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JICPR Vol. XXI - 1

Contents

Contents

Mill's Social Physics and Individual Liberty: The Programme and its Problems

MAHASWETA CHAUDHURY

U.G.C. Emeritus Fellow, 399/A, Jodhpur Park, Kolkata 700068.
E-mail: sweta1-c@rediffmail.com

The aim of this paper is to identify the apparent contradiction in Mill's two different projects towards finding some explanatory laws of society in the fashion of physics as also the principle of individual liberty which, apparently, is a necessary condition for a civil society. The latter defies the naturalistic or mechanistic explanation of social change and human behaviour. Mill tries to reconcile by a psychologistic explanation of human behaviour, which again gives rise to many problems, as pointed out by the famous critique of Karl Popper. Here I attempt to analyze Mill's own viewpoint along with various other positions in order to show that psychologistic/naturalistic explanation can never be sufficient to explain rational human behaviour. It seems Mill himself is aware of the same, for in his argument for freedom of speech, we can find the trace of such an idea. The idea is rooted in the assumption of human fallibilism, which is the basis of Popper's fallibilistic epistemology and critique of any deterministic theory of physical and social phenomena. I shall try to dispel some misunderstanding about Mill's naturalistic approach and simultaneously reject his psychologistic explanation of social behaviour which can be aptly called a reductionist programme.

Mill has an ambitious project of a science of society modelled after physics, particularly Newtonian mechanics. One can, of course, see the main aim behind such a project. If some laws can explain social phenomena, then it will lead to successful prediction and ultimately, control (far from the libertarian ideal!) of social change.

Of course, the difference between social and physical phenomena is apparent, and Mill realizes this. Accordingly, he has modified[1] the

deductive simplicity of physics and opted for a 'method of inverse deduction'.[2] It is apparent that the laws governing the behaviour of people in social interaction can be inferred from the laws governing individual people in isolation from society. Alan Ryan likens this thesis to Popper's 'methodological individualism'. But that is not correct, as we will see later. Mill's methodological reductionism, in connection with social behaviour, involves a fallacy even on the psychological level. A mass behaviour (such as a protest march) or what is called crowd psychology/anger or violent mood is not just the sum total of each individual's behaviour taken out of the context of a social level. It is a new emergent phenomenon that cannot be explained in terms of a single individual's action in isolation of a society. What an individual could not have done by oneself can do so in league with others. So, the *explanandum* (any mass action) cannot be deduced from the *explanans* (single individual actions) isolated from the social level.[3]

There exist two assumptions for Mill's belief in a science of society similar in methodological structure to physics. The first one is already mentioned above, namely the laws governing social behaviour can be derived from the laws governing atoms of individual experience. It is not apparent what these 'agents', 'data' 'elements', are supposed to be. Alan Ryan thinks they are human feelings, desires, aversions,[4] etc. These elements conflict and react with one another and, by the composition of force, modify themselves. But in reality, it can be seen that the situation is much more complex than that and any calculation or prediction of actual phenomena is difficult. For example, in a situation of ordinary complexity, if elements x and y both desire d, it is not predictable as to how they would behave: (1) x may grab it; (2) y may grab it; (3) they may both forego and d goes to a third z; or (4) none of x and y modifies his desire and the sheer violence destroy their relationship as well as the object d.

The second assumption is Mill's belief in the uniformity of the scientific method. This assumption is backed by the consideration that historical explanation does not involve deductive inference of *explanandum* from *explanans*. But again, that is based on a dubious premise that rationality of a method does not require backing all the explanations with general laws. We shall return to this point later in

connection with Popper and his review of what he calls Mill's 'psychologism'. Mill begins with generalization about the psychological phenomena, the elementary laws of the mind. Mill does not describe the difficulty of predicting human behaviour in terms of its complex and indeterministic nature but ascribes the difficulty to the 'extraordinary number and variety of the data or elements of the agents, which in obedience to that small number of laws, cooperate towards the effect'.[5] Mill finds the problem to be empirical, rather than of a methodological nature. It only shows, in his view, the limited 'compass of human faculties'. But Mill does not think that this difficulty makes social science unobtainable because we can still check the result of our deductions, and the confidence in that inference is drawn not from *a priori* reasoning but from 'the consilience between its results and those of observation *a posteriori*'.[6] But this cannot be the solution as Ryan pointed out because the problem of checking deductions once they are made is not the real difficulty; the real problem lies in making the deductions in the first place.

It seems that Mill is not unaware of the problem because although originally the methodology of social science was modelled after physics, he realizes that it cannot, after all, 'be a science of positive predictions, but to tendencies'.[7] That means it is not possible to predict as to how people *will* behave in certain circumstances only, but also how they *would behave* in the absence of unforeseen modifying conditions. For example, it is impossible to predict how people would behave if there is an epidemic or an earthquake but it is possible to foresee their behaviour if certain factors were absent, e.g. if there were no organized relief measures, medical equipments or ready state actions or if they had never faced such a situation before. Mill admits that sheer knowledge of *tendencies* (based on the knowledge of human nature) is inadequate for prediction,[8] but it is sufficient to explain some of the past events. But again, too many tendencies complicate the scene to such an extent that the original difficulty of inference persists.

Mill recognizes this difficulty in case of most social phenomena except for the area of economics where the social facts are different. And tendencies found in one social condition cannot remain unchanged in another social situation, or even in the same society under changed

conditions. Mill himself admits to this phenomenon, but at the same time, locates certain types of social facts that are different from others in being *less* influenced by the *consensus* of social phenomena. Economics, as pointed out before, is such a science. But here again, the laws of economics are undoubtedly more stable than other types of social laws but in order to work as an adequate *explanans*, a number of initial conditions are necessary which are interlinked with social facts of other types. In such a case, prediction is also difficult because in principle the possibility of an unknown variable is always there. Further, an adequate explanation can only go from the effect to cause but not from cause (*explanans*) to effect (*explanandum*). Thus, a statement about a social fact can never be explained *before* it has happened but only *after* its actual occurrence.

It seems that Mill realizes the difficulty of his original programme and opts for middle level generalizations instead of general laws. Following Comte, this option gives away a lot of Mill's ambitious project and makes a big concession to the empiricists. The fundamental idea of what he calls 'inverse deduction' is that in situations where 'it is not possible to deduce truths about the actual course of history from the *law of human nature*', we may nonetheless be able to guess at 'axiomata media'—middle level propositions which we verify, not by testing against the facts of history but by seeing whether they are desirable from the laws of human nature or whether at any rate they are compatible with those laws.[9] Ryan has argued that if he 'opened the gate a little, Mill now leaves it to swing wide'. It is true (what Mill said earlier) that experiments in social matters are not possible and no observation can, in principle, be ever adequate for the conclusions of the inductivist canons.

Now, methodologically, it is an extreme position but one may nevertheless argue that even if it is not a fully justified conclusion, history can at least show us similar trends or empirical laws in several societies in reasonably similar conditions. For example, in most colonial societies, there existed freedom movements or mass movements against the ruling power after a certain period of colonial rule of exploitation and injustice of various sorts. These empirical laws (or trends) only indicate some 'middle-level, derivative' laws governing different

successive states of society. These derivative laws are verified by deduction from the laws of human nature. One may argue that by these derivative laws, it is possible for Mill to infer from the principle of human nature via axiomata media to *trends of social phenomena*. But Mill's claim is just to tie up the derivative laws with laws of human nature 'naturally to be expected as the consequences of those ultimate ones'.[10] From the above expression, it seems that the relation is less than a logical one of derivative inference, implying that there has been no question of either verification or falsification by testing against the *laws of human nature*. Mill's belief in a hierarchy of science (mathematical sciences underlying the physical sciences and the latter underlying other scientific investigations) leads to the position that psychology is basic in the sense that laws of physics are basic to astronomy or atomic physics and many other sciences. Moral science or social sciences are not possible, in Mill's view, without human beings and the latter follow laws of psychology. Thus, the general science of society is the last stage in the deduction of social science from individual psychology. In Mill's view, people's action can be reduced to the play of psychological atoms. We can, at least in principle, build up constructions in the form of not only persons but also up to the point of an entire society. This atomistic/reductionist programme aims at explaining gross regularities in terms of breaking them up to regularities belonging to components of psychological nature.

The most well-known treatment this programme has received so far is at the hand of Karl Popper.[11] Popper approves of Mill's anti-holistic view of society as against those who uphold social wholes such as collectives and groups as real. Mill rightly insists that the 'behaviour' and the 'actions' of collectives such as states and social groups must be reduced to the behaviour and actions of human individuals.[12] However, Popper quickly adds in the next line: 'But the belief that the choice of such an individualistic method implies the *choice of a psychological method is mistaken*'.[13] It is clear that to Popper, it is 'naive to assume' that all social laws are derivable (at least in principle) from the laws of 'human nature'. The main thesis of psychologism in his words is 'The doctrine that society being the product of interacting minds, social laws must ultimately be reducible to psychological laws, since the events of

social life, including its conventions, must be the outcome of motive springing from the minds of individual men'.[14] Popper offers an argument from the institutionalist point of view that motives alone cannot fully explain an action unless placed in the general situation, namely the social environment. So, the institutionalist may contend that sociology *cannot* be reduced to psychological analysis. An adequate analysis of a social action requires other social factors. Sociology, that is any account of society, is *autonomous* to a great extent.

Popper anticipates the possible reaction of psychologism in this respect. The proponent of psychologism may continue to argue that the difference between natural and social sciences is that the environments in social situations are manmade. Therefore, it can be ultimately explained in terms of human nature. To use Popper's example, the economic institution of 'market' can be derived in the last analysis from the psychology of 'economic man'. Mill would analyze it in terms of the psychological phenomena of 'the pursuit of wealth'.[15] The followers of psychologism may also point out that the peculiar 'psychological structure of human nature' makes the institutions play an important role in society. And gradually, these become a part of the tradition or more or less stable social environment. The final point that provoked much of Popper's criticism is the decisive point of any psychologistic view that 'The *origin as well as the development* of traditions must be explicable in terms of human nature'.[16] The origin of any tradition, in this view, is some human motive or other. In his enthusiasm against any type of holism, Popper endorses Mill's anti-holism to a great extent. Mill's remark: 'Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance',[17] is not entirely true. As I have pointed out before, men's behaviour when alone and when in a group is not always the same. On the contrary, often it acquires a completely different quality. Examples abound. Communal riots, protest movements, strikes, etc. Surprisingly, Popper (despite his apparent anti-psychologism) regards this remark of Mill as '...one of the most praiseworthy aspects of psychologism, namely its sane opposition to collectivism and holism... Psychologism is, I believe, correct only in so far as it insists upon what may be called "methodological individualism" as opposed to "methodological

collectivism"... .'[18] The 'dangerous ground' Popper finds in psychologism is that it is led to the adopting of the *historicist method*. If we try to reduce the social facts to psychological facts, it leads to issues about origins and development, i.e. eventually to what Popper calls historicism. Indeed, Mill did realize the difficulty of psychologism, but he regards it as one of empirical nature. Any generalizing in social science is difficult—he thinks—because of the 'tremendous complexity of the interaction of so many individual minds'. The logician Mill is cautious to draw a conclusion 'until sufficient grounds can be pointed out in human nature'. He admits that it is not possible to determine *a priori* the order in which human development will take place of 'the general facts of history up to the present time'. His ground seems to be inductive—'after the first few terms of the series, the influence exercised over each generation by the generation which preceded it becomes ... more and more preponderant over all other influences. The social condition so to say becomes an important determinant.'

As Popper points out, the weakness of pschologism—especially its historicist version—lies in the ultimate reduction of all social institutions into laws of human nature with all its actions and passions. All social regularities then could be given in terms of 'historico-causal' development. For Popper, collectives do not exist. Ontologically, there are no such things as states, nations, armies or other such social groups. In a logical frame, statements about such 'dubious' entities can all be translated into statements about 'non dubious' entities such as individual men and women. Collectives are abstract concepts, models or theoretical constructs to understand the behaviour of the individuals. Popper here almost endorses Mill's kind of individualism. He says 'Even "the war" or "the army" are *abstract* concepts, strange as this may sound to some. What is concrete are the many who are killed; or the men and women in uniform, etc.'[19]

But of course, Mill's individualism goes further than that. He reduces even an individual person's action to atoms of psychological events like hope, desires, pain, etc. If individualism of both Popper's and Mill's variety is pursued to a great extent, it will face difficulties like any other reductionist programme. For example, a statement about a protest march, if translated into statement about individual persons a,

b, c, can never adequately explain the matter. Unless we add the sense or purpose of a's participation, b's participation and c's participation, those actions separately do not have the same meaning as when done collectively with a purpose. And once we introduce purpose—which is irretrievably linked up with theoretical and sociological elements— reduction to individualism is given up. This is in regard to Mill and Popper's common programme. Undoubtedly, both deny the view that social terms are basic. But Popper does not share Mill's 'psychologism' and the only Marxist doctrine he endorses is its anti-psychologistic stance. His basic objections to psychologism[20] are threefold. The first is that human nature is greatly influenced by social institutions; so individual behaviour is conditioned by social norms and states to such a great extent that it is difficult to say how much is in its nature'[21] and how much is due to social conditions. The study of human nature presupposes these institutions and not vice versa. The second difficulty he finds is that social science deals with the *unintended* consequences of people's actions, not with the *intended* ones. These are social facts and not to be explained in terms of psychological laws.[22] For example, if everybody desires an object, the price of that object will *go up*, although those who want to buy will *naturally* want the price to be down. Popper's example: a prospective buyer in the real estate market will want the price to be low as a buyer, but by entering the market (intended action), he raises the price (unintended consequences) level of real estate. And the third and very important objection is that there is a threat of 'historicism' in the interest in human nature, which leads to questions about the origin of society. Popper regards Mill's psychologism as that which leads to a 'desperate position forced upon him'. 'It is a desperate position because his theory of a pre-social human nature which explains the foundation of society—a psychologistic version of the "social contract"—is not only a *historical myth*, but also, as it were, a *methodological myth*.' Popper thinks that if a reduction were to be attempted at all, it would be better to interpret psychology in terms of sociology rather than 'the other way round'.

According to Ryan, methodological individualism would be meaningless if it did not allow reduction of social laws to the laws of 'individual behaviour'. That makes sense if we consider Mill's statement

that character of men is formed by both the social circumstances and the basic human nature they are endowed with.[23] According to Ryan, Popper is unfair to Mill for the only way in which Mill wants to reduce social laws to the laws of individual psychology in that he wants to link that laws of man in society to the laws of basic behaviour of man. Ryan is right about Mill's recognition that there are very few basic human capacities and most of the diversities in their actions are due to the difference in the circumstances. And this recognition is very close to Popper's own view. As regards the question of unintended consequences, we should note that those who would regard all social actions as consequences of human intention will be contenders of the 'conspiracy theory of history'. But Mill is found (as pointed out by Ryan) to have opposed his father's view that politics is a successful conspiracy of sinister plots. Moreover, as an economist, Mill explains price rise of, say, scarce goods not as an organized phenomenon but as a natural consequence of efforts which aim at goals other than price rise. Popper also overemphasized the origin of history issue, because it would be necessary for Mill to question the origin of society only if he would want to give a causal or deterministic account of social development. But if we allow Mill the account of mutual interaction of human nature and the institutions created by it, his position is not far from that of Popper. This is so because if the mutual interaction is recognized, then it is not possible even in principle to predict the whole of human history merely from the knowledge of human nature and its history. So, Ryan's criticism of Popper is basically correct that the latter is mistaken about Mill's so-called 'psychologism' as purely reductionist. Mill has definitely shown more nuances than the simplistic reduction of social facts to human intentions, as ascribed to him by Popper.

CAUSAL EXPLANATION AND RATIONAL EXPLANATION

But the more serious problem still remains open to any attempt at explaining social science, especially history. Surely, a fundamental difference exists between the explanation of physical phenomena and that of human behaviour in history. Mill's notion of individual liberty as espoused in *On Liberty* and his account of individual behaviour in

society is inconsistent. His programme of social physics aims at giving a causal explanation of history in the same way as physics aims to give an explanation of physical events. Historical explanations are *not* causal explanations. They are narratives at best, offering some rational explanation. Mill's initial assumption that there is no methodological difference between physics and history is unwarranted. It is important to realize this distinction and see that history *does not* use laws as does physics. This distinction depends again on a further distinction between *rational* and *causal* explanation. Human behaviour can at best be given a rational explanation (one might also question that) but again, only *after* the action has happened. Mill saw rationality as a requirement for an individual to be socially/politically free, but for social changes he offers only a causal explanation modelled after explanations in physical science.

One might wonder at Mill's explanation for social science. It cannot be the covering law model[24] even if a set of laws instead of one, as required by the original covering-law model. For example, it there is a threat of plunging into the successful explanation only of analytic truth, not concrete social fact. It can also be argued[25] that the use of law to cover an explanation is not wrong for it is difficult to frame laws because of their *non-explanatory nature*. Deducing a social fact from any law does not explain the phenomena. The causal sequence should be analyzed into simpler components in order to throw light on the chain of events. To give an intelligible explanation, a 'causal narrative' is more important than a *logical* relation.

Finally, the distinction drawn between causal and rational explanation is essential to understand that the latter is nothing but an attempt to justify the actions of historical agents. Dray alleges in this vein that historical explanations are attempts to observe things from the agent's perspective—to justify or rationalize the action. Causal explanation, again, is analogous to the deduction of the effect from the causal law and the singular statement about the presence of the cause.[26] Mill did not distinguish between the 'inside' of the agent and the 'outside' view of the spectator and, thus, was led to the weak doctrine that individuals are prone to atomistic analysis of their behaviour. Further, Popper is right in the sense that it belies Mill's assumption that there is always

a causal deterministic explanation of human behaviour. This seems to be a threat not only to reconcile historical explanation with the same methodology as physics but also in connection with the basic requirement of rationality of belief (which is a pre-condition for individual freedom) and action. The other problem lurking behind any variety of social physics is the one of prediction of future changes in social actions and institutions. Popper finds any such attempt to be a deterministic move. No methodology in principle can predict future social phenomena on the basis of historical laws.

TREND, TRADITION AND SOCIAL LAW

Mill's belief in the uniformity of rational explanation led to an attempt to establish the uniformity of science. He intended to explain far-reaching social changes, wherein he identifies two kinds of social enquiry: (1) the question of what effect will follow from a given cause, a given social circumstance; and (2) what laws determine those social circumstances? In other words, '... what are the causes which produce, and the phenomena which characterize, state of society generally'.[27] Any science of society includes the study of social uniformities of succession or change. These may be called 'social statics and social dynamics'. Mill realized that only freedom could not guarantee good social or political order unless certain conditions are fulfilled. The conditions are: First, there existed for all who were accounted citizens— for all who were not slaves kept down by brute force—a system of *education*, beginning with infancy and continued through life, of which whatever also it might include, one main and incessant ingredient was *restraining discipline*. Second, permanent political society has been found to be the existence, in some form or other, of the feeling of allegiance or loyalty. This feeling may vary in its objects, and is not confined to any particular form of government: but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its essence is always the same, viz., that there be in the constitution of the state *something* which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question... The Third *essential* condition (of stability in political society)... is a strong and active principle of rationality'.[28]

The uniformity that exists among simultaneous phenomena must be then the result of the coexistence of phenomena at some earlier time, in conjunction with the laws, which determine the succession of phenomena. To Mill, the principles for social change (the succession of one social state after another) are of two types: cyclical and cumulative or 'progressive change'. Popper[29] rejects the suggestion of a 'trajectory' or cumulative change as it is simplistic in nature. He also finds agreement between the views of Marx and of Mill, which apparently seems very unusual. Popper points out. 'Thus when Marx says in the preface to *Capital*, "It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the... law of motion of modern society", he might be said to carry out Mill's programme'.

Mill clearly distinguishes between two kinds of sociological inquiry. Popper calls the first one social technology and the second one corresponding to historicist prophecy. According to Popper, Mill characterized the second one as the 'general science of society by which the conclusions of the other and more special kind of inquiry must be limited and controlled'.[30] This general science of society is based upon the principle of causality, described by Mill as the 'Historical Method'. 'Mill's "States of society" with "properties ... changeable from age to age" correspond exactly to Marxist "historical period", and Mill's optimistic belief in progress resembles Marx's, although it is, of course, much more naive than its dialectical counterpart'.[31] The human affairs more in conformity with two possible astronomical motions, 'an orbit' or 'a trajectory'.[32] Popper ascribes a more simplistic account of social change to Mill than to Marxist dialectic, which is more complicated like a 'corkscrew movement'. He also finds further similarity between Mill and Marx, like both of their dissatisfaction with *laissez faire* liberalism and both 'tried to provide better foundations for carrying into practice the fundamental idea of liberty'.[33]

But Mill's study of society is different from that of Marx in an important way; while the former divides the analysis of society into laws of human nature and laws of the mind, the latter takes social laws, particularly economic laws as more fundamental, particularly 'the progressiveness of the human'. Popper, as mentioned before, calls this approach 'psychologism', which both Marx and Popper (possibly the

only point they share) challenged. No social or political structures can be explained by the general 'progressiveness of human nature'. Popper rejects the assumption that human being *naturally* (?) displays disposition or natural inclination for progress; he rightly points out the possibility that by an epidemic or a virus, people may someday aspire only for Nirvana.[34] Marx went the other way—the social laws that determine the nature of social events in his view are ultimately economic laws. Marx's critique of Mill's psychologism at least leaves sociological laws as autonomous that are not to be explained in terms of psychological principles.

Popper's ascription of reductionism to Mill for explaining historical or social change is simplistic. Trajectory or cumulative change, as envisaged by Mill (and also Popper), involves more complex elements than just atoms of human factors. Individuals are changed by social situations and the latter undergoes change by ways of individual persons. Indeed, Mill speaks of 'progressive change', but that is only to take account of the fact that the major social phenomena change from one period of history to another progressively, but at the same time it is recognized that the change occurs '... both in the character of the human race, and in their outward circumstances so far as moulded by themselves.[35] Mill only tried to ascertain from such progressive change— a trend to tendency (law) of that change. But trend or law here is not taken in any causal or inviolable manner. He is clearly distinguishing between causal law and social law (trend). Historical changes are only empirical laws—summative in nature; predictions of future events are not possible on the basis of historical change. The latter is only a pattern, a tendency among specific facts to understand the particular situation.

It seems that Mill is very close to Popper's distinction between a law and a trend. Social laws are laws in the sense of a trend or a tendency; they cannot have any predictive power unless they depend on some natural laws or uniformities. The laws of social change are thus merely empirical, '... without any means of determining their real limits, and of judging the changes which have hitherto been in progress are destined to continue indefinitely, or to terminate, or even to be reversed'.[36] What is the motive to *know* the prevailing trends of social change? Is it just

a historical quest or to utilize the knowledge of the trends for some other purpose? Mill's reply to these questions would be clearly for some practical purpose, namely, the knowledge of the trends would empower us more than it was in the past to have greater control over social change and in changing its pattern. So, although Mill criticizes the French historians for confusing trends with natural laws (which only have some predictive power), he is himself definitely heading towards a determinist view of social change. This is in conflict with his active advocacy for individual liberty in society.

Moreover, Mill's scepticism about the predictive power of social trends is only apparent and based on *merely* empirical reasons. He finds the trends of the order and pattern of human development unpredictable not because individuals are basically free agents, but because history up to the present time has a cumulative influence over individuals and their situations in such a way that it is 'impossible' to predict their behaviour in a certain situation. Although Mill is cautious about any inference or prediction from the past to the future, the reason for the impossibility is not based on any logical ground. Rather, it is based on the contingent difficulty of computation because the social circumstances change the individuals to such an extent that their acquired characters are very far from the basic human nature and thus are 'impossible' to be predicted in a certain situation of history. Hence, Mill found it difficult to establish any relation between human nature and social change because observation of human history and its trend can only give us some empirical law sans any predictive power. He claims, nevertheless, to have achieved some low-level tendencies in social change. For example, '... as society advances, mental *tends* more and more to prevail over bodily qualities and masses over individual'. Mill is inspired by Tocqueville or his theory about 'The irresistible tendency of the age toward *equality*'.

Although the statements expressing low-level tendencies cannot guarantee any methodological advantage over empirical generalization, Mill still retains an ambitious programme. He finds at least one element as a great determinant of change in the states of society—the 'states of the speculative faculties of mankind'. Of course, he does not say that desire for knowledge and truth in most individuals is universal; in fact,

it is found to be pretty low when compared to the desire for comfort and wealth. But the desire for comfort and wealth can be gratified only if there is adequate technology to provide for it. Furthermore, technology depends on the state of the science. Thus, progress of technology is incumbent on the progress of knowledge and science. So, even if direct inspection of history *does not* show a trend towards more knowledge and truth, the motivation for wealth and comfort goad on individuals in a society towards more knowledge and prosperity.

This argument, even in its most acceptable form, cannot establish that an analysis of human motivation and the study of trend *explain* social change. First, the study of human desires can never be *exhaustive*; there are many periods in history, many different kinds of society. So, even if there are *trends*, they are so numerous and diverse that it is not easy to find common bonds. Second, if human nature changes with alterations in social conditions, *trends* also change with that of social conditions. It is again difficult to distinguish between the elements in *trends* that are *natural* and those which are due to social conditioning. Third, even if all these empirical difficulties are overcome by computational ability, we still face logical problems. The historical evidences, however exhaustive and analyzed, can at most show that the trends *were* such and such up to a point of time t. It can only say 'so far as the observation goes a *trend is found* to be of such and such nature', and cannot say that 'this trend will continue'. On Mill's own submission, social conditions change from one state of society to another. Then the initial conditions of every state are bound to be different, and there is no way to expect any *tendency* to continue. Popper's tirade against any historicist explanation of social change in this connection still remains unmet. As mentioned earlier, he visualized that an epidemic or virus can in future wipe the human desire for wealth, and it is quite conceivable that in future there would be a universal desire for Nirvana.

There is another attempt by Mill to provide a principle on which a theory of history can be constructed. He is convinced both by facts of history and by the general principles of human nature that any appreciable change in the social conditions '... has been preceded by a change, of proportional extent, in the state of their knowledge or in the prevalent beliefs'.[37] Apparently, this sounds better since science and

knowledge are indeed dominant factors in social change. We shall revert later to the status of science and education with reference to Feyerabend's diatribe against it. It is a fact that features of open and closed societies depend greatly on the kind of education they propagate. The state policy of education makes different kinds of individual and varying kinds of society in the end. We should recall that Mill was inimical to uniform mass education, which may produce uniform set of beliefs detrimental to individuality.[38] Mill's optimism about the positive achievements of sciences is comparable to that of Popper, but his Newtonian framework is too naive, '... the circle of human knowledge will be complete and it can only thereafter receive further enlargement by perpetual expansion from within.[39] Apart from the obvious inconsistency of knowledge being complete and receiving 'perpetual expansion', this statement belies a simplistic trust on mechanical principles and their predictive power (about future events). It also belies Mill's view that historical trends are not absolute but only conditional; not capable of prediction[40] but only offer us a guidance about the future.

The observation of the trend shall enable us to change its course by different modes of social policy, and education to reverse it if it is inimical to individual freedom. If we interpret Mill's social physics in this way, much of Popper's criticism of it would appear as misguided. The three main objections are as follows: (1) Popper finds holism in it; (2) a belief in absolute trends or tendencies which Mill confuses with genuine causal laws; and (3) a simplistic belief in social progress. As regards the objection regarding holism that is taking the states of society as a whole, indeed, Mill does argue that in social matters there is such an interaction between various aspects that we cannot isolate the clear causal link. For example, an economic phenomenon cannot be explained only with pure economic causes without reference to other social factors.

Popper made it clear[41] that the holistic approach tends to explain everything by the same theory. The doctrine of holism holds that every aspect of social life is intimately connected with every other. There are two problems related to the doctrine: (1) Explanation of no phenomenon can be adequate because the relevant causes would be infinite, or else there are too many social facts and—to be precise—not only social, but

natural phenomena can also be causally linked with social facts, then it would be an impossible task to explain a single phenomenon. (2) Tendency to explain social phenomena as connected with (every or) many others discourages partial or piecemeal social change. Furthermore, there are two faces of this tendency: (1) It may be a conservative view to discourage *any* change, to avoid a wholesale social instability if not disorder. (2) It may justify revolution or wholesale social change to amend or improve some local/partial social malady. Incidentally, Mill's actual social and political doctrines aim at making piecemeal social reforms and change instead of advocating a holistic change.[42]

The objection on the ground of having an 'absolutist' view of trend is purely methodological. Popper agrees with Mill that there *are* identical trends found in different periods of history in different societies, but he disagrees on the point of this trend being any law, but only a singular historical statement. Laws and trends are different; the former does not depend on any initial conditions, whereas the latter does.[43] Taking trends as laws is an 'absolutist' move in Popper's terminology. Indeed, Mill gives this impression because his use of 'empirical laws' is quite indeterminate, ranging from genuine low-level laws to descriptions of observed uniformities. Unfortunately, Mill's phrases are not very precise, but he is aware that trends or statements of observed facts need initial conditions in order to have predictive value. But, as I mentioned earlier, the existence of a trend or a tradition, in this view, is a guidance to understand future social phenomena, although it is short of the status of law, which only can have predictive power. But like all classical economists, Mill believes in some general laws of economics that are fundamental like natural laws. Even so, he advocates the reversal of many social trends for egalitarian purposes. This is possible only if we know of the trends because then we have the power to bring forth social change, i.e. reverse an existing trend.

The last but not at all the least important is the criticism based on the assumption that Mill believes naively in 'progress as an unconditional trend'. We have seen before that Popper accuses Mill of 'psychologism' and particularly the belief in progressiveness of human nature. But, as it is mentioned before, progress or progressiveness in this context is

never meant in the sense of improvement or development, but only in the sense of a cumulative effect of knowledge and achievements. In the essay *Civilization*, Mill differentiated between two sense of the term;[44] in the sense of better and in the other, it means to have more wealth and power. He is aware of a nation's being 'civilized' either in a wider or in a narrow sense.[45] It means wealth and power in the narrow sense and moral and intellectual achievement in its wider implications. That the present age is civilized in the narrow sense is clear, but Mill says 'we do not regard the age as either equally advanced *or equally progressive*. In some it appears to us stationary, in some even retrograde.'[46]

Popper seemed to overlook these distinctions Mill made between different meanings of 'civilization' and 'progress' and only emphasized Mill's ambitious picture of rationality in science and extension of that to social phenomena. Surely, inevitability of social progress or prediction of social events from trends is not a viable programme as Mill projected. But ascribing 'historicism' or 'historicist prophecy' to Mill's social philosophy would be incorrect and also not in tune with his ideal of individual freedom. But that ideal, as shown below, is in direct opposition to his project of social physics.

SOCIAL LAW AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

The liberty of the individual, in Mill's view, is threatened not so much by open attacks as by the quiet erosion of liberty brought about largely unintentionally by moralists and political reformers. In fact, Mill's *On Liberty* is a response to a danger—danger already envisaged by Alexis de Tocqueville (in his *Democracy in America*); namely the danger not of undemocratic *laws* or other overt and political measures of an illiberal tendency, but of a more subtle kind of tyranny: the tyranny of a popular ethos over personal beliefs. 'The "tyranny of the majority" not over the body but over the mind.'

The threat of social tyranny is very real in societies like the class-ridden society of England in Mill's time or India's caste ridden system. 'A social tyranny', as Mill rightly projected, is 'more formidable than many kinds of political oppression since though not usually upheld by

such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life and enslaving the soul itself.'

The great difference between political freedom and social freedom has been aptly described by R.B. McCallum in this way[47]: a reasonably affluent young man of modern times will find himself back in the nineteenth century in an easy life with light burden of taxation, licenses, without security and other travel regulations which we face now. On the other hand, in many matters affecting his private and intellectual life, views on science, religion and sex, 'he would find himself bound by a constricting orthodoxy' and would have to guard his words and actions, which he might find intolerable. The main thrust of *On Liberty* is to show the way the powerful Victorian ethos operate in a quiet and comparatively painless manner, achieving its effect without the unpleasant process of fining, imprisoning of killing anybody. It even allowed dissenters to 'exercise their reason', at least in private, provided they disguise their heterodox opinions. It is a 'convenient plan for having place in the intellectual world'. But the price paid for such intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the 'entire moral courage of the human mind'. This 'yoke of opinion' had become so heavy as to thwart independent and energetic action. Mill predicted that when democratic majorities have come to feel their power, they would be tempted to use it to excess, so that civil liberty will be no less invaded by government action than social liberty had been invaded by social opinion.

So far, debates and discussions on Mill's doctrine of individual freedom are well known. One important point, however, needs to be mentioned here that his libertarianism does not invoke any abstract right to liberty. Individual freedom is not a natural right, 'as a thing independent of *utility*'. The central tenet of utilitarianism is that everything should be judged according to whether or not it tends to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But there is another principle (briefly suggested before as anti-paternalistic); namely the principle of non-interference, according to which society must not interfere with an adult person merely for her own good even if by doing that she would be happier and no one else less happy. Mill's 'very simple principle' popularly known as the 'harm principle' does

not appear to safeguard the liberty of an individual when her actions significantly affect other people; surely what we say and write may affect others adversely. The problems inherent in the harm principle generated much heat and literature over the years and it seems that the principle appears either to label all *actions* as harmful or leads to illiberalism. Without going into that controversial issue, we should refer to another principle, which is not given much attention by liberals and others. I shall call this principle the principle of fallibility or rationality. This principle is very general in the sense that liberal principles, in general, can follow from it. Mill's insight should be duly recognized, for it provides a general ground for individual freedom independent of the harm principle. He argues that freedom of thought and freedom of expression are quite inseparable. But the principle of non-interference and harm principle *only* ensures the freedom of thought. Although, if thought and expression are inseparable, then an illiberal might argue that at least *some* expressions should be coerced or banned because these might cause some social harm. And once some expressions are branded as harmful, many others may also be banned for potential harmfulness by illiberal utilitarians. Examples abound like banning a book in advance in anticipation of some social unrest.

Thus, the principles of non-interference and the very 'simple principle' alone cannot safeguard individual freedom. Liberty of thought and expression, therefore, need another principle so as to be justified on rational ground. And that principle is based on the fallibility of human reason. Let us look at some possible arguments[48] based on that particular principle.

Firstly, only trivial truths are certainly known. All other truths are contingent, i.e. dependent on circumstantial evidences. Therefore, for progress of knowledge or amount of truth, we need to have greater discussions. Except for logic and mathematics, we cannot know of an opinion (a belief based on empirical data) that it is true simply by looking at it. Moreover, we cannot rely on the feeling of certainty about any idea because an opinion may be false even if we feel *certain* about its truth.

What entitles us to hold an opinion with some confidence can only be the knowledge that it has so far withstood severe criticism. Thus, even in the case where a received opinion is in fact true and a heretical opinion opposed to it is false, it would still be injurious to truth to suppress the false opinion. To do so would deprive us of an opportunity to test the true opinion; and the less a true opinion has been tested, the less reason we have for assuming it to be true and the less we appreciate its internal resources, its strength and significance. When any opinion (even if it is true) is protected against criticism, it subverts into dogma and intellectual progress halts or at least slows down. Moreover, it is irrational to cling to an opinion if one is ignorant or has been kept uninformed or ignorant of any counter opinion or rival theories. 'He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that—he has no ground for preferring either opinion' (*On Liberty*). Surely any victory would be vacuous and meaningless if there is no enemy to fight in the field.

Secondly, it may surely be the case that the heretical opinion is true and the received opinion false, or what is more possible, both opinions may be *partly* true and *partly* false. A public censor would be unable to know in advance whether the received opinion is *wholly* true, since it is only *after* opinions have been allowed to collide that we can begin to assess their respective strength and weaknesses. As Mill said, 'There is the greatest difference ... for the purpose of not permitting its refutation.[49]

Thirdly, as Watkins pointed out, *On Liberty* was published in the same year as Darwin's *The Origin of Species*, and one might say that Mill regarded the growth of knowledge as a sort of evolutionary process in which true opinions tend to grow stronger and multiply, provided the struggle for survival is fierce. It was with his idea of intellectual progress towards truth that Mill backed up his famous slogan that the peculiar evil of silencing an opinion would be justified in silencing mankind.

Apart from his arguments for freedom of speech and action, Mill's commendation for individuality itself can stand against his principles for social mechanics. Mill's endorsement of one who is self-made is surely contrary to his vindication of social physics and more in tune with the principles of liberty espoused in *On Liberty*. Mill upholds someone who has formed his or her own opinions and worked out an

individual plan of life rather than one whose opinions are not original and life-style is according to customary norms. If customs and traditions are a kind of social laws as we find in *Systems of Logic*, then Mill's applause of eccentricity (even if it is for its own sake than in pursuit of some distinctive individual aim) seems to be incongruous. Indeed, Mill approved of eccentricity indulged in not only for its own sake but also rather for its custom-disturbing effect. The only reason for endorsing eccentricity rather than blind perusal of customs is that 'the tyranny of opinion makes eccentricity a reproach'. In society, where individuals lead their own distinctive life according to their own peculiar tastes and talents, freedom and reason seem to dominate more than trends and traditions.

Even so, individuality to Mill is not as fundamental as free speech. If someone's action hurts others, only then that action may be restrained, but if someone lives without hurting anyone and at the same time not very distinctively, or on the contrary in an innocuous and customary manner, we are not entitled to use moral pressure to force him out of it. If one were to emphasize that people should not be a conformist and imitative, as Mill did, it would be ignoring the immense service that custom, with its readymade norms, does to individual behaviour. Mill first attempted a science of society that follows the laws of tradition based on the universal laws of human nature. Then the principle of fallibility of human reason ensures freedom of speech and action. Finally, the concept of individuality acts as an antidote to the effects of customs and social mores to our thought and action. It is true that all our customary modes of behaviour are not reasonable and most need improvement.

However, one should also remember that reform of one practice or institution requires reliance on a great variety of practices and institutions. The stability of the latter institutions is likely to be indispensable for the rational reform of the institution in question. One cannot just defy all customs; by defying one custom, people may turn to another. It is replacement and not mere rejection of *all* customs whatsoever. Mill seems to ascribe almost nothing to the individual beyond his or her sovereignty over one's private thought and feelings. Of course, he does differentiate between conduct that affects the interests

of others prejudicially and one that doesn't. But that again is problematic, for one's action can affect other's interests prejudicially, but he cannot be always said to have wilfully caused them definite damages and vice versa.

Moreover, Mill made another condition for control of freedom of speech and publication; namely there are occasions when freedom of speech may legitimately be curbed. Mill stated it is one thing to publish an article in a newspaper which argues, for example, that hoarders of food grain make people starve by artificially creating a price rise. It is quite another to make a speech with the same content when an angry mob is assembled in front of a grain-hoarder's house. Such restrictions put on the exercise of freedom of speech and action render such freedom innocuous and meaningless.

John Watkins[50] distinguished between different states of heteronomy of mental and physical conditions where the autonomy of the individual is absent in various degrees and kind. Sometimes, it might also be self-inflicted. Watkins referred to the case of Katherine Mansfield's *The Daughters of the Colonel* where even after the death of their father, the daughters remained in his thrall. Both Mill and the critical rationalist may agree with Kant and his enlightenment ideal in this connection, especially when the latter declares that only a lazy mind does not use its own judgement and reason and depends on others for the course of action to follow. Critical rationalists, similarly, think that an action that shows a high degree of freedom and autonomy also portrays a high degree of reason and thought. Watkins find a similarity between his idea of autonomy and that of Mill. He says: 'Like Kant who declared that reason can accord sincere respect only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination (*Critique of Pure Reason*, *A* xi), Mill was in many ways a good critical rationalist. His *Liberty* (1859) broke with the classical empiricist tradition in which his *Logic* (1843) was embedded, especially in repudiating the no-invention-of-ideas thesis: 'nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and ... all good things are the fruits of originality (*Liberty*, p. 268).'[51] What is needed for intellectual (and moral) progress is bold new ideas in addition to fearless criticism. An opinion should be

accepted, though only tentatively, when 'with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted'.

Mill's idea of individuality was similar to Kant's idea of enlightenment in calling for a movement away from certain negative states. Its attainment calls for a strong will, mental vigour, moral courage and energy (p. 272), which sounds like a position well up on Watkins' disonomy scale. According to Mill, the lives of people who lack individuality are 'pinched and hidebound' and 'cramped and dwarfed' (p. 265), which sounds like our anonymous heteronomy. Mill also wrote: 'In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship' (p. 264), which sounds like outward conformism. But outward conformism may slide over into inward conformism, and Mill also declared that society 'practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and *enslaving the soul itself* (p. 220, italics mine). That sounds like internal heternomy.'[52]

It may be mentioned in this connection that Mill also offers an argument to defend freedom of speech which is based on the fallibility of our beliefs. The argument runs like this: we should not suppress any opponent view (or action) because all our beliefs are fallible. Therefore, the opponent view—however absurd it may seem—might very well be true and a long-held belief may just be false. All opinions should, therefore, be expressed. The similar rapprochement between Mill's notion of liberty of thought and speech and critical rationalism is apparent from his fallibility of reason argument expounded in *Liberty*.

Reverting to the issue of making provocative speech or action that may result in dangerous repercussions leading to violence and other harmful consequences, should there be a pre-emptive measure to stop the same? One may argue, nevertheless, that a true champion of freedom of speech would not put any restriction, nor incur any punishment for preaching any so-called provocative speech. Because then any speech or act might have been pre-emptively stopped in the name of prevention of future harm. But we can never ascertain which speech/writing will lead to harm. Even *after* a disaster has actually happened, it is not an

easy task to assign its *exact* cause. Moreover, the publication of a book or scientific paper that *might* lead to disastrous results then can also be justifiably prohibited. It is true that historically, many events such as the content of Einstein, Bohr and Oppenheimer's scientific papers eventually led to dangerous repercussions; but this thinking does not justify the belief that such scientific discoveries should not have been published. Science presumes a free society which does not deny the role of tradition but does allow free thought and its expressions, no matter what repercussions it might bring forth. It is reasonable to presume that the pursuit of truth is a risky business because it may yield large benefits to society or may also lead to dangerous discoveries. Therefore, should we control human inquiries so that they only yield benefits and no harm? But alas! No pursuit of truth can guarantee only *benefit* and no harm. So, it would be a question of security vis-à-vis knowledge which is the issue and which leads to a tussle between liberty and security. If we value security, then freedom of all kinds have to be compromised. But if liberty as a principle is valued as such then the cost of it is very high because freedom does not ensure security of any kind. The risk of discovering any unpleasant truth lurks behind any free pursuit of truth.

With the breakdown of determinism in contemporary physics, we should have a fresh look at the question of human freedom and those who think that physical determinism is reconcilable with it. Freedom is a kind of emancipation by the use of reason, from dependence on external factors such as social, historical or even psychological laws.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Alan Ryan, *John Stuart Mill*, chap. IX.
2. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, xi, I.
3. Alan Ryan, *Mill*, p. 149.
4. Ibid., p. 151.
5. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, ix.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., VI, IX, 2.
9. A. Ryan, *Mill*, p. 154.
10. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, X, 4.

11. Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* and *Open Society and its Enemies*, II, contain arguments against Mill's 'psychologism'.
12. Karl Popper, *Open Society* II, p. 11.
13. Ibid., p. 91, emphasis added.
14. Ibid., p. 91, emphasis added.
15. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, IX.
16. Ibid., I, VI, VII.
17. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, VII, IX and id, p. 91.
18. Ibid., p. 91.
19. Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 135.
20. M. Chaudhury, 'Objective Knowledge and Psychologism' *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, January, 1995 contains an account of information–processing model of knowledge that is 'psychologistic' in Popper's sense but still yields objective knowledge.
21. Popper's example: fear of snakes is not inherent but inculcated by education. *Open Society* II, p. 90.
22. Karl Popper, Ibid., II, pp. 92–93.
23. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, x, 3.
24. W. Dray, *Laws and Explanation in History*, chap. V.
25. As done by Dray.
26. Karl Popper, *Poverty of Historicism*, pp. 147–52.
27. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, x, 1.
28. Ibid., VI, x, 5.
29. Karl Popper, *Open Society*, II, p. 88.
30. Ibid., p. 87.
31. Ibid., VI, x, 6; J.S. Mill, *Civilization, Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol., I, p. 163; J.S. Mill, *Review of De Tocqueville's Democracy in America*; emphasis added.
32. Ibid., p. 88
33. Ibid.
34. Karl Popper, *Poverty of Historicism*, p. 157.
35. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, x, 3.
36. Ibid., p. 6.
37. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, X, 7.
38. J.S. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. I.
39. J.S. Mill, *System of Logic*, VI, X, 8.
40. Ibid., p. 4.
41. K. Popper, *Poverty of Historicism*.
42. Alan Ryan rightly pointed out this aspect of Mill's political principles.
43. This is a major point where the institutional economists breakaway from the classical economists who hold that economic laws are applicable to

    all economic situations, while most institutional economists stress the historic, systemic and evolutionary nature of economic processes.
44. I owe this point to A. Ryan.
45. J.S. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. I., pp. 171–72.
46. Ibid., p. 161.
47. R.B. McCallum (ed.), *On Liberty*, Introduction, p. XIV, cited by J.W.N. Watkins, 'John Stuart Mill and the Liberty of the Individual' *Political Ideas* edited by D. Thompson.
48. The rudiments of these arguments are already present in Mill's *On Liberty*, where he is discussing freedom of thought and expression. I have expanded it into full-fledged arguments.
49. J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chap. II.
50. John Watkins, *Freedom after Darwin*, chap. 8.
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Foucault and Epistemology:
Knowledge, Discourses and Power

YUNUSA KEHINDE SALAMI

Department of Philosophy, Obafemi Awolowo University, ILE-IFE. NIGERIA
E-mail: elubother@yahoo.co.uk; ysalami@oauife.edu.ng

The aim of this paper is to argue that in spite of Foucault's stated intention to argue that any special theory of knowledge has outlived its usefulness, and that there is no need to build any theory of knowledge or of truth, he still ends up within the armpit of epistemology. It is pertinent to mention, however, that the epistemology he ends up with is different from epistemology as traditionally conceived.

FOUCAULT AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Foucault conceives of epistemology as a normative discipline, that attempts to prescribe a natural starting point, such as the Archimedean point, or the Cartesian 'Cogito', from which knowledge-claims could be defended from the sceptical arguments. For the sceptics knowledge implies certainty, but we cannot know for certain. So, knowledge is impossible. Foucault treats various epistemological answers as attempts to set some criteria of knowledge—the conditions, which a knowledge—claim must satisfy in order to qualify for knowledge.

Foucault observes that the attempts in traditional epistemology to encourage a hierarchy of knowledge and enforce 'a coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse' are faulty.[1] He does not accept a centralized kind of theoretical production. On the contrary, he expresses his aversions to positions that make validity depend on the approval of the established regimes of thought. Foucault sets out to attack the 'inhibiting effect of global, totalitarian theories.'[2] He opposes the epistemic hierarchization of knowledge and the effects intrinsic of their power.

The traditional epistemological search for the natural starting point, for Foucault, was erroneous. He saw any such attempt as struggling to replace the other. This looks like an epistemic show of power. Each epistemic theory pretends to represent the truth until it is dislodged by the other. Each theory, according to Foucault, claims to represent the objective truth. Foucault suggested that 'all schemes of thought and all points of view are hopelessly subjective'[3]. This, if accepted, undermines the reasons and motivations underlying the major or traditional epistemological questions and activities.

Foucault rejects the Cartesian picture of an autonomous rational subject set over against a world of objects that it seeks to represent. Foucault sets out 'to dislodge the "atomistic and disengaged Cartesian subject" from the centre of epistemic and moral universes.'[4]

In his professed attempts to undermine epistemology and its related activities, Foucault ties his discussion around the role played by history, 'discourse', 'discursive-formation', 'power', and a defence of anti-realism.

In his 'archaeological' works of knowledge, Foucault questions some of the shifts in the existing theories. To Foucault, any attempt to study knowledge must be 'genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method'.[5] If it is archaeological, it does not seek the universal structures of all knowledge; and if it is genealogical, it does not make knowledge-type a metaphysics that has finally become a science.[6]

Foucault's studies attempt to lay out some of the historical transformation, which have been necessary and sufficient for the emergence of some particular form of knowledge rather than the other.[7] He sets out to inquire into what has made different forms of knowledge possible. For instance, in his 'Question of Method', Foucault declares that:

> ... in this piece of research on the prison, as in my other earlier work, the target of analysis wasn't 'institutions', 'theories', or 'ideology', but practices—with the aim of understanding the conditions that make these acceptable at a given movement.[8]

Foucault applies his historical approach to emphasize the point that rather than looking for an absolute truth or foundations of knowledge, inquirers ought to be interested in studying and understanding the history

of the present. His contention is that all criteria of knowledge are contingent. For him, if we provide a genealogy of truths now assumed to be absolute, we shall realize that such truth and knowledge had not been there all the time. They may now feature prominently in our knowledge-formation process, but at some future moment, these truths and knowledge may no longer be reckoned with. For Foucault:

> the critical ontology of ourselves has to be discovered not, certainly, as a doctrine, a theory, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophic life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time, the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.[9]

Foucault also uses 'discourse' and 'discursive-formation' in his attempt to undermine traditional epistemology. By 'discourse', Foucault means written and spoken statements, both of which may be referred to as 'texts'. Such texts are approached from different directions. By 'discursive-formation', Foucault implies a description of systems of dispersion between a number of statements or thematic choices.[10] According to Foucault, constitutive parts of the 'discursive-formation' responsible for the socially accepted meanings are questions such as 'who is speaking?' 'Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language?'[11]

In his challenge to epistemology, Foucault—through this use of history and discursive-formation—tries to reject the traditional epistemologists' emphasis on *a priori* knowledge, the self-evident giveness, necessity and certainty, totality and ultimate foundations. He aims at rejecting the platonic idea of transcendent realm. He sees truth as a product of discursive formations.[12]

Another important concept in Foucault's project is 'power'. Foucault replaces the idea that power is mainly repressive with the suggestion that power is mainly 'productive'. For him, power is exercised much more through forms of 'control' rather than through forms of 'prohibition'. He further insists that power is essentially positive, productive and circulates throughout the cells of every social practice, social relation, and social institution.[13] Power, on this account, is

exercised as a form of discipline, which he considers an insidious means of producing and controlling individuals.[14] Thus, power induces pleasure, creates knowledge, and produces discourse.

Foucault uses power as a heuristic device to study the social and scientific practices that underlie and condition the formation of beliefs. His aim is to use power as an interpretation of how what counts as knowledge has historically come to be counted. Foucault's use of power indicates that there would be no context-free, unhistorical way to decide whether a given piece of knowledge is, in fact, true.

The importance of this ideology is that Foucault wants to challenge the traditional epistemological view that reality is 'out there' to be mirrored, or that there is a fixed bedrock of truth, or knowledge. Foucault's premise for this anti-realism is that knowledge or truth is a product of large social apparatuses such as school and various training institutes where docile and useful bodies are produced to staff offices, factories, schools and armies.

Based on this belief, Foucault traces the lowly origins of truth in struggle and conflict, in arbitrariness and contingency, in a will to the truth that is brought about by the complex relations of desire and power that pervade human societies. Knowledge and truth are, in this account, not neutral. They are both products of the ways in which the power relations in a society are distributed. For Foucault, 'Truth is not the product of free spirits. It is produced by virtue of multiple forms of constraints.'[15] More than this, Foucault holds that 'power produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth'.[16] For Foucault, 'each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth'.[17]

Foucault seems to be suggesting that knowledge or truth is determined in its form and domains by the struggles that pass through these particular forms and domains. It is significant to this Foucaultian thesis that any 'regime of truth' privileges certain types of discourse according to the interests of those who were considered competent to distinguish between true and false statements. According to McCarthy Thomas, if we accept Foucault's position, we shall see that 'categories, principles, rules, standards, criteria, procedures, techniques, beliefs, and practices

firmly accepted as purely and simply rational may come to be seen as in the service of particular interests and constellations of power.'[18]

According to Foucault, 'power and knowledge directly imply one another ... the subject who knows, the objects to be known, and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations.'[19] Given this position, it is easy to see how power structures and relations in a society contribute significantly to the final determination of what constitutes as knowledge or truth. Foucault's claim in this respect is that what counts as knowledge and truth is established by social, economic and political practices.

Linking power with knowledge, Foucault visualizes power as a discipline which trains, individualizes, regiments and transforms human beings to be docile and obedient subjects. As was observed by Mac Donnell Diane, power (or discipline) has achieved a lot by means of surveillance and assessment. The supervisor's gaze, according to MacDonnell Diane, is a coercive means through which the behaviours of workers or pupils can be regulated while assessment is important as a means of imposing a normal range of ability, a common standard.[20]

Given the Foucaultian account, knowledge derives its source not in the modality of the universal, the 'exemplary', the 'just-and-true for all' but within specific sectors, as the precise points where the inquirers' own conditions of life or work situate them (such as housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual relations). However, although Foucault links knowledge and truth with power, and sees knowledge and truth as a product of the distribution of power relation in a society, it seems true—as Linda Alcoff suggests—that Foucault is not committed to the view that truth is determined by power.[21]

Foucault can be freed of a possible reductive fallacy. He does not reduce all epistemological considerations to political analyses and power struggles. Rather than appeal to Plato's world of form or to the Cartesian meditation of an isolated individual, Foucault says that knowledge develops from real, material, everyday, social, political and economic struggles.

Foucault opposes the Kantian emphasis on the autonomy of the epistemic subject, which makes human reason the foundation of knowledge. Instead, Foucault proposes that knowledge and truth are based on the social practices and institutions in which they are embedded.[22] Unlike the traditional epistemologists who based knowledge and truth on the 'given' and 'immediate' objects of experience, Foucault argues that these 'given' and 'immediate' objects of experience are themselves products of the different stages in the history of a society as well as of the corresponding forms of power relation.

There is a whole order of levels of beliefs, which are different in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects. The problem is how to distinguish between events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which the events belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which the events are connected with and engendered by one another. This problem arises from the thesis that for every society, for every historical age, there is a regime of truth, which, according to Michael Walzer, is generated somehow out of the network of power relations, out of the multiple forms of constraint, and enforced along with them.[23]

If this alone line of thinking is correct, then traditional epistemology errs in its posture as a general theory of knowledge. It does so, because given the Foucaultian approach:

Discourse in general and scientific discourse in particular is so complex a reality that we not only can, but should approach it at different levels and with different methods.[24]

These positions, in spite of Alcoff's observation to the contrary,[25] constitute an attack on the notion of continuity in knowledge. Foucault tends to juxtapose different historical moments and in doing so, tends to mark out breaks in knowledge: 'In short, there is a problem of regime, the politics of the scientific statement.'[26]

This reading challenges the traditional epistemological claims that there is some foundational truth. Instead, it is considered more plausible to maintain that all we have in the realm of knowledge are contingency and arbitrariness. Truth in this account varies from one regime to another. Unlike in traditional epistemology, philosophers are not expected to

build a theory of truth or of knowledge; rather, they should be interested in a practical 'history of the present'.[27] The role of a philosopher is not to spin theories of truth or of knowledge but to take part in local struggles and through criticism, change—if only for the moment—the balance of power in the present regime of truth.

Foucault can be justifiably understood to deny any need for any special theory of knowledge. In order to determine which knowledge-claim is justified and which is not, we need to turn not to the epistemologist but to the intellectual historian. Contrary to the traditional epistemologists' obsession with the need to answer the sceptics, Foucault urges inquirers to limit their concern to the manner in which certain knowledge-claims or forms of knowledge came into being:

... the target of analysis wasn't 'institutions', 'theories' or 'ideology' but practices—with the aim of grasping the conditions that make these acceptable at given moment ... to show its origin, or more exactly, to show how this way of doing things ... was capable of being accepted at a certain moment ... thus coming to seem an altogether natural, self-evident and indispensable part of it.[28]

This approach challenges the claim that there are self-evident informative truths. It also reveals the complex interconnection of truth or knowledge-claims with a multiplicity of historical process. Instead of ascribing self-evidence to any form of knowledge, attempts should be made to rediscover the connections, encounters, support, play of forces and so on, in order to show how a given 'moment' established what subsequently come to be seen as being self-evident, 'universal' and 'necessary'.[29] Rorty observes 'notions of "method", "starting-point" and "theory" are officially anathema to Foucault'.[30]

It is surmised that Foucault rejects the normative and prescriptive nature of traditional epistemology. Rather, he observes that knowledge or truth is not a mere product of what goes on in people's heads. He sees knowledge as a product of practical activities of people in their bid to settle some specific problems.[31] According to him, each society within a point in history—depending on who is accorded the power to say what—has its *regime of truth, its general politics of truth.* Each society has the types of discourse, which it accepts and allows to function

as true. Each has the mechanisms and instances, which enable one to distinguish between true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned, the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth, and the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.[32]

Foucault's use of the 'regime of truth' seems much like 'conceptual schemes'. According to Donald Davidson, conceptual schemes are ways of organizing experience, systems of categories which give form to the data of sensation, points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene.[33] Foucault, like Davidson and Kuhn, argues that there is no translating from one scheme to another. This implies that the beliefs, desires, hopes and bits of knowledge that characterize one scheme may have no equivalent for the subscriber to another. What counts as real in one system may be unreal in another.

Foucault's works suggest a Hegelian attack on the Cartesian (traditional) Foundationalist epistemology.[34] The notion of discontinuity also draws him near to Kuhn, both of whom want to substitute history for theory of knowledge. Foucault, on some interpretations, rejects only and any epistemology, which suggests that there is something to be represented in thought. Foucault also rejects any transhistorical knowledge or truth. For him, at least so it seems, what we may be tempted to take as an absolute or indubitable foundation of knowledge is, in the final analysis, a product of history and also explicated by the features of the dominant relation of power.[35]

Therefore, although Foucault does not accept the sceptical thesis that knowledge is impossible, he maintains that each community of inquirers has certain types of knowledge-claims, which it accepts and thus makes them function as truth. Foucault rejects all *a priori* and transcendental forms of knowledge, locating the source and the justification for knowledge-claims or truths in the practical activities of people as permitted within the structure of control in a society. He visualizes knowledge and social structure in an intimate relationship, further suggesting that knowledge has a necessary relation to its own social embodiment.[36]

FOUCAULT ON EPISTEMOLOGY

Foucault rejects the account wherein knowledge is a product of an abstract system of rules. He argues that in every society the production of discourse is controlled, selected, organized, and re-distributed according to a certain number of procedures. Foucault does not accept the idea that there is a single, fixed set of principles, which determines our basic assumptions about what constitutes an order of nature.

Foucault can be suitably pigeon-holed into two inconsistent positions of being a 'crypto-normativist' and an 'irrationalist'.[37] For instance, while Ian Hacking and Linda Alcoff read Foucault as offering a theory of knowledge, which is expected to avoid the pitfalls of traditional epistemology, Richard Rorty prefers the view that Foucault avoids epistemology altogether in his works.[38]

For Rorty, Foucault has set things up in such a way that he cannot have a theory of knowledge. Rorty observes that if one wants to build a theory of knowledge on the basis of Foucault's suggestions, it would be difficult to know where to start. His point is that it is not clear whether Foucault has a constructive theory to offer as opposed to simple polemics against traditional notions. Rorty considers Foucault as mainly offering simple negative injunctions to critical inquirers not to believe that knowledge is inherently characterized by progress, rationality or necessity. Rorty further claims that since the Foucaultian maxims are purely negative, they do not constitute either a theory or a method of knowledge.[39] Habermas accuses Foucault of 'presentism' and 'crypto-normativism'. Habermas observes that Foucault's approach eliminates the category of meaning, validity and value.[40]

If Foucault disapproves of all the existing theories of knowledge and is not prepared to offer any of his own, it is suspected that he leaves things open so that we will not be able to distinguish true from false. If he succeeds in telling us what is wrong with the traditional epistemology but fails to suggest any alternative theory of knowledge, it could also be inferred that he holds a fatalistic conclusion that we cannot do anything at all to improve on traditional epistemology. After all, errors are revealed so that improvement may be obtained.[41]

It is not enough to merely describe the manner in which different theories within the same or different ages have treated knowledge or

have found knowledge to be problematic. It is more helpful to also provide us with standards with which we can determine progress and to which we can aspire. Foucault's failure to provide the latter is what Walzer takes to be a radical nihilistic abolitionism.[42] Given Foucault's disavowal of any theory of knowledge, he fails to explain how to improve on the present. In doing so, he gives us no reason to expect that there will be any better theory of knowledge than the ones he tries to destroy. Given this, Nancy Fraser observes '... the genealogy of knowledge as a weapon would be superfluous ... only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it'.[43]

The bane of these beliefs is that we will end up lacking not only a theory of knowledge but also any sense of progress. This is problematic and undesirable. Although it is arguable that philosophy is more than a collection of theories, the fact remains that to criticize and reveal the shortcomings of previous and present forms of knowledge, one must inhabit some social setting, the codes and categories of which one adopts. It also requires that one constructs a new setting and proposes new codes and categories. However, Foucault does not believe in the necessity of such an act. This refusal, which according to Walzer, 'makes his genealogies so powerful and so relentless, is also the catastrophic weakness of this theory.'[44]

Inspite of the fact that Foucault declares his purpose to 'not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyze the specificity of mechanisms of power ...'[45] the task he sets himself appears to require a coherent view of reality and a sense of purpose. No doubt, he is saying something that he wants us to believe. If nothing else, he wants us 'to detach the power of truth from the form of hegemony ... within which it operates at the present time'.[46]

Alcoff does 'reject the view prominent among many continental theorists that Foucault represents such a radical rupture with epistemology ...'[47] Far from rejecting epistemology in its totality, a critical examination of Foucault's works suggests two possible epistemological readings. On the one hand, Foucault can be understood

to be a contextualist in epistemology. His use of the notions of history, discursive formation, power, and episteme points to the view that knowledge is context-dependent. On the other hand, these same key notions suggest—states Linda Alcoff—a coherentist epistemology.

On a coherentist reading of Foucault, strongly argued and supported with textual evidence by Linda Alcoff, Foucault holds the views: (1) that knowledge is 'an immanent account' and (2) that both justification and truth are 'dependent on systemic interrelationships of mutual support between elements'.[48]

Alcoff interprets Foucault's concept of a discursive formation as a possible system of a web of beliefs. Alcoff reads Foucault as generally sticking to the use of 'discourse' to refer to an actually existing group of statements that belong to the same discursive-formation. Alcoff sees the relation between discourse and discursive-formation as purely signifying a coherentist epistemology.[49]

Based on some textual support, Alcoff argues that:

(1) Coherentism is an immanent account of knowledge, which takes beliefs to be justified via their relationship to a system of mutually supporting elements.

(2) Foucault's account of knowledge is insistently immanent in his rejection of reference, intentionality, and transcendent notion of truth as explanatory concepts for the generation of knowledge.

(3) Therefore, Foucault's account of knowledge is a coherentist account.[50]

Alcoff imputes to Foucault the coherentist view that the structural features and strategies discernible at the level of a discursive formation create the possibility that a particular set of statements has meaning and a truth-value.[51] An extension of Alcoff's interpretation is that for Foucault, a statement that has no discernible connection or relation to any other statement is meaningless. The upshot of this is that justification and truth are internal to a discourse, and that they are emergent properties of a certain configuration of discursive and non-discursive elements and practices.

An interesting point is that Foucault's Coherentism—as articulated by Alcoff—is richer than the traditional coherentist thesis. Foucault's Coherentism, as a result of its inclusion of non-discursive elements

such as social and political settings or the positions of the epistemic subject in the system, may find less problem with the devastating criticism that mere coherence among beliefs cannot guarantee truth or epistemic justification. The claim is that truth is defined not merely by the relationship between propositions but essentially by non-theoretical factors. This articulation of the Foucaultian Coherentism breaks the epistemic circle by referring to the non-discursive elements.

However, as interesting and as textually supported as this interpretation of Foucault may seem, it appears more defensible to argue that Foucault's Coherentism is context-dependent. Although it may be argued that Foucault's epistemology is coherentist, it can only be so within some particular contexts. This means that the extra-theoretical factors define the coherence of the system. Foucault stresses the point that knowledge is fully constituted by the assumption reigning in a particular society at particular points in history. His view that discursive-formation determines what counts as knowledge or truth, treats knowledge or truth as something totally constituted by the forms of discourse and assumptions of an age.[52] Some passages in Alcoff's paper can be used to support this contextualized Coherentism of Foucault. For example:

The episteme might be thought of as a structure of rationality, which guides the production of knowledge in a given era.[53]

In fact, Alcoff expresses the view that:

we can characterize Foucault's approach to epistemology as a search for and study of epistemes, i.e. as a historical analysis of the formation and transformations of historically specific and particular discursive systems.[54]

Given a contextualized coherentist reading of Foucault, some problems crop up. One of such reservations concerns Foucault's argument that knowledge is fully constituted by the assumption reigning in a given society. This makes the history of knowledge to '... be seeking, and discovering, more and more discontinuities ...'[55] Given this belief the history of knowledge is no longer 'wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuity-increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its various fields of constitution and

validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured ...'[56]

This line of thinking fails to adequately acknowledge the influence of past assumptions and the fact that current forms of knowledge are, at least, partly built on the previous forms of knowledge. Foucault errs in neglecting the Marxist and Hegelian accounts that the latest forms of knowledge develop within the womb of the previous socio-historical contexts.[57] Unlike Foucault, it is not correct to claim that the forms of knowledge in a particular society and within a particular period in history are fully constituted by the assumptions reigning in that society and period. While it is difficult to defend the view that there is an absolutely secure knowledge, it is also the case that knowledge is less flexible than Foucault thinks.

Given the Foucaultian notion of episteme, it may not be possible to assess one form of knowledge from the viewpoint of another episteme. In this account, what counts as a valid form of knowledge in one system may not hold such a position in another. Inquirers, in this sense, would be much like the Kuhnian scientists who operate in different scientific traditions or in different worlds.[58] Foucault sounds like Kuhn, according to whom, different observers of the same world come to it with systems of concept, which are not inter translatable. This seems to bar mutual understanding between two inquirers of different epistemes. Foucault rejects the view of Feyerabend, according to which the choice of a point of view can be made outside the given system.[59]

As was observed by Thomas Wartenberg, Foucault is erroneous if he treats knowledge as something which is totally constituted by the forms of discourse and assumptions of an age. If that is so, Foucault will be left without a criterion for assessing the epistemic status of knowledge-claims embodied in a particular society.[60]

The cumulative force of the criticisms of scholars such as Fraser, Taylor and Habermas—according to Bernstein Richard—is to prove that Foucault's understanding of a Philosophic ethos as 'a permanent critique of our historical era is confused, incoherent, and enmeshed in performative contradictions'.[61] Bernstein read Habermas as accusing Foucault of committing performative contradictions, sliding down the slippery slope, and of totalizing critique.[62] This, for Bernstein, means

that critique is totalized and turns against itself so that all rational standards are called into question. Habermas accused Foucault of 'presentism', 'relativism' and 'crypto-normativism'.[63] Habermas' criticisms can be summarized to say that Foucault 'brackets normative validity-claims as well as claims to propositional truth and abstains from the question of whether some discourse and power-formations could be more legitimate than others.'[64] Even for McCarthy, the main loss of Foucault is 'the inability to justify normative distinctions that appeared at the heart of critical social analysis'.[65]

Inspite of the positions of the critics, Foucault seems to realize that the resolution of epistemic disagreements is very important to epistemology. Going through the works of Foucault, it is easy to see him criticize the dominant forms of rationality from the period of enlightenment and he thinks they need to be transformed.[66] Foucault's view will allow multiple transformations. Nevertheless, he did not pose it as a collapse of reason. For Deleuze, 'Foucault does not admit to universals of catastrophe in which reason becomes alienated and collapses one and for all'.[67] In fact, for Blanchot, Foucault was mainly 'using hyperbolic rhetorical constructions in order to compel us to disrupt and question our traditional understandings of these key concepts'.[68] It is more reasonable to read Foucault not to argue for the collapse of reason.

CONCLUSION

Much as Foucault professes to denounce traditional epistemology, it does not seem that he succeeded in showing that epistemology is superfluous. Foucault may have succeeded in refuting the traditional Foundationalist thesis of traditional epistemology. Nevertheless, granted that it is illusory searching for an indubitable foundation, the plausible alternative is not to propose unconnected and disparate ideas.

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22. Foucault Michael, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Science* (London: Tavistock Publication, 1970), p. xiv. Also, see Foucault Michael, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 117, Foucault Michael, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 50–51, 174, 81, and MacDonnell Diane, *Theories of Discourse*, p. 96.
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27. For instance, Foucault's self-professed aim as regards the study of the Prison was not to treat prison as an institution, but to concern himself with the practice of imprisonment. His aim was to show the origin of prison, or to show how this way of doing things was being accepted at a particular moment as a principal component of the penal system—thus coming to seem an altogether natural self-evident and indispensable part of the penal system. For further explanation on this, see Foucault Michael, 'Questions of Method' in Baynes Kenneth et al. (eds) *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?*, p. 103.
28. Foucault Michael, 'Questions of Method', pp. 102–104.
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33. Davidson Donald, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 183.

34. See Robert D'Amico, '*Sed Amentes Sunst Isti*: Against Michael Foucault's Account of Cartesian Skepticism' in *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (1994): 33–48.
35. The point must be stressed that Foucault shares a lot here with Karl Marx and Hegel on what look likes a historicist account of knowledge. He is closer to Marx than Hegel, because, of the non-idealist undertone of his work. However, he parts with the duo on his idea of discontinuity. While Marx and Hegel would believe that there is continuity and interconnectedness in knowledge, Foucault thinks otherwise—see Marx Karl, *Grundrisse* (New York: Vintage Point, 1973), pp. 85–108, Marx Karl, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), pp. 121, 210–11. Eftichios Bitsakis, 'For an Evolutionary Epistemology in *Science and Society*, 51 (1987–88): 402–403 and Hegel G.W.F., *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: George Allen and Unwin 1964), p. 75.
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Knowing Our Own Minds:
Ascriptions versus Expressions

MANIDIPA SEN

Centre for Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi 110 067

ABSTRACT

Philosophers have usually held the view that self-knowledge, as articulated in sincere avowals concerning our present mental states, possesses an authority that no second- or their-person claims—or for that matter first-person other tense claims—can ever have. This idea is strongly accepted and argued for by those who accept the Cartesian view of mind, the view that mental states constitute an inner realm which is directly available to the subject whose mental states they are. There seems to be, as it were, a profound asymmetry between the first-person and the other-person points of view. Taking avowals to be the basic form of self-ascription, this paper is an attempt to address the problem of self-knowledge by defending a form of expressivism in the philosophy of mind. After explaining three basic characteristics of avowals, and pointing out the deficiencies of the observational and the non-observational models of self-ascription, this article tries to argue for a hybrid character of avowals taking clue from the expressivist accounts of self-knowledge. According to expressivist philosophers, avowals are primarily expressions rather than ascriptions of mental states, and lack truth-evaluable content. In this sense, expressivism tries to go beyond the observational and the non-observational accounts of self-ascriptions by questioning the very way in which self-ascriptive sentences have been understood by these accounts. Expressivism in its original form may be too simple and deflationary an account to answer the basic problems of self-knowledge. That is why the paper defends a modified expressivist position.

INTRODUCTION

What are the things that we come to know effortlessly and immediately, without depending on any other (human/non-human) aid? The answer seems to be 'those of our attributes which go with our rationality, sentience, and affective susceptibilities'.[1] These are our own fears and hates, desires and beliefs, pains and pleasures, itches and tickles. Usually, these are cases of knowledge characterized by features that other varieties of knowledge, particularly knowledge concerning another person's pleasures, beliefs, etc., seem to lack. We may start by giving an example of what sort of knowledge we are talking about. When I have a toothache, I not only know it first-hand, I am supposed to be the best person to know it, and it is highly unlikely and, for that matter, impossible, that I'll go wrong about it. But my knowledge that $2 + 2 = 4$ or that the sun rises in the east are not of the same category. Anybody else can know these propositions in exactly the same way as I came to know them. Thus, when a sincere and linguistically competent person spontaneously utters sentences like, 'I feel sick', 'I am thinking of how to organize my lecture', 'I am really thirsty', it is typically taken to be the case that the subject is saying something which cannot be normally challenged. This picture of self-knowledge, which has an intuitive appeal, was further re-emphasized with the development of a Cartesian conception of mind.

According to the Cartesian view of the mind, mental states constitute an inner realm that is directly available to the subject whose mental states they are. Therefore, it is taken for granted that there is no problem concerning self-knowledge, no need for the pronouncement of the temple of Delphic Oracle 'know thy self', because human beings—constituted as they are—are already in possession of this kind of knowledge. Hence, the more important philosophical problem is concerning how and by what means, if at all, are we able to know and hence report the mental states and processes of other fellow human beings. But, as we know, this Cartesian picture of the mind and thus of self-knowledge have come under heavy attack in recent times in Philosophy as well as in Psychology. Paul Boghossian (1989) rightly points out that though Descartes and the Cartesians were able to influence a large number of philosophers in believing that self-knowledge was both exhaustive and infallible, Freudian theory as well as present-day theories in cognitive science have shown that Descartes' view carries very little conviction regarding at least a very large class of mental states and processes. Even so, a lot of philosophers hold self-knowledge and self-ascriptions to have a certain authoritativeness that other sorts of ascriptions lack. Boghossian himself acknowledges the fact that there is a profound asymmetry between the way in which I know my own thoughts and the way in which I may know the thoughts of others.

The problem of self-knowledge will be addressed by analysing and understanding the phenomenon of self-ascriptions, because they are either articulated or can be articulated in terms of self-ascriptive sentences. These are articulations of what is being felt, believed, hoped, feared, desired, etc., by the self. In the discussion that follows, we will first try to bring out certain characteristics of self-ascriptions which provide us with a justification for the kind of asymmetry that Boghossian talks about. These are the characteristics that distinguish first-person ascriptions from the other sorts. Having done this, we will try to enquire into the special epistemology that purports to go with self-ascriptions. In order to do this, we will, to begin with, very briefly consider the two traditional models of justifying self-ascriptions—the observational and the inferential models. We will, then, try to show that the inferential model is a non-starter given the way in which self-ascriptions have been understood, while the observational model has some irresolvable difficulties. Once these traditional models are set aside, we will consider the expressivist account of self-ascriptions. The expressivists try to go beyond both the observational and the non-observational accounts by questioning the manner in which self-ascriptive sentences have been understood by both these traditional accounts. Various problems have been raised against the expressivists. The final part of this paper considers some of these challenges to expressivism, and attempts to realize whether they may be met by formulating the expressivist position in a slightly different way, simultaneously, trying to keep intact the main spirit of expressivism in philosophy of mind.

I

Crispin Wright, in his article 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy',[2] says that authoritative, non-inferential, self-ascriptions about our present or occurrent mental states can be called 'avowals'. He goes on to saying that the basic problem of self-knowledge consists in explaining this phenomenon—in showing how and to what extent I am in an advantageous position than you are in making a statement of the form 'I have a severe toothache'. Is there any special relationship between me and my feeling of toothache such that I always know better than anybody else how it really feels? If there is such a special relationship, how are we to formulate it? If there isn't any such special relationship, how are we to account for our intuitive feeling that it is I who know best about my current mental state? If this intuition is just an illusion, won't that imply that in at least certain circumstances, you may know better than I about my toothache? But then, does that not sound rather unusual? These are some of the basis puzzles regarding avowals that have been dealt with by philosophers.

We may start our discussion of avowals by noting that they have a similarity and continuity in form and content with other kinds of reports about myself as well as others. There is no doubt a surface grammatical similarity between an avowal like 'I am very depressed' and a (physical) description like 'I am 6 ft tall'. Hearing me saying 'I am depressed', you may report 'She is depressed', and both these reports, once again, have very similar grammatical form. Therefore, there is no doubt that avowals share the surface grammar with many other present–tense ascriptions, self as well as third-person. Does this grammatical similarity suggest similarity in meaning and epistemology? A lot of philosophers think not. The reason for that may be made clearer by first distinguishing between two kinds of avowals, followed by showing the special features of these avowals in some form or the other.

Avowals may be of two kinds—phenomenal and attitudinal. Phenomenal avowals are those which report our intimate phenomenal experiences like, 'My feet are aching', 'I am elated', 'My vision is blurred', 'I have a severe toothache', etc. They, according to Wright, when sincerely uttered, are groundless, strongly authoritative and transparent. The groundlessness of these avowals is derived from the immediacy with which we come to know them. This feature ensures that once you say 'I have a severe toothache', it will be absurd to ask you the further question 'How do you know that?' I need not offer, and, in fact, it would be absurd to ask me to offer further explanation as to how I come to know that I have a toothache. Thus, my saying that I have a toothache is ungrounded. Whereas your saying that Manidipa has a severe toothache can very well be succeeded by the question as to how do you know that. A statement of this kind is strongly authoritative, because if someone sincerely utters such a sentence and understands what she means by uttering the sentence, then others have to accept it as correct. Doubting the authoritativeness of these avowals amounts to doubting the sincerity and the understanding of the person who utters such a sentence. But once we accept a subject to be making an honest statement that she has a toothache, we shall have to accept that her saying so is the evidence for the corresponding third-person ascription. That is why if you say, 'Manidipa has a toothache', and somebody asks you to substantiate your claim, your saying 'She told me just now' is enough to stop the person from asking any further questions. This sort of self-ascription is also transparent because I can't at one and the same time say 'I am in pain' and 'I don't know whether I am in pain'. We should note that these characteristics of phenomenal avowals hold only when individuals are not self-deceived about their motives and capacities, when they are sincere about what they are saying and do not want to deceive others, and when they understand what they are saying. It is only then that phenomenal avowals will have all the three characteristics mentioned above.

Apart from phenomenal avowals, we have avowals of what Wright calls, 'content-bearing states'. These are self-ascriptions of our intentional states that are directed towards some proposition or the other. Hence, when I say 'I believe that the library will be closed tomorrow', 'I hope that it rains in the afternoon', 'I am thinking of my mother', etc., I report my own propositional attitudes. These avowals are, in the first place, partly individuated by the propositional contents towards which they are directed, and hence lack the intimacy of the phenomenal avowals. Furthermore, and due to their intentional character, they do not possess the three features of phenomenal avowals, because, as Wright

points out, they are usually arrived at through a process of self-interpretation. These are contexts 'where we say that we have learned about our attitudes by finding that certain events cause us pleasure, for instance, or discomfort.[3] Here Wright takes the example of Jane Austen's character Emma who suddenly realizes that she is in love with Professor Knightly, by way of interpreting her reaction of dismay on hearing about Harriet's love for the same person. The moral that may be drawn from the story is that very often we are unaware of our beliefs, desires, wants, etc., and only through some kind of inference involving a process of analysis of our behaviours, actions or attitudes that we come to know what we really believe, desire, want, etc. But Wright points out that even this kind of self-interpretation, on an analysis, can be shown to be based on some 'non-inferential knowledge of a basic range of attitudes and intentionally characterized responses'.[4] For example, my desire to marry X may result from a process of self-interpretation where my being disconcerted to hear that X is planning to marry Y provides a non-inferential datum for the original desire. This second form of attitudinal avowals, i.e. 'I am disconcerted to hear that X is planning to marry Y', provides a non-inferential datum for my original desire. Hence, it is more of a ground for rather than a product of self-interpretation. These basic avowals are what Wright calls 'attitudinal avowals'. These do not require any further interpretation and grounding, and are also transparent to the extent that the subject knows it without any ignorance or uncertainty. However, they are not strongly authoritative because 'to the extent that there is space for relevant forms of self-deception or confusion, sincerity-cum-understanding is no longer a guarantee of the truth of even basic self-ascriptions of intentional states'.[5]

Wright claims that these attitudinal avowals, although not strongly authoritative, exhibit a form of weak authoritativeness. What does this weak authority consist in? What may be the basis of this authority if sincerity and understanding are not the guarantors of authority? In answer to these questions, Wright suggests that presumptive acceptability of testimony in general guarantees this form of authority. This kind of positive presumption claims that unless there is special evidence to the contrary, present–tense self-ascriptions are to be treated as veridical.

There appears to be a significant presumption that these avowals, as they are understood, convey undeniable truths about the current mental lives of the speaker—a presumption that sets them apart from ordinary empirical reports, like 'the grass is green' or 'I am 6 ft tall'. Davidson, in his article 'Knowing One's Own Mind' explains this point thus, 'the possibility that one may be mistaken about one's own thoughts cannot defeat the overriding presumption that a person knows what he or she believes; in general, the belief that one has a thought is enough to justify that belief.'[6] In this respect, Davidson thinks that these claims have a sort of authority that neither third-person claims, nor first-person other-tense claims can be said to have. If A says, 'I am in love with B', then I will take this claim to be a justification for my knowing that A is in love with B. This justification is derived from the presumptive acceptability of A's testimony, i.e. to take A as saying something true in so far as I have no good reason to doubt A's testimony.

This presumptive acceptability of attitudinal avowals, in a certain sense, cannot be challenged. Why is it so? We may try to answer the question in the following manner: To say that one has an authority over what she says about herself is equivalent to saying that she has authority over the conditions of current usage of what she is saying. This really entails that one typically uses and is inclined to use these self-ascriptions correctly. That this entailment holds can be shown by denying that one typically uses and is inclined to use self-ascriptions correctly. This denial further leads to an absurd situation that is brought out by Wright thus: 'Wholesale suspicion about my attitudinal avowals—where it is not a doubt about sincerity and understanding—jars with conceiving of me as an intentional subject at all'.[7] What is special about attitudinal avowals is that we cannot be chronically mistaken about the subject matter of these avowals. You may distrust my testimony concerning other people's character, or my memory regarding names, colours, etc., but this kind of suspicion cannot be wholesale because that would question the very fact of my being an intentional subject. That is why, when we disagree with someone who says 'I think that she is going to fall' we negate the propositional content, and say, 'No, she is too far away from the ledge'.[8] To this extent, reports about our own attitudes remain inalienable. So, from the above discussion, it follows

that avowals of both the varieties are groundless and transparent, with phenomenal avowals being strongly authoritative while attitudinal avowals weakly so.

The most important problem of self-knowledge is to explain how and to what extent the different kinds of avowals exhibit the properties that they seem to have. How is it possible for avowals to be groundless, authoritative (either strongly or weakly) and transparent? A theory of self-ascriptions needs to be formulated that respects as well as explains the way in which avowals behave.

II

One line of response to the problem of self-knowledge comes from accounts claiming that there is no real difference between the knowledge of our own minds and that of other person's mental states and processes. Our 'I' thoughts are systematically illusive. So, the best bet is to say that just as we come to know other people's mental states and processes with the help of inference from their observational behaviour, so we come to know about our own thoughts through a process of inference from what is observationally given to us. As we know, Gilbert Ryle's dispositional account of the mental states is connected with an inferential epistemology. Ryle in his book *Concept of Mind* vehemently argued that my ways of finding out about myself is exactly the same as your ways of finding out about me. Mistakes are possible in both the cases and, therefore, the difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others is just a matter of degree. But a thoroughly inferential account of self-knowledge fails to do justice to the intuitive epistemic fact that there is an inherent asymmetry between the way I know my own thoughts and how I come to know the thoughts of others. Thus, it also rejects the fact that avowals have the properties of groundlessness, authoritativeness and transparency. As we have taken the asymmetry between first- and third-person ascriptions seriously and also that of properties, which provide an explanation of this asymmetry, the inferential model of explaining self-knowledge is not available to us.

The traditional response to questions of self-knowledge lies in pointing out the fact that avowals are used to report a very special kind of knowledge, a knowledge that arises due to a very privileged position

that the subject has vis-à-vis the object. This is the Cartesian response to the problem of avowals. The claim made is that 'the truth-values of such utterances are non-inferentially known to the utterer via his or her immediate awareness of vents and states in a special theatre, the theatre of her consciousness, of which others can have at best an indirect inferential knowledge'.[9] This observational or the Cartesian model of the mental has its attraction and appeal. From a phenomenological point of view, the idea of introspective awareness of one's own mental states and processes seems highly probable. This model seems to provide us with the best explanation of the following two points: (a) avowals are governed by a strong asymmetric presumption of truth; and (b) sincere avowers seem to enjoy a special first-person privilege regarding their present mental states. It seems to be the best way of explaining the special characteristics of avowals.

Thus, the privilege observational model emphasizes the asymmetry between self-knowledge and other forms of knowledge. By highlighting this in such a manner, it further claims that there are aspects of our mental lives that can never be understood by others, 'there is no contingency ... whose suspension would put other ordinary people in a position to avow away on my behalf'.[10] This belief implies that this sort of observation is necessarily possessed only by the subject. Thus, this mental notion suggests both the following points: (a) One's own thought cannot be the subject of another's thoughts; and (b) there cannot be any unconscious thought. But this sort of a picture of the mental as having a unique and advantageous position can be consistently maintained only if a full-blown dualist Cartesian picture is in place— a picture according to which the outer world is publicly available, while the inner world enjoys a privacy of its own. There cannot be, according to Wright, any diluted form of the mental within the framework of the observational model.

Apart from the difficulties that we have already mentioned regarding the observational model, Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, directly attacks the Cartesian position by questioning the very idea that both the different forms of avowals are ascriptions of some inner states. The so-called private language arguments are targeted towards the idea of phenomenal avowals being inner observational reports. While the

various phenomenological and other considerations trying to show that intentional states are not mental processes, are directed against attitudinal avowals. By introducing the distinction between what seems right and what is really right, Wittgenstein claims that a private linguist has no way of telling what seems right to him and what really is right, a distinction that is essential for the reports he makes about this inner states to have truth-evaluable content. Furthermore, if avowals are to be taken as real reports then there must be a 'self-standing subject-matter, which they serve to report'.[11] According to Wittgenstein, we merely assume this to be the case because of the grammatical similarities that avowals have with other sorts of reports. But, as we know, for Wittgenstein the similarity ends there. There is nothing over and above this grammatical similarity, which can be appealed to in order to account for the grammatical similarity.

Now, the question that arises here is: What is the implication of rejecting the Cartesian model? The only plausible answer seems to be that mental content is 'somehow wholly manifest and available to public view'.[12] But, as we have noted, problems with this kind of response are as many as with the Cartesian model. Apart from the issues already mentioned, this view tends to take a behaviourist shape very quickly. And behaviourism has its own burden of difficulties to bear. Thus, the impossibility of a Cartesian as well as the non-observational model has led to an obvious conclusion—a conclusion that philosophers think can be derived from Wittgenstein's own writings.

If neither the observational nor the non-observational models of avowals are acceptable explanations of the special status of avowals, then what are we left with? The most important point to be noted at this juncture is that both these opposing positions have the same starting point, i.e. the avowals are assertions of states of affairs with positive truth-values. They convey information about our occurrent mental states and processes, and thus have an epistemically robust position. Following Wittgenstein, we can very well challenge this assumption.

III

We may try to look for a better understanding of avowals outside of the prevailing two alternatives by getting rid of the original assumption

of both the observational and the non-observational models of explanations. According to them, as we have already mentioned, avowals—be they phenomenal or attitudinal—are really assertions that may be considered as having truth-values. On the contrary, we can take them to be merely '*expressions* of the relevant aspects of the subject's psychology'.[13] There is, therefore, no substantial epistemology of first-person ascriptions. Further, there is no mode of cognitive access to these states which is distinctively available to the subject, and which also ensures the security with which sincere avowals are made. What does this expression of first-person mental states consist in? It is nothing but a way of displaying an aspect of the subject's psychology. Just as a smile displays that we are happy, or a wince displays that we are in pain, or a child's reaching out for a toy displays that she wants to have it, an avowal also displays that we are in a certain mental state. Avowal of pain is nothing but an acquired form of pain behaviour.

Is this expressivist account of self-knowledge able to handle the distinctive marks that avowals are taken to possess—the distinctive marks of groundlessness, authority, and transparency? Wright suggests that expressivism is consistent with the distinctive marks possessed by avowals. One can be asked to provide grounds or reasons for only statements that are either true or false. But as avowals like 'I am in pain' are not statements having definite truth-values, there seems to be no reason to ask for the grounds to assert them. Hence, avowals are groundless. They are, for the same reason, transparent, because no one can be ignorant of their truth-values, precisely because there is no truth-value to be ignorant of. Furthermore, as an avowal is just an expression of (pain/pleasure/want, etc.) behaviour, if the subject sincerely expresses it, then there is not question of others denying that she/he is in that mental state. A subject can make an error in reporting but there is no way in which she can make a mistake in expressing. Therefore, avowals as expressions also fulfil the mark of authority. There is no way in which others can deny my sincere claim; 'only it's being a piece of dissimulation—not sincere—can stand in the way of a conclusion that the subject really is in pain'.[14]

This kind of expressivism may be understood better if we compare it with expressivism in ethics. Expressivism in ethics is a non-cognitivist

view, which denies that propositions of ethics constitute a genuine branch of knowledge, or takes them to constitute a branch of knowledge in a very qualified sense. On the extreme form of non-cognitivism, there are no genuine ethical concepts. Ethical concepts expressed by words like, 'good', 'bad', 'right', wrong', etc., serve to express feelings and emotions, to express decisions and commitments, or to influence attitudes and dispositions. On a less radical form, it is held that these words may have some cognitive meaning, but conveying that meaning is taken to be secondary to the purposes of expressing feelings, decisions, etc. Likewise is the case with avowals. The main purpose of an avowal is expression rather than description. To be more precise, they are verbal replacements of natural expressions of certain mental states. There is really no difference between my grimaces, grunts or winces and my saying that I am in pain. But when you say 'She is in pain', you are trying to describe an objective situation. That is why, the question of truth (or falsity) does not arise in case of avowals, while it does so in the case of third-person ascriptions. Similarity in the surface grammatical structure between avowals and other forms of self-ascriptions have led us to conclude that just as third-person ascriptions are assertions, so should be avowals. Expressivists think that this is where philosophers have gone wrong, and that is precisely the reason why avowals need a non-cognitive interpretation.

. There are, however, various problems with expressivism. Peter Geach, in his classic paper, 'Assertion',[15] launched a sustained attack on moral expressivism. The main problem with expressivism that was highlighted is its inability to deal with certain basic logical moves in the working of language. Wright gives similar arguments against expressivism concerning avowals. They are as follows:

1. How can the expressivist proposal account for the transformation of tense from 'I am in pain' to 'I was in pain' or 'I will be in pain'? If 'I am in pain' is taken to be an expression then the corresponding two sentences in different tense should also be taken to be such. But, in that case, it is puzzling as to what they really express. In neither of the two cases is there a presence of pain and hence there is nothing that they can at all express. An expression surely has to take place at the same time as what it

expresses. If, on the other hand, we take 'I was in pain' and 'I will be in pain' to be genuine assertions having truth-values, then shouldn't the present-tense transformation of these two assertions be an assertion as well?

2. How are we to understand, in the expressivist framework, a locution like, 'He believes that I am in pain', where 'I am in pain' is embedded in the belief context. If this belief ascription is an assertion, which can be regarded as either true or false, then it seems absurd to deny that the embedded sentence 'I am in pain' is also an assertion with a particular truth-value.

3. Furthermore, there are genuine statements, like 'Someone is in pain' or 'Manidipa is in pain', which can be derived from the avowal 'I am in pain'. Now, how can a genuine statement be derived from something which is merely an expression without any truth content? Expressivists either have to say that these kinds of derivations are not possible (which is really an absurd claim to make) or they have to tell a separate story regarding avowals.

4. 'I am in pain' is embedded in a perfectly acceptable conditional statement like 'If I am in pain, I should take an aspirin', or a negation like 'It is not the case that I am in pain'. In understanding both these statements, we cannot take the avowal 'I am in pain' as a mere expression. In the conditional statement, where it is an antecedent, 'I am in pain' needs to be taken as a hypothesis that something is the case. While in the negation, it also needs to be an assertion, because a mere expression cannot be denied.

Objections like the ones above arise due to the intuitive acceptance of the fact that if others can report or describe my present state then I should be able to do the same. If I am able to report what had taken place in me at other times, I should be able to do it at this moment as well. If I can deny a state to myself then I should be in a position to assert its existence as well. Therefore, it does not make any sense to take avowals as mere expressions. It prevents us in connecting avowals to other forms of linguistic phenomena.

IV

These are surely important problems that expressivists need to address. But can these issues really pose a problem for the expressivists in the philosophy of mind, in particular, concerning questions of self-knowledge? Wright thinks not. They are very serious problems of expressivism in ethics. Expressivists in ethics clearly claim that there are really no moral facts or states of affairs. They attempt to draw a line between ethics and other areas of discourse dealing with facts. Therefore, whatever moral judgements we make are really not truth-evaluable and considering them to be assertions about a particular kind of states of affairs is a mere illusion. But the Wittgensteinian expressivist does not maintain that truth-evaluable mental contents are non-existent. There are surely ordinary psychological facts and, therefore, a locution like 'He is happy' is taken to be an assertion with a truth-evaluable content. As Wright correctly points out, the expressivist thesis pertains to avowals or first-person self-ascriptions alone. So, the mentalistic expressivist account—as it is originally conceived—attempts to draw a line within a single area of discourse i.e., discourse about mental states and processes. They claim that within this domain of discourse, there are some linguistic phenomena that are assertions/reports/descriptions, while there are others that are expressions. How does this difference between moral expressivism and metalistic expressivism help in answering the objections raised so far? We need to tell a slightly different story if we are to accommodate the existence of psychological facts along with an expressivist account of the mental.

We may start answering the above question by saying that this difference between mentalistic expressivism and ethical expressivism helps in accounting for some of the basic assumptions about avowals that we started with. In characterizing the presumptive acceptability of avowals, we mentioned that avowals are based on a presumption of truth—the presumption that unless we have some evidence to the contrary, avowals or self-ascriptions are to be taken as true. If we take avowals to be on a par with natural expressions and thus being incapable of having any truth-value, then we have to deny that the presumption that governs avowals is really a presumption of truth. Furthermore, the continuity that seems to exist between my saying 'I am in pain' and your saying 'She is a pain' cannot be explained if the expressivists altogether deny truth-values to avowals. Thus, we might need a less radical expressivist account in our understanding of avowals.[16]

Keeping in mind the special form that mentalistic expressivism take, we can try to formulate a less radical expressivist account of avowals by distinguishing between two questions: (a) Is an indicative sentence associated with a truth-evaluable content? and (b) Is it characteristically used in an assertoric manner? One can very well claim and it is a feature of performative utterances in general; that though a avowal is associated with a truth-evaluable content, its actual use is not assertoric. Appreciating the importance of the problems raised in the four points above, one may say what these objections indicate is that one cannot deny the presence of truth-evaluable contents even in the case of avowals. The expressivists need not deny this at all; what they can still say is that 'the typical use of such sentences is as expressions rather than assertions'.[17]

We may look at avowals once again to understand what is being said here. According to expressivism, an avowal proper is a natural expression. 'What a subject is doing when issuing an avowal proper is similar to letting out a cry or gasping in fear, in the sense that she is directly giving voice to her condition, rather than deliberately crafting an assertoric report that she is in a certain state of mind.'[18] In spite of this naturalness of avowals, they are, in a way, different from natural expressions. A little child's eagerly reaching out her hand for a teddy is not the same as her saying 'I want that teddy'. The latter expression does not express her desire in the same way as the former. The difference between the two lies in the fact that an avowal can be used—in a non-typical context—as an assertion that is capable of being either true or false. Seeing a friend after a long time I might say, 'I am really glad to see you'. When it is used as an avowal, it may be just a replacement of a hug. But in some other circumstances, I may deliberately use the sentence to describe or report a state of my mind. As many philosophers have pointed out, a truth-apt sentence can be put to all sorts of uses, and not every one of them need to be an assertion or report. Wright very clearly says in support of this position that expressivism need not suggest that one cannot make assertions about their own psychological

states and processes. In a non-typical context, they may do so. But when such an assertion is made, we have to grant—provided there is no evidence to the contrary—that the person's making this assertion is the best evidence for the truth of the assertion. The suggestion that can be made by the expressivists is that the apparent epistemic superiority of the selves conveyed by the avowals is an illusion. This illusion arises when we try and find a place for features typical of expressions 'in the context where these expressions are mistakenly taken as ordinary assertion'.[19]

One may at this point ask, does this not ultimately obliterate the distinction between first-person and third-person ascription, particularly when a self-ascription is being used in reporting the subject's mental state? In answer, we may go a little beyond what is being said in the previous paragraph about avowals having a non-typical use. We may say that the difference between my saying 'I am really glad to see you' when used as an assertion and someone else's saying 'She is really glad to see you' is that I am letting my friend know of my mental condition by expressing it, rather than by conveying my judgement about it. On the other hand, a third-person's utterance is purely a report of my mental state. That is why avowals may be taken to have a hybrid character. They are, on the one hand, directly expressive of certain mental conditions, while, on the other hand, they are truth-apt sayings about these conditions. This way of looking at avowals helps in explaining the grammatical similarity and continuity between avowals and other forms of ascriptions. At the same time, we can say that avowals are governed by an asymmetric presumption of truth. As avowals are transparent to the subject's mental condition, they are to be taken as incorrigible, just as their natural counterparts are.

Let us compare this situation with a linguist utterance like 'It is really hot today'. In uttering this sentence, we may not only report the weather condition, but we may also give voice to our feeling towards the heat. It is true that the sentence is primarily used to describe or report the weather condition, but it need not do only that. We may suggest that a very similar kind of hybrid activity, though of the opposite form, is being performed in case of an avowal like, 'I am really delighted to see you'. The primary task of this linguistic utterance is to express

my delight, but by doing so, I also tell you what the state of mind I am in. This is precisely the reason why an avowal is associated with truth-evaluable content. This does not mean that we play down the spontaneous expressivity of avowals proper. That is evident from the fact that they are not accompanied by any explicit intention to inform others that one is in that state, just as a sentence like 'It is really hot today' is not accompanied by an explicit intention of expressing the utterer's feeling of heat. As an objective observer of another person's mental state, I can only inform you of what is going on in his or her mind by conveying my belief about her mental state to you—for example, 'I believe that she is really delighted to see you'. But I can inform you about my occurrent mental state by expressing it directly, without having to articulate the belief that I am in that state.

The above is also the reason why expressivism of this form is able to provide us with a non-epistemic account of the privileged position that subjects have over their observers regarding their mental states and processes. The reason why it is inappropriate to question the truth of an avowal is due to the fact that the subject is in a better position to know what is going on in her mind. But because she has the advantage of ascribing occurrent mental states to herself by expressing them from within the experiencing of the mental condition. She does not forfeit her privileged position vis-à-vis her occurrent mental state even when some kind of secondary reporting is taking place. First-person privileged position will be given up only when the subject talks about her mental state in a way as if she was talking about somebody else's mental state, i.e. when she is not speaking from within the experience that she is having. Note that this is impossible for occurrent mental states, because there is no way in which the subject may be able to distance herself from the mental state she is in at the particular moment. This is how an expressivist can maintain the hybridity of avowals.

V

Having made a case for expressivism as against the four objections, Wright goes on to raising some fresh objections to expressivism. The general expressivist account of avowals seems to be based on a very restricted range of cases where there are natural, non-linguistic forms

of expressions. This is not such a serious objection, and can be handled by saying that we take certain typical cases of avowals and form a general theory on the basis of the features that these typical cases seem to have. This is not an unfamiliar strategy in philosophy. For example, semantics of third-person propositional attitude ascriptions unquestioningly takes belief-ascriptions to be the paradigm case of attitude ascriptions and tries to build up a general theory on the basis of the special features of belief-ascriptions. The same can be done in case of avowals. However, Wright points out some more serious objection to the expressivist account of avowals, which needs consideration at this stage.[20]

In the first place, we can very well conceive of a situation where the content of an avowal is available to me without any public expression—these are unarticulated thoughts. Suppose, sitting and reading a book, I say to myself 'Oh! How nice! My headache is gone!' In this case, my thought has no public expression, though it satisfies all the three properties of groundlessness, transparency, and authoritativeness of avowals. Let us try to understand the point of this objection a little bit more. In the very beginning of the paper, we defined avowals as authoritative, non-inferential, self-ascriptions about our present or occurrent mental states. Now, the objection harps on the point that there is a significant distinction to be drawn between self-ascriptions that are articulated and those others that are not. In the latter case, the objection seems to suggest that no act of expression is being performed, and hence, the expressivist account cannot take them to be genuine avowals despite the fact that they have all the three characteristics of a genuine avowal.

It seems that the expressivist can overcome this difficulty by way of a small modification. Avowals that are sincere, spontaneous and unreflective utterances can be given a voice or can also be silently held. Seeing a friend after a long time, I can say 'So good to see you' and give him a hug. Or, I can say to myself, 'I am so glad to see him'. In the two former cases, my expression is public, while in the latter it is private. It is like sitting in a room alone and exclaiming aloud, 'Oh! What a terrible headache I have!' In none of these cases of private reflections can we really say that they are not expressions. It is not

clear why expressions have to be publicly available in order for expressivism to work as a theory regarding avowals. Both public and private expressions can be subjected to expressivist interpretations. In both the cases, we are giving voice to our occurrent mental state—in one instance it is available to me, while in another instance it is available to others as well. It is not necessary that an avowal be always articulated in the way that Wright suggests.

Wright poses the third and the final objection to the expressivist thesis concerning avowals with the help of an example. Suppose a highly trained secret agent has been captured and is being tortured by his opponents. However, he does not express any of his pains by means of the standard behavioural signs. Nonetheless, his tormentors, with the help of certain sophisticated tools, are able to measure the amount of suffering he is going through. But as the agent is not expressing his pain either behaviourally or verbally, and as he may not be aware of the signs of his pain that are being recorded in the machine, the expressivists have to say that the tormentor is at a more advantageous position than the victim in assessing his pain. This surely is absurd. In fact, this objection arises because expressivists deny the epistemic superiority that the selves have over their avowals. This kind of superiority attached to the self was a result of mistakenly taking avowals as assertion. Once we take avowals to be really expressions, we have to reject epistemic superiority that the selves have over them. Hence, the objection is that in such a situation, the tormentor will be epistemically in a better position than the agent to know what is going on in the agent's mind. The only response available to us is to accept the epistemic superiority that avowers have over their avowals. But in that case, we have to take avowals to be genuine reports, which the expressivists anyway denied. So there doesn't seem to be any way out for the expressivists.

However, one can here try to answer to this objection by saying that first-person privilege is not completely denied to the subject in this expressivist account. As we have explained in the previous section, subjects always have a non-epistemic privilege over their observers regarding their mental states and processes. When the secret agent experiences pain, surely he is in a better position in ascribing this pain

to himself because he is able to express it from being within that felt experience. He may not be expressing his pain by some form of public behaviour which is available to his tormentors, but still there is no doubt about the fact that he is in a better position than his tormentors in ascribing pain to himself. So, the first point one can make in response to the objection is that the subject is not denied a privileged position vis-à-vis his mental states. It is a different kind of privilege that we are talking about. It is a privilege of the subject due to the peculiar situation that she/he is in. As we noted earlier, this special expressive position guarantees the presumptive acceptability of avowals in general. When there is no distance between my expression of pain and the feeling of pain, avowals remain unmediated by any judgement. Only then can we say that a subject is in a privilege position vis-à-vis his avowal. A third person can never be in that privileged position. The second point that one can make regarding the objection is that, like the previous one, this too seems to harp on the public behavioural signs of expressions. That may not be a requirement for an expressivist account of avowals. As we have noted, avowals are not accompanied by an explicit intention to inform others that one is in that state. Therefore, though the agent is not expressing his feeling of pain explicitly, he is, nonetheless, better placed in reporting them through his expression. He have a much better capacity to do that than anybody else does.

* * *

We began this discussion by trying to answer the basic question concerning the nature of avowals. The question was: How should we understand states of affairs that are appropriate to ensure the truth on psychological self-ascriptions, and in what sort of epistemic relations do the subject stand to these states of affairs? Expressivism in its original form may be too simple and deflationary an account to find a solution to this problem. But a variety of expressivism—that keeps in mind the distinction between ethical expressivism and mentalistic expressivism—can do a better job in this respect. Expressivism in this sense does not deny that there are psychological facts that may be reported by sentences like 'He is in pain'. But it goes on to say that the task of an avowal is primarily to express. But this primary task is or can be conducted along

with saying what is going on in one's mind. This hybrid character of avowals helps in answering the above question by saying that though the relationship between the avowal and the avower is not primarily an epistemic relationship, in certain context an avowal conveys information about the subject's state of mind. This is in accordance with the general view of how we use our language to perform various kinds of functions. Therefore, expressivism still seems to have a degree of credibility in our account of self-knowledge.

NOTES

1. Wright, Smith and McDonald, 1998, p. 1.
2. In Wright, Smith and McDonald, 1998.
3. Ibid., p. 14.
4. Ibid., p. 16.
5. Ibid., p. 17.
6. In Cassam, 1994, p. 43.
7. Wright, Smith and McDonald, 1998, pp. 17–8.
8. We may also deny one or more of the implications of the propositional content. Like in response to the avowal 'I am afraid of her', one can say, 'But she is so gentle!' In none of these cases does any one usually denies the testimony of the subject regarding her mental states.
9. Wright, Smith and McDonald, 1998, p. 23.
10. Ibid., p. 24.
11. Ibid., p. 33.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 34.
14. Ibid., p. 35.
15. *Philosophical Review* 74, 1965. Also mentioned in Wright, 1998.
16. See Dorit Bar-On and Douglas C. Long, 2001.
17. Wright, Smith and McDonald, 1998, p. 36.
18. Bar-On and Long, 2001, pp. 326–7.
19. Wright, Smith and McDonald, 1998, p. 36.
20. Ibid., pp. 37–8.

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The Semantic Question in the Realism-Antirealism Debate

GEETA RAMANA

Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Mumbai,
Vidyanagari, Santacruz (E), Mumbai 400 098

ABSTRACT

Since Aristotle and Descartes, thought and language have both been considered to be the most important and necessary human modes of acquiring knowledge and ascertaining their truth-value. Consequently, realism advocates theories about what the world is like independent of our knowledge or awareness of it and that one can make reasonably true statements about the world. However, a sense of caution and pessimism is expressed by antirealists regarding the possibility of getting a 'true' picture of reality, independent of our cognitive and linguistic abilities. Though realism and antirealism are metaphysical doctrines, the issue that enters into the debate is, at roots, semantic. An important question in the above context is: how is the world represented to us within the structures of thought and language?

Representations are said to exhibit intentionality, best seen in examples of what are called 'propositional attitudes' that are distinctive of one's psychological realm. Further, it is only a realism about beliefs and desires which are causally operative that can acknowledge the efficacy of the mental in our reason–explanations, while maintaining its supervenience on the physical. Davidson and Searle both envisage such a view where the logical and ontological features of the mind determine the nature of representation, which on the whole, take a holistic character. However, where Davidson places language as the primary basis for the significance of intentional predicates, Searle states that 'language is, in fact, derived from intentionality'.

To Davidson, one way of ascertaining the meaning of a sentence is being able to detail truth-conditions, wherein the semantic question of

what it is for a sentence to be true is best developed in his notion of 'radical interpretation'. This involves showing how 'most of the beliefs in a coherent total set of beliefs are true', aided by the methodological principle of charity. Though both truth-conditions and conditions of satisfaction are significant indicators of meaning, Searle argues for a distinction between the related notions of meaning and communication. Meaning can, therefore, exist independently of the intention to communicate that meaning. Searle's analysis thus stresses the importance of representation in meaning and the fact that representation of the state of affairs is both prior to and independent of communication. Davidson's notion of minimal interpretation does not seem to depend on any stable theory of meaning. Representation is important but only through an interpretation that is heavily dependent on communicative agreement.

One can agree that there is no one way that language 'hooks on the world', yet it is important to account for the basis of communicable agreement that successful interpretation yields. Correspondence is to be understood as a correspondence of ideas that others also can have when intersubjectively sharing the same 'objective' world. That is, one cannot deny the idea of an objective world (or intersubjectively accessible truth) independent of my beliefs—for truth-conditions to operate—without regressing into some form of idealism. Language is itself a rule-bound activity and so we cannot do away with either intentions (of speakers) or conventions in the use (or misuse) of language, but nor can we blur the semantic-pragmatic distinction. Language thus becomes the only means to assess the questions of meaning as well as truth-conditions. If 'understanding' is to contribute to the notion of meaning and significance of acts and actions, then we do need to analyze the structure of the constitutive character of conscious rational actions that are able to differentiate between ambiguity as well as clarity; rational as well as irrational (*akratic*) action.

Our idea or concept of a world—of what is true and what is false, what is real and what is unreal—largely depends on the objective conditions that humans can determine with the help of language. Correspondence then remains an important relation that helps in developing criteria for truth-conditions. However, correspondence is to

be understood as a correspondence of ideas that others also can share when intersubjectively sharing the same 'objective' world. That is, one cannot deny the idea of an objective world (or intersubjectively accessible truth) independent of my beliefs, for truth-conditions to operate, without regressing into some form of idealism. A strong empiricism in the sense of somehow always deferring to evidential or factual claims, changing our theories to suit facts, is the hallmark of realism as also a good theory of human action.

INTRODUCTION

As a metaphysical thesis, realism advocates theories about what the world is like, independent of our knowledge or awareness of it. The related epistemological question that follows then is whether *knowledge* of such a world is possible. If the world is understood as mind-independent, how does one get to know about it? On the one hand, realism allows us to optimistically know and understand the objective world; it is believed that we can make reasonably true statements about the world. On the other hand, as Wright puts it, the natural antagonists of realism are scepticism and idealism, where there is a sense of caution and pessimism regarding the possibility of getting a 'true' picture of reality as it exists independent of our cognitive and linguistic ability.[1] The next sceptical challenge posed is: on what grounds can be trust our theories if they could all, in principle, be radically mistaken? Broadly, antirealism would deny that the world is mind-independent. At least, one can never know the 'truth' about things independent of how we conceive it within the vocabularies of thought and language. We have, as it were, a filtered view of reality coloured by, say, perceptual and cultural frameworks. (In a way, *how do we know* presupposes the question *what do we mean*.) Nevertheless, the semantic question that comes up even prior to the epistemological question of how one can obtain knowledge of a mind-independent world, is that of representation. How is the world represented to us within the structures of thought and language?

There are important semantic notions such as truth, meaning and reference that enter into the debate between realism and antirealism. Though the ontological issues may not be entirely resolved, it is hoped

that the semantic (or the epistemic) approach will broaden the scope of the debate that had traditionally moved into the direction of ontology and subsequent metaphysics of either transcendence or idealism. Since the time of Aristotle and Descartes, it has been assumed that thought and language are the most important and necessary human modes of acquiring knowledge and ascertaining their truth-value. Therefore, we need to enquire the manner in which this information is *given* or *experienced* or, as contemporary philosophers put it, *represented* to us.

The debate between the realists and the antirealists on semantic grounds hinges on the relation between language and reality. In contrast to the paradigm of objectivity in matters of reference, the antirealist arguments bear upon the fact that there is a certain constraint by way of language and culture, thought and belief, upon the way in which we 'make' our world. There is no extra-linguistic reality inseparable from language. It is claimed that language cannot have any objective relation of representation to such a reality. A kind of semantic relativism[2] can be seen in the way meanings are related to a language. For instance, many a times a word cannot be translated into another language without loss of meaning. An Indian word like *dharma* or a Japanese word like *amae* (used for a locally defined emotion) has no equivalent in English. Traditionally, correspondence theories have pictured a world that *can* be represented by our language where the truth of propositions depends on its 'correspondence' to facts or the relevant state-of-affairs that exist in the world. On the other hand, coherence theories advocate *coherence* within a set of beliefs as the test of truth. Epistemologically speaking, we cannot get *outside* our set of beliefs and compare propositions to objective facts. In both cases, there is the question as to how mental representations function and contribute to our understanding of meaning and truth. Correspondence and comparison, coherence and consistency are all effected only through human understanding and judgement. They cannot be perfect tools by themselves. Nevertheless, both Correspondence and Coherence must have some representational capacities/functions that foster greater or lesser degrees of truth and consistency.

Although realism is best expressed by the correspondence theorists' position on thought, language and the world, the exact nature of the

representation or correspondence between facts and the language applied to bear out this relation is not always clearly definable. We can see the point made by Russell in his *Logical Atomism* and Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*, that 'the world is a totality of facts, not things' (1.1). However, to start with, there is no simple way to identify what counts as a fact. We can see why the charge of (inevitably) re-entering the metaphysical realm was made against both Russell and Wittgenstein. A semantic theory of truth (as opposed to a metaphysical one), arises when 'we need ... to legitimize the concept of logical grammar'.[3] What this means is that 'for a judgement to be truth-evaluable, it has to be structured'. Given this requirement, an extensionalist reading can be made to develop 'a theory that shows in a systematic way, how the combinatorial structure of a judgement determines the truth-condition of the judgement'.[4] In this Tarskian method, the representational power of a language (meta-language) is exploited in order to state what it is for the object language to express truth.[5] For example, 'p' is true if snow is white (where p stands for the statement snow is white). In taking representation to be one of the many functions of language, we can fruitfully understand how there is an attempt (also by philosophers like Davidson) to define meaning and significance in terms of truth-conditions. The Tarskian idea, apart from being able to specify the structure of a language by unambiguously specifying the class of meaningful expressions, also enables one to analyze how a sentence can be true, if and only if the conditions under which such a sentence is asserted, can be asserted. The truth-conditions of a sentence are the conditions under which the sentence is true. The Tarskian analysis provides a systematic way of specifying the (semantic) truth-conditions for any sentence L. In this approach one is not, as it were, going beyond the representational power of language to say what it is for a language to express the truth. Here, the concepts of truth and structure are connected at a meta-linguistic level, thus avoiding any direct confrontation with the world. (It should be noted that according to Tarski, the semantic conception is completely neutral towards epistemological attitudes and issues of realism and idealism.) However, the real semantic power of language is grounded in the language-world relation, as rightly pointed out by Michael Luntley.[6]

One instance of semantic antirealism is seen in Dummett's position where truth and falsity are made to depend on epistemic notions like justified assertion or 'warranted assertability'. Realism is semantically understood on the basis of the principle of bivalence, whereby a statement is determinately true or false. However, this also requires knowledge of the conditions under which they are true.[7] A semantic theory also needs to provide for the basis on which a theory of meaning can be constructed; to exhibit, for instance, the manner in which a sentence is to be determined as true. A theory of meaning must say what a speaker knows when he understands a language and explain how the speaker's understanding of an expression determines its semantic value, further contributing to the determination of truth. Though realism and antirealism are metaphysical doctrines, the issue that enters into the debate is, at its roots, semantic. Dummett also feels that one cannot keep the theory of meaning 'sterilized from all epistemological considerations'. The challenge that the realist and the antirealist face is to show how one can *differentiate* on the one hand and *link* on the other, '*p*' *and a knows that* '*p*'. Davidson attempts to develop a position that places our knowledge of '*p*' as dependent on the condition of inter-subjective agreement that would, in fact, be the basis (evidence) of one's assertion. This further depends on an account of communication that the radical interpreter provides. This, as John Campbell reasons, requires us to understand the conceptual articulation of the thought in terms of a certain structure.[8]

Since representations are said to exhibit intentionality, in the sense that they refer to or stand for something, they also contribute to our understanding of meaning as well as truth. In a representational theory of the mind, for instance, thoughts are believed to have contents that are carried by mental representations. To have a theory of thought is to have a theory of content. Thoughts are said to have semantic properties in the sense that thinking about 'Pegasus', for example, is to think not only about *Pegasus* but also that the horse is winged. In other words, thoughts not only denote that also attribute and this linguistic representation also suffices for their truth valuation. One could, as a result, say that when one thinks *about* certain things, one entertains propositions that stand for *states-of-affairs*.[9] If we consider the

philosophy of mind, attitudes are seen to have contents and these are often represented as propositional. Beliefs and desires, hopes and fears, for example, are all called propositional attitudes that are identified by their propositional contents. For instance, a belief that snow is white is identified by the proposition that snow is white. Propositional attitudes are, thus, very distinctive of one's psychological realm and function in diverse ways, in one's descriptive, explanatory and justificatory practices. Only a *realism* about beliefs and desires that are causally operative can acknowledge the efficacy of the mental in our reason-explanations, while maintaining its supervenience on the physical. Davidson and Searle both envisage such a view where the logical and ontological features of the mind determine the nature of representation, which on the whole, take a holistic character.

Assuming, therefore, that intentionality is a prime property of many intentional states and events, an important question that arises is: how do intentional states represent their objects and *states-of-affairs*? Although intentionality of mental states are explored using linguistic tools, according to philosophers like J. Searle, 'language is derived from intentionality and not conversely'.[10] Beliefs and desires have an intrinsic form of intentionality where the representative content of a belief that you will leave the room and the psychological mode, whether of belief or fear or hope, is distinguished. For example, 'if a man loves Sally and believes it is raining, his two intentional states can be represented as Love (Sally) and Believe (it is raining), the general form being $S(r)$ where S represents the psychological mode and r the representative content'. Beliefs, like statements, can be true or false and have what is called the *mind-to-world* fit.[11] This means that if one turns out to be false, then it is one's belief and not the world that is at fault. We correct the situation by changing the belief. On the other hand, states such as desires and intentions have a *world-to-mind* fit. They cannot be true or false, only fulfilled or unfulfilled. One cannot, in this case, correct the situation by merely changing one's intentions or desires. Another feature of intentional states is that the intentional state constitutes the 'sincerity condition' and is expressed in the performance of the related speech act. Lastly, intentional states have 'conditions of satisfaction' or 'conditions of success'. That is, beliefs are said to be

'satisfied' if and only if things are as one believes them to be, and desires are 'satisfied' if and only if they are fulfilled, and intentions are 'satisfied' if and only if they are carried out and so on, the conditions of satisfaction being internal to the intentional state. In other words, every intentional state consists of an intentional content in a psychological mode, which also determines the conditions of satisfaction. If, for instance, one has a belief that it is raining, the content of one's belief is that it is raining and the 'condition of satisfaction' is that it is, in fact, raining and not that the ground is wet or that the overhead tank is leaking. In other words, the 'conditions of satisfaction' are said to be *represented* under certain aspects. 'Every intentional state with a direction of fit', Searle concludes, 'is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction'.[12] The logical properties of intentional states arise from their being representations, their ontology and forms of realization being quite irrelevant. Further, the conditions of satisfaction function only against a network of other intentional states as well as what is called a *Background* of certain non-representational mental capacities.[13] Intentional states are, consequently, a part of a complex of other psychological states and such a holistic network determines the nature of representation. Simple actions like wanting to get a drink from the refrigerator require a whole lot of other abilities—not themselves representations—as in standing and walking, opening and closing doors and so on.

To accept the realist picture of the world as mind-independent allows for the primacy of truth-conditions and objectivity of our representations. This is what Davidson's position too manages to achieve by defending a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, whereby one can accept objective truth-conditions, a realist view of truth as also agree that knowledge is of an objective world independent of our thought and language. For Davidson, one way of ascertaining the meaning of a sentence is being able to detail truth-conditions. Though truth is relative to a speaker, at some time this picture can be developed to provide 'a clear and testable criterion of an adequate semantics for a natural language'.[14] The relation between word and world as expressed naturally in language is analyzed by Davidson in terms of 'what role each sentence plays in so far as that role depends on the sentence's being a potential

bearer of truth and falsity; and the account is given in terms of structure'.[15] Although this theory may not be able to adequately account for the different kinds of discourse, there is an attempt to provide for an alternative to the requirement of an extra-linguistic reference for a realistic notion of meaning. It is only within the boundaries of our linguistic abilities (and because of it) that meaning gets established. The argument is that it is only with the help of a language that concepts can function and which, in turn, can help in the determining of truth-values. Non-language users cannot be thinkers. In fact, Davidson goes so far as to say that only a creature with a language can properly be said to have a full-fledged scheme of propositional attitudes.[16] If we take propositional attitudes to be characterized primarily by an intentionality, this is seen by some philosophers (like Fodor) as the representational feature of mental phenomena. The semantic relation between thought and language has given rise to various contrasting positions, starting from the seminal Cartesian notion of 'no thought without language' and further developed by Davidson and others. Though Davidson would differ on the issue of the privacy of the mental, it is significant that thought and language express and share semantic notions of meaning, reference and truth-value.

Traditionally, meaning and reference are connected in the sense that to know the meaning of a word is to know how to pick its referent. Once we know that referent, truth-conditions can be easily delineated. However, Davidson points to the irrelevance of reference in his theory of truth and interpretation. Nevertheless, Davidson's slogan of 'correspondence without confrontation' does not intend to conflict with coherence but, in fact, purports to yield correspondence. As he puts it, 'Truth must be a non-relativized, non-internal form of realism',[17] meaning that Davidson would accept an externalist position with respect to propositional attitudes so that they cannot be characterized without reference to the nature of objects and states-of-affairs in the world. In this sense, successful interpretation yields a kind of correspondence, depending on external events and objects. Objectivity is also accomplished by the simple criterion of similarity of response. It is this sharing of response that provides for the content of thought and language. Since interpretation is not relative to any particular scheme, extreme

relativism and scepticism is avoided. 'Reference remains inscrutable', as the interpreter of different schemes 'will not be able to pick out a unique, correct way of matching the schemer's words and objects'.[18] Truth does remain relative to language, but all that gets fixed by the relativization is 'the way we ask questions about reference, not reference itself'.[19] As Davidson explains, if we take the word "rabbit" to refer to *rabbit*, we take him to be speaking one language. If we take his word "rabbit" to refer to things that are Φ of rabbits, we take him to be speaking another language. If we decide to change the reference scheme, we decide that he is speaking a different language'.[20] Thus, it is impossible to determine what a person believes, hopes, desires, intends and then look for their reference. All of them function holistically but can still have determinate representations or conditions of satisfaction. Davidson's notion of *radical interpretation* tries to show how 'most of the beliefs in a coherent total set of beliefs are true' (Coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Davidson). Thus, 'every belief in a coherent total set of beliefs is justified'.[21] What checks scepticism, error and incommensurability of beliefs is the methodological *principle of charity*, which not only aids but is, in fact, a precondition for actual interpretation.[22] What counts as truth is justified by an interpretation of speech where meaning and belief play complementary roles. The aim is to make the speaker's utterances intelligible and 'favour interpretations which as far as possible preserve truth'.[23] For example, Quine started with 'prompted assent' as basic, referring to the speaker's assent to a sentence and what one believes about the world. Davidson takes it as a general rule that a speaker who wishes to be understood cannot also systematically deceive his would-be interpreters when he assents to sentences or holds them to be true. Such a holistic theory of meaning depends on the background of beliefs and their consistent reflection in our speech-acts, enabling the determination of their truth-value. A theory of truth thus leads to a theory of interpretation where the semantic question (rather than the epistemological) of what it is for a sentence to be true, is addressed.

Mental phenomena in traditional epistemology have always been depicted as the occurrence of inner processes in the much abused *Cartesian theatre* of the mind. On the one hand, the influence of early

Wittgenstein on this point associates meaning with truth-conditions while on the other hand, Austin and later Wittgensteinian analyses approach meaning in terms of linguistic usage. Searle tries to mediate between both these views. The mind's experiential relation to the world must be well structured to be represented in thought and language. He tries to combine the intentionalist and correspondence theorist's fundamental insights to develop a position wherein 'to know the meaning of a statement is indeed partly to know under what conditions it is true or false and similarly to know the meaning of a command is at least partly to know under what conditions it is obeyed or disobeyed ... (however) ... this is not inconsistent with the intentionalist view that to mean something is to have a set of intentions'.[24] Searle achieves this (*pace* Davidson) by distinguishing meaning from communication and showing how meaning-intentions can easily be specified in terms of 'the correspondence conditions on the success of the utterance ...'.[25] Searle argues that 'intended effects of meaning are not perlocutionary but rather illocutionary'.[26] In other words, the intended effect of meaning must be *understanding* in the hearer, which also includes knowledge of the conditions on the speech act being performed by speaker. Though meaning and communication are related notions, communication is a *consequence* of meaning. Searle states that the primary meaning intentions are represented by utterance and communication intentions are to produce in the hearer the knowledge that one is intending to represent.[27] One may have no intention of communication or persuading the audience in any manner except that the intended effect of meaning is understood by the relevant party. Meaning, therefore, can exist independent of the intention to communicate that meaning. Searle's analysis thus stresses the importance of representation in meaning. This representation of the state-of-affairs is both prior to and independent of communication.

Davidson's notions of minimal interpretation do not seem to depend on any stable theory of meaning. It is true that we usually make sense of events by distributing families belief systems to others. In fact, Davidson's primacy of truth via interpretation leaves little scope for any *theory* of meaning and intention, particularly in the analysis of human action. What if we are unable to make sense of a *state-of-affairs*

precisely because we have been too charitable or do not share another's belief systems? In that case human actions, in their normative sense, cannot be understood. It is the human subject that must step in and contribute to a meaning that gets represented in thought and language. If truth is an attempt to describe what is, meaning is its content.

As Strawson says, the idea of truth leads us to the idea of what is *said*, the content of what is said when utterances are made. That, in turn, leads to the question of what is being *done* when those utterances are made.[28] However, to Davidson, there is a pattern to sentences held true that enables the determination of meaning. The argument is that given a set of sentences accepted as true under given circumstances, one could 'work out' (interpret) the relevant beliefs and meaning of words. We can also know that a speaker may hold a sentence true without knowing either what is meant or the beliefs it expresses. Though truth remains the primary notion in terms of which meaning is attributed, the idea is that a theory of truth is a function of *interpreted* statements that alone allows for attribution of true as well as false beliefs in accordance with maximal (inter-subjective) agreement. Thus, Davidson's analysis also stresses on the importance of representation but only through an interpretation that is heavily dependent on communicative agreement. Unlike Searle, Davidson believes that communicative agreement is a prerequisite of a theory of truth and independent (though related) to a theory of meaning. To Davidson, a theory of truth, for a speaker or group of speakers, emerges from a network of beliefs that are related in order to generate understanding. And since a system of beliefs must be constrained by consistency, Davidson argues that 'belief is intrinsically veridical'. This is because, as he puts it elsewhere, '... thoughts, like propositions, have logical relations. Since the identity of a thought cannot be divorced from its place in the logical network of other thoughts, it cannot be relocated in the network without becoming a different thought. Radical incoherence in belief is, therefore, impossible. To have a single propositional attitude is to have largely correct logic, in the sense of having a pattern of beliefs that logically cohere. This is one reason why to have propositional attitudes is to be a rational creature.'[29]

Although there is no one way that language 'hooks on the world', it is important to account for the basis of communicable agreement yielded by successful interpretation. Communicative agreement can only be a means to check consistency, not condition for a theory of truth. Such a theory rightly addresses the methodological problem of the manner in which an interpreter can confirm its truth. This involves taking into account the pragmatic considerations and contextual implications that further our (semantic) understanding. The interpreter must use some kind of theory to guide his interpretation (and so does the speaker), though there is no correct theory in advance that is always put to use. Although the starting point of two individuals could be as different as Greek and Sanskrit, there is the linguistic ability to make oneself understood and also understand the same with the help of what Davidson calls 'passing theories'.[30] There is, then, 'no learnable common core of consistent behaviour, no share grammar or rules, no portable interpreting machine set to grind out the meaning of an arbitrary utterance'.[31] Nevertheless, some amount of *post facto* internal representation must be possible that enables the correspondence to reflect in our descriptive linguistic practices. There may not be a well-defined structure even by appeal to convention, yet the content of understanding can only be further communicated with the help of some well-defined tools. Language is itself a structured rule-bound activity. So we cannot do away with either intentions (of speakers) or conventions in the use (or misuse) of language; nor can we blur the semantic–pragmatic distinction. Analyses of semantic and pragmatic requirements that are largely contextual need to be reconsidered in the light of how meanings also depend on what and how things are grasped. If 'understanding' is to contribute to the notion of meaning and significance of acts and actions, then we do need to attempt an analysis of the structure of the constitutive character of conscious rational actions that is able to differentiate between ambiguity as well as clarity; rational as well as irrational (*akratic*) action.

One cannot blur this distinction because, among other things, it helps us see more clearly the difference between the constructed semantics of formal and natural languages. Nevertheless, both do require some system or repertoire of rules for translation and interpretation in

order to determine the meaning as well as truth-conditions. Something that has been understood or makes sense alone can also facilitate in determining its truth, though even an accurate and most sophisticated decision procedure may never generate an understanding or elicit significant response from us (except possibly to say 'I don't understand').

Some scholars have defined pragmatics as the formal study of context-dependence and this is what governs natural language where the pragmatic principles of relevance and background determine truth-conditions of the expressed propositions. As Ruth Kempson points out, 'in pragmatics ... linguistic meaning is the rule-governed contribution that expressions of a language bring to the process of utterance interpretation'.[32] The goal that research would like to achieve is perhaps to successfully apply the rigour and clarity of the artificial medium of formal languages to more cognitively important aspects of an ordinary language. This takes us to the important question of what facilitates radical interpretation in ordinary as well as extraordinary circumstances. If we think that conditions of sense can be reasonably determined even in ordinary conversations, then one must be able to allow for the description of those conditions that will, nevertheless, be always flexible and primarily subject to the individual's 'reading' of the state-of-affairs. I think it is the *conscious* ability to identify a pattern of events as well as explain why an unexpected or non-literal interpretation may be necessary that makes a success of radical interpretation and not mere communicative agreement. It explains not only how 'understanding' but also 'misunderstanding' as well as 'non-understanding' take place. Global and intersubjective principles of charitable cooperation and tolerance can make sense only if an 'individual' adopts an attitude, not as a formal but an intelligent principle, knowing how to apply them to general as well as particular cases. Ultimately, going beyond what is seemingly transparent is necessitated only because at some point something has not been clear or makes no sense unless we radically interpret. But it is still tied to a correspondence of some generally acknowledged or shared perceptions. Seen holistically, the semantic-pragmatic distinction does get blurred but for particular purposes like construction of 'formal' languages or the study of structures of human language and thereof the mind, the distinction can be of conceptual

significance. Today, we know some of the neuro-physiological (empirical) conditions of speech and thought; it is possible that conceptual conditions of thought and language (if describable) may reveal more clearly the nature and function of conscious mind as well as human action.

Expression and interpretation of thoughts is a necessary condition of rational behaviour. Only one can determine the consistency and coherence of beliefs and actions in the light of interests and values that rationalize one's actions. But how do we form our beliefs? Our beliefs arise from the idea or *concept* of a shared world that might nevertheless be differently perceived. The different perceptions or beliefs of various people regarding the same event or action still depends on 'the concept of ... an objective world, a world about which each communicator can have beliefs'[33] and that this belief or perception can be communicated. In this sense, language seems to be an essential, if not the only factor that facilitates truth-conditional requirements.

Truth, in this context, would be a consistency and coherence that is bounded by the fact that we do, in principle, *participate* in the same world and communicate through a mutually understandable language. Our idea or concept of a world—of what is true and what is false, what is real and what is unreal—largely depends on the objective conditions that humans can determine with the help of language. Correspondence then remains an important relation that helps in developing criteria for truth-conditions. However, *correspondence is to be understood as a correspondence of ideas that others also can have when intersubjectively sharing the same 'objective' world*. In other words, one cannot deny the idea of an objective world (or intersubjectively accessible truth) independent of beliefs, for truth-conditions to operate, without regressing into some form of idealism. Language thus becomes the only means to assess questions of meaning as well as truth-conditions.

We assume that most of our beliefs or theoretical systems are true and change our belief according to the situation or facts that confront us. In this sense, truth does emerge when our beliefs and facts maximally correspond—when our theories do explain the facts most satisfactorily or the relevant psychological determinants do justify the consequent action. Facts, events or actions are explained only when the relevant

links in the chain are discovered or appropriately analyzed. Although this requires some amount of interpretation, taking into account various factors involved in the analysis of a situation, this will make sense only if the explanadum now makes sense or is better understood. The fact that sometimes we can be totally misled and erroneous in our understanding does not make the search for the most consistent explanation (rather than an accurate one) futile; on the contrary. A strong empiricism in the sense of somehow always deferring to evidential or factual claims, changing our theories to suit facts, is the hallmark of realism as well as a good theory of human action. This is how correspondence involves a consistent and holistic set of propositions whence truth is established to the extent it is the best imaginable explanation until, of course, further evidence forces us to question or change our beliefs and theoretical assumptions.

Both, linguistic behaviourism of Quine as well as the extended Davidsonian version of a shared response—usually also sharing a causal situation—avoid a direct confrontation with reality. Despite all these strategies, the 'vagueness of shared situations' to use a Quinian phrase, makes meaning and truth tread quite a tenuous path between the human subject and the world of events and actions.

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Madness, Reason and Truth

DAYA KRISHNA
Jaipur 302 015

Philosophers are said to be 'specialists' in the 'business' of 'truth' and 'reality' which, for some reason, are supposed to be closely related to each other. Also, they are supposed to determine each of these by the use of something called 'reason' which is said to provide the criteria for distinguishing between the 'real' from the 'unreal' and the 'true' from the 'false'. But reason itself is divided between that which is 'pure' and that which is 'practical' and has 'uses' whose diversity is determined by his purposes.

The Indian tradition called this *prayojana* and seemed to have argued that unless this is specified, one cannot 'talk' or understand the notions of 'truth' or 'reality' as they are intrinsically related to what man 'seeks'. Hence it has to be seen not only as a human enterprise that seeks something specific for itself, but as related to the other enterprises of man.

This is the theory of *puruṣārthas*, or the theory of the diverse enterprises of man. Seeking for truth and reality happens to be only one of them. But if this 'seeking' is only one amongst the many that man seeks them how can it claim any 'precedence' of 'primacy' amongst them. One can only do so by asserting either the foundational or the basic character of this 'seeking' in the sense that unless it is realized to some extent, the other 'seekings' cannot be pursued at all, or that what is sought through this 'seeking' is the final end, or fruit of all other 'seekings' which, consciously, or unconsciously are seeking just this, even if they do not describe or conceive it in these terms. In the first alternative, both 'truth' and 'reality' are conceived of as 'what is the case' and it is held that unless one's knowledge of 'reality' is 'true' in this sense, one cannot even meaningfully engage in the pursuit of any

other seeking, let alone being successful in this pursuit even in the minimal sense of the term. The second alternative stretches and widens the concepts in such a way as to include whatever man seeks or may seek in future in it.

Both the alternatives are rooted in an ambiguity and a delusion that the terms 'real' and 'true' can, or 'ought' to, have one meaning only. Furthermore, the contentions rest on two assumptions that do not seem to be supported either by evidence or argument required for them. The belief that 'truth' in the so-called 'scientific' sense and the 'reality' supposedly corresponding to it are the foundation for all other 'seekings' of man may be held *only* if one ignores the fact that 'truth' in this sense is continuously changing and is 'revisable' in principle. Hence, the 'reality' corresponding to '*it*' also has to be necessarily so. The popular idea that 'revisability' of 'truth' is rooted in its not being in accordance with 'reality', rests on two beliefs which seem to be equally mistaken. The first considers 'reality' as something completely independent of knowledge, something like Kant's 'thing-in-itself' or Aristotle's 'Being-qua-Being', or what in the Advaitic tradition has been called the 'Nirguṇa Brahman' or 'Reality without any attributes whatsoever', perhaps more appropriately designated as Śūnya or 'Pure Absolute Nothing' by the Mādhyamika Buddhists. The second belief seems to relate to the strange notion that knowledge does not bring any 'reality' into 'being', either through the fact of knowing itself or through the activity based on it.

The first belief results, paradoxically, in the contention that the 'real' is 'unknowable' in principle; hence the human enterprise of knowledge is based on a delusion that what is 'real' can be known. The second notion, equally strangely, results in the view that whatever has been brought into being by the successive acts of knowing of the human race cannot be considered as 'real' in any sense of the term. And this, inspite of the fact that it has itself been the 'object' of knowledge or understanding, for without it, the enterprise of 'knowing' cannot be carried, or even engaged in by any human being at all. The self-suicidal character of such a view is too obvious, yet philosophers seem to have been driven to espouse it. Indians have tried to work around this dilemma by formulating the notions of *avidyā* or primeval ignorance or even mistake, which was *māyā* and may be understood to be characterized

as neither 'real' nor 'unreal', but still has all the 'effectivity' that 'real' is supposed to have and perhaps even more. But the emotive and the cognitive attitudes associated with these terms by their 'use' are primarily a result of the presupposition which have little to support them in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

The generally unquestioned acceptance of the view that what is 'real' must be so, not only to be totally unaffected by the fact of its being brought into relationship with anything else, including what is generally designated by the term 'human being', but that it has necessarily to be of such a nature as not to have even the *possibility* of anything being 'added' to it, is a result not of anything in the concept itself, but because of the structure of the thinking consciousness that 'thinks' it. Kant tried to uncover and articulate the structural presuppositions involved in the act of 'knowing' but he did not see that 'knowing' was only *one* of the modulations of consciousness even in the context we call 'cognitive', and that for any 'real' understanding of the human situation, man finds himself in one will have to try to understand the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness involved in it. Consciousness, it should be remembered, cannot differentiate between the 'real' and the 'imaginary', as both appear equally as 'appearances' to it. As for self-consciousness, which is everywhere at the human level, everything that 'appears' is equally 'dubitable' and necessarily so. But, by a strange twist, philosophical thinking which occurs at the level of self-consciousness sees the self or the sense of the 'I' alone as indubitable and treats all the rest, including itself, as 'objectively' given, and hence 'essentially dubitable' and that too in the sense that it is contingent in principle. It demands and requires that whatever appears as 'object', including itself, can only be regarded as 'real' if, and only if, it has the same indubitability as self-consciousness or the 'I' consciousness. But this is to suffer from an illusion generated by the fact of 'self'-consciousness itself. Once the source of this illusion is realized, the 'dubitable' character of all that is 'object' and the 'indubitability' of the self, i.e. the subject, will disappear and philosophical thinking be 'freed' from the delusion that has characterized it since its beginning, as it is the reflexive activity of self-consciousness in its purest form that we know at the human level.

The 'freedom' from this delusion, however, will itself remain illusory unless its structural and transcendental roots are 'seen' along with the devastating consequences it has had in the history of human civilizations. The former we have explored and articulated at length in *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions* (unpublished). The latter have to be seen both in their 'religious' and 'wordly' dimensions in order to realize the enormity of what man has done to himself as a result of the delusions generated by self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is reflected best in philosophy and it is reason that is supposed to have shaped and formed this 'reflection'. The history of reason as also of this reflection has yet to be written, but what is important to note is the fact that the 'reflection' is a double reflection, reflecting simultaneously the consciousness with all the objects it is conscious of and the so-called 'self' with *all* the modalities that it can have towards this consciousness of the object which is its 'object'. The awareness or 'knowledge' of both the self and the world is, thus, based on this foundation and constructed on its basis. The construction or constructions, in turn, are particularly effective because self-consciousness tends to embody itself in symbolic forms that are quasi-permanent and whose primary example is found in language itself.

The delusions then that self-consciousness generates just because it is; what it is of the fact that permeates and infects all Realms of Knowledge, Action and Feeling as these themselves become the 'objects' of self-consciousness and thus are 'informal' by the structure that it has. Also, though 'reason' and self-consciousness are not identical, the former functions as a determinant of what is to be regarded as 'real' in these realms. This is relatively clear in the realm of knowledge where the 'real' is the function of the 'knowledge' we are supposed to have. This knowledge, it should be remembered, takes the esoteric form of *Śāstra* or science at the human level, a form which rejects much that was 'known' earlier, at least in the form in which it was known, and many a time just calls it 'belief' or 'superstition', depending upon the way one feels about it at that point of time.

The distinction between knowledge that is really 'knowledge' and that which is only spuriously so is brought into being the moment it takes the form of a *Śāstra* or a science in any civilization. Science,

however, is continuously changing as, by definition, it is subject to revision, for it seeks both 'internal' and 'external' coherence and 'completeness' which, in principle, it can never have. Yet, at every moment of its empirical existence, it believes itself to be the 'real' truth and proclaims it as such, forgetting that what it characterizes as 'false' was the 'science' of yesterday and that what it is so certain of today may meet the same fate tomorrow.

The error is so obvious that it is difficult to believe how anyone could be guilty of it. But it is a mistake only if one forgets that it reflects what reason has always claimed for itself. In other words, the exclusive right to 'know' the truth and determine what is 'real' on the basis of criteria that are inherent and immanent in it. This, it would be said to have been a characteristic of reason as it functioned in philosophy, but certainly not of that which functions in science as is understood today. Sensory experience plays an essential part in it, just as perhaps imagination does. But, since both are ultimately judged on the basis of reason, particularly as knowledge systematized in a 'system' increases, the difference steadily decreases as is evidenced by the increasing role of pure theory in disciplines that are deemed most 'scientific' and the mathematical formation that occurs therein. With this there occurs the increasing arrogance in knowledge-claims, brushing aside inconvenient facts and arguments with the statement that they too will be taken care of, accommodated and explained with further increase in knowledge. But no one asks how far, and how much further the 'knowledge' has to increase in order to do so. Nor does one ask what is exactly meant by 'increase' in knowledge, or how shall it be measured, or whether there shall ever be a time when there will be no inadequacies and imperfections in the knowledge attained till then. The fact that 'knowledge' has a 'temporal tag' tied to it does not seem to mean anything to reason when it reflects on itself as it treats itself as atemporal in nature, particularly as it can, if it so likes, treat 'time' itself as an object of reflection.

Reason, thus, seems to have an inbuilt structure or mechanism driving it towards delusions of illusory claims to knowledge, which cannot be sustained by any fair 'objective' and impartial consideration of things. Yet, rooted as it is in the self-consciousness of man and butteressed as

it is by it, the delusion only reflects what is proclaimed aloud by religion and spirituality in the history of man uptil now. The unbelievable certainties of faith and the self-justified wars against heretics and unbelievers have ensured that they are there for everyone to see. What is surprising is that no one seems ashamed of them, or even to think they were wrong. Why does one not do so, is the question one should ask oneself. If one does so, then one might find the answer in the structure of one's own self-consciousness. The most profound identity perhaps lies in the sense of 'rightness' or 'wrongness' that one has, something which the Indians designated by the term *dharma* which, surprisingly, means both religion and morality.

The ages of Faith, it would be said, have long passed and philosophy itself has been infected by ineradicable doubt since the beginning of 'modernity' as, say, in Descartes. Further, just as science has replaced philosophy in the domain of knowledge, so has reason replaced faith in the working and institutions of society and polity. Secularism is the name usually given to this phenomenon, both in respect of the ideal that it seeks and the actuality that obtains amongst those societies and polities which profess to practice it.

But reason is 'reason' and the faith in it can be as devastating as 'faith' in anything else. The heart of 'reason' is logic and the unrelenting nature of the latter in its abstract, uncompromising, impersonality can be as 'inhuman', or even 'anti-human' as anything else. It is, of course, true that logic allows one the freedom to choose, or start from any premises or postulations or presuppositions one wants or prefers, but one has done so, one is no more free to accept or not accept the consequences following from them if one wants to remain rational. The logic of belief, the logic of faith and the logic of reason are not three different logics. They are one and the same, only the ends pursued or that which is assumed are different. Instrumental rationality is no different from the 'rationality' that is supposed to deal with 'ends' or even derive from them. The so-called 'ends', when reason deals with them, make no difference to the functioning of reason than does anything else. And, when they do, reason ceases to function as 'reason' in the ordinary and accepted sense of the term.

The dominance of reason, or rather being 'determined' by reason which is supposed to make man 'rational', leads one to the compulsions of accepting, and even acting upon, all that 'follows from' what was accepted, even if one does not want to do so. This is the paradox of rationality which has been sought to be mitigated by formulating restrictions on the rule of derivation, so that conclusions that are 'unacceptable' on any grounds whatsoever may not follow, without being forced to give up the premises which had appeared self-evident or as necessary to reason itself. Alternatively, one may opt to revise the premises but one generally does not do so as it usually results in far more inconveniences than if one adopts the earlier alternative.

Both in the realm of thought and action, reason confronts the absurdities which its unbridled authority leads towards, and though science and common sense have tried in diverse ways to mitigate the effect and impose restrictions of many kinds, the institutionalization of 'reason' has played a role opposed to that which is sought to be achieved by these restrictions.

The problem of the foundation of institutions and the principles on which they are based has not been much investigated, even though it is well known that human society lives and perpetuates itself through, and in, institutions. There is, of course, the distinction between those institutions which seem to have grown naturally and others which have been the result of deliberate; 'self-constitution' which is supposed to have brought them 'performatively' into being.

The differentiation of polity from society is perhaps the most obvious example of the latter and so also is that of law from custom at another level. The formation of cognitive disciplines or *Śāstras* provides yet another example, just as the emergence of the distinction between the *mārgi* and the *deśi* or the classical and the folk does in the context of the arts and becomes the foundation of the distinction between cultures and civilizations.

The institutionalization of reason in these diverse domains objectifies reason and gives a free 'reign' to 'rationality' to pursue itself to its logical extreme, the limits of which it itself does not know. At the level of pure thought embodied in 'philosophy', paradoxes and absurdities resulting from the necessary compulsions of logic result only in a

'puzzlement' for thought which it tries to deal with in some way or the other. But, when logic becomes 'objective' and determines both 'feeling' and 'action', the result is disastrous, as there seems no way to save oneself from it.

The compulsions of logic can only be matched by compulsions of 'force', the latter often in the service of the former, particularly when it gets institutionalized legitimacy as it does when it gets objectified in them. The 'madness' of embodied reason could perhaps be seen most vividly in the attempt to realize a rational utopia in the erstwhile Soviet Union, and its 'irrational' version in what has come to be called 'Nazi Germany'. The latter would hardly be considered to be an example of 'irrational rationality' by most persons, but it would be so only because they do not understand the nature of 'logical reason' which consists only in drawing conclusions from the premises that one accepts and not on the nature of the premises themselves. This has been obvious after the development of non-Euclidean Geometries, and the denial of 'self-evident axioms' in logic, and their replacement by what have come to be called 'postulates', drawing attention to the idea of 'arbitrariness' involved in their choice. The fact that many a time the 'choice' is governed by the conclusions we want to derive from them only reveals the spuriousness of the veneer of rationality, which the formal character of deductive format is supposed to hide.

Reason, thus, brings a new 'necessity' into being and superimposes this on the 'necessities' of nature in the bondage of which man's biological life is lived. The feeling that the former necessity is not 'necessity' at all, and that in the voluntary submission to it lies one's freedom, is the illusion foisted on man by philosophers down the ages. Hegel's perhaps is the clearest formulation, though he did not formulate it the way he should have. 'To be free' is to be determined by the Form of Reason and not as he puts it; 'Freedom is the consciousness of necessity'. Kant's formulation masks the issue as, for him, freedom consists in being determined by the form of the 'good will' which itself is defined in terms of 'universality', on the one hand, and 'intrinsicality', on the other. Both these characteristics derive from the 'rationality' of reason and not from its 'practicality', as Kant seems to think, or at least would have us believe.

Strangely, the contention that 'to be free *is* to be determined by reason' is said to be the same as 'being determined by truth' for, at the human level, 'truth' *is* what is known by reason and even determined by it. But reason itself can never determine what is 'true'. At best, it can play only a negative role by making us suspicious that what proclaims itself as true may not really be so. On the positive side, it can only suggest 'possibilities', but cannot determine or decide which is actually the case. Not only this; 'truth', as we have already said, is closely related to 'reality', and 'reality' is continuously being brought into being not only by action but also by 'knowledge', whether it be true or false, correct or incorrect.

The claim of reason to know 'reality', let alone determine what is its nature, is circumscribed on all sides, and yet it persists in its claim to do so in spite of all the evidence and the argument to the contrary. The history of thought in general and the history of philosophy in particular attest to this. The latter has tried to determine what is 'really real' on the basis of pure argument, forgetting that this is not the triumph of 'reason' but its madness. Megalomania need not always be a personality disorder; it can be an aberration of reason itself. But such a 'madness', when 'objectified' and 'institutionalized', does not appear as madness to anybody nor is *felt* to be such by anyone.

The 'madness', however, results not so much from 'reason' as from 'logic', which is supposed to be its essence. But the roots of logic perhaps lie elsewhere, just as the compulsive drive towards self-suicidal extremes are also found elsewhere. Who has not heard of the denial of the 'textuality' of the text or of the 'authorship' of the author? But realms still exist where theoretical argument may be said to hold sway. The real madness becomes palpably visible in art where there is a deliberate, self-conscious attempt to deny and destroy the very 'being' of that which was supposed to define it and make it what it purports to be. One may not be able to physically destroy a canvas, or language or that which constitutes music, but much of modern creations in art come as close to doing that as possible. The almost blank canvases of a painter publicly exhibited at the Guggenheim in New York and Joyce's *Finnegan's Wake* may be said to be extreme examples of this. But one can find one's own examples which should not be difficult if

one looks around at what goes by the name of 'happenings' these days in the world of art. Perhaps, it has always been like that, for Henry James is supposed to have said in one of his novels, 'We work in the Dark—We do what we can—We give what we have'. 'Our doubt is our passion, and our passion is our task. The rest is the madness of art'.[1] The phrase 'logic of imagination' is not unknown to those who have thought an written. So also, perhaps, is the immanent logic that permeates the men of faith in all religions, or those who live in a world of passion and feeling, and are moved by it, something which cannot be even put in conceptual terms which the former, many a time, can be.

But the logic in all these fields, or in any others, is driven by two different roots which seem, at least *prima facie*, to be totally opposed to each other. One emanates from the transcendental value immanent in the realm and 'defining' it to be what it is, and which one vaguely apprehends and tries to embody in the work that one creates. This is perhaps what James was talking about. The other, on the other hand, springs from a desire to overcome or even destroy the limitations and constraints imposed by the material and conditions of 'creation' itself. The impulse to destroy, so obviously 'suicidal' in nature, arises perhaps from the desire for 'absolute' freedom which may take bizarre forms, as they have done in modern times. But the very idea of 'pure' or 'absolute' freedom is an absurdity, as without the idea of something to realize or actualize or embody, 'freedom' has no meaning.

Freedom, as everyone knows, is closely related to action, whether it be conceived as 'freedom from' or 'freedom to', even though it may not be so obviously visible in the former case as in that of the latter. There is supposed to be yet another sense, radically different from these two, which is conceived of as a state of being in which consciousness just 'is', having no relation either to knowledge or action, sufficient unto itself. This is what is generally meant by liberation or *mokṣa* or freedom in the Indian context. But even here, 'unrelatedness' does not mean the denial of the possibility of being related. It is not a disability or an empowerishment, but rather, a deeper and richer state of 'being' where it feels or finds itself 'freed' from those 'bondages' in which its engagement with 'knowledge' or 'action' generally lands it. The two notions of 'freedom' explored and elaborated in western thought lead

to increasing 'unfreedom' and 'bondage', a fact that has not been seen by these thinkers. The third alternative, explored in the Indian tradition bye-passes the difficulty as it turns a blind eye to it and treats the problem in a tangentinal manner suggesting, perhaps, that the problem was no problem at all as it arose out of a misconstrual or wrong definition of the situation.

The 'blindness' in all the three alternatives emanates from a presupposition bequeathed by human reason to the self-consciousness of man that 'reality' is to be 'known' and that 'truth' consists in 'knowing' it as 'it is', and that only that action is 'rational' which follows from this presupposition. But as we have argued and tried to show, the presupposition is manifestly unwarranted as man himself is continuously bringing new 'reality' into being, both by his knowledge and action. For this to happen, it is irrelevant whether the so-called 'knowledge' is true or false.

The tragic irony of the situation, however, is that action based on the presupposition which regards itself as 'rational' has a self-justified self-righteousness about it which may lead to institutionalized collective madness whose results are there aplenty in history for everyone to see. The fact is generally not noticed, and most thinkers have failed to see, what we have pointed out earlier, that the 'logic' underlying reason that drives it relentlessly to self-suicidal absurdity is found elsewhere also. In this respect, at least, there seems little to choose between the madness of 'faith' and the madness of 'reason', as both share the same presupposition, and unless the presupposition itself is given up, there can be little hope of escaping from the madness that humanity has been involved in up till now.

NOTE AND REFERENCE

1. Quoted in Ben-Ami Scharfstein's *The Dilemma of Context*, New York University Press, 1989, p. XIV.

The Role of Deduction in Explanation: An Examination

MD. IQBAL SHAHIN KHAN

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Chittagong,
Chittagong-4331, Bangladesh. E-mail: isk69bd@yahoo.com

The problem regarding the role of deduction in explanation can be focussed on only two statements—whether explanation is an argument or not. If explanation is defined as an argument, then it will imply that it is deductive argument. If explanation is not meant as an argument then it will imply that it is not deductive argument. Generally, there are three approaches to the scientific explanation in terms of the relation of deduction with explanation. According to the Deductive-nomological model proposed by Hempel in 1948, an explanation is similar in form to a deductive argument. In this model, the premises must contain a scientific law, and the conclusion is a description of the event that is being explained. Another approach, i.e. the causal view proposed by Salmon (1998) indicates that an explanation is not a deductive argument but rather a description of the various causes of the phenomenon. Salmon denies the deductive-nomological model and proposes that explanation is a causal process. Van Fraassen (1989), in his pragmatic view, also rejects the deductive-nomological model and points out that an explanation is a particular type of answer to a why-question, i.e. an answer that provides relevant information favouring the event to the explained over its alternatives. Our objective here is to reconcile the two opposing views such as 'explanation is deductive argument' and 'explanation is not deductive argument'. In this paper, I will firstly concentrate on the problems of D-N model and Salmon's argument against the deduction in order to establish the view that explanation is not necessarily a deductive argument but can be reconstructed into a deductive argument. Then I will proceed to show that inclusion of law is not necessary in all kinds of scientific explanation and that without

covering law, there can be a deductive model. Here it should be clear that our claim is not to establish the view that scientific explanations are not derived from laws or scientific explanations can never be represented as arguments. Rather, afterwards, I will attempt to link it with the why-question model of Van Fraassen where laws or rules might be used if it is needed and, likewise, rules or laws of deductive ideal can be eliminated in the manner deduced by Ruben (1990).

THE PROBLEM OF D-N MODEL

Apart from some well-known counter-examples (flagpole-shadow; man & birth-control pill) of D-N model, we can consider some other problems prevailing in the D-N model. According to D-N model, for any scientific explanation there are three logical conditions:

(i) The explanation must be a validly deductive argument.

(ii) The explanations must contain at least one general law.

(iii) The explanans must have an empirical content.

Among the three conditions, it can be stated that the condition (i), i.e. the criterion of a validly deductive argument may contradict with the condition (iii). The reason is that the constituents of a validly deductive argument need not be empirically varifiable, whereas the empirical element is a basic condition of scientific explanation. This is why, categorically, it cannot be said that a validly deductive argument is explanation.

The deductive method used in the D-N model is meant either in strict sense, i.e. in a syllogistic form or in a wide sense—deducing a statement covering a law/general statement. It can also be meant on the basis of the necessary relation between premise and conclusion. Rescher also mentions this point when he says that the argument may be either deductive or probabilistic, either in the strong sense or the weak. He further continues to say that with a deductive explanation, the explanatory premises would provide conclusive evidence for the conclusion which constitutes a sufficient guarantee of the explanatory conclusion, while in a probabilistic explanation, the explanatory premises do not provide a guarantee of the conclusion except probable or relative truth (Rescher, 1970, p. 37). Hempel himself also distinguishes better from worse deductive explanations. His notions of 'systematic power'

(Hempel-Oppenheim, 1948), and of 'theoretical support' (Hempel, 1966) are meant to enable us to make such a distinction (Ben-Menahem, 1990, p. 340).

The deductive-nomological model provides a good approximation for many explanations, particularly in mathematical physics. But there are many explanations in science and everyday life that do not conform to the deductive model. Hempel himself discusses at length certain statistical explanations in which what is explained follows only probabilistically, not deductively, from the laws and other sentences that themselves do the explaining. Many critics have argued that explanations in such fields as history and evolutionary biology rarely have a deductive form. For example, a Darwinian explanation of how a species evolved by natural selection applies a general pattern that cites biological mechanisms and historical facts so as to suggest how an adaptation might have come about. But the historical record is too inadequate and biological principles too qualitative and imprecise for deductive derivation (Thagard and Shelley, 1997).

There is a problem in the D-N model surrounding the explanation of the laws of nature. Van Fraassen argues against the theories about the laws of nature. The problem with Hempel is that he has no theory about laws of nature. Fraassen (1989, p. 39) argues that the prescription of law in the explanation is based on metaphysics and cannot give a clear understanding. He has been able to find out two problems of law used in the D-N model: (i) problem of inference; and (ii) problem of identification. The first problem must satisfy the condition that any acceptable laws of nature must justify the inference: It is law that A, then A.

The above proposition indicates a law, which is necessary. In other words, the statement is true in all possible worlds relative to the one question that whether it has modal import. This necessity implies actuality as it looks for the grounds for the necessity. And if necessity implies actuality, all laws must appeal to the facts—that means law must have a sense but we do not get it in facts. This is why there is also a problem of identification of law as the laws are not reflections at all of objective facts but that laws are mind dependent (Rescher, 1970).

The laws or principles used in deduction are not beyond question, but this does not mean that one can always doubt their acceptability. The reason is that the principles of formal logic stabilize and systematize the reasoning process in a particular form which is necessary for consistent thinking. If it is overlooked, all kinds of formulae, rules, laws, principles as well as all kinds of mathematics-oriented systems are ignored, which is quite impossible.

THE THIRD DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM

Wesley Salmon's article entitled 'the third dogma of empiricism' is against the view that explanation is an argument, whatever deductive or inductive. It can be analyzed in terms of the four alternative theses:

(i) All explanations can be *reconstructed* in the form of deductive arguments.

(ii) Deduction has a *constitutive* role in explanation.

(iii) An explanation *involves* a deduction from a covering law.

(iv) An explanation is nothing but a deduction from one or more covering laws (and the statement of the initial conditions) (Yelikoski, 2001, p. 63).

From the above four theses, it can be debated that there is an ambiguity in Salmon's argument against the third dogma of empiricism, as Salmon's argument certainly goes against the theses (iii) and (iv) but not the first two (Yelikoski, 2001, p. 63).

According to Salmon's argument, addition of irrelevant information does not affect an argument but seriously affects an explanation. Irrelevant premises do not influence the validity of the deductive argument. On the other hand, in case of an explanation, there is no scope of including irrelevant information. 'If one adds to the explanation of the dissolving of a piece of sugar to the water in question as holy water, one either ruins or worsens the explanation.'

In response to this comment, one can agree with Salmon in that deduction is different from explanation. Where in deduction, there is a particular structure which is well established. The deductive argument is a shorter process but stronger than explanation at least in the ideal or strict sense of deduction, whereas explanation is a longer process. This proposition is supported by Bengt Hansson (1999) who states that

explanation is not evaluated like the deductive ideal by the words like correct or incorrect, valid or invalid, right or wrong; but by phrases such as better or worse, clever or clumsy, pedestrian or profound. It proceeds from the basic facts to explanandum step by step and can reach the expected goal by many routes, implying that making a more acceptable path is open. A deductive argument deals only with the formal truth. So, relevance or irrelevance of material truth cannot affect its validity. As it is bound up with certain structure or rule or form, and irrelevant premises are also included in this form, cannot affect the validity. For example:

According to the inference rule of simplification,

$$P \& Q$$

Therefore, P

We can include any proposition in this form—which need not be relevant to each other propositions of P and Q—to deduce the conclusion Q. This irrelevancy is included in the form or structure of deduction, which is why it does not affect the validity of the argument. By contrast, explanation is not a shorter process like deductive argument and is not bound with certain hard and fast rules. The most interesting position here, according to Pierce, that abduction is both an art of guessing and a mode of reasoning, but in neither of these capacities is it governed by strict rules (Ben-Menahem, 1990, p. 342). So, there may be a lot of information to establish the explanandum. For liberal feature of explanation, the information may arise as relevant or even irrelevant. Further, it can be rightly said that the additions of irrelevant premises are not a part of explanation; as these are not parts of the explanation, they can neither worsen nor ruin it. This is Salmon's view.

To support Yelikoski's view against Salmon's argument, one can consider the characteristic by which Salmon wants to demarcate an explanation from an argument. In doing so, one has to see at first whether it is fundamental or not. The question of adding irrelevant premises can never be a basic or fundamental characteristic of argument by which one can differentiate between an argument and an explanation. On the other hand, if it would be a fundamental point then too it would not be enough to separate explanation from argument. For example,

'flying' is one of the fundamental characteristics of birds, and so naturally the animal which cannot fly is not in the species of bird. But we know of the bird 'ostrich', which cannot fly, is a species of bird.

Secondly, Salmon tries to explain the relation between deduction and explanation in terms of determinism and says that determinism cannot be related to the term explanation. In reply to this, it can be said that the problem of determinism and indeterminism cannot affect an explanation, and one can accept them; both that means it is possible to have indeterministic explanation and a deterministic one. Here actually, the problem is linked to the metaphysical discussion by Salmon. In fact, we can consider determinism and indeterminism both for a particular period, not absolutely.

ANOTHER PROPOSAL ABOUT DEDUCTION

After proving the ambiguity of Salmon's argument, the role of deduction in explanation can be considered in such a way that explanation can be reconstructed as deductive arguments, but deductive relationship has no constitutive role in explanation. Here it should be more clear between the two views of 'deduction's reconstructive role in explanation' and 'deduction's constitutive role in explanation'. The reconstruction of explanation through deduction means that explanation can be modified or altered with the help of deduction either towards better understanding or for completion of explanation. By contrast, deduction's constitutive role in explanation means that the deduction is the essence or an essential part of explanation, what D-N model holds. About the deductive role in explanation, Yelikoski says, 'The deductive idea provides a useful test for the explanatoriness of an answer to an explanation-seeking question. One should be able to deduce the statement of the explanandum from premises that include both the statement of the explanans and the background assumptions of the explanation-seeking question' (Yelikoski, p. 65). From this statement, we can understand the possibility of reconciling the D-N model with Van Fraassen's theory of explanation, according to which, explanations are not arguments but answers to explanation-seeking questions. For example:

Topic Sentence: NATO sent troops in Macedonia

As per Fraassen's model:
Why did NATO send troops to Macedonia? (the why question)

Before giving a straight answer, one should enquire about the relevancy of the question that means,

Why did *NATO* send troops to Macedonia? (Why not UN?)
Why did NATO send *troops* in Macedonia? (Why not observers?)
Why did NATO send troops in *Macedonia*? (Why not to Ireland?)

In the above example, we find three possible alternative questions regarding explanation-seeking questions. This idea of relevance of the diverse questions is being emphasized in order to identify the right explanans and this kind of question is necessary. If the relevant question is identified for the explanation, then the process would be more easy and accurate. Here, there will be no need to apply a covering law model, as the covering law is applied generally to answer many questions.

For example,
NATO sent troops in Macedonia.
Why?
To disarm Albanian rebels.
Why?
Possible Covering Law: Arms cannot bring peace.

The above example is not clearly related to the scientific explanation as its context is not related to the scientific investigation rather than political affairs. On the contrary, it is given here to clearly understand the unnecessary use of law in explanation. And this is why it can be given another example related to the perfect scientific explanation to make the context more relevant, which is as follows:

Topic Sentence: An apple from the tree always drops on the surface. Why?
Why does the *apple* drop? (Does only apple drop?)
Why does the apple *drop*? (Why does it not remain as it is?)
Why does the apple drop (*down*)? (Why does it not go up?)
Why?
For natural law.

Why?
Law of gravitation.
Why?
Law of Gravity.

The above example expresses such a common scientific phenomenon for what we do not bother to include the law. We see here that the D-N model is applied in general to this explanation-seeking question ignoring other possible relevant questions on the basis of this particular explanation-seeking question. Furthermore, in the case of this kind of causal explanation, i.e. in singular causal explanation, the direct answer based on the relevant question becomes the right explanans; so, there is no need to include covering law or laws.

From this example, we can understand that in the explanation process, there is a significant role of the recipient of the explanation especially when the relevancy of the question is underlined. Because, the relevancy of the question is seen from the recipient's point of view, i.e. what is it that the recipient actually wants to know. This process continues until the recipient is satisfied with the answer to the explanation-seeking questions. Here it should be mentioned that it is unnecessary to use the deductive ideal in all explanations but the deductive ideal can be used if it is needed. For instance, in some explanations, the demand of law comes first. Let us consider the example, 'The possibility of the sinking of a ship is more in the small river than in the deep sea'. But our common knowledge or assumption would be the opposite, i.e. 'The possibility of the sinking of a ship is more in the deep sea than in the small river'. In this case, to know the truth, it becomes necessary to know the concerned law, i.e. law of buoyancy[1] at first because of its difference from the common knowledge.

PROCESS OF EXCLUSION OF DEDUCTIVE IDEAL

Now, to avoid unnecessary use of deductive ideal based on the covering law, one can consider following the Ruben's process of elimination of deductive ideal in explanation.

Ruben (1990) shows how the causal rule does not work and becomes useless from the following example:

When a causal law is included in D-N model, it consumes

(x) (x consumes arsenic $\rightarrow$ x dies in 24 hours)
John consumes arsenic.
John is hit by a bus soon after his arsenic feast
John dies within 24 hours.

The problem here is that although the deduction uses a causal law, and explicitly mentions the cause of John's death, and uses the two other premises to deduce the explanandum, the causal law is causally irrelevant to the explanandum. Ruben says that if one of the premises contains the cause of the explanandum, then it will no longer require a statement of general law.

For example,
John's being hit by the bus caused him to die.
Therefore, John died.

In this manner, Ruben eliminates the deductive ideal of applying a covering law from the explanation and makes the explanatory process short and simple. Moreover, he wants to underline the immediate cause of the effect and this clarifies the explanatory causal relation. However, by using this system, he avoids strong and detailed reason (although it is not immediate) that can weaken the clear understanding of the explanandum. In case of criminal investigation, this kind of approach is not applicable at all. If an autopsy of John's case is conducted, his consuming arsenic will come out, by which one can explain in a different way that is after eating arsenic, John had lost his senses. As a result, he was run over by a bus. Ruben shows that no general fact or law is required for the derivation of explanandum. If this is approved then there might be a question about the position of argument. Ruben then cuts the argumentative nature of explanation as, according to him, it becomes trivial. For instance,

c is the cause of e

Therefore, e.

DEDUCTIVE MODEL WITHOUT COVERING LAW

Explanation can be reconstructed into a deductive model but not its process by including covering law, at least in the causal explanation.

But there arises a question: how is it possible to ensure the necessary relation between premise and conclusion without including the generalization principle? Now it is interesting to note the possibility of exhibiting a deductive ideal using the causal relation at least in the case of singular causal explanation without including the covering law.

We can consider examining this view from the Humean context. According to Hume, we can perceive of an event c and another event e, but not that c caused e. Our knowledge of cause and effect comes from experience. We infer from c that e will occur. We can discover from experience. We infer from c that e will occur. We can discover nothing in c individually that causes e. Hence, Hume's analysis was that when we say c causes e, we mean that c and e are of a class of objects or events that are constantly conjoined but that we cannot penetrate into the reason for that particular conjunction. Since the conjunction of c to e can only be known to us through inductive inference and since inductive inference does not constitute logical argument, there can be no logical analysis, i.e. deductive analysis of a causal analysis. So it can be said that from the Humean interpretation of causal relation, singular causal explanation is not a deductive inference.

In this problem of causality, we might get two kinds of relation, i.e. the relation between cause and effect and that between reason and consequence. The former implies sequence in time, and the latter is a pure relation of logical deduction and essentially implies a simultaneous link between the reason and the consequence—one being a logical deduction from the other, must subsist together. In this stage, we can examine Ruben's argument, which eliminates the covering law, but claims a deductive ideal on the basis of a necessary relation between cause and effect. In Ruben's argument, the relation between cause and effect is one of temporal sequence; for example, hitting by a bus is the cause of his death. The morality of the human being has been there all the time, i.e. if one is born then one must die. It is a logical consequence of such an universal rule that John's death should follow his being hit by the bus. Strictly speaking, the morality of a human being is here not a cause, but a reason for the actual causation, which is in itself merely a sequence with the reason. In this manner, one can claim that Ruben's

argument is a deduction, further stating the singular causal explanation is a deduction.

In fact, explanation is a continual process, and it proceeds step by step. In this process, deduction has a significant role that cannot be ignored. The process can be started from the idea as to the why question, as Van Fraassen proposes. As it starts with the why question, it implies that there must be someone to receive the question either in practice or in imagination. There is then an important role of the recipient of the explanation as the explanation is given to convince someone. Now, if the recipient (may be imaginary) is satisfied with this explanation, it can be said that the explanation is apparently complete. In the process, explanation can be reconstructed by deductive ideal only to make the process complete if it is needed.

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1. According to the law of buoyancy, any material or object immersed in a fluid will tend to rise through the fluid if the fluid density is a greater than the material density.

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On the Fourth Condition of Chisholm's Definition of Knowledge

KAUSIK BHATTACHARYA

Sr. Lecturer in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan.
E-mail: kausic@hotmail.com

I

This essay is an attempt to understand how the fourth condition of Chisholm's latest definition of knowledge in the third edition of his *Theory of Knowledge* (Henceforth *TN-3*) blocks Gettier and Gettier-like counter-examples against an erroneous understanding of the same incorporated in Dr Sutapa Saha's book on *Evidence and Truth: Responses to the Gettier Problem* published under the Second Series of Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy.

In *TN-3*, Chisholm neither gives a phrase-by-phrase analysis of the fourth condition of his definition of knowledge, nor does he show how the fourth condition blocks Gettier and Gettier-like counter-examples. Moreover, his definition has not been extensively discussed and criticized by others. These issues create the possibility of misinterpretation of the definition.

II

Chisholm offers the following definition of knowledge in *TN-3*:

h is shown by $S = Df$ (1) h is true; (2) S accepts h; (3) h is evident for S; and (4) If h is defectively evident for S, then h is implied by a conjunction of propositions, each of which is evident for S but not defectively evident for S.[1]

The fourth condition has been included in the definition to solve the Gettier problem. The statement of this condition includes the technical term 'defectively evident' which has been defined as follows:

h is defectively evident for S = Df (1) There is an e such that e makes h evident for S; and (2) everything that makes h evident for S makes something that is false evident for S.[2]

Chisholm, in his attempt to solve the Gettier problem, finds a common feature of all Gettier and Gettier-like cases. The feature (call it F1) is that the proposition involved (e.g. 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' of Gettier's second counter-example) is defectively evident in the sense that it is made evident by a proposition (e.g. 'Jones keeps a Ford in his garage') and everything that makes the former proposition evident also makes some false proposition (e.g. 'Jones owns a Ford') evident for the person concerned.[3] Chisholm observes that this feature is also present in some cases where the proposition involved represents genuine knowledge. (That is why he does not simply add 'h is not defectively evident' as the fourth condition of his definition.) For instance, a conjunction of propositions (e.g. 'Jones has at all times in the past owned a car and always a Ford') whose conjuncts are evident but not defectively evident may reach the epistemic level of being known and be defectively evident, because in some cases, certain known non-defectively evident propositions in conjunction may make a false proposition (e.g. 'Jones owns a Ford') evident. In that case, everything that makes the conjunction evident does the same for a false proposition. The common feature (call it F2) of those cases where a defectively evident proposition reaches the epistemic level of being known is that the proposition involved is a conjunction (or equivalent to a conjunction) whose conjuncts are evident but not defectively evident.[4] Gettier and Gettier-like counter-examples are cases where the feature F1 is present but F2 is absent and, according to Chisholm, a correct definition of knowledge should not cover these cases. The Gettier problem arises because the traditional definition of knowledge covers these cases, and Chisholm's aim is to provide such a definition of knowledge which excludes these cases. The fourth condition of his definition in *TN-3* fulfils this aim.

For the common cases of knowledge where the propositions involved are not defectively evident, the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition is satisfied vacuously, for in such a case, the antecedent of Chisholm's definition is false. The fourth condition excludes the Gettier and Gettier-like cases where the proposition involved are defectively evident. In such cases, the antecedent of the fourth condition is satisfied but the consequent remains unsatisfied. In those cases of knowledge where the proposition involved is a defectively evident conjunction (or a defectively evident proposition equivalent to a conjunction), the fourth condition of the definition is satisfied because both the antecedent and the consequent of it are satisfied. It is easy to understand how the antecedent of the fourth condition is satisfied in Gettier cases as also those cases where the propositions involved are known as defectively evident conjunctions or their equivalent, but it is not very easy to understand how the consequent in the former cases remains unsatisfied and how it is satisfied in the latter cases. Our problem is to understand this phenomena.

The consequent of the fourth condition consists of the following three clauses:

(a) h is implied by a conjunction of propositions.
(b) Each conjunct of the conjunction is evident for S.
(c) Each conjunct of the conjunction is not defectively evident for S.

Now, any proposition is implied by a large number of conjunctions. (For instance, a proposition p is implied by p.p, p.p.p, p.a, p.b, p.a.b, q.~q, q.~q.r, and so on.) But to show how the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition of knowledge is satisfied in a case of knowledge where the proposition involved is defectively evident conjunction or its equivalent, it is not necessary to consider all the conjunctions which imply it. If it is proved that all the conjuncts of at least one of the conjunctions which imply the proposition involved are evident but not defectively so, then it is established that the consequent of the fourth condition has been satisfied. In any case of knowledge where the proposition involved is a defectively evident conjunction or its equivalent non-conjunction, the consequent of the fourth condition is satisfied due to the following reasons:

As any proposition implies itself, the proposition involved is implied by itself, and as the proposition involved itself is either a conjunction of propositions or equivalent to a conjunction of propositions, the proposition involved is implied by a conjunction of propositions. (Here we must note a point. Without the expression 'implied by' in the consequent of the fourth condition, the definition will not cover the cases of knowledge where the defectively evident proposition is not an explicit conjunction but equivalent to a conjunction. Without the expression 'implied by', the consequent would have stood as 'h is a conjunction of propositions, each of which is evident for S but not defectively evident for S' and it would not be satisfied if the proposition involved were a non-conjunction.) The first clause of the antecedent is thus satisfied. Again, as the proposition involved reaches the epistemic level of being known, each conjunct of it or its equivalent conjunction *by itself* reaches the epistemic level of being known, and each of them is, therefore, evident but not defectively so. Hence, the second and the third clauses of the consequent are satisfied.

With Gettier and Gettier-like cases, the issue is more complex. To show that the consequent of the fourth condition remains unsatisfied in such a case, we must consider all the conjunctions which imply the proposition involved—we have to show that at least one conjunct of any conjunction which implies the proposition involved is either not evident for the person concerned or defectively so. Thus, either the second clause or the third clause of the consequent of the fourth condition remains unsatisfied. Unless we consider all the conjunctions which imply the proposition and show that at least one conjunct of each of them is either not evident or defectively evident, there would remain the possibility that the proposition involved is implied by a conjunction each of whose conjuncts is evident as well as non-defectively evident. As long as this possibility remains, there would remain the possibility of satisfaction of the consequent of the fourth condition. Now, the question is: how can we show that at least one conjunct of any conjunction that implies the proposition involved in a Gettier-like case is either not evident or defectively evident?

Let us suppose that d is the defectively evident proposition involved in a Gettier-like counter-example. We shall have to show that at least

one conjunct of any conjunction that implies d is either not evident or defectively evident for the person concerned, and that the consequent of the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition remains unsatisfied. Any conjunction which implies d must either contain d itself as one of its conjuncts, or be a contradiction of the form P.~P, or includes a contradiction as its part. If the conjunction contains d (which is defectively evident) itself as one of its conjuncts, then at least one conjunct of the conjunction would be defectively evident. If, on the other hand, the conjunction is a contradiction or includes a contradiction as its part, at least one conjunct of the conjunction would not be evident for the person concerned; for both a proposition and its negation cannot be evident for a person. Thus, at least one conjunct of each conjunction which implies that d is either not evident or defectively evident, and the consequent of the fourth condition, therefore, remains unfulfilled. We must consider another possibility. Here, d itself may be a conjunction as it is in Gettier's first counter-example. In that case d, as it implies itself, will be included in the list of all conjunctions which imply d. However, if d be a conjunction in a Gettier-like counter-example, at least one conjunct of it will be defectively evident. Therefore, the consequent of the fourth condition will not be satisfied.

Let us try to understand the manner in which the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition blocks Gettier's second counter-example.[5] The proposition h ('Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona') is evident for Smith. It is made evident by the conjunctive proposition e ('Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford'... etc.). h is defectively evident as well, because h is made evident by e, and everything that makes h evident also makes the false proposition f ('Jones owns a Ford') evident for Smith. The antecedent of the fourth condition is, thus, satisfied. Now it can be demonstrated that at least one conjunct of any conjunction that implies h is either not evident for Smith or defectively evident for Smith, and the consequent of the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition thus remains unsatisfied. This can be demonstrated just in the same way as I have earlier demonstrated that at least one conjunct of d is either not evident or defectively evident.

III

Dr Saha's understanding of how the fourth condition of Chisholm blocks the Gettier and Gettier-like counter-examples is as follows.[6] The proposition involved (h) in a Gettier-like counter-example is evident for the person concerned. It is made evident by a conjunction of propositions which also makes a false proposition evident. Thus, h is defectively evident as well. Hence, the antecedent of the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition of knowledge is satisfied. But, as h is trivially implied by the conjunction of h with h, and as h is defectively evident, the consequent of the fourth condition—h is implied by a conjunction of propositions each of which is evident for S but not defectively evident for S—remains unsatisfied. Therefore, the fourth condition of the definition remains unsatisfied.

Dr Saha thinks that the consequent of the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition remains unfulfilled because h is trivially implied by the conjunction h.h and the conjuncts are defectively evident. This is because Dr Saha assumes that the consequent of the fourth condition would remain unsatisfied if a conjunct of only one conjunction be defectively evident. But this assumption is wrong, for h is implied by a number of conjunctions, and if each conjunct of any other conjunction implying h be evident as well as non-defectively evident, then the consequent of the fourth condition would be satisfied.

If it is true that a defectively evident conjunct of only one conjunction renders the consequent of the fourth condition unsatisfied, this would require us to say, incorrectly, that Smith of Gettier's counter-example does not know that e ('Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford'... etc.). This is because the conjunctive proposition e is not only implied by itself; it is implied by h.e as well; and as h is defectively evident, the consequent of the fourth condition as well as the fourth condition of Chisholm's definition remain unsatisfied. But this is not the aim.

Dr Saha may argue that while identifying all the possible conjunctions which imply h, we must consider only those conjunctions whose conjuncts are all evident for the person concerned in that context. Also we need not consider any conjunction (like a contradiction) each of

whose conjuncts are not evident for the person concerned. But it is difficult to understand how Chisholm's view implies this position. Even if this position is correct, it cannot be maintained that h.h is only conjunction that implies h.h is implied by h.f as well where f is the proposition 'Jones owns a Ford' which is evident for Smith, and we need an explanation, then why should we not consider h.f while identifying the possible conjunctions which imply h?

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1. R.M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 3rd ed., New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 1994, p. 98.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 97–8.
4. Ibid., p. 98.
5. E. Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', *Analysis*, Vol. 23, 1963, pp. 122–3.
6. Sutapa Saha, *Evidence and Truth: Responses to the Gettier Problem,* Kolkata: Allied, 1994, pp. 54–5.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Some Recent Reconsiderations of Rationality

... the opposition of self and others is mediated by the emergence of the other self and the common human language of 'oneself'. This human language is the real and true non-dualist locus of culture, labor and politics, whether the other should be God, non-human nature, the world or other human selves, masculine or feminine, native or foreign.

> J.P.S. Uberoi (2002), *The European Modernity: Science, Truth and Method*, p. 113

The world as we understand it at present may be the same world as it always was but we no longer look to physics to underpin the myth of stability, and provide the same comforts as before. The claims of contemporary sciences, both natural and human, are a good deal more modest, seeking neither to deny nor to explain away the contingency of things.

> Stephen Toulmin (2001), *Return to Reason*, pp. 209–210

Perhaps the names of persons whose *saying* signifies a face—proper names, in the middle of all these common names and common places—can resist the dissolution of meaning and helps us to speak. Perhaps they will enable us to divine, behind the downfall of discourse, the end of a certain intelligibility and the dawning of a new one. What is coming to a close may be a rationality tied *exclusively* to the being that is sustained by words, the *Said* of the Saying.

> Emmanuel Levinas (1996), *Proper Names*, pp. 4–5
> (Emphases in the original)

THE PROBLEM

The concept of rationality has been subjected to numerous critiques in the history of modernity. All these critiques have been helpful in

exposing rationality to cross-cultural translations and examinations. Despite numerous anthropological critiques of an Eurocentric notion of rationality which looks at tribal people having a primitive mind, a modernistic and West-centric view of rationality is still very much in the throne. This situation seems to be altering slightly in the realm of philosophical discourse with some recent foundational interrogations of rationality offered by thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Stephen Toulmin, who urge us to realize that a discourse of rationality should not be a servant either to the discourse of anthropocentrism or Eurocentrism (MacIntyre 1999; Toulmin 2001). Their reconsiderations help us overcome the anthropocentric and Eurocentric temptations to use rationality as a differentiating and discriminatory criteria. The paper begins with these reconsiderations and then adds to Foucault's critique of the hegemonic universalism of Kant, Putnam's elaborations of a Deweyan approach to rationality, and Tambiah's contribution to reconsideration of rationality from transdisciplinary concerns of anthropology and philosophy (Foucault 1984; Putnam 2001; Tambiah 1990).

In elaborating these reconsiderations, the paper also discusses the agenda of a Pragmatic Enlightenment offered by Hilary Putnam in place of a rationalistic enlightenment of an earlier era. But the problem with this path of Pragmatic Enlightenment is that it leaves uninterrogated the enlightenment division between the natural world and the human-social world as also between society and the world of transcendence. But, in order to understand rationality in its inherent multiplicity, we need to overcome this enlightenment black box and understand the unfoldment of reason and life not only in the black box of *cogito ergo sum* but in a relational pathway in which reason relates not only to a separate ego but helps in this relationship between the ego and the world. The world here means not only human-social world but also the world of nature and world of transcendence.

RECONSIDERATIONS OF RATIONALITY AND EXTENSION OF OUR UNDERSTANDING: OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRISM

It is helpful to begin with the famous debate between Peter Winch and Alasdair MacIntyre pertaining to language and rationality. Peter Winch

believed that there is no reality independent of language games but for MacIntyre to successfully describe the rules of use of another culture, the anthropologist applies the 'standard of rational criticism as applied in the contemporary West' (quoted in Tambiah 1990: 121). To this, Peter Winch's reply was: 'Since it is we who want to understand the Zande category, it appears that the onus is on us to extend our understanding so as to make room for Zande category, rather than to see in terms of our own readymade distinction between science and non-science' (ibid.). This task of extending our understanding vis-à-vis language and rationality is undertaken in a much more radical manner by MacIntyre in his *Dependent Rational Animals* (MacIntyre 1999). Here, MacIntyre offers a foundational critique of the tendency to use rationality as a tool of discrimination and domination, especially as it relates to the relationship between humans and animals. MacIntyre writes in the very first pages of his book: '... Aristotle's account of human beings as distinctively rational has sometimes been interpreted as though he meant that rationality itself was not an animal property but rather a property that separates humans from their animality' (MacIntyre 1999: 5). But for MacIntyre, 'Aristotle did not, of course, make this mistake. *Phronesis*, the capacity for practical rationality is a capacity that he—and after him Aquinas—ascribed to some non-human animals in virtue of their foresight, as well as to human beings.' (Ibid.: 5–6).

To illustrate the point about rationality of animals, MacIntyre gives the examples of dolphins. MacIntyre tells us, building on studies carried out with the dolphins, that dolphins exercise capacities for 'perceptual recognition, for perceptual attention, for a range of different responses to what is perceived and recognized as the same individual or kind of individuals and for a range of varying emotional expressions' (ibid.: 23). Furthermore, 'The activities involved in perceptual learning and then in putting to use what they have learned, render dolphins no mere passive receptors of experience. And, like human beings, dolphins take pleasure in those activities which are the exercise of their power and skills. When Aristotle says that there is pleasure in all perceptual activity and that pleasure supervenes upon the completed activity, what he asserts seems to be as true of dolphins as of human beings.' (ibid.: 26)

MacIntyre further tells us that dolphins of a variety of species flourish 'only because they have learned how to achieve their good through strategies concerned with members of different groups to which they belong or which they encounter'. (ibid.: 22)

OVERCOMING EUROCENTRISM

MacIntyre quotes Wittgenstein: 'Animals come when their names are called just like human beings', and Stephen Toulmin, one of the most creative students of Wittgenstein, uses the same Wittgensteinian spirit to overcome another formidable binding in thinking about rationality, namely the binding of Eurocentrism. Toulmin shows how rationality in the form of stability and mathematical certainty, achieved its distinctive and dominant status under specific historical circumstances in modern Europe. But this is only one manifestation of rationality. In history, culture and society and in thinking about rationality, one should not be a slave to this particular construction. Toulmin writes: 'Historically, the enthronement of mathematical rationality was just one aspect of the broader intellectual response to the loss of theological consensus following Luther's and Calvin's success in enrolling craftsmen and other members of the newly literate laity into Protestant congregations' (Toulmin 2001: 205). This loss of consensus led to the infamous religious war in Europe between 1818 and 1848 and the Westphalian system of nation-state emerging in this specific historical context was to ensure certainty and stability in this chaotic situation. For Toulmin, the Cartesian approach to certainty and rationality gained ascendancy in this specific historical circumstance. Theorists clung to Cartesian rationality because it provided them with certainty. But this also came at a great price. Preoccupation with stability and certainty as a part of a commitment to Cartesian rationality led to the construction of impermeable boundaries between different realms of human experience, knowledge and disciplines. Later on, with colonialism and imperialism, this impermeable border was constructed as a tool of discrimination and domination between Western and non-Western peoples at the core of which lay the Eurocentric discourse of rationality (Giri 1998).

Reconsiderations of rationality in this context entail going beyond clinging to certainty and stability, and to 'redress proper balance between

theory and practice'. '[...] to recognize legitimate claims of "theories" without exaggerating the formal attractions of Euclidean reasoning and to defend the lessons of actual practice without denigrating the power of theoretical argument' (Toulmin 2001: 171). Reconsideration of rationality also now calls us to live with uncertainty, as 'in a world of complexity, chaos and other "non-linear" ways of theorizing, the old alliance of State, Church, and Academy has lost their secure foothold' (ibid.: 205).

In his reconsideration of rationality, Toulmin makes a distinction between reason and reasonableness. While Cartesian reason may have been developed in the West, there are different ways of being reasonable even here. As a way of moving beyond the Cartesian agenda of rationality, Toulmin urges us to be in dialogue with Wittgenstein and John Dewey. For Toulmin, 'If Rene Descartes is a symbolic figure marking the beginning of Modern Age, we may take Ludwig Wittgenstein as marking its end' (ibid.: 206). One aspect of this culmination is the help that the late Wittgenstein provides us in freeing us from a rationalistic approach to language and linguistic approach to rationality. For Wittgenstein, 'Our imaginations are particularly open to metaphysical yearnings at the point where language "goes on holiday". Our yearnings begin at a time when meanings are no longer bounded by the demands of workday disciplines or responsibilities, and language finds fulfilment in the High Holy Days. Then we are free to speak in ways that expand outside those boundaries to an unlimited extent: after all, as he put it, *die sprache ist kee Kafig—Language is not a cage.*' (ibid.: 201–202)

Wittgenstein's openness to metaphysics in thinking about language, of course, has a celebrated companion in the ground-breaking work of Heidegger. For Heidegger, 'The human world is not the product of linguistic games which allow the denotation of things: it originates ... out of the essential unfolding of Being' (Kovacs 2001: 46). Furthermore, for Heidegger, 'The word tells something about human being as *Dasein* that goes beyond the idea of human being as rational animal' (ibid.).

Both Heideggarian and Wittgensteinian meditations help us rethink language and rationality and point to the spiritual horizons of self in our reconsiderations of rationality (see Monk 1990). Such a horizon is

missing in the pragmatist reconsiderations of rationality and in Foucault's critique of Kant. But before we come to the issue of spiritual dimension of rationality, it is helpful to get a glimpse of the path of reconstruction and reconsideration of rationality suggested by pragmatism.

PRAGMATISM AND RECONSIDERATION OF RATIONALITY: THIRD ENLIGHTENMENT OR PRAGMATIC ENLIGHTENMENT?

I have already mentioned how Toulmin presents us both Wittgenstein and Dewey as a way of moving beyond Descartes in our reconsideration of rationality. Toulmin introduces the pathways of John Dewey and pragmatism thus: 'With the decline of Cartesian Foundationalism, claims to self-validation do not carry their earlier weight: we need not choose between knowledge based on experience and knowledge based on claims to self-evidence. In this respect, Dewey was right to suggest that pragmatism is not just one theory on a par with all others. Rather, it represents a change of view, which puts theorizing on a par with all other practical activities' (Toulmin 1990: 172).

But the significance of Dewey and pragmatism lies in not only helping us to look at theory as practice but also reconstituting certain prevalent ways of going about rationality. In his works, Hilary Putnam helps us understand this. For Putnam (1994), while in Carnap, the scientific method is reconstructed as a method of computation but for Dewey, the issue is not only one of computation but cooperation. In Putnam's words: 'For Dewey, inquiry is cooperative human interaction with an environment; and both aspects—the active intervention, the active manipulation of the environment—and the cooperation with other human beings are vital'. In his essay, 'Dewey's Logic: Epistemology as Hypotheses', Putnam urges us to understand the wider significance of the silent revolution—the revolution of procedural deliberation—initiated by Dewey. Dewey finds 'traditional empiricism in its own way as aprioristic as traditional rationalism'. Dewey does not speak of reason but of application of intelligence to problems, and it can be well appreciated here that once we pose the problem of rationality in terms of application, it is difficult to hold it as the exclusive possession of either the human being or the modern enlightened soul. Furthermore, Dewey and the pragmatists lay stress on procedure and they urge us to

acknowledge fallibility in talking about and being a part of rationality. This acknowledgement of fallibility is a crucial step in our reconsiderations of rationality, as it has been too confident of itself, and in this overconfidence, has inflicted unspeakable cruelty and suffering in human history. Fallibility is an acknowledgement of human vulnerability that has also been the motivation behind MacIntyre's (1999) effort to overcome anthropocentrism in thinking about language and reason.

But the stress on procedures of argumentation in pragmatism—one on which Jurgen Habermas of our recent times also lays crucial significance, in the process, presenting us a communicative model of rationality—has a crucial moral significance. It becomes an aid in cooperative living of people despite foundational disagreements. In the words of Putnam: 'Pragmatism anticipated an idea that has become commonplace in contemporary moral philosophy, the idea that disagreement in individual conception of good need not make it impossible to approximate (even if we never finally arrive at) agreement in just procedures and even agreement on such abstract and formal values as respect for one another's autonomy'.

In a later work, Putnam (2001) suggests the pathway of a Third Enlightenment or Pragmatic Enlightenment whose claims to reason and progress are more fallibilistic than was allowed in the Second Enlightenment, i.e. modern Rational Enlightenment (the First Enlightenment for Putnam is the one opened up by Plato). The Pragmatist Enlightenment for Putnam lays stress on inbuilt criticism of any claim, criticism emanating from the sphere of deliberations and leading to what Putnam calls 'reflective transcendence' (Putnam 2001).

At this juncture, it is helpful here to bring to our conversations Foucault's critique of Kantian agenda of enlightenment. In place of the Kantian agenda of universalistic enlightenment, for Foucault, we should have 'vernacular enlightenment' (cf. Dallmayr 1998), which is sensitive to localities and to the contingencies of space and time and also to disjunctures in our experiences and knowledges. Foucault endorses Kant's dreams of enlightenment but does not share his faith in the possibility of a coherent body of knowledge—knowledge related to politics, hope and scientific understanding. Knowledges emerging from

these different domains may not fit and rationality has to learn how to acknowledge this (cf. Quarles van Ufford & Giri 2002). The discourse and practice of rationality—especially when it becomes a tool in rational planning, development or 'Applied Enlightenment'—has to acknowledge, come to terms and cope with disjunctures and incompatibilities between different bodies of knowledge and between knowledge and action. Like Toulmin's, Foucault's critique of the Kantian agenda of enlightenment urges us to cope with uncertainties and contingencies in the discourse and practice of rationality. But Foucault's critique of Kantian universalism and plea for what Dallmayr calls vernacular enlightenment is not a support for parochialism. Rather, it has the potential for a radical hermeneutics which, while sensitive to localities, is open to cross-cultural and global conversations. In the words of Dallmayr: '[...] wedded to interrogation and self-transformation, hermeneutics refuses the trap of parochialism and instead encourages ongoing self-critique carried on by Foucault's "specialized" or situated intellectuals. [...] Most importantly, hermeneutical engagement supports and enables the kind of learning experience that alone holds the promise of genuine global cooperation and co-being' (Dallmayr, 1998: 7).

Foucault's calling of 'vernacular enlightenment' is further illumined by anthropologist Stanley Tambiah's and philosopher Mrinal Miri's reflections on the issue of rationality and science. Tambiah presents us Malinowski's arguments for whom 'all human beings are reasonable [...]' (Tambiah 1990: 67). (Tambiah presents us Leach's arguments which shows the affinity between Malinowski's functionalism and the philosophy of pragmatism of William James.) In talking about science, Tambiah initially speaks about two modes of science: participation and causation. He then goes on to point to their intertwining existence: '[...] the elements of participation are not lacking in scientific discourses, and features of causality are not necessarily absent in participatory enactments' (Tambiah 1990: 109–110). This enables us to realize the necessity for a participatory approach to science and causation. As R. Sundara Rajan (1998) tells us in *Beyond the Crisis of European Sciences*, to know is not only 'to know of' but 'to know with'.

Our reconsiderations of rationality are enriched by the reflections of philosopher Mrinal Miri who, like Tambiah, embodies a

transdisciplinary conversation between anthropology and philosophy. Miri writes: 'For me [...] an important part of the task of understanding the tribal situation is that of understanding the great divide between modern science and what may be called pre-science'. While the modern vision for Miri entails an exclusion of the transcendent in the name of science and rationality, this is different in the case of tribals. In the tribal vision, 'the transcendent understood no doubt in a variety of ways is what breathes life into reality'. The focus on transcendence here is accompanied by a focus on the 'inter-relatedness of things—on a holistic rather than fragmentary, atomistic, granular vision'.

FURTHER CHALLENGES: THE CALLING OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN OUR RECONSIDERATIONS OF RATIONALITY

Tambiah's and Miri's interpenetrative reflections of anthropology and philosophy help us broaden the perspective of rationality. At the same time, they call for further rethinking and reflections. While the issue of transcendence is a missing discourse in the recent philosophical reconsiderations of rationality and Miri's pointer to this is a welcome move, Miri's distinction between science and pre-science is not tenable in the light of transformations taking place in modern science, which blurs the distinction between participation and causation. As I have already argued, building on Tambiah and Sundara Rajan, we need a participatory mode in thinking about causation, science and rationality.

In any case, the issue of transcendence raised by Miri based on the tribal life world urges us to move further and deeper, involving foundational interrogations and self-transcendence in our reconsiderations of rationality. Our reconsiderations of rationality are still very much part of an immanent critique where transcendence is dismissed as unnecessary or the very mention of it raises a lot of anxiety (cf. Herdt & Negri 2000). Thinkers such as Putnam talk about reflective transcendence but do not explore the pathways of ontological transcendence that facilitates this (cf. Bhaskar 2002). But with Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's overture towards metaphysics, we can be inspired to go beyond 'rationality' in our reconsiderations and to explore, realize and live by what Sri Aurobindo calls the 'supra-rational' dimensions of our 'rational' existence. But this calls for a foundational

re-evaluation and revolution in contemporary critical philosophy which still continues to assertively and self-confidently present itself as a 'post-metaphysical' undertaking (cf. Habermas 1992, Vattimo 1999).

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Madras Institute of Development Studies   ANANTA KUMAR GIRI
Adyar, Chennai 600 020

Sundara Rajan on *Puruṣārthas*

I

Late Professor Sundara Rajan's premature demise is a loss to creative philosophizing. He made a distinct name in this dimension and his works are felt within as well as without the national border. The Professor's deep study on phenomenology and existentialism interested him in making an excursion into classical Indian philosophy. He tried to view the concept of *puruṣārtha* through the theoretical models of both phenomenology and existentialism, aiming thereby, to advance a conceptual exploration of the issue having certain philosophical significance in cultural anthropology.

Viewing classical Indian *darśana* through various Western philosophical models is not new. Since Oriental studies in India have been introduced, diverse moves have been undertaken to find the roots of philosophizing in the classical Indian phase by advancing a comparative study of the Indian and the Western thoughts. The view that *darśana*, specially the Vedānta, offers a distinct from of spiritual idealism has gained considerable ground. It has also been looked from the stand points of integral evolutionism, phenomenology, existentialism

and logico-linguistic conceptual analysis. Sundara Rajan's attempt at understanding the philosophical significance of the concept of *puruṣārtha* was a move in this direction. He published two articles on *puruṣārtha*—one in 1980 and another in 1988. In the former, he discussed *puruṣārtha* in the light of critical theory, advanced by Jurgen Habermas, while in the latter, he dealt with *puruṣārtha* at the background of phenomenology and existentialism, with special reference to Husserl, Heideggar and Ricoeur.

II

Sundara Rajan asserted in the first article that the relevancy of the doctrine of the *puruṣārthas* could be brought out if 'formulated under the auspices of the Critical Theory'.[1] Following Habermas, he held the view that both classical Greek and the modern positivistic conception have presupposed 'an ontological objectivism—the view that there is an independent order of nature of facts, which is objectively independent of human interests'.[2] To him, ultimately, one is to 'displace the objectivism and, in its place, work out an ontology of the constitution of the objective world by way of the interests of reason'.[3]

Sundara Rajan stated that what constitutes the human form of life as human is the interpretation, mediated by way of social relationships and social understandings. The *puruṣārthas* (*dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*) are, to him, 'transcendental *a priori* constitutive grounds of a form of life that can be regarded as human. They are not merely empirical motivations of men but, rather, they constitute our distinctive humanity.[4] *Puruṣārtha*, in this sense, signifies universality and necessity (not, of course, a logical necessity) and can be held as grounding 'the aesthetic, the technical, the moral communicational and the emancipatory interests of reason'.[5] Sundara Rajan moved on to remark that impulse and desire also show the stamp of the constitutive productivity of reason.[6] He suggested that the four *puruṣārthas* shape the human experience 'as constitutive gestalts'.[7] To him, the interests which encircle *puruṣārthas* are both 'knowledge constitutive' and 'constitutive of the objects'.[8] He tried to imply '*puruṣārthas* as knowledge-constitutive interests' as depicting man 'as natural subject with transcendental functions'.[9] According to him, the doctrine of the *puruṣārthas* suggests

the 'conception of the man as a natural subject with transcendental constitutive functions'.[10] The structures of the 'natural character of the human subject are prefigured in *kāma* and *artha*', but the transcendental constitutive function of the natural subject, to him, is revealed in *dharma* that symbolizes moral values and norms. He conceded that *dharma* plays a 'pivotal and crucial role, for it moderates *kāma* and *artha* on the one hand and *mokṣa* on the other. It is in this sense that *dharma* could be said to be a *parama puruṣārtha*'.[11] But Sundara Rajan made a pause here to concede that a human being, following *dharma* as a moral order, is not self-sufficient and he must also have 'a dream of emancipaton'.[12]

III

This is a succinct account of Sundara Rajan's viewpoint. To review and, if required, to reconstruct or reformulate the doctrine of *puruṣārthas* is, no doubt, encouraging; for it brings in freshness and creativity. Furthermore, in that connection, to relate the classical doctrine with any philosophical theory, either ancient or modern, either of East or of West is not to be despised if it gives rise to some further clarity and illumination. Hence, Sundara Rajan's attempt to review the doctrine of *puruṣārthas* in the light of critical theory need not be brushed aside at the outset.

But, while probing into the matter, it is also important to note as to what particular formulation of *puruṣārthas* is relevant for such a comparative study. It seems that Sundara Rajan just took a general view concerning *puruṣārthas* at the background of a fourfold classification. He did not take the other important classical view of *puruṣārtha*, according to which, there is the admittance of only threefold classification, viz., *dharma, artha* and *kāma*.

Further, it is notable that *mokṣa*, which is added to the threefold classification, is not advanced with one single meaning and purpose. This is so because the concept of *mokṣa* is tackled differently, keeping in tune with the respective *dārśanik* or philosophical standpoint. For instance, the Advaita Vedāntin's rendering of *mokṣa* is found to be strikingly different from that of the theist Vedāntins inclusive of the Rāmānujāites, Madvas, Nimbārkas, Vallabhites and Caitanyites. One

conspicuous thing that needs to be pointed out, in this regard, is the different rendering of *mokṣa* in terms of *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*. If the former view is accepted, then *mokṣa* can be grouped along with *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. It then may have human significance at the socio-cultural level in man's life. But if the latter view is taken (which is advanced by the theist Vedāntins), then *mokṣa* becomes a totally transcendent spiritual state having hardly anything to do with man of socio-empiric frame. It is not so much concerned with the living but with the dead. *Mokṣa*, as *puruṣārtha*, obviously has a different connotation in this setup which can have the least significance to man of this worldly framework. Even, as per one established classical version, *jīvan-mukta* (having the attainment of *mokṣa* while alive) is a person who is often depicted as having the least concern with worldly state; he is beyond the usual sense of *pāpa* and *puṇya* (demerit and merit). He just continues to exist on account of the inertia of motion.

Sundara Rajan has referred to the distinction between ontological objectivism and ontology of constitution of the objective world (by way of the interest of reason). It is not clear as to what bearing does this distinction has to the theory of *puruṣārthas*, having including *mokṣa*. If one takes the Advaitin's view in this context (which is virtually found to be the typical exponent of the doctrine of *mokṣa*, quite in tune with the Advaitic philosophical position of non-dualism) and meaning *mokṣa* as not attaining anything new but only realizing what is already there (*prāptasya prāpti*), then it may be seen that the Advaitic account of *mokṣa* along with its epistemic stand is closer to ontological objectivism rather than to ontology of the constitution of the objective world. For, Śaṅkara—the ablest exponent of Advaita—has clearly (in his *Śārīrikabhāṣya*) taken up the stand that knowledge (*jñāna*) is only object based (*vastutantra*) and never person based (*puruṣa-vyāpāratantra*). It means that, epistemologically, knowledge is defined in terms of objectivity that is independent of the subject's interference. This account of *jñāna* is more or less accepted by other prominent non-Advaitins like the Naiyāyikas (Note: *āpta* is defined in terms of *yathārtha vaktā*). Even the *Mīmāṃsakas* (for whom *karma* is given prominence over *jñāna*) adopt a realistic and objectivistic stand in the epistemological plane and assert that knowledge is ever objective and

that ignorance or even mistake is caused only when the object is not properly cognized or known. *Vastu svarūpa abadhāraṇa* (that is knowing the object as it is) is regarded as knowledge and any deviation is treated as *viparyaya* or error. Even *brahma-jñāna*, from this point of view, is never treated as non-objective. It is *vastu-svarūpa* and free from egocentricity. Sundara Rajan's suggestion that ontological objectivism is not applicable to the puruṣārthas, specially to *mokṣa* (in its epistemic account) is, therefore, not clear and convincing.

Sundara Rajan's remark that the *puruṣārthas* are not merely empirical motivations of man but constitute a distinctive mark of humanity seems to be unclear and imprecise. What are empirical motivations, after all? Are they grounded on inhumanity? To have desire or to seek wealth or to aspire to attain virtue as against vice is surely found in man in his empiric setting. A normal conscious individual is motivated towards all the three values and is also able to discriminate their respective aims and goals. Only when there is excessive craving for one at the cost of others is there the rise of weakness of reason and moral insensibility. Man is not simply confined to himself alone, but is to remain within a socio-cultural framework. In that setup, there is no impropriety of having a balanced aspiration in following the three basic values. These values are not, of course, empirically derived. But that does not suggest that these values are applicable to a transcendental *a priori* realm. Even for the empiricists, the concepts are duly acknowledged, even though those are not empirically formulated. However, concepts have their meaning and significance in the empirical and worldly setup.

It is also unclear as to how a person having empirical motivation ceases to be human. It is neither necessary in the practical plane nor plausible in the theoretical plane that value-neutral rationalists suffer from inhumanity. On the contrary, they are found to be discriminative and analytically sharp to guard and check any form of confusing assimilation. Interpretation is, however, not to be set aside; rather, it is always noted not to be airy and groundless.

Sundara Rajan thought that the programme of ontological objectivism goes counter to 'certain sensitivity of reflection and totalistic comprehension'. But why should it be? There seems to be no impropriety

in an empiricist framework to accommodate both sensation and reflection. There is also no logical difficulty in framing and constructing an unifying gestalt out of empirically derived sense-particulars. The *saṁghātas* (to use the Buddhist expression) have validity within their own limitation. The difficulty, however, starts only when one is to completely give up the empirical origin and remain content within the speculative *a priori* construction. Sundara Rajan came very close to such a synthetic formulation following Kant (to certain extent) but misleadingly, perhaps, drew the conclusion that the empiricism's/ positivist's/value-neutral rationalist's move in this matter is totally radical and uncompromising.

Moreover, as already indicated, *puruṣārthas* can be made quite intelligible, adopting ontological objectivism. The human significance is never lost by taking recourse to value-neutral rationality. Rather, thereby, there is a meaningful check against subjective interference or encroachment, which are advanced on the plea of accommodating human interests. Value-neutral rationality does not necessarily connote valuelessness. Humanism of any variety cannot disregard human interests. But that does not mean, it is to be reduced to self-centred egoism. That would be one radical twist which is logically not warranted. The *puruṣārthas* are basically presented as a formidable check against all sorts of self-centred egoistic tendency. Epistemological realism and ontological objectivism are against visionary, subjective idealism and not necessarily against the acceptance of human values in the socio-empiric setup.

It is interesting to note here that in the Śaṅkarite scheme—where there is the admittance of *mokṣa* and its attainment in the empiric plane of existence—it never suggests that the empirical world of matter of fact is illusory, unreal and false. *Jagat* refers, in that context, to a particular view about the world—the view of self-centred egoism and vanity. It is against selfism and subjectivism. All this is well indicated in the writings of Śaṅkara (*aham idam, mama idam*, etc.). It has no necessary clash with ontological objectivism. If Advaita is against *viṣaya* (object), it is equally against *viṣayī* (subject) in the metaphysical plane. It moves beyond because non-dualism is beyond categorization. Brahman is neither matter nor spirit. *Mokṣa*, in that sense, is trans-

valuational. But again, it is not value-opaque in the socio-empiric plane. There is, thus, an affinity between the Śaṅkarite and the value-neutral rationalist.

Sundara Rajan's point that both *kāma* and *artha* are the natural character of a human subject and dharma symbolizes moral values and norms is well taken. His remark that *dharma* plays a positive role in moderating both *kāma* and *artha* is also valid. *Dharma*, he rightly held, is *parama puruṣārtha* and such a remark is well noted in the classical source also. Only one thing is not clear. Accepting *dharma* to be of pivotal importance and also suggest that morality (*dharma*) is not self-sufficient, needs fulfilment from *mokṣa* (emancipation), is somewhat obscure and misleading.

In order to believe that morality is not self sufficient is to attack its self-autonomous character itself. To question emancipation of freedom within the framework of morality and to aspire for freedom elsewhere is to move against the very sense of moral or dharmic autonomy. To be moral or to follow to track of *dharma* does not necessarily warrant the adoption of any specific form of ontologism in the transcendental realm. It is also the case that to be moral or to follow moral principles does not amount to remain confined to certain fixed, unaltered, non-flexible arbitrary standards. Morality does accommodate flexibility and that need not be confused with prudency. It has, of course, its sense of universality within the contextual framework. The sense of morality or *dharma* need not depend upon any spiritual authority. *Mokṣa*, in the sense of spiritual attainment, is neither morally expected, nor is it necessarily linked up with *puruṣārtha*; though in certain quarters, the addition of *mokṣa* as a distinct *varga* or category has gained wide currency. However, as I have argued elsewhere, there is scope for reviewing *mokṣa* differently as a coordinating principle of harmonizing and balancing the operation of the three values in the social setup.[13]

IV

In the second article, Sundara Rajan discussed *puruṣārtha* at the background of the views expressed by Husserl, Heidegger and Ricoeur. He analyzed the fourfold values and found difficulties in their respective account. While dealing with *kāma*, he took it as desire (in general),

ranging from 'sensuous appetites' to a 'pure disinterested delight' or even intellectual love. And, in this widest sense, desire seemed to him 'to be the whole of human existence'.[14] In that way, there is nothing improper (according to him) to hold desire (*kāma*) as the only *puruṣārtha*. In a similar plane, he remarked that wealth (*artha*) could signify 'a totality' if it is not restricted to material acquisitions and their production. *Dharma* too, according to him, is righteous conduct and cannot be simply limited to 'moral relationship with others' but must include inward 'self-formation and self-discipline'. And, in this form, he thought that the boundaries between *dharma* and *mokṣa* are blurred, because, to him, *mokṣa* 'is precisely a mode of self-formation'.

But, so far as *mokṣa* is concerned, Sundara Rajan found that to be asymmetrical in relation to all the aforesaid values because while all of those are directed to have some objectification, *mokṣa* is 'precisely the overcoming of all such externalities or objectification'. The goal of *mokṣa* is to move beyond externalization and attain full emancipation (freedom). Here, Sundara Rajan took a Husserlian terminology 'noema' for the understanding of *mokṣa*, i.e. as a mode of being not having (as is the case with other values). Taking a clue from the Heideggarian mode of contrast between the ontic and ontological, he thought that while the aforesaid three values are ontic pursuits, '*mokṣa* is an ontological illumination—a self-understanding rather than a worldly activity'.[15]

But, again, Sundara Rajan felt that such a sharp dichotomy between the three values on one hand and *mokṣa* on the other is not sound, for pleasure or wealth or even moral too can be treated as a mode of being in the world. To seek after pleasure is not to have it but to be in a mode of being. So also, to seek after wealth is not simply to have it but to be in a mode of being in the world. Hence, Sundara Rajan remarked 'this totalizing characteristic of these life orientations suggests that we must think them not as separate interests but as formative powers that shape the totality of human nature'.[16]

In that case, adopting a phenomenological frame of reference, Sundara Rajan moved on to the details of *puruṣārthas* as a mode of being in the world. Whether one takes the issue concerning the status of desire or wealth or moral or even emancipation vis-à-vis the world, in all

cases, he found a functioning and the principle of the noeticnoematic correlation which 'reveals the subjective as well as the objective, the anthropological and the ontological dimension and human existence'.[17] Then, through the Heideggerian analysis of the basic structure of man's being in the world, Sundara Rajan found the possibility of working out 'a specific hermeneutics of the *puruṣārthas*, a distinctive mode of understanding and interpreting each one of these life orientations'.[18]

In this way, Sundara Rajan noticed the *puruṣārthas* to be in relation with each other. Even if each of those has its own specific autonomy, each is—somehow or the other—oriented to the others and thus pave for a distinctive human orientation. So far as this issue of mutual relationship is taken into consideration, Sundara Rajan brought out the point of the unity of *puruṣārthas* in terms of what he designated as transcendental synthesis. In this connection, he found a non-analytic necessary relationship between *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma* and also all the three to *mokṣa*. All these four form a synthetic unity that gives 'expression to the medium, the basis, the context and the manner of pursuit of value, each aspect is possible, only because it is an element in a structure made up of the others, and the totality of the four aspects signifies the organized structure of human aspirations'.[19] Subsequently, Sundara Rajan adopted the Husserlian principle of eidetic reduction and tried to focus on how the shift 'from objects to consciousness', and the 'shift from the natural standpoint to consciousness as the universal medium of access' became helpful in exploring the implications of the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārtha*.

Subsequently, Sundara Rajan had a concise survey of hermeneutical programme of the Heideggerian phenomenology and tried to apply it to the theory of *puruṣārthas*, particularly the understanding of *mokṣa*. Each one of the *puruṣārthas* is thought to constitute 'a human value by its relationship to the other; there is a "moment" of *mokṣa* or the emancipatory concern in each one of them, and that it is this indwelling presence of the emancipatory interest that constitutes it as a *puruṣārtha*'.[20] Of course, he was certain that a reductive interpretation would not allow any scope for such constitutive relation of *mokṣa* with other life-values. Within the domain of the theory of *puruṣārthas*, Sundara Rajan then classified two forms of anthropological theory,

viz., anthropologies of pseudo-transcendence and anthropology of transcendence. In the former, there is the mention of *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma*. In each case, there is the emancipatory ideal explainable either in terms of the dynamics of desire or wealth or even moral. In contrast to this, in the anthropology of transcendence, there is the emancipatory drive which is 'as genuine a human fact as other drives and impulses and it is a constitutive element in all human achievements'.[21] According to Sundara Rajan, it can be described as a possibility.

V

This is an outline of the theoretical construction of the concept of *puruṣārtha* as offered by Sundara Rajan. While one closely analyzes his viewpoint, one does face certain difficulties. Firstly, it is not clear in his writing as to which particular source referred to as *puruṣārtha*.[22] The concept of *puruṣārtha* does not have one fixed rendering in the classical Indian sources. In the Vedic/Upaniṣadic phase, there is the admittance of only threefold values: *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. *Mokṣa* has been added later and *puruṣārtha* is treated as *caturvarga* or fourfold.

Here, even with regard to the inclusion of the fourth value, there is no unanimity, as already indicated. *Mokṣa* is a typical Vedāntic concept and other *darśanajñas* mostly adopt different concepts to suit their *dārśanik* vision. Even among the Vedāntins, a Rāmānujāite, for instance, can never accept *jīvan-mukti* and thereby any empirical or this worldly interpretation of *mokṣa/mukti* is not possible. In this context, Sundara Rajan's attempt at treating *mokṣa* as serving a form of human orientation seems to be a remote possibility, because there, *mukti* is not construed in the empirical human setting, but in a trans-empirical realm of divine existence where disembodied soul (*videhī jīva*) is supposed to remain as a part (*aṁśa*) of the *saguṇa* Brahman. In case of Śaṅkara Advaita, *mokṣa* is regarded as nothing but *śuddha jñāna* (pure awareness) where there is only eradication of conceptual ignorance (*adhyāsa*). It is not regarded as a state to be attained, only a point of illumination. In this context, the Advaitin's admittance of *jīvan-mukti*, conforming the view of *Kathopaniṣad*, is notable.

The Sāṅkhya and Nyāya philosophers have altogether different views to offer. The Sāṅkhite prefers to use the concept *kaivalya* (not *mokṣa*)

on the grounds that it is a state of absolute cessation of suffering (*duḥkha nivṛtti*), release from the shackles of *Prakṛti* and the awareness of pure subjectivity (*puruṣatva*) in its total transcendence. It is *puruṣa* as such without being a *kartā* (agent) or a *bhoktā* (enjoyer). Such a *puruṣa* is precisely not human but totally trans-human. Cessation of suffering here does not mean *ānanda* (bliss). If this is so, then where is the scope for relating *mokṣa* with other three values in the framework that the Sāṅkhya *darśana* offers?

The Nyāya conception is not *mokṣa* but *apavarga*. It signifies escape, not attainment of bliss. The notable point is that according to the Nyāya *darśana*, the *jīva* is to attain its goal by suspending all forms of consciousness. Since caitanya (consciousness) is regarded as the accidental property (*āgantuka dharma*) of *jīva* and held to be the source of all miseries and sufferings, so the Naiyāyika's aspiration for a state of complete meta-consciousness cannot be assimilated with the theistic Vedāntin's goal (*mukti*) and also with the Advaitin's goal (*mokṣa*). While in both, there is a sense of positive freedom, in the case of Nyāya, its sense of release has a negative import of escape or withdrawal. In this context, the Vaiṣṇavite's disapproval of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *mukti* is notable. Now it is clear that the account of *apavarga*, provided by the Naiyāyikas, does not have any scope for Sundara Rajan's attempt of relating all the four values under the bond of some sort of synthetic unity and to project them all as shaping 'the totality of human nature'. As a matter of fact, the manner in which *apavarga* is presented only reveals its trans-human nature.

Looking into Jaina and Bauddha *darśana*, the situation becomes no better. It is not definite whether those philosophers adhere to the four-fold classification of values. The Jaina concept of *mukti* is advanced at the point of complete dissociation of *jīva* from *ajīva* and there the radical procedures of moral rituals which are recommended are aimed at total transcendence. So, to treat *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma* as of human social significance and then again to relate those somehow or other with a full transcendental concept of *mukti*, even taking a clue from the Heideggerian source does not seem to be convincing.

In case of the Bauddha *darśana*, at least in one of its phases, there is the prescription of total extinction of *kāmanā* (*kāmanā vināśe duḥkha*

vināśa). Here, *kāmanā* cannot, of course, be interpreted as desire in general. It contextually means sensualistic impulse that gives rise to *moha*, *vāsanā* and *tṛṣṇā* (delusion, allurement and craving). This sort of rendering of *kāma* is also noticed in the Vedānta source. But when *kāma*, as one of the *caturvargas*, is advocated; it is surely not in the sense of sensuous desire. *Nirvāṇa* is regarded to be a state of inessentiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) and there is no admittance of *ātmatva* (selfhood) in any form. If that is so, then *nirvāṇa* is obviously set as a state of transcendence and there cannot be any linkage with other three values by way of projecting all those as shaping human nature in the manner conceived by Sundara Rajan. The Bauddha *darśana*, however, has different phases like the Vedānta *darśana*. In Mādhyamika *dṛṣṭi*, there is no difference between *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.[23] But whether *dṛṣṭi*, there is no difference between *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.[23] But whether that pronouncement would cater to the need of synthetic unity of all *puruṣārthas* remains as an open issue. Taking the clue from the Mādhyamikas, the later Tāntric Buddhists under different formulations of Vajrayāna, Sahajayāna and Kālacakrayāna have gone on to the other extreme in propagating *mukti* or freedom as not trans-empirical but as empirical fulfilment of passionate desire and sensuous pleasure, much against the common social norms. The original Buddhistic sense of avoidance of sensual desire is fully turned upside down in this form of the Bauddha *darśana*.

VI

Now, apart from the standpoint of different philosophies (as outlined above), let there be a probe into the meaning that is more or less attributed to the concepts of *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma* in the context of *puruṣārtha*. What, precisely, is the import of *kāma*? Even the Advaitins conceive *mokṣa* to be a desired goal (*mumukṣā*). But it is to be marked whether *kāma*, in the context of *puruṣārtha*, is to be understood as desire in general. Sundara Rajan took up the suggestion that *kāma* means mere instinctive impulse, but rejected this on the authority of Plato that purely sensuous instinctive pleasure is only animal gratification and hardly human. But is it not the case that sometimes man behaves most irrationally? Man's craziness for sensuous gratification is quite often manifested in a beastly fashion. Rape, molestation, revenge

and murder are clear instances of that temper. So, even if *kāma* is tempered with *buddhī* and that is its normal functioning, the exception is not ruled out. Abnormal functioning of *kāma* is surely an empirical fact. The Vedāntins as *darśanajñas*, when refer to *kāma* as *puruṣārtha*, they seem to be well aware of this vital distinction. They do not reject *kāma* outright; for they have accepted it as one of the values. In a specific sense, they are critical about *kāma*; in so far as *kāma* is grossly sensualistic and exceedingly egocentric to the tune that not only is it callous for other's concern, it also turns out to be harmful to oneself. Simply speaking, it is not well thought out and properly judged. It is not what Plato says that such a desire is hardly human; but rather, one can say that quite often man is a victim to such *kāma-pravṛtti* (hankering after sensuous desire/gross pleasure) because of lack of proper discrimination and intellectual sharpness. The Vedāntins, in particular, and the Indian *darśanajñas*, in general, seem to have been quite conscious of this subtle distinctive phases of *kāma*. Thereby, they include *kāma* as a value in the refined sense, avoiding the gross element. *Kāma*, in one sense, is *puruṣārtha*; but excessive emphasis on *kāma* with the negligence of other values makes the life harmful as also unmeaningful.

Artha, as already hinted, has multiple meanings. It may mean meaning of word or sentence (*śabdārtha/vākyārtha*) or may imply an object of reference (*yathārtha*) or even wealth (*dhana*). Each of those varieties of meaning can be treated as a type of value. However, in the context of *puruṣārtha*, *artha* refers to wealth. Sundara Rajan remarked that *artha* need not be understood in the restricted sense of 'material possessions and their production'. 'It is not merely the object produced but certain mode of relationship to such object'.[24] It seems Sundara Rajan twisted the descriptive account of *artha* as found in the context of the exposition of *puruṣārtha*. If *artha* is treated only as an end in itself, then there is disapproval. Seeking after wealth as such can never be *śreya* or preferable. This attitude has its shortcomings. It leads to a state of degeneration. The person becomes a slave of wealth and not the controller of wealth (as is the case when person becomes slave of passionate sensuous desire or impulse). So, what *puruṣārtha* prescribes is a regulative and controlled acquisition of wealth which is conducive

towards a composite living. Here also, excessive hankering after wealth is critically viewed. In the Indian context when both *kāma* and *artha* are regarded as value, obviously it never directs to certain bare objectivity; rather, it points to the attitude of the person concerned. In that case, distinguishing between a mode of having and a mode of being is not that relevant. The person is not merely psychologically or individually relieved and composite; he is well placed in the empirical society of other fellows and objects. Hence, the adoption of the existentialist's technical nuances, I feel, is not warranted.

In case of *dharma*, the attitude also plays a vital role. *Dharma*, like *kāma* and *artha*, has multiple meanings. Here, in the context of *puruṣārtha*, it is treated as value in a specific sense. *Dharma*, in general, may mean the observance of certain moral rule or conduct as rituals and any deviation is not permissible. But, as it is hinted before, any moral prescription is not to be construed as too rigid or unflexible. After all, moral prescriptions are meant for good living of the individual in the socio-empiric setting. No *dharma* can thrive if it fails to cater to this minimum expectation. Taking this point into consideration, the Indian attitude towards *dharma* as a *puruṣārtha* has, perhaps, taken a liberal shape. *Dharma*, in the sense of practising moral discipline, honesty and integrity, is definitely emphasized here. But, if a rigid dogmatic adherence to a moral code of particular type is insisted upon at the cost of smooth conduct of socio-empiric living, then it is never accommodated in this conception.

In some quarters, *kāma*, *artha* (and even *dharma*) are regarded as instrumental and not intrinsic values; for those are the means for the attainment of *mokṣa* which is nothing but *parama puruṣārtha*. Sundara Rajan did not, however, spell out the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values in the context of *puruṣārtha*. But he tried to explain all the three values as of ontic significance in the sense that there is all through the expectation of having reached a better state of objectivity. Such values are, according to Sundara Rajan, distinguished from the state of *mokṣa* which one is to attain (in the sense one becomes) and that is said to be ontological as distinct from the ontic. Of course, he did not stick to this position. He went further in stating that all the

three values can also be rendered as not having but of the mode of being itself.

But it is not clear as to why one is to bring the Husserlian mode of having and mode of being into the framework of *puruṣārthas*. It is quite clear that the three values of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are understood in a specific technical sense, wherein they are considered as relevant for normal decent socio-empiric living. Neither excessive desire nor excessive wealth, nor even excessive form of adherence to moral ritualism is preferred. Moral principles are to be adhered to as far as possible. In case of situational hazards which are not within the control of person concerned, the moral lapse is not necessarily disallowed within the framework of *puruṣārtha*. Of course, this can be entertained only after due regard to discriminative intellectual judging of the concerned context. The threefold values are definitely of social significance and those are prescribed within a contextual frame of reference. Without taking due cognizance of that, there is every possibility of misunderstanding and confusion.

To put it in other words, all the three values have been prescribed in the empiric setting where a person is placed. He, of course, has his own individual sense of freedom and autonomy. But that is not to bypass the social needs and expectations. There may be the need for reforming the social convention of a particular type; but that is only for another social order and never for completely annulling the social fabric and advocating pure subjectivity or individuality. At least that is not the way in which, I think, *dharma* as *puruṣārtha* is viewed in the tradition.

VII

Sundara Rajan was never noticeably keen for a synthetic unification of all the four values, including *mokṣa*, and he thought that each of the values paves for a distinctive orientation and the totality of the four values signifies the organized structure of human aspirations. The *caturvargas*, to him, are not of 'separate interests but as formative powers that shape the totality of human nature'.[25] Sundara Rajan held that each of the values has 'a moment of *mokṣa* or emancipatory concern' and, in this way, dwelling in the presence of the emancipatory drive

is itself culminated in *mokṣa*. So, he took *mokṣa* as not something transcendental to human concern but finally treated it as 'possibility'.

Now, it is evident that Sundara Rajan's interpretation of *mokṣa* is not acceptable to the view prevailed in certain quarters; that *mokṣa* is *parama puruṣārtha* and the other three are mere means to it. In his rendering, all four have mutual relations. He even went on to suggest that there is some sort of a non-analytic and necessary relation among them. But it is notable that even if one does not favour the view that *mokṣa* is *parama* (absolute) and the other three value are relative (or means for the realization of *mokṣa*), still it does not necessarily follow that one is to find the view held by Sundara Rajan as unquestionable.

Firstly, it is not clear as to how *mokṣa* is being depicted as trans-empirical and transcendental, is to be placed on the same par with *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, which are obviously of social significance in the empiric setting. Any kind of intermixture or blending of the two varieties of valuational framework would give rise to conceptual obscurity.[26] In the Advaitic setup where *mokṣa* is given this-worldly rendering, it is no more to be treated as a transcendental possibility, but rather, an actual state of attainment (*atra Brahma samasnute*). The *jīvan-mukta* is very much in the empiric world of existence, though he has developed self-restraint (*ātma-saṅyama*) in a positive sense. Sundara Rajan, perhaps, came close to this point when he held that the emancipatory drive is 'as genuinely a human fact as other drives and impulses and it is a constitutive element in all human achievements'.[27] But after spelling this out to be the core meaning of *mokṣa* as value, again giving the suggestion that it is somewhat 'anthropological transcendence' does not seem to be effective.

If Sundara Rajan acknowledged that *mokṣa*, as an emancipatory drive, flows all through the three values of *artha*, *kāma* and *dharma*, then what is the difficulty in clearly pronouncing the view (even if it amounts as somewhat unusual) that *mokṣa* is not another distinct value over and above all the three values, but rather, a synthetic unity of all three in a balanced and composite form avoiding radicalness and rigidity? That would present the fourfold values as socio-empirically significant and would be relevant in any situation.[28] It would be possible if one is prepared to move beyond the mystical, transcendental rendering

of *mokṣa* which has eventually brought in all kinds of vagueness and ambiguity. Sundara Rajan was not prepared to spell this out clearly as he was probably of the impression that *mokṣa* stood for some sort of pure subjective awareness free from all natural and objective settings. In the context of *caturvarga* scheme of value, there is no necessity of bringing in such abstract technical nuances.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Ibid., p. 340.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., pp. 342–43.
5. Ibid., p. 344.
6. Ibid., p. 345.
7. Ibid., p. 346.
8. Ibid., p. 348.
9. Ibid., p. 349.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 350.
12. Ibid.
13. Vide my essay 'The Vedānta Concept of *Puruṣārtha*' in *Breaking Barriers* (Eds.: F.J. Hoffman and G. Mishra), California: Asian Humanities Press, 2003, pp.39–49.
14. Vide his article 'Approaches to the theory of *Puruṣārthas*: Husserl, Heidegger and Ricoeur', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* ICPR, New Delhi, Vol. VI, No. 1, September–December 1988, p. 129.
15. Ibid., p. 130.
16. Ibid., p. 131.
17. Ibid., p. 133.
18. Ibid., p. 135.
19. Ibid., p. 137.
20. Ibid., p. 145.
21. Ibid.
22. Sundara Rajan, throughout his discussion, did not state a single original source as a point of reference.

23. Vide 'The limits of *nirvāna* are the limits of *saṁsāra*, between the two, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever' (*mūla-madhyamikakārikā*, 25: 20).

24. Vide his article under reference, p. 131.

25. Ibid.

26. This line of criticism is advanced by Professor Rajendra Prasad in his article 'The Theory of *Puruṣārthas:* Re-evaluation and Reconstruction' originally published in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IX, Dordrecht and Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1981, pp. 49–76. And, the same article is subsequently published in his book: *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality*, ICPR series in Contemporary Indian Philosophy (General Editor: R. Sundara Rajan), New Delhi, 1989.

27. Vide his article, op. cit.

28. In the epics and the *Dharma Śāstra, mokṣa* is not accepted as something absolutely distinct and transcendental value but as a continuation of the other three values. Vide Roy W. Perrett, 'History, Time, and Knowledge in Ancient India' published in *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History*, Vol. 38, No. 3, October 1999.

(Fellow: I.I.A.S., Shimla 5)   BIJAYANANDA KAR
AM-26, VSS Nagar
Bhubaneswar 751 007

Are Qualia Mystified? Response to P. Jetli's Comments published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XX, No. 4

Dr P. Jetli, in his very insightful comments on my paper 'Why Qualia cannot be Quined?' has raised a number of questions regarding whether qualia can be quined at all. He seriously believes that they cannot. His main argument is that I have not succeeded in my attempt to defend qualia. I have, according to him, at best 'begged the question or stacked a mountain of straw men arguments' (p. 11). In other words, my arguments against the physicalists and functionalists, especially Dennett, have not shown how qualia can be real at all except for taking them for granted on *a priori* grounds.

My response is twofold. First, I want to show that the standard arguments against qualia are themselves straw men arguments and, therefore, the functionalist rejection of qualia is based on a dogma. Second, I would like to show why a non-functionalist argument for qualia need not be based on a transcendental metaphysics. Therefore qualia, when defended, need not be mystified.

I

The Enemies of Qualia: Qualia Caricatured

Those who are enemies of qualia, including Dennett, invariably revert to idea that qualia are queer entities, private and ineffable at best, never to be taken seriously in a scientific study of consciousness. Thus, qualia or the phenomenal properties of consciousness are looked down upon as metaphysical entities to be discarded and overthrown from the scientific discourse on the mind. According to the enemies of qualia, we can talk of such phenomenal qualities only if we are doing folk psychology and not cognitive science, i.e. qualia have their friends only amongst the friends of folk psychology.

What can be discerned in this campaign against qualia is that there is already a built-in scientific bias against qualia entertained by physicalists and the functionalists. According to them, certain mental states are only the functional states of the brain and, therefore, there are no phenomenal properties as a part of the mental states. All qualia are fictions attributed to conscious states by those who view consciousness as real, independently of how it is causally and functionally explained. The first-person approach to consciousness, according to them, is riddled with this deep mystery of phenomenal properties of consciousness. Hence, this approach is to be discarded as it is against the scientific approach to consciousness.

The first-person experiences are real for the simple reason that they are basic to any understanding of the conscious states. It is impossible to understand the mental states without understanding what it is like to be in those states. The manner in which one is in those mental states constitutes an inalienable feature of such mental states. However hard we may try to eliminate it, it comes back with full force. Of course,

there is no reason to hypostatize the qualia as private and ineffable entities.

The friends of qualia need not be mystery-mongers as Jetli wants them to be, nor do they demand that qualia belong to a transcendental world. Qualia are the phenomenal properties of consciousness and, hence, are as much real as consciousness itself. If consciousness belongs to the Popperian world, then so do the qualia. It is no mystery that there is consciousness, so also it is no mystery that there are qualia.

My argument is not basically to provide 'an autonomous third account' (p. 3) which will prove qualia to be substantive entities. My aim is only to show that the enemies of qualia have caricatured the qualia by first characterizing them as private and ineffable and then denying the fact that no entities of this kind exist anywhere. In fact, there are no private and ineffable qualia. If there were such entities, in what way can they be relevant in understanding consciousness? Qualia are the phenomenal qualities of consciousness; essential to consciousness, at least from the first-person point of view.

My position on qualia does not imply that consciousness is detached from the natural world or that consciousness does not belong to the world. It is important to note that we are all conscious beings. But this does not solve the problem as to how consciousness came into being. The causal explanation itself does not suffice, though it cannot be denied that many philosophers of the mind favour such an explanation. But is it not the case that we presuppose consciousness even while causally explaining how consciousness is possible?

Is Functionalism the Last Word?

Jetli is worried whether Dennett is begging the question in his refutation of the theory of qualia. Without taking sides on this point, one can say that the enemies of qualia are more prone to beg the question than the friends. The standard functionalist approach is not to accept anything that does not fall within the causal network in a mechanistic framework. Qualia, including consciousness, obviously do not fall within the functionalist framework; therefore, they are excluded from the functionalist discourse. This proves to be the dogma of functionalism and, hence, there is scope for begging the question regarding qualia within

functionalism, because by definition there can be no first-person experiences within a functionalist framework.

Functionalism accepts the multiple realizability thesis and, in doing so, does not depend on the token-token identity of the brain states and the mental processes. But can the type-type identity of the brain and the mind be denied by the functionalists? The same type of mental states could be realized in many systems which share the same functional structure, e.g. robots and the human beings. This is arguably possible because the robot and the human being are type-identical organizations, though they differ biologically.

Functionalism, in any case, fails to answer why there should be first-person experiences at all. It refuses to accept the first-person point of view which allows for the reality of phenomenal experiences. This is, in fact, what David Chalmers calls the hard problem about consciousness. No amount of functionalist and causal explanation can resolve the hard problem. However, one should not conclude that there is a 'transcendental or mystical realm of qualia' (p. 7) because the alternative to functionalism is not transcendentalism. Sheer common sense would suffice to show that there are first-person experiences called qualia.

II

The Explanatory Gap

There is bound to be an explanatory gap between the physical states of the brain and the mental experiences. This is due to the fact that the physical states are causally closed within the physical world while the mental states are not. There are no known psycho-physical laws which can close the mental world within the physical world. In no case is the mental world a causal extension of the physical world. The gap persists even if some sort of causal continuity is admitted to keep the mind within the natural world order.

Mind-body dualism, even without the Cartesian metaphysical underpinning, is bound to crop up even at the height of naturalism of all sorts. How can anybody do away with the mental experiences when it is obvious that bodily states do not explain how there are such

mental states? Only a die-hard physicalist can do so. Jetli seems to be willing to advocate such a die-hard physicalism (p. 8).

In philosophy, there are hardly any knock-down arguments. There are no doubt philosophical explanations, but there are, to be sure, no final explanations in philosophy. My idea of a philosophical explanation does not, of course, include 'fallacious argument' (p. 9) like the ones Jetli refers to (p. 12 fn). (Is it fallacious to argue that self-consciousness is basic to human beings? Does one have to do philosophy to prove that rocks have no self-consciousness?) I think one ought to revisit the concept of a person to situate self-consciousness in the proper perspective. Jetli has generously referred to my writings on this issue. That provides my answer to those who deny self-consciousness.

Quining Qualia at What Cost?

Who quines qualia and why? Obviously, it is the physicalists of all hues who are inclined to eliminate qualia. They believe that such qualitative experiences do not have explanatory functions and hence must be eliminated. However, the friends of qualia defend them not because they are given to our higher metaphysical intuitions but because they are available in our common experience. One does not have to be a philosopher to accept that there are qualitative experiences like feelings and sensations. Philosophers can debate over what is the right explanation of the qualia and not over whether qualia are real. If qualia do not exist, then what is this debate all about?

Which explanation of qualia is superior is definitely a matter of logic. Only amongst the friends of qualia can there be an agreement regarding the superiority of explanation, but not amongst those who deny the very existence of qualia. The enemies of qualia eliminate them altogether, so there is no use of their asking for 'the best explanation' when the existence of qualia is not granted by them. My effort has been to reinstate qualia to their original position in the conscious mind. Mine is a ground-level argument regarding the reality of qualia and consciousness.

Department of Philosophy   R.C. PRADHAN
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad 500 046

Social Philosophy of Rāmānuja vis-à-vis Professor Sangam Lal Pandey

Rāmānuja, an advocate of *Viśistadvaita*, developed his thought processes at the time when Buddhist *sādhāna mārga* and, equally significant, *Nirguna Brahman* of Saṅkara had almost banished the concept of God from the philosophical sphere. The philosophical thoughts of the Buddhist and that of Saṅkara were too difficult to be comprehended by the general mass. Ramanujacharya synthesized both the views on the ground of *bhakti*, and thereupon, developed a composite philosophy of love. Though Sangam Lal Pandey is a thorough going *Advaitin* or a believer of *Advaita Vedānta* of Saṅkara, his view regarding man and society—up to a certain extent—are similar to those of Rāmānuja. I do not imply that Pandey holds good *Viśistadvaitic* ideology but it can be easily said that Pandey looks on the problems of man and society in the same way.

The basic tenet of *Viśistadvaita Vedānta* is that there is only one reality—*Brahman*, which is qualified with matter and soul. Matter and soul are not accessory to God, but the two are completely dependent on Him. Now, if everything is dependent upon *Brahman*, it seems there is no room for human freedom, and, thereupon, there is no social philosophy different from its ontology. In this paper, I shall try to ascertain Rāmānuja's as well as S.L. Pandey's position on these problems.

Social philosophy, in Vedantian parlance, is known as *lokāyana*. S.L. Pandey has rightly defined *Lokāyana* as '... the *ayana* or movement of this *loka* in thought and reality from its natural state-of-affairs to its perfectly rational state-of-affairs'.[1] The Vedantian way of life, whether viewed from political or social point of view, presents itself as an integrated course of duties and actions for the attainment of the spiritual ideal.

Every society has two aspects—a natural-cum-traditional aspect, and a manmade aspect. Pandey uses the term *loka* for the former aspect and *samāja* for the latter one.[2] He argues, quite rightly, that *loka* is more comprehensive than society. In other words, *loka* comprises society as well. Societies are integrated and disintegrated in the *loka*. However,

loka is eternal. It is the bedrock of all societies. Both Rāmānuja and Pandey favour *sat-kārya-vāda* to explain the origin of society. There was no time when there was no society. This world is a real transformation of its material cause, i.e., *Ishvara*, but is completely dependent on Him. 'In all of them there is the same *Brahman*, on which all are dependent for existence just as all gold articles are dependent on gold'.[3] Although the fabric of social order is eternal, the basic societal facts are individuals, as well as social groups. Social groups are based on their own norms, customs, rules, etc. which are changing according to the changes in the life-styles of its individual members. All these are always found to be inter-related. Therefore, both Rāmānuja and Pandey suggest a way of life pertaining to individual and social groups, both of which are equally important. The way of life, i.e., the social order in *Viśistadvaita*, as well as Advaita of Pandey is a moral order. This sort of order, known as *ṛta* in the Vedas, is manifested in the hierarchy of values—*dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *moksha*. In this hierarchy of values, Pandey adds two more—*shakti* and *bhakti*. All these values are inter-related, and, thus, compose the spectrum of *loka*.

The crux of all values is man's desire for the better. Although man is an embodied spirit, but as a member of the earthly and the temporal order, he cannot evade his responsibilities. Thus, Ramanuja and Pandey hold that the eternal truths, which form the basis of the rule of conduct, must be realized in social and temporal terms. Hence, the correct understanding of the *loka* must be based on the community of values that determine the *loka*. Any partial or abstract view of values destroys the multi-faceted base of social foundation.

Hereafter, this paper has been divided into four sections. In each section, the former part deals with the views of Rāmānuja on his social philosophy, and the latter part deals with S.L. Pandey's social philosophy wherein the impact of Rāmānuja's thesis is clearly visible.

WAY TO LIBERATION

According to Rāmānuja the individual soul, on account of *avidyā*, is confined in a material body. It is, apparently, a degradation of the soul as its *dharmabhuta-jñāna* is contracted due to *avidyā*. Rāmānuja has

used the word *avidya* in the sense of *varnashrama karmas*,[4] which bring about the contraction and expansion of the *dharmabhuta-jñāna* of the individual soul. *Avidyā* creates a pseudo sense of agency in individual soul which, quite obviously, has an adverse effect on the individual's attitude towards the world. The individual thinks himself to be the lord of the world. Subsequently, the sole purpose of the world, according to him, is to cater only to various needs and comforts. The false attitude towards the universe impels him to forget that *Ishvara*, is the ultimate source of everything. He, thereby, considers himself to be the controller of the world. Thus, *avidyā* stands in the way of self-realization and God-realization, resulting into the individual's strong yearning for the ordinary pleasures of life. Anyway, *mukti* or release is a state when the individual is freed from *avidyā* and has the intuition of the Supreme.

Hence, the summon bonum of human life in Vedāntian social philosophy is salvation, which means dissociation of the self from all influences of *avidyā*. *Avidyā*, in fact, prevents the individual self from attaining a true knowledge of its free nature. In other words, liberation, for Rāmānuja, is the permanent removal of all the obstacles which cause contraction in the *dharmabhuta-jñāna*. Therefore, Rāmānuja seems to attach importance to the performance of the Vedic rites also, because Vedic actions, too, help a man to realize the distinction between the immortal soul and perishable body. This is also *tattvajñāna*, although of a lower order. A higher type of *tattvajñāna* means full knowledge of the true nature of the eternally free self, and this is attained through *bhakti* and *upāsanā*.

Further, Rāmānuja is of the view that devotion, in cooperation with knowledge and action, constitutes the means to reach the summon bonum of life. *Bhakti* consists of knowledge of the object of adoration, and intense affection and respect for the same. Complete self-surrender, which is the essence of devotion, becomes possible only when the individual realizes his own nature, the nature of God and, also the nature of his own relation to God. Not only knowledge, but also *karma* (action) performed in a proper spirit is equally necessary for the awakening of devotion in the heart of man. It is that disinterested performance of *nityanaimittika karma* (daily and occasional duties)

that purifies the mind of an individual and makes him fit to grasp the ultimate truth. Both knowledge and action are necessary forerunners of *bhakti*, and as such these are the contours of *bhakti*.[5] When all scriptural duties are performed in the spirit of a servant of God, one reaches the supreme goal without much difficulty. Thus, Rāmānuja holds that duties related to various *varnas* and *āshramas* should be discharged even by a wise man because *karma* contributes to *vidyā*, which means meditation on the selfless devotion to God. In fact, regular discharge of duties in an attitude devoid of egoism, pride and arrogance is itself the worship of God.[6] Therefore, *bhakti* or devotion constitutes the principal means, and knowledge and actions are its two essential non-separable auxiliaries.

Rāmānuja, in his *Vedartha-Samgraha*, says that *Brahman* grants emancipation from worldly bonds to a person if and when he performs the ordinary obligatory and ceremonial duties, practices the highest ethical virtues and attains true knowledge through the *shastras*. It is only when a man has thus qualified himself that he can ultimately attain emancipation from all worldly bonds through *bhakti* towards *Ishvara*. The special feature of *bhakti* is that by inculcating it, a man loses all interest in everything else. Every action is done for the sake of *Ishvara*. For Rāmānuja, *bhakti* is not merely feeling but a special kind of knowledge, which seeks to ignore everything that is not for the sake of *Ishvara*.

Thus, Rāmānuja has recognized a close connection between *bhakti* (devotion) and *jñāna* (knowledge). Knowledge is the base of *bhakti*. Knowledge not only produces *bhakti*, but also enriches it. Love cannot spring forth in the heart of a man unless he knows the nature of the object he is going to love. So, knowledge is necessary for the emergence of devotion in the heart of an aspirant. Through *bhakti*, the soul becomes more and more vividly conscious of its relations to God and, at last, it surrenders itself to God. The complete resignation to God has been called *prapatti*. When *prapatti* sanctifies the heart of a devotee, he at once surrenders his whole nature to God, and, consequently, freedom from selfish desires, equal mindedness and love for all arise in his mind. Devotion is perfect in this stage, and forces of attraction and repulsion, friendship and enmity, pleasure and pain cease to affect him.

Through *prapatti* Rāmānuja appears to be trying to open the gate of salvation even for the so-called low castes, and, also to remain faithful to the spirit of Brahmanical religion. The path of *bhaktiyoga* was opened for the three higher castes who were allowed to study the scriptures and practice *vaidika* rites. The lower castes, who were debarred from *vaidika jñāna* and *vaidika karma*, could not adopt the path of *bhaktiyoga*. So, the path of *prapatti* was introduced for them in order to enable them to adopt *Vaishnava* customs. The goal is the same, the essential ingredients are identical. The only difference is that while *bhaktiyoga* is an approach through philosophical knowledge, action, love, and respect, *prapatti* is an approach to *Ishvara* through faith and selfless love accompanied with an attitude of self-surrender and resignation.

Rāmānuja asserts that the so-called caste distinctions do not touch the nature of the soul. Caste distinctions belong to the bodies, and determine the duties which the individual owe to the society. Moreover, Ramanuja has also made provision for the liberation of persons who have committed great sins. Such persons may have recourse to the *prapatti* method. If a man succeeds in offering himself sincerely to God, the sins of his past criminal actions shall be wiped out. There is neither scripture, nor any rule for one who has deep devotion. In this way, Rāmānuja preaches equality in worship, and proclaims that *bhakti* transcends all distinctions.

However, Pandey does not view the way to liberation in the same line as that of Rāmānuja, although both agree that *varnas* are created on the grounds of the different qualities and natural propensities of different individuals. Both the thinkers foresee divinity in each and every individual. No individual is separable from the whole organism and, therefore, no one is untouchable. The distinctive feature of Pandey's thesis is his assertion that each individual is an embodiment of *Nārāyaṇa*. He lays great emphasis on the service of the poor masses, which have been called *Daridra Nārāyan*.

They are to be treated (as) divine, i.e. absolutely without any selfish interest. This way of thinking has generated the idea of *Janata Janardana* that resembles Comte's conception of humanity as God. At any rate, human society is divine and eternal along with the individuals that comprise it. When an individual surrenders himself

to God, i.e. Humanity that is *Nārāyana*, he achieves perfect peace and freedom.[7]

Pandey stresses upon mass charities, mass education and other acts of service of the masses. Thus, he has modernized the concept of *Vedic* rites. *Vedic* rites are outdated for him. Instead of mechanical performance of *Vedic karmas*, one should develop altruistic acts such as free medical service, free education, etc. Such acts should be performed on the individual, social and state level. Besides these words of social services, initiative should be taken at individual as well as social level for the preservation and consolidation of the *loka*. In this regard, Pandey assigns important place to *pravrtti* and *nivrtti*. *Pravrtti* is persuasion towards one's duties, and *nivrtti* is prevention from resorting to wrong path. Thus, *pravrtti* and *nivrtti* are the two important extensions of the works of social service.

Hence, surrender to God through *bhakti* or *prapatti* opens the gate of liberation for Rāmānuja, but for Pandey surrender to God is surrender to humanity. Service of humanity brings an individual close to God and finally he becomes fully integrated to the body of God.

If we examine closely, we find that barring a few exceptions, Pandey's views are much similar to those of Rāmānuja. The main difference between Rāmānuja and a follower of *Advaita Vedānta* will be regarding *bhakti* as a way for liberation. Though *Advaita Vedānta* does not regard *bhakti* as the way of liberation, it does assign a very important role to *bhakti* even in one's liberation. Pandey will agree that in his view also, *bhakti* and *karma* are the two important means for the *chittashuddhi* of an individual. Without this *chittashuddhi*, the knowledge of Brahman will not come to the individual. Therefore, *bhakti* for the *Advaitin* is also important, and is helpful in getting liberation.

KARMA, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

We have seen in the previous section that for Rāmānuja, *avidyā* veils the real nature of the self. The removal of the veil of *avidyā* is possible through the path of *bhakti*, which consists of knowledge and action. But it is solely upon the individual will to either select the path of liberation, or to suffer in the cycle of birth and death.

Ishvara allows individual souls to perform actions according to their own free will. But the fulfilment of the desires of the soul are possible only through the approval of *Ishvara*. Nevertheless, *Ishvara* does not interfere in individual's act, and, thereby, doesn't limit his freedom. If one desires to commit negative actions, God allows one to act accordingly, although such desires take one farther away from God. On the other hand, He is favourable to those who are specially attached to Him. Hence, we see that, although the choice of desires are determined by the character of the individual, desires become effective through the grace of God. In other words, God gives the fruits of actions in accordance with the *adrishta* of the individual. Thereupon, desires are determined by individual's own deeds or *adrishta*. *Adrishta* is unconscious and, thereby, unable to function on its own. It requires to be controlled by a conscious agent. So, God is the controller of *adrishta*. An individual, therefore, has freedom for selecting his own line of action. But when such actions are performed and, consequently, the *adrishta* of the individual is formed, he is liable to reap the fruits of his actions. Hence, individuals are themselves both masters and slaves of their own acts. They (i.e. individuals) are the masters of *kriyamana karmas* (actions done in the present life) and a slave of the *prārabdha karmas* (past actions which have started bearing fruits). Since *prārabdha karmas* bear fruits under the supervision of God, the kind of pleasures and pains that an individual will undergo (due to his *prārabdha karmas*) is to be determined by God.

Though the law of *karma* is immutable there remains the scope of free will and actions. Explaining this position, Surma Dasgupta in her book *Development of Moral Philosophy in India* says:

Our life is pre-destined in one sense; it is being determined by the actions in the previous existences; not only our success and failure, happiness and sorrow, but our mental attitudes also are, to some extent, shaped and fashioned by past impressions. But still we are free in our will and effort which we can direct in the direction of liberation. Determinism here is nothing but self-determinism. We are subordinate to no other agency but ourselves. It is our own actions which have woven in and out the present network of our existences, and we are spinning out our future.[8]

Indeed, God is the necessary cause for the performance of every action by the individual but the special cause is the individual himself who is performing the action. An action is done when both the causes are present—God and the individual. If *adrishta* does not determine one's present action, if all actions done by an individual are mere actualizations of God's wishes, then *Jiva* will be relieved of its responsibility, and, therefore, there will be no reason why an individual should receive punishment for such actions which are really the wishes of God. It has been explicitly stated that the diversities of experiences undergone by different individuals are due to their own past deeds. So, a *jiva* is both free and dependent upon God's will.

Pandey also takes in the view the *drishta* and *adrishta* elements of action. *Drishta* means such consequences which are empirically known, while *adrishta* means empirically unknown consequences. Both these elements are equally important for the determination of the fruits of action.

Pandey assigns so much importance to *karma* that he calls this *loka* as *karma-loka*. Although he finds *karma* inherent in the *loka*, we find a dichotomy of *karma* as purely secular (*laukika*) and secular-cum-religious *karmas*. Secular *karmas* include works of personal piety, deeds for the benefits of others (benevolence) and charity. However, the secular-cum-religious *karmas* are counted as sacrifices, penances and charity. These *karmas* are justified as they promote the goods of the people. In a way, religious *karmas* are more than secular *karmas*, because secular *karmas* ultimately lead to religious spectrum.

> When a secular *karma* is accomplished it gives pleasure, rest and peace, which further produce a unique experience of the reality that is in the *loka*. This experience gives rise to the idea of renunciation (*vairāgya*) of passions, which are the springs of all actions. This idea of renunciation puts constraints and controls over passions, curbs egoism, and promotes altruism.[9]

It seems that Pandey assigns utmost importance to renunciation because it leads to the solidarity of the *loka*. Preservation of this solidarity is the responsibility of each and every member of the *loka*. Moreover, the *loka* is not supportless, its support or base is the *Brahman* himself.

Thus, regarding man's *karma*, freedom, and responsibility, we find some similarity between the views of Ramanuja and those of Pandey.

TRACES OF MODERN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Rāmānuja's recognition of *varnashrama* duties illustrate that he recognized social life as an organic whole in which each member is tied with another in an indissoluble tie. Though an individual is predominantly responsible for his own good or bad actions, he shares the collective responsibility for the good of others and of society as well. It is always due to our actions that we enjoy and suffer. But we also suffer or enjoy in consequence of the actions of others.

The sense of collective responsibility has been emphasized by the law of *karma* which granted equality to all beings, as caste was determined by *karma*. According to it, a person not only experiences happiness and sorrow, as the consequences of his own actions, but has always the chance of regeneration to a higher and better life by his own efforts. Hence, we find that the fundamental concepts of social ethics are traceable in the theism of Rāmānuja, as we find in it the desire of freedom from sorrow, the sense of justice and the possibility of the attainment of spiritual goal. Social philosophy does not seek merely the happiness of this life, but also a purpose of life. This purpose has been clearly emphasized in the form of *moksha*.

Further, we find the notion of justice, which is the basic concept of social philosophy, synthesized with the law of *karma* in Rāmānuja's thesis. However, due to the craving for spiritual enlightenment, the concept of justice did not take the shape of retribution. It has emerged into a reformative outlook as sympathy and mercy for all. It seems that for social stability and maintenance of order, the concept of justice was ingrained in the human mind as an internal moral principle. It has a great social significance as it is concerned with the maintenance of each other's rights in the society and mutual relations. In this sense, it is closely allied with the notion of equality. Recognition of rights for oneself implies the same in others and, therefore, to treat others as one's equal. Hence, the concepts of justice and equality are traceable to the emphasis on emotions of the mind, such as pity and love. One recognizes human dignity and feels compassion for the distressed, and

wishes that they should come upto a better situation. Thus, the proper course of action suggested by Rāmānuja is not only to help the distressed, but also to provide opportunity for all to attend the basic needs of life. He has recognized divinity in all men and, thereby, tried to give them equal platform, which means that they should be given equal opportunity and treatment with respect. A theist's emphasis on deep emotion and love for God sweeps away all considerations of self interest. The devotee melts into sweetness and adoration for *Ishvara* with all the force of his life and love. He does not enquire whether he has received just treatment from God or not, but wishes for greater advantage to the weaker. Therefore, conquest of passion and attachment is a solution for the miseries of life, according to Rāmānuja.

Moreover, Rāmānuja is of the view that life has to be lived as a harmonious development of one's character towards a moral goal. The ideal is *moksha* or liberation. It is held to satisfy the longings of human mind for a spiritual ideal which is beyond the world, above the ordinary level of existence.

So far as the question of *varnashrama dharma* is concerned, Pandey or any *Advaitin* will not disagree with it. However, the concept of *swadharma* assumes paramount importance in Pandey's thesis which only seems an extension of *varnashrama dharma*. He argues that there is only one *swadharma* of all human beings—the duty or discipline for self realization or God realization. Hence, *varnashrama dharma* should be adjusted with *swadharma*. Pandey also holds that in a social structure or social organization, every man is responsible and is important in determining the social ideal. Though Pandey does not hold the organic concept of society, and he distinguishes at certain places between man and society, the voice of society is not always the voice of individuals. For example, in case of moral and social values, an individual has to follow the ordinance of society. He will have to follow the social rules even if he does not want to. But, according to Pandey, these ordinances are important in the realization of the individual good. In of society are important in the realization of the individual good. In this way, he can also be said to have an organic concept of society. Moreover, Pandey's concept of 'justice' and 'equality' is based upon the respect for personality of the individuals which is also in the line of *Viśistadvaita*. It is a guarantee of the external condition for the

development of all persons. After all, the ideal of justice is the right ordering of social relations among all persons which would pave the way of self-realization for every member of society. The right to self-realization or right to freedom is the highest right which is asserted in all *Advaita Vedāntin*, as well as *Viśistadvaita Vedāntin* texts. So far as the human liberty is concerned, more or less Pandey's views are the same as those of Rāmānuja. As an *Advaitin*, he holds that man, though bound by different types of *karmas*, has enough freedom to exercise his will. In this connection, both *Advaitin* and *Viśistadvaitin* do not differ. They both hold human freedom as an essential component of individual and social progress. Rāmānuja also gives full freedom to man to exercise his will. He seems to be aware of the fact that without human freedom, social progress will be impossible. But both Ramanuja and Pandey, maintain that human freedom does not mean anarchy. It is to be governed by social and divine rules.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the social philosophy of *Viśistadvaita* has crossed the boundary of caste-system, and embraced the whole humanity. It has also recognized the diversity in man's approach towards the realization of reality. Although it preaches a proper life of religion which belongs to the eternal order, human beings, as members of the earthly and the temporal order, cannot evade their responsibilities. The eternal truth, which gives us sovereign rules of conduct for our lives, has to be realized by us on this very earth. This is not possible unless we have faith in an inner order. Hence, we find that Rāmānuja has tried to revive society on the grounds of universal salvation and equality. In the process of social restructure, the importance of the lowest of the low has been recognized. The whole system was designated to unite the heterogeneous population of India and, thereby, the whole world in one spiritual bond. In this attempt, he has been successful enough as it suits the composite culture of mankind even today.

As regards the above views of Rāmānuja, we can easily see that Pandey does not differ very much from Rāmānuja. He holds that social philosophy or socialism is not limited to a particular caste, creed or society. His ideal, *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* is very near to Rāmānuja's

concept of universal brotherhood. Pandey is well aware that no society or nation can survive in isolation. He promotes universal brotherhood, and avoids the problems which hurt the views or sentiments or harms any section of human society. This is the true *Advaitic* spirit with which the *Viśistadvaitin* will never differ.

In the end, we can maintain that there are some differences between *Advaitin* and *Viśistadvaitin* about their basic assumption, i.e. about the ultimate reality and some other principles, but so far as social problems are concerned, we do not see any difference between the views of Rāmānuja and Pandey. This similarity is not accidental, but an outcome of the basic assumption of *Advaita* and *Viśistadvaita*. Here it will not be out of place to say that in the beginning, Ramanuja was a staunch *Advaitin* but because of his deep love towards *Saguna Brahman*, he differed from *Advaita Vedāntins*. So, the social ideology of *Viśistadvaita* and *Advaita* is not much different.

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Reader, Department of Philosophy   ABHA SINGH
Magadh University, Bodh-Gaya
(B.S. College, Danapur, Patna), Bihar, India

Has Philosophy Advanced in the Twentieth Century?

ABSTRACT

In order to examine the question whether philosophy has advanced in the twentieth century, three philosophical movements of the past century, viz., Analytical Philosophy, Logical Empiricism and Continental Philosophy have been considered. The idea of philosophical progress is problematic. There have been changes in the methodology, emphasis and style of philosophizing but the perennial questions are still being debated. Science—although different from philosophy—has influenced modern philosophy, e.g. mind-body problem, space and time.

The earlier conflict between analytical and continental philosophy seems to have abated or even vanished. Analytical philosophy provides a rationally argumentative style of philosophizing applicable to different schools. Depending on whether one takes philosophy to be a guide to life or simply as a logical clarification of thought, one can choose the school of thought of one's liking.

INTRODUCTION

In order to examine the question posed here, we propose to discuss three important 'schools' of philosophy of the previous century:

1. Analytical Philosophy,
2. Logical Empiricism, and
3. Continental Philosophy.

Whether philosophy makes any progress at all with the passage of time is a moot question. Of course, philosophy cannot advance in the same sense as science does if we accept, after Wittgenstein, the difference between the two disciplines. According to Wittgenstein, 'Philosophy is not a cognitive pursuit; there are no new facts to be discovered by philosophy; only new insights' (PR, PG 256). Thus, one could perhaps say right away that philosophy does not advance but only examines and re-examines certain eternal questions. A German philosopher points out that it is too simplistic to talk of progress in philosophy. The concept of progress is itself a subject for discussion. What looks like progress from one standpoint might appear as regression from another

because some essential features of the past are forgotten in the newer development, e.g. Neoplatonism, Neokantianism. Philosophy has a different relation to its history than science (Schnädelbach 1985).

On the other hand, we find in the recent writings of distinguished scholars expressions like:

To study the philosophy of language is to see that there is progress in philosophy.   (Canfield 1997)

Philosophy certainly progresses, things change, agendas move on. Debates are taken further or abandoned. Philosophy is not static.
(Mulhall 2002)

Parfit, Nagel, Churchland—all eminent philosophers—think we are beginning to get somewhere and if we take care we can reasonably hope for *undeniable progress*.   (Haldane 2001)

In short, there are views both for and against the idea of progress in philosophy. We believe that there has not been any substantive progress in philosophy in the twentieth century, or in any other century, nor was any progress expected from the nature of philosophy, as we see it.

Old questions are still being debated. In the methodological side and in the style of philosophizing, much has happened in the recent past which is worth taking notice of. We will elaborate upon this below.

A main point to clarify at the start is that we are using the expression 'schools' of philosophy in a loose way in order to focus our attention on particular groups of philosophers of the twentieth century. There are no watertight distinctions between them. Philosophers and their philosophy can hardly be confined to one particular school. For instance, analytical and continental philosophies are no longer considered to be separated sharply from each other, as was the custom earlier.

Let us now briefly consider the status of three modern philosophical movements.

1. ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Analytical philosophy is currently said to be the dominant tradition in academic philosophy in the English speaking world. It relies heavily

on logical and linguistic analysis from which it derives its name (Urmson 1989). G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein launched the movement in Cambridge at the onset of the twentieth century. Dummett accords Gottlob Frege—who inspired both Russell and Wittgenstein—a place of honour in the genealogy of analytical philosophy. According to Dummett, Frege was the fountainhead of analytical philosophy, not Russell or Wittgenstein (Dummett 1987). In addition there were other prominent thinkers in Oxford in the early days of analytical philosophy, viz., Ryle, Austin, P.F. Strawson. They were associated with what was called ordinary language philosophy. What distinguished analytical philosophy was a passion for clarity. The urge for clarity was concomitant of the so-called linguistic turn which is the distinctive feature of the twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy. The phrase 'linguistic turn' refers to a change from a relatively small concern with questions about language to a major one (Canfield 1997).

The sway of analytical philosophy continued for some time and there were valuable and extensive contributions from its practitioners who, of course, did not agree among themselves on all things but followed the main spirit and style of analytical philosophy (with some contempt for what was roughly called continental philosophy, see Section 3).

After 1945, there developed a more relaxed conception of linguistic analysis and the understanding of analytic philosophy was modified in such a way that a critical concern with language and meaning was taken to be central to it. Recent American philosophers, following the analytical style, have struck a new chord all their own. Quine, Putnam, Nozick do not show much analysis as such in their work but they write in the analytic spirit respectful of science, adhering to argumentative rigour, clarity and determination in order to be objective.

Some contemporary philosophers proclaim that we have now reached the end of analytic philosophy. According to them, there are signs that since the 1970s, analytical philosophy has begun to be replaced by the philosophy of the mind (Urmson 1989). However, there are others who hold that analytical philosophy has virtues quite sufficient to ensure it

a role as a central philosophical method for the foreseeable future (Routledge Encyclopedia 2000).

In short, then, we can say that the doctrinal stance of analytical philosophy—use of linguistic analysis to dissolve philosophical problems—has now faded from the academic stage. The methodological side, injection of precision and clarity in philosophical work, however, is very much alive and continues to work all around us in the philosophical realm. Similar comments apply to the next philosophical movement that we will consider, viz., Logical Positivism or Logical Empiricism.

2. LOGICAL POSITIVISM OR LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

The logical positivists developed the method of analytical philosophy further during the 1930s. In the context of their antimetaphysical programme, they held that analysis was the only legitimate philosophical inquiry. Its main proponents were Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, Feigl, Waismann in Vienna and Reichenbach, and Hempel in Berlin. Logical positivism may be characterized by a scientific world conception directed against metaphysics and grounded in logical and linguistic analysis. Central to the movement's doctrines was the verifiability criterion, viz., the meaning of a sentence was the method of its verification. Many of its adherents thought that the propositions of metaphysics, religion, morality were meaningless as they could not be verified (*Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*).

The logical positivists were inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The logical positivism movement reached its apogee in Europe in the years 1928–34. Many of them later moved to the USA where logical empiricism found a receptive audience among such pragmatically minded American philosophers as Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel, W.V. Quine. Logical empiricism exerted tremendous influence, particularly in philosophy of science. This influence began to wane around 1960 with the rise of Quine and Thomas Kuhn.

After being attacked from many sides, the movement which attracted so much attention at its start, has now been pushed to the back burner. Today, logical positivism seems to have run its course (*Oxford*

Companion, p. 508). Nevertheless, in a defence of the old masters, J. Hintikka writes (Hintikka 2003):

> Logical empiricists are dead. Main proponents of the philosophical movements that are thought of as having replaced logical empiricism are also dead (Quine, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos). Who are more dead philosophically, Carnap and his friends or Quine and Kuhn and their ilk? Perhaps it was the logical empiricists, not the new philosophers of science in the stamp of Quine and Kuhn, who were on the right track (p. 167).

3. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The phrase 'continental philosophy' acquired its current meaning only after the Second World War. It referred to the gradually changing philosophical views that developed in continental Europe which were notably different from the various forms of analytical philosophy that flourished in the Anglo-American world in the same period. Like analytical philosophy, continental philosophy is an umbrella term to include work of diverse philosophers writing manly in German or French.

Initially, the expression was more or less synonymous with phenomenology as used by Edmund Husserl. Other important figures in continental philosophy were: Hartmann, Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre, Merlau-Ponty. It is not possible to give a simple definition of phenomenology. In a nutshell, we can say phenomenology tries to clearly describe human experience free from any prior prejudice. Phenomenology is said to consist in an analysis and description of consciousness.

Referring to the broad field of continental philosophy, we can say that it is a systematic reflection on the human situation; a kind of reflection which can lead to a new perspective on human life and experience. (Analytical philosophy promises no such new and revealing vision.) Continental philosophy deals with the world as lived and experienced by human beings. Lebenswelt = Life-world: universally structured realm of beliefs, assumptions, feelings, values, and cultural practices that constitute meaning in everyday life, world of the subject (Husserl) but with genuinely social character (Gadamer, Habermas; and *Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, p. 488).

From opponents of continental philosophy, we read such remarks as: 'continental philosophy relies on dramatic, even melodramatic utterances rather than sustained rational argument' (*Oxford Companion*), and 'Continental philosophy is to be avoided if you are doing proper philosophy' (Glendinning 2002).

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The very idea of philosophical progress is problematic. On the one hand, we see philosophers still discussing age-old questions about knowledge, truth, soul, God, duty, etc. On the other hand, there is a continuous progress in science. There are thinkers who believe philosophy to be an extrapolation of science. Science is widely considered to be the ultimate source of truth. They believe philosophy has already made good progress and our aim should be to achieve continued progress. We, however, do not belong to the progressivist school.

There was a time of a lack of any difference between science and philosophy. Both sought knowledge and truth. Science has now separated itself and today it includes many of the fields of study formerly covered by philosophy, although there are areas of overlap, e.g. problems of mind and brain. In general, we can say science systematically deals with observed facts and those that are classified and more or less comprehended by general laws. Science is supposed to deliver objective knowledge which is inter-subjectively verifiable. But what about philosophy?

Almost every philosopher has expressed his or her views on the nature and aims of philosophy. Following Wittgenstein, we believe there should be a sharp distinction between science and philosophy. Philosophy is an on-going reflective activity, critically and impartially examining important issues. Therefore, it cannot progress like science. Substantial questions of philosophy, like time, substance, identity, knowledge, reality, value, mind, virtue are still being debated today. We do not expect a breakthrough in their solution. In the methodology and style of philosophizing, however, much has changed over a period of time. The progress of theoretical science has had an impact on philosophy, e.g. philosophy of space and time after relativity. One should pay proper attention to these newer aspects of modern philosophy.

An important question remains about the role of philosophy in our lives. Should it not be 'quite simply the supreme guide to life'? (Billington 1990) Or, should it be just a logical clarification of thought, a rationally critical thinking about the general nature of the world, justification of belief, ethics (theory of value)? As we have discussed earlier (Sanatani 2001), lovers of analytical philosophy would choose the second alternative, while adherents of continental philosophy and also perhaps admirers of Indian philosophy (Vedānta, Buddhism) would opt for the first alternative. They believe that philosophy emerges in everybody's life and it should address questions of our life-world, and not remain a dry, academic debate only.

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International Atomic Energy Agency   SAURABH SANATANI
Vienna (Retired)

Towards Perpetual Peace

Under Focus on page 197 of *JICPR*, Volume XX, No. 1, Daya Krishna refers to the recent events in Iraq, and then, in that connection, to Kant's treatise *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. This treatise has three parts. The first part contains six preliminary articles, the second two definitive articles, and the third one secret article. My purpose here is not to give a synopsis of these articles and discuss them. What I wish to do is to formulate yet another preliminary article, and incorporate it as the third article in Kant's list. There will then be seven, not six preliminary articles. It will be seen that I have arrived at this new article as a result of what has currently been happening in Iraq. This shows that our moral life grows, further opens up, with the growth of our moral experience. I state below the new article and an explanation.

A state shall not covet what belongs to another state, and try to acquire it by deceit or force.

There are problems amongst people. One of the reasons is their indulgence in dishonest dealings, which is the same thing as crookedness. One of the reasons why they do so is their greed. There are times when they reinforce their crookedness by force. When people resort to crookedness, they treat others merely as means or objects of exploitation.

I make bold to make here one more point. There is the Indian word *dādā*. In one of its meanings, it may be said to stand for a person who is ever ready to use force in order to have his will done or make his presence felt. I would like to coin the word Dadaism, and define it as the attitude or theory to that effect. Dadaism in this sense differs from Dadaism in another context. In this other sense, Dadaism refers to 'an early twentieth century international movement in art, literature, music, and film, repudiating and mocking artistic and social conventions' (*The Readers' Digest Oxford Wordfinder*). The people who are responsible for the present state of affairs in Iraq exemplify Dadaism in my sense of that term.

R.K. GUPTA

ZB-5, Sah-Vikas Society
68, Patparganj, Delhi 110 092

Comments on Focus, published in the *JICPR*, Vol. IX, No. 3 on Kant

'Morality, for Kant, is supposed to be a purely formal quality of "willing" when it wills the "good" and, if so, how can beauty which is necessarily sensuous and uniquely individual symbolize something which can never be sensuous or individual, in principle?' I will like to make the following observations.

Both in allegory and symbol, one sensible thing stands for another, which is beyond sensibility. But the two have independent origin. Allegory primarily belonged to the sphere of talk, of the logos. Hence, it is a rhetorical or hermeneutic figure. But symbol is not limited to the sphere of the logos. Symbol is something sensible, which is shown and enables one to recognize something else which can never be sensibly present. The word 'symbol' is derived from the Greek word 'symbolon'. In Greek tradition, 'symbolon' was a technical term for a token of remembrance. 'The host presented his guest with the so-called *tessera hospitalis* by breaking some object in two. He kept one half for himself and gave the other half to his guest. If in thirty or fifty years' time, a descendant of the guest should ever enter his house, the two pieces could be fitted together again to form a whole in an act of recognition. In its original technical sense, the symbol represented something like a sort of pass used in the ancient world: something in and through which we recognize someone as already known to us.'[1]

The common structure of representation of one thing—which is never sensibly present—by another which has sensible presence finds chief application in religion, since it is not possible to know the divine in any other way than by starting from the world of senses. But there is a difference in the way the two relate the sensible to the nonsensible. Symbol presupposes a metaphysical connection of the visible and invisible, for the world of the senses is the outflowing and reflection of truth. Allegory does not assume an original metaphysical relationship, such as symbol claims but, rather, a connection created by convention and dogmatic agreement, which enables one to use a presentation in images for something that is imageless. The symbol is the coincidence of the sensible and the nonsensible, while allegory is the meaningful

relation of the sensible to the nonsensible. Symbol can be interpreted inexhaustibly as it is indefinite. Symbol is opposed to allegory since the latter stands in a more exact relation to meaning and exhausted by it. In symbol, what is represented is itself present in the only way available to it.

When Kant claims to take beauty as symbol of morality, he gives his interpretation of the intrinsic metaphysical connection. In my essay 'The Beautiful as the Symbol of the Morally Good.'[2] I have tried to give my understanding of what Kant was doing when he took the beautiful as the symbol of the morally good. I have interpreted his views in light of his claim in §59 of *Critique of Judgment*, 'Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to the habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap'. Through his theory of symbolization, Kant bridges the gulf between the nonsensible goodwill and sensible action.

If we keep this interpretation in mind, then the second question you raise also can be answered in the affirmative. Your second question is, 'In case it is argued, as Kant seems to do, that there is a "universal" element in the apprehension of beauty as it is the "object" of a "disinterested" spectator, would it imply that a perceptual object, in Kant's system, can also have a "universal" element in it which is directly apprehended as the "particular" or the "individual" that is apprehended by the senses?" Since Kant is giving his theory of symbol to correlate the goodwill which is nonsensible, to determinate action which is sensible, is it not required that in the apprehension of the determinate morally good action, we also apprehend the goodwill, which has universality in it?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, Translated by Nicholas Walker, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 31.
2. *JICPR*, Vol. XX, No. 3.

Department of Philosophy   BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA
N.E.H.U. Shillong 793 022

Agenda for Research

Hegel, in his *Science of Logic*, uses the term 'sublation' which, as far as we know, was never used in philosophical thinking in the Western tradition before, or even after, his work. The term is well known in the Advaitic thought in the Indian tradition. And, it would be interesting to find whether Hegel got the term from any of the Indian works available to him at that time.

Hegel's use of the term, of course, is different from the one usually associated with the term in the Advaitic tradition as, for him, what is 'sublated' had already been negated and thus *preserved*, though in a subterranean manner. It does not become a pure 'non-being', but rather, through negation or suppression it *affects* that which replaces it.

Perhaps, one may get a new insight into the notion of 'sublation' in the Advaitic thinking from the way Hegel understood it, or even into the way the non-Advaitic Vedāntins understood it, leading to the important differences between them.

The following excerpt from *Science of Logic* may help the reader in this connection:

SUBLATION OF BECOMING

The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is, in the first place, *becoming* itself. But this equally settles into a stable unity. Being and nothing are, in this unity, only in the form of vanishing moments; yet becoming as such *is* only through their distinguishedness. Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result.

This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally; but at the same time it rests on the distinction between them. It is, therefore, inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself.

This results in the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not *nothing*; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations, not the resultant of *nothing and being*. It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness. But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole.

Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is *determinate being*.

REMARK: THE EXPRESSION 'TO SUBLATE'

To sublate and the *sublated* (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from *nothing*. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is *immediate*; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of *mediation*, it is a non-being but as a *result* which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in *itself* the *determinateness* from which it originates.

'To *sublate*' has twofold meaning in the language; on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus, what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not, on that account, annihilated. The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary *meanings* of this word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is delight to speculative thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning—the German language has a number of such examples. The double meaning of the Latin *tollere* (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun; *tollendum est Octavium*) does not go far; its affirmative determination signifies only a lifting up. Something is sublated only in

so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a *moment*. In the case of the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial determination, a line.[1] We shall often have occasion to notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected determination, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate, whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.

The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive—now that they are *moments*—is to be ascertained from the consideration of determinate being as the unity in which they are preserved. Being is being, and nothing is nothing, only in their contradistinction from each other; but in their truth, in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations and are now something else. Being and nothing are the same; *but just because they are the same they are no longer being and nothing*, but now have a different significance. In becoming they were coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; in determinate being, a differently determined unity, they are again differently determined moments. This unity now remains their base from which they do not again emerge in the abstract significance of being and nothing.[2]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See Encyclopaedia red edition, Section 261, Remark.
2. Hegel's *Science of Logic*, Translated by A.V. Miller, Humanity Books, New York, 1999, pp. 106–108.

Jaipur   DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Attention is drawn to an edited work entitled '*Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*' by Robert B. Louden, published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 254.

The work brings into focus Kant's important distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' philosophical thinking denoting by the latter any element of 'empirical' considerations, and thus suggesting that 'pure' philosophy should be bereft of all empirical elements involved therein.

But the distinction seems to suggest that man *is* an 'impure' being as he is an admixture of 'pure reason' with its 'transcendental' elements and those deriving from the 'senses', the 'desires' and even feelings of 'pleasure' and 'pain', without which it would be impossible to conceive of a human being as a 'human being'. If ethics, then, is to be 'practical' and concerned with man as he exists, it will necessarily have 'impurity' in it as, without it, it would have no meaning.

It, therefore, draws attention to these elements in Kant's thought and, incidentally, also gives information regarding his varied writings and the subjects he taught at the university during his extensive teaching career.

Kant seems to have had a great knowledge of these subjects and also wrote independently on them which, unfortunately, have not drawn the attention of those who have known about him only in the context of the three *Critiques* he wrote.

A list of the contents of the work is given below:

CONTENTS

Jaipur   Daya Krishna

Notes and Queries

Are there three different types of *anirvacanīyatā* in Advaita Vedānta? If so, what is the distinction between *anirvacanīyatā* of *Māyā* on the one hand and Avidyā on the other, as both of these form the *anirvacanīyatā* of Brahman in case it is considered to be so.

Jaipur   DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

I

John Rawls' *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*[1] is an edited version of his lectures prepared, revised and delivered in 1991 at Harvard to both graduate and undergraduate students. Here, the history of ethics appears in a new light and refreshing perspective. Rawls engages only four leading thinkers of modern philosophy, Hume, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, in a dialogue to understand the way they struggled to define the role of a moral conception in human life. The primary focus of Rawls' *Lectures* is the interpretation of Kant's ethical theory as a whole as developed in *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*,[2] *Critique of Practical Reason*,[3] *Critique of Judgment*[4] and *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*[5] and other works. Elsewhere,[6] I had claimed that Rawls is a hermeneutic thinker. In his Kant lectures, Rawls moves back and forth through various critical works of Kant in order to illuminate a particular point of one text just like a practising hermeneutic philosopher.

Lectures on Leibniz are included because according to Rawls, 'Leibniz's ideas often shape Kant's mature doctrine in striking and subtle ways' (pp. 106–7).[7] An extended discussion of Hume is included as part of Rawls' Kant lectures because, in his view, Kant's rationalist psychology, based on the idea of principle-dependent desires as essential to an account of practical reason, is motivated by the limits of the Humean desire-based account of deliberation. Rationale of the inclusion of Hegel in a series of lectures focussed on Kant is due not only to the fact that Hegel's criticism of Kant's ethics sets the terms of subsequent Kant interpretation in history of moral philosophy, but also due to the fact that Hegel's notion of *Sittlichkeit*, elaborating the idea of a wide

social role of morality first broached in Kant's moral and political thought, provides the bridge between Kantian moral philosophy and Rawls' own version of political liberalism.

Rawls, in his introductory lecture, begins with an illuminating conjecture regarding the contrast between classical moral philosophy of ancient Greece and modern moral philosophy of Europe. In his view, ancient Greek moral philosophy began in the context of a civic religion of public social practice, of civic festivals and public celebrations in polis in which the Homeric epics, with their gods and heroes, play a central role. Participation in this classical civic culture on the part of an individual was an indicator of being a trustworthy member of society and always ready to carry out his civic duties as a good citizen when called upon to do so. This civic religious culture was not based on a sacred work like the Bible or the Koran. The atheists in this culture invited rejection not because of their unbelief but because they could not be counted on to participate in shared civic practice. 'So, rejecting the Homeric ideal as characteristic of a way of life of a bygone age, and finding no guidance in civic religion, Greek philosophy must work out for itself ideas of the highest good of human life, ideas suitable for the different society of fifth-century Athens. The idea of the highest good is, then, quite naturally at the center of the moral philosophy of the Greeks: it addresses a question civic religion leaves largely unanswered' (p. 4). The main features of Greek moral philosophy are: (a) the idea of the highest good as an attractive ideal, as the reasonable pursuit of true happiness; (b) this good as the good for the individual; (c) virtuous conduct as a kind of good to be given a place along with other goods in the good life with a conception of the highest good to serve as a basis for harmonizing these various kinds of good; and (d) moral philosophy as the exercise of free disciplined reason alone.

In contrast to this ancient Greek moral philosophy, modern moral philosophy developed in the historical cultural context of: (1) Reformation in the sixteenth century, which fragmented the religious unity of the Middle ages, giving rise to religious pluralism as well as pluralism of other kinds; (2) the modern state with its central administration with enormous powers; and (3) the development of

modern mathematical natural science in the seventeenth century. Be it noted in contrast to the single civic religion of polis, the culture of modern state is characterized by a conflicting plurality of institutional, authoritative, Salvationist, expansionist doctrinal religion of priests with the sole authority to dispense means to grace, giving rise to the problem of how to live in unity with people of conflicting faith. For the churches, moral philosophy was not the result of an exercise of free, disciplined reason alone but as, subordinate to church authority. For them, moral duties and obligation rest on divine law, also called natural law in the seventeenth century. In this cultural context of modern moral philosophy, leading thinkers 'hoped to establish a basis of moral knowledge independent of church authority and available to the ordinary reasonable and conscientious person. This one, they wanted to develop the full range of concepts and principles in terms of which to characterize autonomy and responsibility' (p. 8). This task set for modern moral philosophy required answers to three important questions:

First: Is the moral order required of us derived from an external source, or does it arise in some way from human nature itself (as reason or feeling or both), and from the requirements of our living together in society?

Second: Is the knowledge or awareness of how we are to act directly accessible only to some, or to a few (say, the clergy), or is it accessible to every person who is normally reasonable and conscientious?

Third: Must we be persuaded or compelled to bring ourselves in line with the requirements of morality by some external motivation, or are we so constituted that we have in our nature sufficient motives to lead us to act as we ought without the need of external inducements? (p. 10)

According to Rawls, modern moral philosophers face the problem not regarding the content of morality on which modern thinkers are more or less in agreement but regarding the basis of morality on which they express different views. These thinkers are also concerned with the relation between modern science and Christianity and accepted moral beliefs regarding which they expound different views.

Although Rawls is concerned with progress in answers to a fixed family of problems with agreed criteria for deciding when they are resolved in the history of modern moral philosophy, he is acutely aware of the disputed nature of this conception of history of philosophy. Hence, while dealing with views of any thinker, Rawls tries to recover the problems as the philosopher concerned himself saw them in his own context. For him, the history of moral philosophy is not a history of different answers to one and the same question; rather, both problems and the answers keep changing in the history of the subject.

According to Rawls, we should try to present the views of a thinker in the strongest form supported with the most reasonable interpretation of the text. But in these lectures, he tries 'to suggest a general interpretation for each of the writers we look at' (p. 18). He warns, 'I don't think for a moment that my interpretations are plainly correct; other interpretations are surely possible, and some are almost certainly better' (p. 18). Hence, he exhorts, 'So, if I present an interpretation, it is not only to try to illuminate the writer's background scheme of thought but also to encourage you to work out a better interpretation, one that is sensitive to more features of the text than mine, and makes better sense of the whole' (p. 18). Since in Rawls' own eyes these lectures were not a serious work of scholarship but only helping notes for students and himself, he never intended these to be published. He reluctantly agreed to publish them because other than his immediate students, others were also interested in this excellent course on the history of modern moral philosophy because these lectures provide an insight into how John Rawls has transformed view of this history by the new perspective he brought to bear on the ideas of thinkers he discussed.

Rawls' aim in these lectures was not to criticize the exemplars of moral philosophy but to understand them in order to go beyond them. He hardly criticizes Kant. His lectures exhibit that exemplars of philosophy are beyond envy and he considers the texts of exemplary thinkers as worthy of honour and respect. Therefore, he takes the thought of the text seriously but never succumbs to adulation or uncritical acceptance of the text or the author as authoritative. He tries to bring out with each philosopher he has examined 'what is distinctive

in their approach to moral philosophy, why they were moved to write the texts we read, and what they hoped to accomplish' (p. 329). But he makes it clear that even if we learn much from these texts, we do not study them to find answers to present-day philosophical questions in the way they arise for us. We have to do our own thinking for ourselves. The thinkers considered have expressed deep and distinctive philosophical doctrines which present before us possibilities of thought vastly different from those we would normally be aware of.

II

In his first of the five lectures on Hume's moral philosophy, Rawls interprets Hume as advocating 'fideism of nature' in which radical, unmitigated, theoretical and epistemological scepticism work in tandem with psychological naturalism. In Rawls' interpretation, Hume 'urges us to try to suspend our beliefs only when they go beyond those generated by the natural propensities of what he calls custom and imagination... . Only beliefs that go beyond these can be undermined by sceptical reflection' (p. 23). Scepticism 'reveals to us that for the most part, other psychological forces such as custom and imagination regulate our everyday beliefs and conduct' (p. 23). According to Rawls, 'Hume does not ... defend his view by using his reason: it is rather his happy acceptance of the upshot of the balance between his philosophical reflections and the psychological propensities of his nature. This underlying attitude guides his life and regulates his outlook on society and the world. And it is this attitude that leads me to refer to his view as a fideism of nature' (p. 24).

According to Rawls' reading of Hume, it is not reason but moral sense that is the epistemological basis of moral distinctions; and reason alone cannot be a motive that influences the conduct of man; rather, it has only a secondary role limited to correcting false beliefs and identifying effective means to given ends. For Hume, passions are impressions of reflection and they can be qualitatively distinct, like pride and shame, love and hate, etc. Rawls exhaustively describes Hume's various kinds of classifications of passions on the basis of their origin (direct, indirect and original passions), their turbulence and felt intensity (calm and violent passions) and the strength of their

influence on conduct (strong and weak passions). With the help of this classification we can understand 'Hume's explanation of the rationalists' philosophical error, namely, they confuse the pervasive and *strong influence* of the *calm passions* with the operations of reason' (p. 30). For Hume, a practical deliberation consists of finite chains of reasons in the means to end reasoning, each of which has its stopping point a final end, which is an objective or aim of one or more of the passions. Practical deliberation, according to Hume, may affect man's passions in at least five ways. Two effects arise via corrections of beliefs: (1) beliefs about means to end; (2) beliefs about the features of objects that arouse our passions. Not only that, practical deliberation may also be effected; (3) the specification of passions; (4) time schedule of satisfaction of passions; or (5) weight of final ends. But passions are constant while we deliberate; passions are already there, given to, or available to strict reason during deliberation.

Regarding this official view of rational deliberation, Rawls raises three questions in his second lecture on Hume: 'The *first* question concerns the *kinds* of the possible *effects* of rational deliberation on the passions ... what kind of *continuity*, and how much, Hume's account requires between the configuration of passions at the *beginning* of deliberation and the configuration from which we act as a *result* of it. How far can deliberation by itself ... transform our passions?' (p. 36) According to Rawls' reading of Hume, 'Deliberation can alter the *degree* to which certain passions that we have now are *active* now and so the weight ... with which they effect the decision reached' (p. 40) and also 'deliberation could lead us to realize that we have now certain passions of which we have been largely unaware ... not merely passions we have forgotten about or paid little attention to' (p. 40). 'The *second* question is about the nature of the passions' (p. 36). Are *calm* passions, which are mistaken for the operations of reason by rationalists, impressions of reflection? General appetite for good being a calm passion for Hume, Rawls asks specifically 'whether the general appetite to good is ... a principle dependent desire, that is, a desire the content of which is given by a principle of practical reason' (p. 37). The answer is in the negative, for 'Hume seems to regard it as a psychic force governed by custom, habit, and imagination, but not by judgements

applying one or more principles' (p. 37). In Rawls' view, 'This leads to a *Third* question, which is whether Hume has a conception of practical reason at all, I believe that the Hume of the *Treatise* lacks such a conception' (p. 37).

According to Rawls' understanding, Hume does not present a normative account of rational deliberation but merely a psychological description of the manner in which we deliberate. The process of deliberation is governed by many psychological principles, including the important three principles: (a) the principle of the predominant passions, 'which says that any emotion that accompanies a stronger passion may easily be converted into the stronger one' (p. 38); (b) the principle of custom, which says 'that custom and repetitions are important in increasing or diminishing our passions, and in converting pleasure into pain and pain into pleasure' (p. 38); and (c) 'the principle of the greater influence of more particular and determinate ideas on the imagination' (p. 39).

Rawls, in his third lecture on Hume, explains Hume's account of justice as an artificial as opposed to a natural virtue, where 'artificial' is not a perjorative word but a word of the highest praise. For Hume, artificial is that which involves design and intention, and hence 'the artificial virtues involve, in ways that the natural virtues do not, design and intention, judgement and understanding, and are the work of reason generally, as seen in our projects and conventions, laws and institutions' (p. 53). In Rawls' opinion, 'This topic is central to his fideism of nature; he wants to show that morality and our practice of it are the expression of our nature, given our place in the world and our dependence on society' (p. 51). For Hume, both natural and artificial virtues are part of the natural fact of morality. This gives rise to the problem for Hume as Rawls formulates it: 'How did human beings, beginning in the rude and natural state and possessing only natural virtues, eventually reach the civilized stage in which they also possessed the artificial virtues ...?' (p. 55). Rawls gives a brilliant exposition of Hume's complex answer to this question of origin of justice and property, involving the idea of circumstances of justice, the idea of convention, the idea of the most obvious and best scheme for specifying property and the idea of two stage development of the sense of justice,

i.e. origin in self interest and limited generosity and extension through sympathy with public interest.

The fourth lecture on Hume is devoted to an analysis of Hume's arguments against the rational intuitionism. Rawls presents Hume's arguments as directed against Samuel Clarke's version of rational intuitionism based on the indefinable notion of moral relations of 'fitness' and 'more fit than'. Rawls presents a very lucid exposition of Clarke's rational intuitionism. Clarke's position can be stated thus in Rawls' words: 'We are to act in accordance with an order of fitness that lies in the divine reason: an order that directs both God's will and our will. This order is given to our reason, and it is the same for all rational beings, although its principles in their application allow adjustments for our particular capacities and station' (p. 77). The knockout argument of Hume against rational intuitionism can be stated thus according to Rawls: Since reason alone cannot move us to action but knowledge of morality can, it follows that moral distinctions are not discerned by reason. In Rawls' view, Clarke can rebut this argument of Hume thus: bare knowledge of morality alone does not move us, but that knowledge, given our nature as rational beings, generates in us a principle-dependent desire to act accordingly. This brings us to the forceful second argument of Hume, which states that not only morality cannot be demonstrated from the four philosophical relations that provide the basis of demonstrative reasoning—resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportion in quantity and number, but also no proof on necessary causal connection between knowledge and desire for action can be given.

According to Rawls, a common interpretation of Hume's view is that he is stating a principle of moral reasoning that in order to reach a moral conclusion, there must be at least one moral premise, since moral concepts are not reducible to non-moral concepts. This is not what Hume meant, according to Rawls, for he does not characterize moral or normative reasoning in general; rather, merely drawing the consequence of his particular view of moral judgement and how they fit into his doctrine as a whole.

The last and the fifth lecture of Hume gives a very novel account of moral judgement and the role of the idea of *judicious spectator* in

it, introducing a very original interpretation of Hume's claim, 'Virtue in rags is still virtue ...' In Rawls' interpretation, Hume moral judgements are based on sympathy, but sympathy is not understood as we normally understand it now. By sympathy, on Hume's view, we have the idea of another's feeling and that very idea is enlivened to become the same feeling in us. So, sympathy is an imparted feeling like 'a kind of contagion, or even infection, that we catch from others as a kind of resonance of our nature with theirs' (p. 86). Moral judgement is doubly hypothetical in Hume's moral philosophy.

First, these judgments are governed not by our actual sympathies in everyday life, which vary from person to person, but by the sympathies we would feel were we to assume to point of view of the judicious spectator.

Second, our judgments of persons are governed not by the sympathies we would feel even from that point of view, but by the sympathies we would feel from that standpoint if, in fact, those persons had the good fortune to produce the good effects their characters are fit to produce under normal circumstances (p. 93).

Be it noted that Hume is assigning only an epistemological role to sympathy. Motivational question is separate and Rawls discusses Hume's motivational question separately in this lecture. At the end of his Hume lectures, Rawls also explains how our moral sense is *reflectively stable* according to Hume and why he disowns his *Treatise*.

III

The first of the two lectures on Leibniz explains his metaphysical perfection, including his theory of truth and principle of sufficient reason. The best feature of this lecture is that it makes the extreme complexity of Leibniz's ideas accessible to readers in a very simple and easy to understand language. Rawls presents Leibniz as an apologetic thinker, who wrote in defense of faith. He also emerges in Rawls' lectures as the great conservative philosopher. His moral philosophy is interpreted as a study of ethics of creation, i.e. his ethics are a study of the principles of good and evil and of right and wrong that guide the divine will in the creation of the world. Leibniz is also

presented as advocating the idea of the most perfect state of things, which influenced Kant's idea of the highest good, although Kant dismissed Leibniz's moral philosophy of metaphysical perfection as a form of heteronomy of the will and his idea of freedom as no better than 'the freedom of a turnspit, which when once would up also carries out its motion of itself' (Quoted in p. 108).

According to Rawls' interpretation of Leibniz's moral philosophy of metaphysical perfection, the moral life is a form of the *imitatio dei*, i.e. god is a model for us and is to be imitated as far as this is possible and fitting for free and intelligent beings like ourselves. God has created the most perfect of all possible worlds. The principles of perfection that specify the best of all possible worlds are eternal truths, which rest on and lie in the divine reason. We have but imperfect knowledge of the perfection and its principles. But one thing can be said regarding perfection it that it is pluralistic, requiring a most fitting balance of all the various perfections. According to Rawls, 'Leibniz never gives a careful and reasonably systematic account of the principle of perfection' (p. 111). But what can be gleaned from Leibniz about perfection is that a property of thing that may increase beyond any limit is not perfection. So, perfection necessarily involves internal limits. The most perfect balance of multiple features requires that each element be internally limited to give scope to other elements with their due limits arising from the concept of the object in question or, in some cases, only one feature may be involved but that must also have an internal limit required by the object in question so as to be perfect. Apart from this vague idea of internal limits, nothing more specific can be said regarding the idea of perfection. Rawls also explains in a very simple way the complexities of how Leibniz grounds his moral philosophy of metaphysical perfection in his theory of Predicate-in-Subject theory of truth, which is framed for his philosophical theology and its apologetic aims.

The second Leibniz lecture is devoted to explication of his concept of freedom. According to Rawls, an individual in Leibniz's philosophy is an active substance with powers of its own, so that from within itself and its total present state, it deliberates and acts, and moves spontaneously and voluntarily to another state in accordance with its

own peculiar law. This peculiar law expresses a spirit's individuality and it characterizes its distinctive individuality as it expresses its particular form of life and the point of view from which it mirrors the universe. Rawls tries to present Leibniz's idea of freedom in its most favourable interpretation, so that in his view there is no incompatibility between freedom and his kind of determinism. For Leibniz, action is free if it satisfies the three conditions of intelligence, spontaneity and contingency. Intelligence is a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation. By spontaneity, the spirit itself determines the action. Due to a pre-established harmony, external things have no influence upon us and each of us, as a complete substance, has within himself the source of his action. Contingency is the absence of logical or metaphysical necessity and the presence of alternatives to choose from. These three conditions must work together with individuality. Rawls also explains how it is a mistake, according to Leibniz, to consider that being determined to seek the best is to lack freedom. According to Rawls interpretation, the most fundamental element of true freedom is freedom of understanding, which can be achieved by gaining control of our passions and appetites and proceeding methodically in deliberation, adhering to ways of thought indicated by reason rather than by chance, according to Leibniz. At the end of the lecture, Rawls notes the similarity and differences in the practical point of view of Leibniz and Kant. For those interested in Leibniz's moral philosophy, Rawls' lectures provide an excellent introduction in an easy manner.

IV

Generally, Hegel is accused of advocating apotheosis of the state leading to totalitarianism and is held guilty of having inspired Nazism in Germany. Rawls' interpretation is a welcome departure from this trend. In the very beginning of his Hegel lectures (the last two lectures of the course), Rawls makes it clear, 'I interpret Hegel as a moderately progressive reform-minded liberal, and I see his liberalism as an important exemplar in the history of moral and political philosophy of the *liberalism of freedom*' (p. 330). Rawls places Hegel along with Kant and J.S. Mill as an exemplar of liberalism of freedom and also

acknowledges that all the three have influenced his version of liberalism of freedom as advocated in his *A Theory of Justice*.[8]

In the first of the two Hegel lectures, Rawls explains Hegel's most important contribution to moral philosophy, which is the institutional idea of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) and how it connects with his view of person as rooted in and fashioned by the system of political and social institutions under which they live. Rawls, penetrating the difficult language of Hegel, presents a coherent picture of how, according to Hegel, freedom was actually realized in the social world by way of political and social institutions.

Rawls begins by explaining Hegel's view of philosophy as reconciliation, meaning that we have come to see our social world as a form of life in political and social institutions that realize our essence. This essence is the basis of our dignity as persons who are free. 'So the role of political philosophy, as Hegel sees it, is to grasp the social world in thought and to express it in a form in which it can be seen by us to be *rational*' (pp. 331–2). Only such an understood form of life is actual. A form of life is not actual (*wirklich*) unless it is self-conscious. Since *Geist* realizes itself in human thought and self-consciousness, the form of the modern state, which in its political and social institutions expresses the freedom of persons, is not fully actual until its citizens understand how and why they are free in it. According to Rawls' interpretation of Hegel, *Sittlichkeit* 'is the location of the ethical, the whole ensemble of rational (*vernünftig*) political and social institutions that make freedom possible: the family, the civil society, and the state' (p. 333). According to Rawls, what is important in the account of *Sittlichkeit* is not to tell what we *ought* to do but to *reconcile* us to our actual social world and to convince us not to fix our thinking and reflection on an ideal social world.

Rawls develops a Hegelian critique of Kant's moral philosophy as narrow and alienating. Rawls also explains in an easily understood language what Hegel meant when he claimed, 'the free will is the will that wills itself as the free will'. In Rawls' analysis of Hegel's idea, 'The free will wills itself as the free will, first when it wills a system of political and social institutions within which it can be free ... when, second, in willing the ends of these institutions it makes these ends its

own, and, third, when it is thereby willing a system of institutions within which it is *educated* to the concept of itself as a free will by various public features of the arrangement of those institutions, features which exhibit the concept of a free will (or freedom)' (p. 338). Rawls also explains the substantiality of ethical life and in what Hegelian sense an individual is its accident. Penetrating the intricacies of Hegelian text, Rawls gives a reasonably clear sense to his ideas of private property and civil society as expressive of different aspects of freedom.

In the second Hegel lecture, Rawls explains Hegel's idea of *Sittlichkeit* in relation to the problem of liberalism and state. For Hegel, duties are implicit in the account of *Sittlichkeit*, i.e. the institutional background and one not based on moral law as advocated by Kant. Duties appear as restrictions only to the indeterminate subjectivity of the natural will, but to a free will that wills itself as free will duties appear as the liberation of individual since these are disclosed by the institutions of ethical life, which express its essence as such a will. Duties liberate us from dependence on mere natural impulse and indeterminate subjectivity. Virtue, for Hegel, is the general character demanded of us by our station in the form of life of *Sittlichkeit* and its duties. Rawls gives an account of Hegel's state as the prime component of ethical life. Hegel's state is not an institution that arises by an original contract to satisfy the already given antecedent needs and wants of atomistic individuals; rather, we become a fully developed person by being a citizen of a rational state. Hegel's division of powers of state differs from the traditional division of powers of state into legislative, executive and judicial powers. For Hegel, the powers of a constitutional state comprises: (a) *individual* element: the monarchy; (b) *particular* element: the executive or governmental power; and (c) *universal* element: the legislature. The last element is the people as a whole, but not as individuals but as members of three estates: (i) the hereditary landed gentry; (ii) the business class; and (iii) the universal class of civil servants. The state as a whole enables citizens to attain their freedom. According to Rawls' analysis of Hegel's political philosophy, the society is held together not simply by satisfaction of particular interests of individuals but by a sense of reasonable order and recognition that it is regulated by, let us say, a common good conception of justice,

which recognizes the merits of the claims of all sectors of society. The universal interest of all citizens in participating in and maintaining the whole system of political and social institutions of modern state that makes their freedom possible attains its validity and fulfilment only when the individuals in civil society accept, acknowledge and take an interest in it. A strong state is possible only when the universal interest of citizens is recognized and given priority by them in their political life. Rawls discusses and explains reasons as to why Hegel's preferred scheme of voting is not based on one person one vote. Rather, voting power is vested in estates, corporations and associations. Two roles of public opinion also come up for discussion. The first important role of public opinion is to bring grievances and wishes of the electorate to the attention of the government so that government has a better understanding of the needs and difficulties of people. The other role of the public opinion is to bring to the notice of citizenry the problems and views of government so that citizens acquire a political sense and know what the decisions and policies of government are based on. In Rawls' opinion, 'This is a strong statement of the educative role of political life in fashioning a lively and informed public opinion, which left to itself is a mix of truth and error' (p. 358). Rawls gives an elaborate account of Hegel's *Sittlichkeit* with respect to war and piece. In Rawls' interpretation, Hegel does not reject a liberal society's right to engage in war in self defense, but this defense is not to be viewed as aiming at security of life and property of individuals *as individuals* in civil society. Rather, it aims at protection and preservation of the freedom of its citizens and its democratic political institutions. Rawls also notes the conflict between the traditional classical liberal conception of freedom and Hegel's conception of freedom and gives an outline of a third alternative espoused by Kant and Rousseau, which avoids the errors of the two former views. In the last section of the lecture, Rawls examines Hegel's legacy as a critic of liberalism and finds them less convincing. In his view, liberalism can recognize and account for Hegel's insights like universal collective goals of civil society, deep social rootedness of people and intrinsic value of institutions and social practices. In Rawls' view, the so-called Hegelian criticism of liberalism is based on a parody of liberalism and not on a correct understanding

of it. Rawls also tries to get at the deeper root of Hegel's criticism, which he locates in Hegel's conception of history, *Geist*, and the role of reason in philosophical reflection. In his words, 'The reason, I believe, is that Hegel affirms the exacting standards Aristotle set up for the highest good: namely, that it be complete, desired only for its own sake, self-sufficient, and such that no added good could make it any better. This complete, or perfect, good cannot be achieved by any human individual, or group, or nation, but it can be achieved by *Geist*— at once human and divine—over the whole course of world history' (p. 371).

V

So far in this review, the ideas of Rawls' interpretation of Hume, Leibniz and Hegel have been presented without any critical evaluation. Since Rawls' main aim is to give a 'general interpretation' of Kant's moral philosophy and he does not claim that his interpretation is 'plainly correct', in the remaining sections not only Rawls' interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy will be presented, but also a critical appraisal of it will be made to locate the incorrectness of his general interpretation.

Rawls delivers ten lectures on Kant's moral philosophy in which he deals with three topics: the moral law, the fact of reason, and a practical faith, in order to ultimately understand Kant's claim of: (i) the supremacy of reason; (ii) unity of reason; (iii) the equality of reason with the primacy of practical reason in the overall constitution of reason; and (iv) philosophy as defense, including a defense of the freedom of reason, but theoretical and practical.

Since Kant's *Groundwork* provides a reasonably full analytic account of the moral law, even though it fails to give an adequate view of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole, Rawls begins with moral law as the first topic for discussion. The first of the ten Kant lectures focusses on the preface and the first part of Kant's *Groundwork*. The novelty in Rawls' analysis of the preface is his brief explanation of why—in spite of Kant's own claim in the preface that he plans to write a critique of *pure* practical reason, when the work finally appears—he entitles it simply *Critique of Practical Reason* dropping the adjective 'pure'. According to Rawls, 'Kant's thought is that whereas pure theoretical

reason tends to transgress its proper limits, in the case of practical reason, it is empirical (not pure) practical reason, prompted by our natural inclinations and desires, that tends to transgress its appropriate sphere, especially when the moral law and its basis in our person is not clear to us' (p. 147). Rawls offers a full explanation of this point later. According to Rawls, this issue is also related to Kant's discussion of the need for moral philosophy. It is not needed to teach us our duties and obligations according to Rawls' Kant, for these we already know. In Rawls' words, 'Kant does not mean to teach us what is right and wrong (he would think that presumptuous) but to make us aware of the moral law as rooted in our free reason. A full awareness of this, he believes, arouses a strong desire to act from that law... . In his moral philosophy, Kant seeks self-knowledge: not a knowledge of right and wrong—that we already possess—but a knowledge of what we desire as persons with the powers of free theoretical and practical reason' (p. 148).

In Rawls' view, Kant is not at all concerned with moral scepticism; rather, he is seeking a form of moral reflection to check the purity of our motives due to his pietist background. This can be gleaned from Kant's opaque and obscure explanation of his intentions in the *Groundwork* through a distinction between his own conception of pure will and Wolff's account of willing as such. Kant compares Wolff's account of willing as such is compared to general (formal) logic, while his own account of pure will is comparable to transcendental logic. According to Rawls' conjecture, through these comparisons what Kant has in mind is '...that pure practical reason exists and that *it is sufficient of itself to determine the will independently of our inclinations and natural desires*. This fact too must be explained. To do so, we need an account of a pure will, and not an account of willing as such...' (p. 150, Italics added). He further explains, '...practical reason concerns how we are to bring objects in accordance with an idea (or a conception) of those objects... The principles of a pure will that *Kant wants to examine are the principles of practical reason that, in his view, can effectively determine our will apart from inclinations and natural desires,* and direct it to its *a priori* object, the highest good' (p. 150, Italics added). Rawls, explaining the idea of pure will writes, 'For Kant

... such a will is an elective power *guided by the principles of practical reason,* that is, a power to elect which of our many (often contending) object-dependent desires we are to act from, or to reject them all entirely, *as moved by principle-dependent and conception-dependent desires*' (p. 151, Italics added). Regarding Kant's intentions in *Groundwork,* Rawls concludes, 'He wants to study the principles of a pure will and to set out how persons with *a fully effective pure will would act,* and to ascertain what the structure of their desires as governed by the principles of practical reason would be. It is best, I think, to regard Kant as presenting the principles from which *a fully ideal reasonable and rational agent would act,* even against all object-dependent desires, should this be necessary to respect the requirements of the moral law. Such an ideal (human) agent, although affected by natural inclinations and needs, as we must be belonging to the natural world, never follows them when doing so would violate the principles of a pure will' (p. 151, Italics added).

These extensive quotations from Rawls are given to highlight his pietistic reading of Kant. Understanding Kant in light of his pietist background during the previous two centuries has obscured Kant's intentions rather than illuminating them and has thrown Kant's interpretation off track. The bulk of Kant's *Groundwork* is taken up in discussing the duties, the appearance of the moral law as a categorical imperative, raising and answering the question of the manner in which is categorical imperative possible, and various formulations of categorical imperative, which all go on to show that Kant is *not really* concerned to set out how persons with a fully *effective pure will* would act, and to ascertain what the structure of their desires as governed by the principles of practical reason would be, since they have neither a conception of duty nor a conception of categorical imperative nor a conception of ought. Kant is concerned only with explaining how morality and its principles would appear to a person 'if [practical] reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will', i.e. 'if, in a word, the will is not *in itself* completely in accord with [practical] reason' (*Groundwork,* 77/412f/37).[9] Kant is concerned with the transformation of morality to suit 'a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective constitution'

(*Groundwork*, 77/413/37). Kant is interested in finding out what kind of moral determination of will is possible for such a person and how such a moral determination of will is possible. The need for this transformation arises because the subjective self developed in the transcendental unity of apperception, paralogisms, and the third antinomy of his *Critique of Pure Reason* can admit to only one kind of action, which is understood only as causing an effect. This is the only form of action that can be recognized by the Kantian subjective self. So, for a Kantian subjective self, an action is nothing but an exercise of power for the production of effect in the external object, which is the chosen goal of action. It must be noted that the end is distinct from the action and the end is the consequence of action. But traditional morality from classical Greek thought to Kant's own time was *never* understood as concerned with a category of actions, which are known as means to some independent goals. Rather, morality was always understood as concerned with a category of actions, which are such that excellent performance of each is its own goal. This kind of action is no more possible for the Kantian subjective self, putting a question mark on morality itself. Hence, after writing the *Prolegomenon*, Kant issued the *Groundwork* to allay the fears of complete moral nihilism, by laying a groundwork or foundation of a transformation of morality consistent with a new understanding of action as causing an effect, by making moral worth independent of action and dependent only on internal structuring of will.[10] To transform morality, this internal determination of will has to be done *a priori*, making so determined will *pure will* according to Kant's terminology. Kantian pure will does not originate in his pietist background of purity of motives.

In his analysis of first chapter of Kant's *Groundwork*, Rawls presents what he calls the main argument, which he finds valid and aiming to find the supreme principle of morality. Rawls presents the argument in the following 11 propositions making explicit some of the steps implicit in Kant's work:

1. A good will is a will the actions of which accord with duty, not from inclination but from duty...
2. Actions done from duty have their moral worth from the principle of volition from which they are done, and not from the purposes (objectives, states of affairs, or ends) the inclination to bring about which initially prompted the agent to consider doing the action...
3. The will must always act from some principle of volition...
4. There are two kinds of principles of volition—formal and material—which are mutually exclusive and exhaustive...
5. No material principle of volition is the principle of volition of an action done from duty...
6. An action done from duty is an action done from a formal principle of volition...
7. There is only one formal principle of volition, and this principle is the moral law...
8. Respect is, by definition, the recognition of a principle of volition as law for us, i.e. as directly determining our will without reference to what is wanted by our inclinations...
9. The object of respect is the moral law...
10. Actions done from duty are actions done from respect (or out of respect) for the moral law...
11. A good will is a will the actions of which accord with duty, not from inclination, but from respect for the moral law...

Even if we agree with Rawls that this argument is valid, it is unsound at crucial steps and misrepresents Kant's argument. Let us take the latter point first. Kant explicitly recognizes that a perfectly good will cannot 'be conceived as *necessitated* to act in conformity with law' (*Groundwork*, 78/414/39), but '*Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law*' (*Groundwork* 66/400/14); so, a perfectly good will cannot have duties. Hence the first premise, stated in general terms regarding good will (which also includes perfectly good will), misrepresents Kant's position. Be it noted in the crucial statement about duty that at step 10 in the argument, there is no mention of the word 'necessity'. The conclusion also misrepresents Kant's position. Since good will is unconditionally good, there can be good will in the state of nature also according to Kant. Moral feeling is 'especially distinguished' from other feelings; that of the beautiful included 'by the *modality* of a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, which contain not a mere *claim*, but also a *command* of approval from everyone' (*CJ*, §29,

42. *Kant*, p. 506). In nature, this is not possible as in the state of nature 'each will have his own right to do *what seems right and good to him*, independently of the opinion of others'.[11] If the conclusion of the argument given by Rawls is taken to represent Kant's position then since goodwill acts out of reverence for the law, there can be no possibility of goodwill in the state of nature, which contradicts the unconditional nature of goodwill.

Rawls has represented Kant's invalid argument as valid by making explicit one of his implicit assumptions, which is not supported by any kind of evidence. So, the question of validity gets transferred to the question of soundness. Soundness of Kant's argument, as represented by Rawls, crucially depends on step 4, which claims that formal and material principles are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Be it noted that there are three elements in the context of action: volition, the manifest outward action, and the purpose as consequence of the action. For Kant, a material principle is in terms of purpose or end of action, while a formal principle is exclusively about the internal form of the volition without reference to action or its consequences. So, there is a third possibility of principles recognized by thinkers from Socrates onwards—in terms of actions which are their own ends—which fall neither under formal nor under material principle, as understood by Kant. Hence, the argument Kant gives for bringing in *a priori* formal principle in the context of motive of duty is inadequate. 'That the purposes we may have in our actions, and also their effects considered as ends and motives of will, can give to actions no unconditioned and moral worth is clear from what has gone before' (*Groundwork*, 65/400/13). From this premise, Kant cannot jump to the conclusion, 'Where can this worth be found if we are not to find in the will's relation to the effect hoped for from the action? It can be found nowhere but *in the principle of will*, irrespective of the ends which can be brought about such action; for between its *a priori* principle, which is formal, and its *a posteriori* motive, which a material, the will stands so to speak, at the parting of the ways; and since it must be determined by some principle, it will have to be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, where, as we have seen, every material principle is taken away from it' (*Groundwork*, 65/400/

13f). Mere forbidding of reference to any end or purpose to be achieved, as an effect of the action, does not make the principle involved as formal principle. Principles of decency, courage, dignity, loyalty, etc., are not ruled out because they involve no reference to the end to be achieved as a consequence of action. But these are neither material nor formal principles in the Kantian sense; yet referring to the matter of the action, actions which are their own ends. But how can Kant rule them out without any specific argument? Kant is ruling them out *a priori* because the category of action these principles involved has been de-recognized by Kant as a human action, which gives rise to the whole problem of *Groundwork*, as explained before.

Rawls gives an interesting and novel account of the absolute value of goodwill. In his analysis, goodwill involves two features. Firstly, it is the only thing always good in itself without qualification; and secondly, its value is incomparably superior to the value of all other things that are also good in themselves. The second feature is interpreted as lexical priority by Rawls. 'The superior claims of a goodwill outweighs absolutely the claims of other values should their claims come into conflict' (p. 156) and 'the goodness of all other things ... is conditioned: their goodness depends on being compatible with the substantive requirements on actions and institutions imposed by these formal requirements', i.e. requirements of formal conception of goodwill and a formal conception of right.

Rawls also highlights the distinction between the highest good and the complete good in Kant. The highest good is the condition of all other goods and it is goodwill. But goodwill is not the complete good. It is a goodwill's enjoying a happiness appropriate to it.

The most interesting and illuminating part of Rawls' first lecture is his discussion of two roles of goodwill in Kant's doctrine. The first role of the capacity for a goodwill—a capacity based on the powers of practical reason and moral sensibility—is the condition of our being members of a possible realm of ends. The second role has both a positive and a negative aspect. The negative aspect is that unless we pursue our aims within the limits of the moral law, human life is worthless and without any value. The positive aspect 'is that we can and do give meaning to our life in the world, and indeed even to the

world itself, by respecting the moral law and striving to achieve a goodwill' (p. 158). This positive aspect is based on Rawls' reading of §84 of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. According to Rawls, the first role 'is widely accepted, as it is basic to much democratic thought' (p. 160). The second role, which is distinctive of Kant's thought, is much more disputable.

Rawls concludes Kant's first lecture by noting the occasional devotional character of Kant's language in describing the significance of moral law and our acting from it, which has an obvious religious aspect. There is a glaring lacuna in this lecture. In his moral writings, Rawls emphasizes the contrast is between Kant's moral philosophy and utilitarian moral philosophy. This contrast is between the Kantian hypothetical contract and utilitarian conception of impartial spectator, which are presented as opposed positions. Rawls mentions the figure of an impartial spectator as it appears in the first paragraph of first chapter of Kant's *Groundwork*, 'The prosperity and happiness of someone with no trace of a goodwill cannot give pleasure to an impartial spectator' (p. 155), but never explains how this opposed figure of impartial spectator can be admitted in Kant's moral philosophy and what is its significance in Kant's doctrine; rather, he thinks that it is inconsistent with Kant's moral doctrine.

VI

The distinctive feature of Rawls' second Kant lecture is discussion of a categorical imperative procedure termed as CI-procedure as an essential preparation in understanding the supremacy, the unity, and the equality reason with the primacy of the practical in philosophy as a defense of freedom of reason. This is Rawls' interpretation of Kant's thinking about the procedure by which categorical imperative is applied to us as human beings situated in our social world. According to Rawls, CI-procedure must not only have a sufficient structure to specify requirement on moral deliberation so that it has some content but also exhibit categorical imperative as a principle of autonomy. Clarifying the features of the ideal moral agent, Rawls writes, 'This procedure specifies the content of the moral law as it applies to us as reasonable and rational person in the natural world, endowed with conscience and

moral sensibility, and affected by, but not determined by, our natural desires and inclinations' (p. 164). Here, Rawls uses the terms 'reasonable' and 'rational' to pure and empirical practical reason, respectively.

Rawls sets out the CI-procedure in the four following steps:

(1) Identification of the maxim of the agent, which has the form: I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z. (Here, X is an action, Y is an end, and Z a state of affairs.)

(2) Generalization of the maxim of the first step, which results in an universal precept of the form: Everyone is to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.

(3) Transformation of the universal precept into a law of nature of the form: Everyone always does X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y, as if by a law of nature.

(4) We are a adjoin the as-if law of nature in step three to the existing laws of nature (as these are understood by us) and then think through as best we can what the order of nature would be once the effects of the newly adjoined law of nature have had sufficient time to work themselves out.

In this procedure, it must be noted that maxim has an 'in order to' clause built into it, since for Kant, all actions have ends. Further, Rawls writes, 'At the first step, we have the agent's maxim, which is, let's suppose, rational from the agent's point of view...' (p. 167). Within the Kantian framework, it is acceptable provided it is merely rational from the point of view of means end rationality for that is theoretical technical rationality of empirical practical reason. But the rationality assumed by Rawls even before the application of the Categorical Imperative procedure is much more than that. He explains, '...that is, the maxim is rational given the agent's situation and the available alternatives, together with the agent's desires, abilities, and beliefs (taken to be rational in the circumstances)' (p. 167). Here, the rationality is not merely of appropriateness of the action as a means with the given end, but of the appropriateness of the end given the agent's circumstances, etc., and the appropriateness of the unless clause requiring imagination, etc., also. The later rationality is what Kant's *Critique of Judgment* covers. Not only that, according to Rawls, 'The

maxim is also assumed to be sincere: that is, it reflects the agent's actual reason for the intended action as the agent. Presumed to be actual reason for the intended action as the agent. Presumed to be lucid, would truthfully describe them' (pp. 167f). Here, 'sincerity' is troublesome as it itself is a moral quality, which needs justification through Categorical Imperative procedure. But more importantly, presumption of lucidity of the agent is a supplementation. Lucidity is clearness of thought and style, which is an aesthetic quality. Why is Rawls making such aesthetic supplementation of Kant's CI-procedure?

Not only that. At step four, Rawls clarifies, 'It is assumed that a new order of nature results from the addition of the law at step (3) to the other laws of nature, and that this new order of nature has a settled equilibrium state the relevant features of which we are able to figure out. Let us call this new order of nature an "adjusted social world". Let's also think of the social world as associated with the maxim at step (1), and impute to the agent a legislative intention, an intention as it were to legislate such a world' (p. 169). In none of the critical enterprise does sociability play any role except the third *Critique* and that too in the context of judgement of taste. This presumption of Rawls is also in line of judgement of taste of Kant. Now the question is: Why is Rawls making such assumption in Kant's CI-procedure in harmony with his third *Critique*?

Rawls gives no explanation but the reason is implicit in his manner of reading Kant. The reason is that Rawls is reading Kant's procedure of application of categorical imperative in such a manner that it results in a determinate action of omission or commission. For Kant, determinate action can result from his principle only when the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, i.e. morality becomes operational through determinate action only when morally good is symbolized by the beautiful. The beautiful is the object of aesthetic judgement and involves sociability of man. So, Rawls has to make aesthetic supplement to Kant's CI-procedure if this procedure is to result in determinate acts of omission or commission. Symbolization of the morally good is like schematization of categories. Rawls is neither aware nor ever discusses this issue of symbolization of the morally good explicitly in his lectures in spite of the fact that he takes account of all writings of Kant pertaining to morality, including the *Critique of Judgment*. Somehow, Rawls

ignores §59 of *Critique of Judgment* where the issue of the symbolization of the morally good by the beautiful is discussed. This is a glaring shortcoming of the whole of Rawls' *Lectures*. Since Rawls is a great thinker himself, he is making assumptions to meet his requirements, based on implicit reasons without being aware of them.

In light of his understanding of CI-procedure, Rawls now claims regarding the law of nature formulation, which is the first formulation in his opinion, of categorical imperative,

Kant's categorical imperative can now be stated as follows:

We are permitted to act from our rational and sincere maxim at step (1) only if two conditions are satisfied:

First, we must be able to intend—as sincere, reasonable, and rational agents—to act from that maxim when we regard ourselves as a member of the adjusted social world associated with it, and thus as acting within that world and subject to its conditions; and

Second, we must be able to will this adjusted social world and affirm it should be belong to it (p. 169).

Be it noted that Rawls has reversed Kant's position with respect to the relationship of categorical imperative with its procedure of application. The categorical imperative is defined in terms of CI-procedure in Rawls' interpretation, while in Kant's texts the procedure is dependent on prior understanding of categorical imperative. The way the categorical imperative has been reformulated by Rawls, it results only in permissions, but not obligatory determinate acts of omission or commission. So, CI-procedure needs some further supplementation, which Rawls introduces while discussing two examples of duties given by Kant. Out of Kant's four examples, Rawls discusses only two: the second example dealing with false promise and the fourth example of indifference to others.

The second example of application of categorical imperative results in declaring the determinate act of omission of contemplated deceitful promise as duty. To do so, something more has to be built into the CI-procedure. What is needed is the publicity condition. In Rawls' words, '... in the equilibrium state of the adjusted social world, the as-it-were

laws of nature at step (3) are publicly recognized as laws of nature, and we are to apply the CI-procedure accordingly. Let's refer to this public recognition of the as-it-were laws of nature issuing from maxims at step (1) as the publicity condition on universal moral precepts. Kant views acceptable precepts of this kind as belonging to the public moral legislation, so to speak, of a moral community' (p. 171). One more supplementation is needed, 'A further condition is this: we are to think of the adjusted social world as if it has long since reached its conjectured equilibrium state. It is as if it always has existed, exists now, and always will exist. Call this the perpetuity condition' (p. 171). Both publicity and perpetual sociability conditions can be realized only by bringing in the considerations of aesthetic judgement of taste as developed by Kant in his *Critique of Judgment*. Other critiques deal with only atomized individuals and their individualistic reasons. These two conditions take care of only omission but deriving a determinate act of commission by CI-procedure is still not possible. Hence, in his discussion of Kant's fourth example of duty dealing with help to others, Rawls concludes, 'Thus the test of the CI-procedure, as Kant states it, seems to call for some revision' (p. 173). In his thought, this difficulty cannot be solved easily, but Kant's main thought can be preserved by firstly, giving 'more content to the will of ideal agents in deciding whether they can will an adjusted social world' by bringing in whether they can will an adjusted social world' by bringing in 'appropriate conception of what we may call "true human needs", a phrase Kant uses several times in the *Metaphysics of Morals...*' (pp. 173f). Secondly, further specifying the suitably general point of view from which these decisions about social world are made by imposing two limits on information. 'The first limit is that we are to ignore the more particular features of persons, including ourselves, as well as the specific content of their and our final ends and desires' (p. 175). 'The second limit is that when we ask ourselves whether we can will the adjusted social world associated with our maxim, we are to reason as if we do not know what place we may have in that word' (pp. 175f).

Rawls' reading of how categorical imperative applies to an individual depends crucially on the availability of the social world to the individual to which he belongs. But given the metaphysics of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, no social world can be available to the individual. According

to the epistemic metaphysics of *Critique of Pure Reason*, the distinction between subject and object is central to cognitive experience. Only that experience has cognitive function where the distinction between subject and object is available; so that one can say that the subject is having experience of the object. If, in context of an experience, the distinction between subject and object is not available, then that experience has no cognitive role and is treated as mere feeling. Hence, this distinction can be said to define, distinguish, and identify the cognitive experience from other experiences according to modernity. When any member of the society takes the stance of the subject, i.e. conceives himself as subject to get knowledge of society, i.e. conceives society as the object of knowledge, then he must reflect himself out of society, out of all social relations, since the transcendental condition of the epistemic relation as determined by modernity requires that the duality of subject and object be maintained. To maintain the duality of subject and object, i.e. himself and society, the subject must conceive himself as a being outside the society. That is to say, when any member of society conceives himself as the subject of the experiential relation of which the object is society, he must reflect himself out of all social relations, i.e. he must conceive himself as an individual who can exist independently of society. This is the transcendental requirement of the subject-object dichotomy applied to experience of society. That is to say, if one looks at the society from the perspective of the subject and wants to have an objective knowledge of society, then he must conceive of himself as an individual. Any member who, by taking the stance of subject, reflects himself out of all social relations also when conceives each member of society as a subject, he reflects them each out of all social relations and hence conceives them all as individuals. So, the logic of subject-object dichotomy inevitably leads to the collapse of society; the society is reflected out of existence, since each member is conceived as an individual. This is the reason why modernity cannot admit the ontological autonomy of society and admits only the primacy of existence of individuals and thereby begets metaphysical individualism in philosophy. Together with society, by similar arguments, both tradition and history also get dissolve, as no one belongs to tradition and history. The concept of individuals standing in no

social relations to each other, and also without tradition and history, is the concept of state of nature of political philosophy generated by the analysis of cognitive experience of society by modernity. In other words, when the metaphysics of the *Critique of Pure Reason*[12] is brought to bear upon society', then we are inevitably led to the idea of state of nature. His first *Critique* has political consequences was clear to Kant which is why he introduces the idea of the ideal society that has to be established in the state of nature (*CPR*, A316/B373). Kant's *Groundwork* was the hurried first step towards transformation of morality to suit the non-social subjective individual of the *First Critique*, so that possibility of society is created. Hence, Rawls' reading of the application of categorical imperative with the assumption of availability of the social world to which the individual belongs is essentially flawed.

The last topic discussed in the second Kant lecture is the structure of motives in a person with a firm goodwill, whose actions both accord with duty and are done from duty. Here, Rawls brings in the Kantian distinction between taking an interest in action and acting from interest. An action done for the sake of duty is one done from an interest taken in the action, but according to Kant, every action is moved by some interest, so actions of a person with a fully goodwill often involves both kinds of interest. This requires that these different kinds of interest be arranged in a certain structure, with the practical interest in the action having an effective regulative priority. So, the structure is that 'Questions of duty are to be settled by considerations of practical reason, and we are to act from inclinations only when we see that the maxims that they suggest are permissible by the CI-procedure' (p. 179). According to Rawls, Kant's main doctrine is that of a pure will with its regulative priority of pure practical interest.

The structure of motives, as described by Rawls, is inadequate as duties cannot be made operational by deciding the content through inclinations, which are not opposed to the duty. The explanation will be found in the analysis of what happens when we transgress a duty. Kant writes, 'If we now attend to ourselves whenever we transgress a duty, we find that we, in fact, do not will that our maxim should become a universal law—since this is impossible for us—but rather this its opposite should remain a law universally: we only take the

liberty of making an *exception* to it for ourselves (or even just for this once) to the advantage of our inclinations' (*Groundwork* 87/424/57f). When the inclination is in opposition to duty and we give in to inclinations, then from the point of view of reason, we get into a contradiction of will, 'the contradiction that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law and subjectively should not hold universally but should admit of exceptions' (*Groundwork* 87/424/58). But how do we resolve this contradiction of will? 'Since, however, we first consider our action from the point of view of a will wholly in accord with reason, and then consider precisely the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination', we avoid the contradiction, but see it rather as 'an opposition of inclination to the precept of reason (*antagonismus*), whereby the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) is turned into a mere generality (*generalitas*) so that the practical principle of reason may meet our maxim half way' (*Groundwork* 87/424/58). Similarly, even if we do not transgress the duty but make it operational through an inclination which is not opposed to duty, we make the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) turn into a mere generality (*generalitas*), for there is no guarantee that every person will be inclined towards this kind of nature, so that it is now restricted to only those persons who have inclination consistent with duty. Even in the persons who have inclinations consistent with duty, there may be more than one inclination consistent with the same duty, but opposed to each other, which is quite often the case. In that case we will have no way left to perform the dutiful action, as sagacity in combining the opposed inclinations is lacking in man. The procedure of turning the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) into a mere generality (*generalitas*) 'proves none the less that we in fact recognize the validity of the categorical imperative' (*Groundwork* 87/424/58), but nevertheless (with all respect for it), some times we make a few exceptions in favour of opposed inclinations. Further, if we make duties operational through favourable inclinations, then sometimes we will fail to perform dutiful action either due to lack of favourable inclination or due to the presence of too many mutually inconsistent favourable inclinations. But this procedure of turning the universality of the principle (*Universalitas*) into a mere generality (*generalitas*) is not

justified in 'our own impartial judgment' (*Groundwork* 87/424/58) according to Kant. What is that new element 'our own impartial judgment'? We can recognize it neither as a judgement of theoretical reason, nor as a judgement of practical reason. It is, in fact, the judgement of the familiar 'impartial spectator'. So it is the judgement of the disinterested rational spectator, which must come to our rescue here. That is to say the duties are made operational through the judgement of taste. Rawls has failed to take note of the role of impartial spectator in structuring of motives in a person with a firm goodwill.

VII

The third Kant lecture offers a very novel and illuminating interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative, generally known as the formula of humanity as an end in itself, and the relation between the various formulations of the categorical imperative departing from Kant's text to some extent.

Building upon Kant's various claims regarding the relation between the three formulations of categorical imperative that these three formulations represent the same law—each of which contains a combination of the other two, and that the purpose of having several formulations is to bring the idea of reason nearer to intuition—Rawls conjectures that the first formulation, i.e. the law of nature formulation is from the point of view of the agent subject to moral requirement. In the second formulation, i.e. humanity as an end in itself formulation, we are directed to view ourselves and others as passively affected by our proposed action. The third formulation, i.e. formulation in terms of autonomy, once again is from the agent's point of view, but this time not as some one subject to moral requirement; rather as someone who is legislating universal law.

Rawls detects four statements of the second formulation of the categorical imperative in the second chapter of the *Groundwork*, of which the first three are easily recognizable as variants of the same formulation which stress that we are to treat humanity in our person and in the persons of others never simply as a means but always as an end-in-itself, but the fourth statement lacks the special vocabulary of the other three statements as it says nothing about treating humanity as

an end in itself, yet according to Rawls' interpretation, it is still a variation of the second formulation.

To interpret the second formulation of the categorical imperative, Rawls develops the contrast between the duties of justice and duties of virtue according to Kant. The duties of justice are based on the principle of justice, a special case of the moral law, which says: Every action is right which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with universal law. Duties of virtue emanate from the first principle of the doctrine of virtue, which is another special case of the moral law, which says: Act according to a maxim of ends which it can be a universal law for everyone to have. The important difference between the two principles is that in the principles of justice the 'in order to' clause in the agents maxim is simply 'in order to advance my interests', while in the principle of virtue, 'in order clause' takes the form 'in order that others' true needs be met'. The duties of justice can be externally legislated and enforced, while the duties of virtue cannot be externally imposed, as these are duties to act from certain motive. Duties of justice are said to be of narrow obligation, whereas the duties of virtue are said to be of wide obligation. And, lastly, all duties of justice are duties of narrow requirement, i.e. they require specific acts of commission or omission, whereas the basic duties of virtue are of wide requirement, i.e. they require us to adopt and carry out plans of conduct that give weight to achieving obligatory ends.

Rawls also explains humanity according to Kant. He writes, '...Kant means by humanity those of our powers and capacities that characterize us as reasonable and rational persons who belong to the natural world. Our having humanity is our being both *vernünftig* and animating a human body; reasonable and rational persons, situated in nature with other animals. These power include, first, those of moral personality, which make it possible for us to have a goodwill and a good moral character; and second, those capacities and skills to be developed by culture: by the arts and sciences and so forth' (p. 188). Although Rawls supports his thesis by citing certain ambiguous passages from various Kantian texts, but he fails to take note of certain unambiguous textual evidence, which prove his interpretation to be erroneous. He is aware

of the passages but considers them irrelevant, without giving any reasons. Kant makes a distinction between 'the predisposition to humanity in man, taken as a living and at the same time a rational being' and 'the predisposition to personality in man, taken as a rational and at the same time an accountable being' (*Religion*, p. 21). Here, on the latter disposition, Rawls adds a footnote saying, 'We cannot regard this as included in the concept of the preceding, but necessarily must treat it as a special predisposition' (*Religion*, p. 21). Later, he explains, 'The predisposition to personality is the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will' (*Religion*, pp. 22–23). Humanity can refer to nothing but the capacity both to choose ends and to rationally produce the ends chosen, in Rawls' words, 'those capacities and skills to be developed by culture: by the arts and sciences and so forth' only. In Section VIII of the *Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, Kant writes, 'The power of proposing to ourselves an end is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With the end of humanity in our own person is, therefore, combined the rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found in man.' With this unambiguous statement of what is humanity according to Kant, it appears that Rawls' broad interpretation of humanity, which also includes the Kantian sense of personality, is mistaken.

According to Rawls' interpretation, there is both a negative and a positive injunction in the formulation of humanity as an end in itself. The negative injunction is that humanity must be seen 'as an end against which we should never act, and so something that must never to counted merely as a means' (p. 185). Due to this negative injunction, 'the CI-procedure accepts only maxims action on which respects the limits set by reasonable and rational persons who are to be treated as ends in themselves' (p. 190). Rawls explains what is involved in the negative injunction by taking the example of prohibition of deceitful promise and suicide.

The positive injunction, included in the formulation of humanity as an end in itself, requires us to 'treat humanity in our own person and

the person of others as an end-in-itself in a positive way by conscientiously promoting the obligatory ends specified by the duties of virtue' (p. 194). Explaining further, Rawls writes, 'Described summarily, we do this by striving to advance our own perfection (moral and natural) and the happiness of others, where this is specified by their permissible ends...' (p. 194).

Kant ends this lecture by discussing his claim, '*Rational nature exists as an end in itself*' (*Groundwork* 91/429/66), which is supported by the argument, which is an enthymeme. Rawls makes all the premises explicit and turns it into the following valid argument:

1. Let A be any arbitrarily chosen rational being.
2. Then A necessarily conceives of A's rational nature as an end in itself. [The first stated premise of Kant.]
3. Thus, A's rational nature is a subjective end for A. [From the definition of a subjective end.]
4. But since A is any rational being, all rational beings necessarily conceive of their own nature as an end in itself. [Generalization of (3)]
5. Furthermore, A conceives of A's rational nature as an end in itself for reasons equally valid for all rational beings likewise to conceive of A's nature as an end in itself. [The second stated premise of Kant.]
6. Now, let B be any rational being different from A. Then the reasons for which A regards A's rational nature as an end in itself are equally valid for B to regard A's nature as an end in itself and vice versa. [From (5)]
7. Therefore, all rational beings necessarily conceive of one another's rational nature as an end in itself. [Generalization of (6)]
8. Thus, the rational nature is necessarily viewed as an end in itself by all rational beings, and so it is an objective principle that all rational beings are so to conceive of it. [From the definition of an objective principle.]

Although Rawls discusses the possible misuse of the second stated premise of Kant to buttress the utilitarian position, he fails to throw any light on what is required in making a judgement on the basis of reasons that are equally valid for all rational beings.

VIII

The fourth Kant lecture deals with the third formulation of the categorical imperative—the autonomy formulation—with a view to explaining Kant's idea of gaining entry for the moral law together with assortment of various topics woven round this formulation. According to Rawls' analysis, 'It is basic to Kant's moral psychology that the more clearly the moral law is presented to us as an idea of reason, and the more clearly we understand its origins in our person as free, the more forcefully it arouses our moral sensibility...' (p. 201). Further, 'Were it not for this clear conception of the moral law as a law of freedom and the awareness of its powerful effect on us as such a law, Kant thinks we would not know what we are: our nature as free person would remain hidden to us. A clear understanding and awareness of the moral law is the way to this self knowledge' (p. 202). Formulation of autonomy is one more step towards self-knowledge.

According to Rawls, there are no less than ten variants of formulation of autonomy in the second chapter of Kant's *Groundwork*. Rawls also counts the formulation of the realm of ends among the variations of this formulation. In his view, we must notice, 'first, that all the variants stress the idea that we are to act in such a way that we can regard ourselves as legislating universally through our maxims, and second, that some of the formulations make it explicit that, in legislating universally, we are to view ourselves as members of a possible realm of ends...' (p. 204). Rawls clarifies that the thought of our legislating of ends is purely hypothetical as we do this as individuals, and not as one corporate body. Also, what we legislate is the whole system of maxims as universal moral law. Now combining all the ideas together, Rawls states Kant's categorical imperative more fully thus:

> Always act so that the totality of the maxims from which you act is such that you can regard yourself as enacting through those maxims a unified scheme of public moral percepts the endorsing of which by all reasonable and rational persons is consistent with their humanity and would bring about (under favourable conditions) a realm of ends (p. 205).

With this more complete formulation, Rawls becomes aware of the possible conflict of obligations, but doubts that Kant has an adequate account of this problem. This doubt arises because of Rawls' failure to understand the role of impartial spectator and symbolization of the morally good by the beautiful in Kant's moral philosophy. These two topics are not discussed at all in Rawls' *Lectures*.

According to Rawls, the formula of autonomy is related to supremacy of reason, especially supremacy of pure practical reason in Kant's moral philosophy. This supremacy of pure practical reason is exhibited by two features. First, 'we are subject only to laws that we might have made as reasonable and rational; and we are bound only to act in conformity with a will that is our own, and which has, as nature's purpose for it, the role of making universal law'. Second, 'a supremely legislative will ... cannot be dependent on interests derived from natural desires, but depends solely on interests taken in the principles of practical reason...' (p. 206).

Mark the words 'nature's purpose' in Rawls' text. Kant uses the German word *Naturzweck* which means 'natural purpose'. Kant does not use the phrase *Zweck der Nature*, meaning 'nature's purpose' or 'purpose of nature'. So, it is wrong to translate Kant's sentence using the phrase 'nature's purpose'. Kant makes a distinction between the 'ultimate end of nature' and the 'final end of creation itself' in the *Critique of Judgment*. The *ultimate end of nature* is the subject-matter of §83, while the final end of creation is the subject-matter of §84. Only with respect to the unconditioned self-legislation man is the final end of creation. In §84, Kant writes, 'Only in man, and only in him as the individual being to whom moral law applies, do we find unconditional legislation in respect of ends. This legislation, therefore, is what alone qualifies him to be a final end to which entire nature is teleologically subordinated.' Man is the ultimate end of nature only with respect to proficiency in choosing ends. In §83, Kant asks, 'What now is the end in man, and the end which, as such, is intended to be promoted by means of his connection with nature?' He himself answers, 'The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing, consequently of the aptitude of a being in his freedom, is *culture*. Hence it is only culture that can be the ultimate

end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race.' That is to say, the function of making universal law may be a natural purpose of human will but it cannot be the nature's purpose for the human will.

There are three distinctive features in Rawls' explanation of the Kantian ideal of realm of ends. The first feature makes explicit what is implicit in Kant's understanding of realm of ends. '...Kant must suppose that in realm of ends everyone recognizes everyone else as not only honouring their obligation of justice and duties of virtue, but also, as it were, legislating law for their moral commonwealth ... if he thought it too obvious to be worth stating, he was mistaken: what is neglected is explicitly drawing attention to the mutual recognition of the moral law in the public role of a society's moral culture. Hegel will stress just this point' (p. 209). The second distinctive feature is Rawls' interpretation of Kant's claim, 'Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we shall be able—if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends—to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends which each may set before himself); that is, we shall be able to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principles'. (*Groundwork*, 95/433/74). Rawls suggests, 'that this might be interpreted as imposing certain limits on information... Certainly Kant needs to introduce some such limits...' (p. 209). The third distinctive feature is Rawls' understanding of the condition of membership of kingdom of ends: 'This condition is simply moral personality, or powers of practical reason' (p. 209).

All of these explanations are doubtful as interpretations of Kant's realm of ends. The Hegelian requirement of mutual recognition will make the moral agent essentially social, throwing into doubt all existing paraphernalia of state of nature in Kant's moral political philosophy unless some explanation is found as to how essential sociability is consistent with the state of nature. Information limitation interpretation of Kant's idea of 'abstracting from personal differences' Rawls himself finds unsatisfactory, 'This seems unsatisfactory: it must mean more than this! But what?' (p. 209). Lastly, if mere capacity for morality

makes a person a member of realm of ends, then we all belong to it, rendering it extant and not a mere ideal. According to Kant, 'Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in itself; for through this is it possible to be a law-making member of kingdom of ends' (*Groundwork*, 96/435/77). Kant appears to be saying that a rational being has to be actually moral to be an end in itself, as he has to be actually moral to be a law-making member of kingdom of ends. But confusion is created in the very next sentence: 'Therefore, morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity' (*Groundwork*, 96f/435/77). Mark the words 'humanity so far as it is capable of morality'. Here, Kant appears to be saying that a rational being is *capable* of morality which is by itself enough to make him an end in itself. To be an end in itself, it is enough to be *capable* of being a law-making member of kingdom of ends. Here, Kant is wavering and remains undecided about which interpretation to accept. But it is the latter interpretation which is consistent with the overall position of Kant, even though the language of the present paragraph and the following paragraph point to the former interpretation. What is the reason for this discrepancy in the language of the paragraphs and the correct position? The paragraphs formulate the idea of dignity for the persons in the kingdom of ends, while he needs the idea of dignity of persons who are not in the kingdom of ends yet, i.e. he needs the idea of dignity for human beings in the state of nature. The members of the kingdom of ends have dignity because they are actually moral, which is also the condition of membership of realm of ends, but human beings in the state of nature have dignity even though they are not moral but because they are capable of morality, i.e. morality is possible for them. The confusion is created because Kant failed to make distinct the issue of condition of dignity of a person and the condition of membership of the realm of ends. Persons have dignity by having the capacity for morality. Hence, individuals have dignity whether they are in the kingdom of ends or not, but membership of kingdom of ends is only for those who are actually moral. Rawls also succumbs to Kant's confusion.

According to Rawls' analysis for Kant, an ideal is the conception of an individual thing determinable and even determined by an idea of

reason, while for Kant, an intuition is the awareness—or the experience of a particular—of an individual thing. Hence, moral law as the idea of reason is brought nearer to intuition in the realm of ends, as an ideal, is the conception of particular, and is based on moral law as the idea of reason. In Rawls' view, the ideal of realm of ends brings the idea of reason nearer to intuition in the sense that this ideal of a realm of ends arouses in us the wish that we could be a member of that world.

But this interpretation appears to go against Kant's claim, 'But what I entitle the *ideal* seems to be further removed from objective reality even than the idea. By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely *in concreto*, but *in individuo*, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone' (*CPR*, A568/B596). Since ideal is further removed from objective reality than the idea of reason, realm of ends, qua ideal, is not capable of bringing idea of reason nearer to intuition. Realm of ends brings the idea of reason nearer to intuition through an analogy but not qua ideal.

Rawls also explains the analogy that Kant has in mind while speaking of bringing an idea of reason nearer to intuition. 'One analogy is surely that of regarding a moral precept as a law of nature in the first formulation' (p. 214). But the extensive analogy operative in bringing idea of reason nearer to intuition, in his view, is this: 'In science we pursue the ideal of unifying the knowledge of the understanding by the regulative idea of systematic unity. In doing this, we assume that nature is ordered as if it is the work of pure reason realizing in the world the highest systematic unity. Similarly, we order our social world by acting from valid moral precepts as if they were laws of nature. In this case, it is our pure practical reason that orders the social world as it introduces systematic conjunction into a whole of ends. By giving our social world the form of an intelligible world, the principles of pure practical reason are brought closer to feeling and gain access to our moral sensibility. We now take a pure practical interest in those principles, which gives them an influence over our maxims' (p. 215). Note that unwittingly, Rawls is also admitting that what brings idea of reason nearer to intuition is the analogy, without bringing in the ideal qua ideal.

IX

In the fifth Kant lecture, the deontological aspects of Kant's moral philosophy receive an unorthodox interpretation as the priority of right over the good. In Kant's doctrine, Rawls distinguishes the six conceptions of the good, which are built up in a sequence, one after another, each from the preceding it: (1) conception of good as happiness; (2) conception of good as fulfilment of 'true human needs'; (3) good as the fulfilment in everyday life of permissible ends; (4) conception of good as the goodwill; (5) conception of good as the object of moral law; and (6) conception of the complete good. The conception of good as happiness is given by unrestricted empirical practical reason as organized by the (as opposed to a particular) hypothetical imperative. Rawls emphasizes 'the distinction between the hypothetical imperative, viewed as a family of principles of rational deliberation, and particular hypothetical imperatives, which are rational when they satisfy those principles given the agent's circumstances and interests,' (p. 220) 'the conception of good as fulfilment of "true human needs" is to some extent "amendment"' (p. 221) required by Kant's view, and hence 'with some hesitation' (p. 233), suggests that true human needs includes 'two basic needs: the need for security and order in society required to remove the state of war, and the need for those conditions necessary to develop and exercise our capacity for rationality in order to advance our happiness' (p. 234). In the third conception of good, the permissible ends are the ends that respect the limits of the moral law. The fourth conception of good as goodwill 'consists in a firm and settled highest order desire, or to use Kant's term, pure practical interest, which leads us to take an interest in acting from duty...' (p. 223). In the fifth conception of the good, the object of the moral law is the ideal of a realm of ends. The complete good, which is the last conception of good, is 'attained when the ideal of a realm of ends is realized and each member both has a goodwill and has achieved happiness, so far as the conditions of human life allow' (p. 225).

Following his survey of the six Kantian conceptions of good, Rawls explains 'what Kant says about the autonomy and heteronomy of moral conceptions as a whole...' (p. 226). According to Rawls, what is at stake in the autonomy of will is the supremacy of reason. 'Pure practical

reason cannot take its directives from any object, not even from a rational idea presented as an object of reason ... pure practical reason must construct out of itself its own object ... rather than starting from a conception of the good given independently of the right, we start from a conception of the right—of moral law—given by pure (as opposed to empirical) practical reason. We then specify in the light of this conception ... what ends are permissible and what moral precepts specify our duties of justice and of virtue. From these we work out what social arrangements are right and just' (pp. 226f). Explaining the idea of heteronomy of will, Rawls writes, 'Kant believes that once we start from the good as *a prior* and independently given object, the moral conception must be heteronomous. This is because in this case pure practical reason is not, as it should be, its own sovereign authority as the supreme maker of law ... Heteronomy means precisely this lack of sovereign authority' (p. 227).

For Rawls, Kantian deontology means priority of right over the good understood in a proper way. 'The meaning of the priority of right needs to be carefully understood. It does not mean that Kant's moral doctrine includes no conception of the good, nor does it mean that the conception used are somehow deduced from a previously specified concept of right... . An important point about the priority of right is this: the right and the good are complementary ... Various conceptions of the good fully worthy of the devotion of those who affirm them must fit within the limits drawn by the conception of right itself—by the space it allows for the pursuit of permissible ends ... the right draws the limit, the good shows the point ... What the priority of right insists upon is that conceptions of the good must answer to certain prior constraints springing from pure practical reason' (p. 231).

In between, Rawls discusses in detail Kant's thoughts on perfectionism as a form of heteronomy. This is the best explanation of Kant's idea of perfectionism as heteronomy that the present author has come across till date.

X

The sixth Kant lecture is devoted to moral constructivism in Kant's doctrine. This unorthodox interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy is

very original and pathbreaking, which has inspired Rawls' own version of Kantian constructivism, as exemplified by his political conception of justice. Rawls presents moral constructivism in contrast to rational intuitionism. The distinctive feature of Kant's moral constructivism is that particular categorical imperatives that give the content of the duties of justice and virtue are viewed as specified by a synthetic *a priori* procedure of construction, i.e. the CI-procedure, the form and structure of which mirror our two powers of practical reason, i.e. the capacity to be reasonable and the capacity to be rational, as well as our status as free and equal moral persons, which are implicit in the fact of reason, i.e. our everyday moral consciousness. In contrast to this in rational intuitionism 'the content of first principle is already given and persons need only to be able to know what these principles are and to be moved by this knowledge' (p. 237).

Rawls clarifies that only the content of moral doctrine is constructed; the CI-procedure is also not constructed. Rather, 'it is simply laid out' (p. 239), making explicit what is implicitly present in our everyday moral consciousness, which for Kant, is a fact of reason.

Rawls also explains the constructivist account of objectivity of moral judgements in contrast to that of rational intuitionism. In rational intuitionism, the correctness of moral judgement depends on whether it is true of a prior and independent order of moral values, while in moral constructivism, the correctness of a moral judgement depends on whether any fully reasonable and rational and informed person acknowledges it as conforming to all the requirements of the procedure of construction.

Rawls also discusses the issue of agreement as an important aspect of objectivity. 'Now, a conception of objectivity includes an account of our agreement in judgements and of how it comes about. Kant accounts for this agreement by our sharing in a common practical reason ... Reasonable and rational persons must recognize more or less the same reasons and give them more or less the same weight. Indeed, for the idea of judgement, as opposed to simply giving voice to our psychological state, even to apply, we must be able to reach agreement in judgement, not of course always, but much of the time, and in the light of what we viewed as publicly recognized criteria of practical

reason' (p. 244). Objectivity also requires that disagreement must be explained if agreement cannot be reached. 'Moreover—and this is essential—when we can't reach agreement, we must be able to explain our failure' (p. 244). Apart from many other reasons, according to Rawls, 'Disagreement may also arise from a lack of reasonableness or rationality or conscientiousness on the part of one or more persons involved. But if we say this, we must be careful that the test of this lack of reasonableness or conscientiousness is not simply the fact of disagreement itself, much less the fact that other persons disagree with us. We must have independent grounds identifiable in the particular circumstances for thinking that such causes of the failure to agree are at work' (p. 245). Rawls, one of the greatest moral and political philosophers of the twentieth century, has been able to think through one of the most difficult and obscure aspect of Kant's moral philosophy. But his discussion presents Kant's views on the subject inadequately, because he has failed to take note of the entire first part of *Critique of Judgment*, where he discusses the role of aesthetic judgement of taste in universal communicability and universal agreement of judgements, especially of moral judgements. In §59, Kant claims: 'Now I say: the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this respect (that of a relation which is natural to everyone, and which may also be imputed to everyone else as a duty) does it please with a claim to the agreement of everyone else ...' (*42.Kant*, p. 547). Kant also claims, 'But the *determinability of the subject* by this idea [of freedom]—and, indeed, of a subject which in its sensibility can be conscious of *hindrances* but also of its superiority over them by its subjugation of them, through *modifications of its states*, that is, the moral feeling— is so closely related with aesthetic judgement and its formal conditions, that [the moral feeling] can serve to make the conformity to law of action from duty *representable* as aesthetic, that is, as sublime or even as beautiful, without sacrificing its purity...' (*CJ*, §29, *42.Kant*, p. 506). For Kant, an aesthetic idea, specifically rational aesthetic idea rather than the normal aesthetic idea, performs this task by supplying 'rules for establishing a union of taste with reason, i.e. of the beautiful with the good—rules by which the former becomes available as an intentional instrument in respect of the latter, for the purpose of bringing that

temper of the mind which is self-sustaining and of subjective universal validity to the support and maintenance of that mode of thought which, while possessing objective universal validity, can only be preserved by a resolute effort' (*CJ*, §16, *42.Kant*, p. 488). According to Kant, 'Taste ... is the discipline (or corrective) of genius' (*CJ*, §50, *42.Kant*, p. 531). When genius is corrected by taste of disinterested spectator, 'It introduces a clearness and other into the plenitude of thought, and in so doing, gives stability to the ideas and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture' (*CJ*, §50, *42.Kant*, p. 531). The reason for this is that '... taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through the intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it is this rendering also, and the increased sensibility, founded upon it, for the feeling which these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that are the origin of that pleasure which taste declares valid for mankind in general and not merely for the private feeling of each individual' (*CJ*, §60, *42.Kant*, p. 549). Hence, Kant explains what the deduction of judgement of taste amounts to. 'All that it holds out for is that we are justified in presupposing that the same subjective conditions of judgement which we find in ourselves are universally present in every man, and further that we have rightly subsumed the given object under these conditions' (*CJ*, §38, *42.Kant*, p. 517). Conditions of judgement are conditions of all kinds of judgement and not merely judgement of taste. '...we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of skepticism' (*CJ*, §21, *42.Kant*, p. 492). For Kant, 'Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap...' (*CJ*, §59, *42.Kant*, p. 548). These remarks of Kant, scattered throughout the entire first part of *Critique of Judgment*, are not taken into account by Rawls in his analysis of what is necessary for an agreement on moral judgement, and hence, fails to notice the role of figures of disinterested spectator and the genius, and also the role of aesthetic judgement of taste in agreement on moral judgement.

Rawls also explains in what way the categorical imperative is *a priori*. It 'is *a priori* in Kant's most general sense, that is, it is knowledge grounded on principles of (pure) reason' (p. 247). The two marks of *a priori* knowledge: necessity and universality are also explained. *priori* knowledge: necessity and universality are also explained. 'Necessity here means practical necessity ... So whatever is required by the categorical imperative (via the CI-procedure) is practically necessary for us' (p. 248). 'As for universality, this means that the requirements in question hold for all reasonable and rational persons in virtue of their nature as such persons, independently of any particular conditions of inclination and circumstances that mark off one reasonable and rational person from another' (p. 248). And now, Rawls explains in what sense the categorical imperative is synthetic *a priori*. 'The thought is that just as the categories of the understanding specify *a priori* conditions for the possibility of the experience of objects, the categorical imperative and particular categorical imperatives to which it leads impose *a priori* constraints on the permissible exercise of empirical practical reason ... These constraints are synthetic *a priori* because: (i) they are imposed unconditionally on reasonable and rational persons; and (ii) they are imposed on such persons without being derived from the concept of a person as reasonable and rational' (p. 250). This is an inadequate understanding of the synthetic *a priori* nature of categorical imperative, for it collapses the meaning of 'synthetic' into the meaning of *a priori* because the condition (i) is just the reiteration of universality condition and the condition (ii) merely reiterates the most general sense of *a priori* and it merely plays on the distinction between 'grounded' and 'derived'. Rawls' explanation of what Kant is claiming is that a categorical imperative connects an action *immediately*, i.e. without the mediation of willing of an end, with the concept of a rational will. It is not clear how this immediacy of connection or absence of mediation of willing of an end in the connection can make it synthetic. The necessary distinctions to make the unconditional connection of action with a rational will synthetic are not available in Rawls' interpretation. If Rawls is explaining the synthetic *a priori* nature of categorical imperative in analogy with the synthetic *a priori* nature of the categories of the understanding, then he needs to prove that not only categorical imperative imposes *a priori* constraints on the permissible exercise of

empirical practical reason, but he also needs to show how categorical imperative is *the condition of very possibility of exercise of empirical practical reason*. That is to say, he needs to show that *a priori* constraints on the permissible exercise of empirical practical reason imposed by the categorical imperative specify the very *condition* of possibility of exercise of empirical practical reason.

XI

The seventh Kant lecture focusses on the fact of reason, which is one of the central ideas in Kant's moral philosophy, but not easy to fathom. The fact of reason is mentioned for the first time in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. There are altogether six 'facts of reason' passages according to Rawls' analysis of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. As Rawls discusses all these passages individually, the discussion is repetitive but very subtle and requires a very close attentive reading. In the discussion of the first fact of reason passage where the fact of reason is 'that *there is a pure practical reason*', Rawls explains why Kant called his second critique *Critique of Practical Reason* instead of *Critique of Pure Practical Reason* as the passage deals with this issue. In his various passages, the fact of reason is indiscriminately identified as: (1) our consciousness of the moral law; (2) the moral law itself; (3) the consciousness of freedom of the will; (4) autonomy in the principle of morality; (5) an inevitable determination of the will by the moral law itself; and (6) actual cases of actions presupposing unconditional causality. Since there is only one fact of reason, as it is 'the sole fact of reason' for Kant, Rawls in his discussion of the second fact of reason passage, settles the question: What fact is the fact of reason? 'The fact of reason is the fact that, as reasonable beings, we are conscious of the moral law as the supremely authoritative and regulative law for us and in our ordinary moral thought and judgement we recognize it as such' (p. 260). Rawls also claims, 'the doctrine of the fact of reason is central, not only to Kant's moral philosophy, but to his transcendental idealism as a whole. That the concept of freedom has objective reality, which is the keystone of the system of speculative as well as of practical reason, depends on the fact of reason' ... (p. 261). In the discussion of the third fact of reason passage, Rawls explains how the doctrine of the

fact of reason marks a fundamental change in Kant's view regarding the deduction of moral law from seeking it in the third part of *Groundwork* to abandoning the quest in the *Critique of Practical Reason* by claiming in this third fact of reason passage that the moral law can have no deduction but can have only an exposition, which is a different kind of authentication of pure practical reason. Rawls explains how, in Kant's view, the authentication of each kind of reason differs from the others and how the authentication of each form of reason consists in showing its role and place within the constitution of reason as a whole. According to Rawls' analysis of Kant's idea of constitution of reason, 'This constitution is self authenticating, as reason is neither opaque nor transparent to itself, and can answer all questions about itself on due reflection' (p. 272) and this task of reflection is unending as it 'continues indefinitely' (p. 243). In the discussion of the sixth fact of reason passage, Rawls examines Kant's transition from our possible freedom to our actual freedom. That is to say, Rawls examines whether the possibility of freedom introduced to resolve the third antinomy can be made into an actual freedom as Kant thinks it can be done with the fact of reason.

In spite of his subtle and extensive discussion about fact of reason, Rawls fails to explain: What exactly is the fact of reason? What I ask is not what fact he is taking as the fact of reason, but the question is what exactly Kant means by the phrase 'the fact of reason'. In what sense it is a 'fact'? Since it is neither a fact in the sense of empirically true of nature nor in the rational intuitionist sense of true of antecedently given order of moral values, what is the nature of *being* of that of which it is true of'? The question remains unanswered in Rawls' analysis. And because of the failure to raise and answer this question Rawls' explanation of why Kant abandons the search for deduction of categorical imperative and settles on an exposition based on fact of reasons remains questionable.

XII

In his eighth Kant lecture, Rawls explains in what sense the moral law is the law of freedom according to Kant. Rawls begins with some concluding remarks on constructivism and due reflection. Since due

reflection continues indefinitely, constructivist moral view emerges only on fuller reflection. Rawls distinguishes full reflection from perfect reflection, 'Here by full reflection is not meant perfect reflection at the end of time, but such increasing critical reflection as might be achieved by a tradition of thought from one generation to the next' (p. 274). Rawls also distinguishes between the constructivist doctrine as formulated at a particular time and the process of arriving at a formulation of it by thought and reflection over time, thereby making room for his own version of constructivist moral doctrine as distinguished from Kant's constructivism. Since in his view, 'There should be increasing success in formulating the doctrine as a whole' (p. 274), his version of constructivism is more successful than Kant's.

Rawls presents Kant's doctrine not in terms of two-world's view—a world of phenomena and a world of noumena—but instead, as a doctrine with two points of view. 'So we may think of the two points of view of theoretical and practical reason as articulating the form and structure of two different forms of self-consciousness: in one case, our self-consciousness as a subject inquiring about and investigating the natural world and social world ... in the other, our self-consciousness as a deliberating and acting subject ...' (p. 275). According to Rawls, each point of view is characterized by five elements: (1) the kind of questions we ask from the point of view; (2) the kind of interest that move us to ask these questions; (3) settlement of these questions by a family of ideas, principles and precepts of reason; (4) attitude we must take towards ourselves and the world; and (5) beliefs needed to support and sustain these attitudes. With these clarifications, Rawls makes a very significant observation about actions in Kant's doctrine: '...as applied to persons and their actions, both points of view refer to one and the same thing: the very same person and action seen from two different points of view...' (p. 277). But Rawls fails to explain what it amounts to when the same action is seen from two points of view, for he immediately reverts to the language couched in terms of 'world'. 'These are not points of view on different worlds, nor are they points of view from different worlds: they are points of view for asking different questions about one and the same world' (p. 277). Nowhere

in his entire *Lectures* does he clarify what it amounts to when the one and the same action is seen from two points of view.

Rawls find Kant's doctrine of freedom 'an extremely difficult topic' and presents it as opposed to that of Leibniz. According to Rawls, Kant deals with the problem of freedom not as it is generally discussed in the tradition of philosophy but in a different way. There are three basic differences. Firstly, for Kant, problem of freedom is not a problem of metaphysics and the philosophy of mind alone, but also a question in moral philosophy. Secondly, since principle of practical reason is the principle of autonomy, the question of freedom is really the question of absolute spontaneity of practical as well as theoretical reason due to unity of reason. Lastly, for Kant, there is no separate question of freedom of will, but only a question of freedom of reason both theoretical and practical together.

Central to Rawls' explanation of Kant's doctrine of freedom is the absolute spontaneity of reason. 'One essential feature of reason's absolute spontaneity is its capacity to set ends for itself. Pure reason is the faculty of orientation ... and reason provides orientation by being normative: it sets ends and organizes them into a whole so as to guide the use of a faculty, the understanding in the theoretical sphere and the power of choice in the practical' (p. 284). Once again, Rawls writes, 'The capacity of each form of pure reason to set ends for itself in virtue of its own ideas of reason is, then, an essential feature of the absolute (or perfect) spontaneity of pure reason' (p. 285).

With the help of this absolute spontaneity of pure reason, Rawls explains Kant's three ideas of freedom: the idea of acting under the idea of freedom, the idea of practical freedom, and the idea of transcendental freedom. Acting under the idea of freedom, according to Rawls, means that when we deliberate from the practical point of view, we must, and normally do, regard our reason as having absolute spontaneity. In other words, to act under the idea of freedom means 'to deliberate in good faith'. 'It is not only to deliberate reasonably and rationally as the norms of practical reason specify, but also to do so with the firm belief that our powers of reason both theoretical and practical, are fully self-determining and point the way to what we ought to do and shall do, once known or confirmed by deliberation'

(p. 287). According to Rawls' analysis of Kant's idea of practical freedom, 'it is an empirical fact that we can and often do deliberate in accordance with and act from pure practical principles, and hence act under the idea of freedom; moreover, the conclusions we reach do indeed determine what we do. Everyday experience shows that practical reason is, as Kant puts it, one of the operative causes in nature...' (p. 287). Explaining Kant's idea of transcendental freedom, Rawls writes, 'By contrast, our belief in transcendental freedom is the firm conviction that our decisions as operating causes are not in fact "nature again" ... I take this to mean that we believe that our decisions issue from the absolute spontaneity of pure practical reason and are not determined by remote and unknown natural causes external to reason' (pp. 287f). Rawls' interpretation not only does much violence to Kant's text by transforming the freedom of will into freedom of reason but also is inadequate as it fails to explain how practical freedom can be an empirical fact for Kant.

XIII

In the ninth Kant lecture, Rawls explains Kant's moral psychology as developed in *Religion*. In his view, the moral psychology of Kant's *Religion* is Agustinian, while the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique* betray, on occasion, the Manichean strain. Rawls' aim is to separate Kant's Augustinian moral psychology from the trappings of Manicheanism with which it is laced, for in his view, only the Augustinian aspect of Kant's moral psychology coheres with Kant's moral philosophy, while the Manichean strain in his moral psychology unsettles Kant's moral doctrine.

According to the moral psychology of *Religion*, human nature is constituted by our free power of choice together with three original predispositions to good: (1) the predisposition to animality as living beings, which includes instincts of self preservation, for the propagation of the species, for the care of children, and for community with other human beings; (2) the predisposition to humanity as living and rational beings, which includes desire for happiness and respect from others as superior; and (3) the predisposition to personality as a rational and reasonable being, which includes the capacity to understand and

intelligently apply the moral law and the capacity of moral feeling of respect this law as itself a sufficient motive for our free power of choice. According to Rawls analysis, the free power of choice (*freie Willkür*) in Kant is the power to act from the moral law, which can exist even when we fail to exercise it, and it is not necessited to act by any sensuous determining ground, but may elect a determining ground to act from without being necessitated. It is because of this power that we are responsible and accountable beings. The three power that we are responsible and accountable beings. The three dispositions cannot determine us unless they are incorporated into our maxim by the free power of choice. According to Rawls, 'It means that while we must take each of the three predispositions as given (we cannot alter or eradicate them), we can and must order them: that is, we must decide through our power of choice the priority and weight these predisposition to have in our supremely regulative principles as shown in our deliberations and conduct. Whether we have a morally good or bad will depends on that ordering' (p. 295). In Rawls' reading of Kant, not only the basic features of the original predispositions establish a moral order of priority (*sittliche Ordnung*), such that it ranks the predisposition to personality as unconditionally prior to the other two, making these two subordinate to the former disposition, but also the ordering with such priority is appropriate to us as persons with a free power of choice as it is the principle that fully expresses our nature as autonomous. The moral order of our predispositions does not reflect an antecedent order of values known to us by rational intuition; rather, it is adopted by free power of choice. Adoption of a order of predispositions is the adoption of a moral character. So we make our character with free power of choice, and hence it is not determined in time in the sense that it is neither a social artifact nor determined by psychological laws, nor a product of happenstance, and the like. If we do not regard ourselves as having freely adopted our character with power of choice then it is an evasion of responsibility. But this gives rise to paradox of original sin. According to Rawls, 'How our character can be evil—violate the moral order of the predispositions—is indeed inscrutable ... since our nature is good, not evil but good should have arisen from it, yet long historical experience convinces us to the contrary'

(p. 301). The paradox is that evil seems to be freely adopted without any reason, or at least the reasons are not open to our knowledge.

Rawls separates this Augustinian moral psychology of Kant from the Manichean aspects. The latter depends on theory of two selves: one intelligible good self, belonging to the intelligible world; and the other sensible bad self, belonging to the sensible world. According to Rawls' understanding of Kant, the good self has just one predisposition to act from the moral law and hence for it 'I ought' is an 'I will'. The bad natural self also has just one predisposition, i.e. the predisposition to happiness, or rational self-love and it experiences the injunctions of moral law as frustrating and blocking what we want. It lacks moral feeling. With this account of Manichean moral psychology, Rawls claims, 'The Manichean moral psychology presents grave difficulties for Kant's moral doctrine: not only does it commit him to a serious heretical doctrine at odds with the tenor of his religious thought, but also it would seem to defeat any satisfactory account of responsibility that is acceptable to us when we act under the idea of freedom as we assume the practical point of view' (p. 304). In his view, 'The Augustinian moral psychology overcomes these defects by attributing to the self a free power of choice and enough complexity for a satisfactory account of responsibility... The origin of evil, then, lies not in a bad self with its natural desires but solely in the free power of choice, which may change the moral order of the dispositions and determine what we count as appropriate reasons in deciding what to do' (p. 305). Rawls ends this lecture by pointing out that Kant's moral conception is an aristocracy of all in the sense that 'It comprises all reasonable and rational persons, whose powers of reason define our standing and are counted as belonging to persons in all walks of life, the privileges of none' (p. 306).

Rawls' interpretation of Kant's moral psychology, separating its Augustinian elements from Manichean strains, is the most questionable aspect of his interpretation of Kant's moral doctrine. Kant has coherently woven the two strands in his moral psychology. In fact, it is this coherent composite moral psychology, which gives sense to Kant's problematic and its solution in his *Groundwork,* which Rawls has failed to fathom. Not only that, it is the Manichean aspect of his moral

psychology, which provides ground for preparatory transition of §76 in his third *Critique* to his ethico-theological proof for the existence of God. In §76 of *Critique of Judgment*, Kant admits that in the sphere of practical reason, 'the action, with its absolute necessity of the moral order, is looked on as physically wholly contingent—that is, we recognize that what *ought* necessarily to happen frequently does not happen. Hence it is clear that it only *springs from the subjective character of our practical faculty* that *the moral laws* must be *represented* as *commands*, and the actions conformable to them as duties, and that reason expresses this necessity, not by an *is* or "happens" (being or fact), but by an "ought to be" (obligation)' (*42.Kant*, p. 571, Italics added). And yet reason demands that we accept as a regulative principle that conception of 'an intelligible world in which everything is actual by reason of the simple fact that, being something good, it is possible' and, hence, where 'there is no distinction between obligation and act' and, consequently, no distinction between *ought* and *is* (*CJ*, §76, *42.Kant*, p. 571). The Manichean aspect of moral psychology asserted in the *Groundwork* as well as all the three *Critiques* cannot be overridden by the Augustinian elements of the *Religion*; rather, the hermeneutic task is to reconcile the two in Kant's coherent composite moral psychology, which is the basis of both the problem as well as solution of the foundation of morality in Kant's critical corpus.

XIV

The final Kant lecture deals with reasonable faith and the unity of reason in Kant's critical philosophy. In this context, according to Rawls, questions like the following emerge: How exactly is practical reason related to theoretical reason in the constitution of reason? In what way in that constitution does practical reason have primacy? Rawls finds these as 'dark subjects' and claims to indicate an outline of how to approach them.

Kant begins the discussion of reasonable faith with the distinction between the ideal of a possible realm of ends and the highest good. The former is the *a priori* constructed object of the moral law and it is reasonable on our part to try to realize it under favourable conditions. The latter is God's final purpose in creating the world and it is the

necessary requirement that happiness be proportional to virtue to make the highest good fully harmonious with the holiness of God's will as the highest source of good. But Rawls finds this conception of the highest good problematic since, in his opinion, the idea of impartial reason on which it depends is foreign to Kant's constructivism and the idea of the highest good is incompatible with the idea of the realm of ends as the constructed object of the moral law. So, in his explanation of Kant's doctrine, Rawls makes use of only the secular ideal of the possible realm of ends abandoning the idea of the highest good as the Leibnizian element in Kant's philosophical theology. Since God and immortality as postulates of reason depend on the idea of the highest good, abandonment of the idea of highest good makes the postulate of God and immortality less plausible. The secular ideal of the realm of ends gives greater plausibility to the postulate of freedom, which in any case, is more fundamental to Kant's doctrine and hence the content of reasonable faith is also altered into political faith from religious faith. 'So when the realm of ends is the object of moral law, reasonable political faith ... is the faith that ... a peace international society of people is possible and favoured by forces of nature,' and in this, each person is organized as a state with some kind of a constitutional representative regime (p. 321).

With the help of the above account of reasonable faith, the unity of reason is explained by Rawls in terms of his understanding of two points of view: theoretical reason and practical reason. Although these are two points of view of one and the same world, yet unity of reason is not constituted by piecing them together into one unified account of the world taking them as two perspectives of one and the same world. In his view, Kant 'holds that the points of view of both forms of reason articulate the point of view of an interest of pure reason, and that the unity of reason is established by a constitution that in effect orders these interest and secures for each all of its legitimate claims. The key idea is that no legitimate interests of one form of reason is sacrificed to an interest of the other; all the interests of reason, properly identified, can be and are fully guaranteed' in the constitutional regime of the reasonable faith (p. 323). Again, he writes, 'Thus the unity of reason is established not by the points of view of the two forms of reason

being ordered by their perspectival relations to the (one) world, but by the harmony and full satisfaction of the legitimate claims of theoretical and practical reason as articulated in the form and structure of the two points of view. Reason supplies its own unity through a critique of itself: the aim of critique is precisely to establish this unity' (p. 324).

Rawls' discussion of the unity of reason, based on his version of Kantian reasonable faith, is hopelessly inadequate as an interpretation of Kant's moral doctrine, because it fails to integrate the Kantian idea of impartial reason in his moral doctrine. The idea of impartial reason is nothing but the figure of impartial spectator, which Rawls has failed to harmonize with his understanding of Kant's doctrine. In fact, the inadequacy arises because Rawls has failed to take into account the whole of Kant's third *Critique* while discussing the unity of reason, in spite of Kant's claim that he could succeed in establishing a unity of reason through the faculty of judgement only in this work, although he hinted at it in other works. In fact, Rawls has completely failed to see the role of aesthetic judgement of taste, which is the judgement from the point of view of disinterested impartial spectator, in Kant's moral doctrine.

Rawls is at his best when he explains the content of moral law and the constructivist procedure it implies, but is at his worst while dealing with the larger issues of connection of various forms of reason. Due to separation of reasonable political faith from Kantian religious faith, at best, Rawls' Kant lectures can be seen as rational reconstruction of, and not interpretation of, Kant's moral doctrine. Like P.F. Strawson's rational reconstruction of Kant's metaphysics in *Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*,[13] Rawls' *Lectures* can be read as a rational reconstruction of Kant's moral philosophy. In fact, the parallelism runs still closer. One turns Kant's transcendental metaphysics into descriptive metaphysics, while the other turns Kant's moral doctrine into a kind of moral constructivism. Both do much violence to the Kantian text. Yet it does not belittle the significance of Rawls' *Lectures*, for it is a special contemporary contribution of high philosophical acumen to find one's way through the deeply fascinating texts of Kant in order to go beyond them. It remains a must read for all students of moral philosophy looking for fresh perspective in it and

to gain insight into the development of Rawls' own moral and political doctrines. Those looking for a clear understanding of the content of Kant's moral law can also read this work fruitfully.

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7. The page numbers in parenthesis when no work is mentioned refer to Rawls' *Lectures*.
8. Harvard University Press, 1971.
9. The first page number refers to the *Moral Law* of H.J. Paton, the second and the third numbers refer to the page numbers of two German editions of Kant's original text, given in the margins of Paton's translation.
10. For a detailed discussion, see my essay 'Transformation of Greek Phronesis into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneutic Study of the First Chapter of Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals' *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 31, Nos. 1–4 (2004), pp. 119–56.
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Department of Philosophy   BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA
North Eastern Hill University
Shillong 793 022, Meghalaya, India

JOSEPH VRINTE: *The Pandit and the Guru: Some Comparatist Perspectives, The Perennial Quest for a Psychology with a Soul*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, first edition, 2002, Rs 895.

Our age differs from all the other ages in its frantic pace of change, its cultural confusion and its unique risks and challenges, making us absorb two interpenetrating civilizations and their traditions—our own and that of the dominant West. We have to master an alien mode of thinking and knowing, a different way of walking upon the earth—the way of conceptual control of the universe, so to say. At the same time, we have to reconceive and reclaim our own heritage from the unenviable situation we find ourselves in—a situation of historically distorted and estranged relationship to it. One of our philosophers, the late Professor J.L. Mehta had concluded his famous work *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* with a sentence that kept ringing in my ears while I was busy reading this long-drawn-out enquiry by Joseph Vrinte into the relevance of Sri Aurobindo's metaphysical yoga psychology in the context of Ken Wilber's Integral Psychology. I quote that sentence here:

The Upanisadic, mystical tradition of Indian religious and philosophi–cal thought, by going back to its own unspent origins and opening itself out at the same time to the 'unthought' in that other great beginning in the West, can perhaps contribute more substantially towards the preparation of a new dawn than has seemed possible so far.

One wonders whether the life and work of Sri Aurobindo—the author of *The Secret of the Vedas* on the one hand, and of *An Essay on Heraclitus* on the other, doesn't constitute just such a contribution. The long history of Western ideological adventures had not recognized any worthwhile theological or philosophical wisdom in our ancient texts. The utmost it could concede was an interesting 'psychology' with or without a soul: philosophy itself or theology, for that matter, being 'a Western enterprise'. This tacit assumption of religious and philosophical superiority can be seen at work not only in the western attitude towards ancient India, but also towards the modern exemplars of Indian tradition. One remembers Renou's contemptuous dismissal of Aurobindo's Vedic re-interpretations. History, however, has its own ironical twists and turns. The West is no longer in a position to maintain and enforce its

superior stance: its theology has been eroded; its mainstream philosophy no longer concerns itself about soul or spirit or transcendental truth. Significantly, it was Heidegger himself who deconstructed the history of Western philosophy and punctured its metaphysical presumptions as a deviation from the promise, the 'unthought', in its great beginning, i.e. in its Greek origins.

The title of Joseph Vrinte's book reminds me on the one hand, of that great compendium of esoteric (that is, mystical) wisdom called *The Perennial Philosophy* by Aldous Huxley; and on the other hand, of Jung's *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*. Huxley, perhaps, was the first to coin the phrase 'theological imperialism' to name something, which, hindsight now enables us to see, must have been one of the factors responsible for the intellectual disgrace and displacement of religion in our times. Hindsight also enables us to understand how the emergence of psychology as a new science with unsuspected growth-points was historically inevitable. Thus, the context in which Joseph Vrinte conducts his enquiry into Sri Aurobindo's integral *Yoga Sādhanā* is provided by the most avant-garde psychologist of the transpersonal movement. It is Ken Wilber's integral psychology, which presents an integrative model of consciousness, spirituality, psychology and therapy—integrating the enduring insights drawn from pre-modern, modern and post-modern sources. This integral psychology, as Vrinte explicates it, 'admits the existence of the inner dimension of the individual which can be developed and which can transcend the borders of the personal'. For Ken Wilber, this inner dimension is embedded in the body, culture and society; he does not reduce any one of them to the others, yet he is aware of their influence on each other. Reality, as the Great Chain of Being, has several levels ranging from matter to God. It constitutes body and soul and spirit, which are levels of consciousness as well as levels of reality. Materialistic science does not accept this idea of the inner dimension of man, soul and spirit; but, like Jung before him, Wilber attempts to find a way to rehabilitate the spiritual dimension within Western culture and metaphysics and also provides an academic basis for spiritual experiences and practice. His integral approach accommodates as many visions of their researches as possible in order to formulate a theory of everything.

One of my most fascinating and memorable reading experiences was a book called *Memories, Dreams and Reflections* by Carl Jung. How is it that this book is not mentioned in the official list of Jung's works? From Jung to Wilber, however, the academic scene in the West does seem to have changed drastically. Ken Wilber is no less academic—in fact, he appears to be a much more sophisticated theoretician than his predecessor; but, simultaneously, he is not only a serious practitioner of spiritual disciplines, but deliberately anxious to present those personal experiences as an indispensable part of his work. Thus, in a work of his maturity called *One Taste*, Wilber gives his readers a personal journal of his own meditative practice and various mystical states based on his own experience. He is aware that ultimately, it is the spiritual practice and not theoretical knowledge that is the guide for the seeker's journey to the inner realms of being. His 'theory of everything' may be an essential aid as an orientation in the exploration of the field but it certainly can't replace the actual practice of spiritual discipline. An integral psychology has to embrace every aspect of human consciousness and it is noteworthy that Ken Wilber uses the term 'integral' in the context of unity-in-diversity. Sri Aurobindo, however, never yoked the word 'integral' to psychology; he always spoke of integral Yoga. This significant fact must be kept in mind.

This admirable research work gives an exhaustive description of the life-work of both its heroes. It tells us about Ken Wilber's four-quadrant model of development in which he distinguishes the interior and exterior of the individual as well as the interior (cultural values) and exterior (material base of social systems) of the collective. According to Wilber, evolution occurs in all the quadrants and each is essential for completeness. Individual development is tied to social and cultural evolution; cultural events have social correlates. Each quadrant represents a different type of truth. Together, these truths are the four facts of spirit as it radiates in the manifested world. Insiders of Aurobindo's *Life Divine* will immediately recognize the influence in Wilber's talk of 'descent' and 'ascent'. The movement of ascent (spirit transcendent to the world) and that of descent (spirit immanent in the world) are given equal importance in this system. Reality is understood as the integration of the ascending (as realization of the other world)

and descending (as the creative source of this world) paths that the Non-dual (Advaitic) awareness flashes. In reconciling ascent with descent, the ascent towards the transcendent, One culminates in descent towards the immanent Many. This complementary movement of ascent and descent allows a wider identity and opening in which natural phenomena are able to manifest spirit which radiates through them. 'Like Aurobindo and Plotinus', according to Vrinte, 'Ken Wilber maintains that ascent is related to a change in perception until there is only the perfectly divine in all perception'. Vrinte here makes a very important point that Ken Wilber relates descent (=Aurobindo's Delight of Existence) to compassion (I'm reminded here of the concept of Avalokiteśwar in Buddhism); but, unlike Aurobindo's descent, Wilber's descent misses the purifying function of the psychic being in the process of transformation.

Wilber himself outlines the four phases of his work. Wilber-I presents the Remote/Jungian model in which the primal ground or perfect wholeness is present to the pre-egoic structure, though in an unconscious manner. Wilber-II refers to the involution/evolution model of Sri Aurobindo and Plotinus. Here he explores the idea that evolution itself is a spiritual unfolding, like Aurobindo's vision. The loss of oneness from spirit is called involution—the movement, whereby spirit involves itself in the lower forms of its own manifestation.

Ken Wilber realizes that 'Spiritual experiences do not allow one to bypass the growth and development upon which enduring spiritual realization itself depends. Evolution can be accelerated, as Aurobindo said, but not fundamentally skipped over.' This impels him to refine his formulation by pursuing a new Wilber-III model of enduring structures, developmental-transitional lines. Here he seeks to refine Aurobindo. But, as Vrinte rightly points out, evolution does not take place only because of the latent principle and its urge to emerge, but also for a constant novelty of self-expression and self-finding. For Sri Aurobindo, evolution is not merely a process of awakening to the Atman and overcoming the drama of self-suffering, but the realization of a Divine Life in a Gnostic society. Vrinte explains how Ken Wilber understood only a static realization quite unlike Sri Aurobindo, who knew the dynamic aspects of the spiritual realization.

So, there is the rub: intellectual analysis on the vision-logic level may lead to a right arrangement of concepts, but this is certainly not the knowledge aimed at in Aurobindo's Integral Yoga. One remembers a musician's treatment of this eternal tangle between Moses and Aron in Shoenberg's opera. Also, the poet's (Yeats' dilemma in *A Dialogue between Self and Soul*) wonder: '...But when I think of that, my tongue's a stone'. Ken Wilber, in spite of his mystical journal, has the humility to own up to the fact that he was, after all, a Pandit and not the Guru. 'Could it be', Joseph Vrinte asks, 'that the difference between Ken Wilber, an intellectual thinker who mystifies, and Aurobindo, an integral Yogi, who philosophizes (*Moses and Aron combined*, my emphasis), lies in the fact that Aurobindo starts from his realization which he tries to express in the inadequate language of the mind, whereas Ken Wilber starts from his mental abstraction and tries to reach the essential truth in flashes of mystical vision? Vrinte does not cast doubt on Wilber's direct spiritual realization of 'One Taste' as the ever-present non-dual Divine Consciousness; but nevertheless, he feels that it was by no means a steady light. In other words, his reflections must needs fall short of the flooding of the rays from the Centre of Light. 'Could it be', he asks, 'that Ken Wilber's theoretical and practical investigations on the integrative vision-logic level—when compared with Sri Aurobindo's intuitive vision on the supramental level—need to be supplemented by the lived experience of more *sādhanā*?'

For Aurobindo, all that exists in the universe can be rendered into terms of consciousness, because everything is either a creation of consciousness or of its forms. Aurobindo describes psychology as the science of consciousness and its states and operations beyond what we know as nature. Observable consciousness is only the small visible part of our being; there are ranges of consciousness above and below the average human range, which support the surface nature. Although the inconscient, the subliminal, the circumconscient Universal Mind and Universal Life are all unknown to us, they are all more original, more potent to shape and govern our being and actions. 'The movements of this little surface nature cannot be understood, nor its true law discovered until we know all that is below or behind or around and above it' (*Synthesis of Yoga*). Aurobindo's metaphysical psychology

aims at spiritual self-perfection, wherein the seeker raises himself from the mental level to the supramental level. It is open to criticism in the sense that his view of man's developmental process omits part of the early biographical level—the level containing material related to one's infancy, childhood and adulthood, which, after all, is of crucial importance in forming a cohesive self. So, the question Joseph Vrinte asks here is quite pertinent: 'Can progress in *sādhanā* be made more reliable and smoother if the practitioners of integral Yoga adopt some of the methods and procedures of research from Ken Wilber's integral, all-level, all-quadrant model?' The answer he himself gives is no less pertinent: 'Sri Aurobindo would not challenge the results of science, but he opposes the universalization of naturalistic methods of enquiry'. Vrinte, having said so, suddenly changes gear and exhorts the followers of Aurobindo to emulate the master himself who had arrived at spiritual knowledge and truth by verification from experience and experiment and by patiently testing his results. They should not neglect this demand for scientific substantiation, as 'such an attitude may easily degrade the spiritual vision into a dogmatic system or may even crate a new sect'.

Now, Aurobindo himself had scant faith in the state of psychological knowledge during his time. 'No firm metaphysical building can be erected on shifting quick sands', he felt. He was aware of the limitations of humanistic psychology. 'Mere cognition of subconscious processes is not enough for transformation', he said—'Freudian analysts look from down up and explain the higher lights in terms of the lower obscurities, while the foundation of these things is above and not below.' A more important point is this: Aurobindo's synthetic (one wonders why he chose such a word!) realization aims at the integration of all the parts of one's being with and under the guidance of the soul within. According to him, it is this innermost self or psychic being which acts as the true harmonizer and leader of the different parts of the individual. Aurobindo does not want the seeker to raise up the complications from below before the descending power from above is there to transform them.

Quite understandably, our researcher is rattled by Aurobindo's negative attitude towards psychoanalysis. To him, Aurobindo's recipe sounds too simple: 'Look quietly at the resistance, see its workings,

reject it and call down the power and light from above for its removal'. Furthermore, Aurobindo recommends surrender to the mysterious workings of the Divine Grace. Vrinte here would like to give his transpersonal psychotherapist Wilber his due: 'May be he is able to establish a stable foundation as a preparation for the development of a yogic consciousness in which the divine grace is allowed to work in the deeper roots of the individual's inner nature by removing the unconscious resistances'.

The 'Epilogue' mentions an attack on Ken Wilber by a professional rival. 'It's no honour to original thinkers of the calibre of Plotinus or Aurobindo to lump them into a jargon-laden transpersonal soup', says A. Combs.

Vrinte himself adds his own critique: The aim of Wilber's integral approach is one taste, i.e. merger of the individual with the non-dual approach is one taste, i.e. merger of the individual with the non-dual spirit. Now, Sri Aurobindo does acknowledge the existence of the non-dual spirit; but how can Wilber overlook or wish away his idea of the supermind as a creative consciousness-force? After all, the aim of integral Yoga is not merely liberation from life, but a total transformation of human life and action on earth. Its goal is the evolution of the human race living a life divine. Ken Wilber may plead his case with the disclaimer that he is not a Guru but a Pandit, and that he only tries to legitimize spiritual practice within western securalized culture and to find an academic basis for it. But is that enough to convince even Joseph Vrinte?

Vrinte is on safer grounds when he engages the followers rather than the Guru. Ken Wilber honours the scientific as well as the spiritual dimensions of man. If Aurobindo's disciples omit a dialogue about the insights gained through the twelve approaches recommended by Wilber and maintain that such things are mere palliatives and a radical change from ordinary consciousness to divine consciousness is only possible through the practice of integral Yoga, then it is difficult to bridge the gulf between Sri Aurobindo's metaphysical psychology and modern Western psychology as an academic science.

Sri Aurobindo himself had no intention of becoming a traditional Guru; nor did he encourage dependency on his legacy. Do the followers always remember this? Vrinte is far from sure. He concludes his research

on the maestro thus: 'Sri Aurobindo's integral vision, like Ken Wilber's integral theory, is an open-ended system and how it evolves does not depend on Sri Aurobindo's views but on the attitudes of the followers in the Ashram and in Auroville. It is imperative, therefore, to let the spirit of free enquiry prevail.' After all, Aurobindo himself does not present his vision as a dogma or a creed, but as a subject of experiment and research. As for Ken Wilber, Vrinte had already concluded that 'by incorporating the higher spiritual realm in his model, he creates an academic basis for a spiritual world-view. He does not reduce spirituality to rationality; on the contrary, his post-metaphysical approach offers a scientifically reliable understanding of spirituality. High praise indeed for a self-professed Pandit and appropriate too! This thoroughgoing and well-meaning scholar then goes on in his earnestness to plead for a fruitful interaction between the experimental project of Auroville and Ken Wilber's integral institute. After all, both projects appear in his impartial eye to aim at bringing together the ancient spiritual wisdom of the East with the material achievement of the West in order to create a new integral solution for the global problems of life. It would be appropriate, therefore, to end this rambling review on the hopeful note in the voice of the researcher himself: this is how Vrinte sums up his argument:

Both aim at changing their present human consciousness. Could Aurobindo offer a contribution in bringing forth some fresh perspectives to the noble endeavour of the all-quadrant, all-levels approach where the physical, emotional, mental and spiritual levels of being are exercised simultaneously in the 'I', 'we' and 'it' domains? At the same time, could the establishment of the Integral Institute offer some methods to those Aurobindonians who are in the process of re-evaluating Sri Aurobindo's vision in the context of contemporary scientific development without deconstructing the deeper contents of Sri Aurobindo's integral insights?

One can only say 'Amen' to this.

M-4, Nirala Nagar, Bhadbhada Road   RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH
Bhopal 462 003

P.S. ROODURMUN: *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta: A Critical Approach*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, pp. xv+297, 2002, Rs 495

The book under review is a successful doctoral research work of Delhi University in 1999. It is primarily a textual study of Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools along with Śaṅkara's *Śārīrika-bhāṣya*. Being a Sanskritist, the author has studied the original text and given an exposition of the views found in these works from the literary angle. In addition, he has attempted to present the viewpoints of both Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools by way of comparison and contrast. For those who are not well versed in Sanskrit to delve into the details of the original texts, this book, written in English and profusely citing the original lines from the texts, would be quite helpful. For a literal exposition of the concerned texts, the book is encouraging.

It is notable that the author asserts that his treatment of both Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta is critical. It is indicated in the introductory chapter that the book deals with the placement of both Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa at the background of Indian philosophy in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular (with special reference to Śaṅkara). In that connection, the chapters in the book deal with the *khyātivādas* and thereby the author claims that the Advaita account of error is well formulated under the basis of criticizing the rival theories by way of showing their 'inadequacy in supplying a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of illusion' (p. 5). Subsequently, in different chapters, the concepts of *jīva, jagat, Īśvara,* Brahman and *mokṣa* have been discussed and thereby it is claimed that the Advaita philosophy, specially the viewpoints of Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa have been studied critically.

The present reviewer, however, finds difficulty in conceding the author's claim of providing 'a critical approach'. He holds (like some unserious scholars on Śaṅkara Advaita) that for Śaṅkara, 'reason never occupied the premier position: its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the Upaniṣads' (p. 27). But, in that case, what was the necessity on the part of Śaṅkara to advance arguments (vide *tarkapāda*) to criticize the rival point of views? Moreover, Śaṅkara himself has

clearly remarked that a thousand *śruti-vākyas* cannot change one thing to another. *Vidyā* (knowledge) is viewed by him as the knowledge of the object (*vastu*) as it is (*vastu svarūpa abadhāraṇa*) and not what the scripture holds. Knowledge is not based dogmatically on any scriptural source. It accepts scriptures only in so far as what the scriptures hold is also found to be independently valid. In fact, Śaṅkara's approach to *śruti* (as also true to the Indian *dārśanik* or philosophical setting) is never unconditional. His approach is critical and not dogmatic. While conceding to the point that his Advaita is Vedāntic, what he clearly indicates is that Vedānta, if rationally and critically viewed, must be only in terms of Advaita and not anything else. His singular claim is the Advaita view and Vedānta is interpreted in terms of Advaita only. Even there, Śaṅkara (like others) never takes all the Vedānta *vākyas* into his debate. He makes a definite selection of such *vākyas* which suit his own philosophical position. His concern is only to establish Advaita *darśana*. As a *darśanajña*, his aim is to establish the philosophical position by taking recourse to *pramāṇa* or justification. That is why *darśanajña*, in Indian tradition, is identified as *prāmāṇika* and *darśana śāstra* alone deals with the nature and scope of *pramāṇas*, in order to arrive at valid knowledge.

Of course, while referring to *pramāṇa*, it has to be noted that it is used in a technical sense. The ordinary modes of justification through sense perception and inference, etc., are not dealt with in the Advaita philosophical context. Such modes are not considered not because those are useless or misleading; they have their own sphere of use and application. But, in the philosophical context, such methods are not efficacious. Reasoning, in a deeper technical sense, is rather employed by the Advaita *darśana* throughout. There is no dogmatic, trans-rational backing of the *śruti* passages. *Śrutis* are accepted if they can be so explained and if they conform to what is independently established by reason. So, reason is never discarded. Only bare ratiotination (*kutarka*) is avoided, reason is not. Of course, how far the reason that is employed by one philosopher/philosophy is valid or not is another issue. But to reject reason outright and succumb to blind faith or dogma may be the concern of a stubborn theist as also a rigid atheist (iconoclast) but that is never so for a *darśanajña*. At least he is well aware of the logical

boundaries of faith and reason. That is why, to expose Advaita *darśana* in a trans-rational footing is, according to me, to do it disservice. Further, while following the tract of reason, if a *darśanajña* (Śaṅkara Advaitin included) falls outside the track of reason, there is nothing wrong to point that out and to remain critical on that specific issue.

The author has systematically created a confusion between the concept of reality and truth (as is also noticed in some writings on Indian philosophy, vide p. 49). Even in Sanskrit, though terms like *sat* and *sattā* have the common root (*as*), the logical implication in both cases is strikingly different and the *darśanajña* is not unaware of that. Similar is the case with the terms like *mukti* and *mokṣa*. Both of them have the common root *muc*. While *mukti* is a common term and is adopted by many classical Indian philosophers to explain their account of release, *mokṣa* remains a technical concept, befitting to the typical philosophical standpoint of Advaita. However, later on, both the terms are used interchangeably in certain loose writings.

Let us consider, for instance, Śaṅkara's statement *yat viṣayā buddhī na vyabhicārati tat sat* which is an account of truth at the conceptual level. It is criterion of truth according to which, a statement is true which is unsublatable, incorrigible, and never false or ever true. Though popularly it is held (in certain circles) to be a criterion of reality, it is misleading for the simple reason that truth or falsity is applicable to what is asserted, while real or unreal is applicable to what appears. We do distinguish between real and appearance by way of certain criteria. There is nothing wrong and improper to state the rope to be real and the rope appearing as a snake to be an appearance and not real. The ordinary and usual way of distinguishing between real and appearance is never questioned by the philosopher. The Advaitin does not rejects the ordinary setting as a normal person at all. He never challenges the objectivity of the rope and the subjectivity of the snake.

The Advaita philosophical stand is: if snake-cognition is ordinarily decided to be an illusory appearance and not of a real object due to certain limiting conditions, then the appearance of rope too is also ordinarily possible through certain limiting conditions. Never, it is noticed, is any ordinary means of knowledge (beginning from sense-perception to inference, etc.) free from a limiting adjunct. That is how

we can never know the object at it is and, from a logical perspective, the sceptical arguments against the validity of empirical knowledge are advanced by Śaṅkara. His challenge is not factual but logical. Śaṅkara never denies the actuality of the world-phenomena with all its diversities and multiplicities. It, according to his logical point of view, is not even secondarily or relatively real. It is very much real on its own account. Only for his typical philosophical position (Advaita *dṛṣṭi*) the challenge has been made. *Paramārtha* is to be understood in a philosophical technical sense, not denouncing the world as illusion as popularly (rather superficially) treated and Advaita, for that, has been unduly castigated. It is to be marked that the Advaitin raises certain conceptual issues at the technical field, i.e. epistemology. If one declares snake-perception to be a mere appearance, then why at all is rope-perception regarded as real and not an appearance? Is it not of say that rope-perception also means that the rope appears? If appearance is common to both the veridical and also to illusory perceptions, then why is one to be held as real and the other as illusory? In other words, the point that is raised in the circle of *darśana* is not perceptual but conceptual. Śaṅkara Advaita challenges the conceptual setting and offers a prescription that *sat* must be so defined so as to not have any change or modification (*vyabhicāra*). It must be *avyabhicārī*. Neither rope is true (*sat/satya*) nor snake is false (*asat/mithyā*); but to state the rope to be rope is *satya* and to state the rope to be snake or anything other than the rope is *mithyā*. This is implied by Śaṅkara's saying: *atasmin tadbuddhi* and also accepted by the rival philosophers. That is the reason as to why in the classical Indian *dārśanik* context, it is never stated that any *vastu* is either *sat* or *asat*; it is the cognitive content, i.e. statement/judgement which is either said to be *jñāna* proper (*satya*) or it is *mithyā*. In other words, there is the acceptance of the expression; *mithyā-jñāna* but not *mithyā-vastu*. The entire discussion of error in the Indian philosophical context is quite plausible and significant in the epistemic front and it has been unnecessarily, rather misleadingly extended to an ontological level (in certain quarters) by adopting (rather misadopting) a material mode of speech.

This point is indicated by the famous Naiyāyika: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (whom the author also refers), according to whom, knowledge is a

judgement, whether true or false; and even in a false judgement, it refers to a real object (p. 52). That means, the object is not unreal; one may, however, judge it either truly or falsely.

The author refers to Vācaspati's rendering of Śaṅkara's expression *ababhāsa* as that appearance which is terminated or depreciated (*avasanna* or *avamata*) (pp. 91–92) is illusory cognition. Now, the formulation: illusory cognition may be misleading if it is treated that the appearance in this context is *mithyā* or wrong. The appearance of a rope as a snake is not wrong. Sometimes, the rope does appear as snake. Even after the illusory cognition is withdrawn, the rope appears as a snake. So also the fire-brand circle (*ālata-cakra*) continues to appear as moving after the knowledge about the falsity of the movement. The perception of movement does occur. The difficulty lies at the judgemental level when the appearance is misrendered, i.e. what appears is given a grade that is not appropriate according to certain criteria. The appearance is neither true nor false, but the judging of the appearance as X or not X is either true or false. In fact, truth or falsity belongs to the judging aspect and not to the presentational aspect.

The Advaita philosopher does not object to the ordinary notion between truth and falsity, but he does challenge the criteria on which such concepts are made applicable. If snake-judgement is withdrawn/ rejected on its being sublated, then the rope-judgement can also be challenged on the ground of its sublatability. Hence, any judgemental formulation—based on the coupling of *viṣaya* (predicate) and *viṣayī* (subject)—is, from the root, improper and inappropriate. This is effectively pointed out by Śivāditya Mishra (*Saptapadārthi*) that *viparyaya* (error) is due to *prakāra* (attributes) part and *abhrānta* (non-error) is on account of *dharmī* (substantive) part. Thus, it can be seen that the Advaitic challenge is rooted in the logico-linguistic conceptual source and not on the factual plane. In this sense, the expression *jagat-mithyā* does not have any factual bearing. The world, as a matter of fact, is never regarded to be illusory (*mithyā*) in Advaita *darśana*. This is nothing but a misleading interpretation of Advaita. *Mithyātva* or falsity is significant at the epistemic judgemental level and to ontologize it in the manner in which it has been done in certain quarters is to miss its philosophic profundity.

While referring to *Vivaraṇa*'s standpoint (pp. 100–101), it seems that the author has come close to the important meaning of falsity in the Advaita *dārśanik* framework; but, because he has not pursued the issue analytically and critically, he has missed the core. Commenting on *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, Padmapāda has significantly hinted that *adhyāsa* is 'manifestation of the nature of something in another (thing) which is not of that nature'. This is important because it thereby treats *adhyāsa* not simply as illusory cognition (as the author takes it to be) but as error as such, inclusive of perceptual and conceptual variety. In fact it is, as already stated, concerned with the judging part only. Even if there is no object to be misperceived, a misjudgement takes place, and there is confusion of one with the other (i.e. coupling one with other—*mithyeti bhavitum yuktam*). By such rendering, the illusionistic reading of Śaṅkara Advaita is clearly set aside. *Jagat-mithyā*, as already hinted, does not amount to the denial of the world.

What, then, is denied? Prakāśātman has brought to focus the valid point (that is implied by Śaṅkara himself) by holding that the erroneous association of the evils of doership and enjoyership (*anarthaśca pramatṛtāpramūkham kartṛtva bhoktṛtvam*) with the self (person) constitutes superimposition. This is important, for it thereby brings to the focus the Advaita message that *adhyāsa* virtually refers to a rectification in valuational perspective, i.e. critically viewing *ahambhāva* (egoistic feeling of possessiveness) that gives rise to the evils of life (*anartha*). *Anartha* may mean negation of an object or negation of meaning. But, in the present context, it signifies the ills of life from the valuational perspective. Śaṅkara does not suggest escape from the worldly living status, but a relook to life with a sense of detachment (*anāsakta*)—neither non-involvement/indifference (*udāsīna*) nor non-activity (*akarmaṇyatā*).

In Śaṅkara's writings, *adhyāsa* is variously expressed as *mithyā-jñāna* (p. 102), i.e. false judgement, *māyā*, *avidyā* and even *anirvacanīya* or indescribable/indeterminable. Here, a difficulty arises. To designate something as false is surely to describe it. It is obviously descriptive and not non-descriptive or indescribable. It is on account of this that an enquiry becomes legitimate as to why Śaṅkara insists upon treating *māyā* as *anirvacanīya*. A probe seems necessary for a critical appraisal

of Advaita in general and the views of Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa in particular. The book, under review, lacks such critical investigation. It is not that Śaṅkara's expression of *anirvacanīya* has no philosophical sense. There must have been a special significance attached to the explanation of *māyā* as *nirvacanīya* and that needs to be explored from a philosophical angle.

According to the author, the theory of indeterminability of Advaita is set to explain the phenomenon of erroneous cognition and its object (p. 115). Such a remark is not philosophically warranted. The author's view appears to be compelling only when one treats the object of illusion as either existent (real) or non-existent (unreal) or both and finds difficulty in any one of these alternatives. But the rope-snake is neither a physical existent object nor a metaphysical entity. A rope appears as a snake as a result of misjudgement. It is not that the snake appears and the rope does not appear. Both occur in the sense-field; but the error lies in judging one appearance as another. It seems that indeterminability refers to the ordinary empirical judgement from a typical Advaita point of view that the judgement can neither be treated as absolutely true, nor absolutely false, nor both true and false and hence indeterminable.

Usually, *adhyāsa* refers to superimposition of a certain object that is seen before on the present object due to memory. This is the ordinary account which has been more or less accepted and the author seems to have endorsed it, without critical analysis. Though Śaṅkara has used the term *pūrva dṛṣṭa*, it need not be understood in the literal sense in the concerned context. It is not at all necessary that to confuse one object as another, there must have been the actual seeing of the object before. It is not necessarily confusing one physical object with another existing physical object. Confusion is at the conceptual plane. Somebody, without actually having seen a snake before but understanding the meaning of the word 'snake', can mistake the rope for a snake. Even if the sandy steppe has nothing similar to water yet it is misperceived to be watery, i.e. mirage. Such abnormal cases are possible not because of simply seeing but because of misjudging what is seen, because the person who has been able to realize the confusion does not mistake in taking the rope to be a snake or the sandy steppe

as watery despite the fact that rope resembles snake and sandy steppe resembles water on certain conditions. Similarly, the moon actually appears to be multiple in a certain situation, but the concerned person, after realization, is no more confused with what is actually seen. So the confusion is not on the physical but in the conceptual plane and that is what the philosopher asserts to be logically sound and convincing. The author is to take note of such philosophical subtleties. A philosopher (*darśanajña*) has to clarify his point by way of making a dive into the depth of language and not being confined to surface language. Such a move is illuminating. So, *adhyāsa* or error, which is due to misjudging, need not be traced to a certain objective source and its existential status need not be pursued. That is not warranted, unless one uses the concept (rather misuses) 'existence' in an unfamiliar fanciful manner.

Prakāśātman has been referred to in connection with the admittance of three levels of truth, i.e. *paramārtha satyam, arthakriyā-sāmarthya satyam* and *avidyā-upādhika satyam* (p. 129-n.83). The author treats these to be three levels of reality (p. 112). It is philosophically at least cogent to raise the question here as to whether Śaṅkara Advaita can consistently admit three levels of reality at the face of its advocating non-dualism. If the ultimate is construed in terms of *nirguṇa, nisprapañca, nirākāra, niravayava* and with no description whatsoever, then where is the scope of conceiving Brahman (the ultimate real) as threefold? Precisely speaking, a non-dualistic philosophical position can never accommodate levels of reality in any sense of the term. It is notable that Prakāśātman has used the term: *satya* which has significance and it has no necessary implication of existence unless one becomes rigid to include that meaning.

Conceding to the prevalent use that truth as well as falsity are attributable to judgements (*vicāra*), it may be marked that truth has contextually different uses. For instance, when someone identifies X to be X, then such a judgement is true and there is no scope for any doubt. It is also stated to be absolutely true. *Pāramārthika satyam* does not necessarily mean in the Advaitic context of non-duality something as absolutely true in the above-noted formal abstract sense of identity. It is *parma artha* or of highest significance because beyond that there is no more craving or desire (*ākāṅksyā*). The analogy through which

the Advaitin tries to explain 'That thou art' gives the clear indication that the identity is meant for clarification and illumination and thereby it releases tension and anxiety. That is how it is stated that it leads to a state of peace (*śānti*), tranquility (*tuṣṭi*) and release (*mokṣa*). All this, in the Advaita context, has a clear reference to a certain distinct valuational undertone in the sense that it has the direction towards the cessation of evils of life (*anartha*). In this connection, Śaṅkara's statement that Brahma-*jñāna* is the result of *niḥśreyas* is notable.

At times, there is the use of the term 'truth' in the sense of workability (*arthakriyā*). If the pen cannot be of any use for which it is prepared, then it virtually ceases to be a pen. It is an useless pen and, therefore, it is as good as saying that it is no pen at all. To regard something as valuable is, of course, significant in its specific perspective. 'Father, who was so dear to me, I always cherish his memory and his kind and affectionate words. I heartily feel that father is still alive and he continues to give me blessings and guidance even now. All this is surely inspiring for me.' But still there is a clear sense that father, who is dead long since, is no longer present. He is dead and that is the end of the matter. Out of emotional longing, I only feel his presence and all such expressions have strong emotional and sentimental bearing, having no factual content therein. So the sense in which I feel that my father is still alive is to be treated as valuationally important for me and is, of course, meaningful but is definitely different from the statement that is directed to somebody who is identified as my father as a matter of fact. Truth has a cognitive factual import. It cannot be seriously questioned. That is its core meaning; but sometimes it is also used in an extended sense and that too is permitted in the discourse. But all such extensional concession need not obliterate the valid logical distinction between the different uses of the concept: truth, serving different functions altogether. In the Advaita context, there cannot be levels of reality and such a rendering, even if has appealed to some, has no sense of logical validity.

While discussing Bhāmatī's conception of *jīva*, *jagat* and *Īśvara*, the author refers to Vācaspati's writings and remarks that *Īśvara* is the material cause of the world-illusion, just as rope is the material cause of the snake-illusion (pp. 143 and 164-n.37). It is somewhat strange that some of us, while writing about Indian thought in general and

Indian philosophy (*darśana*) in particular, employ certain English terms and concepts quite often in an altogether different manner which are not their original meanings in English and then some of us add the rejoinder that it is the Indian version of that concept or term, formulated originally in English or any language for that matter. In such a manner, sometimes we surreptitiously use the term/concept that becomes completely different or even opposed to its original meaning, resulting in no definite and clear sense.

While dealing with the concept of cause, Aristotle has introduced the fourfold scheme, i.e. formal, material, efficient and final causes. The scheme has been advanced to explain causality in the empirical domain. The notion of causality has also been seriously debated upon by the rationalists and the empiricists from their philosophical platform. In the classical Indian context also, one comes across the heated discussion on the nation of causation by the Sāṅkhyāits and the Naiyāyikas (*Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*). All such discussions are advanced to explain causality/causation taking illustrations from the perceptual sources like milk and curd, seed and sprout, etc. Of course, the discussion is not limited to an empirical sphere; it is also extended to a metaphysical discussion on causation like *Prakṛti* is the material cause or *Aṇus* are the material causes of the evolved/created world. The Vedāntins in general advocate Brahman to be the cause; but they hold that Brahman is both material and efficient cause of the world/universe. It is notable that some of them regard Brahman as same as *Īśvara* and hold that *Īśvara* is the creator of the universe, being both efficient and material cause.

So far as Śaṅkara is concerned, while commenting upon the Vedānta/ *Brahma sūtras*, he has referred to the doctrine that Brahman is both efficient and material cause of the world. There he has to present and expose the Vedānta point of view, criticizing the rival doctrines of causation like *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. But, it is interesting to note that while causal relationship is admitted, there is the necessity of admitting both cause and effect in some way or other. And, that is not possible in the framework Advaita non-dualism. Again, the concept of Advaita Brahman, being *nirguṇa*, cannot be equated with *Īśvara*. Śaṅkara, therefore, quite consistently has opted for the bold declaration

(making a move from the Vedānta of usual type and at the same time moving in the line of his great predecessor: Goḍapāda) that Īśvara is the product of *māyā* and there is no sense that can be attached to creation (*sṛṣṭi cintakāḥ nirarthakāḥ*). Even while criticizing the Nyāya view of *Īśvara* as the creator, Śaṅkara has been found bold enough to maintain that the notion of causality is well operative in the empirical or phenomenal sphere. Any attempt at extending it from phenomenal to transphenomenal or supra-mundane is logically inadmissible. And, that is the logical background of the Advaita concept of *vivarta* which virtually amounts to the non-acceptance of any causal theory.

One thing which must be raised in this connection is the sense that can be attributed to the expression; material cause of world-illusion/ snake-illusion. In the example of the rope appearing as a snake, what is the status of the rope? Does the rope as the object at issue contribute materially to the occurrence of illusion? If it does so, then all the time the rope that is placed on the spot it would create the illusion of snake to each and everybody, including the person who once mistakes the rope to be a snake. The materiality of rope is not discriminative so far as perceivers are concerned. It is present in the same manner to each and everybody. But it is judged differently by one who mistakes it as a snake. That clearly shows that the error lies in the concerned person's own judging. It is he who mistakes the rope to be a snake. Rope, materially, has nothing to do with any error or confusion. Error is subjective and it may be prompted by some physical, physiological and other circumstantial factors. But the error is committed by the person concerned and there is no necessary linkage with the factors stated above. Because, despite the occurrence of such factors, a person who is otherwise quite careful and cautious does not commit such a mistake. Therefore, the mistake occurs due to misjudging/ misunderstanding of the agent. That is how an error is intelligible. In this case, the issue of material cause does not become relevant. Because, as already stated, the same object is well grasped by one person and not so by another. This illusory snake does not have any existential status of its own. So, the issue of its being real (*sat*) or unreal (*asat*) simply does not arise. It occurs or happens in certain individual cases and that is all. So, to search for the existence of rope-snake and to

locate its metaphysical status is, perhaps, due to certain foggy picture-thinking and is possible on account of misuse of the very legitimate function of significant discourse. In that sense, to formulate something like material cause of illusion either in case of rope-snake or in case of world-phenomena seems to be unfounded and unwarranted. Such a move is not logically cogent and the Indian point of view can be made intelligible by adopting any other procedure. It is perhaps not futile and irrelevant to seek for a different explanation of the expression: *upādāna kāraṇa*, because *upādāna* as material does not fit to the occasion, i.e. error.

The author of the book has referred to a distinction between *pariṇāmyupādāna kāraṇa* and *vivartopādāna kāraṇa* (p. 158) and holds that the Advaita position adopts the latter. Accordingly, it is held that the physical world, being a mere appearance of Brahman, is not real. Here, the modification of Brahman into the world is not real but apparent. Hence it is said as *vivarta-upādāna* and not *pariṇāma-upādāna kāraṇa*. But the question still remains as to what is the logical status of *vivartopoādāna kāraṇa* or illusory material cause? If the so-called cause is not in any way affected/modified/changed in case of illusion, then the very being of the effect (here world-effect) is not entertained. Perhaps that is how Śaṅkara's saying 'Cause alone is real' has to be understood. He, as already hinted, has clearly opted for non-origination and non-creation. The application of causality is never opposed in the Advaita scheme, only its scope is logically specified to the empirical realm. So there is no logical need for entertaining *vivarta* as a form of causality.

It seems that at a later stage, the post-Śaṅkarites (may be due to the pressure of opposition from the theistic quarters to include the theological tenets into the Advaita fold that is overtly transcendent to that) and modern writers, without thorough analysis, have unnecessarily brought in *Īśvara* as the *jagat-kāraṇa*. Some have even gone on to suggest that Advaita is transtheistic, not antitheistic (p. 172), a distinction which is logically least plausible. The admittance of *Īśvara*, *māyā*, *jagat*, *jīva* and the attempt to relate them through the analogy of either *avaccheda* or *pratibimba* seems to make a move beyond the logical framework of Śaṅkara Advaita of non-dualism (which is precisely

neither monistic nor pluralistic. Rather, it is beyond any form of classification). The author should have raised such issues and advanced a critical and analytical appraisal of the views held by Vācaspati and Prakāśātman in this regard. Simply describing the stand taken up by the two prominent post-Advaitins following their texts almost literally (without making a depth analysis) does not contribute to philosophic scholarship. The philosophical treatment requires innovation and even modification if it is rationally required and justified. And, that is possible only when one entertains a critical approach. Dr Roodurmun's work is rather disappointing so far as the claim (made by him) that the work is 'critical' is considered.

It is held in the book that the scripture defines Brahman in two ways: in terms of its essential nature and accidental attributes (p. 171). *Satyam, jñānam* and *anantam* (*Tait. Up*.II.I.1) are taken as pointing to the essential nature and *yoto vā emāni* ... as referring to its accidental attributes (ibid., III.3.1). The author, relying on these sources, maintains that Brahman, viewed in itself, is called the Absolute and viewed in relation to the world, is called God or *Īśvara*. Now the point is: in the Advaita *darśana,* can there be a definition of Brahman (which Śaṅkara at least himself never entertains)? How can Brahman, being *nirguṇa, nirākāra,* etc., be defined? The author himself concedes this in another context and holds that Brahman defies all definitions and descriptions (p. 175). To define a term is to specify it in terms of *per genus et defferentitum,* following the Aristotelian model. Is there any other model available in the Indian source in which Brahman can be defined? Are not *satyam, jñānam,* etc. descriptive and thereby limited to a specific attribution? If those terms have different connotations like truth, knowledge and infinite, then are they not different? If so, does Brahman admit differences within itself? If those are the very essence of Brahman, then do they not affect the non-duality of Brahman, being plural in number? Do they not point to different meanings? As such, to equate them as one, would it be logically tenable? Can it be said consistently that Brahman has two features: natural and accidental, while it is said that Brahman is *lakṣaṇātīta* and *niravayava*? How can Brahman have *svarūpatā* when it is *arūpa* in itself? Does Advaita accommodate consistently two forms, viz., absolutistic and theistic dimensions? The

admittance of two forms virtually comes to suggest that Brahman is descriptive, which it is clearly not in the Advaita framework.

It goes without saying that the Advaitins, like other Vedāntins, often cite such *śruti* passages, while elucidating their own view. Śaṅkara has gone on to state that his philosophy is the philosophy of *Upaniṣads*. That he interprets Vedānta and advances Advaita-*bhāṣya* is least disputed. But it is notable that Vedānta is acceptable only in so far as it is amenable to the Advaitic interpretation and not in any other way. The elucidation of the concept of Brahman in the Advaitic frame is alone admissible and for that necessary reasoning has been adduced.

So, in this manner, Vedānta is acceptable in the Advaitic framework. The acceptance of *śruti* is, as already indicated, conditional and not unconditional. There is no blind dogmatic acceptance of the scripture, as inviolable on the ground it is holy or sacred. The *nirguṇa* rendering of Advaita is alone philosophically admissible. If there is reference to *saguṇa* Brahman in the sources of *śruti*, it is to be treated as of only secondary status but never of primary significance. True, the whole of *śruti* is not discarded, because thereby the traditional lineage is broken. Śaṅkara is not prepared to be a *nāstika* because of his affinity to tradition. But his philosophic view of Advaita moves for suitable modification of the Vedic/Vedāntic set up and he does not hesitate to introduce a new and original dimension that can possibly integrate all the apparent tendencies, including theism and atheism at one hand, *āstikatā* and *nāstikatā* on the other. That is why Brahman is placed in the tradition on an impersonal footing (neutral gender).

The admittance of *śruti* is granted only in so far as it conforms to the line of interpretation of Advaita. In other words, the acceptance of *śruti* in the sense of scripture is never based on dogma or prejudice. Viewing Śaṅkara Advaita in this perspective makes it philosophically refreshing as well as interesting. By this, the critical note advanced in certain quarters that Advaita suffers from theological dogmatism and authoritarianism can be set aside. In a similar manner, the texts of Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa can be analyzed and interpreted from some fresh angle and not simply confined to the literal rendering of such treatises. Textual study is, of course, important and there is no question about that. But that needs definitely a philosophical and critical

orientation. If necessary, there is nothing even wrong in moving beyond Śaṅkara's Advaita, because, as per tradition, one is to pass from darkness to light, wherever that is traced and that is to opt for *vidyā* as against *avidyā*. This trend is not a mark of rebelliousness, but it is, I think, inbuilt in classical Indian tradition as well. In this respect, the Indian tradition is in tune with the Western saying 'Socrates is dear; but knowledge is dearer still'. Of course, the change that is advanced must be reason based, that is the mark of knowledge (*vidyā*).

The author states that with a view to substantiating the nature of omniscience and omnipotence to the Brahman, Vācaspati says that the Vedas are scriptures (*śāstras*) (p. 180). And, again, he refers to Vācaspati writing that 'the conception of the Brahman as omniscient, omnipotent is but result of nescience' (p. 195). Now, the pertinent issue is: how one is to interprete the two moves offered by Vācaspati in this regard? If omniscience, etc., are the result of nescience and the Vedas are *śāstras* on account of substantiating the nature of omniscience to Brahman, then what is the foundation of the Vedas as *śāstra* or *śruti*? Is it to impart knowledge or to give rise to nescience? This point needs to be thrashed out. If it is not spelt out clearly by Vācaspati, it has to be exposed and extrapolated. Serious studies are required to relate the different trends of thought of a thinker and not simply to state such thoughts as they are.

What is the logical status of *Pratyagātmā* in the Advaita perspective, in view of the declaration that its realization leads to the cessation of 'ills of life'? Is it to be taken in the esoteric sense of the mystical Self or is it to be taken as most valuable in inculcating the sense of universal fellow-feeling and mutual goodwill of profound moral significance? An enquiry, in this direction, would be not only philosophically rewarding but also very much relevant at the modern perspective, in view of making Advaita *darśana* not simply a great thought of the past but also as living thought of the present.

Bhāmatī maintains that *śabda* is the mode of justification of Brahman (*śabdo hi tasya pramāṇaṁ vaktavyam*) (p. 208). But then, does *śabda* here stand for blind unconditional acceptance of Vedic utterances or does it mean only those utterances which can be reasonably interpreted as yielding knowledge (*vidyā*) in the specified sense of the term, or

śabda stands for logico-linguistic analysis of meaning (i.e. *vākyārtha vicāraṇā*) as some noted modern Advaita scholars (Professors G. Misra and G.C. Nayak) have suggested? An analytical scrutiny here is, no doubt, expected from a serious scholarship. *Bhāmatī*, following the line of Śaṅkara, holds that through *śabda*, assisted by reasoning, there is the realization of *prajñā* (*vijñāya tarkopakaraṇena śabdena prajñā bhāvanāṁ kūrvitetyarthaḥ*—Bhāmatī) (p. 241). Does it not reveal the special meaning of *śabda-pramāṇa* that prompts the culmination of knowledge/wisdom that is not limited to any parochial theological occultism, but is broadly open-textured and universal? Is it not the case that the Advaitic message of universalism (*sarvātmaikattva*) smacks of communal narrowness of fanaticism and fundamentalism? If this is conceded, then is it not necessary to make a review of the set view that *śabda-pramāṇa* is nothing but Vedic testimony (belonging to a particular religious order)? Philosophical enquiry as critical and analytical is to probe into this, so that in the Indian context, Advaita *darśana* is not to be dumped into a particular religious community. In this context, Prakāśātman's emphasizing *vicāravidhi,* in preference to '*adhyayanavidhi*' to understand the Vedāntic text is quite significant. It is not the literal meaning of the Vedic utterances but the consideration of such utterances from the standpoint of proper analysis and scrutiny (*vicāra-vimarśa*) is important. And, for that, one need not remain confined to the Vedic utterances only but can also move beyond, if it is reasonably justifying. So that such new trends can be viewed as looking to the message of the Vedas from a fresh perspective.

Śaṅkara treats *mokṣa* as bodylessness (*aśarīratvam*) (pp. 209 and 239, n.2). In this connection, it is said that the possibility of total release is only in casting off the body (*videha-mukti*) (p. 231) and the Advaita acceptance of *jīvan-mukti*, thus, is construed to be partial. Now the issue is: whether the Advaitic *mukti/mokṣa* is individualistic or universalistic. If it is the realized state, casting off the body altogether, then it becomes purely a transempirical/transmundane affair. There is no social obligation on the part of *jīvan mukta* to move for the upliftment of society. The human obligation in the social realm is not that essential and the individual is to remain engrossed with his own *ātmānubhūti*, relinquishing family, state, nation and what not. If one takes a cursory

view of the lines of *Mohamudgara* (*ka te kāntā*, *kaste putrah*, etc.), then such an impression is not ruled out. *Aśarīratvam*, if understood literally, may also mean a complete escape from the phenomenal worldly setting. But the Advaitic message is that if one is not unfair to its philosophic vision, then surely one is to bring out the implication of *aśarīratvam*—not simply bodylessness but its meaning and significance are to be made explicit in a metaphorical sense. Otherwise, the introduction of *jīvan-mukti* and the realized person is to do good to others (*loka kalyāṇa*, etc.) cannot be construed as significant. He, being enlightened, has to discharge his social obligations and responsibilities. He is not at all supposed to withdraw himself from the world as a radical (coward?) renouncer. Rather, on the contrary, he is expected to do his duties without being grossly attached or having any passion or *moha*. The Advaita message is for inculcation and preservation of human social values in the best possible manner. That is why Śaṅkara has endorsed the Kaṭhopaniṣadic saying that Brahman is realized here and now (*atra Brahma samasnute*). In Indian tradition in general and in the Advaitic set up in particular, the proper dharmic awareness is not asocial but distinctly social and human. It, therefore, cannot be consistently viewed as transhuman and any form of esoteric transcendental mystical approach makes the whole philosophic or *dārśanik dṛṣṭi* unnecessarily vague and obscurant.

The author (with others too) takes Brahma-*sākṣātkāra* as intuitive in the mystical sense. But such a rendering puts Advaitic move into the camp of theologism and its philosophical worth, thereby, becomes most unreasonably beclouded. Brahma-*sākṣātkāra* can be understood as direct realization (*aparokṣānubhūti*) without any *vṛtti* or mode. In other words, the usual accredited modes of knowing is not insisted upon here. It is a flash of enlightenment which is the outcome of rigorous intellectual deliberation, contemplation and concentration. The enlightenment here is conceptual and not perceptual. It is not derived from empirical source and, in that way, it is not factually cognitive. But, though it is not empirical, it has considerable impact in the empirical living. It gives rise to a meaningful valuational transformation that has both individual and social significance at the human background. Such valuational illumination is in the level of deeper understanding

(*avabodha/avagati*). Such an interpretation makes the Advaita standpoint not otherworldly but distinctly of worldly concern. It is in tune with the Upaniṣadic saying: All this is Brahman and the Vedic utterance—*sarva bhūta hite rataḥ*.

It is expected that the learned author is to take note of some of these stray comments for his future consideration. The book is printed well. However, a few lapses in printing are noticed (vide p. 7-n.2 (not EOI, but EIP), p. 146 (not may but way), p. 171 (not god but God), p. 251 (not Philosophers but philosophers) and p. 277 (not Bijananda but Bijayananda). Index has not been uniformly prepared. Many proper names which are found frequently in the text have not been mentioned in the Index. It is hoped that these lapses will be rectified in the next edition.

UGC Emeritus Fellow, AM-26, VSS Nagar   BIJAYANANDA KAR
Bhubaneswar 751 007

SHIVAJI K. PANIKKAR, PARUL DAVE MUKHERJI and DEEPTHA ACHAR (Eds): *Towards a New Art History: Studies in Indian Art*, D.K. Print World (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 2003

The discipline of art history in India has been rather a new subject, which started with the discoveries of the past literary, archaeological and monumental heritage in the early twentieth century. It has since developed into different branches of archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, architecture, sculpture, and painting. A lot of work remains to reinterpret and correlate the objects in the light of new discoveries in order to make a more authentic picture of the four-million-years-old Indian civilization. The subject has an interdisciplinary nature and involves the interest of scholars not only concerned with the study of culture, religion and history, but also scientists as well as creative artists.

In this book, an attempt has been made to study art objects in a new framework, as is suggested by its title: *Towards a New Art History: Studies in Indian Art*. The alternative framework is proposed in the present book by Professor Ratan Parimoo, a creative artist and founder

of the Art History Department of Maharaja Sayajirao University, Vadodara. This is a record of his lifetime academic exertions. He argues that an object of art is important only as a visual fact and the impact it holds on the onlooker. He has visualized a theory of looking at an art object which can be of interest to all creative artists and beneficial to students belonging to different branches of fine arts such as painting, sculpture, pottery, ceramics, textile designing, film making and other applied arts. He also intends to gear his efforts for the growth of the subject by establishing a *Documentation Centre of Indian Art Objects* and initiating new interpretative researches in Indian art in his Art History Department.

The book appears to present a summary of Ratan Parimoo's efforts and fruits in the form of research papers, summaries of dissertations of his students and colleagues, who appear to be a party to this experiment of interpretative research. The book contains 33 papers of scholars belonging to the faculty of Maharaja Sayajirao University, Vadodara except for a few outsiders, who also hold similar views regarding art. These papers were presented in a *Seminar of New Art History and Indian Art* held at Vadodara to felicitate Professor Ratan Parimoo. Thus, it proves a befitting salute to the person who devoted his intellectual quest to the study of historical and aesthetic aspects of art, cherished a dream to carve out a theory of art criticism especially seeing the modern developments in the field of art, and channellized the efforts of his colleagues and students to see the art object as a visual reality and endeavour to appreciate it.

The title of the book attracts the readers to learn in detail the 'newness' of the approach to study Indian art, though there is nothing new but a step forward in the same direction of acquiring knowledge with a shift of interest. Ratan Parimoo has introduced this new framework of art history in one of his articles initially published in *Essays on New Art History: Studies in Indian Sculpture—Regional Genre and Interpretations* (Books and Books, New Delhi, 2000). The essay has been included by the editors of this book as a prologue and an appropriate introduction to the seminar. Here, he has expressed his view that the pattern of study of art history should not only centre on iconographical details and reports of archaeological discoveries but

also concentrate on the meaning of the form of the art object. The iconographical details and historical background are only confined to explain the subject-matter, stylistic analysis and authentication of the art object. He proposes that a synthesis of the prevalent approaches with the iconological analysis would be more effective to know the meaning and interpretation of art object. Hence, the new methodology of art history must include the following salient features:

(i) Historical and archaeological details regarding the art object, as it will help to assign a place and time to the given object in the chronological scale to know its traditional, social and cultural background.

(ii) Iconographical analysis which will explain conventional subject-matter, themes and concepts.

(iii) The *Silpa* texts and literary references regarding the work of art. These may help to explain the visual imageries with the help of word pictures of the same content.

(iv) The iconological analysis, which may follow the above three features and lead to the implicit meaning (*vyangyartha*) of a form in a particular context. It depends on the intuitive sensitivity of the spectator to understand this meaning.

As far as the above methodology is concerned, there is nothing new about this synthesis of the prevalent approaches to study art history. The use of iconological analysis has always been practiced by reputed art historians who subscribe to the view of presenting a complete analysis including the historical and interpretative meaning of the work of art pertaining to its criticism and aesthetic appreciation. The iconological analysis is a parallel term which can be substituted by *vyangyartha* of the *rasa* theory of Indian aesthetics. Hence, the use of Western terminology to explain the aesthetical approach of art only indicates the predilections of the authors for the Western approach towards the study of Indian art. It is only the use of new terminology to explain the *vyangyartha*—the suggested meaning of a work of art. There are many successful attempts by scholars to exhibit the application of the *rasa* theory in traditional visual arts and works of art that originate from some human sentiment. Moreover, iconological analysis cannot be pursued in a vacuum, as the knowledge of Iconography, *Silpa* texts,

literature and cultural background pave the way to look at the object in its pure form and in understanding its meaning, both explicitly and implicitly. For instance, Stella Kramrisch's analysis can be taken as an example to explain the symbolic interpretation to establish the relation between objects and concepts, myths and forms, and the treatment of space and rhythm in the work of art. She had, by the example of literature and tradition, explained the complexity of temple architecture and sculptural art of India.

In fact, the works of Erwin Panofsky and Ernst Cassirer had played a major role in the formation of art historical thought to study classical art in the beginning of the twentieth century. These scholars of Warburg Institute in London (in 1905) propose the humanistic approach of art historians. Their primary concern is the symbolic function of the art object and not its style or iconography, which could be discovered through the study of relevant poetic, religious, philosophical and political documents.

The book has been divided into five sections revealing the framework of the different branches of visual arts, its application and challenges and contribution of institutional sites to Indian art. It presents the research work and experiments carried out by practicing artists-cum-scholars and their attempts to explain the meaning of their works of art. The themes of the papers are mostly related to experiences of artists in creating new works of art as challenges to the conventional concept of art, breaking down boundaries of art with the introduction of mass production, media, installations, posters, films and digital art—all as a composite to be taken as art. The essays refer to the experiments, for instance, of Geeta Kapur while curating the exhibition of an Indian metropolis as an object of art. She makes use of various media, static and dynamic images, and visual objects of varied nature to create the visual culture of Mumbai. Another noteworthy experiment is described by Shivaji Panikkar by citing the efforts of K.C.S. Paniker to enjoin crafts with fine arts by the artists of the Madras School of Fine Arts. Similarly, the experiment in collaboration of tribal artists to work on a project of installation with the help of a weaver, an electrician and a tailor has been discussed by Altaf Navjyot to show the feasibility of collaborative effort in art.

In a nutshell, the book throws light on the contemporary experiments carried by the Baroda School of Artists. It makes an interesting reading and compels one to ponder over the issues and concepts of modern artists about art and the destination to which it would lead Indian art to make a niche in future. Further, the attempt of creative artists is praiseworthy, as far as they are concerned with the creation and offering their own interpretations to enable the viewer to appreciate their creation in a better way. But it smacks of encroachment in the field of art history as the attempt is focussed on theorizing one's own ventures in the form of new art history. It is especially on the ground that their creation is so recent that it could not be treated with the objectivity which is a prerequisite for the discipline of art history.

B/195-C, University Road,   Neelima Vashishtha
Bapu Nagar, Jaipur 302 015

Srinivas Rao and Godabarisha Mishra (Eds): *Paramparā: Essays in Honour of R. Balasubramanian*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2003, pp. ix+398, Rs 450.

Loving biographical profile, detailing the vicissitudes of life, Professor Balasubramanian (RB) passed through, registering early educative input, informing a sensitive and perceptive mind and also the brilliant academic record, intimating RB's association with Professor V.K. Sashtrigal and Professor V. Rathinasabapathy at home, and with John Goheen and Donald Davidson at Stanford, narrating his deep interest in Advaita Vedānta on the one hand, and in phenomenology and existentialism on the other, listing RB's contributions on Brahmasiddhi, Berdyaeva, Advaita Vedānta, Poygai Alwar and Rāmānuja, referring to his teaching career and positions as Professor in the University of Madras, Pondicherry and finally as Chairman of ICPR up to 1994, Professor Srinivas Rao has brought into relief the personality of RB almost like a sculptor.

The last but one chapter by Godabarisha Mishra presents with meticulous care the philosophical content and career of RB's thought and fills in the details relating to the various issues raised and discussed

by RB, some of which find mention in Rao's contribution. The two papers together portray the philosopher both in respect of his head and heart and thus complement each other.

Most of the other contributions touch, discuss and assess the issues which indicate RB's main philosophical concerns. The first few papers touch upon some independent issues not directly related to RB's thought. Let us consider the next contribution by K. Potter.

It is well known that for most Indian thinkers in the past, the awareness of liberated beings is either *nirvikalpaka* or beyond linguistic expression or *vikalpa*. But does that also imply that, as Potter asks, expression or *vikalpa*. But does that also imply that, as Potter asks, 'inference and knowledge gained through language' (27)[1] have no place in destroying ignorance or illusion? An affirmative answer, as Potter points out, collapses the distinction between *vikalpa* and *viparyaya* for the thorough going linguaphobes. Whatever 'language touches is *ipso facto* not real and is also productive of attachment' (28). Śaṅkara, Mādhyamika Buddhists, even Bhartṛhari, are called by Potter as linguaphobes. (28)

Potter's awareness of the liberated being comes out in his question, 'How can the Yogic know the properties (thatness) of an object by a perception free of construction?' (37) This seems to be reinforced by some texts which he quotes from *Yogasūtra* itself. The question, however is: should these passages be interpreted the way that Potter does? Communicating such an awareness would presuppose both inference and knowledge and, consequently, language. But does such a communication report or describe exactly or it merely indicates in an indirect way a possible state of awareness?

Moreover, the term 'linguaphobe' is not a happy choice for one who believes in the inadequacy of language. No one would accept the idea that a consummate yogi is *scared* of *vikalpas* or language, though surely he knows where it belongs.

Arvind Sharma discusses several passages from Ramana Maharsi as being answers to various questions put to him, in order to present Ramana's views on free will and predetermination in the following paper.

He concludes by pointing out that the question of predetermination does not arise for there are no happenings. Says Ramana, 'Whatever

you see happening in the waking state happens only to the knower and since the knower is unreal, nothing in fact ever happens'. (55)

There is another way to look at things. Whatever happens is determined by God. What goes on is like a film on a screen. What is called free will is also 'planted' by God. (54) It appears that everything depends from where you look at the matter. If one identifies oneself with someone who is playing a role in a drama, it seems that he is acting on his own, which of course is not the case. For a spectator, whatever happens on the stage is already determined. The crucial question arises: do we really have a choice to view things the way we like given a thorough surrender to a faith?

In an interesting paper, Sengaku Mayeda examines the comment made by several critics of Śaṅkara that he was a 'Buddhist in disguise' and shows that while there is an important feature common to both Buddhists (especially *Vijñanavādi*) and Advaitins, e.g. the assertion of non-reality of the phenomenal world and acceptance of *vijñāna* (consciousness) as the ultimate reality, Śaṅkara and Buddhism differ in their approach and understanding of *vijñāna*. Buddhist criticize the eternality of *atman* or pure consciousness, while Śaṅkara criticizes the Buddhist concept of *vijñāna* as unstable or infected with *kshanikavāda*. Mayeda thinks that Śaṅkara's *paramaguru* who authored Māṇḍūkya-kārikā 'Buddhistized' it and so he could as well be called a Buddhist in disguise. To Śaṅkara goes the credit for transmitting *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* into Advaitism by giving it an interpretation in consonance with the Vedānta school. (68) Mayeda further points out that 'the realistic monism of the *Brahmasūtra* was transformed and developed into an illusionistic non-dualism which, as he (Śaṅkara) himself recognized, closely resembled the Buddhist doctrine'. (68)

John Grimes, who studied Advaita Vedānta under the supervision of RB, states in his erudite essay on *Vivekacūḍāmani* that it should be considered as Śaṅkara's work, a fact which is questioned by some others. While discussing the issue of the authorship of *Vivekacūḍāmani*, he has carefully considered certain features proposed by Paul Hacker, in order to find out whether a work can be authenticated as that of Śaṅkara or not. These features involve an understanding of role of notions such as *avidyā*, *anirvacanīya*, *māyā*, *ānanda*', etc.

Panneerselvam places RB amongst those philosophers who are trained in both Indian and Western philosophies and who tried to apply Western models or tools to Indian philosophical problems. According to him, RB believes that Indian philosophical tradition will become a living tradition if the continuity is viewed in connection with other traditions. Panneerselvam mentions the specific contribution of RB in the form of translations and edition of ancient texts, writings on Indian philosophy, specially on Advaita, interpretations of Indian thought 'adopting Western methodology' (102). As he informs, RB attributes seven features to Indian philosophical tradition. The most important of these seem to be 'unity of theory and practice', 'limitation of reason-based inquiry', and 'philosophy must be total'. (109) For RB, philosophy has to concern itself with the life-activity of men. One might add that such a concern did not prevent even the great Śaṅkara to enter into logical subtleties which impress anyone who cares to look through his commentaries on *Brahmasūtra* and various Upaniṣads.

Panneerselvam observes that RB's interest and understanding of Husserl and Sartre do not lead him to modify the basic Advaitic concept of consciousness as being non-intentional. (111–2)

G.C. Nayak writing about RB's notion of liberation (or *mokṣa*) remarks that the 'whole of Indian philosophy is concerned with the problem of how to obtain *mokṣa* which is genuine philosophical problem according to RB'. (121) Nayak further points out that RB's writings are not tied up with 'any tradition whatsoever', though they give a 'definite direction' given for understanding the Indian philosophical tradition in its right perspective without any distortion'. (127) Some contributors to this very volume may differ from Nayak on this point for they view RB's writings as rooted firmly in Advaita Vedānta. Besides, Nayak's claim that the entire Indian philosophy is concerned with the problem of *mokṣa* is also debatable. Nayak himself points out that 'the spiritual tradition itself is the major or the best part of Indian thought' may not be a fact though he concedes to RB that '*mokṣa* or spiritual freedom' may be placed at the apex of the hierarchy of values. (125)

Bijayananda Kar raises the important question, whether *māyā/avidyā* could be treated as something as positive or existent and has presented an analysis of the concept of *bhāvarūpa* which has been discussed by

the followers of Śaṅkara. (130) Kar remarks that RB takes *māyā/avidyā* as something positive for if it were not so it could not have any causal effect. 'He says, putting forth the *prima facie* view, that only what is existent can be the cause of something and what is absent cannot be the cause of anything. Since *avidyā* is the cause of the pluralistic world, it must be conceded to be existent'. (132) But, explains Kar, RB does not take *avidyā* to be real. Kar thinks that *avidyā* is neither a negative entity nor a positive entity. So '*bhāvarūpa* is neither to be treated as positive nor is it to be regarded as existent. It is neither *bhāva* or *abhāva*. It is simply appearance of *bhāva* and nothing else.' (139) The crucial question that remains to be answered is whether what is not or what masquerades as something while being nothing can at all have causal efficacy. The question reminds one of the well known controversy between *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* besides the ontological issue of being or existence.

Jaqueline Suthren Hirst focusses her attention on *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śaṅkara. Exploring the themes of cognition, authority and language function and the reflection of the self in the text in the metric chapter 18 of *Upadeśasāhasrī*, she has shown how the 'four interrelated "strands" interwoven are needed to deal with the opponents such as Pūrvamimānsakas and Buddhists on epistemological issues'. But, more importantly, these interwoven strands shape the direction of Śaṅkara's teaching method which involves an 'epistemic shift' from what is written to what is understood or what is indicated by the words. Remarks Hirst, 'it orients the pupil to the text in such a way that when he hears the sentence "you are that", then the penny drops, and realization dawns'. (155)

The next contribution by Jonardon Ganeri is also related to the problem of method and the end result in terms of realization. He discusses the views of Maṇḍana Miśra using mainly his text *Brahmasiddhi* and raised the issue as to how to understand Misra's claim that 'there is knowledge of the truth even through a belief which is false' *Brahmasiddhi*, 41, 11–15. Ganeri suggests that the claim can be understood as making sense in the sense of a procedural epistemology. It seems that the end result of a cognitive venture must invariably lie beyond the cognitive process.

(Late) Debabrata Sinha's paper on *ānanda* presents a seminal clue to a further enquiry into the fundamental understanding of the emotive-affective constituents of the ultimate reality, i.e. Brahman as *sat-cit-ānanda* or its experience. Sinha asks if it could be interpreted 'as *ānanda* or its experience. Sinha asks if it could be interpreted 'as bearing relevance to joy and its equivalents within the context of human experience and language'. (180) He finds a basic strain in the Advaita Vedāntic literature of '*ātman*, being the closest dearest' (187). While running through his analysis, Sinha has discussed the interpretative possibilities of the various cognate terms such as *sukha, kāma, rasa,* etc., and has derived interesting implications.

While this is true that advaitic experience is often described in terms of emotive-affective tones, in its intense form, yet this is also a fact that the great Ācārya, while talking of *ānanda*, has placed such an experience beyond anything that human beings can imagine in terms of mundane joy, delight or happiness. In fact, the usual meaning of emotive affective terms is completely bleached when it comes to the experience of *Brahman/Ātman.*

In the next paper. T.S. Rukmani writes on *Bhagvadgītābhāṣya* of Śaṅkara focussing on the problematic of *karma.* She observes 'For Śaṅkara, *karma-* or *bhakti-* or *dhyāna-yoga* can only indirectly lead to liberation by first generating knowledge that purifies the mind, and then by giving rise to *jñāna*, which then results in *Brahman* realization or *mokṣa*'. (192) Rukmani raises an interesting question: 'When we approach the *Gītā*, we are directly in the realm of *karma*/action. If so '... why Śaṅkara chose to comment on a text so replete with karma?' (192) Her response to this question is: Śaṅkara may have chosen this text for its popular appeal as compared to the esoteric literature like Upaniṣads. In Kerala in those days, '*karma* reigned supreme' in Śaṅkara's times. Although Śaṅkara's commenting on *Gīta* may have been a strategy to reach a wider audience, yet he does not relax his basic tenet—*jñāna* and *karma* cannot combine in one person. (205) 'Thus, by directly separating the path of renunciation of all actions from the one who has knowledge, and asserting that *karmayoga* can only lead to liberation indirectly through knowledge, Śaṅkara manages to maintain his stand that these cannot at all coexist simultaneously in any single individual'. (205) Still Rukmani rightly asks, how to look

at Śaṅkara's own life and activities—as *saṁnyāsa* or *karmayoga*? Rukmani's contribution is instructive and informative, besides being critical in that her analysis brings out the various ways in which *karma* could be understood.

R.C. Pradhan explores RB's interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy 'in the light of philosophy of Advaita.' In fact, the comparison is confined strictly to *Tractatus*. Pradhan not merely appreciates RB's advaitic interpretation of Wittgenstein but also agrees with it. Running through the fifth and the sixth propositions of *Tractatus* and quoting closely matching statements of RB, Pradhan shows the remarkable affinity between the Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* and RB's Advaitin leanings. While Pradhan hints at the differences between the 'two systems', he concerns himself exclusively with the similarities. (214) One might have misgivings regarding such a comparison in view of the import of what is said or written on either side as being determined by the total background of thought in which such statements are embedded. Yet the similarity, as shown by Pradhan, cannot leave one untouched, especially regarding the notions of the self, world and language.

The notion of 'subjectivity' is unfolded in its various semantic nuances with lucidity and erudition by Ramakant Sinari. He believes that the 'Rigorous attempts by neuro-scientists, artificial intelligence (AI) researchers and robotics experts to account for the self-sense or the sense of subjectivity which everyone of us has' (229) have not been convincing. He finds that the phenomenologists and existentialists are on better grounds when they approach the question of subjectivity. It is interesting and worth pursuing further, the manner in which *Sāṁkhyan* naturalism reveals on the one hand the self as belonging to the world (*prakṛti*) as *Ahankāra* and as *puruṣa* (pure consciousness) on the other. Existentialists, particularly Kierkegaard, have written against Hegel that subjectivity cannot be approached in a rational or objective manner. Sinari also considers the Advaitin view of RB which is in tune with the view of Raman Maharshi that the self is to be radically distinguished from not-self. While Sinari seems to be more in tune with the phenomenologists and existentialists, yet in this paper, he comes quite close to RB's point of view and suggests that 'it would be necessary

to plough deep into the inner structure of *Ātman*, to take our consciousness to the zero point, and to compass its impregnable capacity to build meanings and values and solidify them in what is given to us as our world-experience'. (245) Sinari could have found a protagonist in Yash Deva Shalya.

G. Vedaparayana discusses RB's critique of Sartre's theory of consciousness. RB thinks, as G. Vedaparayana tells us, that Sartre's consciousness is intentional. In fact, it is intentionality itself, unlike the Husserlian view of consciousness where Husserl takes intentionality not identical with consciousness but only as a feature of consciousness. Further, for Sartre, consciousness is impersonal conceived as nothingness and as devoid of anything like 'I' or 'ego'. Ego arises at the reflective level and constitutes the unity of subjective states and actions know through reflection. G. Vedaparayana points out that RB finds Sartre's view of consciousness unacceptable though it is refreshing and original. RB believes that consciousness is not always intentional; neither it is impersonal and devoid of 'I'. RB resorts to Śankara's critique of Buddhists and insights to show that Sartre must admit a permanent 'I'.

The ambiguity (or the paradoxicality) in Śankara's notion of consciousness—being what it is not and being not what it is—appears to RB as similar to *anirvacaniyatā* in *advaita*. But realizing ambiguity is to transcend it and be free. RB further felt that Sartre's philosophy did not belong to Marxian framework, though he (Sartre) wouldn't accept a framework like that of Advaita, for he rejected all metaphysical systems.

Vedaparayana, thinking of the self and the World, finds the attribution of *Māyā* to self enigmatic. He asks how can consciousness, which is complete within itself, desire to appear as what it is not? (362) Veda-parayana disagrees with RB's inclination to use the phenomenological analysis of consciousness from the Advaitic point of view, because phenomenology cannot be applied to *suṣupti* or *turīya* stages. Metaphysics cannot be accommodated in the phenomenology. (362)

N. Veezhinathan discussed some aspects of Advaita as presented in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* in the light of RB's interpretation thereon. (270) Agency and experience imply knowledge and that is possible when the mind is related with consciousness. Such a relation can be due to

avidyā. Thus, *Jīva* can become free when *avidyā* is removed and its identity with the self is realized. It is a matter of debate as to what is the locus of *avidyā*. Manḍana Misra and Vācaspatimiśra believed that it is *jīva* which is the locus of *avidyā*, while Śankara refers to the self as being the locus of *avidyā*. (274–5) Sureśvara has the same view. *Jīva* is an effect of *avidyā*; hence it cannot be the locus of it. (275)

Veezhinathan's detailed examination of the issue is illuminative and instructive.

Ramakrishna Puligandla, in a very interesting paper, asserts that phenomenology of *Upaniṣads* is fundamental phenomenology and has to be distinguished from the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, Sartre's phenomenological ontology or the fundamental ontology of Heidegger. He points out that RB relies on traditional interpretation of *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, and thus courts metaphysics rather than phenomenology. Metaphysical beliefs cannot be verified while phenomenology allows one to view matters wholly in terms of experience. Consequently, the fourth stage of consciousness or *tūriya* is so interpreted by Puligandla, that it is knowable (or rather experienceable) but it points to an experience of complete egolessness on the one hand and the non-duality of *Brahman* and *Ātman* on the other. Sri Ramakrishna, *Raman Mahrsi* and late Śankarācāryā of Kāñcipuram are some recent sages who attained *tūriya*, according to Puligandla.

In the last but one paper, Godabarisha Mishra presents a brief but quite comprehensive survey of the career of RB's thought against the background of RB's mode of tradition's renewal. He suggests RB's works 'portray both continuity and confirmation of philosophical and religious traditions of Advaita Vedānta through exposition of basic tenets ... and refutation of opposing views ...' (312) besides delineating RB's metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta, his synthesis of thought and action and his notion of liberation. Mishra also remarks that RB has broadened 'Boundary of Discourse' through interaction with the phenomenology of Husserl and Sartre. RB's belief that Western thinking forms an extension of his understanding of Indian philosophy (336) will remain a debatable issue in view of the fact that RB also thinks that Western phenomenology is not radical enough for neither it

considers the various states of consciousness nor it reaches the level of pure consciousness.

Marcus Schmüker has discussed a very interesting question: what do we perceive—particular or universal? in the context of Advaita Vedānta and *Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta* traditions. In particular, he has critically considered the views of Maṇḍana Miśra, Śāliknāth and Meghanādārisūri. The issue has a bearing on the nature of the relation of Brahman and the world. Presenting Maṇḍana Miśra's view, Schmüker says towards the end of his contribution, 'The simple word that refers to an entity that consists of universal and the particular is a part of Brahman's body and can be under stood as not referring to a simple object, but to an object that is a mode (*prakāra*) of Brahman'. (359)

From the above broad sketch of the 18 papers included in this festshcrift volume, it is quite clear that the issues discussed—textual or conceptual—concern mostly Advaita Vedānta and it is this tradition or the *paramparā* which is dear to RB, (312) which he defends and reiterates though against a wider canvas which includes some Western trends as well. Some authors (101) believe that RB uses the Western method to deal with the problem of Indian philosophy, though it is not very clear which particular method is intended. Presumably, it is the phenomenological method which is meant but some other contributors believe this method is more Indian than Western and was known to Indian thinkers much before Husserl discovered it. This opinion is not, however, uncontroversial. In any case, RB's festschrift interest in phenomenology is unquestionable and that raises the question why the book does not have a paper penned by J.N. Mohanty a philosopher, pre-eminently at home both in the Indian as well as Western thought.

Generally, Indian philosophy is identified with Vedānta and Vedānta is identified with Advaita Vedānta. RB too inspite of his awareness of more than one tradition, writes of 'the tree of philosophical traditions in India' as being supported in its roots by the concept of 'Advaita'. He goes on further and observes that a qualification (*viśiṣṭa, śuddha*, etc.) weakens the 'full signification of the term (Advaita).[2] Here, his preference for Advaita is clearly exclusive and denies any significance to other trends of Indian thought. Such an approach can hardly be an adequate introduction to the variegated traditions of the Indian thought.

One may well retort that RB is not introducing the whole of Indian thought and that may be quite right.

S. Rao rightly distinguishes between tradition and orthodoxy. Authority and a demand to conformity characterizes orthodoxy while tradition, like elements, allows an individual to have a position and to make a move. Rao, presenting RB's view, remarks that in the Indian philosophical scene, 'tradition invariably happens to be a surer and more reliable guide to truth than our present-day understanding or historical reasoning'. (17) Rao also observes that the Indian tradition is one of inquiry and respect of *Sampradāyavidah*, not an acceptance of authority blindly. (18) However, a critical assimilation of *paramparā* cannot move on the assumption that *paramparā* is a 'surer and more reliable guide to truth'. Moreover, a claim to correct rendering or interpretation of *paramparā* will always remain a debatable issue and an exercise for continual understanding.

Paramparā makes an interesting and thought-provoking reading and it is heartening to find scholars, both Indian and non-Indian, to be deeply involved in the understanding and interpretation of the texts relating to Indian philosophy. The book has been well brought out. The learned editors and ICPR are to be thanked for providing a readable volume.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Numerals in the bracket indicate page number of the book under review.
2. As is evident from a quotation (on page 313) by G. Mishra.

10/558 Kaveripath, Mansarovar   R.S. Bhatnagar
Jaipur 302 020

Bina Gupta: *Cit: Consciousness*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003, pp. ix+203, Rs 525

The book has seven chapters, beginning with an Introduction and ending with a comparative assessment. The author commenses by saying how her book on *The Disinterested Witness: A Fragment of Advaita Vedanta Phenomenology* was focussed on the witness, which is only one idea

of consciousness. The realization that the larger picture of consciousness in the whole of Indian philosophy is to be worked out resulted in *Cit: Consciousness*. Two inspirations responsible for the work are the contemporary Western philosophical debates and a new interest in 'consciousness research' by brain sciences and analytic thinkers.

Not of much interest to scientific discourse and concern for many years, 'consciousness seems to have found a newly respectable place among scientists and scientific philosophers during the past two decades'. The author notes an upsurge of interest in consciousness in many scientific disciplines, including psychology and neurosciences. In this context, it will be helpful to look at 'concerns for consciousness' in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions.

The idea of consciousness or *cit* has played an important role in Indian thought. The nature and function of consciousness is a continuing concern when looked at from an historical perspective. The author gives an outline of the Upaniṣadic, Buddhist and Advaita philosophy mentioning briefly Abhinavagupta, and writes that the 'ethics of rites and rituals, of customary duties [of Upaniṣadic/Vedic period], though not denied was brought under...a sense of duty...but could not accommodate the hierarchical distinction'. This challenge was faced by the virtue of compassion and the Buddhist theory of consciousness which developed in stages.

The author focusses on the *Upaniṣads*, Yogācāra and Advaita to develop a historical perspective. The reader might expect a more comprehensive survey to understand 'consciousness' from a historical perspective, and could ask two questions: (1) Is there a history for the development of *meaning* of consciousness; and (2) What is the definition, basic, atleast, of *consciousness*, as used in different systems. The second question is also important since the usage of consciousness, by the author relates to both technical and popular understanding of consciousness. For instance, in page 2, the sentence, 'consciousness first searched for the proper object of worship in a deity it sought for ...', and further along, 'a new level of consciousness arose out of this challenge' points to a social awareness.

The chapter on 'Introduction' proceeds to look at 'etymological considerations' and makes a clear distinction between *cit* as

consciousness and *jñāna* as cognition. For this reason, the author 'carefully distinguishes between questions of knowledge and questions of consciousness' and enlists three different meanings for the word 'consciousness' such as all mental states, all cognitive states and self-consciousness. The different theories of consciousness in Indian philosophy use these three different meanings.

Both in Indian and Eastern traditions, the two distinguishing features of consciousness have been intentionality of self-luminosity. '... If a subject S has a state of consciousness C, then S *ipso facto* is aware of having C, so that it is never the case that S has C without being aware of itself'. According to the author, both these features involve the discussion of the other. Hence, the discussion on 'whether both these features can be combined as characterizing the consciousness, or whether they are mutually incompatible', do 'awareness of having C' and 'awareness of itself' belong to the same class of awarenesses is a pertinent question one could ask.

The *Introduction* concludes by making three conceptual distinctions in theorizing consciousness—the empirical-transcendental distinction, the objectivist-subjectivist distinction and the transcendental-transcendent distinction. The author also points out succintly that it is a mistaken idea that the theme of consciousness belongs essentially to modern Western philosophy, beginning with Descartes and reaching a final culmination in Husserl. This view is based on the erroneous idea that the notion of consciousness implies a subject-object division which did not characterize Indian thinking. The author emphasizes that the (four types of) theories she presents in the book are 'in accordance with a guiding unitary thread, which consists of two binary oppositions: subjective-objective and empirical-transcendental'.

The typos in this chapter should be noted. The words *ātman* and *brahman* are for some reason not italicized. In reference number 7, in the sentence '...commentaries on these verse of the Gita', the word 'verse' should have been plural.

The second chapter begins with a general introduction to the Upaniṣadic literature. The author clarifies that *ātman*, though usually translated as 'self', does not refer to the empirical self, for which the term is *jīva*. *Upaniṣads* identify a single fundamental principle which

underlies everything, and the commonest among these is *brahman*. The oneness between the *ātman* and *brahman* is the quintessence of Upanisadic teachings. Various concepts such as *dṛṣṭā, vijñātā, ātmajyoti, antaryāmi, svayamjyoti* are used to characterize *ātman*. Since no single *Upanisad* provide a systematic and comprehensive account of the nature of *ātman*, different *Upanisads* need to be consulted in order to get a full picture.

With this point of view, the author discusses parts of *Brhadāranyaka, Cāndogya* and *Māndukya Upanisad*. The discussion on the self in the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and King Janaka throws light into the self-luminous nature of the self and its different states. In its deep sleep state, the self is 'free from pain, does not lack anything, does not know anything; there are no desires, no dreams'. In *Cāndogya Upanisad*, the discussion on *ātman* takes place in the context of the *mahāvākya* 'that thou art' and also the dialogue between Indra and Prajapati enquiring about the immortal self. The discussion in *Māndukya Upanisad* is mainly about the fourth state of self—*turīya*.

According to the author, the 'Upanisadic quest for self was not simply an intellectual analysis; the goal was to provide an understanding of the meaning and significance of the world...'. It is also interesting that the quest for self is done from opposite and different directions in the *Upanisads*. Both objective and subjective methods are employed. There are four features, however, which are unanimously highlighted. Consciousness is the basis of all knowing. It is different from the empirical self. Consciousness is not identical with waking, dream and deep sleep state. Consciousness is self-luminous. The author proceeds to elaborate these four features with the help of different instances from the *Upanisads*.

An interesting discussion which the author initiates in this chapter is about the predominance of the metaphor of light in both the East and West, in the history of concept of consciousness. Plato might have been the first in Western philosophical tradition to use the metaphor of light to characterize the idea of good. For Aquinas, the intellect is the 'intelligible light derived from the primordial light'. Perhaps from Descartes, the metaphor of light became associated with consciousness, in Western philosophy, to be continued by a number of philosophers.

In Indian thought, darkness is the metaphor used for not knowing, while light is the metaphor for consciousness. The author further elaborates on the self-luminous nature of consciousness.

If the reader starts to wonder about what the *Upanisads* say about the mind, the query is soon to be addressed. Towards the end of the chapter, the author enlists a classification of mental functions in the *Upanisads*, taking specific cases from *Brahadāranyaka* and *Aitareya Upanisad*. The chapter ends with a consolidation of the ideas discussed. The one question which still remains at this point in the reader's mind is how important is a discussion on the distinction between mind and consciousness, especially when one of the significant contributions of Indian thought lies in introducing *manas* as the *antahkarana*, the inner organ. Also, a discussion on different kinds of cognition, with some comparison with the different schools, would have been in place.

In the second chapter, a typo was noticed in page 17, paragraph 3. The first sentence uses the phrase 'no single Upanisads'.

The focus of the third chapter is the 'objectivist theory of Nyāya Vaiśesika'. The author begins by saying that all the empirical theories of consciousness, of which the Nyaya Vaiśesika and Mimāmsa are prime examples, might be regarded as objectivist theories. The main features of the Nyāya theory of consciousness are: (i) consciousness is a quality of the self; (ii) consciousness alone has the irreducible quality of being-of-an-object—it is intentional; (iii) it arises when certain appropriate conditions are present; (iv) it is not eternal but produced and destroyed; (v) it is formless; and (vi) it is not self-manifesting. The Nyāya Vaiśesika view differs substantially from Sāmkhya and Advaita views. For Naiyāyikas, the terms *buddhī, upalabdhi* and *jñāna* are synonymous. For Sāmkhya and Advaita, *buddhī* is an evolute of *prakrti*, and *jñāna* (consciousness) is the nature of the self. The author at this point uses the term 'consciousness' for *jñāna*, and further says that consciousness stands for all particular cognitive states (for Nyāya).

This third chapter also discusses whether consciousness is formless or has a form, and also the nature of cognitions. The cognition of an elephant and the cognition of a horse, according to Nyāya Vaiśesika, differs not with regard to their internal content or *akāra*. The only difference is that one object is a horse and the other is an elephant. The

Western epistemological theories insist on the distinction between the object and the content. This is primarily because in the case of non-veridical cognitions, the object may not be there, though something appears in consciousness. In such cognitions, what appears could only be the content and not the actual object.

The discussion on the form and content is followed by what is responsible for knowledge, Nyāya realism and the Mimāmsaka view of nature of knowledge. While for Nyāya, consciousness is neither a substance nor an action, for Mimāmsaka, the idea of consciousness as an action accounts for the difference between the object per se and the object known—the actual object (*vastu*), and the intentional content (*viṣaya*). The act of knowing transforms a mere object into a known object.

The third chapter of this book gives a detailed account of the positions held on 'self-luminosity' of consciousness. Is a cognition cognized when an object is being cognized? Or is it cognized by a subsequent cognition? The Nyāya, Bhatta, Buddhist, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Advaita views on these two questions are presented by the author. The third question which could appear in the reader's mind in the beginning or at the end of the reading of this chapter is 'Is being aware a cognitive state?' The account of Advaita view of the self-luminosity of consciousness outlines the criterion of *bādha*, sublation, as used by Samkara. In this context, the distinction among 'three levels' is mentioned—*pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *asat*. It would have been much in place if this account didn't stop here but continued with the mention of what kind of *asat* is talked about when the unreality of the world is explained.

Towards the concluding part of this chapter, the author points out that the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika theory characterized by her as an objectivist theory has features which do not quite conform to an empirical account of consciousness. The two such features are that consciousness is a quality of the soul and that consciousness has no form of its own. Nyāya account is not entirely objectivist and certainly differs from the Cārvaka account which offers a completely empirical theory of consciousness. The Nyāya argument—that even if a cognition is formless the presence of three elements in it such as *prakāratā*, *viśesyatā* and *samsargatā*—does not lead to a pure objectivist theory of

consciousness. Such a theory, according to the author, refuses to be accommodated within a purely empirical framework.

In the third chapter, a typo was noticed in page 39 para 1, where the sentence should have been 'but in spite of ...' instead of 'but is spite of ...'.

The fourth chapter on the 'subjectivist-objectivist theory of Yogācāra Buddhism' is an elaborate account of various kinds and levels of consciousness as with in the Yogācāra tradition. In addition to the basic doctrine of 'consciousness', this school also gives 'a new theory of eight consciousness'. The additional ones to the six traditional classes are '*manonāma vijñāna* or consciousness called mind and *ālaya vijñāna* or warehouse consciousness'. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part gives an account of the early Buddhist theory of consciousness, while second part the Yogācāra concept of consciousness is discussed with particular focus on 'Twenty verses' and 'Thirty verses' by Vasubandhu. The third part looks at the ramifications of the Yogācāra concept of consciousness in the context of the other schools of Indian philosophy.

In the concluding part of this chapter, the author describes the theory of Yogācāra as having features which are naturalistic, intentionalistic and spiritualistic. She also emphasizes the point that the theory could be best described as subjectivist-objectivist rather than purely subjectivist.

The fifth chapter deals with the core theme of the book. The author makes a detailed analysis of the Advaita theory of consciousness with emphasis on Sankara's own writings and also the Vivaraṇa interpretation of Advaita. In the beginning, the author makes an interesting distinction between the immediacy of consciousness as presented by Descartes and the Advaitic self-luminosity of consciousness—'The Advaitic immediacy of consciousness is its self-luminosity which does not require an ego's introspective knowledge of oneself. The Cartesian infallibility is the impossibility of doubting whether I am conscious or not.' The author further says, 'The suspicion of incurable privacy is understandable but the way to avoid is not to court physicalism but to make consciousness a phenomenon which spans the divide between the public and the private'.

In the second division of the chapter, the discussion is focussed on the mind–matter distinction, the naturalistic tendency of Indian systems,

causal connections of consciousness, and the relation between consciousness and the self in Vaiśeṣikas, Mimāmsakas and Advaita. The third division of the chapter explains the Advaita view of consciousness in seven theses. Consciousness is self-luminous, non-intentional, non-ecological, that which does not admit negations, non-temporal, that which is identical with being, that which is the highest value, good and bliss. In the Advaita theory of consciousness, 'metaphysics, epistemology and axiology come together'.

The 'word I is a result of confusion between undifferentiated consciousness and the inner sense (*antahkaraṇa*) belonging to the person'. The person is described by the author as belonging to *saṁsāra*, the world—'the empirical human being, the person, its body as well as such mental states as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, love, hatred, his/her actions and the consequences of his/her actions, in sum, the person's role as a knower (*jñāta*), an agent (*karta*) and an enjoyer (*bhokta*), all constituting an interrelated system known as the world (*saṁsāra*)'.

The division which follows in the second chapter is a detailed discussion on the distinction between, *vṛtti* (mental modifications), *cit* (pure consciousness) and the *sākṣin* (witness consciousness). This discussion continues to an analysis of the Advaitic conditions for empirical knowledge, and the distinction between the cognition of object and cognition in the case of witness consciousness. The conclusion of these discussions notes that the distinction between pure consciousness and *vṛtti* is a clear distinction between two ontologically different categories. But the distinction between pure consciousness and the witness-consciousness is not that between two categories but 'between two different roles played by the same thing'. This chapter further discusses the Advaita position of consciousness as the only reality on the basis of five connected theses as presented by the author. The author admits that to prove such a monistic philosophy is as difficult as materialist position that all is matter '... a grand monistic philosophy which admits only one kind of reality, irrespective of whether it is the matter or the spirit, faces the most difficult task of explaining even the appearance of dualism'.

The discussion on self-luminosity, form and object of consciousness raises a further question of the appearance of consciousness in plurality.

The final question regarding the theories of consciousness in Indian philosophy is whether consciousness is intrinsically intentional. The chapter ends with a lucid and exhaustive analysis of the question 'why consciousness', in Advaita, by its own nature blissful. The author concludes the chapter with the statement 'the concept of *ānanda* is not simply one of intense positive feeling, but whatever else it may be; it is a state of restfulness, of peace with itself upon reaching it, nothing else remains to be desired'. The extensive footnotes for this chapter make it further comprehensive.

The sixth chapter on 'transformations of the Advaita theory of consciousness' is a brief review of the transformations the Advaita theory of consciousness has undergone in Indian thought in modern times. The philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, K.C. Bhattacharyya and J.N. Mohanty are also touched upon to an extent. The seventh and last chapter of the book makes a comparative assessment with the concluding reflections of the author. A critical account is made in particular with reference to Kant, Heidegger and Derrida. The author says 'the task for Indian philosophers is not merely to rethink the traditional ideas about consciousness, but also to use them to meer contemporary challenges from psychology, biology, genetics and physics'. The reader at this point would expect the author to raise the issues in the current discussions on consciousness which cross disciplines. Issues such as 'binding problem of consciousness', 'qualia', etc., have become the bases for any discussion on consciousness. These issues also indicate several philosophical, psychological and spiritual implications for the study of consciousness. Unfortunately, such a discussion is missing.

This is an excellent book for a scholar as well as a novice. The author follows a style of writing which is simple and exhaustive. The questions raised by the author, especially on the theory of consciousness in Advaita, are exhaustive and enlightening.

Fellow   SANGEETHA MENON
Culture, Cognition and Consciousness Unit
National Institute of Advanced Studies
Indian Institute of Science Campus
Bangalore, India 560 012
E-mail: prajnana@yahoo.com

BIJAYANANDA KAR: *The Sāṁkhya Philosophy*, Ajanta Books International, Delhi, 2003, Rs 125

This is a second enlarged edition, which proves that many readers have appreciated Kar's arguments for demolishing the very edifice of the Sāṁkhya philosophy.

Professionally, I am not a philosopher, though I have studied many works on the Sāṁkhya philosophy. While reading the above book, I was reminded of Sri Harsha's *Khandan Khand Khadya* and the Sanskrit verse starting with *tarko apratisthah*. The meaning of the first is that for some people, opposing or demolishing of other's thesis is like a piece of sweet, which they enjoy eating. The meaning of the second statement is that all arguments can be demolished, because no argument is stable and permanent.

Much of Kar's discussion is inspired by logical positivist point of view. And now it holds no sway even in the West. The formal non-formal distinction cannot be applied to the traditional Indian thought.

The relationship between *upādan* (material) and *nimitta* (efficient) cause is conceptual, not formal. Similarly, the relationship of necessity cannot be converted into that of 'identity'.

Coming back to the Sāṁkhya philosophy, I may inform Kar that long before the appearance of *sāṁkhya karika* by Ishwar Krishna, the vision of Sāṁkhya revolutionized Indian knowledge systems and thought. On the one hand, it encouraged *Sannyāsa* and on the other, it provided a framework for understanding phenomenal reality in a cosmic framework. Even an empirical and practical traditional science of medicine, i.e. Āyurveda was founded on the *triguna* theory. And now Āyurveda is becoming popular in the 'scientifically' oriented West. Of course, for a humanist, cosmic vision is likely to be anathema.

Finally, let me quote a verse from *Gitā Rahasya* of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1984, p. 410). It says the subjects which are beyond reflection should not be reflected with any kind of logic—अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावाः न तान्स्तर्केण चिन्तयेत्

9/76, 1st Floor, Aryanagar   K.N. SHARMA
Kanpur (UP)

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4. Marks Siderits: *Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons*, Ashgate Publishing House, Gower House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire GU11 3HR, England, pp. 227.
5. Dr. Deepak Sarma: *An Introduction to Madhva Vedānta*, Ashgate Publishing House, Gower House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire, GU11 3HR, England, pp. 159.
6. O.N. Krishnan: *In Search of Reality*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 442, Rs 395.
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16. Natubhai Shah: *Jainism Vol. I*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 330, Rs. 795.

17. Natubhai Shah: *Jainism Vol. II*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 322, Rs. 795.

18. K.P. Sahu: *A Common Man's Philosophy of Life*, Satyabhama Publications, Rourkela, Orissa, pp. 85.

19. Luis S.R. Vas: *J. Krishnamurti, Great Liberator or Failed Messiah?*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 191, Rs 195.

20. Daya Krishna: *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Vedānta, Mīmāmsā and Nyāya*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 420, Rs 450.

21. Daya Krishna: *The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text*, India Book Centre, Delhi, 2004, pp. 308, Rs 500.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā

ई ī

ऊ ū

ए,ऐ ē ⎫ (long)

ओ ō ⎭ (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)

ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(˙) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ

ञ् ñ

ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(:) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha

छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa

ठ ṭha

ड ḍa

ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa

ष ṣa

स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa

क्ष kṣa and not ksha

ज्ञ jña and not djña

ॡ lr and not lri

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ன ḻ

ழ ḷ

ண ṇ

ற ṟ

Examples

Ilaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḻa (and not Choḷa),

Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script. (The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.