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Difference Principles, Demoted Democracy and Globalization Without Hegemonism

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
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I

My presentation would try to highlight three basic points contained in the very title of the paper, viz., (i) different forms of the Difference Principle, (ii) implication of demoted democracy, and (iii) critical defence of the ideal of Globalization without its usual attending character of hegemonism.

That humans should be treated equally is an ethical truism. That equals should *not* be treated unequally is also generally agreed upon. But the claim that unequals should *not* be treated equally, though often suggested, if not openly defended, is highly controversial.[1]

The problems of Globalization which, to my mind, deserve serious and critical attention concern the morally permissible modes of treating the 'unequals' within a given socio-historic situation—local, continental or global. That in this age of high technology and fast travel territorial demarcation in the contexts of culture and economy does not mean much needs to be borne in mind. Both 'culture' and 'economy', to my mind, are value-loaded terms. In this respect my thought is informed by the spirit of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*[2] and Adam Smith's[3] *Wealth of Nations* and *Jurisprudence*, Sidgwick's[4] *Methods of Ethics* and *Political Economy*.

Democracy, as most of us are aware, is like a soft, round straw hat which fits different heads of very many shapes and sizes.[5] History tells us how variously the term has been used by 'democrats', 'republicans', 'socialists', 'liberals' and 'dictators' of different types. One feels justified in bracketing these crucial concepts because they are not like a rigid designator with fixed connotations, and lend themselves to different

and, at times, even incompatible interpretations. For example, some Republicans may be liberal and some Democrats conservative. Generally speaking, although history is replete with examples of malevolent dictators, narratives about the benevolent ones are also not unheard of. The world history of the last two centuries is full of disturbing events showing how in the name of Democracy some of the worst pretenders systematically decimated it, leaving the genuine democrats in political puzzle and moral agony. The expressions like 'Social Democracy', 'Socialist Democracy', 'Democratic Socialism', 'New Democracy', 'People's Democracy', 'Christian Democrats' and 'Islamic Democracy', unless suitably spelt out and historically situated, are only misleading signboards. There is no universally acceptable or global form of Democracy. It is not for this or that state authority or political scientist to define or dictate or legislate what 'democracy' is. Yet every thinking being has a say in what 'democracy' *should be* like.

History may not exactly repeat itself. It exhibits an *existential*, as distinguished from *universal,* pattern. The gradual emergence of the ideal of Globalization may be the welcome return or beginning of a long-drawn out process of realization of the literally utopian (i.e., *nowhere*) dreams of the ancient saints, philosophers and practical visionaries like Emerson, Thoreau, Tolstoy, Gandhi, Teilhardt d'Chardin and Sri Aurobindo.[6]

Given the hegemonic trend and conditions of the unipolar world, the process of globalization seems to be very tormented, tortuous and meandrine. Gandhi was fond of saying, 'Good moves at a snail's pace' and he was always very doubtful about the durability of the outcome of fast-moving social transformation and, particularly, political revolution. For the success of the process of globalization in all crucial contexts like economy, ecology, food and health care, mutual understanding, cooperation and civilizational dialogue are the basic desiderata. Globalization demands a judicious balance between *global* solidarity and *local* autonomy.

II

Inside the Indian Parliament House is inscribed a very noble maxim: 'The world is like a family' (*vasudhaiva kutumbakam*). The fuller

statement (in its original form) starts with the words 'to the person of liberal nature'. Whether the world *is* indeed a family or it is likely to *appear* as a familial unit is contingent upon the nature of the concerned persons. If they are indeed liberal-minded, then their world-view would be unitary; on the other hand, if the persons are narrow-minded, they are likely to be inclined toward localism or chauvinism.

Many classical and modern philosophers and religious teachers, both in the East and the West, were emphatic in their assertion that humans are *essentially* identical at bottom. Even those who, like Buddhists and Kant, reject essentialism are of the view that, through non-violence or love and Good Will, all humans are in spiritual communion with one another. While the Vedic thinkers to the Vedāntic philosophers like Śaṅkara define humans essentially in terms of *spirituality*, Plato, Aristotle and their followers think that they are essentially *rational.* Both *spirituality* and *rationality,* notwithstanding their attending practical or empirical constraints, are claimed to be universizable in principle.[7]

The transcendentalism and essentialism which inform the Vedic and the Platonic-Aristotelian forms of thinking are often not quite to the taste of modern and scientifically disposed thinkers. For example, Kant, in spite of his strong scientific commitment, thinks that the human *self* is also transcendental and its cognitive contents are inter-subjectively sharable. To him, *freedom,* like *self,* is also a transcendental pre-supposition without which moral responsibility remains inexplicable. That accounts for Kant's definition of person in terms of *responsibility*.[8] Instructively enough, Russell defines human animals in terms of *patience*.[9] While animals' patience is very limited, he claims, humans are infinitely patient. The basic distinction between humans and animals is to be drawn in terms of their widely different degrees of patience. The noted list of definitions of humans in terms of (i) spirituality, (ii) rationality, (iii) responsibility, and (iv) patience, rightly understood, are convergent and have distinct bearing on the *universizability* claim of our social organization, individual freedon and world-order.

The basic problems attending the correct procedure to decide (a) *how* to treat equals unequally, and (b) *why* to treat unequals equally, the concerned *procedural* issue, both in its institutional and ethical aspects, is rooted in a *substantive* issue. And that issue pertains to the

real or essential human nature. Recalling Śaṅkara on this important issue one can rightly claim the priority of *jñāna-kāṇḍa* (cognitive enterprise) over *karma-kāṇḍa* (actional enterprise). To recall the Kantian variant of the principle would be like this: what humans *can* do depends upon what they *are*. In other words, our abilities to do, including doing duty, depends much upon our very nature, the character of ourselves. Firstly, if we are *patient* with the shortcomings and imperfections of our fellow human beings our attitude *towards* them and our action *for* them will be naturally sympathetic, if not positively respectful. In that case the fallout of our commitment to the Difference Principles, Rawlsian or otherwise, would be different, both theoretically and (more so) practically. Secondly, if we are *responsible*, then, unlike less responsible or irresponsible *others*, we are likely to be inclined to *share* the weals and woes of our *fellow* human beings and act accordingly. Fellow feelings would inform our very being. To extend this moral issue further: if we are intellectually convinced that all human beings are spiritually identical at bottom, our action patterns are likely to be informed by an abiding compassion (*karuṇā*) and felt fraternity (*maitrī*). The Vedāntins like Śaṅkara and Sri Aurobindo may move even further and affirm that a spiritually *self-realized* person does not recognize any essential distinction between *self* and the *others*, between *we* and *they*. This so-called 'metaphysical realization' has its obvious ethical and practical bearing.[10]

The birth of some peoples in the poverty-stricken sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia and their vicarious sufferings of the poverty-linked handicaps seems to be purely contingent, both historically and geographically. Many rich countries of the past centuries have become poor during the colonial period of the last 400 years or so. Conversely, one might point out, many poor countries of the past have become rich during the same period. To refer to this non-linear politico-economic curve of history is not intended either to belittle or to glorify the lot of to-day's affluent West. In the twenty-first century those of us who do not believe in the doctrine of fate and are also more or less persuaded of the Weberian Protestant Ethics of hard work and a moderate form of the pro-Marxian historiography readily recognize that humans are the main architects of their history.

However, in this age of high technology and industrialization, scrutiny of facts and policy patterns of industrialized countries clearly show that problems ranging from health hazards and economic exploitation to environmental pollution and the danger of nuclear accident are of distant origin. For example, the victims of the depleting ozone layer and the rising sea level are not the authors of their impending misfortune. Similarly, the findings of the World Health Organization shows that the victims of AIDS are not necessarily responsible for their impending death. In a shrinking earth many problems of local origin are fast assuming global proportion. But the fact remains that poverty, peace and prosperity are, in the long run, non-isolable and indivisible. The pressing ethical question of *today* is, if these issues remain unsolved, where will we and our future generation be landed?[11]

III

All thinkers, including even the seemingly abstract philosophers, are in a way products of their own social space and historical time. The case with the moral philosophers is even more complex. Their principles are required to be general, if not universal, and, at the same time, expected to be applicable to concrete cases. Otherwise, non-applicable and non-instantiable moral principles may rightly be criticized as utopian and metaphysical in the pejorative sense. Hegel might have overshot his target while he criticized Kant's notion of Good Will as the Will that wills nothing, but he had definitely a point in his criticism of Kant. Unless the content of Good Will is made *reasonably* intelligible or perusable, not necessarily in a universally acceptable form, it is difficult to rationally decide or choose its acceptance or rejection. In other words, the idea of Good Will, in order to be practically relevant, is logically required to have a built-in schematic content, however inarticulate that *schema* might be.

The point may be illustrated in this way. The Constitution of a country is often said to be mother of all laws of that land, though not *directly* related to the latter in a one-to-one relation; yet it is clear that the basic Constitutional principles must be applicable to, and satisfiable by, individual pieces of legislation. Generating principles of ethics, though not directly relatable to these or those specific cases of

judgement about Good(s) and Right(s), can certainly be meaningfully brought to bear upon the latter with the help of some intermediary principles. These intermediary principles show the connections between the generating principles and the ground-level practical specifics which may be characterized as ethical explicata. Since individual ethical principles, in their isolation, are not explainable or intelligible, we need either their *patterned* colligation or subsumption under primary principles mediated by the secondary ones and/or in conjuction with the statements of attending circumstances.[12]

The above (apparently) abstract considerations are extremely relevant to the understanding of the implication of globalization. *Globalization,* like *universalization,* pressingly needs elucidation and specification. To say in a bare abstract vein that globalization is a practical imperative of the modern age of technology amounts almost to saying in a Kantian vein that moral law by its very intrinsic nature is universalizable. I draw a line of distinction between the universalizability *claim* of a law and practically desirable and *concretizable* consequences, forms and sub-forms of that proclaimed universalizable law. To speak of globalization *in abstracto* is innocuous at its best and misleading in its worst.[13]

Why globalization? Globalization for *what?* Globalization in which area or areas of life? *Who* are the architects of globalization? Is globalization, like democracy, *of* the peoples, *by* the peoples and *for* the peoples? Or, mainly because of the tremendous pressure of the print media and, particularly, audio-visual networks, the peoples of the developing and least developed World are drawn towards it, willingly or unwillingly, wittingly or unwittingly?

Admittedly, lofty and high-order normative principles may not be universally and readily agreed upon by all sections of people for various reasons and unreasons, biases and prejudices. It is too much to expect an identical response from an uneven group of persons—uneven in terms of need, greed, knowledge and information. To make the choice of the higher normative principles plausible for the largest possible number of people, it is found in the history of ideas, thinkers have taken resort to some such heuristic ideas or explanatory devices as 'God's-Eye-View', 'views of the *absolutely* rational person', 'views of the absolutely *innocent* persons', 'the Archimedean point(s) of view', 'views from nowhere' and 'views from behind the veils of ignorance'.[14] These ideas are invoked for a number of kindred purposes, viz., to maximize the scope of consensus, to minimize dissent and difference, to achieve objectivity, to approximate the highest possible reaches of the universalizable Good Will, and to try to establish all-inclusive Commonwealth of Humankind. In the theories of many social contractarians, Indian and European, the echoes of these views and their surrogates are directly heard.

More practically-oriented and historically-conscious contractarians have tried to derive reasonably tolerable, livable and/or encouraging models of civil society from the mixed situation of cooperation *and* conflict. The theoretical fictions which are invoked by contractarians in their quest for justice are injected, at times, at the *bottom* of their systems and, at times, at the *top* of their systems. Irrespective of their upward inference or downward derivation of principles of justice it may be pointed out that what they have in the back of their mind are their own times, their places and their problems. Simulated objectification and the attempts of theoretical impersonalization have their *human* limits. The flight of imagination for theory-construction can never succeed in completely neutralizing its ground-level, i.e., socio-historical, gravitational pull to *lebensform.* Explanatory devices or fictions may temporarily keep their 'aims' or 'problematiques' under bracket or suspension, but during the process of spelling out their principles they are thrown back into the details of their hidden orientation or mindset.

For example, in spite of its highly abstract, clearly elucidatory and general, and admirably rigorous texture, the Rawlsian theory of justice, on careful analysis, can be shown to the clearly relatable to the market economy of the USA, tempered of course by the nuanced elements of welfarism, including provisions for *limited* apex intervention and liberal measures for adequate savings and capital formation. Similarly, careful scrutiny of Habermas's theory of communicative justice, backed up by the process of supposed legitimation, will bring out his Neo-Marxian-cum-Social Democratic approach to the post World War II emerging economy of the united Germany. I find nothing wrong for an

American thinker to be pro-American in his orientation. Nor is there anything remotely wrong in a German orientation in the social philosophy of a German thinker like Jürgen Habermas. But the point which leads me to raise this question in the context of globalization is pretty simple. If all of us, notwithstanding our high theoretical profession, are, in effect, found to be foot-firm in our own country's best interests, then our model of globalization is likely to be global from a very *limited* and *interested* point of view. Since we believe in the sanctity of individual freedom and autonomy of individual's ideas and ideals we can not consistently oppose the battle of ideas within and between the writers belonging to different ideological persuasions. At the same time, one must hasten to add that patriotic or national orientation, beyond a point, tends to weaken, if not subvert, the profession of globalization as today's ideal. That partly explains why, in spite of the Socialist International's *principled* support, North-South Dialogue did not yield much.

The upshot of my hurried discussion at this point may be put thus in a radical and paradoxical form. If the normative principles of justice are understandably global or universal, they turn out to be *in*applicable and therefore idle and, if, on the other hand, they are addressed only, or even primarily, to a specific country in a specific age, then their ultra-specificity takes away their trans-national or global applicability claim.

IV

In the wake of *globalization* invariably comes up strong pressure from the industrialized countries for *liberalization* and *economic reforms* on the developing countries. The right-thinking persons and groups in Asia, Africa and Latin America are not opposed to the idea of liberalization and certainly favour economic reforms for obvious reasons, including their long-term self-interest. Their scepticism about these ideas stems from their experience of the spectacular rise and shocking fall of the so-called Asian Tigers within a short span of time. If economic reforms are judiciously planned through democratic deliberation, both intranational and international, and mainly intended to benefit the concerned countries, especially their weaker sections of people,

the same would be widely acceptable. Unfortunately, it has been a long and consistent experience that the idea of economic reforms is often pressed for opening up of the populous and developed countries' market to the marketing needs of the developed countries and their multinational companies (MNCs). Their capital goods and, particularly, consumer goods are sought to the pushed to the developing areas of the globe. However, it must be mentioned here that the demand for the extension and improvement of the infrastructural facilities, if implemented, will benefit both the home market and the world market.

The main point in this context is who should primarily decide the priorities and patterns of the development of the developing countries. Secondly, the model of development chosen for the developing countries has to be basically responsive to the needs of the local people, particularly their weaker and least privileged sections. Thirdly and finally, that there is no incompatibility between the larger interests of the developed countries and *rightly chosen* interests of the developed countries had to be realized and responsibly acted upon by all concerned.[15]

The problem arises about the rightness of choice. In tackling that problem, it is common experience, the priorities and interests of the developed countries are defined and decided unilaterally by others, without keeping in view those of the least privileged people in the less or least developed countries. If the globalization is for arriving at a just world-order, then justice demands that the existing state of affairs needs to be *fundamentally* changed.

It is perhaps in order to recall here that in the global economy and global polity there is no uniformity. Positively speaking, *plurality* of polity and economy, though for the sake of simplicity is indicated under the ideal-typical heads like 'developed', 'developing' and 'least developed', the *difference* of their self-perception and self-interest is not being adequately recognized. Demands of both the global policy-makers and also those of the national policy-makers should be to recognize this ground-level pluralistic reality.

In this context one remembers the shift from Rawls' early position as expounded in *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, to the later position found in *Political Liberalism,* 1993. In his earlier work he presents a liberal, egalitarian and moral conception of justice as fairness. Rawls'

formulation of the idea of an *impartial* social contact is meant to justify the principle that free persons, identically situated and unconscious of their historical conditions, would agree to accept (a) people's priority of equal basic liberty over other political concerns, and (b) the view that inequalities in wealth and social positions maximally benefit the least advantaged. Later on, in the light of others' critical discussion of his position, he tries to make his theory more compatible with the *pluralistic* aspects of liberalism. In any country in which different philosophical, religious, ethical or ideological views are inevitable, the requirement for establishing social unity would be *public* conception of justice based on the *shared* moral ideas and the citizens' *common* conception of themselves as free and equal moral persons. This pluralistic accent of the Rawlsian theory of the original position needs to be extended and further refined in the context of globalization. By this I mean that the shared conception of common justice entertained by unevenly developed countries should be the basis of establishing a just world-order. Secondly, the Rawlsian axiom for inequality in wealth and social position maximally benefiting the least advantaged should be questioned, if not knocked out. This axiom may be recognized only in a very limited, factual or in a descriptive sense only for changing it and not to accept it as an element of just national society or, still less, just world-order.

Another point which needs to be thrashed out at this point is the very conception of *economic development.* As said before, economic development is inseparable from ethical development and both are integral elements of a *just* social order. Economic development should not be accepted only in the narrow sense of modernization, technological advancement, rise in the GDP and favourable balance of trade. Other parameters, perhaps more important parameters of desirable development, are peace, freedom and creativity of the concerned individuals. If economic development is not indicative of, and related to, ethical growth and pursuit of excellence by individuals, the much needed stable basis of a just world-order can hardly be laid. Social solidarity and individual autonomy need to be effectivey harmonized in a well-ordered society but where exactly the balance between the two should be achieved cannot be decided *a priori* and for all time to come. It

depends upon the developing or deteriorating conditions of the concerned peoples and their changing self-perception.[16]

V

This last point brings me to the concluding step of my argument in favour of *globalization with justice and without hegemony.* The model of growth which appeals to me most is pro-Gandhian, not exactly Gandhian. I believe in Gandhi's basic principles that in planning the development of developing countries, the interest of the least developed must be given highest priority. Numerically speaking, in the developing world the poorest people form the largest segment of the population. Their main resources are their hands, capacity for hard work and their non-acquisitive tendency marked by non-possessive individualism. The ideal model, at least to start with, for this type of peoples should be labour-intensive. This initial position does not foreclose either the capital-intensive industrialization in the appropriate future or amount to people's hostility to mechanization. It is often rightly said that God lives in Details and not in big cities and big MNCs.

Another pertinent maxim to be remembered here is that the Small is Beautiful. Neither of these maxims is incompatible with the *possible* advent of large-scale and heavy industrialization under appropriate circumstances described by an effectively regulated and educated demographic composition. Globalization has to be distinguished and separated from homogenization. For the sake of the former the latter can hardly be allowed. It militates against the very democratic spirit of pluralism.[17]

Development ethics is central to the issue of globalization. It reflects on the ends and means of socio-economic change in developing regions and poor countries. Many writers like Amartya Sen, Paul Streeten, D. Goulet and Jean Drèze have extensively discussed these issues. Earlier Gunnar Myrdal[18] addressed these issues with passion and commitment. The focus of these writers is on the development of human capabilities and investment in creating and promoting human resources. Humans should be, in fact rightly understood, they are the basic input of economic development. To think of human entitlement

or national entitlement or group entitlement purely on the basis of imaginary *a priori* cut-off point between the eligible and the ineligible, between the poor and the rich, is not only arbitrary but also unfair and therefore unjust. That some people of the poor countries today are not being deemed entitled to have substantial support from the industrialized countries or the financial institutions controlled by them is not due to their own fault. The cruel colonial exploitation of centuries is primarily responsible for their plight.

Finally, I must say that for a just globalization two aims need to be married, *promotion of all* and *protection of the poor*. In this connection I do recall Gandhi's conception of *public reason* characterized by three basic things, viz., *vicāra* (rational discernment and thought), *saṅcāra* (communication) and *pracāra* (propagation). Development is neither the white human's burden nor is it any single human's or country's burden. It is a common concern, it is a universal imperative. To make the people, all the people adequately and actively aware of this imperative, *public reason* is indispensable.

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16. See, for example, *Entering the 21st Century, World Development Report 1999–2000,* World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2000. In particular the issues like 'The Frontiers of Development Thinking', 'Globalization and Localization', 'Supranational Issues', 'Subnational Issues' and 'Translating Policies into Action' deserve special attention. Boxed items and statistical profiles are indeed very revealing.

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The Constitution of Man—The Key to Harmonious World Order Through Global Planning of Productive Employment and Economic Freedom

A Rejoinder to Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya's Paper 'Difference Principles, Demoted Democracy and Globalization without Hegemony' Presented at the International Conference on Ethics Facing Globalization

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'Man is the measure of all things.'
—Protagoras (Greece) wrote 2400 years ago

'Order is sequence in space.'
—J. Krishnamurti in Chennai in 1979

'The arousal of a "New Global Consciousness" is essential if the management of world affairs is not to be left to technocrats.'
—The Theosophy Science Group, Silver Jubilee Souvenir edited by Dr Kannan, Adyar, Chennai 600 020, India, p. 143, 1987

One of the reasons for academic, philosophical and scientific endeavour is to bring about a continuous upgradation and transformation in the social order of society for harmonious and creative evolution of man and nature.

Theosophy speaks of three levels of evolution termed the physical, intellectual and spiritual. Institutions and organizations must be developed to unravel the hidden potentialities of man and raise him to higher levels of perception and existence. Professor Chattopadhyaya's 'Difference principles, demoted democracy and globalization without hegemony' has the potential to serve the cause of world unity based on

social justice, equality and prosperity across the globe. However, there is a snag here.

The world has seen the march of ideologies and movements, both secular and religious. The common strand that sustained the vitality of civilizations has been an open-ness to new ideas and courage to discard old and retrograde ones which do not serve the cause of dignity and self-respect of their adherents. The sharing of all resources, wealth and insights equitably alongwith the nobility and height of the spirit requires a sense of deep dialogue in the quest and sense of the nurturing spirit even in its intellectual *dispositions*. To this end, the above principles are a necessary and not a sufficient basis, and the external world can and is only a reflection of the world within. This is the world to which the Buddha constantly beckons.

A statement of D.P. Chattopadhyaya's article is in order.

DPC's basic thrust is how to build a world based on sound justice. His sense of justice goes beyond the Rawlsian and stands on two legs. The first is that equals should be treated equally which is accepted as a truism. But the question is on the agreement of the form of the second leg. Should unequals be treated equally? He argues in the context of the problems of ethics in globalization. He argues in favour of globalization as the welcome return to the process of realization of dreams of saints and visionaries. His point of departure is the gap between the ideal of globalization and practice of local autonomy which is constantly subjugated by global hegemonic influences.

His first tenet is that the problem of deciding on both aspects of justice is rooted in the substantive essence. This issue pertains to essential human nature. There comes the primacy of the spiritual to world reorganization. Here, though, while sanctifying the *jñāna* as primary to order and freedom over *karma* he seems to miss the essence of *karma* as sacrifice. But his faith in Gandhian-Schumacher small enterprises and local autonomy still begs the issue as to which is fundamental: the individual or the local society which is an agglomeration of individuals. While culture is created by the few à la J. Krishnamurti, the flame of right perception must first be lit in the individual. *So spirituality must necessarily precede any tinkering with ideas of political democracy.*

His second tenet is that globalization must be subject to appropriate specification and elucidation. The questions of why, what, where, who, how, are imperative to issues of justice and world ordering. The essence of his methodology is seen here: If the normative principles of justice are global, they cannot be applied; and, if specific, then the global applicability is denied. Questions of methodology in asking such questions having a bearing on justice and ethics in globalization must not be generic. I must put it in the following particular form: 'If I am good, I must have overcome the bad.' This gives the '*nature of the person*' some substantive content. It also answers DPC's objection to Habermas not going beyond the latter's nationalistic neo-Marxian Social Democratic approach. His desire to quickly resolve the problem of rightness of choice in a pro-Gandhian framework is hasty. He upholds the later Rawlsian's pluralistic aspects of liberalism. Public conception of justice based on shared moral ideas often does not do justice to the creative property in man. Here also the predominance of ideas of political restructuring based on an economic minimum (Gandhi-Schumacher) shoves Chardin's 'spiritual man' under the carpet and does not give him the spiritual pre-eminence which is his due.

The concept of the 'economic minimum' upholds the 'small is beautiful' dictum in corporate restructuring and is believed to hold the key to reduce economic exploitative power of large corporations. The idea of the 'representative man' is a political instrument to manage democracy. This also refers to the notion of size. The author is seeking to understand the constitution of this representative man. Does his or her dialogical expression seek to understand and help the evolution of man and cosmos in its multiple aspects?

A third tenet of DPC is the inseparability of economic development from ethical development and both being integral elements of a just social order. To make economic growth and ethical growth mirror images of each other means the conditions and changing self-perception of peoples must be codified in building up of appropriate institutions on a global frame. Mere ideological fall-back to size issues to solve this problem has its dangers as creative fires seek expression.

His final tenet that humans are the basic inputs of economic development and that public reason is indispensable does not point to the substantive content and bases, historical or otherwise, of human reason. There are ways to show that the ethical and the economic interact; and that must be codified in international practices.

Our write-up on this important article tries to substantiate our claims in a little more expansive way.

Professor Chattopadhyaya deals with the problem of morally permissible modes of treating unequals within a certain socio-historic context. His point of departure is the political economy of a democratic nation-state and how globalization impinges on it. While he wants to deal with the existential character of history as the parameter of discourse, he upholds the value and ideal of globalization as the beginning of the possible fructification of the utopian ideal of unity and a universalizing goal of harmonious social order in the future. To him, the negation of polar hegemony provides the needed legitimacy to the issue of globalization as an outcome of the four hundred years of scientific and economic enterprise.

While one agrees with the fundamental tenets of Professor Chattopadhyaya as the guiding principles of ethics in the globalization debate, the principles' *per se* need to be examined to see where they lead. The direct reference to ethics is outlined in the rejection of essentialism by the Buddhists and Kant. The definitions of humans in terms of spirituality, rationality, responsibility and patience by Sankara, Plato, Kant and Russell respectively as being convergent obfuscates the issue and negates the existentialist character of the debate. From the idea of 'distinct bearing' and 'convergence' it is difficult to derive the fact that spirituality subsumes rationality, responsibility and patience unless the Krishnamurti-Friere type of dialogical approach is integrated into the exercise. It is imperative to move from Habermasian social democracy to the ideal of a spiritual democracy for sustaining a harmonious world order.

Professor Chattopadhyaya upholds the problem of 'justice' as the prime problem in the issue of ethics in globalization. He joins issue with the Buddhists and the Kantians by raising the issue of 'reality' of human nature. But to talk of the reality or essentiality of human nature

without a mention of awareness or the discussion of the multi-dimensionality of human existence as outlined in Blavatskian Theosophy (two volumes of *The Secret Doctrine: Cosmology and Anthropology*; TPH, Adyar, Chennai 600 020) and Dr Annie Besant's *The Constitution of Man*; *Man—Whence, How and Whither*; TPH, Adyar, Chennai 600 020) religious writings is merely to beg the issue. The difference principle operates here too as a study of atomic conglomerations of different dimensions of man reveals. An inquiry into the correspondence principle (Van Weller Hook, *Correspondences Across the Planes*, TPH, Chennai 600 020) in man's existential nature reveals unique insights into this nature of order. A mere mention of the priority of *jñāna-kāṇḍa* over *karma-kāṇḍa* does not lend justice to any theorization of an empirical issue. To go a little further, even this Sankarvian priority of *jñāna-kāṇḍa* over *karma-kāṇḍa* demands a fusion of the '*jñāna*' with the '*jñānī*' in the human thus efflorescing (flowering inside the human individual across the planes; i.e. in a vertical sense) and transmitting a social dialogue on mutually acceptable levels of compassion. To live and move as per the nature of the being is to transcend contradiction which is righteous and reflects harmony. The stress here is on a study of the 'Constitution of Man' as explained in theosophical literature which would explain the need for harmony and growth. This, in turn should be reflected in the building of types of institutions and its appropriate manpower requirements in society.

The problematic of justice is a multi-dimensional problem in globalization debates. Justice should not only be in the politico-economic sense manifested in treating equal persons equally but should also uphold the ideal of freedom as reflected in the virtue of treating unequal persons equally. What one asserts here is that the problem of 'rightness of choice' cannot be resolved merely by giving recognition to a ground-level pluralistic reality. *The deeper question is how should the shared conception of social justice entertained by unevenly developed countries be the basis for establishing a just world order.* The issue of 'how' assumes significance in the light of the reality of a technocratic elite managing or aspiring to manage the world order at least as far as its aspects of economic welfare and socio-political justice are concerned. The problem is one of finding a governing quantitative

parameter with its difference principles suitably located in time and space and untouched by hegemonic political influences. That would take care of his criticism of Hegel overshooting Kant's concept of Good will. This *substantive* Good will will have the moral force of revealing the movement of the human race towards its self-avowed destiny of shared prosperity and spiritual progress.

Any sense of justice in economic order must consider the prospect of employability for any 'economic man' who aspires to fulfil his 'basic needs'. Simultaneously, it must be ascertained that the *employment is productive enough to cover the costs of employment and still leave a non-exploitative surplus to allow for any practical realization for any 'emergent properties' that would come to pass as an outcome of previous investment, employment and its resultant production.* Thus full employment as a key parameter and not maximal production contingent on technological capacity should be the key ideal of any secular economic enterprise to fulfil the requirements of Aristotelian justice. Yet employment *per se* cannot be the lone defining parameter in an economic enterprise as it could breed 'white elephants'—a pejorative term used to define the character of inefficient public enterprises in India who employed more labour on 'welfare' considerations than technology and efficiency considerations in administration would allow. Welfare considerations should annul non-productive employment as even the mundane considerations of financial exercise proceeds into a blind alley. This brings into focus productivity considerations that are measures of output or production per unit of labour or any other input. While globalization globalizes production locations and manpower quality based on efficiency considerations, the world economic order has little in-built distributive justice considerations and therefore little spiritual awareness of how 'poverty anywhere is exercising a threat to prosperity somewhere else' (Galbraith: *The Affluent Society*). Aid and transfer of utilizable resources come with conditionalities attached and legitimize the sense of self-righteous charity and therefore justify the hierarchy and subservience to authority as existential and perennial truths.

A note on a dual aspect of economics needs to be highlighted here. The conventional economics is 'Chrematistic' in nature. It refers to the

domain and need of operating within a theory and framework of and for exchange relationships. Its nature is more short-term and amenable to monetary valuation. The alternative, that is in the process of being worked out, is rightly termed 'Syncretistic'. This is the area of ecological economics that considers the historical, sociological, environmental, political, cultural aspects of international relations in its domain. At the moment the two are not convergent as the controversies in value theory bring out. While environmental accounting is a non-scientific venture for the 'chrematists', it is a saner basis for valuation exercises in 'syncretistic' economics as it can consider the 'entropy' and the 'depreciation' factors in a more holistic sense. The problem for us is to make them correspond to one another; an issue which can be settled empirically over a period of time. Another important aspect of this is that it gives rise to the 'energetics' theoretical debate and holds the promise of solving the matter-energy evaluation and interchange problems. The clue to solving the latter problems could lie in the progressive understanding and realization of what is religionistically accepted as an existential problem in the theory of 'Constitution of Man' but what science would accept as an 'emergent property' (this term was first used by Ilya Prigogine and Isabella Stengers in *Order Out of Chaos*) once it comes forth. *Our belief is this sort of harmonistic outcome would find an echo and correspondence with the scientific theory of employment and the quantification of the productivity considerations it could give rise to.* We turn to outlining this economic issue next.

Professor Dewey B. Larson in *The Road To Full Employment: The Scientific Answer to The Number One Economic Problem* (International Union of Unified Science, 1680 East Atkin Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, USA) has tried to deal with this problem of injustice in the world by identifying the fundamental issues in socio-economic planning and provides a solution at the global level. He works out a scientific theory of employment with productivity as a key parameter around which the whole economic activity could revolve. We will merely outline some of the principles that enter the employment situation as a fuller discussion of his approach is beyond the scope of this article. The chief principles of this theory are as cited below:

1. There is a substantial and unavoidable variation in the productive efficiencies of individual production units.
2. The fixed components of production price establish a minimum productivity limit (survival limit) below which producers cannot continue operation.
3. Volume of employment and efficiency of production, other things being equal, are functions of the survival limit.
4. The percentage of unemployment is independent of the size of the labour force.
5. The optimum survival limit is the highest level at which full primary employment can be maintained.

The principles outlined here provide a holistic approach to the planning exercise. The last two principles 4 and 5 taken together clearly show that employment planning can be taken on a communal basis if data show a spiritual awareness of the people in its legal structure and community's social practices. Principles 2 and 4 show the cost entailed in such an approach to living. Principles 1 and 5 show that socio-economic planning has a holistic base at least in a horizontal sense. Such a quantitative measure is capable of global application. A global authority can apply the difference principle to this measure on a nationwide basis after a valuation of product needs of a population is done. An advantage of this approach is that the current philosophy of ever-increasing wants and therefore an upward rising curve of national income in measure of GNP, GDP, p.c. GNP, p.c. GDP, etc. is revealed as unrealistic, wasteful, non-justifiable and non-productive. The aspiration to a rising curve of national income is non-sustainable unless the entire needs of the global population are met on an appropriate work-reward framework in a *non-compulsive* way. This presumes an integrated global economic planning mechanism with an efficient data gathering system at national and sub-national levels.

The possible and actual conflicts as an outcome of friction of 'cultures' coming together in a cauldron of self-interests are defined in terms of national, sub-national, regional, linguistic and other identities. This makes Professor Chattopadhyaya speak of 'Difference Principles' based ideationally-horizontally on a difference of self-perception and self- interest. However, *what is more ripe for debate and reflection is*

the 'constitution of man' and how such an approach to understanding of 'truth' can yield far more insights into human nature. This can yield realistic approaches to the problems of global socio-economic-political restructuring and planning as also into areas of spiritual and religious inquiry and dialogue. The etymological and ontological debates in academics can no more be areas of 'mere' academic inquiry. Such discussions while delving into the nature and operation of man can subserve a wider civilizational agenda and goal.

Let us for a moment digress into the question of compassion versus power as a part of the problematic in the debates on 'ethics'. While power seems to be implicit in whatever action is performed, to identify compassion as a special power of presumably self-realized souls as Śaṅkara and Buddha is to miss the fruits for the bark of a tree. Not only this, it also delinks 'action' from 'culture'. The culture of non-hygienic living can by no means be understood as a stage towards hygienic and culturally enriching conditions. It would still require an external factor to enable such a movement. It is indeed a question of culture, plurality of culture, problems of imposition of cultural hegemony through advertisement, use of glamour, ideal of consumerism, commodity fetishism, etc. that informs the debates in globalization. *Therefore, cognition of pluralistic reality must involve not only a plurality of economy and polity but also a plurality of cultures. This debate involves both issues of technology and spirituality. The imperatives of right culture must inform the globalization debate. Without this the dangers of unbalanced economic development and an affirmation of a status-based tradition would distort the mission and the transcendental objective of globalization.*

Any rational decision-making on the part of individuals, assuming public participation, involves value imputation to matter and idea and the prioritization of values. This consequently posits the idea of degree of spiritual self-realization on the part of the individual decision-maker. This latter involves a dialogical communicative capacity both in the Platonic and the Frierian sense. While the Platonic involves the metaphysical reasoning, Paulo Friere's approach tries to involve the spiritual in the mundane activities of the common man that posits observation first, understanding next, action later. Eric Fromm's book *To Be*

or To Have provides deep psychological insights into this issue and can provide the kernel of a comprehensive theory of development for a sustainable society.

The spiritualizing mission of democracy must recognize the bondage of knowledge and 'argument' and then its dissolution by 'spontaneous and unmotivated action'. A natural and harmonious reconciliation of opposites at the Higher Buddhic level is an arena of experience and awareness of holistic comprehensive peace as outlined in Blavatskian theosophy. The logjam in the science-religion debate in academics thus needs to be broken.

The problem of ideology is one of non-preferment of compassion on materially economic and time-loss considerations. This results in loss of possible insight into nature-social interaction. The ends-means harmony in development ethics posits availability in financial resources. This is easier said than done unless one wants to survive on 'charity', an option we have to negate. Then we are back to the search for an objective measure as we have outlined above.

While a socio-economic reconstruction of civil society must fulfil the material needs of all, institutions of a 'transcendental' nature whose worth should only be measured in terms of opportunity cost, as its importance is not subject to exchange or barter, need to be built. The need for such institutions could be assessed in terms of their temporal reduction of per capita expenditure on health imputed in terms of market value and reduction in intensities of disease across regions. Decreasing expenditure on defence, war, weaponry, etc. on a global scale could be another criteria. These criteria serve as a mirror to these religious institutions. The number of people spending labour and time on purely religious pursuits can be identified and documented. The efficacy of such pursuits can be judged vis-à-vis the possible 'alternative' pursuits in leisure time of this class of people. Then an overall index of happiness as in the Human Development Report can be constructed and cost-benefit exercises assessed. Then an overall index of happiness as in the *Human Development Report* can be constructed and cost-benefit exercises assessed.

Moreover, one must look into the concept of Schumacher's 'Small is Beautiful' and see where it leads. The small units with their greater

flexibility and stress on interpersonal relationships beyond their formal organizational boundaries have come to stay. What this entails is that the giant corporations have collapsed in many cases by the sheer strength of their own weight. The idea of 'embeddedness' of Granovetter, where relationships go beyond the mere economic, provide much needed stability. But critics have pointed out that further research can show that strong embedding may not be sustainable under the onslaught of competitive pressures from larger more impersonal forces constantly pushing forward. This may be true unless a true spiritual functionality of man across many dimensions is established vertically and the idea of productivity sharing and valuation is established horizontally across institutions and disciplines and then seeing or researching into how the spiritual and the material interect. This can take place when scientists, economists, thinkers come together for periodic and temporal valuations of capital, both human and material, rooted in historical and spiritual (newer-original) sense. Much resource and input can go into institutions of a spiritual and psychological nature and their productivity assessments undertaken thereto in a syncretistic economic sense. This is the main thesis we have logically developed. Constitution of man refers not merely to its physical, intellectual, aesthetic potentials but an enveloping spiritual dimension that could be ever-expanding in its reaches and insights. As it is truly said, the Buddha is not the end of the world; neither does '*nirvāṇa*' mean a total annihilation, death of the individual atom, euphemistically put as 'merging of the individual consciousness with the divine'. Life truly must be far more than that as the Secret Doctrine points out to layers of 'Rings Pass Not' hinting at systemic wholes that human beings have still to uncover, discover and achieve to reach the sources of life embedded in many realities. Truly, the co-operative and creative agenda of the Evolutionary Plan remains to be discovered by the human mind. Nobody asks a mountaineer why he scales peaks. For the sheer love of it, he would say. The enfolding spiritual mind in its divine essence could be the final and non-static goal.

The above approach considers both the material and spiritual needs of the people. Such a holistic theory with its technological measure can subserve a sustainable globalization process. While fulfilling the criteria of justice of treating unequals equally and equals unequally, it serves

a holistic need in theory-construction in social philosophy. The integration of economic and spiritual aspects in global intellectual-spiritual thinking can subserve the fulfilment of 'karmic' debt and 'dharma' which has suffered long due to fragmentation in man's thought and existence. *A study of the constitution of man not only reveals the importance of doing science but also the emergent areas of human action as a consequence of the latter practice rooted in time.* The need of religion also emerges as an existential reality if only to curb the tendency of false action defined in terms of non-rootedness in the universal life resulting in the non-release of the higher planes in an individual's life. The abstract concepts of the higher mind as, for example, Plato's Archetypes, led to Aristotelian empiricism and development of science whose rewards we are reaping now. Likewise, a study of harmony of those concepts can bring about an ordering and integration of the intellectual, material and spiritual aspects of the entire human and non-human kind perpetually sustaining the law of correspondence in human awareness. The only alternative to this simultaneity of motion is the confusion in our existential ordering, meaningless competition and strife, a consequential and progressive reduction in our degrees of awareness and then our painfully renewed search!

The destiny of humanity is this shared search, shared vision and shared existence.

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All errors, if any, that remain are mine.

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33. 'Constitution of Man' can be replaced by the term 'Inner Environment' or 'koṣas' as used by Dr S.R. Bhatt in his booklet Applied Philosophy Series: 1. 'Applied Philosophy and Professional Ethics' published by ICPR, New Delhi, p. 18. However, we prefer the term 'Constitution of Man' as there is neither a Hindu communitarian tone as in 'koshas' nor is it as vague as 'Inner Environment'. Moreover, we believe our term is more scientific as it directly refers to nature of man, its constitution and the need for its immediate and imperative transformation through modern, secular education as is prevalent at present.

Polity, Economy and Society: Structural Contradictions and the Dynamics of History

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History sees the 'world' in a different way than the 'world' sees itself. What is 'seen' is generally in the 'present', isolated, unrelated and almost as sufficient-unto-itself. The historian, even of the 'present', cannot see things in that way. For him, the so-called 'polities' are forming and re-forming, the boundaries and the 'names' changing all the time. What can he really talk about, when that which he is telling about is always changing? Yet, he has to talk and, in talking 'create' the illusion of stability and permanence when there is none. The history of the 'world' from, say, the end of the First World War is an evidence. Name the country and you will see the problem. There are exceptions but, then, one would have to go a little more, a little backward into the past to see the contours melting, the boundaries getting fuzzier and hazier, and thus realize that the realm of the political has perhaps to be understood in a different way than the historian has tried to understand it, particularly since the so-called 'nation-states' came into being. China seems an obvious exception but, for the moment, we shall treat it as that, only wondering whether something would happen to it that, say, happened to the USSR or earlier to India.

The essential contingency of the unit of study which history deals with has been sought to be bypassed by treating history as the study of 'civilizations' rather than polities. But this is to forget that 'civilizations' not only were preceded by distinctive political formations, but cannot even be conceived without them. Cultures are not civilizations, just as societies are not polities. The latter cannot be thought of without the former, but both cultures and societies can exist and have existed without the latter. One may, if one so likes, see the 'seed', the 'elements', the 'potentialities' of the latter in the former, but that would be

a 'retrospective' look, and the 'insistence' most probably based on the view that nothing 'new' can ever come into being as whatever happens must already have been there in an 'implicit' or 'potential' form as otherwise how could it have come into being.

But even if socio-cultural formations can be there without explicit political or civilizational formation, can they be without the activity called 'economic' without which neither society nor culture can be conceived to 'exist'. What is this activity and what is its relation to society and culture, and how is it affected by the mutational eruption of political formations on the one hand and civilizational creations or constructions on the other, is the question without answering which we shall scarcely understand what goes on in history.

Economic activity may be seen at the human level as the transformation of 'nature' or rather that which is 'given' into something which is 'usable' or 'consumable' in the context of 'needs' which are primarily biological and, secondarily, cultural in nature. This transformational activity involves both knowledge and action which keep continually changing and growing, and have to be preserved and passed on from generation to generation. The closest term conveying this transformation of nature into that which is used for life's purposes in the Indian tradition is '*anna*' or 'food' which has been considered as the first level at which *Brahman* or the ultimate reality 'appears' or becomes 'real' to man. The 'world' is the 'food' for 'life' or *prāṇa* as the *Upaniṣad* says, but in order to become that it requires human activity which itself requires energy, both physical and mental, which in turn is sustained by the world transformed into food once again.

This is the cycle known in economics as the one obtaining between 'production' and 'consumption'. The distance between them may be as small as one likes, but the 'distance' has to be there, and though it can increase and be 'larger' it can never be so large as to become unbridgeable, as then the very purpose of 'production' would be nullified. The mid-way process can assume many forms, but one that has attracted the attention of the economists most is 'exchange', particularly of different kinds of 'food' where the transaction *adds* not only to the 'value' of the product concerned, but to an enhancement of its 'utility' to both the parties concerned.

This, roughly, is the way 'economic' situation may be characterized *before* the mutation in social formations dirempts and divides it and brings what we call a 'polity' into being. Whatever the reasons for this, a new and far-reaching distinction is introduced in the 'body social' between those who are 'ruled' and those who 'rule'. The relation is, and has to be, asymmetrical, but the political asymmetry brings a new asymmetry into being that is primarily 'economic'. The first one relates to 'power', while the second relates to 'wealth', but that is not the whole story. The dichotomy and the division creates a class of those who do not perform any function in the 'production processes' of the economy, unless the exercise of the political function itself is supposed to contribute to the functioning of the economy. This, at least theoretically, has to be seen as purely contingent even if in actual fact it happens to be different, as in the pre-political stage, the economy functioned without it. There arises thus a new class of 'pure consumers' who do not create any 'economic value' in the system. They may be said to create 'political value' but then the key problem would become the relation between 'political' and 'economic' values for the theoretical understanding of a functioning social system.

The economy of the society concerned has now to support the 'ruling class' and the administrative structure it slowly builds to exercise its function, institutions and structures which just did not happen to be there before, as they were not necessary. The 'political costs' to the society thus have not to be seen only in terms of the new distinction brought into being by asymmetries of power, but also in terms of the economic costs that it entails which, though more invisible, happen to be as 'real' as the former.

The most visible sign of this is the imposition of 'tax', the very idea of which was totally absent earlier, and the drawing of a formal boundary dividing the internal exchange relations from those that are 'external'. The political boundary thus becomes also an economic boundary across which exchanges are controlled and regulated not by those who are involved in the transaction, but by someone else who has the final 'say' in the matter.

The 'economic' boundary is, however, different from the 'political' boundary as the exchange relations that occur across it are 'necessary'

while those across the political boundary, that is, those that are political in nature are contingent in a sense that derives from the very nature of the polity itself. Trade is a necessity, as no society can be economically self-sufficient, and also because it is one way, and perhaps the simplest way, of creating, augmenting and enhancing wealth as in its case, it is 'demand' that creates the 'supply' or at least helps in creating it.

Trade thus has to be encouraged and fostered, just as the 'demand' created by the political system has to be internally met by an increase in the 'supply' leading to the creation of wealth because of the differentiation of the polity from the society which now begins to be seen in more positive terms. This, however, brings into being the 'trading class', the so-called *vaiśyas*, who, strangely, are seen as the 'creators of wealth' instead of the primary producers who really produce the goods they trade with.

But the trader likes no frontiers, or at least does not want them. There is thus an in-built conflict between the way the trading class sees the world and the way those who exercise the ruling function see it. For the latter, the other polities are really the 'other', potentially dangerous, even when friendly. The former travel far and wide, discover routes, take risks and have a daring, entrepreneurial side which the latter generally tend to avoid as, for them, it primarily means war, aggrandisement, conquest. These have an economic side too, but so are its 'costs' which generally have been underplayed by those who have written on the subject. Yet, politics and war go together and till very recently it was considered the proud privilege and a 'duty' to do so, for what else was the army supposed to do on which so much was being spent out of the wealth of those who created and produced it. Periodic wars were an economic necessity, justified by the maxim, 'offence is the best means of defence'. Yet, as that applied to every polity, one can understand that 'drama of the absurd' whose enactment is documented in what is known as 'history'.

Wars, though an 'economic necessity', have 'economic costs' also and whether the 'gains' outweigh the 'costs' is not always clear. In the short run, presumably, it must be so, as somebody's 'loss' must be someone else's 'gain'. But in case it results in a real 'empire-building' activity where that which is conquered has to be 'administered' and

'governed', and 'responsibility' taken for its welfare, growth and development, it is difficult to say what the balance-sheet will be in the long run. The 'loot and plunder' is one thing, 'settled conquest' another. Still another is the case when the conquerors come from 'outside', but settle in the land they have conquered as the Turko-Afghan and Mughal rulers did in India. The Mughal empire was not an 'empire' in the sense in which the Ottoman empire was one, or the Roman or the British empires which may be regarded as the classic examples of what an 'empire' is supposed to be.

The expansion and consolidation increases the 'costs' particularly as there is a 'time-lag' for the 'gains' to accrue and accumulate, necessitating the 'expansion' even further, resulting in a repetition of the cycle once again. Polities 'live' on 'borrowed credit', and empires do it even on a grander, more spectacular scale, dazzling the onlooker who does not see the yawning gap behind and beneath it all. This they can do, as they provide the environment for economy to flourish and wealth to be created through an expanding internal and external trade. Merchants become bankers and money-lenders to the State and finance even its military enterprises in order to keep the credit-worthiness of the State afloat and, of course, get a share of the 'spoils' when the victory is won.

The interrelationships of the economies of the conquering State with those of the places that are conquered and the inter-meshing of political and administrative structures is a story that is seldom told, particularly in the context of the conflicts they generate. But it is clear that the political hegemony is seldom accepted and arouses 'resistance' as it affects the deep identifications and self-respect of a people more than economic relationships which take a longer time to be seen as essentially adverse in character and, in many cases, this may not even be actually so. The Marxian analysis, based as it primarily is on the capitalist mode of production and the uneven interrelationships between States with unequal development in that mode in what has been called the 'imperial' relationship with the colonies, has so intermeshed the 'political' with the 'economic' that it has failed to see the relative autonomy and independence of the two. The very differentiation of the political function and its institutionalization creates a dynamics of its

own, bringing into being 'new' forces that radically affect and alter all previously functioning aspects of societies, including its culture and economy. In fact, the differentiation and institutionalization of the political function brings gradually into being a differentiation and institutionalization of other aspects also which earlier were unified in a whole so invisibly that they were hardly perceived or felt to be there at all. The relative autonomy, independence and internal causality of these fields becomes manifest only *after* they have become so differentiated and institutionalized. But, so does the conflict and the ambivalent relationship they have with the polity, as also with one another. The claim of each on the polity and of the polity on them creates a situation where no one is satisfied, and yet the dynamics and dialectic of dissatisfaction, if carefully handled, lead the polity and the society forward.

The differentiations, however, lead to a division, both horizontal and vertical, which create new asymmetries of rank, status, prestige and power besides those of the 'ruler' and the 'ruled', and thus increasingly bring into being the problem of the relationships between them. The State plays, and has to play, a mediating and integrating role but, increasingly, it is seen as partisan tilting the balance in favour of those who provide the economic foundation for it and those who legitimize its function and practice, something which it always needs. The creators of wealth have generally been known, but not so the 'legitimizers' of those who exercise the ruling function in the polity. The problem of 'legitimacy' is always there, but there is the added problem of 'justification' as what those who rule do, is not exactly acceptable or palatable to many even if it be in their 'real' interest or the interest of the society and polity as a whole.

The real problem of a polity which represents 'self-consciousness' at a collective level, is to ensure the maintenance, continuance and growth of *all* that society consists of as constituted, through its increasingly differentiated and differentiating structures, and embodied in institutions with their own divergent values for the realization of which they have been formed and which is the *raison d'etre* of their existence. But while seeing to all this and taking responsibility for it, it also has to see about itself, its continuity and the way it is discharging its function. Its

relation to society from which it got differentiated, thus, is strange and ambiguous as the latter never forgets that the differentiation and the institutionalization of the political function occurred for certain purposes, and if those purposes were not being achieved, something must have gone wrong and needs to be rectified to set things right. The history of man's experimentation with forms of polity has to be seen in this perspective to realize that it just is not the case as may appear at first sight that once the ruling function has become autonomous nothing can be done about it. The delusion of 'omnipotence' may infect those who rule but, sooner or later, it is corrected by forces generated from within and without.

But even in normal circumstances, the question remains as to how those who are to rule shall be appointed, the succession ensured and in case the necessity so arises, removed. The political centre tries to ensure this for all other institutions in a society, but the fact that it has to ensure this for itself as well creates that 'insoluble' problem which the history of 'political experimentation' has been trying to solve over the ages. How to avoid a situation where the ruler becomes a 'tyrant' and cannot be removed, is the central question whose answer in the western tradition has been given by what is called 'democracy' and which perhaps was first tried in the history of Greece by Athens as described and documented in *The Athenian Constitution*, a work ascribed to Aristotle, recording the history of the experiment for more than two hundred years since the time of Solon till his own times.

The problem relates to the relation between the ruler/s and the 'ruled', and how the latter can exercise 'control' over the former, as it is in their interest that the former are supposed to govern. The problem thus is of 'appointment', 'tenure of office' and ensuring that those who are appointed do step down when their tenure is over, unless they are reappointed. There is also the problem of the 'process of appointment' and who are the persons entitled to take part in it. This gave rise to the notion of 'citizen' in the western tradition of thought about polity and of Aristotle's definition of man as a 'political animal'. The other definition, also attributed to Aristotle, which defines man as a 'rational animal' is wider in nature but, when combined with the narrower one restricting it to the realm of the 'political', opens the door to an under-

standing of western thought regarding the 'understanding' of man as perhaps nothing else could. Aristotle's teacher had already shown the way to this type of understanding, but Plato was ambivalent, as his understanding of 'reason' was different and, in any case, he did not seem to understand the problem to which the seeking for the 'democratic' form of political organization was the answer. Plato seems never to have seen the perennial problem from which all polity *qua* 'polity' seems to suffer. The asymmetrical relations of power which the formation of a polity legitimizes may, at any time, turn, by the very nature of the structural situation into those which are exploitative, oppressive and tyrannical. Aristotle too did not seem to have seen this, even though he seemed to have engaged in a comparative study of the constitutions of the 'city-states' of Greece in general and of Athens in particular, as evidenced in *The Athenian Constitution*. In fact, both he and Plato seemed to have had an adverse opinion regarding the functioning of 'democracy' in the Athenian 'City-State', particularly after the way it treated Socrates as documented in *The Trial and Death of Socrates* by Plato, his pupil and one of the greatest philosophers the world has ever seen. The reflection on justice in *The Republic*, it has been argued by some, should be seen in this perspective. Plato seems to have felt that a 'democracy' could perhaps be as tyrannical as any other form of polity, or perhaps even more so.

The Macedonian conquest of Athens, first by Phillips and then by Alexander, put an end to the experiment in democracy described in *The Athenian Constitution* but the Aristotelian definition of man as a being who was both 'rational' and 'political' at the same time haunted and influenced Western thought and practice, just as did Plato's vision of a 'utopia', or an 'ideal polity' in which alone perhaps a fully 'rational' life could be lived, a life that included for him the contemplation of 'ideas' or rather the 'Real' which coincided with the Idea of Good.

The realization of 'Reason' in the realm of the political and the definition of man in its terms introduced a perennially active dimension in the nature of man to make him 'concerned' with the other at an impersonal and institutional level which was different from the personal and individual level in terms of which the problem of morality was generally conceived and defined. Being a 'human being' meant to

be a member of this public domain and actively participate in it for the realization of the public good, and not just to live in the world of 'private' personal relations which, at least in one Greek sense, was said to be 'privative' in character, that is, 'something' which 'deprived' you of being fully human, particularly as this world was essentially non-rational or irrational, constituted as it was by feelings and emotions and valued in terms of them.

The transformation in the notion of 'rationality' that this involved has not been sufficiently noticed. It was now being seen in the context of the 'public good' and involved a 'participative', 'deliberative' inter-individual and inter-institutional character where each thought in a 'representative' capacity, and not as an individual person. This was not exactly that 'universality' of reason which philosophers have talked about whose locus continues to be the individual, nor is its 'good' the same which is talked about in the context of ethics which remains individual-centred as it is enmeshed and stuck in the issues of praise and blame and freedom. Nor is this the reason which thrives on the distinction between 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' rationality or *zweck-rationalitat* and *wert-rationalitat* so dear to social scientists since Weber, as they still remain bound to the individual whose apprehension of 'value' remains central in the analysis.

These notions of 'rationality' and 'value' derive not so much from the way the Athenian Greek saw it, but rather from the Christian formulation which put the individual at the centre, but as a member of the Church, rather than of the polis as Aristotle had perhaps seen it. This, however was the Catholic, and perhaps the Byzantine, view of the matter, not shared by the Lutheran break which seems to have provided the basis for the way both Kant and the utilitarians thought on the subject, even though there was a crucial difference between them as the latter's formulation, though still rooted in the individual subject, provided the possibility of a return to the Greek notion *via* the idea of the 'greatest good' (happiness) of the 'greatest number'. That this, though enormously effective in the socio-political realm, was essentially accidental is shown by the developments in ethical thought in England after Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick. But, the return of the realm of reason to the public sphere and to the 'thinking' about the 'public good'

was taken over in the 'policy-oriented' sciences such as economics, politics, law, etc., though the success of Rawls and the enormous reputation of Habermas suggest that philosophers have not entirely given up the way Aristotle tried to think about man and understood and defined him.

The application of rationality in the public sphere has, however, been confined mainly to economics and as for politics it has almost exclusively concerned itself with the polity within the boundaries which constitute and define it. The political perspective cannot but 'see' the world as defined by itself, and this has boundaries without which it cannot be considered a polity. Economics, as we said earlier, does not have those boundaries, though when seen in the political perspective, it generally tends to have one. The point is that 'reason' in the public domain functions differentially in the realm of politics and economics. It is easier for it to transcend and transgress national boundaries in the economic than in the political realm where the distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer', the 'we' and the 'they' is insurmountable because of the structural limits themselves.

Polity, it should be remembered, is defined differentially in respect of those for whom it is 'responsible', that is, its own citizens, and all the rest, that is, other polities and peoples are alien to it. The twin values of power and welfare that define the realm are related in such a way that while the former is subordinated to the latter at least to some extent in the context of its own citizens, there is nothing of this sort in relation to those which constitute the 'other' to the polity outside itself. There, pure considerations of power prevail and if these are ever tempered it is only by considerations of power that are relevant to it.

The two values that define the realm of the political are intrinsically at odds even in the internal domain, but there, in spite of this, the welfare-dimension has to be taken into account as it is that for which the polity is supposed to be there. The regulative and the integrative function that this involves in respect of all aspects of society includes the economic aspect as well, and it is this which leads to that strange and paradoxical situation where everything that is intrinsically 'universal' has to be parochialized and seen from the perspective of the state to which one belongs, and in terms of its interests alone.

The enormous harm that it has done to the 'universal' interests of mankind has seldom been noticed or emphasized, but it is equally true that humanity could not have engaged in its various enterprises and built what we call 'civilizations' without the protection, patronage and over-arching umbrella of polities without which this would have been inconceivable. The role of empires in this regard is well known, but the contribution of smaller states should not be forgotten. It is not only the small city-states of ancient Greece or of Renaissance Italy or of those which arose in Post-Mughal India in the sub-Himalayan region and elsewhere as in Rajasthan, but also the innumerable unknown ones which kept the flame alive and the civilizational enterprises 'going', as without them they would have died long ago.

It is perhaps this interplay between the centralizing, overarching, unifying, consolidatory periods of the Great Empires and the decentralized, scattered, separate political centres that nourished creativity and brought into being what we call 'civilizations' in history. Seen from the civilizational point of view, the two are not opposed as the story centred on the rise and fall of empires has tended to paint. The polity certainly becomes 'visible' in that which we see as 'Empires', but the empires pre-supposed long periods when creativity was fostered in diverse fields at various places under different polities which continue even in the period when imperial unity and authority is superimposed on them and which recedes when the imperial sway gets loosened over them. This is as true of the Mauryan and the Gupta empires in India, as of Alexander's in Greece and later of the Romans on large parts of what they had conquered in Asia. The role that empires have played in the history of culture and civilizations has yet to be examined, but it can be safely said that Toynbee seems to be definitely wrong when he sees them exclusively in terms of the universal religions that they fostered. Religions, he forgot, have the same history as other areas of cultural creativity; they too had been there *before* the empires were born and outlasted them when they disappeared.

The function of the polity is to continue to do at a self-conscious level what society does almost naturally as the latter not only pre-dates the former, but continues to perform its functions even when the polity gets institutionalized and differentiated, though in a radically modified

form. The polity, in fact, differentiates and formally separates through institutionalization many of these functions, and tries then to unify and integrate them, creating more institutions in this process and thus increasing the 'costs' of 'running' the society which hardly were there before.

The differentiation of political forms and their evolution, or rather the changes in them over time and the effect these have had on society have hardly been studied, but many of the so-called 'social formations' have been the direct or indirect result of the polity's, or rather the political state's vaster interest in perpetuating itself and enhancing its power and power-bases in the society. There is, however, always an 'external' aspect of the polity's relation to other polities which the purely society-centred analysis misses, and which becomes visible even to the blindest eye when a polity assumes the form of an 'empire'.

'Empire', by definition, is expansionist, constituted as it is by those who have been conquered and whose societies and cultures are, by this very fact, 'inferior' even if they are in certain exceptional cases acknowledged as superior, as is said to be the case in the relation between Rome and Greece. The incorporation of that which is conquered, thus creates not only the empire but also that asymmetry within it which impels it to a course involving further and further expansion till it results in an economic bankruptcy and political disaster and the external discontent results in increasing resistance and the costs of maintaining control become so high that the centre not only cannot meet them, but cannot keep itself from breaking and collapsing.

The 'collapse', however is only a 'return-back' to an earlier situation when the empire had not arisen and the enormous complications, differentiations and institutionalizations had not taken place with only one difference of course, and the difference consists in the 'memory' of that which was achieved during the days of the empire when everything was 'staged' and 'played' to be seen and chronicled and recorded and remembered. These included not only the political events about which the historians write, but also the intellectual and cultural creations which the post-imperial decentralized societies and polities try to preserve and develop in their own ways, 'freed' as they are of the centrally

imposed standards and norms of the imperial metropolis where everything was concentrated.

The decentralization reduces the wastage and the costs and thus releases funds for a more economical use giving rise to results which, though less spectacular and glamorous, are equally important as it is through them that the enterprises of a civilization are carried forward.

The economic base and the political superstructure are always in a tension and the interplay between them provides that dynamics which Marx saw but did not clearly understand. The dynamics, however, is not determined by these two alone, as the polity's relations with other polities, provides that third dimension which determines the inner development not only of the polity, but of its relation to its own 'economy' as well.

These, however, are 'internal' factors in the story of a civilization which is centred in its intellectual and cultural enterprises which include the life of the imagination and what is called 'spirit'.

The unasked question that this raises, however, is what happens to 'man' who is the centre of all this drama and whether history with all the changes in polity, economy and society leave his 'essence' 'untouched', or transform and transmute him in a sense that is difficult to grasp as the very activity of thinking and understanding seems to be structured in such a way as to determine and give form to itself by conceiving of everything, including itself, as constituted by the differences that distinguish and define them as 'this' rather than 'that'. The retrospective look at the evidence provided by history seems to suggest that there is little change in man since he became self-conscious and reflected on himself and the world around him and his 'relation' with it. But even if all this is admitted, it does not follow that 'something' that is defined in terms of a property or set of properties, cannot lose them and cease to be either as an individual or a class or species, as that would then imply that any 'object' defined in this way would never 'cease to be', as it cannot do so by definition. Such a conclusion would be unpalatable and hence unacceptable as it would confer 'immortality' on everything that could be defined as having a *svarūpa* or *svabhāva* or essence.

The attempt to save the situation by opting for the immortality of the species alone and sacrificing that of the individual would not help unless one were to assume that *all* the species have existed *all* the time since they came into being and that no 'new' species can ever arise because of the eternal fixity in them imposed by one's definition. But if once it is accepted that there could have been a time when the species called 'man' was not there, then there can be no reason to think that it will always be there *or* that it will not give rise to some other species which would be related to man, as he is said to be related to those from which man is said to have arisen. The relation of this new species to man would be similar to the one that seems to obtain between man and other animals, no matter if the differentiating characteristic is described in terms of 'rationality' or 'citizenship' or *dharma*, that is, the sense of 'rightness' or 'wrongness' in respect of anything that is apprehended by his consciousness.

Thinkers like Aurobindo and Chardin, and even Nietzsche, have struggled with this question, but none of them could have seen the far-reaching fundamental changes in the very structure of the human condition that are being introduced by what goes under the name of genetic engineering, information technology, transmutation of elements and the transformation of mass into energy, all actually around us in different degrees of maturation. Chardin did talk of a 'Noo-sphere' on the analogy of 'Bio-sphere' which man's mind was gradually creating for his 'mental living' just as life had earlier created the biosphere for its sustenance, survival and growth of life on this planet.

But the thought of all of them is 'consciousness-centred', while what is happening is almost the opposite. Consciousness is being ambushed, threatened, overwhelmed by something that is its 'opposite' and we seem to have reached a stage where the very 'reality' of consciousness is in question. Any thinking about consciousness now will have to take into account, at least at the human level, the political, the economic and the socio-cultural matrix in which it is embedded and through which it has to function and achieve its ends. But, if we are to understand its 'history' and learn from it we will have to get rid of the illusion which its apparent transparency projects and makes us believe that it always *was* as it 'appears' to be. A 'look' at the 'animal world' around, as Sri

Aurobindo did, should be sufficient to dispel the illusoriness which, in his own words used in a different context, may be characterized as 'illusion of the obvious'.

The 'self-centredness' of consciousness and life, and perhaps of all 'being', gets a little less at the human level because of the 'other-centredness' imposed on it by those dimensions in which it has necessarily to live, and which helps it in attaining an impersonality and universality which the meditative consciousness seems to provide at the other end of the spectrum. What is the relationship between these two radically opposed directions of consciousness, is the unanswered question of the future. But the fact that Sri Aurobindo wrote *The Ideal of Human Unity* and *The Human Cycle* besides *The Synthesis of Yoga* and *The Life Divine*, witnesses the challenge of this awareness in modern times, just as Gandhi's 'experiments' in the political, social and economic fields do in a different way. But these are just the 'beginning', the faint awareness of something that is needed and we have to go beyond them, each in his or her own way. The path is untraversed, the temptation of 'turning away' too great, and yet if humanity is to move forward, the 'double denial' has to be replaced by a 'double affirmation' and the trail that Gandhi blazed has to be followed, though not in *his* way. It is the vision that should matter and not the 'accidentalities' in which all pioneering efforts are inevitably enmeshed. The value-consciousness has to be operationalized, brought to work in the fields of polity, society and economy which seem most recalcitrant and resistant. Gandhi saw this as perhaps no one else did, but he turned away from the real challenges posed by modern technologies which are now infiltrating and shaping every aspect of life. The Gandhians stand helpless as they are 'wedded' to the wording of *Hind Swaraj* and oblivious of the message contained in his life which was never bound by what he said or did, as he 'knew' what he was doing and was prepared to accept mistakes when he realized that they were such. As for Aurobindians and Aurovilleites, they seem to believe more in the supermind doing things for them, rather than do things on their own in fields which really challenge the higher mind and the intuitive mind, to use Sri Aurobindo's terminology, to shape them nearer the values that human consciousness vaguely apprehends at present. The lessons

from the 'masters' have to be learnt, but the path one has to find for oneself and traverse the way one can. The emerging realities of society, polity, economy and technology can only be ignored at costs which are unimaginable at the historical juncture man finds himself today. The awareness of this along with the great traditions of experimentation with consciousness in the past may help in restoring and redressing the balance in the thought and action that is needed today.

Laying Foundations for Modern Technology: The Aim of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*

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What exactly is Kant doing in his *Critique of Pure Reason*?[1] As an answer to this question the answer given by Kant himself need not be definitive for us, since the author himself and his successors may not be very clear about what they are doing. We have Kant's authority on this point. Kant himself makes a distinction between what is described by a philosopher and the philosopher's description of it and claims that there may be discrepancy between the two. Kant writes, 'No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay even the definition which, at the start, he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognizable even under microscopic observation. Consequently, since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description, which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For we shall then find that its founder, and often even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that consequently they have not been in a position to determine the proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.'[2] How can one rise to the level of rational knowledge so that he does not remain at the level of historical knowledge?[3] Let us hear what Kant says in the context of his own discussion on Plato's ideas: 'I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in

ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.'[4] So to find out what Kant is doing in his first *Critique* we have to understand him better than himself.

Kant describes the aim of his *Critique of Pure Reason* variously. In the Preface to the First Edition he writes, 'I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive *independently of all experience.* It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limits—all in accordance with principles.'[5] But in the Preface to the Second Edition he further writes, 'So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative reason, it is indeed *negative*; but since it thereby removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, nay threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a *positive* and very important use. At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary *pratical* employment of pure reason—the *moral*—in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though (practical) reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself.'[6] That is to say he is limiting the domain of speculative reason in the first critique so as to remove the obstacle in the way of morality. He further explains, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* 'I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room *for faith.*'[7] Although these claims are not wrong, yet these descriptions of aims do not adequately and properly describe what Kant is doing in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* And hence they cannot be taken as definitive of his aim.

Kant was trying to provide a foundation to man's technological domination over the world, but in the process of providing a foundation to our new technological relation to the world, he was logically forced to go beyond its base in modern empirical sciences, to the traditional forms of human relation to the world as embodied in the tradition of Greek philosophy and in the message of the Christian church. So the

reconciliation of sciences as the foundation of new relation to the world with the tradition of Greek philosophy, as the embodiment of everything men knew about God, the world, and human life, and with the message of the Christian Church, became a problem of his critical philosophy beginning with his first critique. This problem Kant inherited from the seventeenth century. Gadamer writes, '... modern science is not an invention of the nineteenth century, but of the seventeenth century. The task of providing a rational foundation for the knowledge of nature was taken up at that time, and the question was raised as to how science, as the new foundation of our human relation to the world, could be united with the traditional forms of that relation—with the tradition of Greek philosophy, as the embodiment of everything men knew about God, the world, and human life, and with the message of the Christian Church.'[8] Let us see if this reading of Kant's *Critique* is correct.

To show the correctness of our claim we have to show that the primary task of Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to lay the foundation of modern technology. To find out what Kant is doing in his first critique we have to first find out what is philosophical knowledge in his view. Kant claims, 'Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.'[9]

What are the essential ends of human reason to which all knowledge is related by philosophy as a science? According to Kant, 'Essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view of the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can be so described. Essential ends are therefore either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are necessarily connected with the former as means.'[10] So Kant divides essential ends into one ultimate end and all others as subordinate ends, which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end.

What is the ultimate end of reason as distinguished from subordinate ends? 'The former is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy.'[11] Here Kant has used two ideas to describe what is the ultimate end. Firstly it is the 'whole vocation of man' and secondly 'the philosophy which

deals with it is entitled moral philosophy'. Let us first proceed via the idea of 'whole vocation of man' to find out what the ultimate end of reason is. In the *Critique of Judgment*[12] Kant writes, 'Therefore the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self—the subject)...'[13] So the vocation of man is humanity in his own self. In *Critique of Judgment* Kant further writes, 'The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing, consequently of the aptitude of a being in his freedom, is *culture*. Hence it is only culture that can be the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race. His individual happiness on earth, and, we may say, the mere fact that he is the chief instrument for instituting order and harmony in irrational external nature, are ruled out.'[14] That is to say our humanity consists in 'a capacity for setting before himself ends of his deliberate choice'.[15] It is for this ultimate end that reason is imparted to mankind by nature in its practical use.

Let us now proceed via the idea that 'the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy'. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant has identified the ultimate end of reason very clearly. There he writes, '... reason ... recognizes as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will ...'[16] The ultimate end of reason or the whole vocation of man on this account is to produce a good will. 'For since reason is not sufficiently serviceable for guiding the will safely as regards its objects and satisfaction of all our needs (which it in part even multiplies)—a purpose for which an implanted natural instinct would have led as much more surely; and since none the less reason has been imparted to us as a practical power—that is, as one which is to have influence on the *will*, its true function must be to produce a *will* which is *good*, not as a *means* to some further end, but in itself; and for this function reason was absolutely necessary in a world where nature, in distributing her aptitudes, has everywhere else gone to work in a purposive manner.'[17] Even in the *Critique of Judgment* itself while discussing the final end, which 'is an end that does not require any other end as condition of its possibility,'[18]

Kant writes, 'Now we have in the world beings of but one kind whose causality is teleological, or directed to ends, and which at the same time are beings of such a character that the law according to which they have to determine ends for themselves is represented by them themselves as unconditioned and not dependent on anything in nature, but as necessary in itself. The being of this kind is man but man regarded as noumenon. He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective characterization is nevertheless such as to enable us to recognize in him a supersensible faculty—his *freedom* ...'[19] He further writes, 'Now it is not open to use in the case of man, considered as a moral agent, or similarly in the case of any rational being in the world, to ask the further question: For what end ... does he exist? His existence inherently involves the highest end—the end to which as far as in him lies, he may subject the whole of nature ... Now assuming that things in the world are beings that are dependent in point of their real existence, and as such, stand in need of a supreme cause acting according to ends, then man is the final end of creation. For without man the chain of mutually subordinated ends would have no ultimate point of attachment. Only in man, and only in him as the individual being to whom the moral law applies, do we find unconditioned legislation in respect of ends.'[20]

So should we conclude that for Kant 'an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing' i.e., 'a capacity for setting before himself ends of his deliberate choice' is the same as 'a *will* which is *good*' and it is the ultimate end with which moral philosophy is concerned? The answer is in the negative. For Kant writes, 'The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind and not in its object, it constitutes a *power of acting or not acting according to liking*. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of the action to produce the object, it forms an act of *choice* (*Willkür*) ... The faculty of desire, in so far as its inner principle of determination as the ground of its liking or predilection lies in the reason of the subject, constitutes the *will* (*Wille*). The will is therefore the faculty of active desire or appetency, viewed not so much in relation to action—which is the relation of the act of choice—

as rather in relation to the principle that determines the power choice to the action. It (*Wille*) has, in itself, properly no special principle of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary act of choice, it is the *prctical reason* itself.'[21] In this passage Kant is clearly making a distinction between capacity to choose ends (*Willkür*) and another faculty called *Wille* (will) which has no determining ground apart from itself, and which is identified with 'practical reason itself'. The *Wille* (will) is the good will itself. So Kant is making a distinction between the capacity to choose ends and the good will. So which is the ultimate end of reason? Or are we saddled with two ultimate ends? Or should we take it that the good will is more ultimate since speaking of *Wille*, which we have identified with good will, Kant has remarked, 'in so far as it may determine the voluntary act of choice, it is the *practical reason* itself.'[22] The answer to the last question cannot be in the affirmative, since good will asks you to '*Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.*'[23] What does the humanity here consist in which is an end in itself? 'This principle of humanity, and in general of every rational agent, *as an end in itself* (a principle which is the supreme limiting condition of every man's freedom of action) is not borrowed from experience; firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings as such, and no experience is adequate to determine universality; secondly, because in it humanity is conceived, not as an end of man (subjectively)—that is, as an object which, as a matter of fact, happens to be made an end—but as an objective end—one which, be our ends what they may, must, as a law, constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends and so must spring from pure reason. That is to say, the ground for every enactment of practical law lies *objectively in the rule* and in the form of universality which (according to our first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (and indeed a law of nature); *subjectively,* however, it lies in the end; but (according to our second principle) the subject of all ends is to be found in every rational being as an end in himself.'[24] Here the clause, 'The subject of all ends is to be found in every rational being as an end in himself'[25] is very important for us. Rational being is the subject of

all ends precisely because he has the capacity to choose ends. Here 'the subject of all ends' means not the subject matter or the content of all ends but it means the one who wills all the ends. A rational being is an end in itself partly because he chooses all ends without being a mere means of any end. Hence the subject of all ends is to be found in every rational being as an end in itself because it is partly end in itself as it has *the capacity to choose ends.* This is also confirmed by Kant's statement, 'As the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, and, consequently, *a capacity for setting before himself ends of his deliberate choice*, he is certainly titular lord of nature and, supposing we regard nature as a teleological system, he is born to be its *ultimate end.*[26] So good will is good partly because it treats this capacity to choose ends as an end in itself. Hence the capacity to choose ends seems to be more fundamental than the good will. Or is Kant moving in a circle? Even then how do we decide which is the ultimate end?

Kant's position is that both are parts of supreme end, which he thought he has united in a single supreme end. When Kant takes practical reason to be moral reason (irrespective of how he identifies it: whether as practical reason or practical use of reason) then good will is the *final* end of reason. When Kant takes practical reason to be the practical use of reason (irrespective of how he identifies it: whether as practical reason or practical use of reason), the other use being theoretical, then the *ultimate* end is aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing. Be it noted Kant is making a distinction between *the ultimate end of nature*, which is *aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing*, which is the subject matter of §83 of the *Critique of Judgment* and *the final end of creation*, which is *the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will*, which is the subject matter of §84.

But the most convincing confirmation of the distinction comes from the *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.* There Kant makes a distinction between 'the predisposition to humanity in man, taken as a living and at the same time a rational being' and 'the predisposition to personality in man, taken as a rational and at the same time an accountable being'.[27] Here on the latter disposition he adds a footnote saying, 'We cannot regard this as included in the concept of the preceding, but

necessarily must treat it as a special predisposition.'[28] Later he explains, 'The predisposition to personality is the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will.'[29] This predisposition to personality refers to *Wille*, which is not included in the predisposition to humanity. So humanity can refer to *Willkür* only, which confirms our hypothesis most explicitly.

Kant will unite the two in his conception of *summum bonum*, i.e. the supreme end. What exactly is the relation between these two parts of the supreme end and whether Kant succeeds in uniting these two into a single supreme end are issues beyond the scope of the present essay.

Since in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant has in mind two uses of reason, the ultimate end is aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing and it is the business of practical use of reason. One may argue that Kant also speaks about three ultimate aims of reason. 'The ultimate aim to which the speculation of reason in its transcendental employment is directed concerns three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.'[30] So talk of *the ultimate end* of reason in the context of Kant's view is wrong. But this argument is not sound. For Kant there is only one ultimate end of reason. But that ultimate end pertains to the three objects mentioned in the sentence quoted above in the argument.

What are the essential ends of the other kind, which Kant calls 'subordinate ends', which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end? Which reason (theoretical or practical) relates philosophical knowledge as science to these subordinate essential ends? What is that philosophy called? These questions are left unanswered in the passages[31] under consideration. Rather immediately after the passage in which he distinguishes the two kinds of esential ends, Kant introduces the division of philosophical knowledge into two kinds. In his words, 'The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature, but also the moral law, presenting them at first in two distinct systems, but ultimately in one single philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all *that is*, the philosophy of morals with that which *ought to be*.'[32] If one kind of essential end of reason, i.e. the ultimate end, is the business of one kind of philosophical knowledge, i.e. philosophy of morals,

then should not the other kind of essential ends, i.e., 'subordinate ends', which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end be the business of the other kind of philosophical knowledge, i.e., philosophy of nature? Kant had declared that the philosopher is 'himself the lawgiver of human reason', 'but as he nowhere exists, while the idea of his legislation is to be found in that reason with which every human being is endowed, we shall keep entirely to the latter, determining more precisely what philosophy prescribes as regards systematic unity ... from the standpoint of its essential ends.'[33] The answer to the last question asked above should have been in the affirmative.

Kant has discussed the questions raised above in an unsystematic manner spread over his entire critical philosophy. So let us first find an answer to one of the questions raised above by putting together his views from various critical works: What are the essential ends of the other kind, which Kant calls 'subordinate ends', which are necessary as a means to the ultiamte end?

In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant writes, 'Skill is a culture that is certainly the principal subjective condition of the aptitude for the furthering of ends of all kinds ... this is an essential factor, if an aptitude for ends is to have its full meaning.'[34] The skill is necessary for the ultimate end. Kant gives an explanation of the idea of skill and principles involved in it in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. There he writes, 'Everything that is possible only through the efforts of some rational being can be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and consequently there are in fact innumerable principles of action so far as action is thought necessary in order to achieve some possible purpose which can be effected by it. All sciences have a practical part consisting of problems which suppose that some end is possible for us and of imperatives which tell us how it is to be attained. Hence the latter can in general be called imperatives of *skill*. Here there is absolutely no question about the rationality or goodness of the end, but only about what must be done to achieve it. A prescription required by a doctor in order to cure his man completely and one required by a poisoner in order to make sure of killing him are of equal value so far as each serves to effect its purpose perfectly.'[35] Be it noted that Kant is completely separating the imperatives of skill from moral principles

here. Kant has a well-settled history of this distinction to appeal to if he wants.

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle distinguished morality from *technē* (skill), which was the model of ethics according to sophists. For all three of them knowledge of the good cannot be understood taking *technē* as a model. In *Meno* of Plato Socrates says, '... *phronēsis ara phamen aretēn einai ētoi sympasan ē meros ti*' (we say then that phronēsis is aretē, be it either the whole of it or a part). According to Plato and Socrates phronēsis plays a role in aretē but they leaving open the question whether other things beside phronēsis also play a role. Aristotle also makes the same point in *Nicomachean Ethics*.[36] According to Aristotle *technē* is the reasoned state of capacity to make while *phronēsis* is the reasoned state of capacity to act. In his view: '... making and acting are different ... so that the resoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting.'[37] So for Arstotle making and acting are mutually exclusive categories. 'For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.'[38] Since *phronēsis* is concerned with action, where the good action itself is its end, it is not concerned with any action, which has an end other than itself, and hence it is not involved in *technē*.

St Thomas Aquinas comments upon the point made by Aristotle in the passage quoted above, in the *Summa Theologica* under the question 'Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art'. He comments: 'The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made", whereas prudence is the "right reason of things to be done". Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ, as stated in *Metaphysics* IX, 16, in that making (*facere*) is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. to build, to saw and so forth; whereas doing (*agere*) is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. to see, to will and the like ... consequently it is requisite for prudence ... that man be well disposed with regard to the end, and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. On the other hand, the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves, whereas art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite.' A little further on he writes, 'The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man.' In his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* Aquinas again makes the point, 'wherefore Prudence, which is concerned with man's good (*human bona*) of necessity has the moral virtues joined with it ... Not however Art, which is concerned with exterior goods (*bona exteriora*).'

St Thomas Aquinas in agreement with Aristotle accepts that art is concerned with making (*facere*, ποιεῖν) which results in modification of external matter, and morality has nothing to do with it, only the principles of evaluation of product are involved in it. Morality is concerned with acting or doing (πράττειν, *agere*) which abides in the agent himself and requires rectitude of appetite unlike making.

Kant elaborates the distinction between *facere* and *agere* in following words: 'Art is distinguished from nature as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (*opus*) from operation (*effectus*) ... By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art, that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their Creator that we ascribe it as art.'[39]

Kant shifts the categories. For Kant 'making' (*facere*) is an action done with both free will and *reason*, and hence it is properly a human action. But activities falling under the category of *agere* are not recognized as human action at all.[40] Hence *making* occupies the whole space of human action according to Kant. For Kant art or skill or *technē* involves *reason*. Since morality is not involved in it, it cannot be that reason which is concerned with the ultimate end. What kind of reason can this be?

Let us have a look at the conception of will according to Kant. For him will 'is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objets (whether the physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our causality.'[41] He further clarifies. 'The will—for this is what is said—is the

faculty of desire and, as such, is just one of the many natural causes in the world, the one, namely, which acts by concepts; and whatever is represented as possible (or necessary) through the efficacy of will is called practically possible (or necessary): the intention being to distinguish its possibility (or necessity) from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect the causality of whose cause is not determined to its production by concepts (but rather, as with lifeless matter, by mechanisms, and, as with the lower animals, by instinct).'[42] And this faculty of desire is defined in the *General Introduction to Metaphysics of Morals*, 'The *active faculty of the human mind*, as the faculty of desire in its widest sense, is the power which man has, through his mental representations, of becoming the cause of objects corresponding to these representations. The capacity of a being to act in conformity with his own representations is what constitutes the life of such a being.'[43]

How does the will get its rule? 'Now, the question in respect of the practical faculty: whether, that is to say, the concept, by which the causality of the will gets its rule, is a concept of nature or of freedom, is here left quite open.'[44] Now Kant explains the differnt bases of the rules and the consequent division of rules into distinct classes. 'The latter distinction, however, is essential. For let the concept determining the causality be a concept of nature, and then the principles are technically-practical; but, let it be a concept of freedom, and they are morally-practical. Now, in the division of a rational science the difference between objects that require different principles for their cognition is the difference on which everything turns. Hence technically-practical principles belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science), whereas those morally-practical alone form the second part, that is, practical philosophy (ethical science).'[45] Now Kant makes it clear to which division of philosophy should the imperatives of skill belong. 'All technically-practical rules (i.e., those of art and skill generally, or even of prudence, as a skill in exercising an influence over men and their wills) must, so far as their principles rest upon concepts, be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they only touch the possibility of things according to concepts of nature, and this embraces, not alone the means discoverable in nature for the purpose, but even the will itself (as a faculty of desire, and consequently a natural faculty), so far as it is determinable on these rules by natural motives. Still these practical rules are not called laws (like physical laws), but only precepts. This is due to the fact that the will does not stand simply under the natural concept, but also under the concept of freedom. In the latter connection its principles are called laws, and these principles, with the addition of what follows them, alone constitute the second or practical part of philosophy.'[46] Why should the imperatives of skill not be part of practical philosophy? Talking about these principles Kant says, 'For, between them all, the above contain nothing more than rules of skill, which are thus only technically practical—the skill being directed to producing an effect which is possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. As these concepts belong to theoretical philosophy, they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of theoretical philosophy (i.e., as corollaries of natural science), and so cannot claim any place in any special philosophy called practical.'[47] But why should we not place these principles of skill separately from but co-ordinate with theoretical philosophy? Kant answers, 'Hence it is evident that a complex of practical precepts furnished by philosophy does not form a special part of philosophy co-ordinate with the theoretical, by reason of its precepts being practical—for that they might be, notwithstanding that their principles were derived wholly from the theoretical knowledge of natural (as technically-practical rules).'[48]

So the subordinate ends are the numerous subjective ends to achieve which we develop skill through the knowledge of technically-practical rules derived from theoretical philosophy. So theoretical philosophy as a science is at the service of *technē* to achieve all sorts of subjective ends. The reason concerned with the subordinate essential ends is, therefore, theoretical reason or to put it in another way one can say that theoretical use of reason is concerned with subordinate essential ends.

From the above account it should not be thought that technology as conceived by Kant is the same as technology as conceived by ancient thinkers. The production process of the ancients depended on the multi-fold causality. But the Greeks conceived four-fold causality operating in the production process, while Indian thinkers conceived three-fold causality operating in the production process. But in essence the two ways of conceiving the causality, Greek and Indian, are one and the

same. These multifold causalities 'are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.'[49] To illustrate what this means, let us take the example Heidegger gives of the four interrelated, co-responsible ways occasioned in the bringing forth of a sacrificial silver chalice.

'Silver is that out of which the silver chalice is made. As the matter (hyle) it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to i.e. owes thanks to the silver for that of which it consists (the causa materialis).'[50] Indian thinkers recognize this causality as *samvāyi kāraṇa* or *upādāna kāraṇa*. With respect to this causality the thing which is *kārya* owes *deva ṛṇa* material debt for its own being in nature.

'But the sacrificial vessel is indebted not only to the silver. As a chalice, that which is indebted to the silver appears in the aspect of a chalice, and not that of a brooch or a ring. Thus the sacred vessel is at the same time indebted to the aspect (eidos) of chaliceness (causa formalis).'[51] Indian thinkers recognize causality as *asamvāyi kāraṇa*. With respect to the *asamvāyi kāraṇa* the thing which is a *kārya* owes *ṛṣi ṛṇa* formal debt for its own being in nature.

'Both the silver into which the aspect is admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the silver appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.'[52] According to Heidegger, 'But there remains yet a third that is above all responsible for the sacrificial vessel. It is that which in advance confines the chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal. Through this the chalice is circumscribed as sacrificial vessel. Circumscribing gives bound to the thing. Within the bounds the thing does not stop, rather, from within them it begins to be what after production it will be. That which gives bounds, that which completes in this sense is called in Greek telos (the causa finalis), which is all too often translated as "aim" and "purpose", and so misinterpreted. The telos is responsible for what as matter and as aspect are together co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.'[53] Indian thinkers do not recognize this as an independent cause. For them all production is part of celebration of *yajña* and hence *yajña* itself assigns the role to the product and hence it is not an independent cause for them.

'Finally, there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the finished sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i.e. the

silversmith but not at all because he, in working brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a making, the silversmith is not a *causa efficiens*.'[54] Then what kind of cause is the silversmith? The Indian thinkers have the perfect name for this cause. They called it *nimitta kāraṇa* or instrumental or mediating cause. The silversmith is just a *nimitta* in the process of production. He is not producing as an agent but participating in the process of coming into being with other causes and hence he is co-responsible for the silver chalice along with other causes. With respect to the *nimitta-kāraṇa* the thing produced or *kārya* owes *pitṛ ṛṇa* or original debt.

What is most important for us here is that in the context of this fourfold co-responsible way of bringing forth in the sense in which the Greeks thought it, the production or *poiesis* is starting something on its way into arrival.[55] This is also what follows if we accept *satkāryavāda* as it is accepted in some schools of Indian philosophy. Hence production or *poiesis* also belong to *physis* or nature, since '*Physis* also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing forth, *poiesis*. *Physis* is indeed *poiesis* in the highest sense.'[56] In fact man participated in production where *physis* by itself is unable to complete the coming into being of a thing and hence man produced to complete the task left unfinished by nature. This is how the ancients conceived of the act of production or making.

The production of the ancients was firmly under the control of men. According to the Greek thinkers the distinctively human form of life is the *life of reason in common*. The life of reason in common is constituted when each agent (*phronimos*) through the reasoned state of capacity to act (*phronēsis*) is 'performing the functions of station' (*To αυτον πράττειν*). For this the agent needs to indulge in *theoria* (speculation, contemplation) as *theoros* (spectator). For Greek thinkers the *welfare* of man as well as *happiness* consists in this *life of reason in common*. For them this *life of reason in common*—and hence welfare and happiness as well—is not an end to be achieved as a consequence *of making*. The common life of reason is not constituted through the exercise of reasoned state of capacity to make (*technē*). That is to say the constitution of this common life of reason is not a technical problem for them; rather it is a moral problem. The life of reason is the

sphere of common use and common understanding constituted through intelligible communication and *acting*. Reasoned state of capacity to make (*technē*) is concerned with production. Production is the emergence of the work as the intended goal of regulated effort. 'The work is set free as such and released from the process of production because it is by definition destined for use.'[57] Hence the concept of work points to this sphere of common use and common understanding. It is the life of reason in common that controlled the process of production. For the Greek mind the world of human activities is located within the entirety of what exists. The whole sphere of human *praxis* (*action* through *phronēsis*) and *poiēsis* (*making* throiugh *technē*) has its place in nature.

The first difference between the modern technology as conceived by Kant and the technology as conceived by ancients is that technology is liberated from social control. We have already noted that activities falling under the category of *agere* are not recognized as human action at all by Kant. Hence *making* occupies the whole space of human action according to Kant. So Kant destroyed the basis of *life of reason in common* in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Society is reflected out of being through modern metaphysics of Kant. And hence he destroyed the basis of control of technology. So Kant liberated modern technology from all social control.

The second difference is that while the production procedure of ancients was a natural process, modern production process is liberated from nature, and men participate in modern production process through will and freedom having dominion over nature.

Thirdly for the ancients the production or *poiesis* is starting something on its way into arrival.[58] The idea of making as explained by St Thomas Aquinas became the basis for understanding the idea of production in modern times, and the idea of 'action passing into external matter' was elaborated as 'labour being embodied in the external object' and it gave rise to labour theory of value accepted by many economists. For Kant production is nothing but production of an external object through the causality of will from its representation of object.

How was this transformation of technolgoy from ancient to modern effected? The first step in this direction was taken by Aristotle himself when he distinguished *theoria* from *praxis* i.e., theoretical reason from

practical reason and in the process severed the connection of *theoria* or theoretical reason from the classical *Theoros* or the spectator and wrote untitled treatises dealing with world as a whole (κόσμος), which later on acquired the title of μετά τά φυσικά (meta physics), in which Aristotle elaborated theoria with a view to technical reason for production. Kant took the second and final step when he lays the foundation of metaphysics as science in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The 'reason' of *Critique of Pure Reason* comes not from 'the reasoned state of capacity to act' or the morally practical reason, rather it comes from 'the reasoned state of capacity to make' or technically practical reason. Since Kant has restricted the use of the term 'practical reason' for 'morally practical reason', when Kant wants to refer to reason of technically practical reason he either uses the term 'reason' simpliciter or when he wants to distinguish explicitly from (morally) practical reason he calls it 'speculative reason' or 'theoretical reason'. How can Kant qualify reason of technically practical reason with adjectives 'speculative' or 'theoretical'? What has technically practical reason to do with speculation or *theoria*? What is its relation to *theoros*? Since Kant is transforming the technical reason, as understood by Aristotle, into modern technical reason, he calls it theoretical or speculative reason, because Aristotle elaborated theoria with a view to technical reason for production.

Kant himself camouflages the relation of reason with the spectator even before he distinguishes the two uses of it, i.e., speculative and practical. Or is it the case that Kant himself is suffering from the camouflage of the previous ages? Kant writes, 'We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely to outline the *architectonic* of all knowledge arising from *pure reason*; and in doing so we shall begin from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems, one of which is *reason*. By reason I here understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge, and am therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical.'[59] Here Kant is talking about reason in the inclusive sense, i.e., inclusive of both theoretical and practical use. Here he is merely contrasting the reason from sensibility, as these are the two stems, which the common root of all knowledge throws out by division. Kant does

not tell what the common root is. In the very beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he also talks of these two stems without stating what the common roots is. 'By way of introduction or anticipation we need only say that there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, *sensibility* and *understanding*, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root.'[60] What is this common root? Let us find out. In the transcendental deduction we hear, 'There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, *sense*, *imagination*, *apperception*.'[61] The third faculty Kant introduces here is imagination. Is it the common root of the other two? How does this third faculty stand *vis-à-vis* the other two? 'A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience.'[62] The faculty of imagination is not a third stem as it stands in necessary connection with the other two faculties and unites them. So we can conclude the faculty of imagination is the common root of the other two faculties. What is imagination? '*Imagination* is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present.*'[63] Or again, 'Imagination (*Facultas imaginandi*) is a faculty of *perception* in the absence of an object.'[64] For Kant intuition is 'representation of imagination'.[65] The word (German word) *anschauen* (to intuit) is related to *schauen* (to look upon). '*Anschauen* thus refers ... to the sphere of the visible, but with a peculiar indeterminate direction toward what is there to be seen. Thus the word was first used for the mystic's vision of God (*Gottesschau*).'[66] We can trace the *Gottesschau* 'back to the Latin *Videre deum per essentiam* which characterizes the *status beautitudinus* and, from there, back to the Latin equivalents for the Greek *nous: intellectus* and *intelligentia.*'[67] And hence 'The corresponding Latin terms take us

back to the Classical conceptual world of *logos*, *nous*, *dianoia*, *theoria*, and *phronesis.*'[68] So the faculty of imagination also comes from this semantic field in Kant's writing. It can be confirmed directly. In Parmenides' fragment-4 *nous* is that faculty 'through which you look steadfastly at things which are present though they are absent'[69] or through which you 'See securely ... things absent as though they were present.'[70] In fact Kantian faculty of imagination is the faculty called *nous* by the Greeks. *Nous* is the highest faculty of the *Theoros*. No doubt Kant will have to rehabilitate genius, who can give intuition of imagination, and combine taste of spectator with genius. And only through combining taste of spectator with imagination of genius will Kant finally succeed in combining the two uses of reason in teleology of nature.

Kant makes the distinction between the two standpoints, that of intelligible world and sensibe world, through 'some obscure discrimination of the power of judgement known to it as "feeling".'[71] The faculty of judgement referred to is known as 'feeling' and this faculty of judgement is also the power of discrimination. Which faculty is being referred to here? Compare this description with the description of a faculty of judgement in the *Critique of Judgment*. 'To apprehend a regular and appopriate building with one's cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is quite different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more to its feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind (*Gemüt*)[72] is conscious in feeling of its state.'[73] Because of the identity of the two descriptions of the faculty of discrimination we can say the faculty of descrimination Kant is appealing to in making the distinction between two standpoints is the faculty of aesthetic judgement, which belongs to the disinterested spectator. How can we say that the faculty of aesthetic judgement brings in the figure of disinterested spectator?

In the very first paragraph of the first chapter of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant writes, '... a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will ...'[74] So it is only an impartial and rational *spectator* who *contemplates* a situation according to Kant. In judgement of beauty we are not concerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection).[75] It follows that the very first rule of reflection on the beautiful is that it produces delight in the disinterested spectator. This delight is independent of the existence of the object of sense experience or object of will. It is only contemplative delight. The *General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals* distinguishes pleasure which may be the cause or effect of desire from pleasure, which is not necessarily connected with the desire of an object, which is at basis not a pleasure in the existence of the object of representation, but rather adheres to the representation alone and which can be called merely contemplative pleasure or passive *delight*; and Kant then claims that 'the feeling of the latter kind of pleasure is what is called *taste*.'[76] So we can say the judgement of aesthetic judgement of taste is the judgement of the disinterested spectator.

Since the power of discrimination, which is feeling and judgement, belongs to even the ordinary person, from the standpoint of the spectator he makes the distinction between the intelligible world of spectator and the phenomenal world of the senses. But even when he finds active unknowable intelligible being behind every object of phenomenal appearance he obscures that fact by his desire to know that being empirically.

The power of judgement known to ordinary intelligence as 'feeling' we saw is the power of imagination of the disinterested spectator and this power of imagination of disinterested spectator which belongs to every person allows him to make a distinction between the unknowable intelligible world of the disinterested spectator and the knowable phenomenal world of the senses. So we can say it is this power discrimination, i.e. the power of imagination of the disinterested spectator, which distinguishes man from everything known to him including

himself as a phenomenal being or as being affected by objects. 'Now man actually finds in himself a power which distinguishes him from all other things—and even from himself so far as he is affected by objects.'[77] Previously this power was power of judgement known to ordinary intelligence as 'feeling' but now Kant declares, 'This power is *reason*.'[78] We should not be surprised at this, for Kant even reason and sensibility spring out as two stems from a common root, which we can identify as imagination.

Kant lays down the foundation of metaphysics as science to effect the transformation of ancient *technē* into modern technology through the faculty of imagination of disinterested spectator in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Why did he not lay the foundation of metaphysics of art (skill)? Why did he decide to lay the foundation of metaphysics of nature? How can the metaphysics of nature serve the purpose of metaphysics of art (skill)? The answer is given in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. 'How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. So far as willing is concerned, this proposition is analytic: for in my willing of an object as an effect there is already conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause—that is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end. (Synthetic propositions are required in order to determine the means to a proposed end, but these are concerned, not with the reason for performing the act of will, but with the causes which produce the object).'[79] Imperative of skill can be obtained from any given causal law of nature by merely adding the analytic proposition 'If I fully will the effect, I also will the action required for it.' For example it is a causal law of nature: The pressure exerted by a mass of gas increases, volume remaining the same, if the temperature increases. If we add the above analytic proposition to this we get the rule of skill: If I will to increase the pressure exerted by a mass of gas, volume remaining the same, then I will increase the temperature. So to have imperatives of skill what we need is just the causal laws of nature. So for modern technology to be possible what we need is not a separate science of metaphysic of art, rather science of

metaphysic of nature. So Kant has to lay down the foundation of metaphysic of nature as a science and not metaphysic of art as a science. So he has to write a critique of pure speculative reason and not a critique of pure technical reason. It is the theoretical reason, which analytically transforms into technical reason according to Kant.

Kant lays the foundation of modern technology by constituting subjectivity of self and objectivity of nature through the faculty of imagination of disinterested spectator in *Critique of Pure Reason*.[80] This constitution of subjectivity of self and objectivity of nature forces Kant to make a distinction between phenomena and noumena. When Kant is speaking of phenomena he is talking about the realm of objectivity, which is correlated to the subjectivity of man. That is to say the objective nature constitutes the phenomena. But this subjectivity of man co-related with the objective nature, camouflages the more essential nature of man, i.e., man as a disinterested spectator or *Theoros*, and the objectivity of nature camouflages the manner of non-objective (and not subjective either) availability of nature to which he belongs primordially. So the phenomenal world is the appearance behind which lies the natural world of spectator to which the spectator himself belongs. Our conjecture is that this primordial natural world of spectator is the noumena of Kant. 'This is that intelligible to which taste ... extends its view.'[81] This noumenal world sustains the appearance, since without the synthesizing activity of the imagination of the spectator there can be no world of objectivity of nature co-related with the subjectivity of man, which is the appearance or the phenomenal world. The transcendental unity of apperception constituting the subjectivity of man, provides the link between the two worlds, i.e., the world of noumena and the world of phenomena. The transcendental unity of apperception in its aspect of process of synthesizing activity belongs to the noumenal world as it is the activity of the imagination of spectator. But in its aspect of product of synthesizing activity, i.e., in its aspect of unity of subjectivity it is the essential co-relate of the phenomenal world. So for Kant the transcendental ego or the subjectivity of man as the product aspect of transcendental unity of apperception has an ambiguous position in his critical work. Sometimes he appears to identify it with noumenal self but sometimes he distinguishes the transcendental ego

from the noumenal self. That the subjectivity of man has dual aspect is made clear in the discussion of will. Will has intelligible aspect referring to the world of things in themselves and it has phenomenal aspect, i.e., power to initiate change in the world of appearance through its knowledge of phenomena.

According to Kant, 'Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.'[82] What is the nature of this intelligible being? Kant answers that the I of 'I think', which represents the transcendental unity of apperception, is nothing but the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'.[83] The 'mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity *a priori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act.'[84] Kant says in another place: 'That is intellectual whose concept is an action.'[85] According to Heidegger, 'This terse observation means that a mental being is one which *is* in the manner of action. The ego is an 'I act' and as such it is intellectual. This peculiar usage of Kant's should be held firmly in mind. The ego as 'I act' is intellectual, purely mental. Therefore he also often calls the ego an intelligence. Intelligence, again, signifies, not a being that *has* intelligence, understanding, and reason, but a being that exists as intelligence. Persons are existing ends; they are intelligences. The realm of ends, the being-with-one-another of persons as free, is the intelligible realm of freedom. In another place Kant says that the moral person is humanity. Being human is determined altogether intellectually, as intelligence. Intelligences, moral persons, are subjects whose being is acting. Acting is an existing in the sense of being extant.'[86] If being a moral person is acting and acting is being of moral person then existence of moral persons as ends in themselves signifies that acting is an end in itself. So Kant begins with the Greek notion of moral action, which is an end in itself, and it is what the Greek thinkers like Aristotle took to be the subject matter of *phronēsis*.

But Kant derecognizes this category of action, which is an end in itself. The reason is not far to look for. The Greek thinkers took the contemplation to be the act of disinterested spectator. But Kant took the contemplative philosophical activities like reflection, synthesis, etc. as end governed activities, i.e., he took philosophy to be interest-guided activity. The thesis of co-relation of knowledge to interests or cognitive interests no doubt became popular with Jürgen Habermas, but this thesis originates with Kant himself. Jürgen Habermas took it over from Kant and elaborated it further. According to Kant, '... sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest ...'[87] Kant claims to quote once again, 'Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.'[88] So Kant has taken what is an endless activity for Greeks, as an activity for an end. That is to say if Kant is seen from the point of view of Greeks, then he is mistaken about the object of philosophical activity and hence when he is philosophizing, he is indulging in involuntary activity. For according to Aristotle, '... what makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in choice nor ignorance of the universal, but particular ignorance, i.e., of the circumstances and objects of the action for it is on these that piety and pardon depend, because a man who acts in ignorance of any such detail is an involuntary agent.'[89] So Kantian reflection and synthesis are strictly speaking from the point of view of Greeks involuntary activities. Kant constitutes subjectivity involuntarily when the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'[90] is turned into an identity of '*fixed and abiding self*',[91] which later in paralogism becomes substance, if not for theoretical reason then at least for practical reason.

Be it noted even though synthesis and reflection are involuntary the entire mankind is implicated in this involuntary act. According to Kant the aesthetic judgement of taste postulates the universal communicability of the 'quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally.'[92] For Kant this postulate is necessary not only for aesthetic judgement of taste but also for the act of knowing.

We have knowledge of phenomenal world, but we have no knowledge beyond the phenomenal world. So we have no knowledge of noumena and the transcendental ego. What exactly is the significance of denial of knowledge in this sphere? The objective knowledge based on subject/object dichotomy is of the nature of power. Hence for the subjectivity of man 'knowledge is power'. Since knowledge is knowledge of causality operating in substance of the object in space and time it gives power to the subjective man to manipulate the object by his own will. The man with 'will' can manipulate the object through knowledge of causality. Knowledge of causality is gained through science, which in turn is the basis of technology. The subjectivity of man by its own will manipulates objects through technology to give it a desired form to suit his own purpose. Now denial of knowledge is denial of power to manipulate. So for Kant the primordial nature of man as spectator and the world of nature to which he belongs are beyond the power of manipulation. If that is manipulated through objective knowledge we will destroy the very basis of synthesizing activity on which the knowledge of phenomena is based. No doubt Kant claims, 'Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, *a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.*'[93]

What is the nature of this denial? Is it an empirical knowledge? Is it known *a priori*? Or is it no knowledge at all? To find an answer to these questions we have to look once again into Kant's notion of object in general. According to Kant, 'the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them *a priori* in some definite fashion.'[94] In Heidegger's words, '"Object" means what offers an advance *a priori* regulating of all empirical knowledge. This *a priori* binding of all empirical determinations *to a priori rules* of determinedness as such is in itself simultaneously an *a priori unification* of all possible empirical knowledge *of certain rules*. Thus these rules of synthesis *a priori* guide all knowledge with the *unity of an advance determinedness. And this unity, which prevents any arbitrariness and regulates empirical knowledge in advance, is the concept of object in general.*'[95] Object in

general is what is contrary to and hence resists the arbitrary, unattached, and chaotic way of taking representations together. 'Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity ... . For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.'[96] This element of *necessity* in all knowledge of objects is the element of resistance in all knowledge of objects. But this resistance does not emanate from an already existing object for Kant. 'Rather this resistance has to do with an *a priori resistance*, with a resistance which is in the subject—a resistance *which the subject gives to itself.*'[97] For Kant, according to Heidegger's analysis, 'All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition.'[98] That is to say the resistance involved in knowledge is transcendental and hence it belongs to the subject. 'All our activities and those of other beings are necessitated. However, only understanding (and the will in so far as it can be determined by understanding) is free and is pure self-activity which is determined by nothing other than by itself. Without this original and unchangeable spontaneity we would not know anything *a priori*, for we would be determined in everything and even our thoughts would be subject to empirical laws. The faculty to think and to act *a priori* is the sole condition for the possibility of the origin of all appearances, (otherwise) even "ought" would have no meaning.'[99] So the denial of knowledge is to prevent this spontaneity from destruction through manipulation by homo-faber. So this denial of knowledge of the noumena and transcendental ego is of the nature of self-binding rule for mankind in its development and use of modern technology. Has mankind paid heed to this self-binding rule? Can mankind really pay heed to this self-binding rule after Kant has liberated technology from all social control to feed ever-increasing choice of goods?

Kant started making preparation for this task in the chapter on 'The Ideal of Pure Reason'. In the very introduction I mentioned that Kant was forced to acknowledge the being (I am deliberately avoiding the term 'existence' as it is one of the categories) of transcendental consciousness having a non-cognitive experience (my interpretation of the noumenal object affecting the transcendental self) of the noumenal

object. That is to say that the transcendental condition of the epistemic experience is not only the forms of sensibility and categories of understanding as Kant realized but also its (i.e. the epistemic experience's) embodying in a non-cognitive experiential relation to the objects, i.e. belonging to the world (of noumena): a condition which Kant would realize only in the *Third Critique*, a condition which he never realized in the *First Critique*, but he laid the ground of this condition through the refutation of the proofs for the existence of God in the *First Critique*. This preparation he makes because the self-binding rule to remain ignorant in the sense of not having empirical scientific knowledge of noumenal self or transcendental ego is necessary to belong to the noumenal world. For belonging to the noumenal world Kant also needs to recover the Greek notion of morally practical action (*agere*, *πράττειν*).

For this purpose Kant introduces the conception of 'Ideal of Pure Reason'. In his words, 'we are ... bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which ... have *practical* power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain *actions*.'[100] What kind of actions does Kant have in mind when he is speaking of 'the possible perfection of certain *actions*'? He explains, 'As the idea gives the *rule*, so the ideal in such a case serves as the *archetype* for the complete determination of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and the defects of the incomplete.'[101] The clause 'we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us' gives the clue to understand the nature of action he is speaking of. He has already explained, 'What to us is an ideal was in Plato's view an *idea of the divine understanding*, an individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being, and the

archetype of all copies in the [field of] appearance.'[102] So the model of action Kant has in mind is the Platonic moral action (*agere*, *πράττειν*). He is preparing ground for the possibility of that kind of action and consequently of the belongingness of man to the noumenal world.

How does Kant introduce the Ideal of Reason? He introduces the Ideal of Reason in the following two consecutive passages:

> If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from which all possible predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of an *omnitudo realitatis*. All true negations are nothing but limitations—a title which would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the unlimited, that is, upon 'the All'.[103]

> But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a *thing in itself* as completely determined; and since in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates one predicate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal* which serves as basis for the complete determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists. This ideal is the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility of all that exists—the condition to which all thought of objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be traced back. It is also the only true ideal of which human reason is capable. For only in this one case is a concept of thing—a concept which is in itself universal—completely determined in and through itself, and known as the representation of an individual.[104]

One can clearly recognize what Kant is talking about. The expression 'the All' makes it clear. It is the Greek *τα πάντα* or *τα όντα* that Kant is talking about. In the western philosophical tradition the march from the Greek term *τα πάντα* or *τα όντα* to Parmenides' reformulation of the collective meanings implied in these expressions in the singular *το όν* is a long one.[105] 'Moreover, it is only after Parmenides, in Zeno's indirect lines of argument and especially in the critique of the Eleatics in Plato's dialogues, that the concept of the *ἑν* begins to supplement that

of the *όν* and finally supplants it completely.'[106] The Kantian representation of an Idea which is also a representation of an individual is nothing but the Platonic conception of the *ἑν*.

But Kant is transforming this Parmenidean-Platonic understanding of God. When Kant is talking of God as having *omnitudo realitatis* or as *ens realissimum* he does not combine Greek *ti estin* 'what it is' with *hoti estin* 'that it is'. When he talks about the *omnitudo realitatis*, the totality of all realities, he does not mean the whole of all things actually existent but the whole of all possible thing-determinations, the whole of all thing-contents or all essences, i.e., the whole of all *ti estin* 'what it is', i.e., the whole of all what-content of all possible things. Since for him real is what pertains to the res, 'reality' is 'thingness', 'thing-determinateness'.[107] The concept of reality is equivalent to the concept of the Platonic idea as that pertaining to a being what is understood when I ask: Ti esti, *what* is the being? The what-content of the thing is what Scholasticism called the res and Kant is taking 'the real' only in this sense and he uses the noun 'reality' in the corresponding sense of 'whatness' of a thing.

Kant himself makes a distinction between 'reality' (corresponding to Greek *ti estin* and medieval *essentia* or *realitas*) and 'existence' (corresponding to Greek *hoti estin* and Medieval *existentia*). The foundation of this distinction lies in the intentional structure of the productive mode of comportment. Conception gives the essence or *realitas*, and production adds existence to the thing so conceived. From the Greeks to the moderns the above metaphysical distinction is needed for conceiving human action as production. The way Kant introduces the conception of God presupposes the production as the basic mode of human action, yet the conception of God is introduced to reconcile the Platonic moral action (*agere, πράττειν*) with the intentional structure of the productive mode of comportment.

According to Kant this representation of an individual '... is therefore no other than the representation of the sum of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its transcendental content, comprehends all predicates *under itself*; it also contains them *within itself*; and the complete determination of any and every thing rests on the limitation of this *total* reality, inasmuch as part of it is ascribed to the thing,

and the rest is excluded ...'[108] What kind of being this Ideal individual has is clarified by Kant. 'It is obvious that reason, in achieving its purpose, that, namely, of representing the necessary complete determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being that corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a being, and this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned totality of complete determination the conditioned totality, that is, the totality of the limited. The ideal is, therefore, the archetype (*prototypon*) of all things, which one and all, as imperfect copies (*ectypa*), derive from it the material of their possibility, and which approximating to it in varying degrees, yet always fall very far short of actually attaining it.'[109] Kant further explains, 'All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only possible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space. The object of the ideal of reason, an object which is present to us only in and through reason, is therefore entitled to the *primordial being* (*ens originarium*). As it has nothing above it, it is also entitled to the *highest being* (*ens summum*); and as everything that is conditioned is subject to it, the *being of all beings* (*ens entium*). These terms are not, however, to be taken as signifying the objective relation of an actual object to other things, but of an *idea to concepts*. We are left entirely without knowledge as to the existence of a being of such outstanding pre-eminence.'[110] We also, as determinate empirical beings in our phenomenal aspect, are nothing but limited beings whose substratum is this ideal individual being. So we do not stand against this ideal individual being like a subject standing against the object. So we cannot have any objective knowledge of it. We belong to this being.

But if this being is hypostatized as an object as having objective existence we have the idea of God of theology. 'If, in following up this idea of ours, we proceed to hypostatize it, we shall be able to determine the primordial being through the mere concept of the highest reality, as a being that is one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc. In short, we shall be able to determine it, in its unconditioned completeness, through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of *God*, taken

in the transcendental sense; and the ideal of pure reason, as above defined, is thus the object of a transcendental *theology*.'[111]

The so-called proofs for the existence of God are nothing but the way of explaining and clarifying our understanding of the essential attributes of God and hence clarifying the nature of our belongingness to God. But in the history these proofs were taken to hypostatize God as an object as having objective existence. Kant refutes the proofs for the existence of God to prevent the hypostatization of God as an object having objective existence.

Notes and References

1. Tr. Norman Kemp Smith, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1929. Hereinafter referred to as CPR.
2. CPR, A834, B862.
3. For Kant 'Historical knowledge is *cognitio ex datis*;' while 'rational knowledge is *cognitio ex principiis*.' Kant explains the distinction elaborately. 'However a mode of knowledge may originally by given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside (and this is the form in which it has been given to him), whether through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case of general knowledge) through instruction. Anyone, therefore, who has *learnt* (in the strict sense of that term) a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head, and, so to speak, at his fingertips, has no more than a complete *historical* knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another. He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen *out* of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man.' In contrast to the historical knowledge, 'Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles—the sources from which there can also

arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.' CPR, A836f, B864f.

4. CPR, A314, B370. After Kant this principle was adopted by Fichte *Werke* VI, p. 337. Subsequently this principle was also elaborated by Schleiermacher. In Gadamer's words, 'Thus Schleiermacher asserts that the object is to understand a writer better than he understood himself, a formula that has been respected ever since and in the changing interpretation of which the whole history of modern hermeneutics can be read', *Truth and Method*, tr. William Glen-Doepel, Sheed & Ward, London, 1975, p. 169. Since Schleierrmacher others, including August Boeckh, Steninthal and Dilthey have also accepted this principle. 'The literary critic understands the speaker and poet better than he understands himself and better than his contemporaries understand him, for he brings clearly into consciousness what was actually but only unconsciously, present in the other', Stenthal, *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin, 1881. Even Martin Heidegger accepts this principle: 'We not only wish to but must understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves. Only thus shall we actually be in possession of our heritage.' *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p. 111. See also Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 169–71; and also O.F. Bollnow, *Das Verstehen*.
5. CPR, Axii.
6. CPR, Bxxv.
7. CPR, Bxxx.
8. Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. David E. Linge, University of California Press, 1976, p. 109.
9. CPR, A839, B867.
10. CPR, A840, B868.
11. CPR, A840, B868.
12. Tr. James Creed Meredith, from the 42nd volume of the series *Great Books of the Western World* on Kant entitled *The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgment*, The University of Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britanica Inc., 1952, pp. 459–613. The entire volume on Kant will be referred to as *42.Kant* hereinafter.
13. *The Critique of Judgement*, §27. *42.Kant*, p. 501.
14. Ibid., p. 586.
15. *Critique of Judgment,* §83. *42.Kant*, p. 585.
16. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals,* translated by H.J. Paton, in *The Moral Law,* Hutchinson University Library, London, 1948. p. 62 (7/396). The page numbers given in the brackets refer to the page numbers of the second German edition and the edition issued by the Royal Prussian Academy in Berlin respectively, which are given by Paton in the margins of his translation.
17. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 62 (6f/396).
18. *Critique of Judgment,* §84. *42.Kant*, p. 587.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., pp. 587f.
21. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals,* sec. I. *42.Kant*, p. 386.
22. Ibid.
23. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 91 (66f/429).
24. Ibid., p. 93 (69f/430f).
25. Ibid., p. 93 (70/431).
26. *Critique of Judgment,* §83. *42.Kant*, p. 585. *Italics added.*
27. *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Tr. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1934, p. 21.
28. Ibid.
29. *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,* Tr. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1934, pp. 22–3.
30. CPR, A708, B826.
31. The passages under consideration are from 'Hitherto the concept of philosophy ...' CPR, A838, B866 to '... of morals with that which *ought to be*.' CPR, A840, B868.
32. CPR, A840, B868.
33. CPR, A839f, B867F.
34. *Critique of Judgment*, §83, *42.Kant,* p. 586.
35. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals,* p. 79 (41/415).
36. Book VI (1144b17 ff).
37. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Sec. 4.
38. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Sec. 5.
39. *The Critique of Judgment*, §43. *42.Kant*, p. 523.
40. Ibid.
41. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Introduction. *42.Kant*, p. 296.
42. *The Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy. *42.Kant*, p. 463.
43. I. The Relation of the Faculties of the Human Mind to the Moral Laws. *42.Kant*, p. 385.
44. *The Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy. *42.Kant*, p. 463.
45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., pp. 463f.
47. Ibid., p. 464.
48. Ibid., p. 464.
49. Heidegger, Martin, *Basic Writings*, Ed. David Farrell Krell, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978, p. 290.
50. Ibid., pp. 290–1.
51. Ibid., p. 291.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 292.
56. Ibid., p. 293.
57. Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. 12.
58. Heidegger, Martin, *Basic Writings*, p. 292.
59. CPR, A835, B863.
60. CPR, A15, B29.
61. CPR, A94.
62. CPR. A124.
63. CPR, B151.
64. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, §28 (italics added), trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
65. *Critique of Judgment*, §49.
66. Gadamer, *Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, pp. 158–9.
67. Ibid., p. 159.
68. Ibid.
69. See Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), p. 42.
70. Vlastos, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1946, 72f.
71. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 111 (105/451).
72. 'This {i.e., that an object is given to me} again is possible, to man at least, insofar as the mind [*Gemüt*] is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled *sensibility*. Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us *intuitions* ... .' Kant CPR, B33. 'For, of itself alone, the *Gemüt* is all life (the life principle itself), and hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in connection with his body.' CJ. '*Gemüt* is one of Kant's most widely used terms, and is prevalent in the third *Critique*. It is commonly translated as "mind" or "mental state" although this is too restrictive a meaning: it denotes more a "feeling". Kant describes it on occasion as the "feeling of the attunement of the representative powers" or as the "life principle itself". It is not "mind" as composed of the powers of sensibility, imagination, understanding and reason, but the position of these powers. This agrees with its original meaning in medieval mysticism, where it refers to the "stable disposition of the soul which conditions the exercise of all its faculties" (Gilson 1955, pp. 444, 758). It is helpful to compare *Gemüt* with the "mood" of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, that is, not as a subjective, psychological state, but as a way of being in the world.' (Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgment*, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 405, n. 9).

73. *Critique of Judgment*, §1, *42.Kant*, p. 476.
74. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 59 (2/393).
75. *Critique of Judgment*, §5. *42.Kant*, p. 479.
76. Ibid., *42.Kant*, p. 385.
77. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 112 (107–8/452).
78. Ibid., p. 112 (108/452).
79. Ibid., pp. 80f (45/417).
80. How Kant constitutes objectivity of nature and subjectivity of self will be explored in another essay under preparation entitled, 'Constitution of Subjectivity of Self and Objectivity of Nature: A Brief Hermeneutical Study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*'.
81. *Critique of Judgment*, §59. *42.Kant*, p. 547.
82. CPR, A546f, B574f.
83. CPR, A108.
84. Ibid.
85. *Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Benno Erdmann (Leipzig, 1884), [volume 2 of *Reflxionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophy*, edited by Benno Erdmann from Kant's manuscript notes] Reflection No. 968.
86. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Tr. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p. 141.
87. CPR, A834, B862.
88. CPR, A839, B867.
89. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1110b7–1111a18.
90. CPR, A108 [*Italics added*].
91. CPR, A107.
92. *Critique of Judgment*, §9. *42.Kant*, p. 483.
93. CPR, A78, B103.
94. CPR, A104.

95. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 250.
96. CPR, A104.
97. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 250.
98. CPR, A106.
99. *Reflexionen,* II, 286.
100. CPR, A569, B597.
101. Ibid.
102. CPR, A468, B496.
103. CPR, A575–576, B603–604.
104. CPR, A576–577, B603–604.
105. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999), p. 38.
106. Ibid., p. 44.
107. CPR, B182.
108. CPR, A577, B605.
109. CPR, A577–578, B605–606.
110. CPR, A578–579, B606–607.
111. CPR, A580, B608.

Science, Science Culture and Philosophy from an Indian Perspective

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The word 'science' is used in contemporary Western culture in a very broad sense. There was a time when 'philosophy of science' meant only philosophy of physical sciences. But nowadays logic and pure mathematics are regarded as *a priori* sciences. The influence of logic and pure mathematics has been prominent in contemporary science; physics, chemistry and even biology have been given an axiomatic form. It has been pointed out that geometry was axiomatized by Euclid. But that axiomatization was very improper. Only recently Hilbert tried to axiomatize Euclidean geometry but failed. Moreover, economics, history and social and political sciences are all called sciences. Although even in some universities in India, economics is studied only in the science course, yet except econometry, there are other concepts of economics, like demand and supply, which cannot be mathematically studied. For demands vary from culture to culture. There are societies in which demands are not felt as demands but as needs. They cannot be satisfied by the supply of goods. About history, there is a question about its objectivity. First of all, there is only selective choice of material. And there is the matter of interpretation. Interpretation depends on theories. Thus there is a dialectical materialism as an interpretation of history. Moreover, history has been studied philosophically. History in India, has been never in the Western sense. There is only Kalhana's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* as a history of the dynasty; there is no history of the people; one has to collect *material* from the *Mahābhārata,* and some *purāṇas* for guessing a history of the people. There is no history of the people in the Western sense, i.e., there is no subaltern history.

It may be argued that by cross-checking, we might solve the problem of objectivity in history. But this is not correct. Only some dates and events could be checked. Post-structuralists, for example, have affirmed that by reading earlier texts, we always commit anachronism. We always understand ancient texts from our point of view. It is not possible to know the intention of ancient authors.

So also archeological evidence has to be interpreted. This we can do only on our own understanding of the past. So this is relative.

History is always dependent upon culture. Social and political science is really rooted in culture. All studies of these subjects are dependent on the culture of the land. Only some years ago social and political science was called social and political philosophy. So by changing the name of the subject, the nature of the subject has not been changed. In most universities they are studied even now as philosophy. Thus social and political ideals in Soviet Russia are entirely different from those, say, in the USA. There were also new sciences added in the 19th century like comparative philology. In the twentieth century some new sciences and technologies were developed. We mention here only one science, namely ecology. Fruit-processing technology has been developed recently. I shall discuss here two different theories of ecology. According to one theory, nature has to be protected, including prevention of global warming, for the sake of man. Because man lives in nature and nature has to be protected, sound and air pollution cured, only to make man healthy. Man is the highest form of creation and therefore nature, and flora and fauna, are to be treated as instruments for man's happiness. A second interpretation of ecology is to regard nature as having supreme value. Nature is to be protected only for the sake of nature; it has nothing to do with human existence.

Indian culture seems to combine the two interpretations. According to Indian culture, man and nature constitute an organic unity. One cannot harm the one without harming the other. Just as man without nature is an abstraction, so also nature without man is an abstraction. Neither man nor nature in isolation has any separate reality. In the Rg Veda, the sages have repeated a number of times that nature and man are united in an all-embracing consciousness. Nature is as much important as man.

In India, society is traditionally divided into four castes, but now this caste system is almost gone from some parts of India. In the USA the Africans have many disadvantages compared to white Americans.

It may be argued that in every society, people have to be differentiated on the basis of their intellectual and social power. Thus workers are united to fight for their rights. In offices, there is a union of office-workers. There are also students unions and so on. They fight for their social, economic and political rights against their respective authorities.

Then there are soldiers. In many countries, soldiers control political power. In India, soldiers are only used to fight; political power is vested in the government elected by the people.

Moreover, science has developed into newer forms. Classical Physics, for example, has developed into quantum science, which has developed very new principles of quantum matter. For example, there is indeterminacy in quantum science. This means that measurement changes or modifies the matter measured. So when the rate of movement, i.e. velocity, of sub-atomic matter is measured, its position cannot be measured. On the other hand, if the position of sub-atomic matter is measured, then its velocity cannot be measured. Many scientists hold that even the law of causal determination does not hold in the sub-atomic matter.

There was also development of the relativity theory of Einstein. According to it, time is only a dimension (the fourth dimension) of space, so that space and time are not different. The basic idea is the idea of movement, which involves both space and time.

I shall explain in more detail about Einstein's theory and quantum mechanics. The General Theory of Relativity deals with large gravitational fields, the Special Theory of Relativity deals with large velocities.

'The history of Einstein's discovery of the theory of General Relativity contains an important moral. It was first fully formulated in 1915. It was not motivated by any observational need but by various aesthetic, geometric and physical desiderata.' (Penrose, *The Large, the Small and the Human Mind,* p. 71)

'One of the theorems shows that inevitably, according to classical relativistic theories of gravity, within a black hole, there must be a physical singularity, that is, a region of space in which the curvature of space or, equivalently the density of matter becomes infinitely great. The second states that, according to classical relativistic theories of gravity, there is inevitably a similar physical singularity at the origin of Big Bang cosmological models. These results indicate that, in some sense, there is a serious incompleteness in these theories, since physical singularities should be avoided in all physically meaningful theories.'

'There is, in addition, a feature which is completely unique to General Relativity, and not present at all in the Newtonian theory of gravity. That is that objects in orbit about each other radiate energy in the form of gravitational waves.' (Penrose, ibid., p. 23)

We shall now explain in some detail quantum mechanics. 'Somehow, the two possible things which the photon *might* do cancel each other out. This type of behaviour does not take place in classical physics. Either one thing happens or another thing happens—you don't get two possible things which might happen, somehow conspiring to cancel each other out.' (Penrose, ibid., p. 55)

'Quantum mechanics is a beautiful, clear-cut subject. However, it also has many mysteries. ... I want to stress that there are mysteries of *two different kinds*. I call these the z and x mysteries.'

'The z-mysteries are the *puzzle* mysteries. They are things which are certainly there in the physical world, that is, there are good experiments which tell us that quantum mechanics does behave in these mysterious ways. ... These mysteries include phenomena such as the *wave-particle duality, null measurements, spin,* and *non-local effects.*'

'There are other problems, however, which I refer to as x-mysteries. These are the *paradox* mysteries. These to my way of thinking, are indications that the theory is incomplete, wrong or something else, it needs some further attention. ... The most famous of the x-paradoxes concerns Schrödinger's cat ... the cat is in a state of being both dead and alive at the same time.' (Penrose, ibid., pp. 63–4)

'It is quite extraordinary that quantum mechanics enables you to test whether something *might* have happened but didn't happen. It tests what philosophers call *counterfactuals.* It is remarkable that quantum mechanics allows real effects to result from counterfactuals!' (Penrose, ibid., p. 67)

Because of the paradoxes in quantum mechanics, it is said 'If you really believe in quantum mechanics, then you cannot take it seriously.' (Bob Wald, quoted in Penrose, ibid., p. 73)

Then there is another peculiarity of the language of quantum mechanics. 'When the photon is *en route* from the source to the screen, the state of the photon is not that of having gone through one slit or the other, but is some mysterious combination of the two, weighted by *complex* numbers.' (Penrose, ibid., p. 56)

Karl Popper thought that the fundamental feature of a scientific theory is that it should be falsifiable. To call a theory falsifiable is not to say that it is false. A falsifiable theory is one that we might discover to be false—it is not compatible with every possible course of experience. Popper thought that some supposedly scientific theories did not satisfy this condition and thus did not deserve to be called science at all; rather they were merely pseudo-science.

Freud's psychoanalytic theory was one of Popper's favourite examples of pseudo-science. According to Popper, Freud's theory could be reconciled with any empirical findings whatsoever.

The same was true of Marx's theory of history, Popper maintained. Marx claimed that in industrialized societies around the world, capitalism would give way to socialism and ultimately to communism. But when this didn't happen, instead of admitting that Marx's theory was wrong, Marxists would invent an *ad hoc* explanation for why what happened was actually perfectly consistent with their theory.

Popper contrasted Freud's and Marx's theories with Einstein's theory of gravitation, also known as general relativity.

Popper's attempt to demarcate science from pseudo-science is intuitively quite plausible. There is certainly something fishy about a theory that can be made to fit any empirical data whatsoever. There is some evidence that this very procedure is routinely used by 'respectable' scientists—whom Popper would not want to accuse of engaging in pseudo-science—and has led to important scientific discoveries.

Adams in England and Leverrier in France, working independently, suggested that there was another planet, as yet undiscovered, exerting

an additional gravitational force on Uranus. Adams and Laverrier were able to calculate the mass and position that this planet would have to have, if its gravitational pull was indeed responsible for Uranus' strange behaviour. Shortly afterwards the planet Neptune was discovered, almost exactly where Adams and Leverrier had predicted.

Adams and Leverrier began with a theory—Newton's theory of gravity—which made an incorrect prediction about Uranus' orbit. Rather than concluding that Newton's theory must be wrong, they stuck by the theory and attempted to explain away the conflicting observations by postulating a new planet.

This suggests that Popper's attempt to demarcate science from pseudo-science cannot be quite right despite its initial plausibility. For the Adams/Leverrier example is by no means atypical. In general, scientists do not just abandon their theories whenever they conflict with the observational data. But little progress would be made if scientists simply abandoned their theories at the first sign of trouble.

The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, argued that there is no fixed set of features that define what it is to be a 'game'. Rather, there is a loose cluster of features most of which are possessed by most games. But any particular game may lack any of the features in the cluster and still be a game. The same may be true of science. If so, a simple criterion for demarcating science from pseudo-science is unlikely to be found.

HEMPEL'S COVERING LAW MODEL OF EXPLANATION

Hempel noted that scientific explanations are usually given in response to what he called 'explanation-seeking why questions'.

Hempel suggested that scientific explanations typically have the logical structure of an argument, i.e. a set of premises followed by a conclusion. The conclusion states that the phenomenon that needs explaining actually occurs, and the premises tell us why the conclusion is true.

Hempel's answer was three-fold. Firstly, the premises should entail the conclusion, i.e. the argument should be a deductive one. Secondly, the premises should all be true. Thirdly, the premises should consist of at least one general law.

Schematically, Hempel's model of explanation can be written as follows:

General laws
Particular facts
$\Rightarrow$
Phenomenon to be explained

The essence of explanation is to show that the phenomenon to be explained is 'covered' by some general law of nature.

Suppose that the *explanandum*—that the shadow is 20 metres long—with the particular fact that the flagpole is 15 metres high. The result is this:

General law	Light travels in straight lines Laws of trigonometry
Particular facts	Angle of elevation of the sun is 37° Shadow is 20 metres long.
$\Rightarrow$	
Phenomenon to be explained	Flagpole is 15 metres high.

The real explanation of why the flagpole is 15 metres high is presumably that a carpenter deliberately made it so—it has nothing to do with the length of the shadow that it casts. In general, if x explains y, given the relevant laws and additional facts, then it will not be true that y explains x, given the same laws and facts. This is sometimes expressed by saying that explanation is an asymmetric relation. Hempel's covering law model does not respect this asymmetry.

Suppose a young child is in a hospital in a room full of pregnant women. This child notices that one person in the room—who is a man called John—is not pregnant, and asks the doctor why not. The doctor replies: 'John has been taking birth-control pills regularly for the last few years. People who take birth-control pills regularly never become pregnant.' The correct explanation of why John has not become pregnant, obviously, is that he is male and males cannot become pregnant.

The general moral is that a good explanation of a phenomenon should contain information that is *relevant* to the phenomenon's occurrence.

Hempel's model does not respect this crucial feature of our concept of explanation.

EXPLANATION AND CAUSALITY

The link between the concepts of explanation and causality is quite intimate. Causality is obviously an asymmetric relation. It is therefore quite plausible to suggest that the asymmetry of explanation derives from the asymmetry of causality. If to explain a phenomenon is to say what caused it, then since causality is asymmetric we should expect explanation to be asymmetric too.

This is another way of saying that the explanation should tell us the explanandum's cause. Causality-based accounts of scientific explanation do not run up against the problem of irrelevance.

Hempel subscribed to a philosophical doctrine known as *empiricism* and empiricists are traditionally very suspicious of the concept of causality. According to Hempel all we see is a vase being dropped, and then it breaking a moment later. We experience no causal connection between the first event and the second. Causality is therefore a fiction.

Most empiricists as a result of Hume's work have tended to regard causality as a concept to be treated with great caution. So to an empiricist, the idea of analyzing the concept of explanation in terms of the concept of causality would seem perverse. If ones goal is to clarify the concept of scientific explanation, as Hempel's was, there is little point in using notions, that are equally in need of clarification themselves. And for empiricists, causality is definitely in need of philosophical clarification. Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that the concept of causality, although philosophically problematic, is indispensable to how we understand the world. So the idea of a causality-based account of scientific explanation seems more acceptable than it would have done in Hempel's day.

Many philosophers say that certain scientific explanations do not seem to be causal. One type of example stems from what are called 'theoretical identifications' in science, 'Water is H_2O' is an example, as is 'temperature is average molecular kinetic energy'. In both of these cases, a familiar everyday concept is equated or identified with a more esoteric scientific concept. Often, theoretical identifications furnish us

with what seem to be scientific explanations. If these examples are accepted as legitimate scientific explanations, they suggest that causality-based accounts of explanation cannot be the whole story.

CAN SCIENCE EXPLAIN EVERYTHING?

Numerous studies of autistic children have confirmed that they have good memory, but as yet nobody has succeeded in explaining it.

It seems arrogant to assert that science can explain everything. On the other hand, it seems short-sighted to assert that any particular phenomenon can never be explained scientifically. For science changes and develops very fast, and a phenomenon that looks completely inexplicable from the vantage-point of today's science may be easily explained tomorrow.

According to some philosophers, there is a purely logical reason why science will never be able to explain everything. For in order to explain something, whatever it is, we need to invoke something else. But what explains the second thing? In Newtonian science the law of gravity was a fundamental principle: it explained other things, but could not itself be explained. The moral is generalizable. However much the science of the future can explain, the explanations it gives will have to make use of certain fundamental laws and principles. Since nothing can explain itself, they themselves remain unexplained.

Some philosophers have made concrete suggestions about phenomena that they think science can never explain. An example is consciousness—the distinguishing feature of thinking, feeling creatures such as ourselves and other higher animals. Much research into the nature of consciousness has been and continues to be done, by brain scientists, psychologists, and others. There is something intrinsically mysterious about the phenomenon of consciousness, they maintain, that no amount of scientific investigation can eliminate.

The basic argument is that conscious experiences are fundamentally unlike anything else in the world, in that they have a 'subjective aspect'. Many people believe that the scientific study of the brain can at most tell us which brain processes are correlated with which conscious experiences. This is certainly interesting and valuable information. However, it does not tell us *why* experiences with distinctive subjective

'feels' should result from the purely physical goings-on in the brain. Hence consciousness, or at least one important aspect of it, is scientifically inexplicable.

There is a long tradition of philosophers trying to tell scientists what is and is not possible, and later scientific developments have often proved the philosophers wrong. Only time will tell whether the same fate awaits those who argue that consciousness must always elude scientific explanation.

There is a division of labour between the different sciences, each specializes in explaining its own particular set of phenomena. This explains why the sciences are not usually in competition with one another.

It is widely held that the different branches of sciences are not all on a par: some are more fundamental than others. The objects studied by the other sciences are ultimately composed of physical particles. Consider living organisms, for example. Living organisms are made up of cells, which are themselves made up of water, nucleic acids (such as DNA), proteins, sugars, and lipids (fats), all of which consists of molecules or long chains of molecules joined together. But molecules are made up of atoms, which are physical particles. So the objects biologists study are ultimately just very complex physical entities.

It seems crazy to suggest that physics might one day be able to explain the things that biology and economics explain. The prospect of deducing the laws of biology and economics straight from the laws of physics looks very remote. Far from being reducible to physics, sciences such as biology and economics seem largely autonomous of it.

Consider, the biological fact that nerve cells live longer than skin cells. Cells are physical entities, so one might think that this fact will one day be explained by physics. However, cells are almost certainly multiply realized at the microphysical level. Cells are ultimately made up of atoms, but the precise arrangement of atoms will be very different in different cells. So the concept 'cell' cannot be defined in terms drawn from fundamental physics. Fundamental physics will never be able to explain why nerve cells live longer than skin cells, or indeed any other facts about cells. The doctrine of multiple realization does

promise to provide a neat explanation of the autonomy of the higher-level sciences, both from physics and from each other.

REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM

There is a very ancient debate in philosophy between two opposing schools of thought called *realism* and *idealism*. To most people, realism seems more plausible than idealism. For realism fits well with the commonsense view that the facts about the world are 'out there' waiting to be discovered by us, but idealism does not. Rocks and trees would presumably continue to exist even if the human race died out; in what sense is their existence dependent on human minds?

A more modern debate is between a position known as *scientific realism* and its converse, known as *anti-realism* or *instrumentalism*. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a description of a certain *part* of the world—the 'observable' part. As far as the 'unobservable' part of the world goes, it makes no odds whether what science says is true or not, according to anti-realists.

Realists say that when physicists put forward theories about electrons and quarks, they are tying to provide a true description of the subatomic world. Anti-realists disagree: they see a fundamental difference between theories in subatomic physics and in palaeontology.

Anti-realists typically claim that these entities are merely convenient fictions, introduced by physicists in order to help predict observable phenomena.

Much of the motivation for anti-realism stems from the belief that we cannot actually attain knowledge of the unobservable part of reality; it lies beyond human ken. On this view, the limits to scientific knowledge are set by our powers of observation. No one could seriously doubt the existence of fossils and trees, but the same is not true of atoms and electrons. The explanation anti-realists give is that they are convenient fictions, designed to help predict the behaviour of things in the observable world.

Strictly, we should distinguish two sorts of anti-realism. According to the first sort, talk of unobservable entities is not to be understood literally at all. So when a scientist puts forward a theory about electrons,

we should not take him to be asserting the existence of entities called 'electrons'. Rather, his talk of electrons is metaphorical. The second sort of anti-realism accepts that talk of unobservable entities should be taken at face value. We will never know which is true, says the anti-realist. So the correct attitude towards the claims that scientists make about unobservable reality is one of total agnosticism. They are either true or false, but we are incapable of finding out which. Most modern anti-realism is of this second sort.

The empirical success of theories that posit unobservable entities is the basis of one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, called the 'no miracles' argument. If there are no atoms and electrons, how do we explain the technological advances our theories have led to, unless by supposing that the theories in question are true? On this view, being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles. Since it is obviously better not to believe in miracles if a non-miraculous alternative is available, we should be realists not anti-realists.

This argument is not intended to *prove* that realism is right and anti-realism wrong.

Anti-realists have responded to the 'no miracles' argument in various ways. One response appeals to certain facts about the history of science. Historically, there are many cases of theories that we now believe to be false but that were empirically quite successful in their day. In a well-known article, the American philosopher of science Larry Laudau lists more than 30 such theories.

Proponents of scientific realism regard the empirical success of today's scientific theories as evidence of their truth. But the history of science shows that empirically successful theories have often turned out to be false. Once we pay due attention to the history of science, argue the anti-realists, we see that the inference from empirical success to theoretical truth is a very shaky one. The rational attitude towards the atomic theory is thus one of agnosticism—it may be true, or it may not. We just do not know, say the anti-realists.

According to the modified version, the empirical success of a theory is evidence that what the theory says about the unobservable world is approximately true, rather than precisely true.

Another way of modifying the argument is by refining the notion of empirical success. Some realists hold that empirical success is not just a matter of fitting the known observational data, but rather allowing us to predict new observational phenomena that were previously unknown.

Optical experiments confirmed Fresnel's predictions, convincing many 19th century scientists that the wave theory of light must be true. But modern physics tells us the theory is not true: there is no such thing as the ether, so light doesn't consist of vibrations in it. Again, we have an example of a false but empirically successful theory.

The moral of the story, say anti-realists, is that we should not assume the modern scientific theories are even roughly on the right lines, just because they are so empirically successful.

As the theory of science shows, we should be very cautious about assuming that our current scientific theories are true, however well they fit the data. Many people have assumed that in the past and been proved wrong.

Maxwell's argument is bolstered by the fact that scientists themselves sometimes talk about 'observing' particles with the help of sophisticated bits of apparatus. In the philosophical literature, electrons are usually taken as paradigm examples of unobservable entities, but scientists are often perfectly happy to talk about 'observing' electrons using particle detectors.

Maxwell's arguments are powerful, but by no means completely decisive. Bas van Fraassen, points out that vague concepts are perfectly usable, and can mark genuine distinctions in the world.

Anti-realists then argue that the observational data 'underdetermine' the theories scientists put forward on their basis. It means that the data can in principle be explained by many different, mutually incompatible theories. So according to anti-realists, scientific theories that posit unobservable entities are underdetermined by the observational data—there will always be a number of competing theories that can account for the data equally well.

Realists usually respond to the underdetermination argument by insisting that this claim is true only in a trivial and uninteresting sense. Just because two theories can both account for our observational data does not mean that there is nothing to choose between them. For one

of the theories might be simpler than the other, for example, or might explain the data in a more intuitively plausible way, or might postulate fewer hidden causes, and so on.

Anti-realists claim that the unobservable part of reality lies beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. Theories about unobser*ved* objects and events are just as underdetermined by our data as are theories about unobserv*able* ones. The scientist's hypothesis is underdetermined by the data, even though the hypothesis is about a perfectly observable event—a meteorite striking the moon. If we apply the underdetermination argument consistently, say realists, we are forced to conclude that we can only acquire knowledge of things that have actually been observed.

Much of what scientists tell us concerns things that have been observed—think of ice ages, dinosaurs, continental drift, and the like. Scientific realists take it as evidence that the underdetermination argument must be wrong. Since science clearly does give us knowledge of the unobserved, despite the fact that theories about the unobserved are underdetermined by our data, it follows that underdetermination is no barrier to knowledge. The realists say whatever problems there are in understanding how science can give us knowledge of atoms and electrons are equally problems for understanding how science can give us knowledge of ordinary, medium-sized objects.

SCIENTIFIC CHANGE AND SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

Scientific ideas change fast. In 1963 Kuhn published a book called *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The impact of Kuhn's ideas has also been felt in other academic disciplines such as sociology and anthropology, and in the general intellectual culture at large.

The dominant philosophical movement in the English-speaking world in the post-war period was *logical positivism*. About the mid-1960s, the movement had begun to disintegrate.

The positivists paid little attention to the history of science. They drew a sharp distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of justification'. The context of discovery refers to the actual historical process by which a scientist arrives at a given theory. The context of justification refers to the means by which the scientist tries

to justify his theory once it is already there—which includes testing the theory, searching for relevant evidence, and so on. Philosophers of science should confine themselves to studying the latter, they argued.

Scientific hypotheses can be arrived at in the most unlikely of ways—they are not always the product of careful, systematic thought. What matters is how it is tested once it is already there—for it is this that makes science a rational activity.

This sharp distinction between discovery and justification, and the belief that the former is 'subjective' and 'psychological' while the latter is not, explains why the positivists' approach to philosophy of science was so ahistorical.

Another important theme in positivist philosophy of science was the distinction between theories and observational facts; this is related to the observable/unobservable distinction.

Kuhn firmly believed that philosophers had much to learn from studying the history of science. Insufficient attention to the history of science had led the positivists to form an inaccurate and naïve picture of the scientific enterprise. Examples of scientific revolutions are the Copernican revolution in astronomy, the Einsteinian revolution in physics, and the Darwin revolution in biology. Each of these revolutions led to a fundamental change in the scientific world-view, the overthrow of an existing set of ideas by a completely different set.

Scientific revolutions happen relatively infrequently—most of the time any given science is not in a state of revolution. Kuhn coined the term 'normal science' to describe the ordinary day-to-day activities that scientists engage in when their discipline is not undergoing revolutionary change. Central to Kuhn's account of normal science is the concept of a *paradigm*. A paradigm consists of two main components: firstly, a set of fundamental theoretical assumptions that all members of a scientific community accept at a given time, secondly, a set of 'exemplars' or particular scientific problems that have been solved by means of those theoretical assumptions, and that appear in the textbooks of the discipline in question. When scientists share a paradigm they do not just agree on certain scientific propositions, they agree also on how future scientific research in their field should proceed, on which problems are the pertinent ones to tackle, on what the appropriate methods

for solving those problems are, on what an acceptable solution of the problems would look like, and so on. In short, a paradigm is an entire scientific outlook—a constellation of shared assumptions, beliefs and values that unite a scientific outlook—a constellation of shared assumptions, beliefs and values that unite a scientific community and allow normal science to take place. According to Kuhn normal science is a highly conservative activity. Kuhn stressed that normal scientists are not trying to *test* the paradigm. On the contrary, they accept the paradigm unquestioningly and conduct their research within the limits it sets. If a normal scientist gets an experimental result that conflicts with the paradigm, she will usually assume that her experimental technique is faulty, not that the paradigm is wrong. The paradigm itself is not negotiable.

Typically, a period of normal science lasts many decades, sometimes even centuries. But over time *anomalies* are discovered—phenomena that simply cannot be reconciled with the theoretical assumptions of the paradigm, however hard normal scientists try. When anomalies are few in number they tend to just get ignored. But as more and more anomalies accumulate, a burgeoning sense of crisis envelops the scientific community. Confidence in the existing paradigm breaks down, and the process of normal science temporarily grinds to a halt. This marks the beginning of a period of 'revolutionary science'. A variety of alternatives to the old paradigm are proposed, and eventually a new paradigm becomes established. A generation or so is usually required before all members of the scientific community are won over to the new paradigm—an event that marks the completion of a scientific revolution. The essence of a scientific revolution is thus the shift from an old paradigm to a new one.

Kuhn advanced some highly controversial philosophical theses. Kuhn argued that adopting a new paradigm involves a certain act of faith on the part of the scientist. He allowed that a scientist could have good reasons for abandoning an old paradigm for a new one, but he insisted that reasons alone could never rationally *compel* a paradigm shift. 'The transfer of allegience from paradigm to paradigm', 'is a conversion experience which cannot be forced.'

If paradigm shifts work the way Kuhn says, it is hard to see how science can be regarded as a rational activity at all. Surely scientists are meant to base their beliefs on evidence and reason not on faith. Kuhn's account of paradigm shifts seems hard to reconcile with the familiar positivist image of science as an objective, rational activity. One critic wrote that on Kuhn's account, theory choice in science was 'a matter for mob psychology'.

According to a widely held view, science progresses towards the truth in a linear fashion, as older incorrect ideas get replaced by newer, correct ones. Later theories are thus objectively better than earlier ones. This 'cumulative' conception of science is popular among laymen and scientists alike, but Kuhn argued that it is both historically inaccurate and philosophically naïve. The history of mechanics is not simply a linear progression from wrong to right. Kuhn questioned whether the concept of objective truth actually makes sense at all. The idea that there is a fixed set of facts about the world, independent of any particular paradigm, was of dubious coherence. Facts about the world are paradigm-relative, and thus change when paradigms change. It makes no sense to ask whether a given theory corresponds to the facts 'as they really are', nor therefore to ask whether it is objectively true. Truth itself becomes relative to a paradigm.

Kuhn argued that competing paradigms are typically 'incommensurable' with one another. The doctrine of incommensurability stems largely from Kuhn's belief that scientific concepts derive their meaning from the theory in which they play a role. If a Newtonian and an Einsteinian physicist tried to have a rational discussion, they would end up talking past each other.

Kuhn used the incommensurability thesis both to rebut the view that paradigm shifts are fully 'objective', and to bolster his non-cumulative picture of the history of science. For to call one idea right and another wrong implies the existence of a common framework for evaluating them, which is precisely what Kuhn denies; later paradigms are not better than earlier ones, just different.

Kuhn also claimed old and new paradigms to be *incompatible*. As Kuhn's critics were quick to point out, if two things are incommensurable then they cannot be incompatible.

In response to objections of this type, Kuhn moderated his incommensurability thesis somewhat. He insisted that even if two paradigms were incommensurable, that did not mean it was impossible to compare them with each other; it only made comparison more difficult. *Partial* translation between different paradigms could be achieved, Kuhn argued, so the proponents of old and new paradigms could communicate to some extent: they would not always be talking past each other entirely. But Kuhn continued to maintain that fully objective choice between paradigms was impossible. For in addition to the incommensurability deriving from the lack of a common language, there is also what he called 'incommensurability of standards'. So even if they can communicate effectively, they will not be able to reach agreement about whose paradigm is superior. In Kuhn's words, 'each paradigm will be shown to satisfy the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent.

Kuhn's second philosophical argument was based on an idea known as the 'theory-ladenness' of data. Kuhn argued that the ideal of theory-neutrality is an illusion; data are invariably contaminated by theoretical assumptions. It is impossible to isolate a set of 'pure' data which all scientists would accept irrespective of their theoretical persuasion.

The theory-ladenness of data had two important consequences for Kuhn. Firstly, it meant that the issue between competing paradigms could not be resolved by simply appealing to 'the data' or 'the facts' for what a scientist counts as data, or facts, will depend on which paradigm she accepts. Secondly, the very idea of objective truth is called into question. For to be objectively true, our theories or beliefs must correspond to the facts, but the idea of such a correspondence makes little sense if the facts themselves are infected by our theories. This is why Kuhn was led to the radical view that truth itself is relative to a paradigm.

Kuhn's writings are not totally clear on this point, but at least two lines of argument are discernible. The first is the idea that perception is heavily conditioned by background beliefs—what we see depends in part on what we believe. So a trained scientist looking at a sophisticated piece of apparatus in a laboratory will see something different from what a layman sees, for the scientist obviously has many beliefs

about the apparatus that the layman lacks. Secondly, scientists' experimental and observational reports are often couched in highly theoretical language. But this data report is obviously laden with a large amount of theory. It would not be accepted by a scientist who did not hold standard beliefs. So it is clearly not theory-neutral.

Statements such as 'on May 14th the sun rose at 7.10 a.m.' can be agreed on by a scientist whether she believes the geocentric or the heliocentric theory. Such statements may not be *totally* theory-neutral, but they are sufficiently free of theoretical contamination to be acceptable to proponents of both paradigms, which is what matters.

It is even less obvious that the theory-ladenness of data forces us to abandon the concept of objective truth. Many philosophers would accept that theory-ladenness makes it hard to see how *knowledge* of objective truth is possible, but that is not to say that the very concept is incoherent. Like many people who are suspicious of the concept of objective truth, Kuhn failed to articulate a viable alternative. Is the claim that truth is paradigm-relative *itself* objectively true or not?

By neglecting the history of science, the positivists had been led to an excessively simplistic, indeed idealistic, account of how science works, and Kuhn's aim was simply to provide a corrective. He was not trying to show that science was irrational, but rather to provide a better account of what scientific rationality involves.

Kuhn made the famous claim that there is 'no algorithm' for theory choice in science. The positivists often wrote as if, given a set of data and two competing theories, the 'principles of scientific method' could be used to determine which theory was superior. This idea was implicit in their belief that although discovery was a matter of psychology, justification was a matter of logic.

Lots of philosophers and scientists have made plausible suggestions about what to look for in theories—simplicity, broadness of scope, close fit with the data, and so on. But these suggestions fall far short of providing a true algorithm, as Kuhn knew well. Theory one may be simpler than theory two, but theory two may fit the data more closely. So an element of subjective judgement or scientific commonsense, will often be needed to decide between competing theories. Seen in this light Kuhn's suggestion that the adoption of a new paradigm involves

a certain act of faith does not seem quite so radical, and likewise his emphasis on the persuasiveness of a paradigm's advocates in determining its chance of winning over the scientific community.

The thesis that there is no algorithm for theory choice lends support to the view that Kuhn's account of paradigm shift is not an assault on the rationality of science. The moral theory of Kuhn's story is not that paradigm shifts are irrational, but rather that a more relaxed, non-algorithmic concept of rationality is required to make sense of them.

Science for Kuhn is an intrinsically social activity: the existence of a scientific community, bound together by allegience to a shared paradigm, is a pre-requisite for the practice of normal science. Kuhn's ideas have been very influential among sociologists of science. In particular, a movement known as the 'strong programme' in the sociology of science, which emerged in Britain in the 1970s, owed much to Kuhn.

The strong programme was based around the idea that science should be viewed as a product of the society in which it is practised. They held that scientists' beliefs were in large part socially determined.

Kuhn's work has played a role in the rise of cultural relativism in the humanities and social sciences. Cultural relativism is not a precisely defined doctrine, but the central idea is Kuhn embraces relativist ideas. Kuhn himself was strongly pro-science. His doctrine of paradigm shifts, or normal and revolutionary science, of incommensurability and of theory-ladenness was not intended to undermine, to criticize the scientific enterprise, but rather to help us understand it better. (For details of the topics discussed and other topics, see, *Philosophy of Science* by S. *Okasha.*)

Science is different from science culture. A scientist is engaged in his own science. Science culture is the theory that science is the best form of knowledge and also involves commonsense philosophy about scientific knowledge. For example, unobservables in nuclear science, like energy, electron, etc. are given two different interpretations. One is antirealism, according to which the unobservables are mere theoretic terms used in science to explain nuclear theory. The other is the realistic interpretation, according to which the unobservables are real. Science culture accepts the second interpretation, even if Science says so.

Freedom of Mind: Locke and Some Yogic Parallels

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For wavering is the mind, O Krishna,
turbulent, powerful and unyielding;
I consider it as difficult to control
as the wind.

Bhagavad Gītā, 6.34.

A proper and effectual remedy for this wandering of thoughts I would be glad to find.

He that shall propose such an one, would do great service to the studious and contemplative part of mankind, and perhaps help unthinking men to become thinking.

John Locke, *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, pp. 89–90.

Philosophers in India have traditionally taken freedom to involve not only independence from the body but mastery over the mind. Freedom here entails more than the ability to act upon our thoughts without any *external* hindrance from other people and things. The origin of thoughts themselves must be sought since if these lie beyond our power so too must the actions which stem from them. The extent of our freedom becomes proportionate to the power we have to determine our minds. Among Western philosophers few have given this equation more consideration than John Locke:

> Men know the value of their corporeal liberty, and therefore suffer not willingly fetters and chains to put upon them. To have the mind capativated is, for the time, certainly the greater evil of the two, and deserves our utmost care and endeavours to preserve the freedom of our better part.[1]

How is the ideal of freedom in relation to the mind to be understood? To what extent is this freedom practically possible? And what implications might this ideal have for our understanding of the self?

Some deny freedom of mind *even* on a phenomenological level. Nietzsche writes:

> ... a thought comes when 'it' wishes, and not when 'I' wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts to say that the subject 'I' is the condition of the predicate 'thinks'.[2]

In contrast to Descartes, Nietzsche calls the very notion of the subject into question and especially as a substantive cause with power over thought. Nietzsche disputes any purported ability of the self to bring thoughts into being by its own power. How can we be responsible for our thoughts if they come simply of their own accord?[3] Nietzsche certainly captures a genuine experience here, of feeling passive, of being subject *to* rather than simply subject *of* thought. His position, however, is extreme. We need to ask how comprehensive this experience of passivity is when considered in terms of the full range of our thinking experience. Is there a way to incorporate this experience of passivity into an account which still preserves some freedom in relation to thought?

Locke offers resources here. His posthumously published and neglected work *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* harks back to the manuals of ancient philosophy with its practical concern of making the mind fit for the acquirement of knowledge. The mind is particularly subject to various weaknesses and prejudices which must be first examined and overcome. Locke's text is propaedeutic and methodological. The mind is understood on the analogy of an imperfect instrument which needs to be worked on in its own right before it can be applied to other domains.

The problematic dimension of this instrument emerges with Locke's insisting on the fact that the major obstacle to our freedom stems less from other people and things than our own thoughts. For we are often as passive before thoughts as we are before the more palpable reality of people and things. Locke here departs from Berkeley who considers the mind's control over itself in imagining as paradigmatic of free activity. Locke, however, suggests an unruliness: sometimes our minds

wander when we want them to focus, while at other times they fixate on an object when we want them to move on.[4] Locke's method here does not highlight positive experiences where we experience free activity proceeding without a hitch in the way Berkeley does. Rather it is by attending to cases where we feel our freedom infringed that we become aware of its presence on a more routine level.

Locke provides three examples. Firstly, there is the case of strong emotion fastening the mind onto a single thought to the exclusion of all else. This thought acts as a 'clog' upon the mind by preventing it from going on to other things as well as excluding any deepened awareness of the object of the thought itself. Love and other strong emotions, according to Locke, often immobilize us in this way. This grip of thought here can also have the effect of excluding awareness of our immediate environment. Locke gives the example of a person unable to participate in a conversation because of the 'puppet' playing in the 'secret cabinet' within.[5] This experience for Locke amounts to a temporary madness.

The second case is the mental equivalent of getting carried away. This time, however, no strong feeling determines us. We casually happen upon an insignificant thought but allow it such a free sway that the mind

> works itself into a warmth and by degrees gets into a career, wherein like a bowl down a hill, it increases its motion by going, and will not be stopped or diverted, though, when the heat is over, it sees all this earnest application was about a trifle not worth a thought, and all the pains employed about it, lost labour.[6]

Locke refers to a third experience of 'mental chiming'. Here the mind becomes preoccupied with an avowedly superfluous thought which it nonetheless finds very difficult to drop. A contemporary example would be the awful tune heard on the radio which replays in our heads—against our better judgement!

Locke's linking the question of freedom with the more inward goings on of the mind is shared with the Yoga school of Indian philosophy. In his commentary on Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtras* Vyāsa refers to five states of mind: the wavering (*kṣipta*), the stupefied (*mūḍha*), the occasionally steady or distracted (*vikṣipta*), the one-pointed (*ekāgra*) and

the settled (*niruddha*).[7] Locke lacks the systematic terminology of the Yoga school but charts the first and second in the aforementioned cases. A mind which runs ahead of its own accord is impulsive, a mind which refuses to budge from an object is stupefied. Against the Buddhists, Vyāsa argues for a unified subject on the premise that the mind can be impulsive and one-pointed at different times. This would be impossible if the mind was, as the Buddhists claim, momentary. Each new experience, irrespective of its character, would then have a separate and equally one-pointed 'I' to accompany it and there would be no problem for Yoga to address.[8] Interestingly, this debate is paralleled in Western philosophy by that between Locke and Hume on the issue of personal identity. Locke argues for a single subject founded on the unity of consciousness and specifically memory, while Hume accords with some Buddhists in taking a reductionist view.

For Locke experiences of mental resistance show how the workings of our minds hamper our freedom on a quite subtle level. Freedom meets its greatest obstacle from within the self 's own sphere although on reflection it may seem that hindrances remain hypothetical: we will only experience certain thoughts as limiting our freedom *if* our intention from the outset is to think along specifically opposing lines. If my aim is to read a book and I *then* experience mental humming while reading, certainly this will come across as a disturbance. Likewise, if I wish to partake in the conversation and *then* find I cannot get the image of a particular person out of my mind. But infringements here presume intentions to follow norms which provide a criterion of relevance for the particular activities in which we engage. If these intentions are missing, we remain unhampered.[9] If, for example, my mind were to wander while having dinner with Locke, his charge of servility would only carry weight if my intention had been to take in everything he said. Having arrived at dinner without this intention, I might accept an alternative charge of impoliteness without, however, feeling any less free on account of this.[10]

Locke might respond by insisting that the choice to enter a situation carries the implication that we will follow the conditions which being involved in it will entail. After all, a choice usually has force beyond the moment of its making. And we are not always making choices,

sometimes because we are living the consequences of what we have *already* chosen[11] while at other times because our choices are really sub-choices overarched by larger ones already made. These latter are, we might say, continuous rather than atomic, dispositional rather than episodic.

What interests Locke is the scenario where having made a supra-choice we encounter resistance to it from within the sphere of the mind. It might then appear that we have a peculiar responsibility both for the choice and its infringement. Consider two examples.

(1) Among several possible courses of action open to me, I finally opt to go for a walk in the park. On reaching the park, however, I find several park keepers blocking the gate and preventing me and anybody else from entering. It transpires they are out on strike.

(2) I go home and in order to compensate for my previous disappointment decide to contemplate a visit to an even more beautiful park in my mind's eye. On trying to do this, however, I am constantly interrupted by thoughts of the aggressive behaviour of the park keepers encountered in (1).

In the first case, I can clearly detect a hindrance to my freely chosen project in the form of the striking park-keepers. But what of the second? What can make this situation so infuriating is that I seem doubly responsible, for both undertaking the experiment *and* for the hindrances that emerge within my own mind. We have seen Nietzsche taking the fact that thoughts come to us as evincing the absence of an agent behind them. But this is not the full story. Often we think this ought not to happen and *ought* implies that we *can* do something about it. On Locke's view we would be better off experimenting to see if anything can be done to extend our freedom into this subtle domain instead of concluding from the outset that it is impossible because we have assumed on *a priori* grounds there cannot be a subject to accomplish this. The risk otherwise is a self-fulfilling theory.

Where, if at all, is freedom of thought to be situated in the thinking 'process'? Perhaps Nietzsche captures the experience many of us have of thoughts *emerging* of their own accord automatically, we might say, without our will. But what Locke is getting at is that freedom comes

more in the maintenance than the initiation of thoughts. While we may often have little say over the appearance of a thought, this does not rule out some role concerning the *course* of its development and the *length* of its stay. The ability to suspend rather than initiate thoughts after all remains a kind of freedom.

Locke's three examples of mental straying involve something more akin to abduction than infidelity. It is not a matter of opposing thoughts occurring in our minds at the same time, jostling and competing for our attention. Rather, an overriding thought gives way momentarily to another which threatens to take our attention away. Locke's advice is to pay minimal attention to the intruder. We should not prolong the acquaintance but check and bring the mind back to its previous consideration.

This suggests that the mind is rarely found at a junction point, a kind of neutral space where it is choosing between two different thoughts. We are usually *already* somewhere specific, so that far from ever thinking from scratch we invariably *find* ourselves thinking a particular thought—*in* thought, we might say, rather than arriving at or leaving thought. This much favours Nietzsche. But there is still choice in deciding whether to go on with the thought we are presently entertaining or move onto something else. And even when we 'change our minds' the new thought is not witnessed at its inception but appears fully-formed.[12]

In this regard everyday language can be revealing. We do not say 'my mind is about to wander' but 'my mind is wandering', implying here that the mind has *already* wandered. Aristotle suggests this in distinguishing between an actuality and a motion. While an actuality is complete at any moment, a movement 'builds up' cumulatively and occurs over time. Thinking for Aristotle is a prime example of an actuality.[13]

For Locke the mind is not mastered by stopping wandering thoughts at their inception but by being brought back to its previous consideration once we notice that it has been distracted. In the first instance what is available for determination is the *extent*, not the *possibility* of distraction. Thoughts may be nipped in the bud but the bud must be there for the nipping. We thus give no *further* attention to the unwanted

thought.[14] Notable also is the order of Locke's advice: we are to check the mind when it strays and *then* introduce other thoughts.[15] The checking here constitutes a moment separate from the introduction of alternative thoughts. Freedom of thought is realized first and foremost in a 'No'.[16]

On a long-term scale, however, we could envisage this practice creating *mental dispositions*, the activity of stopping the *extension* of certain thoughts leading to their eventual cessation. This could provide a second reply to Nietzsche. Thoughts in the immediate situation may come of their own accord, but frequent episodes of negation of undesired attention to desired thoughts could create dispositions for thinking certain thoughts that have on a long-term scale been chosen by us.[17] This principle incidentally sustains the practise of yoga where the mind is likened to a crystal taking on the colour of its predominant experience.[18] Locke sets out his ideal for mental freedom in the following terms:

> ... I think it may be of great advantage, if we can by use get that power over our minds, as to be able to direct that train of ideas, that so, since there will new ones perpetually come into our thoughts by a constant succession, we may be able by choice so to direct them, that none may come in view, but such as are pertinent to our present enquiry, and in such order as may be most useful to the discovery that we are upon; or at least, if some foreign and unsought ideas will offer themselves, that yet we might be able to reject them, and keep them from taking off our minds from its present pursuit, and hinder them from running away with our thoughts quite from the subject in hand.[19]

Ideally, we should have the ability to keep and maintain relevant ideas in our minds. Alternatively, when unwanted ideas enter we will retain the ability to shun them and prevent them getting too firm a hold. Locke has in mind the application of this to ones intellectual life. What prevents people from developing in their studies is the inability to direct some ideas and keep back others. It is then the power of concentration which needs to be educated first and foremost.

We need, of course, to be careful about hasty comparisons but there is some similarity here with the practise of *dhāranā* in Yoga which

involves holding the mind firmly on one thought or idea. But the concerns for Locke and Yoga are different. For Locke the goal is the improvement of our intellectual capacity 'to make unthinking men thinking', whereas for Yoga it is more to do with realizing a self which transcends both thought and sense perception.

Still, Locke suggests a theme which has a pertinent connection to Yoga. His reflections on mental hindrances highlight how the mind can be as much an object for the self as the body.[20] Locke does this explicitly when he likens the mind to a hand which we can learn to control through exercise.[21]

On the other hand, Locke does not consider how closely connected mind and body might be. In Yoga, mind itself is a subtle kind of matter which is also affected by the activities of the physiology, including food consumed. Diet therefore becomes an important factor in controlling and refining the mind.[22] A man who is inattentive at dinner might be so because his diet in general is poor. Locke is a *practical dualist* in his belief that the mind has control of itself, independent of the body's behaviour. Wanting to preserve a domain of independence and integrity in the human person he assigns this to the mind which remains for him the only alternative to the body in which it can be located.

Yoga challenges this assumption and asks whether there may be some other dimension to the subject capable of surveying *both* the mind and the body. In the words of the *Kena Upaniṣad*: 'Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards its object?'[23] Locke does not tackle this question head on but it is one to which we are led by his reflections on the freedom, actual and prospective, of the mind.

Notes and References

1. Locke, *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* (*OCU*), pp. 135–6.
2. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 17.
3. Often the fact that thoughts come of themselves is used to rule out the possibility of a subject. But this assumes that if there is a subject it should be a master of its thought. There is no need to make this assumption. We could conceive a subject who witnessed thoughts which are not of its own making to still be a subject, albeit a passive one.

4. 'There is a kind of restlessness in almost everyone's mind; sometimes without perceiving the cause, it will boggle and stand still, and one cannot get it to step forward; and at other times it will press forward and there is no holding it in.' (*Thoughts Concerning Education*, appendix 4, MS Locke f.2, p. 414, cited by U.S. Mehta in *The Anxiety of Freedom*, p. 104).
5. *OCU*, p. 130.
6. *OCU*, pp. 132–3.
7. Yoga, it should be said, aims to cultivate the third and especially the fourth and fifth states.
8. See Vyāsa, commentary on *Yoga Sūtras* 1.32. For elaboration on the argument see *Śaṅkara on the Yoga Sūtras*, pp. 139–41.
9. The Stoic way is to define these norms so broadly as to leave us without the conceptual resources to interpret any situation as going against them.
10. In Buddhism living in the moment, attending fully to what is present, without looking ahead to the future, devoid of intention and calculation is a virtue known as 'mindfulness' (*mati*).
11. The assertion 'I have chosen' has just as much of a bearing upon freedom as the more popular 'I am choosing'. The former implies that we do not merely inaugurate our choices but 'go with' them.
12. Using 'thought' here in the widest sense to include names and images as well as propositions. Some might argue that the former implicitly contain the latter.
13. For the contrast see Aristotle *Metaphysics* IX.6.
14. An example of this is the act of ignoring where something is noticed but then given no *further* attention. This deliberate gesture differs from the state of being *plain* ignorant, where we do not even know that we don't know. It explains why we hold people responsible for ignoring us as opposed to simply not knowing us.
15. *OCU*, p. 136.
16. This might of course be considered too negative and forceful an approach to mental development. In many forms of Yoga, including Buddhist, the fabric of the mind is transformed primarily through dwelling on the positive, the virtue of compassion for example.
17. The goal in Yoga is to make the mind so supple that it allows the self, normally overshadowed by the mind's outbound activities, to see itself reflected in the mind. Activities like meditation help to make the mind more clear and transparent. And the mind can ultimately become so fine that the Self shines through in its full glory. The self can subsequently retain its link to the mind but without the latter offering an obstacle, the mind then acting as a subordinate which the self can deploy to express its own freedom. Without the practice of Yoga the outbound activity of the

mind tends to predominate to such an extent that the self forgets its own independent reality and is bound by the objective world which the mind reflects. Or better, *seems to be bound*: the Yoga school along with the Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta emphasize that the Self is never really affected by this 'relation'.

18. See *Yoga Sūtras* 1.41; 4.17.
19. *OCU*, p. 89.
20. 'And thoughts, which reveal everything, are perceptible only by something different from themselves, so that they are known only as things, like jars and lights and so on' (*Śaṅkara on the Yoga Sūtras*, p. 239). It is worth nothing that the Self 's regaining independence does not necessarily exclude identification with the objective world here taken to include even thoughts. As Maharishi Mahesh Yogi puts it: 'Identification should not be a terror to the seekers of truth. It is simply that a state of mind must be cultivated so that the mind, engaged with outer things, does not allow the pure state of Being to be overshadowed' (*The Science of Being and the Art of Living*, p. 238).
21. *OCU*, p. 136. This organic approach to the mind incidentally contrasts with the more static picture, usually associated with Locke, which takes the mind as a blank tablet.
22. As do unconscious dispositions in general or *samskaaras*.
23. *Kena Upaniṣad* I.1.

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Russell on Negation

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RUSSELL ON NEGATION

Russell gives two derivations of negation:

(1) Negation is behaviouristically derived from an arrest of a started activity. Examples are: a mouse attracted by cheese on bait, desists because its friends came to grief that way, and is supposed to think, 'This cheese is not for eating'. A pigeon that took the wrong hen pigeon for its companion desisted from further courtship on recognizing, 'She is not my wife'.[1]

(2) Negation as a basic proposition arises through incompatibility either perceived, remembered or inferred. Examples of incompatibilities are black and white, hot and cold, sweet and sour; and two colours red and blue in an identical location. A person quarrels with the washerman on perceiving that the washed cloth is grey and says 'It is not white'. How does he arrive at this negative basic proposition? Problem arises because, unlike Nayiyāikas, Russell does not think that absence or negation can be perceived. However, if a white cloth is placed alongside the grey, one sees the incompatibility. In the absence of the white cloth, its memory or general proposition 'grey is not white' would also serve the purpose.[2]

While these views are both interesting and thought-provoking, it is difficult to accept them.

The first lacuna in this scheme is that these two derivations are not properly related. They could be related provided every incompatibility led to arrest in activity. But this is not the case. An incompatibility would arrest an activity provided it was unfavourable to the activity in question, or general interests of the agent. In the case of the mouse

above, getting trapped went against its freedom and life, in the case of the pigeon, unfamiliarity went against the requirements of courtship. In case the incompatibility is favourable to activity or general interest, a spurt of activity might be released. Thus day-break is incompatible with night, but stirs activity, and boom is incompatible with slump, and spurs business activity. Moreover, even if the incompatibility is favourable, whether it leads to increased activity or not depends upon circumstances. If day is denial of night, night also is a denial of day, and may provide a welcome invitation to rest.

In *Ṛgveda*[3] there is a hymn to dawn that stirs all creatures to activity with the birds. But it also releases a night worker for rest. As we have from Hamlet:

> The cock, that is the trumpet to the morn,
> Doth with his lofty and shrill-sounding throat
> Awake the god of day
> ...
> But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad
> Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill,
> Break we our watch up.

In *Ṛgveda* there is also a hymn to night[4] that calls all creatures to rest, again with birds, and like children in the arms of their mothers.

According to Russell, in formulating a negative basic proposition, there is no percept of negation, but a percept of what is incompatible with it, together with a comparison with the negated item or a general inference about this incompatibility. If grey and white are both perceptible or one compared with memory image of the other, then, according to Russell, one can grasp that grey is not white. From the general proposition that 'grey is not white' also one can get the proposition that 'this grey is not white'. The fact is that when grey and white are presented, one sees that they are opposed to each other, and so negate each other. This is the basis of their perceived incompatibility. When white is not present but the person expects to find it in the washed cloth, and instead finds grey, he perceives that the cloth is not white or the cloth is non-white. The general proposition 'grey is not white' is generalization from such percepts. Similarly, when a man on sipping tea, remarks

that it is cold or non-hot, he perceives the absence of heat that is the negation of cold, and so makes the basic proposition 'tea is not hot'.

Russell is at pains to explain that two colours red and blue cannot occupy the same identical spot at the same time. This however, is not confined to two colours but extends to any two objects, because two men also cannot occupy an identical spot at the same time, and conversely no man or any other object can be in two places at the same time. These incompatibilities follow because one place is not another place and one object is not another object. Russell himself mentions these cases but tries to regard them as too neat to be objective, but based on definition of matter as impenetrable,[5] but this hardly follows, for even without being impenetrable, two horses are not seen to squeeze into the same spot. The colours rather could do so in shades from purple to indigo.

Again, the arrest of activity of creatures follows on perception of the negative aspects of a situation, and not vice versa. The mouse and the pigeon desist because they see the situation as unfavourable and not vice versa.

Therefore, both in basing negation on incompatibilities, and on arrested activity, there is *hysteron proteron.*

According to Russell, while a particular negation can not be an object of perception, general negation can be perceived, as a busy man who failed to hear the dinner bell, said, 'I heard nothing.'[6] Russell would thus reverse the usual rule that the particular can be perceived, but not the general, in the case of negation. But actually this is not tenable, because in such cases, the general is mentioned to cover and even emphasize the corresponding particular, here it being the not hearing of the dinner bell.

Russell tells us that 'white' and 'back', 'hot' and 'cold', 'sweet' and 'sour' and 'hard' and 'soft' are incompatibles. In all these cases we 'see' the incompatibility. So much so that in Russell's own words 'it requires some reflection to realize that an incompatibility such as that of "white" and "black" is not logical."[7]

Russell admits that the word incompatible applies both in logic and to observed facts. But he seems to think that negation has to be only logical, to be used for combining atomic propositions of basic lan-

guage into compounds of secondary language. In fact, he makes negation together with disjunction the main such connective through stroke function. His commitment to hierarchy of language is a contributory factor.

In fact, the above cases cited are more in opposition than incompatibility, because they freely and pleasantly mix together. Many people find twilight, as at dawn and dusk, and lukewarm spring and autumn poetic, and sweet and sour mix well in vinegar, pickles and guavas.

In a case like 'white' and 'black' incompatibility, such as there is, springs from opposition and mutual negation. These colours negate each other not only in vision, but also at the level of the cause of vision. When there is no light at night or the whole of the light is absorbed, as in the case of coal, there is dark or black. When there is full light during the day or the entire light is left unabsorbed as in lime, there is white. If carbon is all dark outside, it is all light inside. When, on crystallization, this inner light is turned outwards, we have diamond. If the process is incomplete, diamond has a black tinge, which is regarded as a defect. Thus black opposes white as its negative both in terms of cause of vision and vision. The opposition is like contrary opposition in propositions, leaving in between an intermediary range of greys. It could be arranged as a square of opposition or for short, in a triangle of opposition, grey combining both non-white and non-black. 'Hot' and 'cold' could be arranged in a similar opposition.

Besides greys making up the interval, there is the view in Nyāya and Aristotle that blue is but diluted black. It has profound implications, but it is not relevant in the present context.

In fact, all coloured objects show their colours by negation by subtracting from white the colours they absorb. Only in case of black it is noticeable.

According to Russell, in a basic proposition of negation, together with a percept, a propositional attitude that the percept is not compatible with what is negated, is required. But actually, in basic propositions of negation, while besides the percept, a mental factor is also required, it is not a propositional attitude, as stated by Russell, but an expectation. No one observes the absence of a jumbo elephant in his study, but one might notice its absence in an African wildlife sanctuary. The man who expects washed cloth to be white, when he perceives it grey, marks that it is not white, and the person who expects the tea to be hot, if he finds it cold, notices that it is not hot. Similarly, the cashlessness of the cash box and the duck or runlessness of the score of the cricket player, however regrettable, are rather too clearly perceptible.

The mental preliminary of negative perception is not a negative propositional attitude as Russell thinks but a positive expectation, which when disappointed, leads to perception of negation in the form of absence of the expected thing. Nyāya thinkers were also remiss in not talking note of the role of expectation in negative perception. If we compare the dichotomies, 'white' and 'black', 'hot' and 'cold' and 'sweet' and 'sour' we find the second dichotomy most immediately related to organic life, the first so related through vision and the cycles of day and night, and the third through fruits that remain sour and hard when raw and ripen into soft and sweet. Of these 'white' and 'black' visually and directly related to rhythms of activity and rest, appear closest to the logical negation, 'hot' and 'cold', tactile, and more closely related to organic life, are less so, and sweet and sour, related through other agents like fruits, appear just different or like anyonyābhāva of Nyāya. In fact, mental, visual and tactile experiences are closely related, as seen in testing of syllogisms by Venn diagrams, and dealing with many geometrical problems, where diagrams are used, by algebraic methods without diagrams.

If in addition, as argued below, void is made up of electrons with negative energy from $-mc^2$ to $-\infty$, while matter is made up with electrons, with positive energy in the range mc^2 to ∞, the organic cycle is more closely related to cosmic cycle than generally supposed, the 'hot' and 'cold' related to matter and void respectively. The above account of dichotomies of 'white' and 'black' and 'hot' and 'cold' can also be expressed by stroke function W/B, H/C.

Russell uses what might be called De Morgan's sense of negation, disjunction, and conjunction in logic to make use of stroke function, but De Morgan's use of these logical words are not their only possible meaning or use. De Morgan's theorem is based on *conjunction exclusive of negation* and *disjunction based on inclusion of any number of*

disjuncts, viz., in conjunction none of the conjuncts should be negated, and in disjunction, all or any of the disjuncts may be affirmed. However, the example of disjunction that he gives, and on which he bases his theory of disjunction, as based on hesitation, is not of the inclusive type. He also thinks that disjunction is subjective and not factual. But if his example is made inclusive, it ceases to be subjective and becomes objective and factual.

Russell gives the example of a man going to Oxford, who comes to a signboard on the road 'To Oxford'. But, on proceeding along the road, he comes to a fork with no further direction. So he hesitates whether to take the road to the right or to the left.[8]

According to openness of scrutiny and choice, disjunction can be of four types, which shows that only one meaning assigned to it in De Morgan's theorem is not enough. These four types of disjunction can be listed thus, with examples:

1. Both scrutiny and choice open
   A man decides that for success in life he has to be well trained or careful.
2. Open to scrutiny but not in choice
   Games of Chess.
3. Open in choice but not to scrutiny
   Throw of dice.
4. Open in neither—Russell's example.

In Russell's approach there is the disparity because he bases his theory of disjunction on an instance involving most hesitation, but applies it for logical purposes, in a sense where the disjunction involves no hesitation, being inclusive of affirmation of both disjuncts. While his example is of the fourth type of disjunction above, his use is of the first type.

Russell's example can be made inclusive by supposing that both roads at the fork converge on Oxford at practically the same distance. But the disjunction ceases to be subjective and becomes objective in the matter of choice, but not in scrutiny, unless it is visible from the fork. If it is also visible at the fork, it becomes a truly objective disjunction, as in the case of sidewalks in Mughal gardens, where the frontal approach is occupied by fountains. Other cases of objective

disjunction can be easily suggested. Thus in the toss of a coin, it is heads or tails in falling, in a throw of dice, one of the six numbers.

If in the above examples, objective cases of negation and disjunction are given, in conjunction Russell himself cites the examples of molecules for formation of compound propositions from so-called atomic ones. The example is not correct, because there is nothing common between combination of atoms in molecules and combination of sentences by logical words, but in his example objective conjunction is accepted. Thus the theory that logical words are absent from primary language and necessarily subjective is not correct.

Russell thinks that negation has only one meaning which is subjective, logical and belongs to the secondary language, because he thinks that 'no' has to be applied only to a proposition 'p'.[9] Its application in a basic proposition is derived from incompatibility and propositional attitudes,[10] except in some cases of general negation like 'I heard nothing'.

Actually, if propositional attitude is taken as expectation, and what is expected is not found, there is an experience of its absence, as of a book from a bookshelf, or whiteness in washed cloth if it is found grey.

In the above cases, an expectation precedes perception of absence. However, in objective negation no expectation is needed for its perception; the negation is as directly perceived as affirmation. No one requires an expectation of the opposite to see that coal is black or non-white.

Russell states that 'not p' and 'p is false' mean the same thing.[11] This is usually true of propositions in language, but, not always so, even for them. It can be said correctly that the solid (of ordinary practical experience) is also not solid (according to physics), earth moves, according to astronomy, but also does not move (according to ordinary feeling, and Michelson-Morley experiment), if rose is red and marigold yellow, sky is also blue, and hence, if sky is not blue, rose is not red or marigold is not yellow ($R.Y \supset B$, therefore, $\sim B \supset R \vee \sim Y$). In these cases discrepancies arise because of different levels of truth involved, viz. apparent, practical and scientific, with no clear boundary lines in between. In such cases, the more mixed the levels, the greater the discrepancy. The above two forms of linguistic negation can be

called linguistic univocal and linguistic equivocal. There are other forms of negation in language, where Russell's statement does not apply, but before considering them, it would be better first to consider objective negation, for lucidity of exposition.

In the sphere of objects, Russell's statement does not apply, as most often both 'A' and '~ A' are true. Thus 'white' and 'black', 'matter' and 'void' are equally real. Therefore, 'non-white' or 'black', does not mean that 'white' is false; coal might be black but that does not prevent lime from being white. As objects have locations, objective negatives can occupy different locations, and co-exist peacefully. The earth may be matter, but non-matter or void can surround it, as it does.

In traditional discussion of opposition of categorical propositions, the classes, represented by the terms are taken to have members generally. Those of the oppositions, contrary, contradictory and sub-contrary have negation in them. The contraries are 'All S is P' and 'No S is P'. Both can be false together but cannot be true together. The sub-contraries are 'Some S is P' and 'Some S is not P', and while both can be true together, both cannot be false together. In contradictory opposition, the opposition is with respect to both quality and quantity, and if one is true the other false and vice versa. While these are taken as three forms of opposition, negation in the three cases is taken to have the same meaning of contradictory negation. But this is not necessary. Actually three forms of oppositions have three different forms of negation, of which contrary and sub-contrary forms of negation are free negations, the first to be called contrary negation and the second to be called sub-contrary negation. In the former the negation of 'All S is P' is 'No S is P', in the latter, negation of 'Some S is P' is 'Some S is not P'. Contradictory negation pertains to contradictory opposition, and is rather not free negation because of admixture of quantity. Lying astride the other two forms of negation, it balances them, by excess is negation in contrary case being neutralized by deficit in negation in sub-contrary case. If the difference in negation between 'all' and 'some' be represented by ΔN, and contradictory negation by N, we see that contradictory negation of 'All S is P' is 'Some S is not P'. Therefore, contrary negation exceeds it by ΔN (all not, some not) and is $N + \Delta N$. Similarly, sub-contrary negation of 'Some S is P' is 'Some S is not P', while

contradictory is 'No S is P'. Therefore, sub-contrary negation has a deficit of ΔN, and is $N - \Delta N$. Thus the two are balanced in contradictory negation, N.

The reason why contradictory negation is held as the real negation, while sub-contrary negation is not so regarded, is that Russell's statement holds for contradictory negation, but does not hold for sub-contrary negation. As particular propositions have existential import, like objective negations, sub-contrary negations also can be true together, occupying different locations. Thus, both 'some men are educated' and 'some men are not educated' are true of different persons.

In a sense sub-contrary negation can be taken as lying in a region between those of objective negation and contradictory negation, that is itself close to linguistic negation. That is why it is important to accept sub-contrary negation as a distinct form of negation.

In case of categorical propositions without members, the situation gets reversed. Both the propositions in sub-contrary negation become false, and therefore, their contradictions, in contrary negation, both become true. Thus all 'fairies are beautiful' and 'no fairy is beautiful' should both be true. Even by definition these cannot be simultaneous. This might be called freak negation of Boolean logic. In fact, the contradiction lies in Boolean logic itself, a purely denotative logic that goes on to admit cases without denotation!

In De Morgan's theorem, when it is written by negating a conjunction, as

$\sim (a.\ b.\ c.\ d) = (\sim a \vee \sim b \vee \sim c \vee \sim d)$, as the formula will hold even when one, two or three of disjuncts are true, the rule of double negation will not apply. If the theorem is written by negating a disjunction, the rule will apply. Thus the theorem and, correspondingly, the use of negation, lacks symmetry of application.

Disjunction combined with double negation gives material implication,

$$P \supset q = \sim (p.\ \sim q) = \sim p \vee q$$

This has the paradoxical result that any false proposition can imply any true proposition. Thus, $(2 + 2 = 5)$ will imply $(2 + 2 = 4)$.

Thus we get three meanings of negation in modern logic, in the first of which Russell's statement does not apply.

From these discussions, nine different meanings of negation emerge, in four of which Russell's statement does not apply. These are equivocal linguistic, objective, sub-contrary negation where members exist, and contrary negation of Boolean logic, where members do not exist.

As disjunction is true, if one of the disjuncts is true, $\sim p \supset \sim p \vee q$, therefore, $\sim p \supset (p \supset q)$

and $p \supset \sim q \vee p$, therefore, $p \supset (q \supset p)$.

This means that a false proposition will imply any proposition, and a true proposition will be implied by any proposition, whatever.

Thus, 'The sun sets in the east' will imply 'The sun does not set in the east'.

This material implication, with its paradoxes, also uses both implication and negation with peculiar meanings.

The only justification for these uses of negation and other logical symbols in modern logic, is that they are helpful in testing many ordinarily employed forms of arguments.

Thus from the present discussions nine different meanings of negation have emerged. These are:

1. Univocal linguistic
2. Equivocal linguistic
3. Objective
4. Contrary (existential)
5. Contradictory
6. Sub-contrary (existential)
7. Contrary (Boolean) non-existential
8. De Morgan's
9. In material implication.

Of these, Russell's statement does not apply in 2, 3, 6 and 7. '3' is not in propositions, but can be put into propositions.

The theory of a hierarchy of languages also comes handy for Russell for his subjective theory of logical words like negation. We are told 'if "p" is a sentence of the primary language, "not-p" is a sentence of the secondary language'.[12] But the example usually given for such a hierarchy, and repeated by Russell, in the form of the paradox of the liar is hardly a paradox and constitutes too flimsy a ground for a hierarchy

of languages. There might be such a hierarchy, but many of the cases relegated to it can be resolved at the same level of language, usually by a careful supplementary clause.

Russell tells us that hierarchy of languages is inevitable and follows from the paradox of the liar of the form 'I am lying'. In this form the statement is incomplete. Russell, however, himself provides it in a complete and sensible form; thus 'I make the statement p and p is false'. But, put in this completed form, the paradox disappears, and the assertion boils down to 'p is false' whose actual truth or falsehood remains open like that of any other common assertion.

Russell further states that in the primary language we can make assertions; we cannot say that our assertions are either true or false.[13] He thinks this because according to him truth or falsity can only be applied in the secondary language to assertions belonging to the primary language.

However, this will hardly do, because an assertion in whatever level of language, already carries a claim of truth, but it is denied by Russell. Russell also states that a careful empiricist will say 'I see a canoid patch of colour' instead of 'I see a dog' since the latter involves induction. We are also told that such immediate empirical knowledge is as close to certainty as possible, and a basis of certainty of all other knowledge.[14] Yet, as assertion of primary language, it would be denied a claim to truth. Then question arises, if certainty is not about truth what is it about. In fact, the ambiguity in the meaning of 'assertion is created by Russell in the interest of hierarchy of language'; what he calls assertion pertaining to primary language is prescriptive, no serious man will make such a non-commital assertion.

Again, Russell, in his attempt to give an outline for a logical language, starts with primary atomic propositions with names and relations of the form 'x Ry'. These would be connected by logical words to give molecular sentences. For, according to him, the sentences made up of names, predicate and relations, express judgements of perception.[15] Atomic hierarchy of sentences would be made up out of these by combination etc. We are also told, the second principle in the formation of sentences may be called combination. A given sentence may be negated, two given sentences can be combined by 'or', 'and', 'if

then', 'if then not' and so on. Such sentences are called 'molecular' if they result from a combination of atomic sentences, either directly or by any number of finite operations.[16]

However, relations themselves will present cases of negation. If we have the following relations 'a is greater than b' $a > b$, then 'b is not greater than a' $b \not> a$, because greater than is not a symmetric relation. And if x is father of y, and y is father of z, x is not father of z, because father-son relation is not transitive.

Any one who will understand a relation will also understand its nature, including both affirmative and negative aspects. A child may not know the logical terms but he can also see that a dog is not larger than a horse, and the grandson cannot be the son.

It is all the more surprising that while Russell himself admits negative relation, viz. 'if x precedes y' it is not that 'y precedes x', he states that to admit negative facts would appear to be preposterous,[17] but actually not so. Russell thinks that negative facts become possible either as a general negation as 'I heard nothing' or a particular negation through incompatibility either perceived or reflected as propositional attitude.

Even without such explanation, negative fact is presented around us. We have already seen how black and white are negative of each other as perceptible facts, and also on the basis of their causes. Also, if we can conclude from Dirac's theory of the electrons, that matter and void are made up by electrons with positive and negative energy levels, then matter and void are not only negation of each other as perceptible facts, but also causally. And the void not only provides a location and medium for motion for matter but, according to the Relativity theory, it also plays a positive role in determining the nature of such motion. As Russell himself says, 'what a body does, it does because of the nature of space-time'.[18]

If arrested activity be taken as the defining characteristic of negation, it would be too wide as it would extend to disjunction also, since hesitation also stops activity, till it is resolved. Turning to the example of the fork on the way to Oxford, there is a case of optional negation. If the path to the right (R) is tried first, the path to the left (L) is rejected (negated) for the time being, and if 'L' is tried first, 'R' is

negated for the time. When one of them is chosen, the other is actually negated for the time.

Since Russell makes stroke function as the sole logical connective for combining atomic sentences in his logical language, and stroke function itself is a combination of negation and disjunction, if we accept the last two as based on arrested activity, the resulting language is likely to be halting and faltering.

There is also nothing to recommend cumbersome stroke function as the logical connective for compound propositions, except that it provides a single logical word for the purpose. However, one might wonder why it is that the only single logical connective that is possible should be negative. The answer is not far to seek; it is because from negation, it is possible to arrive at assertion by doubling the process, while there is no such device in the reverse. As Russell himself illustrates, p.q. = p/q/p/q which means, according to him, p and q are not incompatible. Thereby Russell also admits that incompatibility is for him another name for negation.[19]

Notes and References

Most of the references from Russell are based on his Harvard Lecture of 1940, published as *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (Allen and Unwin, 1948) (abbreviated as *IMT*).

1. *IMT*, p. 211.
2. Ibid., pp. 73, 173.
3. *Ṛgveda*, I.48.
4. Ibid., X.10.127.
5. Russell, B., *Logical Atomism in Perspectives on Reality*, ed. J.A. Mann, and G.F. Kreyoke (Harcourt Brace and Ward Inc., 1986), p. 471.
6. *IMT*, p. 163.
7. Ibid., p. 82.
8. Ibid., pp. 84–5.
9. Ibid., pp. 63–4.
10. Ibid., p. 163. A negative basic proposition thus requires a propositional attitude, in which the proposition involved is the one which, on the basis of perception, is denied.
11. Ibid., p. 78, 'we may safely treat "false" and "not" as synonymous'. 'If p is a proposition, "p is false" and "not-p" are synonymous'.

12. Ibid., p. 64.
13. Ibid., p. 64. The assertion which is the antithesis of denial belong to the secondary language; the assertion which belongs to the primary language has no antithesis.
14. Ibid., p. 151.
15. Ibid., p. 194.
16. Ibid., p. 195.
17. Ibid.
18. Russell, B., *The ABC of Relativity* (Mentor, 1960), p. 81.
19. Russell, *IMT*, p. 196. This, however, is wrong. Mere compatibility does not ensure reality. A man can be both wise and honest, but that does not ensure him the virtues. The problem with Russell is that he combines an objective epistemology based on association psychology with linguistic and subjective logic, and these are constantly at cross purposes.

Logic as 'The Science of Truth'*

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Gottlob Frege once said 'The word "true" indicates the aim of logic as does "beautiful" that of aesthetics or "good" that of ethics.'[1] He further said 'To discover truth is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth.'[2] From these remarks of Frege it is clear that to him logic is 'the science of truth'. But he never explained it anywhere. My task in this paper is to explain and examine this definition of logic as suggested by Frege. It is to be noted here that when Frege speaks of logic, he speaks about deductive logic. So, my discussion of his definition of logic will be confined in the realm of deductive logic and its subject matter, viz.; deductive inference. My aim in this paper is to show that Frege's definition of logic incorporates three concepts of syntax, semantics and ontology and in doing so I have started with one of the very basic concepts of logic, namely the concept of validity.

Deductive logic is primarily concerned with the notion of validity of an inference. So the primary task of a logician is to analyze the concept of validity. The basic question to him is: What is it that makes an inference valid? To answer this question the logician says: An inference is valid because of the form to which it belongs. In other words, if the form of an inference is valid, the inference itself is valid and if the form of an inference is invalid, the inference is invalid. But this answer will not satisfy us because another obvious question is raised here and until we get a proper answer to this latter question, our original question remains partly unanswered. This latter question is: How does the form of an inference determine its validity? To answer this question we are to consider such things about an inference that are not within the jurisdiction of a purely formal investigation of inferences. A purely formal investigation of inferences constitutes the syntax of the

inference and how the form of an inference determines its validity is a question which cannot be answered by the consideration of syntax of the inference. To answer this we must consider the semantical facts of the inference, indeed of the very form to which the inference belongs. To consider the semantical facts of an inference is to note that the form to which the inference belongs is such that it is not possible for all the premises of it to be true and the conclusion to be false. To say it in other words, the inference, by belonging to the form to which it does, exemplifies a general rule of inference according to which the inference is constituted and this rule is truth preserving in the sense that if a conclusion is drawn from the premises according to this rule then if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Now this analysis of validity in terms of truth brings us in the field of semantics which deals with certain relations between expressions of a language and the objects or state of affairs referred to by those expressions. A theory of truth is a semantical theory that tells us how the expressions of our language are related with the facts of the world. It is this relation between expressions of our language with the facts of the world that determines whether the statements of our language are true or false.

Frege had realized with great clarity that semantics—a theory of truth in particular—is the soul of logic. And from this realization he defined logic as 'the science of truth'. An example of a theory of truth that we are speaking of here is what we have in Tarski's 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Language'[3] and in Saul Kripke's 'Outline of a Theory of Truth'[4] which enable us to determine systematically the truth conditions of all the statements (which occur as premises or conclusions in inferences) from an account of the structure of the sentences and an assignment of semantic values to the component parts of the sentence structure.

It is true that Frege had recognized the importance of the role of semantics in logic but this does not mean that he had denied the important role of syntax in logic. Frege thought that the truth of a sentence depends not only on the significance of the terms and predicates which occur in it, but also on how they are arranged to make the statement as a whole and this is a matter of syntax. Frege never denied the role of syntax in the notion of validity, but to him semantics itself

is, in a very important sense, supervenient on syntax. However, since we cannot have a semantical notion of validity without having a syntactical notion of the same, Frege thought it not necessary always to mention the need of the latter separately. What he had in mind is that we need adequate syntactical and semantical notions of validity for deductive logic and a clear understanding of the relation between them. 'All a are b and All c are a therefore All c and b' is such a form that when realized in terms and propositions, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. In other words, given the definition of material implication {(All a are b & All c are a) ⊃ All c are b} is a logical law because of the semantical property of the '⊃' which permits the derivation of a true statement from the statements which are themselves true.

Frege's definition of logic as 'the science of truth' and our explanation of that definition in terms of theory of truth prima facie may cause some elementary misunderstanding. First, it may appear to us that by his definition of logic, Frege is suggesting that logic is concerned with whether a statement appearing in an inference as a premise or as a conclusion, is actually true or not. But, Frege's definition of logic as 'the science of truth' is not concerned with this question but rather with the question of why and how is it, that a statement becomes true. In other words, his definition of logic is concerned with the question of the truth conditions of a statement occurring in an inference and with the question of how the truth-value of one statement is related with the truth-value of another statement.

Again, one may mistakenly suppose that when we are explaining Frege's definition of logic in terms of the theory of truth, we are doing so in terms of metaphysical theories of truth like coherence or correspondence theory. But in fact, when we are explaining Frege's definition in terms of theory of truth, we are not doing just a philosophical analysis of the concept of truth which the metaphysical or traditional theories of truth do. Here in our explanation, the theory of truth is a theory of the truth conditions of statements or may be called after Tarski the semantic theory of truth which shows that for certain formalized languages, we can construct a finite set of rules that entail for the sentence S of such language, something, of the form 'S is true if

and only if ... .' The theory of truth which we are considering here may address itself to the traditional task of defining truth in such a way that, from the definition it provides, statements specifying the truth conditions of the sentences in the language for which the definition has been provided, would follow as logical consequences, as it does from Tarski's definition of truth in terms of 'satisfaction'.

We have seen earlier that from the realization that semantics is the soul of logic, Frege had defined it as 'the science of truth'. In semantics, we specify the truth conditions of statements ultimately by reference to the objects in the world, the properties they possess and the relations they hold with one another. And in doing so, we are certainly committed to the existence of the objects, properties and relation and this is what philosophers say is ontological commitment. Thus, according to Frege's definition of logic, logic depends not only on syntax and semantics, but also on ontology, i.e., on the view of what entities there are in the world. The reason why logic can be said to depend on ontology is that it presupposes, as well as implies, the truth of some ontological views. In the standard logic of Frege-Russell type, a rule of inference known as existential generalization permits us to derive the existential statement 'There is at least an x such that ϕx' from the statement 'ϕa' for any singular term 'a'. This rule is based on an ontological assumption, that is, on the assumption that every singular term stands for something that really exists.

Ontological commitment signified by the rule of existential generalization is an example of the connection between semantics and ontology. In this rule when the statement 'ϕa' implies the statement 'There is at least an x such that ϕx', it is nothing but a consequence of the semantics of the statement 'ϕa', viz., that it is true if and only if there is a thing, 'a' which is 'ϕ'. That semantics and ontology are connected can be seen in another way. If semantics is an investigation of truth and truth conditions, we can legitimately ask like Frege:[5] What is it that can be true or false? The answer is: Whatever it is that is true, it must exist, so that it could be true. Thus we see that Frege's 'the science of truth' involves three concepts of syntax, semantics and ontology as the essence of logic.

Prima facie it may appear that Frege's definition of logic has applicability only in the standard logic because in many systems of non-standard logic, e.g. in Modal and Many-valued logic, the rule of existential generalization is not permitted and consequently no ontological commitment is there in non-standard logic. In other words, as the rule of existential generalization is not permitted in some systems of non-standard logic, we can not consider ontology as an essence of logic in general and in this respect Frege's definition is too narrow. But this is not true. It is true that there are some systems of non-standard logic which do not permit existential generalization. But from this it does not follow that these systems of logic do not make any ontological commitment. Logics which do not permit existential generalization, i.e. logics without existential assumption, may make ontological commitment in ways other than the way of permitting existential generalization. As for example, there is no rule like existential generalization in modal logic but the semantics of a modal logic dealing with necessity, possibility and impossibility, is given in terms of possible worlds and if this semantics is taken seriously then some ontic status will have to be accepted to the possible world, that is, we have to accept that the real world in which we have our being is one of the members of the possible worlds which are all real.

So the charge that ontology is not the essence of logic in general and Frege's definition of logic is too narrow is not tenable.

Notes and References

* This paper is developed from the class notes taken by me from the lectures delivered by Late Dr Pranab Kr. Sen in a Refresher Course in Visva Bharati, 1996.

1. Frege, G.: 'The Thought: A Logical Enquiry', trans. A.M. and Marcelle Quinton in *Philosophical Logic*, ed. P.F. Strawson, OUP, 1967.
2. Ibid.
3. Tarski, A: 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Language' in *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, ed., J.H. Woodger, Oxford 1956.
4. Kripke, Saul: 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' in *The Journal of Philosophy* 72, 1975.
5. Frege, G.: op. cit.

Am I a BIV?

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I focus here on two reconstructions of the Putnamian anti-sceptical argument.[1] My endeavour is to advance reasons and arguments other than Anthony Brueckner's[2] and others'[3] in support of the conclusion that both reconstructions, though holding promise of disarming the sceptic, ultimately fail to silence her.

In §I, I consider a reconstruction of the Putnamian argument that relies on disquotational truth-conditions for sentences, and in §II, a reconstruction that does not. In each section, I will try to show why the reconstructed argument under consideration does not work. I arrive at the limited conclusion that neither of these two reconstructions of the Putnamian anti-sceptical argument will satisfy the sceptic.

First, however, let us re-create Putnam's scenario. We are to imagine a world that consists of nothing apart from the brains of sentient beings floating in a nutrient-filled vat (BIVs). Each of these Putnamian BIVs is supposed to be connected to the terminals of a supercomputer that stimulates these brains to have exactly those sense-impressions that normal sentient beings, including humans ('NHB' for 'normal human being'), have.

A crucial feature of this world is that it is totally devoid of any causal connections with the 'normal' world.[4] This feature clearly demarcates the situation obtaining in the Putnamian BIV world from similar situations that have been discussed in the literature. For example, instances of ill-intentioned neuroscientists in the normal world who remove fellow-beings' brains and stimulate them to have real-life experiences are often discussed. Such neuroscientist-scenarios are distinguished from the Putnamian BIV world by the existence of causal relations between these neuroscientist-BIVs and kinds of things in the

normal world, through the neuroscientist, and the past connections of the afflicted NHB. Since Putnamian BIVs, unlike neuroscientist-scenario BIVs, are not causally related to the normal world, they are not in a position to refer to things in the normal world that are designated by natural kind terms. Conversely, inhabitants of the normal world cannot refer to things in the Putnamian BIV world designated by natural kind terms for those things.

For reasons that will become clear momentarily, I modify Putnam's scenario slightly. Instead of postulating a world in which a computer stimulates these brains, we consider a scenario in which there are just brains randomly having sense-impressions exactly similar to those that inhabitants of the normal world have. Notice that this modification does not violate the condition that the BIV world should not stand in any causal relations with the normal world.[5]

Given all this, Putnam asks the natural question: How do we know that we refer to things in the normal world rather than to things in the Putnamian BIV world? In other words, how do we know that we are not Putnamian BIVs? His answer constitutes the core of his anti-sceptical argument based on the causal theory of reference. Let us now examine a version of the answer that depends on disquotational truth-conditions for sentences.

I

Consider this reconstruction of the Putnamian anti-sceptical argument:[6]

(1) Either I am a BIV (speaking vat-English) or I am a non-BIV (speaking English).
(2) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are true iff I have sense impressions as of being a BIV.
(3) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then I do not have sense impression as of being a BIV.
(4) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are false. [(2), (3)]
(5) If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are true iff I am a BIV.

(6) If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are false. [(5)]
(7) My utterances of 'I am a BIV' are false. [(1), (4), (6)]

After Brueckner, let us call this argument 'E'.

Notice first premise (2) of the argument. The assumption here is that on the hypothesis that I am a BIV, 'BIV' in the sentence 'I am a BIV' refers to the sense impressions that I have when I think 'I am a BIV'. The literature, however, discusses two other possible candidates for the referents of Putnamian BIV words: the electrical impulses that stimulate the BIV when he thinks, e.g., 'Here is a tree', and the computer states that obtain when it stimulates the BIV to have sense-impressions. These choices are available to theorists considering the original Putnamian BIV scenario. In our modified scenario, however, the only available choice is the first one, namely, sense-impressions. The reason is that our modified scenario presupposes nothing but brains floating in a vat randomly having the sense impressions that NHBs have; there are no other referents of BIV words.

Much effort has been expended on the issues of the preferred candidate among these three,[7] and of whether each of the three candidates can be legitimately substituted for one another, without change of sense, in discussions of Putnamian anti-sceptical arguments.[8] However, it seems that the focus should be more on whether Putnamian BIV words refer to things other than what NHB words refer to, rather than on what exactly Putnamian BIV words refer to. Developments will show that our arguments will turn more on the referents of NHB's words for natural kinds being different from BIV natural kind terms, than on which of the three candidates is the referent of Putnamian BIV words. It is with this in mind that I have modified the original Putnamian scenario in order to restrict the range of possible candidates for the referents of Putnamian BIV natural kind terms. Note that the modification retains all the essential features of Putnam's original scenario.

While Brueckner and Falvey & Owens have offered independent reasons to suspect (E),[9] I will here concentrate on developing yet another independent reason to suspect this argument. I wish to establish that the truth-condition for vat-English sentences that (E) assumes entails the unacceptable proposition that a BIV is a normal-human-being-in-

the-image ('human-in-the-image', for short). The unacceptability of this proposition arises from the intuitively acceptable fact that nothing can be both a material BIV weighing a few pounds, and at the same time be an insubstantial bunch of sense-impressions, which is what we will shortly argue that humans-in-the-image are.

Let us make clear at the outset the connection between the referents of BIV words and the truth-conditions of BIV sentences. Since vat-English is an artificial language, we may assume that the truth-conditions for vat-English sentences incorporate the referents of the words of its sentences. Thus we assume that if BIV words refer to their sense-impressions, we assume also that the truth-condition for a BIV sentence, say, 'I am a BIV' is: 'I am a BIV' is true iff I have sense-impressions as of being a BIV.

From the facts that truth-conditions for BIV utterances invoke the sense impressions that the BIV has when she thinks a sentence, and that these truth-conditions entail that something is both a material BIV and an insubstantial clump of sense-impressions, I will argue that premise (2) of (E) must be rejected, and that therefore (E) does not work as it stands.

According to (E), the truth-condition for my utterance of, e.g., (the vat-English sentence) 'I am a BIV' is my sense-impressions as of being a BIV, if I am a BIV. By the same count, if I am a BIV, the truth-conditions of my utterance of 'I am a normal human being' is my having sense impressions as of being a human. Since by hypothesis a BIV does have sense-impressions as of being a human, my utterance of 'I am a normal human being', if I am a BIV, is true. My utterance of this sentence being true, the proposition expressed by it is also true.

Recall that, if I am a BIV, my words refer to sense-impressions rather that to brains, vats, etc. Therefore, the proposition expressed by my sentence 'I am a normal human being' is not *that I am a human*, but rather, *that I am a human in the image*.[10] Thus if I think 'I am a BIV', the proposition *that I am a human in the image* is a true proposition, if I am a BIV. However, my utterance of 'I am a BIV', if I am a BIV, entails that the proposition *that I am a BIV* is also true.

Now the truth of these two propositions entails the truth of the further proposition *that I am both a BIV and a human in the image*.

This is a conclusion that we clearly do not want though, for it is not possible for anything to be both a BIV and a human-in-the-image because one is a material object and the other is a collection of insubstantial sense-impressions.

One point needs to be clarified before the above argument can be stated formally. First, in order to see why something cannot be both a BIV and a human-in-the-image, we need to know more precisely what it is to be a human-in-the-image. In general, we need a more precise description of the state of affairs that obtains when something is '-in-the-image'. As we said earlier, a BIV does not, indeed cannot, refer to the things which we refer to; when she utters, e.g., 'Here is a tree', she does not refer to a tree. According to the sense-impression account of the reference of vat-English words, the BIV refers to her sense-impressions as of being in front of a tree when she thinks 'Here is a tree'.

When a BIV has sense-impressions as of being before a tree, what happens, presumably, is that she has random processes in her brain that cause her to 'see' (and to 'smell', to 'feel'—even to 'hear' and to 'taste', if possible) a tree. In short, certain random occurrences in the BIVs cause her to have tree-like sense-impressions. We may take it that this process causes a BIV to have tree-like sense-impressions, which collectively conjure up an image of a tree, i.e., a tree-in-the-image, for the BIV, not in the sense that it produces a representation of a tree, but in the sense that it causes tree-like sense impressions in the BIV. In other words, the tree-in-the-image is simply the totality of the BIV's tree-like sense-impressions, and this is what the BIV's token of 'tree' refers to.

Given this picture, we have the following idea of what is meant when we say that something is a human-in-the-image. The BIV's token of 'normal human being' refers to the sense-impressions he has as of being a human, i.e., it refers to a human-in-the-image.

Just as a non-BIV may be taken to assert that he is one of the members of the class containing all (and only) humans by his sentence 'I am a normal human being', a BIV, when she utters 'I am a normal human being', may be taken to assert that she is one of several members in the class containing all and only humans-in-the-image. Since a human-in-the-image is a totality of sense impressions, the BIV's assertion of 'I am a normal human being' amounts to an assertion that she

is a member of the class containing all and only totalities of certain sense-impressions.

The conclusion that we have at present, then, raises a problem for (E). For, if I am a BIV, my utterance of the (vat-English) sentence 'I am a normal human being' says that I am a member of the class that contains all and only totalities of certain sense-impressions. If I am a member of this class, I am identical with one of the totalities of sense-impressions. But my belonging to this class is inconsistent with my belonging to the class of all and only BIVs, for the very nature of sense-impressions and BIVs prevent anything from being a member of both sets, i.e., from being identical with a material BIV and with a bunch of sense-impressions.

Of course, if I am a BIV, and if my utterance of the vat-English sentence 'I am a normal human being' is taken to mean that I have sense-impressions as of being a human, then this is not inconsistent with my being a BIV. But what we said just above shows that this is not what the BIV's utterance of the vat-English sentence 'I am a normal human being' means.

No doubt I would have such sense-impressions if I am a BIV, but I do not indicate this fact by my utterance of this sentence. What I indicate, rather, is that I am a member of the class of normal human beings. But because I am a BIV speaking vat-English, the proposition that my sentence expresses is *that I am a member of the set of humans in the image*.[11] Since a human-in-the-image is a bunch of sense-impressions, my utterance of 'I am a normal human being' entails the problematic conclusion that I am both a BIV and a bunch of sense-impressions.

As mentioned earlier, we have been assuming throughout that the word 'I' functions the same way in vat-English as in English. The main basis for making this assumption is that an envatted brain retains whatever it is that makes an embodied human being a person. If this basic similarity between BIVs and NHBs did not obtain, i.e., if BIVs were one kind of sentient beings and humans another, there would be too little common ground between BIVs and NHBs to fruitfully discuss the question whether one is the other.

Here, then, is a rigorous statement of the foregoing argument that we will call (A):

(a) If I am a BIV, my vat-English utterance of 'I am a normal human being' is true iff I have sense-impressions as of being a human.
(b) If I am a BIV, I do have sense-impressions as of being a human.
(c) If I am a BIV, my vat-English utterance of 'I am a normal human being' is true. [(a), (b)]
(d) If I am a BIV, the proposition *that I am a human in the image* is true.
(e) If I am a BIV, the proposition *that I am a BIV* is true.
(f) If I am a BIV, the proposition *that I am both a BIV and a human in the image* is true. [(d), (e)]

The above argument yields the problematic conclusion that something is both a material BIV and a collection of sense-impressions. If it is correct, the argument above shows that in a BIV world, the obviously false proposition that something is both a BIV and a human-in-the-image must be held true given a certain type of truth-condition for vat-English sentences. It follows that the truth-condition for vat-English sentences are not of the type mentioned in premise (a).

If this is the truth-condition for vat-English sentences, premise (2) of (E) cannot be true, and therefore its conclusion cannot be granted. Our argument (A) neither does nor is intended to show that we are not BIVs or that we cannot be BIVs; we are not concerned with that question here. What (A) shows is that (E) cannot be given as it stands because one of its premises is problematic.

A plausible objection to this argument turns on the justification for assuming (e). For to assume that I am a BIV means that every sentient creature in my world is a BIV. Given these circumstances, no one in my world could even express the proposition *that I am a BIV*, much less evaluate its truth-value; the proposition is not available to me or to anyone else in my world. In other words, when I assume that I am a BIV, I thenceforth relinquish my knowledge of, i.e., my ability to even state, the hypothesis itself.

However, the success of the argument does not depend upon the availability to me of the premise in question. Because we assume the argument to be given in English,[12] it is enough if it is available to a human. To look at it differently, the argument may be considered as given by an NHB, in English, about a situation in which he is a BIV speaking vat-English. On this point of view, therefore, the availability of premise (e) is not a problem.

To make this clearer, we could state the same argument in the third person about someone in the BIV world. Assume that our world is the normal one, and that S is a BIV of the Putnamian sort inhabiting a BIV world. The argument would now go something like this: *that S is a BIV* is a true proposition. Since 'S is a normal human being' is true iff S has sense-impressions as of being a human, and since she does have such sense-impressions, her utterances of this sentence are true. Therefore, the proposition expressed by his sentence, *that S is a human in the image* is true. Once again, something turns out to be a BIV and a human-in-the-image.

If the foregoing is correct, premise (a) of (A) [premise (2) of (E)] is problematic. This being so, the reconstruction of the Putnamian argument being considered, (E), cannot get off the ground.

II

Let us now turn to the reconstruction of Putnam's anti-sceptical argument that does not depend upon disquotational truth conditions:

(a) If I am a BIV, then my sentences have non-disquotational truth-conditions.
(b) My sentences have disquotational, not non-disquotational truth-conditions.
(c) Therefore, I am not a BIV.

Call this argument (F).

Question begging is a serious charge that (F) faces. For, given premise (a), I cannot avail of premise (b) unless I assume also that I am not a BIV. In other words, one could question the propriety of asserting (b) when its truth depends on whether the conclusion of the argument is

true. Therefore, asserting premise (b) is assuming exactly the conclusion of (F), and so the argument begs the question.

An answer to this objection might run thus: just because the two premises of (F) together give the conclusion of (F), this rejoinder goes, it does not mean that (F) begs the question. To say that (F) is question begging would be tantamount to saying that an argument of the form 'If (if A then B) and ~B, then ~A' is question begging because ~B cannot be asserted until the truth of the conclusion ~A is determined. To object that given the truth of (if A then B), ~B is true only if ~A is true would be to make an unreasonable objection because it would apply equally to every valid argument of this kind. Thus, if the charge of question begging against (F) is reasonable, every valid argument of this form is circular. Of course, this kind of argument is not circular.

The charge that (F) is circular because it assumes (b) as a premise stems from the intuition that unless we know whether or not we are BIVs, we do not know whether or not our sentences have disquotational truth-conditions. We do not have an argument yet to show that we are not BIVs; hence we do not know whether our sentences are disquotational or non-disquotational truth-conditions.

The above answer to this objection, on the other hand, relies on the fact that whatever language we speak, the truth-conditions for all sentences, stated in our language, are disquotational. For instance, if I am a normal human being, the truth condition for my sentence 'I am a BIV' is simply that I am a BIV. If I am a BIV, though, the truth-condition for the same sentence uttered in vat-English is that I have sense-impressions as of being a BIV. But this statement of the truth-condition for the vat-English sentence is made in English; if we 'translated' this statement into the language of the sentence, viz., vat-English, we would say: 'The truth-condition for the sentence "I am a BIV" is that I am a BIV'. In short, if the truth condition for a sentence in language L is stated in L, then that truth-condition is disquotational.

On the face of it, this fact clearly answers the charge of circularity. Since premise (b) of (F) is talking—in my language—about the truth-conditions of sentences in my language, it rightly claims that these must be disquotational; I do not have to assume in addition that I am not a BIV to be confident of premise (b) of the argument. But if

premise (b) is allowed with the other premise (a), (F)'s conclusion that I am not a BIV follows, and so I am not a BIV.

I wish to argue now that the very intuition that saves (F) from the circularity-charge renders the truth-value of its premises indeterminate. As we just said, the response to this charge relies on the intuition that the truth-condition for a sentence S in language L is disquotational iff the truth-condition for S is also stated in L. Let us call this intuition N.

In the light of N, premise (b) of (F) may be taken as true or false depending on whether the truth-conditions for 'my sentences' are stated in the same language as the language of my sentences. No doubt premise (b) is trivially true, but this is so *only on the assumption that the languages of my sentence and of the statement of its truth-condition are the same*. Unless this assumption is made explicit, we cannot assign premise (b) a truth-value, i.e., it may be taken as either true or false.

Further, premise (a) presents the same problem. If I am not a BIV, premise (a) is, of course, vacuously true. On the other hand, if I am a BIV, this premise cannot be considered true or false unless the languages of the truth-condition-statements and 'my sentences' are specified. For, if I were a BIV speaking vat-English, *and the truth-conditions for my sentences were stated in English*, then premise (a) would be true. But this, again, is not specified in the premise. If I were a BIV and the truth-conditions for my vat-English sentences were stated in vat-English, N tells us that premise (a) would be false.

Thus, in providing an answer to the charge of circularity, this intuition undermines the very argument it tries to save by rendering the truth-values of its premises indeterminate.

An attempt may be made to avoid this consequence of N by rebuilding the premises of (F) so as to avoid ambiguity in their truth-values. Thus, premise (a) may be changed to read, 'If I am a BIV, then my vat-English sentences have non-disquotational truth-conditions iff these truth-conditions are stated in English'; and premise (b), 'My sentences have disquotational truth conditions iff they are stated in the same language as that of my sentences'.

Such a reconstruction makes both premises clear, but renders them trivially true. In this form, whether or not I am a BIV, the consequent

of premise (a) is always true because it is an instance of the intuition N, and the premise (b) is nothing more than a re-statement of N.

That these reconstructed premises are trivially true may not have mattered if the desired conclusion that I am not a BIV had followed. But the premises, thus reconstructed, do not yield the conclusion that I am not a BIV because the consequent of the new premise (a) is an instance of the more general premise (b); in other words, one is not the negation of the other. So not only are the reconstructed premises of (F) trivially true when made explicit in accordance with the demands of N, they actually block the conclusion that (F) was supposed to yield.

All this is not to say that an argument along the lines of (F) cannot be given to show that I am not a BIV. However, the premises of (F), as they stand, are ambiguous in the light of N. No doubt the circularity objection has no force now; but this is because the argument (F) is ambiguous in the first place, and not because the response to it that we mentioned answers this objection. Further, a reconstruction of (F) to accommodate N only makes its premises trivially true and leads to no interesting conclusion.

One way in which (F) may be resurrected is by appealing to some other reconstruction of the premises of (F) which accommodate N and yield the desired conclusion. Another way to do it would be to deny that the response to the circularity-charge relies on N. But to deny that N forms the basis of this response is not to deny the plausible intuition N itself, and it is the plausibility of N that makes the premises of (F) problematic. The alternative seems to be to reconstruct the premises of (F) differently.

In both sections I and II, I adduced reasons and arguments to show that two kinds of reconstructions of Putnam's anti-sceptical argument fail to satisfy the sceptic. Clearly, however, we neither argued nor intended to argue that all possible varieties of Putnamian anti-sceptical arguments similarly dissatisfy. An argument perhaps could be given along Putnamian lines that will avoid the pitfalls that these two reconstructions suffer from. Till such time, though, we must be content to put off any conclusion on whether we are BIVs!

Notes and References

* I would like to thank Anthony Brueckner for first persuading me of the possibility that I am not a BIV!

1. This anti-sceptical argument is advanced only sketchily in Hilary Putnam's celebrated first chapter of his *Reason, Truth and History*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. I rely on Anthony Brueckner's 'Brains in a Vat', *Journal of Philosophy* (1986) for a rigorous reconstruction of the Putnamian argument.
2. See, e.g., his 'Brains in a Vat', *Journal of Philosophy* (1986).
3. See, e.g., Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism', *The Philosophical Review* (1994).
4. Special note needs to be taken of this requirement since the Putnamian anti-sceptical requirement depends heavily on the causal theory of reference. One of the essential tenets of this theory is that in order to be able to refer to a kind of thing (natural kind), one must have been, or be, in a causal relation with that kind of thing. For Putnam's purposes, it is necessary that Putnamian BIVs are unable to refer to things in the normal world. He ensures this by pre-empting any causal relation between the Putnamian BIV world and the normal world.

   Thus we are to imagine, e.g., that the Putnamian BIV world came into existence by pure chance and independently of the inhabitants of the normal world, rather than assume, say, that it is a creation of some NHBs in the normal world.
5. Unless otherwise specified, we use 'BIV' to designate a brain in a vat in the *modified* Putnamian scenario, and 'Putnamian BIV' to designate a brain in a vat in Putnam's original scenario.
6. Anthony Brueckner's 'Brains in a Vat', *Journal of Philosophy* (1986). Though Brueckner uses 'BIV' throughout this argument in our sense of 'Putnamian BIV', we take 'BIV' in this argument (and in others, unless otherwise specified) to apply to BIVs in our modified scenario. Considering that he is here solely concerned with the sense-impression candidate for referents of brain in a vat words, we take it that the argument applies equally to brains in a vat in both the original and our modified Putnamian scenarios.
7. Though Brueckner assumes in 'Brains in a Vat' that sense-impressions of the BIV are the referents of BIV words, some of his later work seems to indicate a preference for computer-states or electrical-impulses that stimulates the Putnamian BIVs as candidates for the reference of Putnamian BIV words. See, e.g., 'Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin', forthcoming.

8. See, e.g., Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens, 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism', *The Philosophical Review* (1994), p. 129. Falvey and Owens suggest that the sense-impressions candidate for referents of BIV words cannot be treated in the same way as electrical-impulses or computer-states candidates, Brueckner's 'Knowledge of Consent and Knowledge of the World', *The Philosophical Review* (1994), pp. 335–7, though, seems to lean toward the position that in fact the three candidates for the reference of BIV words are similarly treatable.
9. For example, Brueckner rejects the argument (E) on the grounds that the causal theory of reference that Putnam adheres to in his (Putnam's) argument 'engenders a scepticism about knowledge of meaning or propositional content'.
10. Of course, we are assuming here that the word 'I' is unique in that it does not refer to sense-impressions, because it seems plausible that this word refers to a person rather than to his or her sense-impressions. In other words, our position is that there is more that constitutes a person than just the person's sense-impressions, and that 'I' refers to that which constitutes a person. We will not here go into what exactly constitutes a person as this would raise issues too far afield from our present concerns. Suffice to say that it seems reasonable to think that person-hood is not a collection of sense-impressions.
11. We take 'member of the set' as having the semantical properties in vat-English as in English to avoid such unwieldy propositions as ... *member in the image of the set in the image* ... .
12. Notice that when we assume we are speaking English, we *are* assuming that we are non-BIVs. But this does not affect the conclusion of our main argument (A) because that conclusion is one *about* the BIV world—not one about whether we are BIVs or not. In other words, our main argument is not about whether we are BIVs; if this had been so, it would have been crucial to determine which language we were speaking. But since our main argument is just that there is a problem with the BIV world as conceived by Putnam, we may assume a non-BIV's standpoint to give the argument about the BIV world.

BEING-Being-being: The Advaitic Perspective

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The philosophical presuppositions on the Ultimate Reality are most feasibly represented in Advaita Vedānta. It is an outcome of the distinctively inspired inquiry into the subjective level of the world phenomenon within the realm of speculatively construed human predispositions. The depth and subtlety of these inquisitions on finding an answer to the essential existence can be traced back to the Vedas in particular reference to Indian philosophy. These speculations are affirmed on the basis of certain rational evidences in the form of individual experiences as enunciated in the Upaniṣads. Though there persist differences of opinion among philosophers regarding the Absolute principle, most of them remain in conformation with a Unitary Absolute without a second, infinite and all-pervasive. The different philosophical systems in India insist on the recognition of an underlying pure subjective essence beyond sense-perception to which all divisions of existence owe their origin. The most ancient findings are revealed in the form of Ṛgveda. The possibility of an Absolute Being is elaborated in a portion of Ṛgveda. The Vedic scholars in the fervour of their aspirations to invent the fundamental Reality, by raising above their individuality, had discovered a unique power transcending all the insentient and sentient forms of existence. This non-dual infinite principle, the Pure subjectivity, is referred to as 'Brahman'.

The Vedic and Upaniṣadic teachings reveal that the Absolute principle though unknowable in ordinary perception can be cognized through an inward vision as the immanent principle. The Absolute is described as Pure consciousness—Bliss. Śrī Śaṅkara, in his Advaita Vedānta explicitly signifies the perspective of the immanent structure of consciousness. He clearly enunciates the concept of non-dual (advaya)

Brahman which presupposes the oneness of Ultimate Reality. Śaṅkara distinguishes between nirguṇa (attributeless) and saguṇa Brahman (with attributes), both being the two poises of the same Brahman. The nirguṇa Brahman, according to him stands as pure subjectivity. He says 'Attributeless Brahman is the Ultimate Reality which is neither existent nor non-existent'.[1] It is not void too, rather it represents the essence of the whole world. The infinite Brahman becomes finite by self-manifestation. Māyā or ignorance is the causal factor in the phenomenal conception.

An in-depth analysis of the concept of pure consciousness (Cit) in its broad implications necessitates a meaningful interpretation and thereby review of the notion of subjectivity. It seeks condition for the possibility of the two poises within the non-dual absolute existence. Such an inquisition towards the subjective level means a methodological reflection on the ideal dimension of the Absolute itself. Śaṅkara indiscriminately denies the existence of the Truth as Absolute Truth. The present paper focuses on a review of this subject-centric perspective of the doctrine of advaita and examines the three levels of Existence—the Pure subjectivity (BEING), the associated entity (being) and the associated objectivity (be-ing). In the meantime, subjectivism is explained as Pure subjectivity (BEING) which is stated as avyākṛta (unmanifested) and its manifestation as another subjectivity (Being). Such a differentiation is necessitated for the true disposition of the logic of oneness or identity (Tādātmya). Ultimately, the unity of existence is affirmed and established as anirvacanīya (indefinable). This consistent approach proceeds from the ultimate one and is brought to the objective level. Some of the contentious issues such as the nature of inconceivable Brahman, the process of becoming, cessation of duality, self-manifestation of the unmanifest and the consciousness—knowledge relation are discussed here from the standpoint of Upaniṣadic perspective and that of Advaita Vedānta.

BEING

The Absolute Truth, the Pure subjectivity, is undoubtedly Brahman without a second, devoid of all attributes and transformations.[2] The elements of universality and necessity make it difficult to discriminate

such an entity with prima facie evidence. But an underlying basic unity among the objective elements presupposes the 'possibility' of a systematic exemplification of 'Existence'. The Vedas and Upaniṣads also refer to the Ultimate Truth as Brahman that represents the indefinable, omnipresent entity.[3]

A deeper investigation into the central doctrine of advaita pertaining to the region of Pure subjectivity as 'possibility' which is the common chord of existence as 'essence', reveals that this 'possibility' is not the 'actual' transcendental Reality. Such a possibility is to be further 'actualized', actuality being beyond the region of pure possibility. In the advaitic principle of 'Cit', as referred to in 'saccidānanda' Brahman, the status of 'Cit' has to be defined within the realm of Pure subjectivity. Whereas advaita defines Cit in terms of possibility, actually it is not the highest. A reflective analysis of 'saccidānanda' reveals a distinction (though superficial) in this ultimate—'Cit' and 'ānanda'. Sat, Cit and ānanda are equated with this pure subjective essence. An outright denial of absolute Truth on the one hand and describing It as 'neither existent nor non-existent' undermines the significance of the pure aspect of subjectivity. As for the Buddhists, It need not be denied altogether. A mere abstraction of the Reality would not also suffice for its legitimacy in factual conception.

On the other hand, a better way for illuminating Advaitic subjectivity or Truth would be to look into the level of cognition in human beings. Though Advaita integrates cognition with pure subjectivity, the crucial problem lies in the dimension of the level of cognition. The possibility of knowing the 'Pure' remains out of our reach as clearly elaborated in the Upaniṣads: 'The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman Itself'.[4] There remains nothing else except Brahman—neither individuality nor objectivity. Such a pure subjectivity demands extension of the cognitive level of subjectivity to a higher actuality (Truth), not a mere abstraction—infinite, indefinable, unknowable, not void; but it is only indicated in the cognitive level. It is the Pure consciousness or Absolute Principle and is called the BEING. It is not a possibility as far as 'possible' refers to a prima facie content and this possible remains real until actuality is realized. Within the said realm of human existence no such actuality is realizable since complete identity occurs

at the time of realization and hence only possibility is asserted as real. Advaita strictly adheres to the principle of possibility as it believes that realization of the possibility is enough for immortality but it does not completely deny this actuality. It is also based on the conception that 'as far as' cognition reveals an object, the object of cognition is real. This 'as far as' reveals the domain of termination of this possibility.

An examination on the perspective of BEING and its unique identity as Pure subjectivity could pose an objection on the 'knowability' of this Absolute. BEING is a necessity as is affirmed by the indicating characteristics (possibility) in human cognition. 'Knowability' is the terminal state of transcendence into the absolute. The non-possibility of attribution of any characteristics—either indicative or accidental, necessitates the conceptualization of 'BEING'. The reality of the 'possibility' as far as the termination of the level of possibility into actuality also proves the beyond—the BEING.

From the Upanisadic point of view this BEING is unmanifested (asat) as evidenced by 'असद्वा इदमग्रआसीत्। ततो वैसदजायत।' (First it was unmanifest state of the Pure sat and then it became manifest (Impure).[5] The absolute is said to be 'indistinguishable' and non-dual—'एकमद्वितीयम्'. Manifestation is not related to any external agency but by itself and is also unknowable.[6]

CONSCIOUSNESS VS PURE SUBJECTIVITY

Consciousness is the chord that underlies all sorts of existence. It as such refers to 'something' as its essence. So viewed, it can be understood that true subjectivity is intrinsic to consciousness signifying Pure subject, being above the level of consciousness. Consciousness also pertains to one who has experienced or known the subject. From the Advaitic approach, consciousness is experienced in the form of cognition of the Reality which is intrinsically validated. Reality is presented in the act of cognition and every presented content makes it felt or experienced at the moment of cognition itself. But Advaita also holds that this presented content is real so far as cognition reveals it. Therefore actual reality is beyond this cognitive level. This approach results in a distinction of subjectivity intrinsic to consciousness and subjectivity itself. The core of consciousness thus presupposedly stands behind

the consciousness and is independent of any other externalities and is empirically indeterminate. This pure subjectivity is not accepted by Advaitins while they posit it as the two 'poises' of the same subject.

However, the above-said interpretation substantially denies 'actuality' to the advaitic notion of consciousness as 'Cit'. It is the 'possibility' and this possibility is real so far as complete oneness with the Absolute is had outside the human existential level. It is non-revelatory as oneness denies 'Knowability' at the subjective level.

The possibility of considering consciousness as a distinctive principle apart from BEING shows its causal determination by way of self-manifestation. Accordingly, there is a reference for this consciousness or pertaining to BEING. Consciousness also is the cognizing subject and not the Absolute. How the BEING manifests is 'anirvacaniya' for Sankara as 'some how' for Kant. The indefinability of manifestation is also a strong assertion of 'BEING' as distinct from consciousness. The commonsense interpretation of knowledge as consciousness makes it possibly the object of cognition, which in turn becomes relational and hence consciousness also becomes relational. An analysis of the bliss component in 'saccidānanda' also proves the relational aspect of the consciousness, for bliss has referentiality to something. It is also 'experienced' in the phenomenal level and so cannot be postulated for BEING. Bliss certainly pertains to some manifested entity. No content of Bliss is identifiable in the Absolute as it is complete identity.

The most significant factor requiring a clear elaboration is about the referentiality of the consciousness to the Advaitic doctrine of the 'self'. The self is considered as the locus of consciousness. Therefore consciousness must pertain to this self only and, as a matter of fact, signifies subjectivity. It cannot be the objectivity. The unity of self and consciousness only is to be considered as the Pure subjectivity—BEING. From this point of view the notion of the self as depicted in Advaita requires a review in relation to consciousness. Advaita holds that consciousness is attributive of the self as an essential characteristic. This attributiveness admits a secondary formulation. The self in its certitude remains unmanifest and at times becomes manifest by self-manifestation.

A further analysis of the concept of the 'self' reveals contradictions at the levels of knowledge—higher and lower. The statement 'By the knowledge of Brahman, one is completely identified with It' does not admit any other level (secondary) of knowledge or else. Knowledge itself would belong to a lower level. Also the distinction of self as locus and consciousness brings in distinctions in the non-dual reality. Śaṅkara admits two truths—Pāramārthika (Absolute) and Vyāvahārika (Relational).[7] The former is the pure subjectivity without any distinction (even as self as locus and consciousness). The latter refers to the relational knowledge. The Vyāvahārika Truth is the highest cognizable Truth within the realm of phenomenal existence. In this case, though the self and consciousness seem identified as one, since ones phenomenal existence does not cease to exist, both remain distinct. Such a state of existence is referred to as 'Brahma niṣṭhā' in Upaniṣads. In this state it is possible for one to experience the supreme bliss and that continues until one is completely identified with Brahman. Scriptural texts reveal only this state of existence where one experiences bliss. Absolute Brahman is never revelatory.[8]

Śaṅkara traces the basis of truth to immediate certainty. He asserts that the self is prior to consciousness and prior to truth and reality (that is cognized empirically). In his opinion 'the self cannot be proved as it is the basis of all proofs and is established prior to all proofs'.[9] This admits the 'unknowability' of the Absolute Truth. It is 'nirviśeṣa cinmātram'—The BEING.

Thus the concept of pure subjectivity—BEING—leads to the unique oneness of the self and consciousness. The subjective essence seems to be missed in the empirical cognition and only a superficial identity of these two becomes an immediate certainty in cognition. But the background subjectivity is to be sought as the Absolute Truth, whereas other approaches may lead to dualism as self and locus of consciousness as metaphysical truths.

Being

The distinctive approach to actuality through possibility necessitates a 'Being' as possibility transcending itself into the actuality when manifestation ceases. Possibility in terms of the 'Cit' content is the highest

cognizable entity. Self as locus and consciousness becomes distinctive though only superficially. Absolute is brought down to cognitive level through relation. Śaṅkara does not find any validity for such a distinction whereas Sarvajñātman holds that this Being is the inward self or 'pratyagātman' distinct from the Absolute. This Being is the highest Truth that is revealed in Vedas and Upaniṣads that is said to be revealed as satyam, jñānam and ānandam. It is the highest Truth that is termed as self that lies within all. It is to be 'Pratibodhaviditam' and is known to exist on account of its immediate presentation when the 'I' is distinguished from the 'not-I'.

An analysis of the Upaniṣadic statements like 'I am Brahman' and 'Thou art that', 'Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinite' and 'not this, not this' brings forth the notion of two distinctive identities in the Absolute. These statements reveal that an inward or subjective perspective properly determines the content of 'That thou art'. As Sarvajñātman notes, 'Tat' refers to the Being (inward self) with essential and indicating characteristics, the knowledge of which results in a superficial identity where self as locus and consciousness still persist.[10] Accordingly, Sarvajñātman calls the 'Tat' as 'Sabala brahman' or mixed consciousness (transcendent) which could be attributed with qualities—essential and accidental; ascribed to it in the positive statements like 'satyam, jñānam, anantam Brahma' and 'Tvam' as the inward self or Pratyagatman.[11] The Supreme self or Parātman is beyond that. Sarvajñātman clearly identifies the words satya, jñāna, ānanda, nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta and sat indicating this pratyagātman. It is the principle to be sought by an empirical individual which is within him but can stand beyond the specific confinements. It is the inward lustre self-manifested but unlike the physically manifested one. This is 'indefinably' or 'somehow' caused. It is the very essence of individuals and is the link between the individual self and parātman. It is cognitive and partly transcendent in nature. It is the 'Sākṣin' devoid of Kartṛtva.

Svāmi Vidyāraṇya in his Pañcadaśī identifies two types of final mode of consciousness—Akhaṇḍā kāra Vṛtti (Absolute) and the self-manifest consciousness.[12] The final illumination is meant for the integral mode of consciousness that has only the Being as its content and by this knowledge alone the concrete Reality can be apprehended.

Such a knowledge is a pathway to the Absolute. Nevertheless one can gain freedom from objectivity (the so-called 'impressions of prārabdha karma' in advaita). This mode is only a transcendental one which is indirectly admitted by the Advaitins. The highest essence can no longer be apprehended as a content present to cognition and therefore 'Being' is the 'approximation' to the Absolute. It cannot be evidenced at all.

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat 3.4.2 holds that 'the self is the ultimate knower, you cannot know who is the knower of knowledge'. The self referred in this statement is to be treated as Being and knower of knowledge is the BEING. The Kenopaniṣat 1.2.4 declares that the self is 'Pratibodha-viditam' implying that Absolute is conceived only through relative truth (Being). According to Padmapāda: 'Vedas did not establish Brahman as the object of knowledge'. The vedic testimony 'know that self declared by the Upaniṣads' specifies the 'Being' as the knowable entity which is the relative truth and not the Absolute.

An analysis of the causation of Being from BEING is required in a subjective approach. The Being is believed to be caused by self-manifestation without any external agency. In a subjective level this manifestation is unknowable. This probably tempted Śaṅkara to describe it as 'anirvacanīya' and Kant to call it 'some how'. The anirvacanīyatva on further elaboration can be correlated with Māyā. Śaṅkara uses the term Māyā in this context. Upaniṣads describe it as illusion. Based on its function Māyā can be said as projecting the world. Advaita refers to it as the inexplicable power inherent in Brahman that projects the world. But in Brahman there is no distinction between either power or consciousness which may raise difference in non-difference. Therefore Māyā is to be conceptualized not as the power of projection but as the indefinability element. The Absolute projects the world which is unknowable or inexplicable. One has to rise above the level of manifestation to know such an inexplicability factor. This is not possible as one gets completely identified with that Absolute. This is because of which the world is said to be an appearance of the Absolute. Māyā cannot be the creative power as BEING becomes limited by that which is not. Therefore Brahman alone is the material cause of the world which is said to be as Māyā or inexplicable.

As for advaita, avidyā plays a major role in causation. It is described as the veiling power in the Absolute. Śaṅkara contends that the terms avidyā and māyā are synonymous. Avidyā points to the absence of knowledge, the false knowledge or ignorance. It cannot be traced to the Absolute as knowledge and ignorance/false knowledge cannot co-exist. Also non-difference in the Absolute does not allow avidyā to function. Avidyā, in a possible approach is to be conceptualized as the ignorance or false knowledge about the Reality and it exists in the minds of the created beings. It is the inability of the mind to realize the Absolute or the absence of knowledge or false knowledge regarding the Absolute in the empirical realm. The advaitic view of avidyā as concealing power is also right in this perspective as concealment is due to non-knowledge. Sankara rightly argues that it is not possible to attain a knowledge of Reality so long as one is subject to avidyā. Avidyā is the mental deformity of the finite self that makes appearance of the Absolute into different fractions. Deussen also makes a similar proposition—'Avidyā is the innate obscuration of our knowledge which makes it impossible to see things in the right way.'[13] These arguments strongly affirm that avidyā is not in the Absolute unmanifested BEING but in manifested ones alone.

TWO SUBJECTIVITIES ANSWERED

From the investigations into the subjectivity it is proposed that two subjectivities as BEING and Being exist which may be true from the phenomenological point of view. But Pure subjectivity does refer only to the highest and the Absolute Truth. In the Advaita doctrine of the self as the highest truth, the self is substantively identified with the locus of consciousness. In a purely subjective approach the consciousness is the only subjectivity and then the self will be objectified. This presupposes a distinction of the pure subjectivity which is not possible in tune with the philosophical perspective of 'Tadekam'. As a solution to this, Advaitins proposed them as the two poises of the same subjectivity in the form of Nirguṇa and Saguṇa Brahman or Para and apara Brahman. But this brings in the perplexed question of the locus of avidyā in the highest which is in fact not possible. Sarvajñātman presents the concept of 'Pratyagātman' for the lower subjectivity which he says

is not clearly distinguishable. In order to resolve such a problem, the notion of self itself is to be reviewed in terms of Absolute Truth (BEING) which Śaṅkara does not admit. The 'possible' and 'actual' approach discussed above points out the highest single subjectivity or actuality (BEING) and the possibility as the highest cognizable truth (Being).

Śaṅkara holds that scriptural texts help to differentiate the true self from the one associated with physical and psychical adjuncts.[14] Their main intention is to direct the mind towards the inward self (Pratyagātman) which stands only as an approximation to the Absolute. This implies that the true self that Sankara refers to is the lower subjectivity only. At the same time it points to the Absolute BEING.

being

In a proposition to the 'possibility' it has been pointed out that in this level only a superficial distinction between self and consciousness exists. But in the case of being, such a distinction is clear. This being is attributive (saguṇa). The Upaniṣads describe it as 'Īśvara'. Advaitins also refer to it as Īśvara. It is the first formful entity. Phenomenologically viewed, it is the highest 'sat' inclusive of Rajas and Tamas which are subsistent to the Sattva. It corresponds to the truly evidenced continuum (dṛṣya).

Īśvara is accepted as the ruler of the universe consisting of individuals and objectivity. With his conscious power (with Sattva, Rajas and Tamas elements) he creates the entities and enters into them as jīva. Association of a jīva with a particular mind-body complex is a result of predominance of one of the three elements of the conscious power. Such a jīva-mind complex engages in karma and when the jīva realizes its true nature it ceases to exist and attains Īśvarabhāva or 'Brahmaniṣṭhā' according to its degree of realization. In the meantime avidyā or false knowledge conceals the true nature of jīva and it makes realization difficult.

In so far as individual is concerned, being constitutes the evidencing reference in the phenomenal realm of body-mind factors. Freedom from the body-mind complex demands establishment in a state of no possibility of reference in respect of the evidencing principle. However, to

pass from the state of being to Being requires a transition as essential nature of consciousness which is Brahma niṣṭhā.

Śaṅkara and traditional advaitins as well posit body-self identity (dehātmatā) as adhyāsa (false identification). The fusion of the body and the self is attributed to ego. Egoity is the cause of inexplicable fusion (Tādātmya) between pure consciousness and objectivity in the form of individuality. The mind (antaḥkaraṇa) acts as the reflector of the consciousness to become explicit as ego or 'I' hood. The physico-mental complex is referred to as 'be-ing' or the individual or the 'person'. Individualized or modalized consciousness as a result of ego represents the jīvas whose true nature is obscured. The inner self remains completely unmodified in the process of reflection. The jīva and the self stand for two distinct perspectives of consciousness in the body-mind complex. While jīva is limited by antaḥkaraṇa, the self becomes attributed. The be-ing does not indicate complete objectivity as its associated modal consciousness involves a subjective element. The feeling of 'I' ness alone stands for a reflective inquisition into subjectivity. Advaita posits that the body-mind relation with the ego-principle is basic and it is experienced. The distinction of 'ego' hood from body-complex can be understood by perception.

An inquisition into the function of avidyā as obscuring the Reality reveals that the modes of antaḥkaraṇa are responsible for such obscuring and thereby generating false knowledge about Reality. The question of dualism of essence and function arises as a result of this avidyā. The locus of ignorance is traced to the pratyagātman (Being). The empirical world of experience comes within the purview of this Being and as such follows a seeming independence. As there is no complete dissociation of avidyā to the level of Being, having its referentiality to its locus, this Being is apparently recognized as the Highest self. The problem of inalienable consciousness seems difficult to resolve without the conception of Absolute Truth—BEING.

So, in conclusion, one can approach the level of Pure subjectivity at four levels of existence. The Highest BEING is the Absolute Truth, indefinable unmanifested, one without a second. It is unknowable as Pure subjectivity terminates knowability. This unmanifested BEING becomes manifested Being with surficial distinctness as self as locus

and consciousness. It is the possibility as distinct from actuality (BEING). It is the pratyagātman and is the maximum cognizable limit of consciousness. The being is the attributed entity (saguṇa) where distinction of ego from the consciousness is evidenced in formfulness of the entity called Īśvara or the creative principle. The last one is the being which is the 'person'. Māyā is the inexplicability of the manifestation and avidyā is distinct from it having its locus in the pratyagātman. It acts according to the reflection in the modalized consciousness. Immortality or identity with the Absolute is complete only when the self-manifestation ceases. Whatever freedom is claimed before this state is not absolute freedom. Hence BEING is to be recognized as the only Absolute Truth—Tadekam.

NOTES

1. **Avyākṛta and Vyākṛta:** The term avyākratam is used to denote the unmanifested state in which the Absolute exists. It is synonymous with 'असत्', also referred to in the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.vii.I. 'असद्वाइदमग्रआसीत्'. 'असत्' is not the opposite of 'sattva guṇa' referred to at the objective level, but it refers to the 'unmanifestedness' in the subjective level. The Avyākṛta cannot be said to be 'Śūnya' or 'Nothingness' as the existence cannot come from nothing or non-existence. This unmanifested created itself.

   'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' (Tait II.vii.I) The manifested or 'Vyākṛta' came into being by itself. Vyākṛtam refers to that which is differentiated. In this state the Brahman is referred to as Bliss-consciousness. This is the व्यक्त, visible to the cognitive level of human beings. 'अव्यक्त' denotes the invisibility of the Absolute by any means. But oneness with the Absolute is by Brahman itself when the manifestation ceases and all individual souls get liberated (सर्वमुक्तिः) and unmanifested Brahman alone remains.
2. **Prājña and Sarvajña:** One who acquires the 'Knowledge' of Brahman (manifested) is a Prājña. It is not the Absolute identity as there still remains distinction in the form of consciousness and self as locus of consciousness. Hence knowledge of a Prājña is only a part as Brahman cannot be known completely. Brahman (unmanifested) is the only Sarvajña. A Prājña cannot distinguish the avyakta, for which complete identity with the supreme is to be had. When he realizes this identity he becomes the Absolute itself and there is nothing to reveal such an identity. The Sarvajñatva refers also to the power of all-pervasiveness. The term

'sarvajñatva' means the knowledge of all not in a special or distinct sense. This is suited to Brahman which is the essence of all and so also all-pervaded in an undifferentiated manner, 'सामान्येन सर्वं जानातीति सर्वज्ञः'.



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2. सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्--छान्दोग्योपनिषत्.VI.ii.1.
3. यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्यमनसा सह--तैन्तिरीयोपनिषत्.II.4.
   स वेदैतत्परमं ब्रह्म धाम यत्र विश्व निहितं भाति शुभ्रम--मुण्डकोपनिषत्.III.ii.1.
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13. Paul Deussen. D.S.V., p. 302.
14. शांकरभाष्य on माण्डूक्योपनिषत्.I.7.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Rethinking Pluralism and Rights

Does the collapse of 'logocentrism' anchored in the cogito, really compel us to abandon every type of 'humanism' or commitment to humanity even when it transgresses human self-indulgence? In the political domain: does the rejection or critique of liberal universalism inevitably force us to embrace the alternative parochialism and hateful xenophobia? Is it not possible—indeed are there not good practical and philosophical reasons to cherish cultural and ethnic diversity while at the same time opposing the blandishments of both cosmopolitanism and local narcissism?

Fred Dallmayr (1998),
Truth and Difference: Lessons from Herder

The very notion of human rights (or the 'rights of man') is generally presented as the gift of the West to the rest. The non-Western traditions are usually considered bereft of notions of human rights. [... But] this disables any intercultural, multi-civilizational discourse on the genealogy of human rights. The originary claims concerning the invention of 'human rights' in the West lead to a continuing insistence on the oft-reiterated absence of human rights traditions in the 'non-West'. From this it is but a short practical step for the 'West' to impart, by coercive and 'persuasive' means, to others the gift of human rights. This leads to a rank denial, even in a post-colonial and post-socialist age, of equal discursive dignity to other cultures and civilizations. It also imparts a loss of reflexivity, in terms of intercultural learning, for the Euro-American traditions of human rights. [...] The future of human rights is serviced only when theory and practice develops the narrative potential to pluralize the originary metanarratives of the past of human rights beyond the time

and space of European Imagination, even in its critical postmodern incarnations.

Upendra Baxi (2002),
The Future of Human Rights, pp. 24–6

The ethic of non-injury applied to philosophical thinking requires that one does not reject outright the other point of view without first recognizing the element of truth in it; it is based on the belief that every point of view is partly true, partly false, and partly undecidable. A simple two-valued logic requiring that a proposition must either be true or false is thereby rejected, and what the *Jaina* philosopher proposes is a multi-valued logic. To this multi-valued logic, I add the Husserlian idea of overlapping contents. The different perspectives on a thing are not mutually exclusive, but share some contents with each other. The different 'worlds' have shared contents, contrary to the total relativism. If you represent them by circles, they are intersecting circles, not incommensurable, [and it is this model of] intersecting circles which can get us out of relativism on the one hand and absolutism on the other (emphases added).

J.N. Mohanty (2000a),
Self and Other: Philosophical Essays, p. 24

THE PROBLEM

Pluralism and human rights are epochal challenges now and they challenge established modes of discourse and practice including our conceptions of the normative. Both of these face challenges of multi-dimensional transformations in self and society. A key challenge here is to broaden our conceptions and realizations of law and rights to pluralize the originary metanarratives of human rights, as Upendra Baxi would challenge us. But as we pluralize our conceptions of laws and rights, there is a transformational challenge to pluralize our pluralist imagination itself as our established conceptions of pluralism are state-centred and suffer from the problem of Western, and now Euro-American, ethnocentrism. Now discourses of muticulturalism and toleration are being globalized but the globalization of these benevolent ideals

reflect both the limits and possibilities of their genealogies and locations of performances, for example the contemporary Euro-American world. The discourse and practice of pluralism here has followed a stable trajectory and toleration here carries the originary violence of killing the native Americans or colonizing the world and then tolerating the other. Even the Habermasian discourse of inclusion of the other does not interrogate this originary violence and does not go beyond a dualistic model of self and other which is at the root of contemporary notions of rights and pluralism (cf. Habermas 1998). It is against this background that the present paper seeks to explore the pathways of a non-dual pluralism and mode of embodiment of responsibility.

Pluralizing the established pluralist imagination which is based upon a stable conception of self (which is in turn predicated upon a dualist division between the private and the public), stable model of expected inter-group relations under the benevolent and panoptic gaze of the state, and a notion of public sphere which is one-dimensional, calls for a multi-dimensional vision and practice of state, inter-group relations, public sphere, intersubjectivity, and much more significant, a plural or multi-dimensional conception of self what William Connolly calls 'plurivocity of being' (Connolly 1999). Thus we need now a radically pluralized multi-dimensional public sphere beyond the rationalist Habermasian one-dimensional one, and a multi-dimensional 'plurivocity of being'. In my paper, I present an outline of such a new pluralist imagination in both self and society. But my plurivocity of being differs from William Connolly's Nietzschian conceptualization as it is conceptualized not only in terms of the infra-rational but also by the work of what Sri Aurobindo (1962) calls supramental, the work of a transcendental self which while using reason puts reason in its place. Self has also a transcendental dimension apart from its location in ego, social roles and other sources of identity and it is possible to see a connection between transcendental dimension of self and many transnational social movements which urge us to embody a new mode of responsibility to self, society, world and cosmos. A plural conception of being is crucial for rethinking rights and laws as it urges us to realize that the self is not only a bearer of rights and the subject of justice but also a practitioner of responsibility.

TOWARDS A NEW NORMATIVE PLURALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF RETHINKING AND RECONSTITUTION

In recent political theory William Connolly has presented us pathways of multidimensionally creative pluralism. Connolly urges us to understand the limits of conventional pluralism: 'A conventional pluralist celebrates diversity within settled contexts of conflict and collective action [...] But what about the larger contexts within which the pattern of diversity is set? How plural or monistic are they? To what extent does a cultural presumption of normal individual or the pre-existing subject precede and confine conventional pluralism? (Connolly 1995: xiii). Speaking of his own home experience which should inspire all of us concerned to engage ourselves in a self-critical reflection Connolly tells us: 'The American pluralist imagination, in particular, remains too stingy, cramped, and defensive for the world now we inhabit. These stingy dispositions sustain operational standards of identity, nature, reason, territory, sovereignty and justice that need to be reworked' (ibid.: xii–xiii). For Connolly, in rethinking pluralism it is important to pluralize our accepted frames of identity: nation-state, ethnic identity, a normal model of heterosexuality, or a stable self. Connolly also urges us to understand the distinction between pluralism and pluralization and the work of critical social, political and cultural movements in pluralization as a continued process of broadening the accepted horizons of plurality. There is the need to 'translate the pluralist appreciation of established diversity into active cultivation of generosity to contemporary movements of pluralization' (ibid.: xv). On the part of actors in state and civil society, it is essential to develop 'an ethos of critical responsiveness' to such movements 'seeking to redefine their relational identities' (ibid.: xix).

Rethinking pluralism then calls for cultivating an ethos of pluralization which in turn calls for plural conception of individual: A normal individual is not only a Kantian and Habermasian rational self, there is also a Nietzschian rebellion against reason which pluralist imagination must be open to. Connolly calls this 'plurivocity of being'. Though Connolly's 'plurivocity of being' does not include within itself a suprarational critique of reason as suggested by Aurobindo, his conception of

'plurivocity of being' still has rich possibilities. By talking of plurivocity of being Connolly wants to bring the issue of ontological nurturance to the practice and perspective of normative pluralism. Thus Connolly calls for cultivating an ethos of pluralization which 'pursues an ethic of cultivation rather than a morality of contract or command; it judges the ethos it cultivates to exceed any fixed code of morality; and it cultivates critical responsiveness to difference in ways that disturb traditional virtues of community and the normal individual' (ibid.: xxiv). The practice of cultivating an ethos of pluralization in Connolly reaches a new height and depth when Connolly urges us to cultivate a spirit of gratitude which need not be theistic but it should not be anxiously opposed to religion or any theistic cultivation of life: '[A] nontheistic gratitude for the rich diversity of being provides an ethical source from which a modified vision of pluralism might emerge, one in which larger variety of identities strive to find ways to coexist on the same territory, combining together from time to time to support the general material and spiritual conditions of this very cultural diversity' (ibid.: 32).

Thus realization of pluralism calls for crossing over many traditional boundaries in modernist thought and practice. In his most recent work, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* Connolly (2002) urges us to understand the connection between mystical states and deep pluralism. Mysticism is an experience of crossing conventional boundaries of mind and identity and finds 'expression as a radiant feeling of joy and generosity' (Connolly 2002: 126). Connolly sends us his invitation: 'We are, so it seems, to honour our existential faith in the first instance, according to whatever work it takes to do so, and there to cultivate self-modesty about its applicability to others in order to promote deep pluralism. We are, that is, not only to be born again, but also grow up a second time. The latter we do by working on ourselves—within those very religious and secular constitutions through which the first faith was consolidated—to activate the visceral appreciation of the contestability of that faith and to cultivate a presumption of receptive generosity of other faiths' (ibid.: 127–8). But Connolly makes clear that such a multi-dimensional cultivation of pluralism is not an abdication of critical political action: 'A public ethos of deep pluralism does not

eliminate politics from life or sink into a tub of beautiful souls. It is itself an effect of micro- and macro-politics. It forms the lifeblood of democratic politics by folding creativity and generosity into intracultural negotiations over issues insusceptible to settlement through pre-existing procedure, principle, or interest aggregation alone. On this reading, arts of the self, micropolitics, private and public deliberation, a generous ethos of engagement, and macropolitical action are interconnected, even though valuable dissonances and disturbances well up between them' (ibid.: 137). What Connolly (1995: xxi) writes below provides us pathways of a multidimensional pluralism:

> A pluralizing culture embodies a *micropolitics* of action by the self on itself and the small-scale assemblage upon itself, a *politics of disturbance* through which sedimented identities and moralities are rendered more alert to the deleterious effects of their naturalization upon difference, *a politics of enactment* through which new possibilities of being are propelled into established constellations, *a politics of representational assemblages* through which general policies are processed through the state, a *politics of interstate relations*, and a *politics of nonstatist, cross-national movements* through which external/internal pressure is placed on corporate and state-centred priorities.

Connolly's outline of a new vision of normative pluralism has inspiring pedigrees both in the Western as well as non-Western imaginations and social experiments. In the Western tradition we are reminded of the pathway of 'cooperative pluralism' that Herder had charted, and the vision of a non-assimilationist and non-dual pluralism that Uberoi outlines building upon both Gandhi and the hermetic tradition of Europe (cf. Dallmayr 1998, Uberoi 2002). For Herder, cultural and historical diversity do not entirely cancel a certain commonality, a link fashioned by universal human sympathy (Dallmayr 1998: 34). Herder's project of cooperative pluralism was accompanied by a trenchant critique of state and militarism. Herder's project of cooperative pluralism finds a creative resonance in Uberoi's project of non-dual pluralism who, building on both Gandhi and Goethe writes in his *European Modernity: Truth, Science and Method.*: '[...] under a regime of pluralist non-dualism, all

human differences and partitions are negotiable in civil society as a "community of sovereignties" because no one reality or truth falsifies another. [...] In effect our common humanity thereby returns to the perennial fashion of the Hermetic tradition of Europe, and produces neither simple homogeneity (equality) nor heterogeneity (inequality) but a new non-dualist axis of correlation and mediation, correspondence and complementarity' (Uberoi 2002: 130).

Many other thinkers in the recent times have also elaborated concretely the economic and political implications of rethinking pluralism. In her work, *Mayan Visions: The Quest for Autonomy in an Age of Globalization*, anthropologist June Nash (2001) shows how realization of pluralism in the face of a monological corporate globalization calls for sustaining and developing plural bases of production and cultural reproduction. Speaking of the Zapatista revolution in Mexico to reclaim their land and to have autonomous development, Nash urges us to realize that the Zapatistas are 'hatching the foundation for a pluricultural coexistence based on their existence as distinct indigenous entities within regions characterized by a multiplicity of languages and customs' (Nash 2001: 244). The Zapatistas urge us to take note of the pluricultural premises of economy, governance and the 'global significance of autonomy in the constitution of a pluricultural state' (ibid.).

To this pluralized vision of economy and governance, Will Kymlicka and his followers in the evolving global discourse of multiculturalism add the issue of a multicultural plural political organization. For Kymlicka (1995), 'Many liberals hoped that the new emphasis on "human rights" would resolve minority conflicts' (Kymlicka 1995: 2). 'However, it has become increasingly clear that minority rights cannot be subsumed under the category of human rights. Traditional human rights standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to cultural minorities: which languages should be recognized in Parliaments, bureaucrats and courts' (ibid.: 4). But Kymlicka himself writes: '[...] though it is important to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights but minority rights need to coexist with human rights [and] limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice' (ibid.: 6).

Gurpreet Mahajan, an Indian political theorist, also presents us some new challenges in thinking about pluralism. She urges us to understand the core significance of non-discrimination in democracy and how pursuit of pluralism and cultural diversity ought to be accompanied by commitment to a principle of non-discrimination. Mahajan writes: '[...] in a multi-cultural democratic polity, the pursuit of cultural diversity needs to be mediated through the concern of non-discrimination vis-à-vis assimilation, likewise the principle of non-discrimination needs to be given priority vis-à-vis the unconditional pursuit of cultural diversity' (Mahajan 2002: 215). For her 'special rights [for minorities] have to be structured in a way that takes cognizance of [...] the undetermined nature of cultures' (p. 215). She urges us to go beyond the state-centric view of pluralism and statist guarantee of special community rights in the name of pluralism. Furthermore community rights and individual rights need not be seen in opposition:

> Against the backdrop of a homogenizing nation-state that almost always embodies the culture of the majority, cultural community rights and individual rights have been transformed into binary opposites. It is assumed that discrimination of minorities can also be overcome by granting special community rights. It appears that individual rights have little or no role to play in this. [But] the two are not mutually exclusive. While special rights given to cultural communities can help to correct the majoritarian biases of the nation-state and enable minorities to retain their identity, individual rights are essential, and indispensable, for protecting minorities from discrimination by the actions of other groups in society (ibid.: 204).

Both Kymlicka and Mahajan call for the need to combine individual rights and community rights but they need to touch upon the obligations that individuals and communities have to learn from each other, enter inside each other and tolerate each other at a deeper level of self and only as a politically mandated thing. In this context, Michael Walzer brings the issue of individual responsibility in an interesting manner. He writes: 'As an American Jew, I grew up thinking of myself as an object of toleration. It was only much later that I recognized myself as a subject too, an agent called upon to tolerate others, including fellow

Jews whose idea of what Jewishness meant differed radically from my own' (Walzer 1997: xi).

RETHINKING RIGHTS AS A VERB: BEYOND UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM AND A NON-DUAL EMBODIMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

Walzer's discussion of responsibility and obligation in practices of toleration bring us face to face with a foundational problem; that is how dominant conception pluralism is based upon a rights-based approach and though thinkers such as Connolly urge us to overcome its legalistic binding by cultivating an ethos of pluralization, there is still the stupendous task of overcoming the pervasive influence and valorization of rights-discourse. This discourse lacks a perspective and practice of responsibility. The rights discourse had emerged in the midst of modernist Revolutions and now it needs to be radically supplemented, not replaced, by a radical practice and perspective of responsibility especially as rights-based approaches are inadequate to come to terms with challenges such as environmental disasters and human responsibility to nature (Strydom 2000).

When once asked about the issue of rights, Gandhi had said: 'I do not now what rights means I only know duties.' Though the discourse of duty and obligation has been used by hierarchical systems of caste, colonialism and gender to deny rights of individuals, going to the other extreme of only rights is fraught with dangers. Moreover different cultures have different conceptions of relationship between rights and duties that a discourse of normative pluralism and human rights need to open itself to. African philosopher Kwasi Wiredu helps us understand this: 'On the face of it, the normative layer in the Akan [an African tribe] concept of person brings only obligation to the individual. In fact, however, these obligations are matched by a whole series of rights that accrue to the individual simply because s/he lives in a society in which every one has these obligations' (Wiredu 1996: 160). From this Wiredu goes on to elaborate the rights that are respected in the Akan land in Nigeria: (a) the right to trial, (b) the right to land, and (c) religious freedom. On the first issue of right to trial Wiredu tells us: '[...] it was an absolute principle of Akan justice that

no human being could be punished without trial' (ibid.: 164). On the right to land, Wiredu tells us: 'Any human being was held, by virtue of his blood principle (*mogya*), to be entitled to some land. For the duration of his life any Akan had the right to the use of a piece of lineage land. However land was supposed to belong to the whole lineage, conceived as including the ancestors, the living members and those yet to be born' (ibid.: 165).

Wiredu writes: '[...] so long as a custom has a rationale, it has at least, a qualified universality via its transcultural universality' (ibid.: 32). While rights such as rights to land, free trial and religious freedom embody universalizing human rights in Akan culture, certain aspects of Akan culture do not embody this. One of this relates to the traditional belief and custom that a person should be killed to accompany the dead chief in his journey to the other world. Here Wiredu urges his fellow Akans and us to apply an internal critical perspective of sympathetic universality in valuing such customs: 'Equal respect is a requirement of sympathetic impartiality. Now the fact is that, inspite of the profound respect that the Akans had for their chiefs, few cherished the notion of being killed in order to have the honour of serving their chiefs on their last journey. Accordingly sympathetic impartiality should have destroyed that custom before birth. In general, no rights can jutifiably be superseded in a manner oblivious to the principle of sympathetic impartiality' (ibid.: 170).

For Wiredu, 'A successful exercise in conceptual decolonization will usually be an unmasking of a spurious universal' (p. 5). Shiv Visvanathan also urges us to go beyond the spurious divide between the West and non-West, universal and particular in thinking about rights. Visvanathan writes: '[...] the question is not whether rights is universal but whether the notion of rights is inventive enough to be life-giving. Also, does the framework of rights, to use a Heideggerian term, provide a proper sense of *dwelling* to these societies' (Visvanathan 1996: 113). Visvanathan further challenges us to realize: 'Saying rights is only a Western invention creates a stereotypical view of rights. It misses the creative acts of translation that the rights language is creating. [...] When Castro says that the whole world has a right to Cuban research on sugar, he is challenging the dominant ideology of the rights, creating a dialogue of rights reminding the West of worlds it has forgotten [...]' (ibid.: 117). For Visvanathan, 'The notion of rights is only a thin layer, a metacarp, protecting the isolated I in the world of the nation-state. But what has been destroyed in a deep way is the commons of nature and communities between state and citizen' (ibid.: 125). He further argues: 'A right is not a linear index. It is also what Mary Daly calls a knot, a myriad set of connections, a labyrinth, a maze. What Gandhi said of *khadi* should be equally true of rights. Khadi, he claimed, is not about cloth but about love, freedom and self-reliance' (ibid.: 141).

Visvanathan quotes Wayn Booth who tells us in her Oxford Amnesty Lectures: human rights is 'an affirmation of the mystery, the inexhaustibility of personhood' (p. 143). For Visvanathan, 'we need to recover the "I" as a bundle of possibilities that the Enlightenment has suppressed so unhistorically [...]' (ibid.: 142). The 'I' in this Enlightenment discourse has been imprisoned within an ideology of possessive individualism and blindness of anthropocentrism and now both the 'I' and the notion of being human have to be broadened, thinking of them as verbs rather than a noun, or a possessive pronoun. The challenge here is to rethink human rights as a verb and for this we need to 'provincialize Europe' (cf. Chakraborty 2001) realizing that its construction of human rights is only one path, and undertake a cross-civilizational journey in other to realize that human rights as a verb is intimately connected with the practice and perspective of commons and is intimately tied to the calling of responsibility. The challenge for us is to realize that a theory or rights without an ethics of caring would be fatal.

FURTHER CHALLENGES: THE CALLING OF NON-DUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION

Creative pioneers of a new normative pluralism such as Connolly plead for a pluralization of self and society. But having a pluralized conception of self and society is only a first step and it is crucial to interpenetrate this pluralized plurivocity with a vision and practice of responsibility because it is responsibility which enables us to have a proper relationship of what I would like to call autonomy and interpenetration

between different domains, dimensions, levels and realities conceptualized aprioristically as dualistic. For many, invocation of pluralism spells dangers for realization of rights as in the name of pluralism we can easily justify violations of rights and human dignity. This concern is not unfounded as many dictators around the world have used a version of pluralism and relativism to justify their suppression of rights. In this context, a key challenge is to have a logic of pluralism which is beyond the established binary logic of universalism and particularism. We need a multi-valued logic in thinking about and realizing creatively the relationship between the 'universal' and 'particular' (Mohanty 2000a). As against anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz (1983) who talk about 'local knowledge' we have to realize that the basic problem is that the universal and particular are conceptualized in a closed manner and now we should think about the particular and the universal in an emergent and open-ended manner. What we conceptualize as local and particular has already within itself an opening for the universal—there is an emergent dimension within it. We need to develop a notion of emergent universalism and emergent particularism to help us go beyond the violence emanating from an imperialistic universalism and an annihilating particularism.

Going behind violence and realizing non-violence in discourse and practice is an important normative challenge here; in fact, we can rethink the very notion of the normative from an ideal and seeking of non-violence. Mohanty (2000b) makes this connection between non-violence in philosophical discourse, modes of reasoning and modes of action. Non-violence is a key theme in the strivings of Gandhi and it is my submission that normative pluralism and human rights now need to be broadened and deepened by a new notion of the normative emanating from our ideals and practices of non-violent imaginations and social struggles. But the normative ideal of non-violence is also dear to critical philosophers in the contemporary West such as Vattimo (1999), Ricouer (2000) and Habermas. Consider here the following lines of Habermas: 'Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical course of history the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently closes off the path to unconstrained communication does it further the process whose suspension it otherwise

legitimates: mankind's evolution toward autonomy and responsibility' (Habermas 1971: 315). Norberto Bobbio urges us to see this violence in both war and poverty and while rethinking pluralism and rights we could provisionally conclude with his passionate calling for development of human civilization:

> The implementation of a better system for protecting human rights is linked to the global development of human civilization. If the problem is taken in isolation, then there is a risk not only that it will not be resolved, but that its true significance will not even be understood. One cannot abstract the problem of human rights from the great problems of our time, which are war and poverty, the abstract contrast between the excess of *power* which created the conditions for a genocidal war and the excess of *impotence* which has condemned the great majority of humanity to hunger. This is the only context in which we can approach the problems of human rights realistically. We must not be so pessimistic that we give up in despair, but neither must we so optimistic that we become over-confident (Babbio 1999: 30).

[This is a revised version of a paper first presented as 'Normative Pluralism and Rights and Law: The Challenge of Transformations and a Non-Dual Embodiment of Responsibility' in the International Seminar on 'Normative Pluralism and Human Rights', University of Florence, December 6, 2002. I thank Professor Danilo Zolo for his invitation and Filippo Ruschi, Helena Tagesson and other participants of the seminar for their comments and suggestions. This has also been subsequently presented at Seoul National University, and I thank Professor San Jen Han of Seoul National University and MS Park of Korea Foundation for their comments and hospitality.]

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Exceptive Moral Laws

Kant considers moral laws as universal. There has been the criticism that there are exceptions to these laws. Here I would like to talk of exceptive moral laws. I would define them as those which have the exceptions to them included in their very formulation: as 'One may do "a", except under "c" ', where 'c' signifies all those conditions under which not doing 'a' is morally in order. I find there to be two kinds of those conditions: those under which not doing 'a' is morally justifiable; and those under which not doing 'a' is morally excusable. We have the former when, in a situation of conflict, a moral law is superseded by a higher moral law, one with a greater obligatory force: as in not speaking the truth in order to save the life of an innocent person. We also have the former, when again in a situation of conflict, any one of the two alternatives is superseded by the other with the same status, or the same obligatory force: as in not protecting the life of any one of the two innocent persons but that of the other, all other things being the same. We have the latter, when one is not able to follow a moral law, because one does not have those exceptional qualities; qualities which people do not normally have even with a great deal of effort, which are required in following it: as in a person's not being able to keep a secret with which he has been entrusted, when his dear ones are being tortured or even threatened with death in front of him, in order to extract that secret from him.

On the assumption that there are moral laws and they have different obligatory force, the notion of not doing 'a' as being morally justifiable, the notion of morally justifiable exceptions, should raise no difficulty. For it is evidently morally right that, in a situation of conflict, the lower moral law is abandoned and the higher one adopted, or any one of the two equally obligatory courses of action is abandoned and the other adopted (rather than abandoning both). My adoption of the notion of not doing 'a' as being morally excusable, the notion of morally excusable exceptions, is a concession, a moral concession, to human limitations, to *some* of the human limitations. I do not wish to say that it is morally right that one should not do 'a' confronted with those limitations. What I wish to say is that it is morally understandable; it

is to make allowance for human incapacity in the face of those limitations. A person who is able to transcend these limitations is a person of heroic proportion, a moral hero. One may define a moral hero as a person who can follow a moral law in the face of those limitations.

Without withdrawing anything from what I have said in the preceding paragraph, I may amend my account of a morally excusable exception. We may say that our deviation from a moral law is morally excusable, if we do not have those exceptional qualities which are required in not deviating from it, *provided that our deviation does not have the consequence that we bring into existence what is wrong*. I come to this amendment as a result of the following two examples: (1) parents do one thing or another in order to save their child from being punished for the crime which he has committed; and (2) parents, again, do one thing or another in order to fulfil their desire for the well-being of their child, even if it means their being unfair. I find that the parent's deviation from the moral law of justice in these two cases is not morally excusable. For, although the qualities which they need in order not to deviate from this law are of exceptional nature, their deviating from it has the consequence of their letting a criminal go scot-free or an undeserving person benefit. This latter factor more than nullifies the consideration resulting from their not possessing those qualities.

If moral laws are universal, then exceptive moral laws are no less so. What we would say in their case is this: once all the exceptions to the moral laws which are morally in order have been included in the very formulation of these laws, then there are no (further) exceptions to them. This is as it would be in the case of non-exceptive moral laws, should there be such. In the case of all moral laws, exceptive or non-exceptive, given that they are universal, we would say that there are no exceptions to them. In connection with the point which I have made here, it would be illuminating to mention a certain controversy between Paton and Moore. In his article, 'The Alleged Independence of Good', which he contributed to the volume on *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore* (the Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IV, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, Northwestern University, 1912), Paton contends that the (moral) goodness of some of the actions is dependent upon circumstances. He gives the example of Sir Philip Sidney, who in dying resigned to a

wounded soldier the cup of water which had been offered him. And he concludes from this that Sir Philip's action was good under those circumstances, while it would not be good (or as good) if he had been well (p. 126). Moore's reply to this objection is this: it is not the case that the action 'a' is good under circumstances 'x', and the same action 'a' is bad under circumstances 'x_1'. In reality, there are at present two different actions, the whole of 'the action a under x', and the whole of 'the action a under x_1', where x and x_1 do not signify two different sets of circumstances under which one and the same action 'a' occurs, but essential qualities of two different actions. And what is good is 'the whole of the action a under x' (not the action 'a' under 'x'), and what is not good (or not as good) is the whole of 'the action a under x_1' (not the action 'a' under 'x_1') (pp. 618–20). In connection with my above-mentioned point, one may also quote the following from Hare: 'The fact that exceptions are made to them (our principles) is a sign, not of any essential looseness, but of our desire to make them as rigorous as we can. For what we are doing in allowing cases of exceptions is to make the principle not looser, but more rigorous. Suppose we start with a principle never to say what is false, but regard this principle as provisional, and recognize that there may be exceptions. Suppose, then, that we decide to make an exception in the case of lies told in war-time to deceive the enemy. The rule has now become "never say what is false, except in war-time to deceive the enemy." This principle, once the exception has been made explicit, and included in the wording of the principle, is not looser than it was before, but tighter. In one large class of cases, where previously the possibility of exceptions was left open and we had to decide for ourselves, the position is now regulated; the principle lays down that in these circumstances we may say what is false.' (Words within brackets in this quotation are our own.) (*The Language of Morals*, Oxford University Press, 1952, 3.6, pp. 52–3).

There may be a moral law about never telling a lie. Then we may be confronted with a situation in which we are called upon to protect the life of an innocent person, which we find we can do only by telling a lie. Here we have an exception, a morally justifiable exception, to the given moral law. Again, there may be a moral law about not betraying somebody's confidence. Then, once more, we may be confronted with

a situation in which our dear ones are being tortured and even threatened with death in front of us in order to make us betray that confidence. Here, yet once more, we have an exception, a morally excusable exception, to the given moral law. Now, on the basis of what I have said above, it will not be wrong to maintain that we do not discover moral exceptions to moral laws along with these laws themselves. If that were so, these laws would already be exceptive moral laws. On the other hand, we discover them subsequently as we are confronted with new situations. There is one more thing which I would like to say here. It is this. We may always be confronted with a new situation in the course of our life. As a result, there is always the possibility of our discovering new moral exceptions to the given moral laws. This would make morality an open-ended affair, like, I suppose, any other system of knowledge.

In the remaining part of this paper, I would like to ask the question: are there non-exceptive moral laws, i.e. those of which we could say that there are no exceptions which would need to be included in their very formulation? Let me mention here some which have seemed to me to be so; and, of course, there could be others. These are: 'A person who has been asked to adjudicate should do so impartially'; 'One should not take advantage of somebody's helpless position'; 'One should not make use of ones superior position, say, physical or social or economic, to take advantage of somebody, or to humiliate him, or to destroy him, or something else of that sort'; and 'One should treat all living beings, *qua* living beings, as equal.' (Non-vegetarianism is a violation of this law. Mercy-killing in the case of animals, but not in that of human beings, is also a violation of this law.)

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Agenda for Research

1. Indian thinking about art has generally not found any place in what is usually designated as Indian Philosophy. Even the thinking of the Neo-Naiyāyikas in the alaṁkāra śāstra has remained confined to the students of alaṁkāra śāstra only. The same has been true of the long reflection on the subject of such outstanding thinkers as Abhinavagupta, Rājaśekhara and others. The same seems to be the case with the concepts relating to painting, music, dance or architecture or the conceptual structures built to understand them, or the epistemological and ontological problems they have given rise to. It is time that Indian philosophical thinking breaks this isolation and deals with the concerned philosophical issues in a manner that brings into one focus all these strands together so that each may gain and benefit from the other. The concept of *āhārya jñāna* tries to do something of this sort, but it remains undeveloped and may perhaps provide a clue to the understanding not just of what man creates but also of human reality which is shaped and constituted by what it imagines and, through 'imagining', brings it into being.

Jaipur

Daya Krishna

2. Sāṁkhya sets before itself certain and final (aikāntika and ātyantika) cessation of threefold suffering (duḥkhatraya) as its goal, and points out that the discriminative knowledge of the Prakṛti, its evolutes and Puruṣa (vyaktāvyaktajña vijñāna) alone can lead to such certain and final cessation of suffering, a state of *kaivalya* in Sāṁkhya. A simple question that comes to the mind here is, even after discriminative knowledge is obtained, what would guarantee the finality of release? Surely, the same Puruṣa could once again be entangled by Prakṛti! If enjoyment and release (bhoga and apavarga) of Puruṣa is the goal of Prakṛti's evolution, does the bhoga of a certain order exhaust all possible types of bhoga on the part of Puruṣa? We know from our experience that bhoga is inexhaustible, endless and of infinite variety. What

makes Sāṁkhya so sure that Prakṛti would have accomplished its purpose once for all even in case of a single Puruṣa? What would ensure that understanding, once obtained, will never be sullied again? Is it logically impossible?

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Focus

A recent survey of the concept of mass in physics and philosophy published from the Princeton University Press in the year 2000 should be of interest to all students in general and those interested in the Philosophy of Science in particular. (Max Jammer, *Concept of Mass in Contemporary Physics and Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, University of Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000).

The concept of mass is central to the very definition of what we consider as 'matter' and hence has been a foundation of what is considered as 'material reality' by common sense and philosophers alike. The foundational character of the concept, however, was questioned when Einstein established its complete translatability without a residuum in terms of energy. Is the world, then, to be conceived of in terms of 'matter' or 'energy' becomes the central question as its conception in these two frameworks leads to different pictures of the universe.

The work traces the history of thought and experimentation regarding this basic concept during the last fifty years of the twentieth century in particular and since the beginning of the century in general.

Surprisingly, the work also documents the 'questioning' regarding Einstein's famous equation concerning the equivalence of mass and energy propounded in his 1905 paper and the debate that has continued around it till almost very recent times.

Where has matter disappeared; for, as modern physics contends, there are only four fundamental 'forces' in the universe; the 'gravitation', the 'electro-magnetic', the 'weak interaction' and the 'strong interaction'? This is the question left by this masterly survey which at the end even seems to suggest that perhaps the concept itself may be dispensed with, at least as far as physics is concerned. The work has been written by Max Jammer and is based not only on almost all the articles/papers dealing with the controversies around the subject, but also on Einstein's complete works including his correspondence published

recently by the Princeton University Press which brings out Einstein's own changing views on the subject about it.

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Notes and Queries

1. Reply to the Query about abhāva published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 2.

1. No *sāmānya* or universal of absence (abhāva) is accepted in Nyāya; every absence is specific to what is absent by *akhaṇḍopādhi*, by specific distinction. Thus absence of horse is different from absence of cow. Nyāya does not recognize a general absence without a specification of what is absent.
2. *Atyantābhāva* in Nyāya has nothing to do with a universal as *sāmānya*. It had two phases in Nyāya. At first there was a distinction between *sāmayikābhāva* (temporary absence) and *atyantābhāva* (constant absence). The example of the first would be absence of a book from the shelf, of the second would be absence of cold in fire. In later Nyāya both were put under *atyantābhāva* with the tag 'constant' (*nitya*), which ought to be added only to the second type above. To many the title *atyantābhāva* for temporary absence might appear a misnomer.
3. *Anupalabdhi* is the subjective aspect of non-perception of the absent object, *abhāva* is the objective aspect of perception of the absence of the object, in the locus.
4. Absence before creation is easily known when we see the creation of some thing like a pot by the potter, absence after destruction is seen in the broken parts or disappearance. The two cannot be identified because that would lead to rehabilitation of the destroyed object from the beginningless past, by double negation.
5. *Anyonyābhāva* is just difference, and can be perceived. The eye, for instance, can come in contact with two different objects like a horse and a cow. One might attend to them severally.
6. *Indriyārtha sannikarṣa* is not with the absent object, but with the locus qualified by the absence of the object. Thus an empty cash-box would be seen as qualified by cashlessness.

Some of the difficulties in Nyāya theory of absence as a category (*padārtha*) arise because they do not emphasize the importance of

expectation in perception of *atyantābhāva*, specially of the temporary type. No one perceives the absence of the moon in an empty cashbox because no one expects the heavenly luminary there. Also the definition given for *anyonyābhāva* is meant for different species, but would actually extend to different members of the same species also.

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2. 'What is the difference, if any, between abhāva and anupalabdhi? Reply to query published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 2

Abhāva and Anupalabdhi get significance primarily in the premises of epistemology relating with Pūrva mīmāṁsā and so also with Advaita Vedānta in the realm of Indian philosophy. There is indeed difference in the implications of these two terms. A keen observation into the analytical outlook of both Mīmāṁsās (Pūrva and Uttara) reveals their epistemological uniqueness and clarity in interpretation of the process of cognition so that one can discriminate true knowledge from the false ones.

Knowledge in its empirical realm represents the particular modes of mind—stuff that is constantly subject to change. Among those modes, similar ones are classified into respective divisions in the epistemological interpretations of philosophy. Hence, separate types of knowledge have to originate from distinct means of knowledge. According to the observations in Pūrvamīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, the process of knowledge is to be analyzed quite in consonance with human experience. Human beings experience the knowledge of existence and non-existence of objects in the empirical world. The senses along with the mind lead one to the knowledge of objects existent in nature at a limited particular time and space. Generally philosophers consider this process alone to theoretize the means of knowledge. But apart from this, one has to recognize the experience of non-existence of objects enquired by one within the limitations of particular space and time even without sense-activity. Mind also fails to find out the enquired

particular thing and thereby one cognizes the non-existence of that thing. Thus affirmative as well as negative types of knowledge have prominent place in human life. These two contradictory types of cognition cannot be originated by similar means of knowledge. In this way, analyzing human experience of knowledge in a reasonable way, Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta dared to put forth a unique means of knowledge named anupalabdhi. The essence of the knowledge arising from this means of knowledge is negation that brings a uniform kind of voidness in the human mind, though related with various objects and affairs. Therefore this means of knowledge is not divided into many subdivisions as is done in the case of other affirmation—sensing means of knowledge.

As the terms indicate, 'Abhāva' and 'Anupalabdhi' have different meanings and implications. Upalabdhi refers to human cognition and hence anupalabdhi refers to the absence of it. As a means of valid knowledge, this is defined in Vedāntaparibhāṣā as follows:

'ज्ञानकरणाजन्याभावानुभवासाधारणकारणमनुपलब्धिरूपं प्रमाणम् ।'

Here itself, it is evident that the means of knowledge is named Anupalabdhi whereas the knowledge arising from this means refers to 'abhāva'. Abhāva is absolute non-existence which embraces the whole universe. Everywhere one can experience the non-existence (abhāva) of things which are absent there. When it is mentioned particularly and brought to a peculiar occasion, it reforms itself into a valid knowledge originated from a valid means. Here the relevance of Anupalabdhi can be disclosed. All other means of valid knowledge bring the cognition of existing objects whereas Anupalabdhi alone is competent to make man conscious of the non-existence of familiar objects in particular space and time.

Advaita Vedānta, though it advocates the non-dual Brahman as the sole reality and considers the whole universe as false, it does not hesitate to admit the fact that Brahman is to be realized while living in this world itself. Therefore, up to the attainment of true knowledge, one should consider the world and the objects in it as real and valid. In such a context, one should examine and analyze ones own experience not in a superficial manner, but with deep concentration and justice.

This is the inspiring factor of this system behind the analysis of various types of knowledge and their means with considering their underlying distinctions. This is why Advaitins refute the view of Naiyāyikas that negative invariable committance leads to negative inference. Negative knowledge arising out of inference cannot be justified, for, anumāna occurs first in the mind which brings cognition in a positive manner. Common man's experience of knowledge also puts forth the fact that the mind brings the knowledge of existing objects and affairs previously experienced in an existent form. Possessing this nature of analyzing facts in their utmost depth, Advaita Vedānta rejected the Buddhist view of non-recognition of savikalpaka pratyakṣa. In this way, if one penetrates into the nature and purpose of pramāṇas, it can very well be asserted that there should be the recognition of six pramāṇas which can engage in the production of different kinds of knowledge. Moreover, such an interpretation, being reasonable and all-embracing could not affect the true principle of Advaita Vedānta because according to this system, the universe where these means of knowledge are valid is merely relatively real. The relatively real is incapable of nullification of the Absolutely real principle. Therefore there need not be hesitation in admitting all those propositions that can work as the means of valid knowledge. It will not undervalue any philosophical system. On the other hand, this true and honest interpretation hails the value, relevance and public consent of the system. Advaita Vedānta is undoubtedly successful in this regard which presents and analyzes empirical affairs in a true and just way. Hence they consider Anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa for acquiring the cognition of the non-existence of particular objects and affairs in the world. In this way, 'व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः' is not a blind following of the facts and doctrines proposed by Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsakas. But with due reflection and observation, Advaita recognizes almost all empirical theories put forth by Bhāṭṭas.

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3. A reply to the queries of Jagat Pal published in *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, July–September 2000.

The question 'what does the word "*Brahman*" signify?' is similar to the question relating to the signification of words on which there are a number of theories discussed in Indian and western philosophical systems. A word signifies individual for some, universal for some others and an aggregate of the individual and universal for still others.

The word '*Brahman*', like other words, signifies universal, the meaning of the word. An individual, according to *Śāṅkara Vedānta*, is known consequently by association of the universals known by the words first. The problem arises only when we take that words have the sole function of referring. What does the word '*Brahman*' refer to? *Brahman*, in the philosophy of *Śaṅkara* is an ontological reality. Ontological beings are generally taken either as universal or as individual. They are objects of knowledge and are referred to by language.

Is *Brahman* universal or individual? It, in the philosophy of *Śaṅkara*, is not an object—neither external nor internal, neither objective nor subjective, neither individual nor universal. It is knowledge itself. He makes a difference between the objects of knowledge, the knowledge of the object and the knowledge itself. Knowledge is knowledge of an object but itself, being foundational to all sorts of knowledge acquired through the processes of knowing, is not an object in the knowledge. Knowledge itself may be the *svarūpa* of Brahman but it may be characterized only by proxy as existence, consciousness and bliss. Any description of it through experiences in waking, dreaming and sleeping, allegories, myths, analogies and other experiential and linguistic categories are description by proxy as it transcends all categories of knowledge by means.

The word '*Brahman*' signifies an ontological being of a knower (*Vijñātā*, *Jñātā*, or *draṣṭā*) because a knower is always relational to the knowledge and to what it knows. *Śaṅkara's Brahman* is beyond these categories. It is not right to understand the self in the manner we understand the external objects. Similarly, it is not proper to understand the spirit-itself in the manner we understand the self as it, unlike

the external objects and the internal self, is never an object. It is the awareness of the awarenesses of them (*jñāna*, *dṛṣṭi*).

The question of meaning of a word, say *Brahman*, is legitimate as it is a cognitive problem par excellence. The knowledge itself is not only trans-experience but also excelling all the categories of objects and it is, perhaps, the meaning for denoting which the word '*Brahman*' is used in the metaphysical scheme of *Śaṅkara*. As the meaning of a word, in *Śāṅkara Vedānta*, is indivisible, the exercise of interpreting the indivisible, by analysis and interpretation, for the understanding of ignorant, is philosophically legitimate.

The case of identification of *Brahman*, as an ontological being, does not arise, as it is not an object, neither individual nor universal. It is not referred to directly by words but, indirectly all words referred to it. However, it cannot be denied, as self-veridical illuminating principle or witness of the identification cases also. Not only that but the meaning of the word '*Brahman*', as it is revealed in the mind by the word '*Brahman*', is well identified on account of which we know it different from the meaning conveyed by other words.

(b) A transcendental-signified cannot significantly be referred to, as the referring function of a word is dependent on external or internal things and their empirical experiences. If we do not accept that the function of language is confined only to referring and if expressiveness of it is also taken for granted, we can safely accept that the language expresses the meaning non-differently. As the meaning is universal, in his philosophy, it, for the understanding of ignorant, is made understandable through piece-meal scheme.

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4. Query by Professor Daya Krishna: 'Has there been a tradition of philosophizing initiated by Vākyapadīya or it has been an isolated work accepted as outstanding by everybody but not followed by anybody?'

REPLY

Vyākaraṇa is one among six *Vedāṅgas* namely: 1. *Śikṣā* (the science of proper articulation and pronunciation), 2. *Chanda* (the science of prosody), 3. *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar and philosophy of language), 4. *Nirukta* (etymological explanation of difficult vedic words), 5. *Jyotiṣa* (astronomy), 6. *Kalpa* (the science of ritual or ceremonial matters). (See, *pradhānam ca ṣaṭ svaṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam, Harivṛtti* on Vp. 1/11.)

Vyākaraṇa belongs to the tradition of *Veda*. It can be said that the vedic spiritual thinking is promoted against the hedonistic way of life prevailing in vedic time and the language and grammar flourished as means to enrich the spiritualism. Philosophy of language and grammar, as a respected discipline, is a result of reflections on the content of language and grammar for clarification, conception and wisdom and flourished as '*sarva veda pariṣadam*' in the tradition to which *Bhartṛhari* belongs.

The vedic thinking on language and grammar was developed, basically, in two separate ways by Pāṇini and by Vyāḍi. Pāṇini first of all formulated the rules regarding formation, categorization designation, definition and abstraction of the words, their meanings and the relation between them. He on the whole provided us an interpretation of *Vaikharī*-speech (the sanskṛta language-tokens we use for speaking, reading and writing) without missing the philosophical influence he derived from the tradition. Vyāḍi, a contemporary to Pāṇini, propounded the philosophical aspect of the language and grammar in his *Saṅgraha* which is not available but the verses of which are frequently quoted by Mahābhāṣyakāra Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana pre-Pāṇinian advocates of the philosophical aspect of *Vedāgama* have been referred to by Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Patañjalī has also referred to their theories in his *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Bhartṛhari has elucidated their theories respectively in two separate chapters of his *Vākyapadīya* namely, *Dravya-samuddesaḥ* and *Jāti-samuddesaḥ*. Apart from them, Sphoṭāyana and Niruktakāra Yāska are also enumerated in the tradition who influenced the philosophical aspect of the tradition of language and grammar. No work of Sphoṭāyana is available. Pāṇini has referred to his name in *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. He was, perhaps, the founder of the *sphoṭa* theory which later flourished as sphoṭa theory of language. The

Nirukta of the sage Yāska is primarily an etymological interpretation of the difficult *Vedic* terms but contains philosophical statements of the tradition also.

As we have mentioned earlier, Pāṇini, on the whole, provided an interpretation of *Vaikharī*-speech without missing the philosophical influence he derived from the tradition in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Points of philosophical importance of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* attracted Kātyāyana for his *Vārttika*, Patañjalī for his *Mahābhāṣya* and Bhartṛhari for his *Vākyapadīya*. They tried to show that *Vaikharī-śabda* is only instrumental in the cognition of a language which is being revealed (*Madhyamā-śabda*). In this regard it is notable that the theory of three levels of speech is a *Vedic* theory propounded by the Ṛgvedic verse *Catvāri vākaprimitā padāni tāni vidurbrāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ, guhā trīṇi nihitā nengayanti turīyam vāco manuṣyā vadanti*. Ṛgveda 1/164/45, and was settled as a basic statement for the philosophical theory of *language* and *grammar* of the tradition to which *Munitraya* belongs. This and many more *vedic* verses have been referred to by the sages, namely Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari, in his *Vṛtti*, has referred to a number of verses (Ṛgveda 10/17/4, 1/164/45, 4/58/3) and many more verse are quoted in his Vṛtti on Vp. 1/130, 1/118, 1/120, 1/142.

Bhartṛhari is a grammarian philosopher of the tradition of *Munitraya* (Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patanjalī). As authorities on the tradition of language and grammar he has specifically referred to the names of these sages as the *Sūtrakāra, Anutantrakāra* or *Vārttikakāra* and *Bhāṣyakāra* respectively (Vp. 1/23). He himself has claimed that he learnt the philosophy of *sūtra*, *vārttika*, *bhāṣya* and of others from his teacher *Vasurātra* and that constitutes the subject matter of his *Vākyapadīya* (Vp. 2/476–82). This is evident from the fact that the subject matter of *Vākyapadīya* contains all those concepts which were discussed by Pāṇini in his aphorism.

Bhartṛhari has repeatedly said that his philosophy of language and grammar belongs to the tradition of *Āgama* of the śiṣṭas (see Vp. 1/27, 29, 30, 41, 43, 141). He has used the term *Āmnāya* in the same sense of *Āgama* (see, Vp. 1/2, 120, 134) and, it is different from *Purāṇāgama*, (Vp. 1/48). From the verses quoted by him in *Vākyapadīya* it is clear

that he, by *Āgama*, meant *Vedāgama* including *Veda*, *Upaniṣads*, *Śikṣā*, *nirukta*, etc. (see *vedo maharṣibhiḥ ... samāmnātam pṛthak pṛthak* Vp. 1/5, *vedavidbhiḥ* Vp. 1/7, *Āmnāya vidoviduḥ* Vp. 1/20, *Āmnāyaveda* Vp. 1/134) and not *Tantrāgama* which is not opposed to *Vedāgama* but is a later scripture. Somānanda, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, philosophers of *Tantrāgama*, are seen much influenced by Bhartṛhari. They have refuted some ideas of Bhartṛhari but have accepted his basic ideas. Against Bhartṛhari's theory of three levels of speech they have accepted four levels of it. They have criticized Bhartṛhari for not accepting *Parā* and, thus, they claim to represent the *Āgama* in its true spirit. In connection with the levels of speech-principle, it is notable here that Bhartṛhari's theory of these levels is based on cognitive ground. *Śabda*-principle, in his holistic philosophy, is the only Reality pervading all, in different forms and levels of beings, known by different sources of knowledge, i.e., we know verbal-tokens (*vaikharī-śabda*) by perception, language as idea (*madhyamā-śabda* or *sphoṭa*) as a unit directly revealed or figured in the mind in communication. *Paśyantī* in itself is beyond our knowledge because it is neither a perceived nor a revealed unit of awareness in nature; it is known by implication or by presumption as the ontological substratum of the language revealed by itself in the mind. *Paśyantī* is not a philosophical-object because it is not a being revealed; but inferred. *Parā*, the being beyond these levels, is unacceptable to him as a philosopher. It is not an object of knowledge even of inference but he does not feel any need to refute it. It as a transcendental metaphysical reality is a subject matter of *sādhanā*.

Vākyapadīya as Bhartṛhari himself says is the *Āgamasaṅgraha*. Vasurātra, his teacher, was highly impressed by the *Saṅgraha* of sage Vyāḍi and so was Bhartṛhari and, perhaps, this might be the reason behind claiming *Vākyapadīya* as *Āgamasaṅgraha*. Bhartṛhari, himself, and his commentator Puṇyarāja in Vp. 2/476–82 accept that it was Vasurātra who initiated the interpretation of the philosophy of grammar in the light of the theories of *Munitraya* and that of other theories.

The influence of *Vākyapadīya* is not only viewed in the commentaries on it, but also in the discussions, on language and its relation to reality, that occur after it. Almost all schools had to come to term with

what Bhartṛhari had said on the issue and they may be seen as 'defining' their position in reference to the position of Vākyapadīya.

Many of the ideas of Vākyapadīya were not only modified and developed later but have become relevant recently in the context of the development in philosophy of language in the contemporary western tradition of philosophizing also.

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5. A Note on Saṁhitā

The word Saṁhitā, is applied to the collection of Sūktas like Ṛksaṁhitā (Ṛgveda) etc. on one hand and euphonic combination of uttered sounds in the grammatical tradition on the other. Possibly the initial *pravṛttinimitta* (original application of the word to a particular meaning) was only one and that was 'euphonic combination of uttered sounds'. It probably was synonymous to *Saṁhanana/Saṁghāta* etc. (used by Yāska). One of the definitions reads as *varṇānām eka-prāṇa-yogaḥ saṁhitā*, which means morphophonemic combinations of sounds. In the Vedic context, Saṁhitā is applied to the collection (*Samāhṛta*—used by Yāska) of Mantras/Sūktas on account of the oral tradition of Vedic learning like *Saṁhitā-pāṭha* (combined and continued utterance of sound; and in this sense Pāṇini's rule—P.1.4.109: *paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ saṁhitā* becomes justifiable) and *pada-pāṭha* etc. The standard principles of *saṁhitā* (euphonic combination) are given in the following *kārikā*: '*Saṁhitaikapade nityā nityā dhātūpasargayoḥ/Nityā samāse vākye tu sā vivakṣām apekṣate*'. It means the euphonic combination is *regular* in (i) a single-word-formation (*ekapada*), (ii) between the combination of prefixes and verbal-roots (*dhātu* and *upasarga*), and (iii) in compound formation; however it is left to the choice of the speaker in sentence formation. The other definition of *Saṁhitā* (that stands for 'a sentence') namely '*pada-prakṛtiḥ saṁhitā*' (Ṛk-Prātiśākhya—ii.1) has been explained in two ways. Naiyāyikaś (*pada-vādins*) explain it with *bahuvrīhi-samāsa* taking it in the sense that the

words are the base of 'a sentence'; whereas the grammarians (*Vākya-vādins*) take it to be *Tatpuruṣa* taking it to mean that the sentence is the base of *pada*. In the latter sense Bhartṛhari's *apoddhāra-pakṣa* becomes justifiable. Any way, we have to accept the application of the word *saṁhitā* in both the senses.

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6. On Flagging Kant

My friend Swami Vikrant once narrated to me an event that happened at the then conservative Centre for Advanced Studies in Philosophy at Chennai. Professor Dieter Henrich was scheduled to give a Seminar on the 'The Structure of Proof in Kant's Transcendental Deduction'. The learned Kantian scholar wanted to confirm how many in the audience brought copies of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* or at least the relevant pages. The audience replied that they were not instructed to do so. So, it was confirmed that none had brought it. Thereupon he wondered how one could understand his seminar without this. This incident shows to what extent Kant scholarship flourished in the University when the ruling paradigm was Advaita. There is nothing wrong in this swansong, but it is not agreeable when one reads it as the greatest of all. Restraining this, Professor T.M.P. Mahadevan used a ruse of catholicity in which he wants to let a thousand flowers bloom but still all are in the garden of Advaita.

Likewise, I was taken aback at the way Professor Daya Krishna has provoked scholars like Professor Binod Kumar Agarwala to force the latter to harangue on Transcendental Logic à la Kant. Daya Krishna's questions are quite ingenious and not all as 'erroneous' (134) as Binod thinks they are. They are like the ones you comes across elsewhere, for which no satisfactory answers have so far emerged. Nevertheless, Binod missed no opportunity to include him among scholars who have no 'proper hermeneutics' (110 ff) to understand the so-called metaphysical deduction of categories in Kant. His major accusation is that Kant does

not want to *derive* the table of categories *formally* from the table of judgements by means of general logic (130). In a bid to offer a corrective, from an extraneous point of view, he meticulously combs through the text only to find some distinction between general and transcendental logic. One expects that he would try to show how he would have 'transcendentally' derived the categories from judgements in the context of this assumed transcendental logic. Taking his main charge against Daya as failing to understand the contextuality (133) of this logic in contradistinction to traditional logic, this much is expected of him. Such hopes are however belied by the way Binod proceeds first to give the textual exegesis of transcendental logic. This keeps him busy for nearly three-fifths of his 'hermeneutic response' (upto 130).

Binod writes as if he is going to unravel the mystery by surging forward with a transcendental proof structure. But he has not gone beyond saying that transcendental logic (TL) requires a definition which tells us something about 'object-relatedness involved in knowledge' (112) which gives rise to functions of understanding (116). No doubt, Binod's is a good guess closely on the heels of the text to obtain the relation between synthesis and judgement that will again foster the link between judgements and categories. Binod's charge is that the latter linkage cannot be read 'simpliciter' (126) as Daya does in his without looking at the first linkage. When the former is shown to fit the bill, we have a hermeneutic principle. This is roughly the stand of Binod. In fact Daya too has a way of reading it, but his only query is how to go about making sense.

What Binod conveniently forgets is that the transcendental deduction has a definite 'proof' structure, but it is difficult to unravel (Dieter Henrich 1969, 1989). His textual exegesis tells us that the correct way of understanding the linkage is to trace it to have 'common source' (ibid.), that is, to the three-fold synthesis and when some of its specificities are captured, one can bare the transcendental structure. This common source is the transcendental function of imagination (which he compares to the Greek Nous) and this achieves the functional unity by means of pure synthesis (122). Binod is willing to attribute reflexive, reflective abstraction and comparative functions to the transcendental function of imagination. He also identifies pure

synthesis with the reproductive function of imagination. His definition of imagination as perception in the absence of an object may take him in the direction of Nous, but it hardly explains anything.

Binod misses a great opportunity to distinguish between what he calls the reflective analytic unity of form (needs pure consciousness or an argument from above; 129 ff.) and synthetic unity of content (*a priori* possibility) object relatedness (the argument from below) (129), and to split in that order. Such distinctions hardly matter to him. He is unable to provide any missing premise except saying that it is the work of pure synthesis which it indigenously terms as '*a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in object-relatedness', but it hardly explains anything (112). This serves only to nod at the argument from above that, in turn, forces him to completely overlook the crucial part of the argument from above, namely, the transcendental unity of apperception. Again, he circumscribes it by calling attention to representation of representation (metarepresentation?). He is aloof from the unity of apperception and the underlying psychological theory, and consequently misses the argument from above, as well as the essential connecting link which he captures by saying the 'same functional unity of understanding' whereby he also misses the argument from below. Binod's lenience to the text is too much to seek any explanations from the text. On the contrary, he exhorts us to re-read the text but offers no reconstruction. This is briefly the bad hermeneutics of Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya he advocates. This tenor of Bhāṣya-style is to heap interpretation on interpretation without linking it to current science.

By saying that TL is wholistic *ex hypothese*, does he not beg the most important question? Invariably, he thinks that giving a textual reading would pre-empt any misunderstanding without giving an alternative to the structure of the deduction. Thus Binod fails not only to meet the standards laid down by Daya, who wants me (also) to explain why this should be read as having the structure of the *Deduktion* and consequently, he fails on the very front of proof structure. In other words, he has not succeeded to explain the exact linkage between the judgements and categories, because he has not explained what kind of thing a transcendental deduction is in the architectonic. The transcendental deduction proceeds from a 'slender premise' which holds that

we have experience and then proceeds to unpack the conditions of possibility. The slender premise talks about any possible experience, and the conditions of possibility suggest a theory of mental processing that explains the above is the *explanans*. This refers to *a priori* concepts and the overall conclusion states the legitimate application (normative claim).

One should be prepared to forego the twelve-categoried architectonic before looking at the independent categories. The totality is *Ganzen* because it brings together the metaphysical substance (physical causality that has temporal element), epistemological act, and the ethical action (communal causality that has atemporal causality). This provides the 'clue' to the other connections (374). The clue is the three laws of Newtonian Mechanics (law of subsistence, inertia and reaction) that applies to matter. The synthesis would mean the interdependence of parts in nature as well as in community. One should consult Lucien Goldman (1971) and Norman Fischer (1978) in this context. I am not saying that one should go the whole hog with this *Gemeinshaft* (community) reading. My point is that Binod hankers after the transcendental while he could very well move from empirical. First he should identify the exact location of B-Deduction (15–20) before deciding on this. In a miasma of scholarship, he misses the part for the whole where he accuses others of missing the whole for the part. Moreover, his critique is marred by extraneous reading from Heidegger or Gadamer which is quite out of context. They deserve editorial pruning. What is required is the specific research that has been undertaken in this particular domain to capture the very argumentative structure (Professor Chattopadhyaya calls it proof-deduction). So he fulminates: Professor Daya fails to grasp the content of this logic and so his questions were lop-sided. They were formulated on a distorted horizon. His replies to Daya turned out to be perfunctory. Lampooning apart, I fail to understand whether it was meant to be a serious defence of Kant.

The major lacuna here is that my friend Binod has not said anything to explain the T. Logic except saying that it is object relatedness which he thinks brings out the alleged 'pure synthesis' between the table of judgements and the table of categories (the sixth paragraph provides the clue). No doubt Daya missed this transcendental bus. He commits

a logical fallacy ('post hoc ergo propter hoc') in thinking like anyone us how exactly the categories are somehow 'derived' from the table of judgements. From Binod's point of view, Daya's modern logic is no match to Kant. Nevertheless I have a different opinion. His questions, coming from his spontaneous natural ingenuity, are innocuous. No one has shown how this could be explained. For Binod, T. Logic is a club worth flying in. Binod, in spite of his Vedantic ticket (his epigram is from Atharva Veda), in my opinion, also missed the Airbus because he has not bothered to clearly portray the structure of the proof in Kant's metaphysical deduction. Had he done so, he would have given us a staple diet on Kant. Daya's questions bear a similarity to any interpreter of Kant. If so, how come that all of us miss the Boeing of Kant scholars and remain incommunicado for so long?

No doubt the structuration of the transcendental deduction makes exorbitant demands on us. The failure is Kant's. Calling it an 'extravagant claim', Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya correctly traces the failure to Kant's acceptance of Aristotle's Doctrine of Categories for its linear character. *Pace* Popper, the physical world is quantum specifiable in terms of non-linearity. It is not a deductive argument but it has a proof structure that has a beginning and a terminal conclusion (Henrich 1969, 1989). It is not adequately established (Guyer 1987). It is underargued for in Kant (Pereboom 1995: 34). The wholistic package is only an 'accidental and arbitrary nomenclature' (quoted from Schopenhauer by Norman Fischer). It has a great deal of implications for it runs parallel to his moral philosophy (twelve categories in Practical Reason). It builds 'an architectonic between the ethics and epistemology' and goes even beyond to consider religion within reason (Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya wants Kant to transcend reason to reach religion). There is not only an interface of nature (epistemology) and morality and an interface with the Critique of Judgement (CJ contains the four aspects of judgement). This by no means implies that the wholistic emphasis is not to be abandoned in favour of consideration of 'separate aspects of the architectonic' (373). This was exactly the issue confronted by Daya. Daya's problem is that if we do so, then we feel inconsistent.

Moreover, it is an undeveloped psychological theory (Kitcher 1990). Besides, there is no substantial argument (Pereboom 1995: 34). Binod's

narrative, if it can be called so, requires to be sensitized to the distinction between the argument from above and the argument from below, both of which provide an integrated theory of self-understanding. Professor Chattopadhyaya rightly recognizes the progressive and regressive character, but he suggests that it is the transcendental that betrayed Kant. He would have been satisfied if it had triggered the sense of God. Binod leaves a glaring confusion. No one knows where to begin in the list of Categories. No other reading looks plausible than the one suggested by the *Gemeinschaft* interpretation (*Infra.*).

What all of us miss is the *Logik* of B-*Deduktion* 15–20? According to Pereboom, Kant developed all the basics of a theory of conscious as well as mental activity. It consists of two independent arguments. The argument from above (16) is put forward as an explanation of consciousness of subject-identity across self-attributions. It neither argues for substantial Cartesian self. It is equally against Hume's associationist theory of mental activity (17). Kant's theory nowhere posits a transcendental self nor does it deny but lends credence to the idea of higher order theory of consciousness (HOT). Its first credential is that we have no state consciousness but only access consciousness. This could explain the two parts of the argument. The first part argues for the principle of necessary unity of apperception while the second argues for *a priori* synthesis. This is the theory of conscious activity. The focus of the argument below (18) gives an account of necessity and universality of the *a priori*. We can take 17–20 as a self-contained argument (21). While 17–18 defends necessity against Hume's attack, the second argues for *a priori* concepts. That is, 19–20 attempts to establish that judgement is the medium that brings about the synthesis (33) and this is connected to the twelve categories. This is the theory that should explain what we do with the mind.

Why do we miss a substantial argument here? Pereboom explains: there is the connection between synthesis and judgement and also the connection between judgement and categories and then of course the relation between these two relations, then only the connection between synthesis and categories will get explained. As remarked above, Binod concentrates on synthesis and pure synthesis, and mediates them in terms with the 'same function', to obtain the functional unity of

understanding. All these points are limited to the re-reading of the text. He must reconstruct the link without placing the complete burden on the transcendental logic. How do we attribute experiences to one and the self-same subject? What kind of necessity is involved here in the mind-world relation? This can be explained without resorting to reading the proof structure. This is what Daya asks and Binod never answered.

It is agreed that Kant has established the need for synthesis by *a priori* concepts in 18. But which *a priori* concepts synthesis employs is not explained. His question requires a formulation like this: If Kant wishes to conceive of judgement as employing precisely these twelve categories, then he has not established that judgements conceived in this way are the vehicles for synthesis. If Kant wants to conceive of judgement as the vehicle of the sort of synthesis, then he has not shown that judgement conceived in this way must employ twelve categories. So Daya's queries are good posers. They are not adequately met by Binod's perfunctory reading of the text. These questions that arise here in the context form the bulk of the query in which Daya shares with other Kantian scholars. The failure of a priorist methodology is apparent in other questions. In order to show that it provides a novel metaphysical method, one has to seek the evidence from psychology or other empirical sciences like cognitive science. It by no means follows that Daya's queries are totally irrelevant. Nor does it show that the exact way of proving is along the lines of my friend Binod.

What is the way out? Can Daya be appeased? As Fischer cautiously observes, there is indeed a passage from mind to world (of objects as well as other people) in an embedded standpoint which suggests that we should start from community, in this hyper-wholistic picture. So the argument from above and below can be read the other way also. Thus one can move from community (reciprocity and simultaneity) to universality and by giving universality a causal status, we can arrive at a new theory of universals (New Conceptualism), that has an edge over nominalism, realism and old conceptualism in that it opens universals to a causal status. This provides a necessary condition for what is called the limited reality-1. The sufficient condition is derived from the comparative function of mind. The consequent new theory of human action not only bridges causality and community, but also object and

persons. We start from the dynamic category and move to the mathematical ones. An important feature of this is that it answers the comparative nature of the mental and the subjective. Synthesis is broadly understood as communication (381). This explain how one system of representation is reciprocal to another system of interpretation. Freedom and necessity (determinism), reality also get explained and so most of Daya's questions can be answered partially. There is indeed a passage quoted by Daya on p. 6 which captures the above.

One may even analyticize the table of judgements to complete the circle of the linkage. I am not very happy about a very serious undertaking Pereboom mooted. The flaw in his thinking is that he bets too much on *a priori* and this shows a certain bias to the non-reducibility of the *a priori* while at the same time agreeing that the mix-up of the empirical and the *a priori* in the manner of Quine. The solution probably lies in this direction of reading Kant from a philosophy of language point of view without losing sight of the recent reductionist notes of cognitive science. I owe the motivation for this write-up to Professor Daya Krishna's gentle chiding at my indifference to his first request, though I am no scholar in Kant.

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7. Queries

1. Does *buddhi* in Nyāya mean knowledge, cognition, apprehension or awareness? If yes, as stated in the *Nyāya Śūtra*, then how to distinguish between means of knowledge and the result of knowledge?
2. Will it be possible to defend the view that Nyāya is realist if this meaning of *buddhi* is accepted. Also, if so, would it be correct to hold *saṁśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (error), *smṛti* and *svapna* (dream), as types of *buddhi* or jñāna.

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8. A Note on Similarities between Sartre and Gandhi

There is an apparent similarity in Gandhi and Sartre who was also writing when Gandhi was struggling to find out a middle path between the pure transcendental approach of Indian philosophy and the pure empirical or the individual approach of the west. Sartre too faced this dilemma which is solved by his two-tier system; 'Being God is a value humans naturally, perfectly seek.' 'It is the very structure of my existence' (*Notebooks for an Ethics*, 1947–48, pp. 559–60, published in 1983). Accomplice or impure reflection chooses to accept this value and seeks to attain that impossible goal. Pure, non-accomplice reflection chooses to reject it and seek freedom instead.

Becoming God is the goal which Sartre wants us to keep as a regulating idea even though it is inconsistent with his earlier position in *Being and Nothingness*.

Secondly the idea of a cooperative society of Gandhi which was supposed to be the basis of Indian psyche and individual in its relatedness is also present in Sartre who was writing about the same time though independently. 'Thus the appearance of the other's look is not an appearance *in the world*—neither in "mine" nor in the "other's"—and the relation which unites me to the other cannot be a relation of exteriorly inside the world. By the other's look I effect the concrete proof that there is a 'beyond the world'. The other is present to me without any intermediary as a transcendence, which *is not mine*. But this presence is not reciprocal. All of the world's density is necessary in order that I may myself be present to the other.' (*Being and Nothingness*, p. 361).

'I cannot attain any truth whatever about myself except through the mediation of another' (*Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 45). Sartre admits that individuals can be 'mystified' by those who oppress and lie to them so that they are either not aware that they are free or think they are free when they are not. Such individuals need to 'wake up', which may be extremely difficult (*Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 16).

In Sartre one of the, if not the most, basic needs of a human being is for valuable and meaningful life; it is essential that a person receive positive evaluation from others. 'Of course, each individual can freely choose to confer value on his or her own life and it will thereby have value'. However, if other freedoms also recognize my value, he says, 'this will "enrich" the solitary worth I give myself' (*Notebooks for an Ethics*, pp. 282–4, 499–500). 'It follows, then, that I should recognize (value) the freedom of others because it is the source of their valuation of me. Failure on my part to do so will mean that any value or recognition they offer me, even if positive in character, will be worthless in my eyes.' (*Sartre's Two Ethics From Authenticity to Integral Humanity*, Thomas C. Anderson, Open Court, Chicago, 1993, p. 76.)

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Book Reviews

BHIKHU PAREKH: *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform—An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse,* Sage, 1999, pp. 359 (Revised Edition)

It is a work of grand and complex dimensions. Parekh's concern is not merely to make accessible what Gandhi said and thought. The foremost concern is to clarify the texture and salience of Gandhi's mode of thought. Hence the meticulous sifting of the constitutive elements of concepts and the way they link and subsist in human memory and life. Colonialism, Tradition and Reform are the three meta-concepts through and from whence this sifting and demarcation proceeds. In this cluster of meta-concepts one could speak of Colonialism as the first predicate. It signifies the dominant process at work in the making, as also in the re-making of India in the 19th–20th centuries. Colonialism defines the inescapable historical context in which what is, and what could or ought to be are apprehended and voiced. It is the supreme referent that each and all of life and thought as it happens to be, or as it is sought to be made, has to take into account.

Gandhi's quest, argues Parekh, was to clarify and work towards India's '*yugadharma*': a 'moral order appropriate to India in the modern age'. Gandhi, as indeed every significant voice that had preceded him, knew that the modern age was not of India's making. That meant of course a firm recognition of details concerning political control and economic subjugation. But for Gandhi it meant foremost, recognition of the definitive reach of a subtle force beyond the compass of these details. He knew the modern age had arisen from a cognitive universe utterly unlike anything known to India. And yet, the irreplaceable requirement had to be that the *yugadharma* for India, to be meaningful, had to be appropriate to the modern age. Hence the deep and grave question implicit in the author's formulation: Could one make sense of this *yuga* from a ground that lies beyond and away from the cognitive resources of the modern age?

Recognition of the need to clarify and work towards India's *yugadharma* entailed for Gandhi an affirmation of the abiding signifi-

cance of tradition, as also what needs to be done to keep it alive and vibrant. For Gandhi, the need to affirm the abiding and significant in tradition, and the need to reform it were inseparable. The clear and intense sense that the two were inseparable stemmed from an understanding of tradition as essentially a mode of recognition and knowing. True, Gandhi would concede, tradition is invariably grasped through the numerous details of its practices and social-political arrangements. But it retains significance and abides beyond the details of its practices and arrangements, in the words of the author, as a 'form of enquiry'. Thus practices and arrangements, however great their prestige and age, signify essentially the contingent and historic. But their contingent character shaped by specific historical situations does not rob them of lasting significance. They embody in fact the working out in actual living and doing responses to fundamental questions of human existence as a collective entity. In Gandhi's thinking they are seen therefore to represent a collective 'cultural capital' without which human life would loose the sense of its own possibility.

One could ask of this understanding as to how and from whence could arise recognition that something needs to be done to change the state of things, as they happen to be. Parekh dwells upon this question with meditative sweep and incisive clarity. He tells us that in Gandhi's thinking the primary resource for such recognition lies within Indian tradition. But he takes care to indicate the two levels reference inherent in Gandhi's use of the word tradition. It refers to both Indian tradition and Tradition with a capital T, i.e., as a form of enquiry. As a form of enquiry, tradition signifies an inheritance and practice that is universal to all human communities. Hence the cognitive space as also the need for a dialogue between different traditions-civilizations.

Each tradition acquires its distinctive character and force, the author reminds us; from the way it comes to be 'constituted'. Dialogue, be that within a given tradition or between different traditions is both made possible and constrained by the constitutive structure of a tradition or traditions. To mark out the way Indian tradition or *paramparā* is constituted Parekh begins by invoking two salient grids: relationship between religious belief and social structure, and the relationship between belief and conduct. In Christian Europe social structure and

belief are more or less fully separate. But belief and conduct are seen in Christianity and Islam as closely bound. Hindu practice posits belief and social structure as closely bound, but accords to belief relative freedom so long as it does not affect social practice. Hence the ease and swiftness of change and reform of social facts in Christian Europe and the fierce resistance to change and reform of social facts in India. What then is the basis of Gandhi's certainty that Indian tradition constituted the most open form of enquiry? One could argue for instance, that the relative immobility of social facts over a very long period of time signifies in fact the virtual absence of openness. To this one could add another proposition. If the openness of *paramparā* is confined to freedom of belief, this openness could well signify the freedom to dwell in dreamlike trance that would lead to loss of coherence and meaning.

Gandhi's affirmation of *paramparā* as an inherently open form of enquiry rests on the mode of validation intrinsic to it. Unlike the three great Semitic traditions it does not possess, in the words of the author, 'the headwaters'. It is a tradition without a sense of clear and definite beginning. It lacks a single supreme referent—either as text or as history—from whence one could proceed to consider and determine as to what belief and practice ought to be. Its two cardinal referents are *śruti* and *smṛti*. Of the two cardinal referents, *Śruti* is acknowledged as the first referent. But its recognition as the first referent is not in the sense of a historical beginning. Rather, one could speak of it in terms of primal origins of meaning and truth. Hence the sense of *śruti* as an abiding eternal presence that is available always, to any one. *Smṛti*, the secondary referent signifies in contrast a life and salience of the historical kind. It defines the ground of actual living. The joy and pain of human life in India is in some sense or other intimately bound to the second referent. Inevitably therefore, it is in relation to this referent that engagement and contest concerning social facts and moral judgement take place. Gandhi sought to reform and recast the ground of the second referent while affirming to the utmost the abiding significance of the first referent. It was not an easy undertaking. True, Gandhi's way of engaging with tradition had a deep resonance with 'principles internal' to *paramparā*. And yet, it encountered fierce and protracted resistance precisely from those who for a long time had been its custodians.

Parekh records the grim details of a momentous three hours argument (10th March 1925) between Gandhi and the Travancore Brahmins. The argument is instructive and extremely significant. One could speak of it as an argument concerning the ontological status of the second referent and the ways in which it could be changed. Gandhi chose to journey to the temple town of Vaikkam to 'convert' the 'orthodox'. For nearly a year they had been opposing fiercely the *satyāgraha* to put an end to the long established practice of not allowing untouchables to walk the road adjacent to the temple.

Gandhi began by affirming belief in *karma* and rebirth. But all that belongs, he argued to the 'divine' and clear beyond the authority and reach of any human agency. Therefore, 'it is wrong' to prevent even a 'single person' from walking the road adjacent to the temple 'simply because he is born in a particular caste'. Such practice is not 'universal' to Hinduism. Its defense can be 'only as custom'. To invoke an 'authority or book' in support of such practice means you 'tie yourself down' to something that cannot be 'defended by reason'. Gandhi's insistence was that surely a 'mere custom' that was not universal to the tradition that it claims to represent, or even true of accepted practice in a region like Malabar could be changed in the interest of 'reason and justice'. In a final bid to resolve the impasse Gandhi proposed to the Brahmins three 'compromises' all of which they rejected:

1. Referendum among the 'caste Hindus' of the region.
2. Arbitration by a committee of three of whom two would be Brahmins.
3. Examination of the 'canonical status' of concerned text by learned pandits of Benares, or Chennai.

The orthodox custodians of the Vaikkam temple emphatically rejected Gandhi's salient proposition that a custom could be changed in the interests of reason and justice. Their contention was that reason and justice could not be the basis of interfering with 'customs and sentiments based on religion and faith'. It was also not a question of regarding untouchables 'low'. They were 'equally entitled to enjoy the privileges of the world'. The prohibition against their approaching anywhere close to the temple was not, argued the orthodox, a case of imposition. Rather, it was an act of 'removing ourselves to a certain

corner so that we may avoid the unapproachables'. They conceded that this custom was not universal to Hinduism. But they were bound by what their *ācārya* had ordained. True, other *ācāryas* may not support their custom. But that was of no concern or consequence. Others were free to follow whatever their respective *ācāryas* required them to do. 'Ordinary people' could not revise and change what the *ācāryas* had laid down. That could only be done by 'well educated *avatārs*'.

Gandhi confessed that his appeal to 'their reason', to 'their humanity', and the 'Hinduism in them' failed to make an 'impression'. In terms of tangible results the argument yielded nothing. The acute sense of being at a dead end led Gandhi, according to the author, to 'reconsider' his mode of discourse. Henceforth Gandhi's 'discourse on untouchability was at once more traditional and more reformist'. That of course is true. But could that be seen as signifying a change in Gandhi's mode of discourse? Perhaps the point of salient contention in Gandhi's debate with the Vaikkam Brahmins as also with the orthodox generally was the notion of authority or, *adhikāra*. In the Vaikkam debate as also in every other debate that took place, the orthodox Hindus recognized the possibility of changes in *smṛti*, the second referent, as legitimate and not untrue to the ways of *paramparā*. For instance, the contention of the Brahmins in Vaikkam was not that *smṛtis* were final and finished and therefore could never be revised. They well knew its contingent standing. It was not something of which it could be said without a beginning and without an end. Their insistence was that 'ordinary people' could not be allowed to revise what had been laid down by the great *ācāryas*. Such revision could only be undertaken, as it had been done several times in the past, by 'well educated *avatārs*'. They conceded that *ācāryas* of the highest standing had in the past laid down rules of conduct sharply at variance with each other. As to the basis of judgement in the face of choices sharply at variance with each other, they had nothing to say beyond affirming that they were bound to follow their chosen *ācārya*. Clearly, the point of fierce and relentless contention was whether to Gandhi could be conceded the *adhikāra* to revise and recast the second referent. Or, to put it in general terms what constitutes the basis of *adhikāra*?

What explains the deep discomfort and fears that Gandhi's implicit claim to possess the *adhikāra* to re-form the second referent aroused among the orthodox custodians of Hindu practice? Consider in this context a folk saying about Gandhi cited by the author: *na sanyāsī na saṅsārī* (neither an ascetic nor a householder). It is profoundly suggestive of the subversion of neat demarcations favoured in Hindu practice that Gandhi's life and mode of discourse exemplified. In a somewhat simplified way, one could speak of the *sanyāsī* as belonging to a realm naturally attuned to seeking and giving voice to the truth and meaning of the first referent. True, the *saṅsārī* also seeks the first referent as the ultimate in the journey of life, or rather lives. But that seeking of the *sansari* can only be through living by certain codes and rules of conduct. It is a mediation the *saṅsārī* cannot revise. That may and can happen but only through voices and interventions of preceptors from the realm of the *sanyāsī*. Gandhi was unique in seeking to make the demarcations between the two intensely fluid and thereby to redefine the basis of *adhikāra*. And that signalled to the orthodox custodians of Hindu practice the making of a vast and profound disturbance.

Gandhi was not the first one to invoke the primacy of *śruti*, the first referent, to question the worth and relevance of *smṛtis*, the second referent. Beginning with Rammohun Roy, almost every significant voice of reform in India sought to make the first referent the touchstone of worth and moral judgement. Like Gandhi, Rammohun Roy also pointedly marked out the absence of codes and practices that could be said to be universal to Hindu social practice. But there were vital differences in the way different reformers spoke of the first referent. For Raja Rammohun Roy and Swami Vivekananda it meant primarily the corpus of philosophical texts known as *Upaniṣads*. Swami Dayananda Saraswati made a distinctly different kind of choice. To him the first referent meant essentially the *Ṛg Veda*. But all of them shared a more or less complete rejection of *smṛtis* as the definitive referent for Hindu social practice. Gandhi's invocation of the first referent had it seems to me a distinctively different kind of salience. He would never for instance privilege one particular part of *śruti*. He disowned nothing. Yet, he would insist that eternal Truth to which *śruti* gives us access in a

way nothing else could or does, makes it possible and imperative to question and if need be revise its translations in actual living.

Parekh speaks of Gandhi as a 'critical traditionalist'. There was much in the working of tradition that Gandhi found unacceptable. He was troubled by the 'absence' of certain vital concerns from the moral universe of tradition as lived practice. Hindu social practice more or less excluded an active concern (as service) for fellow humans. It was indifferent to issues of equality, justice and human dignity. The practices of untouchability, subjection of women, contempt for manual labour, were all searing reminders of a flawed moral universe. Gandhi's critical insight into the working of tradition, the author reminds us, was from a threshold unmistakably marked by the presence of other traditions. This presence came to life in Gandhi's discourse and action as a possibility that had life distinctly its own. The play of elements and lineages within a tradition and across different traditions in the grand conversation Gandhi mediated is sketched with prescient lucidity.

Consider in this context Parekh's rendering of Gandhi's *ahiṁsā* (non-violence) and *mokṣa* (final release, salvation). *Ahiṁsā* signified in Gandhi's understanding profound insight into the 'unity of life' in its human and all the other forms. It was for him perhaps the 'greatest' of the 'central values of Hinduism'. Yet, its firm anchor despite resting upon the very fount that sustains life remained 'passive', and lacked the sense and urge towards active engagement. Thus he set about to seek in the 'Christian concept of *caritas*' the cardinal absence for active engagement. But this search entailed recognition of a somewhat dangerous 'emotive' impulse towards 'worldly attachments' within *caritas*. Hence Gandhi's re-reading of Christian *caritas* with Hindu *anāśakti*, which led him to seek 'positive but detached and non-emotive love'.

Gandhi's *mokṣa* was meant to be the ultimate touchstone of life lived according to *dharma*. True, that in its basic sense—dissolution into the *Brahman*—conformed to the conventional understanding of tradition. Traditional practice and Gandhi, both took suffering as the means to transcendence. In traditional practice indifference to suffering, ones own as also of others, was seen as transcendence. In Gandhi, transcendence meant indifference to ones own suffering and unfailing concern for the suffering of others. Unlike the way of ascetic renunciation

favoured in traditional practice, Gandhi's journey towards *mokṣa* entailed constant active engagement. In Gandhi's refusal to turn away from the world inhered however, the deep sense that for a true seeker this world could never be home to true repose. But the here and now of this world mediates, as the body mediates the journey of the soul, the path to the true home and final repose. He was certain that in the modern age ultimate metaphysical repose (*mokṣa*) could only be sought in 'active service of mankind'. And politics provided the 'only adequate path to it'. This reorientation led Gandhi to also redefine the 'state of mind' associated with *mokṣa*. In traditional practice it was associated with *ānanda*, or supreme joy. For Gandhi it 'involved' not only *ānanda* but also *duḥkha* or suffering. A true seeker after *mokṣa* could never turn away from suffering. It simply had to be shared and engaged with. For a true seeker *ānanda* comes, in the words of Gandhi, from 'pain voluntarily borne' in the service of others. In traditional philosophical discourse *tapasyā* or self-discipline is seen as basic and necessary for a seeker of *mokṣa*. Gandhi also recognized *tapasyā* as a crucial requirement. But his deep engagement with suffering transformed the conception and practice of *tapasyā*. From ruthless self-denial and a turning away from pleasures and pain of worldly living, in Gandhi's care *tapasyā* came to be rigorous self-denial as a preparation for service to relieve suffering and resist injustice.

A strange paradox seems to run through the way from whence Gandhi's discourse gets noticed. For Gandhi recognition of things as they are and as they could be begins with and in tradition. He knew well the power of modern civilization to numb and simply sweep aside everything that had preceded it. Yet, his search was to find ways to take measure of modern civilization and colonialism from a cognitive locus within tradition. The politics he shaped from this discourse very swiftly came to constitute the centre space upon which hinged the outcome of the struggle to end Colonial rule. It was the power of Gandhi's politics to resist Colonial rule and wrest major political concessions that began to compel notice of his discourse and philosophic faith. But of the millions who endorsed his politics of civil disobedience and *satyāgraha* against Colonial rule, there were very few even among his close followers who would fully endorse the discourse and

philosophic faith in which Gandhi believed it was anchored. That by itself may not have been of much consequence. The historical structure of attention in any age, and in relation to almost all things is perhaps never neatly aligned. The route to notice in the case of Gandhi's discourse acquires an enuring edge for two reasons.

One, the custodians of traditional Hindu practice took his philosophic faith and the discourse predicated upon it seriously, but only to demolish and bury it. Their interest in promoting the politics associated with it was at best severely confined. They felt infuriated and threatened by the changes he wanted to bring about in social practice. But despite deep unease and hostility, they could never ignore his claim to speak for tradition. Two, the custodians of 'Young India' in their search for a way out of the Colonial shadow took to his politics in earnest but only because it seemed to offer an effective instrument against Colonial rule. Towards the philosophic faith and its discourse, without which politics for Gandhi was of no significance they remained deeply suspicious. Hence the near absence of serious and sustained intellectual engagement that would seek to make sense of his politics in relation to its cognitive referents.

Questions that aroused intense and continual debate between Gandhi and his contemporaries concerned the mode of political action he stood for and the kind of economic-social order he was seen to advocate. In the early phase, doubts about the worth and effectiveness of Gandhi's *satyāgraha* were voiced by the votaries of revolutionary terror. The established moderate leadership of the Indian National Congress also felt very uneasy with Gandhi's advocacy of mass participation in politics. Their unease stemmed from fears that politics of mobilizing the masses would unleash uncontrollable passions, which could only lead to repression and loss of whatever had been gained through years of patient effort and negotiations. A detail of some significance in this context is the near absence of notice of their unease and doubts in discussions of Gandhi's *satyāgraha*. This absence in a theoretical consideration of Gandhi's thought and practice merits a look. Historical works sketch in ample detail the shifting and often ambiguous strands of what could be termed as the apprehensions and hope of politics pursued according to the rules laid down by the Colonial rulers. A

detail of some consequence in this context concerns Jinnah's sharp and increasingly hostile distancing from the national movement after Gandhi launched the Non-cooperation movement. Two things seem to stand forth. One, during the inevitable periods of fatigue and exhaustion that followed campaigns of mass resistance, politics of cooperation with Colonial rule acquired greater acceptance. Two, the objections were articulated almost entirely in terms of what was seen as pragmatic and immediate. Hence perhaps an absence of moral resonance that transcends the immediate and realizable, even though the pragmatic orientation of moderate politics made possible its repeated return to vigorous life during the long periods between mass struggles.

To the votaries of revolutionary terror, Gandhi's insistence upon non-violence signified abject surrender. Gandhi's invocation of self-reliant villages as the fount and foundation of *swaraj*; his impassioned plea that India should never seek to recast herself in the image of Europe, all served to confirm their fear that he was pushing India back to stagnant immobility and permanent servitude. To this critique the Marxists imparted revolutionary-modernist finality. Votaries of revolutionary terror also thought of themselves as custodians of the modernist project in India. But the pathos that moved them was the longing that somehow India should stand as an equal with the most powerful nations of Europe. The Marxists sense of self-worth rested on a different kind of premise: the certainty that they knew what the economic and social imperatives of modern transformation were, and for that the decisive locus was not India but the potentially revolutionary social formations-classes in the world and India.

Professor Parekh seems to indicate the simmering of a silent paradox within the 'central thesis' of Marxist discourse in India. He locates their 'central thesis' between a grudging acknowledgement of Gandhi's political effectiveness and the epistemic certainty of Marxism as the final revelation into the working of history. The acknowledgement is of Gandhi's passionate commitment to the cause of the oppressed and their mobilization on a scale unprecedented in Indian history. The epistemic certainty is that this emotional subjective commitment remained fatally flawed. Gandhi's 'ideas and especially his actions reinforced' bourgeois hegemony and Capitalism. Ideas herein refer to

what was seen as Gandhi's romantic idealization of pre-modern primitive social forms and economy. Actions refer to his insistence upon non-violence and rejection of class conflict as the cardinal principle of mass mobilization. An important consequence of the silent paradox simmering has been a nuanced and sympathetic rendering in recent years of Gandhi's role and significance, most notably by Partha Chatterjee.

Parekh speaks of Gandhi's discourse and political practice as an attempt, akin to that of a head of a vast joint family, to mediate continual conversation between diverse elements that could at times be ranged in bitter conflict. The analogy is instructive and significant for its heuristic value. Rejection of the discourse and politics of carrying everyone, or almost everyone, more or less together came from several quarters. Among them, the Marxist rejection was premised on a ground of modernist purity. Social, or to be precise, class harmony struck them as a camouflage for collaboration with exploiting classes; and hence a device to misdirect the struggle away from its historic mission. To the votaries of a Hindu consolidation social harmony signified softheaded sentimentality towards the Muslims. It would render Hindus vulnerable and powerless to cope with the grim imperatives of survival in the modern world. Rejection by the Muslim League and Jinnah stemmed from the deep certainty that freedom for Muslims could have meaning only within an Islamic destiny. Ambedkar voiced perhaps the most grave and anguished rejection of Gandhi's discourse and politics of harmony. It was premised on a ground distinctly different from that in which the other three rejections were anchored. The moving force for all of them was in the vision of a castle of purity and the faith that it could be built, if only they could mobilize and wrest the power to control and decide the shape of things. The supreme regret of both the Marxists and the votaries of Hindutva was that when it came to harnessing mass support it was Gandhi's politics that worked. The pathos that moved Ambedkar had a resonance of another kind. He was not in search of a castle of purity. He sought instead to banish the fear of pollution and thereby restore to life the normal kind of possibilities for decency and fair play. It was pathos close to Gandhi's sense of the enduring eternal in the everyday. But the path to it Ambedkar was convinced, made conflict with caste Hindus unavoidable. He felt

Gandhi's reliance on persuasion was excessive and would only serve to strengthen entrenched prejudice and hierarchy.

Gandhi's 'campaign' against untouchability, in the words of the author, 'permanently discredited it'. But it failed to even 'enter the equally crucial second round against the high-caste economic and political domination'. Gandhi's 'passionate moral commitment' to the cause of the 'untouchables' failed to generate a 'political commitment' of equal measure, and it 'failed to tackle the roots of untouchability'. The indictment is severe and unrelenting:

> Gandhi spoke for them, but did not allow, let alone encourage, them to speak for themselves. Thanks to this mistaken strategy, his love kept them almost just as dumb as had the centuries of humiliation.

Parekh's indictment of Gandhi's record on untouchability shows up the stupendous fragility inherent in Gandhi's mode of intervention so suggestively invoked in his analogy of Gandhi mediating, like the head of a vast joint family, continual conversation between diverse elements ranged in frequent and at times bitter conflict. In seeing this fragility as final and definitive he seems not to notice the enduring consequence and power of the everyday details of collective life being reoriented, however slightly. Surely, without the discourse and practice Gandhi brought to the collective life of India, it would have been almost impossible for Ambedkar to be the leading figure in the making of the Indian Constitution. The constitution in this context stands forth as an audacious conceptual artifact. It was the very first attempt to create a legal framework, which while remaining true to liberal universalistic principles, provided for corrective reverse discrimination. The preference vigorously pursued in British Imperial policy was to privilege in near absolute ways a variety of ethnicities, and thereby deny for India even the theoretical possibility of constituting a state capable of sustaining a shared public realm.

In modern cognition the State is seen as the irreplaceable first condition for a sane civilized order. That mode of cognition and the discourse around it Professor Parekh knows and understands as very few would. Clearly, Gandhi did not quite subscribe to the proposition that the Sate signifies the predicate that makes possible sanity and order.

Parekh sees and writes with lucid care on the impossibility of finding neat dockets for Gandhi's views on political economy and the state. He also takes note of the tension that inheres in Gandhi's deep commitment to personal autonomy and his advocacy of an economic order that implied support for state intervention of a comprehensive kind. But he leaves matters at that point. And that is truly a matter of regret. One wishes he had pursued and clarified for us the meaning of the state in Gandhi's discourse and political practice. Gandhi's view of the state is characterized by a complex ambiguity and runs deep. For Gandhi, political thought and practice acquired moral possibility in the measure it could bring into play a certain moral substance that perhaps is never completely effaced in even the meanest and most evil of human beings. And how does one provide for that in an institution so vast and abstract as the State? From a Gandhian point of view the question is of critical significance. Twice the Indian State during the fifty years of its existence, failed to uphold as Gandhi would have said its minimal obligations as a trustee of the civilizational ethos of India; the killing of Sikhs in 1984, and more recently the killing of Muslims in Gujarat. In such moments of State complicity the moral voice of individuals and institutions of civil society is powerless to prevent violence and violations on a vast scale. In a prescient chapter, Indianization of Autobiography, Parekh speaks of Gandhi's profound perplexity on finding that for the Mahatma to speak of Mohandas entailed facing up to the impossibility of writing a *kathā*, a *Jīvanavṛttānta*, without taking measure of *itihāsa*, of *ātmakathā*. That formulation I thought provides a promising frame to explore an Indic locus and life for the state in the discourse of Gandhi.

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KRISHNA ROY (ed.): *Fusion of Horizons: Socio-Spiritual Heritage of India,* New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 2000

In this remarkable volume Krishna Roy has brought together a series insightful contributions on the socio-spiritual heritage of India. At a time in India and the world when there is a closing of our minds, these contributions help us to open ourselves and to realize our interconnected existence. D.P. Chattopadhyaya in a very long essay, ' "We" and "they" in understanding India's cultures', tells us how Indian culture has evolved over the millennia through a fusion of horizons. He provides detailed description of the interaction between Vedic and non-Vedic people and the significance of critical movements of heterodoxy such as Buddhism and Jainism. For Chattopadhyaya, 'It is the egalitarian attitude of the Buddhist and Jaina teachers which strongly and successfully contained, at least for seven hundred years, from the death of Asoka (239 BC) to death of Samudragupta (c. AD 357), the hierarchical forces that encouraged and sustained a rigid structure mainly due to Brahmanism' (p. 45). In her essay, 'An Outline of the Ongoing and Development of Indian Thought and Culture', Aruna Halder provides further elaboration of this fusion of horizon. Speaking of the influence of the Proto-Austroid ancestors, Halder tells us how 'Indian religion later adopted some different totemic animals' and made them attached to the chariot of gods and goddesses. Furthermore, 'many primitive theories about cosmology and cosmogony were later transferred into the Hindu view of creation or causation. These primitive people believed that the manifest universe has come out of a potential egg which later came to be known as *Brahmāṇḍa*' (p. 83). Some unique religious practices emerged out of such interaction such as the cult of Jagannatha. Jagannatha was an original Sabara deity and now is the only deity in Hinduism who is worshipped along with his sister. Both Chattopadhyaya and Halder also draw our attention to the significance of Islamic contribution in the growth of Indian civilization. Writes Halder, 'Cultural synthesis has become more prominent in places like North India and East Bengal and some other parts of India where the class of poor Hindu and equally poor Muslims live side by side' (p. 91).

The contributions to the volume touch on several themes such as ethics, *dharmanīti, daṇḍanīti* and democracy. In her essay, 'Social Philosophy in the Smṛti Saṁhitās', Sati Chatterjee discusses about less-known and possibly radical aspects of texts such as Manu Saṁhitā and Parāśara Smṛti. Manu Saṁhitā provides detailed instruction about the practice of *yama* or control. While in contemporary India Manu Saṁhitā is easily vilified as propagating oppressive Brahmanism, it is important to keep in mind two injunctions from Manu Saṁhitā: (a) 'Brahmins are advised to reject the lure of worldly honour'; and (b) 'If the king moves away from the right path, a Brahmin must not accept anything, any gift of honour, from him. Accepting gifts from a corrupt king would lead a Brahmin to twenty one circles of hell' (p. 112). The Smṛtis and Saṁhitās have also injunctions against killing of birds, animals, and cutting down of trees.

Heramba Nath Chatterjee Sastri discusses the 'the social and moral obligations of kings in Ancient India' and Nrusinha P. Bhaduri, the concept of dandaniti (the theories of punishment). For Bhaduri, 'ancient Indian political scientists never allowed any royal power to function without restraint' (p. 130). It is in this context that Anantalal Thakur's essay, 'Democracy in the Mahābhārata,' is significant. Thakur shows the creativity of republics such as the Yadhavas in ancient India. Though they were constantly under the threat of being swallowed up by monarchies such as Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas, they had an important contribution in the evolution of democracy and the promoting of free thinking in India and the world. In the words of Thakur: '[...] The whole human culture has been enriched by the thinking developed in the three republics of Yadvas, Vajis and Sakyas embodied in the Bhagavadgītā and the Jania and Buddhist canons' (p. 151).

The editor Krishna Roy discusses about Hindu law and Mīmaṁsā Nyāyas. Roy tells us that 'due consideration for social practices and common usage—*lokavyavahāra*—has been given at all stages of the evolution of Hindu law and it is interesting to note that such importance of practice and *śāstras* prevails till today' (p. 178). In his contribution, 'Social Dimension of Jaina Thought', Tushar K. Sarkar discusses several aspects of Jaina thought and action such as *jīva, karma* and *ahiṁsā*. He also discusses in great detail and with insight three

basic tenets of Jainism—Anekāntavāda (non-exclusive or multifaceted view of reality), Syādavāda (conditionality of all judgements) and Nayavāda (epistemic perspectivalism).

Sarkar shows how Ahiṁsā is at the core of Jaina ethics which means not only abstaining from 'doing actual physical harm or injury [...] but also from thinking and speaking' (p. 189). The Jaina conception and practice of Ahiṁsā had deeply influenced Gandhi but in his provocative and insightful contribution, 'Gandhi's Truth', J.N. Mohanty challenges us to bring out the inner link between 'an ethics of non-violence and the Jaina metaphysics of "anekāntavāda"' (pp. 262–3). Mohanty argues that with such a commitment to non-violence and anekāntavāda a seeker, practitioner, and experimenter of truth cannot assert ones point of view but has to open oneself to other points of view respecting the emergent truth emerging in the dialogical situation. Mohanty raises the following critical issues vis-à-vis understanding, interpreting and realizing Gandhi: (a) Though many statements of Gandhi come close to a dialogical and emergent notion of 'political truth', 'his own activism often gave the impression of an uncompromising adherence to his own belief' (p. 263); (b) the reason Gandhi did not quite see political truth in a dialogically constituted and emergent manner was because of his adherence to the Vedantic idea of oneness of being. 'Such a metaphysics does not allow the problem of intersubjectivity to be asked, in as much as the plurality of subjects is on this view a surface-level appearance of a deeper identity' (p. 263).

There are other important contributions in the volume—Shailendra Nath Chakraborty writing about Gandhi and Marx; Manjula Bose on 'Social Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore', K.K. Banerjee on 'Revolution, Religion and Sri Ramakrishna', and Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya Sastri, 'Bharatīya *Dharmanīti*'. Each of them deserves careful reading and I would describe briefly issues raised by two other contributors to the volume. In his essay, 'Social Development, Man's Emergence, and Value as Spirit', Kalyan Kumar Bagchi discusses the social philosophy of K.P. Bhattacharya who questions 'the self-sustainability of the concept of social'; society cannot completely account for 'the emergence of the individual quality of life' (p. 283). Furthermore, Bagchi argues quite insightfully against any simplistic evolutionary logic. What Bagchi

writes deserves our careful consideration: 'It is in terms of its "quality" that a society comes to be judged or assessed to be superior or inferior in contrast to another. Secondly, while the stages of a society's development can indeed be traced, once the 'quality'-concept strikes the society or individual there on, once the individuals become aware of a distinct level of advance of society—whatever may be the content of such an advance, e.g. appreciation of values, freedom, truth, etc.—there takes place a swing-back, so to say, in terms of which all the stages temporarily antecedent to the stage in which quality-acquisition takes place, are reviewed—more acutely, assessed' (p. 287).

Bagchi urges us to look at quality as emergent and Shailendra Nath Ghose's concluding contribution, 'Mould of Emerging Thoughts', raises many important critical issues vis-à-vis tradition and contemporaneity in India society. Ghosh argues, 'The concept of personal salvation' divorced from social redemption [...] is the bane of Hindu society. In this, the Christian missionaries, inspired by the biblical message of love, are far superior. Fatalism, the idea that all sufferings in this life are the result of *karma* (action) in previous birth—is a devaluation of human will, and is sapping society of its vitality' (p. 328). In the time of Hindutva when we need more and more such self-critical reflections and actions, Ghosh also pleads for an authentic religio-socio-cultural transformation and spiritual renewal in which the depressed castes, tribals and women have to play an important role and articulate a new renaissance out of insights emerging from the depth of their suffering.

These contributions truly help us in realizing the creative dimension of socio-spiritual heritage of India. This is a rich book which calls for careful reading from all of us concerned. At a time when there is a narrow and violent closure of what it means to be Hindu and Indian, and that too a human person, this volume can transform contemporary public discourse in helping us in realizing that being Hindu and Indian are not synonymous and self-realization and social development now rests on overcoming of our closure, transcendence of the banality of patriotism and the contemporary violent annihilation of religious, cultural and social pluralism. In this context the volume pleads for a new

saṁhitā—a new gospel—which 'has to relate not to religious doctrine alone but to other arts and sciences' (p. 331).

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SANGEETHA MENON, M.G. NARSIMHAN, ANINDYA SINHA AND B.V. SREEKANTAN (eds): *Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness*, National Institute of.Advanced Studies, Bangalore, 1999, pp. 392, Rs 350

This book is an attempt to study consciousness with an interdisciplinary approach in keeping with the contemporary trend. The volume is based on the papers presented at a national conference on consciousness, held at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. The book has 31 essays, which range from experimental to esoteric, scientific to spiritual, psychological to philosophical perspectives on consciousness. The essays in the first and second sections of the book consist largely of scientific studies on the nature of consciousness. These explore diverse issues, for example, the possibility of reducing consciousness to vacuum, finding the physical or neural or neurobiological basis of consciousness and explaining the functional brain imaging techniques etc. Two interesting studies in these sections relate to a study of dynamics of the human brain during meditation and consciousness in non-human primates. Mathematical, linguistic and philosophical perspectives are also given their due in the book. The discussions of philosophical contributions cover the views from Greek philosophers to modern and contemporary western thinkers like Sartre, Husserl, Putnam, Dennett and Davidson among others, as well as Indian philosophical standpoints of Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, Tantra and Sri Aurobindo.

If we look at the different papers in the volume, we find broadly two kinds of attempts at play. One, to show that scientific studies help us to unravel the mystery of consciousness and two, to show how science can lend support to claims about higher consciousness found, for

example, in Yoga, Tantra and Advaita Vedānta. Let me take the second issue first. It is clear that claims made in this area are only tentative and far from well established. The study about the changes in the brain during meditation attempts to show that during meditation the brain 'evolves to a high-dimension state' and its 'information capacity' gets increased (p. 141). One can not, however, help feeling disappointed because the study is based on the patterns observed in one volunteer only. One wonders whether the results of this study can really be called scientifically established at present, given the exceedingly small size of the sample.

Now to come to the second issue. The advancement of research about brain and central nervous system has indeed established that there is a strong correlation between mental states and states and processes of the brain. However it is not being claimed that mental states can be simply reduced to brain processes or that all the complex features of consciousness or of human mental life can be explained on the basis of these correlations. The limitations of the scientific studies in this area are frankly admitted by most of the contributors. Sreekantan, while discussing the promise inherent in the proposal to reduce consciousness to vacuum, admits that vast areas of conscious processes and phenomena remain as yet unexplained. For example, we do not understand why music gives us delight or why some incidents move us to tears (p. 20). Tandon, in his discussion of neurobiological studies, admits that the available scientific information is limited and largely correlative. He adds that it is obvious that consciousness can not be ascribed to any specific region of the brain. He therefore argues for a 'holistic' approach (p. 112). Samal states categorically that the paradigm of finding neural correlates of attributes of consciousness is not 'fruitful' in 'demystifying consciousness' (p. 26). The reductionist approach can, however, provide us with 'valuable clues regarding the attributes of consciousness.' He concludes that one can hope to explain consciousness only by adopting a holistic approach and making use of 'quantum communication' (p. 36). Bijoy Mukherjee expresses reservations about the ability of science to explain consciousness for a different reason. He makes a distinction between literal and symbolic thought. He argues that science, including cognitive science, which falls under

literal thought, can not answer questions about the 'irreducible felt content' of consciousness (p. 80). The limitations of scientific studies at present, however, are not a reflection on the value of scientific enterprise in this field, nor can it be denied that such studies add to our understanding about human mental life in a significant way.

Let me come to a different question now. What is the purpose of an interdisciplinary study of consciousness? More specifically, what is the objective of juxtaposing scientific and philosophical perspectives on consciousness? The editors list four objectives of the conference. These can be taken to be the objectives of the book also. As far as the twin objectives of 'reviewing the current international status of the field' and enabling Indian scientists and philosophers to present their work and enter into a dialogue are concerned, the book can be said to be quite successful. However the stated objectives are much wider and include highlighting the 'relevance and significance' of ancient insights on consciousness found in Indian philosophy and exploring the possibility of collaborative work between scientists and philosophers. It is not clear how these aims are to be achieved. Undoubtedly metaphysical claims about higher mental states and their salutary effects throw up the possibility of scientific investigation and validation. To this extent collaboration between science and philosophy may be said to be feasible. The experiments in this field, however, have to be conducted with an open mind and their results can not be taken for granted. The big question is what bearing the results of such investigation can have on metaphysical standpoints? Do we expect the results to make the metaphysical theories associated with Yoga or Tantra clearer and provide support for these? Can we say that the concerned metaphysical theories should be open to the possibility of modification, revision or even rejection, if need be, in the light of the results of such studies?

It is not clear what the gains of such an interdisciplinary study for philosophy and science are. For a study of this kind to be really fruitful, it is necessary to formulate the issues on which the concerned disciplines can contribute equally in a meaningful way and enter into a dialogue. It is not clear, however, whether there is a meeting point between scientific and philosophical studies on consciousness. One wonders whether philosophical perspectives really help to shed light

on the kind of issues raised by scientists. Conversely it is far from obvious whether and how scientific studies clarify issues discussed, for example, in philosophy of mind. The scientific studies do not seem to enable us to adjudicate better between the different philosophical positions on the mind-body issue. For example, Tarakan outlines three such theories, namely, substance dualism, property dualism and property monism (p. 188). Scientific studies do not seem to enable us to come any closer to take a definitive stand on these. Do scientific studies on consciousness give any indication of how to deal with the problem of other minds or the issue of free will? Do these shed light on the kind of issues raised by Sartre or Husserl? One of the contributors, Sahu, claims that the empirical study of the physical conditions pertaining to consciousness are significantly helpful for 'grammatical analysis of the mental concepts'. He adds that with every significant new result of science the grammar of the mental predicates will also change (p. 247). However, it is debatable that such a close connection between scientific findings and the use of mental predicates can be asserted.

An interdisciplinary study of consciousness also throws up certain methodological questions. Does *a priori* speculation have any relevance in analyzing the nature of consciousness? Should consciousness be studied primarily from a first person perspective emphasizing the felt content and quality of experiences, or from a third person perspective emphasizing what one can observe in another person's brain etc.? If both are relevant, then how are the two to be related? How to relate the scientific enterprise with the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis? My point is not to detract from the value of scientific research on consciousness but simply to emphasize that questions raised above need to be addressed in order to establish the significance and viability of an interdisciplinary dialogue on consciousness. At least some indication or proposal to address these is required. Hopefully some such proposal would be forthcoming in future interdisciplinary studies.

The book is an interesting collection of papers on consciousness covering a really wide range of perspectives. It should, therefore, be of interest to a wide variety of readers. It is useful for all those who would like to familiarize themselves with a wide variety of responses to the mystery of consciousness. Its contribution lies not only in presenting

diverse perspectives on consciousness in one volume but also in the fact that this kind of interdisciplinary interaction throws up interesting questions to be explored further.

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KALA ACHARYA: *Buddhānusmṛti (A Glossary of Buddhist Terms)*, Mumbai, Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2002, pp. xvi + 281, Rs 425

The book is an addition to the family of dictionaries, encyclopaedias and handbooks on Buddhist terms and concepts. As the author mentions, this work 'will help a beginner as well as someone who has the background of the subject' (Preface).

Before presenting the actual glossary (from p. 89) the author gives a valuable introduction. The introduction consists of a very brief sketch of topics like: biography of Buddha, the concept of *dharma*, Buddhist philosophy, Buddhist schools, spread of Buddhism and a survey of Buddhist literature. The section on *dharma* is, however, written in a slipshod manner. Nothing significant is conveyed to the reader when the *Dharmakāya* is referred to as Law-body (p. 7). The explanation of the classification of *dharmas* into *pañca-skandha* (p. 9) is quite disappointing. *Vedanā* actually stands for feelings of pleasure, pain, etc. However, according to the author, 'feeling means experiencing the essential property, for example, taste.' (Again, on p. 95 the author equates *vedanā* with sensation.) *Saṁskāra* really represents, mostly volitions and voluntary actions. Calling them 'mental properties', and saying, 'They are emotions, propensities, faculties and conditions of an individual' (p. 9) is thus quite improper. (On p. 95, however, *saṃskāra* is referred to as 'mental formations'.)

There are some misleading pieces of information in the sections on Buddhist schools and Buddhist literature. Contrary to what the author claims (p. 80), *Abhidharmakośa* is available in Sanskrit (published by Bauddhabharati, Varanasi, 1960); and the commentary on *Abhidharmakośa* is not by the author Vasubandhu himself (p. 81), but

by Yaśomitra (*Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*). In introducing Sarvāstivādins, the author remarks, 'They advocate the permanent reality of things' (p. 29). It is difficult to reconcile this remark with the fact that most schools of Buddhism accept the doctrine of impermanence (*anityatā*).

A glossary is a list with explanations of abstruse, obselete technical terms. An encyclopaedia is a book containing extensive information on a particular branch of study. A dictionary, however, is concerned with explaining and translating words giving their meaning and etymology. However, the book under review fails to discharge its specific function of a glossary proper on a number of occasions. Some of its entries are fit for an encyclopaedia giving detailed information and hardly bothering to explain the various concepts contained in it. These comprise entries like *āryasatyāni* (pp. 101–9), *bodhisattvabhūmi* (pp. 121–5), *bodhyāṅgāni* (pp. 125–30), *pāramitā* (pp. 163–9), *pratītyasamutpāda* (pp. 172–80), *saptaviśuddhi* (pp. 190–93) and *yāna* (pp. 213–19). Expositions of terms like *anātman* (pp. 95–6), *śūnya* and *śūnyatā* (pp. 200–201), *vipaśyanā* (pp. 212–13), are concerned, to a large extent, with showing variations in meaning in the different Buddhist schools. Accordingly, these expositions resemble those found in a dictionary. Sometimes the glossorial contents consist of enumerations, offering no explanation. Consider, for example, contents like *āhāra* (pp. 90–91), *artha* (p. 100), *bodhipakṣīyadharmāḥ* (p. 119), *indriya* (pp. 147–8), *navāṅga-śāsana* (pp. 159–60). Items in the Appendices (pp. 223–45) are also purely enumerative.

The selection of the glossorial material is arbitrary and badly planned. The entries are supposed to be in Sanskrit and Pali; and yet we find entries like 'Epithets of the Buddha' (pp. 133–5), 'Admission to saṅgha' (pp. 187–90). One wonders why Buddhagaya is treated as a glossorial content. One also wonders why, under the heading, 'glossary', pages 85–7 are filled with quotations from Pali and Sanskrit texts, without any translation and exact textual references. Arbitrariness in the selection of contents is evident from the selection of the Vaibhāṣika school (p. 209) to the utter neglect of the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools. Arbitrariness is also evident in the survey of Buddhist literature (in the Introduction), where important epistemo-

logical and logical works like *Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pramāṇavārttika, Hetubindu, Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, Apohasiddhi* and Jñānaśrīmitra's treatises are completely ignored.

I would like to mention below just a few instances of inconsistent, insufficient, incomprehensible and misleading treatment of some of the items in the glossary:

(i) *Ālayavijñāna* (pp. 93–4). The author states, 'The unchanging aspect of ālayavijñāna is known as Tathatā.' This contradicts the very next statement, 'However the ālayavijñāna is characterized by changefulness' (p. 94).

(ii) *Avyākṛtadharmāḥ* (pp. 113–14). According to the Buddhist tradition, there are 12 *avyākṛtadharmas*. However, the author mentions only 10 such *dharmas*.

(iii) *Dharmacakra* (p. 144). The author's statement, 'Cakra means a wheel or establishment,' is incomprehensible.

(iv) *Kṣaṇika* and *kṣanikatva*. These concepts play vital roles in the logic and epistemology propounded by the followers of Dignāga. One fails to understand why the author omits them in the glossary.

(v) *Pratītyasamutpāda* (pp. 172–80). Although the author faithfully represents the 12 members of the causal chain involved in the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*, she fails to explain the specific way in which an earlier member acts as the cause of the later one.

(vi) *Śūnya* and *Śūnyatā* (pp. 200–201). Although the concepts play important roles in early Buddhism, they acquire the highest significance in Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially Mādhyamika philosophy. Yet the author does not even make an honest attempt to analyze the complex nuances of these concepts as found in various Mahāyāna texts. The cognate concepts of essencelessness (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*) and relativity (*āpekṣikatā*) are not even mentioned in the discussion of these entries. The expositions of these concepts are highly unsatisfactory.

(vii) *Vijñapti* (p. 210). The author interprets it as 'intimation, proclamation', thereby completely ignoring its import in the Vijñānavāda philosophy.

(viii) *The Yogācāra School* (pp. 26–7). To say, as the author does, that (i) 'it admits the reality of mind', and (ii) 'It is subjective idealism', is highly misleading. The school admits the reality of non-dual pure consciousness, and it represents a form of absolute idealism.

In spite of the lapses of the work mentioned above, it must be admitted that the author has made painstaking efforts in expounding some of the abhidhārmic concepts, largely neglected hitherto, in the dictionaries and encyclopaedias on Buddhism (even if it is at the cost of neglecting some important concepts of Mahāyāna philosophy and Buddhist epistemology and logic). Those who do not bother much about technical nicety, will benefit, to some extent, from reading the book from the point of view of gaining some brief information on technical terms used in early Buddhism and abhidhārmic literature. The author is, however, advised to make a good revision in case she is interested in the second edition of the book.

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MRINAL MIRI: *Identity and the Moral Life,* New Delhi, OUP, 2003, pp. xvii + 132, Rs 395

The book comprises, besides the author's Introduction, thirteen papers, two of them (the second and the last) being very short. The papers are: 'Memory and Personal Identity', 'Persons and their Bodies', 'Self-deception', 'On Knowing Another Person', 'The Means–End Distinction', 'Rationality and Moral Life', 'Science and Prescience', 'Plurality of Cultures and Multi-culturalism', 'Morality and Moral Education', 'Politicians and the Instrumentality of Violence', 'On "Mainstream" and "Marginality" ', 'Gandhi on the Moral Life and Plurality of Religions' and 'A Note on the Idea of Human Rights'. Most of these are already published between 1973 and 2000 in journals like *Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, The Journal of Value Inquiry,*

Philosophical Studies, The Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research and some anthologies. The long span of time within which these have been written and published shows, in Miri's own words, 'how a philosopher's mode of thinking may change—at times quite unrecognizably—both in style and substance, and yet retain a thread of continuity that may be quite surprising' (Introduction, p. ix). The thread of continuity Miri speaks of is the moral and socio-political concerns we confront in our lived situation and the way we react to them in and through our deliberations and actions.

Seen as a whole, the papers clearly show a categorial distinction between the first two and the rest. The former indeed fall under the best examples of analytic/linguistic philosophy, largely practiced in the academic world but which he has happily outgrown. The latter show how gradually and systematically he has come to deliberate upon problems which have serious bearing upon man's moral, social and political concerns—the problems which deeply affect us in our real life and which go a long way in forging our authentic self understanding.

Before saying something about the papers, I would like to mention a few points about his 'Introduction' which is in itself a short paper. Here Miri raises some very significant and profound questions about how we do or ought to relate ourselves intellectually to our own philosophical tradition or to our history of philosophy. Miri invites us to think of this problematic in a manner that we can adequately conceptualize our understanding of a tradition irrespective of the method of doing it. Our philosophical concerns and moorings should be rooted in our own soil though we can use any tool of philosophizing available to us. On this point Miri shows predilection for a somewhat hermeneutical understanding of our tradition which must be critically viewed, its defects and shortcomings from the contemporary standpoint be brought out and, if necessary, it may be transformed. In all this critical exercise recourse may be taken to the earlier phase of this very tradition.

In his paper on memory and personal identity, Miri subjects the views of Sydney Shoemaker and D. Wiggins that memory is an essential condition and a criterion of personal identity to incisive criticism and convincingly explains the difficulties inherent in such a view.

Similarly, he shows the inadequacies of Shoemaker's view that personal identity consists in bodily identity.

The second paper deals with one of Strawson's thought experiments picked up from *Individuals* (section 2 of the chapter on Persons). This short paper seeks to show the futility of the thought-experiment alleged to show the possibility of there being only one subject of experience having several different bodies.

While arguing for his position in both the papers Miri employs with his characteristic finesse the same analytical tools which have been used by the thinkers whose views he attacks. Both these papers show the centrality of the concept of person and personal identity in the deliberations on the nature of individual/person as the moral agent.

The paper 'Self-deception' treats the phenomenon of self-deception by offering causal analysis. The problem has great phenomenological significance and has also been discussed by existentialists like Sartre in his account of *bad faith*. He finds the similar difficulty which Miri records due to the fact that here there is identity between the deceiver and the deceived. Sartre, however, treats it as a temporary phase and thinks of it as finally impossible. Miri explains it in a more realistic manner—suggesting the role played by causal mechanism whereby one can condition oneself into believing what one knows to be false. More importantly, for Miri self-deception has primarily to do with concealment of some of ones motives from oneself. This is underlined by his view that one can have motives without actually acknowledging or avoiding them. (Extreme cases of this nature become fit for psychoanalytic explanations and subsequent treatment if necessary. But Miri does not resort to this sort of suggestion as he most probably thinks that within limits these are normal cases of man's refusal to acknowledge motives which he himself cannot approve of.) With causal mechanism one can and does condition oneself into disavowing motives one has. The important point which Miri makes (and which comes closer to Sartrean position) is that self-deception arises as we try to hide impure or bad motives from ourselves.

In his paper 'On Knowing Another Person' Miri addresses himself to the 'real-life problem of the accuracy and justice of ones claim to know another person'. The use of the term 'justice' ensures that any

such knowledge-claim is not only justifiable but it must also be seen as doing justice to the person who is the object of the knowledge-claim. Surely, this line of thinking seeks to assert that any genuine knowledge of man cannot be value-neutral. Miri refers to Strawson's distinction between 'objective' and 'reactive' or 'participatory' attitudes in ones relationship with other human beings. Miri expresses his agreement with Strawson's distinction and favours the employment of reactive/participative approach towards our understanding of other persons because, as he rightly holds, the objective attitude gives us an incomplete picture, a '*broken image*', of the person concerned. The objective knowledge treats the person as an *object*—a mere subject of inquiry. Miri's main thesis is that 'love alone provides the condition in which the reality of another person presents itself to one' (p. 43). The sense in which Miri talks of love includes sympathy or Husserl's 'empathy'. This interesting paper belongs to the genre of writings of men like Buber, Polanyi or Marcel. Miri would surely accept Marcel's distinction between 'problem' and 'mystery' or his concept of 'participation', Polanyi's 'personal knowledge' and Buber's account of 'I–thou' relationship. Miri, however, suggests closeness between his view and Gandhi's concept of ahiṁsā. Buddha's 'karuṇā' is also another parallel.

The paper on means–ends and rationality examines the place of rationality in morals by arguing for 'different levels of employment of the idea of rationality in the sphere of what has been called practical reasoning' (p. 47). Rationality in action, as he suggests, is not restricted to means–ends distinction. He contests the view of rationality of action which is based on the ideas of possibility, efficaciousness and avoidance of undesirable consequences. There are many actions which lie beyond the pale of these conditions. For example, there are artistic activities, rituals and so many neurotic acts which cannot be thrown out from the sphere of rationality/irrationality divide. Relating the discussion of rationality to the question of rationality of ends, the moot point Miri seems to assert is that an end is moral which is known to be moral through practical reasoning, or what Aristotle called *phronesis*, not because of freedom. For Miri, the greatest guarantee of its rationality is that one knows it to be moral by exercise of reasoning and judgement. He does not accept the instrumentalist view of rationality

for which the end always justifies the means. He rather comes close to Gandhi's view that there is a means–ends continuum and the purity and morality of means is as important as those of ends. Freedom of consciousness does not create *ex nihilo* moral values. But even for Sartre freedom and responsibility are grounded in self-imposed commitment and 'good faith'. Even spontaneous flow of action, which Miri accepts as freedom, is not totally devoid of reasoning and decisions.

The essays 6 and 7 look into some thematic issues embedded into the identity of tribesman and examine the concept of development which is related to our understanding of science and prescience. The notion of personal identity is shown to hinge upon self-evaluation which could be weak or strong (cf. Taylor) but it is the latter which makes self-evaluation a meaningful, though sometimes inarticulate, self understanding. In this context Miri takes sides with men like MacIntyre for whom rationality and truth are both constitutive of tradition and are also constituted by it. Such a view steers clear through relativism and prescriptivism. Miri notes with a sense of loss and helplessness that modern vision robs tribal vision of its foundations and characteristic features. The latter thrives on freedom as spontaneity and the creative urge which run counter to the western model of development and progress—a 'whiggish' notion of progress. This is amply manifested in the Western, specially American, notion of peace and democracy (for the Third World indeed, à la Fukuyama).

The paper on mutliculturalism is a plea against cultural relativism since the concept of culture is rooted in natural history. Miri nevertheless allows for uniqueness of every culture, i.e., cultures are individuated and unrepeatable. But some post-modernists also would accept it and yet plead for some form of relativism.

A few papers towards the end deal with some practical problems that are of topical interest specially for us in India. His discussion of politics and violence brings into sharp relief moral compromises and commitment to power as inalienable features of modern day politics. In other words, we must accept Johnson's characterization of politics as *fait accompli.* The way out for Miri is decentralization which may reduce concentration of power. Gandhi also strongly advocated such a

view in his discussion on *swarāja.* Perhaps, less blood would be shed for lesser power.

In 'Mainstream and Marginality' Miri is acutely conscious of the fact that growth and development in India may go against linguistic and other diversities. But he recognizes that 'cultural diversity will not be a threat to the unity of the nation'. In a multi-cultural and multiethnic society, the survival of different cultures requires a 'secular space' which unfortunately has not found universal favour in our country. From some quarters there have been shrill cries, though for purely political reasons, to impose 'acculturation' based on the mistaken view of 'one country one culture'. However, the genius and spirit of India have always upheld mutual interaction and dialogical communication with different cultures rooted in different languages and religions. This has given rise to fluid cultural boundaries with large similarities among them. There is indeed enough hope that this spirit would continue.

To conclude, the papers on the whole make very interesting reading and enable us to look into the concerns and commitment of a thinker for whom philosophical activity is not confined only to purely intellectual and theoretical issues. Miri is more often inclined to deliberate upon social and political problems and grapples with them with the spirit of honesty and integrity. The volume truly mirrors, as he suggests in the *Introduction*, the intellectual transformations he has passed through. Both philosophers and social scientists would find it extremely readable.

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Nirmalangshu Mukherji: *The Cartesian Mind: Reflections on Language and Music*, Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2000, 81-85952-77-9, pp. x + 129, Rs 200

In the book under review, Mukherji (hereinafter M) proposes that there is a philosophically interesting level at which language and music are not just similar, but identical. He thus faces 'the hard task of explaining

the phenomenal differences while upholding that the domains, at some abstract level of description, are essentially the same. This is what I shall claim regarding the domains of language and music. In other words, there is no delineable module of the mind that is dedicated only to linguistic information. This is my basic disagreement with Chomsky.

'But I wish to claim more. I will suggest that when we look closely at the unique features of the abstract and shared principles underlying language and music, they seem to satisfy the requirements of Cartesian mind, as discussed above. To that extent, the human mind is not modular; in fact, it is a singularity consisting of those abstract principles which, when they interface with components *outside* the mind, produce disjoint effects such as language, music and the like. Quite obviously, much of the current notions of domain, module, mind and body need to be revised at various points to make sense of the picture just sketched' (30).

What work does the book do? Just how does M go about unpacking and substantiating his claim? M admits that the account he offers here 'is largely informal and speculative' and should be read in the context of the fact that he 'hope[s] to add more formal and empirical content in subsequent work' (7). For what he calls methodological reasons, M proposes to 'restrict this inquiry to raising a series of plausibility arguments to suggest that it will be extremely counterintuitive if it in fact turns out that, despite stark similarities of a rather unique kind, no shared account could be given to some central aspects of language and music. The discussion is basically intended to settle intuitions on these stark similarities that demand a principled account. In that sense, this work is a plea for further research' (31).

For strategic purposes it helps that M has pitched his work at this level. Had he gone in for a more fleshed out account that goes into musicological details, any reviewer would have had to deal with those local details as well as potential principles nourishing a general enterprise. Few readers could have made use of a discussion of that sort. The musical enterprises of the individual cultures have not yet even begun to delegate their intellectual and aesthetic sovereignty to any comparative musicology from which a cross-culturally acceptable

principle-based study of musical systems might emerge. That many people imagine that the Western classical musical systems are in some way proto-universal is not a valid starting point for any serious inquiry, but a fact about the imagination formats that have an unexamined hold on many minds. Any programme for research in cognitive science will need to recognize such ideas as non-starters.

Where do I, then, see any starters? What I welcome is M's decision to go into just the right level of linguistic detail, given that he cannot afford to make that move for the musicology side of his argument. He proposes that the alleged language faculty of the human mind, to which studies in generative linguistics have sought to contribute, should in fact be viewed as the application of a more broadly conceived faculty to the domain of language. The proposal is couched in such a way that it takes part in the discussion shaped by the generative linguistic restaging of the rationalism vs empiricism debate. Thus M's proposal does not come out as some kind of revival of the pre-generative proposal that general 'learning' mechanisms of an experience-driven intelligence (shared by humans with other higher animals) suffice to explain the phenomena of language acquisition. M assumes, with generative linguistics, that a distinctive human supplement, 'the Cartesian mind', is what gives humans alone access to language. M takes over also, from pioneering generativist work by Lerdahl and Jackendoff at the linguistics-musicology interface, the conjecture that this distinctive human mind needs to be conceptualized at a level that unifies human linguistic and musical abilities.

What M contributes to this discussion can be itemized as follows. Vis-à-vis the formal task of characterizing the Cartesian mind on the basis of investigations in linguistics and musicology, M proposes that the language-music unification should be attempted at the level of abstract principles rather than operational rules or structures. In terms of the distinctly musicological aspect of such a project, M renews Lerdahl and Jackendoff's (1983) classicalist focus, extending their argument to Hindustani classical music, and suggests a strategy (I will discuss it later) for addressing the objection that a majority of humans seem to display little if any talent for music in general and classical music in particular. Finally, at the level of the foundations of cognitive

science in the philosophy of mind, M argues that the philosophical project of characterizing mental processes in terms of formal operations on representations, on a full Cartesian scale whose language-music unification restores the nonmodular essence of Descartes' classical *res cogitans* itself, is strengthened by a research strategy that picks up on the formal nature of linguistic representations. On this basis M de-emphasizes the naïve word and thing approach to the way language supposedly corresponds to the objectual world.

In all three strands of his inquiry M is careful to stress the limited scope of the argument he offers. M seeks to show only that it makes sense to aim for a unified formal characterization along the lines of the Cartesian mind approach even though the actual goal will remain far from our grasp in the short term. It is important to bear this tentativeness in mind as we take the points up for separate discussion.

The principle-based unification strand of the argument is likely to interest formally inclined readers most directly. Recall that the whole project of working towards formal generalizations subsuming linguistics and musicology had originated in the observation that something like syntactic transformations could be usefully said to turn certain basic musical passages into those variants through which their conceptual constancy through perceptual multiplicity was recognized by listeners. When that project was under active discussion in the late seventies, many participants believed that processes (formulated as dynamic transformations or as static correspondences) might be the common factor underwriting a future common formal approach to language and music. M suggests that that approach to the language-music unification problem be recast as part of the transition from rules to principles in linguistics that has been under way since the eighties.

To this end, M provides an exposition of the principles and parameters perspective in syntax, refers with approval to the minimalist turn in parametric syntactic research, and notes some advantages of launching the unification attempt from a platform based on a principle-focused account rather than a rule-driven one. Rules branch out, M argues, to match the diversity of the materials they deal with. Now, language and music grossly differ at the level of material and elicit correspondingly distinct types of rules. Thus an abstract unification

that somehow bridges those differences, even if constructible, would be likely to land us in a region of formal abstraction that exists only in the mathematics of such mappings and has no pertinence to what makes either language or music tick, let alone both. But principles one step more abstract than rules, M proposes, are relatively independent of the materials that the rules hug so closely.

M is happy to note that progress from the principles and parameters perspective to the minimalist one has followed the same path of increased detachment of the operative principles from details of the material that a syntactic representation contains. This degree of abstraction achieved in formal linguistics makes the project of a language-music unification look more feasible than it did in the seventies.

I agree with M that the language-music unification project must take part in shifts in formal linguistics, and also that the transition to a principled view of language will benefit the project. However, my reading of the transition under way is rather different from that of the formalists whose work M takes to be representative of contemporary linguistics. The substantivist perspective in linguistics (for expositions that provide conceptualizations and a representative sample of implementations, see Dasgupta, Ford and Singh 2000; Singh and Starosta 2003) construes the project of moving into principles in terms of sharpening the early abstract universalism into an interlocal set of enterprises involving concrete instantiations of the universal. Where formalists confine their localism to the syntagmatic axis, substantivism extends the locality principle onto the paradigmatic axis as well, thus creating a basis for moving older structuralist work on poetry into the generative epoch and renewing the contract between theorists of language and their colleagues in poetics. Another advantage of the substantivist approach to linguistics lies in its ability to keep faith with the individual speaker-listener's standpoint, while formalism tends to lapse into a grammarianship conceptually indistinguishable from the societal-hegemonic work of the old authoritarian pedagogues and their deceptively liberal structuralist replacements who still rule the world of language teaching. A third advantage is that substantivist linguistics is practically next door to a serious philosophical interest in pragmatics (on this aspect, see Ghosh-Sarkar 2003). I am sure that M and other

colleagues who wish for a serious language-music unification will be led by the exigencies of their own work to prefer substantivism to the default diet of formalism they have been living on for reasons more sociological than academic.

Let me be more specific. M finds it exciting that formalist linguistics at its minimalist moment chooses to stress not the properties of anaphoric or inflectional dependency that enforce the locality of internodal relations but such principles of economy as the minimal link condition or the blocking of less parsimonious derivations by more parsimonious ones. He hopes that this will make formal linguistics at its real base indistinguishable from the formal basis of human musical ability. The core of his hope is that it will then turn out that there are no modules in the technical sense, but that the same Cartesian mind applies to material in various domains to produce systems that only appear to diversify.

But this need not excite M as much as it does. The kinds of linguistic mechanism that make the local relations tick, whether in inflection or in anaphora, are tantalizingly analogous to the way little pieces of music remind you of the bigger passages that they are pieces of and cross-refer to. A truly principled approach to these matters will surely bring out fundamental points about abbreviation, expansion, exact and inexact repetition, and cross-reference that justify M's excitement, but are substantive rather than formal in an intuitive sense. It is entirely possible that to make sense of what is at stake M and other colleagues will have to push the project to the point of comparing smaller musical passages with linguistic sentences and real compositions with discourses. We have long known that cohesion in the systemic grammar sense is a standard property of discourse and that cross-reference devices are at this level obligatory, a fact that does not follow from formal grammar. Since the same is obviously true and significant in music, it would be surprising if an adequate theory of music were to have nothing to say about this shared property.

I turn now to the second strand in my itemization. M's musicology leans in a classicalist direction. This is obviously the right thing to do, as only the classical elaborations provide data that become crucial at the present stage of the inquiry M is engaged in. As the inquiry

progresses, I presume he will take on board some theory of formality that both makes sense of where the classical stands in the spectrum of musical conceptualization and matches some understanding of corresponding options in language. What I have in mind is something along the lines of diglossia theory, but that detail is not a point at which M's interests converge with mine. To find some common ground, let me focus on the fact that, as part of his classicalist stance, M suggests a strategy for addressing the standard objection that a majority of humans seem to display little if any talent for music in general and classical music in particular. His strategy is to stress the patterns of listening and identification rather than of production. M argues that whenever children get the right levels of exposure they do in fact burst into musical performance, indicating that the disparities are due to the sociologically explicable non-availability of a pedagogically adequate initial exposure in the case of music, whereas in the case of language acquisition exposure it is bio-socially impossible for children not to be given the necessary initial data base. Hence the facts as we know them.

I rather like the strategy M implements. But I would like it even better if M could take on board the fact that in these respects music is more closely analogous to poetry than to language. The next step for M's project might be to reconfigure the notion of formal so that it becomes a means for changing the equation in theory and practice between labour and art. Ordinary psychology's bare bones approach to ordinary actions and cognitions exceptionalizes art, plays into the hands of the old elitisms, and will not suffice to theorize labour. Humans need a minimum of art to make any action seriously social by injecting a concretely sharable rationality into its pattern. Art seems to make this rationality socially available, in ways I do not claim to understand or to have an articulate research programme for. I am merely predicting that M's emphasis on the cognitive will inevitably force his project to move into the question of rationality and into theories of the labour-art relation.

In connection with the third of the strands I have itemized, I will comment here only on the issue of semanticity. M tries to argue away the apparently massive difference between language which is meaningful and music which is not. His point is that current linguistic work that

explains what is distinctively human about language focuses not on the lexical meaning-linked aspects but precisely on the formal aspect of linguistic structure, which music also brings to the fore.

Here it seems clear that extending the scope of research to include discourse, a point I mention in connection with the first strand above, will help M's case. Cross-reference and progressive abbreviation in a text produce meaning both in language and in music, which is why a piece of music grows on you and becomes easier to remember, which means that you understand it at the only level cognition cares about.

In all three strands of his argument, I suspect M will gain from asking if a larger base of observable and pervasive common properties shared by language and music might flesh out in interesting ways the skeleton he has so admirably constructed on the basis of what he quite defensibly chooses to regard as state of the art theories in language. As the art changes, so will its state, and we in the disciplines of language studies are honoured to have M as a colleague who may help accelerate the changes we are part of.

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ओ ē, ō } (long) (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Ḳṛṣṇa* and not *Ḳṛishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൾ ḷ
ഴ ḷ.
ൺ ṇ
ർ ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Chola),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.