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JOURNAL OF INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

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Western Analytic Metaphysics Reduces to a Philosophy of Brahman (Second Part)*

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6.5 *The Impossibility of Noncomplex Relations in the Relationalist Account*

The above arguments against relations between p_1 and p_2 are dependent upon the concept of spatial *location*: in addition to the item being considered, such as a non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation, there must *also* be a location in space that the relations are located at. What if the location did not, in fact, exist? The relationalist account does not involve space—it does not exist. Rather, what exists on the relationalist account are merely interrelated objects. When we look at a lion, a proton, or a flock of birds, all we experience are the objects. To add on the idea that, in addition to the objects, there is space that the objects are located in, may be considered uneconomical and speculative. For these reasons, some relationalist accounts do not make use of the concept of *location in space*, and thus relationalist accounts of the universe appear not to be susceptible to the problems just discussed. I just discussed apparently serious problems to do with non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations if the relations are *located* in space. On a relationalist account, no object, strictly speaking, is located since there are no points in space—there are only the objects, *period*.

I will next argue that the relationalist account does not avoid problems vis-à-vis the relations discussed to this point, and the relationalist account also apparently involves serious problems. On the relationalist account, consider that p_1 and p_2, two protons, for example, are interconnected by the relation *quantum entanglement*, where p_1, p_3, and the relation,

quantum entanglement, are each not considered to be located in space. On this account, the following statements would be true:

S1: *Quantum entanglement* coincides with p_1,
S2: *Quantum entanglement* coincides with p_3.

If the relation, *quantum entanglement*, is a noncomplex relation, the entire relation is describable by any statement about it, such as statements S1 and S2. Upon coincidence with p_3, however, the relation, *quantum entanglement*, would be describable, as by the following statement:

S3: *Quantum entanglement* does not coincide with p_1.

The relation is describable by this statement since at photon p_3, the relation does not coincide with p_1 and thus cannot be said to coincide with p_1. By coinciding with any item that is not p_1, S3 would be true with respect to that coincidence which the relation involves. For example, if the relation, *quantum entanglement*, coincides with both p_2 and p_3, and if the relation was an extended relation between p_1 and p_3 where p_2 was between p_1 and p_3, then at photons p_2 and p_3, the following statement would be true:

S4: *Quantum entanglement* does not coincide with p_1.

S4 is true because we can discuss the coincidence that p_1 has with the relation, and this coinciding is not a coincidence that the relation has with any other item other than p_1: at p_1, the relation, quantum entanglement, does not coincide with p_2 or p_3. It cannot be a coincidence with any other item other than p_1 since p_1, p_2 and p_3 all do not coincide in space. Thus, we can consider the coincidences that the relation has with each p_1, p_2, and p_3 as distinct, regardless of whether or not these photons are co-exemplifiers of the relation, *quantum entanglement*.

Each of S1–S4 are statements that can only be descriptions of the *entire* noncomplex relation, since the relation in question is a non-platonistic *noncomplex* relation. The conjunction of statements is also a description of the relation. The conjunction of statements S1 and S4 gives rise to a statement that describes the relation but which is a contradiction:

S5: *Quantum entanglement* coincides with p_1 and does not coincide with p_1.

If a relation on the relationalist account is a non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation that does and does not coincide with p_1 then it is impossible and the relation does not exist. S5 is a description of any noncomplex non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation of the relationalist account (unless it is a self-reflexive relation) regardless of whether or not the relation is spatially extended or unextended.

In the sections below, I will continue discussing the impossibility of relations between p_1 and p_2, where I will discuss the complex relations between p_1 and p_2. My arguments apply to both relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of complex relations between p_1 and p_2.

6.6 The Impossibility of a Complex Relation as an Extended Continuum of Noncomplex Relations

Since noncomplex relations make up complex relations, it may appear that non-platonistic *complex* relations between or among p_1 and p_2, are *also* impossible, given the above reasoning. But there may be varieties of spatially located complex relations between p_1 and p_2 not susceptible to the problems discussed up to this point in the paper. Above, I have discussed apparently serious problems with *noncomplex* non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations between or among p_1 and p_2, where those non-platonistic and non-pure realist noncomplex relations were considered as either spatially extended or spatially unextended. In the case of spatially *extended* noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations, the apparent problems were drawn from the combination of the *partlessness* and spatial *extendedness* (extended larger than one basic building block of space) of the noncomplex spatially located temporal relation. In the case of spatially *unextended* noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations, the apparent problems I discussed drew from the inability of the noncomplex spatial relation in connecting p_1 and p_2 if non-platonistic or non-pure realist noncomplex relations are in no way spatially *extended between* relata. Perhaps a *complex* non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation of a very specific sort avoids these problems.

The following two sorts of spatially located, spatially extended, *complex* relations between or among p_1 and p_2 may avoid the problems of noncomplex non-platonistic and non-pure realist relations discussed above.

1. A relation composed of an extended *continuum* of point-sized, noncomplex, non-platonistic subrelations between p_1 and p_2. [Any one of these non-platonistic point-sized subrelations are *spatial* since they are *in space* (they are *non-platonistic*), but they are *point-sized* since the location in space that any one of them occupies is spatially unextended].
2. A relation composed of *discrete* spatial subrelations in tandem between p_1 and p_2, where the subrelations have a basic (irreducible) spatial size (a basic spatial size, such as the size of a Planck atom of space).

Points 1 and 2 describe a relation between p_1 and p_2 that is a series, or a chain of spatially located subrelations in tandem, linked one after the other, by analogy as chain-links are linked to give rise to a chain. (Loux and others use 'link' to denote the *tying* of a relation to other relations.[63]) This is not the sort of relation that I have seen discussed often in the literature, other than for a few specific cases.[64] In this section, I will consider *continuous* non-platonistic complex relations (point 1 above), and also complex relations that are composed of *discrete* noncomplex Planck-scale-sized subrelations (point 2 above). If some of the current leading theories of quantum gravity are correct (such as some of the string theories, which might be described by non-commutative geometries), there are no point-sized entities involved in the makeup of space or time, since at the Planck scale, the smallest entity is a Planck atom of space or a Planck length (1.6×10^{-35} m) or a Planck unit of time (10^{-43} s). I will only consider the noncomplex subrelations to be Planck size or smaller, since if the noncomplex subrelations were larger than that, they would occupy more than one location of space, and the problems of previous sections would ensue. Physicists and philosophers take each position seriously: the position that (1) space can involve point-sized items, such as point-sized atoms of space or matter, or perhaps point-sized subrelations; and the position that (2) space can only involves discrete space atoms with a tiny

magnitude, for which reason the atomic building blocks of space or matter are discrete spaces, and any subrelations of a relation between p_1 and p_2 must be discrete subrelations of an irreducible non-zero spatial size (1.6×10^{-35} m). Since both positions are taken seriously, I will consider each of them: the position that the noncomplex subrelations that composed the complex relation between p_1 and p_2 are *point-size* (I do this in subsections 6.7 and 6.8), and the position that there are noncomplex subrelations that must be the size of a Planck atom of space or a Planck length (I do this in subsection 6.9). I find that in either case, such continuous or discrete non-platonistic or non-pure realist noncomplex subrelations cannot compose a complex non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between p_1 and p_2.

6.7 The Impossibility of a Complex Relation as a Continuum of Point-Sized Noncomplex Subrelations, Part 1

I will next discuss the reasons as to why a non-platonistic or non-pure realist complex relation (allegedly) connecting p_1 and p_2 that is composed of $\aleph_1$-many spatially unextended noncomplex subrelations apparently cannot constitute a relation between p_1 and p_2.

It might seem that $\aleph_1$-many noncomplex subrelations constituting a spatially located complex relation between p_1 and p_2 would be a complex relation that consists of point-sized subrelations that *directly link to one another*, in order to give rise to a spatially extended relation between p_1 and p_2. But if this were the case, the spatially located complex relation would be denoted by a statement that describes an infinite regress of point-sized subrelations: 'p_1 is related to a subrelation that is related to another subrelation that is related to another subrelation ...' This may, however, imply that p_1 and p_2 are *not* related, since there is no last step in this regress of point-sized subrelations between p_1 and p_2 and, thus, p_1 and p_2 would be *unrelated*. This infinite regress attempts to complete a task by an infinite sequence of steps, where the 'completion' 'at infinity'—some might claim—in fact, never occurs, since an infinite set of items has no *last* item. Chisholm considers this sort of regress vicious; Moreland has lucidly written about Chisholm's position:

There are at least three forms of infinite regress arguments ... [One form] involves claiming that a thesis generates a 'vicious' infinite regress. How should 'vicious' be characterized here? ... Roderick Chisholm says that 'One is confronted with a vicious infinite regress when one attempts a task of the following sort: Every step needed to begin the task requires a preliminary step' [Chisholm, 1996, p. 53]. For example, if *the only way to tie together any two things whatever is to connect them with a rope, then one would have to use two ropes to tie the two things to the initial connecting ropes, and use additional ropes to tie them to these subsequent ropes*, and so on. According to Chisholm, this is a vicious infinite regress because the task cannot be accomplished.[65] (Emphasis added.)

Phillips also uncomplicatedly discusses the problem involved in this sort of regress:

The regress is set up by treating the relation [spatially located, unextended relation] as a term, as the same sort of thing, logically, as its relata [i.e. relata are also relations]. Without an argument that a relation is a different sort of critter, it seems that if a third thing is required to relate two things, then the third thing equally requires a fourth and fifth to tie it up with the first two, *ad infinitum*. The regress is vicious: unlike an infinite series of causes that does not undermine the notion that a preset x has y as its cause, the relation regress does undermine the work proposed for the relator. *The relator, the third thing, cannot relate the two items without help from the fourth and fifth things* (ad infinitum) *needed to tie it up with the first two*.[66] (Emphasis added.)

6.8 The Impossibility of a Complex Relation as a Continuum of Point-Sized Noncomplex Subrelations, Part 2

Some philosophers consider infinities to involve paradoxes, and for that reason, they make a point to avoid infinities when describing collections. But others may object to such a position and to the reasoning given in the last section, and may hold that infinite collections *can* exist in nature. Examples of such collections might be, for example, the collection of spatial locations, the collection of time-instants before

this present moment,[67] or, perhaps, the collection of noncomplex, spatially unextended subrelations constituting a spatially extended complex relation between or among p_1 and p_2.

An extended continuum of point-sized subrelations resembles an extended continuum of topological spatial points. Such a complex non-platonistic relation consists of $\aleph_1$-many spatially unextended, spatially located, spatially non-collocated subrelations, that give rise to an extended continuum (the complex relation between p_1 and p_2). For these reasons, hereafter I will consider a complex relation that is composed of $\aleph_1$-many durationless, spatially non-collocated subrelations to be a complex relation that is a continuum of point-sized subrelations. Points in a continuum do not directly contact one another, since any point in a continuum is not immediately next to any other points. This reasoning would apply to an extended continuum of spatially located point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations extending between p_1 and p_2: none of the $\aleph_1$-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations are immediately next to one another. For this reason, a complex relation composed *only* of point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations cannot give rise to a complex connection between p_1 and p_2.

Continuums of *points* are, however, typically considered to be composed of *interrelated* points.[68] Perhaps, as with the point-set topological account of space, the complex relation between p_1 and p_2 could consist of $\aleph_1$-many *interrelated* items (spatially non-collocated subrelations). If so, perhaps the reasoning of the previous paragraph, where $\aleph_1$-many spatially non-collocated subrelations were considered to be *the only* constituents of a continuum is misguided.[69] Instead of discussing the point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations as *directly* attached to one another (which is impossible), the point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations should be considered to as interconnected by a relation, topological *connectedness*, which is perhaps analogous to point-set topological accounts of *connectedness* of spatial points in the spatial manifold.

If a continuum is extended and interconnected, since the point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations of the continuum cannot account for the interconnectivity of the continuum, there are *two* constituents of the complex relation between p_1 and p_2: (1) the $\aleph_1$-many point-sized

spatially non-collocated subrelations, and (2) the topological relation, *interconnectedness*, between or among the $\aleph_1$-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations. I will next argue that a non-platonistic or non-pure realist *interconnectedness* relation between or among a continuum of point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations that compose the non-platonistic or non-pure realist complex relation between p_1 and p_2 cannot connect the $\aleph_1$-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations.

Since none of the non-platonistic or non-pure realist point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations are immediately next to one another, the *interconnectedness* relation between or among the point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations is a relation between or among *non-identical subrelations* (the subrelations are at a spatial distance from one another). If *connectedness* is a relation between or among the spatially *non-collocated* subrelations, and if the *connectedness* relation is *not also* a complex non-platonistic or non-pure realist spatially extended relation composed of a $\aleph_1$-many point-sized subrelations, in order to interconnect the point-sized subrelations, the *connectedness* relation would be a non-platonistic or non-pure realist *noncomplex* relation between the *non-collocated subrelations which is for that reason located at more than one spatial location*. But this is exactly the sort of relation found to be apparently contradictory in the sections above on noncomplex, non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations.

For these reasons, the relation, *connectedness*, connecting the $\aleph_1$-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations must *also be a complex relation consisting of continuum—many durationless spatially non-collocated subrelations that are not directly linked to one another*. If the *connectedness* between or among the point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations was also composed of *point-sized subrelations*, the relation, *connectedness*, would itself provide no continuous connection between the non-collocated point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations that compose the complex relation between or among p_1 and p_2. Only if the point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations that compose *connectedness* were *also* interconnected by a complex relation, *connectedness$_2$* (where *connectedness$_2$* is also

composed of continuum-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations), would *connectedness* provide a continuous connection of the point-sized subrelations between or among the complex relation connecting p_1 and p_2. *Connectedness$_2$* would require *connectedness$_3$*, and an infinite regress would ensure, where each instantiation of the *connectedness* relation would require another instantiation of *connectedness*.

Some may consider the mere fact that an infinite regress ensues enough to discard this sort of relation. I, however, want to point out another problem. At any stage of the regress, each instantiation of the *connectedness* relation is composed of $\aleph_1$-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations that do not directly link to one another, and which require another instantiation of the *connectedness* relation. The problem, however, is that *any stage of the regress only consists of unconnected $\aleph_1$-many point-sized spatially non-collocated subrelations*. At any stage, the unconnected subrelations require another distinct relation at the next stage of the regress to hold it together, but where the relation at the next stage is *also* composed of $\aleph_1$-many *unconnected* point-sized sub-relations. *Every* stage of the regress is only composed of unconnected $\aleph_1$-many spatially unextended (point-sized) elements (subrelations), and for that reason, nowhere in the regress is there any contact or connection between any subrelations, and there is no interrelating at all between p_1 and p_2. In other words, since we never arrive at a stage in the regress where there are anything but $\aleph_1$-many spatially unextended subrelations *that are not linked to one another*, the *connectedness* relation among the $\aleph_1$-many subrelations that compose the complex relation connecting p_1 and p_2 is apparently impossible. I do not know of any other way to consider a continuous relation between p_1 and p_2 and for that reason, I will move to the other case: a complex relation between p_1 and p_2 composed of *discrete* subrelations in tandem.

### 6.9 The Impossibility of a Complex Relation Composed to Planck-Sized Subrelations

In this subsection, I shall consider the complex non-platonistic or non-pure realist relation between p_1 and p_2 to be a series of *discrete* subrelations that are the size of the Planck-sized discrete basic building

blocks of space. I will further argue that there are no complex, non-platonistic relations between p_1 and p_2, if the complex relation is composed of a tandem of *discrete* noncomplex subrelations. To see why this is the case, I only need to consider the minimum case, where two directly adjacent Planck spaces—call them p_1 and p_2—are interconnected, which I will do next.

According to quantum gravity theories,[70] since there is no space smaller than a Planck space, there is no space between any two Planck spaces that are directly adjacent. The smallest subrelation that can be considered to connect two adjacent Planck spaces would not be smaller than a Planck space and thus would be a subrelation that is itself an irreducible (noncomplex) non-platonistic relation between the two directly adjacent Planck spaces, p_1 and p_2. This one Planck-sized subrelation would coincide with both of p_1 and p_2.

It cannot be the case that one irreducible (noncomplex) subrelation coincides with more than one Planck space, since in connecting p_1 and p_2, the subrelation is: (i) noncomplex, and (ii) must coincide with p_1 and p_2 in order to connect them. If the relation is located at or partially located at *both* p_1 and p_2—which it appears it must be if it is to connect to them in the way just described—then this relation is a noncomplex relation connecting two non-identical Planck spaces, which is exactly

Interconnection of p_1 and p_2

Planck-scale-sized subrelation connecting Planck spaces p_1 and p_2.

the sort of relation I found to be contradictory in the previous sections of this chapter (see figure above).

The only way this problem could be avoided is if the Planck-sized subrelations coincided exactly with Planck-sized basic building blocks of space, linking up to one another while the subrelations each exactly occupy only one discrete basic building block of space (one Planck atom of space or matter). But on this account, it is unclear as to how these discrete subrelations could link to one another. They cannot link, in this case, by partial collocation, since they coincide exactly with non-identical Planck times. Without coinciding, the Planck-sized subrelations are entirely non-collocated, and for that reason it is unclear how the Planck-sized subrelations can be relata of one another by *linking* (to use Loux's word) in any way to one another. If we imagine that the subrelations link by *abutting* to one another without overlapping, there must be an item distinct from the subrelations that is responsible for holding (or 'gluing') the subrelations together if the subrelations perfectly coincide with Planck spaces p_1 and p_2 and abut without overlapping. However, this item responsible for holding the subrelations together would be smaller than a Planck space, and in fact would be sizeless if the subrelations abut—and for that reason this gluey item would be susceptible to the problems to do with durationless subrelations given about in this subsection. For example, if the gluey item is point-sized, it is unclear how it could contact, or attach to, the two Planck-sized subrelations that coincide exactly with Planck spaces p_1 and p_2, since point-sized items cannot contact any other entities unless the entities that contact the point-sized gluey item *collocate* with the gluey item. But if the subrelations collocated—either while being exactly collocated with Planck atoms or not—the subrelations, in partially collocating (spatially overlapping) with the gluey item, would also partially collocate which each other, which we just discussed they cannot do, since that would mean they would be noncomplex relations at more than one spatial location.

If we go against quantum gravity theorists and imagine that the discrete subrelations of the complex relation between p_1 and p_2 are somehow larger than a point, but *smaller* than the basic discrete spaces of the Planck scale, the same problems as those just described involving

Planck-scale-sized subrelations would ensue. In other words, regardless of the size of the discrete basic building blocks of space or the subrelations connecting the discrete basic building blocks of space, *discrete* basic building blocks of space interconnected by *discrete* subrelations would involve the problems to do with Planck-sized subrelations and Planck spaces just discussed.

If my reasoning in this section is correct, there apparently cannot be any temporal relations between t_1 and t_2 if the relations are non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations.

6.10 The Impossibility of Non-platonistic Monadic Relatedness

Some philosophers may argue that according to an account of non-platonistic or non-pure realist *monadic relatedness*, non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic properties located at p_1 *or* p_2—rather than at both p_1 *and* p_2—account for a *relatedness* of objects in nature, and for that reason, a non-platonistic or non-pure realist may be assumed to avoid the problems discussed so far in this section to do with relations between times. I will next argue that an account of non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic relatedness apparently involves serious problems.

An example of a non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic property might be, *at a spatial distance from p_2*, possessed by, for example, p_1. If the monadic property is instantiated by a space or matter atom, such as time p_1, then according to an account of non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic relatedness, the non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic property, *at a spatial distance from p_2*, does not coincide in space with p_2, but does coincide in space with p_1 (and at any other spatial location or physical object that is at a distance from p_2). The problem that I will discuss to do with non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic relatedness has to do with the issue that a monadic property, such as the property, *at a spatial distance from p_2*, does not coincide in space with p_2, but is involved with *both* p_1 *and* p_2: the non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic property has involvement with p_1 because it is *instantiated by* p_1 and, therefore, coincides in space with p_1. And the monadic property has involvement with p_2 because p_2's existence (allegedly) *makes p_1 a certain way*,[71] and that way that

p_1 is, is *at a spatial distance from p_2*. Here, p_2's making p_1's a certain way can be considered a sort of *involvement* that p_2 has with the non-platonistic or non-pure realist monadic property, even though the non-platonistic monadic property does not coincide in space with p_2, for the following reasons. As such, p_2 must exist if it is to be the referent of 'p_2' in the statement that describes the monadic property: 'at a spatial distance from p_2'. For that reason, some sort of *connection* between p_2 and the monadic property must exist in order for p_2 to be referred to in the statement that describes the monadic property, 'at a spatial distance from p_2'. If the monadic property is at p_1, if p_2 is what the monadic property *is about*, there must be a *connection*—call it 'aboutness'—between p_1 and p_2 in order for there for the monadic property to be about p_2. If there were no such a connection, *aboutness*, between p_2 and the monadic property, *at a spatial distance from p_2*, which is possessed by p_1, then the property could not be about p_2, and p_1 then could not be at a spatial distance from p_2. The connection, *aboutness*, is a relation that is between or among non-identical spaces or non-collocated material objects, which is the sort of relation I have argued so far in this paper does not exist.

7. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PLATONISTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN p_1 AND p_2

To avoid the ensuing problems with non-platonistic or non-pure realist relations, relations among p_1 and p_2 could be considered relations that are not in space. Rather, *relations* among p_1 and p_2 are *spatially unlocated*: they are spatially unlocated universals (platonistic or pure realist universals) *exemplified* by p_1 and p_2, and not coinciding in space where p_1 and p_2 are at. On this account, p_1 and p_2 are interrelated since they *co-exemplify* a spatially unlocated relation. This sort of relation between or among p_1 and p_2 is, in the platonic or pure realist sense, *nowhere* (it is in the spatially unlocated platonic realm). Considering platonistic or pure realist relations as spatially unlocated is the standard position on platonia. In using the word 'non-spatial' to mean 'not in space', Grossmann, a major platonist philosopher, writes:

According to Plato, as we have seen, there are two realms: the realm of temporal things, of things which exist in time, and the realm of

atemporal things, of things which do not exist in time. To the first realm belong the individual things around us; to the second, their properties [including their polyadic, or *relational*, properties].

The question arises naturally of whether it is also the case that all individual things are in *space* are spatial, while all properties do not exist in space, are not spatial. In other words, does the distinction between temporal and atemporal things coincide with the distinction between spatial and non-spatial things?[72]

... [S]ome philosophers, and especially Plato, have held that all properties are non-spatial ... ... [T]he color of the apple is not located anywhere in space ... ... [A]ll properties are both atemporal and non-spatial ...

Plato ... speaks of 'abstract quality'. I shall speak of abstract things (entities, existents) in general. An abstract thing is a thing which is neither temporal nor spatial. A concrete thing, on the other hand, is a thing which is temporal and/or spatial.[73]

...[P]roperties ... are abstract things; they are not spatio-temporal. It follows that they do not belong to the universe. They are not part of the universe. The shade of red we talked about, for example, surprising as this appears, is not a (spatio-temporal) part of the universe. And what holds for this particular property holds for every other: none of these things is a part of the universe. But this means that there are things which are not parts of the universe.[74]

Other who hold this position are Michael Jubien, J.P. Moreland, Quentin Smith, just to name a few.[75]

In this section, I will give novel arguments for the position that a platonistic or pure realist account of relations between or among p_1 and p_2 is an impossible account of relations. The specific problem has to do with the *tie* between relations and the items they interrelate. As I will discuss, platonistic and pure realist relations cannot directly attach to the physical particulars they are properties of. Rather, there is a special tie that is responsible for holding platonistic and pure realist properties to the particulars that have the properties. The special tie is typically called the exemplification tie, instantiation relation, or

inherence relation. For reasons I will discuss in detail, I will only refer to it as the 'exemplification tie' in this section. I will not argue against the existence of spatially unlocated objects, nor will I argue for physicalism. I will not discuss any of the commonly discussed issues that are brought up when platonistic or pure realist property possession is discussed (such as, such as whether or not spatially unlocated platonic universals exist or the specific nature of spatially located physical particulars). Rather, my aim in this section is to only argue that the (alleged) *connection* between spatially unlocated platonistic or pure realist universals (such as the relations, *parthood*, *connectivity*, *quantum entanglement, at a spatial distance from*, and so on) on the one hand, and space or objects in space (p_1 and p_2) on the other hand, is a connection that is impossible. More specifically, I concentrate on the *platonist exemplification tie* between a spatially unlocated platonic *universal* and the spatially *located* physical particulars, and the platonist exemplifications tie's alleged capacity to connect, in some sense, spatially *located* objects and a spatially *unlocated* objects.[76]

The *co-exemplification* of aspatial relations by p_1 and p_2, on the platonistic or pure realist account, involves the *platonistic exemplification tie*, which connects universals in the spatially unlocated platonistic realm or the pure realist realm—where relations, such as *connectivity* or *parthood*, and where any other platonistic or pure realist relation, are—to entities in the spatial realm (such as p_1 and p_2). In the case where p_1 and p_2 co-exemplify a platonistic or pure realist relation, platonistic or pure realist exemplification is a tie between or among *spatially unlocated* objects (platonic universals) and platonistic or pure realist thin particulars. Platonists and pure realists often neglect to reveal *what* exactly a first-order property ties to, and platonists and pure realists often merely claim that it is 'the particular that exemplifies properties'. But this is not precise, for the following reasons. First-order platonistic or pure realist properties cannot be tied to other properties, lest a platonistic or pure realist substance be a wholly spatially unlocated bundle of the properties, since platonist properties are aspatial. Thus, first-order properties must tie to the only remaining element of the substance: the *particularity*. Since this particularity cannot be a

property (lest a substance be a bundle), this particularity can only be the *thin particularity* of the substance.

A thin particular is typically discussed in the context of non-platonistic or non-pure realist metaphysics of objects such as the Aristotelian tradition[77] and Armstrongian physicalism, but I will discuss it as the item in platonistic metaphysics that is the literal possessor or exemplifier properties, which itself does not have properties. I see no objection in using it here in the context of platonism and pure realism with one minor modification: the properties exemplified are platonistic or pure realist properties. Other philosophers use Armstrongian concepts in a platonistic context. For example, Vallicella (2000), a platonist, discusses Armstongian ontology extensively, accordingly intermixing the two due to Vallicella's platonism, including using the concept of a thin particular. Moreland discusses thin particulars:

> [Armstrong] distinguish[es] a thick from a thin particular. A thick particular is a state of affairs (e.g. A's being F), and as such it is a particular along with its properties. The particular 'enfolds' its properties in the sense that they are spatially located where the thick particular is. In the statement 'this is hot', the word 'this' refers to a thick particular and says that hotness is among its properties. The thin particular is the particular considered in abstraction from all its properties. It is not a thing *per se*, but amounts to bare numerical difference or thisness, the individuating factor that makes the thick particular more than just a bundle of universals.[78]

A 'platonistic or pure realist thin particular' would be different from an Armstrongian thin particular in the sense that, unlike the Armstrongian thin particular, platonistic universals, if they exist, are not *required* to be part of a thick particular since platonic universals can (allegedly) be unexemplified. On Armstrong's account of a thin and thick particular, '[u]niversality and particularity are, he says, inseparable aspects of all existence, they are neither reducible nor related to each other and, although distinct, their union is closer than a relation'.[79] I do not use 'thin particular' in a platonistic metaphysics to confuse Aristotelian and platonistic or pure realist states of affairs, but rather to be clear in what I mean: the platonistic scenario is: a spatially located

entity (a *platonistic* thin particular) is tied (exemplification) to spatially unlocated entities (platonic universals). Also, I use 'thin particular' here in the context of platonism and pure realism because I find that platonists and pure realists very rarely discuss the analogue of the thin particular in platonistic and pure realist metaphysics.

In this section, I will argue that there is a specific problem to do with the platonistic or pure realist account of polyadic property possession since there may be a fatal problem involved with the exemplification tie that binds *spatial entities* and *spatially located* platonistic or pure realist properties. If I am correct, and if the problem is serious enough, a spatially unlocated platonistic relation cannot relate p_1 and p_2 since it cannot be exemplified by p_1 and p_2 due to serious problems with this platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie.

7.1 Platonistic and Pure Realist Exemplification Ties and Unmediated Attachments

In this subsection, I shall discuss how I use the terms 'exemplification tie' and 'unmediated attachment', which are terms relevant to the discussion of any (alleged) platonistic or pure realist interrelation of p_1 and p_2: a platonistic or pure realist interrelation of any parts and wholes of space or matter, and between or among any non-identical atomic building blocks of space or matter.

There are two entities (in the broadest sense of 'entity') that I will be concerned with in discussing the exemplification tie that ties spatially unlocated platonistic or pure realist universals on the one hand, and p_1 and p_2 on the other.

(i) I will be concerned with the *exemplification tie,* which is an *intermediary* tie that ties the spatially unlocated platonistic or pure realist n-adic properties (monadic properties such as, *relatedness*, or relations, such as, *connectivity*, or *parthood*), to physical thin particulars, such as p_1 and p_2.

(ii) I will also be concerned with the *unmediated attachments*, which spatially located platonistic or pure realist thin particulars and the exemplification tie are involved in, and which a spatially unlocated platonistic or pure realist universal and the exemplification tie are involved in (or which, as I will explain below,

parts of the platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie, if it has parts, might be involved in). *Unmediated attachment* describes the attachment between the exemplification tie and the platonistic or pure realist thin particular, and the exemplification tie and the platonistic or pure realist universal.

Let 'exemplification tie' denote what is denoted by p_1 and p_2 'exemplify' R, or p_1 and p_2 'share' the polyadic property, R (R is the platonistic or pure realist universal). The exemplification tie is the intermediary *between* p_1 and p_2 (platonistic or pure realist thin particulars) on the one hand, and the spatially unlocated platonistic or pure realist universals on the other hand.

Let 'unmediated attachment' express the concept of an attachment that *does not involve an intermediary*, and which the thin particulars and the exemplification tie are involved in, and which platonistic or pure realist universals and the exemplification tie are involved in. The concept of unmediated attachment comes from responses to F.H. Bradley's work on the paradox of the relations regress. Loux lucidly explains:

> According to the [platonist], for a particular, *a*, to be *F*, it is required that both the particular, *a*, and the universal, *F-ness*, exist. But more is required; it is required, in addition, that *a exemplify F-ness*. As we have formulated the [platonist's] theory, however, *a*'s exemplifying *F-ness* is a relational fact. It is a matter of *a* and *F-ness* entering into the relation of exemplification. But the realist insists that relations are themselves universals and that a pair of objects can bear a relation to each other only if they exemplify it by entering into it. The consequence, then, is that if we are to have the result that *a* is *F*, we need a new, higher-level form of exemplification (call it exemplification$_2$) whose function it is to insure that *a* and *F-ness* enter into the exemplification relation. Unfortunately, exemplification$_2$ is itself a further relation, so that we need a still higher-level form of exemplification (exemplification$_3$) whose role is to insure that *a*, *F-ness*, and exemplification are related by exemplification$_2$; and obviously there will be no end to the ascending levels of exemplification that are required here. So it appears ... that the only

way we will ever secure the desired result that *a* is *F* is by denying that exemplification is a notion to which the realist's theory applies.

The argument just set out is a version of the famous argument developed by F.H. Bradley. Bradley's argument sought to show that there can be no such things as relations ... [Platonists] claim that while relations can bind objects together only by the mediating link of exemplification, exemplification links objects into relational facts without the mediation of any further links. [This is the unmediated attaching of the exemplification tie to the universals on the one hand, and to p_1 and p_2 on the other.] It is, we are told, an unmediated linker; and this fact is taken to be a primitive categorical feature of the concept of exemplification. So, whereas we have so far spoken of exemplification as a relation tying particulars to universals and universals to each other, we more accurately reflect the realist thinking about the notion if we follow realists and speak of exemplification as a 'tie' or 'nexus' where the use of these terms has the force of binging out the *nonrelational* nature of the linkage this notion provides.[80]

The unmediated attachment I am concerned with here is not a *relation* between the exemplification tie and the spatial items (p_1 and p_2) that possess platonistic and pure realist properties, or between the exemplification tie and a platonistic or pure realist universal. These unmediated attachments do not involve non-relational ties *between* the exemplification tie and the spatial entities (p_1 and p_2), or between the exemplification tie and the universal. And the unmediated attachment does not involve *any* sort of item that *stands between* the exemplification and the spatial entities, or that *stands between* the exemplification tie and the universal. Unmediated attachment is normally how exemplification is conceived to attach to a property or to platonistic or pure realist thin particulars.

Exemplification is a non-relational tie or nexus[81] between or among properties and platonistic or pure realist thin particulars, or between or among properties and other properties. The exemplification tie is not *related* to the platonistic or pure realist relation (*connectivity, parthood*) or to the non-identical spaces or spatial objects (p_1 and p_2). And the

exemplification tie is not a *relation* between or among the platonistic or pure realist relation (*connectivity, parthood*) and the non-identical spaces or spatial objects (p_1 and p_2). Given the exemplification tie's apparent non-relational nature, in this paper, I will discuss exemplification as a *tie*, rather than as a *relation*.

To avoid a Bradley-esque regress in the scenario where p_1 and p_2 are related by platonistic or pure realist relations, at least four entities are involved: (a) p_1, (b) p_2, (c) the relation (such as the relations *quantum entanglement, connectivity, parthood*, and so on), and (d) the exemplification tie which involves an unmediated attachment to both p_1 and p_2, and which involves an unmediated attachment to the platonistic or pure realist relation. In the case where p_1 and p_2 co-exemplify a platonistic or pure realist relation, the exemplification tie is a tie, and apparently is not a relation, because the exemplification tie allegedly holds the platonistic or pure realist relation and non-collocated spatial entities (p_1 and p_2) together without the ensuing Bradley-esque regress. It is not the case that platonistic or pure realist thin particulars such as p_1 and p_2 exemplify the relation *exemplifies quantum entanglement*, since *exemplification* involves unmediated attachments with *quantum entanglement* and also involves unmediated attachments with the spatial objects (such as p_1 and p_2, if, for example, p_1 and p_2 are two quantum entangled photons). The italicized 'exemplifies'—which indicates that it is being referred to as an aspect of the property that is exemplified—denotes an exemplification tie between the relation (*quantum entanglement*) and the exemplification tie, and an infinite regress would ensue. But since platonists and pure realists tell us that the exemplification tie involves unmediated attachments with particulars, and with properties, they assert that this infinite regress is avoided, and reference to the second (and third, fourth, ...) exemplification tie is not needed. (I will explain below that reference to the unmediated attachment between property and the exemplification tie, and between the particulars and the exemplification tie, is not a reference to an entity distinct from the particulars, the universal, and the exemplification tie, but rather to the *way* the property and the exemplification tie attach, and the *way* that the universal and the exemplification tie attach.) The phrase 'p_1 and p_2 exemplify *exemplifies quantum entanglement*' is either a category

mistake or a redundant way of saying 'p_1 and p_2 exemplify *quantum entanglement*'.

The relation (*connectivity, quantum entanglement, parthood*, etc.) does not involve an unmediated attachment to p_1 and p_2. Rather, the relation (*connectivity* or *parthood*) involves unmediated attachments to the exemplification tie. Likewise, the interrelated entities (p_1 and p_2) are not involved in unmediated attachments to the platonistic or pure realist relation (*connectivity, parthood*). Rather, the interrelated spatial entities (p_1 and p_2), and the relation (*connectivity, parthood*), involve an unmediated attachment to the exemplification tie, which itself involves an unmediated attachment to the platonistic or pure realist relation, and to the spatial entities. The relation (*connectivity, parthood*), and interrelated entities (p_1 and p_2), do not involve unmediated attachments to each other; rather, these together form an unordered set [relation (*connectivity* or *parthood*), object p_1, object p_2]. The members of this set involve unmediated attachments to the exemplification tie in such a way as to constitute the interrelated entities (p_1 and p_2) *being* interrelated *with* each other. Here *being* and *with*, in '... *being* interrelated *with* ...', denote the exemplification tie.

It is worth emphasizing these distinctions for the sake of further clarifying what is meant by 'exemplification'. We refer to the exemplification tie when we say that the interrelated entities (p_1 and p_2) *are* interrelated (... are ...). The exemplification tie is also expressed when we say that the interrelated entities *stand in* a relation *to* each other; we use 'stands in ... to' to denote the exemplification tie that involves unmediated attachments with the spatially unlocated relation, and with the platonistic or pure realist thin particulars. On the platonistic or pure realist account, that statements 'two things p_1 and p_2 stand in the relation R', or 'two things exemplify the relation R', means that 'two spatial things tie to an aspatial object'.

To ontological role of the exemplification tie is to act as the non-relational intermediary between: (i) the interrelated entities (t_1 and t_2), and (ii) the relation (*connectivity, quantum entanglement, parthood*, etc.) without a Bradley-esque regress ensuing. To my knowledge, platonists and pure realists have not told us *how* the exemplification ties without being related to property and particular, but have merely

asserted that in order for platonism or pure realism to be coherent, the exemplification tie must somehow tie *non-relationally*.

Some readers may be concerned that any *description* of the exemplification tie is not possible since the tie is alleged to be *primitive*. I suggest that if this is the case, then an inquiry of the nature of the exemplification tie will *reveal* its primitivism. However, as an aside, I maintain that the primitivism of the exemplification tie has not been established, perhaps due to the near absence of discussion of the tie. Rather, it appears that it has been *merely asserted* that the exemplification tie is primitive, following Bradley's work. But Bradley's regress only shows a *need* for a special *non-relational* tie, not that the special tie is *primitive*.

Some may object that the reasoning I have given to this point—and that was given in the passage above by Loux—is fatally flawed, since 'unmediated attachment' must have a truthmaker, but if there is a verbal referent to 'unmediated attachment', then an unmediated attachment, as described by Loux and myself above, is impossible, since unmediated attachment would refer to yet *another* entity (in the broadest sense of ('entity'), *distinct from* the universal, the exemplification tie, and the particulars. This objection fails, however, for the following reasons. The referent of 'unmediated attachment', if I understand Loux's terminology correctly, is not *another* entity distinct from the exemplification tie, property, and particular, but is a *manner* or *way* in which the property and the exemplification tie, or particular and the exemplification tie, are attached. For example, in his passage above, Loux describes the exemplification tie as a 'linker', and the word 'link' might imply a chain-like connection, to use a rough analogy, where only the pieces of a chain are involved, and a third *mediating* entity, between chain links, such as some sort of bonder, adhesive or glue, or string-like connection, *holding* chain links together, and which is an entity distinct from the chain links, is not required for the linking of the chain links to ensue.

Lastly, the exemplification tie is not *merely* a non-relational unmediated attachment of an aspatial property with platonistic or pure realist thin particulars. When we say, 'p_1 and p_2 *share* R', there must be a truthmaker denoted by 'share'. For this reason, the exemplification

tie is an *additional* entity (in the broadest sense of the word 'entity') in addition to the platonistic and pure realist property and the platonistic or pure realist thin particulars, which connects the platonistic or pure realist factor of thin particularity to the platonistic or pure realist spatially unlocated universal. Some may object here, and maintain that it is correct to discuss platonistic and pure realist account as if relations *directly attach* to particulars, rather than as if relations and their relata are *mediated* by an exemplification tie. This would be to consider 'the unmediated attachment of a relation to its relata' as *synonymous with* 'exemplification tie', where an unmediated attachment between a relation and its relata is a special 'unmediated linkage' that a relation and its relata are involved in. However, to my knowledge, this cannot be how the exemplification tie is to be considered, for the following reason. If the platonistic or pure realist relation were involved in an unmediated attachment with p_1 and p_2, and with the platonistic or pure realist relation. In order to directly attach to the spatial objects (p_1 and p_2), the platonistic or pure realist relation would have to be where spatial objects are located, if it is to have an unmediated attachment with the spatial objects. By this, I mean that p_1 and p_2 are only found in the spatial realm, and if something is to have an unmediated attachment with them, that something can only do so if it is where p_1 and p_2 are. If it is not where p_1 and p_2 are, it cannot have an *unmediated* attachment with p_1 and p_2. Rather, only items which are right where p_1 and p_2 are can have unmediated attachments to p_1 and p_2. But if this is the case, the platonistic or pure realist relation—in going to where p_1 and p_2 are—would be located in space, and would be an aspatial item that is located in space, which is impossible. For this reason, it appears that there cannot be an unmediated attachment between platonistic properties and platonistic or pure realist thin particulars, and instead there must be a bridge, or nexus, between spatial particulars and aspatial universals.

7.2 *The Impossibility of Platonistic and Pure Realist Property Possession*

In this subsection, I will further discuss the following unmediated attachments:

(i)   The unmediated attachment between the exemplification tie and platonistic or pure realist thin particulars,

(ii) The unmediated attachment between the exemplification tie and the platonistic or pure realist relational property, and

(iii) The unmediated attachment between the parts of the platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie (if the platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie has parts).

In this subsection, I will discuss that one of these unmediated attachments involved in platonistic or pure realist property possession apparently involves an unmediated attachment between a wholly aspatial item and a wholly spatial item. I will also argue that such unmediated attachments between wholly spatial items and wholly aspatial items are apparently impossible, and for that reason, p_1 and p_2 cannot be interrelated according to the platonistic or pure reality accounts of polyadic property possession. One of the unmediated attachments involved in platonistic or pure realist property possession is an unmediated attachment between a wholly spatial entity and a wholly spatially unlocated entity for the following reasons:

1. If the platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie is partless (simple), and is either wholly spatially located or wholly spatially unlocated,[82] then the exemplification tie is an intermediary tie that connects wholly spatial entities (p_1 and p_2) and the wholly spatialy unlocated relations, and the exemplification tie involves an unmediated attachment to *both* p_1 and p_2 (which are wholly spatial entities) *and* to the wholly spatially unlocated relation (*connectivity, parthood*).[83] On this account, where the exemplification tie is simple, for there to be any tying of a platonistic or pure realist thin particular and a spatial property, there is an unmediated attachment between a wholly spatial entity and an entirely aspatial one.

2. If the platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie is both spatially located as well as unlocated, it is composed of two or more parts, where at least one part is wholly spatially located (and involves unmediated attachments with p_1 and p_2), and where at least one part is wholly spatially unlocated (and involves an unmediated attachment with a platonistic or pure

realist universal, such as *connectivity* or *parthood*). In order that the exemplification tie give rise to a tie between wholly spatial items (p_1 and p_2) and wholly spatially unlocated platonistic universals, wholly spatial and wholly spatially unlocated parts of the exemplification tie must involve an unmediated attachment.[84]

In order for there to be a tie between a property and particular, the exemplification tie between property and particular must be unbroken. For that reason, points 1 and 2 above both suggest that platonistic or pure realist property possession must involve an unmediated attachment of a wholly spatial entity and a wholly spatially unlocated entity. It is this unmediated attachment that I will be concerned with in this subsection, and which I will show is an impossible unmediated attachment.

I will not discuss *which* entities might be those that are specifically involved in the unmediated attachment of an entity that is wholly spatial and an entity that is wholly aspatial. I will only focus on the issue that there is at least one such unmediated attachment required in platonistic or pure realist property possession, as described in points 1 or 2. I will call the entity that is wholly outside of space this is involved in this unmediated attachment, O, and the wholly spatial entity that is involved in the unmediated attachment, L. L could be the two particulars (p_1 and p_2), or it could also be the entire exemplification tie if the exemplification tie is simple and is wholly spatial, as discussed in point 1. Or L could even be a part of the exemplification tie that is in space, as discussed in point 2. O could be the platonic universal; or O could be the entire exemplification tie, if the exemplification tie is simple and not in space, as discussed in point 1. Further, O could be a part of the platonistic or pure realist exemplification tie that is not in space, as discussed in point 2 above. What L and O symbolize depends on whether point 1 or point 2 is correct, and, beyond that, it also depends on specific details to do with points 1 and 2. In this paper, I am only concerned with the issue that on the platonistic or pure realist account of property possession, there is at least one unmediated attachment between a wholly abstract entity, O (an entity wholly outside of space), and a wholly spatial entity, L. According to my argument in

the next paragraph, such an unmediated attachment, between an entity wholly in space (L) and an entity entirely outside of space (O) is impossible, which would mean that p_1 and p_2 cannot be interrelated according to the platonistic or pure realist accounts.

Since L is a wholly spatial item, L cannot fail to either be a spatial location, or to be a spatially located object (in either case, L cannot fail to be wholly spatial). Any unmediated attachment having to do with L must, thereby, be an unmediated attachment that is wholly spatial, lest it not be a unmediated attachment to do with L. Since L can only be wholly *spatial*, and cannot be located outside of space, if L is involved in an unmediated attachment with any other entity, the other entity involved in an unmediated attachment with L *cannot fail to also be wholly spatial*. Since O is wholly outside of space, if O is involved in an unmediated attachment with L, O must come into space and become *located* in space, in order to be involved in an unmediated attachment with L. If this is the case, then O would be *inside and not inside* of space, apparently taking on characteristics that are self-contradictory. A similar line of reasoning could be given when considering the unmediated attachment O is involved in. Unmediated attachments to do with O only occur by way of entities that are entirely outside of space. An entity in space, L, having any sort of dealing (such as unmediated attachment) with O can only do so if it is also outside of space. If this is the case, if L is to have an unmediated attachment with O, L must go outside of space and become aspatial, in order to be involved in an unmediated attachment with O. If this is the case, then L would be *outside and not outside* of space, apparently taking on characteristics that are self-contradictory.

7.3 Objection

Two objections to the argumentation in the previous subsections of this section are offered. Firstly, the platonistic or pure realist property only exists in the spatially unlocated platonistic or pure realist realm, and the platonistic thin particular only exists in the spatial realm, and the notion of a tie or nexus 'across' the realms, bridging the realms, is an erroneous concept. The exemplifying (and relating) *only* exists where the spatial objects (p_1 and p_2) are, and *only* aspatially in the platonistic

or pure realist realm (where there relations *connectivity* or *parthood* are); and there need not be any sort of concept of bridging or literal tying *from* one realm *to* the other. For this reason, the notion of an exemplification *tie* is misguided: the *exemplification tie* need not do any 'tying', 'linking', or 'bridging'. For the rest of this subsection, I will use 'exemplification' in place of 'exemplification tie' in order to discuss platonistic or pure realist property possession without discussing the tie *from* one realm *to* the other.

In the second objection, all argumentation in previous subsections about the exemplification tie can be ignored since platonistic and pure realist exemplification need not be discussed at all, since platonistic and pure realist exemplification is *ontologically primitive*, and nothing can be said about it at all other than that it is holds a property and particular together, *period*.

I shall further argue that these objections fail. The platonistic or pure realist thin particular, p_1, for example, only involves an unmediated attachment to exemplification at p_1 and nowhere else, since p_1 is not identical to any other space or spatial object. This unmediated attachment must be spatially *located* since p_1 is wholly spatial; the unmediated attachment, if not at p_1, is not an attachment that can involve p_1. An unmediated attachment to the exemplification tie *not* coinciding in space with p_1 is an unmediated attachment that does not have anything to do with p_1 (whereby, exemplification would not involve an unmediated attachment with p_1). Since a platonistic or pure realist relation, R (*parthood, connectivity*), cannot *fail* to be spatially *unlocated*—call the aspatial location of the platonistic or pure realist universal, z—this implies that R only involves an unmmediated attachment to exemplification at z, since R is nowhere else *but* at z (in the platonistic or pure realist realm). An unmediated attachment to exemplification *not* at z is an unmediated attachment that does not have anything to do with R (whereby, exemplification would not involve an unmediated attachment with R).

This implies that p_1 cannot exemplify R, for the following reasons. If R only involves an unmediated attachment to exemplification at z, and if p_1 only involves an unmediated attachment to exemplification where it is, if the unmediated attachment of exemplification with p_1 is

an unmediated attachment that coincides space with p_1, and if the exemplifying is not considered as 'bridge', 'nexus', or 'tie' p_1 *to* z (or *from* p_2 *to* z) since $p_1 \neq z$, then p_1 and R apparently cannot have any sort of dealings with one another (such as p_1 taking part in the co-exemplification of R). It appears that in order for R to be exemplified by p_1 (and p_2), R, which is wholly at z (in the platonistic or pure realist realm), must also be at p_1 (and p_2), which is to say that aspatial R must be located at *spatial* locations, and thus must apparently take on characteristics that are self-contradictory: R is located in the spatial realm and is wholly aspatial. (The absurdism discussed in this paragraph ensues *regardless* of whether or not exemplification is considered primitive and unanalyzable.)

8. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY

I will next discuss mereotopology. Some may hold that mereotopology may avoid the problems I discussed in sections 6 and 7 to do with relations between non-collocated pieces of matter or between non-identical regions of space. Mereotopology is a relatively recent theory developed to solve problems in mereological and topological relations. Mereotopology is about the *contact* of spatial objects, where contact is discussed in terms of *collocation*. Consider this introductory passage about mereotopology from Pratt-Hartmann and Schoop:

> The most basic part of Whitehead's mereotopology employs a single primitive binary relation $C(x, y)$, which may be read 'x is in contact and y'; and this primitive has formed the basis for many subsequent approaches ...
>
> Whitehead refers to the relation denoted by C as *connection*, risking confusion with the mathematically well-established, and quite different, property of *connectedness*. We have resolved this termino-logy clash by substituting the word contact and its cognates for Whitehead's relation, and using the term *connected* in its usual topological sense. Nothing substantive should be read into this decision.[85]

Mereotopology is a theory of boundaries. Barry Smith writes:

> We wish ... to capture the commonsensical intuition to the effect that boundaries exist only as boundaries, i.e. that boundaries are dependent particulars: entities which are such that, as a matter of necessity, they do not exist independently of the entities they bound ... This thesis—which stands opposed to the set-theoretic conception of boundaries as, effectively, sets of points, each one of which can exist though all around it be annihilated—has a number of possible interpretations. One general statement of the thesis would assert that the existence of any boundary is such as to imply the existence of some entity of higher dimension which it bounds. Here, though, we may content ourselves with a simpler thesis, one whose formulation does not rest on the tricky notion of dimension, to the effect that every boundary is such that we can find an entity which it bounds of which it is a part and which is such as to have interior parts.[86]

Mereotopologists might believe that mereotopological theories might not be affected by my argumentation I will present against the existence of mereological and topological relations since mereotopology is about the relation, *contact*, between entities, where *contact* only involves *collocation*.[87] Smith describes material objects as consisting of coinciding boundaries: 'Coincidence, as we shall here understand the notion, is exclusively the sort of thing that pertains to boundaries'.[88]

> Each point within the interior of a two- or three-dimensional con-tinuum is, in fact, an infinite (and as it were maximally compressed) collection of *distinct but coincident points* ...[89] (Italics added.)

> A pair of spatial entities are in contact with each other directly when their respective boundaries, in whole or in part, *coincide*.[90] (Italics added.)

Smith is here describing a theory where contact of bodies is ultimately described as consisting of collocation of point-sized items (collocation); and bodies themselves are composed of collocation of point-sized items (boundaries). So mereotopology is, in general, not affected by my arguments in this paper against relations between p_1 and p_2, since '[b]odies are in contact in the broader sense when they and all their parts are connected to one another, possibly via others, in such a way

as to establish *a seamless chain of direct contact* [i.e. *coincidence*].'[91] (Emphasis added.)

According to mereotopology, if p_1 and p_2 are two billiard balls that *touch* at boundary interface b, as the diagram below illustrates, then the areas on the boundary that are opposite b, call them a and c, do not touch:

But by this touching at b, the mereotopologist can coherently maintain that since the billiard balls are complexes of coinciding boundaries, the billiard balls *are in contact*, since they form a 'seamless chain' of contact[92] (a and c do not *touch*, but they *contact*). If my reasoning in the above sections is correct, then with respect to the diagram of billiard balls p_1 and p_2 above, the statement, 'a *is related to* c' is false, since a and c are non-collocated parts of the entities in contact. But if mereotopologists are correct, the statement, 'p_1 *is in contact with* to p_2' is true because of b, and also because of the 'seamless chain' of collocated boundaries that p_1 and p_2 involve.

I will next discuss that mereotopology may be a fatally flawed. The mereotopologist must describe bodies as being composed of *collocated boundaries*, where the collocation of boundaries involves the collocation of point-sized items. Contact of boundaries across a magnitude consists of contact of point-sized items. Smith writes: '[b]odies are in contact in the broader sense when they and all their parts are connected to one another, possibly via others, in such a way as to establish a seamless chain of direct contact.'[93] Smith is describing a continuum (the word 'seamless' is typically used in discussion of a continuum of objects): a continuum of point-sized items, where in that continuum, point-sized items collocate with one another. But since the point-sized items in a continuum are not immediately next to any other of the point-sized items in the continuum, it is difficult to see how there can exist an

extended magnitude in a mereotopological continuum of coinciding boundaries. All boundaries that coincide do so only in a point-sized region, where that particular region is not in contact with any other regions. So, how do point-sized regions with coinciding boundaries give rise to an extended magnitude, according to mereotopology? The answer is that they cannot: there is no seamless chain of coincidence. The only way to have a seamless (continuous) chain of coincidence is to violate mereotopological theory, and to consider the mereotopological relation, *contact*, between coinciding point-sized domains of coinciding boundaries, to be a relation is of *non-zero magnitude* (lest all the collocating boundaries be the size of a point, and no contact exist between non-identical collocated point-sized regions). The scenario is given by the following diagram:

Point-sized region, p_1, partially collocates an extended contact relation, c, and point-sized region, p_2, partially collocates with c, and p_1 and p_2 do not partially collocate.

But this theory appears problematic, since if the extended relation, *contact*—call it c—acting as an intermediary of two others, were partially collocated with two others—call them p_1 and p_2—where p_1 and p_2 do not collocate, then c would be describable as 'partially collocated with p_1' and 'partially collocated with p_2'. However, since c has differing regions of it, where in one region it is collocated with p_1, but not collocated with p_2, and in another region it is collocated with p_2, but not with p_1, c is describable also by the statements, 'not partially

collocated with p_1', or 'not partially collocated with p_2', since where p_2 is, for example, p_1 is 'not partially collocated with c'. The problem is that the entirety of the relation, c, is describable by any of these statements, since c is non-complex (partless), and any reference to it is only a reference to one item; so any statement can only be about all of the item. But this means that if we combine some of the statements above describing the noncomplex relation, *contact*, it is describable by contradictory statements, for example: 'partially collocated with p_1 and not partially collocated with p_1', or 'partially collocated with p_2 and not partially collocated with p_2'. An extended relation, contract, is impossible, so we have to again take up the relation as being only among collocated point-sized boundaries in a point-sized region, but for reasons discussed above, since such a relation does not extended outside of its region, and since that region is not immediately next to any other point-sized regions of coinciding boundaries, then there is no seamless chain of coincidence. Mereotopology's relation, contact, cannot be extended (E) nor unextended (~E), which is describable as ~(E & ~E), and thus appears impossible since ~(E & ~E), translates to ~E & E.

9. MEREOLOGICAL NIHILISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF BRAHMAN

If the argumentation of the above sections is correct, Western analytic metaphysical theories describe a structured reality, or a reality with parts and wholes, and the only description of reality they provide is a mereological nihilist reality. I will discuss is that Western analytic metaphysicians, by (inadvertently) supporting mereological nihilism, are supporting the coherence of a philosophy of Brahman. The unstructured blob is Brahman, and Brahman, the Absolute, is beyond all categories of space, time, and causality that the concept forming phenomenal mind creates. I will discuss that descriptions of both Brahman and the mereological nihilist blob can be described as monistic, devoid of internal differentiation, self-conscious, and transcendent of names and forms, and for the reason, in this section I will argue that the mereological nihilist blob is not different from Brahman.

9.1 Monism and No Diversity

If mereological nihilism is the description of reality that modern physics and Western analytic metaphysics (inadvertently) provide, then modern physics and Western analytic metaphysics predict the existence of a monistic reality. There are no parts and wholes; therefore, there is only one thing: the blob. Parts and wholes are what give rise to diversity and structure in modern physics and Western analytic metaphysics, and without parts and wholes, there is no differentiation and structure in nature. The blob cannot have different parts since there are no inner distinctions involved within the unstructured blob. Similarly, according to the philosophy of Brahman, there is also only one thing, Brahman, which is without inner diversity or distinctions. Phillips writes:

> Śrīharsha is motivated by religious considerations—and perhaps by personal experience as well—to uphold the reality of Brahman, the Absolute and Unity beyond all appearance and differentiation. Brahman is the sole reality and the single self. Only Brahman may authentically be said to be ... The reality of Brahman entails the impossibility of coherently conceiving a diverse world.[94]

> There is no Upaniṣadic passage where such illusionism (*māya-vāda*) is more pronounced than in a portion of the Yājñavalkya-Janaka discourse that constitutes the third and fourth *Brāhmanas* of the fourth chapter of the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*. At the core of this extremely important passage is an elaborate discussion of dream ... The text includes several monistic proclamations boldly applied to world appearance, for example, *na iha nānā asti kimcana*, 'There is no diversity whatsoever'.[95]

9.2 Self-Consciousness

One of the key descriptions of Brahman is that Brahman is *self-consciousness*. Phillips writes:

> ... [A] state of self-illumination is exalted over the waking and dream states ... [S]tates involving awareness of objects other than the self are said to be less valuable than the state of self-illumination ... The idea that Brahman is one is given special psychological and

axiological meaning: the state where the self knows only itself is the state that is most valuable.[96]

Now consider the following argument, which derives from my reasoning in the sections above.

There is only one thing (blob).
That consciousness exists self-evidently true.
Therefore, the one thing (blob) is consciousness.

With respect to the second premise, philosophers often maintain that it is self-evidently true that experience exists. Experience must exist since to question, in the first place, that experience exists, there must be an experiencer to question. Philosophers often maintain that it is self-evidently true that experience exists. It does not matter if the representations of experience are successful or not, but that there is experience at all. Experience must exist since to question, in the first place, that experience exists, there must be an experiencer to question them. That experience exists appears to be something that cannot be disproven. Consider what Gupta writes:

The self is known as 'I' to empirical individuals; nobody doubts this fact. We know the self directly, immediately. The self is not an object of thought; it is not the conclusion of a rational argument. However, to direct the empirical mind to its experience, Śaṁkara gives us a kind of *cogito ergo sum*, which may be expressed as follows: 'It is not possible to refute the self, for he who is doing the refutation is the self' ... No one can doubt the existence of *ātman* because it is involved even in doubting ... As fire cannot deny its own heat, similarly, the self, being self-established, can never doubt itself ... The 'I' that is the referent of the self-consciousness of the empirical individual is bound by the limitations of the body, the mind, and the senses. The referent of *pratyagātman*, the inmost or the innermost self, is neither the doer (*kartā*) nor the enjoyer (*bhoktā*).[97]

The argument apparently shows that the blob can only be consciousness. Now consider another argument, which uses the conclusion

of the argument just given, to show that the blob is *self*-conscious. That argument is as follows:

The one thing (blob) is consciousness. (Conclusion of argument above.)
Consciousness must have an object that it is conscious of.[98]
If there is only *one thing*, then consciousness must be conscious of *it*.
Therefore, the one thing (blob) can only be conscious of itself.

If consciousness, or experience, exists, and there is only one thing—according to the mereological nihilist blob theory and the metaphysics of Brahman—whatever exists *must be the one thing*. So, consciousness must be identical to the mereological nihilist blob. Further, since there is only the blob, and there can only be experience of *it*, the consciousness that is the blob can only be consciousness of the blob, which is self-experience. If the blob that modern physics and Western analytic metaphysics (inadvertently) puts forward is monistic, unstructured, self-consciousness, and if it is the only thing there is, the blob is apparently a description of Brahman. Phillips:

Brahman is unitary, the coincidence of opposites, and omnipresent ... Brahman has 'non-dual' (*advaita*) self-awareness ... [These] themes [emphasize] ... the unity and self-awareness of Brahman. These Upanishadic ideas are developed into Advaita monism. Brahman's unity comes to be taken to mean that appearances of individualities ('names and forms') are illusory, unreal.[99]

For the Upaniṣad idealists, 'Brahman is self ... and consciousness.'[100] 'Brahman has "non-dual" ... self-awareness.'[101]

10. CONCLUSION

If my preceding arguments are correct, the entirety of Western analytic metaphysics reduces to a metaphysics of partless, unstructured, self-conscious Brahman. The problems I have discussed involving parts and wholes in contemporary Western analytic metaphysics are problems to which I see no solution.

NOTES

* First part published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, April–June 2004.

63. Loux 1998, pp. 38–41.

64. Some accounts of causation are described as this sort of a relation.

65. Moreland 2001, p. 24.

66. Phillips 1995, p. 23.

67. This is a position discussed extensively by Quentin Smith (1995, 1993).

68. Grünbaum (1952, 1955, 1967) is one of the philosophers who has argued for this commonly held position.

69. This is widely held to be the error that Zeno made in his *Measure Paradox* (*unextended* points somehow compose an *extended* line, plane, or volume). See Pyle, 1995, pp. 1–7.

70. Quantum gravity is a unification of quantum theory and relativity, and is for that reason, believed to be the theory that will end the divergence that exists in physics between relativity and quantum mechanics. See Lesniewski, 1997, Kane, 2000, Madore, 2000, and Jones and Moscovici, 1999.

71. This is, in fact, the definition of a property: a property *makes a particular a certain way*. Armstrong discusses how properties are *ways* objects (substances) are:

> Properties are ways things are. The mass or charge of an electron is a *way* the electron is ... Relations are *ways* things stand to each other.
> If a property is way that a thing is, then this brings the property into very intimate connection with the thing, *but without destroying the distinction between them*. (Armstrong 1989, pp. 96–97.) (Emphasis added.)

72. Grossmann, 1990, p. 5.

73. Ibid., p. 7.

74. Ibid., p. 8. Moreland (2001), also a Platonist, discusses Grossmann's platonism in depth, especially on pages 4, 9, 12–13, 102–103, and many other places.

75. Some have argued that many quantum physicists (if not nearly all quantum physicists), who in making use of the abstract mathematical concepts of Hilbert space, or imaginary space, are quite literally postulating the existence of a *platonistic* realm. (See Stenger 2000, p. 143, and chapter 10.)

76. Although I only discuss platonistic and pure realist relations in this section, my arguments attach all accounts of n-adic platonistic and pure realist property possession.

77. Armstrong 1989, p. 60.

78. Moreland 2001, p. 87.

79. Moreland 2001, p. 86.

80. Loux, 1998, pp. 38–41. I have altered Loux's passage to read as if he only discusses platonic realism, rather than metaphysical realism in general. For further lucid discussion on these issues, see Vallicella (2000). Some argue that it is not so certain that Bradley *did not*, in fact, conclusively argue that relations do not exist, and doubt that exemplification does away with the problems Bradley disclosed. See Grupp, 2003 and 2004.

81. Moreland 2001, pp. 99–100, also refers to exemplification as a 'nexus', but unlike Loux, he typically refers to it as a relation.

82. A simple (partless) platonistic or pure realist exemplification is *wholly* spatially located, or *wholly* spatially unlocated, for the very reason that it is the platonistic or pure realist *exemplification tie*, and not, for example, a space or physical particulars object that *exemplifies* spatially unlocated properties, or a spatial property that is *exemplified by* a spatial object. A spatial object, according to some platonists and pure realists, might be considered *not* to be *wholly* spatial, but rather to be an entity that is spatially located *and* spatially unlocated, since it has spatial and aspatial aspects or constituents: *wholly spatially unlocated* platonic universals, that are tied to (exemplified by) a platonistic or pure realist thin particular (which is *wholly spatially*). Exemplification is not an ordinary spatial item (or aspatial) item of any sort, since it is the special tie *that gives rise to* ordinary spatial (or aspatial) items, such as spatial objects, because they are platonistic or pure realist thin particulars are *exemplify* certain spatial properties. Unlike a spatial object that might be considered by platonists to have spatially unlocated constituents, the exemplification tie, in being a constituent of, or aspect of, those spaces or physical particulars, is *wholly* spatially located *or wholly* spatially unlocated. These same points would apply to a non-simple exemplification tie, where parts of the tie would be wholly spatially located or wholly spatially unlocated.

83. Moreland, a pure realist, appears to hold this position: 'For traditional realists, neither the universal nor the exemplification nexus are spatio-temporal ... [T]he exemplification nexus connects an abstract entity with a spatiotemporal one' (Moreland 2001, 100). On this account, a wholly spatially located entity (the platonistic thin particular) and a wholly spatially unlocated entity (the exemplification tie) would involve an unmediated attachment.

84. Wolterstorff (1970, Chapter 4) is a platonist who appears to hold the view that exemplification is composed of parts.

85. Pratt-Hartmann and Schoop 2002, pp. 469–71.

86. Smith, Barry, 1996, p. 295.

87. See Cohn and Varzi (2000, pp. 362–65). Also, consider what Pratt and Schoop have to say about this:

> Mereotopological calculi vary as to which primitives they employ, and the axioms they propose. Clarke's calculus as a single binary relation of 'connection' with the gloss that two regions are connected if they share a common point. Randall, Cui and Cohn also use a binary connection relation, but take two regions be connected if their closures share a common point (Pratt and Schoop 1998, p. 622).

88. Smith, Barry, 1997, p. 524.

89. Ibid., p. 540.

90. Ibid., p. 549.

91. Ibid., p. 551.

92. If mereotopologists could explain gunky space solely in terms of collocated contacting and collocating of boundaries, my arguments below would not be against such a model of space.

93. Smith, Barry, 1997, p. 551.

94. Phillips 1995, p. 2.

95. Ibid., p. 10.

96. Ibid., p. 11.

97. Gupta, 1998, p. 41.

98. If consciousness is not conscious of something, it is intentionality without intentional objects, which is an apparent absurdism.

99. Phillips, 1995, p. 10.

100. Ibid., p. 9.

101. Ibid., p. 9.

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Mind: A Connectionist Model

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ABSTRACT

In cognitive science, there are many computational theories regarding
the functions of the mind; connectionism is one of them. Connectionist
networks are intricate systems of simple units related to their environ-
ments. Some have thousands of units, but those with only a few units
can also behave with surprising complexity and subtlety. This is because
processing occurs in parallel as also interactively, in marked contrast
with the serial processing to which this is accustomed. In the first
section of this paper, I intend to describe a simple network that illustrates
several features of connectionist processing. Secondly, I would like to
examine its relation with other areas in the realm of cognitive science.
Thirdly, I shall make an attempt to find out whether this theory
contributes to the replacement of folk psychology. Lastly, I find that
connectionist thus fails to account for the real nature of the mental
states because of its not too clear attempt to reduce mental states to the
machine states. The mechanistic theory of mind in all its hues faces the
question as to how we can account for the qualitative content of our
consciousness. It cannot ultimately tell us how the subjective experience
is possible and how consciousness can be real in the universe. The
mechanistic view does not have any convincing answer to the question
as to how are qualia a necessary feature of consciousness. If the mind
functions like a machine, it can best exhibit only mechanical states
which look very much like the mental states but, analogically, are very
different from the machines.

There are different models of mind: Connectionism is one of them. In modern cognitive science, these models have provided the basis for simulating or modelling cognitive performance. Simulation is one of the important ways of testing theories of the mind. If a simulation performs in a manner comparable to the mind, then it will offer support for the theory underlying that simulation.

However, in cognitive science, two models have provided the basis for most of the simulation activity.[1] On the one hand, a digital computer can be used to manipulate symbols. In so far as it becomes possible to program the symbol-processing computer to execute tasks that seem to require intelligence, the symbol-processing computer becomes a plausible analogy to the mind. Numerous cognitive science theorists have been attracted to the proposal that the mind itself is a symbol-processing device.

The model of the brain, on the other hand, is a technique for analyzing the anatomy and physiology of the brain. This view suggests that the brain consists of a network of simple electrical processing units, which simulate and inhibit one another. The style of explanation of the brain, in the cognitive science, is generally considered as the brain-style computation.

Now, the question is: Why should there be a brain-style computation? The basic assumption is that we seek an explanation at the program or functional level rather than the implementational level. Thus, it is often pointed out that we can learn very little about what kind of program a particular computer may be running by looking at the electronics with which it is made. In fact, we do not care much about the details of the computer at all: All we care about is the particular program that is running. If we know the program, we will know how the system will behave in any situation. It does not matter whether we use vacuum tubes or transistors: the essential characteristics are the same. It is true for computers because they are all essentially the same. Whether we make them out of vacuum tubes or transistors, we invariably use computers of the same design. But when we look at essentially a difficult architecture, we see that the architecture makes a good deal of difference. It is the architecture that determines which kinds of algorithms are most easily carried out on the machine in question. It

is the architecture of the machines that determines the essential nature of the program itself.[2] Thus, it is reasonable that we should begin by asking what we know about the architecture of the brain and how it might shape the algorithms underlying the biological intelligence and human mental life.

Rumelhart[3] says that the basic strategy of the connectionist approach is to take the neuron as its fundamental processing unit. We imagine that computation is carried out through simple interactions among such processing units. Essentially, the idea is that these processing elements communicate by sending numbers along the lines that connect the processing elements. This identification already provides some interesting constraints on the kinds of algorithms that might underlie human intelligence. A question may arise here: How does the replacement of the computer metaphor as model of mind affect our thinking? Rumelhart[4] says that this change in orientation leads us to a number of considerations that further inform and constrain our model-building effort. This is so, because neurons are remarkably relative to the components in modern computers. Neurons operate in the time scale of milliseconds, whereas computer components operate in the time scale of nanoseconds—a vector of 10^6 time faster.[5] This means that the human brain process that receives the order in a second or less can involve only a hundred or so times steps. Because, most of the computational processes like perception, memory retrieval, etc., take about a second to function. That is, we seek explanations for these mental phenomena that do not require more than about a hundredth elementary sequential operations.

The human brain contains billions of such processing elements. Just as the computer organizes computation with many serial steps, similarly the brain can deploy many processing elements cooperatively and in parallel to carry out its activities. Thus, the use of the brain-style-computational system offers not only a hope that we can characterize how brains actually carry out certain information processing tasks but also offers solution to computational problems that seem difficult to solve in a more traditional computational framework.

The connectionist systems are capable of exploiting and mimicking a brain-style computation such as artificial intelligence. Connectionism operates both as a system and a process. The connectionist systems are

very important because they provide good solutions to a number of difficult computational problems that seem to often arise in models of cognition. The connectionist model can solve best-mach-search, rapid-pattern-matching, implementing content-addressable memory-storage systems. This model allows many more such systems to its environment. Connectionism as a processing mechanism is carried out by a number of processing elements. These elements, called nodes or units, have a dynamics, which is roughly an analogue to simple neurons. Each node receives input from some number of the nodes and responds to that input according to a simple activation function, and in turn excites or inhibits other nodes to which it is connected.[6]

The above analogy will be very clear, if we go through the connectionist system.

THE CONNECTIONIST FRAMEWORK

Figure 1 is arbitrarily taken as a connectionist model. In any connectionist model, there are three units such as input units, hidden units, and output units. Here, the input units are 'I', 'S', ..., 'N', 'R', the hidden units are 'IS', 'THE', 'MAT', 'ON', 'RAT', and the output unit is 'THE RAT IS ON THE MAT.' There may be many inputs, hidden units, and many output units. The hidden units serve neither as input nor output units, but facilitate the processing of information through the system. This model will be very clear if we go through Rumelhart's[7] seven major components of any connectionist model.

(i) A Set of Processing Units

Any connectionist system begins with a set of processing units. All the processing of the connectionist system is carried out by these units. There is no executive or other agency. There are only relatively simple units, each doing its own relatively simple job. A unit's job is simply to receive input from its neighbours and, as its function, it sends output values to its neighbours. The system is inherently parallel in the sense that many units can carry out their computations at the same time.

There are three types of units—input, output, and hidden units. Input units receive input from sources external to the system under study. The output units send signals out of the system. The hidden units are

Figure 1: A connectionist model.

those that check that inputs and outputs are from within the system they are modelling. They are not visible to any outside system.

(ii) The State of Activation

In addition to the set of units, we also need a representation of the state of the system at time 'T'. This is primarily specified by a vector (T), representing the pattern of activation over the set of processing units. Each element of the vector stands for the elements of one of the units. It is the pattern of activation over the set of units that captures what the system represents at any time. It is useful to see processing in the system as the evolution, through time, of a pattern of activity over the set of units.

(iii) Output of the Units

Units interact by transmitting signals to their neighbours. The strength of their signals and the degree to which they affect their neighbours are determined by their degree of activation. But in some of our models, the output level is exactly equal to the activation levels of the unit. The output of the unit depends on its activation values.

(iv) The Pattern of Connectivity

Units are connected to one another. It is this pattern of connectivity that constitutes what the system knows and determines how it will respond to any arbitrary input. Specifying the processing system and the knowledge encoded therein is a matter of specifying this pattern of connectivity among the processing units.

(v) Activation Rules

We also need a set of rules whereby the inputs impinging on a particular unit are combined with one another and the undergoing processing, with the current states of unit, produces a new state of activation.

(vi) Modifying Pattern of Connectivity as a Foundation of Experience

Changing the processing or knowledge structure in a connectionist system involves modifying the pattern of interconnectivity. Generally, there are three kinds of modifications:
   (a) Development of new connections.
   (b) Loss of existing connections.
   (c) Modification of the strength of connection that already exists.

(vii) Representation of the Environment

For the development of any model, it is very difficult to have a clear representation of the environment in which this model is to exist. In the connectionist model, we represent the environment as a time-making stochastic function over the space of input patterns. That is, we imagine that at any point of time, there is some probability that any of the possible sets of input patterns is impinging on the input units. This probability depends on the history of inputs as well as outputs of the system. In practice, most models involve a much simpler characterization of the environment.

CONNECTIONISM AND ITS RELATION WITH OTHER DISCIPLINE

Now the question is: What is the relation of connectionism with other disciplines like artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind? Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary research area which has emerged from the cognitive revolution. Cognitive science includes artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and philosophy. It reveals functional unity among diverse epistemological assumptions because they share certain core assumptions of the symbolic approach to cognition. In contrast, connectionism is related to all these areas, being a part of neuroscience which talks about cognition in a different manner. This is said to be done by locating the neurons in the cerebral cortex that correlate best with consciousness and then figuring out how they link to the neurons elsewhere in the brain, as the connectionist explains. This theory was first outlined by Crick and Koch.[8] They hypothesized that these oscillation are the basis of consciousness. This is partly because the oscillations seem to be correlated with awareness in different modalities within the visual and olfactory systems and also because they suggest a mechanism by which the binding of information contents might be achieved. Binding is the process whereby separately represented pieces of information about a single entity are brought together to be used by later processing, as when information about the colour and shape of a perceived objected is integrated from separate visual pathways. Both connectionists and neuroscientists are exploring the consciousness or mind broadly from a materialistic point of view. They leave out the essence of mind, and forget about the really difficult aspects. Now, we may raise some of the questions like, why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from pulpy gray matter? How can an unintelligent machine give rise to an intelligent experience? If the cognitive scientists try to give an answer, then that answer will not be appropriate for the relevant questions. But it is very difficult to offer precise definitions of mind.

CONNECTIONISM AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence has witnessed the emergence of several new methods of analysis, including connectionism that investigates the

properties of networks of neurons, like units. This approach focuses on computational methods inspired by natural phenomena. Connectionism is inspired by observations of basic neural activity in biological organisms. Connectionism is an approach to cognitive modelling which, in contemporary usage, refers to particular classes of computer-implemented models of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence gives importance to the mind, whereas connectionism emphasizes on the brain. For connectionism, human brain is a neural network; that is to say, that there is a relation among the neurons. Artificial intelligence argues that the mind is the software, and the brain is the hardware in which the mind works. This is also the view of functionalism. Thus, both connectionism and artificial intelligence belong to the same theory concerned about the human mind.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATION OF CONNECTIONISM

In the understanding of cognition, connectionism will necessarily have implications of philosophy of mind. There are two areas in particular on which it is likely to have an impact. They are the analysis of the mind as a representational system and the analysis of intentational representational.

Fodor distinguishes the computational theory of mind from the representational theory of mind. The representational theory of mind holds the view that systems have mental states by virtue of encoding representations and standing in particular relations to them. The computational theory adds that cognitive activity consists of formal operations performed on these representations.[9]

Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument against connectionism brings out the defects of the connectionist model. They opine that it fails to support the computational theory.[10] Fodor interprets connectionist models as representational and, thus, potentially conforming to the representational theory of mind. This is because connectionists routinely interpret the activations of units or groups of units as representing contents.. This is the case for input and output units providing cognitive interpretation of a network's activity; thus, a theorist must treat the input as a representation of a problem and the output as representing the answer. Some times this is done unit by unit. A given unit is found

to be activated by inputs with certain features and then interpreted as representing those features. This is interpreted as that the network has differentiated inputs with differentiated features. This further suggests that connectionist systems can indeed be understood as the representation theory of mind. Even if connectionist networks exemplify the representational theory of mind, they are significantly different from more traditional examples of the representational theory.

Firstly, it is not clear that we can always interpret what units in a connectionist network can be represented in natural language terms.

Secondly, the representations constructed are not discrete but distributed. That is, the same units and the same connections connect many different representational roles rather than employing one representation per role. This distinguishes the connectionists' representations from those that have been previously designed.

Thirdly, it is emphasized that the pattern of activations on hidden units in connectionist systems are the products of the learning that the system has undergone. The interpretations assigned to these units are not arbitrary. They are represented symbolically, but are analysis of how the network has solved the problem it was confronting. Thus, the network is connected to real sensory inputs, and not supplied inputs by the modeller machinery. The intentionality of these representations is genuine, not merely a product of the theorist's interpretation.

WHETHER CONNECTIONISM CONTRIBUTES TO THE REPLACEMENT OF FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY

We know that in many ways, cognitive science orginated from philosophy. The importance of connectionism to philosophy emerges first with respect to the question of whether folk-psychology remains viable or it must be replaced. If it is replaced, then the reliance on prepositional representations of knowledge in other areas of philosophy would be at risk. Because connectionism explains the mind in terms of mechanical processes, it omits the 'mentality' of the human mind. This theory suggests that there is no mental quality such as belief, intention, etc. If connectionism should provide a correct account of mental processing, and if it did not turn out to implement symbolic systems, then the account of mental life as actually involving the manipulation

of propositions would appear to be false. That is, mental states involving propositions will not figure in the causal genesis of behaviour.

William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen quote from William Churchland regarding eliminative materialism by maintaining that if a theory fails to reduce to our best scientific theories at lower levels, it must be dismissed as false. They contend that reduction fails in the case of folk psychology because there is nothing in the head with which to identify the propositions it posits. This conclusion entails the further conclusion that folk psychology is false.[11] In making this inference, they assume that folk-psychological theories about processes occur inside people's mind. Now, we have to examine the question whether connectionism contributes to the replacement of folk psychology.

According to William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen,[12] folk psychology refers to people's attributions of prepositional attributes to other people and uses the same to predict and explain their behaviour. These attributions are made to entire persons; folk psychology does not itself offer an account of the finer-gained internal operations that may produce prepositional attitudes. If we attribute to a person a particular belief that itself need not be a discrete internal state, the states inside the person that enable the person to have a belief will have a quite different character.

Bechtel and Abrahamsen apply the above point to the case of cognition. The activities inside the head may enable a person to have beliefs and desires, but it does not assume that they have internal states that correspond to these prepositional attributes. It may be that the internal activities are best described in the connectionist approach. However, it does not prove that folk psychology is false. But if it is false, it will be so because it does not give a correct characterization of the cognitive state of persons and must, therefore, be replaced by a better theory at the same level.

Here, I would like to argue that the connectionists' model of mind is unable to refute folk psychology. The connectionists explain the mind in syntactical terms and thereby neglect semantics, which is very important to understand the human mind. There is mental content which represents the world; that is to say, there is central 'agency' or the 'I'

to which the mental activity is ascribed. This shows that the human mind has propositional attitudes about the world. As David Chalmers pointed out, mental states such as 'belief', 'doubt', etc.—often called 'propositional attitudes'—are attitudes to propositions concerning the world.[13] For example, when I believe that John will tour India, I endorse a certain propositions concerning John; when I hope that John will tour India, I have different attitudes toward the same proposition. Here, the central feature of these mental states is their semantic aspect, or intentionality. That is, a belief has semantic content; the content of my belief cited is something like the proposition that John will tour India. This semantic or intentionality aspect has features of subjectivity and qualia. The subjectivity of consciousness is an essential feature of mental states, which can prove that the ontology of mental states is an irreducible fact of first-person ontology. In contrast, in the case of connectionists' model of the mind, there is no subjective experience, and it gives the explanations of mind in the third-person perspective.

Now the question is: Can subjective experience be made a part of the objective structure of the natural order in the way the connectionist functions of the mind are? This has generated a debate as to whether there can be a complete reduction of the subjective experience into mechanical states of the brain. William Bechtel, Rumelhart, and Marr are fully committed to the replacement of folk psychology. However, this can be opposed on the grounds that the mental beliefs are ascribed to a conscious subject and not to the connectionist model of mind or brain because the brain is at best a physical system, though with infinite physical capacity. The subject is non-reducible to the brain in the sense that the brain itself belongs to the subject. The subject functions autonomously; the qualia as well as the brain states are merely different states of the autonomous subject.[14] Thus, the reality of the subject of the qualia has to be admitted if we can have coherent theory of mind.

The connectionist model of the mind fails to account for the real nature of the mental states because of its not too clear attempt to reduce mental states to the machine theory states. The connectionist theory of the mind fails because of its reductionist dogma: It makes the mind superfluous in the universe.[15] The human mind is, at best, a mechanical system with certain determinate functions.

The mechanistic theory of the mind in all its hues faces the question as to how we can account for the qualitative content of our consciousness. It cannot ultimately tell us how the subjective experience is possible and how consciousness can be real in the universe. The mechanistic view does not have any convincing answer to the question as to how qualia are a necessary feature of consciousness. If the mind functions like a machine, it can at best exhibit only mechanical states which look quite like the mental states but ontologically are very different.

THE NOTION OF 'SUBJECTIVITY' AND THE CONCEPT OF 'I' OR 'AGENCY'

Consciousness is a specific feature of living organisms. Humans, as conscious beings, possess this specific feature. Each human being has a uniqueness of seeing or experiencing things, and it is important to understand the very nature of their subjective experiences.

Consciousness seems to involve something that is essentially subjective. In case of a conscious mind, there is a subjective point of view, which is accessible only to the conscious being itself. Consciousness is a phenomenon which cannot be measured, observed or experienced in public, because it is a personal matter. It can be known only from a first-person perspective, but not from the third-person objective or even scientific perspective. Thomas Nagel shows that subjectivity is a fundamental feature of consciousness. According to him, consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem intractable, as 'subjectivity' is its most troublesome feature. Self is the subjectivity, which encompasses our feelings, thinking, and perception. The qualitative character of experience is what it is like for its subject to have the experience. In his article, *What it is like to be a bat?* Nagel presents the notion of subjectivity, which proves the irreducibly subjective character of experience. He writes, 'Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it ... no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism ... But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and

only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism.'[16]

We can know the physical facts about a bat but we cannot know what it is to be like a bat. According to Nagel, we cannot comprehend a bat's experience; we cannot adopt its point of view. The subjective experiences of the bat are beyond our comprehension. The objective facts regarding the organism do not and cannot explain the subjective character of the bat's experiences. Scientific knowledge cannot answer to the question 'What is it like to be a bat?' Thus, Nagel sees the subjectivity of consciousness as a challenge to physicalism. He further argues that physical theories cannot explain one's phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, subjectivity is too difficult to be captured. According to him, subjectivity is, '... the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since they could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.'[17]

However, conscious experience is the representation of subjectivity. Facts about conscious experience, therefore, do not exist independently of a particular subject's point of view. Objective phenomena have a reality independent of appearances, but subjective phenomena are just phenomenological appearances. Nagel claims that science stands little chance of providing an adequate third-person account of consciousness, as there is no objective nature to phenomenal experience. Phenomenal experience cannot be observed from multiple points of view. As Nagel puts it, 'The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.'[18]

Hence, from the subjective point of view, we know what it is to be like us, but we do not know what it is to be like a bat. We do not know what it is like to have sonar experiences. Sonar experiences imply a subjective perspective and we must occupy that particular point of view in order to know specific sonar experiences. For example, we must be in the bat's position to know the bat's sonar experiences. Nagel writes, 'We may ascribe general *types* of experience on the basis

of the animal's structure and behaviour. Thus, we describe bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which is beyond our ability to conceive. And if there is conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us.'[19] In contrast to subjective experience, the subjective experience such as knowing the square root of 144 is 12 or table salt is a compound of sodium and chlorine does not require any kind of experience. This is not to deny that it may require some experience. It could be that any one who has this knowledge must also have the experience. However, what makes mathematical and scientific knowledge objective is not the particular kind of experience accompanying that knowledge. However, to know what it is like to see red entails having a particular kind of experience, which is the experience of seeing red. As Nagel puts it, 'In the case of experience, on the other hand, the connection with a particular point of view seems much closer. It is difficult to understand what could be meant by the *objective* character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends it.'[20]

This subjective character of experience cannot be captured by any functional or causal analysis. Therefore, we do not know how physicalism can explain consciousness. Physicalism rules out the subjective viewpoint and, therefore, fails to explain human experiences. According to McGinn, consciousness is a natural process of the brain. However, we cannot form concepts of conscious properties unless we ourselves instantiate those properties because a blind man cannot understand the concept of a visual experience of red, like we cannot conceive of the echolocatory experiences of bats. We know that certain properties of the brain are necessarily closed to perception of the brain. Consciousness itself cannot be explained on the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects. While rejecting physicalism, McGinn emphasizes that, 'Conscious states are simply not, *qua* conscious states, potential objects of perception; they depend

upon the brain but they cannot be observed by directing the senses onto the brain. You cannot see a brain states *as* a conscious state.'[21]

Consciousness itself cannot be established simply on the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects. Distinct cognitive properties, namely perception and introspection, necessarily mediate our relationships with the brain and with consciousness. We cannot understand how the subjective aspects of experience depend upon the brain; that is really the problem.[22]

According to William Lycan, in case of subjectivity, experiences are representations. For example, my visual experience of my blue shirt is a mental representation of the shirt as being blue. When I introspect my experience, I form a second-order representation of the first-order representation of the shirt. Other people have syntactically similar second-order representations. But each individual can introspect only his own experiences. For Lycan, this is the ultimate explanation of subjectivity. He analyses Nagel's view and replies that, 'seeing someone's brain in a state of sensing-blazing-red is nothing at all like sensing blazing red oneself'.[23] Similarly, in case of the bat's sonar sensation S; we do not have the sonar sensation S; we cannot ourselves feel S. We do not know what it is like to have S (we do not have cognitive access to S) in the way the bat does.[24]

For Lycan, these facts are obviously true and accepted even by materialists. When we observe the bat, at that time, we observe only some physical or functional state, but thereby we do not have that conscious state ourselves; we do not have the same perspective with respect to it. However, a materialist account of the mental should not claim otherwise. As he puts it, 'the felt incongruity is just what anyone, materialist or antimaterialist alike, should expect. Therefore, the incongruity affords no objection whatever to materialism, and to take it as impugning or even embarrassing materialism is simply fallacious.'[25]

From Nagel's point of view, the individual consciousness can be understood or reported only from the first-person perspective and not from the third-person objective viewpoint. An objective representation can be described in an objective manner. This representation or concept is a function from the world to the individuals. As Lycan says, '... any such function is objectively describable, or so it would seem ... there

is nothing intrinsically perspectival about functions from worlds to individuals; any one could be described by anyone who had the right sort of mental apparatus or brain wiring.'[26]

However, Nagel's view is that the functional state of the bat having sonar sensation S is different from the bat's subjective consciousness. A functionalist takes it as an objective fact and tries to describe it as functions of the mind. However, an experience is held to be a conscious experience, which is likely for the subject of the experience to have it. Thus, we have to accept the qualitative feel of experience. This qualitative feel, unique to every distinguishable experience, is supposed to be what it is like for the subject of the experience to have the experience.

J. Searle argues that consciousness is subjective. Subjectivity is the most important feature of conscious mental states and processes, which is not possessed by other natural phenomena. Judgments are taken as 'subjective' when their truth or falsity is not a matter of fact or 'objective' criteria, but depends on certain attitudes and feelings of the maker of the judgment. For Searle, the term 'subjective' is an ontological category. The statement 'Someone is feeling pain in his/her leg' is completely objective, because it is true by the existence of a fact and is not dependent on the attitude or opinion of the observer. But the actual pain itself has a subjective mode of existence, which implies that consciousness is subjective. The term 'pain' is subjective as it is not equally accessible to any observer. Therefore, for Searle, every conscious state is always someone's conscious state.[27] Someone has a special relation to his/her own conscious states, which are not related with other people's conscious states. He says, 'Subjectivity has the further consequence that all of my conscious forms of intentionality that give me information about the world independent of myself are always from a special point of view. The world itself has no point of view, but my access to the world through my conscious states is always perspectival, always from my point of view.'[28]

According to Searle, a theory of consciousness needs to explain how a set of neurobiological processes can cause a system to be in a subjective state of sentience or awareness. We accept the view that subjectivity is a ground floor, irreducible phenomenon of natural science.

So, being objective cannot explain how this is possible. According to him, 'consciousness' stands for these subjective states of sentience or awareness that we possess when we are conscious, i.e. during the period we are not in a coma or are not unconscious.

Consciousness is, as Searle believes, essentially a subjective, qualitative phenomenon. It is not a mechanical state or a certain kind of set of dispositions to behaviour or a computer program, as many philosophers believe. There are two most common mistakes about consciousness such as that it can be analyzed behaviouristically or computationally. The Turing test shows that conscious mental states are mechanical or computational. It gives us the view that for a system to be conscious, it is both necessary and sufficient to have the right computer program or set of programs with the right inputs and outputs. There is no logical connection between the inner, subjective, qualitative mental states and the external, publicly observable output. Our mental states cannot be fully represented in a machine or in a computer. Because, somehow, we have subjective mental phenomena, which require a first-person perspective for proper understanding.

Searle describes 'subjectivity' as a rock-bottom element of the world. The world that we know to exist consists of particles, which are organized into systems including the biological systems. Some of these biological systems are conscious and that consciousness is essentially subjective. This subjective consciousness occupies a special ontological position. It is too fundamental to be an object of perception. As Searle puts it, 'But when we visualize the world with this inner eye, we can't see consciousness. Indeed, it is the very subjectivity of consciousness that makes it invisible in the crucial way. If we try to draw a picture of someone else's consciousness, we just end up drawing the other person (perhaps with a balloon growing out of his or her head). If we try to draw our own consciousness, we end up drawing whatever it is that we are conscious of.'[29]

When we try to observe the consciousness of other persons, we observe their conscious behaviour, structure and the casual relation between these behaviours and not the subjectivity of the person. There is something called subject of experience, which is an inner state and which eludes our observation. Observation is impossible in case of

subjectivity, as there is no distinction between observation and the thing observed, between perception and the object perceived.[30] Therefore, though we can easily observe another person, we cannot observe his/her subjectivity. Similarly, in our own case, we cannot observe our own subjectivity though we can be intuitively aware of it. It is my inner self which is ontologically identical with myself. All observation presupposes an observer who occupies a subjective point of view. The observer observes from a subjective point of view, and has a subjective feel about it.[31] Thus, phenomenal consciousness has distinctive subjective feels.

The subjective feeling or experience is a mental state. What we feel is not such that each part of our body feels it. It is 'I', who is an agent that feels such emotions. The 'I' is the central problem of consciousness. Neurosciences try to explain how conscious experience arises from the electrochemical processes of the brain. Even if they can prove conscious states to be caused by the neural states the brain, they cannot show how and why the conscious states belong to an 'I'. The 'I' is not a part of the brain. Consciousness, therefore, is not identical with the brain states, which cause it. The 'I' that has consciousness is not identical with the brain states either. The 'I' is distinct from the body.

An individual's desires, beliefs, and intentions are formed according to one's interaction with the world. There is a qualitative difference between the mental states of one person from others. This qualitative feature of one's mental states is, therefore, treated as the subjectivity of consciousness. Qualia are a part of subjective experience realized in the brain. Conscious experience involves neural activity and information processing. Thus, consciousness is defined in terms of the qualitative feel of experience. This qualitative feel is supposed to be for the subject of the experience. If the mental world is irreducible and we have a reasonable assurance that the mind, at any cost stands, beyond the horizon of the physical world, we can make a safe bet that the mind has a reality of its own and that physicalism, connectionism and identity theories of all sorts fail to understand the inner dynamics of the mind.[32]

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A Consensus Principle of Fairness

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The principle of fairness (or, fair play) holds out one of the most promising prospects for an acceptable theory of political obligation. My aim here is to arrive at a principle of fairness that most political philosophers would agree upon. This I will attempt by formulating a shared position on fairness theory among Simmons[2], Arneson[3], Cullity[4], and Klosko[5], who are considered the body builders of the Fair Play theory of Political Obligation. Each has advanced a version of the principle of fair play, and though they all agree on the essentials, each version is refined in different ways and in different degrees.

Let us start with Simmons's version of the principle of fair play. From preliminary sketches of this principle by H.L.A. Hart[6] and John Rawls[7], Simmons delineates the following three important features of the context within which obligations of fair play arise,[8] each of which I will discuss in turn:

(a) There must be an active scheme of social cooperation that is mutually beneficial.[9] Most noteworthy here is the scope of the word 'scheme'. While 'scheme' normally is suggestive of a small-scale venture run by a handful of participants, it also connotes, for our purposes, the working of an entire political community. With some qualifications—we shall momentarily look into them—on the nature of the schemes we are interested in, we will see that the same principle that generates obligations of fair play in small schemes also generates such obligations for the members of the body politic. The scheme must also be mutually beneficial. This restriction is made more perspicuous by Cullity, Klosko and Nozick[10], who stipulate that the scheme must be such that participating in it must represent a net benefit for the participant, and by Arneson, who stipulates also that the scheme supply a *collective benefit*.[11]

This last stipulation—that the scheme supply collective (or, non-excludable) benefits—may seem that the principle of fair play is not applicable to schemes which supply only excludable goods. But as Klosko and others show us, the fact is that the fair play principle explains the generation of obligation in schemes whether they provide excludable or nonexcludable goods. However, since the principle of fair play easily explains the obligations of a participant in schemes providing excludable goods, and also since a study of schemes providing nonexcludable benefits is closely related to our ultimate goal of explaining political obligation, we focus on schemes which supply nonexcludable goods. We may state the first requirement for the generation of obligations of fair play, then, as follows:

(a) There must be a scheme of social cooperation, providing nonexcludable goods, which is such that participation in it yields a net benefit for the participant.[12]

(b) Cooperation under the scheme involves at least a restriction of one's liberty.

Whether these restrictions must be rule-governed is a question that divides Simmons from Hart and Klosko. Whereas the latter two insist that the operation of a scheme be coordinated by rules, Simmons opines that an enterprise could be of the right sort which assigns burdens fairly but not in accord with any pre-established rules.

We may distinguish two kinds of rule-governedness in enterprises, which will help in determining the nature and extent of the role played by rules in restricting the liberty of individuals cooperating in a scheme. First, the conduct of an enterprise may be governed by a set of rules that is explicitly articulated beforehand. Simmons tentatively takes Hart as saying that an enterprise should be rule-governed in this sense, and naturally concludes that an enterprise need not be so rule-governed. But as he himself adds, '... perhaps my objection [to insisting that a scheme be rule-governed] simply involves a stricter reading of "system of rules" ...'[13] A plethora of examples, which we will not go into here, indicates that this construal of rule-governedness is not tenable. However, if we take 'rule-governed' simply to mean the requirement to contribute a fair share to the success of the scheme, we have a more

plausible interpretation because the very nature of the schemes we are interested in demands such contribution by at least some participants.

The difference between the two senses of 'rule-governedness' is roughly this: Whereas the first sense is concerned with explicitly stated rules on, for instance, how and what to do in order to bear a fair share of the burdens of cooperating in a particular scheme, the latter sense of 'rule-governedness' is concerned merely with this essential feature of the schemes we have in mind: it *requires* all the participants in a scheme to contribute to the ends of the scheme in ways which restrict their liberty without specifying what should be done or how it should be done in order to contribute to that scheme's ends. And it is this latter sense which we will consider the relevant one. The rule-governedness of these restrictions on a participant's liberty, then, is a natural consequence of the essential features of the kind of schemes we are interested in, and need not be an explicitly stated set of rules which specify the content and mode of the restrictions. With this understanding of rule-governedness, we may state the second feature thus: (b') Cooperation under the scheme involves at least a restriction, governed by rules, of one's liberty.

The third feature, viz., (c) The benefits yielded by the scheme may be availed in at least some cases by someone who does not cooperate when his turn comes, receives mention in all four accounts of fair play which we are considering. This is not surprising because any explanation of obligations of fair play can get off the ground only if there is at least one participant in a scheme who can enjoy its benefits without discharging his obligations. Since the fair play theory is geared toward explaining why someone has an obligation to contribute to the success of a scheme which benefits him through the labours of others, a complete lack of means to exploit a possibility of not discharging their obligations renders the theory of fair play uninteresting. It is this fact that necessitates the inclusion of feature (c) in any fair play account of (political) obligation.

It will prove useful to consolidate the foregoing thus: (C) Obligations of fair play arise in the context of schemes of social cooperation providing, by the labour of *some* participants' rule-governed loss of liberty, a net benefit, in the form of nonexcludable goods, to *all* the

participants regardless of their individual contributions to the scheme's success.

This by itself is insufficient to impute obligations of fair play to anyone who may have benefited by a scheme, though, because an accidental beneficiary of a scheme—such as a non-participant who nonvoluntarily receives a nonexcludable benefit provided by a scheme merely because he is unable to avoid it without inconveniencing himself—cannot rightly be held as being obligated to do his part in the scheme. A variety of ways have been proposed to get around this difficulty, all of which revolve around precisely defining a 'free rider' in a scheme of cooperation. Once the notion of a free rider is clarified, it is only a step to the statement of a principle of fairness. Intuitively, a free rider is someone who enjoys the benefits provided by others without contributing anything toward the provision of those benefits. The task at hand, then, is to fill out this intuition with a full account of the conditions under which one is a free rider, i.e. under which a person can justly be said to enjoy certain benefits without 'paying' for them.

Let me begin by asserting, with Klosko[14], the relative unimportance of a beneficiary's beliefs, values or state of mind in determining whether he or she has benefited by a scheme's provision of what may reasonably be taken as indispensable nonexcludable goods. While we cannot, as Simmons's arguments show, easily dismiss a beneficiary's subjective attitudes to excludable goods provided by a scheme, we may ignore those attitudes in the case of indispensable nonexcludable goods because we may presume that everybody needs them.[15]

We may now gear the discussion to follow to more narrowly bear upon indispensable nonexcludable goods, and determine the conditions under which a person enjoys these goods without contributing to their provision. A thorough and detailed list of such conditions occurs in Arneson[16] where he first defines the notion of a free rider, then states a principle of fairness that crucially depends on this definition. According to Arneson, a free rider is one who, under certain conditions, reasons as follows: Either other persons will contribute sufficient amounts to a scheme to assure continued provision of a collective

good, or they will not; in either case, I am better off if I do not contribute.

Some of the conditions which Arneson stipulates have already been built into (C), such as the condition that a cooperative scheme supply collective benefits, the condition that participation in the scheme supplies a net benefit to the participant, and the condition that all participants who contribute to the success of a scheme face some loss of liberty. By far, the most significant of the other four conditions that Arneson lists is what we may call the fair-distribution-of-costs-and-benefits requirement. According to this condition, 'the actual ongoing scheme [must] distribute the cost of supplying [a benefit] to all beneficiaries in a manner such that the payment requested of each individual beneficiary is fair'[17].

This requirement is stated in one form or another in all accounts of fair play, and the reason for its importance is not far to seek. At once this condition eliminates a powerful motivation for a potential free rider to refrain from bearing the burden allocated to him: if one participant in a scheme is apportioned a share of the scheme's benefits disproportionately higher than his input, and the next participant's reward is not commensurate with his labours, the latter has very good reason to refuse to cooperate in the scheme. It is this motivation that the above condition removes by requiring a fair distribution of burdens and benefits.

Regardless of the necessity of this requirement to successfully define free rider conduct, the fair distribution of costs and benefits condition is important for the additional intuitive reason that every individual must be fairly recompensed for his labours in a scheme. The problem of determining what exactly is a fair burden to lay on a participant in a scheme is a thorny one, but we may largely sidestep it here because it does not fall under the proper purview of the present inquiry. Suffice it to mention, with Klosko[18], that for our present purposes, we will be concerned only with the fairness of cooperative schemes as a whole, rather than with whether every particular individual has been treated fairly.

The remaining three conditions that Arneson says should be obtained for free riding to occur jointly strive to eliminate situations in which

a participant's motivation to contribute to the scheme is influenced by factors which somehow diminish the importance of the main consideration which we except should compel him to contribute, viz., the receipt of a net benefit from a scheme which displays the characteristics mentioned in (C). These factors are:

(d) additional benefits being externally supplied to supplement the benefit accruing from participation in the scheme,

(e) the choice of an individual to cooperate in a scheme being influenced by other member's choices, and

(f) a 'lower-than-threshold' number of members in a scheme providing benefits.

The necessity for this last factor is unclear. Why should it be objectionable if a smaller-than-recommended subset of the members of a community provides a good to the entire community for which everyone, appropriately, is expected to pay? No doubt, Arneson's concern is to avoid situations in which the costs to contributors, if they are too few, of producing a collective good far outweigh the benefits afforded by that good to all members. However, the possibility of free riding in even these situations in open, since they allow one to enjoy goods produced by others without payment. This being so, there seems to be no independent reason to exclude these situations in characterizing free rider conduct. We may, therefore, drop this factor in considering the conditions under which one is a free rider.

Factors (d) and (e) do mitigate the centrality of the receipt of a net benefit from the sort of scheme 'we have in mind' in determining our obligations to play a part in the scheme and, therefore, should at least be 'kept in mind' in precisely characterizing a free rider. But they certainly are not the only ones that can detract importance from what we just termed the centrality of the net benefit in determining one's obligations to a scheme. Consider a conspiracy, for instance, on the part of some current members of a scheme to supply incentives to other current members to become noncooperators in order to further some interest or other they may have. Such a conspiracy would no doubt vitiate the scheme and render the obligation-generating role of the receipt of a net benefit less important.

Considering the practical impossibility of cataloguing all possible situations which rob the receipt of a net benefit of its role in generating obligations of fair play, we may group together factors (d), (e) and others like them as follows: the schemes we are interested in do not operate under conditions which downplay the central role of the receipt of a net benefit in generating obligations of fair play. Since this is in any case a fundamental feature of the contexts that we are dealing with, we would do better to incorporate this restriction into (C) rather than insisting on the absence of 'down-playing factors' as a precondition for someone to be counted as a free rider.

The modified (C) would now be: (C') Obligations of fair play arise in the context of *equitable* schemes of social cooperation providing, by the labour of some participants' rule-governed loss of liberty, a net benefit, in the form of nonexcludable goods, to all participants regardless of their individual contributions to the scheme's success. It is evident here that the word 'equitable' carries the burden of ensuring that the receipt of a net benefit does not yield to other factors its pre-eminent role in generating obligations.

Let us now tentatively agree on this Arnesonian working definition of a free rider:

In schemes which are characterized by the features mentioned in (C'), and by none others that militate against these, a free rider is one who refuses to contribute a fair share to such schemes when they fairly distribute the costs of providing benefits due to the following reasoning: Either other persons will contribute sufficient amounts to a scheme to assure continued provision of a benefit, or they will not; in either case I am better off not contributing.

Call this working definition (W).

A major flaw in this formulation at once comes to mind, and that is that (W) requires someone to have gone through a certain process of reasoning in order to (partly) qualify to be a free rider. Why, one could ask, is it necessary for one to consciously reason one's way to free riderdom, when we really want to impute obligations to all free riders, whatever be their reasons or reasoning? Surely it is more relevant to our purposes to identify all free riders rather than just the ones who reason toward free riderhood in a particular fashion, and ascribe to all

of them obligations of fair play. The current definition of 'free rider', then, is too restrictive; what is called for is a broadening of the definition.

There is a further reason, though a minor one, to be dissatisfied with (W). The above definition makes it appear that a person must actually *refuse* to contribute a fair share of the labour involved in running a scheme. This makes it sound as if a person must first be asked to contribute a fair share to the scheme before he can be called a free rider if he refuses to oblige. Of course, this would leave out the entire range of noncooperators who are not asked to cooperate, who nonetheless benefit from a scheme; clearly, it is desirable to include these noncooperators as well in the set of free riders.

In fairness to Arneson, we must mention that he has a viewpoint from which the use of 'refuse' appears necessary. The term 'free rider' is often reserved for those who know they are expected to contribute but do not; on such a construal of 'free rider', a refusal would not amount to saying 'no' when pressed for a contribution, but would amount simply to an omission of the act of contributing. However, since we will want to include even those who do not know that they are expected to contribute in our definition of 'free rider', we will insist that the occurrence of 'refuse' in (W) is problematic.

Both these flaws, fortunately, are easily rectified. The first problem is removed simply by dropping from (W) the clause that requires a person to go through the reasoning mentioned in (W) before being able to be counted as a free rider. And the second is as easily dismissed merely by substituting 'does not, though able' for 'refuses'.

Note the clause 'though able'. The need for this becomes obvious when we recognize that an accidental beneficiary of a scheme who cannot do his part because of an *inability* cannot fairly be considered a free rider. We may, therefore, modify (W) to: In schemes which are characterized by the features mentioned in (C'), and by none others that militate against these, a free rider is one who does not, though able, contribute a fair share to such schemes when they fairly distribute the costs of providing benefits. Let us call these and similar definitions '(W)-like definitions'. Before stating the consensus definition of a free rider, however, it is instructive and interesting to study Cullity's conditions for the emergence of free rider conduct.

I will deal with Cullity's account at some length. As his conception of a free rider has to be extricated from his version of the principle of fairness, I will state the latter first, and then extract his (intended) definition of a free rider. The next step will be toward reconciling, if possible, Cullity's definition with (W) [and (W)-like definitions], after which we will state the consensus version of the principle of fairness. Since we would already have touched upon the fairness theory in the attempt to arrive at Cullity's proposed substitute for (W), this will provide some basis for discussion of fairness theory after such substitute for (W) is found.

Let me begin by stating Cullity's version of the fairness principle. According to him: If a person receives benefits from a scheme that satisfies the following conditions, it is unfair for her not to meet the requirements it makes of her in respect of her enjoyment of those benefits:

(i) The practice of participation in the scheme represents a net benefit for her.

(ii) It is not the case that practically everyone would be made worse off by the practice of participation in the recognition as obligatory of those further requirements that must, in fairness, be regarded as obligatory if the requirements in question are regarded as obligatory.

(iii) She is not raising a legitimate moral objection to the scheme.[19] Condition (i) is already embedded in (C'), and condition (iii), loosely implied. What is exciting here is condition (ii), and it has to be seen whether it contributes something new to the conditions under which a viable definition of free riding is possible, i.e. if it contributes something new to (W). It also needs to be seen whether some or all of the conditions stated in (C') and (W) are somehow implied by condition (ii) above.

Allow me to launch on the formidable task of unpacking condition (ii) by quoting Cullity's prototype of the above-mentioned principle of fairness. The prototype of the principle states: 'If a person is benefited by a scheme that makes fairly distributed requirements, the benefit is worth its cost, and it is not the case that practically everyone would be made worse off by the practice of regarding as obligatory those further

requirements that must in all fairness by regarded as obligatory if the requirements in question are regarded as obligatory, she is being unfair [if she does not contribute]'.[20]

It is clearer in the prototype what condition (ii) is about; let us first re-state it. For someone's conduct to be unfair, the following is one of the conditions that must be met. When a contribution by a beneficiary of a scheme is regarded as an obligatory requirement, there are also requirements of the beneficiaries of (like) schemes that must be regarded as obligatory simply because it is 'fair' to so regard them if the original requirement is regarded as obligatory. Now, if considering these further requirements of beneficiaries obligatory makes practically everyone worse off, then condition (ii) is violated; on the other hand, if it does not make practically everyone worse off (and conditions (i) and (iii) are not violated), then, if a beneficiary does not contribute his share to the scheme, his conduct is unfair.

A couple of related questions at once come to mind. First, why should it matter to determine whether one's conduct is fair with respect to a particular scheme if others are made worse off or better off with respect to other schemes, even if the natures of the requirements in both the relevant scheme and these other schemes are similar? Second, and more specifically, we need a clearer account of what is claimed when we say that 'these further requirements must *in fairness* be regarded as obligatory if the original requirement is regarded as obligatory.' What does this 'fairness' consist in? Let us take the second question first.

Though we could begin by attempting an abstract characterization of 'fairness', as used here, it is more suggestive to first illustrate the notion of 'fair generalization' with an example given by Cullity himself. Suppose there is a group of Enterprising Elves who confer the unsolicited benefit of polishing the shoes of anyone in a community who happens to leave them outside overnight, and then charge these unsuspecting beneficiaries an amount which is fair, not exorbitant. Now the key feature of this requirement—if we count it a requirement—to pay for the unasked-for benefit conferred by the Elves is this: it endorses a demand for payment for goods which are worth their cost, though they are thrust upon reluctant beneficiaries. If this demand is

endorsed, one may reason, all other demands of the same kind must also be endorsed in the absence of arguments to show the contrary. This, of course, would make everybody worse off. The manoeuvre of inferring something about the status of demands from the status of what may be considered a paradigmatic demand—in this case the Elves' demand—is what Cullity calls the 'fair generalization of a scheme'. I will not set myself the task of precisely defining the notion of fair generalization, but I will attempt to adequately characterize what is involved in fairly generalizing a scheme to an extent that will prove sufficient for our purposes.

It is fruitful first to look for what thing(s) exactly is/are fairly generalized. A plausible answer, which Cullity would probably assent to, seems to be that the status of a requirement of a participant in a scheme (as being obligatory or not), as determined in the context of that scheme, is what is being fairly generalized. Notice that the status of a requirement by itself is not independently fairly generalized. Such a position would commit Cullity to holding, for example, that it is obligatory for one to pay somebody who breaks into one's house to polish one's shoes just because we consider the requirement to pay the Elves who clean shoes when they are left outside obligatory. This is clearly something Cullity would not want to commit himself to because he would recognize a vast difference between someone breaking into one's house to clean one's shoes and the Elf who cleans one's shoes only when they are left outside. Although we may loosely say that the benefit is *thrust* on the beneficiary in both cases, it is evident that this benefit is not thrust upon one in the same way in both these cases.

The point Cullity seems to be driving at is this: in fairly generalizing a scheme we do not simply take a requirement in a particular scheme, ascertain its status and then claim that this requirement has the same status in *all* schemes; rather, in fairly generalizing a scheme, we make judgments on the status of requirements *with respect to kinds of* schemes, given the status of a requirement in a particular scheme *with respect to that scheme*. In other words, in generalizing a scheme fairly, we move from the status of a requirement *with respect to* a particular scheme to the status of similar requirements *with respect to* similar schemes (i.e. schemes similar to the particular scheme).

Let me resort to illustrating this understanding of fairly generalizing a scheme with reference to Cullity's Enterprising Elves. We correctly fairly generalize this scheme when we say that if paying the Elves is obligatory, all requirements to pay up in like schemes which are characterized by the conferring of an unsolicited benefit which is worth its cost are obligatory. We do not correctly fairly generalize this scheme, however, if we say, for instance, that all such requirements to pay in *any* scheme are obligatory if we regard the requirement to pay the Elves obligatory. Nor do we correctly fairly generalize this scheme when we hold that the requirement to pay is obligatory in all schemes which are characterized by only some of the features in the Elves' scheme.[21] We only have to consider the unintuitiveness of saying that a poor man is obligated to pay for an expensive yacht which is thrust upon him (and which is worth its cost) just because we hold that it is obligatory for him to pay the Elf for a benefit conferred under the same conditions.

This rough-and-ready understanding of fair generalization of a scheme should throw light on what is meant by 'in fairness' as it appears in Cullity's '... regarding as obligatory those further requirements that must *in fairness* be regarded as obligatory if the requirements in question are regarded as obligatory ....' There is a relationship between the use of the words 'in fairness' and the fair generalization of a scheme that is hard to miss, and it is this: if a scheme is fairly generalized, then it is fair to regard certain requirements as obligatory if a requirement in that scheme is held as obligatory. We may agree, then, that it is fair to regard the further requirements as obligatory, if the requirement in the 'base-case' scheme is regarded as obligatory whenever we fairly generalize a scheme.

With this, we may arrive—finally!—at the following understanding of condition (ii): if someone's conduct in a scheme is to be judged unfair when he does not pay for benefits received, it must not be the case that practically everybody is worse off when that scheme is fairly generalized. Cullity's principle of fairness, then, may be thus stated: If participation in a scheme brings a net benefit to someone, he has no legitimate moral objection to the scheme, the fair generalization of that

scheme does not make practically everybody worse off, and the participant does not do his fair share in that scheme, he is being unfair.

From Cullity's definition of a free rider as someone whose failure to pay for nonrival goods[22] under certain conditions makes his conduct unfair, we may infer that under conditions (i)–(iii), if one neglects to pay for nonrival goods, one is a free rider. It only remains to state the relationship between nonrivalness and nonexcludability before we can tie in this construal of 'free rider' with our working definition (W). Fortunately, there is a straightforward argument to show that all non-excludable goods must also be nonrival.

Cullity defines a nonexcludable good as one which if enjoyed by anybody, no one else in the scheme can practicably be prevented from doing so. Now if such a product were also not nonrival, it would be possible for one's consumption of it to adversely affect others' enjoyment of it. However, by its very nature, a rival good is such that it is possible to prevent others from enjoying it. This, however, is inconsistent with claiming that the good is nonexcludable; therefore, all nonexcludable goods are also nonrival.

A legitimate concern about this argument relates to the different senses of 'prevent' as used here. A rival good is one such good that one person's enjoyment of it reduces the amount available for other consumers. Therefore, it must be possible to prevent a potential consumer from enjoying a rival good by consuming it first. On the other hand, an excludable good is such that the potential consumer can be prevented from enjoying it by keeping him out. It would seem, then, that our argument slides from one sense of 'prevent' to the other.

However, this distinction between these two senses of 'prevent' does not appear to affect the validity of the argument if we are persuaded that a potential consumer who cannot be excluded from the set of people consuming a good is already consuming it. Clearly, his current consumption of this good guarantees that others cannot then prevent him from consuming it, whether by consuming it themselves or by other means. This reasoning seems to leave our conclusion that all nonexcludable goods are also nonrival intact.[23]

We may add that we do not make the converse claim that a good's being nonrival is sufficient for its being nonexcludable. Since all

nonexcludable goods are nonrival, we may restrict Cullity's definition of free riding to nonexcludable goods alone, which are the ones of interest to us in any case. A Cullitian definition of a free rider would have the form:

Under conditions (i)–(iii), if one neglects to pay for nonexcludable goods that one enjoys, one is a free rider.

We have now two definitions of a free rider; the first is our working definition (W) [and (W)-like ones], and the other is the Cullitian one just formulated. Both definitions involve a failure to pay, certain conditions holding, for nonexcludable goods provided by a scheme. Some of these conditions are different in the two definitions, but some in one definition seem to be implied by, or even repeat, some in the other. There was occasion to mention earlier that conditions (i) and (iii) of the Cullitian definition are not interesting because they are in accord with the provisions made in (W). Let us, therefore, explore the relationship, if any, between condition (ii) and the conditions in (W). As it turns out, we will have an answer in the course of this investigation to the other question we have been holding in abeyance, viz., why should it matter to determining whether one's conduct is fair with respect to a particular scheme if others are made worse off or better off with respect to other schemes?

As is clearly evident from his examples, Cullity's fair generalization move may best be viewed as an attempt to generalize the status of requirements with respect to certain schemes from the status of a requirement with respect to a particular scheme. Rather than specify the general features of the contexts in which free riding is defined— as Arneson, for instance, does—Cullity prefers to determine whether free riding occurs in a context by asking if practically everyone is made worse off when that context is fairly generalized. So we may recast our question to ask that if practically everyone is not worse off when a scheme is fairly generalized, what does it have to do with deciding whether free riding has occurred in that particular scheme.

I will refrain from attempting to make such a connection because there seem to be strong reasons to think that none such exists. Consider a group of one hundred people, twenty of whom comprise a minority and the other eighty, a majority. Let us say that this minority is engaged

in providing a nonexcludable good that the majority also enjoys (because the good is nonexcludable). An important detail in the scenario we are painting is that the members of the majority, for whatever reasons, cannot in any way contribute to providing this benefit because it is such that nobody but the members of the specialized minority can produce it. Also important are the facts that the minority manufactures this benefit solely for its own consumption, and that the benefit, though it accidentally enriches the lives of the majority-members, has not really been solicited by the majority-members. Since the minority-members are engaged in a cooperative effort to produce a benefit for themselves—which let us say they all must have—we may regard the requirement of all of them to contribute to its production as obligatory. Are the majority-members free riders?

Now let us fairly generalize this scheme. Posit a much larger scale, say a population of a million people, twenty per cent of whom constitute the minority which produces the same good which all of the million people enjoy. Clearly, no one is worse off in this scheme than the members of the original hundred-strong scheme; in fact, more people are better off. Therefore, the condition that practically everybody must not be made worse off when a scheme is fairly generalized—condition (ii) in the Cullitian definition of a free rider—is satisfactorily met. If the other two conditions are also met, one would except to see evidence of free riding in the original small-scale scheme if Cullity's definition is right. It seems unintuitive to say, though, that the eighty majority-members in the small scheme are free riders when we have stipulated that they are somehow incapacitated to contribute. We have a case, then, where all of the conditions in the Cullitian definition of free rider are satisfied without, therefore, leading to the emergence of free rider conduct.

One may object that this move from small-scale to large-scale is not really fair generalization. However, this should not throw a spanner in our works. If this criticism has force, we could take all schemes, like the hundred-member scheme above, in which the majority-minority divide is present, and in each of which (different) nonexcludable goods are produced by the minority-members alone. As before, the minorities need the goods which accidentally benefits the majorities. In all these

cases, nobody is made worse off. Since this fair generalization of the original scheme (the hundred-strong scheme) does not make practically everyone worse off, we may give an argument similar to the one we just gave to the effect that all the Cullitian conditions are satisfied even though free riding does not occur. That is, assuming again that the other two conditions are also met, we see that conditions (i) through (iii) are not jointly sufficient to guarantee free riding if one does not pay.

Not only this, with minor changes of detail in the hundred-strong scheme, it becomes evident that satisfaction of condition (ii) is not necessary for defining free riding either. We only have to establish a clear case of free riding in a scheme which, when fairly generalized, makes everyone worse off. Take the same hundred-strong scheme we were discussing but stipulate this time that the majority-members *are* capable of contributing to the production of the nonexcludable good. Let the nonexcludable good be one that is most efficiently produced by a work force numbering hundred, and suppose that any more or fewer hands in the production of this good only serve to upset the optimal manpower requirement. Since only twenty people in this hundred-strong scheme are contributing, the majority-members are clearly free riders. On fairly generalizing this scheme, we find that it is fair to require the majority-members of the million-strong scheme—say that exactly hundred members in this scheme are currently producing the nonexcludable good just described—to contribute if it is fair to demand this of the eighty people in the hundred-strong scheme, which it is. But requiring the majority-members to contribute makes almost everyone worse off because a once efficiently produced good which was previously available to all million members now has to be thrust upon everyone at a higher cost to each.

We have our case, then, where free riding occurs in a scheme which when fairly generalized makes a vast majority of people worse off; satisfaction of condition (ii) is not necessary for free riding to obtain.

All this is not to say that an account of free riding cannot be given along Cullitian lines; but the proposed version seems somehow inadequate, and certainly not to be preferred over the Arnesonian (W).

With one more foray, we may end our excursion into Cullity's account of free riding and fairness, and concentrate instead upon (W).

Notice that according to (W), the majority-members of the schemes in which they are unable to contribute are not labelled free riders because (W) requires someone *who is able* to refrain from contributing in order for free rider conduct to emerge. Since these majority-members are not able to contribute, i.e. since it is not in their power to contribute, one condition for free rider conduct to obtain is not satisfied; therefore, we are not held to saying that the majority-members are free riders, and this is in accord with our intuitions about the situation.

In fairness to Cullity, we should also examine the case which he claims is not amenable to the equivalent of (W) but which is explained by his definition of free rider. Take his Shoe Repairing Convention: One moves into an area where there is a well-established convention (of which one is unaware) that leaving one's shoes outside one's house amounts to a request to have them fixed. But when his shoes are repaired, he refuses to pay.[24]

Implied by Cullity is that (W)-like formulations can disqualify demands of the sort exemplified by the Enterprising Elves on at least one of the two grounds of excludability of the goods, or the non-cooperativeness of the scheme involved. However, (W)-like formulations also disqualify demands made in schemes like that of the Convention on the same grounds, where the produced good is excludable and the scheme is noncooperative. In other words, Cullity's complaint suggests that (W)-like formulations disqualify demands in both kinds of schemes whereas one's intuitions clearly favour disqualifying demands for payment in one class of schemes (Enterprising Elves-type) and allowing these demands in the other class of schemes (Shoe Repairing Convention-type).

A little thought shows that Cullity's own formulation avoids this pitfall, if pitfall it be. On fairly generalizing the two kinds of schemes, viz., the Enterprising Elves kind of scheme and the Shoe Repairing Convention kind of scheme, the former makes practically everyone worse off, and the latter, not worse off. The Cullitian formulation would thus preclude demands for payment in the first kind of scheme, but sanction such demands in the second. Since this outcome is in tune

with our intuitions about these situations, Cullity claims this consequence of his formulation as a point in favour of this formulation over (W)-like formulations.

To say that the Cullitian formulation scores a point on this issue is to say what is not readily disputable. But to go a further step and assert that, therefore, the Cullitian formulation *scores over* (W)-like formulations would at the very least require argument. For in the first instance, (W)-like formulations do not disqualify the demands of the Shoe Repairing Convention and such other schemes. Since (W)-like formulations only assert, among other things, that *if* a good is nonexcludable (and certain other conditions hold) then failure to pay constitutes free riding, it would be more accurate to hold that (W)-like formulations deliver no verdict on cases akin to the Convention, rather than hold, as Cullity does, that they *disqualify* the demands made in these schemes. The criticism that could now be levelled at (W)-like formulations is that they cannot process certain kinds of schemes while the Cullitian formulation can. But equally, (W)-like formulations successfully handle other situations like the majority-minority examples in which the Cullitian formulation actually yields counter-intuitive results, in the sense that it insists that free riding occurs in the hundred-strong scheme where there really is none.

However, we need not be inspired by such a you-suffer-the-same-defect-too mentality in choosing (W)-like formulations over Cullitian formulations as the better account of free riding; for there is at least one strong reason, which we have already adumbrated, that speaks for (W)-like formulations. To repeat, whereas (W)-like formulations clearly specify the conditions under which free riding occurs, the Cullitian formulation relies on a very tenuous connection between schemes and their fair generalizations in order to specify the same. No doubt the fair generalization move admirably handles the case of the Enterprising Elves, and may well display such success in some other situations, too. However, without a full exposition of the connection between schemes and their fair generalizations, it would be premature to embrace Cullity's account of free riding. While, as we have said before, there is in principle nothing against making such connections, we must reject the Cullitian formulation in the absence of convincing arguments to show

the necessity of these connections. For this reason, I will favour the (W) extracted from Simmons, Arneson and Klosko over the Cullitian definition for an account of free riding, and then of fairness.

Now that we have Cullity out of the way, we may state our consensus definition of 'free rider' thus:

(FR) In schemes which are characterized by the features mentioned in (C'), and by none others that militate against them, a free rider is one who does not, though he is able, contribute a fair share to such schemes when they fairly distribute the costs of providing benefits.

Only one more task needs to be performed before we can state the consensus version of the principle of fair play, and that is to make the connection between free riding and fairness.

We may note at the outset that not all unfairness consists in free riding. A full account of the relationship between these two would specify the conditions under which one implies the other (or under which they imply each other). But a limited answer to 'What is the connection between free riding and fairness?' is sufficient for our purposes. Specifically, it is enough for us to establish the following conditional: If one is a free rider, as defined in (FR), then one is unfair. We will not try to defend the obviously tenuous claim that one is a free rider if one is unfair because as we just said, not all kinds of unfairness consist in free riding. To establish the desired conditional is to argue for the impossibility of both being a free rider and being fair. Such an argument is not far to seek, though, for it can be generated from our philosophers' very conception of a free rider as one whose conduct, under certain conditions, is unfair and, therefore, there is no free rider whose conduct is fair.

At this point, we can formulate the consensus version of the principle of fair play by appeal to the definition (FR): If anybody is a free rider, then his conduct is unfair (because, being a free rider, he fails to pay for benefits received). Spelt out fully, we have the following consensus principle of fair play:

(FP) In contexts characterized only by the features mentioned in (C'), a person's conduct is unfair if he can be described as a free rider in accordance with the provisions in (FR).[25]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Simmons, John, *Moral Principles and Political Obligation.*
3. Arneson, Richard J., 'Fairness and Free Riders', *Ethics* 1982–83.
4. Cullity, Garrett, 'Moral Free Riding', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Winter 1995.
5. Klosko, George, *The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation.*
6. Hart, H.L.A., 'Are there any Natural Rights?' *Philosophical Review*, v. 64.
7. Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice.*
8. Simmons, John, *Moral Principles and Political Obligation*, pp. 104–8.
9. Rawls suggests without elaboration that the scheme must also be just; but with great insight, Simmons argues that a scheme need not be just in order for it to generate obligations of fair play. In fact, he even shows that we are sometimes bound by obligations to unjust schemes. In what follows, we will assume, along with Simmons, that a scheme need not be just in order for it to generate fair play obligations.
10. Nozick, Robert, *Anarchy, State and Utopia.*
11. A 'collective good', according to Arneson, is one which if anyone is consuming it, it is unfeasible to prevent anyone else from consuming it. This is just nonexcludability, as defined by Cullity.
12. For present purposes, a rudimentary understanding of 'participant' as someone who is intimately tied to the scheme will suffice. We will reserve discussion of a definition of 'participant' for another occasion.
13. Simmons, John, *Moral Principles and Political Obligation*, pp. 105–6.
14. Klosko, George, *The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation*, chap. 2, sec. 4.
15. See Klosko for forceful arguments in support of the necessity of some nonexcludable goods.
16. Arneson, Richard J., 'Fairness and Free Riders', pp. 621–3, *Ethics*, 1982–83.
17. Arneson, Richard J., 'Fairness and Free Riders', p. 622, *Ethics*, 1982–82.
18. Klosko, George, *The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation*, p. 63.
19. Cullity, Garrett, 'Moral Free Riding', p. 18, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Winter 1995.
20. Cullity, Garrett, 'Moral Free Riding', p. 14, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Winter 1995.
21. It is indeed a prodigious task to delineate even some of the features which may be considered 'essential' to determine likeness of schemes. This is a matter which we may best leave for another essay, relying for now on our ethical intuitions about what makes cases significantly like.

22. According to Cullity, a *nonrival* good is a good such that one person's enjoyment of it does not diminish the benefits available to anyone else from its enjoyment.
23. Still, one could insist that the fact that a potential consumer cannot be kept out of enjoying a nonexcludable good does not entail that the good is nonrival. The reason, one could go on, is that a nonexcludable good could be such that one person's consumption of it diminishes the amount available to others, thus making it a rival good.

    But this argument ignores the fact that even if the availability of the nonexcludable good in question could shrink, everybody is already enjoying it by virtue of the good's nonexcludability. It is evident that the question of preventing someone from enjoying it by consuming that good first, therefore, does not arise.

    In any event, it does not appear that the supply of a nonexcludable good could shrink. If prevention by early consumption cannot be effected, the quantity available does not diminish; if this is so, the good must be nonrival. Thus, the definitions of nonrivalness and nonexcludability entail that if a good exhibits the latter, it must also exhibit the former.
24. Cullity, Garrett, 'Moral Free Riding', pp. 15–6, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Winter 1995.
25. Of course, (FP) recommends that one should exhibit fair behaviour by contributing to a cooperative scheme from which one has received benefits that exceed the cost of one's contribution.

The Hacker Ethics

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Computer ethics as a branch of applied ethics studies and analyzes the social and ethical impacts of information technology. At the core of our technological time stands a fascinating group of people who call themselves hackers. Though, they are not widely acclaimed, everyone is aware of their achievements, which form a large part of our new, emerging society's technological basis: the internet and web, the personal computer and an important portion of the software used for running them. A hacker is a person who enjoys exploring the details of programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities. He programmes enthusiastically. He enjoys programming rather than just theorizing about programming. He is capable of appreciating hack value and is good at programming quickly. A hacker is an expert at a particular programme or one who frequently does work using it or on it; as in a 'Unix hacker'. He can be an expert or enthusiast of any kind. He enjoys the intellectual challenge of creatively overcoming or circumventing limitations unlike the majority of the users who prefer to learn only the minimum necessary. The term 'hacker' also tends to connote membership in the global community defined by the net. It also implies that the person described is seen to subscribe to some version of the hacker ethic.

The hackers' 'Jargon file' defines them as people who program enthusiastically and who believe that information sharing is a powerful positive good, and that it is an ethical duty of hackers to share their expertise by writing free software and facilitating access to information and computing resources wherever possible.[1] The hacker ethic refers to the feeling of right and wrong, to the ethical ideas of this community

of people, that knowledge should be shared with other people who can benefit from it and that important resources should be utilized rather than wasted. This has been the hacker ethic ever since a group of Massachusetts Institute of Technology's passionate and enthusiastic programmers started calling themselves hackers in the early sixties. But the media started applying the term hackers to computer criminals later in the mid eighties. Only later did the term 'hacker' acquire negative connotations. The problem of ethics seldom arises at the beginning of the research programme when imagination explores various alternatives towards the solution of technical problems. It is only when we start using the successful innovation that the problem arises. But this has happened with so many other media, including the internet, in contemporary times. The internet and web technologies have provided ease of access to information and an efficient communication channel for those who use it. However, the ease of use and access to information has fostered a new category of criminal activity and behaviour. The term 'hacker' began to be used to refer to those who used computers for illegal actions, especially causing havoc over the internet, either by infiltrating sites, releasing viruses or causing denial of service on computers, rendering them inoperable. Resisting this change in usage, many old-line computer enthusiasts pushed for a distinction between 'crackers' and 'hackers'.

In order to avoid the confusion with virus writers and intruders into information system, hackers started calling these destructive computer users crackers.[2] The term hacker, they hoped, would continue to have its original, heroic meaning, while cracker would refer to those who engage in illegal activities. The special problem in the internet is not the hacker, but those who deliberately interfere and create viral infection. This has not so far occurred in case of other innovations, though perhaps something analogous may be found in them also. And, if so, it deserves the attention of those who are concerned with this dimension of human creation.

The impressive factor about hackers is the fact that the best-known symbols of our time—the net, the personal computer and software such as the Linux operating system were all created primarily by some enthusiastic individuals who just started to realize their ideas with

other like-minded individuals working in a free rhythm. A hacker uses the computer for his social ties, i.e. e-mail and net are great ways to have a community. For him, a computer is also a source of entertainment. Entertainment corresponds to passion; it is the state of being motivated by something intrinsically interesting, enticing and joyful. They do something because they find it very interesting and they like to share this interesting thing with others. They do not worry about making much money. Thus, one may get both entertainments from the fact that he is doing something interesting and he also avails of the social part. Thus, a lot of hackers work together because they enjoy what they do. They believe that there is no higher stage of motivation than that. A similar spirit can be found in hackers like Vinton Cerf, the father of the Internet, Steve Woznaik, who built the first personal computer, and Linus Torvalds, the originator of Linux operating system.[3] This is a general spirit of hackers, i.e. they programme because programming challenges are of intrinsic interest to them. Problems related to programming arouse genuine curiosity in the hacker and make him eager to learn more. He is also enthusiastic about this interesting thing; it energizes him. Hacker activity is also joyful. It often has its roots in playful explorations. Eric Raymond, a well-known defender of hacker culture—summing up hacker's activity spirit in his description of the Unix hacker's philosophy—uses the word 'passion', i.e. the dedication to an activity that is intrinsically interesting, inspiring and joyous.[4] The attitude of passionate intellectual inquiry is not limited to computer hackers alone. The academic world can be seen as its much older predecessor. It can be found in Plato who emphasized 'a passion or love for wisdom'.[5] The same attitude may be found in any number of other spheres of life—among artists, artisans, and the information professionals from managers and engineers to media makers and designers, etc. It can be further applied to electronics and music. It can be found at the highest level of any science or art.

Computer hackers can be considered as an excellent example of a more general work ethic, i.e. the hacker work ethic, which gains ground in our new network society in which the role of information professionals is expanding. Hacker work ethic challenges the social ethic of the capitalistic culture that has long governed our lives and

still maintains a powerful hold on us. The capitalist spirit describes the notion of work as a duty. It is an obligation, which the individual is supposed to feel and does feel towards the content of his professional activity. Not only is a developed sense of responsibility absolutely indispensable here, but also in general an attitude, which at least during working hours, is freed from continual calculations of how, the customary wage may be earned with a maximum of comfort and a minimum of exertion. Labour must be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling.[6] The capitalist spirit advises employers to reinforce the idea in workers of wanting to do one's job as well as possible by making it a matter of conscience. In other words, work must be seen as an end in itself; at work, one must do one's part as well as possible; and work must be regarded as a duty, which must be done because it has to be done. But the radical nature of general hackerism consists in proposing an alternative spirit for the network society. It is only in this sense in which all hackers are really crackers, i.e. they try to crack the lock of the iron cage.[7] Hackers want to realize their passions, and they are ready to accept that the pursuit even of interesting tasks may not always be perfect bliss. Passionate and creative hacking also entails hard work. Hard work is needed in the creation of anything even just a little bit greater. If needed, hackers are also ready for the less interesting parts necessary for the creation of the whole. The meaningfulness of the whole makes even its more boring aspects worthy.

Another important feature in the hackers' work ethic is their relation to time. Hacker creations, like the Linux operating system, the Net and the PC, were not developed in an office between the hours of nine and five. This free relation to time has always been typical of hackers, who appreciate an individualistic rhythm of life. The majority of the managements still focusses too much on the external factors of work, like the workers' time and place, instead of inciting the creativity on which the company's success depends in the information economy. Information economy's most important source of productivity is creativity, and it is not possible to create interesting things in a constant hurry or in a regulated manner from nine to five. So, even for purely economic reasons, it is important to allow for playfulness and individual

styles of creativity since, in the information economy, the culture of supervision turns easily against its desired objectives. Hackers have always respected the individual. They have always been anti-authoritarian. The hacker ethic also reminds us—in the midst of all the curtailment of individual worth and freedom that goes on in the name of 'work'—that our life is here and now. Work is a part of our continuously ongoing life, in which there must be room for other passions too. Reforming the forms of work is a matter not only of respecting the workers but also of respecting human beings as human beings. Hackers do not subscribe to the adage 'time is money' but rather to the adage 'it's my life'.[8]

Besides, the hacker work ethic is the hacker money ethic. For hackers, the basic organizational factor in life is not work or money but passion and desire to create something socially valuable together. But the capitalist hackers share the spirit of the old capitalism, the Protestant money ethic. The *summum bonum* of Protestant ethic is to earn more and more money.[9] In tune with the protestant ethics focus on money, the supreme goal of capitalism is the increase of capital. On the other hand, the hacker ethics emphasizes passionate and free rhythmed activity. Hence, there is an inherent tension in the idea of hackerism within a traditional capitalism. The tension between them is often resolved in practice by dropping the hacker ethics and following the guidelines of the protestant ethics. The hacker ethics connected with the development of information technology has been a feature of all innovations, which always have been pursued in the beginning by idealistic-minded enthusiasts and later, when successful, are taken up by large business interests who alone can manufacture, market and invest in further development of what has been achieved. Bill Gates' Microsoft serves as a good example for this instance. Gates was just like a hacker when he co-founded the company Microsoft in 1975. He had a passion for computers from his childhood and used all the available time for programming. He gained wide respect as a hacker by programming the first interpreter of BASIC programming language. Thus, Gates along with his friend Paul Allen, founded Microsoft with initial intention of creating programming languages for personal computers from a hackerist starting point. But in Microsoft's subsequent

history, the profit motive has taken precedence over the passion. They started sharing the capitalist hackerism. Since capitalist hackerism shares the protestant ethics goal of maximizing money, this focus is bound to influence and finally dominate the work ethic of an enterprise.[10] When money becomes the highest end in itself, passion is no longer an essential criterion for work choices. Projects are chosen primarily on the basis of the greatest promise of profit. Recognition, then, is determined by ones power position—one's place within the organization and one's personal wealth.

Combining hackerism and the current form of capitalism, a group of hackers defend a new type of economy based on the so-called open source enterprise that develops software on the open model. The spiritual father of this movement is Richard Stallman, the founder of the Free Software Foundation. Stallman's version of the hacker money ethic does not oppose making money, just making money by closing of information from others. According to Richard Stallman, free software is a matter of freedom, not price. Free software means that you, the user, have certain freedom; the freedom to help your neighbour by giving him/her a copy of the programme, and the freedom to help build your community by adding new capabilities to the programme and releasing them so other people can use them and further build on them. This is important because it presets voluntary co-operation, encourages civic spirit. Every society depends on goodwill to function. There is no other possible basis for a livable world. People have faced many alternatives for goodwill that didn't work well. The general fellowship that leads you to tell someone the time of day, even though you are not going to make any money from it, is what makes the world go round. The most fundamental way of helping other people is to teach people how to do things better, to tell people that things that you know that will enable them to better their lives. For people who use computers, this means sharing the recipes you use on your computer, in other words, the programmes you run. Sharing software between computer users is the most natural form of cooperation.[11] Thus, this hacker open model could be transformed into a social model. It can be used as an effective means for joining forces and later disseminating and developing the idea further. Thus, the hacker model can bring

about great things in cyber space without any mediation from governments and corporations.

Another element present within the hacker ethic is the network ethic or nethic. It addresses ideas such as freedom of expression on the net and access to the net for all, i.e. the freedom of expression in action, privacy to protect the creation of an individual lifestyle and a rejection of passive receptiveness in favour of one's passion. Thus, the hackers value the individual's own activity which interconnects all the elements of hackers nethic. 'Freedom of expression is a means towards being a publicly active member of society, receiving and articulating various views. Privacy secures one's activity in creating a personal lifestyle, because surveillance is used in order to persuade people to live in certain ways or to deny legitimacy to lifestyles that deviate from the ruling norms. Self-activity emphasizes the realization of a person's passion instead of encouraging a person to be just a passive receiver in life.'[12] Another important feature of hackers' nethic is caring, which means concern for others as an end in itself and a desire to rid the network society of the survival mentality. A hacker institution at the heart of the net's development, the 'Internet Society' supports the diffusion of the net and the teaching of network skills to all who have been left out of the development of enterprises and governments. According to them, there must be 'no discrimination in use of the Internet on the basis of race, colour, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.'[13] It also includes the goal of getting everybody to participate in the network and to benefit from it, to feel responsible for longer-term consequences of the network society and to directly help those who have been left on the margins of survival.

Looking at these three levels of hacker ethics—hacker work ethic, hacker money ethic and hacker nethic, we can find the values of passion, freedom, social worth, openness, activity, caring and creativity. These values will have a significant role in the formation of our new society. These values can be considered as an alternative spirit for the technological development of our information age. The technological creations of our time, like the Internet, the PC and the Linux operating system were all created with this spirit. Thus, we find that a hacker

who lives according to the hacker ethic on all three of these levels—work, money and nethic—gains the community's highest respect. The hacker work ethic consists of melding passion with freedom. In the hacker money ethic, they do not see money as a value in itself but motivate their activity with the goals of social worth and openness. The nethic gives importance to the values of activity and caring. With all these values, the hacker becomes a true hero when he manages to honour the value of creativity, i.e. the imaginative use of one's own abilities, the surprising continuous surpassing of oneself and giving to the world, a genuinely valuable new contribution.

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On Wittgenstein and the Inexpressibility of Ethics

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Consider the following two remarks of Ludwig Wittgenstein that appear contradictory to each other:

(a) If a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world. Our words, as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water if I were to pour out a gallon over it.[1]

And, his remark about *Tractatus* that

(b) The sense of the book is an ethical one. I once wanted to include in the preface a sentence which actually is not now in it but which I will write out for you here since it will perhaps be a key (to the book) for you. I wanted, then, to write: my work consists of two parts: of that which is under consideration here and of all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one.[2]

As (b) asserts that *Tractatus* is about Ethics, Cyril Barrett maintains that, contrary to the general perception, for Wittgenstein, 'it is not primarily a work on logic and language. It is an ethical work.'[3]

Since (a) admits the impossibility of a book on Ethics and (b) asserts that *Tractatus* is a book on Ethics, the question arises: Is Wittgenstein inconsistent in his views of Ethics? Or whether Wittgenstein changed his views? Or was he mistaken? This paper argues for none of these alternatives; rather, it tries to find out as to how it is possible to abridge

the apparent differences in his view. It moves for the accommodation of these apparently conflicting views into Wittgenstein's inexpressibility view of ethical values. It explores and critically expounds Wittgenstein's view that ethics cannot be put into words and that the experiences of ethical value are ineffable. In the process, it tries to understand and clarify some misconceptions regarding Wittgenstein's views of ethics.

Wittgenstein's view on the inexpressibility of ethics is based on his distinction between the realms of 'sayable' and 'showable'. Whereas sayable is the realm of pscho-physical world to which belongs language and everything about which something can be said, showable is the realm which transcends everything and nothing can be said about it. In order to get a clearer picture, let us further analyze this point. By way of drawing a distinction between the realms of sayable (what can be said) and unsayable or showable (what can not be said), he propounds that ethics—like aesthetics, religious belief, metaphysics and philosophy—belongs to the realm of 'showable' or mystical, therefore, it cannot be put into words. Underneath his distinction between 'sayable' and 'showable' lies his conviction in the principle of Okhams's razor that believes that unnecessary entities should not be multiplied. The 'saying' and 'showing' distinction differentiates between a proposition and a pseudo-proposition—an expression that says nothing. The difference between them is that whereas a genuine proposition always refers to a fact (a reality), a pseudo-proposition does not represent any fact whatsoever. Pseudo-propositions are classified into three categories: meaningless, lacking sense and nonsensical. The *TLP* 3.328 and 5.47321 hold that a sign is meaningless if it is useless and unnecessary and, thus, serves no logical purpose. Different from meaningless propositions, those pseudo-propositions which lack sense do serve a logical purpose but do not say anything as they do not represent any fact in the world. Thus, tautologies, contradictions, propositions of logic and mathematics lack sense. Since a tautology admits all possible conditions and a contradiction admits no such situation, they fail to represent any reality (*TLP* 4.462). Further, a nonsensical pseudo-proposition serves no logical purpose. The propositions of philosophy, ethics, aesthetics and religion belong to this category. These propositions say nothing, as they do not picture any fact/reality of the world. Unlike those pseudo-propositions

which lack sense, e.g. propositions of logic which show their form, the pseudo-propositions of ethics do not show themselves. Thus we see that the underlying criterion about genuineness of a proposition is the representation of a fact/reality by that particular proposition. A proposition has to represent a fact in order to be a real one. Just as a real proposition represents a fact, Wittgenstein says that a proposition is the picture of the reality. A proposition in order to be a real proposition has to picture a reality in the world—the world which consists of facts (i.e. the psycho-physical or material world). There is no proposition to picture any transcendental entity (of the supernatural or sense of the world) because the transcendental entity is not a fact. Since a transcendental entity is not a fact, any sign which attempts to describe it actually does not picture anything and, hence, fails to be meaningful. Therefore, such a sign is not a real proposition but a pseudo-proposition—a sign which appears to be a proposition but actually is not a proposition. Thus, we see that the trinity of the interconnected relationship brought out by the above analysis—between proposition picture, and fact—is to be found only in the psycho-physical world. For Wittgenstein, as there is no fact in ethics, it does not belong to this world. That is why there are no ethical propositions—ethical propositions are pseudo-propositions—they are nonsensical expressions.

The above-described *Tractarian* notion of the inexpressibility of ethics broadens in Wittgenstein's 'Lecture on Ethics'[4] which does not fully accept G.E. Moore's definition of ethics as 'the general enquiry into what is good'. With the help of following synonyms and parables, Wittgenstein illustrates his concept of 'ethics':

(1) Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable.
(2) Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life.
(3) Ethics is the enquiry into what is really important.
(4) Ethics is the enquiry into what makes life worth living.
(5) Ethics is the enquiry into the right way of living.

For Wittgenstein, the above described features of ethics are 'wider synonymous expressions'—wider than that of Moore—and that is why he wanted that these should replace 'ethics as the general enquiry into what is good'. There is no need to emphasize here the point that for Wittgenstein these synonymous expressions of 'ethics' are not the

definitions of 'ethics' but only its 'characteristic features' which facilitate one's understanding 'as to what it is that ethics is concerned with'. These are not definitions of ethics because there is no possibility of any such definition. However, the question which arises here is: why are these not to be taken as definitions of ethics? For an answer to this question, one has to see Wittgenstein's distinction between a word's trivial or relative sense and ethical or absolute sense. It is the centre point of Wittgenstein's view of the inexpressibility of ethics. For Wittgenstein, what is striking about the above described expressions— from (1) to (5)—about ethics.

> ... is that each of them is actually used in two very different senses. I will call them the trivial or relative sense on the one hand and the ethical or absolute sense on the other. If, for instance, I say that this is a *good* chair, this means that the chair serves a certain predetermined purpose and the word good here has only meaning so far as this purpose has been previously fixed upon. In fact, the word good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard. Thus when we say that this man is a good pianist we mean that he can play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity. And similarly if I say that it is important for me not to catch cold I mean that catching cold produces certain describable disturbances in my life and if I say that this is the right road I mean that it's the right road relative to a certain goal. Used in this way these expressions don't present any difficult or deep problems. But this is not how ethics uses them.[5]

For Wittgenstein, these are not the senses of words 'good' and 'right' in which ethics uses them as they express only relative values whereas the fundamental concern of ethics is the absolute values. The relative sense of these words is factual and expresses relative value, whereas the absolute sense is ethical which is inexpressible and which can only be grasped or *shown*. Wittgenstein, in the following way, has drawn the difference between the expressions of relative and absolute values:

> Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said 'well, you play pretty badly' and suppose I answered 'I know, I'm playing badly but I don't want to play any better', all the

other man could say would be 'Ah, then that's all right'. But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said 'You're behaving like a beast' and then I were to say 'I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better,' could he then say 'Ah, then that's all right'? Certainly not; he would say 'Well, you ought to want to behave better.' Here you have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment.[6]

Although Wittgenstein accepts the statement 'Well, you ought to want to behave better' as a statement of absolute value, he is of the view that it actually does not express any absolute value but only hints upon it in the way that one can grasp it. That is why he is of the view that there cannot be any statement of absolute value or ethics and precisely it is this reason that there cannot be any book on ethics.

Thus, we see that Wittgenstein's basic reason for the inexpressibility of ethics is that since language can express only that which is natural or factual, therefore ethics, in which there are no facts but which is supernatural, cannot be expressed.

At this point of discussion, one basic apprehension in accepting Wittgenstein's view of the inexpressibility of ethics seems to be that it turns out to be against the ordinary usage of 'ethics'. There are some ethical propositions and terms acceptable to every society and civilization. No one would deny the authenticity and truthfulness of the propositions like 'one must return one's debt', and 'it is morally wrong to punish an innocent person'. No one would deny that there is an involvement of moral element in these and other similar propositions. However, as corresponding to moral terms such as pity, courage, good, love, etc., there lie no fact, the questions arise: will they lose their moral content in Wittgenstein? And, will it be erroneous to say that they are ethical terms? An obvious answer to these question is 'no'. No one, not even Wittgenstein, can deny that these propositions and terms possess ethical sense, albeit a relative one. Notwithstanding this, Wittgenstein's ethical position is different from what is ordinarily believed to be an ethical term. And this difference lies in Wittgenstein's distinction between relative and absolute judgments of value which we have mentioned in our earlier discussion. All the propositions of what

is ordinarily maintained as ethical would belong to Wittgenstein's relative judgment of value because they can be analyzed in terms of facts or acts and things. Further, such an analysis reveals that nothing remains in generally believed moral terms or propositions after we abstract acts and things into which they consist in. For example, moral terms such as pity, virtue, good, love are nothing beyond a certain kind of action or behaviour or a state of mind. It is like the phenomenologist's notion of the relationship between *noema* and *noesis*, i.e. act of consciousness and object of consciousness. There is no object over and above the activity. The act constitutes the object. Likewise, for Wittgenstein, what is ordinarily taken as a moral term or a proposition can be reduced to facts or certain acts and behaviours. And in such a situation, when they are getting analyzed in terms of factual objects, there remains nothing ethical in them. Ethical, for Wittgenstein, is not factual or natural. Ethical value is supernatural. Hence, ethical terms of general belief are, in fact, not so ethical in the ultimate analysis. But this does not mean that Wittgenstein rejects or denounces them. For Wittgenstein, they are relatively valuable; which means that they serve some practical or socio-cultural purpose. He admits,

> I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned, there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc. And let me, before I go on, illustrate this by a rather obvious example. The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrary predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal.[7]

So, terms such as pity, virtue, right, wrong, etc., have relative ethical value and to say this does not rob them off their social value. So far as proper ethical value is concerned, it cannot be analyzed or reduced in terms of certain acts or things. That is why, for Wittgenstein, there is nothing like an ethical proposition. This is sufficient as a reply to the above-posed question about the scope of meaningfulness of generally believed ethical terms and propositions in Wittgenstein's notion of ethics.

Here, another possible objection to Wittgenstein's inexpressibility view can be raised and that is: by holding that only a factual proposition

is meaningful, Wittgenstein restricts and limits the domain of meaningful propositions. One such critique, E.D. Klemke, maintains:

> Proponents of this view commonly use the term factual in a restricted sense in which a fact is some observable state of affairs in the world, e.g. the falling of a book to the floor. Others use the term so as to include not only everyday observation on statements but also the statements of the various sciences. Having put forth this definition of 'factual', they then stipulate that only factual statements are meaningful (or cognitively meaningful or literally meaningful, etc.). It then follows by definition that value statements are nonsensical by the stipulated definition and criteria (or else purely verbal or linguistic). But this is a cheap trick. Anyone can prove any statement whatever as significant (or nonsensical) by arbitrary stipulation. Hence we must ask: what reasons are there for accepting such stipulated criteria? In the case at hand, it seems to me that there are none. There are many statements which do not meet the conditions of the above definition and criterion, yet which are surely significant statements—for example, most philosophical propositions.[8]

Such objections, as raised by Klemke against Wittgenstein's views on ethics, are misplaced since they indict upon the logical and metaphysical structure of the system in which a philosopher builds up his conceptual construction. These criticisms are superficial like the debate between the cognitivists and the non-cognitivists in the meta-theories of ethics. A cognitivistic approach, like that of Klemke, cannot criticize a non-cognitivistic approach of Wittgenstein simply on the pretext that it does not conform to his presumptions. Moreover, Klemke is mistaken in criticizing Wittgenstein on the ground that he treats philosophical propositions as insignificant. For Wittgenstein, the *TLP* is like a staircase to help philosophers see dissolution of their problems. So far as the nonsensicality of ethical propositions is concerned, for Wittgenstein, it is their very essence, i.e. they are not nonsensical because Wittgenstein had not found any correct expression for them but because nonsensicality is the essence of such expressions.[9] By being nonsensical, they belong to the 'higher' realm—the realm of showable.

Thus, we have seen that there is nothing factual underlying an absolute judgment of value and, therefore, such statements are nonsensical whereas a relative judgment of value can be analyzed purely in terms of factual statements. As absolute propositions of value or ethical propositions do not denote anything, they are nonsensical, i.e. they are not expressions but psuedo-propositions. In other words, ethics is inexpressible in language.

Now, once we accept that there are no ethical expressions, then the question arises: 'What have all of us who ... are still tempted to use such expressions as "absolute good", "absolute value", etc., what have we in mind and what do we try to express?'[10]

An attempt to answer above question runs Wittgenstein's inexpressibility thesis into another discourse, the discourse of experience. Like the twin aspects of linguistic expression—relative and absolute—his account of experiences of ethical value has a twin edge. That is to say that an experience of ethical value has two aspects: one of which is something like our day-to-day experience about which one can talk and discuss whereas the other aspect is ineffable. The first is the peripheral aspect of the experiences of ethical value, whereas the second is its core. The essence of an experience of ethical value cannot be talked but can only be grasped like spiritual or mystical experience. The core of ethical experience is ineffable. Thus, the discourse of inexpressibility is the ineffability of *that* (my emphasis) 'higher' reality, which underlies an ethical realization, and which in Wittgensteinian terminology is called as the 'experience par excellence'.

The peculiarity of these experiences is that there is nothing in the world corresponding to them, i.e. nothing in the psycho-physical world corresponds to the experience of 'absolute good'. In terms of the state of affairs—the things or events—which could be regarded as corresponding to the 'absolute good', would be such that everybody would logically either accept or discard it. Wittgenstein maintains that there is no such state of affair. He says, '... such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge.'[11]

Wittgenstein describes the following three examples of such experiences of ethical or absolute value:

(a) The mystical feeling of wonder that the world exists.
(b) The feeling of being absolutely safe, whatever happens.
(c) The feeling of guilt.

These are the examples of the experiences about which one feels to use terms such as 'absolute good', 'absolute value', etc. The mystical wonder at the existence of the world is a peculiar kind of experience or wonder. In an ordinary discourse of experience, one wonders at the presence of a situation or object which was unexpected, i.e. presence of something which might be absent can cause wonder in us. This ordinary foundation of any possibility of wonder about something (i.e. the possibility of absence of that particular thing) does not apply to the case of 'wondering' at the existence of the world because the world's non-existence cannot be expected. It is a mystical, ineffable feeling. Likewise, in the experience of 'feeling *absolutely safe*, whatever happens', there is no possibility of the existence of any threat which is generally present in an ordinary case of feeling safe. Similar is the case with the feeling of 'guilty as God disapproves certain conduct'. Like the experiences of 'wondering at the existence of the world' and 'feeling absolutely safe', underlying 'the feeling of guilty' also there is no psycho-physical object. The following points are discernible from Wittgenstein's views on the above-described cases of the experiences of ethical value:

(i) There is no state of affair underlying these experiences.
(ii) There is a misuse of language in expressing them as 'wonder', 'absolutely safe', and 'guilt' are words whose meanings can be determined only in ordinary usage. The propositions describing these words, as we have seen, do not use them in an ordinary way.
(iii) Wittgenstein also maintains that these expressions are like similes with the difference that whereas ordinarily once similes are taken out there remains something, here, in the case of absolute value, by removing similes we are left with nothing.

Another argument, which quite straightforwardly endorses Wittgenstein's inexpressibility view, is based on his admission of the involvement of the elements of paradoxes in the acceptance of the existence of the experiences of absolute value. The argument is quite

simple. It goes like this. An experience *ipso facto* is concerned with the world—it occurs in a certain space and time—which is the limit of that experience. So there can be no experience of an absolute value which is beyond space and time. Thus, the assertion that a certain experience is an experience of an absolute value is a paradoxical assertion—a meaningless proposition. As Wittgenstein admits:

Now the three experiences which I have mentioned to you (and I could have added others) seem to those who have experienced them, for instance to me, to have in some sense an intrinsic, absolute value. But when I say they are experiences, surely, they are facts; they have taken place then and there, lasted a certain definite time and consequently are describable. And so from what I have said some minutes ago, I must admit it is nonsense to say that they have absolute value. And I will make my point still more acute by saying 'It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.'[12]

Wittgenstein suggests the manner in which this paradox can be resolved. He explains it in terms of 'miraculous'. For him, there are two senses of 'miraculous'—relative and absolute. Like 'miraculous', words such as 'wonder', 'safe' and 'guilt' also have the above described twin senses. The trivial or relative sense gets reflected in the language, whereas the absolute sense is beyond any linguistic expression. Thus, Wittgenstein says, 'All I have said is again that we cannot express what we want to express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous (or other experiences of ethical value) remains nonsense.'[13] For Wittgenstein, the meaninglessness is the crux of the experiences of the absolute value as it shows that they cannot be had in an ordinary way. They cannot be explained away in terms of an ordinary experience— it shows that there is an element of mystical in these experiences.

Our analysis brings out the fact that Wittgenstein's inexpressibility belongs to these two discourses: (a) language, and (b) experience. It has been seen that there is no proposition expressing ethical value because there is no fact underlying a (pseudo) proposition of ethics. Likewise, we have also seen that it is paradoxical to say that there is an experience of ethical value, i.e. absolute value. However, the

paradoxical feature or nonsensicality is the very essence of ethical experiences. It, once again, shows that these experiences are not like an ordinary experience. This is what Wittgenstein calls 'transcendence of ethics' (*TLP* 6.13; *NB*, p. 79). However, it may strike someone like Klemke that Wittgenstein has created an unnecessary dichotomy between fact and value. For Klemke, Wittgenstein's view on ethics is based on the presumption 'that there is a rigid dichotomy between fact and value, and that therefore no value statement can have factual content and none can imply factual statements and vice versa'.[14] Klemke's basic contention, among others, is that by creating the fact-value dichotomy, Wittgenstein does not provide any reason for his view that there are absolute judgments of value. So far as Klemke's objection— and on the basis of this, his view that Wittgenstein takes the propositions of absolute value as insignificant—is concerned, it can very easily be understood that critics like Klemke grossly misunderstood Wittgenstein. We have seen that Wittgenstein accepts even a concept of relative value. It may be that the framework of his ethical thought does not conform to ethical descriptivism, but then that does not go against his inexpressibility view of ethics. Moreover, the inexpressibility of ethical propositions or nonsensicality of ethical propositions does not make them insignificant in Wittgenstein's account as he admits:

Ethics—so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable—can be no science. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.[15]

Thus, it may seem to someone that Wittgenstein's view that *Tractatus* is a book on ethics is, in fact, an exaggeration. Such a critic, like Bertrand Russell who in his introduction to the *Tractatus* says that it is 'concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language' (*TLP*, p. ix), may become perplexed as to how could *Tractatus* be treated a book on ethics. However, once it is noted that the *Tractatus*' purpose is to hint at the realm of showable with the help of the sayable, it can be treated as a book on ethics. As there cannot be any book either on showable in general and ethics in

particular, a book which tries to show the absolute ethical value with the help of 'what can be said in language' can be treated as a book on ethics. The apparent contradiction posed in the beginning of this paper can be resolved once Wittgenstein's view, about the structure of the *Tractatus*, in his letter to Paul Engelmann has been properly understood in which he admits that it is a book in which the sayable tries to show the showable. Just as showable is a realm of ethics, *Tractatus* is a book of ethics by default. Wittgenstein is right that no book on ethics can be *written* (my emphasis) as words are insufficient to express something which is a reality of the 'higher' realm. Notwithstanding the inability of words to express ethical values, these values can be *shown* and experienced. Thus, even though a book on ethics cannot be written, there can be a book on ethics such as *Tractatus*.

In brief, Wittgenstein's approach to the inexpressibility of ethics has two levels and each level has a twin fold layer; one belonging to the relative value whereas the other one—which is actually inexpressible and ineffable—is ethical, as its concern is absolute value. The misconceptions about Wittgenstein's views on ethics crop up due to misunderstanding this structure of his views and getting bewitched through the grammar of the language.

ABBREVIATIONS

TLP: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. by Pears, D.F. and McGuiness, B.F., with the introduction by Bertrand Russell, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922.

NB: *Notebooks 1914–16.*
Wittgenstein, L. *Notebooks 1914–16*, Wright, G.H. and Anscombe, G.E.M. (ed.), translated from German into English by Anscombe G.E.M., New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Wittgenstein, L. 'Lecture on Ethics', *The Philosophical Review*, 74, pp. 3–13, 1965. Reprinted in Anthony Kenny (ed.), *The Wittgenstein Reader*, Blackwell, UK, 1994, p. 291.

2. Engelmann, Paul, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967, p. 143.

3. Cyril Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, UK: Blackwell, 1991, p. x.

4. For me, Wittgenstein's lecture is an attempt to reach, as for as possible, at the defining characteristics of what is called ethics. Here Wittgenstein is labouring to let his audience understand the inexpressibility of 'Ethics' by way of showing as to what exactly ethics is.

5. Wittgenstein, L., op. cit., pp. 289–90.

6. Ibid., p. 290.

7. Ibid., p. 291.

8. Klemke, E.D., (Summer 1975), 'Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics', *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 9:2, p. 125. Like Klemke, some other philosophers have also criticized Wittgenstein's inexpressibility view of ethics on the ground that it presupposes that only factual propositions are meaningful. For these criticisms refer to Glock, Hans-Johann, *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966, pp. 107–11. Also Redpath, Theodore, 'Wittgenstein and Ethics', (ed.) 1972, Ambrose, Alice and Lazerowitz, Morris, pp. 95–119, reprinted in Canfield, John, V. (ed.) *Aesthetics, Ethics and Religion*, New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc. 1986, pp. 117–41.

9. Wittgenstein, L., op. cit., p. 296. Wittgenstein maintains that absolute judgments of value or ethical judgments are nonsensical and inexpressible not because any correct expression was not found but because their essence lies in their belonging to the 'higher' realm. But his view on page 291 that 'if a man could write a book on ethics, which really was a book on ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world', seems to admit the first reason (i.e. the non-availability of any correct expression) rather than the second (i.e. the belonging of the absolute value to the 'higher' realm) for the inexpressibility. And, therefore, here Wittgenstein's clarification that ethics, in essence, is inexpressible, as it belongs to the realm of showable, is significant.

10. Ibid., p. 292.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 294.

13. Ibid., p. 295.

14. Klemke, E.D., op. cit., pp. 125–7. Klemke is a staunch Descriptivist—the one who maintains that all the ethical statements can be explained in terms of factual statements.

15. Wittgenstein, L., op. cit., p. 296.

Modern Conceptual Analysis of the Self and the Mystical Experience of the Self

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ABSTRACT

Modern conception of the self seems to have no corresponding field of experience, or of empirically based qualities. Such a concept does not amount to being more than a vacuous concept. This paper aims to show this fact in brief, and suggests that such a concept could be amended by application of the experiential insights as gained from the practical mysticism in its old tradition. The aim is to suggest that the apparent conflicts in the modern concept of the self can be resolved by underpinning them with a mystico-experiential account of the self, and to support the proposal and many of these conflicts can be integrated and brought to completion on the basis of the widespread experience of the self identified in the mystical traditions.

INTRODUCTION

As supported by mystical practices, meditative experience seems to allow us to give experiential significance to the characterization of the self as something which can neither be characterized nor defined in terms of empirical qualities and their collections and relationships. This point is supported by a profound experience of the self widely reported by mystics who claimed to taste the high experience of 'no-mind', by abandoning reflective thought and picking up the 'presence' through meditative techniques, and those whose mystical meditations are claimed to cover all the aspects of our experiences, including our external and internal perceptions. In traditional mysticism, one relies

on an empirical element as well as his ordinary commonsensical experiences (including his experiences of thinking).

Furthermore, on the assumption that experience of the self is necessarily present in every experience, one can again show that experience of the self is not only an excellent candidate for experience of the self but the only possible one. Only an experience without any qualities can accompany every other possible experience and the experience of the self meets the requirement uniquely. This argument is conclusive, but another argument is also worth noting. The self is experienced in a performative state; this experience has no parts or components (indeed, even the manifolds of space and time, the very contexts in which parts can be distinguished, are not present in the experience). Therefore, given our assumption that experience of one's self is present in this experience, it must actually be this experience, as a whole, for the experience of the self has no part which can be assigned to or be specified as being the experience of the self. Thus, we see not only that this mystical experience is the only possible candidate for fulfilling the criteria for experience of the self, as derived from Descartes and modern philosophers but it is also the only possible candidate for fulfilling the common sense intuition that the self is somehow experienced as present in every experience.

However, if the self is somehow experienced as present in every experience, as common sense insists, and if this mystical experience is identified as the relevant experience of the self, then the experience of the self must somehow be a component or aspect of every other experience. But this further raises the question of why the mystical experience usually goes unnoticed, even when specifically sought. The answer immediately suggests itself that it goes unnoticed precisely because it is constant and present in all our experiences. Our attention tends to focus to what is changing; what remains constant gradually recedes into the background. This, in turn, suggests that the self as constant and unchanging—present somehow in all of our experiences— is a reflection of a vague yet widespread subliminal awareness of the mystical experience as pervading all our experiences. If this analysis is correct, the fact that the mystical experience usually comes to be noticed only when all the other contents of awareness cease to occupy

our attention ceases to be puzzling and becomes what we expect. Finally, if this analysis is correct, we would expect that the mystical experience renders it more noticeable and raises it from its existential level.

The identification of the mystical experience of the self thus offers a simple explanation for the otherwise extremely problematic fact that common sense continues to insist that the self is somehow present in all experience, even when it is unable to isolate it, and even when intellectual analysis convinces us that it cannot be given in experience by any empirical quality, or even abstractly accounted for by any relationship or collection of such qualities. This is so because the self is present in all experience, there to be noticed, as qualityless experience.

In the following discussion, I will show that the major efforts to establish a modern concept of the self have been non-consciously based on such a practical field of experience as the mystical experience of the self, and this can helpfully unify apparently the conflicting modern theories of self, and allow development of a theory of being self capable of giving experiential realization of the otherwise unfulfilable criteria derived from Descartes and other modern philosophers.

MODERN CONFLICTS ON THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF

The history of the modern concept of the self begins with Descartes. Descartes claimed that he was able to locate the self, simple and abiding throughout our changing experiences. Philosophers after him have been challenging this concept and developing other possible insights.[1] Nevertheless, Descartes' analysis seems to be faithful to common sense. The mystical experience makes this common sense claim (and the appeal of Descartes' analysis) intelligible, and in a way that suggests that common sense is, in fact, correct. In the absence of this experience, however, common sense and reflective analysis have often been in sharp conflict. Such a conflict can be found, for example, in Bertrand Russell's views on the self.

The early Russell argued that 'dualism of subject and object' is 'a fundamental fact concerning cognition' and that 'I am acquainted with myself.'[2] Indeed, he seems to argue that there are precisely two things that we are aware of; namely, the self and its presence.[3] Russell's thesis,

like Descartes, clearly conforms to common sense. Later, however, Russell changed his mind, saying that

Hume's inability to perceive himself was not peculiar, and I think most unprejudiced observers would agree with him. Even if by great exertion some rare person could grasp a glimpse of himself, this would not suffice, for 'I' is a term which we all know how to use.[4]

Russell finally concluded that the concept of the self has to be a mere 'logical fiction', 'schematically convenient, but not empirically discoverable.'[5]

Russell's rejection of his earlier common sensical view was based on his inability to discover in experience anything that could either correspond to or clarify our ordinary notion of the self as simple and abiding. We have already seen how the mystical experience is a good candidate for this experience of the self that Russell, like Hume before him, could not find.

The experience of the self (especially as accepted by the mystics), also seems capable of removing the force of difficulties which arise from some linguistic approach to the self. In the history of Western philosophy, especially since Hobbes (Descartes' contemporary), we see some philosophers who come to reject the notion of 'I' simply through a grammatical analysis. The general point of such analyses is that verbs such as 'think' require a grammatical subject naturally suggests that there is some 'I' (in the first person case) who does the thinking. However, this 'I' is merely a schematic convenience, required by ordinary grammar but not representing any real thing. For example, when we say 'It is raining', we neither need nor want to postulate any separate 'It' that does the raining. The same case holds good for the 'I' (in 'I think'). Thus, if we cannot find anything that could properly correspond to the term 'I', we should recognize that this 'I' is nothing but a mere schematic convenience.

This view is, for instance, held by Wittgenstein who once considered consciousness as a 'particular current experience' to avoid the conceptual approaches, while trying to follow Lichtenberg in order to eliminate the self as redundant and instead of 'I think' one can say 'It thinks' as in 'It rains.'[6] This ideas that the 'I' can be eliminated from our language survived the transition from transcendental to methodological solipsism.[7]

Such an approach to the 'I' also conflicts with common sense. Common sense rejects this approach, insisting that we (or at least most of us) are, in fact, somehow aware of our selves throughout our experience, and that the 'I' in 'I think' is, unlike the 'It' in 'It is raining,' definitely not superfluous at all. The mystical experience seems capable of giving an experiential support to this claim of common sense, and removes such a grammatical approach. It can also enforce the experiential aspects of what such philosophers express. For example, Wittgenstein who rejects the 'I' 'self' as redundant, refers to an interesting notion of a double consciousness.[8] The early Wittgenstein seems to consider the deeper level of this consciousness as identified with life and reality. In this stage, consciousness means for him 'my current experience',[9] while holding that 'all that is real is the experience of the present moment.'[10] Apparently, this notion could be fruitful had it been given an experiential support. Instead, Wittgenstein has criticized himself for his approach[11] to this profound idea. Later, rejecting the dichotomy of subject-object (inner-outer) 'which has dominated philosophy since Descartes',[12] he critically points out that 'the picture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.'[13] Wittgenstein conceived 'consciousness' 'as the ray of light which illuminates our private mental episodes.'[14] In such a case, it is misleading to look for the essence of consciousness 'through turning one's attention towards one's own attention. What is needed is an investigation of how the word "consciousness" and its changes are used. Such an investigation reveals that consciousness does not refer to a phenomenon occurring inside us. The alleged ontological split between the physical world and the world of consciousness is merely a categorical difference drawn in our language.'[15]

Through his analysis of language and its relation to 'thought', Wittgenstein ends up in a practical interpretation of 'consciousness' which remains faithful to his early idea of 'current experience'. I am not claiming to have knowledge (in its reflective sense) when I say 'I am sitting in a chair,'[16] because I am actually aware of this at the time that I am sitting. There is only a current experience in which 'the ego is not an object'.[17] Wittgenstein clarified this position more in his

analysis of, e.g. seeing and pain[18] and he considers consciousness as 'current experience', as 'light' as well as practical, living 'activity'. One may wonder how close he has come to the mystical approach in his point; however, he could not give his notion an experiential support.

DESCARTES' EXPERIENTIAL LANGUAGE OF THE SELF

It is interesting also to note, in this context, that Descartes himself has a similar problematic position. Hobbes objected to Descartes, saying that since we have no inner perception corresponding to the idea of self or soul, this idea could only be a mere product of inference. Descartes agreed that 'there is no image of the soul fixed in the fantasy'. But he insisted nevertheless that 'there is what I call an idea', something that he was 'directly aware of' and which was not 'inferred by reason.'[19]

'For when we observe that we are conscious beings (res cogitantes), this is a sort of primary notion, which is not the conclusion of any syllogism; and, moreover, when somebody says: I experience (Cogito), therefore I am or exist; he is not syllogistically deducing his existence from an experience (cogitatione), but recognizing it as something self-evident, in a simple mental intuition.'[20]

'I experience (cogito), therefore, I am ... this knowledge is no product of your reasoning, no lesson that your masters have taught you; it is something that your mind sees, feels, handles.'[21]

Descartes' experiential language and explicit denial of reliance on reasoning here are thus both unmistakable—even though, as he insists, the experience has nothing of the imagination in it, for any such content would only 'reduce the clearness of this knowledge.'[22]

It is easy to see why Descartes' experiential claims here have not generally had much effect. For in the absence of knowledge of the relevant experiences, these claims appear problematic if not simply unintelligible. The mystical experience, however, allows us to see how the experiential aspects of Descartes' Meditations can be read literally and intelligibly.[23] We can also note numerous close parallels between Descartes' explicit narrative experience and the mystical texts, parallels which indicate clearly that Descartes might helpfully be read here in this mystical fashion. Consider, for example, the following passages from Descartes' first three 'Meditations.'[24]

I will suppose that sky, air, earth colours, shapes, sounds and all external objects are mere delusive dreams ... I will consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no senses.[25]

Yesterday's meditation plunged me into doubts of such gravity that I cannot forget them, and yet do not see how to resolve them. I am bewildered, as though I had suddenly fallen into a deep sea, and could neither plant my foot on the bottom nor swim up to the top. But I will make an effort, and try once more the same path as I entered upon yesterday.[26]

The result of being lost in this unbounded sea of doubt was, as Descartes describes in the next two paragraphs of his text, his 'discovery' of self, already analyzed by us at some length. Descartes then begins his next 'Meditation' with a further description of his method:

I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, withdraw all my senses; I will even blot out the images of corporeal objects from my consciousness; or at least (since this is barely possible) I will ignore them as vain illusions. I will discourse with myself alone and look more deeply into myself. I am a conscious being.[27]

Descartes then came to recognize that he had an idea of unbounded, 'infinite' consciousness,[28] that this idea is 'supremely clear and distinct and representationally more real than any other' and is 'innate in me, just as the idea of myself is'.[29] Descartes, calling this 'infinite' consciousness 'God', then concludes his third meditation with the following observations:

I wish [now] to stay a little in the contemplation of God; to meditate within myself on his attributes; to behold, wonder at, adore the beauty of this immeasurable Light, so far as the eye of my darkened understanding can bear it ... [T]his contemplation of the Divine Majesty ... makes us aware that we can get from it the greatest joy of which we are capable in this life.[30]

Thus in his first three 'Meditations' Descartes describes (a) generating a pervasive attitude of doubt, (b) withdrawing his attention from external objects, sensations, and sensory-oriented thought, (c) finding himself lost in a 'sea' of doubt, (d) discovering his self as consciousness,

independent of all imaginable content, (e) locating a completely unbounded level of such consciousness ('God') as the context and foundation of his own (finite) consciousness, and (f) finding that contemplation of this unbounded level produces incomparable joy.

All six of these points correspond closely with the mystical literature. They are standard in the practice and performance of the mystical experience which determines the self as pure presence, including even the description of what is called 'the stage of raising doubt' from which all meditations start.[31] And, more generally, the main features described in Descartes' account, namely; (i) reversing the direction of attention (away from the senses and sense-oriented thought), (ii) coming to inner experiences of unboundedness (a deep sea, non-picturable consciousness, and infinite non-picturable consciousness), and (iii) gaining an experience of exquisite joy and light in the latter unboundedness, are all standard components of the literature of mystical experience in the traditional mysticism.

The autobiographical nature of these passages is, however, explicit. This interpretation provides the basis for an explanation of how Descartes might properly claim to have a 'clear and distinct' intuition of the self as unpicturable consciousness independent of all sense-oriented content and thought,[32] even though other investigators such as Hume and Kant could not.[33] For as we have seen, the mystical experience, which uniquely can give clear significance to Descartes' concept of self, remains unnoticed unless one methodically and radically reorients the direction of one's attention.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Descartes is usually read by most of Western philosophers in an intellectual context, putting aside exceptions like Husserl. They do not even suggest that they have attempted to do what Descartes described, namely 'withdraw' their senses from physical objects and 'even blot out the images of corporeal objects' from their consciousness. They have, however, often taken the idea seriously enough to propose what may be called 'thought-experiments' wherein they attempt to imagine what it would be like to perform the process Descartes described, and then draw conclusions from the imagined result. While thought-

experiments can be useful, their results are often far from unambiguous. Two thought-experiments articulated by noted philosophers on the topic in question will illustrate this difficulty. The first was Cinavian; in this thought-experiment, Avicenna asked us to imagine a man created suddenly, floating in empty space, with his various senses either inherently non-functional or having no objects on which to operate. Such a person would nevertheless still be conscious of his own existence.[34] This line of reasoning, however, would not be at all acceptable to Hume. For in thought-experiments of his own, Hume argued repeatedly that if all his perceptions were removed he would be 'insensible of' himself, and would 'truly be said not to exist'. Without any perceptions or impressions, according to Hume, 'I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity.'[35]

The fact that Hume and Avicenna come to such different conclusions from what for our purposes are comparable thought-experiments indicates, of course, that they had very different intuitions about the nature of the self and the relation of self-knowledge to the contents of ordinary experience. Various responses to their different intuitions and conclusions are possible. Depending on one's own intuitions about the topic, for example, one might attempt to account for the difference between the positions of Hume and Avicenna (and correlatively defend one's own position) by postulating that one or the other thinker was influenced by hidden verbal and/or common sensical assumptions. Alternatively, one might postulate that the two thinkers had different degrees of clarity of the experience of 'the self' similar the theory of a 'transcendental self', in Cartesian, Kantian or Husserlian senses.

If we suppose here that it is possible to perform in reality (the phenomenologically relevant aspect of) the imagined thought-experiments, a less hypothetical analysis of this case is possible. In mystical practices, all the objective contents of experience can frequently fade out and disappear, entirely, leaving the experience of the self (or in the mystical terminology, a pure presence to being which is the absolute openness of an absorbed self) by itself, devoid of all sensations and thought, and identifiable as the self.

This experience, as already hinted, has allowed us to corroborate and/or falsify the various aspects of modern theories of the self. It is worth noting here that while the experience falsifies some of Hume's (and other later empiricists') major conclusions about the self, it does so by remaining faithful to Hume's basic empiricist methodology. Hume emphasized throughout his treatise that the orientation of his philosophical work was to attempt to apply the 'experimental method' to questions of human nature and mind. One can also, it appears, significantly advance this aspect of Hume's empirically-oriented programme by removing at least one important question from the realm of mere thought-experiment through performing the relevant experiment directly. Thus, although the mystical experience of the self corroborates the aspects of Descartes, Husserl, Kant, and other rationalistic theories of self, it does so in accord with empiricist experiential methodology (rather than by abstract *a priori* arguments).

Thus understood, we may see to what extent the mystical experience of the self can helpfully supply a context in which to unify the apparently conflicting theories of self in modern thought.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Bertrand Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', reprinted in *Mysticism and Logic*, New York: Norton & Co., 1929, p. 210. Also see his *Problems of Philosophy*, ch. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 224.
3. Bertrand Russell, 'On the Nature of Acquaintance', reprinted in *Logic & Knowledge*, Essays 1901–1950, (ed.) R.C. March, London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1956, p. 164.
4. Bertrand Russell, 'On Propositions: what they are and how they mean', in *Logic and Knowledge*, Essays 1901–1950, p. 305. See also, 'On Acquaintance', in the same volume, p. 276.
5. Cf. Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Remarks*, tran. R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford, 1975; see also Glock H-J., *A Wittgenstein's Dictionary*, Oxford, 1996. The term: I/Self, and Intentionality.
6. See C.S. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, 'Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein' in *American Philosophical Quarterly* II, 4, pp. 281–95. See also J.A. Fodor, 'Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology' in *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* III 1, pp. 63–72. Some other linguistic philosophers are also more or less on this trail; the eliminative materialism advanced by

Feyerabend ('Mental Events and the Brain' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, LX, 11, pp. 295–96) and Rorty (*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, ch. 2) and modified by Quine (Cf. 'States of Mind' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, LXXXII, 1 (1985, pp. 5–8) tries to adopt a language devoid of mental terminology. There are others like P.F. Strawson who want to replace the 'self' with a 'person'.

7. See Horgby's article in: H.A. Durfee (ed.), *Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology*, The Hague, 1976, pp. 96–125.
8. Glock H-J., *A Wittgenstein's Dictionary*, Oxford, 1996, The term: 'Consciousness', pp. 84–6.
9. Ibid.
10. For Wittgenstein's 'solipsism,' see ibid., pp. 348–52.
11. Ibid., p. 84; see also: ibid., pp. 174–9.
12. Quoted in Ibid., p. 84.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See: Hanfling O., *Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy*, London, 1989, ch. 2, pp. 152 ff.
16. *Tractatus*, 5.641.
17. See: Genova J., Wittgenstein: A Way Of Seeing, New York, 1995, ch. 2 'Don't Think, Look!' pp. 55–92; also part three, pp. 135 ff.
18. Descartes R., *Philosophical Writings*. Trans., (eds.) E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Indiana, 1978, pp. 136, 139, 142.
19. Ibid., p. 299.
20. Ibid., p. 301.
21. Ibid.
22. It is interesting to see that Descartes is read in a supportive and similar manner by M. Gueroult and M. Grene; See M. Grene, *Descartes*, Sussex, 1985, pp. 3–23.
23. Descartes R., *Les Meditations Metaphysiques*, Paris, 1994, p. 65.
24. Ibid., p. 65.
25. Ibid., p. 66
26. Ibid., p. 76.
27. For, according to Descartes, awareness of (himself as a) 'finite' consciousness presumes awareness of 'infinite' consciousness as its context and condition of intelligibility. For the concept of 'finite' is only intelligible in its contrast with that of 'infinity'. Ibid., p. 86.
28. Ibid., pp. 85–7. Descartes' arguments here are often complex, contain scholastic elements, and (to modern readers at least) often appear quite unconvincing. Our present concern, however, is only with the phenomenological significance of his statements, and not the validity of his arguments or truth of his conclusions.

29. Ibid., p. 90.

30. See: *Understanding Mysticism*, (ed.) Richard Woods, Image Books, Garden City, NY, 1980. Also: *Mysticism and the Modern Mind*, (ed.) Alfred P. Stiernotte, Liberal Arts Press: New York, 1959.

31. Ibid., p. 91.

32. The above literal reading of Descartes in the context of traditional mysticism also makes a number of his other claims much more understandable. These include (I) his claim to have an idea of unbounded consciousness ('God'),[2] his claim that this idea and that of self are the two most 'clear and distinct' Ideas that he has, and that they are both innate, and[3] that he experienced 'light' and great bliss in the contemplation of this 'idea' of God. The fact that such a subjective mode of experience exist of course says nothing about the objective truth of its contents, but the supposition that Descartes may have had this experience might make his insistence on his doctrine of clear and distinct Ideas somewhat easier to understand.

33. Both Hume and Kant kept open at least the logical possibility of experience that could fulfil the otherwise rejected notion of self. Hume allows the possibility that someone else might be able to conceive of a notion of self existing entirely without perceptions, but adds: 'I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular' (Hume D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed.) L.A. Selby Bigge, Oxford, 1958, p. 252). Kant allows the logical possibility of experience of 'noumena' such as the self completely independent of all perceptions, but he maintains that it is impossible for us as human beings not only to have but even adequately to conceive of such experience. (Kant I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith, New York, 1995, p. 157. See also pp. 90, 164, 250, etc.)

34. This thought experience is first articulated by Ibn Sina, *al-Shifa* [De Anima], Tehran, 1978, V.I, p. 281. Copleston describes Avicenna's thought-experiment as follows: 'Imagine a man suddenly created, who cannot see or hear, who is floating in space and whose members are so disposed that they cannot touch one another. On the supposition that he cannot exercise the senses and acquire the notion of being through sight or touch, will he thereby be unable to form the notion? No, because he will be conscious of and affirm his own existence, so that, even if he cannot acquire the notion of being through external experience, he will at least acquire it through self-consciousness. 'Copleston F., *A History of Philosophy*, London, 1968, v. II, part I, p. 216. See also: Edwards P. (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, London, 1972, vol. 1, p. 228.

35. Hume D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed.), L.A. Selby Bigge, Oxford, 1958, p. 252. See also pp. 634–5.

Rasa—The Bane of Indian Aesthetics

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Indian thinking about the arts has been centred to such an extent about what has been called *rasa* in the tradition that it has come almost to be completely identified with it. There are other concepts which the cognoscenti know such as *dhvani* on *vakrokti* but they have always been treated not as rivals or alternatives but only as subservient or supplementary to it. The concept has remained central in all thinking and has never been questioned or criticized or critically evaluated for its adequacy for the understanding of all the arts which the civilization pursued in its long history. Yet, rooted as it was in the reflection on *nātya* which was the concern of Bharata in his well-known treatise on the subject, it should have been obvious to the blindest observer that it could not do justice to all the other art forms which have nothing to do with the representation of the human situation or situations in the context of which Bharata explicitly *defined* it and which the dramatic performance was supposed to portray. It is, of course, true that Bharata does discuss—even in substantive detail—other arts, particularly dance and music, but *always* as subservient in the depiction of the mood or rather the 'emotional feel' of the situation seen as defining and constituting it, and *not* as something *independent* of it, having a world of its own, with its own *puruṣārtha*, autonomy and values which had only an accidental relation to the human situations as portrayed in the play. The arts could not have a 'free' life of their own within the context of the performance of the play for, if permitted to do so, this will interfere and even destroy that which the performance was supposed to achieve. Bharata was aware of this, but he did not care as, for him, it alone was *sarvaśilpapravartakam*, and not just *sarvakarmānudarśanam*. What is, however, strange is that the whole

subsequent tradition, with rare exceptions, accepted what he had said on the subject.

Each art is autonomous and independent and to think of it only in the context of *Nātya*—or *Kāvya*, as was done later—is not only to do injustice to them but fail to understand that which pervades, encompasses and envelops them all, distinguishing the activity that creates them and the distinctive *puruṣārtha* that sets it apart from all the other activities of man. The idea of *alaṁkāra* developed in the context of reflection on *kāvya* proved as inadequate as that of *rasa* developed in relation to the reflection on *nātya* in Bharata. The former misled the thinkers into treating all art as being a 'craft', just as the latter was misled by its understanding of the human situation in terms of the 'emotional meaning' it has, and not the ideal value or values it pursues in terms of a meaningfulness, which includes man's relation not only with other men and women, but also nature, transcendence and one's own self. Art does involve prolonged apprenticeship, learning the 'tricks of the trade', amassing 'skills' of all sorts, but it is not just this. Also, human beings do live immersed in a world of feelings and emotions, but the 'enterprise' of human life is never just that. Man seeks something beyond what he is, something more than just feeling or emotion, and the creation of art itself is an evidence of this, just as his enterprises in other fields such as 'knowledge' and 'action' do. Art is not an easy thing to achieve, and a 'hedonistic' perspective on it which the *rasa* theory—bereft of all its subtle subterfuges—is basically incorrect as it forgets the far-reaching Indian insight that man is defined by what he 'seeks' which basically involves the distinction between 'is' and 'ought', and not what he 'is'. What is the ideal seeking involved in the creation of *nātya* or of any other art, Bharata does not ask; nor does anybody else in the long tradition of thinking on this subject in a country which has prided itself in thinking that every *śāstra* must have a *prayojana*, if it is to be a meaningful enterprise significant enough for man to engage in. Uddyotakara, the well-known Naiyāyika belonging to the early seventh century AD, formulated the contention in the clearest manner when he said that every *vidyā* has its own *niḥśreyasa* which defines and distinguishes it from all others, giving concretely the

examples of *vārtā*, *daṇḍanīti*, *ānavīkṣiki* and *adhyātma vidyā* in order to illustrate his point.

But even if one leaves aside Bharata's forgetfulness about the *prayojana* or *niḥśreysa* of the *śāstra* that he was creating, one cannot but wonder why he did not even attempt to give a *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* of that of which he was building a *śāstra*. Perhaps, he was too early in the tradition to do that as the formal characteristics of what constitutes a *śāstra* had not crystallized by then. Even so, it remains a moot question why his successors did not do anything to rectify the situation. In fact, even his definition of *rasa* has not been reformulated inspite of the obvious inadequacies and inapplicability to other arts, including poetry and literature.

The fact that no need was felt for redefining Bharata's definition even in respect of the art form he was writing on, suggests a deeper problem about the nature of reflection on art in this country. What, after all, is to be the object of reflection in the case of art? The 'object' created or the complex creative act which brings it into being, or both? In the case of any work of art, the problem is intrinsically complicated by the fact that it is not a 'natural' object at all and hence cannot be understood like any normal object. Abhinavagupta had raised this issue at the beginning of his treatise on Bharata's work called *Abhinava Bhāratī*, but did not pursue it further after citing reasons as to why it could not be assimilated, classified or defined as the other objects that we 'know' of. Nor did any of the thinkers who thought after him seem to have done that.

But the case of *nātya* is different from all the other arts as it presupposes a 'written' text or a text adapted for purposes of being performed as a 'play'. There is a person to take charge of this enactment and 'actors', both male and female, who try to give it a 'living' reality which has to be seen with the eye and heard by the ear and understood for the meaning conveyed by it all. It consists of a sequence of acts and scenes, and has a beginning and an end indicated by the rise and fall of the curtain which signals the 'opening' and 'closing' of the performance.

What, thus, demands to be reflected upon is whether the idea of *rasa* captures the meaning or significance of that which is conveyed by the

'story' embodied and enacted through the acts and scenes performed on the stage. Bharata uses the term *anukṛti* and its analogues such as *anukīratana*, *anukaraṇa*, etc., to convey this meaning. But, surely, the actual story of human life as it is 'lived' and which is sought to be represented, does not seek *rasa*, or be understood or defined in its terms. If it is so, how can that which is its *anukṛti* or *anukīrtana* ever be understood in its terms without distorting it completely and making it seem what it is not, a superimposition, an *adhyāsa* from which not only thinking about Indian aesthetics has not been able to recover up till now, but also the far-reaching influence that it has had on the life of the cultured *nāgara* in this continent as it began to be conceived of and modelled on its model and in its terms. The subtle inter-influencing of art and life has seldom been reflected upon, but the Indian case can provide a classic example if one wants to do so. The self-conscious formulations of Bharata influenced the writers and artists in their literary and artistic creations and these, in turn, 'determined' the 'ideal' way in which civilized and cultured *men* were supposed to live in the tradition which, in turn, affected the art-productions as that was the way they were wanted to be.

Yet, though this 'circular self-effectivity and self-validation' has misled most observers of the scene into thinking that what *appeared* to be the case was also really so and that, besides this, it also captured the 'reality' of what art 'really' is, even though there was also some counter evidence to them. The elaboration of the theories of *dhvani* and *alaṁkāra* in the context of *Kāvya* and the almost total non-applicability of the theory to non-representational arts which have nothing to do with the human situation are the obvious counter examples. Bharata's theory cannot be applied in principle to non-representational art because of the way he defined it. All this was deliberately ignored or underplayed in the picture that modern writing on the subject has built regarding thinking about aesthetics in the Indian tradition. The tradition itself might have helped in this, but only at the cost of a 'collusion' whose incalculable costs have not been thought of by those party to it. How, for example, can *dhvani* or *alaṁkāra* be accommodated in a *rasa*-centric theory of even *kāvya* without fundamentally challenging the definition of *rasa* which is essentially tied to the diverse human

situations in terms of which the specific particularity of each *rasa* is defined and which can never be understood without reference to it. Does each situation have its own *dhvani*, just as it is supposed to have its own *rasa*? Or, does the *rasa* itself create its own *dhvani* which is the heart of the matter? Or, is *dhvani* the resultant that emerges out of the totality of the whole and, if so, how is it different from the *rasa* that is also supposed to characterize the whole and is supposed to be an emergent quality from the different specific *rasas* that characterize the parts from which it is built?

Further, what about *alaṁkāra* which has dominated thinking about *kāvya* in this country and whose proliferation has known no end? Does each *alaṁkāra* have a *rasa* of its own? If so, there would be as many *rasas* as there are *alaṁkāras* and, in any case, they would have little to do with the human situations in terms of which Bharata defined them.

Thus, neither *dhvani* nor *alaṁkāra* can be accommodated within the theory of *rasa*, though most writers have assumed that this can easily be done and that there is no problem in doing so. The fact that the extension of the theory to other arts raises even more intractable problems has been masked by two facts. First, Bharata himself had discussed *nrtya* and *sangīta*, or dance and music in detail and treated them in this context alone as they were to subserve the purposes of the *nāṭya* which was the primary object of his reflection and discussion. In fact, it is not quiet clear if he conceived of the former as consisting primarily of *abhinaya* conveyed through dance, supported and augmented by music which was its inevitable accompaniment. The analysis of each part of the body in terms of its possible movements and their combination into *aṅgahāras* depicting and expressing various emotional states is an evidence of this. Dr Kapilā Vātsyāyana's well-known work on the subject documents this, though she strangely ignores almost completely its relation to *nāṭya* and concentrates only on its relation to Indian temple sculpture which, according to her, not only illustrates it in stone, but also defines its history as it evolved over time and space in different regions of India.

The treatment of dance in the *nāṭyaśāstra* seems to have given a strange twist to the development of both *nrtya* and *nāṭya*, taking each

away from its own immanent ethos and nisus, making each lose its autonomy in trying to accommodate itself to the other in terms of the theory propounded by their author. Bharata's analysis of dance is as *rasa*-centred as that of *nāṭya*; only this time, it is *abhinaya*-centred, if presentations of classical Indian dance in modern times are to be believed, in spite of the *karaṇas* and the *aṅgahāras* he delineates and describes. In fact, even the latter are explicitly seen in terms of the emotions they express and the *abhinaya* may only be said to bring this out. *Nāṭya*, thus, disappeared into the dance and the dance into the *nāṭya*, and both became subservient to the theoretician's formulation which became so *rasa*-centred that it did not know how to escape from it.

This became clear in the author's treatment of music which he treated as completely subservient to the *nāṭya*, having no independent autonomy of its own, its sole purpose being to enhance the 'emotional being' of the scene enacted by the actors on the stage. The *nāṭya*, of course, was his central concern and everything had to be subservient to it, but the mistake lay in his 'understanding' of the *loka* of which it was to be an *anukṛti* or *anukaraṇa*, or even *anukīrtana*, terms that Bharata himself has used. The *loka* constituted by 'human beings' is not only 'feeling-centred' but also centred in 'knowledge' and 'action' which have only a tangential relation to 'feeling' and which, in any case, can never be defined in its terms. The *loka*, thus, which Bharata is supposed to be concerned with is not the 'actual' *loka*, but an idealized abstraction of persons in interaction whose life is centred in the feelings they feel and who have nothing else to 'do' in their lives.

The situation may be saved by pointing out that, after all, all art does this, and the *nāṭya* does it pre-eminently as it has to be performed before an audience which wants to have a 'nice' evening in a hall fully packed with the smell of perfume floating in the air, and beautiful ladies and gentlemen adding their own charm to the occasion. No greater contrast could be imagined than the mood and expectancy prevailing in the auditorium and the one behind the curtain which is still to rise and reveal the 'magic world' for which every one is waiting. The *rasa* certainly cannot be behind the curtain; neither the director nor the actors could possibly have seen that way in the innumerable

rehearsals that had preceded or 'feel' the impending result of their efforts in that manner. In fact, even the successful enactment of the play would hardly be said to produce any *rasa* in them unless the feeling of relief 'that it was all over', be said to be that.

But what about the audience? Who would deny that they have gone through an 'experience' which, whatever be its name, was, in a sense, the *prayojana* and *puruṣārtha* of everything that went before? Was Bharata, then, talking about this when he talked of *rasa*? Was he concerned with the spectators alone who watched the spectacle and were immersed in it often visiting another world and, for a time, living and participating in it?

But, then, who were these spectators in respect of whom the theory really applies though, by a projective superimposition, it may be applied to the play as enacted and even the play as written. The tradition calls these people *sahṛadaya*, a term which is misleading in the extreme as it seems to suggest that the only quality required for it was to be responsive, or to be in tune with what was going on, on the stage. But how can one be responsive or be in tune with whatever is going on, unless one cultivates and develops almost an infinite plasticity of sensitivity not only to the subtlest shades and nuances of feelings and emotions, but also awareness of the multiple dimensions of a human being in both their depth and height in all directions? Keats called this 'negative capability', but he thought it was necessary for the creator, forgetting that it was even more necessary for the readers or the viewers, as they have to read or view the most contrary creations of man. For this, however, one needs a long self-training or self-learning which makes one perpetually open to new possibilities that the 'creators' are trying to actualize all the time and also judge them critically in the light of the immanent standards and ideals that man has vaguely apprehended in the creations he has encountered in the past.

The audience, thus, is not a 'raw' audience, a *tabula rasa* on which the playwright, the director and the actors may create the emotional concoction they like, but a culturally trained, critical judge of the performance, a function which Bharata's analysis in terms of *rasa* seems totally unaware of, and which the idea of *sahṛadaya* fails to capture as it does not take into account the cognitive-critical judgment

involved in the creation of a work of art and its appreciation. Both the creation and appreciation involve a continuous process of rejection, and most of the creations and productions are a 'failure', facts which Bharata's theory cannot explain.

The dismal failure of Bharata's theory is clearly revealed in its incapacity to handle the notion of *rasābhāsa*, which should have been just the place to come to grips with the problems raised by any theory which tries to be exclusively 'feeling-centred'. Can one be mistaken about the *rasa* that one apprehends? This should have been the central question for the theory, but it just is not so. The issue, when it is raised, is answered not in the context in which the theory was propounded or formulated, but in relation to the 'moral appropriateness' of the situation which is the occasion for the arousal of the *rasa* in the reader or the spectator. The stock example is that of Rāvaṇa and the way he feels for Sītā. Why should this not be an example of *śrangāra*, but only of *rasābhāsa*, or pseudo-*srangāra*, remains the unanswered question for the theory. If moral considerations are held to be relevant for the very arousal of *rasa*, then the theory itself would have to be formulated differently. The reformulation, however, would find it difficult to limit itself to just this, as 'judging' whether the ascription of some property— be it simple or complex—is correct, is a cognitive act fraught with all the problems that any 'truth-claim' involves. The claim that some creation has this particular *rasa* can escape this requirement only by claiming it to be self-validating because of its being a judgment of taste, having nothing to do with inter-subjective validation through mutual discussion. But *rasa* is an 'objective' ascription, both to the whole and the parts out of which the whole is said to be built, and yet the theory does not tell us what is the relation between the *rasas* that characterizes the parts and the one that characterizes the whole. The latter—if it is an emergent property—has to be different from those which characterize the parts, but Bharata has no distinct name for it. One may opt for something like that which later on was added and called *śānta*, but then it would characterize all *nātya* equally and, in any case, be difficult to accommodate within Bharata's definition of the same.

In fact, the later additions of *śānta* and *bhakti* to the list of *rasas* mentioned by Bharata raises problems not only about the exhaustiveness of the list given by Bharata, but also about the adequacy of his definition of it. Neither *śānta* nor *bhakti* can be related to specific human situations whose *anukaraṇa* or *anukrti* can be said to give rise to them. The former has generally been attributed to the *Mahābhārata*, which is not a *nātya* or even a *kāvya*, and has been a subject of dispute in the tradition. As for the latter, the attempt of Madhusūdana Saraswatī to establish *bhakti* as a *rasa* has been examined in detail by Professor R.B. Patankara in his article in *India's Intellectual Traditions* whose second edition has recently appeared under the auspices of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. *Bhakti*, if taken seriously as the realization of a 'feeling relationship' with whatever is regarded as 'ultimately real', destroys the distinction between 'art' and 'reality', and thus cannot give rise to an experience which could be called *rasa* in the sense in which it has been used in the tradition about 'aesthetic thought', or thought about the arts that has occurred in India.

This is obviously correct, but what Patankara does not see is that the 'art creations' in India tried to create an entirely 'objective' world where only one character dominated the scene and became not only the source of all *rasas*, but also more 'real' to the 'imagination-centred' life of the people than any 'living' person, and this *was* Krsna, Mīrā, Sūra, Jayadeva and a myriad others in the different languages of India, including Sanskrit, and the arts concretizing them through pictorial representations found far and wide all over the country and their 'realization' into 'felt-forms' in dance and music is more than sufficient evidence of this. The *Gīta-Govinda* is a classic example, combining as it does, the poetic, the pictorial, the musical and the dance forms centring around the life of Krsna in Vrndāvana. The *Viraha-Bhakti* of which Wilhelm Hardy wrote is perhaps found here rather than in the south where *Śrīmad Bhāgavad* was composed and Andal's passionate love for the lord burst into uncontrollable song and yet found no painters to paint, or dancers to express what she felt in those lyrics, whose intensity of feeling hardly comes out in the translations one reads.

Yet all this, though true, can hardly do anything to 'save' the *rasa* theory from all the shortcomings we have pointed out earlier. In fact, the situation seems to worsen if we confront the theory with the actual plays found in Sanskrit and ask the simple question whether the theory helps us to understand or appreciate them any better. Kālidāsa is said to have written three plays, *Vikramoravaśīum*, *Śākuntalam* and *Mālvikāgnimitram*. How does the *rasa* theory help us in illuminating our understanding of these plays? It would be difficult even to honestly answer the simple question, 'what is the *rasa* in these plays?' And, if one were to ask this about *Mudrārākṣasa*, what would, or could, one say? It is not that there are not plays about which there is little doubt or dispute. Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarītam* is one such case. But what about his *Mālatī-Mādhava*? One would find it difficult to give any unhesitating answer, as nothing seems to be clear in the matter.

One may multiply examples, but whether one does so or not, one thing is clear: the theory, in spite of its prestige, was not used either by the critic or the creator to seriously reflect or evaluate the work that was being produced in the realm of *nāṭya* in this country. It is true that sometimes the writers seem to be deliberately trying to create scenes so that *rasas* like *raudra* or *bhayānaka* or *vībhatsa* may arise as, say, in *Mālatī-Mādhava*, but then these seem so obviously 'forced' as to mar the play. In fact, many of the scenes located in cremation grounds or even those relating to execution of human sacrifice belong to this class. Yet, though these scenes abound in deference to Bharata's enumeration of these as distinct *rasas*, no one seems to have asked why one cannot have a play with these as its predominant *rasa*, or those who equate it with what he called *sthāyī-bhāva*, as its *sthāyī-bhāva*. To think of a play as being any of these would be strange indeed. But the same will be true of *hāsya*, though to a less extent.

But, if so, the very idea of *rasa* would have to be seen in a disjointed way, as some of them can never characterize the play as a whole, while others may do so. The distinction would strike at the very roots of the theory as it assumes that all *rasas* are equally so, and that *qua rasa*, there cannot be much to choose between them. On the other hand, if a distinction were to be made, one would have to offer a ground for the distinction, and a justification for the same.

Not much thought has been given to the problem, as it has been assumed there is no problem at all. Take, for example, the *rasa* called *adbhuta* and the *sthāyī-bhāva* associated with it called *vismaya*. How can it be a separate *rasa* on its own and, in any case, what can be the human situation whose *anukṛti* is supposed to give rise to this *rasa*, and whose *sthāyī-bhāva* is supposed to be *vismaya*? But *vismaya* is short-lived and can hardly be *sthāyī* for very long. As for *adbhuta*, it can hardly be a characteristic of any *particular* creation, but rather 'some thing' that may characterize any outstanding creation if it is of a certain kind. Here, it is like a *camatkāra* which is also actually a characteristic of a few masterworks, even though Jagannātha seems to offer it as a characteristic of *kāvya* in general.

The shift of attention from *Nāṭya* to *Kāvya* revealed the essential limitations of the *rasa* theory even more clearly, as the latter was hardly concerned with the *anukṛti* of human situations as was the former. But the reflection should have freed the theory from its limitations and led to a wide-ranging, all-encompassing theory of art which saw *bhāva* or the world of feelings itself in a different way than as it was seem by Bharata. This, however, did not happen as his authority was too great to be set aside. Yet, the conflict is there in all the theorists who reflected on *kāvya*, whether they belonged to the *dhvani* or the *alaṁkāra* school, or any other. There was something like *rasa*, but it could not be the *rasa* of Bharata, tied as it was to the human situation and divided into the eight or nine forms he had classified them into. Poetry was tied to language, and it was language that created the *bhāva* and the *rasa*, and not the depiction of any human situation, as Bharata had thought.

'What was the relation between language and *rasa*?' This should have been the question raised by the new theorists who reflected upon *kāvya*. But, instead of doing so, they got trapped in the mechanism of poetic construction or the 'crafting' of the poem, and gave us the *alaṁkāra śāstra* with its unending proliferation and classification which, married to the *rasa* theory, produced Sanskrit poetry, the most crafted sensuous poetry ever written in the world. It was over-ornate and had to be sensuous or even grossly sensual as the only *rasa* it could now feel as *rasa* had to be those related to *śraṅgāra*, directly or indirectly.

Strangely, the *rasa* born out of *alaṁkāra* was not paid any attention, for, had this been the case, it would have taken thinking on the subject away from the 'content' and turned it towards those formal elements which arouse a 'feeling-response' that has little to do with human situations as they are 'lived' in ordinary life, or even as they are represented as *mimesis* in art. The *mimetic* or the *anukaraṇa* element represented as *mimesis* in art. The *mimetic* or the *anukaraṇa* element has misled the theorists from Aristotle and Bharata onwards as their thinking arose in the context of *nāṭya* or drama which, *prima facie*, seem to be concerned with this and this alone. But poetry, which may be seen as a halfway-house to music, need have nothing of this and yet produce its effect in spite of, or even because of this. The meaning aspect of words functions differently in poetry than it does in ordinary language, something that perhaps was sought to be captured by the language, something that perhaps was sought to be captured by the *dhvani* theorists in the Indian tradition. But *dhvani* is not *rasa*, though it may arouse one, but then it itself would have to arise not just from the 'meaning' of the words in the poem, but from the *bhāva* or the 'feelings' associated and contained in them.

From poetry to music is a little step, but if that had been taken, the limitations of the traditional *rasa* theory would have been obvious as language or even 'mimicry' would have been seen as totally contingent to the experience of that which was sought to be conveyed by the term *rasa*.

Yet, so strong was the tradition that instead of poetry and music providing a corrective to a theory based on *nāṭya*, they themselves began to be seen and moulded in its terms. The innumerable paintings of *rāga* and *rāginis* attest to this and, what is even stranger, is to find practicing musicians articulating their 'experience' of these in terms of the *rasa* theory of Bharata. Omkar Nath Thakur, the well-known vocalist, is on record confirming what the painters of earlier generations had proclaimed aloud through their work. Perhaps, it was their work, which shaped or influenced his imagination, as the ordinary listener seldom 'sees' or feels classical music in this way. It is not that what has been called *bhāva* is totally absent, or that it is not sought to be conveyed by the singer as, say, in *thumrī* or the *bhajans* that he/she invariably sings at the end of the performance, and which is even to some extent, present in the *khyāla* that precedes it. But what about the

pure *alāpa* which is supposed to be the real essence of all true music, and which comes into its own in the style of singing called *dhrupad* whose *alāpa* is perhaps the purest example of what music seeks, at least in its classical north Indian form today.

. The conflict and the tension between the two, i.e. the word-independent and the word-dependent forms has not been noticed as the musician perforce has to take the 'meaning' in their 'feeling' or 'emotional' sense into account and convey them in their 'living feel' as best as he/she can. The conflict is clear in *khyāla* where the words are there but play only a secondary role to the *svara*-modulation, formation, and combination in which both the artist and the audience are really interested. Even the choice of the 'wording' is subtly chosen to subserve this purpose. But the situation dramatically changes with the *bhajan* or the *thumrī* and both the audience and the artist know it. Nobody is interested in *rāgadārī* now; the atmosphere has changed and the 'strain' of 'listening' and 'attending' and 'creating' has eased and there is relaxation all around.

There is, of course, *rasa* in both, but if it is to be called by the same name, it can only lead to confusion, at least in thought, if not in practice. The problem becomes still clearer, if we ask ourselves what do we 'feel' when we 'see' a great piece of sculpture or architecture? Is it *rasa*, or something else? It will be too difficult to classify it under the former, but then we will have to find a different name for it and ask ourselves, is there nothing akin to this in the 'experience' that we have in respect of other arts? In case there is, why does it get mixed or submerged in something else which perhaps more appropriately is conveyed by the term *rasa*? The latter still retains something 'human' about it, man 'seeing' himself 'reflected' in a 'mirror'. The former, on the other hand, seems 'freed' from all such references and hence the 'feeling' that arises in respect of it also seems unburdened by all that is 'human, all too human', breathing a purer, fresher air. One may find it difficult to stay long at those abstract, rarified levels, but there can be little doubt that human consciousness seeks it always and in all fields, including that of the arts. Mathematics and philosophy are the clearest examples of this impulse towards 'freeing' ourselves from all human sensuousness, including that involved in the notion of the 'inner-

sense', and art tries to do this in the realm of 'feelings' in spite of the fact that it is, and has to be, inevitably sensuous because of its very nature. The search for absolute abstraction in the realm of feeling through its complete detachment from the human reality from which it arises and in which it is involved in a sensuous presentation, is the ultimate impossibility it seeks, a contradiction which it shows challenging man to transform his life of feelings through the capacity for sensuous-cum-non-sensuous imagination that he has within himself.

The search for 'purity' and 'autonomy' may be said to characterize all the 'seekings' of man, but arts face the problem, burdened with the dilemma that it is not only wedded to the sensuously 'felt' and 'lived' life of man, but also that it has to please, attract and 'entertain' without which it cannot have a 'life' of its own. The distinction between the popular and the classical epitomizes this, though the so-called 'classical' has to have the elements of the 'popular' in it to maintain its appeal even to classical audiences. The *rasa* theory caters to this element and derives its strength from it, as it is there everywhere in all cultures and civilizations, whether acknowledged or not. But the self-conscious formulation of a 'temptation' into a norm has played havoc not only with the 'thinking' but also the 'art-creations' in the Indian tradition which have had to try to come to terms with it, whether they liked it or not. The story of their struggle to throw off the burden bequeathad to them in the name of Bharata still has to be written. But what made the thing increasingly difficult was the half-deliberate confusion by bringing in the *raso vai sah* of the *Upaniṣads* and treating the *ānanda* produced by the *rasa* as '*bhrahmānanda sahodara*'. Now one could indulge the temptation to one's heart's content and feel 'good' about it if one was as close as one could be to the highest ideal of spirituality propounded in one's culture.

The influence, however, was not a one-way affair. The 'ideal' of '*rasa*-experience' initiated by Bharata affected the ideal of spiritual seeking in the tradition in a way that has not been noticed primarily because it has been seen not only as completely autonomous in itself, but also as unrelated to the other 'seekings' of men and as being unaffected by them. The transformation of the upaniṣadic *raso vai sah* into the various *rasika sampradāyas* of *bhakti* on the one hand and of

tantra on the other, are an evidence of this. The development of *vajrayāna* in Buddhism and of *rasika sampradāya* in *Rāma Bhakti* would have appeared theoretical impossibilities, if they had not been there as actual 'facts' in the tradition. Perhaps, the very formulation of the ideal of *mokṣa* in positive terms as 'unalloyed bliss' or *ānanda* facilitated this. The *Bṛhadānyaka* analogy was taken literally and the centrality of *Śṛngāra* as *rasarāja* or preeminent amongst all the *rasas*, did the rest.

The deeper harm done by the theory of *rasa* was, thus, in the spiritual domain where, in spite of the way Patanjali had seen it in the search for the transformation of consciousness by its own activity toward 'freeing' it from all 'objectivities' so that it may be able to experiment with itself and find its truth and power in freedom, was forgotten for something that appears only as a subtle substitute for gross sensory pleasure. The lesson that art could have provided in case it had searched for its own truth, or the immanent ideal that governed it from within in terms of its own 'seeking', just could not be as it itself had been derailed by Bharata's authority and his theory propounded about it.

The internal contradictions in the theory were not seen, nor its 'limitations' deriving from the context in which it had arisen. The theory purported to be about the 'arts', something created by man and claiming to have a 'reality' of its own, alongside with and yet independent of that which it presupposes and considers as 'really real' or 'actual' and yet evolves a concept that is 'consciousness-centred' and makes it central to its theory. *Rasa* is centred in consciousness, and can be centred nowhere else, and so if a theory about the arts has to be built, it has to be centred in the arts and has first to ask itself what is its distinguishing or differentiating feature, and then think in terms of it. Also, as arts are in plural, it has to think not only in terms of the generalized differentiation, but also the 'specificities' that differentiate the one art from the other. The concept of *rasa* is intrinsically unable to do this, as consciousness has the capacity and the ability to 'feel' the same or something analogous in respect of 'nature' or even what is called 'actual' at the human level, or even without reference to any 'reality', whether actual or virtual or imagined. The meditative consciousness that seeks to withdraw from all 'objectivity' attempts to do just this.

It is, of course, true that neither in actual life nor in meditative consciousness, one can experience *bhayānaka, raudra, bībhatsa, karuṇa* as *rasa*. As *hāsya, vīra* and *śṛṅgāra*, they can certainly occur and be 'enjoyed' in actual life, though not in meditative consciousness, unless it chooses to live an 'imagined life' as, say, in *bhakti*. The only *rasa* that remains for consciousness when it has withdrawn from all 'objectivities' is *adbhuta* which the *Śiva-sūtra* talks about, or *śānta*, which the latter theoreticians added.

The arts themselves are not all of a piece, and it will be difficult to say if they share anything in common except that they seem to be human creations based on the senses, and that their extension and complication occur independent of considerations of 'utility' relating to the biological needs conceived fairly narrowly. The exploration of the sensory realm relating to each of the senses in terms of the possibilities inherent in it and the ideal values immanent in it gives to each realm an autonomy which has a cognitive dimension that has not been noticed because of its close association with the 'feelings' that it arouses and through which it is apprehended. A painter 'knows' colours, and a dancer 'knows' the body in a way that it cannot be known by a physicist or chemist, or an anatomist or physiologist or doctor. They also know, but their knowledge stops short just at the point where the 'knowledge' of the artist begins. He or she 'accepts' the primacy and the 'reality' of the sensed qualities in their sensuousness which the 'objective' scientist, with all his instruments of observation and analysis, cannot. It is akin to the knowledge of a stone which the sculpture has, a geologist cannot, and what an architect 'sees', an engineer cannot.

The last example should bring home the truth that arts differ very widely in their relation to the 'other' kinds of knowledge which alone is considered 'knowledge' these days and is deemed 'scientific'. The knowledge which is there in what we call 'engineering' is necessary in a sense in which the knowledge involved in physics or chemistry or anatomy or physiology does not. Not only this, knowledge in these fields may not, and usually does not, help in understanding and appreciating what a painter has painted or a dancer has danced.

Music is perhaps the clearest example of a total disconnection of 'sound' from the way it is ordinarily produced or heard. Poetry and the literary arts are at the other end and though what is called 'language' arises from the same physiological base, the two move in such different direction as 'art forms' that it is difficult to see any relation between them. Linguistics and poetics are worlds apart, and though music has been sought to be related to sound frequencies and vibrations since the times of Greeks, both the musician who creates and the listener who listens know how irrelevant it is to the activity they are engaged in. The so-called 'music of the spheres' is irrelevant to all except perhaps the mystic who is not interested either in science or art, or the knowledge they embody and represent.

The worlds that the arts make are thus diverse and distinct and hence have to be 'known' in their own way. The 'truth' of each has to be seen in terms of what it embodies and seeks, independent of the 'subjectivity' of the consciousness that tries to know and understand it. Most theories of art do not do so, and the *rasa* theory certainly does not. It takes one away from the work of art and sees it primarily in 'instrumental' terms as if it had no 'individuality' of its own, when it has not only a 'uniqueness' and 'individuality' about it, but is valued and cherished for just that reason. If *rasa* were the essence of it, then the 'individuality' should make little difference, and only the 'universality' should suffice.

But, besides the individuality and the uniqueness, there is also the history and the plurality of the particular art form, which has also to be taken into account. The *rasa* theory is just incapable of doing this. It is time to forget it; it has already done great harm to India's thinking about the arts, and the effects this has had on the creation of artworks in this country. Any insights that it may have given can, and should, be accommodated in the new thinking. But whatever the resistance, cultural or otherwise, the arts and the thinking about the arts has to be rescued from the millennium-long *adhyāsa* superimposed on it by Bharata's authority, and the unquestioning way it has been accepted till now.

Transformative Education: Śankara and Krishnamurti on the Encounter Between Teacher and Student

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The following paper attempts to discuss the educational approach of two great Indian thinkers: Śankara, the famous Advaitin of the eighth century, and Jiddu Krishnamurti[1], a twentieth-century reluctant 'world teacher'. While the latter explicitly talks of education, the former discusses the interlacement of the teacher and the student, as well as the process of teaching leading to ultimate knowledge (*ātmavidyā*). Krishnamurti is the founder of several schools worldwide, which attempt even today to offer an alternative method of education, inspired by his teaching. Śankara is considered by the Advaita tradition to be the founder of several *mathas*, 'monastic study-centers' at every corner of the Indian subcontinent.

The main argument of the paper is that both Śankara and Krishnamurti, despite more than a thousand years between them, share a similar pedagogical approach, based on the fact that they both reject the conventional model of teaching, according to which the teacher knows, the student does not know and the former conveys knowledge to the latter. Instead, they both maintain that 'knowledge' takes place only within an intimate encounter between teacher and student. Such an encounter brings forth a special kind of knowledge or, rather, awareness which lies in each of them waiting to be 'invited' out. They are equal partners in the enterprise of recovering this inner-awareness, to the extent that it is often impossible to determine who teaches and who is taught. This raises a question regarding the difference between the teacher and the student: If they are equal partners, what is it that makes the former a teacher, the latter a student and not vice versa?

This question is closely related to the purpose of education according to Śankara as well as Krishnamurti. For both of them, as we shall further see, education or the unique encounter of a teacher and a student has nothing to do with information, but rather with transformation.

This alternative approach is presented by Śankara is his exceptional work, *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* ('A Thousand Teachings'). It is the only work of Śankara—considered by scholars to be authentic[2]—which is not a *bhāṣya*. Here, he is free to express his views without being bound by any external textual framework, and he dedicates a large portion of the text to what I wish to refer to as his educational approach. Furthermore, the uniqueness of this work is the outcome of its exceptional 'tone'. In Śankara's other, more famous, works, namely his commentaries of the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Upaniṣad*s and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, a severe battle takes place between the *advaitin* and his *pūrva-pakṣin*s. In the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī*, this battle—or rather firm debate—is replaced with a patient, sometimes even affectionate dialogue between teacher and student, out of which deep understanding concerning the human nature is to be achieved.

In the first chapter (in prose) of his work, titled *Siṣya-pratibodha-vidhi-prakaraṇam* (How to enlighten the student), Śankara lists the qualities required of both teacher and student, *ācārya* and *śiṣya*,[3] to facilitate the emergence of a special type of knowledge, self-knowledge, referring not to the objects of the 'outer world' but rather to one's own Being. Let's inquire into the qualities required from both the participants in the 'pedagogic encounter', to better understand this very encounter and its purpose, namely Śankara's unique notion of *ātmavidyā*.

The qualities required from the student, as specified by Śankara in *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* 1.2,[4] can be divided into inherited and acquired. I am less interested in the inherited requirements (i.e. the student should be a *brāhmin*, whose caste and family have been carefully examined[5]). We are allowed to assume that they reflect the social atmosphere in Śankara's time. The acquired qualities can be classified into two headings: general qualities of a student and specific qualities of a renunciate. The general qualities include tranquility, inner restraint and generosity,[6] as well as what is referred to by Śankara as '*śāstric* qualities of student'.[7] He further suggests that the student should approach the

teacher in the proper manner (namely, not empty handed, etc.) and be a *Veda-vid*, i.e. versed in the *Veda*.[8] Above and beyond these general qualities, Śankara emphasizes the fact that the student should be endowed with qualities of a renunciate. He is required to be indifferent to everything which is transitory (namely, everything but the *ātman*),[9] to be a *paramahamsa-pārivrājya*, wanderer, belonging to the *paramahamsa* category of ascetics[10]; and finally to give up the desire for sons, wealth and worlds (i.e. heritage in this life and the next). In this final requirement, Śankara draws on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.5.1; here it is said that 'When they come to know the self (previously depicted as being "beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death"), *brāhmin*s give up the desire for sons, wealth and worlds and undertake the mendicant life'.[11] In other words, the three-dimensional 'inner-renunciation' required from the student by Śankara (which might later on lead, as specified by the *Upaniṣadic* text, to 'outer' or 'physical' renunciation in the form of *bhikṣā-carya*) is the clear outcome of a certain understanding regarding one's true nature; the clear outcome of *ātmavidyā* (self-knowledge). The striking conclusion, then, is that Śankara requires the student to be a 'graduate' even before embarking on his studies, namely to 'enter' the 'pedagogic encounter' already equipped with *ātmavidyā*. The question is why? If he is already an *ātmavid*, why should he approach a teacher? And what is the purpose of the *guru-śiṣya* encounter? In a nutshell, Śankara's answer would be the following: Every human being is endowed with *ātmavidyā* from the very beginning. To know the *ātman* is to be the *ātman*, which we all are and have always been. The *ātman* is the very essence of teacher and student alike. Yet, the student fails to realize that he *knows*. The purpose of the 'pedagogic encounter' is to awaken this very realization. It is not about knowledge, but rather about 'knowledge-of-knowledge', about the subtle awareness referring to knowledge itself.

Just like the student, the teacher too is depicted by Śankara as required for both general qualities (of a teacher), as well as specific qualities of a renunciate.[12] The general qualities include equanimity, inner restraint, generosity and kindness (*anugraha*). Only the last quality, referring to the teacher's special urge to teach (compatible perhaps with the student's

mumukṣatva,[13] the special urge to be liberated) is inclusive and has not been mentioned in the requirements of the student. *Anugraha* and *mumukṣatva* mean that both should participate in the 'pedagogic experiment' voluntarily, rather than be forced into it. Furthermore, the teacher is expected to be endowed with moral values (to refrain from deceit, trickery, etc.), a good memory and the desire to teach not out of personal interest but rather for the benefit of the student and for the sake of knowledge itself. He should be a '*Vedic* teacher', namely well-versed in the *Veda*, and lastly, he is expected to be a skilled in argumentation (to be able to confront whatever argument the student raises in order to protect and sustention his familiar, dualistic, perspective). On top of these general qualities, the teacher (like the student before him) should have the qualities of a renunciate—he is required to be indifferent to worldly pleasures, as well as a renouncer of rituals. He is further required to be a *brahmavid brahmaṇi sthitah*, knower of *brahman* and established in the *brahman*. I consider this last requisite as belonging to 'the qualities of a renunciate', since it 'uproots' the teacher from the *māyā-loka* in favour of the so-called *brahma-loka*.[14] By insisting that the teacher should be not merely be a *brahmavid*, but rather *brahmaṇi sthitah*, Śankara makes it clear that for him, self-knowledge is not *śuṣka-tarka* ('dry reasoning') but rather existential, experiential knowledge, converted into flesh, into being, into life.

Śankara further emphasizes the existential dimension of *ātmavidyā* in his commentary of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, by replacing the *gītā*'s notion of *jñāna-yoga* with his very own *jñāna-niṣṭhā*. The term *niṣṭhā* literally means 'position', 'condition', 'fixity', 'steadfastness', 'application', 'accomplishment' and 'devotion', and is derived from *niṣṭha*, 'being in' In his *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad bhāṣya*, Śankara explains the meaning of *jñāna-niṣṭhā* (here, *brahma-niṣṭhā*), as used by him:

> One who renounces all activities and remains absorbed in the non-dual *brahman* only is a *brahma-niṣṭha*, just as it is in the case of the words *japa-niṣṭha*, absorbed in self-repetition, and *tapo-niṣṭha*, absorbed in austerity. For one engrossed in action cannot have absorption in *brahman*, *karma* and the knowledge of the *ātman* being contradictory.[15]

To clarify the notion of *brahma-niṣṭha* (a person absorbed in the *brahman*), Śankara draws on the more familiar notions of *japa-niṣṭha* (a person immersed in recitation of *mantra*) and *tapo-niṣṭha* (a person engaged in *tapas*). *Prima facie*, these two practitioners differ immensely from the *brahma-niṣṭha*; if they are dedicated, each to his own practice, the latter—owing to Śankara's clear-cut distinction between knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*karma*)—is not *doing* anything. Yet, my contention is that even though 'knowledge', in Śankara's sense of the word, has nothing to do with *practice*, nevertheless it refers to *praxis*—it is to be accomplished, applied, lived! Like the *japa-niṣṭha* and the *tapasvin*, the knower of *brahman* is not merely dedicated to a certain path, but rather cannot be divorced from it. He is not just a knower, but rather knowledge itself.

If we compare the requirements of both the student and the teacher, as specified by Śankara, again we are faced with a striking conclusion: the requirements are the same! Both are expected to be endowed with general positive qualities (*śama*, *dama*, etc.) and to be versed in the scriptures; both are expected to be renunciates; and finally, both are *knowers*, in the metaphysical, *ātman*-centric sense of the word. What could be the explanation of this salient resemblance of the two?

First, a 'common language' is needed to enable fruitful communication between them, which is necessary for the emergence of *ātmavidyā*; common language, both literally (teacher and student alike should be well versed in the *Vedic* language) and figuratively (both of them should have the tendency of 'looking within', rather than 'without').

Second, I believe that the striking similarity between the two participants of the 'pedagogic encounter' reveals something of the uniqueness of the knowledge for which sake they meet. It is found 'at the beginning and in the end'. It belongs and it is available for teacher and student alike. The only difference between them is that the latter fails to acknowledge the fact that being the *ātman*, he necessarily *knows*; he fails to acknowledge his own nature, due to the veil of *avidyā* ('ignorance'). Writes Śankara:

> The teacher said (to the student): Though you are the highest *ātman* and not a *samsārī* ('man of the world'), you hold the inverted view, 'I am a *samsārī*. Though you are neither agent nor enjoyer (you hold

the inverted view, 'I am) an agent and an enjoyer'. *Though you know, (you hold the inverted view) 'I do not know'*—this is *avidyā*.[16]

The teacher's task, then, is to unveil the covering of *avidyā*, due to which the student is unable to recognize his true eternal, quite, free nature; to remove the obstacles owing to which the student cannot hold (*grahaṇam*) onto knowledge.[17] *Ātmavidyā* is depicted by Śankara as something which has to be firmly held or grasped at. It is elusive, easily forgotten in favour of identification with *māyā*, with mere appearance. The obstacles to be removed by the teacher include, as specified by Śankara, *adharmic* behaviour, *laukika-pramāda* (translated by Mayeda as 'worldly laxity'[18]), non-discrimination between eternal and transitory, care about what other people think and arrogance owing to one's class in the social hierarchy. Śankara's list of obstacles further illustrates the elusiveness of *ātmavidyā*. If previously he has required the student, preliminarily, to be a knower and a renunciate (which for Śankara are none but 'two sides of the same coin')—now we come to realize that the purpose of the 'pedagogic encounter' is to bring these two 'in-built' qualities into light, lest they be forgotten in favour of the 'external' *kartā-bhoktā-samsārī* perspective, resulting in the 'obstacles' mentioned by Śankara. The seeds of *ātmavidyā* as an existential notion are already there; it is the teacher's 'job' to facilitate their growth and bloom. The question is, how? How to protect the seeds of 'knowledge as renunciation' (renunciation of *avidyā*, of the conventional 'I *do*, therefore I am' perspective)? How to remove the obstacles? How to convince the student that everything which has so far been taken for granted is not 'necessary' but rather 'voluntary'?

Śankara's reply, or method of teaching, is twofold: First the teacher should repeat the *advaitic* alternative (condensed in a single phrase, *tat tvam asi*) again and again, until the 'given-ness' of the conventional, dualistic, perspective fades away. Second, he should prescribe certain *yamas* (guidelines) for the student, thus admitting him into a 'framework' which will not enable him to proceed according to his previous view of himself as an 'individual self', i.e. doer and enjoyer, but rather encourage him to 'extend his boundaries'. The prescribed *yamas* consist of *ahimsādi* (non-injury, etc.[19]); *ahimsā*, being an example for equal treatment of 'me' and the 'other'. Elsewhere, instead of mentioning

yamas, Śankara speaks of the *dharma* ('duty') prescribed for the *brahma-samstha* ('a person established in *brahman*'):

> His *dharma*, viz., restraint of the senses and the like, is not opposed to the state of being grounded in *brahman*, but rather helpful to it. For the only work (*karma*) enjoined on him by his *aśrama* is the state of being firmly grounded in *brahman* (*brahmaniṣṭhatva*), wherein he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on—just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other *aśramas*—and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work.[20]

The *dharma* prescribed for the *brahma-samstha* consists of *śama-damādi*, 'equanimity, inner restraint, etc.', included by Śankara—as we have seen—in the list of qualities required of both student and teacher. This *dharma*, just like the *yamas* previously mentioned, is presented by Śankara as 'supportive environment' for him who wishes to accomplish the *karma*(!) of the *brahma-samstha*, namely to be established in *brahman*, to *know*—existentially, not theoretically. The teacher, according to Śankara, then, operates on two levels: on the level of knowledge (the epistemological level), by repeating the '*advaitic* mantra' *tat tvam asi*, and on the complementary level of the student's way of living, by prescribing certain *yamas*, particular *aśrama* (the fourth) and special *dharma*. Implied is an intriguing assertion regarding the interlacement of knowledge and way of living. According to Śankara, a certain 'way of living' (mental attitude leading to an outer life-style) determines certain 'type of knowledge', and vice versa.

As far as we have seen, the teacher and the student share the same way of living (inner and perhaps even physical renunciation), as well as the same 'type of knowledge' (*ātmavidyā*). The only difference between the two, as I have ceaselessly suggested, is that the latter fails to acknowledge the fact that he is already an *ātmavid*. G.C. Pande, 'digging' deeper into the significance of such a difference, explains that even though 'there is a continuity of qualities and aspects between the spiritual-seeker (the student) and the liberated person (the teacher), the seeker assiduously practices the virtues which come naturally to the realized person'.[21] In the light of Pande's observation, the astonishing fact that Śankara—famous for his razor-sharp distinction between

'knowledge' and 'action'—clearly speaks of knowledge (i.e. of being established in the *brahman*) in terms of action (*karma*) might be intelligible. The student needs to 'work' to accomplish that which is only natural for the teacher. Śankara, as we have seen, prescribes 'supporting environment' for such 'work' in the form of *yamas*, etc. Perhaps the teacher-student encounter too should be seen as 'supporting environment'; supporting not merely for the student, but rather for both of them. Considering the elusive nature of *ātmavidyā*, can't we assume that the teacher too needs support in grasping at it? According to the traditional accounts of Śankara's life, he certainly does. Composed hundreds of years after Śankara, these hagiographic texts provide us with a narrative illustration of his thought—as seen and understood by the later Advaita tradition—including his understanding of the *guru-śiṣya* encounter.

A famous episode, related to this very theme, tells of Śankara's debate with Ubhaya Bhārati, wife of the well-known *Mīmāmsāka* Maṇḍana Miśra. Determined to win, she decides to ask him of what Madhava Vidyāraṇya, author of the *Śankara-digvijaya*,[22] refers to as *Kusumāstra-śāstra*, 'the scriptures of erotic love' (or literally, of Lord Kāma's 'flower arrows'). Having been a *sanyāsī* from his early childhood, Śankara is totally ignorant with regard to the chosen subject. He therefore asks for a month-long 'time-out', to prepare for the debate. Instead of contemplating on relevant texts (such as Vatsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra*), Śankara prefers to use the time given to him for entering (with his yogic powers) the body of a dying king, in order to acquire 'erotic-knowledge' by experience, without breaking his *brahmacarya* 'erotic-knowledge' by experience, without breaking his *brahmacarya* vow.[23] Absorbed in sensual pleasures, he 'forgets himself' altogether and in due time fails to appear for the debate. Worried for their master, as well as for themselves having been left without a *guru*, Śankara's students show up at the king's court disguised as musicians. They sit at the feet of the king, singing the following song:

O honey sucker! We, your companion bees, guarding your body on the wooded top of a mountain peak, have long been most anxiously awaiting your return ... O one with moon-like face! How is it that by identification with your present situation, you have continued to stay on here, forgetting all your antecedents? O victor of passions!

May you be pleased to be reminded of your higher nature through those words of ours! *Tat tvam asi, tat tvam asi!*[24]

The whole episode is full of irony. If I have previously suggested that due to the intimate interlacement of teacher and student, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain who teaches and who is taught—the story clearly illustrates the vagueness of the 'borderline' between the two. Owing to the unique nature of *ātmavidyā*, each of them (as even the great Śankarācārya) is always at the risk of losing it. The sentence *tat tvam asi*, depicted by Śankara (the philosopher, not the protagonist) as the only 'medicine' for *avidyā*, is here used not by the 'teacher' but rather by his 'students', trying to unveil his sudden ignorance. If the teacher's task, as already said, is to remove obstacles 'blocking' the student's vision of his *ātman*hood—here, the obstacle which has to be removed (for the *ātman* to be revealed) is desire or sensuality (belonging perhaps to what Śankara refers to in the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* as *laukika-pramāda*). In his commentary of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 2.23.1, Śankara mentions a much more relevant obstacle for the 'typical' *bhikṣu* (renunciate), namely *bubhukṣā*, hunger. It is not difficult to imagine a person forgetting everything, perhaps even his own identity, under conditions of hunger.

The episode about Śankara entering the king's body further emphasizes the link between knowledge and way of living. Implied is the assertion that a certain way of living not only facilitates a certain type of knowledge, but might as well 'block' other types of knowledge. Here, Śankara's *brahmacarya* (celibacy, monkhood, renunciation) which facilitates (or at least supports) his *ātmavidyā*, prevents him of acquiring the required 'erotic knowledge'.

To sum up, I would like to suggest that the purpose of 'education' in Śankara's thought—or rather the aim of the unconventional encounter of teacher and student—is none other than to weave the thread of 'knowledge as a way of living'; it is the teacher's task is to reveal the intrinsic connection between these two notions.

*   *   *

Jiddu Krishnamurti's educational approach is intriguing, as *prima facie*, there is a contradiction between his famous assertion 'Truth is a pathless land', proclaimed on August 2, 1929, when he has dissolved *The Order of the Star in the East*, and repeated later on, in different formulations at different occasions, and his firm belief in education which has led to the establishment of several schools worldwide, attempting to offer an alternative in the field of education. In the following lines, I will make an attempt at depicting Krishnamurti's educational approach, focussing on the 'purpose' of education and the teacher-student encounter. My attempt will naturally draw on what has been said so far.

Krishnamurti (henceforth K) distinguishes between two modes of the mind: the absolutely conditioned and the totally free. To the former, he refers as *consciousness*; to the latter as *Intelligence*. According to him, consciousness is determined by thought, which is divisive, hence cannot touch truth. Consciousness is further determined by time; it is brain which has evolved physically and psychologically through time. Consciousness functions merely in the realm of time. It is a movement from past to future, regarding the present as merely complementary to these two notions. Indeed, thought is preoccupied with past and future, the latter being mere reflection or modified continuity of the former. Therefore, consciousness is actually a movement from past to past. It is further determined by desire. Consciousness is, as K puts it, 'an agglomeration of desire'.[25] Further, it is depicted by him as equivalent to the known.[26] Consciousness is knowledge, since knowledge, like consciousness, is (the product of) the past. Consciousness is confined to the realm of the known. It is a movement from the known to the known. Knowledge or the known is ever limited, never complete; therefore, so is consciousness. K further claims that consciousness is never an 'individual consciousness'; it is not 'mine', but rather a 'heritage' from the whole of humanity. It is the psychological content or 'the story' of humanity, perpetually self-centred, divisive, conflicting, lonely, confused, envious, violent, suffering, etc. Like a computer, consciousness has been (and still is) programmed according to religious, nationalistic and other cultural agendas. 'For centuries, we have been programmed to believe, to have faith, to follow certain rituals, certain dogmas; programmed to be nationalistic and to go to war.'[27] According

to K, consciousness is also temporal; there is nothing permanent or eternal in it. Yet, unable to bear its own impermanence, consciousness invents a 'permanent entity', called 'the thinker'. Thought divides itself into 'thought' and 'thinker', whereas in reality there is no difference whatsoever between the seemingly two. The thinker is not an independent entity, but rather a projection of thought, as much conditioned as thought itself.[28] The artificial notion of a permanent thinker carries along an equally false sense of security. Totally different from consciousness is Intelligence, synonymous in K's terminology with 'the unknown', 'the immeasurable', 'nothingness', 'what is' and 'truth'. 'To be absolutely nothing', he asserts, 'means a total contradiction of everything you have learnt, everything that thought has put together'.[29] We are so habitual, identified and dependent on the known, on the measurable, on 'things', on past and future, on what K metaphorically refers to as 'smoke', that we have completely forgotten the 'flame'. The unknown cannot be grasped by consciousness. All the same, thought constantly tries to capture 'nothingness'. In its efforts, consciousness merely strengthens itself by gathering more and more content, words and fear (of losing the known, the already accumulated). The more it tries, the more thought is strengthened, hence moving further away from the immeasurable.[30] K's description of consciousness trying its best, but in vein, to grasp at the unknown, reminds me of Śankara's nineteenth and final chapter of the metric part of the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī*, titled *atha ātma-manah-samvāda-prakaraṇam*, 'A conversation between the *ātman* and the mind'. Dedicated as he is to the teacher-student encounter, Śankara offers a dialogue between the *ātman* and the *manas* (the mind), depicted here respectively as teacher and student. The theme of their discussion is naturally *ātmanvidyā*, knowledge of the *ātman*, self-knowledge. Says the *ātman* to the *manas*:

> Oh, my mind, you indulge yourself in vain ideas like 'me' and 'mine'. Your efforts, according to others, are for one other than yourself. You have no consciousness of things and I have no desire of having anything. *It is therefore proper for you to remain quite.*[31]

The *ātman* explains that the notions of 'me' and 'mine', thought of by the *manas* (by thought itself) are futile in referring to the metaphysical

level (i.e. to the *ātman*). He seems to be an 'Advaitic *ātman*' as he rejects the Sāṅkhyan position, according to which the mind (*prakṛti*) is functioning for the sake of the self (*puruṣa*). He further tells the *manas* that all its efforts are in vein since he (the *ātman*) is free of desire, and concludes by suggesting, 'be quiet!'[32] In other words, the *manas* is requested to stop! To stop thinking as well as desiring. Only such 'stoppage', such silence, will enable the *ātman* to be revealed. Just like Śaṅkara's *manas*, K's 'consciousness' is unable to grasp the 'unknown'. Only when the known comes to an end (to rest, to suspension), the unknown might be revealed. Just like Śaṅkara's *ātman*, 'the immeasurable' is always there, but the 'noisy' mind (thought, consciousness) prevents us from 'hearing' its silent existence.

In view of all that has been said so far, K's 'purpose of education' is clear: to evaporate the smoke of self-centricity, fragmentation, fear, confusion, loneliness, possessiveness, envy, violence, etc.—all belonging to consciousness, to the past—to enable the revelation of the flame, of the immeasurable. Before asking how, I would like to add that K is not merely phrasing what I have referred to as his 'purpose of education' *via negativa*; he explicitly talks of love, creativity, spontaneity, sensitivity, beauty and wisdom (different from accumulated knowledge) as the goals (or the 'milestones') of the process of education. Now, the question is how? How to extinguish jealousy and possessiveness, to enable the flow of love? How to renounce the disciplined, past-centred mind in favour of spontaneity? How to be free from the known? How to find truth? Replies K:

> One cannot find it. The effort to find truth brings about a self-centred end; and that end is not truth. A result is not truth; result is the continuation of thought, extended or projected. Only when thought ends, there is truth. There is no ending of thought through discipline, through any form of resistance. Listening to the story of *what is* brings its own liberation. It is truth that liberates, not effort.[33]

K's last sentence, 'It is truth that liberates, no effort', echoes Śaṅkara's clear-cut distinction between 'knowledge' and 'action'. For him—just like for K—self-knowledge (K's notion of Intelligence) cannot be a result or an outcome of any action. Instead of doing, just be! Education

is depicted by K as an invitation to listen to the story of *what is*. Thought is constantly telling us another story, namely the story of *what should be*. The story of *what is* can only be listened to when thought is not. Explains K:

> Thought has created all the things in the world—great paintings, poetry, music, and so on. Thought has created everything except nature. The tiger has not been created by thought, nor that lake which you see.[34]

Thought is limited, nature is not. This is the reason why nature is given such an important role in K's life and teaching. He himself lived in the nature. His schools are in the nature. Every page of his diaries starts and ends with nature (or rather with nature-experience). For him, the tiger and the river, the tamarind tree and the moon, are the only authentic reflection of our human nature, not as depicted by thought but as it is. Furthermore, the story of *what is* cannot be found in books. For K, books are the past; they reflect hierarchy and authority; they are 'warehouses' of accumulated knowledge, of old values. Intelligence has nothing to do with information; therefore it does not belong, nor found, nor derived from books.[35] This explains why K has never written any book.[36] The numerous books ascribed to him are the protocols of talks given by him at every corner of the globe. K only kept a diary,[37] considered by him to be a totally different undertaking than writing a book, as it is flowing spontaneously, rooted in the here and now experience rather than in the past/future, and since it is—as Nietzsche puts it—'a book for none and all'. For none, as it is a diary, intended merely for the author himself. For all, as it refers to what K calls the experience of 'aloneness':

> Aloneness is not aching fearsome loneliness. It's the aloneness of being; uncorrupted, rich complete. That tamarind tree has no existence other than being itself. So is this aloneness. One is alone like the fire, like a flower ... one can truly communicate only when there is aloneness.[38]

K's journal is 'a book for all', as it communicates at the level of being, which for him is 'true communication'. At this level, the author

is 'anonymous', free from identification. It is no longer K communicating with his readers; 'K' has faded away; it is nature, bare nature, communicating with nature. It is a book for all, since the nature of each one of us is not personal, since to be 'alone' is to be 'all one'. At the same time, it is 'a book for none', since it is nature communicating with none but itself. By writing to himself, K was trying to establish a different relationship between 'me' and the 'other', hence aiming simultaneously at oneself and at the 'other', not at all different from one's own self.

If the immeasurable is not to be found in books (diary being an exceptional experiment), how are we to find it? Or rather, how are we to find in ourselves the receptivity and awareness without which we shall not be able to ascertain the flame from the smoke? Nature, as we have seen, is 'supportive environment' for such a task. As supportive as the nature-experience is direct communication between teacher and student, taking place at the present moment. Before 'digging' further into the nature of such communication, it should be noted that K has objected wholeheartedly to the *guru*-disciple relationship based on authority. 'To me', he said, 'an authority is terrible, destructive. The quality of authority, outward or inward, is tyrannical.'[39] And he further suggested that

> Humility is unaware of the division of the superior and the inferior, the master and the pupil. As long as there is division between the master and the pupil, between reality and yourself, understanding is not possible. In the understanding of truth there is no master or pupil, neither the advanced nor lowly.[40]

For K, authority is the arrogance of the so-called *guru*, religious leader, politician, etc., as well as the heredity ('people want to be told, to be led'[41]) of those abiding by it. As far as K is concerned, where authority ends freedom begins. Now, K has not merely spoken of immediate communication between teacher and student, but rather converted his belief in this unique encounter into action by offering numerous talks, meetings, question and answer sessions, all through his life. Having severed himself from the Theosophical Society at the age of thirty-four, thus renouncing his role as a 'world teacher', ironically

he has become ... a world teacher; or as Mary Lutyens puts it, 'The most remarkable thing about Krishnamurti's life was that the prophecies made about him in his youth were fulfilled, yet in a very different way from what had been expected'.[42]

At the opening of many of his talks, K used to say:

> The speaker is not giving a lecture; you are not being talked *at*, or being instructed. This is a conversation between two friends, two friends who have a certain affection for each other, a certain care for each other, who will not betray each other and have certain deep common interests. So they are conversing amicably, with a sense of deep communication with each other, sitting under a tree on a lovely cool morning with the dew on the grass, talking over together the complexities of life. That is the relationship which you and the speaker have—we may not meet actually; there are too many of us—but we are as if walking along a path, looking at the trees, the birds, the flowers, breathing the scent of the air, and talking seriously about our lives; not superficially, not casually, but concerned with the resolution of our problems. The speaker means what he says; he is not just being rhetorical, trying to create impression; we are dealing with problems of life much too serious for that.[43]

Before discussing the implications of this typical statement (quoted from a talk at Benares in 1981), concerning the nature of the dialogue between teacher and student—I would like to suggest that having been practically engaged in education rather than being merely a theoretician, K's educational approach should be evaluated not only according to *what* has been said (the content, the words) but also according to the *how*, to the 'tone' in which the words have been uttered. His own application of the alternative approach presented by him (education not based on conveyance of knowledge!) should be taken into account. Does he not sound, for example, extremely authoritative in rejecting authority?

K depicts both participants in the educational process as two friends (thus excluding any type of authority), walking together in the nature, attentive to the world around them as well as to themselves. They are equal partners in the exploration of the inner details of life. Just like

in Śankara's thought, both are required for the same qualities: openness, receptivity; '*mumukṣatva*' of a new kind, i.e. sincere curiosity and willingness to meet life with all its complexity, to discover rather than to be creative rather than imitative, and to change rather than repeat, to be creative rather than imitative, and to change rather than renounce the world. Both of them are further required for great deal of seriousness (after all, it is life itself which is about to be explored), courage (not to conform), and above all eagerness to question, inquire, experiment. The first step in their mutual inquiry would be to find out what inquiry is all about. What does it mean to really ask (not searching for an answer which you already have)? What does it mean to inquire without being told what to inquire? To observe without being told what to observe?[44] This existential rather than theoretical or abstract inquiry, as already said, is about life and living in the world. 'To understand life', maintains K, 'is to understand ourselves, and that is both the beginning and the end of education.'[45] Referring to Śankara's *ātmavidyā*, I have argued that it is to be found 'in the beginning and at the end'; in the beginning as potential, waiting to be awakened; at the end (namely, following the *guru-śiṣya* encounter) as a full-fledged understanding regarding knowledge as a way of living. K's terminology is different. He discriminates—as we have already seen—between knowledge (accumulated information about 'things', equivalent to Śankara's *avidyā*) and awareness, Intelligence, wisdom (equivalent to Śankara's *ātmavidyā*, at least in the general sense of 'understanding ourselves' and despite K's firm objection to the use of the Sanskrit term *ātman* with all its 'religious connotations').[46] Intelligence is not to be achieved or gained, but rather to be revealed as it is always here and now. Therefore, K says that it is 'the beginning and the end of education'. The teacher-student communication is undertaken to awaken that which is already here, which is the very essence of each of them. Both are made from the same 'material'; both start from conditioned mind and have the capacity to transcend it, to find in themselves a 'place' (or rather 'no-place') which is free. The teacher's task is to invite the student to ask questions and to facilitate an open environment, willing to tolerate true inquiry. She or he invites and facilitates, but the inquiry is mutual. The student's role is as active (in asking, listening, discovering) as the teacher's. Regarding the difference between teacher

and student, K ironically remarks[47] that the teacher is already conditioned, while the student (referring to school children) is still being conditioned. In a sense, the student stands in an 'advantageous position', as her or his 'programming' is not yet completed. In rare occasions, the teacher is completely free from conditioning (as in the case of K himself, at least as he has been seen by his students); in other cases, the seeds of freedom are already there, to be irrigated by the immediate communication of the participants in the process of education. The teacher's role and the nature of the teacher-student communication are further clarified in a dialogue between K and a questioner in a talk at the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, 1984.

> Questioner: Throughout your talk you claimed that there is a lot of confusion in this world. But I do not remember your having a suggestion or a solution regarding that. Don't you think that this adds to the confusion rather than reduce it?
> K: Certainly. But confusion is there; I don't claim it; it is so. Aren't you all confused? When you look at yourself honestly, clearly, aren't you all confused? The speaker says there is no suggestion. He is not offering you a *thing*; he is not telling you what to do. But look at this confusion carefully. Don't say there is no confusion.[48]

Elsewhere K adds:

> Clarity cannot be given by another. Confusion is in us; we have brought it about and we have to clear it away.[49]

That the process of education is not based on exchange, we have already seen. As K puts it, the teacher does not give the student a 'thing', but rather invites him or her to observe. Just like Śankara's teacher, who cannot but repeat again and again the 'mantra' *tat tvam asi*, thus constantly putting the student in a position from which he can truly (uncommitted to any previous, conventional perspective) investigate and arrive at a conclusion regarding his own nature; K's teacher cannot but persistently point out the problem. She or he wakes (or shakes) the student up, thus putting him or her in a position to face life with all its intricacies; from here onwards, it is up to the student to deal with *what is*, arriving at her or his own solutions and way of action.

By offering a solution, the teacher would take away rather than facilitate the student's freedom.

To close, I would like to make an attempt at reconciling the irreconcilable, namely K's insistence on the fact that 'truth is a pathless land' and his equally firm persistence on the importance of offering an alternative educational path. My attempt will draw on Crockett Johnson's famous children book, *Harold and the Purple Crayon*. As you may know, this little book tells the story of a boy called Harold, travelling the world with a purple crayon in his hand. He follows a purple path which he is sketching with his crayon, facing different purple adventures, all at the tip of the crayon. Harold's world is not 'given' or 'readymade', but rather created at every step by none other than himself. Having gone out for an evening walk, Harold suddenly forgets his way home. Worried as he is of getting further lost in the woods, he makes a very small purple forest made of only one tree. It turns out to be an apple tree, and Harold thinks that the apples will be very tasty when they get red. So he puts a frightening dragon under the tree to guard the apples. It is a terribly frightening dragon; frightening to the extent that even the hand by which it is made shivers with fear. So far—if I may offer my own *bhāṣya* to the story—Harold is a typical Advaitin, crafting his world, frightened by a dragon (in place of the traditional snake) which he himself has created. When time comes to go to sleep, Harold needs to find the way home. He makes a lot of purple buildings with purple windows, but he is not sure which of the windows is his own. He therefore approaches a policeman (ironically depicted by Johnson as a clown), asking him in which way to go. The policeman—turning out to be a 'Krishnamurti type of teacher'—'points the way Harold was going anyway. But Harold thanks him, and walks along with the moon'. The happy end is inevitable: Harold finds home, makes his purple bed and drops off to sleep.

What is the contribution of the story to our discussion? I would like to suggest that for K, education is a 'pathless path'. For an 'Indian ear', this inner contradiction would sound challenging, even familiar. Is true renunciation, for example, not defined by Śankara as 'actionless action'[50]? Harold's path, I would like to further suggest, is an illustration of such 'pathless path'; it is spontaneously created by him every moment

(hence leading from the present to the present); it is a *niṣṭhā*, in Śankara's sense of the word, namely existential, even experiential, not at all a theoretical way of living. The 'pathless path teacher' invites Harold to embark on his journey and equips him with a crayon, to sketch his own path; he is a traffic policeman (with a smile!), always giving you the right of way, especially when it seems to you that you have altogether lost your path. He is always available, co-traveller on a parallel path, sketched with his own crayon. He is always available, willing to sit under a tree, share a cup of *chai* and openly discuss the hardships of the way. But all the same, the student is alone, always alone, necessarily alone; not lonely, but rather alone. His aloneness is his freedom. He is a light to himself. And when the sun sets, he thanks the teacher (until their next meeting) and walks along with the moon.

NOTES

1. The paper is based on a presentation at the Ninth East-West Philosophers' Conference on the theme 'Educations and their Purposes: A Philosophical Dialogue among Cultures', Hawaii, June 2005.
2. See Ingalls, Daniel, H.H., 'The Study of Śamkarācārya', Potter, Karl H., 'Śamkarācārya: the Myth and the Man', Mayeda, Sengaku (trans. and ed.), *A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śankara*.
3. I have chosen to translate the term *śiṣya* as 'student' rather than 'disciple', owing to the philosophical nature of the dialogue between *ācārya* and *śiṣya* in Śankara's *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī*. Both are engaged in inquiry. The *śiṣya* freely asks, examines, questions, rather than blindly accepting or submitting to the authority of the teacher.
4. Up-Sā 1.2: *tad idam mokṣa-sādhanam jñānam sādhana-sādhyād anityāt sarvasmād viraktāya tyakta-putra-vitta-lokāiṣaṇāya pratipanna-paramahamsa-pārivrājyāya śama-dama-dayādi-yuktāya śāstra-prasiddha-śiṣya-guṇa-sampannāya śucaye brāhmaṇāya vidhivad upasannāya śiṣyāa jāti-karma-vṛtta-vidyābhijanaih parīkṣitāya brūyāt punah punah yāvad grahaṇam dṛdhī-bhavati.*
5. Śankara needs not explicitly specify that the student should be a male *brāhmin*. After all, we are dealing with a male-centric tradition, in which women are generally considered as non-entitled for 'religious studies' and liberation.
6. In *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.1, Śankara presents four requirements expected of whoever wishes to embark of the 'inquiry towards the *ātman*'. Among

these requirements, he mentions *śama-damādi*, 'equanimity, inner restraint, etc.', just as in *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* 1.2.

7. Śankara does not specify the '*śāstric* qualities' required from the student, but the author of the *Manusmṛti*, for example, belonging to the *śāstra*, indicates that a student should pay for his studies, be dedicated to the *dharma*, be obedient, truthful, etc. (*Manu* 2.109, 112 in; Doniger, Wendy and Smith, Brian K., *The Laws of Manu*, p. 29).

8. The requirement that the student will be versed in the *Veda* is closely related to the 'inherited requirements'. *Śūdra*s, for example, are not allowed to study the *Veda*.

9. In *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.1, Śankara presents a similar requirement: the *mumukṣu* (he who desires liberation) should be *nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ*, 'endowed with clear distinction between the eternal and the transitory'.

10. Renunciates are commonly classified into four ascending categories: *kuṭīcaka, bahūdaka, hamsa* and *paramahamsa*; Sengaku Mayeda (*A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śankara*, p. 227) depicts the *paramahamsa*, the renunciate of the highest category, as an ascetic who 'always stays under a tree, in an uninhabited house or in a burial place', and who 'begs alms from people of all castes and regards all as *ātman*'. Throughout his *bhāṣya*s (See, for example, Śankara's introduction to the *Aitareya Upaniṣad bhāṣya*), Śankara persistently (and despite the constant requests of his *pūrva-pakṣin*s) refuses to discuss renunciation at any level other than the metaphysical. Therefore, I believe that only the last part of Mayeda's explanation ('the *paramahamsa* regards all as *ātman*') is applicable in Śankara's case.

11. *etam vai tam ātmānam viditvā brāhmaṇāh putrāiṣanāyāś ca vittāiṣanāyāś ca lokāiṣanāyāś ca vyutthāyātha bhikṣā-caryam caranti.*

12. *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* 1.6: *ācāryas tūhāpoha-grahaṇa-dhāraṇa-śama-dama-dayānugrahādi-sampanno labdhāgamo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa-bhogeṣv anāsaktaḥ tyakta-sarva-karma-sādhano brahmavit brahmaṇi sithito 'bhinna-vṛtto dambha-darpa-kuhaka-śāṭhya-māyā-mātsaryānṛtāhamkāra-mamatvādi-doṣa-varjitaḥ kevala-parānugraha-prayojano vidyopayogārthīm.*

13. *Mumukṣatva* is mentioned among Śankara's requirements of the student in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.1.

14. 'So-called', since Śankara's discussion is epistemological, rather than ontological. The notions of *māyā-loka* and *brahma-loka* refer to different perspectives of the same world in which we all live, not to different 'ontological' realms.

15. *hitvā sarva-karmāṇi kevale 'dvaye brahmaṇi niṣṭhā yasya so 'yam brahma-niṣṭho japa-niṣṭhas tapo-niṣṭha iti yadvat/na hi karmiṇo brahma-niṣṭhatā*

sambhavati karmātma-jñānayor virodhāt (Gambhīrānanda, Swāmī, *Eight Upaniṣads with the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, Vol. II, p. 104).

16. *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* 2.50 (prose): *guru uvāca—tvam pramātmānam santam asamsāriṇam samsāry aham asmīti viparītam pratipadyase 'kartāram santam karteti abhoktāram santam bhokteti vidyamānam cāvidyamānam itīyam avidyā* (my own translation).

17. *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* 1.4.

18. Mayeda, S., *A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śankara*, p. 212; the term '*pramāda*' can also be translated as 'addiction' or 'wrong judgement'. Swāmī Jagadānanda explains that here it refers to 'unrestrained conduct, speech, eating, etc.' (*Upadeśa Sāhasrī: A Thousand Teachings of Sri Śankarācārya*, p. 4).

19. Etc.—often, five *yama*s are specified, namely *ahimsā, satya* (truthfulness), *brahmacarya* (celibacy), *asteya* (non-stealing) and *aparigraha* (greedlessness); See for example Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* 2.30.

20. *śama-damādis tu tadīyo dharmo-brahma-samsthatāyā upodbalako na virodhī/brahma-niṣṭhatvam eva hi tasya śama-damādy-upabṛmhitam svāśrama-vihitam karma yajñādīni cetareṣām tad-vyatikrame ca tasya pratyavāyah* (*Brahma-sūtra* 3.4.20, in: Thibaut, G., *The Vedānta Sūtras With the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, Part II, pp. 301–2).

21. Pande, Govind Chandra, *Life and Thought of Śankarācārya*, p. 241.

22. Madhava Vidyāraṇya's *Śankara-digvijaya*, has been composed—as shown by Yoshitsugu Sawai (1992) and Jonathan Bader (2000)—as late as the beginning of the eighteenth century.

23. Interestingly, the *brahmacarya* vow is considered here as applying only to Śankara's body, not to Śankara in the king's body. It is hard to imagine that Śankara the philosopher (not the protagonist), according to which identification with the body in nothing but *adhyāsa*, erroneous notion, would have accepted this narrow ('physical') interpretation of *brahmacarya*.

24. Tapasyānanda, Swāmī, *Śankara-digvijaya*, pp. 121–2.

25. Krishnamurti, J., *Commentaries on Living*, Second Series, p. 119.

26. Krishnamurti, J., *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 119.

27. Krishnamurti, J., *The Network of Thought*, pp. 8–9.

28. Krishnamurti, J., *Tradition and Revolution*, p. 246.

29. Krishnamurti, J., *Meeting Life*, p. 185.

30. Krishnamurti, J., *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, p. 10; Second Series, pp. 42–4.

31. *Upadeśa Sāhasrī* 19.2: *aham mameti tvam anartham īhase parārtham icchanti tavānya īhitam/na te 'rtha-bodho na hi me 'sti cārthitā tataś ca yuktaḥ śama eva te manah* (Jagadānanda, Swāmī, *Upadeśa Sāhasrī—A Thousand Teachings of Sri Śankarācārya*, pp. 288–9).

32. The root √*śam* further means 'to cease', 'to stop', 'to come to an end'.
33. Krishnamurti, J., *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, p. 171.
34. Krishnamurti, J., *Why are you being educated?*, p. 116.
35. Krishnamurti, J., *Education and the Significance of Life*, p. 14.
36. Exceptional is a book titled *At the Feet of the Master*, composed out of notes, supposedly written by K in 1909 at the age of 14, as he was going through intense occult training at the Theosophical Society headquarters in Adyar. Mary Lutyens (*The Life and Death of Krishnamurti*, p. 12) claims that it was Charles Leadbeater, in charge of K's training at the time, who has typed (and perhaps even dictated to K) the notes which the book consists of; the original notes have disappeared. C.V. Williams (*Jiddu Krishnamurti: World Philosopher*, p. 27) adds that in his later years, K denied and memory of writing the book.
37. Krishnamurti's diaries have been published under the titles *Krishnamurti's Notebook* (first published in 1976), *Krishnamurti's Journal* (first published in 1982) and *Krishnamurti to Himself: His Last Journal* (spoken into a tape recorder rather than written, first published in 1987).
38. Krishnamurti, J., *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, p. 17.
39. Krishnamurti, J., *On Education*, p. 89.
40. Krishnamurti, J., *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, p. 19.
41. Ibid., p. 66.
42. Lutyens, Mary, *The Life and Death of Krishnamurti*, p. 1.
43. Krishnamurti, J., *The Flame of Attention*, p. 32.
44. Krishnamurti, J., *Why are you being educated?*, p. 28.
45. Krishnamurti, J., *Education and the Significance of Life*, p. 14.
46. See for example Krishnamurti, J., *Tradition and Revolution*, p. 157; *Commentaries on Living*, Third Series, p. 60.
47. Krishnamurti, *On Education*, p. 90.
48. Krishnamurti, J., *Why are you being educated?*, p. 128.
49. Krishnamurti, J., *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, p. 19.
50. For Śankara, 'actionless action' means action which does not make its 'owner' a *kartā*, 'doer', in a strong sense of the word. For him, an action undertaken at the *vyāvaharic* level has no impact on the actionless *ātman*, which we all are, whatever actions we undertake 'empirically' (see Śankara's discussion in his commentary of *Bhagavadgītā* 5.9).

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Non-Existence: A Conceptual Analysis

I will try to present a formal system, consisting of a set of rules that concern non-existence or absence [*abhāva*] in Indian logic. All the Indian logicians have the tacit understanding of these rules. But as far as the knowledge of the present author goes, nowhere these are presented in an explicit and systematic manner in the vast literature of Navya-Nyāya.

First, I will discuss the mechanism of describing an absence in the highly technical style of Navya-Nyāya. Absence means an absence of something. Technically, that something is the counterpositive [*pratiyogī*] of the absence. Thus, 'pot' is the counterpositive of an absence of pot, i.e. ~pot. So there will be a counterpositive-ness [*pratiyogitā*] in the counterpositive [*pratiyogī*], i.e. pot here. In this case, we can't quantify 'pot' by 'the' or 'a' as this is not a single or a specific pot. This is pot-in-general [*ghaṭa-sāmānya*]. There may be many absences of pot, depending on the relations that 'limit' [*avacchidanti*] the counterpositive-nesses in a pot. Let's first understand this 'limiting' [*avacchedanam*]. Pot may be absent in many things, in many ways. In Indian logic, a non-existence or absence is understood in a special way. The existence of something means the existence of that 'in' a specific relation. That very relation is the limiting relation [*avacchedakasambandha*] of that existence. Suppose a pot is there on a table in the relation of contact [*saṃyoga*]. Here, contact 'limits' the existence of that pot on that table. Still many other absences of the pot are there on that very table, if the relation between the pot and the table varies. Here the pot is non-existent or absent on the table 'in' the relation of identity [*tādātmya*], as the identity between the pot and the table is impossible. Pot is the counterpositive of the above absence of pot on the table. Naturally, a counterpositive-ness resides in the pot. This counterpositive-ness is 'limited' by identity [*tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitā*]. When x is present in y, a limiting relation between them must also be there. Likewise, when there is an absence of x in y, a counterpositive-ness

must be there in x and there must be a relation to 'limit' that counterpositive-ness. Any x is negated along with a relation that limits the counterpositive-ness, residing in x and the counterpositive-ness 'determines' the absence of x. Now what is this 'determination' [*nirūpaṇam*]? In our above example, many other absences of the pot are there on the table, depending on the limiting relations. As an example, an absence of the pot is there on that very table in the relation of inherence [*samavāya*], as a pot never inheres in a table. Correspondingly, there are as many counterpositive-nesses in the same pot as the absences of the pot. In order to pick up a specific counterpositive-ness among many others, we also need a special technique. That technique is 'determination'. Now we can describe the absence of the pot in the table in identity as an absence, determined by the counterpositive-ness [residing in pot], limited by identity, i.e. *tādātmya-sambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitānirūpitaghata-abhāva*. In that very table, another absence of pot is there, when the inherence between the pot and the table is negated. Here the limiting relation [*avacchedaka-sambandha*] is inherence [*samavāya*] and this absence of pot is determined by the counterpositive-ness [residing in pot], limited by inherence, i.e. *samavāyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitānirūpitaghata-abhāva*. Thus, we can think of various absences of pot, when the determining counterpositive-ness [*nirūpakapratiyogitā*] varies. Finally, we can say that a relation specifies a counterpositive-ness among many others by 'limitation' and a counterpositive-ness specifies an absence among many others by 'determination'. We may consider the entire picture once again. It has already been shown that there are many absences of a pot in a table even though the pot is present on that very table in the relation of contact. The number of absences = the number of counterpositive-nesses in the counterpositive, i.e. the pot here. Let's concentrate on one of the absences of the pot in the table—absence1. Correspondingly, there will be counterpositive-ness1 in the pot. Now a specific relation, say inherence, has to specify counterpositive-ness1 by limiting it. Even then, this counterpositive-ness1, limited by inherence, has to be related to absence1. By determining absence1, counterpositive-ness1 gets related to it. Thus we get absence1, determined by counterpositive-ness1, which is limited by inherence.

Naturally, if another relation limits counterpositive-ness2, we get absence2 and so on. These limiting relations of the counterpositive-nesses in x are those, in which x is 'not' there in some locus.

The counterpositive-ness must be limited by the limiting property [*avacchedakadharma*] also. In case of an absence of a pot, that property is pot-ness. But we will not discuss that here.

THE ABBREVIATIONS

- An absence of x = ~x
- Counterpositive of ~x = x
- Relation = (m)R(n), where m is the subjunct and n adjunct, i.e. n occurs [i.e. n is there] in m in relation R
- The limiting relation of the counterpositive-ness of ~x = $R_1(\sim x)$ = (locus of x)$R_1(x)$ [sometimes simply written as R_1]
- The absental relation of ~x = $R_2(\sim x)$ = (locus of ~x)$R_2(\sim x)$ [sometimes R_2]
- The locus of x = $1_1(\sim x)$, when 1_1 is that in which x occurs in $R_1(\sim x)$
- The locus of ~x = $1_2(\sim x)$, when ~x occurs in that in absential peculiar relation [*abhāvīyasvarūpasambandha*]
- Equivalence = ≡
- Time and the created entities = φ
- The eternal entities other than time = ψ
- ( ) is used in a technical sense, as listed in 'Abbreviations' only. Otherwise [ ] is used.

The relations of absence: ~x consists of two units— '~' and 'x', i.e. the negation and its counterpositive. So, ~x also must concern two relations. The relations are the following:

(A) **The limiting relation of counterpositive-ness** [*pratiyogitāva-cchedakasambandha*] = the relation in which the counterpositive [say pot-ness, i.e. *ghaṭatva*] occurs in its locus [*adhikaraṇa*]. We have already discussed this. This relation 'R_1' has the counterpositive [here pot-ness] as its adjunct [*pratiyogī*] and the locus of the counterpositive as its subjunct [*anuyogī*]. We may rewrite this relation as (locus of x)$R_1(x)$.

Consistently, we will keep the subjunct before the relation and the adjunct after the relation. Now, if R_1 = inherence [*samavāya*], then the counterpositive, i.e. pot-ness will occur in any pot, We can write (pot)R_1 (pot-ness) = inherence here. If R_1 = identity, then we can write (pot-ness)R_1(pot-ness) as in identity, something occurs in that very thing.

(B) **The absential relation** [*abhāvīyasambandha*] = the relation in which the absence '~x' itself occurs in its locus = (locus of ~x)R_2(~x).

The presuppositions: Here we begins our axioms. We are presenting the relevant presuppositions of Nyāya here, without testing them. They are presented as Ps.

P-1: In absential peculiar relation, ~x may occur in many loci. The locus of ~x will be determined in the way shown in C-2.

P-2: In temporal relation [*kālikasambandha*], everything in world occurs in time and the created entities [*mahākāla* and *janyapadārtha*, i.e. φ]. In spatial relation [*daiśikasambandha*], everything occurs in space and non-abstract entities [*deśa* and *mūrtapadārtha*].

P-3: A relation like inherence (*samavāya*), contact (*samyoga*), etc., must have a positive entity as its adjunct. If (m)R(n) is such a relation, then n has to be positive.

Conventional techniques regarding the loci of x and ~x: This is all about determining the loci of x and ~x. The techniques are presented as Cs. They will also serve as axioms of our system.

C-1: The locus of x will be determined by R_1(~x). In R_1(~x) if x occurs in something, then that will be l_1, i.e. the locus of x. In the relation of inherence [*samavāya*] pot-ness occurs only in the pots. So when x = pot-ness, R_1(~x) = inherence, then l_1(~pot-ness) must be the pots. When x = pot-ness and R_1(~x) = identity, then l_1(~pot-ness) must be the pot-ness itself.

C-2: The locus of ~x will be the complement of the locus of x. When x = pot-ness, R_1(~x) = inherence and l_1(~x) = locus of x = pot, then

the locus of ~x or l_2(~x) will be the complement of l_1 or non-l_1(~pot-ness) = non-pot. When x = pot-ness, R_1(~x) = identity and l_1(~pot-ness) = pot-ness, then l_2(~pot-ness) = complement of l_1 = non-pot-ness.

C-3: ~x will always occur in l_2(~x) in the absential peculiar relation [*abhāvīyasvarūpasambandha*]. When x = pot-ness, R_1 of ~x = R_1(~x) = inherence, l_1(~pot-ness) = pots and l_2(~pot-ness) = non-pots, then ~x will occur in non-pots in this peculiar relation only. Here onwards, 'peculiar relation' will mean the absential peculiar relation.

We can present the whole thing in the following table:

x	R_1 of ~x= R_1(~x)	Locus of x = l_1	Locus of ~x=l_2	~x	Absential relation of ~x=R_2(~x)
pot-ness	inherence	pots	non-pots	~pot-ness	Peculiar relation
pot-ness	identity	pot-ness	non-pot-ness	~pot-ness	Peculiar relation

C-4: If the locus of ~ ~x happens to be identical to the locus of x, when x occurs in its locus in R_1(~x), then x will be the positive equivalent [*bhāvarūpasamaniyata*] of ~ ~x, i.e. (~ ~x) ≡ x.

When x = pot-ness, R_1(~x) = R_1 of ~x = inherence, the locus of x = l_1(~x) = the pots and the locus of ~ ~ pot-ness happens to be identical to the locus of pot-ness, i.e. the pots, then (~ ~ pot-ness) ≡ pot-ness.

[We can justify this rule in the following manner. Many things are there in a pot. Pot-ness is there in it in inherence. That very pot is there in itself in identity. A coin may be there in that in contact. Now the things there, or the superstrata [*ādheya*] are pot-ness, that pot, the coin, etc., and the locus or the substratum [*ādhārā*] of all those superstrata is the same pot. Naturally, all the superstrata have superstratum-ness [*ādheyatā*] in them. Here, the superstratum-ness residing in the pot-ness is limited by inherence [*samavāyasambandhāvacchinna-ādheyatā*], that residing in the pot is limited by identity [*tādātmyasambandhāvacchinna-ādheyatā*] and the superstratum-ness residing in the coin is limited by contact [*samyogasambandhāvacchinna-ādheyatā*], though all these superstratum-nesses are determined by that very pot [*ghaṭanirūpitā*]. Now the rule is the following:

If the locus of $\sim \sim x$ [i.e. $l_2(\sim x)$] determines a superstratum-ness that is there in x in $R_1(\sim x)$, then $x \equiv \sim \sim x$. Lets take an example where $R_1(\sim x)$ = the temporal relation and naturally the locus of x = time and the created entities [φ]. Suppose the locus of $\sim \sim x$ also happens to be φ. Then we have to see whether φ determines a superstratum-ness, which occurs in x and which is limited by the temporal relation, i.e. $R_1(\sim x)$. Everything occurs in φ in the temporal relation. So x also occurs in φ in that very relation. Then there is a superstratum-ness in x limited by the temporal relation and determined by φ. So $x \equiv \sim \sim x$ here.]

The theorems: Thus we now have seven axioms. Now we shall commence upon our theorems. We will present our theorems as Ts.

T-1: An absence can't occur in its locus in inherence or contact.

Proof: One may argue that when x = pot-ness, $R_1(\sim x)$ = inherence, $l_1(\sim x)$ = the pots and the locus of $\sim \sim$pot-ness also happens to be the pots, then pot-ness will be materially equivalent to $\sim \sim$pot-ness [according to C-4]. Pot-ness occurs in the pots in the relation of inherence only. Then let $\sim \sim$pot-ness also occur in the pots in the relation of inherence as $\sim \sim$pot-ness and pot-ness are equivalent here.

But this can't be argued. Only a positive entity can be the adjunct of a relation like inherence or contact [according to P-3]. So $\sim \sim$pot-ness can't occur in the pots in inherence. Here, $\sim \sim$pot-ness is equivalent to pot-ness, not identical. So, $\sim \sim$pot-ness [i.e. $\sim \sim x$] can't occur in its locus in a relation to inherence or contact. [Proved]

T-2: Any $\sim x$, whose counterpositive-ness is limited by the temporal relation [i.e. $R_1(\sim x)$ = temporal relation] must occur in the eternal entities, other than time [*mahākālabhinnanityapadārtha*] in the peculiar relation.

Proof: All positive entities in world can be divided into two groups— eternal [*nityapadārtha*] and the created entities [*janyapadārtha*]. Now, once again, eternal entities can be divided into two groups—time [*mahākāla*] and the eternal things, other than time [*mahākāla-bhinnanityapadārtha*]. We can now say that, all the positive entities =

the created entities + time + the eternal things, other than time. If the created things and time are grouped together as φ, then the eternal things, other than time [hence ψ] become complement to φ, as there is no other entity other than these three. Thus φ and ψ are mutually complementary.

Now when the limiting relation of the counterpositive-ness of $\sim x$ or $R_1(\sim x)$ is the temporal relation, then x will occur in its locus in temporal relation only [according to C-1]. Here x's locus is φ [=the created things + time], as x is in the temporal relation [according to P-3]. Naturally, the locus of $\sim x$ will be the complement of φ, i.e. ψ [=the eternal things other than time] [according to C-2]. Thus, the locus of $\sim x$ will always be eternal things other than time, i.e. ψ, when $R_1(\sim x)$ is the temporal relation and $\sim x$ will occur in ψ in the peculiar relation [according to C-3]. [Proved]

T-3: If the counterpositive-ness of $\sim \sim x$ is limited by the peculiar relation, i.e. $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = peculiar relation, then $\sim \sim x$ must be equivalent to x [*abhāvasya svarūpasambandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitā-nirūpita-abhāvaḥ prathama-abhāva-pratiyogisamaniyataḥ*].

Proof:
   (i) Consider x, when $R_1(\sim x)$ = R, $l_1(\sim x)$ = Y.
   (ii) The locus of $\sim x$ will be the non-Y [according to C-2].
   (iii) So $\sim x$ will occur in the non-Y in peculiar relation [according to C-3].
   (iv) Only the relation, in which $\sim x$ occurs in its locus, will be the R_1 of $\sim \sim x$, i.e. $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ [according to C-1].
   (v) Let us consider that $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = peculiar relation. It is already determined that $\sim x$ occurs in the non-Y in that relation [vide (iii)].
   (vi) The locus of $\sim \sim x$ then will be the complement of non-Y, i.e. Y once again according to C-2. So the condition in C-4 is satisfied, as the locus of x is identical to the locus of $\sim \sim x$. Thus, $\sim \sim x$ becomes materially equivalent to x.
   (vii) Then $\sim \sim x$ must become materially equivalent to x if $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = peculiar relation. [Proved]

[If $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = temporal relation, then $\sim x$ would be there in time and positive created entities, i.e. φ and $\sim \sim x$ would be there in ψ [according to T-2]. Now if $\psi \neq Y$, then $\sim \sim x$ will not be equivalent to x. The locus of x must be identical to the locus of $\sim \sim x$ only when $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = peculiar relation. In other cases, the locus of x can be accidentally identical to the locus of $\sim \sim x$. Such a case will be considered in Problem 4.]

The system: Thus we can show that a formal system can be built in the traditional structure of Navya-Nyāya. The rules are known to the logicians tacitly. But logic is a journey from the tacit to the explicit. That is why the Indian logicians took such a great trouble to define pervasion [*vyāpti*] explicitly, even though *vyāpti* was understood by everyone.

Here is a small specimen of a formal system in Indian logic. Our specimen consists of ten rules, including seven axioms [four Cs and three Ps] and three theorems [three Ts]. This is, of course, an open-end system.

The rules can be rewritten for a quick reference.

P-1: If $R_1 (\sim x)$ = peculiar relation, then $l_1(\sim x)$ can be many things.

P-2: If $R_1 (\sim x)$ = temporal relation, then $l_1(\sim x)$ or the locus of x will be φ or time and the created things. If $R_1(\sim x)$ = spatial relation, then $l_1(\sim x)$ or the locus of x will be space and the non-abstract things.

P-3: If $(m)R(n)$ is a relation like inherence or contact, then n is a positive entity.

C-1: x occurs in its locus, i.e. $l_1(\sim x)$ in $R_1(\sim x)$.

C-2: $l_2(\sim x)$ = the complement of $l_1(\sim x)$.

C-3: $R_2(\sim x) = (l_2(\sim x))$ $R_2(\sim x)$ = absential peculiar relation.

C-4: If $l_1(\sim x) = l_2(\sim \sim x)$, then $(\sim \sim x) \equiv x$.

T-1: $R_2(\sim x)$ is not inherence, contact, etc.

T-2: $l_2(\sim x)$ is ψ, when $R_1(\sim x)$ = temporal relation and $R_2(\sim x)$ = peculiar relation.

T-3: $(\sim \sim x) \equiv x$, if $R_1 (\sim \sim x)$ = peculiar relation.

The advantage:

(A) Apart from the logical clarity, what we get from this system is a nice pedagogical advantage.

(B) In western logic $(\sim \sim x)$ = x, Most of the people believe that in Old-Nyāya, $\sim \sim x$ is always identical to x. We have proved that is not always so. Our expositions clarify the stand of the Navya-Nyāya, i.e. 'When $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = the peculiar relation, then $\sim \sim x$ is materially equivalent to x [or $(\sim \sim x) \equiv x$]. But by no means is $\sim \sim x$ identical to x.' In *Vyāptipañcakarahasyam*, a great Naiyāyika, Mathurānātha, discusses these things elaborately. It becomes very difficult for a beginner to follow Mathurānātha's argument there. Our system, we believe, makes the task easier.

(C) The computational advantage of a system is always the 'topper' among all others. Some of the problems are presented here along with their solutions. The great Mathurānātha can supply a number of such problems to an enthusiastic logician.

Some problems:

1. Suppose, $R_1(\sim x)$ = the temporal relation and $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = the peculiar relation. Is x here the positive equivalent of $\sim \sim x$?

Solution:
   (i)   The locus of x must be determined by $R_1(\sim x)$ [according to C-1]. Here the locus is φ, i.e. time and the created entities [according to P-2].
   (ii) $\sim x$ must occur ψ, i.e. eternal positive entities, other than time, in the peculiar relation [according to T-2].
   (iii) In the peculiar relation then $\sim x$ occurs in ψ. So the locus of $\sim \sim x$ will be naturally the complement of ψ, i.e. φ [=time and the created entities], when $R_1(\sim \sim x)$=the peculiar relation [according to T-2].
   (iv) As everything occurs in φ in the temporal relation, i.e. $R_1(\sim x)$, x will naturally occur in φ. Then the positive equivalent of $\sim \sim x$ is x as their loci are the same thing, i.e. φ.

2. Suppose the R_1 of $\sim$pot-ness is inherence and R_1 of $\sim \sim$pot-ness is peculiar relation. Is $\sim \sim$pot-ness equivalent to pot-ness?

Solution:

Suppose x = pot-ness.

pot-ness[x] $\rightarrow$ inherence[$R_1(\sim x)$] $\rightarrow$ ~pot-ness[~x] $\rightarrow$ peculiar[$R_1(\sim \sim x)$] $\rightarrow$ ~ ~pot-ness[~ ~x] = pot-ness[x]

inherence [$R_1(\sim x)$]	peculiar [$R_1(\sim \sim x)$]	peculiar
↓	↓	↓
pot	non-pot	pot

So, here ~ ~pot-ness is equivalent to pot-ness.

3. Suppose $R_1(\sim\text{pot-ness})$ = inherence and $R_1(\sim \sim\text{pot-ness})$ = temporal relation. Is pot-ness equivalent to ~ ~pot-ness here?

Solution:

Let pot-ness be x. Now,

x = pot-ness $\rightarrow$ inherence [$R_1(\sim x)$] $\rightarrow$ ~x = ~x $\rightarrow$ temporal [$R_1(\sim \sim x)$] $\rightarrow$ ~~x

|			
inherence [$R_1(\sim x)$]		temporal [$R_1(\sim \sim x)$]	peculiar [$R_2(\sim \sim x)$]
↓	peculiar [$R_2(\sim x)$]	↓	↓
pot	↓	φ	ψ
	non-pot		

So, here x is not equivalent to ~ ~x.

4. Let 'eternity residing in entities other than time' [i.e. *mahākālā-nyatvaviśiṣṭanityatva*] be x. Suppose $R_1(\sim x)$ = peculiar relation and $R_1(\sim \sim x)$ = temporal. Is ~~x equivalent to x here?

Solution:

x $\rightarrow$ peculiar [$R_1(\sim x)$] $\rightarrow$ ~x = ~x $\rightarrow$ temporal [$R_1(\sim \sim x)$] $\rightarrow$ ~ ~x

peculiar [$R_1(\sim x)$]		temporal [$R_1(\sim \sim x)$]	peculiar [$R_2(\sim \sim x)$]
↓	peculiar [$R_2(\sim x)$]	↓	↓
ψ	↓	φ	ψ
	φ		

So here (~ ~x) ≡ x. This is the only case where the absence of an entity [hence ~ ~entity] is equivalent to that very entity, when R_1 (~ ~entity) = temporal. When R_1 (~ ~entity) = spatial relation and ~ ~entity is equivalent to that entity, the entity must be 'abstract-ness residing in entities other than space [*deśānyatvaviśiṣṭa-amūrtatva*]. Probably, these two exceptional cases have not been discussed anywhere else in published literature.

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Significance of the Term *Karma** and its Cognate Terms *Kriyā* and *Karman*

In Indian philosophy and religion, *karmas*/actions/acts are of three types:

(A) MUNDANE, WORLDLY OR *SAṀSĀRIKA OR LAUKIKA KARMAS*

The *saṁsārika* or *laukika* acts are mundane acts in the domain of *artha* and *kāma*. This category of *karmas* would include purely physical acts: eating, drinking, sleeping, walking, etc., actions or activities essential for providing the means to sustain life, gathering food, cultivation, manufacturing goods, etc., in short, actions for survival, for running the economy and maintaining social life.

These actions would also include physical acts like *yogic* and *tāntric kriyās* which enable a person to control his mind and body, *upacāra kriyā*, therapeutic acts for treating and curing diseases.

In terms of results or consequences, these actions bear fruit or produce results immediately or simultaneously or within a short interval of time. These *karmas* are in the nature of *kriyās*.

An important class of mundane *karmas*, rather *kriyās*, described in the *Atharvaveda* is *abhicāra karma*, sorcery, exorcising or warding off evil spirits (*bhūta-preta pratiṣiddha*), countering *asuric* inflictions or demonic influences, inflicting harm on one's enemy, subduing, bewitching another person (*vaśikaraṇa* or *vaśikriyā*) by spells/incantations and charms.

Śyenayāga, a sacrifice performed to harm or kill one's enemy, is an example of *abhicāra karma*. Like the *Vedic yajñas*, this is also performed by a Brāhmaṇa specialist, *abhicāraka*, conjurer, magician, a *shaman*, on behalf of the *kartā*, who is called *yajamāna* in *yāga*.

(B) RELIGIOUS OR *DHĀRMIC KARMAS*

These acts fall in the domain of *dharma* and *mokṣa*. Their performance is enjoined by one's religious beliefs and scriptures.

The most important *srauta* or *vedic karmas/kriyās* was the performance of *yajña*.[1] They were performed for obtaining material blessings—*bhoga aiśvarya*—from gods. The grand *yajñas* like the *rajasūya* (proclamation of sovereignty), *aśvamedha* (declaration of dominion), *vājapeya* (performance for rejuvenation), etc. were performed by the royalty in which 16 or more specialists were employed to perform the *yajña*.

Similarly *Vedic* or *srauta yajña kriyās*[2] performed by the common people, especially the householders (*grhapatis*), were mainly three;

yāga, *iṣṭi*, and *homa* such as *pitryajña* (later day, post-*vedic śrāddha*) *somayāga*, *agnihotra*, *agniṣṭoma*, *devayajña*, *darpśapūrṇamāsa*, *cāturmāsa*, etc.

These *yajñas* or *vedic karman* were the means of obtaining one's desires: *kāmeṣṭi*, *yajña* for obtaining one's desires, *putreṣṭi*, *yajña* for the birth of a son, *āyuṣeṣṭi*, *yajña* for longevity etc. Jaimini's aphorisms sum up the ideology of ritualists: *karmabhyo mukti*: liberation through sacrifice, and *svarga kāmo yajeta*: perform *yajña* (sacrifice) for attainment of heaven.

These *yajñas* were thus *kriyās* and not ethical *karma*, expedients (*upāya*), for achieving material ends. Saṁkarācārya aptly describes: *vedic karmas* as *iṣṭāpūrta aniṣṭa parihāra upāya*, *vedic* ritual for fulfilment of one's desires, and avoidance of what is undesirable or injurious. Likewise Sāyaṇa describes these *kriyās*, rituals, as *alaukikam upāya*, supernatural expedients.

In the post-*vedic* period, the utility of *yajñas* and other ritual practices were questioned by *Upaniṣads*, Buddhism and Jainism; they emphasized the utmost importance of ethical *karmas*, *puṇya* and *pāpa karmas* as the cause of rebirth, and happiness and suffering. In consequence the *vedic* cult of *yajñas* declined and their popular practice suffered. However, the practice of *śrauta karmas* or *kriyās* was replaced by the same or similar rituals with different names or by new rituals: *pitryajña*, offerings to deceased forefathers or manes, *tarpaṇa* (oblations of water, *piṇḍa-udaka-kriyā*), *Veda adhyayana*, recitation of the *vedic mantras*,[3] *agnihotra* daily fire worship by the householder in place of public *yajñas* and *sattras*, mass religious offerings over a long period of time—sometimes extending over a year, *yogic* exercises—aptly described as *mana-prāṇa indriya kriyāḥ*.[4]

These *śrauta karmans* in the post-*vedic* period were systematized as *smārta karmas* and classified into three broad categories:

(i) *nitya*, daily. They are mandatory (*niyat*) to be performed every day. These are *bhūta yajña*, which is a *bali*[5] *karman*, offering of food to all creatures—men, animals and birds.

Pañcamahāyajña, a 'broad-spectrum' *yajña*, making daily offerings, as in a sacrifice, to *brahma* (to the impersonal spirit or to brāhmaṇa priests), *deva* (gods), *pitṛ* (forefathers), *manuṣya* (human beings) and

bhūta (all creatures). Significantly the *smṛtis* describe them as *gṛhastha*[6] *kārya* and *kriyās*; the *Pūrvamīmāṁsakas* described them as *vaidic*[7] *karma*.

(ii) *Naimittika*, occasional, on the occurrence of an 'event' such as the full-moon (*pūrṇamāsi*), the new-moon (*amāvasyā*) ceremonies[8], *saṁkrānti* [transit of the sun from one *rāśi* (zodiacal house) to another], daily performance of *agnihotra* by householders, *śrāddha*[9], obsequial or post-mortem death ceremonies. These are also in the nature of religious acts, *dhārmic kriyās/karmas*.

The *Purāṇas* added yet new *kriyās* to the repertory of *karmans*, religious rites—*tīrthayātrā*, pilgrimage to holy places, and *vratas*.

Tīrthayātrā is believed to be purificatory for the pilgrim who also earns merit. *Vratas* are 'ascetic practices' (*tapas*), by laymen, such as fasting, sexual continence (*brahmacarya*) for a specific period, study (*pāṭha*) of sacred texts.[10]

Another category of *dhārmic kriyās* is the *saṁskāras*[11], 'rites of passage' and of purification. These are cultural, societal practices *sāṁskritika kriyās*, such as *jāta karman* (birth ceremony), *cūḍā karman* (tonsure), *yajñopavīta*, sacred thread investiture ceremony for *dvijas* (twice-born), *vivāha* (sacramental marriage) requiring *saptapadi*), seven steps by the couple around *agni* (sacred fire); *antyeṣṭi*, cremation or last rites.

The fruit or results of *śrauta* (*vedic*), *dhārmic karmas*, was realized by the *yajamāna* in this life in the form of material blessings or hereafter in *svarga loka*, heaven, in the form of *apūrva*, the beneficial potential generated by the performance of *yajñas* on this earth. *Apūrva* is the merit earned by performance of *śrauta kriyā*, *yajñas*.

Thus, the essential character of both mundane, *laukika*, and *dhārmic* (scriptural) *karmas* is that they both are *kriyās*. They largely bear fruit in this life; the fruit of certain *kriyās* such as *iṣṭāpūrta*—is also stored up in heaven to be enjoyed by the soul of the *kartā* after death.

(C) ETHICAL OR MORAL *KARMAS*

All sentient creation is subject to existential or constitutional suffering: old age and death. That is *ṛta*, the law of life. According to the *Upaniṣads*, Buddhism and Jainism, besides suffering which is inherent

in existence, happiness and suffering are also man made: they are born of his selfishness, uncontrolled desires, greed. Man's selfish, and unfair conduct, behaviour, *karma*, towards his fellow beings causes unhappiness and suffering. Such *karma* is *duṣkṛta*, evil, wrong, *pāpa*. Likewise just, friendly, compassionate acts and behaviour, *karma*, produce happiness and reduce suffering. Such *karma* is *sukṛta*, good, *puṇya*, right. Thus ethics, right and wrong, good and evil, became the key to the understanding of the cause and cure of human suffering and ethics became the foundation of the Indian doctrine of *karma*.

However, the suffering and unhappiness a man faces in this life cannot be explained wholly and always with reference to the known, ostensible, *karmas*, good/evil acts, right/wrong done by him. It is often inexplicable and baffling—a man suffers for no known cause or reason. The key to unexplained suffering is provided by the nexus between the "conceptual devices" of transmigration of the soul and rebirth, *punarjanma*.

Ethical *karmas* are good/evil, *puṇya/pāpa*, *sukṛta/duṣkṛtra*. The principles of ethics are formally embodied in the rules of morality and conduct in the *pañca sila*[12] of Buddhists, in the *anu vratas* of the Jainas and *yama* (restraints) of the followers of the *sanātana dharma*.

Thus ethical *karma* is fundamentally different from *Vedic karma*, more precisely *kriyā*: the former belongs to the system of ethics, the latter to the system of ritual practice. However, the name *karma/karman* is misleadingly common and confusing.

Difference between religious karman, kriyā *and moral or ethical* karma

Religious or *dhārmic karman/kriyā* is essentially supplicatory.[13] Some *karman/kriyās* may also be purificatory[14] and dedicatory[15]. Their performance is a highly specialized function[16] which can be done only by Brāhmaṇa specialists. Any errors in performance will lead to *vidhi aparādha*, procedural lapse, necessitating *prāyascitta*, expiatory ceremony.

There is no *vidhi*, procedure, for the performance of an ethical *karma*. It is a voluntary, spontaneous act. In consequence the author of the act, the *kartā* or principal is also the *kartṛ* agent, the person who actually does an act. But in the performance of religious *karma*, especially

vedic karmas, the *kartā*, the principal, is the *yajamāna* who organizes and pays for the performance of a *yajña*. It may be a costly affair if the particular *yajña* being performed is an elaborate function extending over a number of days. The Brāhmaṇa priests are the *kartṛs*, agents, they actually do the *karman* but on behalf of the *yajamāna*[17], the *kartā*, the principal. The officiants get fee, *dakṣiṇā*, for the performance and the *yajamāna*, as *kartā*, is responsible for the *karma* and receives or is entitled to receive the beneficial potential (*apūrva*) produced by the *yajña*, sacrifice.

In the case of ethical *karma*, the *kartā* (principal) is also the *kartṛ*, the person who actually does the action.

The dictum of the doctrine of *karma*, *kartā* (he who does) is also the *bhoktā* (he who bears the consequences), does not apply to *dhārmic* or ritual *karma*.

Ethical *karmas*, as a rule, do not fructify in the life in which they are done. Accumulated ethical *karmas* of one life fructify in subsequent embodiments of the soul of the *kartā*: when and how such *karmas* will fructify is unknown. Hence such accumulated ethical *karmas* are *adṛṣṭa* *Dhārmic kriyās/karmas* are expected to mature and yield fruit in the same life in which they are done. For the same reason, *naimittika* (and *kāmya karma* such as desire for a son or for long life) *karmas* (*kriyās*) are expected to mature and fructify in the same life in which they are performed. In brief, ethical *karmas* are rooted in the doctrines of *punarjanma*, rebirth and the related doctrine of *karma—vipāka* and are *adṛṣṭa*. *Dhārmic karmas* or *kriyās* have only limited potential—to bring material benefits to those who perform them.

Ethical *karmas* are also to be distinguished from *dhārmic karmas* or *kriyās* in that the *kriyās* were enjoined not only by religious beliefs and practices but were also part of the *varna dharma*.[18] The code of ethics, on the other hand is to be observed by all irrespective of a person's caste.

Karma *and Causation*

Ethical *karmas* are truly causative—a macrocosmic force which operates the mechanism of transmigration of soul and determines its rebirth (*punarjanma*)—the *yoni*, the form of embodiment—as human being, animal or plant, happiness or suffering it has to experience. Religious

karma/kriyā generates comparatively a minor force of causation which fulfils a man's desires and promotes his welfare.

In discussing the doctrine of *karma*, however, the distinction between ethical or moral *karmas* on the one hand, and ritual acts, *karman*, *kriyā* (*yajña karma*) and *yogic kriyās* on the other, was blurred for various reasons. This was, first and foremost, due to the semantic relationship between the different terms, *karma*, *karman*, *kriyā*. They have a common root √*kri*. Examples of the terminological confusion are *dāna* and *iṣṭāpūrta*.

Dāna, truly speaking, is an ethical *karma*. However, it came to be called *kriyā—dānakriyā*.[19] Again, *iṣṭāpūrta*, truly speaking, was a *vedic yajña kriyā*: the fruits of the ritual *karma*, *iṣṭi*; were stored up, *pūrta*, in heaven. However Saṁkarācārya and Sāyaṇa and the various commentators of the *smṛtis* interpreted *iṣṭi* as *vedic yajña karma* and *pūrta*[20] as works of public charity—construction of wells, tanks, temples etc.

Secondly, ritual acts like *yajña karma*, were described as *dhārmic* (scriptural) acts. *Dhārmic* acts, *prima facie*, are sacred acts which are necessarily good acts and can never be evil. Thirdly, Indian philosophers and savants equated the *apūrva*, beneficial potential of the ritual acts, with the *adṛṣṭa* of ethical *karmas*.

Again by making obligatory religious *karmas* as *dhārmic*, *karmas* which are essentially of the nature of *kriyās*, camouflaged their true nature—that they are also *kriyās*.

Thus, in literature, the word *karma* is used in its varied meanings and the precise nature of *karma*—whether it is *kriyā* or moral act is to be understood from the context in which it is used.

However, the differences in *karma phala*, fruits or consequence of: (a) mundane act (*saṁsārika* or *laukika karmas* or *kriyās*); (b) ritual acts (*dhārmic kriyās*, *karman*, *yajña karma*, *nitya*, *naimittika* and *kāmya karmas*); and (c) ethical or moral acts (*karma*, *punya*, *papa*, etc.) ensured that their distinctive character was maintained.

Vedic Yajñakarma and Post-Vedic Karma

The recapitulate, *Vedic yajñakarma* and religious *kriyā* are fundamentally different from moral *karma*, *punya* (good) and *pāpa* (evil) *karma* of the *Upaniṣads*, *Brāhmanical śāstras*, Buddhism and Jainism.

Yajñakarma is a ritual of fire sacrifice. By its performance, the *yajamāna* earns religious merit (*apūrva*) to be enjoyed in heaven (or in later incarnations of the soul). The *Brāhmaṇas* employed by him to actually perform the *yajña* are given *dakṣiṇā*, fee, as remuneration for their services.

The post-*vedic śrāddha karma*—post-mortem obsequial rites in honour of deceased forefathers—is a later day variant of *vedic pitṛ yajñakarma*. This *śrāddha* ritual is also performed by the *Brāhmaṇas* on behalf of the descendants of the deceased. However, the benefit of the *karman*, ritual, is believed to reach the spirit of the deceased through the Brāhmaṇas, mediators, who are given *dakṣiṇa* for their services.

Moral *karma*, on the other hand, is voluntary action, mental or physical, of an individual *kartā* (doer). It embodies the principle of retributory justice—as we sow, so shall we reap—with the qualification; what one sows in this life, he reaps in another.

Thus, moral *karma* is conjoined inseparably to the doctrine of rebirth (*punarjanma*): the fruit (*phala*) of moral *karma* in a particular existence is received by the soul (*atmā, pudgala*) of the doer in a succession of lives.

Thus, moral *karma* is causative potential in its nature; microcosmically, it determines the forms of embodiments of the transmigrating soul, and the happiness or suffering it experiences; macrocosmically, moral *karma* is the law of causality operating the *saṁsāra cakra*, the wheel of existence—birth, death and rebirth. Ritual *karma* (*yajñakarma, karma kāṇḍa* and *śrāddha*) only creates beneficial potential (*apūrva*) for the *yajamāna* in this life, or for the *pitṛs* (the deceased forefathers) to be enjoyed in *svarga* (heaven).

Vedic and Pūrvamīmāṁsā Fire Rituals

The cult of fire-burnt offerings, *yajñakarma*, in the *saṁhitās* was materially different from the post-Brāhmaṇa cult. The *Vedic* fire cult consisted of *śrauta karma* (public and communal *yajñas*) and *gṛhya karma* (domestic fire worship).

The utility of the cult of fire offerings was questioned by the *Upaniṣads*, Buddhism[21] and Jainism. As a result, the *vedic*—more precisely *Saṁhitā* and *Brāhmaṇa* cult of burnt or fire offerings— underwent a radical transformation. On the other hand, the *darśana* or

school of philosophy known as the Pūrvamīmaṁsā, formulated the ideology of fire worship in the post-*vedic* period.

The cult of fire worship of the Pūrvamīmāṁsakas was materially different from that of *Saṁhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*. It is essentially a *gṛhya* or domestic cult of fire-worship having three distinctive cult practices: (i) *nitya*, daily fire worship which is obligatory; (ii) *naimittika*, occasional, those rites which have to be performed on certain occasions, say, at the occurrence of certain important natural phenomena like the full moon, the new moon, the eclipse, etc.; and (iii) *kāmya*, optional fire cult performance to achieve human, worldly, desires or aspirations, such as for the birth of a son, for success in one's enterprise, etc.

Again *Vedic yajña karma* involved animal sacrifice (*paśu bali*); in addition to oblations of grains, ghee (*havis*). But in the *agni karma* of the Pūrvamīmāṁsās, as a rule, animal sacrifice is eschewed.

Yajña karma comprises rituals and is, therefore, fundamentally different from the moral or ethical *karma* of the classical doctrine of *karma*. *Yajña karma* produces *apūrva*, a beneficial potential which the soul of a person doing the *karma* enjoyed in heaven (*svarga*) according to the *vedic* metaphysics and in subsequent births according to the Pūrvamīmāṁsakas. In comparison, *puṇya* and *pāpa*, moral acts, produce *adṛṣṭa*, unseen good or evil potential which the doer enjoys in his subsequent births. Thus, the fruits of dhārmic, ritual, *karmas* are different from the fruits of moral or ethical *karmas*: they are always good as ritual *karmas* are *dhārmic*; ethical *karmas* results would be good or bad depending on the quality of the *karmas*. As the force of causation, *yajña* (ritual) *karma* is microcosmic, whereas ethical or moral *karma* is macrocosmic.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

* The words *Karma, Karman, Kriyā* are all derived from the root √*kri*.
   (a) √*Kri* means (i) 'to do', 'make', 'accomplish', 'perform'.

(b) *Kriyā* means: (i) to offer libations of water to the deceased; obsequies
(ii) religious rite or ceremony; sacrificial act; sacrifice.
(iii) purificatory/expiatory rites.

(d) *Karman*, act, action, performance, any religious act or rites such as sacrifice, oblation etc., especially as originating in the hope of future recompense.

See Monier Williams, *Sanskrit–English Dictionary*

V.S. Apte, *Practical Sanskrit Dictionary*

Gode and Karve, *Sanskrit–English Dictionary*

Suryakanta, *Practical Vedic Dictionary*

Raj Bali Pandey, *Hindu Dharma Kośa*

The *mantras* of the *saṁhitās* explicitly state that *yajña* is in the nature of *karman* (*vedic*)

(a) Illustrative citations of the *vedic mantras* and other *vedic* texts cited below establish clearly that *yajña* ritual was also called *karman*.

(i) *ricam sāma yajāmahe yābhyām karmāṇī kurute AV* 7.54

We worship by reciting the *ricas* (of the *Ṛg Veda*) and *Sāmans* (of the *Sāmaveda*); thus we perform *karmāṇi* (*yajña karma*).

(ii) *devebhyo karma V.S.* 3.47

performing (*vedic*) *karman* (*yajña*) in honour of the *devas*

(iii) *kurvanneveha karmāṇi jijivisecchatam samā V.S.* 40.2

performing *karmas* (vedic, *yajñas*) one should desire to live a 100 years.

(b) Synonyms for the term *yajña* also confirm that *yajña* was a religious act or rite. The six synonyms for *yajña* in the *Amarakoṣa* are: *sava* (*sama yajña*); *adhvara karman*, a *soma* rite; *yāga* (i) offering or oblation (ii) ceremony of presentation of offerings or oblations; *makha*, a sacrificial oblation; *kratu* is *iṣṭam karma*, worshipped with sacrifices, also sacrificed; *sapta-tantu*, seven threaded or sacrifice in seven parts.

1. *Yajña* is a form of *karma*. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (SB)* 1.7.1.5 declares *yajño vai karma* (*yajña* or sacrifice is the *karma*). Again *S.B.* I.7.1.5 and the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* II. 2.1.4 aver *yajña vai śreṣṭhatam karma*, ritual sacrifice is the excellent of *karma*, sacred work.

2. The *Mahābhārata (Mbh)* 2.42.41 describes *yajñas* (*vedic karman*) as *kriyā viśeṣa. Mhb* 3.100.11 calls *svādhyāya* (study of the *Vedas*), *vaṣat—kāram* (a *yajña* ritual) and *iṣṭa* (*yajña*) as *yajñotsava kriyām*, sacrificial ceremony. Jaimini, the founder of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsa*, the chief exponent of *karma kāṇḍa* (ceremonial acts and sacrificial rites), describes *śrauta* or *vedic*

karman as *āmnāyasya kriyārthatva*, *kriyās* (rituals) of the sacred tradition, that is, of the *Vedas*.

3. *Chāndogya Up* 7.4.1 and 2 *Muṇḍaka Up*. 1.2.1.

4. *Bhagavadgītā* XVIII.33.

5. *Bali* means gift, oblation, offering, a propitiary oblation as in the case of *yajña*.

6. Y. Krishan, *The Doctrine of Karma*, Delhi, 1997, p. 161.

7. Krishan, ibid., p. 162.

8. These were *smārta*, post-*vedic* version of the *śrauta (vedic) darśapūrṇamāsa*.

9. *Srāddha* is *smārta* version of *śrauta pitṛyajña*.

10. For *tirthayātrā* and *vrata*, see Krishan, ibid., pp. 431–49. Significantly the *Nirukta* treats *vrata* as a synonym for *sat karma*. Krishan, ibid., p. 437.

11. *Saṁskāras*, truly speaking, are secular acts, but they are treated as religious *karma* being enjoined by the scriptures. So we have the well-known verse:

janmanā jāyate śūdraḥ I
saṁskāreṇa dvijottamaḥ II

(a person is born a *śūdra* but becomes an excellent *dvija* (twice born) by virtue of the *saṁskaras*.

12. The *pañcaśila* of the Buddhists, the *anuvratas* of the Jainas and the *yama* of the Brāhmaṇical schools are the same: *ahiṁsā* (non-violence), *satya* (truth), *asteya* (not stealing/robbing), *brahmacarya* (sexual continence), *aparigraha* (non-possession).

For the laymen there were additional but less rigorous rules of conduct: *daśasila* in the case of Buddhists; *guṇavratas* and *sikṣāvratas* in addition to *anuvratas* in the case of Jainas; and *niyama* in addition to *yama* in the case of householders belonging to the Brāhmaṇical tradition.

13. Supplicatory *karman* is intended to win or evoke divine favour through (i) *stava* hymns of praise, *stuti* (eulogy), (ii) offerings, oblations or sacrifices to gods through Agni. The offerings must consists of approved materials, *paśu bali* (animal sacrifice), oblations of vegetal matter, (iii) prayer (*prārthanā*), to gods through the *ricas* of *Ṛg Veda*, *yajus* of the *Yajurveda*, and *sāmans* of the *Sāmaveda*.

14. An example of purificatory *karman* is cremation or last rites (*antyeṣṭi*).

15. Dedicatory *karman* is dedication of land or income therefrom for the periodical performance of a *yajña*.

16. The Brāhmaṇa priests have to ensure that the altar (*vedi*) has been built to the appropriate design and dimensions and with approved bricks/materials. Further the firewood to be used in making the sacred fire must be from the wood of the approved trees—*yajanīya* trees, the oblations, *āhutis*, are of suitable materials. Above all the priests have to recite the appropriate *mantras* properly.

17. *Yajamāna* is often described as 'patron'. In our opinion *yajamāna* is the person who organizes and pays for the performance of *yajña*.
18. *Manusmṛti* I. 88–91 sets out the duties of the members of the four castes: (i) the duties of the Brāhmaṇa are: study and teaching of the *vedic* texts (*adhyayana* and *adhyāpana*); performance of *yajñas* for oneself and for others (*yajanam* and *yājanam*) etc. were the duties of a Brāhmaṇa. A Kṣatriya's duty is to give *dāna* (charity) and to perform *ijyā* (*agnihotra*). A Vaiśya's duty is to give *dāna*. The Śudra's supreme duty is to serve members of other castes.
19. *Bhagavadgītā* XI. 48, XVII. 24, 25.
20. *vāpa, kūpa, taṭāka, devāgāra nirmāṇādi.*
21. *Aśvaghoṣa* in the *Buddhacarita* XI.64 states that his *dharma* enjoined the performance of customary family sacrificial rites (*makha kriyā*) which he refused to perform as they involved slauhter of animals.

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Individualism and Indian Renunciation: Revisiting an Old Controversy

In 1960, in his monumental paper 'World Renunciation in Indian Religions'[1], Louis Dumont has argued that '[the Indian renouncer] thinks as an individual and this distinctive trait brings him closer to the western thinker'[2]. I was recaptured by his claim when I read T.N. Madan's intriguing paper, titled 'The Comparison of Civilizations: Louis Dumont on India and the West' (*JICPR*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, January–March 2002). In the following lines, I would like to examine Dumon't claim in the light of T.N. Madan's remarks and to offer my own contribution by reconstructing the notion of individualism in the context of Indian renunciation. My reconstruction will create a link between individualism and what I shall call 'conscious identification'. I will argue that an individual is a person who is not bound any longer by his or her identifications (with I and my, with gender, caste, national cricket team, etc.). Such a person is not necessarily free *from* identification (i.e. does not identify with anything), but rather, is free *in* identification.

The meaning of 'freedom *in* identification' will be clarified in the lines to come.

Dumont writes:

> To say that the world of caste is a world of relations is to say that the particular caste, the particular man has no substance: they exist empirically, but they have no reality in thought, no Being ... *on the level of life in the world, the individual is not.*[3]

Dumont sees Indian society as based on relations. In such a society, a person's identity is determined only according to family and caste. This social picture leaves no room for the individual; 'individual' as the opposite of 'homohierarchicus', of the person within a social hierarchy. Dumont further acknowledges a different type of 'Indian thought', 'a kind of thought which conceives the individual as a being',[4] thought which allows individualism, 'sanyāsi thought'. The Indian renouncer, believes Dumont, is essentially different from the 'homohierarchicus':

> The renouncer leaves the world behind in order to consecrate himself to his own liberation. He submits himself to a chosen master, or he may even enter a monastic community, but essentially he depends upon no one but himself, he is alone.[5]

The difference between the man of caste and the renouncer lies in their 'location': the former is inseparable from society and culture, from 'the world'; the latter is an outsider who has crossed the borderlines of the conventional world. But the difference is further emphasized by the fact that the renouncer 'depends upon no one but himself', by the fact that 'he is alone'. This leads Dumont to his famous conclusion, according to which 'the Indian renouncer thinks as an individual and this distinctive trait brings him closer to the western thinker'. However, he further writes, thus softening his own claim, that in the case of the western thinker it is 'individualism in the world' whereas in the case of the Indian renouncer, it is 'individualism outside the world'. Elsewhere, he defines 'individualism in the world' as a state in which 'every man is, in principle, an embodiment of humanity at large, and as such he is equal to every other man and free'[6]. But what does Dumont mean when referring to 'individualism outside the world'? Five years and

four volumes of *Contributions to Indian Sociology* after claiming that the Indian renounces's individualism brings him closer to the Western thinker even if it is 'individualism outside the world', without any further explanation or clarification, Dumont returns to the issue of individualism and Indian renunciation:

> The Western individual is a man in the world, enjoying property as one of his necessary attributes. Therefore, my compound may be objected to. It means only that he [the Indian renouncer] shows some important characteristics of the individual, although he differs from him [from the western individual] in other respects. Here again, the vocabulary in imperfect, but the perception it is meant to convey, of the situation of the renouncer in relation to the man of the caste on the one hand, and in comparison to the Western individual on the other, is the main thing.[7]

In the quoted lines Dumont adds another reservation to his initial claim: what really matters, he writes, is not the vocabulary. He calls the Indian renouncer 'individual' to distinguish him from the man of caste. It does not mean that the socio-political connotations which accompany the notion of individualism in its Western sense are valid with regard to the Indian renouncer too, except—as we shall further see—one: even though he is 'located' outside the social framework, the Indian renouncer, just like his 'colleague', the Western thinker, creates new values. In this respect, he clearly plays—even if reluctantly—a social and even socio-political role.

S.J. Tambiah[8] rejects Dumont's comparison of Western individualism and Indian renunciation: First, he 'loudly' wonders whether Western concepts such as 'individualism' can really capture or depict 'Eastern fact and institution' such as Indian renunciation. Second, he suggests that 'Western individualism' is closely related to the concept of 'property' in both its meanings: possessions as well as human characteristics. A person is considered an individual due to certain possessions which he or she owns and with which she or he is identified, and in virtue of some typical traits. As a matter of fact, adds Tambiah, the Western individual is not just a proprietor, namely a person who owns property, but rather he himself is considered to be a 'property', i.e. he is seen as unique and even indispensable. On the other hand, the Indian renouncer

has not only given up his possessions (including home and family), but also tries to leave behind his personal characteristics, to abandon what he used to consider as 'I'. The renouncer's abandonment of his 'conventional self' might either take the Buddhist form of the 'breaking' this self (or so-called self) into bits and pieces, or the Advaitic form of extending its boundaries, setting a lesser value to the old 'empirical self' and to everything which used to characterize and signify it.

In his captivating paper, 'The Comparison of Civilizations: Louis Dumont on India and the West', T.N. Madan tells the story of Dumont's eagerness to write of 'individualism' in the context of Indian renunciation. For Dumont, explains Madan,[9] the key term as far as the understanding of Western sociology is concerned is 'individualism', and the main characteristic of a person in Western (or in his own words, 'modern') society is the fact that she or he is an individual ('an embodiment of humanity at large, equal to every other man and free'). On the other hand, Dumont believed that the key-term as far as the understanding of Indian sociology is concerned, is *dharma*. For Dumont, elucidates Madan, the term *dharma* refers to the hierarchy, considered by him to be the main feature of the Indian society. Dedicated to comparative sociology, proceeds Madan,[10] Dumont was keen to detect the similarities as well as the differences between the social pictures of India and the West, or to quote Dumont himself:

> The two societies [the western and the Indian], while so directly opposed in their ideals, in reality may have much in common; there might well be something of *dharma* in modern society, something of the *individual* in the counterpart.[11]

Therefore, Dumont searched for *dharmic* symptoms in Western sociology as well as for 'individual' traces in Indian sociology. Madan supports[12] Dumont's claim regarding the link between the notion of individualism (in its Western, socio-political sense) and Indian renunciation. It is the fact that he creates new values—agrees Madan with Dumont—which makes the Indian renouncer an individual (in the 'Western sense' of the world). In this respect, he mentions the fact that renouncers have been the founders of most schools in Indian philosophy, and further claims that ironically, it is only after they leave society that renouncers start to play a major social role:

From his own point of view, it is only his [the renouncer's] own spiritual progress, his freedom from all social ties, from choice making in the arena of social obligations, that matters. But from the point of view of the society that lets him and indeed urges him to leave, he emerges as a critic, a reformer and a teacher, indeed a 'creator of values'.[13]

Society, then, sees itself through the eyes of the renouncer. Dumont mentions, in this respect, the term *samsāra* which, according to him, refers to the renouncer's backward glance over the world that he has abandoned. It means that society has assimilated something of the *sanyāsi*'s perspective. It also means that famous renouncers, such as the Buddha or Śankara, who have 'come back' to spread out their insights, have had great impact both at the social and the philosophical levels. To add to Madan's claim, I believe that those who have left society behind had an impact not only when they returned as teachers and founders of *darśana*s and *matha*s, but even at the very act of renunciation itself. By turning their back to society, to social norms and values, they have left deep impression upon those left behind, who started to question, inquire and wonder: Why have they left? Does it mean that something lacks in society, in the familiar world? What are they looking for? What is their goal? Can it be achieved or found only 'outside'?

My contention is that by the very act of renunciation, the renouncers have imparted the tendency of wondering to the 'man of the world'; and this tendency, I would like to suggest, is the essence of what renunciation is all about. It is wondering rather than wandering which makes true renunciation.

To sum up our findings so far: 'individualism' is a Western concept with socio-political implications. Can it be meaningful in the context of Indian renunciation? Tambiah believes it cannot, since the Indian renouncer has opted out of the socio-political arena. Madan, following Dumont, argues that even as an 'outsider', the renouncer influences society by creating new values. He implies that these new values have been created or realized 'outside' but were brought 'back in' by the renouncer upon his return. I have added that the most essential new value, which the renouncer has 'created', is the tendency to wonder or

the urge to question old norms and values. This tendency has been internalized by the society simultaneously with the act of renunciation, not upon the renouncer's return as teacher and reformer.

Madan proceeds to assert, thus agreeing with Dumont's famous claim, that due to his influence over society, the renouncer should be seen as belonging to the socio-political context and as entitled to be called an 'individual'.

Dumont, Madan and Tambiah have asked themselves whether the notion of 'individualism'—in the Western socio-political sense of the word—could be meaningful in the Indian context. I would like to take a further step and ask whether a reconstruction of 'individualism' in its Western sense might enable us to speak of individualism of a new type; individualism which transcends the socio-political realm and which could, therefore, be meaningful in discussing Indian renunciation not only as a social phenomenon but philosophical as well. To establish such a reconstruction, I would like to draw on the *Bhagavadgītā*. The first chapter of this famous text is dedicated, as we all know, to Arjuna's doubts which lead him to the decision not to fight. The narrative reflects the fundamental conflict between action and inaction, life-in-the-world and renunciation. My contention is that behind this conflict, at a deeper level, lies a question of self-identity. Arjuna indeed asks himself whether he should fight or opt out of the war, but at the deeper level, I believe that he asks 'Who am I?' 'With what am I willing to identify and with what I refuse to?' The answers for these questions will later on determine Arjuna's decision regarding opting for or out of fighting. I would like to argue further that in the Indian context, the notions of individualism and identification are closely related. Individualism in that very context is seen as nothing less than an existential choice. An individual is a person who refuses to be objectified. His resolution regarding his own identity, and this resolution alone, makes a subject out of him. It is for him to decide whether his identity will be determined through identification with the 'other', i.e. with family, caste, etc., or by rejecting the very same other, namely by de-identification. This dilemma is reflected in the transformation of the Sanskrit term *purusa*. Initially, in its Vedic sense, the term has referred to a primordial being, out of whose body the four *varnas* came into

being. A person's identity, then, in the Vedic milieu, is determined according to his *varṇa*, to his position in the totality of the social picture. One is interconnected with every other member of society, just as the different limbs of the body are interlaced and, therefore, cannot be referred to independently. Later, in the Sāmkhyan tradition, the term *puruṣa* begins to indicate him whose identity is determined by cutting off social ties, rejection of the other, world renunciation and abandonment of the known. Self-identity, according to the Sāmkhya school of philosophy, has to be determined *via negativa*. The question is no longer 'Who am I?', but rather 'What is it that I am not?' If previously, in the Vedic picture, there was no 'I' without the 'other', then now it was only through rejection of that very 'other' that the 'I' could establish itself.

An individual, then, in the new sense of the word, is a person who is willing to determine his identity on his own. He should be able to opt out, to leave everything behind, to be more than 'homohierarchicus'. He should be capable of making his own choice regarding his identity, whatever choice he makes. I suggest seeing Arjuna, then, as a paradigm of individualism in the proposed sense of the word, as he chooses to fight, rather than accepting the social verdict ('you are a *kṣatriya*— therefore, fight!'), hence determining his identity on his own. The proposed notion of individualism transcends the socio-political realm, since the choice which makes a person an individual is a choice about and not within the socio-political arena. The individual in the new sense of the word is a renouncer, whose renunciation does not force him to opt out but rather to be able to do so. To be able to opt out, because when a person is capable of giving up—in a sense, he has already given up. To be able to opt out is to be less identified, to realize that one's identity is better reflected by the formulae 'I am' than by 'I am this'. To be able to opt out is to become a subject, no longer to remain an object. The notions of 'identification' and 'de-identification' lie at the heart of K.C. Bhattacharyya's acclaimed work *The Subject as Freedom*.[14] The author asserts that when a person stops identifying, he comes to realize that his identification has all along been 'voluntary', rather than 'necessary'. For Bhattacharyya, no longer to identify is to become a subject, and to be a subject means to be free. Daya Krishna

remarks that identification is not really stoppable, since 'it is the very condition of one's being alive and living in the world'.[15]

I would like to reconcile these two *prima facie* contradicting claims ('identification is voluntary rather than necessary' and 'identification is a necessary condition for life in the world'), applying the newly born notion of 'individualism as renunciation'. This notion is based on identification in a weak sense of the word, identification and de-identification at the same time, 'conscious identification', Take, for example, a play or a movie. When we watch it, we identify with the characters and get totally absorbed (if it is well played). This identification is a necessary condition for the play/movie to 'work'. Yet, we do not cease to remember that it is only a play, just a movie. Or take for example, Hermann Hesse's Siddhartha, who becomes a successful merchant by not considering himself a 'merchant'. He identifies with the role of the merchant only to a certain degree, which is a necessary condition for him to become successful in this trade. Yet, he remembers (or cannot forget) that there is more to him than a merchant. In a sense, his success is the result of his playing the role of a merchant. There is something of the play/movie spectator and of Hesse's protagonist in the individual as a renouncer. To live in the world, he needs to identify with numerous things. This identification, as Daya Krishna has justly maintained, is necessary. Yet, the individual's awareness of these identifications (or rather of identification as a mental pattern), loosens the grasp of identification. Due to this awareness, identification no longer 'occupies' the totality of the individual's Being. Someone or something is aware of the fact that identification takes place, without taking any part in this very act. Thus emerges the understanding that this identification, as maintained by K.C. Bhattacharyya, is not necessary—not necessary in the sense that it can be changed, modified, strengthened, weakened, replaced by other types of identification, etc., while the stream of awareness 'watching' it is constant, always there, never involved. It does not mean that there is for a human being a state without identification, but rather a 'place' deep within which is not affected by it and which is, therefore, free. It is not freedom-from-identification (i.e. a state in which a person is not identified with anything), but rather freedom-in-identification.

'Freedom in identification' means that even as identification occurs, one does not have to be bound by it. He or she can be the controller rather than the controlled. Awareness to the fact that I am 'identified with' weakens the hold of identification and allows freedom. After all, we can always opt out of identification, thus replacing in with a different one. We can always wander between identifications, as the *pārivrājaka* wanders in the paths of India. He is always situated somewhere or the other, but this empirical fact alone does not bind him. He is free, no matter where his feed stand.

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Agenda for Research

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a well-known work but not his *Science of Logic*, even though both concern the same theme and develop the same idea. Like the former, the later also develops dialectically from a discussion of the development of the categories of *Being*, 'Essence', and *Notion*. Yet, there seems to be a substantive difference between Hegel's treatment in the *Phenomenology* and the one that obtains in the *Science of Logic*.

A comparative study of the two will not only reveal the development in Hegel's thought, but also the differences in his treatment of the issues with which Kant was concerned in the three Critiques that he wrote.

A comparison with Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* would be equally rewarding as both develop a phenomenological dialectic starting from a radically opposed beginning. Hegel starts with '*Being*' while Fichte begins with the fact of 'self consciousness' or, as he puts it, 'I am'. Hegel, in fact, asks at the very beginning, 'With what must then science begin?' and answers that it should begin with the most general and universal category underlying anything and everything that can be said or thought of. Fichte, on the other hand, starts with the fact of consciousness, but not with Descartes' '*I think*', but '*I am*' as 'thought' has to be thought of something while 'I am' is just 'self-consciousness' having no 'object', not even itself as it has no 'predicates' predicated of itself.

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Focus

Attention is drawn to Michael Witzel's work on the Vedic *śākhās*, specially the following two articles published by him, amongst many others.

1. Witzel, Michael (1987): 'On the localization of Vedic texts and schools (Materials on Vedic Śākhās, 7), In: *India and the Ancient World, History, Trade and Culture Before* AD 650. (Ed.) Gilbert Pallet. Leuven: Department Orientalistiek (Orientalia Lovaniensia, Analecta, 25.) pp. 173–213.

2. Witzel, Michael (1997): 'The development of the Vedic canon and its schools: the social and political milieu (Materials on Vedic *Śākhās*, 8)'. In: *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Vedas*. (Ed.) Michael Witzel. Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University; distributed by South Asia Books, Columbia, MO. (Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora, 2.) pp. 235–257. Also on internet: http:www.people.fas.harvard.edu/witzel/canon.pdf

The problem of the *śākhās* in respect of the Vedas has not been paid sufficient attention as it is generally assumed that there are only four Vedas and that all of them are like the Ṛgveda which has only one unitary text of its own.

The situation, however, is totally different in respect of the three other Vedas, *Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Atharvaveda*. In the case of each of these, there is no one unitary text which can be called by that name. There is, in fact, no such *Saṁhitā* text of any of these unqualified by the *śākhā* to which it exclusively belongs by names such as the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandin Saṁhitā* or the *Kāṇva Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda*. The *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, which is different from the *Śukla Yajurveda*, faces the same problem as there is no such text as the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. We have either the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, or the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, or the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, or even the *Kāṭhaka-Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā* which are all different from one another and are said to belong to *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, and not to *Śukla Yajurveda*. The

Sāmaveda and the *Atharvaveda* have the same problem as there is no one such text as the *Sāmaveda* or *Atharvaveda*, pure and simple. We just have the *Jaiminīya Saṁhitā*, or the *Rāṇāyanīya Saṁhitā*, or the *Kauthuma Saṁhitā* belonging to the *Sāmaveda*. The *Atharvaveda*, on its part, is found only either in the *Saṁhitā* belonging to the *Śaunaka* or the *Paippalāda* which, like those of the *Yajurveda*, are different from each other. Each of these is separate from the other and generally has its own *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka*, or *Upaniṣad* which are known by that name. They are also separate independent texts belonging to what we call different *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and *Atharvaveda*.

Professor Witzel's work examines each of these *śākhās* in detail as well as that of the Ṛgveda and discusses the political and geographical location of each of these along with their development as shown by the material within the text itself and, at times, the relation of this material to the *Śrauta* and the *Gṛhya Sūtras*, which also were developing within this period. Interestingly, he refers to the text and evidence pointing to the time of Parīkṣita, when the floating Ṛgvedic verses were first brought together and collected in the form of the *Saṁhitā*. Is this the same Parīkṣita of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Śrīmadbhāgawad*? If so, then the widely prevalent view is true regarding the editing and collection of the Vedas at the beginning of the *Kali* era so that the past may not be forgotten and the continuity may be preserved through the tradition by handing down this knowledge of those who had thought about things earlier may not be completely lost to this age.

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Notes and Queries

1. What exactly is meant by the term *devatā* and *ṛṣi* in the Ṛgveda?

2. How is it determined as to who is the *ṛṣi* and who the *devatā* of a *mantra* in the Ṛgveda?

3. What is the relation between the *mantra* in a *sūkta*? Does the *sūkta* have a unity of its own, or it is just a collection of the *mantras*, having little relation to one another?

4. Does the *mantra* taken from the Ṛgveda and 'used' in the *Yajurveda* or *Sāmaveda* function there in a different way? If so, what is this difference? Does the 'meaning' of the *mantra* become irrelevant when it is used in the ritual of the *Yajurveda* or sung in the *Sāmaveda*?

5. What happens to the *Varṇāuukramṇī*, *Śabdānnukrmaṇī* and *Svarānakramaṇī* of the *mantra* in the Ṛgveda when it is sung as a song by the *Samvadin* who, perforce, has to violate it, particularly when he starts signing outside the context of the sacrificial ritual?

6. What happens to all the three Vedas, i.e. the Ṛgveda, the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda*, when the material from them is taken by Bharata in his *Nātya Śāstra* and calling it the fifth Veda?

7. What is the unity of the *Yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda* when each of them consists of independent *Saṁhitās* belonging to different *Śākhās* which are so different from one another that they not only have differences among them but speak ill of each other and even prescribe *prāyāścitta*, if something prescribed in the texts of a different *Śākhā* is performed by one, as is mentioned in detail in *Sabara Bhāṣya* on the Mīmāṁsā Sutra 2.4.8.

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SOME ISSUES RELATING TO ṚGVEDA

1. What exactly is the status of *sūkta* in the Ṛgveda? *Mantras* are always collected and organized in the form of a *sūkta* and one *sūkta* is distinguished from the other? Thus, it is *not* the *mantra* which is central to the Ṛgveda as is generally supposed, but the *sūkta*. Which, then, is the unit of forming the collections *mantra* or the *sūkta*?

2. What is the relation between the successive *sūkta* in a *mandala?* Is the relation haphazard, accidental or has it some 'inner' meaning resulting from the sequential development of the *sūktas* themselves?

3. What is the relation between *mandalas* which collectively from the Ṛgveda? In other words, does the Ṛgveda have a unity of *mandalas* or *Ekvākyatā*, to use the Indian term in this regard?

4. What is the exact relation between the *chanda* or meter and the *mantra?* Does a mantra have a *chanda* of its own and, if it does so, what exactly is the meaning of the sequences of *mantras* in a *sūkta*, particularly when the *mantras* in a *sūkta* have a different *chanda*. Ascription of a *chanda* to a sequence of *mantra* would, then, be meaningless and, if so, what exactly would be meant by a *chanda* of the whole sequence?

5. What exactly is meant by the term *devatā* in the Ṛgveda and how is it known that the *mantra* is related to one particular *devatā* and not to another?

   The problem becomes obvious when in a *sūkta* *mantras* are addressed to different *devatās* and thus the sequence of *mantra* does not form a 'unity' given to them by the fact that they are addressed to the same *devatā*.

6. How is it known that the *mantra* or the sequence of *mantras* is related to the *rṣi* who is supposed to be the *drṣṭā?* The problem becomes obvious in the case of those *sūktas* where different *rṣis* are supposed to be responsible for different *mantras* addressed to the same or different *devatās*. In fact the problem becomes even more insistent in the case of those *mantras* or *sūktas* where there is either no attribution to a *rṣi* or the attribution is ambiguous. If it cannot be determined who is the *rṣi* to whom the *sūkta* or

mantra is to be attributed, then how is it known or determined that this particular *rṣi* is one to whom the *mantra* or the *sūkta* has to be unambiguously attributed. The problem may be seen to be even more complicated in the case where a large number of *rṣis* whose individual proper name and 'family' or 'clan' or 'school' name remains the same. There are, for example, too many *rṣis* having the same surname as Kāṇva, Āṅgirasa, Ātreya, Viśwāmitra in the text. It is imperative, therefore, to find the basis on which this distinction is made. If there is something in the *mantra* that proclaims its authorship then it would be something like a 'signature' in the text itself. But, then, why the ambiguity and why are alternative attributions being made?

Book Reviews

This book is addressed to a layman or to anyone who wants to be familiar with the basic trends of philosophical reflections.

The book contains five parts, (I) Nature of Reality, (II) Western Philosophy, (III) Human Psychology, (IV) Religious and Mystical Philosophy, and (V) Mysticism, Metaphysics, Ethics. The classification of different parts is quite interesting. Part I distinguishes between the various kinds of existence such as spiritual, mental, astral, material, vegetative, animal and human existence along with the various ways of knowing reality. Normally, we do not see this sort of classifying, which is certainly helpful for the reader and, for that matter, for any student of philosophy. The second part 'Western Philosophy' is more or less a routine matter but the discussion under these headings is so sketchy that the reader hardly gets any idea of the contents discussed under this heading. Part III, 'Human Psychology' deals with various topics such as Emotion, Intuition, Action, Sensation, and Free Will. These terms are used in Western philosophy and ethics very often and we do not have a clear idea of what they refer to. So, it is extremely important and appropriate to discuss these, but again, more details were expected from the author.

Part IV, 'Religion and Mystical Philosophy', includes all the schools of Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Jewish philosophy and Islamic philosophy. On the one hand, it is very interesting to see the inclusion of Islamic philosophy, although Carvaka philosophy and Nyaya school of Indian philosophy, not falling under this heading, are completely absent from *Philosophical Reflections*. Discussion on Samkhya, Jaina philosophy, and Persian philosophy is limited. It is almost as good as not presenting their views at all. Moreover, Thomas Aquinas has been included in Christian philosophy but only a few lines are devoted to him. Islamic philosophy, normally neglected by

philosophers, does find a place in this book but the discussion is so brief that the reader hardly gets any idea of their distinct contributions to philosophy. I only wish the author had accommodated some more details and should have concentrated on at least one or two main Islamic philosophers as in my opinion, it is an appropriate, and interesting departure from any traditional introductory book on philosophy.

I would like to discuss some of these thinkers in detail as I think; Al-Farabi and Ibn-Sina deserve much more attention than the others. They have greatly influenced modern western philosophers, specially Descartes, Leibnitz and Locke with whom philosophers are familiar but we are hardly aware of the fact that the origin of their ideas lies in Islamic philosophy.

The basic principles of Islam deal with supersensible realities and as such, they must first be accepted on the authority of revelation. Mu'tazilites tried to judge everything by reason alone and consequently destroyed the personality of God and reduced Him to an abstract unity. This was not acceptable to ordinary and orthodox Muslims and they reacted strongly to such rationalism. al-Ash'ari became the most popular hero, who brought the Mu'tazilite (rationalist) system down and became the founder of the orthodox philosophical theology. The school al-Ash'ari was known as Ash'arism. Ash'arites were between the two horns of dilemma. They could neither assert the eternal attributes of God to be identical with the essence of God nor could they accept the attributes being wholly different from the essence of God. For example, God is knowing; this means he possesses knowledge as an attribute which is inherent in God but it is not the same as its essence yet it is not very different from and other than His essence.

Another very well-known contributor to Islamic philosophy is al-Farabi who is not given the due importance in this book. His philosophy was most systematic and harmonious. He is quite logical in thinking and expression, in his arguments and discussion and his exposition and reasoning. His treatise entitled 'What should Be Learnt Before Attempting Philosophy' is almost an index of Greek schools of philosophy, mainly Aristotle. His works can be divided into two parts— one with logic and the other with related studies. He distinguishes

between logic and grammar and develops his own syllogism for the Arabic-speaking world. Al-Farabi maintains that philosophy is essentially one single unit and it is only concerned with truth. He developed the *Theory of the Ten Intelligences* dealing with two worlds of Islamic Philosophy; heaven and earth. The first intelligences is God, necessary by himself and has no opposite or equivalent, then follow the souls of the spheres and then the spheres themselves. The last in order is the earth and the world of matter, which falls in the fourth rank.[1] To vindicate the uniqueness of God, Al-Farabi has resorted to the mediacy of these ten intelligences between God and the terrestrial world. Al-Farabi also develops a *Theory of the Intellect* and talks of rising gradually from intellect in potency to intellect in action, and finally to acquired intellect, which is obviously based on Aristotle. This theory helps in fusing psychology with cosmology but it underestimates the activity of the human mind, since it is made capable of comprehension only when it is illuminated by heaven. Al-Farabi's *Theory of the Intellect* that was one of the most significant contributions of Muslim thinkers influenced Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd and Al-Kindi and it has greatly influenced Christian philosophy as well. But at the end, due to Middle Ages, his doctrine is spiritualistic and idealistic, for al-Farabi reduces almost everything to spirit. His God is the spirit of spirits and the prince of his city is a man whose spirit transcendents his body. Through speculation and contemplation, man can commune with the celestial world and attain utmost happiness. No spiritualism is so closely related to idealism as that of al-Farabi. But it is also sufficiently modern. He favours science, causality, and experimentation and rejects astrology. 'He elevates the intellect to a plane so sacred that he is driven to its conciliation with tradition so that philosophy and religion may accord'.[2]

Ibn Sina's contribution to modern philosophy is also unique. By using distinct concepts and rigorous method of divisions, he arrives at definitions, which were later used by Descartes in his thesis of the mind-body dualism. His argument for the existence of God became the cardinal doctrine of the Roman Catholic dogmatic theology. After Aquinas, it is more like the Leibnitzian proof of God as the ground of the world, i.e. given God, we can understand the existence of the

world. He talks of non-existent objects that have 'some sort of existence in the mind'. He also makes a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' perception. Primary here is subjective, a state of the individual's own mind; the secondary being that of the external world. Later, Locke makes use of this ideology for his distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. Ibn Rushd, the last great name in philosophical medieval tradition, has no philosophy of his own but wrote commentaries on Aristotle.

One can understand the author's main concern to give a taste of everything and leave the reader to find out his own interest and then for deeper and detailed study, delve into other sources. From this point of view, perhaps it is a remarkable work of bringing so many things together at one place.

The last part V deals with 'Mysticism, Metaphysics and Ethics'. The first chapter of this section 'Mysticism' should have been included in the part IV that deals with Religion and Mystical Philosophy.

There are some interesting aspects of this book, which need serious attention of philosophers.

(1) Under Modern Idealistic Philosophy, the author discusses 'Metaphysics of Quality' developed by R.M. Pirsig in his famous book *Zen and The Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance* and *Lila*. (Chapter 13, p. 83). According to him, all life is a 'migration of static quality to dynamic quality'.

(2) In the book, each chapter presents a view and in each section, after presenting the view, the author writes an 'analysis' which very often is nothing but presentation of the same theme but the idea of providing an independent analysis or critical analysis of each view is interesting and may be followed for helping the understanding of the reader.

(3) The most remarkable part, as I have mentioned earlier, is the discussion on Islamic philosophy. Various Islamic thinkers like Ashiri, Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Ibn Rushd, Al Ghazali, Md. Iqbal and Sufi thinkers have been presented in this section. Although the author gives equal importance to all the above-mentioned Islamic philosophers, most of the discussion is extremely brief.

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VINIT HAKSAR: *Rights, Communities and Disobedience: Liberalism and Gandhi*, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, Rs. 225

The book focusses as its central theme on the right to civil disobedience and, subsequently, the nature of punishment. It also highlights the problem of tension between group and individual interests, as also between groups, especially the religious ones depicting enduring features of multi-cultural societies. In the first part, the author discusses both the individual and the collective rights, the rights-based punishment, and explores the nature of Indian secularism and Indian constitution. In the second part, a discussion on the nature of coercion and ethical dimension of civil disobedience is initiated.

The author, Vinit Haksar, has primarily examined some of Gandhi's views on the right to civil disobedience and that of some contemporary liberals. He compares and contrasts the formulations of philosophers like Rawls, Dworkin and Raz. Nozick's views have also been taken up and critiqued. Comparing Gandhi with the liberal thinkers and philosophers within the paradigm of liberal discourse, Haksar covertly takes Gandhi closer to liberal philosophers while maintaining the uniqueness of the Indian experience—perhaps depicting it as the experience of the non-Western societies. Yet one observes in the book an attempt to encompass various thoughts of non-Western multi-cultural societies within the pan-umbrella of liberalism.

While illustrating the finer complexity on the nature of conviction of the civil disobedient and the soundness or unsoundness of the

conviction, Haksar critiques the general liberalist view that we should extend tolerance to the civil disobedient however wrong or unsound the cause of the civil disobedient may be. He contrasts himself from Ronald Dworkin in the view that a theory of civil disobedience should be sensitive about the type of conviction the disobedient has and remain insensitive to the soundness of those convictions. For Haksar, a theory of civil disobedience must be equally sensitive to the soundness of the convictions of the disobedient. Extending the argument, he further states that authorities (state) must extend tolerance not only when the disobedient is right, but also when he/she is reasonably mistaken in his/her view. This marginally deviates from the general liberalist perception that the authority ought to be tolerant towards the disobedient howsoever wrong the disobedient is in the cause.

Haksar further suggests linking the 'moral' with the 'legal'. Contrasting himself from the conservative positivists, he sees the right to civil disobedience as a moral right, which has a direct or indirect implication on the legal system. In fact, legal rules are to be guided by moral norms.

The book pleads for civil disobedience—unlike other forms of protest—as a constitutional device. The disobedient, according to Gandhi—by defying the ills of a state, or even of the constitution—does not breach upon the sanctity of the highest law. By enacting the conception of a 'highest law', which is *a priori* or universal in nature, Gandhi makes a sound distinction between the law of the land and the highest law. While the former is state-specific and contextually/ temporally variable, the latter depicts an invariable form of law guided by the moral norm. Such a form of law operates in an ideal form of *Ramrajya. Ramrajya*, as Gandhi visualized, is not a utopia but a state of society governed by the 'morally good', and transcends the temporal variables. It represents a state, which is humanly achievable. A form of agitation that adheres to the highest form of moral correctness cannot be said to be against the 'law'. Civil disobedience agitation, which defies the law of the land or the constitution of the state, continues to be constitutional by adhering to the highest law. It is not against the constitution or the law per se. Rather, civil to remain disobedience is

law governed. It attempts at changing a particular form of law that is either inhuman or unconstitutional.

Like Rawls, who took civil disobedience as the final device to maintain the stability of a just constitution, Gandhi too sees it as the purest form of constitutional agitation. Gandhi's *satyagraha* adheres to the constitutional agitation of the highest order. By adhering to the idea of purity of the soul and the highest form of law, Gandhi creates room for justification of an agitation, not from the eye of the law of the land but from the point of view of the universal law, which transcends the variability of a constitution and its laws.

The uniqueness of the Gandhian conception of disobedience lies in his conception of *satyagraha*. Haksar has brought out in detail this aspect of Gandhi's formulation as distinct and more intense than many liberal philosophers like Rawls. Rawls, while believing that justice has an objective basis, in actuality confines the idea only to those regimes that he considered to be just or near-just. This refers, in his scheme of things, only to the developed world. The objectivity of civil disobedience and that of justice for these philosophers excludes the non-Western communities. Gandhi's concern has been, on the other hand, shown as much greater and deeper. It was the search for a universal character of civil disobedience through which a higher and a more generic form of justice could be achieved. For Gandhi, moral principle is a strong and universal force which does not remain confined to one regime or another. Nor does he refer to cultural or temporal divides. His is governed by the concept of 'moral universal.' As such, he defines *satyagraha* as 'clinging to truth', suggesting the concept of having a moral underpinning.

The strength of moral conviction is clearly visible in Gandhi when he asked the British judge, C.M. Broomfield, to give him maximum punishment if the judge thought that Gandhi was wrong, or the judge himself ought to resign if he thought that Gandhi was right. This statement closes all possibilities of a middle path, which in the case of Rawls, is an important means of theorizing. For Gandhi, civil disobedience has to be either wrong or right, but not partly right or partly wrong. Though the judge chose a middle path, Gandhi's insisting the judge to choose either of the extremes was primarily based on the

logic of the morals and moral commitment. That Gandhi not only knew but also was committed to the moral enabled him to make such a statement. For Gandhi, one can have right to civil disobedience if and only if one's cause is just and conscience is clear. This further involves that the person or those group of persons who opt for civil disobedience also possesses a tremendous amount of self-respect.

The idea of self-respect and integrity is so strong in Gandhi that a major difference could be drawn between his thought and that of the other liberal philosophers on the aspect of the moral. Haksar, while narrating this aspect of Gandhi, compares his thought with that of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin makes a distinction of justified civil disobedience into one based on integrity or conscience and the other based on just cause. For Gandhi, the latter is subsumed under the former. It is self-respect, sense of integrity and pure conscience that needs to be inculcated prior to launching any form of civil disobedience movement or agitation. This should not, however, suggest us to think that intending to cultivate a sense of integrity and self-respect in one involves prior intention of launching a civil disobedient agitation. This idea is to suggest that any form of civil disobedience movement or agitation must *a priori* constitute the sense of integrity and self-respect. In other words, one does not cultivate the sense of integrity and self-respect in order to launch a civil disobedience movement, but any form of civil disobedience movement, whatsoever it may be, must be steered by the morally guided concepts like self-respect and integrity.

Based on the above-mentioned concepts, Gandhi categorically posited the status of civil disobedience as either right or wrong. With this idea Gandhi stood by the conviction that the state (and its functionaries) must either give in to the demand of the disobedients if it is convinced that it is wrong and the disobedients are right, or must inflict maximum punishment if it thinks that it is right and the civil disobedients are wrong. This is where Gandhi substantively differs from the liberal philosophers. Rawls and Dworkin, as propounders of the liberalist tradition, go contrary to what Gandhi formulated. The state, for them, should show tolerance to the disobedients howsoever wrong they might be either in their understanding of the problem/issue under concern or the particular form of approach they adopt for agitation. Both the

philosophers, by holding such a poster, neither highlight the State's being a possible offender of the right of the people nor the State's conceding the demands of the disobedients. This could be one of the strategies that might have been adopted by the liberalist (and statetist) propounders. This may be compared with a more direct liberalist (and statetist) like Raz, who does not provide any room for protest, such as civil disobedience, within the liberalist discourse. Any plea for change is to be sorted out through legal procedure. This particular poster presupposes two standpoints. One, any change in the state policy is to be initiated as well as operated within the particular framework under which a particular vision of the state is projected. Two, legal sanctity is something that is being exclusively presupposed on the basis that any other mode of change is not entertained.

Critiquing these standpoints, Haksar projects the experiences of the developing world to counter the sanctity of legal proceeding as well as the exclusivity of liberal paradigm. While the author himself is a sympathiser of the liberalist discourse, he is not bound by the particular trend within the Western liberalism, which sets exclusive paradigm based on the experiences of the Western world. He is among those who prefer to expand the paradigm of liberalism beyond the narrow confines of the Western world views and experiences. Critiquing this larger framework, he illustrates the cases of India (Gandhi as an example) through which the sanctity of legal procedure is being strongly questioned. An example from India is highlighted where the prime minister of the country proposes to have a national debate involving all the political parties on the issue of conversion in the wake of violence meted out on Christians couple of years back. The author constructs a possible state of affair where every form the debate fails and the violence continues. In such a case, the pertinent question is if the Christians still should look back to the legal procedure of the country or go for civil disobedience movement. If, supposedly, they adopt the latter, will the state be morally justified to curve such a form of movement going by the 'liberalist' norm that no other mode of change/reform can be had except through the legal procedure? Haksar's illustration of the contrary instances from the Indian experience has greatly helped in countering such an exclusive paradigm set about liberalism by the scholars from

the West. He has shown the amount of stereotyping that has undergone in constructing theories and concepts relating to society and people.

Liberalism, as has been witnessed today both in its theory and practice, seems to become ever more encompassing than before. The philosophy provides due importance to the individual by enacting it as *a priori* category in social and political theorizing. However, bringing in Gandhi, who was both a propounder of individual freedom as well as of community life, sets a new task for the liberalist thinkers to recast the nodal point of liberal theory—of the individual and the collective.

The book may be seen as an attempt to rethink liberalism either by setting up multiple paradigms or expand the existing paradigm. Haksar's thesis is about a search for liberalism in Gandhian philosophy, which hints at revitalizing liberal discourse. However, it has not been made clear whether the author opts for 'multiple paradigms' or to 'expand the existing paradigm.' More intriguing question whether one sees Gandhian thought as a form of liberal philosophy or an alternative to the existing liberal philosophy is left open for further debate. Irrespective of the answers provided, the author has brought out several such problems and issues and has conceptually tried to understand those using analytical tools to avoid inconsistency and overlapping in social and political theorizing.

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Sebestian Alackapally: *Being & Meaning (Reality and Language in Bhartṛhari and Heidegger)*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 297, Rs. 490

The book under review is a presentation of Sebestian Alackapally's study of being in the light of Bhartṛhari, the Indian grammarian philosopher (fifth century AD) and Heidegger, the German philosopher of Being (twentieth century AD). It emphasizes the universality of their

thinking on one hand and tries to find out common points the two meet up on the other. The study is presented in four proportionate chapters with a general introduction (from pages 1 to 20) and a general conclusion from pages 227 to 246. Inclusion of a glossary, appendix, bibliography and index completes the shape of the book.

It is very difficult for a person who is not efficient in Sanskrit and German to write a book like one under review. The author is not only versed apparently in Sanskrit and German but has a good understanding of the philosophy of the two traditions as well. The manner in which he has presented the material on several issues concerning Being and language, quite obviously suggests that the author has a clear understanding of the ontological philosophy of M. Heidegger. The book is very useful for those who cannot understand the changing faces of Heidegger's philosophy, and his ontological, rather, mystical approach to Being presented in the garb of complicated expressions in original German language.

In the beginning, the author has presented a brief general introduction of Bhartṛhari, with information regarding his life and works. Significance, commentaries, subject matter of his *Vākyapadīya*, *Vākyapadīya* and the problem of meaning have been presented in a general way. The author has tried to present Bhartṛhari more in the context of reference books than the original text and the commentaries thereon and, therefore, it seems that on some issues, he is either not aware of the true position of Bhartṛhari or he is not serious about the statements he furnishes to evaluate Bhartṛhari's position on those contexts. In page 9, he writes 'In short, the same word is regarded as the subject and the object, both at the same time'. This statement of the author is opposed to what Bhartṛhari has himself made. Let me quote the verse from Bhartṛhari. '*Na ca vācakarūpeṇa pravṛttasyāsti vācyatā.* V.P. 3/3/26, commenting on the verse *Helārāja* says '*yat pratipādakam na tat pratipādyam.* The word (expresser = *Vācaka* cannot, at the same time, be the meaning (expressed = *Vācya*). The issue in *Vākyapadīya* is discussed in detail with the examples as a basic issue of *Sambandhasamuddeśah*. I wonder how the learned author has missed the discussion in *Sambandhasamuddeśah* while writing this statement. The author has followed the rendering of Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphoṭa*

by K. Kunjhunni Raja, who understands it in terms of one single integral symbol (p. 12). The text, the commentaries and the works by K.S.A. Iyer understand it as inner, indivisible and meaning-revealing unit of awareness. The issue is discussed in a paper entitled 'Regarding *Sphota*' *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, Number 3, 2001, pp. 157–83. The author is unaware of the discussion there. Similarly, the author takes *pratibha* as intuition but Bhartṛhari himself uses the term for a unit meaning awareness in nature. The issue is discussed with great clarity in a paper entailed 'Sentential Meaning ..., *JICPR*, Vol. XIX, Number 1, 2002, pp. 143–63. Again on page 13, the author is very vague when he observes 'what is worthy of emphasis is that whether the universal is looked upon as the meaning of all words or the substance is so looked upon, it is ultimately the Brahman (*Śabdatattva*) which turns out to be the meaning of all words'. The author has not supported this observation by way of the text. The text gives at least 12 different theories of meaning of words. The author has relied upon the theory that is given by Bhartṛhari as one among different theories. In Bhartṛhari, not only *Śabdatattva* but all the entities ontic in nature that is Being or thing— in-itself are trans-intelligible Beings and we know only intelligible beings, which are meaning for him. If *Śabdatattva* is accepted as meaning, it will either be universal or individual but the *śabda* principle is cognitively neither of the two because it is not an object the *sphota* reveals and that our knowledge is confined only to what the words reveal in the mind, i.e. the intelligible beings. It is to put in a mystical sense to say that all words denote *Śabdatattva* that is not an intelligible being but a subject matter of *sādhanā*.

From pages 13 to 20, a brief general introduction of Heidegger as a philosopher of Being and language is presented. The author has distinctly clearly outlined the question of temporality and Heidegger's language in a scholarly way and has arrived at the conclusion that thought must strive to stand in the light of truth of the Being–Being of man and Being of beings bring him to understand Being concretely as the 'event of appropriation'. The word as proposed by Heidegger indicates that speech is directly involved in the disclosure of the Being of the beings (p. 20).

The second chapter deals with *Śabdatattva*: The *Sphota* of Language. The title of the chapter is ambiguous. It shows that Bhartṛhari accepts *sphota* as a quality of language and that there are *sphota* of things other than language. For Bhartṛhari, language is not confined to the uttering and hearing articulations, writing, and reading of the marks that are tokens/tools helping manifestation of the *sphota*. Real language is *sphota*, an unit of awareness in character. It is *sphota* as it reveals itself its own nature when manifested by the tokens and afterwards reveals its meaning non-differently.

In this chapter, the author has studied *sphota* as the unitary medium of expression, manifesting the process of *sphota*, *vākyasphota* as the meaning-bearing unit, *sphota* and *artha*, *sphota* and the evolution of language, concept of *pratibhā*, *dhvani* of *sphota*, *dhvani-śabda* relationship, the *dhvani* of aesthetics, critique of *sphota*, *Śabdatattva*: the principle of integration and, lastly, he has offered a conclusion of the discussion in the chapter. The author is misguided when he observes *sphota* as a medium of expression (p. 67), and the evolution of language in Bhartṛhari (p. 78). *Sphota* in Bhartṛhari is not a unitary medium of expression but expression itself (VP. 1/93–7). Bhartṛhari does not give a theory of evolution of language but a theory of gradual manifestation of language.

The statements 'Bhartṛhari holds that it is the meaning rather than words that is eternal' (p. 65), '*sphota* as latent unitary medium that forms the content of all words' (p. 67), are the author's own reading of the text of which the text itself has no room. However, he has not discussed the statement warranted for. His observation, *sphota seems* to represent both the linguistic symbol as well as the transcendental reality is misguiding because *sphota* in Bhartṛhari is neither of the two. It is the unit of awareness, an idea revealed in the mind when manifested by the symbols. It is directly revealed/expressed and, hence, a cognitive unit that cannot be transcendental. In the conclusion of this chapter, the author has pointed out at least three inadequacies in Bhartṛhari's systems (p. 102). These are:

1. Nowhere does he say anything about the transformation of knowledge into language, forms and vice versa.

2. Bhartṛhari is silent on the method of learning the meaning of words.

3. Although he visualized grammar as the means of attaining *moksa*, he does not describe the stages of the spiritual ascent.

The aforementioned inadequacies raised by the author show that the author has not delved seriously through the text or he has tried to look for Heideggerian or some other's view in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. In Bhartṛhari, the language and knowledge are non-different and the forms are revealed non-differently by the language (VP. 1/123). Thus, it is inconsistent to raise the inadequacy of transformation of knowledge into language, forms and vice versa. Had the author consulted Bhartṛhari's *Sambandhasamuddeśaḥ*, he would have better observed that Bhartṛhari is not silent on the method of learning the meaning of words. Bhartṛhari has elaborately discussed various modes of *samaya* and *saṅketa*, through which one learns the meaning of words.

It is true that Bhartṛhari, in the first part of *Vākyapadīya*, visualized grammar as the means of attaining *moksa*. He does not describe the stages of the spiritual ascent because his concern is that of a grammarian philosopher who aims at clarifying the concepts as they are used in communications and accepts that the issue of *moksa*, the means of attaining it and the process of spiritual ascent are the subject matter of *sādhanā*. In the light of these observations, it can be said that those inadequacies are that of the author and not of Bhartṛhari.

The third chapter is a good exposition of concepts like the Being question, Being and Dasein, Being and non-being, Being and truth, Being and time, Being and the world, Being and thinking, beings to Being, Being as event, Being and God. There is a conclusion of the discussion in this chapter. The author concludes 'philosophy consists in listening the voice of Being that is the reality of Dasein. Dasein is the openness to Being, responds to the call of being, makes his journey in the Being through the language. Along with the very uncovering of the Being that is truth, language breaks out where the being finds its home' (p. 162).

The fourth chapter, entitled 'Language: The Saying of Being' deals with different levels of language and its relation to Being, time and Dasein. In particular, it studies language in Being and time, the language

of Dasein, everyday language, language: the shift of emphasis, discourse and conscience, the language speaks, experiencing the language, essence of language, showing to saying, thought and poetry, language: eventing of Being and, lastly, the conclusion of the discussion in the chapter. The author is right in saying that language in Heidegger is not representative; it is manifestation. The language of Dasein embodies and makes explicit the intelligibility of Dasein's Being-in-the world. It is language more primordial than the theoretical and abstract language that articulates the intelligibility of things present-at-hand kind of Being (p. 182). Language is not merely an instrument of communication but the coming of Being into saying. The author has discussed ably and successfully the ontological orientation and nature of language as an agency through which the Being comes into presence.

The author has very comprehensively observed Heidegger's understanding of the nature of language in relation to his understanding of Being over each of the two distinct periods—the period of Being and time and the later period. He is also right in observing that Heidegger of BT takes that language as a discourse is the constitutive element of the Being of Dasein that is man, the individual human being and the later Heidegger conceives language as primal saying, that is the call of Being—the manifesting within the unhiddedness of the clearing of the Being. However, some of the observations invite further clarification. For example, the Being has its own fundamental speech and the speaking of Being is the fundamental mode of speech (p. 224). Language is not primarily communicative but the way in which things emerge into presence (p. 225). Is it not that the emergence of things into presence through language is communication?

The general conclusion entitled 'Being and Language in Bhartṛhari and Heidegger: A Synthesis' attempts at presenting a comparative view on the issues discussed in the rest of the chapters. It is for the first time that a comparative study of the being in Bhartṛhari and Heidegger is presented in a book under review. The author's effort to arrive at some points of agreement on metaphysical concept of Being and metaphysical understanding on language in Bhartṛhari and Heidegger is rare, if not the first. The author, in making the points fit for his mission, is very enthusiastic in his presentation of points of comparison and has not

bothered about differing even with the recent developments in the field of research on Bhartṛhari's philosophy.

The author is a knowledgeable person. He has consulted original as well as secondary sources from Bhartṛhari and Heidegger. He has deep understanding of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The influence of ontological phenomenology on the author is dominant to the extent that he sometimes seems to impose Heideggerian understanding of the concepts of Being and language on those of Bhartṛhari. However, it had been a matter of further appreciation if he might have presented an updated understanding of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, in the book. The book under review attempts for the first time a comparative study of the being and metaphysical orientation, nature and relation of language to the Being in view of two great masters distant in space and time (Bhartṛhari, fifth century and Martin Heidegger, twentieth century) and belonging to two different cultures, East and West, respectively. I am sure, this book will succeed in drawing the attention of the scholars on the subject.

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DAVID L. HABERMAN: *Acting as a Way of Salvation: A Study of Rāgānugā Bhakti Sādhanā*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2001, pp. xiv+211, Rs. 295

This book is an excellent exposition of the famous theory of Gauḍīya Vaiṣnavism. According to the author, David L. Haberman's own admission, his twin abiding obsession, viz., religion and theatre, led him to the study of the theory and practice of *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā*. Apparently, these two concerns are distantly related. Religion, in general, deals with God, His divinity, His power and His relation to the devotee. There are, of course, many religious systems that talk of the creation of the cosmos as a divine sport. But there are a few systems that look at the entire business of devotion in terms of participating in the cosmic

drama of the God—a drama, in which the God is not just a detached onlooker but an active participant, the hero of the drama. So it is natural that somebody with interest in religion as well as in drama would find the *bhakti* theory of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣnavism a befitting subject for an intensive study.

Bhakti as a term defies definite definition. *Bhakti* may mean to engage in, to turn or resort to, to pursue, to prefer or to choose, to serve, to love, to adore. Thus, *bhakti* can mean an experience as well as a practice, reverence as well as adoration. But there can be systems of thought that may come up with an altogether different connotation. Śaṁkara, for example, defines *bhakti* as an investigation into one's own being (*sva svarūpānusandhāna*). Similarly, in the *Bhagavadgītā*, sometimes a *jñānī* is preferred as a *bhakta*. In this case, the knowledge of the non-distinctness between the God and the *atman* is eulogized. But most of the schools of *bhakti* may not like to adhere to this sort of non-dualistic metaphysical scheme. For them, *bhakti* has to be understood in terms of a mutual relation between the object of *bhakti* and the *bhakta*. These two components of *bhakti* are bonded in terms of an emotional relationship. Thus, *bhakti* implies a sense of emotional dependence of man on God. In this case, emotion overtakes reason. Thus the path of *bhakti* is opposed to the non-emotional path of the *yoga* and the self-realization of the Advaitins. It is no wonder that Panini interprets *bhakti* in terms of a mental/emotional state (*bhāva*). This, perhaps, facilitates the bonding together of dramaturgy and religion. In Indian theories of dramaturgy and aesthetics, *bhāva* (the emotional state) plays a central role. *Nātaya Śāstra* of Bharata, the first extant work on dramaturgy, develops the theory of *rasa* (aesthetic or dramatic relish) on the superstructure of the human capacity to experience and transform emotion to a sublime level. In this case, the shifting of the reality from the empirical world to the imaginary level of drama is highlighted. Thus, a system like Gauḍīya Vaiṣnavism does not find it incongruent to develop a theory of *bhakti* in terms of the divine drama. Here, the emotional state of intense love provides the connecting link. Understanding *bakti* in terms of love, however, is not a novel idea. Right from Nārada to the Vedāntin Vaiṣnavas, everyone has projected *bhakti* as a kind of love. Vallabha, the famous Vedāntin

Vaiṣṇava, while dichotomizing *bhakti* in terms of *puṣṭi mārga* and *maryādā mārga*, asserts the supremacy of the former, as it is associated with love for God (in his case, it is *Kṛṣṇa*). Nimbārka, another Vedāntin Vaiṣṇava, enriches the concept of *bhakti* with the introduction of the idea of the *mādhurya pradhāna bhakti* (the sweeter aspect of love of God) and contrasts it with the *aiśvarya pradhāna bhakti* (the glorious aspect of God). Even Rāmānujācārya, despite being a monist, does not escape the trap of emotion and defines *bhakti* as (*sneha purvam anūdhyānam*) some sort of love-based theory. So, the concept of love has always played a vital role in the Vaiṣṇavic theory of *bhakti*. But Śri Caitanya changed the connotation of love by his emphasis on *prema bhakti*. It is a form of heightened emotionalism in which the devotee not only expresses his love for God but also plays a role in the divine drama of *Kṛṣṇa* as narrated in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. The role is that of a real person; and the role model either may be *Rādhā*, His beloved or that of any of her young companions, equally pining for *Kṛṣṇa*, the skillful lover. Naturally, the focus shifts from the matured and wise philosopher of the *Bhāgavadgītā* to the adolescent, playful and amorous *Kṛṣṇa*, as depicted in *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. Thus, the ground is prepared for a dramatic perception of a religion based on the *bhāva* (emotional state) centred on the *śrngara rasa* (the erotic emotion of love).

Śri Caitanya did not have any written work to his credit. He left the task of providing the metaphysical basis of this new theory to his followers, Sanātana and Rūpa Gosvāmīns. While Caitanya continued with his religious mission at Purī, the land of Lord Jagannātha, his followers made Vṛidāvana the centre of their activity. These two Gosvāmīns, along with Jīva Gosvāmī, successfully worked out a religio-metaphysical system popularly known as Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism. In a certain sense, the task assigned to these Gosvāmīns was quite tough. They had not only to etch out a metaphysical system but also to develop it in consonance with dramaturgy and aesthetics. In this respect, Rūpa Gosvāmī deserves full credit for transforming a theory of *bhakti* into a unique theory of aesthetics, unparalleled in many respects. Rūpa and Sanātana were successful in shifting the focus from the real world to the divine world conceived in terms of the dramatic world of the *Kṛṣṇa*. This technique of shifting from the social reality to the religious

reality based on the dramatic experience is known as *Rāgānugā Bhakti Sādhanā*.

The author, due to obvious reasons, devotes the first three chapters of this book to the explication of the religio-aesthetic basis of the *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā*. The transformation of the Indian theory of *rasa* expounded by Bharata, Abhinava Gupta and Bhoja to a religious theory of *bhakti rasa* makes an interesting study. The author never falters in providing a most lucid exposition of a very technical theory, often comparing notes with the contemporary dramaturgy of the Russian dramatist and aesthetician, Constantin Stanislavjski. His theory of 'depersonalization' and 'reincarnation' provide David L. Haberman enough justification to prove the validity of human access to the world of the divine drama. So, those interested in the theoretical structure of such a unique religious movement may find the first three chapters an invigorating experience. The rest of the chapters make a study of the practical and the technical dimension of the theory.

In the introductory chapter, the author prepares the way for justifying the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavic theory of the religious experience as a form of cosmic drama and also the possibility of such an experience through the technique called *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā*. This theory preaches the possibility of accessing the divine world on the part of a devotee via role enactment. Such role enactment requires an individual to shed the role performed in the natural social order and realize his real identity through an imitation of the paradigmatic role model from the drama of *Kṛṣṇa*. Does not the entire conception appear to be a religious frenzy bordering on schizophrenia? The author tries to prove that there is nothing abnormal about such transference of existence in another world, as well as 'role enactment', with the help of the contemporary anthropologist Arnold Gehen's theory of 'world-openness'. The theory suggests that human experience cannot be pinned down to the world in which he is born. Man's instinctive capacity allows him to occupy a place in plurality of possible worlds. Out of these multitude possible worlds, he has to choose the favoured world. In case of the Caitanite Vaiṣṇavas, it is the world of the religious reality. In this context, Haberman applies the theories of socio-psychologists like Alfred Schutz, Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Theodore R. Sarbin to

postulate that each possible society is a form of drama and each individual has a role in it. The role is determined by the role models or the paradigmatic individuals (or the 'significant others') that the actors are supposed to emulate. This new way of looking at the construction of a social reality is used by the author to extend it to the case of religious reality. Human beings as *homo religious*—the author argues—have a natural inclination to be dissatisfied with the empirical reality and a thirst for a perfect religious reality that stands qualitatively above all others. Now empowered with the capability of choosing from the multitude of possible worlds, human beings can naturally enter this much-coveted religious reality. This possibility of entering the new reality is structured on the possibility of shifting the roles and assuming a new identity. This requires a technique. *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā* stands for such a technique. In case of this new technique, such a shifting of role is the entry ticket to the religious reality of *Kṛṣṇa*'s sport. It is presupposed that with such a transference of roles, the social identity of a man gradually recedes to give way to a new identity that the Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavas call the *siddha rūpa*. But how is such shifting of roles and depersonalization possible? To justify the viability of the technique, the author takes the help of the method developed by the famous dramatist philosopher Constantin Stanvilavski. According to him, depersonalization and transference of role on the part of an individual actor are the clues to the perfect form of drama. The author uses this theory of drama to justify the Vaiṣṇavic presupposition that each individual has the potentiality to play a perfect role in the divine drama of *Kṛṣṇa*.

The second chapter deals with the famous Indian theories of aesthetics developed by Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Bhaṭṭa Lollata and Abhinavagupta. Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* is taken as a model of religious aesthetics. This model is further strengthened by Bhoja's theory of *sṛngara* as the final *rasa*. In this context, Bharata' enlisting of eight possible *rasas* and Abhinavagupta's addition of the ninth *rasa* in the form of *śānta rasa* (the state of tranquility) is of particular interest. It was Abhinavagupta who raised the status of the ordinary dramaturgy to the level of philosophy by structuring it in terms of his monistic position.

The third chapter, in a sense, is the most important portion of this book. Here the author very cogently analyzes Rūpa Gosvāmin's attempts to apply the theory of aesthetics to the religious experience in terms of *bhakti*. Rūpa Gosvāmi very innovatively transforms the *rasa* theory into a new theory centred on *bhakti rasa*. The theory of mundane drama is transformed into the divine drama without any trace of incongruity. This task is achieved through the recognition of *bhakti* as a *rasa*. Neither Bharata nor Abhinavagupta, included *bhakti* in the list of the accredited *rasas*. Abhinavagupta, of course, mentions *bhakti*, but it is seen as a part of the *śānta rasa*. So, Rūpa relies on Vāpa Deva's *muktāphala* to prove the independence of *bhakti* as a *rasa*. In the Vaiṣṇava metaphysical scheme, bliss was already accepted as an inherent aspect of the highest reality. Of the three aspects of God as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, the third power, viz., *ānanda* (bliss), renamed as the *hlādinī śakti*, is offered the highest status. Rūpa asserts that this power of the Lord is manifested in the form of love (*rati*). So, Rupa finds no difficulty in explicating the divine play of *Kṛṣṇa* in terms of *bhakti rasa*, which is now understood in terms of *sṛngara* and *rati* (in their case, *Kṛṣṇa rati*). To experience the *bhakti rasa*, the *bhakta* has to transport himself to the world of the religious reality. In this transformed world, *Kṛṣṇa* becomes the hero and the *bhaktas* directly take a role that effectively displays his relation to *Kṛṣṇa* in terms of love. Thus, religion becomes a drama and acting a way of salvation.

Rūpa Gosvami's innovation does not end here. He tries to add a new connotation to the very concept of drama. Abhinavagupta was concerned with the staged drama, Rūpa was concerned with the divine drama on which the curtain never falls. Besides, in Indian theories of aesthetics, primacy is attached to the spectator, but Rūpa shifts the point of emphasis. In case of Abhinavagupta, the focus is on the spectator but for Rūpa, *rasa* is not the passive experience of the spectator, but the active participation of the actor. It is the actor who is in the most favourable position to enter into the dramatic world and experience the emotion that he portrays. Another important aspect of Abhinavagupta's theory is the temporality of the highest experience. According to him, the spectator can be transported to the level of experiencing the *Brahman*. This is what is known as the *Brahmāsvāda*. But this state is

temporary. This is what makes the dramatic experience distinct from the *mokṣa* experience of a *yogī*. But for Rūpa, this experience is continuous and never ends. When the entire cosmos becomes a stage, the actors participating in the drama enjoy the bliss permanently. But the most important distinction between Abhinava's and Rūpa's theory can be noted in their respective metaphysical positions. Abhinava was a monist. So self-realization means a total identity between the *jīvatman* and the *Brahman*. Rūpa was a dualist, so he highlighted the duality between the *bhakta* and God, for no drama could be conceived with only one actor on the stage.

To understand the true implications of *bhakti* as a form of drama, there is a need to analyze the Vaisnavic conception of *bhakti*, *bhakta* and *kṛṣṇalilā*. To build a bridge between the theory and practice, one has to delve deeper in to the nature of the participants and the role they are supposed to enact. So, in the fourth chapter, the author scans the literature of Sanātana Gosvāmī to offer the readers a glimpse of the theory of *kṛṣṇa bhakti*. One of the basic presuppositions of the Gaudīya Vaisnavism is that the ultimate reality is not an abstract principle like the *Brahman* of the *Upaniṣads*. It is the adolescent and playful *Kṛṣṇa* whose true form is revealed in the shape of a cosmic drama. Here, the word drama is not taken as a divine allegory but a religious history. In this drama, *Kṛṣṇa* is an actor and his relationship with other actors is a relationship of emotion. No emotional bonding is possible if the ultimate reality is conceived as a detached and majestic personality. This has to be relationship based on the intimate and sweet relation of love. With this emotion as the basis, Sanātana Gosvāmī in his *Bṛhad Bhagavātmṛta* tries to prepare a graded list of *bhakti*, based on the nature of the relationship between the God and the role models. In this scheme, the relation of servitude is placed on the lowest rung and the amorous attachment is deemed to be the highest. Again, in the sphere of amorous attachment, adulterous love (*parakīyā*) is given a higher status than the conjugal love (*svavīyā*). So, the most exalted role models are the adolescent cowgirls of *Vraja*. Married to others, they risk all to meet their beloved *Kṛṣṇa* to please him in the act of total love.

The fifth chapter enunciates the process of entering the cosmic drama. How does one enter the cosmic drama? The Gaudīya Vaisnavas claim

that the path of *Rāgānugā bhakti* is the only entrance path to the stage. It not only suggests the emulation of role models but also identifying oneself with the role. This can be justified by looking at the principles of role enactment in a drama. Here, the author justifies the method by referring to the theory of Stanislavski. He discovered that there could be an inherent relationship between the external behaviour of an actor and internal feeling. So, Stanislavski comes out with a very striking theory that challenges Freud's presupposition that it is the subconscious that determines our conscious behavioural pattern. Stanislavski would rather say that the actor's physical enactment on the stage transforms his internal feeling that ultimately allows the actor to identify with the character in the mental plane. In other words, it is the conscious level that finally shapes our subconscious level. Very much like Stanislavski, Rūpa believes that by following the *anubhāba*, i.e. the physical behaviour of the character, one can attain a new identity and come to inhabit the world of the religious reality (in case of these Vaisnavas, it is the *Vrajaloka*, the location of *Kṛṣṇa*'s love play). This imitation of the ways of *Vrajaloka* is *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā*. In Rūpa's estimation it is a form of the imitation of the *rāgātmika bhakti* that is displayed in the original *Vrajaloka*. It may be the imitation of amorous relation of the *gopīs* (the cowherd maidens) or that of the other characters of the *Vraja*. But in any case, it is the total absorption of the feelings (*āveśa*) on the part of the actors. Stanislavski prefers to call it 'reincarnation'. But the parallelism between the staged drama and the divine drama seems to end here. As per Stanislavski, the actor is temporarily engaged in such a process of reincarnation, so the actor never loses sight of his social identity. But in case of Gaudīya Vaisnavism, it is rather the forgetfulness of the old self that is taken as the most vital goal. This is called *siddha rūpa*. In this state, the individual loses his old identity and rediscovers his true identity in the world of religion and spirituality. So, in the correct sense of the term, *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā* does not simply imply the imitation of the role models but something more than that. In this context, the author throws some light on a debatable issue that concerns the nature of the paradigmatic role—should *Rādhā* be the paradigmatic character to be emulated or should it be the *sakhīs* (young friends of *Rādhā*), who

are more interested in the vicarious satisfaction rather than direct enjoyment of *Kṛṣṇa*'s love? Most of the theorists favour the latter.

The sixth and the seventh chapter mostly deal with the practical dimensions of this dramatic mode of *bhakti* that includes different forms of contemplation and different forms of rituals associated with *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā*. One of the issues discussed in this context is of special interest. It is about the modalities of the role enactment. Should the imitation be confined to mental plane or should it also be extended to the physical plane such as dressing up and behaving like the characters of *gopis*? One of the central instructions of *Rāgānugā bhakti sādhanā* states that: 'The one desirous of attaining one of the states of emotional states of the *Vrajaloka* (the world of Vraja) should do the performative acts of service in a manner which imitates *Vrajaloka* with both the perfected body (*siddha rūpa*) and the practitioner's body (*sādhaka rūpa*)'. Thus, some type of imitation is intended even with the physical body (*sādhaka rūpa*). The author scans different literature of the Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavas and seems to conclude with Viśvanātha Cakravarti that the *sādhaka rūpa* should not mean the imitation of the *gopis* but the imitation of *sādhakas* like Sanātana Gosvamī and others, in the physical plane.

The concluding chapter also deserves to be studied with interest. Here, David L. Haberman presents a comparative model with reference to three other religious traditions that are also based on the conception of drama and the imitation of role models, viz., Cistercian Christianity, Theravada Buddhism and the religion of the Sioux Visionary Black Elk. The author very insightfully brings out the commonalities of all these models.

The book also includes translation of relevant portions from Rūpa Gosvamī's *Bhakti Rasāmṛta Sindhu* and also the *Asta-Kāliya-Lila-Smaraṇa-Maṅgala-Strotram* for direct acquaintance of the readers with the theory and practice of a method of *bhakti*. The foreword by Edward C. Dimock Jr., a well-known name in the field of Vaiṣṇavic scholarship, adds to the flavour of this interesting work.

This book, primarily written for the Western readers is likely to impress the Indian readers too, especially those who have not bothered to understand the true implications of the *bhakti* theories. Haberman's

way of presentation is likely to glide the readers through the journey to a new and fascinating world of religious reality. The only thing that somehow appears jarring to Indian ears is the frequent use of the word 'south Asian' while referring to classical Indian theories of aesthetics and religion. Is the term 'Indian' so alien to the Western readers that it has to be replaced by the term 'South Asian'? Excepting such trifle matters, the book, in every respect, is a highly interesting work.

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Books Received

1. John Chathanatt, S.J. Gandhi and Gutierrez: *Two Paradigms of Liberative Transformation*, Decent Books, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 284, Rs 450.
2. C.V. Williams: *Jiddu Krishnamurti, World Philosophers (1895–1986) His Life and Thought*, M.L.B.D., Delhi, 2004, pp. 581, Rs. 495.
3. Piotr Balcerowicz and Marek Mejor: *Essays in Indian Philosophy Religion and Literature*, M.L.B.D. Delhi, 2004, pp. 510, Rs. 895.
4. Daya Krishna: *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 430, Rs. 450.
5. Daya Krishna: *Nyāya Sūtras—A New Commentary on an Old Text*, Satguru Publication/India Book Centre, Delhi, 2004, pp. 308, Rs. 500.
6. Sangeetha Menon: *Science and Beyond: Cosmology, Consciousness and Technology in the Indian Tradition*, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, 2004, pp. 338, Rs. 350.
7. Sweta Prajapati: *Influence of Nyāya Philosophy on Sanskrit Poetics*, Paramamitra Prakashan, Delhi, 1998, pp. 272, Rs. 400.
8. Ajai R. Singh and Shakuntla A. Singh: *Psychiatry, Science, Religion and Health*, Mens Sana Research Foundation, Mumbai, pp. 112, Rs. 200.
9. Baidyanath Saraswati: *Voice of Death*, D.K. Printworld, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 226, Rs. 400.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ   ā
ई   ī
ऊ   ū
ए,ऐ ē } (long)
ओ   ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the
          particular syllables in Dravidic
          languages.)
ऋ   ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely
          figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(˙) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ   ṅ
ञ   ñ
ण   ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(:) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च   ca and not cha
छ   cha and not chha

Linguals

ट   ṭa
ठ   ṭha
ड   ḍa
ढ   ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श   śa
ष   ṣa
स   sa

Unclassified

ळ   ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ   ḷr and not ḷri
     General Examples
     kṣamā and not *kshamā*, *jñāna* and not
     djñāna, *Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru
     chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc.
     etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*,
     (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific)*
characters

ன   ḷ
ழ   ḻ
ற   ṉ
ந   ṟ
     Examples
     Ilaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḻa (and not Choḷa),

Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṉ etc.

Miscellaneous
Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is
clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa
    Also, for English words showing similar
or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or
pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-
operation
    For the Simhalese, excepting where the
words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of
rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be
followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*
    Quotations from old Indian sources
involving long passages, complete verses etc.,
should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render
these in Roman script if they wish; these will
be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the
editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in
Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-
viccheda* (disjoining), following the
conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the
signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the
citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names
These are to be diacriticised, excepting the
anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī,
Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tilevalli etc., but Allahabad
(not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā),
Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations
There will not be footnotes; but annotations
(or notes and references), serially arranged,
will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in
each article.

References to published works
Those pertaining to articles, books etc.,
appearing in the main body of the text, or
annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with
his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the
name of the series (if it appears within it);
next the place of publication along with year
of publication, but without a comma in
between; finally the page (or pages) from
where the citation is taken or to which a
reference is made.