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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

The Beautiful as the Symbol of the Morally Good: The Role of Aesthetic Judgement in Kant's Critical Philosophy

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I. THE QUESTION

In *Critique of Judgement*[1] Kant establishes a link between aesthetics and morality. In the last paragraph of §40 he claims: 'If one could assume that the mere universal communicability of our feeling must of itself carry with it an interest for us (an assumption, however, which one is not entitled to conclude from the character of a merely reflective judgement): one would then be in a position to explain how the feeling in the judgement of taste comes to be exacted from everyone as a sort of duty';[2] and in §59 he claims: 'Now I say: the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this respect (that of a relation which is natural to everyone, and which may also be imputed to everyone else as a duty) does it please with a claim to the agreement of everyone else ... .'[3]

In spite of nearly two centuries of Kant scholarship we have yet to understand the nature of this link between morality and aesthetics.[4] We have not yet understood what Kant was doing when he linked morality to aesthetics. The present essay is an attempt to answer the question: How and why does Kant link aesthetics to morality?

II. THE ANSWER

The very title of the section III of the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*, 'The Critique of Judgement as a means of connecting the two parts of philosophy in a whole', makes it clear that Kant is interested in effecting a combination of understanding and reason through the faculty of judgement, i.e., combination of theoretical understanding

with practical reason through both judgement of taste and teleological judgement. When Kant is linking morality with aesthetic judgement he is preparing ground for teleological judgement, i.e., teleology of nature, through which Kant will effect the combination of nature with freedom, or theoretical knowledge with morality.

According to Kant, '... sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest ... .'[5] Kant further writes, 'Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.'[6]

What are the essential ends of human reason to which all knowledge is related by philosophy as a science? According to Kant, 'Essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view of the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can be so described. Essential ends are therefore either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are necessarily connected with the former as means.'[7] What is the ultimate end of reason as distinguished from subordinate ends? 'The former is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy.'[8] In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant has identified the ultimate end of reason very clearly. There he writes, '... reason ... recognizes as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will ... .'[9] The subordinate ends are the numerous subjective ends to achieve which we develop skill through the knowledge of technically-practical rules derived from theoretical philosophy. So theoretical philosophy as a science is at the service of *technology* to achieve all sorts of subjective ends. The reason concerned with the subordinate essential ends is, therefore, theoretical reason or to put it in another way one can say that theoretical use of reason is concerned with subordinate essential ends.

Kant was a genius. He recognized that to elaborate different interests and knowledge from different interests presupposes a more basic mode of knowledge which itself helps us in recognizing what the interests are and harmonizing these interests. This basic mode of knowledge cannot be interest guided, as it would remain blind to other interests. It was his *Critique of Judgement*, which elaborated a form of knowledge,

which is independent of all interest. It is knowledge from the point of view of disinterested spectator. The figure of disinterested spectator is nothing but a dramatic presentation of faculty of judgement. The hint of that faculty is given when Kant writes in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, 'One observation is possible without any need for subtle reflexion and, we may assume, can be made by the most ordinary intelligence—no doubt in its own fashion through some obscure discrimination of the power of judgement known to it as "feeling".'[10] Mark the words 'some obscure discrimination of the power of judgement known to it as "feeling".' The faculty of judgement referred to is known as faculty of 'feeling' and this faculty of judgement is also the power of discrimination. Which faculty is being referred to here? Compare this description with the description of a faculty of judgement in the *Critique of Judgement*. 'To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with ones cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is quite different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more to its *feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating*, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind (*Gemüt*) is conscious in the feeling of its state.'[11] Because of the identity of the two descriptions of the faculty of discrimination we can say that the faculty of discrimination, Kant is appealing to, is the faculty of aesthetic judgement, which belongs to the disinterested spectator. Estimating and discriminating is a kind of knowing but different from knowing scientifically. And hence in the quotation above when Kant says that the faculty of discriminating and estimating contributes nothing to knowledge, he means contributes nothing to empirical knowledge of natural sciences.

For Kant interest-guided knowledge presupposes a prior knowledge based on disinterested delight. Whether empirical interest in the object of inclination, which requires technically-practical knowledge, or intellectual interest in goodwill which needs morally-practical knowledge,

both presuppose taste or disinterested delight. It is the knowledge based on disinterested delight of taste, which by uniting theoretical with the practical reason, brings into accord and harmony the knowledge elaborated from the point of view of technically practical interest and knowledge elaborated from the point of view of morally practical interest.

So before Kant develops his theory of teleological judgement where he unites all these interests, he had to develop theory of judgement of taste, which caters to no end or interest. But this aspect of Kant's theory of interests, i.e., that Kant's theory of interests is grounded in a knowledge based on a higher faculty of discrimination which is of the nature of feeling, which caters to no interest or end, is not understood properly by modern thinkers including even Paul Guyer, who wrote a massive commentary, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*,[12] on just the first half of Kant's *Critique of Judgement* dealing with aesthetic judgement. The second half of *Critique of Judgement* deals with teleological judgement. Paul Guyer's book is full of analysis and facts about what Kant says regarding aesthetic judgement, but it is completely bereft of any insight about what Kant was up to in this part of the *Critique of Judgement.*

III. THE NEED TO COMBINE THEORETICAL WITH PRACTICAL REASON

Before we investigate how Kant is going to effect the union of the two, i.e. aesthetics and morality, let us ask why it is necessary for Kant to combine theoretical reason with practical reason. In the very first section, entitled 'Division of Philosophy', of the introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*, he makes it clear that theoretical reason is nothing but technically practical reason as laws of nature discovered by the natural sciences give rise to technically practical rules or rules of skill to achieve numerous subjective ends. According to Kant, the possibility of scientific knowledge in its turn requires that, '... only understanding (and the will insofar as it can be determined by understanding) is free and is pure self-activity which is determined by nothing other than by itself. Without this original and unchangeable spontaneity we would not know anything *a priori*, for we would be determined in everything and even our thoughts would be subject to empirical laws. The faculty to think and to act *a priori* is the sole condition for the possibility of

the origin of all appearance, [Otherwise] even 'ought' would have no meaning.'[13] In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant was trying to provide a foundation to man's technological domination over the world, but in the process of providing the foundation to our new technological relation to the world, he was logically forced to go beyond its base in modern empirical sciences, to the traditional forms of human relation to the world as embodied in the tradition of Greek philosophy and in the message of the Christian Church through the investigation of pure and free self activity of the understanding and the will. So the reconciliation of sciences as the foundation of a new relation to the world with the tradition of Greek philosophy, as the embodiment of everything men knew about God, the world, and human life, and with the message of the Christian Church, became a problem of his critical philosophy beginning with his first critique.

Be it noted theoretical use of reason requires for its own success another use of reason, i.e. morally practical use of reason. To make it possible that there is a morally practical use of reason, the theoretical use of reason needs to be limited and prevented from entering the region of morally practical use of reason. So mankind has to heed to a self-binding rule for mankind in its development and use of modern technology based on theoretical use of reason. This self-binding rule is the categorical imperative: We ought to '*Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.*'[14] Here humanity can refer to nothing but *Willkür* only for it is simultaneously the capacity both to choose ends and to produce the ends chosen. If technological knowledge is for all, this capacity of each must be respected. To follow this categorical imperative Kant needs to recover the Greek notion of morally practical action (*agere*, *πράττειν*).

What is the Greek notion of morally practical action (*agere*, *πράττειν*)? To answer this question we have to understand a distinction made by Greek thinkers. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle distinguished *phronēsis* from *technē* (skill), which was the model of ethics according to sophists. For all three of them knowledge of the good cannot be understood taking *technē* as a model. In *Meno* of Plato, Socrates says, '*... phronēsis ara phamen aretēn einai ētoi sympasan ē meros ti*' (we

say then that phronēsis is *aretē*, be it either the whole of it or a part). According to Plato and Socrates, *phronēsis* plays a role in *aretē* but they leave open the question whether other things beside *phronēsis* also play a role. Aristotle also makes the same point in *Nicomachean Ethics*.[15] The *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle opens with a distinction between two kinds of actions: (1) actions, which are ends in themselves and are designated by the Greek verb πράττειν 'doing' or 'acting' and (2) actions, which are designated by the Greek verb ποιείν 'making' or 'producing' and have ends different from these activities themselves and these ends are produced by these actions as consequences. According to Aristotle, *technē* is the reasoned state of capacity to make, while *phronēsis* is the reasoned state of capacity to act. In his view: '... making and acting are different ... so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting.'[16] So for Aristotle, making and acting are mutually exclusive categories. 'For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.'[17] Since *phronēsis* is concerned with action, where the good action itself is its end, it is not concerned with any action, which has an end other than itself, and hence it is not involved in *technē*.

This classical distinction of two kinds of action is further elaborated in Middle Ages. St. Thomas Aquinas also elaborates Aristotelian distinction in the *Summa Theologica* under the question 'Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art'. He comments: 'The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made", whereas prudence is the "right reason of things to be done".'[18] He translates the Greek verbs ποιείν and πράττειν with Latin verbs *facere* and *agere* respectively. He writes, 'Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ ... in that making (*facere*) is an action passing into outward matter, e.g., to build, to saw and so forth; whereas doing (*agere*) is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. to see, to will and the like ... consequently it is requisite for prudence ... that man be well disposed with regard to the end, and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. On the other hand, the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves, whereas art does not presuppose

rectitude of the appetite.'[19] A little further on he writes, 'The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man.'[20] In his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*, Aquinas again makes the point, 'Wherefore Prudence, which is concerned with man's good (*human bona*) of necessity has the moral virtues joined with it ... Not however Art, which is concerned with exterior goods (*bona exteriora*).'[21]

These quotations make it amply clear that art is concerned with making (*facere*, ποιείν) which results in modification of external matter, and morality has nothing to do with it, only the principles of evaluation of product are involved in it. Morality is concerned with acting or doing (πράττειν, *agere*) which abides in the agent himself and requires rectitude of appetite unlike making.

But *Critique of Pure Reason* has left no room for the Greek notion of morally practical action (*agere*, πράττείν). As §43 of *Critique of Judgement* makes clear, this kind of action is reduced to natural operations and they cease to be human actions. In §43 Kant explains the nature of action designated by this verb '*agere*' when he himself elaborates the distinction between art and nature. In his words, 'Art is distinguished from nature as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (*opus*) from operation (*effectus*).'[22] Further, 'By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art, that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is product of their nature (or instinct) and it is only to their creator that we ascribe it as art.'[23] This is the case because, for the *First Critique*, an action is nothing but causing an effect, where effect is the chosen subjective end and the action is the means to that end. The end is achieved as the consequence of the action, the action being the cause. For the *First Critique* the will is nothing but the spontaneous capacity to begin a chain of cause and effect with free choice. But this action is the business of technically practical reason or theoretical reason but not morally practical reason.

So in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, in the first chapter, Kant has made the moral value of the good will not only independent of the consequences of action but also independent of the action itself. Kant asserts it explicitly in the second chapter, '... for when moral value is in question, we are concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with their inner principles, which we cannot see.'[24] Kant makes the moral value of good will even independent of the moral feeling called the 'reverence' for the law. Why?

The epistemic metaphysics of the *First Critique* further influences the formulation of the moral law. When any member of the society takes the stance of the subject, i.e., conceives himself as subject to get knowledge of society, i.e., conceives society as the object of knowledge, then he must reflect himself out of society, out of all social relations, since the transcendental condition of the epistemic relation as determined by modernity requires that the duality of subject and object be maintained. To maintain the duality of subject and object, i.e., himself and society, the subject must conceive himself as a being outside the society. That is to say when any member of society conceives himself as the subject of the experiential relation of which the object is society, he must reflect himself out of all social relations, i.e., he must conceive himself as an individual who can exist independently of society. This is the transcendental requirement of the subject-object dichotomy applied to experience of society. That is to say if one looks at the society from the perspective of the subject and wants to have an objective knowledge of society then he must conceive of himself as an individual.

Any member who by taking the stance of subject reflects himself out of all social relations, also, when conceives each member of society as a subject, he reflects them each out of all social relations and hence conceives them all as individuals. So the logic of subject-object dichotomy leads inevitably to the collapse of society; the society is reflected out of existence, since each member is conceived as an individual. This is the reason why modernity cannot admit the ontological autonomy of society and admits only the primacy of existence of individuals and thereby begets metaphysical individualism in philosophy. Together with society, by similar arguments, both tradition and history also get dissolved as no one belongs to tradition and history.

The concept of individuals standing in no social relations to each other, and also without tradition and history, is the concept of state of nature of political philosophy generated by the analysis of cognitive experience of society by modernity. In other words when the metaphysics of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is brought to bear upon society then we are inevitably led to the idea of state of nature. That his *First Critique* has political consequences was clear to Kant and hence he introduces the idea of the ideal society that has to be established in the state of nature in the *First Critique* itself.[25]

In the state of nature according to Kant, 'Each will have his own right to do *what seems right and good to him*, independently of the opinion of others.'[26] In the state of nature without communion or dialogue with others each has to legislate morally. This brings in a contradiction. If individuals are in a state of nature then moral determination of the will must be possible for individuals in the state of nature. But the supreme principle of modern morality announced in the first chapter of his *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* makes a person essentially social since the moral determination of will takes place, if it is determined by Kantian supreme principle of morality, by fitness of the maxim of the will to be universal law. Judging the fitness of a maxim to be willed as universal law is a social phenomenon. In one of the formulations supreme principle can be stated as: so act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of kingdoms of ends. Many individuals determining their wills by universal laws stand in community. Kantian principle becomes inconsistent with the idea of individuals in state of nature, while he needs a conception of good will, which is good in all conditions, i.e., good irrespective of the condition obtaining. So it must be possible to have good will even in the state of nature. So to make the supreme principle applicable even in the state of nature some further transformation is needed. Kant undertakes the task of transformation through further abstraction of the supreme principle of morality by transcendental reflection in the second chapter of *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. By transforming moral law of practical reason into a categorical imperative by bringing in the idea of 'ought' to describe the relation of this law to 'a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective

constitution',[27] Kant in a master stroke has inscribed law in the perspective of the subjectivity of man without destroying his subjectivity, i.e., without making him a social being.

We mentioned above that Kant makes the moral value of good will even independent of the moral feeling called the 'reverence' for the law in the first chapter of the *Groundwork*. Now we can explain why he has to make the moral value independent of the moral feeling. Moral feeling is 'especially distinguished' from other feelings, that of the beautiful included, 'by the *modality* of a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, which contain not a mere *claim*, but also a *command* of approval from everyone.'[28] In the state of nature this is not possible as in the state of nature 'each will have his own right to do *what seems right and good to him*, independently of the opinion of others.'[29]

The peculiarity of Kantian categorical 'ought' as arrived at by the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* and established by the *Critique of Practical Reason* is that by itself it is not capable of resulting in a determinate action. According to Kant, 'But if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will'[30] then only the categorical 'ought' emerges. Reason needs the assistance of something else to determine the will so that it results in a determinate action. The notion of action that comes from the first *Critique* as explained above is just a means to an end chosen by the subjective individual. The real problem Kant has to face is how to effect the conjunction of categorical 'ought' with a determinate action. Mind you this will not be a simple task, for Kant is trying to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable. Categorical 'ought' requires us to motivate us to act with complete disregard of all ends while every determinate action has to be performed as a means to an end. This is the problem Kant has in mind when he talks of the problem of reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason, which he wants to solve through the critique of judgement.

For Kant the deduction of the judgement of taste is just a step in effecting the conjunction of theoretical reason with practical reason. So he needs an independent deduction of judgement of taste. If the deduction of judgement of taste is completed through morality, it will become ineffective in solving the problem of uniting the two uses of reason.

Kant was aware of the problem involved here while introducing the typic of categorical imperative in his ethical writings especially *Critique of Practical Reason*. But his attempt to solve the problem was unsuccessful. In *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant places the formula of the law of nature under what he calls the 'typic' of moral judgement. The need for typic arises because the actions of human beings as a possibility in the phenomenal world are all empirical in nature, while the moral law is completely independent of empirical considerations. Hence the moral law is not applicable to actions directly. The problem is similar to the problem of schematism of categories of understanding. The categories are *a priori* but the intuitions are empirical. So to make the categories applicable to intuitions we need to supply schemata of imagination for each category of understanding to make the latter applicable to intuitions. Similarly to make the moral law applicable to actions of human beings we need a '*type*' of the moral law. In Kant's words, 'The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible intuition, as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to it—that is, a general procedure of the imagination (by which it exhibits *a priori* to the senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law determines). But the law of freedom (that is, of a causality not subject to sensible conditions), and consequently the concept of the unconditionally good, cannot have any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the purposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a schema of the sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as law; such a law, however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call this law the type of the moral law.'[31] '[T]hat is to say, its purpose is to bring an Idea of reason nearer to intuition (in accordance with a certain analogy) and so nearer to feeling.'[32] Be it noted the '*typic*' of the moral law is supplied by understanding, unlike schemata, which is supplied by the faculty of imagination.

Kant distinguishes the typic of the categorical imperative from both empirical motives and symbolic presentation of morally good. He writes,

'This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, guards against the *empiricism* of practical reason, which founds the practical notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences (so called Happiness).'[33] And further, 'The same typic guards also against the *mysticism* of practical reason, which turns what served only as a *symbol* into a *schema*, that is, proposes to provide for the moral precepts actual intuitions, which however, are not sensible (intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God), and thus plunges into the transcendent.'[34] With this understanding of the typic, let us find out why Kant was bound to fail in his attempt.

Kant first introduced the law of nature formulation of the categorical imperative in *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* before he recognized it as a typic of the moral law in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The first formulation of the categorical imperative derived from the original formulation of the categorical imperative in the *Groundwork* is in terms of 'law of nature'. Why should Kant formulate the categorical imperative in terms of 'law of nature'? There was a long tradition both Greek as well as Biblical merging into one through St. Augustine of Hippo up to Montesquieu, enriched in between by Gratian, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, Johannes Althusis, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke which presented the common laws of humanity as such, as laws of nature. Starting with Thomas Hobbes laws of nature became laws known to man through reason even in the state of nature. Kant is also presenting the categorical imperative as the law of reason known to man (as non-social individual subject) in the state of nature. So it had to become the basis of all laws of nature. Hence Kant formulated the categorical imperative in terms of 'law of nature'.

As we know, Kant derives this formulation from the previous formulation of the categorical imperative. What kind of derivation is this? It is a derivation through reflection. Reflection involves comparison and abstraction. What is compared and what is abstracted? This will become clear when we proceed.

According to Kant, '... the universality of the law governing the production of effects constitutes what is properly called *nature* in its most general sense (nature as regards its form) ... .'[35] Why is nature in its most general sense (nature as regards its form) constituted by '... the

universality of the law governing the production of effects'? To find out we have to first look into the specific senses of nature. The teleology of nature brought in by Kant in the first chapter of the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* shows the Greek lineage of his moral philosophy. Mind you, Greek mind accepted the teleology of nature. Nature as teleological is one specific conception of nature. Kant has destroyed the constitutive claim of teleology in the knowledge of nature by the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Hence it generated another specific conception of nature as object of knowledge, which is non-teleological. Kant will recover the teleological conception of nature in *Critique of Judgement* taking nature as the object of teleological judgement of taste. As object of judgement of taste, nature has the form of finality. 'An end is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is finality (*forma finalis*).'[36] Since nature in this specific sense is constituted by the form of finality, which is the form of 'the causality of a concept in respect of its object', and also since the *form* of the causality is nothing but 'the universality of the law governing the production of effects' it follows that the teleological conception of nature involves the idea of '... the universality of the law governing the production of effects'. Similarly nature as the object of knowledge, which is another specific sense of nature, is nothing but the sum total of phenomena. For Kant phenomena are also governed by the universal law of causality, i.e., phenomena are also governed by the 'the universality of the law governing the production of effects'. So this specific conception of nature also involves the idea of 'the universality of the law governing the production of effects'. So the form common to both the conceptions of nature, which is nature in the most general sense of the term, is constituted by 'the universality of the law governing the production of effects'. So the comparison involved in reflection is the comparison of the two specific senses of nature and abstraction involved in the reflection is the abstraction from the differences of the two specific senses of nature.

The universal laws governing the production of effects are therefore laws of nature, nature understood in the most general sense of the term. In the categorical imperative the content enjoins the choosing of act of

production under universal laws, it can be formulated as: You ought to '*Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.*'[37]

Since act of production in case of man is through will, which is the faculty of producing objects through the conception of it, the categorical imperative is pushing Kant in the direction of the teleological conception of nature, which is the object of teleological judgement. So Kantian morality, to be followed, will involve judgement of taste. Why?

Since reflection brings in advance the morally-practical interest of the subject to constitute phronēsis into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration), Kant after giving this new formulation of the categorical imperative checks through examples whether he has succeeded in turning phronēsis into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration). Here his interest is not to teach how duties can be deduced from the categorical imperative. He is merely checking whether he has succeeded in formulating an *apodeictic* law fit for *apodeixis* (demonstration). Following the customary division of duties into duties towards self and duties towards others and into perfect and imperfect duties he takes one example each from the following four divisions: perfect duties towards self, perfect duties towards others, imperfect duties towards self, and imperfect duties towards others.

The question in the context of each example is this: Can he give justification (*logon didonai*) for this well-settled duty starting from his formulation of the categorical imperative in such a way that it has the form of a proof or demonstration (*apodeixis*)? Kant's demonstration of each well-settled duty consists of five steps.[38]

The first step: Identification of the maxim of the agent, which has the form: I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z. (Here X is an action and Y is an end, Z a state of affairs.)

The second step: Generalization of the maxim of the first step, which results in a universal precept of the form: Everyone is to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.

The third step: Transformation of the universal precept into a law of nature of the form: Everyone always does X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y, as if by a law of nature.

The fourth step: Think what will happen if it is willed that the law of nature of step three be added to the existing laws of nature.

The fifth step: If the addition of the law of nature of step three to the existing laws of nature results in a contradiction among the system of laws of nature at step four then decision is as follows: Not to do X is a perfect duty in circumstances C.

If the willing of the addition of the law of nature of step three to the existing laws of nature results not in a contradiction in the system of laws of nature but results in contradiction in willing itself due to deprivation of all-purpose means of achieving any possible end whatever that may be all the while wanting to achieve an end whatever that may be, at stage four, then the decision is as follows: Not to do X in circumstances C is an imperfect duty.

If neither of the above two possibilities arise then the contemplated action is not a matter of duty. It will be covered by the principle of right, with which the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* is not concerned. The details of these issues will be dealt with in the metaphysics of morals, which he will write later.

Be it noted, Kant is not giving an operational procedure to find out what our duties are in the *Groundwork*, for to make the categorical imperative operational we will need the beautiful as the symbol of morally good. So it will require judgement of taste also, which in turn require taking up the stance of the disinterested spectator which is the stance of the essentially an ideal social being. Here Kant is abstracting from all sociality to give morality a form so that it becomes fit enough for a non-social individual subject in the state of nature and he is checking whether his work of reflection is proceeding well by seeing whether the abstracted categorical imperative is good enough basis for giving reasons having the form of a demonstration. In this Kant succeeded remarkably well as his examples testify.

The examples of duties given for the law of nature formulation of the categorical imperative in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* make clear a significant difference between the way the practical reason resolves the choice (*prohairesis*) in Greek thought and the way the practical reason determines the choice (*Willkür*) in Kantian ethics. In Greek thought given justification (*logon didonai*) for choice (*prohairesis*)

consisted of true dialectic called *phronēsis* and it resolved the choice completely so that afterwards he can say, 'I could not have chosen otherwise'. But Kantian justification consisting of *apodeixis* does not resolve the choice completely. The categorical imperative procedure may result in perfect duty or imperfect duty or nothing. If it results in perfect duty it merely tells us what must not be done (prohibition) leaving open what is to be done. If it results in imperfect duty we still have to choose further, and if it results in neither then the contemplated action is permissible leaving it open to the agent to choose or not to choose it. So under none of the possibilities the choice is closed by Kantian practical reason through categorical imperative procedure. Hence Kantian reason by itself is not sufficient to resolve the choice completely. Hence it by itself is not practicable. It has to be supplemented by the natural faculty of genius under the guidance of judgement of taste. This kind of supplementation will transform the Kantian justification consisting of *apodeixis* of the form of categorical imperative procedure back into the Greek *phronēsis* from which it has been abstracted through reflection. That is to say, even with the typic, Kant has not solved the problem of complete determination of will, which can result in a determinate action. It will require further supplementation for this task.

Why has tradition of Kant interpretation not realized this need of supplementation of this kind? The answer is that the interpreter himself implicitly makes this kind of supplementation while making use of the Categorical Imperative procedure. Take for example Rawls as Kant interpreter. In the presentation of Categorical Imperative procedure he writes, 'At the first step, we have the agent's maxim, which is, let's suppose, rational from the agent's point of view ...'[39] Within the Kantian framework it is acceptable provided it is merely rational from the point of view of means end rationality for that is theoretical technical rationality. But the rationality assumed by Rawls even before the application of the Categorical Imperative procedure is much more than that. He explains, '... that is, the maxim is rational given the agent's situation and the available alternatives, together with the agent's desires, abilities, and beliefs (taken to be rational in the circumstances).'[40] Here the rationality is not merely of appropriateness of the action as a means

with the given end, but of the appropriateness of the end given the agent's circumstances, etc. and the appropriateness of the unless clause requiring imagination, etc. also. The latter rationality is what Kant's *Critique of Judgement* covers. Not only that, according to Rawls, 'The maxim is also assumed to be sincere: that is, it reflects the agent's actual reason for the intended action as the agent. Presumed to be lucid, would truthfully describe them.'[41] Here 'sincerity' is troublesome as it itself is a moral quality, which needs justification through Categorical Imperative procedure. But more importantly presumption of lucidity of the agent is a supplementation. Lucidity is clearness of thought and style, which is an aesthetic quality. At step four Rawls remarks after bringing in the idea of social world, 'Let's also think of the social world as associated with the maxim at step (1).'[42] This presumption of Rawls is also in line with judgement of taste of Kant. In none of the critical enterprises does sociability play any role, except the *third critique*, that too in the context of judgement of taste. Judgement of taste claims for itself the validity of an ideal universal social agreement through mutual communication of members. If we describe the process of *phronēsis* through Kantian terminology then it is a process of arriving at a maxim, covered by some general law universally agreed upon (*homologoumenon*) as good, through analogy with precedent of the law through communication with others in the society, which [maxim] can claim universal social agreement. When Kant abstracted the content of *apodeictic* categorical imperative from this *phronēsis* he took it to be the process of arriving at the maxim, which can be willed to be universal law. Here Aristotle misled Kant, for Aristotle models his exposition of the exercise of practical reason entirely on the logic of the theoretical syllogism used in demonstration (*apodeixis*). Kant never noticed that when Aristotle analyzes the exercise of this practical reason, he does not use decisions that are really practical or moral, but pragmatic, technical decisions instead. For Aristotle the exercise of really practical or moral reason is *phronēsis*.

Why can duties not be made operational by deciding the content through inclinations, which are not opposed to the duty? That is to say why can't we deduce duties from the categorical imperative and then make them operational by deciding which action to perform on the

basis of inclination if it is not opposed to duty? What's wrong with that procedure? The explanation will be found in the analysis of what happens when we transgress a duty. Kant writes, 'If we now attend to ourselves whenever we transgress a duty, we find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should become a universal law—since this is impossible for us—but rather that its opposite should remain a law universally: we only take the liberty of making an *exception* to it for ourselves (or even just for this once) to the advantage of our inclinations.'[43] When the inclination is in opposition to duty and we give in to inclinations then from the point of view of reason we get into a contradiction of will, 'the contradiction that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law and subjectively should not hold universally but should admit of exceptions.'[44] But how do we resolve this contradiction of will? 'Since, however, we first consider our action from the point of view of a will wholly in accord with reason, and then consider precisely the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination,' we avoid the contradiction, but see it rather as 'an opposition of inclination to the precept of reason (*antagonismus*), whereby the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) is turned into a mere generality (*generalitas*) so that the practical principle of reason may meet our maxim half way.'[45] Similarly, even if we do not transgress the duty, but make it operational through an inclination which is not opposed to duty, we make the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) turn into a mere generality (*generalitas*), for there is no guarantee that every person will have inclinations of such nature, so that it is now restricted to only those persons who have inclinations consistent with duty. Even in the persons who have inclinations consistent with duty, there may be more than one inclination consistent with the same duty, but opposed to each other, which is quite often the case. In that case we will have no way left to perform the dutiful action, as sagacity in combining the opposed inclinations is lacking in man. The procedure of turning the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) into a mere generality (*generalitas*) 'proves none the less that we in fact recognize the validity of the categorical imperative'[46] but nevertheless (with all respect for it) some times we make a few exceptions in favour of opposed inclinations, and further if we

make duties operational through favourable inclinations, then sometimes we will fail to perform dutiful action either due to lack of favourable inclination or due to the presence of too many mutually inconsistent favourable inclinations. But this procedure of turning the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) into a mere generality (*generalitas*) is not justified in 'our own impartial judgement'[47] according to Kant. What is that new element 'our own impartial judgement'? We can recognize it neither as a judgement of theoretical reason, nor as a judgement of practical reason. It is in fact the judgement of the familiar 'impartial rational spectator'. So it is the judgement of the disinterested rational spectator, which must come to our rescue here. That is to say the duties are made operational through the judgement of taste.[48]

Commentators like Guyer and Crawford[49] do not take the attempted solution of the problem of reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason through the *Critique of Judgement* of Kant seriously. Guyer writes, 'For those interested in the *Critique of Judgement*'s claim to effect a 'union of the legislation of the understanding and of reason by means of judgement,'[50] or to offer 'a mediating link for the union of the realm of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom,'[51] the thesis that beauty is the symbol of morality has been of great interest. It appears to the thesis by which Kant's promissory note of systematic significance for his aesthetics can be cashed in.'[52] Guyer is not interested in the larger pretensions of the third *Critique*. 'My own interest, however, has been confined throughout this study to the intersubjective validity of the judgement of taste, and I have limited consideration of the larger systematic pretensions of the third *Critique* to their bearing on this issue. I will maintain this policy in the discussion of §59, and restrict my discussion of this rich and suggestive section to its implications for the thesis that judgements of taste rationally demand intersubjective agreement in pleasurable response to given objects from others and impute it to them.'[53]

Crawford also interprets the third *Critique* with a limited objective. He also maintains that the argument that beauty is the symbol of morality completes Kant's deduction of aesthetic judgement. Crawford's view is that the connection of aesthetic judgement to morality can supplement the results of the deduction from purely epistemological grounds only

if the requirement of aesthetic judgement can actually be deduced from the requirements of morality, or if 'there is a basis for implying that others ought to agree with our judgements of taste, because they ought to be morally sensitive.'[54] Given this, he holds that 'to complete the deduction, Kant must argue or assume that moral sensitivity implies a sensitivity to that which symbolizes the basis of morality',[55] he then argues that §59 accomplishes such a completion, for what this section demonstrates, he says, is that 'our judgements marking the pleasure in the beautiful (and the sublime, too) can rightfully demand universal assent, not simply because they can be based on what can be universally communicated, but because they mark an experience of that which symbolizes morality.'[56] In Crawford's opinion, the fact that the beautiful symbolizes morality allows aesthetic sensitivity to be demanded of others in a way that the fact that the development of taste may be conducive to the development of a morally good disposition does not.[57] The argument of §59 is thus supposed to be an improvement over the earlier thesis that the harmonious accord in the play of the cognitive faculties merely 'promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling.'[58] Since Crawford thinks that §42's theory of interest in natural beauty also constructs only a 'tenuous link between the aesthetic and the moral, simply because this contemplation [of natural beauty] does not itself seem to be any firm indication of a morally good disposition,'[59] he believes that the argument of §59 must improve on the argument of that section too.

Guyer has 'also argued that the theories of §§29 and 42 cannot accomplish what appears to be required of the link between aesthetics and morality. The question that now arises, then, is whether the thesis that beauty is the symbol of morality is in fact significantly different from the thesis that taste may be conducive to morality and thus demanded on the grounds of morality. Does the argument of §59 in fact improve over those of §§29 and 42?'[60] But unlike Crawford, Guyer answers the question in the negative. 'Crawford has argued only that beauty's symbolism of the basis of morality justifies the demand for agreement in aesthetic response, so our first question may be whether the thesis of symbolism can accomplish even this much. It is by no means clear that it can ...'[61]

IV. THE ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT OF TASTE

The common assumption of many Kant scholars like Crawford, Elliott, and Guyer, is that in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* the deduction of the aesthetic judgement of taste is not completed even in §40. It extends beyond it through §§41 and 42 up to §§59 and 60. This assumption is wrong. Kant's deduction of the aesthetic judgement of taste is over by §40 and does not extend beyond it. And the link Kant establishes between morality and aesthetics presupposes a prior completion of this deduction and the link between aesthetics and morality is established for some other purpose. Let us, first, see how Kant is completing the deduction. The preparation for the deduction begins in §30 with the contention, 'The claim of an aesthetic judgement to universal validity for every subject, being a judgement which must rely on some *a priori* principle, stands in need of a deduction (i.e., a derivation of its title).'[62]

Before we try to understand the deduction, let us understand the nature of aesthetic judgement of beauty, which needs a deduction. 'Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful.'[63]

In judgement of beauty we are not 'concerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection).'[64] In judgement of beauty we are neither concerned with determining the object as existent, as that is the business of theoretical reason, nor concerned with bringing the object into existence, as that is the business of practical reason. To be disinterested is to disregard the aspect of existence of the object. In Kantian Critical philosophy what does it amount to, to be disinterested? Or to put it another way what does it amount to, to disregard that aspect of existence of an object according to Kant? For Kant existence 'is merely the positing of a thing ...'[65] '*Being*' means position, positedness of a thing, i.e., posited by thinking as an act of understanding. But this positing can only posit something as object, i.e., as something brought over against us, and thus bring it to a stand as something standing over *against* us [*Gegenstand*], if something that can be posited is *given* to our positing through sensuous intuition, i.e., through the affection of the sense. So to disregard the aspect of existence of an object is to

disregard its standing-over-against-ness [*gegenständigkeit*]. And hence to be disinterested means to disregard the object's standing-over-against-ness [*gegenständigkeit*].

To disregard the object's standing-over-against-ness [*gegenständigkeit*] is neither to confront the object as a 'subject', as that happens only in theoretical reason, nor to produce an object with a 'will', as that happens only in practical reason. So what kind of stance is taken to the object in aesthetic judgement according to Kant? The disinterested delight brings in the figure of disinterested spectator. Although this figure is not explicitly mentioned in *Critique of Judgement* yet it is very much present from the very beginning of the analytic of the beautiful. How can we say so? Do we have any reason to believe so?

In the very first paragraph of the first chapter of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant writes, '... a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will ...'[66] So it is only an impartial and rational *spectator* who *contemplates* a situation according to Kant. Since '... the judgement of taste is simply *contemplative*, i.e., it is a judgement which is indifferent as to existence of an object ...'[67] it follows that the very first rule of reflection on the beautiful is that it produces delight in the disinterested spectator. This delight is independent of the existence of the object of sense experience or object of will. It is only contemplative delight. The *General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals* distinguishes pleasure which may be the cause or effect of desire from 'that pleasure which is not necessarily connected with the desire of an object, and which, therefore, is not a pleasure in the existence of the object, but is merely attached to a mental representation alone, [and which] may be called inactive complacency, or mere *contemplative pleasure*'; and Kant then claims that 'The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure is what is called *taste*.'[68]

So it is not the stance of the subject to an object but the stance of the spectator to a spectacle without regard to its objective existence that is primary in the estimation of the beauty of an object. For Kant we take this stance of the disinterested spectator not only to objects, but only to the will of man. As we saw above Kant writes, '... a rational

and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will ...'[69] This implies that will of man is available to the disinterested spectator. Since will is not an object of experience it is not available to a subject for evaluation. It is available only when we take the stance of the disinterested spectator. When we take the stance of the subject to society taking society as an object we find ourselves in a state of nature where there is no society. But if we take the stance of a disinterested spectator society is available to us. The knowledge which a spectator has is distinguished by Kant from the knowledge which the subjective self has. The subjective self has only knowledge of nature, but the knowledge that a spectator has is called '*worldly knowledge*'. Kant explains, 'The most important object in the world, to which man can apply all progress in culture, is *man*, because he is his own ultimate end. To recognize him, therefore, in accordance with his species as an earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called *worldly knowledge*, even though he comprises only one part of the creatures of this earth.'[70] Knowledge of *man*, and indeed precisely with respect 'to what *he* makes, or can and ought to make of himself as a freely acting being,' i.e., *precisely not* knowledge of man in a 'physiological' respect, which is mere part of nature, is here termed knowledge of the *world*. Knowledge of the world is synonymous with pragmatic *anthropology* (knowledge of the human being). 'Such an anthropology, considered ... as *worldly knowledge*, is then not yet properly called *pragmatic* when it contains knowledge of *matters* in the world, e.g., of animals, plants, and minerals in various lands and climates, but when it contains knowledge of man as *citizen of the world*.'[71] That for Kant 'world' means precisely human existence in historical being with one another, and not the appearance of the human being in the nature as a species of living being, becomes especially clear from the turns of phrase that Kant has recourse to in clarifying this social concept of the world: 'knowing the world' and 'having class [world]'. Kant explains, 'for the first (the human being who knows the world) merely understands the game as a spectator, whereas the second has *played along with it*.'[72] Here world is the term for the social 'game' or play of human spectators. Such an engrossed spectator is not a reflectively self-

conscious person and not an individual standing apart from society; rather in his self-forgetfulness he essentially belongs to society through his speculative consciousness. This fact will emerge in the second rule of reflection on the beautiful.

Generally Kant is held guilty of subjectivization of aesthetics.[73] But to say only that is not a proper reading of the third *Critique* of Kant. He in fact is trying to overcome the subjectivity of man through aesthetics in the *Critique of Judgement*. But as any analogy works both ways, if Kant was trying to overcome subjectivity through aesthetics there was tendency to subjectivize aesthetics too. Hence the state of being of a disinterested spectator became just a stance or the point of view of the subject for most of the readers of Kant.

Firstly, it may be remembered that the notion of action, which is a means to an end set by a subject, and which is problematic from the moral point of view, arises because of self constituting itself as a subject confronting an object. By bringing in the spectator Kant is taking the first step in the direction of recovery of the notion of action, which can fit with the moral point of view. Secondly, the idea of self as an individual in the state of nature arises because of taking the stance of subject to society, i.e., taking society as an object. By bringing in the disinterested spectator Kant is preparing ground for making the man social through the second rule of reflection on beauty.

That Kant in fact is trying to overcome the subjectivity becomes clear in the second rule of reflection on the beautiful, which says, 'The beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is represented as the *object of a universal* delight.'[74]

This follows from the first rule of reflection according to Kant. 'For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground of delight for all men. For, since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or any other deliberate interest), but the subject feels himself completely *free* in respect of the liking which he accords to the object, he can find as reason for his delight no personal condition to which his own subjective self might alone be party. Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person and therefore he must

believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one.'[75] When disinterested spectator finds any object delightful then the object is delightful independent of all interest of the person. Hence the ground of delight obtaining in the object is valid for all persons.

This presence of universality in the estimate of the disinterested spectator makes his estimate a judgement of taste. Through this judgement of taste Kant is overcoming the subjectivity of man established by his First Critique. In §8 of *Critique of Judgement*, when Kant claims 'In a judgement of taste the universality of delight is only represented as subjective,'[76] he is *not* attempting at *subjectivization* of aesthetics; rather he only wants to deny the *objective universal validity* of judgement of taste. But when he says the judgement of taste has *subjective universal validity*, he is trying to overcome the *subjectivity* of man by attributing *universal validity* to his judgement of taste nonetheless.

This universality that one disinterested spectator can demand is only from all others as spectators. It is not an empirical universality. Since interested subjects (who have taken the stance of subject to an object) may not agree with the estimate of the spectator. They may not find the spectacle delightful from their interested point of view. Of course, it may, also, be the other way round. It may also happen that others have taken the stance of the spectator while a person himself has failed to take up that stance and hence others may not agree with his estimate. 'It may be a matter of uncertainty whether a person who thinks he is laying down judgement of taste, is, in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is what is contemplated in his judgement, and that consequently, it is meant to be a judgement of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the expression 'beauty'. For himself he can be certain on the point of his mere consciousness of the separation of everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the delight remaining to him; and this is all for which he promises himself the agreement of everyone—a claim which, under these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were it not that he frequently sinned against them, and thus passed an erroneous judgement of taste.'[77] So in taking the stance of the disinterested spectator one speaks in agreement with a *universal voice*. But how can the universality of voice through mutual correction be achieved? What are its conditions?

To answer this question let us find out what is involved in aesthetic delight. Kant writes: 'To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with ones cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is quite different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more to its feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind (*Gemüt*)[78] is conscious in the feeling of its state.'[79]

Be it noted when a person is conscious of a 'representation with an accompanying sensation of delight' then three things happen: (1) the representation under consideration is referred to his 'feeling of life', (2) the feeling founds a capacity for discrimination and estimation which makes no contribution to knowledge, and (3) this capacity of distinction and estimation compares the representation with the complete capacity for representation.

According to Kant in the aesthetic delight no concept is involved. So he argues: 'The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general. Now a representation, whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a source of cognition at all, imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations.'[80]

But his aesthetic delight must be universally valid. So 'this state of free play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must admit of universal communication.'[81] Otherwise cognition, as a definition of the object with which given representations (in any subject whatever) are to accord, will not be the one and only representation which is valid for everyone.[82] He further writes: 'As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of

representation in a judgement of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite concept, it can be nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these are in mutual accord, as is requisite for cognition in general); for we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for a cognition in general must be just as valid for every one, and consequently as universally communicable, as is any indeterminate cognition, which always rests upon that relation as its subjective condition.'[83]

What is more fundamental: the pleasure or the universal communicability of this pleasure? Kant argues that if the pleasure in a given object is the antecedent, and the universal communicability of this pleasure is all that the judgement of taste is meant to allow to the representation of the object as a consequent, then such a sequence would be self-contradictory. For a pleasure of that kind would be nothing but the feeling of mere agreeableness to the senses, and so, from its very nature, would possess no more than private validity, as it would be immediately dependent on the representation through which the object is given. Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgement of taste, must be, fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its consequent.[84] 'Nothing, however, is capable of being universally communicated but cognition and representation so far as appurtenant to cognition. For it is only as thus appurtenant that the representation is objective, and it is this alone that gives it a universal point of reference with which the power of representation of every one is obliged to harmonize. If, then, the determining ground of the judgement as to this universal communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective, that is to say, to be conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation *to cognition in general*.'[85]

So according to Kant the aesthetic judgement of taste postulates the universal communicability of the 'quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition

generally.'[86] For Kant this postulate is necessary not only for aesthetic judgement of taste but also for the act of knowing. 'Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e., the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise.'[87] As explained in the very first section of this essay Kant needs a different kind of knowledge, which is not based on interest to elaborate interest based knowledge. This is what Kant is claiming now.

It must be noted that Kant is interested in the recovery of the primacy of sociability of man through the aesthetic judgement of taste overcoming the subjectivity of persons.

It may be noted that for Kant judgement of taste is always singular. 'In their logical quantity, all judgements of taste are singular judgements.'[88] 'As a matter of fact, the judgement of taste is invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object.'[89] Singularity of judgement of taste is very important for Kant. Since judgement of taste is always on a particular object, it will help Kant in relating the categorical ought with a determinate (singular) action.

Kant will further define 'taste as the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept.'[90] For Kant communication and connection between concepts of reason with intuition are related. 'The aptitude of men for communicating their thoughts requires, also, a relation between the imagination and the understanding, in order to connect intuitions with concepts, and concepts, in turn, with intuitions, which both unite in cognition. But there the agreement of both mental powers is according to law, and under the constraint of definite concepts. Only when the imagination in its freedom stirs the understanding, and the understanding apart from concepts puts the imagination into regular play, does the representation communicate itself not as thought, but as an internal feeling of a final state of the mind.'[91] And Kant concludes, 'Taste is, therefore, the faculty of forming an *a priori* estimate of the communicability of the feeling that, without the mediation of a concept, are connected with a given representation.'[92] It is by universal communicability of quickening of feeling of life that we participate in common life of the people, which is the most fundamental aspect of our sociability.

The disinterested spectators are communicating with each other to achieve universality of voice through the free play of communication. When Kant explains 'knowing the world' and 'having class [world]' respectively as *merely understanding the game as a spectator* and as having *played along with it*[93] and when Kant claims 'A man of the world is a participator in the great game of life', and '*man of the world* means knowing ones relation to the other human beings and how things go in human life'[94] he has the free play of communication in mind. Since for Kant '*To have class* [*world*] means to have maxims and to emulate great examples. It comes from the French. One attains ones end through *conduite*, morals, dealings, etc.'[95] It follows that moral behaviour and action involves free play of communication too.

This postulate of universal communicability and hence sociability of man is not enough. What Kant needs is the persistence and sustenance of this communicability and sociability of man. For Kant sociability man cannot be produced artificially from the state of nature. So sociability of man is not something, which can be produced as an effect of action done with free will of first *Critique*. The problem of persistence of communicability and sociability is solved in the third rule of reflection on the beautiful.

Let us analyze the third rule of reflection on the beautiful, which says, 'Beauty is the form of *finality* in an object, so far as perceived in it *apart from the representation of an end.*'[96] What it means is that the communicative social spectacle in which the disinterested spectator is engrossed has the form of purposiveness apart from any representation of its purpose. Kant explains: 'The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the subject attending a

representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure itself, because it involves a determining ground of the subject's activity in respect of the quickening of its cognitive powers, and thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of cognition generally, but without being limited to a definite cognition, and consequently a mere form of the subjective finality of a representation in an aesthetic judgement. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither resembling that from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But still it involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving a continuance of the state of the representation itself and the active engagement of the cognitive powers without ulterior aim. We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself.'[97]

Kant is introducing here a third kind of causality different from both the causality of nature of theoretical reason and causality of free will of practical reason. The causality of nature merely relates the action to the end dependent on charm of the sense, the causality of free will merely relates the agent to the action so that we can say he has acted to achieve an end, but with these two causalities the law fails to determine the will by itself. Kant needs this third causality to make habitual obedience of law possible. Kant is making preparation for claiming, 'Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap ...'[98]

Since the free play of faculties and the consequent communication has no purpose such that when it is achieved then the play and the consequent communication will come to an end, the form of finality involved in beauty says nothing but that the form the play of faculties has and as a consequence the form that the communication has is what is intended here and hence whose continuance apart from any end is what is meant by the form of finality involved in beauty and this continuance of the play of faculties and communication is ensured through the *causality* of recognition of this form of finality in the free play of faculties and communication. The consciousness of this causality is what is felt as pleasure according to Kant. 'The consciousness of the causality of a representation in respect of the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may here be said

to denote in a general way what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for converting the state of the representations into their opposite (for hindering or removing them).'[99] Hence we belong to a communicative society because our engrossment as disinterested spectator of beauty of objects is strengthened by our mutual communication, which reproduces itself through disinterested delight in the beautiful object itself.

At this stage of the argument the engagement of the individual in the continued preservation of the primordial communicative social unity is not based on his recognition of it being a perfect society. 'Beauty, therefore, as a formal subjective finality, involves no thought whatsoever of a perfection of the object, as a would-be formal finality which yet, for all that, is objective: and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good, which represents both as differing only in their logical form, the first being merely a confused, the second a clearly defined, concept of perfection, while otherwise alike in content and origin, all goes for nothing: for then there would be no specific difference between them ...'[100] What is the basis of preservation of this communicative society? Kant writes, 'For since abstraction is made from this unity as end (what the thing is to be), nothing is left but the subjective finality of the representations in the mind of the subject intuiting. This gives a certain finality of the representative state of the subject, in which the subject feels itself quite at home in its effort to grasp a given form in the imagination, but no perfection of any object, the latter not being here thought through any concept.'[101] So the feeling of being at home in this communicative society is what keeps it in being as an on-going affair according to Kant. The feeling of being at home—pleasure or the consciousness of life—precedes even its recognition through concepts as to what it is by its members. Be it noted that Kant in the passages quoted above is speaking of 'object'; this object could be the communicative society itself, as we saw before the stance of spectator is taken to this primordial society too.

Kant introduces a distinction between two kinds of beauty. 'There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*), or beauty which is merely dependent (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does

presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects which come under the concept of a particular end.'[102] In light of the above distinction we can say the primordial communicative society, as an ongoing affair is a free beauty for Kant.

The last feature of our belongingness is to be discovered by the fourth rule of reflection on the beautiful, which says, 'The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a necessary delight.'[103] What it means is explained by Kant, 'The judgement of taste exacts agreement from everyone; and a person who describes something as beautiful insists that everyone ought to give the object in question his approval and follow suit in describing it as beautiful. The ought in aesthetic judgements, therefore, despite an accordance with all the requisite data for passing judgement, is still only pronounced conditionally. We are suitors for agreement from everyone else, because we are fortified with a ground common to all. Further, we would be able to count on this agreement, provided we were always assured of the correct subsumption of the case under that ground as the rule of approval.'[104]

We cannot rest with disagreement in communication in society; the quest for agreement in society must go on since common sense assures its possibility. Common sense is the ground of agreement in society. Kant writes, 'The judgement of taste, therefore, depends on our presupposing the existence of a common sense. (But this is not to be taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.) Only under the presupposition, I repeat, of such a common sense, are we able to lay down a judgement of taste.'[105]

So the last element discovered regarding our belongingness to a primordial communicative society is that we must seek agreement in communication since it is guaranteed by the presupposition that we have common sense.

V. THE DEDUCTION OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT OF TASTE

With this understanding of what Kant had in mind when he gave his analysis of the various moments of beauty we are in a position to understand Kant's deduction of the judgement of taste. The deduction is stated very briefly in §38 of *Critique of Judgement*: 'Admitting that in a pure judgement of taste the delight in the object is connected with the mere estimate of its form, then what we feel to be associated in the mind with the representation of the object is nothing else than its subjective finality for judgement. Since, now, in respect of the formal rules of estimating, apart from all matter (whether sensation or concept), judgement can only be directed to the subjective conditions of its employment in general (which is not restricted to the particular mode of sense nor to a particular concept of the understanding), and so can only be directed to that subjective factor which we may presuppose in all men (as requisite for a possible experience generally), it follows that the accordance of a representation with these conditions of the judgement must admit of being assumed valid *a priori* for everyone. In other words, we are warranted in exacting from everyone the pleasure or subjective finality of the representation in respect of the relation of the cognition faculties engaged in the estimate of a sensible object in general.'[106] A deduction merely shows how the judgement of taste is possible. To show the possibility of judgement of taste is to show the possibility of stance of disinterested spectator in communication of feeling of being at home in public in unison with all others. This is the subjective factor which can be universally presupposed in all men. The footnote to the passage given above explains the nature of the assumption of the so-called subjective factor. 'In order to be justified in claiming universal agreement an aesthetic judgement merely resting on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgement are identical with all men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought into action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as otherwise men would be incapable of communicating their representation or even their knowledge; (2) that the judgement has paid regard merely to this relation (consequently merely to the formal condition of the faculty of judgement), and is pure, i.e., is free from confusion either

with concepts of the object or sensations as determining grounds. If any mistake is made is this latter point, this only touches the incorrect application to a particular case of the right which a law gives us, and does not do away with the right generally.'[107] Kant explains what the deduction amounts to. 'All that it holds out for is that we are justified in presupposing that the same subjective conditions of judgement which we find in ourselves are universally present in every man, and further that we have rightly subsumed the given object under these conditions.'[108]

What is the justification of this presupposition? Be it noted that for Kant the common sense is 'the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.'[109] What kind of an effect is this? Kant explains, 'However, by the name *sensus communis* is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgement. This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate.'[110] This public sense called common sense is effected by the free play of faculties through communication, which in turn becomes the basis of agreement. What reason do we have for postulating such public sense? Kant gives the reason: '... a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts. But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. However, there must be one in which this internal ratio suitable for quickening (one faculty by the other) is best adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally; and this disposition can only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts). Since, now this disposition itself must

admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense: it follows that our assumption of it is well founded. And here, too, we do not have to take our stand on psychological observations, but we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism.'[111] Even the acceptance of knowledge of logic guarantees the existence of common sense. But more importantly for the deduction the possibility of common sense is guaranteed by the existence of the precedence and examples from the past of the successful exercise of common sense. These examples from the past show that mankind has achieved agreement in the past. Since common sense is collective public reason it requires well-stocked memory. Kant writes, 'There is no employment of our powers, no matter how free, not even of reason itself (which must create all its judgements from the common *a priori* source), which, if each individual had always to start afresh with the crude equipment of his natural state, would not get itself involved in blundering attempts, did not those of others tie before it as a warning. Not that predecessors make those who follow in their steps mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking in themselves for the principles, and so of adopting their own, often better, course.'[112] Be it noted Kant makes a distinction between following a precedent and imitating a precedent. He explains, 'Following which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert upon others ... . Taste, just because its judgement cannot be determined by concepts or precepts, is among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem. Thus it avoids an early lapse into crudity and a return to the rudeness of its earliest efforts.'[113] So without destroying the autonomy of taste Kant laid the possibility of completion of the deduction in the §32 of *Critique of Judgement*. But the deduction gets completed in §40.

VI. UNION OF TASTE WITH THE MORAL FEELING

With the above clarification of the judgement of taste and its deduction, we are in a position to understand how Kant is linking aesthetics to morality. In the first step Kant is showing the possibility of the union of the moral feeling with taste. How?

For this question first we have to answer another question: What is moral feeling for Kant? For him the moral feeling is *respect* (*reverence*), *Achtung*. Kant gives the analysis of respect in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, chapter III, 'On the Motives of Pure Practical Reason.'[114] He says: 'The essential thing in all determinations of the will by the moral law is that as a free will it should be determined solely by the law and, moreover, not merely without the co-operation of sensuous impulses but even with the repulsion of all such impulses and with the breaking off of all inclinations so far as they go counter to that law.'[115] Rupturing of sensible feelings 'is itself a feeling.'[116] This is in conformity to the well-known statement of Spinoza in his *Ethics* that an emotion can be overcome only by an emotion.[117] If a repulsion of sensible feeling is present, then positive feeling, which performs the repulsion is also present in it. Therefore Kant says, 'Consequently, we can see *a priori* [from the phenomenon of the repudiation of sensible feelings] that the moral law, as a determining ground of will, in thwarting all our inclinations [sensible feelings] must [itself] produce a feeling.'[118] According to Heidegger's analysis, 'All the sensible inclinations subjected to the break are inclinations in the sense of self-love and self-conceit. Moral law strikes down self-conceit.'[119] 'But as this law is something positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect; for, by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations, it weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks down, that is, humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest respect and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which is not of empirical origin, but is known *a priori*. Therefore respect for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite *a priori* and the necessity of which we can perceive.'[120] This feeling of respect for the law can 'be called a moral feeling'.[121] 'This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced simply

by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions nor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely as a motive to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we more suitably apply to this singular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal of reason only, and that pure practical reason.'[122] Be it noted, respect here is respect for the law as determining ground of moral action.

In a footnote in the *Groundwork*[123] Kant explains what he means by 'reverence'. Reverence is a feeling. But 'it is not a feeling *received* through outside influence,' that is to say it is not a pathological feeling. It is a feeling which is '*self-produced* a rational concept'.[124] Since all feelings of the former kind are reducible to inclination or fear, the feeling of reverence is distinct and separate from both inclination and fear. What a person recognizes immediately as law for him, he recognizes with reverence. Hence reverence means consciousness of the subordination of ones will to a law without the mediation of external influences on his senses. So it is a kind of immediate feeling. In Kant's words, 'Immediate determination of the will by the law and consciousness of this determination is called '*reverence*', so reverence is regarded as the *effect* of the law on the subject and not as the *cause* of the law.'[125] According to Kant, reverence is properly awareness of a value, which demolishes ones self love. Object of reverence is regarded neither as an object of inclination nor as an object of fear, yet it is analogous to both. 'The *object* of reverence is the *law* alone—that law which we impose *on ourselves* but yet as necessary in itself. Considered as a law, we are subject to it without any consultation of self-love; considered as self-imposed it is a consequence of our will. In the first respect it is analogous to fear, in the second to inclination.'[126] According to Kant even reverence for the person is nothing but reverence for the law, which he exemplifies. Even reverence for a talented man is reverence for the law. 'Because we regard the developments of our talents as a duty, we see too in a man of talent a sort of *example of the law* (the law of becoming like him by practice), and this is what constitutes our reverence for him.'[127] So ultimately, 'All moral *interest*, so-called, consists solely in *reverence* for the law.'[128] What Kant is

explaining here is borrowed from the ancient Greek philosophy. The ancient Greek philosophy, according to Heidegger, 'characterized practical behaviour in the broadest sense, orexis, by dioxis and phuge. Dioxis signifies following in the manner of pursuit, a striving toward something. Phuge signifies a yielding, fleeing, retreat from, striving away from. For dioxis, striving towards, Kant says inclination for; and for phuge, giving way before, he takes fear as a shrinking standing in fear of.'[129] Be it noted the ancients explained both dioxis and phuge for the context of striving, orexis of outward action or practical behaviour. But this outward action is missing in Kant's explanation of reverence. It is only an inner feeling although a moral feeling. Hence he speaks of only an analogy. According to Heidegger, 'He says that the feeling of respect has something analogous, something corresponding to the two phenomena, inclination and fear, striving toward and striving away from. He speaks of analogy because these two modifications of orexis, feeling are sensibly determined, whereas respect is a striving toward and simultaneously a striving away from of a purely mental kind.'[130]

But moral feeling is not sufficient to determine the will to action in case of man, as '*Duty is the necessity to act out of the reverence for the law*',[131] duty is expressed by an ought, which emerges 'if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will ...'[132] Feeling of reverence for the law merely gives a resistance in the form of an 'ought' and nothing more to contrary empirical inclinations. It cannot result in action by itself as moral feeling is 'especially distinguished' from other feelings, that of the beautiful included, 'by the *modality* of a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, which contain not a mere *claim*, but also a *command* of approval from everyone.'[133] In the state of nature this is not possible, as in the state of nature 'each will have his own right to do *what seems right and good to him*, independently of the opinion of others.'[134] So moral feeling needs the assistance of some other feeling, which will not destroy its purity and nature to conform to 'a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, which contain not a mere *claim*, but also a *command* of approval from everyone'[135] to result in determinate action. Kant had already in the *Groundwork* given a hint of that whose assistance morality needs when he writes regarding Francis Hutcheson's moral views, 'On the other hand, moral feeling, this alleged special

sense (however shallow be the appeal to it when men who are unable to *think* hope to help themselves out by *feeling*, even when the question is solely one of universal law, and however little feelings, differing as they naturally do from one another by an infinity of degrees, can supply a uniform measure of good and evil—let alone that one man by his feeling can make no valid judgements at all for others)—moral feeling still remains closer to morality and to its dignity in this respect: it does virtue the honour of ascribing to her *immediately* the approval and esteem in which she is held, and ***does not, as it were, tell her to her face that we are attached to her, not for her beauty***, but only for our own advantage.'[136] The implication is that according to Kant we must be attached to virtue because of its *beauty*. So morality needs the assistance of beauty according to Kant.

VII. THE ANALYTIC OF SUBLIME

Have we enough capacity to actualize the moral law even with the assistance of beauty? This is the question that is answered in the *Analytic of Sublime* in the *Critique of Judgement*. The mathematically sublime in nature makes us aware of our supersensible vocation. Kant claims, '... the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self—the subject); and this feeling renders, as it were, intuitable the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty of sensibility.'[137] According to him the aesthetic judgement in its estimation of a thing of nature as mathematically sublime refers the faculty of imagination 'to reason to bring out its subjective accord with ideas of reason (indeterminately indicated), i.e., to induce a temper of mind conformable to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it.'[138] In the representation of sublime in nature the mind of the subject feels itself set in motion. In the feeling of sublime in nature 'The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself, yet again for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out

such an effort on the part of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility.'[139]

Kant makes it clear that the above ideas of the kingdom of ends, the constitution based on the principle of right etc., give us the basis of the feeling of sublime. 'For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation.'[140] Kant defines, '*Sublime* is the name given to what is *absolutely great.*'[141] On the basis of this definition he argues: 'If, however, we call anything not alone great, but, without qualification, absolutely, and in every respect (beyond all comparison) great, that is to say, sublime, we soon perceive that for this it is not permissible to seek an appropriate standard outside itself, but merely in itself. It is a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence is comes that the sublime is not to be looked for in the things of nature, but only in our own ideas.'[142] According to Kant, 'in the practical sphere, the greatness of a particular virtue, or of public liberty and justice in a country' are such 'standard[s] given *a priori*, which by reason of the imperfections of the judging subject is restricted to subjective conditions of presentation *in concreto.*'[143] Hence Kant maintains, 'It is, in other words, for us a law (of reason), which goes to make us what we are, that we should esteem as small in comparison with ideas of reason everything which for us is great in nature as an object of sense; and that which makes us alive to the feeling of this supersensible side of our being harmonizes with that law.'[144]

The dynamically sublime in nature also makes us aware of our supersensible vocation. In the dynamically sublime in nature, 'the irresistibility of the might of nature forces upon us the recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature, but at the same time reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of nature, and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and brought into danger by external nature.'[145] That the dynamically sublime in nature has a social dimension is brought out by the example he gives of the dynamically sublime. 'War itself, provided it is conducted

with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation.'[146] Ultimately for Kant, 'Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own mind, in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature without us ...'[147]

Once the sublime in nature has made us aware of our capacity for the supersensible vocation, the next step is to show us the way to fulfil that vocation. This Kant does in §29 of his *Critique of Judgement.* There he writes significance of moral feeling is that it reveals 'the determinability of the powers of the subject by means of the representation of an *absolutely necessitating* law.'[148] Effect on feeling in the case of the absolutely good 'is not attributed to nature but to freedom,'[149] Kant continues, 'But the *determinability of the subject* by this idea [of freedom]—and, indeed, of a subject which in its sensibility can be conscious of *hindrances* but also of its superiority over them by its subjugation of them, through *modifications of its states*, that is, the moral feeling—is so closely related with aesthetic judgement and its formal conditions, that [the moral feeling] can serve to make the conformity to law of action from duty ***representable*** as aesthetic, that is, as sublime or even as beautiful; without sacrificing its purity; which could not be the case if one were to place [the moral feeling] in natural connection with the feeling of the agreeable.'[150] Be it noted, Kant is talking about representation of 'conformity to law of action from duty' as 'aesthetic', i.e., as sublime or beautiful. This idea of representation will play a very significant role later. The beautiful and the sublime, 'both united in the same subject, are final in relation to the moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, apart from any interest; the sublime, to treasure something, even in opposition to our own (sensuous) interest.'[151] If both the beautiful and the sublime are to perform their task the possibility of judgement of taste

requires independent justification, i.e., independent of morality. We have shown above how Kant undertakes the task of deduction of judgement of taste from §30 to §40 in the *Critique of Judgement* without bringing in morality.

So far in the deduction Kant has merely shown the possibility of judgement of taste by bringing in the sociability of mankind. And in §29 he had merely shown the possibility of the union of the moral feeling with taste without destroying the purity of the former. But he has not yet effected that union. Hence at the end of the deduction in §40 he claims: 'If one could assume that the mere universal communicability of his feeling must of itself carry with it an interest for us (an assumption, however, which one is not entitled to conclude from the character of a merely reflective judgement): one would then be in a position to explain how the feeling in the judgement of taste comes to be exacted from everyone as a sort of duty.'[152]

To combine taste with moral feeling, taste has to carry the moral interest. If taste carries moral interest by combination with moral feeling of reverence and duty is the necessity to act out of the reverence for the law, then in the first step we ought to have feeling in the judgement of taste to give effect to that interest, i.e., to make that interest result in action whose character is not yet known, for the model of action from the first *Critique* is not suitable here as argued before.

VIII. THE FINE ART

So Kant has to first clarify the nature of action associated with the interest that combines with the taste. This he does in the next five articles §§41–45. §41 is the most crucial for that gives direction to the inquiry regarding the nature of action, which must result from the moral interest. Commentators like Guyer simply fail to understand this article because they see it as a step in the completion of deduction of judgement of taste and not as a step in the inquiry into the nature of action that results from moral interest. The clue to the interpretation is given in the very opening paragraph of §41 when he states the saying, *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*, ['From possibility to actuality.'][153] Kant is here investigating how something becomes actual starting from its possibility.

Kant writes, 'Abundant proof has been given above to show that the judgement of taste by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest as its determining ground. But it does not follow from this that, after it has once been posited as a pure aesthetic judgement, an interest cannot then enter into combination with it. This combination, however, can never be anything but indirect. Taste must, that is to say, first of all, be represented in conjunction with something else, if the delight attending the mere reflection upon an object is to admit of having further conjoined with it a pleasure in the real existence of the object (as that wherein all interest consists). For the saying, *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*, which is applied to cognitive judgements, holds good here in the case of aesthetic judgements. Now this 'something else' may be something empirical, such as an inclination proper to the nature of human beings, or it may be something intellectual, as a property of the will whereby it admits of rational determination *a priori*. Both of these involve a delight in the existence of the object, and so can lay the foundation for an interest in what has already pleased of itself and without regard to any interest whatsoever.'[154] In this opening paragraph one is misled by the appearance and concludes that Kant is interested in the movement of possibility of judgement of taste to the actuality of judgement of taste. But that is not the issue, for judgement of taste can be realized even in combination with the empirical interest as the last sentence in the quotation makes clear.

Kant himself makes it clear that even empirical interest in society can actualize the judgement of taste from its possibility. 'The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in society. And if we admit that the impulse to society is natural to mankind, and that the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e., sociability, is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature intended for society, and one, therefore, that belongs to humanity, it is inevitable that we should also look upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our feeling to everyone else, and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural inclination of everyone is set.'[155] It will not affect or destroy the possible aesthetic normativity involved in the aesthetic judgement itself. 'Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a man, but a man refined after

the manner of his kind (the beginning of civilization)—for that is the estimate formed of one who has the bent and turn for communicating his pleasure to others, and who is not quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling of delight in it can be shared in communion with others. Further, a regard to universal communicability is a thing which everyone expects and requires from everyone else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself.'[156]

Even though empirical interest in society is capable of actualizing the aesthetic normativity of the judgement of taste, yet Kant makes it clear, 'This interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful by the inclination towards society; and, consequently, empirical, is, however, of no importance for us here.'[157] But if he is not interested in realizing judgement of taste via the empirical interest in society, i.e., inclination toward society, then why did he bring in the issue of empirical interest at all? This question can be answered only if we can interpret properly what Kant has said at the end of the previous paragraph, previous to the last quotation above. There he says, 'Eventually, when civilization has reached its height it makes this work of communication almost the main business of refined inclination, and the entire value of sensations is placed in the degree to which they permit of universal communication. At this stage, then, even where the pleasure which each one has in an object is but insignificant and possesses of itself no conspicuous interest, still the idea of its universal communicability almost indefinitely augments its value.'[158] Commentators generally fail to interpret this passage. Guyer does not even take note of it. Although it is couched in general terms applicable to all civilization, but no other civilization except Classical Greek had reached 'its height' to such an extent to make 'this work of communication almost the main business of refined inclination', and in which 'pleasure which each one has in an object' is 'almost infinitely' augmented by 'its universal communicability'. According to George H. Sabine, 'The Athenian lived in an atmosphere of oral discussion and conversation which it is difficult for the modern man to imagine.'[159] According to Hannah Arendt also classical Greek polis is a kind of body politic, 'which not without justification has been called the most talkative of the bodies politic'.[160] When Kant is talking about 'civilization' that 'has reached its height' and which 'makes this work of communication almost the main business of refined inclination' he is talking about the Classical Greek civilization.

Gadamer writes about this Classical Greek civilization, 'But what we can learn from the Greeks, the father of western thought, is precisely the fact that art belongs in the realm of what Aristotle called *poietike episteme*, the knowledge and facility appropriate to production.[161] What is common to the craftsman's producing and the artist's creating, and what distinguishes such knowing from theory or from practical knowing and deciding is that a work becomes separated from the activity. This is the essence of production and must be borne in mind if we wish to understand and evaluate the limits of the modern critique of the concept of the work, which has been directed against traditional art and the bourgeois cultivation of enjoyment associated with it. The common feature here is clearly the emergence of the work as the intended goal of regulated effort. The work is set free as such and released from the process of production because it is by definition destined for use. Plato always emphasized that the knowledge and skill of the producer are subordinate to considerations of use and depend upon the knowledge of the user of the product.[162] In the familiar Platonic example, it is the ship's master who determines what the shipbuilder is to build.[163] Thus the concept of the work points toward the sphere of common use and common understanding as the realm of intelligible communication.'[164] When Kant is talking about the 'stage' of civilization 'even where the pleasure which each one has in an object is but insignificant and possesses of itself no conspicuous interest, still the idea of its universal communicability almost indefinitely augments its value',[165] Kant is referring to the sphere to which work points in the Greek civilization, i.e., 'the sphere of common use and common understanding as the realm of intelligible communication.' For it is in this sphere it is true that even if the object gives insignificant pleasure to the individual, the very communicability of this pleasure augments its value almost infinitely.

To understand Kant's argument further we must have the clear picture of the civilization Kant is referring to in the passage under consideration. According to the Greek thinkers the distinctively human form of life is the *life of reason* (*logos*) *in common*. The life of reason

in common is constituted when each agent (*phronimos*) through the reasoned state of capacity to act (*phronēsis*) is 'performing the functions of station' (το αντον πράττειν). For this the agent needs to indulge in *theoria* (speculation, contemplation) as *theoros* (spectator). For Greek thinkers this *life of reason in common* is not an end to be achieved as a consequence *of making* (ποιείν). The common life of reason is not constituted through the exercise of reasoned state of capacity to make (*technē*). That is to say the constitution of this common life of reason is not a technical problem for them; rather it is a moral problem. The life of reason is the sphere of common use and common understanding constituted through intelligible communication and *acting* (πράττειν). Reasoned state of capacity to make (*technē*) is concerned with production. Production is the emergence of the work as the intended goal of regulated effort. 'The work is set free as such and released from the process of production because it is by definition destined for use.'[166] Hence the concept of work points to this sphere of common use and common understanding. It is the life of reason in common that controlled the process of production. For Greek mind the world of human activities is located within the entirety of what exists. The whole sphere of human *praxis* (*action* through *phronēsis*) and *poiēsis* (*making* through *technē*) has its place in nature.

Now we are in a position to answer the question raised above: But if Kant is not interested in realizing judgement of taste via the empirical interest in society, i.e., inclination toward society, then why did he bring in the issue of empirical interest at all? Let us read the whole paragraph once again, where he discounts the empirical interest in the beautiful. The passage says, 'This interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful by the inclination towards society, and, consequently, empirical, is, however, of no importance for us here. For that to which we have alone to look is what can have a bearing *a priori*, even though indirect, upon the judgement of taste. For, if even in this form an associated interest should betray itself, taste would then reveal a transition on the part of our critical faculty from the enjoyment of sense to the moral feeling. This would not merely mean that we should be supplied with a more effectual guide for the final employment of taste, but taste would further be presented as a link in the chain of the human

faculties *a priori* upon which all legislation, depend. This much may certainly be said of the empirical interest in objects of taste, and in taste itself, that as taste thus pays homage to inclination, however refined, such interest will nevertheless readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions, which in society attain to their greatest variety and highest degree, and the interest in the beautiful, if this is made its ground, can but afford a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good. We have reason, however, to inquire whether this transition may not still in some way be furthered by means of taste when taken in its purity.'[167]

The empirical interest is brought in to draw our attention to the common life of the Greek civilization. Once our attention is drawn to the common life of the Greeks, we are led to the idea of an action, which constitutes the common life. The action, which constitutes the common life of Greek civilization, as we saw above, is designated by the Greek verb πράττειν. Latin Church fathers translate this Greek verb by the Latin verb *agere*. For Kant 'making' (*facere*) is an action done with free will and hence it is properly a human action. But activities falling under the category of *agere* are not recognized as human action at all; they are just the actions of nature. We saw before that for Greeks too the action designated by the corresponding Greek verb πράττειν does not belong to art but to nature. It is concerned with the constitution of, to use Gadamer's words, 'the sphere of common use and common understanding as the realm of intelligible communication.' The empirical interest prepares us for an ambiguous transition via the beautiful to the good. 'This much may certainly be said of the empirical interest in objects of taste, and in taste itself, that as taste thus pays homage to inclination, however refined, such interest will nevertheless readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions, which in society attain to their greatest variety and highest degree, and the interest in the beautiful, if this is made its ground, can but afford a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good.'[168] But this ambiguous transition makes us aware of another inquiry. 'We have reason, however, to inquire whether this transition may not still in some way be furthered by means of taste when taken in its purity.'[169] When disinterested delight of taste is elaborated it 'would then reveal a

transition on the part of our critical faculty from the enjoyment of sense to the moral feeling ... taste would further be presented as a link in the chain of the human faculties *a priori* upon which all legislation must depend.'[170]

Let us recollect that the issue here is not the actuality of judgement of taste, from the possibility to actuality of judgement of taste can be effected by even the empirical interest in society. But the issue here is the actuality of performance of moral action starting from its possibility in the categorical 'ought' of morality. Can taste in combination with moral or intellectual interest effect this transition?

Consistent with his notion of human action, which is related to only art and not nature, in §42 entitled 'The intellectual interest in the beautiful' Kant declares, 'Now I willingly admit that the interest in the beautiful of art (including under this heading the artificial use of natural beauties for personal adornment, and so from vanity) gives no evidence at all of a habit of mind attached to the morally good, or even inclined that way.'[171] And at the same time, 'But, on the other hand, I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in estimating it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is at least indicative of a temper of mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily associate itself with the *contemplation of nature*.'[172] He further claims, 'One, then, who takes such an interest in the beautiful in nature can only do so in so far as he has previously set his interest deep in the foundations of the morally good.'[173] Interest in the beautiful in nature is—to use Kantian phraseology—the (reflective) *ratio cognoscendi* of possible moral feeling, while moral feeling is the *ratio essendi* of possible interest in the beautiful in nature, through reflection. Previously in greater detail he explains, 'I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in estimating it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is at least indicative of a temper of mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily associate itself with the *contemplation of nature*.'[174] What reason can be given for this? It must be looked for in the contention of Kant: 'The fact is that our intuition and reflection must have as their concomitant the thought that *the beauty in question is nature's handiwork*; *and this is the sole basis of the immediate interest that is taken in it*. Failing this, we are either left with a bare judgement of taste void of all interest whatever, or else only with one that is combined with an interest that is mediate, involving, namely, a reference to society; which latter affords no reliable indication of morally good habits of thought.'[175] *The interest in natural beauty is related to moral concern with respect to it being a product of art of nature but not with respect to it being a free beauty*. A person concerned deeply with moral goodness is interested in natural beauty with respect to its production by nature because the discussion of empirical interest has already drawn our attention to the sphere of common life of the Greeks, which is constituted by a kind of action called by the Greek verb *πράττειν* or the Latin verb *agere*, which is properly moral action, which does not belong to art, rather to nature, according to Kant. Our moral action has to be of the nature of *art of nature*. Commentators like Guyer analyze §42 of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, but fail to note the crucial passage cited above. Hence, in spite of their scholarly argument with all the quotations, scholars like Guyer fail to understand the significance of §42. No doubt Guyer points out, 'It is natural to ask why an interest in the beautiful forms of nature should be indicative of anything about a person's moral character ...'[176] In his opinion Kant 'begins his answer with one of his most fundamental statements of the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgements,'[177] and he quotes the analogy: 'We have a faculty of judgement which is merely aesthetic—a faculty of judging of forms without the aid of concepts, and of finding, in the mere estimate of them, a delight that we at the same time make into a rule for every one, without this judgement being founded on an interest, or yet producing one. On the other hand, we have also a faculty of intellectual judgement for the mere forms of practical maxims (so far as they are of themselves qualified for universal legislation)—a faculty of determining an *a priori* delight, which we make into a law for everyone, without our judgement being founded on any interest, though here it produces one. The pleasure or displeasure in the former judgement is called that of taste; the latter is called that of the moral feeling.'[178] Paul Guyer has already missed the answer, which Kant gives even before he begins this analogy.

The crucial passage, which is the basis of our interpretation, is bypassed by Paul Guyer and is not commented on or analyzed by him.

According to Kant, as shown above, to solve the problem of determination of Willkür by Wille so as to result in determinate action man has to learn the art of nature as exhibited in the production of natural beauty. Fine art is the art in the appearance of nature for Kant. 'Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature.'[179] Not only that, according to Kant, 'Hence the finality in the product of fine art, intentional though it be, must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e., fine art must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognize it to be art.'[180] So the moral action has to be of the nature of fine art so that the action, which has an end, is done with disregard to the end. This is the lesson up to §45. It should not surprise us that the idea of representation plays such a crucial role in Kant's ethics. Kant had written in his universally read *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, 'A categorical imperative would be one which ***represented*** an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end.'[181] '... if the action is ***represented*** as good *in itself* and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is *categorical.*'[182] Kant is here trying to get at the Aristotelian-Thomistic idea of *doing* or *acting* (*agere, πράττειν*) as distinguished from *making* (*facere*, *ποιείν*). According to Aristotle, 'For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.'[183] As already mentioned for Kant, 'An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end ... .'[184] For Kant every action is of the nature of Aristotelian *making* (*facere*, *ποιείν*). For Kant there is no human action, which is of the nature of Aristotelian *doing* or *acting* (*agere*, *πράττειν*). So categorical imperative is also concerned only with those actions, which fall under Aristotelian category of actions, which includes only *making* (*facere*, *ποιείν*). But categorical imperative is concerned only with a sub-category of *making* (*facere*, *ποιείν*). This sub-category is the category of *makings*, each of which can be '*represented*' as an action 'objectively necessary

in itself apart from its relation to a further end.' That is to say categorical imperative is concerned with that *making* (*facere*, *ποιείν*) which can be '*represented*' as *doing* or *acting* (*agere*, *πράττειν*). These actions belong to fine art.

IX. THE FIGURE OF GENIUS AND THE AESTHETIC IDEA

And now Kant declares, 'Fine art is the art of genius.'[185] 'Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: 'Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.'[186] For Kant the genius is a favourite of nature. Kant identifies four aspects of genius which make him special: '... genius (1) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given ... and that consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) ... its products must at the same time be models, i.e., be exemplary; and, consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e., as a standard or rule of estimating. (3) It cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature ... (4) Nature prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only in so far as it is to be fine art.'[187] So determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* must be of the nature of a fine art through reflection. For Kant proficiency in fine art is not sufficient condition for having good will, i.e. having *Willkür* determined by *Wille*. But it is (reflectively) necessary that determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* be of the nature of a fine art if good will has to result in determinate action. The determination of *Willkür* by *Wille* cannot be a making of a *good will*, rather it has to be a *doing* in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense. It cannot be *poeisis*, but *praxis* it must be. But Kant so far has only come up to fine art, i.e., art appearing as nature. But can Kant succeed in recovering fully the concept of Aristotelian-Thomistic *doing* or *acting*? This can be answered only after investigating his teleology of nature, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

How can genius help in morality? Genius belongs to nature while *Willkür* and *Wille* belong to the realm of freedom. To answer these questions Kant makes use of the notion of aesthetic idea. The aesthetic idea 'sets the *Gemütskräfte* [powers of mind: the imagination and understanding] into a swing that is final, i.e. into a play that is self-maintaining and strengthens the powers for such activity.'[188] Kant further defines: '... by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible. It is easily seen that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which, conversely, is a concept, to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate.'[189] Kant further clarifies: 'In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, annexed to a given concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that no expression indicating a definite concept can be found for it one which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit (soul) also.'[190] In Kant's opinion an aesthetic idea serves a rational idea as a substitute for logical representation. Since autonomy of will is a rational idea, which no intuition can present, we need aesthetic idea for its presentation in intuition. It is only genius which, through aesthetic idea produces a 'second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature,' which works nature up 'into something else, namely, what surpasses nature,' which is freedom or autonomy of will. The totality of inclinations, desires, aversions, abilities, name what you may, which nature gives us, we can, through genius, reorganize them to represent freedom which then becomes the basis of activity.

Aesthetic idea, specifically rational aesthetic idea rather than the normal aesthetic idea, performs this task by supplying 'rules for establishing a union of taste with reason, i.e., of the beautiful with the good—rules by which the former becomes available as an intentional instrument in respect of the latter, for the purpose of bringing that

temper of the mind which is self-sustaining and of subjective universal validity to the support and maintenance of that mode of thought which, while possessing objective universal validity, can only be preserved by a resolute effort.'[191]

With genius we can effortlessly invent, dispose and eloquently express our life as an aesthetic idea corresponding to free will given the nature that we have. But how this is done, its rule cannot be one set down in a formula and serving as a precept—for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Hence the rule must be gathered from the performance, i.e., from the product, which others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it serve as a model, not for imitation, but for following.[192]

So for Kant genius is a talent for (fine) art. So it produces a definite idea of the product—as its end. The end here is the production of a good will. '... [S]ince ... reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary.'[193] But reason cannot do this without following the example set by the genius through aesthetic idea. That is to say even to follow a moral law we need to work up our life activity into an aesthetic idea, especially the rational aesthetic idea following the example set by the genius.

According to Kant 'Taste ... is the discipline (or corrective) of genius.'[194] When genius is corrected by the taste of the disinterested spectator, 'It introduces a clearness and order into the plenitude of thought, and in so doing gives stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture.'[195] The reason for this is that '... taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through the intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it is this rendering also, and the increased sensibility, founded upon it, for the feeling which these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that are the origin of that pleasure which taste declares valid for mankind in general and not

merely for the private feeling of each individual.'[196] The genius disciplined by taste is not a homo-faber, rather he is a non-homo-faber man. 'This makes it clear that the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of the moral feeling. For only when sensibility is brought into harmony with moral feeling can genuine taste assume a definite unchangeable form.'[197]

X. THE ROLE OF SYMBOL

To understand the next step in our argument we need to understand the idea of *symbol* and *symbolic representation* according to Kant. He explains: 'All hypotyposis (presentation, subjectio sub adspectum) as a rendering in terms of sense, is twofold. Either it is schematic, as where the intuition corresponding to a concept comprehended by the understanding is given *a priori*, or else it is symbolic, as where the concept is one which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate. In the latter case the concept is supplied with an intuition such that the procedure of judgement in dealing with it is merely analogous to that which it observes in schematism. In other words, what agrees with the concept is merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself. Hence the agreement is merely in the form of reflection, and not in the content.'[198]

Kant distinguishes both schematic representation of a concept of understanding and symbolic representation of an idea of reason from mere marks of a concept. 'Marks are merely designations of concepts by the aid of accompanying sensible signs devoid of any intrinsic connection with the intuition of the object. Their sole function is to afford a means of reinvoking the concepts according to the imagination's law of association—a purely subjective role. Such marks are either words or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs, simply as expressions for concepts.'[199] Both schematic and symbolic representations are modes of 'intrinsic connection with the intuition of sensation'[200] according to Kant.

What is the nature of the intrinsic connection in the context of symbolization becomes clear if we understand what Kant says when he further explains the idea of symbol by distinguishing it from schemata. 'All intuitions by which *a priori* concepts are given a foothold are, therefore, either schemata or symbols. Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, presentations of the concept. Schemata effect this presentation demonstratively, symbols by the aid of an analogy (for which recourse is had even to empirical intuitions), in which analogy judgement performs a double function: first in applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, secondly, in applying the mere rule of its reflection upon that intuition to quite another object, of which the former is but the symbol.'[201] In case of symbol two movements of thought are involved. The first movement of thought takes place 'in applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition', in which two items are involved, 'concept' and 'object of intuition', and here analogy is involved; the second back movement of thought takes place 'in applying the mere rule of its [*judgement's*] reflection upon that intuition to quite another object', which is being represented by the concept, the intuition on which the reflection is taking place is the symbol of the object represented by the concept. Kant's position is quite clear in the example he gives. Kant made it clear; 'a monarchical state is represented as a living body when it is governed by constitutional laws, but as a mere machine (like a handmill) when it is governed by an individual absolute will.'[202] He clarifies, '... but in both cases the representation is merely *symbolic*. For there is certainly no likeness between a despotic state and a handmill, whereas there surely is between the rules of reflection upon both and their causality.'[203]

The intrinsic relation, which Kant tries to capture by symbolic representation, emanates from Greek logos. Λόγος in early Greek thought means 'discourse'. According to Heidegger Λόγος as discourse has the function of δηλουν: 'to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in ones discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as αποφαίνεσθι [*De Interpretatione* 1–6, also *Metaphysica* z4, and *Ethica Nicomachea* z.]. The λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσθι), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either *for* the one who is doing the talking ... or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be.'[204] Heidegger further explains, 'And only *because* the function of the λόγος as αποφανσις lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the λόγος have the structural form of σύνθεσις. Here 'synthesis' does not mean a binding

and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the 'problem' arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the συν has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen as its *togetherness* [*Beisammen*] with something—letting it be seen *as* something.'[205] Since Kantian 'reason' actually comes from Greek 'logos' Kant is trying to get at the as-structure of reason or logos so that he can have the unified reason, which is not split into theoretical and practical. Kant will attempt to recover the unified 'reason' in the critical investigation of teleological judgement which take us to the supersensible.

Like Heidegger, Gadamer also recognizes, 'We live in the *logos*, and the *logos*, the linguistic dimension of human being-in-the-world, fulfils itself by making something visible so that the other sees it. The Aristotelian word for this is *deloun*, which contains the 'de' root of the deictic comportment or showing.'[206] He also writes at another place, 'It seems to me that Aristotle had already indicated the true character of the being of language when he freed the concept of *syntheke* from its naïve meaning as "convention".' He then explains, 'By excluding every sense of founding or originating from the concept of *syntheke*, he pointed in the direction of that correspondence of soul and world that comes to light in the phenomenon of language as such and is independent of the forceful extrapolation of an infinite mind by which metaphysics provided this correspondence with the theological foundation. The agreement about things that take place in language means neither a priority of things nor a priority of the human mind that avails itself of the instrument of linguistic understanding. Rather, the correspondence that finds its concretion in the linguistic experience of the world is as such what is absolutely prior.'[207] As Kantian reason has roots in the Greek logos, through the synthesis of the morally good with the beautiful through the as-structure of symbolization in linguistic communication Kant is trying to show that to concretize the ethically justified action in the world is the primary function of agreement involved in aesthetics.

We have already seen that taste is the discipline of the genius. If genius gives indeterminate but rational aesthetic ideas to represent the supersensible, then taste extends its view to the supersensible. Kant

writes, 'This is that intelligible to which taste, as noticed in the preceding paragraph, extends its view. It is, that is to say, what brings even our higher cognitive faculties into common accord, and is that apart from which sheer contradiction would arise between their nature and the claims put forward by taste. In this faculty, judgement does not find itself subjected to a heteronomy of laws of experience as it does in the empirical estimate of things—in respect of the objects of such a pure delight it gives the law to itself, just as reason does in respect of the faculty of desire. Here, too, both on account of this inner possibility in the subject, and on account of the external possibility of a nature harmonizing therewith, it finds a reference in itself to something in the subject itself and outside it, and which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but still is connected with the ground of the latter, i.e., the supersensible—a something in which the theoretical faculty gets bound up into unity with the practical in an intimate and obscure manner.'[208] So the as-structure of the symbolization performs the function of exhibiting the supersensible without giving any knowledge, which can become the basis of its manipulation.

In *Critique of Judgement* symbolic representation of ideas of reason play a role similar to schematic representation of concepts of understanding in *Critique of Pure Reason*. In his first *critique* Kant raises the question: 'How, then, is the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible?' He answers, 'Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.'[209] Similarly the ideas of reason can be employed for performing their (regulative) function only through their symbolic representation or symbols. In the case of practical reason ideas like morally good or right etc. have the function of production of proper will or action respectively. This function of production of proper will or action can be performed only when they have symbolic representation. Mind you the symbols are only for reflection, but without these symbols for reflection there can be no production of good will or right action as without the symbolic representation the idea of morally good and right cease to be functional, as

they have no intrinsic connection to intuition of sensation. 'But to call for a verification of the objective reality of rational concepts, i.e., of ideas, and, what is more, on behalf of the theoretical cognition of such a reality, is to demand an impossibility, because absolutely no intuition adequate to them can be given.'[210]

Since symbolization depends upon the analogy between the object which is symbolized and another object to which the symbol of the former applies directly in a reflective judgement, in symbolization of morality by the beautiful Kant exploits the following analogy: '(1) The beautiful pleases immediately (but only in reflective intuition, not, like morality, in its concept). (2) It pleases apart from all interest (pleasure in the morally good is no doubt necessarily bound up with an interest, but not with one of the kind that are antecedent to the judgement upon the delight, but with one that judgement itself for the first time calls into existence). (3) The freedom of the imagination (consequently of our faculty in respect of its sensibility) is, in estimating the beautiful, represented as in accord with the understanding's conformity to law (in moral judgements the freedom of the will is thought as the harmony of the latter with itself according to universal laws of Reason). (4) The subjective principles of the estimate of the beautiful is represented as universal, i.e., valid for every man, but as incognizable by means of any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is set forth as also universal, i.e., for all individuals, and, at the same time, for all actions of the same individual, and, besides, as cognizable by means of a universal concept.)'[211]

Kant needs the beautiful as the symbol of morally good because the moral law by itself does not close the choice of the action in the situation it declares any maxim to be fit to be the universal law. The moral law can judge only the fitness of the maxim to be the universal law. But it cannot tell which maxim must be taken up in the situation. The maxim must be taken up sizing up the situation by the aesthetic judgement of beauty. Mind you the aesthetic judgement of beauty is most suited to do this job, as it is a reflective judgement and not a determinant judgement. For Kant, 'Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is given, then the judgement which

subsumes the particular under it is determinant. This is so even where such a judgement is transcendental and, as such, provides the conditions *a priori* in conformity with which alone subsumption under that universal can be effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective.'[212] So the selection of the maxim must be left to the reflective judgement of beauty in the situation, which is a judgement without any kind of interest by the disinterested spectator, while the task of testing it for universalizability from the point of view of taking an interest in action is the job of practical reason. The practical reason is nonfunctional without the assistance of aesthetic judgement of beauty, because it lacks a determinate action by itself; while aesthetic judgement of beauty is pointless without the assistance of practical reason, as it is a disinterested judgement without any interest in the actuality of the object of judgement. The relation between aesthetic taste and moral sense is stated thus: '... taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through the intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it is this rendering also, and the increased sensibility founded upon it, for the feeling which these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that are the origin of that pleasure which taste declares valid for mankind in general and not merely for the private feeling of each individual.'[213]

The relation between the morally good and the beautiful is almost similar to the relation between the concept and intuition in the context of theoretical reason. Here taste functions analogous to the sensibility and practical reason functions analogous to the understanding. Recollect that schematism of pure categories of understanding is the first step in effecting the conjunction of sensible intuition and *a priori* categories. Similarly symbolization is the first step towards bringing in a conjunction of the maxims of the self of the sensible world with the moral law of the self of the intelligible world.

Kant himself explains 'Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap, for it represents the imagination, even in its freedom, as amenable to a final determination for understanding, and teaches us to find, even in sensuous objects, a free delight apart from any charm of

sense.'[214] What Kant is trying to get at is what has been shown by Aristotle. Aristotle had shown that the basis of moral knowledge in man is orexis, and its development into a fixed attitude (hexis).[215]

It was only Greek mind, which related truth, beauty and goodness. For Aristotle *ἀγαθόν* (good) and *καλόν* (beautiful) have the same meaning, and the only difference is that καλόν (beautiful) is a more inclusive term. *ἀγαθόν* (good) refers to actions only, but *καλόν* (beautiful) is used *also* where no action or movement is involved.[216] Both Socrates as well as Plato before Aristotle noted the close connection between *ἀγαθόν* (good) and *καλόν* (beautiful). So when Kant brings in the rational and impartial spectator in the context of good will then it indicates that the subject matter he is trying to recover and opened for discussion is the same as Socratic-Platonic will which can do no wrong.

According to Paul Guyer, 'The problem with using its purported reference to a supersensible as the basis for beauty's symbolism of morality is really twofold. First, it is only by a tenuous argument that the aesthetic response itself may be interpreted as any sort of experience of a supersensible, for it was only by exploiting the ambiguity of the notion of an indeterminate concept that the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement was able to link aesthetic judgement to a supersensible.'[217] Guyer's objection is based on not understanding the function of '*deloun*' performed by the as-structure of symbolization. Mind you, to the disinterested spectator 'will', 'good will', 'freedom', which all are intelligible characters, are available for view.

According to Guyer, 'The second problem with this interpretation of beauty's symbolism of the basis of morality arises from Kant's ethics. If we demand that others respond to beauty because it is a symbol of the basis of morality, then we are demanding of them a form of knowledge of the basis of morality.'[218] Kant will not deny it. But this knowledge cannot be of the nature of natural sciences, which enables us to manipulate the object of knowledge.

XI. NEED FOR TRANSITION TO CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT

Although the problem of concretization of action is solved through the symbolization of the morally good with the beautiful, yet another problem remains. As we saw the problem Kant is facing is that reason by

itself is not sufficient to determine the will to result in the concrete ethical action. The conjunction of aesthetics with morality has only solved the problem of finding the determinate action, but the insufficiency of reason to result in that determinate action still stands. How can that be solved?

Taste gives a view of the intelligible or supersensible through the as-structure of the symbolization according to Kant. If we keep in mind the Greek lineage of Kant's thought then we can find out what more needs to be done by Kant. The Greek idea of λόγος is associated with ἀλήθεια. Here 'the "being true" of the λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means that in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθι the entities *of which* one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (ἀλήθές); that is, they must be *discovered.*'[219] At another place also Heidegger explains, 'Laying, λέγειν, concerns what lies there. To lay is to let lie there before us. When we say something about something, we make it lie there before us, which means at the same time we make it appear. This making-to-appear, and letting-lie-before-us is, in Greek thought, the essence of λέγειν and λόγος.'[220] In Greek thought λόγος is in intimate unity with the entity since it is only λόγος that lets the entity be seen in its unhiddeness. The language, object and thought belonged together as one. This idea is formulated by Parmenides in fr. 8, 34 ff 'ταντον δ' έστι νοειν τε και ουνεκεν έστι νόημα. ου γαρ άνευ του εοντος, εν ω πεφατισμένον εστίν, ευρήσεις το νοειν' i.e. 'the same thing is there to be thought and is why there is thought. For you will not find thinking without what is, in all that has been said [Or: in which thinking is expressed].'[221] These lines have been translated by W.K.C. Guthrie as: 'What can be thought ... and the thought that "it is" are the same; for without that which is, in which ... it is expressed ... thou shalt not find thought.'[222] What we let lie before us in language is the essential community between thinking and being. What we let lie in language is expressed also by the Parmenides's principle: 'το γαρ αυτο νοειν εστίν τε και ειναι',[223] which is generally translated as 'for it is the same thing to think and to be.' The idea is further formulated by Parmenides in fr. 6 which begins with words, 'χοη το λέγειν τε νοειν τ' εον εμμεναι' which means 'it is useful what is there to be said and thought must be'.

Kant also needs to close the gap between thought and being, if thought of the concrete moral action is to result in that action. Taste as the view of the supersensible draws to our attention this aspect of the intelligible that there is no gap between the conception and reality. So in §76 of *Critique of Judgement* he admits that in the sphere of practical reason, 'the action, with its absolute necessity of the moral order, is looked on as physically wholly contingent—that is, we recognize that what *ought* necessarily to happen frequently does not happen. Hence it is clear that it only *springs from the subjective character of our practical faculty* that *the moral laws* must be *represented* as *commands*, and the actions conformable to them as duties, and that reason expresses this necessity, not by an *is* or "happens" (being or fact), but by an "ought to be" (obligation)."[224] And yet reason demands that we accept as a regulative principle the conception of 'a intelligible world in which everything is actual by reason of the simple fact that, being something good, it is possible' and hence where 'there is no distinction between obligation and act' and consequently no distinction between *ought* and *is*.[225] The distinction between *ought* and *is* arises because 'Human understanding cannot avoid the necessity of drawing a distinction between the possibility and the actuality of things. The reason of this lies in our own selves and the nature of our cognitive faculties."[226] But at the same time he declares that this distinction is 'not valid of things generally', and this 'is apparent when we look to the demands of reason."[227] What is the demand of reason? It is contained in the challenge of reason, 'For reason never withdraws its challenge to us to adopt something or other existing with unconditioned necessity—a root origin—in which there is no longer to be any difference between possibility and actuality, and our understanding has absolutely no conception to answer to this idea—that is, it can discover no way of forming any notion of its mode of existence."[228] Kant, in agreement with Parmenides' principle, claims, 'An understanding into whose mode of cognition this distinction did not enter would express itself by saying: "All objects that I know *are*, that is, exist"; and the possibility of some that did not exist, in other words, their contingency supposing them to exist, and therefore, the necessity that would be placed in contradistinction to this contingency, would never enter into the imagination of

such a being."[229] For Kant even if this cannot be a constitutive principle of objects yet it has to be adopted as a regulative principle. 'And if—as must needs be the case with transcendent conceptions—judgements passed in this manner cannot be constitutive principles determining the character of the object, we shall yet be left with regulative principles whose function is immanent and reliable, and which are adapted to the human point of view."[230] The understanding operative in mathematico-empirical natural sciences analyzed in *Critique of Pure Reason* cannot meet the challenge of reason. But reason meets this demand bringing in the teleology of nature in the second part of *Critique of Judgement*, which points to the world of classical Greek logos, which is also Kant's world of reason. 'Hence it follows that the conception of a finality of nature in its products, while it does not touch the determination of objects, is a necessary conception for the human power of judgement, in respect of nature. It is, therefore, a subjective principle of reason for the use of judgement, and one which, taken as regulative and not as constitutive, is as necessarily valid for our *human judgement* as if it were an objective principle."[231] 'Subjective' refers not to 'subject' of the first *Critique*, rather it refers to the disinterested spectator of the third *Critique*. For the subject of the first *Critique* there is no teleology of nature, but teleology of nature is valid for the disinterested spectator as it has a view of the intelligible world. Disinterested spectator is not the subjective self of the first *Critique*. Although Kant wants to overcome the subjectivity of the self by introducing the figure of disinterested spectator, he will ultimately fail to retain the advantage of the later, because it will become just a point of view of the subjective self.

Notes and References

1. Tr. James Creed Meredith, from the 42nd volume of the series *Great Books of the Western World* on Kant entitled *The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgement*, The University of Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britanica, 1952, pp. 459–613. The entire volume on Kant will be referred to as *42.Kant* hereinafter.
2. *Critique of Judgement*, §40, *42.Kant*, p. 520.
3. Ibid., p. 547.
4. Most of the commentators on Kant's texts make a common mistake of investigating the link of morality with aesthetics in Kant's writing with

the assumption that Kant has forged a link between aesthetics and morality with a view of complete the deduction of judgements of taste. Such commentators, because of this common mistake, not only fail to understand the deduction of aesthetic judgement of taste in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* but also fail to understand the nature of the link between aesthetics and morality in Kant's texts.

Thus Donald Crawford has written that the last passage §40 quoted above reveals that 'the full import of a judgement of taste is not justified simply by the deduction that the basis of judgement is universally communicable,' [*Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974, p. 143] and that 'Kant explicitly declares that what he is after—what the complete deduction requires—is 'a means of passing from sense enjoyment to moral feeling' ... This transition constitutes the final stage in the transcendental deduction of judgements of taste.' [*Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 145].

In a similar vein, R.K. Elliott has written that 'taste is grounded not on a pre-existing common sense but on an Idea of Reason which, in conjunction with the moral analogy, sets a universal community of taste before us as a regulative idea, to be realized whether or not common sense exists as a condition of experience ... . The connexion with the moral does not destroy the autonomy of taste but ensure its possibility. If it were not for the moral analogy there could be no judgements of taste, but only private preferences and judgements of objective perfection.' ['The Unity of Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement" ', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 8, no. 3 (July 1968), p. 259]. Elliott claims that Kant 'says explicitly that it is only through the analogical connection between the beautiful and the good that the judgement of taste has any right to claim universality and necessity.' ['The Unity of Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement" ', p. 255.] Elliott is referring to the claim of Kant's from §59 quoted above.

Crawford's summary of the deduction of aesthetic judgement is that 'our judgements marking the pleasure in the beautiful (and the sublime too) can rightfully demand universal assent, not simply because they can be based on what can be universally communicated, but because they mark an experience of that which symbolizes morality.' [*Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 156].

Paul Guyer also investigates the Kantian link between morality and aesthetics in a similar vein but unlike Crawford and Elliott he does not think that Kant was successful in completing the required deduction. He writes, 'A connection between aesthetic and moral judgement might justify us in *demanding* agreement in judgements of taste, or it might justify us in *expecting* such agreement under the appropriate conditions. Rightfully

demanding something of others and reasonably expecting it of them are obviously different, so we must raise the question—which neither Crawford nor Elliott does—of whether a link to morality can support one or both of these elements. This is particularly important because the deduction of the judgement of taste, carefully defined, concerns only the justification of the *expectation* of agreement in taste, yet §40 most obviously suggests that morality may play a part in taste's *demand* for agreement.' [*Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 314f]. But in his view, 'Whether a link to morality might support aesthetic judgement's demand for concurrence or its expectation of agreement is not the only question which must be made explicit before the validity of this link can be considered. Another question is this: even if an analogy with the moral judgement can justify us in either demanding or expecting of others *something* pertaining to aesthetic judgement, just what would this be? ... Thus we must determine whether taste's analogy with morality can bear on the imputation of pleasure to others, or on the imputation of taste as a faculty for reflecting on pleasures. The thesis of the deduction of aesthetic judgement suggests that its connection with practical reason should bear on the first issue; but the actual content of Kant's analogy may suggest a bearing on the second.' [*Kant and the Claims of Taste*, pp. 315f]. That is to say Kant has failed in completing the required deduction.

Such commentators who take the link of morality with aesthetics in Kant's writing as completing the deduction of judgements of taste not only misunderstand the deduction of aesthetic judgement of taste in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* but also fail to grasp the nature of the link between aesthetics and morality in Kant's texts irrespective of the result of their investigations, i.e., irrespective of whether they find Kant successful or unsuccessful in completing the deduction of aesthetic judgement of taste by linking aesthetics with morality.

5. *Critique of Pure Reason* [abbreviated as CPR hereinafter], tr. Norman Kemp Smith, A834, B862.
6. CPR, A839, B867.
7. CPR, A840, B868.
8. Ibid.
9. *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, translated by H.J. Paton in his *The Moral Law*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1948, p. 6/396. The page numbers refer to the page numbers of two German editions of Kant's original text, given in the margins of Paton's translation.
10. *The Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 105/450f.
11. *Critique of Judgement*, §1. *42.Kant*, p. 476.
12. Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xxii + 424.
13. *Reflexionen*, II, 286.

14. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 66f/429.
15. Book VI (1144b17 ff).
16. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Sec. 4.
17. Ibid., Sec. 5.
18. Quoted by Charles S. Singleton, 'The Perspective of Art', in *Perspectives On Political Philosophy, Vol. I: Thucydides through Machiavelli*, Eds. James V. Downton, Jr. and David K. Hart (Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1971), p. 427. The article was originally published in *The Kenyon Review*, 15 (Spring 1953), 169–89.
19. Ibid.
20. Quoted, Ibid., p. 427.
21. Quoted, Ibid., p. 426.
22. *Critique of Judgement*, §43. *42.Kant*, p. 523.
23. Ibid.
24. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 26/407.
25. *Transcendental Logic II, Dialectic, 1, 1: Of Ideas in General*, CPR, A316, B373.
26. *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, Tr. H.B. Nibset, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 137.
27. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 37/413.
28. *Critique of Judgement*, §29. *42.Kant*, p. 506.
29. *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, tr. H.B. Nibset, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 137.
30. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 37/412.
31. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ch. II, tr. T.K. Abbott, in *42.Kant*, p. 320.
32. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 79f/436.
33. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ch. II, *42.Kant*, p. 320.
34. Ibid., p. 321.
35. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 52/421.
36. *Critique of Judgement*, §10. *42.Kant*, pp. 483f.
37. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 52/421.
38. Here I am following the Four-Step CI-Procedure of John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 167–70. I have modified the fourth step and added the fifth step.
39. John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, p. 167.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pp. 167f.
42. Ibid., p. 169.
43. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 57f/424.
44. Ibid., 58/424.
45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. That the judgement of taste is from the point of view of disinterested spectator will be explained later.
49. Crawford, Donald W., *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974).
50. *Critique of Judgement*, IX, Cf. *42.Kant*, p. 474.
51. Ibid.
52. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 331. Guyer's note on this sentence n38 says, 'An example of this kind of interpretation may be found in the book by Peter Heintel, who interprets Kant's theory of symbolism as a meant to resolve the problem of the typic of practical reason, or making moral ideas intuitable; according to him, in §59 'so geht es jetzt um die fundamentals *Reflexion* jeder möglichen Bestmmbarkeit von Vernunftbegriff, Idee und Sitlichkeit ... Also kann ... nur das Schöne, als die Aufhebung sowohl des theoretischen als auch des practischen Moments, zur Darstellung der Vernunftbegriffe herangezogen werden' (*Die Bedeutung der Kritik*, pp. 134–5).
53. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 331–2.
54. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 149.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 146.
57. Ibid.
58. *Critique of Judgement*, IX, *42.Kant*, p. 475, cf. §29.
59. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 148.
60. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 332.
61. Ibid., p. 338.
62. *Critique of Judgement*, §30, *42.Kant*, p. 512.
63. Ibid., p. 479.
64. Ibid.
65. CPR, A598, B626.
66. Ibid., 2/393.
67. *Critique of Judgement*, §5, *42.Kant*, p. 479.
68. *General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals*, tr. W. Hastie, *42.Kant*, p. 385.
69. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 2/393.
70. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt* (1800), 2nd edition, Preface. *Werke* (Cassirer) VIII, p. 3.
71. Ibid., p. 4.
72. Ibid.

73. Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Truth and Method*, Sheed and Ward, London, 1975, pp. 39ff.
74. *Critique of Judgement*, §6, *42.Kant*, p. 479.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., §8, *42.Kant*, p. 480.
77. Ibid., §8, *42.Kant*, p. 482.
78. 'This {i.e., that an object is given to me} again is possible, to man at least, insofar as the mind [*Gemüt*] is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled *sensibility*. Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us *intuitions* ...'. Kant CPR, B33. 'For, of itself alone, the *Gemüt* is all life (the life principle itself), and hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in connexion with his body.' CJ. '*Gemüt* is one of Kant's most widely used terms, and is prevalent in the third *Critique*. It is commonly translated as "mind" or "mental state" although this is too restrictive a meaning: it denotes more a "feeling". Kant describes it on occasion as the "feeling of the attunement of the representative powers" or as the "life principle itself". It is not "mind" as composed of the powers of sensibility, imagination, understanding and reason, but the position of these powers. This agrees with its original meaning in medieval mysticism, where it refers to the "stable disposition of the soul which conditions the exercise of all its faculties" (Gilson 1955, pp. 444, 758). It is helpful to compare *Gemüt* with the "mood" of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, that is, not as a subjective, psychological state, but as a way of being in the world.' (Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgement*, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 405, n.9.) Gilson 1955 stands for E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in Middle Ages*, New York.
79. *Critique of Judgement*, §1. *42.Kant*, p. 476.
80. Ibid., §9. *42.Kant*, p. 482.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., pp. 482f.
84. Ibid., p. 482.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., p. 483.
87. Ibid., §21. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
88. Ibid., §8. *42.Kant*, p. 481.
89. Ibid., §33. *42.Kant*, p. 515.
90. Ibid., §40. *42.Kant*, p. 520.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.

93. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt* (1800), 2nd edition, Preface. *Werke* (Cassirer) VIII, p. 4.
94. Lecture on Anthropology, cf. *Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen I. Kant's. Nach den neuaufgefundenen Kollegheften des Grafen Heinrich zu Dohna-Wundlachen*, edited by A. Kowalewski (1924), p. 71.
95. Ibid.
96. *Critique of Judgement*, §17. *42.Kant*, p. 491.
97. Ibid., §12. *42.Kant*, p. 485.
98. Ibid., §59. *42.Kant*, p. 548.
99. Ibid., §10. *42.Kant*, p. 484.
100. Ibid., §15. *42.Kant*, p. 487.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., §16. *42.Kant*, p. 488.
103. Ibid., §22. *42.Kant*, p. 493.
104. Ibid., §19. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
105. Ibid., §20. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
106. Ibid., §38. *42.Kant*, p. 517.
107. Ibid., p. 517, n2.
108. Ibid., p. 517.
109. Ibid., §20. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
110. Ibid., §40. *42.Kant*, p. 519.
111. Ibid., §21. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
112. Ibid., §32. *42.Kant*, p. 514.
113. Ibid.
114. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *42.Kant*, p. 321.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p. 134.
118. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *42.Kant*, p. 321.
119. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 134.
120. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *42.Kant*, p. 322.
121. Ibid., p. 323.
122. Ibid.
123. 16/401 n.
124. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 16f/401 n.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 136.

130. Ibid.
131. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 14/400.
132. Ibid., 37/412.
133. *Critique of Judgement*, §29. *42.Kant*, p. 506.
134. *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, tr. H.B. Nibset, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 137.
135. *Critique of Judgement*, §29. *42.Kant*, p. 506.
136. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 442f/91. ***Italics in boldface added.***
137. *Critique of Judgement*, §27. *42.Kant*, p. 501.
138. Ibid., §26. *42.Kant*, p. 500.
139. Ibid., §27. *42.Kant*, p. 502.
140. Ibid., §23. *42.Kant*, p. 496.
141. Ibid., §25. *42.Kant*, p. 497.
142. Ibid., p. 498.
143. Ibid., p. 497.
144. Ibid., §27. *42.Kant*, p. 501.
145. Ibid., §28. *42.Kant*, p. 503.
146. Ibid., p. 504.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., §29. *42.Kant*, p. 506.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid. Emphasis with ***boldface italics added.***
151. Ibid., §29. *42.Kant*, p. 506.
152. Ibid., §40. *42.Kant*, p. 520.
153. Ibid., §41. *42.Kant*, p. 520.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., p. 521.
158. Ibid., pp. 520f.
159. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed., revised by Thomas Landon Thorson, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1973, p. 35.
160. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 26.
161. *Metaphysics*, 6.1.1025b, 18–21.
162. Plato, *Republic*, 601 d–e.
163. *Cratylus*, 390 b–c.
164. Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 12–13.
165. *Critique of Judgement*, §41. *42.Kant*, p. 521.

166. Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. 12.
167. *Critique of Judgement*, §41. *42.Kant*, p. 521.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid., §42. *42.Kant*, p. 521.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid., p. 522.
174. Ibid., §42. *42.Kant*, p. 521.
175. Ibid., §42. *42.Kant*, pp. 521f. [Italics added—Author]
176. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 326.
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178. *Critique of Judgement*, §42. *42.Kant*, p. 522.
179. Ibid., §45. *42.Kant*, p. 525.
180. Ibid.
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182. Ibid., 40/414. Emphasis with ***bold face italics*** added.
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188. Ibid., §49. *42.Kant*, p. 528.
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid., §49. *42.Kant*, p. 530.
191. Ibid., §16. *42.Kant*, p. 488.
192. Ibid., §47. *42.Kant*, p. 526.
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Second Philosophy*

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Perhaps some of the movie-goers among you have had the experience of sitting through a film with no discernable plot and no significant action, only to be accused by your companions of having missed the point. 'It's not supposed to be dramatic', they tell you, 'it's a Character Study!' The conventions of this genre seem to require that it centre on an otherwise inconspicuous person who undergoes some familiar life passage or other with terribly subtle, if any, reactions or results. Well, if a thesis is to a philosophy talk what a plot is to a movie, I'm afraid I'm about to inflict the counterpart to a Character Study: I'll introduce a distinctive inquirer and record her progress through a particularly venerable philosophical neighbourhood. My apologies in advance for what will be more a saunter than a journey.

I. DESCARTES

To explain what 'Second Philosophy' is supposed to be, I should begin with Descartes and his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641). The key to this work is Descartes' dramatic Method of Doubt.[1] It starts modestly enough, noting that our senses sometimes deceive us about objects that are very small or very distant, but quickly moves on to perceptual reports that seem beyond question, like my current belief that 'this is a hand'. Still, the meditator wonders, might I not be mad, or asleep?

> Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake ... as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to one asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been

> tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed ... Perhaps ... I do not even have ... hands ... at all. (Descartes [1641], p. 13)

In his dizziness, the meditator anxiously grasps for a fixed point:

> ... whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. In seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicion of being false. (op. cit., p. 14)

But the midnight fears cannot be stopped. What if God is a deceiver, or worse, what if there is no God, and I am as I am by mere chance? Mightn't I then be wrong in absolutely all my beliefs?

> I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised. (op. cit., pp. 14–15)

And he concludes that

> in future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty. ... I will suppose therefore that ... some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things ... this is an arduous undertaking ... (op. cit., p. 15)

Arduous, indeed, to deny that I have hands, that I'm now standing here giving this talk, that you are all sitting in your chairs, listening as I rehearse the familiar Cartesian catechism. We might fairly ask, what is the point of this difficult exercise?

The point is not that I am somehow unjustified in believing these things. Despite the doubts that have just been raised, Descartes and his meditator continue to regard my ordinary beliefs as

> highly probable ... opinions, which, despite the fact that they are in a sense doubtful ... it is still much more reasonable to believe than to deny. (op. cit., p. 15)

The very reasonableness of these beliefs is what makes it so difficult to suspend them. For this purpose, some exaggeration[2] is needed:

> I think it will be a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and deceive myself, by pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary. (op. cit.)

So, the Evil Demon Hypothesis is designed to help to unseat my otherwise reasonable beliefs, though the doubt raised thereby is 'a very slight, and, so to speak, metaphysical one' (op. cit., p. 25).

But this just pushes the question back one step. We now wonder: why should I wish to unseat my otherwise reasonable beliefs? The meditator is explicit on this point. He is concerned about the status of natural science, and he realizes that

> It [is] necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I [want] to establish anything at all in the sciences that [is] stable and likely to last. (op. cit., p. 12)

The Method of Doubt, the suspension of belief in anything in any way doubtful, is just that, a method—designed to lead us to a firm foundation for the sciences:

> I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, *if I want to discover any certainty in the sciences*. (op. cit., p. 15, emphasis mine, underlined phrase from the 1647 French edition)

The hope is that once we set aside all our ordinary beliefs, reasonable or not, some absolutely indubitable foundational beliefs will then emerge, on the basis of which science and common sense can then be given a

firm foundation. The Method of Doubt is the one-time expedient that enables us to carry out this difficult task.

Janet Broughton, the scholar whose account of Descartes I've been following here, describes the meditator's situation like this:

> Of course, there is nothing about the strategy of this [Method of Doubt] that guarantees it will do what we want it to do. Perhaps we will find that all claims can be impugned by a reason for doubt. Perhaps we will find some that cannot, but then discover that they are very general or have few interesting implications. (Broughton [2002], p. 53).

But, as we all know, this is not the fate of Descartes' meditator. In the second Meditation, he quickly establishes that he must exist—as he must exist even for the Evil Demon to be deceiving him!—and that he is a thinking thing. From there, he moves to the existence of a benevolent God, the dependability of 'clear and distinct ideas', and so on, returning at last to the reasonable beliefs of science and common sense.

Alas, a sad philosophical history demonstrates that the path leading from the Evil Demon Hypothesis to hyperbolic doubt has always been considerably more compelling than the route taken by the meditator back to ordinary belief. Still, the Cartesian hope of securing an unassailable foundation for science has persisted, down the centuries. So, for example, the good Bishop Berkeley (1710) suggested that our sense impressions are incontrovertible evidence for the existence of physical objects, because such objects simply *are* collections of impressions, but the price he paid—subjective idealism—was one nearly all but Berkeley have found entirely too high. More recently, Russell (1914) and early Carnap (1928, on some readings, anyway) applied the full scope and power of modern mathematical logic to the project of construing physical objects as more robust logical constructions from sensory experiences, but both efforts ultimately failed, even in the opinions of their authors. There is surely much in this historical record—both in the detail of each attempt and in the simple fact of this string of failures—to lead us to despair of founding science and common sense on some more trustworthy emanations of First Philosophy. Thus, Quine speaks of a 'forlorn hope' and a 'lost cause' ([1969], p. 74).

But perhaps the situation is not as tragic as it is sometimes drawn. Let's consider, for contrast, another inquirer, one entirely different from Descartes' meditator. This inquirer is born native to our contemporary scientific world view; she practices the modern descendants of the methods found wanting by Descartes. She begins from common sense, she trusts her perceptions, subject to correction, but her curiosity pushes her beyond these to careful and precise observation, to deliberate experimentation, to the formulation and stringent testing of hypotheses, to devising ever more comprehensive theories, all in the interest of learning more about what the world is like. She rejects authority and tradition as evidence, she works to minimize prejudices and subjective factors that might skew her investigations. Along the way, observing the forms of her most successful theories, she develops higher level principles—like the maxim that physical phenomena should be explained in terms of forces acting on a line between two bodies, depending only on the distance between them—and she puts these higher level principles to the test, modifying them as need be, in light of further experience. Likewise, she is always on the alert to improve her methods of observation, of experimental design, of theory testing, and so on, undertaking to improve her methods as she goes.

We philosophers, speaking of her in the third person, will say that such an inquirer operates 'within science', that she uses 'the methods of science', but she herself has no need of such talk. When asked why she believes that water is H_2O, she cites information about its behaviour under electrolysis and so on; she doesn't say, 'because science says so and I believe what science says'. Likewise, when confronted with the claims of astrology and such like, she doesn't say, 'these studies are unscientific'; she reacts in the spirit of this passage from Feynman on astrology:

> Maybe it's ... true, yes. On the other hand, there's an awful lot of information that indicates that it isn't true. Because we have a lot of knowledge about how things work, what people are, what the world is, what those stars are, what the planets are that you are looking at, what makes them go around more or less ... And furthermore, if you look very carefully at the different astrologers they don't agree with each other, so what are you going to do? Disbelieve it. There's no

> evidence at all for it. ... unless someone can demonstrate it to you with a real experiment, with a real test ... then there's no point in listening to them. (Feynman [1998], pp. 92–3)

My point is that our inquirer needn't employ any general analysis of what counts as 'scientific' to say this sort of thing, though we philosophers use the term 'science' in its rough and ready sense when we set out to describe how she behaves.

This, then, is the Character of our Character Study, a mundane and unremarkable figure, as the genre dictates. Following convention, we hope to tease out the hidden elements of her temperament by tracing her reactions to a familiar philosophical test: the confrontation with scepticism. So, how will she react to the challenge Descartes puts to his meditator? Does she know that she has hands?

In response to this question, our inquirer will tell a story about the workings of perception—about the structure of ordinary physical objects like hands, about the nature of light and reflection, about the reactions of retinas and neurons, the actions of human cognitive mechanisms, and so on. This story will include cautionary chapters, about how this normally reliable train of perceptual events can be undermined—by unusual lighting, by unusual substances in the blood-stream of the perceiver, and so on—and she will check as best she can to see that such distorting forces are not present in her current situation. By such careful steps she might well conclude that it is reasonable for her to believe, on the basis of her perception, that there is a hand before her. Given that it is reasonable for her to believe this, she does believe it, and so she concludes that she knows there is a hand before her, that she has hands.

But mightn't she be sleeping? Mightn't an Evil Demon be deceiving her in all this? Our inquirer is no more impressed by these empty possibilities than Descartes' meditator; with him, she continues to think it is far more reasonable than not for her to believe that she has hands, that she isn't dreaming, that there is no Evil Demon. The question is whether or not she will see the wisdom, as he does, in employing the Method of Doubt. Will she see the need 'once in [her] life, to demolish everything completely and start again' (Descartes [1641], p. 12)?

This question immediately raises another, which we haven't so far considered, namely, what is it exactly that Descartes' meditator sees as forcing him to this drastic course of action? The only answer in the *Meditations* comes in the very first sentence:

> Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. (Descartes [1641], p. 12)

Our inquirer will agree that many of her childhood beliefs were false, and that the judgements of common sense often need tempering or adjustment in light of further investigation, but she will hardly see these as reasons to suspend her use of the very methods that allowed her to uncover those errors and make the required corrections! It's hard to see why the meditator feels differently.

The reason traces to Descartes' aim of replacing the reigning Scholastic Aristotleanism with his own Mechanistic Corpuscularism. As he was composing the *Replies* that were to be published with the first edition of the *Meditations*, he wrote to Mersenne:

> I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But please do not tell people, for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle. (Descartes [1641a], p. 173)

To get a sense of the conflict here, notice that on the view Descartes comes to by the end of the *Meditations*, all properties of physical objects are to be explained in terms of the geometry and motions of the particles that make them up; the features we experience—like color, weight, warmth, and so on—exist, strictly speaking, only in us. For the Aristotelians, in contrast, physical objects themselves have a wide variety of qualities, which brings Aristotelianism into close alliance with common sense.

This background is laid out beautifully by Daniel Garber, who then takes the final step:

> Descartes thought [that] the common sense worldview and the Scholastic metaphysics it gives rise to is a consequence of one of the universal afflictions of humankind: childhood. (Garber [1986], p. 88)

On Descartes' understanding of cognitive development, children are 'so immersed in the body' (Descartes [1644], p. 208) that they fail to distinguish mind and reason from matter and sensation, and

> The domination of the mind by the corporeal faculties ... leads us to the unfounded prejudice that those faculties represent to us the way the world really is. (Garber [1986], p. 89)

So these are the 'childhood falsehoods' and Aristotelianism is the resulting 'highly doubtful edifice' that the meditator despairs of in the opening sentence of the *Meditations*.[3] As the errors of childhood are extremely difficult to uproot in adulthood, only the Method of Doubt will deliver a slate clean enough to allow Descartes' alternative to emerge: the resulting principles of First Philosophy will be completely indubitable, and as such, strong enough to undermine the authority of common sense.[4]

Now our contemporary inquirer, unlike the meditator, has no such Cartesian reasons to believe that her most reasonable beliefs are problematic,[5] so she lacks his motivation for adopting the Method of Doubt. Still, if application of the Method does lead to First Philosophical Principles that are absolutely certain, principles that may conflict with some of our inquirer's overwhelmingly reasonable, but ever-so-slightly dubitable beliefs, then she should, by her own lights, follow this course. Even if all her old beliefs re-emerge at the end, some of them might inherit the certainty of First Philosophy.[6] Though she quite reasonably regards such outcomes as highly unlikely, she might well think it proper procedure to read past the First Meditation, to see what comes next. The unconvincing arguments that follow will quickly confirm her expectation that there is no gain to be found in this direction.[7]

So our inquirer will continue her investigation of the world in her familiar ways, despite her encounter with Descartes and his meditator. She will ask traditional philosophical questions about what there is and how we know it, just as they do, but she will take perception as a

mostly reliable guide to the existence of medium-sized physical objects, she will consult her astronomical observations and theories to weigh the existence of black holes, and she will treat questions of knowledge as involving the relations between the world—as she understands it in her physics, chemistry, optics, geology, and so on—and human beings—as she understands them in her physiology, cognitive science, neuroscience, linguistics, and so on. While Descartes' meditator begins by rejecting science and common sense in the hope of founding them more firmly by philosophical means, our inquirer proceeds scientifically, and attempts to answer even philosophical questions by appeal to its resources. For Descartes' meditator, philosophy comes first; for our inquirer, it comes second—hence 'Second Philosophy' as opposed to 'First'. Our Character now has a label: she is the Second Philosopher.[8]

II. STROUD'S DESCARTES

The Descartes we've been examining so far—perhaps he should be called Broughton's Descartes—regards the sceptical hypotheses as a mere tool in his search for a new foundation for science,[9] but contemporary epistemologists tend to entertain a more potent scepticism that takes centre stage all on its own. To see how our Second Philosopher fares in this context, let's turn our attention to this Descartes, of whom Barry Stroud writes:

> By the end of his *First Meditation* Descartes finds that he has no good reason to believe anything about the world around him and therefore that he can know nothing of the external world. (Stroud [1984], p. 4)

This Descartes would seem to stand in clear conflict with common sense, and with our Second Philosopher.

Stroud's analysis brings us back to the dream argument. The meditator realizes that the senses sometimes mislead him, when the light is bad, or he is tired, and so on, so he focuses on a best possible case: he sits comfortably by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand. At first, it seems to him impossible that he could be wrong about this—until he's hit by the thought that for all he knows he might be dreaming.

'With this thought,' Stroud writes, 'Descartes has lost the whole world' (Stroud [1984], p. 12).

At this point, the Second Philosopher is tempted to answer in the spirit displayed by Descartes himself at the end of the *Meditations:*

> The exaggerated doubts ... should be dismissed as laughable ... especially ... my inability to distinguish between being asleep and being awake ... there is a vast difference between the two, in that dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences are ... when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of my life without a break, then I am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake. (Descartes [1641], pp. 61–2)[10]

But the trouble, says Stroud's Descartes, is that I might be dreaming that I distinctly see where the paper in my hand came from, I might be dreaming that my current perception of my hand is connected with the rest of my life without a break, and so on. If I think there is some test I can apply to determine whether or not my current experience is or isn't a dream, I might be dreaming that the test is satisfied—I might even be dreaming that this test is effective![11]

To this, the Second Philosopher might reply that she knows, by ordinary means, that she is not dreaming, just as Descartes suggests: her tests centre on doing things now that she can't do while dreaming; her belief that she can't do them while dreaming is based on her past dreaming experiences, and so on . Surely we do, in fact, operate in this way. But even if such an adherence to everyday methods could be maintained to rule out the possibility of dreaming, it would be of no use against the Evil Demon hypothesis, for which there cannot in principle be any ordinary tests: the Demon makes it seem to me exactly as it would if there were no demon, so no aspect of my experience could count against his existence. This suggests that the debate over ordinary tests is beside the point, so let's leave this style of response aside, and continue with Stroud's line of thought, assuming the dream hypothesis to be as impregnable as that of the Evil Demon.[12]

So, Stroud's meditator reasons like this. First, if I'm now dreaming, I can't know there's a hand before me, (and this is true, by the way, even if there happens to be a hand there). Second, I can't tell whether or not I'm dreaming—which the Second Philosopher must admit, given the recently-adopted strong sense of the dream hypothesis. From which it is to follow that I can't know that there's a hand before me. But I chose the case of the hand to give perception the greatest possible advantage; if I don't know in this case, I can't know anything at all on the basis of perception. And so, as Stroud puts it, I have lost the world.

The remaining kink here is the unspoken assumption that I can't know the hand is there if I can't rule out the possibility that I'm dreaming. This is hardly required in ordinary life, even under the most rigorous conditions, as Stroud appreciates:

> If I testify on the witness stand that I spent the day with the defendant, that I went to the museum and then had dinner with him, and left him about midnight, my testimony under normal circumstances would not be affected in any way by my inability to answer if the prosecutor were then to ask 'How do you know you didn't dream the whole thing?' The question is outrageous. ... Nor do we ever expect to find a careful report of the procedures and results of an elaborate experiment in chemistry followed by an account of how the experimenter determined that he was not simply dreaming that he was conducting the experiment. (Stroud [1984], pp. 49–50)

The worry arises that Stroud's Descartes is simply imposing an artificially high standard on knowledge, a standard we don't in fact consider reasonable. If this is right, then I could be said, under the proper perceptual conditions, to know that there is a hand before me, even if I can't prove that I'm not dreaming.

Understandably, Stroud is keen to argue that his Descartes isn't simply changing the subject from knowledge to some kind of ultra-knowledge. He begins his response by pointing out that its being inappropriate to criticize the witness's or the chemist's knowledge claims in this way doesn't by itself show that ruling out the dream hypothesis isn't necessary for knowledge:

> The inappropriately-asserted objection to the knowledge-claim might not be an outrageous violation of the conditions of knowledge, but rather an outrageous violation of the conditions for the appropriate assessment and acceptance of *assertions* of knowledge. (Stroud [1984], p. 60)

The witness and the chemist make their claims to knowledge 'on just about the most favorable grounds one can have for claiming to know things' (op. cit., p. 61), so it isn't appropriate to criticize them for failing to rule out, or even to consider, the possibility that they're dreaming. But this doesn't show that they do in fact know what they claim to know.

Having found this opening, Stroud's Descartes takes it: he thinks it's appropriate for me to assert that I know when there is no reason to think I might be dreaming, but that I still do not in fact know unless I can rule out that possibility. The reason for this discrepancy between conditions for knowledge assertions and conditions for knowledge lies in the contrast between the practical and the theoretical:

> It would be silly to stand for a long time in a quickly filling bus trying to decide on the absolutely best place to sit. Since sitting somewhere in the bus is better than standing, although admittedly not as good as sitting in the best of all possible seats, the best thing to do is to sit down quickly ... there is no general answer to the question of how certain we should be before we act, or what possibilities of failure we should be sure to eliminate before doing something. It will vary from case to case, and in each case it will depend on how serious it would be if the act failed, how important it is for it to succeed by a certain time, how it fares in competition on these and other grounds with alternative actions which might be performed instead, and so on. This holds just as much for the action of saying something, or saying that you know something, or ruling out certain possibilities before saying that you know something, as for other kinds of actions. (Stroud [1984], pp. 65–6)[13]

The picture, then, is of a sliding scale of strictness on proper assertions of knowledge:

> From the detached point of view—when only the question of whether we know is at issue—our interests and assertions in everyday life are seen as restricted in certain ways. Certain possibilities are not even considered, let alone eliminated, certain assumptions are shared and taken for granted and so not examined. (Stroud [1984], pp. 71–2)

In ordinary life, then, under good perceptual conditions, it's reasonable for me to risk asserting that there is a hand before me, and so, to claim to know that there is a hand before me. But the knowledge claim is just a loose way of speaking, for practical purposes. In a theoretical context—one without practical time pressures, with no limit on the amount of 'effort and ingenuity' (op. cit., p. 66) we can bring to bear on the question of the truth of our claims—in such a context, free of practical restrictions, we have no excuse for speaking loosely and we shouldn't claim to know until we have ruled out every possibility that would preclude our knowing—in particular, we must rule out the possibility that we are dreaming. So Stroud's Descartes hasn't changed the subject; he's simply working with the usual notion of knowledge in an unrestricted or theoretical context.[14]

Now there is considerable appeal in this notion of a sliding scale of stringency. The Second Philosopher imagines a shopkeeper concerned about the coins he takes in: are they pure metal or fakes?[15] He instructs his hired assistant to bite each coin to be sure, knowing that many counterfeits are laced with harder metals. He also knows that more sophisticated counterfeiters produce fake coins with softness comparable to pure coins by a different, more difficult process, and that these finer fakes can be detected by an optical device he keeps in the back of his shop. But the fellows capable of this fine work are now in jail, so he doesn't bother to include this extra twist in his instructions to his assistant. Under these conditions, when the assistant says he knows a particular coin is pure metal, the shopkeeper realizes that the fellow doesn't really know, because he hasn't used the optical device in the back room and doesn't know that the coin isn't one of the finer fakes, but the knowledge claim is appropriate in the context, and the shopkeeper would be out of line to correct him.

Likewise, the chemist knows that there are impure metals that pass both the biting test and the optical test, so he can see that the

shopkeeper's claim to know, after using his optical device, is also restricted, despite being appropriate in the given circumstances. Even the chemist's claim to know that the metal is pure will appear restricted to the physicist who realizes that there are atomic variations undetectable by chemical means. And even the physicist may have to admit that there are possible variations he doesn't yet know how to test for, and he will always realize that there may be possibilities he's unaware of that will be uncovered by future scientists. So, even his claim to know that the metal is pure will be subject to the proviso, 'at least as far as current science can determine'.

All this gives the idea of a sliding scale of restrictiveness some initial plausibility. But the Second Philosopher remains troubled by the conclusion that such a scale somehow presupposes an underlying entirely unrestricted notion of the sort proposed by Stroud's Descartes. After all, the scale as she understands it, no matter how stringent it gets, will never require ruling out the hypothesis that the relevant inquirer is dreaming, or deceived by an Evil Demon; these doubts still seem artificial. Furthermore, no notion of a scale seems relevant in a simple perceptual case like my seeing my hand before me; there I'm not hampered by time pressure or ignorance or anything else, no further, more strenuous investigation or special expertise seems relevant.

From the Second Philosopher's point of view, the situation looks like this. She has various methods of finding out about the world, beginning with observation, and as she builds and tests and modifies her theories, she also studies, tests and refines those methods themselves. She has seen, in her day, implementations of various bad procedures for finding out about the world, like astrology and creationism, and she can explain in detail what's wrong with these methods. Now Stroud's Descartes presents her with an alternative hypothesis: perhaps everything she believes is false and she is dreaming, or an Evil Demon has made it seem to her as if what she thinks she knows is true when it is not. This alternative hypothesis is deliberately designed so that none of her tried and true methods can be brought to bear on it. I imagine she will reply along these lines: 'I admit I can't refute the hypothesis, though it's hard for me to see the point of entertaining it.[16] Perhaps this shows that I can't be absolutely certain that I know what

I think I know, but that doesn't surprise me so much.[17] I constantly work to remove as many "restrictions" as possible, to conduct my inquiries in a detached and unhurried way, as unimpeded as possible by practical limitations and lingering prejudices. This seems to me the best way there is to find out what the world is like. The semantics of the word "know" seem to me quite complex, and I don't pretend to understand them completely,[18] but it still seems to me reasonable to think that we know, in a straightforward and unrestricted sense, that we have hands (in which case scaling seems irrelevant), that water is H_2O (in which case we seem suitably high on the scale), and much, much more.'

This will hardly satisfy Stroud's Descartes, but to avoid an unappealing debate over the concept 'know',[19] let me approach the issue from another direction. Stroud calls the epistemological challenge a 'theoretical' or 'philosophical' one:

> We aspire in philosophy to see ourselves as knowing all or most of the things we think we know and to understand how all that knowledge is possible. (Stroud [1994], p. 296)

The Second Philosopher thinks she has at least the beginnings of an answer to this question, in her account of how and when perception is a reliable guide, in her study of various methods of reasoning, and her efforts to understand and improve them.

But this obviously isn't what Stroud has in mind:

> In philosophy we want to understand how *any* knowledge of an independent world is gained on *any* ... occasions ... through sense-perception. So, unlike ... everyday cases, when we understand the particular case [like my hands] in the way we must understand it for philosophical purposes, we cannot appeal to some piece of knowledge we think we have already got about an independent world. (Stroud [1996], p. 132)[20]

From the 'philosophical' or 'external' point of view:

> *All* of my knowledge of the external world is supposed to have been brought into question in one fell swoop ... I am to focus on my relation to the whole body of beliefs which I take to be knowledge

> of the external world and ask, from 'outside' as it were ... whether and how I know it ... (Stroud [1984], p. 118)

In other words, I'm to set aside all my hard-won methods, all my carefully checked and double-checked beliefs, and then explain ... Well, the Second Philosopher will hardly care what she's now asked to explain; the demand that she explain anything without using any of her best methods seems barmy.

From Stroud's point of view, the problem with the Second Philosopher's explanation can be illuminated by a comparison.[21] Suppose a pseudo-Cartesian inquirer gives the following account of his knowledge of the world: 'I know because I have a clear and distinct idea, and God makes sure that I only have clear and distinct ideas about things that are true; furthermore, I came to believe this about God by means of clear and distinct ideas, so I have good reason to believe I am right.' This account is to run parallel to the Second Philosopher's: 'I know because my belief is generated by such-and-such methods, and such-and-such methods are reliable; furthermore, I came to believe that they are reliable by means of such-and-such methods, so I have good reason to believe that I'm right.' We may be inclined to think that the Second Philosopher *is* right— that perception and her other methods of belief formation are reliable—and that the pseudo-Cartesian is wrong—that there is no such accommodating God—but the best either of these inquirers can say is:

> 'If the theory I hold is true, I do know ... that I know ... it, and I do understand how I know the things I do.' (Stroud [1994], p. 301)

Given that all knowledge is being called into question at once, neither of them can detach the antecedent, so neither can give a philosophically satisfying account of their knowledge.

In fact, this just repeats the previous observation that the Second Philosopher can't explain her knowledge without using her methods of explanation, but the rhetorical force is heightened by the suggestion that she's in no better position than this woeful pseudo-Cartesian. Of course, she doesn't see it that way; to her, the pseudo-Cartesian is just another in a long line of the benighted—like the astrologer and the creationist—all of whom she can dispatch on straightforward grounds.

What Stroud's comparison invites her to attempt is an explanation of the pseudo-Cartesian's errors that uses none of her methods, a task that seems to her no more reasonable than the original challenge to explain her knowledge using none of her methods.

Perhaps the Second Philosopher's reaction can be clarified by comparison with a few close cousins. Moore, like the Second Philosopher, tends to stick to the 'internal' or 'everyday' versions of the sceptic's questions. Stroud writes:

> It is precisely Moore's refusal or inability to take his own or anyone else's words in [the] 'external' or 'philosophical' way that seems to me to constitute the philosophical importance of his remarks. He steadfastly remains within the familiar, unproblematic understanding of those general questions and assertions with which the philosopher would attempt to bring all our knowledge of the world into question. He resists, or more probably does not even feel, the pressure towards the philosophical project as it is understood by the philosophers he discusses[22] ... But how could Moore show no signs of acknowledging that [those questions] are even intended to be taken in a special 'external' way derived from the Cartesian project of assessing all our knowledge of the external world at once? That is the question about the mind of G.E. Moore that I cannot answer. (Stroud [1984], pp. 119, 125–6)

Here the Second Philosopher must sympathize with Stroud. Though she, too, fails to feel the 'lure' of the philosophical project, she surely realizes that those who do feel it intend the question of the external world to be understood in a sense that explicitly marks off everything she has to offer as beside the point. For this reason, she, unlike Moore, cannot honestly claim to have answered the sceptic's challenge.

Quine's naturalized epistemology is another obvious relative, but the Quinean opus includes many themes, some of which seem to conflict with his naturalism, and many statements and restatements, so the assessment of agreement and disagreement here is an arduous one.[23] Still, one note is salient for our purposes here. Quine poses the epistemological challenge this way:

> We are studying how the human subject ... posits bodies ... from his data. (Quine [1969], p. 83)

The Second Philosopher, relying more on cognitive science than on empiricism or behaviourism, is less inclined to speak of 'data' and 'positing' and more inclined to cite studies of how prelinguistic infants come to perceive and represent physical objects.[24]

This brings us to one of Stroud's central concerns about Quine's naturalism. He is unbothered by the idea of relying on science, which he sees as an update of Moore's dogged trust in common sense:

> What Moore says is perfectly legitimate and unassailable ... The results of an independently-pursued scientific explanation of knowledge would be in the same boat. (Stroud [1984], p. 230)

As we've seen, Stroud thinks 'there is wisdom is that strategy' ([1984], p. 248), though it doesn't answer the sceptic's challenge as he understands it. The trouble comes in Quine's distinctive conception of the scientific undertaking, in his description of humans as positing objects on the basis of data, where what

> ... can be said ... in common-sense terms about ordinary things are ... far in excess of any available data. (Quine [1960], p. 22)

For Quine, the naturalized epistemologist studies

> the relation between the meager input and the torrential output ... in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence. (Quine [1969], p. 83)

Though Quine doesn't begin from a sensory given, but from 'the limited impingements' of our sensory surfaces (Quine [1974], p. 3), he persists in the language of 'evidence', 'information' and 'data'.

Stroud worries that this way of describing the scientific project provides a new foothold for the sceptic. If I regard my beliefs about the external world as the result of my own positing, a positing that could have gone any number of different ways without coming into conflict with my sensory inputs, it's hard to see how I can use those beliefs to explain how I come to know what the world is like:

> Countless 'hypotheses' or 'theories' could be 'projected' from those same slender 'data', so if we happen to accept one such 'theory' over others it cannot be because of any objective superiority it enjoys over possible or actual competitors ... our continued adherence to our present 'theory' could be explained only by appeal to some feature or other of the knowing subjects rather than of the world they claim to know. And that is precisely what the traditional epistemologist has always seen as undermining our knowledge of the external world. (Stroud [1984], p. 248)

Though Quine hopes to use ordinary science in his epistemological project, the project itself is formed by 'the old epistemologist's problem of bridging a gap between sense data and bodies'; it is 'an enlightened persistence ... in the original epistemological problem' (Quine [1974], pp. 2–3). Stroud's point is that Quine's enlightenment has not saved him; as soon as he allows

> a completely general distinction between everything we get through the senses, on the one hand, and what is or is not true of the external world, on the other ...

he is 'cut ... off forever from knowledge of the world around us' (Stroud [1984], p. 248).[25] As Quine's line on positing and underdetermination is supposed have resulted from scientific inquiry, Quine's science has undermined itself from within.[26]

But the commitment to science and common sense doesn't force us to conceive the problem in Quine's way. In fact, if we are interested in explaining how a causal process beginning with light falling on and reflecting off an object, continuing through stimulations of our sensory surfaces, proceeding through various levels of cognitive processing, often results in reliable belief about the external world, we find nothing in the story about 'data' or 'theory', no grounds for identifying one episode in the causal chain—the 'irritation' of our 'physical receptors'—as data or information or evidence that radically underdetermines the rest.[27] Ironically, Quine himself, at other times, counsels us to drop such talk of 'epistemological priority' (see Quine [1969], p. 85), but if we do so

> We are left with questions about a series of physical events, and perhaps with questions about how those events bring it about that we believe what we do about the world around us. But in trying to answer these questions we will not be pursuing in an 'enlightened' scientific way a study of the relation between 'observation' and 'scientific theory' or of the 'ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence' ... (Stroud [1984], p. 252)

Any suggestion that we are addressing the sceptic's original challenge now evaporates.

Of course, the Second Philosopher never embraced this Quinean conception of the project in the first place: she isn't out to explain how we project or infer objects from sensory data, but how we come to be able to detect external objects by sensory means. Stroud has no objection to this project of the Second Philosopher, or for that matter, to Moore's persistence in the everyday or 'internal' reading of the question; in fact, it's hard not to be struck by Stroud's admiration for Moore, in particular. Speaking for himself rather than Descartes, Stroud wonders whether

> the fully 'external' or 'philosophical' conception of our relation to the world, when pressed, is really an illusion. (Stroud [1984], pp. 273–4)

His distrust extends not only to scepticism, but to all efforts to answer the 'external' question:

> It is what all such theories purport to be about, and what we expect or demand that any such theory should say about the human condition that we should be examining, not just which one of them comes in first in the traditional epistemological sweepstake. In that tough competition, it still seems to me, skepticism will always win going away. (Stroud [1994], p. 303)

Here Stroud and the Second Philosopher come into partial agreement, in their reservations about the very problem of traditional epistemology, the problem of justifying our knowledge of the world without using any of our ordinary means of justification. The difference is that Stroud suspects the problem is somehow incoherent—that there's some obstacle in principle to posing the completely general question—while the Second Philosopher thinks it's simply misguided.[28]

III. VAN FRAASSEN

In any case, scepticism of this traditional variety seldom troubles the sleep of our level-headed philosophers of science. Still, they do worry over some partial versions, most often scepticism about unobservables. Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is a conspicuous example. I'd like to take my Second Philosopher on one last ramble, around this corner of the philosophy of science. For future reference, let me begin by summarizing the development of the Second Philosopher's reasons for believing that there are atoms, despite her inability to see them, with or without her eye-glasses.

Beginning with Dalton in the early 1800s, the atomic hypothesis was used in chemistry to explain various laws of proportion and combining volumes, then Boyle's law and Charles' law, and was elaborated to good effect with the notions of isomers, substitution and valence.[29] For a time, difficulties in the determination of atomic weights produced severe worries—one prominent chemist proposed that the atom be 'erased' from science because 'it goes beyond experience, and never in chemistry ought we to go beyond experience' (Dumas)—but by 1860, all this was settled and, in the words of the historian, 'the atom [came] into general acceptance as the fundamental unit of chemistry' (Ihde). In the second half of the 19th century, atoms entered physics by way of kinetic theory, again with dramatic success, including the determination of absolute atomic weights.

Despite all this, scientists concerned about atoms still asked 'who has ever seen a gas molecule or an atom?' (Bertholet, 1877) and complained about the appeal to 'forces, the existence of which we cannot demonstrate, acting between atoms we cannot see' (Ostwald, 1895). Even supporters recognized that it might well be thought 'more dangerous than useful to employ a hypothesis deemed incapable of verification' and that scepticism here was 'legitimate' (Perrin). In this climate, a leading textbook of 1904 warned that

> The atomic hypothesis has proved to be an exceedingly useful aid to instruction and investigation ... One must not, however, be led astray by this agreement between picture and reality and combine the two. (Ostwald, 1904)

In one of his remarkable series of papers of 1905, Einstein declared his 'major aim' was to 'find facts which would guarantee as much as possible the existence of atoms'.

A decade before, Gouy had argued that the phenomenon of Brownian motion 'places under the eyes the realization of all [the] hypotheses' of the kinetic theorists. Einstein was unaware of this work and only dimly aware of Brownian motion itself, but he concluded that:

> According to the molecular-kinetic theory of heat, bodies of microscopically visible size suspended in a liquid will perform movements of such magnitude that they can be easily observed in microscope.

Einstein took the presence or absence of this phenomenon in the exact mathematical terms predicted by kinetic theory as a crucial test, but he apparently thought actual experiments would require a level of precision beyond human reach.

But it was not beyond Jean Perrin, as we now know. He manufactured tiny particles of exact and uniform size and weight and studied how they suspended in a liquid—balancing the scattering forces of Brownian motion against gravity. In this way, he used

> the weight of the particle, which is measurable, as an intermediary or connecting link between masses on our usual scale of magnitude and the masses of molecules ...

... and he obtained measurements of absolute atomic weights and Avogadro's number that matched the predictions of kinetic theory. From this beginning, he went on to verify the rest of Einstein's predictions.

In 1908, Ostwald, the same chemist who issued the textbook warning, described the work of Perrin and others as constituting

> experimental proof for the discrete or particulate nature of matter—proof which the atomic theory has vainly sought for a hundred years.

Poincare, another former sceptic, writes:

> we no longer have need of the infinitely subtle eye of Maxwell's demon; our microscope suffices us ... atoms are no longer a useful fiction ... The atom of the chemist is now a reality.

The contemporary Second Philosopher agrees, on these grounds and others that have accumulated since.

Now van Fraassen takes a different view, stunning in its sweep:

> When the theory has implications about what is not observable, the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that it is true. (van Fraassen [1980], p. 71)

The sting of this denial is temporarily drawn by van Fraassen's admission that the evidence doesn't even warrant belief in a 'simple perceptual judgement', not because the evidence is sense-data—this way lies traditional scepticism—but presumably because such a judgement involves belief about matters I haven't actually observed (like the other side of the moon, and so on). Indeed, van Fraassen holds that there are no 'rationally compelling' reasons for extending ones belief beyond the evidence precisely as far as he advocates and no further ([1980], pp. 72–3). He draws the line where he does following the lead of his underlying Empiricism, which counsels him 'to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, observable phenomena' ([1980], p. 202).

Parallel to Stroud's Descartes on the subject of hands, van Fraassen thinks that no evidence whatsoever could rationally compel belief in atoms. Still, the Second Philosopher is somewhat heartened, because she finds here no general sceptical argument—corresponding to the dream hypothesis—that's intended to establish this. Perhaps van Fraassen is simply in the position of the chemists and physicists of 1900—imagining, with some reason, that the existence of atoms 'goes beyond experience' and is 'incapable of verification'. Perhaps he can be persuaded, as they were, by Perrin's experimental evidence and its like. If he is not persuaded, she is eager to hear his objections to that evidence: perhaps there is a misunderstanding she can clear up; perhaps there is some weakness she hasn't noticed!

To her surprise, van Fraassen's reactions don't seem to take this form. Instead, he presents a range of arguments against people who connect the truth of a scientific theory in one way or another to its explanatory power, or who think the terms of mature scientific theories typically refer, or whatever. Now she is disinclined to think a theory true simply because it is the best explanation of the phenomena: the atomic hypothesis gave an excellent account of a wide range of chemical and physical phenomena by 1900, but the existence of atoms still hadn't been established; of course, their existence explains Brownian motion, but this bare description of the situation leaves out the details that made Perrin's experiments so compelling. Furthermore, the 'maturity' of the theory in which an entity appears seems to her an unclear and oddly-chosen indicator of the existence of its objects; what matters is the particular experimental evidence available for the particular entity in question! There is more, of course, but the nature and source of the Second Philosopher's befuddlement should be clear.[30]

Here van Fraassen makes the helpful suggestion that she has misunderstood the terms of the debate. The Second Philosopher is speaking as one 'totally immersed in the scientific world-picture' (van Fraassen [1980], p. 80). From this point of view,

> the distinction between [*atom*][31] and *flying horse* is as clear as between *racehorse* and *flying horse:* the first corresponds to something in the actual world, and the other does not. While immersed in the theory, *and* addressing oneself solely to the problems in the domain of the theory, this objectivity of [*atom*] is not and cannot be qualified. (van Fraassen [1980], p. 82)

So, while the Second Philosopher is immersed in atomic theory, the Perrin experiments *do* provide compelling reason to classify atoms as real, as opposed, say, to phlogiston or whatever. But she has not yet, according to van Fraassen, taken an 'epistemic' stance. He writes of the working scientist:

> If he describes his own epistemic commitment, he is stepping back for a moment, and saying something like: the theory entails that [atoms] exist, *and* not all theories do, *and* my epistemic attitude towards this theory is X. (op. cit.)

To grasp what's at stake in van Fraassen' empiricism, the Second Philosopher must step back and adopt an epistemic stance. And, at that level, van Fraassen's empiricism counsels belief in the empirical adequacy of the theory—that is, belief in what the theory tells us about observable events and things—rather than belief in its truth.

The Second Philosopher imagines that she understands the distinction between immersion and an epistemic stance. It seems to be what Ostwald recommended in his 1904 textbook: use atoms all you want while you're doing your chemistry, treat them as real, just as you would medium-sized physical objects, when you're explaining chemical phenomena, making chemical predictions, and so on; but, when you step back, notice that the existence of atoms hasn't actually been established and don't confuse the atomic picture with reality. The Second Philosopher knows many examples of this 'epistemic' phenomenon: a theory is used, taken as true during 'immersion', while the theorist nevertheless retains doubts about certain aspects or entities involved. But atomic theory has now passed beyond this, as a result of Perrin's experiments: it was once regarded as empirically adequate; now it is regarded as true.

Once again van Fraassen insists that the Second Philosopher has misunderstood. The 'immersion' and 'stepping back' she describes is all happening *within* what he calls 'the scientific world-picture': Ostwald's reservations about atomic theory were 'immersed', part of the internal scientific process of distinguishing between, say, race horses and flying horses; from the epistemic stance, atomic theory should still be and should always be regarded as empirically adequate only.

The bewildered Second Philosopher might be inclined to think we should seek to understand *why* atomic theory is empirically adequate, so as to understand the world better. Van Fraassen grants that

> The search for explanation is valued in science because it consists *for the most part* in the search for theories which are simpler, more unified, and more likely to be empirically adequate ... because having a good explanation *consists* for the most part in having a theory with those other qualities. (van Fraassen [1980], pp. 93–4)

So it's best that working scientists think as the Second Philosopher does, always searching for explanations—it makes for progress—but

> the interpretation of science, and the correct view of its methodology, are two separate topics. (van Fraassen [1980], p. 93)

From the interpretive or epistemic point of view:

> that the observable phenomena ... fit the theory, is merely a brute fact, and may or may not have an explanation in terms of unobservable facts ... it really does not matter to the goodness of the theory, nor to our understanding of the world. (van Fraassen [1980], p. 24)

All the Second Philosopher's impulses are methodological, just the thing to generate good science. Much as Stroud's Descartes recommends that we make knowledge claims in practical life that aren't properly justified theoretically, van Fraassen finds it beneficial to speak the language of current science 'like a native' (p. 82). But the correct interpretation of science—the empiricist interpretation—is entirely independent of its methodology.[32]

So the Second Philosopher is once again silenced. Stroud's Descartes left her no reply, because she was asked to justify her knowledge without using any of her means of justification. Similarly, van Fraassen has ruled all her evidence for the existence of atoms as ultimately irrelevant: good, even admirable, for the purposes of science, to one immersed; but not rationally compelling to the epistemologist. Her trouble is that she is so completely immersed: she doesn't speak the language of science 'like a native'; she *is* a native. Van Fraassen introduces her to his epistemic foreign language, where this baffling empiricism reigns: her best theories are taken to be empirically adequate, rather than true, and the desire for an explanation of why they are empirically adequate is perhaps useful as a heuristic, but in truth unmotivated.

In an effort to understand, she asks why we should adopt empiricism in the foreign language. Van Fraassen answers, because 'it makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity' ([1980], p. 73). Better than what?, the Second Philosopher wonders. Better than those accounts of scientific truth in terms of 'best explanations' and 'mature theories' that van Fraassen explicitly engages and that so befuddled her before. The salient difference now is that these opponents of van Fraassen think science aims for truth, not just empirical adequacy, and though she may flinch at generalities about 'science', the Second Philosopher *was* dissatisfied before Einstein and Perrin, and perhaps it isn't too great a distortion to say that she wanted to know if atomic theory was empirically adequate because it was true or for some other reason. Still, she concedes that it wasn't clear, before Perrin showed what could be done, that this question could be answered, that the existence or non-existence of atoms could be established, and if it couldn't have been, she might have settled for the empirically adequate theory. She figures the aim is to do the best we can in determining what the world is like, but all this, from van Fraassen's point of view, is just the thinking of one immersed: fine for scientific purposes; irrelevant epistemically.

Under the circumstances, the Second Philosopher seems unlikely to get the hang of this new language—she can't see what style of argument is appropriate there, given that all hers are 'merely immersed'—not to mention that she has little motivation for trying[33]—given her watchful and considered confidence in her own methods. From her perspective, the empiricist challenge is hardly more compelling than the Cartesian. To Stroud's Descartes, she concedes that she cannot justify her knowledge without using her means of justification; to van Fraassen, she concedes that she cannot defend the existence of atoms if all her best evidence is ruled irrelevant. But neither of these gives her reason to doubt her methods or to change her ways.

This final stroll has taken the Second Philosopher even further from Quine's naturalist, as Quine's justification for the atomic hypothesis, like those of van Fraassen's proper opponents, depends on general features of the theory rather than detailed experimental results. This separates Second metaphysics, like Second epistemology, from metaphysics and epistemology naturalized, which leads in turn to disagreements in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of logic. I'll talk about some of these things on Monday. For now, I hope the Second Philosopher's character has been brought into some degree of focus by

this excursion into scepticism. And I hope the lack of philosophical action hasn't left you wishing you'd gone to a different movie![34]

NOTES

* This is the Lakatos Award Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics in May 2003.

1. The following account of Descartes goals and strategies comes from the elegant and fascinating Broughton (2002).
2. In the 'Fourth Replies', Descartes refers to 'the exaggerated doubt which I put forward in the First Meditation', and in the 'Seventh Replies' he reminds us that 'I was dealing merely with the kind of extreme doubt which, as I frequently stressed, is metaphysical and exaggerated and in no way to be transferred to practical life' ([1642], pp. 159, 308). See Broughton (2002), p. 48.
3. As Broughton points out ([2002], p. 31), the meditator comes 'uncomfortably equipped with Cartesian theories' at the outset of the *Meditations*, though those theories aren't revealed to him until the end.
4. The need to undercut our most tenacious common sense beliefs explains Descartes' interest in certainty: if p and q conflict, and there is some slight reason to doubt p, but q is certain, we take q to undermine p. See Broughton [2002], p. 51.
5. She doesn't see the errors of childhood as based on a serious inability to distinguish mind from body, so she thinks her ordinary methods of inquiry can correct them.
6. Not all of the new science will be indubitable, of course. See Garber [1986], pp. 115–16, and the references cited there. Even perceptual beliefs are only trustworthy when *properly* examined by Reason, so some room for error remains here as well (see the final two sentences of Descartes [1641]).
7. Recall that our Second Philosopher has no grounds on which to denounce First Philosophy as 'unscientific'. Open-minded at all times, she's willing to entertain Descartes' claim that the Method of Doubt will uncover useful knowledge. If, by her lights, it did generate reliable beliefs, she'd have no scruple about using it. But if it did, by her lights—that is, by lights we tend to describe as 'scientific'—then we'd also be inclined to describe the Method of Doubt as 'scientific'.
8. The Second Philosopher is a development of the naturalist described in Maddy [2001] and [to appear], building on [1997]. I adopt the new name here to avoid largely irrelevant debates about what 'naturalism' should be.

9. Both Broughton ([2002], pp. 13–15) and Garber ([1986], p. 82) would allow that Descartes has some interest in replying to the sceptical arguments current among his contemporaries, but they see this as something of a side benefit to carrying out his real project of revising the foundations of science.
10. On Broughton's reading, it seems Descartes' meditator could have said this in the first Meditation.
11. For Stroud on ordinary tests, see [1984], pp. 20–23, 46–8.
12. I suspect that Stroud's Descartes gains some rhetorical advantage by sticking to dreaming, a familiar phenomenon, rather than plumping for the Evil Demon—this makes the challenge seem less like one based on an objectionable requirement of logical certainty. But the familiar phenomenon might well be ruled out in familiar ways.
13. An odd note here. When I say I have hands, there is a risk that I'm wrong, just as there's a risk that I might not get the best seat on the bus if I sit down quickly, but it might still be best, in both cases, to take the action. So I say I have hands without ruling out all possible defeaters. This might incline me also to say that I know I have hands. But if Stroud's Descartes is right, this second utterance is different: it's not that there's a small risk I might be wrong in saying that I know I have hands; there's no chance at all that I might be right!
14. Williams describes this nicely as a sort of 'vector addition': 'The concept of knowledge, left to itself so to speak, demands that we consider every logical possibility of error, no matter how far-fetched. However, the force of this demand is ordinarily weakened or redirected by a second vector embodying various practical or otherwise circumstantial limitations. The effect of philosophical detachment is to eliminate this second vector, leaving the concept of knowledge to operate unimpeded' ([1988], p. 428).
15. I use this example in place of Stroud's plane-spotter ([1984], pp. 67–75, 80–81) to bring out the role of scientific inquiry on the sliding scale.
16. Unlike Broughton's Descartes, Stroud's Descartes doesn't suggest that sceptical hypotheses are themselves means to deeper knowledge.
17. Opinion seems divided on the role of certainty: e.g., Williams holds that knowledge doesn't require certainty ('there is no obvious route from fallibilism ... to scepticism' ([1988], p. 430), while Lewis takes the idea of fallible knowledge to be prima facie 'madness' ([1996], p. 221). Stroud sees the requirements of certainty and foundationalism (the epistemic priority of experience), not as presuppositions of the sceptical argument, but as 'natural consequence[s] of seeking ... a certain kind of understanding of human knowledge in general' ([1989], p. 104). (I take up this formulation of the challenge below). My own feeling (which I apparently

share with Williams) is that the sceptical challenge isn't of much interest (unless as a Method, as for Broughton's Descartes) if it rests on a requirement of certainty. (Fallibilism doesn't trouble me as it does Lewis.)

18. The Second Philosopher may well suspect that her linguistic inquiry into the semantics of 'know' will not turn up anything determinate and unified enough to play the role of the 'underlying concept' Stroud's argument requires. Williams ([1988], p. 428) seems to make a similar suggestion, though in a different argumentative setting. Lewis finds the concept complex, but still more strictly codifiable than seems likely for a rough and ready notion like knowledge.
19. For example, over the certainty requirement: it's hard to see how the argument just rehearsed from the possibility that I'm dreaming to the conclusion that I don't know I have hands can be pressed without requiring that knowledge be certain; the sliding scale seems to be an attempt to defend this requirement. But leaving aside the word or concept (see previous footnote) of 'knowledge', what really matters is whether or not I have good reason to believe I have hands.
20. From the philosophical perspective, no certainty requirement seems to be presupposed: if I admit (as I must) that I might be dreaming, I have no grounds on which to count this hypothesis as unlikely—because I can't appeal to other knowledge of the world—and thus I have no good reason to believe that I have hands. (Stroud doesn't put the case quite this way in [1996], p. 132, but I think the spirit is the same.) As Stroud claims, the requirement of certainty emerges from the sceptical reasoning, because, in the absence of other information, any room for doubt leaves me with no good reason to believe. Thus, it seems to me that two different arguments for the sceptical conclusion are being offered, depending, on which considerations support the key move from 'I could be dreaming I have hands' to 'I don't know I have hands', the move, that is, that rules out the response that the dream hypothesis is sufficiently unlikely to be dismissed: in the first version, the sliding scale argument purportedly shows that certainty is required for knowledge, so the dream hypothesis must be conclusively defeated; in the second version, the philosophical perspective disallows the appeal to collateral information that would show the dream hypothesis to be unlikely.
21. This is adapted from Stroud [1994], a reply to externalism. See also Stroud [1989].
22. Stroud notes ([1984], p. 120) that 'even Homer nods'—there are places where Moore leans farther than perhaps he should toward the 'external' understanding.

23. See Fogelin [1997] for a discussion of one major fault line in the Quinean opus, between naturalism on one side and the likes of holism and ontological relativity on the other. I emphasize the tension between naturalism and holism in [1997]. Stroud [1984], chapter VI, highlights the difficulty of finding a single, consistent Quinean doctrine on scepticism. On epistemology itself, Quine sometimes says, 'why not settle for psychology?' ([1969], p. 75), while the Second Philosopher imagines a broader study, including various other human studies, plus her accounts of the things known. But see also Quine [1995], p. 16, where naturalized epistemology is described as 'proceed[ing] in disregard of disciplinary boundaries but with respect for the disciplines themselves and appetite for their input'.
24. Fogelin traces Quine's approach to Carnap's *Aufbau:* 'Quine's inspiration comes from the library, not the laboratory' ([1997], p. 561).
25. I'm not sure Quine would disagree with this diagnosis. After all, his views on proxy functions suggest that the world could be made of numbers instead of physical objects, for all our evidence tells us. Stroud needn't take a God's eye view and declare all these ontologies as equally good (Quine [1981], p. 21); he need only point out that science itself has told us that its evidence doesn't support its ontology over many rivals. Thus, it's hard to see how Quine has 'defend[ed] science from within, against its self-doubts' (Quine [1974], p. 3).

    Quine replies that his 'only criticism of the sceptic is that he is overreacting' when he 'repudiates science' (Quine [1981a], p. 475). I'm not sure what this repudiation comes to, apart from denying that science is knowledge. But Quine himself declares that there is no sense in which the world can be 'said to deviate from ... a theory that is conformable to every possible observation' (op. cit., p. 474). It sounds as if there is no fact of the matter about ontology that we can be said to know or fail to know.

    It's hard to resist Fogelin's conclusion (Fogelin [1997]) that Quine's naturalism sits ill with his ontological relativity. Surely ordinary science thinks there is a fact of the matter about whether the world is composed of physical objects, as opposed to numbers.
26. See Stroud [1984], pp. 225–34.
27. See Quine ([1960], p. 22, [1969], pp. 82–3, [1974], pp. 2–3). Gibson ([1988], p. 66) suggests that Quine should be understood as linking the 'irritations' to 'holophrastically acquired observation sentences'. If so, then we're back to the previous situation, with a gap between those observation sentences and 'theory' (and the latter includes observation statements understood referentially).
28. I'm not sure whether Stroud's worry is over the coherence of the way the sceptical challenge is raised, that is, by generalizing from a particular case

(Descartes' inability to know by perception that he has hands) to the whole of our purported knowledge of the world, or over the coherence of the philosophical perspective itself, whether or not it's forced upon us by the sceptical argument. If the former, he might still take the challenge to be coherent and unanswerable (as the Second Philosopher does).

29. For details and references, see [1997], pp. 135–42. Achinstein [2002] adopted the same general tone on the efficacy of the Perrin experiments.
30. Cf. van Fraassen [1985], p. 252: 'A person may believe that a certain theory is true and explain that he does so, for instance, because it is the best explanation he has of the facts or because it gives him the most satisfying world picture. That does not make him irrational, but I take it to be part of empiricism to disdain such reasons.' These aren't the Second Philosopher's reasons.
31. van Fraassen uses 'electron', in this quotation and the next, but the same would seem to go for atoms.
32. Like van Fraassen, Broughton's Descartes thought his contemporary scientists were wrong, but he clearly didn't take this fact to be methodologically irrelevant—his aim was to change the way science was done.
33. Notice that van Fraassen, like Stroud's Descartes but unlike Broughton's Descartes, is not offering an improvement in scientific methods.
34. My thanks to Sam Hillier, David Malament, and Kyle Stanford for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts, and to the audience at the Lakatos Lecture at LSE for stimulating discussions.

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Wittgenstein's Criticism of Moore's Propositions of Certainty: Some Observations

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G.E. Moore's papers 'Defence of Commonsense' and 'Proof of the External World'[1] have two common objectives. They are: (1) refuting the doctrines of Idealism and scepticism, and (2) upholding the theory of commonsense realism. In these two papers Moore makes certain interesting statements such as that he 'knows' with all certainty that 'there exists at present a living body, which is his body', 'the earth existed for a long time before his birth', 'here is one hand, and here is another' and so on. Moore makes the first two statements in his 'Defence of Commonsense', and the third in his 'Proof of the External World'. Statements of this type made by Moore, were the target of attack by Wittgenstein. The point of Wittgenstein is that Moore failed to understand the rule of the language game of 'I know'. The objective of the present paper is to examine Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore's propositions referred to above. This paper falls into three sections. In the first section Moore's propositions of certainty are stated. In the second, Wittgenstein's criticism of those propositions is outlined. The first two sections constitute the background for the discussions of the last section where Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore is examined.

I

In his paper 'A Defence of Commonsense' Moore gives a long list of propositions and claims that he knows them with all *certainty*. He writes that he knows that there exists at present a living human body, which is his body, that 'was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously'. Ever since it was born, it has been 'either in

contact with or not far from the surface of the earth'. Since the birth of his body, there have 'been a large number of other living human bodies', each of which has, like it, 'at some time been born', and 'continued to exist from some time after birth' and been 'either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth'. Many of these bodies 'have already died and ceased to exist' but 'the earth had existed also for many years' before his body was born. Finally Moore says that he knows that he is a 'human being' and he at different times since his body was born 'had many different experiences', e.g. he had perceived both his body and other things 'which formed part of its environment, including other human bodies'. He had also observed facts about them, for instance, the fact that the mantelpiece was nearer to his body than the book-case. He was aware that his body existed the day before and then also his body was 'sometime nearer to that mantelpiece than to that bookcase'.[2]

Again in his paper 'Proof of an External World' Moore says that he certainly knows the existence of external objects and he could as well prove them. By holding up his two hands, and making certain gestures with his hands, Moore says, 'here is one hand' and 'here is another'. By doing this he said that he had proved the existence of external things.[3]

II

The above statements of Moore are the target of attack for Wittgenstein in his work *On Certainty*. In fact this work of Wittgenstein is exclusively devoted to repudiate the views expressed by Moore in his two papers, mentioned above.

Wittgenstein writes that the 'propositions presenting what Moore "knows" are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the country'.[4] For example, Moore claims that he has spent his entire life in close proximity to the earth and that we cannot think of the opposite. Moore affirms that he certainly knows truths like 'the earth existed since a long time' etc. However, in the case of these propositions there is neither doubt nor certainty. Certain knowledge arises when a doubt is clarified. But Moore's propositions like 'the earth existed since a long time' etc., cannot be doubted under any

circumstance and therefore there is no certainty in knowing it. One cannot doubt the existence of earth since a long time, and therefore what is that we certainly know here?, asks Wittgenstein. No one doubts the existence of the brain inside his skull. In the same way no one doubts the existence of the earth since a long time. One might doubt the existence of Napoleon and consider it as a fable, but not that the earth did not exist 150 years ago. Wittgenstein says that if a child asks him whether the earth was already there before his birth, he would answer him that the earth did not begin only with his birth, but that it existed long before. The child's question is as funny as the question whether a mountain were higher than a tall house. Men build houses and demolish them and therefore it is meaningful to ask questions like 'how long has this house been here'? But it is meaningless to ask questions with reference to the existence of a mountain or that of the earth. There are scientific investigations into the shape and age of the earth, but not into whether the earth has existed for the last one hundred years.

Criticizing Moore's claim that he certainly knows his two hands, Wittgenstein writes that if a blind man were to ask him whether he has two hands, he would not look at his hands because he cannot doubt their existence. One need not verify his toes in order to say that he has ten toes. We don't doubt our having two feet when we want to get up from chairs. In the same way we don't doubt the existence of our hands. Wittgenstein says that if he were to have any doubt about it, then he does not know why he should trust his eyes.[5]

Wittgenstein observes that we don't doubt everything. We do not doubt the absence of sawdust in our friend's brain and body. In the same way, we do not doubt the existence of the earth since a long time, and the possession of two hands. As there is no doubt in these cases, there is no (certain) knowledge in this regard. Therefore, Wittgenstein asserts, 'where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either'.[6]

While explaining the language game of 'to know' Wittgenstein says that the expression 'to know' is correctly used in such contexts as: 'I know that water boils at 100°C, or 'I know that twelve pairs of nerves lead from the brain'. But Moore misuses this expression in making statements like 'I know that the earth existed since a long time' etc. The

point of Wittgenstein is that through his series of propositions Moore does not give any new information; he says something which we all know. The truths which Moore says he knows 'are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them'.[7] The reasonable man believes that the earth has existed since a long time, that his life has been spent on the surface of the earth, that he has never been on the moon, that he has a nervous system and the like. One knows these basic truths as he knows his name.[8] Instead of this, had Moore given some new information regarding the distance between two stars or had he given the name of a village which is not known hitherto to anybody, then such information might have been useful.

III

These arguments of Wittgenstein's indicate how pungent he is in criticizing the propositions of Moore. Wittgenstein's arguments are striking and persuasive. On reading Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, which makes very absorbing reading, initially one might conclude that Moore is at fault. But a cool and careful study of Moore's papers ('Defence of Commonsense' and 'Proof of the External World') and a rethinking on these papers would reveal that Moore has not committed such naïve mistakes as alleged by Wittgenstein.

The basic questions that I put to myself after re-reading Moore are: Why did Moore make such simple statements like 'The earth existed since a long time', 'Here is one hand and here is another' etc.? Was he not aware of the fact that these truths were known to everybody and that there was no need to repeat them? Was he ignorant of the usage of 'to know'? There is no doubt that Moore is a great thinker and contributed significantly to the analytic tradition. Could such a great thinker have committed such basic mistakes as alleged by Wittgenstein? If Moore was right, how to resolve this difficulty?—These are some of the serious questions that would agitate ones mind. In fact this paper is a response to these questions. A reconsideration of Moore's two papers (referred to above) is needed in order to assess Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore. The following is a modest attempt to see Moore's point of view in proper perspective

First we will consider Moore's paper on 'Defence of Commonsense'. In this paper Moore's primary aim is to reject the Idealism of Berkeley and his followers. As stated by Moore himself, his objective is to disprove the four-fold propositions of the idealists namely: (1) material objects are not real, (2) space is not real, (3) time is not real, (4) the self is not real. The idealists accept the reality of ideas only and reject the reality of everything else. But Moore attempts to disprove this theory. In this context he writes that he knows definitely propositions like 'the earth existed since a long time', 'there are other human bodies that exist apart from him in this world', and so on. He therefore argues that physical bodies (objects) do really exist in the external world, being independent of his mind. Moore argues that each one of us has frequently *known* with regard to *himself* or his body and the time at which he knows it; for instance he definitely knows the time at which he wrote down a series of propositions; and it is definitely known that other human bodies exist prior to ones own existence on earth. Then how could the idealist reject the reality of time?, asks Moore. He says that one cannot deny that his body existed for many years in the past, and had at every moment during that time been either in contact with or not far from the earth. These propositions which are true indicate the reality of material things and also the reality of space.[9]

While rejecting the Berkelean idealistic tradition, Moore holds that there is no good reason to suppose that *every* physical fact is *logically* dependent upon some mental fact or that *every* physical fact is *causally* dependent upon some mental fact. Moore explains his point with several examples. By physical facts he regards facts like the following: 'That mantelpiece is at present nearer to this body than that bookcase is', 'The earth has existed for many years past', 'The moon has at every moment for many years past been nearer to the earth than to the sun', 'That mantelpiece is of a light colour'. By mental facts Moore refers to facts like 'I am conscious now' and 'I am seeing something now'.[10] Moore views that while all the four physical facts he has mentioned above are *logically* independent of mental facts,[11] two of the facts which he has given as instances of physical facts, namely the fact that 'the earth has existed for many years past' and the fact that 'the moon has for many years past been nearer to the earth than to the sun' are

both *logically* as well as *causally* independent of mental facts.[12] In holding this Moore differs from Berkeley, who held that mantelpiece, book case, human bodies, are all of them, either 'ideas' or constituted by 'ideas' and that no 'idea' can possibly exist without being perceived.[13]

From the above discussion it is obvious that Moore attempts to defend realism against the idealistic tradition and in such an attempt he cites propositions like 'the earth existed for many years past' for illustrating physical facts which are independent of mental facts. But for illustrations of this kind what else could Moore have chosen to illustrate his point of view regarding physical facts? The charge of Wittgenstein against Moore is that Moore's illustrations of physical facts do not carry any new information and are therefore worthless. But the point to be noted here is that Moore's aim is not to give new information like a scientist but only to defend commonsense and refute idealism, through ordinary language.

Now let us consider Moore's paper 'Proof of the External World'. In this paper Moore makes it clear that his purpose is to refute Kant's thesis that 'the existence of things outside of us ... must be accepted merely on *faith*, and that if any one thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.'[14]

Against Kant's view Moore claims that one need not *believe* in the existence of things outside of us; on the contrary one could *prove* their existence with all certainty. Moore holds that the phrase 'things outside of us' has been used by Kant in two senses—(i) in the transcendental sense that refers to things-in-themselves, and (ii) empirically external objects. Moore makes it clear that his proof of the external objects refers to objects in the second sense, i.e. empirically external objects.

Before attempting to prove the existence of external things, Moore elucidates their very conception. He says that expressions like 'external objects', 'things external to us' and 'things external to our minds' have been used as equivalent to one another. The origin of this expression had prominently figured in the writings of Descartes. Kant defines external objects as objects to be met within space. But Moore shows the inadequacies of this definition through a series of arguments. It is not necessary to elaborate these arguments of Moore's here but it is

enough to explain his meaning of external objects. By external objects, Moore means the things that are logically independent of ones perception.[15] Such objects do exist even before or after ones perception. Moore gives the soap-bubble as an example of the object external to ones mind. He says that there is no contradiction in asserting that it existed before one perceives it and that it will continue to exist, even if one ceases to perceive it. This seems to be the reason for distinguishing a real soap-bubble from the hallucination of a soap-bubble.

While explaining the distinction between things that exist in the mind and things external to the mind, Moore says that bodily pains, after-images, one of the double images, that we see and any image which is seen when we are asleep or dreaming are typical examples of the things which are 'in the mind'. On the contrary, human bodies, the bodies of animals, plants of all kinds, stones, mountains, the sun, the moon, stars, houses and buildings, manufactured articles of all kind like tables, chairs and papers, are the things external to ones mind. External objects like tables and chairs could be perceived by many people, but internal objects (objects in the mind) like bodily pains, after-images etc., are proprietary and cannot be observed by many.

After thus explaining the meaning and scope of objects external to the mind, Moore goes to prove their existence. In the course of such proof he raises his two hands and says that his two hands exist and it is beyond doubt of anybody and therefore the physical objects external to his mind exist. To quote Moore:

> I can prove now, for instance that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand', and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, 'and here is another'. And if, by doing this, I have proved *ipso facto* the existence of external things, ...[16]

Moore says that if he wanted to prove three misprints in a book he could prove them by showing three different pages where misprints occur. In the same way he raises his two hands in order to prove the existence of things outside of us. Moore says that he raised his two hands not very long ago and therefore he has proved that physical objects existed in the past. This sort of proof, Moore says, differs from

the proof he produced for the existence of his two hands. Further he says that if any one doubts the existence of his hands, he could examine his hands by touching them, pressing them and so on. Therefore Moore says that he could prove the existence of his hands beyond doubt. He observes that if he cannot prove the existence of his hands, he cannot know them and thereby has to *believe* in them. But he has already proved the existence of his two hands, and therefore he does not have to find the reasons for believing in their existence.

The charge of Witttgenstein is that, by proving the existence of his two hands Moore has not proved something new. The existence of his hands is not an unknown fact in any way. But it is to be noted that Moore's proposition 'Here is one hand ... here is another' is made exclusively to prove the existence of external things on commonsense grounds. He does not proclaim it in order to say that he has a special claim of knowledge over his two hands, which nobody knows. Therefore Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore does not have either point or force.

Wittgenstein is concerned with ordinary linguistic expressions. His language games deal with utility. In fact he reminds that he is 'trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism'.[17] Consequently there is no place for the language of idealists and sceptics in the Wittgensteinian language games because their linguistic expressions are unusual in nature. Any reaction against them is also unwarranted. He goes to the extent of accusing Moore that his answer to the sceptic and the idealist may be mistaken as a madman's language. Thus Wittgenstein remarks that when a philosopher says again and again 'I know that's a tree' pointing out a tree that is near him, one may mistake him as insane.[18] This remark of Witttgenstein refers to Moore who says that 'this is a human hand' as an answer to the sceptic who rejects extra-mental reality.

But the question is: Could we sideline Idealism and scepticism on the ground that their expressions are unusual and non-pragmatic as conceived by Wittgenstein? These are important trends in the history of philosophy, introduced with a purpose and if at all we have to reject their thesis, we must do it through counter arguments. Kant challenged Hume's scepticism not on the ground that it is unusual in nature, but through systematic inquiry. A similar approach, we find in the writings

of Moore. He does not brush aside scepticism and idealism on the ground that they are unusual expressions, but he takes pains to advance strong arguments to show their lapses and limitations.

The point is that while Wittgenstein is more concerned with the language games of 'to know', 'to doubt', etc., Moore's preoccupation is with a critical examination of scepticism and idealism. Wittgenstein argues that while answering the sceptics and idealists, Moore has misused the language game of 'I know'. One has to agree with Wittgenstein when he says that 'I know' has to be used in the context where one gives new information to others. But this is one of the several uses of the phrase 'I know'. As Wittgenstein himself has remarked in his *Philosophical Investigations*, language has multiple functions to perform. Accordingly the phrase 'to know' can be used in situations where one gives new information to others or for the sake of emphasis in the game of a philosophical debate. Moore has used the phrase 'to know' in the latter sense. When Moore says that he knows with all certainty that the earth existed since a long time, he has not given any new piece of information and Moore himself is aware of this fact. He advances this statement purposely with a point of emphasis in order to refute idealism. So also when he remarks that he knows the existence of his two hands beyond doubt, he does not state it as a scientific discovery, but as a remark in order to prove the reality of external objects, the reality of space and time, which were hitherto rejected by some philosophers. Moore uses the phase 'I know' only as a part of philosophical debate with a point of emphasis and this should be allowed in the multiple functions of language games, which Wittgenstein himself accepts. If the argument developed in this paper is correct, then Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore on the ground that he has violated the rule of language game cannot be accepted.

The controversy between Moore and Wittgenstein regarding their respective positions may be resolved by considering their world-views. For Wittgenstein the world is the totality of facts and propositions are pictures of these facts. The world is fully described if all its atomic facts are known. Wittgenstein does not seem to subscribe to any particular theory, realism or idealism or any other, but he is only interested in understanding the nature of the world and its relation to thought

and language. The idea of critical examination of language dominates his works. He holds that the object of philosophy 'is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations'.[19] In the light of these ideas Wittgenstein examines Moore's propositions and considers them as meaningless on the ground that they do not follow the grammar of language. But Moore's world-view is different. As an out and out realist and defender of commonsense, he seeks to refute scepticism and idealism which challenged the commonsense position. While Wittgenstein looks at the world from the linguistic point of view, Moore perceives the world and its objects from the realistic viewpoint. Thus their approaches to understanding the world are very different, though their objective is the same—to arrive at a world-view. Looked at from the language point of view, Wittgenstein's arguments appear to be convincing and Moore's propositions seem rather odd. But when looked at from the realistic viewpoint of Moore's and his rejection of idealism and scepticism, his propositions of certainty do appear to be tenable. We definitely perceive that there is a point in his arguments.

Notes and References

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2. Moore, G.E., *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 33–4.
3. Ibid., pp. 145–6.
4. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974), Sect. 93.
5. Ibid., Sect. 125.
6. Ibid., Sect. 121.
7. Ibid., Sect. 100.
8. Ibid., Sect. 328.
9. Moore, *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 38–9.
10. Ibid., p. 46.
11. Ibid., p. 51.
12. Ibid., p. 52.
13. Ibid., p. 51.

14. Vide Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* tr. by Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1963), preface to the second edition, B. XXXIX, p. 34.
15. Moore, G.E., *Philosophical Papers*, p. 144.
16. Ibid., pp. 145–6.
17. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, Sect. 422.
18. Ibid., Sect. 467.
19. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., sixth impression, 1955), 4.112.

Language, Consensus and World Peace

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In this paper I shall discuss Habermas's view of the theory of communication in the context of post-modernism—taking specially into account the view of Lyotard, who is a post-modernist philosopher.

Habermas starts to build his theory of communication by raising a question which is almost similar to Kant's. Kant's question is—what are the conditions of the possibility of knowledge? Kant tried to answer this question in his own way by a transcendental approach. Knowledge, according to Kant, is possible by some *a priori* factors like the forms of sensibility and the categories. Thus it stands that there will be no knowledge without the application of forms and categories. Now Habermas's question is also somewhat like Kant's—only it is slightly different in its form. The question that Habermas raises is—what are the conditions of the possibility of communication? Habermas, by taking help of linguistics, tried to give an answer to this question.

Habermas's model is linguistic but his starting point is speech-acts. According to Habermas, to use language is not something cognitive, which is determined by only truth and falsity, but we do a variety of things by our language and that is why language is a speech-act, where truth and falsity are not so important. Sometimes speakers, by using language, say something about external objects and events. For example, when a speaker says *the table is brown*, he is uttering a sentence in language about that object *table* and this linguistic behaviour of his makes it possible to connect him with the *external world*. Again sometimes the speaker also uses language to express his feelings, his convictions, his ideas, his intentions and so on, i.e. about his internal experiences. Here the speaker is connected with the *internal world*. Further, the speaker sometimes may use language to say something about the shared norms, about what we should say and what we should

not say. Here the language is connected with our *social behaviour or the social world or socio-political world*. Thus in this way a speaker may have a variety of language-behaviour or use, and this language-behaviour ultimately means to have communication with others in society. Actually, a speech-act itself is communicative and that is why Habermas is interested in it and also starts with this speech-act in order to explain his communicative theory.

'To have communication with others' means to have at least a speaker and a hearer in a communicative act or speech-act. A speaker in a situation, while trying to communicate with the hearer, produces certain effects on the hearer. More clearly in order to communicate with the hearer (others) the speaker uses sentences and has a certain *intention* to produce certain effects on the hearer. A speaker's intention is to state a certain proposition and the hearer must be convinced about the truth of the proposition. 'The production of effects on the hearer' includes the hearer's understanding of what the speaker says, or, the hearer's understanding of the speaker's intention and also his acceptance of the truth of what the speaker says. So we see that there are both understanding and acceptance which are important factors involved in a speech-act or communicative act. In fact Habermas is giving much emphasis on this *understanding and acceptance* which he calls '*agreement*', without which, he thinks, there can be no true communication with others. But to produce effects on the hearer and to convey his intention to the hearer, the speaker uses certain sentences and these sentences are to be constructed by certain rules. Thus we find that Searle talks about two kinds of rules—one is *regulative* and the other is constitutive. Now in a speech-act the rule which we use is the constitutive rule without which there will be no language. Language is involved both with the convention and intention of the language-user (speaker) and this makes possible the communicative act. Thus, Habermas's theory of communication also takes account of the notion of the Searlian constitutive rule. Now, over and above this, Habermas talks about the *validity claims*. These validity claims are connected with the variety of language-behaviour or use. Thus when our language is connected with the external world (uttering or asserting something about an object) then our claim regarding that should be *true*. If it is not true, there cannot be any real communication according to Habermas. Again when we are talking about our beliefs or emotions or any internal experience to others, we should be *sincere* or *authentic*. Hence if the sincerity condition is not fulfilled there will be no real communication. By maintaining this, what Habermas wants to say is that one cannot be diplomatic or strategic while talking about his beliefs or emotions. That is, one cannot pretend with others while stating his internal experience. Again in the case of the social norm, the norms which will be operated or followed must be *legitimate*. If again this legitimacy claim is not fulfilled, we will not have a true communication with others. So, it stands, then, that when we use language, we make a claim about the *truth, correctness and sincerity* of what is said. In other words, according to Habermas, communicative action involves these validity claims.[1]

However, we have seen that both Kant and Habermas raised almost a similar kind of question, where the former tried to deal with knowledge and the latter with communication as their respective concerns. Again, they both have put stress or emphasis on the notion of *reason*. Habermas thinks, that without this reason we can never have understanding or agreement. Now, it is to be noted that Kant and Habermas have different approaches to solve their own problems. Kant's approach is from the direction of the *a priori*, because he thinks that since the rational structure is the same in all human beings, the forms and categories are also the same in them and so this type of approach of Kant is known as an *a priori* transcendental approach. But, unlike Kant, Habermas's approach is an empirical, reconstructive approach, and this kind of approach of Habermas has been developed by taking the help of speech-act theorists.

According to Habermas, language has an important practical value for its *use*. What does *use* mean? 'Using' mean *doing things*. A speech-act is nothing but making use of language. A speaker does a variety of things by using his language—he asserts, regulates, gives orders, makes promises, etc., and by doing these he communicates with others. It follows that two things are involved in the speech-act model:

(1) Speakers are able to do a variety of things with language, that is, they are able to engage in speech-acts.

(2) Speech-acts centre round communication, which according to Habermas, involve both *understanding* and *agreement*.

From the first point the important thing which follows is that the speakers have *communicative competence*,[2] i.e., they are able to do a variety of things which are directed towards communication. A speech-act must be communicative and not purely and only syntactic or cognitive. Speakers can do a variety of things with their language; they can assert, promise, request, etc., and therefore have *communicative competence*, which again means that the native speakers of a language can construct or produce sentences and this they do to communicate something to others. So the production of sentences is ultimately done for the purpose of communication and this is possible because, according to Habermas, we have communicative competence.

I have already mentioned that Habermas's approach is empirical and reconstructive. Now, let me see why he has taken this approach. His approach is *empirical* because he has developed his theory by taking help from linguistics. But let me go into some details about why his approach is *reconstructive*. One should note that not only is Habermas's approach reconstructive, Chomsky's approach, too, is such. According to both Chomsky and Habermas, speakers already have linguistic competence and communicative competence. For Chomsky communication is not at all so important. For Habermas, on the other hand, not only is the generation of well-formed sentences so much of importance, but to use them for effective communication is a much more important factor in language. Now, as Chomsky's grammatical sentence is rule-bound, so also is Habermas's notion of sentence-production rule-bound or having structures. That means communicative competence is also rule-bound. Thus when a speaker performs speech-acts, he uses certain rules or follows certain obvious rules for speech-act performances. Now, a very obvious fact is that a linguist can produce a well-formed sentence and so also can an ordinary man or a native speaker. The only difference between a linguist and a native speaker is that the former knows the rules, i.e., he can explicitly explain the rules, but the latter, although he can generate a well-formed sentence, cannot formulate the rules explicitly. But the significant point to be noted is that, although the native speaker cannot formulate the rules explicitly, he can produce

a grammatical sentence, and this means that the native speaker *does know* the rules; he knows the rules *unconsciously*. What, then, will be the task of a theory of language? Its task is to make explicit the rules which are implicit in us. In other words, its task is to *reconstruct*, or formulate explicitly the implicit rules that ordinary speakers of the language know unconsciously. So, the task of a theory of language or a linguist would be to *reconstruct* the rules and structures that speakers follow, but about which they have no conscious knowledge. So, now we have come directly to the point, why both Chomsky and Habermas's approaches are reconstructive. According to Habermas, competence theories are 'rational reconstructions' of basic capacities. Such theories actually *re-construct* what is already present, though in a tacit form.

Now, if somebody says, like Habermas, that speakers have 'communicative competence', he is then actually accepting the speech-act model. Thus to have 'communicative competence' is not the same as having an innate disposition or possession of Chomskyan 'universal grammar'. Rather to have 'communicative competence', according to Habermas, is to have certain categories which are called *dialogue-constitutive universals* or *pragmatic universals*, which the speakers have at their disposal. Habermas's universals are pragmatic universals, because he places emphasis on the communication or on the dialogue of the speakers and hearers. Habermas's communicative competence depends upon the pragmatic universals, the universals which every language has.[3] We know that (1) every language has personal pronouns like 'I' and 'you' (speaker/hearer); (2) every language has deictic expressions in which the speaker locates the language; (3) every language has certain demonstratives by which we can connect the language; (4) every language has certain performative verbs—communicative, constative, regulative, representative, etc.

As Chomsky accepts that speakers have linguistic competence (internalization of rules) and this linguistic competence is universal and so it has a deep grammar, so also Habermas accepts that communicative competence has a deep grammar—it includes personal pronouns, deictic expressions, demonstratives and so on—all the pragmatic universals. Hence, Habermas admits that we all generally possess a communicative structure. That is, we all have 'pragmatic universals' by

which the communication becomes possible in society. We actually internalize these pragmatic universals and have communicative competence, and this whole process makes communication possible. According to Habermas, everybody has communicative competence, but this competence is not successfully exercised because of various contingent conditions. It is only in an *ideal* condition or situation that this communicative competence can be fruitfully exercised. When we *use* language or are involved in speech-acts, we use certain deep structures or rules embedded in the language. Every language has this kind of structure or rules because they are universal or the core of language. Habermas wants to explicate or *reconstruct* these deep structures or rules. This communicative competence, according to Habermas, is a universal communicative competence or a *species communicative competence* and not a *culture-specific* competence. Moreover, we have seen that the communicative theory of Habermas is built upon actual performance and so it is empirical and not *a priori*. A native-speaker's *performance* is his actual behaviour, which is determined partly by his competence but also by other factors like perception, learning, etc. Actually it is the constitutive rule, which Habermas admits enables the performance of intentional actions and products. Apart from being rule-following, intentional actions are also generally rational. Intentional activities are intentional for they embody certain procedures and norms of rationality or conform to certain norms of intelligibility.

Habermas, however, tries to highlight the important point that we often in our everyday life fail to have a successful communication because of some ideology or power. The essential communicative conditions are not strictly followed or they are rather distorted, when our language-use is dominated by different motives or when we employ manipulative or strategic devices. When our communicative competence is distorted, successful communication is hampered or disturbed. According to Habermas, some ideologies or power-domination always work in the actual life of every society and these constraints hamper our communication to become successful. We seem to have successful communication with each other in society, but in reality the communication actually fails due to certain external or internal constraints. In fact we are not in a position to realize this *reality*, because

we have internalized all those ideologies, norms, vices or institutionalized beliefs of our society from our very childhood in such a way that we cannot think those elements to be outside our skin. When a child learns a language, the existing norms, ideologies which are intermingled with this language simultaneously are grasped by the child, or the child picks up language with all kinds of vices that are there in the society. This is the way a child or a human being, while learning a language, internalizes all kinds of ideologies and social norms that are created by the existing power, and thinks that *real* communication is going on with his fellow beings. But, according to Habermas, strictly speaking no communication in the true sense really goes on in society. The communication that we think goes on is our illusion; it is something apparent. Thus we can never have that *real* or *ideal* kind of communication which Habermas refers to, because we can never make ourselves free from the domination of power or ideologies—we, in fact, unconsciously accept them. Successful communication, perhaps, is not ever possible at the empirical or social level. So, according to Habermas, it is only in an *ideal-speech-situation* that successful communication becomes possible.

What, then, according to Habermas, is an ideal-speech-situation? When a person talks he actually wants to communicate with someone; moreover, whatever he tries to say carries a validity claim, as sketched by Habermas. With this background the communication may begin, but what Habermas tries to say is that in an ideal situation, speakers and hearers who are engaged in linguistic behaviour for communication, should have equal opportunity to speak—and both the speakers and the hearers should be free from internal and external constraints while speaking, so that the constraint-free discussion could help them to reach an agreement. Habermas believes that successful communication will be possible if there is an ideal situation—the situation where there is no domination of power and no constraint and where everyone has an equal opportunity for dialoguing or, in Habermas's language, everyone has 'symmetrical distribution of chances'. In other words, if the participants in a dialogue are equal partners, i.e., if they have equal opportunity to participate and exercise their reason, then, and then only is there the possibility of agreement or successful communication. This

situation of successful communication is *ideal*, because it is not the situation that we encounter in our ordinary normal social life. In our social life we have many kinds of discriminations and distortions and that is why we are unable to satisfy the ideal conditions, and consequently we are unable to make a beautiful or healthy society. Thus we have to get rid of these distortions and vices of society and should try to create a beautiful society.

Hence, Habermas gives a theory of communication, where communication means understanding, agreement of *rational consensus*. We can come to this rational consensus by having constraint-free discussions and by exercising our reason. Thus, no emotional or non-cognitive element should be considered in an ideal communication. Habermas tries to develop a more comprehensive conception of reason, by which he means one that is not reducible to the strategic calculations of an essentially monadic, individual subject. Moreover, it is by this broader conception that one could start to give a sketch of an 'emancipated' or 'rational' society. According to Habermas, a rational basis for collective life could be achieved if social relations are organized according to the principle that the validity of every norm should be made dependent on a consensus—a consensus which will make the communication free from domination.

The main aim of Habermas is to bring *solidarity*, which means ones identification or relation with the community ('one and the others'). When we have a realization that we are not disconnected from society, but tied together in one thread, we have then achieved solidarity. But this realization becomes impossible due to many kinds of manipulation, domination, constraints which are there in society and consequently the right or ideal communication becomes impossible. It is only ideal communication which can bring about solidarity.

Habermas spells out the preconditions for rational or ideal communication when he talks about his communicative competence. He derives them from the performative aspects of speech which are presupposed by the ability to utter, not any particular speech-act, but speech acts as such or 'universal pragmatics'. Habermas, we have seen, believes that the native-speaker's natural languages are represented through 'dialogue-constitutive-universals', such as verb forms and personal

pronouns. These actually reveal the intersubjective elements like reflexivity and reciprocity, which make mutual understanding possible. Competent native speakers must be able to give reasons for their claims and must be willing to grant others the same rights as themselves. Habermas believes that speakers demonstrate communicative competence through mastery of the ideal speech situation. He defines ideal speech as:

> intersubjective symmetry in the distribution of assertion and dispute, revelation and concealment, prescription and conformity among the partners of communication.[4]

Habermas takes these symmetries as unconstrained consensus, freedom and justice or universal forms. He believes that due to the existence of these symmetries, communication cannot be hindered by constraints arising from its own structures; it is then rational.

It is expected, then, that speakers and hearers in modern, rationalized societies will settle their needs and problems collectively. According to Habermas, 'universalism' is not so much a political value as it is a collectively shared *mentality*—a sense of solidarity that is distinct from political or economic institutions. It is the ability to approach ones own needs and interests reflectively, and to recognize that the other's needs are also potentially legitimate. 'Universalism', therefore, means a basic kind of shared mentality which allows people to conceive of themselves as citizens of a proper democratic state. A proper democratic state, then, has provision for allowing social contract between people—a social contract on which all compromises will be based.

Now one should note that consensus is not brought about by a kind of negotiation; rather it is brought about by sustained argumentation or discussion in which the rational native speakers analyze, articulate and consider the basic principles which are to govern their interaction. So Habermas prefers to believe that we need a theory of communication which includes an ideal situation, and a common consensus can help to construct this theory of communication. According to Habermas, it is, therefore, only by formulating a theory of communication that one can resist the domination of power or can get rid of the ideologies.

Now, one can be critical or unappreciative of the achievement of the work of Jürgen Habermas, as the post-modernists are. I shall now particularly discuss the view of the post-modernist thinker, Lyotard as a critic of Habermas. Habermas, as we know, belongs to the Modernity tradition. And the post-modernists, being the critics of this tradition, say 'farewell to modernity'. The critique of modernity points to the serious problems associated with this vision of reason. Habermas, in spite of being in the tradition of modernity, recognizes and rectifies the philosophy of 'subjective reason' (which is mainly attributed to Kant) by replacing it with reason embedded in language and the shared practices of communicative agents. In this way Habermas claims to be initiating a novel orientation in philosophy. But his claim did not go very far. For, his view of the new orientation is perhaps not as clear and satisfactory as he would have liked it to be. According to the post-modernists, Habermas's common consensus, which brings 'we' as universal at the basis of any objective moral discourse, is quite untenable. This untenability of the common consensus is presented in the view of Lyotard.

Lyotard is very sceptical about Habermas's transparent communicational ideal society. Habermas's new type of rational society, defined in communicational terms as

> the communication community of those affected, who as participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given circumstances the proposed norms are 'right',[5]

is completely rejected by Lyotard because it gives a picture of the closed totality and makes common consensus the ideal.

The question is, can legitimacy or a common rule be found in consensus? Or can an agreement which is obtained through discussion among rational minds bring universal peace? Lyotard's reply to this question, is *no*. Because consensus can be a part of any discussion, but it can never be the end of the discussion. Moreover, there cannot be any common set of rules by which we are able to make validity claims and thus make possible our communication, as Habermas thinks. Lyotard actually believes in different language-games by which he tries to say

that there cannot be any common rule, and every discourse has a different kind of rule to play with. For example, different kinds of discourses like, science, ethics, literature and so on, have different kinds of rules of statements and by the help of those rules they play different language-games.

Hence, Habermas's presuppositions that there are common sets of rules by which we are able to make certain validity claims or truth-claims in a language and that without these claims there cannot be any communication, cannot be accepted by Lyotard. Lyotard believes that there are diversities in language and that is why the rules by which I describe something, cannot be used to prescribe something, for, in prescribing something, I have to use some other values. We use different kinds of rules. That means we always play different language-games. First, in a language-game, the rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a contract between the language-game players. Secondly, without the rules there cannot be any game. Moreover, one alteration of a rule can also change the nature of the game, and if a 'move' in a game does not satisfy the rules, then it does not belong to the particular game which we are playing. When we play different language-games in different discourses, we use different kinds of utterances according to the discourses, and every utterance of a particular discourse should be thought of as a 'move' in a game. Thus, in each language-game we are actually making a different move according to certain rules. Every discourse is a different language-game, according to Lyotard, and if we try to mix up one with the other, the purpose of the language will be defeated. Hence it is very unreasonable to maintain that there is a vocabulary or a common set of rules by which we can express all the discourses. Such a common set of rules does violence to the heterogeneity of language-games.

Lyotard believes that any invention is always a result of *dissension*. The notion of Lyotard's *dissension* is just the opposite of the notion of Habermas's *consensus*. The common consensus has been challenged by introducing the notion of dissension or what Lyotard also calls *paralogy*.[6] Dissension, therefore, refers to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.

If we want to keep moving or go on continuously by playing the language-game, then we will have to keep open a provision for challenging or questioning any common set of rules. Playing continuously the language-game means to keep open the window of our minds, wherefrom we can counter or resist or question any common rule or common agreement. My ability to question the common agreement, my scope to escape from the rules and practices of the social institution by making authentic criticism should always exist in society and this Lyotard calls *paralogy*. Lyotard believes in dissension or disagreement, which he thinks is a kind of value. Disagreement forces us to raise a voice against any common agreement—it helps us to come out of the vices, evils, standard institutionalized norms and the cruelty of society. We need a society where we have flexible networks of language-games. The weight of certain institutions or socio-political power imposes limits on the games, and thus restricts the inventive power or the creativity of the players in making their moves. Lyotard says that to 'speak is to fight',[7] which refers to the 'move' that we make in a language-game. We need rules also in war, but rules which encourage the possible flexibility of utterance, rules that are pragmatic and which cannot ever be universalized.

Therefore, it is the 'incommensurabilities' which are applicable to the pragmatics of most daily-life problems. Lyotard suggests a model of legitimation which has as its basis difference understood as paralogy. The principle of consensus as a criterion of validation then becomes inadequate, even if, Habermas points out, a fruitful intervention can help us to achieve the level of consensus or agreement through reason and create a brighter society. It is on dissension that we have to put the main emphasis, according to Lyotard. For, consensus is something that is never reached. Habermas's idea of consensus is a picture of just an ideal situation and the beautiful or brighter society, which he tries to build, is nothing but a dream-world which one loves to imagine. Habermas's strong belief that the common agreement which will come through reason will be universal, that we can have norms through reason which will be free from all ideologies, and that this universal norm though unhistorical may serve every historicity, is quite untenable. Post-modernists will agree that there can be no absolute agreement, we

can reach only an ad-hoc agreement. Abstract rationality or an abstract rational paradigm cannot work successfully in the context of human beings, because human beings are involved with emotional factors as well. However, this reason or rationalized norms bring us into a social system conceived as a totality, a unity which is closed. This social system, with its so-called established rationalized norms, in the course of time becomes so powerful that it acts like a *terror*. The *terror* here is the threat of eliminating the other player in the game. Thus, if anybody in a closed social system wants to make a different move and tries to go against the common practice and common rationalized norms, his move will be ignored or repressed. Actually the power's arrogance in society consists in the exercise of terror.

Now if common consensus brings about such terrorism and a closed system, then, it cannot do any justice to the people and, therefore, it must be eliminated. It is not in any case possible or prudent to follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction towards the universal consensus through a dialogue of argumentation. We have to admit that there are only heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules and not a common set of rules which determines all the discourses. The goal of dialogue cannot be consensus, because consensus is only a particular part of the discussion, and not its end. The end can only be the *paralogy*. One can suspect any common agreement, but justice is a kind of value which cannot ever be suspected. We should, therefore, try to arrive at an idea of justice which is not linked to that of consensus. Moreover, ideologies or any consensus on rules defining a game and its moves are all local. In a different way it can be said that the ideologies, or norms, should be spotted out locally and should be tackled by some ad-hoc strategies. But one should note that these strategies are not unchangeable theory. One cannot get rid of these ideologies by taking a transcendental perspective. Every time we have to think anew and the strategies thus may get changed; every time and whenever we need, we will have to adopt new rules, new ideas, and this is the quest for paralogy, which can help us to break the ideologies. In fact, Lyotard, by introducing the notion of paralogy, gives emphasis on *perpetual resistance*. According to him, the process of creativity cannot continue if we cannot escape from the rules and

practices prevalent in a society. Further, we should keep in mind that the ideologies are all culture-bound, historical, but, that which Habermas wants to eliminate all those ideologies is reason, which is unhistorical. It is, therefore, really a difficult task to make a bridge between a culture-bound, historical component, on the one hand, and an unhistorical core, on the other. Even if this difficulty is there, Habermas, we have seen, puts much emphasis on constructing a theory of communication, the basis of which will be reason and a common consensus. Habermas's is a theoretical approach, which, in Lyotard's language, is an approach, to *meta-narrative*.[8] Lyotard is against such metanarratives or theory-construction. His incredulity towards metanarratives points out that Habermas is offering a more general and abstract 'narrative of emancipation', almost an abstract theory of communication which is based on consensus, the consensus that is taken totally as final. But Lyotard hammers the point that 'consensus is not the end of discussion'. Lyotard believes that the problem of solidarity can be tackled not by giving an ideal, *a priori* theory, but by looking into the actual situation. We have to look and see from where the complexities and constraints are emerging, we have to see what factors are standing as obstacles and have to analyze the actual situation empirically. Hence, not by thinking or theorizing, but by looking into the situation, we can close the gaps in the empirical situation and handle the problem of solidarity.

However, post-modernists and thus, Lyotard believe in individual liberty. They put emphasis on negation, challenging and perpetual resistance. Their emphasis is not on social commitment but on individual liberty. They believe in absolute negation without any commitment. They talk about the pure autonomy of individual and that is why they approve authentic criticism of the common set of rules or norms, practices that are standard. They do not have any better sense of a better world.

The vocabulary of normal discourse needs to get changed. It is then by redescription that we change the injustices or vices of the vocabulary. For a better and healthy society we need to change the vocabulary, and this is the way a society improves. So paralogy works to create an improved society and an improvement is always created through changes. If somebody like Habermas has to maintain consensus or

harmonization of common interests, then he has to have a common vocabulary, a vocabulary which will decide what to do and what not to do. But there cannot be any common vocabulary which will be final—a vocabulary can change according to human needs and choices. Thus, there is neither a first nor a last word. Even the meanings which were born in past centuries are not stable, finalized once and for all. Hence nothing is stable, nothing is final.

Further, Lyotard's perpetual disagreement with the social institutions, power and norms makes him speak in favour of the *sublime*.[9] 'Sublime', according to Lyotard, is to speak a language that is no part of anybody's language. This language or vocabulary is not the language or vocabulary of social institution. It is thinking that is not yet thought of. By saying this, Lyotard actually wants to highlight his main point—'*to be away from the institution*'.

In the end I must say that neither a *theory of communication* in the Habermasian sense, nor the *perpetual resistance* of Lyotard could create a beautiful society. Habermas's theory of communication, on the one hand, is not practically possible, because, it gives a picture of a utopian situation; it is too ideal. On the other hand, Lyotard's perpetual resistance is also not possible, because it indicates total negation. It is not that we should not challenge the rules of a standard practice which is imposed on us; but our main emphasis should be on something positive. We have to put much more stress on how to make adjustments between different interests than on offering a constant challenge. I believe a compromising attitude is more generous, more important than the negative one of challenging authority. Thus, we must try to be reasonable persons with the capacity of adjusting with others. These are the qualities by which we can share our culture with others and may give us an enriched society with enriched personalities. Hence the lesson is that in our way of living we should try to mix with other's way of living; we should try to take the help of what is good in other culture in order to make an improvement in our own culture.

Therefore, I believe that a give-and-take with concern and involvement between human beings, and adjustment and compromise, may bring some light of hope to build a beautiful society. Human beings *are* expected to create such a society, because the capacities to make

compromises and adjustments are the important and valuable ingredients inherent in them—ingredients which may enable them to act towards a wider mentality and to create a healthy society.

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Freeing Philosophy from the 'Prison-House' of 'I-Centricity'

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Philosophical thinking has generally been rooted in self-consciousness as it has arisen from that 'reflexive' activity of consciousness which only explicates what is involved in self-consciousness, even though the latter is not identical with it.' This, however, has given rise to that fundamental problem which it has not known how to solve, as once the thought, or rather the 'thinking', has become reflexively centred in itself, it does not know how to 'think' of anything else that is 'independent' of it or 'unrelated' to it in its essentiality, as even for that it has to be made an 'object' of 'thought' or 'thinking'.

The dilemma is well known to philosophical thought, as also the 'failure' of almost all the 'desperate' attempts to get out of it. Descartes had to lean on the 'idea of God' to get out of the prison of 'self-certitude' he had built for himself and Husserl who thought he would be cleverer and leave the door 'open' for coming out whenever he wished by adopting the strategy of self-willed 'bracketing' or 'phenomenological reduction' found that once the step was taken he could not, for some reason, do so and ultimately was led to see everything as being 'constituted' by the 'constituting acts' of the ego. It was perhaps only Śaṁkara who decided that the attempt was not worthwhile as once the 'self' was made central by the reflexive act of self-consciousness, there could be no 'other' or even the 'appearance' or 'illusion' of the 'other'.

The problem, in fact, occurs at two levels: the first relates to everything that appears as 'object' or, to use Fichte's comprehensive term, 'not-self' or rather that which is essentially different from and 'opposed' to the 'I' that is sensed or felt in self-consciousness. The second relates to the fact that not only no distinction is made amongst

'objects' of different kinds, but that objects are not seen in terms of their own nature or *svabhāva* which makes them 'resistant' to consciousness both in its enterprise of knowledge and action. It seems to have been taken for granted that to be apprehended as an 'object' was the same as its 'being known' and that there was no difference between the two. Kant did try to articulate the distinction but did not see that it did not help matters, as the necessary application of the categories did not help in any way in finding what the 'specific' nature or *svarūpa* of the 'object' was. He did not even see that the nature of the self as 'object' was found to consist of almost contradictory predicates when seen in the context of 'knowledge' or 'action', that is, as a 'knowing' or 'acting being'.

The 'resistance' that the 'object' offers proclaims its 'independent' being, and yet the truth of this self-evident fact is denied by the reflexive act of self-consciousness in philosophical reflection as it can 'negate' or 'deny' all 'objectivity' by withdrawing from it or by shutting it out of consciousness by an act of withdrawal whose paradigmatic example was said to be 'deep sleep' in the Indian tradition and which, according to it, could be voluntarily achieved in waking consciousness also, if it so desired.

This *is* the implicit presupposition of *all* philosophical thought which starts from the reflexive activity of self-consciousness and regards it as the only thing that is self-certifying, and hence is indubitable. But it forgets that, at least some of the 'objects' amongst those that appear to be such also evince this capacity and hence will have to be granted this same 'subject-hood' as one grants to oneself. One 'feels' this capacity of the 'other' in relation to oneself in almost all 'living' beings with whom one has any 'feeling-relationship', as it is in this relationship alone that one becomes acutely aware of the freedom of the 'other' to relate or not to relate, to withdraw or not to withdraw. But then, this is also the relationship which makes one feel oneself to have become an 'object' to some other 'subject', just as everything else was supposed to be to ones own 'subjecthood'. This is a commonplace experience known to everybody in the situation described as 'love', but even in relation to children and pets, it is well known. A child's turning away or that of a pet, is as much a 'rejection' or 'withdrawal' as that we

ascribe to an adult or even God as the lovers and mystics have moaned all the world over. The dark night of the soul has been known to everybody and Christ has not been the only person who has cried in anguish 'O God, why hast thou foresaken me?'

To feel oneself to be an object, a 'forsaken object' is not an unusual 'experience' and if philosophers have to be reminded of it, there is truly something wrong with philosophy, or rather with those who philosophize. It may be said that the reflexive turning away of consciousness in self-consciousness in the direction of pure subjectivity is epistemologically and ontologically different from the one we are pointing to, and that there *are* thinkers like Kierkegaard who have written existentially of *Fear and Trembling* before God who ultimately perhaps is the only 'pure subject' that we can think of.

The objections or rather 'reminders', though well-meant, fail to see that even if they are taken into account, they do not affect in any way the point that was being made by drawing attention to the implication of certain facts which, though commonly known, have not been seen for the far-reaching significance they have for the epistemological and metaphysical thinking that philosophers are generally supposed to pursue. The 'resistance' offered by the 'objectivity' *proves* its ontological independence from the 'subject' to whom it is an 'object', while the 'turning away' proves simultaneously its epistemological independence, along with the fact that one was an 'object' to that which one mistakenly considered *only* an 'object' and nothing more, that is, a being who was a 'subject' in his or her own right, and to whom ones own 'subjectivity' meant nothing more than his or her own 'subjectivity' meant to oneself. The relation between 'subjectivities' could not perhaps be better illustrated than by this tragi-comic situation where each thinks and feels oneself to be a 'subject' and all the others to be 'objects' whose very 'being' is supposed to be dependent on ones being conscious of them and which would dissolve or disappear the moment one would turn ones consciousness away from them. But there is, and can be, no privileged subjectivity as the 'other's turning away' proves to oneself. It is only an illusion superimposed on oneself by the fact of self-consciousness, and elevated to the status of the most indubitable

foundational certainty by the rope-trick of the philosopher, be his name Descartes or Fichte or Śaṁkara or any one else.

As for Kierkegaard, it is true that he imaginatively identified himself with Abraham, but he forgot that the 'God' of Christianity is not the 'God' of Judaism, and that even in Judaism, there *is* such a thing as Jewish mysticism which is close to mysticism as found in other religious traditions of the world. Also, he perhaps did not understand the symbolic import of the story as the 'sacrifice' that was demanded, was of that which was 'dearest' to one, that is, of oneself and that not at the gross physical level, but at the level of that 'identification' which follows from the sense of 'I-ness' and makes it mistakenly turn everything into 'mine'. Also, the relationship with 'God', or whatever be called by that name, has to be the same, that is, as both 'subject' and 'object', a fact known to all the religious traditions of the world and brought to clearest consciousness in what has been called the *bhakti* tradition in India.

The 'object' as 'other' and the 'other' as 'object' has infact, not been seen the way it is because of the 'I-centricity' of self-consciousness in which the philosophical thinking takes its birth. The 'object' has been seen primarily in epistemological terms and hence has been defined in terms of that to which it is an 'object'. But to see the 'object' as the 'other', is to see it in metaphysical terms, that is, as 'real' or rather 'coordinately real' with oneself. The diverse relationship which consciousness has with the 'other' would easily have revealed it, if reflected upon, for understanding the nature of the 'other' or what the Indians call, its *svarūpa* and *svabāva*. This call for understanding, or even the 'demand' for it, has not been 'understood' by those who have dismissed all that 'appears' as 'object' to be epistemologically dependent and hence as ontologically subservient or even 'unreal' when compared with the self-certifying, self-luminous character of that to which it appears as 'object'. And this, in face of the unbelievable 'knowledge enterprise' of man which has tried to know the 'object' in all its diversity for millennia and find itself baffled before its mystery that seems so inexhaustible that he finds himself as far away from 'knowing' it as he ever was. Nor has he seen that in this process of 'knowing' he has brought 'objects' into being which, in turn, demand to be understood

and are discovered to be as difficult to understand and almost as opaque and inexhaustible as those which are supposed to have been there before he appeared on the scene. The organized systems of knowledge called the 'sciences' or the '*śāstras*' and the works of art and literature that he has created are the pre-eminent examples of this. So also is that which is known as 'history' where man looks back to see and understand what collectively he has created over time.

The so-called 'object', then, is not an object in the sense in which philosophers have usually understood it, but rather something in its own right, as mysterious and as inexhaustible as the 'subject' which has been so 'dear' to the philosophers that they have held nothing else as 'real' when compared to it.

The anomalous and ambiguous character of all that appears as 'object' becomes perhaps most clearly visible in what is called 'language'. Language is as much an 'object' as anything can be, and yet it is not clear in what its 'objectivity' consists in. It has to be 'understood' in a sense in which most of the so-called 'objects' are not, and it has an essential inter-subjective aspect which comes out vividly in the fact that in its context one is always either 'addressing' someone or is being 'addressed' by someone. This is transparent in the case of speech, while in the case of language that is written it is there, but only in a veiled or hidden or subterannean manner. All that is written has to be 'seen' as written by someone who intended to communicate or convey something and hence demands or seeks to be understood in a sense in which most other 'objects' are not, unless they also are 'seen' as the creation of someone with an in-built or immanent intentionality in them which has become 'freed' of the intentionality of their author, even though it was 'dependent' on it for its coming into being or 'origination'. The understanding, then, is primarily of this immanent intentionality embedded and embodied in that which has been created and only secondarily through that of the other intentionality without which it would not have come into being.

The cycle is unending as the attempt to understand itself brings something into being which has to be understood in its turn, but what is important in the context of what we are discussing is to understand that a very large class of 'objects' we encounter or apprehend have a

transparent, obvious, immanent 'subjectivity' in them which philosophical discussion on the subject has deliberately chosen to ignore. The epistemological and ontological primacy and indubitability of the 'subject' or the 'self' have followed from this, along with the puzzling and bewildering spectacle of philosopher after philosopher trying to get out of the 'I-centric' prison-house of his own making for the last two-and-a-half millennia or so.

In fact, if the philosophers had reflected on their own activity, they would have seen that it effectively negated their own contention as in the very process of doing what they were doing, they were not only referring to thinkers, but submitting what they were thinking before 'others' for their appreciation and acceptance, an act which could not be done without assuming their 'subjectivity' which was completely independent from that of their own. Without this 'assumption', human action ceases to make sense as is evidenced by the insatiable desire of all those who engage in any creative, or even seemingly creative, activity to be appreciated, applauded, admired, fawned upon and followed by the multitude, no matter whether it be discerning or undiscerning. This is as true of spiritual masters as of others, and the 'doubting' or sceptical philosopher imprisoned in his own 'I-centricity' seems no exception to it.

The inalienable and irreducible 'subjectivity' of the 'other' is, however, encountered in a more intractable manner by its non-acceptance or opposition or rejection of what one communicates even after the 'other' has 'understood' it. Many a time one deludes oneself into thinking that if the other had 'really' understood what one is saying, one could not but have agreed to it. But this is to forget that one has oneself disagreed or rejected someone else's contention after having 'claimed' to understand it as otherwise one would not, or could not, have done so. The continuous and continuing refutation of views and counter-views thus proclaims aloud the plurality of 'subjectivities' in 'inter-subjective' interaction, as nothing else could.

The phenomenon, in fact, is even more transparently known in the realm of feeling and action where the 'other' can always 'turn away' and by doing so negate ones own very being or, as in action, offer resistance to what one is trying to achieve. The 'denial' in the former

is perhaps deeper than in the case of the latter, as the resistance offered in the case of action acknowledges ones reality as nothing else could. The capacity for inertial resistance is almost the very definition of 'being' in the context of inert matter, but it is only in realms where 'feeling' begins to be 'felt' that one knows what the 'free' subjectivity of the other can do to ones own subjectivity and make it 'bonded' or 'free' at its own sweet will. The experience of 'captive subjectivity' is known almost to everybody in relations where feelings and emotions constitute ones being but, at a still deeper level, this is the experience of consciousness or 'subjectivity' as it finds itself in the world.

The 'world', or as the Sāṁkhyans call it *Prakṛti*, not only entices, entangles, seduces and binds through the promise of *rasa* and *ānanda* in the context of life as 'felt' and 'lived' in the world of emotions, or 'resists' as in the realm of action, but also challenges one to understand and know it as it *is*. The knowledge, however, is a two-edged affair as in knowing the world, one 'knows' oneself also; as the former changes, so does the latter, just as the changes in the latter cannot but bring about a change in the former. The same is, in a sense, true of the realms of feeling and action, but as the philosophical problem arises primarily in the context of knowledge and the asymmetry in terms of 'certainty' involved in it, it has to be understood primarily in that context also. In 'knowing' the world, the self knows itself and the way it knows itself affects the way it knows the world.

This is not usually seen this way for two reasons; first, knowledge is seen primarily in terms of its content, and not its modality or the way the 'context' is seen or formed or organized; and second, the 'I' or the 'subject' is seen not only as bereft of all content, but also of all modality and thus talked of, as Śaṁkara did, as the bare, self-referential reflexivity of the term 'I', a pure linguistic projection of the indexical expression resulting in an ontological illusion of a substantive self or *ātman* devoid of all predicates or properties, treating them as what is called *upādhi* in the advaitic tradition of philosophizing in India.

But both the reasons, when seen for what they are, would be found unacceptable as the moment we remind ourselves that we are talking of consciousness and self-consciousness at the human level where alone philosophy has its abode, their falsity would become transparently self-

evident. Knowledge is not a bare inventory of discrete, disparate, itemized contents and the indexical 'I' is not the self with its inexhaustible richness which is almost impossible to fathom or imagine.

This 'richness' of that which is referred to by the 'I' has generally not been seen because of a strange prejudice or blindness amongst philosophers regarding the question as to what the ontological 'being' of that which is 'real' consists in. Somehow, it is thought that what is ontologically 'real' should have no 'relational' properties at all and that if it has any properties it should have them always and forever, and always in the same form without the least little change in them whatsoever. This has seemed so self-evident to most philosophers that they have not seen the manifest problem which the phenomenon of 'knowledge' or 'being known' would create in such a situation. That the situation would become worse if 'feeling' or 'action' are brought in is scarcely considered at all. The ontologically 'real' is reduced to almost an utter 'nullity' about which not only nothing can be said, but which literally can have nothing in it as it is 'nothing', thought of only as a residual necessity left after everything has been taken away from it because of a supposed necessity of thought, something that is still thought of as a sub-stratum even when there is nothing to which, or in respect of which, it can perform that function.

The view that 'reality' has to be completely and absolutely 'unchanging' and that all characterization necessarily involves 'exclusion' have been given as 'rational' grounds for the belief in the reality of the illusion imposed by the reflexivity of self-consciousness in which philosophy is rooted, and from which it necessarily arises. But once the illusoriness of the illusion is theoretically apprehended, its hold on one lessens as is the case with all structural and transcendental illusions, a contention argued for at length in the author's still unpublished work entitled *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*. The former are well known in the field of optics and other physiological sensory realms while the latter have been well known, at least to philosophers, since Kant exposed them through his transcendental critique of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But neither Kant nor anybody else has exhausted the unearthing and unveiling of these illusions, nor has anyone seen that the philosophical enterprise as it has

been practiced up till now is rooted in such an illusion. It is time that philosophy 'frees' itself and gets 'liberated' to achieve that for itself which it has been prescribing as the *summum bonum* or *param puruṣārtha* for others. The dawn of such freedom may herald a new revolution in the field of thought freeing man from that prison of ' "I"-centricity' in which it has been held since reflexive reflection on self-consciousness gave birth to it a long time ago.

There is Something About the Indicative Conditionals: An Overview

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Statements with the *if-then* construction in natural language are called *conditionals*. Conditional statements seem to epitomize the essence of human reasoning. We deftly use them in our inferences, and sometimes even unknowingly. Looking at an address on a piece of paper, without realizing we use a chain of conditionals to decide which streets one has to take to reach that address. Their universal use has prompted theoretical claims that the concept of conditionality, as represented by the *if-then* construction, is one of the *universal* logical abilities that *any* rational creature *must* have (see for instance Evnine, 2001).

The role of conditionals and conditional thinking is valuable for us. Conditional thinking helps us to *project* conclusions from what already is known. This is how our knowledge base gets extended from the given and from the very obvious. The *if-then* construction also allows one to go beyond the merely factual to make suppositions, or to admit hypotheses, or to use a possible world framework. Without conditionals, our creative imagination would be restricted, and our powers of conceptualization and reasoning would be severely stunted.

Their wide use is a fact. Theorization about them, however, is problematic. There is something about the conditional construction *if-then* which has fascinated philosophers for centuries. Over the ages, debates about them have spawned many bold and ingenious theories, and lately have inspired equal interest in the more recently developed disciplines such as cognitive psychology and linguistics (see for example Traugott, ter Meullen, Reilley, and Ferguson, 1986). Yet, everything about them seems to be shrouded in controversy. There are disputes about the kind

of logical theory that would be appropriate for them. Controversies revolve around the 'right' set of truth-conditions to be attributed to them, about the validity of the inference patterns involving them and even about their classification, that is, about the 'kinds' of conditionals.

The aim of this paper is to provide the readers with an overview of the problems and solutions generated by them starting from antiquity to some of the recent research. This, by no means, is an effort to come up with an exhaustive list. The focus of this paper will be on only one type of conditionals; namely, the *indicative conditionals*. Primarily, the philosophical research will be highlighted. However, towards the end of the paper a section on recent research in cognitive psychology also has been included just to provide a more holistic point of view. First, however, some introductory remarks are in order.

As a class, statements in *if-then* format, i.e., conditional statements, are compound statements. That is, they are composed of other statements. The component statement between 'if' and 'then' is known technically as the *antecedent*, and the statement after 'then' is known as the *consequent*. The relationship between the two components can be further understood by reference to the notion of *sufficient* and *necessary condition*. The *antecedent* is supposed to be the *sufficient condition* for the *consequent* to happen: its presence should be *sufficient* to make the *consequent* occur. Similarly, the *consequent* is to be regarded as the *necessary condition* for the *antecedent* in the sense that if it does not occur, one can presume that the antecedent too has not happened.

Broadly, there are two types of conditionals: (a) *indicative conditionals*, and (b) *subjunctive conditionals*. By *indicative conditionals* I mean statements in English such as:

(1) If Ravi is in Mumbai, then Dev has approved the leave.

The name comes from the fact that the constituent statements of this particular type of conditionals are supposed to be in the indicative mood.

The *subjunctive* conditionals, on the other hand, have components in the subjunctive mood, as can be seen in (2):

(2) If I *had* the power to solve one problem facing our world today, then I *would* end world hunger.

The main feature of subjunctive conditionals is that they necessarily speak of *contrary-to-fact* scenarios, situations that had not happened but could have happened. Hence they have been also called the *counterfactuals*.

There have been vigorous philosophical debates in recent years about whether the indicative and the subjunctive conditionals are different at all, and if so, where exactly the line has to be drawn.[1] The debate raises a theoretical concern also; namely, whether there ought to be only one 'unified' logical theory for all the conditionals, or there should be separate theories for each class of conditionals.

For this article, however, I would like to treat the indicative conditionals as different from the contrary-to-fact subjunctive types, and keep my focus restricted within the domain of indicative conditionals. Thus, theories of David Lewis and others, who are concerned primarily with the subjunctive conditionals or counterfactuals, will not be included in the purview of this paper, though their contributions no doubt are valuable in their own field.

Another type of natural language statements is also excluded from the purview of this article; namely, those statements which use the *if-then* structure but really are not conditionals. As for instance:

(3) If you are hungry, then there is food in the refrigerator.

In spite of its *if-then* structure and the indicative mood of its clauses, the consequent of (3) is *not* conditionally dependent on the antecedent. That is, the presence of food in the fridge is not conditional upon the fact that the addressed person is hungry. Thus, (3) is not a conditional assertion in the first place, and for that reason it is not an indicative conditional either. Therefore, statements such as (3) are outside the scope of this article.

In natural language the indicative conditionals are used in many diverse ways. Apart from in our reasoning, we use them to assess situations and for future course of actions:

(4) If the map is correct, then this is the shortest route to the hotel.
(5) If I want to get into IIT, then I have to prepare for JEE.

Sometimes they are used for definitional purposes as an alternative form for a universal statement as follows:

(6) If this creature is a whale, then it is a mammal.

More often, they are used when the antecedent and the consequent are events that are temporally sequential or are imputed to have a causal connection.

(7) If the weather is bad, then the plane will be late.
(8) If the tap is left open, then the water will continue to flow out of the tank.

Other than the *if-then,* our ordinary language has several other non-typical formats for expressing the indicative conditionals. Some examples are shown in Table 1. It is generally agreed upon that these formats can be recast in the *if-then* format, if necessary, without any loss of meaning.

Table 1. Alternative formats for natural language conditionals.

i. Dev has approved the leave if Ravi is in Mumbai.
ii. Ravi is in Mumbai only if Dev has approved the leave.
iii. That Ravi is in Mumbai is a sufficient condition to state that Dev has approved the leave.

Typically, in standard two-valued[2] prepositional logic, conditional statements are represented by material implication ($p \supset q$). However, when we take into consideration the rich variety of the natural language indicative conditionals as can be seen above in cases (4)–(8), or in the startling exception that case (3) offers, it appears that the use of *if-then* in natural language could be a whole lot more complex matter than what the textbook logical treatment takes it to be. Literature on indicative conditionals is replete with claims that certain important differences exist between the indicative and the material conditional, as will be discussed in detail below. Given that these differences are real and cannot be explained away, how to justify the logical treatment of the indicative conditionals as material conditionals? If the answer is in the negative, then what should be their truth-conditions? Which conditional inferences are acceptable and why?

These are just some of the questions which will surface again and again in the discussion below. They can be used as the common threads to find our way through the answers proposed by different philosophers. Sections 1–3 present a chronological history spanning from ancient to medieval times. Section 4 deals with the more recent developments.

1. ANCIENT GREEK HISTORY

In western philosophy, the first reported philosophical theory regarding the nature of conditional statements can be traced back to as early as the 3rd century BCE Greece. This is the time when the Aristotelian Peripatetic School of logic was dominant. However, historians of logic (see for example Kneale and Kneale 1968, Sanford 1989) report that neither Aristotle nor the Aristotelians can be credited for this first venture into a philosophical theorization about the conditionals.

Interestingly, Aristotle never really had concerned himself with the conditional form of a statement as a topic for philosophical discussion. Historians attribute this lack of interest in conditionals in Aristotelian logic to multiple factors such as:

(a) Aristotle's major concern was with *terms* or *classes*. *Terms* are predicates or class-property indicators which are predicated of something or to some group. As Sanford (1989) has observed, as linguistic items *terms* have this unique feature that they can fill out the blanks, other than those occupied by verbs and quantity terms, in an Aristotelian proposition. For instance, in 'All____ are ____', the gaps can be filled up by any two terms, such as, 'dogs', 'mammals'. Contrarily, however, conditional form such as 'if____ then ____' cannot be converted into fully formulated typical Aristotelian propositions just by filling up the blanks after *if* and *then* with *terms*. They require complete propositions or statements, e.g. 'he is sick', 'he is absent', as in 'If he is sick, then he is absent'. Though 'if sick then absent' at times may be fully understood in certain contexts, statements such as these cannot be counted as complete statements in isolation, particularly in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, the kind of interest that Aristotle has with *terms* or *classes,* which can appear as subject or predicates in propositions, cannot

be appeased by complex propositions and propositional forms which allow for other propositions as components.

Thus, specifically conditional propositions or statements as such, or their forms, were never a research priority for Aristotle. Kneale and Kneale make a stronger claim that Aristotle had simply 'ignored' (Kneale and Kneale, 1968, p. 120) the conditional *if-then* form of propositions. Their presence is evident in his work. For instance, he had amply used conditionals in his *class* or *categorical logic,* particularly in *Prior Analytics*, to present the principles of syllogistic moods. Conditionals also constitute his 'hypothetical reasoning' as one of the valid argument forms. Yet, Aristotle did not concern himself with the conditionals.

(b) It could be the result of a conscious effort to stay away from certain topics due to professional reasons. According to Diogenes Laertius, the chronicler, there was hostility between Eubulides and Aristotle, two contemporaries who were associated with two rival schools of logic. Eubulides belonged to the *Megarian school* of logic, founded by Euclid[3] of Megara in Megaris, a city of Attica. Eubulides of Miletus apparently was strongly averse to Aristotle and to the research programs taken up by the *Peripatetic school* of Aristotle. Instead of the categories, terms and general propositions which occupied Aristotle's interest, Eubulides took a keen interest in the problems of argumentation, such as paradoxes, which rose from using the everyday language; an area that was known in those days as *dialectic.* Subsequent writers of later antiquity had attributed to Eubulides a number of interesting logical paradoxes which still have not lost their charm, such as the Liar paradox, the Argument from the Heap or the bald man etc.[4]

As the disciples dutifully perpetuated the disagreement between the masters for centuries, it is possible that the two contemporary rival logic schools, the Peripatetic and the Megarian, purposely kept a distance in their respective research programs. The antagonism between the two schools, the Peripatetic and the Megarian, strained, consequently, the relations between the Peripatetic and the Stoic[5] schools also. For, the Megarian school became the breeding ground for the emergence of the Stoic logicians subsequently. The antagonism is evinced in the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias from 3rd CE, a committed Aristotelian, who clearly regarded the Stoic teachings of

logic as 'hostile' to the teachings of Aristotle (Kneale and Kneale, 1968, p. 175). A manual written in 2nd CE allegedly by Apuleius (Kneale and Kneale, p. 181) also observes on the sharp differences between Aristotelian and Stoic logic. The division between the two schools was evident enough to provoke Galen, the physician, to comment that Aristotelian and Stoic logic had their own *separate* areas of application. For instance, in his view, Aristotelian logic was required for axiomatic reasoning and geometrical demonstrations, whereas Stoic logic was required for dialectically settling metaphysical conundrums, e.g. 'is there fate?'

Thus, it is possible that since the Megarians and later the Stoics found the problem of conditionals interesting, the Aristotelians did not consider it necessary to concern themselves with the same problem.



Fig. 1. The master-student tree of schools of logic in ancient Greece and the debate on conditionals.

In any case, both schools, Peripatetic and the Stoic, recognized the notion of deduction or that of logical implication as is to be found in statements such as 'If a, then b'. Yet, the Stoics alone took a keen philosophical interest in the conditionals. It could be because, as Kneale

and Kneale have observed, logic for the Peripatetic School was never more than just an instrument or a tool (*organon*); the Stoics, on the other hand, always treated logic as an integral part of philosophy.

Very probably, the Stoics came to be interested in the conditionals through their close connection with the Megarians, who in turn, were influenced by Zeno, the Eleatic, and his kind of dialectic. Zeno, who was famous for paradoxes, had frequently used dialectical arguments of the following form which fully exploit the conditional possibilities:

If p then q
If p then not-q
Therefore, it is impossible that p.

It is possible that the exposure to arguments such as these led the Stoics to speculate about the nature and meaning of conditionals.

Early Stoic logicians knew the important distinction between a conditional statement and an argument. Several times in his work, Sextus Empiricus attributes to the Stoics the view that an argument is valid if the *corresponding conditional*[7] is true. The Stoics also came up with five basic argument forms, two of which included conditional reasoning and today are better known as *Modus Ponens* (MP) and *Modus Tollens* (MT). They also had second order logical principles, which they called *themata* (pl.). A *thema*, if valid, preserves validity from one argument or group of arguments to another. One of the *themata* developed by them was the Rule of Conditionalization or the Conditional Proof. This principle utilizes the notion of conditionality as follows:

> Given a set of premises $\{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}$ and an inserted premise **x**, **c** can be validly inferred.
> Therefore, given $\{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}$, if **x** then **c** can be validly inferred.

Various modern logic textbooks feature this proof procedure as an important procedure, though many do not acknowledge its Stoic origin.

Even in the times of the Stoics, the topic of conditionals was not free of controversy. Reports, written hundreds of years later from the time of the Stoic logicians, by Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus (in 3rd century CE) show that not once, but three times there were debates between Diodorus Cronus and his student Philo of Megara on the nature of conditionals. Chrysippus, the celebrated head of the Stoic

school, was also supposed to have contributed a different theory on conditional statements (see Kneale and Kneale, 1968, p. 116). The well-known and repeated discussions apparently had prompted Callimachus to write the following epigram: *Even the crows on the roofs caw about the nature of conditionals.*

In his report of this famous debate between Diodorus Cronus and Philo on conditionals, Sextus Empiricus has mentioned four different views on what an acceptable, 'sound', conditional must be:

View 1. Philo of Megara is said to have maintained that a 'sound' conditional is the one that does *not* begin with a true antecedent and end with a false consequent. Translated in the symbolic language of logic of today, the condition clearly is '$\sim (p \bullet \sim q)$' [Not (p and not-q)]. Or, in truth-table form the undesirable condition is:

p	q
T	F

Confirming that the given condition is the *only* falsity condition, Sextus Empiricus further attributes to Philo the following:

> ... there are three ways in which a conditional may be true, and one in which it may be false. For a conditional is true when it begins with a truth and ends with a truth, like 'if it is day, it is light'; and true also when it begins with a falsehood and ends with a falsehood, like 'If the earth flies, the earth has wings', and similarly a conditional which begins with a falsehood and ends with a truth is itself true, like 'if the earth flies, the earth exists'. A conditional is false only when it begins with a truth and ends with a falsehood, like 'If it is day, it is night'. (As cited in Kneale and Kneale, 1968, p. 130)

From the above, Philo's requirements for truth of a conditional 'If p then q' as true appears to be the following:

p	q
T	T
F	T
F	F

Thus understood, Philo's approach matches exactly with that of today's truth-functional approach. All one requires to check in a Philonian conditional is whether the antecedent is false, or the consequent is true, or both [(~p ∨ q), where '∨' is an inclusive 'or'].

View 2. Diodorus differed from Philo on this point. From the sequence in which Sextus Empiricus presents these views, it seems that Philo, though he was a student of Diodorus, was the first to make his observations on conditionals known. It is possible that Diodorus's view is more of a reaction to Philo's position.

Diodorus was concerned that on Philo's condition it would be difficult to mark any conditional as *unquestionably* true. For, events change with time and what is true at t_1 may become false at t_2. Thus a conditional which simply states:

(9) If it is day then I am conversing

could be true only at a given point of time, and could become false at a later point if it is still day but I have stopped conversing. This possibility of falsification seemed to trouble Diodorus who appeared to expect the conditional, if true, to hold true *at all times.* The distinction between a Diodorean and a Philonian conditional, therefore, is related to expectation from the truth-condition. Diodorus prefers that a true conditional should have an impossibility requirement: it 'neither could nor can' begin with a truth and end with a falsehood. Best examples of this kind are those which start with an established falsehood or a contradiction in terms, or at least that which is highly unlikely to become true. So, on Diodorus' view, the following truth-condition for a conditional is not satisfactory at all:

p	q
T	T

The only truth-conditions that he may allow are:

p	q
F	T
F	F

Sanford (Sanford, 1989, p. 28), however, has rightly observed that it is not obvious how a Diodorean and a Philonian conditional would differ if we had conditionals with components such as:

(10) Dogs never climb trees
(11) I am conversing on July 4, 1984

which have very specific temporal qualifiers in them to counter the kind of falsification conditions that Diodorus was concerned about.

View 3. The third view, which possibly can be attributed to Chrysippus, maintains that a conditional is sound when *the contradictory of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent.* The best example of a conditional acceptable on this view will be something of the form 'if p, then p'.

This rules out the following truth-conditions:

p	q
F	T (in case p and q refer to the same statement)

The only two allowable truth conditions are:

p	q
T	T
F	F

In both of these cases, the said 'incompatibility' cannot arise. Chrysippus clearly used a notion that we would call 'modal' today. For, the *incompatibility* can be explicated further in terms of possibility and necessity as follows:

p and q are *incompatible*: It is *not possible* that both p and q
p and q are *incompatible*: It is *necessary* that not both p and q

View 4. The last view, which Kneale and Kneale attribute to the Peripatetic School, insists that the consequent has to be 'potentially contained' in the antecedent. The conditional form is supposed to bring out this implication or the entailment relation between the antecedent and the consequent. This rules out the 'if p, then p' example mentioned in view 3, as p cannot be said to 'contain' itself. Instead of a list of possible truth-conditions, this view clearly requires logical and *semantic*

analysis of the statements involved in each case of determine the truth of a conditional.

2. ANCIENT INDIAN HISTORY

In contrast, in ancient history there is no record of discussion or debate, parallel to the Greek debate, on conditional statements as such. In fact, there is no direct reference or discussion on the *form* of any type of statements. Interestingly, there are discussions strewn in the Indian philosophical literature which could have opened the door to a discussion on the conditional form, but for some reason they did not.

For instance, there are discussions on logical structures which is a notion akin to that of logical form, e.g. discussion on the structure of a full-fledged inference. *Nyāya* system mentions a 5-limbed structure (*pañca-avayava*) for an inference that needs to be demonstrated for the benefit of others. This 5-limbed structure apparently was reached through a phase of modification and revision of some earlier models (e.g. model found in *Yuktidīpikā*). The idea of justifying the conclusion on the conditional basis of the premises, or the notion of entailment, could not have been unknown to the advocates of the structural view. Yet, there is no explicit discussion on the topic.

Similarly, the art of philosophical disputation or *Vāda-vidyā* was discussed extensively in ancient India, in particular in the post-Upaniṣadic period. The popularity of philosophical debates at that time is evinced in various texts of that time. Historians mention that even the Buddhist and Jain texts refer to many technical terms about the art of debate. In the Greek writings, there is reference to the 'gymnosophists' of India who as a profession would go from place to place and engage themselves in debates. According to scholars (see for instance Matilal, 1997, 1998), there was a connection between the origin of Indian logic with the extensive practice of debating prevalent at that time: Indian Logic emerged from a felt need to have a well-reasoned, systematic discussion. The concern clearly was to promote the notion and the practice of a *good* debate, and to differentiate it from the pointless, destructive debates (e.g. *vitaṇḍa*). Like the Stoic school, the concern was to lay down the rules for proper argumentation using everyday language and to watch out for the fallacies and loopholes that

language can create and help to cover up. Rules of correct public speaking had to incorporate the rules of logical thinking. Thus classical Indian logic, in its pursuit of truth and establishment of truth, was never really far away from language. It could have gone deeper into forms of linguistic items such as the *if-then,* but it did not.

The focus on language became more intense with the later schools such as Navya-Nyāya. One of the major concerns of this school was the problem of 'logical grammar'. The goal of this 'logical grammar' was supposed to classify the 'significant' parts of a sentence and also to discover the rules which determine the concept of a 'meaningful sentence'. Jagadiśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* is supposed to be a prime example of important and innovative work along this line (Matilal, 1997, p. 390). In addition, in Navya-Nyāya, there are other expositions which exhibit a similar commitment to the idea of a close relationship between logic and language. For example, there are discussions on property-terms, on how to locate properties, and also on the idea of a delimitor (*avacchedaka*) for attribution and location of properties, etc. None of the theories in the overlapping areas of logic and grammar, however, spilled over to conditional reasoning or the conditional form of a sentence.

3. MEDIEVAL AND POST-MEDIEVAL EUROPEAN VIEWS

In comparison, in the west the topic had a persistent presence which was visible in the medieval times also. The glory of the Greek era did not last beyond the 5th century CE. In the last phase of the ancient period, the last two centuries BCE and in the 1st century CE, the Stoics and the Epicurean schools were very influential. By a twist of fate, however, when the study of logic was resumed after the dark ages, Aristotle and his works became better known and more popular than the Stoics.

In 5th century CE, the downfall of the ancient civilization in Europe reached a new low point with the attack of the Barbarians on what was remaining of the Roman Empire. Gradually after this, Europe steadily plunged into a darkness that lingered for over a thousand years. Boethius (470–524 CE) belonged to these transition years before the darkness fell. He was the last of the Latin logicians in the line of antiquity. He,

however, was the first to classify conditionals on the basis of the nature of relation that holds between the antecedent and the consequent. Boethius observed that sometimes a conditional is true because of a *consequentia naturae* or a natural necessary connection. On the other hand, the truth of some conditionals, he knew, did not involve a necessary connection, and was due to some contingent, empirical factor.

When his works were rediscovered after the dark ages, his treatment of the conditionals, particularly his concept of *consequentia* or the relation of 'following from', led to a certain way of thinking about the conditionals in Medieval logic. In contrast to the Ancient Greek views, which treated all conditionals alike and were focused on providing *the* truth-condition for the conditional, the Medieval logicians were aware of multiple types of conditionals and their various *grounds* of truth. Peter Abelard (1079–1142), for instance, proposed a division between *perfect* and *not-perfect* conditionals. Abelard's *perfect* conditionals were true by virtue of their formal structure; independent of their subject matter, e.g.:

(12) If no humans are reptiles, then no reptiles are humans.

Because of its form, it can have only true instances. On the other hand, the truth of his *not-perfect* conditionals depended on facts about how the world happens to be. For instance, the truth of the contingent universal (13) depends on facts other than the form of the statement.

(13) If a piece of wax is left out in the hot sun, then it will melt.

Influenced by Boethius, William Ockham (1287–1347) made a similar distinction between conditionals that hold good by *extrinsic means* (extrinsic to the conditional) and those which are true by *intrinsic means*. By *intrinsic means* he probably meant truth by virtue of logical form. He made another distinction among conditionals that is reminiscent of the Diodorus-Philo dispute. He treated *absolute* conditionals as separate from the *as of now* conditionals. For his *absolute* conditionals, the antecedent *cannot* be true if the consequent is false; whereas for the *as of now* conditionals he allowed the occurrence of that possibility, though not at present, but sometime in future. The truth-conditions for these two types naturally cannot be the same.

Ockham also distinguished between *formal* and *material* conditionals. However, what he meant by *material conditional* is not the same as what we mean by this term today; that is, it does not refer to the truth-functional Philonian conditional. His *material conditional* was true *due to the subject matter or content,* not because of its form. He, however, anticipated some of the modern logical concerns. For instance, he explicitly accepted two consequences of standard notions of validity; namely: (a) the necessary follows from anything, and (b) anything follows from the impossible. The corresponding points can be easily appreciated in case of a Philonian or a Chrysippian conditional: A conditional with a false/impossible antecedent is true, and a conditional with a true/necessary consequent is true. Similar concerns were felt by C.I. Lewis centuries later in 1912 when the Philonian conditional was rediscovered and reintroduced by Frege as the material conditional. As we shall see below, these results are known as the *paradoxes of the material conditional.*

4. THE MODERN AND RECENT VIEWS ON THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS

As was mentioned in the introduction, in modern times typically the account for material conditionals of the form $p \supset q$, complete with truth-conditions, is offered as the account for the conditionals. The symbol '$\supset$' is called the *horseshoe* or the *hook*, and it is taken to represent conditionality[8] among the sentential connectives. A material conditional $p \supset q$ behaves exactly like the Philonian conditional; it is false only when the p (antecedent) is true but the q (consequent) is false. As is to be found in any standard logic textbook on truth-functional logic, the truth-table for '$\supset$' is:

p	p	p ⊃ q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

The Philonian truth-functional conditional reentered modern logic through the seminal work of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925). Frege, whose work in logic (particularly his system of derivation and his ideas of

quantification and variables) is the fountainhead for today's symbolic logic, was the first to clearly enunciate the notion of truth-functionality of these conditionals. Philo, though he attributed the same truth-conditions to his conditional, was never explicit whether he meant the truth-conditions of his conditional as the *function* of the truth-conditions of its components.

In 1897 in his *Begriffsschrift*, Frege, among many of his original contributions in logic, used this Philonian conditional, though with a different symbol, as the basis of his logical system. Regarding its truth-conditions, he wrote to Husserl:

> With regard to the question whether the proposition 'If A then B' is equipollent to the proposition 'It is not the case that A without B', one must say the following. *In a hypothetical construction we have as a rule improper propositions of such a kind that neither the antecedent by itself nor the consequent by itself expresses a thought, but only the whole propositional complex.* Each proposition is then only an indicative component part, and each proposition indicates the other ... But let us first suppose that the letters 'A' and 'B' stand for proper propositions. Then there are not just cases in which A is true and cases in which A is false; but either A is true or A is false; ... The same hold for B. We then have four combinations:
>
> A is true and B is true,
> A is true and B is false,
> A is false and B is true,
> A is false and B is false.
> Of these, the first, third and fourth are compatible with the proposition 'If A then B', but not the second (Frege, 1980, pp 68–9, italics mine)

Any standard introductory text of logic will confirm[9] that the usual logical practice is to extend this truth-functional analysis of material conditionals of sentential logic to all kinds of indicative conditionals. In favour, it is argued that truth-functional treatment of indicative conditionals makes it easier to assess their truth-values. Conditionals are not like the following statements (14) and (15) for which we know how to find out whether they are true.

(14) A brown spot is still there on the shoulder of this coat.
(15) This coat has not been to the cleaners since winter.

As long as we know which coat and which spot are being referred to, the truth-value of (14) and (15) can be determined. However, what kind of fact or situation must obtain to make the following statement true?

(16) If a brown spot is still there on the shoulder of this coat, then this coat has not been to the cleaners since winter.

Being in a conditional construction, the component statements are, as Frege had expressed, 'improper propositions' as neither of them 'expresses a thought', i.e. is complete by itself. Treating them as truth-functional, on the other hand, easily resolves the problem of determining truth-values of statements such as these. All one needs is to find out the truth-values of the component statements, and then use these as the basis for computing the truth-value of the entire statement with the help of a generalized formula such as the truth-table mentioned above.

It has also been argued that allowing the indicative conditionals into truth-functional logic has direct benefits for ordinary reasoning. For, through such permission, the powerful and convenient tools of formal logic, such as the axiom schemata and the proof-procedures etc., become available for the evaluation of ordinary inferences. Without the formal apparata of formal logic, evaluation of myriad types of ordinary inferences becomes an extremely difficult task.

The fact remains, nonetheless, that the treatment of indicative conditionals as truth-functional material conditionals is quite problematic. Charles Sanders Peirce was one of the first to point out that the calculus of Frege-Russell's material conditional '... produces results which seem offensive to common sense' (Peirce, 1933, p. 279). Among other things, he observed that it is too easy for a material conditional to be true. The falsity of the antecedent or the truth of the consequent: either way if becomes true. Peirce used the following subjunctive conditional which he clearly considered as counter-intuitive to prove his point:

> (17) If the Devil were elected president of United States, it would prove highly conducive to the spiritual welfare of the people. (Peirce, 1933, p. 279)

His point seems to be that (17), according to the truth-functional analysis, comes out to be true specifically because of the least likelihood of the antecedent.

After the publication of the *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. 1, (Russell and Whitehead, 1910), C.I. Lewis also voiced a similar concern that Russell and Whitehead's 'algebra of logic' produces 'two somewhat startling theorems'; namely:

> ... (1) a false proposition implies any proposition, and (2) a true proposition is implied by any proposition. (Lewis, 1912, p. 522)

These results, which subsequently have come to be known as the *paradoxes of material implication*, can be easily shown as counter-intuitive in the context of indicative conditionals. For instance, the following apparently nonsensical conditionals will have to be accepted as true simply by virtue of their either having a false antecedent or a true consequent, or both:

(18) If 2 + 2 = 5, then Thailand is in Europe.
(19) If 2 + 2 = 5, then Thailand is in Asia.

For that matter, we find it odd to declare the following indicative conditional true also though both of its components are true:

(20) If 2 + 2 = 4, then Thailand is in Asia.

Thus, the whole business of treating the indicative conditionals as truth-functional material conditionals as per the aforementioned truth table appears to be problematic.

In the 1950s, when the ordinary language movement was taking shape, Strawson objected to the treatment of indicative conditionals as material conditionals. He claimed that there were important differences between the *if-then* construction of the indicative conditionals and the $\supset$, such as in the circumstances of their standard or primary usage. In his view, the standard use of '$\supset$' is specified by its truth table; however, the *if-then* construction is typically used in circumstances where there has to be an element of doubt regarding the truth or falsity of the antecedent and the consequent. He writes:

> ... not knowing whether some statement which could be made by the use of a sentence corresponding in a certain way to the first clause of the hypothetical is true or not, or believing it to be false, we nevertheless consider that a step in reasoning from that statement to a statement related in a similar way to the second clause would be a sound or reasonable step; the second statement also being one of those whose truth we are in doubt, or which we believe to be false. (Strawson, 1974, p. 83)

Similarly, Strawson argued that although the material conditionals '$p \supset q$' and '$p \supset q$' are consistent with each other (when p is false), the ordinary indicative conditionals 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q' are not. Consider for instance:

(21) If it rains, then the match will be cancelled.
(22) If it rains, then the match will not be cancelled.

Under usual circumstances, if the same person asserts both (21) and (22) about the same match, he would be considered inconsistent. Or, if two people assert them separately about the same match, they would be considered as disagreeing with or contradicting each other. He added other theorems, such as:

$q \supset (p \supset q)$
$q \supset (\sim p \supset q)$

in support of his claim, which are true for '$\supset$' but in his view are not true universally for ordinary *if-then* statements. Differences such as these, he thought, show that the identification between the truth-functional '$\supset$' and natural language *if-then* cannot be correct.

Since then, many other logicians have joined their voices in this controversy; some in agreement with Peirce, Lewis and Strawson against a Philonian or truth-functional treatment of the indicative conditionals and some in support. Thus, in recent literature we see the emergence of two sharply contrasting perspectives on the problem of logical treatment of conditionals.

4.1 The Supplemented Defence of Truth-functionality

In defence of the truth-functional treatment of the indicative conditionals, a group of theories claim that the *if-then* is truly truth-functional and its truth-conditions are the same as the '$\supset$'; however, since the *if-*

then is a natural language item, it has certain *extra features which are linguistic.* Any differences that may be noted between '⊃' and the *if-then*, it is argued, are all effects of some linguistic feature or other of the 'if-then'. It is further argued that the linguistic feature is not logically significant, therefore does not affect the truth-functional treatment of the *if-then.* Since proponents of this line of argument try to salvage the identification of the '⊃' and the *if-then* with the supplementation of certain linguistic principles, I prefer to call this approach the *supplemented approach.* Given below are two important exemplars of recent times of this approach.

In 1967 in his William James lectures 'Logic and Conversation', H.P. Grice first proposed his theory of *conversational implicatures:* these are implied meanings, apart from the conventional meaning, of an utterance that come out in a conversational context as a result of our following certain conversational rules. From 1967 to 1987, in a series of articles, Grice developed an intricate theory of meaning, direct and oblique, through conventional and conversational channels. He was successful to draw a legitimate distinction between various shades of meaning, conventional and conversational, drawing our attention to the difference between truth-conditions and assertion-conditions, particularly in a conversational set-up. Given the standards of conversation that we usually follow, there are many ways, in his view, to give out information yet mislead the audience, or give out less than sufficient information without telling a lie. These are necessities at times thrust upon us by circumstances. Because of these practices and because of our usual expectations in a conversation, certain meanings arise by the way of conversational implicatures. For example, suppose in a conversational set-up a professor is asked to rate the performance of one of her students, and she says: 'Well, all I can say is that he used to come to the class regularly'. From her utterance, though she does not say it directly, it is *conversationally implied* that she means to convey that she does not have anything better to say about the academic performance of the student. The rules of conversation expect her to answer, and knowing that expectation she has chosen an indirect answer. Out of this conversational dynamics, an *implicatures* is generated which Grice named as the *conversational implicature.*

He has leaned on his theory of implicatures to argue that there is no 'divergence' between the '⊃' and the *if-then* as far as their 'conventional or lexical meaning' (see Grice, 1989, p. 83). Rather, he claims that what seems to be 'divergence' is a case of a *conversational implicature.* In other words, in his view there is an extra *assertion condition* of a natural language indicative conditional. Namely, whenever we use *if-then* construction in natural language, as pointed out by Strawson, we seem to expect and indicate that there is some sort of 'connection' between the antecedent and the consequent, whereas there is no such requirement in the use of a '⊃'. However, that extra indication, Grice claims, is just a 'conversational implicature' that the *if-then* construction generally carries and has nothing to do with its truth-conditions.

As we have seen above, one of the major differences between the two types of conditionals is that a false antecedent makes $p \supset q$ true, but does not do the same for an indicative conditional. Grice explains that that too is a result of our conversational expectation from *if-then.* To use his example, I may know that Smith is not in London (~p). However, when asked about him I may choose simply not to tell the direct truth. I, however, may still want to cooperate as is expected in a conversation; hence may choose to use the conditional format to provide a true but misleading information as follows:

(23) If Smith is in London, then he is attending a meeting.

It is a true but inappropriate remark. With this, in his view, all I want to communicate is either Smith is not in London or he is attending a meeting there in London. This tells the truth but does so in a misleading sort of way. If from my saying so, the audience picks up an intended sense of 'connection' between Smith's being in London and his attending a meeting, then, Grice maintains, that is the result of the conversational implicature of 'connection' that the *if-then* format carries. It also is the result of an assumption on the part of the audience that this was the most precise information I am in a position to give to him about Smith.

However, the problem with Gricean defence is that the difference between the *if-then* and the '⊃' does not get explained in terms of appropriate and inappropriate remark. It shows merely that at times I

can offer a conditional as a source of weak information. It does *not* explain, as Edgington has rightly pointed out (Edgington, 1995, p. 245), why one has to *believe in* this conditional as true. Comparatively speaking, there is no such problem of dearth of reasons for believing in 'p ⊃ q' as true when all we know is that p is false. The difference, therefore, remains.

The other problem with the Gricean defence is that the theoretical basis for it is not adequate to support it. Elsewhere (see Chakraborti, 1997, 1995), I have argued that since his claim heavily depends on his theory of meaning and implicatures, his defence for truth-functionality of indicative conditionals falls with the problems inherent in his theory of meaning and implicatures. There are situations, e.g. in case of embedded conditionals 'If (if p then q) then r', where the theory in terms of a general conversational implicature falls miserably short of explanatory power.

In his book *Conditionals* (Jackson, 1987), Frank Jackson has presented another supplemented defence using the notion of conditional probability. Without going into the formalism involved in the notion of conditional probability, the view can be summarized as follows. Like Grice, Jackson too claims that the 'if-then' and '⊃' do not differ in their truth-conditions. However, there is a special condition for asserting an indicative conditional; namely, that the belief in the conditional will have to be *robust with respect to the truth of its antecedent*. It clearly is not enough to have high probability for high assertability; the sentence also must be *robust* in the sense of being able to retain its probability value under the emergence of some new, pertinent information. Suppose that my sole basis for saying 'if Smith is in London, then he is attending a meeting' is that I have almost certain information that Smith is not in London. In that case, in Jackson's view the assertability of the sentence becomes questionable, because the sentence is not *robust with respect to the truth of its antecedent*. If by chance Smith comes to London and if I do not know what Smith will do if he comes to London, my point of statement will completely be lost.

Jackson further writes,

> ... we need devices and conventions to signal which statements our assertions are robust relative to. (Jackson, 1987, p. 28)

In our language, he claims there are such syntactical constructions which satisfy this need. The *if-then* construction of indicative conditionals, according to him, is such a device; it explicitly signals to the hearers that 'If A then B' is *robust* with respect to A. That is, belief in the probability of 'if A then B' will not go through a radical revision if one were to come to know that A indeed is the case. Therefore, in Jackson's view, it is not enough to know that the antecedent is false for asserting an indicative conditional. It has to be further tested whether the belief in the conditional will not be forsaken if one came to know that the antecedent is actually true. This strengthens the ground for Modus Ponens: one has to believe in 'If A then B' and that A is the case.

The problem with this defence is similar to that of Grice, but in a sense is deeper. According to this view, an indicative conditional with a known false antecedent is true but has no justified ground for assertion. Thus, its truth is ineffectual. The problem is that because of his adherence to the truth-functional truth-table, Jackson does not leave for himself any device to differentiate this sort of 'hollow' truth of a conditional from a 'robust' truth. His theory does not help us to believe in the truth of the *if-then* under the circumstances in which a '⊃' is believable as true. Instead, it piles on more differences by tagging a special assertability condition and special linguistic functions on to the *if-then*. Jackson's indicative *if-then* does not mean the same as '⊃', does not imply the same as '⊃', and cannot even be asserted under the same circumstances. For all practical purpose, therefore, his indicative conditional is ultimately a very different entity from a material conditional. Why does it, then, have to have the *same* truth-conditions as the '⊃'? Grice at least had an answer in his theory. The special conversational implicature that he had attached to the 'if-then' was not allowed in his theory to affect the conventional meaning of *if-then*. Truth-conditions, he claimed, are formed out of the conventional meaning alone. Jackson, however, has no such explanatory shelter available in his theory.[10]

4.2 The Opposition to Truth-functionality

The common theme of the theories in opposition to the truth-functional account of indicative conditionals is to emphasize on the unacceptability

and inadequacy of such treatment of the indicative conditionals. Robert Stalnaker, for instance, rejects the truth-functional analysis of indicative conditionals on the ground that it is inherently inadequate. According to him, the important questions to ask and to test the worth of a theory by are:

(24) What is it that makes an indicative conditional true?
(25) How does one decide whether or not he believes a conditional to be true? (Stalnaker, 1991a, p. 30)

According to him, one of the reasons why the truth-functional account is bound to fail in because it thinks the answer to (24) also answers (25), when clearly a very different kind of answer is required for (25). This is the reason why undesirable paradoxical consequences arise from the truth-functional treatment of indicative conditionals. For instance, according to this treatment the following argument should be valid as it follows the well-known valid schema of '$(p \vee q)$, therefore $(\sim p \supset q)$':

> Either the butler did it or the gardener did it. Therefore, if the butler did not do it, the gardener did it. (Stalnaker, 1991b, p. 136)

However, according to him, if we allow this as valid, then we are forced to accept also the argument below which is 'intuitively absurd' and has 'no trace of intuitive plausibility' (Stalnaker, 1991b, p. 136):

> The butler did it. Therefore, if the butler did not do it, the gardener did. (Stalnaker, 1991b, p. 136)

The only way to redemption lies, he believes, in looking beyond the truth-conditions into *the belief-conditions*. He finds the answer to (25) in an adapted version of the *Ramsey* test[11] (Ramsey, 1931) as given below:

> First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief in the antecedent); finally consider whether or not the consequent is then true. (Stalnaker, 1991a, p. 33)

According to this, the belief-condition for a conditional is to check how the consequent holds up against the conditional acceptance of the antecedent with the minimal adjustment for consistency within ones existing belief-system. It is acceptable if and only if B should be accepted after checking the (new) information that A within the belief-system.

Frank Ramsey suggested the following intuitive test for the acceptability of the conditionals:

> If two people are arguing '*If p will q*?' and are both in doubt as to *p*, they are adding *p* hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about *q*; ... they are fixing their degrees of belief in *q* given *p*. (Ramsey, 1931, p. 247)

To this Stalnaker gave a new twist by adding the notion of *possible world*. As he puts it:

> ... if A then B, is an assertion that the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it is, but *in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true*. (Stalnaker, 1991b, p. 143, italics mine)

The concept of a possible world, in his view, is the 'ontological analogue' (Stalnaker, 1991b, p. 143) of a hypothetical stock of beliefs. It provides the metaphysical dimension about the hypothetical insertion of the antecedent to the facts already believed. It further allows the scope of evaluation of truth-value of the consequent against that possibility, and also for minimal revision within the belief system in order to accommodate the new belief. Also, as he sees it, a possible world also is a 'made-up world' to which one can attribute the known and unknown features of the actual world. This, he maintains, exactly is the situation with the conditionals: they are about things that are true and that *could have been true*. Accordingly, he reformulates his test of believability of a conditional as:

> Consider a possible world in which A is true and which otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world. (Stalnaker, 1991b, p. 34)

Stalnaker has rightly pointed out that truth-conditions and belief-conditions are not to be treated as the same: the answer for one does not automatically provide the answer for the other. However, in the final analysis his account seems to make a radical departure from some of our common but very firm intuitions about the indicative conditionals. For instance, it appears to completely ignore the fact that there is a special way in which our belief in the antecedent of a conditional plays a role in *propagating* a belief in the consequent and subsequently in the whole conditional. Rather, he considers the truth of a conditional simply as a matter of *coincidental truth* of both antecedent and consequent in the same world. If B happens to be true in the same world where A is also, Stalnaker's account considers 'if A then B' as believable. This, however, is absurd. In a possible world very close to ours, where it is true that I turn switch A on and that the sun rises, this account allows the following absurd conditional to become believable and acceptable:

(26) If I turn the switch A on, then the sun rises.

In a world in which both A and B are true, paradoxically in such a world both 'if A then B' and 'if B then A' will be believable. This has undesirable consequences. For instance, in that case, the following two conditionals should be believable/acceptable as true under the same conditions:

(27) If I win the lottery, then I'll buy the biggest house in the city.
(28) If I buy the biggest house in the city, then I win the lottery.

Clearly, the result is counter-intuitive.

Others have argued that the introduction of the possible world semantics is not necessarily helpful (see for example Sainsbury, 1991, p. 123), as it does not really help us to understand why we should believe in a conditional as true. Finally, very recently it has been argued that Stalnaker's interpretation of Ramsey's test is not correct.[12] It has been claimed that careful reading of Ramsey shows that (a) in key cases Ramsey's test does not involve any adjustment, or revision, in the belief set at all, and (b) that Ramsey drew no difference between the indicative and the material conditional. For the indicative conditional

'If p then q', Ramsey simply means that q is inferable from p given the background information or the 'stock of knowledge', K. Thus, in this view, 'If p then q' in Ramsey's test comes out to be true *iff* K, p |– q. If this recent claim of misreading of Ramsey is true, then this makes Stalnaker's axiomatic account based on Ramsey's test in defence of the non-truth-functionality of the conditionals a suspect.

Ernest Adams (Adams 1965, 1966, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1990) and Dorothy Edgington (1991, 1995) on the other hand, are very direct in their rejection of the truth-functionality of the indicative conditionals. Adams argues that an indicative conditional is not a proposition *per se*, it is not a truth-bearer. This conclusion is in consonance with Ryle's earlier proposal (Ryle, 1950) to consider indicative conditionals as 'inference tickets' rather than statements which can be true or false. On a similar note, Mackie (Mackie, 1973, p. 93) observed that since asserting 'if A, then B' is asserting B within the scope of the supposition that A, they in the strict sense cannot be statements. However, it was David Lewis (Lewis, 1976, 1986) who provided an irrefutable argument by showing that a conditional degree of belief (conditional probability of the conditional) is not equivalent to a degree of belief in a conditional (probability of truth of the conditional). In a similar vein, Adams writes:

> ... degrees of belief that attach to conditional objects cannot be derived from truth-conditions. (Adams, 1987, p. 15)

He contends that the conditional probability of the indicative conditionals does not converge with the probability of truth of their supposedly corresponding material conditionals. In fact, he argues that the major difference is that unlike material conditionals these indicative conditionals do not have truth-conditions: they only have conditional probability. Ramsey explained the idea of conditional probability as:

> Degree of belief in (p and q) = degree of belief in p × degree of belief in q given p. (Ramsey, 1931, p. 181)

Even before that we find Thomas Bayes presenting essentially the same idea in 1763 as his Proposition 3:

> The probability that two ... events will both happen is ... the probability of the first, [multiplied by] the probability of the second on the supposition that the first happens. (Bayes, 1940, p. 378)

Adam's other arguments against the truth-functional account of the indicative conditionals are as follows. First, truth ought to have some practical, desirable consequences. Truth is supposed to guide an ordinary reasoner to a fruitful consequence, and this is precisely where, in Adams' opinion, a conditional with a false antecedent fails to deliver. To use his example, suppose a man is about to eat some perfectly good, non-poisonous mushrooms and is told the conditional below, which leads the man not to eat the mushrooms:

(29) If you eat these mushrooms, you will be poisoned. (Adams, 1975, p. x)

In the truth-functional analysis, (29) then is true since the man did not eat the mushrooms; however, Adams claims that this truth is a hollow, undesirable truth as it does not lead us anywhere. For, at least the man who wanted to eat the mushrooms would have been 'better off' not to have to come to this conclusion. Second, Adams claims that certain argument forms, such as '$p \supset q$, and $q \supset r$, therefore $p \supset r$' (known as *hypothetical reasoning*) or '$\sim(p \supset q)$, therefore p', which are considered as valid under the truth-functional account, come out to have invalid instances[13] as given below when ordinary language indicative conditionals are used:

(30) If Brown wins the election, then Smith will retire to private life. If Smith dies before the election, then Brown wins the election. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election, then Smith will retire to private life.

(31) It is not the case that if John passes History, he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass History. (Adams, 1965, pp. 166–7)

These, according to him, bear clear evidence that the truth-functional analysis of indicative conditionals is not tenable at all, hence the truth-functional logic of '$\supset$' cannot be applied to the *if-then* of ordinary indicative conditionals.

As he sees it, even our ordinary usage supports that we envisage these conditionals as pieces of 'provisional reasoning' (Adams, 1981, p. 331). He considers a belief in a conditional as not a belief simpliciter but as a belief in degrees. His radical proposal is to jettison the truth-functional logic for indicative conditionals and use instead a separate,

special logic which shuns all references to truth-conditions and employs only probabilistic criteria. The success of this move, he claims, is evinced by the fact that his probabilistic criterion helps to detect and explain all these argument-forms (of which some of the exemplars are mentioned above) as cases of probability-preservation failures, which are valid in the truth-functional analysis but have intuitively unacceptable or dubious results when applied to indicative conditionals (see Adams, 1975).

Following the footsteps of Adams, Edgington (Edgington, 1991) also has argued that unlike a material conditional, the measure of ones belief in an ordinary indicative conditional 'If A then B' is a conditional probability value of B given that A. The thought process behind that assessment is, as she puts it,

> ... equivalent to considering whether A and B is nearly as likely as A. (Edgington, 1991, p. 190)

Does this proposal from Adams and Edgington solve the problem of finding an appropriate logic for the indicative conditionals? Perhaps not. In their move to take the indicative conditionals out of the domain of truth-bearer propositions, hence out of the fact-stating discourse, Adams et al. have given the indicative conditionals back to us as an enigmatic, freakish category. The treatment offered by Adams gives rise to more pressing problems than the ones it purports to solve. Lewis (1976), for instance, raised the following point against it. In case of computing truth-values of compounds of which conditionals are constituents, this account leaves us in a quandary, if the conditionals lack truth-values. Lewis puts it as follows:

> It burdens us with too much work still to be done, and wastes too much that has been done already ... . Either we need new semantic rules for many familiar connectives and operators when applied to indicative conditionals ... or else we need to explain away all seeming examples of compound sentences with conditional constituents. (Lewis, 1976)

Others (Mellor 1993, Chakraborti 1995, 1998 and Read 1995) have objected that from Adams-Edgington thesis the highly counter-

intuitive result follows that the belief 'A & B' is enough for belief that 'If A then B'. As pointed out above, just because the chances of '2 + 2 = 4' and 'Thailand is in Asia' significantly and sufficiently outweigh the chances of their not being so, this view forces us to accept the absurd conditionals 'If 2 + 2 = 4, then Thailand is in Asia'.

Also, it has been argued that Adams' 'counter-examples' to 'valid' truth-functional argument forms mostly draw their force from a shift in the original context. In case of (30), for example, the premise which asserts Smith's retirement given Brown's victory in the election, clearly assumes that Smith will be alive once the election is over. The scenario the next premise brings in, namely 'If Smith dies before the election', is incompatible with that given assumption, hence is an impermissible move within the scope of the same argument. Adams' examples such as (30) at best show that the 'validity' of the truth-functional argument forms requires an extra requirement, when applied to arguments in ordinary language, that *the context assumed should remain unaltered throughout within the same argument.* As this requirement is not a fault ensuing from truth-functionality, it does not establish what Adams wishes it to establish.

Last but not the least, high conditional probability of an indicative conditional may be an important cue for its justified assertion, but it is not our primary concern when we are interested in the plain and simple truth of a statement. Consider for instance,

(32) If an American is a senator of the US Congress, then he is a rich white man.

The probability of his being a rich white man is pretty high given that this American is a senator of the US Congress. However, it is simply not true; for, there are plenty of woman and black senators in the US Congress to counter its claim.

5. RECENT STUDIES ON CONDITIONAL REASONING IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

As a contrasting perspective, we may shift our gaze to the intensive psychological research that has been conducted specifically on conditional reasoning in the last few decades. The research has probed into

many interesting issues concerning our reasoning, and understanding of the conditional statements. The main reason for including it here is that psychological studies in this area seem to impinge upon the philosophical positions. They have collectively unearthed intriguing empirical results about human reasoners and their use of conditionals. These findings are hard to ignore, and in the discussion below we shall see that their cumulative impact on some of our theoretical assumptions about the logical treatment of indicative conditionals is quite significant.

In what follows, I shall present the findings of broadly three types of studies.

5.1 Group A

A set of studies investigated the *frequency* with which adults use the following two basic conditional inference rules, *Modus Ponens* or MP (if p then q and p, therefore q) and *Modus Tollens* or MT (if p then q and not-q, therefore not-p); and commit the two common fallacies; *denying the antecedent* (DA) and *affirming the consequent* (AC). The fallacies of DA and AC are common mistakes which overlook that 'if' in a conditional indicates only a sufficient condition, and not the only condition in which the consequent can take place. The first example below commits the DA in wrongly assuming that the phone connection is guaranteed by payment of the telephone bill alone. Whereas, the second example is that of AC: Since there could be number of reasons besides diabetes due to which eyes could be affected, it is not logically safe to jump to the conclusion just from the presence of some affliction in the eyes.

Ex. 1. If payment of the telephone bill has not been made, then there will be no phone connection.
The payment for telephone bill has been made.
Therefore, there will be phone connection.

Ex. 2. If he has severe diabetes then his eyes will be affected.
His eyes are affected.
Therefore, he has severe diabetes.

Table 2 presents the findings of just a few of the studies among the numerous studies under this category. In this table, under the separate columns of MP, MT, DA and AC, the frequency (in %) of endorsement of the inference rule or the fallacy is mentioned. It mentions only those studies, or only those parts of a study,[14] which have involved adult subjects (typically college students); though similar results are said to have been observed in studies involving children. The rationale for not including the experimental data on children here is to avoid the usual objection that in children the logical understanding and ability could be at a developmental stage; hence data based on that may not represent what actually is the case.

In the studies mentioned, either some premises and conclusions were given to the subjects with the question whether the conclusion follows from the given premises; or they were given a list of statements and were asked to decide which one, if any, of these statements 'follows' from a given set of premises. Studies reported in Table 2 reveal, among other things, that between *Modus Ponens* and *Modus Tollens*, clearly people use the former more often. *Modus Tollens*, though equally valid, is endorsed less frequently. However, between the two fallacies, DA and AC, no such stable tendency towards any one of them can be found.

These studies, done with the intent to bring out the frequency of our use of the two conditional reasoning patterns and our endorsement of the two fallacies associated with them, are said to have brought out a point against the truth-functional treatment of indicative conditionals. It has been claimed that the rate of difference between the use of *Modus Ponens* and *Modus Tollens* among the subjects shows that inference patterns are not perceived as *truth-functional*. If conditional reasoning were seen as truth-functional, they argue, then there would not have been this disparity of use between *Modus Ponens* and *Modus Tollens* (see for example Evans et al., 1993, p. 38). The results also suggest rather strongly that our perception of conditionals very probably is a *learnt or acquired process*, and not something that is culturally or genetically inherited. Had that been the case, the performance between two conditional inference rules would not have varied so much.

Table 2. Frequency (%) of endorsement of conditional inferences by adult subjects in some studies (Source: Evans et al., 1993, 36)

Name of Study	*Age*	*n (size of the sample group)*	*MP*	*MT*	*DA*	*AC*
Wildman and Fletcher (1977)	Adult	81	95	62	51	36
Rumain et al. (1983)						
Experiment 1	Adult	24	98	81	48	54
Experiment 2	Adult	24	100	63	73	65

5.2 Group B

Another group of studies has tried to assess people's understanding of the conditionals by asking them either to construct a truth-table for the given statements, or to evaluate a given conditional as true or false by coming up with examples. Usually, the subjects have been shown cases which represent TT, TF, FT and FF situations in the truth-table and have been asked whether these cases confirm the given conditional, or falsify it, or do neither.

In a study by Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969), the task included a third category called 'irrelevant' or 'indeterminate'. They found that when subjects encountered the conditional in the *if p then q* natural language form, then they judged only the TT cases as true, TF cases as clearly false, but regarded FT and FF cases as *irrelevant*. Thus, this study, which was about how we understand 'implication' or conditionals, exhibited that in people's perception the truth table for *if-then* is starkly different from that of the material implication. This prompted Johnson-Laird and Tagart to report this anomaly as the *defective truth table* for implication. This *defective* truth table is given below in Table 3 with a comparison to material implication, where T = true, F = False, and I = Irrelevant or Indeterminate.

The verdict clearly seems that people in general do *not* consider $p \supset q$ and *if p then q* the same, especially in the case of having a false antecedent.

Table 3

pq	*Material conditional*	*Defective conditional*
TT	T	T
TF	F	F
FT	T	I
FF	T	I

Most of the cognitive psychology research agrees that the way in which people use *if-then* involves a reference to a *context* and also to the *content* of the antecedent or the consequent. Contrary to Piaget's theory that *if-then* is understood with a fixed truth-functional meaning, many studies (for instance, Fillenbaum, 1975, 1976, 1978, Marcus and Rips, 1979) have suggested that *if-then* of indicative conditionals has a changeable meaning, dubbed as the 'chameleon theory' by Braine (1978). Fillenbaum insisted that certain conditional inferences, though not logically valid, are sometimes *invited* by the context; such as denying the antecedent (DA). For instance he claimed that conditionals used as promises or threats such as (33) below, seem to *invite the DA* (that if I do not mow the lawn, I'll not get the money). The content supposedly appears to validate this inference, though the move is logically not permissible.

(33) If you mow the lawn, then I'll give you $5.

The effect of context and content on the understanding of *if-then* has been also upheld by studies which have claimed that they have shown that when the content is manipulated or when the background assumptions are made clearer, the reasoner often *suppresses* conditional inferences. Byrne (1989), for example, is said to have shown that it is possible to suppress fallacies as well as valid inferences such as *Modus Ponens*, with the manipulation of information about the context or the content. She suggested that people make valid inferences such as *Modus Ponens* or *Modus Tollens* only when they can safely presume that the background conditions or presuppositions have been sufficiently met. Whenever there is reason to doubt, for instance, in the case of *Modus*

Ponens that the antecedent is no longer sufficient for the consequent given the new information about the background, the reasoners tend to suppress the inference. In one of the tasks, Byrne gave subjects the following two conditionals as premises in which the second statement provided some additional information to the antecedent of the first.

(34) If she meets her friend then she will go to a play.
(35) If she has enough money, then she will go to play.

Given the next premise, 'She meets her friend', the rate of endorsement of *Modus Ponens* (Therefore, she will go to the play) by the subjects supposedly dropped from 96% to just 38%. Similarly, given another premise 'She will not go to play', the rate of endorsement of *Modus Tollens* (Therefore, she did not meet her friend) dropped from 92% to just 33%. Reminded of the extra background condition that she also has to have enough money, the reasoners supposedly no longer felt free to draw the obviously valid inferences. This result is also indicated by Cummins et al. (1991) study. Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis and Rist asked their subjects to generate 'disabling conditions' or additional requirements for making a situation involving conditionals possible, e.g.:

Rule: If Joyce eats candy often then she will have cavities.
Fact. Joyce eats candy often, but she does NOT have cavities.
Please write down as many circumstances as you can that could make this situation possible.

Their observations say that the subjects tended to make fewer *Modus Ponens* and *Modus Tollens* inferences for premises where they could generate many additional antecedents. In the process of generation, they became aware of the extra conditions which may come in the way of drawing the valid inferences. From this, one can safely assume that additional information, about the background or about what is being said in the antecedent or consequent, does affect how we use 'if-then' and how we mentally process them. Hence, this undermines the exclusively formal approach to the indicative conditionals as is to be found in the truth-functional account of the conditionals.

5.3 Group C

Finally, an impressive number of studies in cognitive psychology on conditionals revolve around the well-known *Wason Selection Task* (Wason, 1966). The original Wason selection task used real packs of cards which the subjects were asked to turn over in order to decide whether a given conditional is true or false. In Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) and Evans (1982) selection task, for instance, the subjects were shown four cards from a pack which all had a capital letter (such as 'A', 'D') on one side and a single digit number (such as '1', '2') on the other side. Then they are given a conditional such as:

(36) If there is 'A' on one side of the card, then there is '3' on the other side of the card.

The cards that they were shown had 'A', 'D', '3' and '7' on one side. With respect to (36) which is an 'if p then q' statement, these letters and digits are often referred to as *p*, *not-p*, *q* and *not-q*. The subjects are then asked to decide which of these four cards they should turn over to decide whether (36) is true or false. Following the *Modus Ponens* and *Modus Tollens* inference patterns, the logically correct answers are: Card that has 'A' and the card that has a 7 on the visible side. For, the first card, if it has a 3 on the other side, confirms (36), and if it has some number other than 3, then it clearly flasifies (36). Similarly, the card which has a 7 is the not-q card, hence it must be turned over to see whether there is the absence of 'A' on its other side or not. If yes, then (36) is confirmed; if not, then it falsifies the given conditional.

Early studies (Wason, 1968, 1969, Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1970) all reported that despite the simplicity of the task, the majority of intelligent adult subjects *failed* to solve it. Most subjects chose the 'A' card, or 'A' and '3' both cards, and very few chose '7' card. The correct combination of two cards bearing 'A' and '7' was reported less than 10% in those studies.

The earlier theoretical account of this logical failure was in terms of a *confirmation bias*, or as Wason phrased it a 'verification bias: the subjects were trying to prove the conditional true rather than false. Recent research, however, proposes two basic theories as explanations:

the *Heuristic-analytic theory* of Evans (1984, 1989) and the *Mental Models theory* of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). Evans argued that all reasoning tasks involve (a) selective attention to relevant items that are selected at a pre-conscious heuristic stage, and (b) subsequent analytic reasoning stage. In the case of selection task, he claimed that only heuristic stage is involved: subjects simply choose the card that seems relevant to them, and the stage of analytic reasoning is not induced.

Johnson-Laird and Byrne suggest, on the other hand, that at the algorithmic level human mental logic does not consist of formal rules of inference. Rather, the mind contains procedures that manipulate *mental models* of the situation mentioned. Certain valid inferences come easy to human subjects, such as *Modus Ponens*, because mentally modelling it or envisioning it in given possibility is easy. On the other hand, the *Modus Tollens* inference is difficult because it requires multiple models to be kept in mind and revised.

6. THE CONCLUSION?

In the discussion above, I have tried to provide an overview of the problems with the indicative conditionals and the various solutions that have been proposed to counter them. I have tried to follow them sometimes historically as time has unfolded them to us, as in the ancient and medieval periods. Sometimes, I have grouped them following a theoretical divide among them. Reports from the cognitive psychology are supposed to add to our comprehension of the problems.

Out of this, two research paradigms should be evident: one that supports the truth-functional treatment of the indicative conditionals and the other, which does not and has interesting alternative proposals. There is clearly scope for further work in both directions before a final word on this can be reached.

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NOTES

1. See for instance Dudman, 1984a, 1984b, 1988, 1992, 1994, Weatherson 2001.
2. Two-valued logic assumes that all propositions have either of the two truth-values: they are either true or false, certainly not both and also not neither.
3. This is a separate individual who is not to be confused with the geometer Euclid. Eubulides' master Euclid was a contemporary of Plato and an heir to the Eleatic tradition starting from Parmenides.
4. See for a discussion Kneale and Kneale, 1968, p. 114.
5. The term 'stoic' comes from Greek 'stoa' or portico. The Stoic logicians were remarkable for their vigorous research in logic. It was Chrysippus who first advocated that instead of using long, cumbersome syllogisms with multiple premises, there are some simple ways to combine propositions by the use of short words such as 'or', 'and' which we know today as logical connectives. He is also known to have distinguished between exclusive and non-exclusive 'or'.
6. This Zeno was also a student of Diodorus Cronus.
7. That is, the conditional formed by taking the conjunction of the premises as the antecedent and the conclusion of the argument as the consequent.
8. There are other variations available. Some books, for example, prefer '$\rightarrow$' as the symbol for *if-then*.
9. See for instance, I.M. Copi, 1995, Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong, 1991.
10. For detailed criticisms of Jackson's approach, see Chakraborti, 2001.
11. Frank Ramsey is attributed with the following intuitive test for the acceptability of the conditionals. The statement 'if A then B' is accepted (or is acceptable) in a given state of belief C if and only if B should be accepted if C were to be revised with the new information that A. See Gärdenfors, 1986, for an interesting paradox involving the Ramsey test for conditionals.
12. 'Ramsey's Tests', Personal communication from Professor H.B. Slater. This paper is supposed to appear in *Synthese* shortly.
13. William Cooper (1968) took the argument one step further. He claimed to have shown that some classically invalid argument forms have 'corresponding' instances in natural language which are usually accepted as valid in ordinary reasoning.
14. Rumain et al. (1983), for instance, had conducted the same experiments on a group of children. I chose not to include that data in Table 2.

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How Secular 'Logos' turned into Theological 'Word'

It is the fertility of human mind that generates a number of concepts from a single embryonic *thought*, turning it into a full fledged philosophy. Such is the concept of 'logos', which is known to have been conceived by the Greek thinker Heraclitus. There are many legends about the life and inconsistent views of Heraclitus quoted in the works of Greek authors and philosophers. He is said to be the son of one Bleson or Blyson or Bautor. Herakon was probably his grandfather. He grew up as *a haughty* and *supercilious* young man. Heraclitus viewed this cosmos as in a constant flux and held that '*the constant of opposite into opposite did not go on randomly, but proceeded according to "Logos" that is according to some reasoned pattern or argument.*'[1]

The term *Logos* has been used as '*word*', '*reason*', '*ratio*' in the medieval theology and philosophy, the divine reason that acts as the ordering principle of the universe.[2] A sixth century BC Greek philosopher was the first to use the word in a metaphysical sense. He asserted that the world is governed by a fire like *Logos*, a *divine force* that produces the *order and pattern* in the *flux of nature*. He believed that the force is similar to *human reason* and that his own thought partook of the divine *Logos*.[3]

There are many views about the meaning of 'logos'. Reinhardt[4] remarked that 'logos' must refer to *Heraclitus*' own '*word*' or *book*.

One view is that the word 'logos' is derived from the root 'leg' (λεγ) which implies 'picking out' or 'choosing' from which comes the sense of 'reckoning' and so 'measure' and 'proportion'.[5] The meaning of 'logos' is reported to be as primary as the sense 'account' or 'discourse', which E.L. Minar took to be basic.[6] A further development either from 'reckon', 'measure' and 'proportion' took place which extended the meaning to the sense 'definition', 'reckoning', 'formula' and thence 'plan', and went ahead even to 'law' (such as physical laws). By the time of Heraclitus these senses were legitimate and he is said to have used the word in three senses, and primarily the one which he has used in the sense of

'word', that is 'his word'. In different 'fragments' the meaning of λογοσ is used in different senses. In fr. 50: Listening to the 'logos' leads to the acknowledgement that *all things are one.*[7] Fr. 108 ο κοσων λογουσ ηκουδα plainly means 'whose accounts (or perhaps) whose words have I heard?' In fr. 87 meaning is simply 'word'.[8]

There are a number of expressions which indicate that the basic concept in the mind of Heraclitus is that of 'measure'. Miss K. Freeman, companion to the Pre-socratics 116 has stressed that the concept of *measure* is implicit in the *logos* of Heraclitus 'of the measure which is I describe it, men are uncomprehending' ..., 'the measure being common' ..., 'listening not to me but to the measure'.[9] German philologist Max Mueller finds the literal meaning of *logos* as 'gathering' which in Greek expresses both 'speech' and 'reason'. It is derived from '*legein*' which like Latin '*legere*' originally meant '*together*'.[10] This can be compared with the word '*katalogos*' (a catalogue) a list.

These specimens of the utterances show that Heraclitus had a well-entrenched concept of the *logos* in his mind which is translated as *measure* in English language but must have polysemous characteristics. As per suggested senses like 'picking', 'choosing', 'reckoning', 'proportion', even 'plan' and 'law', all these words have one common semantic feature and that is 'reason' and 'discretion' on the part of the agent guided by an inner voice. In short, 'reason' is the controlling principle of the universe, it being 'a fire-like divine force' has all the resonance of Bhartṛhari's *Śabda tattva*, i.e., *word principle*. The difference between the two is quite wide as Bhartṛhari has a grand vision of the *Word* as the life force and the *essence* of the *Brahman*. 'Listening to the logos leads to the acknowledgement *that all things are one.*'[11]—Heraclitus

The word is the very essence of the Brahman—Bhartṛhari

It is interesting to note Bhartṛhari's concept of *Vidyā* as the *absolute unity* and the *difference* and *disunity* is considered *avidyā* (*Nescience*). '*All things are one*', the central message of Heraclitus's *logos*, comes very close to Bhartṛhari's concept of *Śabda Brahman*.

The concept of Logos as a *rational divine power* was conceived by the *Stoics* of the 4th century BC. '*Logos* is conceived as a rational divine power that orders and directs the universe; it is identified with *God*, *nature* and *fate*. The *Logos* is present everywhere and seems to be understood as both a divine mind and at least a semi-physical force acting through space and time.'[12]

It is the divine *logos* which determines the *potentiality*, *vitality* and *growth* in the individual human beings. These are called seeds of *Logos* (*logoi-spermatikoi*). In the 1st century AD Philip Judaeus, a Jewish-Helenistic philosopher, used the term Logos in the sense of the God's word or Divine wisdom.[13]

In the Gospel of John, Jesus Christ is identified with *Logos* and this Greek word *Logos* is translated as *Word*. '*In the beginning was the word and the word was with the God.*' In this way Heraclitus's secular *logos*, synonymous with the *reason*, is given a semantic twist by the Christian theologians and identified with the *will of God*, which *a believer* is duty bound to accept without any doubt. Thus *reason* has been replaced by *faith*, with a full semantic turn about with diametrically opposed conceptual frame. But this is the nature of *Semantic shifts* and the growth of language.

It will not be out of place to compare the Hebrew concept of *Torah* with the concept of *Logos*, as the *word* or its equivalent has been the most revered and, sometimes, awesome power in all cultures. *Torah* is supposed to be the lost language of Adam. 'For Abulafia the *Torah* had to be equated with the *Active Intellect*, and the scheme from which the God created the world the same gift that He gave it to Adam. A linguistic matrix, not yet Hebrew, but capable of generating all other languages.'[14] Language had a mystic aura for all the races, civilized or uncivilized, in the initial stages of their existence. Secrecy about the name of a person and the sacred *mantras* are examples of this human tendency to mystify the language.

Plato was critical of Heraclitus and parodied him as '*friends of flux and movement*'[15] because Heraclitus believed that nothing is fixed and permanent in the cosmos. He is criticized for his aphoristic and often apparently contradictory expressions. German philologist Max Mueller has a word of caution for his (Heraclitus's) critics. 'When we translate the enigmatic and poetical utterances of Heraclitus into our modern dry and definitive phraseology, we can hardly do them justice. Perfect as

they were in their dark shrines, they crumble to dust as they are touched by the bright rays of our modern philosophy.'[16] He further elaborates: 'They had to speak in parables, in full weighty suggestive poetry that can not be translated without an anachronism. We must take their words such as they are, with all their vagueness and all their depth but we must not judge them by these words as if these words were spoken by ourselves.'[17]

Heraclitus's views come very close to the views of *Vijñānavādins* about the nature of the universe and even their views about the nature of *Śabda* or the word. Apart from the concept of *Logos*, Heraclitus had no discernible language theory or philosophy. But he presented his views about language in a poetic fashion using imagery: 'Words are like the shadows of things, like the pictures of the trees and mountains reflected in the river, like our own images when we look into a mirror.'[18] His concept of *logos*, to my reckoning, was the *faculty of mind to reason*, in order to lead a happy life. There are two prominent theories about the origin of language in ancient Greek works. There are terms like '*thesei*' (artificially) and '*physei*' (naturally) and earlier '*nomo*' (conventionally). The theory of natural origin of language is based on the concept of *imitation* of the words by human beings, which suggests that the present-day language is the product of copying of the natural sounds and remnants of the *interjections*, *sighs* and *animal sounds*. Aristotle calls these sounds '*onomatopoeia*' 'making of names'. Even Epicure mentions 'men acted unconsciously moved by nature as in "coughing", "lowing", and "sighing".'[19] Although Epicure did not believe in the natural theory of language; he was simply referring to certain sounds. Democritus called words '*agalmata phonënta*' (statues in sound). He said, 'Words are not natural images, images thrown by nature on the mirror of the soul, they are statues, work of art, not only in stones or brass but in sound.'[20] He represented language as due to *thesei*, i.e., *institution*, *art* and *convention*.

Plato's does not have a *linguistic* theory of his own but has a theory of the *ideas* which is close to the theory of *universals* and *particulars* comparable to Patañjali, Bhartṛhari and other Sanskrit grammarians' concept of Śabda. The question has been reframed by the commentator[21]: '*What is the one thing which all have in common and which the name names?*' Obviously Plato is suggesting the common characteristics of an entity which is the cause of the common name, of a class of things? It is the same question which Patañjali's disciple had put to his teacher as, what is it that designates a cow that name? But it will be futile to compare Plato with the Indian grammarians, who had a quite comprehensive linguistic theory, intertwined with the philosophy in general. He glosses over the difference between *a name* and *description* with basic philosophic enquiry about the nature of relationship between objects and their meanings.

Is there any affinity between the concept of Sanskrit *Śabda* and the Greek term *logos*? There could be one, for the simple reason that both are sister languages of the Indo-European family and in Greece as well as in India, there have been great civilizations around sixth century BC, during which Heraclitus was spreading his mystical concept of *Logos*, in order to have a proper understanding of the *kosmos*, which he thought, was *in a flux*. Almost at the same time, Buddha was negating the Brahmanical philosophy of the infinite nature of the Cosmos, and asserting the ever-changing nature of things. There are works suggesting connection between the two cultures.[22] Even otherwise, there may be a chance association. As the Sanskrit concept of *Śabda* is not merely the linguistic faculty in the human brain, it imbibes the very essence of the *Brahman* (Supreme Being). The imprints of *Śabda* are transmigrated from the previous lives of a person. It is the source of all creative faculties known as '*vāgrūpatā*' in the words of Bhartṛhari.[23] Some authors compare the concept of *sphoṭa* with the concept of *logos* and take them as prototypes of the *word*. 'The *sphoṭa* which has been likened to the *neo-platonic logos* is often translated by the terms '*expression*', '*concept*' or '*idea*' but none of these terms bring out its essential nature.'[24] All arts and crafts are said to be the product of this force. Aristotle names this faculty *Mimesis*. Poetry, painting and sculpture, music and dancing are all forms of Mimesis.[25] This shows that the concept of *Shabda* is wider in its scope while *logos* is basically the *intellect*, the *reason* which can be contrasted with *Mythos*, the *archetypal patterns* acquired by a person as a member of a particular culture.[26] There is another Greek term which comes closer to '*logos*' and that is '*nous*'. The meaning of '*logos*' in pre-Christian Greece was stabilized as '*reason*'

and '*nous*' meant '*intuitive mind*', and true love of wisdom could bring in contact what is divine in us, that is *nous*. This divine element '*nous*' (metaphorically termed as '*noetic* light') shines in human *micro-cosmos*. And God is the *divine intellect* '*Nous*' shinning in the *macro-cosmos*.[27] (To me it has a familiar ring of our Vedāntic concept of ātman and parmātman.) 'Logos (discursive reason) must yield to the superior power of the *energized human nous* (intuitive intellect).'[28]

We find a variety of branching of concepts from the term logos which is quite natural in the linguistic world. Those who have had the chance to study philology are aware of this reality. So we have words like 'logic', 'legend', 'lexis', '-logy', 'lexicon', '-logue' (as in *monologue* or *dialogue*) born of the same family of 'logos'. Logos has also been used for the term 'idea' as we see in the term '*logo-centric*' coined by Derrida in contrast with the '*phono-centric*'. In simple terms, it means language is not '*idea-centred*' but is *speech centred*. In the term '*logo-centric*', 'logo(s)' is taken as the synonym of *idea*. He rejects the western traditional word-meaning fixed relationship. Also he negates the traditional philosophical view that the word or language expresses the reality of the outer world. In his philosophy the word does not have a fixed meaning; it *defers*, and does not *refer*, as traditionally viewed by the linguists and philosophers. He uses the French word *Différance*, which has two meanings; one is to '*differ*' and the other '*defer*'. In his theory, the word does not *refer* or *represent* but *defers* perpetually. This, in a nutshell, is the theory of Derrida's logo-centrism.

How the concept of *logos* was transferred to German '*wort*', and subsequently to English 'word', is the topic of further research.

The spirit of the age works in different climes and races and we see brilliance in one age and long spells of intellectual drought in the other. The sixth and fifth centuries before Christ were periods of great intellectual fermentation, specially in Egypt, Greece, India and China. To my mind, this is an intellectual trade fair for a few romantics of culture and history.

Notes and References

1. Plato, *The Republic* and *Dialogues*.

2. From *The New Millennium Encyclopaedia* by Simon & Schuster, 1999, and beyond (PC-CD-Rom).
3. Ibid.
4. *Heraclitus—The Cosmic Fragments*, Kirk, G.S., CUP, 1953, p. 36.
5. Ibid., p. 38.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 39.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Max Mueller's *Encyclopedia of Language*, Vol. II, p. 63. Reason and Speech.
11. *Heraclitus—The Cosmic Fragments*, Kirk, G.S., CUP, 1953, p. 39.
12. *The New Millennium Encyclopaedia*, 1999, Simon & Schuster, and its licensors, CD.
13. Ibid.
14. *Serendipities: Language and Lunacy*, Harvest Books, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1998, Umberto Eco. Tr. William Weaver, p. 45.
15. *The Republic and Dialogues*, Barrister Publishing Co., New York, 1966, p. 181.
16. Max Mueller's Encyclopaedia of Language, Vol. II, p. 63, Reason and Speech.
17. Ibid., p. 301. *Heraclitus—The Cosmic Fragments*, Kirk, G.S., CUP, 1953, p. 30.
18. Ibid. *The New Millennium Encyclopaedia*, 1999, Simon & Schuster and its licensors, CD.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 304.
22. See India and Europe—An essay in understanding, Wilhelm Halbfass. State University of New York Press, 1988. Translation from Indien Und Europa. The Philosophical View of India in Classical Antiquity. Also see *Plato and Upanishadas*, Vassilis G. Vitsaxis, Arnold Heinnemann, 1977.
23. Vaakyapadiiyam Brahma Kanda Shloka 124.
24. De, S.K., Sanskrit Poetics Ferma KLM Private Ltd., 1976, Kolkata, p. 143.
25. This topic will be discussed in detail in a separate chapter in this project. For details on Mimesis, see Aristotle Poetics, D.W. Lucas, Oxford At The Clarendon Press, 1968, Appendix, pp. 258–72.
26. *Myths & Motifs in Literature*, Ed. David J. Burrows, Frederick R. Lapides and John T. Shawcross, The Free Press, New York, 1973.
27. Mark the difference between the small and the capital 'n'.

28. Christos C. Evangeliou, *The Hellenic Philosophy Between Europe, Asia and Africa*, Institute of Global Studies, Binghamton University, 1997, p. 48–50.

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A Reply to R.S. Bhatnagar's Essay 'On Binod Kumar Agarwala's Response to Daya Krishna's Essay on Kant's Categories'[1]

I am grateful to R.S. Bhatnagar for his comments, which have given me an opportunity to understand some issues better by bringing them under sharper focus. However I would like to make the following observations on the various issues he has raised regarding my views.

1. R.S. Bhatnagar's way of understanding and criticism of my essay exemplifies the need for the practice of hermeneutics. To take an example consider his claim, 'Still more strange is the conclusion "the source of the origin of pure concepts of understanding." Says BK,[2] "Kant's intention is to make use of transcendental table of judgements to lay bare *the source*[3] of the origin of pure concepts of understanding, i.e., pure synthesis and to be sure about the completeness and division of categories as they originate in synthesis." One wonders what happens to the mistake pointed out in the opening of the paper.' (RSB, p. 145) Bhatnagar implies that by making this claim I have negated the mistake I pointed out in the beginning of the paper. That is to say accusing others of making the mistake and at the same time making the claim he has quoted from my essay, I have contradicted myself. Both the principle of charity as advocated by Davidson in his theory of interpretation as well as hermeneutic circle required in hermeneutics of texts require that if we spot an apparent contradiction in a text we must make best effort to reconcile the contradictory statements and only

when our best effort fails we should accuse the author of contradiction. In the case of my essay not even best effort was required; only a little effort would have reconciled the two claims of mine. Had Bhatnagar read together the mistake I pointed out and the sentence he quotes, he would have realized that in the sentence quoted I am not negating the mistake I pointed out in others. Regarding the mistake I had claimed, 'A common mistake most commentators on Kant's so called metaphysical deduction of categories make is to take the table of forms of judgement as such, as the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding. ... the table of judgements is not at all the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding.' (BKA, p. 109) If we read this together with the sentence quoted by Bhatnagar then it amounts to claiming that the table of judgements is not the source of origin of categories, but the table of judgement can be used to find out the third thing, which is the source of origin of categories. This third thing is the clue Kant is looking for and that clue itself is the source of origin of categories. Contradiction arises because Bhatnagar understands and rephrases my contention, which I made also pointing out the mistake, in his words as follows: '... the table of judgements as given in the so-called metaphysical deduction does not offer the clue for the discovery of categories ...' (RSB, p. 137) This is not what I had claimed as this is an ambiguous formulation because it does not make it clear whether the table of judgement does not offer itself as the clue or it does not offer something else as the clue. The contradiction arises because although his formulation is meant to capture the former but he surreptitiously reads it in the latter sense. The table of judgement is not the clue but the table of judgements can help in discovery of the clue. This is what I had claimed. Be it noted if x helps in discovery of the clue to y, it does not necessarily follow that x itself has now become a clue to y.

2. R.S. Bhatnagar rightly points out that the hermeneutic principle that I employ is based on the distinction, which is traceable to Kant himself, between 'what a philosopher describes' and 'a philosophers' description of it'. There may be discrepancy between the two. The hermeneutic task is to get at what the philosopher wanted to describe,

prenetrating the veil of his own description. But he goes on to claim, 'BK's quotes from Kant ... seem to indicate a point quite different from the one on which they are intended to be glosses.' (RSB, p. 138) In his opinion, 'When Kant illustrates his point, discussing the distinction between rational knowledge and historical knowledge, he seems to be saying that so long as certain data remains unrelated to the principles on which it could be organized, it remains merely external and is not subjectively appropriated and does not constitute rational knowledge. Kant remarks that a science or a system has an organic structure. The idea lies in reason like a seed and allows a natural unity to the various parts of the system holding them together. Writing from the point of view of an author (rather than from the point of the reader) Kant says it is really not a happy thing that one goes on collecting all kind of material having some hidden idea, instead of having a clear idea and then articulating the whole in accordance with reason (*vernunft*). This may as well be applicable to a reader who gets entangled in details and finds them unintelligible till one is able to get a glimpse of the idea which informs the details. The later consideration is different from the earlier one. In the first case, the 'description' remains inadequate to the 'idea', while in the latter case the 'description' has an organic relation with the idea it articulates. The latter seems to be Kant's actual intent for he is talking about the architectonic of his own system.' (RSB, p. 138) Let us check if R.S. Bhatnagar's reading is correct. Let me quote the two relevant passages from Kant once again in this paper which I quoted in the paper he is commenting on. 'However a mode of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, *if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside* (and this in the form in which it has been given to him), whether through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case of general knowledge) through instruction. *Anyone, therefore, who has learnt (in the strict sense of that term) a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head, and, so to speak, at his fingers' ends, has no more than a complete historical knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another.* He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen *out* of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man.' In contrast to the historical knowledge, 'Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles—*the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.*'[4] In the distinction between the historical knowledge and rational knowledge what is emphasized by Kant is not the systematization or the organic nature of the body of knowledge, for a thinker with mere historical knowledge may have received a systematized knowledge with all proofs and explanations, but whether the thinker is in a position to make a distinction between the body of received description and what it is a description of, so that starting from the thing described one is in a position to defend or criticize the description received. In the case of philosophy rational knowledge is the knowledge of universal sources of reason, hence the object described is the universal source of reason, be it theoretical, practical or otherwise.

I remarked earlier that R.S. Bhatnagar's way of understanding and criticism of my essay exemplifies the need for the practice of hermeneutics. This point can be illustrated by his criticism of Kant as well. Regarding Kant's architectonic, R.S. Bhatnagar writes, 'He must have thought it essential for the reader to relate his architectonic with what he called the seed idea. But how could one get at these seed ideas when in his own words they "were scarcely accessible even to a *mikroskopischen Beobachtung* (microscopic observation)".' (RSB, p. 138) This criticism arises because he has taken out Kant's remarks from their context. Let me give Kant's remarks in their context. 'No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay even

the definition which, *at the start*, he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For *this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognizable even under microscopic observation*. Consequently, *since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest*, we must not explain and determine them according to the description, which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For we shall then find that *its founder, and often even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that consequently they have not been in a position to determine the proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.*'[5] The context makes it clear that it is only at the start of the science that the idea on which it is based is hidden in reason and it is the founders and immediate followers who grope for the idea and there arises discrepancy in the idea and the description. But from the vantage point of historical distance when the concerned science has flourished and the seed idea has developed we are in a better position to describe the idea even better than the original thinker who had that idea. If we keep this in mind we can even understand what Kant meant when he said in the context of Plato's ideas, 'I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.'[6] What is the seed idea of Kant's first critique, which is '*a certain universal interest*' I have tried to explain in my forthcoming essay, 'Laying Foundation of Modern Technology: The Aim of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*'.[7]

He questions this hermeneutic task also, 'It presupposes a notion of privileged access to the author's mind. The question is who can claim to have such an access? ... In any case, this much is clear that the "description" has to be taken into account in order to get at what the author wanted to "describe".' (RSB, p. 139) The question is not relevant here. In understanding a text we are not interested in the authorial intention but the intention of the text itself. Even if we employ the locution like 'what Kant intended to describe', 'Kant's intention' etc. in the context of interpretation of his texts, what we aim at is the purport of the text. It is not because of the authorial intention that we return again and again to the text, as authorial intention does not bind us. What binds us is the appropriation of the text by a tradition and as members of the tradition we return to the text to understand what it means. It is because of this reason that Ricouer finds that we understand the text better when the author is dead, i.e. to say the meaning of the text is independent of the authorial intention. And as far as I understand when certain philosophical traditions take Veda to be *apauruṣeya* what they mean is that text as revealing a meaning is without an author.

Now the question arises how can we talk of discrepancy between the text and its intention when we have only the text to go by. The very structuring of the text through its lines of fault makes it apparent where the incision has to be made to reveal its intention. Let me give an example from Kant himself. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has elaborately described the threefold syntheses, and yet he goes on to say, 'Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, *a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.*'[8] This discrepancy in the text is not a formal contradiction but a line of fault. The text cannot be taken at its face value now. To reveal the intent of the text now an incision has to be made here.

Having pointed out the discrepancy in the form and content of the text one can bask in the air of superiority of having found a fault and stop there. But that is not philosophically significant as no understanding of text is revealed. It is easy to create a straw man by freezing the apparent meaning for criticism. What is significant is the revelation of intent of the text by penetrating the text through incision at the line of fault.

But the revelation of the meaning of the text is not a subjective interpolation, but only the text can be a guide here. Here one has to

proceed via the hermeneutic circle described in my essay to achieve the meaning of the unified text; better the unification of the text better is the understanding.

3. R.S. Bhatnagar claims that the three functions (a) understanding an author better than the author himself, (b) organizing a text around the basic principle, and (c) understanding the idea of the author, are distinct and separate. He writes, 'In itself, what Kant had said, is important and can be taken as useful hermeneutic advice ... . But organizing data on principles is not the same as to have an access to the idea of the author though the two may go hand in hand. The quote from Gadamer points to something quite different. Quoting Schleirmacher, Gadamer is pointing to an understanding which is better than that of the author himself. His remark suggests that a reader can enrich a content (the text) while understanding an author by explicating something which escaped the attention of the author himself. A real understanding of an author would involve all these points and so they may be present complementing each other, but they have to be distinguished from each other.' (RSB, pp. 138–9) In this contention the bogey of the authorial intention is the main culprit. One tends to think that authorial intention is something objective and fixed once and for all; it needs to be discovered independently of the other two functions. But as I remarked, the real philosophical hermeneutic task is not the discovery of authorial intention but the intent of the text itself. Once we look for the intent of the text then coherence of the text becomes important and it will require explication too. So the three functions, discovery of the intent of the text, establishing coherence of the text, and explicating at the lines of fault by making incision, go together and are not separable. Mark the use of the expression 'real understanding of an author' by R.S. Bhatnagar. If 'real understanding of an author' involves all the three, then why distinguish the three, for separating the authorial intention from the other two, if it is possible at all, will render it to be not a 'real understanding of the author.'

4. According to R.S. Bhatnagar, 'there is yet another serious consideration which merits attention ... . The impression one gets after going through BK's rendering carefully is of a perfect, flawless theory which

Kant had propounded. Kant's presentation cannot be further improved upon. No deviation or modification is necessary. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have now been placed in a proper way and the puzzle has now vanished completely. Now, as soon as we accept this picture, another puzzle comes to the surface. How come that philosophy did not stop at Kant? ... However, my suspicion is that his manner and spirit of approaching Kant may, then, result in stating that Kant was right in whatever he claimed and proved and a reader must be more humble and serious while studying Kant.' (RSB, pp. 139–40) I must agree with the last contention of R.S. Bhatnagar. I definitely believe that a reader, whether he agrees or disagrees with Kant, must not approach his text trivially or flippantly or with an air of superiority. Even if one feels that he has spotted a difficulty in Kantian text, there is a greater likelihood that Kant himself has noted it and dealt with it in the text itself or in a later text. From the first to the last critique and beyond, he develops and works out the consequences of the same seminal idea. So to make a serious dent in Kantian thought one is required to work through most of his critical writings and read each in light of the other, as most of the German idealists after Kant did, including Hegel. No doubt there are serious flaws in the Kantian critical edifice and only to get at them I am trying to understand his critical corpus. A number of essays of mine on Kant are lined up for publication in *JICPR* and *IPQ*, and one has already appeared in the same volume in which Bhatnagar's essay appears on which I am commenting, which will testify to it. But if I have given the impression that Kant's theory is flawless that is the fault of my presentation, which I must own up. But at the same time I must warn that without a serious attempt to establish coherence of the text by understanding it if one undertakes ab initio the task of criticizing it, the task will come to a naught.

5. R.S. Bhatnagar disagrees with my reading of Kant's category of reality. In my view the term 'real' in Kant's list of categories does not mean 'existence', it is used in the sense of Platonic 'whatness' rather than 'thatness'. By way of criticism Bhatnagar produces the quotation from Kant to which I referred in my interpretation. After quoting the passage he claims, 'I do not think we can construe the meaning of this

passage in the way BK suggests. The reference to time in Kant's passage, granting that time is generated itself 'in the apprehension of the intuition' (*CPR*, A143, B182), prevents us from identifying Kant's notion of reality with that of Plato.' (RSB, p. 146) Let me give the passage from Kant under consideration in full.

> Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore, the concept of which in itself points to being (in time). Negation is that the concept of which represents not-being (in time). The opposition of these two thus rests upon the distinction of one and the same time as filled and as empty. Since time is merely the form of intuition, and so of objects as appearances, that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is not the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality). Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude whereby, in respect of its representation of an object otherwise remaining the same, it can fill out one and the same time, that is, occupy inner sense more or less completely, down to its cessation in nothingness (= 0 = *negatio*). There therefore exists a relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a transition from the one to the other, which makes every reality representable as a quantum. The schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform production of that reality in time as we successively descend from a sensation which has a certain degree to its vanishing point, or progressively ascend from its negation to some magnitude of it. (*CPR*, A143, B182–3)

It is precisely the reference to time that brings out the special character of Kant's concept of reality which makes it distinct from the category of existence and in a way equates with Platonic 'whatness'. Reference to time brings out that 'every reality is representable as a quantum', i.e. reality according to Kant admits of degrees. He makes this point clear time and again. In the anticipations of perception he states, 'In all appearance, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.' (*CPR*, A166, B207) 'Every sensation, however, is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually

vanish. Between reality in the [field of] appearance and negation there is therefore a continuity of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference between any two of which is always smaller than the difference between the given sensation and zero or complete negation. In other words, the real in the [field of] appearance has always a magnitude.' (*CPR*, A168, B210) For Plato reality admits of degrees and here is Kant's explanation of what it means. Those who equate Kantian 'reality' with 'existence' forget that corresponding to degrees of reality Kant never speaks of degrees of existence. Secondly Kant has admitted reality and existence as two distinct categories in his table. When he introduces the ideal of God all reality belong to God even though he refuses to apply the category of 'existence' to Him. That 'reality' in Kant is Platonic 'whatness' becomes clear when he introduces the idea of God. Let me give the relevant passages:

> If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from which all possible predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of an *omnitudo realitatis*. All true negations are nothing but limitations—a title which would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the unlimited, that is, upon 'the All.'
>
> But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a *thing in itself* as completely determined; and since in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates one predicate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal* which serves as basis for the complete determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists. This ideal is the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility of all that exists—the condition to which all thought of objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be traced back. It is also the only true ideal of which human reason is capable. For only in this one case is a concept of a thing—a concept which is in itself universal—completely determined in and through itself, and known as the representation of an individual. (*CPR*, A575f, B603f)

These passages make it clear that reality refers not to the existence of the object but *what* belongs in its possible existence, i.e. what it is. The *ens realissimum* is an ideal precisely because it does not include 'existence'. It is of interest to note that when Kant uses expression in quotes in the first passage above 'the All' it is the classical Greek *τα πάντα*, which is also *τα όντα* that Kant is talking about. If there is any doubt regarding the interpretation of reality as whatness of an object, let us read to one more passage:

> The transcendental major premises which is presupposed in the complete determination of all things is therefore no other than the representation of the sum of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its transcendental content, comprehends all predicates *under itself*; it also contains them *within itself*; and *the complete determination of any and every thing rests on the limitation of this total reality*, in as much as *part of it is ascribed to the thing, and the rest is excluded* ... (*CPR*, A577, B605, emphasis added.)

In the complete determination of the whatness of an object we apply some predicates and withhold other predicates. 'Whatness' involves delimitation but 'thatness' involves positing.

6. R.S. Bhatnagar finds my characterization of transcendental logic as concerned with *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness as vague and misleading. He claims, 'Transcendental philosophy assumes the relationship between subject and object and deals with the content of the judgement in its entirety that is in terms of its form as well as content. Hence the term object-relatedness is less clear and misleading than Kant's own formulations.' (RSB, p. 141) Does trnascendental philosophy or logic deal 'with the content of the judgement in its entirety'? Let us read the relevant passage once again:

> General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general. But since, as the Transcendental Aesthetic has shown, there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, a distinction might likewise be drawn between pure and empirical thought of objects. In that case we should have a logic in which we do not abstract from the entire content of knowledge. This other logic, which should contain solely the rules of the pure thought of an object, would exclude only those modes of knowledge which have empirical content. It would also treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects. (*CPR*, A55f, B79f)

The other logic Kant is talking about is the transcendental logic. It excludes empirical content, but not the content, which arises *a priori* in understanding. So to claim that transcendental logic deals 'with the content of judgement in its entirety' is a misleading characterization of transcendental logic. Bhatnagar's objection to my characterization of transcendental logic in terms of *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness also arises because in the quotation above general logic is characterized as abstracting 'from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object' and in contrast transcendental logic, therefore, should be characterized not only in terms of not abstracting from all 'relation of knowledge to the object' as I think but also in terms of a not abstracting from 'all content of knowledge'. In his words, '... the expression "object-relatedness" itself is not a happy one. BK seems to have used it having in view Kant's expression "from any relation of to the object". But Kant has also used the expression "from all content of cognition". As against the general logic, transcendental logic has been characterized by Kant as dealing with the value and content of the predicate, of course, in relation to object of cognition.' (RSB, p. 141) Now the question is when Kant characterizes general logic as abstracting 'from all content of knowledge' and then with the expression 'that is' adds the characterization 'from all relation of knowledge to the object' is he giving two different characterizations so that if we take only as one as definitive then we misread Kant or are they two different formulations of the same characterization, so that one can be taken as definitive and the other as meaning the same thing? Let us read §2 of Kant's lectures on logic. 'We must distinguish in each concept between *matter* and *form*. The matter of the concept is the *object*, while its form is generality.' In the *Critique of Pure Reason* this demand is reformulated in the following statement: 'We demand in every concept,

first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general, and secondly, the possibility of giving it an object to which it may be applied.' (A239, B298) Mostly, Kant understands 'matter' as *objects* of the concept. Hence in his distinction between general logic and transcendental logic in his lectures on logic there is no mention of the word 'matter' at all. It is given in terms of 'object' only. 'As propadeutic for all employment of understanding in general, general logic on the other hand is distinguished from transcendental logic, by which the object is represented as an object of pure understanding. By contrast general logic relates to objects in general.'[9] What Kant means is that transcendental logic considers the problem of objects *as* objects to the extent and insofar as objects are determined or constituted by *pure* (*a priori*) thinking. By contrast, general logic does not study objects as such and even less objects as objects of pure thinking. Rather, general logic studies thinking with respect to *all* objects, no matter of what kind. General logic disregards the question of whether or not objects are those of pure thinking, of empirical thinking, or of a thinking intuition. That is to say, general logic tries to investigate the rules of thinking disregarding its relation to any kind of object, even though the relation to the object is present in the thinking. And hence in contrast transcendental logic investigates the *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness involved in thinking. Constitution of object by pure thinking is the same as *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness of thinking.

7. R.S. Bhatnagar questions my claim that the table of forms of judgement given by Kant in his metaphysical deduction is a table of transcendental logic. He refers to Kant's statement, 'If we abstract from all content of a judgement, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgement can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments.'[10] He then questions, 'If Kant says that he is considering mere form, abstracting from all content of a judgement, then how can we construe the following table of forms of judgement as in trnascendental logic?' (RSB, p. 142) He concludes, 'Thus the claim that the table of forms of judgement is, in fact, a table in transcendental logic, cannot be supported by the consideration that Kant has introduced three-fold divisions in *all*

the four divisions. Kant's own way of presentation is responsible for confusion.' I fully agree with R.S. Bhatnagar that Kant himself is responsible for confusion.

In the first section of the transcendental deduction Kant claims, 'The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be discovered if we can give an exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgements. That this can quite easily be done will be shown in the next section.' (*CPR*, A69, B94) The next section is entitled 'The Logical Functions of the Understanding in Judgements' (*CPR*, A70, B95) and it opens with the sentence quoted above, and then immediately gives the table of forms of judgement. From this one may get the impression that the table is a table in general logic. But there is a discrepancy in what is presented in the table and what Kant claims to present. Kant intends to show how 'functions of thought in judgement can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments' starting from 'functions of unity in judgement'. But he gives merely the finished table of forms of judgement. It is not clear how if one starts with mere form of judgement then the four heads with three moments each will arise. In the subsequent discussion also he does not explain the four heads or how they arise. He only discusses why he has introduced three moments under each head. But one thing is clear that this table cannot be developed only from the inflections of 'logical functions of understanding' as indicated by the title. Hence he speaks of transcendental logic (*CPR*, A71, B97) and identifies the table as the 'transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgements.' (*CPR*, A75, B98) His discussion is motivated by later considerations concerning problems of transcendental philosophy. But Kant again refers to this '*transcendental* table' in §21 of *Prolegomena* as '*logical* table of judgements'. The hesitation and confusion in Kant is due to the fact that he never explicitly poses the question whether the four characteristics of judgements, i.e., quantity, quality, relation and modality, are obtained purely *logically*, i.e., regardless of the *object-relatedness* of thinking, or whether they arise *transcendentally*, i.e., by relying upon judgement as an *object-related* function of unification. But this question can be settled if we take his later writings also into consideration together with the fact that each of the four heads is trichotomical and not dichotomical. Hence,

the division into four groups is not general logical but transcendental logical division. In his lectures on logic also Kant introduces the four heads of division of forms of judgement[11] but there too he does not demonstrate how these four heads arise in general logical considerations. Simply because these divisions occur in general logic is no guarantee that this table is a table of forms of judgement in general logic as they have not been grounded in formal considerations. Since its inception general logic is not free from ontological considerations. Although Kant took over the four divisions from the traditional logic but he wants to secure it through transcendental logical considerations. But Kant does not undertake the kind of reformulation general logic will require if the basic division of forms of judgement in it is secured by transcendental considerations. Contrary to what he does in his transcendental philosophy, he always believed that general logic is well founded and requires no reformulation.

In the words of Heidegger, 'It seems as if one is silently and quickly to slide over this table of judgement of Kant, like sliding over a creation of a baroque and pedantic passion of construction and schematization'[12] as not only the origin of this table is unclear and questionable but also the deduction of categories from this table is unclear and questionable. Since Kant grasps *the function of unification as object related*, in the third section of the transcendental deduction, before he gives the table of categories, he explains the sense in which the logical function of understanding, i.e. the function of unification or synthesis is to be taken. And this is the clue for the discovery of categories and not the table of forms of judgement.

8. R.S. Bhatnagar finds my explanation of syntheses in Kant's metaphysical deduction with the help of syntheses as explained in transcendental deduction of the first edition as objectionable. He argues, 'As is well known Kant had re-written the deduction [the transcendental deduction], for he thought that the earlier version delineated a subjective process which would have been more properly placed in psychology. That is why, towards the end of the passage on page B152, distinguishing productive imagination from the reproductive one, he wrote, 'reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, those of association, and therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology' (B152). What it implies is that how can I take into account something which in Kant's opinion does not belong to transcendental philosophy to explain a point in transcendental logic. Despite Kant's opinion, the tradition of Kant scholarship has not dismissed the subjective deduction as merely empirical psychology, rather in most editions of the first critique the first edition version of transcendental deduction continues to be given along with the second edition version, which testifies to the fact that tradition still considers it as belonging to transcendental philosophy and takes seriously the Kant's view of the first edition, 'the reproductive synthesis of imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind' distinguishing it from the 'empirical synthesis of reproduction' of A101. In the second edition either he is talking of only the 'empirical synthesis of reproduction' as distinguished from pure synthesis of reproduction, or if he is dismissing the entire reproductive synthesis as empirical then he is exhibiting how an author can think against his own idea. It will be beyond the scope of this reply to go into exegetical details to show that the first edition view fits in well with the totality of what he is doing in the first critique and it does not contradict the objective deduction of the second edition provided we discount this last remark as mistaken. I took care of this discrepancy in my essay 'Constitution of Subjectivity of Self and Objectivity of Nature: A Brief Hermeneutical Study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*' already submitted for evaluation for publication in *JICPR*. Let me remind once again that authorial intention is not binding; what makes us return to the text is the fact that the text has been appropriated by the tradition.

9. R.S. Bhatnagar finds my discussion about reflection, in quest for the clue to the discovery of pure concepts of understanding, as superfluous and unnecessary. In his view, 'Kant's passage relating to reflection occurs in the beginning in the "Appendix on the amphiboly of concepts of reflection" through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding. This text is devoted to an evaluation of Leibnizian effort to

construct an intellectual system of the world (*CPR*, A270, B326). The concepts or ideas of reason discussed here are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and finally matter and form. Obviously the notion of reflection, as dealt with in this section, does not offer us even a possibility of a possible alternative. BK could have easily left it out and saved some ink.' (RSB, p. 144) In the sixth paragraph of the third section of the metaphysical deduction Kant introduces the clue as 'the same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement*' which also 'gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*' and 'this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding'; and again 'the same operation by which in concepts, by means of analytic unity, it produces the logical form of a judgement' but the identity of the function is not revealed in the metaphysical deduction. So one has to find out what this 'same function' or 'same operation' is in metaphysical deduction. According to Kant, 'This *loigcal* origin of concepts—original only according to their form—consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to many objects (*conceptus communis*) emerges as that form which is required by the power of judgement.'[13] What is reflection? Reflection is 'the deliberation of how various representations can be contained in one consciousness.'[14] So reflection is also a function or operation of understanding that introduces some kind of unity in concept and judgement. So isn't it the obvious candidate for being the clue? For rigour of the argument isn't it required that it be examined whether it is the clue Kant is looking for? It may be remembered that a philosophical text has organic unity and not a mechanical assemblage of discrete items. So even if a concept occurs explicitly in some context, it cannot be ruled out *a priori* that it has no bearing in understanding other parts of the text. This consideration also requires back and forth movement from different parts of the text to understand some crucial points of the text as it happens in my paper, which R.S. Bhatnagar finds strange. He finds it strange that I make a back and forth movement from subjective deduction to metaphysical deduction. (RSB, p. 145) The back and forth movement as required in the hermeneutic circle mentioned in my paper establishes the organic unity of the text.

10. R.S. Bhatnagar disagrees with my view that the specificities of categories cannot emerge at the stage of metaphysical deduction by simply looking at the forms of judgements even if three-fold synthesis is taken into account and it would not be possible to talk of the specificities before we are through the transcendental deduction and schematism. That is to say he questions my contention that specificities of categories will emerge only when Kant had shown that they have application in knowledge (transcendental deduction) and when the unities of consciousness represented by each category acquired a temporal form (schematism). He argues, 'Specificities are *presupposed* in the application of the categories. Read the first sentence of section 26 of *CPR*. 'In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the *a priori* categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical function of thinking; in the transcendental deduction, however their possibility as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited (*CPR*, ss 20, 21, B159). This statement of Kant renders BK's elaborate and admirable effort redundant.' (RSB, p. 146) In the sentence Bhatnagar quotes from Kant, what he is speaking of are the 'categories in general'. The metaphysical deduction shows only the way of origin of categories in general not in their specificities as Bhatnagar thinks. Categories become applicable only when they are schematized. For the chapter on schematism of categories tries to answer the question: How ... is the *subjunction* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible? (*CPR*, A138, B177) So it is only after the categories are schematized that the specificities become known. Hence in Kant's first critique the specificities of categories are presented only in and after the schematism chapter. Even if we accept Bhatnagar's claim that specificities of categories are presupposed in the application of categories in Kantian philosophy, it does not prove that my views are wrong. Kant does not show that categories are applicable by giving examples of application to particular cases, as Bhatnagar seems to think in his argument, but transcendentally, i.e. he shows *a priori* the applicability of categories to objects. The ontological priority of a thing to another thing need not imply the cognitive priority of the former to the latter.

For example in Kant's philosophy moral law presupposes freedom but we become conscious of freedom by being conscious of moral law.

11. Regarding the discussion about categories under modality R.S. Bhatnagar writes, 'The difficulty is not about the distinction between the two types of categories, but regarding the understanding of the notion of category itself. If the categories of modality are not adding to the content of the cognition and are merely concerned with the relation between the object and the thought of faculty of cognition, can they be called categories in the same sense in which Kant calls categories of quantity, quality and relation categories? DK's paper is basically concerned with the understanding of the notion of category. The problems arise with respect to the various usages Kant has put this notion to; whether the various usages are compatible with each other or not remains a problem.' (RSB, 146f) In my paper I had given an account of what is a concept (BKA, 118f) and what is a category (BKA, 128f) according to Kant. The problem as it appears in Bhatnagar's reading of Kant's notion of category is not due to problems inherent in Kantian notion, but in the notion of 'same sense' and the notion of 'compatible' that Bhatnagar is operating with. For Kant, to put it very roughly, a category, is an *a priori* characterization required for object-hood (objectivity) of any thing. In this sense all the categories are categories in the same sense. But apart from characterization of quality, quantity, and relation object-hood (objectivity) of a thing also requires characterization of its positing vis-à-vis the cognitive faculty, which he puts under the head of modality. And these are different kinds of characterizations. So Kant notes the similarity between them by calling them 'categories' but also notes the difference between them by putting them under different heads. So sameness and difference go together. But to me it appears Bhatnagar may be operating with notions of 'same sense' and 'compatible' such that if the categories under quantity, quality, relation and modality are categories in 'the same sense' then they cannot admit the kind of difference that obtains between the categories under the first three and the last one, since these differences are such that they are not 'compatible' with calling categories under modality categories in the 'same sense' as those under the other three heads. But

to me it appears there is no flat contradiction between taking all the categories as *a priori* characterization required for objecthood, in spite of their differences and also noting these differences. So Bhatnagar needs to clarify the notion of 'same sense' and 'compatible' he is operating with. Once he becomes clear about these two notions, the problem he finds in Kant's notion of categories will disappear.

Notes and References

1. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, October–December 2002, pp. 137–47. Hereinafter this essay will be referred to as RSB.
2. Binod Kumar Agarwala, 'Interpreting Metaphysical Deduction: A Hermeneutic Response to Professor Daya Krishna's Essay "Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Questions and Problems", *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, July–September 2002, pp. 109–54. Daya Krishna's essay appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, pp. 1–11. DK stands for Daya Krishna's essay.
3. Emphasis added by RSB.
4. Both quotations are from *Critique of Pure Reason* (abbreviated as CPR hereinafter), tr. Norman Kemp Smith, A836f, B864f. Emphasis added.
5. CPR, A834, B862. Emphasis added.
6. CPR, A314, B370.
7. Accepted for publication in *JICPR*.
8. CPR, A78, B103.
9. Immanuel Kant, *Logik*, in *Werke* ed. by Cassirer, Vol. VIII, (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912–22), p. 336.
10. CPR, A70, B95.
11. *Logik*, §§20–30 (Cassirer, VIII, 408ff).
12. Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1997), p. 178.
13. *Logic*, §5, note 1.
14. Ibid., §6.

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The Blank Screen

Let nothing be changed and everything be different.[1]

What did I learn all these years?

I learnt a story is a story but not Cinema. I learnt drama is drama, but not Cinema. That photography is about image alright, yet not quite Cinema. A still image is all said and done, still. It is only when 'time' enters and sets it rolling, that Cinema happens. It is here then, that the spell of the moving image binds you to your seat and you get gooseflesh looking at the ghost of a train come towards you on the screen.

As with Cinema, so with the students of Cinema, the main problem remains that of Time. Cinema is both—the movement in time as well as time made still. Sometimes it is movement, and sometimes it is the still centre of movement. It is like the centre of the spinning top that remains still while all around it moves. Or one can also put it this way—all else moves only because the centre is still.

Following this basic nature therefore, it seems there are two kinds of effects that Cinema can have upon you. One, of moving your still centre; two, of stilling your moving centre. Consequently there are these two kinds of Cinemas too—one that moves you, takes you out of yourself; and the other that stills your centre, turns you around like a silent top, and takes you further into your own self. There are cans and cans of the first kind of Cinema being produced every day in this country and around the world, but the makers and takers of the latter, are a handful, here, as everywhere else. Needless to add that given a chance I would like to talk about that handful.

To begin at the beginning, one realized as soon as one stepped into film school, that the actual process or rather the technical aspect of the making of cinema was very tricky in itself. It tricked you into believing in the projections it made on the blank screen, while the truth remained far from it, in fact often turned out quite the contrary. So much so, that one can say, when the reality was movement (of the film reel in the projector behind you), the illusion it gave was that of steadiness (in front of you on the screen). And one wondered, What is Cinema?

It seemed things were not to the camera eye what they were to the human eye. They changed from the one eye to the other. And they changed beyond recognition. For instance, the goal to record and capture a swaying tree seemed simple enough. It only turned into a challenge as we persevered. In the soundtrack, the rustling of leaves sounded like the waterfall buzz and the actual footsteps became hammering noise when played back along with the image. It became quite impossible to reproduce simple things like a rustle of cloth or a crumpling of paper, because they sounded completely like something else. So it happened in the process of Cinema that we finally feigned something to make it pass off as something else. For example we waved a silk scarf before the microphone in the studio, and when played back nobody could say it was not the sound of the wind. Truth, alas seldom worked, in a lie that was Cinema.

Professor D was very fond of stories. 'Tell me a story,' he always said. 'What's the story?' he insisted. 'But there's hardly a story here ...!' he grumbled. We could hardly hear him. All we heard however was,

> Be as ignorant of what you are going to catch as is a fisherman of what is at the end of his rod (the fish that arises from nowhere).[2]

At some such point it became clear that cinema wasn't about a story. I must mention here a ten minute film by Istvan Gaal from Hungary called, 'People at Work'. Noon. Top sun. A bunch of labourers working with their hammers, shovels and nutscrews at a railway track. The continuous sound of the iron on the gravel and the bang of the hammer on the track joints. The distant sound of the train approaching. The workers pick their tools up and step aside to let the train pass. The train comes down roaring and speeds past thundering. The eyes of the workers inspect the track checking for loose joints if any, that might shake with the movement of the train. After the train has passed each follows his/her own gaze to the loose nut and gets back to the suspended work. People look at the rail-tracks. Camera looks at the people and the train. We look at the people not looking at the train. Not a word spoken. People at work.

I do not think it is possible in any medium other than Cinema to show so quintessentially—'People at Work'. And is this not what one

ultimately demands of a medium—this inevitability of the medium, to say something in a way it cannot be said in any other. So here, the wonder that once was—'the train', passes by without any of the men and women as much as once looking up at it. Could it be the same 1895 Lumiere train[3] whose mere arrival at the station gave gooseflesh to the people watching it zoom towards them on the screen? I wonder. This is perhaps as much as Cinema has travelled across a century, or so I think. To me it seems to have been a journey from the near and the personal to the impersonal verging on the universal.

We did a lot of still photography in the beginning and then all through whenever we found the time for it. The dark room was the most splendid place on earth, or so it seemed then. A place where in the darkness things existed only to the tactile, and the outside world totally vanished. Then suddenly from nowhere emerged an image. It was sheer magic to see the image appear out of nothing on the silver bromide paper as it floated in the chemical. It seemed the image would start speaking soon. It was so mesmerizing, and yet it couldn't still be called Cinema. The dark of the darkroom also resembled that of the cinema hall. Yet, it seemed there still had to be something else. This wasn't quite cinema.

In the pitch dark, a ray of light flashed through and illuminated the blank screen. When the light went out, the projection stopped, the images vanished and once again the screen turned lifeless and dead. Technically it was only a still image projected at the terrific rate of twenty-four frames a second, in an effort to appear moving to the human eye. Time inched every second and the film in the projector many times faster, yet all the images on the screen moved at a steady pace, appearing normal[4] to the human eye. Apart from the general pace, even if the character on the screen were to appear still, the film would anyway have to run at the same pace. For instance to show a woman on screen sitting still on a chair with her head thrown back, lost deep in thought, the film strip with this single image of the unmoving woman will have to keep moving nevertheless at the rate of some twenty-four frames a second. It has to keep running if only to capture a batting of her eye, a heaving of her chest as she breathes, or a tear drop, if you like, from the edge of her eye. The film strip keeps running

at an amazing speed of six times four in the projector, while the woman appears to sit quite still on the screen, until a tear drops or an eye blinks. So all the feet lengths of running film to capture this pearl swell in the eye and drop down! Is it then about the most vital, yet subtle movements of life? Is it then, not about an inspector chasing a thief, but about a tear dropping from the core of the eye?

I remember here a French film called Le Jette by Chris Marker. The entire film is made of still images. The filmmaker as a style has chosen to make it by stringing together a series of still photographs. The film is about the love between a soldier at war and his beloved left behind. All the images are photographs taken with a still camera. (Technically though even here for you to grasp fully, each image is projected continuously at the rate of twenty-four frames a second for whatever length of time is required for it to hold on the screen. For instance if it is required of the image to hold for ten seconds, it will be projected two hundred and forty times in a row.) So the narrative unfolds one by one through this sequence of independent images that are still. Suddenly in one image of the girl, as she lies quietly with her face on the pillow, the eyelid bats. Only at a single point has the filmmaker chosen to use a moving image and it is enough to shock you. It is sufficient to experience the power of a single moving image in a myriad still ones, and, in turn, be moved by it. Enough to know what little is capable of creating drama in Cinema—a blink of the eye.

Fair enough that it has little to do with the drama of the stage. In fact it has no need for it, precisely because it creates a drama of its own. Here the lifting of an eye, the falling of a leaf is drama enough. Hence the power that an otherwise everyday, ordinary image acquires in cinema is extraordinary.

Like the rope in the film, 'Desert of Thousand Lines' by Mani Kaul. While one end of the rope lies deep down at the bottom of the well holding on to the bucket, the other end remains tied to the camel constantly moving away from the well. A part of the rope slithers endlessly against the barren land. No words to explain. Only the sound of the rope moving on the land and the sand stirring by the moving rope. As the camera watches the unending rope move, for the viewer get created, the desert as well as the water deep down in the sand. It

is not in the rope, but the rope moving incessantly in time, that the dry desert with its deep down water, hides. Cinema seems to be searching for the impersonal, in the process revealing the hidden. It looks at the everyday, the prosaic, the commonplace and only through it strives to create the uncommon and the poetic. It is a way of looking at things, of seeing.

Long before Cinema, back in the fourteenth century, perhaps it was the poet-saint Kabir who saw. He saw, as everybody else did, a leaf fall off a tree:

Patta tuta dal se, le gayi pavan udaye.

But what he saw in the next line, none else could.

Ab ke bichhude nahin milen, dur paden hain jaye.[5]

Tragedy in the fall of a leaf. Viraha Forever.

Such absolutely everyday ordinary images. It is what the poet sees through them, that lifts them to unbelievable heights. So much power it acquires, as can shatter your world. It shows you, or sees for you, something that you 'see' everyday and yet do not quite see. It invites you to 'Be the first to see what you see as you see it.'[6]

Cinema to me, also seems like something that comes closest to the everyday wisdom of Zen. It can perhaps best complement the saying that the everyday mind is the mirror that gathers no dust. And well, there is no mirror. So where will the dust gather? One has to learn to wait for the whack, and learn to be patient for the Satori. Like that woman monk, who fetches water everyday for years, one has to walk day after day over the chipped wooden bridge, mindful yet not quite striving for the same. One has to allow it to come when it will. And it is only then, in the darkening haze as the evening descends, that one day the woman is likely to trip over one of the broken planks on the bridge, her pitcher likely to break and she likely to see, nothing less than the moon flow out of the pitcher. Satori. Wisdom. Bliss. Is Cinema then about waiting? Professor D inquires 'story'? I want to say 'Satori'!

Cinema sometimes comes closest to the as-it-is simplicity of the folk or the tribal song. Just a plain and simple description of things

choicelessly being what they are. An image of the simple awareness of the simultaneity of things without as much as offering a critique. A matter of just being aware.

Kargori bhaji randhe, padhari mor bhata wo, saunvrengi gheu la karkaye.
Bodela deera.
baghwa rengaele dheere dheere, dungri ke teere.
Nahin tor daya o maya re shikari bhaiya,
baghwa rengayele dheere dheere.[7]

The dark girl is cooking the bhaji, the fair one is chopping the brinjal and the brown one is pouring oil in the frying pan.
Meanwhile, the pumpkin gets fatter by the day sitting on the roof of the house.
The tiger walks by the side of the hill (towards the river to drink water).
O! Hunter hiding in the bush, don't you have some compassion.
The tiger walks over the side of the hill.

Just a plain and simple landscaping. The mere record of the simultaneity of things as they be. Here also comes to mind the story of one Karia Baiga. It must be the insistence on stating the as-it-is, in his tribal artistic sensibility that is basically the urge to 'not judge'.

'Karia Baiga was once hunting a deer (when such a thing was possible) in the dense forest around Amarkantak where the great Narmada takes its birth, when to his consternation he found that he was chasing not a deer but a tigress with her cubs. He ran for his life and succeeded in saving himself by climbing a tree. Karia Baiga tells me this story as he draws a tiger on paper. He is one of the artistically gifted in his community near Kabir Chaura. It is a remarkable tiger that he draws, quite unlike the ferocious beast he must have faced in the jungle. I asked Karia as to why he has not drawn a ferocious tiger, to which he replied, that ferocity is only one of the moods of the animal whereas he has drawn the animal as such.'[8]

To preserve the as-suchness of the tear, and the smile and the frown; that is the challenge here too. However much as we would like, it is not easy to follow Karia's way here in cinema. Things do not remain

the same in front of the camera. A smile, a frown, a tear acquire a phenomenal proportion here. It is hard to prevent it from slipping into magnifications that allow it to become much larger than life. It is not easy to preserve the independent and the impersonal being of a tear or a smile; more so because it chooses to place value on the tragedy inherent in a tear, irrespective of whose tear it is and what makes it brim over the precipice and drop. On the one hand it is most difficult to achieve this in cinema, for it is here that it is not possible for a chair to remain 'a' chair. It can only be 'the' chair on which light falls and it comes alive on the screen as—'that' chair and nothing else. So à la Gertrude Stein, 'a chair is a chair is a chair' and it is nothing else. Unlike literature, where even an exhaustive description of a chair does not kill the possibility of a different chair in each reader's mind—to each his/her own and hence, so many. In the image on the screen however, it gets fixed as the one chair and loses the possibility of being many. This immovability only complicates it further.

Yet at the same time it is here that it can be absolved too. It is here that resonances too deep for tears can also be stirred. For it is here that a relevant presence can be evoked by a significant absence. For instance there is the famous race-course scene from the film 'Pick-pocket' by Bresson, where the whole sense of the space is created without showing as much as a horse running. You realize only after the scene that showing the stadium would actually have been quite futile there. The Iranian film by Abbas Kiarostami 'Wind Will Carry Us' is another such example where the whole set of friends accompanying the protagonist to the village is simply invisible as characters in the film. At the most you can hear their voices from inside the room and from inside the car. But you never once see them in the film. And well, does it matter?

On the other hand popularly speaking, it is an age-old method which the commercial cinema has been employing ever since 'Sholay' and even before that of showing a murder without showing the weapon. The absence of the weapon creates a blank, to fill in which, terror is generated in the minds and hearts of the viewers. Basically the idea of showing only a part is so that the whole is formed in the mind of the viewer, thus ensuring her/his participation in the bargain.

However coming back to the tear that belongs to no one, let us say Cinema attempts to search for the impersonal. So to say it hates to have captive audiences bound to a storyline identifying with its characters, ready to laugh and cry at the first promptings of music used to that effect. It says beware of pity, and in an attempt to save it from these pitfalls, searches for the impersonal, or in other words it searches for 'the tear that belongs to no one'. Though it has terrific powers like the supernatural, to scare you, depress you or to make you laugh. At the same time it is the first unsaid rule to use such a powerful tool or weapon with the utmost care. In fact as far as possible to not use the arsenal at all.

Thus the principle of non-violence acquires special significance in the particular context here. Wherever there is potential power, self-restraint becomes difficult and yet the need of the hour. I am then for a non-violent film-making that respects life, talks of the everyday, and only through that aspires to talk of the universal. Thus alone does it seem possible to talk of the brute violence inherent in life, from one day to the other.

This however again brings us back to the tear belonging to no one. This tear has to drop almost like a leaf falling off a tree. It has, so to say, to carry the agony of the inevitability of the tear falling down alongwith the impossibility of its ever going back into the eye. It would then be like the separation of the leaf from the tree. Viraha forever.

Ab ke bichhude kab milen, dur pade hain jaye.

We used to say, there is little that is taught at the film school and much that is learned. Inspite of the fact that the equipment was ill-maintained, the faculty was devoid of inspiring teachers and the atmosphere totally unmotivating what was it that worked? Perhaps the feeling that more often than not one had nowhere or no one to turn to but oneself was at times one of greatest miseries and also at times the biggest help. Thus every moment there, was actually, what you made of it.

Anup Singh took a workshop with us at the end of our second year at the institute. He watched with tremendous patience our stumbling films, the first films of most of our lives. He looked calmly at a shot in which nothing much happened—only from the far bend in the road

a cyclist turned a corner and paddled towards the camera. 'That is the first step towards Cinema' he said. 'As the filmmaker waits, the camera waits, and alongwith them, the viewer too, waits.' Our first lesson in Cinema.

Seven years later we were going to be struck by the film, 'The Name of a River' by Anup Singh—a film about Ritwik Ghatak, who is by turns, a filmmaker, a person, an actor, a storyteller, a human being, and a guru. Anup regards Ritwik as his guru. He never actually met him in his life. And does it matter! Ritwik is not there as a character in the film. Does it matter! The presence evoked by the conspicuous absence is significant in so much as all presences in the film glow and resonate with that one absence. The film remains with you, like the taste of poetry left behind in the mind, long after it has shed the skin of all those words and their many meanings. What is it that lingers behind? What is it that remains?

Miracles also happen to those who believe in them, wait for them. This is perhaps the first lesson that needs to be taught in a film school—to wait for the moment, to wait for the magic. To finally realize you are not always the one to make things happen. As elsewhere so here it is important to let go. It is only when you watch long at the deep dark sky that there is also the possibility of a moon suddenly rising out of nowhere. Moon. Ecstasy. Magic.

However where exactly does this magic lie? The endless train of images on the film negative cannot be the thing, the reels in the can can't be it either, neither the blank screen or the ray of light falling on it possibly can. Where is Cinema then? Is it the play of images on the screen as long as the light lasts? For that while, you forget even the screen. Only the world visible in that light beam exists. As soon as the light is shut, the connection with the created world snaps with it. There is nothing but the blank screen once again.

This blank screen of the Cinema is also a favourite metaphor with saint-philosophers like Nisargadatta Maharaja and Raman Maharshi, It is the most concrete image they find at hand when trying to talk of illusion and reality. The world is as illusory as the images projected on the screen. The images are only a projection of the mind, hence the word—imaginary. The projection of images exists in time. To be in

time is to be in this world. With the end of this projection the world snaps, and once again there is nothing but the blank screen. So in the beginning, you are already where you are destined to arrive at the end—the blank screen. It remains.

The wind whirls, the leaf falls if it has to, and once again the screen is blank.

Patta tuta dal so, le gayi pawan udaye, ab ke bichhude kab milen, dur pade hain jaye.

To show a leaf falling with such inevitable destiny is a cinematic challenge. And when met, it is nothing short of a miracle. The ordinary and the everyday then acquires enormous proportions and the blank screen becomes the mirror that gathers no dust.

But then, there is no mirror.

Notes and References

1. From Robert Bresson's book, *Notes on the Cinematographer*.
2. Ibid.
3. The first film in the history of cinema was the live recording one reeler film called 'The Train Arriving at the Station', made by the Lumiere brothers of France in the year 1895.
4. You must remember the films of the Chaplin times where all the characters seemed to be walking, nodding, laughing, beating and kicking at a fast pace. It generated a humour though the real reason was that till then nobody had hit upon the magical number 24 frames/second. They were the early years of Cinema and the speed was only 16 frames/second—the reason why it didn't appear normal to the human eye.
5. A couplet by Kabir that says—a leaf falls and is blown away by the wind, and once it is separated from the branch, none knows whether it will ever meet it again.
6. From Robert Bresson's *Notes on the Cinematographer*.
7. A Chhattisgarhi tribal song heard by the author from a Devar woman from Khairagarh.
8. The incident is mentioned by J. Swaminathan in his book, *Perceiving Fingers*, a catalogue of the tribal and folk art collection of Bharat Bhavan.

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Music and Silence

Very few aestheticians have reflected on the relation of music to silence; and, to the best of my knowledge, perhaps no one has so far addressed the question how Hindustani music relates to silence. The only generally relevant essay that I have come across is the one by Gisèle Brelet which appeared in the twenty-second volume of *La Revue Musicale* more than half a century ago.[1] It is doubtless a thoughtful essay written, at places, in a markedly phenomenological vein; but it does not clearly bring out how silence relates to the three distinct ways in which music concerns us, that is as composition, performance, and listening. And, of course, it could not be expected to have any direct bearing on North Indian music with which alone I can truly claim to be familiar.

But before I proceed further I must face a possible question. Does the subject I have chosen deserve philosophic reflection at all? Is it not quite apparent that as privation of sound, silence is just *opposed to* music which must build upon *svaras* that are all meant to be *heard*, if discriminatingly? The point of such sceptical questions, however, dissolves the movement we look at two simple facts. First, for listening to music properly we need a measure of quiet in the auditorium; and secondly, moments of quiet are not only inevitable within the very run of music itself, but even desirable because music is essentially a contemplative, not a dramatic art. It *can* appear dramatic as when a singer becomes flamboyantly emotional or tries to cover up lack of intrinsic quality in music with frequent and exaggerated gestures. But classical singing which is really good needs contemplation in ample measure; and, what is more, the need is equal for the performer *and* his audience. How this very need calls for recurring moments of silence would become clear if we gave some thought to what contemplation itself is. Here, the following from Harold Osborne should be of help:

> Aesthetic contemplation ... [is a special] form of absorption ... [Here] ... the field of attention is narrowed; our usual practical concerns are put into abeyance ... When aesthetic contemplation is successful and absorption is achieved there is a loss of subjective time-sense, a loss of the sense of place and a loss of bodily consciousness.[2]

Now, one simple remark may be made here at once. As engrossment, contemplation is not just a peck of attention, however focused it may be. It needs time to settle itself and to take over the mind. This is why the *vilambita* idiom is essential for music.[3] Now, it is obvious, leisurely or reposeful singing just cannot be unremitting; it has to let in some moments of silence. Even generally, no one can sing without any break. But even if once could, it would be an aesthetic disaster. It would just leave no time for the singer and the listener to internalize the ongoing music and the heard sounds would only tickle the ear. The experience, in either case, would be merely perceptual.

Contemplation, however, is not the only key term that relates to our present purpose. We will also be using, pretty freely, words like music, silence, composition, and performance. These are all familiar words to be sure; but a little close thinking on what they really mean in the context of practice *and* art in general may yet be found to help. *Music* is of course commonly taken to be pre-eminent among the arts, but its inseparability from *laya* (or aesthetic pace) and rhythm is not generally seen quite clearly. For those who are wedded to Hindustani (or North Indian) music it should be easy to see why it is essential to distinguish *laya* from rhythm. Here, in the particular genre of music which is all along the context of my thinking in this essay (that is, Hindustani music) *rhythm* or *tāla* is an extent of temporal flow measured by means of *mātrās* (or beats); made internally articulate with the additional help of *bols* which are meaningless letters (or their bunches which are equally non-semantic) and segments (or *vibhāgas*), all conjoining to make a cycle with a focal point (called the *sama*); and meant, in the main, to be played at some drum.

All this is just not there along with *ālāpa* of the *dhruvapada* genre where the duration of *sustainment* of individual notes—and the pace of tonal *passages*—are both determined by the singer's own creative ability to produce different effects. So the temporal element in *ālāpa* can only be said to be *laya* or aesthetic pace, that is, tempo as determined essentially by the vocalist's own ability to evoke varying effects, consistent of course with the character of the *rāga* chosen. Now, bearing all this in mind, and as demanded by the subject we are dealing with, two points may be made here. First, intervals of silence in *ālāpa* cannot

easily be so *long* as in *Khayāla*-singing where the gaps in vocal utterance can easily appear filled up by listeners' attention to the ongoing *ṭhekā*. Secondly, there are some *brief*, but aesthetically significant bits of quiet which just cannot be there in *ālāpa* because there is no *tāla* here. My reference here is to such moments of silence as the ones that (may be made to) separate the three segments of a *tāna* modelled as a *tiyā* or the dainty and adroit bit of quiet which is sometimes brought about by the vocalist when he intentionally completes a predetermined *tāna* or phrase just a little before the *sama*, inducing us, the listeners, to visualize the focal beat and to bridge the vacant little interval imaginatively.

The way I have taken *rhythm* so far is, however, relevant only to our music. Aestheticians, on the other hand, have given a wider meaning to the word, with a view to covering all art quite generally, say, as follows:

> Rhythm not only dominates music and poetry, but also, in a wider sense, architecture, sculpture, and painting: the bigger part of a space is heavier than the smaller; one spatial form, whether linear or plane, weightier, more striking, or stronger in character than another; colours, also, are distinguished from various points of view by their greatly varied impressiveness ... If, therefore, we want to define rhythm in general, we have to say: rhythm is the alternation between heavy (stressed) and light (unstressed or less stressed) parts, in so far as it follows certain rules.[4]

The view given above is quite relevant to our rhythm too. I say so because our rhythm-cycles have off beats as well—beats which may be said to be unstressed because they are not marked on the *tabalā*. However, the noteworthy point here is that the *temporal flow between the beats* which is all along quiet because not marked on the drums, has got to be held on to by the listener, imaginatively. In fact, it is this fact which throws a tissue of ideality over our listening to music and prevents it, along with some other factors, from being a merely sensuous experience.

To turn now to *silence*, its commonest meaning is absence of sound or speech. But here two points may be made at once. First, if we take

silence as sheer absence of sound in the outer world, a very faint sound may serve to heighten the impact of enveloping silence. This truth can be seized even imaginatively. Thus, when in the very opening of Shakespeare's Hamlet we come across talk like the following:

> Bernardo: Have you had *quiet* guard?
>
> Francisco: Not a mouse stirring,[5]

we lose no time in imagining that the quiet of the night is very deep indeed.

This, however, is not the only way in which sound relates to silence. Nor is absence of outer sound or speech the only meaning of *silence*. The word is also freely taken to mean a *period* of such absence, stillness, refusal or failure to speak or communicate, and oblivion or obscurity. The last of these meanings is irrelevant to the making and contemplation of music. Of all the other meanings *stillness* perhaps needs a little extra attention because it means privation not only of sound or speech, but of motion or activity. This activity may be the inner tumult of thought, desire or anxiety as is implied by the Biblical maxim: 'Be still and know that I am God'. But when a philosopher (Professor Whitehead, if I remember correctly) characterizes *silence* as 'the medium in which great things fashion themselves', the word has to be taken in a fuller sense, that is, to signify not only a period of intense and undisturbed concentration but of utter quiet on the outside. On the other hand, where we speak of 'the still waters' of a lake we mean that the lake is free from motion and noise, *both* alike features of the *outer* world.

Such a concern with the terms' mere meanings, however, only distinguishes or juxtaposes the inner and the outer. It hardly takes due notice of how the two overlap or interpenetrate in actual experience; in other words, the phenomenology of sound and silence remains quite untouched. In real life we have *many* sounds and *many* silences, not just one sound and one silence; and their individual character is determined not only by the way they interrelate, but by their context of situations and happenings, our attitudes and experience, and even by our state in the present which may be one of sheer vacancy or of intense absorption in some thought or activity. Now, it is easy to see

how sounds in the outer world differ not only because of their intrinsic character, but because of the different ways in which they relate to silence. A pop and a thud are of course both pretty quickly accomplished; but only the second one of these looks like making a passing dent in the quiet around. Likewise, a splash seems to do what a plop clearly does not, that is, appearing to scatter the frame of silence for a while. Sounds emanating from human beings are also easily distinguishable. To sob is clearly not the same thing as to wail. With its own intermittent gulps for breath the act of sobbing only lets in some moments of nervous calm; it cannot look like tearing the quiet air apart as wailing can easily appear to do.

The way is now paved to see how the distinguishing we have done above can help us see why actual musical utterance strikes us differently. To speak quite generally, how exactly the voice is made to enter immediate quiet, gently and contemplatively or abruptly and full blown; how long a stretch of silence it overlays; and how exactly it re-enters the calm it has covered, as a taper or as an emphatic cut,—all this determines the look and impact of singing. Such thinking has a bearing also on the sonant variety of the very basic material of music, namely, the *svaras* as they have been named or note names, that is *sa*, *re*, *ga*, *ma*, and so on. Of all these *svaras* of the musical scale *re* alone (as a note-name duly sung) seems to enter silence as an incline. All other *svaras* up to (and including) *dhā* appear to rest on silence horizontally and open. The note *ni* is the only other note which appears a little singular by virtue of making a closed linear entry into silence. It seems to me that precisely because of this singularity a sustained singing of *ni* (as such) is perhaps better able to evoke a semblance of engrossment than a resting of voice at one of the 'open' *svaras*. As for *re* (as such), specially where it is *komal* or nearer to *ṣaḍaj* (than its 'pure' colleague), its little incline which does not (as a rule) appear to cleave silence, makes it admirably suited to produce a suggestion of gentle emergence of sound from within its melodic neighbour, *ṣaḍaj*. This is probably the reason why quite a few morning *rāgas* build on the *komal ṛṣabha* to make the music chime with the image of sunrise.

Here, however, a question may well be put. Am I justified in giving so much attention to *saragamas* (or patterns of note-names)? Have

they actually distinguished the singing of any eminent vocalist? Yes, I can straight away refer to at least two vocalists of repute: first, the late Ustad Amān Ali Khan of Bhendi Bazar and Ustad Ali Bux Khan (Bade Ghulam Ali's father) who specialized 'in singing intricate *sargamas*'.[6] Further, a devoted practice of *merkhaṇḍ paltā*-s (patterns of varying disposition of *note-names*) is generally thought to make an essential part of a classical vocalist's initial training. Some *paltā*-s can be of such vital importance that they may have to be practised assiduously for one whole year.[7] Note-*names*, we may note, enable us to *identify* the sonant character of a *svara* (even as names assist us in identifying people) *and* its location in the scale. And this is extremely important. Note-names as such are of course not the same thing as *tānas*; but unless their places in the scale are identified and held on to through long and devoted *riyāja* (or practice), their occurrence in the run of *tānas* is bound to be off-key and so to lose colour.

However, yet another doubt may disturb us. Why do I speak of the *sound* (of note-names) entering into silence, implying that silence is the matrix of sound? Why shouldn't one speak rather of silence creeping into the region of sounds? To questions such as these my ready answer is that I realize the validity of the alternative suggested; that, later in the essay, I will myself have to argue that without the entry of quiet moments into actual or visualized sounds we can have neither the composition or performance, nor even the contemplation of music as art; and that silence must *yet* be regarded as the matrix of sounds. The reason why I insist on the primacy of silence simply is that whereas we can surely have fair periods of silence quite without sounds, we just cannot have sound without silence (as environment). Sound is an event; it happens; it emerges as a passing overlay of silence; acquires its character, as already illustrated, partly because of how it appears against the background of silence; and obviously re-enters the region of quiet when it ends.

However, before we proceed further one more question, arising from what has been said about *saragams*, may be put and discussed. If the singing of the very basic material of vocal music—that is, the note-names—includes two sounds, *re* and *ni*, which are not really open, how can the norm of *śuddha ākāra*, by which we generally mean that the

musical use of voice should appear natural or uncontrived and *quite unconstricted* besides being sweet, be said to be essential to—or even preservable (specially as *open*) in—actual singing? By common consent, it was the *ākāra* of Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan (besides that of some others whom I cannot recall at the moment) which could be said to be a model; it indeed was sweet, luminous, without any creases within or rough edges at the periphery. What is more, he would even revel in singing *tāra* swaras majestically in a perfectly open *ākāra*. But did not the *text* of some of his songs contain letters including ओ, ए, and ई sounds? Consider, for instance, his following *drut* composition in *rāga āsāvrī*:

अब भई भोर नहीं आए लालन
मैं तो सगरी रैन जागी[8]

Therefore, a *consistent openness* cannot be said to be demanded by the norm of *śuddh ākāra*. Take, again, the criterion of *naturalness*. Did our maestros like Ustad Faiyaz Khan and Pandit Kumar Gandharva use their voices in really as natural a way as an average and untutored man, yet with a flair for sweet singing does? Is sheer naturalness of manner unquestionably preferable to an aesthetically cultivated way of musical utterance? Can it ever be binding on a painter to keep his colouring continually bright and every detail of his works perfectly open to perception? Does any material or element quite retain its own independent character in the organic form of a complete work of art? To all such questions our genuine *rasikas* may be expected to say *no*. I therefore suggest that the only meaning which can be fairly given to the norm of *śuddh ākāra* in classical singing is that the vocalist's utterance should be all along pleasing to the ear, and that *ākāra* has to be cultivated to this overriding end, without letting it *appear* merely contrived and so a source of displeasure. In the wholeness of singing and listening, indeed, even the involvement of silence is far from being uniform. This should become clear as we turn to consider the place of silence in the creation (as composition), performance, inner run, and appreciation of music.

Take *creation* (as composition), to begin with. The details of the ways in which composers create music are, in principle, infinite; and

all that we may do as required by our present purpose is to make the following simple points. First, a more or less quiet environment is generally quite as necessary for *composing* music as for intense thinking. But, secondly, for proper pursuance of the task in hand one has also to put aside all such thought and concerns as are likely to disturb the act of creation. See, here, the following from Beethoven:

> All genuine [musical] invention ... [requires one] to submit to its inscrutable laws, ... to overcome and control one's own mind, so that it shall set forth the revelation that is the isolating principle of art.[9]

In respect of this extract two distinct points may be made. First, though as an outer fact silence may well be taken as mere absence of noise, there is an inner calm too which issues from a kind of self-gathering, a positive control of irrelevant thoughts and impulses; and which seems to be an essential pre-requisite for focusing duly on the creative activity at hand. It may not be quite serene, because it is at once instinct with the readiness to begin what one is so keen about; but at the same time, as disengagement from ones practical concerns, it is positive enough to steady one for the work ahead; and so is felt as a calm, if short-lived and not really absolute. I think it is more or less similar to the state of a vocalist who finds himself seated on the stage and is all set to begin singing the moment the compere finishes his work of introducing the artist and the music to come.

Second, a distinction may be made between the 'laws' and the *process* of creation. The controlling forces of art creation are various. Any compulsive impression in the present or poignant reminiscence can trigger off the act of creation; and there is much to support Beethoven's view that the laws of creation are 'inscrutable' or hard to determine. Even Wagner, who is perhaps the most verbal of all the great composers 'wrote about everything under the sun ... except composition', probably because 'the music rose to his pen [for notation] from levels deeper than anything that even he could verbalize.'[10] Yet, in respect of the process, as distinguished from the 'laws' (or principles) of creation, one remark may be made with certainty. As Coleridge pointed out long ago, the creative process is an alternation of two impulses, the impulse to create and the impulse to contemplate. Indeed, cases where the process

of creation is literally continuous are extremely rare; and in most cases there are frequent intervals, at times covering a lapse of two or three years (as in the case of Kumar Gandharva),[11] when the artist just quietly mulls over the part which has been completed with a view to determine what it itself demands as the next step. And this aesthetic demand may be quite unforeseen. This happened, for instance, with Tagore when he found that the very marks and lines with which he sought to correct and improve the ongoing course of his poems admitted of being turned into aesthetically significant designs. Be that as it may, the noteworthy point here is that the moments of contemplation which intermit the creative process may well be regarded as silences in the sense of suspension of active making.

However, it is only in the actual run of music that the role of intervening silence is perfectly clear. When we witness a good play of the traditional kind, absorption (*tanmayī bhāvanā*) is secured, as Bharata would say, by an integration of many factors, of which *abhinaya*, specially as *vācikā* and *āṅgikā*, is importantly one. Such aesthetic resources are not available to music. To elicit absorption it has to rely on some quite different factors, such as sweetness of tone, the recurring cycle of rhythm, and the organized and distinct melodic character of the *rāga* being sung. But whereas, as notated, a *rāga* simply leaves a little empty space between the different *svaras*, when it assumes the living form of singing the space which separates—and interlinks—the different *svaras* or *svara-samūhas* (tonal phrases) has to be filled either with the help of glides (*mīṅḍa*) or regulated *silences*. In actual singing, we may note, these privations of sound are no mere vacuity; they are effective invitations to both the singer and the listener to *ideally hold on to* the flow of *rhythm*, even as it runs *unmarked* on the drums *between* the different *mātrās*, as also to the form of the *rāga* even where it is not audibly manifest (or actually heard), exemplifying what phenomenology speaks of as 'constitution' by the contemplator. This ideal holding on to the music (and rhythm) is contemplation and what not only allows but invites it to rise and run as a confluence is deft interposition of silence, besides of course the charm that is intrinsic to melody and rhythm. How these quiet intervals relate to the singer and the listener *differently* has, however, to be brought out.

The performing vocalist gets a little time not only to tune himself anew to the ongoing rhythm as marked by the drummer, but to visualize and even visibly cherish the next melodic step. This indeed is why a classical singer is occasionally seen swaying his head serenely even where there is no actual singing. Even generally, the very logic of creation in art (as performance) makes such silences necessary. On the one hand, we may note, the act of art-making is not the directed pursuit of a clearly *pre*determined (ultimate) end. Yet, on the other hand, it is not a random activity either, because every onward step in the creative process *is determined* by (what appears to the singer as) the aesthetic demand of what has just been accomplished. This is precisely what distinguishes such activity from indulgence in a mere reverie where the subject just lets himself float over fanciful images or ideas as *they* suggest each other without any attempt on *his* part to actively subject their run to norms of consistency or probability. Now the performing musician's contemplation of what he has just completed with an eye to determine its aesthetic lead is (here too) a momentary suspension of active singing and so an interval of silence, if a little tense and uneasy, because of the implicit urge to proceed.

Here, before we turn our attention to how the subject of this essay relates to *listeners* at a concert, let us see how silences in fact vary according to situations we find ourselves in. Where we are stunned momentarily into silence by the quite unexpected news of a dear ones death, everything around seems to come to a halt; our impulses too appear to freeze; and it is only a little later that open grieving may animate us into feeling alive once again. On the other hand, the silence that fills the act of getting set—say, at the blocks—to face the competitive challenge of a race is at once a felt, tight focusing on the task ahead. Yet another kind of silence—falling, so to say, midway between the two we have just distinguished—is provided by a poet's quiet communion with beautiful objects of nature. As a *wise* passiveness it is quite ready to register impulses 'from a vernal wood' (Wordsworth), and so is by no means numb; at the same time it is quite without any feeling of tenseness. It is this last kind of silence which comes pretty close to the *rasika's* state as he just waits, after the compere's prefatory remarks, for the singer to open the *rāga* 'announced'. But though this

has to be the pervasive tenor of his silence throughout the recital, it may well be relieved at times by impressions of different kinds. A meteoric, yet beaded (दानेदार) *tāna* from Bade Ghulam Ali Khan may just *dazzle* the listener's contemplative calm with sonority; a pattern of yearning effulgence from Kumar Gandharva may make our silence swell with a sense of high seriousness, and so provide an illustration in music of what may perhaps be called (following Kant) a look of dynamical sublimity, or of what Plotinus meant when he spoke of art as a kind of 'metaphysical homesickness'; and the recurring moments of quintessential fineness in Rahimuddin Khan Dagar's *ālāpa* may just deepen the listener's quiet into a felt tranquillity of spirit which is deeper than the charms of mere outer ornament.

Notes and References

1. This essay appears in *Reflections on Art*, edited by Susanne K. Langer, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 2nd Printing 1960, pp. 102–21.
2. Harold Osborne, *The Art of Appreciation*, OUP, 1970, pp. 34–5.
3. See, here, the following: '... Is not speed normally *opposed to* contemplation? ... Incidentally the Oxford Dictionary ... *pace* Winterbourne ... gives "contemplation" as *opposed* to active'. David Best's essay, 'Reply to My Critics' in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 1983, p. 158.
4. *Reflections on Art*, p. 26 of the essay, 'Art and Feeling' by Otto Baensch.
5. Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Act I, Speeches 10, 11.
6. Malti Gilani and Quratulain Hyder (eds.) *Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan: His Life and Music*, Harman Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003, p. 7.
7. Ibid., p. 29.
8. Ibid., p. 188.
9. Cited by Susanne K. Langer in her book, *Feeling and Form*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 3rd Impression, 1963, p. 31.
10. Peter Kivy, *Music Alone*, Cornell University Press, 1st printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 1991, pp. 103–4.
11. Ashok Vajpeyi (ed.), *Kumar Gandharva*, Rajkamal Prakashan, New Delhi, 1st edition, 1982, p. 196.

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Agenda for Research

The demand for 'practicality' and 'usefulness' is there everywhere these days and so in order to be accepted one has to have an 'applied' dimension to philosophy and thus 'prove' that it is as 'relevant' and 'useful' as other fields of knowledge which generally do not have to 'prove' their usefulness in the contemporary context.

One of the promising areas in this regard would be to study the interaction between the theoretical study of ethics in general and values in particular and 'actual' legal enactment and practices on the other.

Law is as 'applied' as anything can be, and the changes in it can be 'seen' as reflecting the value-apprehensions of a particular society in time. The same could be attempted in respect of written constitutions which have 'constituted' polities and a comparative study in this regard of the presuppositions involved in the constitutions could be revealing about the thinkers of those societies which have constituted their polity according to them.

The amendments in the constitutions over time and the discussion and debate regarding them in the legislatures and at the apex court could provide rich material in this regard.

Jaipur

Daya Krishna

Focus

1. Kant's *Science of Right* is perhaps the least known amongst his works, yet it provides the transition from the *Critique of Practical Reason* to his work on *Perpetual Peace* where he is concerned with the problem of transcending the state of 'nature' in which 'sovereign states' find themselves in a state of perpetual conflict towards some sort of 'living' in a 'supra-national' 'juridical' system on the pattern provided by the civil juridical system he has formed for peaceful living in a civil society.

The relation between the 'sense of duty' or 'the categorical imperative' which constituted, for Kant, the 'moral being' of man has to be translated into the notion of 'right' with the complementary notion of 'obligatoriness' in a civil society where the 'freedom' of each is conditioned by the recognition of the 'freedom' of the 'other' and, thus, creating a 'world' where the notion of 'mine' is related intrinsically to the notion of 'thine', resulting in a 'world' based on the category of 'reciprocity' under the heading of 'Relation' as given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The essence of the relation between 'free' beings is, thus, strangely and paradoxically, seen in what has been called '*svatva*' in the Indian tradition and which Kant calls '*possessio noumenon*' (p. 407) to distinguish it both from *actual* physical possession on the one hand and 'empirical' legal 'right' of possession on the other, which he calls '*possessio phenomenon*'. This provides the *a priori* formal precondition of the possibility of the moral being of 'man' in society and derives from the fact that both the 'sense of duty' and the 'categorical imperative' imply a reference to the 'other' whose reality, however, gets established as an independent 'free' being only through the notion of 'right' or that which is 'mine' which, in turn, cannot make sense without the acceptance on the part of the 'other' to respect it and even actively help in seeing that it is secured for me.

The following observation from *The Science of Right* may be helpful in understanding this strange and unfamiliar turn in Kant's thought in this connection:

> The conception of a purely juridical possession is not an empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time, and yet it has practical reality. As such it must be applicable to objects of experience, the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions of space and time. The rational process by which the conception of right is brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a possible external mine and thine, is as follows. The conception of right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be *immediately* applied to objects of experience, so as to give the conception of an empirical *possession*, but must be applied directly to the mediating conception, in the understanding, of *possession* in general; so that instead of physical holding (*detentio*) as an empirical representation of possession, the formal conception or thought of *having*, abstracted from all conditions of space and time, is conceived by the mind, and only as implying that an object is in my power and at my disposal (*in potestate mea positum esse*). In this relation the term external does not signify existence in *another place* than where I am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer to a thing; it signifies only an object *different* from or other than myself. Now the practical reason by its law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in accordance with the laws of freedom. For it is only a *conception of the understanding* that can be brought under the rational conception of right. I may therefore say that I possess a field, although it is in quite a different place from that on which I actually find myself. For the question here is not concerning an intellectual relation to the object, but I have the thing practically in my power and at my disposal, which is a conception of possession realized by the understanding and independent of relations of space; and it is *mine*, because my will, in determining itself to any particular use of it, is not in conflict with the law of external freedom. Now it is just in abstraction from physical possession of the object of my free-will in the sphere of sense, that the practical reason wills that a rational possession of it shall be thought, according to intellectual conceptions which are not empirical, but contain *a priori* the conditions of rational possession. Hence it is in this fact, that we found the ground of the validity of such a rational conception of possession (*possessio noumenon*) as a principle of a universally valid *legislation*. For such a legislation is implied and contained in an expression, 'This external object is *mine*', because an obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it, who would otherwise not have been obliged to abstain from the use of this object.[1] (p. 407).

2. Mathematics, from the time of Plato and Pythagoras, has been considered to be a type of knowledge which is not only 'universal' and 'necessary', but also something which is known by an exercise of pure reason *without* any reference to sense experience. It is thus supposed to be the standard example of a 'knowledge' which is not only about 'something' which is essentially 'non-empirical' in nature but also which is necessarily true of that which is known by sense-experience just because of this fact. It is true that there is such a thing as 'applied mathematics' but, to the extent that it is so, it is also considered to be only 'approximately correct' because of its application to empirical reality. No one tries for an empirical verification of mathematical knowledge as its purely formal deductive character has been widely accepted. Even those who have argued for its character as 'social construction' do not demand empirical verification for its 'statements' as is usually the case with other sciences.

It may, therefore, come as a surprise to all those who have accepted this that 'experimental solutions' of mathematical problems have been attempted in recent times. The following is one such example:

'*Experimental Solution of Minimum Problems: Soap Film Experiments*'[2] (p. 385).

In many cases, when such an existence proof turns out to be more or less difficult, it is stimulating to realize the mathematical conditions

of the problem by corresponding physical devices or rather, to consider the mathematical problem as an interpretation of a physical phenomenon. The existence of the physical phenomenon then represents the solution of the mathematical problem. Of course, this is only a plausibility consideration and not a mathematical proof, since the question still remains whether the mathematical interpretation of the physical event is adequate in a strict sense or whether it gives only an inadequate image of physical reality. Sometimes such experiments, even if performed only in the imagination, are convincing even to mathematicians (p. 386).

The idea of considering 'the mathematical problem as an *interpretation* of physical phenomena' is thus not as absurd as it might seem at first sight. The existence of the physical phenomenon in this perspective '*represents*' the solution of the mathematical problem.

Here the relation between mathematics and physics or 'empirical reality' is reversed and the former is seen as merely an explicated representation of the latter. This perhaps, is a reversion to the 'original' situation in which mathematics had actually arisen in the 'measuring' and 'counting' processes from which it is supposed to have 'freed' itself long ago when the Greeks reflected on it. The wheel seems to have returned to the original position but, in the meantime, mathematics has encountered 'infinities' which it would be difficult to accept as '*actually existing*' in nature.

Notes and References

1. *The Critique of Pure Reason*; *The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Treatises*; *The Critique of Judgement* by Immanuel Kant, The University of Chicago, 1952.
2. *What is Mathematics? An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods* by Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins, revised by Ian Steward, OUP, New York, 1996.

Jaipur Daya Krishna

Notes and Queries

1. What is the distinction between *anirvacanīyatva* of Advaita Vedānta and *avaktavya* of Jain thinkers?

2. Are there different types of *anirvacanīyatā* in Advaita Vedānta? If so, what is the distinction between *anirvacanīyatā* of *Māyā* on the one hand and *Avidya* on the other, as both of these form the *anirvacanīyatā* of Brahman in case it is considered to be so.

Jaipur Daya Krishna

Book Reviews

M.D. SRINIVAS: *Measurements and Quantum Probabilities,* University Press, Hyderabad, 2000, pp. 272, Rs 200

The book by Professor M.D. Srinivas presents to a specialized group of readers a nice exposition on the recent advancements in the field of foundational aspects of quantum mechanics—a subject of great importance in the context of modern theoretical physics. The contents of the book cover four major themes, which are of immediate concern to a researcher in the field. The first theme deals with the probabilistic structure of quantum theory; the second with the hidden variable formulation of quantum theory; the third with the famous collapse postulate to observables with continuous spectra, and the fourth and the most important one deals with the quantum theory of continuous measurements. The last theme is important mainly because it is the process of measurement for which one comes closer to experiments/apparatus and there is a maximum scope of exploring the role of consciousness (or that of essences of life of a human being) in the scientific domain, if at all it is there. Once the consciousness creeps into the scientific domain it might open a Pandora's box of problems for a philosopher of science. All the four themes are discussed in great detail in the book in a rigorous mathematical language. A beautiful introduction to these topics, of course with a limited philosophical linkage, can be found in Chapter 1 and also in the introductory sections of various chapters.

After reviewing the progress made in these themes in Chapter 1, the probabilistic structure of quantum theory is discussed in Chapter 2. An entropic formulation of uncertainty relations and their role in the case of successive measurements is then presented in Chapter 3.

The framework of hidden variable theories introduced in Chapter 4 is later discussed in detail with reference to local causality and Bell's theorem in Chapters 5 and 6. While a new proof of Bell's theorem is presented in Chapter 5, the incompatibility of these theories with regard to the interpretation of mixed states has been discussed in Chapter 4.

The collapse postulate for observable with continuous spectra and its possible generalization are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 presents the case of a general law for quantum mechanical joint probabilities. In this connection the generalized Born statistical formula for any set of mutually compatible observables, Wigner formula for the joint probabilities for successive observations of observables with a purely discrete spectrum are highlighted.

Under the last theme, after introducing the photon counting probabilities in quantum optics in Chapter 9, the classical and quantum theories of dead time corrections to photon counting statistics are discussed respectively in Chapters 10 and 11. Finally, the quantum theory of continuous measurements and its applications in quantum optics are beautifully reviewed in Chapter 12. In this context, after presenting a survey of the inadequacies of the quantum Mandel formula, the cases of quantum counting formula of Chmara and the photon emission process with reference to quantum jumps are discussed.

The book is basically a collection of several research papers of original nature published by Professor Srinivas in journals of international repute over a period of 25 years and more. No doubt the book adds a lot to the foundational aspects of quantum mechanics, yet it somehow does not come up to the expectations of a professional philosopher or even a philosopher of science. It is true that these are the disciplines of quantum mechanics (from the point of view[1] of measurement problem vis-à-vis wave-particle duality or the collapse postulate for that matter), theory of relativity (from the point of view[2] of space time structure in nature), and dynamical systems (from the point of view of human behaviour in terms of the role of essences of life vis-à-vis nonlinear phenomena[3]) in which one can freely explore to a maximum the role of the physics-philosophy interface in understanding nature. Clearly the book focuses only on the first topic and that too, in my opinion, not so much to the taste of philosophers. To qualify the latter conclusion several reasons can be advanced.

(i) There has been considerable discussion in the literature on the philosophy of the subject of quantum mechanics, even by the originators of the subject themselves such as E. Schrodinger, J. von Neumann,

E.P. Wigner and others. However, not much linkage with their works has been discussed in the book, particularly in the philosophical spirit.

(ii) The main difficulty with the book is that the language of rigorous mathematics is used throughout with which, I am sure, most philosophers (except those who come from a highly specialized theoretical physics background) are least familiar.

As a matter of fact the basic difference[4] between the training of a philosopher and that of a scientist comes in handy in appreciating a book such as the one by Professor Srinivas. A philosopher tries to understand the finite (outer world) by an infinite inner (as far as the development of the inner essences of life is concerned) whereas a scientist tries to understand an infinite (outer world) by a finite inner (in terms of a limited set of well defined rules/axioms based mainly on the objective reality in nature).

Thus, in the absence of some philosophy-based chapters in the book, the utility of the latter remains pretty much focused/directed only to the scientists (and that too to the specialized ones) alone and a specialized theoretical physicist among readers is definitely going to be benefited by this package. Hopefully, the author will take care of these points in the next edition.

Notes and References

1. See, for example, Jagdish Mehra, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature* (ed.) D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973.
2. See, for example, Roberto Torretti in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (ed.) by E. Craig, Vol. 8, (1998), p. 199; Vol. 9 (1998), pp. 66–70.
3. See, for example, 'Nonlinear Dynamics in Human Behaviour', *Study of Nonlinear Phenomena in Life Sciences*, Vol. 5, (ed.) by W. Sulis and A. Comb (World Scientific, Singapore, 1996).
4. Radhey Shyam Kaushal, *Structural Analogies in Understanding Nature*, Anamaya Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, Chapter 1.

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ARAL JHINGRAN: *Ethical Relativism and Universalism*, Motilal anarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 2001, pp. xiv + 385, Rs 95

lumanity is one. Societies, cultures and forms of life are different. Vhat about morality? Jhingran says that there is one 'universal moral-y, as distinct from separate moralities' (p. 208). She is so convinced f one universal morality that she thinks, 'not only do we share a ommon world, but we also share common ways of perceiving, think-ıg, and responding to the world' (p. 332). For her, neither morality or rationality is culture specific; both are cross-cultural. However, she oes not consider a cross-cultural morality the foundation of all pos-ible moralities. She is for universalism and cross-culturalism, not for oundationalism and, hence, does not bother about the foundations or oots of morality. Of course, as a sequel to her *The Roots of Religions*, The Roots of Moralities' could have been an apt title of this book but he present title is more justifiable. For the book explicitly contains arious arguments for and against each of the two themes, namely, elativism and universalism.

Jhingran provides a well-balanced discussion on ethical relativism nd universalism though she sides with and tries to develop a thesis in avour of universalism. Her thesis is that there is a minimum basic of niversal morality or, what she calls after Kurt Baier, 'the moral point of view'. The minimum basic of this moral point of view consists of ationality, universality, objectivity and over-ridingness. Jhingran counts hese as the fundamental features of the moral point of view. These asic features are certainly not the ultimate basis of every possible norality. These are the features on the ground of what Jhingran argues n favour of a possible cross-cultural morality. To what extent she ucceeds in presenting a convincing and original thesis, that all de-ends on the novelty and soundness of the arguments, which she presents o establish those fundamental features and the constitutive principles f 'the moral point of view'.

The book has eight chapters, four each on relativism and universalism. n relativism, two are expositional and two are critical. On universalism, ne is anti-relativistic and three are pro-universalistic. Chapter 1

(Cultural and Ethical Relativism) contains an exposition of ethical relativism through an explanation of cultural relativism, approval theories and institutionalism as three different grounds of ethical relativism. These are construed as the empirical grounds in the sense that these are more of the sociological and anthropological, less of the philosophical. Some non-empirical grounds can be found. The exposition of ethical relativism made in the second chapter (Positivism, Postmodernism and Ethical Relativism) is an exposition of these non-empirical grounds, the metaethical theories expressed through positivism and postmodernism. Chapter 3 (Cultural-Ethical Relativism: A Critique) is a critical assessment of the ethical relativism that springs from cultural relativism. The strength of the assessment depends on the strength of the arguments made by Moore, Hare, Stace and Taylor in this regard. In Chapter 4 (Relativism: Positivism and Postmodernism: A Critique) Jhingran takes up metaethical relativism for criticism.

The fifth chapter (Anti-relativist Trends: Realism and Universalism) sets the ground for objectivity and universality of the 'moral point of view'. Objectivity and universality have been further highlighted along with 'over-ridingness' of the 'moral point of view' in the sixth chapter (The Moral Point of View). The 'moral point of view' is a 'common framework within which moral discourse can be carried out cross-culturally' (p. 237). As a framework, it cannot be without its constitutive principles. According to Jhingran, 'the principles of impartiality, reversibility, equality and justice are constitutive of the moral point of view' (p. 238). In the sixth chapter, an attempt has also been made to explain and justify each of these constitutive principles. In the seventh chapter (Self and Others), Jhingran tries 'to argue that the moral subject or agent is probably the primary referent of all ethical discourse' (p. 291). The last chapter (A Rational Approach to Universal Morality) is basically meant to explain and justify that rationality is another fundamental feature of the moral point of view.

I consider the book an original attempt to establish a thesis of modest universalism. I may suggest the following general clues to make out Jhingran's modest universalism. (a) Modest universalism cannot be an absolute negation of relativism, nor can it be completely independent of Kantian absolute universalism. (b) It accepts the fact that there are

different societies and cultures but denies the idea that the plurality of societies and cultures ultimately determines the answers to ethical questions. (c) It holds that, from a moral point of view, a human being is just a human being irrespective of the society and culture it belongs to. No human being is superior or inferior to others so as to be considered good or bad for the same type of act for which others are not considered so. (d) A moral point of view is a common framework, a framework common to all social, cultural, institutional and subjective frameworks of morality. (e) To explain and justify this framework, one should say that there are certain fundamental features, constitutive principles and a rational justification of that framework.

The first chapter is of thirty-one pages but accommodates patches of thoughts of about forty thinkers. It includes Ladd, Sapir, Hume, Moore, Strawson, Searle, Rawls, Marx, Manheim, Durkheim, Weber, Stevenson and Harman. One may doubt the direct relevance of the issues discussed in this chapter to the main thesis of the book. But Jhingran should be credited for including the viewpoints of sociologists and anthropologists, which normally escape the attention of philosophers; and her discussion is definitely to be appreciated if one asks questions like what is origin of cultural relativism, how has it been developed, what are its different grounds, how is it distinguishable from ethical relativism? In answering the last question, Jhingran introduces the specific sense in which 'ethical' is understood. It sets up the ground for her 'moral point of view'. The sense of the ethical that Jhingran adheres to is the sense of 'ought' (of morality) that cannot be derived from 'is' (of sociology and anthropology). It is contrary to an ethical relativist's viewpoint that '"what is" *is* "what ought to be"' (p. 19). Jhingran maintains that, since cultural relativism is descriptive in nature and ethical relativism is normative, the former cannot be a defensible ground for the latter. The normative ingredient is not derivable from the descriptive.

One apparent inconsistency lurks in the first chapter. On pp. 19–20, Jhingran counts five theses of ethical relativism whereas, in p. 31, she counts three basic assertions of ethical relativism. Of course, the inconsistency may disappear if the concept of 'form of life' includes the concept of 'culture'. Jhingran does not clarify it and, in the book, there is no separate exposition of either of these two concepts.

Harping on the specific sense of 'ethical', Jhingran defends the meaning of the 'ethical' on metaethical grounds. For this, she needs to refute metaethical relativism. Prior to the refutation, she makes an exposition of it. She rightly observes that one 'cannot refute ethical relativism without first challenging metaethical relativism' (p. 34). Conceptual relativism or cognitive relativism upheld by postmodernism is a version of metaethical relativism. Positivism is another. The latter challenges the validity of ethical propositions and advocates the 'emotive theory of meaning' in ethics. The former challenges 'objectivity' and 'universality' of any ethical judgement through its theses of 'incommensurability' of frameworks and 'untranslatability of various languages' (p. 67). Starting with the two versions of emotivism (Ayer's and Stevenson's), Jhingran makes an attempt to include at least fifteen more philosophers' main theses to explain postmodernism *qua* conceptual relativism. Quine, Goodman, Rorty, Kuhn, Lakatos, Schweder, Feyerabend, Bloor, Hesse, Bernstein, MacIntyre, Peter Winch, Davidson, Gadamar and Habermas are the fifteen I have counted. Jhingran is fundamentally unjust to Quine. Her exposition of Quine's 'indeterminancy' may mislead one to think that Quine does not accept the fact that we translate sentences from one language to another. On the contrary, according to Quine, there can be alternative manuals of translations, not just one. But on no ground can we determine any one of the alternatives *the* correct one. This is one of the reasons for which Quine says that ontology is 'doubly relative', relative to a language and relative to a manual of translation by means of which the language is translated to its background language.

According to Jhingran, cultural relativism's theses like 'diversity thesis', 'dependency thesis', the thesis that culture is an integrated whole of interdependent parts and 'the thesis of internalism in judgement' are empirical. In Chapter 3, she tries to explain how ethical relativism 'does not follow from the empirical thesis of cultural relativism' (p. 75). For her, 'what *is* can never be the major premise in any argument that seeks to assert what *ought* to be' (p. 76). Given any culture, it has its integrity but, at the same time, it is not incommensurable. Plurality

of cultures does not guarantee their self-sufficiency or self-enclosed whole. She says, 'A closed culture, with a definite unique way of life and determinate standards of judgement, is an anthropological myth' (p. 105).

By 'metaethical relativism', she means 'any theory which seeks to understand and explain ethical judgement in such a way that makes ethical relativism true by definition' (p. 125). It makes every ethical discourse relative to culture, way of life or conceptual scheme. As a result, since every ethical judgement belongs to an ethical discourse, it makes every ethical judgement relative. Jhingran includes approbation theories, logical positivism and postmodernism under metaethical relativism. Against the approbation theories which 'say that whatever is approved in a society *is* right for its members' (p. 125), she makes a three-pronged attack. One, it is subject to Moore's 'open question'. Two, 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is'. Three, an approved system of morality is subject to rational-moral scrutiny. Against positivism, she argues that positivism is self-refuting, science need not be the ideal of every other discourse, and morality has cognitive content. Against postmodernism, she argues that incommensurability and untranslatability are mutually inconsistent, the scheme-content duality is untenable and implications of postmodernism cannot be acceptable to common sense and reason.

In the fifth chapter, objectivity is shown to be the common element in both epistemological and metaphysical realism. Further, Jhingran explains how that common element is no less found to be there in moral realism of ethical discourse; and, in an ethical discourse, universality and objectivity are shown to be complementary to each other. Only after going through the last three chapters, one can comprehend what exactly Jhingran is trying to get at. The discourse in which Jhingran's 'moral point of view' can figure is certainly a metaethical discourse. For she takes the moral point of view for a framework that subjugates all other frameworks, like cultural, social, and institutional.

Whatever the framework may be with its constitutive principles and fundamental features, if a group, society or institution is primarily responsible for the execution of the framework in the sense that it determines how, when and where the framework is to be used, then,

what ultimately determines an act to be ethical or unethical, morally good or bad, is the concerned group, society or institution. As a result, since plurality and diversity prevails over the groups, societies and institutions, the proposed moral point of view qua the framework cannot be cross-culturally valid. In Chapter 7, this is the rationale behind putting forth the self as the primary referent of every ethical discourse.

In the last chapter, Jhingran explains how self does not abrogate the moral laws with their universality and objectivity. They are prior to the self such that a moral law is either discovered or chosen by the agent. They are self-validating and, for a rational agent, it becomes obligatory to accept them. To explain a rational approach to morality, Jhingran has adopted arguments made by Baier, Singer, Kupperman, Perry and Wellman. However, she is not in complete agreement with them. Not to consider moral principles based on moral reasoning an abstract ideal and, at the same time, not to delimit rationality to a form of life or culture, she finds Habermas' 'communicative rationality' suitable to explain the status of moral principles which have objectivity, universality as well as rational justification.

Academically, the book reflects a sincere and serious effort for universalism in ethics. With more than one hundred philosophers being referred to, thoughts from east and west being looked into, it is an exploration into the factual, conceptual and spiritual realms of life in order to envisage some basic universal moral codes of conduct. An assessment of this exploration demands an acquaintance with a great many thinkers' writings, from sociology, anthropology, modern western philosophy, analytic philosophy, postmodernism, Indian philosophy and, of course, ethics. But, given Jhingran's superb style of presentation, it is not at all a difficult book to read and grasp the ideas expressed in it. I think it can attract scholars from every subject mentioned above. The best thing about the book is that it is an unbiased evaluation of both relativism and universalism.

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RAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH: *Philosophy: Modern and Post-modern*, Om Publications, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 164

Professor Raghavendra Pratap Singh is a distinguished leader of the Group of Philosophy (JNU), author of many books and had a distinguished career in the university. The second edition of his book on *Philosophy: Modern and Post-modern* is a sort of Kantian-looking diatribe against post-modernism. For Raghavendra, such a defence is available on the basis of the distinction between phenomena and the noumena which, according to his reading, is roughly analogous to the pure and practical reason of Kant. *A fortiori*, 'freedom is a transcendental idea' (88). This is clearly a *non-sequitur*. I am at not at all sure whether any one of the interpreters of Kant will endorse this argument. His ultimate intention here is to fuse religion with science.

One must say that there must be something 'religious' in all the contemporary trends such as deconstruction, critical theory, and post-modernism. Consider for example, the deconstructive *differance* to God. According to this, the God-talk is deferred. More poignantly, what Raghavendra calls the dialectical dialogue will 'incorporate, sublate, and even transcend of the dialectic and dialogue' (151). Working like Habermas's notion of communicative action, it will 'incorporate all contradictions, oppositions, and differences between one culture and another'. 'Ones identity could thereby be shaped by the experience of other's identity' (ibid.). This is the beaten track of *Bhedābheda* multiculturalism (cf. J.N. Mohanty articulates it in a different context in a much more interesting way) which incorporates identity and difference. *Ekam Sat* meets the *Bhedābheda* Multiculturalism. Both seem to be vulnerable to attack (see A. Kanthamani *Ms.* for critical comments).

For many Indians, philosophy is to be identified with religion. So post-modernist stance against science is tantamount to a stance against religion. It is not the method that must be recovered but religion must somehow be glorified. Such is the purity of intention of the author that would be used against Foucault's characterization of the empirical-transcendental doublet. Such a post-structuralist stance, as opposed to structuralist Derrida, reminds us of the Cartesian dualism which is then to be valorized. What then are the wrongs of Foucault? Foucault levels

a charge against Descartes for the pure project of the Cogito and not the impure project of Madness. But one can counterpose this with Derrida's soft-pedaling: *I am mad or not, Cogito sum*. The reason is that both are flipsides of the same *Cogito*.

While literary writers like Thomas Eagleton talk about the 'illusions' of post-modernism, Raghavendra weighs post-modernism in the conservative style of Kant-Hegel scholarship, in the end defending it against Derrida's attack on transcendentalism and dialectic. His starting assumption is that both Kantianism and Hegeliansim lie at the centre of the Critical Theory and Post-modernism (159). For scholars like Norris, whom he quotes in his Preface, but does not include in the Index, Derrida should be treated as a Kantian philosopher. How he could reconcile the apparent opposition between the above extremes remains beyond comprehension. In the course of this he wants to build a case for what he calls multi-logue, based on his understanding of dialectical dialogue (a fusion of Hegel and Habermas) and uses it as the proxy for globalization with which he begins his diatribe against post-modernism. The whole argument is developed over a period of many years in many of his previous contributions. On the whole, this book intends to look at the three streams of post-modernism, deconstruction and critical theory and how the relation could be understood. The addition of the critical theory in the second edition, after a period of five years (Chapter 5), must be intended to complete the map of the relation between them (the first edition was published in 1997). No such relation emerges from what is engaged in the book.

Instead he turns to deride the post-modernists' craving or nostalgia for the *adṛṣṭa*. Such a test inevitably foists the religious element on the *adṛṣṭa* by calling it the unseen, unmanifested instead of bemoaning the loss of method. Thus no balanced assessment arises in his treatment. He warns the post-modernists not to look for this *adṛṣṭa*. Globalization is only a sop not because it opens us up to others, but because it gives us a distinct identity. His account of multiculturalism engages the reverse gear to retreat into that which is distinct in Indian traditions. The celebrated ex-President of the World Council of Churches gave the figure in his Foreword. He uses the *Sāṁkhya* category to paint post-modernist craving for the unformed. The post-modernists are against

theory, metanarratives, representation, against any universal standards. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether they also crave for that which they cannot attain.

Professor Raghavendra's book does not so much aim to reduce post-modernism to this negative level but positively also to the level of uniculturalism thus bordering on fascism. He shares a motif saying that 'globalization technologically does not prevent local identities' (39). For many social theorists in India, multiculturalism is just a convenient label for uniculturalism called *Ekam sat*. Multiculturalism takes a back seat. Modernism, argues the author, is something like the languishing of the Kantian reason, the reason of the Enlightenment, as Kant himself has realized in his 'What is Enlightenment?'. Let us turn our backs to it. This is the *Walspruch* (motto), he gathers from Kant. It is time to surrender, modern or post-modern, obviously to Yin-Yang or religion so as to detoxify us from the modernism. This is the 'key' with which he opens up the relation of modernism and post-modernism.

The picture that I painted above is not foisted but it is glaringly there in the book. Science is not the standard. Hegel's poser to Kant is: by what categories of enlightenment do we establish the categories of sensibility and understanding? Nāgārjuna posed the same question eighteen centuries before Hegel: by what *pramāṇas* do we establish the *pramāṇaśāstra*? By what canons do we formulate the canons of science? Nāgārjuna's cynicism decks much of Raghavendra's quest for post-modernism. Having said this much, he smoothens Derrida's stance for post-structuralist philosopher of language to get back his Descartes.

The next step is to counterpose Kant's idealism to Newton's realism, to get back his Kant-like transcendentalism. Similarly Foucault's critique of transcendental-empirico doublet, seen in his critique of Descartes's exclusion of madness, must be counterposed to Derrida's recovery of the Cogito whether mad or not and attains its full fruition in Kant's ideal. We must gain back the noumenon since it is the sphere of faith and morality (83). The procedure gets methodically complete by defending Hegelian aufgehoben (sublation of opposites), against the Derridean or even Lyotardian thrust, so as to pave the way for the penultimate fusion with Habermas's theory of communicative action. Habermas, argues the author, is a 'synthesis of Kantian apriorism and

Hegelian dialectic' (150). Derrida can forego the teleology but he has to retain the horizontal 'dialectic'. Derridean phenomenology is a phenomenology with ruptures with which he critiques Hegel's theory of semiology (118). Hegel and Derrida occupy a semiological continuum. In a similar vein, both Adorno, Marcuse and Horkheimer also endorse a dialectical view, that makes his task easier. Like many American writers, like Richard Bernstein, and Chris Norris (UK), Raghavendra's approach also underwrites the *aufgehobonist* motif but at a heavy price (the sublationary motif is under attack in A. Kanthamani, 2000). Because he never reviews their works in his book. Thus one is left with an impression that the book is not yet complete. A similar fate envelops many a potential author in India. They rush to print before settling on anything which could be defended against attack.

The book is written with verve and with a great deal of clarity, and the author is to be congratulated for this. But will our students ever learn the stuff of the ideas from this? They may not. I have spotted the weakness of the main line of argument.

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Shashi Prabha Kumar: *Facets of Indian Philosophical Thought*, Vidyanidhi Prakashan, Delhi, 1999, pp. viii + 168, Rs 300

This book under review is the collection of twelve essays by Shashi Prabha Kumar that covers a wide range of topics on Indology, starting from the Vedas down to the different schools of Indian philosophy. The first five essays deal with diverse topics of Vedic thinking and the

rest of the essays deal with topics relating to Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā. The appendix is devoted to the contribution of Sri Goda Subrahmanya Sastri, a contemporary Indian philosopher from Andhra Pradesh to the enrichment of Indian philosophy in the fields of Advaita and Nyāya. In the first essay, 'Vedic View of Life and Society', the author portrays the Vedic society as one which abounds in happiness and prosperity by citing a large number of passages from the Vedas. In the second essay, 'Vedic Philosophy of Education', she highlights the Vedic Ṛṣi's integral vision of the reality which emphasizes the knowledge of the transcendental reality (*parā-vidyā*) rather than the relative reality, i.e. the day-to-day world. She discusses certain important terms like *Śikṣā*, *Svādhyāya*, *Pravacana*, *Upanayana*, *Brahmacarya* and the like to elucidate the nature of education during that period. The Vedic ideal of education was not only to prepare a person to face life but to proceed from the state of lower knowledge to higher knowledge culminating in the highest knowledge, the knowledge of the Self.

The third essay deals with a topic of contemporary importance, i.e., 'Indian Feminism and Vedic Thought'. In this, the author tries to place feminism in perspective by comparing the status of women in modern India vis-à-vis those in the Vedic period. She relates the Vedic history to the problems of feminism and tries to see how the Vedic world-view of women can serve as an alternative model to achieve greater dignity and self-determination for women. She opines that the Western aggressive feminism is not the ground reality in India and suggests that we need to draw upon the Vedic corpus to tackle the problem. The examples of Gārgī and Maitreyī, the concept of Puruṣa and Prakṛti in which Prakṛti has a pre-eminent position, and Ardhanārīśvara symbolism of the eternal union of Śiva and Pārvatī are presented to show the integral nature of man-woman relationship in Vedic society. She also points out factors like freedom to choose ones husband, the *Sāptapadī*, the idea of *Dampati* (both the owners of the house) and *Saṁrājñī* (empress of the house) in the *Āśīrvāda-mantra* in order to highlight the importance accorded to women. She lists a series of words used for woman in the Vedas to draw different connotations of woman's independence, strength and equal participation in the societal activities. Though the essay discusses the social problems, it does not translate the Vedic ideals into effective remedial measures for the maladies of today.

The fourth essay, i.e., 'Social Justice: A Vedic Perspective', deals with the concept of social justice in relation to the Vedic ideals. The essay discusses gender equality, class equality and economic equality in the Vedic age by analyzing the social milieu as found in the Vedas. The author states that Vedic society was founded on a just, duty-centric approach and accordingly the Varṇa-vyavasthā was based on choice of vocation in accordance with ones aptitude, and not on birth in a particular caste or class. As for economic equality, it was considered to be the duty of each citizen to see that all members of the society were fed as well as himself. Though the Vedic ideal of government is based on monarchical ideologies, the guiding ethics for the king did not leave room for any kind of anarchy. This is evident from the references like the court of the king being known as *dharma-sthāna*, *dharmādhikaraṇa* etc. showing the pre-dominance of ethical codes of conduct in the administration of justice. The Vedas, according to author, represent a fair picture of social justice, social integrity and cosmic harmony. There seems to be no place for inequalities and disparities. Shashi Prabha emphasizes social concord as the Vedic ideology rather than social justice.

The fifth essay deals with a topic of contemporary importance: 'Ecology and Conservation of the Eco-sphere'. It is discussed in the context of the *Bhūmi-sūkta* of the Atharva Veda. The author states that in the Vedic world-view, all life in the cosmos is inter-related and inter-woven and the process of transmutation and cyclic degeneration and regeneration of life is an accepted postulate. In the *Bhūmi-sukta*, this has been dealt with by the Vedic seers. *Bhūmi* represents the whole eco-sphere and the protection of this eco-home has been taken up as the primary duty of the human beings. This *sūkta* makes us feel that the Ṛṣi of this hymn considers the earth to be the centre around which everything revolves. Shashi Prabha shows her eco-concern in stating that in a world order that we are living in, we stand on the brink of an environmental disaster in a manner never before. In the name of development, man has not been careful to see the lurking danger facing his own habitat. In Vedic society, the sustenance of the ecological balance is regarded as the first and foremost duty of the man for evolving and maintaining a moral order of the world which is known as Ṛta. Even

the practice of *pañca-mahāyajña* is designed as an eco-conservation model for a householder reflecting his day-to-day concern for the world, sentient and insentient beings around him. The message is quite clear that man has to rethink the present concept of development in his role as the custodian of the present and trustee of the future. Atharvan echoes that responsibility in accordance with the eternal law of nature invoking the idea of *vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam*. The Vedic ideal of eco-religiosity is reflected in the Ṛṣi's proclamation that the earth is the mother and sky the father and we need to respect them for our prosperity and sustenance. But unfortunately even while the relation between the parents and their offspring has now touched an all-time low, so has the relation between man and the earth.

After dealing with these pertinent social issues as reflected in the Vedas, the author goes on to deal with the 'Vedāntic Foundations of Indian Culture' in the sixth essay. In this essay, she first defines what culture is and discusses its broader connotations. She says that the culture is space-time bound and attempts to highlight the foundational and universal elements of Indian culture. The cultural life of the Indian society owes its sustenance to the Vedas. She proclaims that Vedānta is the quintessence and culmination of Vedic thought (p. 72). Shashi Prabha has taken the meaning of the term 'Vedānta' as the 'end portion of the Vedas'. If that be the meaning, then the Upaniṣads like *Aitareya* cannot be brought under the fold of Vedānta since it occurs in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* which is in the middle portion of the Veda rather than at the end.[1] This, however, is only an observation in passing since her aim is not to discuss the meaning of the term Vedānta in this essay. The seventh essay contains a very scholarly discussion relating to the exposition of the witness self under the title '*Pratibodhaviditam* as *Sākṣī-caitanya*'. This essay is more textual and the author gives a set of prima facie meanings proposed by Śaṅkara in his commentary of the *Kenopaniṣad* where this line occurs. 'Matter, Mind and Motion in the Vaiśeṣika Pluralism' is the eighth essay in which she deals with the basic Vaiśeṣika categories to make them understandable to students and scholars alike. In the ninth essay, 'The Nature and Role of Adṛṣṭa in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy', Shashi Prabha analyzes the need for accepting Adṛṣṭa in Vaiśeṣika and the role it plays in giving us a metaphysical

and ethical dimension of this school. She shows how the concept has undergone change over time and has been accepted as a moral force in the karmic theory of the Hinduism. The tenth essay is '*Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*: Mīmāṁsā Critique of Buddhist Definition of Pramāṇa'. Much of the essay constitutes translation of the above text. The way the Prābhākara school looks at Dinnāga forms the crux of the analysis. The penultimate essay is titled 'Tarkapāda of *Śāstradīpikā*: An Analytical Study'. In this the author, apart from dealing with the epistemology of the Mīmāṁsā school, deals with the pre-eminent place the Mīmāṁsā philosophy attained in the scheme of philosophical enunciation. The final essay in this book is 'The Concept of *Vidhi* According to *Vidhi-viveka* of Maṇḍanamiśra'. The metaphysical dimension of the concept of *vidhi* is brought out along with its ethical dimension in this essay.

The appendix contains an interesting account of the scholarly contributions of the late Goda Subrahmanya Sastri, who must have been alive while the essay was written. The Paramacharya and present Acharyas of Kanchi Śaṅkara Maṭha patronized him. In this essay, Shashi Prabha shows how it is possible to have fresh and innovative thinking on the different schools of Indian philosophy citing the example of Sastri. In this context, mention may be made of Professor Daya Krishna who identified and unearthed such scholarship and interacted as an interlocutor with traditional scholars like Badarinath Sukla and others. The *Samvād*[2] edited by Daya Krishna and others is a product of such a dialogical exercise between traditional and modern scholars, which opens up newer vistas for research and exploration in Indian philosophy. The important contributions by traditional scholars in our times serve to dispel the notion that Sanskrit is a dead language and that, in the present philosophical scenario, nothing worthwhile is being written in Sanskrit.

As far as the author's analysis of the social problems is concerned, (in the first five essays), one may find the influence of the Aryasamajist ideologies propagated by Dayananda Saraswati. It is perhaps a welcome trend; a timely and progressive way of looking at the Vedas, rather than viewing them narrowly as texts propagating unhealthy practices relating to caste and gender. But it appears, the Aryasamaj movement, which can provide useful remedies to many problems we face

today in India, has become dormant and is confined to a few pockets in North India. It is hardly involved in national deliberations on social themes.

Apart from the lack of a unitary theme, which is not a major lacuna in a book of this nature, the author as well as the publisher have not taken sufficient care to edit the essays properly. Hanging sentences, a large number of mistakes in diacritic marks for Sanskrit words, and above all, the absence of bibliography and index of important words diminish the value of the work. The notes and references in each essay, though carefully chosen, are at places incomplete. Thus even though the book contains essays which have great research value, its production aspect leaves much to be desired. Though it is stated that some of the essays were published in philosophical journals, the details of the publications are not available.

It is pertinent in this context to note that the Western scholars of Indology usually complain that the books published in India at times lack these vital tools of research. This is one of the reasons why many books published in India, even though rich in contents and ideas, are rarely referred to by the Western scholars.

Leaving aside the above minor shortcomings, the book portrays the author's command to handle śāstric texts and her multifaceted scholarship. I sincerely feel that the book would be of immense help to scholars and lay readers alike in their attempt to understand the contemporary relevance of our Vedic wisdom and to appreciate the rich philosophical legacy which has come down to us in an unbroken tradition.

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79th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress (IPC)

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(iii) Associate Membership : Rs 100 (for students only)

REGISTRATION FEE

As Madurai is a busy tourist place, the delegates are requested to remit their registration fees in time to enable us to reserve comfortable accommodation for them. The fees for each member is given below:

On or Before 10th November 2004

Delegates	Rs 750
Students and Retired Professors	Rs 450

After 10th November 2004

Delegates	Rs 850
Students and Retired Professors	Rs 500
Local Delegates	Rs 350

The registration fee for children above 10 years is Rs 750.

There is no registration fee for children below ten years.

The registration fee should be sent by account payee DD, payable at Madurai, in favour of 'Dr R. MURALI, Local Organizing Secretary, 79th Session of IPC'.

Number of persons accompanying the delegates are also to be mentioned in the registration form and the payment is to be sent accordingly. The registration fee is refundable as per the norms circulated by the General Secretary, Professor S.K. Singh.

We would not be in a position to assist those delegates who send their registration fee late or arrive without prior registration. In such situations, they may need to pay higher costs for inferior accommodation. Also, there is no certainty that accomodation will be available.

The programme of the sessions and paper reading will be finalized in accordance with the prior information and registration sent by the delegates. Please, therefore, send these well in time. Delegates are requested to submit proof of their membership/studentship along with registration fees.

Delegates are requested to reach the Madura College (Autonomous) which is 2 kms from the railway station and 6 kms from the bus stand. Transport facility is available 24 hours at nominal rates.

Volunteers would receive and welcome the delegates at Madurai Railway Station and Bus Stand (Mattuthavani) from the morning of 15 December 2004.

For delegates who have sent their registration fee in time, the boarding and lodging facilities would be available from 10 a.m. on December 15, 2004 to December 20, 2004. The delegates are requested to make reservations for their journies on their own.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
ए,अे	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं)	ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ
ञ्	ñ
ण्	ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः)	ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not dja
ऌ	ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ன	ṉ
ழ	ḻ
ற	ṟ
ற	ṯ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Chola), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dāgaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḻevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.