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ARTICLES

Western Analytic Metaphysics Reduces to a Philosophy of Brahman*

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ABSTRACT

I will first discuss that the descriptions of reality given to us by Western analytical metaphysicians are ultimately given in terms of mereological and topological metaphysics: the nature of reality (allegedly) consists of interrelated parts and wholes, as also interrelated pieces of space and interrelated pieces of matter. These relations (allegedly) give rise to the structure of and to the differentiation of objects in nature. I shall then offer novel arguments for the impossibility of any sort of topological and mereological interconnections for what contemporary Western analytic metaphysicians call 'mereological nihilism', and for what could be called 'topological nihilism'. There are no parts and wholes, and there are no interconnected pieces of space or interconnected pieces of matter. I will prove so by stating novel arguments for the thesis that if any two entities located in space are not exactly collocated in space (located at identical spatial locations or regions), or if any pieces of space are not identical, then the spatially located items and the pieces of space cannot be interrelated in any way. Mereological nihilism and topological nihilism lead to the position that—contrary to the reality presented to phenomenal consciousness—reality is, in fact, partless, structureless, and devoid of any internal differentiation or distinctions, and only one thing can exist. If my reasoning is correct, Western analytic metaphysicians have not offered a logically coherent theory of reality that describes the parts and wholes or any interconnections between entities in nature. Since reality is devoid of any mereological or topological connections, the best theory that

*To be continued in *JICPR*, Volume XXI No. 3

describes reality would be one where reality is structureless, and where reality is one, and contains no distinctions within it. Western analytic metaphysicians call such a position 'blob theory'. I shall argue that the partless blob apparently can only be self-conscious, in addition to being structureless and devoid of inner differentiation. Lastly, I will discuss that the structureless, partless, self-conscious blob is no different from the way the Brahman is described. This would mean that, due to the failure of Western analytic metaphysics, the best theory of reality we would have is the philosophy of the Brahman.

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to put forward novel arguments for the thesis that the nature of reality, as described by Western analytic metaphysicians,[1] reduces to a philosophy of Brahman. In order to do so, in sections 6 and 7, I offer novel arguments for the position that, due to a hitherto unnoticed problem, the account of reality given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians reduces to what they call *mereological nihilism*: the position that parts and wholes *do not exist*. Western analytic metaphysicians allege that their metaphysics is about a coherent *mereological* reality: a reality ultimately based on the existence of parts and wholes. Few things could be more fundamental to Western analytic metaphysics than its mereological nature. But if my reasoning in sections 6 and 7 is correct, parts and wholes are impossible regardless of how obvious their existence might seem to be, and regardless of what one might believe reality is like when following the account of reality (supposedly) known by one's empirical life. If my reasoning is correct, seemingly commonsensical states of affairs such as a mane being a part of a lion, a mountaintop being part of a mountain, or a quark being part of a proton, are impossible. If it could be proved that parts and wholes do not exist, then there is only one thing: reality is partless, reality is one, and reality does not contain any differentiated objects or any structures within it. The position in contemporary Western analytic metaphysics, where reality is considered to be structureless, is called 'blob theory'.[2] Mereological nihilism and blob theory are quite like the philosophy of Brahman. Phillips writes: '... Brahman ... [is] the Absolute and Unity beyond all appearance of

differentiation. Brahman is the sole reality and the single self ... The reality of Brahman entails the impossibility of coherently conceiving a diverse world.'[3] If my arguments below are correct, due to hitherto unnoticed incoherencies involved in the mereological nature of Western analytic metaphysics that I will point out in sections 6 and 7, the account of reality given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians must be *replaced* by a theory that is logically coherent. Such a theory describes reality as being devoid of parts and wholes, and thus monistic, unstructured, and—as I will argue in section 8—self-conscious, this is a description of *Brahman*, and for that reason, if my reasoning in this paper is correct—due to fatal problems to do with Western analytic metaphysics—Western analytic metaphysics reduces to, and diminishes to, a philosophy of Brahman.[4]

Western analytic metaphysicians hold that parts and wholes are obviously a primary aspect of reality, which give reality a coherent structure. All contemporary Western analytic metaphysical theories (except mereological nihilism and the blob theory) depend on the existence of parts and wholes. One can ask: What *is* it about a part that *makes* it a part? Is there something special about a part that makes it a part? The only way philosophers have been able to explain why or how a part is, in fact, a part is by inventing the notion of *metaphysical relations* that stand between a part and the whole—relations that are believed to be real constituents of nature, independent of any human mind, out in phenomenal reality.[5] These relations ultimately give rise to differentiation of parts and wholes and further promote structure in nature, according to the account of reality given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians. But in sections 6 and 7 of this paper, I will give novel arguments that show that:

1. If any two entities that occupy space are not exactly collocated in space (if they do not occupy an identical spatial location), then they cannot be connected to one another by any sort of relation or connection; and
2. If two spatial regions or spatial locations are not identical, they cannot share any sorts of relations.

If the points 1 and 2 could be argued for, mereological relations would not exist, for the reasons discussed in this paragraph. In the case

of, for example, a *part* of a lion, such as its heart, the *part* of the lion is located at a location in space that is not identical to the location of the *whole* lion, and an interconnection between the part (heart) and whole (entire lion) is an interconnection between non-collocated spatial entities. For this reason, mereological relations are relations that (allegedly) connect non-collocated pieces of matter, as described in point 1. Similar reasoning will be given below for non-identical pieces of space, as described in 2. If 1 and 2 can be successfully argued for, and if mereological nihilism, blob theory and the philosophy of Brahman each are about a reality that is devoid of inner differentiation, and that is monistic, structureless, distinctionless, eternal and timeless, and, I will argue, self-conscious—then Western analytic metaphysics reduces to a philosophy of Brahman.

Interestingly, points 1 and 2 above, if vindicated, would also show that topological relations do not exist.[6] Descriptions of reality given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians are ultimately given in terms of mereological (part-whole) *and* topological (extension, manifold) metaphysics; the nature of reality (allegedly) consists of interrelated parts and wholes, and interconnected pieces of space or matter. Although this paper is primarily about mereological relations, since topological relations are *also* ultimately behind Western analytic metaphysicians' descriptions of reality, and since my arguments against mereological relations also show that topological relations do not exist, I will also discuss in this paper that topological relations do not exist either, which could give further evidence of serious problems in relation to Western analytic metaphysics (and perhaps also for modern physicists).[7]

The belief that there are parts and wholes is so natural to the phenomenal consciousness that philosophers typically maintain that the existence of, and the coherence of, the relations that give rise to parts and wholes are obvious to the point of being unquestionable. Simons writes:

> The most obvious formal properties of the part–relation are its transitivity and asymmetry, from which follow its irreflexivity ... These principles are partly constitutive of the meaning of 'part', which means that anyone who seriously disagrees with them has failed to understand the word.[8]

But if my reasoning in sections 6 and 7 is correct, regardless of how obvious it may seem (to the phenomenal consciousness) that parts and wholes exist (and that there are relationships of part to whole), *part-whole relations do not exist*, since I will show that the seemingly straightforward account of mereological relations given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians involve contradictions.

Since Western analytic metaphysicians have only been able to describe the mereological structure of reality by way of part-whole *relations*, if it could be shown that these relations involve contradictions, whereby it was revealed that reality is devoid of these relations, then the best account of reality with us would be one where reality is without parts and without structure. This is because the theories that describe reality with structure, with distinct entities, and with parts and wholes within it, would fail to be logically coherent, and a logically coherent theory of reality as being a partless reality would be needed to replace the logically incoherent theories. If my reasoning is correct, the description of structure in reality invented by Western analytic metaphysicians is a description of an illusion, and the (topological and mereological) theories of Western analytic metaphysics do not describe reality. For these reasons, the accounts of reality found in Western analytic metaphysics are erroneous and absurd models of reality, and they can only be replaced by a consistent theory of reality, which I will show is a philosophy of Brahman.

Some might object that the mere nonexistence of part-whole relations does not lead to the position that there is only one thing. For example, in the case of two atoms that are not at the same place, since the atoms are not parts of the another, it might appear that regardless of whether or not it can be argued that mereological relations do not exist, the atoms are *distinct* items in reality, and for that reason reality cannot be one. But even though the atoms are not parts of one another, I do not know of one philosopher (or physicist) who would assert that they are *not constituents of* the universe they exist in, and if it could be shown that there really are no mereological relations, then two *distinct* atoms cannot exist, since the universe could not have parts, such as the two distinct atoms. On the standard account of non-Brahmanic reality, the atoms would each by *parts* of the universe, and so if it could be shown

that there are no parts and wholes, such *distinct* atoms could not exist, and there could only be one thing.

In section 2, I will discuss the manner in which Western analytic metaphysicians ubiquitously assume the existence of and the coherence of part-whole relations. In section 3, I shall discuss that given my arguments in section 6 and 7 proving that relations between non-identical pieces of space and non-collocated pieces of matter do not exist (points 1 and 2 above), only a mereological nihilism that is *Brahmanic* survives my attacks in sections 6 and 7 below, and any non-Brahmanic account of mereological nihilism would be incorrect. Section 4 deals with the standard accounts of space and matter given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians and how the relations described in points 1 and 2 above are ultimately behind these accounts. Section 5 discusses various issues vis-à-vis mereological relations. In sections 6 and 7, I will show that relations between non-identical spatial locations, non-identical regions of space, and between non-collocated material objects do not exist. This task consists of two parts and of several arguments that are new to the vast literature on relations. I will first show in section 6 that mereological and topological relations cannot be physical entities. After that, in section 7, I will prove that mereological and topological relations cannot be non-physical entities (as I will discuss, it is standard for philosophers and mathematicians to assert that relations are not physical parts of the physical universe). If my reasoning in sections 6 and 7 is correct, mereological and topological relations *cannot be physical or non-physical*, which indicates that they cannot exist at all since this leads to a logical contradiction. Lastly, in section 8, I argue that the one thing that exists apparently can only be self-conscious.[9]

The problems with properties and particulars (relations are properties that are shared by particulars) are widely documented, and are even readily admitted by Western analytic metaphysicians. But Western analytic metaphysicians typically assume that the problems will be solved some time in the future, and the problems are not fatal for Western analytic metaphysics. Since it is standard for Western analytic metaphysicians to believe that universals and particulars *must* exist, such metaphysicians believe that the well-known and widely discussed problems to do with universals and particulars do not indicate that the

descriptions of universals and particulars are incorrect, or that universals and particulars do not exist. An example of the way in which Western analytic metaphysicians commonly overlook troubles in their theories can be illustrated if we look at the problem of non-physical minds interacting with physical brains. This is a problem often associated with Descartes, but it is also a problem which Descartes and nobody following him found a solution to, but which at any rate is a widely accepted theory of mind and is widely held to be an accurate theory even though it appears very problematic, with no known solution to the problems it involves. In this paper I, however, will not merely assume—as Western analytic metaphysicians commonly do—that problems with properties and particulars are not significant enough to throw out the theories of properties and particulars. Rather, I will hold that the problems are evidence that universals and particulars *do not exist*. The problems with universals and particulars that I point out are all hitherto undiscussed problems, and they are specifically intended to reveal *fatal* problems for Western analytic metaphysics. They are not minor problems that can merely be put aside as Western metaphysicians have chosen to do for millennia. Rather, they apparently show that Western analytic metaphysics is in error, and a relationless theory of reality—where reality is entirely unstructured—appears to be that the coherent theory needed to replace Western analytic metaphysics. I will show that the replacement theory is a philosophy of Brahman, since the philosophy of Brahman does not involve the incoherencies of Western analytic metaphysics.

2. THE ASSUMED COHERENCE OF MEREOLOGICAL RELATIONS

In this section, I will discuss how Western analytic metaphysicians ubiquitously assume that there are parts and wholes and mereological relations, and almost no Western analytic metaphysicians question their existence.

Although mereological relations are referred to in many areas such as physics, mathematics, and ordinary language, the only group that explores the *specific nature* of mereological relations are the analytic metaphysicians. Many groups, including mathematicians and physicists, discuss and make enormous use of relations when constructing their

theories, but they do not explore the specific nature of relations; instead, they merely assert that, for example, *objects x and y are related by relation R*, and no further exploration of the relation in question is carried out. This is similar to the way people commonly refer to relations in everyday speech, where statements such as, 'He is *to the left* of her', 'The hummingbird is *in* the garden', 'The sun is *behind* the cloud', are unthinkingly uttered, but where it is very rare to find a person wondering: What is the *nature* of these relations, and what are the qualities of these relations, *behind*, *in* and *to the left*?

Part-whole relations are ubiquitously assumed by contemporary Western analytic metaphysicians to be coherent and give rise to the order and structure of time, space, ordinary physical objects, and the universe as a whole. There is nearly no discussion in the contemporary Western analytic metaphysical literature over whether or not the part-whole relations exist. The only philosophers I am aware of who apparently deny that *all* parts and wholes exist (and thus deny the existence of any part-whole relations) are Rosen and Dorr.[10] The discussion of the relations found in contemporary Western analytic metaphysics consists of discussing just a select few issues about what the relations are like (are they platonistic, physicalistic, etc.), rather than whether or not they actually exist. Nature's structure is described in terms of part-whole relations, and the Western analytic metaphysician believes that instantiations of the relation are all around, and give rise to the universe; but any discussion of the *existence or nonexistence of the relation itself* is basically absent from analytic metaphysical literature. Instead, it is assumed that no discussion is needed, given the (alleged) obviousness and pervasiveness of the instantiations of the relation. Consider what Simons, who is a leading philosopher on mereology, writes at the beginning of his widely discussed book *Parts*:

> The most basic and most intuitive mereological concept, which gives the subject its name, is that of the relation of part to whole. Examples of this relation are so legion, and it is so basic to our conceptual scheme, that it seems almost superfluous to offer examples ...[11]

Given the (alleged) obviousness of mereological relations, Western analytic metaphysicians typically assert that mereological nihilism

cannot be a correct theory. For example, van Inwagen, a major Western analytic metaphysician, asserts without argument that mereological nihilism is obviously incorrect:

> Any answer to the SCQ ['Special Composition Question'[12]] must be either *Moderate* or *Extreme*. There are exactly two extreme answers: *Universalism* and *Nihilism*. According to the former, composition [of physical objects out of parts] 'always' happens; it happens, so to speak, automatically. Universalism holds that for any things (no two of which have a common part) there is something that they compose. According to the latter, composition never happens: two or more things never compose or add up to anything. (Nihilism is equivalent to the thesis that nothing has proper parts.)
>
> The extreme answers are erroneous. Nihilism is wrong because we are living, thinking animals and composite objects, therefore, exist. Universalism is wrong because, if it is right, then ten years ago I was a cloud of atoms spread throughout the biosphere; but ten years ago, I was a living animal.[13]

This is the typical position taken on mereological nihilism, where it is just assumed without argumentation to be incorrect. Consider what Hudson writes:

> Nihilism [about composition of physical objects and about reality] ... [is] roughly, the view that there are no material objects with proper parts. Nihilism is usually mentioned (as it will be here) only to be more or less immediately rejected. It earns a place among the popularly discussed theories primarily because it lies at one of the extremes along the continuum of answers ... [I]f we maintain our materialist presuppositions, Nihilism is a non-starter.[14]

I will, however, argue in sections 6 and 7 that no matter how obvious it might appear that part-whole relations exist, and regardless of the fact that part-whole relations are ubiquitously assumed to exist by Western analytic metaphysicians, part-whole relations are *contradictory*, and thus cannot exist.

The mereological structure of nature comes from a common sense description of nature. The Western analytic metaphysician is typically interested in describing the mereological reality given to her or his

phenomenal consciousness, which is very often labelled 'common sense reality'. There is a strong divergence between most Western analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of Brahman on this issue. Woodhouse writes:

> Hindu religious and philosophical thought revolves around the basic metaphysical thesis that *Atman*, the individual self, is identical with Brahman, the universal self in which all things are sustained. With a few notable exceptions, most Western philosophers have found this thesis too far removed from common sense to consider it seriously.[15]

The Western analytic metaphysician typically has enormous trust in the common sense mereological reality, and the philosopher of Brahman has no trust in it (the philosopher of Brahman will tell you: 'if does not exist', or 'it is an illusion', or 'it is mere appearance, not reality'). The contemporary Western analytic metaphysician most often holds the viewpoint that the mereological reality of *common sense* exists, the philosopher of Brahman does not. The contemporary Western analytic metaphysician tries to explain the common sense phenomenal world. The philosophers of Brahman typically try to explain its contradictoriness and nonexistence. This paper is about the latter position, where I will argue that the contemporary Western analytic metaphysicians' best attempts to describe the common sense structured reality of parts and wholes lead to contradiction.

3. MEREOLOGICAL NIHILISM AND UNCONNECTED ATOMS

If there are no interconnections between non-identical pieces of space or non-collocated pieces of matter, as I will argue in sections 6 and 7, some may, however, assert that there still can be distinct unconnected atoms. This nihilistic philosophic position is similar to the one held by, for example, Rosen and Dorr: there are only atoms, and there are no real entities, no mereological wholes, over-and-above atoms.[16] And this is apparently the philosophical position developed by the Greek atomist Democritus, and which is held by some physicists, such as Stenger, who refers to his position as a 'particle reality'.[17] If this position were correct, some might hold that the nonexistence of relations between

pieces of space and between pieces of matter would not lead to a philosophy of Brahman, since there might still be distinct *unconnected* atoms that compose reality. But I will argue in this subsection that if there are no *mereological* relations, as I will show there are none in sections 6 and 7, it can be shown that Western analytic metaphysics reduces to a philosophy of Brahman: if there are no mereological relations, it can be shown that there are no *distinct* unconnected atoms; rather, there is only *one* atom, and thus a philosophy of Brahman can be shown to be the best theory of reality we have.

I will next discuss that that if there are no mereological relations—as I will argue in sections 6 and 7—then there cannot be *distinct* unconnected atoms. Imagine that reality is somehow composed of unconnected distinct atoms. If reality is *made up of* these atoms, how can't the atoms be *parts* of reality? If one item *makes up* another, this appears to be a way of expressing that one item is a *part* of another. But if, as I discussed earlier in this article, there is no other way to describe parthood except with mereological relations, and if it can be shown that there are no such relations, as I will show in sections 6 and 7, then a reality with distinct unconnected atoms is impossible, since the distinct atoms appear to be *parts* of reality. The reductio of this section goes as follows:

1. The only way Western analytic metaphysicians have come to describe how or why there are parts and wholes is by way of mereological *relations*.
2. Reality is composed of unconnected atoms.
3. 'Composed' in the previous sentence is a denotation of a mereological relation.
4. There are no relations between non-collocated pieces of matter and non-identical pieces of space (conclusions of sections 6 and 7 below).
5. There are no mereological relations (follows from the previous sentence).
6. There cannot be any items that compose any other items.
7. Therefore, reality is not unconnected atoms.[18]

If mereological relations do not exist, a mereological nihilist reality where there are only *unconnected* atoms appears impossible. Rather, if

there are no mereological relations, there apparently can only be *one* thing which has no parts. Such a theory of reality is much like the theory of reality invented by Parmenides. A Parmenidean reality has been compared to Brahman by some,[19] and there is good reason for the comparison since a Parmenidean reality and Brahman are both monistic, unchanging, uncreated, and eternal. But Parmenidean reality is not entirely Brahmanic, since unlike Brahman, Parmenidean reality is not a reality that is self-conscious.

4. SPACE AND MATTER

In this section, I will discuss the standard accounts of space and matter that are given to us by Western analytic metaphysicians. It is relevant to briefly point out the manner in which relations of the sort described in points 1 and 2 in section 1 are used by Western analytic metaphysicians (and modern physicists[20]) before going into the arguments for the nonexistence of these relations in sections 6 and 7. Although accounts vary, the accounts of nature given to us by Western analytic philosophers are typically ultimately given in terms of one of the following:

(i) Matter and space ultimately consist of *interconnected* networks of spatial locations, and *interconnected* networks of basic (atomic) material building blocks (true philosophic atoms).

(ii) Matter and space consist of *interconnected* spatial regions, and *interconnected* chunks of matter, each of which are infinitely divisible. There are no atomic building blocks.

In sections 6 and 7, I will argue that (i) and (ii) are each impossible due to serious problems involved with the *relations* referred to in (i) and (ii). In this subsection, I will first discuss (i), followed by (ii). In section 8 of this paper, I will discuss a relatively new theory called *mereotopology*, which has been developed as an attempt to avoid problems to do with topological and mereological relations, but I will argue that mereotopology is fatally flawed.

Basic building blocks of space or matter are either point-sized, or they have a magnitude. I will first discuss *discrete* space and matter, where the atomic building blocks of space or matter have a *non-zero* size (such as the size of a Planck length or a Planck cell[21]). On this

account, a relation between or among non-collocated atomic building blocks of matter (an atom that occupies space) is a relation between or among *two or more* non-identical atomic building blocks of space or matter (where, in the case of space, the non-identical atomic building blocks of space are different spatial *locations*). One of the first philosophers to discuss the discrete model of space or matter was the famous mathematician Reimann.

> If, in a case of a discrete manifold, the basis for its metrical determination is contained in the very idea of this manifold, then for a continuous one it should come from without. The reality which lies at the basis of space, therefore, either constitutes a discrete manifold, or the basis of a metrical determination must be sought outside the manifold in the binding forces which act on it.[22]

(Many of my arguments in the sections 6 and 7 specifically attack relations that connect different spatial *locations*, but I will also criticize *relationalist* theories, according to which space does not exist, only matter exists.)

If space or matter is not discrete but continuous, the atoms of matter or space are point-sized (they do not have a spatial magnitude). To my knowledge, this is the most widely accepted topology among philosophers.[23] Cohn and Varzi call it 'a normal space':

> Another important factor is the kind of topological space one considers. In particular, one may draw a line between theories that take space to be dense (*a normal space*) and those that do not. Most accounts in the literature are of the first kind, but there are exceptions. In the following we shall remain neutral on this issue and work with arbitrary topological spaces.[24] (Emphasis added)

Next, I will discuss the position that there are no atomic building blocks of space or matter, which is point (ii) above. The anti-atomic theory has been called 'atomless gunk' by David Lewis,[25] and that is the name it often goes by in current debates. Not every philosopher is convinced that there is an atomic level of nature. In a recent article, Schafer argues that not only is the position that there is an atomic, fundamental level of nature *non* self-evidently true, but it is often *assumed* to be the correct position:

> So, the question of the evidence for fundamentality is best understood as the question: What is the evidence for mereological atoms? And here there is a *presupposition* that mereological atoms, if such exist, also comprise the ultimate supervenience base, that cast of the prime realizers, and subjects of the fundamental laws of nature.[26] (Emphasis added)

Gunky space and matter consist of pieces of space or matter that are composed of interconnected parts and wholes with no atomic level. According to *gunkism*, as it might be called, any physical object, or any topological region, is further reducible into more fundamental parts, where there are no point-sized atomic building blocks that are reached in the series of divisions.[27] According to gunkism, any material object or region of space can be described as an infinite series of divisions: a spatially extended material object, for example, can be divided into halves, where each half can be further divided into quarters, each quarter into eights, ad infinitum. Part-whole relations (allegedly) connect the parts of gunky object (where according to gunkism, it might be the case that the *whole* that the parts make up, call it whole_1, that is a relatum of the part-whole relation and is a part of another whole, call it whole_2, where whole_2 is a part of another whole, whole_3, ad infinitum). If the part-whole relations are relations between non-collocated pieces of matter or non-identical regions of space, then they are the sorts of relations I attack in sections 6 and 7. If space or matter is gunky, a 'gunky topology' of space involves part-whole relations between non-identical topological regions, and a 'gunky topology' of matter involves interrelated non-collocated entities.

5. PARTS, WHOLES, AND MEREOLOGICAL RELATIONS

I will use four examples of mereological and topological relations throughout this paper: the relations, *at a spatial distance from*, *quantum entanglement*,[28] *parthood*, and *topological connectivity*. Hereafter, I will refer to the relata (non-identical spaces or spatial locations, or non-collocated pieces of matter) that are connected by relations as p_1 and p_2. (In the example I give in the sections of this paper, I will occasionally need to refer to three relata, p_1, p_2, and p_3.) The examples

of p_1 and p_2 that I will typically use are quarks at a distance from one another, a quark that is part of a proton (p_1 = quark, p_2 = proton), two protons that are quantum entangled, and I will refer to p_1 and p_2 as non-identical atomic building blocks of space, or non-identical regions of space where one region is a part of another, such as when a region of space that is a cubic nanometer is a part of the universe ($p_1 = nm^3$, p_2 = universe). There is nothing special about why I choose these examples; any other examples of non-collocated pieces of matter, or non-identical spatial locations or pieces of space, could have been used.

I do not discuss the relation that an entity may have with itself (*loves oneself*, etc.). Also, I do not discuss relations between or among *collocated* spatial entities. I only discuss that if spatially located entities do not occupy the very same topological region or basic building blocks of space, or if any spatial regions or atomic building blocks of space are non-identical, such objects, regions, or atomic building blocks of space cannot not share any relations.

I will also argue against *monadic relatedness* possessed by any composite material object, any spatial region, or any atomic building block of space. Campbell discusses this position: 'Monadists propose to replace the relational *aRb* with two monadic propositions, F*a* and G*b*, which attribute qualities of *a* and *b* individually'.[29] Monadic relatedness is given in terms of monadic facts: p_1's relatedness to p_2, where *relatedness* is a monadic property of p_1, not a shared polyadic property co-exemplified with p_2. Monadic relatedness does not exist spatially *between* p_1 and p_2. And p_1's non-platonistic monadic property, *related to* p_2, is not located where p_2 is, but only where p_1 is. I will mainly discuss relations, and not monadic relatedness, in this paper, since monadic relatedness has been discussed far less in the literature since Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, where relations were argued to be irreducible. (One philosopher who does discuss monadic relatedness at length is Keith Campbell.) I will, however, refer to both relations and monadic relatedness at various places in the chapter, and at specific points I will mention how my argumentation applies to monadic relatedness. But I will mainly mention relations hereafter, only infrequently mentioning monadic relatedness.

I will attack theories of noncomplex relations, and theories of complex relations. Complex relations have parts: they are relations that are conjunctions of, or that are structures of, simpler subrelations. Relations are either (i) noncomplex relations that are fundamental and irreducible; or they are (ii) complex relations that are non-fundamental and reducible.[30] Noncomplex relations make up complex relations. Noncomplex relations are typically held to be primitive and unanalyzable,[31] but a certain degree of analysis of them does exist in literature, such as when relations are discussed as being platonistic (outside of space), physicalistic (not outside of space), and so on. But in general, there is very little analysis in the literature of the *precise details* of, and the *specific nature* of, relations that goes further than this. Some thinkers such as D.H. Mellor[32] deny the fact that there are any complex properties. If he was correct, this would not matter to my reasoning in this paper, since I am also going to argue that there are none. I am considering that there are complex relations in this section in order to show that complex relations do not exist.

I will refer to relations as 'entities', where I am using the word 'entity' in the broadest possible sense, and in the way that many other metaphysicians refer to n-adic properties as 'entities', such as Esfeld,[33] Love,[34] Moreland,[35] and many others. Also, there is a passage from Reinhardt Grossmann at the very start of the section below about problems in platonistic relations (alleged to exist) between or among p_1 and p_2 that involves Grossmann referring to 'abstract qualities' and 'entities'.[36]

Theories of relations discussed by Western analytic metaphysicians can be divided into two camps: (i) platonistic theories of relations, where relations are considered to be outside of space; and (ii) anti-platonistic theories of relations, where relation are not considered to be outside of space. Quentin Smith writes:

> For a large number of philosophers, platonic realism is a preposterous theory they cannot imagine believing. But it is also true that a large number of philosophers find anti-platonism, especially in its nominalist version, a preposterous theory they cannot imagine believing. (Anti-platonism includes Aristotelian realism, conceptualism, physicalism, trope theory and the many varieties of nominalism.) The debate between platonists and anti-platonists has been going on for over two thousand years without any sign of a 'knock-down argument' or a consensus of opinion among philosophers in sight.[37]

In this paper, I will state that both positions are impossible regarding relations between non-collocated spatial objects and non-identical pieces of space; and for that reason, such relations do not exist at all. It is standard to consider platonistic relations as those which are *not* in nature, whereas non-platonistic relations are not outside of nature, as Loux discusses:

> What are the issues separating the Aristotelian realists from Platonists? ... Aristotelians typically tell us that to endorse Platonic realism is to deny that properties, kinds, and relations, need to be anchored in the spatiotemporal world. As they see it, the Platonist's universals are ontological 'free floaters' with existence conditions that are independent of the concrete world of space and time. But to adopt this conception of universals, Aristotelians insist, is to embrace a two-worlds' ontology ... On this view, we have a radical bifurcation of reality, with universals and concrete particulars occupying separate and unrelated realms ... [T]here [is a] connection between spatiotemporal objects and beings completely outside of space and time.[38]

In sections 6 and 7 below, I will argue that there is a specific problem to do with any variety of the relation between or among p_1 and p_2: they apparently cannot be spatial, S, (relations that are spatial, or that are located in space, I will call *non-platonistic* relations[39]) nor aspatial, ~S (relations that are aspatial, or that are not located in space, I will call *platonistic* relations). If the relations between or among p_1 and p_2 are neither non-platonistic (S) nor platonistic (~S), they are apparently contradictory, since they would be describable as ~(S v ~S), which translates to ~S ^ S. In this section, I discuss hitherto unnoticed problems to do with non-platonistic relations (relations that are not outside of space, S). If my reasoning is correct, only *platonistic* relations (abstract relations,[40] relations that are outside of nature, outside of space, ~S) exit among p_1 and p_2. I then consider platonistic relations among p_1 and

p_2 in the next section, where I also come to serious problems when considering them, which lead to the position that relations between p_1 and p_2 and S ^ ~S. Before discussing the reason why relations between non-identical spaces and non-collocated material objects are S ^ ~S, I need to discuss a few issues to do with mereological relations.

5.1 Are there any Perfectly Collocated Parts and Wholes?

Before moving to my arguments for the nonexistence of relations between or among any parts and wholes of space or matter, and between to among any non-identical atomic building blocks of space or matter, I will discuss another issue. One might be tempted to hold that any arguments which attack relations between *non-collocated* spatial entities need not lead to all-out mereological nihilism, since there may be spatially extended and *exactly collocated* parts and wholes (if such mereological wholes are coherent). If this is the case, there would be some part-whole relations: part-whole relations between entities that are exactly collocated in space. I will next argue, however, that if there are no relations between *non-collocated* spatial entities, then even *perfectly collocated* entities *cannot* share part-whole relations, unless they are point-size mereolgoical wholes.

To argue this point, I will first need to consider any item that has a spatial magnitude, such as a lead ball. The lead ball has two halves. These halves, according to Western analytic metaphysicians, that are (allegedly) connected to the entirety of the lead ball by part-whole relations. Part-whole relations between non-collocated items do not exist—as I am going to argue in sections below—and the halves would not be connected. Now consider one of the halves. The quarters composing the half would not be connected to one another, if, as I will argue in sections below, part-whole relations do not exist. Considering one of the quarters of the lead ball, it is (allegedly) composed of two-eighths connected by a part-whole relation, but if there were no part-whole relations, then there could not be a connection holding together the eighths. Similar reasoning could be given for any spatial magnitude, and never could we find a spatial extension involving interconnected segments, if there are no part-whole relations between non-collocated spatial parts and wholes. Without such relations, there would be no

spatial magnitudes at all that are connected by part-whole relations, and each point of the lead ball could only be considered as *unconnected* to every other point of the lead ball. Even if spatially extended parts and wholes perfectly collocate, for reasons just given, the parts of the lead ball could only be considered as point-sized regions that are *unconnected* in any way from any other point-sized regions of the lead ball—if, that is, my arguments below are correct and there are no relations between non-collocated spatial entities.

(The reasoning of the previous paragraph does not prohibit point-sized parts, and wholes (i.e. collocated points), if there are any such mereological wholes.)

5.2 Pure Realism

The last issue I will discuss before getting to the arguments against non-platonistic relations has to do with *pure realism*, the position that property possession is *wholly aspatial*: polyadic property possession (relational property possession) cannot be discussed at all in spatial terms. Moreland discusses pure realism.

> Pure realists such as Grossmann hold on to a non-spatial ... view of exemplification. Redness is 'in' Socrates[41] in the sense that Socrates *has* or *exemplifies* redness within its very being. But neither redness nor the exemplification relation itself is spatial. Properties are not in the concrete particulars that have them ...[42]

Grossmann writes:

> I shall speak of *abstract things* (entities, existents) in general. An abstract thing is a thing which is neither temporal nor spatial. A concrete thing, on the other hand, is a thing which is temporal and/or spatial ... [P]roperties, as we assumed in the last section, are abstract things; they are not spatiotemporal. It follows that they do not belong to the universe. They are not part of the universe.[43]

Pure realism, to put it as Moreland does, involves properties and their exemplification relation[44] as being entirely outside of space. But many other platonists maintain that relations are indeed outside of space, but by the relation of *inherence* (also called *exemplification* or *instantiation*, depending on the specific philosopher and his/her position on property

possession), that connect an aspatial property to spatial particulars, aspatial relations *inhere* in space, and for the reason, platonistic property instantiation involves a physical aspect. Consider Jubien's passage about this issue:

> There are a number of different philosophical accounts of properties. Two very different kinds of account are of special interest to us here. According to one of these, properties are 'abstract' entities—they exist apart from and independently of their instances. Plato is famous for his detailed version of this position, and this more modern versions is often called Platonism ... A Platonist philosopher who holds that the concept of mass is simply the property of *having mass*, therefore, thinks that his concept is an abstract entity. It exists independently of any physical objects that happen to instantiate it, and also independently of anyone's mind or mental activity. Although the *instances* of the concept of mass are, of course, physical, the concept *itself* is not. It does not even occupy space time.[45]

Pure realist platonists hold that property possession is not describable at all in spatial terms. (Moreland: 'But neither redness nor the exemplification relation itself is spatial.') But other platonists, in opposition to pure realism, hold that while platonistic relations are indeed not in space, their *instantiations* are. On this second view, described above by Jubien, instances of aspatial relations are in space, due to the relation of *inherence*. If I understand Jubien's passage correctly, this position is apparently a platonistic position since properties are not in space, but is not a purely realist position since instantiations of aspatial properties are located in space. For these reasons, when we say 'x instantiates F', the *instantiation* of aspatial F is at least to some degree *physical*. According to pure realism, as described by Moreland, when we say 'x exemplifies F', the *exemplification* of aspatial F is *entirely non-physical*: it does not involve any spatial aspect whatsoever. The italicized words 'instantiation' and 'exemplification' denote the *linkage*, to use Loux's word,[46] between a property and a physical particular. But according to the platonistic position which is not the pure realist position, the linkage between property and particular in some way involves a *physical* aspect, whereas in pure realism, it does not do so. This is because in non-pure realist platonism, the instantiation of the property is physical.

Since a relation, if it is a platonistic relation, is entirely outside of space, in the case of pure realism or non-pure realism, the linkage of inherence between property and particular must in some way *cross realms* from the realm of the aspatial to the realm of the spatial.[47] I borrow the phrase 'realm crossing' from one of Armstrong's passages where he refers to pure realist and platonistic linkage as the 'instantiation relation' (but others might call it by different names) between or among spatially unlocated platonic universals and spatial particulars:

> Once you have uninstantiated universals you need somewhere to put them, a 'Platonic heaven', as philosophers often say. *They are not to be found in the ordinary world of space and time.* And since it seems that any instantiated universal might have been uninstantiated ... then if uninstantiated universals are in a Platonic heaven, it will be natural to place all universals in that heaven. The result is that we get two realms: the realm of universals and the realm of particulars, the latter being ordinary things in space and time ... Instantiation then becomes a very big deal: a relation between universals and particulars that *crosses realms*.[48] (Emphasis added)

Pure realists such as Grossman and Moreland hold that, in crossing realms, the inherence linkage never enters space: the inherence linkage is responsible for linking aspatial properties to spatial particulars, but it never becomes spatial in doing so. Non-pure realist platonists apparently hold that the inherence linkage does enter space (Jubien writes that property instances are *physical*). Non-pure realist platonists believe that platonistic property instantiation involves a physical aspect of some sort, but they typically do not discuss the nature of, or the coherence of, the *physicality* of the instance of a *non-physical* platonistic relation. Instead, it is standard for platonists who hold this position to merely tell us that *physical particulars have aspatial properties*, without describing how this can coherently be. An example of the way platonists typically pass over this critical issue is found in a passage from one of Lowe's recent books, where he merely tells us that aspatial platonistic

universals have spatial instances, but no further discussion follows to clarify the *specific details* of this account:

> Now, it is true that some philosophers hold that universals exist in space and time, being 'wholly present' where and when the entities exemplifying them exist [Lowe cites Armstrong, 1989] ... However, it seems plausible to claim that when the ball changes in shape and colour, *something* ceases to exist—and this could not be the universals' sphericity (of such-and-such radius) or redness (of such-and-such a hue), at least so long as other things exemplify those universals. What ceases to exist could only be the ball's particular sphericity or redness. So, modes are only concrete entities, they are concrete particulars. And, indeed, I would want to explain the ball's exemplification of the universal's sphericity and redness in terms of the ball's possessing modes which are particular instances of those universals. The ball itself does not instantiate those universals, but it 'exemplifies' them in virtue of possessing modes which do instantiate those universals ... So, whether or not one wants to say that universals themselves exist in space and time (have spatiotemporal location)—and I, for one, do not—it seems very plausible to say that there are particular qualities, or modes, which do exist in space and time and are consequently concrete entities. Anyway, that this is what I shall assume from now on. (I should emphasize, incidentally, that for present purposes I do not use the term 'particular' as a synonym for the term 'individual', but rather in contrast with the term 'universal': particulars are instances of universals but do not themselves have instances.)[49]

There are other accounts of platonistic property possession where property instantiation is not considered to be entirely aspatial. I will call these positions, and any other platonistic positions that are not what Moreland describes as pure realist positions, 'non-pure realist platonist' accounts (or just 'non-pure realist' accounts). According to these positions, properties are considered aspatial (platonistic), but instantiation involves a non-aspatial aspect or ingredient of some sort.

One version of non-pure realist platonism, which comes from Plato,[50] is *model/copy realism*, according to which, *copies* of aspatial platonistic universals are in nature. Moreland discusses this position:

> There are two major views—realist and moderate nominalist—of [for example] the 'universals' redness, with important varieties of each. First, there is the realist position with four main versions. The first two (allegedly) realist versions hold that the universal does not enter into the being of its instances and, thus, is a one-*over*-many. One example of this version is the model/copy realism, according to which, properties are abstract entities that exist outside of space and time and do not enter into the particulars that supposedly have them. Instead, each particular has a copy of that property.[51]

Another non-pure realist version of platonism position is Wolterstorff's, which appears to be a trope version[52] of what I am calling non-pure realist platonism. Wolterstorff is a platonist[53] who holds that the platonistic properties have tropes that are cases of platonistic properties. Moreland discusses Wolterstorff's position:

> [For Wolterstorff] universals are kinds or types with examples or tokens as their instances. As instances of a universal is a member of that universal. The universal, wisdom, is identical to the kind, case of wisdom. In general, a universal is a kind whose examples are cases of that universal ...
>
> Wolterstorff uses a variety of terms to talk about cases. A case is a token, occurrence, example or member of a kind. It is an aspect of a substance ...
>
> Wolterstorff explicitly states that his cases are like abstract particulars (tropes) of Stout or Williams.[54]

My arguments against non-platonistic relations in this section, in addition to being against non-platonistic relations, are also against the tropes, copies, or non-aspatial instances involved in non-pure realist platonistic property possession. This is because the non-aspatial instances, tropes, or physical copies of platonistic relations *are apparently connections between objects that are not outside of space*. (Recall that Lowe writes, in the passage above: 'so, whether or not one wants to say that universals themselves exist in space and time (have spatiotemporal location) ... it seems very plausible to say that there are particular qualities, or modes, which do exist in space and time and are consequently concrete entities'.) If copies, tropes, or non-aspatial instances of aspatial properties are not

outside of space, and are apparently entities that do their connecting in space, this would be a similarity that the copies, non-aspatial instances, or tropes involved in aspatial platonistic polyadic property possession have with non-platonistic relations, which are also spatial, or spatially located, connections between entities: both the *non-platonistic relations* of physicalism, Aristotelianism, Armstrongianism, weak nominalism, and so on, and the non-pure realist copies, tropes, or non-aspatial instances, *are all interconnections that are not aspatial.*

This implies that the physical copies, tropes, or instances of non-pure realist platonism also might involve any problems that non-platonistic relations might happen to involve, since the physical copies, instances, and tropes, much like non-platonistic relations are interconnections that do their interconnecting spatially. One of my goals in this paper in section 6 where I attack non-platonistic relations is to argue that there cannot be any non-platonistic relations, and there cannot be any aspects or ingredients (copies, tropes, non-aspatial instances, etc.) of platonistic polyadic property possession that are not *entirely* aspatial.[55]

If my arguments against non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations reveal that there are no non-platonistic relations and no physical non-pure realist instances of platonistic relations, then we can only consider the position that the exemplification of relations is *only entirely outside of space*, without any spatial aspect. Such an account of property possession, where the exemplification tie and the relation are entirely aspatial, is devoid of copies, tropes, spatial instances, or any spatial aspect of any sort. In other words, if my arguments in section 6 are correct, the only leftover coherent theories of polyadic property possession would be those in what Moreland calls 'pure realism'.[56]

My introductory remarks are concluded and I will next move to my arguments against non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations.

6. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF NON-PLATONISTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN P_1 AND P_2

Subsections 6.2–6.9 pertain to problems about non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations. In these subsections, I will assume (toward reductio) that there *are* various kinds of non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations between or among p_1 and p_2: between any non-collocated spatial entities, or between or among non-identical spatial regions or non-identical building blocks of space. First, I discuss problems to do with *noncomplex* non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations (subsections 6.2–6.5). Second, I discuss problems to do with any *complex* non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations that are not affected by the reasoning against noncomplex non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations (subsections 6.6–6.9). In subsection 6.10, I discuss problems to do with monadic relatedness, and first in subsection 6.1, I discuss an issue about relations that (allegedly) hold together regions of space.

6.1 Non-Platonistic and Non-Pure Realist Relations can only be Occupants of Space

I will next argue that non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations between p_1 and p_2 can only be considered as *occupants* of space. This is relevant to my reasoning below where I argue that non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations between p_1 and p_2 are contradictory.

On the non-platonistic and non-pure realist accounts, it is standard to hold that the non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations that contribute to the makeup of space (the spatial relations that connect spatial locations and spatial regions), along with the basic building blocks of space, are not *occupants*' space, but rather, are relations that contribute to the *makeup* of space. Cohn and Varzi write:

> ... our focus will be on the logical spectrum of theories concerned with the topological structure of space, as opposed to things *located* in space. This makes our study independent of question of location, which call for a different sort of theory ...[57]

If there are non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations contributing to the makeup of space, since they interrelate p_1 and p_2—non-identical topological regions or non-identical spatial locations—the non-platonistic relations must *coincide with* those spaces that they interrelate. Further, such a relation must coincide with the *entirety* of the spatial regions or non-identical spatial locations it coincides with, regardless of whether or not the interrelated spaces are spatial regions or atomic building blocks of space. If a non-platonistic and non-pure realist relation

only coincided with a *part of* one of the spaces it interrelates, then statements such as 'p_1 is related to p_2' would be false, since only parts of p_1 or p_2 would take part in the co-exemplification of the non-platonistic and non-pure realist relation (and instead, statements such as, for example, 'p_1 is related to part of p_2' would be true). For example, if one cubic nanometer (p_1) is related to the entire universe (p_2) by the relation *parthood*, it can only be the case that the *entire* cubic nanometer coincides with the relation in order for the cubic nanometer in question to be a relatum of the relation, *parthood*. If only part of the cubic nanometer coincided with the relation, *parthood*, then the statement 'the cubic nanometer is part of the universe' would be false, and, for example, the statement 'part of the cubic nanometer is part of the universe' would be true. Similar reasoning holds for Planck basic building blocks of space. For example, it cannot be the case that, with respect to a Planck space, the relation only contacts the surface of, or a left side of, a single Planck unit of space. (Also, it is unclear that what has just been written about a Planck space is coherent, given the fact that it is unclear whether a 'side' or 'surface' of a Planck space can even be discussed at all, since 'side' and 'surface' *may* be references to *parts of* the Planck space, or aspects of the Planck space not identical to the entirety of the single unit Planck of space, rather than the entire Planck unit of space, and this is not possible single there are no parts or aspects of a Planck space that are not identical to the entirety to the Planck space.) Of course, if a relation did not attach or link to its relata (where 'attach' and 'link' denote the special exemplification tie that holds relations to their relata[58]), then there would be a discontinuity of some sort between the non-platonistic relation and its relata (spaces p_1 and p_2)—the relata and the relation would be at a spatial distance from one another—which is absurd, since the relations then would not attach or link to their relata, and thus they would be relations that do not interrelate their relata.

For reasons just given, non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations that are constituents in the makeup of space must *coincide* with the entirety of the spaces that they interrelate. I will next discuss the implication that non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations that contribute to the makeup of space *cannot also be spatial locations*,

even though the spatial relations are *constituents* of space. If, in addition to the spatial locations, the relations that contribute to the makeup of space were *also* spatial locations, in that case spaces *and* the relations that connect the spaces to one another would coincide (overlap), where these coinciding entities *would each be spatial locations*. This has obvious problems, however, since two spatial locations that spatially overlap or coincide are not at a spatial distance from one another, and cannot *each* be spatial locations, unless they are identical. But this cannot be the case since a spatial relation must be *distinct from* its relata. This implies that if there are non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations between non-identical spaces and spatial locations, and which contribute to the makeup of space, since the non-platonistic and non-pure realist spatial relations are in space but are not spatial locations, then they could only be *located at* places in space, in order to avoid the problems just discussed. But if that is the case, then non-platonistic and non-pure realist spatial relations that are constituents of space would be *spatially located* relations that *occupy* space (that are *located in* space). Hereafter, for reasons just given, I will only discuss non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations of *any* sort as being *occupants* of space, regardless of the fact that they are alleged to be constituents of space or not.

6.2 The Impossibility of Noncomplex Relations of Non-Zero Spatial Size between p_1 and p_2

It appears that there are two ways to conceptualize a non-platonistic and non-pure realist relation, if the relation is between or among p_1 and p_2.

1. A non-platonistic and non-pure realist relation is *spatially extended between* p_1 and p_2 (and for that reason is apparently a relation that is some sort of a *material object* connecting other material objects, perhaps roughly analogous to the way a rope connects a boat and a dock).

The position that relations are spatially extended objects is a position that, to my knowledge, has not been held by any philosopher, and which is rarely discussed in the literature, if at all, since relations are typically considered to be spatially *unextended*: relations are considered

to be either platonistic, and for that reason, of no spatial side at all, or when relations are considered non-platonistic or non-pure realist, they are also typically considered spatially unextended. I am going to discuss spatially extended relations just to cover all the possibilities there might be. I will discuss varieties of this sort of relation in this subsection, and in parts of other subsections of this section, where I will discuss relations that, in connecting p_1 and p_2, are spatially *in-between* p_1 and p_2.[59]

I am surprised that any discussion of this sort of relation is not found in existing literature. It may seem odd to consider that a relation would be like a material object, but from the perspective of the empirical mind, there may be many kinds of matter not at all familiar to us and not observed by us, and which could perhaps be 'relational matter'. 'Material relations' might be composed of matter that humans do not perceive in the manner they perceive ordinary matter (rocks, electrons, clouds). Perhaps one type of matter is the ordinary matter (electrons, quarks, protons, etc.) studied by physicists, and perhaps *another* type of matter is responsible for connections between entities in nature. Physicists tell us that there are apparently many varieties of matter *different than* 'ordinary', familiar matter ('light matter'), such as neutrinos, dark matter (if dark matter is *not* neutrinos), so-called 'exotic matter', and so on—each of which is a type of matter that either does not interact much with the familiar, ordinary matter that humans perceive, or if it does interact with ordinary matter, it does so in a way humans cannot detect.[60] Indeed, we are now also told by physicists that what we call 'ordinary matter' may be actually the *rare stuff in the universe*, vastly less common than other types of matter, such as neutrinos. It is not immediately apparent to me why there could not be a sort of extended matter that gives rise to *extended material relations* between material objects, and which only interacts in a special manner with ordinary matter. Perhaps such spatially extended material relations could collocate with and interpenetrate ordinary, familiar matter, so that when, for example, a spatially extended relation such as the relation, *at a distance from*, stands between the earth and sun (much like a rope between a boat and dock)—perhaps in their orbits Mercury or Venus could pass through, and temporarily partially collocate with—the extended relation between the earth and sun, since the two types of

matter (relation-matter, and planet-matter) might not interact in that scenario. It is interesting to speculate about such relations, but in this paper, I will argue below that if relations are extended and material, they are apparently contradictory entities.

2. The second way to conceptualize non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations between p_1 and p_2 is by considering non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations as *not spatially extended between* p_1 and p_2. This is the commonly-held position, where spatially located relations are considered as spatially *unextended* entities which do not resemble material objects, even if the non-platonistic relation in considered to be *physical* (as in Armstrong's realism), or if the relation is considered to be either a trope of, or a physical instance or copy of a platonistic universal.

I will discuss spatial extended non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations that—in connecting atoms and parts and wholes of material objects—*occupy* spatial locations and spatial regions. Furthermore, I will discuss spatially extended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations that contribute to the *makeup* of space; for reasons given above, these are also non-pure realist relations that *occupy* spatial locations and spatial regions. In either case, I am only considering relations of non-zero spatial size *that occupy at least two non-identical spatial locations*. For the remainder of this subsection, I will call the spatial locations, p_1 and p_2

I will next state my argument against non-platonistic and non-pure realist, *spatially extended*, *noncomplex* relations between or among p_1 and p_2. Such relations *occupy* at least two of spatial locations—call them p_1 and p_3. If spatially extended, noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations between non-collocated spatial entities *occupy* at least two non-identical spatial locations, then they are apparently contradictory, for the following reasons.

If a spatially extended relation is partless (noncomplex), it is a *single* entity. If a spatially extended, noncomplex relation is describable by a statement, since it is partless, then the *entire* relation is describable by the statement. For example, the entire relation located at two spatial

locations, p_1 and p_3, would be describable by the statements, 'located at p_1' and, 'located at p_3'. If the relation is located at p_3, and if $p_1 \neq p_3$, then by being at p_3, the noncomplex non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation is describable by the statement, 'non located at p_1'. This could be said of any location that the non-platonistic or non-pure realist noncomplex relation occupies that is not p_1. If the relation occupies more than two spatial locations, and for that reason is located at three locations, p_1, p_2 and p_3, then at locations p_2 and p_3 the relation would be describable by the statement, 'not located at p_1'. These are, however, statements that lead to contradictory descriptions of the relation: since the relation is one, partless entity, if it is 'located at p_1', and 'not located at p_1', each of these statements must describe the *entire* noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation, and that implies that the entire relation would be describable by self-contradictory conjunction of the above statements: 'located at p_1 and not located at p_1'.

6.3 Spatially Extended Relations Only Located at Entire Spaces

In this subsection, I discuss an objection to the reasoning given above, where non-non-platonistic and non-pure realist noncomplex relations were found to be contradictory if they occupy two or more spatial locations.

Philosophers who hold that relations are spatially extended may assert that if a relation is located at a certain spatial location p_2, this does not imply that it, therefore, *does not* also have the property of being located at some other spatial location, p_1. Such philosophers may maintain that non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations can be *wholly located at two different spaces*.

For a philosopher to hold this position, he or she would merely need to avoid my reasoning above where I held that there are statements such as 'not at p_1', that describe the non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation; instead, he or she must hold that such statements do not describe noncomplex, non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations between p_1 and p_2. This might be done by holding the view that the spatially extended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation can only be considered at the *entire space* it is located is at. To hold this objection

is to hold that in the above subsections, relations have been inaccurately described, since it may be the case that a spatially extended, noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation might only be accurately described as being *at its entire spatial location* (call it $p_1p_2p_3$), not at a *part* (sub-location) of its spatial location, such as the basic locations, p_1, p_2, or p_3. According to this objection, the spatially extended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation that connects p_1 and p_3, where p_2 is between p_1 and p_3, is *not* located at the basic spaces, p_1, p_2, and p_3, of the spatial locations, $p_1p_2p_3$. Rather, only *the entirety of* $p_1p_2p_3$ can be called the noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist, spatially extended relation's location. On this scenario, the statement,

> 'The noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between p_1 and p_3 is located at space $p_1p_2p_3$',

is true and the statements about the relation being at any non-atomic subspace of $p_1p_2p_3$ (i.e. space p_1p_2, or space p_2p_3), or at the individual atomic subspaces of $p_1p_2p_3$ (locations p_1, p_2, and p_3) are all false, such as the statements,

> 'The noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between space p_1 and p_3 is located at p_1',
>
> 'The noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between spaces p_1 and p_3 is located at p_2', or
>
> 'The noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between spaces p_1 and p_3 is located at p_3.'

In this section, I will argue that this objection fails. The problem, I will ague, is in considering a simple (partless) entity at a non-simple space. Or, to put in similar words: there is a problem in considering a non-basic space containing an irreducible, noncomplex (partless) relation. According to this objection, the spatially extended, noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between p_1 and p_3 is at spatial location $p_1p_2p_3$, but aspects of the relation at only p_1, p_2, or p_3 cannot be discussed, since there are no such aspects of the relation that are not identical to the entire relation. Nevertheless, since the relation extends spatially between spaces p_1 and p_3, it is important to note that all of the individual atomic building blocks of the entire space $p_1p_2p_3$, which are

atomic spaces p_1, p_2, or p_3 can only be occupied by something to do with the relation. By this, I merely mean that when we consider the sub-locations of $p_1p_2p_3$ (which are the spatial locations p_1, p_2, or p_3, spaces p_1p_2 or p_2p_3) and when we ask the question of whether or not, for example, the atomic sub-spaces (p_1, p_2, or p_3) are occupied, we apparently can only conclude that they are *not unoccupied* with respect to the relation. The reason that p_1, p_2, or p_3 must be occupied by something to do with the relation is because the entire spatial location, $p_1p_2p_3$, that the noncomplex spatially extended non-platonistic relation is at is a topological space that is made up of more fundamental spatial locations, and if the relation is at a non-basic spatial location (such as space $p_1p_2p_3$) and, accordingly, occupies the entire spatial location, it must also be the case that the relation occupying $p_1p_2p_3$ leads to each of the more basic spatial locations (p_1, p_2, p_3, p_1p_2, or p_2p_3) that make up $p_1p_2p_3$ *also* being occupied.

A spatial location would not be occupied at all if none of its sub-locations that compose it were occupied. In other words, if a relation occupying a spatial location ($p_1p_2p_3$) does not occupy the more fundamental non-atomic spatial locations (p_1p_2, or p_2p_3), or any of the atomic spaces (p_1, p_2, p_3), of the spatial region $p_1p_2p_3$, then the noncomplex spatially extended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation does not occupy the *entire* spatial location. For these reasons, the spatial relation's being at $p_1p_2p_3$ must also lead to all of the sub-locations of $p_1p_2p_3$ being occupied. But this poses a serious problem for the noncomplex, spatially extended, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation at spatial location $p_1p_2p_3$: if the relation can be described as occupying sub-locations of $p_1p_2p_3$, the problems of the previous subsection ensue.

The reasoning about spatial locations, just given—where non-basic spatial locations were discussed as being composed of sub-locations, and of basic sub-locations (if space is not infinitely divisible)—is the case for any non-atomic spatial region, since any non-atomic spatial region is made up of more fundamental spatial locations. If a non-atomic spatial region such as $p_1p_2p_3$ were *not* made up of more fundamental, or atomic, spatial locations, then an extended and non-atomic spatial location would not be made up of anything, and it would not be a spatial location at all. For these reasons, a non-atomic spatial location is composed of more fundamental spatial locations, or atomic spatial locations, and a spatial relation's occupying a non-atomic spatial location, must accordingly result in the more fundamental spatial locations, or atomic spatial locations, also being occupied. The noncomplex, spatially extended, non-platonistic relation, for these reasons, cannot be located at $p_1p_2p_3$, since the relation cannot be located at any of the spatial sub-locations that make up $p_1p_2p_3$. This sets up a fatal problem for the coherence of the spatial relation: no sub-locations of the spatial relation's entire spatial location ($p_1p_2p_3$) can have *anything* to do with the relation, and for that reason, the non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation, which is not outside of space, cannot be a spatially located entity at all, which is a contradiction.

The argumentation denoted to this point need not apply only to spatially *extended* non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations, but also to the spatially *unextended* non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations that I will discuss next. This is because the arguments just given deal with nothing more detailed than *connections between non-identical spatial locations (or non-collocated objects that occupy space)*, which apply to *any* sort of non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation, whether spatially extended or unextended.

6.4 The Impossibility of Spatially Located, Spatially Unextended, Noncomplex Relations between p_1 and p_2

I will next discuss the position that (somehow) a non-complex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist interrelation of p_1 and p_2 does not involve a connection *across* space, *extending between* p_1 and p_2. Rather, the interrelation of p_1 and p_2 exists *in space*, where p_1 and p_2 are, but the noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation is spatially *unextended*, since on this account, the spatial relation is located where and only where p_1 and p_2 are.

One thing to note before I move into my arguments is that if p_1 and p_2 are each *extended* topological regions, or *extended* material objects, but the non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between them is spatially unextended (point-sized), it is unclear how the spatially unextended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation can relate to

them, since the relation would only be able to attach to one point of each extended objects or spaces p_1 and p_2. The non-platonistic or non-pure realist spatially *unextended* relation has no extension with which it can coincide with *all* of p_1, or *all* of p_2, in its interrelating p_1 and p_2. For this reason, a spatially unextended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between p_1 and p_2 cannot interrelate p_1 and p_2 if p_1 and p_2 are extended spaces or spatially extended material objects. Perhaps this issue could be avoided if continuum, many spatially unextended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations were involved, connecting every point of p_1 to every point of p_2—if, that is, both p_1 and p_2 were constituted of continuum-many spatial points if p_1 and p_2 are extended spaces, or if p_1 and p_2 are spatially extended material objects. But this is not how topological relations or non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations between material objects are typically discussed. Philosophers typically discuss relations as if one relation relates *all of* an object or space p_1 to *all of* another object or space p_2 via one primitive relation. I see this as a serious problem for spatially unextended non-platonistic relations between p_1 and p_2 if p_1 and p_2 are extended spaces or extended material objects. I will, however, not focus on this issue, since I want to point out a different, apparently more pressing problem with spatially unextended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations between p_1 and p_2.

It would appear that the above reasoning, where I found spatially *extended* non-platonistic or non-pure realist noncomplex relations between p_1 and p_2 to involve serious problems, would also apply to non-platonistic or non-pure realist noncomplex spatially *unextended* relations. When discussing extended relations, I discussed apparently serious problems to do with noncomplex relations when they are considered to be at their entire spatial locations. In the case of spatially *unextended*, noncomplex, non-platonistic relations, they, of course, are also at their entire spatial location (which might be a spatially scattered location), and thus the same problems would ensue. But I am still going to discuss yet more problems to do with spatially unextended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations between p_1 and p_2 in a different light, since spatially unextended non-platonistic relations are

quite different from spatially extended non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations.

First, I will consider p_1 and p_2 as parts and wholes of material objects (objects that occupy space), where the relation, *parthood*, between or among p_1= quark (part), and p_2= proton (whole), is a spatially *unextended*, noncomplex, non-platonistic relation. On this account, the connection among p_1 and p_2 is a connection among *non-collocated* spatial entities, since pieces of p_2 are not collocated with p_1: p_1 (part) is at p_2's (whole's) spatial locations, but p_1 does not collocate with all of p_2's spatial locations, such as where the two other quarks that make up the proton are, and also where the gluons that are exchanged between the quarks, and which also go into the makeup of the proton, are located. For these reasons, the relation, *parthood*, between p_2 (whole) and p_1 (part), connects spatially non-collocated entities, which is the very sort of relation I am concerned with in this article.

This situation has the following restrictions. Being a spatial entity, quark p_1 cannot fail to be at a spatial location; call p_1's location, a_n (which is the topological region or the point in space or the atomic building blocks of space that p_1 occupies). This implies that p_1 only participates in the co-exemplification of polyadic properties (such as *parthood*) at a_n and nowhere else, since the spatially located entity p_1 is nowhere else *but* at a_n. If one of the spatially unextended, noncomplex, non-platonistic relation's relata is not at a_n, then p_1 is not one of the relation's relata. Proton p_2, being a spatially located entity, also cannot fail to be at a spatial location, b_n (which is the topological region or the atomic building blocks of space that p_2 occupies). This implies that p_2 only participates in the co-exemplification of non-platonistic polyadic properties at b_n and nowhere else, since spatially located object p_2 is nowhere else *but* at b_n. If one of relation's relata is not at b_n, then p_2 is not one of the relation's relata.

I will next explain that these restrictions imply that quark p_1 and proton p_2 could *not* be related by the non-platonistic or non-pure realist spatially unextended relation, *parthood* at the spatial locations that *they are not collocated at*. If quark p_1 is only at a_n, and if proton p_2 is only at b_n, and if many of p_2's spatial locations are not identical to p_1's spatial location(s) (they are not identical since if $a_n \subset b_n$, then $a_n \neq b_n$),[61]

and if on this account the non-platonistic or non-pure realist interrelation of p_1 and p_2 is not being considered as spatially *between* p_1 and p_2, then at those spatial locations where p_1 and p_2 do not collocate, p_1 and p_2 apparently cannot have any sort of dealings with one another (such as being interrelated by the relation, *parthood*). It appears that in order for p_1 to, for example, participate in the co-exemplification *parthood* with p_2, p_1, which is wholly at a_n, must also be at all of b_n's spatial locations, and thus must apparently take on the characteristics that involve contradiction, since p_1 would be at a_n, and not at a_n.

I will next consider p_1 and p_2 as atomic building blocks of space[62] which are connected by the topological relation, *connectivity*. Atomic building block of space, p_1, for example, participates in the co-exemplification of polyadic properties (such as the spatial relation *connectivity*) at p_1, since it is not identical to any other atomic building block of space. If one of the spatially located relation's relata is not identical to atomic building block of space p_1, then p_1 is not a relatum of the spatially unextended, noncomplex, non-platonistic relation. If atomic building block of space p_2 is a spatial location, then p_2 only participates in the co-exemplification polyadic properties at p_2, since it is not identical to any other atomic building block of space, such as p_1. If one of the relation's relata is not p_2, then p_2 is not a relatum of the relation.

These restrictions imply that any non-identical atomic building blocks of space, p_1 and p_2, could not be related by a noncomplex, spatially unextended, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation, for the following reasons. Since $p_1 \neq p_2$, and since on this account the non-platonistic interrelation of p_1 and p_2 is not being considered a spatially *between* p_1 and p_2, but only at locations p_1 and p_2, then p_1 and p_2 apparently cannot have any sort of dealings with one another (such as being interrelated by the topological relation, *connectivity*). It appears that in order for p_1, for example, to contribute to the co-exemplification of a spatially *unextended* relation of the sort I am discussing here, which is a non-platonistic or non-pure realist, noncomplex relation shared with p_2, p_1 *must also be identical to* p_2, and thus must apparently take on characteristics that are self-contradictory (e.g. p_1 is identical to p_2 and is not identical to p_2). Similarly, in order for p_2 to share a spatially

unextended, noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation with p_1, p_2 *must also be identical to* p_1, and thus must apparently take on characteristics that are self-contradictory.

As a last example, I will consider p_1 and p_2 as non-collocated spatial objects, more specifically two photons, which are connected by the relation, *quantum entanglement*. Photon p_1, for example, participates in the co-exemplification of polyadic properties (such as the relation *quantum entanglement*) only where it is, since it is not located anywhere else but where it is. If one of the spatially located relation's relata is not identical to p_1, then p_1 is not a relatum of the spatially unextended, noncomplex, non-platonistic relation. Another photon, p_2, only participates in the co-exemplification polyadic properties where it is and nowhere else, since photon p_2 is only located where it is. If one of the relation's (*quantum entanglement's*) relata is not p_2, then p_2 is not a relatum of the relation.

These restrictions imply that any non-identical photons p_1 and p_2 could not be related by a noncomplex, spatially unextended, non-platonistic relation, for the following reasons. Since $p_1 \neq p_2$, and since on this account the non-platonistic or non-pure realist interrelation of p_1 and p_2 is not being considered as spatially *between* p_1 and p_2, but only at the non-identical locations that p_1 and p_2 are at, then p_1 and p_2 apparently cannot have any sort of dealings with one another (such as being interrelated by the relation, *quantum entanglement*). It appears that in order for p_1, for example, to contribute to the co-exemplification of a spatially *unextended* relation of the sort I am discussing here—which is a non-platonistic, noncomplex, not-platonistic or non-pure realist relation shared with p_2—p_1 must be located where p_2 is, and thus must apparently take on characteristics that are self-contradictory (e.g. p_1 is located/is not located where p_2 is, but must be located where p_2 is). Similarly, in order for p_2 to share a spatially unextended, noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation with p_1, p_2 must be located where p_1 is and, thus, must apparently take on characteristics that are self-contradictory.

If my reasoning in this sub-section is correct, then noncomplex, spatially *unextended*, non-platonistic relation relations cannot account for any connection between or among p_1 and p_2.

NOTES

1. Throughout this paper, when I use the word 'analytic' while referring to contemporary Western *analytic* metaphysics, I am not referring to phenomenologists such as Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Quentin Smith in his early philosophy, Max Weber; Robert Sokolowski, and Max Scheler. Nor am I referring to any metaphysicians that do not clearly fall into the analytic tradition such as Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Eugene Gendlin, Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, or Hubert Benoit. Philosophers such as these are metaphysicians, but they do not clearly fit into the group of philosophers labelled *analytic metaphysicians*, and they are not considered *analytic* metaphysicians by the large group of contemporary Western analytic metaphysicians.

   By 'Western' analytic metaphysics I am, of course, not assuming that philosophers in the Indian tradition have not explored many of the same issues that Western analytic metaphysicians have explored through the centuries. I am merely discussing the Eastern and Western philosophy as I see others have done before me, where those philosophers under the label of 'Eastern philosophers' tend to be more oriented toward idealism, monism, and the *illusion* of phenomenal reality, and where those philosophers under the label of 'Western philosophers' tend to be more oriented toward realism about phenomenal reality, and about a (purported) distinction between the observer and the observed.
2. Armstrong 1989, 38; Maddy 1990, 273; Moreland 2001, 74. Blob theory is a position endorsed by virtually no Western analytic philosophers—not even by the few who tell us that they are mereological nihilists, such as Rosen and Dorr (2002), who hold that what exist are only atoms, no wholes (this is what I mean by 'atomistic mereological nihilism' and I will argue in a section below that only Brahmanic mereological nihilism is coherent, not atomistic mereological nihilism).
3. Phillips 1995, 2. I discuss what Phillips means by Brahman as 'the single self' in a section below.
4. In this paper, I make every attempt to *only* use arguments for my positions, and if possible, to never use belief or opinion that are not solely based on argument. Philosophy, as any introductory philosophy book will reveal, is based on argument: she/he who has the best argument wins. This is, however, sadly ignored by a few highly regarded analytic philosophers. A good example is Peter van Inwagen, in his *Material Beings* (1990, Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Others have noted the lack of any argumentation by van Inwagen in *Material Beings*. Hirsh writes: 'An initially surprising feature of his [van Inwagen's] book is that van Inwagen does not purport to offer any knockdown argument for his seemingly incredible thesis.' (1993, 687) Other examples, unfortunately, can be found. I am not suggesting that it is *typical* for analytic philosophers to *not* use inferences in their work; I am just discussing that too often this however occurs, and I have made every attempt for it not to be my method of philosophy in this paper, in order to hopefully assure that I only *argue for*, rather than *demand*, *preach*, or *assert*, my conclusions. At any point in this paper, I will only be doing one of three things: (1) explaining as best I can the theories of others since their work is relevant to my arguments in this paper; (2) presenting arguments; and (3) discussing the conclusions of arguments.
5. I use 'phenomenal reality' in a way that is synonyms with how Gupta uses 'phenomenal sight':

   > Here, a distinction is made between two kinds of sight: the phenomenal and the eternal. The former takes place with the eyes; such seeing is an accidental attribute of the self that has a beginning as well as an end. However, the sight that the self possesses by its very nature, like the burning of fire or the shining of the sun, is eternal. Eternal seeing is an essential attribute of the self. When it is associated with phenomenal sight, its limiting adjunct, it is described as the seer and is differentiated into the seer and the sight (Gupta 1998, 25).

6. Philosophers and scientists understand nature in terms of not only parts and wholes and the mereological relations between parts and wholes, but additionally, for many centuries, theories of space, matter, and atomism have primarily taken the form of *topological* theories. Topological theories are an array of theories that involve various sorts of *networks of interrelated items*. Alexanderoff, in his classic text, where he discusses the topology of space, writes:

   > The concept of topological space is only one link in the chain of abstract space constructions which forms an indispensable part of all modern geometric thought. All of these constructions are based on a common conception of space which amounts to considering one or more systems of objects—points, lines, etc.—together with systems of axioms describing the relations between these objects. Moreover, this idea of a space depends only on these relations and not on the nature of the respective objects (Alexanderoff 1961, 9).

   Topological networks do not just describe only space, but also other entities that are (allegedly) composed of networks of relations interconnecting various sorts of items, such as times and matter particles. Zimmerman writes:

> In Bernard Bolzano's account of continuity, for example, we have 'the first attempt at a mathematical formulation of the topological notion of connected' (Wilder 1978, 721). And Bolzano's definition is meant to apply to physical substances as well as to space and time (Zimmerman 1996, 148).

7. If modern physics—relativity and quantum mechanics—were also ultimately devoted in terms of relations, it too would reduce to a philosophy of Brahman. Although most of the debates in physics are beyond the scope of this paper, it appears, however, that modern physics *may*, in fact, ultimately be describable in terms of the relations I am concerned with in this paper. Consider a passage from a recent article on quantum mechanics by Jenann Ismael, a philosopher:

   > The heart and soul of quantum mechanics is contained in the Hilbert spaces that represent the state-space of quantum mechanical systems. The internal relations among states and quantities, and everything this entails about the ways quantum mechanical systems behave, are all woven into the structure of these spaces, embodied in the relations among the mathematical objects which represent them... This means that understanding what a system is like according to quantum mechanics is inseparable from familiarity with the internal structure of those spaces. Know your way around Hilbert space, and become familiar with the dynamical laws that describe the paths that vectors travel through it, and you know everything there is to know, in the terms provided by the theory, about the systems that it describes (Ismael 2000, section 1).

   If quantum mechanics is based on mereological and/or topological relations, then modern physics would not be aligned with a philosophy of Brahman, and instead, my arguments in this paper would reveal that modern physics is based on philosophical contradictions, and must be *replaced* by a philosophy of Brahman. This would be in opposition to the many theorists who have attempted to argue that modern physics is in accord with a philosophy of Brahman (such as Panigrahi 2002; also see Lathief 2003, for discussion of Panigrahi's work).
8. Simons 1987, 10–11.
9. Some may object that a Quinnean nominalist or a conceptualist account of reality may be able to avoid these issues, since on those accounts, properties, such as polyadic properties (relations), are typically considered to be mere names, concepts, or ideas one has about nature, not real mind-independent constituents of nature. Quinnean nominalists tell us that according to their philosophy, relations (polyadic properties) are mere words, and not actual ontological building blocks of nature. But the Quinnean nominalist's entire philosophy makes use of the relation *set membership*. If that relation is contradictory—as I argue it is in sections 6 and 7—for any regions of nature larger than atomic building block of space or matter, then Quinnean nominalism would be contradictory, if it is an attempt to describe sets of entities in a region larger an atomic building block of space or matter, that are (allegedly) grouped in a set by the relation *set membership*. If the *set-membership* relation of Quinnean nominalism does not avoid my arguments in sections 6 and 7, then it cannot be an account of reality that avoids the problems I will discuss. As for conceptualism, it may not be entirely against the conclusions I make in this paper, *if* conceptualism supports the thesis that true reality is an unstructured blob beyond all categories and appearances: space, time, and causality created in the concept forming mind (the phenomenal mind). But this is very far from the *typical* conceptualist position.
10. Consider a passage from Rosen and Dorr.

    > ... when the [quantum physicist] says that three quarks together make a proton, or when the cosmologist says that billions of stars and planets and specks of interstellar dust together make up the Milky Way, or when the voice of common sense says that twenty cards make up a house of cards—what they say is false, strictly speaking. There are no protons or galaxies or houses of cards. There are, rather, billions of simple particles arranged proton-wise and galaxy-wise and house-of-card-wise. The most radical view of this sort is compositional nihilism, according to which there is no such thing as a composite entity. On this view, it is probable that you do not exist. You just might be an absolutely simple Cartesian soul. But if not—if the only objects in your vicinity are material objects—then strictly speaking, there is no such thing as you. There are, rather, many simple things arranged 'person-wise' and engaged in various collected activities. Since you are not any one of these particles, and since there are no other candidates, the compositional *nihilist* maintains that strictly speaking, you do not exist (Rosen and Dorr 2002, 152).

11. Simons 1987, 9–10.
12. Markosian: 'The Special Composition Question is, roughly, the question *Under what circumstances do several things compose, add up to, or form, a single object?* (Markosian 1998, 213).
13. van Inwagen 1993, p. 684.
14. Hudson 2001, 81–82.
15. Woodhouse 1978, 109.
16. Rosen and Dorr 2002.

17. Stenger writes:

> The standard model [which is the currently widely accepted theory in quantum physics, according to which fields, such as the gravitational field, are composed of particles] offers a picture of elementary quarks and leptons, interacting by the exchange of a set of elementary [particles called] bosons ... In this book, I am making the unremarkable suggestion that the [particles called] quarks, leptons, and bosons of the standard model can be safely regarded as elements—perhaps the only elements—of an objective physical reality ... The alternative ontology in which continuous fields are 'more real' than particles was discussed in the previous chapter. First, we saw that a dual ontology of fields and particles, as existed in the nineteenth century [physics], contradicts the one-to-one correspondence between particle and field in modern quantum field theory. We can have either a reality of fields or a reality of particles (or other localized objects). We cannot have both without asserting some new physics not described by relativistic quantum mechanics. Such an assertion is uneconomical—not required by the data ... Second, we saw that any viable field ontology based on relativistic quantum fields necessarily entails a Platonistic view of reality (Stenger 2000, 253–54).

18. I have argued for this thesis in this section, but if my argumentation is incorrect, and there *are* distinct unconnected atoms, but which are somehow not considered *parts* of the reality they make up since they are not the relata of part-whole relations, then reality would appear to not be one; but rather, would appear to be two (or more), and thus would appear to not be Brahman after all. But at least one philosopher (McEvilley 30, 2002) may be implying, if I understand him correctly, that a quasi-atomism consisting of atoms that are entirely identical even though they are at different places, and may give rise to a theory of Brahman that some Upaniṣads put forth.
19. Gangopadhyay 1980, 47. McEvilley suggests that there is a historical link between Parmenides and the philosophy of Brahman (McEvilley 2002, 25).
20. Even if physicists have not always recognized it, unless there are no items in their physics except unconnected and unrelated true philosophic atoms, metaphysical relations and connections are ultimately behind their descriptions of the structure of matter, space, fields and forces of their physics. Jammer writes:

> With the rise of Newtonian dynamics and its interpretation along the lines of Boscovich, Kant, and Spencer, the concept of force rose almost to the status of an almighty potentate of totalitarian rule over the phenomena. And yet, since the very beginning of its early rise to power, revolutionary forces were at work (Keill, Berkeley, Maupertuis, Hume, d'Alembert) which in due time led to its dethronement (Mach, Kirchhoff, Hertz). This movement in mathematical physics, from the time of Newton onward, was essentially an attempt to explain physical phenomena in terms of mass points and their spatial relations (Jammer 1999, 242).

21. Many have held the position that the basic building blocks of space are of non-zero size *and* simple (partless), including Democritus (Democritean atoms) (see Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997, 13, 150–51) and perhaps Aristotle (minima), although whether or not Aristotle held this position is controversial, and I take no position on it (see Pyle 1995 for a lucid discussion of minima). Many contemporary physicists and philosophers hold the position that so-called Planck cells, or Planck lengths, are basic entities which have a non-zero size.
22. Quoted in Jammer (1993, 187). This sort of topology is often espoused by quantum gravity theorists, who hold the view that the fundamental particles of nature are not points, but are rings, 1-dimensional strings, cells, or sheets. One of the most widely discussed quantum gravity theories today is the string theory. In this theory, strings vibrate in spaces that (allegedly) have many more dimensions than is typically ascribed to the four-dimensional phenomenal world.
23. For example, see Esfeld (2003), Grünbaum (1952, 1955, 1967), Smith (1993), and Roeper (1997), just to name a few. Relativity theorists such as Smith (1993), Hawking, and Einstein also hold this position.
24. Cohn and Varzi 2003, 359.

    In the quantum field theory, and Einstein's relativity, space is considered to be continuous, consisting of continuum—many interrelated point-sized basic building blocks, where there are relation between or among the spatial points, and where any point in the extended continuum of space is not immediately next to any other points. (See Hawking 1996, 4; Stenger 2000, 76–78, 85. Also see Quentin Smith 1983, 1995.)

    An example of someone who holds that space is dense (continuous) is Stephen Hawking, in his 1994 book with Roger Penrose:

> Although there have been suggestions that space time may have a discrete structure, *I see no reason to abandon the continuum theories that have been so successful.* General relativity is a beautiful theory that agrees with every observation that has been made. It may require modifications on the Planck scale, but I don't think that will affect

> many of the predictions that can be obtained from it. It may be only a low energy approximation to some more fundamental theory, like string theory, but I think string theory has been oversold (Hawking 1996, 4). (Emphasis added)

25. Lewis 1991, 20.
26. Schafer 2003, 500.
27. For a clearly written argument for why this is the case, see Pyle 1995, 2–4.
28. Entanglement is a measurable phenomenon that all particles in nature exhibit, and which is an *instantaneous* connection between particles—particles are observed to interact with one another instantaneously, as if to exhibit action-at-a-distance (see Maudlin 2001 for an account of quantum entanglement). Quantum entanglement is widely discussed by physicists in virtually every area of quantum mechanics, relativity, and superconductivity, but it is a subject that has yet to make it into the philosophic literature. Quantum entanglement is very widely considered to be a relation, which is why I use it as an example in this paper. But if my reasoning in sections 6 and 7 is correct, quantum entanglement cannot be a relation.
29. Campbell 1990, 102.
30. An example of a complex relation would be: *attracted at a distance*, as in the case of gravitation, since this relation is the conjunction of two noncomplex relations, *distance* and *attraction*.
31. Roeper, 1997. Also see the passage above by Cohn and Varzi.
32. Mellor 1991 and 1992.
33. 2003, 10.
34. 2002, 16.
35. 2001, 13.
36. Grossmann 1990, 7.
37. Smith 1998, 147.
38. Loux 1998, 46.
39. This position is widely held. Ehring writes: 'A non-Platonic theory of universals brings universals into the spatiotemporal world. Instantiated physical universals exist in space and stand in spatial relations to each other on this view' (Ehring, 2002, 17).
40. In this paper, I will use 'abstract' to denote entities outside of space, and 'concrete' or 'physical' to denote entities not outside of space. See Lowe (2002, chapter 20) of Jubien (1997, p. 39), where Jubien writes: 'Platonists see reality (or "the world") as divided into two realms, the spatiotemporal and the nonspatiotemporal or, as we will usually say, the concrete and the abstract.'

41. Moreland here is considering a red ball that is named 'Socrates'.
42. Moreland 2001, 18–9.
43. Grossman 1992, 7–8.
44. Many hold that instantiation or exemplification relations should not be considered as *relations*, but rather as a non-relational 'tie' (apparently to avoid Bradley's regress, among other reasons). See Lowe 2002, 384, and Loux 1998, 38–41. I discuss this, including giving this Loux passage, in the section on problems with platonistic relation later in this paper.
45. Jubien 1997, 14–5.
46. 'Linkage' is another term used by Loux (1998, 38–41) for the tie between relation and particulars that share the relation.
47. I use Armstrong's metaphor of 'realm crossing' when discussing pure realism in this section only, and the metaphor does not play into my arguments against platonistic and pure realist property possession in sections below.
48. Armstrong 1989, 76. Moreland (2001, 100) may also refer to a *realm-crossing* exemplification: 'For traditional realists, neither the universal nor the exemplification *nexus* are spatiotemporal ... [T]he exemplification *nexus* connects an abstract entity with a spatiotemporal one.' (Emphasis added)

    Moreland's passage in confusing since, on the one hand, he uses a word, 'nexus' (Loux uses the same word), which appears to refer to a bridge-like intermediary tie between entities; but on the other hand, Moreland tells us (as do many philosophers who discuss a platonistic property possession in detail) that exemplification is not spatially located, and this implies it is not bridge-like, not a nexus, 'reaching' (to use Armstrong's word) from one realm to the other. This leaves open the question of *how*, exactly, a non-spatial entity can attach to a spatial entity: if a spatial entity is, by definition, spatially *located*, and if a spatially unlocated entity is, by definition, spatially *unlocated*, one wonders how the two can be involved in a direct attachment without the spatial entity becoming spatially unlocated upon such an attachment, or without the spatially unlocated entity becoming spatially located upon such an attachment. I discuss this much more in the section below on problems with platonistic relations.
49. Lowe 1998, 78–9.
50. Malcolm 1997, 4–5, 92.
51. Moreland 2001, 7.
52. Moreland 2001, 77.
53. A note (n. 3) in Loux (1998, 48) that refers to page 22, finds Loux writing that Wolterstorff follows the 'Platonic schema'. Also, Moreland discusses Wolterstorff's platonistic position: 'Wolterstorff says that his kinds do, in fact, *transcend* their cases ...' (Moreland 2001, 102) (Underlining added).

54. Moreland 2001, 76–7.
55. As an aside, it is worth mentioning that there are perhaps other problems with the varieties of platonism that involve copies of properties that are in space other than the problems that I will discuss in this section. For example, it is unclear how the instances (which Jubien calls 'physical') are copies of, or in any way resemble, the platonistic universals, which are *abstract*. In other words, it is unclear how a wholly abstract platonistic universal can be described as having a copy that is in space, since that would leave one having to describe the platonic entity (its copy) in spatial terms. And there are more problems with this position, which Moreland discusses (2001, 7–9).
56. Hereafter, I will refer to all positions on relations that are not pure realist positions as 'non-platonistic and non-pure realist' positions.
57. Cohn and Varzi 2003, 358–59. Roeper writes: '... a point is a location in space'. (Roeper 1997, 251)
58. See Loux 1998, 38–41. I will be discussing exemplification ties in greater detail when I discuss platonistic property possession below.
59. 'I' is this 'betweenness', where relations are not merely at the locations of their relata, that monadists often reject about relations.
60. See Kane 2000, 25.
61. In this parenthetical note, my using symbols '⊂' and '≠' perhaps provides reason for me to bring up, as an aside, a complaint some readers might have at this point. On the ontological accounts of mathematics that are standard, the symbols '⊂' and '≠' denote relations, and therefore, it is unclear how I can freely use them in this paper, if I am arguing against the existence of all relations, except those in a collocated region. Further, some readers might suggest that language in general involves relations, and if relations do not exist, then language cannot exist. As I see it, this issue is completely avoided if we merely consider that relations are mere ideas in our empirical minds (which reveal only illusion), rather than real constituents of nature.
62. The arguments in the previous paragraph would apply to a gunky topology, showing that particular sort of topology to be unrelated by non-platonistic noncomplex relations.

Other Notes

1. Phillips 1995, 2.
2. Phillips 1995, 10.
3. Phillips 1995, 11
4. Gupta 1998, 41
5. If consciousness is not conscious of something, it is intentionality without intentional objects, which is an apparent absurdism.

6. Phillips 1995, 10.
7. Phillips 1995, 9.
8. Phillips 1995, 9.

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Towards Universal Values

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Available evidences from the social sciences suggest that the quest for universal values might appear to many as at first quixotic. The claim is that there are no universal values or global norms. That is, ethical norms are thoroughly embedded in specific cultures. With the unfolding of events in the emerging new world order, people are getting increasingly convinced about the imperativeness of universal values. Specifically, boundaries which otherwise served as the *locus of values* priorities in different societies are beginning to collapse, giving credence to the fact that what happens in one place cannot be isolated from global, socio-economic and political concerns. In fact, the need for such global principles, obligatory for human survival and social progress, was never as urgent as we find it today. The existence of common needs, the problem of poverty and disease and the new conceptions of human rights as universal exhibit this need clearly.

Now, even if this kind of transcultural values is desirable, will it be possible in spite of the heterogeneous character of human cultures? And how would we respond to the postmodernist challenge, responding to such metanarrative as imperialistic or ethnocentric in nature? Or, simply put, will the demand for universal values not undermine local narratives? The attempt in this study is to provide answers to these and other questions within the context of the emerging new 'order of things' where local events are controlled by cultural activities afar.

Strictly speaking, I find the thesis of the universalist who subscribes to the claim that there are areas of mutual consent by which we can establish universal values to be quite attractive. This is partly because the claim, as it stands, does not deny the historical or cultural specificity

of values or ideas, but contends that this fact does not detract from the relevance of those values to other cultures and times, and thus can be considered globally. This being the case, it can be said that human beings, irrespective of their cultural background and history, share certain basic values and ideas, the existence of which grounds the acceptance and adoption of such values.

What is the basis of this conception of universal values? Before answering this question, it is significant to ask why the need for this transcultural ethics is imperative now, especially when the demand is coming from an intellectual from Africa who, at least like many, should be agitating for values that are culture specific.

The need for universal values is significant now because the existing values in many African states and other continents in the world are inadequate for the survival of the society and the promotion of human solidarity. Many African states have literally collapsed. More are at the verge of destruction. Yet, the events in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Algeria, Sudan and Congo to mention a few of the crisis regions in Africa, reminds us how desperate an enduring and workable solution to the problems bedeviling Africa states has become.

For some, the crisis can be seen from two perspectives. A section is of the opinion that the crisis in Africa is a product of the uncritical acceptance of Western political structures, institutions and values. This is so because these systems and values, as Anke Graness says, quoting Professor Wiredu, 'are inadequate for the needs of the artificial constructs of African nations and their multi ethnic structures, as the abuse of the multi-party system or the prospering corruption in most African nations show'.[1] Others see the above ideology as a consequence of a more serious issue of injustice and subjugation. For them, the crisis of Africa emanates from the long years of colonial rule and domination—a process which led to the dislocation of the socio-political and moral values which hitherto served as a vehicle for social cooperation in many African societies. The point of the disposition of African values was to put the people of the colonies under a form of control that would make them unable to question the sharp practices of colonial activities and the assumption on which they were based. To do the contrary, for the colonialist, will amount to formulating policies that will 'mould

one citizenry from the many peoples, which will lead to the development of a new consensus among the various peoples they brought together to form new colonial territories'.[2] Hence, they adopted policies that sufficiently disunited the people. This created a new sense of communal identity for the people where none existed, and provided a new symbolic and ethnocentric focus for each group. This did not only compound the task of welding diverse elements in each colony into a coherent whole; it also became the source of many life-threatening conflicts which were to proliferate, and consequently impede the development of values and served as an instrument for social progress and human solidarity. Colonialism, therefore, widened the social distance among the communal groups, and consequently reinforced those values that led to general loss of orientation of the people.[3]

The result of this loss of orientation is partly the reason for the denial of universal values. I will explain further. The claim is that the socio-cultural and moral crisis caused by colonialism has made it imperative to contextualize the solutions to solving the crises, because they arise in, or out of, certain historical or cultural situation. In other words, the fundamental principles or ideals or, simply put, the moral guide of the colonized should be seen as something tied to some other presupposition in the societies, on the basis of which we can understand their beliefs, judgements and ideas. This is so, in the words of M.B. Conant, 'after we have laid bare the systems of knowledge, values and symbols that structure the mind of the people'.[4] This is to say that since historical experiences vary from place to place, it should be expected that the contents and concerns of the people in different societies must also vary in some respects. And so the judgments, beliefs, ideas or, for short, the ethical guide that they use in the assessments of their conducts must of necessity be relative to their social, historical and even natural conditions. For this reason, I believe the particularist thesis cannot be ignored cavalierly.

But as correct as the particularist thesis might appear, it is in itself innocuous, for it rejects the possibility and some times the significance of harnessing the ideas, values, and institutions of peoples and societies, where it is necessary and beneficial to solve the problems of a people. In other words, no matter how profound or great our differences may

be, it is possible to hold that some of these beliefs, values or ideas are true or false in terms of the extent of their adequacy as a means of realizing human needs and social cooperation.[5] The fact that societies vary in the way they organize their human activities does not deny the fact that some may have better reasons for holding their views than others. In fact, as Dorothy Emmet avers, 'even if there is an unlimited variety of social systems; there may nevertheless be reasons for preferring some social practices to others'.[6] This is so, because on the score of happiness and satisfactory human relationships, some practices are more successful than others. In this sense, it will not be out of order for some features of a society to be criticized and changed without necessarily undermining the social structure. In fact, that is the reason we can call to question the human rights records of world leaders, for example.

The foregoing discussion shows that human values are dynamic. They are, as Oladipo says, constantly in the making in consonance with the dynamics of human struggles.[7] At this point, the particularist might argue that the fact of the dynamism of human values is not in doubt. The contention is that such change should not be occasioned by values alien to the social context. This position is equally erroneous because even if the conditions of change are explicable from a different social context, it does not mean that it must be so for the society to develop. In fact, as Siegel says:

> 'Locality cannot be the final
> word in cultural authority.
> Sometimes local cultural
> practices impinge upon and
> restrict the freedom of members
> of other cultures; sometimes
> local cultures have obligation
> to members of other cultures
> there is a sense in which cultures
> are local and separate; there is
> an equally important sense
> in which we are all members
> of the overlapping (set of)
> culture(s), and in which we not
> only may, but must be concerned
> with cultural activities afar ...'.[8]

Since no society operates in isolation, i.e. they operate in a network of interlocking relationships, the existence of which enables us to assess our goals and values in terms of their adequacy as a means of realizing our objectives. Thus, while we may agree with the particularist that local narratives may play a significant role in the explication of our social and political lives, it does 'not necessarily mean that there is no possibility of its taking on a universal character; nor does it mean that its significance is necessarily tethered to its original cultural ambience'.[9] Even though the potential for universality of values would greatly depend on its viability, i.e. the power to influence the socio-political and economic direction of a people, that potentiality cannot unconsciously be ruled out *a priori*, as the particularist claim appears to imply.

From the above reasoning, we can see that the particularist ignores entirely the historical fact of cultural borrowing in the wake of the network of an interlocking relationship that characterizes our contemporary lives. We do know that particularists do not abhor the reappraisal of cultural values in the event of their inadequacy in meeting contemporary needs and interests. We also know that such critical engagement cannot be achieved in an orientation that is unnecessarily insular. Note that the new orientation urged here does not disregard local narratives as such, but that we should go beyond what we know in our locality and embrace those aspects of foreign values that will enable us to promote modern ways of thinking on man, society and nature.

A particularist might argue that the moment we allow cultural values to enjoy a privilege status, local values will be ruled out of court. Perhaps it is important to emphasize here that the adoption of foreign values is not meant to endanger 'home narratives', as one commentator calls it. In fact, the adoption of foreign values is based on the assumption that cultures are receptive to new ideas. Because, 'it is only by adaptation and adjustment of its culture is a society able to satisfy its changing

needs within the context of its physical human environment'.[10] Part of this dynamism is the view that cultural boundaries are not cast in iron. Since we now live in a global village, cultures do interact and thus borrow from one another. This is a regular fact of human history. But this does not mean the total acceptance of the foreign values. When cultures interact, 'the reception or rejection of cultural items depends largely on the need felt by the given society on its suitability or otherwise to the already existing cultural organism'.[11] The implication here is that the borrowing culture is only receptive to the positive aspects of the other culture that suits its condition. This is to say that, although a borrowed cultural item is often itself modified to fit a local situation, all borrowing involves some reshaping of some aspect or aspects of the recipient culture'.[12] This sieving of ideas is what has been referred to as cultural negotiation.[13] And this, from the foregoing discussion, cannot undermine local narratives, because the concern of universalism is to see human endeavours or activities as an exercise in the development of man and human solidarity. This being the case, we can say that human beings, 'irrespective of their culture and histories, share certain basic values; our common humanity grounds the adoption and acceptance of such ideas, values, and perceptions, as well as the appreciation of the significance of events taking place beyond specific cultural boarders'.[14] Now, if universalism concerns the promotion of the interests of man and human solidarity, irrespective of cultures and histories, what are the conditions under which it can possibly exist?

One of such conditions is what I have argued elsewhere as the biological similarity of human beings.[15] This is manifested in instinct and drives, leading to the development of human moral sensibilities. Every culture or being is concerned about the promotion of its interests. The problem of ethics arises because not everybody/society has the natural inclination to be concerned about the interest of others, but coexistence between and within cultures requires that we regulate our interest. The possibility of this regulation rests on the fact that human beings do have or are motivated by instinct or what Kwasi Wiredu called natural sympathy for one another.[16] Here, sympathy cannot be said to depend on benevolence or kindness, which is psychologically

limited and discriminatory. Rather, to be sympathetic is to have due concern for the interest of others.

Now, since it is not the case that we are all constituted in the same way, we should not be expected to behave alike. But this is to say that we do not understand the full import of the meaning of sympathy. Sympathy could be passive or active. When it is active, as Maclagan says, we have a practical concern for the interests of others[17]; passive, when we merely feel with others. The latter has a distinctive characteristic of the human mode, i.e. it involves consciousness of others as experiencing the subject. This is the case of feeling oneself into the experience of others. But sympathy in the active mode seems to be a natural gift which, from our human understanding, may vary from one person to another and from place to place. That is to say, as a factor in the explication of human social action, passive sympathy would not be accepted as a moral ingredient. Now, because passive sympathy is a natural capacity, it can be inhibited in some cases by environmental constraints. If this is so, then we would not be out of order to say that we can control our excesses or personal obsession or, to use Maclagan's phrase, 'passive sympathy flowers in our daily human experiences quite naturally'. Is this also the case for the practical concern for others? I think so, because how is it psychologically possible to feel oneself in the experience of others without having some modicum of practical concern for them? There seems to be some measure of connection between the two. This is so because once we agree that passive sympathy is related to sharing to some extent the feelings of others then it implies the sharing in some measure in the actions, which are the manifestation of those feelings. Be that as it may, we are all aware that there are different kinds of natural capacity; some may be more relevant to moral action than others, but among the relevant sorts of characteristic, the capacity of practical concern has the advantage of being, if not equally, at least broadly distributed. This is responsible for the reason we see sympathy as a necessary moral element in the explication of human behaviour within and across cultures.

The universalizability of human rights arising from the United Nations declaration in 1948 is another milestone in the evolution of human ethical consciousness. This is so because the declaration took the idea

of human rights as basically relating to human beings *qua* human beings and not necessarily something that can be discussed in response to circumstances. The reasoning here does not undermine the existence of the practical conditions of each society that determine the nature of rights in defferent societies. For, we are aware of the fact that the existence of the different conception of human rights depends on the assumption of certain beliefs of a society, which provide the framework within which human experience is interpreted in its socio-cultural setting.[18] We are not disputing this obvious fact. The trouble, rather, is with the fact that while it may be legal to torture in some societies, it does not mean that citizens of those societies do not have a right not to be tortured; this indicates that they have the right and that the right is not protected. In other words, this right may be violated at any time by their legal authorities. But the right is still a right. What we are saying here is that a person's right not to be tortured is a right that all human beings have irrespective of the society one is from. And this is the reason when anybody's right is violated, it can be subjected to the scrutiny of world opinion (like the gruesome murder of Ken Saro Wiwa and nine other Ogoni activists by late General Sani Abacha of Nigeria) when that treatment violates widely recognized standards of respect for human rights. In other words, the existence of these 'recognized standards' of human rights by member states of the United Nations is a clear indication that human beings share a certain common moral ideal, the furtherance of which has come to be conceived as an overriding obligation upon everybody within and across societies.

Beside the above, there is also the existence of certain common human needs, the pursuit of which generates common moral ideals. It is a fact of human history to say that man is by nature a gregarious animal. Part of this is to say that man as a social being must live with one another in a society. That is, he is a being in relation. Now, because man is created in such a way that his needs are many and varied to the extent that he alone cannot meet them, it follows that he, of necessity, needs others to survive. Because man socializes, he inevitably loses his 'individuality' in a way that his life becomes influenced by the action of others around him. One implication of the relationship of men in a state, which in fact, issues from the foregoing,

is the need for social organization. This becomes pertinent because when men socialize in a state, there is the inevitable fact of the possibility of conflicts. If this is so, it becomes imperative for some independent bodies to regulate such conflicts. There is no society where the practice of the regulation of human conflict is absent. Kai Nielsen is therefore right when he writes, 'there is no society that does not believe that it is good as a general rule to preserve human life'.[19] In fact, there is the injunction that we ought not to take the life of an innocent being—which is the hallmark of the moral value of the sanctity of human life—that has gained expression in the moral lives of all known human societies.

Thus far, the foregoing discussion has been an attempt at providing an appropriate theoretical context for the understanding of the possibility of universal values. What makes the search compelling is not simply the heterogeneous nature of human cultures and the varying values therein (in fact, this is an obvious platitude). Rather, the urgency of this search derives from the fact that the existing values in many societies are inadequate for human solidarity. For this reason, it has become imperative for even the relativized values not to be impervious to revisions by standards alien to it. It, therefore, follows that outside contributions cannot be ruled out in the explication of human conduct across cultures in virtue of the changing events arising from the collapse of boundaries in the emerging new world order.

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A Critical Examination of the Arguments Against Act-Utilitarianism as a Utility Maximizing Principle

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According to act-utilitarianism (AU), each individual should always perform an act that has at least as good overall consequences under that occasion as any other act open to him. This presumably means that on any particular occasion, an agent should appraise the possible consequences of the various actions open to him and choose that one which yields on that particular occasion at least as good consequence for the group as any other.

At the very first sight, it appears that the universal satisfaction of AU is the best pattern of behaviour to maximize group interest; there cannot be any prescription conformity to which could have better consequences than this one. For if of all the things I can do, doing a certain thing will have the very best consequences (everything considered), then there is nothing better I can do than this. And if everyone always does the very best thing it is possible for him to do, the total value produced will be at a maximum. Any act that deviates from the AUian principle would produce less good than some other act that might have been performed. So the AU prescribes general conformity which is supposed to produce the best for a group.

Some critics, however, argue that universal satisfaction of AU cannot lead to the maximization of group interest. But we believe that most of the arguments put forward by the critics are unsound because the reason on which their argument is based is misleading. In this paper, first, we will see where these arguments go wrong, and then we will identify the correct argument to show the inadequacy of AU as a utility maximizing principle.

MISLEADING ARGUMENTS

There are many incorrect arguments against AU. We will only consider the following popular ones:

Kaplan's Garden Watering Example

In an earlier writing, Morton A. Kaplan (1960) used the following example to show the inadequacy of AU as a utility maximizing principle. Kaplan tells us to imagine an AUian society where the quantity of water is such that if most people used it to grow flowers in their gardens, there would be shortage of water for drinking and cooking.

Under this circumstance, what should the AUians of this society do? Kaplan's answer is that everyone will use water. He argues that for each person, watering is the dominant strategy, since the people of this society are in a prisoner's dilemma situation, i.e. each person can maximize his own interest by watering the garden no matter what others do.

In response to Kaplan's position, J.J.C. Smart (1961) rightly points out that Kaplan's argument is based on the assumption that the people of this society are egoists, i.e. they value their own interest only. Therefore, while Kaplan's argument might be valid for Egoistic Utilitarianism (EU), it does not refute the universalistic AU which prescribes that each individual ought to promote group interest.

In a later writing, Kaplan (1961) partially agrees with Smart. He says that if people value group interest instead of self-interest, then in a small group the matrix changes and the dominant strategy that resulted in the dilemma does not exist any more. But he maintains that in a large group, it is still the dominant strategy and the dilemma is still present and, hence, regarding garden-watering EU and AU will produce exactly the same result. The reason why a small group will, but a large group will not abstain from watering is, according to Kaplan, the following:

> The reason is clear. As the effect of the individual watering on the total supply of water approaches zero, the consequences for the community for each decision to water the lawn wash out in the matrix, and the individual need consider only the consequences to those affected by his individual decision whether to water the lawn or not... As a result, the decision to water becomes dominant even though we have assumed Smart's universalism. At some point, however, as we increase the visible or clear effects of the individual decision upon the total supply there is a growing divergence between the matrix where we assume egoism and where we assume Smart's universalism. As this occurs, dominance disappears and at some point ... the socially desirable decision is made (p. 301).

Kaplan's above argument can be summarized as follows. In large groups, the effect of each individual's watering on the total supply of water is zero. In this circumstance, AU requires each individual to water his garden. But if everyone follows AU, i.e. if everyone waters his garden then there will be severe shortage of water. This loss would outweigh the gain from everyone's watering their garden to produce flowers.

Kaplan's claim that in large groups watering is the dominant strategy is based on his assumption that in such groups the effect of each individual's watering on the total supply of water is zero. But this assumption is false. We know that the sum total of zeros is zero. From this, it follows that if the effect of one person's watering on the total supply of water is zero then two person's watering on the total supply of water must be zero. Similarly, three person's watering or four person's watering and so on must also be zero. But Kaplan's argument indicates that a series of watering, each one of which has zero effect on the total supply of water, together can have an effect which is more than zero. Now the question arises: how can a series of watering (from no one's watering to one person's watering and from one person's watering to two person's watering and so on), each one of which has zero effect, together have an effect more than zero? One cannot consistently hold that while each individual watering has a zero effect, but a series of watering can have an effect greater than zero. If the effect of a series of watering is greater than zero, then it is not true that each individual's watering has zero effect.

Furthermore, Kaplan's argument commits logically inconsistent assumptions. On the one hand, he is committed to the assumption that an individual's using water makes a zero effect on the total supply of water. From this, it follows that there is zero effect between the

consequences of one individual's using water and two people's using water. It also follows that there is zero effect between two person's using water and three person's using water and so no. Since the relation of 'there being zero effect between the consequences of' is transitive, we can conclude that there is zero effect between the consequences of one person's using water and the consequences of everyone's using water. But this is inconsistent with another claim of the argument that the overall consequences of everyone's using water are bad.

One can, however, try to defend Kaplan on the following ground. When Kaplan says that in a large group each individual watering on the total supply of water approaches zero, he does not mean that each individual watering has absolutely zero effect. What he really means is that each individual watering has nearly zero effect or, in other words, each individual watering is insignificant or imperceptible to the total supply of water.

The assumption that in a large group each individual watering is insignificant is also false. We can still raise the question of how can a series of watering, each of which has an insignificant effect, together make a significant effect? In a series of watering, there must be a point (threshold point) at which individual watering is significant. If this was not so, then the whole series of watering together could not be significant. Again, if this is so, and we believe this is, then it is not true that in a large group each individual watering is insignificant on the total supply of water.

Again, like the relation of 'there being zero difference between the consequences of ...', the relation of 'there being insignificant difference between the consequences of ...' is transitive. Hence, in this argument, there is the same logical inconsistency as before.

The defender of Kaplan may still argue that when Kaplan says that in a large group the effect of each individual watering approaches zero, he means that the effect of each individual watering taken by itself is insignificant. For example, X's watering, taken independently, has no significant effect on the total supply of water.

In this argument, the phrase 'taken by itself' or 'taken independently' is crucial. This kind of argument is not applicable to group actions

where the effect of one's action depends on how the others act. To clarify this point, let us consider the following example:

		Others
	Water	Do not water
Waters X	6	12
Does not water	12	10

Here what is the effect of X's watering or not watering taken by itself? We do not have any answer. What we know from this example is that the effect of X's and others' watering is 6, the effect of X's and others' not watering is 10 and so on. But we do not know the effect of X's watering or not watering taken by itself. So, to ask the question mentioned above is totally unwarranted. In other words, when it is said that in a large group the effect of each individual watering taken by itself or taken independently is insignificant, it does not make any sense.

Regan's Button Pushing Example

In *Utilitarianism and Co-operation*, Donald Regan (1980) uses the following example to show the inadequacy of AU as an utility maximizing principle.

		Poof
	Push	Not push
Push Whiff	10	0
Not push	0	6

In this example there are, according to Regan, two patterns of behaviour in which AU is universally satisfied. First, if both Whiff and Poof push the button (produces 10 units of value), and second, if neither Whiff nor Poof pushes the button (produces 6 units of value). The second pattern of behaviour shows that the universal satisfaction of AU cannot maximize group interest. Regan's argument in support of this claim runs as follows:

> Suppose, for example, that Whiff and Poof both push their buttons. The total value thereby achieved is ten units. Does Whiff satisfy AU? Yes. The only other thing he might do is not push his button. But under the circumstances, which include the fact that Poof pushes his button, Whiff's not pushing would result in a total utility of zero. Therefore, Whiff's pushing his button has at least as good consequences as any other act available to him under the circumstances. Therefore, it is right according to AU. We may conclude by an exactly parallel argument that Poof also satisfies AU. Thus, if both Whiff and Poof push, both satisfy AU.
>
> Now suppose instead that neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button. Does Whiff satisfy AU? Yes. Under the circumstances, given Poof's failure to push his button, Whiff's pushing his own button would result in a total utility of zero. By failing to push his button, Whiff produces a total utility of 6. Therefore, not pushing the button has at least as good consequences as any other act under the circumstances. Therefore, Whiff satisfies AU. By an exactly parallel argument, we can show that Poof satisfies AU. Therefore, both satisfy AU.
>
> We have just seen that if neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, both Whiff and Poof satisfy AU. The consequences produced, however, have a value of only 6 units, 4 units less than the best possible. Therefore, universal satisfaction of AU does not guarantee the production of the best consequences possible overall (pp. 18–19).

There is something wrong with Regan's argument. In order to find the error, let us consider the argument which is designed to show that when neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, each satisfies AU.

Regan's argument that when neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, each satisfies AU can be summarized as follows:

Premise 1: When Poof does not push his button, it is AU right for Whiff not to push his button.
Premise 2: When Whiff does not push his button, it is AU right for Poof not to push his button.
Conclusion: When neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, each satisfies AU.

Here the conclusion does not follow from premises 1 and 2. In order to draw the above conclusion, we have to show either of the following:

(a) When Poof does not push his button, it is not only AU right for Whiff not to push his button, but it was also AU right for Poof not to push his button.
(b) When Whiff does not push his button, it is not only AU right for Poof not to push his button, but it was also AU right for Whiff not to push his button.

Let us put the matter in another way. It is important to notice that Regan uses two separate examples to justify that when neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, each satisfies AU. In the first example, it is taken for granted that Poof does not push his button, and on the basis of this fact it is shown that when Whiff does not push his button, Whiff satisfies AU. Similarly, in the second example, it is taken for granted that Whiff does not push his button, and on the basis of this fact it is shown that when Poof does not push his button, Poof satisfies AU. But even though Regan has been able to justify that when Whiff does not push his button, Whiff satisfies AU; and when Poof does not push his button, Poof satisfies AU, by the first and the second example, respectively, it is not enough to justify the conclusion that when neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, each satisfies AU. In order to justify the conclusion, we need to argue that in the same example, either in the first or in the second, when Whiff does not push his button, Whiff satisfies AU; and when Poof does not push his button, Poof satisfies AU.

Hence we can say that what Regan has been able to show is that when Whiff does not push his button, Poof satisfies AU by not pushing his button. Similarly, he has been able to show that when Poof does not push his button, Whiff satisfies AU by not pushing his button. But he has not argued that when Whiff does not push his button in the first place, Whiff satisfies AU. Likewise, he does not argue that when Poof does not push his button in the first place, Poof has satisfied AU. So he has not been able to show that when neither Whiff nor Poof pushes his button, each has satisfied AU. With a parallel argument, it can be said that Regan's claim that when both Whiff and Poof push the button, both satisfy AU is not convincing.

Gibbard's Argument of Non-cooperation, Surplus Cooperation and Car-push

In a recent book, Allan Gibbard (1990) argues that the universal satisfaction of AU cannot guarantee the maximization of interest of a group, since there is a conflict between AU and cooperation. The universal satisfaction of AU, according to him, will lead to non-cooperation and surplus cooperation.

Non-cooperation

Gibbard uses the boulder example as a case of non-cooperation. This example is stated as follows:

> A boulder perches on the hill above a village of act-utilitarians, and threatens soon to hurtle down the hill and destroy the village. Together, the villagers could push the boulder down the opposite slope of the hill, where it would fall harmlessly into the ocean. Instead, they go about removing their children and possessions, each freely helping his neighbours when it is the most useful thing to do.
>
> A visiting sociologist interviews the villagers about what is going on, and since they are convinced of the utility of accurate social science, they answer him truthfully.
>
> Q: Why don't you get together with the others and push the boulder down the other side of the hill?
>
> A: The others won't help. I can't save the village myself, and if I tried, it would take me away from saving children and possessions, with no good results at all.
>
> Q: Why won't the others help?
>
> A: Because each knows the others won't, and wants to do something useful.
>
> Q: Why won't you organize them to remove the boulder?
>
> A: They won't cooperate.
>
> Q: Why not?
>
> A: Each knows the other won't.
>
> Q: If someone else tried to organize people to remove the boulder, would you join in?
>
> A: No.
>
> Q: Why not?
>
> A: I know no one else would.
>
> The visiting sociologist is disgusted with their behaviour, but being an act-utilitarian himself, he can find fault with neither the ethical nor the factual beliefs of the villagers. They are act-utilitarians, and each one, given his belief that the others will not help remove the boulder even if he tries to organize them, does the best thing he can in the circumstances. Moreover, as the sociologist has discovered to his disgust, each is correct in believing that the others would not help remove the boulder even if someone ties to organize them. From the act-utilitarian point of view, each is correctly acting on correct beliefs. The sociologist sets about helping to remove the villagers' children and possessions (pp. 6–8).

By the boulder example, Gibbard tries to argue that a group of AUians will not cooperate with each other to maximize its interest. But we do not think that he has been able to show that in the boulder example, the group of people (villagers) are AUians. In order to show that they are so, Gibbard needs to argue that when none of them cooperates with others, everyone has followed the AUian principle. But no such reason is provided by him.

The conversation between the sociologist and the villagers suggests that each villager has acted (that is, has not cooperated with others) on his knowledge that others will not cooperate. Now, in order to say that everyone is AUian, it must be shown that everyone's knowledge is grounded in AUian reason. But no such reason is provided by any of the villagers. So what Gibbard has been able to show is that all the villagers are non-cooperators, but he has not been able to show that they are AUians.

Surplus Cooperation

A case of surplus cooperation is discussed by Gibbard with reference to R.F. Harrod's following remark:

> It may well happen that the loss of confidence due to a million lies uttered within certain limits of time and space is much more than a million times as great as the loss due to any one in particular. Consequently, even if each and every occasion is taken separately, it can be shown that there is a gain of advantage (the avoidance of

> direct pain, let us say, exceeding that disadvantage due to the consequential loss of confidence), yet in the sum of all cases the disadvantage due to the aggregate loss of confidence might be far greater than the sum of pain caused by truth-telling (1936, p. 148).

By the above phrase, Harrod suggests that an AUian will tell a lie whenever his lying has a gain of advantage over loss of confidence in a particular occasion; but if everyone does the same, that is, if AU is universally satisfied, then the total loss of confidence will be greater than the total gain of advantage and, hence, a great consequential harm will take place.

Harrod's argument against AU faces a similar question that we raised to refute Kaplan's argument against AU. David Lyons (1965) rightly wonders how a series of lies—each of which, taken separately, has an advantage over loss of confidence—together can produce a total loss of confidence greater than the total gain of advantage? In order to grasp the defect of Harrod's argument, let us consider the following set or series of lies: {1,2,3,4,5,6, ..., n}. Harrod argues that even though each of the lies of this set, e.g. lie 1 or lies 2 ... or lie n, has an advantage over loss of confidence, yet the set of lies as a whole, i.e. n lies, produces loss of confidence greater than the total gain of confidence. But how can one consistently hold that in a set of n lies, lie n has a gain of advantage over the loss of confidence but n lies as a whole has a loss of confidence over the gain of advantage? In order to say that the set of n lies produces a loss of confidence over the gain of advantage, we must recognize that there is a point on the set where the particular lie does not have the gain of advantage over the loss of confidence.

Hence, Harrod's argument that the universal satisfaction of AU, i.e. each person's telling a lie when his lying has a gain of advantage over the loss of confidence together can produce the loss of confidence greater than the total gain of advantage does fail. This also shows that the ground of which Gibbard bases his claim that the universal satisfaction of AU leads to surplus cooperation is wrong.

Car-Push

Besides the cases of non-cooperation and surplus cooperation, Gibbard used another example to show the coordination problem of an AUian group. This example is stated below:

> Eight men push a car up a hill, but any six of them could do so equally easily. They leave two bicycles at the bottom. Any of them could push a bicycle if he were not occupied with the car. Getting the car to the top produces eight units of good, while getting the bicycles to the top of the hill would produce two units of good each. The eight men are alike in all ethically respect, and their actions are causally independent of each other. This means, for instance, that though Jones can do something different from what he does, Smith cannot force or persuade him to act differently from the way he does. Now all eight men push the car, and since their acts are the same in all ethically respects, either everyone does what is AU-right, or no one does. Which of these possibilities hold? Take an arbitrary man Smith, and consider the utility of his pushing the car as opposed to pushing a bicycle. In actual fact, Smith pushes the car, the car gets to the top, and the bicycle does not. Eight units of good results. If he pushed the bicycle instead, the others would still push the car, since what they do is causally independent of what Smith does. Both the car and a bicycle would get to the top, and ten units of good would result. The consequences of Smith's pushing a bicycle are better than those of his pushing the car. Hence, pushing the car is not AU-right for Smith. Thus, since the acts of all eight men are the same in all ethically respects, it is not AU-right for anyone.
>
> In this example, Gibbard argues that it is not AU-right for Smith to push the car, since the other seven will be pushing the car; and as the acts of all eight men are the same in all ethically relevant respects, it is not AU-right for the other seven to push the car. But because of the following reason Gibbard's assumption that the act of all eight men is same is wrong.
>
> The act of Smith is causally different from that of some others. It is established at the beginning that Smith's pushing the car is inconsequential, since the other seven are also pushing. But like Smith, others' pushing the car is not inconsequential. Among the others, at least six men's push is required to get the car at the top of the hill. So, among the remaining seven, at best, one man's act can be similar to that of Smith, since his act is inconsequential, and hence is different from that of Smith.

Barnes' Example of a Dictator's Regime

Gerald Barnes (1971) tells us to consider the following example to see how everyone's following AU is consistent with the production of considerably less than the interest they could produce by acting differently. In a dictator's regime, the following holds concerning each citizen: if he, e.g. Smith, is resisting, he will achieve nothing and will probably suffer greatly for his action. All his compatriots are not resisting. So, by not resisting, he avoids that suffering. Besides, he himself is not responsible for his country's misery, since his compatriots could perfectly well overthrow the dictator, if they rebelled all at once, without his help. In this situation, non-resistance of any citizen produces more interest than would his resistance. This is equivalent to saying that each citizen is acting on AU. But if each citizen is resisting instead, it will not be difficult to overthrow the dictator. Some may, however, lose their lives, but the improvements for everyone else will be so great that overall interest will clearly be greater than everyone's non-resistance. This show that although everyone is following AU, there are, nevertheless, alternative acts, the performance of which may produce greater overall interest for a group.

Barnes' argument could be valid if each citizen is reasoning on AUian ground. But Barnes has not been able to show this. What he has been able to show, at best, is that only Smith acted on AUian ground. For when *all his compatriots are reluctant to resist* the dictator, it is AU right or dominant strategy for Smith not to resist, since in this way he can minimize the harm of the group. But if Smith abstains from resisting on the ground that *his compatriots could overthrow the dictator without his help*, as the story indicates, then we will say that even Smith acted not on AU, but on EU.

What about the compatriots of Smith? Here Barnes says that they are reluctant to resist. But why? The answer, we guess from the story, is that each of them wants to avoid his personal suffering. If so, then they are not AUian but EUian. Therefore, we can conclude that all the citizens of the dictator's regime have not reasoned on AUian grounds.

CORRECT ARGUMENT

Thus far, we have argued that some criticisms against AU that an AUian group cannot maximize utility are based on false assumptions. Now let us present the correct reasoning to show that the universal satisfaction of AU cannot maximize the interest of a group.

Brandt's Universal AUian Reasoning

We believe that in *Ethical Theory*, Richard B. Brandt (1959) develops the correct reasoning to show that the universal satisfaction of AU fails to maximize group utility. Brandt tells us to consider the position of an AUian Frenchman living in war-time England who has to decide whether to obey the government's request to conserve gas and electricity by having a maximum temperature of 50 degrees F in his home, or to use more gas and electricity to raise the temperature up to 70 degrees F in order to keep his home warm. Brandt says that the Frenchman will reason as follows:

> All the good moral British obviously will pay scrupulous attention to conforming with this request. The war effort is sure not to suffer from a shortage of electricity and gas. Now, it will make no difference to the war effort whether I personally use a bit more gas, but it will make a great deal of difference to my comfort. So, since the public welfare will be maximized by my using gas to keep the temperature up to 70 degrees F in my home, it is my duty to use the gas (pp. 389–90).

Brandt goes on to say that the Frenchman can also reason in a different manner. This reasoning is phrased by R.E. Bales (1971) as follows:

> If enough other people decide to use gas and electricity, so that the war is lost, my abstaining won't have made any difference to the war effort, but it will have made a lot of difference in my comfort. Thus, the general harm will be decreased if I use enough gas and electricity to keep my home warm. Therefore, I ought to keep my home warm (p. 259).

Brandt now asks us to suppose that every Englishman reasons just like the Frenchman. If so, then the war will be lost. So he concludes:

> If everybody follows this AUian reasoning, the war will be lost, with disastrous effects for everybody. Thus, universal obedience of the act-utilitarian directive to seek the public good may well cause the public harm (p. 390).

In Defence of Brandt's Position

1. J.J.C. Smart (1973), however, rejects what Bales calls 'Brandt's argument from universal act-utilitarian reasoning', namely, that, if every Englishman follows the Frenchman's reasoning, a disastrous result will follow. Smart writes:

> This objection fails to recognize that the Frenchman would have used as an empirical premise in his calculation the proposition that very few people would be likely to reason as he does. They would very likely be adherents of a traditional, non-utilitarian morality (p. 58).

Smart believes that the basis of the Frenchman's reasoning is that most of the Englishmen will comply with the government's request to conserve gas and electricity. So it is wrong to say that most of the Englishmen will follow the Frenchman's reasoning.

But if we analyze Brandt's argument carefully, we will see that the Frenchman adopted a different line of reasoning. Actually, the Frenchman's reasoning takes the following form. Either enough of the vast number of Englishmen will probably conform to the government's directive, or enough of them will probably decide not to conform to the government's directive. In the former case, the war effort will probably not suffer if the Frenchman uses enough gas and electricity to keep his home warm, but it will make a lot of difference in his comfort. Thus, general welfare will be increased if the Frenchman uses more gas and electricity to keep his home warm. In the latter case, the Frenchman's abstaining from using gas and electricity probably will not make any difference to the war effort but it will make a lot of difference in his comfort. Thus, the general harm will be decreased if the Frenchman uses enough gas and electricity to keep his home warm.

Hence, the Frenchman's reasoning is not based, as Smart thought, only on the premise that most of the Englishmen will comply with the government's directive. He also considers the possibility that most of them may not comply with the government's directive. What Brandt's argument suggests is that for the Frenchman using gas and electricity is a dominant strategy from the AUian point of view. For if the war is won because of the participation of enough other Englishmen, he can maximize general welfare by using more gas and electricity. Again, if the war is lost because of the non-participation of enough other Englishmen, he can minimize the general harm by using more gas and electricity. Thus, given either alternative—lose or win—he should use more gas and electricity. This is the correct interpretation of the Frenchman's reasoning. And there is no reason why all the Englishmen cannot reason the way the Frenchman does. So Smart's objection against Brandt's argument from universal AUian reasoning does not stand.

2. Allan Gibbard suggests that Brandt's gas cheating example represents no real conflict between AU and cooperation but shows only a bogus conflict. Now let us see why Gibbard does find only a bogus conflict or none at all between AU and cooperation in Brandt's case.

According to Gibbard, Brandt's argument regarding why the Frenchman will not cooperate with the government to win the war by conserving gas is that the Frenchman will reason as follows: one agent's using gas has no effect on the total gas supply (or that an individual's cooperation is too diffuse to be noticeable); even if everyone did the same, the result would be dire.

On the basis of his analysis of Brandt's argument, Gibbard disagrees with Brandt that in the gas example AU prescribes non-cooperation. In order to defend this claim, Gibbard challenges the validity of the reasoning of the Frenchman. He argues:

> ... the net value of what n gas cheats accomplish is the sum of the values of n effects individual gas cheats could have. It is the sum of the net benefit from one gas cheat in a world with no other, the net benefit from one gas cheat in a world of two others, and so up to a world with n-1 others. If the effect of n gas cheat is calamitous, at least one of these net benefits from an individual gas cheat must be negative. Hence it is possible for an individual to produce a bad result by helping to strain the gas system, no matter how uncertain

> and diffuse that result may be. If the system is likely to be under strain even with everyone cooperating, an act-utilitarian will cooperate. He will calculate the average expectable net benefit from an act of gas cheating by dividing the likely effect of a large number of gas cheats by n (1990, p. 27).

Gibbard is right to reject the reasoning that one individual's gas cheating has no or unnoticeable effect on the total gas supply. For if one individual's gas cheating has no or unnoticeable effect, then we can reasonably ask how a series of gas cheating make a noticeable effect?

But the problem is that Gibbard misunderstood Brandt's argument. Brandt does not argue that the reason why the Frenchman will not conserve gas is that his using gas has, as Gibbard thought, a negligible or a diffuse effect on the total consumption of gas. Rather, Brandt says that the Frenchman will not cooperate to win the war by conserving gas, since this course of action is the dominant strategy for him in order to promote the interest of the community by his own action.

Again, Gibbard is wrong to believe that the Frenchman will cooperate to conserve gas. The reason why the Frenchman will conserve gas is, according to Gibbard, that he will calculate the average expectable net benefit from his act of gas cheating by dividing the likely effect of a large number of gas cheats by all Englishmen (p. 27).

But as an AUian, the Frenchman will not follow the course of action suggested by Gibbard. For (i) the Frenchman has no reason to believe that all Englishmen will cheat gas; and (ii) if all Englishmen cheat, then as an AUian the Frenchman's rational policy is to cheat also because in this way, as we have seen earlier, he can minimize the general harm of the community.

Indeed, in the gas and electricity example, there is no clear direction for the Frenchman unless he has the premise how each of the Englishmen will do. The Frenchman cannot plan his action unless he has the premise how other people will do. Similarly, each of the other people cannot plan his action unless he knows what other people (including the Frenchman) will do. Under this circumstance, the rational course of action for the Frenchman, we believe, is to follow the dominant strategy mentioned by Brandt, i.e. not to follow the government's directive of gas conservation.

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Obligation to Animals: Some Approaches in Environmental Ethics

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The relations between humans and other species and their relationship to their environments occupy a central place in an ecocentric universe. The well being of the human species is closely entwined with that of other species and the rest of the universe. History provides us good evidences and awareness about the relationship between humans and animals species. In an ecocentric framework, the term 'animal' covers all 'living beings', including the 'plant world'. Some theorists, however, use the term 'animal' referring to merely 'living beings' which exclude the 'plant world'. Aristotle, throughout his work, insists on the continuum of abilities that links plants with animals and animals with humans. He credits all animals with perceptual capacities. Most animals, according to Aristotle, possess desire which involves the capacity to see an object as an 'apparent good', and also have imagination or *Phantasia* which can represent a present or absent object to an animal as an object of desire.[1] Moreover, most animals have minimal emotions like fear and some even have complex emotions such as anger and compassion.[2] Some animals also have memory or even a rudimentary type of judgement. Aristotle imputes voluntary action to both children and animals, stating that they can be justifiably praised or blamed for their conduct. On the basis of all this analysis, he advances a common framework of explanation for the voluntary movements of all animals, human and non-human alike. Under this framework, Aristotle claims that, evidentially enough to say, many types of animals are person-like. They are capable of intelligence and planning, capable of emotion and responsiveness, capable of awareness of another animal's feelings,

capable of recognizing one another and members of other species as individuals, capable of joy, humour, and delight.[3] Of course, there is always scope for doubt about attributions of intelligence and emotion to animals. This is so because all human descriptions of animal behaviour are in human language and we do not have unmediated access to the experience of other species.

However, a major contribution made by Aristotle in his writings on nature is the idea that each creature has its own characteristic form of life and an internal organization suited to attaining that form of life under appropriate conditions. In other words, living creatures are organized to maintain themselves and function in ways characteristic of creatures of that sort. Thus, Aristotle articulates a notion of flourishing for animals and opines that flourishing is different for each animal. Aristotle regards each animal as an end in itself, each as the measure of its own type of flourishing. Thus, Aristotle's brief remark in the *Politics* that animals exist for human's sake is counterbalanced by hundreds of statements in his biological writings suggesting that each animal's goal is its own life and flourishing.[4] Descrates, as a modern rationalist philosopher, makes a notorious remark holding that animals are automata.[5] He attacks mere teleological views of nature and claims that animals behave just mechanically without thinking or reasoning. They live without purpose, desire or any sort of rational need usually associated with all human beings. Charles Darwin, in fact, brings a revolutionary change in human attitudes towards animal species with his *The Origin of Species* and this change effectively involves an animal rights movement in both ethics and law. Consequently, the eighteenth century observed a tremendous upsurge in public sympathy for the sufferings of animals. There were widespread attacks not only on cockfighting, bearbaiting, and other cruel sports, but also on the cruel treatment of domestic animals and even on hunting, fishing and meat eating. Philosophers and environmental ethicists have entertained the case for animal welfare.[6] Its defense depends upon overcoming an anthropocentric bias. In this direction, ethical inquiries into animal welfare presuppose a paradigm shift or decentring of the human subject. Specifically, the paradigm shift reorients a normative discourse about animal welfare by providing a new portrait of humanity's reciprocity

with nature. In order to coordinate the prescriptive and descriptive modes of discourses, it is necessary to clarify the larger presuppositions which govern environmental ethics and outline specific guidelines to regulate our treatment of animals. In this respect, the major query is: Do advocates of animal welfare merely exchange one set of assumptions for equally problematic ones, or do they succeed in cultivating a deeper appreciation for the affinity between human beings and nature?

In this essay, I intend to present four prominent approaches to animal ethics such as: (i) Kantian views; (ii) utilitarian views; (iii) rights-based views; and (iv) views based on an idea of capability and functioning or Neo-Aristotelian views. In this connection, I shall argue in favour of a combination of both (iii) and (iv) while recognizing the considerable importance of (ii), which firmly focusses on the moral issue of killing and non-killing.

KANTIAN VIEWS ON ANIMAL ETHICS

Immanuel Kant, a critical thinker, holds that our duties to animals are all indirect duties which are derived from our duties of human beings.[7] He insists that animals have worth and dignity only as instruments of human life. Moreover, Kant says, 'Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity. Animal nature has analogies to human nature, we indirectly do our duty towards humanity.'[8] For him, we become cruel ourselves when we treat animals cruelly. Contemporary Kantian theorists are not so explicit about this position. John Rawls makes it very clear that duties of justice are based on an idea of reciprocity among rough equals and that we, therefore, have no duties of justice to animals. Animals are owed 'compassion and humanity' but '[t]hey are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way'.[9] In other words, people may have genuine ethical duties to animals but these duties are not part of the design of society's basic structure. Thomas Scanlon, taking about ethics rather than political theory, advances a similar view holding that the contract doctrine cannot deal with relationship not involving reciprocity.

The contract doctrine is the entirety of ethics, and some other type of ethical doctrine will take care of those important issues.

This approach seems inadequate, for it postpones the important issue of animal welfare and uses a Kantian conception of the person, identifying citizens with their mental and moral powers and leaving their animality to one side. For Kant, human dignity and moral capacity are radically separate from the natural world. Morality certainly has the task of providing for human needness, but the idea that at bottom we are *split beings* (both rational persons and animal dwellers in the world of nature) never ceases to influence Kant's way of thinking about how these deliberations about our needs will be resolved. Rawls too seems to adopt this way of thinking.

Here, the problem lies in the 'split'. First, it ignores the fact that our dignity is just the dignity of a certain sort of animal. It is the animal sort of dignity. This very sort of dignity cannot be possessed by a being who is not mortal and vulnerable. If it makes sense to think of God as having dignity, it is emphatically not dignity of the type. Second, the split wrongly denies that animality can itself have dignity. Thus, the split leads us to slight certain aspects of our own lives that have worth and to distort our relation to the other animals. Third, it makes us think of ourselves as self-sufficient, not in need of the gifts of fortune. In thinking so, we greatly distort nature of our own morality and rationality which are thoroughly material and animal themselves. We learn to ignore the fact that disease, old age, and accidents can impede the moral and rational functions, just as much as the other animal functions. Fourth, it makes us think of ourselves as atemporal. We forget that the usual human life cycle brings with it periods of extreme dependency in which our functioning is very similar to that experienced by the mentally or physically handicapped throughout their lives.

UTILITARIAN VIEWS ON ANIMAL ETHICS

In general, all utilitarian views have three aspects: consequentialism, sum-ranking, and a substantive view about the good. Consequentialism holds that the right act is the one that promotes the bet overall consequences. Sum-ranking tells us how to aggregate consequences

across lives, i.e. by adding together the goods present in distinct lives. Views about the good in utilitarianism have taken two distinct forms. First is the Bentham's pure hedonistic utilitarianism which asserts the supreme value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain.[10] Second is Peter Singer's modern version of 'Preference utilitarianism',[11] which holds that the consequences we should aim to produce are those that on balance 'further the interests of those affected'.[12] Killing is wrong only when the individuals killed have a preference to continue living; the killing is a wrong to those individuals.

There are some difficulties with the utilitarian views in both of its forms. First of all, because the view is committed to aggregation of all relevant pleasures and pains or preference satisfaction and frustration, it actually makes the answer to ethical questions about our conduct to animals depend on many complex empirical calculations for which the results are uncertain. Thus, it seems that utilitarianism provides a shaky and unclear rationale for vegetarianism. Animals do not have rights. Therefore, we have to calculate all the satisfactions and non-satisfactions of all the people and animals involved. The answer to these calculations is unknown and may prove unknowable.

Second, the view depends on the idea that pleasure and pain are the only intrinsic goods and bads. It, therefore, does not consider deprivations that never register in the animal's consciousness. But, of course, animals raised under bad conditions cannot imagine a better way of life they have never known, and so the fact, for example, that a calf is deprived of free movement cannot register in the utilitarian calculus. Thus, the view suffers from a problem endemic to preference-based views in general, the problem of 'adaptive preferences'. It has long been argued that human beings adapt their expectations and satisfaction to a low living standard if that is all they think they can achieve. How much more true must this fact of adaptation be in the case of animals, isolated and caged, who have no conception of any other way of live? They may still feel pain, and this pain the utilitarian can consider. What the view cannot consider is all the deprivation of valuable life activity that animals do not feel.

Third, although in its origin the view is quite egalitarian about the worth of all life, in practice, utilitarianism favours animals with complex

forms of consciousness. While this conclusion might prove ethically right we ought to at least debate it rather than simply assume its validity. According to both Bentham and Singer, it is only wrong to kill an animal when doing so frustrates the animal's interest in its well being. They understand this interest as a conscious awareness that death is bad. For Bentham, this requirement draws a pretty significant likeness (if not precisely between humans and animals) at least between humans and some animals, on the one hand, and most animals, on the other. The preference to continue living is difficult to ascertain; how broadly does it extend in the animal kingdom? By insisting on the presence of this preference as a necessary condition of the wrongness of killing, Singer thus makes differences of capacities directly relevant to that moral issue. He holds that species membership may point to things that are morally significant. This argument sounds plausible, and yet the idea that there is no moral importance in the deprivations of life suffered by creatures who cannot be said to have a preference for continued life seems questionable.

RIGHTS-BASED VIEWS ON ANIMAL ETHICS

The next major type of view, which tries to go beyond both Kantian contractarianism and utilitarianism, is the rights-based view. So far animals are concerned, the most fully developed exposition of this view is contained in Tom Regan's *The Case for Animal Rights*.[13] Regan argues that a moral right is a prepolitical valid ethical claim to certain types of treatment. All moral agents and all moral patients have, he argues, certain basic moral rights to respectful treatment. All members of this moral community have great and intrinsic value. This is a crucial step in his argument because Kantians restrict rights to humans on the grounds that only moral agents have intrinsic value. In fact, they uphold the 'Stoice dichotomy'.[14] Regan erodes the dichotomy by insisting that the harms (not just pains, but also deprivations of chances for functioning and flourishing) that animals can suffer are similar to those humans can suffer in a morally relevant way. To the claim that intrinsic value can come in degrees, he replies that morality does not tolerate matters of degree. You either have intrinsic value or you do not, and all who have it, have so equally.[15]

Steven M. Wise also proposes a rights-based view,[16] for his project is to provide an account of legal rights for animals. Though he is not concerned with advancing a complete theory of their moral rights, he tries to work animal rights into the existing common law framework. Thus, he focusses on attributes that have traditionally been salient in the common law as bases for legal rights. The theory he advances is consequently narrower than Regan's. Wise intends to defend the rights of some animals on the same basis on which various rights of human have been defended in our legal tradition. He argues that it is a 'virulent injustice' not to extend to animal rights 'derived from these same principles and values and in the same ways'.[17] The rights in which he is most interested, and which he groups under the rubric of 'dignity rights',[18] are rights to bodily integrity and bodily liberty.[19] In consequence, he maintains that under current legal standards, a necessary condition of having such rights is autonomy. As he insists, 'Having dignity-rights without autonomy is a little like being a bird without feathers or a Buddhist Pope'.[20] Autonomy requires capacities for choice and reflection. In Wise's view, a realistic lower limit of autonomy, the lowest level at which a creature qualifies for right would be the choice-capacities of 'young children or the adults of many species of mammals'.[21] In practice, however, he focusses on chimps and bonobos. He holds that the rights of animals, like those of children and mentally handicapped adults, may be qualified in some respects and one not necessarily the same as those of human adults. For him, all creatures with rights have equal intrinsic values.[22] But if we are convinced that animals have rudimentary capacities of practical reason and choice, as he argues, then it is a flagrant injustice to deny them rights of some kinds. With regards to this conception, Wise puts forth the results of much current research into the cognitive and social capacities of chimpanzees and bonobos. According to him, chimpanzees and bonobos have a wide range of cognitive and emotional capacities, roughly at the level of a three-year-old child. They feel humour, fear, grief, compassion and what is crucial, the ability to think perspectively, to interpret the world as it would be seen from another creature's viewpoint. Indeed, Wise shows that they have this capacity to a greater extent than do some humans. Autistic children, for example, lack this capacity.[23]

One strange and interesting result of Wise's investigation is that the innate capacities of chimpanzees and bonobos living among humans appear to display fuller development than the capabilities of those who live among peer animals in the wild. Thus, living in the company of humans enables chimpanzees and bonobos to develop abilities that they do not manifest when living only with their own species.

Let us consider the advantages and disadvantages of rights-based views. One attractive merit of the rights-based views is that they consider each and every individual as an end and they refuse to subordinate the interests of some creatures to the general social welfare. These commitments mean that their ethical claims about animals need not await the result of complex utilitarian calculations: animals have entitlements, whatever else is true of the social world in which they live. Another advantage is that rights-based views can embrace concerns that do not reside entirely in sentience. Thus, deprivation of liberty and violations of bodily integrity are wrong in themselves, no matter how they register in the creature's awareness. Rights-based views share these advantages with Kantian views, but unlike those views, rights-based views do not insist on human capacities as a necessary basis for claims of justice.

A difference between rights-based views and utilitarian views that is more difficult to evaluate is the matter of ethically relevant differences among species. As we have seen, Singer insists that the concern we owe various creatures is relative to the types of thoughts and desires of which they are capable. The species barrier is of no moral relevance in and of itself, but morally relevant traits may often be correlated with species membership. Regan's rights-based view appears to express a more determined moral egalitarianism. But, as it seems, rights-based views are not committed to such moral egalitarianism. Wise's rights-based view makes the possession of certain non-universal capacities (such as imagination, sentience and perspectival thinking) a necessary condition of having rights.

However, here we get to the real difficulty with all rights-based views: they are a little loose and vague. The concept of a right has been debated in many ways throughout the history of the subject. One of the most contested points is the basis for saying that a creature has

a right to something. Regan does his best to give a clear account of his rights-based conception, but the rights framework by itself does not supply much definiteness.[24] Rights need to be incorporated into an ethical approach that spell out the basis for rights and what it means to secure one to someone.

NEO-ARISTOTELIAN VIEWS ON ANIMAL ETHICS

It is here to focus, again, on Aristotle and his ideas of capability and functioning. Every creature strives for a good, which is the exercise and maintenance of its characteristic form of life. All animals that move from place to place also desire that good and in some way or another are aware of it as an apparent good. In the case of human beings, of course, we cannot identify these goods simply by looking at our form of life. Human beings are ethical animals. Evaluating the capacities that we have to essential to making any list of 'human capabilities' for normative social purposes. Humans possess innumerable capacities which are potentially in them and flourish depending on the situations that they encounter. In fact, these capabilities are in contents as social goods which are correlated with innate ability of human beings. In this connection, Martha C. Nussbaum, an eminent ethicist, presents a broad list of central human capabilities.[25] This list includes: (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination and thought, (5) emotions, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, and (10) control over one's environment. The list enumerates capabilities, not actual functions with regards to the approach attached to choice and also to pluralism. Here the concept 'pluralism' implies that in a pluralistic society, we do not want to drag people into functioning in a certain way, but we do want to make sure that the choice is fully open to them.

Like Rawlsian and rights-based approaches to animal ethics, the capabilities approach insists on treating each individual as an end and criticizes the utilitarian accounts of the social goal on that account. Similar to these critiques of utilitarianism, the capabilities' approach does not consider preference to be a necessary condition of making something a social goal. Deprivations that do not register in awareness are a major concern of the approach. But like utilitarianism, the

capabilities' approach does take experience seriously: pleasure and delight, and the avoidance of pain, are among the major goals that it promotes. The capabilities approach is closely related to forms of Kantian liberalism that operate with a more restricted list of social primary goods and so the capabilities approach has the advantage of not committing itself to the split between humanity and animality that is in many ways built into Rawls's theory. It might seem that the language of capabilities equips us to move beyond the species better in the sense that it sees animality as something valuable and dignified and prepares us to turn to the difficult issue of animal entitlements.

It is not out of the context to note that in *Created from Animals*, a very fine work on animal entitlements, philosopher James Rachels first assails the idea that there is a sharp divide in capacity between humans and animals.[26] Rachels questions the meaning of morality when we deny the sharp dichotomy. The view he proposes focusses on supporting the opportunity of all creatures to flourish in accordance with their characteristics that vary from species to species. It may sometimes make an ethical difference to the question of how a creature ought to be created. Thus, having the capacity for autonomy or for language is not irrelevant to all questions of ethical treatment. But there must be a relevant connection between capacity and treatment. The fact that humans are language users and dogs are not may have implications for employment rights and education rights, but it has no ethical implications for causing pain or withholding life-sustaining food. Again, autonomy makes a difference to certain issues in the area of paternalism, i.e. humans have an interest in planning their own lives that many animals do not have; treatment that might be find for a horse would be unacceptably intrusive for a human adult. But it does not make a difference in every area. Rachels concludes that to the extent that humans and animals are similar, they should be treated similarly and to the extent that they differ, those differences may permit different treatment.

Like Peter Singer[27], Rachels is a moral individualist. He thinks that the relevant question is about the level of capacity of the individual creature with which we are dealing, rather than species membership as such. Species membership is frequently a good shortcut to the

identification of relevant needs and capacities, but not always. Thus, it is a dangerous and imperfect attitude to prefer our own kind. Like Singer again, Rachels is prepared to admit morally relevant differences in levels of life. It is worse to kill some creatures rather than others. The kind of life that is being destroyed is relevant in assessing the type of harm a killing does. If we are forced to choose between killing a rhesus monkey and swatting a fly, we are justified in choosing in the monkey's favour, since the life of the monkey is far richer and more complex than that of the fly, as also the monkey's psychological capacities are so much greater. It is the richness and complexity of the individual life that is significant. Thus, in a conflicting case, we justifiably prefer a human life to a non-human life.

Now one may be tempted to ask: where does this leave us with animals? Rachels focusses on those *areas of life* in which we already interact with animals. In these areas, he holds, we have duties to act in ways that protect and ensure the capacities of the individual sort of life with which we are dealing. He focusses, above all, on duties not to interfere in ways that cause pain and harm. Like Singer, his practical focus is on the harms caused to animals in research, product testing, and factory farming. More generally, no animal that has a rich biographical life may be killed. This entails, given his views about capacities of mammals, at least no meat eating, though fish may possibly be exempt. In the case of domestic animals, a clear implication of the account is that we also have a wide range of positive duties to support and ensure good lives. Finally, like Singer, Rachels insists that a normal adult chimpanzee needs more consideration than a human child who lacks all cognitive capacities and will never have the sort of awareness that characterizes the chimpanzee.

Rachels does not discuss the implications of his view for cases in which we can support the well being or safety of wild animals by intervention. In the wild, creatures suffer pain, torture, and death all the time just as they suffer from hunger and disease. It is one thing to suggest that we ought to be sure that we do not destroy the habitat of an animal by our own self-interested actions. It is quite another to suggest that we ought to protect mice from becoming the prey of predatory birds or ought to stop lions from killing sheep. If we were

to generalize the capabilities' view to all sentient life, we would say that all major capabilities ought to be protected for all creatures capable of them. Thus, bodily integrity and health, for example, ought to be protected for all living creatures. Rachels confesses that the logic of his view leads in that direction.

The fact is that animal ethics is so complex that many questions are yet to be answered. The capabilities' view begins from a high moral evaluation of complex powers of sentience, consciousness, affiliation and thought. It seems reasonable to hold that a creature such as monkey who can think, experience many emotions, and form complex social relationships, has a form of life that is more valuable than the borderline sentience of an insect.

However, even if we narrow the groups of creatures according to their capabilities, there will very likely be pervasive conflicts, since creatures threaten one another's safety and also since ensuring the good of one creature may actually create a greater threat to another. In other words, for example, the protection of wolves has resulted in threats to sheep, house pets, and some instances, children. It would be nice to think that rats could all be shipped off to a rat community where they could live untroubled lives without infecting or endangering other animals. But killing rats does not seem to be a heinous moral evil and it may in many cases be the least of the evils. So, a complete ban on killing seems implausible. But with regards to Bentham, Singer and Rachels, killing done in the meat industry and its cruel practices, creatures being subject to factory farming where they lead hideous lives, and the cases of product testing where it results in the infliction of needless and terrible suffering may be protected on a strong humanitarian moral ground.

After all, the capabilities' view is not anti-consequentialist as are some rights-based views because it values the capabilities of all creatures who are affected by a choice. It urges us to consider the totality of the consequences when we choose, though not to adopt the simple maximizing strategies favoured by some utilitarians. With consequentialist force, we really do want to know what will happen to animal species in an anti-eco-friendly world. But we fail to evaluate such a condition. We do not want to say that the welfare of society

overrides significant entitlements; and yet this position does not mean that we do not want to know what effects our interests will have to the welfare of all creatures.

ECOLOGY, ANIMAL ETHICS AND MORAL OBLIGATION

Here, it is imperative to deal with the questions: what exactly is our obligation to the animal kingdom? In other words, how are we as humans committed to animals' good and suffering? As we have experienced, there may be a distinction between humans who love animals, i.e. animal lovers and humans who are sensitive to the ethical rights of animals. But often there is a conflict between two. Hence, it causes a great error. In ecological conditions, we observe that humans may be genuine lovers of animals while treating them extremely badly in certain cases. Even humans who care for the particular animals they love may not care at all about animal rights. On the other sight, an arid and formal person, in whose heart nature has placed little sympathy or emotion, might prove an eloquent defender of animal's goals and rights. It is to say that many people who love animals are quite indifferent to their plight. Some of these people treat the animals in their immediate interest like things and many more do not. They would be aghast at any mistreatment of their beloved dogs and cats. What they lack is an extension of sympathy to cases not in their immediate interest. In contrast, a person who fears animals or just does not like them can still form good moral judgements and work energetically in this field. In fact, one's attachment to animals requires some sort of motivation derived by moral conscience. And this moral conscience in humans is not an inborn attribute or inner sight; rather, it happens through continuous participation in the lives of animals or domestic pets. This type of sheer moral conscience itself is the source of moral motivation to act or behave rightly. Everyone cannot have such moral motivation. Thus, it is not surprising that defenders of animal rights have not always agreed about the role to be played by the participation and moral motivation in thinking well about animals. But, according to ecological need, wherein we are to be morally committed to animals, has been a prominent device for the expansion of ethical awareness either about non-killing of animals or to respect animal interests.

Animals constitute a major part of our environment and play a significant role in the ecological balance. Our ecological consciousness has caused to energize us against cruelty not only to domestic animals but also to all creatures in general. Thus, our participation in animal lives has been extended from our interests to animals-interests in order to assert a safe and sustainable existence of both in an occupied ecocentric moral order.[28]

It is not surprising that the conservation of different species of biological resources maintain the balance of the ecosystem. Animal protection and conservation helps mankind towards peaceful coexistence with the natural environment. Conservation of animals (both domestic as well as wild animals) is an essential component for sustainable development because it has been proved that the loss of even a single species may cause irreparable damage to the environment. It is pertinent to mention that environmental imbalance in the ecosystem would even result in few species of the biological resources becoming extinct. Another important characteristic of the ecological need of species is that some key species have a more intense impact on the ecosystem than that of the other species. There are organisms essential for the existence of others. Unfortunately, recent environmentalists and environmental ethicists, for example, D. Drew, Rick O' Neil, Eric Moore, Peter S. Wenz, etc., observe that in most cases, different species are destroyed for the sake of human greed and need.[29] This is the reality that we encounter in an environmental discussion and it urges us to develop an ethics towards the interest of species in contrast with our interests.

CONCLUSION

The idea that humans are the ultimate masters of the world has led to the denigration of animals as lacking rational thought or self-awareness and as devoid of any intrinsic value of their own. Animals become vulnerable to exploitation when they relinquish their territorial claim and occupy only the space granted to them by the instrumental ends of human beings. Given the fact that we can simultaneously recognize the limits of the Earth's habitats as well as our potential for self-aggrandizement, our responsibility toward animals arises from the finite

nature of freedom. Because freedom is a gift summoning us to dwell on the Earth and not a proprietorial right exclusive to us, we must deploy it in a way which allows animals to be its benefactors. Our moral obligation and responsibility to the animal kingdom, however, is an ethical value for the ecosystem. This is presupposed by ecological demand and requires demoralization of anthropocentrism. How could it be possible? It could be possible by two supposed ways: first, humans must have a positive attitude towards animal liberation and respect to animal interest; and second, by developing a sharp environmental-ethical consciousness. These fundamental issues mean to motivate and activate humans to be the custodian, rather than the destroyer/killer of animal world are not regulated by emotions or intuition, but by practical reason. We should not forget that practical reason is an ethical condition. This conception can prove to be extremely valuable to establishing a harmonious order among interests of both humans and animal-species.

This conception may be further extended to cope interests of all sort of eco-items which have a vital role to play for asserting the sustainability of human life, making humans morally more responsible to a eco-system as a whole. Barring all 'eco-enemy' attitudes and looks, their eco-friendliness will drive them to adopt a framework of animal ethics in which killing or any sort of assault to animals obviously will be proved morally worthless.[30]

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Creative Visualization: A Semantic Analysis

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Life has no limits, rather in the way visual field has none.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein

This paper explicates the notion of creative visualization as a semantic feature of thinking. Thinking is a conscious as also creative activity. Human consciousness is creative. Creativity needs semantic characterization in order to show that it is intrinsic to human consciousness. A creative mental state is formed as well as visualized in imagination. So far as the objectivity of creative visualization is concerned, the paper brings out a *first person perspective* of analyzing creativity. In this regard, the *third person perspective* of creativity, according to the cognitive scientists, gives an objective analysis considering that consciousness, subjectivity, and intentionality are non-intrinsic and non-phenomenal features of the brain. Hence, a first person perspective seeks objectivity of creative experience from the basis of semantics. The paper is an attempt to show that if creativity is a sensible and rational enterprise, then the semantic explication will not dismiss its intrinsic relationship with consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality and their phenomenality. The paper maintains the Searlean theorization that thinking is a semantic activity. At the same time, it also brings out the main contentions of the Searlean critics like Dennett and Fodor who strongly argue for a syntactic theorization of creative experience. This paper is divided into three sections excluding the introduction and the conclusion. The first section is about the creative visualization as a conscious-semantic process. The second section gives a syntactic explanation of creativity. The third section is a description of the

semantic features of experience with relation to their ontology and objectivity. The ontology of experience brings back the notion of the self and its subjectivity. The paper concludes that the objectivity of creative visualization lies in the meaningful representation of reality.

I

Creative visualization is one of the modes of 'visual experience' in imagination. A person experiences imageries in his/her imagination. Imagination, as it has been usually understood, is a power to call upon images which can also be explained in terms of memory function. Mental images appear and disappear in our thoughts. The appearance and disappearance of mental images can also be a fancy. Imaginary thoughts in the ordinary sense may include fancy. Fancies are not creative states of the mind. Moreover, we are concerned with the concept of imagination in a much wider sense of the term, in which creative thoughts are formed. So, creative visualization is about reflection on or realization of creative thoughts in imagination. It is a capacity to reflect upon the mental imageries. As Kenny rightly puts it, 'The ability to imagine the world different in significant ways; the ability to conjecture, hypothesize, invent—this is a different form of imagination, creative imagination, creative imagination possessed par excellence by person such as poets, story-tellers, and scientists of genius'.[1] Creative imagination intends to describe reality in a newer way; something different from the way they are given to us. It is a new way of looking at things. As Wittgenstein calls it, one makes a 'grammatical movement' by 'looking beyond' the form in which it is given to us. For instance, 'while drawing a new form of painting, attempting to write a song applying a new metre',[2] the artists and the poets transcend the established form of creativity. More importantly, creative visualization is one of the inner senses of realization of the reality. When this realization grows into something new—may be a novel idea, a new concept—better methods are formulated for solving problems or into an aesthetically pleasing product, the visualization may be termed creative.

Human beings are artistic about doing things. Creativity is very much a part of their life. As Tagore illustrates it, 'For a man by nature is an artist; he never receives passively or accurately in his mind a

physical representation of things around him. There undergoes a continual adaptation, a transformation of facts into imagery, through constant touches of sentiment and imagination.'[3] A creative genius—or an ordinary individual experiencing a creative process—is quite conscious about sensing creative ideas that form in his imagination. In imagination, the person conceives imageries and develops them for a better representation. At the beginning, he may have some impression but he intends to look forward to have a *perspicuous* representation, which suggests that the person is involved in a mode of comprehending the imageries. Representation involves willing, emotion, feelings, sentiments, reason, etc., through which the artist in any subject nurtures the gestate images. A creative state undergoes *transformation* in the process of formulating new ideas. That is to say, the *content* of a creative state continues to modify till the artist realizes that the piece of art is complete. The modification is a 'sustained interplay'[4] among the emerging imageries and their applications. The sustained interplay is a process between the convergence and the divergence of various mental states. The self-regulative function among the imageries precisely brings out the *cognitive flexibility* of realizing the content of mental states. For instance, we can think of a musician trying to put notes in the instrument. The person repeats the notes again and again till he fine-tunes the notes. Similarly, the painter works on the canvas repeatedly with colour and line many times till he is satisfied. The process of modification, therefore, is a shift from an *imperfect* creative state to a *perfect* creative state. The modification of mental states *persists in time* which could be linguistically translated in terms of the verb 'to happen' or 'may happen'.[5]

When a person is involved in creative something new, he is aware of the experience that he undergoes. The feeling of that sensibility is a mode of realizing something and then *describing* it. The form of sensing and form of describing unfolds a process of transformation of experience, which results in 'joy, pride, ... something new which we call transforming too'.[6] This transformation of thoughts is a part of thinking whether it is verbal to visual or the opposite. The content of visual experience of thought and the expression of the experience of thoughts are meaningfully connected. As Searle interprets, 'There are

perceptual experiences, they have intentionality, their intentional content is propositional in form; they have mind to the world direction. The properties which are specified by their intentional content are not in general literally properties of perceptual experiences.'[7] Searle emphasizes that there is an intentional feature embedded in structuring the content of experience. He maintains that the semantic characterization of the content of experience flows from the *intentionality* of consciousness. The 'eyes' see what the mind knows and is looking for. Secondly, intentionality bridges the gap between the mental representation and linguistic representation. There could be an isomorphic relationship that persists between the two levels of representation and intentionality remains a connecting principle between them.

The flow of intentionality constitutes a field of experience. In the field of experience, a person comprehends the meaning that s(he) tries to disclose. An artiste's willingness towards a perspicuous representation of thought signifies not only the pictorial features of thoughts but also the process of experiencing. The content of the experience is to give a *meaning* to the piece of art. Thus, looking for a meaning in the representation of thought is a self-referential feature of intentionality. For instance, while playing a few notes, a musician keeps on modifying the notes for a better tune. Creative thinking aims to reach at perfection. Here, being conscious of tuning and opting for suitable or perfect modifications are due to the self-referential feature of consciousness. That is, intentionality is involved in showing the directedness from the *mind to the world*, i.e. playing of the notes shows the flow of intentionality from thought to action; whereas, listening to the tuning shows the *world to the mind* direction.[8] The intentionality flows from the *subject pole* to *object pole* and vice versa which constitutes the field of experience.[9] The subject pole is the root of intentional experience. All shifts of experience are possible with reference to the subject pole. The shift of visual fields would show the manifoldness of intentionality of subjectivity transforming the visual fields and entering into different realms of experience. That is, precisely, for instance, the reason one talks about the experience of *solitude* in the presence of others. Although the shifting of *visual field* is the process of the 'change

in sequence of thoughts,[10] still it is due to the intentionality that acts in the *background* of consciousness.

II

Cognitive science discards the traditional notion of thinking as a conscious activity. Rather, thinking is a mental process which can be explained with relation to brain processes. Cognitivists provide a non-conscious/physical basis to explain the experience of thoughts. Thought or mental representation is caused by the 'deeper anatomical level' of brains as well as with the interrelated 'parts of an essentially arbitrary system'.[11] According to this school, representation must be explained at the sub-personal level. Sub-personal levels of explanation are governed by the laws of psychophysics to take up the 'hard ontological questions'[12] and provide an *extensional* explanation of experience against the *intentional* explanation of experience of thought. The extensional approach denies the intentional feature of consciousness. Intentionality is not the representational features of thoughts. It may be one of the *functional properties extrinsic* to thinking, and is not causally efficacious. So, the *aboutness* of mental representation only gives as *if* impression. Moreover, representations being the effect of physical events of the neural states and process, do have a *descriptional feature*. As Dennett puts it, 'Imagining is depictional or descriptional, not pictorial and is bound only by this one rule borrowed from the rules governing sight: it must be from a point of view—1 cannot imagine the inside and outside of a barn at once'.[13] The point of view of description of mental imagery, for Dennett, is the inner constituents of the perceptual properties of the object. He is not concerned with the sort of description that 'the barn is dark rafters with black rafters and a pine floors'; rather, the very constituents of its representation which would give an *objective* description of the mental imagery. For instance, an objective description of hallucination can be given with regard to the 'cause of abnormal neural discharge and stimulation of by electrode of micro areas on the visual cortex'.[14] Hence, cognitive science looks at the reality from a third person perspective to provide a scientific objectivity to human thought processes.

Daniel Dennett[15] further discusses the nature of thought with relation to their imagistic capacities, i.e. whether thoughts produce certain images or the 'information bearing states are themselves images'. He raises strong objection to the belief that thoughts themselves embody semantic properties or charts, sentences, graphs, etc. According to him, it is a thorough misconception to accept the view that images are visualized in thinking. 'Visualization' as an imaginary mode of experiencing the mental imageries is acceptable to Dennett in the sense that 'imagining is like *seeing*'. On the contrary, if the visualization is to be understood as a mode of reflection or conceiving the mental images, then he strongly differs, stating that *imagining* and *conceiving* are two different concepts like 'listening and seeing'.[16] Conceiving is an ability to understand, whereas imagining is *seeing* in the sense of observing but 'not making pictures'. So, imagination as a mode of seeing can be explained in terms of causal function of observation. Therefore, visualization of the intentional *image* in thoughts is something like getting into the 'psychological experiments of mental images that are *subjective* and over the above to maintain that there are radical differences in *imagistic powers* of people'.[17] The ability to create images is quite subjective in the sense that mental images are apprehended subjectively or what is thought by a creative person as different from other creative person. The *comprehension* of thoughts is very important so far as its descriptional features of imagination is concerned. With the help of a description, one can express the *mental image*, i.e. to describe what he imagines. To have a mental image need not necessarily be identical with a corresponding object of observation. Should the mental image of a tiger be identical with the tiger that I see over there or a tiger-like beast that visit our campus at night? So, having a mental image need not guided by the *rules of images* in general. The description may 'give rise to totally a new conception; a new intentional object that needs a "new grammatical move" for its explanation'.[18]

The nature of an object of visual experience is different from creating a mental image of that object. One can explain the function of visual imageries with the help of stimulus and responses. If the 'stimulus fails to stimulate', then it fails to generate responses. In other words, a failure to locate the causal disorder may not bring an intentional object

to my observation. A scientific look at the cause of mental images accepts the fact that it is a *logical construction*[19] of certain elements of brain processes. Dennett gives an example of 'β-manifolds' which involves the series of mental states embedding the images like 'alpha' and 'beta', i.e. 'A > B > C > D < E > α > β'.



$A + 1 = B + 2 = C + 3 = D + 4 == E + 5 \ldots \rightarrow \alpha \ldots \rightarrow \beta$

Once the causal elements are de-linked then it would *transpire* either differently or will not succeed in producing the image at all. Suppose β is an image produced by the causal process $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow E \rightarrow \alpha$. Once the process is known then we can name the process for producing the image. Now, if someone believes his mental images are information carrying structures in his brain that deserve to be called images because they have certain structural and functional properties, and if science eventually confirms that normal causes of that person's β-manifolds are merely such structures, and then they can identify intentional object with cause. Images have caused him to believe he is having images. That is the scientific *iconophile* prediction[20] that will annihilate all assumptions of a fundamental cognitive affect to the mind.

Mental representation will produce pictures with a condition that a proper simulation takes place following an order. The simulation sustains by causal operation of the neural networks. If the stimuli fail to carry out the process then it shows the breakdown of the operation. In this regard, stimulation depends upon the coordination of neural networks and the physico-chemical processes that occur in the brain. Moreover, that itself is also the cause of realization of thoughts. Unless the brain events are properly detected, it is certainly difficult to answer the ontological questions raised for experience of thought. Since every aspect of mental simulation guarantees the physical simulation in the brain, it clearly suggests that reality of mental images or the picturing

capacity of the mental representation is rooted in the neuro-physiological structures and functions of the brain. Scientific facts can, thus, bring *epistemic credentials* to the explanation of mental image with relation to the causal theories of perception, memory, inference, etc.

The loss of scientific objectivity may result in stating the fact that mental images as *intentional object* are not only fictitious entities but also found in fictitious space. It will imply that 'the creative ability to produce *ideactic* imagery lies in the subjective capacity of creative genius. And, only the creative genius will have 'the authority to create a world'.[21] A subjective basis of creativity will thus disown the objectivity. It would mean that creative imageries are not part of objective world but exist in a *phenomenal space*. Dennett writes, 'Phenomenal space is Mental Image haven, but if mental images turn out to be real, they can reside quite comfortably in the physical space in our brains, and if they turn out not to be real, they can reside, with Santa Claus, in the logical space of fiction'.[22] However, the appeal of the imageries in logical space of fiction is ingrained in the history of mankind in the form of appeal of the archetypal symbols and is well illustrated by the phenomenal success of the Harry Potter series.

However, Dennett does not disown the fact that the explanation of experience of thought is analogous to the information processing in cognitive systems. If anyone believes that his mental images are information-carrying structures in his brain, those deserve to be called images because they have certain structural and functional properties, and if science eventually confirms that the normal causes of that person's β-manifolds are just such structures, then they can happily identify intentional object with cause. He will realize that imaging is, and has been, life normal veridical perception: just as pigs cause one to see pigs and cows cause one to see cows, images have caused him to believe that he is having images.[23] Mental states are informational states. Mental states embody certain properties for transforming the stimuli into *images* once they are simulated. The scientists will insist that the extensional characterization in terms of physics or physiology should be amenable to explanation and prediction. But the functioning of the innumerable neurons in the brain—about 10^{11} in number—at a particular point of time seems to be so chaotic (in the sense of the new

branch of physics of chaos) that it seems almost impossible today to decipher as to how content, meaning and intentionality come out of that function. And though the actual occurrence of quantum phenomena in neural network is still lacking proof, should the developments of measuring devices in experimental physics to confirm them, the randomness and the chance occurrences that characterize the quantum events would qualify the creative images to be end product of such randomness. If we were to look for a print out to come out from the mental occurrences similar to what one gets from a computer by feeding it with images; *alas*, what is provided by the modern sophisticated gadgets like PET scan will also appear to be a crude sketch compared to the works of the geniuses. The concern lies in incompleteness of the physicalists' agenda in their extensional explanation as well as the exclusion of the *first person perspective* (subjectivity) of understanding experience. We shall thus be then forced to another aspect of cognition: what is joy and beauty is a work of a creative mind; what is ugly and dangerous is the product of schizophrenia. But both are rooted in the processing of imageries in the brain.

This thinking is exemplified in Fodor's 'propositional attitude psychology' (PAP). PAP explicates the semantical properties of mental states with the help of *language of thought*. Language of thought is a distinct form of language which structures as well as processes thoughts. It is like an algorithm processing inputs and outputs in a machine. The linguistic feature of thoughts is primarily syntactical. Computational Psychology understands that mental states are cognitive states. Cognitive states like belief, desire and intention are central to mental representation. Believing, etc., is a relation between an organism and mental representation. 'Mental representations have (*inter alia*) syntactic properties; and the mechanisms of belief-change are defined over syntactic properties of mental representations.'[24] This is the organic function of the neuro-physiology. The neuro-physiological function is the ultimate ground for the causal process that is involved in *information processing*. The transformation of content of thoughts is thereby explainable with relation to the causal powers of syntax or the syntactic properties of language of thoughts. 'The connection is about the causal properties of the symbol with semantic properties, via its syntax. Syntax

of symbols is of higher order.'[25] The syntax has a deeper level of existence and a higher order function not only defines the intentional feature of experience, but also *evaluates* the content of thoughts. In other words, content of thought is determined by the causal function of the syntax with relation to the brain. Thus, psycho-semantics holds causal relationship between the function of neurons and neural dynamism with the language of thought.

Let us maintain the cause relationship between neuron and language of thought, without negating the intentional feature of thoughts and experience. Then, intentionality of experience will be an epiphenomenal feature of neural states of the brain. The descriptional feature does no more remain an intentional feature of the mind; rather it could be defined as the propositional attitude of the neural states. But have we defined the *dynamism* of the neural states? Can the neural functions be causally determined? The assertion of these questions may succeed in revealing the causal function of the syntax and the propositional attitudes. But that is not the case; the functions of the neural orders are indeterminate. So far as thought process is concerned, it is important to note that 'the causal talk is conceptual and linguistic, rather than ontological'.[26] So, to define thought process in terms of certain 'linguistic apparatus' and their causal function gives a conceptual analysis of the nature of thinking. It does not have a necessary relationship among the regulating function of the cognitive states. We can ascribe a causal explanation to the mental phenomena knowing that the very function of the mental is not governed by the causal laws. On the other hand, cognitive science maintains that experiential features are not causally efficacious, because their functionalities depend on the function of syntax. Whereas, the syntax by itself is not causally efficacious; rather it sustains the functions being causally identical with neural states and processes. The question further arises: how do the unconscious symbols *transform* to conscious thoughts by the syntax which is neither itself conscious nor accessible to consciousness? The transformation of internal properties of signs to their form of content in thoughts is still a *mystical* process for the extensional explanation given by cognitive science. The extensional explanation cannot show the 'mirror-image' relationship of the *logical form of language* which is attempted to

show in conjecturing *language of thought*. The logical form of language can show that 'mirroring is related to experience of content and form'.[27] The very fact is that it makes the division between thought and expression on the basis of content; it fails to show the connection between them and accepts reductionism. Thus, the intentional explanation succeeds in philosophizing the mental by asserting the ontology of thought and expression. The ontology of thoughts is still the ontology of consciousness. In the discourse of intentional explanation, intentionality acts as a connecting principle of consciousness, thoughts and experiences, showing that they are conceptually intrinsic to each other and ontologically one. On the contrary, the ontology of experience advocated by the cognitive science with regard to the language of mind needs to hold a stronger notion of identity with the ontology of brain, to assure that psycho-physics is the locus of psycho-semantics. Psycho-semantics eliminates the *subjectivity of* experience, and looks for the objectivity in the functions of the neural states. As a result, it reduces the mental features with a functional description to neurophysiology.

III

Neurophysiology does not take experience *per se* more seriously. It takes the psychological components like feelings, attitudes, motives, habits, etc., in structuring experience and defining experience with relation to the physical features that are *tightly* linked with brain processes. In this connection, neurophysiology takes the help of psychology. Moreover, neurophysiology treats the mind as a *syntactic engine*.[28] The ascription of experience to the mental processes is treated as epiphenomena. Experiential properties—let us exemplify by quoting spirituality as an example—are not physically identifiable and causally explainable. They are not physical or they are not causally efficacious. That does not disown the experiential features of the mental states. Rather, their non-physical features characterize them as distinct features having ontological significance. Call them mental or *res cogitans* and they intrinsically involve intentionality to define mental causation. The mind as a syntactic engine will not be aware of these mental features. Yet, it does have the capacity to transform mental representations that

involve semantical properties. Mind acts as a *semantic engine*. Semantical properties are the feature of consciousness.

The semantical perspective of understanding experience is well discussed in Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA). Hypothetically, a person is made to sit isolated in a room. The person knows English but he does not know either Chinese or Japanese. Instructions are given in English to the person. He is asked to match Chinese scripts with Japanese scripts that are given separately in two different baskets. By reading the *rules* (algorithm), the person successfully correlates the scripts. Though the person succeeds in matching the scripts, he still does not literally understand. He does not derive any meaning from the exercise except that he has done some work. This proves the point that 'the syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and minds have semantics'.[29] That is precisely why and how the computers based on the precise algorithmic systems do not have any *intrinsic* intelligence to understand what they are doing. Thus, ascription of intentionality in the human mind to algorithm is a misunderstanding. Such interpretation is based on misunderstanding the scope of modal operators. 'The argument at *any level* which satisfies the Turing Test is not sufficient for, nor constitutive of intentional content.'[30] Intentional content as a constituting feature of meaning is related to various levels of experiences to which human psycho-semantic experiences are interrelated. Can brain function exclusively substitute the explanation of experiences?

The brain is certainly a vital part of my embodied existence. But my existence is not only the bodily existence; my bodily existence is realized not by identifying myself with the body. Rather, I *feel* my body and bodily sensations by being *conscious about* them. Here *my* existence is defined by my being *conscious about* the *existence* itself. 'I' as conscious being stands in a reflective mode of consciousness to my *visual field*. My visualization shifts by changing the order of fields. 'I' as a subject of experience is metaphysical. 'I' *see* different visual fields. The visual field may be about thought experience or may be about sense-experience or experience of the world. The 'I' stands in an intentional mode of existence.[31] Subjectivity is not *coextensive* with the consciousness or the self. Rather, the self discloses itself in various modes of subjectivity. Subjectivity extends in time—the 'agency persists

in time through different modes of experiences'. The continual adaptation of modification of creative ideas is a temporarily extended activity. I *see* my activity of creating a painting or writing a paper over an extended period of time. As Bratman writes, 'I see myself as the beginning of the project, developing over time, and finally completing it. I see the agent of various as one of the same agent—namely me.'[32] The self stands as synthetic unity of all the subjective modes of experience. It can transcend its own subjectivity. Precisely in creative visualization, the person continues to remain in the state of experience till he withdraws himself. The sense of belongingness is an internal aspect of experience. By extending myself to the object of visualization, I can attempt to comprehend its meaning. An intentional engagement of that sort precisely constitutes the field of experience.

The meaning derived from a creative experience has its own objectivity. The truth of a creative phenomenon lies in itself. For instance, writing a good piece of poetry, drawing a beautiful painting, inventing new theorems, proving a mathematical problem in the simplest method are certainly creative activities issuing pleasure, happiness and joy. It is more satisfying; rather, the beauty is in feeling joy when others understand it or interpret it meaningfully. So, *meaning* is not reduced to the artist's own subjectivity. Rather, it is born out of this/her experience with the reality. Mohanty puts it as, 'Poetic and religious experiences—experiences of beauty and sacredness—are not methodologically created; they over take you, they happen to you, they cannot be guaranteed as the idea endpoint of a process, and when they happen to you, they bring with them their own objectivity, not a mere claim to objectivity to be verified or rejected later on. These experiences and the descriptions of the world they sustain are fully objective, not presumptive claims.'[33] All creative experiences are not methodologically explainable. A scientific theorization demands a methodological explanation. So, scientific objectivity is different from the objectivity claimed by poetic and other forms of creative representation. Moreover, creativity lies in conjecturing the reality in its different forms of existence. The objectivity as a feature of truth can very well be discussed in the realm of creativity. Creativity has a different sense of objectivity which is not methodologically comprehended. In a hierarchy of

experiences, religious and mystical experiences are deeper levels of experiences than the scientific theorizations. Theoretical sciences are still bound by a methodological explanation, whereas poetic and religious experiences are not limited to human rationality. Hence, the notion of scientific objectivity differs from the objectivity of creative phenomena. Their meaningfulness lies in the discourse in which they are visualized. The novelty of a creative discourse lies in its way of looking beyond the conventional form of life. Mohanty says, 'It shows a new vision to the world set up by imagination and sustained by an experience can yield reality/objectivity right then and there without asking for its use and success'.[34] Thus, the semantic of experience justifies its ontology. The ontology of the self and its mode of experiencing reality in which its objectivity is guaranteed is rather valued.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, in the Searlean schema, though consciousness is a causal feature of brain processes, still the semantic features of consciousness remain irreducible to the brain processes. Consciousness, along with its semantic properties, remains autonomous so far as the ontology of the mental is concerned. Cognitivists' explanation of the *inner* eliminates the very notion of consciousness and its semantic features. It fails to see the significance of the notion of creativity based on human consciousness and its semantic features. The creative visualization reflects the inner experience of a person. Subjectivity, an objective phenomenon so far as conscious experience is concerned, brings out the *values* of creative experiences revealing a new facet of looking at the reality. Thus, it is a step towards understanding the *truth* that has been revealed to us in a mode of experience.[35] The creative art lives in our experience, unfolding various meanings that results in *showing* its objectivity. The creative process is never complete. Its completeness lies in the meaning that it reveals to the viewers, the way it is appreciated and discarded or the joy and the satisfaction that it provides to us. The truth of such a phenomenon lies in the values.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See, Anthony Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 113.
2. See, Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, Section 401, 1976.
3. Tagore says that creativity shows an intentional communication with our own self. It is a modification of our relationship 'till we have perfect imageries'. See, Rabindranath Tagore, *The Religion of Man*, Viswa-Bharati Publishing Department, Kolkata (6th edition; first published in 1930), 2000.
4. Shear explains that the 'sustained interplay' is a process of reaching at a new idea. It is interesting to learn that Tagore and Shear talk about creativity in a similar fashion. See Johnathan Shear, *The Inner Dimension: Philosophy and the Experience of Consciousness*, Peterlang, New York, 1990, p. 120.
5. Such type of process refers to an *imperfective aspect* of thought in comparison to the *perfect aspect* of thought. Stout makes this above distinction while stating that processes are metaphysical categories *persisting in time* 'though they do not have temporal parts' do not happen in time. Stout does take an extreme position, which is not a matter of concern here. Rather, it is certainly unavoidable that in the process of imagination the content gets modified and, therefore, it shows there is an imperfective aspect of thought involved in thinking. See Rowland Stout, 'Processes', *Philosophy*, Vol. 72, No. 279, January, 1997, p. 19.
6. See, L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel* (eds) G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. Von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, # 443 and # 434, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
7. John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 41.
8. The condition of satisfaction results from the self-referential feature of intentionality because that would be the sufficient condition of realization of intentional content of visual experience. See Searle's *Intentionality*, especially the chapter 'The Intentionality of Perception', p. 48.
9. See, J.N. Mohanty, *Self and Its Other: Philosophical Essays*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000, p. 73.
10. Searle writes in connection with change of visual fields. Intentionality, op. cit., p. 81.
11. Dennett discusses the notion of 'mental imagery' with reference to the functional properties of the perception. See, Daniel C. Dennett, *Content and Consciousness*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp. 134–35.
12. Daniel C. Dennett, *Intentional Stance*, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987, p. 71.

13. See, Dennett, *Content and Consciousness*, pp. 135–36.
14. Ibid., p. 137.
15. In this connection, Dennett discusses two significant models: (i) the multiple drafts model (MDM); and (ii) the sub-personal model. MDM model is analogous to the function of the computer as an intelligent system. As a system it involves different subsystems, which function together for information processing. Similarly, the subpersonal view refers to the physical mechanism of different parts of the brain functions for the experience of thought. Hence different suborganisms of the brain involved in processing the simulation cause transformation of thought. See, Daniel Dennett's *Content and Consciousness*, p. 111, and *Brainstorms*, The MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Massachusetts, 1986, p. 153.
16. Dennett, *Content and Consciousness*, p. 139.
17. See, Daniel Dennett, 'Two Approaches to Mental Images', *Brainstorms*, p. 175.
18. See, Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Section 401.
19. Dennett gives an example of 'β-manifolds' which involves the series of mental states embedding the images like 'alpha' and 'beta', i.e. 'A>β>C>D>E>α?β'. See, Dennett, *Brainstorms*, p. 181.
20. Ibid., p. 187.
21. Ibid., pp. 180–81.
22. Ibid., p. 186.
23. Ibid., pp. 186–87.
24. Jerry Fodor, 'Making the Mind Matter More', *The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/Contemporary Issues* (eds) Brain Beakley and Peter Ludlow, The MIT Press, London, 1992, p. 156.
25. See Jerry Fodor, *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in Mind*, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, A Bradford Book, 1987, p. 27.
26. Pradhan discusses about Wittgenstein's notion of causality and language relationship, R.C. Pradhan, *The Great Mirror*, Kalki Prakashan, New Delhi, 2002, p. 281.
27. Pradhan illustrates Wittgenstein's notion of mirroring in the chapter 'Logic, Logical Form and Logical Necessity', that helps in showing the semantic relationship between thought and language. Ibid., pp. 236–40.
28. Dennett interprets mind as a *syntactic engine*. For McDowell, such a system does not *know* anything. It never *interprets* operation going inside the system. Interpretation needs semantic characterization of the mental. See John McDowell, 'The Content of Perceptual Experience', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 175, 1994, p. 198.
29. See Searle's discussion on 'Reply to Jacquette', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 49, No. 4, June 1989, pp. 701–08. Dale Jacquette gives a critical analysis of 'Searle's Thought Experiment' and 'intentionality' entitled 'Adventures in the Chinese Room' this volume of the journal.
30. Cf. Searle's response to Dale Jacquette 'Reply to Jacquette'.
31. Searle talks about the shifts of thoughts as shifts of the visual fields construed by intentionality as not reduced feature of the consciousness. But Searle's notion of experience of bodily existence is well developed without any reference to the notion of a metaphysical self. Searle recognizes the autonomy of the self as non reducible category. See, Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, op. cit., p. 81. J.N. Mohanty has extensively discussed it in the chapter 'Layers of Selfhood'. See, Mohanty, *The Self and Its Other*, pp. 71–85.
32. Michael E. Bratman, 'Reflection, Planning and Temporarily Extended Agency', *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 109, No. 1, 2000, p. 43.
33. See, Mohanty, *The Self and Its Other*, p. 66.
34. Ibid.
35. See, Tagore, 'The Creative Spirit', *The Religion of Man*, p. 21.

Can Ethics of Virtue Replace Our Need for Norms in Ethics?

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ABSTRACT

The recent renewal of interests in the virtues constitute a shift of substance and method in thinking about ethics. The shift is away from discussion of rules and principles and is concerned with a discussion of traits, character and conditions of their excellence. This paper attempts at unfolding the nature of the ethics of virtue by addressing an interesting debate regarding the replacement of normative ethics or theory-laden ethics by discussion on virtues, which is anti-theoretic in essence.

Ethics of virtue was initially introduced to distinguish an approach in normative ethics, which emphasizes the virtues or moral character in contrast to an approach which emphasizes the duties or rules (deontology) or one which emphasizes the consequences of action (utilitarianism). Until thirty years ago, the field of normative ethics was dominated by just two theories: deontology, which was inspired by Immanuel Kant and utilitarianism, which derives its modern formulations from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers such as David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, James Stuart Mill and John Stuart Mill. Gradually, a change was noticeable—the emphasis started shifting from 'norms' to character and traits of moral agents. Virtue ethicists started asking: how we should 'be' rather than what we should 'do'. The reasons for the revival of virtue ethics may be traced to several factors. Part of the answer lies in the fact that the prevailing literature ignored or sidelined a number of topics that any adequate moral

philosophy should deal with. Two most important features are 'motives' and 'moral character', while others are moral education, moral wisdom, friendship and family relationship. The most important question is: What sort a person should I be and how I should live? Surprisingly, we find these topics thoroughly discussed in Plato and Aristotle. This is not a coincidence that the modern thinkers who are credited with reviving virtue ethics—Anscombe, Foot, Murdoch, Williams, McIntyre, Slote—have all absorbed Plato and Aristotle. It is interesting to note that some deontologists and utilitarians have recognized the importance of this revival of virtue ethics and sought to address it within their own theories, e.g. the revived interest in Kant's doctrine of virtue and elaboration of character-based versions of Kantianism.

The recent shift to the ethics of virtue was marked historically by the provocative essay by Elizabeth Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy'[1] in 1958. Anscombe found the notion of a 'universal moral law'—a special 'ought'—unintelligible. Traditionally, moral law was grounded on God. Modern moralists, on their part, tried to find a source of obligation in: (a) society; (b) conscience; (c) nature; and (d) some sort of contract. But Anscombe rejected all of them and said 'if we do not believe in God, there is only one way to have ethical 'norms'—it might remain to look for 'norms' in human virtues. 'Just as man has so many teeth, which is the average number of teeth for the species, so perhaps the species of man, from the point of view of activity of thought and choice has virtues.' Anscombe thus emphasized the concept of 'human flourishing'. Perhaps what is for us to flourish is, as Aristotle held, to live a life perfected by virtue, without any holiday. Anscombe further clarified that there is no secularized 'moral ought' which has an intelligible application to all rational beings, though perhaps there is an ordinary 'ought' or norm which applies in some version or other to every living being. This is the 'ought' which instructs us about what is good for us. Anscombe stressed that the notion of our 'good' should be parsed in terms of what we 'need' or require in order to flourish. Finally, she announced that 'flourishing of a man qua man, consists in his being good—a man needs or "ought" to perform only virtuous actions'.

Philippa Foot further carried on this renewed revival of ethics of virtue. In the introduction to her collection of essays 'Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy',[2] she insisted that a sound moral philosophy should start from a theory of virtues and vices. When this thought is considered in conjunction with the central argument in her article, 'Morality as A System Of Hypothetical Imperatives',[3] the indication is that another virtue-based theory is in the making. In this essay, Foot visualizes a 'moral community' composed of 'an army of volunteers', i.e. agents who voluntarily commit themselves to such moral ideals as truth, justice, generosity, and kindness. In a 'moral community' of this sort, all moral imperative become hypothetical rather than categorical, there are things which an agent morally ought to do, if he or she wants truth, justice, generosity of kindness, but an agent is not supposed to do anything if he or she is not committed to these moral ideals first.

After Foot, many versions of ethics of virtue have evolved—each quite distinct from the other. However, much as these versions differ, they all agree on insisting that good character is the central concept of moral theory and the basic element of moral living. Virtue ethicists are all committed to the following three propositions: (a) that the concept of moral goodness is more basic than the concept of moral obligation; that the basic moral judgements are about persons or characteristics of persons [aretaic]; and (c) the judgements about the moral rightness of actions are derivative.

Some critics are sceptical about any ethics of virtue over and above an ethics of duty. But a close look into their exact nature will reveal them to be complimentary to each other. Ethics of duty holds that only judgements about right action are basic in morality and the virtuousness of the traits is derivative from rightness of actions. Conversely, an ethics of virtue holds that only judgements about virtue are basic in morality and the rightness of action is derivative from the virtuousness of the traits. Here, it is important to quote Prichard's analysis of the distinction between ethics of virtue and ethics of duty since it had some influence in the contemporary literature on virtue. Prichard says, 'moral goodness involves the disposition to be motivated by a sense of duty, conceived as independent of desire. On the other hand, virtue is

simply an intrinsic desire for some morally significant and, when the end is described wholly in non-moral terms'.[4] Interpreted in this way, ethics of virtue can claim that a moral agent need only display the virtues and need not be 'morally good'.

This idea leads to a sceptical reaction within ethics: Does it aim at disposing off normative ethics or is it a supplement or a complement to it? Or is it just another valid task of ethics? We can attempt to answer in the following manner. An ethics of duty differs from an ethics of virtue, in part, with respect to whether the idea of moral duty or the idea of moral goodness is given priority. An ethics of duty holds that moral obligation is logically prior to moral virtue or that the basic moral judgements are deontic. In contrast, an ethics of virtue is committed to the ideal that moral virtue, rather than moral obligation, is basic to morality. It further states that the basic moral judgements are aretaic, either because there are no non-aretaic moral judgements or because no none-aretaic moral judgement can be justified, except by an appeal to an aretaic one. There is no logical necessity that every complete moral code be either exclusively deontic or exclusively aretaic. It is easy to imagine a morality in which duty and virtue are jointly fundamental—neither being more basic than the other.

In the recent times, to analyze the nature of the ethics of virtue, we come across an interesting debate whether or not the ethics of virtue is agent-based or agent-focussed or even agent-prior?

Agent-focussed virtue ethics stresses on the *character* at the core of morality and defines virtue as a character trait that a human being needs for his well being. They profess that the central moral question is not 'What ought I to do?' but 'What sort of a person am I to be?' The virtuous person is someone 'for whom proper conduct emanates characteristically from a fixed disposition'.[5] Though there is not much of agreement as to the exact nature of virtue, still we can claim the following common ground: the virtuous dispositions lead the moral agents to be sensitive to the goods and ills to which people are exposed in particular situations and to respond positively. On the epistemological side, the thinkers hold that the perception of the virtuous agent is the original and central source of knowledge of how much good to pursue, for whom, in what circumstances and how vigorously. They further

assert that the virtues are natural to humans, i.e. they are implanted in us naturally, in such a way that the virtuous agents benefit from virtue, both individually and socially. Living alone and living without virtue are both harmful to us.

The greatest exponent of agent-focussed virtue ethics is Aristotle. Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, focusses more on the inner traits and character of the virtuous individual than he does on the rightness and goodness of actions. He further stresses that the rightness of an action does not depend on motives or habits of the person. Rather, a virtuous individual is someone who, without relying on rules, is sensitive and intelligent enough to perceive what is right and noble, through his or her practical wisdom, which is trained by philosophical wisdom. The imperatives of the practical wisdom is the origin of a habitual state of mind or what is the right intention. This empowers the person to choose the right at the right moment, for the right reason, towards the right person, at the right degree. When Aristotle makes the virtuous man a standard of what is virtuous, he primarily means that it is his conduct, his choices and not just dispositions, which is the standard. In fact, in his exposition of virtue of moral agents, Aristotle embarks on the inner *alma mater* of the agents which counts for philosophical wisdom, practical wisdom and its imperatives in the sense of duty and habitual state of mind or the rightness of intention leading to actions through choosing a mean between excess and defect. This is continuous for a virtuous individual and only such people attain eudemonia or well being. Hence, *focussing* on the moral agent's basic virtuosity, we can further find that such virtuous actions or mean actions are *not one but many*, as courage or cowardice have no absolute moral or immoral values. Rather, both fall in the scale of choice between the extremes, excess and defect, by virtue of one's wisdom. In that sense, it would be nonsensical to compartmentalize something as absolutely virtuous or vicious as we often do in cases of violence and non-violence. It is a reminder of a state in which the moral agent is and the form of life one has. Yet Aristotle speaks of a chief virtue as 'eudemonia', which traditional ethics projects as a *standard of morality* acting as a handmaid to value-judgement of intuitional actions. It is due to this fact that we have been conditioned, says Anscombe, to need a standard or norm in

modern ethics. She argues that a careful reader of Aristotle would not like this imputation of norms to his ethical thinking at all because why should we cry for norms and normative judgements, for value declaration is not known to the Aristotelian legacy. It may well be that the modern theory-laden normative ethics pressing hard for evaluation on the basis of norms is completely a tale of twist to the roots of ethical thinking—it is not needed at all. When the basis of moral agent's act-judgements have been pronounced loud and clear in terms of the inner *alma mater* as shown above in elucidating the agent-focussed view of ethics of virtue, the redundancy of normative thinking is equally pronounced. Nevertheless, an analysis of the inner life reveals that we may conceive of some *cardinal virtues* apart from the chief one such as wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, also conceived by Plato in the *Republic*. However, there are plenty of other virtues. This is, in fact, the starter of anti-theory debate in ethics—thanks to the growth of virtue ethics by a typical Heideggerian return to the roots. Whatever may be the outcome of the discussion, we have to remember that a condition or rather prejudiced modern ethical mind may not do justice to an evaluation of the anti-theoretic turn in ethics. The point is, an anti-theoretic stance may be questioned as well on other grounds, but not before we have seen the entire gamut of virtue ethics as a precocious reincarnate.

In contemporary times, Michael Slote's *agent-based virtue ethics* stresses that moral status of acts is entirely derivative from independent aretaic characterizations of motives, character, traits or individuals. This clearly implies that the virtuous individual does what is noble or virtuous because it is the noble thing to do, rather than the statement that whatever a virtuous person does is virtuous. According to Slote, a virtue is an admirable trait of character of the agent and its admirability need not be based on its tendencies to promote further value or good of the agent.[6] Gray Watson, in his writing 'On the primacy of character', has also stressed the agent-based view of ethics of virtue. He said, 'in an ethics of virtue, how it is best or right or proper to conduct oneself, is explained in terms of how it is best for a human being to be'.[7] In other words, he claimed that the basic moral facts are facts about quality of character and moral facts about actions are secondary to

these. James Martineau's agent-based conception of morality treats 'compassion' or 'benevolence' as the highest motive. Others such as Hume, Hutchenson and now Jorge Garcia have placed a special emphasis on compassion or 'benevolence'. All these can be said to be 'agent-based' in their approach to ethics of virtue, in so far as it focusses on this or that part of character of a moral agent or moral agents and believes that keeping an agent at the helm of virtue-talk would be necessary and sufficient. As a result, they are anti-theoretic in outlook.

Rosalind Hursthouse proposes a sort of ethics of virtue which can rightly be said to be 'intermediate' between 'agent-focussed' virtue ethics and 'agent-based' virtue ethics.[8] Hursthouse treats act-evaluation as a derivative from aretaic evaluation of character traits and motives; but at the same time, she regards the evaluation of character traits as further based on human well being. Thus, an act is right if it accords with virtues and a trait is said to count as a virtue if people need it in order to live a good life. We can call this theory 'agent-prior' since the act evaluations are carried on with reference to the agent's virtues. Even Plato's view can be said to be 'agent-prior'.[9] He insisted that we evaluate actions by reference to the health and virtue of the individual soul; but he also insisted that the Form of the Good represents a level of evaluation prior to the evaluation of souls and the souls count as virtuous when they are properly appreciated and guided by the value inherent in the Form of Good. For Plato, good action is to be understood in terms of creating or sustaining the strength or health of the soul. But to me, it seems more promising to explore the idea of actions that express 'inner strength'. 'Inner strength' is somewhat 'intuitively admirable' since it need not appeal to other ideas for its defense, but is built on the strong foundations of inner dispositions.

Yet the most common charge against the above views is that they do not provide us with an exact and detailed guide for action. The critics ask: 'What can a virtue theory say about specific moral dilemmas?' We can try to answer this by saying that virtues are not simply dispositions to behave in specified ways, for which rules and principles can always be cited. It should be noted that virtues also involve 'skills' or rather situation-specific 'know-how', all of which are developed only through acting on what is relevant in specific moral

situations. These 'skills' or 'know-how' are not stereotyped and so cannot be transferred from agent to agent as a kind of 'package-deal'. In other words, we have to accept that moral virtues cannot be generalized so easily; but that does not diminish the importance of ethics of virtue.

The radicalists, however, attached the attempt of formulating any 'agent-based theory of virtue'. First of all, they argue that these theories appear to vitiate the common distinction between 'doing the right thing' and 'doing the right thing for the right reason'.[10] If rightness of an action is made to depend upon the rightness of motives and wrongness in terms of bad motives then there will be every chance of misjudging an action, e.g. the prosecutor who does his duty by trying to convict a defendant, but if he is motivated by malice rather than by a sense of duty, will that not mean that the prosecutor does the wrong thing in prosecuting someone out of malice? Is this not very unfortunate? It does not follow from the agent-based assumption that he acts wrongly if he acts from malice. But then, how can such a duty be understood in agent-based terms?

The critics argue further that if the evaluation of action is dependent on the virtuous agents then we can legitimately deduce that if one is a virtuous person, it cannot morally matter what one actually does, i.e. a virtuous person or his actions are not subject to moral constraints. In this light, the agent-based approach to ethics of virtue seems to be a highly 'autistic' and 'antinomian' 'approach to ethics—an approach that seems to go against the notion that the moral life involves "living up to" certain standards of behaviour'.[11]

We can answer this objection by saying that a virtue theory can be agent-based and still not treat actions right simply because it is performed by a virtuous individual. Nor does an agent-based theory assert that every action that a virtuous individual is capable of performing would automatically be considered as good. A virtuous person is capable of choosing many actions that fail to exhibit his character. On the contrary, if one is not entirely virtuous, he is capable of choosing the right course of action. So it is not true to say that agent-basing entails what one does cannot matter morally or that it cannot matter if one has good enough motivation. Conversely, actions

will count as wrong or contrary to obligation if they show bad motivation. It is, therefore, not true to say that agent-based theories treat actions as subject to no such moral standards. Rather, the standards are from within.

Hursthouse's view avoids standard ethical egoism by allowing acts to count as admirable even when they are known to run counter to the agent's self-interest. But then we can naturally ask: why should 'being necessary to the agent's flourishing' be the criterion of goodness in traits and motives, but not in actions? A trait—in order to be counted as a virtue—must benefit the possessor but should be also conducive to general well-being. Thus aretaic evaluations of inner life and claims about human well being should both count as fundamental and occupy the ground floor of ethics.

The main contenders in favour of a moral theory argue against the agent-focussed or agent-based versions of ethics of virtue in the sense that they are *not applicable* in our daily life as are moral theories. They contend that if someone is in deep trouble or faced with a serious moral problem, then it is irrelevant for the agent to 'look inside' and examine his or her motives. On the contrary, he should be aware of the facts about people and the world around him and look for moral theories which, like algorithms, can guide us to a solution. But the agent-focussed or agent-based approach of ethics of virtue fails to do so miserably when we most need moral guidance. In answer, we can say that ethics of virtue does not aspire to provide algorithms—even then, agent-based ethics of virtue can, of course, be applied. If we analyze a difficult situation or when we face any moral problem, we should not merely look inside, but we are also supposed to take into account facts about people as well as circumstances in the world and then decide what is the best thing to do. We can at least say that motives are relevant to the moral character of the action. For, if we judge actions simply by their effects in the world, we end up failing to distinguish the accidental or ironically useful actions from good and praiseworthy actions.

In fact, the above objection is based on a common misunderstanding of what virtue ethics involves. It is often thought that virtue ethics, in being agent-centred in starting with the virtues and vices rather than

right or wrong acts, is committed to a sort of reductionism. It is thought that virtue ethics maintains that the concept of the virtuous agent is the piece of conceptual apparatus relevant to moral philosophy and that the theory promises to be able to give a reductive analysis of all our moral concepts in terms of the virtuous or the vicious agent. But it is not so. For built into the virtue theory is the claim that part of the virtuous person's practical wisdom is her knowledge, her correct appreciation of what is truly good, and indeed, of what is truly advantageous, worthwhile and important.

In conclusion, we can say that the theory, anti-theory debate is based on a misconception as to the exact nature of a moral theory. The term 'theory' can be used in wider or narrower sense. In its widest sense, a moral theory is simply an internally consistent 'fairly comprehensive account of what morality is and why it merits our acceptance and support'. In this sense, ethics of virtue can definitely be called a moral theory. Even if there was some truth in the theorist's claim, we might still hope to build up a coherent account by a mosaic method, assembling a lot of smaller scale works until one had a more or less complete account of the virtues. But then, would that sort of comprehensiveness in one's moral philosophy entitle one to call the finished work—a moral theory? And, in that sense of 'theory', most of the current moral theories will turn out to be incomplete since they do not yet purport to be comprehensive.

But is comprehensiveness too much to ask of a moral theory? The best examples of moral theories are distinguished not by the comprehensiveness of their coherent account but by the sort of coherence which is aimed at over a fairly broad area. Their method is not mosaic but the 'broad brushstroke' method. In this sense of theory, a fairly tight systematic account of a large area of morality, with a keystone supporting all the rest—virtue theory, can be called a moral theory.

Notes and References

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Language and Substance
(In the Light of *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s Philosophy)

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The topic under discussion presents the view of language in relation to substance and substance in relation to language. In relation to substance, the theorists observe the language chiefly as an expresser, as a reference and as a representation. The present discussion is based on the *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s view of language, as an expresser. It points out the philosophical difficulties of the theories of those who accept language as a reference and representation and evaluates their relevance only as a mode of interpreting the veridical cognition[1] expressed by language.

The discussion is presented in six parts. The first part discusses *Vaiyākaraṇa's* view on language, particularly in the context of *Patanjali* and Bhartṛhari. In the second part, substance or individual as discussed by Bhartṛhari in two chapters entitled *Dravya-Samuddeśaḥ* and *Bhūyodravya-Samuddeśaḥ* of the third part of *Vākyapadīya* is presented in a way that clarifies the issue relating a original theory of expressional substance, i.e. how the substance is expressed by language. The third part comprises a discussion on language as reference. It, as the expresser, is the theme of discussion in the fourth part. The arguments, from the side of *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s against the theories of language as representation, are presented in the fifth part. The representation theory of language in the West has recently been a popular theory favoured by language philosophers like Wittgenstein, Frege, Davidson and Dummett. The term 'representation' is used for discussion, in this paper, in a very general sense of 'language as representation'. It is the theory of those for whom language, thought and the empirical objects/referents are discrete existences out of which the former represents the latter two. Lastly, we have concluded that all knowledge, in *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s active

theory of language, is knowledge revealed by language and hence it is expression and the substance is that which it expresses. This expression for the purpose of a demarcation of it in terms of referent and represented is understood as reference and representation, respectively, but in all the cases of referring and representing, the cognition expressed by the expresser serves as the cognitive ground, the ground that is overlooked by those who take language as reference or as representation.

I

Vaiyākaraṇas do not use the term *Bhāsā* that is generally translated as 'language'. They use the term *Śabda* for it. Their use of the term *śabda* in the sense of language comprises all of its parts, i.e. letters, words, phrases, subordinate sentences and the complete sentence. They differentiate between *śabda* as verbal articulations (*Vaikharī-śabda* or *dhvaniyān*) and it as meaning the revealing unit or expresser (*Sphoṭa* or *madhyamā-śabda*) that expresses meaning (*Pratibhā*) non-differently in the mind. In the present discussion, I am using the term language-token for the former and the term language for the latter. Briefly, *Vaiyākaraṇas* define language from the point of view of cognition of a unit meaning. By a unit meaning, they mean a complete meaning, extincting further expectancy in the cognition of a unit meaning. If a unit meaning that is an indivisible idea is revealed even by a single letter as in case of ॐ or by a word implying a verb, the unit then is a complete sentence expressive of a complete meaning. If a large number of subordinate sentences do not express a complete meaning, they are not a complete sentence.

(A) Analysis of Patanjali*'s Definition of Language*

Let us see how *Vaiyākaraṇas* define *Śabda* (language). *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has defined it from two points of views: (1) from the point of view of verbal-articulations/utterances; and (2) from the point of view of cognition. An account of those definitions is given as follows:

1. Keeping verbal utterances/articulations as language (*Śabda*) in view, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* on two occasions, has given two definitions of it:

(i) Mahābhāṣyakāra, while interpreting the *Vārtika ādityavatsyuḥ* of sage *Kātyāyana* on *Māheshwara Śutra* अ, इ, उ, ण of *Pāṇini*, has defined *Śabda* as *śrotropalabddhirbuddhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogeṇābhijvalita ākāśadeśaḥ Śabdaḥ*[2], according to which *Śabda* is sky-pervading; it is manifested through utterances, receptive to the auditory sense and understood by the mind. One may observe that *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, in this definition, has emphasized two matters of fact. Verbal articulations/utterances are not a quality of the sky (*ākāśa*) but a quality of the language. The grammarian distinguishes them from the other who accepts articulate utterance as a quality of sky, atom, etc., as we find in the *Nyāya School* of Indian philosophy.

The idea of articulate utterance as sky pervading throws sufficient light on the fact as to how it is heard by the audience even when spoken from a distant place. The modern scientific inventions have also proved the seer's observation on articulate utterances as sky pervading. I will discuss the problem concerning articulate utterance later but before coming to the second definition given by *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, it is necessary to mention here that this definition of *Śabda* by him characterizes verbal articulations (that to be heard and understood by the audience) as the means to the accomplishment of cognition.

(ii) *Pratīta padārthako loke dhvaniḥ Śabda ityucyate*.[3] According to this definition, verbal articulations in usual communication are ordinarily assumed by perception and practice as the expresser (*Śabda*). In the expressions like *Śabdam kuru* (please, utter the language), *Śabdam mā karṣīḥ* (do not make a noise), *Śabdakāryayam māṇavaka* (this child makes noise), etc., used in day-to-day communication, *dhvani* is popularly taken as the expresser of meaning. According to this definition of language (*Śabda*), the technical grammatical names like *ti*, *dthi*, *dhu*, *bha*, etc., do not convey meaning in the usual communication. Thus, such verbal-articulations that are conventionally given for the meaning are called language (*Śabda*). Articulate utterance produced by mutual friction of the parts of a body is not the expresser. Verbal utterances are produced by the vocal organs

of the speaker when he intends to speak to communicate meaning. In this sense, the ringing of bell, thunder, etc., are not language though hearers understand some or the other meaning attached to them. The issue will be discussed in detail under the discussion on language as reference.

Vaiyākaraṇas have made a distinction between language as verbal articulations (*Vaikharī-śabda*) and as meaning-revealing units (*Sphoṭa* or *Madhyamā-śabda*). They have assumed the former as a tool only in manifestation of the latter, which is the real language, the expresser, in their philosophy.

2. This definition of *Śabda* by *Mahābhāṣyakāra* is chiefly based on characterizing language as the meaning-revealing unit or the expresser. In the very beginning of *Mahābhāṣya*, Sage Patanjali has himself raised the question as what is the expresser in articulate utterance *gauḥ*. Is it a thing possessing dew, lap, tail, horn, hoof, etc.? He says: 'No, that is substance'. Is it the gesture and efforts made by the speaker while uttering *gauḥ*? He says: 'No, that is an action'. Is it coloured white, etc.? 'No, that is a quality'. Is it common and essential property of different individual cows (*gauḥ*)? 'No, that is universal'. Passing through this dialectical reasoning, Patanjali conclusively defines it as *Yenoccāritena Sāsnālāngūlakakuda khuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati sa Śabdaḥ*.[4] According to this definition, the expresser (*Śabda*) is that which, when manifested in the mind after hearing verbal utterances, reveals its own nature (idea/concept) from which meaning is revealed non-differently. These are only intelligible beings (*sampratyaya*).

The concept (*Sampratyaya*) of the cow is universal in character. This universal nature is not a property but the being, an indivisible whole of awareness in nature. The expresser, according to the definition, is a concept (*sampratyayātmaka*) or meaning-revealing unit. *Mahābhāṣya-kāra* gives this definition from the point of view of cognition revealed in the mind by the expresser. As such, it comprises both the verbal-articulations/utterances as the body, more specifically garb and the meaning-revealing unit or the expresser as the soul, more specifically the constant content of awareness in nature that reveals meaning.

The word *Uccāritena*, used by *Mahābhāṣyakāra* in his definition, distinguishes the phonetic element and the word *sampratyayaḥ* emphasizes the expressive or cognitive being/unit. The momentary phonemes alone cannot cause cognition. They, discretely or collectively, are not meaning-revealing units and, hence, not expressive of meaning. An expresser, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is that which is the inner meaning-revealing unit and which when manifested gradually by phonemes, reveals itself first and then its meaning is revealed non-differently by it in the mind of the audience. For *Vaiyākaraṇas*, it is *Sphoṭa*. The problem of *Sphoṭa*[5] has been discussed separately.

The expresser, for them, is not a tool like verbal-articulations/utterances but is a revealing force, and, as such, it expresses itself and the meaning as well. Bhartṛhari writes 'the expresser (*Śabda*) like senses does not illuminate the objects only but like the soul, it illuminates itself and the meaning as well and that is why it is defined as the luminosity and the illuminative force (*grāhaka-grāhya*)'.[6] The use of words *Uccāritena* and *sampratyayaḥ* by *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, in his definition of *Śabda*, aims at characterizing it as both the expresser and the expressed. As cognition of meaning by the language may be properly explained on the basis of it as a meaning-revealing unit, which is the expresser of what is expressed (meaning), Bhartṛhari, from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition, has given much regard to this definition of *Śabda*. The expresser (*Vācaka*) in his philosophy is a meaning-revealing unit (*Sphoṭa*) and verbal utterances/articulations are only instruments in manifesting it. He seems right in explaining the meaning as the expressed (*Vācya*) and language as the expresser (*Vācaka*) of it which, when uttered (*uccāritena*) by the speaker's effort and heard by the audience, reveals cognition (*sampratyayaḥ*) in the mind. As all knowledge is knowledge expressed by language and no knowledge is possible isolatively from language, how can revelation of cognition be explained if *Sphoṭa*, the expresser (*Vācaka*) is not accepted differently from the verbal-articulations/utterances, which are not the expresser but tools only in the manifestation of the expresser?

It is obvious from the aforementioned analysis that the first definition defines it, because of perception, habit and practice as verbal

articulations uttered for communication in day-to-day practices. *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, as we have already mentioned in the second definition has characterized language (*Śabda*) as awareness, the concept or idea which, in usual communication, is manifested by utterances (*dhvaniyān*) and, then, reveals itself and its meaning in the mind.

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, the author of *Vyākaraṇa-Manjūṣā* has interpreted *pratīta padārthakaḥ* used by Patanjali in the first definition, in terms of cognition of meaning.[7] According to his interpretation of this definition, a *Śabda* is a word, a collection of or a set of phonemes to be heard in a sequence and capable of conveying meaning. According to Bhartṛhari, the definition of it as *Pratīta Padārthakaḥ* is given because of perception, popularity and practice. In day-to-day practice, articulate utterances/articulations (*dhvaniyān*) through which communication with the factors like context, etc., is performed, are popularly called expresser (*Śabda*). As the meaning-revealing unit (*Sphoṭa*) is manifested by verbal utterances/articulations (*dhvaniyān*) they, by proxy or practice (*Upacāra*), are also taken by him as language. We are so accustomed to this practice that we overlook the inner, meaning-revealing-unit involved in the cognition and consider it as confined to the audible verbal articulations/utterances only.

(B) Bhartṛhari *on Language as Expresser (Vācaka) of the Expressed (Vacya)*

Bhartṛhari is a philosopher pundit of Patanjali. He very clearly shows that both of the verbal articulations (*Vaikharī*) and the expresser (*Sphoṭa*, the *Madhyamā-śabda*) are involved in the accomplishment of communication. Verbal articulations are instrumental in the manifestation of meaning-revealing unit (*Sphoṭa*). Manifested thus, the *Sphoṭa* as expresser is revealed, which states the meaning non-differently.[8] The expressed (meaning=*pratibhā*) is non-differently revealed by the expresser on the basis of which identical conception in all occurrences and instances, by a set of verbal articulations/utterances, is singled out in spite of difference of tone, pitch, etc., incurred in the uttering. In order to clarify Bhartṛhari's position on language, his verse *Dvāvupādāna śabdeṣu śabdau Śabdavidoviduḥ. Eko nimittam Śabdānām aparo 'r 'the prayujyate*,[9] must be taken for deliberation. According to

this verse, a *Śabda*, the expresser is, in fact, a totality of the two—the inner meaning-revealing unit that is *Sphoṭa* and the verbal articulations/utterances. The former is of the nature of awareness as it is revealed-being and the latter is a tool/garb that manifests the former.

Bhartṛhari explains[10] the cause and caused relation between them from the point of view of both of the speakers and of the hearers. The expresser (*Sphoṭa*), from the point of view of speaker, is the cause of production of articulations and articulations; being produced by the expresser, it is caused. From the point of view of the hearer, articulations are the cause of the expresser because it causes manifestation of the expresser. Communication is neither a sheer activity of hearing nor that of uttering. It is not confined even to the act of uttering and hearing only; rather, it is the accomplishment of cognition in which uttering and hearing serve as only a tool. What is heard and what is uttered is articulate utterance which—from the cognitive point of view—is only a tool that manifests and invokes revelation of the expresser. The conceptual/intelligible level of language (*Sphoṭa*) is a cognitive unit and, hence, foundational to communication. Accomplishment of cognition is possible in some cases as of Yogins, etc., even without the invoking by verbal articulations. How can a Yogin's cognition be explained only on the basis of language confined to discrete momentary sounds which are unuttered? Verbal articulations serve as effect of the expresser that produces them. Similarly, the latter is the cause of the former because it effectuates the former through the speaker's effort and, on the other hand, it is an effect of the former because of the limited reason that the latter, in the mind of hearers, is manifested through hearing them. It is clear from the lines mentioned above, that the determination of being the cause and effect of one another of them depends on the expectancy of speakers and hearers.

The *Sphoṭa* is an inner-unit of cognition and, as such, sequenceless, while verbal articulations, as a collection of discrete phonemes, are uttered in sequence. Now, the problem is: how is a sequenceless expresser manifested into sequences and that how do sequences manifest sequenceless expresser? In order to clarify the problem, Bhartṛhari gives instances based on established experience of seers and sages (*Āgama*). According to the first sort[11] of instance, the fire, lying potent

in pieces of wood, is produced when the pieces are churned for kindling the fire that burns. Similarly, by the expectancy to the speaking, the inner, sequenceless expresser is manifested through the organs of speech in the form of verbal articulations/utterances. The sequences involved in uttering and hearing of articulate utterances are imposed on the sequenceless expresser. Just as different colours of a peacock are sequencelessly potent in its egg and manifested in a sequence when the egg is hatched, *Sphoṭa*, the expresser, is manifested through articulated utterances produced in a sequence by speaker's effort when he intends to communicate.[12] Manifested thus, *Sphoṭa* reveals itself as well as its meaning non-differently. Showing how verbal articulations are manifested by sequenceless *Sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari says[13] 'just as different parts of a statue painted on a board are perceived in a sequence first and, then, the unitary cognition of a single statue is cognized afterwards similarly, different phonemes, when heard in a sequence, manifest sequenceless unitary expresser in the mind of hearers. Manifested so, it reveals its own nature in the mind.[14] Verbal articulations/utterances, spoken to convey meaning are produced by the efforts of vocal organs of the speaker and, a child, born in a society, observes the modes, tones, length (short, long, prolonged) and contents, etc., of the verbal articulations used by the elders of that society and, then follows them in the manner when he intends to communicate.

There are three factors involved in communication in the way a child learns it: (1) the observation of gestures, tones, etc., occurred in verbal articulations made by the elders when they communicate; (2) things, external or internal, for which the verbal articulations/utterances, by proxy, are made by elders; and (3) posed relation between the verbal articulations and the things because of which the word, by proxy, is taken to stand for them. But for a philosopher, investigating into the cognition revealed by language, there are three other utmost important elements involved in communication. They are: (1) *Sphoṭa*, the inner, ubiquitously given meaning-revealing unit; (2) *Pratibhā*, the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind; and (3) The natural relation between the two. These are not conventional but foundational elements of communication and, according to Bhartṛhari; they, in fact, are not two discretes but non-different. In his philosophy, meaning is

not a separate being but that which is non-differently revealed by the expresser and, thus, Bhartṛhari, by accepting the expresser (*Sphoṭa*) as the being that non-differently reveals meaning and confining cognition to these beings, explains *Sphoṭamayamviśvam* (the world of communication is the world of *Sphoṭa*).

From the earlier discussions, it can be easily seen that Bhartṛhari's problems in defining language (*Śabda*) is basically concerned with the explanation of cognition as revealed in day-to-day communication and that he has explained the problem of cognition by speeches, by accepting *Sphoṭa* as an inner meaning-revealing unit that is awareness in character. The concept of *Sphoṭa* stands as the bedrock of his philosophy of *Vākyapadīya*. One who does not understand his concept of revealing unit, as an intelligible or philosophical being, cannot understand his philosophy. The reason behind saying so is that he has observed and analyzed all the contents of his *Vākyapadīya* from the point of view of cognition as figured in the mind and, hence, *Sphoṭa* is a cognitive being, a being of awareness in character. It is an ubiquitous, indivisible and intelligible being that makes communication possible.

Cognitive approach, is this paper, views Bhartṛhari's philosophy in accordance with his goal of analyzing and interpreting the cognition as revealed by language in usual communication. Knowledge ceases to be so if isolated from language. It views even the metaphysical concepts in the manner they are revealed in the mind by way of language. Philosophy can get no excellence. There is no possibility of philosophy if it is taken to occupy with transcendental, non-cognitive and incommunicable things beyond the reach of language. Philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence in the sense that it is concerned with and is confined to the beings of awareness in character. The world of awareness for a Bhartṛharian comprises the being of language and that of the meaning, revealed non-differently in the mind. The language expresses/reveals those beings independently of things-in-themselves: empirical or transcendental and of our allegiances to them. Such beings—as are revealed by language—are only intelligible and, hence, philosophical objects.

There is a difference between the objects revealed by language and the things illuminated by lamps, etc. A lamp illuminates external things

that are known by the knower as the object of perception, while the objects/beings revealed by language are self-retained beings. Throughout the presentation, I have used the term 'being' (with small 'b') for intelligible beings, the beings figured/revealed in the mind by language and the term Being (with capital 'B') for the thing-in-itself which are transcendental to or beyond the grasp of language. What figures in the mind by language is an intelligible being, i.e. *upacāra-sattā*,[15] that includes the being of language as expresser, the *Vācaka* and the being of meaning as expressed (*Vācya*). The two—languages and meaning—are non-different; the later is revealed non-differently by the former. Such a revelation by language is possible because of its natural fitness. This natural fitness of language (*Yogyatā-Sambandha*)[16] to express meaning non-differently is taken by grammarians as the given relation between the language and meanings. This relation is given with all its meanings (*Sarve Sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) but restricted by convention to a fixed meaning. We, herein, emphasize a most significant concept of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, according to which, meaning is always the meaning of language and that meaning known by factors context, etc., is also explained as the meaning of the language itself, simply because that context in our philosophy is neither a meaning of a word not expressive or a meaning itself. It is ultra virus.

The sentence-holism of Bhartṛhari is a cognitive holism for which language infuses cognition. The knowledge ceases to be so isolatively from language. The language and the meaning are cognitive beings; they are units of awareness in nature. Our philosophical reflections and investigation are confined to the beings. By the term beings with small 'b', we mean the idea that figures in the mind by language and thus they are an intelligible being which, by contract to the Being that is an external object as a primary Being, is called secondary being (*Upacāra-satta*). As there is no possibility of extension and division in unit of awareness, it considers that the divisions of the indivisible sentence into different units words/roots/stems/suffixes, etc., are an artificial remedy, useful for practical or grammatical purposes. Although indivisible sentence-in-itself is understood by the ignorant and children as a synthesis of parts it, in fact, is not so. The device of grammatical analysis and synthesis of parts as a whole is a tool making the indivisible

understandable to those who can understand it may through piece meal.[17] The scheme of analysis (*apoddhāra*) is useful for the explanation of the indivisible sentence because no explanation of it is possible without its artificial divisions. No logic of the part and the whole is applicable to the sentence as awareness ubiquitously given in the mind as an indivisible unit which is revealed by itself as flash of awareness, i.e. *Sphoṭa*, a unit whole. It considers that the difference in explaining the indivisible differently is inevitable but it hardly adds any difference in the sentence as such. All grammatical and analytical methods and the units derived by those methods are significant and considered to be real only as a tool in the clear understanding of the awareness as accomplished in communication. The indivisible sentence is a being that serves as the cognitive base of not only all the divisions of it but of the cognition revealed by them also and only in this sense is it called the cognitive unit.

The present observation of Bhartṛhari's holism clearly holds that the indivisible sentence is ubiquitously given as a foundational being (*Sphoṭa*), which is the expresser that expresses meaning non-differently (*grāhaka-grāhya*). Meaning is not cognized independently of it and, hence, the relation between the two does not arise as an insolvable problem. As meaning is the thought-object revealed non-differently by language which is also an idea that serves as the expresser of the former, there is no room to take them as separate entities of linguistic and non-linguistic character and thus, in his holism, the expresser that is language and the meaning that is expressed are both non-different beings. The expressed is eternally related with the expresser. Relation, for Bhartṛhari, is the eternal fitness of the expresser for expressing the expressed.

Knowledge, for Bhartṛhari, is determinate. This determination is not possible if the knowledge is not taken as infused by a language. Even indeterminate knowledge requires language in order to be known thus. Knowledge ceases to be so if isolated from language. Isolated from language, the analysis of language will not remain as such, and vice versa. Hence, analysis will be an useless task if knowledge is not taken to be infused with language which, as a cognitive unit of awareness in character, is non-different from the knowledge.

The cognition revealed by language is a veridical-cognition as communication—independently of corresponding referents which are metaphysical in nature[18]—is accomplished by it. If the veridical cognition revealed by language in the mind is denied as the cognitive base, any implication or inference will be unfounded. Metaphysical entities may be accepted as known by implication as the ontic base of the cognition revealed by language but cognitively, their ontic existence without the cognition cannot even be inferred or implicated. On the contrary, if the cognition revealed by language is taken as a cognitive-base of inference, etc., of those entities, the problem of the link between the two—between the cognition revealed and the cognition consequently inferred—and the demand for any further epistemic justification for convincing and for philosophical need for accepting on denying it, will be relevant. Even if further justification is demanded for convincing and believing the veridical cognition, the cognition revealed by language stands as cognitive base of all those known consequently by inference, etc., and, perhaps, this is the reason that Bhartṛhari and his commentators have not felt any need to discuss this epistemological problem independently.

This does not mean that our observation of *Vākyapadīya* denies or overlooks Bhartṛhari's stand on things-in-themselves. It considers that Bhartṛhari, as a philosopher of language, emphasizes to explain even very popular metaphysical concepts like *Brahman*, world, soul, sky, space, time, etc., as they are presented by language in the mind. For his philosophy, cognition is revealed by language in the mind but the mind itself (as an ontic entity) is beyond the grasp of language. The mind does not grasp the mind itself but it as presented by language 'mind'. The mind itself is known either by implication or by inference as the substratum of the cognition figured in the mind by language 'mind'. Physical and psychological entities are also known as the ontic substratum (*tāttvikasāmānādhikaraṇa*) of the inner-beings (meaning revealed-non-differently in the mind by language) but in all the cases, he emphasizes to reflect on the concepts as they are revealed when presented in the mind by language. The cognition revealed by language in the mind serves as the cognitive base for other meanings by a word and for the implication or inference of the entities (metaphysical, physical or psychological) as the ontic (*tāttvika*) substratum of the cognition as well.

II. SUBSTANCE

The time-honoured discussion on the problem of substance as a metaphysical entity—as empiricists conclude—tends either to scepticism or to decomposition of a substance to properties, and the modern readers show little interest in spending their times for such an issue as empirically unsolvable or having no cognitive ground. Observing philosophically, the substance—whether to be found in empirical world or that of the transcendental—necessarily demands a cognitive ground in order to be known and to be expressed. Is there any cognitive-ground in order to be known and to be expressed? Is there any cognitive-ground or justification for accepting a thing-in-itself or external-thing, beyond the grasp of the mind, as meaning of the word? Philosophy itself is not involved with the study of external objects or things-in-themselves. Rather, it is involved with the study of objects as they are revealed in the mind by language/words. For a philosopher who takes philosophy as a system of interpreting cognition as revealed by language, philosophical reflections are concerned with the clarification by analysis and explanation of meaning as presented by language in ordinary communication. For a Bhartṛharian, no theory of meaning can be proper if it is not grounded on a communicative or a cognitive-base.[19]

For some analytic philosophers, the issue of substance, as a thing-in-itself, is not a legitimate problem of philosophical investigation. For them, the problem is actually verbal but metaphysicians confuse it with the factual. Is it not true to say that all problems of philosophy, and, hence, the problem of 'substance is a fact' are verbal for a philosopher for whom the language and its meaning are only intelligent beings? A philosopher, whose aim is to explain the world of communication (*Vyvahāra*, i.e. the world of language and meanings), takes all the issues for investigation on the basis of cognition as expressed by language. The interpretation of communication or cognition by language is the sole philosophical concern for such a philosopher and he does not consider a substance independently of what and how the language reveals it.[20]

Substance stands as a logically and philosophically legitimate problem if it is discussed as the language presents it. The founder of the theory 'all words denote substance' is an ancient Indian grammarian named *Vyādi*[21]. *Pāṇini*[22] and his commentators have honoured the theory for the explanation of the meanings of words. Bhartṛhari, in his third book of *Vākyapadīya* has included two chapters entitled *Dravya Samuddeśaḥ* and *Bhūyodravya Samuddeśaḥ*, respectively, to look into *Vyādi*'s view of meaning. His interpretation in these chapters is dedicated to the substance as the very general meaning of all words. Bhartṛhari's significance as a metaphysician, as a grammarian and, finally, as a philosopher for whom language and meanings are only intelligible beings, can well be observed in his treatment of the problem.

According to Bhartṛhari, soul (*ātmā*), Individual or thing (*vastu*), nature (*svabhāva*), reality (*sattā*), body (*śarīra*), and substance (*tattva*) are synonyms of *Dravya* (Being with capital B).[23] An account of the discussion on substance is classified into two categories: (i) substance as the transcendental absolute-untouched by words (*Pāramārthika Dravya*); and (ii) substance as it is presented by expressions or expressional substance (*Sāmvyavahārika Dravya*). A brief account of these two follows:

i. Substance as a Transcendental Absolute (Pāramārthika Dravya)

No category of speech is applicable to the unconditioned transcendental substance. It can be said neither to exist nor to non-exist, neither one nor many, neither unity (*Sansṛṣṭa*) because there is nothing except it, nor diversity (*Vibhakta*) because it is non-dual, and, hence, no question of diversity, neither changing nor non-changing, neither nor, nor nothing. Such things are untouched by words; they are not intelligible beings that are expressed by language in the mind and, hence, they are non-communicable Beings.

How can such transcendental unconditioned substance be accepted as the meaning of a word? It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it thinks determinately even of those beyond the grasp of it. As all thinking is infused by language, the unconditioned is thought of as conditioned by language and is communicated accordingly as of this or that form, one, many, unity, diversity, changing, unchanging, etc.[24]

Bhartṛhari has mentioned two sorts of conditioning factors of the unconditioned: (i) *Mūrtivivarta* (space); and (ii) *Kriyāvivarta* (time). He further elucidates that space and time serve as individualizers of the unconditioned substance. Time and space in Bhartṛhari's philosophy are non-different and differentiated on the basis of action (*kriyā*) and form (*mūrti*), respectively. All things in the world are divided into finished and non-finished characters. It is on the basis of time (*kāla*) that actions (non-finished characters) and of space that form (*mūrti*) that is finished character are treated differently. No sequence is known isolated from form and a form is always a form in a time. Not only that but also a being of finished character may be presented by language and known as a being of a non-finished character and vice-versa. All actions are action in a space and all forms are forms known in time and hence they are correlated conditioners in Bhartṛhari's philosophy.[25] The same substance from the point of view of movements is sequence (action) in time and from the point of view of extension is thing moving in space. As no sequence is possible without a thing and as a thing is always a thing existing or non-existing in a time, the two are co-related continuum conditioners through which the unconditioned is known as determinate.

The world of communication is the sole concern of philosophy, and communicable being (words and meanings) are only intelligible beings to which the reflection of a philosopher of language, like Bhartṛhari, is confined. The words do not express external things and the senses do not reveal meanings. The meaning (*Vācya*) is revealed by the word and is non-different from the word it reveals. The words reveals the expressed (*Vācya*) and not the thing or external-object which are trans-language, beyond cognitive beings. The meaning is not even an outcome of an abstraction (*amūrtikaraṇa*) from external-objects. It is a revealed/expressed being, the being presented or revealed in the mind by word independently of external-things.

As a grammarian metaphysician, Bhartṛhari does not deny; rather, he accepts the fact that language-token served as indication/marks. It indicates things/entities. There are things corresponding words. But as a language philosopher, he reflects on the cognition as it is revealed by language in the mind. For such a reflection, the real language is

ubiquitous, given, and an indivisible being that reveals itself and its meaning as well in the mind. It is awareness-awareness of itself and of its meaning as well and, hence, the language and the meaning, it reveals, are the only beings of a philosophical concern. External-objects are taken by habit as the external basis or substratum (*Vāhyālambana*) of the intelligible beings. Meaning, as such, is not a thing assumed by habit. It is a being revealed by language in the mind,[26] and, thus, there is no philosophical need and sense in assuming external-things, which are non-communicable and are ungraspable by language.

Those who accept external-substance as meaning of words conceive substance as the substratum of qualities. For some, the substance is the sum total of the qualities, while for others it is something more than the qualities. Logically, the theorists, belonging to the former view, are unable to defend themselves if the question of the decomposition of substance to qualities, which are only perceived, is put before them, while those belonging to the latter view fail to produce any cognitive-ground for a substance beyond and above the qualities known. Is there any ground to perceive gold beyond the qualities or free from all its qualities? The assumption of substance as that 'which is defined through its qualities but indescribable in-itself' amounts to scepticism, and, no uniform theory of substance as the import of words may be founded on the basis of the aforementioned metaphysical view of substance.

Those who accept that the words denote the form directly and the substance indirectly, confuse the term denotation, for Bhartṛhari, a denotation (*Vācya*) is that which is revealed in the mind non-differently by the words.[27] Two denotations are not cognized simultaneously. Since language infuses cognition, there is no cognitive ground to accept the denotation as a thing independently of what is expressed. If the consequential cognition of them is accepted, then there is no justification for accepting indirectly supposed substance as the denotation which is cognized directly as expressed by the word and which serves as the basis of implication or assumption of the former as the substratum of the latter.

A denotation is an expressed one, which is directly revealed in the mind by words. There is no space in the mind in order to house external-things. It can be said that external-things are there and it is

things which figure in mind when words are uttered; otherwise, one cannot find any justification for the problem as to why do we not understand 'house' when we hear the word 'cow'.[28] It can also be added that the uniformity of external-objects perceived and the ideas figured in the mind by words, necessarily demand the existence of external-things as the meaning of words. *Helārāja* refutes[29] their arguments by putting the dialectic—whether they (external-things and their ideas) are similar (*Sādṛśya*) to limited extent or to the full-extent? In the former case, the cognition will be like the cognition of an entity (pot, etc.) but for Bhartṛhari it is awareness. In case of assuming it as an entity, it will lose its foundational character. Not only that, but the cognition of a part or a thing, say pot, will, in that case be the cognition of all things (pot, cot, dog, etc.). Thus, the issue of similarity between an entity unintelligible in nature and the being, intelligible in nature, is baseless. In the later case, the knowledge will cease to be knowledge. It will be, then, a matter like external-things, and, thus, the logic of the sameness of a cognitive being and a physical or external-thing will amount to utter obscurity. In perceptual experiences, it may be accepted that external-things are perceived by senses. Perceiving a thing is not the knowing. Knowing is cognition of intelligible beings. Perceiving is just a tool in the manifestation of the only expresser. However, there is no justification for external-things if we confine only to the cognition expressed or revealed by the words in the mind. The experiences perception, inference, etc., serve as means in the manifestation of the expresser and the meaning is revealed by it only. If we deny the foundationality of the cognition revealed in the mind by language, there will be no base even for the presumption of external-things.

The view that ideas hypostatized as external-objects is the meaning of words is also confusing. The words do not reveal external-objects (whether hypostatized or otherwise). The cognition by words is the awareness of meaning revealed by words without having any recourse to external-objects. How can the words, viz., negation, unreal, non-existent, hairs-horns, etc., be explained if external-things are taken as the expressed of words? The meaning is known as revealed in the mind by words and it is needless to admit it as personified. How Bhartṛhari shows impossibility of expressions regarding being, non-

being, etc., if external-beings are taken as the meaning of language is discussed in precise elsewhere.[30] It is apparent from the observation made in the earlier pages that if substance is taken as the meaning of words, it must be a being (*Buddhistha*), thought-object or idea figured by words in the mind. It is not a mental construction or any kind of abstraction but a being revealed in the mind by words.

Some metaphysicians accept that words are indicators of thing-in-itself. They are signs or symbols of external-objects and indicate that of which they are symbols. As word and its meaning are revealed as truths[31] and as the word does not reveal anything ontic in nature, how can an external entity be accepted as the meaning which is non-different from the word? Is it not that they are assumed by implication or supposed by habit? If it is yes, how can that which is not revealed by words but supposed otherwise be accepted as expressed (*Vācya*) of an expresser? Now it is clear that the view of language as committed to ontology is significant for ontologists but for philosophers it misleads philosophical reflection from the right philosophical conclusion. For some, the word functions as a denotation of a sense (meaning) and as a pointer to a referent (thing-in-itself). The referring capacity of a word cannot be denied but it also cannot be denied that with the change of sense the referent is also changed. The same person is a father, a teacher, and a friend but with the uses in those respective senses, the referent does not remain the same.

III

ii. Expressional Substance (Sāmavyavahārika Dravya)

The uniqueness of Bhartṛhari philosophizing as a language philosopher may be seen in his exposition of substance presented by language in the mind. He has interpreted the expressional substance from two perspectives. A brief account of these perspectives is given as follows:

(a) First Perspective: Substance and the Problem of Language as Reference

Let us come to the problem of language as reference in precise. Jainas, Bauddhas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmānsakas and Advaita Vedāntins—who take language as that which, by proxy, stands for the referents, i.e. things

and thoughts—accept language as reference. The difference of language and thought is basic for them. In a more general sense, they accept the fact that the language is used to communicate the thoughts of the things of which it is a reference. Thought is basic and prior to any communication. When one intends to communicate the thought, the language comes forth to act on the purpose. Thoughts are aroused by experience; memory and perception based on the sense-object contact and the language by convention refer to those objects.

As a grammarian philosopher, Bhartṛhari aims at explaining meaning as presented in the mind by words. According to him[32], some words, i.e. pronouns like *idam* (this), *tat* (that) and *sarva* (all) function as indicatives to substances in general (*vastumātra abhidhāyinaḥ*) while some other pronouns like *anya* (others), *anyatara* (another) are expressive of specified substances (*Viśiṣṭavastuvācakāḥ*). In brief, by the term non-qualified or substance in general (*Śuddha-Dravya*), we mean sheer substance that is indeterminate. Different from it, by the term-qualified substance (*Viśiṣṭadravya*), we mean substance determined by quality. Apart from the meaning of qualified substance as mentioned above, Bhartṛhari has used the term for that which figures by language in the mind as some thing distinguished from others (qualifiers).

Presently, we propose to discuss the former perspective according to which a substance is that for the indication of which pronouns like *idam* (this), *tat* (that) and *sarva* (all) are used.[33] These pronouns are used as pointers to all sorts of things in the world without distinction of their properties, particular names, genders, etc. Pronouns are used on the place of nouns having particular names, gender, etc., but when pronouns *idam* or *tat* or *sarva* are used in the place of nouns, the specific name, gender and other distinctions are neither expressed nor expected, and, thus, all that is called by those pronouns *idam* (this), *tat* (that) or *sarva* (all), is taken as 'substance' in general.

Though pronouns are used on the place of nouns, their uses are different. Nouns express their own particular meanings, while pronouns as 'this' or 'that' indicate that substance is general. A noun cannot be used for substance in general or for substance without its determinants, i.e. qualities. For example, the word 'dog' is not used for all substances like pen, book, etc., except its own meaning. Unlike nouns, pronouns

are used as indicative to all sorts or substances (thing—this or that). A thing may be called by different names (i.e. *ātmā*, *dravya*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*, etc.) and by each name, their specific meanings are known or expressed but pure substance, void of names and genders, cannot be indicated by them. A pronoun is used to indicate the substance for which a number of nouns may be used, and, perhaps, this is the reason Bhartṛhari defines substance in general (*Śuddha-Dravya*) as that for which pronouns, *idam*, *tat* are used.

Clarifying the position of pronouns in referring/marking to substance, Bhartṛhari gives the analogy of a crow sitting on the roof of the house of Deodatta.[34] As the house of Deodatta is indicated through the crow (mark) sitting on the roof of his house, which is attained by the hearer through the crow indicated by the word, even if it flies later on, the substance is referred to by pronouns like *idam* (this), *tat* (that) and *sarva* (all), which are separated after performing the task of indicating the substance. The pronouns function as marks or as pointer (*upalakṣaṇa*) but they should not be confused as adjectives or properties. The difference between a mark and property is that the former is separated from what it points while the latter is inseparably associated with the substance. In case of properties, as they are inseparably associated with the substance, the unqualified substance or substance void of forms cannot be referred. The former may point to the unqualified (substance in general) while the latter, being a predicate, implies the substance as its substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇa*).[35] Conclusively, pronouns, according to grammarians, function to indicate the substance in two ways. Words such as 'this', 'that' and 'all' indicate sheer substance void of all determination. Out of them, 'this' indicates visible Beings of present time and that of 'that' for indicating Beings invisible, presently, and are inferred.

According to Vaiyākaraṇas, language is awareness by nature; it infuses thought and is also expressive. They also accept the referential function of language. Conventionally, language is used to refer to the referents. Thoughts are imposed on things that are taken as referents. Convention is learnt by practice, perception and habit and cannot be learnt without observation of the referential use of language. We have seen in the discussion made in the earlier pages that Bhartṛhari, in

Bhūyo-Dravyasamuddeśaḥ has accepted that the pure substance: substance devoid of specific qualities, is referred to by the pronouns like that, this, it, all.

Language is expressive by nature and it expresses the universal. The universal is imposed on an individual that is identified as a referent for which the language stands as the reference. In other words, it is by reference that the use of language is specified to the particulars on which our convention is based. Theorists who believe language as different from thought and verbal cognition established by convention accept the language as reference. For them, validity of verbal cognition is based on corresponding empirical existence or non-existence of the referent. Different from those theorists, *Vaiyākaraṇas*, who believe language and thought as non-different, language as expressive of meaning and meaning as the meaning revealed in the mind by language, i.e. idea, accept referential use of language only for the sake of interpretation of convention. Conventionally, meaning of the language is imposed on the referents and language is confined to as the marks of those referents.

In brief, there are basically two types of approaches to cognition by language—firstly, language oriented, and secondly, meaning oriented. In the former, language is the original unit of cognition and it reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. It is a cognitive approach to language, for which our knowledge is confined to and is based on the revealed beings, i.e. the language and the meaning. These beings are only intelligible/philosophical beings and the referents or things-in themselves, to be found in the empirical world, are beyond our cognition because they are not expressed. They are known by imposition and presumption as the substantial base of intelligible beings. Meaning for the latter is different from language. They accept meaning of the language that stands for the things the language refers.

IV

(b) Second Perspective: Substance and the Problem of Langauge as the Expresser

According to the second perspective, a substance is that which is expected as that to be differentiated/distinguished by others

(*Bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*). In this view, the qualified substance (*viśiṣṭavastu*) is the expressed (*Vācya*) of the expresser (*vācaka*).

The words present substance as that which is qualified or distinguished by meanings of other words of an expression. The difference between what qualifies and what is qualified is known by the use of words, and, anything, even qualities, etc., can also be presented by words as that to be distinguished by others and, then, they are also substance. Helārāja, by explaining all the words grouped into five categories, i.e. *nāma* (nominatives), *ākhyāta* (verb), *upasarga* (prefixes), *nipāta* (particles) and *Karmapravacanīya* (post positions), shows how they, when presented as substantive, express an accomplished character or state (*siddhāvasthā*) designated as individual (*vyakti*) or particular (*viśeṣa*) or substance (*dravya*).[36] For example, the word *nīla* (blue) in the use *nīlokāśaḥ* (blue sky) expresses a quality (colour), but, the same word in the use 'key-blue' expresses the 'blue' as distinguished by the sky, and, hence, substance. The word 'batting' in the sentence 'He is batting' expresses an action that is an unaccomplished character but the same word in the expression 'His batting is excellent' expresses substance that is an accomplished character (*siddhāvastha*) qualified by the predicate 'excellent'. If the definition of substance as *adhikaraṇam-Dravya* (that which is presented by words as substratum of the meanings of other words of the expression) is taken for consideration, substance will be the meaning of all words standing as substratum (*adhikaraṇa*). For example, the word 'liberation' (*mokṣa*) as it serves as a substratum, in the expression *Mokṣe icchāsti* (there is craving for liberation), is substance because it stands as the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) of the desire (*icchā*). For *Vaiyākaraṇas*, this definition of substance (*dravya*) may also be explained on the basis of the definition *bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*. Helārāja says, as an action is the central meaning of an expression and as they take other words of the expression, as accessories that qualify verb, so also substance is taken as the meaning of verb.[37] Substance is considered as the import of suffixes, prepositions and postpositions also as they function as suggestive to the meaning (substance) of the words with which they are used. For individualists like Vaiśeṣikas, universal is a

quality and not substance, but universal, as Helārāja says, if presented by words as something qualified, expresses substances.[38]

In brief, it can be said that the views of substance, as presented by Bhartṛhari and his commentators, regard substance as that which is referred to be pronouns 'this' or 'that', etc., and is known as that which is presented as qualified or distinguished in an expression. These two definitions of the common sense view of substance, given by Bhartṛhari, are not separate but complementary as they together characterize the common sense view of the use of words for substance.

Kumārila Mīmānsakas, to whom universal is the very general meaning of all words, reject the individualist's theory of substance as the meaning of words by saying that, as discrete individuals are innumerable, it is difficult to decide the individual particularly observed by the convention (*Samaya*). If convention of the word 'pot' is there with pot-A and if pot B or C is cognized by the word 'pot', it will cause an irregularity of convention (*Samayavyabhicāra*), and, hence, a deviation (*Vyabhicāra*) from what is observed by convention. It is not sound to say that the word serves as limiter of all of its instances (individuals).

Individualists, in order to get rid of the charge, say that the specific form, qualifying substance as specific (*viśeṣa*), distinguishes the meaning of a word from that of the others. For example, the individual 'pot' associated with a certain form is distinguished from the individual 'sun' or 'tree' associated with different forms. Speaking of the individualist's position, Bhartṛhari says 'as the perceiving power of eyes is limited if one perceives through a tube, the substance, when communicated by words, is cognized as qualified by the qualities—form, colour, etc., and, thus, 'the substance qualified by a particular form is the meaning of the word'.[39]

It may be asked: does the word express the form or the substance without a form or the substance qualified by the form or substance and form both? For universalities, the word expresses form and individual as an ontic substratum of the form is known by implication. For realists, like Vaiśeṣikas, the word expresses the individual qualified by the form. The grammarian's account of individualist's positions is similar to that of realists. For them, the word denotes the form directly and the substance indirectly (through the forms). The denotation is not limited

to form but it comprises the substance. For universalist, form or universal is the primary meaning of the word and substance is secondary, while, for individualists, the form, being the adjunct of substance, is secondary and the substance is the primary meaning of words. In an individualist's account, substance is cognized as the primary meaning of the word and, as forms are inherent in them, they are also known by implication or by presumption.

Vaiyākaraṇas give due importance to both of the views for interpreting meaning. Some unitaries like *ākāśa* (sky), sun, moon, etc., that can be better explained on the basis of individual as the meaning of words. Terms like 'these universals' (*imā jātiyān*), 'word universal' (*Śabda-jāti*), etc., though they may be explained on the basis of individual as the import of words, can be better explained on the basis of universal as the meaning of words.[40] What Bhartṛhari wants to prove is that if universals are taken as primary meaning of words, individuals are secondary and the vice versa. Finally, the words can be used in a sentence to mean substance or universal as per the expectancy of the speaker involved in the use of words.

The use of words as per expectancy or will of the speaker is not possible if substance is taken existent independently of language. The change of status as per expectancy or will is not possible in context of external-things which are not beings figured by words (*vikalpagocara*). A *vikalpagocara* is a being figured in mind by words and, even so, independently of external-things. Cognitively, it means the intelligible being qualified or to be distinguished by the other is known in accordance with the use of word, but in daily practices, particular utterances (sounds) by proxy are taken to stand for particular things.

Bhartṛhari has made a three-tie approach towards explaining substance as the meaning of words. As a metaphysician, he interprets substance as the ultimate reality expressed in all the qualified forms and words. As a grammarian, he expounds the definition of substance as that which is presented as qualified by the others and which can be referred to by pronouns. As a philosopher of language, he bases his reflections on cognitive grounds and accepts meaning as that revealed by words in the mind of the audience. Cognitively, as he shows in *Jāti Samuddeśaḥ*, the word reveals universal and other meanings like

substance or individual (*Vyakti*) are known, consequentially, by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*)[41] as the ontic substratum (*Sāmānādhikaraṇa*) of the universal. The universalists—as meaning for them is what is revealed non-differently by words—take universals as the very general meaning of all sorts of words but the individualists view substance as a substratum of the universal and take it as the general meaning of words. It is observed that in Bhartṛhari's explanation of substance, as the very general meaning of words, the wordism (*Padavāda*) of the individualists, according to which the discrete word—independently of sentence is a meaning-conveying unit turns to sententialism, because, something can be presented as qualified or as distinguished by other words only by a unit of a sentential form.

It can be said that Bhartṛhari's expositions of substance as the very general meaning of words achieve significance only if a word is taken as a part of sentence or expresses a sentential meaning. Discrete words, independently of a sentence, cannot be explained on the basis of it, because, in that case, the expectancy of being qualified or distinguished by qualifiers will not be accomplished. The individualist's assumption that 'the import of a word, acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence, is substance' implies that the words are expressive of qualified meaning. It can be said against their view, that a meaning is taken as qualified only if there is a qualifier and this is possible only in the case of a sentence. On the basis of analogy of gold[42] and its various ornaments, individualists may say that the substance in general is the very general meaning of words and the forms are known consequently as they subsist in it but this later assumption again implies that non-qualified substance (gold), void of all forms, is no different from the universal. This is the meeting point of Bhartṛhari's discussion in all three chapters entitled *Jāti Samuddeśaḥ*, *Dravyasamuddeśaḥ* and *BhūyoDravya Sammuddeśaḥ*. The all-comprehensive Being is the all-encompassing universal (*Mahāsattā* is *Mahājātī*).

So far the meaning of a word isolated from the sentence is concerned, universalists are right in assuming universal as the very general meaning of all words. For them, a word is universal and the meaning it reveals non-differently is also universal. That is why, identical cognition, in all its occurrences and instances, is accomplished by them. The identical

cognition is not possible if universal is not admitted. Both the universalists and individualists accept that the expressive or primary meaning serves as the basis of cognition of other meanings of the word in its different use, which according to universalists, cannot be explained without admitting the universals as the very general meaning of words. The individualists attempt to explain the problem of identical cognition on the basis of similarity. For them, identical cognition is imposed, while for the universalists, it is basic. The individualist's theory has no solution to the question as to why should one accept a being (unit) directly revealed by the word as imaginary. The logic of eternity of substance may be attractive but cognitively, it is unfounded. The logic of grammar or use of words, in daily practices, for things, is all accepted but it needs to be examined philosophically on the ground of cognition as revealed by words. The idea that the language is a referring tool or marks confined to referring underestimates the expressive nature of it. If words are accepted as reference then the foundational character of the word as expressive of itself and its meaning may not possibly be given its due and that may cause serious cognitive problem regarding philosophical beings.

For Bhartṛhari, the cognition by language is an issue of proper philosophical investigation. As a being can be presented by words so as to be distinguished or to be differentiated, it seems right to accept substance as the very general meaning of all words. Expression regarding being or non-being cannot be possible if substance as external being is taken as the meaning. The substance, in general, cannot be expressed as different from universality. In other words, the idea of substance, in general, is universal which even the word substance expresses. Utterances or language-token are taken as the indicator of substance (qualified) but the real language expresses universal. What conclusively we derive from the aforementioned discussions is that the universal is the import of words (if the words, derived from grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence, are taken as an indivisible meaning revealing units). In that case, substance is known by the implication as the substratum of universal.

We have already seen in the earlier pages that in some cases, only the uttering of word is understood as the meaning as in the cases of

mantras (numinous words which are uttered in a contemplating manner). In some other cases, the form of the words as in the cases of words like *apūrva devatā*, *swarga* and *sūtras* of Pāṇini, and, in still some other cases, the word (*Sphoṭa*) itself and the meaning non-differently revealed by it are understood as the meaning of the word. However, in no case is a referent outside taken as meaning of words. Words are not eternally related with things beyond words but with meanings non-differently revealed by them. The meaning revealed is imposed on referents of which words are taken, by habit, as reference.

Do words stand only as marks of things? Much has been said on the problem, and, here, I am not going to suggest any thing new but to clarify the reason for thinking words as marks. When we teach the meaning of a word, say, 'cat' to a child, the most easy and sure shot method we adopt is to show him the picture of cat or an animal 'cat' sitting on the mat before him. It can be said that he learns all the principal words by observing corresponding referents. It is a remedy prescribed for a beginner but philosophical investigation is an afterward process. A philosopher of language, who aims at interpreting the cognition by words, takes meaning as that the words reveal or expressed (*Vācya*), for investigation. There is difference between learning pattern analysis of the function of words and that of philosophical. Those who accept words as mere referring tools confuse not only the differences of functioning of the senses and that of the words but the differences of the object of perceptual cognition and that of the cognition revealed by words also. They fail to observe the very instrumental character of perception and the foundational character of cognition as well. Showing the differences of functioning of senses and of the words, Bhartṛhari writes 'the senses need not be cognized before perceiving objects. They do so when they are exposed to objects by their mere existence. Words, on the other hand, do not reveal objects (meaning) by their mere existence. They have to be cognized themselves first before they express meaning.[43] Manifested by sense data it reveals itself and then meaning is revealed non-differently in the mind.[44] External things may be accepted as the object of perception or as an inevitable basis of sense data but there is no question of sense data as the meaning of a word, which is cognized as revealed in the mind non-differently by the

word independently from external objects. The hearings of a set of verbal-articulations in a sequence (wrongly taken as real words) are not the expressers of knowledge (*Jñāna*). They are mere tools helping revelation of given word (*Sphoṭa*) by which the meaning is revealed. The sense data of something, acquired by the same or the other persons at different times, varies but the meaning-revealing expresser is fixed or given and that is why identical cognition by them is accomplished. Sense data acquired by senses are not meaning; they serve as tools for manifesting *Sphoṭa* from which meaning is revealed non-differently.

Where there is a change of meaning of the word, Bhartṛhari does not endorse a case of transfer of meaning but a case of imposition of the expressive meaning on them. In brief, we can say that sense perception necessarily requires an external object as a prerequisite of sense data but this is not applicable to the cognition by word in which perception of articulations/utterances are tools only for the manifestation of the *Sphoṭa* which, out of itself, reveals meaning and, thus, it is not an outcome of sensing contents.

My involvement here in showing the differences of perception by senses and cognition by words is to clarify how the cognition by words, when considered on the pattern of cognition by senses, misleads one to conclude that words are marks of some or other kinds of referents-empirical or transcendental. As a child learns the uses of verbal utterances by taking them to stand by proxy for things, in his daily practices, he is not only driven to things through-utterances (*dhvaniyān*) by habit (*abhyāsa*), practice (*prayoga*) and perception (*darśana*) but also identifies them with things[45] and, thus, he does not mind the foundationality of the inner meaning revealing language. The word as *sphoṭa* is awareness and the meaning revealed non-differently by it is awareness (*Pratibhā*) as well. The meaning as *Pratibhā* cannot be explained as a flash of understanding, if the word as the expresser (*Sphoṭa*) that reveals it is denied. The two are non-different and that is the reason identical conception or cognition by words is accomplished. Taking the word as *Sphoṭa* only that the foundational character of it as meaning revealing unit or expressive by nature may be explained properly.

Thus, *Sphoṭa*, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is a meaning-revealing unit. Verbal or articulate utterance are marks which, on one hand, are tools in the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* and are taken as marks of things on the other hand. These differences must be kept in mind for avoiding many difficult problems of philosophy of language. Verbal utterances as marks are taken as substitute of things, i.e. they stand by proxy for the things meant; they occupy positions like that of label of commodities while *Sphoṭa* as awareness of itself and of meaning is an expressed being. It is doubtless to say that while discussing universal as the meaning revealed by word (*Sphoṭa*), Bhartṛhari is quite clear about the substance that, according to him, is known consequentially by implication made on the basis of universals as their substratum.

It is remarkable to note that Bhartṛhari's account of substance as the import of words is different from other theorists in the sense that he investigates not into the substance—empirical or transcendental—but into the meaning as cognized or figured in the mind by words. For him, the pronouns this, that, all, are indicatives to pure substance without forms (gold void of all forms) and *anya*, *anyatara* (other-another) present qualified substance expected as distinguished from others. A qualified substance can be explained as the import of a word in the presence of its qualifiers and that is possible only in the case of compounds and sentences. The substantives express substance qualified by adjectives, verbs, etc. Bhartṛhari's definition of qualified substances present it in a way that keeps us free from the danger of decomposition of substance despite the fact that it presents it as that which is qualified. Taking words as independent expressers of meaning, it is epistemological justified to accept substance as the import of words because what is cognized by discrete word 'pot' is not individual pot (a qualified substances) but 'potness' and, thus, universal (potness) is revealed by the word 'pot'. It is justified on the plane of cognition to accept universal as the very general meaning of words and substance as that cognized, consequently, as the substratum of universals because words are indivisible concepts. It is also justified to accept that a universal is substance if it is presented by language as that to be qualified but it is possible only in case of sentence as the expresser and not in case of the word independently of sentence.

V

ARGUMENTS AGAINST REPRESENTATION THEORY OF LANGUAGE FROM THE SIDE OF INDIAN GRAMMARIANS

Bhartṛhari is aware of the language theories of Jaina, Bauddha, Sānkhya, Nyāya, Mīmānsa and Vedānta, for which language represents the thought. Throughout the Vākyapadīya, he has taken the labour to establish the infusion of language and thought against the theorists who accept thought independently of language; the language is employed for the representation of thoughts. I am not going to discuss the issue of infusion of language and thought which is discussed in detailed elsewhere.[46] Bhartṛhari is an ancient philosopher of language and, as such, he has not confronted with the problem of language as representation, which significantly arises later on with the hand of representationists and essentialist of the analytic trends of the West of our time. However, if we take the Bhartṛharian view of language as expresser in consideration and respond on representation theory of language, we are confronted with certain problems.

Let us analyze the statement 'the toy train represents the actual train'. Both of the trains—the actual and the toy—are perceived in difference of time. Previously, we perceived the actual train and when we perceive a toy later on, the perceived fact of the actual train comes to memory by resemblance. Taking that memory into account, we make the statement 'the perceived toy train represents the actual train' but in fact, that represents the memory of the actual train perceived previously. If memory and perception both are discrete facts, it is not proper to say that memory is represented by perception because none of them are representation and that there is no language for representation at that stage. Even if we accept for a moment that the former represents the later, it hardly says anything on the representation by language. Does the language represent the former or the later? Alternatively, does it represent the representation of the later by the former? Then again, does it represent the two tangled together? The representationists are not very clear on these issues. However, if it is accepted that language represents all those cases, the authenticity of the knowledge by representation will not be explained if originality of the knowledge by language is denied.

From the side of grammarian philosophers, we may provide with objections, against the view of representationists, an account of them may be given as follows:

1. Language, for grammarians, is expression and not representation. If taken as representation, language will then be a mere tool for representing the things or facts derived by other sources like perception or memory and thus subordinated either to moot things or abstracted facts which in that theory are primary. This underestimation of the language is against the active theory of language according to which in a cognition the language expresses its own nature first and then it reveals meaning non-differently. If language is taken as representation of the reality or fact by taking it as representation then the cognition by language will not be authority. Either it will be memory or implication/inference and thus the expressive power of language will be underestimated.
2. If we take language as representation, the question arises as to what extent does the language represent the reality or facts. If it represents them in their completeness then the knowledge by perception and the verbal knowledge will be identical, and then it will be useless to say language as representation; rather, it will be a presentation. If it is taken to represent them to a certain extent, the question of certainty of the represented facts will remain unsolved.
3. In the grammarian's theory of verbal cognition, the cognition revealed by language in the mind serves as the cause of incentive for articulations but if it is accepted as representation, the question arises as what is the cause of representation. Is it external/internal objects or facts? Abstracted sense-data/facts themselves require expresser in order to be known and to be presented. As they are abstracted, they cannot do so by themselves. As the language is implied only as a representational tool, the representationists are not privileged to accept that language is the cause of incentive for representation of the facts. To deny the primacy of language as the expresser is to deny the cause of incentive to referring or representing. It is the

cognition expressed that serves as the cause of incentive and that is expressed by language.

4. The problem of identical cognition arises if language is taken as representation. The cognition expressed by language is identical cognition of the language and meaning it reveals non-differently. In representation theory, the facts are derived by perception. The entity perceived is retained in the mind by memory and the fact as resurrected in memory comes to the mind when one desires to represent the same. Thus, there is no principle to base identical cognition of the instant entities perceived, the fact resurrected in memory, the language and the fact represented by language. To accept the mind as the base is to give undue importance to subjective element, i.e. mind, to which all are subordinated for their existence. The possibility of certainty of identity in between the objects-perceived, the facts in mind and the represented facts remain itself a problem. If the identical cognition by language is denied then the fact represented by language will be altogether a different fact—different from the object-perceived, facts and the memory of the facts and that will go against the representation theory of language itself.
5. If identical cognition is accepted by resemblance or by group/assemblage, then the represented fact will only resemble similar to the perceived fact that it will not be identical. In the cognition by group, the differences are primary and not the identity. However, the group theory is not applicable to representationists as the group of different characters, viz., the object-perceived, the fact resurrected in memory and the fact represented are different not only in character but in time also. If it is accepted to be grouped by the mind, then it will be difficult to distinguish the fact represented by language and the fact retained in the mind and then there will always be a case of confusion.
6. Indian grammarians accept language as expressive and so they accept verbal cognition as authority. For them, all knowledge is veridical and the veridical cognition for demarcation of it as valid or non-valid or as truth or false, is made understandable

to those who can understand it in terms of validity or invalidity on the presence or absence of the corresponding referents. Even, the cognition expressed by the language 'Non-veridical, contradictory', etc., are also known thus because they are expressed so by language. Representation and further verification in terms of truth and falsity based on availability or non-availability of referents of which they are representations are significant for logical purpose but the theorists are not serious on the issue of identical cognition.

VI

CONCLUSION

It can be said that the core purpose of the theorists who accept language as reference and representation is to present an understanding of the metaphysical world that is things-in-themselves through language, particularly in terms of reference and representation. It is a non-philosophic understanding of the world in which we live and with which we act and react. It considers perceptual entities, thoughts and language discretely of each other. In that manner, the significance of those theories cannot be overlooked but, in those cases, relation of language with referents or with the facts represented will be difficult to explain because of the reason that the former is a cognitio-linguistic unit while the latter is a metaphysical unit. Not only that but also the relation of reference and referent or representation and represented is not natural. Artificial relation between the two always varies with the variation of the allegiance of the mind. In view of cognition, language is the expresser and it expresses any meaning non-differently by the natural fitness. This natural fitness of the expresser to express the expressed is natural relation. It is the natural fitness by which the language is a active force and by which the expresser (*vācaka*) and the expressed (*vācya*) are naturally related. Moreover, the philosopher's world is different; they are concerned with the world of philosophical/intelligible beings. Philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence and the reflection of a philosopher, while reflecting, is based on and is confined to the beings expressed in the mind that is to intelligible/philosophic beings of which language is only expresser. It reveals its

own nature first and then reveals the meaning non-differently. There is non-difference between language and thought. They are infused together.

Grammarian philosophers aim to understand the cognition of substance as it figures in the mind by language. They do not bother with the substance in itself, whether it is eternal or transient,[47] while the referentialists and representationists attempt to understand things-in-themselves for which they accept language as a referring/representating tool. The question of language as reference comes up later when one intends to understand the cognitive beings expressed by language, in terms of reference and referent. The expresser is taken to be confined to the garb/language token and the meaning it expresses is taken by presumption to stand for the referents corresponding to the cognition expressed first in the mind by language. Thus, the question of language as reference stands significant only secondarily. There is no possibility of searching for a referent corresponding to the knowledge expressed by language in the mind if the knowledge expressed by language in the mind as the cause of incentive for that searching is denied. We are so accustomed with communication with verbal utterances and marks that we do not mind the cognition expressed by language as the cause of incentive of referential modes of language and take verbal utterances or marks (*Vaikharī*), used for the manifestation of expresser, as identified with language that stands for a referent with which one learns the convention. It is by perception, practice and habit that we ordinarily take the language token/verbal utterances/marks as language that by proxy stands for the things for which they are used conventionally. The representation mode of use of language is not denied but the question of language, as representation does not stand significant if language and thought are non-different. It is not only improper but also underestimation to say that language stands for the referent known by other sources of knowledge like visual perception, inference and others based on perception.

Bhartṛhari, in both of the chapters on substance, has discussed three levels of substance: (i) transcendental—that includes even the things-in-themselves in this world, that according to him, is beyond the reach of language, (ii) very general substance which is indicated by the pronouns like 'this', 'that', etc., and (iii) substance as that figures by

language in the mind as distinguished from others or as qualified. The last one emphasized in the discussion as a unique contribution of Vaiyākaraṇas, in general, and of Bhartṛhari, in particular.

As per the Vaiyākaraṇa's active theory, language is an expresser; it infuses knowledge. All knowledge is knowledge revealed by language. This expresser, for the purpose of a demarcation of it in terms of referent and represented, is understood as reference and representation, respectively, but in all the case of referring and representing, the cognition expressed by the expresser serves as the cognitive ground—the ground that is overlooked by those who take language as reference or representation. The referentialists' and representationists' endeavour is significant if taken as attempts to make the cognitive beings understandable to beginners who can understand them only through concrete referents. The basic difficulty in accepting a language as a referent/representation lies in a misguided attempt to search for a relation between the language as a linguistic element and substance as a thing-in-itself.

It is, perhaps, for the first time that Bhartṛhari observed that a substance is presented by language as universal and the universal can be presented as a substance. Substance, as presented by language and the language are only intelligible beings. Language does not express the substance as Being—transcendental or empirical—and the substance, known as the language presents it in the mind, is expressional substance, that is intelligible being with which philosophers are concerned. Language presents beings to be of accomplished or of non-accomplished character. If the former character figures in the mind by language, it is substance. Essentialists and referentialists may differ on the issue of language as expresser but they cannot deny the philosophical significance of an expressional substance.

Notes and References

1. See Helārāja's Commentary on *Jāti-Samuddeśaḥ* VP. Part 3, Vol. 1 *Kārikā* 104. Varanasi, 1974. See also the paper, by the same author, entitled 'Analysis of how and what we know by a word', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 2 & 3, 2002, pp. 313–14.
2. *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 65, II. *Āhnika*, Tr. Chārudeva Śāstrī, MLBD, 1988.

3. Ibid., p. 4, *I. Āhnika.*
4. Ibid., p. 4, *I. Āhnika.*
5. A detailed and precise discussion on *Sphoṭa* is presented by the same author in a paper entitled 'Regarding *Sphoṭa*', *JICPR*, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XVIII, Number 4, 2001, pp. 157–83.
6. *Grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā. Tathaiva sarvaśabdānāmete pṛthagavasthite. Vākyapadīya (henceforth VP)*, 1st part (*Brahma Kāṇḍam*), 1/55 edited with Harivṛtti & Ambākartrī Tīkā, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Viswavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1976.
7. *Tatra madhyamāyām yo nādānśaḥ tasyaiva sphoṭātmāno vācakatvenakṣatih. Vyākaraṇasiddhānta Manjūṣā*, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, p. 180, see also pp. 168–80.
8. *Pratairanupākhyeyairgrahaṇānuguṇaistathā. Dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpamavadhāryate.* VP.I/83. A good exposition of the issue is presented by the same author in the paper entitled 'Analysis of how and what we know by a word', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, edited by S.V. Bokil, Department of Philosophy, Pune, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 2&3, 2002, pp. 291–317.
9. *VP.* I/44.
10. For an exposition of the issue see the paper by the same author entitled 'Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Relation Between Word and Meaning', *JICPR*, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XI, Number 2, 1994, pp. 43–55.
11. *Araṇistham yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam. Tadvacchabdo'pi buddhisthaḥ śrutīnām kāraṇam pṛthak*, VP. I/46.
12. *Āṇḍabhāvamivāpanno yaḥ kratuḥ śabdasanjñakaḥ. Vṛttistasya kriyārūpa bhāgśo bhajate kramam.* VP. I/51.
13. *Yathaika buddhiviṣayā mūrtirakriyate paṭe. Mūrtyantarasya tritayamevam śabde'pi dṛśyate.* VP. I/52.
14. *Viṣayatvamanāpannaiḥ śabdairnārthaḥ prakāśyate. Na sattayaiva te'rthānāmagṛhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ.* VP. I/56. See also '*Svarūpeṇāvadhriyamāṇabhedaḥ parigṛhīta viśeṣaśabdasvarūpaḥ pratyāyyamartham prakāśayati*'. Harivṛtti on *VP.* I/55.
15. For a detailed account of the concept of *Upacāra-sattā*, see the paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian Approach', *JICPR*, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XIV, Number 1, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 75–85.
16. See, *Sambandhasamuddeśaḥ* VP, Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 3. A precise account of the chapter is presented by the same author in a paper published in *JICPR*, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XI, Number 2, 1994, pp. 43–55.
17. *Upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānāmapalāpanāḥ. Asatye vartamani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate. VP.* 2/238, 1980.

18. The term 'metaphysics' stands for a theory of transcendental as well as empirical things assumed as existent even independently of our cognition. A metaphysician theorises substance/things-in-themselves as they are perceived while a language philosopher, especially Bhartṛhari, analyzes the cognition of the substance as it is known when presented by language or as it is expressed by the expressions.
19. Communication in our view is the accomplishment of cognition by language. It is not confined to uttering and hearing of the articulations.
20. Truth, for philosophical reflections, is that which the language expresses. It, as Helārāja puts it, is *paramārthadarśanam*, for which our knowledge is confined to the language and to what it expresses (*Śabdapramāṇakānām hi yacchabadāha tat paramārtharūpam*), Helārāja's *commentary on Jāti-Samuddeśaḥ VP.* 3/1 *Kārikā-11.*
21. *Dravyābhidhānam Vyāḍi. Kātyāyana Vārtika* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1/2/64–46.
22. *Sarūpāṇāmekaśeṣa eka vibhaktau, Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1/2/64.
23. *Ātmā vastu svabhāvaśca śarīram tattvamityapi. Dravyamityasya paryāyāstacca nityamiti smṛtam. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, *Kārikā-1.*
24. All the 18 *Kārikās* of *Dravyasamuddeśaḥ*, VP. Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, discusses the concept of substance as the absolute Being.
25. *See, Sādhana Samuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 7, *Kārikā* 39–40, 42.
26. *Na so'sti pratyo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate, VP.* I/123.
27. *Iha hi vyākraṇe na vastvārtho 'rthaḥ, apitu śabdartho 'rthaḥ. Kriyāsamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 8, Helārāja on *Kārikā-34.*
28. See Prakāśa Commentary of Helārāja & *Ambākartrī ṭīkā of Raghunath Sharma*, Varanasi 1979, on *VP.* 3/2/9.
29. *Ekadeśena sārūpye sarvam syāt sarvavedanam.sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānamajñānatām vrajet.* Helārāja on *Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, *Kārikā 9*, See also *Jāti samuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, *Kārikā* 103–105.
30. A detailed account of the issue may be seen in a paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian Approach', *JICPR*, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XIV, Number 1, 1996, pp. 65–73.
31. See *Harivṛtti* on *VP.* I/55.
32. *Vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra sarvanāma prayujyate. Dravyamitryucyate so'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ. Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 4, *Kārikā 3.*
33. *Iha sarvanāmnām dvayī gatiḥ. Vastumātrābhidhāyinaḥ kecid yathā sarvādayaḥ. Viśiṣṭavastuvācakāścānye yathānyatarādayaḥ. Tatra pūrvairdravyam lakṣyate. Yathā hi-idam taditi*

sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyam dravyam. Idamiti pratyakṣārthavācakam, taditi pramāṇāntarāvagataparokṣārthābhidhānam. Helārāja on *Bhūyodravyasmuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 4, *Kārikā* 3.

34. *Adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagṛham yathā. Gṛhītam grhaśabdena śuddamevābhidhīyate. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, *Kārikā 3.*
35. *Anyohyupādhirūpalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyenāvacchedakaḥ.* Helārāja on *Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, *Kārikā* 3.
36. Helārāja on *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 4, *Kārikā* 3.
37. Ibid.
38. *Jātyādirapiviśeṣyatvena cedvivakṣitastadā dravyamiti tārthāntarīyadravyalakṣaṇānādarāt vyādidarśanena sārvatrikī dravyapadārthavyavasthā siddayati.* Helārāja on *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.* Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 4, *Kārikā* 3.
39. *Ākāraiśca vyavachedāt sārvārthyamavarudhyate. Yathaiva cakṣurādīnām sāmarthyam nāḍikādibhiḥ. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ,* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, *Kārikā 5.*
40. Helārāja on *Jāti samuddeśaḥ,* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, *Kārikā 9.* Bhartṛhari, in *Jātisamuddeśaḥ,* has beautifully interpreted the problems of universal as the import of words. A precise account of the chapter is presented by the same author in a paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari's reply to Vaiśeṣika's arguments against Universal as the import of words', *Darshana International*, edited by J.P. Atreya, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, pp. 22–34.
41. *Jātyācchuriyā (jātyupalakṣitāyāḥ) vyaktereva vācakatvamā. Uplakṣaṇabhūtā tu jātirāśrīyata iti.* Helārāja on *Jāti samuddeśaḥ,* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 12, *Kārikā* 7–8.
42. *Dravyasamuddeśaḥ,* Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, *Kārikā* 4.
43. *Viṣayatvamanāpannaiḥ śabdairnārthaḥ prakāśyate. Na sattyaiva te 'rethānāmagṛhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ and Ato 'nirjñātarūpatvāt kimāhetyabhidhīyate. Nendriyaṇām prakāśye 'rthe svarūpam gṛhyate tathā. VP.* Part I, *Kārikā* 56–57.
44. Ibid., *Kārikā* 55.
45. *Prayogadarśanābhyāsādākārāvagrahastu yah. Na sa śabdasya viśayaḥ sa hi yatnāntarāśrayaḥ. VP.* Part II, *Kārikā* 120. Sampurnanand Sanskrit Viswavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1980.
46. The issue of infusion of language and thought is discussed in detail, by the same author, in a paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian Approach', *JICPR*, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XIV, Number 1, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 66–74.
47. *Kim na etena-idam nityamidamanityamiti. Mahābhāṣya*, 1988, *Āhnika I,* p. 28.

Reflections of Ibn Rushd's Plea for Rationality in Contemporary Arab Philosophy

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Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) is widely known in the history of philosophy as a staunch supporter of reason and a defender of rationality. His followers in Medieval Europe, known as Latin Averroists, were strongly attracted to his rationalism and many contemporary Arab thinkers were influenced by it. He did not issue a 'Plea for rationality' or 'a call for rationality'. I use the term 'plea' not as a political call or stand where one invites others to join in a drive for a cause, such as Bertrand Russell's famous plea for world leaders to remember their humanity and not lead the world into the brink of a third world war, but rather as a principle that Ibn Rushd wanted others to adopt. Based on his writings, particularly *Fasl al-Maqal* (*The Decisive Treatise*) and *al-Kashf 'an Manahij al-Adilla* (*Exposition of the Methods of Proofs*), one may construct such a principle. I use it in a manner similar to Occam's razor, the famous medieval principle, which states 'do not multiply entities beyond necessity' or, more recently, Russell's call for 'substituting logical constructions for inferred entities, wherever possible'. In this way, Ibn Rushd's plea for rationality would be a principle calling for 'using rational principles wherever possible' or 'do not adopt any other interpretation when a rational one would do'. I will refrain from describing the content of this principle besides pointing out the fact that it involves supporting one's views with logically defensible arguments.

There are two main domains where Ibn Rushd applied his principle of rationality: first, in studying Aristotle's works, where he thought that he could not go beyond Aristotle who had reached the limits of

rationality. The second is the relationship between religion and philosophy or *al-Shari'a* and *al-Hikma*, where Ibn Rushd thought that in this realm, one could go to a great extent in using rational principles. I will discuss three areas in religion where Ibn Rushd applied this principle. The first is found in *Fasl al-Maqal* where Ibn Rushd advocates his view that the study of philosophy or philosophizing is an obligation in religion because the *Qur'an*, the Holy Book of Islam, summons people to reflect and study how existing beings are created. 'Reflect, then, O people of perception'.[1] 'Will they, then, not consider the camels, how they were created? And heaven, how it was raised up?'[2] According to Ibn Rushd, philosophizing is nothing other than 'the study of existing beings and their consideration, as created objects, with reference to their Creator'.[3] The consideration (*al I'tibar*) is 'the discovery of the unknown from the known and its deducibility through the syllogism (*al Qiyas*) or which is the syllogism itself'.[4] In other words, Ibn Rushd is concerned with showing that religion calls for the study of existing beings, leading to the discovery of God, but this cannot be done in any haphazard way, except through logical principles which necessarily lead to the truth. There is no safeguard from error in this regard, except by following rigorous logical rules of demonstration. Many a philosophical and theological school, however, went astray because of their dialectic and non-demonstrative logical techniques.

The corollary of this conclusion is that the followers of a religion must study very carefully the principles of reasoning or logic and the various kinds of the syllogism in order to be in a position of truly knowing God through His handiwork. If the religious culture does not contain such a study, scholars and scientists must inquire into it, making use of each other's successive efforts in order to discover these principles or sciences.[5] But it is a daunting task to discover by oneself a new science, let alone all sciences, and one can easily get lost. Ibn Rushd wonders what would happen if the Arabs were to venture and try to discover mathematics or astronomy. Certainly, they would not have known where to start. In this case, it is better to inquire whether other cultures and peoples have already discovered this science, and if they did, the duty of the believers or the scholars of that community would be to learn from that group and be thankful for what they have done.

One would have to read their books to see how they arrived at the truth. After digesting these sciences, the believers should draw attention to any failures they noticed in these books and try to make the appropriate corrections. Successive waves of scholars would complete each others' work, thus, continuing the march of the sciences and the process of learning throughout history.[6]

The second theme is found in *al-Kashf* where Ibn Rushd directs his principle of rationality to the main arguments of the theological schools in the Muslim community, implying that in this regard, one can go a long way in applying his principle of rationality. He distinguishes four such schools: the Ash'arites, the Mu'atazilites, the Sufis and the Literalists. In his opinion, the use of these schools of the principle of rationality in religion varies from complete rejection, as is the case with the Literalists, to guarded acceptance, as is the case with the Sufis to extensive use by the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites. The problem with the Ash'arites, who receive the brunt of Ibn Rushd's criticisms, is that they were not rigorous enough in their arguments, which remained dialectical and never reached the level of demonstration. Yet the Ash'arites behaved as though they have reached the pinnacle of rationality and obtained the key to the truth. This led to disastrous results in the community, because the Ash'arites imposed their views on the common people. They considered those who did not follow their interpretations as heretical, whose property and blood were free for all to plunder.[7] According to Ibn Rushd, the Ash'arites justified their hegemony and political influence in the community by appealing to the superiority of their theological position and the arguments they offered for the knowledge of the existence of God. By appealing to his principle of rationality and showing how the Ash'arites' arguments do not amount to a demonstration of God's existence, Ibn Rushd absolved the common people from the obligation to follow the Ash'arites' interpretations. He proceeded to offer his own arguments for the existence of God, namely, the argument from invention (*Dalil al-Ikhtira'*) and the argument from design (*Dalil al-'Inaya*). His two arguments, he maintained, were derived from the *Qur'an* itself; they meet the rules of demonstration and are known intuitively by the

common people, while the detailed knowledge of these arguments is known to the scientists and the philosophers.

The third theme where Ibn Rushd used his principle of rationality is in the *Shari'a* itself. It might be asked: How far can one go in applying this principle of rationality to the *Shari'a*? Ibn Rushd's answer is that it goes a long way. What is the limit? Does reason **replace** religion or make it redundant? As we will see shortly, his answer was not unambiguous. Ibn Rushd argues that the *Qur'an* itself states that it contains two types of verses: clear verses (*Muhkamat*) and ambiguous verses (*Mutashabihat*). 'It is He who has revealed to you the Book, with verses which are precise in meaning (*Muhkamat*) and which are the Mother of the Book, and others which are ambiguous (*Mutashabihat*). As to those in whose hearts there is vacillation, they follow what is ambiguous in it, seeking sedition and intending to interpret it.' However, no one except Allah knows its interpretation. Those well-grounded in knowledge say, 'We believe in it; and is from our Lord; yet none remembers save those possessed of understanding!'[8] In this translation, the conjunction is left out. Ibn Rushd does not put the stop after 'interpretation' (*al-Ta'wil*), but rather after 'knowledge'. The verse becomes, for Ibn Rushd, 'However, no one except Allah knows its interpretation and those well-grounded in knowledge'.

Moreover, the *Qur'an* contains verses that contradict each other, as when it speaks, for example, about freedom or determinism and justice or injustice. Here, reason can provide interpretations to show that the contradiction is merely apparent, not real. Evidence of determinism are in verses like 'Indeed, we have created everything in measure',[9] of freedom in verses like 'then each soul will be rewarded fully for what it has earned; and none shall be wronged'.[10] Regarding justice, one can cite verse 3, 182, which sates 'that Allah is not unjust to His servants',[11] and of injustice, 'Then Allah leads astray whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases'.[12] Ibn Rushd maintains that this conflict 'should be resolved according to the requirements of reason'.[13]

Ibn Rushd's considered opinion is that the truth does not oppose the truth and philosophy does not contradict religion.[14] Reason cannot replace religion, and vice versa. Both are primitive notions—to use modern vocabulary—and one cannot be reduced to the other or be

explained in terms of the other. In Ibn Rushd's own terminology, religion and philosophy are close friends and milk sisters, writing in *Fasl* that 'Philosophy is the friend of religion and its milk sister... they are close friends by nature and love each other by instinct and essence'.[15] In *al-Kashf*, Ibn Rushd elaborates this point by saying that those who hold that religion opposes philosophy, whether they are followers of religion or philosophy, do not truly know the nature of either of them. 'The opinion in religion that holds that religion opposes philosophy is either an innovation in religion, that is, not of its fundamentals or a mistaken opinion about philosophy or a mistaken interpretation of it.'[16]

Ibn Rushd was not unrealistic. Like any two sisters, religion and philosophy might have disagreements or one of them might, as the metaphor goes, pull the covers to its side. This is what happened with regard to philosophy in his days; it came under attack from religion and became an outcast, but the truth of the matter is that any opposition between them is apparent and a proper interpretation would lead to their reconciliation. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether Ibn Rushd, despite his explicit avowal, arrived at the conclusion that philosophy or reason has priority over religion. I will venture only a tentative answer. In two instances, I found Ibn Rushd arguing as though reason has priority over religion, but he checks himself rather quickly and covers his tracks, leaving the reader in the dark, unsure as to where Ibn Rushd stands on this issue of priority. Both instances are found in *al-Kashf* on the section dealing with freedom and determinism (*al-Qada' wal-Qadar*). The first one concerns the limits of God's power: 'Can God, the Almighty, do what is logically impossible?' Ibn Rushd's answer is that 'God, the Almighty cannot be described as capable of doing what is impossible'.[17] For example, God cannot make the sum total of the angles of a triangle equal to more than two right angles. Ordinary people cannot comprehend this fact and imagine it to be a limitation or 'weakness in the Creator'. The learned scientists know this to be a logical fact and it is a logical priority that implies no weakness on the part of the Creator who must observe the rules of logic.

The second instance concerns justice and whether there are objective moral values that are independent of God's will. Ibn Rushd argues that some theologians hold the view that religion determines what is right

and wrong or justice and injustice, claiming that 'there is nothing that is just in itself or unjust in itself. This is the utmost of absurdity. For it follows [on this view] that nothing [in the visible world] is good or bad in itself. Yet, it is self-evident that justice is good and injustice bad; so that [it follows on this view] that believing that God has a partner is not unjust or wrong in itself, but only from the point of view of religion; and had religion stipulated that God has a partner, then that would be just, and had it [stipulated] disobedience to God, that would have been just, too. But all this is contrary to both tradition and reason.'[18] According to Ibn Rushd, religion cannot hold beliefs that are contrary to moral rules.

From both instances, one can infer that religion is limited by reason, which occupies the position of priority over religion. It cannot advance views that are contrary to reason or not sanctionable by reason. But Ibn Rushd refrains from making this inference. Instead, he goes on to claim that good and evil do not exist independently of God's will. God is responsible both for the creation of good and for the creation of evil. The long-established dilemma of how an Omniscient, Omnipotent and all good God can create evil looms again in front of Ibn Rushd as it did with St. Augustine. Ibn Rushd, however, not much unlike St. Augustine, points to the limitations of human reason, once again, balancing between reason and religion. Interpretation saves the day. Ibn Rushd argues there is no intrinsic evil in existence; evil is accidental, like the evil consequences that result from fire. In itself, fire is good, but it may destroy some existent beings. St. Augustine maintained that evil is negation or privation and that it does not exist by itself. Similarly, Ibn Rushd argues that evil is an accident and not a substance. Leading people astray is evil, and when God leads people astray, it is evil, particularly so since there is no Creator other than God. Evil clearly must be attributed to God, but this attribution must not be understood in an absolute sense. Ibn Rushd argues that 'God is the Creator of the good for its own sake, and the Creator of the evil for the sake of the good; I mean, for the sake of the good that is conjoined to it. On this view, God's creation of evil could be just. An example of this is that fire was created, because it is necessary for the subsistence of many things that would not exist, if fire did not exist. However, because of its nature, fire might accidentally destroy some existing things, but if we were to compare the destruction resulting from it, which is evil, and the existence, which is good, we would find that its existence is better than its non-existence, and thus it is good.'[19]

Ibn Rushd takes the harmony between good and evil to be a sign that this world is the best of all possible worlds that God could have created, a view that was destined to play a significant part in the world views of Leibnitz and Voltaire. Apart from that, it was an interpretation that preserved Ibn Rushd's view about the harmony and consistency between religion and philosophy. Contemporary Arab philosophers can be divided into two schools: one that heeds Ibn Rushd's call for rationality, of whom one can mention two of its representatives, namely, Mohamed 'Abed Al Jabiri and Fahmi Jadaan. Al Jabiri does not hide his affection for Ibn Rushd and goes as far as considering him a super theologian and a great religious reformer who defended philosophy against the attacks on it by other theological schools. According to Al Jabiri, Ibn Rushd corrected the views of the theologians about 'nature, man and the relationship between God and them, which Ibn Rushd considered farthest from sound philosophical truths and the intention of religion'.[20]

But Al Jabiri is fully aware that Ibn Rushd is not an ordinary theologian and that discussion of religious issues was not of the dialectic kind that 'aims to destroy the case of the opposition and raise doubts about it'. Rather, they are of the kind that is scientific and demonstrative.[21] Ibn Rushd can be considered close to the contemporary Arab mind that is still preoccupied with the same issues raised during Ibn Rushd's medieval days. Al Jabiri's task is to make Ibn Rushd's answers available and more widespread by reissuing his books in new and modern critical editions that facilitate his understanding. Such answers have remained valid until now. The correspondence (*Tawafuq*) rather than harmonization (*Tawfiq*), according to Al Jabiri, between religion and philosophy serves as a good resolution for the confrontation between the two. Rather, the real conflict is between the demonstrative discourse of philosophy and the dialectic discourse of theory. In our modern times, the conflict is not between different domains of human discourse, but rather, in Al Jabiri's view, 'between religion and society'.

Fahmi Jadaan reinforces Al Jabiri's position, even though Jadaan is particularly interested in the reaction of Islam to modernity. Jadaan maintains that when the discussion revolves around the duality of tradition/culture or (*al-Turath*) and modernity (*al-Hadatha*), no opposition arises between the two. Tradition or culture occupies an essential epistemological role in modernity and the former allows itself to be interpreted and understood by the latter, whereby the apparent conflict between the two vanishes.[22] The allusion to Ibn Rushd is clear. We have seen earlier how Ibn Rushd calls on believers to search into the books of other cultures to learn from them; a call that is premised on the religious obligation to know God's created beings. The problem arises, according to Jadaan, when a third dimension is added to the duality of tradition and modernity, namely, religion or revelation (*al Wah'i*). 'In this case, tradition-culture is required along with modernity to enter "the house of obedience" (*Beit al-ta'a*) and to accord with the requirements of revelation. Here there is only one of three alternatives: conformity and there is no problem; or contradiction and there is conflict; or apparent contradiction, and interpretation. Clear Rushdism.' Jadaan does not elaborate the Rushdism he has in mind, but it is obvious that it refers to Ibn Rushd's plea for rationality which calls for the use of reason as much as possible within a harmonious outlook between philosophy and religion. There is no escape from the interaction (*al-Tafa'ul wa al-Tawasul*) with the West and the cultures of the East.[23] In a critical effort similar to Ibn Rushd's criticisms of the theologians, Jadaan undertakes a critical study of the image which some Muslim fundamentalist thinkers have given to Islam 'as a confrontational, hardened and violent' religion. He concludes that this view must give way to the image of an Islam which is 'compassionate, good and generous' that accords with reason.[24]

Of the second school, which represents a critical reaction to Ibn Rushd, we mention Adel Daher and Nassif Nassar. This group accepts Ibn Rushd's plea of rationality, but does not stop at the limits he imposes on it, namely, the accord between philosophy and religion. This group upholds the priority of reason to religion, without the harmful effects that were associated with it in the traditional medieval Arab *philosopho-theological* circles. The priority of religion is a philosophical

hypothesis that should not lead to conflict between philosophy and religion or philosophers and theologians. Each is entitled to its point of view, within the framework of respect to the other. The first representative of this school is Adel Daher, who argues in his book *The Philosophical Principles of Secularism*, Beirut, Dar Al Saqi, 1998, that reason holds priority to revelation and religion. In his view, 'man can organize his political and practical affairs independently of this or that religion and that man is called upon to do so for numerous philosophical considerations'.[25] Daher's position is much too complex to be concisely put into a few sentences, but it may be stated essentially this: man's moral sense is called upon in the formation of any society or in consenting to any divine revelation instructing him how to order his society. Man must judge whether or not a religious message is good prior to consenting to it. For example, it would be contrary to moral rules to accept as good a divine command to decimate an entire population of innocent men, women and children, which means that man has an independent rational faculty to assess religious and moral pronouncements. The independence of reason implies the priority of reason over revelation. As we saw earlier, Ibn Rushd touched upon this subject while discussing the themes of justice and injustice, but only to abandon it in favour of his notion of determinism or the universal pre-established harmony.

The second representative of this school is Nassif Nassar, who devotes the major part of the first chapter of his book *Thinking and Migration: From Tradition to the Second Arab Awakening*, Beirut, Dar Alnahar, 1997. Nassar rejects Ibn Rushd's definition of philosophy on philosophical grounds. As indicated earlier, Ibn Rushd defines philosophy as the act of studying the existing beings and reflecting on them as they refer to the Creator. Nassar considers this definition too essentialist and too abstract to be used as a starting point for philosophy in our times. The focus in philosophy, according to Nassar, should be 'the actual human existence as a historical existence, which may lead to studying existence as such with the first causes. But it [the historical existence] remains in all cases the primary domain for philosophical research.'[26]

In the first chapter of *Thinking and Migration*, Nassar deals specifically with the major characteristics of Medieval Arab rationalism. But what interests us here are his main criticisms of Ibn Rushd's brand of rationalism, under discussion here. He raises several questions against it: how far does it help us in understanding man as a historical being? What are the critical social and political concerns that it articulated and suggested solutions for? On both counts, Nassar finds Ibn Rushd's rationalism considerably ineffective and inadequate. Nassar's concerns, however, should be put in perspective. As a philosopher, Ibn Rushd was concerned with the larger issues of existing beings, rather than with man, as an anthropologist would do. If philosophy were to confine itself to the evolution of man, one would then have to bracket all sciences such as biology and quantum physics that have a bearing on this question. Philosophically, however, this exclusion is not required and, accordingly, one may see the advantages of Ibn Rushd's definition of philosophy over Nassar's narrower definition. The value of Ibn Rushd's rationalism should not be confined simply to articulating social and political issues. Hence, Nassar's remarks so far do not undermine Ibn Rushd's view of rationality.

Nevertheless, Nassar attacks Ibn Rushd's rationalism more directly and on important ground. According to Nassar, Ibn Rushd's rationalism failed to lead to a clear position on man's freedom, although it led to a clear conception of the external world as causally and rationally ordered. In relation to moral issues, Ibn Rushd criticized the Jabriya School which took man's actions to be predetermined. But he also rejected the Qadriya School that considered man free in choosing his actions. Furthermore, he criticized the Ash'arites who took a middle position between the two schools, considering man's actions predetermined, yet man earns a reward for his good actions. Ibn Rushd rejected the views of all three schools on this issue and accepted the popular view that God is the only agent in the universe, which meant that man could not be considered as the real author of his actions. Man, then, must be determined and he is not free to choose his actions. However, Ibn Rushd does not accept this view, because man, as he sees it, must be praised for his good actions and punished for his evil deeds. Otherwise, man cannot be held responsible for his actions. How

can this be? Here Ibn Rushd retreats into interpretation. Since the external world is controlled by causality, nothing happens without reason, and man is part of this macrocosm. Ibn Rushd must have adhered to the well-known principle of sufficient reason prevalent in medieval philosophy that nothing happens in the external world without reason. The internal world of man, his body and soul, constitute a microcosm also controlled by necessary causal relations, since nothing happens without a cause. The pre-established causality in both the macrocosm and the microcosm renders man's actions totally predetermined and there is no place for freedom. Here we have a precursor to Leibnitz's monadism and the principle of universal pre-established harmony. The monad is a windowless atom which acts in harmony with the other monads, mirroring the greater world. Man does not act freely, but rather the monads or the internal mixture of elements, under the influence of the external causes, lead the person to perform his actions. As evidence, Ibn Rushd takes example from desire. When externally frightful objects affect us, we hate them necessarily and run away. Similarly, when something desirous affects us from outside, we desire it necessarily and move towards it without volition. 'If this is the case, then our volition is preserved by the matters that are outside and tied to them.'[27] Nassar asks, What space remains for free will? Rational will, to be rational, must inevitably be free, otherwise there is no meaning to the will. 'If the moment of choice is attributed to the order of causes and effects in nature and in bodies which are parts of nature, then there is no real choice and there is no real responsibility and there is no difference between the human acts and the natural acts.' Ibn Rushd's position leads to making man much like an automaton or a robot.[28] Nassar's inference is that 'Ibn Rushd's rationality is nothing more than a call to subjugating the human existence to the divine mind by way of philosophy through, science and speculation and by way of religion through faith and action. In Nassar's view, Ibn Rushd does not call for the harmony of religion with philosophy, but rather for the subordination of philosophy to religion and making man like an automaton.

The second characteristic in Ibn Rushd's rationality that Nassar finds objectionable is the subordination of philosophy to the prophetic

revelation with which it must live. According to Nassar, Ibn Rushd was equally enthusiastic about his defense of reason and revelation. Ibn Rushd was both a *Faqih* or a jurist and a philosopher and it is not clear who used whom. The harmony that he established between philosophy and religion succeeded at the expense of practical reason. Interpretation is a device that Ibn Rushd used successfully to eliminate any apparent contradiction between philosophy and religion on the theoretical level, but in Nassar's view, Ibn Rushd did not apply this device in the same manner to ethics and transactions in religion. Ibn Rushd's rationalism stops at the doorsteps of the practical side of the *Shari'a*. It becomes a rationalization (*Tabririya*), justifying the status quo in society, thus stultifying the independence of reason. It is an extremely conservative view of rationalism.[29] Ibn Rushd writes that 'philosophers, and the best among them, hold that it is inappropriate for them to speak or argue about the principles of religions. Anyone who ventures into this realm should be strongly admonished.'[30] These principles should be accepted upon faith. Nassar concludes that Ibn Rushd's rationalism in the realm of action and practice is disastrous and amounts to surrender of the free spirit of inquiry and the stifling of reason.

Both Nassar and Daher agree that Ibn Rushd's rationalism did not extend into the realm of action, which is as important as theory. The readers of Ibn Rushd do not fail to notice his complete adherence to the teachings of Islam and accepting them as necessary both for happiness in this world and the next. Although he is open-minded and tolerant of other religions, he holds forth on the superiority of Islam to other religions. Religious teachings are like food; some might like one kind and find it nourishing, others might like another kind and be nourished by it. There are no universal foods that nourish everyone, but Islam nourishes the majority of people. Both Nassar and Daher would have liked to see Ibn Rushd more critical of the practical side of religion as he was critical of the theologians' theories'. This stems from their concerns that philosophy should be more critical of all views whether inherited or not, practical or theoretical. Although they have legitimate concerns, one need not lose sight of the fact that Ibn Rushd was a product of his medieval times. Even though he was not

critical of everything in religion, he led the way in raising daring issues, by criticizing the theologians and political standing in the community, like no other philosopher did, and, one should add, at the risk of losing his own life. And he did that in the name of reason. Instead of asking too much from him, we should look at him as having pointed the way, and it is up to others now to complete his project or chart new heights. In all this, however, one should agree with Al Jabiri and Jadaan—no progress can be achieved without first heeding his plea for rationality, before reducing it to critical examination, as Daher and Nassar maintain.

Notes and References

1. *Qur'an* 59, 2.
2. Ibid., 88, 17.
3. *Fasl*, parg. 1, 2.
4. Ibid., 1, 4.
5. Ibid., 2, 9.
6. Ibid., 4, 15.
7. *Al-Kashf*, parg. 3.
8. *Qur'an* 3, 6.
9. Ibid., 54, 49.
10. Ibid., 2, 286.
11. Ibid., 3, 182.
12. Ibid., 14, 4.
13. Ibn Rushd, *al-Kashf*, p. 325.
14. Ibid., parg. 19.
15. Ibid., 25.
16. *Al-Kashf*, p. 330.
17. Ibid., p. 338.
18. Ibid., pp. 319–20.
19. Ibid., pp. 332–33.
20. *Al-Kashf*, edited by Al Jabiri, p. 70.
21. Ibid., p. 74.
22. Fahmi Jadaan, *The Road to the Future*, p. 147.
23. Ibid., p. 171.
24. Ibid., p. 176.
25. Adel Daher, *The Philosophical Principles of Secularism*, Beirut, Dar Al Saqi, 1998, p. 6.
26. Nassif Nassar, *The Road to Philosophical Independence*, p. 35.

27. *Al-Kashf*, p. 289.
28. Nassif Nassar, *Thinking and Migration: From Tradition to the Second Arab Awakening*, Beirut, Dar Alnahar, 1997, p. 21.
29. Ibid., p. 28.
30. Ibn Rushd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, p. 525.

Negation: Can Philosophy Ever Recover From It?

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All that is 'is'. Where from does, then, 'is not' appear in thought and claim to be as 'real' as that which it seems to deny, and yet through its denial seems to render it a greater reality.

Everything is, and yet it ceases to be, or does not remain the same, and so the 'is not' becomes as much a part of experienced reality as that which 'is', always is. It, however, is not there just alongside with it, but infects it in a way that changes its very nature as the past becomes a part of the present, haunting it with memories and infusing it with desire for recreating that which once was and is now no more.

The present might be a 'relief' from the past, but the logic of the analysis would remain the same; only the signs will change. The negative will become positive and the positive negative, but memory and desire will function in the same way, transforming that which is present into something else.

The ambiguous role of negation in language, thought and experience has created problems and paradoxes for philosophy. Such paradoxes have functioned in a subterranean manner and determined its history without its being aware of it. Negation is usually a sign of something being 'untrue', being not the 'edit' but a negative statement may be true and in case it is true, its 'truth' should be of the same order or type as that of a positive or affirmative statement. On the other hand, if it is supposed to be different, the 'truth' itself will be riven apart and become a 'divided house', leading to consequences that might be difficult to live with.

A positive or affirmative statement seems simple. One has only to find if it is the case, and if it is so, is it true. But what if it does *not* obtain and thus, by a strange twist, renders the corresponding negative

judgement true? The non-occurrence or non-obtaining of a situation or state of affairs begins to play a positive role in knowledge. This is not exactly the 'falsifiability' that Popper talked about, but rather the ghost which Quine wanted to exorcise from philosophy for ever.

A true negative judgement has to have a semantic dimension in order to be true. But what is the nature of this semantic dimension is not clear as it is defined negatively. To say that something is not red, is *only* to deny the colour 'red' to it, and to do nothing else, except perhaps to delimit the range of values of 'something' to those which can meaningfully take a colour-predicate. But then, the statement 'something is red' would have done the same.

The problem with an empirical value of the predicate-variable is that it brings 'empirical' considerations into the picture that radically affect, or even distort, the logical purity of the thought that was mirrored or embodied in the formal structure of the statement concerned. To say 'something is not red' is not the same thing as to say 'something is not P' as the negative of 'P' connotes an indefinitely extended universality which excludes only p. But 'p' is a 'predicate-variable'; its values are restricted by definition only to those that can function as 'predicate' in a sentence. 'Something' symbolized by the variable 'S' stands for that which, at least in that context, cannot function as a 'predicate'. But such a consideration would not only make that distinction between the 'subject' and 'predicate' are relative, and render the discourse purely verbal or linguistic without any epistemological or metaphysical significance.

The sentences, however, are not only of the subject-predicate form, and at least the 'subject' has to be quantified if then are to have any 'truth value' at all. The sentence 'Rose is red', logically speaking, is not a sentence at all as unless we specify whether we are talking about all roses, or some roses, or this particular rose, the sentence cannot be known to be true or false, i.e. its truth or falsity cannot be established. In other words, it has only the 'appearance' of being a sentence, and not a 'real' sentence in the proper sense, or it is just a 'pseudo-sentence', to use the current logical jargon to describe the situation.

The idea of quantification and its presumed neccessity for assigning a truth value to a sentence-form and thus turning it into a 'real' sentence

runs into difficulty as to what this quantification really means. The term 'all' does not really mean anything as one just does not know what to exclude from it. The exclusion, when it comes, comes from the value that we give to the variable standing for the 'subject term' which, by its placing, has already been restricted to function as a 'subject', that is, implicity defined both in epistemological and ontological terms. What is a 'subject' and why only a class of objects or terms can function in that capacity, is never questioned. The logical and the empirical exclusions that are involved already vitiate the 'all-ness' of the 'all' and reveal that the facade of universality was not really universal.

The problem, in fact, is further complicated by the simple unasked question whether the value given to the variable is to be understood extensionally or intentionally; in case it is understood extensionally, it is bound to be a limited, finite set to which no new member could be added by definition. It is what used to be called 'Induction by simple enumeration' and raised no problems. The only interesting addition to this characterization has been that the so-called members of such a 'universal' class need have nothing in common except the purely formal characteristic of belonging to that class, and that their number may be as small as you please. Normally, a class which has only one member, or even no member, is supposed to be excluded from this privilege of being regarded as 'universal' in this extensional sense of the term. But there is no reason why a unit class with one member only or a null class with no member, should not be regarded as 'universal' in the sense mentioned above. It is true that the idea of unit or 'null' class was formulated in the context of arithmetic which Russell had defined as a 'class of classes that were equal to a given class' and, hence, as a second-order class and so could have an infinite number of 'first-order' classes as their member. But this is irrelevant, because what we are talking about is *not* the 'universal' in the sense of the class of all classes which gives rise to the paradox of classes, but something which, though masquerading as 'all', is not 'all' as it can easily be counted and exhausted in a finite number of steps as it has been defined extensionally.

The problem with the intentional definition of 'all' is different. Here the class is literally inexhaustible as any number of new members can be added to it, except in the case where the defining characteristic

itself excludes it. The problem is with the notion of definition itself and whether the candidate proposed for the membership of the class *actually* possesses that characteristic or not. But the idea of definition and that of essence which is associated with it have been rejected on this ground, and the idea of an extensional definition proposed in their place to avoid the difficulties caused by them. But whatever the choice or the way out of the difficulty, the universal quantification required to make a proper sentence in the logical sense of the term is intrinsically incapable of overcoming the formal difficulty that, viewed as an indefinite conjunction of elementary or atomic sentences, it cannot be proved even to be 'true' by the very fact of its being construed in such a way. It, of course, can be proved to be false, for even if *one* of the conjuncts in a logical conjunction happens to be false, then the entire conjunction is false, as that is the way conjunction as symbolized by the connective 'and' is defined in truth-functional logic by everybody these days.

The problem created by the only other accepted quantifier in logic, whether modern or Aristotelian, is slightly different. The quantifier called 'existential' and traditionally conveyed by the word 'some' cannot, in principle, by proved to be false as it is construed as a disjunction of infinitely many atomic sentences.

The quantifiers, of course, are interdefinable and, if so, one may wonder what this asymmetry between the two really means. The formal equivalence as a result of inter-definability, however, hides the substantive difference we have pointed out due to the tricky nature of negation which is used twice to get the one defined in terms of the other. The formal and semantic dimensions get confused, as becomes evident if one asks what the translation really means. To ask the question is to dive into deep waters, which the formal logician wished to avoid as he does not want to talk about 'meanings' even though he is continuously trying to translate ordinary language sentences which will become meaningless without their semantic import into his formalized language and illustrating the 'meaning' of his formal symbols by explaining them in terms of the way we use ordinary language. The strategy, as everyone knows, is old and was used in traditional logic to translate any affirmative proposition into its equivalent negative

proposition and *vice versa*. After all, 'p' is equivalent to 'not, not "p" and "not-p" as equivalent to "not p" or, rather, *is* "not-p"'.

The strategy employed depends on the one hand on the almost universally accepted rule that 'the negation of a negation results in affirmation' and on the conventional acceptance that a negative predicate may be *affirmed* of a subject without affecting its 'affirmative character' in any way whatsoever. The positive ascription of a negative predicate, however, raises the question as to what exactly is being ascribed or predicated, just as the rule concerning 'negation of negation' raises the question regarding the nature of the operation of negation, or what 'negation' or 'negating' is exactly supposed to do. What, in other words, is the function of negation, or even its necessity in the context of 'thinking' about reality and for the 'description' of reality itself?

Negation negates, but then there must be 'something' to negate, and that something has to be presupposed by the act of 'negating'. The act, thus, is both contingent and parasitic, as there is no necessity about it and it would certainly not be there if something else were not there. But what would be there, if there were no negation? Not even 'something', as that something would have to be 'asserted'. One would have to say it *is* and to say 'it is this' is to distinguish it from something else and say 'it is not that'. But is the act of assertion necessary, and need it necessarily involve the act of distinguishing?

The issue is both logical and epistemological in nature and, as always, has metaphysical overtones which are unavoidable if one happens to be self-conscious about the whole thing. Russell tried to introduce the sign for 'assertion', corresponding to the sign for 'negation' as, in his view, what was being asserted or denied was the proposition or something that could be the 'object' of either and thus, independent of these relations as neither was necessary to it. The proliferation of the notion of 'propositional attitudes' revealed that 'assertion' and 'negation' were not the only epistemological 'acts' in relation to that which was the object of thought, even if they were what logic could comfortably handle and thus declare that they constituted the essence of what 'knowledge' could possibly be meant to be.

But the term 'knowledge' has to be wider than just 'affirmation' or 'negation', as these not only presuppose what is to be affirmed or

negated, but also that some doubt has arisen in one's mind or some question raised by someone else regarding it. Doubting is questioning that which is neither asserted nor denied and questioning, whether by oneself or another, points to the dubitability of that which was considered to be 'indubitable' by oneself. Descartes is the clearest example of this in modern Western philosophy, but a clearer example of the fact that 'knowledge' does not, and cannot, consist in affirming or denying may be found in the logico-epistemological articulation of scientific method as 'hypothetico-deductive-verificational', i.e. that which consists in a continuous, unending interplay of imagination, reason and sense-experience where each supplements, enlarges and restricts the other. Knowledge, in this perspective, is not an assertion or denial, but a complex and inter-related web or even a net of statements which are always structured in the form of an 'open' relationship permitting movement either way, resulting in an essential revisability or modifiability in principle, but leaving it to the practitioners concerned to decide what, and when, to do so.

Knowledge, thus, is a succession of interconnected assertions perpetually expanding and perennially changing as a result of doubt and questioning, in which negation plays only a subsidiary role that is purely temporary in character. This, however, is not to see it as a logician does, not even of the type that sees logic as dialectics, for neither doubt nor questioning are negation and, in any case, they are not predetermined either as to their content or even form, as negation has to be. Strangely, neither Hegel nor Marx seem to have understood the nature of true dialectics as they superimposed on what was a free activity of reason the notion of necessity taken from traditional logic where the movement of reason was seen as bound by necessities which no seeker of knowledge could ever be free from as they were the very conditions of knowledge which was not only defined but constituted by them.

Kant had earlier attempted to be free from the constraints of logic by making it transcendental and thus seeing the entire activity of knowing as a free activity in which reason exercises its objectivating function through the superimposition of the categories which had an internal structure that he articulated in the well-known section of the

Critique of Pure Reason, called *The Transcendental Analytic*. But Kant has insisted that the moment one forgot the transcendental nature of the whole enterprise of Reason, one would forget the freedom underlying it, and treat it as a character of the 'given' and land oneself in insoluble antinomies, and feel bound hand and foot to something that was totally independent of oneself. The bondage to reason was as much a bondage, as the one to causality, and the freedom from bondage consisted in seeing that they were all 'transcendental' in character.

Negation, for Kant, resides in the transcendental paraphernalia of thought or 'thinking' when it tries to 'know' anything and hence, like all the other categories, cannot be a feature of reality-as-it-is-in-itself. But reality *is* or rather, 'to be' is 'to be real'. In Kantian terminology, 'to be' is 'to appear' or 'to be given' or even 'to be intuited', and for something 'to appear' is to be, as it can hardly be otherwise.

But, for Kant, negation which is a necessary feature of thinking that is 'trying to know', is not pure negation, but rather a negation that, through negating, *asserts* something. The infinite judgement in Kant synthesizes both the affirmative and negative judgements in it and is the 'real' judgement under quality and not the affirmative and negative judgements *separately* as they were for Aristotle. It has the form of the affirmative, as it has to be, for all knowledge has to have the character of an assertion analogous to the one contained in what he called '*anchauunng*'. But the content of the affirmation is a negation. The statement 'X *is* not-red' is the well-known example where what is being asserted is the ascription of a practically 'infinite' predicate through exclusion or negation. The simple, usual construal of the negative judgement hides this infinite extension of the exclusion which the negation involves. But, at a deeper level, it opens the problem as to what a formally affirmative statement with a positive content says or does, something that Kant does not seem to have considered in his discussion of the subject. The only possible reason for this perhaps was that ascriptive assertion of a positive content does not seem to raise any problem as the world *is* what it *is*. But while the assertion of a negation raises the problem of the ontological status of negation which is being affirmed as a *predicate*, the assertion of the positive content raises the problem of the ontological status of that of which

something is predicated or what is usually designated as 'subject' in philosophical literature. Ontologically, the 'subject' is supposed to have a 'precedence' over the predicate and hence is called 'substance', a term denoting that which alone is supposed to be ontologically real, presumably because it is that to which the properties 'belong', or that which 'possesses' them. But the question what is this 'possessing' or 'belonging' does not seem to have been asked or answered in a clear manner. Can the 'substance' be bereft of all the properties, or can the properties be there even if there were no substance to belong to? This is the central question which does not seem to have been asked or debated or even answered in the Western discussion of the subject.

Locke's classic formulation of the subject and development of thought around this subject from Berkeley to Hume on the one hand, and from Descartes to Kant on the other, does discuss the issue but in a tangential manner. The ghost of substance as a 'Know-not-what' haunts everybody except Hume who accepts that qualities need not belong to anything, but does not even raise the question whether the same may also be true of substances as they may also exist without qualities. The thinking from Descartes to Leibnitz bypasses the problem posed by Locke, and Kant tries to cut the Gordian knot by suggesting that substance and quality are two terms of a relation which is necessary for thought and is called 'inherence', forgetting that the Lockeian ghost had reappeared as the 'thing-in-itself' with this difference that it could not be thought of either as a 'substance' or as a 'property' and yet which was still necessary, for without it whatever 'appeared' would lack 'grounding' or 'objective support' and thus become devoid of all reality whatsoever.

The asymmetry between the positive and the negative predication and the problems raised thereby have been squarely faced and discussed in the Indian philosophical tradition, though for some strange reason, they have not yet formed a part of the philosophical self-awareness of thinkers even after a great deal of interaction between the two traditions during the last two hundred years or so. The Buddhists had long ago done what Kant failed to do, i.e. give up the notion of substance and opted for a pure property- or quality-based understanding of things, and thus had exorcized the 'substance ghost', whether in its Lockeian or Kantian version from their philosophical thinking, for ever. The

Advaitin, for his part, had boldly accepted the idea of a 'substance' which not only needed no properties, but which could not have any properties as it was absolutely relationless and hence could not be related to them by 'inherence' which the Indian tradition also knew. In fact, had Kant thought a little further, he would have seen that the 'thing-in-itself' had to be without any relation as the very idea of 'relation' was transcendental in all its modalities, i.e. 'inherence', 'causality' and 'reciprocity', as he called them. This is perhaps the real Advaitin position, though they continued to think and write of it as if it were 'substance'.

The problems raised by the negative predication created real havoc in Indian philosophy, and no one can understand India's philosophical dilemmas unless one sees the roots and genesis of this problem. Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician, brought forth the discussion by asking what was meant by the affirmative assertion of a negative predication and answered that what was positive was the 'non-availability' (*anupalabdhi*) of something which, if it would have been there, would have been available to the senses and, thus, known. The fact that it is not being perceived when all the conditions of 'perceptibility' are fulfilled becomes the *ground* or (*hetu*) for the assertion of its absence. The discussion arises in the context of inferential knowledge where Dharmakīrti had already suggested that the inferential basis of a positive predicate would either be that it was already included implicitly in the subject itself, or that it was causally related to it as an effect. The former he called *svabhāva-hetu* and the latter *Kriyā hetu*.

Dharmakīrti's analysis of the negative predication gave rise to the obvious question as to how to distinguish between 'non-availability to the senses' and the 'absence' or *abhāva* when one was supposed to be the ground for the other. There has to be a distinction if the inference is to be an 'inference', and in case there was none, why not assume that the 'absence' or *abhāva* was directly perceived? This was the road that the Naiyāyikas took and, after much hesitation, took perhaps the boldest step in the history of thought by declaring not only that 'absence' was directly perceived, but that it was also ontologically real, an independent *padārtha*, as the Vaiśeṣikas called it. This move from epistemological and semantic independence and 'reality' to ontological independence

and reality of 'positive negativity' resulted in creating new problems for the Naiyāyikas, which they had not even dreamt of.

The immediate problem was regarding the type of ontological status to be accorded to this new entrant in the class of 'reals' to be accepted by the system. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who were more interested in the problem had already divided the realm of the ontological 'reals' into two classes, i.e. *sattā* and *bhāva*. These roughly correspond to what have been called 'existents' and 'subsistents' in the Western tradition, but the Vaiśeṣika distinction is, at least *prima facie*, clearer as it seems to be based on independence of the reasoning activity of the mind, or what they called *buddhī* in their system. Substances, qualities, and actions or movements were, in the world, independent of the knowing activity of reason, while inherence, universality and singularity were not. The former, therefore, existed, while the latter came into being because of the knowing activity of reason, and hence, though intersubjectively objective, were *buddhyāpekṣā*, or reason dependent, or relative to reason in their nature.

Abhāva could not belong to either of these classifications and, hence, had to be *sui generis* in character. It was as positively existent as those which were supposed to exist, as it was perceived and yet it was also as necessary to reason, as without it, reason could not be. The activity of thinking involved distinguishing, differentiating, demarcating and this involved, as the Buddhists had seen, positive affirmation of the negative predication which, for them, was only an epistemological necessity without much ontological significance on its part. For the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, the ontological reality of non-being or *abhāva* opened doors for ontological investigation that created problem after problem for their epistemology.

If 'absence' was to be an object of direct apprehension, the role of senses in it could not be easily determined. Moreover, the apprehension of 'absence' implied prior presence of the object which was now absent, and this could be of at least two types. The simplest one was change of location, or something missing; the other one was the 'destruction' of the object, or 'death' in the case of that which was 'living'. This second kind of absence, strangely, was 'unending' even though it had a beginning. But once the idea of 'destruction' or 'death' was seen as

giving rise to the 'reality' of 'absence', the door was open to the asking of the question regarding the 'coming-into-being' of the object or its 'origination' or 'birth', and its 'absence' before that. This 'absence', if it were to be admitted, would have to be 'beginningless' and yet as having an 'end', for it ended with the 'origination' of the object concerned.

The strange situation created by these two 'absences'—one of which was 'beginningless' and the other 'endless'—seems to have aroused no metaphysical reflection amongst the Naiyāyikas, who appear to have discovered them. It was the thinkers of the other schools, primarily the Buddhists and the Advaitins, who appear to have been struck by the metaphysical possibilities lying hidden in the analysis. Were the so-called 'appearance' and 'disappearance' 'passing episodes' in a deeper reality for which they were essentially contingent, or epiphenomenal in nature? Or, was this continual appearing and disappearing the eternally present that was ever becoming 'past', the very nature of reality? The Advaitin and the Buddhist seem to have argued for these two alternatives without seeing that on either alternative time, as we 'experience' it, becomes unreal, and so also 'life' as we 'live' it. What will 'action' be if there were no 'future' and what will 'identity' be if there were no memory? The momentary present of the Buddhist would become totally meaningless and even unrecognizable without the form and colour it gets from memory on the one hand and desire on the other, the two shaping each other and giving that living pulsating throb to the 'present' which makes one *feel* and say 'it *is*' and hence is 'real'.

The two 'infinite' absences that the Naiyāyikas discovered were implicit in the relation of the 'present' to the 'past' and the 'future', and the fact that things come into being and cease to be. But in case there are things that can never come into being because of their very nature, then that would have to be granted absolute absence, and the Naiyāyikas did just that in the case of that which was said to be 'impossible' in the western tradition. 'Impossible' was that which *could* not be, and never *would* be. The Naiyāyikas called this *atyantābhāva* and if any student of Quine questions this, he has only to ask himself about the ontological status of the 'null-class' in logic and mathematics and whether these disciplines will be possible without postulating its reality. The

'null-class' or the 'empty set' may be thought to be so, because it just happens to be so because there *is* no actual member that belongs to it. But, would one distinguish between that which is only empirically so and that which is necessarily so. The *not* of 'impossibility' belongs to the latter class, and even in it, perhaps, one would have to distinguish between empirical impossibility and logical impossibility. The Naiyāyikas seem to be aware of the latter distinction as the examples they give implicitly contain it though they never seem to explicitly say so.

The ontological acceptance of something that is, and has to be, always absent creates a problem for the knowledge-enterprise that has never been squarely faced in the western epistemological tradition. Thinking has to use what has come to be called the joint method of agreement and difference, and this assumes that things are sometimes present and sometimes absent, for if something were to be always present, it could not be known just as if it were to be always absent. The Naiyāyikas called these *Kevalānavayī* and *Kevalavyatirekī*, and the acceptance of their reality created insurmountable problems for the definition of concomitance, whether causal or non-causal, that is required for any satisfactory definition of inferential knowledge or *anumāna*.

Was difference, then, necessary to knowledge and, if so, was 'difference' a kind of 'absence' also? The Naiyāyikas saw the problem and the difficulty, but opted for understanding the notion of difference in terms of 'mutual absence', i.e. as the 'absence of one in the other'. The standard example is that of jar and the cloth, or *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, but one may choose one's own examples as the world is full of them. 'To be' is 'to be different from something else' and if 'difference' is real, then this would be 'absence' or *abhāva*, and the world would be nothing but full of absences or *abhāva* as 'to be' will be 'to negate' or 'to deny' or 'to be different' or, in other words, not to be the other. But then why only from the cloth or the *paṭa*, and not from everything else? The Buddhist adopted this alternative and developed the theory of *apoha* where a thing has to be understood in terms of its difference from *everything* else, and not just from *one* thing, as the Naiyāyikas thought. But was there any difference between the difference that one thing had from another, and the difference that it had from something

else? The 'difference' obviously has to be different, and the Naiyāyikas suggested that each of the different 'differences' had to be specifically qualified in order to differentiate the one from the other. They introduced the notion of the 'qualifier' or the *avacchedeka* to achieve this but forgot that this would have to be infinitely large as the 'objects' from which it has to be different keep on growing all the time. Kant had a vague apprehension of this when he called the judgement capturing this as '*unendlih*' as the class from which it was to be 'excluded' had to be 'open', as it could not be closed in principle.

But neither Kant nor the Naiyāyikas or the Buddhists saw that as far as knowledge was concerned, it was the positive that alone mattered and that the unending difference which it had from everything else was only a creation of self-conscious reflection which created the problem that had little relation to the knowledge-enterprise in which it was engaged. That the situation will become different in the realms of action and feeling is a different story that we need not enter here. As far as knowledge is concerned, we might as well bury the problem or consign it to flames and get rid of it forever. Negation in thought is a 'shadow' projected by the affirmation and hence it is nothing 'real' as one need not do anything about it, nor does it demand that something be done about it. Where this obtains as in feeling and action, there has to be something *positive* about it but, as far as we know, little has been thought about it. But if the negation has to have a 'positivity' about it in order to be effective, the 'positive' would have to have a 'negativity' in it in order to be seen as what it is not, that is, as lacking something or, in other words, not being, 'completely positive'.

A Reply to A. Kanthamani's Essay 'On Flagging Kant'[1]

I am grateful to Professor A. Kanthamani for his very erudite comments on my essay 'Interpreting Metaphysical Deduction: A Hermeneutic Response to Professor Daya Krishna's Essay "Kant's Doctrine of Categories: Some Question and Problems"'.[2] His comments have helped me in clarifying some ideas and their interrelationship involved in Kant's critical philosophy by looking more closely at the issues under the discussion. However, I would like to make the following observation on his comments.

(1) The measured thrust of Professor Kanthamani's comment, which is repeated many times, is that I have failed to clarify the proof structure of transcendental deduction of categories.

> What *Binod conveniently forgets is that the transcendental deduction has a definite 'proof' structure*, but it is difficult to unravel ...[3]
>
> He is unable to provide any missing premise except saying that it is the work of pure synthesis which it indigenously terms as '*a priori* possibility of *a priori* element in object-relatedness', but it hardly explains anything ... This serves only to nod at the argument from above that, in turn, forces him to completely overlook the crucial part of the argument from above; namely, the transcendental unity of apperception. Again, he circumscribes it by calling attention to representation of representation (metarepresentation?). He is aloof from the unity of apperception and the underlying psychological theory, and consequently, *misses the argument from above, as well as the essential connecting link which he captures by saying the 'same functional unity of understanding' whereby he also misses the argument from below.*[4]

By saying that TL is wholistic *ex hypothese*, does he not beg the most important question? Invariably, he thinks that giving a textual reading would pre-empt any misunderstanding without giving an

> alternative to the structure of the deduction. Thus Binod fails not only to meet the standards laid down by Daya ... and consequently, *he fails on the very front of proof structure*. In other words, he has not succeeded in explaining the exact linkage between the judgements and categories, because he has not explained what kind of thing a transcendental deduction is in the architectonic.[5]

The ground of accusation of failure in understanding the proof structure is that I intend to do so, but the task was too difficult on my part to understand. He writes,

> Binod writes as if he is going to unravel the mystery by surging forward with a transcendental proof structure. But he has not gone beyond saying that transcendental logic (TL) requires a definition which tells us something about 'object-relatedness involved in knowledge' ... which gives rise to functions of understanding ...[6]

I still fail to understand which part of my essay under discussion gives rise to the impression that I am going to unravel the proof structure of transcendental deduction. The structure of transcendental deduction was not under discussion either in Professor Daya's paper or my comments on that particular paper. Yet if I have created the impression that I am going to lay bare the proof structure of transcendental deduction, then it must be the fault of my presentation, which I must own up.

But I have a hunch that Professor Kanthamani is confusing the structure of transcendental deduction with the structure of metaphysical deduction, since metaphysical deduction was the topic under discussion in Professor Daya's paper and my response to it. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why after making the claim,

> Binod, in spite of his Vedantic ticket (his epigram is from *Atharva Veda*), in my opinion, also missed the Airbus because he has not bothered to clearly portray the structure of the proof in Kant's *metaphysical deduction*. Had he done so, he would have given us a staple diet on Kant. Daya's questions bear a similarity to any interpreter of Kant. If so, how come that all of us miss the Boeing of Kant scholars and remain incommunicado for so long?[7]

Immediately in the next paragraph, he goes on to answer.

> No doubt the structuration of the *transcendental deduction* makes exorbitant demands on us.[8]

It is not clear whether this switch from metaphysical deduction to transcendental deduction is intentional or unintentional. Be that as it may, let us listen to Kant about what he wants to do in metaphysical deduction:

> In the *metaphysical deduction* the *a priori* origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought ...[9]

Hence the exposition in the metaphysical deduction concludes,

> In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as, in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgements. For these functions specific the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers.[10]

Kant has two aims in his metaphysical deduction. Firstly, he wants to bring to light the actual source of the origin of categories, which is pure synthesis. Secondly, he wants to be sure of the completeness and division of categories as they originate from synthesis. He is not trying to derive *individual categories* either from the actual place of origin or from the table of judgements in the metaphysical deduction. Mark the phrase 'complete agreement with' in his understanding of metaphysical deduction. He does not write the phrase 'complete derivation from'.

In fact, Kant cannot, and therefore, does not undertake the task either of deducing or of fully determining, i.e. of defining each specific category starting from the origin without bringing in the problem involved in relating pure manifold of intuition, especially time with the faculty of imagination. Hence Kant admits,

> In the above statement of the table of categories, we relieved ourselves of the task of defining each of them, as our purpose, which concerned only their synthetic employment, did not require such definition,

> and we are not called upon to incur any responsibility through unnecessary undertakings from which we can be relieved. It was no evasion but an important prudential maxim, not to embark upon the task of definition, attempting or professing to attain completeness and precision in the determination of a concept, so long as we can achieve our end with one or other of its properties, without requiring a complete enumeration of all those that constitute the complete concept. But we now perceive that the ground of this precaution lies still deeper. We realize that we are unable to define them even if we wished.[11]

Be it noted Kant is relieving himself of the responsibility of complete determination of categories not only on heuristic grounds but also because of 'deeper' reasons. Hence, he cannot define them even if he wanted. Kant also explains what a real definition is:

> I here mean real definition—which does not merely substitute for the name of a thing other more intelligible words, but contains a clear property by which the defined *object* can always be known with certainty, and which makes the explained concept serviceable in application. Real explanation would be that which makes clear not only the concept but also its *objective reality*.[12]

Kant cannot have a real definition and also derivation of any specific category even with the clear understanding of the proof structure of transcendental deduction. The reason is explained,

> We cannot define any one of them in any real fashion, that is, make the possibility of their object understandable, without at once descending to the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearances—to which, as their sole objects, they must consequently be limited. For if this condition be removed, all meaning, that is, relation to the object, falls away ...

These quotations from Kant also confirm my view expressed earlier that the specificities of categories cannot emerge at the stage of metaphysical deduction by simply looking at the forms of judgements even if three-fold synthesis is taken into account and it would not be possible to talk of the specificities before we are through the

transcendental deduction and schematism. Specificities of categories will emerge only when Kant had shown that they possess application in knowledge (transcendental deduction) and when the unities of consciousness represented by each category acquired a temporal form (schematism). But he is satisfied with exhibiting only some of the specificities in the analytic of principles. Even after schematism, he is unable to derive the complete specification of each category for that will require him to go into solving the problems involved in correlation of time with imagination, which he is not in a position to do. Be it noted the question of derivation of meaningless categories, i.e. categories without real definition does not arise. Kant is absolving himself of the responsibility of giving real definition of any of the categories, and hence of deriving them, even after the schematism chapter. Hence to claim regarding myself,

> On expects that he would try to show how he would have 'transcendentally' derived the categories from judgements in the context of this assumed transcendental logic ... this much is expected of him ...[13]

is pointless. But the question arises: If Kant is not interested in deriving specific categories from the origin, then why is he uncovering the origin of the categories? The answer is hidden in the cryptic remark just before the table of pure concepts of understanding,

> These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call *categories*, for *our primary purpose is the same as his*,[14] although widely diverging from it in manner of execution.[15]

To understand the interest Kant has in uncovering the origin of categories, we have to understand Aristotle's intention. Aristotle's interest in categories is to exhibit the basis of connection between the determination of ontological constitution of beings and basic forms of judgement. Kant also, by uncovering the origin of categories, is trying to show the basis of connection between the forms of judgement and the ontological constitution of objects of experience, where experience understood in the sense in which it is understood in empirical science. Basis of this connection is synthesis. This is what Kant wants to uncover in his metaphysical deduction.

Professor Kanthamani's comments as well as the entire tenor of his discussion gives an impression that he believes we can derive categories from the table of judgements once we have the proof structure of transcendental deduction of categories, which exhibits to more clearly the link between judgements and categories. But as I have tried to show neither Kant wanted nor is it possible in his view to derive each specific category from the actual place of origin, i.e. synthesis, let alone the corresponding point in the table of forms of judgement, as he is not prepared to 'descend to the conditions of sensibility' since that will require him to enter into the problematic scenario of relating pure manifold of intuition, especially time with the faculty of imagination. Hence, in my opinion, Professor Kanthamani's following three comments are misplaced.

> Binod's narrative, if it can be called so, requires to be sensitized to the distinction between the argument from above and the argument from below, both of which provide an integrated theory of self understanding ... Binod leaves a glaring confusion. No one knows where to begin in the list of categories ...[16]
>
> ... there is the connection between synthesis and judgement and also the connection between judgement and categories and then, of course, the relation between these two relations, then only the connection between synthesis and categories will be explained. As remarked above, Binod concentrates on synthesis and pure synthesis, and mediates them in terms of the 'same function', to explain the functional unity of understanding. All these points are limited to the re-reading of the text. He must reconstruct the link without placing the complete burden on transcendental logic. How do we attribute experiences to one and the same self-same subject? What kind of necessity is involved here in the mind-world relation? This can be explained without resorting to reading the proof structure. This is what Daya asks and Binod never answered.[17]
>
> The major lacuna here is that my friend Binod has not said anything to explain the T. Logic except saying that it is object relatedness which he thinks brings out the alleged 'pure synthesis' between the table of judgements and the table of categories (the sixth paragraph provides the clue). No doubt Daya ... commits a logical fallacy ('post hoc ergo propter hoc') in thinking like any one of us, how exactly the categories are somehow 'derived' from the table of judgements. From Binod's point of view, Daya's modern logic is no match to Kant. Nevertheless, I have a different opinion. His questions, coming from his spontaneous natural ingenuity, are innocuous. No one has shown how this could be explained ...[18]

(2) Unraveling of the structure of Kant's transcendental deduction of categories is an important task in itself in Kant exegesis. But it is doubtful whether Professor Kanthamani's understanding regarding the proof structure of transcendental deduction is hermeneutically adequate. He writes,

> The transcendental deduction proceeds from a 'slender premise', which holds that we have experience and then proceeds to unpack the conditions of possibility. The slender premise talks about any possible experience, and the conditions of possibility suggest a theory of mental processing that explains the above is the *explanans*. This refers to *a priori* concepts and the overall conclusion states the legitimate application (normative claim).[19]

One cannot but raise the questions: Can Kant really deduce a 'normative claim' from a factual premise? Can Kant really proceed with the assumption that we have experience and then proceed by looking for the conditions of possibility of experience? Consider Kant's claim in his *Critique of Judgement*,

> To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is a quite different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here, the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more to its feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind (*Gemüt*) is conscious in the feeling of its state.[20]

Kant is distinguishing between different kinds of experience here. 'Conscious of ... representation with an accompanying sensation of delight' is also a kind of experience. But Kant is not finding *a priori* condition of possibility of this kind of experience. So, can Professor Kanthamani sustain a linear proof structure from the premise to the conclusion of transcendental deduction by claiming that Kant is starting with experience simpliciter? If 'experience' in transcendental deduction is not experience in general but a specific kind of experience, i.e. cognitive experience or scientific experience, is it not part of the function of transcendental deduction to define cognitive experience implicitly by laying bare its *a priori* conditions, so that it has implicitly a circular structure, where the conclusion backfires on the premises to redefine its terms? Is it not the case that if the conclusion is normative, then it backfires on the factual premise to implicitly lay down norm for its terms, there by destroying its value neutral factuality?

(3) Whether Professor Kanthamani is able to appreciate the hermeneutic task that confronts any Kant scholar interested in Kant exegesis is doubtful. This is testified by a number of his comments, all of which relate in one way or other to the hermeneutic task. Hence, the second major thrust of his criticism is directed against the kind of hermeneutics which I practice. Professor Kanthamani writes,

> In a miasma of scholarship, he misses the part for the whole where he accuses others of missing the whole for the part. Moreover, his critique is marred by extraneous reading from Heidegger or Gadamer which is quite out of context. They deserve editorial pruning.[21]

Binod's lenience to the text is too much to seek any explanations from the text. On the contrary, he exorts us to re-read the text but offers no reconstruction. This is briefly the bad hermeneutics of *Brahma Sūtra Bhāsya* he advocates. This tenor of *Bhāsya* style is to heap interpretation on interpretation without linking it to current science.[22]

His definition of imagination as perception in the absence of an object may take him in the direction of nous, but it hardly explains anything.[23]

For some academicians of philosophy in India, scholarship definitely appears as a 'miasma' and hence there is a trend to avoid it like a noxious influence. My endeavour is to dispel this tendency by showing the manner in which meaningful, fruitful and original philosophizing can be done through scholarship.

The Kantian corpus is not a self-contained unit, which can be read in itself. Kant takes a good bit from the tradition as a tacit premise or as meaning of terms, which he employs. The general tendency in Kant exegesis atmost is to see his critical philosophy merely as a reconciliation of two schools of modern philosophy: rationalism and empiricism. That is to say that his critical philosophy is seen merely as a response to the earlier two trends of modern philosophy. But this reading is not adequate to understand fully what is happening in the Kantian corpus. We have to place Kant in context of the whole tradition of Western philosophy even going back to classical Greek philosophy and not merely in the context of modern philosophy only. Kantian corpus is part of a larger dialogue, which is the entire Western philosophy, beginning with the classical Greeks. Kant was trying to provide a foundation to man's technological domination over the world, but in the process of providing foundation to the our new technological relation to the world, he was logically forced to go beyond its base in modern empirical sciences to the traditional forms of human relation to the world as embodied in the tradition of Greek philosophy and in the message of the Christian church. So, the reconciliation of sciences as the foundation of new relation to the world with the tradition of Greek philosophy, as the embodiment of everything men knew about God, the world, and human life, and with the message of the Christian Church, became a problem of Kant's critical philosophy, beginning with his first critique. By tracing Kant's definition of imagination to Parmenides' definition of *nous*, I was exhibiting the linkage between Kant and the classical Greek philosophy. In the discussion above also, I explained the reasons why we need to refer to Aristotle to understand what Kant is doing in metaphysical deduction of categories. I became aware that Kantian corpus needs to be understood in the context of the whole tradition of Western philosophy, including the classical Greek philosophy only after reading Heidegger, Gadamer and Hannah Arendt.

So it is wrong to claim that my 'critique is marred by extraneous reading from Heidegger or Gadamer which is quite out of context' or that my reference to them 'deserve editorial pruning'.[24]

It is equally erroneous to claim regarding my hermeneutic practice that I am lenient to the text or that I seek no explanation from the text or I give no reconstruction of the text. The charge of lenience to the text is misplaced as when we are interpreting a text, then definitely the text is the sure guide, which we have to follow and we must allow the text to control the meaning. Explanation from the text can be sought only at the line of fault where the claim of the text apparently fails to cohere with what the text is doing. The reconstruction of text is needed if there is any contradiction in the claims of the text. Otherwise we have to follow the text in interpretation.

Professor Kanthamani is quite right when he claims that my hermeneutic practice is that of the *Sūtra Bhāṣya* style. But his claim that

> This tenor of *Bhāṣya* style is to heap interpretation on interpretation without linking it to current science[25]

is wrong. Rather, the aim of the *Sūtra Bhāṣya* style of hermeneutic practice is to recontextualize the text in the context of the interpreter. This is a complex process whose details cannot be discussed in this reply. For details, one can refer to my essay 'A Prolegomenon to Hermeneia Indica: The Sudarśan Cakra', forthcoming in a volume edited by Raghunath Ghosh of North Bengal University. As far as Kant exegesis is concerned, I have already tried to show in the essay 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology: The Aim of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*', which appears in the same volume[26] in which Professor Kanthamani's comments are published, that Kant is laying foundations of modern empirical sciences in his *first critique.*

Professor Kanthamani's claim that I miss the part for the whole in reading Kant is based only on the claim that I have not discussed the argumentative structure of the transcendental deduction of categories. I have already explained the reason for not thematizing the transcendental deduction of categories in my response to Professor Daya Krishna. But it must be kept in mind that the whole is never a

given whole. In Kant's exegesis, for example, one may be interested, say, in transcendental deduction of categories as a part of the whole of just the first critique, but for another, the whole may be the totality of critical corpus, or it may be the whole of Kantian corpus including the pre-critical writings, so on and so forth. Similarly, the result one gets, i.e. the meaning that emerges may change with the change of the context. What is problematic in one context can suddenly be illumined with meaning in another context. I interpret Kant's critical corpus in the context of whole of Western philosophy and I believe we can make better sense of Kantian critical writings.

(4) According to Professor Kanthamani,

> ... there is indeed a passage from mind to world (or objects as well as other people) in an embedded standpoint which suggests that we start from community, in this hyper-wholistic picture ... Thus one can move from community (reciprocity and simultaneity) to universality and by giving universality a causal status, we can arrive at a new theory of universals (New Conceptualism), that has an edge over nominalism, realism and old conceptualism in that it opens universals to a causal status ... Synthesis is broadly understood as communication ...[27]

In the context of Kant's understanding of what is a concept, this is pure fantasy and there is not a shred of textual evidence to support it. Let us examine the Kant's text that may seem to come closest to what Professor Kanthamani is claiming and this text is not from the first critique. Kant writes in the *Critique of Judgement*,

> Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit to communication, then our mental status, i.e. the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proposition suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, without

> this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise. And this is always what actually happens where a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts. But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. However, there must be one in which this internal ratio suitable for quickening (one faculty by the other) is best adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally; and this disposition can only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts) ... now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation) ...[28]

Here, even though Kant is linking communication with synthesis, he is not equating them, because the synthesis is of the manifold of intuition but communication is not merely of the various representations but also of the feeling of proportion involved in the disposition of the cognitive powers. This quotation from Kant also goes against Professor Kanthamani's claim regarding Kant's theory which states,

> Its first credential is that we have no state consciousness but only access consciousness.[29]

Here Kant is specifically talking about the communication of the mental state. This passage hardly supports Professor Kanthamani's new conceptualism as it cannot be construed to support the causal status of universality. Professor Kanthamani has not given any evidence from Kant in support of his new conceptualism.

Similarly, I fail to understand the relevance of the claim Professor Kanthamani makes while the context is the discussion of *a priori* origin of the pure concepts of understanding,

> The clue is the three laws of Newtonian Mechanics (law of subsistence, inertia and reaction) that apply to matter. The synthesis would mean the interdependence of parts in nature as well as in community ...

> My point is that Binod hankers after the transcendental while he could very well move from the empirical.[30]

Once again, it appears he is fantasizing, leaving the text way behind. Kant's use of the term 'synthesis' in the context of mental activities can under no circumstances be construed as 'interdependence of parts in nature as well as in community'.

(5) The third thrust of Professor Kanthamani's comments is to defend Professor Daya Krishna's queries, which I had shown to arise from a misunderstanding of Kant's position. He writes,

> Daya Krishna's questions are quite ingenious and not all as 'erroneous' ... as Binod thinks they are. They are like the ones you come across elsewhere, for which no satisfactory answers have so far emerged.[31]

Regarding my criticism of Professor Daya's questions, he further writes,

> So he fulminates: Professor Daya fails to grasp the content of his logic and so his questions were lop-sided. They were formulated on a distorted horizon. His replies to Daya turned out to be perfunctory. Lampooning apart, I fail to understand whether it was meant to be a series defence of Kant.[32]

> ... Daya's queries are good posers. They are not adequately met by Binod's perfunctory reading of the text. These questions that arise here in the context from the bulk of query in which Daya shares with other Kantian scholars ... it by no means follows that Daya's queries are totally irrelevant. Nor does it show that the exact way of proving is along the lines of my friend Binod.[33]

It must be made clear that I am not interested in defending Kant or Kant's philosophy. But what I am after is a correct understanding of Kant. My claim was that Professor Daya Krishna's questions arise as a result of misunderstanding Kant's position. It is no defense of the correctness of the questions raised by Professor Daya Krishna to claim that 'they are like the ones you come across elsewhere' or that 'These questions that arise here in the context from the bulk of query in which Daya shares with other Kantian scholars ...' for misunderstanding of Kant's philosophy is rampant. Professor Kanthamani's claim is that my

reading of Kantian text is 'perfunctory'. I fail to understand how my replies to Professor Daya's queries can be termed as 'perfunctory' in the face of detailed discussion with evidence of why Professor Krishna's queries arise due to a misunderstanding. Yet, if my manner of presentation of argument exhibits perfunctory reading of Kant's text, then the fault is mine, which I must own up.

The sense of a genuine question determines the direction in which the answer is to be given. A genuine question brings the thing questioned to a state of indeterminacy by opening up the possibilities of the thing. These possibilities must not be boundless. The horizon of the question, which gives sense to it, limits the possibilities. That is to say, a genuine question exhibits the doubt of the inquirer as to which one of the limited possibilities is realized by the object under question. A genuine question is inspired by the knowledge of not knowing whether something is this or that, i.e. not knowing which one of the limited possibilities is correct. But for a person who raises questions in order to prove himself right and not in order to remove his doubt by gaining knowledge (as he lacks doubt), asking a question is easier than answering them. But this only goes on to show that a person cannot ask the right questions if he has no doubts. My charge against Professor Daya was that he has no doubts regarding the text of Kant. Professor Daya Krishna's questions arise not from his desire to gain insight from Kant, but from his desire to demolish Kant through his superior knowledge. Not only that, my charge was also that most of the questions asked by Professor Daya Krishna are situated in a distorted and faulty horizon of understanding. In the distorted question, the answer lies not in the direction opened by the sense of the question, i.e. the answer emerges not from the possibilities opened by the question, but in some other direction. I gave reasons for my charge. But Professor Kanthamani has done nothing to dispel the charges. Rather, he appeals to the prevailing opinion. Plato's dialogues amply show that it is the power of opinion against which it is very difficult to obtain an admission of ignorance. It is an opinion that suppresses genuine questions. Opinion has the tendency to propagate itself and it would like to be a general opinion. It is interesting to note that the Greek word for opinion is 'doxa', which also means the decision made by the majority in the assembly. No

doubt the admission of ignorance and genuine questioning fail to emerge on the face of the prevailing opinion.

(6) I cannot agree when Professor Kanthamani writes,

> Binod misses a great opportunity to distinguish between what he calls the reflective analytic unity of form ... and synthetic unity of content (*a priori* possibility) object relatedness ..., and to split in that order. Such distinctions hardly matter to him.[34]

The distinction is important and it was employed in my discussion of Professor Daya's paper.[35] But I must concede that even though I made the distinction in the discussion, but I failed to discuss in detail what the difference consists in.

(7) Professor Kanthamani, at the end of the discussion, advocates reading of Kant from the point of view of philosophy of language. He writes,

> ... the solution probably lies in this direction of reading Kant from a philosophy of language point of view without losing sight of the recent reductionist notes of cognitive science.[36]

We look forward to his reading, which is yet to be produced. But I must warn that P.F. Strawson in his *Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*[37] attempted a linguistic reading of Kant's metaphysics. But it turned out to be a rational reconstruction and not an interpretation of Kant's metaphysics as Strawson could not reconcile his linguistic reading of Kant with the transcendental idealism of Kant. He turns Kant's transcendental metaphysics into descriptive metaphysics and does much violence to the Kantian text. Let us wait and see the kind of metamorphosis Kant's philosophy undergoes in the hands of Professor Kanthamani.

Notes and References

1. *JICPR*, Vol. XX, No. 2, April–June 2003, pp. 193–201.
2. *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, July–September 2002, pp. 109–54.
3. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 194, *Italics added.*
4. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 195, *Italics added.*
5. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 195, *Italics added.*
6. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 194.

7. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 197, *Italics added.*
8. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 197, *Italics added.*
9. *Critique of Pure Reason* [abbreviated as CPR hereinafter], tr. Norman Kemp Smith, B159.
10. CPR, A79, B105.
11. CPR, A241.
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13. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 194.
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16. 'On Flagging Kant', pp. 197–8.
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27. 'On Flagging Kant', pp. 199–200.
28. *Critique of Judgement*, §21, *42.Kant*, p. 492.
29. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 198.
30. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 196.
31. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 193.
32. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 196.
33. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 199.
34. 'On Flagging Kant', p. 195.
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On Revenge—A Short Note

A person harms, or is believed to harm, another person. The latter harms the former in return. Revenge may be defined as this retaliatory harm.

We may distinguish between individual and collective (or communal) revenge, and between two forms of the latter. In individual revenge, an individual or a group harms some person or persons, and the latter harm the former in return. In collective revenge in one sense—in the first sense as we may call it—a community as a whole or somebody who represents that community harms another community as a whole or somebody who represents that community, and the latter harms the former in return. In collective revenge in the second sense, some member or members of a community harm some member or members of another community or that community as a whole, and the latter harm the former community as a whole, *including those of its members who are not responsible for the initial harm.*

It is possible that a person does not take revenge himself, say, on account of his incapacity, but is helped by others to do so. However, this is as good as his taking revenge himself. It is also possible that the person harmed is not around or is no more there to take revenge. In that case, others, especially his kith and kin, may take revenge on his behalf. When that happens, we can say that the person has been avenged, although not by himself. Further, it is possible that one does not take revenge soon, or more or less soon, after the initial harm. But one, or someone else on one's behalf, waits for what they consider the right moment to do so; and this moment may take a long time to come.

There are certain moral considerations connected with the notion of revenge. I will begin with mentioning one, which a person may happen to overlook, but which is of great importance. It will be seen that, in the case of individual revenge and in that of collective revenge in the first sense, the party (an individual, a group, a community as a whole, somebody who represents a community), against which revenge is taken, is indeed a guilty party, guilty of doing the initial harm. However, in the case of collective revenge in the second sense, the party

(a community as a whole), against which revenge is taken, includes those members who are not guilty of doing the initial harm, who are innocent. As a result, we can say that collective revenge in the second sense is not morally in order, insofar as it includes harming innocent people. (In practice, often enough, it is also found to be harming defenceless people.) We find that, generally speaking, a communal strife, as between Hindus and Muslims in India, is an example of collective revenge in the second sense, and consequently must be a subject of moral censure.

There is another moral consideration in connection with the notion of revenge which I would like to mention here. Taking revenge is a form of countering evil, i.e. it is a form of countering injustice. As such, it has a moral character. Legally, the state legislates punishment for crime; and we look at it with approval. However, taking revenge has also been much criticized. It has been said that it tends to lead to chain-reaction; and, as a result, rather than diminishing it, it tends to augment it. Thus, we have here two views concerning the morality of revenge. One is that, as a form of countering injustice, it is moral. The second is that, as augmenting evil through chain-reaction, it would be wrong to resort to it. We may call the latter the consequentialist view of the morality of revenge, and the former the non-consequentialist view. We find that the non-consequentialist view can also be said to have a consequentialist side. For, according to it, it is possible to maintain that non-countering injustice will only encourage further evil-doing.

It is true that injustice has to be countered. But it is also true that, whatever method of countering injustice we adopt, it should not have the tendency to augment evil; rather, it should tend to diminish it, as far as possible. It is in the light of such considerations as these, I would like to think, that the idea of some sort of non-retaliatory response to evil has been under discussion. There are no fixed forms of non-retaliatory response, just as there are no fixed forms of retaliatory response. Some of the forms of non-retaliatory response, which have been mentioned, include discussing and forgiving. Others can be conceived, keeping in view the given situation.

I have said above that collective revenge in the second sense is morally wanting, insofar as it involves harming people who are innocent, as in the case of the communal strife between Hindus and Muslims in India. We find that it is also logically fallacious, insofar as it extends to *all* the sins of *some*. As a matter of fact, it is its being logically fallacious which leads to its being morally wanting. The question which I would like to ask here is: why does one commit this logical fallacy? This question is deeply worrying, particularly on account of the moral consequences. I do not think that there is the question of oversight or incapacity here. There is the possibility that one extends to all the sins of some, on account of certain rather important similarities between the latter and the rest, like religious or cultural or linguistic similarities. However, it does not seem to be the case that one undertakes the said generalization, *just* because of this consideration. Let me explain what seems to me to be the case. Let us suppose that there are two religious communities. There exists, historically or otherwise, a certain amount of hostility and distrust between them. As a result, the harm which only some members of one of these communities do to some members of the other community or to that community as a whole, is projected upon all the members of the former community. Thus, there is found to be a psychological reason behind committing the logical fallacy of extending to all the sins of some. This can be seen as a hypothesis which I wish to advance about the problem which I have posed above in connection with the notion of collective revenge in the second sense.

There should be no difficulty in seeing that what I have said above about communities, may be extended, *mutatis mutandis*, to families as well.

APPENDIX

There is the question about the role of the state in connection with collective revenge in the second sense. Needless to say, the state is always required to vindicate the law, and not to adopt a partisan attitude. However, there are examples galore, including those in connection with collective revenge in the second sense, when the state does exactly the opposite, i.e. not vindicate the law, and adopt a partisan attitude. Witness what happened in Gujarat in the recent past. This possibility

brings to light the relevance of Gandhi in the evolution of other forms of regulatory mechanism than that of the state. As far as the present discussion is concerned, the relevance of Gandhi is also indicated in the evolution of non-retaliatory responses to a person's harming another person, in place of retaliatory harm or revenge.

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Agenda for Research

The availability of the Veda to women and *śūdra* is supposed to have been denied from the very beginning on the authority of the Veda itself. Yet, the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* 6.1.4 not only opens with the declaration 'फलार्थत्वात कर्मणः शास्त्रं सर्वाधिकारं स्यात्' and *Sūtra* 6.3.8 specifically controverts the view of Aitiśāyanaḥ given in *Sūtra* 6.1.6 that only men are entitled to this, and *Sūtra* 6.1.27 gives the opinion of Sage Bādari in the context of the right of the Vedic *karma* to all the four *varṇas* that 'निमित्तार्थेन बादरिः, तस्मात् सर्वाधिकारः स्यात्।' This, of course, is not accepted by the author of the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra*, even though he had earlier accepted the position of Bādarāyaṇa in respect of the rights of women in *Sūtra* 6.1.8.

The *Brahma Sūtra* does not discuss the 'rights' of women, but does discuss the question relating to the 'rights' of *śūdra* to *Brahma Vidyā* (1.3.34–38). It denies them the right in its discussion on these *sūtras* as given in Śaṁkara's *Bhāṣya* on it. He does discuss the objection based on the *Jānaśruti* episode in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* but does not discuss the *Satyakāma* Jābāla episode in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

It has, therefore, to be founds as to when in the development of the *Śruti*, the denial of these 'rights' became crystallized and began to be treated as 'orthodox' and 'authoritative' by others.

Jaipur

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Michael Witzel's work on the *Śākhās* of the Veda deserves to be known more widely and paid serious attention than it has generally been done uptill now. As the texts of the *Saṁhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads* differ according to the *Śākhās* to which they belong, this simple fact not only affects the 'unity' and 'uniqueness' of the texts designated by that name, but also challenges the reader to find what is 'common' and what is 'different' between them. And, if some distinction can be made, as has been claimed, between the 'earlier' and the 'latter' within each *śākhā* text, and between the *śākhās* themselves, then one may separate these portions so that the 'development' that took place can be easily grasped and understood.

As many of these *śākhā* texts, according to Witzel, contain portions from the *Śraūta Sūtras* and the *Gṛhya sūtras*, the relation between them and the recognized texts of the Vedic Corpus has to be explored.

In fact, as the *Śraūta sūtras*, the *Dharma sūtras* and the *Gṛhya sūtras*, collectively known as the *Kalpa sūtras*, are also different in the different *śākhās*, the same procedure has to be adopted regarding them.

Witzel's major work in this regard are the following:

—Witzel, Michael (1987): 'On the localisation of Vedic texts and schools (Materials on Vedic *Sākhās*, 7)' in *India and the Ancient World, History, Trade and Culture before AD 650*. Ed. Gilbert Pallet. Leuven: Department Orientalistiek. (Orientalia Lovaniensia, Analecta, 25), Pp. 173–213.

—Witzel, Michael (1997): 'The development of the Vedic canon and its schools: the social and political milieu (Materials on Vedic Śākhās, 8)' In: *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Vedas*. Ed. Michael Witzel. Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University; distributed by South Asia Books, Columbia, MO. (Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora, 2), pp. 257–35. Also on internet: http//www.people.fas.harvard.edu/witzel/canon.pdf

Jaipur DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

1. Can philosophers in India be identified with any *one* school when they have authoritatively written on more than one school and are said to have made a 'significant' contribution to it? Is Vācaspati Miśra, for example, a Naiyāyika or an Advaitin or a Sāṁkhyan, or none of these or all of them together? Does this reveal the character of Indian philosophy or of those who 'wrote' on philosophy in that culture? Was there, for them, no such thing as 'Truth' to be 'known' by *Buddhi* or 'reason'?
2. Why is the first chapter of the *Yoga Sūtras* called *Samādhi Pāda* and the last *Kaivalya Pāda*, when the complete *citta vṛtti nirodha* is supposed to be the same as *samādhi*? Is *kaivalya*, then, the 'real' *puruṣārtha of yoga* and not *samādhi*, either in the *savikalpaka* or *nirvikalpaka* sense?
3. What is the relation of *Yoga Sūtra* to *Abhidhamm* in the Buddhist tradition? It explicitly mentions the well-known *Śīla* in *Sūtra* 1.33 and, like it, talks of something beyond *samādhi*, i.e. *kaivalya* instead of *prajñā*.
4. Is *Nyāya Pracchanna* Advaitin, even though it does not think of itself that way?
5. What exactly is the notion of *manas* in Nyāya? Is it 'mind' in the Western sense of the term? Does it make 'knowledge' an 'episodic event'? If so, how does it avoid 'momentariness' on the one hand and solve the problem of 'unity' of knowledge on the other?
6. What is the role of 'Self' or *Ātman* according to Nyāya in 'knowledge' or the 'knowing activity' or the *pramāṇa vyāpāra* whose *phala* is said to be *pramā*?

1. REPLY TO THE QUERIES RAISED BY PROFESSOR DAYA KRISHNA

Q.1. Whether we have any *saṁhitā* text independent of *śākhās*. And, in case there is none, what are the differences between them?

R. Though any *Saṁhitā* is not found without a *śākhā*, the former is the original and the latter an adaptation of the former brought in

application by a *Śākhā*. *Śākhā* is the traditional recension of the Veda, a traditional text followed by a school and *saṁhitā* is a continuous hymnical text of the Veda with the phonetic changes incurred by the uses of different *śākhās* or schools. The changes incurred in the application of a *mantra* by different *śākhās* are due to the time, space, situation and other contexts in which the *saṁhitā* is adopted in use for an act. We do not find a *saṁhitā* independently of a *śākhā* because the former came in application only through the latter.

Q.2. What exactly do using the term *Ṛgveda*, etc., mean, without mentioning the *śākhā* to which the text belongs?

R. The use of the term *Ṛgveda*, etc., without mention of a *Śākhā* is to refer to the original *saṁhita*, i.e. the commendments and injunctions of which all *śākhās* are in accord. No *śākhā* differs on this duty. They may differ on the application of the *saṁhitā* for some or the other duty. There may be cases of differing, even conflicting, injunctions (*vidhi*) prescribed for the same sacrifice in different *śākhās*. In that case, Mīmāṁsā and Vaiyākaraṇas have given certain specific and general laws to understand which part is injunction and which part is *arthavāda*, that is, added by that particular *śākhā*. There is no conflict in an injunction as such in any of the *śākhās*. Different *śākhās* apply the same injunction for different duties in a sacrifice. The same injunction in some *śākhā* is applied for some duty in a sacrifice and for some other duty in another *śākhā* that may appear conflicting if the use context of the injunction is overlooked, Mīmāṁsā and Vaiyākaraṇa accept that any of the two conflicting uses adopted as option (*vikalpa*).

Q.3. The name of the sacrifice cannot be mentioned independently of *śākha* texts and hence the sacrifice as mentioned in different *śākhās* has to be treated as different from one another.

R. Here in, I want to furnish an account of Bhartṛhari's discussion on the issue and I hope that this account will be of some importance in meeting with your queries. *Śabdabhedavāda*, in connection with the Vedas, is accepted. The same *mantras* with the difference of their application to duty or duties, are taken to be different (Vp2/263).

The difference in the *mantra* is also accepted in cases of a single *maṇtra* if it is employed for different duties. Let us discuss this further.

Bhartṛhari has given three theories interpreting the plurality of meaning of a word in a sentence. Those theories are equally applicable in the context of decision on variation of the injunctions in different *śākhās*:

(i) Śabdaekatvavāda

This theory accepts the unity or non-difference of the word in spite of its different uses for different meanings. The word is not changed even if it is used to convey numerous meanings. The unity of the word is original or primary and its separateness resulting from different uses is artificial or unreal. For example, the word 'cow', the expresser of cowness, does not differ from the word 'cow' when used for a cowherd (*Gaurabāhika*). The cowness by some similarity is imposed on cowherd and thus the word 'cow' secondarily denotes it.

(ii) Śabda Nānātvavāda

In this theory, the word is different if it is used for different meanings. Unlike the former view, any change of the word used for different meanings, in this view, is original, and the oneness or sameness is imaginary or unreal. As no verbal cognition or communication is possible without the identical cognition revealed by a word, *nānātvavādins* also give place to unity of word used for different meanings, but, for them, unity is merely imagined and, hence, unreal. For example, the word 'cow' used for cowness (meaning) is different from the word 'cow' used for 'cowherd'. As these words are same and alike, they are taken as the same by resemblance.

(iii) Vaiyākaraṇas view

Vaiyākāraṇas attach importance to both of the above views to explain the meaning of a word acquired by grammatical analysis of an expression. '*Vārttikāra Kātyāyana* has written the *Vārtika ekatvādakārasya siddham*' in favour of unity of a word if it is used for different meanings on one hand and the *Vārtika Anyabhābyam tu kāla Śabdavyasvāyāt*

in support of plurality of word on the other hand. In order to illustrate the significance of theories of *śabdaekatvavāda* and *śabda nānātvavāda*, respectively, in the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, Bhartṛhari has given an instance of *Sāmiddhenī hymns* which, in some *śākhās*, are thirteen (13) and in some other *śākhās* they are eleven (11) of which the first and last verses (*rchāyen*) are recited repeatedly three times, because of which, they are numbered seventeen or fifteen in total in respective *śākhās*. It may be asked, if the same hymn, in its repeated recitations, is taken to be different, can the repeated hymn be accepted as an original (Vedic) hymn? These hymns are called *Sāmidhenī*. Repeated hymns are considered original; they function independently of other *Sāmidhenīs* involved in *Sāmidhenī* sacrifices (V.2/260).

Clarifying the position of *nānātvavādins*, Bhartṛhari says that the meaning of a hymn is its recitation and in each recitation hymn is a different word, revealing a different meaning. For example, the hymns of the deity sun (*Savitā*) apparently appear to be one but originally they are different, i.e. one is employed for sanctification, another for praying to the deity 'Sun' and still another is employed for *Jāpa* (muttering in a contemplating manner). As the hymns are similar and alike, the unity among them is obvious, but the hymn is a different expresser (*Vācaka*) if used for a different expressed (*Vācya*). Because of the popular and unpopular uses of the hymn, its primary and secondary meanings are distinguished.

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2. REPLY TO THE QUERIES RAISED BY PROFESSOR DAYA KRISHNA

Traditionally, there was only one Veda, i.e. the body of eternal knowledge calculated to conduce to the welfare here and hereafter for the human beings, and it was revealed by Lord Brahmā and handed down since ages through a continuous series of teachers and students. Having noticed that the intellectual and spiritual faculties of the successive generations of the Vedic reciters, by about the end of Dvāpara Age,

after the end of the Mahābhārata war, were degenerating thousands years ago, Bhagavān Veda Vyāsa edited the Vedas and classified the hymns into four *Saṃhitās*, called the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda*, and handed them down each to his four disciples, wherefrom the traditions of the four Vedic *Saṃhitas* commenced.

Due to the location and residence of the line of disciples of these traditions of the Vedic reciters, each of the *Saṃhitās* branched off into different recensions, called the *Śākhās*. Thus, during the times of Patañjali, the great commentator of the Paninian grammar (about 350 BC), there were 11 *Śākhās* of the *Ṛgveda*, 100 *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, 1000 *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda*, and 9 *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda*. The *Śākhā* was generated due to the regional proclivities of the pronunciation of different reciters in different parts of our country.

Now, as per the traditional information, the five recently known *Śākhās* of the *Ṛgveda* were the *Śākala*, the *Bāṣkala*, the *Āśvalāyana*, the *Śāṅkhāyana*, and the *Māṇḍūkya*. The *Yajurveda* was handed down in two main recensions, viz., *Śukla* and *Kṛṣṇa*; the *Śākhās* of the former were the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandina* and the *Kāṇva*, while those of the latter were the *Kāṭhaka*, the *Maitrāyaṇī*, and the *Taittirīya*. The three *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda* were the *Kauthumā*, the *Jaiminīya*, and the *Rāṇāyaṇīya*. Further, the two *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda* were the *Śaunaka* and the *Paippalāda*.

However, at present, only the following *Śākhās* of the respective Vedas are extant: *Śākala* of the *Ṛgveda*, the *Mādhyandina* of the *Yajurveda*, the *Kauthumī* of the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Śaunaka* of the *Atharvaveda*. And, the answer to your query is that these *Śākhās* of the respective *Saṃhitās* are known currently by the names of their respective Vedas.

Thus, at present, there are only a very few Vedicists who recite the respective Veda orally, and even rarer are the ones who can perform the Vedic sacrifices!

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N.M. Kansara

Book Reviews

V. HANSON, R. STEWART AND S. NICHOLSON (EDS): *Karma: Rhythmic Return to Harmony*, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 2001, pp. 291, Rs 295

This book is an anthology containing 25 articles by eminent scholars on the concept of *Karma* which appeared at different times in the previous century. The Theosophical Publishing House has selectively compiled the scattered material in a book form.

The articles in the book have been divided into five parts. Part I has 6 articles on 'What is *Karma*?', Part II has 5 articles on '*Karma* in World Religions'. Part III has 4 articles on '*Karma*, Psychology and Astrology'. Part IV has 5 articles on 'Social Dimensions of *Karma*'. Finally, Part V includes 5 articles on certain other aspects of *Karma*.

There is no Index which, we feel, is essential in an anthology and on a subject like *Karma*.

MEANING OR DEFINITION OF THE TERM *KARMA*

There is complete diversity in the definition of the doctrine of *Karma*. The authors of different articles in this anthology have defined it differently.

Karma has been described as a metaphysical law of cause and effect which operates in the field of sentient creation. It is comparable to the scientific law of cause and effect in the world of matter.

According to Felix Layton (Article No. 1, '*Karma* in Motion', p. 4), *Karma* is a scientific law of cause and effect, like the Newtonian laws of mechanics—more precisely, the three laws of motion.

Most of the scholars compare the law of *Karma*—cause and effect—with Newton's third law of motion: action and reaction are equal and opposite (Article No. 14, Stephen Arroyo: '*Karma* and the Birth Chart': p. 139). Layton, however, goes a step further. He maintains that 'correspondence exists with the first two laws and often those who

quote the third law as an illustration of *Karma* misunderstand Newton's meaning'.

Comparison of *Karma* with the third law of motion—action and reaction are equal and opposite—is inappropriate as it overlooks the fact that the term 'action' in Newton's laws means 'force' and not an action or act. Again, the fruits of action, *karma phala*, cannot appropriately be described as reaction. Further, the reaction in Newton's laws is immediate; there is no time lag between action and reaction. But Karmic seeds take a long time to mature and bear fruit. (Lawrence Bendit, in Article No. 25, '*Karma* and Cosmos', p. 282.)

Again, properties and characteristics have been attributed to *Karma* which belong to the vocabulary of physical or material sciences and are used to describe qualities or features of matter and energy. Thus, Stephen Arroyo (ibid., p. 140) states that 'The concept of *Karma* is based upon the phenomenon of polarity',[1] by which the universe maintains a state of balance—a dynamic constantly changing equilibrium. Again, other material quality and characteristics ascribed to *Karma* are 'balance'—*Karma* 'keeps the universe in a state of balance', 'in equilibrium of forces'; in a 'state of stability and harmony'. According to Lawrence Bendit (Article No. 25 '*Karma* and Cosmos', p. 251), the *kārmic* data bank keeps on changing from time to time—there is 'perfect dynamic balance from instant to instant'. Thus, according to Freifield Lemkow, 'As fundamental function of *Kārmic* process is to maintain balance and harmony in world' (p. 194).

Dane Rudhyar, in his Article No. 21 'Transmutation of *Karma* into Dharma', attacks the comparison of the Law of *Karma* with Newton's laws of motion (p. 239).

'Balance', 'equilibrium', 'state of stability' are the results of opposing pulls or contrary forces of good (*puṇya*) and evil (*pāpa*). But in the *sañchita karmas*, unexhausted accumulated *karmas*, the seeds (*bījas*, *kārmic potentials*) of good and evil *karmas* lie in a dormant state and each of the *karma bījas* mature and fructify separately. Again, the causative potential created by a *karma* is either good (*puṇya*) or evil (*pāpa*) but not bipolar[2] (both good and evil).

It must also be noted that the law of *Karma* is a principle or 'law' of metaphysics, whereas in Netwon's laws of motion, the law of polarity,

the state of balance and equilibrium belong to the objective, material world.

Further, laws and concepts of material sciences are capable of experimental verification. But these sciences are unable to explain the phenomena of birth and death and existential suffering. Metaphysical concepts like *Karma* and rebirth/reincarnation, which have been developed by man to explain human suffering and inequality, cannot be assumed logically to possess empirical properties of matter, such as balance, equilibrium, polarity.

Again, the term 'balance' has also been used in the sense in which it is employed in social sciences' accountancy. *Karma* is described as 'moral accountancy' (Article No. 10: 'The Christening of *Karma*', p. 94) *kārmic* balance is the net of debit and credit in an account, debit representing evil *karma* and credit representing good *karma*, 'a credit and debit balance in the cosmic bank: debit listing is bad *karma* in store for us' (Article No. 16: '*Karma* Re-examined: Do We Ever Suffer Undeservedly?' by Diana Dunnigham Chapotin, p. 171). The concept of net balance of *karmas* has important implications in formulating the law of *Karma*. In accounting, the net balance means setting off debit and credit leading to debit (or minus) or credit (plus) balance. *Sañcita karmas* are kārmic accumulations. So the concept of 'a net balance' leads to the important question: Do good or evil *karma* mutually cancel each other? Can an individual escape the consequences of his evil acts by doing a considerable number of good acts like *dāna* or charity? According to the classical Indian doctrine of *karma*, each *karma* must mature and fructify separately; man cannot manipulate the accumulated *karmas* to avoid the consequences by his evil *Karma*.

The doctrine of Karma *of Indian Philosophy and* Karma *in the book under review*

The term *karma* is purely an Indian term, exclusive, nay unique to the dogmatics of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.[3] It is essentially linked to the concept of rebirth (*punarjanma*): in fact, *karma* and rebirth are like the two sides of a coin.

In the different articles of the book under review, *Karma* is discussed as formulated by non-Indian thinkers and philosophers except for four

articles: (i) No. 7 'A Buddhist View of *Karma*' by Joseph Goldstein; (ii) No. 8 '*Karma*, the Link Between Lives' by Ananda Coomarasway; (iii) No. 9 'The Meaning of *Karma* in Integral Philosophy' by Haridass Chaudhuri; and (iv) No. 23 '*Karma* and the Path of Purification' by Christopher Chapple. These articles discuss *Karma* or certain aspects of *karma* within its framework of the classical Indian doctrine.

A distinguishing feature of the classical Indian doctrine of *karma* is that it is distinguished from *kriyā*. Grammatically, all actions are *kriyās*; *karma* is also *kriyā*. But in Indian religions and philosophy, the term *karma* is applied exclusively to: (a) moral acts which conform to or violate the rules of ethics of the society; (b) *kriyā* would also include religious ritual acts like performing *yajñas* (sacrifices) and *pūjās* worship, *tīrthayātra* (pilgrimage), fasts, recitation of names of God (*jāpa*). The latter are prescribed as obligations in religious doctrines, as *dharma karma*. Truly speaking, such actions are also *kriyās* and not *karma*, action in the moral sense; they are amoral actions. However, they are an aid to physical and mental purification which, in turn, restrains individuals from indulging in immoral actions—*pāpa*, *duskṛta karma*. Perhaps for that reason, such *kriyās* have also been treated as *karmas*, even though they are amoral acts.

The articles in the book, except Chapple's '*Karma* and the Path of Purification' (No. 23), do not distinguish between *karma* and *kriyā*. Indiscriminate use of the term *karma* is, in our opinion, the cause of confusion. Originally, the book contained 'articles primarily based on the theosophical understanding of *karma*', which embraces both *karma* and *kriyās*. By adding articles on classical Indian doctrine of *karma*, thematic consistency has been compromised except in name and the fundamental distinction between *karma* and *kriyā* has been blurred. This has unavoidably affected the clarity of exposition of the doctrine of *karma*, either in theosophy or in Indian schools of philosophy. Again, the writers of the articles are divided on the philosophical question, whether *karma* is causality, like the principle of cause and effect in science, is linear, horizontal and sequential: *karma* is fluid and flexible, as outcomes are constantly shaped by the input of new factors'; 'it is not linear but multidimensional' (Nicholson, p. 12, Dane Rudhyar, p. 233), *kārmic* causality follows the time track and is also

synchronistic in the Taoist sense (Bendit, pp. 276–77, 283), etc. So far as the classical Indian doctrine of *karma* is concerned, it is sequential and horizontal (Chapple, p. 262).

We now proceed to analyze the different articles of the book except No. 6, 'God is not Mocked' by Aldous Huxley and No. 11, 'A Kabbalistic View of *Karma*' by Edward Hoffman. We did not find anything concerning the doctrine of *karma* in Huxley's article. As regard Hoffman's article, it declares itself to be a Judaic exposition of the *karma*, transmigration of the soul and rebirth to fulfil the Commandments.

The Article No. 2 '*Karma* as Organic Process' by Shirley Nicholson, No. 4 '*Karma* and Reincarnation' by Leslie Smith, No. 6 'The Source of Because' by Clarence Pedersen, and No. 16 '*Karma* Re-examined—Do We Ever Suffer Undeservedly?' by Diana Dunnigham Chapotin are expositions of the theosophical 'Law of *Karma*' rather than of the classical law of *karma* in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.

'Organic Process' in theosophy stands for the principle of universal causation—formation of atoms, galaxies, rocks, sentient beings (p. 10), 'keeping the stars on their courses and every atom in being' (p. 40), of the geological ages, birth and death of species (as distinct from individuals) and 'diversity in plant and animal life, birth and disappearance of great races, rise and fall of civilizations' (p. 13) are also considered as manifestations of *Karma* at the macrocosmic level.

In philosophies of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, the universe is self-existent, eternal, *anādi* and *ananta* (without beginning and end). The sentient creation is composed of human beings, animals, including microorganisms, and plants.

Different forms of life consciousness (*yonis*) are embodiments of *ātmā*, *puruṣa*, *pudgala*, *skandha*. The embodied beings are graded hierarchically into superior/inferior embodiments or *yonis*—human beings, animals, including insects, microorganisms and plants—on the basis of the quality of their *karmas*. Happiness or suffering which they experience in their embodied selves, are also the result of the quality of their previous *karmas*.

Thus, *karma* in Indian philosophy, is not universal causation but causation which brings about the 'birth' of embodied beings or sentient

creatures possessing the capacity to commit *karma* and who can experience happiness and suffering as retribution for their past *karmas*. It is not the force of universal causation, it is its subset. Retribution is experienced not by the same physical entity of being who did the *karma* (action) but by the new embodiment of the same soul (*puruṣa*, *ātmā*, *pudgala*).

Blavatsky, on the other hand, identifies *karma* with eternity (p. 10 '*Karma* is eternity itself'), 'the ultimate law of the Universe' (p. 39), 'Creation and birth of Cosmos', 'the Mutable Radiance of the Immutable Darkness, Unconsciousness in Eternity', 'evolution from an inactive state into one of intense activity' which brings about differentiation. This work is *karma* (p. 11). At the human level, '*Karma* adjusts moral relationship, resulting from the power of choice' (p. 40).

In respect of individual sentient beings, '*karma* is also retributive inasmuch as *karma* gives back to every man the actual consequences of his own action'. *Karma* ensures that 'punishment fits the crime' and 'rewards fit the merit'. *Karma*, in short, is 'an unfailing redresser of human injustice' (p. 40). In fact, A.P. Sinnet very aptly called *karma* as 'the law of ethical causation', thus restricting it to human beings (p. 40). '*Karma* is the force that impels to Reincarnation', 'Reincarnation is the method by which human *karma* works' (p. 41).

Man is a social being who lives in collectives—large communities. As such, members of large social groups are exposed to mass suffering caused by natural phenomena, epidemics, earthquakes, hurricanes, lightning, man-made disasters like train or plane accidents, industrial disasters like the Bhopal gas tragedy.

To explain the phenomena of mass suffering as against individual suffering, the theosophists have evolved the concept of collective *karma*, group *karma*, national *karma*, and even world *karma*.

Human communities are no longer isolated, self-sufficient settlements of small self-contained and self-sufficient economies. Exchange economy, coupled with rapid, nay, instant communication have made different national economies inter-dependent and sensitive to fluctuations in any one economy: human economies are no longer village centred, town centred or country centred. (Universe 'is a vast network of interconnections in all directions, at all levels', p. 16.) The theosophists

explain the phenomena of mass suffering on the basis of the concept of groups, national, or world *karma*. The *karma* of an individual or group strongly affects other groups of people across the globe: action (*karma*) is done by one individual or group but its consequences have to be experienced by many and even those who are not even remotely a party to the action, or even aware of it. Group *karmas* are in the nature of distributive *karma* inasmuch as the consequences of the *karma* of an individual or a group have to be borne by many individuals outside those groups. According to the theosophists, 'we each participate *kārmically* in the actions of our nation whether we like those actions or not'. As each individual is in some way *kārmically* linked with all others, we all share in the outcome of world events (p. 15). Again, *karma* 'works in an interconnected system in which everything affects everything else' (p. 12).

The theosophists' concept of group *karma* also helps to explain the phenomena of unmerited suffering—punishment of innocents and whether the law of *karma* is a law of personal responsibility.

Blavatsky considered human inter-dependence as an essential feature of society and, therefore, the law of *karma* is not necessarily an individual law ... 'men often suffer from the effects of the actions done by others ...' in fact 'when they are innocent of the causes that lead them into trouble' (p. 172), 'we cannot paddle our own *karmic canoe*.' Chapotin (pp. 175–76) illustrates it with two relevant examples: 'Being vegetarian will not save us from the ecological repercussions of the unspeakable exploitation of animals.' 'The deforestation of the planet affects us all, the most innocent and the most guilty alike.' In brief 'we can be affected by the acts of others, acts unrelated to our own circumstances'. This drives the theosophist to the startling conclusion '... choosing to serve the world in order to advance ourselves spiritually as individuals is a nonsense'.

The concept of group *karma*, *smaṣṭi karma*, is totally alien to Indian schools of philosophy—Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina. In the classical doctrine of *karma*, *karma* or action is individualistic, the consequence or *karma phala* is personal. There is no unmerited suffering. The theosophical law of *karma* renders *punarjanma*, transmigration of the soul as the mechanism for liquidation of *karmas*, irrelevant.

It is necessary here to mention in passing that a substantial body of eminent Buddhist scholars maintain that the Buddhist doctrine of *karma* in a doctrine of collective *karma*. The concept of collective *karma* in Buddhism is based on the interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of *anātmavāda* to mean the absence of a transmigrating soul. We have discussed the concept of collective *karma* in Buddhism elsewhere[4] and it can not be discussed in book review.

Article No. 3: 'Compensation' by Emerson

The article does not deal with the doctrine of *karma* as such. It is about retribution, called compensation. Retribution is an essential element of the doctrine of *karma*: as you sow, so shall you reap, *jevan karma, teman phala* (p. 78). Retribution as a compensatory reaction is a universal necessity (p. 24). It is dispensation in equity. Thus, every act rewards itself. In Christian theology, the Last Judgement is not executed in this world; compensation is made to both the parties in the next life (in heaven) (p. 19). 'Thou shall be paid exactly for what thou hast done, no more, no less' (p. 28).

Having said that, Emerson recognizes that many errant and delinquent individuals may escape retribution. 'We feel defrauded of the retribution due to evil acts, because the criminal adheres his vice and contumacy and does not come to a crisis or judgement anywhere in a visible nature. There is no stunning confutation of his non-sense before men and angels' (p. 34). Further, there may be long intervals of time between the commission of a misdeed and the compensation or retribution therefor (p. 37). Emerson, however, speculates that what is apparently an 'unpaid loss' may, over the years, provide compensation to the sufferer by a beneficial transformation of his life (p. 37) and elevating him as a good human being.

Article No. 7: The Meaning of Karma *in Integral Philosophy by Haridas Chaudhuri*

As the author himself has stated, the purpose of this article is to provide philosophical significance of the law of *karma* (p. 73). Corresponding to the law of cause and effect in science, it is also that same law in the field of religion (p. 78). The author makes a new point: *karma* is the ethical correlate, in the sphere of human relations, of the scientific law

of Entropy (p. 76). The key to dynamic creativity, intensive *kārmic* activity *Tapas-Sristi* (pp. 76 and 82) is rigorous self-discipline (*ātma siddhi*) and intense concentration (*dhyāna*). This is perhaps what Chaudhuri means when he says 'illuminated persons possessing cosmic vision evolve through prodigious centralization of consciousness' (p. 76). Herein lies, according to Chaudhuri, 'the secret of creativity of masterminds like the Buddha, Krishna, Christ, Moses, Muhammad, Zoroaster, Lao-Tze', etc.

The laws of science in general and the law of entropy in particular are experimentally verifiable. But the law of *karma*, both as cause and effect and as entropy, are beyond empirical verification. Again, fundamental features of the law of *Karma* are: (i) as a rule *karmas* done in this life fructify in subsequent life or lives; (ii) there is no knowing when they will fructify; and (iii) there is no knowing, how the *karmas* will fructify. This remains a mystery. *Karma* was also significantly called *adṛṣṭa*. Thus, the law of *karma* is, strictly speaking, not a law but a thesis.

*Article No. 12: '*Karma, *Jung and Transpersonal Psychology' by Howard Coward and Article No. 13, 'Psychic Scars' by Roger Woolger*

These articles bring out the impact of the Indian doctrine of *karma* on modern psychology, especially the Transpersonal Psychology of Karl Jung.

Corresponding to what is known in biology as 'genetic heredity', Jung developed the concept of 'psychic heredity' or 'ancestoral collective unconscious'. Jung gives to 'psychic heredity' the name *saṁskāras, vāsanās* of the Sāṁkhya Yoga school of Indian philosophy. It is, however, not clear whether Jung also equated the 'ancestral collective unconscious' or archetypal inheritance with the accepted meaning of *saṁskāra, vāsanā*—residues of unexhausted *karmas* of a being, *puruṣa-prakriti* complex. In fact, Jung was uncertain about rebirth or reincarnation of a transmigrating entity experiencing its own unripened *karmas* in the course of its transmigratory existence. Jung confessed that the problem of '*karma* and personal rebirth' had remained obscure

to him. However, he also did say 'when I die, my deeds will follow along with me ... I will bring with me what I have done' (p. 121).

In Article No. 13, 'Psychic Scars', Woolger speaks of *karmaskaya* (? *karmāśaya*), the term used by Sāṁkhya for *kārmic* residues of unexhausted *karmas*. These residues find fulfilment in rebirth or reincarnation and phenomenon of past life memories, the major complexes that structure our lives and determine our personal interactions (p. 137). There is a clearer acceptance of the concept of rebirth (*punarjanma*).

At page 135, the author refers to many examples of the *kleṣas* (afflictions or the *saṁskāras*) and at page 136 to the case of Bridey Murphy and Edgar Cayce's readings in connection with the idea of past lives and reincarnation. These references are unintelligibly brief.

Article No. 14: Karma *and the Birth Chart by Stephen Arroyo*

This article does not deal with *karma* as such but the relation of astrology to *karma*. The author cites Yogananda that 'A child is born on that day and at that hour when the celestial rays are in mathematical harmony with his individual *karma*'. Therefore, the horoscope or natal chart (*janma patrī*) reveals his past and its probable future results. The birth chart, according to Arroyo (p. 148), shows nothing but *karma*—everything stems from past actions and desires. He, therefore, calls astrology the 'science of *karma*'. He classifies *karmas* into three categories—*sincita* (?*sañcita*) (past accumulated *karmas*); *sañcīyamāna* or *kriyamāna karmas*—*karmas* which we are doing at present and which, therefore, get accumulated and become *sañcita*. There is a subcategory of *sañcita karma*, called *pralabd*(?) (*prālabdha*), accumulated *karmas* of past lives which have started maturing in this life. Arroyo explains that the birth chart or horoscope facilitates ascertainment of the good or evil that might 'visit' an individual in present-day life. He recognizes that the vast accumulation of *sañcita karmas* remains beyond the purview of the horoscope. Even in regard to the horoscope enabling determination of the 'fruits of action', the 'natal chart' exhibits the consequences of past *karmas* but not the *karmas* themselves—*karma phala* but not *karma* (action) Itself. More importantly, the thesis that birth takes place on a day and at an hour

'when the celestial rays are in mathematical harmony with his individual *karmas*', is highly ambiguous. What precisely is meant by 'mathematical harmony between the celestial bodies and terrestrial human beings and their birth' remains unexplained. However, Arroyo maintains that the birth chart shows nothing but *karma* (p. 148) and that astrology could legitimately be called the 'science of *karma*', i.e. 'a way of realizing and accepting one's responsibilities in a precise way'. Here again, it is inappropriate to define horoscope as the 'science of *karma*'. As already observed, a birth chart only shows the good and evil things that happen or are likely to happen to a particular individual. The birth chart does not identify the specific *karmas* which bring about good and evil in the life of the individual. It is, therefore, an absolutely arbitrary assumption that the good or evil that befall a human being are the result of his previous *karmas* done in an earlier embodiment. It would be more logical and rational to assume that the good and evil are the result of the influence of heavenly bodies rather than of a person's previous *karmas*.

Again, which, when and how the *sañcita karmas* fructify is a mystery. That is why the *karmas* are called *adṛṣṭa*, what cannot be seen or known. Horoscopic predictive astrology is directly in conflict with the essential character of *kārmic* accumulations, *adṛṣṭa*.

Here it will be relevant to mention that Lawrence J. Bendit in Article No. 25, *Karma* and Cosmos (p. 283) also says that astrology—a chart of the heavens at the time of birth—can give endless insights into the child's latent character. He emphasizes that astral influences such as that of Saturn, Uranus, etc., are being ascertained with the help of a birth chart rather as an index of a person's past *karmas*.

Article No. 15: 'The Ancient Shape of Fate' by Lez Greene

I found it difficult to comprehend what the author has to say about *karma*. From his somewhat long, meandering exposition, it appears that the author seeks to equate *karma* with fate and that they both embody the principle of cause and effect (p. 153). According to the author, it is not only difficult to distinguish 'fate from providence, it is equally difficult to distinguish it from *karma* ...' (p. 154). Fate, with 'the property of the unconscious psyche (hereditary predispositions,

conditioning, patterns, complexes and archetypes) (p. 154) is alternatively called 'providence, *karma* or the Unconscious' (p. 159) and he attributes catastrophes to fate (p. 162). He does not deal with the Indian doctrine of rebirth in different embodiments (*yonis*) and happiness and suffering as the essential components of the law of *karma*.

On p. 155, the author refers to 'case histories in this book' which illustrate that 'some very specific events in life are fated and unavoidable and can hardly be attributed to the individual's active choice (*karma*, I presume). No such case histories are available in the book under review. We have had to restrict ourselves in this review to the chapter reproduced from the author's book.

In Indian philosophies and religions, fate is known as *daiva* (divine power), and *niyati* (preordained, destiny) which were obviously in conflict with the doctrine of *karma*. Indian savants resolved this conflict by equating *daiva*, *niyati*, etc., with *karma*.

Article No. 17: 'Choosing: Karma *and Dharma in the 21st Century' by William Metzgar*

According to Metzgar, *karma* is not a personalistic doctrine. He rejects the view that the abused child is a 'victim' of his own *karma* (p. 182). He attempts to formulate 'a broader meaning of *karma* grounded in social responsibility'.

We must confess that Metzgar's article is beyond our comprehension. All actions in the ultimate analyses are personal for the simple reason that they are the acts of an individual or a group of individuals (a team of doctors performing an operation). In our opinion, the author fails to distinguish between *karma* as a moral and an ethical act, and *kriyā* (mental and physical actions in society, political and economic systems or a corporate body).

Article No. 19: 'Can we Avoid Karmic Debts?' by Alfred Taylor

Suffering caused by disease and premature death is explained as the result of an individual's previous *karma*s. However, advances in modern science, especially in the field of medicine and the relevant diagnostic techniques and creation of hygienic environment have eliminated epidemics, mass diseases, and provided protection against illness,

mitigated pain or made it bearable (pain killers) and speeded up recovery. The life span has been significantly increased. In that context. Taylor discusses the question whether science can counter or abate the unfavourable, painful consequences of a individual's past *karma*s.

Taylor's answer is unambiguous: there is no elimination of *kārmic* debts because of advances in science and improvement in environment. He explains that an extended life span has been accompanied by increase in the incidence of old age diseases: heart trouble, blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis, depression or mental ailments, age-related diseases like loss of vision, of hearing power, mastication. In brief, science does not invalidate the law of *karma*.

Article No. 20: 'The Side Blows of Karma*' by George E. Linton*

This article is yet another exposition of the theosophical doctrine of *karma*.

Karma is considered as a force both at the cosmic or macrocosmic and microcosmic levels. It disturbs the balance and reaction to *karma* restores the balance. Thus, *karma* is described as corrective action (reaction) which restores the balance whenever equilibrium is disturbed by *karma* as primary force. In *pralaya*, the universe is inactive, in a state of rest or balance, in evolution or manifestation (creation) of the universe, this balance is disturbed. Reaction to restore this balance is *karma* (pp. 217–18).

Linton enumerates several categories of *karma*: personal, group, national, racial, religious, *karma*s, past *karma*s, *karma*s being done concurrently (p. 220).

Explaining the maturation of accumulated *karma*s, Linton says that *Lipika*[5] (called Lord of *Karma*s by Penderson), a complex of intelligent forces, selectively apportions the periodic maturation of accumulated *karma*s. 'The special function of these forces (*Lipika*) seems to be that of maintaining the integral balance of the universe and, therefore, of all the separate elements within it. The methods by which this is accomplished are not easily comprehended, except possibly by these who would personalize these forces as agents of an anthropomorphic god' (pp. 220–21).

Before we conclude, we reproduce from the book the episode in the life of an important and senior theosophist A.P. Sinnet, to establish a

newspaper, as illustrative of how the law of *karma* has been understood or rather misunderstood by the theosophists.

The theosophist had failed in their endeavour to establish in India a newspaper under the management of A.P. Sinnet. 'The previous year, the owners of the Allahabad's *Pioneer* had terminated Sinnet's editorship of that paper and he and his friends had been endeavouring to raise sufficient funds from the Indians to start a new paper which would be sympathetic to the Indian viewpoint. The endeavour had failed due to lack of support by the Indian financiers.' The Mahatma Koot Hoomi had explained that 'it was a karmic side blow occasioned by the fact that in his earlier years in India, Sinnet had looked upon the Indians as an inferior race and had felt a profound contempt for them at that time. So at this later date, when he wanted to help the Indians and could have done much useful work for their betterment, his past *karma* denied him the opportunity' (p. 216). Simplistic, nay absurd!

All this is contrary to the classical Indian doctrine of *karma*, which is called *adṛṣṭa*. (i) *karma*s, as a rule, do not mature or fructify in the life in which they are done; they fructify in subsequent life or lives, (ii) when *karma*s fructify, and (iii) how they fructify remains unknown, a mystery.

Article No. 21: 'Transmutation of Karma *into* Dharma' *by Dane Rudhyar*

In understanding this article, we are, at the threshold, faced with the meanings of *dharma* and *karma*.

In the classical Indian doctrine of *karma*, past *karma*s also called *sañcita*, *pūrva* and *pūrva arjita karmas* are the unexhausted *karma*s of previous births. *Punarjanma* or rebirth is the mechanism through which the transmigrating soul of the doer (*kartā*) of these *karma*s experiences them. Embodiment of a soul in a particular *yoni* (form of existence like human, animal, etc.) and the happiness/suffering a soul experiences, depend upon the quality of his *karmas*, *puṇya/pāpa*.

Dharma is the guide, the path, which an individual being must follow if he has to avoid, in future, the accumulation of evil (*pāpa*) *karma*s which cause suffering, accumulate *puṇya karmas* which bring happiness and rebirth in superior *yonis*.

Rudhyar, however, traverses the traditional meanings of these terms. According to the writer, *karma* of the newborn is the sum total of past experiences and thoughts which have been conditioned by his ancestry, social history and his personal acts and thoughts in earlier reincarnations (previous births).

Secondly, the author maintains that there is a specific cosmic need which the new born individual has to fulfil. His actions 'to meet this cosmic need' of the new existential situation, constitutes his *dharma* (p. 231).

Performance of the new *dharma* may suffer as a result of the elements of 'irreversible momentum' and 'inertia' of the conditioned past *karma*s (p. 232). There is constant 'Warfare between the pull of ... what one is born to perform and the ghosts of a long series of past sins of commission as well omission' (p. 232). Thus, (past) *karma*s 'affect the performance of *dharma*', *karma* in the present incarnation is the creature of *karma* which has to perform the *dharma*?

Rudhyar also discusses the issue of apparent conflict between the law of *karma* as the principle of causalty and the doctrine of *avatāra*—incarnations of God. According to Rudhyar, causalty is founded on horizontal relationship between cause and effect. It is also individualistic, being rooted in the concept of a distinct transmigrating entity. It is also 'absolutely deterministic'. The *kārmic* chain can be broken only by the transcendent power operating at the vertical level. This, according to Rudhyar, is the *avatāra*, 'an agent of humanity and an answer to its acute need' (p. 236).

Avatāras or incarnations of god in human form in the Indian tradition were intended to immediately implement the law of *karma* and not to interfere with it. Krishna, in the *Bhagavadgītā* declares his aim as *dharma sansthāpanāya*, to rehabilitate the *dharma*, rule of law. Divine intervention becomes imperative because, if the law of *Karma* were to take its own course, *kārmic* retribution will be inflicted on the errant only in his subsequent lives. The *avatāra* ensures prompt retribution to the wrong doer; it was a special device for immediate enforcement of the law of retribution.

Rudhyar formulates a new concept of 'collective psychism' which he defines as 'A holarchic (holarchy)—the universe is a hierarchy of

systems': atoms, molecules, cells, living organisms, planets solar systems, galaxies, etc. (p. 234), relation of containment ... links a single person to his or her family, social class, nation and culture and to mankind as a whole. Such a hierarchical series operates at the level of 'collective psychism'. Rudhyar does not specifically define collective psychism. From what he says in different parts of the article, he posits that 'nothing is separate from anything else, and that every conceivable entity, micro- or macrocosmic, is related to every other entity at all levels', 'inter-relatedness and inter-penetration of all there is' the fourth dimension of Blavatsky (pp. 239–41). 'At that level, effects act upon causes ... future acts upon the past. *Karma* is the limitation imposed upon beings existing at the level of ever present humanity. But from a cosmic point of view, all "choices" are being made at all times. They are inter-related and inter-dependent.' 'What constitute the individuality of a human being is the fact that, for him or her, certain choices are constructive—thus future oriented—while others are inherently destructive or regressive' ... 'to refuse to move towards the future is to regress. Evil is essentially the refusal to move towards the future. It is to accept the repetitive inertia of past choices. It is to succumb to *karma*, instead of using what the past had produced as a floor against which to rebound and of investing this rebounding with a creative, future engendering meaning' (pp. 240–41). I must confess that all this is beyond my understanding.

Article No. 22: 'The Other Face of Karma' *by Virginia Hanson*

I find this article highly esoteric and obscure. It deals with the apparent conflict between the mechanical law of *karma* (cause and effect) which the author describes as a mechanical grinding process, and grace being 'unpredictable' favour displayed by God (p. 242). *Prima facie*, they are mutually foreign and antagonistic: *karma* is an immutable, inexorable but modifiable law of cause and effect (p. 243).

In the classical Indian doctrine of *karma*, only the *Dvaitavādins* postulated that *karma* could be modified by the Lord's grace.

Hanson distinguishes between cosmic *karma* and individual *karma*. The former is 'the invincible divine will to perfection eternally in action', 'making perfect' process 'in perfect rhythm and perfect harmony or balance' (p. 245). At the individual level, it is 'a mystical energy of

inconceivable power which derives from the Logoic Will, in fact, is one with it' (p. 245).

Hanson identifies archetypal destiny with the Self, the Ego who is also the true Actor. The Ego is not separate from the Self (in the theosophical sense); 'it is indeed that aspect of the Self through which action must take place'; 'interaction between the personality (actor) and its environment is what we ordinarily think of as *karma*'. The Ego is not defined as in Sāṁkhya. On the face of it, all this seems to be contrary to Sāṁkhya, wherein *Pūruṣa* is *nirguṇa*, inactive and *prakṛti*, possessing *guṇas*, is the active, creative but differentiating force.

Hanson goes on to observe, 'It is in the rhythmic balance at the level of the self, disturbances (pleasant or unpleasant) take place in the outer circumstances where the fragment, the personality is focussed' (p. 246), 'Cause and Effect' are necessary in the outworking of the archetypal destiny (p. 247). All this I find beyond my understanding.

Article No. 23: 'Karma *and the path of Purification' by Christopher Chapple*

This is an excellent article, both succinct and an illuminating exposition of the traditional Indian doctrine of *karma*. It is the only article which takes cognizance of the difference between *karma* as a moral, ethical act and *kriyā* (ritual action and amoral, physical actions in day-to-day existence) (p. 252) which may be creative immediately but are not causative of *punarjañma* or future births. It is *karma*s, moral acts, more precisely the *saṁskāra* or *vasanās*, the residues of unexhausted *karma*s, which cause a person to enter repeatedly into this world and keep the soul in the transmigratory process (pp. 255–56).

Chapple dismisses the common, mechanistic interpretation of *karma* doctrine as fostering the spirit of passive resignation. He explains that the doctrine of *karma* is the key to understanding the cause of suffering and thus also indicates the way to escape it. As Chapple observes, actions done unreflectively (*karma* which are not free from corruption and restraint), which are selfish and self-centred bind one to repeated worldly existence (afflicted with attachment, impurity and dissatisfaction). One has, therefore, to experience existential pleasure and pain inherent therein.

This analysis also provides the way of escape from existential suffering by purification of *karmas* through 'meticulously ethical behaviour'. The doctrine of *karma* thus becomes 'an incentive to strive for purification of *Karma*' (pp. 257–58).

We must, however, point out that *karma* is a force of causation—rebirths in various embodiments (*yonis*) is, therefore, inescapable so long as these are residues of unexhausted *karmas*. Accumulated (*sañcita*) *karmas* are exhausted only through experiencing them. This makes rebirth (*punarjanma*) essential and inescapable. Consequently, freedom from rebirth can be achieved by withdrawing from kārmic activity. Paradoxically, the imperative of rebirth for exhaustion of unexhausted *sañcita karmas* led to the growth of ascetic orders *sramaṇas*, as by renouncing lay life, one automatically curtailed compulsive *kārmic* activity therein. This promoted *akarmavāda*, avoidance of *karma*: *mā kṛta karma mā kṛta karmāṇī; śānti voḥ śreyasī.*

Chapple also points out that various life forms are a part of an interconnected web with the result that an individual being in its various incarnations might have been a mother, father, brother, sister or son, or more importantly, a kin to all the wild and domestic animals, birds, etc. Therefore, *karma* is both sequential as well as horizontal. It is sequential so far as a particular being, *pudgala*, *ātmā*, *jīva*, takes birth in different embodiments with reference to its own *karmas*. The *karma* is horizontal so far as it impacts on the life of others through the web of relationships: pp. 262–63. We, however, have our reservations: the horizontal impact of the *karmas* of the individual on his relations and friends does not mean that a person has to bear the consequences of the acts of another even though the former is totally innocent. This will cut at the root of the doctrine of *karma* as it would lead to undeserved suffering and compromise. The concept of horizontal *karmas* appears to be drawn from the Chinese. In China, the doctrine of *karma* is familial rather than individualistic as in India.

Finally, Chapple cites the *Bhagavadgita* and the *dharma sastras*, treating sanctified caste *karmas* as purified actions (p. 265); these stabilized the existence; self and society.

This, we submit, was a gross distortion of the *karma* doctrine by the champions of the caste system. Firstly, caste duties are *kriyās* but not moral *karmas*. Further, caste practices or *karmas* do not become ethically good/evil only because the society has sanctified them; they are discriminatory and contradict inter-relatedness.

Chapple also suggests that by positively and actively cultivating correct behaviour, the effects of past actions can be mitigated and eventually overcome (p. 264). This, we suggest, is contrary to the weight of the Indian doctrine; (i) each doer bears the consequences of his own *karma*; and (ii) each *karma* must bear fruit.

Article No. 24: 'Karma, *the Chakras and Esoteric Yoga' by Ray Grasse seeks to explain the doctrine of* karma *in the context of the esoteric doctrine of* chakras

Chakras are 'psycho-physical centres of awareness located along the spine'. There are eight principal *chakras*. In *kriyā yoga*, a *chakra* is considered to be a memory bank or '*kārmic* storage bin'. Each *chakra* is believed to store a distinctly different kind of *karma*. Whenever a person acts through mind or body or speech, a seed or charge of that act (*karma*) is planted in a *chakra*. The *chakras* store different kinds of energies, e.g. love (heart *chakra*), forcefulness, anger (*manipura* or third *chakra*), voice or communication (*Vissudha* or fifth *chakra*).

Kriyā yoga techniques are specifically designed to mitigate the effect of *karma*. These practices or techniques influence the energy fields of the spine and ultimately transcend the *kārmic* process, breaking free from the cycle of birth and death.

Kriyā yoga and the doctrine of *chakras* are totally different from the classical doctrine of *karma* except that the storage of *karmic* seeds in the *chakras* bears superficial similarity to the concept of *vāsanās* and *saṁskāras* of the classical doctrine. However, powerful *chakric saṁskāras* are also considered as '*Kārmic* blockages'. In the classical doctrine of *karma*, the *karmas* must mature and fructify and the doer must experience the consequences of his previous *karmas*. *Kriyā yoga*, it appears, was a philosophy and discipline intended to control, manipulate the causal potential and the fruits of *karmas*.

Article No. 25: 'Karma *and Cosmos' by Lawrence Bendit*

The article appears to be an exposition of the theosophical doctrine of *karma* rather than of the classical Indian doctrine. According to Bendit,

karma is generated as a result of the interaction of human personality with his environment (p. 281). *Lipikas* are recording angels who are believed to keep and update the record of *karma*s of each individual (p. 281). *Karma* is not a fixed quantity at any point of time like debits and credits of an account book. *Kārmic* balance is also elastic because of the complexity of factors involved (pp. 281–82). Since an individual is doing *karma* all the time, the *kārmic* balance is dynamic at each moment of time (p. 281). *Karma* as such is neither good or bad. Its goodness or badness depends on the reaction, pleasant or unpleasant, of the person doing the *karma* (p. 281). The self which does *karma* is developing and undergoes changes between the time when an act is done and when it fructifies (p. 282). Unlike the Newton's laws of motion, where reaction to an action is not only equal and opposite but also immediate, *kārmic* reaction is not immediate. Certain *kārmic* forces do not come into manifest operation until its slot in time arrives into which a person fits (p 282). In consequence, 'many' wicked flourish like the green bay tree and die in full enjoyment of results of their misdeeds' (p. 281).

Bendit also discusses the role of the individual, who is a 'realized soul' in manipulating his own *karma*. When an individual attains self realization (perhaps a *siddha*, who has attained mastery over his mind and body), the process of *karma* is reversed. Ordinarily, it is the individual who is at the mercy of *karma*—a passive victim of his own actions. However, after he has attained mastery over his self, he is able to alter the effects of his past acts. The active self remakes the past from its operational point in the immediate present. The author attributes the transformation of the individual to its identification with the Tao even though there is a powerful tradition of *siddhas* in Hinduism and Buddhism. The author traces this self development to Taoism (pp. 282–83).

Since the individual personality is perpetually undergoing change and development, strictly speaking, the individual who experiences the fruits of an action is not the same one who did it.

Since the corpus of *karma*s is a dynamic balancer and elastic and there are no separate debits (bad *karma*) and credits (good *karma*), the *kārmic* balance is unascertainable, the maturation and fruits of *karma* have no relationship with the original *karma*. An evil *karma* may not, therefore, produce unpleasant or bad results for the doer.

Again, if an individual is undergoing change all the time, the considerable time lag between the doing of a *karma* and maturation and fruits of that *karma*, the person who bears the consequences of *karma* will be totally different from the doer of the original *karma*. An evil *karma* may not, therefore, produce unpleasant or bad results for the doer.

Furthermore, the considerable time lag between the doing of a *pāpa karma* and maturing of that *karma*—and in the meanwhile, the person guilty of the misdeed visibly enjoying the fruits of his misdeed—seriously compromises the retributive character of *karma* doctrine.

In the Indian religious traditions, all the actions of an enlightened being, 'a *siddha*, after he has reached that stage and till his *mahaparinirvana* or decease', are sterile; they are not *karma*s which produce fruits or consequences so it is not necessary to discuss this matter except to say that Taoists did not believe in *karma* and rebirth.

Notes and References

1. Ralph Waldo Emerson; Article No. 3 'Compensation' p. 29 also uses the term polarity but in the Newtonian sense of action and reaction.
2. The term 'polarity' has more than one meaning: (i) a characteristic or property of a body which produces unequal physical effects at different points on that body. (ii) The positive and negative states in which a body reacts. See the *Random House Dictionary of English Language*. College ed. 1968.
3. In Jainism, *Karmas* are considered to be fine particles of matter (*aṇu*). This does not make the Jaina doctrine of *karma* significantly different from the Brahmanical and Buddhist doctrine of *karma*. In other articles, the concept and doctrine of *karma* is not identical with or is materially different from the classical Indian formulation.
4. Yuvraj Krishan, *The Doctrine of Karma: Its Origin and Development in Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain Traditions*, Delhi, 1997.
5. We are not aware of the concept of *Lipika* in Hinduism, Buddhism or Jainism. According to Monier *Williams*' '*Sanskrit English Dictionary*', *Lipika* means a scribe or a clerk. Perhaps Linton, and Penderson 'The Sources of Becauses' p. 54 are referring to Citragupta, the assistant of Yama, who keeps a record of good and evil deeds of all men.

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The central theme of the book under review is to exemplify the systematic disposition of Vedanta philosophy. The task of undertaking such an effort focussing on the various aspects of the commonly indigestible Vedantic system and a coherent attempt in unfolding the themes in a simplified way without deterring the basic concepts of the different streams in it deserves acknowledgement. The many expositions of various saints of modern times are very systematic disclosures on the different aspects of Vedanta. The ideas are truly enriched with the current trends in philosophical thinking around the world and deserve special attention.

A general reader can approach the book by first studying the Vedic and Upaniṣadic themes in chapters 2–7. The doctrines of Vedanta hidden in the *Bhagavatgītā* are analyzed in chapters 8–13. A general view of Indian systems of philosophy is given in the chapter 14. Chapters 15–25 deal with different streams of thought in Vedanta. Articles 26–28 deal with some of the significant factors in Vedanta that are beneficial to the modern man, who is in the quest of realizing the reality and peace of mind. Article 29 makes a comparative study of George Santayana, the modern Western philosopher and Vedanta. The Natha Tradition is also disclosed in article 30. Through the first article 'Introduction to Vedantism', the author introduces the sublime stream of thoughts in Vedanta. He has rightly dealt with the view on the *Prasthānatraya* in accordance with the traditional scholarly elaboration. The author amicably reviews the progressive aspects of Vedanta as well the deficiencies of thought in this great system of philosophy as exposited by various preceptors. The author's penetration into the various Vedantic realms, starting from the most ancient Vedic antiquity to the nineteenth-century philosophers invites appreciation from a general reader unfamiliar to this system and not from an ardent philosopher. From the philosophical point of view, these deliberations are only superficial. It is to be noted here that different interpretations on the nature and content of reality gave way to various streams of thought in Vedanta and even in the Advaita Vedanta itself. Sri Sankara, the

Advaita philosopher, is very clear in his exposition of reality. But, in fact, the later thinkers developed new ways of thinking, perhaps because of an ambiguous understanding of ideas elaborated by Sankara which is admitted by some new generation of thinkers in Advaita.

In the first page itself, Dr Panda refers to the reality as substance (Line No. 8). But in Vedantic terminology, substance is not the reality as the Western philosophers believe but it is the highest objectivity (the conditioned Brahman, by definition). Except Advaita Vedanta, all other Vedantic streams believe in this substance–reality relation and that is perhaps the reason why *Bhakti* (devotion) is given significance in these thoughts. The highest reality is 'the unconditioned Brahman'. In page 7, the author claims that 'different systems of Vedanta represent different stages in the development of philosophical thinking', which implies that the Advaita thinking of pure non-duality has been brought down to the dualistic principle as in later Vedantic systems. This is not the case. The Advaita is the ultimate. It is better to think so, as the later Vedantic dispositions are stages of development towards absoluteness for which 'devotion' is the instrument of 'knowledge' of the reality. The correct understanding of Sankara's thinking is necessary to understand the absoluteness of reality. One of the interpreters in this book, M.K. Venkatrama Iyer had noted this factor. Another factor is that 'Devotion' is to 'the conditioned Brahman' and not to 'the unconditioned', which is against the higher stage of development during later periods. Western philosophers like Sartre, Santayana and Kant address the problems on reality in the Advaitic way. The twofold nature of Brahman, esoteric and exoteric, as explained by the author is right and is in proximity to Sankara's view on reality.

In the second article, 'The spiritual heritage of India' by Swami Satswarupananda', the Swami clearly elaborates the views of Sankara on the paramount question: 'What is that by knowing which everything in this universe is known?' and the search for ultimate truth has been given utmost significance in Indian religious thinking. Here, the Swami highlights the significance of spiritual process which represents the gradation from the speculative thinking, as is done by the Vedic *ṛṣis*. From the conception of multiplicity of Gods, the sage ascends to that of *viśvedevas*, to the unitary existence of divinity (the so-called

'conditioned Brahman'—here stops the conception of other Vedantic systems) and finally to the oneness with the ultimate principle—the Unconditioned Brahman. The article extracts, in an elusive manner, the place of 'devotion' in different forms of literature and architecture. Sankara's definition of *Bhakti* as *Svasvarupānusandhānam bhaktirityabhidhīyate* (Viv. Ch.) implying 'the repeated concentration on oneself' is called *Bhakti* deserves special mention for praise.

Swami Vimalananda in his article 'On the Peace Invocations of the Vedas' expounds the basic facts inherent in the peace invocations in the Vedas. The nature of reality is revealed through the invocative verses which are relevant even for today's religious fervour. The mantra *Aum āpyāyantu mamāṅgāni* is the epitome of learning and discloses the necessity of an optimistic and theistic tendency of the mind that can guide the authority of man in all his realms of life. Emulating this guide can help one to imbibe such values in his life. Other invocations in this article shed light on some of the unfamiliar meanings underlying various peace invocations in the Vedas. The article also highlights the repeated invocation of the mantras so as not to slip away from the mind.

In the article 'The Vedic concept of the *Karma* Doctrine', Prakash Dubey recapitulates the Vedic concept of *karma* as a means for moral life and also as a means of spiritual fulfilment. His opinion about the utterance of mantras at sacrifices as a part of *karma* which produces the unseen effect (*adṛṣta*) is notable. This is also highlighted by S.N. Dasgupta. The concept of *Ṛta* (the inviolable order of things) is the first doctrine of *karma* expounded in Vedic literature, as rightly argued by Dubey. The author critically examining the view of Professor A.B. Keith interprets *karma* as *yajña* as is truly implied in the *Brāhmaṇas*. But P. Dubey's criticism of the viewpoint of Professor Deussen on the Upaniṣadic theory of *karma* as self-contradictory is not correct. The *Upaniṣads* disclose that the final resolve is had by the effacement of the effects of *karma*. Chand. Up. VIII.1.6 exclusively states the temporal nature of *karma*. One who dies without having known the true nature of the self will not attain salvation. This is in contradiction to later interpretation as 'those who do good *karma* ascend to the world of gods'. This is due to the influence of *Bhakti*. On the Upaniṣadic

doctrines, Deussen is right in saying the Upaniṣadic doctrines of *karma* are self-contradictory with respect to the later *Upaniṣads* which also contain the explication of *Bhakti*. Death and rebirth are in this world only. When the subtle body is destroyed, all the *karmas* become annulled and one attains liberation. The author is also mistaken in considering this aspect of the *Upaniṣads*. The Br. Up. (IV.IV.6) must be taken in the above view only. It is said, 'the man who desires *karma* gets the specific result. He goes to the other world and after exhaustion of *karmas*, returns back to this world.' This implies that the man enjoys the higher realms of life. Therefore, a true knowledge of *karma* can only guide one to complete freedom.

In the three articles 5–7, M.K. Venkatrama Iyer discerns the ideas hidden in the *Upaniṣads* such as Brahman and *māyā*. These three articles are general elucidations of the ideas in Advaita Vedanta. No new ideas are presented. These represent the traditional views. But by including these articles in the book, the editor has done justice to the name of the book. Without a thorough exposition of the Upaniṣadic views, *Studies in Vedanta* will be incomplete as *Upaniṣads* are the foundations on which Advaita Vedanta is established. For a student of Advaita philosophy, these articles are absorbing and may help in stimulating the understanding of the nature of reality, Brahman and the causative world phenomenon, *Māyā*. In the article 'The grandest discovery of the *Upaniṣads*', why the author had presented the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya ideals is difficult to digest. More facts concerning the Upaniṣadic doctrines could have been exposited by the author for a clear insight into its grandest discoveries. His attempt to bring out the authenticity of the concept of *māyā* advocated by Sankara in relation to the supreme reality needs certain related arguments that can work as a link between them. The relevance of *māyā* in the realm of *Parā* and *Apāra* aspects of knowledge certainly requires special mention in this context. Article 6 essentially needs more serious, arranged and centralized elucidation of the topic in order to ascertain the true ideals underlying the doctrines of the *Upaniṣads*.

The article on 'The methodology of the *Upaniṣads*' by Iyer presents a clear dimension of the methodology of the *Upaniṣads* to understand the nature of reality. The methodology of the *Upaniṣads* is to dissociate

the mind from ignorance or the world of duals like passion and aversion and develop into a pure form of static type. This will help man to turn inwards in a slow but steady manner with the denial of all external entities that serve as obstacles in his path of self-development. The author has made explicit the significance of *sādhanacatuṣtaya* in this regard. He also evaluates the impersonal mode of revelation sensed in the Upaniṣadic statements. The incapability of language and logic at higher stages of mental development to bring in desired results is exemplified with sufficient reasons and examples. Though the various methods leading to the highest reality are elaborated, the method of mental cognitions pertaining to one's experience lacks necessary description in the article. However, the article is absorbingly good and may possibly serve as a guide to deeper inquires.

Articles 8–13 discuss the quintessence of the *Gītā*. These elucidate the nature of reality in its manifestedness as Lord Krishna. His songs in the Kurukshetra are always reverberating in every Hindu believer. The *Bhagavadgītā* serves as the most efficient guide to all those who are inflicted with troubles in the external world. It elaborates the various schemes of self-development according to one's choice. The *Gītā* envisages the gradual development of man into higher realms of intelligence (knowledge) and existence. In the article 'An analytical approach to the *Bhagavadgītā*', V. Perumal discusses the various aspects in the life of the common man within the structural framework of the *Gītā*. The author also critically examines the ideas of social life in the *Gītā*. The usage of the verses *Buddhau śaraṇamanviccha*, *Buddhiyukto jahātīha ubhe sukrtaduṣkrte* and *Buddhināśāt praṇaśyatī* revealing the ideals of intellectual process, skill and equilibrium advocated in the *Gītā* deserve special appreciation. The moral aspect of the *Gītā* pointing to the renunciation of bad habits and cultivation of desirable behaviour requires certain clarifications by the author.

In the article 'Sri Krishna and the ideal of life', the author Dr Vidya Caitanya elucidates the nature of Sri Krishna in concordance with the Upaniṣadic philosophy. The whole pervaded mission in the *Gītā* aimed at moulding suitable mode of lifestyle is very appealingly discussed by the author. Sri Krishna, from the stature of an object of worship, is visualized into an invisible form of god and then into the supreme self,

the foundation and essence of the entire universe. The justification given in this article for the Cāturvarṇya system is not clear. Sri Krishna's advice to Arjuna in his sufferings is beautifully described in this article.

The article 'On the Advent of Sri Krishna', M.V. Sridatta Sarma brings out the devotional content and its necessity in cognition of the reality. But the inner meanings and true scheme behind the prevalent sort of worship of Krishna are not given sufficient attention with respect to this supreme nature. Refraining from the true knowledge regarding the advent and message of Krishna, people are keen to worship him through external idols. The ignorance behind this practice is contained in the *Gītā* itself and the real implication of Krishna and the *Gītā* need an unequivocal exegesis in a philosophical perspective to reveal the true purport of the meaning of the supreme reality.

The article 'Kurukshetra—The Land of the *Bhagavadgītā*' focusses on the religious, historical and cultural aspects of Kurukshetra. There is not much philosophical content in this article. It seems a disposition based solely on the tradition, history and outlook of an orthodox Hindu handed over in a strict reverence to the varied ideas and ideals scattered in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The significance of the great land of philosophical disposition is looked at only from a historical perspective and it seems that the dispositions have been relegated to some sort of general preaching itself. The presentations are collected mainly from the epics and discussions with some religious scholars only. No scholastic attempt is being made in revisiting the doctines of the *Gītā* which makes the acceptance of the article in this series difficult.

The article by Swami Gnaneswarananda 'The Goal of Human Life—According to Jñānayoga' is most interesting. He has seriously and speculatively enunciated the philosophical discipline of Vedanta. The question of identity is highlighted and its relevance is presented in a clear manner. The article is truly conducive to the realization of the supreme principle through the triad of *Karaṇas-śruti* representing *vāk*, *yukti*-representing the mind and *anubhava* or direct experience representing the whole body. The distinctive excellence of real knowledge over the sense-born worldly knowledge is very thought provoking for the reader of Advaita Vedanta. A harmonized outlook of

Vedanta from Sri Sankara to Swami Vivekananda is quite relevant to the topic and also to the field of philosophy.

The next article 'The *Gītā* and the Ganga' by R. Ramakrishnan is an epitome of the views expressed by Swami Vivekananda. The article might have been relevant to the field if both Ganga and *Gītā* were analyzed for their aphorism of wisdom and revelation of the supreme truth independently and then compared for their arresting import and inspiring power. The River Ganga is religiously more potent but not philosophically so. In today's condition, if Ganga is said to be Bharat in its liquid form, it is shameful for every Hindu to be a child of Bharat. Krishna's teachings then will become irrelevant, which they are not. Such unnecessary glorifications are to be avoided in articles related to Vedanta philosophy.

In the article 'The six systems of Hindu philosophy' by Harold Barry Phillips, the author's presentation of the philosophical implications of the six systems is very general. The change of words like 'perception' into 'intuition' makes misleading conceptualizations on the part of readers from the factual-philosophical standpoints in India. The words sāṃkhya and yoga are misinterpreted. Sāṃkhya means number in a very general sense. It actually means 'real knowledge'; therefore, sāṃkhya is the philosophical system based on and aimed at 'real knowledge'. Yoga in its philosophical sense means 'disconnecting' from the joining of sorrows in oneself. The description of *cakras* like *Mūlādhara*, *Anāhata*, *Ājña*, *Viśuddha*, etc., is part of the Tantra system and not of the *Yogasutra* of *Patañjali*, the basic text of yoga. The words used to depict the ideas of Advaita Vedanta are totally misleading and do not bear the true and essential meaning of the philosophy. A proper conclusion is missing in the article.

Swami Satprakashananda approaches the problem of reality in a fascinating way. In the article titled 'The Sum and Substance of Advaita Vedanta', he clearly enunciates some solutions to the problems of misunderstanding on Advaita Vedanta in all its philosophical perspectives. The meaning of unreality (*mithyātva*) is exposited in a simple manner for those interested in philosophy. The contradictions that seemingly prevail between perception and *śruti* are also solved with its true purport. The mode of duality superimposed on Brahman

as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* finds expression in its most desirable and realistic way. The most crucial problem of identity of the individual soul with the supreme is disclosed in a simple and attractive manner.

The article 'A New Angle on the Problem of Unreality in Advaita' by A.G. Krishnawarrier is, similarly, an apt perspective on the problem of unreality in Advaita. The author clearly brings forth the meaning and implication as disclosed by Sankara about the unreality of the world in terms of *avidyā*. The misguiding interpretations on it are brought to limelight. The author has done an indepth analysis of the problems of *māyā* and *avidyā* with his scholarly approach in an apt and reasonable way, providing clear clarifications. The real meaning and intention behind *avidyānivrtii* and *prapañca-pravilaya* are elucidated in the right perspective of Advaita. The author also clearly explicates the relevance and possibility of the doctrine of unreality in the philosophical standpoint of Advaita. There is also an elaboration on the progressive phases of life in an inquirer pursuing Advaita Vedanta. Sankara's visualization finds a clear exposition in the article.

The two succeeding articles deal exclusively with the conception of soul or the inner essence of man in a spiritual context. By presenting the questions involving the true inquiry into the real spirit of philosophy, Roma Choudhuri in her article 'Advaita Vedanta Conception of the Soul', analyzes the Vedantic doctrines (*mahāvākyas*) in a simplified and dignified way so as to inspire the feeling of inquisition about reality in common man. The characteristics of an individual soul are clearly elaborated to point out their impermanent relation with it. The impossibility of duality and the reality of 'one' are pointed out as the conclusive totality. The article makes sense in that the humanistic standpoint of Advaita Vedanta is described in its true purport. But the author, meanwhile, has not clarified the facts about will or desire regarding creation in the ever-perfect, eternal Brahman and thence the conception of *māyā*.

P.K. Sundaram, in his article 'The Conception of the Soul in Sankara's *Sutrabhāṣya*', gives a general glimpse into the various representations of Brahman in varied contexts of scriptural texts as presented and explained by Sankara in his *Sūtrabhāṣya*. The original quotations from *Śankarabhāṣya* are absent throughout, which makes it difficult for the

reader to identify the particular portion the author likes to highlight. The direct translation of certain sentences from *Śānkarabhāṣya* and presenting them in a more generalized and familiar way speaks of the author's inability to penetrate deep into the real implications of the statements of *Śānkarabhāṣya*. It is essential to discuss and present the different representations of the soul in the *Śānkarabhāṣya*, pointing out the inner essence of the 'oneness' of the soul. This only will justify the theme of the title.

In the article 'Madhusudana Saraswati' by Anima Sen Gupta, the author brings to light the reasonings and justifications in the doctrines of Advaita Vedanta. Since only a few English translations on the works of Madhusudhana Saraswati are available, the author's work is appreciable to a great extent. The author has attentively revisited the explanations given by Madhusudana Saraswati in different aspects of Advaita Vedanta. The Swamiji has clarified the doubts raised by Udayanācārya, which requires special attention in philosophical circles. The self-contradictory approach of Udayana in the description of *vaiśiṣtya* as *atadvyāvṛtti* is beautifully presented here. The distinctions in the perspectives of Nyāyā and Advaita Vedanta regarding the Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka perception is highlighted in an indispensable manner. The *bhedagrahaṇa* (grasping of difference) can come only after the knowledge of the object. The condition of *Daṇḍī puruṣah* can ease the cognition of *adandabheda*. Thus, Madhusudana Saraswati attempts to highlight the fact that *vaiśiṣtya* is not *atadvyāvṛtti*, which occurs only after knowledge of the object. Tattvacintamaṇi also supports his view. The author has attempted a relevant subject itself that requires much attention and a revisiting of the subject from an analytical perspective.

R.K. Panda in his disposition of 'The Philosophy of Ramanuja—Some Salient Features' deals with the essential principles of the philosophy of Ramanuja, the internal distinctions in the soul. He gives due importance to *Bhakti*, *Jñāna* and *karma* as conceived by *Viśiṣtādvaita*. The plurality of souls is explicated with their unique numerical character. The five stages of *mokṣa* and the true nature and characteristics of the individual soul in accordance with the theory of Ramanuja are clarified in their correct perspective.

In the work of Vireswarananda 'Sri Bhasya', the author discusses the transmigration of the soul, especially the way the soul leaves the body at death, quoting from Br. Su. 3.1.1 and *pañcāgnividyā* advised to Naciketa in *Kathopaniṣad*. The *Visiṣtādvaita* standpoint clears the doubt about the departure of the soul at death with subtle parts (enveloped with water). The article makes sense for the followers of *Visiṣtādvaita* only. The element water is highlighted and no other element as water in its gross form consists of the other two elements, according to tripartite creation in *sūtra* 3.1.5. The word *Śraddha* is disclosed as not a mental attitude, but water itself. *Tattirīya Samhita* is quoted as an evidence for the above. The author has also referred to the mode of departures of the soul (*Sūtra* 3.1.6 and 3.1.7). From the *Viśiṣtādvaitic* view, the approach to the problem of transmigration of the soul is satisfactory though not elegant.

B.H. Kapadia, in his article 'Satadusani' of Vedanta Desika, is not eager to bring out the philosophical impact of that great Acarya. He is interested in glorifying his own works only. Vedanta Desika is a renowned philosopher of *Viśiṣtādvaita*. The peculiar charcteristics of Śatadūṣaṇī require a deeper introspection. The author has merely given a superficial briefing of the Śatadūṣanī. But if and only if the sum and substance of the philosophic disposition of Vedanta Desika is known, readers can understand and glorify his philosophy. The better title of this article will be 'History and Literature' of Vedanta of Vendantadesika.

The editor now passes into the system of dualistic Vedanta of Madhwacharya, who is an uncompromising critic of Advaita Vedanta of Sankara, as pointed out by the editor. The article by Kowlagi Seshacharya on Srimad-Viṣṇu-Tattva-vinirṇaya of Madhwācārya edited by S.S. Raghavacar elucidates the important principles of Dvaitavāda. At the outset itself, it is stated that the scriptures have no human authorship, as recognized by Madhwa. Then there is no justification in his stand that the validity of the scripture depends upon their compatibility with experience. If they were of human authorship, they will surely convey the facts as commonly experienced. In Madhwa's view, what exists in the universe clearly depicts duality and, therefore, the world of human experience is *bheda* or dualism. In this sense, *pramāṇas* being *apauruṣeya*, are to be dualistic as they belong to the

realm of human experience which they are not in the true purport. In addition to this, everything in the universe is traced to the unity in the form of Viṣṇu, the all-pervading individual soul which is the supreme. Though this point is an objection against the basic principle of Dvaita system itself, it should be remembered that any disposition on Dvaita should clearly enunciate the basic propositions. The supreme soul as Viṣṇu represents the Advaita view and hence the true purport of *dvaita* has to be made clear. The scriptures clearly enunciate the non-difference of all individual souls and the universe itself with the supreme soul. The article is devoted in negating the viewpoints of Advaita only in the style of *vitaṇda* as accustomed by the *dvaitins*.

The problem of relation with regard to Brahman, *Jīva* and *Jagat* is abridged by Roma Chaudhuri in the article '*Brahman–Jīva–Jagat* Relation—A Unique Theory'. The author discusses the problem of relation in its multidimensional nature and then enters into its solution as proposed by Bhaskaracarya. Bhaskara accepts the *abheda* (non-difference) of *Jīva* and *Jagat* with Brahman prior to and after creation. When these are created and sustaining, they are different from Brahman. The difference is created due to *upādhis*. Though this standpoint resembles the Advaita perspective of oneness of *Brahmabhāva* of the whole universe and the beings in it, the difference lies in the fact that the *aupadhikabheda* is considered as *satya* by Bhaskara. However, this view can be easily discarded on the basis of the fact that 'what is *Āgantuka* (*Aupādhika*) will be subject to nullification'. This view is accepted as a popular doctrine by most of the philosophical systems as the foundational one. Similarly, *anityatā* and *satyatā* cannot go hand in hand. But Advaita carefully deals with this problem of non-difference as real and all limiting adjuncts as unreal. In Bhaskara, the nature of Brahman involves *swagatabheda* in the form of *Jīva* and *Jagat*. This fact is very clearly explicated for the true knowledge of difference between the Advaitic perspective and Bhaskara's view. The latter part of the article highlights the lack of possibility and plausibility in recognizing the non-difference at first and then the difference in the same reality. The author rightly discusses the absence of reasoning in considering *āgantuka* as *nitya*, the unchangeability of Brahman and eternality of *Mokṣa*. The author is also right in pointing out that the

Bhedābhedavāda of Bhaskara is not pertaining to the depths in comparison to the Advaita of Sankara.

The next assignment undertaken by the editor is to highlight the importance of another school of Vedantic thought, the Śuddhādvaita exposited by Vallabhacarya. The author of 'The School of Vallabha', G.H. Bhatt, reveals the historical background of the formation of Śuddhādvaita thought. The article discloses that the *Upaniṣads* clearly illustrate Advaita which is *śuddha* (pure), unalloyed with *māyā*. It is otherwise known as *puṣtimārga* due to its strong emphasis on divine grace as the most powerful means of attaining the highest bliss. Vallabha considers the *Upaniṣads*, *Brahmasutra*, *Bhagavadgītā* and *Bhāgavata* as the *pramāṇas* of Śuddhādvaita. Even though Bhāgavata is known as *samādhibhāṣa*, recording the experience of Vyasa in meditation it is counted as the foremost. The literature with Vallabha's authorship is aptly described.

Many of the philosophical propositions in the philosophy of Vallabha such as Parabrahman as *Sat-Cit-Ānanda* and *Rasa*, his attribute of *kartrtva* as well as *bhoktrtva* are clearly mentioned in the article. The creation of the universe, according to Vallabha, is *avikrtapariṇāma* which is nothing other than the *vivartavada* of Advaita Vedanta. Like Ramanuja, the *Aikaśāstrya* (oneness of the contents of Veda) is stressed by Vallabha. Next to the Parabrahman, there is the immutable Brahman (*Akṣara*). He is the abode of the Parabrahman and possesses *sat*, *cit* and limited *ānanda*, appearing in various forms like *Prakrti* and *Puruṣa*. The process of creation is elaborated here in a correct perspective acceptable to the followers of that school. The universe is depicted as the *amśa* of Brahman and is, therefore, real and non-different from Him, representing the *ādhibhautika* form of Brahman. Knowledge and devotion destroy the *samsāra* (caused by egoism). But the article does not clearly reflect on the means of knowledge. However, it is interesting as it is penetrative and shows a dignified attempt on the part of the author.

Swami Tapasyananda in his article 'The Concept of the Absolute in Vedanta' strives to bring out the idea of the changeless substratum of the whole universe. The obvious forms of knowledge in human experience imply a higher being, beyond and unaffected by all empirical

phenomena. The inter-relation of *Satyam-Jñānam-Ānandam* in indicating the ultimate cause is explicated in an earnest manner though superficially. The causal relation imposed upon the absolute requires some sincere and indepth elaboration. The author truly remarks that the saguṇa Brahman represents the highest conception of God of all religions. The author analyzes the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* view on the Absolute that clarifies the difference of views of Sankara and Ramanuja on this issue. The article requires some illumination regarding the twofold realism of Advaita.

The article on 'Vedanta and Democratic Spirit' by Swami Swahananda quite interestingly posits Vedanta within the cultural realm, exhibiting its own identity. The author attempts to stimulate the sense of political democracy through the Vedanta philosophy, which is rightly the epitome of the Indian cultural identity. The necessity of freedom of discussion, patience towards hearing others' views and finding solution to the problems comprise the essential Vedantic spirit that is well-articulated by the author. The alternative to democracy is pointed out in the form of totalitarianism that brings forth the atomization of man. Vedanta advises to identify oneself exclusively with the all-pervaded consciousness, Brahman and thereby to develop one's own personality. This article is significant as it exposits one's reflecting capacity to stress and recognizes the positive aspects of the true concept behind *varnāshramadharma*. The author's contention that higher and higher standards of morale caused the origin of caste is untenable as people belonging to any caste, if they remain as members of a society, should keep a single standard of morale within the local, lingual and cultural limits. Among the various castes, customs and tastes, the unity of man can be found with the help of Vedanta only. The implication of the ideals of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* are well explored by the author in the context of a democratic society.

In the article 'The Dynamic Power of Vedanta', Swami Gnaneswarananda seriously introspects and asserts the nature of Vedanta in terms of the greatness of human birth. A great deal of observation regarding the inherent power in beings is presented in this article. The Upaniṣadic story of Indra and Virocana is appropriately exhibited as a good evidence for the greatness of power in one. The true purport of

Vedanta consisting of the depth of knowledge is briefed in the article. The main content of this disposition is the explication of the unchallenging stature of power, the all-pervaded eternal force of consciousness depicted by the word Brahman in the *Upaniṣads*.

A theoretical understanding of the discipline of Vedanta is visible in the disposition of philosophy by Santayana. A.V. Subramania Aiyer in the article 'George Santayana and Vedanta' exposits the Vedantic doctrines in Santayana's works. He also recognizes the dualism between the mind and body reasonably. The definition and conditions of materialism and the limitations thereupon as posited by Santayana are conveyed well in the article by the author. Santayana firmly believes that 'spirit is not an instrument, but a realization', and the 'final glory of the spirit is its union with the supreme, the pure being'. This is in clear concordance with the theory of Advaita Vedanta. Santayana's reflections on the principle of being as well on religion visibly imply the post-modernistic acceptance of Advaita Vedanta view on reality by a renowned philosopher. Further, the author has highlighted Santayana's acceptance of renunciation of the empirical world for realization of the absolute with a real spirit of Indian philosophical disposition which ensures the message of Advaita beneficial for common man as well. The author has presented the Vedantic doctrines in their original purport. But the author's earnestness in bringing out a comparison between Santayana's philosophy and the erudite propositions of Vedanta truly lacks sufficient assertions in conformity with the title. It will be more beneficial to philosophers if and only if, all the aspects of Vedanta are reviewed and revisited through a deeper introspection.

The editor of the book under review has rightly attempted to focus on a lost legend (though several sects are proliferated over the land) the *Nath* tradition, the basis of which is the concept of Śivaśakti. Śakti is the dyanmic aspect of the indefinable Śiva. Śakti is expressed in multifarious forms. The author has reasonably outlined the principle of the Natha tradition while attempting to correlate it with Advaita. The self-revelation of Śakti leading to Śivapada and the process of universal creation are well evaluated. The Yogic method (with various limbs), practices of *mantrajāpa* and *nādānusandhāna* being the essences of this tradition are clearly focussed in the article. The author of this

article 'The Natha Tradition', M.P. Pandit has made a valuable contribution to this book. The volution of the universe is traced to the *nijaśakti* with *ichāmātra*. The peculiar kind of evolution elaborated reminds one of the ultimacy of the Advaitic being, Parabrahman, the pure being. This persistent theme is unique in Indian tradition that requires further philosophical deliberations.

Finally, the editor R.K. Panda, through the article 'Approach to God' wishes to exemplify the conceptualization of God and develop a tendency in man of submission and servitude towards God. The author attempts to discuss the various approaches to God. There is a revelation of the fact that the worship of God is not feasible. This is asserted by the Vedantic doctrine of renunciation. Worship to God is solely for the ignorant people. It is necessary to recognize oneself as *Atman* which is God Himself. The *Upaniṣads* had strongly admitted such a view. The idea of 'free will' is deliberated but not sufficiently so. A perfect man always has a 'will' that is free. In evaluating the various streams of thought in Vedanta, Panda makes it amply clear that Advaita leads man to the empire of the self where worship, worshippers or the worshipped will never remain in the material form. Hence, worship of God is never admissible. The ascent from the formful to the formless is the final goal of every man and through reflections on the subtlest principle, the *sat*, man can realize the goal of eternal self-sufficiency in itself. This is the true purport of Advaita Vedanta.

Despite a relentless effort in compiling the work, the editor, an author/editor of many books, articles, etc., has forgotten to review the work on his own. The book contains numerous spelling mistakes, repetition of sentences and absence of certain interlinking sentences. Mistakes in Sanskrit words will make for different interpretations.

The book is indeed a valuable contribution to the Indian philosophical literature in general. It contains some unique and simple streams of thought in Vedanta that will surely be admissible to all. Finally, it has preferably brought to eminence the Advaita Vedanta, the philosophy of the ages and for the ages. Salutations to the *Parabrahman*.

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Arvind Sharma: *Advaita Vedānta: An Introduction*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2004, pp. 125, Rs 295

Arvind Sharma is a very fruitful writer. The latest of his numerous books, which I have read and found interesting as well as useful was *Modern Hindu Thought: The Essential Texts* (Oxford University Press, 2000), compiling selections from the writings of thinkers such as Devendranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi and Jiddu Krishnamurti, with a short introduction referring to the life and thoughts of each of them. *Advaita Vedānta: An Introduction* is his fourth book on the Advaita tradition, following *The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedānta* (1993), *The Philosophy of Religion and Advaita Vedānta* (1995) and *The Rope and the Snake: A Metaphorical Exploration of Advaita Vedānta* (1997).

'The readers have the right to ask', Sharma justly writes in his preface, 'why another book on Advaita Vedānta?' He justifies his decision to write the book, claiming that for the first time, the Advaita tradition is being presented three dimensionally: scriptually, rationally and experientially. For him, it is nothing less than a 'pedagogical variation in the way Advaita Vedānta is thematically presented' and a 'refreshing presentation' of the tradition under discussion. In fact, Sharma summarizes the modern scholarship's treatment of the Advaita tradition. First, the religio-theological aspect of Advaita has been emphasized, and research has focussed on the scriptures and the central role given to them by this very tradition. For Max Müller and others, it has brought Advaita closer to Christianity, and thus it has become 'the most developed school of Hinduism'. Later on, emphasis has shifted to the philosophical (or, in Sharma's words, the rational) aspect of Advaita Vedānta. Many scholars have been determined to prove that Indian philosophy is as serious as its Western sister. They have done their best to make a distinction between philosophy *per se* (including Advaita philosophy) and religion, between philosophy and the *mokṣa* ideal. Among them were B.K. Matilal[1] and Daya Krishna[2]. Finally, came those who have dared to emphasize that which has previously been considered as opposing to the authoritativeness of scriptures in Advaita Vedānta and as not philosophical (and academic) enough, i.e. the

existential (or in Sharma's words, the experiential) aspect of Advaita. This last dimension, well known and practiced by Advaitins from the very beginning, can be found in the works of T.M.P. Mahadevan, Ramana Maharshi's disciple, and is further emphasized by Eliot Deutsch and Arvind Sharma himself in his *The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedānta*.

Thorough as he always is, Sharma quotes at length from the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (the *Tat Tvam Asi* chapter), from Ramana Maharshi, Jiddu Krishnamurti and scholars such as M. Hiriyanna and K. Satcidananda Murty. The essential texts are here, but something is lacking. Perhaps it is the feeling that Sharma's book does not bring along any truly refreshing approach. If an introduction should consist of a general background, basic texts and the author's insight (a three-dimensional Advaita), then he has done his work faithfully. But if one expects it (as I do) to be thought provoking and encourage the readers to dive further and deeper into the Advaita waters, then I am not sure that Sharma is fully successful. Like so many other books, his is far too schematic (take for example the paragraph titled 'Religion and Philosophy in India and the West') or the list of 'orthodox' and 'non-orthodox' schools in Indian philosophy. Are we doomed to find the same old list (representing the same old approach) in each and every book introducing Indian philosophy?

And a final remark: the fact that Sharma treats Jiddu Krishnamurti as an Advaitic thinker is more than problematic. He defends his decision to do so, arguing that one of the chief tenets of Advaita Vedānta is the claim that realization is achieved not through *karma* but rather *jñāna*.[3] We are supposed to conclude that since Krishnamurti too does not see self-awareness as a result of any action, nor does he prescribe any 'Karma yoga' for his listeners, one might consider him an Advaitin. Well, as we all know (including Arvind Sharma himself), Krishnamurti's firm stand against authority of any kind contradicts another chief Advaitic tenet, i.e. the authority ascribed to the scriptures. Furthermore, maintaining that 'Truth is a pathless land', he believed that it could never be approached by any path, religion or sect. This would definitely include Advaita Vedānta. I believe that Krishnamurti would have

preferred (or rather insisted on) not being defined as an Advaitin, or actually not being defined at all.

Notes and References

1. Matilal, B.K. *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.
2. Daya Krishna, 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy', in: *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991 (first published in *Diogenes*, July–September, 1966).
3. Sharma, Arvind, *Advaita Vedānta: An Introduction*, p. 104.

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S.J. John Chathanatt: *Gandhi and Gutiérrez: Two Paradigms of Liberative Transformation*, Decent Books, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 284, Rs. 450

Comparisons are tricky business. The question is always: why compare between two things or more (personalities, objects, phenomena, ideas, etc.)? Is it to illuminate the one through the other/s? Is it to illuminate or to understand better each of the compared particles? Writing about Gandhi is also tricky. So much has already been written of the myth and the man, of his work and of the two cornerstones of his teaching (*ahiṁsā* and *satya*), that it is indeed a challenge to try to say something novel of him.

Still, John Chathanatt offers us a comparison between *apna* (Gandhiji and Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Christian activist 'in the oppressed and exploited land of Latin America'. What is the purpose of such a comparison? 'In the light of the insights drawn from the comparison of our two paradigms figures from diverse cultural milieus', explains Chathanatt in page 239, 'one could draw from both Gutiérrez and Gandhi various elements to propose a more adequate paradigm for India. A process of systematic and structural change simultaneous with a process of individual conversion (conversion to Truth) ...'

The above quotation tells a lot of the book under discussion. Its author is Christian, Gutiérrez is Christian, and Gandhi too is depicted a Christian, if not by birth or conversion then by behaviour, attitude and works. To be a Christian, in this context, is to be devoted to God and work for the oppressed and the poor. Gandhi was indeed devoted to God, but for him, 'God' is merely another name for truth, rather than 'truth' being one of God's names, as Chathannatt believes. The latter rightly denotes that 'at one stage of his "experiments" with truth, Gandhi came to realize that the formulation "Truth is God" is preferable to "God is Truth"'[1], and he willingly 'corrects' Gandhi's deviation from the 'Christian agenda', by using (from now onwards) the 'right formulation', i.e. 'God is Truth',[2]. Chathanatt further emphasizes Gandhi's embrace of the *carkhā* (the spinning wheel) as a symbol and means by which the Indian mass poverty could be elevated, which for him is another indication of Gandhi's 'true Christian nature'.

Gandhi was not a Christian, even though he has been definitely influenced by Christianity. In this respect, it would be interesting to understand his relationship with Tolstoy, by which he was deeply influenced or at least inspired. Gandhi can be characterized (using the terminology of Paul Hacker and later on, Willelm Halbfass) as a 'Neo-Hindu'; the meaning of the term would be that Gandhi (among others) draws from different sources and traditions, all of which are considered—to use Ramakrishna Paramahamsa's image—as *ghāt*s leading to the same lake. Christianity has not necessarily been Gandhi's 'main *ghāt*'. In this respect, it would be interesting to figure out in which areas and to what extent Gandhi was influenced by the Jaina tradition and especially by Raichandbhai, his mentor.

The implicit depiction of Gandhi as a Christian and the comparison to Gutiérrez might contribute, if not to discovery of new dimensions of Gandhi himself, at least to a better understanding of contemporary Christianity. Whereas in Europe and North America, the shopping mall has replaced the church as a place of 'worship' and assembly, Christianity can still play an important social role in the poverty struck regions of the so-called Third World. Gutiérrez and Mother Teresa are good examples for such a role. In India, not only is poverty a fertile soil for the growth of the otherwise declining Christianity, but also the

spiritual background. Gandhi was indeed a spiritual person, but at the same time an ambitious politician, an aspect less emphasized in Chathanatt's book. 'It is clear', he writes, 'that Gandhi's religious faith led him to politics. His theological convictions gave the motif-force for his theo-political theory of action'.[3] It is Chathanatt's theological convictions, I would like to suggest, which led him to such a 'clear' conclusion. What strikes me the most about Gandhi is the richness, complexity and even ambivalence in his persona: a renunciate which acts and moulds the world in which he lives; a married man who takes the *brahmacārya* vow; a leader of a resistance movement, insisting on non-violent means; a politician and *tapasvin* at the same time. This intriguing complexity is not to be found in the book under discussion.

An interesting theme in Chathanatt's book is the link between the terms *swarāj* and *mokṣa* in Gandhi's thought. The fact that Gandhi prefers the first term on the latter, argues Chathanatt rightly, shows that for him freedom consists of socio-political as well as economic aspects. It further reveals the interlacement between inner freedom (*swa-rāj*, self-rule or restraint of one's own senses) and outer freedom (in the realms of society, polity and economy) in his teaching. Another interesting theme is the comparison between Gandhi's notion of *ahimsātmaka satyāgraha* and Gutiérrez's 'Drinking from our own wells'. Obviously, neither of them was interested in mere theory. For both of them, philosophy (or in Gutiérrez's case, theology) is *śuṣka-tarka* unless it is converted into life, into being, into a skill to act. Further interesting is the comparison between Gutiérrez's notion of 'the Kingdom of God' and Gandhi's *Rāmarājya*. Whereas the first notion refers to what Gutiérrez sees as the goal of liberation ('that His love, His fatherhood, and a community of brothers and sisters is going to reign among all human beings'[4]); the second notion, Gandhi's *Rāmarājya*, is far more ambiguous and intriguing. Writes Chathanatt, 'The Gandhian utopia of a democratic polity is suggested by the symbol of *Rāmarājya*, the reign of Rāma, the kingdom of Rāma ... As a popular leader of the Indian masses, Gandhi knew that the presentation of his utopian vision in a religious-emotional symbol would bring home to the masses the ideal to be reached. Gandhi was rather vague in his description of such a reign of Rāma. His vision was only roughly sketched and not worked

out in detail'.[5] Unfortunately, Chathanatt does not offer a direct quote from Gandhi regarding the *Rāmarājya*, and the reader is left with nothing but the author's own interpretation of it, i.e. *Rāmarājya* as Gandhi's 'Kingdom of God'. Is it a central term in Gandhi's thought? Do we finally meet Gandhi the politician, who uses a 'religious-emotional symbol' to win the support of 'the masses'? Has it really been his hidden religious dream? It is further unclear why Chathanatt depicts the democratic polity as utopia—has it been seen as such prior to the 1947 independence?

Finally, a word about Chathanatt's model of 'liberative transformation'; in using this term, Chathanatt refers to a structural change, consisting of an economic and socio-political action together with an 'individual conversion process', which would lead to a better social order. His recipe for such a 'liberative transformation' includes both 'the moral wisdom of Gandhi' and 'the theological insights of Gutiérrez'. Wherever one looks, he sees endless poverty, oppression, violence and corruption, and Chathanatt rightly claims that an inner as well as outer change is desperately needed. As far as I am concerned, any action in this direction is welcomed, whether inspired by Gandhi and Gutiérrez, by other good people along the path or by one's own insight and best of understanding.

Notes and References

1. Chathanatt, John, S.J., *Gandhi and Gutiérrez; Two Paradigms of Liberative Transformation*, p. 73.
2. See, for example, pages 99 and 222.
3. Chathanatt, John, S.J., op. cit., p. 102.
4. Gutiérrez, Gustavo, *The Power of the Poor*, p. 14; in: Chathannatt, John, S.J., op. cit., p. 213.
5. Chathanatt, John, S.J., op. cit., p. 207.

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Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ	ā
ई	ī
ऊ	ū
ए,ऐ	ē } (long)
ओ	ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ	ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं)	ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ्	ṅ
ञ्	ñ
ण्	ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः)	ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च	ca and not cha
छ	cha and not chha

Linguals

ट	ṭa
ठ	ṭha
ड	ḍa
ढ	ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श	śa
ष	ṣa
स	sa

Unclassified

ळ	ḷa
क्ष	kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ	jña and not dj̃ña
ॡ	ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not *dj̃ñāna*, *Ḳṛṣṇa* and not *Ḳrishṇa*, *sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ	l̤
ഴ	l̤.
ൻ	ṉ
ർ	r̤

Examples

Ilaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Chola),

Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:

e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai

Seüṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence

coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Saṅskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*

veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.

(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for

laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:

Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḻevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:

Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.