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Contents

ARTICLES

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Constitution of Subjectivity of Self and Objectivity of Nature: A Brief Hermeneutical Study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*

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Kant lays down the foundation of modern technological dominance of nature by man in his *Critique of Pure Reason*[1] by constitution of subjectivity of self and objectivity of nature. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has shown that in mathematical natural science some thing *a priori* must be known.[2] In other words in this science something is fixed about the objects before they are given to us.[3] In Heidegger's words, 'This fixing which is *a priori* and free from experience—occurs prior to all experience—makes possible that these objects be given to us as what they are. These *a priori* fixings are *prior* to all experience and are valid *for all experience*, i.e., they make experience possible.'[4] Without this *a priori* fixing no science is possible. Kant states, 'I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*.'[5] For Kant the system of transcendental philosophy is metaphysics. Therefore without metaphysics no science is possible.

Kant writes, 'We have already defined the understanding in various different ways: as a spontaneity of knowledge (as distinct from the receptivity of sensibility), as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgements. All these definitions, when they are adequately understood, are identical. We may now characterize it as the *faculty of rules*. This distinguishing mark is more fruitful and comes closer to its essential nature.'[6] When we observe thinking *by setting aside thinking's reference to specific objects*, then we will discover rules which lie *a priori* in thinking itself and regulate its *general employment*. Such an investigation of the rules of the *general employment of understanding*

is to be distinguished from establishing the rules of a specific employment of understanding. The former task is the business of *general logic*. 'I understand by a canon the sum-total of the *a priori* principles of the correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge. Thus general logic, in its analytic portion, is a cannon for understanding, and reason in general; but only in regard to their form; it abstracts from all content.'[7]

However, in the introduction to the logic lecture Kant says, 'Logic is a science of reason, not with regard to the matter, but only the form. It is a science *a priori* of the necessary laws of thinking—not thinking in relation to specific objects, but thinking in relation to all objects in general. Thus it is a science of the correct employment of understanding and reason as such, not subjectively, i.e., according to empirical (psychological) principles by which understanding thinks, but rather objectively, according to principles *a priori* by which understanding ought to think.'[8] If general logic deals with the necessary laws of thinking 'with regard to all objects in general,' then how can he hold, 'General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general?'[9] The answer is that when Kant states that general logic is the science of necessary laws of thinking in relation to objects in general, this only means that it makes no difference which object is thus being thought and that we do not need to pay attention to thinking's *relation to objects*, although *this relation* belongs to it. Investigation of the rules of the element of object-relatedness involved in thinking is not the business of general logic. General logic ignores precisely *all kinds of object-relatedness* involved in thinking.

In contrast to general logic transcendental philosophy investigates this element of object-relatedness involved in Knowledge. Kant writes, 'I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*.'[10] Transcendental philosophy also does not investigate the element of object-relatedness in its entirety—rather it investigates only the mode of object-relatedness

with respect to its *possibility a priori*. What is this mode of object-relatedness involved in knowledge, which is investigated with respect to its *possibility a priori*? According to Kant, 'In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed.'[11] There are two modes of object-relatedness—immediate and mediated—involved in knowledge according to Kant. The immediate mode of object-relatedness is intuition and the mediated mode of object-relatedness is concept: both intuition and concept are *a priori* conditions of knowledge of objects. Kant writes, 'None the less the representation is *a priori* determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to *know* anything *as an object*. Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible; first, *intuition*, through which it is given, though only as appearance; second, *concept*, through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition.'[12] But transcendental philosophy is not concerned with all *a priori* knowledge, and hence it does not investigate intuition and concept in their entirety; rather it is concerned with the *a priori possibility* of intuition and concept. 'Not every kind of knowledge *a priori* should be called transcendental, but that only by which we know that—and how—certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely *a priori*. The term "transcendental", signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment.'[13] So we may infer that for Kant transcendental philosophy is concerned with the mode of object-relatedness with respect to its *possibility a priori*. In other words transcendental philosophy is concerned with *a priori ontological constitution of objectivity* or *the a priori foundation of the possibility of the object's standing over against the knowing subject* irrespective of the object known. So for Kant *transcendental philosophy* 'treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of objects that *may be given* (*Ontologia*)...'[14]

The *published Critique of Pure Reason*, which establishes the ground of the possibility of metaphysic of Nature, is not itself a metaphysic or

transcendental philosophy in finished form as a system of *a priori* principles. The first *Critique* lays out 'the entire plan [of metaphysic of nature] architectonically, i.e., from principles.'[15] It is for the sake of laying bare the ground of the possibility of synthetic judgements *a priori* alone—for the possibility of this synthesis—that whole *Critique* is undertaken.[16] Therefore, Kant states, 'It [the *Critique*] is a treatise on method, not a system of science itself.'[17]

The architectonic place of critique is explained by Kant in the following passage: 'The philosophy of pure reason is either a *propaedeutic* (preparation), which investigates the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure *a priori* knowledge, and is entitled *criticism*, or secondly, it is the system of pure reason, that is, the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason, and which is entitled *metaphysics*. The title "metaphysics" may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known *a priori* as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type—in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason.'[18]

Therefore, Kant has to solve two problems. He has to argue for the *a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in both the immediate object-relatedness and the mediate object-relatedness. He has to argue for the *a priori* possibility of pure (*a priori*) intuitions and concept.

For Kant space and time are the pure immediate object-relatedness whose *a priori* possibility is shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 'In the representations of space and time we have *a priori forms* of outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place at all. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves *intuitions* which contain a manifold [of their own], and therefore are represented with the determination of the *unity* of this manifold (*vide* the Transcendental Aesthetic).'[19] How is this *a priori* fixing of pure immediate object-relatedness possible? It is possible through the faculty of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of

synthesis. So for Kant space and time themselves involve synthesis, which is of a different nature than the synthesis involved in *a priori* concepts. 'Space, represented as *object* (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains *combination* of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only a manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated that unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simple in order to emphasise that it precedes any concept, although, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (cf. §24).'[20] How can synthesis 'not belong to sense' and yet synthesis is involved in the *a priori* forms of sensibility? It is possible because imagination is involved in sensibility. 'Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to *sensibility*.'[21] Synthesis is the function of imagination and not of senses.

How is *a priori* fixing of pure mediate object-relatedness possible? First, Kant in metaphysical deduction shows that this pure mediate object-relatedness is nothing but the pure (*a priori*) categories of understanding, which he discovers through analysis of the idea of judgement. 'Judgement is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgement there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. Thus in the judgement, "all bodies are divisible", the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearance that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility.'[22]

In case of man immediate object-relatedness is intuition, which is given through sensibility. But concept, which is mediate object-

relatedness in knowledge, is not given through sensibility—rather it is given through understanding. Pure concepts are given through pure understanding. What is pure understanding? 'Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from all that is empirical but completely also from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be increased by any additions from without.'[23] Kant calls this unity transcendental unity of apperception. 'The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself.'[24]

The transcendental unity of apperception involves pure concepts. But what is a concept for Kant? The concept is 'a *general* ... or a *reflected* representation'.[25] The concept 'is a general representation or a representation of what is common to several objects.'[26] Conceptual representation is 'a representation *insofar as it can be contained in several different things*.'[27] Kant now explains the object-relatedness involved in any concept. 'We must distinguish in each concept between *matter* and *form*. The matter of the concept is the *object*, while its form is *generality*.'[28] In the *Critique of Pure Reason* also he repeats the same point. 'We demand in every concept, first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general, and secondly, the possibility of giving it an object to which it may be applied.'[29] It must be noted that the idea of commonality also presupposes the idea of difference as that which is common is common to many things which are different from each other. 'A representation which is to be thought as common to *different* representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something *different*.'[30]

Now Kant raises the important question. In Kant's words, 'And here the question arises: *Which activities of understanding constitute a concept* or—the same thing—*belong to production of a concept from given representations*?'[31] It is the activity of reflection undertaken by understanding which gives rise to concepts of any kind as far as their form is concerned. 'This *logical* origin of concept—original only according to their form—consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to many objects (*conceptus communis*) emerges as that form

which is required by the power of judgement.'[32] What is reflection? Reflection is 'the deliberation of how various representations can be contained in one consciousness.'[33] For the generation of concepts we need two more functions of understanding, i.e. comparison and abstraction. 'In order to make concepts out of representations, one must be able to *compare*, *reflect*, and *abstract*. For these three logical operations of understanding are central and general conditions for the production of each and every concept.'[34]

But Kant makes an important observation on reflection as a function of understanding. '*Reflection* (*reflexio*) does not concern itself with objects themselves with a view to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations, to our different sources of knowledge; and only by way of such consciousness can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another be rightly determined.'[35] Reflection is not only a function of understanding that gives rise to concepts, but more importantly from the point of view of Kantian Project of providing foundation to the new technology, it constitutes the subjectivity of person, i.e., the person is subjectivised by reflection. A person becomes conscious of subjective sources of knowledge to which the representations are related.

Before reflection at the stage of receptivity of representation there is no subjectivization of man, in fact it is beyond subjectivity/objectivity. According to Kant, 'This {i.e., that an object is given to me} again is possible, to man at least, insofar as the mind [*Gemüt*] is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled *sensibility*. Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us *intuitions* ...'[36] What is *Gemüt*? Kant explains, 'For, of itself alone, the *Gemüt* is all life (the life principle itself), and hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in connection with his body.'[37] According to Howard Caygill, '*Gemüt* is one of Kant's most widely used terms, and is prevalent in the third *Critique*. It is commonly translated as "mind" or "mental state" although this is too restrictive a meaning: it denotes more a

"feeling". Kant describes it on occasion as the "feeling of the attunement of the representative powers" or as the "life principle itself". It is not "mind" as composed of the powers of sensibility, imagination, understanding and reason, but the position of these powers. This agrees with its original meaning in medieval mysticism, where it refers to the "stable disposition of the soul which conditions the exercise of all its faculties" (Gilson 1955, pp. 444, 758). It is helpful to compare *Gemüt* with the "mood" of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, that is, not as a subjective, psychological state, but as a way of being in the world.'[38]

Before reflection and subsequent synthesis 'Cognition and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would have it.'[39] What are the conditions of communication of cognition? Kant answers, 'But if cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e., the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise.'[40] Kant now relates this two-fold communication with synthesis. 'And this is always what actually happens where a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts.'[41] And now the communication is related to common sense. 'But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. However, there must be one in which this internal ratio suitable for quickening (one faculty by the other) is best adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally; and *this disposition can only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts)*. Since, now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, *the universal communicability*

of a feeling presupposes a common sense ...'[42] Finally Kant declares, '... but we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism.'[43] So the person at the stage of receptivity of representation is essentially a social being and not a person with a subjective point of view. In fact subjectivity is also constituted *a priori* along with the constitution of pure object-relatedness in knowledge.

What kind of being is he who can communicate his feelings? We will have occasion to see that for Kant, 'To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is quite a different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more, to its feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind (*Gemüt*) is conscious in the feeling of its state.'[44]

According to Kant no concept is involved in the aesthetic delight. He argues, 'The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general. Now a representation, whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a source of cognition at all, imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations.'[45] We have already seen according to Kant how imagination is the common root from which both sensibility and understanding emerge as two stems. He, who has imagination and capable of feeling delight, and who can communicate this feeling is the disinterested spectator who is not a subject with a subjective point of view but a person with a universal point of view of *sensus communis* (common sense). It is this non-subjective

person who camouflages his universal point of view through the *a priori* constitution of pure subjectivity and pure objectivity.

To return to the point where we were discussing the various functions of understanding involved in concept formation, we may say that reflection is more basic than the other two functions. Reflection brings into picture in advance the technically-practical interest of the subject to achieve his subjective ends whatever they may be in the context of concept formation. Comparison and abstraction is guided by this technically-practical interest brought in advance by reflection. Keeping this interest in view on the basis of reflection we can explicitly disregard 'the respect in which given representations are different'[46] on comparison. Reflection brings into view the technically-practical interest of the subject in achieving subjective ends, with regard to which the many representations are to be compared. Many representations are compared not only for noting the respect in which they differ so as to disregard it but also to render the unity transparent wherein the many as different agree with one another. But this aspect is not emphasized at this point as Kant has not yet brought in the function of synthesis of imagination involved with reflection. He will bring synthesis as the function of understanding later. Hence it makes sense why Kant deviates from the traditional usage of the term 'abstraction'. According to Heidegger, 'Traditionally, before Kant and again after Kant and still today, one uses the word *abstracting* to mean: abstracting from *something*, to put something aside, to remove something and to pull something out.'[47] But Kant cannot use the term abstraction in this sense since what is abstracted in this sense is the *unity wherein the many as different agree with one another* which is the function of synthesis of imagination, a function, which Kant has not yet introduced at this stage. It will emerge after the process of abstraction is over logically. Hence for Kant, 'The term *abstraction* is not always used correctly in logic. We are not supposed to say: abstracting *something* (*abstrahere aliquid*) but abstracting *from something* (*abstrahere ab aliquo*).'[48] The concept will be formed after the process of abstraction is over logically. Hence according to Kant, 'By making abstraction we *do not arrive at* a concept.'[49] For Kant 'Abstraction is only the *negative* condition under which representations can be produced which are generally valid.'[50]

And now Kant concludes, 'Hence one should actually call abstract concepts *abstracting* concepts (*conceptus abstrahentes*), i.e., one in which several abstractions occur. The most abstract concept is one which has nothing in common with what differs from it. This is the concept of *something*. For what is different from this concept is *nothing* and has nothing in common with something.'[51]

So far the idea of synthesis has not been brought in, but only the idea of judgement is taken help of to explain the idea of concept after abstraction. 'Judgement is the representation of the unity of consciousness of various representations, or representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept.'[52] So far Kant is discussing the concept in general whether empirical or *a priori*. Now he prepares ground for pure concepts of understanding by bringing in a distinction between form and matter in the judgement. '*Form* and *matter* belong to every judgement, as basic constituents. The *matter* of a judgement consists in the given knowledge which is bound up with the unity of consciousness of judgement. The *form* of a judgement consists in determining how various representations as such [as various] belong to *one* consciousness.'[53] With this distinction Kant brings in the concepts of reflection. 'All concepts in general, no matter from where they may take their matter [*Stoff*], are reflected representations, i.e., reflected into the logical relation of their applicability to the many. However, there are concepts whose whole meaning is to be capable of being subordinated, as one or the other reflection, to any representation that occurs. They can be called concepts of reflection (*conceptus reflectentes*). And because any kind of reflection occurs in judgement, these concepts will comprehend absolutely the mere activity of understanding, which in judgement applies to relation as the ground for the possibility of judging.'[54] *Conceptus reflectentes* are nothing but *pure concepts of understanding*.[55] Since pure concepts of understanding are concepts of reflection, and as reflection brings into picture in advance the technically-practical interest of the subject to achieve his subjective ends whatever they may be in the context of concept formation, comparison and abstraction, involved in the formation of pure concepts of understanding, is all the more guided by this technically-practical interest brought in advance by reflection.

As we have already explained concept formation involves synthesis too. What is being synthesized in the pure concepts of understanding? What kind of manifold is available to them? Kant answers, 'Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding. In the absence of this material those concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty. Space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind—conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects. But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name *synthesis*.'[56] It may be noted that the manifold of pure *a priori* intuition in space and time is itself a product of synthesis, which takes place without concepts as pointed before. The synthesis involved in space and time is different from the synthesis involved in *a priori* concepts of understanding.

What is the difference between the two syntheses? 'This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, may be entitled *figurative* synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*), to distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of the intuition in general, and which is entitled combination through the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*). Both are *transcendental*, not merely as taking place *a priori*, but also as conditioning the possibility of other *a priori* knowledge.'[57]

What exactly is the second kind of synthesis? Kant explains, 'By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is *pure*, if the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time. Before we can analyse our representations, the representations must themselves be given, and therefore as regards *content* no concepts can first arise by way of analysis. Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and

therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge, and unites them to [form] a certain content. It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge.'[58] This second kind of synthesis requires a manifold of intuition, while the figurative synthesis requires no such thing.

Which faculty is involved in the second kind of synthesis? According to Kant, 'Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis *to concepts* is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called.'[59] Imagination is involved in the second kind of synthesis also.

Is there any difference in the two kinds of imagination, one involved in sensibility and another involved in understanding? 'But the figurative synthesis, if it be directed merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in the categories, must, in order to be distinguished from the merely intellectual combination, be called the *transcendental synthesis of imagination* ... But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense *a priori* in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility *a priori*; and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the *categories*, must be the transcendental synthesis of *imagination*. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application—and thereby the ground of all its other applications—to the objects of our possible intuition. As figurative, it is distinguished from the intellectual synthesis, which is carried out by the understanding alone, without the aid of the imagination. In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the *productive* imagination, to distinguish it from the *reproductive* imagination...'[60] This synthesis of productive imagination is nothing but the *synthesis of apprehension in intuition*.

And the synthesis of reproductive imagination is nothing but what Kant calls *the synthesis of reproduction in imagination*. 'The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction. And as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever—of those that are pure *a priori* no less than of those that are empirical—the reproductive synthesis of the imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination.'[61] So we can say in the context of synthesis of *a priori* manifold of intuition in space and time imagination is productive, but in the context of synthesis of this manifold through pure concepts of understanding imagination is reproductive.[62]

Kant explains pure synthesis involved in pure concept formation. 'Pure synthesis, *represented in its most general aspect*, gives the pure concept of the understanding. By this pure synthesis I understand that which rest upon a basis of *a priori* synthetic unity. Thus our counting, as a easily seen in the case of larger numbers, is a synthesis according to concepts, because it is executed according to a common ground of unity, as, for instance, the decade. In terms of this concept, the unity of the synthesis of the manifold is rendered necessary.'[63] It must be noted that pure synthesis requires *a priori* synthetic unity. This pure synthesis, giving rise to concepts, renders transparent the necessity involved in the required *a priori* unity of synthesis. Hence Kant writes, 'By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept—a procedure treated of in general logic. What transcendental logic, on the other hand, teaches, is how we bring to concepts, not representations, but the *pure synthesis* of representations. What must first be given—with a view to the *a priori* knowledge of all objects—is the *manifold* of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the *synthesis* of this manifold by means of the imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis, and which consists solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding.'[64] Apart from both productive and reproductive synthesis of imagination a third function is also required for knowledge.

What is that third function? 'The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying *a priori* to objects—a conclusion which general logic is not in a position to establish.'[65] That is to say we have pure concepts when the productive synthesis of imagination in intuition and reproductive synthesis of imagination in understanding are united in a common function of judgement. The former gives content to concepts while the latter gives only the form of concept. Only when these two are united in a common function of judgement we have pure concepts. This common function is what Kant calls *the synthesis of recognition in a concept*. This common unity introduced by this common function, i.e., this unity, in its most general expression, Kant entitles the pure concept of the understanding.

Now the question raised earlier—How is *a priori* fixing of pure mediate object-relatedness possible?—becomes the question of 'how *subjective conditions of thought* can have *objective validity*.'[66] The answer is given in the transcendental deduction of categories. 'The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate *a priori* to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction.'[67]

Kant now prepares the ground of this transcendental deduction by relating the three faculties to the very possibility of experience of an object. 'There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, *sense*, *imagination*, and *apperception*. Upon them are grounded (1) the *synopsis* of the manifold *a priori* through sense; (2) the *synthesis* of this manifold through imagination; finally (3) the *unity* of this synthesis through original apperception. All these *faculties* have a

transcendental (as well as an empirical) employment which concerns the form alone, and is possible *a priori*.'[68]

According to Kant, 'There are only two possible ways in which synthetic representations and their objects can establish connection, obtain necessary relation to one another, and, as it were, meet the another.'[69] These two ways are presented as alternatives. 'Either the object alone must make the representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible.'[70] But the former alternative is discounted since it can give rise to only an empirical relation between the two. 'In the former case, this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible *a priori*.'[71] In the latter case also there are two possibilities and one of them is discounted for the purposes of transcendental deduction. 'In the latter case, representation in itself does not produce its object in so far as *existence* is concerned, for we are not here speaking of its causality by means of the will.'[72] So the only alternative left is that 'None the less the representation is *a priori* determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to *know* anything *as an object*.'[73]

Thus Kant establishes the *a priori* linkage between pure concepts of understanding and object through the idea of possibility of experience. 'The *possibility of experience* is, then, what gives objective reality to all our *a priori* mode of knowledge.'[74] He further clarifies this point, 'the possibility of experience as a knowledge wherein all objects—if their representation is to have objective reality for us—must finally be capable of being given to us.'[75]

To link *a priori* the pure concepts with objects through the idea of possibility of experience is to constitute the subjectivity of the person simultaneously. Regarding the pure concepts of understanding Kant says, 'If we can prove that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity. But since in such a thought more than simply the faculty of thought, the understanding, is brought into play, and since this faculty itself, as a faculty of *knowledge* that is meant to relate to objects, calls for explanation in regard to the possibility of such relation, we must first of all consider, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution, the subjective sources which form the *a priori* foundation of the possibility of experience.'[76] This transcendental constitution of the subjective sources, which form the *a priori* foundation of the possibility of experience, is nothing but transcendental constitution of the subjectivity of the person. This is the subjective side of the transcendental deduction.

Without the object-relatedness the *a priori* concepts are only forms of concept without being concepts themselves. 'An *a priori* concept which did not relate to experience would be only the logical form of a concept, not the concept itself through which something is thought.'[77] So object-relatedness is essentially involved in the *a priori* concepts of understanding. 'A concept which universally and adequately expresses such a normal and objective condition of experience would be entitled a pure concept of understanding.'[78] This brings us to the objective side of the transcendental deduction. 'All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a *something*, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something = X, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate to the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an object.'[79] According to Kant, 'The object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, that is, the completely indeterminate thought of *something* in general.'[80]

As we have seen the subjectivity and the objectivity are constituted simultaneously through transcendental deduction. So for Kant object is that which is 'standing over against' the subject. So object is *Gegen-stand* in German for Kant. It is the power of imagination, which through its synthesis provides the foundation for the object's standing over against the subject. 'There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension.'[81] And for Kant, 'The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction.'[82]

We have already seen now these two functions take place through imagination.

It must be remembered that the faculty of imagination belongs to man as a disinterested spectator who is essentially a social being who is not primordially characterized by subjectivity. But by the exercise of this faculty man constitutes his own subjectivity together with the objectivity of knowledge so that the object of knowledge stands over against the subject who has knowledge and thereby camouflages his own original nature. This he does in order to serve the technically-practical interest as claimed before.

Let us examine what more is involved in this imaginative constitution of subject/object dichotomy in knowledge. Before Kant explains what is *the synthesis of apprehension in intuition* Kant makes an important observation. 'Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise *a priori*, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is a general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental.'[83] But the manifold of time, as the *a priori* form of intuition and itself being a pure intuition, is constituted through *the synthesis of apprehension in intuition*. So how can Kant make this general observation? Or is he introducing a different notion of time here, which is more primordial and hence has priority as claimed in the general observation? In fact this notion of temporality, which has priority, is the primordial temporality with which the man as a disinterested spectator who is essentially a social being who is not characterized by subjectivity, operates and he imaginatively synthesized the manifold of empty time as pure intuition as required for constitution of subjectivity and objectivity. This point will come up for further discussion later.

We observed earlier that according to Kant pure synthesis, giving rise to concepts, renders transparent the necessity involved in the required *a priori* unity of synthesis. Hence according to Kant, 'Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object

carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them *a priori* in some definite fashion.'[84] This finding that our thought—is not a psychological finding but an essential element of the transcendental constitution of subjectivity. So for Kant, 'It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object.'[85] Here we know the object as standing over against the knowing subject. So the subjective and objective necessity is one and the same for Kant. 'But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us—being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations—the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.'[86]

Kant is now preparing the subjectivity of person for (technically)-practical interest. 'Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.'[87] Man grasps himself in activities with respect to his abilities: 'taking oneself in the sense of "I am able to" and "I can".'[88] Intelligible object is the object who has the ability to act. What is the relation of the self-grasping of man with respect to his ability in transcendental apperception to the concepts of understanding? Kant's answer is contained in the passage: 'We now come to a concept which was not included in the general list of transcendental concepts but which must yet be counted as belonging to that list, without, however, in the least altering it or declaring it defective. This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgement, "I think". As is easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as

belonging to consciousness.'[89] The 'I think' or the transcendental apperception functions like a category which is presupposed in every pure concept of understanding like substance, causality, etc.

The I of 'I think', which represents the transcendental unity of apperception, is nothing but the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'.[90] The 'mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity *a priori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act'[91] there must be a '*fixed and abiding self*'[92] and this must be the I of 'I think'. This fixed and abiding self is not an object, which stands over against the subject. Rather it is the subject's self standing as an acting being who acts on the object standing over against him.

According to Kant, 'But it must not be forgotten that the bare representation 'I' in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception *as a faculty*.'[93] Kant claims that I is not given empirically as an existent object: rather it is available as the self awareness of ability or power 'I can'.

This point is made more emphatically and clearly in the passage: 'The "I think" expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given *a priori* form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable [in me]. Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the *determining* in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of *determination*, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an *intelligence*.'[94] In other words it is

through the transcendental unity of apperception I determine myself as a being with spontaneous ability.

Why should the nature conform to the constitution of subjectivity of man? According to Kant, 'That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, and should indeed depend upon it in respect of its conformity to law, sounds very strange and absurd. But when we consider that this nature is not a thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representations of the mind, we shall not be surprised that we can discovere it only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on account of which alone it can be entitled object of all possible experience, that is, nature.'[95] So for Kant, 'The *a priori* conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.'[96] What is the *a priori* condition of a possible experience? 'This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be *a priori* necessary, the synthesis must also be *a priori*. The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. But only the *productive* synthesis of the imagination can take place *a priori*; the reproductive rest upon empirical conditions. Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.'[97] And this synthesis constitutes the subjectivity of the person through the synthetic unity of apperception. Be it noted in the second edition reproductive synthesis has been declared to 'rest upon empirical conditions' but for the first edition it is as much transcendental as the productive synthesis of imagination, which we take as the correct position.

Now who has this imagination? What is the nature of this being? He cannot be a subject, as subjectivity will be constituted by the synthesis of imagination when imagination will give intuition to the concept of understanding. At the stage of mere reception of intuition by imagination in sensibility the being under consideration is merely conscious without being self-conscious. What kind of consciousness is this, which is not self-consciousness? If our reading of *Critique of Judgement* is

correct then it is the spectator consciousness, which is consciousness without being self-consciousness. According to Kant knowledge, as an effect, arises '... where a given object, through the intervention of sense, set the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts... .'[98] But this is also the process of synthesis of an objective nature resulting in the self-consciousness of transcendental ego, which is the subject against which the objective nature is laid. Here Kant encounters the problem of schematization of categories. The problem of schematism is how do categories of understanding known *a priori* apply to objects of nature, which are external and empirical. To put it in a nutshell the problem is how to link the categories to the objects. According to Kant, '... an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.'[99] For Kant, 'The schema is in itself always a product of imagination.'[100] It is the faculty of imagination, which can schematize the *a priori* categories in terms of transcendental determination of time.

Kant scholars have appreciated neither the problem nor the solution of schematism. Stripped of all Kantian jargon the problem of schematism reduces to the problem of the correctness of having followed the rules of synthesis. For Kant categories are rule of synthesis. What are the conditions of correctness of having followed rule of synthesis or what are the conditions of correctly following the rule of synthesis? So long as we are contented with Kant's description of the synthesizing activity of imagination as a '... a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious,'[101] we will also continue to believe him when he declares, 'This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely even to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.'[102] We cannot appreciate the significance of his solution nor can he.

Let us, therefore, examine the significance of schematization of categories through time. Who is the agent who is undertaking the

synthesizing activity and also schematizing the categories? The answer is that he is essentially the person who is also a disinterested spectator and a member of an essentially communicative society based on common sense. Since categories are rules of synthesis and schematization is temporalization of these categories, it follows that schematization is temporalization of these rules of synthesis which are followed by an essentially communicative social being. Now we have all the elements of determining the correct rule following and hence determining the applicability of categories. It must be noted that the time involved in temporalization of categories for application to empirical objects and time involved in temporalization of categories as rules of synthesis are two different times. The latter time is the primordial time, which has primacy as all representations occur in it even before they are synthesized and it is the person with imagination, i.e., the disinterested spectator who has this time available to him. But the former time is the synthesized empty time available to the person after the subjectivization of his self.

Any person who claims to have mastered the rule will be judged by the community to have done so if his particular acts of rule following elicits agreement (ideal agreement of disinterested spectators only) from the community in enough cases. Here it should not be assumed that the agreement of the society is fixed which can be discovered empirically and the only course left to the person following the rule is to conform to it if he wants to be correct in his rule following. The real situation is that there is no fixed agreement (ideal agreement of disinterested spectators) of society over how the rule is to be followed in the given situation. In each situation of rule following given a rule every member must try to achieve agreement (ideal agreement ...) in what constitutes a rule following in this particular situation through communication with others referring to the past agreements on this rule (precedent), which will constitute the understanding of that rule in that situation. But this implies that each understanding of rule or concept by the community is also the event of being of the society or event of unfolding of its tradition or history. These points will come up for discussion later.

So we can say mankind through imagination constitutes the subjectivity and objectivity collectively in history for serving the technically-practical interest. In this process they camouflage their essential nature.

The subjectivity of the person is further constituted in the chapter on paralogism in *Critique of Pure Reason*. 'We can thus say of the thinking "I" (the soul) which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does *not* know *itself through the categories*, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so *through itself*.'[103] There he allows the proposition '*The soul is substance*' to stand recognizing it very well 'that this concept signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality.'[104] He takes the soul as substance not for the purposes of extending theoretical knowledge of the soul rather for the purposes of (technically)-practical use of reason. 'Meanwhile we may till retain the concept of personality—just as we have retained the concept of substance and of the simple—in so far as it is merely transcendental, that is, concerns the unity of the subject, otherwise unknown to us, in the determinations of which there is a thoroughgoing connection through apperception. Taken in this way, the concept is necessary for practical employment and is sufficient for such use ...'[105]

That Kant constitutes subject/object dichotomy for (technically)-practical use of reason is finally confirmed by his discussion of will in the third antinomy of reason. In the thesis of this antinomy Kant claims, 'Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.'[106] The reason for this thesis is based on the insufficiency of natural causality by itself alone. 'But the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a cause *sufficiently* determined *a priori*. The proposition that no causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature, when taken in unlimited universality, is therefore self-contradictory; and this cannot, therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality.'[107] What is the nature of this insufficiency of natural causality? Kant explains, '... it is evident beyond all possibility of doubt, that if the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all

its conditions is *set* us *as a task*.'[108] This regress on the series of conditions is not 'already really *given*'.[109] The task set is both for knowing the regress on conditions which is a task for theoretical reason and for bringing into being the completion of this regress on the natural causal series, which is a task of practical reason. For Kant 'will is nothing but practical reason.'[110] So to bring into being the completion of regress on the series of natural causes Kant needs to presuppose will in man. 'We must, then, assume a causality through which something takes place, the cause of which is not itself determined, in accordance with necessary laws, by another cause antecedent to it, that is to say, an *absolute spontaneity* of the cause, whereby a series of appearances, which proceeds in accordance with laws of nature, begins *of itself*. This is transcendental freedom, without which, even in the [ordinary] course of nature, the series of appearances on the side of the causes can never be complete.'[111]

It must be noted that the series of natural causes is completed by attributing it to a person. So, will is the basis of this attribution. 'The transcendental idea stands only for the absolute spontaneity of an action as the proper ground of its imputability.'[112] For the possibility of attribution of action to a person this will must function with choice. It can always say 'I could have acted otherwise'. 'The necessity of a first beginning, due to freedom, of a series of appearances we have demonstrated ... . But since the power of spontaneously beginning a series in time is thereby proved (though not understood), it is now also permissible for us to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beginning of themselves, and so to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom.[113] The 'substance' Kant is talking about here is not the substance in nature but 'substance' of paralogism, which is a person. That will for Kant requires choice is further confirmed by the fact that Kant uses the German term *Willkür* for will in this context.[114] In the introduction to *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant exclusively identifies *Willkür* with faculty of choice. 'The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind and not in its object, it constitutes a *power of acting or not acting according to liking*. In so far as the

activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of the action to produce the object, it forms an act of *choice* [*Willkür*] ...'[115]

Kant makes a distinction between transcendental and practical freedom. Pure spontaneity of will is transcendental freedom. 'By freedom ... I understand the power of beginning a state *spontaneously*. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature. Freedom, in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot be determined or given in any experience.'[116] Practical freedom is the independence of will from natural sensual desires. 'Freedom in the practical sense is the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses. For a will is sensuous, in so far as it is *pathologically affected*, i.e., by sensuous motives; it is *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*), if it can be pathologically *necessitated*. The human will is certainly an *arbitrium sensitivum*, not, however, *brutum* but *liberum*. For sensibility does not necessitate its action. There is in man a power of self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses.'[117]

For imputation of action we need will with transcendental freedom. 'But since in this way no absolute totality of conditions determining causal relation can be obtained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality.[118] The will, which is transcendentally free, is nothing but the faculty of choice. For Kant practical freedom of will is based on the transcendental freedom of will. 'It should especially be noted that the practical concept of freedom is based on this *transcendental* idea.'[119] Hence, 'The denial of transcendental freedom must, therefore, involve the elimination of all practical freedom. For practical freedom presupposes that although something has not happened, it *ought* to have happened, and that its cause, [as found] in the [field of] appearance, is not therefore, so determining that it excludes a causality of our will—a causality which, independently of those natural causes, and even contrary to their force and influence, can produce something that is determined in the time-order in accordance with empirical laws, and which can therefore begin a series of events *entirely of itself*.'[120] The

practically free will Kant is talking about, 'is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether the physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our causality.'[121] Production of objects can take place through the series of natural causality, which practically free will initiates.

Practically free will, which initiates the series of causes for the production of objects independent of all sensuous desires needs to be combined with transcendentally free will, which is the faculty of choice so that man can now produce objects through his own choice without being determined by any previous cause or any sensuous desire. It is this problem of combining two notions of freedom that Kant has in mind when he is facing the problem of reconciling freedom with nature. 'The difficulty which then meets us, in dealing with the question regarding nature and freedom, is whether freedom is possible at all, and if it be possible, whether it can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causality.'[122]

The solution that Kant offers also points in this direction. 'While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature.'[123] The action is imputed presuming free choice but it has effect according to the necessity of natural causes, i.e., it produces objects through the operation of law of natural causes. 'Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects*.'[124] He further clarifies, 'No action begins *in* this active being itself; but we may yet quite correctly say that the active being *of itself* begins its effects in the sensible world. In so doing, we should not be asserting that the effects in the sensible world can begin of themselves; they are always predetermined through antecedent empirical conditions, though solely through their empirical character (which is no more than the appearance of the intelligible), and so are only possible as a continuation of the series of natural causes.'[125] Self-determination of will is not an action, rather it is

determination of choice, but it is also the power to act which brings in change in the empirical world according to laws of causality.

Finally Kant attributes this power to produce objects, according to his own ideas through his own choice without being determined by sensuous desires or previous causes and yet by making use of natural causality in the empirical world to man, for he is a being with a dual nature. 'Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular, we distinguish in a quite peculiar and especial way from all empirically conditioned powers. For it views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts.'[126]

How does man detect this power to produce objects of his own choice? 'That our reason has causality, or that we at least represent it to ourselves as having causality, is evident from the *imperatives* which in all matters of conduct we impose as rules upon our active powers. "*Ought*" expresses a kind of necessity and of connection with grounds which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature.'[127] So it is the consciousness of "ought", which indicates that we have the power to produce objects of our own choice. This power which we detect through is moral not in the sense that whatever we do with this power of choice is morally correct but in the sense that it pertains to morality.

The consciousness of 'ought' makes us aware, according to Kant, 'Whether what is willed be an object of mere sensibility (the pleasant) or of pure reason (the good), reason will not give way to any ground which is empirically given. Reason does not here follow the order of things as they present themselves in appearance, but frames to itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they have never taken

place, and perhaps never will take place. And at the same time reason also presupposes that it can have causality in regard to all these actions, since otherwise no empirical effects could be expected from its ideas.'[128] We become aware that reason can frame ideas of its own choosing and it can adapt the empirical knowledge of causal laws of nature to decide what action is necessary to produce objects according to the ideas chosen and reason also presupposes in itself the power to produce these objects. Once again Kant emphasizes the dual nature of man's will in *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'Thus the will of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, so far as that causality exhibits, in its effects in the [field of] appearance, a rule from which we may gather what, in their kind and degrees, are the actions of reason and the grounds thereof, and so may form an estimate concerning the subjective principles of his will.'[129]

The way the dual character of will is emphasized, i.e., the causality of it to produce effect in the empirical world and the non-empirical inner capacity of choice makes it suitable for technically-practical reasons. The picture of action emerging in Kant's critical philosophy is such that necessity of natural causality relates the action to its consequences, while freedom of rational will relates the agent to the choice of action.

Will involved with morally practical reason has no such dual character necessarily. 'A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes—because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone—that is good in itself. ... Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.'[130] In the moral evaluation of Kantian good will not only the proposed end is missing but action is also missing. It is not an oversight. Rather moral will, which is *Wille*, is something different from faculty of choice, i.e., *Willkür*. 'The faculty of desire, in so far as its inner principle of determination as the ground of its liking

or predilection lies in the reason of the subject, constitutes the *will* [*Wille*]. The will is therefore the faculty of active desire or appetency, viewed not so much in relation to action—which is the relation of the act of choice—as rather in relation to the principle that determines the power choice to the action. It [*Wille*] has, in itself, properly no special principle of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary act of choice, it is the *practical reason* itself.'[131] But will in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is explained with reference to its capacity to produce results. 'Thus all that we are justified in saying is that, if reason can have causality in respect of appearances, it is a faculty *through* which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins.'[132] Or again, 'This freedom ought not, therefore, to be conceived only negatively as independence of empirical conditions. The faculty of reason, so regarded, would cease to be a cause of appearances. It must also be described in positive terms, as the power of originating a series of events.'[133]

Kant's discussion of blame also points to will as the power to act to achieve ends of one's choice. If there was choice one can say, 'I could have acted otherwise'. To blame a person is to point out that he could have acted otherwise. 'Our blame is based on a law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause that irrespective of all the abovementioned empirical conditions could have determined, and ought to have determined, the agent to act otherwise. This causality of reason we do not regard as only a cooperating agency, but as complete in itself, even when the sensuous impulses do not favour but are directly opposed to it; the action is ascribed to the agent's intelligible character ... Reason, irrespective of all empirical conditions of the act, is completely free, and the lie is entirely due to its default.'[134]

It must be clear by now that will as the power to act to achieve ends of one's choice involves two elements, i.e., proficiency in choosing ends, which is transcendental freedom and skill in achieving ends chosen, which is practical freedom. *Critique of Pure Reason* by constituting subject/object dichotomy has prepared us for skill in achieving ends chosen, which is practical freedom. Skill in achieving ends chosen, which is practical freedom, is less problematic for Kant since its effect is visible in the empirical world. But proficiency in choosing ends,

which is transcendental freedom and also the ultimate end here, is problematic for Kant. This ultimate end is moral in the sense that it pertains to morality but not in the sense that it is morally correct. 'While we thus through experience know practical freedom to be one of the causes in nature, namely, to be a causality of reason in the determination of the will, transcendental freedom demands the independence of this reason—in respect of its causality, in beginning a series of appearances—from all determining causes of the sensible world. Transcendental freedom is thus, as it would seem, contrary to the law of nature, and therefore to all possible experience; and so remains a problem.'[135] That Kant is using the term 'practical' in the context of practical freedom in a wide sense covering the technically-practical in it and not in the narrow sense of merely morally practical is made clear by Kant. 'This practical point of view is either in reference to *skill* or in reference to *morality*, the former being concerned with optional and contingent ends, the latter with ends that are absolutely necessary. Once an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary.'[136]

Why does Kant need the preparatory constitution of subject/object dichotomy in *Critique of Pure Reason* to prepare man for technology of production? The answer is contained in the following passage from Heidegger's *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*: 'In traditional terminology intuition means *intuitus*. There is an old doctrine according to which spirit which knows absolutely—in the medieval and modern philosophy: God—can only know in the manner of intuition. God does not need means—that is, of thinking—*and* this intuiting is such that by means of it a being or its possibilities, the ideas, *emerge* and have their origin (*origo*). Divine infinite knowing is *intuitus originarius*. The infinite intuition as intuition is the origin *of the being* of what is intuited; this being originates from intuiting itself. By contrast human knowing is finite intuiting, i.e., an intuiting which as such does not create or produce what is intuited, but just the opposite. As an intuition of what is already on hand, this intuition lets be given to itself only what is already on hand. This human intuiting is not an *intuitus originarius*, not an original intuition, but an *intuitus derivativus*. This intuition presupposes the being to be encountered via intuition as

already being. Thus the finitude of human knowing does not lie in humans' knowing quantitatively less than God. Rather it consists in the fact that what is intuited must be given to the intuition from somewhere else—what is intuited is not produced by intuition. The finitude of human knowing consists in being thrown into and onto beings. 'Intellectual intuition in man is an absurdity. Yes, I venture to say that no created being can know *intellectual* things except the being whose knowing causes things to be.' [Heinze, *Vorlesungen Kant's über Metaphysik*, p. 192] Kant mentions this difference between *intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus* in the last paragraph of the transcendental aesthetic, which was added only in the second edition. [CPR, B71f.]'[137] Since man cannot produce through intuiting only man needs to be prepared to be a producer of objects and this preparation must be such that he is a producer where the material production is already given. So *Critique of Pure Reason* is a preparation for technical skill in production where production is 'an action passing into outward matter' or is the process of 'labour being embodied in the external object' and it gave rise to labour theory of value accepted by many economists. But in this preparation man is subjectivized and he is also prepared for the possibility of choice of ends. Faculty of choice is *only shown to be consistent with law of causality of the phenomenal world* according to *Critique of Pure Reason*. This critique cannot prove the actuality of this faculty. Kant will attempt to show the possibility of this faculty in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, and he will show its actuality only in *Critique of Practical Reason*.

The possibility of choice of ends has a profound effect. It transforms the ancient technology into modern technology. Faculty of choice is free will. 'A will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, and therefore through motives which are represented only by reason, is entitled *free will* (*arbitrium liberum*), and everything which is bound up with this will, whether as ground or as consequence, is entitled *practical*. [The fact of] practical freedom can be proved through experience. For the human will is not determined by that alone which stimulates, that is, immediately affects the senses; we have the power to overcome the impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, by calling up representations of what, in a more indirect manner, is useful

or injurious.'[138] A will which does not choose ends is animal will. 'A will is purely *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*), which cannot be determined save through sensuous impulses, that is, *pathologically*.'[139] Since the ancient mode of production was natural it did not involve choice of ends. The ancient control over the ends to be produced also involves action that did not involve choice through will.[140] So both the kinds of ancient action, i.e., act of production (*facere*) as well as act of control of production (*agere*) are relegated to the realm of natural animal instinctive operation. The only category of human action left is the category of acts of production through choice. 'Art is distinguished from nature as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (*opus*) from operation (*effectus*) ... By right it is only production through freedom, i.e., through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art, that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their creator that we ascribe it as art.'[141] This transforms technology by liberating it from all control to feed ever-increasing choice of goods.

Objective knowledge based on subject object dichotomy is of the nature of power. Hence for the subjectivity of man 'knowledge is power.' Since knowledge is knowledge of causality operating in substance of the object in space and time it gives power to the subjective man to manipulate the object by his own will. Although causality and will appear to belong to different realms in Kant, in reality they fit well with each other. The man with 'will' can manipulate the object through knowledge of causality. Knowledge of causality is gained through science, which in turn is the basis of technology. The subjectivity of man by its own will manipulates objects through technology to give it a desired form to suit his own purpose. This is the only form of action that can be recognized by the subjective man. So in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has transformed man into a homo-faber through the constitution of subject/object dichotomy.

According to Kant the transcendental freedom or the act of choice, which activates the practical freedom or the capacity to produce objects in the empirical world, is not an object of experience. 'For the absolutely first beginning of which we are here speaking is not a beginning in time, but in causality.'[142] Since the empirical world is the world where all appearances are causally related with some previous appearances, 'An *original* act, such as can by itself bring about what did not exist before, is not to be looked for in the causally connected appearances.'[143] Kant further states, 'The action, in so far as it can be ascribed to a mode of thought as its cause, does not *follow* there from in accordance with empirical laws, it is not *preceded* by the conditions of pure reason, but only by their effects in the [field of] appearance of inner sense. Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, nor consequently to the conditions of succession in time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not, in producing an effect, *arise* or begin to be at a certain time.'[144]

Yet Kant says, 'Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative employment, but in that practical employment which is also moral, principles of the *possibility of experience*, namely, of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, *might* be met with in the *history* of mankind. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place.'[145] How can there be history of mankind if moral action is not in time? No doubt for Kant 'The action to which the "ought" applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions. These conditions, however, do not play any part in determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the [field of] appearance.'[146] But 'This "*ought*" expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept.'[147] So we can have no empirical experience of 'ought' and the experience must be beyond time. How can moral actions be met with in the history of mankind? Is Kant not contradicting in demanding something in history which is beyond time? The contradiction is too glaring to be missed in the passage: 'Reason is present in all the actions of men at all times and under all circumstances, and is always the same; but it is not itself in time, and does not fall into any new state in which it was not before. In respect to new states, it is *determining*,

not *determinable*. We may not, therefore, ask why reason has not determined *itself* differently, but only why it has not through its causality determined the *appearances* differently.'[148] The solution to this difficulty is that Kant needs two notions of time, which we had occasion to distinguish earlier, i.e., the primordial time before synthesis and the synthesized empty time. Act of transcendental freedom is outside the synthesized empty time and does not belong to the phenomenal world but it is in the primordial time so that it can be met in the history of mankind, which takes place in primordial time.

We are also now in a position to understand Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena. When Kant is speaking of phenomena he is talking about the realm of objectivity, which is correlated to the subjectivity of man, i.e., the objective nature constitute the phenomena. But this subjectivity of man co-related with the objective nature, camouflages the more essential nature of man, i.e., man as a disinterested spectator or *Theoros*, and the objectivity of nature camouflages the manner of non-objective (and not subjective either) availability of nature to which he belongs primordially. So the phenomenal world is the appearance behind which lies the natural world of spectator to which the spectator himself belongs. Our conjecture is that this primordial natural world of spectator is the noumena of Kant. This noumenal world sustains the appearance, since without the synthesizing activity of the imagination of the spectator there can be no world of objectivity of nature co-related with the subjectivity of man, which is the appearance or the phenomenal world. The transcendental unity of apperception constituting the subjectivity of man, provides the link between the two worlds, i.e., the world of noumena and the world of phenomena. The transcendental unity of apperception in its aspect of process of synthesizing activity belongs to the noumenal world as it is the activity of the imagination of spectator. But in its aspect of product of synthesizing activity, i.e., in its aspect of unity of subjectivity it is the essential co-relate of the phenomenal world. So for Kant the transcendental ego or the subjectivity of man as the product aspect of transcendental unity of apperception has an ambiguous position in Kant. Sometimes he appears to identify it with noumenal self but sometimes he distinguishes the transcendental ego from the noumenal self.

The subjectivity of man has dual aspect is made clear in the discussion of will. Will has intelligible aspect referring to the world of things in themselves and it has phenomenal aspect, i.e., power to initiate change in the world of appearance through its knowledge of phenomena.

According to Kant, 'Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.'[149] What is the nature of this intelligible being? Kant answers that the I of 'I think', which represents the transcendental unity of apperception, is nothing but the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'.[150] The 'mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity *a priori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act.'[151] Kant says in another place: 'That is intellectual whose concept is an action.'[152] According to Heidegger, 'This terse observation means that a mental being is one which *is* in the manner of action. The ego is an 'I act' and as such it is intellectual. This peculiar usage of Kant's should be held firmly in mind. The ego as 'I act' is intellectual, purely mental. Therefore he also often calls the ego an intelligence. Intelligence, again signifies, not a being that *has* intelligence, understanding, and reason, but a being that exists as intelligence. Persons are existing ends; they are intelligence. The realm of ends, the being-with-one-another of persons as free, is the intelligible realm of freedom. In another place Kant says that the moral person is humanity. Being human is determined altogether intellectually, as intelligence. Intelligences, moral persons, are subjects whose being is acting. Acting is an existing in the sense of being extant.'[153] If being a moral person is acting and acting is being of moral person then existence of moral persons as ends in themselves signifies that acting is an end in itself. So Kant begins with the Greek notion of moral action, which is an end in itself, and it is what the Greek thinkers like Aristotle took to be the subject matter of *phronēsis*.

But Kant derecognizes this category of action, which is an end in itself. The reason is not far to look for. The Greek thinkers took contemplation to be the act of the disinterested spectator. But Kant took contemplative philosophical activities like reflection, synthesis, etc. as end governed activities, i.e., he took philosophy to be an interest-guided activity. The thesis of co-relation of knowledge to interests or cognitive interests no doubt became popular with Jürgen Habermas, but this thesis originates with Kant himself. Jürgen Habermas took it over from Kant and elaborated it further. According to Kant, '... sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest ... .'[154] Kant further writes, 'Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.'[155] So Kant has taken what is an endless activity for Greeks, as an activity for an end. If Kant is seen from the point of view of Greeks then, he is mistaken about the object of philosophical activity and hence when he is philosophizing, he is indulging in involuntary activity. For according to Aristotle, '... what makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in choice nor ignorance of the universal, but particular ignorance, i.e., of the circumstances and objects of the action for it is on these that piety and pardon depend, because a man who acts in ignorance of any such detail is an involuntary agent.'[156] So Kantian reflection and synthesis are, strictly speaking from the point of view of Greeks, involuntary activities. So Kant constitutes subjectivity involuntarily when the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'[157] is turned into an identity of '*fixed and abiding self*',[158] which later in paralogism becomes substance, if not for theoretical reasons then at least for practical reasons.

Even though synthesis and reflection is involuntary mankind in its entirety is implicated in this involuntary act. According to Kant the aesthetic judgement of taste postulates the universal communicability of the 'quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally.'[159] For Kant this postulate is necessary not only for aesthetic judgement of taste but also for the act of knowing.

Notes and References

1. Tr. Norman Kemp Smith, The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1929. Herein after referred to as CPR.
2. CPR, Bix/x.
3. CPR, Bxii.
4. Heidegger, Martin, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1997), p. 32.
5. CPR, B25.
6. CPR, A126.
7. CPR, A796, B824.
8. *Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 336).
9. CPR, A55, B79.
10. CPR, B25.
11. CPR, A19, B33.
12. CPR, A92, B125.
13. CPR, A56, B80.
14. CPR, A845, B873.
15. CPR, B27, A13.
16. CPR, B28, A14.
17. CPR, Bxxii.
18. CPR, B869, A841.
19. CPR, B160.
20. CPR, B160 note.
21. CPR, B151.
22. CPR, A68f, B93f.
23. CPR, A65, B89f.
24. CPR, B134, note.
25. *Logik*, §1 [Cassirer, VIII, 399].
26. *Logik*, §1, note 1[399].
27. *Logik*, §1, note 1[399].
28. §2 of lectures on logic.
29. CPR, B298, A239.
30. CPR, B134, note.
31. *Logik*, §5.
32. *Logik*, §5, note 1.
33. *Logik*, §6.
34. *Logik*, §6.
35. CPR, A260, B316.
36. CPR, A19, B33.

37. *Critique of Judgement*, General Remark upon the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgements, *42.Kant*, p. 511. [42nd Volume of the series Great Books of the Western World].
38. Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgement*, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 405, n. 9.
39. *Critique of Judgement*, §2. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., *Italics added.*
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., §1. *42.Kant*, p. 476.
45. Ibid., §9. *42.Kant*, p. 482.
46. *Logik*, §6.
47. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 159.
48. *Logik*, §6, note 2 [Cassirer, VIII, 402].
49. *Logik*, §6, note 3.
50. *Logik*, §6, note 3.
51. *Logik*, §6, note 2.
52. *Logik*, §17.
53. *Logik*, §18.
54. *Reflexionen II*, 554.
55. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 171. To refer to the table of twelve categories of understanding Kant himself uses the expression 'our table of concepts of reflection' CPR. A270, B326.
56. CPR, A76f, B102.
57. CPR, B151.
58. CPR, A77f, B103.
59. CPR, A78, B103.
60. CPR, B151–152.
61. CPR, A102.
62. Kant alters his position in the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*. There he declares all reproductive synthesis of imagination to be only empirical. 'In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the *productive* imagination, to distinguish it from the *reproductive* imagination, whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws, the laws, namely, of association, and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. The reproductive synthesis falls within the domain, not of transcendental philosophy, but of psychology.' B152.
63. CPR, A78, B104.

64. CPR, A78f, B104.
65. CPR, A79, B104f.
66. CPR, A89, B122.
67. CPR, A85, B117.
68. CPR, A94.
69. CPR, A92, B124.
70. Ibid.
71. CPR, A92, B124f.
72. CPR, A92, B125.
73. Ibid.
74. CPR, A156, B195.
75. CPR, B264, A217.
76. CPR, A96f.
77. CPR, A95.
78. CPR, A96.
79. CPR, A250.
80. CPR, A253.
81. CPR, A120.
82. CPR, A102.
83. CPR, A98f.
84. CPR, A104.
85. CPR, A105.
86. CPR, A104.
87. CPR, A546f, B574f.
88. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 254.
89. CPR, A341, B399f.
90. CPR, A108.
91. Ibid.
92. CPR, A107.
93. CPR, A117, note.
94. CPR, B157, note.
95. CPR, A114.
96. CPR, A111.
97. CPR, A118f.
98. *Critique of Judgement*, §21. *42.Kant*, p. 492.
99. CPR, A139, B178.
100. CPR, A140, B179.
101. CPR, A78, B103.
102. CPR, A141, B180–181.
103. CPR, A401–402.

104. CPR, A350–351.
105. CPR, A365f.
106. CPR, A444, B472.
107. CPR, A446, B474.
108. CPR, A479f, B526.
109. CPR, A498, B526.
110. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, translated by H.J. Paton, in *The Moral Law*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1948, p. 76 (36/412). The page numbers given in the brackets refer to the page numbers of the second German edition and the edition issued by the Royal Prussian Academy in Berlin respectively, which are given by Paton in the margins of his translation.
111. CPR, A446, B474.
112. CPR, A448, B476.
113. CPR, A448–450, B476–478.
114. CPR, A534, B562.
115. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals*, sec. I. *42.Kant*, p. 386.
116. CPR, A533, B561.
117. CPR, A534, B562.
118. CPR, A533, B561.
119. Ibid.
120. CPR, A534, B562.
121. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Introduction, *42.Kant*, p. 296.
122. CPR, A536, B564.
123. CPR, A537, B565.
124. CPR, A538, B566.
125. CPR, A541, B569.
126. CPR, A546f, B574f.
127. CPR, A547, B575.
128. CPR, A548, B576.
129. CPR, A549, B577.
130. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 60 (3/394).
131. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals*, sec. I. *42.Kant*, p. 386.
132. CPR, A552, B580.
133. CPR, A553f, B581f.
134. CPR, A555, B583.
135. CPR, A803, B831.
136. CPR, A823, B851.
137. P. 58f.

138. CPR, A802, B830.
139. Ibid.
140. That does not mean that choice is not involved. Choice is involved but choice is not made by will. The προαιρεσις (*preference*) of the ancients is not the same as *Willkür*.
141. *The Critique of Judgement*, §43. *42.Kant*, p. 523.
142. CPR, A450, B478.
143. CPR, A544, B572.
144. CPR, A551f, B579f.
145. CPR, A807, B835.
146. CPR, A548, B576.
147. CPR, A547, B575.
148. CPR, A556, B584.
149. CPR, A546f, B574f.
150. CPR, A108.
151. Ibid.
152. *Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Benno Erdmann (Leipzig, 1884), [volume 2 of *Reflexionen Kants zur Kritischen Philosophy*, edited by Benno Erdmann from Kant's manuscript notes] Reflection No. 968.
153. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p. 141.
154. CPR, A834, B862.
155. CPR, A839, B867.
156. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1110b7–1111a18.
157. CPR, A108.
158. CPR, A107.
159. *Critique of Judgement*, §9. *42.Kant*, p. 483.

Dasein's Self and Heidegger's Claim of Theological Neutrality

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This paper views Heidegger's notion of the 'Self' in *Being and Time*[1] as a critique of the substance-notion of the self. Heidegger advocates a process-notion of the self which is consistent with his dynamic notion of Being. The process-self is actualized when one resolutely chooses to act upon one's ownmost possibilities upon the background of Dasein's essential finitude. Despite such a notion of the self in *BT*, Heidegger claims that his analysis is theologically neutral in the sense that, by giving such an analysis of the self of Dasein, he does not thereby decide about the immortality of the self of humans. The paper analyzes both his notion of the self and his neutrality claim, and shows that while there is some theoretical sense in such a claim, *BT* can be best read from a secular, non-religious stance.

The problem of the self has bothered philosophers since long. It is closely linked to the problem of identity of the human person. Who was to be called a human being? Is there something/someone that remains unchanged and identical in this complex reality called the human person? Would there be something in us that survives the physical death of the body? It is more or less agreed that the self is that which gives identity to the individual. Some would call this identity-principle the unity of consciousness, whereas others would doubt if there is any unity at all in the stream of consciousness.

Western theoretical traditions of the self may be divided very broadly into two: the conservative view that takes the self for the inner reality of the human person and his/her outward appearance, and the sceptical view that the notion of the self is a metaphysical myth and that we never come to know anything more than particular impressions or

thoughts. The self as the objective reality, the substratum and foundation of all mental phenomena and the owner of the external physical appearance is symbolized in Cartesianism. The assumption of the self as the objective, essential reality of the total person runs through Descartes' discussions comprehensively. The writings of David Hume, that gentle rebel of a philosopher, epitomized the sceptic's view of the self as the metaphysician's myth. Hume was totally uncomfortable about the idea of any substance and much less of the self. He insisted that we were sure only of perceptions and their impressions, and not about substances.

The central preoccupation in Heidegger's *BT* is the meaning of 'to-be'. Heidegger asks the question what it means to be only in relation to that entity for which its own 'to-be' is always an issue, for which its 'to-be' is always my 'to-be' and for which the characteristic of inquiring and questioning is fundamental. This entity which Heidegger calls Dasein may be roughly thought of as the human person because only humans definitively make issue with their own existence as 'my existence' and inquire into the same. However, there is danger in reading Dasein as the human person because this term does not include all aspects of the human person but only that aspect of a human's awareness of his/her own existence.[2] In order to clear this misunderstanding, Heidegger almost annoyingly remarks in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, a work published two years after *BT*: 'The existential analytic of existence does not have as an objective a description of how we manage a knife and a fork.'[3]

However, *BT* does address some vital questions regarding the human person characterized as Dasein and one of them is the question of the 'self'. Heidegger's discussions in *BT* about the self fall randomly within his existential analytic of Dasein. There are only a few direct references to the problem and no systematic treatment of it can be noticed in *BT*. Nevertheless, reading these passages, connecting them with other passages and looking closely into still more unsaid views, I believe, reveals a notion of the self that is different from the traditional substance-view of the self. To this may I turn now.

I have divided the paper into two parts. The first part is a discussion on the said notion in *BT* and the second part analyzes the notion of the self vis-à-vis Heidegger's claim of theological neutrality.

I

Heidegger's approach to Dasein presupposes two basic principles, namely, existence precedes essence and possibility is higher than actuality. It is to be noted that these two principles have relevance only in the domain of Dasein. Considered in totality, they lay adequate emphasis on the dynamic character of Dasein and *BT*'s dynamic notion of the self is woven around them. Dasein is not an entity like a stone whose Being is predetermined or fixed as soon as it comes into existence. On the other hand, Dasein is such an entity that first of all comes into existence without any predetermined Being and, dynamically and proactively, makes its own Being around its own purposes and goals. Since Dasein comes into existence and, from this starting point, creatively gives rise to its Being, the possibility of Dasein's 'to-be' in the next moment is ontologically more significant than what it is just now. It is an entity that can be something different tomorrow. Its Being today does not determine all its possibilities of Being tomorrow.[4]

In *BT*, the notion of the self of Dasein is closely linked to the authenticity, inauthenticity or undifferentiatedness/averageness/everydayness of Dasein's manner of existing. The existential analytic of Dasein begins by saying that 'Miness belongs to any existent Dasein and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case, Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated.'[5] To exist authentically means to exist by owning one's self; to exist inauthentically means to exist deliberately in the they-self (*das man*); and, to exist undifferentiatedly means to exist in a floating everyday manner without distinguishing authenticity or inauthenticity of the self.[6] *BT* asserts that, in a primordial way, Dasein can become authentic in its self by anticipating its final possibility of death resolutely. This way, Dasein becomes both total (by comprehensively understanding its possibilities, the totality of its being as Dasein on the backdrop of its final inevitable possibility of death) and authentic (by resolutely owning up

these authentic possibilities). This way, Dasein owns its self. It is then clear that the question of the self of Dasein arises in *BT* within this discussion of existing authentically and inauthentically. To be authentic is to own one's self. What/who, then, is the self of Dasein if Dasein can have an authentic mode of existence by owning its 'self'?

At the outset, Heidegger takes the self for the principle of identity in the individual. He calls it the 'I' or the 'subject'. Heidegger gives a sort of provisional definition of the self by saying that it is 'what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.' (*BT*, p. 150) Though this definition has a prima facie resemblance with the traditional view of the soul-substance, in Heidegger's analysis, there is no solid 'I' which is an entity. His aim was to break the jinx of the Cartesian thing-self. The essence of Dasein is not a thing, not an object, not a solid 'I' which remains unchanged as the witness to the manifoldness of experience. Thinghood, objecthood or substantiality is something that belongs to entities which are totally different from Dasein's kind. It is a characteristic of the 'present-at-hand', a term Heidegger uses to designate whatever is not of Dasein's character. The essence of Dasein, its self, instead is its existence. Let me quote:

> But if the Self is conceived 'only' as a way of Being of this entity, this seems tantamount to volatilizing the real 'core' of Dasein. Any apprehensiveness, however, which one may have about this gets its nourishment from the perverse assumption that the entity in question has at bottom the kind of Being which belongs to something present-at-hand, even if one is far from attributing to it the solidity of an occurrent corporeal Thing. Yet man's '*substance*' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather *existence*. (*BT*, p. 153)

The self is not an entity but it is a Being of Dasein. It is the 'to-be' of Dasein's existence, since in each case, Dasein is an 'I'. Dasein is its self at any moment only in existing in a particular way. There is no pre-given nature to Dasein; rather, its nature as unfolded in life is its true nature. A human person is not a soul that accidentally happens to get into a body. Being-in-the-world is so essential to selfhood that one

cannot be a self without a world. For Heidegger, all other accounts of the self are based on 'the naïve supposition that man is, in the first instance, a spiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced "into" a space.' (*BT*, p. 83)

Nonetheless, in this account of the self, Heidegger does not sacrifice the 'constancy factor' which we generally take for granted when we consider the self as the principle/sense of identity in a person. In fact, the philosophical problem of personal identity is what, first of all, gave rise to the assumption of the self, which was considered to be the underlying substratum of changing bodily features and the plentitude of experiences. A twenty-year-old who looks at her photograph at age two, wonders what she has got common with that two-year-old! An inquisitive youngster who strives to search for the connecting links of his pattern of experiences is frustrated over the missing links. From such striving is born the concept of the self—the principle of individuality. However, Heidegger is far removed from conceiving the self as a substance or a subject. Only Dasein is the entity and everything else we characterize of Dasein ontologically is not entities but aspects of its Being, which again is not an entity but Dasein's 'to-be' or manner of existing. For Heidegger, the self is that existential quality which Dasein manifests when it exists authentically and it is that existential quality which it covers up when it exists inauthentically. In this interpretation of the self, how do we trace the constancy-factor? To discuss this issue, we need to turn to some of the pivotal notions of *BT*, like authenticity, inauthenticity, care, temporality and historicity.

Heidegger's primordial ontological explication of Dasein takes the entity of inquiry, that is, Dasein, in its totality (that is, the whole of its Being from birth to death) and in its authenticity (that is, in its own self). Dasein can become total because it is an entity which can take its past, present and future Being into a unified whole and, because it is an unfinished entity in its Being, it can continuously evolve towards its future possibilities, the most definite of these being its own death. Dasein's character of unifying its past, present and future is called its temporality. As an entity that constantly takes issue with its Being, either negatively or positively—either as fleeing from its self or as owning its self—Dasein is characterized as 'care'. It is an entity who

'cares'. Dasein is not primarily an 'I think'; rather, it is an 'I care', which is constantly entangled in a world, and is always encountered by its own Being-question. Since Dasein's structural whole is 'care', the question of its authenticity is always before it and, since temporality is the ultimate meaning of its Being, its 'to-be', Dasein can, in principle, become its authentic self. Heidegger writes:

> Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one's authentic potentiality-for-Being-one's-Self—that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein's Being *as care*. In terms of care, the *constancy of the Self*, as the supposed persistence of the *subjectum*, gets clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-Being also opens our eyes for the *constancy of the Self* in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The *constancy of the Self*, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the *authentic* counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. Existentially, '*Self-constancy*' signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the Self's Selfhood. (*BT*, p. 369)

To be one's self, then, means to do authentic actions. Anticipatory resoluteness is the ultimate of authentic selfhood because here Dasein owns both its totality and its authenticity. To be a totally authentic self means to accept fully one's finitude and act in the light of that realization. Authentic selfhood is a continuous process of actualization of possibilities and this process is marked with a lot of ups and downs.

Coming back to the question of self-constancy, what is it that is constant in Dasein's manifoldness of experiences? First of all, what is constant is not a thing or a subject but it is Dasein's 'to-be-able-to-be-its-own-self'. The possibility of authentic selfhood is what is constant in Dasein. In the beginning of his existential analytic itself, Heidegger points out that 'only in so far as it (Dasein) is essentially something which can be *authentic*—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself.' (*BT*, p. 68) That is, since Dasein is structurally 'care', it is always in sight of its authentic Being, its authentic self, even when it is actually bounded from all sides by falling inauthenticity. Even when Dasein flees from its authentic self and flees

into the 'they-self', it can thus flee only because, first and foremost, it can be authentic. The passage we have quoted from page 369 of *BT* throws light eloquently on this. Only an authentic Dasein is a self and an inauthentic Dasein is a not-self. An inauthentic Dasein is only provisionally self-constant as that which can be authentic any moment.

In the notion of historicality, the constancy factor of the authentic self is made clearer. Heidegger clarifies this point:

> With the analysis of the specific movement and persistence which belong to Dasein's historizing, we come back in our investigation to the problem which we touched upon immediately before exposing temporality to view—the question of the constancy of the Self, which we defined as the 'who' of Dasein. Self-constancy is a way of Being of Dasein and is, therefore, grounded in a specific temporalizing of temporality. The analysis of historizing will lead us face to face with the problem of a thematical investigation of temporalizing as such. (*BT*, p. 427)

Dasein is an entity which stretches itself along between birth and death because it is a historizing entity. Historicality is the concretization of the temporality of Dasein by its power to historize. What is significant to the Being of Dasein is not just its present but the whole of Dasein's movement of existence, its stretching itself between birth and death. 'The "between" which relates to birth and death already lies *in the Being* of Dasein.' (*BT*, p. 426) Hence, the authentic self of Dasein is not delinked from what Dasein was thus far. Resolute authenticity is not arbitrarily choosing just any possibility. Authentic Dasein, instead, takes count of its heritage (the whole of Dasein's 'givenness'), its fate (awareness of finitude embedded in one's factical possibilities) and its destiny (awareness of the finitude of its community). Being-free-for-death is cardinal to authentic selfhood of Dasein because death is a 'possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.' (*BT*, p. 435) When Dasein authentically historizes the constancy of its Being-a-self, the connectedness of its Being is never broken. Heidegger writes:

> Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for *anxiety*, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free

> existing can have—of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence. Resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose that it *would be* actual as 'Experience' only as long as the 'act' of resolving 'lasts'. In resoluteness lies the existential constancy which, by its very essence, has already anticipated every possible moment of vision that may arise from it. As fate, resoluteness is freedom to *give up* some definite resolution and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible Situation or other. The steadiness of existence is not interrupted thereby but confirmed in the moment of vision. This steadiness is not first formed either through or by the adjoining of 'moment' one to another; but these arise from the temporality of that repetition which is futurally in the process-of-having-been—a temporality which has *already been stretched along*. (*BT*, p. 443)

To be a self means to own up to one's being, one's manner of existing in the acts of choices one has to make each moment in life. One can also be not-self by not owning up to one's Being. However, even when one is not-self, one can be so primarily because, in the final analysis, one can be one's self. To be a self is to be existing authentically. It must be added here that Heidegger not only throws light on the existential interpretation of the self but also rejects summarily the notion of the substance-self. According to him, there is not enough ontological ground for discussing the 'substantiality, simplicity, and personality as characteristics of Selfhood.' (*BT*, p. 370) All such characterization of the self assumes, first and foremost, that the self is a thing or substance. This Heidegger rejects in keeping with his existential assumptions. For him, the unbiased phenomenological digging into the Being of Dasein reveals nothing but this process of Being a self and not a self thing. What happens when this 'process of Being' ends in the finitude of death, when the horizon of temporality closes itself off? In this connection, I wish to investigate Heidegger's claim of theological neutrality in the following section.

II

At once, it is plain that the existential exposing of the notion of the self in *BT* reveals several things. When Heidegger says that the self is not

a substance, he means both that it is not a soul-substance which is temporarily attached to a body, as the rationalists hold, and that it is not a sophisticated organism called the brain attached to the body, as the materialists hold. From this viewpoint, the outward actions of a person may be, at the most, only signboards for her inner self. Actions need not always be good judges of the inner self. According to Heidegger, this view is not acceptable because, he claims, if we look at Dasein phenomenologically, that is, without presuppositions, we see that human actions are not signboards of the self but they *are* the self. Phenomenologically, we are not given any thing other than this. We do not need to fabricate a self out of thin air like the metaphysicians do. Reflecting on Heidegger's notion of the self, Julian Young observes: 'To be a human self, then, is to be, not an inner object, but rather a process of happening, a pattern of "concernful activity" in the world."[7]

In this view of the self, the world is already given as a characteristic of Dasein, a totality of its relations and, so, one need not ask the question of the connectedness between the material world and the spiritual soul. Dasein is a type of entity which always finds itself understandingly amidst other entities of its own kind and amidst entities which are of the character of the ready-to-hand. This conception of the self also means that what makes up one's essence or core is not a substantial thing called the self but a process of actions that total up to a way of Being the self. The self of Dasein is the drama of Dasein's actions. For this drama to unfold, the world is the stage—the world of others, tools of use and every other object. It then follows that, without this stage, there is no self and out of the scaffold of the world, there is no selfhood. My to-be-in-the-world profoundly influences my Being a self, so much so, I cannot be a self without it. When the world is gone, I am gone too. When the lights are off, the flickering of existence within me that constantly strives to be actualized into newer and newer possibilities is extinguished too. When my essential nullity is totally actualized in death, my world ends.

This being the case, the legitimacy of Heidegger's claim of theological neutrality with regard to the human person needs to be questioned. *BT* is a work that had taken shape in a Christian context. In fact, it makes use of the traditional Christian notions elegantly for a very

different purpose in a very different manner. Heidegger, who knew Christian theology with fair clarity, was fully aware of the consequences of his notion of the self as a process of Being than an entity. Despite all clues to the contrary, Heidegger wants to remain theologically neutral in his great work; he claims that his analysis of Dasein does not decide if there is personal immortality of the self or not.[8] I would like to attempt to probe a little more into the legitimacy of this claim.

A sympathetic reading of *BT* should, first of all, consider that Heidegger is treating not the human person in her entirety but only the human person from the perspective of Dasein. As Dasein, nullity, finitude and a definitive death are wrought essentially into the very fabric of humans. Dasein is a temporalizing entity and the temporal circle of Dasein is closed definitively at death. *BT*, as a genuine and original philosophical work, should be placed in the context of the writings of Frederick Nietzsche who announced the 'death of God'. There's no doubt that, in *BT*, Heidegger strives to respond to the European human's utterly frustrating search for meaning after the 'death of God' and he did it with a fair degree of success, not because he reinstated the concept of God and of absolute values but because he explained the thesis of meaningfulness in that very partially nihilistic atmosphere.

Heidegger believed that, to his day, there was no satisfactory philosophical explication of personal immortality or eternality of the self[9] and he seems to think that such a question is purely a matter of one's faith. Given this, he draws in *BT* a picture of Dasein who is entrenched in finitude and morality. In this context, it is significant that the whole framework of meaningfulness that *BT* tries to paint by the important notion of authenticity derives its power and focus from the notion of 'anticipatory resoluteness', which is nothing but a resolute Being-towards-death which, in turn, is an absolute finishing point for the self of Dasein. To think and hope that there will be something after this death would be to grasp death inauthentically. Being-towards-death is primarily understanding and accepting my finitude.

This being the case, what does Heidegger mean by saying that *BT* is still open to the question of the continuing existence of the self after death? The point seems to me to be this: as Dasein (that entity which

is, in each case, mine and for which inquiring is one of the possibilities of its Being) death is definitive for humans; but we are not only Daseins but also, say, persons, and from such a perspective, it may be that there is significance for the question of personal immortality. It is not that Dasein itself may be explicated from the stance of eternality. This is not allowed by its ontological structure. What Heidegger seems to say is that while, as 'persons' humans 'might' survive death, the person's 'Daseinhood' ends in death. Heidegger analyzes only how the whole comportment of people between their birth and death is entrenched in finitude. In this analysis, even if people, in fact, survive death, that is not a significant thing since, phenomenologically, there is only the sense of mortality. According to Heidegger, Dasein is that aspect of the awareness of the human being about her own existence and the phenomenological methodology employed by him makes it definite that there is no awareness of existence after death in Dasein. The question of immortality still remains unsettled because though there is nothing in human awareness about immortality, it still 'may be' that there is immortality. As Daseins, the awareness of immortality is not ontologically given. I think this is a consistent position so far as it goes.

Let us consider that there is immortality of the self after 'the death of human's Daseinhood'. If I believe in faith that I will survive death in some way, what will the scenario be in this case? Here, we need to recall that, according to Heidegger, the human being is thrown into existence and her sense of identity as 'I' develops in terms of the self by the acts of daily existence and not in terms of an essential *a priori* identity substance. This being the case, if one were to survive the death of one's 'Daseinhood' one can survive only as a process-self or a series-self, as in the Transmigration theory of Buddhism, and not as a self-substance. If there were a self-substance, it is absurd that while the human being is Dasein the self-substance could get suspended. However, we need to hasten to add that, in fundamental ontology, there is no significance to such speculation since the system of meaning developed in it in terms of Dasein is deeply rooted not in eternality but in finiteness. Thus, Heidegger neither wants to decide nor discuss the issue in *BT*.

To conclude, *BT* makes more sense to a non-believer than to a believer. While for a non-believer it makes for a compact whole, the believer has to search outside it and do so by abandoning its cardinal principle of finitude. I think it was due to this powerful atmosphere of essential nullity and finitude wrought into the very fabric of human being as Dasein that *BT* was associated with atheistic existentialism from the beginning. This way, the claim of theological neutrality that follows from the conception of self in *BT* needs to be left at its theoretical hermitage. The claim that it is Dasein that is finite and not human being as such makes Heidegger's unique approach to the ontology of the human being rather fragmentary. In order to penetrate into the ontology of Dasein, we are called upon to assume finitude as its definitive characteristic, granting that we may also study the human being from other perspectives, say, the theological one. In this case, then, we need to give up the finitude-assumption. There is no doubt that *BT* is made a more difficult work than it actually is by leaving many questions unsettled.

Notes and References

1. Henceforth *BT*.
2. Commenting on the concepts of 'man' and 'Dasein', Michael Gelven remarks: 'Heidegger insists that his analysis is not an anthropology. We are not investigating "man", but that aspect of man which is concerned with the awareness of his existence. "Dasein" does not mean "man"; for the concept "man" is both too broad and too narrow: there are many things that a man is other than Dasein; and there is much to the meaning of "Dasein" that goes beyond a simple understanding of what man is. There are a lot of things one does that do not necessarily reveal one's existence.' Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, Revised Edition, 1989), p. 33.
3. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 243.
4. This does not mean that the past or the present has no role to play in Dasein's future or that there is no continuity in Dasein's Being. Heidegger's notions of 'facticity', 'thrownness' and 'historicality' explain the role of the past and present in Dasein's future and the continuity in Dasein's Being. We will deal about these aspects later in this paper.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), p. 78. Henceforth, all references to this work will be made by indicating '*BT*' and the page number within parenthesis at the end of the reference in the text itself.
6. The whole of the existential analytic of Dasein, that is, the whole of the published portion of *BT*, deals with the authenticity of the self of Dasein.
7. Julian Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 58.
8. 'If "death" is defined as the "end" of Dasein—that is to say, of Being-in-the-world—this does not imply any ontical decision whether "after death" still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein "lives on" or even "outlasts" itself and is "immortal". Nor is anything decided ontically about the "other-worldly" and its possibility, any more than about the "this-worldly"; ...' (*BT*, p. 292)
9. 'That there are "eternal truths" will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, this principle remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy from having philosophers commonly "believe" it.' (*BT*, p. 269–70)

Wittgensteinian Perspectives on World, Death vis-à-vis Living a Meaningful Life

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Wittgenstein maintains that only a happy life is worth living and among other things such a life consists in having no fear, not even when death is imminent. The questions which immediately arise are: is it possible to live such a happy and fearless life, and if it is possible then how can one achieve such a life pattern? These are among the questions central to the focus of this paper. It is concerned with Wittgenstein's notion of the meaningfulness of life, i.e., a life which is worth living. Such issues are not necessarily related to the description of the existence of psycho-physical life which is regarded as opposed to death. A psycho-physical life is regarded as opposed to death as the beginning of the existence, of the latter brings an end to the former. That is why a life is taken as the period between one's birth and death. Such a dichotomization between life and death takes life as something which is lived and death as something which is to be feared, dreaded and avoided because it brings an end to such living and because experience of death is perceived to be painful. However, discussions about living a meaningful life doesn't take life as opposed to death since its concern is the way of living, which has much to do with attitudes to life, irrespective of the conditions of the psycho-physical or materialistic life.

Before beginning our exploration of Wittgenstein's notion of meaningfulness of life, it seems pertinent to mention different views regarding living a good and worthy life.[1] First, there is a view which holds that belief in the immortality of soul and after-life makes present life meaningful. Such a belief causes meaningfulness to life as in the absence of such a belief there wouldn't be anything which could solace a person that one day he would reap the results of his actions. The life of a person who believes in the soul becomes meaningful in the long

run as there is an element of eternal hope for the fulfilment of unrealized wishes. For a believer in soul, this life doesn't become the end of all his activities. The second view holds that the belief in God provides meaning to an individual's life. God, who acts as an arbitrator of the results of one's good and bad deeds, stands as the chief source of meaningfulness of life. These two views, which are based on Kantian assumptions of the immortality of soul and the existence of God respectively, are virtually one and the same as they seem to treat meaningfulness of life and morality as convertible terms. The third view about meaningfulness of life has been generally ascribed to putting some worthy goals to life and then getting satisfaction and pleasure in the pursuit and achievement of such goals. There is an apprehension about applicability of this view, which holds that since death puts an end to the meaningfulness of life, it is not a genuine meaningfulness. In defense against such apprehensions it can be argued that like the above two views, in this case too, meaningfulness of life doesn't get eroded and actually does last during one's life-time. The fourth view could look for meaningfulness of life in living in the present, forgetting events of the past and worries of the future. Such a view takes life as a limited whole and as an opportunity to live life in its true sense. At times it appears that it is this view which can be more suitably ascribed to Wittgenstein. We shall discuss issues regarding 'living in the present' in detail during the course of this paper. However, all these views regarding the meaningfulness of life can be broadly divided into two categories:

(1) The view that derives meaningfulness of life from the belief in afterlife based on the assumption of either the immortality of soul or the existence of God.
(2) The view that ascribes meaningfulness to life by formatting ways of living on the basis of either getting pleasure out of pursuit and achievement of the self-imposed goals or living in the present moment of life.

As we shall see, so far as Wittgenstein is concerned, these categories of beliefs about a meaningful way of living, in the final analysis, may not be necessarily different from each other. That is to say, it might be that there is an approach to living a meaningful life such as that of

Wittgenstein, which somehow touches upon all these belief patterns and still may not be exactly classifiable under any one of these.

LIFE AND WORLD

Let us begin with Wittgenstein's notions of life and world, which according to him, are inherently related to each other. In *NB*, p. 77 and *TLP*, 5.621 Wittgenstein has maintained the inseparability of the world and life as he wrote, 'The World and Life are one'. The questions which arise at this point are: What, according to Wittgenstein, is world and what, according to him, is life? And, how could they be construed as one or inseparable from each other?

Wittgenstein has explained his concept of the world in terms of fact. *TLP* and *NB* maintains that the world consists of fact. The actual and even a possible existence of a fact is the qualification for a proposition to be true. A proposition would be false, if underlying it there is no fact. So, it is due to the existence or non-existence of a fact that a proposition is either true or false. Further, facts could be complex as well as atomic. Atomic facts are represented by atomic propositions whereas complex facts are depicted by complex propositions. For example, the complex proposition 'Betty is pretty and wise' consists of two atomic propositions: 'Betty is pretty' and 'Betty is wise'. It represents the complex fact which consists of two atomic facts—i.e., the two attributes of Betty.

Further, each atomic fact could be analyzed into what Wittgenstein called 'simples' or 'objects' which are ultimate constituents of the world like quarks and which are further unanalyzable. The world could not be fully analyzed in terms of objects or things unless analysis brings into account the relation amongst objects as well. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein maintained that the world consists of facts and not of things; facts are endowed with objects or simples and relations amongst objects. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, there is nothing but facts in the world.[2]

This is a materialistic notion of the world about which even Bertrand Russell had talked about much before the publication of the *TLP*, in his lectures on *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, which he delivered and published in 1918, though acknowledging that in it he had used the

materials of his disciple Ludwig Wittgenstein. However, the question is: Is this materialistic or physiological feature of the world the only feature? This question arises precisely because of Wittgenstein's view, as mentioned above, that the world and life are basically one and the same. If world and life are one and the same and if the world is a materialistic phenomenon then life turns out to be nothing but a materialistic one. But it couldn't be so as Wittgenstein denied physical or material life to be 'life' at all. For him 'Physiological life is of course not "life". And neither is psychological life. Life is world.' (*NB*, p. 77e) So the problem we are faced with is the following: if psychological life is not a life then how could the materialistic world be equated with a non-materialistic life? It seems that in order to solve this problem we have to see Wittgenstein's notions of life and world in a wider perspective.

Actually, the world, which according to Wittgenstein is identical with life, is not a physiological world. He claims it is the sense of the world which is identical with life. It is not the material world and life which Wittgenstein equates. Neither is a physiological nor a psychological life inseparable with the sense of the world. It is the spiritual life which is one with the sense of the world.

Thus, we can say that: (a) Wittgenstein draws a distinction between two notions of the world: (i) constituents of the world, and (ii) the sense of the world. The world consists of fact but the sense or meaning of the world lies outside of it. Such a distinction between Wittgenstein's two kinds of worlds is concurrent with his distinction, in *TLP*, between the realm of saying and that of showing.[3] Moreover, Wittgenstein's distinction between two kinds of worlds can be seen in F.P. Ramsey's interpretation of *TLP*, 6.45: 'The meaning of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling'. For Ramsey, the key to his sentence is 'limited', which shows that 'the mystical feeling is the feeling that the world is not everything, that there is something outside it, its "sense" or "meaning".'[4] Likewise, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two concepts of life: (i) physiological and psychological life, and (ii) sense of the life. (b) When Wittgenstein equates world and life, he actually meant sense of the world and life, i.e., the sense of the world and meaningful life.

Not only did Wittgenstein maintain two opposite concepts of life and world, he even maintained some kind of relation between psychophysical life and material world on the one hand, and sense of the world and that of the life, on the other. It is a kind of unification of spiritual forces of the world or universal spirit with individual lives, on the one hand, and individual material bodies with world of facts or universal body, on the other.

He maintained that there is an universal spirit and an universal body which constitutes all the individual spirits and bodies respectively. Much like Spinoza, he emphasized a parallelism between spirit and matter. This is to be seen in his following remark:

> This parallelism, then, really exists between my spirit, i.e., spirit and the world.
>
> Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is your spirit. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with spirit at all ... The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp.
>
> But the question arises whether even here, my body is not on the same level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely it is so), so that I have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine nor from mine to that of the wasp.
>
> Is this the solution of the puzzle why men have always believed that there was *one* spirit common to the whole world?
>
> And in that case it would, of course, also be common to lifeless things too.
>
> This is the way ... and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as unique, *the world* ... (*NB*, p. 85e)

Thus, for Wittgenstein the spirits of all beings are on the same pedestal—whether its of human beings or of animals or of wasps, etc. Similarly, bodies of everything—whether that's of human beings or of inanimate things, are nothing but one. Thus, the world is divided into two domains: spiritual and factual. The uniqueness in Wittgenstein's position is that for him the spiritual domain does not constitute the world of facts—in a way it lies at the boundaries of the physical world.

To sum up this section: There are two notions of world and life for Wittgenstein; one is physical/material and other is spiritual/meaningful. The physical world and life constitute 'universal matter' and the spiritual world and life constitute 'universal spirit'. And there is a kind of parallelism between them. This parallelism shows as to why Wittgenstein regarded world and life to be one and inseparable from each other. It is the sense of the world and life which are inseparable and thus are one and the same. One can argue that it is similar with the case of the material world and the psycho-physical life. In fact, Wittgenstein asserts them to be inseparable when he draws a parallel between universal spirit and universal matter which we have described. But as we shall see in our discussion on death that from the point of view of living a meaningful life the oneness of the psycho-physical life and the material world is not of the same nature as the oneness of the sense of world and the sense of life.

WITTGENSTEIN ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO LIVE A MEANINGFUL LIFE

We have seen that for Wittgenstein sense of life and that of the world are one and the same as both of them are different from psycho-physical life and material world respectively. Now, let us see what according to Wittgenstein is the meaning/sense of life and how could one live a meaningful life.

(a) For the purpose of facilitation of our discussion and establishing cogency in the argumentation, let us begin with the third view, namely the view which accrues meaning to life by way of the allotment of some purpose and attempt to achieve that purpose. Wittgenstein's view on the meaning of life doesn't cohere with what is generally regarded as a meaningful life. Generally it is maintained that since a meaningless life is a purposeless living, so a meaningful life is the one which has some purpose. That is, a meaningless life is pointless and purposeless. There is no difference between a purposeless life and the existence of a stone or the life of an animal. The existence of such a person's life, who has no purpose to live, is like the existence of a stone. As different from this, a meaningful life is a life which serves some purpose of human existence. However, Wittgenstein does not endorse this general

conception of a meaningful life as his notion of a meaningful life is not necessarily a life which has some purpose. Cyril Barrett admits:

> I take that Wittgenstein does not understand 'the meaning of life' in a purposive sense. I do not think for him the life of a human being, much less a barn-cat, had a meaning in the sense of performing a function. 'Why are we here and what are we supposed to be doing?' does not seem to be the question he is asking. Nor would he pose it in the form in which it is usually posed: 'What is our destiny? Where do we go from here and how should we go?' Nor has 'the meaning of life' anything to do with scientific explanation, whether physical, chemical, biological, historical, psychological or sociological.[5]

A life with some purpose cannot be Wittgenstein's meaningful life since the so-called purposes are found to be lying outside of what constitutes the sense of life. That is, sense of life does not belong to the material world whereas empirical purposes of life do. Hence, the meaning of life, for Wittgenstein, cannot be traced in the material world as it lies outside of the world.

It follows from this analysis of Wittgenstein's view on the relationship between purposeful life and meaningful life that for him the above-mentioned third view is beyond his perspective. Nonetheless, although Wittgenstein does not regard purposive life as meaningful, for him, as we shall see later, 'living life' itself can be regarded as a purpose of life.

(b) Now let us take up the second alternative, i.e., on the relation between God and living a meaningful life. Our analysis of the previous section shows that the sense of world lies outside of the material world and belongs to a different world. The 'higher' world is the residing place for many non-facts and non-things. It is in this connection we have to understand the implication of Wittgenstein's remark, 'God does not reveal himself in the world' *TLP*, 6.432. That is, God is not a fact. Unlike facts he does not exist in the world. Like everything which is 'higher', God is transcendent.

But the question is: if God does not belong to the world and if the (material) world and the psycho-physical life are one and the same then how could God be called 'God', i.e., if God is not endowed with the

attributes which are ascribed by the traditional theology—such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence which inevitably presume God's relation with the world—then what is the relevance of the concept of God? The concept of God, whether it is enumerated by Deism, or Theism or Pantheism, has at least some kind of association with the material world. Even Deism does not advocate the complete transcendence of God as it accepts timely interference of God in worldly affairs whenever any such need arises. As such Wittgenstein's notion of God appears to be different from what is held by traditional religions like Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, etc., for they all suppose God's revelation in the world.

This impasse can be resolved. As such Wittgenstein is not against any of the religious/theological interpretations of God. It can be said that Wittgenstein

> ... is not saying that God don't reveal himself, but that he does not reveal himself as a fact or event or state of affairs that form part of the world. God, therefore, like value, is 'outside the world', not part of it. God, like value, belongs to what is higher. So, in so far as he reveals himself, it is not as part of the world, the world of historical facts or scientific data. Even a Pantheist such as Spinoza could accept this. Even if the world (*Natura Naturata*) is God (*Natura Naturans*), God is still in some way distinct from and 'outside' the world in so far as it evolves from his nature or essence.[6]

One could object to such a defense of the Wittgensteinian God on the ground that even if it is accepted, Wittgenstein's God remains different from its traditionally established notion because here there is no scope for the personal revelation of God. It is so because God reveals himself in the world in the form of a human being such as Ram, Krishna, Buddha, and Christ, etc. However, such objections do not apply to Wittgenstein's God as they presume that human beings are like other facts of the world. Wittgenstein's notion of human beings and *ipso facto* revealed God does not treat them as a mere fact. This would be clearer in our next point when we discuss his concept of subject or self which he regarded as not belonging to the world. Here, it is sufficient to say that like a subject or human being, God even while being in the world, is not a part of it.

Whatsoever be the nature of God's revelation in the world, its due to his conviction that He is beyond the world that Wittgenstein asserts God as meaning of life and world. He says, 'The meaning of life, i.e., the meaning of the world, we can call God.' (*NB*, p. 73e) As the meaning of life and that of the world lies outside the material world and the psycho-physical life, so does the God.

However, the basic question which remains to be seen is: How is the belief in God helpful in living a meaningful life? In this connection we may refer to Wittgenstein's direct comments. He says,

> To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. (*NB*, p. 74e)
>
> To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. (*NB*, p. 74e)
>
> To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning. (*NB*, p. 74e)
>
> To pray is to think about the meaning of life. (*NB*, p. 73e)

These statements show that the 'belief in God' is the source of understanding that life is meaningful. In other words, one can understand that life is meaningful only when one believes in God. The thinking about meaning of life and contemplation of God are one and the same. Now we are faced with the question: how could belief in God or prayer give rise to the understanding or seeing of life's meaningfulness?

It appears that for Wittgenstein such understanding comes through the realization that human will is dependent on an alien will. Such a realization comes through the realization of the *given-ness* of the world.

> The world is given me, i.e., my will enters into the world completely from outside as into something that is already there.
>
> (As for what my will is, I don't know yet.)
>
> That is why we have the feeling of being dependent on an alien will. (*NB*, p. 74e)

Thus belief in God helps in seeing meaningfulness of life through the realization of dependence on God.[7] However, one can ask: how could feeling of dependence be a prior condition to understand the meaning of life? It appears that such feeling of dependence is the realization that

life does not exhaust in facts and things, i.e., life is something more than material elements. The psycho-physical life is dependent and guided by non-material elements. Therefore, it cannot be regarded that life exhausts in material cravings. And, so long as there is an outside agency to guide the events of the world, life does not get explained in its entirety solely by way of enumerating its psycho-physical properties. This, in turn, shows that life has a meaning which is beyond the material world and life. The sense of life or spiritual life has to be outside the psycho-physical life. Thus, God is not only the meaning of life and world but also something which could make life meaningful, as through believing in Him one realizes the meaningfulness of life.

In this connection, it is to be noted that not all that on which we are dependent in our daily life can be called God. For the purpose of getting success in our actions for certain desired goals we are often dependent on other human beings, nature, animals, etc., who act either as facilitators or as obstacles. These obstacles cannot be called God. For Wittgenstein, God is not something material like these things but he is fate—a supernatural entity.[8] Another deference in dependence on worldly things and that of God is that whereas former dependence can be overcome with determination and integrity, the latter, i.e., fate cannot be changed. Thus, it is through the realization of dependence on God and one's own limitation that one is motivated to look beyond the psycho-physical life and can grasp the meaning of life.

(c) Wittgenstein's view on the first alternative, i.e., living a meaningful life on the basis of the belief in soul, is quite different from the views of established religious, theological or philosophical traditions. Wittgenstein neither accepts Cartesianism nor Humanism and the Kantian notion of subject, self or soul:

> According to Cartesianism it refers to a soul substance attached to the body. According to Humean theories it can refer only to a bundle of mental episodes, since no such unitary substance is encountered in retrospection; according to Kantianism it signifies the transcendental unity of apperception; a formal feature of all judgements, namely that they can be prefixed by 'I think'.

> Wittgenstein imbibed these options through Schopenhauer's Kantianism and Russell's Humanism. Both rejected the Cartesian soul-substance, but retained various 'selves'.[9]

The Schopenhauerian position is as follows:

> The subject of experience can never be an object of experience. It is not identical with the person (since persons are, at least in part, bodily and bodies are objects of experience.) It is not identical with any part of the spacio-temporal, empirical world—not any individual thing within the world. Rather, he says, 'each one of us finds himself as this subject.' Schopenhauer uses a number of images in describing the subject: it is like an eye that cannot see itself, or the local point at which light rays are concentrated by a concave mirror.[10]

The impact of the Schopenhauerian notion of subject on Wittgenstein is apparent. In *TLP*, Wittgenstein accepts that sensations are not part of the self. *TLP*, 5.6 particularly deals with Wittgenstein's notion of subject or self. Like Schopenhuer, Wittgenstein explains the notion of subject with the help of the relation an eye has to its visual field. *TLP*, 5.6331 states that the form of the visual field is as follows:

Eye

It says that one cannot find anything in the visual field which could infer the existence of the eye. Similar is the case with life. From life one can never infer subject as from the visual field one cannot infer the existence of eye. According to *TLP*, 6.4311, 'Our life has no end just the way in which our visual field has no limits.'

As there is no end of life, so there is no subject in the physical world. However, *TLP*, 5.641 asserts that there is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way as there is no such subject that thinks (*TLP*, 5.631). About this subject Wittgenstein says that it is neither human body, nor human soul but it is the metaphysical subject. Such a subject is the limit of the world and is not a part of the world. About this subject *TLP*, 5.632 asserts that it does not belong to the world.

The following question arises: why did Wittgenstein regard subject/soul as the transcendental and not in the world? The reason seems to be that the framework of the early Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy was committed to the principle of Ockham's razor. Dale Jucquette puts this point in the following way:

> Wittgenstein rejects the existence of the metaphysical subject as a world entity by an ingenious application of Ockham's razor to subject terms in propositional attitude expressions ... It is by showing that there is no need for propositional attitude expressions of the form 'believes (fears, doubts, etc.) (that) ...', that Wittgenstein argues there is no justification for allowing terms designating a metaphysical subject into the correct logical notation prescribed by the picture theory of meaning. On the interpretation of Ockham's razor by which terms are meaningless if not strictly necessary, Wittgenstein concludes that nothing corresponds to putative terms for the metaphysical subject. The subject consequently does not exist, but transcends or stands outside the world as its limit or boundary (*eine Greze*) and vanishing point.[11]

Whatsoever is the case, the subject's or soul's non-existence in the world shows that like God, the meaning of life and the meaning of world, it belongs to the 'higher' realm—the realm of showable about which nothing can be said.

Now, we are faced with the basic question: How does, by believing in such a soul, one begin to live a meaningful life? It is to be noted here that the belief in such a soul is not necessarily a belief in the immortality of soul. Wittgenstein in his early phases did not believe in the kind of immortality generally understood by traditional religions. He says, 'Philosophers who say: "after death a timeless state will supervene", or "at death a timeless state supervene" and do not notice that they have used in a temporal sense the words "after" and "at" and "supervene" and that temporality is embedded in their grammar.' (*CV*, p. 26e)

Hence, in *TLP*, 6.4312, Wittgenstein asserts:

> Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving forever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies *outside* space and time.

Thus, Wittgenstein did not believe in the immortality of soul[12] because for him this would not be helpful in solving the problem to which it was intended to solve. The problem which the assumption of the immortality of soul was intended to solve was to create harmony in life. And it was presumed that this harmony would be obtained only when there is a consistency between the action performed and, corresponding to it, obtained happiness of life. As there is bound to be inconsistency between an action and its results, so it was presumed that given the immortality of soul, in the long run consistency would be established. It was under this belief that immortality was accepted as a pre-condition of morality. For Wittgenstein, the temporal immortality of soul, even if such immortality is presumed to be of infinite time duration, cannot solve the riddles of life because they lie deep and don't appear on the surface.

The riddles of life can be solved not by the belief in temporal immortality but the immortality of timelessness can be a solution. Thus, his notion of immortality is a typical one. *TLP*, 6.4311 asserts, 'If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.' We shall elaborate this point further in the next section.

It seems from Wittgenstein's views on the notion of the subject that he distinguishes between an empirical ego and a metaphysical subject. And it is a metaphysical subject, as David Favrholdt puts it, which 'is ... neither an object nor a fact and therefore cannot be a part of the world but in some sense or other must be outside the world.'[13] As different from the metaphysical aspect of the subject, the empirical ego part of the subject is very much related to the world. And, the timelessness or 'living in the present' kind of immortality can be ascribed to this empirical ego for living a meaningful life.

However, let us postpone the discussion as to how this peculiar kind of immortality, if it can be treated as immortality at all, can be helpful

for living a meaningful life, for the next section. The postponement is a necessity here because first we have to take into account Wittgenstein's views on death before dealing with his views on living in the present in relation with living a meaningful life. It is precisely this reason that here we are not considering the fourth alternative about living a meaningful life mentioned in the beginning of the paper as we shall deal with it the next section.

DEATH AND MEANINGFUL LIFE

For Wittgenstein death provides meaning to life.[14] The question is: how could the certainty of the occurrence of one's own death provide meaning to life? Death could provide meaning to life in any one of the four ways mentioned in the beginning of the paper. We have seen that all these four ways of drawing meaning from life can be broadly divided into two categories, i.e., the belief in afterlife and the moulding of the ways of living. Thus we can see that the Platonic view of death is different from that of Materialists. Plato belongs to the first category, i.e., belief in afterlife whereas Materialists belong to the second category which is the moulding of the ways of living. Hence they recommend different methods by way of following which a life can be worth living.

In *Phaedo*, Plato defines death as separation of soul from body. The acceptance of the immortality of soul is a prerequisite of Plato's notion of death. On the other hand, Materialists, who believe that there is no soul, e.g., Epicureans, counter this view as for them death can do no harm to the person at the moment he is alive, and a non-existent cannot be said to be harmed. No one is alive to experience death so one cannot be said to be harmed with what he is not alive to experience. To quote Epicurus:

> ... death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it comes, is but an empty pain in anticipation. So, death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.[15]

The following points are discernible in Epicurus's above quoted view on death:

(a) Death does not belong to life because life which is a collection of sensation does not have sensation of death. One doesn't live to experience death.

(b) The understanding that we have a limited life, i.e., the understanding that life is not immortal, helps in enjoying life because one stops behaving as if one is an immortal.

Wittgenstein's view that there is no death in life *TLP*, 6.4311 resembles the Epicurean view on the underlying issue of the denial of the irrational fear of death. To say that there is no death in life is to say 'that there is no such thing as "living through death", so long as to emerge on the other side of it. Death is not an experience in life, and there is no such thing as looking back on death, and assessing it from some new perspective.'[16] Wittgenstein maintains, 'Fear in the face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e., a bad life. (*NB*, p. 75e) Wittgenstein's view (*TLP*, 6.431) that in death, world does not change but stops existing, and that the presumption of the temporal immortality of soul does not solve the riddles of life (*TLP*, 6.4312), also endorses the Epicurean view[17] that life which is devoid of the fear of death is a life of prudence and worth living.

Notwithstanding the apparent similarities between the views of Wittgenstein and Epicurus on Death, their differences are of profound significance as they determine the non-empirical nature of Wittgenstein's view on a life worth living. Whereas Epicurus's notion of death is about the death of the empirical ego, that of Wittgenstein is about both the metaphysical subject as well as the empirical ego. Wittgenstein's statement, 'Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death', (*TLP*, 6.4311) deals with both the aspects of the subject. The first part of the statement, 'Death is not an event in life' is about the

metaphysical subject because the subject is beyond the world; hence death also lies outside the psychological life. The second part, i.e., the sentence, 'we do not live to experience death' cannot be associated with the metaphysical subject as Wittgenstein asserts that sense experience cannot be part of the metaphysical subject. It is related to the empirical ego. Even empirical ego, which undergoes death, cannot be said to have experiences of its own death. It can have experience of the moments which are just prior to the moment of death but cannot exist to have death-experience because the moments of experience of death are co-terminus with the existence of the empirical ego. However, even though the empirical ego does not get the experience of death, it undergoes death. Hence it is limited by death.

This position of Wittgenstein coheres with his views on life and death. Death, of course, does belong to the empirical ego, material world and psycho-physical life, therefore, there is no scope for the traditional notion of the temporal immortality of soul. On the other hand, from the point of view of the metaphysical subject, meaning of world and life, death is not an event. It does not belong to the sense of life and world. From this point of view a peculiar notion of immortality can be apprehended. It is not the immortality in time but in eternity, i.e., in timelessness. That is why Wittgenstein maintains that the immortality can be understood not as an infinite temporal duration but as a state of timelessness. For him its such a kind of eternity which can be obtained only while living in the present. (*TLP*, 6.4311)

Following Wittgenstein's view that 'living in the present' could be treated as eternal life or immortality, D.Z. Phillips, enumerates different notions of immortality such as 'we do live after us', 'we overcome death because we live on in our descendants', 'to win a place in history', 'to be remembered for one's artistic creations'. Here, the immortality could mean moral attitude as 'living and dying in such a way which could not be rendered pointless by death'.[18] Explicating the Wittgensteinian notion of 'eternal life', Phillips says, 'Eternity is not more life, but this life seen under certain moral and religious modes of thoughts. This is precisely what seeing this life *sub specie aeternitatis* would amount to be.'[19] Thus, for Wittgenstein eternal life need not necessarily mean the temporal immortality of soul as for him 'living in

eternity' means living in the present. 'Living in the present' is the prior condition of living a happy life. That is why Wittgenstein says, 'Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy.' (*NB*, p. 74e) Its a life which is lived in accordance with the sense of the world, and *ipso facto* with the sense of life. Thus, 'In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what "being happy" means.'[20] (*NB*, p. 75e) Wittgenstein's notion of a worthy life is not like the materialistic view of a good life which consists of 'eat, drink and be merry'. As different from the materialistic notion of an ideal life which consists of nothing but sense enjoyment, its the life which is happy and which is devoid of fear. He says, 'A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the face of death.' (*NB*, p. 74e)

For Wittgenstein, happy life is good in itself—its a life worth living. He says, 'I keep on coming back to this! Simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I now ask myself: But why should I live happily, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it is the only right life.' (*NB*, p. 78e) The reason Wittgenstein gives for saying that a happy life is good is that it seems that a happy life is more harmonious that the unhappy life. (*NB*, p. 78e) Thus, a happy life is the meaningful and spiritual life whereas a life full of miseries and fear is a psycho-physical life.

Wittgenstein's response to the query as to what is the objective mark of a happy life is that there cannot be any physical criterion of a happy life. The material well-being or sense-enjoyment cannot be a criterion of a happy life since such a life is devoid of living in the present. A materialistic life is devoid of living in the present because the basis of sense enjoyment is hope and expectation which is the root cause of sorrows in life. As such the criterion of a happy life is indescribable because it is a spiritual and not a physical one. He maintains, 'But we could say: The happy life seems to be in some sense more harmonious than the unhappy. But in what sense? What is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark, that can be *described*.' (*NB*, p. 78e)

Although Wittgenstein does not provide any criterion of a happy life, he maintains that a happy life is good because a happy man fulfils

the purpose of his existence. At this point, endorsing the view of Dostoievsky, Wittgenstein says that Dostoievsky is right in his view that a man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of his existence. (*NB*, p. 73e)

From this position of Wittgenstein, again a question arises as to what is the purpose of the existence which the happy man is said to be fulfilling? In answer to this, Wittgenstein maintains that one is said to be fulfilling the purpose of existence when one has no purpose but to live. In his words, '... we could say that the man is fulfilling the purpose of existence who no longer needs to have any purpose except to live.' (*NB*, p. 73e) What does this mean? It means that a man is living a meaningful life only when he lives in desirelessness. He lives for nothing but for the sake of living. The one who lives for the sake of living is for Wittgenstein a contented man. (*NB*, p. 73e) Such a man is contented because he lives in no expectation and hence there is no danger of his being deprived of anything. This view of Wittgenstein's can be understood in reference to Indian Metaphysics, which asserts that a proper living consists in living without any attachment. *Bhagvad-Gita* announces:

tyaktvā karma-phalāsaṅgaṁ nitya-tṛpto nirāshrayaḥ,
karmaṇy-abhipravṛtto-pi naiva kiñchit karoti saḥ.
(Ch. 4, *Shloka*-20)

That is: 'Having given up attachment to the results of action, he who is ever-contented, dependent on nothing, he really does not do anything even though engaged in action.' *Gita* (18: 11) recognizes that since it is not possible to live without activity while living, therefore what is important is not to live without action but to live a life in which there is no craving for a certain result from a certain action. And one can live such a life only when one realizes that: 'I cannot bend the happiness of the world to my will: I am completely powerless. I can only make myself independent of the world—and so in a certain sense master it—by renouncing any influence on happenings.' (*NB*, p. 73e)[21]

There is no contradiction in living in the present and living in the state of desirelessness because for renouncing the effects of the world one need not become inactive. This is also what *Gita* holds about the nature of renunciation: renunciation *in* action and not the renunciation

of action. The renunciation *in* action means giving up of desires and the expectation that certain result will follow the action. Thus what is to be given up is not the action itself but the desires. And it is in such giving up that Wittgenstein's renouncing the world consists of. By renunciation *in* action we recognize our dependence on God. As Wittgenstein says, '*However this may be*, at any rate we *are* in a certain sense dependent, and what we are dependent on we can call God.' (*NB*, p. 74e) It is this recognition which motivates us to live in accordance with the world, in the state of desirelessness—and only such a person can live happily—bereft of uncertainties and remorse. As such a recognition provides courage and insight to live fearlessly and without any expectation, one can live happily. It is in fact an attitudinal change which brings about a happy way of living. Thus, in *NB*, p. 76e, Wittgenstein says, 'Man cannot make himself happy without much ado. Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope.'

And when one lives in the present, lives without any desire and without any fear, such a life turns out to be a life which is guided as per the direction of the conscience. Therefore, Wittgenstein maintains that one can live happily only if one follows his conscience. Thus he commands: 'Act according to your conscience whatever it may be. Live happily!' (*NB*, p. 75e) Conscience, for Wittgenstein is the voice of God. (*NB*, p. 75e) Hence a happy life is the one which is lived as per the direction of God. As God is the meaning of world and life, a meaningful life is the one which is lived in the sense of the world and life. It is a way of living which consists of seeing life as a work of God. Wittgenstein asserts that to see life as a work of God is 'worth contemplating'—life appears splendid. (*CV*, p. 6e) Its a kind of dependence on God which we have described in the previous section. Thus, living meaningfully consists in living in such a way which reverberates the sense of life and world (i.e., God).

All the above described ways to live a meaningful life such as 'living in accordance with the world', 'living in the present', 'living happily', 'living in timelessness', 'living without fear and hope', 'living in accordance with conscience', and ultimately 'living life in the glory of God', which actually are synonymous to each other in Wittgenstein so far as their practical application is concerned, only suggest or show a

genuine life pattern. Neither can there be any prescription or commandment or theory of a meaningful life nor such prescriptions commensurate with Wittgensteinian methodology which holds that the realm of a meaningful life can only be shown and cannot be described.

In brief, we have seen that for Wittgenstein living a meaningful life consists in living happily. And a person lives happily if he lives in the present, i.e., in timelessness, fearlessness and acts according to his conscience; otherwise he lives an unhappy life. A happy life is a meaningful life and it is this life which is inseparable from the sense of the world, i.e., it is a life which is lived in the sense of the world. Living such a life is like living a kind of immortality obtained in timelessness to which death does not belong.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABBREVIATIONS

NB: *Notebooks 1914–16*
TLP: *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*
CV: *Culture and Value*
LC: *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs.*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cf. Craig, Edward, Routledge *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, London: Routledge, 1998, Vol. 2, p. 822. I have tried to explore the Wittgensteinian perspective on these generally held views about living a meaningful life.

2. Some commentators of *Tractatus*, in their own ways, have expressed similar views. According to James Griffin, the reason for Wittgenstein's view that the world is the totality of facts and not of things is: 'Facts are generically different from things; facts have things as constituents; but they are not just the set of these things; they are these things plus configurations.' Griffin, James, *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism*, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 30.

   Likewise for Mounce: 'To say that the world is a totality of things would be to leave out that things fit together. Things exist only in facts. Moreover which facts a thing *can* fit into is predetermined; it is written into the nature of the thing. That is why not thing but facts, and not just facts but facts in logical space, that constitute the world.' By 'facts in logical space' Mounce meant that for Wittgenstein, not the actual existing facts but the possible fact constitute the world. Mounce, M.O., *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction*, London: Basil Blackwell, 1981, p. 18.
3. The realm of saying is about the psycho-physical world whereas the realm of showing is about the sense or meaning of the world.
4. Ramsey, F.P., 'Critical Notice, *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*', *Mind*, Vol. 32, No. 128, October 1923, p. 478. While establishing his interpretation of *Tractatus*' sentence 6.45, Ramsey rejects Bertrand Russell's interpretation of it. Russell held that 'the totality of values of x is mystical' because 'the world is the totality of things not of facts' (*TLP*, 1.1). It seems that Ramsey's denial of the acceptance of Russellian interpretation is basically due to the reason that Russell undermines Wittgenstein's distinction between the realms of 'saying' and 'showing'.
5. Barrett, Cyril, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, UK and USA: Blackwell, 1991, p. 97.
6. Barrett, Cyril, op. cit., p. 95.
7. I am not going into the details about our dependence on God here, as I will take up this in the next section in connection with Wittgenstein's view that the dependence on God can be a tool for living a meaningful life while 'living in the present'.
8. I shall take up this point in the next section while dealing with God's role in living a meaningful life.
9. Glock, Hans-Johann, *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, UK and USA: Blackwell Reference 1996, p. 160.
10. Craig, Edward, op. cit., Vol. 8, 1998, p. 548.
11. Jacquette, Dale, 'Wittgenstein on the Transcendence of Ethics', *Australian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 75, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 312–3. In support of his view as to why for *Tractatus* the subject does not belong to the world, Dale cites *TLP*, 5.542–5.5421 (which asserts that statements

such as 'A says p' are of the form 'p says p') and that 'there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in contemporary superficial psychology.' It is due to this reason that he asserts: 'The world does not belong to any particular personal empirical subject of superficial psychology, but to the impersonal undifferentiated extra-worldly transcendent subject, the metaphysical, not the phenomenological "I", at the limit of the world.'

12. In his *LC* Wittgenstein provides another view about the immortality of soul and in fact accepts that it is meaningful in its own language game.
13. Favrholdt, David, *An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1964, p. 148.
14. Wittgenstein is quoted as 'Only death gives life its meaning' in Monk, Ray, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, UK: Vintage, 1991, p. 139.
15. Epicurus, *Death is Nothing to Us* in Lousis P. Pojman, *Life and Death: A Reader in Moral Problems*, Sudbury, Massachusetts, Boston: Jones & Barrett Publishers, p. 150.
16. Scruton, Roger, *Modern Philosophy: A Survey*, Great Britain: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994, p. 313.
17. Epicurus, op. cit., p. 152.
18. Phillips, D.Z., op. cit., p. 50.
19. Ibid., p. 39.
20. Wittgenstein's notion 'living in accordance with the world' has been variously interpreted. Ronald Sutler maintains that this notion contains seven requirements: (i) you must fulfil the purpose of existence and not be troubled by the purpose or meaning of life, (ii) you must live in the present, (iii) you must live without fear and hope, (iv) you must act according to your conscience, (v) you must lead a life of knowledge, (vi) you must not be dependent on the amenities or comforts of the world, (vii) you must look at life aesthetically. Ronald Sutler, 'The Early Wittgenstein on Happiness', *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Issue No. 115 (September 1989), pp. 291–9. What Ronald Sutler misses is that these are not requirements or qualifications of 'living in accordance with the sense of the world' but actually they all constitute a worthy life which is lived in the sense of the world and life. As each of them explains the other one hence they could be taken as synonymous to each other.
21. Wittgenstein's view may seem ironical to someone as it may appear to him that there is a logical connection between will, action and the result of the action. Wittgenstein rejects the view that there is any such connection. For an elaborate reference to this point please refer to my article 'The Concept of Will in Waismann', *The Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, Summer 2001, pp. 71–81.

On Elucidating the Nature of Ego

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Ego, the enduring and conscious feeling of 'I' vs. 'all else' is experienced subjectively by everyone. Its origin and nature have engaged human intellect for millennia and are still important topics of current scientific and philosophical enquiry. According to ancient Indian thinkers knowledge about Self is supreme (*parā vidyā*). All that deals with various sciences, arts, ethics, religion and *karma kāṇḍa* were considered as auxiliary (*aparā vidyā*).[1] Following Aristotle most European philosophers believed that the Self or soul is the immortal part of man as distinguished from the body. Post-renaissance scientists in Europe either ignored the question relegating it to philosophy, a field outside their own province of activity, or considered it as a riddle not yet amenable to scientific inquiry. In any case it received little importance as a thrust area of scientific research. Philosophers of various proclivities dealt with the question in their own style, largely ignoring the established methods of scientific inquiry. Deprived of the benefits of interacting with mainstream scientists philosophical enquiries into this field did not make any tangible progress. In the recent past, however, the problem is receiving the attention of distinguished scientists as well as philosophers. Recent progress in neurobiology has clearly indicated that consciousness, mind, ego and related phenomena are within the purview of exact sciences.

The subjective feeling of 'I' vs. 'all else' is evident in the behaviour and linguistic expressions of everyone. Inasmuch as the human race has had a long history of evolution it is very unlikely that awareness of Self arose suddenly with the origin of *Homo sapiens*. Even cats, dogs, horses and other mute animals seem to have this feeling as is evident from their behaviour. It would be rash to assume that these animals have no awareness of Self. Do frogs, flies, worms and such

other creatures also have an awareness of Self? It is pragmatic not to demand a final answer at this stage. It is evident that the awareness of Self arises from some neural activity. Frogs and flies also have brains after all. Presumably the awareness of self as a distinct entity is not as vivid in the lower organisms as is in humans. But that is a difference in degree and not in kind.

In lay understanding Self has generally been identified with soul or the hypothetical non-material living (vital) principle. Awareness, consciousness and Ego are often regarded as the attributes of the vital principle. From time to time many questions have been asked about the soul and provided with different answers. Does every individual have a separate soul? Generally the answer is in the affirmative. There are, however, some philosophers who have offered alternative answers. One such answer is that God is the Supreme Soul and human souls are parts of it. Another doctrine holds that a single vital principle called *brahma* constitutes the universe and the individual soul is only a fragment of the universal soul. This is the view held by the *advaita vedānta* school of Indian philosophy. There are, however, other schools of *vedānta* thought which assume the distinctness of individual souls. Every living animal has, according to this view, its own soul.

I. TERMINOLOGY

Before proceeding further the prevailing confusion in terminology has to be cleared. The confusion arises from the difficulties in defining the various terms designating some related life activities. In common parlance many terms are used with considerable overlap in meaning or as synonyms. For use in philosophical and scientific discussion it is necessary to have them defined as precisely as possible.

Let us begin with the word consciousness which is frequently used interchangeably with awareness, alertness and some other states. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousness with Ego. It is indeed not easy to define consciousness. We have to define it at least provisionally so that further discussion makes sense. Awareness of one's own existence, thoughts and surroundings are some of the important indicators of consciousness. In general, what is lost under anaesthesia is consciousness. It can be regained after the influence of the anaesthetic

wanes. An important point to be emphasized here is that a conscious person's sense organs are fully functional. Awareness is reportable knowledge of some particular objects, events or phenomena. Awareness necessarily assumes consciousness. Alertness is a mental state that keeps sense organs is readiness to receive some anticipated information.[2] During sleep alertness is considerably decreased though never eliminated. It is erroneous to say that one is not conscious during sleep. Anyone who is fast asleep can hear sounds, feel vibrations and perceive strong smells. A person can easily be awakened when called by name. Though the sensitivity of some sense organs is somewhat blunted during sleep they are nevertheless functional. This is not so in case of persons rendered unconscious by exposure to various general anaesthetics. A person under general anaesthesia will not respond when called by name. Under anaesthesia one can be lifted, transferred to another cot or subjected to very severe pain as during surgery, without any awareness of any of these. This clearly indicates that unconsciousness and deep sleep cannot be used synonymously. Furthermore, awareness and consciousness are not to be used interchangeably. If one is not aware of the presence of an ink mark on the back of his shirt it does not mean that he is unconscious. Consciousness includes awareness of present and remembered sensory inputs. However, that is not all. It is a more generalized functional state of the sense organs and control over voluntary actions. Consciousness is temporarily eclipsed under the influence of general anaesthetics; yet it is not lost. Coma is a prolonged state of eclipsed consciousness.

While on terminology let us consider another term. What is soul? Is it the same as consciousness? Or, is it the persistent subjective awareness of self as distinguished from all else? Neither, it seems. The concept of soul probably arose as a theoretical requirement to account for the obvious differences between the living and non-living. Traditionally the soul has been considered as a distinct non-material entity.[3] Its existence has not been proved.[4] On the other hand there is adequate evidence now to show that all attributes of life can be explained in physico-chemical terms. The soul now remains only as a component of religious faith. It has been written off by all modern scientists and philosophers except the vitalists. Much of the prevailing confusion in

terminology can be avoided if soul is placed along with entities such as phlogiston and universal ether.

Mind is another term that poses problems while attempting to define it. According to most authors mind is some activity of the brain. As a non-committal definition it is acceptable though it can include many activities of the brain that are obviously not mind. Inasmuch as mental activities can be both conscious and unconscious, mind has a broader meaning than consciousness. There are, however, good reasons to suppose that mind is also an 'internal organ of action'. Mind can perform several reportable activities or their results. Its anatomical correlate cannot be demonstrated. In view of its nature it is unreasonable to look for a defined part of the brain that corresponds to it.

Finally we consider the term Ego.[5] It is the subjective feeling of 'I' as a distinct entity, that excludes all else. It is experienced by everyone. It is continuous from the time as early as is possible to remember till death or onset of coma. In sleep and anaesthesia it persists albeit not experienced continuously. A person recovering from anaesthesia does not feel that he is now a new person. Brief periods of unconsciousness do not break its continuity. We propose to use Ego as a single word for the long phrase 'the persistent subjective feeling of *I vs. all else*'. We use the upper case E in order to avoid Freudian and other undesirable denotations. Ego involves the feeling of self-identity based on memory and that is how it retains unity and continuity through life. It is experienced by the mind but it is not mind itself. We shall discuss the various aspects of Ego in the following sections.

II. A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF EGO

When framing a crisp definition of Ego is not possible, the alternative course is to explain what it includes and what may be excluded from it. An attempt is made in this section to accomplish this aim. In a subject such as psychology which is not yet tamed to exhibit mathematical precision it is unwise to attempt precise definitions of its concepts.

A perusal of recent literature shows that consciousness is the term most commonly used as equivalent to Ego or to include Ego together with other psychological aspects such as awareness, introspection and

others. In a recent book presenting the problem in a scientific background Crick[6] has used consciousness and awareness interchangeably and indicated that it is the same as self or, what in popular parlance is called, the soul. It corresponds only in a general way to the subjective feeling of *I* as a distinct entity. Although Crick has brought about much clarity in our understanding of what consciousness is, he has somehow chosen to exclude Ego from his discussion.

> There are many forms of consciousness such as those associated with seeing, thinking, emotion, pain and so on. Self-consciousness—that is, the self-referential aspect of consciousness—is probably a special case of consciousness. In our view it is better left to one side for the moment. (Crick,[6] p. 21)

Indeed it is the self-referential aspect of consciousness that poses itself as the most stubborn riddle. The other aspects of consciousness, viz., seeing, thinking, etc. have somewhat simpler neurobiological explanations. It is Ego that seems to pose the real challenge before biologists, psychologists and philosophers. If one attempts to understand one's own Ego assuming that it is most easily accessible for analysis a strange philosophical conundrum presents itself. 'I try to understand the nature of I' is, if examined closely, a hopeless paradox. However, once we accept that every individual has a separate Ego which develops during one's life and ends with it, the problem solves itself more than half way through. It is then possible to study objectively another individual's Ego. After all we find no special difficulty in explaining others' respiration, or blood circulation. Others' distress, rage, confusion and such other experiences are also quite comprehensible, though not as clearly and fully as respiration. In a similar manner others' Ego can in principle be studied. There are of course some problems. However, they are not insuperable. Even understanding the molecular mechanisms of respiration and muscle contraction was not without difficulties: but they were overcome. There are possibly greater difficulties in elucidating the nature of Ego; but that is all.

As will be clarified in the following sections memory is closely related to Ego. However, the essential feature of Ego is its role as a central coordinator of the organs of perception (*jñānendriyas*) and the

effector organs (*karmendriyas*). In a recent publication[7] I have tried to elaborate on this aspect of Ego. We may take this as a working definition of Ego—the sustained experience of being the coordinator of all perceptions and controlled actions is Ego (*satatamanubhūtaḥ bhoktṛtvakartṛtvayoḥ saṁvidhātṛtvabhāvaḥ aham-bhāvaḥ*). This definition is in fact a phenomenological description of Ego. Philosophers in general emphasize the subjective feeling of Ego since it is 'so clear' to everyone of us. They seem to be reluctant to give due importance to the phenomenological aspects that can facilitate objective investigations. A fruitful approach to understanding Ego is to eliminate its subjective aspects. Subjective feelings cannot be discussed in philosophy if they are considered beyond the purview of linguistic expression. Pursuing the 'transcendental' aspect will push the discussion into the abyss of solipsism. Retaining the subjective aspect and separating it from the objective aspects has the advantage of sharpening the focus of different questions. However, if the residual subjective aspects are treated as the 'hard' problem[8] categorically different from the 'easy' (i.e., objective) aspects and to be dealt with separately using a non-scientific method it will continue to remain 'hard'. In the working definition proposed here it can be pointed out that it does not include the unitary aspect of Ego while emphasizing its role in discrete physiological processes of perception of stimuli and coordination of responses to them. Menon[9] considers this as the 'harder' problem within the 'hard' problem. In order to obviate this difficulty the association of memory with Ego will be discussed in the following account.

III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

In this article I shall attempt to integrate an ancient philosophical idea with recent scientific knowledge as an approach to elucidating the nature of Ego. It will be convenient to elaborate the phenomenological description of Ego and then to use it as the proposal to adduce further neurobiological knowledge in support.

Objects, their attributes and events occurring outside the body are known through the sense organs. Ancient thinkers of all schools of philosophy had recognized the importance of the organs of perception. Jaina philosophers used it as the chief criterion for the classification of

organisms.[10] Classically, five organs of perception have been enumerated. However, biologists have recognized the role of some others too. We sense the position of our body in relation to gravity. This is done by the vestibular organ, a part of the internal ear.[11] There is a sense organ to perceive the ratio of oxygen:carbon dioxide in the blood. There are sensory mechanisms to detect fullness/emptiness of the stomach. These are undoubtedly organs of perception. If we consider the sense organs of other animals it will be realized that organs of perception are not just five; they are many more. Nevertheless the importance assigned them by philosophers is not diminished. On the contrary it is greatly increased.[12]

The effector organs (organs of action, *karmendriyas*) are closely related to the organs of perception through the mediation of mind. Classically enumerated as five (*vāk*, *pāṇi*, *pāda*, *pāyu* and *upastha*) there are in fact many more. A novel classification of *karmendriyas* has been presented.[13] Muscles, glands and the mind are the three broad classes of *karmendriyas*. Being controlled by the nervous system is their common feature. Many animals drive offending flies away using their tail or ears which are therefore *karmendriyas* similar to *pāṇi* and *pāda*. Breathing movements are performed by muscles of the thorax and diaphragm. Thus, including voluntary muscular organs as types of *karmendriyas* is justified. Some glandular secretions (e.g. tears, saliva, etc.) have a neuronal control. The glands are also therefore *karmendriyas* in their own right. Inclusion of mind among the *karmendriyas*[14] is likely to be contested by most philosophers. However, inasmuch as we perform many activities 'mentally' (e.g. numerical calculations, outlining future actions, etc.) the inclusion of mind (or at least some aspect of it) in *karmendriyas* seems to be justified.

IV. PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

We may now return to the working definition of Ego mentioned in section II. Experience of perception or the notion of being a perceiver is an important aspect of it. The other aspect is the experience of coordinating the voluntary actions giving rise to the notion that there is a central agency that integrates perceptions and actions. In other words, it refers to the experience of being a unified perceiver-cum-

performer with respect to everything of the individual. Ancient Indian philosophers have defined *aham* (the Sanskrit word for *I*) almost like this. Modern Indian writers paraphrase this as the 'enjoyer of the world and doer of actions'. The terms enjoyer and doer are literal translations of the corresponding Sanskrit words *bhoktā* and *kartā*. The word enjoyer has unintended and undesirable connotations. Some writers have expressed it as enjoyer-sufferer. The terms perceiver and performer may be used as the preferred translation. More important than the terminology, however is the notion that Ego is an intervening neural activity that mediates between all perceptions on the one hand and all voluntary actions on the other.

All sense perceptions and any or all actions elicited by them are experienced by the central agency, viz., Ego. Phenomenologically this is explained in Fig. 1. On perceiving an object or event (say a cat and its mewing) one can perform any of the several corresponding actions as directed or demanded by the context. Obviously the signals from each of the organs of perception are received in a centralized neural structure. Any of the corresponding actions as instructed or demanded by the context can be performed irrespective of which particular stimulus elicits them. Memory is obviously involved in this. Further, the mind also plays a role since not all responses elicited by the stimulus are simple reflexes. Some of the responses may indeed be very complex.[15] (See the legend below Fig. 1 for details.)



V. NEUROBIOLOGICAL MECHANISM

In the foregoing narration we have mentioned the role of a 'central agency' without specifying what it is. There is no doubt that it is a neural activity and so there is no need to invoke any mysterious or transcendental entity. Extant scientific knowledge is inadequate to

Fig. 1. Various sense organs (*jñānendriyas*) provide information which is processed internally by the brain and the appropriate voluntary action of *karmendriyas* is initiated. The large circle represents the brain. Auricular areas outside the circle represent *jñānendriyas* (left) and *karmendriyas* (right). The thick arrow on the left represents signals received by the sense organs and the one on the right represents various responsive actions as illustrated. An abstractum (*apākarṣa*) of the sentient object (a cat in the illustration) is formed on seeing the visual inputs, i.e. the written word, cat (1); a cat, i.e. the animal (2); the written words for cat in different languages (3); auditory inputs, i.e. the word cat pronounced or mewing of a cat (4); or tactile signals (5). In response to any of the incoming signals an abstractum is formed in the mind (A). A variety of voluntary responsive actions (B-F) may be performed. Thus irrespective of which incoming signal or signals elicited the formation of an abstractum any of these actions can be elicited: pronouncing the name of the object in any language known to the subject (B), pointing out the word signifying the object by distinguishing it from distracting choices (C), drawing a picture (E) or writing the name of the object (F). The incoming signals are processed with reference to the memory and mind. Signals that have no corresponding referent already formed cannot elicit the proper action. For a subject who does not know German, the word Katze (3, read or read out) does not make the abstractum of the object. Similarly the Kannada word (3) makes no sense to the subject who does not know the language. Yet the shape of the written form can be remembered even by an illiterate subject and recognized and pointed out correctly and avoiding distracting choices. Thus a person who has seen carefully the written Hindi word for cat can recognize it correctly (D). Obviously the abstractum formed in the mind of the illiterate person is different from that formed in the mind of one who can read and write. In case the subject is shown a dog (6) and asked, 'Is this a cat?' he responds by saying 'No' (G). This is because the subject already has the abstractum of a cat formed in his mind from previous experience. He now compares it with the newly formed abstractum and says 'No'. Interactions among the parts of the brain that process the incoming signals, memory and mind are indicated by thin arrows. The central coordinating agency, viz., Ego, activates the part of the brain which in turn sends electrical signals to the appropriate organs of response. (Modified after Rao.[7])

explain its mechanism fully. Whatever is known with a high degree of certainty will be explained in this section.

In explaining the integration of several sensory stimuli and regulating the corresponding action we ought to trace step by step all the neural activities involved. Given the structural and functional organization of the human brain with its bewilderingly complex back and forth exchange of signals among parts it is not to be expected that a well defined part acts as the coordinating agency. Extant scientific information permits only a narration in broad outline as depicted in Fig. 2.

A fully conscious waking person (i.e., when not asleep) continually receives external stimuli which after a complex internal processing elicit responses that may be classified broadly as physical, glandular and mental. In the schematic diagram (Fig. 2) the brain is shown as a large circle with two auricular outlines representing sense organs and the organs of muscular action. For simplicity glandular responses are not shown. The different parts of the brain indicated (sensory and association cortex on the left and the motor cortex on the right) are anatomically recognizable structures with considerable details already known. The areas representing memory, Ego and mind do not correspond to any discrete parts of the brain. They are in fact different aspects of the internal processing of neuronal signals. Many discrete signals from the organs of perception (represented by a thick arrow, A) are processed separately and integrated. Signals constituting internal processing (thin arrows) are shown to suggest probable interactions between different parts of the brain. Details of these interactions are not yet known. There is considerable moderation of the magnitude of voluntary actions, obviously controlled by some parts of the brain. The controlled ('moderated') signals elicit externally visible muscular activity (shown by the letter B in the figure).[16] Involuntary reflex actions are generally of the 'all or none' type and are initiated from parts of the spinal cord. Voluntary and involuntary actions (thick arrows numbered 1 and 2) are visible externally. There are also some muscular actions not visible externally. An example is the fine tuning of vision brought about by the movements of the eye ball and controlled by the motor cortex (thick arrow numbered 3) serving to improve the quality of perception. Thus there is looping over of the earlier internal processing.



Fig. 2. Schematic diagram to illustrate the relation of perception and action with Ego and the possible neural mechanisms. The brain is shown as a large circle with two auricular outlines representing sense organs and the organs of muscular action. The different parts of the brain indicated do not necessarily correspond to any anatomical parts. Sensory inputs from different sense organs are shown by a single thick arrow. 'Action arrows' are thick and also numbered. 1. Reflex actions occur without deliberate effort. They are involuntary. 2. Voluntary actions, like the reflex actions, are externally visible movements. They can be initiated or inhibited at will. 3. Some fine tuning of sensory signals is brought about by the action of muscles. These actions are generally not visible overtly. 4. One can perform mental activities subjectively. The mind is considered as an instrument in performing these actions. These actions are not externally visible but they are reportable. Thin arrows within the brain show some essential interactions among the parts. Ego is shown as the central agency coordinating different activities. All organs of action are covered by the skin and hence also act as tactile organs. The organs of action therefore establish a feedback loop (discontinuous arrow at the bottom of the figure). A. Many distinct signals and their parallel processing. B. Controlled magnitude of activation; many parallel signals. C. All or none type of action. (Modified from Rao.[7])

Inasmuch as the external organs of muscular action (classical *karmendriyas*) are covered by the skin they also serve as tactile organs and thus engender a feedback loop (represented by the discontinuous arrow at the bottom of the figure).

In the previous paragraph we have summarized a complex set of neural activities synthesizing sensory inputs and initiating regulated voluntary actions. Many details have been excluded for the sake of simplicity, hoping that what is given is adequate to explain the process in general. The role of memory and mind in internal processing of the signals can be surmised with a reasonable degree of certainty though the details are not known. Furthermore, their anatomical correlates are not well defined. Memory ensures continuity of experience thus connecting previous perceptions and responses with the current events. Perhaps this can be stated in neurobiological terms as follows. The messages pass across synaptic junctions that already exist. Voluntary actions can be controlled in their timing and intensity. This obviously demands mental activities. Ego has been assigned the central role in the processes depicted in Fig. 2. The innermost circle in the figure (labelled Ego) is in all probability a part of the brain called thalamus (*vide infra*).

As a brief digression we may now return to the 'harder than the hard' problem mentioned in Section II. Because distinct conscious experiences take the same neuronal route to and from memory and eventually reach the effector organs it is easy to understand that different discrete conscious experiences separated in time accrue to the same unitary system including memory. The 'harder than the hard' problem thus solves itself. Although every individual has a separate Ego there should be no difficulty in explaining how all persons seem to have similar notions of Ego. The nervous system of all normal humans is similar and so the notion of Ego is similar in all. Indeed that is how it becomes a legitimate issue for philosophical discussion and scientific investigation. On the contrary if we admit mysticism[17] into the discourse then we are forced to appeal to 'established authority' (scriptures or *pūrvasūri*s).

How a unitary and continually sustained notion of distinct I-ness becomes established in every person can further be explained by the fact that every waking person has an experience of continually passing time and an appropriate concept of time intervals or the time occupied by different events. After brief spells of sleep or general anaesthesia we get ourselves back into the proper time frame either by observing

the surroundings or by reliable testimony (*āptavākya*). Inasmuch as the 'restoring' process and subsequent sensory/motor signals take the same neural route including memory there is no break in the continuous self-identity of the person.[18]

VI. THE ORIGIN OF EGO DURING AN INDIVIDUAL'S LIFE

Does a newborn baby have Ego? Or does it originate postnatally and develop in everyone's life? It is argued here that Ego develops early during infancy and gradually gets fortified to the definitive state by the age of 20–24 months. When exactly it originates is not clear. John Locke[19] believed that the newborn baby's mind is blank ('tabula rasa'). Though this unqualified statement will be contested by some it may be accepted as a generalized approximation. The infant's receptor organs are fully developed at birth. However, they are exposed to a rich variety of stimuli only subsequently. Gradually an infant begins to observe objects and to correlate causes and events by trial and error. The mother's contact and satiation of hunger are probably the earliest to be correlated. A month old infant is able to locate the source of sound by turning the head. Obviously this is an instance of good coordination of sensory stimulation and a complex muscular movement involved in turning the head. Grasping objects (e.g. mother's finger, clothes, toys, etc.) is an inherent ability. The objects are clasped and moved by the infant thereby acquiring knowledge about their attributes such as hardness, softness, weight, etc. Initially the clasping and moving actions are crude. A rattle gripped and moved makes some sound. After some time a correlation is inferred among the rattle, its movement and the sound produced. The movement, being crude to begin with, may hit the infant's own body. It takes some time for the infant to learn that the one who moves the rattle and gets hit is one and the same. This helps the infant to experience the unity of being the perceiver and performer. In other words the notion of Ego or self vs. all else begins to develop. Gradually the infant learns to control the movement of shaking the rattle so that it produces the sound but does not hit the body. In 'optimizing' the vigour of shaking so as to produce the pleasurable sound and no painful impact the role of hedonic parts of the central nervous system is involved. Obviously the experience of others is not of any use in such processes

of learning. All such learning processes fortify the notion of self as the coordinator of actions. Eventually the infant desires to hold the rattle when it is seen or its presence is inferred from its sound produced when shaken by others. These early 'lessons' help the infant to establish an identity of 'self' and 'all else'. When the infant is 8–10 month-old he/she responds when called by name. By the age of 25 months or so the infant's notion of being a distinct individual, i.e., I-ness has developed fully. It may be emphasized that all this learning establishes the unity of *bhoktṛtva* and *kartṛtva*. Once developed, memory retains its identity throughout life.[20]

It has been argued that Ego arises because of language, i.e., the ability to recognize subject-predicate relationship. Linguistic expression involving *I* (subject) and all else (predicate) no doubt accelerates and reinforces the development of Ego. Yet its origin can be traced to pre-linguistic stage in infants' development. Semantic expressions of Ego (i.e., the use of *I*, *my*, *me* and so on) no doubt depend on language though its subjective experience is independent of it.

VII. THE NEURAL CORRELATE OF EGO

When it is proposed that neural activity engenders Ego, the next step in its study is to identify the brain centre where it is localized. Failure to demonstrate a single brain centre as *the* seat of Ego need not disappoint us. It is not a requirement of the scientific theory. Theoretically it is enough if several parts of the brain, each with its own role, are properly integrated with suitable interconnections even if the parts do not constitute a well defined part of the brain as recognizable in conventional anatomy.[21] Nevertheless, trying to identify a part or a group of brain structures where most of the physiological activities leading to the feeling of unified perception-performance occurs is not an unscientific approach. It has at least the merit of being able to exclude those parts that are clearly unrelated to Ego. If such a stance is taken considering the thalamus (Fig. 3) as the 'centre' is justified.[22] This suggestion is based on a large body of evidence gathered by neurophysiologists[23] who have confirmed that awareness (especially visual awareness which has been studied extensively) is associated with electrical activity in this region. In fact, all sensory inputs (except



Fig. 3. Idealized diagram to show the position of thalamus and its connections with the areas of cerebral cortex. (From Rao.[7])

olfactory) pass directly through the thalamus before reaching the various parts of sensory cortex. There are also reciprocating signals from the sensory cortex, thus making the thalamus a relay station. The motor cortex is also connected with the thalamus.[24] It is therefore probable that the feeling of being the central entity (Ego) is an activity of this region. We may recall here the fact that *karmendriya*s act as tactile sense organs thus engendering the feed back loop mentioned earlier (see Fig. 2). It is the completion of this feed back circuit that is significant, distinguishing the brain from mechanical devices that respond to stimuli. Unifying *bhoktṛtva* and *kartṛtva* is evidently the function of this feed back. The hippocampus, another part of the brain, is associated with the function of memory. Functional relation of this part with the experience of Self (especially its continuity) is no doubt important. Yet the suggestion that the thalamus has much to do with Ego seems to be worth pursuing in future experimental studies. Scientists are particularly cautious about finally concluding anything from scattered experimental evidences. It is too early to exclude some other functionally connected parts from this context. However as an indicator of the area of fruitful research the suggestion made here seems to be valuable.

Mainstream philosophers are likely to raise a number of questions on the views expressed in this article and contend that the 'harder than

the hard' problem[25] has not been addressed to. Inasmuch as Ego has been characterized as an experience (*bhoktṛtvakartṛtvayoḥ saṁvidhātṛtvabhāvaḥ*) and explained in neurobiological terms it is admitted that there is no account of a subject of the subjective experience. Does the comprehension of Ego, a process, demand the identification of an experiencer? Human thinking shaped by observation of external objects and events during millions of years of evolution is somehow conditioned to expect that every event has to have an efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). So we tend to think that experience of self also has to have an experiencer. We ought to overcome this handicap in order to obtain a definitive concept of Ego. On the other hand, if we continue to be guided by the 'logical demand' for a subject we are pushed into the realm of incomprehensibles.[26] Offering a name—*ātmā*, *jīva*, *puruṣa* or whatever—or describing it as *sadasadvilakṣaṇam* does not take us very far. What is important to realize is that the experience, experiencer and the process of experiencing Ego are all indistinguishable. This indeed is the contention of *advaita vedānta*.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Philosophical problems can be solved only if we combine contemplation and experimental evidence. Ancient philosophers have arrived at some valuable conclusions on the nature of Ego on the basis of deep insight, gut feeling and observation. The conclusions can be used as the foundation on which to build new knowledge. Neurobiological evidence can no longer be ignored in a discussion on Ego. The old idea of integration of perception and action by a mediating agent variously designated *ātman*, *manas*, *antaḥkaraṇa*, etc. has been re-examined here in the light of extant neurobiological knowledge to explain the nature of Ego. It is contended that Ego is a neural activity. Its comprehension does not demand the assumption of a non-material entity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (Text with English translation), Advaita Asram, Calcutta, 1979, I, 1–2.
2. Cautioning a newcomer to the town we might say, 'There are pick-pockets in the crowded railway station. You will have to be alert.' We don't advise the newcomer to be conscious; we assume he is. Merely being aware of the practice of picking pockets is also not enough. So even if one is conscious and 'aware' of pick-pockets he/she may lose the wallet for not being alert. One has to be beware of rather than be merely aware of pick-pockets. Attention to *anticipated* events is of importance here.
3. The most widely known description of the non-material *ātmatattva* is to be found in *Bhagavadgītā*, II, 18–25.
4. It is always possible to argue that inability to find something is no proof of its non-existence. Philosophers generally maintain that scientific methods are inherently inadequate to demonstrate non-material entities. Once this argument is admitted there no scope for further discussion.
5. The Sanskrit term for this is *aham-bhāva*. The hyphen serves to distinguish it from the commonly used term *ahambhāva* for haughtiness.
6. F. Crick, *The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1994.
7. K. Vasudeva Rao, *Ko'ham? Adhyātmaviṣaye vaijñānikam cintanam*. AIUN Publication, New Delhi, 1997.
8. D.J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp. xii–xiii.
9. S. Menon, 'Towards a Śānkarite Approach to Consciousness Studies: A Discussion in the Context of Recent Interdisciplinary Studies', *J. Indian Council of Phil. Res.*, 28 (2001): 95–111.
10. Umāsvāmi, *Tattvārthasūtra*, II, 13, 19–23. (Sanskrit text with Hindi commentary) Sri Digambara Jain Svadhyayamandir Trust, Songarh, 1954.
11. R.H.S. Carpenter, *Neurophysiology* (2nd edn.), Edward Arnold, London, 1990, pp. 115–23.
12. *Ko'ham?*, p. 29, citation in Note 7.
13. Ibid., p. 51.
14. Ibid., p. 52.
15. For example, on seeing a stray cat in the kitchen the housewife quickly puts the milk pot inside a closed cabinet. This action is prompted by a number of complex interactions between the mind and memory occurring before the visible activity.
16. There is no invariable one-to-one relation between the stimulus and voluntary muscular response. For example when a question is asked we give the answer in the 'normal' way. If the same question is asked again the answer may be louder, believing that the first one was not heard properly. However, if we think that the question was posed again just for fun we may not give any answer at all. The role of the mind in increasing the intensity of the second response or suppressing it altogether is obvious.
17. S. Menon, p. 101, citation in Note 9.

18. *Ko'ham?*, p. 5, citation in Note 7.
19. J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (A.D. Woozley, ed.), Collins Fontana Paperbacks, Glasgow, 1977.
20. *Ko'ham?*, p. 62, citation in Note 7. See also A. Streri, *Seeing, Reaching, and Touching* [English translation of *Voir, atteindre, toucher* by T. Powell and S. Kingerlee], Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertsfordshire, UK, 1993, and H. Gruber and J.J. Voneche, *The Essential Piaget*, Routledge and Kagan Paul, London, 1977.
21. G.M. Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of Mind*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1992, p. 125.
22. *Ko'ham?*, pp. 65–83, citation in Note 7.
23. See F. Crick, citation in Note 6; J. Rothwell, *Control of Human Voluntary Movement* (2nd edn.) Chapman and Hall, London, 1994; R. Passingham, *The Frontal Lobe and Voluntary Action*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1993. A detailed account may be obtained from D. Purves et al. *Neuroscience*, Sinauer Associates Inc., Sunderland MA, USA, 1997.
24. A.G. Cairns-Smith, *Evolving the Mind: On the Nature of Matter and the Origin of Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996, pp. 125–91.
25. S. Menon, p. 97, citation in Note 9.
26. After knowing in detail all the physical causes of cloud formation and rainfall if one persists and asks 'Who/what causes all this?' the possible answers are in the realm of incomprehensibles. This is how Indra or his Greek counterpart Jupiter Pulvius seems to have been invented.

Transcending-Transversal Ethicality

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Two of my papers published in the Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 'An Inquiry into the Cases of Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics' (2001) and 'Intersubjective Corroboration' (2002) were aimed at dislodging ethical sceptics, particularly those sceptical about the possibility of ethical application owing to the lack of the knowledge of proper methodology of ethical application. In 'Intersubjective Corroboration', I have tried to establish a model of ethical application, which is based on the *people's participation* in ethical application as that amounts to application of 'common ethical knowledge owing to ethical experience in the ecological community' and not application of ethical theories artificially by ethics experts. But ethical sceptics are hard nuts; they may be still unsatisfied with this methodology and reject the application of ethics saying, 'It is not common ethical knowledge which people apply, it is moral dogma or what we call common sense morality, which is applied'. Hence, sceptics think that there is no application of ethics. This paper may be considered as the last part of a 'trilogy' as it takes a final attempt at dislodging ethical scepticism. In doing so, the paper discloses the crucial difference between ethicality and morality and shows how coming to understand the concrete value of ethical principle is possible.

The most crucial question we now face is whether applied ethics, even if it is understood in terms of 'intersubjective corroboration', has a future. The question is a sceptical one as one feels that the prospect of people's participation in ethics is not bright. The main reason is that if applying ethics amounts to the application of our 'common ethical knowledge', it is at best application of our knowledge of social mores, customs, traditional norms, and personal and social virtues and values, which in any way is not applying ethics. Better said, 'There is no ethics

in applying ethics; there is something else, namely, application of social dogmas'. Moreover, social dogmas are in no sense ethics (which is within philosophy), and therefore, its application does not have a bright future. What we apply in the name of ethics is nothing but our dogma of a 'true morality', which has no future. The future may rather be waiting for its complete rejection as trash. Further, a post-corroboration analysis of ethical dialogue reveals the dynamics of well-known ethical first principles in real life situations. This is another unfounded belief because nothing but private and public moral sense, moral opinions, moral beliefs, moral dogmas and not ethics have been applied as will be clearly revealed.

Is the future of applied ethics I have envisioned so dark? Is there no pathway to people's ethics in which value-laden problems are collectively resolved keeping full faith in theoretical analytic work of discovery of ethical dynamics? Let us first try to resolve the residual sceptical doubts; the rest will follow. First, to remind the sceptics, it has been argued at length that in application of ethics, standard ethical first principles like deontology and teleology cannot and need not be applied. Another reminder is that a conception of artificial application of ethical theories presupposes ethical chauvinism and ethical expertise leaving out the option of an involvement of professionals with regard to resolution of moral problems. We have to remind our sceptic friends that a possibility of collective resolution of moral problems in society does not beg moral dogmas and there is a difference between applying common sense morality and applying common ethical knowledge through intersubjective discourse. Our sceptic friends may be nurturing an old dogma in their minds that ethics and morality are just the same. In the common parlance we do not make sharp distinctions between the two because we feel that one may easily replace the other but to do it every time may be a great mistake. We have to understand that as a member of a typically identifiable Indian society some of us might have unique moral opinions tracing back to our social customs, traditions, and opinions regarding virtues and values. We cannot pooh! pooh! them for they are constituents of our 'moral being', commonly at work in our wakeful active life. Being a member of a typical middle-class Bengali family I would hesitate to pull off my trouser and throw off my shirt

to cool-off in a swimming pool with my wife (equally well-dressed), while our parents watching us may be a bemused lot. Our counterpart couples in another part of India or elsewhere while reading this might wonder, 'what is wrong with this?' Therefore, what is wrong, that is, morally wrong to me may not be so for others for I am a 'vector' (or carrier) of a certain 'morality' whereas others are potent carriers of other 'moralities'. However, when the problem boils down to euthanasia or capital punishment, for instance we do not behave merely as 'moral vectors' (and we feel that we should not behave like that). Otherwise, we may be *moral islanders* deciding in favour or disfavour of some such things, which were not ethically permissible. We know that moral islanders may be so cruel as to chop off a women's hand because her fingernails are beautifully painted. Who knows that in a modern society able sons will enjoy the right to inject a lethal drug to their terminally ill father! In fact, cases of euthanasia and capital punishment should not be left to our common sense morality; they need careful 'moral dialogue' and not whimsical traditional moral sense to take a rash decision.

Let us accept the fact that all moral vectors might transcend rudiments of dogmas to apply their common moral knowledge, which is, the knowledge of desirability, rightness, oughtness and dutifulness. This brings us to realize that application of our common sense morality does not consider the value of collective discourse leading to ethical decision-making. In cases of ethical decision-making, our moral dogmas give way to interplay of our moral knowledge. In such cases, man as a dogmatic being is transcended by man as an ethical being. In fact, in due course of ethical resolution no one is perhaps interested in listening to or following the dictates of our moral sense, which are at best the rudiments of social mores, customs and dogmas, and not suggestive to what *ought to be done*. An ethical discourse is to churn our ethical being where we move out of 'what is done by us or what people do' and enter into 'what ought to be done'. This is essentially, 'transvectoral' or to be more precise, ethics, unlike morality, when applied, is essentially 'moving beyond dogmas or rudiments of the social norms'. Ethics when applied, unlike morality, is also 'transversal' or that ethics essentially cuts the edges of local moralities to become

universal. However, if we accept the relativists' half-truth, our common ethical knowledge of oughtness is possible only within a teeming social (or more broadly ecological) interactive life of decision-making. This acceptance does not go against what I now say because our empirical anchor to ethical knowledge is not merely a testimony to either 'vectoral' or 'islander' morality. In teeming societies, the moral knowledge we gather by virtue of moral experience is not just the same as gathering, 'what people do' or 'what were done by people'. Morality in this sense may be 'the present is', whereas ethicality is 'the present outlook of a possible ought'. If ethicality consists of common ethical knowledge and their application for a resolution of moral trifles, it is also the knowledge of the value of 'transcending' moralities and the value of 'transversality' of knowledge of oughtness.

It is clear that ethical knowledge cannot transcend societies, and what is going on here at the historical, political, economic levels, but that does not amount to the same as saying that ethical knowledge is 'what is going on at the social, political and other levels'. In societies, several human and non-human activities are incessant; they influence us, they have a potential to spread their roots in moral and dogmatic being, and result into several moral opinions and beliefs. But it is equally true that within this empirical milieu we have specific experiences of moral strife and moral disagreement about such established norms or moral opinions; we also have specific experiences of agreement and disagreement about what should be done, a question that transcends 'now' and 'then', and the moralities of 'now' and 'then'. We do have experience of transcending the islander morality to move to transversal ethicality. However, is it not true that ethics cannot be infinitely 'transversal'? Is there any doubt that the moral resolution of euthanasia and capital punishment has to consider the typical social settings of a nation? If this were true, then we have to fall back on the unique dogmas of societies, and with it, on morality and not ethics. Even in this case, we find that social dogmas and social norms are not applied because within the societies of unique identities the common ethical knowledge, that it, the unique transcending-transversal knowledge of the moral being (the knowledge of the essential oughtness), is applied. There is a possibility therefore that transcending-transversal

ethical knowledge assumes a universal character. Nevertheless, that need not be pressed too far because every ecological community has its own identity, its issues bear a unique character which should be faced by the moral agents in their own unique settings. Nevertheless, the half-truth of the relativists is realized once again but that does not amount to the same as following socio-economic-political dogmas in the name of morality.

The conclusion is that ethicality is beyond such dogmas. If this were the case then ethics as a branch of philosophy may be concerned with such transcending-transversal ethicality of people, which is an involvement in practical ethics having pragmatic value. Moreover, such ethics is not bereft of theoretical analytic work or metaethical task as the study of the dynamic of ethical theories, their nuances and logical strength and weakness is important in ethics. Finally, the explanation of standard ethical theories having pragmatic value is a normative venture within ethics, which makes great sense as well. Hence, ethics as we understand it, unlike moral science, is neither study of dogmatic morality of men and societies nor study of divine and metaphysical morality. Ethics as I understand it is a branch of philosophy having the three tasks mentioned above, among which the practical task is the application of common ethical knowledge by the ethical being through intersubjective dialogue. It is here that we realize the value of a people's ethics, which is empirically grounded, and not phoenix but common.

Let us analyze the possibility of people's ethics vis-à-vis phoenix ethics—a possibility of empirical ethics vis-à-vis *a priori* ethics. I cannot resist quoting Kieffer here. He says, 'Clearly, we are in need of an ethic that can clarify moral dilemmas and resolve conflicts ... we need to engage in ethical theorizing that is responsive to current needs. Whatever is our role, concerned lay citizen, medical practitioner, scientific researcher, and patient—we need *some principles* to help us resolve the perplexing ethical problems that are thrust upon us in this rapidly advancing technological society. The thesis proposed was this: Humans develop their ethics by the method of *public discussion* leading to public acceptance of what appears to be right and good and a rejection of that which is judged wrong or bad. Further, our conception of which

is ethical, right and good changes in the light of new knowledge and continuing debate.'[1] The readers at this point may be reminded of the ethical methodology I was speaking about and about the notion of application of ethical knowledge within ethics. Kieffer provides me with a useful support but I have to make a cursory remark regarding what he says. The italicized words in the passage remind us of the fact that Kieffer, like moral engineers, might be under the influence of an artificial application of standard ethical theories though he says that the application is indubitably discursive. In fact, a number of ethical thinkers are under the engineering influence, which is against the spirit of the basic discursive method. Otherwise, Kieffer went on elegantly explaining the virtues of people's ethics or 'public ethics.'[2]

Kieffer further treated an important component of people's ethics (and I agree) that it demands a methodology of ethical application in which evaluation of divergent values in society to come to corroboration regarding values is needed. This is particularly needed for coming to 'ought behaviour'[3] or 'transcending-transversal ethicality'. Hence, ethical decision-making, which is the climax of ethical application, consists of logical discourse regarding preferential values and once such preferences are spelt out, one must stick to the consequences of such preferences. It is also needed that ethical decision-making involves choices between divergent outcomes, which is in turn placing divergent values on different outcomes. Ethical application is that collective enterprise, essentially relative to value-related choice. It is therefore apparent that ethical application involves both facts and values. This reminds us of the fact that the ethical, unlike the moral, is a way of choosing the ought-value and doing what ought to be done. It is choosing the right and the good and doing to attain the right and the good. Ethics in this sense is related to 'ought behaviour'. However, I have some reservations towards accepting Kieffer's opinion regarding the relation between the ethical and the moral. To me the relation between the two is not one of dependence as Kieffer thinks it to be. He believes that moral rules function as ethical guides, that is, moral rules serve as basis of judging ethical behaviour. To justify this he takes Henry Aiken's analysis of 'levels of moral discourse'.[4]

Aiken conceives of four levels of moral discourse, viz., the expressive, the moral rule, the ethical principles and the post-ethical. The expressive level is the level of moral belief in which some voluntary human decision or intentional choice is judged for its value based on one's belief system. For example, 'I don't believe in euthanasia'. The level of moral rule is the 'declarative' level in which some intentional choice is stated in matter-of-fact terms, which bears an emotive-evaluative import. For example, 'Euthanasia is murder'. At the level of ethical principles a definite 'ethical reason' is given, the reason stems out of a clear statement of the first principle of morality. For instance, 'Killing the innocent under any condition is non-permissible'. Finally, at the post-ethical level, a statement of universal principle like 'the supreme value of life' is taken as a final basis to fortify the erstwhile claim. (All four examples have been stated by Aiken; Kieffer quotes them.) Based on this we may infer that there is a deductive scheme in judgement of moral values and moral decision-making.

What is more interesting to me is to analyze what Aiken and Kieffer say about the intimate dependence relation between the moral and the ethical. They believe that the moral belief and emotive-evaluative statements of common people in society are expressive of 'the moral', i.e., they express what are moral and immoral in the context of what people in such and such society think, decide and do. This is further fortified by the notion of 'the ethical', i.e., the conception of what is right, good and desirable. Hence, the factual and the dogmatic are justified by the moral and the super moral. However, where is the deductive scheme justifying the ethical behaviour by the moral rule (Kieffer calls it reciprocal and even within a coherent system)? In fact, the rudimentary morality of man as a dogmatic being is expressive of our belief system mingled with the emotive—evaluative, but when the dogma comes to justification, it begs the ethical and not the other way round. Even if we consider the fact that the dogmatic man is supreme in this context, his dogmas constitute different systems and not a coherent, dependent (reciprocal) system. However, the transcendent-transversal ethical level is essentially different in man. Do we necessarily justify the dogmas of morality in an ethical discourse? Do we really mean to say that if ethics consists of its practical task where common ethical knowledge is applied

in a discourse situation, we tend to justify our moral opinions by the ethical? (It will be a little too much to imagine that in such a situation our moral opinions justify the ethical).

Really speaking, to justify the moral dogmas is pointless because our common ethical knowledge essentially transcends those dogmas and such knowledge (as I have said) is not known to be the knowledge of ethical principles in any way by common people. Interestingly, even if a trained person is aware of some such ethical principles, in real life application of ethics such principles can never be applied deliberately. Even if some one tries to be wise enough and apply some such principles, he or she may soon lose ground in a moral discourse. If he or she is very careful at that, is it at all moral to apply ethics in that way? We have answered it in the negative because that is against the ethical liberty of common people who are able to transcend the moral and able to apply transversally moral knowledge, which is knowledge of 'ought behaviour'. Ethical chauvinism, apart from the unfounded deductivism corrupts Aiken's and Kieffer's theses if they are pressed too far. It is not difficult to find Kieffer pressing it too hard. We shall now find out what should not be done in the name of people's ethics.

The steps of people's ethics are: (a) posing ethical issues or recognition of an ethical problem, (b) evaluating ethical positions based on comparison of the consequences of one's own set of values or to ask, could I live with this? There are other ways of evaluation as well—Kieffer imagines the universalizability, consequentialist and deontological theories as helping aids in this regard and (c) application of ethical theory, which he says, is 'moving from the theoretical to the practical'.[5] I have little to say about the first part of the project. I have to remind our readers that here we should be careful about peculiar division of labour imagined by our ethics experts, which is, non-philosophers supply value-laden problems and philosophers applying ethics. Much has been said against such an imagination. Let us now move on to the second part, which is the theoretical part and the last part, the practical one suggested by Kieffer. In a real life discourse situation, we are asked to imagine any one of the four theoretical aids to evaluate ethical positions propounded by the concerned parties in ethical resolution. Kieffer is certainly not referring to the post-corroboration

analysis of the contesting opinions here (which I have said should be done by ethicists after dialogue is over and a decision has been taken). It may be at best a kind of theoretical evaluation going on in the mind of the ethicist who has arranged a dialogue and is moderating it to reach its climax. It is possible that the ethicist is trying to constantly correct the opinions of others by pointing towards an apparent fallacy in terms of the theories mentioned above. That would be a little difficult, nay, foolish thing to do even by wise ethicists because in a dialogue situation he or she will discover that he or she has to accept a theoretical dogma to be true, or else all views of the concerned parties demand correction. Given a gamut of principles, no one view would appear to be true. This artificial job is therefore not pragmatic. Finally we come to 'the practical', and Kieffer declares, 'moving from the theoretical to the practical, at least three major bioethical positions can be described which present *application of the theories discussed above*'.[6] Whatever may be these bioethical positions, we have at hand a model of ethical application in which 'application of the theories' is needed by virtue of ethical engineering. This has to be carefully avoided in people's ethics because that is essentially chauvinistic and impractical.

Practical ethics is people's ethics as far as it is helping society to clarify concrete problems of ethical urgency. It aims at the 'well-being' of people. Practical ethics does not assume purely theoretical and speculative contexts in which people live. The real contexts in which we live are agglomerations of a number of concrete aspects posing specific problems to us. In practical ethics, the serious ethicist is concerned with the resolution of these problems so that the well-being of the masses is made possible. A practical ethic is thus goal-directed; it is directed towards the well-being of people. However, practical ethics understands the limits of people as far as they are not able to fully understand and resolve all the concrete problems in a society. A practical philosopher thus does not shun its responsibility of contributing to the well-being of people but he or she is always careful about considering not all but some specific moral problems needing urgent resolution. In order to act responsibly, a practical philosopher is always at pains to judge which values are to be honoured. In doing so, he or she may be often mistaken but he or she is almost sure to judge that

some ways of choosing, deciding and acting are right and better than others. The right and good, he comes to realize, is not beyond the well-being of the people. Hence, practical ethics always takes a social empirical footing. It regards the practical investigation of the right and the good in terms of human well-being as supreme. Practical ethics is thus people's ethics as far as it is an empirical investigation into what is right and what is good for the masses or what constitutes the well-being of people. Coming to understand what is right and good for the masses is possible through an empirical process and through rational reflection.

Applied ethics is thus empirically oriented, if not purely rational, *a priori*, or metaphysical. It is not purely theoretical analysis either. Its empirical orientation enables the realization of the ideal. Hence, the ideal is concretely realizable but not at once, not fully but gradually. The gradual understanding or unfolding of the concrete ideal of practical ethics, which is 'well-being', is partly due to the inherent relativism in value judgements in society, partly due to the absolute fixity of rudiments of morality in the human psyche and partly due to the extrinsic situations in which we are placed in this vast ecological community. However, the understanding is made possible through application of ethics when we come together to find a way out of dogmatic morality. Hence, applied ethics 'transversally' enables us to realize its ideal gradually. It is thus an effort of the people or the collective moral being. It is clear therefore that the means to the achievement of the ideal of practical ethics can be an empirical means. It cannot be a phoenix or ideal means. It is due to this that applied ethics needs an empirical method (or means) to achieve the concrete realizable (not realized) ideal of well-being of people. A people's ethics thus needs an empirical method. Naturally, it has to take into account the empirical methods of the sciences (in this case, the method of social sciences), by selecting value-laden issues, arranging discourse, moderating moral dialogue, coming to a closure and post-corroboration analysis. Clearly, coming to understand the concrete (and not phoenix) value of moral principle is gradual and not *a priori* and intuitively possible at once and absolutely. This unfolding of the practical value of ethical principles is again empirically grounded, i.e., it also depends on the vocation of social

scientific methodology, the 'intersubjective corroboration'. It is perhaps due to this that the post-corroborative analysis of the debates reveals the real dynamics of ethical principles. Ethical principles are not handmaidens of pure reason. The whole ethics, as I understand it, is not phoenix.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Ibid., p. 44.
3. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Aiken, H., 'Reason and Conduct' in *New Bearings in Moral Philosophy*, A.A. Knopf, New York, 1962, Chapter 4, Levels of Moral Discourse.
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Issues Relating to the Criteria of Moral Status

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It is quite often said that if x and y have the same moral status, then x and y must be treated in the same way and if x and y do not have the same moral status, then x and y must not be treated in the same way. They must be treated differently because their relevant difference morally justifies a difference in treatment. But if x and y have the same moral status and yet x and y are not treated in the same way, then it is said that it is morally wrong because their relevant similarity morally demands that they must be treated in the same way and no one should be given any preferential treatment over the other. But if x and y do not have the same moral status and yet x and y are treated in the same way, then it is said that it too is morally wrong because their relevant difference morally justifies a difference in treatment and what is morally justified must be done. It should not be avoided. All these statements are said to be analytically true the moment when we logically assume the validity of the basic principle of moral equality. But then before deciding whether we should treat x and y in the same way or differently we are always logically required to know first the moral status of x and y themselves. Because unless we know the moral status of x and y themselves, we cannot decide whether we should treat x and y in the same way or differently because the latter always logically presupposes the former. If x and y do not have any moral status, then the question of our treating them in the same way or differently from the moral point of view simply does not arise at all. It is because of this reason we always stand in need of some criterion of moral status in order to evaluate and decide whether we should treat x and y in the same way or differently.

But, nonetheless, whatever the criterion of moral status we may choose, morality always demands that we must apply it consistently

throughout in all cases that fall under the domain of its jurisdiction. Not only this, we also stand in need of some criterion of moral gradation, over and above the criterion of moral status, in order to judge and evaluate how much and in what degree x and y really do have moral status, if at all they have any. The reason is that because unless we have some criterion of moral gradation, we can neither judge nor can we decide who between x and y actually deserves a preferential treatment over the other when there is a conflict between them. When we go through the views of different moral philosophers, unfortunately we do not find any agreement among them on these issues. They advocate different criteria of moral status and gradation according to their own religious and cultural conception of moral world views, beliefs and sentiments which they entertain about things. The objective of this paper is to discuss and examine some of these criteria of moral status which are quite often put forward by them and to show through analysis that they have not been applied consistently to all entities which fall under the domain of their jurisdiction due to human bias and interest towards their own species against non-human ones which a consistent view of morality does not allow. To substantiate these points let us first turn to the examination of the human-centric criterion of moral status which is widely held in different ways.

Some moral philosophers, like J. Noonan[1] and F.J. Beckwith[2], for example, claim that an entity has moral status if and only if it is a human being. If it is not a human being, it has no moral status at all, and any entity which has no moral status does not count morally and what does not count morally does not deserve any moral consideration. For them the class of morally considerable entities, thus, is co-extensive with the class of human beings. Since in their view the class of morally considerable entities is co-extensive with the class of human beings, therefore they say that non-human entities such as animals, insects and plants do not have any moral status at all; they do not count morally. So they are morally irrelevant entities. Since they are morally irrelevant entities, we have no moral obligations towards them. We can kill them for our food and biological testing, etc., as we like. If at all they have any value, they can be said to be having only instrumental values. They cannot be said to be having intrinsic moral values. By 'human beings' they mean biological or genetic human beings. It is simply on the ground of this many anti-abortionists have argued variously and rigorously that abortion is morally wrong. It cannot be morally justified because it involves the destruction of the life of a foetus and foetuses do have moral status because they are human beings from the very moment of their conception and all human beings do have moral status by virtue of their being humans. Since according to these thinkers foetuses do have moral status from the very moment of their conception, therefore they also claim that foetuses do constitute as a member of the moral community because moral community is a community of human beings and foetuses are human beings from the very moment of their conception. Now if we go by the human-centric criterion of moral status, then it is quite evident from this that the feature of moral status is purely a biological human feature which human beings possess genetically from the very movement of their conception regardless of age, gender, status, caste, creed and colour, etc. It is not an acquired feature. It is purely a biological human feature which human beings possess genetically and keep on passing from one individual life to another within the domain of their own species through the genes present in chromosomes. But then the question arises, is it really so? The answer appears to be negative because of the following reasons.

If moral status were purely a biological human feature as it is said by the anthropocentric moral philosophers, then it should have been possible for us to determine scientifically how much and in what degree human beings actually possess it from the very moment of their conception. But this is not so. We cannot determine scientifically the moral status of any human being neither in practice nor in principle. The reason is simple because moral status is not a biological or genetic feature which we can claim does constitute the distinctive mark of human species and keeps on passing from one individual life to another within the domain of human species and other organisms lack it. In fact, no biological human characteristic is a necessary and a sufficient condition to qualify for moral status. It becomes a necessary and a sufficient condition to qualify for moral status only when we logically assume it. But to assume it would tantamount to mean committing a naturalistic fallacy in the Moorean terminology because the

notion of moral status is not a biological notion. It is a value notion and being a value notion it cannot be defined in terms of any biological notion whatever because biological notions are factual notions while value notions are not. To say this does not mean that what is factual cannot have value. It only means that moral status is not a question of facts. It is question of how we respond to facts. If this be the case, then to attribute humanity is not to attribute moral status at all as it is done by the anthropocentric moral philosophers. In fact, no entity can be said to have any moral status if it is not morally significant and the notion of moral significance is a value notion which we assign to it generally, but not necessarily, according to our own religious and cultural conception of moral worlds, beliefs and sentiments.

Moral notions are not referential notions. They do not refer to any actual or possible entity which could be said to be existing outside of our human minds and constitutes their meanings. Moral notions are constructions of human minds. But it is not done arbitrarily. It is done on a rational moral ground. Human minds construct moral notions according to their own moral world-view and their moral world-view generally is shaped by their own socio-economic, political, cultural and religious thoughts, etc. But to say all this, however, does not mean that moral notions are always derived from them and human moral thinking cannot transcend religious and cultural structures of thought, etc. Moral notions are autonomous notions. It only means that such factors do generally play, but not necessarily, a causal role in the shaping of our moral conception about things. Humanity cannot be said to be the proper criterion of moral status because the notion of humanity does not constitute the central feature of morality. Morality is a matter of all lives concerned.

Even if we accept for the sake of argument that humanity does constitute the proper criterion of moral status, it still raises the philosophical issue, what does constitute humanity? If mere biological elements constitute humanity, then we cannot logically escape from the abovementioned difficulties. But if biological elements do not constitute humanity or it is something more than biological elements, then the question arises, what is it? When we go through the various arguments of anthropocentric moral philosophers, unfortunately we do not find

any satisfactory answer to these questions on the grounds of which we can say that their account is logically well grounded. They only assume that humanity is the essence of morality keeping in view the interest of human species and to assume this premise is not to state the fact because assumption is not an assertion of fact.

To avoid these problems some of the moral philosophers, like J. Feinberg,[3] M. Tooly,[4] M.A. Warren,[5] S.I. Benn[6] and H.T. Engelhardt Jr.[7] do not accept humanity as the proper criterion of moral status. They accept the person-centric criterion of moral status. They say that an entity has moral status if and only if it is a person. If it is not a person, it has no moral status at all. For them the class of morally considerable entities, thus, is co-extensive with the class of persons. Since in their view the class of morally considerable entities is co-extensive with the class of persons, therefore they claim that non-person entities such as foetuses, infants, mentally deranged adults, animals, insects and plants, etc., do not have any moral status; they do not count morally at all. By 'persons' they mean that entities which have the capacities to know, think, feel, desire, reason, deliberate, choose, plan, intend, communicate and carry out obligations, and responsibilities. It is simply on these grounds that many pro-abortionists have argued variously and rigorously that abortion is morally permissible because foetuses do not have any moral status at all even though they do constitute as a part of human species from the very moment of their conception. According to this account, the class of morally considerable entities, thus, is not co-extensive with the class of human beings. It is co-extensive with the class of persons.

Take, for example, the case of Warren. She says that a foetus does not have any moral status because it is only a bit tissue that will become a person at birth. Since a foetus does not have any moral status according to her, therefore she claims that it does not, and cannot, constitute as a member of the moral community because moral community is a community of persons and foetuses are not persons at all. By a 'person' she means an entity which has the characteristics of sentience, emotionality, reason, self-awareness, moral agency and communicability. Michael Allen Fox[8] also shares the similar view because according to him too only those creatures that have critical

self-awareness, capacity to anticipate to choose among alternative courses of action and taking responsibility can be said to have moral status.

Now if we go by this account of moral status, it is quite clear from this that not only non-human entities but also some human entities like foetuses, infants, children and retarded adults surely cannot be said to have any moral status at all because they do not possess the qualifications of a person, although they do constitute as a part of human species. Only adult normal human beings can legitimately be said to be having moral status because it is they who have the qualifications of a person and none else. Even here there may be a difficulty because adult normal human beings do not become persons just by virtue of their being adult normal human beings. When we say that they have the qualifications of a person, it is because we believe that they have dispositions to behave like persons; to say this is not equivalent to saying that they always actually exercise the dispositional properties of a person. They may or may not do it. If this be so, then x and y can be said to have moral status if and only if they have the dispositional properties of a person and not otherwise. Which means, in other words, that if they do not have the qualifications of a person, they cannot be said to have any moral status at all in spite of their being a member of the human species according to this account. D. Marquis[9] also shares the similar view because according to him, too, humanity is not the proper criterion of moral status. Only those creatures that have a 'future like ours' do have moral status. But while saying this, he of course does maintain, unlike Warren, that higher animals do have moral status because he strongly believes that they also do have a future like ours and hence count morally. Since higher animals do have moral status according to him, therefore he says that we should not kill them for our food and biological testing, etc., unless we have some compelling reasons to do so. Marquis does not restrict, thus, the notion of moral status to only human persons. He extends it to the domain of higher animals as well.

Nonetheless, whatever the case might be, the fact still remains that according to these thinkers the class of morally considerable entities is not co-extensive with the class of human beings. It is co-extensive with the class of persons or future like ours—entities which are said to have

the capacity of rationality to do certain things in a particular way. Now if we go by this account of moral status, then only those creatures that have the capacity to exercise the dispositional property of rationality can legitimately be said to have moral status and none else. But then the question arises, is it really so? The answer to my mind seems to be negative because of the following reasons.

There is no doubt that a person-centric criterion of moral status does provide the point of distinction in some sense between humans and non-humans when we define the concept of person in terms of a set of dispositional properties such as sensibility, self-awareness, emotionality, reasoning, autonomy, moral agency, communicability, deliberating, choosing and carrying out obligations and responsibilities, etc. The reason is simple because these dispositional properties are generally found only in adult normal human beings. They are not found in non-human beings and we do assign certain moral values to the exercises of these dispositional properties because they do enhance the degrees of moral values and make things more valuable. In fact, those who associate the notion of moral status with the notion of person go to the extent of saying that only human beings do have 'moral right'. Animals do not have any 'moral right' because the notion of 'moral right' is co-relative with the notion of 'duty' and the notion of 'duty' has no applicability in the domain of non-humans. But this is not so because one can have a 'right' without having a corresponding 'duty'. For example, infants, children, physically and mentally disabled and animals do have 'moral right' without corresponding 'duties' because they do not have the capacity to discharge them. Moreover, the dispositional properties of a person which involve the role of reason in them, nonetheless, are the characteristics of a moral agency. If we say that they are necessary and sufficient conditions to qualify for moral status, then it is quite clear from this that some human organisms cannot be said to have any moral status at all because they do not satisfy the conditions of a person and hence should not count morally.

Take, for example, the case of human foetuses. Human foetuses do not possess the qualifications of a person, and hence do not count morally. Since they do not count morally, therefore they also do not deserve any moral consideration; we are not morally obliged to give

them any moral weightage while making our moral decisions about the cases of abortions even though they have a life from the very moment of their conception and do constitute a part of a woman's body. If this be the case, then we can very well say that abortion is morally justified. It is not morally wrong as it is said. But if we say that human foetuses do have moral status on this grounds because they have a life, then we will have to admit that non-human organisms, too, do have moral status because they also have a life. But if we say that human foetuses do have moral status not on this ground because they have a life but on this ground that they have the potential dispositional capacities for becoming a person in future, then we will have to admit that whenever we judge the moral status of any entity, we always do it not on the ground of its actual dispositional capacities of a person but on the ground of its potential dispositional capacities for becoming a person in future. If this be so, then we cannot logically exclude non-human organisms from the class of morally considerable things because they too can be said to have the potential dispositional capacities for becoming a person in future. We cannot logically rule out this possibility. As human organisms do have moral status without being disposed to behave like a person, so also non-human organisms, because what holds good in one case also holds good in another. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that foetuses do have the potential dispositional capacities for becoming persons in future, they may not realize it because there is no necessary connection between the two. If this be the case, then we cannot say that foetuses do count morally simply on this ground because they have the potential dispositional capacities for becoming persons in future as it is said.

This argument holds well not only in the cases of human foetuses but also in the cases of human infants and retarded adults, etc. But if we say that such human organisms do have moral status on this ground because they have the potential dispositional capacities for becoming persons in future even though they do not actually possess them or fail to exercise them, then we will have to admit that non-human organisms also do have moral status and hence count morally because they also can be said to have the potential dispositional capacities for becoming persons in future without facing any logical difficulty because what

constitutes a reason in one case also constitutes a reason in another case as well. Above all, the notions of rationality, autonomy and moral agency cannot be said to be the central notions of moral status. They can at best be said to be the central notions of moral judgements, responsibilities and duties because whenever we pass moral judgements or assign moral responsibilities and duties, we always do it only on those beings who have the actual capacities to exercise the dispositional characteristics of rationality, autonomy and moral agency and not on those beings who actually lack them such as human foetuses, infants, retarded adults persons and animals, etc. But to say all this, however, is not tantamount to saying that only these creatures do have moral status and none else. So to attribute the dispositional properties of a person is not to attribute moral status. We cannot interpret, analyze and define the notion of moral status in terms of the patterns of person-behaviour because there is no logical connection between the two. Non-person organisms also can very well be said to have moral status like persons even if they do not have the capacities of a person because they have a life and morality primarily deals with life which is thought to be intrinsically valuable. Let us turn to examine in this context the life-centric criterion of moral status.

Some moral philosophers, like James P. Sterba[10], for example, do not accept the person-centric criterion of moral status. They accept the life-centric criterion of moral status. Since they accept the life-centric criterion moral status, therefore they claim that an entity has a moral status if and only if it has a life. If it has no life, it has no moral status at all. For them the class of morally considerable entities, thus, is co-extensive with the class of living things. Since in their view the class of morally considerable entities is co-extensive with the class of living things, therefore they claim that human foetuses, infants, children and retarded adults, animals, insects and plants all do count morally like human persons. But abiotic elements such as soils, waters, stones, rivers, hills, planets and mountains, etc., do not count morally simply because they have no life. But while saying this, they of course do not claim that all biotic elements do have the same moral status. They maintain the moral gradation between them. They believe that the possession of a life does not necessarily require that we treat all lives alike. Since the

lives of animals are not as rich as the lives of humans, we should not count them as much as humans. Now if we go by this account of moral status, then it quite clear from this that the domain of morality is not restricted to only the domain of human persons. It is extended to the domain of all living things irrespective of their potential dispositional properties of a person.

But then the question arises, why do only living things count morally and non-living things fail to qualify? If living things have moral status simply because they have life as it is said, then we will have to admit that the notion of moral status is purely a biological notion because life is purely a biological notion which it is not. If it were so, it would have been possible for us to determine, at least in principle, the moral status of each and every living being by using the scientific devices because life is determinable by using the scientific devices. But this is not so. We cannot determine the moral status of any living being by using the scientific devices even if we wish simply because moral status is not a biological feature of a living thing. It is purely a value notion. So to attribute life is not to attribute moral status. We cannot determine whether a thing has in itself moral status or not. But we can determine whether a thing has in itself a life or not. In fact, the question of determining the moral status of any living thing does arise only when it itself possesses the characteristic of a moral status, which it does not.

When we say that such-and-such living thing has such-and-such moral status, we say not because it in itself possesses the characteristic of moral status but because we believe so and to believe is not to be the case. If this be so, then it is incorrect to say that to have a life is to have moral status. If it is said to avoid the problem that although life in itself does not have any moral status but it does constitute the proper ground of moral status, then the question arises, what is the nature of that connection? Is it a natural connection or artificial? We cannot say that the connection holding between them is a natural connection because if it were so, it would have been possible for us to ascertain through our sense organs by using the scientific devices, which isn't the case. But if the connection holding between them is an artificial connection, then it totally depends upon us the way we respond to it. If we say that

living things have moral status not because they have a life but because life is intrinsically valuable, then we will have to admit that anything which is intrinsically valuable qualifies for moral status, not only living things. Soil, water, stones, rivers, planets, hills and mountains also should count morally because they also can be said to have intrinsic values. If this be so, then we cannot say that the class of morally considerable things is co-extensive with the class of living things. It is co-extensive with the class of all intrinsically valuable things. We cannot say that living things do have moral status because they have a life and life is intrinsically valuable but non-living things do not have any moral status even though they are intrinsically valuable without committing the fallacy of inconsistency. We cannot justify that life is intrinsically valuable on this ground because it has intrinsic properties because the latter does not logically entail the former. The reason is that because the notion of intrinsic value is conceptually different from that of the notion of intrinsic property and there is no logical connection between the two. Even if we admit for the sake of argument that life is intrinsically valuable on this ground because it has intrinsic properties, still we will have to admit that anything which has intrinsic properties has intrinsic value and not only living things as it is said. In fact, we cannot define the notion of intrinsic value in terms of intrinsic property at all. If we do it, it would amount to committing a naturalistic fallacy in the Moorean terminology because the notion of intrinsic property is a descriptive notion while the notion of intrinsic value is not.

But to say all this however, is not tantamount to saying that there cannot be any connection between the two or what is the case cannot have any value. It only means that life is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to qualify for moral status. If this be so, then we can very well say that to attribute life is not to attribute moral status because an entity can be said to have moral status even if it does not have any life at all, for example, rivers, planets and mountains, etc. In fact many eco-centric moral philosophers uphold this view. Moreover, which thing has moral intrinsic value and which one has not is solely determined by us, the way we view and evaluate it, and our evaluations may vary, and in fact do vary, because of our own cultural and religious moral world-views, beliefs and sentiments which we entertain

about the things. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is not in fact grounded in the very nature of the things themselves. It is a human made distinction. It is we who consider certain things intrinsically valuable and certain things not. But when we do it, we generally do it according to our own cultural and religious moral beliefs and sentiments which we entertain about things and not because the things in themselves possess these values.

Some moral philosophers, like Peter Singer[11] for example, do not link the notion of moral status with the notion of life as such. They link it with the notion of suffering. Since they conceptually link the notion of moral status with the notion of suffering, therefore they claim that an entity has a moral status if and only if it has the capacity to feel pains and suffering. For them the class of morally considerable entities is not co-extensive with the class of all living things. It is co-extensive with the class of those entities which have the capacity to feel pains and suffering. It is simply on these grounds that many theoreticians of the animal liberation movement claim that animals do have moral status because they do have the capacity to feel pains and suffering like human beings.

Take, for example, the case of Peter Singer. He says that animals do have moral status because they have the capacity to suffer and in order to suffer animals do not have to be self-conscious, have interests or beliefs or language, to have desires and desires related to their future, to exercise self-critical control of their behaviour or to possess rights. Since in his view pains and suffering count morally, therefore he says that all beings on whom pains and suffering are inflicted and do have the capacity to suffer also count morally irrespective of their distinctive nature. We cannot say that cruelties to human beings count morally but cruelties to animals do not count morally when cruelties cause pains and sufferings on both without committing the fallacy of inconsistency. Now if we go by this criterion of moral status, then certainly our actions which contribute to the suffering of animals such as hunting them, butchering, eating and milking them, experimenting on them, etc., surely cannot be said to be morally right. They are morally wrong. We cannot treat animals as a means to fulfil our own selfish needs and aspirations. We are morally obliged to treat them like humans. But then

the question arises, why do only those beings which have the capacity to feel pains and sufferings count morally and others fail to quality? When we go through the writings of the theoreticians of the animal liberation movement, unfortunately we do not find any satisfactory answer to this question because it can be said very well that there are many organisms like insects which do count morally even though they do not have similar capacity to suffer like human beings and higher animals. If such organisms do not have similar capacity to suffer like human beings and higher animals, it does not mean that they do not feel, nor can they feel pains and suffering at all when pains and suffering are inflicted upon them.

In fact, any entity which has a life can be conceived to have some amount of capacity to feel pains and suffering in certain degrees because every entity which has a life does have some interest that matters to it even if it does not have the capacity to promote and protect it itself like human beings and higher animals. If we say that human beings and higher animals deserve more moral respect than lower animals and insects because they have the cognitive and emotional abilities as R.G. Frey[12] argues, then we will have to admit that suffering is not the sole criterion of moral status. The qualifications of a person also count to it. Not only this, human beings and higher animals that are said to have cognitive and emotional abilities may not feel similar kind of suffering by the same act of cruelty because their psycho-physical organisms differ. Even the same act may not produce a similar kind of suffering on the same individual at different times and in different contexts who counts morally because there is no necessary connection between the two. Moreover, suffering is the causal result of an act which we cannot calculate in advance on an *a priori* ground before performing the act. We can merely imagine the possible suffering which it would be causing when it is done. Not only this, even after doing the act, it is impossible to calculate and grade sufferings because we cannot experience the sufferings of others. We can know what pain that we feel. But we cannot know others' pain which we do not feel. We can only infer it on the basis of the overt bodily behaviour-patterns which we observe and in doing so we may be totally wrong because bodily behaviour-patterns do not always indicate the existence of the feeling

of suffering. Above all, to feel suffering is one thing and to be disposed to behave in a particular way is another thing and there is no logical connection between the two because a living being may feel suffering without even being disposed to behave in a particular way. If this be so, then how can we say that animals suffer like human beings but insects and plants do not? In fact we cannot interpret and analyze the notion of moral status in terms of the dispositional property of suffering at all because suffering is purely a psychological feature while the moral status is not. We can say meaningfully that we have pain in my right hand but we cannot say meaningfully that we have moral status in my right hand. We can locate bodily pain that we feel, but we cannot locate moral status which we ascribe. Theoreticians of the animal liberation movement give moral weightage to higher animals on the ground of their capacity to feel pains and suffering. But when it comes to lower animals and insects, they do not hold the same view. Above all, to attribute the dispositional properties of pains and suffering is not to attribute moral status at all because there is no logical connection between the two. We can say very well that an entity has moral status even if it does not have any dispositional property to feel pains and suffering like human beings and higher animals. For example, we can say very well that soil, water, rivers, mountains and planets, etc., do have moral status even though they do not have any capacity to feel pains and suffering at all in any sense of the term of 'suffering'. Let us now turn to examine in this connection the eco-centric criterion of moral status.

Some moral philosophers, like Aldo Leopold[13] for example, do not conceptually link the notion of moral status with the notion of suffering. They link it with the notion of eco-system as a whole which comprises not only biotic elements but also abiotic elements and their interdependence. Since they conceptually link the notion of moral status with the notion of eco-system and its elements, therefore they claim that an entity has a moral status if and only if it has interest either as an organ or as a system. For them the class of morally considerably entities, thus, is co-existensive with the class of eco-systems and their biotic and abiotic elements. It is simply on this ground that many theoreticians of the eco-movement and others claim that just as individual

organisms have moral status because of having interest of their own, so also eco-systems have moral status because of having interest of their own which is not just a mere collection of the interests of various organisms falling under their domains. But while saying this, they of course do not claim that all biotic and abiotic elements do have the same moral status. They make the distinction between them by assigning different degrees of moral status to different constitutive elements of eco-systems. Now if we go by this criterion of moral status, then it is quite evident from this that not only biotic elements but also abiotic elements and eco-systems all count morally. One can very well say that this account of moral status is relatively more reasonable and comprehensive than any other accounts discussed above because it takes into account the holistic view of moral status and does not ignore the moral status of any entity or system. But then the question arises; if morality consists in the interdependency of both the biotic and abiotic elements and their systems as it is said, then we will have to have some rational criterion of moral gradation to evaluate them and their relationships without showing any disrespect or giving undue weightage to any one of the species of eco-systems. But this does not happen so due to human bias.

Non-humans cannot grant the moral status to anything given their nature. It is we who grant moral status to the things and in doing so we keep our interest and survival at the top directly or indirectly which morality does not permit because morality always requires equal considerations on the same footings. When it suits us, we give some moral status to the things and when it does not suit to us, we do not give any moral status to them which we rationally justify. There is no doubt in it that we do have moral right not only to defend ourselves but also to preserve our own species. But this does not mean that we have the moral right to do such things which necessitate killing or harming of non-human organisms and eco-systems for the defence and preservation of our own life and species. As we do have moral right to our own life, so also animals, insects and plants even though they do not have any capacity to defend and preserve themselves. We cannot say that the defence and preservation of our own life is more valuable

than the defense and preservation of non-human organisms and eco-systems on the ground of this because we are human beings. It becomes morally more valuable only when we logically assume that human life deserves higher moral status over the other lives but to assume this is not to state the fact. Furthermore, assuming this would also amount to giving preferential treatment to ourselves and our own species over non-humans which a consistent view of morality does not permit because it does not strike the right balance between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature.

A consistent view of morality always demands that all lives must be given equal treatment on the same footing without showing the superiority of one life over the lives of others unless there is a morally relevant difference between them. But what difference is morally relevant and what is not, cannot be decided by keeping in view the interest of human beings in the centre just because we happen to be in the class of human beings and if we do not do it, the existence of our own species will not be there. Our conception of morality should not be motivated by human bias against non-humans. We should not frame, twist, manipulate and rationalize our conceptual framework of moral rules and principles to suit our own interests. Theoreticians of eco-movements give moral status to animals, insects and plants and yet permit them to be killed and destroyed when it comes to the defence and preservation of human life. They do not treat them on the same footing. They give preferential treatment to human life over other lives. When they give some moral weightage to biotic elements, they give not because they sincerely believe that biotic elements in themselves possess some moral worth but because biotic elements are useful to them which they do not of course say openly. Above all, to attribute interest to biotic elements and their systems is not to attribute moral status at all because there is no logical connection between the two. So an entity can be said to have moral status even if it does not have any interest at all. Some of the theistic moral philosophers do not attribute any interest to God and yet strongly believe that God does have moral status. They in fact go to the extent of saying that God is the only being who can be said to have full moral status and none else. Let us turn to examine in this connection the theistic account of moral status.

Theistic moral philosophers do not only conceptually link the notion of moral status with the notion of eco-system and its biotic and abiotic elements. They also link it with the notion of God. Since they link the notion of moral status with the notion of God, therefore they claim that an entity has a moral status if and only if it is God-given. If it is not a God-given entity, it has no moral status at all. Since theistic moral philosophers believe that every living and non-living thing is a gift of God, therefore they say that everything counts morally. For them the class of morally considerable entities, thus, is co-extensive with the class of God, man and nature. In other words, it is co-extensive with the class of everything. Now if we go by this criterion of moral status, then from this it is quite clear that the notion of moral status logically rests on the notion of belief in the existence of God and the existence of God cannot be established. It is only a matter of faith and faith does not necessarily entail the existence of God because there is no logical connection between the two. Not only this, a person can be said to have moral status even if he/she does not have any faith in the existence of any divine God. If belief in the existence of God were a necessary condition to qualify for moral status, no atheists would have any moral status. But this is not so. Atheists do have moral status. Not only do atheists have moral status but also animals, insects and plants can be said do have moral status even though they do not have any conception of God. If this be so, then we cannot say that the notion of moral status is conceptually linked with the notion of belief in the existence of God as it is said. The notion of moral status in fact is a secular notion. It does not essentially involve in its meaning any reference to the notion of God and Godly things. In fact, the notion of God is a morally irrelevant notion. It has nothing to do with the notion of moral status. Above all, if all living and non-living things are the gift of God as it is said, then they all deserve equal moral consideration being God's gifts no matter what they are, and hence we have no moral right to kill animals and insects and destroy plants for the defence and preservation of our own human life. They should all be treated as morally holy entities. They cannot be said to be unholy because the notion of holiness does not admit any kind of moral discrimination or gradation between human and non-human lives. If this be so, then theistic moral

philosophers should not give any preferential treatment to human life over the life of others. But since the very fact that theistic moral philosophers do give preferential treatment to human lives over the life of others on the ground of their rationality feature, therefore their account of moral status cannot be said to be a consistent account of moral status at all. If Godly things are in themselves intrinsically valuable in virtue of their being Godly things, then we cannot give any preferential treatment to our own life over the life of non-human ones on the ground of rationality as it is done. If rationality is the ground of moral status, then human foetuses, infants and minor children cannot be said to have moral status at all since they lack it in actuality. Theistic moral philosophers give moral status to everything. But when it comes to the defence and preservation of human life, they do not hold a consistent view. They permit killing of animals and destroying of plants to preserve human species, which a consistent view of morality does not permit.

But from the foregoing discussions we should not gather this impression that our talk of moral status is just a matter of a particular individual's opinion and belief, and hence we cannot criticize or rationally scrutinize any one else's view of moral status. It only indicates that how our criterion of moral status had been changing from time to time and context to context due to our different conception of moral world-views, beliefs, sentiments and rationalities which we entertain about living and non-living things. And to say this is not to say that morality is just a matter of a particular individual's opinion and belief. Morality is not a matter of a particular individual's belief and sentiment. It is also not a matter of fact. It is a matter of how we rationally respond to facts. Talking about some entities having such-and-such degree of moral status can be a fact but 'moral status' does not by itself refer to any objective reality on the basis of which we can settle the problem of moral status by using the scientific procedure. The involvement of beliefs and sentiments in moral considerations do not necessarily preclude the possibility of any rational discussions from the domain of morality because the notion of 'morality' always involves in it the notion of rationality (in terms of reasonability) and the notion of rationality involves in it the notion of universalizibility. The criterion of moral status possesses the characteristic of universalizability not in this sense because it is subscribed to by everyone but in this sense because it is applicable to all the individuals coming under its jurisdiction. In other words, morality always demands consistency within its application. So to be moral is to be consistent but to be consistent is not always to be moral because the notion of consistency is not the sole condition of morality. It is only one of the conditions of morality. The moral discrimination arises when we do not apply the criterion of moral status consistently. The notions of belief and sentiment preclude the possibility of rational discussions only when we exclude the notion of rationality (in the sense of reasonability) from the notion of morality and rest it solely on the individual's mere opinions, beliefs and sentiments, otherwise not. Further, to say that our criteria of moral status vary due to our different conception of moral world-views, beliefs and sentiments is not to say that each moral world-view, belief and sentiment is equally rational or irrational, which it is not. It only means different moral rationalities. Even if we admit for the sake of argument that all moral world-views, beliefs and sentiments are equally rational or irrational, we can do it only when we logically assume a common ground of morality because the former always presupposes the latter, and to accept this means to accept the thesis of universalizability which is the ground of rationality. If this be so, then we can very well say that we can resolve the issue of the criteria of moral status by following a consistent account without showing any disregard to any entity, humans or non-humans.

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Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth

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The problem of truth has been closely related to that of knowledge and has generally been discussed in term of its sources, validity and limits, if any. But the explicit limitation of the discussion to what was called 'human knowledge' by the British empiricists has hardly been paid sufficient attention as otherwise the question would have been raised as to what exactly is the distinction that human knowledge has from knowledge that cannot be regarded as 'human'. This distinction is important as unless we are aware of knowledge which is non-human, we shall not be able to understand the specific characteristics of that knowledge which we generally call 'human'.

The problem has assumed crucial importance with the development of 'machines' which claim to replicate human knowledge in all its forms and contend that there is no difference whatsoever between man and machines at least in the context of knowledge. There is also the problem of how to differentiate human knowledge from that which other animals may be supposed to have in the world. In case someone still likes to differentiate man from all the other species one will have to find the differentiating characteristic in something other than knowledge. But whatever characteristic one may choose one will face the same problem as so many of the other animal species share the same characteristics as evidenced in their behaviour. As for machines, one will have to think of them in terms other than that of 'knowledge', if they are to aspire to becoming 'human' as it is man who has made or manufactured the machine after which he feels and lives with some of them all the time. Ultimately, then, whether man manufactures the machine or other species of animals, he will have to be defined in terms of that which distinguishes him from them. Man is, or does, or feels what neither machines nor any other living being can do or does

or feel. But why has man not been able to specify this distinction clearly or completely to his own satisfaction? Whatever he may propose as a distinctive feature may be replicated or duplicated, at least in behavioural forms, by something that man himself has built. But it would still not stop him from asking the question what is it that which differentiates me from what has been built by me to 'imitate' what I am. This situation has been present since man attained self-consciousness and it obtains even today. He is supposed to have asked 'what am I or who am I'. The answers given were different and they went on changing as man's self-consciousness changed over time. But the problem is perennial and it would remain with him till he continues to be what he is as, perhaps, it defines him in a certain sense because it follows from the fact that he is self-conscious.

The attempt at answering the question in the context of 'knowledge' and its correlate distinction between 'truth' and 'falsity' has been there in the philosophical thinking on this issue since its earliest time. But if the question has to be posed in the context of 'human' knowledge we have first to know what it means to be 'human'. This, however, as everybody knows, is an impossible enterprise or at least an unending one. It is 'impossible' and 'unending' because it is undertaken by a being who is 'self-conscious', and for whom everything that 'appears' as an 'object' is essentially dubitable in principle.

But if this is so, then no question regarding any knowledge being 'true' can ever be settled? Perhaps the question of 'truth' has to be posed differently and the idea of 'knowledge' revised radically from the way it has been formulated by philosophers since the beginning of philosophy. Neither 'correspondence' nor 'coherence' nor 'pragmatic sense' can help us in determining even theoretically what it means for knowledge to be knowledge in the human context.

Whatever a man may be, he has a body, and he is conscious and he is also conscious of the fact that he is conscious. Not only this, he also inevitably makes the distinction between truth and falsity, good and bad, right or wrong, and what appears to him as pleasant and unpleasant, or beautiful and ugly. These distinctions define and constitute his being as much as anything else. What has not been seen is the fact that what is 'false' or bad or wrong or unpleasant or ugly is as much 'real'

as those which are characterized as their opposites. This normally is not supposed to create any problem except in the case of that which is regarded as 'false' or that which cannot 'be' because it is false. Yet the removal of falsity is as much a task of human effort as the overcoming or removal of that which is bad or wrong or unpleasant or ugly. The distinctions are embedded in consciousness and when one becomes aware of them, one feels the obligation and the challenge to remove them through one's own effort which has been called *purusārtha* in the Indian tradition.

But if man is to be defined or understood in terms of what we call human effort to realize something that is not there including what is 'truth', then he himself will have to be seen in a different way and the question asked where does 'falsity' exist. The only answer that can be given to this question is that it is in the very 'being' of consciousness that makes the distinction. To be conscious is to bring into being something that is ontologically impossible, for it simultaneously has the character of being both 'is' and 'is not'. If it were just not there, one could not be even aware of it, and if it were there then the question of bringing about any change would not arise. But to be conscious at the human level is just to be 'this' and the history of man cannot be understood without this radical transformation in the notions of 'reality' and 'truth' which are closely related to each other.

The radical changes in the understanding of these foundational concepts will, if properly seen, affect the whole philosophical edifice. Man's consciousness itself will be seen as infected with a logical ambiguity rendering it ontologically unintelligible, if 'reality' and 'truth' are conceived in traditional terms. In other words, to self-consciousness man appears as 'something' which he can become but which he is not. The knowledge that such a being will have of the 'world' will thus be infected with an intrinsic defect which in principle, it cannot get rid of. There will be no problem if man were not aware of this, but as he knows that this is so, he is haunted by the suspicion that the knowledge enterprise can never give him the truth he wants as he is not what he ought to be. This is what is not realized by thinkers who have addressed themselves to this problem. First, as human beings change their idea of what is 'knowledge', and correspondingly of what is true,

also changes. Secondly, the realization that the situation is intrinsically unchangeable opens the doors to radical scepticism on the one hand or to a restriction of all knowledge to the specificity of the situation in which one happens to be situated. One is saved to a certain extent by the fact that 'to be human' is to have a certain kind of body which has a structure of its own and whose life history from birth to death provides a firm foundational base to all that man wants to be or to achieve, including that which we call 'knowledge'. This normally, is spelt out in terms of the senses which man has and the 'knowledge' that these are supposed to provide. Perception as the foundational basis of all knowledge is accepted by most philosophers in all the philosophical tradition of the world. But no one asks why the so-called senses should be restricted only to five as there seems no necessity about it. Nor have they asked the question arising from the fact that the senses that man has have structural and functional limits of their own which they normally can not transcend. Man cannot see in the dark but many animals can. The colours and sounds that one can see or hear are apprehensible only within a certain range that is the limit of that which is perceived and sensed as colour or sound at the human level. The same must be true of the other senses also. Animals can discriminate between smells which human beings cannot, and many of them can only survive on the basis of these discriminations which are considered by most persons as irrelevant to the human enterprise called 'knowledge'. But this is not the only limitation which human senses have and which can, at least to some extent, be known and discounted and lived with. The real problem arises when one realises that the senses on which one relies for knowledge create illusions which are structurally determined and make man see what he sees or hears or smells or tastes or touches and, in addition makes him feels that what is seen or heard or smelled or tasted or touched is vertical even when it is not so. A simple example of this is the movement of the sun across the sky which is literally seen as such by everybody, even though the 'truth' is supposed to be that it is the earth that moves, and not the sun. There are many other such examples such as the earth and the sky meeting at the horizon or the stick which seems to be bent in water.

In each of these examples the 'illusory' appearance is determined by the structure of the condition of 'seeing' itself and it is because of this that appearance, though, illusory do not disappear even if it is known to be such. The knowledge that what 'appears is not really' so remains purely theoretical and does not affect, at least visually, the 'appearance' as it appeared earlier. What is, however, stranger still is the fact that as far as 'lived life' is concerned, it is the illusory appearance that determines how we live as we 'live' within it. The theoretical correction does affect our action in certain contexts, but as far as 'lived life' is concerned, it is the illusory appearance that determines how we live, as we 'live' within it. The theoretical correction does affect our action in certain contexts, but as far as our 'lived life' is concerned it plays *only* an indirect role as what is directly experienced alone determines the world we live in. The 'world' that the artist creates depends upon this basic reality of human life and the reason why we choose to live in those 'worlds' and want to go to them repeatedly depends on this. The world of 'appearances' is the 'real' world for us and what we want is that they should be meaningful, significant and pleasant and not whether they are true or false.

The structural illusions that we have pointed out belong primarily to the sense of sight but it is not that one cannot reasonably talk of such illusions in the context of the other senses also. Can't there be structural illusions in the realm of sounds or smells or touch? Painters are supposed to create tactile illusions through a subtle modulation of the surface on their paintings. There is the well-known example of artificial objects so realistically created that even when one touches them, one feels the 'feeling' that the 'real' object is supposed to make one feel. One sometimes tries to pluck the grapes in the dish before one realizes that one is really being cheated.

The problem of structural illusion in respect of senses other than that of sight can only be resolved if theoretical considerations are offered to show that what we hear or touch or smell or taste is necessarily real as in their case what 'appears' is itself real as there are no theoretical reasons to doubt this. In fact, the issue does not seem to have arisen and hence there does not seem to be any awareness of problem amongst those who have thought about it. The same seems to be the case with

the problem relating to the unitary and unified character of appearances emanating from the different senses, even though 'perception' is generally defined as that wherein the *same* object is apprehended by *different* senses. But once the unification and the unitary character of the diverse sensory appearances in perception is accepted along with what we have called the structural illusion, the problem whether there are different illusions of unification determining our perception of the world which is generally regarded as 'external' will have to be faced.

Kant raised the question, though in a tangential manner. He, as is well-known, suggested that space may be regarded as that which 'unifies' the 'appearances' given by the *outer senses*. But he seems to forget that space divides and separates as much as it unifies. The same may be said of time which, according to him, is supposed to unify 'appearances' of the 'inner' sense. But though the distinction between the 'outer' and the 'inner' sense is generally accepted in philosophical thinking, the distinction is not as clear as is assumed to be. There are, of course, different terms used in philosophical literature for pointing to the distinction. 'Mind' and 'body' for example, have been such 'terms' for designating what is known through them and which is also called 'outer' and 'inner'. But the moment one brings in the notion of 'mind' or 'inner sense' which apprehends same thing that is distinct and different from what is apprehended through the body and outer sense, the problem of knowledge at the human level undergoes a radical transformation which has generally not been noticed.

The distinction, even in Kant, between the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic does not notice that the so-called sensory 'appearances' have disappeared and that what he calls 'judgements' in his table of judgements is not, and cannot be, concerned with or have appearance or inner sense as content in any sense of the term whatever.

'Knowledge in judgemental form' is not, and cannot be, of that which 'appears' even though it may give rise to the illusory appearance of such a relation. The relation between the concept and the percept and of the percept to that which is given by the senses on the one hand, and the relation between the concepts and those between the percepts and the relation between these two different sets of relations is not clear.

Kant assumes that the relation can be made transparent by the notion of 'schema' or application, but the promised transparency is 'illusory'. To a certain extent he seems to realize this himself as otherwise the discussion on the schematism in the context of the categories would have been totally irrelevant.

The problem of the relationship between the concept and the percept is different from the problem of the relationship of the judgement to the 'facts' which it is generally supposed to represent. Wittgenstein specifically drew attention to that to which the judgement refers to, or that about which the judgement tries to say something at the linguistic or sentential level. But if human knowledge necessarily takes the form of judgement, and if judgements alone can be 'true' or 'false', as Aristotle pointed out long ago, then both 'truth' and 'knowledge' are a superimposition on 'reality' which is not linguistic or judgemental in character. And if it is not so then it can not be regarded as consisting of 'facts', a view which Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* made so fashionable amongst thinkers after him.

Wittgenstein, however, only talked of the world as consisting of 'facts' which probably were the co-relates of a 'judgement'. But he forgets the whole doctrine of the categories which Kant has explored and elaborated in the context of his discussion of the doctrine of categories.

The relation between judgement and its forms, and the categories, though specifically explicated by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* is not clear. It is the judgement that is central to knowledge or the categories of the understanding which are supposed to be founded on it. But if judgement is essentially linguistic in character, then the categories are so also. There is the additional problem of the relationship to what has been called 'grammar' and in case they are essentially linguistic in character, they suggest a 'universal grammar' which is also a grammar of thought. Scepticism has been voiced in this context by pointing that the distinction between subject and predicate is only an accidental characteristic of European languages as it is not found in many other languages. The distinction between substance and attributes, it has been urged, is only a reflection of the distinction between subject and predicate and hence was considered as the necessary form of thinking itself. This, though plausible, goes against the fact that the whole

Buddhistic tradition in Indian thought does not seem to sustain this interpretation of the nature of 'thinking', as it persistently maintained and argued for millennia that the idea of substance was a linguistic illusion, which thinking could dispel and dispense with.

The deeper problem however relates to the fact which does not seem to have been noticed either by Kant or his successors, that in case these are forms of judgement, there will be 'forms' of knowledge, and if one accepts the idea of intrinsic variety in the forms of knowledge what shall happen to the idea and ideal of knowledge which demands a unitary character as it integrally relates to the unity of 'reality' itself.

The problem at this level however belongs to the very structure of human consciousness and any attempt at reflective self-awareness is bound to be intrinsically indeterminate and ambiguous in character. Still, at another level, it presents itself in a different way which is relatively more capable of being articulated and dealt with in a more satisfactory manner. This is the level which Kant had designated as the 'inner sense' and which has generally been indicated by the term 'mind' and its analogues in various philosophical traditions of the world. What exactly is the role played by the contents of the inner sense in relation to the seeking for knowledge, is the question that does not seem to have been raised in epistemological literature, which has dealt with the problem of knowledge. The contents of the inner sense comprise such items as desires, feelings, emotions, imaginings, hopes, fears and all the other paraphernelia which constitute the human situations and are described in their variety and complexity in the literary creations of all languages. These, strangely, are not supposed to be of any relevance or significance to what is called 'knowledge' at the human level and its claim to be 'true'. Yet sincerity, honesty, and objectivity are accepted by everybody to be the necessary prerequisites for any one engaging in the 'knowledge enterprise' or staking the claim that what he 'claims' to know is 'true'. The Indians called this *Śabda Pramāṇa* which has generally been dismissed by all 'serious' philosophers as being totally unphilosophical in nature. Yet all knowledge at the human level has to be necessarily 'human' by definition and this involves someone's claim that he knows about 'something'. And such a claim is accepted if one has no reason to disbelieve or doubt what is said. In fact, knowledge

is transmitted from man to man, generation to generation and from civilization to civilization. Knowledge, it is forgotten, has been accumulating over thousands of years and hence does not belong exclusively to any one individual, or group, or nation, or civilization. Not only this, even the whole of humanity as it has lived up to now cannot claim to have or possess the whole of knowledge as the succeeding generations are bound not only to add to it, but also show its inadequacies, imperfections, errors and falsity.

Knowledge, thus, is essentially a 'human' achievement and depends, in a strange sense, on a 'belief' in the veracity and the trustworthiness of those who claim to know. Such a belief is a necessary prerequisite for knowledge and unless we try to understand what this belief is and what it presupposes or implies, we cannot understand what knowledge consists of. In other words, unless we understand what is meant to be 'sincere', 'objective', 'truthful' and 'trustworthy' we cannot understand what it means to know at the human level. Besides these, there has to be assumed a desire to impart the knowledge that one has, not to be secretive, to help others through knowledge for the good of mankind. But at the human level knowledge is also Power, the power to do good or evil, to benefit or harm others.

Many of these characteristics have been pointed out in the discussion on the *śabda pramāṇa* or 'authority' as the source of knowledge in the Indian tradition. The *Nyāya Sūtra*, one of the basic text of India's philosophical enterprise, defines this *pramāṇa* as the *upadeśa* of an *āptapuruṣa*. The key terms here are *āpta* and *upadeśa*, the former defined in terms of those essential characteristics which are presupposed in any claim to knowledge, and the latter meaning some sort of helpful advice which, if followed, would make the person not only understand what is said but use it not only for the good of oneself and others, but also to help one to become an *āptapuruṣa* oneself.

The definitions given in the *Nyāya Sūtra* point out explicitly to a dimension of knowledge and truth which has not been noticed and paid attention to even by Indian commentators on the text. The term *upadeśa* points to someone else, someone other than the person who knows and has been designated as *āpta* because of the fact that he knows. The 'other' in the definition is one who is desirous of knowing, one who

wants to know or rather one who is a seeker of knowledge and truth. This is usually conveyed in the Indian texts by the terms *Jijñāsā* and *Jijñāsu* which are generally translated in terms that have been mentioned earlier. But, there is a dimension of the term 'seeker' of knowledge and truth which has not been understood, for if it had been understood, the concept of *āptapuruṣa* would not have been understood the way it has been in the tradition. To put the point in another way, one may ask the question 'Is one who "knows" not desirous of knowledge and truth?' In other words, is the *āptapuruṣa* not a *Jijñāsu* and if he is not, how can he be an *āptapuruṣa* at all.

The distinction between one who knows or claims to know and one who is desirous to know is after all only a relative one. One who has ceased or stopped seeking truth or knowledge has already given up the *puruṣārtha* in which he was engaged as a human being, which, in a sense, defined him at least in respect of this dimension. The seeking for truth and knowledge is one of the *puruṣārthas* or ends of human life which defines what being human means, and if one has ceased to pursue this end, then, to that extent, one has ceased to be human.

But what does it mean to be a *Jijñāsu* or seeker of knowledge or truth? The tradition has interestingly brought in the notion of *adhikāra* in this connection. The term is so ambiguous and varied that it is not easy to pinpoint its exact meaning. There are examples of those who have interpreted it in the context of the *Śruti* in the Indian tradition and viewed the 'right' for the pursuit of the 'knowledge' contained in it, that is of the Vedas in particular and the Vedic Corpus in general. The women and the sūdras were explicitly excluded from the right to pursue this knowledge. They just could not be the *adhikārīs* for it, even if they had the talent for it and the *Śrutis* permitted it as in the case of Maitreyi and Satyakāma Jābāla whose cases are well-known. The term has been extended to other fields which normally one would have expected to be immune from it. How can one explain otherwise the fact that even in such a secular field as the knowledge regarding the weilding of certain weapons, from which persons belonging to certain varnas were excluded from acquiring it. The story of Eklavya and Karṇa is well-known, but there are so many others that one need not recount them. In fact, the idea of *adhikāra-bheda* has been carried to extremes

and whenever one does not wish to impart one's knowledge to someone, one can always legitimise it by bringing in this notion into the picture, forgetting that ultimately it is the desire to know and learn which is the only thing one can demand of one who has come to learn from someone. Human knowledge thus has to be understood in terms of the relationship between one who knows and one who is desirous to know, without forgetting that one who knows not only once belonged to the latter class, but still belongs to it as seeking for truth and knowledge is as 'unending' as any other 'seeking' of man.

Viewed in this perspective, human knowledge will have to be seen in a way totally different from the one in which it has been seen uptil now. It is not something out there, finished and final, to be taken hold of by man as a possession and kept intact with him for ever. Rather, it is something which is in a continuous process of modification because it is uncompleted and unfinished, acquired and passed on from generation to generation. It is a process in which those who learn become teachers and those who are teachers were once students who learnt from someone, even if they forget that this was so. In this unending process knowledge can get lost or forgotten because of many reasons. These reasons can be of all sorts, but once one reflects on them, one would become aware of the strange fact that this unending process of acquiring what is called 'knowledge' is sustained and maintained by factors in which one of the most crucial one is not only the motivation to learn and to teach, but the desire to seek the truth and be as 'true' to it as possible. This is the strangest desire that man has as it is tangential to all other desires and its deepest impulses run counter to them. It makes one deny what one has received from those who have taught one and stand against the accepted orthodoxy and wisdom of the times. Even beyond this, it makes one continuously 'open' to the possibility that one may be mistaken and in case the argument or the evidence points in that direction one is prepared to give up what one considered true and revise it in the light of counter-argument or the counter-evidence that has been brought against what one had held to be true.

All this, though obvious and common place, is almost totally absent from the awareness and 'self-consciousness' of those who claim to

'know'. This is the greatest paradox that one encounters when one reflects on the phenomenon called 'human knowledge'. There seems to be some invisible structure in the cognitive consciousness that seems to project the delusion that knowledge is of a character that is totally different from what it would appear if it 'objectively' is seen to be what it actually is. This delusion is not a structural delusion projected and determined by the senses that one has, but by that to which knowledge or 'knowing activity' has generally been ascribed and which is called 'reason'.

This delusion, however, is not the same that Kant attempted to expose in his *Transcendental Critique of Reason*. He only tried to uncover the presuppositions involved in judgemental knowledge and saw space and time as only the forms in which the sensibly 'given' has to be apprehended or perceived at the human level. But for some reason he did not see time as determining the 'form' of the 'knowing' process itself and taking the strange form of what we have called the 'inter-generational' becoming where something is passed on from one generation to another generation. Once this way of looking at knowledge is accepted there will be a revolutionary transformation in the way the problem of knowledge and truth has been posed in the philosophical traditions of the world up till now. It will be clearly seen that there is no such thing as 'knowledge' or 'truth' which is the possession of any individual or group or civilization. Instead, it will be seen as a 'seeking' which like all other 'seekings', is not only impossible of completion in principle but also internally differentiated in such a manner that what is achieved in one field may have no relation to that which is attained in other domains and may even at times, be opposed or incompatible with it. The terms 'knowledge' and 'truth' will, then, be seen to be systematically misleading as they generate the illusion that there '*is*' or '*can be*' such a thing as knowledge which unifies all 'knowledges' within itself and thus is that which alone may be regarded as pre-eminently 'true'.

The realization that there is no such thing as knowledge but only 'knowledges' and that what is thought of as 'knowledge' or described as such in any domain whatever, is only a short-hand term describing the tentative results of a collective seeking on the part of a large number

of individuals which is continuously being challenged, questioned and modified in the light of the inadequacies and imperfections which people see in it will change the situation in a fundamental way. It will thus see 'human knowledge' as subject to all the weaknesses and strengths which and which define the human situation in its basic structural aspect has or suffers from. The seeking for knowledge, however, is different as it makes everything, including all other seekings, its subject and hence has a supervening character which no other seeking of man has. That is one reason why 'truth' seems to have such a supreme value that when that is questioned, no one knows what to do in the face of that questioning'. The raising of the question about the 'truth' of anything, it should be remembered, is not a question of verisimilitude or even of veridicality but of something else which is perhaps more adequately conveyed by that which relates to the 'seeking' itself and as the seeking cannot be separated or divorced from the one who seeks, ultimately therefore it is the 'seeker' who becomes the central concern of all those who want seriously to think about either knowledge or truth.

To talk of the 'seeker' is to talk of a being who is self-conscious and conscious of his inadequacy and imperfections as, that is why he seeks or wants to know and through that knowledge 'become' something that he is not. This involves imagination as an intrinsic constituent of the seeking for knowledge and truth whose far-ranging ramifications have not been appreciated, particularly in terms of the obstruction they create for the enterprise of knowledge itself. It is only in the context of the formation of hypotheses that the philosophy of science has taken note of this dimension of the knowledge enterprise of man. But imagination does not function only in the framing of hypotheses; it has other aspects which are far more disturbing and which are revealed in the psychiatric clinic, the mental hospital and the workshop of the artist. All of these are as 'real' as anything else even though they are regarded as 'hallucinations' by everybody. They are closely related to one another and once one begins to look at them closely and take them seriously, one begins to wonder whether what we call 'knowledge' or 'truth' is possible at all.

The history of superstition is far older than the history of what is known as science these days. But the belief that there is no 'superstition' in science would be difficult for anyone to believe who knows anything about the history of science as it has changed over time. The very fact that there is a 'history' of 'science' reveals that what one had considered as 'knowledge' and accepted as 'true' was not really so. And, if one relates the history of science to the sociology of science one would begin to wonder if what one ideally considers to be 'science' can ever be possible at all. Those who have written on the sociology of knowledge have generally left 'science' untouched and even those who have talked of 'scientific revolutions' have only talked of paradigm shifts. Neither of them have discussed the psychological roots in which all human enterprises are founded, including that of the search for knowledge itself. It is of course true that man's psychic formations may themselves be seen as historical and socio-cultural formations, but the same is true of the human body and yet we talk of bodily structures and the illusions they generate and if it is so there seems no reason why we cannot, or should not, talk of the structure of the psyche on the one hand and the functional disorders analogous to the disorders that the body is so obviously subject to, on the other.

To talk of psychic disorders and psychic illusions emanating from the structure of the psyche itself and see it in the historical and socio-cultural perspective, relativises not only the notion of psyche but also of 'knowledge' and 'truth'. The idea that man's psychic formation has structurally changed over historical time or that its specific formation has been determined by socio-cultural factors would imply that what man '*is*' has itself changed and hence there can be no meaningful truth that transcends temporality.

This, however, is not acceptable to human consciousness as it sees 'something' that is not relative to time and space, or to the specific socio-cultural formations that he himself has brought into being. Yet the 'awareness' that man has been involved in a process that spans millennia and what he is psychically and physically today, is continuous with what he was in the past and is in some sense, a result of it is bound to affect his conception of both knowledge and truth in such a way that his perception and the changes that occur in it in accordance

with the type of consciousness and self-consciousness that he possesses will become evident. The point is that the search for objectivity and its determination by consciousness in the seeking of knowledge itself undergoes significant transformation as man's consciousness develops without jeopardising the continuity which he has with the past. The point perhaps may be better appreciated if it is realized that as man changed and developed the dangers and obstructions to the achievement of the objectivity which is the precondition for the attainment of all knowledge also changed and human consciousness had to invent new strategies to overcome them. The history of knowledge enterprises in different fields during the last three hundred years or so is evidence of this. Perhaps the clearest example of the dilemma stared man in the face when he encountered the phenomena in quantum physics. How could 'objectivity' be ensured if the phenomenon concerned was itself affected by observation. The question whether the observation should be construed purely in terms of the measuring instruments or include the psycho-physical observer also, opened one of the most fascinating chapters in the history of modern science. The phenomenon of course has been known in other fields of knowledge dealing with human beings at any level whatsoever. One need only mention the phenomenon known as 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and the place it occupies is known to everybody who has any acquaintance with socio-cultural or medical phenomena.

What is important however is not that there are these phenomena but that they have not stood in the way of man's search for knowledge and trying his best to achieve objectivity and determining what is 'true' inspite of them. The strategies adopted are unbelievable and yet they attest to the fact that whenever man encounters difficulty in being 'objective' in relation to the knowledge of a realm which refuses to be seen as 'independent' of him, he tries to see and ensure that this somehow does not affect the enterprise itself.

Philosophers who have dealt with the problem of knowledge and truth have generally kept away from realms where the achievement of objectivity becomes difficult, if not impossible. The realm of art is one of the clearest example of this. Is any objective judgement possible regarding that which constitutes this realm? Can one really talk about

a work of art in terms which are inter-subjectively decidable in principle? And, what about the realms of law and politics? The fact that the highest court of the land can give a decision or that voters can decide by a 'majority' which in so many cases is spurious is generally not even noticed or, if noticed, is brushed aside as irrelevant.

There are other realms where the most stringent conditions of experimentation have been applied and yet where the whole realm is dismissed as being incapable in principle of being 'true' or *real*. This is the realm dealing with what are called paranormal phenomena which are accepted if they happen in the realm of physics but which are treated as superstition if they happen in the realm of the mind. The same is true, though again in a different sense, of the world of human relations where it is just impossible to determine what 'really' happened. The Roshman story is well-known but so is the Alexandria Quartet of Durrell along with many others of the genre to which it belongs.

But what is even more tantalizing is the realm of the spirit where consciousness itself tries to transform itself through what has been called concentration or the 'intending act' which tries to change consciousness itself.

Both knowledge and truth, thus, become not only relative to the state of consciousness that one has but also the activity that this consciousness engages in as relevant distinctions have necessarily to be made within the context of the consciousness and the activity concerned. The point is that the distinctions between what is to be counted as 'knowledge' and what is to be considered as 'true' has always to be made and yet what is to be counted or considered to be such changes significantly every time the activity changes within the same level of consciousness and even more radically when the level of self-consciousness changes.

All this has been vaguely known to those who have reflected on the subject. But two important points have generally been missed in the thinking even when it has taken note of the points mentioned above. The change of level does not mean as is generally thought, that consciousness does not or cannot revert to the earlier levels and be a *subject* to all the old determinations under which it necessarily has to

live on those levels. Most of the Advaitic thinking along with that which has been done in the context of what has been known as 'Yoga' in Indian tradition suffers from this obvious shortcoming.

The second point that seems to have been missed relates to the fact that at each level, and in each activity at any level, consciousness suffers from inherent defects which affect both 'knowledge' and 'truth' in a sense, which have not been paid much attention or realized in detail. These are generally known as 'intrusions' of 'subjectivity' into that which by definition is supposed to be completely 'objective' in character. There are many aspects of this, the most important of which derives from the fact that without imagination no human knowledge is possible. But imagination is also the 'enemy' of what we call 'knowledge' and 'truth'. It is imagination that creates 'interests' and interest in the context of 'knowledge' and 'truth' mean prejudices to which one is wedded and which define, or are supposed to define one's identity. These occur mostly at the deepest level. At other levels, it takes the form of what has been called in the Indian tradition *rāga* and *dveśa*. The moment feelings, emotions and sentiments arise, the ideas of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' change at once and so do those of 'truth' and 'falsity', as the two 'sets' are interrelated in a way that epistemologists have not noticed. Reason is all of a piece, a unity that cannot be divided in terms of theoretical and practical or 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic'. Those who do so deceive themselves, but the real problem is: can one conceive of consciousness without the capacity for imagining and can imagining be conceived of without the idea of deception or deceiving.

But then, is not there a distinction between deceiving the other and deceiving oneself. The 'other', it should be remembered, has to be a consciousness in order that it may be deceived. A stone cannot be deceived by definition. But shall we then say that consciousness has to be defined as that which can either deceive or be deceived. If it is so, where shall there be knowledge or truth as without consciousness and self-consciousness there can be no meaningful talk of either knowledge or truth. But if these are infected at their very roots by this possibility, it seems impossible to have either knowledge or truth. One may still hope for knowledge about that which is not consciousness, that is, the

inaminate nature as one cannot 'deceive' it by definition; one may still hope for knowledge about those dimensions in man or the living world in general which are close to what we call matter. But the farther one moves away from these aspects of knowledge in the sense we understand, it becomes increasingly difficult. And as for the self and its relation with other selves, the whole thing is just 'impossible'.

Iqbal's Concept of Khudi

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The concept of *khudi* in Iqbal's thought and poetry is the most attractive notion, and it deserves proper attention and understanding. Commonly, in the English translation of *khudi*, its synonyms are taken to be 'self' or 'ego'. But in our view it is the principle of individuality which is primarily meant by Iqbal in his writings. However, when attributed to man, it may rightly be called self or ego. Sometimes it also means personality. But the term '*khudi*' is not exhausted by man though man remains the most important designatum. Iqbal, of course, seeks to use it as a universal idea applicable to every being or object in the cosmos. Iqbal has passionately written on it in his Persian poems—especially *Asrar-e-khudi* (*AK*)[1] (1915) (*Secrets of Self*, tr. R.A. Nicholson, 1920), *Payam-e-Mashriq* (*PM*) (*The Message of the East*) 1923 or *Javed Nama* (The Eternal Song) 1932. In his collections of Urdu poems, he has dealt with it in *Bal-e-Jibreil* (*The Wings of Gabreil*) 1935, *Bang-e-Dera* (*The Call of the Bell*) and *Zarb-e-Kalim* (*The Blow of Moses*) 1937.[2]

The only work of prose which extensively dwells upon this idea and its correlata is his well-known six lectures entitled *Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam*.[3] On account of wider familiarity with the Urdu works, we will mainly refer to his Urdu verses along with a number of Persian verses (in my own inadequate translation) from *AK* and some other works.

Iqbal's concept of *khudi* has to be understood in relation to a set of other concepts like love, God, freedom, creativity, dynamism, the perfect man (*insan-e-kamil* or *mard-e-momin*) and time and eternity. When Iqbal versifies them or writes about them his views sometimes come close to those of a number of Western thinkers like Nietzsche, Goethe, Bergson, Whitehead, Samuel Alexander, Sartre or Heideggar. Some

parallels can also he found between his ideas and those of Samkara, Ramanuja, Kabir and Nanak. But significant and genuine influences on his thoughts most tellingly come from the *Quran* and the sufis like ibn-e-Arabi, Fariduddin Attar and Rumi. Some vitalistic philosophers and Goethe are also important.

In this context it must be noted that he is often made out to have borrowed much from Bergson and Nietzsche. It is mistakenly held by some that Iqbal has almost lifted Nietzsche's superman and Bergson's view of time as duration, and transplanted them on the soil of his poetry. Any meaningful discussion of this point would require a full length study. Hence, with extreme brevity we make a few observations on this point.

Iqbal of course comes very close to Bergson's notion of time as duration or continuum as against serial time. This distinction was in some sense already present in European thought as one between conceptual time and perceptual time. Bergson, in his *Creative Evolution* (the English translation first appeared in 1911), holds that his concept of time as duration makes creative evolution possible. In Bergson's view however, it is only the present and the future which are more meaningful and he does not give adequate importance to the past. But without the past we cannot have the sense of history because the historical consciousness in several senses has to relate itself with the past. Iqbal, on the other hand, has an integrated view of time where, from the point of view of man's consciousness, the past flows into the future. Bergson does account for novelties since, as a biologist, he wanted the door of creative evolution to be kept ajar. But he rejects all teleology as he sees it as inverse mechanism which robs duration and acts *in* duration of freedom. For Iqbal, on the other hand, the *telos* or ideal cannot be banished since the creative process cannot be directionless. As for the close resemblance between Nietzsche's superman and Iqbal's *mard-e-momin*, the latter is rooted in the *Quran* as well as in the thoughts of ibn-e-Arabi, Rumi and some of their followers in whose thoughts the reality of Mohammed symbolizes the finality and zenith of man's perfection. Iqbal's *mard-e-momin* is a man of God and his viceregent on earth, imbibing all the divine names and attributes as possibilities. Nietzsche's master or superman is not limited in his power but Iqbal's

perfect man voluntarily accepts the authority of God as the supreme lord and master. It is also true that there are some parallels between Iqbal's thoughts and the vitalistic philosophies of life. Schopenhaeur, Alexander, Bergson and Nietzsche belong to this genre of thinking. During his stay in Europe during 1905–08, he studied western thought and especially German philosophy with great attention. Some such ideas might have been internalized by him and they might have provided him with some conceptual tools that helped him in erecting the edifice of his philosophy. But while formulating his ideas of *khudi* and the perfect man, he had access neither to Nietzsche nor to Alexander (whose Glasgow lectures were published as *Space, Time and Deity* in 1930). It is indeed the sufi ideas concerning *insane-e-kamil* (ibn-e-Arabi) and *ishq*/love (Rumi) which provide the framework for his thoughts.

Iqbal presents his concept of *khudi* as a universal cosmic principle which primarily works as an individuating principle responsible for providing each unit of creation a particular station or a unique position in the cosmos. He conceptualizes it as a principle of self-assertion, self-manifestation, self-realization, self-completion or self-development. Yet, Iqbal views *khudi* as something mysterious. Its nature is generally hidden from us and so in most cases we cannot understand it. Though *khudi* is created, it can become eternal through its acts and efforts. In his long poem *Asrar-e-Khudi* he often sings of these features of *khudi* and also of the infinite possibilities of progress hidden in it. In *AK* the quintessential theme concerning *khudi* is two-fold: that the reality underlying the system of the universe is *khudi* as a creative principle and that the limits and the determinants of *khudi* depend upon the strength of *khudi* itself. The opening verses of *AK* read as:

> The forms of life are the manifestations of *khudi*,
> Whatever I behold is due to the effects of *khudi*.
> When *khudi* got awakened in me,
> It made manifest the phenomenal world to me.
> Hundred worlds are hidden within your essence
> The 'other' (non-*khudi*) is born out of your self-affirmation

His emphasis on the dynamic nature of *khudi* made him critical of those Sufis for whom the material world is illusory, evil and, hence

worth discarding. This neo-Platonic hatred for matter led them to the ascetic and monastic way of life. Iqbal, on the other hand, believes that the essence of *khudi* is revealed through actions. It is not given to us merely through senses and reason. It operates not primarily at the cognitive level but essentially it is active and dynamic—gliding over and enjoying constant struggle and tension. He frequently resorts to the concepts of aim, end, longing and desire to define and illustrate what he means by *khudi* which is often understood as synonymous with life. The opening verses of the second section of *AK* begin as:

Life has permanence because of the desired goal,
The caravan of life moves on due to this.
Life is hidden in the search,
Its reality lies beneath the longing,
Keep the longing alive in your heart,
So that you may not become dead.
Life is rich on account of the longing.
Intellect is born out of its womb.

Iqbal, in this section of *AK*, goes on developing his ideas about the self-growing, self-creating, self-developing and self-protecting—the active and dynamic—nature of *khudi*. In a typically Sartrean way he says in the last verse of the second section:

I am living by creating my aims and values,
I am shining with the ray of longing.

Khudi, for Iqbal, is a creative principle which functions the way will-to-live or will-to-power structures and over-arches the philosophies of Schopenhaeur and Nietzsche respectively. In its creativity it is free and its freedom is limitless and unbound. At the same time Iqbal holds that *khudi* should always move within the self-imposed bounds of divinity since its acts and projects are translation of the divine will into history. There is no paradox in his view as it implies that *khudi* is both historical and transhistorical. It is a point of intersection between infinity and finitude.

His poems, those written after 1908, reveal an existential anguish which is a reflection of the ill-effects of modern western civilization

and that of loss of moral and spiritual values which downgrades humanity to slavery and brutishness.

Nevertheless, it may be noted that his indictment of western culture, systems and values anticipates some of the points raised in post-colonial and subaltern studies—though in a rudimentary form. Some of his concerns in this context sound similar to Edward Said's critique of the stereotypes and prejudices, which are inbuilt in the West's jaundiced or distorted vision of the 'oriental' cultures and societies. In Iqbal his existential anguish is sought to be overcome through his call to the individual to fully realize the hidden possibilities of his being. In Heidegger's way of putting it, the primordial mode of being of *Dasein* for Iqbal is the fullest realization of *khudi* which infinitises the finite. This ontological dimension encircles the whole universe but its clearest manifestation is found in man.

When *khudi* is conceived in relation to man, it leads to his concept of the perfect man which the Sufis like ibn-e-Arabi had developed. Among the Sufis it was an essentially spiritual state of the highest self-development while for Iqbal it is a dynamic spiritual-social concept. It symbolizes the highest state of self-dignity, fearlessness, courage and eternal search for companionship with God. As God for Iqbal is the highest ego and supreme personality (an idea popular with many Sufis), direct communication with God is possible. The expanse of *khudi* is like a huge ocean with limitless scope for development. As the *Quran* says, God has made man in his own image and taught Adam all the names. Hence, man is capable of acquiring knowledge and other divine attributes without of course having the essence of God in his being. But when man achieves the ideal of being one with God, he attains infinity. Some Sufis call it a stage of final absorption in God, i.e. *fana* (self-annihilation) and some *baqa* (permanent state of being). For some, the way to the latter is through the former. Iqbal says in *BJ*:

Khudi is an ocean which has no limit,
Nothing can be done if you take it as a stream
Your life and your dignity is due to *khudi*
You are a king if you retain it, or else you're dammed.
If it is priceless, it is only because *khudi* is protected
There is nothing in the pearl except its shine.[4]

Khudi woh behr hai jiska koi kinara nahin,
Tu abjoo isay samjha to koi chara nahin.
Teri zindagi isi se, teri abroo isi se,
Jo rahi khudi to shahi, ne rahi to roosiyahi
Geranbaha hai to fifze khudi se hai warna,
Gohar mein abe gohar ke sewa kutch aur nahin.

Again he says:

What is *khudi*? It is the secret of life.
What is *khudi*? It is the awakening of the universe
It shines in darkness and in light,
It is found in 'I' and 'you' but is untouched by 'I' and 'you'
Eternal beginning is behind it and eternity in front.
There is neither any limit behind it nor in front.
Life and death are not worth any concern
Only *khudi* is the aim in the eyes of *khudi*.[5]

Khudi kya hai? Raaz-e-duroon-e-hayat.
Khudi kya hai? Bedariye kainat.
Andherey ujale main hai tabnak,
Man-o-to mein paida, man-o-tu se paak.
Azal iske pichhe, abad samney.
Na had iske pichhe, na had samney.
Hayat-o-maut nahin iltefat ke laiq.
Faqat khudi hai khudi ki nigah ka maqsud.

The moving principle behind such a bold and dynamic concept of *khudi* is *ishq* or love which Iqbal has drawn from the Sufis like ibn-e-Arabi, Rumi, Jili and Mansur al-Hallaj, though Rumi is the main inspiration whom Iqbal accepts as his guide or *pir*. The Sufis take love as the only explanation and justification for having faith in God and seeking proximity with Him. The journey towards God, at a higher stage of God-realization, becomes the journey *in* God or *with* God. It is love and not mere knowledge which can bridge the distance between man and God. At the same time it is love with which the self can transcend everything except, of course, God and itself.

For most Sufis there are two ways of responding to divine calling—the *shariah* and the *tariqah*. The former is the way of the law and external observances while the latter is the spiritual way which essentially is the way of love, devotion and prayer—the *bhakti marga*. There has always been in Sufism a tension between the two which Ghazali (d. 1111 AD) sought to resolve by bringing mysticism within the fold of orthodoxy. In Indian Sufism the important schools/orders (*silsilas*) like the Qadris and Chishtis tried to keep the two within certain limits. The *shariah* was accepted as the conceptual space within which morality was the moving force backed up by piety and social obligation. *Tariqah* was deemed necessary for the fruition of inner experiences, devotion, faith and love. But early Sufis generally preferred *tariqah* to *shariah* and often ridiculed external observances. It is well known that Mansur al-Hallaj and Suharwardy were executed for having committed anti-orthodox 'heresy'. Ibn-e-Arabi never considered the *shariah* necessary for authentic Sufis. Rabia Basri openly derided notions of heaven and hell as temptation or fear to keep people on the path of righteousness. Iqbal defends Mansur and praises his mad love of God which prompted him to utter *an-al-Haq* (I am the creative Truth). It is through *ishq* or love of God that true knowledge of God becomes possible and man becomes like God by identifying himself with Him through inculcating and perfecting in himself the godly qualities. The truth thus attained is an existential truth whereby the mode of knowing is transformed into the mode of being. As the Vedantins say, to know Brahman is to become Brahman (Iqbal would, however, say *like* Brahman). The phenomenology of religious experiences is revealed to us through intuition and not reason. That is why Kierkegaard says that it is faith through which we live our religion and he calls faith subjectivity or madness because it cannot be grasped by rational categories. One of the early Sufis, when accused of being insane for holding views which were anathema to orthodoxy, says:

To your mind, I am mad
To my mind you are all sane,
So I pray to increase my madness
And to increase your sanity.
My 'madness' is from the power of love,
Your sanity is from the strength of unawareness.[6]

It is the 'madness' which made Mansur say at the time of his execution, 'O God! Forgive them but not me'. This statement surprisingly resembles the words of Jesus when he was going to be nailed on the cross: Forgive them for they know not what they are doing.

For Iqbal, love is a life force which enables us to determine our values and which also enables us to strive for their attainment. The emotional and ecstatic devotion to God was perfected by Rumi and his followers who are often called the dancing *dervishes* (like the Bauls of Bengal). Iqbal was greatly enamoured of Rumi's poetry and placed love almost at par with *khudi*. We can say that *khudi* characterizes the state or mode of being whereas love is the experience of that state as well as the way of perfecting it. In this sense it is often contrasted with reason and is used as intuition and faith. He says:

When love teaches the manners of self-awareness
The secrets of mastery are revealed to the slaves.
Fearlessly love leaped into the fire of Nemrud,
Reason is still viewing the show from a distance
The acts of godly man grow with love,
Love is real life and death is forbidden to it.
The melody of life is due to the plectrum of love,
The light and fire of life are kindled by love.[7]

Jab ishq sikhata hai adab-e-khud agahi
Khultey hain ghulamon per asrar-e-shanshahi
Be khatar kud para aatish-e-Nemrud mein ishq,
Aql hai mahw-e-tamasha-e-labe bam abhi
Mard-e-khuda ka amal ishq se sahib farogh,
Ishq hai asl-e-hayat, maut hai is par haram.
Ishq ke mizrab se naghma-e-tar-e-hayat
Ishq se noor-e-hayat, ishq se nar-e-hayat

Such an understanding of *khudi* and *ishq*, when informs an ego or a self, brings a ceaseless effort on the part of the individual to do what he freely wills. There is no restriction on his actions except what he himself imposes on himself or God imposes on him. But the nearness to God, which a perfect man has achieved even makes God's intervention non-existent. In a well-known couplet he says:

Take your *khudi* to such a height that before
Making your destiny God may seek to know your wish.

Khudi ko kar buland itna ke har taqdeer se pahle
Khuda bandey se khud poochhey bata teri raza kya hai.

Iqbal's *momin*, armed with the power of *khudi*, reveals the Promethean spirit who can oppose any authority which interferes with his intentions. What pleases such a man is the joy of acting. His actions are for the sake of action even if it is a futile exercise—the Sysyphusian model. Iqbal's *pir* or guide, Rumi, once said that 'vain effort is better than slumber' (i.e. inactivity). Iqbal, asserting perpetual growth and development of the self or *khudi*, says in *AK*:

If your today is the image of your yesterday,
Your dust is devoid of any sparkle of life.

Elsewhere he says:

You are a falcon, your job is to fly,
There are many more skies before you.
There are many more skies beyond the stars
Still there are more tests of love to face.
Your abode is not on the dome of king's palace,
You are a falcon and your resting place is on the mountain rocks.[8]

Tu shaheen hai parwaz hai kam tera,
Tere samne aasman aur bhi hain.
Sitaron se aage jehan aur bhi hain
Abhi ishq ke imtihan aur bhi hain
Nahin tera nasheman qisr-e-sultani ke gumbad par,
Tu shaheen hai basera kar paharon ki chatanon par.

In the same book at one place, emphasizing the creative and life-bestowing character of self, he says:

Thy station is beyond all station
Life is nothing but the delight of journey
Stillness and tranquility are illusion,
Every particle of the universe is restless

To your mind life is a secret,
Life is only the joy of flight.[9]

Har ek maqam se aagey maqam hai tera,
Hayat zauq-e-safar ke sewa kuchh aur nahin.
Fareb-e-nazar hai sukun-o-sabat,
Tarapta hai her zarra-e-kainat.
Samajhta hai tu raaz hai zindagi,
Faqat zuaq-e-parwaz hai zindagi.

Hence, as in *PM* it is stated, 'I am as long as I move, not moving I am not'. Iqbal agrees with ibn-e-Arabi in his understanding of a perfect man as one who does not only seek God but who is sought after by God for His self-expression and self-manifestation. Man is the manifest form of God as he becomes the exemplar of the divine names or attributes of God. Man's freedom and creativity are full of infinite possibilities. This lofty concept of the free man makes him participate even in the creative process. For Iqbal, God's creative act has not come to an end but it is still continuing without being repetitive. In one of his verses he says that 'perhaps this universe is still incomplete as constantly the call is heard: "be and it was" '. But Iqbal has the audacity to say that man is cooperative with God in this creative act because he has been made the viceregent of God and the viceregency puts man under the dual obligation to be a trustee and a co-worker. Asserting this Iqbal's man addresses God and says:

Thou created the night, I made the lamp,
Thou created the clay, I made the goblet,
Thou created deserted land.
I made the orchards and garden.

(*Javed Nama*)

Such a man is called '*mard-e-momin*' in whom are imbibed divine qualities. Disparaging the later sufi ideal of renunciation and asceticism, he constructed an image of man who is both historical and trans-historical, the intersecting point between time and eternity and who is in the world without being its slave. The symbolism of *momin* and *kafir* should not be understood here in their ordinary connotation. They

are employed by Iqbal to assert the supremacy of man and his liberation from worldly desires and temptations. Man's being-in-the-world is not denied. It is like Heidegger's temporality or Sartre's facticity. But Iqbal's momin is courageous, free, creative and spiritual. He says:

The identity of *kafir* is this that he is lost in the universe
The identity of *momin* is that the universe is lost in him,
If there is love, kufr is the quality of being a Muslim
If not, a Musalman is a *kafir* or a non-believer.[10]

Kafir ki yeh pahchan ke aafaq mein gum hai
Momin ki yeh pahchan ke gum oos mein hain aafaq
Agar ho ishq to hai kufr bhi musalmani
Na ho to mard-e-musalman bhi kafir-o-zindiq

Finally, to quote a couplet from *AK*:

Anyone who is devoid of creative power
He is nothing but infidel and heretic.

Notes and References

1. All references to *Asrar-e-khudi* are from the original poem published as *Asrar-e-khudi*, comm. Professor Yusuf Salim Chishti, Eteqad Publishing House, New Delhi, 1998. Hereafter, *AK*.
2. All references to Urdu poems/verses are from *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal* (Complete Works of Iqbal, Urdu) centenary edition, Educational Book House, Aligarh, 1980, hereafter *Kulliyat*. It contains *Bang-e-Dera, Bal-e-Jibreil* and *Zarb-e-kalim*—hereafter referred to as *BD*, *BJ* and *ZK*, respectively.
3. *Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam* (Oxford, 1934, Kitab Bhawan, Delhi, 1994), hereafter *Reconstruction*.
4. *BJ* (in *Kulliyat*) pp. 44–5, 47.
5. *BJ*, p. 127; *ZK*, p. 68.
6. Cited by Idries Shah, *The Way of the Sufi*, Penguin, 1974.
7. *BJ*, pp. 56, 94–5; *BD*, p. 278.
8. *BJ*, pp. 61, 120.
9. *BJ*, pp. 47, 126.
10. *ZK*, p. 44; *BJ*, p. 35.

Meaning, Explanation and Grammar in Wittgenstein*

Any innovation made of natural language does not alter its essential core, but only serves a methodological purpose of determining its bounds—what it is possible to express sensibly in it and what is not, what it is possible to do with it and what not. Wittgenstein, in his later phase, examines and explores the conceptual possibilities offered by the application of language in every day life.

Languages are open-ended and we have a high degree of freedom in using them in our lives. But this does not in the least preclude them from being clearly identifiable and recognizable as distinct systems of rules. Languages are *systems* of rules governing the combination of signs. Bare signs become full-fledged symbols or are rendered so by explanations which link them to another kind of language, though not of words. But here we are still using language, even if it is not words.

The conditions necessary for a sign to become a symbol are internal to the latter. What makes a sign meaningful (or sensible) is part of the symbol. The conditions which are necessary to give meaning (or sense) to a sign do not connect it with anything else. The explanation completes the symbol but does not extend itself to anything extraneous; it does not supercede the symbol. What cannot be explained of a sign is irrelevant and whatever counts as explanation must be in language, i.e., in symbols.

A sign can be nonsensical but not a symbol. Words are not just reminders of association between images or devices to recall them, but a full part of the symbolism. They, therefore, function well within it. A sign explained by an ostensive definition completes the symbol, giving further conditions necessary for understanding the symbol. To reiterate, these belong to the symbol. For a symbol to be meaningful, it is hardly necessary that the actual occasion of its explanation should be remembered. Actually, it is possible to remember the occasion, but lose the meaning and therefore, not to know the meaning of a sign which one had learnt.

The occasion of the explanation of the meaning of a sign or the meaning itself may be lost to memory. The real criterion of an explanation, however, is whether the symbol explained is used properly in the future after it has been learnt. Whatever endows meaning or sense to a symbol is part of it; it is internal to what can be said in language. The place a symbol has in language is shown or revealed by the way in which it is *used*.

In explaining the meaning of a sign, we are actually describing the symbol of which it is a part; we are not transcending it. Meaning is part of the symbol. Understanding, therefore, means to get hold of the symbol (to grasp the conditions required for its sense) and not the fact. Understanding is conveyed by the explanation we can give, not by any external agency or stimulant.

The symbol is self-contained in some sense and one grasps it as a whole. A symbol is a completed sign with its conditions of sense fulfilled. It does not anticipate something else in a shadowy way, say a fact. Meaning is not the shadow of a fact. However, if a fact is presupposed in the significance of a symbol, then it is part of the symbol. What is essential for the fact to have meaning is given in the conditions necessary to the sense of the sign or the symbol. These conditions of sense are a part of grammar.

It is we who give the sign its meaning. The signs have both a *general* arranged significance and an interpreted *particular* or concrete application. It is thus that language can convey something new. The concept of language is defined by certain *systems* of rules for the use of its signs. The rules which forms a system and which govern the combination of its signs and their application can be described in that language itself. No other more general artificial/formal/meta-language is necessary. A language that cannot describe itself is no language at all. This capacity to describe itself is internal to a language; nothing extraneous can make it clear. The essence of a language—what is essential to the expression of sense in it—must be statable in that language itself. Essence in later Wittgenstein is linked to *Paradigms*. What is essential must have something paradigmatic about it.

Language as a system of rules is given by its *grammar*. 'By "language" I mean only that for which a grammar can be written—.'[1] The

grammar of a language maintains harmony between its diverse parts and acts as a kind of centralizing agency. In contrast, the variegated use of words dissipates and diversifies meanings. Meaning is defined by use and consequently the meaning of the word 'grammar', too tends to become diversified with the various ways of its use.

What is the connection of grammar with meaning? The place of a word in grammar as well as its use in language, Wittgenstein avers, is its meaning.[2] He thereby equates the activity of placing a word in grammar in terms of its general rule and application (use) with using it as a part of a language in life conjoining them in the meanings of words. Use, grammar, and meaning are tied together; they are closely connected kinship concepts. What connects them together is 'rules'.

The placing of a word in the grammar of the language of which it is a part and which forms an explanation for us of its meaning engages the rules of use of the word. The explanation of the meaning of a word enables us to form a general picture or concept of its active use and, thereby, to understand its sense and purpose completely.

The explanation of the meaning of a word is furnished by relating the general rules of its understanding to its use in a language, i.e., the whole to its parts by placement of a word in the over-all scheme of language. But the explanation of meaning which makes a sign or a word a part of a symbol makes language pictorial in the sense that it enables us to form a general concept of it, i.e., understanding it as a correlate of its explanation which completes and fulfils the symbol. Explanation of the signs of language only sets up pictures we have of the use of language. We mistakenly take them to be its essence/meaning. We can get by however, if we set the picture aside and follow the use.

The pictorial character of thought is an expression of the harmony of thought and reality which must already obtain for words to have meaning. But this pictorial character of thought is not to be regarded as merely an agreement of form as the Tractatus had claimed. As Wittgenstein himself suggests later, '—every projection must have something in common with what is projected no matter what is the method of projection.'[3] This means extending the concept of 'having in

common' and making it equivalent to the general concept of projection. Here attention is importantly drawn to a possibility of generalization.

For the later Wittgenstein, language is an uniquely human projection of human purpose resting on an agreement over the possibility of generalization. Language rest on harmony; it is already there in the grammar of language and manifest in every instance of the use of language. Every use of language reflects the total harmony of thought and reality. We can therefore see structure in anything that is given in language if we look closely enough: 'Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of language.'[4] Grammar is, therefore, the repository of all connections and holds language together.

Explanation of meaning involves rules which are conventionally well established and clear cut rules for the use of words. Thus at bottom *explanation* of meaning is really *description* of conventional use by means of picturographic comparisons, analogies, similes and illustrations that are possible in language.

The relation between grammar and the place of a word in it constitutes what counts as the active use of a word in language. Explanation of meaning places a word properly in the grammar of language, a part in relation to the whole in which it functions. The meaning of the word 'meaning' is ineffable except in its conventional uses which are diverse. The unity we might want to see in it can only be found, if at all, by attending to its use. 'Meaning' and 'use' have a common grammar; the same rules apply to both of them. The same lines of projection link them to reality and the conditions for understanding them are so close that they can be identified. But Meaning can be *explained*, whereas use which is conventional, can only be *described*.

Explanation of meaning through rules is nothing but the understanding we already have of it in using it and it designates a general concept. 'Understanding is the correlate of explanation and is translation into action according to a general rule.'[5] When we see a general rule, we see in it a special case. In interpreting a general rule, we are doing much the same thing as we do when interpreting any other special case. The special case has the general rule, but not the explanation of the rule. The rule is what renders the symbolism of language non-arbitrary.[6]

The explanations absent in the special instance of the application of a rule are supplied by grammar. Grammar furnishes the explanations of rules of meaning by producing descriptions of cases of the use of rules. The rules of grammar cannot be empirically verified, but we include them as part of a system of signs (language) by concepts in terms of the general rules of projection used for them. These general rules being conventional in nature have no real justification as such. We can at best describe them, their practical everyday use. Use can be described, meaning explained. The explanation of meaning includes primarily the description of rules of use.

The conventionally ratified application/use makes language necessary, renders its rules solid. The general rules of understanding are already implicitly and tacitly present in the special cases of its use, but are made explicit by the explanations of the meanings of the language whose use it constitutes.

Grammar, therefore, comprises the general rules of understanding of a language—the conditions required for its sense and which are made in language by the explication of the meaning of its signs. This explication of the meanings of signs makes the purpose of the general rules, their intentionality, explicit. Wittgenstein does not deny the phenomenon of 'intentionality' as is popularly held, but makes it a silent, well-integrated and tacit part of the use of language. The variability of a part of a phenomenon investigated thus comes to be seen as an intended one. When we understand a part as part of a system, we perceive its purpose in life.

The general rule cannot be separated or isolated from the special instances of its use. It is a method along with its rules of application that forms the most general concept we can have of 'grammar'. Grammar is the method of language and its rules are its lines of projection by which it connects language to reality. Language is constituted by its uses while grammar comes into being by our consciously explaining and relating the uses of words to their general rules of meaning and understanding. The explanation of meaning is a method of understanding meaning. And as a method it rests on an interpretation of the world. But interpretations do not determine meaning as they determine what

counts as reality in a given language. It is the particular uses of words that determine meaning, not its various possible interpretations.

All connections of a language are quite openly visible and available to scrutiny in its grammar. 'Grammar', Wittgenstein says, is 'the account books of language. They must show the actual transactions of language, everything that is not a matter of accompanying sensation.'[7] We cannot ask of a system of language or its grammar if it is right or wrong. Those epithets are applicable only to the use of words.

Notes and References

* Revised version of a lecture presented for a UGC refresher course held at Visva-Bharati in 1996.

1. Quoted in *Wittgenstein's Philosophy Language*, by J. Bogen, p. 179, published by Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972. The quote is from the unpublished notes of Wittgenstein.
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein *Philosophical Grammar* ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978, p. 97/55. Henceforth referred to as PG.
3. PG, p. 163/113.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein *Zettel* ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. Van Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, 55. Also PG, p. 162/112.
5. *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930–32*, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, pp. 51 and 44. Henceforth referred to as LWL. See also, in this regard PG, p. 60/24.
6. LWL, p. 40.
7. PG, p. 87/44.

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Is Chomsky's Grammar, Sui Generis, Non-empirical? A Rejoinder to Sinister Heterodoxy

Professor Amitabha Dasgupta's attempt to give a blow-by-blow account of refutation of my title question comes as a bolt from the

blue, at least for me who thought the game was all over. Protect his honour as he must, even after a lapse of ten years. Astounding, at least for me. I must have been thrown off gear, if indeed it is a must. Nevertheless, I must indeed be grateful for the opportunity to search all over in what remains of the debris and to raise some more dust not only to clarify my stand again, but also to focus sharply his misdeeds, purely for a better understanding. In what follows, therefore, I hope to clear the decks for *his* better understanding of Chomsky as well as the points of the debate. The whole debate is less about the empiricality of Chomsky's linguistics, than about the type of charges one can make even within the framework of Chomsky's linguistics.

Dasgupta's official view was that since Chomsky's linguistics posits the psychological reality of grammar without telling us how nomological laws operate within the brain, it is and ought to be non-empirical. He arrives at his 'central thesis' to be 'TG has a non-empirical foundation' (p. 1) moving through the following motions:

> LSLT (Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory) develops a *D-N* model of linguistics to explain the observable event of a sentence in terms of hypothesized formal laws (rewriterules).
> Generative Grammar is an algorithmic device, in which the rewrite rules provide the input and the sentence is the output.
> The relation between a sentence and its parsed structure is one between *explanans* and *explanandum*.
> So, *explanandum* is deducible from the *explanans*.
> Chomsky is a positivist in claiming a 'complete' scientific status for his theory.

In the quoted passage, Chomsky does not make any explicit claim of any of the above except the first, second and the latter half of fourth premise, in which he tries to fit the data (formal rewrite rules such as $S = NP + VP$) to a theory (of grammar). The child is just like a scientist while learning a language. A child has as much cognitive potential as a scientist in building up a theory. Let us identify this as the 'cognitive basis' thesis. The child has a theory (of grammar) with the help of which she acquires the mastery (theory) of language. That is to say, *TG*, as Grammar (*G*) of *L* (Language), is potentially a theory of language (linguist's theory of language), and incidentally, a theory of the

speaker (speaker's theory of his language). This is also called *theory-theory* in the literature on cognitive science. This is just to capture the contours of the debate within cognitive science. We are far away from the alleged *D-N* mode of explanation. Critics do not agree with the epistemology behind what is called a *theory-theory* and tried to replace it with another paradigm called *simulationism* which is just an offshoot of the current reliabilist epistemology *a la* Goldman.

Amitabha has no patience to enquire into any such paradigm nor does he care to tell us where else Chomsky makes such a claim to reinforce his affiliation to positivism. One can still do science without caring much about positivism, or with the so-called *D-N* model of explanation. Not all scientists are positivists. What he fails to see is that all claims to science need not necessarily be confined to positivist's claim about the structure of scientific theory. Hence, he puts the wrong foot forward to say that it should call for a 'total revision' (ibid.) and a 'radical departure' (15), which he wants to provide by 'reconstructing' it on a revisionary view of normative foundation, within which the notion of *explication* should take over the place of explanation. Amitabha's *revisionary* thesis state that 'TG, as a system of *explication*, arises due to the normative reconstruction' (14). He should tell us how to make a distinction between explanation and explication. Both stem from positivistic adoration of science.

Now, Amitabha claims the explication arises out of the major thrust of his recent Wittgensteinean account of second 'linguistic turn' (1996). Based on criterial considerations, which takes him to the unsafe domain of social facts, it aims to unloosen a particular stance of so-called autonomy of linguistics. The question is whether he succeeds where Chomsky fails. I am in agreement with the philosophical opinion which tells us that it would be rather perverse to exclude the psychological counterpart of language/linguistics. That remains the only starting point. Otherwise, you are back to square one. With the onus to tell us what this language/linguistics is all about without their being processed in the brain. Let me verify his claims. Amitabha claims that he is making a 'radical departure' (160) so as to be concerned more with the *how*-question (acquisition of language) rather than the *what*-question (what language is). It is not so much clear whether he takes the 'synchronic'

model in the above sense. In what sense, does it link up with autonomy claim? Does autonomy then lend credence to the idea of Third World entities *a la* Frege or *a la* Popper? These questions demand answers.

Let me explain why I think that it is perverse to look at language/linguistics in Amitabha's way. He wants to give up on one hand the alleged 'causal account of mentalism' but takes seriously on the other hand the causal event of a sentence and intuitive knowledge of the grammaticality of a sentence. Nothing is gainsaid by replacing 'explanation' with 'explication'. Even if granting that explication can become a proxy for explanation, how does it follow that neither Chomsky nor Wittgenstein (in his sense) are doing science? I shall use *L* for Language and *df* for definition (in a rather crude sense) and collate the three views of *L* so as to impress upon him the flaw in his approach:

(L) = *df.* Brain $\rightarrow$ Innate $\rightarrow$ Behaviour
(L) = *df.* Science $\rightarrow$ Innate $\rightarrow$ Behaviour (explanation)
(L) = *df.* ?? $\rightarrow$ Intuition $\rightarrow$?? (Explication of sentence?)

The first two approaches are agreeable to most of us for the simple reason that the first is marked by a biological approach and the second is marked by a physicalistic or reductionistic approach, irrespective of the nature of innateness each assumes. This is what he stoutly denies. The third model is Amitabha's, which he claims to be a more sanguine project. He accepts intuitive knowledge. In what respects does it differ from the other two is not so clear from his reflections. He does not want to be a naturalist or a behaviourist either. He only rejects innatism for the sake of rejecting it. He wants to be a performance theorist even while accepting some sort of intuitive knowledge. He thinks that this much is enough for proving the non-empiricality of linguistics. In what sense does his 'explication' provide the causal structure to a sentence considered as an event? In my debate with him, he has somehow gained a false impression that I stand for the above positivist orthodoxy, arguing for a defence of the empiricality of Chomsky's linguistics: '*TG* has an empirical foundation' in that sense. I am not. I am not a defender of the status quo, since none of us knows how exactly language is processed (implemented or realised) in the brain. None has any idea about this, including Chomsky. It does not necessarily follow that Chomsky is not doing science in any respectable sense. My question

was: with what (empirical) credentials does Amitabha claim to prove the non-empiricality of (Chomsky's) linguistics? His very query seems to be a bunk. In fact, I urged him to debate this question about the psychological explanations in linguistics more within the now relatively well established cognitive science. This is the place where the second cognitive revolution has occurred following Chomsky's first revolution. Neuroscience becomes the foundational subject for a philosophy of mind. The question is about nature and form of psychological explanations that is given a sharper relief, though it is by no means solved. No cognitive scientist till date is able to tell us how it is implemented in the brain.

In the event of his not following up the cognitive basis or biological basis (*supra*), several other options are open to Amitabha. First, a philosophical (axiomatic) option. Make the rules (of competence) as innate axioms for performance. This is just to make it evident for a causal structure between the underlying psychological rules and the torrent of discourse. Unless he has a strong bias against the axiomatic model, he cannot object to this particular move, championed by Gareth Evans and Martin Davies in different forms. Add compositionality as an axiom, then you almost get something analogous to a truth-functional system of logic. The only objection here might turn to be against its explanatory slack about creativity. No causal structure can explain creativity of new sentences. While Chomsky takes refuge in calling it a mystery, others try to go beyond Chomsky; Amitabha also thinks it is explainable in his sense. But he still cannot agree with them. The second option is the cognitive one. He can direct his query to assess whether a cognitive scientist like Jerry Fodor can formulate nomological laws of intentionality. For this, he would be better to begin with the alleged dictum which holds that mind has a language-like code of thought called the mentalese or language of thought as advanced by Jerry Fodor, where exactly the issue about the status of causal-mentalistic explanation in linguistics assumes more prominence. Fodor's nativism is biological in the sense that there are 'psychological phenotypes' (103). Biology needs some sort of innatism. Think of genetics and the phenotypes. In order to do this, I naturally invited him to join the bandwagon. Chomsky is also in some agreement with this natural

course of development, though he is not inclined to join the bandwagon.

What vitiates Fodorian intentional realism or cognitivism is that, on Chomsky's understanding, our cognitive systems are dynamical systems in some sense. If this much is agreed, then we cannot without ease subscribe to a thesis that grammar is psychologically real. This is exactly where Chomsky does not want to own up the dictum, which holds that internalism is the only option. The positing of Chomsky's I-language of competence is not without any relations to systems of performance and the relation itself is described to be one having 'access-to'. We are away from *explanandum-explanans* or the so-called *D-N* mode. Maybe that from performance of scientific output, we can *abduct* (i.e., neither deduct, nor induct) a hypothesis about the language (competence). The former is the data (torrent of discourse) and the latter has *stages* of acquisition. Chomsky's I-(intentional) language has an initial and a matured stage. I take this as Chomsky's latest position which goes against innatism to some extent. If so, many criticisms which aimed to undo linguistics on innatist hypothesis may not be true after all. If so, then why accuse Chomsky for what he has not said. Chomsky does not claim that innatism is empirical, but demands a rationalistic explanation. As remarked above, innatism has empirical support within cognitive science. There is no 'orthodoxy' today as he can verify the support on the study of the mind within cognitive science.

The third option follows from the first in which you lend a 'listiform' (using Tarskian Schema) to the above framework and make it work like a Tarskian style truth theory so as to yield a Davidsonian type of axiomatic semantics. All these moves take us away from the *D-N* model. Further, Chomsky has never said that hypothetico-deductive way of doing linguistics is the only option. In today's parlance, the hypothetico-deductive way of doing linguistics is christened as cognitive (science plus) linguistics. The worth of Chomsky's linguistics is that it is the best bet for a truth-functional treatment, or that truth-functionality is the best fit for Chomsky's grammar. Such a paradigm, rudiments of which are evident in Davidson, is still open to objections for their obvious innatism. But one can turn them out to be performance-

oriented theories. Thus Michael Devitt (1987) rejects the competence-oriented folk philosophies of language in favour of sophisticated naturalistic philosophies of language. Still, it is christened to be a representational theory of mind and language. Amitabha's theory has never exercised this third option. But even so, this does not pronounce the last word in linguistics. Amitabha has an animus against holding that grammar cannot be separated from its mental representation. He exhorts us to 'distinguish' the former from the latter (160). Is Amitabha an eliminativist of an extreme type who cannot accept representation which even eliminativists accept? Presuming that he cannot accept the equivalence of theory and folk psychology, because he sounds so, still it is repugnant to him (156–7). Currently, eliminativism is not a fashionable option but hybrids are preferable. Alternatively, he can fight on the home front by checking the particular empirical claims of Chomsky, instead of charging him as one who subscribes to a distinct mode of explanation. He can question Chomsky's claim to be a naturalist. This is the fourth option which he never examined. Thus, he has not exercised any of the above myriad options, all of which are meant to be empirically grounded psychological options. The last option is to look at the neurobiological basis of language. This has not proved its scientific credentials as yet. This is the root cause of his confusion.

While singling out competence as a target, Amitabha wants to spare performance. He must be aiming to achieve a sharp separation of these two concepts. If so, how he will react to Chomsky's explanatory mode that includes both. Performance becomes the *explanandum* and competence is the *explanans*. The link is not to be understood in terms of any existing model of explanation. This is exactly my point throughout. It is quite unfortunate that my friend Amitabha was led astray by a move to bet on the positivistic *D-N* mode. Let me tell him this: given a language L, there are two models of Grammar to choose from, called respectively, *G1* and *G2*. We choose one which has more explanatory power. *TG* is preferable to Phrase-Structure Grammar. By parity, Government and Binding is preferable than the classical *TG*. This is inference to the best explanation, which is a better scientific mode than that of the *D-N* mode.

The structural description of grammar in terms of parsing rewrite rules is according to Chomsky the best way to fit the data with theory, and hence descriptive adequacy is empirical adequacy awaiting the discovery of brain sciences to fill the gap. If it is the best fit, it is an inference to the best explanation and this need not be identified with the so-called *D-N* mode. In view of this, Amitabha's poser is rather naïve: since *TG* cannot divulge anything about the psychological reality, it has no right to advance any empirical claims. In what sense does this give a premise to prove that his linguistics should be non-empirical? The specific area he should look for is the interface between language and mind with which Amitabha must have a great deal to do. As I gather, his reason for ignoring my advice is to sponsor a sinister revisionary claim about the non-empiricality of *all* linguistics which is therefore currently advanced as a *sui generis* claim. He can see the hollowness of this claim in the way he formulates the counter-argument:

(All) grammar is conceptual (*sui generis* claim)
Grammar has an intrinsic conceptual nature
Grammar is non-empirical.

Nevertheless, he says as much to conclude that *it does not follow* that it is non-empirical (157). Then what is the fuss all about? Can he assume an escape route by holding that he is only suggesting a conceptual distinction and not an empirical distinction between grammar and its psychological counterpart (*ibid.*)? It looks as if his reasoning does not sustain any arguments. That proves that he has no standards of empiricism, and if so, how on earth he can call something non-empirical. The very quest looks gloomy.

As far as I know no philosopher/linguist has taken up such a claim including Katz's linguistics of the new intentionalism with whom he seems to be in perfect alignment. His quote towards the end attests to this. Linguistics, as he is well aware, is not a hard science. It can only make soft laws. Even so, cognitive science is replete with *ceteris paribus* laws, which are exceptionable laws. We have actually no idea what are scientific laws (universal generalizations). According to some critics, even scientific laws about microparticles lie. If it were to frame hard laws, it will naturally become part of physiology/brain sciences. As of date, we have not succeeded in this. That does not reduce its status of

science anyhow. On Chomsky's own admission, linguistics would disappear if it is to become a hard science because it will be subsumed under brain sciences.

For Quine, linguistics, as it is at present, must be excluded from science. The debate between Chomsky and Quine is waged on this basis. Quine takes the position that the extensional first order logic is the only canonical idiom of science. Chomsky accuses that it is not as empirical as it is claimed to be, and hence his internalised language representation given in terms of structural description, is as empirical as anything else in science. George, who is a pioneer in these methodological reflections, ventures to believe that they are, after all, compatible at a deeper level since both will converge when advances in brain sciences develop. George calls it 'deep explanation'. Both debate whether linguistics is a natural science. Both are innatists (Quine is innatist upto his neck) as well as naturalists: there is no deep divide between them. The deepest explanation is brain for Chomsky and nerve hits for Quine. Both are a species of the neuronal and hence both speculate about the biological basis. Amitabha questions its relevance. For him it only proves its 'uncertain nature' (160). He questions Quine for taking the data of linguistics as 'emission of noise' which Chomsky takes as the parsing of syntax. Quine externalizes syntax so as to combine with logic to get what he calls as 'logical grammar'. It is a pity that Amitabha cannot follow that the relevance consists in the relation between language, linguistics, and physics vis-à-vis theory construction.

Thence follows my invitation to look at this debate. There is no evidence that Amitabha is keen about this because he is just not interested in the empirical credentials of any linguistics. How can he get help by quoting a passage from Chomsky's earliest work (his work has undergone many drastic changes over the years)? In what sense is Amitabha's attribution of nomological laws in linguistic theory warranted by Chomsky's hypothesized formal laws? Is this only to facilitate a convenient target and thence forward to assert that since he has not explained anything about the origin of language in the brain, he cannot claim to do empirical science? I can agree if Amitabha has shown the way to better Chomsky by demonstrating that there is no best fit between his theory and his data. I am really at a loss to understand how Amitabha himself would fit his data with his theory which he claims to be a

theoretical account of atheoretical position of intuitive knowledge. Does this not obfuscate his credentials for making this an empirical theory? Let me take the former as a better fit and venture to think that it may be a species of inference to the best explanation. So now for Amitabha, the 'revisionary' option is open to castigate him by holding that since he cannot say anything about the representation about the brain (psychogrammar), he must go the other extreme and be obliged to give an alternative notion of correct sentence. His argument goes through the following motions:

TG's claim to give us nomological laws is false.
The notion of grammar must be intuitively correct.
Grammar is a corpus of grammatically correct sentences.
Grammar must have an intrinsic (metaphysical?) trait.
Its laws must not be falsifiable.
Linguistics is, and ought therefore to be, a non-empirical (*sui generis*).

The naivity or question-begging nature of the first premise must now be apparent. Neither Chomsky nor any one else claims that there are such nomological laws. Quite independent of this model, Chomsky may still maintain that his hypothetical construction is an inference to the best explanation and hence it is still empirical. *D-N* Model is not the only one. I do not swear that the empiricality cannot be questioned. This is done more by what he actually claims rather than from what he does not claim. This is indeed how I urged him to undertake but he rejected my plea. However, Amitabha is logical enough to presume that the above conclusion cannot follow from the *sui generis* claim about the metaphysical core of language/grammar. So he now hypothesizes that it is rather a direct outcome of a normative foundation of linguistics (*ex hypothese*, it excludes any empirical motivation) wherein alone it is possible to give an intuitively correct notion of grammar. Such an intuitively correct notion must *explicate* what it is to utter a correct sentence. Strangely, he regards this as an epistemic task. What are its credentials for an absolutely correct epistemology is not clear at present from his account. Begging many questions, he presumes that Chomsky also actually explicates, but he looks no better than him. So he is not engaged in explication for psychological reality of grammar. This is down right narcisstic. In fact, Amitabha casts his net wider to

argue for what he christens as the 'autonomy of linguistics'. One wonders how, without giving the status of science, autonomy is to be given. He is in a fine mess here.

Grammar cannot be reduced to a set of Chomskyan rewrite rules which are falsifiable. But such rules must be inviolable and non-falsifiable. I am inclined to think this is no different from the first argument which proceeds from the intrinsic nature of grammar. In support of this, he says that he is interested not in the utterance as an event in space and time but as an 'action'. Is a speech act an action? If he denies the event thus, he is not doing any linguistics of parole, but language. Whence comes an action? For Amitabha, the non-empiricality follows either directly from the conceptual confusion between linguistics and the psychological/brain sciences, or from the fact that it does not say anything about the nomological laws in the brain. From this, he passes on to say the *sui generis* non-empiricality of *all* linguistics. In this connection, I invited his attention to the critical assessment of George but Amitabha cannot agree with George simply for the reason that he is nowhere denying the empirical status to linguistics. The thrust of George's critique is that if linguistics is to become a science, it should inevitably identify grammar with brain processing with which Chomsky cannot disagree. Amitabha has failed, therefore, to grasp the thrust of my critique. Amitabha has every reason to agree with George's distinction because it divides grammar from psychogrammar. For Amitabha, they can never be identified and kept separate for the purpose of explication of grammar as a corpus of correct sentences. Look at the patent contradiction in his argument: he denies the psychological basis of grammar and so he concentrates on the 'speech' (*parole*). But he swears that he is not concerned with utterance-events in space-time. Then he must have recourse to language (*langue*). But then it is something about the innate structure which is what he denies. This is circular. Probably, Amitabha denies the above interface between language and mind, with which George, Chomsky, and many others (including myself) agree, deciding in favour of another interface in which he makes Chomsky more Cartesian than he appears (Amitabha 1999).

It is probably at this juncture that he turns to Katz (Platonic Grammar) for succour. What he misses is that Katz's rationalism is more realistic (Realistic Rationalism) than he seems to think. He should also

note that Katz summarily dismisses Wittgenstein's so-called naturalism which is based on normativity of linguistic rules (For an incisive review see Professor S.V. Bokil, 1999). A similar option is available for him to compare Jaakko Hintikka's *GTS* with the latest Chomskyan *GB* variety, but he overlooks Hintikka's explicit remark that Chomsky is 'far more realistic', but his theory is a better one than Chomsky's own as far as *LF* is concerned for the simple reason that *GTS* is more sensitive to certain nuances of natural language. The natural consequence is that *GTS* has more clout than the other. This can hardly prove the non-empiricality of *LF*.

With what empirical strength, then, is Amitabha going to prove his own credentials? At some level, holistic explanations are a species of psychological explanations *a la* Peacocke (Minimal Innatism), but he is averse to it for a similar reason. Science is holistic. His autonomy claim stands or falls with his normativity claim. His normativity is not simply sustainable as a *sui generis* non-empirical claim. On all hands, it is agreed that empiricism cannot take a back seat. Even without refuting this, he may theorize about grammar, if he thinks that he can. So why should he resort to a move that may not sustain him after all? So, I call it a sinister move with a certain semblance of heterodoxy aimed simply to do some logic chopping without any due regard to factual details.

Notes and References

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Reaction to Comments Made by Binod Kumar Agarwala on My Essay (*JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 4) on his Response to Daya Krishna's Article on Kant's Categories (*JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 3)

Understanding a text is partly an understanding of one's own understanding, and therefore, I feel obliged to Dr. Binod Kumar Agarwala on having taken the trouble to make a reply (rep.) to what I wrote (rsb) on his response to Daya Krishna's essay on Kant's categories (res.) and thus giving me another chance to sort out my understanding of Kant. His comments consist of eleven sections. There is little substantial to differ from him as regards sections 6 to 8, hence I confine myself to sections 1 to 5, and 9 to 11, only.

1. While I accept that 'if x helps in discovering of clue to y, it does not necessarily follow that x itself has now become a clue to y' (or, in other words, a clue to a clue is not a clue) (rep. p. 2). I still fail to understand how one can make the statement that 'the table of judgement can be used to find out the third thing which is the source of origin of categories' and also assert that 'the table of judgements is *not at all* the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding'. (res. p. 109, accent added)

BKA's statement 'Kant's intention is to make use of transcendental table of judgements to lay bare the course of the origin of pure categories of understanding, ...' (res. p. 130) can certainly not be taken as leading to the conclusion that 'the table of judgements is not at all the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding', and thus it does make the reader ask as to 'what happens to the mistake pointed in the opening of the paper.' (rsb. p. 145)

BKA points out that one has to go to the third section of the first chapter of the Analytic of Concepts to find out as to 'what the function of unity is ...' (res. p. 117) and what is the clue for the discovery of pure concepts of understanding, which lies in between the transcendental table of judgements and the thing in 'between judgement and concept ...' (res. p. 116). It is true that to understand what the function of unity is one has to go to the six paragraphs preceding the table of

categories, yet so far as the *mention* of 'the third thing' (in BKA's locution) is concerned, it has already been mentioned by Kant in the first section of the said chapter—'All judgements are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, ...' (*CPR*, 1998 Tr. 69A, 94B), and to some extent he has also clarified how 'the function of unity' operates a few lines earlier. He further asserts that the functions of understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgements.' (ibid. quoted by BKA also, see res. p. 116) These points are elaborated in what follows later in the successive sections. The table of judgements lists all the judgements which Kant takes to exhibit the functions of unity exhaustively. Since the table of categories is formed after the pattern exhibited in the table of judgements, it can quite legitimately be taken as having its source in the other table. However, that does not mean that it is derived from the other table.

2 and 3. Keeping in view the fact that Kant had overgrown the Wolffian influence, if we re-read what BKA quotes from my essay regarding the Kantian idea of organic unity of knowledge and the passage that BKA quotes from Kant, my understanding regarding the organic unity of knowledge would not turn out to be either disparate or incompatible. According to Kant, subjective appropriation would be only possible if one is not approaching the material from history in an external way. For anyone wanting to do something 'productive' the knowledge has to arise 'out of reason'. Such an enterprise would prevent a plaster-cast of a given model and would help not merely a creative exercise but would give rise to internal criticism as well, and as Kant remarks, 'even the rejection of what has been learned, can also arise, i.e., from principles'. (CPR, 1998 Tr. 837A/865B)

I have no quarrel with BKA when he remarks that 'from the point of historical distance when the concerned science has flourished and the seed idea has developed we are in a better position to describe the idea even better than the original thinker who had that idea' (rep. p. 3). However, it may turn out to be a matter of personal predilection as to what one would be interested in—'authorial intention' or the 'intention of the text itself'. (rep. p. 5) BKA prefers the latter and he has his

reasons for doing so. For me it is hard to make sense of 'intention' (of a text) apart from its relation to an author, notwithstanding the problems attending the unavailability or unknownness of the author concerned. Even if it makes sense to talk about the 'intention of a text', I suspect the presence in it of the surreptitious intent of the reader himself, which is hard to set aside. It is interesting to note that BKA himself has used the expression 'Kant's intention' not infrequently.

4. I fully agree with BKA that without 'a serious attempt to establish coherence of the text by understanding it if one undertakes *ab initio* the task of criticising it, the task will come to naught'. (rep. p. 5) However, the attempt to establish coherence assumes that there *must be* coherence in the text for we expect an author to be consistent throughout in what he writes. But it is often the case that the text does not exhibit the coherence sought. The assumption that the author must have been consistent throughout turns out to be a pious hope only. Since this applies to any one and therefore to any text, the principle of charity is invoked. And that would require an excursion into possibilities and what one may call constructive interpretation. Coherence, consistency and completeness are ideals or guiding stars. In practice and actuality they occur only in glimpses.

5. What BKA writes about his reading of Kant's category of reality taking it in the sense of Platonic 'whatness' *seems* to be convincing. Yet I have my misgivings. I ask myself why is it that Kant lists this category with the categories of negation (rather than unreality) and limitation? The category of 'existence' listed separately as a part of the pair 'existence and non-existence' appears to have been so mentioned because of different context. But does this different context render the category of reality substantially different from the category of 'existence'? Why does Kant remark while discussing the distinction between phenomena and noumena that 'reality is that which can be thought only through an affirmative judgement ...' (CPR, 1998 Tr. 245A)? Can the category of reality be applied to noumena in the sense of 'whatness?' Unless the answer is in the affirmative, it does not appear to me to be Platonic 'whatness'.

9. I agree with BKA that 'reflection is also a function or operation of understanding that introduces some kind of unity in concept and judgement'. (rep. p. 11) But BKA has already pin-pointed the clue as the 'function of unity' and it is also obvious that this function belongs to an operation of understanding, so why add another term to the list?

10. Well, I still think that the specificities of categories are presupposed in the application of the categories. If Kant wrote of the categories in general only in the metaphysical deduction and not in their specificities, why did he list them separately and severally, and then go on to explain them?

11. I beg to differ with BKA when he disagrees with my use of 'in the same sense' while accommodating the categories of modality in the same list in which the categories under the heads of quantity, quality and relation are listed. The distinction between the two sets is the same as mentioned by Kant himself. The only plausible reason of listing modality categories with the others appears to me Kant's fascination for symmetry—the parity of the list of the categories with the list of the forms of judgements.

I leave the last word to BKA.

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A Reply to R.S. Bhatnagar's Essay 'On Binod Kumar Agarwala's Response to Daya Krishna's Essay on Kant's Categories'[1]

I am grateful to R.S. Bhatnagar for his comments, which have given me an opportunity to understand some issues better by bringing them under sharper focus. However I would like to make the following observations on the various issues he has raised regarding my views.

1. R.S. Bhatnagar's way of understanding and criticism of my essay exemplifies the need of practice of hermeneutics. To quote an example, consider his claim:

> Still more strange is the conclusion 'the source of the origin of pure concepts of understanding'. Says BK,[2] 'Kant's intention is to make use of transcendental table of judgement to lay bare *the source*[3] of the origin of pure concepts of understanding, i.e., pure synthesis and to be sure about the completeness and division of categories as they originate in synthesis.' One wonders what happens to the mistake pointed out in the opening of the paper. (RSB, p. 145)

Bhatnagar implies that by making this claim I have negated the mistake I pointed out in the beginning of the paper. That is to say accusing others of making the mistake and at the same time making the claim he has quoted from my essay, I have contradicted myself. Both the principle of charity as advocated by Davidson in his theory of interpretation as well as hermeneutic circle required in hermeneutics of texts require that if we spot an apparent contradiction in a text we must make best efforts to reconcile the contradictory statements and only when our best effort fails should we accuse the author of contradiction. In the case of my essay not even best effort was required; only a little effort would have reconciled the two claims of mine. Had Bhatnagar read together the mistake I pointed out and the sentence he quotes, he would have realized that in the sentence quoted I am not negating the mistake I pointed out in others. Regarding the mistake I had claimed:

> A common mistake most commentators on Kant's so-called metaphysical deduction of categories make is to take the table of forms of judgement as such, as the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding. ... the table of judgements is not at all the clue for discovering the pure concepts of understanding. (BKA, p. 109)

If we read this together with the sentence quoted by Bhatnagar then it amounts to claiming that the table of judgement is not the source of origin of categories, but the table of judgement can be used to find out the third thing, which is the source of origin of categories. This third thing is the clue Kant is looking for and that clue itself is the source of origin of categories. Contradiction arises because Bhatnagar

understands and rephrases my contention, which I made after pointing out the mistake, in his words as follows:

> ... the table of judgements as given in the so-called metaphysical deduction does not offer the clue for the discovery of categories ... (RSB, p. 137)

This is not what I had claimed as this is an ambiguous formulation because it does not make it clear whether the table of judgement does not offer itself as the clue or it does not offer something else as the clue. The contradiction arises because although his formulation is meant to capture the former, he surreptitiously reads it in the latter sense. The table of judgement is not the clue but the table of judgement can help in discovery of the clue. This is what I had claimed. Be it noted if x helps in discovery of clue to y, it does not necessarily follow that x itself has now become a clue to y.

2. R.S. Bhatnagar rightly points out that the hermeneutic principle that I employ is based on the distinction, which is traceable to Kant himself, between 'what a philosopher describes' and 'a philosopher's description of it'. There may be a discrepancy between the two. Hermeneutic task is to get at what the philosopher wanted to describe, penetrating the veil of his own description. But he goes on to claim,

> 'BK's quotes from Kant ... seem to indicate a point quite different from the one on which they are intended to be glosses.' (RSB, p. 138) In his opinion, When Kant illustrates his point, discussing the distinction between rational knowledge and historical knowledge, he seems to be saying that so long as certain data remains unrelated to the principles on which it could be organized, it remains merely external and is not subjectively appropriated and does not constitute rational knowledge. Kant remarks that a science or a system has an organic structure. The idea lies in reason like a seed and allows a natural unity to the various parts of the system holding them together. Writing from the point of view of an author (rather than from the point of the reader) Kant says it is really not a happy thing that one goes on collecting all kind of material having some hidden idea, instead of having a clear idea and then articulating the whole

in accordance with reason (*vernunft*). This may as well be applicable to a reader who gets entangled in details and finds them unintelligible till one is able to get a glimpse of the idea which informs the details. The latter consideration is different from the earlier one. In the first case, the 'description' remains inadequate to the 'idea', while in the latter case the 'description' has an organic relation with the idea it articulates. The latter seems to be Kant's actual intent for he is talking about the architectonic of his own system. (RSB, p. 138)

Let us check if R.S. Bhatnagar's reading is correct. Let me quote the two relevant passages from Kant once again in this paper which I quoted in the paper he is commenting on.

> However a mode of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, *if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside* (and this in the form in which it has been given to him), whether through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case of general knowledge) through instruction. *Anyone, therefore, who has learnt (in the strict sense of that term) a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head, and, so to speak, at his fingers' ends, has no more than a complete historical knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another.* He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen *out* of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man.

In contrast to the historical knowledge,

> Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles—*the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.*'[4]

In the distinction between the historical knowledge and rational knowledge, what is emphasized by Kant is not the systematization or the organic nature of the body of knowledge, for a thinker with mere historical knowledge may have received a systematized knowledge with all proofs and explanations, but whether the thinker is in a position to make a distinction between the body of received description and what it is description of, so that starting from the thing described one is in a position to defend or criticize the description received. Be it noted in the case of philosophy rational knowledge is the knowledge of universal sources of reason hence the object described is the universal source of reason be it theoretical, practical or otherwise.

I remarked earlier that R.S. Bhatnagar's way of understanding and criticism of my essay exemplifies the need of practice of hermeneutics. This point can be illustrated by his criticism of Kant as well. Regarding Kant's architectonic R.S. Bhatnagar writes,

> He must have thought it essential for the reader to relate his architectonic with what he called the seed idea. But how could one get at these seed ideas when in his own words they 'were scarcely accessible even to a *mikroskopischen Beobachtung* (microscopic observation)'. (RSB, p. 138)

This criticism arises because he has removed Kant's remarks from its context. Let me give Kant's remarks in its context.

> No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay even the definition which, *at the start*, he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For *this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognisable even under microscopic observation.* Consequently, *since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest*, we must not explain and determine them according to the description, which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For

> we shall then find that *its founder, and often even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that consequently they have not been in a position to determine the proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.*[5]

The context makes it clear that it is only at the start of the science that the idea on which it is based is hidden in reason and it is the founders and immediate followers who grope for the idea, and there arises discrepancy in the idea and the description. But from the vantage point of historical distance when the concerned science has flourished and the seed idea has developed we are in a better position to describe the idea even better than the original thinker who had that idea. If we keep this in mind we can even understand what Kant meant when he said in the context of Plato's ideas:

> I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.[6]

What is the seed idea of Kant's first critique, which is '*a certain universal interest*' I have tried to explain in my forthcoming essay, 'Laying Foundation of Modern Technology: The Aim of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*'.[7]

He questions this hermeneutic task also,

> It presupposes a notion of privileged access to author's mind. The question is who can claim to have such an access? ... In any case, this much is clear that the 'description' has to be taken into account in order to get at what the author wanted to 'describe'. (RSB, p. 139)

The question is not relevant here. In understanding a text we are not interested in the authorial intention but the intention of the text itself. Even if we employ the locution like 'what Kant intended to describe', 'Kant's intention' etc. in the context of interpretation of his texts, what we aim at is the purport of the text. It is not because of the authorial intention that we return repeatedly to the text, as authorial intention does not bind us. What binds us is the appropriation of the text by a tradition and as members of the tradition we return to the text to understanding what it means. It is because of this reason that Ricouer finds that we understand the text better when the author is dead, i.e., to say the meaning of the text is independent of the authorial intention. And as far as I understand when certain philosophical traditions take Veda to be *apaurūṣeya* what they mean is that text as revealing a meaning is without an author.

Now the question arises as to how can we talk of discrepancy between the text and its intention when we have only the text to go by. The very structuring of the text through its lines of fault makes it apparent where the incision has to be made to reveal its intention. Let me give an example from Kant himself. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has elaborately described the threefold syntheses, and yet he goes on to say,

> Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, *a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.*[8]

This discrepancy in the text is not a formal contradiction but a line of fault. The text cannot be taken at its face value now. To reveal the intent of the text, now an insertion has to be made here.

Having pointed out the discrepancy in the form and content of the text one can bask in the air of superiority of having found a fault and stop there. But that is not philosophically significant as no understanding of text is revealed. It is easy to create a straw man by freezing the apparent meaning for criticism. What is significant is the revelation of intent of the text by penetrating the text through incision at the line of fault.

But the revelation of the meaning of the text is not a subjective interpolation, but only that the text can be a guide here. Here one has to proceed via the hermeneutic circle described in my essay to achieve the meaning of the unified text; the better the unification of the text, the better is the understanding.

3. R.S. Bhatnagar claims that the three functions (a) understanding an author better than the author himself, (b) organizing a text around the basic principle and (c) understanding the idea of the author are distinct and separate. He writes:

> In itself, what Kant had said, is important and can be taken as useful hermeneutic advice ... But organizing data on principles is not the same as to have an access to the idea of the author though the two may go hand in hand. The quote from Gadamer points to something quite different. Quoting Schleirmacher, Gadamer is pointing to an understanding which is better than that of the author himself. His remark suggests that a reader can enrich a content (the text) while understanding, an author by explicating something which escaped the attention of the author himself. A real understanding of an author would involve all these points and so they may be present complementing each other, but they have to be distinguished from each other. (RSB, pp. 138–39)

In this contention the bogey of the authorial intention is the main culprit. One tends to think that authorial intention is something objective and fixed once and for all; it needs to be discovered independently of the other two functions. But as I remarked the real philosophical hermeneutic task is not the discovery of authorial intention but the intent of the text itself. Once we look for the intent of the text then coherence of the text becomes important and it will require explicating too. So the three functions—discovery of the intent of the text, establishing coherence of the text, and explicating at the lines of fault by making incision, go together and are not separable. Mark the use of expression 'real understanding of an author's by R.S. Bhatnagar. If 'real understanding of an author' involves all the three then why distinguish the three, for separating the authorial intention from the other two, if it is possible at all, will render it to be not a 'real understanding of the author'.

4. According to R.S. Bhatnagar,

> ... there is yet another serious consideration which merits attention ... The impression one gets after going through BK's rendering carefully is of a perfect, flawless theory which Kant had propounded. Kant's presentation cannot be further improved upon. No deviation or modification is necessary. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have now been placed in a proper way and the puzzle has now vanished completely. Now, as soon as we accept this picture, another puzzle comes to the surface. How come, that philosophy did not stop at Kant? ... However, my suspicion is that his manner and spirit of approaching Kant may, then, result in stating that Kant was right in whatever he claimed and proved and a reader must be more humble and serious while studying Kant. (RSB, pp. 139–40)

I must agree with the last contention of R.S. Bhatnagar. I definitely believe that a reader, whether agrees or disagrees with Kant, must not approach his text trivially or flippantly, or with an air of superiority. Even if one feels that he has spotted a difficulty in Kantian text, there is a greater likelihood that Kant himself has noted it and dealt with it in the text itself or in a later text. From the first to the last critique and beyond, he develops and works out the consequences of the same seminal idea. So to make a serious dent to Kantian thought one is required to work through most of his critical writings and read each in light of the other, as most of the German idealists after Kant did, including Hegel. No doubt there are serious flaws in the Kantian critical edifice, and only to get at them I am trying to understand his critical corpus. A number of my essays on Kant are lined up for publication in *JICPR* and *IPQ*, and one has already appeared in the same volume in which Bhatnagar's essay appears on which I am commenting, which will testify to it. But if I have given the impression that Kant's theory is flawless, that is the fault of my presentation, which I must own up. But at the same time I must warn that without a serious attempt to establish coherence of the text by understanding it if one undertakes *ab initio* the task of criticizing it, the task will come to naught.

5. R.S. Bhatnagar disagrees with my reading of Kant's category of reality. In my view the term 'real' in Kant's list of categories does not mean 'existence'; it is used in the sense of Platonic 'whatness' rather than 'thatness'. By way of criticism Bhatnagar produces the quotation

from Kant to which I referred in my interpretation. After quoting the passage he claims:

> I do not think we can construe the meaning of this passage in the way BK suggests. The reference to time in Kant's passage, granting that time is generated itself 'in the apprehension of the intuition' (*CPR*, A143, B182), prevents us from identifying Kant's notion of reality with that of Plato.' (RSB, p. 146)

Let me give the passage from Kant under consideration in full.

> Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore, the concept of which in itself points to being (in time). Negation is that the concept of which represents not-being (in time). The opposition of these two thus rests upon the distinction of one and the same time as filled and as empty. Since time is merely the form of intuition, and so of objects as appearances, that in the objects which correspond to sensation is not the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality). Now, every sensation has a degree or magnitude whereby, in respect of its representation of an object otherwise remaining the same, it can fill out one and the same time, that is, occupy inner sense more or less completely, down to its cessation in nothingness (= 0 = *negatio*). There therefore exists a relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a transition from the one to the other, which makes every reality representable as a quantum. The schema of a reality, as the quantity of something in so far as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform production of that reality in time as we successively descend from a sensation which has a certain degree to its vanishing point, or progressively ascend from its negation to some magnitude of it. (*CPR*, A143, B182–83)

It is precisely the reference to time that brings out the special character of Kant's concept of reality which makes it distinct from the category of existence and in a way equates with Platonic 'whatness'. Reference to time brings out that 'every reality is representable as a quantum', i.e., reality according to Kant admits of degrees. He makes this point clear time and again. In the anticipations of perception he states:

> In all appearance, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.' (*CPR*, A166, B207) Every sensation, however, is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually vanish. Between reality in the [field of] appearance and negation there is therefore a continuity of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference between any two of which is always smaller than the difference between the given sensation and zero or complete negation. In other words, the real in the [field of] appearance has always a magnitude. (*CPR*, A168, B210)

For Plato reality admits of degrees and here is Kant's explanation of what it means. Those who equate Kantian 'reality' with 'existence' forget that corresponding to degrees of reality Kant never speaks of degrees of existence. Secondly Kant has admitted reality and existence as two distinct categories in his table. When he introduces the ideal of God all reality belongs to God even though he refuses to apply the category of 'existence' to Him. That 'reality' in Kant is Platonic 'whatness' becomes clear when he introduces the idea of God. Let me quote the relevant passages:

> If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from which all possible predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of an *omnitudo realitatis*. All true negations are nothing but limitations—a title which would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the unlimited, that is, upon 'the All'.
>
> But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a *thing in itself* as completely determined; and since in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates once predicate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal* which serves as basis for the complete determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists. This ideal is the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility of all that exists—the condition to which all thought of objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be

> traced back. It is also the only true ideal of which human reason is capable. For only in this one case is a concept of a thing—a concept which is in itself universal—completely determined in and through itself, and known as the representation of an individual. (*CPR*, A575f, B603f)

These passages make it clear that reality refers not to the existence of the object but *what* belongs in its possible existence, i.e., what it is. The *ens realissimum* is an ideal precisely because it does not include 'existence'. It is of interest to note that when Kant uses expression in quotes in the first passage above 'the All' it is the classical Greek τα πάντα, which is also τα όντα that Kant is talking about. If there is any doubt regarding the interpretation of reality as whatness of an object, let us refer to one more passage:

> The transcendental major premises which is presupposed in the complete determination of all things is therefore no other than the representation of the sum of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its transcendental content, comprehends all predicates *under itself*; it also contains them *within itself*; and *the complete determination of any and everything rests on the limitation of this total reality*, inasmuch as *part of it is ascribed to the thing, and the rest is excluded* ... (*CPR*, A577, B605, emphasis added.)

In the complete determination of the whatness of an object we apply some predicates and withhold other predicates. 'Whatness' involves delimitation but 'thatness' involves positing.

6. R.S. Bhatnagar finds my characterization of transcendental logic as concerned with *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness as vague and misleading. He claims,

> Transcendental philosophy assumes the relationship between subject and object and deals with the content of the judgement in its entirety that is in terms of its form as well as content. Hence the term object-relatedness is less clear and misleading that Kant's own formulations. (*RSB*, p. 141)

Does transcendental philosophy or logic deal 'with the content of the judgement in its entirety'? Let us read the relevant passage once again:

> General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logic form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general. But since, as the Transcendental Aesthetic has shown, there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, a distinction might likewise be drawn between pure and empirical thought of objects. In that case we should have a logic in which we do not abstract from the entire content of knowledge. This other logic, which should contain solely the rules of the pure thought of an object, would exclude only those modes of knowledge which have empirical content. It would also treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects. (*CPR*, A55f, B79f)

The other logic Kant is talking about is the transcendental logic. It excludes empirical content, but not the content, which arise *a priori* in understanding. So to claim that transcendental logic deals 'with the content of judgement in its entirety' is a misleading characterization of transcendental logic. Bhatnagar's objection to my characterization of transcendental logic in terms of *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness also arises because in the quotation above general logic is characterized as abstracting 'from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object' and in contrast transcendental logic, therefore, should be characterized not only in terms of not abstracting from all 'relation of knowledge to the object' as I think but also in terms of not abstracting from 'all content of knowledge'. In his words,

> ... the expression 'object relatedness' itself is not a happy one. BK seems to have used it having in view Kant's expression 'from any relation of to the object'. But Kant has also used the expression 'from all content of cognition'. As against the general logic, transcendental logic has been characterized by Kant as dealing with the value and content of the predicate, of course, in relation to object of cognition. (RSB, p. 141)

Now the question is when Kant characterizes general logic as abstracting 'from all content of knowledge' and then with the expression 'that is' adds the characterization 'from all relation of knowledge to the

object' is he giving two different characterizations so that if we take only as one as definitive than we misread Kant, or are they two different formulations of the same characterization, so that one can be taken as definitive and the other as meaning the same thing? Let us listen to §2 of Kant's lectures on logic:

> 'We must distinguish in each concept between *matter* and *form*. The matter of the concept is the *object*, while its form is generality.' In the *Critique of Pure Reason* this demand is reformulated in the following statement: 'We demand in every concept, first the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general, and secondly, the possibility of giving it an object to which it may be applied.' (A239, B298)

Mostly Kant understands 'matter' as *objects* of the concept. Hence in his distinction between general logic and transcendental logic in his lectures on logic there is no mention of the word 'matter' at all. It is given in terms of 'object' only.

> As propadeutic for all employment of understanding in general, general logic on the other hand is distinguished from transcendental logic, by which the object is represented as an object of pure understanding. By contrast general logic relates to objects in general.[9]

What Kant means is that transcendental logic considers the problem of objects *as* objects to the extent and insofar as objects are determined or constituted by *pure* (*a priori*) thinking. By contrast general logic does not study objects as such and even less objects as objects of pure thinking. Rather general logic studies thinking with respect to *all* objects, no matter of what kind. General logic disregards the question of whether or not objects are those of pure thinking, of empirical thinking, or of a thinking intuition, That is to say general logic tries to investigate the rules of thinking disregarding its relation to any kind of object, even though the relation to the object is present in the thinking. And hence in contrast transcendental logic investigates the *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness involved in thinking. Constitution of object by pure thinking is same as *a priori* constitution of object-relatedness of thinking.

7. R.S. Bhatnagar questions my claim that the table of forms of judgement given by Kant in his metaphysical deduction is a table of transcendental logic. He refers to Kant's statement,

> 'If we abstract from all content of a judgement, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgement can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments.'[10] He then questions, 'If Kant says that he is considering mere form, abstracting from all content of a judgement, then how can we construe the following table of forms of judgement as in transcendental logic?' (RSB, p. 142) He concludes, 'Thus the claim that the table of forms of judgement is, in fact, a table in transcendental logic, cannot be supported by the consideration that Kant has introduced three-fold divisions in *all* the four divisions. Kant's own way of presentation is responsible for confusion.'

I fully agree with R.S. Bhatnagar that Kant himself is responsible for the confusion.

In the first section of the transcendental deduction Kant claims,

> The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be discovered if we can give an exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgements. That this can quite easily be done will be shown in the next section. (*CPR*, A69, B94)

The next section is entitled 'The logical functions of the Understanding in Judgements'. (*CPR*, A70, B95) It opens with the sentence quoted above, and then immediately gives the table of forms of judgement. From this one may get the impression that the table is a table in general logic. But there is a discrepancy in what is presented in the table and what Kant claims to present. Kant intends to show how 'functions of thought in judgement can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments' starting from 'functions of unity in judgement'. But he gives merely the finished table of forms of judgement. It is not clear how if one starts with mere form of judgement then the four heads with three moments each will arise. In the subsequent discussion also he does not explain the four heads or how they arise. He only discusses why he has introduced three moments under each heads. But one thing is clear that this table cannot be developed only from the

inflections of 'logical functions of understanding' as indicated by the title. Hence he speaks of transcendental logic (*CPR*, A71, B97) and identifies the table as the 'transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgements.' (*CPR*, A75, B98) His discussion is motivated by later considerations concerning problems of transcendental philosophy. But Kant again refers to this '*transcendental* table' in §21 of *Prolegomena* as '*logical table of judgements*'. The hesitation and confusion in Kant is due to the fact that he never explicitly poses the question whether the four characteristics of judgements, i.e., quantity, quality, relation and modality, are obtained purely *logically*, i.e., regardless of the *object-relatedness* of thinking, or whether they arise *transcendentally*, i.e., by relying upon judgement as an *object-related* function of unification. But this question can be settled if we take his later writings also into consideration together with the fact that each of the four heads is trichotomical and not dichotomical. Hence, the division into four groups is not general logical but transcendental logical division. Be it noted in his lectures on logic also Kant introduces the four heads of division of forms of judgement[11] but there too he does not demonstrate how these four heads arise in general logical considerations. Simply because these divisions occur in general logic is no guarantee that this table is a table of forms of judgement in general logic as they have not been grounded in formal considerations. Since its inception general logic is not free from ontological considerations. Although Kant took over the four divisions from the traditional logic, he wants to secure it through transcendental logical considerations. But Kant does not undertake the kind of reformulation general logic will require if the basic division of forms of judgement in it is secured by transcendental considerations. Contrary to what he does in his transcendental philosophy, he always believed that general logic is well founded and requires no reformulation.

In the words of Heidegger, 'It seems as if one is silently and quickly to slide over this table of judgement of Kant, like sliding over a creation of a baroque and pedantic passion of construction and schematization'[12] as not only the origin of this table is unclear and questionable but also the deduction of categories from this table is unclear and questionable. Since Kant grasps *the function of unification as object related*, in the third section of the transcendental deduction, before he gives the table of categories, explains the sense in which the logical function of understanding, i.e., the function of unification of synthesis is to be taken. And this is the clue for the discovery of categories and not the table of forms of judgement.

8. R.S. Bhatnagar finds my explanation of syntheses in Kant's metaphysical deduction with the help of syntheses as explained in transcendental deduction of the first edition as objectionable. He argues:

> As is well-known, Kant had re-written the deduction [the transcendental deduction], for he thought that the earlier version delineated a subjective process which would have been more properly placed in psychology. That is why, towards the end of the passage on page B152, distinguishing productive imagination from the reproductive one, he wrote, 'reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, those of association, and therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology' (B152).

What it implies is that how can I take into account something which in Kant's opinion, does not belong to transcendental philosophy to explain a point in transcendental logic. Despite Kant's opinion the tradition of Kant scholarship has not dismissed the subjective deduction as merely empirical psychology; rather in most editions of the first critique the first edition version of transcendental deduction continues to be given along with the second edition version, which testifies to the fact that tradition still considers it as belonging to transcendental philosophy and takes seriously Kant's view of the first edition, 'the reproductive synthesis of imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind' distinguishing it from the 'empirical synthesis of reproduction' of A101. In the second edition he is either talking of only the 'empirical synthesis of reproduction' as distinguished from pure synthesis of reproduction, or if he is dismissing the entire reproductive synthesis as empirical, then he is exhibiting how an author can think against his own idea. It will be beyond the scope of this reply to go into exegetical details to show that the first edition view fits in

well with the totality of what he is doing in the first critique and it does not contradict the objective deduction of the second edition provided we discount this last remark as mistaken. I took care of this discrepancy in my essay 'Constitution of Subjectivity of Self and Objectivity of Nature: A Brief Hermeneutical Study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*' already submitted for evaluation for publication in *JICPR*. Let me remind the reader once again that authorial intention is not binding; what makes us return to the text is the fact that the text has been appropriated by the tradition.

9. R.S. Bhatnagar finds my discussion about reflection in the quest for the clue to the discovery of pure concepts of understanding, as superfluous and unnecessary. In his view:

> Kant's passage relating to reflection occurs in the beginning in the 'Appendix on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding. This text is devoted to an evaluation of Leibnizian effort to construct an intellectual system of the world (*CPR*, A270, B326). The concepts or ideas of reason discussed here are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and finally matter and form. Obviously the notion of reflection, as dealt with in this section does not offer us even a possibility of a possible alternative. BK could have easily left it out and saved some ink. (RSB, p. 144)

In the sixth paragraph of the third section of the metaphysical deduction Kant introduces the clue as 'the same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement*' which also 'gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*' and 'this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding; and again 'the same operation by which in concepts, by means of analytic unity, it produces the logical form of a judgement' but the identity of the function is not revealed in the metaphysical deduction. So one has to find out what this 'same function' or 'same operation' is in metaphysical deduction. According to Kant:

> This *logical* origin of concepts—original only according to their form—consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to many objects (*conceptus communis*) emerges as that form which is required by the power of judgement.[13]

What is reflection? Reflection is 'the deliberation of how various representations can be contained in one consciousness.'[14] So reflection is also a function or operation of understanding that introduces some kind of unity in concept and judgement. So isn't it the obvious candidate for being the clue? For rigour of the argument isn't it required that it be examined whether it is the clue Kant is looking for? It may be remembered a philosophical text has organic unity and not a mechanical assemblage of discrete items. So even if a concept occurs explicitly in some context it cannot be ruled out *a priori* that it has no bearing in understanding other parts of the text. This consideration also requires back and forth movement from different parts of the text to understand some crucial points of the text as it happens in my paper, which R.S. Bhatnagar finds strange. He finds strange that I make a back and forth movement from subjective deduction to metaphysical deduction. (RSB, p. 145) The back and forth movement, as required in the hermeneutic circle mentioned in my paper, establishes the organic unity of the text.

10. R.S. Bhatnagar disagrees with my view that the specificities of categories cannot emerge at the stage of metaphysical deduction by simply looking at the forms of judgements even if three-fold synthesis is taken into account and it would not be possible to talk of the specificities before we are through with the transcendental deduction and schematism. That is to say, he questions my contention that specificities of categories will emerge only when Kant has shown that they have application in knowledge (transcendental deduction) and when the unities of consciousness represented by each category acquire a temporal form (schematism). He argues,

> Specificities are *presupposed* in the application of the categories. Read the first sentence of section 26 of *CPR*. 'In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the *a priori* categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical function of thinking, in the transcendental deduction, however their possibility as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition in general

was exhibited' (*CPR*, ss 20, 21, B159). This statement of Kant renders BK's elaborate and admirable effort redundant. (RSB, p. 146)

Be it noted in the sentence Bhatnagar quotes from Kant, what he is speaking of is the 'categories in general'. The metaphysical deduction shows only the way of origin of categories in general not in their specificities as Bhatnagar thinks. Categories become applicable only when they are schematized. For the chapter on schematism of categories tries to answer the question: How ... is the *subjumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible? (*CPR*, A138, B177) So it is only after the categories are schematized that the specificities become known. Hence in Kant's first critique the specificities of categories are presented only in and after the schematism chapter. Be it noted that even if we accept Bhatnagar's claim that specificities of categories are presupposed in the application of categories in Kantian philosophy it does not prove that my views are wrong. Kant does not show that categories are applicable by giving examples of application to particular cases, as Bhatnagar seems to think in his argument, but transcendentally, i.e., he shows *a priori* that applicability of categories to objects. Be it noted the ontological priority of a thing to another thing need not imply the cognitive priority of the former to the latter. For example in Kant's philosophy moral law presupposes freedom but we become conscious of freedom by being conscious of moral law.

11. Regarding the discussion about categories under modality R.S. Bhatnagar writes,

> The difficulty is not about the distinction between the two types of categories, but regarding the understanding of the notion of category itself. If the categories of modality are not adding to the content of the cognition and are merely concerned with the relation between the object and the thought of faculty of cognition, can they be called categories in the same sense in which Kant calls categories of quantity, quality and relation categories? DK's paper is basically concerned with the understanding of the notion of category. The problems arise with respect to the various usages Kant has put this notion to; whether the various usages are compatible with each other or not remains a problem. (RSB, pp. 146f)

In my paper I had given an account of what is a concept (BKA, pp. 118f) and what is a category (BKA, pp. 128f) according to Kant. The problem as it appears in Bhatnagar's reading of Kant's notion of category is not due to problems inherent in Kantian notion, but in the notion of 'same sense' and the notion of 'compatible' that Bhatnagar is operating with. For Kant, to put it very roughly, a category is an *a priori* characterization required for object-hood (objectivity) of any thing. In this sense all the categories are categories in the same sense. But apart from characterization of quality, quantity, and relation object-hood (objectivity) of a thing also requires characterization of its positing vis-à-vis the cognitive faculty, which he puts under the head of modality. And these are different kinds of characterizations. So Kant notes the similarity between them by calling them 'categories' but also notes the difference between them by putting them under different heads. So sameness and difference go together. But to me it appears Bhatnagar may be operating with notions of 'same sense' and 'compatible' such that if the categories under quantity, quality, relation and modality are categories in 'the same sense' then they cannot admit the kind of difference that obtains between the categories under first three and the last one, since these differences are such that they are not 'compatible' with calling categories under modality categories in the 'same sense' as those under other three heads. But to me it appears there is no flat contradiction between taking all the categories as *a priori* characterization required for objecthood, in spite of their differences and also noting these differences. So Bhatnagar needs to clarify the notion of 'same sense' and 'compatible' he is operating with. Once he becomes clear about these two notions, the problem he finds in Kant's notion of categories will disappear.

Notes and References

1. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, October–December 2002, pp. 137–47. Hereinafter this essay will be referred to as RSB.

2. Binod Kumar Agarwala, 'Interpreting Metaphysical Deduction: A Hermeneutic Response to Professor Daya Krishna's Essay "Kant's Doctrine of the Categories: Some Questions and Problems", *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, July–September 2002, pp. 109–54. Daya Krishna's essay appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, pp. 1–11. DK stands for Daya Krishna's essay.
3. Emphasis added by RSB.
4. Both quotations are from *Critique of Pure Reason* [abbreviated as *CPR* hereinafter], tr. Norman Kemp Smith, A836f, B864f. Emphasis added.
5. *CPR*, A834, B862. Emphasis added.
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9. Immanuel Kant, *Logik*, in *Werke* ed. by Cassirer, Vol. VIII (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912–22), p. 336.
10. *CPR*, A70, B95.
11. *Logik*, §§20–30 (Cassirer, VIII, 408ff).
12. Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1997), p. 178.
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Comments on Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta: A Critique

The Advaita Vedanta exposited by Sri Sankara is a great system of Indian Philosophy which is subjected to reinterpretations and misreadings from time to time. In Dr. Radhakrishnan's view none of the other systems (non-vedantic) developed in India can be compared to it in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation. It requires a fine penetration and profound spirituality to know its contents. It seems vague to the common man thanks to the immaturity of his mind and

unpreparedness to go deeper into higher realms of intelligence. He is interested in the positive affairs of life whereby he indulgs in the materialistic tendencies and they obstruct him from going deeper into the unseen facts. Such a person cannot activate his intelligence in its effective and non-destructive way, and think of the welfare of the whole world. Advaita Vedanta, unlike other systems, considers its first and foremost duty to enlighten man of his own self whereby he efficiently visualizes the reality behind life and neglects all others as insignificant. It is not a system in its strictest sense, for, it teaches man to leave all conservative systems that bind man in certain faiths and perceived facts. The common tendency of philosophical systems to fight against other systems and ideas is but conceived in Advaita with secondary concern alone. Even then, some points deserve clarification in this context for avoiding the misunderstandings that may arise in the minds of readers of *JICPR*.

Sankara views the world as the appearance of Reality otherwise called Brahman. According to Advaita, indefinable and indescribable Brahman which is the substratum of all cannot be sublated. World appearance is illusion for one who has experienced Brahman. It does not indicate the total disappearance of the world, but for a man with Brahman-realization the world is experienced as merged in Brahman, the primordial consciousness in spite of all manifold objects.

Before entering into questioning the philosophical standpoints of Advaita Vedanta one should try to do justice to oneself and prepare to reflect on one's experiences and facts with sincerity. Brahman is the one and only eternal Reality without a second as revealed in Upaniṣads.[1] It is neither apprehended nor perceived like the world of objects. Hence it has ontological reality whereas the world has pragmatic reality alone. Duality and related knowledge are subject to change every now and then depending on the perception of the individual, and this fact proves their transitory character. Therefore the world has empirical and relative reality. Illusion about the world appearance ceases to exist in one who has experienced Brahman as his own self. Sublation produces the knowledge of absence of the object of illusion. An experienced object is nullified by self-knowledge but it cannot produce the absence of Brahman as it is its substratum.

There is no incompatibility between the explanation of the illustration and that of the world illusion in Advaita Vedanta. In the hemisphere of Indian philosophy, the *pramāṇa* by name inference includes illustration. It must be well-known and should consist of the combination of *hetu* and *sadhya*. If these conditions are furnished, an illustration is considered valid. In dream (the state of lesser reality) one experiences certain objects which are sublated in the waking state (higher reality). Where higher reality is experienced, the lesser reality is to be sublated. Therefore the experience of the higher Reality, Brahman, must undoubtedly awake man from his miscognitions. In every inference, the *pakṣa* and illustration have the only resemblance in involving the *hetu* and *sadhya* alone. Otherwise kitchen cannot be an illustration in the inference of fire in a mountain. Moreover, if the higher Reality is not experienced, the sublation also will be impossible. Therefore one's identified knowledge with Brahman alone can bring forth the sublation of the world which, otherwise points to the oneness of the world with Brahman. The dream state and its sublation are personal. In the same way, influence of ignorance and its end are also personal. The sublating knowledge 'the world appearance is not true' produces the knowledge of non-existence of the world in present tense only. But the knowledge of Reality negates the world appearance in all the three tenses. Therefore an illusion cannot be the apprehension of an object as different from it. What the others view as existent is in the relative sense itself as far as Advaita Vedanta is concerned.

Every kind of knowledge in man presupposes the mind. In fact, the mind itself is the creator of bondage and liberation of man. The mind filled with ignorance cannot grasp things in their true nature. But while knowledge dawns, the difference occurring to the mind is beyond descriptions and subject to experience alone. The sublation of the world resulting from Brahman-realization has but practical purpose alone to serve by which man can avoid sorrows and sufferings originating from the fluctuations of the mind. The experiences in waking state are certainly beyond contradictions. But how they are experienced by Man? Even for such a man who uses his will power and reflective capabilities of mind in a creative form, sufferings will not leave. The unstable mind can view in its own favourite and possible way. Advaita also holds that

an empirically existent object is not sublated in empirical life.[2] The waking experience will be subject to sublation only when one goes beyond it. This is the state of Jivanmukti where one will not be bound by desires in spite of the existence of body-mind complex. The knowledge of a Jivanmukta reveals oneself as Brahman. This knowledge implies the sublation of the world. Strictly speaking, everyone considers the objects around him as his self or possessions. A total calculation of such objects form the essence of the world. The knowledge 'I am Brahman' positively denotes his selfhood but negatively indicates that the knowledge which was possessed by him earlier, based on worldly objects is proved false. This concept of Jivanmukti is a clear solution to the puzzle presented by Mr. Rao that the world has to be realized as an illusion while one is in the same illusion.

Duality cannot co-exist with Brahman. Advaita insists on reaching the eternal by leaving the world of objects which is incessantly transforming. Duality and related knowledge on objects of the world are subject to variation every now and then. An individual may favour one at one time, the same person may stand against him at another time. An object subjects to liking and disliking by one and the same person at different times. Thus, reflecting on the world of objects it can easily be found that anything in it will never create unending happiness in one's life. Even sentient objects of pleasure such as wife, husband and children will create suffering for a person if they are found more than once. At the same time, a single relationship will result in joy and peace of mind. Reflecting in this way, the Advaita concept is more desirable even at the empirical level.

The world need not co-exist with Brahman. On the other hand, Brahman appears as world due to superimposition. Adhyasa is defined as the appearance of a thing where it is not. It is the presupposition of all practical distinctions made in ordinary life. Adhyasa results in breaking up the nature of the one Absolute into a subject-object relation which is a product of the very constitution of human mind. Therefore the world is not an illusion as Mr. Rao evaluates. Adhyasa is misrepresented as illusion. The duality between world and Brahman is an empirical experience only. When Brahman-realization dawns, the world of experience ceases to exist for him alone and not for others.

Besides, appearance is change of an entity, which has not the same degree of reality as the real. The difference of world as real and appearance can be felt only through various rising stages of the mind into perfect maturity, and thereby into the elimination of ignorance residing there. No Advaitin will say 'Antahkarana does not exist'. Instead it is to be purified for the clear vision of the self which leads one to the understanding that the world around him is a mere appearance. Advaita clearly conceives that ontological sublation of the world will be possible only at the time of cosmic dissolution. Practical sublation of the world can be described as similar to the sublation of requirement of books for a scholar in practical sciences. If once known, books will lose their relevance to a scholar. Knowledge being the ultimate goal, prevents all other including its sources from influencing a scholar. Thus Brahman-realization prevents the influence of the whole world in a true scholar.

Man, if is not non-duality and therefore duality consisting of body-sense-mind complex, cannot always use the term 'I' in his related affairs. Body-mind complex as the component of 'I' is experienced by all, including laymen. Such points never deserve specific mention in this context, for, they are not part of real philosophy. The real relevance of philosophy in Indian context is to penetrate into the unperceived realms of intelligence, and thereby to invent and present novel solutions to the deserved minds. The modern world plunged into the extremities of materialistic tendencies lacks happiness and peace of mind. The wide popularity of some kind of 'Yogic practices made easy' attract laymen due to its capability of saving the calmness of mind. The Yogic practices are only the preparations for a higher realm by way of mental calmness which leads to realization of the Supreme principle in oneself. Advaita Vedanta goes far more to an extent towards Yoga because it is a philosophical speculation that requires more maturity of mind by way of true and right understanding of one's own self and the world around him so that he can cultivate a correct insight into his existence by approaching matters in a direct and straight forward method. Reason, if applied in its true and right insight, will help prove non-duality as the sole reality behind this visible world of multiplicity. But in order to understand this, one has to prepare oneself

to eradicate the ignorance abiding in him and to avoid the pretentious approach on Reality as exhibited by the present generation.

Moreover, if one says 'I am duality consisting of body-sense-mind complex', then it is itself contented that body-sense-mind complex is different from 'I' which is its substratum. With the help of a true reflection on oneself, one can realize the fact that actions are done by senses with the help of mind. Wherever we go and whatever state we have, the 'I' factor will not be subject to change. But visible change comes to our body, sense and mind. Considering this factual basic experience of every person literate or illiterate, Advaita puts forth the idea of a self that will not change in any state and time and is beyond all limitations.

If the waking experience is to be considered as the state where non-duality can be sublated, then duality must continue in its own nature in a singular manner. But things experienced in the waking state include changing nature in a visible manner. The form of an object once experienced may not last beyond a definite period. A bare land that was once full of trees and plants cannot be identified by one at once as the same land that was familiar to him. A small child on becoming a grown-up person need not be identified by one who had seen him only during his childhood. In this way, including several common examples, if waking experience is reflected with its full fledged manifoldness, it is proved that this state contains full of contradictions and contraindications. It is only one state among the three states of experience. If it is to be taken as reasonable, Advaita Vedanta or any other true philosophy need not deserve attention.

Waking up from Turiya as from the dream state is not necessary for a scholar. Though it is his natural state, he experiences that by his untiring efforts of the eradication of ignorance. In life, if we reach a peaceful state as a result of hard effort, no one will desire to leave it. In fact, empirical life includes those states of experience where man, bound by ignorance, considers himself as a part of the inert world. But in Turiya, one can overcome such states consciously and his existence will be beyond 'states' in their true sense. In discriminating this fact, Advaita highlights experience itself as valid which open its doors to the most mature minds.

Negation of the world implies the negation of providing more importance to the empirical world and the objects in it. It necessitates deep penetration into the true facts for realizing the meaning implied in Upaniṣads. The best cure for the disease is to destroy the cause of it and by that the external appearances also will disappear. In modern Allopathic medical study and practice, physicians try to cure the appearance of disease, and the root will remain there without any defect. In the same way, the reflections of Mr. Rao presented as a part of philosophy rely only on the external generally well-known signals and there will not be the true remedy for philosophical questions and riddles. However, this example quoted by him is the most relevant one in this context as it reveals Mr. Rao's attitude towards philosophy. By considering the external world as the only relevant factor, there is not much strain to present some visible facts as philosophy. Ayurveda and Homeopathy try to discover the root cause of the disease and strive for the eradication of it in the body. They try to go deep into the formation of the body and to investigate into the changes occurring in the body, and their causes. In the same way, Advaita is devoted to find out the root cause of all sufferings of man and thereby to present a desirable and harmless theory before man which can bring him peace of mind and thereby eternal bliss.

The very existence of the world can be the cause of duhkha. If there was no world, no body, sense or mind would be there. The mistaken knowledge of Mr. Rao that 'I am body-sense-mind complex' itself reveals that the changes occurring to them affects him also. Thus in different stages of their growth, they change their form and if one uses 'I' in childhood, that same knowledge cannot be in other stages.

Advaita never advises one to get rid of one's own existence and that of the world. Rather it suggests to experience the all-pervading consciousness as one's own self which cannot be different from the self of the world too. To get rid of one's existence in Advaita implies liberation from one's misunderstandings based on the universe and the objects in it.

Ontological sublation of the world is not within the limit of discourses or lessons of Advaita. Everyone strives for his own life in the world as we see around us and in our case also. The difference in

the Advaitic method is that it approaches the problems directly and advises to go beyond the common intellectual level so that the mind should not be affected by future sufferings, and should remain calm and quite devoid of worldly desires and other complexes. Advaita cares to present the facts in their truly experienced state rather than pretending in philosophical issue. It is very difficult to grasp its negative dialectics by an average man. This is the root cause behind its misreadings and questionings. The less we indulge in worldly affairs, the less will become sufferings thereon. The Yogāsastra goes to such an extent that the sunlight available in the phenomenal world is itself sufficient to provide the same energy to man that he receives from food. World cannot do harm to human beings, but the way by which man treats the world decides its qualitative character.

How can the author explain the role of vasanas that misguide man? Can it be experienced that there is a sort of thing by name 'vasana'? What does he mean by that term? All these problems need clear answers in this context.

However it is somewhat consoling that Mr. Rao admits the fact that 'man is naturally falling himself into the subject illusions with the influence of his own false ideas'. Doesn't this statement itself serve as the proof of the fact that man possesses false ideas? Advaita strives to eliminate such false notions in all their meanings.

There need not be the expression of surprise on the Advaitin's agreement on the two alternative methods for the removal of sufferings. Advaita insists on seeing things as they really are through deep reflection on them. 'Nothing is permanent and unchangeable' is to be filled with 'in the world'. From the origin of creatures, the 'I' consciousness is experienced in an unchangeable way. Man being the more developed creature, is advised to strive for finding out the true meaning behind 'I'. This forms real philosophy and not the common explanations of the already cognized affairs of the world.

The proper thinking must be kept aloof from all kinds of anticipations and it should include deep penetration into facts and experiences. This is also the mission of Advaita. 'A practical sublation of the delusion in the form of identity and possessions of the world' is not a new invention from the part of the author. Rather, it is one of the implied points in

Advaita Vedanta. Leaving the tendency of वितण्डावाद one should investigate into the ideals of Advaita philosophy, which is to be truly experienced beyond all exercises of language. The realization of Advaitic principles will make one understand the futility of language exercises.

The world of duality is provided higher than any other world by the senses of the author. Such a person cannot go deep into the insights of Advaita Vedanta. In Advaita also, none of the levels of empirical experience is worth calling the highest Reality. Experience, being subject to the senses or the mind cannot include the attributeless Brahman. Discovering the cause of sufferings and thereby getting rid of duhkha is necessary for a mumuksu; but when these are gained, the highest Reality can be recognized by him as beyond experience. The extraordinary cognition arising in him prove all empirical cognitions as invalid. This state is to be experienced in spite of all language exercises. The ever-relevant call is worth reminding here: 'उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत'...[4]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Problems of Post-Sankara Advaita Vedanta, S.N. Dasgupta, p. 286.
3. *The System of Vedānta*, Paul Deussen, p. 56. Also Sarvavedānta siddhānta sārasamgraha, xii, 85–86.
4. कठोपनिषत्, I.3.14.

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A Reply to A. Kanthamani's Comments on my Views concerning Consciousness vs. Dreamless Sleep

Professor A. Kanthamani's article 'The Search for a Naturalistic Basis of Consciousness'[1] was a pleasant experience in respect of its endeavour to emphasize the need for studying the phenomenon of consciousness along scientific lines. Though, in principle, I am not unsympathetic to

any attempt which strives to lay bare the diverse aspects of the phenomenon in question, I do not feel myself to be qualified enough to discuss Prof. Kanthamani's article in respect of those details which are related to some of the (presumably) science-minded views on the issue. Nor do I intend to touch upon those areas where I find myself to be in general agreement with him. So my main aim would here be to attempt a reply to the criticisms that he makes of the (alleged) views expressed in my article 'Dreamless Sleep and Some Related Philosophical Issues', published in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 210–31.

Professor Kanthamani asserts that I hold, (1) in agreement with Advaita Vedānta, that '*suṣupti* is a state which has pure and unalloyed joy and self-luminous consciousness with capitals'; and (2) that 'there is an empirically supported proof for *śuddha caitanya*' (Kanthamani: 159). My first reaction to this is that I have nowhere sided with the central Vedāntic doctrine that in dreamless sleep there is pure (i.e., contentless), undifferentiated self-consciousness; nor have I, for that matter, anywhere endorsed the other half of that position, namely, that in deep sleep there is consciousness of 'lack of awareness' (nescience). I have only described these two ideas as constituting the Vedāntic account of the matter. In fact, I have sought to undermine the Vedāntic position (cf. Sharma: 215–18) by raising certain basic issues which in my view remain wholly unclarified in terms of the position in question. One such basic issue, as I have put it, concerns the paramount question, who is it that sleeps? The body or the self? Obviously it cannot be the self, which, being of the nature of consciousness, never ceases to be conscious and which, especially during *suṣupti*, is (on the Vedāntic account) undifferentiatedly self-conscious in the sense that, there being no specific (knowable) content in sleep, there is no subject-object duality either in that state. It must, then, be the body that sleeps, and to this Advaita says 'yes'. But if it is the body, the total live psychophysical complex (*kārya-karaṇa-saṁghāta*), that sleeps and thus ceases in its operations, and if during sleep the self becomes dissociated from this body (*na hi suṣuptikāle śarīrasambandho'sti*: Śaṁkara), then who is it that recollects on waking that it had a blissful sleep unruffled even by the awareness that the state was quite without even the sense of its

being such, or that it was a state of sleep? I have explicitly drawn attention to this and other paradoxes in my critique of the Advaita position, and I can only wonder why Professor Kanthamani has not cared to take note of that critique before concluding that I endorse the Vedāntic account.

As for my statement that even the periods of non-Rapid Eye Movement (NREM) are dream-like, I say this, not to conclude (as Professor Kanthamani alleges) that *suṣupti* is a state which is one of pure and unalloyed joy and self-luminous consciousness (with capitals), nor even that there is such a thing as *śuddha caitanya* in the Advaita sense, but simply to garner empirical support for my hypothesis that perhaps at no stage in sleep (including deep sleep) is the self completely without its content of mental activity or experiences, however difficult it may be to recall them on waking (cf. Sharma: 225).

If I have only consulted the *Encyclopedia of Psychology* as my source for the psychoanalytic opinion which apparently favours the hypothesis in question, it is because that served my purpose for the time being; this work, the *Encyclopedia*, supplied information about current views on the issue for which empirical evidence has been forthcoming. A fuller exploration (experimental or otherwise) at my own level was beyond my capacity, and also perhaps unnecessary in the context.

Kanthamani not only seems reluctant to look at my analysis or arguments, but goes on to attribute to me things which I have just not said. Thus he writes: 'There is nothing wrong in positing NREM unconscious state but the question whether it is the self-luminous *sui generis* level strains credulity. A close reading will reveal that the jump cannot be justified and so it can hardly stand in support of his [Sharma's] claims' (Kanthamani: 160). Now any careful reader of my article will see that I have nowhere maintained that the NREM state reflects the self-luminous *sui generis* level. Relying on the current psychoanalytic view, what I have said simply is that even the so-called NREM states are not wholly devoid of mental content—call it mental activity, if you will—since people are said to dream during the entire stretch of sleep (including the so-called *suṣupti*). But, it may be asked, as indeed Kanthamani does, doesn't all this amount to 'casting aspersions on the very distinction between REM and NREM?' (Kanthamani: 161). I reply: no; the distinction can clearly be said to hold for example in terms of (i) outward eye-movement; and (ii) in terms of the vividness of perceptions (*perceptions* in the widest sense). No one need deny that like in waking life, in the state of sleep too, assuming that mental activity never wholly ceases, there are some dreams which are more vivid and transparent than others and so potentially more capable of being recalled when one awakes. As I have stated in my article, following the lead of such thinkers as Leibniz and McTaggart, 'consciousness admits of degrees such that many a minute perception and, of course, sensation often goes unappercieved' (Sharma: 224–5).

To give him a clear idea of my thinking on the subject, I invite the reader's attention to the following passage in my article:

> [I]t is possible that the self in sleep undergoes experiences (whatever their content or even form) all the time during different stages of that stretch. Of these experiences, such images or thoughts that are reasonably perspicuous, variations in the degree of that perspicuity notwithstanding, would then comprise the more or less distinct dream content that is always in principle capable of being recalled on awaking. The rest of the sleep experience (called dreamless sleep) can consequently be plausibly treated as forming, in terms of self-awareness, a relatively amorphous or undifferentiated background to the (more vivid) dream state, and so leaves virtually no scope for its contents to be retained in memory with any degree of distinctness. Consciousness here, although not non-existent, remains in a highly dormant state without, however, potentially losing the capacity, other conditions permitting, to recover, immediately at times, its (fuller) animation. Indeed, the currently influential scientific/psychoanalytic opinion that in sleep mental activity does not completely cease—along with at least one strongly advanced hypothesis, namely that people dream throughout their sleep (including during periods of so-called non-Rapid Eye Movement)—would seem to lend a good amount of support to the point of view expressed here. (Sharma: 225)

Now I may be utterly wrong in all this; but in what way, I ask, can the above 'speculations' be construed as endorsing the Advaita standpoint

whether in letter or in spirit? Perhaps it is the words "*relatively amorphous*" and "*undifferentiated background*" that (mis)lead Kanthamani to conclude to my Vedāntic affiliation, but, I may submit—and this is clearly evident from the context too—that I use the words in italics not in any Vedāntic sense but just to press home the important phenomenological point that we are neither aware of the said content during sleep, not does it seem capable of being recalled on awaking. Apparently, Kanthamani does not pay attention to these and other utterances of mine, and goes on to assert: 'Ramesh Kumar Sharma is keen to turn it into a phenomenological claim. He wants to claim that it [*suṣupti*] is a stage in which:

1. I was aware of nothing during the sleep.
2. I know nothing.
3. Consciousness can know its absence.

A more charitable interpretation says that

4. Consciousness knows that it is ignorant.' (Kanthamani: 160–61)

Now here I may once again seek the reader's, and of course, Professor Kanthamani's indulgence for a while. When I have said the above things, I have pointedly referred to them as some of the paradoxes that the Advaita view seems to involve in my view. 'There is a further paradox that the Advaita thesis, in the way it is formulated, seems to involve and that often goes unnoticed.' (Sharma: 217) This statement is followed by my formulation of the paradox, and preceded by certain questions which the Advaita thesis appears to me to give rise to. It is possible that I have gone wrong in focusing on these questions and paradoxes, and so have, on the whole, misunderstood the Vedāntic position in criticizing it. But by no stretch of imagination can they be represented as views which define my own position in the matter. It is again possible that my presentation is not clear enough and thus leaves room for ambiguities. But this too is possible that Professor Kanthamani has somewhere failed to clearly see things as put by me. I have consequently no option but to leave it to the discerning reader to judge.

Lastly, to briefly refer to the question whether dreams should be seen as experiences, Professor Kanthamani does not explicitly make out a case for excluding dreams from the category of experiences; though he is convinced that this is precisely what thinkers such as Malcolm and Dennett have conclusively proved. Some of Malcolm's arguments I have briefly responded to in my article. Dennett's arguments I am not familiar with (my failing). Nevertheless it seems to me that anyone who denies an experiential character to dreams will have to deny, first of all, the 'fact' that there is, within the dream, awareness of the dream-*content* (objects, events, places), even if there is no awareness of the dreamy or unreal character of the content (or experiences); and, secondly, that the content presented to the subject in dreams is in principle capable of being recalled on waking. An analogy with illusory perception should make the point clear. No one would deny that an erroneous perception is also an experience, and that, though remaining conscious of its (apparent) content, we are not conscious of the illusory character of the perception (experience) or of the content. But just as the content of an illusory perception comes to be seen as illusory when it is contradicted by a correct perception, so does the dream-content come to be known as a mere seeming in the light of waking perception. To conclude, in the very act of exposing the *dream*-character of dream-*percepts*, our waking awareness testifies to their having been actual occurrences in the mind. Otherwise, of what is the character in question exposed?

Notes and References

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Mystifying Qualia: A Comment on R.C. Pradhan's 'Why Qualia Cannot be Quined' published in *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 2

My comments on Professor Pradhan's paper are divided into five sections: In section 1, I present his suggestion that there is a third possible characterization of qualia that is missed by Dennett's account.

In section 2, I evaluate his insightful suggestion that Dennett's quining of qualia is based on his mechanistic presuppositions. In section 3, I evaluate whether Pradhan's unquining of qualia is based on his presuppositions of the existence of qualia. In section 4, I conclude that as Dennett asserts quite poignantly the burden of proof of the existence of qualia lies on the friends of qualia. In section 5, I trace Pradhan's present account of qualia to some of his recent writings.

1. DENNETT'S FALSE DILEMMA

Applying the principle of charity, here is the best account of Professor Pradhan's critique of Dennett's article:

In a nutshell: Dennett has constructed a straw man of the characteristics of qualia as special properties that the defenders of the existence of qualia would accept, and effectively argued for quining qualia. However, once the correct conception of qualia replaces the straw man, Dennett's quining of qualia no longer works and qualia are effectively unquined.

More precisely: Dennett's unquining of qualia is based on a false dilemma of what the friends of qualia take qualia to be. Dennett claims that qualia, according to the friends of qualia, are either ineffable, intrinsic, private and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; or, they are simply qualitative or phenomenal features of our sense perceptions.[1] Holding on to the second horn of the dilemma, Dennett argues that once we cash out 'phenomenal' and 'qualitative', we either end up in some circularity where some concept such as 'conscious states' or 'raw feelings' has to be taken as primitive, or we end up again with the ineffability, privateness and direct apprehension of qualitative or phenomenal features and hence of qualia.[2] Grabbing the first horn of the dilemma leads to all kinds of difficulties, as the ineffability, intrinsicness, privateness, and direct apprehensibility, none of these can be established empirically; which is the aim of the majority of the friends of qualia, as they would no longer be satisfied with either the 'infallibilist' account of qualia nor the 'logical constructs' account.[3] Dennett's *reductio ad absurdum* argument against the friends of qualia is hence effective.

Pradhan contends that there is a third characterization of qualia other than the two specified by Dennett. Pradhan's task then becomes to delineate this characterization so that it does not collapse into the other two. A large portion of his paper is hence devoted to fine tuning his characterization. The characterization, as I can best grasp it, is on the one hand a synthesis of a first-person and third-person account as qualia are subjective but publicly communicable, hence not solely private, nor ineffable.[4] On the other hand qualia are defined as raw feelings, which constitute the essence of consciousness.[5] Pradhan's task then becomes to argue for the existence of raw feelings. As far as I can gather from a close reading, no empirical evidence can establish the existence of raw feelings. We must hence accept raw feelings as undefined non-physical states, which in turn will overthrow any possible reduction of them to physical states. Furthermore, the presupposition of a consciousness that is not reducible to physical characteristics or functions of the brain must also be made plausible. Here, Pradhan clearly states:

> The fact that we have consciousness is not logically implied by the physical history of the universe: it is only a matter of fact that we have consciousness. But once consciousness appears in the universe, it is futile to offer a causal explanation of consciousness.[6]

This echoes of Popper's emergence of World 2, without Popper's commitment that it emerges from World 1 and that makes this emergence even more mysterious, or perhaps mystical, than Popper.

It appears that we have ended up with the second alternative of Dennett's. I am afraid that Pradhan's characterization of qualia does not provide an autonomous third alternative.

2. DOES DENNETT BEG THE QUESTION?

Pradhan contends that Dennett's quining of qualia is based on his mechanistic presupposition that qualia are simply functions of brain states.[7] This charge against Dennett would be fatal if it can be sustained as Dennett has clearly stated that his quining of qualia is based on destroying all the intuitive appeals which are used in defence of qualia,

and that his argument against the reality of qualia is based on the characterization of qualia accepted by the friends of qualia.

Let us see how this accusation might work in favour of Pradhan. In his critique of the inverted spectra intuition as evidence for qualia as special characteristics, Dennett argues, with the help of intuitive pump #6, that the person with the inverted spectrum cannot introspectively determine whether the inversion is caused by (I) optic nerve inversion, or (II) by memory inversion.[8] However, Pradhan could claim that both of these reasons are physicalist reasons, which presuppose either an identity theory, or, as in Dennett's case, a functionalist theory. Dennett could perhaps respond here by saying that even (I) and (II) were not the only two alternatives, the defenders of qualia still have to give an account of how the existence of qualia can ever help us in determining when and whether there really are inverted spectra. To give such an account, the existence of qualia has simply to be presupposed.

Pradhan also uses this opportunity to give a critique of functionalism. He contends that there is no one to one correspondence between brain states and conscious states.[9] However, one to one correspondence is not necessary for functionalism to hold as a tenable theory. Consider an analogy: Pushing a combination, c_1, of keys on the keyboard while operating under a word processing programme wp1 may produce the character 'é', but for a different word processing programme wp2 we may have to press a different combination of keys, c_2, in order to produce the character 'é'. The same character is produced on the screen by pushing two different sets of keys. This does not necessarily imply that what appears on the screen is non-physical or of a different type than the punching of the keys. The point I am trying to make is that the function between the physical states and the conscious states need not be into and onto in the mathematical sense, in order for it to be a viable function. 'The square of' is definitely a function,[10] $f(x) = x^2$,[11] when the argument of this function is either 2 or –2, the value of it is 4. Whatever real or complex number we pick, the square of it will be a real number. The lack of one to one correspondence here does not mean that by squaring numbers we can go out of the realm of numbers, though it does mean that squaring complex numbers takes us out of the realm of complex numbers to the realm of real numbers.

Furthermore, I suspect that the word 'function' is not used in the mathematical sense by the functionalist theory of mind. So, that it is even possible that the pressing of the same set of keys produces different characters in different words processing programmes. So, the relation is one-many, which cannot be a function in the set-theoretic mathematical sense, just like 'square root of' is not a function, though 'positive square root of' is a function.[12]

So, it seems like Pradhan does have a very keen mathematical insight if he wants to point out that there may be more than one mental states m_j and m_k, corresponding to one physical state p_i. In some higher mathematics there are even one-many functions. Denying that conscious states are functions of physical states when 'function' is used in the strict mathematical sense does not in any way imply the denial of the one way causal connection from brain states to conscious states. 'The square root of' gives us two values, 2 and –2, for the same argument, 4. Hence, it is not a mathematical function. Yet, this relation does not take us out of the realm of numbers. Though it can take us from real numbers to complex numbers, such as in the case of square root of –4. Though square root of is not closed over the real numbers, it is closed over numbers. Real numbers and complex numbers are different kinds of numbers, but they are numbers nonetheless, and the square root of does not take us into some transcendental or mystical realm. Similarly, one could argue that though the physicalist world is not closed over brain states it is closed over physical states, and that conscious states are kinds of physical states caused by brain states, and we are in no way taken into a transcendental or mystical realm of qualia.

3. DOES PRADHAN BEG THE QUESTION?

Now, turning the table around, I ask whether Professor Pradhan's unquining of qualia is based on his presupposition of the existence of qualia. Again, I turn to the discussion of the inverted-spectra, and simply state Pradhan's words:

> Qualia-inversion, if possible, entails the following regarding the nature of consciousness:

(a) conscious states are not nomologically tied down to the brain states in the sense that they are not functional states of the brain;
(b) the mental states are type-different from the physical states of the brain because the latter remaining the same, the former can be different;
(c) the qualia are the properties of the mental states which cannot be ascribed to the physical states, including the so-called machine-states.[13]

First of all, the shift from 'spectra-inversion' to 'qualia inversion' by Pradhan clearly indicates that he is convinced, like many others, that spectra inversion entails qualia inversion, which in turn presupposes the existence of the qualia. (a) pronounces anti-functionalism, (b) is the anti-identity theory assertion, which does not imply anti-functionalism as discussed in section 2, (c) is the general anti-physicalist claim based on the presupposition that there are mental non-physical phenomena based on the presupposition that there are mental non-physical states.

4. THE TWO DOGMAS OF QUALIA

As more or less of an amateur in this very hot contemporary debate on the existence of qualia, I would like to make a simple observation. It seems to me that when all is said and done, including the consideration of all the empirical and scientific data and evidence, the question of whether or not there are qualia as non-physical conscious states can only be answered by holding on to some dogma. Professor Pradhan states the dualist dogma at the end of his paper:

> To what extent mental life is autonomous we can hypothesize only on the basis of our knowledge of the inner structure of consciousness. If the mental world is irreducible and we have a reasonable assurance that mind at any cost stands beyond the horizon of the physical world, we can make a safe bet that mind has a reality of its own and the physicalism, functionalism and identity theories of all sorts fail to understand the inner dynamics of the mind.[14]

The opponent's dogma is that the world is explanatory closed in its essence as a physical organism. If the debate is really reduced to the

acceptance of one of these alternative dogmas, then I, like Dennett, choose the second one. My only reason for this preference is, as Dennett states regarding the existence of qualia: 'I want to shift the burden of proof, so that anyone who wants to appeal to private, subjective properties has to prove first that in so doing they are *not* making a mistake.'[15]

5. THE BEST EXPLANATION

Finally, even though this is a comment I would like to go beyond polemics. In the spirit of Nozick, I can accept Pradhan's lack of knock down arguments.[16] Pradhan does not consider fallacious arguments to be a vice.[17] So, following Nozick, I ask whether Pradhan has furthered the cause of qualia in terms of philosophical explanations, in what way has he attempted to find 'deeper explanatory principles, preferably with some independent plausibility, not excluded by current knowledge.'[18] To accomplish this task I trace Professor Pradhan's publications in this journal from 1997 to 2002.

One of Pradhan's sustained efforts is to show that private, non-physical entities and states provide a better explanation of what the word 'I' may refer to than the absence of these:

> To say that there is no self-conscious human being is to say the absurd because it is ungrammatical to say that 'I am unconscious'. I can make none of the statements like 'I doubt I am conscious' or 'I can infer that I have a self'. These statements are ungrammatical because they deny the obvious, that is because they deny the necessary facts of life.[19]

This surely is a strong declaration that the existence of self-consciousness has an overwhelming explanatory superiority than the absence of it.

One year later Pradhan claims:

> It is the capacity to become the first-person—the 'I'—which makes someone a person ... . The person-substance as a minded being tends to be the 'I' or the self in the sense that, though it is a continuant being in the spatio-temporal world, yet it does not belong to the world in the way the human being belongs.[20]

> The argument for the metaphysical being of the person is that a person cannot be a mere a social construction, or a forensic reality. The persons are metaphysical beings who could be all these and yet must claim an ontological reality in the sense that they could not be what they are without a metaphysical essence.[21]

Pradhan's purpose of establishing the metaphysical reality of persons as minded beings is precisely to establish that minded beings give a better explanation of the 'I' than un-minded or merely physical beings.

Pradhan continues in the same vein three years later in response to a charge by Goswami that the concept of 'person' is a primitive one as Strawson has claimed rather than that of 'minded beings' that Pradhan claims. Pradhan responds:

> I believe that a person is essentially a thinking or minded being because it is not possible to describe a person without attributing to him or her the essential and constitutive attribute of thought and other related activities. If the body would have been the only or the essential characteristic of being a person, then it would have been difficult to distinguish human persons from the physical bodies. Cartesianism is a revolt against the materialist notion that persons are bodies, albeit complex bodies of some sort.[22]

Even though it is not explicitly stated here, Pradhan must believe that the materialist doctrine that persons are solely bodies is not explanatorily sufficient. Yet, physicalist and identity theorists since the 1920s have maintained just the opposite. They claim that explanations of mental phenomena in terms of brain processes are in principle empirically verifiable and hence serve a better explanatory role than the alternative hypothesis that mental events are some ineffable, in principle empirically unverifiable qualia. I do not want to either defend or unleash the whole history of the physicalists accounts from Neurath to Dennett here. I would however like to request Professor Pradhan to now turn the fulcrum of this debate to that of explanatory superiority of his view over that of the physicalists, rather than attempt to demolish the arguments of the physicalists, or to offer sound arguments in support of his own views on qualia, because, in my opinion, he has failed at both of these tasks in his recent writings, and has at best begged the question or stacked a mountain of straw men arguments.[23]

Notes and References

1. Dennett, Daniel C. (1990), 'Quining Qualia' in William G. Lycan (ed.) *Mind and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 523.
2. Ibid., pp. 523–24.
3. Ibid., pp. 528–29.
4. Pradhan, R.C. (2002), 'Why Qualia Cannot be Quined', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, April–June, 2002, pp. 85–86.
5. Ibid., p. 91.
6. Ibid., p. 99
7. Ibid., p. 87.
8. Dennett, pp. 525–28.
9. Pradhan, pp. 87, 91.
10. Cormen, Thomas H. et al. *Introduction to Algorithms* (2nd ed.) (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 2003), p. 1077: 'Given two sets A and B, a *function f* is a binary relation on A × B such that for all $a \in A$, there exists precisely one $b \in B$ such that $(a, b) \in f$.'
11. Gillett, Philip, *Calculus and Analytic Geometry* (3rd ed.) (Lesington, Mass., U.S.A.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988), pp. 29–31.
12. Ibid., p. 39.
13. Pradhan, p. 89.
14. Ibid., pp. 99–100.
15. Dennett, p. 520.
16. Nozick, Robert (1981), *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 4–8.
17. For example, in his comment on G.P. Ramachandran's discussion, 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness' (*Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XV, No. 1, September–December 1997: 83–85), Pradhan freely combines the fallacy of equivocation with the fallacy of straw man to reduce Ramachandran's profound insight to the two dimensions of a linguistic move and an ontological move. Then, Pradhan goes on to argue that the ontological move is Humean and the linguistic move is Wittgensteinian.' (*JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 85–86). This reduction derobes any profundity in Ramachandran's discussion which I think is more than unfair to Ramachandran's brilliant essay. Even if Pradhan invokes Hume and Wittgenstein, Ramachandran may not have had them in mind, unless Pradhan is an underrated psychologist of

philosophers. Pradhan then brings down the axe by pronouncing the Humean argument to be hackneyed, and since Pradhan himself is a big fan of Wittgenstein, he goes on to argue that despite whatever Wittgenstein may have said about language his position does not lead to the conclusion that there is no self-consciousness (*JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 86–87). And what follows from the fact that the Humean argument is hackneyed and the Wittgensteinian argument does not conclude with the non-existence of self-consciousness? 'If there were in fact no self-consciousness, it would be impossible to understand human beings' (*JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1, p. 87). This seems to me to be the elementary fallacy of jumping to a conclusion. From the preceding discussion of Pradhan, this conclusion follows as much as the conclusion that if there were no self-consciousness it would be impossible to understand rocks.

18. Nozick, p. 11.
19. Pradhan, R.C. (1997), 'Is There Such a Thing as Self-Consciousness: A Response', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XV, No. 1, p. 87.
20. Pradhan, R.C. (1998), 'Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*. Vol. XV, No. 3, May–August 1998, p. 21.
21. Ibid., p. 22.
22. Pradhan, R.C. (2001), 'Response to Dr. Sauravpran Goswami's reaction to the article of Professor R.C. Pradhan entitled "Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons"', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January–March 2001, pp. 222–23.
23. This is a revised version of a comment first presented in an ICPR-sponsored National Seminar on 'Consciousness and Phenomenal Mind' held at Butler Palace, Lucknow, in 1999, as mentioned in Footnote No. 51 of Professor Pradhan's Paper. I am grateful to those who appreciated and commented upon my comment.

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Agenda for Research

The talk of Śruti and its authority has been a matter of unquestioned acceptance in the philosophical tradition tracing its lineage from the Vedas in this country. Yet, a close look at the Mīmāṁsā sūtras and the Brahma sūtras which alone seem to literally accept the authority of the Śruti develop in opposite directions. Not only this, even a cursory look at these texts strikes the blindest person that this so-called Śruti whose authority is supposed to be of such final and fundamental importance for the tradition, is not only continuously contested in respect of its interpretation but also that it consists of a complex of statements scattered all over the Vedic corpus which have to be understood in a coherent manner as *prima facie* they conflict with one another.

Mīmāṁsā and the Brahm sūtras try to provide a perspective to the Vedic corpus which deserves close attention. The Mīmāṁsā Sūtras which are clear in respect of the 'purpose' or *prayojana* of the Śruti have no problem in respect of the Upanisadic portion of the text as it is not regarded by them as important. The Brahma Sūtra, on the other hand, have a real task before them as they can not refuse the genuineness of the texts on which the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras are based. But, somehow, they want to treat them as secondary in character and not having that primary importance as the Upaniṣadic text with which they are concerned. They thus display a more ambiguous attitude which is hardly there in the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras which are supposed to have been composed a little earlier.

What is perhaps more surprising is that both in the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras and the Brahma Sūtras there is sufficient evidence for the fact that the final interpretation adopted by the author of the sūtras was a subject of controversy in the earlier tradition as names of a number of persons have been given and their opinion mentioned in the Sūtras themselves. Many of these persons occur in both the Mīmaṁsā and the Brahma Sūtras suggesting that there was a common scholarly world interested in the issues that these two sūtra texts raise and that they were knowledgeable about the details of the text in the context of which the questions are being asked. The names Bādari, Ātreya, Kārsanājini seem

to be common to both the sūtras along with those of Bādarāyaṇa and Jamini which occur surprisingly both in the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta Sūtras not just once but a number of times. There are, of course, persons who are referred to in the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras but not in the Vedānta Sūtras and vice-versa. The following comparative list of the names which occur in the two sūtras may be of interest to the reader interested in the subject and may help in a comparative study of these two Sūtra texts from a perception different from the one that has been accepted up till now.

Brahma Sūtra:	Mīmāṁsā Sūtra:
1. Jaimini 1.2.28, 1.3.31, 1.4.18, 3.2.40, 3.4.2, 3.4.17, 3.4.40, 4.3.12, 4.4.5, and 4.4.11 (10)	1. Jaimini 3.1.4, 6.3.4, 8.3.7, 9.2.39 12.1.7 (5)
2. Bādari 1.2.30, 3.1.11, 4.3.7, 4.4.10 (4)	2. Bādari 3.1.3, 6.1.27, 8.3.6, and 9.2.33 (4)
3. Bādarāyaṇa 1.3.26, 1.3.33, 3.2.41, 3.4.1, 3.4.7, 3.4.18, 4.3.15, 4.4.7 4.4.12 (9)	3. Bādarāyaṇa 1.1.5, 5.2.19, 6.1.8, 10.8.44, 11.1.64 (5)
4. Kārsnajaṇin 3.1.9 (1)	4. Kārsadnajini 4.3.17, 6.7.36 (2)
5. Audulomi 1.4.21, 3.4.44, 4.4.6 (3) and not (4)	5. Ātraya 4.3.18, 6.1.26 (2)
6. Asmarathya 1.2.29, 1.4.20 (2)	6. Aitisayana 6.1.6, 6.7.36 (2)
7. Karsakrtsna 1.4.22 (1)	7. Lavukayana 6.7.38 (1)

Jaipur DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

1. The publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* at the end of 18th century (1781) in Germany seems to have had almost the same effect as the rise of logical positivism at the end of 19th century in the Anglo-Saxon world. Metaphysics, in both cases, was argued to be the result of a foundational misunderstanding about the nature of reason and what can strictly be called 'knowledge'. For Kant, it was the result of the application of categories to a realm where they could not be applied as their meaningful application could only be done in the realm of sense-experience. For the latter, it was the result of a foundational misconception about the cognitive use of language and what it really meant to make a 'knowledge-claim' whose 'truth-conditions' have to be specified in order to intersubjectively determine whether it was valid or not. In Germany, however, the response to Kant was a desperate attempt to reinstate metaphysics in some form or other, though taking Kant's contention seriously in this connection. The work of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger may be seen in this perspective.

On the other hand, there seems to have been no such sustained reaction in the Anglo-American world to the declaration of metaphysics as being 'literally nonsensical' as its statements could neither be shown to be true or false, and hence could not be considered as informative statements claiming cognitive status.

At a different level, metaphysics was considered as a 'disease' of the language which could only be cured by a proper linguistic analysis as the language seemed to have taken a holiday from its usual function. The following quotation from Hegel's *Science of Logic* gives a vivid picture of the unease created by Kant's work and the challenge it posed for the German thinkers of those times, particularly as it seems to have been affecting younger minds who had begun to think under Kant's influence, that whole of past philosophy was based on a fundamental mistake. The complete transformation which philosophical thought in Germany has undergone in the last twenty-five years, and the higher

standpoint reached by spirit in its awareness of itself, have had but little influence as yet on the structure of logic.

That which, prior to this period, was called metaphysics has been so to speak, extirpated root and branch, and has vanished from the ranks of the sciences. The ontology, rational psychology, cosmology, yes even natural theology, of former times—where is now to be heard any mention of them, or who would venture to mention them? Inquiries, for instance, into the immateriality of the soul, into efficient and final causes, where should these still arouse any interest? Even the former proofs of the existence of God are cited only for their historical interest or for purposes of edification and uplifting the emotions. The fact is that there no longer exists any interest either in the form or the content of metaphysics or in both together. If it is remarkable when a nation has become indifferent to its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical customs and virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a nation loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life of the nation.

The esoteric teachings of Kantian philosophy—that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which, by itself, generates nothing but fantasies of the brain—this was a justification from a philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought. In support of this popular teaching came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the time demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience was the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private life, practice and practical training generally were essential and alone necessary, theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy [*Wissenschaft*] and ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics—like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies. Theology, which in former times was the guardian of speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it) had given up this science in exchange for feelings, for what was popularly matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition. In keeping with this change, there vanished

from the world those solitary souls who were sacrificed by their people and exiled from the world to the end that the eternal should be contemplated and served by lives devoted solely thereto—not for any practical gain but for the sake of blessedness; a disappearance which, in another context, can be regarded as essentially the same phenomenon as that previously mentioned. So that having got rid of the dark utterances of metaphysics, of the colourless communion of the spirit with itself, outer existence seemed to be transformed into the bright world of flowers—and there are no *black* flowers, as we know.

2. The following statement in Hegel's *Science of Logic* makes 'strange reading' and perhaps shows a strange, though paradoxical, similarity with the philosophical enterprise that occurred in the Anglo-Saxon world at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century centred around language analysis, called 'The Linguistic Turn'.

Hegel talks of the German language as being specially privileged for philosophical thinking as it contained terms which have 'opposite' meaning embedded in them, thus suggesting a direction for thought which transcends the demand of 'understanding for extremely precise and exclusive meaning for every term so that clear thinking may be attempted. In this, it is just the opposite of what Anglo-Saxon philosophy of language tried to do where the ideal was just to have 'one' and only one meaning for every term resulting in the demand for the construction of an 'ideal language' in which alone philosophical problems could be meaningfully discussed. Hegel's statement not only shows the profound influence that German language has exercised on philosophising in Germany, the evidence for which may be found in plenty in the work of such an outstanding thinker as Heidegger, where it is quite explicit. But it also raises the larger question of the relation between language and philosophy and whether philosophical thinking is shaped and determined by the specificities of the language in which it is done. Could the same, for example, be said in respect of philosophical thinking done in Sanskrit which has more than 2000 years of continuous tradition of thinking in this country?

The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and stored in human *language*. Nowadays we cannot be too often reminded that it is *thinking* which distinguishes man from the beasts. Into all that becomes something inward for men, an image or conception as such; into all that he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he has transformed into language and expresses in it contains a category—concealed, mixed with other forms or clearly determined as such, so much is logic his natural element, indeed his own peculiar *nature*. If nature as such, as the physical world, is contrasted with the spiritual sphere, then logic must certainly be said to be the supernatural element which permeates every relationship of man to nature, his sensation, intuition, desire, need, instinct, and simply by so doing transforms it into something human, even though only formally human, into ideas and purposes. It is an advantage when a language possesses an abundance of logical expressions, that is, specific and separate expressions for the thought determinations themselves; many prepositions and articles denote relationships based on thought; the Chinese language is supposed not to have developed to this stage or only to an inadequate extent. These particles, however, play quite a subordinate part having only a slightly more independent form than the prefixes and suffixes, inflections and the like. It is much more important that in a language the categories should appear in the form of substantives and verbs and thus be stamped with the form of objectivity. In this respect German has many advantages over other modern languages; some of its words even possess the further peculiarity of having not only different but opposite meanings so that one cannot fail to recognize a speculative spirit of the language in them: it can delight a thinker to come across such words and to find the union of opposites naïvely shown in the dictionary as one word with opposite meanings, although this result of speculative thinking is nonsensical to the understanding.

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Notes and Queries

The term 'Yoga' in the *Yoga Sūtra* is defined as योगश्चित्त वृति निरोध (1.1.2) and the *vrttis* that are to be completely stopped are enumerated as प्रमाण विपर्यय विकल्प निद्रास्मृतय (1.1.6). In case these are the *vrttis* that have to be completely stopped and eliminated from consciousness in order to attain the end which the Yogi is supposed to pursue, then how can there be any notion of 'false knowledge', or विपर्यय if 'falsity' is to be established by a *pramāṇa*?

Also, if there is no *smṛti* or memory, then how can there be any knowledge at all including that of *dharma* which, presumably, are enumerated in the '*Yama*' and '*Niyama*' which are supposed to be integral parts of the *Sādhanā* mentioned in the second chapter (2.30 and 2.32).

Not only this, how can there be any notion of *siddhis* mentioned in the third chapter, which are supposed to arise out of the pursuit of yoga when all movements of consciousness have been stopped, including that of '*saṅkalpa*' or 'willing' or 'desiring'?

Further, the Yoga Sūtra starts with *Samādhi* and ends with Kaivalya. Are they different or the same and, in case they are the latter, is that an unnecessary repetition or punarukti doṣa which is regarded as a serious defect in a text and in any case renders the fourth chapter irrelevant.

In case they are different, what is the relation between *samādhi* which is the subject of the first chapter and *Kaivalya*, which is the subject of the last chapter?

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Book Reviews

R.C. PRADHAN (ed.): *Philosophy of Wittgenstein: Indian Responses*, Decent Books, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 201+ix, Rs 300.

The value of this volume lies in the fact that it represents the latest developments in Wittgenstein's Philosophy from the point of view of Indian Wittgensteinians. It consists of twelve articles by different authors on various aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of language and an introduction of articles by Professor R.C. Pradhan. Most of the articles of the festschrift were presented at a national seminar. It explores various themes of Wittgenstein's Philosophy such as Language Games, Forms of Life, Family Resemblance, Private Language Argument, Wittgenstein's conception of Necessity and Objectivity, Criterion, Silence and Speech, and Wittgenstein's criticism of European civilization. Some of its articles are post-Wittgensteinian in nature and deal with topics such as 'Grammar of Emotion Words', 'Wittgenstein on Cinema', 'A Feminist Response to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language'.

As such, any festschrift is bound to lack cohesiveness but it becomes more fragmented if it is a contribution of different authors. Here, in this book, it appears that no set pattern was adopted in the decision as to which articles were to precede and which were to follow. In the absence of any pattern in sequence of articles, there is a want of cohesiveness in the book. In order to obtain continuity and flow of thoughts, articles of similar subject matter should be put together. Keeping this in view, the reader could classify the entire book for himself into three sections:

(1) Articles which are comparative in nature. This includes articles by Suresh Chandra, Srinivasa Rao, and S. Paneerselvam.

(2) Articles which are on traditional themes of Wittgenstein's philosophy. These are articles by Ahmad Nizar, A. Dasgupta, P.R. Bhat, G.P. Das, Sadhan Chakraborti and R.C. Pradhan.

(3) Articles which are post-Wittgensteinian. These are articles by Shefali Moitra, Sanil and G.P. Ramchandra.

Suresh Chandra's biographical paper 'Attacking Modern Western Civilization: Mahatma Gandhi and Ludwig Wittgenstein' draws a similarity between Wittgenstein and Gandhi on their critique of Western civilization. He compares Wittgenstein and Gandhi on various points such as (1) their critique of industrialization and materialistic civilization, (2) their disenchantment with undue emphasis on science and technology and loss of human values in modern society, (3) their religious views which, in essence, are an appreciation of spirituality, and (4) respect for human labour. Although Chandra's paper is informative, his alleged dichotomy between the East as spiritual and the West as material, and between industrial labour and manual labour, etc. could be appreciated only uncritically—a conditional, partial point of view. The question remains unanswered as to what role such dichotomization plays in today's world. Moreover, Pradhan's dissent (p. 2) to Chandra's view that Wittgenstein was a child of Gandhian thinking is not the only point over which a Wittgensteinian could disagree. Some other views of SC, which a Wittgensteinian might find difficult to agree with, are: (a) 'Wittgenstein has certainly failed to liberate the fly from the fly-bottle' (p. 17), (b) 'His views on religion remained quite ambiguous even to his friends and close associates' (p. 18), and (c) 'Wittgenstein was a religious man' (p. 21). However, it is noteworthy that Chandra has pointed out in the conclusion of his paper that economic slavery is the stark reality of globalization.

Srinivasa Rao's view in his paper 'Speech and Silence in Western Philosophy: Critique of Wittgenstein from an Indian Point of View' that Wittgenstein's notion of silence is similar to the position held by Nyaya and dissimilar to the Advait Vedantic stand point has been rejected by Pradhan who argues for a different conclusion in the introduction (p. 3). Rao delineates two different notions of silence: (a) silence as a mere absence of thought and speech, and (b) silence as a positive entity—as a special entity of its own kind. For him, (a) represents Western and Nyaya's view whereas (b) represents the Advait Vedantic view. According to Pradhan, 'it may be contended that Wittgenstein's notion of silence has a positive content also in view of

the fact that in the *Tractatus* he is definitely aware of the realm of the mystical that defies all cannons of linguistic expression ... . Hence, the parallel between Wittgenstein and Vedanta may be more illuminating than the one Rao draws' (p. 3). Further, Rao's interpretation of Wittgenstein's analysis as quasi-phenomenological and his definition of quasi-phenomenological as the analysis, which is not thoroughgoing, is lackadaisical. If we accept Rao's criterion of thoroughness every analysis would turn out to be quasi-phenomenological.

Paneerselvam in his paper 'On the Problem of Communication: Wittgenstein versus Habermass' presents Habermass as the one who develops the Wittgensteinian notion of language game in order to explain the communicative aspect of language. For Paneerselvam, although Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* explains that language and social conventions are inextricably intertuwined, it does not explains 'institutional transformation' or 'social change' or 'conflict in society' (p. 75). He puts another form of the problem on p. 79 and concludes that Wittgenstein couldn't explain metalanguage-game (language game of language game). According to Paneerselvam. Habermass points out this lacuna of language game and admits form of life to be but only one aspect of language game. For Habermass, all the dimensions of language game can be covered only if it is restored in the context of tradition (p. 81). It is in this way that 'intersubjective validity of linguistic rules' come into play (p. 81). Paneerselvam concludes, '"linguistic turn" of Wittgenstein has moved into another direction, namely, "social turn" in the hands of Habermass ... . This means language and social practice always are inseparable' (p. 86). As against such conclusions it can be easily asked: whether form of life does not include social practice?, and if it does, then the issue of language games development in the hands of Habermass tends to be debatable. Moreover, it could also be debatable whether issue of metalanguage-games, like Russellian metaclasses (class of classes) is pseudo or not.

Ahmad discusses role of language games in understanding the meaning of language. In the very beginning of his paper 'Language-game, Grounding and the Metaphysics of Meaning' it is obvious that Ahmad has not properly understood Wittgenstein's notion of language games.

He interprets that for Wittgenstein bottom of language game is form of life (pp. 40 and 52) and says that 'Wittgenstein tried his best to do away with the notion of form of life'. It is a view which is patently false even to the eyes of those who have had only first-hand study of Wittgenstein. In fact it is not the language game which is a groundless or bottomless. For Wittgenstein groundlessness is to be seen a in form of life and not in language game—form of life is groundless because it is just given. Form of life is not the ground of language game as both of these are interwoven as Paneerselvam on pp. 74–75 explains that language and social conventions are inextricably intertwined. And, the relationship between the language game and form of life is communicative (p. 75).

The debate between behaviourism and mentalism about the criteria of language-learning: whether language learning depends on the behaviour or on in-built linguistic competence, is the subject of Dasgupta's paper 'Criteria and the Concepual Structure'. He argues for Chomsky-Fodorian brand of mentalism and criticizes Wittgenstein's operationalism which, according to him, has behaviouristic leanings, and which is against mentalism. Dasgupta's view is debatable as some Wittgensteinians maintain that Wittgenstein's operationalism accommodates a balance of both behaviourism as well as mentalism.

Bhat's paper 'Wittgenstein on Private Language' and Das's 'Kripke-McGinn Controversy on Rule and Rule-Following' deals with Kripke's sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of rule and rule-following. Bhat reformulates Wittgenstein's criticism of the private language argument. He rejects Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein and concludes that even Kripke's sceptical views about rule-following cannot support the private language argument.

Das discusses the debate between Kripke and McGinn on rule-following. On the one hand, Kripke maintains that as rule-following is a common practice, it necessarily presumes the notion of community, for McGinn, on the other hand, rule-following is not necessarily a common practice of a community, but it is a repeated practice; hence notion of community is not necessary for rule-following. Das supports Kripke and Malcom's position as 'language is the primary mode of

communication' (p. 121) and such communication is a common practice of a community.

Sadhan Chakraborti in his paper, 'Wittgenstein on Necessity and Objectivity in Mathematics and Logic' argues that Wittgenstein's criticism of the assumption that mathematics and logic are based on necessary and objective entities as empirical sciences are based on experiments on physical objects should not be interpreted that he does away with the necessity and objectivity in mathematics and logic. For Chakraborti, what was not acceptable to Wittgenstein was Hardy-Frege-Russell way of explaining necessity and objectivity in Mathematics and Logic as he explains them with relation to linguistic rules. He contrasts Wittgenstein's position with that of logical positivism, Quinean reductionism, Dummettian verificationism, descriptivism, pragmatism, psychologism, and Kant. Chakraborti establishes Wittgenstein as a realist because he advocates necessity and objectivity of mathematics and logic.

As against Dummett's conventionalism and Putnam's naturalism, R.C. Pradhan in his paper 'Logical Necessity, Conventionalism and Forms of Life: Wittgenstein's Philosophy Revisited' puts forth what he calls Wittgenstein's 'transcendental argument' in order to explain the nature of necessity of mathematical and logical truths. He points out that neither conventionalism nor naturalism adequately explains Wittgenstein's idea of necessity as it is embedded in the grammar of mathematics. Pradhan claims that his own position saves the normative character of necessity. For him, Wittgenstein's concept of necessity is normative yet it is not empirical. It is normative because it is embedded in form of life but as it does not depend on our contingent form of life, it is not empirical. It is this sense of necessity which is the bedrock of our language and thought. On p. 164, he explains that there is nothing in logic and mathematics which is not related to human thought and life but thereby they do not become empirical phenomena as by being grammatical they remain normative and *a priori*. But Pradhan did not sufficiently clarify the difference between normative and *a priori* adjectives of Wittgensteinian concept of necessity. We expect an eminent scholar of Wittgensteinism such as Professor Pradhan to expound his position further. Nonetheless, Pradhan's interpretation of Wittgenstein's transcendental argument, which tries to infuse norma-

tive and *a priori* characteristics into Wittgenstein's notion of necessity, on the lines of Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgements, resembles the Aristotelian thesis that eternal forms do reside in wordly things.

There is a concurrence in the conclusions of Pradhan and Chakraborti. Both reject Dummettian 'Fullblooded Conventionalism' of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. For Pradhan, necessity of mathematical propositions lies in their grammar (p. 164) and for Chakraborti, it lies in their linguistic practices (p. 127). Unless otherwise explained by Pradhan and Chakraborti, 'grammar' and 'linguistic rules' seem to denote the same linguistic entity which is responsible for necessity in Mathematics as both accept that such necessity is neither empirical nor analytic but is normative (p. 164 and p. 128).

It is often said that the greatness of a scholarly work lies in its diversity of interpretations. There are different interpretations of Wittgenstein. He is termed as pragmatist, mentalist, neo-positivist, behaviourist, linguist, and utilitarian *et al*, despite the fact that he deplored theory building. Wittgenstein was against system building in philosophy. Nonetheless, it is the nature of Wittgenstein's writings that it accommodates divergent kind of theories and invites numerous interpretations. It is in this context that Shefali Moitra's exploration of feminist elements of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* is to be seen. Moitra's paper 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language: A Feminist Response' tries to establish that language in Wittgenstein's works functions as a liberating force. As against Moitra's conclusion, the fact remains that Wittgenstein, in his early thoughts, was influenced by Otto Wininger's *Sex and Character*, which is anti-women. However, Moitra's methodological emphasis is on the linguistic aspect of *Philosophical Investigations*, which is refreshing.

Sanil's paper 'The Language of Face: Wittgenstein on Cinema' deals with the non-linguistic phenomenon of Wittgenstein's philosophy such as pictures, memory, dreams and faces, and tries to delineate a Wittgensteinian notion of language underlying them. He attempts to explore not only the concept of cinema of language but also the concept of language of cinema in the Wittgensteinian framework. But both of these conceptions of Sanil are troublesome. If the concept of cinema of language could avail some solace only from the earlier Wittgenstein's

picture theory of language, the concept of language of cinema, i.e., language of face turns out to be a contradiction in terms of a category mistake. The term 'language of face' or 'language of cinema' commits the same category mistake as the term 'body language'. In the end, Sanil's presumption that language of face is cinematic language and his tracing up of Wittgenstein on cinema remains quite sketchy.

G.P. Ramchandra's paper 'Exploring the Grammar of Emotion Words' is concerned with ontological and linguistic status of emotions in Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology. He holds that for Wittgenstein, ontologically, emotions are not real entities. For this conclusion he cites the results of the experiments of scientist Hebb and views of R.M. Gordon. According to Ramchandra the scientific results of the experiments of Hebb maintain that 'emotion words are necessary tools for living; they are not indicators of anything hidden' (p. 190). Ramchandra says that Gordon wrongly interprets Hebb as he accepts certain 'states' beneath emotional behaviour, whereas there is no such state. Ramchandra accepts that his paper is based on Wittgenstein's rejection of picture theory of meaning and his distinction between material and grammatical propositions. (Here, it is noteworthy that it is still debatable among Wittgensteinians whether later Wittgenstein completely rejected the picture theory of meaning or he accepted at least one of its thinnest versions in his notion of the language game.) On the basis of his interpretation of Wittgenstein that emotions are not real entities Ramchandra argues that those philosophers who take emotions as real entities end up discussing nothing significant and end up talking tautologies and grammatical propositions. In order to establish his Wittgensteinian thesis that emotions are function words therefore 'any attempt to give an account of emotions would inevitably be a failure', he discusses Saam Trivedi and R.M. Gordon's views on emotions.

Notwithstanding its multifacetedness, this book covers only a few aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy as there is no article which could focus on his philosophy of mind, moral and religious thoughts, etc. As this book does not cover Wittgenstein's entire philosophy, it would have been better if the title of the seminar in which these papers were presented, i.e., 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language' had been retained as the title of the book.

The get-up and printing of the book are soothing. There are few printing errors like on p. 6, line no. 24, 'nor' is printed as 'no' and on p.195, line no. 19, 'is' is redundant. As such, Pradhan's introduction of the book is concise, lucid and as good as it is expected from a scholar of Wittgensteinism like him, but he certainly commits an error when on p. 7 he says that 'G.P. Das has shown that McGinn is closer to Wittgenstein in his interpretation of rule-following'. As against this, on p. 121 Das admits, 'I am inclined to agree with Kripke ...'.

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D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA: *The Ways of Understanding the Human Past*, PHISPC, New Delhi, 2001, Rs 295.

The Ways of Understanding the Human Past by the noted philosopher Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya is the 12th monograph in the Project of History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization. Chattopadhyaya has designed his investigation on the Indian Past in terms of its myths, epics, scientific understanding of the past and the historic approach to the past presumably due to plurality of approaches. Spread over a number of millennia Indian civilization appears to have had a serious encounter with a poli-glossia regarding 'Imagining' India. Myths, epics and history are not synchronic in India just as King Oedepus, Homer and Herodotus were not simultaneous in ancient Greece, and the diachronicity is marked not only temporally but also in their conceptuality of the past. The historiography of a specific segment of imagination is taxonomically underpinned as 'historical imagination'; but Chattopadhyaya has argued that its linguistic expression is 'more or less culture-specific'. Therefore, he says, 'To make history and *Itihasa* as synonymous would be somewhat misleading'. Why indeed both of them are not synonymous is a question which presumably Chattopadhyaya has to answer. History, according to Chattopadhyaya, is marked by an excessive concern 'for spatial, temporal and causal considerations', *Itihasa* etymologically means 'so indeed it was or what really happened' and is held to have addressed the ideals of human life, i.e., *dharma, artha, kama* and *moksa.*

In order to develop his arguments D.P. Chattopadhyaya thoughtfully brought into his analysis specifics such as *Itihasa* and *Epics* and also some generalities as History as Art, History as Science, History as Practical Dialogue. Designing the questions, as he did, may appear to be disintegrated on superficial observation but Chattopadhyaya has interlaced them by seeking to situate them to the ancient, medieval and modern Indian historical imagination. *Itihasa* is viewed by him as an ensemble of 'talk, legend, tradition, geneology, story, historic—heroic poem, biography, traditional account of past events, etc.' He has examined the authorship of the two epics *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*, amongst others, as an important scholarly preoccupation. Understandably, he has been struggling to explore the terms with which every age, every culture and every people of India negotiated the past and hence deserve to be treated within this framework. He has arrived at the conclusion that in the Indian epics there are both *Dharmakanda* and *Karmakanda* of human life, because he shares the opinion of Sri Aurobindo that legends in *itihasa* are fused into symbolic myths and tales to convey some spiritual and social message to the people.

In the chapter on History As Art: Indian Context, Chattopadhyaya has started with the admission that the question is old and no universally acceptable answer can be furnished. Because the individuals perceive their identity and personality differently, one of which according to Chattopadhyaya is space-bound (social) and the other (temporal) history-specific. On very logical grounds he has examines the *Puranas* with which the term *itihasa* is traditionally prefixed. The resume of the debate on the historical significance of the *Puranas* as *itihasa*/history is well informed. But what is noticeable in his study is the emphasis which he has laid on (i) the concept of 'time' and (ii) on 'number' as a major preoccupation of the *puranic* literature. The *Puranic* division of time is multiple consisting of *ksana, muhurta, yuga, mahayuga, kalpa.* F.E. Pargiter in his *Ancient Indian Historical Traditions* has assiduously worked on the calculation of the number of years encompassed in each of the four yugas, i.e., *satya, krita, dapar* and *kali* and the number of cycles to be completed to make the time-span of *mahayuga* and that of a *kalpa*. The *Puranic* time consequently appears to be a blend of cyclical and linera time unlike the Judeo-Christian

concept of time which is basically cyclical and has been later replaced by rational linearity of time as progression. In the mythical world, Chattopadhyaya suggests space and time are indirectly, at times almost inscrutably but unmistakably related. By way of citing example he mentions spatial zone, east as related to the temporal phase, morning, and spatial zone, west related to the temporal phase, evening. Another important element in mythical thinking is held to be number; to quote him 'in the world of mythology each number is endowed with an individual nature and power and not given an elevated, abstract and exact ordinal position'. Chattopadhyaya simultaneously expresses the view that 'chronology' is non-specific temporal address to events and so, by merely chronicalling events one does not get or write history. On the other hand, with Indian historical literature from Kalhana till the near contemporary Indian historians, Chattopadhyaya had deftly trodden the familiar ground.

The author has posited another important question with regard to the scientific status of History, though he confesses that the issue '... by itself is not something very illuminating, unless one spells out what one means by the words "Arts" and "Science" '. By way of answering the question raised by himself Chattopadhyaya has deployed an arsenal of facts and ideas to perceptively survey the progression of thought, both in India and in Europe. For his convenience he has reduced the scientific process to an act of deduction of laws. Having regard to this interpretation of science Chattopadhyaya has sought to examine its relevance to history. So, he has mentioned Collingwood who has argued that what is rational or thought is only universalizable. And he has inferred Collingwood's answer to be 'No' to a contingent situation. Chattopadhyaya has of course chosen to differ from Collingwood on the ground that '... there is nothing like historical law or laws in terms of which the future historical events can be reliably predicted ... . Human freedom, though socially circumscribed, are many-sided in their orientation. Social circumscription is to be distinguished not only from natural determination but also from cultural determination. Historical unpredictability is basically rooted in human freedom and creativity'.

It is in fact a little mystifying why Chattopadhyaya asks the question now as he does. The Gulbankian Commission Report on the Social

Sciences and published by Immanuel Wallerestien as *Open the Social Sciences* has broadly defined the character of social sciences as 'empirical' as distinguished from 'conceptual' and 'dependable variable' centric than conditioned by 'causality'. Popper having emphasized on the differences between the natural and social sciences has suggested that causality in natural sciences is *invariant,* while in social sciences it is *contingent.* Human acts being pronouncedly voluntary neither qualify for a positivist treatment nor do they achieve the conditions of 'correspondence truth'. Consequently, 'truth' in History, because objectivity is a major moral preoccupation of the historians, cannot be 'the truth, the only truth and nothing but truth' of Ranke. For a History, propositional truth, therefore, is the unavoidable condition of 'truth'. In fact, Kuhn's emphasis on 'paradigm' as the only logical resolution of the debate on the epistemology of Social Sciences has gained in ground. Hence, it appears to be largely misplaced if the argument is tendered now, since the position has changed during the last five decades, as to what should be the correct taxonomy of history *per se.* The debate that interests the theoreticians amongst the historians is on *The Poverty of Theory* raised by E.P. Thomson, short time, *lange duree* and man mediating as agent between time and space visualized by Braudel and on the post-modernist agenda of the 'end of history'. All histories being contemporary histories (*a la* Corce and Carr) all historical questions too are contemporary questions and there is no tangible reason why should we bother the past by interrogating it with questions which the past did never ask itself. That Chattopadhyaya has indulged in it immediately after he has stated that we should not do so puzzles me.

With a profound regard for human tradition Devi Prasad Chattopadhyaya constructs the concluding chapter of his book entitled *History as a Practical Dialogue.* The tenor of his argument is set by his statement 'Informed of the past, oriented by the present and addressed to the future our theories and practices, rightly understood, transcend the bound of immediacy,—immediacy of time, place and person'. Consequently, Chattopadhyaya is led towards the validity of shared history which he has mentioned as *indirect realism.* By an extension of the argument it may be held to be the off-spring of the 'critical rationalism' of Popper. However, the message of the lived-past

had also bothered T.S. Eliot, and he had uttered it fairly clearly in his confession.

I am tired with my own life and the lives of those after me,

I am dying in my own death and the deaths of those after me.

(A Song for Simeon)

The position held by Chattopadhyaya becomes critical when he says, 'Marked by both realism and constructionism, history is essentially dialogical in character. It is a dialogue not only between the present and the past but also between the present and future (of concrete cultural group)'. A serious question with reference to history's disciplinary preoccupation with the *retrospectivity* was first raised by Namier through his cryptic statement, 'we make the past but remember the future' long time ago. None of his eminent students such as Carr, Berlin, Hill could have visualized then the implication of the comment of their great teacher whose critical mind was then measured up on the basis of *The Revolt of the Intellectuals* partly as a refutation of *The Revolt of the Masses* of Ortega. The present having a dialogue with the past to construct history is admitted now by historians of all shades. But 'remembering the future' or having a dialogue with the future, which is yet to be is still doubtful as a category of historical dialogue. As much as a poser Chattopadhyaya's claim, 'The question of concreteness of the present culture with reference to the future is being raised here purposefully, is significant. By way of explification Chattopadhyaya mentions *Rama Rajya* as the ideological agenda of the contemporary Indian political establishment. He describes it as the concreteness of the present culture. It is logically assumable as long as it is accepted as reiteration of the past by way of activation of the frozen memory, which therefore competitively belongs to 'historical relativism', 'millinarianism' of Radcliff Brown and 'neo-tribalism' of Popper. Presumably, millenarianism cannot be the only vocabulary of the dialogue between the present and the future, or for that matter between the past and the future of all human and cultural entities.

Chattopadhyaya, in order to defend himself, advances an argument that 'the Cognitive impulse which accounts for the origin of *itihasa* (history) ... has its distinct orientation towards the future'. He uses

itihasa and history synonymously pleading initially that they are not the same. I find it difficult to accept the equation at this stage of his argument, because the cognitive impulse which made *itihasa* as a flow of events contextualized by time and space as an aggregative is not certainly the idiography of history (western), where an event in its singularity is held to be the basic active principle of historical imagination. Are they truly identical involving no category confusion? In *itihasa* future, the *prospectivity*, is sought to be understood in terms of the *retrospectivity* by atrophysing the past, and not through hypertrophysing either the present or the future, whereas in *history* at least till the end of the Judeo-Christian theological influence, the past had been atrophized, and after the Renaissance, the major preoccupation in the name of progress is the hypertrophy of the future. By 'remembering the future' Namier meant it. It took a long time from Herodotus, Thucydides to Polibius, Livy and Tacitus to state the idiographic distinctiveness of history. Graeco-Roman historians held that (a) history begins by asking questions, (b) that it is humanistic or it asks questions about things done by man, (c) that it is self-revelatory by telling man what he is through what man has done, and (d) that it is rational. Hellenic historiography has added to the ideas enumerated above (i) that a particular social unit was only *one among many*, (ii) that there was such a thing as the human world, (iii) that historical method hitherto invented, i.e., cross-questioning eye witness to be replaced by compilation. Our *itihaskar* did never (a) accept the concept of *one among many*, (b) doubt oral tradition as devoid of the quality of *pramana*, and (c) have a sense of segmented time *bhut*, *bhavishya* and *bartaman* as disjointed temporal entities. Kalhana wrote *Rajatarangini* and his successor Jonaraja continued the study where Kalhana left off under the same title only. But for the concept of 'democracy' in contemporary Europe or America no legitimacy of European tradition is required to plead for democratization. In this age of technological tyranny when we neither live in the past, nor even in the present, but for the future, seeking logical linkage between the present and future by analogies which are patently culture-specific would be over-simplification.

On the whole, Chattopadhyaya has made a significant contribution, as one of the very few Indians studying the history of ideas, to the understanding of the concept of *itihasa* as an autonomous entity that has originated from the Indian space and milieu in India's quest for civilization.

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M.T. ANSARI (edited and introduction): *Secularism, Islam and Modernity: Selected Essays of Alam Khundmiri*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 308, Rs 250.

The book under review is a collection of essays by Alam Khundmiri who is undoubtedly one of the best scholars and thinkers in modern India. His philosophical predilections and his socio-political views and ideals always remained for him existential truths which lent honesty and tenacity of conviction to his words and deeds. He always stood for objective, non-partisan, non-dogmatic and liberal thinking in those areas of thoughts, belief and action where it is most difficult to maintain them. The three moving forces which shaped his ideals and his personality are Marxism, existentialism and Islam. It is a wonder he not only succeeded in organically synthesizing what he accepted to be creditable aspects of all and at the same time maintaining a critical approach towards them. It is a great pity that his productive and multifaceted life was abruptly cut short at the age of 61 in 1983. His deep and critical understanding of, and involvement with, social, political, religious, cultural and economic realities gave his views a width and comprehensiveness, which is rare even among the best minds. His passion, however, was literature and philosophy. His literary criticism was well received among the literateurs and his social-political commitments were widely respected. As Ansari records in his introduction, at the young age of seventeen he became the founder president of the Comrades Association in 1939—a Marxist social-cultural

organization. Plunging deeper into social political activism in 1939 he became the vice-president of the Nizam's State Railway Employees Union and in 1941 he became the President of the Allwyn Metal Workers Union, Hyderabad. His engagement with the important intellectual-social movements was neither a fad nor an ideological stance. He accepted them as worth-pursuing and worth-achieving ideals. As an authentic person he always lived them in good faith. Similarly, he always remained a nationalist secular Indian Muslim without ever feeling apologetic and defensive about his religion, which in fact for him was a combination of a cultural and spiritual way of life. Of course, sometimes he felt disillusioned when he saw oppression and tyranny perpetrated against innocent people—whether it was during the 1948 massacre of at least hundred thousand who were not all *razakars*, or in Hungary in 1958. But this could not make him dither regarding nationalism or Marxism. Indeed for the latter, it made him lukewarm for about a decade, but the former only spurred and strengthened his belief that a strong and progressive India can only emerge if the Indian society accepted and respected its secular multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic character. He dedicated his life and writings to the pursuit of this goal.

The book comprises twenty-one papers, twelve of which have been published earlier in various journals between 1968 and 1980 besides a very incisive introduction by the editor M.T. Ansari, and Asgar Ali Engineer's 'Perspective on Islam and Philosophy' which together provide the philosophical and a general intellectual background that would enable the readers to have an empathetic understanding of Alam's views and intellectual predilections. The vast variety of themes and problems dealt with bear an eloquent testimony to the wide canvas of the author's interests and intellectual occupations. Although it is difficult to neatly categorize them into different parts, the editor has properly put them under four parts. The first has four papers which deal with the Islamic point of view, actual as well as possible, concerning tradition, modernity and demands of modern life, God and inter religious understanding. The second part has five papers on history of Muslim philosophy which mainly focus on the views of al-Farabi, ibn-Sina and al-Ghazali

concerning man, reason, time or casuality. The third part includes five papers on various aspects of Iqbal's thoughts on epistemology, Sufism, time, self, politics and certain parallels between Iqbal and some existentialist thinkers. Part IV comprises seven papers on a number of issues of topical interest within Islamic discourse. Some of these are democracy, obscurantism or fascism in the context of Islam in modern India. Characteristic features of Indian Sufism and the concept of man in Sufism are also the subject in some essays. An interesting discussion of the contemporary religious situation in India has been done from the existentialist point of view. There is some criss-cross of views and topical issues between Part I and Part IV.

With the very wide and multi-dimensional canvas of Alam's writings it would be difficult to do justice to all the papers. Hence, I will restrict my discussions to most of the papers from Parts I and IV since they have great relevance to the contemporary situation in the subcontinent in particular, and the Muslim world in general. A brief reference will be made to Part III which contains Alam's perceptive and convincing analyses and presentation of Iqbal's thoughts. At the outset a few points concerning Ansari's introduction and Engineer's views on Islam and Philosophy may be in place.

Apart from the short biographical account mentioned earlier, Ansari highlights his intellectual, social, political, spiritual, philosophical and literary interests and commitments. In this context an important observation he makes is: 'Alam's engagements with nationalism, Marxism, existentialism, Islam and Sufism reveal the dual edge of his project: to situate Islam in the modern context and, to scrutinize the modern in the light of Islam'. Though it is extremely difficult, the critique of an ideology or religion must adopt the internal and the external points of view or, as Ansari says, the critique has to be both centripetal and centrifugal. The difficulty which a normally rational and liberal Muslim faces in talking to his community is that either he talks as an orthodox whereby he perpetuates the malaise which the community suffers from, or he talks as a purely secular person and fails to receive a sympathetic hearing. What is needed is an organic critique which synthesizes various approaches and tries to convince the audience that religion can be secularized and secularism can be

spiritualized. Alam has eloquently performed this function as a 'critical subject'. Besides, a very serious situation which operates for Indian Muslims is that his psyche has been corroded as well as corrupted by certain forces that have never accepted the secular polity and cultural synthesis with grace and empathy. Both Muslim and Hindu fundamentalists who feed each other, have sharpened the differences, sometimes inessential ones, beyond any legitimate limits. Savarkar and Jinnah both worked on the same assumption—though for different reasons. Hindu nationalism took the path of cultural nationalism, which unfortunately in some quarters led to militant Hindu nationalism. The results are before us. If this process is not checked it may destroy the unity and progress of the nation simply because India is one nation. A fractured nation never achieves its full potential. Recent political and socio-cultural trends, in many cases artificially engineered, do not augur well specially for Muslims. They have been forced equally by the fundamentalists of both the categories to isolate themselves from the mainstream and to search for their socio-cultural identity (for the community as a whole) in terms of Islamic identity, which is falsely essentialized as the most important common denominator. But it is not hard to see that in a normal situation a Punjabi Muslim, for instance, is much closer to a Punjabi Hindu than to a Tamil or Malayalee Muslim. It is language, art, literature or music and the general way of living which account for socio-cultural identity. Religion is indeed a part of culture but it only determines certain values and the ultimate goal of life. And these too, if seen from an unbiased point of view, are far too common across different religions. Of course, there are external observances, rituals, forms of worship and prayer, which are peculiar to every religion or even to different sects and sub-sects within the same religion. Nevertheless, most of these are inessential to the spirit and the central message of all religions. What is required is a rational and sympathetic understanding of the nature of religion and religious institutions. Reason is not anathema to any religion and more so in the case of Islam. What the Muslim community urgently needs today are scholars and intelligensia who accept and understand Islam sympathetically and yet can provide the internal critique by intepreting or reinterpreting many of the ideas and views which unnecessarily bring the charge of being outmoded, unjust, irrational or irrelevant.

Engineer has very succinctly surveyed the main currents in Islamic philosophy, jurisprudence and theology. He has tried to show how, during and after the last phase of Abbasid rule, orthodoxy and anti-rationalism gained the upper hand, and how al-Ghazal became instrumental in accelerating the end of philosophy. He rightly emphasizes the need for rationality and modernity as the only corrective to the orthodox and anachronistic approach to various problems confronting the Muslim community. The problem concerning Islam and modernity needs the serious attention of the entire Islamic world—and most seriously of the intelligensia in the subcontinent. The importance of thinkers like Alam and reformers like Engineer himself cannot be over emphasized. Their views and deeds can go a long way in liberating the Muslim mind from bigotry, orthodoxy and fundamentalism.

Taking up the paper by Alam, I will begin with a few papers from Part I and IV (Nos. 1, 4, 20 and 21) which deal with modernization, obscurantism, and contemporary religious situation with special reference to Islam. One of the most important points which Alam raises is concerning the claim of finality of the Quranic teaching and, by substitution, of the prophetic injunctions and opinions—the *sunnah*—which form the second source of shariah after the *Quran*. The other sources are *ijma* (the consensus of the jurists/theologians—and other learned authorities), *qayas* (analogical reasoning) and *ijtehad* (independent reasoning) which provide ample scope for reinterpretations. Unfortunately, different schools of jurisprudence, theological schools and sects are not united in their acceptance of the last three. Even those who accept *ijma* have severely restricted it and the last two have been ignored. *Ijtehad*, for example, is almost given up by the Sunni schools despite pleas of men like Sir Syed and Iqbal to revive it. The Shia sect, however, accepts it though the right to employ it is recognized in case of highly qualified religious scholars. Coming back to finality, it has been wrongly understood by the orthodox that there can be no change in the laws and what has been said earlier either in the *Quran* or by the prophet must be still true and would remain eternally true. This dogma, first of all, gives more credence to the letter rather than to the spirit of the injunctious in question. Secondly, it encourages the erroneous belief that *Quran* and *hadith* (the written version of *sunnah*) contain the

whole truth and there cannot be even the slightest deviation from what has been said therein. Such a view runs counter to the spirit of rationality and independent reasoning encouraged by the *Quran*. There are repeated statements in the *Quran* that man should resort to their own observations based on their sense-experience and reason. Man is urged to know and/or confirm for himself what has been said. Here there is an appeal to scientific temper overriding blind faith. The invitation to seek knowledge from whatever source possible is clear from the well-known exhortation by the Prophet: seek knowledge even if you have to go to China. This means that truth and knowledge can also be available among people of different faith, beliefs and culture. Hence, the *Quran* cannot and does not claim any monopoly of truth. It is generally accepted that very many Quranic injunctions were made to meet the contingencies arising from time to time in newer and newer circumstances. Again, there are supererogations in the *Quran* whereby older injunctions were cancelled by newer ones. Finality can be reasonably admitted for the spiritual and moral values of the highest order or for the religious-cum-social obligations as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca (i.e., *Hajj*) qualified by certain conditions or giving *zakat* (charity for the poor). Alam rightly points out that it was after stagnation in Islam that 'the idea of finality concurrently degenerated into the illusion of finality and Islam split up into many closed systems' (p. 46). As opposed to the times of the Prophet and the first four 'righteous' caliphs, the dynamic interplay and fusion of different sources of laws and principles lapsed into closed systems. Alam, meaning no affront to the authority of the *Quran*, holds that many of the Quranic assertions have been made in specific human situations and are therefore within the temporal realm (p. 56). The talk of final or whole truth does not arise without falling into absurdity. The moral and metaphysical vision of the *Quran* (or of any other religion) can claim finality and the wordly life can only derive its strength, justification and guidance from such a vision. There need not be any fear that change in specific laws would destroy the sanctity of the Book. The law of change, growth or development which takes place as historical occurrences in time cannot be beyond time. 'Orthodox' Islam negates the very spirit in which shariah laws and injunctions were issued. In this context Alam makes a crucial semantical distinction

between *hidayah* or guidance, and actual laws. The former is concerning the normal and spiritual life of the community whereas the 'latter concerns the specific historical manifestations of the former'. The empirical and scientific truths can never claim finality otherwise the great scientific achievements made by Muslim scientists and philosophers like Avecinna, Razi, al-Beruni, ibn-Khaldun, al-Jabr and many other would not have been possible. Unfortunately, the liberal and rational face of Islam was distorted by the tyrannical rule of the Omayyads who sought to usurp the spiritual authority, which ought to have been vested with the authentic spiritual leaders and scholars. The amalgamation of the two in the body of the ruthless rulers paved the way for their totalitarian and autocractic regimen. Orthodoxy came in handy for their nefarious activity and liberal or new interpretation was dubbed as dissent, which had to be curbed. The legalist and the literalist approach dominated the moral and spiritual force of Islam. The liberal and rational thinking nevertheless persisted among the Shias and some schools of Sunni jurisprudence, and theology like the Hanafis. In this context, Alam points out (in Paper 2) the role of the reformist movement led by Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and his followers Mohammad Abduh and Rashid Raza who influenced mainly the educated Muslims in Egypt, India and some other parts of the Islamic world during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They realized that Islam needed significant changes in the wake of modern demands. Abduh used to say that Islam needs a Luther (p. 76). Sir Syed and Iqbal were also influenced by some of these reformists. But the orthodox and the traditionalist theologians and religious leaders did not allow the reformist trend to settle in.

It must be noted that the decadence and stagnation in Muslim society—specially in countries like Saudi Arabia and on the sub-continent—are due to complex geo-political and historical factors and require different sort of explanations and interpretations. The contemporary Western, specially the America and Israeli, policy in relation to the middle east and Afghanistan has only hardened general Muslim attitude against reform and change, which are often identified with Western stereotypes. Labouring the point concerning change and modernization in Islam, Alam repeatedly asserts that what Islam needs

is rediscovery and reinterpretation, not revival (p. 103). Those who are against change are against growth and development. Within the socio-political discourse refusal to change is an inevitable invitation to decay and death. One of the undesirable and even suicidal consequences of a decaying tradition is obscurantism, which is sadly reflected in many followers of both the major religions in India, i.e., Islam and Hinduism (paper 21). The desire to go back to the pre-medieval or medieval religious institutions without a critical approach not only makes them anachronistic but erodes their relevance and significance in modern humanistic world. When metaphysico-spiritual vision of a religion is identified with its laws, the latter mistakenly overshadow the former and are given the status of true religiosity. Though, as Alam says, 'it is a normal tendency of an average believer to identify religion with the legal system which is no more than a historical reflection of it' (p. 279), religious leaders and intellectuals in both the communities have an obligation to rectify such an approach. Alam makes an interesting point when he suggests: 'Finality which revealed experience may feel maybe like the finality of a work of art rather than final experience of total truth' (p. 295). The sort of absolute authority which is falsely delegated to various religious and communal institutions tend to assume absolute (fascist!) dictating power which not only usurps individual freedom but destroys the independence of writers, historians and artists. Some recent happenings prove Alam's analysis on this point. Most of the modern, secular and liberal Muslims and Hindus feel alienated and are forced into silence by the smaller number of obscurantists and revivalists who are becoming more vocal due to various socio-political reasons. In most of his papers Alam's concern, explicity or implicity, is to assert that India needs modernization as opposed to obscurantism. Addressing the Muslims in particular, he says: 'Indian Muslims can accelerate the process of modernization if they accept the suggestion that the values of secular democracy are more in tune with a higher ethical ideal than futile attempts to recapture past politico-legal traditions which are neither in tune with modern times nor can be shared by their contemporaries belonging to different faiths. Indian society can only be modernized on the basis of a value system, which can be shared by all its members, and such a value

system can emanate from the humanistic tradition of the contemporary world alone' (pp. 281–82). This, however, does not mean the denial of religion and belief in God. On the other hand, he believes that human life is meaningless if God is denied (p. 297). At the same time a God who denies freedom to man is not a God worth having. As Sartre says in *Flies*, God has created man but He has created him free. What can be implied here, though not said by Alam, is that the essential thrust of religiosity is to relate man as an individual to God and this is possible in a personal spiritual space. The socio-political space requires a public space where particular historical situations are confronted by men in community or society. Here, religion can only be a source of higher values like love, service, mutual respect, help, cooperation, brotherhood, justice, equity etc., in relation to other members of society irrespective of whatever religion, faith, creed or language anyone has. This can be termed as religious humanism or humanistic religion, which men like Vivekananda, Tagore, Gandhi or Iqbal have cherished and advocated. In Islam itself, the defining attributes or the most significant names of God are *Rahman* and *Rahim* (the beneficient, the merciful) apart from *Rab* (the preserver or rearer) and these names, to be meaningful, make it necessary that man must exist as individual so that God can relate Himself to his creature under the category of love and compassion. Such a view has found favour with many Sufis. But it implies freedom and an importance of the individual in the cosmic scheme which has been either negated by many Sufis in their ultimate goal of *fana* (annihilation of the individual) or completely suppressed by the orthodoxy. Rumi and Iqbal, however, tried to reconcile human freedom and divine omnipotence.

In Paper 3 on inter-religious understanding among different faiths, Alam tries to explore its possibility by suggesting both unity and differences among them. Once the illusion of finality of historical religions is given up, different religions appear to be different ways of relating oneself with the transcendent. At the transcendental level different faiths manifest unity of the spiritual and moral beliefs and attitudes without denying the distinctions at the level of their institutionalization. As different ways of realizing the same goal, they all deserve the same respect allowing, at the same time, for different practices.

In Paper 4, he takes up the problem of Islam in modern life. Here he points out some salient features of Quranic metaphysics and epistemology such as: continuity between the visible and invisible world or world of events and hereafter; the sensible world is not unreal or illusory and sense-experience besides reason is a valid source of knowledge; there is no rebirth and so this temporal-physical existence is the only battle-field where the moral and spiritual virtues have to be fought for; the law of causality governs the world of events and, hence, no irreconcilability between causality and destiny; it encourages the study of the physical world and past history of mankind; it discourages belief in disciplines like astrology or palmistry and holds that universe is indifferent to human destiny; it denies intermediaries between God and the universe, making objective and scientific study of the universe possible (pp. 101–2).

Such a view, Alam emphasizes, must be rediscovered in order to meet the challenges of the modern world—applying the norms and values to suit the vicissitudes of historical and social changes. This rediscovery should not be confused with revivalism which is backward-looking, and romaticizing of the past.

Continuing his thesis concerning the forward-looking approach and realization of modern needs, he discusses an important point in Paper 9. He asserts that the fundamental tenets of a religion do not necessarily lead to any particular set of moral or legal injunctions. There is no necessary connection/implication between the two. What needs to be seen is whether what was said or meant earlier when certain commands were issued at certain historical junctures is existentially compatible with the present situation or not. *Quran's* conditional permission for polygamy is a good example. It is an affront and an insult to the *Quran* what the Muslim jurists and theologians have done. They have concealed the monogamous temper of the *Quran* and have presented polygamy as having been clearly permitted though under certain strict and almost unfulfillable conditions. Denial of rational interpretation (i.e., *ijtehad*) is another anti-Quranic stance which has been smuggled into Islam by certain schools of jurisprudence and theology. Alam rightly affirms: 'A religious culture which does not grant to reason itself, a revelatory status becomes a victim of stagnation.'

NAVAJIVAN RASTOGI: *Kāśmira Śivādvayavāda Kī Mūla Avadhāranāyen* (in Hindi), Munshiram Manohar Lal, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 276, Rs 450.

The doctrine of non-duality arose in the upaniṣdic experience of the Indian psyche. Since then it has permeated all walks of the Indian world of thought. This very conception of absolute non-duality impregnated all of Indian culture along with its intellectual, religious, intuitive insights and art-forms. This experience was totally different from the experience of God-realization and the realization of otherness or the object-world. The Sūnyādvaita of Buddhists, Kevalādvaita of the great vedāntins, Śaivādvaita or Śivādvaya of Kashmir, Śāktādvaita of later Mīmānsaka worshipers (upāsakas) of shakti, Viśiṣtādvaita of Rāmānuja, the vaiṣnavites and other aspects of the philosophy of non-duality are now popularly known and understood in the international world of knowledgeable people.

A very distinguished character of this philosophy is the search of human existence in the deep down earth centre of individual's realization of one's own self of 'I', which is the bedrock of human existence. In the Upaniṣads, this conception revealed itself in the form of 'Aham Brhmaasmi' (I am the Brahman consciousness) and in the later period of śaivagamas it manifested in the substantial experience of 'Śivoham' (I am the Siva-consciousness). If the Brahman-consciousness experience was exclusively a metaphysical, the experience of 'Śivoham' was of the nature of metaphysical-cum-aesthetics, which held a real potential of building a bridge over the gulf of the dichotomy of the realization of otherness and the self or I-experience termed as Ahantā and idantā.

In other shades of philosophical approach to non-duality, there was more or less a kind of integral experience of metaphysical morality or ethical perception, which was unable to accommodate the aesthetic vision of the fine arts of this region. On the contrary, the different schools of Kashmir shivādvaya system disseminated the rays of beauty into the whole ethos of India's philosophical vision of life.

The present book entitled 'Kāsmīr Shivādvayavāda kī mūla Avadhāraṇāyen' (Fundamental Concepts of Kashmir Shiva-non-dualism) is a significant achievement of the author of the book Dr. Navajivan

Rastogi, who is a well-known scholar in the area of indological studies in general, and Kashmir śaivism in particular. His specialization of Kashmir Śaivism has been throughout a kind of continuous tapas or austere awareness to fulfil the receptacles of the modern man's required vision of Indian thought, which is very much relevant in the present context of human understanding.

The author has expressed his complete understanding of śiva-nonduality in the Hindi language, which is his natural mother tongue also. To give support and to prove his thesis, he provides a lot of sanskrit original text of Kashmir Śaivism at the end of the each chapter along with a rich bibliography. But his expressions in Hindi are over-awed and loaded with Hindi translations of English terminology of Western philosophy and science which is totally foreign to the fluid and holistic spirit of sanskrit text and Kāśmir śaivism, and where the arbitrary borders found in English between mind, body and spirit fall away. Unlike English, the Indian common languages and Kāsmīr Śaivism do not draw sharp lines between means and ends, or between an inner quality and an outer action. Unlike other analytical philosophies, Kāsmīr Śivādvayavāda is very close to earth, rich in images of planting and full of views of the natural wonder of the cosmos.

To approach the crux of Kashmir Śaivism, one must not only acquire the skills of the modern methodologies and language-skills but also express the mystical traditions of the non-duality of Śaivism. Only this kind of study can point to the States of meditation and awareness that must be experienced. Otherwise an unnatural analytical division, which is unknown to the meditative-cum-devotional aspects of the Kāśmīr śaivism can creep into our study and language with the advent of modern technical terms.

The present work of Professor Rastogi is a nice compendeum of all the concepts of Sivādvayavāda giving a detailed summary of Trika, Pratyabhijñā, Kula, Krama, Spanda and other schools of the central thought of Sivādvayavāda, which is an amalgam of upāsana and yoga. He begins the book with an elaborate introduction and in 13 chapters deals with the theory and philosophy of Sivādvaya-naya. His handling of the vast material related to these concepts and a comparative study

with the concept of other schools of Indian philosophy is also an ample proof of his erudition.

The author has planned all the chapters of his book according to a certain paradigm which, inherent within the fold of the śaivite system of evolution of Shiva-Reality, rich in the wealth of existence or being, consciousness and bliss, is the self-sufficient (Svatantra, Svayampūrṇa) energized conscious Being, out of whom creation is evolved. Out of the first steps of the evolution Prakāsha and Vimarsha can be taken as light and life. Spanda, Vāk (speech), Svātantrya, Śakti, Pūrṇatā, Sambandha, Bheda, Pratyabhijña, Bhakti, yoga and upāya-catustaya (four means) are the major eleven concepts which constitute the fabric of Kashmir Shivādvayavāda. Explaining each concept like vāk, etc., the author has successfully brought out the originality of the śaivite view in comparison to the views of Sanskrit Grammarians, Naiyyakas, yoga, vedānta and other schools of Indian traditions. The author has handled the theme of his choice with a sense of dexterity. A comprehensive approach to the subject along with a modern world-view of the author is a quite useful proposition to the learners of Kāsmīr Śaivism. But one would not hesitate to comment on the printing of the book attenuated by the publisher, which sometimes make the footnotes illegible.

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KLAUS G. WITZ: *The Supreme Wisdom of the Upaniṣads: An Introduction*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 1998, pp. xxv + 558, Rs 700

The Vedas, of which Upaniṣads form a part, are perhaps the earliest available literature of mankind. The Upaniṣads provide the necessary impetus for the formation of many schools of Indian philosophy, and for Vedānta, they provide the basic motivation. The book under review by K.G. Witz is a welcome addition to the Vedānta literature written

in English. The purpose of the author is to delve deep into the philosophical discourses found in the Upaniṣads. The contents of the book are designed to make it appealing to the Western audience. The author believes that the Upaniṣads have the potential to uplift mankind today and hence should be available to the populace at large. He finds that the intellectual climate currently prevalent in the West is particularly favourable to the study and understanding of upanishadic thought. The main idea behind this book is to unravel the difficulties of interpretation and to help the reader to get a better insight into the Upanishadic teachings.

The core of this book deals with the 'Vidyās', the teaching relating to specific spiritual practices involving meditation leading to highest realization. According to the author, in the course of time, the inner meaning of the Vidyās was lost and the book attempts to resurrect such subtle meanings through the textual exegesis. He acknowledges that he has been influenced by the teachings of contemporary Indian saints like Ramana Maharshi and Satya Sai Baba in the interpretation of certain intricate ideas. It may be due to the fact that they echo the Upanishadic ideas in a meaningful manner relevant to modern man. Since the Upanishadic contents are interpreted in the Indian context, it does pose certain difficulties for the Western readers. The author has tried to overcome this problem by providing necessary translation and scientific references relating to historical contexts and by identifying universal validity of the teachings.

Besides a lucid preface, the book is divided into six chapters. Chapter One entitled 'Upaniṣads: Background' contains a historical and religious philosophical background of the Upaniṣads. In the Introduction, he tries to show that the Upaniṣads, which have the earliest references to questions of 'Oneness', 'Existence', 'Being all' can be dated to 800–600 BC. The goal of all the Upanishadic teaching is to relate the individual self to the supreme self which is transcendental as well as integral. It is transcendental because the being, which it is related to, is beyond sense experience. It is integral because it is immanent in the individual, especially belonging to the basic aspects of mind and matter. The chapter also explicates the historical and philosophical growth of the Upanishadic thinking from the ritualistic thinking of the Vedas. As a prelude to the

teachings contained in the Upaniṣads, the author introduces the other dimensions of Hindu thinking as reflected in the epics, Purānas, Āgamas and different schools of Indian philosophy and shows how the traces of the Upaniṣadic thought are found in these traditions also. He also tries to correlate the understanding of the various types of Vedic literature with their historical base and the later literature like the *Brahmasūtras* and the commentaries thereon.

The last section of this chapter, 'The Upaniṣads and the West' briefly deals with the relevance of the study of the Upaniṣads in the West and how it fits into their scientific and philosophical tradition. It relates to the works done by scholars like Schopenhauer, C.H.F. Krause and Paul Deussen who have highlighted the importance of the Upaniṣads and their relevance to the *erkenntnis* and truth operating in occidental sciences and philosophy. The author discusses at length the first journey of the Upaniṣad westward, in the form of the *Opunek'hat*, a Latin translation of the sixty Upaniṣads by A.H. Antequil Duperron, a French scholar, in 1802. Duperron translated the texts not from the original Sanskrit, but from the Persian translation in AD 1657 done under the guidance of Dara Shikoh, brother of Emperor Aurangzeb. Schopenhauer was influenced by this text and formulated his own summary of the Upaniṣads in AD 1814. He is one of the great western admirers of the Upaniṣads. He described the Vedas as 'the fruit of the highest human knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) and Wisdom, whose core has finally come to us, as the greatest present of this century, in the Upaniṣads.' He was also the first western thinker, who placed Upaniṣads explicitly higher than western philosophy. It was Hegel who drove Schopenhauer into isolation and undermined the contribution of Indian thinking to the world of philosophies.

The next important western scholar on the Upaniṣads was K.C.S. Krause (1781–1832) who not only read the text of *Opunek'hat* several times but also opined that in profundity the text of the Upaniṣads does not stand behind any of western philosophical works, even though it does not appear to be very scientific. The contribution of Max Müller to the study of the Upaniṣads in the West cannot be gainsaid. He translated the text from the Sanskrit original in the Volume I of his *Sacred Books of the East*. The credit of putting the Upaniṣads onto the

intellectual map of the West goes to Paul Deussen whose *General History of Philosophy* presents the Indian philosophical tradition with its religious metaphysical roots, on par with the western philosophical traditions. Witz considers himself to be part of the lineage of Krause, Schopenhauer and Deussen and strives to awaken an interest the study of the Upaniṣads. He believes that science which plays an important role in the western world could be unified with highest spiritual aspirations and values enunciated in the Upaniṣads and become a supportive element in the welfare of western society and thus contribute to societal and individual fulfilment. Though set in a historical perspective, this part of the book shows the author's deep involvement and commitment to the Upanishadic tradition.

Chapter 2 entitled 'The Great Teachings' communicates the Upanishadic tradition to the modern reader through the illustration of two episodes from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*. The attempt of the author has been to introduce and highlight the high level transcendental element in these texts. The author considers the important Upaniṣads as fourteen which include the traditional ten principal Upaniṣads commented upon by Śaṅkara as well as four other Upanisads, viz., *Śvetāśvatara*, *Kauṣītakī*, *Maitrayaṇīya* and *Mahānārāyaṇa* (see Table 2.1). The author argues that the Uapniṣads like *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya*, *Aitareya*, *Kauśitaki*, and *Taittīrīya* are the oldest Upaniṣads belonging to a period between 800–600 BCE. On the basis of similarity in contents and style, the author tries to prove the antiquity of these texts and comes to the conclusion that these are the earlier ones. This, however, is a very unsettled view and the grounds for drawing such conclusions are rather shaky.

Through the examples drawn from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, as portrayed in the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya, he discusses the subtlety of the wisdom of the Upaniṣads. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, the author feels, is the crowning achievement of Vedic literature as it incorporates in itself the central teachings of all the Upaniṣads. He demonstrates how this Upaniṣad comes down to us in two recensions, Kāṇva and Mādhyandina with significant differences in readings. In accordance with the nature of the subject, the author deals with the concept of self and consciousness and analyzes the nature

of Brahman-Ātman which is the crux of the whole Upanishadic literature. He points out that Brahman-Ātman which is the crux of the whole upanishadic literature. He points out that Brahman-Ātman is neither a a concept nor a statement of fact nor a theory. The Upaniṣads being revealed texts do not expound doctrines in the same way as the sciences do. The teachings of the Upaniṣads are directed to attain the knowledge of the self. They enjoin the study to be combined with contemplation and meditation, which involve going into the depths of ones very being. That being is none other than the Brahman which is the locus (*pratiṣṭhā*) of all the empirical things, and the transcendent-immanent ground of the universe.

The author tries to show the unity between Brahman and Ātman though they represent two comprehensive forms of understanding of one and the same infinite reality. He exemplifies the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya to substantiate his standpoint that through the cessation of desires, one can attain to this supreme self. The author says that all desires are essentially the same, as they lead man away from the infinite—the non-dual reality. That is the reason why the Upaniṣads declare that the wise of the yore abandoned all desires and wandered about without a care. To substantiate this unity, the author presents the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue, one of the very famous dialogues in the Upaniṣads, which provides a deeper synthesis of the Upanishadic doctrine of non-dualism. The dialogue relates to sage Yājñavalkya's answers to the queries of his wife Maitreyī about the nature of the reality. The sage wanted to distribute his property between his two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī and become an ascetic to lead a complete spiritual life. Maitreyī asks, 'What do I have to do with that by which I could not become immortal.' With a little persuasion from the wife, the sage opens up and gives the knowledge of immortality which forms the subject matter of this dialogue. He says, 'not for the love of husband is husband dear to wife, but for the love of the self, is husband dear.' He relates this to all others who are dear to a person and establishes that it is for the sake of self, Ātman, that everything is dear to a person. Then he goes on to say that this Ātman, the self, is to be heard, thought of, and meditated upon and by understanding Brahman, everything becomes known. He clarifies further that this

Ātman is imperishable, its nature is indestructible; but it denotes the state of liberation, where all duality ceases. After giving the affirmative description of the Ātman, the sage adopts a different approach, (the negativistic approach) and asserts that Ātman is not an object of knowledge. Whatever one 'objectifies with' is not this, i.e., the famous statement of 'not this, not this' "*sa esa neti netyātmā*". As Hiriyanna describes, 'It may be doubted whether it is altogether sound to draw a metaphysical conclusion from forms of linguistic usage—to take 'the grammar of language for the grammar of reality' (*The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, 1973, p. 179). It is the inner seer, the witness, which is the core of everything and there is nothing beyond it or outside it. The author concludes the chapter by making a reference to Satya Sai Baba who echoes the same thinking. He says: 'To say that such fullness is "I" is a meaningless expression. It is wrong also to call it the Vision or the Sākṣātkāra' (p. 92).

'The Infinite Beyond Mythology' forms the title for the third chapter which deals with the multi-level approach to Brahman-Ātman. The first level relates to the religious life and purification of the mind. The second is the level of anthropological and hermeneutic analysis. The third level represents the meditation and inner spiritual life. Then the author goes on to deal with the idea of Puruṣa and the Sense Powers. On the whole, this chapter discusses four mythological and philosophical texts and shows that each of them is grounded on some kind of higher realization or enlightenment. The general theme of this chapter is based on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 1.4.7. where it is said that the sense powers are nothing but the action-names of Brahman, the Puruṣa. In describing the 'Puruṣa hymn' to deal with the theory of creation, Witz suggests that there is a shift from Puruṣa to Ātman, corresponding to the shift from the Vedas to Upaniṣads. He discusses at length the shift in focus and inner approach from the Ṛgvedic Puruṣa to Upaniṣadic Ātman. The Ṛgvedic hymn describes the Puruṣa from an external point of view as the unfathomable and incalculable infinite entity. It describes it as the sole existent, the one infinite glory. It works at least partly in the manner of myth by engaging the reciter fully with his whole mental and emotional powers in the super archetype, the great thought which it presents. The Upaniṣads reshape this phenomenon by

focusing entirely on a Universal 'ground of the self', viz., the Ātman. The Puruṣa of the *Puruṣa-sukta*, according to him is really the ground of the self, the Ātman. Witz uses this as a step to discuss the *ahaṁgraha* meditation, the instruction for the inner attitude one should have when living ones life idea. According to this idea, Self which is the ground of the individual self encompasses the whole cosmos, all beings as well as the immortal in heaven. As a mode of instruction, the Upaniṣad makes a strong exhortation to drop all the detailed perception of and involvement with the aspects of the world. He then turns to the contribution of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* to the concept of Ātman where the Puruṣa's entry into the man is suggested. The author dwells at length on the process of evolution of the Puruṣa idea. He traces the prevalent godheads in the religious pantheon like Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, Śiva, to the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature. He shows how ranging through all the traditions, like Buddhist, Christian, and Sufi, there is a common substance or continuum of knowledge which can be called 'perennial knowledge' or 'universal religion', the deeper level of which depends on meditation and spiritual life.

Chapter four, 'Teaching with Meditation on Sense Powers and Deities', deals with the importance of the traditional texts dealing with Upāsanās and Vidyās. This chapter discusses the nature of meditation, and shows how the wisdom of the Upaniṣads arose out of the Vedic and Brahmanical religions which are characterized by the knowledge of divinity rather than by wisdom. The texts relating to Upāsanā (worship) as a means to Brahma Vidyā are discussed in detail. The author points out that both Upasanā and Vidyā involve knowledge and key formulations which figure in the meditations and guide the aspirant in the spiritual path. Upāsana is like meditation which has to pervade ones life and living; whereas Vidyā is the path to self-realization and understanding of Brahman-Ātman. Both involve elements of knowledge and key formulations on the path of spiritual attainments. The 'Ṣoḍaśakalā-vidyā' (sixteen parts of Vidyās), Vaiśvānara-vidyā and the nature of meditation relating to these are analyzed depicting the rich spectrum of knowledge of the divine in the Upaniṣads.

'Five Sheaths and Antar-jyotir-vidyās' constitute the subject-matter of the fifth chapter. The description of the five sheaths (pañca-kośa) is related to five experiential selves, existing in ones own self. The discussion focuses on discrimination of these selves and their unfoldment in one's spiritual life. The spiritual progression from the physical sheath (first sheath) to the sheath of bliss (fifth sheath) is meticulously worked out by the author by correlating them to the three sheaths of waking, dream and sleep. The highlight of this section is the discussion on *Vijñāna* in its different aspects as found in the Upaniṣads and understood by the tradition of commentators. The author also explicates the relevance of Ānanda, the fifth sheath, as a state proximate to the idea of Brahman-Ātman. From the discussion of the sheaths and their import, the author meaningfully identifies important links with the *antar-jyotir-vidyā*, in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* by citing a large number of passages from the Upaniṣads, especially the *Jyotirbrāhmaṇa* section of the text. Witz also shows how these teachings are reflected in the teachings of the contemporary teachers like Satya Sai Baba.

Chapter six is exclusively devoted to the exploration of *Dahara-Vidyā* of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VIII.1–6. *Dahara-ākāśa* is the subtle space within the heart and is the ground for the whole universe. This contains the seed of the whole discourse leading to the understanding of Brahman-Ātman. So the *dahara* teaching can be regarded as an exposition of how the supreme divine can be realized within ourselves by a path of unfolding the awareness of the heart. This section provides a profound explanation of the primacy of the heart and the stages of meditation involved in raising the aspirant from the physical to the psychic level and from that to the final level in which the heart and mind are transcended in the realization of the ultimate Principle. The author describes the prevalence of the Dahara-Upāsanā among the present-day Vedāntins. Witz cites the authority of Vidyāraṇya and many others to show how '*dahara-vidyā*' contains the essence of understanding of the reality and how the study of the Upanishadic Vidyās is useful in the true infinitization of the self through deep reflection and contemplation.

The book is unique in many ways. First, it is written in a special style of its own. It is rigorous and requires alert attention of the reader. Secondly, it is the latest reference book on upanishadic literature which incorporates all prominent writings produced in the field so far. Thirdly,

it shows the way for a different method of comparison with inter- and intra-traditions. It describes the journey of the Upaniṣad westward and the appreciation it received from leading thinkers like Schopenhauer. The Bibliography is truly exhaustive and the author has hardly omitted any important book on Upaniṣads.

In the Indian tradition, Upaniṣads are considered highly sacred literature dealing with secret doctrines (*guhya-vidyā*). Witz makes an attempt to unravel this mystery and profundity of Upanishadic knowledge to the English-knowing readers. On the whole, this book serves as an authentic introduction to the subtle wisdom of the Upaniṣads and their textual studies. Such publications indicate great interest being evinced in the West on the themes of Indology and ancient Indian literature. There is much admirable translation activity under way in Europe, especially in Germany. Witz's work is a scholarly attempt in that direction which sets forth the quintessence of Upaniṣads in a profound way. I strongly believe that this book would generate a great interest in the study and research in the field of Upaniṣads. I have great pleasure in prescribing this book to the serious students of Indology in general and Upaniṣads in particular.

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11. Margaret Chatterjee: *Hinterlands and Horizons: Excursions in Search of Amity*, Lexington Books, Maryland, USA, 2002, pp. 138.
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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,अे ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *djñāna*, *Ḳṛṣṇa* and not *Ḳrishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ழ ḷ.
ൺ ṇ
ற ṟ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvanaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seũṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.