausible manner. I am not here suggesting that there is necessarily something intrinsically wrong with dualism as such, whatever form it may then take, but only that Sāṁkhya fails to make a proper case of its brand of dualism at the basic level itself. This failure represents to my mind a missed opportunity, if for nothing else than the fact that Sāṁkhya's conclusions, besides being gravely inconsistent, fall starkly short of its own philosophical expectations.

To return to Vijñānabhikṣu, the sum and substance of his theory of mutual reflection (to recapitulate) is that in addition to the reflection of the self in the *buddhi* whose modes at their level not only reflect the objects but refer them (i.e., their knowledge) illusorily to that reflected self, the modes of *buddhi* also are reflected back in the self such that the subject- or experient-character of the self finds an experiential basis which it does not do on the 'single reflection' theory or any other doctrine. The reasoning he summons towards this end can be briefly put as follows.

(1) If we accept the single reflection theory, then (as noted above) the concepts of *bhoga* and *apavarga* which that theory regards as (attributes) ascribable only to the reflection of the self and not to the real

self, lose (to repeat) all meaning, and the creaturely effort to achieve freedom from pain is reduced to so much Sisyphean labour. A reflection possesses no real substantiality or independent reality (*a-vastutva*), and so no real agenthood to which any activity can properly be ascribed. Consequently conferment of any such title on it would render the supposition of the original (real) self wholly infructuous.[13]

(2) In explicating his doctrine, Vijñānabhikṣu makes the point that 'becoming one with the object' (*arthākāratā*)—which is how 'knowledge' of objects is conceived in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and even in Advaita Vedānta—constitutes a change (or modification) in the *buddhi*, while in the self the same knowledge survives in the form of a reflection.[14] This reflection of the *buddhi* in the self does not, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, have its support in reason alone, but in hundreds of traditional sayings as, e.g.: 'In that clear mirror of consciousness all these objects are reflected, like the trees on the bank are reflected in the lake.'[15] Bhikṣu's point is that his proposal cannot be reproached on the ground that, however rationally argued, it is after all novel, for, he asserts, it has the backing of a no less strong tradition.

(3) Now Vijñānabhikṣu anticipates an objection, especially from the supporters of the 'single reflection' theory, which he formulates as follows: When knowledge of the objective content of the modification is possible through contact with consciousness alone, whose reflection in the *buddhi* confers upon it experienthood, where is the need for postulating the reflection of *buddhi* and its modes in consciousness or the reflection, in *buddhi*'s modifications, of consciousness?[16]

This protest Bhikṣu attempts to meet by pointing out that if his theory (which incorporates backward reflection) were to be rejected, then we shall be faced with the contingency that the self, being eternal and all-pervasive (*vibhu*), would come to know everything in the world, whether past, present or future, because of its contact with them all at the same time.[17] And this, according to Bhikṣu, runs counter to common experience. The second point is that because of *puruṣa*'s omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) the exhortation to it to undertake spiritual practices (like meditation) will become utterly pointless. The 'double reflection' theory therefore ensures against the possibility of the self's admitted omniscience coming into real effect, by making the self a

recipient only of such (finite) knowledge of objects as are reflected, in the form of *buddhivṛttis*, in the self: the knowing *buddhi* after all is restricted to its *vṛttis* which alone represent (knowledge of) objects by reflecting them and which in the nature of the case are not all-knowing. We say 'in the nature of the case', for it is only when *buddhi* assumes the form of the apprehended object presented *through* the senses and gets reflected in the self that the latter comes to have an experience of that object. And, as is obvious, the field of sense-knowledge and, *a fortiori*, of *buddhi*-knowledge is intermittent and limited. The objection that the self's inability to know all that is, can be traced to the (element of) ignorance acting as a hindrance, is met by Vijñānabhikṣu by observing that the presence of ignorance stands ruled out in something that is by nature eternal knowledge.[18] Secondly, since attributes such as pain and ignorance belong really to *buddhi*, they can in no wise be conceived as belonging to the self.[19] So, concludes Bhikṣu, the intermittent nature of the self's (so-called) knowledge of objects becomes intelligible when understood as *arthākāratā* ('becoming one with the object'), which *arthākāratā*, as such knowledge, represents a modification of the *buddhi*.[20]

It seems to us that what Bhikṣu is trying to emphasize is that its all-knowing character notwithstanding, the self's being encased in a body makes no inconsiderable difference to its cognitive capacities, just as a man's vision of the expanse of the sky through the window of the room in which he is shut up differs from his vision of the same when he is out in the open. (As a limited comparison, one here calls to mind Plato's doctrine, as expressed, for example, in *Republic* BK X.611 and *Phaedo*, 67d, 82e–83a, etc., that the body is a positive evil which adversely affects the natural activities of the soul, which otherwise, according to Plato, is quite capable, as a spiritual substance, of subsisting by itself and pursuing its objectives.)

(4) Another argument which Vijñānabhikṣu puts forth in support of his theory is that the beginningless relationship of 'owned' and 'owner' between *buddhi* and *puruṣa* respectively inevitably determines, in the sense of putting limitations, the reciprocal reflection of the two—something which makes impossible knowledge of the modifications of another's intellect.[21] (The reader will note that this point supports what

we have said in the preceding.) It may be noted that this argument does not prove what cannot be proved on Vācaspati's theory also. For even that theory does not in principle allow for the possibility of knowing what is happening to (i.e. what is being cognized by) someone else's *buddhi* (mind).

(5) A further important reason cited by Bhikṣu is this: If Vācaspati's view were to be accepted, then the world '*pauruṣeya*' in '*pauruṣeya-bodha*' would become meaningless, for Vācaspati's theory admits knowledge, experience, etc. as attributes not of the real self but of its reflection in *buddhi*. And since a reflected self's existence can only be a shadowy one, it is proper, Bhikṣu strongly suggests, that we accept the doctrine of mutual reflection, which (in his view) can account for the real self acting as the substrate in which experience and knowledge subsist.[22]

(6) The preceding leads Bhikṣu to assert that the self can be called a knower proper (*pramātṛ*) only if the fruit of knowledge is admitted to reside in him (*cit*) as conditioned by the reflection of *buddhi*.[23]

(7) It deserves notice that in order to establish his doctrine of mutual reflection, Vijñānabhikṣu envisages a special kind of relation between *buddhi* and *puruṣa*. It is this relation, called by him *saṁyogaviśeṣa* or 'particular copresence', which according to him is the cause of the mutual reflection of *buddhi* and the self in each other.[24] *Buddhi* is illuminated by consciousness' presence like the iron is heated by the presence of fire, and just as again, fire's light etc. do not get transmitted into the iron, similarly consciousness is not transmitted into *buddhi* whereby it may become identical with it.[25] In other words, through this 'conjunction' consciousness or the self *only* gets reflected in the intellect. And this special *saṁyoga*, adds Bhikṣu, takes place through the change in the form of preponderance of *sattva* in the *buddhi*, it being impossible to admit 'instrumental causality' (*nimittaka-viśeṣa*) in respect of the self, which latter would make it susceptible to changefulness.[26]

(8) We have already noted that one fatal objection which Vijñānabhikṣu brings against Vācaspati's view is that it uses the ground—namely the self's experient-character—mentioned in *SK* 17 to demonstrate *in fact* the reflection of that self, and that this position

is contradictory. In continuation with that, Bhikṣu at different places makes (what to him is) the very pertinent point that if *buddhi*, with consciousness (self) reflected in it were to be considered as the real enjoyer and agent (the self being so only by proxy), then it would lead us into the grievous error of confounding the object with the subject (agent) (*karma-kartṛ-virodha*), of making, e.g., of the same thing the object and the subject of pleasure, pain, etc.;[27] and as is well known, predication of contrary attributes—in the present context, *kartṛtva* and *karmatva*—of the same entity at the same time violates the law of contradiction. Ostensibly, then, Vijñānabhikṣu seems inclined to admit actual *bhoktṛtva* in the self itself, in line with the *SK* 17 argument.[28] Not only this. He seems, at least in letter, to endorse the other argument given in *SK* 17—*saṁghātaparārthatvāt*—to prove the necessity, the metaphysical rather than merely epistemological necessity, of the self as something which is not only different from the *saṁghāta*—which any object, whether phenomenal or noumenal (*prakṛti*) truly is because of its being a combinational unity of the three gunas—but which is the actual reality for whom as 'other' (*para*) the *saṁghāta* is really meant.[29] Sāṁkhya seems aware that there is no contradiction involved in a thing's being real and its being contingent. (Note that, as is clear from *SK* 17, *saṁghāta* includes, besides *prakṛti*, the manifest individual bodies, whose *adhiṣṭhāna* the self is conceived to be.) In other words, if our understanding of the Sāṁkhya meaning and Bhikṣu's explication of it is correct, association with *puruṣa* is not only the trigger of the evolutionary process, but also makes, at least in letter, *puruṣa* itself the chief beneficiary of that process. *Puruṣa*'s reality is thus sought to be proved retrospectively (so to speak) by postulating an immanent meaning and direction in the evolution of *prakṛti* in which the *puruṣa* itself has a definite role to play. And if it happens at the cosmic plane, it must happen at the individual plane too. (The same holds of Bhikṣu's explication of other arguments given in *SK* 17, as represented respectively in the *Sāṁkhyasūtras* 1.140–144.) An anarchic world devoid of any specific meaning or design is thus not acceptable to Sāṁkhya, and it is this idea which gives the system, of almost all the Indian metaphysical theories, its typical character. Regrettably, however, this peculiarity of the Sāṁkhya argument for the self seems to have been lost

on the subsequent writers on Sāṁkhya who do not seem inclined to undertake such interpretive exercise as could enable the notion of self's *bhoga* and *apavarga* to retain its plausibility. So, so far as his intentions are concerned, Bhiksu's endeavour is meant to provide a needed corrective to this aberration, which in his view undoes all that Sāṁkhya attempts to provide by way of a basic insight into the nature of the world. And apparently it would seem that irrespective of the merit or otherwise of his own solution, Vijñanabhikṣu is partly able to see the problem for what it is. In other words, his anxiety is to see that Sāṁkhya's own grounds for proving the self's reality do not turn out to be no-grounds.

Our intentions are, however, no guarantee by themselves of our actual ability to work out in thought solutions which meet the objective set by them. In fact quite often they are found to pull in different directions such that while sympathizing with the intentions, one has per force to reject the theoretical solution offered as false, in whatever measure, whether because of its failure to think the things out to their logical limit or because of the chinks developing in its explanatory armour. Our fear is that this is precisely what has happened in Vijñānabhikṣu's case.

While Vijñānabhikṣu rightly judges Vācaspati's theory to be deficient in a major way, he does not try to enquire (1) whether the Sāṁkhya account of the whole issue of the self may not itself suffer from basic incongruities and even contradictions, and (2) whether therefore it is not possible that at least part of Vācaspati's 'faulty' thinking derives more from this feature of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* than otherwise. For, after all, the point at issue between Vācaspati and Vijñanabhikṣu and their respective followers is, how best to account for the agenthood of the self so that *prakrti*'s self-manifestation as meant for the self's *bhoga* and *apavarga* makes plausible sense.

It is possible that, as Bhikṣu says, Vācaspati's 'single-reflection' doctrine completely fails in the said objective. But how about Vijñānabhikṣu's own attempted solution? If we forget about Bhikṣu's own claims or even the claims of such of his followers as Nāgeśa, or in our own times, K.C. Bhattacharyya, then, even presuming with him that his theory goes farther than Vācaspati's, it does not seem to go far

enough. One basic objection to which the theory seems exposed is that Bhikṣu also, like Vācaspati and others, does not cast suspicion on the fundamental assumption of Sāṁkhya that the self being, after all, not susceptible to vicissitudes[30] is *not* the real experient-agent. The so-called agenthood then of the self which in Bhikṣu's view accrues to it from its (seeming) identity with the reflection in it of the *buddhi* and its modes[31] turns out not to be a part of the self's intrinsic nature but a grand delusion born of the fatal confusion between *buddhi* (*prakṛti*) and the self and their respective natures. The seeming change caused in the self by *buddhi*'s modifications by appearing to be *his* modifications, is then a false change much like the crystal which appears to possess false redness because of its proximity to the china-rose.[32] And if the self's *bhoktṛtva* or 'enjoyerhood' is a delusion, so must be its quest for freedom from bondage.

For the very same reason Bhikṣu's explanation of '*puruṣeya-bodha*' virtually ends up being no explanation: *puruṣeya-bodha* in the end turns out to be not as something subsisting in *puruṣa* but in *buddhi* whose misidentification with *puruṣa* causes such ascription to be made to him in the first instance. *Bhikṣu's theory therefore succeeds, paradoxically enough, only in proving appearances, and not reality, its professed objective to the contrary notwithstanding.* The self is here, the suggested devious procedure of 'double reflection' apart, no more a *bhoktṛ* than it is on Vācaspati's theory, and so what is supposed to be *prakṛti's parārtha* remains in the end only its *svārtha*. The irony gets compounded when we find that Vijñānabhikṣu also simultaneously wants to preserve the spirit of the original Sāṁkhya doctrine by repeatedly arguing in favour of self as the real experient-agent. In *SPB* under *SS* 1.99, he unequivocally declares that if knower-hood were to be the property of *buddhi*, then the *Sāṁkhyasūtras* 1.104 ('*cidavasano bhogaḥ*') and 1.143 ('*bhoktṛbhāvāt*'), which declare that experience ends with discrimination and that the experient is *puruṣa*, would be contradicted—something that he finds hard to swallow. Indeed he concludes that if experience were to be taken as belonging to *buddhi*, the attempt to prove the existence of *puruṣa* would be deprived of the only (major) argument that exists to that effect, namely experience, which (as he says) serves as an inferential mark of *puruṣa: puruṣe*

pramāṇābhāvaśca purusaliṁgasya bhogasya buddher eva svīkārāt (*SPB* under *SS* 1.99). Now, unless their genuineness be disputed, these are not positions which can be easily reconciled, least of all on the theory Bhikṣu advances. And there are other difficulties which attach to the theory, one of them surely being the bothersome question as to what is the basic evidence, experiential or otherwise, on which to ground the view that the self too receives the reverse reflection from *buddhi*? I will not, however, discuss this question either. The presently more relevant question is whether even acceptance of the reality of such a reflection solves the issue at hand in any very satisfactory way. Let me here quote from a passage in *Vijñānamṛtabhāṣya* which testifies to the grave inconsistencies between Bhiksu's 'official' view and his actual pronouncements: 'This *bhoga* gets reflected in the self; since the latter is beyond mutations, that very experience (*bhoga*) of pleasure and pain is *bhoga* of *puruṣa*. *Even at a secondary level, the above bhoga cannot by any possibility belong to the buddhi for the reason that the latter is insentient, and there arises, besides, the contingency of the assumption of the self becoming superfluous.*'[33] (My italics.) The question is, if the self is beyond change, how can *bhoga*, which 'necessarily' involves change in the existent to which it belongs, be legitimately said to be of the self. Its belonging to *buddhi* is, on the other hand, ruled out (1) on the ground that *buddhi*, though active, is non-conscious, the idea being that an experience must belong to a conscious being, and (2) for the reason that *bhoga* (experience) of pleasure, pain, etc. by *buddhi* itself whose modes the former are, would incur subject-object contradiction. In such an event one is obviously left with the feeling that Vijñānabhikṣu seems to be attempting the impossible. He fails to see that if Vācaspati's reflected self is powerless to do what it is supposed to, then his self too, in spite of its being a recipient of *buddhi*'s reflection, fails to become a real enjoyer or knower; it loses none of its detached witness-character or its (so-called) purity by acquiring contentfulness which the act of knowing involves and apparently imparts to it.[34] It looks then that though, given that the original Sāṁkhya view is already ridden with deep incoherences, Bhikṣu's attempt to make the relationship between the self (with all its proclaimed nature) and *buddhi* appear more intelligible does not lack seriousness of purpose, the emergent

picture does not help matters very substantially. Indeed, the theoretical pressure under which Bhikṣu strives to explain the Sāṁkhya viewpoint (once again) shows up in his comment on *SS* 1.144 (*'kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteḥ'*), where he observes: *śarīrādikameva ced bhoktā syāt tadā bhoktuḥ kaivalyārthaṁ duḥkhātyantocchedārthaṁ kasyāpi pravṛttir nopapadyeta. śarīrādīnāṁ vināśitvāt, prakṛteśca dharmigrāhakamānena duḥkhasvābhāvyasiddhyā kaivalyāsaṁbhavāt. na hi svabhāvasyātyanto-cchedo ghaṭate ityarthaḥ.*[35] (It is to be noted that Bhiksu's gloss on the above *sutra* cites in full *SK* 17 by way of support to his above view.)

It passes comprehension however that Vijñānabhikṣu—and of course Vācaspati, apart from the other commentators who have gone before him—should be averse to take note of the almost sudden and drastic change in the Sāṁkhya doctrine and the resultant melancholy compromise between the only argument given for the self (cf. *SK* 17 and the relevant *Sāṁkhyasūtras* mentioned above) and the nature or character of that self delineated a few Kārikās later. It seems in this light that whether we accept Vācaspati's interpretation or Vijñānabhikṣu's, the actual self is nowhere in the picture. And though it is maintained that the self is intelligible by itself in contradistinction to *prakṛti*, which is said to exist *for* the self, this self is a redundancy for all practical purposes: far from constituting the only rationale of *prakṛti*, the self, to the extent its reflection alone or in combination with *buddhi*'s reflection in it is supposed to do all the duties, proves in the end to be its supreme embarrassment. And so its association with *prakṛti*, which, even though held to be having its source in non-discrimination (*aviveka*), is after all considered very much real, turns out to be a mock-relation, a relation, in other words, which has no real warrant either in the nature of *prakṛti* or in the nature (or existence) of the self.

It will have been noticed that I have refrained from examining in detail the appositeness or otherwise of Vijñānabhikṣu's theory. It is not because I want to deny the credit where it is due, but because in my judgement Bhikṣu's effort to make tenable sense of the Sāṁkhya argument for the reality of the self at the most succeeds only in lending to the self's *apparent bhoktṛtva* greater plausibility than Vācaspati's theory. The apparent *bhoktṛtva* is, however, a fundamentally different proposition from the real *bhoktṛtva*, which alone is made by Sāṁkhya the

premise on which to ground the inherent purposiveness of *prakṛti*. As a matter of fact, Bhikṣu's own comments make, as per his opponents, the problem difficult of resolution when he maintains, in the same breath, (1) that the agency of seeing is unreal due to the projected activity on the reflection, and (2) that the self's status as a witness of *buddhi* and its modifications is real and not apparent.[36] Thus the *YV* gloss on *YS* 2.20 observes: *puruṣa* knows well by reflection the *buddhi* which has assumed the form of, and so become identical with, the object (of knowledge). '*Saṁvedanam*' is the modification through which there is the above identity (*arthākāravṛtti*). *Puruṣa* is one who reflects (lit. echoes: *pratidhvanivat*) that (kind) of *buddhi* like an echo. The resultant meaning then (of *puruṣa*) is: he is the witness of the *buddhi*. Through this it is also conveyed that seership (*draṣṭṛtva*) is, 'being a knower brought about by the imposed activity in the form of reflection'.[37] The point of the above is to underscore that his claims apart, Bhikṣu's device fails to prove either that the self on his interpretation comes out as the kind of self which the Sāṁkhya argument sets out to prove, or that it comes out as a better justified apparent 'enjoyer' than it does on Vācaspati's or any other thinker's theory. He forgets that on any reckoning the relation between the self and the intellect—also called the relation of identity (*buddhyabheda*)—is taken as an illusory one, so that even if we succeed in proving that *prakṛti* is a real *bhogya*, we can in no wise prove that the self is a *real bhoktṛ*. The rest of the difference between him and Vācaspati is therefore mainly verbal. Also the self's purity, attributelessness, witnesshood, etc. are asserted by Sāṁkhya, and followed unquestioningly by both Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu (and their respective followers) without the slightest feeling that this nature of the self also needs to be reasoned in the way for example Sāṁkhya reasons for the necessity of the self within its scheme. So Bhikṣu too, even while never questioning the validity of the Sāṁkhya argument,[38] fails to make the way clear for its acceptance through his double reflection theory. In fact, to go a little further, Bhikṣu too falters where almost every interpreter does, for he too fails to see that the original Sāṁkhya thought already moves in contrary directions, thus leaving behind a chasm which cannot be bridged easily. To argue to the existence of the world-ground *prakṛti* from the

experienced world, and to argue to the existence of the self from the inherent purposiveness of *prakṛti*, is, whether successful or not, truly a heroic and perhaps unexampled speculative effort. The effort, however, comes unstuck when (to repeat) we are told that the self for whose enjoyment *prakṛti* plays its dance, is really an unaffected non-enjoying seer-witness with no pretence to participate in the affairs of the world. It remains where it is, immobile and immobilizable; its end, if we can speak of its end, is nothing beyond its beginning. I have no wish to deny *a priori* that the self may be of the nature the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* decides to assign it in Kārikā 19. My point is (1) that, unlike with respect to some other things, no show of reason is attempted to prove that this is so; and (2) that this is not the self which the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* originally aims at proving as part of its explanation of the world. Appearances normally do not need proof; they are already, especially in the context of a philosophy such as Sāṁkhya, part of everyday experience. It is the reality, which supposedly gets confounded with them, which needs proof. Any argument therefore which is designed in intention to prove a certain reality turns into a mere pretence when it is assumed as proving an appearance which veils that reality. The result of it all is there for all to see: the (so-called) activity of the non-conscious *prakṛti* is of no real meaning to *puruṣa*, while the untainted *puruṣa*, except for its illusory association with *buddhi*, survives as something scarcely distinguishable from an 'adventitious' facticity.

Finally, at no place does Vijñānabhikṣu's dilemma come into such sharp focus as when he asserts in *SPB* under *SS* 1.141, that the common experience expressed as 'I feel pleasure', 'I feel pain'—which all at least appear to common sense as belonging to the sentient self incarnated in the word 'I'—cannot constitute an evidence that they are indeed attributes of the self; but though they are not attributes of the self, they can yet (avers Bhikṣu) be regarded as belonging to the self much like a thing which belongs to its owner.[39] Now it is strange that Bhikṣu should deny these experiences as those of *buddhi* as their subject on the ground that this position involves *karmakartṛvirodha*, and discount the self as their proper subject on the ground that that would make the self a mutable entity.[40] It seems that both the reasonings are fallacious,

and, besides, rest on a dogma. One side of the dogma is that if a thing is of a certain nature—as *buddhi* is of the nature of pleasure, pain, etc.—then that thing cannot properly be the experient-subject of something that possesses that nature, for that involves '*karmakartṛvirodha*'. Bhikṣu however gives no forceful argument in support of this contention. Besides it seems that his idea of *karmakartṛvirodha* in the context at hand is a glaring instance of misapplication of an otherwise useful notion. To illustrate, someone may maintain that while the eye sees other things, it cannot see itself, and that therefore anyone asserting that it can, implies that the subject or perceiving eye can make itself the object of its (own) perception. Now while this argument may have an immediate appeal, it is scarcely sound. For the question is: after all how do we know that the eye sees things other than itself unless we admit—what is a fact—that in that very process the eye also *feels* directly that it is seeing, or that its function is to see. Needless to say, this self-awareness on the subject's part (here, the eye) is unobjectifying, involves no returning upon itself of the subject-eye, and so involves no *karmakartṛvirodha*. My point in saying this is not to suggest that therefore *buddhi* becomes the proper subject of experiences such as pleasure, pain, etc., but rather that its claim—and for that matter, anything's claim—to subjecthood cannot be rejected on the ground that that would involve subject-object contradiction. The other side of the dogma—viz. that if the self be admitted as changeable in nature then it would never cease to change and so would make conception of its permanent liberation, which implies changelessness, impossible—is also in itself fallacious. There is, after all, no inherent incompatibility in a self first getting bound because of its certain (bondage-involving) actions and then attaining release because of certain other (release-involving) actions. Nor is there any inherent contradiction between eternity and change: after all one can think of a thing retaining its self-identity in the midst of change. In other words, eternity does not by definition involve changelessness.

An attempt at resolving the problem is made by Bhikṣu by suggesting that since pleasure, pain, etc. cannot be accepted as attributes of the self, they can yet be regarded as apprehended by the self in the sense that being properties of the *buddhi* they are reflected in the self. And

if, he adds, we concede this apprehension as in order, then we have to concede the self's ownership of these experiences also as real. But this again in my view is to beg the issue. In the first place, even if it be granted that reflection of *buddhi* and its modes in the self is a plausible hypothesis, this reflection cannot legitimately be construed as apprehension on the self's part unless the said apprehension implies that the self at least *entertains* those modes. And it is clear that the self, insofar as it is, even on Vijñānabhikṣu's admission, a mutationless non-active presence, cannot really entertain the reflections. In fact, in contrast, the *buddhi* assuming subjectivity proper to the self on account of the latter's reflection in it, is still understandable because *buddhi* is dynamic in nature and besides represents the knowing function. Secondly, it is not understood how, if the self's reflection in *buddhi* is insignificant (*tuccha*) and therefore meaningless so far as the question of agenthood is concerned, the *buddhi*'s reflection in the self can acquire meaningfulness and greater purpose. Lastly, even if it be conceded that the self can somehow be said to apprehend the intellectual modes without (actively) entertaining them, conferment of such agenthood would in any case at best be only illusory, thus reducing the phenomenon of the self's bondage too to a mere illusion. And needless to say, all this militates against Vijñānabhikṣu's own original promises and his reasons to propose the theory of mutual reflection.

NOTES

1. '*puruṣastu sukhādyanuṣaṅgī cetanaḥ. so 'yam buddhitattvavartinā jñānasukhādinā tatpratibimbitas tacchāyāpattyā jñānasukhādimān iva bhavati iti cetano 'nugṛhyate.*' *TK* under *SK* 5. See details there. Also compare Vācaspati's comm. *TV* under *YS* 4.22 (pp. 434–5). See also ibid. under *YS* 3.35 (p. 351) where this doctrine is again enunciated and affirmed.
2. Though what I say here is a view which I have come to form on several grounds, in attributing this to Sāṁkhya I find support from such quarters as Vijñānabhikṣu, who observes in his *SPB* under *SS 1.66*: '*na hi dharmibhānaṁ vinā sukhasya bhānaṁ sambhavati. ahaṁ sukhītyevaṁ sukhānubhavāditi*' (p. 70).
3. Though I have rendered '*pratisaṁvedī*' as 'reflector', I would not be taken as final about this rendering; this is the one that strikes me presently.

Vijñānabhikṣu's explication of the word in his gloss (*YV*, p. 214) on *YS* 2.20—*saṁvedinyāḥ buddheḥ pratisaṁvedī puruṣaḥ, saṁvedanam arthākāravṛttiḥ tasyāḥ pratisaṁvedanaṁ pratidhvanivat pratibimbaṁ yatra sa puruṣa etyarthaḥ, buddheḥ sāksī iti tu paryavasito 'rthaḥ*—however seems to enable us to understand its meaning: the self being luminous and besides being associated with *buddhi*, echoes (*pratidhvanivat*), as it were, whatever happens to *buddhi* and so can be said to be the latter's witness (*sāksī*). The self's witness-character, however, needless to add, does not necessarily presuppose 'double reflection', as Vijñānabhikṣu seems to contend in the above.

4. '*puri liṁge śete' iti puruṣaḥ, liṁgaṁ ca tatsambandhīti cetano'pi tatsambandhī bhavati ityarthaḥ.' TK* under *SK* 55.
5. '*evaṁ pratyekaṁ puruṣān mocayitum pravṛttā prakṛtir yaṁ purusaṁ mocayati taṁ prati punar na pravartate.' TK* under *SK* 56.
6. See R.S. Bhattacharyya's Hindi commentary *Jyotiṣmatī* on *TK* (under *SK* 57), pp. 320–21.
7. *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* under *SK* 56.
8. The *YD*, while explaining '*pravartate*' in Karika 56 observes: '*pravartate iti kriyāprabandhamāha pravṛtto na pravartsyati kintarhi pravartata evānantānām śarīrādibhāvena parasparānugraheṇa ca*' (p. 140).
9. The *YD* (under Karika 56) clarifies that *prakrti* becomes 'desireless' (*nirākāṁkṣya*) after fulfilling *puruṣa's* interests: '*sarvapuruṣ-ādhikāranibaddhāyāḥ sarvaśakter nirākāṁkṣīkaraṇārthamityarthaḥ*' (p. 140).
10. '*yathā ca citi buddheḥ pratibimbam evaṁ buddhavapi citpratibimbaṁ svīkāryam anyathā caitanyasya bhānānupapatteḥ svayaṁ sākṣāt svadarśane karmakartṛvirodhena.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22). Continuing Bhikṣu explains: '*tadevaṁ buddhyātmanoḥ parasparapratibimbarūpāddoṣādeva ekatābhramo 'haṁ kartā sukhī jānāmītyādirūpā iti.*' Ibid. It deserves notice that Bhikṣu cites *SK* 20 in support of his above doctrine, and specially refers to the word '*iva*' in that Kārikā. Reference to this treatment in *YV* is made by Vijñānabhikṣu in *SPB* under *SS* 1.99. See also details there.

   The reader who sympathizes with Vijñānabhikṣu's above doctrine, but yet may want to see it interpreted in a way that makes it on the whole more fascinating, is referred to the late K.C. Bhattacharyya's version in his *Studies in Philosophy*, vol. I, chapter VIII, especially pp. 190–91. I, however, since I do not find Bhīkshu's view very convincing, do not discuss Bhattacharyya's undoubtedly ingenious improvements.
11. *YV* under *YS* 1.7 (p. 30). This assertion is made by Bhikṣu after presenting Vācaspati's view, without of course naming him.

12. '*yaśca caitanye buddheh pratibimbaḥ sa ca ārūḍaviṣayaiḥ saha buddher bhānārtham iṣyate.' SPB* under *SS* 1.99 (p. 97). Bhikṣu elaborates that since at the level of *buddhi*, apprehension of objects takes place only when it (*buddhi*) assumes their form (*arthākāra*) it is not reasonable to regard this *arthākāratā* as unnecessary on the ground that manifestation of objects in the self can become possible through mere particular conjunction. That is, in other words, the self's apprehension of objects can be made intelligible only by postulation of reverse reflection of *buddhi* in consciousness.
13. '*yattu kaścidavivekī vadati—buddhipratibimbitapuruṣasya karmeti, tanna, yogabhāṣye 'smaduktaprakārsasyaivoktatvenānyaprakārasyā-prāmāṇikatvāt, pratibimbasyāvastutvena karmādyasambhāvacca. anyathā pratibimbasya karmatadbhogādyaṅgīkāre bimbatvābhimata-puruṣakalpanāvaiyarthyasya pūrvaṁ pratipāditatvāditi.' SPB* under *SS* 2.46 (p. 183).
14. '*sā ca arthākāratā buddhau pariṇāmarūpā ... puruṣe ca pratibimbarūpā.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22).
15. '*tasmiṅściddarpaṇe sphāre samastā vastudṛṣṭayaḥ/imās tāḥ pratibimbanti sarasīva taṭadrumāḥ.*' Though this verse is from *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* (upaśama) 41.113, Bhikṣu quotes it in ibid.
16. '*nanu saviṣayavṛtteḥ sphuraṇaṁ cetanasaṁyogādeva bhavatu ... ataḥ kimarthaṁ caitanye vṛttipratibimbaṁ vṛttau vā vakṣyamāṇa-caitanyapratibimbaṁ kalpyate.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 21).
17. '*anyathā kutasthanityavibhucaitanyasya sarvasambandhāt sarvaṁ vastu sarvair jñāyeta ...' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22).
18. '*na cājñānākhyaṁ jñānapratibandhakam caitanye kalpanīyaṁ, nityajñānasya pratibandhāsambhavāt.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22).
19. ' "*duḥkhājñānamayā dharmāḥ prakṛtestu nātmanaḥ*" *ityādibhiḥ ātmanyajñānapratiṣedhācca.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22).
20. '*ato'rthabhānasya kādācitkatvādyupapattaye arthākārataiva arthagrahaṇaṁ vācyaṁ, buddhau tathā dṛṣṭatvāt.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22).
21. '*anādisvasvāmibhāvasyaiva pratibimbaniyāmakatayā vakṣyamāṇatvāttu na parabuddhivṛtter bhānam.' YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 22).
22. '*pauruṣeyaśabdasya yathāśrutārthatyāgāpatteḥ, pratibimbasya tucchatayā 'rthabhānarūpatvānupapatteśca pratibimbasya prakāśādyartha-kriyākāritāyāḥ kvāpyadarśanācca.' YV* under *YS* 1.7 (p. 30).
23. '*citereva vṛttipratibimbopāhitāyāḥ phalatvaṁ yuktam.' YV* under *YS* 1.7 (p. 30).
24. '*ayameva ca saṁyogaviśeṣo buddhyātmanor anyonyapratibimbane hetuḥ.' SPB* under *SS* 1.99 (p. 97).

25. '*na tu caitanyamantaḥkaraṇe saṁkrāmati yena saṁgitā syāt.*' *SPB* under *SS* 1.99 (p. 97).
26. '*ayaṁ ca saṁyogaviśeṣo 'ntaḥkaraṇasyaiva sattvodrekarūpāt pariṇāmād bhavatīti phalabalāt kalpyate, puruṣasyapariṇāmitvena saṁyoge tannimittakaviśeṣāsambhavāditi.*' Ibid.
27. '*śarīrādināṁ hi yaḥ sukhādyātmkatvaṁ dharmaḥ, sa sukhādibhoktari na sambhavati svayaṁ sukhādigrahaṇe karmakartṛvirodhāt. dharmipuraskāreṇaiva sukhādyanubhavāditi.*' *SPB* under *SS* 1.141 (p. 132). The same thing is asserted in Bhikṣu's comment on *SS* 1.143; see note 26. Also see *SPB* under (the following) *SS* 1.144 (p. 133). All these emphases echo, wittingly or unwittingly, the point made by Vācaspati in his *TK* under *SK* 17 regarding '*svātmani vṛttivirodha*', referred to in the first part.
28. '*yadi hi śarīrādisvarūpa eva bhoktā syāt tadā bhoktṛtvameva vyāhanyeta, karmakartṛvirodhāt.*' *SPB* under *SS* 1.143 (p. 133).
29. '*yataḥ sarvaṁ saṁhataṁ prakṛtyādikam parārthaṁ bhavati śayyādivat. ato'saṁhataḥ saṁhatadehādibhyaḥ paraḥ purusaḥ siddhyati.*' *SPB* under *SS* 1.140 (p. 131).
30. '*tathā ca kūṭastha eva puruṣo vyuttāna iva tadānīmapi prakāśasvarūpa eva tiṣṭhati.*' *YV* under *YS* 1.3 (p. 18).
31. And the condition of *puruṣa* in *vyutthāna* (activity of the intellect) is described by Bhikṣu thus: *vyutthāne cittena saha draṣṭur vṛttau sarūpyamityarthaḥ, vyutthāne hi bimbapratibimbarupayor buddhipurusavṛttyoḥ sārūpyam.*' *YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 20). Though '*sārūpya*' generally stands for similarity, here it means identification. Cf. Vācaspati's *TV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 19): '*sārūpyamityatra sa-śabdaḥ ekaparyāyaḥ*'.
32. '*yadyapi puruṣascinmātro 'vikārī tathā'pi buddher viṣayākāravṛttīnāṁ puruṣe yāni pratibimbāni tānyeva puruṣasya vṛttayaḥ, na ca tābhir avastubhūtābhiḥ pariṇāmitvaṁ, sphaṭikasyevātattvato 'nyathābhāvāditi.*' *YV* under *YS* 1.4 (p. 20).
33. '*ayameva vā bhogaścetane pratibimbati, tasyāvikāritvāt, sa eva puruṣasya bhogaḥ sukhaduḥkhasākśātkārarūpo bhavati. na tu sukhaduḥkhasākṣātkārarūpo gauṇabhogo'pi buddheḥ sambhavati tasya acetanatvāt puruṣakalpanāvaiyarthyāpatteśceti.*' And then Bhikṣu quotes the Sāṁkhya argument: '*ata eva sāṁkhyāḥ 'puruṣo'sti bhoktṛbhāvād'ityāhuḥ.*' *VAB* (under *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2), p. 35.
34. '*viśeṣastvayam—apariṇāmitvāt puruṣasya viṣayabhogaḥ pratibimbādānamātram.*' *SPB* under *SS* 1.104 (p. 102).
35. *SBP*, p. 133.
36. See *YV* under *YS* 2.20. See details there.
37. '*saṁvedinyā buddheḥ pratisaṁvedī puruṣaḥ, saṁvedanam arthākāravṛttiḥ, tasyāḥ pratisaṁvedanaṁ pratidhvanivat pratibimbaṁ yatra sa puruṣa ityarthaḥ. buddheḥ sākṣīti tu paryavasito' rthaḥ, etena pratibimbarūpāyā āropitakriyāyā kalpitaṁ darśanakartṛtvaṁ draṣṭṛtvamityapi sūcitam.*' *YV* under *YS* 2.20 (p. 214).
38. Some further statements of Bhikṣu need to be quoted here: '*asya ca saṁyogasya puruṣārtho hetur iti vaktuṁ sakalapuruṣārthavattvarūpaṁ svatvaṁ buddhau puruṣasya pratipadāyati—tadetaditi.*' *YV* under *YS* 2.17 (p. 189). Bhikṣu goes on to point out (ibid., p. 191) that the intellect, though otherwise independent of the self, becomes dependent upon it due to its pursuing its (self's) goal: *svatantraṁ puruṣānāśritamapi parārthatvāt paratantraṁ parasya svāmityarthaḥ.*'
39. '*ahaṁ sukhī, duḥkhī, mūḍha ityādipratyayastu na puruṣe sukhādisādhakaḥ, tatsvāmittvenāpyupatteḥ*' (p. 132).
40. Cf. *SPB* under *SS* 1.146 (p. 135).

Selected References with Abbreviations

1. Aniruddha, *Vṛtti* on *Sāṁkhyasūtras* in *Sāṁkhyadarśana* of Kapila, as published with Vedāntī Mahādeva's *Vṛttisāra*, Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* and Nāgeśabhatta's *Bhāṣyasāra*, by Janardana Shastri Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.
2. Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, ed. K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye. Pune: University of Poona, 1965.
3. *B.S.S.B.: Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.
4. Gauḍapāda, Commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, trans. into English with Notes by T.G. Mainkar, 2nd rev. and enlar. ed. Pune: Oriental Book Agency, 1972.
5. *SK: Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as published with Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī*, under the title *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, trans. into Hindi with a Hindi commentary *Jyotiṣmatī* by Ram Shankar Bhattacharyya, 2nd enlar. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976.
6. *SPB: Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu in Janardana Shastri Pandeya. (See Ref. 1.)
7. *SS: Sāṁkhyasūtras* of Kapila in Janardana Shastri Pandeya. (See Ref. 1.)
8. *SYD: Sāṁkhyayogadarśana*, ed. Goswami Damodara Sastri. (See Ref. 13.)
9. *TK: Tattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, in Ram Shankar Bhattacharyya. (See Ref. 5.)
10. *TV: Tattvavaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra in *SYD*. (See Ref. 13.)
11. *VAB: Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya* (on Bādarāyana's *Brahmasūtras*) of Vijñānabhikṣu, ed. Kedar Nath Tripathi. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1979.

12. *YD: Yuktidīpikā*, an ancient commentary on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, ed. R.C. Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.
13. *YS*: *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali, as published with Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya*, and the commentaries *Tattvavaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Pātañjalarahasya* of Rāghavānanda Sarasvati, *Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu and *Bhāsvatī* of Hariharānandāranya, ed. under the title *Sāṁkhyayogadarśana*, by Goswami Damodara Sastri. Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, reprint, 1990.
14. *YV: Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu in *SYD*.
15. *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, Part I, ed. Vasudeva Laxmana Sharma Pansikar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

The Dogma of Determinism

If a man knows English and no other language, he has no option but to speak English if he wants to speak. Had he learnt some language other than English, he could have spoken that language if he would have wanted to speak. To the extent that it was possible on his part to learn that language, at least to that extent it is not necessary that he speaks English. He actually speaks English, but it is not necessary that he speaks English. The reason why it is not necessary that he speaks English is quite simple. That the man speaks English is a fact and no statement of fact is necessarily true. That either he speaks English or he does not speak English is a necessary truth, but it is not a statement of fact. As it is not necessarily true that the man speaks English, it is false that P (P = If a man speaks English then it is necessary that he speaks English) when the man speaks English and falsity of P is less harmful than its truth. The former leaves room for the sceptic; the latter stops our growth of knowledge. Granted that no necessary truth follows from a factual truth, P is false. However, if scepticism is possible on every truth that does not amount to a necessary truth, the ground for making P false is also the ground to make scepticism alive forever on every factual truth. On the other hand, if P is true and the said ground is invalid, then, there is no scope of scepticism on factual truth. Such a win over scepticism defeats our growth of knowledge. A necessary truth can follow from a fictitious truth if it can from a factual truth.

One may argue for the truth of P like this. There is no world other than the actual world. Whatever is true in this world is true in every possible world since 'every possible world' ultimately refers back to this actual world. What is true in every possible world is a necessary truth. Hence, if it is fact in this world that the man speaks English then, it is necessarily true that the man speaks English. In other words, 'Actually he speaks English' and 'Necessarily he speaks English' are two different sentences expressing the same proposition. He necessarily speaks English means nothing but that he actually speaks English

because both of the sentences belong to a system that approves of the actual world as the only world. This defence for the truth of P can be outrightly rejected on the ground that this world is not the only world possible. If there is no other world possible, then not only can P become true, even Q can become true, when one dreams of a cat speaking English and

> Q = If a cat speaks English then it is necessary that the cat speaks English.

If it is viable to accept that this actual world is the only world, why can't it be viable that the dream world is the only world? If the dream world is the only world, whatever is true in the dream turns out to be necessarily true. 'It is necessary that the cat speaks English' and 'It is true in the dream that the cat speaks English' are two different sentences expressing the same proposition. As we cannot accept that Q is true, so also, we cannot accept that P is true.[1]

P is an instance of a general principle that whatever actually takes place, necessarily it takes place. We may call it the thesis of a Logical Determinism and abbreviate it as

> T1: Given any x, if x is a fact or event in this world, it is logically necessary that x.

Corresponding to Q, we can have another general principle and call it an alternative version of Logical Determinism. Abbreviate it as:

> T2: Given any x, if x is a fact or event in a dream, it is logically necessary that x.

Neither T1 is true not T2 is true. The difference between T1 and T2 is that the former presupposes that this actual world is the only world possible whereas the latter presupposes that a particular dream world is the only world possible. The former is a Logical Determinism based on this physical world and the latter is a Logical Determinism based on a dream world.

Physical Determinism can be distinguished from Logical Determinism. Physical Determinism also requires the fact of event to be necessary but involves a physical mode of necessity. Changing the mode of necessity from logical to physical, we can have a thesis parallel to T1 as:

> T3: Given any x, if x is a fact or event in this world, it is physically necessary that x.

The difference between T1 and T3 is the difference between the two senses of 'necessity', namely, the logical and the physical.[2] The physical necessity depends on physical laws as much as the logical necessity depends on logical principles. Nothing is logically necessary if ~p follows from p by some logical principle.[3] Similarly, if by a physical law, we can have facts and events without any cause, then, nothing becomes physically necessary. Anything made out to be physically necessary can be made out to be not so. For example, if it is physically necessary on his part to speak English, then, it is not physically necessary on his part to speak English. It can be conceived that it is not the case that he speaks English. That the man is not speaking English can be conceivably brought about. It does not require a cause and, thereby, it can be there out of nothing, devoid of all possible determinations. If it is physically necessary that p, then, insofar as ~p can be conceivably brought about as it requires no cause, it is not physically necessary that p.

Physical determinism claims that it was impossible to bring about not-x at a moment t, if it is x at t. The physical laws determine x to be there at t. Let us call the whole set of physical laws L. If the man speaks English, then, in accordance with this claim, the man could not have spoken Hindi even if he knows Hindi. It is possible to think of the man speaking Hindi but it is not possible to think that L is true and, at the same time, the man is speaking Hindi. If L is true, then, even if he knows Hindi, he has no option but to speak English if he speaks English. It is not in his power to alter the physical laws and the physical laws determine that he speaks English. A set of propositions which represent the relevant states of affairs prior to his speaking English and L entail that the man speaks English. This is in accordance to a general principle. Abbreviate it as:

> T4: Given any statement S, if S represents a fact or event of this world, we can have a set of propositions M representing facts and events prior to what S represents such that M&L entails S.[4]

T4 is either untenable or uninteresting. It is not an interesting claim if it ultimately means that all physical facts and events are physical. If no known set of physical laws along with the relevant propositions entails that the man is speaking English, then also it is determined that he speaks English. The known laws may fail to determine but, insofar as it is a physical event that he speaks English and, thereby, it is determined by physical, laws, some of the yet-to-be-known-laws which may even conflict with the existing known laws, determine that he speaks English. In this understanding of physical determination, the claim is not that S can be determined by the known physical laws but by the physical laws which may or may not be known at present. It is not interesting because the sense of 'determinacy' is reduced to 'determination in principle' on the ground that 'All physical events and facts are physical' is analytically true. If any event fails to be entailed by any statement of fact plus the physical laws, then it may fail in actuality, not in principle.

The mistaken presupposition of such a move is that physical laws are no less true than logical truths. A logical truth never becomes false, so also, a physical law never becomes false. If it is proved to be false then it is no more a physical law. In accordance to this understanding, only those physical laws are physical laws, which are immune to revision. Otherwise, if we understand determinism without considering the physical law par with the logical truth, determinism fails. This is for the simple reason that the laws are revisable, hence, what they determine is revisable too. Any answer to 56 + 57 cannot become the correct determination of the answer. Nor does the correct answer by a wrong procedure amount to the correct determination of the answer. So also, if by a revisable procedure we make out a result, we cannot say that we have correctly determined the result.

Notes and References

1. Any sentence that expresses the proposition P is false, for example, the sentence 'If he speaks English then he has to speak English' may be used ambiguously and mean that P. Secondly, one may argue (Malcolm in his 'Dreaming and Skepticism', *The Philosophical Review*, 1956, Vol. LXV, pp. 14–37, argues against Descartes' Dream Argument, whatever we perceive in waking state is doubtable because, whatever we perceive in the dream is doubtable and there is no mark by which we can distinguish the state of waking from sleep) that there is no question of truth or falsity of what we dream of. What we dream of claiming, describing, asserting or reporting are not our assertions but dreaming of some assertions. We do not assert something in a dream because dreams can take place in 'sound sleep' and ones making an assertion is enough to prove that he not in sound sleep. However, this would lead to say that nothing is necessarily true and truth is confined to factual truth. Such a claim would be unacceptable. That either the cat speaks English or the cat does not speak English is necessarily true. It is true in the dream, in the imagination as well as in this world of facts. Insofar as 'necessarily true' conveys some sense over and above the sense conveyed by 'factual truth', Q can be true if P can be true. Neither P is true nor Q is true.
2. 'If he speaks English then he had to speak English' is ambiguous in the sense that 'he had to speak English' can be understood in two ways. It can be understood as that it is logically necessary that he speaks English, it can also be understood as that it is physically necessary that he speaks English.
3. Because anything made out to be logically necessary can be proved to be not so on the ground that its negation is logically necessary, insofar as its negation can be logically derived from it. If it is necessarily true that p, since ~p follows from it by the contrived logical principle, it is necessarily true that ~p. Since ~p is true, it is not necessarily true that p. A parallel argument follows in the text with respect to physical necessity.
4. Strictly speaking, M need not stand for a set of relevant propositions. When the claim is that M&L entails S, M may stand for any proposition representing a state or event prior to that represented by S. If the thesis of determinism is true, then, from any point we can determine any other point.

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A Spoor of Spooks[1]

The title of this paper is lifted from a book with the same title published some fifty years ago. The author claims to track down a number of ghosts or spooks, that is, popular fallacies, myths and superstitions. Philosophy also has its spooks, old and new, and mine is an attempt to track some of them down. This attempt has been occasioned by a talk

given recently at the Department of Philosophy, the University of Mumbai, by a visiting professor from Germany. He sought to promote a new kind of philosophy which he called Intercultural Philosophy, which may be spelled out in the four following theses:

A. A philosophy springs from a certain culture and differs from culture to culture. Therefore, unless you immerse yourself in that culture and get the right 'feel', you cannot understand or appreciate that philosophy.
B. Philosophy is a combination of rational argument as well as preference and prejudice.
C. Each philosophy and philosopher must be approached with an open and unprejudiced mind and all philosophies and philosophers must be given an equal hearing.
D. All philosophies are equally good or true and, therefore, according to ones preference (or prejudice), one may accept any or all of them.

I shall try to show that the concept of 'intercultural philosophy' is an extremely tangled bundle of half-truths and confusions. I shall try my best to disentangle the threads and examine them.

I have straightaway to point out that Intercultural Philosophy is not itself a philosophy at all. It (whatever it is) bases itself on the two dubious and dogmatically asserted theses A and C above. It is only an exhortation and gives you apparently sound advice about how to do philosophy, namely, you must immerse yourself in the culture from which a philosophy springs and give all philosophies and philosophers an equal hearing. Having said that, it has reached a dead end. It has no problems or theories of its own. The visiting professor in fact admitted that Intercultural Philosophy is really just an 'attitude'. Indeed, calling a philosophy an attitude is a long-standing dodge in the face of awkward questions.

I shall now examine the four theses which make up the concept of 'intercultural philosophy'.

Thesis A. It is made up of two propositions: 'a philosophy springs from a certain culture' and 'unless you immerse yourself in that culture, you cannot understand or appreciate that philosophy'. The first proposition may be readily granted. A philosophy is bound to be determined by

some of the characteristics of the culture from which it springs and within which it flourishes. For example, since individual freedom is greatly prized in Western culture, the problems of free will and political freedom have always been conspicuous in Western philosophy, whereas the Indian philosophers, working in a predominantly religious culture, have not been too exercised over these problems but have been more concerned about *mokṣa* and *karma*. So also, the peculiar German culture, based on its heroic legends, produced the philosophy of the superman, embodied (so I believe) in the opaque writings of Nietzsche and expressed through Hitler's fascist philosophy.

It may be interesting to trace the relationship between cultures and philosophies and to discern similarities, differences, influences and borrowings; but this would be the sociology of philosophy, not philosophy. Such a survey cannot affect the philosophical content of the philosophies, that is, the problems that are tackled, the relevance and cogency of the arguments used, and the manner in which the issues are developed. An acquaintance with the cultural background may, occasionally, help in unravelling some obscure or weird position. But once one has immersed oneself sufficiently for the purpose and got the right 'feel' and once one has isolated the issue from its non-philosophical setting and grasped its philosophical significance, it has to be considered on merits and assessed by using methods common to all philosophical investigations. For example, after understanding the background against which the *Republic* was written or against which the fascist philosophy was developed, one has to pull oneself out of the respective backgrounds and consider whether malformed children or a particular race ought to be eliminated. Or would you say it was all right under the circumstances?

Thesis B. Philosophy is a combination of rational argument, preference and prejudice. Here we have, not a half-truth, but a logical confusion. If this thesis is meant to be a statement of fact, then, of course and sadly, it is largely true. As true as it is to say that all judges are to some extent biased. It is an expression of human weakness, a human predicament. Philosophers are also human.

The thesis can also be taken to mean that one may get interested in a certain philosophy because of ones personal preferences and,

perhaps, prejudices. This is also true, but, for our discussion, harmless. I may, due to my upbringing and education, prefer to study the *Republic* to studying the *Gita*; nevertheless I may disapprove of the teaching of the *Republic* and embrace the ideas in the *Gita*. If Thesis B means to suggest that one *should*, in studying a philosophy, succumb to ones preferences and prejudices, or that one cannot help doing so, instead of pinpointing them and trying to overcome them because they obstruct fair assessment, then there is a confusion between the 'is' and 'ought' of doing philosophy (a distinction which philosophers should be aware of).

Admittedly, it is extremely difficult to suppress our biases and prejudices, but it can be done, or education becomes simply indoctrination. Legal training, for example, is geared partly to achieve the capacity of unbiased and critical thinking. We do not cheerfully accept 'committed judges'. We should not accept committed philosophers either or, rather, philosophers who are not committed to impartial and critical thinking. Even if we can't conquer our prejudices completely, that is no reason for not trying to do it at all. Thesis B is an expression of an easy defeatism. It sends out wrong signals, especially to those who have just set out on the quest.

Thesis C. Each philosophy or philosopher must be approached with an open and unprejudiced mind and all philosophies and philosophers must be given an equal hearing. But this is impossible if we accept Thesis B, which told us that preference and prejudice together play a major role in philosophy. Against them, rationality has little chance.

That apart, to say that all philosophies deserve an equal hearing is again a half-truth. Firstly, if a philosophy deals with trifling, ephemeral or insignificant matters, there is no reason why it must be given an equal hearing along with those which discuss important, more permanent and fundamental problems. (I anticipate the retort 'Who is to decide what is fundamental etc.?' I shall answer that later.) Secondly, after having given the equal hearing, what next? Has equal weightage also to be given? Indeed, this cannot be done, since some of these philosophies would conflict with others. That all views should be heard is a (relatively true) democratic principle; that all views are equally worthy of being taken seriously is carrying democracy too far.

Thesis D. All philosophies are equally good or true and so one may accept any or all of them. This is somehow supposed to follow from Theses A, B and C. What it comes to is that philosophies cannot be intellectually graded. In support of this thesis, the visiting professor cited two cases.

Case 1. Hegel and Max Mueller regarded Indian and Chinese philosophies to be immature and inferior to Western philosophy, particularly the German variety. So you see? But what do we see? Granting the stupidity and arrogance of these two worthies, does it prove that grading is inherently impossible or meaningless? It was, let us say, simply a case of faulty grading and, further, it was so precisely because they allowed their Western prejudice to cloud their rational faculty. If, however, we accept preference and prejudice as necessary or inevitable ingredients of philosophy (as Thesis B says), where were Hegel and Max Mueller remiss? And why are we not, as good intercultural philosophers, prepared to tolerate their views?

Case 2. Descartes claimed that he was certain of his own self, but Hume could not find his. So doesn't that show there is no one truth in philosophy? Hardly. They were neither asking the same question nor using the same method nor contradicting each other. Descartes asked if anything was certain, while Hume asked if the self could be found; Descartes used the rational method, while Hume used introspection; Descartes concluded that doubting was impossible without a doubter, while Hume failed to find his self by introspection. When you compare two philosophers, you must make sure about what exactly you are comparing. And suppose Descartes and Hume did really contradict one another? What then? Does it follow that both were equally right or equally wrong or that all philosophies are equally true?

Intercultural Philosophy gives us nuggets of wisdom. One of them is 'Truth is nobody's private possession.' Another version of this remark is 'Why do you think you alone are right?' Such expressions, believed to be lethal, really fall in the category of red herring. Truth is not like a piece of land waiting to be discovered and taken possession of. When a person propounds, for the first time, a truth, it can, in a sense, be said to be *his* truth. Einstein's theory is Einstein's theory. Once it is generally accepted, it becomes everybody's theory, but it can

still be referred to as his. Do we not speak of the *Vedanta* theory of *karma*? As for the challenge, 'Why do you think you alone are right?', it could equally well be returned, with compliments, by the other party. If a man seriously makes a statement, he naturally believes and claims it to be true, otherwise why would he make it? He doesn't think he alone is right; what he thinks is that, at this moment, he thinks he is right, and, if he is a reasonable man, he thinks he has some good reasons for thinking he is right. He is being neither dogmatic nor presumptuous. He would be if he were to add that he never can be wrong and is not willing to admit his error even if it is shown to him. All that the above two red herrings, when properly understood, are trying (rather clumsily) to show is that no philosophy or philosopher can claim truth as a matter of right, irrespective of argument or evidence.

Another apparently knock-down argument against the possibility of grading philosophies takes the form of another challenge: what is your criterion for grading? There are many criteria, but, first, let us make sure that we know what exactly we are talking about, for philosophy can mean many things to many people. When Plato, Kant, Gandhi, Aquinas, Jaspers, Aurobindo, Shankara, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, J. Krishnamurty and Ramesh Balsekar are all called philosophers, there is bound to be a lot of talking at cross purposes. (At least Gandhi disclaimed the title of philosopher.) Do all these assorted persons have anything in common? I think they have. All of them show concern about certain fundamental problems and they are all very keen to convince others about what they hold to be true. They can, however, be divided into two groups—those who hold that their method of inquiry is essentially and exclusively the rational one of argument and counter-argument and those who hold that this method has grave limitations and must be supplemented by other more satisfying and reliable avenues of reaching philosophical truth. Nevertheless, persons belonging to both the groups are called philosophers because (1) for all of them the rational component is the minimum requirement for being so called, and (2) all of them are anxious to convince their opponents of their own position by an appeal to at least some sort of rational argument. We do not refer to Moses, Jesus or Zarathustra as philosophers. Hence, I suggest that it is this rational component that makes philosophy an

academic discipline and it is on this minimal common factor that we have to concentrate if we want to see the relationships between different philosophies.

Returning to our earlier question, I think there are several criteria for grading philosophies.

If we are considering entire philosophies (say, Indian philosophy or British philosophy) or the philosophies of different particular philosophers, I would give the following as important criteria:

1. the richness of the philosophy, that is, the extent and scope of its investigations, the number of fundamental problems discussed and the seriousness with which they are pursued;
2. the number of propositions, theses or theories treated strictly by the method of intellectual argument without appeal to extra-intellectual considerations;
3. the quality of the arguments used.

So how do we assess arguments? Ready-made recipes would be inappropriate, but I suggest the following criteria. An argument

1. must be relevant to the problem in hand;
2. must be *prima facie* plausible and internally consistent;
3. must have a structure and cogency that is geared to convince the other party, must avoid red herrings and must be as neat, economical and straightforward as possible.

If an argument does not stand up to at least the first two demands, it should be dismissed forthwith. I am not underestimating the difficulty of applying these criteria, especially the third one. In many cases we might not be able to decide between rival contestants. But from none of this does it follow that we must throw up our hands in despair. Very often we *are* able—if we are not being obtuse and tendentious—to decide between good and bad arguments.

The sceptical and negative attitude towards philosophical grading, though superficially attractive, is unwarranted. Are we, for example, seriously going to maintain that the moral philosophy (if it may be so called) of Diogenes is on a par with that of Aristotle, that J.S. Mill's proof of Hedonism is a sound one, or that the epistemology of the Australian aborigines (if they have one) is as worth taking seriously as that of *The Critique of Pure Reason*? An affirmative answer to these questions would only be an affectation.

So much—and quite enough—for Intercultural Philosophy, which declares that all philosophies are equally true (or false). A new, but not very new, spook has appeared on the philosophical scene. It says that philosophical truth is itself a spook. I call this the Black Cat Syndrome—the view that a philosopher is like a blind man looking for a black cat called Truth etc. This is to be distinguished from the Logical Positivist thesis that metaphysical statements, being unverifiable in sense experience, are meaningless nonsense. The Black Cat Syndrome does *not* say that philosophical statements are meaningless; they are perfectly meaningful; their peculiarity is that any two of them may contradict one another and both be true or any number of them may be each other's contraries and yet all of them may be true. A variant of this thesis is that philosophical statements do not claim truth at all. In support of this also the Descartes-Hume example has been used. This example is as irrelevant here as I had shown it to be earlier and I need not repeat my analysis. However, in further elucidation of this new thesis, it is said that philosophical statements are neither like scientific or common-sense statements, whose truth-claims can be settled by empirical tests, nor are they like statements regarding tastes (like A saying 'I like beer' and B saying 'I detest it'), where the question of contradiction simply does not arise. (Neither of these two contentions is as simple as it is made out to be, but let it pass.) Philosophical statements, we are told, *can* contradict each other and yet we can accept them both without feeling any intellectual discomfort. Take 'The soul is immortal'; and 'The soul is mortal'; each is true from its own point of view; from one point of view it is mortal because, on death, it merges with the Absolute and so loses its identity, but from another point of view it is immortal because it merges and never dies. With this some revolutionary and crucial discovery is claimed to have been made, namely, that philosophical statements can defy the laws of common or garden logic with impunity and without being any the worse for it. But the appearance of a great discovery here is an illusion. Any elementary text-book on logic will tell you that it is only when contradictory or contrary terms are asserted of the *same* subject at the *same* time in the *same* sense that the propositions making these assertations cannot both or all be true. Once you introduce points of view, the contradiction

vanishes and the game is up. No logical law is violated and the logical miracle is seen to be a fraud. Just as the soul can be mortal and immortal from different points of view, so can so mundane an object as this table be solid and stable (from the common-sense point of view) and also a continuously changing whirl of particles (from the micro-physicist's point of view). It can also be to the left of the door from my point of view and to the right of the door from yours.

Lastly, I take up another argument for demolishing the idea of truth in philosophy. This is the old chestnut, 'Who is to decide what is true or what is a good argument?' The Descartes-Hume combine reappears; Descartes said one thing and Hume said another! and so another red herring also makes its appearance.

The first thing to notice is that this creature can be drawn across *all* truth-claims—scientific, philosophical or any other. Who is to decide that the Law of Gravitation is true? The expected retort is: 'Ah, but this law is the result of scientific observation'. But then who is to decide that the observations were properly made and the result correctly reached? Who is to decide whether Shakespeare was a great dramatist? Bernard Shaw disputed it. Who is to decide if kindness is better than cruelty? Once you start on this slope, there is no stopping. Who is to decide if the principles of logic are reliable? Who is to decide if 'who is to decide ...?' is a good question? Whatever answer one gives to your 'who is to decide?' question, you will ask who is to decide if that answer is the correct one. We have an infinite regress, but who is to decide whether that is a good thing or a bad thing?

Let me try to explain the correct position. The word 'decide' is quite inappropriate here. Nobody *decides* if a statement is true or false or if an argument is a good one or not. This is to adopt a legalistic stance, as if there must be some duly appointed authority empowered to make a ruling which cannot be challenged, an authority like a judge or chairman or a head of an institution. But even these persons, even dictators, seek to give reasons for their decisions, and then who decides if they are good or bad reasons? In an argument, it is just those who engage in it who have the responsibility of mutually considering the validity of the arguments they use. The party that is trying to establish a thesis has to use the method and standard paraphernalia of rational argument—

facts, evidence, premises, inferences, etc. If the other party does not accept any of this, the burden is on him (if he wishes to continue the discussion) to raise specific objections (not the 'who is to decide?' type of objections) and expose errors and fallacies. The first party may then challenge these objections in the same way. This is how a discussion would ideally proceed by argument and counter-argument. Discussions don't proceed ideally, not because there is any fault in reasoning as such, but because time, energy and argumentative capacity are limited. Tempers also tend, in different degrees, to run out, and then an exasperated party flings at the other party one of the red herrings. If, however, both parties are serious and sincere about reaching the truth, there is no reason for thinking that a conclusion cannot be reached which is satisfactory to both parties. One party may be able to convert (that is, intellectually of course) the other party to his position or both parties may find it necessary to modify their original positions or they may abandon the search and agree to continue it another time. They may call it off with 'Oh, a difference of opinion', but that is only a provisional and temporary measure.

So what does all this come to? One thing it doesn't come to is that discussion or argument are futile. If people dispute, then, in principle, they must believe that the dispute must reach the truth regarding whatever they are disputing about. Otherwise arguing would be pointless, merely a game. Even in most games winning is the aim. As a matter of fact many arguments do terminate satisfactorily. If you maintain that all this does not apply to philosophy, you would have to produce a much stronger case than to appeal to some of the red herrings I have considered or to some of the spooks hiding in the concept of 'intercultural philosophy'. Why philosophical arguments are often not satisfactorily concluded and disputants keep doggedly sticking to their positions, is because of the peculiar nature of the subject and particularly the fact that philosophical arguments cannot be refuted or supported in a straightforward way, as scientific and common-sense arguments can, by citing factual evidence. You cannot, for example, refute idealism by kicking a stone, as Dr Johnson claimed to have done, or by holding up your two hands, as Moore tried to do. In legal disputes it sometimes takes months to clearly frame the issues; in philosophy it could take even much longer to be quite sure as to where the point of disagreement lies. Hence the greater scope for introducing spooks and red herrings. But none of this proves that philosophical disputants are never able to satisfy each other. Even self-conversion is not unknown. Plato, Russell and Wittgenstein are obvious examples of philosophers who repudiated their own earlier views.

I close with a significant passage from Plato's *Gorgias*. Socrates holds that the wicked cannot be happy and Polus claims to refute him by pointing out that the majority of Athenians would not accept the Socratic thesis. Socrates answers:

> Not so, my simple friend, because you will refute me in the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party thinks that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses ... . [T]hey will all agree with you; I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me, although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours. (472)

NOTE

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Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra on the Definition of *Pramā*: Some Reflections

I

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has defined the valid cognition (*pramā*) in two ways—one including memory-cognition

under the purview of valid cognition and another excluding the same. In this paper an effort will be made to show some paradoxes in the latter definition of valid cognition, which runs as follows: valid cognition is a kind of cognition having some object as its content, which is uncontradicted and unacquired (*pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ*).[1] The terms '*anadhigata*' (unacquired) and '*avādhita*' (uncontradicted), which are accepted as adjuncts to the object, which has become the content of cognition (*arthaviṣayakajñāna*).

II

The term '*anadhigata*' means 'unacquired' or 'novel'. Actually the term has been incorporated in order to exclude memory-cognition from the purview of the valid cognition, which is indicated by the term *smṛtivyāvṛtta*.[2] Though Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra does not pass any judgement of his own regarding the tenability of the memory as a valid cognition, it is assumed that he is in favour of not accepting memory as a valid cognition. This assumption is grounded on the fact that he has formulated the above-mentioned definition and substantiated it through some arguments. The term '*anadhigata*' means 'that which is not acquired earlier'. That which is not acquired earlier is called 'novel'. It must apprehend something new, which was not known before. Recollective cognition is the memory of an object, which was perceived earlier. It does not add anything new to our knowledge. It is simply a reproduction of the previous perception. So it should not be regarded as strictly valid cognition. To them the object which is new, comes under the purview of the valid cognition. In other words, novelty is a characteristic feature of truth. From this the memory-cognition is excluded from the purview of valid cognition, no doubt, but it also excludes the recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Memory-cognition is generated through our earlier impression alone (*samskāramātrajanya*) while recognitive cognition is caused by the impression of the past experience associated with the presence of the object (*samskārajanya* but not *samskāramātrajanya*). If it is said that the object of cognition is *anadhigata*, i.e., not known earlier, it excludes both memory and recognitive cognition, because recognitive cognition is not *anadhigata* but acquired earlier. Memory-cognition is accepted as invalid, as the

content is not verifiable due to the absence of it. Due to its non-verifiability there is every chance of committing a mistake or acquiring a mistaken cognition. Hence there is no guarantee that such cognition (*smṛti*) would be veridical. But so far as recognitive cognition (*pratybhijñā*) is concerned, it is not at all invalid, because it can help us to lead our day-to-day behaviour. As the term *anadhigata* is incorporated in the definition, it cannot justify the recognitive cognition as valid cognition, as it is already acquired (*adhigata*) and hence not new.

Keeping the earlier objection in view Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra perhaps has tried to justify the *lokavyavahāra*, i.e. day-to-day behaviour in the light of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*), which does not solve the real problem. To him the cognition of an object known for a considerable period of time is called persistent cognition of the same. When we keep looking at a table, for example, it is not the same object seen for a period of time but it is different in different moments. The table seen in the first moment is completely different from that seen in the second moment. In the same way, the table in the second moment is different from that occurring in the third. To him it is the temporal factor which differentiates one from the other. Hence, an object existing in each and every moment is completely new (*anadhigata*), but not repeated what is already acquired (*adhigata*).[3] As the continuous cognition is not the repetition of the same object due to the acceptance of their change in every moment, it provides a continuous flow of an object changing in every moment. As such cognition is completely new, it is valid on account of the fact that it comes under the said definition.

This justification cannot really solve the earlier problem of recognition cognition. If each and every object is different from each other from the standpoint of temporality and it is new as per the given justification, how is an object seen earlier recognized as identical in other occasion in different time and space? It is accepted that each and every object is new or unacquired, it will lead to the non-acceptance of recognition or recognitive cognition, which is already accepted as valid cognition in the Advaita Vedānta by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra himself. In other words, this definition does not cover such recognitive cognition and hence there arises the defect of *avyāapti* here. If it is accepted

that, though an object is different in a different moment, and hence new, there are some similarities between two pieces of cognition, which make the recognition possible. These two pieces of cognition cannot be taken as completely new or novel due to having some old characters in it for which recognition is possible. When a jar is recognized as such in the light of the old one, it may be said that the new is completely different from the old one as this occupies different time in comparison to the old one, which also occupied a different time. How is the recognition possible if some similarities are not found in them? When a particular sword used by Tipu Sultan, as for example, is seen by an individual in the museum and appercepted as 'This is that sword used by Tipu Sultan', how is the old sword used by Tipu Sultan recognized as such if these are completely different? The sword used by Tipu Sultan and seen by me belongs to different space and time and hence they should be called as new or novel (*anadhigata*). But if it is so, how is the recognition of the sword used by Tipu Sultan possible? It is a fact that the recognition is possible and this recognition presupposes some sort of identity between them. If identity is there or if some identical features are there, these are not completely different or new though they belong to different time-span. Rather it would have been more accurate if it is taken as acquired or *adhigata* instead of *anadhigata*. If the acquiredness of such cognition of sword used by Tipu Sultan were not accepted, its recognition would not be possible at all. Hence, the term *anadhigata* as an adjunct to the object cannot justify all types of valid cognitions.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has already described such type of recognitive cognition as indeterminate perceptual cognition (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*). It is paradoxical to the Advaitins that they have accepted unacquired or new cognition as a mark of an object of the valid cognition (*pramā*) on the one hand and *nirvikalpaka*—perceptual cognition on the other. The acceptance of one is contradictory to another. The Advaitins have given two examples of such cognition—one from the secular world and another from the Vedic text.[4] 'This is that Devadatta' (*so'yaṁ devadattaḥ*) is from the secular world, which points to the recognitive cognition, as the present Devadatta is identified with the past Devadatta. In other words, there is an identity

between the consciousness limited by Devadatta and the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of Devadatta, as our inner organ called *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out of the body and assumes the form of Devadatta as per the methodology of perceptual cognition.[5] Though the present Devadatta and past Devadatta are different in terms of time and though they are not completely identical yet there is an essential identity (*svarūpagatatādātmya*) between them, which entails that they are not completely unacquired (*anadhigata*). The example cited from the Upanisadic text bears the same import. The *Mahāvākya*, '*Tattvamasi*' (Thou art That) signifies the essential identity between two, 'Thou' (*tvaṁ*) and 'That' (*tat*), i.e., *Brahman* or *Ātman*. Both are taken to be different due to having the specific characters in them. The former has got an atomic (*aṇu*) power while the latter is endowed with all-pervasive power (*vibhu*). In spite of this, an identity between them is asserted from the standpoint of essence (*svarūpagata*). In this case there is the identification of the knower referred to by the term 'thou' and the object referred to by the term 'That'.[6] In this case also the phenomenon of *anadhigatatva* does not exist, leading to the falsity of the *nirvikalpaka*-cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka*-cognition is proved as falsified, it would lead to the falsity of the *Mahāvākya*, i.e., *tattvamasi* which is suicidal to the Advaitins. For, the understanding of the *Mahāvākyas* helps an individual to build a mental platform to realize the Ultimate Reality. The falsity of the *Mahāvākyas* leads to the falsity of the whole metaphysical presuppositions. Hence the term *anadhigata* creates confusion in the Advaita Vedānta system of Philosophy and it should be excluded from the definition. That a *Mahāvākya* is false is contradictory in nature. If it is true, it will lose its *Mahāvākyatva*.

Moreover, the sentence '*Tattvamasi*' (Thou art That) is taken as an example of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* (i.e., a *lakṣaṇā* which partly forsakes and accepts its primary meaning) according to some Advaitins. In this sentence the absolute identity between an individual being (*jīva*) and Brahman is rejected but the essential identity between them is accepted. By virtue of being a specific type of *lakṣaṇā* the sentence provides us a valid verbal or scriptural understanding (*śabda*) though the character of being *anadhigata* is not there.[7] What is the utility of

inserting the term *anadhigata* in the definition of *pramā*? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has made an effort to justify the fact of an object's unacquiredness by introducing the concept of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*).[8] To consider a piece of cognition as occupying a moment and changing in every moment is an attempt to justify the theory of momentariness as accepted by the Buddhists, though the Advaitins do not believe in the same set of ontological presuppositions. The Buddhists are consistent in propagating the theory of momentariness, as they believe in the theories of *svalakṣaṇa*, no-soul or permanent entities like *sāmānya* etc. For the Advaitins such a theory of momentariness is not at all supportable because the Advaitins believe in the existence of permanent Self but not in *svalakṣaṇa* etc. As the Advaitins have accepted a different set of presuppositions, the theory of momentariness does not find its entry in the Advaita framework. When the Advaitins formulate the theories of the perceptuality of cognition of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) and the perceptuality of object (*viṣayagatapratyakṣa*), they recommend the amalgamation of different limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the Consciousness like *viṣayacaitanya* (the Consciousness limited by object), *pramāṇacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by mental mode) etc.[9] How can an amalgamated situation be a momentary one? Even if it is accepted as momentary, how can it be known as perception of a jar or the perception of the cognition of a jar within a single moment? All these problems remains unresolved if the term '*anadhigata*' is not withdrawn from the definition.

The famous commentary *Sikhāmaṇi* has raised some of these problems. Through the incorporation of the term '*anadhigata*' Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra would like to suggest that memory-cognition is caused by the impression alone (*samskāramātrajanya*) and there does not arise any question of over coverage of the definition of *Pramā* to such cognition. As recognitive cognition is not caused by impression alone (*samskāramātra*), it is not excluded from the purview of *Pramā*. But this criterion is not clearly mentioned here. As there is an emphasis on the term *anadhigata* or novel, no old cognition would come under it. Hence recognitive cognition would not come under the purview of valid cognition, though Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has accepted its

validity as an indeterminate perceptual cognition. Those who believe in the instrumentality of a sign admit that in an inferential cognition *sādhya* is inferred through a sign, which is in the form of impression, and hence a sign seen earlier is recognized elsewhere with the help of impression. From this one can raise a question of the defect of *avyāpti* of the said definition of *pramā* to all the cases of inferential cognition (*anumitimātre*) and also to the case of recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, however, has tried to give an explanation of the term '*anadhigata*' in a different way, which also cannot solve the problems raised earlier. The term '*anadhigata*' means something invariably having an object, which is not the property of something existing in the immediate preceding moment. (*Anadhigatatvaṁ ca svavyavahitapūrvakṣaṇavṛttidharmaviṣayaviṣayakatvena niyatatvaṁ*).[10] Let us explain this with the help of an example following the line of *Maṇiprabhā*. Here the term '*sva*' stands for the cognition of a jar. The property existing in the immediately preceding moment is the cognition of cloth etc., the object of which is the cloth etc. The cognition in the form of a jar is endowed with the substratumness determined by the contentness of a jar, which is different from the cloth etc. (*'svamayaṁ ghata iti jñānaṁ tasmādavyavahitapūrvakṣaṇavṛttidharmaḥ paṭaḥ ityādijñānātmako dharmastasya viṣayaḥ paṭādistabhinnaghaṭaviṣayakatvanirūpitādhikaraṇatāvattvamayaṁ ghaṭa iti jñāne iti lakṣaṇasamanvayaḥ'*).[11] There is the cognition of X which is endowed with the substratumness determined by having the contentness of X which is completely different from Y etc. whose property is in the form of cognition of Y etc. remaining in the immediate preceding moment. In other words, an object is known as having substratumness determined by having the contentness of that particular object which is different from another cognition having an object occurring in the preceding moment. If there is the cognition of X endowed with the substratumness determined by having the contentness of X which is completely identical with the X occurring in the previously preceding moment, it would be taken as *adhigata* (acquired) as opposed to *anadhigata* (unacquired). Even if this interpretation of *anadhigatatva* is taken into account, memory-cognition as well as recognitive cognition can be excluded from the purview of *pramā*. As

in the case of recognition etc. the same object remains in the preceding moment or earlier than this, the phenomenon of recognition is not possible due to its absence of unacquiredness (*anadhigatatva*). The problems raised earlier remain unresolved even if the new interpretation of the term *anadhigata* is taken into account. If such definition is accepted for granted, the cognition in the form of Brahman being alone real, the cognition of a jar etc. becomes illusory and hence there arises the defect of *avyāpti*, which cannot be removed. So the term *anadhigata* inserted in the definition will be of no use, as all objects are taken as *vādhita* or contradicted from the standpoint of the cognition of Brahman. It may be argued that as valid memory-cognition leads us always to the successful inclination (*niyatasamvādipravṛtti*), it comes under the purview of *pramā* (valid cognition) and hence it, being a defiendum of a valid cognition, may lead to the uselessness of the term *anadhigata*. Considering this possibility, it is said that the term serves the purpose of either excluding acquired object (*itaravyāvṛtti*) or including the usages in which the property of being a valid cognition becomes the qualifier (*pramātvaprakārakavyavahāra*). That is, it is useful on account of the fact that it can exclude memory-cognition, which is *adhigata* in character from the purview of the valid cognition. Under such circumstances the validity of a cognition having the capability of inducing successful inclination (*saṁvādipravṛttyupayuktaprāmāṇyaṁ*) should not be determined as a separate criterion of valid cognition. In order to indicate this the adjunct *anadhigata* in the definition is justified. In other words, an object is known as such from the fact of its leading to the successful inclination of cognition through the light of the previous impression of the same object, which is certainly *adhigata* in character. The mention of the term *anadhigata* at least removes the possibility of excluding successful inclination as a criterion of valid cognition.[12] In this connection it may be said that if such a case is excluded with use of the term *anadhigata*, what is the utility of another term *avādhita* inserted in the definition?

In response to this, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has inserted the term *avādhita* as an adjunct of object, which entails that the cognition of an object existing in the phenomenal world, i.e. in the transmigratory state, must not be contradicted or sublated by the latter cognition in the

phenomenal, i.e. in the transmigratory state but not in the transcendental level. It implies factual consistency or agreement with the given facts, which have an empirical reality. The Advaita Vedanta recognizes the empirical reality of the world, but not its ontological reality. The knowledge of plurality as found in the phenomenal level is contradicted by the intuition of identity of the Absolute. The term *avādhita* can test the truth of an object at the empirical level.[13]

The insertion of the term *avādhita* again creates some philosophical confusion in this context. How can an object be adjudged as uncontradicted? If there is cognition in the form: 'It is raining outside', the question may be raised how the truth-value of such a sentence can be determined. Definitely we have to look outside whether the incident described in the sentence is true or false, which will go in favour of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda* not admitted by the Advaitins. As they believe in the *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* (i.e., the extrinsic validity of truth), the enquiry into the truth of a sentence cannot be experience-independent. If it is said, 'The sentence is either true or false', it can easily be said that the sentence is true without going out of the sentence, i.e., instrinsically true. It is stated by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra that the validity is intrinsically known. The meaning of the term *svataḥ* is as follows. The collocation of causes, which can reveal the object existing in it, can also reveal its validity if and only if there is the absence of defect.[14] The substratum of it is the knowledge of *vṛtti* or mental mode, which can reveal the witness (*sākṣī*). If the cognition of *vrtti* is apprehended, it can apprehend the validity of it also. It has already been said that the various transformations of *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* or mind are called *vṛtti*. As this vṛtti is known through the witness, the validity existing in it also is known through the same witness. It may be argued that if it is accepted that the validity is *svataḥ*, there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity. Because in each and every case the witness will reveal the knowledge of *vṛtti* resulting in the knowledge of intrinsic validity. Under this situation there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity, which is not the fact. In fact, we generally feel the doubt of validity. The previous sentence is not like this and hence the truth-value of such a sentence can be determined extrinsically, which goes in favour of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, which is not accepted

by the Advaitins leading to a paradoxical situation. In response to this objection the Advaitins may rejoin that the term *avādhita* is incorporated in order to remove the defect of *ativyāpti* (over coverage) to an illusory cognition of an indeterminate object (*anirvacanīyaviṣaya-bhrame'tivyāptivāraṇārthamuktamavādhiteti*).[15] In spite of this the problem cannot be solved. What is to be understood by the term '*anirvacanīyaviṣaya*'? The object, which is inexpressible through language, does not come under the purview of contradiction (*vādhitatva*). If an object is mistaken as an indeterminate object, there is a chance of taking it as valid cognition. In order to exclude such cognition from the purview of valid cognition, the term *avādhita* has been incorporated. If cognition is without any description, there does not arise any question of contradiction (*vādhitatva*). In this connection it can be said that an indeterminate cognition is neither true nor false due to the absence of proper description. On account of this it is very difficult to say that there is *vādhitatva* or *avādhitatva*. Even if it is accepted that the term *anirvacanīya* is taken in the sense of some indescribable phenomena that are unseen in character, the term *avādhita* cannot be applied here, as there does not arise any question of contradiction (*vādhita*). Hence the justification of the insertion of the term *avādhita* does not stand in the eye of logic. *Maṇiprabhā* further adds that when an individual is having an illusory cognition, the cognition of the earlier object seen in different space (i.e., snake for example) is acquired and hence there is the lack of the cognition of an object unacquired earlier. As the content of an illusory cognition remains acquired due to the absence of the content (i.e., rope for example), which is unacquired in nature, the adjunct *anadhigata* does not remain here. In order to exclude such cognition from the purview of valid cognition the term *avādhita* is inserted in the definition.[16]

Though the significance of the term *avādhita* can be explained somehow partially, the problems of *parataḥprāmāṇya* in order to test the unacquired character of the object cannot easily be resolved. Moreover, the paradoxes of the incorporation of the term *anadhigata* cannot be resolved and hence the term should not be incorporated in the said definition.

Again the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' generates some problems in the following manner. The term literally means 'having some object as its content' of the cognition. A question may be raised as to the incorporation of the term *artha* as an object (*viṣaya*). The *viṣayaka* means a cognition having an object, which is characterized by the adjuncts—*anadhigata* and *avādhita*. Hence there is no justification for incorporating the term *artha*; rather it leads us to a kind of tautology. The expression 'the cognition must have an object as its content' means 'the cognition must have an object'. The term 'as its content' (*artha*) is, I think, superfluous; because an object always remains in cognition as content. It is contradictory to say that something remains in a cognition without being its content. At the phenomenon level the knowledge means the knowledge of something. Hence the term *viṣayaka* instead of *arthaviṣayaka* would have been more justified. Through the insertion of this term Brahman that is in the nature of Pure Knowledge having no object (*aviṣayaka*) can easily be excluded from the purview of the definition, which is meant for the knowledge of the phenomenal objects. However, one justification may be offered in favour of the Advaitins. In this connection the term *viṣayaka* is not to be taken as 'having some object', but as 'having some relation with'. From this term '*arthaviṣayaka*' would mean 'having some relation with content'. In other words, the *viṣayatā* in this particular context exists in the content, which may technically be called *arthaniṣṭhaviṣayatā* (i.e., the contentness existing in the object). *Viṣayatā* (contentness) generally exists in three places—in the qualificandness called *viśeṣyataniṣṭhaviṣyatā*, in the qualifierness called *viśeṣaṇataniṣṭhaviṣayatā* and in the relationness called *samsargatāniṣṭhaviṣayatā*. By the term '*arthaviṣṭaviṣyaka*' Dharmarāja wants to mean that contentness exists in the qualificandness in the form of *artha* (*artharūpaviśeṣyataniṣṭhaviṣayatā*). As the term *viṣaya* is taken in the sense of a relation, there is no scope for the defect of tautology.

Notes and References

1. *Vedāntaparibhāsā* (*Pratyaksapariccheda*), Bengali translation by Panchanan Bhattacharyya, Kolkata.
2. 'Tatra smṛtivyāvṛttaṁ pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ.' Ibid.

3. 'Nīrūpasyāpi kālasyendriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvāhikabuddherapi pūrvapūrvajñānaviṣaya-tattatkṣaṇaviśeṣakatvena na tatrāvyaptiḥ.'
4. 'Nirvikalpakantu saṁsargānavagahi jñānaṁ. Yathā 'so'yaṁ devadattaḥ', 'Tattvamasi'ityādivākyajanyaṁ jñānaṁ.' Ibid.
5. Tathā ca so'yaṁ devadattaḥ iti vākyajanyajñānasya sannikṛṣṭaviṣayatayā vahirniḥsṛtāntaḥkaraṇavṛttyabhyupagamena devadattāvacchinnasya-caitanyasya vṛttyavacchinnacaitanyābhinnatayā 'so'yaṁ davadattaḥ' iti vākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣatvaṁ.' *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Pratyakṣapariccheda).
6. 'Evaṁ tvattvamasi ityādivākyajanyajñānasyāpi, tatra pramatureva viṣayatayā tadubhayabhedasya sattvāt.' Ibid.
7. 'Tathātrāpi vākye tattvatpadayorva viruddhaparokṣatvāparokṣat-vādiviśiṣṭatvaparityāgenāviruddhacaitanyena saha laksyalakṣṇabhāvaḥ. Iyameva bhāgalakṣaṇetyucyate' *Vedāntasāra* p. 159, edited by Kalibar Vedantavagisha, Kolkata, 1379 (B.S.).
8. Nīrūpasyāpi kālasyendriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvāhikabuddherapi pūrvapūrvajñānaviṣaya-tattatkṣaṇaviśeṣaviṣayakatvena na tatrāvyāptiḥ.' *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (*Pratyakṣapariccheda*).
9. 'Kim jñānagatasya pratyakṣatvasya proyojakaṁ pṛcchasi kiṁvā viṣayagatasya? Ādye pramāṇacaitanyasya viṣayāvacchinnacaitanyābheda iti brumaḥ' *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Pratyakṣapariccheda).
10. *Śikhāmaṇi* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, edited by Swami Govinda Singh Sadhu, Mumbai, p. 29, 1885.
11. *Maṇiprabhā on Śikhāmaṇi on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 29 (same edition).
12. 'Nanvevaṁ yathārthasmṛterapi niyatasamvādipravṛttijanakatvena pramātvallakṣyatvenānadhigatapadavaiyarthaṁ tadavasthamevatyā-śaṁkyetaravyāvṛttipramātvaprakārakavyavahārānyataraprayojanopāyo-gyeva prāmānyamatra nirūpanīyaṁ na tu saṁvādipravṛttyupayukta-prāmāṇyamatra nirūpaṇīyamityanadhigataviśeṣaṇasya sāphalyaṁ ...' Ibid., p. 32.
13. 'Brahmasāksātkārānantaraṁ hi ghaṭādīnāṁ vādhaḥ. 'yasya tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūttat kena kaṁ paśyet' iti śruteh. Na tu saṁsāradaśāyāṁ vādhaḥ 'yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaraṁ paśyati' iti śruteh. Tathā cāvādhitapadena saṁsāradaśāyāmavādhitatvam vivakṣitamiti na ghatādiprāyamavyāptiḥ.' *Vedāntaparibhāsā* (Pratyakṣapariccheda).
14. 'Svataḥsiddaḥ svasāmagrīvirahaprayojyah' *Nṛsiṁhaprakāśikā* on Dīpikā on *Tarkasamgraha*, p. 263, ed. Satkari Sharma Bangiya, Chowkhamba. 'svataḥsiddhaḥ itarakāraṇavirahasthale tādṛśakāraṇavirahaprayukta evetyarthaḥ'. *Nīlakaṇṭhaprakāśikā* on Dīpikā of *Tarkasamgraha* (same edition).
15. *Śikhāmaṇi* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 16–17, same edition.

16. 'Na ca bhramasya deśāntaravṛttijñātaviṣayakatvenānadhigatārthaviṣaya-katvasyābhāvāt kathaṁ tatrāvyāptiriti vācyam. Bhramāt pūrvaṁ bhramakālikotpattimadanirvacanīyarajatādiviṣayakajñānābhāvena bhramasya jñātaviṣayakatvarūpādhigataviṣayakatvasyābhāvā-danadhigatārthaviṣayakatvasya bhrame sattvāditi.' *Maṇiprabhā* on *Śikhāmaṇi* on *Vedāntaparibhāsā*, p. 17, same, edition.

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A Critical Review of Śāntarakṣita's Proof of Non-Conceptuality (nirvikalpakatva) of Perception (pratyakṣa)

In order to prove the non-conceptuality of perception Śāntarakṣita resorts to both direct experience (sāksādanubhava) and inference especially the inference of anupalabdhi type.

I. PROOF THROUGH DIRECT EXPERIENCE

Let us start discussing the Śāntarakṣita's proof of the non-conceptuality of perception with the help of direct experience. He says that when a person's mind, which is the source of conceptual construction (kalpanā), is attracted by something and at the same time, the person is aware of the presence of an object which appears before his eyes, this awareness is clearly an instance of a simple, non-conceptual experience. For example, if at the same time when someone is thinking about a prize he will offer to a dancing girl entertaining him, he is also aware of the presence of something, e.g. colour appearing before his eyes, then the latter awareness is an instance of a simple, non-conceptual cognition. For, in this case, that object which is before his eyes cannot be interpreted by the name 'blue', 'yellow', etc. An instance of non-conceptual cognition is thus established on the basis of direct experience (sāksādanubhava).[1]

The opponent Naiyāyika, may suggest that both the cognition involved in thinking about the prize, and the cognition of a thing before

the observer's eyes are conceptual cognitions. That is according to opponents, two conceptual cognitions may occur simultaneously in someone's mind.

But Śāntarakṣita says that it is true that the cognition involved in thinking about the prize, is conceptual, but the cognition of something appearing before the observer's eyes cannot be conceptual. If the latter cognition were conceptual then the observer would be able to interpret the object which appears before his eyes, as blue, yellow, etc. In our day-to-day life we all have experience of that kind. We often find that when we are fully pre-occupied with some thoughts we suddenly become aware of some sensations (visual, auditory, etc.), although we are not in a position to interpret these sensations. Hence, such indisputable experiences of our day-to-day life prove that such experiences are not conceptual. According to Śāntarakṣita, then, two conceptual cognitions cannot occur simultaneously, although a conceptual cognition and a non-conceptual one may appear at the same time.

The opponent may try to stick to his own position in the following way: Though two conceptual cognitions cannot occur simultaneously, yet it is possible that the two conceptual cognitions occur successively and the mistaken idea of their simultaneous appearance is due to the rapidity of succession. For example, the rapid circular movements of a fire-brand produce the impression of an uninterrupted fiery circle (alātacakra). In this case, because of the rapidity of movements the idea is produced of a single flaming circle, all the several successive perceptions being mixed up as one. In the same manner, where cognitions appear very quickly, one after the other, there arises the mistaken idea of their appearing together as one.[2]

But reacting to the above argument Śāntarakṣita firstly says that quickness of succession cannot be a cause of this error of simultaneous perception. He argues that, if the rapidity of succession could be an obstacle to the perception of real succession, then we could not also be able to apprehend any succession between two words like 'latā-tāla' and the 'saraḥ-rasaḥ' etc. when they are pronounced very quickly. However, as a matter of fact, we can apprehend the succession between two such words inspite of their quick enunciation. Hence from the above discussion it is clear that two conceptual cognitions which occur

successively, cannot appear to be simultaneous inspite of the quickness of their occurrences.[3]

Secondly, Kamalasīla points out that the example of rapidly moving flames of fire, producing the illusion of a circle of fire, is not apposite. One cannot, with the help of this example, prove that two cognitions are essentially successive and yet, because of the quickness of their succession, we wrongly take them to be simultaneous. In order to prove the erroneous nature of the simultaneous appearances of cognitions, which really appear successively, the opponent should have produced an instance of conceptual error (vikalpaja-bhrānti). For, the error mentioned above is a case of conceptual error. But the example actually provided by the opponent, namely, the example of the appearance of fiery circle, is not a case of conceptual error. Memory plays a crucial role here by lumping together several successive perceptions of moving flame. However if memory was responsible for the illusion of the fiery circle, then the fiery circle would have appeared as faint, indistinct. As a matter of fact, it appears to be vivid and distinct. Accordingly, it is called a case of perceptual error (indriyaja-bhrānti). Hence Śāntarakṣita concludes, the opponent is not successful in proving that 'the two conceptual cognitions are essentially successive, but due to the quickness of succession we take them to be simultaneous.'[4]

It is then clear that two conceptual cognitions cannot occur simultaneously. On the contrary, Śāntarakṣita maintains that it is proved from our experience that two distinct cognitions, one conceptual, the other non-conceptual occur simultaneously in a person's mind. In support of his opinion, Śāntarakṣita gives an example of a person witnessing the performance of a dancing girl. In witnessing the dance of a girl the observer not only sees the girl dancing, but he also hears the song, tastes the flavour of camphor, smells the fragrance of flowers, feels the cool breeze of the fan waved overhead and *thinks of* making presents of clothes and ornaments. He does all this at one and the same time.[5]

II. PROOF THROUGH INFERENCE

After having established perception (pratyakṣa) as a non-conceptual cognition with the help of the cognizer's own direct experience (sākṣādanubhava), Śāntarakṣita proceeds to prove it by means of

inference (anumāna). For this purpose, he resorts to the anupalabdhi anumāna. The formulation of the inferential argument which is advanced by Śāntarakṣita is as follows:

> Wherever there is the absence of the reason of being determinate (i.e. the absence of the apprehension of the qualified object), there is the absence of determinacy or conceptuality.
>
> Perception is free from the reason of being determinate (i.e. free from the apprehension of the qualified object).
>
> Therefore, perception is free from determinacy or conceptuality.

The inference may be formulated in Sanskrit in this form:

pratyakṣaṃ na savikalpakaṃ viśeṣaṇavisiṣṭārthāgrahanāt.[6]

Kumārila's Objections Against Śāntarakṣita's Inference

Kumārila, the founder of the bhāṭṭa school, raises an objection against the above inference. He says that in that inference the reason (hetu), viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇāt (the absence of the apprehension of the qualified object) is inadmissible (asiddha) and thereby the inference is invalid. The reason is proved to be inadmissible in the following way.

Kumārila asks: is the term 'pratyakṣa' (sense perception), in the above inference, regarded as a subject (pakṣa) generally, i.e. without reference to any particular kind of perception, or with special reference to any particular kind of 'perception'? Does the term, 'sense perception' indicate both determinate perception (savikalpaka-pratyakṣa) and indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa) or does it indicate indeterminate perception alone? If 'sense perception', Kumārila urges, is regarded as the subject (pakṣa) generally, without reference to any particular kind of perception, then the reason will be vitiated by the fallacy of *pakṣāsiddha*, in as much as there will be a possibility of the absence of the reason (hetu) in one part of the subject (pakṣa). In other words, the reason, 'the absence of the apprehension of the qualified object', will be absent in determinate perception or conceptual cognition although it will be present in indeterminate perception or non-conceptual cognition. Again, if 'sense perception' is regarded as the subject with special reference to a particular kind of perception, that is, if the non-conceptual or indeterminate perception alone is regarded as the subject, then there will be a fallacy of *establishing what is already established* (*siddhasādhana doṣa*).[7] There is no need to prove that indeterminate or non-conceptual cognition is nirvikalpaka (non-conceptual).

Śāntarakṣita's Defence of His Own Position

Defending his own position Śāntarakṣita says that in the inference 'pratyakṣaṃ na savikalpakaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇāt' the subject (pakṣa), 'pratyakṣa' (perception) does not mean either the non-conceptual cognition or both the conceptual cognition and non-conceptual cognition. Here 'pratyakṣa' (perception) means 'immediate awareness' (sākṣātkāri-jñāna). Only the specific individuality (svalakṣaṇa) can be the object of awareness at the first moment of our cognizing process. It is not obvious to the cognizer that such an immediate awareness is non-conceptual. The cognizer establishes non-conceptuality of that immediate awareness, through the above inference. Hence, Śāntarakṣita claims that his position is free from the charge of establishing what is already established (*siddhasādhana doṣa*).

Śāntarakṣita adds that because perception is only the immediate awareness of the specific individuality at the first moment of our cognizing process, the subsequent cognition of universal and the rest (which are not real, being produced by conceptual construction) is not perception at all. It is called conceptual cognition (savikalpaka-jñāna). Because the subsequent cognition is conceptual cognition, it is not perception (pratyakṣa) and it is not regarded as subject (pakṣa) of the above inference (ekadā tavajjātyādināṃ nirastatvānna santyevata iti kutastadgrahaṇe prāmāṇyam; *TSP*; Vol. 1, p. 472). Consequently there is no possibility of the absence of the reason (the absence of the apprehension of the qualified object) in a part of the subject (pakṣaikadeśavṛttitva of the hetu). It cannot be shown that the reason is present in one part of the pakṣa (i.e. in non-conceptual perception). Hence, because there is no fallacy in the above inference, the inference, 'pratyakṣaṃ na savikalpakaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇāt' remains valid.

Śāntarakṣita's commentator Kamalaśīla adds: even if, for the sake of the argument, it is admitted that universal and the rest are real, and the apprehension of those universal characters at the subsequent moment

constitutes perception, there will be a contradiction in Kumārila's standpoint. He can never show any case of perception as a case of conceptual cognition (savikalpaka-jñāna), in as much as every case of perception has specific individuality as its object. But we know that Kumārila believes in both conceptual cognition and non-conceptual cognition as perception. The contradiction can be shown in the following way:

> According to Kumārila both the universal and the particular (specific individuality) are related to each other in the relation of identity-cum-difference (bhinnābhinna sambandha).

Because both are related in this way, he has to admit that 'wherever there is the universal, there is also the particular (specific individuality) and vice-versa'. As a result, when the universal and the rest are apprehended at a subsequent moment (uttarakṣaṇa), then the particular is also apprehended there. Because the particular or specific individuality is apprehended at a subsequent moment, along with the universal and the rest, so the apprehension or the so-called 'perception' at a subsequent moment becomes non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) cognition.[8] The reason is, according to the Buddhists, the cognition of specific individuality must be free from concept. This argument may be formulated in Sanskrit in this form, 'uttarakālabhāvi pratyakṣaṃ avikalpakaṃ svalakṣaṇagrāhitvāt'. Hence, it is clear that if Kumārila admits the subsequent cognition as perception, then all perceptions become non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) and the distinction between the non-conceptual and the conceptual perceptions accepted by him becomes invalid.

From the above discussion it is clear that Śāntarakṣita applies the indirect method (prasaṅga method) of proof and shows that a contradiction evolves from taking Kumārila's position as true. In this way he proves that the subsequent cognition (uttarakālabhāvi jñāna) is not perception at all. And consequently, he claims that there is no possibility of the apprehension of the reason, 'the absence of the apprehension of the qualified object', in a part of the subject (pakṣa). The inference, 'pratyakṣaṃ na savikalpakaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇāt' thus remains valid.

The opponent may urge again that the universal alone (and not the specific individuality) is apprehended at the subsequent perception

(uttarakālabhāvi-pratyakṣa). Hence, he claims, the application of the reason, 'the apprehension of the specific individuality', for establishing the inference, 'uttarakālabhāvi pratyakṣaṃ avikalpakaṃ svalakṣaṇagrāhitvāt' is inadmissible.[9]

Śāntarakṣita, however, reacts to Kumārila's objection in the following way. If it is said that the universal alone is apprehended in the subsequent cognition (uttarakālabhāvi-jñāna), then an absolute distinction between the universal (qualification) and particular (qualified) must be admitted. However, it is not admitted by Kumārila that there is an absolute distinction between the universal (qualification) and the particular (qualified). Kumārila himself in his *Ślokavārittika* clearly says that if qualifications were absolutely distinct from the qualified, then they could never qualify the object qualified, i.e. the particular, svabuddhyā yena rajyeta viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇaṃ (as quoted in *TSP*, Vol. 1, p. 474).

However, according to Kumārila, qualifications (viśeṣaṇa) qualify the qualified object (viśeṣya). Moreover, in the opinion of Kumārila the qualifications, 'universal and the rest', are different as well as non-different from the particular. The universal is neither absolutely different from nor absolutely non-different from the particular. Hence, he can never claim that the universal alone is apprehended in the subsequent cognition.[10]

Kumārila may, at this stage, claim that what is apprehended in the subsequent cognition is neither the universal alone nor the particular alone. The particular, as characterized by the universal and the rest, is apprehended in that cognition.[11]

However, Śāntarakṣita objects to Kumārila's observation by saying that it is not correct to say that one and the same cognition apprehends the specific individuality and the universal. If a cognition apprehends both the universal and the specific individuality then the question will arise: what is the nature of that cognition? Is it conceptual (savikalpaka) or non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka)? If this cognition is conceptual, then it will apprehend only the universal and the rest (jātimātra). And if the subsequent cognition is non-conceptual, then it will apprehend the specific individuality alone (vyaktimātra).[12] And if the subsequent cognition is the cognition of the specific individuality alone, then the

cognition has no novelty (anadhigatatva) which, according to Kumārila, is the main feature of valid cognition; and as a result, the cognition will not be considered as a valid cognition. In as much as the specific individuality, which has already been apprehended in the initial cognition of our cognizing process, is again apprehended in the subsequent conceptual cognition, the subsequent conceptual cognition, thus, is not considered as valid cognition (pramāṇa).[13]

In the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas, a cognition which is the apprehension of the object that has already been apprehended, cannot be valid. Memory is not recognized by Mīmāṃsakas as valid cognition, in as much as its objects are already apprehended in the root-perception. Because the subsequent conceptual cognition (uttarakālabhāvi-jñāna) which follows from the initial cognition (ālocana-jñāna), apprehends the object that has already been apprehended in the initial cognition, the subsequent conceptual cognition can never be treated by Mīmāṃsakas as valid cognition (pramāṇa). The argument can be formulated in Sanskrit in this form, 'uttarakālabhāvi savikalpakajñānaṃ na pramāṇaṃ gṛhitagrāhitvāt smṛtivat'.[14]

In the above inference Śāntarakṣita with the help of vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi' proves the invalidity (apramāṇatva) of the subsequent conceptual cognition (uttarakālabhāvi savikalpakajñāna).[15]

Vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi is one among the eleven kinds of non-apprehension (anupalabdhi anumāna). It is an apprehension of the contradictory of the probandum (vyāpaka) of the probans which will be negated (pratiṣedhya-vyāpya). Through such an apprehension the absence of the thing negated is established. Let us now see how Śāntarakṣita proves the invalidity of the subsequent conceptual cognition through vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi. In the inference 'uttarakālabhāvi savikalpakajñānaṃ na pramāṇaṃ gṛhitagrāhitvāt' (a) the negated probans (pratiṣedhya-vyāpya) is validity (pramāṇatva) of cognition; (b) the actual probandum (vyāpaka) of that probans is 'the apprehension of the un-apprehended', i.e., agṛhitagrāhitva); (c) the contradictory of that probandum is 'the apprehension of the already apprehended' (gṛhitagrāhitva). In this way, in the above inference, Śāntarakṣita proves the invalidity of the subsequent conceptual cognition through the

apprehension of the reason, 'the apprehension of the already apprehended object' (gṛhitagrāhitva).

Because the subsequent conceptual cognition is not valid cognition, it cannot be regarded as perception and, consequently, according to Buddhist logicians, only initial non-conceptual cognition is perception.

Notes and References

1. pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ vedyate' tiparisphuṭam,
   anyatrāsaktamanasā'pyak ṣaṇaimīladivedanāt, *TS*, Vol. 1, Verse 1242.
   See also Kamalaśīla's commentary:
   syādetat-bhavatvevaṃ yathopavarṇitā kalpanā, kalpanāpoḍhaṃ tu kathaṃ siddham? ityaha-pratyakṣamityādi. anena svasaṃvittyā pratyakṣataḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ siddaḥ ityādarśayati. *TSP*, Vol. 1, p. 458.
2. krameṇaivopajayante vijñānānīti cenmatam,
   sakṛdbhāvābhimānastu śīghravṛtteralātavat. *TS*, Vol. 1, Verse 1246.
   See also Kamalaśīla's commentary: vikalpasahabhāvitvamasiddhamiti kadācitparobrūyāt, atastadāśaṅkyannāha-kramoṇetyādi. yadi krameṇopajāyante kathaṃ yugapat pravedyante? ityāha sakṛdhāvābhimānastviti. alāta ivālātavat. yathā'lāte śighrahbhrāmāṇāt sakṛccakrākāra pratītiḥ, taddarśanānāṃ ghaṭanād evaṃ jñānānāṃ śighrotpattitaḥ sakṛdbhāvābhimāna iti. *TSP*, Vol. 1, pp. 458–9.
3. bahubhirvyavadhāne'pi bhrāntiḥ sa cāsuvṛttitaḥ.
   latātālādibuddhīnāmatyarthaṃ laghu varttanam,
   sakṛdbhāvābhimāno'taḥ kimatrāpi na varttate. *TS*, Vol. 1, second line of Verse 1249 and Verse 1250.
   See also Kamalaśīla's commentary; *TSP*, Vol. 1, p. 460.
4. (i) na cāyaṃ sakṛdbhāvābhimāno'pi bhrānta
   ityādarśayannāhabhrāntirityādi.
   ... na cātra bādhakamasti, yena bhrāntiḥ syāt. Ibid., p. 459.
   (ii) yaścāyamalātavaditi dṛṣṭāntaḥ
   ... yato neyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ kramavarttinī darśanāni ghaṭayantī samupajāyate, kiṃ tarhi?
   ... na hi vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭapratibhāsitvaṃ yuktam. tathāhi ghaṭanā kriyamānā smṛtyaiva kriyate, nendriyajñānena;
   ... iti sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntah. Ibid., pp. 460–61.
5. tathā hi-yadaiva narttakīmutpaśyati tadaiva gītādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti, karpūradirasamāsvāyati, nāsikāpuṭavinyastakusumāmodaṃ jighrati, vyajanānī ādisparśam ca sparsati, vastrābharaṇādidānādi ca cintayanti. Ibid., p. 460.

6. viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇaṃ na ca vidyate. *TS*, Vol. I, Verse 1257 (2nd line).
   See also Kamalasīla's commentary:
   nāsti ca pratyakṣasya ... savikalpakabhāvavyavasthitau. viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇaṃ nimittamiti kāraṇāmupalabdhiḥ. *TSP*, Vol. I, p. 461.
7. sarvaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pakṣīkṛtam tatra ca sarvatra pratyakṣakhye dharmiṇi savikalpakavyavasthitau nāsti ca viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthāgrahaṇaṃ nimittamityasa hetorasiddhiḥ; ālocanājñānavyātirekeṇanyatra pratyakṣe sāmānyādiviśeṣaṇāviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇasya vidyamānatvāt athālocanājñānameva paksikṛtya heturabhidhiyate, tada siddhasadhyateti manyate paraḥ. *TSP*, Vol. I, p. 470.
8. tathāpi tadgrahaṇe ālocanājñānavaduttarakālabhāvināṃ jñānānāṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvādavikalpataiva, jātyādīnāṃ svalakṣaṇādavyatirekasyābhyupagatatvāditi bhāvaḥ prayogaḥ-yat svalakṣaṇagrāhi tadavikalpakam, yathālocanajñānām. Ibid., p. 473.
9. syādetat-jātimātraviṣayatvādasiddho hetuḥ? *TSP*, Vol. I, p. 473.
10. jātimātretyādi. ekāntena vibhinnatā viśeṣaṇasyeti. viśeṣyāditi śeṣaḥ naitacca parairiṣṭamiti. ekāntena viśeṣaṇaviśesayorvibhinnatvam. kathaṃ neṣṭam? ityāha yathoditamiti. tenaiveti śeṣaḥ.
    kiṃ tat? ityāha-yadityādi paryāyeṇa bhedasyāpyabhyupagatatvādekāntata ityāha. tathā hi-bhinnābhinnasvabhāvā jātyādayas tasyeṣṭānaikāntato bhinnā nāpyabhinnaḥ.
    ['buddhibhedānna caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate,
    ekānekatvamiṣṭaṃ vā satā rūpādī bhedataḥ'] *SLV*, Verse on perception 158. *TSP*, Vol. 1, p. 473.
11. svasāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvenobhayaviṣayatvāt
    kevalasvalakṣaṇamātraviṣayatvamasiddhamevottareṣāṃ jñānānām? Ibid., p. 474.
12. svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇayonaikaṃ jñānāṃ vedakaṃ yuktam. tathāhi tadekaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ vā syād, avikalpakaṃ vā; tatra savikalpakabhāve = savikalpakatve sati, prāktanasya = pūrvoktasya svalakṣaṇasya, vit = vedanam, na prāpnoti. anyathābhāva iti. nirvikalpakapakṣe aparasyeti sāmānyātmanaḥ, vit = vittirna syāt. Ibid., p. 474.
13. evaṃ tāvat svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvaitareṣāṃ jñānānāmavikalpatā prāpnotīti sādhitaṃ. idanīṃ bhavatu nāma savikalpatvaṃ tathāpi gṛhitagrāhitvānna teṣāṃ prāmāṇyameva yuktamiti pratipādayannāha. Ibid., p. 474.
14. tatścādyenaivālocanajñānena jātyādi gṛhitamiti smārtta jñānavadadhigatārthādhigantṛtvāt paraṃ jātyādidharmaniścayajñānamapramāṇameva yuktamiti. prayogaḥ-yad gṛhitagrāhī jñānaṃ na tatpramāṇam. yathā smṛtiḥ. Ibid., pp. 474–5.

15. gṛhītagrāhī ca pratyakṣapṛṣthabhāvi vikalpa iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ. Ibid., p. 475.

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Comments on Professor R.C. Pradhan's article entitled 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons' published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 3, reactions of Dr Sauravpran to it, *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, pp. 218–21, and the response of Professor Pradhan to it, published in *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, pp. 221–7, 2001

Professor Pradhan, in his well-argued article, has tried to provide a theory of metaphysics of person and defines persons as minded/thinking begins. Dr Sauravpran Goswami has reacted that because of what Professor Pradhan has established that infants and insane human beings cannot be called human persons. He has charged that Professor Pradhan in his article has failed to rise above a restatement of the Cartesians. Dr Goswami has put forward the Strawsonian argument that the person is an organic body against Professor Pradhan's Cartesianism. No doubt, Dr Goswami's favour of Strawsonianism includes the infants and insane human beings as persons, but what he has to say on inorganic entities is left without any deliberation. Are they not persons? If they are not, how is their person, in uses, determined?

Ideas or thoughts are represented in language as being of awareness in character and neither 'I' nor 'You' but 'it' is used to denote them.

How far is it philosophical to ask for an option is itself a question. However, Professor Pradhan, in the concluding lines of his response to Goswami's reaction, asks one to choose between the two theories and certainly he chooses his own. It is very like a surgeon who has an option to but puts off all the lights while operating in the operation theatre.

If we accept the person as a minded being in the strict sense of Professor Pradhan, it will be difficult, rather, impossible to accept not only the person represented by the pronouns like this, that, all (not representing mind/consciousness as it is, usually, represented by the pronouns of first and second person) but all the nouns representing third person also. The person of a minded person, when he reflects on his person, stands neither as 'I' nor as 'you' but as it, this or that pronoun not representing mindedness but very general substance, without all its specialties of mind or body.

A definition of a person must be such that it includes all the cases of person, that is, on the basis of which all sorts of persons can be defined uniformly. Otherwise, it is narrow. If we accept the person as a minded person then there will be the possibility of only two sorts of persons, i.e. first and second person, or in more specific words, 'I' as speaking and 'you' as spoken to. Then, what will one say about the character 'spoken about' that is about a third person?

'Ram is a person' is a sentence representing 'Ram' as person. If the person (Ram) is a boy, he is a minded person, but if Ram is the name of a sheep or a dog, it is not a minded person in terms of Professor Pradhan, and that of Dr Goswami if it is the name of a stone. In the sentence 'Ram is moving', it is not clear if Ram is a minded boy or a non-minded stone. These cases show that the person is a character/capacity represented, in language and grammar, as a subject qualified by qualities or actions as the case may be. The subject represented thus may be, metaphysically, a minded person as in cases of 'I' and 'You' and may be a non-minded person as well as in the cases of 'this', 'that', 'it'. The subject represented by the third person pronouns like 'this', 'that', 'it', and nouns like Ram, Christ, etc., may be or may not be minded persons but in both of the positions, the mindedness of the subject is not represented by the words. Leibnitzians and most of the idealists of the east and west may interpret the non-minded as minded reflecting mind in less degree.

I conclude that throughout the discussion on 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards Metaphysics of Persons', reactions to it and the responses to them, neither is the person defined well nor is the metaphysics of person settled well. Metaphysically, a person is not confined to minded persons only because metaphysics is metaphysics and cannot be divided in two level metaphysics of the minded/conscious being and of unconscious/physical beings. Even if the metaphysics of person is divided into minded and non-minded for some specific purpose, the character of minded person represented in language as non-minded or even as mind-imposed will not be acceptable to one who confines person to minded persons only. In his state of affairs, there will be no possibility of the sentences in third person represented by pronouns like 'this', 'that', 'it', 'all' denoting very general being without any specification or qualities. Not only that, but either the metaphysics of non-minded beings will need an extra criterion for the acceptance and description or the existence of non-minded persons is negated as a metaphysical person. The former position amounts to arbitrariness and the latter is inconsiderate.

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A Response to the Discussion Note on the Definition of Knowledge given in Tarkasangraha Raised by Dr Ranjan K. Ghosh

In response to the discussion note on 'The Definition of Knowledge given in Tarkasangraha (TS) and Deepika (Dpk)' by Dr Ranjan K. Ghosh, in *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, January–March 2002 issue, I would like to make some observations.

Before I do that, I would draw attention to the lines of the same portion of Prakāshika (P)—a commentary on TS Dpk.

ज्ञानत्वमात्रं लक्षणम्। जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यत्वं तु ज्ञानत्वस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वसूचनाय। इत्थं च मूले सर्वव्यवहारहेतुः इति बुद्धेः स्वरूपकथनम् इति भावः।

The English translation of this would be as follows:

> Mere 'Knowledgehood' is the defining mark of knowledge. To show the authenticity of knowledgehood, it is also said that knowledgehood is apprehended by anuvyavasāya, having the form 'I know'. Thus, 'सर्वव्यवहारहेतुः बुद्धिः ज्ञानम्'—the statement in TS must be taken as an explanatory note on the nature of knowledge.

This statement is explained in all the commentaries thereon in the same manner. The early works of Nyāya such as Nyāyasāra, Lakshaṇāvali and Lakshaṇamāla etc., also hold the same view.

* * *

Now, let me put forth my views on this matter.

The statement of TS 'सर्वव्यवहारहेतुः बुद्धिः ज्ञानम्' consists of two synonyms for knowledge, i.e., 'बुद्धिः' and 'ज्ञानम्'. Here the word बुद्धि refers to लक्ष्य, the thing to be defined, and the second word ज्ञानम् offers the definition for the same. This is explained by the author himself in his Dpk. To avoid any misunderstanding, he further writes, 'जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानत्वमेव', emphasizing the same with 'एव'.

Therefore I think, no room is left for any confusion in this context.

* * *

Explaining the statements of TS and Dpk, Dr Ranjan comes to some conclusions, which are wrong in my view when we analyze the original text.

He writes, 'Whatever is statable alone is knowledge (K1).'

This is a misconception according to me. The explanatory statement of TS, i.e., 'सर्वव्यवहारहेतुः बुद्धिः ज्ञानम्' means that knowledge is a quality, which is a causing factor for all meaningful linguistic activity.

If we interpret it carefully, it seems to convey that knowledge is that which has causality described by the effectness of all linguistic expressions. The Sanskrit rendering of this may be as 'व्यवहारत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणतावत् ज्ञानम्'.

To make it clear, we can put it in Predicate Logical form as under.

$$\forall x\ \exists y\ [\text{Cause}\ (y, x)] \wedge [\text{Knowledge}\ (y)] \wedge [\text{Ling-Expr}\ (x)]$$

Since, effects are pervaded by their cause, we can also say that knowledge—the cause pervades the Linguistic Expression—the result. This can also be expressed in Predicate Logical form as follows:

$$\forall x\ \exists y\ [\text{L-Expr.}\ (x) \Rightarrow \text{Knowledge}\ (y)] \qquad \text{(F1)}$$

If we put it in simple English, it reads as 'All linguistic expression implies some knowledge.'

Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that 'whatever is statable ALONE is knowledge', which represented in PL, reads as

$$\forall x\ \exists y\ [\text{Knowledge}\ (x) \Rightarrow \text{L-Expr.}\ (y)] \qquad \text{(F2)}$$

Here between the above statements F1 and F2, contradiction is very much clear. Hence, the conclusion of Dr Ranjan would go against the original text.

The second assumption made by Dr Ranjan is also a quasi-fact and half-acceptable. He writes ... 'Whatever has knowledgehood, is knowledge and mark of which is the condition of it being statable.'

The first half of the statement is absolutely right, whereas the second half is not acceptable. For, this is not that what has been stated in Dpk.

In Dpk, Annambhatta, defining knowledge as having knowledgehood, says that knowledgehood—the defining mark of knowledge, is grasped by anuvyavasāya—the cognition that comprehends the cognition prior to that, having the form 'I know'. This form is not a linguistic form. It is only a representation form of anuvyavasāya. Therefore the question as to 'whether the process of anuvyavasāya takes place without the aid of the linguistic act of the form "I know"' that is based on the aforesaid misconceptions, does not arise.

* * *

The conclusive remarks made by Dr Ranjan are as follows:

(a) सर्वव्यवहारहेतु points to a process of reflection, which can be carried out only by linguistic means, and as a mark of cognition, it leaves out the possibility of *Nirvikalpaka* cognitions.

My comment: Yes, the definition given in TS, does not cover all its लक्ष्य—the objects being defined—as it leaves out *Nirvikalpaka* cognition. However it can be considered as the definition of just *Savikalpaka* cognition or, it may be taken as just an introductory note that gives a general idea about knowledge. If it is considered as a flawless definition, to overcome avyāpti, it will be altered as सर्वव्यवहार-निष्ठकार्यतानिरूपितकारणतावच्छेदकजातिमत्वम् by addition of Jathi—universal that resides in all instances and doesn't leave out any single instance. This kind of Lakšana is called जातिघटितलक्षण—the definition that consists of Jathi. सर्वव्यवहारनिष्ठकार्यतानिरूपितकारणतावच्छेदकजातिमत्वम् means that the Jāthi—universal, that is delimiter for कारणता—causality described by कार्यता—effectness of all linguistic expressions, is the mark of knowledge. Knowledgehood or ज्ञानत्व is that kind of Jāthi here. Since, ज्ञानत्व alone can be a flawless definition, the other portion can be omitted. For the same reason Annambhatta himself goes on to replace the first definition with another, i.e., ज्ञानत्व, which covers all type of cognitions including *Nirvikalpaka*.

In other words, the definition सर्वव्यवहाहेतुत्व is not a general definition and ज्ञानत्व is considered as the general definition, which also covers cognition like *Nirvikalpaka*.

This explanation, I feel, is sufficient to show that the objections based on the aforesaid assumption will not stand any more. Therefore, I do not want to take up other issues.

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Agenda for Research

The Bṛahadāraṇayaka Upaniṣad is a well known work, and so also the discussion and debate at Janaka's court where after the great sacrifice a discussion and debate ensued testing Yājñavalkya's implied claim that he has the knowledge of the *Brahman* as he had asked his student to take away the gold and the cows which were to be his who knew it. But, no detailed study seems to have been made of the questions that Yājñavalkya was asked and the sequence in which they were asked and the answers that he gave. Nor has the relation of these questions to the knowledge of *Brahman* been examined.

A critical examination of the nature and the sequence of these questions, and the answers given by Yājñavalkya to them would perhaps result in a micro-investigation into this and the other texts which, as far as we know, has generally not been done.

There is also a problem as, perhaps alone, amongst the Upaniṣads, the work, though called 'Bṛahadāraṇayaka Upaniṣad', consists of chapters called *Brāhmaṇa* and not *Āraṇyaka* or Upaniṣad. This raises the question as to what exactly was meant when a particular text was designated as a *Brāhmaṇa* or an *Upaniṣad* or an *Āraṇayaka*. A close investigation into this might help in freeing us of many delusions created by the 'naming' of the texts which seems *prima facie* to be arbitrary in nature.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

1. The recent events in Iraq have highlighted once again the problem of war and peace, and the role that supra-national political organizations such as the United Nations are supposed to play in this regard. On one side, we have the notion of 'independent' 'sovereign' states which can not accept, by definition, any authority, superior to or higher than, themselves. On the other hand, if peace is to be preferred to war, then one has to accept equally the necessity for some supra-national organizations to ensure this.

The problem was examined by Kant who tried to deal with it in his work entitled *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* and contains the blue-print of the 'articles' required for an organization which may possibly ensure peace between states. The work discusses the relation between politics and ethics, an issue which has generally been ignored by almost all those who have thought about politics or ethics, as if they had little relation to each other. Ethics has been seen as an individual enterprise, and politics has been seen as an arena where only power matters, particularly when it concerns relations between states.

In this connection Kant develops the notion of 'public right' which he treats as a 'transcendental' presupposition of thinking about the public domain.

It is time that political thinkers and philosophers become aware of Kant's pioneering work in this regard and carry it forward for all its worth, as even after what has happened nations have to return to the peace table and think of how to avoid wars.

2. Attention is drawn to the publication of the second part of the Anumāna Khaṇḍa of Gangeśa's *Tattvacīntāmaṇi* by the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupathi in 1999. The first part of that work was published from Tirupathi in 1982 by Ramanuja Tatacaryya from where the Pratyaksa Khaṇḍa was published in 1973. Both these have been published by Professor Ramanuja Tatacaryya.

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Notes and Queries

1. Kant sees both arithmetic and geometry as examples of knowledge which is both *a priori* and synthetic in nature. This is sought to be justified by showing that both time and space which they deal with are transcendental forms of inner and outer sensibility. As transcendental they are *a prioṛi*, and as they are forms of 'sensibility', they may be said to be 'synthetic' in character. Their synthetic character is further strengthened by the fact that space and time are themselves apprehended as sensuously 'given' and that the categories have to be applicable to that which is apprehended through them and sensuously given either through inner or outer sense.

But both arithmetic and geometry as 'knowledge' display a character which at least *prima facie* seems incompatible with their *a priori* nature. The 'knowledge' in these fields not only grows but changes in such a way that what was considered correct is found to be incorrect and has to be given up or radically modified taking it into account.

This, however, raises the problem not only for Kant but for the usual understanding of this kind of knowledge from Plato onwards in the Western tradition.

On the other hand, it would be equally difficult to treat them as empirical in nature in the usual sense given to that term. Would then there be some 'third' kind of knowledge which is neither 'empirical' in the accepted sense of the term nor purely *a priori* as understood in the Western tradition? But, then, what would be an example of *a priori* knowledge?

2. What does the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' mean in the Mīmāṁsā definition of Veda which is supposed to consist of *mantra*, *brāhmaṇa* and *nāmdheya*.

Is it the same or different from the 'texts' known as '*Brāhmaṇa*' in the Vedic tradition such as, say, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*?

3. What does the term '*Saṁhitā*', mean in the context of the 'Veda'

Saṁhitā? Does it mean the *Saṁhitā pātha*, as has been suggested by some, or something else?

4. It is accepted by both Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta that the Śruti is authoritative only for that which can not be known either by *pratyakṣa* or by *anumāna*. Yet, how can it ever be established that something can not, in principle, be known by either of these, or by both of them together?

5. What exactly is meant by Swarūpa Saṁbandha and what is the difference, if any, between it and *tādātmya*? What exactly was the philosophical reason for postulating these relations. Was it the same which led to the acceptance of 'reflexive' relations in modern logic which have hardly been seen as creating any epistemological or ontological problems in the philosophical consciousness of that tradition?

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Book Reviews

RATNAMUTHU SUGATHAN: *Polylectics Logic of Postmodernism* (Delhi, Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2002), pp. x + 190, Rs 400

A study of postmodernism in the intellectual world today makes us aware of the extent to which we have not questioned and modified the outdated categories of thought and the modes of perception. Dr Sugathan's book, a selective reference work, intends to delineate the elements of dialectics and logic from the postmodern stream, seeing the continuity and divergence from the modern thought. It is going to open up for us a vista on the depth and extent of unquestioned/unexamined categories; this alone would make such a discussion worthwhile.

The book has been divided into five chapters besides a brief Introduction. He has taken up such issues as 'Recurring Circles of Reason and Passion', 'A Polylectic of Reason in Hegel and Nietzsche', and 'Redefinition of Reason'. About *Polylectics* or multilectics, the author contends, 'subjective, objective and historical metaphysics are shattered or at least challenged. The necessity of pattern is questioned. The causal binding is broken. The reason is disrupted. The linearity, singularity and the absoluteness are ruptured. The rupture is in the logic itself ...' (p. 41). The author feels that there has been development in the sphere of thought and reality and asks 'whether we can find and collect the elements of this new turn of thought. If dialectics was a great breakthrough in thought and logic, one is justified in pinpointing the significance of the third turn in logic, that is, the logic of the postmodern dialectics' (p. 41). In his attempt to define the so-called postmodern dialectics, the author says, 'It is a dialectics which takes into account the rupture of thought which Derrida talked about, and gets ruptured accordingly. A dialectics which is able to hold this collapse within its logical playground and is amenable to "free play", the post-Neitzschean logic, and cannot be the same as dialectics itself, despite its continuity in the history of thought in a multi-dimensional

dialectics with qualitatively newer and infinite dimensions. This can be called *multilectics* or *polylectics*' (p. 41).

Dr Sugathan tries to show that the matrix of polylectics is not just confined to the binary tensions, dual and dyadic, or triadic and trichotomous at the maximum. Polylectics has 'the multiplicity of dimensions in each contradiction. A contradiction in polylectics is multipolar. The dialectics was so far as opposites. The "identity of opposites" in Hegel, the unity or "unity and struggle of opposites" in Marxism and the base-superstructure debate in it point at the binary level involvement of reason/thought/logic' (pp. 41–2). The dialectical thinkers like Mao-Zedong and Louis Althusser are also confined within the rigid frame of causal reason. 'Multiple polarity of reality is a matter of logicization yet to be reckoned with. Polylectics comes handy here' (p. 42). Finally the author gives an optimistic note that polylectics 'in the political and social arena ... can defend ethnicities, marginalized sections, and various life-options ... and this is the right step to avoid the fundamentalist sort of error' (p. 43).

Postmodernism is one of the very fertile areas of human enterprises. It has been vibrating since the '60s and '70s with new nomenclatures and conceptualizations, facing new challenges and criticisms during the '80s, and is still imbued with creativity and is alive to the new problems and perspectives in the society. Dr Sugathan himself was involved in the radical left movement during the '70s and '80s in Kerala and at JNU. With the collapse of socialism in the Central and East European countries during the '90s, which the People's Republic of China just managed to escape, young radicals like Dr Sugathan (not so young now) were forced to look for an alternative ideology, as an alternative to ideological hegemonies (Soviet Marxism in particular). Dialectics was taken into account to construct an alternative ideology, but, however, dialectics is itself responsible for the development of ideological hegemony, beginning with the 'totalizing efforts of reason' in Hegel. How can dialectics help to overcome ideological hegemony? It can not. Therefore Dr Sugathan introduces 'polylectics', that *of his own kind*.

In the first chapter, Dr Sugathan tries to present the path of reason; reason-passion conflict, the prevalence and rampancy including

occasional hibernation and the challenges reason faces. He gives an intellectually stimulating but brief account of Parmenides and Zeno, Socrates and Plato (pp. 5–7). He gives due emphasis on modern western Reason beginning with Descartes and taking into account the contributions made by Leonardo, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Locke, Rousseau and others (pp. 7–10). Out of three reasons that Kant has advocated, Dr Sugathan has discussed only one, i.e. pure reason, and that also in just two pages (pp. 11–12). A further development has been shown in Fichte and Schelling (pp. 13–14). On Marx and Marxism, he has given Marx's criticism of Hegel, Engels' and Lenin's articulations of dialectical materialism (pp. 14–17). Schopenhauer gives a new turn to the journey of reason, replacing it with will, not only with human will but also a cosmic one. The Reason and Passion conflict, which is so inherent in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, can be traced in Hume (pp. 18–25). This in fact is the beginning of postmodernism (pp. 22 and 29). Brief introductions to Derrida, Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, Julia Kristeva, Habermas and Lyotard have been furnished to create a background to polylectical possibilities (pp. 25–43).

In chapter two, Dr Sugathan goes into the details of Hegel's *System*, which includes *Logic, Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Spirit*. He has discussed 'contradiction' and 'sublation' as the two operative terms of the dialectics of reason (pp. 67–75). It is this dialectic of reason which has been applied to the study of history because 'reason is the law of the world and, that therefore, in the world history too, things have come about rationally' (p. 76, Hegel, *Philosophy of History*). Reason and reality also get united, 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' (Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*).

In chapter three, the author goes to the rush of ideas in Nietzsche, unlike the comprehensiveness of them in Hegel, the explosion-like scattering of insights, deeper and controversial ones. The Dionysian/Apollonian orders in the Greek drama have been highlighted with the contention that it can displace Christ (pp. 88–92). The ways of Nietzsche are read and used by Foucault and Derrida. The author gets an insight into the existence of ethnicity of consciousness and a reaction against equating life with logic (pp. 96–100). Hume's denial of necessary connection between cause and effect has also been used to substantiate

this point (pp. 100–101). Nietzsche's mistrust in all systems is what lies in the decline of metaphysics and consequently to the death of God (pp. 102–6). The author gives a cursory view of Nietzsche's influences on Foucault and Derrida on issues like language, representation, reality, truth, things and so on.

In chapter four, Dr Sugathan gives a comparative account of Hegel and Nietzsche with the aim to establish polylectics. He has drawn resources from reason and dialectics in Hegel (pp. 142–4), 'play' in Nietzsche (pp. 142–52) and deconstruction and difference in Derrida (pp. 154–62) for identifying and formulating polylectics. Identity is the central category of formal logic. Contradictions take place in Dialectical Logic. Free play can be, the author argues, adjudged the category of polylectics. Logic is useful to decode and dismantle the structures and the patterns of reality making it understandable to human epistemic processes. And logic is itself also undergoing such a process (pp. 163–70). This is the part of the demetaphysicization or a sort of demystification of reality itself. Here the author wishes to introduce Polylectics, which can represent the logic of breaks, ruptures and disintegration. Thus necessity/determinism/causality gets broken in polylectics (p. 171).

At the end in chapter five, Dr Sugathan has attempted to furnish a redefinition of Reason; that 'Reason is everywhere from full to nil, from cent to zero, in history, ethnicity, religion, secular, linguists even in irrationality' (pp. 175–9).

Taking into consideration the divergent positions and viewpoints, quite often mutually contradictory concepts concerning logic, dialectics and polylectics that Dr Sugathan has so painstakingly collected, arranged and presented, he should be congratulated. Besides sweeping generalizations almost everywhere in the book, the author does succeed in throwing new lights on most of our outdated categories. The method of dealing with the philosophers is indeed polylectical.

Notwithstanding this merit of the book, I am myself more concerned with the following points of difference or amendments for further debate and discussion.

To begin with, polylectics cannot be regarded as the third turn in logic (p. 41). It could however be regarded as the fourth turn-formal logic (Aristotle) Transcendental Logic (Kant) Dialectical Logic (Hegel and Marx) and fourth could possibly be polylectics (though I'll recommend that with certain reservations). In *Positions*, Derrida with the logic of *difference* does the same. The *pharmakon* is neither remedy nor poison, the *hymen* is neither confusion nor distinction, *gram* is neither signifier nor signified, *spacing* is neither space nor time (Derrida, *Positions*, etc., pp. 43, also please see, *Dissemination*, pp. 20–40).

Instead of giving a superfluous account of metaphysical issues and causal patterns of modernity being questioned, the author should have gone into the causes of the breaking of causal bindings, reasons for the disruptions of reason, the modes and extent to which the subjective, objective and historical metaphysics is challenged; the collapse of linearity, singularity and absoluteness, etc. A serious reflection on these issues will inevitably take us to a re-reading of modernists' texts, inscriptions and discourses. For instance, if we read Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637) and *Meditations* (1642), we come across what I call Central and the Marginal issues. At the centre of Descartes' philosophy, we find *cogito*, truth, certainty, moral issues, dualism, God, etc. At the Margins of his philosophy, we find demon, deception, madness, sin, fantasy, sexuality, absurdity, diabolic acts, emotions, passions, etc. The central issues of Cartesian modernity got their philosophical growth and development in the succeeding philosophical systems like those of Galileo, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Marx. Thus four grand narratives of European modernity come up—Foundationalism, Essentialism, Teleology and Logocentrism. The marginal issues were also moving at a relatively slow pace but could never find a philosophical basis. It was during the time of Marx, especially in the writings of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that an incredulity to modernist metanarratives was seriously raised. There was growing awareness of new problems wrought by societal rationalism, the explosion of new informational technologies and the emergence of new social, ethnic and subaltern movements. The modernist assumption was that we had a 'glassy essence' that could be rationally perceived and interpreted through particular ideologies, but postmodernism smashes that glass. It was at this time that we found an *internal departure* from modernity to the so-called postmodernity, an attempt to recognize the potentialities of these marginal issues. If modernity breaks with the

endless reiteration of traditional (classical) themes, topics and myths; postmodernity operates at the places of closure in modernity, at the margins of what proclaims itself to be new and a break with tradition. To be modern means to search for new self-conscious expressive forms. To be postmodern is to marginalize, delimit, disseminate and decentre the primary and often secondary works of modernist inscriptions. It implies that the line of demarcation between modernity and postmodernity remains a matter of uncertainty because postmodernity operates at the edge of modernity. That is why Lyotard says that 'postmodernity is a re-writing of modernity'.

Further, in polylectics, Dr Sugathan argues in favour of multiplicity of dimensions in contradictions (pp. 41–2) over and above the formal (the transcendental) and the dialectical logic. The basic questions, however, are: (1) What, after all, is the fundamental basis of our act of philosophizing? (2) Is multiplicity operating in it? To answer the first question, we can say that we have three possible acts of philosophizing; (a) we go from *one* to *many* like those in Plato, Hegel, Marx or eight to ten schools of the Vedantins; (b) we go from *many* to *one* like Schopenhauer, *Nyaya-Vaisesika* (theory of Atomism); (c) we go from *many* to *many* like those of *Jainism*, *Samkhya*, *Yogacara Buddhism*, *purva Mimamsa*, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Russell, Derrida, etc. It is under this act of philosophizing that I can recommend multilectics. We have a profound exposition of multiplicity in Marx's analysis of Capital in which the cause is one but there are multiple effects. Private property could be the one such cause with multiple effects like 'exploitation of the working class', of 'unemployment', of 'competition and anarchy of production', of 'class-struggle' and so on. But this position could not be equated with Polylectics because for Marx there is an underlying principle of 'unity and struggle of opposites', but Polylectics is unprincipled, opportunist and quite arrogant. Polylectics seems, like in guerrilla warfare, to attack quickly and run back, to puncture and parody and to defuse through refusing to take a thesis seriously.

Besides these charges, I would in the following enlist such issues, which should have been dealt with seriously and comprehensively:

(1) The author has not even touched the three pillars of European modernity like Foundationalism, Essentialism and Teleology.
(2) The Enlightenment Movement developed by Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume and Condercet needs to be discussed. Special attention should be given to Kant's Enlightenment rationality published in the *Berlinischer Monatsschrift*, December 1783 issue, entitled *Beanwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklaerung*? or 'Answer to the Question: What is the Enlightenment?'.
(3) Kant's paradigm of three 'reason' (p. 10) needs to be explored further. European modernity revolves around these reasons where 'pure reason' self-reflexively comes to grasp the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility, validity and limits of synthetic *a priori* judgements, 'practical reason' can give rise to categorical imperatives and the 'Judgement' can discern what is beautiful and sublime.
(4) Since the critique of logocentrism (p. 42) lies at the basis of postmodern thinking, the five meanings of the *logos* should have been explained; such as those of Heraclitus, the sophists, the stoics, the *Bible* and that of Socrates.
(5) Critical theory is not simply just what Habermas has said (pp. 33 and 38). In fact, the Institute for Social Research was founded at Frankfurt in 1923 with Max Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and others. Habermas belongs to the second generation of critical theorists and we have already come to the third generation. All this needs to be explored.
(6) A study of European modernity requires extracting the central and marginal issues. In decentering the central issues and centering the marginal issues in the modernists' inscriptions, the postmodernists have expanded the horizons of modernity. Thus continuity between modernity and postmodernity could be established.
(7) In the last chapter, Dr Sugathan has given 16 definitions of reason with the contention that 'reason is neither this nor that, but it is there' (pp. 175–9). Is it not the same kind of an argument which the theologians have given about God? I wonder!

Despite these shortcomings, it has to be unanimously accepted that Dr Sugathan's book is intellectually stimulating, informative and provocative. I wholeheartedly recommend the book to teachers, researchers and general readers who wish to improve their understanding of the subject from author's chosen point of view.

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PRAFULLA KUMAR PANIGRAHI: *The Theory of Zero Existence* (New Delhi, Sarup and Sons, 2002), pp. 90, Rs 150

In the preface the author begins by saying he propounds a theory that bridges the gap between the findings of higher physics and those of vedanta. He further asserts that the book establishes the world as illusion and also identifies the mother of this illusory creation for the first time.

In the first chapter called 'Maya and Her Duality' the author explains the horizontal and vertical duality of the opposing principles of the world which are really complementary. In the horizontal duality two opposing principles, first and second, constitute one single whole. This is further explained by material objects and non-material sky, matter and energy, proton and electron, etc. In vertical duality two opposing principles, first and second, are one and the same. This is explained by wave-particle duality of light and electron, individual cell and the whole organism etc. He further explains the dependence of the sub-atomic particle's nature on the observing mind as either wave or particle and comparing this with the concept of Maya of Shankara as the power of Brahman which conceals the real and superimposes the unreal on it, the author comes to the conclusion that the object is an illusion. At the end of the first chapter the author concludes with stating the vertical duality of creation of the phenomenal world and Brahman as first and second respectively.

Now what the author calls duality is what philosophers and mystics called the dual nature or the dual aspect of reality. Active spirit and passive nature or essence of mind and essence of matter or being and thought. Now both are real and it depends on the plane of reality whether it is being or thought or a combination. The ultimate expressing different aspects at different planes. Everything is real in its own plane. So it is not right to say matter and energy are only attributes of subatomic objects. At the subatomic plane they are the substance. In that realm they are real. What quantum theory proves is there is no independent reality, in other words, the inter-dependence of subject and object. What the author calls non-physical space and physical objects (phenominal world) and matter and energy (physical world) are one and the same thing. This is because the quantum field is nothing but energy field. So space is nothing but different forms of energy field. Now if by Brahman the author means the highest plane of the reality, it is not correct to call it the second of the phenomenal world in vertical duality. Brahman as the highest plane is beyond duality, opposition and comparison.

In the second chapter called 'Maya and Her Tridhara' the author describes the whole cosmos as existing in and through tridhara of Maya. The first is positivity or plus one. When wakeful, if an idea corresponds with an external object, it is plus one. The second is nullity and its concept is zero. If there is neither idea nor anything external it is called zero. Third is negativity, called minus one. Here there is only idea in the mind. This is produced by plus one acting on zero. The author further reduces all into minus ones by first showing the existence of zero in mind as concept and then explaining the wave-particle duality of sub-atomic objects and the principle of complementarity of Bohr which states sub-atomic objects are wave and particle at the same time and at any time the nature depends and is decided by the observing mind which proves the so-called plus ones are also minus ones. The author further argues that for the formation of the world which is absolute minus one there must be absolute plus one and that is Brahman. The absolute minus one or the phenomenal world is produced by the action of absolute plus one or Brahman on zero or Maya.

The author's nullity or concept of zero is debatable. As he himself later says, as there is concept of zero in the mind, it is minus one. But then he compares Maya with zero. Throughout the book, and even the title of the book, suggests the author takes Maya as zero existence. Now even nothing or non-being is a concept. As a concept it is minus one. Zero existence is a concept. As a concept it is minus one. So there are only two categories possible, plus one and minus one. Now if Maya or zero is not an entity, a plus one (brahman) cannot act on it. If the author considers mother maya as an entity or existence it is not zero. Now from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle or Bohr's complementarity principle one cannot prove that the world is minus one but rather that the nature of reality also depends on and is determined by the observing mind or the interdependence of subject and object.

In the third chapter called 'Maya and Her Relativity' the author explains the relative existence of everything like space, time, mass, volume, etc. (except the velocity of light) by explaining Einstein's theory of relativity and concludes that velocity of light is infinite and all the objects in the world lie between zero and infinite velocity. As the world is a creation of mind and velocity of light has cancelling effect on the velocity of mind they influence each other so both of them cannot be absolute. Now as the human mind knows plus one only as minus one so it is deficient so cannot be absolute. So the absolute is pure consciousness or Brahman which as plus one acting on zero (Maya) mind is produced.

The author's view that everything is between zero and infinite velocity is a novel idea which needs further discussion. As I said earlier, the world is not minus one but reality as a different aspect or plane other than the highest plane and zero which is non-being cannot be the cause of the world.

In the fourth chapter called 'Maya and the Point of Dissolution' starting from the particle wave duality the author establishes everything is activity and so becoming. The author further says time is only a mental concept and not objective reality. He explains why time stops for someone who travels at the velocity of light. This is because when one travels at the velocity of light all activities are cancelled by the velocity of light. So time, being an index of change of activity, also

stops. This also means stopping of mental activities. So there is dissolution of both observing mind and observed world. Then being alone remains. This is Brahman, the pure consciousness. He further states that the cessation of volume is due to stopping of mind and mass does not become infinite as Einstein says but also dissolves.

The author's view of everything as activity and the dissolution of mind, volume, mass at the velocity of light is a novel idea which need further consideration. Time as mental concept is similar to Kant's view of time as *a priori*. But as Hegel says, time is not only subjective but also objective reality. The changes in activity or duration is real in objects. Now time stops, mass becomes infinite and volume zero of an object travelling at the velocity of light, to an observer who is not moving with it. For the thing in itself there is no change. Relativity theory is relative to an observer from another frame.

In the fifth chapter called 'Maya and Her Amazing City' he states that as mass and volume are different aspects of the same object, when one becomes zero the other also becomes zero and not as Einstein's theory which says that mass become infinite when volume becomes zero at the velocity of light. Further he argues that zero and infinity are the same because all numbers are limitations so we cannot get infinity by increasing numbers. Not only is light at absolute motion but also at absolute rest. This is because when one travels at the speed of light time stops but as velocity is the relation between unit of time and distance, when one is zero there will be no motion.

As I said earlier, the theory of relativity is relative to an observer from another frame. It does not say the object in its own frame changes. For an object with the velocity of light, there is no change in time, volume or mass. The author's view that true infinity is beyond numbers is a novel idea. But both increase in number and decrease in number are limitations. Zero is the concept of absence of quantity so it is also inadequate to the concept of infinity. The author's view that light is in absolute motion and absolute rest is debatable. Now light has a velocity of 300,000 km/sec. An object with the speed of light time stops for the observer not for the object. So there is no point in saying there is no time element for light. Light takes minutes or days to reach earth from the sun or other stars. So there is a specific velocity. So it is not

infinite or absolute motion, and lastly zero and infinity are not the same.

In the sixth chapter called 'Maya and the Nature of her Creation', stating light velocity as both zero and infinity, he says light is both at absolute rest and absolute motion. He further elaborates the massless character of the light photon and the zero volume of the light velocity object to the observer hence concluding that light is zero or non-existence, so that the velocity of light is absolute. All the other existences which are minus ones are produced by this zero, velocity of light, so this is Maya herself. In explaining the Heat-Death theory the author illustrates the creation from zero or infinite point. Just a fraction later there is maximum energy and minimum matter. This is also the point of maximum velocity and hence activity. There is waxing and waning process and at some other point matter become maximum and energy minimum, then at zero or infinity point there is dissolution of universe.

As we said earlier, light has a definite velocity. So it is neither zero nor infinite. Activity also depends on frequency. In fact the activities of the human brain during waking, dreaming and deep sleep are measured by alpha, beta, and delta waves with different frequencies. Now light is only one member in the electromagnetic spectrum. Only the velocity of EMR is the same but it contains radio waves with the least frequency to cosmic rays with the highest frequency. So if we take frequency as the parameter of activity as there is in EMR waves with other frequencies, we cannot say light is in absolute motion or rest. It is true that photon is massless but the zero volume is not that of light but to an observer of any other object with the velocity of light relative to the observer. So we cannot conclude from this that the velocity of light is absolute.

In the seventh chapter called 'Maya and Her Lord' he states that the brahman or pure consciousness or plus one acting on Maya or velocity of light or zero form mind and the mind create the world which is the minus one. When we reach the plane of zero the minus one or the world disappear. If we observe zero from the plane of plus one zero also dissolves, then only Brahman remains and we come to the realization that both the world and Maya are Brahman. Further he argues that maya (illusion) itself is the proof that the real is Brahman.

Now the concept of Maya as velocity of light is debatable. Now velocity is only a property. It depends on a substance. It has no independent existence. The author, throughout the book, takes maya as a being or entity. He refers to maya as she or her. Now is maya illusion? According to Kashmir shaivism, Maya is real and denotes limiting power (emanating principle) by which the five kanchuka evolved. In vedanta also badarayana and other commentators like Ramanuja and Madhava treat the universe as real. Now the concept of Maya of Shankara as the power of Brahman which conceals the real and superimposes the unreal is from the highest plane where except Nirguna Brahman everything is unreal. Now the reality of Maya or illusion is taking the material world as something devoid of mind. According to self-realized men, reality is knowledge (thought or mind). The two aspects of the knowledge are thought and images (discursive mind and imaginative mind or in Hegel's terminology speculative thought and picture thought). Now what mystics says illusion is taking this imaginative thought as something devoid of mind or as inert matter. Another point is when the author talks about maya as the cause of mind and world the author's concept of maya is that of being or essence of matter or prakriti which acted upon by essence of mind or purusha forms the world, but maya is not only the nonspiritual principle of reality but also the emanating power. When we reach brahman or at realization, it is not dissolution of world or maya but realization that all are different aspects or planes of brahman, which is the highest plane and everything is real in its own plane.

Now the ultimate is neither mere affirmation nor mere negation. It is a dialectics of affirmation and negation. The highest vision is of course not diversity or multiplicity but neither is it unity. The state of self-realization is a dialectics of unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity.

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RADHIKA SRINIVASAN: *Sacred Space* (A Journey Through the Spirit of Asian Art), 2002, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, pp. 168, 24 colour plates, Rs 325

The book *Sacred Space* explores the concept of space in different contexts of Asian art traditions beginning from the external space in structures, forms in movement, sound and time; and leading to the inner space of man within. Like a philosopher the author gradually leads the reader to the unity of time and space, the two parameters, cancelling each other yet complementary and often used interchangeably, and finally reaches to the space of consciousness within. It is by realizing this space one touches the Divine within oneself. The book interestingly enough presents a reflective journey through the Asian art to the final destination of the realization of the Divine within us.

It is the sacred space, the space which is meant to provide a place for the gods to live in. The journey starts with the exploration of the sacred external space in all its different manifestations in temples, sculpture, dance and musical notes and explores the inner space, the *chidākāśa* in man.

The approach of the author is to study art monuments of Asia to explain the common threads of symbolism in the architecture of temples, the religious sculptures and the Divine Being. The author has cited the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts to explain the symbolism of the architectural space and of the form of religious sculptures of Viṣṇu, Śiva, Śakti and Buddha. It is true that the author is able to convey to her readers something of her experience and her own sensations of the presence of the Supreme spirit while going through a temple. In this regard the book is a good example of the involvement of the author who has lived with the subject. As a result the analysis of the subject is far more illuminating and greater than any art historian's description of the architecture and other arts in the context of space. It is because of the intimate involvement with the subject that the author could treat the subject in all seriousness yet present it in a way that it could be understood by a lay reader.

The author has tried to delve deep into the layers of space in the Asian tradition, citing the literal meaning of space as hollow, cavity,

fountainhead or source to sky and void. The term has been used in various symbolic contexts of sacred structures of temples, sculptures, *stūpas*, dance in movement, sound and music and finally the inner space, time and consciousness. It is interesting to read the meaning and imagery of circular fire altars representing the cosmic time. The cosmic body of Puruṣa corresponding to the human body with all its limbs, senses and apertures, leading to the abstract thought of space. She has based her explanations and symbolism on the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts.

The idea of space behind the sacred structures is commonly upheld by all the Asian countries. She tries to re-establish the common threads in architectural terms, building material, names for sculptors etc., by citing instances from literature, religious texts and common names prevalent in Bali, Nepal, Kerala and other Asian regions. For instance, the workmen who decorated the temples belonged to the wood carvers' class and were known as *takṣaka*. Wood was commonly used for building the earliest sacred edifices originating from the wooden shaft used for Vedic rituals. Similarly, the symbols of temples of Hindu and Buddhist tradition, from 100 BC to 10th century AD, are compared to medieval temples and *linga* sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. The imagery of a temple as a mountain and cave is used in many Asian countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Bali, Burma and India. She has also referred to the different terms used for cave as *Ku* or *Guha* in Myanmar, *Giri* in Cambodia and *Meru* (axis) in Bali, whereas in India. Meru, Mandara and Kailāśa are terms denoting temples in ancient texts—the *Brihat Samhitā* and the *Matsya Purāṇa*. She even goes on to describe the architectural space of the temple in terms of human body corresponding the inner space of *garbhagriha* to that of the inner space of the heart shrouded in darkness, the *Hridayākāśa*. As the supreme being resides in our heart, its symbolic form is established in the innermost space of the temple, the *garbhagriha*. She also gives the reasons for the profuse ornamentation on the outside walls of the temples while the innermost chamber is left vacant and dark. This inner space is left for the real occupant, while the outer space symbolizes the profusion of forms in the universe. The inner space signifies the heart when it realizes the Supreme Being. That state comes after renunciation

of all desires. Thus the physical space is transformed through architecture of the temple into a metaphysical space. She has explained the presence of architectural space in the temples of *nāgara* as well as *dravida* styles. According to her the *nāgara* temple presents space in vertical form of the *śikhara* whereas *dravida* temple, surrounded by *gopuram*, is the example of horizontal space. The *gopuram* represents the feet of the deity. Here the vertical and horizontal lines converge at the centre that is the sanctum, which is the heart and head of the god in *nāgara* and *dravida* temples respectively. In this way the compassion and wisdom of the Supreme being is significantly explained by the author. The vertical space is emphasized in the pyramidal Hindu temple of Brihadiśvara at Tanjore while the *stūpa* presents an ideal model of horizontal expansion.

The idea of cosmic being dwelling in the cavity of hearts of all beings has been emphasized in all Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts. While describing the temple the author has always emphasized the justification of using architectural forms and also gives supportive evidence by quoting texts. For instance, the doorway of the temple also frames the image of the sanctum, or the *gavākṣa* is so placed that the sunlight only illuminates the face of the image. In this way she has tried to explain the structural symbolism of the temple architecture from the point of view of *yoga* to enhance the understanding of the visitor. The representation of the twenty-sided plan of the *adhiṣṭhāna* corresponding to the twenty gross and subtle *tattvas* consisting of five senses, producers and their productions, five sheaths and five elements and four sides of the temple delineate the four mental states, the *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra*, *Manas* and *Prakriti*. She has referred to the architectural examples from the temples of Angkorwat at Cambodia, Chandi Prambanam at Central Java and Chandi Borobudur thus including all the important religious sects of Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva and Buddhist to emphasize that the philosophical symbolism is universally followed in all the temples and sculptures irrespective of place, time and religious affinity.

She has also clarified the concept of space in the context of sacred images. Here space manifests in the form of the image itself. As in dance it is the body of the dancer in movement which is taken as

space. The images of Buddha, Viṣṇu or Śiva in the Asian tradition have developed more as a personification of an ideal than as a means to deify a historical figure. From the external manifestations of space, the readers are led to the abstract concept of space in structural form in movement, i.e., dance and space in temporal arts as rhythm and order.

After going through the book one feels that the artist must become a mystic in order to understand and create these types of space. The true nature of classical Asian art is to realize beauty beyond the limitations of physical and mental space. The author has glorified traditional Indian art as proper art that extends to an order of beauty. Though she accepts that proper art may be static or fossilized in the convention but it has significant form that leads the viewer to contemplation and enjoyment which is called *rasa*. This feeling of enjoyment is universal.

As far as the analysis of the sacred space and its philosophical symbolism is concerned, the book is technically sound but it lacks in the representative examples of images and temples. The author has focused her analysis around the temples of Angkorwat, Chandi Prambanam, Chandi Borobudur of Cambodia, Java and Indonesia; and of *stūpas* of Nepal, Bali etc. Only some passing references to a temple of the south and the *stūpa* of Sanchi have been given in the book, while the supportive evidences from the texts are only confined to Indian literature. This imbalance in the representative illustrations and literary examples may lead a lay reader to believe that Indian heritage is lacking in representative examples, while it is *vice versa*, the examples of temples, *stūpas*, images of Viṣṇu as Śeṣaśāyī, Śiva as Maheśamūrti of Elephanta, sculptures of *pañchamukha lingam* and the cave architecture of Ajanta and Ellora would also have served as representative examples of space.

The book has an exhaustive bibliography, glossary and index.

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NEELIMA VASHISHTHA

J.N. MOHANTY: *Classical Indian Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. x + 180, Rs 425

The book begins with a brief history of the development of Indian philosophy, i.e., from Vedas to the rise of Navya Nyāya in Mithilā—from Vedas to the systems of Indian philosophy. The book is later divided in to epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, religion, art and aesthetics. It gives the reader a clear concept of epistemological ideas and their development through time, making their inherent meaning explicit and their interconnectedness clear.

The Theory of Knowledge section, i.e., Part I, discusses the various sources of valid knowledge, i.e., *Pramā*. The Sanskrit terms used in philosophical discourse are defined. The questions about these sources—that were asked and answered by the different systems of philosophy—are discussed. While elaborating the six *Pramāṇa*, a list of *Pramāṇas*, as recognized by different schools is also given. The author has also discussed these *Pramāṇas* with reference to different schools. For example, all schools accepted perception as a true cognition, but they did not agree regarding the nature of perception such as, Nyāya, Vaiśesika and Mimānsā separate the casual process, i.e., *Pramāṇa* and its result, i.e., *Pramā*, others as Buddhists of Vijnanvad school and Jains regard the cognition itself to be both *Pramāṇa* and *Pramā*.

After surveying all the modes of knowledge, theories of false cognition or illusion are also considered. The idea of ignorance is very important not only to Indian epistemology but also to the Indian metaphysical systems. For awareness of ignorance, illusion or *Apramā* is the starting point of logical thinking. A true cognition arises by destroying the past ignorance of the object being known and this awareness that the object was unknown makes one start thinking consistently and logically. The problem of truth and falsity, being intrinsic or extrinsic, is also discussed.

Dr Mohanty, then, takes up the problems of metaphysics, i.e., *Padārthas*, Self—its goals, i.e., *Purushārthas*, causality, relations, part and whole, existence of the external world, is the world real? Identity and difference as propounded in Vedānta, absolutism versus non absolutism (*Anekāntvāda*).

Later, Dr Mohanty deliberates philosophy of religion. He begins with disagreeing with the widely held view that philosophy in the Indian tradition was inseparable from religion, just as religion was deeply philosophical. He does not discuss major Indian religions but philosophy of religion, i.e. philosophical questions which arise from the reflection of religions themselves. He begins with the nature of Vedic traditions, making clear that it is not a historical religion in the sense that it is founded by a prophet or based on a book at an identifiable part of time. Vedic religion, at best, is called a natural religion. The Vedas record everything that was known, derived from the root *vid*—to know, and from which entire culture began. Not having an author, they are called *apauruśeya*. Every subject, art, music, aesthetics originated from them.

Dr Mohanty has also deliberated the three paths for Moksha, i.e., path of knowledge, action and devotion, both as alternatives for religious life or a synthesis for reaching the goal of religious life. The problem of evil is also included.

The basic problem throughout the book has been subject-object dualism, the distinction between means of knowing and the object of knowing. Even in the chapter on Dharma and Rasa, the dualism is between the possible objects of knowing, namely moral laws and aesthetics and the means of apprehending them. Although Indian philosophy is determined by subject-object dualism, there is also a tendency on the part of philosophers to overcome the dualism.

From the time of Upanishads, philosophers have pointed out the positive possibility of a kind of experience or knowledge that is beyond the subject-object dualism, knowing of *Brahman* is also becoming *Brahman*: '*Brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati*'. Once ignorance is removed the knowledge of nature of *Brahman* stands unconcealed—it is self-revealing. Knowledge in this sense, Dr Mohanty states, has no object. This knowledge is not produced, it is not acquired through *pramāṇas*, and it is self-revealing once its concealment is removed. It is not someone's knowledge. This knowledge is eternal, universal—the foundation of all things. The goal of human beings is to realize it.

Throughout the book, his style remains lucid and precise. His style of depicting the problems of knowledge and metaphysics remains true

to the traditional techniques of Indian philosophy, on one hand, while on the other, he also makes use of the conceptual thinking of western thought. The author has successfully made the metaphysical concepts of Indian philosophy clear for a beginner without losing their depth and subtleties. The language is simple, clear and makes very good reading.

The contents give the number of pages to be 181, but the page 181 is missing.

The bibliography is exhaustive. The book has an appeal for both a beginner as well as a scholar.

If this book could be translated in Hindi, a large section of students of Hindi-speaking regions would also be benefited.

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ARUNA ANAND: *Patanjala Yoga Evem Jaina Yoga ka Tulnatmak Adhyana*, Bhogilal Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, distributed by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, pp. 328, Rs 695

Here is a piece of research on Jaina Yoga compared to Pātanjala Yoga. The work is, no doubt, produced with expert deep penetrating acumen after exhaustive study of Jaina Yoga in the light of Patānjala Yoga. As it is believed that Patanjali was the first to offer the systematic study on Yoga, hence much credit has been given to him unequivocally by all, though the learned author took no pain to trace the historical antiquity of Patanjali. Perhaps the author presumed without any sense of controversy that Patanjali preceded the thinkers of Jaina thoughts on the subject, whereas it is glaringly clear from the impartial study of the aphorisms of the Yoga Sūtra text that the technical terminology and phraseology used in it is very much borrowed from various texts of Jaina cannonical works. The philosophy evolved from the text of the Yoga Sūtra does not reveal, directly or indirectly, any clue of continuity of any previous thought of the orthodox school of Indian philosophy.

At most it seems an independent work on spiritual philosophy and spiritual practice duly influenced by all the currents of contemporary thoughts prevalent at the time when Patanjali (if he is generally the real author of Yoga Sūtra) wrote the important thought-provoking work on yoga, which influenced the entire thought world including the Bhagwata Gītā and others later on.

The present work has been divided in seven chapters. In the opening chapter the author describes first of all the philosophical background of spiritual sādhanā of Patanjali and Jaina system and brings out the difference in approaches of the two. Jaina texts have widely used the word 'yoga', but with different connotation from that used in Patanjali's text. The Jaina used it as inlet source of the influx of Karman in the region of soul, which is eventually shut down voluntarily by way of tapasyā; whereas the writer of Yoga sūtra used the word in the sense of voluntary efforts of the individual to resist the perversion by way of eightfold organs of personal discipline (astāṇga mārga). The Jainas used their technique to trace the path of liberation. Patanjali is anxious to control and restrain the mental vibrations for spiritual emancipation. Later on Patanjali's interpretation and approach became popular, so much so that every system of Indian tradition re-traced its steps and revised the exposition of their respective philosophies accordingly.

Historically the author based his study of Yoga Sūtra on three available commentaries of Vyāsa Muni, Gyanā Nanda and Swāmi Narain comparing with Jaina Yoga as propounded by Jainācārya Haribhadra Suri, Muni Jina Vijai, Āchārya Shubha Chandra, Hema Chandra Suri and Upādhyāya Yasho Vijai.

In the third chapter the main purport of Yoga is elucidated in detail in the form of samprajnāta and asamprajnāta classification. In Jaina Yoga adopting the anekāntavadi temper the reconciliatory technique of attaining transparency of spiritual sādhanā is the goal in self-realization. Hari Bhadra in this reference discusses ādhyātmika yoga, bhāvanā yoga, samatā yoga with all its vicissitudes based on samyak-darśana and samyak jñāna. On further study the author discusses in detail as to who is really eligible for yoga-sādhanā. Different classifications of eligible yogis on that basis are elaborate in both the systems.

The fourth chapter is devoted to yoga and ethics to attain the kaivalya level of sādhanā. Patanjali insists on eightfold path, whereas the Jaina system bases on three jewels (triratna) of sādhanā, i.e. right vision (darśana), right cognition (jñāna), and right conduct (cāritra). In this context the author refers to the philosophical theory of non-absolutism, theory of relativity and seven-fold logic. Also the basic postulates of Jaina philosophy, basic elements of Jaina asceticism and detailed expositions of vows of Jaina ethics have been discussed in the continuation. Brief reference of Karma-bandha, destiny and voluntary efforts are also given in this chapter.

The fifth chapter deals with the evolutionary stages of spiritualism. Pātanjala Yoga Sūtra mentions five stages of spiritualization by way of self-control through yoga exercises. Jaina thinkers, consistently with the Jaina spiritual tradition, mention with great details the 14 stages of spiritual evolution (gunasthānas). Such evolution takes place by way of ascetic penance along with yogic control of mind. In order to attain liberation from Kārmic bondage it is necessary to make efforts to free the entire existence of mind, body and soul from the clutches of devil-karma. In this way the sādhanā-range of Jainas is much wider than that of the Yoga Sūtra. Both the systems do full justice to dhyāna-process to realize the purity of soul. This is, as a matter of fact, the ultimate goal of life, i.e., Kaivalya.

The sixth chapter vividly deals with the fruits obtained in human life by yogic sādhanā and ascetic penance. In Yoga Sūtra such realized fruits are called siddhis. Varieties of Siddhis are realized by yama, niyama, āsana, prānāyama, pratyāhara and dhyāna, dhārma, samādhi. Similarly in Jaina Yoga several types of riddhis are detailed in Jaina scriptures. Some of them are: 18 buddhi-riddhis, 11 vikriyā-riddhis, 7 + 7 Kriyā-riddhis, 3 bala-riddhis, 8 aushadhi-riddhis, 6 rasa-riddhis, and 2 Kshetra-riddhis.

The last and concluding chapter beautifully summarizes the entire discussion so far done on yoga. The author rightly traces the root of yogic thought in the prehistoric period of Hiranyagarbha Rishabha Deva and presents a reconciliatory view of all the aspects of yogic practices in India. The entire discussion of this treatise is well-illustrated and supported with authentic references in footnotes, and an exhaustive bibliography facilitated with an index of special personages and technical terms used.

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ARVIND SHARMA: *Modern Hindu Thought: Essential Texts*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002

This book is a compilation of essential texts from different sources—speeches, biographies, pamphlets, autobiographies and letters, etc., of some of the eminent thinkers which record their views on Hinduism and Indianism. Sharma is a well-known name in the field of studies on Hinduism. But in this work he puts on a different mantle, that is, of an anthologist, presenting source materials interspersed with his own observations and comments on the issues and events. According to him the British rule in India should be viewed as a form of encounter (rather, forms of encounter) at two levels—an encounter between the culture of two countries, and a religious encounter between Christianity and Hinduism. As per his own admission: 'The cultural and religious encounter, with its horizon extended to the end of the twentieth century, when viewed through the lens of Hinduism, constitutes the theme of this book.' But in the process of going through the work the reader is likely to experience other forms of encounter, too.

A student of religious history of India is likely to be aware of the fact that the eighteenth century was a period of stagnation for Hinduism. The Bhakti movement spearheaded by the Sanths all over India was gradually losing ground. This movement had very successfully generated a new interest in Hinduism, with its dynamism and reformism. But the British rule in India and the cultural imperialism that followed it posed a new challenge before the educated elite of India, which the editor very rightly calls, the 'civilizational encounter'. This form of encounter could be displayed by four possible forms of reactions: (1) acceptance, (2) rejection, (3) resistance, and (4) selective adaptation

Here the editor prefers to capture the fourth form of reaction. He admits that the focus of the source book, 'lies in its attempt to foreground the pattern of "selective adaptation" without overlooking the three other elements in the Hindu response to this encounter.' Keeping this in view, the editor selects sixteen thinkers—Raja Ram Mohun Roy, Devendranath Tagore, Keshub Chunder Sen, Rāmakṛsna Paramahaṁsa, Swami Vivekānanda, Dayānanda Sarasvatī, Jyotirao Phule, Mahadev Govind Ranade, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Sree Narayan Guru, Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghose, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Jiddu Krishnamurti. The list covers an extensive period of Indian history from the first decade of the 19th century to the 1980s—almost a hundred years. Naturally, the reader is likely to come across a kaleidoscopic picture of Hinduism as a way of life. Sometimes it is moral, sometimes intellectual and in some cases it is aesthetic. Thus, the editor's selection of the representatives of the modern Hinduism provides a fascinating panorama of the Hindu view of life.

As we come to know from the preface, the editor intends to present the contents from a purely historical angle. But a sensitive reader may not feel so limited and is likely to be transported far beyond the limits of history. What he ultimately captures is not just the cultural and religious encounter between Christianity and Hinduism, but a different sort of encounter. It is an 'ideological encounter' between the two faces of Hinduism—the exotic, which extols non-idolatry, spiritual monism and *jñāna*; and the ugly, which prescribes a rigid social hierarchy and elaborate rituals for the attainment of the *svarga*. Such paradoxes of Hinduism come out very prominently through excerpts selected in this book.

Never the question—'What is Hinduism?' has stirred the Hindu mind so violently as in the post-Godhra period. One comes across people talking very excitedly about Hindu revivalism. But the moot question, that many of the Hindu protagonists are likely to ignore is—'Which aspect of Hinduism they want to revive?' This same question was asked by Ranade more than a hundred years ago, when he very frankly admitted, 'People seem to me to be very much at sea as to what they seek to revive.' The second question that any Hindu is likely to avoid

is—'What after all is Hinduism?' Is it there in the temples dedicated to innumerable gods and goddesses? Does its essence lie in the caste-wars? Is it there in the discourses offered by the televangelists? Is it there in the *Vedas*, *Upaniṣads*, *Gītā* or in the elaborate rituals? Even a hard-core Hindu fanatic would fumble in the face of such questions, for there is no definite answer. Vivekananda had asked this question, so had Tilak and Gandhi. All of them agree that Hinduism stands for a concatenation of many forms of beliefs and faiths. As Vivekananda very aptly says, 'From the very high spiritual flight of Vedanta philosophy ... to the low ideas of idolatry with multifarious mythology, the agnosticism of the Buddhists, and the atheism of the Jains, each and all have a place in Hinduism?' But what is the common centre to which the diverging radii coverage? It is the spirit of Hinduism itself—the spirit of adjustment and self-appraisal. Hindu dharma has been interpreted and reinterpreted since Saṁkara's attempt to save it from social rejection when it found an alternative faith in Buddhism. The challenge Śaṁkara had to face has resurfaced again and again, though not always in the form of social rejection. All the sixteen thinkers included in this book faced the challenge in the form of an alien culture. Along with this they also had to go through the process of self-appraisal to save Hinduism from its ugly repercussion, i.e. the overdose of ritualism, casteist bias and other forms of social evils. Therefore, the selections and excerpts from the writings of these great thinkers offer us a glimpse of two types of encounter, i.e. between Christianity and Hinduism, and between the ugly side and the beautiful side of Hinduism.

The reactions of the thinkers represented in this book, to the modernism perpetuated by the British rule, have different shades. Most of them belonged to the elite and educated class (excepting Rāmakṛsna Paramahaṁsa). Some of them wanted reform and restated Hinduism in the light of the rationalism and scientism of the West, without violating the basic character of Hinduism. But certain other thinkers were revivalists who wanted to revive the traditional Hindu spirituality of the Vedas and other sacred texts. But all of them in their own way had offered a constructive criticism of traditional Hinduism and highlighted its spiritual dimensions.

The first three chapters of the book are devoted to three stalwarts of the Brahmo Samaj movement—Raja Ram Mohun Roy, Devendranath Tagore and Keshub Chunder Sen. Incidentally, all of them were from the eastern part of India (to be more specific, from Bengal). Pointing out the historical compulsion behind such a process of the development of the modern Hinduism, Sharma very rightly points out, 'Bengal, in the east, was the first region in India to come under British rule (1757) in a major way' (154). So the book very justifiably starts with the selection of texts of Raja Ram Mohun Roy.

Raja Ram Mohun Roy (1772/74–1833) is the pioneer of modern Hinduism, if we mean by 'modern' the phase of Indian history projecting the interface between traditional Hinduism and Western rationalism. Though Roy learnt English at a later stage of his life, he was not totally oblivious of its impact on Indian intellectual psyche. The chapter devoted to Roy is most fascinating because it very successfully reveals the mind of a person, who in the words of F. Max Müller possessed three essential elements of manly greatness—'unselfishness, honesty and boldness.' Most of us are more or less aware of Roy's contributions, i.e. (1) his effort to separate the pure from the popular form of Hinduism (which subsequently led him to found the Brahmo Samaj), (ii) his sincere advocacy for the abolition of the practice of *Suttee*, and (iii) his keen interest in the introduction of western science. He was an unflinching monist, who would not accept any form of idolatry and religious pluralism—be it the polytheistic practice of traditional Hinduism or be it the idea of the trinity of the Christianity. One is simply struck by his critical and unbiased thinking. He, no doubt, defends his own brand of Hinduism by delving deep into the sacred texts of his own ancestors. But one sincerely feels that his entire reformist thought process is not inspired by any external influences, it comes straight from within. In this context the remarkable passage describing how he became modern India's first major Hindu reformer is very crucial. He writes:

> The physical powers of man are limited, when viewed comparatively, sink into insignificance; while in the same ratio, his moral faculties rise in our estimation as embracing a wide sphere of action, and possessing a capability of boundless improvement. If the short duration of human life be contrasted with the great age of the universe, and the limited extent of bodily strength ... we must necessarily be disposed to entertain but a very humble opinion about our own nature; and nothing perhaps is so well calculated to restore our self-complacency as the contemplation of our more extensive moral powers, together with the highly beneficial objects which the appropriate exercise of them may produce.
>
> On the other hand, sorrow and remorse can scarcely fail, sooner or later, to be a portion of him who is conscious of having neglected opportunities of rendering benefit to his fellow creatures. From considerations like this it has been that I (although born a Brahman and instructed in my youth in all the principles of the sect), being thoroughly convinced of the lamentable errors of my countrymen, have been stimulated to employ every means in my power to improve their minds and lead them to the knowledge of a purer system of morality.

This passage holds the key to understanding the personality of a man who had the courage of conviction to pursue the goal of his life inspite of strong social opposition and, in certain cases, public humiliation.

What may endear Roy to the women readers in particular is the discovery of the fact, that even the women of modern India cannot surpass his zeal in advancing the cause of women's liberation. The selections presented in this book very clearly unfold the honesty, sincerity and dynamism of the multi-faceted personality of Raja Ram Mohun Roy.

Second in the series comes Devendranath Tagore, another Bramho Samaji. But the selections provided by the author very distinctively bring out the difference between Roy and Tagore in their approach to life, as well as their process of self-appraisal. Devendranath's interpretation of Hinduism is more aesthetic and emotional which can easily be contrasted with Roy's intellectualism. His religious orientation comes from his own spiritual realization. Specifically, the passages where he narrates his spiritual experience at the sight of the star-studded sky are simply fascinating. Like Ram Mohun Roy, he searches for the basics of Hinduism in the sacred texts like the *Upaniṣads*, but he soon realizes

that all that is contained therein does not conform to the theory of God as an infinite and impersonal Being. So he is forced to use the method, better known as the 'selective use of scriptures', to provide a basis for his own version of religion. This method was used by subsequent Hindu thinkers to project their interpretation of Hinduism, thereby successfully concealing the paradoxical nature of the sacred texts.

The chapter on Keshub Chunder Sen very succinctly brings to the surface the contradictions involved in the life and thought of a person caught between the love of ones own culture and fascination for the alien culture. Like Roy and Tagore, he belongs to the Brahmo Samaj movement. But his inspiration is neither supported by the deep sense of concern for his fellow-men, nor based on internal conviction, as it happened in case of Roy and Tagore. Here is a man, who looks at his own religion through the lens of Christianity and western culture. It is very much evident from the passage where he epitomizes the impact of his tour to England. In a characteristic way he admits, 'I am now, thank God, a man of the world, and can say that England is as much my father's house as India.' The hypocrisy involved in his encounter with Hinduism comes out explicitly in Max Müller's account of Sen as described in his letter to his wife. Though later on he became more sympathetic in his interpretation of Hinduism and more radical in his criticism of the British culture, the inherent fascination with the West continues to be there. However, an intriguing dimension of his personality is indicated in this book through Rāmakṛsna Paramahaṁsa's account of the nature of their relationship.

All the three thinkers presented in the first three chapters are reformers and believers in spiritual monism. The intellectual streak in their thought and works cannot be overlooked. So the author provides a study in contrast by enlisting Rāmakṛsna as a modern Hindu thinker. He is modern because he encounters a society more or less soaked in the spirit of the then modernism. Rāmakṛsna's lack of education and his simplicity do not stand in the way of his own interpretation of religion. His deep involvement and experiments with different forms of religion, including Christianity and Islam, provide him with unparalleled conviction in the unity of religions. He, alone could announce with confidence that, 'wherever I look, I see men quarrelling in the

name of religion ... But they never reflect that He who is called Kṛsna is also called Shiva and bears the name of Primal Energy, Jesus, Allah as well.' These are words of a bhakta, a mystic, a realized soul. His brand of Hinduism has more relevance for the modern man than that of many others, presented in this book. This brand of Hinduism is for the intellectuals as well as the common mass.

Any account of Rāmakṛsna Paramahaṁsa's contribution to Hinduism is incomplete without a reference to Swami Vivekānanda. His interpretation of Hinduism in the light of Vedānta and Yoga are well-known and most often included in the syllabi of Indian universities. The author presents in detail Swami Vivekānanda's addresses at the Parliament of Religions. But what may be of great interest to the reader is Sister Nivedita's account, as well as his own account of his spiritual encounter with Goddess Kālī. Again Vivekānanda's own lyrical composition 'Song of the Sannyāsīn' reproduced at the end of the chapter is equally appealing. Another piece depicting his straightforward criticism of the missionary activities of the Christian order may be worth noting. He asks: 'You Christians, who are so fond of sending out missionaries to save the soul of the heathen—why do you not save their bodies from starvation?' It is particularly interesting in the modern context.

There is a shift in geographical theatre from the East to West with the enlisting of the modern Hindu thinkers Dayānanda Sarasvatī, Jyotirao Phule, M.G. Ranade, G.K. Gokhale and Bal Gangadhar Tilak in the subsequent chapters. The editor feels that this shift from the East to the Western part of India is not without a 'historical logic'. Bengal was the major region to come under British rule while the Western part came under its sway quite a while later. So the religious encounter had its impact accordingly. The description of such encounter starts with Dayānanda Sarasvatī, a man who was neither bred in western education nor had the knowledge of English. Yet the challenge posed to Hinduism by the British rule was countered in the intellectual and ideological front by him. He contributed in a major way to Hindu nationalism by emphasizing on the revival of the brighter dimension of Hinduism. Again, the reader is made aware of Dayānanda's two-pronged challenge—challenge to the alien culture and challenge to the false

doctrines passed in the name of *sanātana dharma*. His hard hitting views about the Vedic concepts as opposed to other religious ideals may evoke the interest of the readers, so also the records of his debate with the representatives of other religious faiths. At the same time, the rich tribute paid to him by Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan is evidence of his dynamism.

Jyotirao Phule's account of Hinduism very adequately projects an interesting foil to Dayānanda's revivalism. His brand of reformism is characterized by a rebel against the Brahmanical social order. His interpretation of Hindu mythology is truly innovative. Mahatma Phule's modernism is inspired by a passion for social justice, which does not stop him from conceiving the British rulers as the saviours.

On the other hand, the selection and excerpts included in the section on M.G. Ranade project the personality of a man, more patient and much less violent. As a member of the Prarthana Samaj, an institution inspired by Keshub Chunder Sen's version of Hinduism, he carried on the reformist movement, but with a difference. His source of inspiration was not the sacred texts of the Hindus, but the lives and works of the Sanths of Maharashtra. So the selections dealing with the bhakti movement are likely to unfold a much neglected aspect of the history of medieval reformist movement. Two interesting points referring to his personal life also attract the attention of the readers. Both the accounts are narrated by his wife. Inspite of his attack on the system of child marriage, he was forced to accept a child bride after the death of his first wife. She offers a detailed account of how it happened and the 'field realities that the reformer had to grapple with.' The second account is recorded in the end-notes. Ranade was opposed to Dayananda's revivalist movement, as he very rightly felt that Hinduism was too vast and too multifaceted to be caught within the scheme of revivalism. But when there was a planned attack on Dayānanda Sarasvatī by his opponents at Pune, he stood by him. These two accounts reveal the vulnerability as well as the inner strength of Ranade as a great person.

In the chapter devoted to G.K. Gokhale the author very rightly points out that 'G.K. Gokhale is of special interest to students of Hindu Thought on account of his close connection to Mahatma Gandhi.' Gokhale's call for 'spiritualizing public life' was interpreted by Gandhi as follows:

'All of us can surely cultivate the virtues of fearlessness, truthfulness, courage, meekness, fairness, straightforwardness, firmness and such like and devote them to the service of the country.' Gokhale's choice of his career as a teacher seems to be backed by this conviction. Here the selections provide a perfect picture of an honest and convinced reformist. But particularly interesting are Mrs Roy's accounts of his honesty. There seems to be no hiatus between what he preached and what he practised. The editor, at certain points, presents some good examples to show the moderation of Gokhale in contrast to Tilak's revolutionary attitude.

The next section naturally is devoted to Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a true revolutionary in speech, thought and action. The Indian readers of this source book are supposed to be aware of Tilak's two great contributions to modern Hinduism—his reinterpretation of *Bhagavat Gītā* in the light of *Karmayoga* and his endeavour to instil self-confidence amongst the people of Maharashtra by organizing public celebration of the worship of the Hindu God Ganapati and the Maratha hero Sivaji. The former was aimed at establishing the theory that the *Gītā* is essentially a book on *Karma yoga*, not *bhakti*. For him, *Gītā* preaches a way of action-oriented life for the cause of society and humanity at large. The latter was aimed at re-establishing the national pride, because, for Tilak, religion is an essential element of nationality. In fact, one cannot separate nationalism and religion in Tilak's thought. No other thinker, covered by this book, displays so much of pride in Hindu philosophy as Tilak does. His address at the meeting of 'Bharata Dharma Mahamandala' and his speech on *Gītā* at Amraoti must be meticulously scanned to assess his brand of nationalism and reformism.

Inclusion of Sree Narayana Guru, the saint from the south, comes as a surprise. Not many books on Hinduism discuss his views on the subject. He was born in the family of Ezhavas, who are considered to be low castes. Therefore, it is not surprising that he strongly felt, at that point of time, that one of the greatest needs for India was 'liberation from the competition among castes and religions.' Equally significant is his slogan 'One Caste, One Religion, One God for Man.' He was revered by some of the greatest like Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi. His way of activating Hinduism was quite different from others.

'It is striking that Sree Narayana Guru, unlike other leaders of modern Hinduism, was actively engaged in temple construction.' He envisioned the temple as the centre for spiritual and educational activities. He was a Saivite, but the selections presented in the book reveal that he was a broadminded, dynamic and rational thinker. Two conversations recorded in the book, one with a Christian missionary and the second with Sahodaran Ayyappan, who was in favour of wholesale conversion of Ezhavas to Buddhism, bring forth clearly Sree Narayan Guru's clarity of thought, the power of rational explanation and his sense of wit. The section entitled 'One Caste, One Religion and One God for Man' is equally appealing. One notes with interest, Sree Guru's way of defending Hinduism against Buddhism which, at that point of time, was thought to be a better alternative for the preservation of the self-esteem of the people of the lower caste.

In the section devoted to Rabindranath Tagore the reader may discover a different hue of Hinduism, which neither fully conforms to the Upanisadic spiritualism nor to any sort of *bhāktik* type of emotionalism. It is essentially an aesthetic representation of a religion which could only be envisioned by a poet of high order. It is best put in his own words: 'I felt that I found my religion at last, the religion of man, in which infinite became defined in humanity, and came close to me so as to need my love and co-operation.' Rabindranath calls Him, 'Jivan Devata'. Therefore, those interested in his interpretation of Hinduism may find the selection from the conversation between Albert Einstein and Tagore very useful. Tagore's conception of Hinduism as a form of universalism is aptly manifested in his attitude towards the 'culture of encounter' between British rule and Indian struggle for freedom. In Tagore's case the encounter pales into a form of synthesis between the East and the West. This ideal, in turn, provides the very basis of his ambivalent attitude towards Gandhi and his method of fighting against the British rule. The selections dealing with these dimensions are likely to attract the attention of the readers.

Mahatma Gandhi's autobiography as well as his views on religion, *ahimsā*, *satyāgraha*, are so well-known that it might have become quite difficult for the author to introduce novelty in the chapter. Arvind Sharma very frankly expresses his problem in dealing with Gandhi's

thought. He writes, 'The collected works of Mahatma Gandhi cover almost a hundred volumes and render an anthologist's task somewhat daunting.' So he tries to make the section on Gandhi something more informative by presenting the excerpts from Gandhi's book *Hind Swaraj*, originally written in Gujarati in the course of his voyage from England to South Africa in 1909. The selection deals with Gandhi's enunciation of the doctrine of *Satyāgraha*, *ahimsā* and primacy of the soul-force. The excerpts dealing with Gandhi's views on the caste-system also should deserve attention. Another important aspect which is dealt with in this chapter is the Jewish response to Gandhi's opinion regarding the application of the technique of *satyāgraha* in the context of the persecution of the Jews. The selections on this issue contain two long letters, one by Martin Buber and the other by J.L. Magnes.

The life and contribution of Aurobindo Ghose is also not unknown to the Indian intellectuals. So what is likely to hold the reader's attention are the accounts of his mystic experiences, especially his experiences in Alipore where he was imprisoned for one year. The detailed account of this experience is recorded in his Uttarpara speech. What really touches ones heart is his identification of the nation's interest with his god-realization. The following lines may offer us some idea on this:

> If thou art, then thou knowest my heart. Thou knowest I do not ask for Mukti, I do not ask for anything which others ask for. I ask only for strength to uplift this nation, I ask only to be allowed to live and work for this people whom I love and to whom I pray that I may devote my life.

Again, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is a well-known personality and a much read about author of a series of books on Indian philosophy and Hinduism. The chapter on Radhakrishnan, however, deals with his personal reflections on the Hindu view of life. He claims that religion is a form of experience and religious tolerance is the basic feature of Hinduism. This ultimately leads him to believe in the harmonization of the living faiths of mankind.

The concluding chapter presents the thoughts and reflections of Jiddu Krishnamurti, a modern Hindu in every respect. However, he does not

fit in with the basic focus of the book, i.e. the cultural encounters between British rule and the Indian struggle for freedom, on the one hand, and between Christianity and Hinduism, on the other. His views are too sophisticated and intellectual to be placed even within the broader and the extended notion of Hinduism. Even when he talks of the 'freedom from the self' and 'abnegation of me', in the context of the realization of the Truth, one notices the influence of Buddhism, more than that of Hinduism.

Selecting materials from the literature available on the thinkers, from Roy to Krishnamurti, is a herculean task. But the editor has done a wonderful job. He has taken meticulous care to project the benign face of Hinduism in the background of the cultural encounter between the British modernism and Hindu traditionalism. In the process the reader is likely to be amply rewarded with new insights about Hinduism.

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Books Received

1. Ram Murti Sharma: *Encyclopaedia of Vedānta*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 225, Rs 295.
2. J.N. Mohanty: *Between Two Worlds—East and West*, OUP, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 134, Rs 345.
3. Stephen H. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya (trs.): *Gangeśa on the Upādhi—The Inferential Undercutting Condition*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 160, Rs 250.
4. Raffaele Torella: *Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva*, M.L.B.D., New Delhi, 2002, pp. 272, Rs 650.
5. Prafulla Kumar Panigrahi: *The Theory of Zero Existence: Māyā: the Power Divine*, Sarup & Sons, New Delhi, pp. 88, Rs 150.
6. Rajendra Prasad: *Dharmakīrti's Theory of Inference: Revaluation and Reconstruction*, OUP, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 257, Rs 625.
7. Navjivan Rastogi: काश्मीर शिवाद्वयवाद की मूल अवधारणाएँ, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 2002, pp. 276, Rs 450.
8. Bimal Krishna Matilal: *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, OUP, 2002, pp. 438, Rs 645.
9. G.C. Nayak: *Philosophical Reflections*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 255, Rs 300.
10. Chha ya Rai and K.L. Sharma (Eds): यशदेवशल्य का दर्शन, ICPR, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 360, Rs 600.
11. G.V. Tagare: *The Pratyabhijañā Philosophy*, M.L.B.D., New Delhi, 2002, pp. 165, Rs 295.
12. Kireet Joshi: *Philosophy of Value-Oriented Education: Theory and Practice*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 768, Rs 325.
13. P.K. Jain: *Jaina and Hindu Logic—A Comparative Study*, Research Books, Delhi, 2002, pp. 216, Rs 400.
14. J.N. Singh: *Microcosm: Perceptible and Imperceptible*, Jain Publications, Delhi, pp. 139, Rs 250.
15. Mrinal Miri, *Identity and the Moral Life*, OUP, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 132, Rs 395.
16. S. Ranganatha Desika: *Esoteric Lalitha Trishathi*, International Humanitarian Services, Bangalore, 2002, pp. 60, Rs 30.

Errata

Relevance Logic: An Overview, JICPR, *Volume XIX, No. 2, April–June 2002*

Pages	Lines	Corrections		
20	21	of	to be replaced by	or
21	8	ε	"	⊃
24	5	stratifies	"	satisfies
24	24	B_1 B_2	"	$B_1 \wedge B_2$
28	37	$A \wedge \leftarrow A$	"	$A \wedge \neg A$
28	38	$A \wedge \leftarrow A$	"	$A \wedge \neg A$
31	25	$\vee$	"	$\odot$
32	8	$B \wedge C$	"	$B \odot C$
32	13	$A \vee B$	"	$A + B$
33	6	Thus	"	That
33	6	R distribution	"	R-Distribution
34	7	‘ ’	"	‘ ’

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,अे ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha,* (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൾ ḷ
ൿ ḷ.
ൻ ṉ
ർ ṟ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.