Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research Vol. XXII No. 1 January - March, 2005

ISSN 0970-7794

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor : DAYA KRISHNA
Associate Editor : R.C. PRADHAN

Volume XXII Number 1
January - March
2005

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

Volume XXII
Number 1
January–March
2005

Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Darshan Bhawan
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, Mehrauli-Badarpur Road
New Delhi 110 062, India

Articles published in this Journal are indexed in the *Philosophers' Index*, USA.

Typeset by Print Services, New Delhi 110 024
Printed in India
at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd., Noida 201 301
and published by Member-Secretary
for Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Darshan Bhawan
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area
Mehrauli-Badarpur Road, New Delhi 110 062

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DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas

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The present paper is an attempt to compare and contrast the philosophical quests of Jacques Derrida (1930 to October 9, 2004) and Jürgen Habermas (I.. 1929–). The unlikely comparison between Derrida and Habermas faces two-fold important questions: Can the self-proclaimed 'philosopher deconstructor' and the 'universal pragmatist' have the richness of potential in their philosophical programs, and is the comparison really a sharing of space between the covers? What is striking about their individual quests and thus about sharing of space, though perhaps not to some who have long been of this view, and thus could not countenance this as a comparison, is that they seem to have as much in common as they have separating them. It may be pointed out at the outset that what Habermas sees as a 'program of action', Derrida understands it as an 'ideal'. By this, we can understand that for Habermas communication, to anticipate a later discussion, is never wholly one sided; it involves the necessity of a mutual recognition and the procedural mechanisms of communicative action. While Derrida, in deconstructing the terms, identifies its logocentric roots.

However, such a difference can itself be deconstructed when we consider the normative justification for communicative action. To substantiate this point, we can take the example of Habermas' roots in Kantian deontological ethics. Both Kant's 'duty for the sake of duty' and Habermas' communicative action as a predicate of the democratic norms are based in reason as the framework of recognition. Habermas' aim is to realize the ideal speech—situation, a moment that is characterized by undistorted communication. Yet elsewhere, Habermas himself has recognized the abstract and other-worldliness of such an

ideal, couching it in terms of a thought experiment, or fictional idealization, 'a methodological fiction in order to obtain a foil against which the substratum of *unavoidable* societal complexity becomes visible. The idea then allows us a model of pure communicative socialization.'[1]

Both Derrida and Habermas have developed the philosophical schools of the much broader philosophical movement known as 'Postmodernity'. Other such schools are structuralism of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, the cultural semiologist Ronald Barthes, the psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan, the post-structuralist Michel Foucault, besides Richard Rorty, Lyotard, Levinas, including other critical theorists like Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. These representatives of postmodernity, each in his own way, have attempted to go ahead of Kant and Hegel, either by offering an amendation to Kantianism and Hegelianism or by making Kant and Hegel relevant in the changed intellectual climate in Europe and America. In this context, both Derrida and Habermas can certainly be included as contributing to an unfinished project of European modernity. Both have stated and are still stating, or at least reliant on the notions of transcendence as part of a decidedly unending quest of modernity, whether it is termed *the democracy to come* or *the ideal speech situation*. While this itself is not an issue here, what it means is that despite mutual differences between Derrida and Habermas, they share the same flaw/gap/margin of modernity. To substantiate this point, I propose to mention in brief some of the founders of European identity along with the central and the marginal issues in their philosophical quests.

The central issues of modern Europe could be identified in terms of ideology, scientific and technological development, logocentrism, foundationalism, essentialism and teleology, unified world order, rationality, conceptions of morality and justice, secularism, human rights, democracy, freedom, capitalism, etc. At the margins of European identity, we find that Europe has shrunk into finite propositions in terms of anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism and anti-teleology, fragmentation, irrationality and plurality of ethnic identities, linguistic identities, etc.

It was the period of sixteenth to seventeenth century, that European society underwent that crucial change, which marked the transition from tradition to modernity. It was the period when the centre shifted from religion and revelation to science and human rationality. With this separation, the European Middle Age entered into the New Age (*Neuzeit*). We have a long list of philosophers who are the founders of modern European Identity. They are Descartes, Bacon, Galileo, Newton, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Comte and so on. These philosophers radically liberated traditional thinking from the authority of the Church and highlighted the role of independent and rational thinking based on the achievements in science. The basic philosophical quests in modernism are that 'man can be interpreter of nature' (Bacon), 'an observer of the universe through an instrument such as the telescope and the mathematical foundation of the physical world' (Cartesian-Galilean mechanics), 'universal law of gravitation' (Newton), 'understanding makes nature' (Kant), 'what is actual is rational and what is rational is actual' (Hegel), 'the point is to change the world' (Marx). In a nutshell, one can shape and control the world through science is what inaugurates the modern European identity. So, rationalism, empiricism, transcendental idealism, dialecticism, Marxism, utilitarianism, positivism, etc., are the manifestations of European identity.

Both Derrida and Habermas have developed their individual philosophic quest greatly under the influence of one or more of the central and the marginal issues of European identity. They have aimed a strong reaction not at a single philosopher, but at the entire modern European movement in philosophy. Derrida, for instance, has dubbed this reaction as 'deconstruction', '... it did indeed become the systematic rejection of the most basic premises of modern European philosophy: the celebration of the self and subjectivity, the new application of history, and most of all, the already flagging philosophical confidence in our ability to know the world as it really is. It was, in a phrase, the wholesale rejection of the transcendental pretence.'[2] In what follows, I'll first discuss Derrida's attempt to deconstruct the fundamental presuppositions of Western philosophy. Derrida has occasioned considerable confusion and misunderstanding among the enthusiasts and detractors alike, as well as some sound criticism.

Professor Jacques Derrida is one of France's most famous philosophers. He was born in a modest small town in Algeria, a Mediterranean land, endowed with abundant and a fine quality of lustre. At the age of 19, he went to France. In his long academic career, he worked at the Sorbonne and also several American universities. Derrida's ground breaking work in the 1960s and his ongoing achievements in the academic circle, specially in America, besides his constant and untiring engagements against apartheid in South Africa, supporting the dissidents in Czechoslovakia and most importantly Derrida/Habermas appeal entitled as 'Europe and the global South towards a circle of equality', specially the second war on Iraq, are some of the landmark events of his life. He is best known for his deconstruction theory, vivisecting the anatomy of a text to strip away the concealing tissue of codified signifiers to reveal what lie beneath, shorn of the semantic superstructure of the deliberate or unwitting bias, unpicking the way a text is put together in order to reveal its hidden meaning.

Jacques Derrida's deconstruction could be described as 'the revenge of language in philosophy', tracing its lineages to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, which attempted to cut away the blinkers that 'intentionality' imposed on the consciousness. Deconstruction is highly complex, not to say obscure; at its heart is the notion that each word and, by its extension, each text contains layers of meaning which have gone through cultural and historical processes.

DERRIDA'S QUEST

In an interview in Paris in 1981, Derrida has said, 'My philosophical formation owes much to the thought of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger'.[3] Derrida hails originally from the phenomenological movement of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas and it is within and around this particular framework more than anything else that his thinking has evolved. Derrida's 'deconstruction' questions such notions as the Idea of Plato, the Pure Thought of Aristotle, the *Cogito* of Descartes, the Transcendental Consciousness of Kant and the *Geist* of Hegel.

DERRIDA ON MODERN WESTERN THOUGHT

'I have never been very happy with the term "modernity". Of course, I feel that what is happening in the world today is something unique and singular. As soon, however, as we give the label of "modernity", we inscribe it in a certain historical system of evolution or progress (a notion derived from Enlightenment rationalism), which tends to blind us to the fact what confronts us today is *also* something ancient and hidden in history. I believe that what "happens" in our contemporary world and strikes us as particularly new has, in fact, an essential connection with something extremely old which has been covered over (*archidissimule*) so that the new is not so much that which occurs for the first time but that "very ancient" dimension which recurs in the "very modern"; and which indeed has been signified repetitively throughout our historical tradition, in Greece and in Rome, in Plato, in Descartes, in Kant, etc. No matter how novel or unprecedented a modern meaning may appear, it is never exclusively *modernist* but is also and at the same time a phenomenon of *repetition*. And yet the relationship between the ancient and the modern is not simply that of the implicit and the explicit. We must avoid the temptation of supposing that what occurs today somehow pre-existed in a latent form, merely waiting to be unfolded or explicated. Such thinking also conceives history as an evolutionary development and excludes the crucial notions of rupture and mutation in history. My own conviction is that we must maintain two contradictory affirmations at the same time. On the one hand we affirm the existence or ruptures in history, and on the other we affirm that these ruptures produce gaps or faults (*failes*) in which the most hidden and forgotten archives can emerge and constantly recur and work through history ... The difference between our modes of thought does not mean that I or other 'modern' thinkers have gone beyond Plato ...'[4]

DERRIDA'S DECONSTRUCTION

With the above understanding of the history of Western thought, Derrida has this to say about deconstruction: 'A sowing that does not produce plants, but is simply infinitely repeated ... a semination that is not

insemination but dissemination, seed spilled in vain, an emission that can not return to its origins in the father.'[5] In *Positions*, he remarks, 'In the final analysis, dissemination means nothing and cannot be reassembled into a definition...'[6] and, therefore, deconstruction is not a theory, not a position, not a critique, not a technique, 'not a method and cannot be transformed into one'.[7] With deconstruction, Derrida tries to transcend the binary oppositions like truth and falsehood, reality and appearance, good and evil, etc. With deconstruction, Derrida dismantles these conceptual oppositions. It is the logic of *différance* that is the most operative term in Derrida's deconstruction. Richard Kearney, in a Prefatory Note on Derrida, writes, 'Derrida was working out his central notion of the irreducible structure of *différance* as it operates in human consciousness, temporality, history and above all in the fundamental and overriding activity of writing (*Lécriture*). By means of this concept of *différance*—a neologism meaning both to "**defer**" and to "**differ**"—, Derrida proposed to show how the major metaphysical definitions of Being as some timeless self-identity of presence (e.g. *logos* ...), which dominated Western philosophy from Plato to the present day, could ultimately be "deconstructed". Such deconstruction would show that in each instance, difference *precedes* presence rather than the contrary ...'[8] In *Positions*, Derrida writes, '... *différance* refers to the (active and passive) movement that consists in deferring by means of a delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving. In this sense, *différance* is not proceeded by the originally and invisible unity of a present *possibility that* I could reserve, like an expenditure that I could put off calculatedly, or for the reasons of economy. What defers presence, on the contrary, is the very basic on which presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign, its trace ...'[9]

DERRIDA AND WESTERN METAPHYSICS

Derrida developed this problematic in order to question the system of Western metaphysics as a whole. In his Exergue or 'outwork' to *Of Grammatology*, Derrida focusses attention on a triple movement of our logocentric epoch: '1. The concept of writing ... 2. The history of (the only) metaphysics, which has always assigned the origin or truth in general to the *logos*: the history of truth, of the truth of truth, (which) has always been ... the debasement of writing and its repression outside "full speech". 3. The concept of science or the scientificity of science—what has always been determined as logic.'[10]

DERRIDA AND *LOGOS*

In his celebrated works *Positions* and *Of Grammatology*, Derrida has overwhelmingly acknowledged the significant place of the *logos* in his own 'theory of sign' on many occasions. Derrida has said, 'The problematic of the sign derives from a fundamental logocentrism, a philosophy of consciousness of the originary subject'. The notion of sign occupies the central theme of Derrida's writings. In his analysis of the history of the notion of sign in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida attempts to show that '... the very concept of the sign has always depended upon, or been determined by that fundamental metaphysical opposition: the sensible and the intelligible. His various treatments of the sign work shows that the metaphysical tradition has always treated the sign as a transition or bridge between these two moments of presence. Because the sign could only function as a provisional reference between presence in the form of the object (the sensible) and the presence in the form of self-presence (the intelligible)...'[11] With the logic of *différance*, Derrida first decentres the *logos*, then he marginalizes the *logos* and finally he rejects the *logos*, 'The **sign** unites an independent "representation" and "intuition", in other words, a concept (signified) and a sensory perception (signifier),'[12] but in logocentric systems, Derrida charges, there is a kind of 'separation' or 'disjoining' which, by dislocating the 'intuition', opens the space and plays off signification.

Derrida, in fact, takes up a Kantian project—to show how the atemporally true can be contained in a spatio-temporal vehicle, regularize the relation between man and what man seeks by exhibiting its 'structure', freezing the historical process of successive reinterpretations by exhibiting the structure of all possible interpretation.

DERRIDA ON WRITING

Richard Rorty says, 'Writing is an unfortunate necessity; what is really wanted is to show, to demonstrate, to point out, to exhibit, to make

one's interlocutor stand and gaze before the world. The copy theory of ideas, the spectator theory of knowledge, the notion that "**understanding representation**" is the heart of philosophy, are expressions of this need to substitute an epiphany for a text, to "see through" representation.'[13] Let us consider this passage:

> There is, therefore, good and bad writing: the good and natural is the divine inscription in the heart and the soul; the perverse and artful is technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body. A modification well within the Platonic diagram: writing of the soul and of the body, writing of the interior and of the exterior, writing of conscience and of the passions, as there is a voice of the soul and a voice of the body .... The good writing has therefore always been comprehended. Comprehended as that which had to be comprehended: within a nature or a natural law, created or not, but first thought within an eternal presence. Comprehended, therefore within a totality, and enveloped in a volume or a book. The idea of the book is the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier. This totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified pre-exists it, in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing .... If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall say that the destruction of the book as it is now underway in all domains, denudes the surface of the text.[14]

DERRIDA ON LANGUAGE AND WORLD

What is the relation between the language and the world? Derrida does not come right out:

> 'To this one can only reiterate that Derrida is in the same situation in regard to language that many of us secularists in regard to God. It isn't that we believe in God, or don't believe in God, or have suspended judgement about God. It isn't that we know that God is a cognitively meaningless expression, or that it has a role in a language-game other than the fact stating, or whatever. We just regret the fact that the word is used so much. So is this the case for Derrida with the vocabulary of Kantian philosophy. His attitude towards centuries of worry about the relation between subject and object, representation and the real, is like the Enlightenment attitude toward centuries of worry about the relation between **God, man, faith and reason**.'[15]

At the end, we can say that although Derrida has an intense distrust of metaphysics, yet he has made an important contribution to European identity. For Derrida, the job of philosophy is not to account for a system, but to deconstruct it. In deconstructing the presuppositions of Western philosophy, Derrida offers a serious and constructive counter nomenclature.

Professor Jürgen Habermas belongs to the second generation of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, founded at Frankfurt in Germany in 1923. The critical theory of the postmodern philosophy is the most important reaction to Kantianism and Hegelianism. Its advocates, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas, attempt to go ahead of the 'closed', 'systemic' thinking of Kant and Hegel. It is the first criticism of modern science and enlightenment rationality. Adorno and Horkheimer attempt to lay out, 'The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism'.[16] Adorno's 'negative dialectics' or the 'immanent criticism' or the 'critical theory' is neither a 'pure scientific theory' nor a 'pure philosophy'. Critical theory is located 'between philosophy and science'. This makes the critical theory as negative dialectics, which sets out not only to describe but also to vigorously criticize the existing social norms without recourse to either the fundamental concept of the enlightenment rationality (i.e. reason, freedom, truth) or the value-free model of science. With these clarifications, I shall come to Habermas.

The range of Habermas' theorizing is extraordinary. He deals with most of the themes developed by earlier critical theorists, including epistemological questions raised by Adorno. In addition, he has sought to achieve a thorough going synthesis of developments in social science and philosophy, including analytical philosophy, the philosophy of science, linguistics, political science and systems theory. In 1969, George Lichtheim, one of the most perceptive commentators on European cultural life, wrote about Habermas, 'It is not easy to assess the work

of a scholar whose professional competence extends from the logic of science to the sociology of knowledge, by way of Marx, Hegel and the more recondite sources of the European metaphysical tradition ... (At) an age when most of his colleagues have painfully established control over one corner of the field, he has made himself master of the whole, in depth and breadth alike. There is no corner-cutting, no facile evasion of difficulties or squires enunciation of conclusions unsupported by research: whether he is refuting Popper, dissecting the pragmatism of Charles Peirce, delving into the medieval antecedents of Schelling's metaphysics, or bringing Marxist sociology up to date, there is always the same uncanny mastery of the sources, joined to an enviable talent for clarifying intricate logical puzzles. He seems to have been born with a faculty for digesting the toughest kind of material and the refashioning it into orderly wholes.'

Habermas was 40 years of age and already recognized as a leading younger social theorist in post-war Germany. The most striking and impressive feature of Habermas' approach to the range and complexities of human inquiry is the way in which he weaves whatever he analyzes into coherent *whole*. There is a *unity* of vision that informs his work. To this extent, he is greatly under the influence of Marx, the young Hegelians, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte and Kant. Even before Habermas became fully aware of the critical theory of the 1930s, he was recreating the experience and pathway followed by Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School. Recalling these intellectually formative years, Habermas has written, 'In retrospect, I sometimes have the impression that a student can recreate a segment of the critical theory of the 1930s, if he systematically works his way from Kant through Hegel, including Schelling, and approaches Marx via Lukács.'[17]

HABERMAS' QUEST

In *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968 and English edition in 1971), Habermas outlines his first systematic philosophical exposition. His major theses were succinctly summarized in the inaugural address he gave at Frankfurt University (published as an Appendix to the book). In the Preface, Habermas announced, 'I am undertaking a historically

oriented attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing the connections of knowledge and human interest. In following the process of dissolution of epistemology, which has left the philosophy of science in its place, one makes one's way over abandoned stages of reflection. Retreating this path from the perspective that looks back towards the point of departure may help to recover the forgotten experience of reflection. That we disavow reflection is positivism.'[18]

HABERMAS AND POSITIVISM

By 1968, the positivist tradition, from August Compte to logical positivist like A.J. Ayer, was already under severe attack. But one cannot underestimate the extent to which the positivistic thinking pervaded and dominated the intellectual and cultural life. Habermas, in this context, is speaking of 'positivism' in a broad encompassing manner. He wants to identify the tendency to which many philosophical schools have contributed. This formulation is very close to issues that preoccupied thinkers of different philosophical positions. He has advanced a provocative interpretation of a movement of thought that encompassed Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Dilthey, Peirce, Nietzsche, Compte and Freud. But I would like to emphasize the point that at the roots of Habermas' philosophical formulations to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism, there lies an essentially Kantian paradigm of 'reason'.

HABERMAS AND KANT

Habermas has derived from Kant that 'reason is self-reflective' or 'the self-reflection of reason upon the conditions of its employment'. This is the thrust of Kant's *Critiques*, where 'pure reason' can self-reflexively come to grasp the universal and necessary conditions for the very possibility of theoretical knowledge, i.e. synthetic *a priori* proposition; 'practical reason' can give rise to categorical imperatives and 'judgement' can provide aesthetic judgements. Further, the 'critique' is the self-critique of reason where reason is both the subject and the object of critique. This is the emancipatory sense of self-critique and self-

reflection. This concept could be further elaborated with the help of Kant's article 'Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' The attempt to get rid of 'self-imposed immaturity' is both self-critique and self-reflection with the aim to attain emancipation. Emancipatory self-reflection is dependent on giving a rational reconstruction of the universal conditions for reason. To use the Kantian analogy, only when we understand the possibility, validity and limit of theoretical knowledge and the categorical imperatives does it become intelligible to specify what must be done to attain autonomy and emancipation.

The nature and status of human mind, divided into three distinct faculties—pure reason, practical reason and judgement—was essentially Kantian and remained Kantian from historical perspective. Post Kantian philosophers, especially Hegel, have resolved, once and for all, the Kantian distinction.

HABERMAS AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT RATIONALITY

Late Dr Paulos Mar Gregorios, in one of his lectures, has this to say: The basic thing about European enlightenment is an attempt to totally undermine the feudal system and to give a rationale to the new bourgeoisie that is where the enlightenment begins. Bourgeoisie was a new class of people comprising artisans, craftsmen, traders and others, just coming out around the seventeenth century as a result of the economic and social development. They wanted in the first place to overthrow feudalism and to establish a new philosophical justification for the new class. The class is the new bourgeoisie—the citizens. In doing so, one thing became very clear as a historical fact. The old feudal system was so integrally related to the religion and it was very clear that as long as religion and feudal system work together, any attack on feudal system would not work. So, in the European enlightenment, it was decided that religion as such should be omitted. Even in the French Revolution, there were some people who were 'deists', believing that God started the whole thing, then He went away and everything goes on in accordance with the natural laws, i.e. deists. Even Voltaire was like that. But others were strongly convinced that you couldn't defeat feudalism unless you defeated the religion. The best example of that is Heinrich Heinz, the great German poet and

writer. He said that in France, you are able to beat religion but in Germany we are not because religion is so deeply rooted and unless we defeat this religious entrenchment, we cannot begin our task. This was one side of it. Voltaire was also influenced by the idea that religion was a reactionary force. Nehru himself was partly of the same point of view that religion was an obstacle to progress. If you want progress, not only should you attack religion but also put it aside.

Until enlightenment, the integrating intellectual principle was the belief in God. It was in theology that all human problems in experience were integrated. Now the enlightenment threw out that integrating principle—the religion as the matrix of thought process. In that place, enlightenment put the human reason which could integrate everything. This was the basic change which European enlightenment brought. I myself do not subscribe to that theology as integrating element. But once you subscribe to enlightenment reason, you find that the integrating principle does not work fully. So you divide 'experience' into three compartments—science, ethics and art. In the new enlightenment thinking, technically, it is human reason that reconciles the three. But that integration is very flimsy. It does not have adequate foundation. Immanuel Kant particularly was the one who was trying to distinguish between three kinds of reason—pure reason, practical reason and the judgement. In the one, you know the things (phenomena); in the other, you know how to act; in the third, you have to discern what is good. By making this separation, he held on the 'idea of reason', which was already divided in three compartments. European enlightenment has this problem that 'reason' as such is not able to fulfil the task of integrating everything. But the enlightenment was able to assert on the 'autonomy' and 'adulthood' (maturity). According to the evolutionary ideology, which was going through that time, humanity has been developing into three phases; of which one is the religious stage, the second stage is metaphysics. These two stages are the stages of 'immaturity' of humanity. Humanity becomes 'mature' when its knowledge becomes 'scientific' which is the third stage. Science is the mature form of human dealing with reality. Both religion and metaphysics belong to the 'childhood' of humanity. Maturity means repudiating religion and metaphysics. The positive thing is that it affirms

humanity. In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant wrote, 'What is Enlightenment?' In the pamphlet, he wrote, 'Enlightenment is the coming of the age of maturity, throwing away all that belongs to childhood'. And why is humanity languishing because, it does not have the 'courage' to trust its own 'reason', it is too dependent on religion and metaphysics. So, enlightenment means that a human being has to have the 'courage' to think boldly, to overthrow childishness. It was industrial revolution, which was coming out of feudal relationship and trying to affirm human autonomy. An individual's dignity, freedom and rights are affirmed in enlightenment reason. If reason has to be criticized, it has to be criticized by reason alone. That is what we mean by critical reason.[19]

HABERMAS AND HEGEL

Like Kant and Hegel, Habermas took the split between science, morals and art as the 'fundamental philosophical problem of modernity'. Habermas saw that Hegel 'solves the problem of the self-assurance of modernity too well, because the philosophy of Absolute Spirit removes all importance from its own present age ... and deprives of its calling to self-critical renewal'.[20] He saw the popularity of 'end of philosophy' thought as an over-reaction to this over-success.

HABERMAS AND THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

Habermas thought that we need not be restricted, as Horkheimer and Adorno were, to mere socio-historical forms of social criticism. He viewed Horkheimer, Adorno and Foucault as working to new versions of 'the end of philosophy' '... no matter what name it (philosophy) appears now—whether as fundamental ontology, as critique, as negative dialectic, or genealogy—these pseudonyms are by no means disguises under which the traditional (i.e. Hegelian) form of philosophy lies serves as the drapery of philosophical concepts more likely serves as the cloak, for a scantily concealed of philosophy.'[21]

Hebermas' account of such 'end of philosophy' movements is offered as part of a more sweeping history of philosophy since Kant. He thought that Kant was right to split 'reason' into science, morality and art and that Hegel was right in accepting this as 'the standard (*massgeblich*)

interpretation of modernity'.[22] He also thought that Hegel was right in believing that 'Kant does not perceive the ... formal divisions within culture ... as diremptions. Hence he ignores the need for unification that emerges with the separations evoked by the principle of subjectivity.'[23] It may be recalled that unification was the fundamental philosophical preoccupation for Hegel. In a very remarkable manner in his early fragments entitled *Glauben und wissen*, Hegel has said, 'Unification and Being (*sein*) are equivalent; the copula "is" in every proposition expresses a unification of subject and predicate, in other words, a Being.'[24] In the process of unifying the opposites, 'reason', for Hegel, touches every part of reality; 'reason' sublates the finite and its negation, so that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. Habermas agreed with Hegel that there is a 'need for unification'. He wanted to go back to Hegel and to start it again. He thought that, 'in order to avoid the disillusionment with the philosophy of subjectivity which produced Neitzsche and the two strands of post Neitzschean thought which he distinguishes and dislikes (the one leading to Foucault, and the other to Heidegger) we need to go back to the place where the young Hegel took the wrong turn; that was the place where he still held open to option of using the idea of uncoerced will formation in a communication community existing under constraints of co-operation as model for the reconciliation of a bifurcated civil society ... it was the lack of a sense of rationality as *social* that was missing from the philosophy of subject which the older Hegel exemplified from which the "end-of-philosophy" thinkers have never really escaped.'[25]

Habermas thought that the philosophical requirement that 'the philosophy of the subject' gratified is as real as it was during Hegel's own time, and can perhaps be fulfilled by his (Habermas') own focus on a 'communicative community'. With Hegel's overemphasis on the *Geist*, philosophy has become 'an isolated monastery/sanctuary' in which an individual forms an isolated order of priests untroubled by how it goes with the world. This position has certainly come from Kant's 'three-sphere' picture of culture which Hegel tries to resolve. On this latter view, Kant's attempt to deny knowledge to make room for faith (by inventing 'transcendental subjectivity' to serve as the function for the Copernican revolution) was provoked by an unnecessary worry

about the spiritual significance or insignificance of modern science, 'Like Habermas, Kant thinks that modern science has a theoretical dynamic, one which can be identified with (at least a portion of) the nature of rationality. Both think that by isolating and exhibiting his dynamic, but distinguishing it from other dynamics (e.g.) practical reason or the emancipatory interest, one can keep the results of science without thereby disenchanting the world. Kant suggested that we need not let our knowledge of the world *qua* matter in motion get in the way of our moral sense. The same suggestion was also made by Hume and Reid, but unlike these pragmatical Scotchmen, Kant thought that he had to back up this suggestion with a story which would differentiate and 'place' the three great spheres into which culture must be divided.'[26]

Despite being under the influence of Kantian paradigm, Habermas remained a critical theorist. One of Habermas' most basic and challenging thesis is that 'we cannot even make sense of the concepts of meaning, understanding and interpretation unless we rationally evaluate the validity claims that are made by participants in these forms of life. We must be able to discriminate what participants themselves count as reasons for their actions, and this requires a performative attitude on our part where we assess what "they" count as good reasons for action with reference to "our" standards of rationality.'[27] To illustrate it further, we can say that we are essentially embodied beings. We are embodied in the family—the property, language and the value systems—in the tribal community and in the ethnicity. At the same time, we are able to transcend this infrastructure and bracket all judgements of the validity claims made by participants in a form of life. It is dialectic that lies at the centre of Habermas' critical theory. Habermas says, 'A critical social science will not remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed ... thus the level of (non-reflective) consciousness which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed. Of course, to this end, a critically mediated knowledge of law cannot through reflection alone render a law itself inoperative but can render it inapplicable. The

methodological framework that determines the meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this category is established by the concept of self-reflection. The latter releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers. Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest.'[28]

Habermas' critical theory is a dialectical synthesis of the empirical-analytic and the historical–hermeneutic disciplines. It is a constant cognition and vigilant criticism and this process always goes on and never arrives at any finality. There are also issues and their criticism, further issues and further criticism; but there is no final issue and no final criticism. Habermas' synthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognitive interest: the emancipatory interest: 'This interest is at once derivative and the most fundamental cognitive interest. If we reflect upon the forms of knowledge and the disciplines guided by the technical and practical interests, we realize that they contain an internal demand for open, free, non-coercive communication. The validity of knowledge claims in empirical-analytic sciences and the historical hermeneutics disciplines always allow of further testing, challenge and rational evaluation.'[29]

Habermas agreed with Kant in the belief that there are basic structures, rules and categories presupposed by reason (Kant) and communicative action (Habermas). But he is sceptical of pure transcendental philosophy, which cannot transcend itself. Habermas takes the help from Hegelian dialectic, which can break with the legacy of pure *a priori* transcendental philosophy. It is this synthesis of Kantian *apriorism* and Hegelian dialectic that has given rise to Habermas' critical theory of communicative action.

To conclude, we can say that although the details of Habermas' communicative actions are subtl , complex and controversial, we can sketch some of its basic features; 'Communicative action is a distinctive type of social interaction—the type of action oriented to mutual understanding. It must be distinguished from other types of social action and non-social actions, which are oriented to "success", to the efficient achievement of ends. These latter action-types exhibit the form of purposive rational action where we seek to achieve an end or goal by appropriate means.'[30] Habermas elucidates '... the goal of coming

to an understanding (*Verstanding*) is to bring about an agreement (*Einverstandis*) that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord with one another. Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness."[31] All communicative action takes place with two operative terms—consensus and disagreement. Habermas argued that anyone acting communicatively must, in performing a speech action, raise *universal validity* claims, and must suppose that such claim can be vindicated. As indicated in the above quotation, there are four types of validity claims—comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness (sincerity) and normative rightness. In most empirical situations, we resolve our conflicts and disagreements with these validity claims. But there may arise a situation where validity claims can break down or be challenged by one of the participants in the communicative context. To resolve a break down in communication, Habermas proposes to have a discourse and argumentation or dialogue where we explicitly seek to warrant the validity claims that have been called into question and replace it with a new model of validity claims, which could be higher, more comprehensive than the earlier one. And that there is no dispute about a validity claim beyond rational argumentation by the participants involved.

To bring this paper to a close, we can say that Derrida has an intense distrust of metaphysics. For Derrida, the job of philosophy is not to account for a system, but to deconstruct it. In rejecting the presuppositions of Western philosophy, Derrida, however, fails to offer a serious and constructive counter hypothesis to supplant the doctrines that lie at the roots of Western metaphysics. Derrida's method of deconstruction means, like in guerrilla warfare, to attack quickly and run back, to puncture and parody, and to defuse through refusing to take a thesis seriously. The logic of *différance* has been designed to do the same function. In the context of Habermas, it may be said that he dialectically synthesizes the empirical–analytic and the historical–hermeneutical studies. It is a constant cognition and vigilant criticism and this process always goes on. Habermas takes the help of Kantian *apriorism* and Hegelian dialectic to formulate his communicative action. He has made

an effect to develop a validation criterion in communicative action. It is quite uncharacteristic to Frankfurt scholars to develop a validation criterion. The validation criterion for physical sciences is different from the validation criterion for social sciences. This is because what is actually practiced in science is different from the ideology formations.

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Moral Personhood: Natural Propensity of Man to Act Morally*

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ABSTRACT

It is argued in this paper that man is a naturally moral being. This is shown to follow from the fact that man by nature is rational as well as spiritual. By virtue of rationality, we are capable of discerning right from wrong, moral from immoral. But by simply knowing this distinction we do not do what is right and may not act morally. Moral reflection does not by itself lead to moral action. But it is shown that the link between moral reflection and moral action is, nonetheless, a logical link—weaker than logical necessity but much stronger than mere contingent relation. (The extreme claims of ethical externalism and ethical internalism are thereby refuted.)

This argument is strengthened by arguing further that our evaluation system, which consists of our capacity for moral reflection, would influence our motivation system by the exercise of our spiritual faculty, by virtue of which one *identifies* with one's value judgement and acts in accordance with it. Moral motivation is effected by spiritual endeavour.

Thus, it is shown that while rationality is necessary condition of moral personhood, spirituality is the sufficient condition thereof. And both together complete the making of moral personhood.

*Contents of this paper form part of the project on 'Ethics and Society', which I did recently as a Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

In this paper I want to argue that man is a naturally moral being, and that to be moral and to tend to act morally is as much natural for man as it is for him to be rational. As I do this, I shall use 'man' to mean the same as 'person', in the sense in which Aristotle defined man as a rational animal, and I shall ignore the rather dubious distinction, made by Locke, between man and person—the former, for him, requiring a human body for its application and the latter defined in terms of consciousness 'that makes a person'. My account of man or person in the described way will lead to the concept of *moral* personhood with the implication that man has a natural propensity to act morally unless otherwise constrained.

The theory of moral personhood that I want to present is based on the fact that morality supervenes on personhood in as much as the reality of value supervenes on the reality of consciousness. For consciousness, which essentially characterizes personhood, has two prominent aspects that define personhood in a way: rationality and spirituality. In respect of the first, i.e. rationality, man is capable of reason and reflection. And because of this feature, human consciousness necessarily contains what is called 'personal stance' that is adopted by one person towards others who, in turn, are capable of reciprocating this stance. This reciprocal personal stance is what I regard as constitutive of personhood. As Strawson implied,[1] to be a person is to treat others, who are like oneself, *as* persons. Rationality makes us recognize not only the distinction between oneself and others but also their essential interrelation; it accounts for (explains) that reciprocal personal stance, which necessarily characterizes us as persons. By virtue of spirituality, the second important aspect of human consciousness, human beings are capable of reflective self-transcendence, which is the capacity for going beyond the confines of one's own interests and recognizing values in others. Moral personhood is a necessary outcome of these two aspects, rationality and spirituality, of human consciousness. Thus, if man is rational and spiritual by nature, then it follows that man is naturally moral. It is because of this that acting morally is congenial to human nature and on the few occasions, when he refrains from morality or acts in ways contrary to moral expectations, one *does* find it *alien to one's nature and inclinations*, to say the least. In what follows, I shall spell out in some detail this fact of morality as the natural offshoot of man's rationality and spirituality.

RATIONALITY AND MORAL PERSONHOOD

Let us consider rationality in man. What exactly is involved in man's being rational and how it bears upon moral personhood? When man is said to be rational, it is meant to be so much an essential characterization of man—indeed a defining feature of him—that anybody questioning this by asking 'Why should I be rational?' would be asking an utterly improper question, because in trying to answer this question, we would be giving *reasons* for being rational! We would be presupposing *rationality*, that is, in our attempt to justify rationality. The resulting justification, whatever we may come up with, would thus be inevitably circular. It is, therefore, futile to ask for a justification for man's being rational. But this shows 'not that rationality lacks a necessary justification but that it needs no justification, because it cannot intelligibly be questioned unless it is already presupposed'.[2] All this accounts for the definition of man as a rational being. The fact that many people, in fact, are irrational or, at any rate, sometimes behave irrationally, is irrelevant to this definition. For what is meant here is that men are *capable* of rationality, that is, they are *capable* of being fully rational, though—because of factors alien to their nature—at times they may not be acting or behaving rationally. In this respect to be rational, like to know, is a capacity concept *a la* Gilbert Ryle—and hence the rational being need not always exercise the faculty of reason but *can* do so on appropriate occasions. The fact that some of us are very irrational some of the times, or even most of the times, in actual life should be absolutely unworrying. To such deviant pointers, eminently raised by Bertrand Russell, Antony Flew appropriately responded by saying that '... to be rational, in this sense of [being] capable of rationality, is not merely not inconsistent with but is a precondition of being irrational ...', very much in the same way as '... only a moral being, a being capable of morality and immorality, can be truly said to be actually immoral.'[3] We would not say of a chimpanzee—even a systematically trained one—nor of a sophisticated machine, nor of a robot endowed with what now is fashionably described as artificial intelligence, that it is

behaving irrationally, for it is incapable of behaving rationally and irrationally in the strict sense of the terms. Just as only people with a sense of logic can be said to be illogical and be properly reprimanded or criticized for being so, i.e. for not being logical which they are capable of being, only rational beings, beings with a sense of discrimination between what is reasonable and what is not, can be said to behave irrationally and be held accountable for doing so. Because of this, actions of beasts, babblers and insane adults which, though may happen to be good or bad, useful or harmful, can never be termed as rational or irrational, much less as moral or immoral, since responsibility cannot be ascribed to them and commendations or condemnations will not apply. Freedom and morality are semantically inalienable, and in the obvious lack of freedom in the described case, attribution of moral responsibility would be gratuitous.

Rationality, thus, being the presupposition of personal consciousness, reasoning is a distinctively human faculty. Reason governs our actions as well as theorizing. In other words, we all are capable, by virtue of rationality, not only of theoretic discriminations of sorts but also of judging what we should do and what we should not, what is good and right and what is not. Further, our actions governed by reason are responses made to our desires, and as Aristotle cautioned, one can respond too much or too little to one's desires. The correct response lies somewhere between the two extremes. This is the doctrine of the 'golden mean', which is a meta-ethical statement about the form of certain moral concepts; namely, to every virtue there are two distinct vices, the two extreme responses to one's desires. Reason steers clear between the two and locates the virtue.

The distinction between the two extreme responses, on the one hand, and the correct response, on the other, is the distinction between what can be called the *desired* and the *desirable*. The desirable is what one values, or what any one would vale, under all normal conditions. Being driven by passion, I may act upon a desire, e.g. to supersede a more deserving colleague which, deep within my inner self, I find alien and hostile because it is not in keeping with the dictates of reason. My being motivated by such a desire, which I really disvalue, would create for me a moral predicament, not uncommon in human history, and the

rational struggle to get over it by attaining an 'ideal consistency' between what I value and what I desire is a distinctive mark of moral personhood.[4] By acting upon the described desire, I might appear to have been free to do what I desire to do; but this would not only be an irrational but an utterly puerile view of freedom, since, far from being free, I would be really impeded from being the person I want to be if I acted upon a desire that is hostile to what I value as a rational being. A genuine moral reason derives from what we value, from what we count as desirable rather than from what we desire, from the nature of the case rather than from *our* nature. Thus, rationality of persons is inseparably connected with morality. Morality is a distinctively rational affair in the sense that moral concern is grounded on reason. This makes persons, who are constitutively rational, naturally moral and endowed with intrinsic moral worth.

The other connected feature that follows from persons being rational is evaluative consciousness, which is characteristic of personal consciousness. That means that persons are conscious of others, the world and of themselves in terms of moral and religious values. 'Those things mean to them in certain ways, as having some significance.'[5] Moral reflection, by which we engage in moral evaluation of ourselves, our actions and of those of others, is thus constitutive of personhood; for moral reflection is the activity of rational agents, and only persons are rational agents.

Moral reflection is an intellectual operation aimed at judging the moral worth of human actions and intentions. The objects of one's moral reflection may be one's own intentions and actions as well as those of others. The results of such reflections are usually expressed in the form of moral judgements. Being endowed with the capacity of reason and reflection, a person often reflects on the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, morality or immorality of his actions before actually performing these actions, in which case the actions become the proper objects of moral accountability. It is not suggested that every person, every rational being does, in fact, engage in this act of reflection *always* before doing anything he does. Quite to the contrary, moral reflection is not the same thing as moral action, nor are moral actions necessarily preceded by moral reflections. It is quite possible,

indeed often the case, that men do things which may turn out to be morally right and commendable without at all reflecting on the morality or otherwise of such actions before performing these actions. People often do such things because of their familial and societal habits and conditioning. Such unpremeditated actions, more prevalent in unsophisticated and intellectually naïve societies, are nonetheless subject to moral commendation and condemnation. A properly reflected action, however, gets a clear edge and is often more deserving, at least on the well-known principle that a Socrates dissatisfied is better than a pig satisfied. For if one simply happens to stumble on to what is a moral thing to do, one does this by a fluke without knowing that one is doing so. And when one acts in this way, one gets no, or not much, credit for this. But when one does it with proper reflection, with full knowledge of what one is doing, one gets full credit for it and one's action is more properly moral, if I am allowed this way of putting the matter. The *deserving trait* of moral reflection is further explained (evidenced) by the fact that, other conditions being fulfilled, moral reflections would lead to moral actions. However, in some cases, despite reflecting on the morality of an action X and judging that X ought to be done, a person may not do X, because the actual doing of X requires fulfilment of certain *other* conditions, besides judging that it ought to be done—conditions like absence of obstructions, external and internal, incapacity of the agent, physical, physiological and psychological, and so on. But if these other conditions are fulfilled, '... then one's judging that one ought to do X suggests that one would do it.' This is how Rajendra Prasad explains the intimate [logical, as I am inclined to argue] relation between moral reflection and moral actions.[6] However, I would very much like to think that the 'suggests' in the quotation has all the strength of 'implies'. It is rather odd that Prasad seems to underplay this crucial point; for he himself goes on to say thereafter that other conditions being fulfilled, 'we would then be surprised or disappointed if we find that one does not do what one says [read "judges", PKM] one ought to do. And *our surprise and disappointment will be more logical than psychological*'.[7] (Emphasis added.) This 'logical surprise' at one's failure to perform the moral action X, despite one's reflection that it is a moral action which one ought to perform, clearly points to

the *logical* link between moral reflection and moral action, by virtue of which people will resort to moral actions because of their moral reflection or belief unless otherwise obstructed by the nun-occurrence of the other required conditions.

What kind of 'logical' link are we talking about, it will be asked, if moral reflections do not *always* lead to moral actions? or if moral beliefs and motives for action are not *necessarily* related? To be sure, I have been talking somewhat within the confines of ethical externalism by espousing the thesis that one can accept (have the belief) that X is morally desirable and yet that this alone cannot provide the motive for doing X. The link, I suppose, can be construed as a conceptual connection, weaker than logical necessity but much stronger than contingent relation, very much in the way Evan Simpson suggested in his article 'Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics'.[8] We can say, for example, Simpson points out, that '... one kind of thing [moral actions in this case, PKM] logically depends upon another [moral reflections here, PKM] if it is logically impossible for things of the first kind *always* to occur in the absence of the second *but logically possible that the first should sometimes occur alone*.'[9] (Emphasis added.) This sort of logical relationship has also been recognized in some other areas of philosophy. Wittgenstein's notion of criterion, on which mental states are by nature expressible in physical behaviour even if they are not always so expressed, may be a fitting case. Pain is typically, though not invariably, connected with pain behaviour. I have argued elsewhere[10] that it is not at all a case of contingent relation, because though it is possible for pain to occur unaccompanied by pain behaviour, it is impossible for pain *never* to be expressed in behaviour. Remember section 142 of the *Philosophical Investigations*: 'If things were quite different from what they actually are—if there were for example no characteristic expressions of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency—this would make our normal language-games lose their point.' The [such] impossibility of massive error makes Davidson argue that 'belief in its nature is veridical', for most, if not all, of a person's beliefs must be true, although it is not a matter of necessity that any one particular belief be true. Elsewhere I have adduced a

similar view[11] that it is necessary that persons should have mental states, though it is not necessary that a person should have *this* or *that* mental state. These are instances of that important kind of relationships, which are *necessary but defeasible* but which do not, for that reason, cease to be necessary and degenerate into mere contingency. In view of this, and given the weaker sense of logical dependence sketched above, we can say that it is necessary that any one having a moral belief will *sometimes*, or quite often, be motivated to act accordingly—*not* that it is necessary that he will *always* be thus motivated. Thus, internalism fails and so does externalism. The lack of logically necessary connection between beliefs and motives, between moral reflection and moral action, should be absolutely unworrying, for *pace* externalism, the fact is that moral motivation is included in the moral beliefs of people, that moral action flows from moral reflection, if of course there are no defeating situations obstructing the actual performance of the action. Simpson again: 'It is part of making moral judgements that one is *sometimes* moved in virtue of the contents of those beliefs.'[12] All this points to the fact that men with moral beliefs are naturally inclined to act morally, and since moral reflection is the act of rational agents, persons are prone to act morally by virtue of their rationality that is constitutive of their nature.

Our natural propensity to act morally is so strong and so compelling that it is often considered an improper question to ask, 'Why act morally?' or 'Why be moral?' Besides the dubious reason (for rejecting the question as improper) that our ethical principles are by definition overridingly important,[13] the more important reason, important for the present purpose, is that this question must be rejected for the same reason that we must reject the other important question 'Why should I be rational?'[14] The question 'Why should I be rational?', I have shown above, is a logically improper question, a question that should not, rather cannot, be asked for the simple reason that in asking this question one would be questioning something (i.e. rationality) that is normally, nay logically, presupposed. Therefore, the question is really a logically improper question since, in trying to answer this one would be giving *reasons* for being rational. But is the question 'Why should I be moral?' as much improper a question as 'Why should I be rational?' To be

rational is a part of the definition of man or person. Can we say that to be moral is also a defining feature of man/person? Would the question then be taken as presupposing the very same thing (morality) it purports to question? My answer is: yes, if the 'should' in the question is taken as a moral 'should'. For, in that case, one would be asking for *moral* reasons for one's being moral, and this is absurd. However, as Singer points out, it is not necessary to interpret the question as a request for an ethical justification of ethics. The 'should' here need not mean a moral 'should'. 'Why should I act morally?' can simply be asking for reasons for one's actions without any specification about the *kind* of reasons asked for. There may be several non-ethical points of view from which we may ask for reasons for actions, e.g. self-interest, public etiquette or aesthetic considerations. And whether to act morally from considerations of ethics, self-interest, etiquette or aesthetics would be a very open question, not committed to the ethical point of view. Non-question beggingly, it is (may be interpreted as) 'a question about the ethical point of view asked from a position outside it'.[15] However, given the conception of ethics as in some sense involving a universal point of view, the question 'Why should I act morally?' would be asking for reasons for transcending self-interest and acting on universalizable principles, from the point of view of the impartial spectator or ideal observer. We thus come back here to the reciprocal personal stance, which we have seen to be constitutive of personhood as a result of the person being a rational agent. Kant is eminently noted as trying to demonstrate that to act rationally is to act ethically. Moral personhood is, thus, the direct offshoot of the person's rationality.

SPIRITUALITY AND MORAL PERSONHOOD

Let us now consider the role of spirituality in the making of moral personhood. If it is because of rationality that we adopt the reciprocal personal stance and treat others as persons as we are, it is the faculty of spirituality that endows us with the distinctive capacity of reflective self-transcendence, the capacity to rise above the ethos of self-interest and egocentricity. Unfailing moral personhood, which requires freedom from egocentricity, depends upon spiritual sustenance. Admittedly, the basic function of reason is to discern between oneself and others and

to judge egoism as ethically inferior to altruism. But as we have seen, merely judging the latter as good and valuable is not necessarily or even invariably connected with one's actually being motivated to realize this good. Merely having the valuational system, which no doubt is the essential first step towards moral personhood, is not enough to have one's motivational system oriented accordingly. One has to *identify* with the value judgement in order to be so motivated; the identification has to be typically relevant to moral motivation. And such morally relevant sort of identification is possible only when it is characterized by spirituality. For in identifying with a value judgement, 'the agent is not just emotionally attached to the judgement of value but is in spiritual accord with the judgement of value'.[16] Moral motivation is possible through spiritual endeavours.

What I want to drive home is the point that reason, unaided by spiritual endeavour, does not *eo ipso* facilitate morality or lead to moral action. In order to realize unfailing moral personhood, an agent must buttress his evaluation system with a distinctively spiritual urge for self-excelling. His motivational system must add to itself this unique urge for self-excelling, which is not intrinsic to his evaluation system. More importantly, this spiritual urge is not only extrinsic to the agent's evaluation system; it is extrinsic to rationality itself.[17] To attain unfailing moral personhood, rationality must be complimented by spirituality, both of which are distinct, though essential, aspects of personal consciousness. If we may put it this way, rationality, insofar as it promotes (is responsible for) the evaluation system in us, is the necessary condition of moral personhood whereas spirituality, insofar as it makes us *identify* with our value judgement or the moral point of view and orients our motivational system after that (our judgement of value, that is), is the sufficient condition thereof; for it, in the company of the rational faculty in us, goes on to complete the making of moral personhood.

The more important fact, which must be noted with emphasis, is that spirituality, though extrinsic to rationality, is, like rationality, not extrinsic to personhood. It is an innate potentiality which, when actualized, leads the person to excel his self-interest and egocentric ethos. To the extent to which this realization of spirituality is effected,

moral personhood gets developed in the direction of perfection. The control of our motivation system by our evaluation system can be a matter of degree, depending on the extent of this realization. The evaluation can evolve and change drastically, and moral paradigms can and do change because of this. The prevailing wisdom of a culture is a prominent source of value paradigms, which shapes our motivation after them. But to draw from this the general theoretic conclusion that moral personhood, even personhood as such, is a matter of degree and subject to gradation, as some have done,[18] is not only far-fetched but somewhat odd and counter-intuitive. Moral personhood, like personhood, is an all-or-nothing concept, and the unfolding of it through evolving value system cannot interfere with its intrinsic pristinity. Spiritual self-excelling, which makes this unfolding possible, is an innate capacity that gets realized through intellectual maturity and in response to changing cultural contents. It is by virtue of this faculty of spirituality that the person is a reflective self-evaluator. As discussed above, if rationality makes us distinguish between wanting as desiring and wanting as valuing, between *preyas* and *shreyas*, spirituality makes us alienate from the former and identify with the latter. Reflective self-appraisal involves alienating something of our common nature, which Nerlich describes as 'person-contingent features',[19] such as some specific needs and desires, moods and manners, which form the first-order features of ordinary life. The first-order desires that persons have are largely part of their human nature, which constitute their basic nature. But human beings would not be *persons* if they were to be constituted of and confined to only the basic features with which the moral beings in them refuse to identify. This is so because persons are distinguished from other beings by virtue of the fact that they are capable of having higher order intuitions and attitudes towards their first order desires from the valuational point of view. This distinctive feature, which tells a person apart from a mere human being, is what Frankfurt calls 'second-order desires'.[20] Second order desires mark the distinctive character of persons as reflective self-evaluators and it is in their ability for reflective self-evaluation that the real freedom of persons lies. For freedom consists, not in acting upon our basic desires, but in being able and willing to translate our higher order desires into actual motivations for

action. 'The free agent has the capacity to translate his values into actions; his actions flow from his evaluational system'.[21] Compulsive behaviour, like that of a kleptomaniac or of one under coercion or hypnosis, are un-free, being responses to desires that claim fulfilment independently of the agent's evaluation system. By taking resort to reflective self-appraisal, the person—the moral person—exercises his freedom and breaks away from his basic desires and inclinations, which he finds alien to his true nature and identifies with others, which he values and glorifies. He wants to be different from what he happens to be. Thus Frankfurt:

> Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are... No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second order desires.[22]

Freedom of the individual, which is the driving force of self-excellence, is the prerogative of persons. It lies at the root of the urge for moral perfectibility and goes to the making of what I have been calling unfailing moral personhood. It is in quest of freedom that the person is engaged in reflective self-evaluation and as such is an embodiment of value. It is because of his ability to be free, the ability to identify with the value judgement and motivate himself to live the life in conformity with it, that the person is able to transcend the level of mere human existence. The self-transcendence or personal self-excelling requires that the person's motivational system be controlled by his valuational system with which he identifies, his reason has to control his passion. The evaluative system that we persons have, it must be reiterated, is not and need not be static and fixed. It is a faculty we all are endowed with and each of us is capable of developing and making progress with it by exercising the freedom to expose ourselves to new and changing values and circumstances. On its part, the evaluation system can evolve and go through drastic changes, all through the exercise of our critical self-appraisal. This is how moral *progress* is possible. Moral progress is possible by moral striving and moral striving,

which aims at moral perfection (perfect moral personhood), is not just rational but also spiritual, as we have been arguing.

The conclusion to which we are drawn from the foregoing is that moral personhood is a joint offshoot of man's rationality and spirituality. As rational beings we discriminate between what is right and what is wrong, what is moral and what is immoral, what *is* and what *ought to be* (if the former happens to be what ought not to be). We distinguish between what is desired and what is desirable, between egoism and altruism, also we know that altruism is preferable and worthwhile. As spiritual beings we *identify* with the latter and alienate from the former. Because of the spiritual urge in us, we rise above self-interest* and are motivated to act morally from the universal point of view. Both these faculties combined, we are not only aware of the moral but also are motivated to *be* moral, to act morally. Rational discernment of the moral from the immoral and the spiritual urge for self-excelling put us, persons, naturally on the path of moral progress and moral perfection. Thus, moral inclination is innate to persons who are naturally or constitutively endowed with the faculties of rationality and spirituality. By virtue of this, we inherit our moral standards and engage in the process of improving these standards, replacing one (or one set of) standard(s) by another, which may be found to be better under the changing social and cultural circumstances. Our intrinsic moral sense enables us to gather the acquired abilities for improving and developing the moral standards, by living up to which we march towards moral perfection. Indeed, this is what moral philosophy is all about. 'Much of moral philosophy should be seen as just a continuation—more self-conscious and more sustained—of this project of improvement that all of us are engaged in well before we have even heard of philosophy,'[23] much in the same way as we all think and speak in accordance with the principles of logic even without our being aware of this. And that means, for a person, there cannot be any question about his having or not having any moral standards; it is only a matter of his having *this* or *that* moral standard. So, to repeat, the question 'Should I be moral?' or 'Why should I be moral?' is a logically improper question that cannot be asked without involving self-inconsistency. This fact that there is, for us, no alternative to being moral is also evident from some

compelling facts about human nature like: (1) that we all have *benevolent inclinations* that make us concerned about the welfare of others; and (2) that we all have a *natural conscience* which gives rise to the feeling of guilt when we do something we know is wrong.[24] Awareness and acceptance of ethical standards is bound to incline us to live up to them. And on Hare's persuasive account of ethics, one's acceptance of ethical standards is likely to lead one to arouse similar moral feelings in others. Ethics has the primary function of promoting values common and conducive to the members of the society, and ethical judgements do this by commending and encouraging actions in accordance with these values. Further, ethical judgements must be concerned with *motives* of (right) actions not just the rightness of the actions, *pace* Kantianism and virtue ethics, because the former is a good indicator of the tendency of an action to promote good or evil, and also because it is here that praise and blame may effectively alter the tendency of a person's actions and behaviour. It is here also that applied ethics can get a firm foothold. Praise and blame can change a man's moral evaluation (system), which is a very good means of changing his moral behaviour. In this sense, morality can be taught and our natural propensity to act morally can be properly propelled to bring about a perfect moral order. Like learning counting or knowing how to go on, morality can be taught in order that our intrinsic moral sense could be sharpened to effect unbridled, spontaneous moral actions and unfailing moral personhood.

POSTSCRIPT

However, commitment and requirement of self-consistency often may not act as enough motivation to act morally as required of moral personhood. I shall cite the remarks of two prominent philosophers of our time before I come to mild grips with them and fortify the conclusion of this paper. The first, which is stated as under, is that of Thomas Nagel:

> To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, *a dominance which is precious* in any case. (Emphasis added.)

And Nagel goes on to add with apparent indignation:

> The manner in which human beings have conducted themselves so far does not encourage optimism about the moral future of the species.[25]

With a similar note of indignation, though with less explicit desperation and pessimism, Rajendra Prasad writes:

> It can be said of most modern Indians that they censure injustice only fearing that they may be victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it.[26]

This, incidentally, is a well-known remark made by Thrasymachus about the nature of the average man in Plato's *Republic* (p. 609). I find the indignation expressed in the above quoted passages absolutely unworrying, *albeit* apparently unsettling to the general trend of this paper. For what it purports to highlight in effect is only the distinction I have drawn attention to between one's knowing to discern the moral from the immoral *and* one's identifying with the moral. As I have shown, the former is because of our rational faculty while the latter is because of the spiritual urge endemic in human nature. The few occasions, in which some people are likely to act to the contrary, display the exceptions rather than the features of normalcy. Such deviant actions and behaviour, we have seen, are hostile to our nature and from which we understandably alienate deep within our inner self; these exceptional (im)moral conducts are because of obvious extraneous factors, prominent among which are kleptomania and akratia or weakness of will, which make the subject act against his best judgement. The oft-quoted confession of Duryodhana *jānāmi dharma na ca mé pravṛtti, jānāmyadharma na ca mé nivṛtti* is a glaring case in point, too familiar and self-explanatory to create a flutter. I have argued that both these faculties of rationality and spirituality are present in us in the dispositional form and need to be made occurrent by sufficient intellectual maturity and meaningful social living, which plays an important catalytic role in the process of moral progress and perfection. Interestingly, Rajendra Prasad alludes to this in the very first essay of the cited book (p. 2). Although moral reflection may not, in some

cases, lead to moral actions, as Prasad and Nagel rightly point out, it cannot be denied that the former is intimately related to the latter. For, other conditions being fulfilled, one's judging or reflecting that one ought to do the action X would lead to one's doing X. We would be certainly surprised, even disappointed—as Prasad and Nagel seem to be—if one does not do X *despite* one's judging that one ought to do it. But, as should be quite clear from the foregoing discussion by now, this has nothing to impair my contention (indeed the fact, as I have laid bare) that man is naturally moral and is inclined to act morally by his very nature and dispositions.

Notes and References

1. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 99: 'It is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself ... that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself.'
2. Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 316.
3. *A Rational Animal* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 90.
4. For an elaborate analysis of the distinction between desiring and valuing see B.H. Barua, in *Persons, Mind and Value* ed. S.K. Mohanty (Decent Books, New Delhi in association with the Department of Special Assistance in Philosophy, Utkal University, 2000).
5. Ibid., p. 9.
6. *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality* (ICPR: New Delhi, 1989), p. 2.
7. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
8. *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 49, April 1999.
9. Op cit., p. 202. (Emphasis added.)
10. See my *Concepts and Problems* (Santosh Publications: Cuttack, 1988).
11. See my *Personal Identity*, 2nd edn. (Decent Books: New Delhi, 2000).
12. 'Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics', ibid., p. 203.
13. Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 2nd edn., p. 315. Singer considers this a dubious reason, since it conflicts with universalizability, which by general admission is a more natural feature of ethical principles.
14. Ibid., p. 316.
15. Ibid., p. 317.
16. B.H. Barua in *Persons, Mind and Value*, p. 36.

17. Ibid., p. 32.
18. E.g. Barua and Mohanty respectively in *Persons, Mind and Value*, especially in p. 30.
19. G.C. Nerlich, *Values and Valuing: Speculations on the Ethical Life of Persons* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989).
20. Harry Frankfurt, 'Identification and Wholeheartedness' in F. Schoeman (ed.), *Responsibility, Character and the Emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
21. Gary Watson, *Free Will* (Oxford University Press, 1982).
22. Ibid., p. 7.

    *Insofar as self-interest leads to, or becomes indistinguishable from, selfishness and egoism. Self-interest, however, need not have only this connotation. It is certainly different from selfishness and can be rationally justified. Indeed self-interest can be morally sanctioned whereas selfishness can never be. And as long as self-interest does not affect the interest of others it can have moral as well as rational justification. For example, it is quite rational and not at all immoral to carry an umbrella when it is raining, but it would be obviously immoral if you snatch away somebody else's umbrella to protect yourself from the rain and let the other fellow get drenched.

23. James Griffin, *Value Judgement* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 1.
24. See Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 327.
25. As Rajendra Prasad pointed out in his *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality*, p. 329.
26. *Possibility of Altruism* (Oxford, 1970), p. 144.

Use, Language-Game and Meaning: Reflections on Problems in Game-Model Semantics

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Hintikka's semantics (1975) represents (according to his own words) a confrontation with Fregean semantics. This theory deserves some attention concerning its consequences for a general theory of meaning. The issue to be explored here is the possibility of using Dummett's falsificationist conception as the theory of meaning for this purpose. The question can be put more precisely in this way: Is Dummett's conception a philosophical theory of meaning, and if it is, can it incorporate the semantics of Hintikka's game-theory as its own part or not? That is, are these theories parallel, analoguous or neither? Hintikka implicitly permits for such a development with his verificationist/ falsificationist/language-use interpretation of language-games (for formal logic in 1968), and Dummett (1976) explicitly indicates the 'obvious affinities' of his own theory with 'the language-game type of semantics developed by Hintikka and others'. In Saarinen's (1979) words, 'it remains to be seen whether both theories can be tied together with more systematic links'. This kind of investigation includes the theses: (1) Wittgenstein's influence on both Dummett and Hintikka; (2) their attitude toward Frege; and (3) the forming of the theory of meaning involving verification/falsification. The main objective of this paper is to highlight only on the first thesis which is associated with the growth of Dummett's conception out of Wittgenstein's claims about use and language-games.

THE PROBLEMATIC INTERVENTIONS

Although Dummett and Hintikka criticize Wittgenstein's view of language, they both develop their theses about language-games and the importance of the use of language. Dummett does not think that Wittgenstein's conception can be a systematic theory of meaning, because it impugns the 'legitimacy of any distinctions corresponding to that of Frege between sense and force'; and if it must be 'a wholly new kind' of the theory of meaning, 'there is not sufficient indication' even for 'the general outlines of such a new types of theory' (1978). He accuses Wittgenstein of 'linguistic holism' (1975) and finds a similar defect in the picture theory (1981). On the other hand, Hintikka thinks that Wittgenstein's device 'is not unequivocal' (1968) and that the notion of a game is vague (1971). However, according to Dummett (1963), merely identifying meaning with use does not 'by itself accomplish very much: but to reject the identification is to abandon all hope of an explanation of meaning'.

Hintikka claims that Wittgenstein's picture theory already suggests a theory of language use (1969), and that the idea of language games does not refute his earlier picture theory (1971). So, Hintikka wants to relate Wittgenstein's device closely to the notion of language-game, a notion which he believes 'sits especially happily' with his own conception of 'language-games of seeking and finding' (1968), providing for Wittgenstein's notion 'the precise sense of the mathematical theory of games' (1971). As Hintikka (1976) himself says, he by and large accepts Wittgenstein's notion of 'language-games as the mediators between language and reality'.

It is obvious that Dummett and Hintikka differ with regard to Wittgenstein. The question is: Would not such a difference be so great as to compromise the possibility of Dummett's conception being a theory of meaning for Hintikka's game-theory semantics? Or can such a difference be explained as a difference only at a level, as Dummett seems to suggest by his conception of a philosophical theory of meaning that would also provide a semantics for a fragment of natural language? An investigation of the origin of such a difference in these attitudes toward Wittgenstein's thoughts may facilitate an answer to this question.

Dummett's *Truth* (1959) was already an announcement of his plan to accommodate Wittgenstein's concept of use to Frege's theory. Dummett no longer identifies Frege's term 'sense' with the truth-condition of a sentence, but with its use, i.e. with what is accomplished by making several kinds of statements, in this case, conditionals. He invokes the *Tractatus* distinction between saying and showing as it 'might have been useful to Frege' in distinguishing between meaning and sense. Dummett emphasizes the 'force' which in Frege's *Begriffschrift* had the role of determining 'the connection between the truth-condition of an arbitrary sentence and what we effect by uttering the sentence'.

But, in *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (1973), Dummett remarks that the late Wittgenstein does not understand the term 'sense' very well, because he captures only one aspect of sense by 'use'. Frege's theory, according to Dummett, does not neglect to employ both approaches, atomic and molecular, toward the relation between words and sentences. Wittgenstein overvalues one approach; for him, the sentence is the smallest unit of meaning. In this connection, Dummett draws a 'crude analogy' between a simple code and the understanding of its constituent words, and our understanding of the words through grasping the way in which they may figure in a sentence in general. (Wittgenstein also employs the term 'code' in a his *Philosophical Grammar*, but Dummett does not mention it.)

Dummett points out that Frege's conception of meaning accounts for three important notions: sense, tone, and force. The notion of sense presupposes the distinction between sense and reference. In his examination of Frege's notion of reference, Dummett mentions Wittgenstein's discussion about 'Moses', incorporating it into Frege's account of the problem of reference. He points to Wittgenstein's later writings as an attack upon Frege's distinction between sense and force. Dummett repeatedly emphasizes the importance of force in our understanding of a sentence (1967, 1975a and b, 1976).

In 'Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference' (1975) Dummett, interpreting Frege, writes, 'Sense is an ingredient in meaning'. The sense of the words contributes to the determination of the condition under which the sentence is true. This claim is explained as in previous

texts, but now the stress is on Frege's thesis that the 'sentences play a primary role in the theory of meaning' because the smallest linguistic complex with which one can say anything is a sentence. In order to support such a claim, Frege employs the distinction of which, as we know, Dummett approves. Dummett claims that the main attack on the sense/reference distinction today comes from holism and the causal theory of reference. This claim is important not only with regard to his objection to Wittgenstein, but also in regard to the emphasis he places on the notion of force. Dummett thinks that for Frege, sense determines reference, and the force is an aspect of meaning without which it is impossible to consider the different categories of sentences.

At the end of his paper 'Was Frege a Philosopher of Language?' (1979a) Dummett affirms that it is possible to connect Frege's conception of the sense of a sentence with the idea of its use, but that 'no statements of this thesis are to be found in Frege'. Later, in 'Comments on Professor Prawitz's Paper' (1980), Dummett includes the notion of use as the central notion in the theory of meaning, i.e. in its part (I). In his book *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* (1981), he is concerned with indications that Frege does not succeed in his attempt to explain the notion of sense independently of psychology, because the understanding of a sense is a mental process. Eventually, according to Dummett, Wittgenstein provides the solution: understanding is not a mental process.

At the outset we can find reason to suspect Dummett's accommodation of Wittgenstein to Frege's framework. We already have some indication of a negative answer to the putative question: Can Dummett accommodate Wittgenstein's thesis in Frege's framework? If this accommodation is not possible, it seems that we would have a reason for precisely the reverse strategy. Our question should then be: Can Dummett accommodate Frege in a Wittgensteinian framework?

SENSE AND FORCE VS. USE AND LANGUAGE-GAME

We can find some indications of this reverse strategy in Dummett's treatment of language-game in his early article 'Truth' (1959). Dummett employs the characteristic terms from board games, 'winning' and 'losing', which he says coincide with formal descriptions of what

happens in natural language. He makes a comparison between winning and losing and the determination of the sense of a statement by knowing in what circumstances it is true or false. The notion of sense becomes separated from a truth-conditional treatment. At the end of this paper, he credits Wittgenstein with being the author of the doctrine of meaning explained in terms of use, which involves dethroning truth and falsity from their central role in the theory of meaning (Behera, 1998). Dummett adds that the point of Wittgenstein's doctrine has not been generally understood. Dummett connects this doctrine with Frege's notion of contextual definition in the *Grundlagen*. He explains in *Frege's Philosophy* (1968) that Frege seems to be aiming at what Wittgenstein is after with his notion of 'making a move in the language-game'. According to Wittgenstein, says Dummett, the linguistic act of uttering a sentence—the smallest linguistic unit—is making a move in the language-game.

In 'Postscript' (1972) to 'Truth', Dummett reiterates the claim that 'the comparison between the notion of truth and that of winning a game still seems' to him good; but he doesn't mention Wittgenstein here. In his book *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Dummett mentions playing cards, and connects it with the problem of sense. He points out in the same connection Wittgenstein's dictum 'make a move in the language'.

Our first insight, then, is that, when the Wittgensteinian notions of use and language-game are introduced as candidates for the central notions of Dummett's theory of meaning, this is done only implicitly. If we bear in mind that Dummett claims to supplement Wittgenstein's thesis, then it seems that our candidates do not have much of a chance. But we can try to find another possibility.

In 'Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference', Dummett asserts that a Fregean theory of meaning must be capable of accounting for the actual use of language. This direction can be taken as an indication of another way of emphasizing the relation between Wittgenstein and Frege, one that would combine Wittgenstein's thesis and Frege's 'force'. In 'Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic, and Ought It To Be?' (1975) Dummett allows that the notion of language-game that Wittgenstein employs is connected to various activities, e.g.

linguistic acts. But he points out that the category of the sentence is still one aspect to the meaning based on different acts, which Wittgenstein does not respect because he proposes rejecting the linguistic act of assertion in *Philosophical Investigations*.

This objection deserves much attention. For instance, C. Wright (1980) does not share this opinion. It is strange that Dummett does not connect the problem of force with Wittgenstein's notion of language-game, although in his text he mentions it and considers it along with Frege. He claims (1975a) that Wittgenstein employs the notion in the *Brown Book* and elsewhere, regarding a language-game as a 'fragment of the language which is displayed as actually spoken' and which is constituted by 'the complex of activities with which the utterance of sentences of the language are interwoven'. Dummett points out that Wittgenstein's example of a coin in *Philosophical Investigations* is the best illustration of what he meant with the term 'use', i.e. he means the institutionalized character of the linguistic activities. To both Wittgenstein and Frege, Dummett attributes the insight into the ineradicably social character of language. However, he must admit that Frege takes the institution of language as autonomous, whereas for Wittgenstein, language is interwoven with our non-linguistic activities. Dummett does not restrain his criticism of Frege's disregard of the social character of language, but he does glide rather quickly over such difficulties of Wittgenstein's as 'the remoteness of the connection between linguistic activities and non-linguistic ones' (1975a). However, we can admit it is visible in the trace of his supplementation of so-called Fregean force with Wittgenstein's notion of social games.

In 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)' (1976) Dummett once again claims that the theory of force must be viewed as a supplementation to Wittgenstein's thesis identifying meaning with use, since the distinction between sense and force, disregarded by Wittgenstein, is important especially for the linguistic act of assertion. Thus, Dummett insists on his radical interpretation of Wittgenstein, but he doesn't supply any reason for preferring the Fregean notion of force. Dummett here favours a theory of meaning in which it is possible to obtain a formulation of 'the general principles in accordance with which the language-games of assertion, question, command, request, etc. are

played'. So far, we do not know whether such a claim is in accordance with Wittgenstein. The problem requires further analysis, especially if we bear in mind Wright's disagreement with Dummett's opinion about Wittgenstein's denial of the sense/force distinction.

In his lecture at Stockholm University, entitled 'What Do I Know When I Know a Language?' (1978), Dummett, developing Wittgenstein's tenets, thinks that it is also necessary to take into account the three well-known ingredients of meaning. Here we have more evidence that the supplementation of Wittgenstein with Frege is the accommodation of Frege to Wittgenstein's conception of meaning as use in a language-game.

Dummett repeats in 'What Does the Appeal to Use Do for the Theory of Meaning?' (1979) the importance of the theory of force, which he connects with the use the sentence has in actual linguistic practice. But at the same time, he repeats his claim that Wittgenstein repudiates Frege's distinction between sense and force.

In the beginning of his 'Comments on Professor Prawitz's Paper' (1980) Dummett repeats that there is no clear idea of 'use' of a sentence without an explanation of what a speaker does by uttering it. He emphasizes that 'it will have to envoke some general principle'. But in the discussion with Prawitz, he agrees that it is possible to take 'use' as the central notion of the theory of meaning. But he also points out to Prawitz that it remains necessary to take force into account. Dummett's reply to the problem of force seems so far to be only a half an answer.

Wright (1981) has shown that it is not very certain that Wittgenstein does deny the sense/force distinction, and has explained why Wittgenstein does not consider the entire theory of force necessary. We can add that Wittgenstein seems to make this distinction in many texts (for instance in *PI, OC, RFM*), and that the various linguistic activities provide a natural basis for it, i.e. they constitute the general principle of distinction. It seems that to Dummett it is not so strange an idea. We can raise the question—why has it remained only implicit? Let us try to make it more explicit.

In his book *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, we find the exposition of Frege's thesis about thought which has as its vehicle the sentence.

According to Dummett, Wittgenstein is indebted to Frege for such an idea, and for denying that thoughts are mental entities (Pradhan, 1996).

In other papers also Dummett is occupied with this topic. In the book *Truth and Other Enigmas* (1978), he stresses the public character of Frege's thesis, and adds that Wittgenstein is very forceful in rejecting the private interpretation. The direct contribution of Frege and Wittgenstein to the fundamental outlines for the insight of how language functions is in their thesis that thoughts are communicable by means of language (Pradhan, 2001). An analysis of employment of language must, therefore, according to Dummett, make explicit the principles regulating our use of language, of which we already have an implicit grasp. He reiterates that they both treat language as a vehicle for thought and a means for communication. Nevertheless, Dummett thinks, 'although these are ideas with which any future attempt to construct a theory of meaning must come to terms, Wittgenstein's work does not provide a foundation for such an attempt' (p. 453). A systematic theory of meaning must enclose a vast complex of interconnections in an account of the mastery of language which does not consist 'in a number of principle isolable practical abilities' (p. 454). According to Dummett, further development comes after Frege, since, as a result of his work, we know enough of 'underlying syntactical structure of our language and about what is demanded of a theory of meaning' (p. 454).

In his Stockholm lecture, Dummett repeats both Frege's and Wittgenstein's theses regarding language as the vehicle of thought, characterizing it not as a means for thoughts, which becomes important for further interpretation.

In his *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* (1981), Dummett is concerned with defending Frege's conception of thought. Frege does not believe in incommunicability of thoughts in the sense in which Wittgenstein denies them to be possible. Wittgenstein is clearer, Dummett admits, denying the thought as mental processes. Dummett cannot deny that Frege takes into account an individual speaker's mastery of language and connects it with his idiolect. The whole point of Wittgenstein's attack, admits Dummett, has its origin in his treatment of language as a public language, which essentially involves reference to the linguistic community. This reference is obscure in Frege's

conception, and, according to Dummett, equally far from Putnam's idea of the division of linguistic labour. This public character of a language is also pointed out by Dummett in his paper 'Realism' (1982).

The previous analysis shows that Dummett vacillates between a partial and a complete denial of Frege's so-called public interpretation of language. It is remarkable that he displays such vacillation not merely in the articles from different periods of his writing, but often in a single article. His relation to Wittgenstein is interesting in this regard: he admits Wittgenstein's advantage over Frege, but persists in the thesis that further development comes from Frege and not from Wittgenstein. In most of his papers, his objections to Wittgenstein are sharper than they are to Frege, but in his last book (1981), he admits the full advantage of Wittgenstein over Frege. We can conclude that these elements of Dummett's own theory become more explicit when we consider their origin.

CONVENTIONAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

Closely related to the notion of public linguistic activities is the problem of the interpretation of a code. In his book *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Dummett points out that a code is not a good comparison with a word or with a sentence. In his Stockholm lecture, Dummett emphasizes his and Frege's repudiation of the conception of a language as a code. He claims that in such a conception it would be required 'that we may ascribe concepts and thoughts to people independently of their knowledge of language'. He cites Frege's and Wittgenstein's counter examples. For more light it is useful to turn back to 1963 article 'The Philosophical Significance of Godel's Theorem'. In his examination of meaning and use, Dummett says that recent philosophers have tended to reverse Aristotle's approach. His useful analogy with a code drops out. According to Aristotle, we use sentences to communicate thoughts that we cannot transmit directly; therefore, we code them by means of audible or visible signs. The sentence is in that case the code-symbol for the thought. Dummett says that Wittgenstein's analogy with chess-pieces and their posers is better. The code-symbol for that power is not considered as something which could in principle exist on

its own, but only in the practice of moving it in accordance with certain rules. It seems that he is in agreement with Wittgenstein's treatment that we do not code our thoughts. But, consequently, since Dummett considers only these particular thoughts of Wittgenstein and not the others, we can conclude, that Dummett has not provided a complete account. So, Frege receives the better treatment. Dummett is too severe with Wittgenstein and too mild with Frege. We cannot forget here that, according to Dummett, Frege could not give up his unpublic conception of language and the mental character of thought. If this is so, how can we admit that Frege reverses Aristotle's approach? Wittgenstein's attitude toward thought is uncompromisingly unmentalistic. Dummett is forced to admit this, at least in his second book on Frege, more explicitly. We have seen that this problem has to do with implicit knowledge and with problems about rules. We shall now pursue these topics.

In his Stockholm lecture, Dummett stresses the question: Do we really know the theory of meaning when we know a language? Following first Wittgenstein and further Frege, he asserts that 'the conception of mastery of a language' consists 'in implicit knowledge of a theory of meaning', i.e. 'what makes the utterances of a speaker to be expressions of thought is a piece of internal equipment'. In his attempt to make this implicit knowledge manifest in the speaker's use of the language, it becomes evident that invoking the knowledge is not necessary at all, because we must take into account 'the social practice in which that mastery enables' the speaker to participate.

In his last book about Frege, Dummett says that we cannot dispense with the notion of a purely implicit understanding, and points to Frege's analysis of the expression of generality of which we have implicit knowledge. He also points to Wittgenstein's 'tacit conventions' 'governing the working of our language' (p. 236). So, it appears, that we must take into account such terms as 'implicit', 'tacit', and so forth. Implicit knowledge of which Dummett earlier wished to dispense, in reality, is the problem of implicit knowledge of the rule.

In his book *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Dummett speaks about rules of inference and of proof. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein's 'move can be made in the language' (p. 194), he explains what for Frege is the

problem of the relation between words and sentences, and then he employs the term 'rule'. He also makes a comparison with playing cards. The rule for a word functions together with the rules which govern other words, which in turn constitute the words of a sentence. In 'Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference', Dummett (1975b) says that according to Frege, 'in our everyday speech we are not playing a game whose rules we have not fully formulated, but one for which no consistent set of rules could be drawn up'. In 'Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic, and Ought It To Be?' we find Dummett emphasizing the proximity of Frege's and Wittgenstein's descriptions of the conventional principles which govern the practice of speaking the language and of the concept of following a rule. In 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', speaking of an anti-deterministic theory of meaning, Dummett stresses as the main claim, the studying of the rules and strategies of a game which even in principle could not be predicted by any one speaker. In the Stockholm lecture, he makes the comparison with a board player. If we wish to explain what the mastery of a rule for a player consists in, we describe the practice of playing the game, i.e. we simply 'state the rules'. So, the individual player's practice is based on implicit knowledge of the rules, but in the question of language we must take into account 'the social practice'. As we have already seen, for such a purpose we do not need to 'invoke the knowledge at all'. We already encounter in Dummett's last book his stress on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* appeal to 'tacit convention'. He applies Wittgensteinian language-game terminology to Frege and asserts that Frege does not think it possible to formulate a consistent set of rules for natural language. Who doubts the existence of a systematic theory, Wittgenstein or Frege?

After this, Dummett thinks that both Frege and Wittgenstein are interested in the description of conventional principles which govern linguistic practice. It is clear that, according to Dummett, Frege does not believe in the possibility of such a description. Finally, Dummett claims that the rules are constituted by conventional and social linguistic practice, a view which—Dummett claims in his last book—Frege could not hold. Hence, Dummett must change his negative opinion about Wittgenstein in an explicit way, or we can conclude that he is merely

using Wittgenstein as a supplementation to Frege. In the preceding discussion, we saw that the problem of interpretation and understanding the rule includes the question about the relation between words and sentences, i.e. it is included in the main problem of meaning, to which we now turn.

COMPONENT AND CONTEXT PRINCIPLES

In his book *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Dummett discusses Quine's holism, which cannot allow the notion of language 'as something decomposable into significant parts', with different levels. In 'Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference', he reiterates this objection to Quine and especially to Davidson's holism as well (Pradhan, 1992). Though the holist theory has difficulties, he admits that for some kinds of sentences, ones with proper names, it seems to be true. But, nevertheless, he pursues the objection in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)'. The holistic theory precludes the possibility of providing a systematic theory of meaning for natural language, because it has the wrong basis, a specific class of sentences, and because the notion of language is reduced 'to that of an idiolect'. Throughout his writings, Dummett is opposed to the social character of language. In this sense, he ascribes to holists the omission of the phenomenon called by Putnam 'the linguistic division of labour'. He criticizes the holist for applying the case of Wittgenstein's 'Moses' to all the words in the language. In 'The Justification of Deduction' Dummett makes the distinction between the radical Wittgensteinian holistic position and a possible modification of it. Wittgenstein's holism renders the characterization of the meaning of an individual sentence without 'giving an account of the entire language of which it forms a part'. According to Dummett, in modified holism, the molecular view is lacking too, because we can find no way of ascribing an individual content to each sentence of the language without a knowledge of the entire language. Either holism cannot 'consider the sentence as a smallest unit of the language'. Therefore, according to Dummett, we must reject holism if we wish to retain both the claim that each sentence has a content depending only upon its internal structure, and the claim that the sentence cannot have 'a meaning independent of *all* the rest of the language'. Dummett

contends in 'Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic, and Ought It To Be?' that Wittgenstein's language-games 'gave an account of some very small fragments of language' which 'do not appear a promising model for a systematic account of an entire language'. Confronting Dummett's own text, one gets the impression that his objection to Wittgenstein involves contradictions, which we ought now to try to resolve.

In his article 'Nominalism' (1956), Dummett for the first time points out that probably the most important of Frege's philosophical statements, quoted by Wittgenstein in both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, is his 'doctrine that only in the context of a sentence does a name stand for anything'. Dummett writes very often after that about Frege's treatment of proper names, of complex names, i.e. of the reference of words and expressions. Dummett (1973a) explicitly applies the term 'reference' to the relation between words and things. He tries to explain Frege's own view as the name/bearer relation, which, as the prototype of reference, forces him to the distinction between intensional and extensional contexts (Sen, 1991). Dummett (1973a) reveals difficulties that make Frege's conception much too weak. Of course, for Frege, the most important question always concerns the truth or falsity of a sentence: a sentence without a bearer has no truth value. And, as we know, a truth-conditional approach is the standpoint neither of Wittgenstein nor of Dummett. However, Dummett tries to explain in his last book some misunderstandings about the terms 'referent' and 'reference' connected with Frege's interpretation of predicates. He must finally admit in 'Realism' (1982) that, by Frege's principle, 'we do not need to invoke the notion of reference' in applying to terms, but 'we continue to ascribe reference to terms for directions' (p. 68). The previous stress on the distinction between sense and reference becomes superfluous, and Dummett's criticism of the causal theory of names becomes unconvincing. The first insight renders the criticism of Wittgenstein's holism and holism in general unconvincing. Dummett claims that Wittgenstein's example of 'Moses' indicates the correct schematic use of the form which a specification of the use of the name must take (1975c). But, he thinks that the typical holistic requirement of the entire language for the understanding of any part is not avoided

(1976). In his last article (1982), he employs the same interpretation of Wittgenstein's treatment of words and expressions of inner sensations. But at the same time, he approves of Wittgenstein's view of the ascription of inner sensations as involving a radical divergence from the principle of bivalence (1982). How can we combine this with the previous criticism? Dummett's theory of reference is not so firm anymore. Why?

In 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', Dummett presents his own ideas of the correct theory of meaning as composed of two, rather than of three parts, the central part providing the theory of sense and reference, and the second part being supplementary. In the first part, Dummett lays out the features any sentence must have; and in the second part he provides a uniform means of deriving such features for every aspect of a sentence's use. But on the very next pages, we see that he advocates a theory in which 'the theories of reference and of sense merge', a theory in which the candidate notion is verification or falsification. This new theory 'has obvious affinities, not only with Popper's account of science, but also with the language-game type of semantics developed by Hintikka and others'. It is very important to see here how much closer Dummett's interpretation of Frege is to Wittgenstein's account of the relation between words and sentences.

In the beginning, Dummett ascribes to both Frege and Wittgenstein a theory that is both atomistic and molecular as the same time (1956). The sentence is primary only 'on the ground that we can learn the meaning of a word only by learning the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs'. There are the sentences 'which we understand only by already knowing the meaning of the constituent words'. For Dummett, it is quite wrong to ascribe to Frege 'the doctrine that the unit of significance is not the word but the sentence' (1973, 1956). In both cases, Dummett appeals to Wittgenstein supporting Frege's doctrine with Wittgenstein's idea of making a move in a game (1973). The word is another kind of linguistic unit. It is the smallest bit of language to which one can attribute sense. The first is named the 'context principle' (1968), and the second may be called the compositional principle, i.e. the componential principle (1975b). Dummett makes a 'crude analogy' with a code-word may consist of a numeral followed by a string of

letters. The analogy with our understanding of a word independently of any particular sentence containing it is established in the following way: the determination of the encoded word proceeds only by applying the general rule of a code word. The analogy with our understanding such a word consists in grasping the way in which it may figure in a sentence in general. It follows that the significance of the code of any numeral or letter is not explainable without the reference to the general notion of the representation of a normal word by means of a code word (1973). But in the same book, he mentions Wittgenstein's comparison of the word with a chess piece, which for Dummett is a better comparison than with a code: 'the word has a sense, and is not, as on the first view, a code for it, just as the rook has certain powers of movement and is not a code for them' (p. 156). It remains for us to choose which example is better or to accept Wittgenstein's treatment of codes in *Philosophical Grammar*, as we already suggested. Wittgenstein employs the terms 'code', 'denotation', 'designation', in *Philosophical Grammar*. He speaks about 'the grammar of denotation' and makes an example with designation. The rules of the language-games, according to Wittgenstein, codify different characteristics of words. The code with the key for deciphering we can explain as a connotative code for the sentences encoded (1982). Since, according to Wittgenstein, the 'meaning is the role of the word in the calculus' and 'the proposition has its content as part of a calculus'; this gives to denotation a character of identification of one part of sentence content, as we have explained before (1982). So, the denotative code denotes the primary content and the connotative code is the 'under-code' (1982). The 'multifariousness' of language in *Philosophical Grammar* must be understood as the cultural systems of codes. Wittgenstein is not satisfied with some general theory. He allows for a generality (PG) which cannot concern the language alone, but involves the cultural and social systems with which the language is interwoven. The terms 'denotation' and 'designation' in *PI*, in *OC*, and 'designation' and 'reference' in *Remarks on Colour* have the same role. In this manner, Wittgenstein tries to save the individual content of a sentence through the compositional principle, and to guarantee the sentence as a unit of language through the context principle.

Let us consider the distinction between syntax and semantics which, according to Dummett, is the source for Frege of his double principle. Dummett explains that Frege does not directly provide 'any syntactic analysis of natural language'. The sentences comprising his formalized language, however, have a precise syntactic structure, manifested in their surface appearance, which can provide the basis for a semantics for a large fragment of natural language, even though Frege does not believe in the possibility of such semantics (1975b). Frege's syntax has two stages: first we construct the simplest form of sentences, then out of them the complex sentences by means of iterable devices of sentence-composition.

In 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)', Dummett says that holism has a tendency to disregard the atomistic standpoint only at first sight. Given the continuous needs of the relation 'to the language as a whole', this tendency becomes apparent and unsuccessful.

In 'The Justification of Deduction', Dummett speaks about a modified Wittgenstein doctrine which would also throw out the 'molecular conception of language under which each sentence possesses as individual content which may be grasped without a knowledge of the entire language'. Therefore, he concludes, we must reject holism if we wish to suppose that each sentence has a content which depends 'only upon its internal structure'. But, 'of course, even on a molecular view of this kind, no sentence can have a meaning which is independent of all the rest of the language'. He admits this double principle, and at first it is hard to see the difference between a point of view which is molecular and one which is atomistic. But in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', Dummett proceeds with explaining the difference between a molecular and a holistic view. For a 'molecular view, there is, for each sentence, a determinate fragment of the language a knowledge of which will suffice for a complete understanding of that sentence', and for a holistic view, 'it is impossible fully to understand any sentence without knowing the entire language'. In 'Was Frege a Philosopher of Language?' (1979), Dummett attempts to further explain the same claim in connection with Frege's problem of thought: 'the structure of the sentence reflects the structure of the thought and the senses of the constituent parts of the sentence are parts of the thought, which is the sense of the sentence'. Such a view Dummett sees, as before, as close to a possible interpretation of natural language. He says, 'the surface form of the sentence does not reveal its true structure', which is not an unfamiliar idea to Chomsky and other linguists. Such a conception aims at what Dummett calls 'essential structure', even though it is not 'intended [by Frege] as a contribution to a syntactical theory; it is concerned to explain Frege's account of what is involved in grasping the thought expressed by a complex sentence'. Dummett claims that such a treatment, which Frege has pointed out, 'Wittgenstein, Chomsky and others are never tired of pointing out'.

In *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, 1981, Dummett defends himself against Sluga's attack that he has not given enough weight to the context principle. But, even now, he gives more weight to the other compositional principle. Here Dummett writes about Frege's unsuccessful attempt to reveal how thought is constructed out of its constituents. He examines Wittgenstein's proposal in *RFM*, pp. 41–43, that the meaning of a complex sentence consists in what we can do with it, or in what is involved in accepting it (as an assertion). Dummett remarks that this is essentially explained by the rule governing the deduction of simpler sentences from it. What Dummett needs is a stronger principle. Frege does not find the solution. Wittgenstein comes closer with his anti-mentalistic approach, but exaggerates, according to Dummett, the context principle. However, Dummett emphasizes Wittgenstein's approach in his last article (1982). In his last book (1981), he rejects the Wittgensteinian picture theory as a possible solution of the role of the thought in such problems.

In the third section, an analysis is provided of the problem of proper names, words, and expressions. Dummett settles this, yielding, as is promised, to holism (to Wittgensteinian holism and also Quine), and to some kind of causal theory as well. Wittgenstein's conception of a name is nearer to some aspects of the theory of direct reference, as we can conclude from Salmon's interpretation of possible refinements of an orthodox Fregean theory (1982). Dummett insists so much upon a distinction between sense and reference, but already from 1973 on, he began to 'incorporate' the reference into sense. Finally, they 'merge'

and give way to another notion, that of verification and falsification. We can conclude that until 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)' Dummett does not find in Wittgenstein any exaggeration of the context principle. He starts then to accuse him of holism, but at the same time asserts that his model of language is not promising, because it can be only for a small fragment. Frege's conception is promising for a large fragment of language. After all, what are language-games, and what is Hintikka's type of game-theory semantics to which Dummett appeals? Is it for a small or a large fragment of language? Wittgenstein's language-games are in language; they are fragments, some of the examples are explored by Hintikka. On the other hand, Hintikka (1971) shows that his idea of game-theory semantics is connected with the picture theory explicitly. We have tried to show that Wittgenstein's explanation of word-meaning and sentence-meaning is better than Frege's. The last section provides the most explicit view that Dummett implicitly accommodates Frege to Wittgenstein. This is the reason for his errors.

CONCLUSION

Comparing and confronting Dummett's texts, we may conclude thus: Dummett, by his own words, commences as a follower of Wittgenstein (1978). Then he attacks Wittgenstein using Frege. But, step by step, he is forced to concede. If he intends to accommodate Wittgenstein's notions in a Fregean framework, he should have made it in conjunction with Frege's truth-conditional theory. Dummett does not want to do this, and cannot. Considering further the converse possibility, the difficulties in accommodating Wittgenstein's notions into the central and second part of Dummett's theory of meaning, we come to Wright's interpretation of 'force', developed more explicitly than Dummett's own concession to Wittgenstein's unmentalistic, conventional, and social rule-governed treatment of linguistic activities. Such a conception leads Dummett to abandon the previous approval of the strict distinction between sense and reference, and to acknowledge some interpretations of certain representatives of the theory of direct reference and holism. The candidates he proposes for a central part of his theory are verification and falsification, which he finds later in Hintikka's semantical notions. This investigation shows that Dummett must be

closer to Wittgenstein if he wants to include Hintikka's context-dependent semantics and his own conception as an attempt at a general philosophical theory of meaning.

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Fanaticism and the Philosophy of Dwelling: A Heideggerian Approach

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ABSTRACT

Man is essentially a guardian irrespective of actually becoming trustees and caretakers in a homeless world. The essential and the ontological search for meaning is to reveal the essential structures, the structural necessity of man's being in the world. This can be a search for the taxonomical account of the essential features of the object of caring for and a similar account of what it is to care for, and of the act of caring itself. This would justify man's intimate relation to the world, a different manner of existing sharing a relation of mutual trust and commitment, which makes man a dweller in a homeland. Otherwise, the tiring and the strenuous journey of being in the 'homeless' world is marked by the urge to manipulate and the entire relation is then characterized by the logic of the maximum utility for the maximum number and the enhancement of instrumental rationality which will ultimately make the world an insecure resting place for the weak, unprotected and the silent ones. Using Heideggerian terminologies to define fanaticism and terrorism as modes of inauthentic existence, I have tried to relate it to one of the central themes of Martin Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy: the essential world dependentness of a human Dasein. I have attempted at understanding the essence of a kind of coping that could be characterized as fanatical way of coping with one's environment. My basic claim is that there are some distinctive traits that characterized both Nazism and Al Qaeda in terms of which a Hitler or an Osama Bin Laden could appeal to their followers for a kind of total submission as

obligatory. An attempt will be made to address these issues for the Heideggerian perspective.

The recent happenings in the World Trade Center is for me another reminder of our inauthenticity, a mode of existence characterized by intolerance and rejection. So I have used Heideggerian terminologies to define fanaticism and terrorism as modes of inauthentic existence. I will also look forward to a solution to this crisis, if their is any, in the philosophy of stewardship that Heidegger had provided, in making the earth a secure dwelling place with a promise for an authentic dimension of life. I will also try to understand the contradictions found in Heidegger's creed and deed, not sure though if these are contradictions or consistencies, in terms of his so-called controversial role as an active member of the National Socialist Party, thereby rendering his philosophy in the service of those who could justify any wrong as necessary means for a desired goal.

At a time when there was need for Heidegger's philosophical guidance to humanize a situation that behaved in an insane manner, Heidegger did nothing that could unveil the 'inner beauty', and 'depth' of that dark phase of existence. In Heidegger, we seem to find another case of betrayal when reason and philosophy are surrendered at the service of fanaticism. 'There is finally no significant distinction between Heidegger's call for submission to the whim of the Führer and Lukács' similar betrayal of reason in the service of Stalinism. As concerns their voluntary subordination of philosophical criticism to political totalitarianism both thinkers are outstanding example of the betrayal of reason in our time'[1] (Rockmore, 1992, p. 66). My basic question is: How to reconcile the two faces of Heidegger, an active member of the National Socialist Party, and a 'philosopher of Being' with genuine concern for making the earth a secure place of dwelling? My approach to Heidegger is an attempt at understanding man in the light of his thought and to locate any disparity between the two. This, I hope, will throw some light on exploring some dimensions of man's inauthentic phases of existence over which man seems to have no control, as man finds him 'thrown' into a situation which makes him an impotent thinker but a skilled doer. My philosophical understanding of fanaticism is

also a search for meaning of man in terms of the commitments he is permitted to make. So, I start with Heidegger to understand the essence of a kind of coping that could be characterized as fanatical way of coping with one's environment. This, I hope, will justify my claim that what we have recently witnessed on September 11, 2001 is not an isolated instance unparalleled in the history of fanaticism. It is an instance representative of many others of its kind, including the holocaust of gas chambers, and of fanaticism in diverse forms and guises.

My basic claim is that there are some distinctive traits that characterized both Nazism and Al Qaeda in terms of which a Hitler or an Osama Bin Laden could appeal to their followers for a kind of total submission that could justify any wrong, including killing of innocents as instrumental for a religious goal, an attainment of heaven for the one, safeguarding the interests of the *volk*, or of the nation, for the other. This inauthentic dimension of man is one of the central themes of Martin Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy, which depicts man in terms of his world dependentness. I will first try to understand one type of fanaticism, Nazism under Hitler, an ideology that inspired intolerance and a rejection of the 'other' for the sake of the 'One'. In my attempt at accommodating this picture of a dependent Dasein as a victim of circumstances to which man in this world is just thrown, a price any Dasein has to pay for dependence on ideologies, fanatic, or compassionate, the way it is handed down to him through shared language and shared tradition that nurtures his subjectivity and makes him what he is. A Dasein may be hypnotized by an intolerant ideology which is the price he has to pay for being rooted in a particular tradition that is authentically his own, which he may wrongly identify as his 'homecoming' with a strong demarcation between its indwellers and outsiders, a demarcation made not only on social and political grounds but temperamentally, ideologically, and thereby exclusively, and fanatically.

My philosophical approach to a possible understanding of these two kinds of fanaticism associated with Hitler and with Osama Bin Laden is an understanding of the limitations of our situatedness that makes man vulnerable to forces that are beyond his grasp. In this background,

it is no wonder that a Nazi or a member of the Al Qaeda will redefine man in terms of a sacredly demarcated inner line permit identifying 'home' as that which is exclusive of the 'foreign'. Taking this as the reality, I am interested in understanding a sense of 'rootlessness' and a genuine feeling of 'homesickness' that is there in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger with its central focus in the sense of alienation of an inauthentic Dasein. An inauthentic Dasein finds him a stranger at his own homeland, a place that looks alien that once witnessed the orchestration of the play between the fourfold, the earth, sky, mortals and gods. This is the time when man becomes a stranger and an alien in a world which is no longer a home, a place to dwell, but the flat planet earth that has lost its radiance. This fallen state of man is an alienation, a way out of which is to restoring the radiance, which alone can transform the world into a habitat, a place for dwelling.

In the case of Nazism, it was a will to restore the lost radiance with nostalgic longing for the God who could be exclusively 'theirs'. Heidegger has rightly identified the disease, this is the sacrifice man has to make at the altar of modernity and its mechanization. This pathetic state should not be the permanent destiny of man who is essentially a dweller, for whom the earth is a home that is to be cared for. Man is to be restored to that essential and authentic dimension, its care structure and its poetic mode of existence characterized by the mutual interplay between the fourfold reality of heaven, earth, mortals and gods. In that authentic state, man is a caretaker, a guardian of the fourfold, for whom there is no separation between the one and the other, between the home and its outsiders.

Heidegger's pre-war thought, revealed in *Being and Time*, is a continuous quest for Being, for the being of all things and the being of man, as for him, any thought must contain the presupposition what it means for something 'to be'. This could keep room for flexibility and for a kind of intellectual humility in one's exploration of a dimension that is not yet defined. Dasein alone has this privileged access to the question of Being. Dasein is primarily a participator, one essentially involved in the world, and is a part of the world, is basically immersed in the flux of everydayness, lost in a mode of inauthenticity. Man relates to the world in a concerned way, 'we care about the way things

are, we are interested in what will happen'[2] (Edler, 1995). Man is basically a doer, habitually responding to things and beings using them as tools, or as resources, which characterize man's inauthentic life style. This, for man, is the only way to cope in this inauthentic and a fallen state of existence that makes man an explorer of significance and for his root.

Unlike other beings, man's inauthentic living is characterized by a sense of anxiety, driving him ahead toward a mode of existence that alone would transform the alien world into a safe home for mankind. Dasein's loss of the sense of 'being at home' in this world, the sense of *heimisch*, is his inability to own death which alone gave impetus to heroic living. All the violence of modern technology is a part of our existence now as we, as fallen Daseins, are living in a disenchanted world with our inability to see the being of beings, and the 'what ness' of things, a necessary prerequisite for a care based relation to things and beings. This is our living in terms of modernity and mechanization when the radiance of things and beings is lost transforming man, nature and gods into things and resources. In this inauthentic manner, Dasein acts as a part of a system, displaying only equipmental understanding of things and beings, a pathetic state that is responsible for the worship of death and destruction when man is a stranger to another man and a stranger in an alien world.

An inauthentic Dasein is the disenchanted man of everydayness, 'a man there', living a life that is a meaningless repetition of everyday ritual. These are the masses who always wait for a revolutionary or a poet, for a charismatic leader for miraculously transforming them into lived dynamites. It is a matter of skill for a political leader, who is not a poet or a thinker but a man of the world deeply interested in worldly goals, to mobilize the masses, focusing their hatred against a common enemy. This is how millions of Germans at Hitler's time identified them with the leaders of the Nationalist Movement and with Hitler when the latter used his political skill to channelize the superstitious and the unscientific nature of their thought for his political advantage. About Germany at Hitler's time, Konrad Heiden lets us know: 'Germany was the perfect place for this development. In almost no other country were so many "miracles" performed, so many ghosts conjured, so

many illnesses cured by magnetism, so many horoscopes read, between the two World Wars. A veritable mania of superstition had seized the country, and all those who made a living by exploiting human stupidity thought the millennium had come'[3] (Online, 2001).

'For Hitler, Jews were the sources of all mankind's ills—from Marxism, social democracy to international capitalism. The Nazis promoted the pseudo—sciences, astrology, clairvoyance, spiritualism and other 'magical' forces—in their belief that these could help them understand the supernatural powers that control the destinies of man.'[4] (Online, 2001). Hitler despised enlightenment and its emphasis on reason and humanism and promoted the romantic view of a super race. The Jews were identified as the enemy of all that was valuable for the Germans; they were the supposed votaries of all those ideals despised by Hitler and by the Nazis, humanism, reason, intellect, the forces that could overthrow the Third Reich and its cherished beliefs. Some such beliefs are: 'We are at the end of the Age of Reason. The intellect has grown autocratic, and has become a disease of life.' 'Conscience is a Jewish invention. It is a blemish, like circumcision.' 'A new age of Magic interpretation of the world is coming, of interpretation in terms of the Will and not the intelligence.' 'There is no such thing as truth, either in the moral or in the scientific sense. The new man will be the antithesis of the Jew'[5] (Online, 2001).

Heidegger sought to revolutionize the revolution, giving it a linguistic and a hermeneutic turn. The thinker Heidegger used the language of the revolutionaries, leading them to a state of ecstasy where the inner beauty and depth of the movement could be poetically lit. It is still debatable whether the dreamer and the thinker, the man with a vision, could transform the Dasein in others, and in him, or it was the other way round. If it was a failure on his part, his failure was a serious offence of wrong guidance. As Walter Newell writes: 'Just as Heidegger wanted the German people to return to a foggy, medieval, blood and soil collectivism purged of the corruptions of modernity, and just as Pol Pot [who, like Shariat, studied at the Sorbonne] wanted Cambodia to return to the Year Zero, so does Osama dream of returning his world to the imagined purity of seventh-century Islam. And just as Fanon argued that revolution can never accomplish its goals through negotiation

or peaceful reform, so does Osama regard terror as good in itself, a therapeutic act, quite apart from any concrete aim'[6] (Nowell, online).

Heidegger's tragedy was his failure not only to revolutionize the revolution stealing the language from the revolutionaries, it was a tragedy of coming under the powerful spell that the revolution and its language had on him, transforming the voice of the thinker to that of a superstitious but tradition-rooted fanatic Dasein. What was natural for a leader like Hitler to use the language of the *volk*, it became a symbol of a superior race and its superior language at the hand of the philosopher. When this is coupled with Heidegger's desire for German self-determination apart from the 'isms' of modernity, we see him not only throwing his support to Hitler as a dictator who would make the transition possible but also plunging into the political arena of National Socialism in order to guide that transition. 'He plunged into politics, I think, because he believed that, like a Janus, his double language would enable him to accomplish two tasks at once: on the one hand, his language appeared, on the surface at least, close enough to the ideology to pass muster, while on the other it covertly circumscribed and displaced the metaphysical foundations of the ideology into the hermeneutic movement of questioning. In other words, Heidegger thought he could guide the revolution by stealing the language out from under the noses of Nazi ideologues such as Krieck, Baeumler, and Rosenberg. As late as 1935 in "An Introduction of Metaphysics," Heidegger still believed that a revolution in language was the prerequisite for a revolution in education: "the first step must be a real revolution in the prevailing relation to language"'[7] (Online, 2001).

As the linguistic turn in Heidegger's philosophy brought out the specificity of German language, the poetic mode of existence of an authentic Dasein could be revealed only by some special poetry: 'It is not just any poetry that takes over from the Nazis to uncover Being, but German poetry. Heidegger is thus not a "linguistic philosopher", but a self consciously German philosopher. This made him a natural and logical admirer of Hitler'[8] (Rockmore, 1992). This radiant mode of existence could be conveyed poetically by German poets leading to authenticity of Dasein in terms of a care relation. Man cares for that to which he belongs, his place of birth, a local sky, a god of the region

worshipped by the people of the locality, which is what Heidegger initially wanted to convey with his *Blut und Boden* principle though widening its scope from its racial framework. Heidegger first talks of the local fourfold (Young, 2002, p. 100).*

But in another sense, it could accommodate a wider scope as homeliness implies foreignness, though strictly speaking, to be at home in one place is not to be at home in another place. Though it is not rejection of foreignness, a Dasein's being at home somewhere rules out being at home anywhere. To be at home is for it to show as a holy, a poetic place. 'In particular, it is for the gods of that place, as we know, is for it to show as holy, as that is, authoritative. To belong to a place is to be committed to its ethos. Different places, however, house at least marginally different "gods". Hence, the idea of being equally and fully at home everywhere threatens the unity of a person. It entails the possession of a multitude of different, and incompatible, fundamental commitments'[9] (Young, 2002, p. 101).

Identifying a fanatic as one who is totally intolerant of the other who differs in race, creed or ideology, I have tried to address these issues from a philosophical perspective, more specifically a distinctively Heideggerian one, understanding man as Dasein with ideologies that inspire him to cope so that one can live. What sort of coping it would be that inspires one to die here in order to live there? Is there scope in Heideggerian framework for a kind of Dasein who is a prey to an ideology of nihilism that inspires it to be a crusader for the sake of idolizing and glorifying death and destruction and for a total rejection of the one which is profane and impure just because there is the Other which alone is sacred? Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda are emerging basically as a kind of nihilistic and world-negating force that glorifies death and destruction as a means as also as an end. My observations about the negative ideology of the Al Qaeda is an attempt to relate this picture of a being who is helplessly a victim of his circumstances to such an extent that Dasein rejects oneself in the process of rejecting others. Using a language existing in some forms in Islam, what Bin Laden has done is its reinterpretation for a fanatic goal toward a complete rejection of the profane for the sake of the sacred.

With its much focus on the transcendence of 'Allah' than His immanence, Islam as a religion has a tendency toward overemphasis on the life beyond than life here though this is not to be interpreted in literal manner as it is a mysticism that conveys its meaning poetically than literally. In this manner, one is advised to interpret such sayings that what is more important is the life after death, a life with the God than life here. With this in the background, the only thing a fanatic Muslim like Osama Bin Laden did was revolutionizing religion identifying his goal as a religious goal for which no true Muslim should hesitate to make them subservient to a divine purpose.

Bin Laden could inspire his followers that they were dying for a just cause, for the cause of the God, which gave his type of fanaticism a religious brand. Bin Laden gave calls that would motivate his followers to accept death and destruction in this particular context as another instance of celebrating and glorifying the sacred at the cost of the profane, a rejection of life here that has become impure as defiled by infidels. It was thus transformed to a pro-death ideology with an urge to escape and to reject executing a death sentence that is already declared to those who have done wrong. It is not an encouragement to reform and correct that which is impure but to reject it and to reject it with a rejection of life and love.' Bin Laden appears on the tape to counsel, 'the love of this world is wrong. You should love the other world ... die in the right cause and go to the other world.' In his October 9 taped message, Al Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman abu Ghaith gloried in the 'thousands of young people who look forward to death, like the Americans look forward to living'[10] (Online, 2001).

The tension between the two trends of religion, between the liberal and the fanatical—a common trait in almost all religions—is felt at different phases of history, which are decisive for creating an atmosphere of tolerance or of hatred and intolerance. It is a conflict of ideology that divides mankind into two blocks: those who are in possession of the absolute truth and are intolerant to criticism, and the others who are for assimilation and for recognition of others into its fold. It is basically a tolerance of the other which is different from the One or a total rejection of the others. For the fanatics, 'Truth' is certain since it is 'the Truth', there is no scope for any flexibility in one's stand, it is then

simply a matter of making others obey the Order, as 'Truth' is not to be further explored. It is also a rejection of all sorts of consensus or negotiation with a strong hostility to reform or for dialogue. It is a pathetic phase of existence characterized by frustrations and nihilism that transforms man to a votary of death and destruction which later became one of the characteristics of fanaticisms of the kind advocated by Bin Laden, and his followers.

Like the Nazis or some other fanatics elsewhere, Bin Laden sought to channelize some genuine concerns and feelings which were there in some form in the minds of many Muslims and non-Muslims across the globe, some kind of resentment for sanctions against Iraq and many other sensitive and delicate issues which would always keep room for divided opinions. This was then a situation more favourable to the ideologies of the conservatives than for the progressives, some section of the secular minded tolerant Muslims. Bin Laden could fuel an explosive situation, which was already charged with distrust and mutual hostility, a situation which would make man stranger everywhere in an alien world, searching for a home that would safeguard that lost identity which is sought to be resorted. This goes to the credit of any charismatic leader who could reinterpret the nihilistic tendencies in terms of religious aspirations. Others could be aroused toward a holy war against the wrong doers, the sinners, who have defiled the sacred; a rejection of such elements could also be interpreted as akin to the performance of a purification rite.

This is definitely not what characterizes Islam as a religion. It is wrong to identify fanaticism with Islam as it would amount to rejecting the human and the tolerant face of Islam, which could inspire liberal ideals focussed around the centrality of a tolerant and loving face of Allah that gave impetus toward a congenial atmosphere for the tolerance at heart of Sufism. Such liberal and tolerant ideals of Islam were evolved with the emphasis on love and tolerance than on power around many places in Central Asia, Persia, Afghanistan and around the subcontinent. The Muslims who were not totally uprooted from the pre-Islamic past opted for a tolerant atmosphere with assimilation and accommodation than total rejection, with recognition of pharaohs and pyramids in Egypt, of Darius and Zorashtra in Iran, trace of Hinduism

in Indonesia, and in Iraq. On the other hand, a home was sought to be provided for the indwellers both by the Nazis and the Al Qaeda, a home for those who were legitimate indwellers, exclusively. The Nazis opted for an ideology of being rooted in a particular tradition the exclusiveness of which was for them a matter of shared destiny of a particular people. On the one hand, it inspired dynamism and a will to change and to reform, either by eliminating the others or awaiting to be eliminated by others, or, it was a war of strength and power that also kept room for others, superior in strength and power for rejecting and eliminating the less powerful by the more powerful. Ironically, one who is recognized as a religious fanatic need not always be fanatically committed to virtues or vices that are religiously approved. Some of the practices adopted by those Islamic fanatics were not proper Islamic virtues.' The terrorists had shaved off their beards, they spent time in bars, they became drunk, and they participated in lap dancing.

Interestingly, in Bin Laden and in Al Qaeda, it is not a rejection of modern America and its strength, its modern technological achievements and its riches. Not because America is a symbol of modernism and all that is associated with it, which is felt to be a threat to the traditional ideologies and its solidarity. Bin Laden was not against the fruits of modernism and of Americanism, its sophisticated modern weapons and the American lifestyle, unlike some other fanatics who used death and destruction as instrumental toward a mundane goal safeguarding a 'home' for them with a rejection of the other who is a stranger to them. This is what is common in all phases of fanaticism, from Nazism to state-sponsored terrorism, which is subservient to a mundane goal. This was also the interesting dimension of Al Qaeda and its relation with super powers, including America as the CIA-trained Bin Laden was acceptable to the Americans as a category of state-allied terrorist, so was America acceptable to Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda who could change customers suiting the situation. This was a time when fanatics could share worldly concerns of Leftist anti-globalization discourse or of a return of a Nazi vision of Jewish conspiracy. Till that time, both Bin Laden and the superpowers were mutually sharing a relation of give and take as instrumental for safeguarding the sovereignty of the territory or for any other cause.

Bin Laden's hatred for America started at a time when Americans landed in Saudi Arabia and remained after the Kuwait conflict; that is the time which is a turning point for this fanatic movement to be completely identified as a religious revolution given a call for a holy war against the infidels. Now it is no longer a worldly movement for a mundane cause like driving away the intruders to Afghanistan or changing customers in the war between superpowers. 'Yet along with this crazed "rationale", we should keep in mind that, as Dostoevsky understood so well in *The Demons*, at the core of every terrorist movement lurks the nihilistic pleasure in destruction. Bin Laden's celebratory statements following the attacks of September 11 stand in a long line of terrorist exultation over death and destruction'[11] (Online, p. 3).

CONCLUSION

Heidegger's basic philosophy was a search for that significant dimension of dwelling, which is a recognition of the mysterious dimension of being-in-the-world. Dasein's being in the world is recognition of its potential vulnerability and its finitude that it has alive with contradictions. It is the relational mode of existing that makes the embodied 'I' ever open to its other, who is 'with me in the world'. Dasein's 'mineness' is also an 'openness' to the interest of others. This sense of dwelling with others, this tension between the 'I' and 'thou', between one's home, its indwellers, and all others, those outsiders is contributive toward constituting the authenticity of the authentic Dasein. Acceptance of others is a prerequisite for identifying the stranger in others and the familiar in the one, a foreignness that makes one homesick, some 'everydayness' average that makes one strive for its own 'significance' with a sense of having a special mission in life, an aspiration for an authenticity for oneself that restores its caring structure which is equally authentic in all its concerns. A fanatical rejection of the other is suicidal on Dasein's part; it is an aim at silencing the voice of others that initially kept the tension alive, it is like severing one's head if one has a headache. Silencing the voice of others would diminish the one in stature as one needs inspiration and challenges from others to explore one's naturalized potentialities. A fanatic who glorifies death

of others, or of one, fails to safeguard the security of a home and authenticity even to its own indwellers.

But what should be the role of a poet and a thinker, who is also a steward of the fourfold realities? When one comes across a statement, 'Do not let doctrines and ideas by the rules of your Being ... the Führer himself and he alone is the present and future German reality and its rule,' not from an inauthentic Dasein with his mode of fanatical coping but from the thinker who relentlessly searched for ways to make the earth a habitat, a place to dwell, one must take note of the difference between his creed and deed. In his writings, Heidegger continues to emphasize conservation instead of domination, though in reality, Heidegger, the man, is constantly in search for the historicity and the facticity of the German Dasein exclusively. 'About becoming a "custodian" of Being Heidegger because he didn't actually want to do anything particularly practical but his poetic language calling to mind a time of farmers, shepherds, Greek gods, nature, community, yet used to describe anthropological/ontological structures rather than sociological ones, is his great appeal. Is it possible to cover the world, this harsh, industrial inhuman world with a language of high culture, of artistic beauty? Or perhaps if we start thinking like Heidegger suggests (seeing ourselves as guardians, not exploiters, etc.), the world will begin to change too. Rather like hoping that the workers cover their hard, oily machinery with something will somehow change the nature of the machine.'[12]

Heidegger remained optimist of reviving that old magic of making the earth a place of dwelling from a distance, a mystic and a contemplator willing to take mankind back to a more primordial time when man could be awakened to a new kind of thinking. His talk of Being and his philosophy moved further away from talks of beings here but he remained a poet and a mystic while all others, the people and the institutions—including the movement that in his eyes started with a right beginning—could not be transformed to a new way of thinking. The thinker and the mystic failed to provide the beings an alternative and a non-fanatical mode of coping in an world that has lost the radiance of the heaven in its fallen state of a living hell. At a time when the philosopher's search for making the earth a habitat ends in

confusion that fails to demarcate heaven from hell, home from foreign, all appearing one and the same, death for others then becomes life for some, home for one is exile for others. This is a time when the philosopher and the thinker has to remain a distant and a remote observer, a contemplator, for whom the dividing line between life and death, light and darkness, becomes blurred, the two appearing to be one and the same. 'Agriculture is now a motorized food-industry—in essence, the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.'[13]

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Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge

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Definition is suspect, at least since Wittgenstein is said to have given it a death-blow or mortally wounded it and the post-modernists, following Derrida, gave it a hasty burial. Yet man still pursues knowledge, at least that is what the universities and the research institutes, so lavishly funded by the Public Exchequer, are said to do. But no one asks how can this enterprise be pursued if there is nothing to know and how can questions of 'truth' or 'falsity' be even raised, let alone settled. The two positions are at loggerheads, and yet both go merrily along without 'seeing' or 'caring' for the contradictions involved in them.

Strangely, both the notion of 'definition' and that of the 'knowledge-enterprise' harbour hidden problems in them which have not been seen either by those who accept or deny the one or the other for some reasons of their own. The idea of 'definition' does not involve, as Wittgenstein thought, the possession of some common properties by all those to which the term was 'correctly' applied, even if at first glance it may appear to be so. Rather, it involves making a distinction between the qualities possessed by an object on grounds which may be as varied as the 'purposes' of the classifier and the 'order' of 'importance' given to them. This has been traditionally masked by the use of the term 'essential' in respect of those properties, that were taken to be the 'defining' characteristic of the object concerned. The post-modern denial of 'essences', which follow from Wittgenstein's position, underwrites this traditional understanding of the notion of definition as perhaps nothing else could. But neither the post-modernists nor Wittgenstein or his followers seem to have asked the simple question, 'what was a

property?' and 'what was the basis of making distinctions between them?' That this should have happened in face of the long discussion from Galileo and Locke onwards and even earlier, say, since Aristotle, speaks volumes for the ahistorical nature of the thinking influenced by them. The 'ahistoricity' by itself, may not be a fault, but when it results in the total neglect or blindness to distinctions that were discussed and found reasonably well grounded, there is reason for disquiet and wondering what has gone wrong with much of the contemporary thinking that has become the 'fashion' of the day.

The problem, however, is a deeper one and infects both classical, modern and post-modern thinkers alike on the subject concerned. It assumes not only the notion of an 'object', but that *all* 'objects' are of one kind as, whatever be the differences between them, there are 'objects' of knowledge both in the epistemological and the 'ontic' sense of the term. In the former sense, they are all 'objects' to consciousness, provided one accepts that there is such a 'thing', while in the case of the latter they enjoy an independent reality of their own and, it is *because of this*, that they become the objects of knowledge. The glaring contradiction between the two senses has either not been seen or just glossed over. In the former sense, all that is there already exists, there is nothing to be 'known' as the 'presentation' exhausts what there is without any residuum whatsoever. In the latter case; the 'object' is never exhausted by any of its 'appearances' and thus *demands* to be 'known', a demand that is insatiable and inexhaustible and which thus sets the enterprise of 'knowledge' on its unending course whose possible finality is nurtured only by the illusion that the so-called presentation has no 'ontic' reality of its own independent of the facticity of its being 'known'. The illusion, as should be obvious from the history of the 'knowledge-enterprise' of man, creates the delusion that the 'object' is not only constituted by the 'acts' of the 'knowing consciousness', as in Husserl, but also that ultimately it is as 'definitional' in nature as in mathematics, no matter if this definition is arrived at through a rigorous process of empirical investigation and experimentation, as in 'science' which is accepted as the paradigmatic example of knowledge today. The recent attempt to turn the tables and see mathematics itself as a 'social construction' only substitutes 'society' for the Husserllian

transcendental subjectivity, without seeing, that it brings once again the 'unendingness' in the enterprise of knowledge, not this time from the ontic reality of the object but from the indefinite temporality of that which is supposed to construct it. The term 'society' in this context, it should be remembered, is most probably a deliberate deception to hide the fact that those who are supposed to construct are a little minority whose members, though mortal, delude themselves into thinking that they are 'legislating' on behalf of the whole mankind and for all future, as without this assumption their 'construction' would lose the aura of authority they want it to have.

The deeper and perhaps more intractable problem, however, relates to the notion of the 'object' which is said to be known and in respect of which the issue of 'truth' or 'falsity' arises. That which is supposed and said to be an 'object' transcends that which 'appears' at the level of sensuous apprehension and also that which may be said to be an object of thought or reflection and is usually described in conceptual terms that have to be embodied in language if they have to be apprehended at all. The difference between the two relates to the contingency or necessity of language for their apprehension, as is evident in the case of animals who possess the former but not the latter. The fact that living beings that are non-human possess some sort of 'language' for purposes of communication between themselves makes no difference as, even in their case, the so-called 'language' is contingent for the sensory apprehension they have, just as the number of 'senses' they may have for the purpose of acquiring what we call 'sensuous knowledge'. In fact, the 'facticity' of the 'nature' and 'number' of senses and their 'necessity' for what we call 'knowledge' has been the unexamined presupposition of all discussion about knowledge up till now. So also has been the question whether anything like 'inner sense' has to be accepted and, if so, what is its nature and whether it has to be assumed to be as diverse in character as the bodily senses are and whether it is confined to human beings alone.

The so-called 'outer' or 'bodily' senses are usually said to be five and all knowledge is supposed to be based on them but, as everybody knows, not only are there animals who do not have all the senses that we have but there are also human beings who are born blind or deaf,

and yet who 'know' in some sense of the term 'know' and live on the basis of that knowledge. The case of a Helen Keller may be exceptional, but there are others, thousands in number, whose case should have been the object of epistemological reflection, particularly amongst those who contend that 'senses' alone are the 'source' of knowledge or that only in their terms can a 'knowledge-claim' be validated.

That 'knowledge', whatever be its source or nature, provides a basis for 'living' should have raised the question of the relation between sense organs and motor organs, or *jñānendriyas* and *karmendriyas*, as they are called in the Indian tradition. But epistemological reflection on the problem of knowledge has, for some reason, failed to come to grips with the problem in spite of the fact that *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* or the capacity of knowledge to lead to successful action, and the relation of knowledge to liberation or of *jñāna* to *mokṣa* have played a significant role in Indian thinking on the subject just as the centrality of 'cash-value' of ideas or the operational theory of meaning has done in the western tradition.

But whether it be *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* or 'cash value of ideas' or the operational theory of meaning, they all introduce not only an unresolvable ambiguity in the notion of knowledge as they themselves are intrinsically 'ambiguous' in nature, but also surreptitiously give a direction to the enterprise of knowledge which it would not otherwise have had except for, or because of them. Besides this, it also thrives on the unasked question as to how such a formulation would avoid the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent', even if one accepts that the notion of 'success' can be defined in such a way as to suggest that the 'knowledge' on which it was based was true.

Perhaps, the insight involved in these formulations has to be disengaged from the notions of 'success' or 'cash value', and seen in a different way. The crucial question perhaps is whether the idea of 'knowledge' can even be thought of without involving some sort of 'activity' which is intrinsic to it and varies with the type of knowledge that it is. 'Knowledge' surely is not of one type, and the difference in this must affect not only the way it is acquired or comes into being, but also that which it inevitably must give rise to, as 'effectivity' of some sort is generally supposed to be one of the characteristics of

reality, besides others. Knowledge always requires some sort of 'activity', even if it be only of 'attending' which is minimally required in any 'knowing' or 'learning' process, as it itself is a part of the process, a resultant of some previous activity of knowing and giving rise, in its own turn, to further knowing and thus engendering a chain which may be broken at any moment, but which is unending in principle. And, strangely, even 'knowledge' has to be known, understood, interpreted, disputed, debated and discussed, not only be others but even by oneself as the enterprise of knowledge is as unending as all other enterprises, both for oneself and everybody else.

But how could knowledge be an 'object', and it has to be such if it has to be 'known'? That it is an object can hardly be doubted as otherwise the whole process of 'education' would make no sense at all. But if it be an 'object' what sort of an object it is, and what is its relation to those 'objects' of which it is supposed to be knowledge. The 'objecthood' of knowledge, however, has to be radically different from that which is ascribed to that of which it is a 'knowledge', as questions of 'truth' and 'falsity' can be raised about the former in a sense in which they can never be raised about the latter. Tarski pointed this out in his well known paper 'The semantic conception of truth', where he had argued that 'truth' is a characteristic of sentences and not of things. The sentence 'snow is white' can be said to be true, but to say that 'white snow' is true seems meaningless.

But there are 'objects' which share certain characteristics with 'knowledge' as they too are 'human creations', though different from it. The problem of knowledge arises in respect of these also as they demand to be 'understood' and 'known' like everything else, even if their knowledge be different from that which is sought in respect of those that have little to do with man as they are not his creation. The term 'art' collectively designates most such objects, just as 'history' does in another context. Knowledge is sought in respect of both these realms and that knowledge is as much 'knowledge' as the knowledge of any other realm. In fact, if we leave the 'natural sciences' aside, knowledge in most other sciences shares the peculiar characteristics that belong so obviously to those that relate to the realms of art and history.

Knowledge, thus, seems to run parallel to that of which it claims to the knowledge, whether it be that of 'nature' or of that which man has created either individually or collectively. The 'being' of this knowledge is, however, radically different from all that 'is', including that which man creates, as it lies outside itself in a way that is not the case with his other creations. The knowledge of these 'creations' has always created a problem for man, just as 'knowledge', which itself needs to be known. In fact, many a time doubts have been expressed whether the knowledge of these human creations deserves to be called 'knowledge' at all but no one seems to have doubted that whatever is called 'knowledge' not only needs but deserves to be known. Yet, knowledge about what is claimed to be known is not only a second order knowledge, but all knowledge, whether 'first order' or 'second order' presupposes a pre-existing knowledge in the context of which it alone can arise and which it adds to, finds fault with, modifies, criticizes and chooses to some extent. This process seems as 'beginningless' as that which is involved in the notions of 'causality' and even 'change' which apply to all processes which have a temporal dimension to them. But a process when it is 'thought of' has not only to be seen as 'beginningless' but also 'endless', a point that the 'revisability' thesis about knowledge appears to ignore. If knowledge is essentially revisable in principle, then the so-called claim of knowledge to be 'knowledge' is essentially spurious and based on the illusion that what is claimed to be knowledge is not 'really' so and that one has the warrant to act on it in the belief that if one does so one would achieve what one wants by doing so.

The 'antinomian' nature of the situation, so well pointed out by Kant in his *Antinomies of Reason* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, however, different from the one discussed here in the sense that the dilemma that knowledge always has to have a previous pre-existent knowledge as its context finds its paradigmatic, yet baffling example, in the phenomenon called 'education' without which no human society or culture or civilization can even be conceived. There has to be such a thing as 'education', and yet one has to learn to unlearn a lot of what one has learnt, to see through the delusions of 'certainty' it had deceptively built, to doubt and to question what one had taken for granted as

'gospel truth' and which one was supposed and expected to take as such.

Yet, in spite of all this, one is also supposed to do 'research', to add, to discover just as the earlier generation had done, and the generations before that. The 'house of knowledge' is ever being built and rebuilt and yet never completed, even though the whole of humanity has been engaged in it since it appeared on the scene. And, perhaps, there is not one but many 'houses' all half-built and many in ruins as the histories of civilizations amply testify.

The idea of an 'object' that is to be 'known' seems to arise at first at the perceptual level and then gets successively transformed, creating the problems whether what is sought to be known can be called as 'object' at all till we reach such nebulous entities as concepts, theories, values, mental states and, above all, self-consciousness where one does not know what the 'self' is of which one is supposed to have knowledge as it intrinsically is incapable of being an 'object', whether conceived of as a substance, as in *Advaita Vedānta*, or as an incessant, evanescent flow of momentary episodic occurrences as in Buddhism.

The perceptual 'object' which provides the model for that which is said to be the object of knowledge is, and has to be, a centre of substantive, enduring unity of all the qualities that are apprehensible by the different senses that human beings may be said to possess. The point is that a 'sense-quality' cannot be an 'object' of knowledge unless it is conceived of in substantial terms as having properties of its own which have, at least possibly, multiple dimensions or 'facets' to them just as the perceptual objects have. An object with a single property which itself is supposed to get 'exhausted' in the moment of its occurrence can hardly be called an 'object', even though some sub-atomic particles are said to display such characteristics. But, then, they are supposed to have multiple properties such as spin, colour, angular momentum, etc., and the duration of their existence can not only be calculated with fair accuracy, but their interaction properties be also stated in terms of inter-subjectively testable prediction. In fact, to be an 'object' means to be able minimally to fulfil these conditions as without them the enterprise of knowledge cannot even take off, as mere 'appearance' as in dreams or in pure imagining, does not and

cannot raise any questions about itself, in the seeking of the answers to which knowledge arises. The issue of truth is central to knowledge and it cannot arise unless that which is claimed to be known has something further to reveal in relation to that which appears to have 'appeared' and even whose 'appearing' may be subject to simultaneous or subsequent 'doubting'. The complex of appearances, even at the sensory level, has to be both related and 'unending' in order that the parallel stream of knowledge may flow diversifying in different directions as the questions themselves diversify and proliferate. That is one reason why 'knowledge' seems to grow incessantly and become more and more complex and complicated even when the object that is claimed to be known seems to remain the same.

Yet, however large the number of properties that an object may be said to have—whether those that are supposed to belong to it naturally or those that arise from its interaction with others—a distinction always has to be made between those on whose cessation the object itself will be considered to have ceased and others whose 'disappearance' does not entail its cessation.

This is the doctrine of essential qualities which are supposed to be captured in its definition which was thought to be the goal of all knowledge at one time and in which knowledge was supposed to consist in. These properties could be seen either in static terms as 'attributes' belonging to some substance or as 'powers' or 'forces' resulting in 'causal effectivity', or even as 'capacities' or 'potentialities' which would be actualized through maturation as in the biological world or through interaction with other substances as in the world usually called 'material'. But, whether conceived of in one way or another, they always have to be thought of in such a way that if they 'ceased to be', whatever may be meant by this phrase the 'object' that was supposed to be defined in terms of them also ceased to exist.

But, for this to happen, not only the object had to be conceived of in a certain manner, but the properties that were supposed to be 'essential' to it had also to be both 'finite' in number and related in such a way that if any one of them ceased to be for any reason, so would the others. As for the conception in terms of 'powers' or 'forces' or 'capacities' or 'potentialities', the notions are so nebulous, dispositional

and time-dependent that one would never be able to determine whether this was actually the case or not, at least in principle.

The deeper difficulty, however, arises from another direction as those that relate to the above in the context of practical action can be taken care of pragmatically, even on cognitive grounds and for cognitive purposes. But what cannot be so taken care of is the arbitrariness in the choice of what shall be taken to count as the 'defining' property or power or capacity of the object, as that is what 'knowledge' about it is supposed to consist in. In the case of objects with a multitude of complex, interrelated properties and capacities, to be an 'object', as pointed out earlier, means just this. There is always the problem as to which is given primacy or importance over others, something that can, and always has been a matter of dispute.

Definitions do change, as everyone who is acquainted with the history of any subject knows and these changes reflect changes in knowledge about that domain. But what does this really mean? Does it imply that what we considered as 'essential' was not 'essential' and that what was supposed to be 'knowledge' of the 'object' was not knowledge, even though we thought of it as such, and taught and acted on it.

There is another problem in respect of knowledge that is central to the idea of 'definition' and that is that it not only subsumes an 'object' under a class and sees it primarily as its member, but has to differentiate it from other cognate classes, epitomized in Aristotle's well-known statement in this regard. But this, as Aristotle noted, would make the enterprise of 'defining' restricted only to that which can simultaneously be seen as a member of a class higher than itself and as itself a class having subclasses of itself. Aristotle saw this primarily in terms of 'genus' and 'species' but, as the idea of 'class' has undergone a radical revision since then, it need not be confined to the biological perspective within which it had first been formulated. But, whatever the reformulation, it would still make such a definition impossible in principle as what cannot be subsumed under a class higher than itself, or which cannot have a subclass of itself, for it is not a class at all. This latter is the case with an individual or that which is the subject of singular judgement, just as the 'class of all classes' may be said to be an example of the former. The recourse to the notion of a 'unit class'

and the idea of the 'null class' being a member of every other class as it is necessarily included in it, would be of little avail as the latter, by definition, can have no characteristic at all to characterize it, while the former can only grant the spurious quantitative character of being 'equal to' all other unit classes, bereft of any quantitative identity which was needed to define it.

As for the 'class of all classes', the paradoxes in respect of it are well known and the Russellian recource to the theory of types to save the situation is only a clever move which deceives no one. The point is that the 'singular' and the 'universal' can have no definition, and thus are incapable of being known, if to 'know' is to know, through the definition of it, in its terms. But if neither the individual nor the universal can be known, what is the 'knowledge-enterprise' doing in which man seems to be engaged since he achieved self-consciousness and got involved in it. But the dilemma is that in order to determine what is 'singular' or 'individual' and what is that 'universal' which has nothing more universal than itself, one can have at the level of thought which is the sphere of intellect or reason only negation, as it is only in respect of objects that are 'in between', i.e. have elements of both 'singularity' and 'generality' that both affirmation and negation can simultaneously occur and 'knowledge' obtain as that is the very characteristic of knowledge. Identification and differentiation occur simultaneously in the judgement as to recognize that 'this is this' is also to implicitly recognize that 'this is not "that"'.

But, paradoxically, it is the 'singular' or the 'individual' which is felt to be the most, or even the only 'real', just as in another context, it is only the 'truly universal' that is felt to be the only real and everything else as being only deceptively so. This may not be knowledge as reason understands it, but it is certainly 'something' in which man 'lives' all the time and provides for that which he calls 'knowledge'. The relation between the two is or should be the central problem for thought though, for some strange reason, it has not been so. The preemption by 'reason' of what shall be considered to be 'true' and the relegation of everything else to the realm of the 'pre-reflective' is perhaps one reason for this. The other is the radical discontinuity between the two as the former is committed by its very nature to seek

coherence, consistency and adequacy both in terms of evidence and argument, while the latter seems to be concerned only with immediacy, significance, meaningfulness and fulfilment.

The 'philosophical' and the 'poetic' consciousness perhaps paradigmatically illustrate this, if they are treated as Weberian 'ideal-types' in themselves. The poetic consciousness should be treated as symbolizing the 'aesthetic consciousness' in general which is distinguishable from its closest analogue, i.e. 'spiritual consciousness' in the sense that the former has necessarily to try to embody itself in an 'externality' through an activity which it considers to be 'creative' but which is continuously constrained by factors of which the 'creator' is overwhelmingly aware though he is reluctant to acknowledge them, while the latter just never feels the need to do so, and in case it does, it feels it to be a 'temptation', a 'fall' from what it 'knows' it should be.

Distinguishing, discriminating and evaluating awareness is present and active at all these levels, and yet is not treated as 'knowledge', even though it also changes and grows and stagnates and perhaps has a 'history' of its own just as 'knowledge' is supposed to have. The latter, however, seems to have a cumulative character which the former does not seem to have and has, in most cases, a character which ensures that the 'latter' is better or more reliable than that which has been superceded by it. This results in that ambivalent relationship which makes all that is not accepted and certified as 'true' by the reason-centred enterprise of knowledge as 'superstitious belief or faith' which only the ignorant and the 'irrational' can cherish or 'live' in. Yet, it is 'beliefs' that man lives by and the so-called 'knowledge' has to turn into superstitious belief if it is to influence and determine the feelings and behaviour of men. The way this happens is generally overlooked as the very pretension to 'knowledge-claim' renders it difficult, if not impossible, to do so. The 'claim' denies that anything else can be regarded as 'true', or even worthy of cognitive consideration as it has not fulfilled even the minimum conditions for being considered as such. But the 'denial' is itself based on a denial of that very characteristic of knowledge which makes it 'knowledge'. There is, and can be, no 'finality' in knowledge and hence its claim to 'truth' can only be in a sense in which 'truth' is not generally considered as true.

Normally, 'truth' is supposed to be both infallible and complete and yet knowledge, that is 'human knowledge', can never be so. The attempt to save the situation by seeing 'truth' as a characteristic of 'atomic propositions' designating 'atomic facts', as in Wittgenstein, would result in a 'relationless' world where nothing affects or makes a difference to anything else and all the so-called 'relations' will be only a superimposition by the 'logical reason' on 'reality', designated as 'logical connectives' in his system. Wittgenstein's is a Leibnitzian monadic world where 'reason' as the 'organon' of knowledge functions as it does in Buddhism or Advaita Vedānta without his being aware that it is so. The question, however, is whether this world of 'atomic facts' is 'open' or 'closed', and in case it is the former, how does a new 'atomic fact' come into being and in case it is the latter, how does one know that it is 'closed' and that nothing further can be added to it. The deeper question, however, relates to its reflexive relation to language which it is supposed to mirror and which itself is supposed to be 'atomic' in character without any 'real' relations in between them, thus destroying the very character of language as 'language' for just as 'words' have to be related to form 'atomic sentences', so 'atomic sentences' have to be related *ad infinitum*, at least in principle, to yield language.

Yet, the moment one gives up the notion of 'atomic facts' and 'truth' as being a characteristic of 'atomic propositions', one also gives up the notion of knowledge that characterizes it as true in the *deceptive* sense of the term. Knowledge is certainly 'true', but this 'truth' is always bound to be 'less' than that of which it is supposed to be knowledge, as it is the latter which provides that perennial dynamics which makes the former perpetually move forward and never rest content with itself.

But though knowledge never rests still and is ever incomplete, the illusion of having grasped the 'truth' affects both the consciousness about the object of which it is the knowledge and the self-consciousness that thinks it possesses the knowledge, and is 'sure' of the 'certainty' thereof. The 'object' begins to be conceived of in terms of its knowledge and defined in its terms, so that now it is the 'definition' that begins to determine what 'object' shall be correctly designated by that name or word. And, as knowledge changes, which it must, definition also changes, 'changing' the objects designated by its name or term.

The changes thus introduced affect, at another level, both feeling and action, transforming the self and the world in a way which would not have happened if the illusion had not been there, or if the 'illusoriness' of the illusion had been realized. What comes thus into being is the strange world created by man through actions based on that knowledge and the feelings engendered by it, specially in the context of the way the 'self' and the 'world' are conceived and also the relations between them.

The story of civilizations is the story of this interplay between the delusion and deception superimposed by the successive definitions of reality at all levels, both of objectivity and subjectivity, and the attempts to get out of them only to get caught in some new snare or conceptual net created by the cognitive enterprise of man.

The enterprise of reason or the cognitive enterprise determined by the search for essences and the grasp thereof in definitions may, however, itself be either totally given up as in the so-called 'spiritual' or creativity-centred aesthetic pursuits of man, or submerged in living primarily in terms of 'feeling-relationship' with the 'other' at all levels, or actively negated through the pursuits of wealth and power, epitomized in business and politics.

Each of these, paradoxically, however gives rise, because of the reflexive self-conscious nature of man, to a view of self and reality which are not only at loggerheads with one another, but result in the creation of that human world which has necessarily to be self-contradictory because of this very fact. Man has to see himself in terms of all of these, including all that he knows about them even if it results in contradictions which he finds difficult to live with.

The contradictions arising from the conflicting definitions which continue to persist even after one is supposed to have superceded the other provides a clue not only to the dynamics of the human situation in all its dimensions, but also to the unbelievable tragedy which permeates every aspect of it since its very inception. Wars, cruelty and injustice have dogged it at every step. But, what is stranger, human reason has always been able to find 'reasons' to justify them, mainly because it has seen 'reality' and defined and constituted it in terms of its own definitions. Definitions constitute knowledge and knowledge

determines the way 'reality' is seen, and the way reality is seen determines the way men feel and behave and act on its basis. Once, one loosens the bonds between these, one would also 'free' oneself from the compulsions which the uncritical acceptance of reason and the belief or 'faith' in the knowledge that is its result, result in.

Knowledge is an unending, 'open' enterprise of man, while that which is sought to be 'known' is supposed to be ever the same, and even when it is supposed to change, there is the 'unchanging' law according to which it is said to change. To treat the former as if it were the latter, is the mistake and 'definition' does just this, just as the formulation of a 'law' does at another level. Both, if not understood as steps in that open unending process, generate dangerous delusions as they superimpose deceptions leading to what has been called 'arrogance of knowledge' resulting in that state of the 'cogito' which asserts 'I know' when it knows nothing. The 'unknown' is always greater than the 'known', and what is 'known' is not only incomplete but full of inaccuracies, inadequacies and errors about which one knows nothing except that they *must* be there if the enterprise of knowledge has to go on, as it must.

Once this consciousness takes hold of man, the enterprise itself will become radically different, 'freed' as it will be from the 'I-centricity' which is the bane of all knowledge-claims, and that 'past-centricity' which thinks that all that is to be known was already known as evidenced in a revealed text or the utterances of a Master who had 'seen' the truth. The 'unendingness' of the enterprise, if existentially realized, might also cure one from the illusion that there would ever be a time in the future when the enterprise would cease, as man would have known all that was to be known and there would remain for him nothing more to know. There is, and can be, little difference between the past and the future in this respect, though many consider the 'illusion' about the 'future' to make the enterprise move forward. But this itself seems an illusion as otherwise the enterprise would have stopped long ago as many a time, in the past, man had thought he had found the truth 'finally' and that there was nothing more to find.

The illusions of 'finality' are thus not necessary for the human enterprise of knowledge, just as they are not necessary for his other

enterprises for, basically, it is not different from them. Definitions, thus, have to be 'freed' from the notion of 'finality' which has been associated with them up till now, if the knowledge-enterprise is to be seen as an 'enterprise', 'open' and 'unending', like the other enterprises in which man has engaged since he appeared for reasons about which he can know nothing.

How to Dispose of the Free Will Issue: An Analysis

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In loose terms, free will is a philosophical notion describing a particular ability possessed by an agent which enables it to choose an unconstrained course of action from amongst various alternatives. There is significant argument over the exact nature of free will and in the case of humans, it is often largely ignored except when moral responsibility comes into question. Now that sophisticated Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents are being developed, the notion of free will is being applied to them too. However, Aaron Sloman suggests that the development of AI agents has revealed the futility of the notion of free will itself.

According to Sloman, the traditional notion of free will is dependent upon a well-defined distinction between systems which have free will and systems which don't. He refutes this assumption by arguing that the only well-defined distinctions between systems are design distinctions and even though all the different designs have some or the other form of freedom, there is really no one holistic property of 'free will' that a system can be said to have.[1]

In the beginning of this discussion, free will was introduced as the ability to make an unconstrained choice of a motive. However, whatever may be the design of the system, it would always have to operate under some constraints.[2] So, we really can never say that a system has 'free will'. In fact, due to each constraint it has to operate in, it would lose a certain kind of freedom. We would then have several different notions of freedom, some applicable to some agents and other applicable to other agents. The single distinction between systems with or without free will has hence been lost.

Once the core assumption of free will is refuted, Sloman argues that the question of free will loses meaning since there is no single way left to answer it. This is because there is no single meaning of free; instead, there exist several shades of freedom. For instance, consider a child being told to play. The child can do whatever he wishes. Is he not free then? However, speaking broadly, we can immediately list some very obvious constraints. The child cannot go out of the playground, or he would probably be lost. The child cannot do anything that harms himself or others. The child can also not play games which demand more physical characteristics than those he currently possesses. There are many more constraints that are due to the design of the agent (child) and are not discussed here. But the ones listed are enough to prove our point—even the most elementary activities which we might think to be free, are often under several constraint. Answering the question 'Is the child free?' is now a lot more difficult.

We probably need to understand the constraints imposed upon the agents due to their design, before we can attempt to answer the question of free will. Sloman brings to notice the differences in the designs of agents. In the section below, some of these designs have been compared and their freedom assessed.

CASE 1

Compare (a) agents with a monolithic hierarchical computational architecture where sub-processes cannot acquire any motives (goals) except via their 'superiors', with only one top level executive process generating all the goals driving lower level systems with (b) agents where individual subsystems can generate independent goals. In case (b) we can distinguish many such cases, for instances:

(b1) the system is hierarchical and subsystems can pursue their independent goals if they don't conflict with the goals of their superiors.

(b) there are procedures whereby subsystems can (sometimes?) override their superiors (e.g. trained reflexes?).

In agent (a), achievement would be greater as the whole agent comprising superior and subordinates will work as a team towards a single goal. However, in such an agent, the exploration of new methods and opportunities would completely depend on the superior module.

There could be a scenario, where a motive which might be very important for the system could be missed out. Assuming that the subordinates of a team do not have personal ambitions, all the subordinates perform according to the superiors and work towards achieving the single goal.

However, in agent (b) even though the system might not be able to achieve a lot towards a focussed goal, it would still be able to explore more methods and opportunities. More time would obviously be needed to achieve the subordinate goals as each subordinate module would be working independently towards its goals. This behaviour would be different in agent (a), as the entire system with all its subordinates works towards a single goal. Moreover, in a complex agent like (b), mechanisms are required to ensure that the subordinates' separate goals do not conflict with each other's goals or the goals of the system as a whole.

We can think of (b1) to simulate the behaviour of a country where the superior module is the head of the state, the restrictions are the laws and the subordinates would be like the citizens of the state having individual goals and the right to fulfil them as long as they don't go against the law/restrictions. In (b2), the system can be thought of as a natural system like the body, where the brain commands what is to be done but sometimes subordinate modules like the spinal card takes over in conditions like experiencing a burn, and overrides the brain by appropriate reflexes.

Finally, in agent (a), the aspects of a social setting will be explored just by the superiors and hence the adaptiveness would depend on the superiors. The subordinates would just follow the superiors. Further, interaction with (a) would be very focussed, and similar ideas/reactions would be obtained in each iteration since each time, basically we are just interacting with the superior. On the other hand, diverse reactions can be expected from agent (b). Reactions of (b1) would be moderated by the superior, but in (b2) even this would not be a restriction.

In this classification, the aspect of free will is more focussed to the subsystem rather than the system. In case (a), the subordinates are retrained. On the other hand, in case (b), a sort of free will can be

thought of to exist under certain restrictions for the subordinates to act as they want.

CASE 2

Contrast (a) an agent whose motive generators and comparators (higher order motivators) are themselves accessible to explicit internal scrutiny, analysis and change, with (b) and agent for which all the changes in motive generators and comparators are merely uncontrolled side effects of other processes (as in addictions, habituation, etc.). A similar distinction can be made as to whether motives themselves are or are not accessible to explicit internal scrutiny, analysis and change.

Initially, when either of the agents are given a certain goal to accomplish, their performance would be quite similar to each other, but there would be an improvement in (a) over a period of time. This is because apart from the environment, the internal processes of agent (a) would act as meta-processes which would evaluate the process itself. Therefore, agent (a) would learn from self-correction unlike (b). Agent (b) would also improve due to the increased familiarity that it will have by performing the same task, habitually, over and over again. However, it is not necessary that the method the agent is repeatedly using is necessarily the most optimal method, since it has no mechanisms to check that. It hence faces this obvious disadvantage when compared to (a).

However, the nature of the self-correction employed by agent (a) raises some doubts. The doubt is introduced because the correction might not always be towards the good as what might seen to be good to the agent might not be good in reality. Therefore, the power of an agent to modify itself by self-correction can have an adverse effect as well.

Agent (a) does seem to have more free will than (b) since the changes to its generators and comparators are controlled by itself. In (b), these changes are merely 'uncontrolled side-effects'.

CASE 3

Contrast (a) an agent whose motive generators and comparators change partly under the influence of genetically determined factors (e.g. puberty), with (b) an agent for whom they can change only in the light of interactions with the environment and the inferences drawn therefrom.

We are assuming here that the first agent (a) can modify its motive generators and comparators partly due to genetic factors and party due to interactions with the environment. The second agent (b) can only modify itself due to the interactions with the environment. We can hence see an obvious advantage (a) has. It cannot only change according to the changing needs of the environment like (b), but in addition it also changes due to genetic factors. It is arguable whether the effect of such a change would be positive (as we are assuming) or negative. We think it to be positive since we are assuming that genes of a species being passed down are modified and improved to suit the environment. In this way, agent (a) would be able to perform certain tasks 'innately' while (b) will have to rely on its experience alone.

Another difference between the characteristics of the two agents is that it is almost certain that (a) will change over time. However, the same prediction cannot be made for the latter agent as it is dependent on changing due to interactions with the environment, and we cannot say for sure whether or not the environment would change over time or would induce a change in the agent.

We can infer from the above discussion that (b) is probably freer since it is not bound to its genetic factors to change. The changes due to genetic factors do not force any change (good or bad) upon the agent. Agent (b) is hence responsible for learning from its experience and changing its generators and comparators accordingly, unlike (a) which cannot escape the changes due to uncontrollable genetic factors.

Hence, Sloman successfully proves that there is no one distinction between agents with or without free will, rather as seen in the examples above, there exist shades of freedom. However, the notion of 'freedom' is still not clear. From Sloman's persuasive argument, it is acceptable that there is no one single idea which can define freedom and that freedom has many characteristics. However, even if we consider a particular kind of freedom, still we are unable to clearly understand it.

In my view, this understanding is important before any attempts to answer the question of free will are made. For instance, we can claim that the choice 'to be or not to be'[3] exists and that we are free to take the decision. We are certainly physically capable of employing a method of self-destruction in order to commit a suicide. So, whether we commit suicide or not is ultimately our choice since we are equally capable of performing both actions. But it is arguable whether it is really a choice or merely an illusion of a choice because rationally we know that unless mentally ill, we will not commit a suicide. Does just being capable of doing something make us free, even though we know we wouldn't do it? According to some philosophers, there is no genuine problem of free will since freedom is illusionary.[4] This line of thought demands our attention, since it is not difficult to view the environment as a set of constraints. Sloman describes 14 different kinds of constraints on the design and operation of an agent. We can think of many more constraints under which agents have to operate. We can hence argue that there is no action that can be performed that is unconstrained. The definition of free will, with which we began this discussion, required an agent to choose an unconstrained motive, and since this is not possible, we can derive that there is no free will.

Amongst the many arguments against this point of view, I believe the most significant argument is that of moral responsibility.[5] It can be argued that morally, there is no obvious constraint. For instance, if we indulge in charitable work then we are doing it out of our own wish and will. Are we then not free? I do not agree with this argument. Indulging in a particular kind of work—moral or not—is a goal. People are morally responsible for all sorts of reasons including the simplest that they might just like it. Liking or disliking something (charitable work in this case) is also a form of a constraint. Just like Sloman argued that there is a distinction between agents who modify their motive generators and comparators according to the likes/dislikes of other agents, we can argue that likes/dislikes of self are also constraints. Hence, we can think of moral responsibilities as an extreme kind of constraint.

My view is also different from determinists.[6] I do not believe that all the events in the world are due to a chain of previously occurring

events. In fact, recent developments in physics and mathematics reveal that a system can get into phases where small variations in parameters can lead to an unpredictable behaviour variation in future system behaviour.[7] This negates the cause and effect theory of determinists.

I do not believe in free will because freedom is just an illusion—ultimately, even the choice of our very existence is constrained. We can think of environment as a programme with invisible rules and constraints, creating an illusion of free will.

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Reason, Democracy and Freedom

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ABSTRACT

A general concession granted to any ideology is that its practice might encounter some difficulties and, thus, ideology can neither be practiced with absolute rigidity nor it can thus be expected to generate perfect results. In this article, an attempt has been made to argue that despite the ideal of democracy being so popular, there are certain difficulties in its practice. These difficulties are not only empirical, i.e. that ideal of democracy is difficult to practice not only because of uncongenial political situations, but more importantly that there is some thing in the ideal itself which makes it self-defeating. Thus, there is not only practical difficulty but also logical impossibility in the practice of democracy. This is largely due to the two mutually negating presuppositions 1 of liberty and 2 of consent of people, as fundamental to democracy. The critique is based on the understanding and exposition that in purest form the concept of 'freedom' (as conceived by libertarians) defies consent and the consent (which is essentially the 'reason') is encroachment on individual's liberty. Both cannot go together.

It is argued that since the concept of democracy is based on reason on one hand and it tries to protect freedom on the other, it becomes self-contradictory. Reason demands submission and freedom defies the same. Thus, due to this inherent contradiction in the idea of democracy, its practice is bound to promote corruption, coercion and violence. The end product is terrorism.

The ideal

Some definition of democracy, and the promise

Genesis of ideal—the philosophy of social contract (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau)
The evolution of the concept of liberty, of individualism and individual liberty

The practice

Necessity of judging political ideal (of democracy) on the basis of practicability
Basic conditions for the practice of democracy
Contract implies consent of people, but there are other aspects too
The scheme of practice (dilution of either liberty or contract or both)
Democracy as conceptual impossibility (three arguments)
Democracy as empirical difficulty (three arguments)

The product

The nature of man, the scheme of practice, the concept of liberty, power and individual
Collectively or in isolation result in *terrorism*.

Democracy, it is almost unanimously presumed, is the best form of, and the most popular form of government in the modern world. It is also presumed to be not only a political system of governance based on the consent of governed, but also a value in itself and a way of life. The pressure and struggle to transform undemocratic nations into democracies continues. Even those nations which are not democratic, partly due to this endeavour, proclaim themselves to be democracies of their kind. Why is democracy regarded as so high a system?

THE IDEAL

Lincoln conceived democracy as 'Government of the people, by the people and for the people.' Lord Bryce observed, 'The word democracy has been used ever since the time of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of the State is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of community as a whole.'[1] Democracy is taken as a civilized way of political action

in which everyone has a share; a system in which people have the power to legislate and govern themselves in accordance with their own will. Most of the contemporary discussion on democracy emphasizes, along with others, on the notion of liberty, of individual liberty. It is basically this liberalism which makes democracy of present day a value, as it goes well with freedom; individual, economic, etc. Mill's love and advocacy of democracy, it can be supposed, results from his belief that it is democracy alone which can defend and give the fullest possible expression to an individual's liberty. Thomas Mann held that any definition of democracy is incomplete if it takes only the technical political view into account. Nor can the idea of peace and of right to self determination (alone) be adequate grounds of understanding democracy. 'We must reach higher and envisage the whole. We must define democracy as that form of government and of society which is inspired above every other with the feeling and consciousness of dignity of man.'[2] We can, thus, see that democracy as a concept seems to promise a better or the best possible political, social and economic world order in which the individual is most important.

It will be expedient at this juncture to probe into that genesis of democracy, which makes it an ideal. One of the greatest promoters of modern democracy is the contractarian thought. The contractarians including Hobbes are held high in democratic thought essentially because they all based the foundation of government on the consent of people. And the consent of people is the foundation of democracy.

Hobbes, one of the greatest contractarians in the history of political thought, presents for the purpose of contract the description of the 'state of nature'. Hobbes sees in the state of nature, a continual war or threat of war of every man against every man. For Hobbes, strife and war are a matter of rule rather than the exception in uncontrolled human behaviour. Man's natural passion carries him to partialities, pride, revenge and the like.

Due to the presence of selfish and egoistic tendencies in human nature, Hobbes advocated a strong sovereign state unassailable against enemies from within or without. He also attacked any institution that could weaken the omnipotence of the state, such as the division of power, the principle of coalition in government formation, liberty of

the subject or the right to challenge the wisdom or legality of sovereign actions. He maintained that the only law is the word of the sovereign. There can be no unjust law. No laws are wrong because laws are the rules of just and unjust.

On the questions of why mankind cannot live sociably with one another like living creatures as bees and ants can. Hobbes answers are interesting. For him, 'men are continually in competition for honour and dignity which these creatures are not ... . Among these creatures the common good differs not from private ... . But man, whose joy consists in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent ... . The agreement of these creatures is natural, that of man is by covenant only, which is artificial, and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.'[3]

Hobbes' entire account should, for our purpose, be divided into two sectors:

1. Dealing with the basic nature of man which drives him to enter the covenant, to form a commonwealth and contract, and
2. The nature of legal sovereign power.

Locke, in contrast with Hobbes, supposes that the state of nature is not the state of war, but a state of peace, goodwill and mutual assistance. The only defect of the state of nature is that it does not have political organization to give effect to the rules of right. Men, thus, enter a contract of political or civil society, the great and chief aim of men's formation of commonwealth is the mutual preservation of their, lives, liberties and possessions. And invasion of the life, liberty or property of subjects is *ipso facto* void.

Rousseau's General Will is considered as one of the most influential inspirations behind modern democracies. Of General Will, Rousseau says, 'There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interests, while the former takes private interests into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills; but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences.'[4] On the nature of man and state, Rousseau

held that man is naturally good, and only by institutions is he made bad.

The idea of liberty is a natural ally of the concept of democracy. The original concept of liberty in West, i.e. the Greek concept of liberty was essentially the right to participate in public affairs. The modern Western concepts of liberty and individual (with reference to the duality of individual and state) emerged in the sixteenth-century movements. In economic thought, it expressed itself as capitalism. The changed political and economic circumstances of the modern states brought about a remarkable change in the concept of individual and liberty. The concept of liberty assumed more and more negative emphasis of 'the absence of restraint' in place of positive stress on 'participation in public affairs'. The democratic ideal of liberty, from ancient to modern, always attracted the libertarians and no wonder almost all of them sided with democracy.

THE PRACTICE

A political ideology, even if abstract, also has to be judged on the basis of the actual results it produces, or is bound to produce in real human, political situation. How is the ideal of democracy to be practiced? The ideal in itself is not enough and surely it demands certain conditions to prevail for its success.

The conditions necessary for the successful practice of democracy can be broadly stated as: High standard of honesty and honour among the people, high level of rationality and education amongst the people, the community consciousness, strong and vigorous public opinion, a mind for not only political but also for social and economic democracy (after Hearnshaw). Some of these conditions can be fulfilled, but the point is, not some but all of these or even more are required to be fulfilled.

Any discussion on the social contract is so obsessed with the idea of 'consent of people' that other aspects get easily ignored or sidelined. The idea of popular consent is good for democracy, but the idea of popular consent is not a complete idea if divorced from the causes and the consequences (both imagined and actual) of popular consent. The moment we bring to surface the causes and consequences of the idea

of popular consent, we see democracy landing into trouble, conceptually fading away to nullity.

Of all contractarians, Locke is the most outstanding in terms of impact and influence. He has suggested that popular consent is the sole legitimate base of government. For Locke, an arbitrary autocrat is an outcast and people in rebellion against him are the defenders of law. 'What makes the two treatises remarkable is that they are more than an apologia for the revolution in 1688.'[5] His insistence that there is a law higher than the proclaimed law of community has led to the conception that to obey the law is virtue but not the highest civic virtue.

Locke's concept of law and that of the consent of the ruled exposed him to the charge that his idea 'lays ferment for frequent rebellion'. In response to this change Locke answers, 'The people generally ill-treated, and contrary to the right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of burdens that sit heavy on them.'[6] In continuation of this response he further says, 'Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to people and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see wither they are going—it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which the government was first erected, ...'[7] Expanding the propriety of rebellion, Locke holds that it is right to rise in rebellion against legislators if they act contrary to the end for which they were constituted. 'And if those who by force take away the legislature are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shown, can be less esteemed so, when they who were set up for the protection and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they, putting themselves into the state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly with the greatest aggravation rebellantes (rebels). But if they who say it lays ferment for rebellion mean that it may occasion civil wars ... . They may well say upon the same grounds that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If

any mischief came in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own rights, but on him that invades his neighbour's. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for peace's sake to him who will a violent hand upon it, I desire it may be considered what a kind of peace there will be in the world which consists only in violence and rapine, and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors.'[8]

The spirit behind this justification of rebellion by the liberals is that the rebellion against the government (establishment) is justified only when the majority feels oppressed by a minority of those who govern or by a single despot. Under such conditions, it is not only morally justified but also a duty of those who love liberty and the rule of law, to rebel against oppressing establishment. If force is the only way to wrest freedom from the oppressive rule, then force must be used.

Harold J. Laski outdoes Locke in the right to rebel. Locke restricts the right to rebel to aggrieved majority; Laski goes much farther to conclude that, 'In the last resort, the *individual* will have to decide for himself whether he will bow to established law and order, or whether he will feel compelled by inner impulse of irrepressible intensity, to rebel.'[9] Regarding such a decision, Laski maintains, 'He may be wrong in the view he takes; but he has never any rational alternative to action in the light of his own certainties'.[10] This move from the feeling of majority to the judgement of singular individual is much in consonance with the logic of individualism which runs hand in hand with democracy as against that of (majority) society which is compatible with socialism.

Individual's freedom and opinion have always remained precious for libertarians. Much like Laski, John Stuart Mill holds that despite the government being popular and upholder of the interest of the people at large (majority), it cannot ignore individual. In his defense, significance and just fullness of individual's opinion says Mill, 'Let us suppose, therefore, that government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or their government. The power itself is illegitimate—it is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when

in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, then he if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.'[11]

After having mentioned these principles of practice of democracy (as given by noted contract and other thinkers), I now proceed first to argue that there is something conceptually wrong with the idea of democracy and it is a self-defeating concept. Due to inherent contradictions, true democracy is forever impossible. Next I shall argue that if despite self-defeating nature of democracy, it is still practiced (in distorted from as the only alternative) it shall produce; it has produced in the past and shall continue to produce results contradictory to those imagined or hoped for. Position two is logically implied by position one.

Democracy as a conceptual impossibility

Since all my view regarding the conceptual impossibility of democracy is based on the nature of 'reason', it is important first to present a brief statement (of my understanding) of the nature of 'reason'. Reason is that supreme faculty of human mind which does not argue to convince. It, on the contrary, being the supreme authority of thought, has the power to grasp and comprehend the truth immediately, i.e. without any mediation. It see the truth *a priori*. It sees the essence of existence. It sees the universal and the unchangeable. The truths of reason are self-evident, necessary, un-contradicted and un-contradictable, underived and eternal. They are not arrived at but are ever there. To this category belong the truths of mathematics and logic. The truths are only discovered. The process of discovery is all that is meant by reasoning. And by rationality is meant the instrument employed to make this discovery possible.

1. Rationality is presented as a demand or condition for democracy. The contract invokes reason to arrive at a compromise, the consent of all. All here means each individual, the liberty of whom is promised to be safeguarded. But reason and liberty both know no compromise. Reason does not give consent (i.e. it does not function in persuasive or appeasing manner). It either approves or disapproves (i.e. its judgements are of the nature of command or imperative). Thus, 'creation' of contract is impossible, for if reason approves of it, it shall always be, and if it does not, it can never rationally be. Further, the hypothesis of contract presupposes a march from imperfection to perfection. Thus, believing men or at least most of them are not rational. In spirit of contract, it is useless to argue that some rational beings, after the contract may make the remaining beings rational.
2. Reason subscribes essences; the universal unchanging essences, liberty the existence; the ever-changing particulars. Essence and existence mutually negate each other. (Rationalism or essentialism tries to define man, to present a fixed unchanging nature of man. Existence, particularly as Sartre saw it, on the other hand, emphasizes that man is ever at liberty to change and there ought not to be a closed conceptualization of nature of man, liberty by nature defies all sorts of binding.)
3. Fallacy in collective reason:
   The conclusion that democracy is desirable—based on the belief that it stands to fulfil the people's wish—proves to be logically invalid on closer examination. This is shown by the fallacy in collective reason which may assume two forms:
   (a) Fallacy of composition: As it is fallacious to argue that, since that every ship of fleet is ready for battle, the whole fleet must be ready for battle. It is also fallacious to argue that, since every one in contract wants liberty, equality and fraternity for all, the contract safeguards the liberty, equality and fraternity of all. To argue like this is to apply the attributes of the components to the composed. It does not happen often, and never in human spheres.
   (b) Fallacy of division: As it is fallacious to argue that, since the machine is heavy the component parts of machine must be heavy. It is also fallacious to argue that since democracy is based on people's will, all people will for democracy.

Now I bring forward to second set of arguments which render the idea of good practice of democracy as impracticable. These may be called irremovable empirical difficulties.

Democracy as empirical difficulty

1. We the people—who are they? How many are they? Surely few, who only represent or in most cases, are only believed to represent people. If they really represent the will of people, the will of people is diluted, for at every stage or point of human representation, corruption of thought or feeling takes place. The more indirect, the more corrupt. If they are only supposed to be representing people, it is the rule of a few on the rest. The will of people in either case is mitigated, diluted or even corrupted.
2. Adult franchise principle, even at the best in its application, counts only the heads. It goes by number (unconscious sophists) rather than by actual spirit of governance for good. It is neither by the people nor for the people.
3. The outcome of voting does not reflect peoples' choice, not even of many and in some cases not even of any. Resultant equilibrium is always in different from desired direction.

THE PRODUCT

What have this concept/idea of democracy and its application produced? What have they given to humanity, to people? Surely, they have not proved themselves sterile. They have produced, amongst many things, both ideological and actual, ground and condition for proliferation of one of the ugliest malice for humanity. That is *Terrorism*.

Let us recall our formulation of Hobbes' account

(1) Dealing with the basic nature of man which drives him to enter the covenant, to form a commonwealth and contract as well as

(2) The nature of legal sovereign power.

Of these, (1) tells us that it is inherent in man's nature to be selfish and to fight with use of force. He is a brute who wants to appropriate for himself as much as he can. He has no rules to abide by and that it is in the nature of every man to wage a war at every man. This (irrespective of what political historians and analysts have thought so far regarding this) also leads us to presume that to be selfish and voracious is a psychological-natural fact in man and there is no wonder that these

tendencies pop up again and again and are given a name of terrorism in today's political setups and situations.

(2) leads us to think that the state is itself another name of terror, as the purpose of its formation is to broadcast awe and so that the brute are forced to abstain from their natural desires. Here two things demand our attention. (1) In the first place, what if some (considerable group) does not enter the contract? And (2) What if it desires to break away from the formed contract? In the case (1) it is more than likely that the group of individuals will be coerced (terrorized) by the rest, and with this the spirit of contract would die out. In case (2) the legal sovereign who may exist and wield the law shall declare the dissident as outlaw. Here the use of terror is inherent on both sides, i.e. the state and the dissident. Dissidents would either be acting at the force of natural tendency or on the reason of failure of the purpose of covenant.

Yet another situation is entailed, that the state—which is so authoritarian that it overrides the individual's intellect and power to reason—ignores individual's liberty and freedom, and might itself become a terroristic state. In doing so, it might sow the seeds of counterterrorism amongst its subjects.

Thus, the political thought of Hobbes, intended to explain society and its governance, the relationship of sovereign and the subject, the means and process of avoiding conflict and coercion, has not only not delivered the promise but has also brought in its train ideas which might be helpful in promoting the use of coercion, violence and terror. His mistake lies in unintentionally promoting what he wanted to avoid. Many a thinker today associates the genesis of modern terrorism with totalitarianism; hence finding fault with Hobbes is not so disappointing.

Liberalism, as generally understood, stands in thorough opposition to terrorism. The terrorist actions distort the face of liberty, and the majority of people feel liberty loss with any activity of terror inflicted on them. Yet it is not difficult to see that they have something in common. Both libertarians and terrorists (as per their own pronouncements) are devotees of freedom. For terrorists too, their entire activity is a freedom struggle or the demand or pressure for demand of some kind of (or extension of) liberty. The difference between the two, according to the traditional as well as recent prevailing literature, is

that *liberty* is lawful and it is to be demanded through the means approved by law, where as terrorism has no legal justification, it is condemnable wherever it occurs, more important of all the differences is that the value system(s) find liberty moral and *terrorism* immoral.

The popular opinion regarding the distinction between terrorism and liberty is so strong that our thought process flows only in one direction and never does any mind endeavour to think against the stream. This should be overcome. Let us begin by asking ourselves a question: is there anything in libertarianism which can be (at least supposed to be) supporting terrorism?

Thomas Jefferson is a hero par excellence in the history of American liberalism. Reacting to the charges of anarchy laid on Americans by the British, in one of his letters he wrote, 'The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.'[12] Jefferson had written this letter from Paris but he did not have any idea of French Revolution in mind when he wrote these words. Though, however, the concept of 'blood thirsty tree of liberty', entered into the rhetoric of the French Revolution and specifically into the rhetoric of revolutionary terror.

One of the metaphysical[13] conceptions of Rousseau's general will in social contract is that of being 'forced to be free'. The general will is the will of the sovereign, general will is always right. Each citizen qua citizen shares in general will, the social contract involves that who ever refuses to obey the general will shall be forced to do so. 'This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free.' The dilemma in Rousseau's thought is this: that either democracy should be direct one and of small states (small enough to support direct democracy in which each citizen can directly participate). Or if there are larger indirect democracies the concept of 'forced to be free' shall become inevitable. Small direct democracy of Rousseau's kind is not possible, and 'forced to be free' involves coercion of some minority by the majority. This might lead to what may be called 'State Terrorism'.

There would be hardly anything seriously wrong if the idea of 'contract' and the idea of 'rebellion' were (especially in Locke) not in conformity with each other. This would only imply that the philosophy was inconsistent. But unlike empiricism, his ideas of rebellion are

consistent with his ideas of contract. And this time it is the consistency which is root of the problem.

Locke's idea of law above the law gives each individual an opportunity to fix for himself (quite subjectively) the nature of this higher law. If for one it is the path of religion (one's own) and for the other the secular humanism, conflict becomes inevitable. Further, the oppression or benevolence of the government is not always the same for all interest groups amongst the ruled. For a considerable period of time, the British Raj in India was seen as oppressive only by the minority of few elite, there was simultaneously a large part of Indian population which believed British to be just and benevolent. (Many have seen this as the reason of failure of many revolts against the British.) A policy of government might appear appeasement of a particular section (and therefore unjust), to many, to the equal in number it may appear to be appeasement and still just, and still there would be many who would find the same policy neither appeasement nor unjust. This always happens in large democracies, happens to the extent that the majority opinion becomes ambiguous and is often moulded to benefit by interest groups, either in power or in public. Majority opinion is seldom monolithic and well defined. It is composed of fractions and fragments, of which suitable are chosen and highlighted by influential to gain political leverage. The question of the unpopularity of rule is also decided in more or less the same way. In such a situation, there might be radical groups (as there actually are) that may feel deceived and their opinion, however strong (also right according to themselves) being trivialized. There is high possibility that such groups will take to arms to overtake the current of those opposing their view. The suggestion being offered here is that a particular group may consider its opinion to be the opinion of majority, remaining either indifferent to support from masses or waiting for the support and approval of masses in the retrospect of the action done. (The success or failure to get such support and approval would not in any way change the action already done.) United States' leadership and its forces, despite their continuous propaganda—that the majority of Iraqis are pro-coalition forces and anti Saddam—could not demonstrate this, as long as the battle (almost one-sided) was going on. The US claim and belief that the common

Iraqi would stand up in rebellion against Saddam with the support of and to support US-led forces is also being increasingly proved to be hollow. Even within the US, the opinion on the question: 'To wage or avoid the war' was not only divided but also displayed a see-saw bending one side or the else from time to time. (President Bush's appeal to support the war is well known to the world.)[14]

In the liberal thought majority counts, a majority which Rousseau suggested and Locke gave a high value. But this is not all. In the thought of Laski and Mill we see that though majority is important, yet the most significant and precious for their kind of liberalism is individual and from this the individualism.

Laski's view that the law has to be based on ethical consideration and the source of ethical validity of law lies in individual 'I make law legal ...' makes sufficient base for the launch of ideas of inappropriateness of laws and these are to be revolted against. Mill does consider power to be illegitimate, yet he indirectly grants the conditional sanction to the individual, of the use of power, i.e. in case of majority not being sympathetic to his view point. Mill's declaration that 'even one person would be justified in silencing the mankind' is definitely motivating (surely much contrary to what Mill must have wished) for terrorists. They are accumulating and also displaying what they have accumulated in terms of power. (A perverted destructive type.)

Notes and References

1. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, Vol. 1, p. 20.
2. Thomas Mann, *The Coming Victory of Democracy*, p. 22.
3. Ibid.
4. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1938.
5. William Ebenstein, *Revolution is The Glorious Revolution of 1688*, Treatises is work of Locke.
6. John Locke, *The Treatises of Government*, Mentor, 1965, p. 463.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 465.
9. William Ebenstein, *Modern Political Thought*, 2nd ed. (Oxford & IBH), pp. 129–30.
10. H.J. Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice*, (The Viking Press, NY, 1935).

11. J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859.
12. A letter to Colonel William Stephens Smith, November 13, 1787.
13. Burtrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (Routledge, 1995), p. 671.

14. The US led forces attacked Iraq in the first quarter of 2003 on the unproven charges that Iraqi President Saddam was developing unconventional weapons of mass destruction.

The Primacy of the Family in the Philosophies of Confucius and Aristotle, and in African Philosophy: A Comparative Analysis

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INTRODUCTION

To the question, 'What is the true origin of government and civil society?' one of the responses that arose postulated a theory of 'the state of nature'. The state of nature was seen to be the condition of men before there was any state or civil society. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) described 'the state of nature' as an anarchic condition in which the life of man was 'short, solitary, nasty and brutish' (Hobbes, 1975). John Locke (1632–1704), referred to as 'Father of British empiricism', described the condition of 'the state of nature' in a very different way, maintaining that 'men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them is properly the state of nature' (Locke, 1972). Locke's analysis reveals that while the state of nature persists, every man is the judge in his own cause since he must rely upon himself for the defense of his rights. To counter this evil, civil government is the remedy.

The Hobbes and Locke, the foundation of the entire social and political order is civil government. Questions have been raised concerning whether there indeed ever was such a state of nature, i.e. whether it has any historical existence. Was there ever a time when men lived without some form of law, order, regulation and organization? An alternative position is the view that the family stands at the foundation of the entire social and political order; the family and not civil government is the fundamental society. This latter position was advanced by the ancient Chinese sage Kung Fu-tzu (more popularly

known as Confucius) and, similarly, by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle.

In our view, the idea that the family is the fundamental unit of society is a more plausible position than the postulate of some kind of society which preceded the institution of government. The implication then in that 'the state of nature' may be a mere hypothetical conjecture, an illustrative hypothesis lacking historical validity.

Our task in this paper is to carry out a comparative analysis of the centrality or primacy of the family as the foundation upon which the state is built from the perspectives of Confucius and Aristotle. We further show that the family is also a fundamental institution in African cultural philosophy. Our aim is to show that there are points of convergence of various strands of philosophical traditions in the world, in this case, Eastern, Western and African.

In the final analysis, we posit in agreement with Confucius and Aristotle, that the state or nation is indeed, families-writ-large. Thus, by the cultivation and promotion of family ethics and values such as love, care, mercy, loyalty, selflessness, generosity, obedience, sharing, sincerity, steadfastness, and so on, in individual families, the whole nation would be gradually transformed. The point made here is that peace in the families is the basis for peace in the society and strong united families make for a stable and strong society and nation. Proper family ethics and values must then be necessarily cultivated. In our view, the global relevance and moral legacy to the world of Confucius in the East and Aristotle in the West lies in their refocussing our attention on the all-important institution of the family, an institution of supreme significance in African cultural philosophy.

THE CONFUCIAN SOCIAL SYSTEM

The family stands at the foundation of the entire Confucian social and political order. It is in the family that *Li* and *Jen*, two Confucian concepts that connote filial piety and individual capacity for goodness, respectively, are found and cultivated. Confucius posited that through the kindness and courtesy practiced in individual families, the whole nation would be gradually transformed. It is in the family that one

learns how to exercise authority and submit to authority, and from the family these virtues are translated to the state.

Confucius made the natural love and obligations obtaining among members of a family the basis of a general morality. The two most important relationships within the family are those between father and son and between an elder brother and younger brother. If a man is a good son and a good younger brother at home, Confucius assumed, he can be counted on to behave correctly in society. Confucius went on to draw the logical conclusion that 'being good as a son and obedient as a young man is, perhaps, the root of a man's character' (Confucius, 1979:15). A passage in The Analects quotes Confucius thus:

> Those who in private life behave well towards their parents and elder brothers, in public life seldom show a disposition to resist the authority of their superiors. And as for such men starting a revolution, no instance of it has ever occurred. It is upon the trunk that a gentleman works. When that is firmly set up, the way grows. And surely proper behaviour towards parents and elder brothers is the trunk of goodness (Waley (Trans.), 1938:83).

Confucius emphasized the duties of children to their parents. And this is in two categories, material and spiritual. At the material level, Confucius enjoins careful attention to the bodily needs of one's parents; caring for one's own body as a legacy received from one's parents and rearing children to perpetuate the family tree. A very fundamental precept of Chinese social life to which Chinese have remained faithful is that 'the most unfilial thing is to have no sons'. Perhaps this explains the very high birth rate among the Chinese.

Under spiritual obligation, Confucius urges obedience to parental authority; being mindful of one's parent's after death; carrying out their cherished wishes and unfulfilled plans, and winning all the successes and honour that will bring glory on the family name. Confucius is quoted as saying that 'filial piety is the root of all virtue, and the stem out of which grows all moral teaching' (Edet, 2001:89).

From the practice of filial piety to one's parents, a person enters the larger relationship of society; the rulers of government become, for him, new objects of filial piety. At the government level, the practice

of filial piety applies not only to subjects toward their officials and toward the sovereign, those who govern are themselves expected to be faithful in the practice of this virtue.

Confucius believes that the disorders and distresses of society are not so much due to the innate wickedness of mankind as to the lack of social cohesion and harmony. That the human person is perfectible is a central tenet of Confucian thinking. The human person, Confucius believes, is not always good but can become better. This tenet is expressed by the Confucian concept, *Jen*.

Jen is the implicit capacity for goodness and harmony in the individual. It is the supreme virtue and interior quality in Confucius' catalogue of values. It may mean humaneness, humanity, human-heartedness, man-to-manness, love, benevolence, or goodness. In essence, *Jen* is what one does when he is truly human and implies that humanity is a task and an achievement (Baird & Bloom, 1971:164; Kwong-Loi, 1997:140). Betterment in the individual, Confucius teaches, comes through learning and service to others. *Jen* must be cultivated in a social way and this cultivation begins from the family. If harmony is to be established in society, proper attention needs to be paid to the right forms for social life. Confucius suggested that although peace is an artificial creation, peaceableness is innate in men, even though men so often display the greed, cruelty and arrogance that promote warfare and disharmony.

In order to recreate the right forms of social life, one must consider the social relationships which exist in human life with a view to determining the proper attitudes to be adopted by those standing in the relationships. Consequently, Confucian teachings codify five most important personal and social relationships of human life. Beginning from the family, Confucian teachings consider first the relation between father and son; second, that between the elder brother and the younger one; third, that between a husband and his wife; fourth, that between an elder and the younger and fifth, that between a ruler and the subject. It should be recognized that the latter of each pair is inferior in status to the former.

Confucianism further teaches that these five relationships should be governed by appropriate dispositions. The son should show filial piety;

the younger brother should show respect; the wife should show obedience; the younger man should show deference and the subject should show loyalty. But all these ought to be reciprocated by the superior in these relationships: the father ought to show kindness; the older brother, nobility; the husband, love; the elder, humaneness and the ruler ought to be benevolent. In this way, Confucius believed, true human welfare will be attained (Omoregbe, 1993:292–293).

Central to the system of relationships outlined above is a very important Confucian concept, *Shu* or reciprocity. It is reported that a disciple asked Confucius, 'Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?' The Master answered, 'Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others' (Edet, 2001:83).

The point of the entire Confucian social system is that there must be stability and mutual consideration in both social and political transactions and reciprocal cooperation must reign in human affairs, and all these values are cultivated in a social way from the family as the family stands at the foundation of the entire social and political order.

ARISTOTLE'S POSITION ON THE FAMILY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

Aristotle in ancient Greece has also postulated the view that the family is the root, the foundation upon which the state is built. Aristotle maintained that nature intends that man should live in society. He also maintained that there are three types of natural associations. The first is the family, which is that association established by nature for the supply of daily wants and for the sake of propagation of the human race. The second is the village, which is the union of several families for the supply of something more than daily wants or needs. In effect, for Aristotle, villages evolve in response to the need to attend to those needs of man which transcend daily needs, and hence cannot be satisfied at the family level.

Just as with the family, there are human needs which cannot be satisfied at the village level. Hence, the third natural association which evolved as a consequence is the state. The village is not self-sufficient. It cannot adequately satisfy man's needs. The state thus emerges as a

higher form of association. There is a fusing together of several villages into a complete community, large enough to be self-sufficient (Aristotle, 1972). Here we see that for Aristotle the formation of state is, therefore, a gradual process, beginning with the family. The family is thus the fundamental society. Aristotle is in agreement with Confucius that the family stands at the foundation of the entire social and political order.

THE AFRICAN TRADITIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEM

The average African is incurably family conscious. Within the context of traditional African society, the word 'family' has a much wider application than the word suggests in Europe and North America. In traditional African society, the family includes children, parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters who may have their own children and other immediate relatives (Mbiti, 1969:106). This is the 'extended family system'.

According to Omoregbe, the family tie is so strong in African culture that Africans do not make a sharp distinction between brother, half-brother (or sister), cousin, nephews or nieces. The words 'brother' and 'sister' cover all degrees of blood relationship (Omoregbe, 1999:70; Unah, 1995:116). Anyone who is related to me, no matter how distant that relationship may be, is my 'brother' or 'sister'. This implies that the average African considers himself as his brother's keeper. Thus, wholesome human relationships can be found within the institution of the family.

The extended family system is still being practiced in many African communities today. An Igbo proverb says, 'Both the eagle and the kite should perch; whichever denies the other the right should suffer a broken wing'. Elechi Amadi (1982; 58) opines that the extended family system rested and still rests, on the eagle-and-kite principle, to borrow the image of the Igbo proverb. The traditional extended family is cooperative in spirit and practice. Ideally, there are no lazy or idle persons in the community. Each person is taught to share whatever he has with other members of the extended family and each person is expected to contribute his quota to the common pool. No one is expected to sit back on the labour of others, those who do their best but cannot

make any contribution to the common pool are, however, protected and not made to suffer want. To quote Amadi,

> Take the case of a young boy who lost his parents at a tender age. His uncle would bring him up practically as his own child. He would give him an education, which in those days included the arts of looking after himself and of conducting himself properly in society and basic skills such as hunting, trapping, fishing and farming. The art of bringing up a family he would learn by observing his uncle's example. When he came of age his uncle would help him to build a house and acquire a wife and would give him funds or the wherewithal for farming, fishing, cattle-rearing or some other livelihood. When the boy became the man he would look after his uncle's children, if necessary, to the best of his ability (Amadi, 1982:58).

Amadi explains further that,

> Of course, an uncle anywhere else in the world might show his nephew the same kindness, but the difference is that in Nigeria the uncle would regard his nephew's education, in these circumstances, as a duty, not just as act of kindness. He would come in for the censure of the community if he behaved otherwise (Amadi, 1982: 58).

According to Amadi,

> As a result of this system, the individual was never without help. No one was absolutely destitute, so the kind of insanity that is caused by the pressures of urban life and by loneliness were virtually unknown in rural Nigeria. In a system which had no asylums, poor houses or old people homes, the eagle-and-kite system proved very effective indeed (Amadi, 1982: 58).

It is clear then, that the extended family system in particular, and the African society in general, offer the individual both economic and social security. This is what Sofola has called 'Familism' or 'Familyhood'. Sofola defines familism variously as:

i. A feeling of belonging to the family group;
ii. Integration of activities of family members for the attainment of family objectives;

iii. The utilization of family resources to help needy members;
iv. Rallying to the support of a member if he is in trouble; and
v. The maintenance of continuity between the parental family and new family units (Sofola, 1973:140).

In Familism, one finds appropriate answers to the problems created by the modern world of atomic individuals with undue emphasis on social and economic self-interest. Because of its altruistic outlook, familism has continued to thrive. To consider familism irrelevant to the twenty-first century world of greed, complexity, acquisitiveness, cut-throat competition and struggles for survival is to lack the grasp of the structure and needs of our present world.

No wonder then, Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania adopted 'familyhood' as his development ideology for independent Tanzania, which he expressed in the concept of *Ujaama*. *Ujaama* is literally translated as 'familyhood' or 'brotherhood'. In *Ujaama*, Nyerere is concerned with socialism and traditional African society and problems of stratification in the society. He believed that *Ujaama* is the basis of authentic Africa socialism. The essential goal of *Ujaama* is to build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities and where social justices are practiced. To create this kind of society, Nyerere believes that it has to be built on the firm foundation of the three principles of the *Ujaama* family: respect, community life and an obligation to work. In addition to these principles, there is need to develop the knowledge and instruments necessary to overcome the poverty that was prevalent in traditional African society. In other words, there is an urgent need to modernize the means of production in order to guarantee increased output per worker (Nyerere, 1967:4). It is important, he reiterates, for the attitudes of traditional African socialism to be regained, modified, and applied to the new societies being built (Nyerere, 1962:6). He envisaged a society made up of *Ujaama* villages (i.e. atomic family units) with mutual cooperation and collaboration.

If this type of socialism is to succeed, Tanzanians have to fulfil certain essential conditions. The first of these is hard work which, according to Nyerere, has no substitute, especially as Tanzania is basically a poor country lacking large accumulations of capital that can be invested in agricultural labour-saving devices or in increased

productivity. Nyerere insists that it is obligatory on Tanzanians to rely 'on their hands and brains' to develop.

In addition, there must be an efficient and democratic system of local government so that the people make their own decisions on the things that affect them directly. This would enable them to establish control over community decisions and ensure their responsibility for carrying them out. Yet this local control has to be organized in such a way that the nation is united and working together for common needs and for the maximum development of the whole society.

Consequently, for Nyerere, it is vital that the principles upon which the traditional extended family was based be reactivated. For a start, extended family villages are to be established and with time they will be developed into larger communities than was traditionally the case. Also, modern knowledge must be applied by these communities, and ways and means have to be found to break the barriers that previously existed between different groups so that they cooperate on the major tasks of development.

To ensure such a cooperation by different people, *Ujaama* farms and communities are to form the basis for the rural economy and to set the social pattern for the country as a whole. This means that most farming needs are to be done by groups of people who live and work as a community. This community is the traditional family group or any other group of people living according to these *Ujaama* principles articulated by Nyerere:

> The land this community farmed would be called 'our land' by all the members; the crops they produced on that land would be 'our crops'; it would be 'our shop' which provided individual members with the day-to-day necessities from outside; 'our workshop' which made the bricks from which houses and other buildings were constructed ... (Nyerere, 1967:11).

Nyerere hopes that such living and working in communities could transform the living standards of Tanzanians. In such a society, he opines, there will be no class struggles, individualism, capitalist spirit of acquisition, exploitation of man by man and inequality. The rulers will identify with the masses and everybody will be prepared to work

in any capacity for the good of all. Such a society will aim at self-actualization, self-liberation and self-reliance.

The essential element in the *Ujaama* communities is the equality of all members and the members' self-government in all matters that concern their own affairs. This, for Nyerere, is authentic socialism. Socialism, like democracy, is construed by Nyerere to be an attitude of mind. It is this attitude of mind, rather than a rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, that is needed to ensure that people care for each other's welfare.

African socialism, to Nyerere, is distinguished from capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism, which seeks to build a happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. The foundation of African socialism is the extended family, which regards all men as brethren—as members of an ever-extending family because Nyerere maintains that in the modern world, familyhood must be made to transcend the family, the tribe, to embrace the whole society, the whole country, the whole of Africa and the whole world.

As Nnamdi Azikiwe, former President of Nigeria observed, family or tribal feeling is not incompatible with national unity and progress if it is eclectically and pragmatically channelled towards the nation. Every country in the world is made up of tribes, every tribe is made up of clans, every clan is made up of villages, every village is made up of families, and every family is constituted of individuals. Now, an individual's duty is first to himself, next to his immediate and extended family, then to his village, clan, tribe and last to the country. Although such an order does not conduce to national unity and progress, nevertheless, history shows that many nations have been able to replace tribal loyalty with national unity (Igwe, 1992:132).

Despite the place and role of the individual within the African family, he cannot avoid to function within the community. Without community, there can be no meaningful existence (Iroegbu, 1995:345). For Menkiti, man is defined by reference to the environing community (1984:171). In short, the close relation between life in the family and life in the community is such that one cannot exist without the other

and the solidarity to one is the solidarity to the others (Uduigwomen, 2001, 29-30). This is evidenced in the process of family formation (i.e. marriage). In traditional African society, the marriage union is considered not just as a union between the two individuals who are directly involved, but between two lineages or two extended families to ensure that the union is a success. Among the Igbo and the Yoruba of Nigeria, for instance, the splitting and sharing of kola nuts in the atmosphere of honour-pledging during marriage ceremonies seals the marriage contract. Thus, the family having been assured of stability and solidarity extends the same to the wider community or society.

What we have tried to show in the foregoing discussion is that the individual in traditional African life does not and cannot exist alone, except in a community. He is simply a part of the whole. Only in reference to other people does he become conscious of his own being, his own duties, his own privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards others. When he suffers, he does so with the corporate group. When he rejoices, he does so with his kinsmen and neighbours. Himself, his wife and children belong to the community. Whatever happens to him happens to the whole group and whatever happens to the whole group happens to him. According to Mbiti, the individual can only say, 'I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore, I am' (1969:108).

EVALUATION

We have laboured to show that in Confucius' philosophy the family occupies a central place as the foundation upon which the state or society is built. Aristotle likewise, we have shown, considers the family to be the bedrock of the state. Similarly, we pointed out that in African cultural philosophy, the family institution, even in its more extensive application is an outstanding feature of the African traditional social system. Following this analysis, we reiterate the view that the family is the fundamental unit of society and maintain that this is a more plausible position than the postulate of some kind of society which preceded the institution of civil government. Thus, we dismiss the 'social contract theorists' and their notion of a 'state of nature' as mere hypothetical conjecture, an illustrative hypothesis lacking historical

validity, a myth. There cannot have been a time when men lived isolated from their families or forebears.

Aristotle, in his social and political philosophy, did not articulate any system of virtues or values which need to be cultivated at the family level to ensure the ideal state in the evolution of the family through the village level up to the third level, the state.

Aristotle's purpose was mainly to criticize his contemporary and teacher Plato. In Plato's *Republic*, the family institution stood abolished for the ruling class and the auxiliaries. Thus, Aristotle perceived the social evolution as a consequence of an inadequacy to satisfy the wants of men at the various levels.

Confucius, on his part, was a moral teacher and political reformer who was convinced that good government could only be achieved by the application of certain transcendental values and virtues which can be cultivated by study, zeal and self-cultivation as directed by the *Tao* or 'way'. The *Tao* or 'way', in its broadest implications, refers to the entire socio-political order, with its policy and familial roles, statuses, and ranks. The *Tao* governs this order, but it also refers to the inner moral life of the individual. Confucius found that 'the *Tao* does not prevail in the world' (Waley (Trans.) 1938:204) and saw himself as its restorer.

In his conviction that it is in the family that the supreme virtues *Li* and *Jen* are found and that it is there that one learns how to exercise authority and submit to authority, and from the family these virtues are translated to the state, we posit that Confucius was advocating the 'extended family system' which has been with Africans for ages and is still being practiced and which constitutes the logic upon which Nyerere's *Ujaama* ideology was grounded, as we saw earlier.

Furthermore, we maintain that Confucius in the East, Aristotle in the West and Julius Nyerere, the African sage, all deserve commendation—Confucius and Aristotle in their refocusing our attention on the all-important institution of the family and Nyerere for articulating the *Ujaama* ideology using the family institution and attempting to practically implement this ideology to transform the living conditions and standards of Tanzanians.

In our view, the 'extended family' practice should be studied in greater depth and worked into a political philosophy. The ultimate hope of all the peoples of the world is the realization of the universal brotherhood of man. In Nigeria, that hope is already realized at the tribal and clan level. It should be nursed, expanded and made the basis of a Nigerian ideology.

CONCLUSION

Indeed, the civil state is 'families-writ-large', as Confucius and Aristotle opine. The family stands at the foundation of the entire social and political order. Thus, by the cultivation and promotion of family ethics and values such as love, caring, mercy, loyalty, selflessness, generosity, obedience, sharing, sincerity, steadfastness and so on in individual families, the whole state would be gradually transformed. The family is the school of love and peace. Peace in the family is the basis for peace in the society and strong united families make for a stable and strong society and nation. Proper family ethics and values must then necessarily be cultivated.

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Some Observations on Buddhist Mysticism

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I

We had better begin with the question whether Buddhist mysticism is a mysticism in the strict sense of the term 'mysticism'. If we define mysticism as 'immediate, non-discursive, intuitive relation with the Absolute, whether personal ... or impersonal ...' then it would be hard to affirm that there is mysticism in Buddhism. This is what L Dela Vallée Poussin and E.J. Thomas had contended in their contribution on 'Mysticism (Buddhist)' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Their contention was that as there is no Absolute according to all the orthodox forms of Buddhist thought, so there is no Buddhist mysticism as such.[1]

Over the decades, the meaning of 'mysticism' appears to have become broader. One of the distinguished philosophers of religion, John Hick, for instance, has defined mystical experience as nothing other than 'first hand religious experience as such'. He observes:

> Religion consists primarily in experiencing our life in its relation to the Transcendent and living on the basis of that experience. And mysticism, I take it, is simply religion understood in this way ... mysticism is a general name for religious experience together with part at least of the network of religious practices which support it.[2]

In this broader sense, Buddhism is as much rooted in mystical experience as are the other major world religions. Being based on the mystical experience and the resultant spiritual awakening (*bodhi*) of Prince Siddhārtha, Buddhism can simply not be anything else than a mysticism at its core.

One of the pivotal tenets of mysticism is that there is a third kind of knowledge over and above sense-knowledge and knowledge by inference. In this respect too, Buddhism belongs to the mainstream of world mysticism. Buddha only interprets his religious experience with the aid of the concepts provided by his cultural milieu like *Karma*, *Saṁsāra*, *Avidyā*, etc. Even here we do find that he introduces necessary changes into the cultural context that he inherits. For instance, he finds such concepts as God and self irrelevant to the articulation of his religious experience.

In Sutta 26 of *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Buddha sheds light on the nature of his mystical insight into the meaning and destiny of human existence as follows:

> This doctrine to which I have attained is profound, recondite, and difficult of comprehension, good, excellent, and *not to be reached by mere reasoning*, subtle and intelligible only to the wise.[3]

Like the Upaniṣadic seers, the proponents of Vedānta, the Sufi mystics and other master mystics like Eckhart, Buddha is convinced of the transcendental character of his spiritual or inner awakening (*bodhi*).

II

Professor Sisir Kumar Ghose demarcates four stages in the attainment of or ascension to the mystical experience, viz., purgation (of bodily desires), purification (of the will), illumination (of the mind) and unification (of one's will or being with the divine).[4]

Buddhist mysticism lays great stress on the stages of purgation and purification. The Buddha's sermons at Rajagraha, Jetvana and on many other occasions bear ample testimony to this. But this mysticism fundamentally differs from Upaniṣadic, Sufi and many schools of mysticism in regarding illumination of the mind as the summum bonum of the path of mysticism. It has no room for any unification between the self and the absolute for the reason that the very entities that are to unite are not acknowledged to be valid concepts.

In the description of his own state of Nirvāṇa, the Buddha lays stress only on the cognitive dimension which liberates a person immediately from the states of ignorance, suffering, selfhood and the

cycle of life and death. In the Sutta 26 of *Majjhima-Nikāya*, he sets forth the state of super consciousness as follows:

> And being, O priests, myself subject to birth, I perceived the wretchedness of what is subject to birth, and craving the incomparable security of a Nirvāṇa free from birth; myself subject to old age, disease ..., death ..., sorrow ..., corruption, I perceived the wretchedness of what is subject to corruption, and craving the incomparable the security of a Nirvana free from corruption. And the knowledge and the insight sprang up within me 'My deliverance is unshakable; this is my last existence; no more shall I be born again'.[5]

Soon after his mystic illumination, the Buddha encountered the naked ascetic Upaka between the Bo-tree and Gaya while on his way to Benaras. In his reply to Upaka's query as to who his spiritual mentor was, the Buddha laid emphasis on the fact that his mystic experience had imbued him with total illumination, with higher knowledge capable of destroying his thirst for the world of the senses. Here are the Buddha's first utterances immediately after his mystic experience:

> All-conquering have I now become, all-knowing; Untainted by the elements of being. I've left all things, am freed through thirst's destruction, All wisdom's mine: what teacher should I follow?[6]

Thus, Buddhist mysticism lays stress on the cognitive dimension of the mystical experience. 'Knowledge of Being, not absorption of the self into divine or cosmic Being, is therefore the keynote of Buddhist mysticism', remarked Herbert V. Guenther.[7]

III

In his sermon to the five disciples at Benaras, the Buddha delineates the various stages to the highest mystic experience. The first stage or trance consists in an isolation from sensual pleasures and demeritorious deeds. This state is characterized by joy and happiness. The second trance consists in the inner tranquility and the inactivity of the rational faculty. Contemplation is a prominent feature of the third and fourth trances. The fifth trance consists in the contemplation on the infinity

of space. The seeker passes on to the infinity of consciousness in the sixth trance and then to the contemplation of nothingness. At the eighth or the penultimate stage, the seeker proceeds from the realm of nothingness to the realm of 'neither perception nor non-perception'. The Buddha's reluctance to give a detailed description of the nature of mystical experience is evident in his account of this final stage of religious experience:

> But again, O priests, a priest through having completely overpassed the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception, arrives at the cessation of perception and sensation, and before the clear vision of wisdom all his depravity wastes away.[8]

Such a person's transformation into an *arhat* and his total liberation from evil is underlined in this account:

> Of such a priest, O priests, is it said, 'He has blinded Māra, made useless the eye of Māra, gone out of sight of the wicked one, and passed beyond all adhesion to the world'. He walks, stands, squats and lies down in confident security. And why? Because, O priests, he is out of the reach of Māra.[9]

IV

The Buddha takes recourse mostly to negative descriptions of the everlasting state of mystic illumination. He used such expressions as deathless (*amrita*), without end (*ananta*), not liable to dissolution (*apolokina*), imperishable (*acyuta*), etc. for this state of final release (*apavagga*). In his long dialogue with Upaśiva in *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, he carries his negative method of communication to one of its logical conclusions when he refers to the inadequacy of speech to convey the experience:

> There is no measure to him who has gone to rest; he keeps nothing that could be named. When all dharmas are abolished, all parts of speech are also abolished. (Attahaṅgatassa na pamānam atthi; yena nam vajju, tam tassa nātthi; Sabbesu dhammesu, samūhatesu Samūhatā Vādapathā pi sabbeti.)[10]

This ineffability is the keynote of his characterization of Nirvāna in Udāna 80 which, in our view, is one of the characteristic revelations of Buddhist mysticism. Here we notice a not-so-oblique reference to the transcendental realm or universe of non-discourse of some kind. The Buddha, much like a Upanisadic seer, proclaims:

> There is that sphere wherein is neither earth nor water nor fire nor air; wherein is neither the sphere of infinite space nor of infinite consciousness nor of nothingness, nor of neither ideation nor non-ideation; where there is neither this world nor a world beyond nor both together nor moon nor sun...[11]

He continues:

> I say there is neither coming from it nor going to it; it has neither duration nor decay; there is neither beginning nor establishment; there is no result and no cause; this verily is the end of suffering.[12]

Like Jaidev Singh, we are also convinced that the Buddha here refers to the revelation of a new dimension of being in mystic experience. This characterization of mystic experience has striking similarity to attempts in the *Upanisads* to depict such a singular and basically ineffable experience.

Here is how the *Māṇḍūkya Upanisads* describes the state of superconciousness (the *chaturtham*):

> Not inwardly cognitive (*antaḥ-prajña*), not outwardly cognitive (*bahih-prajña*), not both-wise cognitive (*ubhayatah-prajña*), not cognitive (*prajña*), not non-cognitive (*a-prajña*), unseen (*a-dresta*), with which there can be no dealing (*a-vyavahāra*), ungraspable (*a-grāhya*), having no distinctive mark (*a-laksana*), non-thinkable (*a-cintya*), that cannot be designated (*a-vyapadeśya*).'[13]

So far as the mystical content of Buddhism, the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna philosophy appears to accord closely with the Buddha's life and teachings. The Mādhyamika thinkers like Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti prefer to use the world *Śūnya* and *Sūnyatā* to denote the mystical experience of a bodhisattva. In his *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna characterizes *Śūnyatā* as that experience which cannot be communicated (*aparapratyayam*), as inexpressible by the categories

belonging to the verbalizing activity of the mind (*prapanchairaprapanchitam*), as devoid of plurality (*anānārtham*) and as incomprehensible by the intellect or reason (*nirvikalpam*).

The Buddha's silence regarding the 'questions that tend not to edification' including the ones about the saint's existence or being after his nirvāṇa and about the eternality or transience of the world found a systematic expression in Mādhyamika distinction between the two kinds of truth; empirical (*saṁvṛiti*) and transcendental (*paramārtha*).

Ashwaghosha, the author of *Buddha Charita*, was another pioneer of Mahāyānic mystical philosophy. In this classic work on the Buddha's life and mystical awakening, we come across the following splendid reference as to how the Buddha attained his *bodhi* or transcendental cognition and the consequent liberation:

> This is pain, this also is the origin of pain in the world of living beings; this also is the stopping of pain: this is that course which leads to its stopping. So having determined he knew all as it really was. Thus he, the holy one, sitting there on his seat of grass at the root of the tree, pondening by his own efforts attained at last perfect knowledge.[14]

The transformation of Prince Siddhārtha into the *Tathāgata* (one who has attained the mystical enlightenment) is described in a metaphorical mode of speech as follows:

> There has arisen the greatest of all beings, the Omniscient All-wise *Arhat*—a lotus, unsoiled by the dust of passion, spring up from the lack of knowledge ...'[15]

V

The *bodhisattva* deal is one of the greatest accomplishments of Buddhist mysticism. It appears to be the consummation of mysticism at large. Here is a mode of individual existence, which is soaked through with bodhi or enlightenment. His individuality is an abode of universality which rises above cultural parochialism. His unique existence is the actualization of the synthesis of bodhi (mystical illumination) and *Karuṇā* or compassion, of knowledge and action, of the paramārtha (transcendental realm) and *Vyayahāra* (the here and now) and of the

personal quest for liberation and the altruistic concern for mankind, nay, for the entire domain of sentient being. His decision to postpone his own final Nirvāna in order to alleviate the suffering of his fellow human beings and other sentient beings adds a glorious dimension to mysticism.

Many scholars of mysticism have directed our attention to the expression of mystic illumination in social action. Such scholars include Hocking, Underhill, Bergson, Wapnick and Johnston. Thus, the bodhisattva ideal has manifested itself in such historical cases as those of Eckhart, Joan of Arc, Kabir and Gandhi. Richard Woods refers to this post-illumination phase of a mystic's life after a period of withdrawal for self-realization as positive social engagement. He says:

> The isolation and alienation of the mystics during their period of development is thus both provisional and contingent upon heightened social interaction later on, ... The greater mystics, then, are those whose identification with their fellow human beings is more profoundly human, less specifically cultural, and whose process of development is proportionately searching, their subsequent activity more pervasive and penetrating. They belong not to Germany, Spain or India, but to the world.[16]

Compared to this ideal, Theravāda ideals of the *arhat* and *pratyeka* Buddha or self-enlightened Buddha lack this equal valuation of wisdom (*prajñā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*). Only the Bodhisattva is so suffused with compassion that he transfers his own merit to his devotees for their faster moral and spiritual advancement.

VI

The Mahāyāna reconciliation between higher wisdom and universal compassion is reiterated and expressed through symbolic language in Tāntric Buddhism, especially through sexual symbolism. This much-misunderstood, even maligned, tradition is fundamentally one with the central core of Mahāyānic thought. While setting the ultimate goal of mystic experience akin to that of the Buddha under the bodhi tree, it lays down its own mode of attaining the goal. Its final goal reveals its mystical identity. Moreover, like any Mahāyānic thinker, it lays the

utmost stress on the synthesis of the two poles of a seeker's life: *prajñā* (wisdom) and means (*upāya*). The latter consists of adopting the best possible course of action in a situation that could raise him to a higher plane on the way to *prajñā*. Passivity characterizes the state of wisdom and activity that of means or *upāya*. This encouraged the Vajrayāna thinkers to use feminine symbols for the former and masculine symbols for the latter.

Sexual union provides these thinkers with the most convenient imagery to convey the synthesis of wisdom and means which obviously includes compassion and other ethical values along with the appropriate spells or mantras. The sexual union between a man or woman, a god or goddess illustrates the inner integration of wisdom and compassion (*Karuṇā*) with the means (*Upāya*) or dynamic aspect of the mystical ascension of an aspirant. This integration of apparent opposites is considered indispensable for the mystic awakening. The union (*maithuna*) of the female goddess *yum* with the male god *yab* results in the eternal bliss (*mahāsukha*) of mystic realization. The influence of Hindu Tantra appear pronounced when the Kālacakra Tantra recounts the Buddha's teaching that the body can also be the instrument of Enlightenment in this age of degeneration (Kali Yuga).

VII

Buddhist mysticism attains one of its tallest summits in the conception of *Satori* in Ch'an or Zen Buddhism. This tradition reaffirms the original mystical orientation of the Buddha's teachings, especially with regard to the determination of the goal of a Buddhist aspirant as consisting in the attainment of mystic experience that would result in a total transformation of one's being. Deriving its name from the Sanskrit term for meditation *dhyāna*, Zen Buddhism lays stress or mediation as the highway to enlightenment. It traces its origin to the sage Kāśyapa who is credited with having received his instruction from the Buddha himself. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra records such an association between the master and the disciple.

Wu in Ch'an Buddhism and *Satori* in Zen Buddhism (the latter is an extension of the former) refer to the state of Enlightenment in which the Buddha-nature of the entire gamut of reality is revealed. These

schools declare emphatically that the enlightened aspirant can never communicate the objective pole of his mystic experience because it surpasses the concepts and categories of the customary speech. *Satori* (or *Wu*) transcends the subject-object duality and so it can never be expressed by any book, teacher, sermon, etc. The only path leading to *Satori* (or *Wu*) is one's own personal religious experience. It cannot be achieved either through the intellect or empirical experience. It is an inner, intuitive experience, which is absolutely ineffable. *Satori* is identical with the experience that transformed Prince Siddhārtha into the Enlightened One, the Buddha. The means of obtaining it is also quiet sitting and meditation (*zazen*) atleast in the largest sect of this school known as *Sōtō*.

VIII

Our appraisal of the Buddhist mysticism leads us to affirm that it conforms to the basic postulates of mysticism and reveals itself as more a mysticism than a religion. It is in the name of mysticism as the alpha and omega of religion that it revolted against the ritualism of pre-Upaniṣadic Hinduism. We have already made a short reference to the affinity between Buddhist and Upaniṣadic mysticism. There are many more very fundamental points of agreement between these two traditions that ascribe priority to intuitive religious experience over conformity with the external aspects of religion. The Buddha's leave-taking advice to his followers to be lamps unto themselves is an indication of his re-evaluation of the nature of religious life. It also fundamentally conforms to the basic postulates of mysticism as the power of the human intuition to penetrate into the very heart of Reality, as the necessity of moral preparation, as the inner individual having the potentiality for transcendental expansion or realization, as the achievement of a state of Enlightenment and Liberation as the culmination of the mystic's life, etc.

Despite the difference is terminology, the Buddhist *bodhi* denotes almost the same experience as referred to by the Sufi 'Vision' called in Arabic *Mushahadāh*. This vision equips the aspirant with absolute certainty (*Yaqīn*) which is beyond the ken of the intellect and which cannot be conveyed by the illuminated self (*ru'yat al-qalb*) to a non-

illuminated self. It is also a basic postulate of Buddhist mysticism that each aspirant has to achieve his own illumination in the depths of his own being. Its a sort of mystical monadology that Buddhist mysticism adheres to.

The priority of the mystical substructure over the theological and ritualistic aspects or expressions of religion places Buddhism among the higher religions of the world. The focus of a higher religion must be the integration or reconciliation of religious experience, reason and the moral-cum-spiritual elevation of mankind. It must be imbued with a universal spirit, which must not divide mankind into the saved and the condemned, into the believers and the infidels. Being based on a firm mystic foundation, Buddhism eminently qualifies for this position.

Moreover, this priority of the mystical over the ritualistic and the theological demonstrates that the characterization of the Buddhist doctrines as 'ethical idealism'[17] is an understatement. If it is unable to satisfy the architectonic requirements of human reason,[18] then, it cannot be considered one of its demerits. Rather, its mystical orientation and its repeated emphasis on the inadequacy of reason and language adequately account for this inability. Thus, instead of saying that the Upaniṣadic metaphysics must supplement the Buddhist doctrine, we had better say that the applied or practical dimension of Buddhist mysticism with its accent on loving kindness (*mettā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) has the potentiality of adding a human touch to Hindu mysticism which is usually charged with such a lacuna. One can venture the thesis that one of them emphasizes the metaphysical expression and the other the practical, social application of a single evolving mystical tradition that was bent on redefining the religious life of India with an outright rejection of Vedic ritualism and caste-governed orthodoxy and ethical-system.

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Does Affirming the Consequent Make Hypothetical Arguments Invalid?

It is a commonly held thesis that hypothetical arguments are valid in virtue of their logical form. If they have the logical form of valid hypothetical arguments, for example, *modus ponens* or *modus tollens*, they are valid. If they have the logical form in which the consequent is affirmed or the antecedent is denied, that is the form of invalid hypothetical arguments, then they are invalid. I show in this paper, by giving two counterexamples—one of affirming the consequent and the other of denying the antecedent—that this commonly held thesis cannot be rationally maintained, that it is possible for an hypothetical argument to 'commit' the fallacy of affirming the consequent or the fallacy of denying the antecedent, and in this way being apparently fallacious, yet the hypothetical argument, in fact, may be perfectly valid from the strictly logical point of view. The validity or invalidity of hypothetical arguments in either of the counterexamples that I give here does not depend upon their logical form.

An argument is said to be valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises. In other words, an argument is said to be valid if it is inconsistent to assert the truth of its premises together with the falsity of its conclusion. Hypothetical arguments are valid by this criterion of validity; if they fail to satisfy this criterion they are characterized as invalid.

An example of hypothetical arguments is

(A) If X is the case, then Y is the case, but X is the case, therefore, Y is the case.

Its logical form can be exhibited as

(B) If p, then q,
p,
therefore, q.

Symbolically,

$$p \supset q,$$
$$p,$$
$$/ \therefore q.$$

The hypothetical argument (A) is valid if it is an exemplification of a valid logical form of an hypothetical argument. The logical form of an hypothetical argument is valid if it satisfies the definition of validity; namely, that the conclusion of the argument follows logically from its premises.

The logical form of a valid hypothetical argument in *modus ponens* is

(C) If p, then q,
p,
therefore q.

Symbolically,

$$p \supset q,$$
$$p,$$
$$/ \therefore q.$$

The logical form of an invalid hypothetical argument is

(D) If p, then q,
q,
therefore p.

Symbolically,

$$p \supset q,$$
$$q,$$
$$/ \therefore p.$$

Again, the logical form of a valid hypothetical argument in *modus tollens* is

(E) If p, then q,
not q,
therefore, not p.

Symbolically,

$$p \supset q,$$
$$\sim q,$$
$$/ \therefore \sim p.$$

The logical form of an invalid hypothetical argument is

(F) If p, then q,
not p,
therefore, not q.

Symbolically,

$$p \supset q,$$
$$\sim p,$$
$$/ \therefore \sim q.$$

In (D) above, the fallacy of affirming the consequent is committed, and in (F) above, the fallacy of denying the antecedent is committed. Hence, both (D) and (F) are invalid hypothetical forms.

Now consider the hypothetical argument

(G) $(A \vee B) \supset (A \cdot B)$,
$(A \cdot B)$,
$/ \therefore (A \vee B)$.

This argument, prima facie, has the logical form of an invalid hypothetical argument (D), and thus it apparently commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent. However, the argument (G) is perfectly valid, for its conclusion follows logically from its premises. The second premise '$(A \cdot B)$' straightaway implies the conclusion '$(A \vee B)$'; the first premise is redundant. What do we say here? Shall we say following the doctrine of logical form that the argument (G) is invalid because it commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent? Or, do we say that the argument is perfectly valid, for its premises imply its conclusion, that we cannot assert the truth of its premises and deny its conclusion?

Again, consider the argument

(H) $(A \vee B) \supset (A \cdot B)$,
$\sim (A \vee B)$,
$/ \therefore \sim (A \cdot B)$.

On the face of it, this argument has the logical form of an invalid hypothetical argument (F) and thus it commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent and, therefore, it should be characterized by its logical form alone as fallacious. But the argument is valid. The first premise is redundant and the second premise alone implies the conclusion. The second premises is '~(A v B)', and it is equivalent to '(~A • ~B)'. The conclusion is '~(A • B)' which is equivalent to '(~A v ~B)'. It is easy to verify that '~(A • B)' implies '(~A v ~B)'.

On the basis of my analysis of (G) and (H) hypothetical arguments, I am led to form the picture that either the arguments (G) and (H) do not have the logical form of hypothetical arguments and therefore the fallacy of affirming the consequent or the fallacy of denying the antecedent are not applicable to them. Or, if one goes by the apparent logical form of the arguments, then the arguments must be said to be logically fallacious. But, one can easily verify, by using any relevant decision procedure, e.g. the method of alternational normal schemata, that they are perfectly valid from the logical point of view. Of course, we cannot characterize them as both valid and invalid on pains of contradiction.

The picture that I have drawn above compels me to observe: *one*, that the so called logical form alone cannot be effectively used as a reliable guide for determining the validity or invalidity of hypothetical arguments; and *two*, that the dogma of logical form of hypothetical arguments, as I have shown above, is logically indefensible in that it leads to consequences which are inconsistent from the logical point of view and thus cannot be rationally accepted.

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Postmodernism: A Philosophy of Consumerism

Because in common uses 'modern' means 'contemporary', the term 'Postmodernism' has seemed from the start like the vocabulary of science fiction. How after all, can something which exists, now, be said to come after the present ... the confusion vanishes when we replace 'modern' with 'modernism' and explain that the latter refers less to historical time than to a specific movement in the art.[1] Prefixed by 'post', modernism proceeds ahead in the second half of the twentieth century, identifying a historical sequence in the sense of simple succession. The 'post' indicates a new direction from the previous one.

The term 'postmodernism' was first used by Federico de Omin in his 'Anthologia de la literature', says Ihab Hassan, 'the prelude to postmodernism what he terms as literature of silence or anti-literature.'[2] Postmodernism emerges from the post-industrial techno-scientific development and refers to a perfect change in the attitude of the people belonging to developed societies of the West, the impact of which can be clearly noticed on art, literature, architecture, politics and economy.

Postmodernism is a term usually applied to the period of literature and literary theory since 1960, though some regard it as a prevailing intellectual mood since World War II in 1945.[3] It can be realized in the context of post-war political and cultural disappointment of the developed countries of western Europe and United States of America. The frustrated generation of the new consumers' society rebelled against traditional values and ideals, but could replace them only by despair or cynical hedonism wallowing in sex and alcohol. Some critics refer all non-traditional literature written after World War II to postmodernism, which virtually represents a second shift in Western thought during the

twentieth century, apparently, anti-modernist, non-traditional, against authority and signification.

Freudian psychological movement turned many modern authors from the objective world to subjective experience, creating a new domain of individualism in English literature, leading to the development of typical literary devices like internal monologue and stream of consciousness technique. Being closely related to pessimistic beliefs and tragic ideas, individualism created an unbridgeable gap between subjective experience and the objective world. Postmodernism emerges from over use of subjectivity and its typical association with urban landscape, since we can hardly imagine a countryside scene in *The Waste Land* or *The Ulysses*.[4] Modernist intercourse with subjectivity and urbanization were close to a 'cliché' for alienation.

Postmodernism is used in different way: (i) to refer the non-realistic and non-traditional literature and art of the post-Second World War period; (ii) to refer to literature and art which take certain modernistic characteristic to extreme stage; and (iii) to refer to aspect of a more general human condition in the late capitalist world of post 1950s which have all embracing effect on life, culture, ideology and art.[5] Postmodern literature virtually presents a mimetic of socio-economic and political practices in which it appears depicting many discriminations of people on racial and regional ground.

Modernity, chiefly representing novelty and depth, is correlated with the principle to break with the tradition and institute a new way of living and thinking. Modernism was the high tide of the movement and postmodernism was what came after. Thus, a change in modernism may be called postmodernism.[6] But it was not a simple change. Postmodernism emerges as a specific reaction against the established form of high modernism.[7] It aims at freedom from all shackles of the past, especially intellectual shackles of the past, both political and cultural.[8] The second feature ... of postmodernism is the effacement of some key boundaries or separations most notably the erosion of old distinction between high culture and so-called mass or popular culture.[9] It is virtually difficult to define postmodernism without having the knowledge of the chief characteristics of modernism, since there is more continuity than difference in the movement from modernism to

postmodernism and the latter represents a crisis within the former.[10] Postmodernists' reaction against modernism can be noticed in the contrasting features, depicting in the following columns:[11]

Modernism	Postmodernism
Hierarchy	Anarchy
Presence	Absence
Genital	Polymorphous
Narrative	Anti-narrative
Determinacy	Indeterminacy
Construction of World model	Deconstruction of World model
Ontological certainty	Ontological uncertainty

Some critics refer to postmodernism what others call avant gardism or even new avant gardism, while others call the same phenomenon simply modernism.[12] The term 'avant garde' comes from military terminology and virtually represents 'advance-guard' which indicates the arrival of larger shock troops of army for a massive attack. Avant garde means a pre-indication of what will come after. It generally represents the movements occurring between modernism and postmodernism. Avant garde includes movements like cubism, futurism and surrealism.

For postmodernism, nothing remains absolute or eternal. All meaning, all value, is historically conditioned. There is nothing necessarily essential about human being; the idea of human nature itself a human construct. Thus, the construction or depicting universal experience in traditional literature is irrelevant and illusionary.[13] Postmodernists vehemently attack aestheticism, telling all beauty today is meretricious and the appeal to it by contemporary pseudo-aestheticism is an ideological manoeuvre and not creative resources.[14] Modernism is a period marked by the search for totality; postmodernism abandons this search.

Postmodernist's critics have sought to do without genre theory. These critics assume that a genre theory of a novel is committed to back grounding literary artifice to demanding coherence, unity and linear continuity.[15] They no longer believe in the meta-narrative. Lyotard, of course, defined postmodernism as incredulity towards meta-narrative.[16] Apparently, meta-narrative signifies a narrative within a narrative which

does not represent real life. To avoid coherence, unity and linear continuity Barth means by postmodernism keeping one foot in the narrative past and one foot in the present. One foot, let's say, in the *Arabian Nights* and one foot in grim real world history of Latin America.[17]

Postmodernists abandon not only the plot treating it as a construction, but also reject characterization, since the description of a fiction character can never be complete like in real life. Secondly, there is always a discrepancy between the character who acts and the character who watches herself or himself acting. There is, as it were, a temporal distance between the agency and self-consciousness regarding that dance. How can we know the dancer from the dance.[18]

David Lodge has singled out five techniques typical of postmodernist fiction—contradiction, permutation, discontinuity, randomness and excess.[19] The world being virtually composed of contradictions like light and darkness, postmodernists adopt this device to depicts physical reality in their works. Permutation as a mathematical concept presents aimless movement of things arranged in a group. It points to the postmodernists' style of incorporating alternative narrative in the same text. Discontinuity undisputedly disrupts continuity of discourse by unpredictable and sudden change in the direction. Randomness too is a kind of discontinuity according to the logic of absurd. Excess involves a technique deployed taking words used in transformed sense and testing them to deconstruction.

Some very prominent literary devices of postmodernism include 'parody' and 'pastiche'. Parody stands for imitating others' style in amusing and exaggerated way. Parody is a form of literary imitation in which the distinctive characteristic aspects of the original, usually, the style is exaggerated. Murdoch's *The Black Prince* is a parody of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. Similarly, Cervante's *Don Quixote* is a parody of sixteenth-century chivalric romance. Sometimes parody forms an excellent example of inter-textuality and in such case it cannot be appropriately appreciated without having the knowledge of the original work. Pastiche, a collage of disparate fragments, is actually a patchwork of works, sentences or complete passages from various authors or even one author. It is also a kind of imitation and intentionally constitutes

a parody. Pastiche is a blank parody and parody involves the imitation or better still, the mimicry of others style.[20]

When literary study went 'post', there was a changing need of evaluative device, since there was no fact, only interpretation and no value, so there was no need of value distinction. Under the circumstantial demand, postmodernists have developed some important devices like 'deconstruction' and 'difference' as tools for new interpretation of the text and to unveil the physical reality.

Postmodernism starts with the rejection of artistic aura and the logocentric tradition of the western metaphysics. Discrediting, meaning hopeless delusion, postmodernists discard the whole previous system of philosophical and linguistic speculations. The focus of postmodernists is on language and signifying system, but its claims are basically epistemological.

Postmodernists' concept of material reality is based on the indeterminacy theory of quantum mechanics which reveal that statistical possibilities can be determined for the position of an electron of an atom at any given time, beyond that our measurement cannot go with any certainty. And, by attempting to 'lift the veil', we disturb the natural stage of the atom; the act of observation alters the phenomenon we observe.[21] By the application of the concept of uncertainty, the autonomy of the text has been toppled. Critics are now free to explore multiple possibilities interpreting any original work of art. Derrida's deconstruction emerges from this scientific theory of uncertainty.

The term 'deconstruction' originates in the writings of an Algerian-French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and denotes a particular kind of practice in reading. Deconstruction is a method of textual analysis, a mode of analytical inquiry. ... It is much closer to the original meaning of the word 'analysis' itself which etymologically means 'to undo' a virtual synonym for 'to deconstruct'.[22] Deconstruction is just like picking up separate fibres from a soft wooly blanket. It provides threads for inter-textual web to unweave the hypertext or hybrid text.

Derrida is the founder of 'deconstruction' a method of textual analysis applicable to all text, but method of deconstruction has obvious interest in literary criticism. Derrida's 'de-construction' is ... the minute detailing

of the text.[23] Deconstruction ... the task is ... to dismantle the metaphysical and rhetorical structure which are at work (in text) not in order to reject or discard, but to reinscribe them in another way[24] to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in nutshell.[25] The movement of deconstruction do not destroy structure from outside.[26] Deconstruction involves locating the point where the fabric which tropes are so adept at weaving is unraveled. Finally, deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one. It is virtually the dissemination of facts and to scatter the seed on the stone to destroy and never to germinate.

Derrida's neologism liberates critics from the logocentric tradition of the Western metaphysics. Logocentrism is derived from the Greek word 'logos' identified with God, the ultimate source of truth. In deconstructing Western metaphysics, Derrida tries to prove that its theories are not truth, rather they are constructions. The logocentric idea of 'presence' is defined as transcendentality, consciousness or God. Derrida claims it to be a dream.

Deconstruction discloses that the interpretation of a text can never arrive at a final and complete meaning. Moreover, it has nothing to reveal, since there is always something more to be revealed that absolute revelation is impossible.[27] Thus, for Derrida, the meaning of a text is always unfolding just ahead of the interpreter, unrolling in front of him or her like a never-ending carpet whose final edge never reveals itself.[28] Postmodernist readings and interpretations have a tendency to end up all looking the same, all demonstrating the ceaseless play of signifier and nothing much else. Postmodern critics assume that a text may possess so many meanings that it cannot have a meaning.[29] Neologists virtually explain language as multi-layered medium of expression without having the possibility of final meaning.

A deconstructive reading analyzes the specificity of a text's critical difference from itself. Jacques Derrida's coinage *differance* is based on a Saussurean theme that is language everything is based on relation.[30] Derrida's master concept 'difference' spelled with an 'a' has been taken from the French verb 'differer' which means both to 'to differ' and 'to defer' (suspended status). The 'ance' ending is the mark of that suspended status ... . The 'a' serves to remind us that even within the

graphic structure, the perfectly spelled word is always absent, constituted through endless series of spelling mistakes.[31] This difference is also the structure of 'presence'.[32] Derrida, by his difference, intends to reject the presence, the reality itself which is treated it to be absent.

Derrida argues that in language there is only *differance*.[33] An originary *differance* is neither absent nor present, neither negative nor positive.[34] The *differance* ... must be nil.[35] It reveals that differance is the middle point between presence and absence, a suspended status. Meaning, as Derrida insists, is a matter of contrast, it is created by difference, not by identity of the sign (word) with that which the sign represents.[36] To understand Derrida's concept of meaning, one must have the knowledge of the traditional theory of meaning, the relation between the signifier and signified, word and object. Derrida rejects this theory saying that the signified does not exist. It is a logocentric illusion. The signified is never present it is always absent.

Some critics are of the view that Derrida's concept of meaning is based on the argument that nothing is simply present, but depends for its meaning on relation to things absent. In this negative logic a pen is a pen, because it is not a pipe. Those critics argue that Derrida's concept of *differance* is close to Buddhists' claim of negative theory of meaning. But it is significant to mention here that after Kumarila's attack that negation of non-existence and nothingness is not possible,[37] the Buddhist concept of negative meaning lost its ground. Moreover, Derrida's concept of *differance* is not a true copy of Buddhist theory of negative meaning. Derrida argues, 'Imagination alone has the power of giving birth to itself. It creates nothing because it is imagination. But it receives nothing alien or anterior to it. It is not affected by the "real". It is pure auto-affection. It is the other name of *differance*, the auto-affection.'[38] Apparently, Derrida's concept of difference seems to be his own imagination a construction of present. But it is not a fact. Nāsadīya Sūkta of the *Ṛgveda*[39] deals with the suspended condition before the creation revealing that there was nothing present or absent. Neither there was death nor deathlessness. Neither there was day nor even night Derrida's imagination of *differance* has much similarity with this vedic concept. In this context his imagination cannot be treated as original in nature.

Derrida rejects the established form of meaning and argues that meaning does not involve a correspondence between signifier and signified, sign and thing; rather he claims that signified does not exist except as logocentric illusion invented to suppress the materialistical play of language the movement from signifier to signified. Obviously, language is an illusionary play of signifier, a journey from word to word and the object, which the word represents never, appears. To conclude that in the context of language one can never has direct sensory contact with the phenomenal world.

An important assumption of Derrida is that producer of the first signifier, it is not a simple signifier among others. It signifies mental experience which themselves reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance.[40] The feelings of mind, expressing things naturally, constitute a sort of universal language.[41] Mental experience represented by different words in different languages indeed forms the foundation stone of human speech.

Postmodernists present some novel concepts of language and criticism that we cannot outright reject. de Man argues that language does not function like the world. We treat it to be 'a-phenomenal'. Derrida tells that there is nothing outside the text. He disregards extra textual factors influencing the interpretation of the text. F.R. Leavis also believes that evaluation of the text ... the focus must always be the 'words on the page'.[42] Evaluation of the text is the principal function of criticism. Leavis rejects the concentration on literary biography and history as extra-textual factors overpowering interpretation. Critical evaluation however does not require or depend on formulation of a rigid poetics or theory of literature.

The great legacy of postmodernism can be the dismantling of the authority of the West itself. The dismissal of intellectual heritage and line of descent of which postmodernists themselves are not exceptions proves to be a suicidal attack on their own writings to be insignificant. Some critics are of the view that postmodernists expose the question of reality; they do not provide explicit answer about reality.[43] Professor Shah is, therefore, right to joke, 'I suppose that once the West had both theory and practice, then, there was only theory and no practice and now there is neither theory nor practice.[44]

After rejecting all previous philosophical and linguistic principles, postmodernists' introduction of determinacy theory in the realm of criticism and in quest of physical reality seems to be unveiling the darkest chapter of history leading to the destruction of human race. Ihab Hassan believes that certainly it is not the Dehumanization of art that concerns us now, it is rather the Denaturalization of the planet and the end of the Man.[45]

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Senses and Human Understanding

ABSTRACT

Human perception is characterized with certain limitations and tendencies. Under certain conditions, human senses convey false knowledge to the mind. Human understanding does not exclusively depend either on innate faculty of mind or on the data supplied by the senses; rather, it is jointly dependent on the two sources of knowledge, inner and outer. Human mind and ego are primary in their constitution at the initial phase. Later, they are metamorphosed into secondary constitution. Consciousness precedes idea.

Let me begin this paper with a quote from Kant's book, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant writes '... all our knowledge begins with experience ... though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience'.[1] Kant further poses a question, 'Whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses? Such a knowledge is entitled *a priori* and distinguished from the *empirical*, which has its sources *a posteriori*, that is, in experience'.[2]

Let me now start from the very beginning. There are five senses, namely, eye, nose, ear, tongue and skin. These senses convey knowledge of the outer world to the human mind in the form of vision, olfaction, audition, gustation and touch respectively. Let it be mentioned here that out of the five senses, four are dual-sensory and the remaining one is uni-sensory. In addition to their own specific sensations, eyes, nose, ears and tongue also convey touch sensation to the mind. Skin conveys only one sensation to the mind, i.e. touch. The five senses are further classified into two categories namely, contact and distance. Contact senses convey impressions from the stimuli to the mind through contact. Tongue and skin fall in the contact category of senses. They convey gustation and touch messages, respectively, to the mind only after the physical contact with the stimuli. Eye, ear, nose are distance senses. They catch impressions from their respective stimuli both from afar as well as from close ranges.

Senses are the media of perception; they cannot perceive themselves. De-linked from the mind, they lose all capacity to perceive. It is generally believed that senses and stimuli play active and passive roles, respectively, in the perceptual process. Such a belief, however, is quite often belied. Two bulls fighting with each other forcibly catch the attention of people around. Further, senses' perceptual jurisdiction is confined to the outer world; they cannot look within. A hymn in *Kathopanisad* clearly states that senses are so constituted as to perceive the outer world only; they cannot orient their focus in the inner world of man.[3]

Let us distinguish perception from other neighbouring words such as sensation, sensitization and observation. Sensation is a pre-stage of perception. Sensation arises when the senses come in the tangential

touch with the stimuli. Sensation is believed to be a psychological myth. Sensitization is a process wherein senses derive impression from the stimuli. Observation is planned and purposive perception.

LIMITATION OF SENSES

Ishwar Krishna, author of *Śāṁkhya Kārikā*, enumerates certain limitations of visual perception.[4] According to him, under certain circumstances, eyes convey false knowledge of the stimuli to the mind. Visual limitations arise under the following five conditions:

(a) *Extreme Contiguity with the Stimuli:* A dust particle falls in the eyeball. The particle is so close to the eye, yet the eye fails to perceive it. Further, eyes fail to perceive their own eyebrows because of the same reason. In fact, the visual focus has a starting as well as termination point. Stimuli at the pre-starting point fall without the range of visual perception. The termination point of focus is extended in the case of radiant objects, such as the sun, the moon and the stars. In the case of non-radiant objects, the termination point occurs much earlier. It is because of this tendency of visual termination that the sky falsely appears as a canopy. The canopy-view of sky is nothing but an illusion that arises due to the termination tendency of the visual perception. Let it be mentioned here that sensory perception is confined only to such stimuli which exist physically. Sky lacks this qualification; it is devoid of all physical attributes. In Sanskrit language, the equivalent of sky is *Śūnya*. Void or *Śūnya* lies beyond the periphery of visual perception. Our knowledge of the sky, therefore, is not perceptual; it is inferential. Like sky (space), the entity of time also lies beyond the periphery of visual perception. Yet it is believed to be a piece of empirical reality. In fact, the origin point of the time-concept is traceable to the sequence of astral events such as sun-rise, sun-set, hide and seek play of day and night, cycle of seasons and so on.

(b) *Inattention:* In the state of inattention, divided attention, sleep and other such mental conditions, eyes along with other senses cease to perceive any stimuli. In the state of inattention, linkage of mind with the senses is suspended.

(c) *Infinitesimility of the stimuli:* In the event of the infinitesimility of the stimuli, there is no perception of the items concerned. We fail to perceive small germs, atom particles. We fail to form auditory sensation of sound if it dips below a minimum volume.

(d) *Stimuli under Cover:* Our eyes fails to perceive such stimuli which are not exposed to them directly. We do not perceive our lungs, heart and other inner parts of body as they are covered by the skin and flesh.

(e) *Identical Structure of Units:* Our eyes fails to distinguish identical units from one another. We fail to distinguish one ant from the other, one fly from another, one bee from another, one wasp from another and so on.

Further, according to Ishwar Krishna, our eyes convey false knowledge of the stimuli to the mind under the following three conditions:

First, a jaundiced eye conveys false message to the mind in respect of the stimuli's colour. Second, stimuli lying far away from us do not appear as big as they are actually. The sun, the moon, the stars appear so small and tiny, which is evidently a false knowledge. Third, under dazzling light of the sun, we fail to perceive the stars. In other words, glory of stars is lost in the radiant light of the sun. Non-perception of the stars in the daytime is a piece of false knowledge which our eyes convey to the mind.

The story of non-perception, wrong perception and perceptual limitation does not end over here. There are many more instances wherein our senses fail to perceive the stimuli as they are actually. Our senses openly mislead us. There are cases of illusion (rope appearing as snake). Perception of movement outside the running train is another example of perceptual illusion. Hallucination (perception of apparition and other non-beings), non-perception of stimuli due to darkness are the common experiences of our life. Further, our senses convey false knowledge in respect of stimuli of enormously large size. Due to the largeness of the earth, it appears as flat, though it is global in

constitution. The list of visual limitations and false perception in fact, is quite long and serpentine.

A poet composed a rhyme, which reads as below:

Twinkle twinkle little star/How I wonder what you are.
Up above the world so high/Like a diamond in the sky.
When the burning sun is set/When the grass with dew is wet.
Then you show your little so light/Twinkle twinkle all the night.

In this rhyme, three pieces of false knowledge have been conveyed to the reader (tiny tots). First, the star is diamond-sized. Second, the sun sets and the third, it twinkles in the night only and not in the daytime.

Limitations of human senses are overcome by technologies developed by man. Distant sounds are brought within the reach of man's auditory perception through radios, telephones and mobiles. Distant images are brought within the reach of man's visual perception through TV sets. Man perceives inner parts of the body through x-ray. Man extends his perceptual capacity through such instruments as telescope, microscope, etc.

I view the problem of perceptual limitation and human senses conveying false knowledge to the mind in a different way. In my view, knowledge which senses supply in respect of stimuli, is *primary*. A parallel may be drawn between primary knowledge and raw gold extracted from the gold mine. At the later stage, man processes his primary knowledge and raises it to the secondary stage. At the secondary stage, sense data are *checked* and *balanced*. Through the process of checking and balancing, man approximates his knowledge to the real state of the stimuli.

Through his sustained experience, man tries to explicate the nature of perception and *devises* ways and means to pickup true pieces of knowledge from the heap of mixed data supplied to him by the senses.

Our senses supply us primary or raw data. As the senses are the part of the nature, they are constrained to abide by the laws of nature. Nature has framed the law of *diminishing size* in respect of long-distance perception. Our senses cannot outstrip such laws. According to the law of diminishing size, the image of the stimuli grows smaller and smaller with the rise of distance between the two sides of perception.

After man comes to know this law, he does not interpret his perceptual data literally. He changes his mode of interpretation in the light of the law of diminishing size.

If man does not perceive stars in the daytime, he does not rely on the testimony of the daytime sense data. For true knowledge, he moves to the nocturnal data in respect of the stars. Man now knows why things outside the moving train appear as moving. The man at the present stage of awareness has freed himself from the wrong pieces of knowledge lying buried in the heap of primary data. A jaundiced man does not rely on the sense data in respect of the colour of the stimuli supplied by his diseased eyes. There are others to tell him the true colour of the stimuli.

In addition to the natural laws by which our senses abide, there are certain tendencies of perception. These tendencies have been identified by some psychologists. According to Krech and Crutchfield,[5] visual perception is determined by two sets of factor, *structural* and *functional*. Structural factors derive from the structure of the stimuli. Following are the major structural factors which determine the nature of perception:

(a) Contiguity: Two items immediately contiguous to each other are seen as a part of the common stimuli. (b) Closure: Two separate units if united, look as one unit. (c) Figure and ground: Figure is perceived and ground is overlooked. (d) Whole and part: Whole is perceived as a single unit and the parts are lost in the whole unit. We perceive the tree but hardly perceive its leaves individually. (e) Similarity of items: Similar items of the stimuli are perceived as parts of a single structure. This is called similarity principle of perception. Murphy[6] has given a detailed and illustrated description of the structural factors of perception.

Functional factors derive from the need, moods, personal idiosyncrasies, past experiences, memory, mental set and several such personality dispositions of the persons concerned. Functional factors go to make perception selective. People ignore certain items of the stimuli inadvertently and selectively perceive such items, which suit their needs. A hungry man may perceive non-eatable items as eatable ones.

Now, how does man pick up pieces of true knowledge from the mixed heap of sense data? Does he rely for this on anything other than the senses? This is a very crucial question. On this issue, views furiously

differ. Philosophers and epistemologists are divided into two schools on this point, *empiricism* and *rationalism*. Propositions posited by one school are hotly refuted by the other. Empiricists like Locke talk of *Tabula rasa* (blank sheet of paper) analogy. On the other hand, rationalists like Leibnitz talk of *windowless monads*. Whereas empiricist economy is based on the policy of endless import, rationalist economy follows the policy of total self-sufficiency. The two extremes were joined by Kant. He came out with the concept of *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Kant was half empiricist and half rationalist in his approach. According to him, truth does not lie in either of the two schools; rather, it consists in the synthesis of *a priorism* and *a posteriorism*.

Analogically speaking, Lockian man is settled on the moon. For his sustenance and subsistence on the lunar surface, he imports his necessary items from the earth as nothing grows on the surface of the moon. Like lunar surface, man's mind does not produce any thing internally; it simply imports items from without through servants (senses) and cooks the material thus collected. Entire property of mind is collected from the outside sources. If this be the position of Locke, he is certainly indefensible. But Locke is not so categorical on this point. According to him, man's mind is not equipped with *innate ideas*, but it certainly is equipped with *innate faculty*.

Quite unlike the Lockian man, Leibnitzian man is lodged in a cell, where everything is provided from the very beginning once and for all. Here, there is a rule of *pre-established harmony*. Mind need not move out of the cell for anything. Leibnitzian man's cell is closed from all the sides. The external world is strictly prohibited from entering into the monadic cell.

THE MIND

As I visualize the situation, and real man is neither only senses nor only mind; he is senses plus mind. At the time of birth, the human baby is equipped with primary mind. At the initial stage, such a mind makes reflexive movements; it mechanically sustains the body; makes instinctive gestures as assisted by the primary sensory system. The senses carry the message from the outer world, which the primary mind stores, processes and synthesizes. Primary mind remains engaged

in dual function, namely oozing consciousness and storing the images from the outside world conveyed by the senses. With the expanding volume of consciousness, primary mind is metamorphosed into secondary mind. Primary mind is the baby counterpart of the adult or secondary mind. In the reservoir of consciousness, sense impressions brought from the outside are shaped and fashioned. Consciousness and sense-impressions may be likened to egg and spermatozoan, respectively. The spermatozoan fertilizes the egg. The fertilized egg is nothing but *idea*. So, consciousness is the mother and sense-impression is the father of *idea*. Both sense-impression and consciousness precede idea. In case consciousness precedes idea, how can idea be called innate? No idea is possible without consciousness and sense-impression. Mind encompasses consciousness it generates idea and many other items, in the course of its existence. Consciousness may also be called psychological field, which is differentiated into several sub-systems such as cognition, affection and conation.

Primary mind is managed by the primary ego, which also goes with the name of *id*. With the growing volume of consciousness and furtherance of shade-differentiation, the *id* is metamorphosed into secondary or real ego. After coming into being, the real ego manages the volume of consciousness and directs it towards the intended targets. Primary and secondary egos may be likened to the protem or *ad hoc* and elected Speaker of the Parliament respectively.

Shades of Consciousness

Consciousness possesses several shades. Almost all the shades of consciousness move under the instruction of the ego. Following are the major shades of consciousness:

(a) Attention: attention is the flow of consciousness to a particular target. Attention takes several shapes in respect to the following conditions. (a) Singularity and multiplicity of target: In the event of singular target, attention is highly pointed and intense. Multiplicity of targets makes attention fragmented, less intense and less effective with respect to each target. (b) Imagination: It is wayward flow of consciousness toward certain distant ends. Imagination remains always tied to the string of reality like kite. The kite flies high in the sky but

it does not lose touch with the ground reality. (c) Inference: Inference is judgement reached on the basis of major and minor premises. Major premise is believed to be a piece of self-evident knowledge. (d) Reasoning: Reasoning refers to the investment of consciousness for tentative judgement on certain issues. (e) Speculation: Speculation is reality-controlled flow of consciousness in respect of certain issues. (f) Fantasy: Fantasy is flight of consciousness beyond all constraints and regulations in the pursuit of certain ethereal objectives. Such a flight, however, remains under the loose supervision of the ego. (g) Dream: Dream is a shade of consciousness whereupon the ego exercises no control whatsoever.

In this short paper, I have sought to portray the structure of human understanding and the role of senses thereinto.

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Noticing the Illusoriness of the Illusion of 'I-Centricity'

The article entitled 'Freeing Philosophy from the "Prison-House" of I-Centricity'[1] written by Professor Daya Krishna (hereinafter DK) is very

opportune. DK, in fact, has been trying since long to demolish through his writings this particular prison-house. And through them he has been trying to emancipate contemporary Indian philosophy from the morass of biased thinking. And thus he is doing signal service to philosophy in general and Indian philosophy in particular.

But what is this prison-house? Well, this phrase obviously is used metaphorically here. And its real significance may perhaps escape the notice of many who are not experts in philosophy. So I would like to briefly explain its real significance.

Reality, whatever it is, started to evolve with a 'Big Bang'[2], and then its evolution went on and on, and today it is what we find it to be. And, it may perhaps please you and other human beings, the evolutes emerging after the animals are all of us the Homo Sapiens. The Christians expressed this phenomenon by saying that God created man after His own image. I shall not go into the details of the concepts of God and Creation here. In the beginning our primitive Aryan thinkers were not quite definite about the nature of the ultimate reality as is indicated by the नासदीय सूक्त (*Ṛgveda*, X. 129). But then this very *sūkta* tells that through the force of heat the One (cf. Singularity as for Big Bang) was born out of whatever was (यदासीत्तपसस्तन्महिनाजायतैकम्). And then, as is clearly pointed out in *Ṛgveda*, X. 190, on account of this intense inflammatory heat (अभीद्धात् तपसः) Law and Existence were born. And then was born night, and then watery ocean. (कृतं च सत्यं चाभीद्धात् तपसोऽध्यजायत। ततो रात्र्यजायत ततः समुद्रो अर्णवः) (cf. अपः एव ससर्जादौ). And then in the course of this creation in the form of evolution life and then consciousness emerged, and only then self-consciousness. And it is this self-consciousness which made thinking possible and later our game of philosophy.

But then, what exactly is this self-consciousness? DK says that it is the outcome of the 'reflexive' activity of consciousness. Well, reflexive activity is a sort of reaction. It can be possible either at the unconsciousness level or at the consciousness level. In animals, it is at the former level, but in human beings, who are obviously more advanced, it can be at the latter level also. But whatever be the level, the physical or more specifically the neural base is unavoidably necessary for consciousness and, therefore, also for self-consciousness.

The most advanced animals just below the human level are neurologically almost similar to the human beings in respect of the neural equipment. But the slight neural difference between the two species makes the former incapable, while the latter capable, of thinking. The Director of the Centre for Brain and Cognition, California, V.S. Ramchandran has in this connection said, 'We know that thinking is unique to human—to conceive implausible alternatives and to be able to juggle them around. I would say that this major step in human evolution—that must have occurred between half a million to 100,000 years ago—was the ability to introspect and become aware that you're aware ... . It was when we became aware that we're aware that there was a major difference between humans and apes ... .

'One crucial but elusive aspect of self is its self-referential quality; the fact that it is aware of itself—the metapresentation.'[3]

Prakash Chandra, a Newspaper Columnist, also says, '... sequences of DNA have hardly changed in hundreds of millions of years of evolution. And humans share much of their genetic inheritance with other organisms, and *nearly* (italics mine) 100 per cent of the same genetic code among themselves ... . This genomic perspective of man's place in nature should be a source of humility; and a heavy blow to the idea of human uniqueness. Let's now wait for the chimpanzee genome that will probably be the best reality check for mankind. Although scientists expect *almost* (italics mine) 100 per cent sequence similarity between humans and chimps, there must also be a few differences that will be of immense value. For among these differences, we may find the genetic secret for our overbearing domination of planet Earth.'[4]

And obviously this 'domination' is due to thinking, which is the prerogative of man only. And surely enough, this ability to think is very much linked with the above-mentioned 'self-referential quality' of man. It is this quality which, according to DK, is self-consciousness. So, this self-consciousness is nothing mysterious after all, but is just a kind of orientation of something towards some other thing. In the case of the human consciousness the orientation is either towards things outside of consciousness or towards consciousness itself.

Here a very pertinent question arises: Can consciousness be conscious of itself? Well, in this connection, there is a very interesting view

according to which consciousness, in order to be conscious, must have to be conscious of some object other than itself. And according to a different but still very interesting view consciousness in order to be consciousness need not be conscious of any outside or inside *object* whatsoever. In India, there is a very strong lobby in favour of this second view since very ancient time. But then, ordinarily it is the first view that is accepted. In my Presidential Address 'Consciousness or Consciousness-of'[5] I have elaborately argued in favour of the 'Consciousness-of' view. I have also argued in its favour in my paper entitled 'शंकर और हुस्सर्ल'[6]. It may also be noted here that many philosophical disciplines of the West such as Existentialism, Phenomenology, etc., are quite emphatic in holding that consciousness in order to be consciousness must have to be conscious *of* some object either mental or physical. I shall not discuss this point here in detail.

Now, in our own country the 'pure consciousness' lobby is so strong and so much entrenched that many of its influences have become inherently embedded in our culture also. This point needs some clarification. This 'pure consciousness' lobby is very old in India and it has a boosting, as it were, in the teachings and preachings of the *Upaniṣads*. The *Upaniṣads* are the culmination of the *Vedas* and apart from many other things the former preach with much emphasis the ultimacy of Pure Consciousness, शुद्ध चैतन्य. The *Upaniṣads* were summarized in *sūtra*-form by बादरायण in his *Brahma Sūtra*. Well, these *sūtras* on account of their being sūtras needed explication for being understood, and this explication was done by very many commentators, the earliest of whom perhaps is the Ādi Śaṁkarācārya. He was a strict monist and this implies that apart from Pure Consciousness there existed nothing. This One Existent *Brahman* or *Ātman* is nothing different from me or you or any other *jīva*. There is full identity between *Brahman* and any other *jīva*. But then, the manyness of *jīvas* again is not real. 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि', 'तत् त्वं असि', 'नेह नाना अस्ति किञ्चन' and 'ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या' are the crucial statements of the Monistic Vedānta which is also known as Advaita Vedānta. In the above statements which are regarded as the mahāvākyas the 'अहं', 'ब्रह्म', 'तत्' and 'त्वं' have the same referent. But then the question arises: What is the status of the World? Well, it is an illusion, pure and simple.

The *Brahman* or *Ātman*, which is Pure Consciousness, cannot indulge in any articulate knowing, nor can it perform any doing. The subject-object relationship of any kind which the 'consciousness-of'-lobby regards as essential for consciousness is, according to the 'pure consciousness' lobby, a myth. Whatever is regarded as 'object' is just a concoction on the part of those who are ignorant or *ajñānī*. The entire complex of objects is an illusion which vanishes as soon as the pure conscious state, that is the state of *Brahman*, is realized. Here the analogy usually given in support of the illusoriness of the World is quite famous. The illusion of the snake with which everybody is familiar vanishes as soon as the illusory object is recognized as a rope due to, say, the advent of light. The Advaita Vedānta theory of the *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibāsika drṣtis* is quite well known. In the above analogy the *vyāvahārika drṣti* destroys the *prātibhāsika drṣti*. Similarly, the *pāramārthika drṣti* can make the *vyāvahārika drṣti* vanish. We know as well that the Advaita Vedāntin admits three kinds of *sattā* also, corresponding to the three *drṣtis*. The *prātibhāsika sattā* vanishes when the *vyāvahārika sattā* is known, and the *vyāvahārika sattā* vanishes when the *pāramārthika sattā* is cognized. So, at the highest, i.e. the *pāramārthika* level, nothing except the *Brahman* or the *Ātman* is really existent; and all else is just illusion, also called *māyā*. Accordingly, when a person is in the state of ignorance, he is *māyopāhita*. Such a man is world-conscious, and on account of this he is engaged in all sorts of worldly activities; and so as a result of this he has to suffer all sorts of worldly miseries. This is the human bondage, a sort of imprisonment which one cannot avoid, when one is altogether oblivious of his true nature of pure consciousness which is an objectless subjectivity or just I-ness. And it is this very I-centredness which can make a human being *free* from the above bondage resulting from the cosmic illusion referred to above. And so, this I-centricity alone is the *parama puruṣārtha* for man, attaining which liberation or *mokṣa* can be realized.

This philosophy of *mokṣa* preached by the Advaita Vedāntins is perhaps started in its extreme form, as pointed out earlier, by Ādi Śaṁkarācārya. And this has influenced a large number of Indian intellectuals and also quite some Western thinkers in such a way that

for them what the Advaita Vedānta says is the Last Word. Such people are so much indoctrinated as Advaita Vedāntins that they would not stand any kind of down-rating or devaluation of their 'final' doctrine. Recently, DK wrote an article entitled 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed' which was published in a *JICPR* Special Volume. This was adversely commented upon by a number of 'outstanding scholars of Advaita Vedānta' whom DK has named in his counter-reply to them under the title '"Shock-Proof", "Evidence-Proof", "Argument-Proof" world of Sāmpradāyika Scholarship of Indian Philosophy'[7]. DK had contended in his original article that Vedānta was much less prevalent in India in the first Millennium AD than were the non-Vedāntic philosophies. This implied a sort of minimization of Vedānta which obviously included Śaṁkara Vedānta also. So, DK's contention could not be tolerated. But then DK also could not take this intolerance lying down. And the title of his counter-reply referred to above is clearly indicative of the intensity of his intolerance. What I want to say by pointing out the above controversy is that it is very difficult for thinkers to be altogether bias-free, neutral and impartial. And certainly I cannot claim to be an exception in this connection. But then I do certainly *want and try* to be reasonable and impartial.

Now, let us try to evaluate the situation created by the 'I-Centricity'—believers. They hold that the 'I-Centricity' is the Basic Reality and the Empirical World is altogether illusory. And one must escape from this illusion and must be established in 'I-Centricity' which is Real Freedom or *Mokṣa*. DK, however, holds that this view is a philosophical hoax. According to him the 'I-Centricity' itself is an illusion and the Empirical World itself is foundational. The Empirical World is not at all a 'prison-house', and this designation is most appropriate for 'I-Centricity' itself. So, one must necessarily escape from the prison-house of this I-Centricity itself. I whole-heartedly endorse what DK says.

But in his article near the end, DK also says, 'But neither Kant nor anybody else has exhausted the unearthing and unveiling of these illusions, *nor has any one seen* (italics mine) that the philosophical enterprise *as it has been practiced up till now is rooted in such an illusion* (italics mine). It is time that philosophy "frees" itself and gets

'liberated' to achieve that for itself which it has been prescribing as the *summum bonum* or *parama puruṣārtha* for others.'[8]

Well, this statement of DK is rather difficult to accept. If it means that nobody (other than DK) has till now detected or noticed the illusoriness of the above illusion of I-Centricity in his philosophical enterprise, then I think it is not correct. The *Cārvākas* did dismiss I-Centricity completely when they dismissed the very possibility of a soul-substance distinct from the physical elements from which that substance emerged as an epiphenomenon. If the 'I' or the *Ātman* is an epiphenomenon, could it be an eternal existence? And if it is reducible to earth, water, fire and air, must not the 'I' or the *Ātman* be ontologically illusory? Did not then the *Cārvākas* notice the illusoriness of the illusion under discussion? Thus, the detecting of this illusion is surely very ancient, as ancient as the Vedas, because the heretical views against the spiritistic views were prevalent even in the Vedic times. *Bṛhaspati* was a Vedic god and he was also regarded as the priest of the *asuras* and he had preached heretical views and hedonistic norms to them. Further, in connection with the impermanence of consciousness *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 2 IV 12 may be consulted.

Coming to Buddhism, we find that it preaches *anātmavāda* in which the entitative persistence of the soul is denied. H.D. Bhattacharya discussing *anātmavāda* says, 'The assemblage of coenaesthetic and other presentations, representations and ideas, habits and dispositions, feelings and sentiments make up the entire texture of our personality, and all these are changing constantly like a mass of foam or bubbles and are ultimately unreal like a *mirage* (italics mine), the trunk of a plantain tree, a spectre or magical *illusion* (italics mine), so that there is nothing abiding in our psychical life to which the term soul (*ātman*) might correspond.'[9]

Now, if we turn our attention to the West we shall find that there also the Illusoriness of this I-Centricity has not escaped the notice of the critics and they have made it disappear perhaps forever. David Hume, the celebrated British philosopher of the eighteenth century is very famous as a sceptic denying the existence of any soul-substance. He says, '... 'tis intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common *simple* substance or

subject of inhesion. When I turn my reflection on *myself*, I never can perceive this *self* without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the *self* (italics mine)'.[10]

And now the American New Realists. Well, they went on a crusade, as it were, to demolish subjectivity altogether and launched the movement of Pan-objectivism. It was they who pin-pointed this ego-centricity as a *predicament* (italics mine) and, accordingly, they advised all not to be misled by it. And if this ego-centricity is a predicament, it can certainly not be regarded as a reality, much less as an Ultimate One. And to regard it as *Parama puruṣārtha*, as is done by the Advaitins, is in my opinion the height of absurdity. How can any illusory thing or object be any kind of *puruṣārtha*?

While dealing with the American New Realism in my book समकालीन पाश्चात्य दर्शन[11] I wrote,

'... नव्य वस्तुवादी उपर्युक्त तर्क [आत्मनिष्ठतावादी तर्क] को नहीं मानते हैं। उनके अनुसार उपर्युक्त तर्क कई दोषों से ग्रस्त है। सबसे प्रमुख दोष यह है जिसके कारण आत्मा को ज्ञान का केन्द्र मान लिया जाता है। इसे हम आत्मकेन्द्रित विषम परिस्थिति (ego-centric predicament) कह सकते हैं।...

'आत्मनिष्ठता पर आधारित तर्क इसलिए भी दूषित होता है कि इसमें यह मान लिया जाता है कि आत्मा केवल विषयीरूप हो सकती है और जो तत्त्व एक बार विषयी होता है वह सर्वदा विषयी ही बना रह जाता है। किन्तु ऐसा सोचना *भ्रान्तिपूर्ण* है (italics mine)।'[12]

Again, in my article 'शंकर और हुस्सर्ल' I wrote, '...शंकर और हुस्सर्ल दोनों ही विश्व, ईश्वर तथा जीव के परे शुद्ध निरपेक्ष चैतन्य को ही एकमात्र मूल तत्त्व मानते हैं।'

'... शंकर इस चैतन्य को सच्चिदानन्द भी कहते हैं। ... अब प्रश्न उठता है कि क्या सत् चित्रहित नहीं हो सकता? तार्किक दृष्टि से ऐसा कहने में तो कोई विसंगति नहीं जान पड़ती कि ऐसा सत् हो सकता है जो चित् नहीं है। ... शंकर में यह प्रश्न कि सत् चित् कैसे है एक पहेली बनकर रह जाता है।'

'पर हुस्सर्ल में यह प्रश्न पहेली नहीं रहता। उनके अनुसार चेतना का अर्थ ही है किसी विषय की चेतना। 'विषयहीन चेतना' *आत्मविरोधी* (italics now) प्रत्यय है।'[13]

As a matter of fact, Śaṁkara has not been able to explain the existence of the *vyāvahārika sattā* at all. All accounts given in this regard with the help of *māyāvāda* are hoaxes, as it were. I have tried to explain them in my article 'Dogmas and Paradoxes of Advaita Vedānta'.[14] In

it I write, '... When they [the Advaitins] regard *avidyā* as terminable on the attainment of *mokṣa*, they regard *avidyā* as an epistemological concept having significance in relation to the bondage of an individual *jīva*. But when they regard *avidyā* as *āśrita* on Brahman without any beginning, they take it as a metaphysical concept logically independent of the epistemological condition of an individual *jīva*. But in order to declare the purity and characterlessness of *Brahman*, they very cleverly confuse the metaphysical and epistemological categories and become the victims of a very bad type of category mistake.'[15]

But then DK in his article under our review here has claimed, as I have pointed out above, to have detected the prisonhood of the I-Centricity himself for the first time. Well, I do not want to dwell upon this point any more, and therefore end this article with my very best wishes to him in his very laudable endeavour of demolishing the prison-house of the 'I-Centricity'.

But before I conclude, I would like to make a confession, in the manner the great Exorciser Gilbert Ryle did quite some time ago,[16] by saying 'As confession is good for the soul I do admit that I am a spiritualist, all that I have said above notwithstanding. But then my spirituality is an ethos, not a mythos of any kind.'[17]

Notes and References

1. *JICPR*, Vol. XX, No. 3, 2003, p. 135.
2. The Bigness of the Bang implies that the Singularity (the pre-existent Reality) must have underwent a very forceful or intense bursting which is very nicely indicated in our *Ṛgveda* (X.190) through 'अभीद्धात् तपसः'. Thus, the pre-existent Reality must have been a Pent-up Potential Energy and this is again very well implied by the Vedantins' 'ब्रह्मन्' which is derived from the root बृंह् which means to arise, to grow, to expand (बृंह् । मनिन्–ब्रह्मन्).
3. *The Hindustan Times*, Patna (a daily newspaper).
4. Ibid., 13.12.2004.
5. Delivered at the Conference of All Orissa Philosophy Association at Bhubaneswar in 1983.
6. A Swami Pranavanand Comparative Philosophy Lecture delivered in Haridwar and published in दार्शनिक त्रैमासिक, Vol. II of 1986.
7. *JICPR*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 2000 (pp. 143–59).
8. Ibid., Vol. XX, No. 3, 2003, pp. 142–3.

9. *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), p. 162.
10. A.J. Ayer (ed.), *British Empirical Philosophers*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p. 501.
11. शुक्ला बुक डिपो, पटना, 1988.
12. Ibid., p. 126.
13. दार्शनिक त्रैमासिक, 32–2, 1986.
14. *Review of Darshan*, Vol. III, No. 2, October 1984.
15. Ibid., p. 14.
16. *Vide* his article 'Systematically Misleading Expressions' (at the end).
17. *Vide* my Presidential Address (Sectional) entitled 'Must Morality Culminate in Spirituality?' delivered at the World Philosophy Conference for Platinum Jubilee Celebration of Indian Philosophical Congress at New Delhi in 2000–01.

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Morality of Revenge

I wish to ask the question: does revenge, which is retaliatory harm, have the same moral status as initial harm? It is easy to answer this question. If harming somebody is wrong or unjust, then retaliatory harm, as countering this harm, would be just. It would be punishment for the wrong done. Next I wish to ask the question: does retaliatory harm against this retaliatory harm have the same moral status as this retaliatory harm? This question is also easy to answer. If the given retaliatory harm is just, then the other one, as countering it, would be unjust. It would be like a criminal avenging his punishment. In general terms, we can make the following entirely uncomplicated statement: a retaliatory harm is just when it counters an unjust harm; and it is unjust when it counters a just harm. I have talked above of initial harm. I do not wish to claim that it is easy to be sure in actuality which harm is initial harm. It is possible that what is seen as initial harm is found to be a retaliatory harm. However that may be, the general statement which I have just made remains valid.

There are certain empirical theses, which I find going with the notion of revenge. I would like to mention these, and also try to determine their moral status. Firstly, there is a form of revenge, which tends to become what I call extended revenge. That is, in this form of revenge, we not only tend to take revenge against the person who has done us harm, but also against other members of the class or group to which he belongs.[1] Secondly, revenge tends to lead to chain-reaction. Thirdly, with revenge against revenge, with retaliatory harm against retaliatory harm, the question of right or wrong, just of unjust, tends to be all but forgotten, and the assertion of one's personal or communal ego takes over. One will have no difficulty in seeing that all these theses are profusely illustrated in the case of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India.

I will now seek to determine the moral status of these theses. In the first case, we not only take revenge against the person who has done us harm, but also against others who are not guilty, who are innocent. As a result, we do something which is manifestly unjust. This unjust phenomenon is startlingly common. To take just two examples. Muslims in Godhra in Gujarat allegedly burn a coach of Sabarmati Express in which Hindus had been travelling from Ayodhya. And then, in return, Hindus kill Muslims *in general* in different parts of Gujarat. A Sikh kills Indira Gandhi. And then, in return, members of the political party to which she belonged kill Sikhs *in general* in Delhi and elsewhere. In the second case, revenge as tending to lead to chain-reaction brings into existence more and more violence. This can hardly be said to be a desirable state of affairs, notwithstanding the fact that some of this violence may be of the just kind. In the third case, morality is abandoned altogether. This conclusion is directly contained in the thesis that with revenge against revenge, with retaliatory harm against retaliatory harm, the question of right or wrong is all but forgotten, and the assertion of one's personal or communal ego takes over.

I may conclude my preceding discussion of the morality of revenge as follows: revenge may be moral or immoral. But there are certain empirical phenomena which tend to go with revenge, which are not morally in order. We may say that this is one of the reasons why people like Gandhi have spoken in favour of a non-retaliatory response to injustice, in place of a retaliatory one.

I would like to utilize this opportunity to dwell upon a problem which has worried me a great deal and for a long time. This concerns the reason for extended revenge. On an earlier occasion, I have advanced a hypothesis in this connection. In doing so, I particularly had Hindus and Muslims in India in mind. I had made the following suggestion: let us suppose that there are two religious communities. There exists, historically or otherwise, a certain amount of hostility and distrust between them. As a result, the harm which only some members of one of these communities do to some members of the other community or to that community as a whole, is projected upon all the members of the former community. On further thought, however, I find that this explanation has at best only a limited application, say, to the case of Hindus and Muslims in India. Thus, for example, it does not apply to the following case which I have also had an occasion to mention before: a Sikh kills Indira Gandhi. In return, members of the political party to which she belonged kill Sikhs in general in Delhi and elsewhere. Let me mention another case, which one will not be surprised to come across in India even now. A boy elopes with a girl. In return, members of the girl's family who do not approve of this start looking at members of the boy's family in general with enemity, and do not even hesitate to harm them.[2] I would now like to advance an alternative hypothesis, which seems to me to have general validity. It is as follows: the affected party, or the group to which the affected party or one which is taken as the affected party belongs, treats the group to which the perpetrator of mischief or one who is taken as the perpetrator of mischief belongs, as one single whole, as a collective unity, in such a way that all the members of the group are held as somehow having a part in the mischief, and consequently as objects of punishment. And it treats this entire group as one single whole on the basis of some affinity that there may be between the perpetrator of mischief or one who is taken as the perpetrator of mischief and the rest of the group. The affinity may be a religious one as in the case of Hindus and Muslims in India; or, again, as in the case of Sikhs in the example of a Sikh killing Indira Gandhi; or it may be the affinity of the relation of kinship as in the example of a boy eloping with a girl; or it may be some other affinity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. I distinguish between individual and collective (or communal) revenge, and between two forms of the latter. In individual revenge, an individual or a group harms some person or persons, and the latter harm the former in return. In collective revenge in one sense, in the first sense, as we may call it, a community as a whole or somebody who represents that community harms another community as a whole or somebody who represents that community, and the latter harms the former in return. In collective revenge, in the second sense, some member or members of a community harm some member or members of another community or that community as a whole, and the latter harm the former community as a whole, *including those of its members who are not responsible for the initial harm.*

   It will be seen that it is collective revenge in the second sense which I have in mind here, and which I call extended revenge.
2. A story is told of a boy eloping with a girl. Members of the girl's family kill the boy's father, his brother, and also other members of his family. In return, members of the girl's family are also killed, so that there ultimately remain only the boy and the girl to lead their life of love without obstacles.

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Agenda for Research

What exactly is meant by *padārtha* in the Indian Philosophical Tradition?

The Nyāya Sūtra mentions sixteen *padārthas* and the whole of the Nyāya tradition is said to deal with them. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's recent volume entitled *Development of Nyāya Philosophy and its Social Context* published by the Centre for Studies in Civilizations under its Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture programme, New Delhi, 2005 seems to centre its discussion around them and not about the problems dealt with in the Nyāya Sūtra. But these are totally different from the ones given in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

The *padārthas* of the Nyāya Sūtra seem to be related only to knowledge and the argumentation leading to it, while *padārtha* in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra refer so that which is there, i.e. substance, quality and activities.

Both the Nyāya Sūtra and the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra offer 'extentional', definition of what they consider *padārtha* to mean without giving any independent criterion regarding what shall be considered as *padārtha* in their system.

Strangely, the Nyāya, according to Sibajiban Bhattacharyya as the author of the Nyāya Sūtra considers *padārtha* as confined only to those mentioned in Sūtra 1.1.1, later seems to consider *padārtha* neither in the sense of the *Nyāya Sūtra* or the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, but as the 'meaning' or *śābdabodha*, as is clearly spelled out by Gadādhara in his *Vyutpattivādaḥ*.

VV-I.I.I: शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थस्य संसर्गः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते।

The term *padārtha* here is neither the *padārtha* of the Nyāya Sūtra or that of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

The term *padārtha* is also used in other schools of Indian Philosophy as shown by Vladimir Shokin in his Article published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2.

The use of the term *padārtha* in all these contexts has to be distinguished, differentiated and systematically elucidated in order to gain an understanding of this key term in Indian Philosophy.

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Focus

1. Attention is drawn to Derrida's work entitled *Eye of the University: Right to Philosophy* published in 1904 by Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. The work focuses on Derrida's concern with philosophy and the 'teaching' of philosophy as central to university particularly in the context of the emerging situation created by far-reaching developments in science and technology on the one hand and economic and political forces on the other.

The work draws attention to the central problem emerging in the field of 'knowledge' affecting all disciplines and, thus, requiring the critical attention of concerned thinkers everywhere, be it the West or the East.

2. Gadādhara is generally acknowledged to be the last great Naiyāyika of the Post-Raghunātha era and his *Vyutapattivādaḥ* is justly famous amongst his many works, as it is an independent text on a linguistic-cum-epistemological issue, and *not* a commentary on anyone else's work.

The 'originality' of the work in the well-established Sanskrit tradition may be gauged by the tribute paid to it by subsequent thinkers who have attempted to elucidate and understand its meaning. Surprisingly, this work of the great master has challenged so many thinkers after him that those who think that the great philosophical tradition of India ceased long ago, would find it hard to come to terms with this overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Eight commentaries have already been published, starting from Kṛṣṇamabhaṭṭa, whose date as given in Potter's Bibliography is close enough to that of Gadādhara to suggest that he was already a name to reckon with in his own time, and ending with Sri Venīmādhava Śukla Śāstri. A recent edition of the text with all the commentaries has been brought out under the editorship of Achyutananda Dash, published by the New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2004. The work is to appear in three parts, but even the first part offers a taste of what is to

come. It deals with Abhedānavya Bodhaprakaraṭ raises the central issue of language and meaning in Nyāya or Śābdabodha on which everything else rests. If 'meaning' is inextrically involved with and dependent upon the particular specificity of the linguistic construction, then how can 'meaning' ever be 'detached' from that specification, seems to be the central question addressed to in the work.

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Notes and Queries

If *Samvāya* is not given the status of 'existence' or *sattā* in *Nyāya*, how can there be a real existent relation between *dravya* and *guṇa*, i.e. substance and property or *dravya* and *Karma*, i.e. substance with activity? Would not then, in reality, there would only be 'substances', 'qualities' and 'occurrences', 'events' or 'activities' without any 'real' relation between them?

In case the Nyāya distinction between that which is *bhuddyāpekṣā* and that which is not, and if that which they consider as *bhāva* is regarded as *buddhyāpekṣā*, then does not the whole 'world' 'constituted' by relations and conceived of in its terms be *buddyāpekṣā* also?

In case we bring in the notion of *paryāpti saṁbandha* in terms of which they try to understand quantitative relations such as 'twoness' or 'threeness' or *dvitua* and *tritva*, then would not the Nyāya position become 'idealism' pure and simple?

In case Nyāya accepts *paryāpti* as a distinct relation different from *samvāya*, how would it be differentiated from the former?

What is the distinction between *āhārya jñāna* and *pramā* in Nyāya which seems to accept both? Do *dravya guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samayāya* and *abhāva* not apply in the case of *āhārya jñāna* as they do in the case of *pramā*?

Jaipur

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

SWETA PRAJAPATI: *Influence of Nyāya Philosophy on Sanskrit Poetics*, Paramamitra Prakashan, Delhi, 1998, pp. xxii + 275, Rs. 400

This book by Dr Sweta Prajapati has been introduced in the Foreword as a Ph.D. thesis prepared by her under the guidance of Dr R.I. Nanavati. Through this book Dr Sweta has fulfilled a long-standing need of making an assessment of the influence of *Nyāya* system on Sanskrit Poetics. I must say at the outset that the work has a stamp of authority and critical acumen. It has been convincingly shown how both the *Prācīna* and the *Navya* branches of *Nyāya*, including the Buddhist Logic, have deeply influenced the various theories of Sanskrit Poetics pertaining to *Rasa, Śabdavṛttis*, *Dhvani*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Doṣa*, etc. Due credit has been given to the *Anumāna* theory which had its roots in Śaṅkuka's interpretation of Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra* and which was developed as a substitute for the *Dhvani* theory by Mahimabhaṭṭa. The chapter on *Nyāya* Methodology and Sanskrit Poetics has been quite useful.

The chapter I, which is an introduction, gives a brief survey of Sanskrit Poetics from Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* to Devaśaṅkara Purohita's *Alaṅkaramañjūṣā*, covering the salient features of all the schools of poetics, and a succinct account of the influences of grammar and philosophical systems on Sanskrit Poetics. A brief account of the history of *Nyāya* as well as Buddhist Logic has been given in the end. This provides a background to the subsequent study.

The second chapter called 'Influence of *Nyāya* on *Śabdavṛttis*' is quite interesting. Taking up *Abhidhā*, the primary function of a word, the scholar gives a comparative account of the views on the definition of *Abhidhā* and the classification of *pada* according to the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Ālaṅkārikas*. Regarding the sources of *śaktigraha*, the treatment of a single *Ālaṅkārikas* has prompted the scholar to go into the eight sources, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Upamāna*, *Kośa*, etc., in detail on the basis of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Again, in the case of *Lakṣaṇā*, a discussion on its

name '*upacāra*' follows a mere mention of the three conditions of *Lakṣaṇā* according to rhetoricians. The discussion is based on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama. Going back to the conditions of *Lakṣaṇā* (*Lakṣaṇā—hetus*), the scholar discusses about them on the basis of *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali* among the *Nyāya* texts and *Kāvyaprakāśa* and *Rasagaṅgādhara* among the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* texts. The claims of *Tātparya* as a *vṛtti* has been examined in the light of the views of the different *Naiyāyikas* and *Ālaṅkārikas* and a distinction between *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* has been drawn. In the cases of *Laksanā* and *Tātparya*, the influence of the *Nyāya* system on Sanskrit Poetics has been quite evident.

I have to make some observations on some points in this chapter. It is said that 'Mahimabhaṭṭa recognizes *Abhidhā* alone as *vṛtti*' (p. 35). It must be noted that Kuntaka was the first to recognize *Vācya-Vācaka-bhāva* alone between the word and the sense.[1] Hence, according to Kuntaka also, *Abhidhā* alone is the *vṛtti*.

Secondly, it is said that 'the restriction of *Abhidhā* by the restrictive factors, therefore, is a myth' (p. 41). There are two views regarding the restriction of *Abhidhā* among the *Ālaṅkārikas*. These views are expressed in the context of '*anekārtha-śabdas*'. One view is that the restrictive factors such as *saṁyoga*, *viprayoga*, etc. restrict the denotative power of those words to give one meaning. The other meaning is conveyed by *Vyañjanā*.[2] This view is held by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha, etc. The second view is that the factors such as *saṁyoga*, *viprayoga*, etc. do not restrict the *Abhidhā*, but help in deciding the contextual meaning (*Prākaraṇika* or *Prastuta artha*). The other meaning is conveyed by *Abhidhā* itself. This view is held by Appayya Dīksita, Jagannātha, etc.[3] The first view is guided by one of the five views on *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* discussed in Abhinava Gupta's *Locana* on the *Dhvanyāloka*.[4] The second view is guided by Ānandavardhana's *kārikā* on *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*.[5] This view corresponds to the view of the *Naiyāyikas* regarding the restriction of *Abhidhā* quoted above. According to the second view, the *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* consists in the suggestion of some *alaṅkāra* to avoid '*asambaddārthatā*' between the *prākaranika* and the *aprākaraṇika* senses.[6]

It would have been better if a passing reference were made to what the *Naiyāyikas* say about *Vyañjanā vṛtti* in this chapter on *Śabdavṛttis*, indicating that the topic would be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter on 'The Theory of *Anumāna* in Sanskrit Poetics' (chap. V, pp. 148–9).

The third chapter entitled 'Influence of *Nyāya* on Poetic Blemishes' gives a critical account of poetic blemishes which are formulated by the *Alaṅkārikas* under the influence of *Nyāya* concepts of logical faults like *Vyāghāta* and *Punarukta* and those of *Nigrahasthānas*. Yet some doubts arise in some specific cases as to whether they are defects at all. For instance, an example of *Ekārtha* is given as cited by Abhinava Gupta: कुन्देन्दुहारहरहासासितं यशस्ते। Here, on the basis of a poetic convention that the fame is white, the fame is compared to the Kunda flower, the moon, the garland of pearls and the laughter of Śiva in whiteness. This is given as an example of a poetic blemish called *Ekārtha*, which, according to Bharata, consists in *aviśesābhidhāna*, i.e. use of many words without difference in meaning, but not 'use of many words for a single purpose' (as the scholar has understood, vide pp. 64–5). The use of *Kunda* (flower), *indu, hāra* and *harahāsa* does not amount to such a blemish. The purpose may be the same, i.e. to bring out the pure whiteness of fame. Fame is the *Upameya* and *Kunda*, etc., are the *Upamānas* with 'whiteness' as the common property (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*). If this is regarded as a blemish, the scope of *Mālopamā* is totally eradicated. Again, Mammaṭa's example of *Punarukta* (which is identified with *Ekārtha*) has been (vide p. 66):

प्राप्ताः श्रियः सकलकामदुघस्ततः किं
दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किम्।
सन्तर्पिताः प्रणयिनो विभवैस्ततः किं
कल्पं स्थितं तनुभृतां तनुभिस्ततः किम्।।

(Riches which yield all desires have been acquired. What then? The foot has been placed on the head of the enemy, i.e. all authority over the enemies has been established. What then? Friends have been gratified with riches. What then? The bodies of men have lasted for a full cycle. What then?)

Here the repetition of *tataḥ kim* has been taken as a defect called *Punarukta* on the ground that it does not add anything new to the meaning. It is true that *tataḥ kim* does not literally add anything new to the meaning. Yet the repetition has its own charm here, in as much as it suggests the futility of human existence as a whole.

I am not finding fault with the scholar's treatment of the subject. She has followed the textual authority faithfully in explaining the various points of the topic. I am only wondering as to how the scholars like Abhinava Gupta and Mammaṭa gave such examples to illustrate the defects.

The fourth chapter gives a study of the influence of *Nyāya* on the poetic figures of speech. The very principles underlying the classification of *Alaṅkāras* into *Śabdālaṅkāras, Arthālaṅkāras* and *Ubhayālaṅkāras* have been derived from the *Nyāya* system. The principles are *Anvayavyatirekibhāva* and *Āśrayāśrayibhāva*. Mammaṭa is of the view that the *Guṇas, Doṣas* and *Alaṅkāras* are decided as of *śabda* or of *artha* on the principle of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*, while Ruyyaka holds that the principle of *Āśraya* and *Āśrayin* underlies the classification of *alaṅkāras* as of *śabda* and of *artha*. Further, in the classification of *Arthālaṅkāras* as governed by *Tarkanyāya, Vākyanyāya*, and *Lokanyāya*, the group of *Alaṅkāras* governed by *Tarkanyāya* are formulated on the basis of *Nyāyaśāstra*. *Anumānālaṅkāra* and *Kāvyaliṅga* are the two *alaṅkāras* based on *Tarkanyāya*. Vidyānātha, Appayya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha consider *Arthāntaranyāsa* also as based on *Tarkanyāya*. The conception and classification of these *alaṅkāras* are based on *Nyāya* principles. Some later *Ālaṅkārika* (Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita) has treated *Hetvābhāsas* as sub-types of *Anumāna*. Among the eight *Pramānālaṅkāras*, the first four (*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna* and *Śabda*) are based on *Nyāya* principles. Bhoja, Amṛtānanda Yogin, Appayya Dīkṣita and Viśveśvara Paṇḍita deal with all the eight and Devaśaṅkara Purohita deals with only first four. *Dṛṣṭānta, Udāharaṇa, Viśeṣokti, Smṛti, Samāsokti, Tulyayogitā* and *Virodhābhāsa* are the other *alaṅkāras* based on *Nyāya* principles. All these *alaṅkāras* are dealt with in detail and the *Nyāya* principles underlying them have been explained quoting relevant authorities.

Now, as regards the points made in regard to the *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* principles underlying the classification of *alaṅkāras* as of *śabda* and of *artha*, some points need a close and critical look. One such point is: 'If one *Alaṅkāra* of a *śabda* is due to the presence of *śabda* then *Śrautopamā*, which due to the *anvaya* of *iva* is actually an *Arthālaṅkāra*, will be a case of *Śabdālaṅkara*' (p. 95).

This observation is not warranted because what Mammaṭa has kept as the underlying principle of *Śrautī* and *Ārthī Upamā* is whether *aupamya* is expressed or implied. When the *upamāvācakas* such as *yathā, iva* and *vā* are used, they convey the relation of *aupamya* directly. Then the *Upamā* is *Śrautī*. The same is the case with *vat* added in the sense of *Tatra tasyeva* (*Pāṇini-sūtra* 5.1.116). This does not make *Śrautī Upamā* a *Śabdālaṅkāra*. The *anvaya* of *śabda* in that case is coupled with the idea of *śabdaparivṛtti-asahatva*. If a particular word is not used and any other synonym of that word is applied, the expected *alaṅkāra* should not be there. In other words, the *alaṅkāra* does not arise when the particular word is changed. Then only the *alaṅkāra* is called *Śabdālaṅkāra*. In the case of *Śrautī Upamā*, even if *iva* is substituted by *yathā, vā* or *vat* in the sense of *iva*, it remains an *Upamā*. It cannot be a *Śabdālaṅkāra*. Hence, *Anvaya-Vyatireka* theory need not be discarded. Dependence on *śabda* or *artha* for *saundarya* can also be expressed in terms of *Āśraya-Āśrayi* relation.

Then as regards *Anumānālaṅkāra* which is a *Nyāya*-based *alaṅkāra*, the examples given by Vāgbhaṭa (pp. 102–3) shows that there is a strong element of *sambhāvanā* in them. Some cases of *Anumāna* have the *Saṅkara* with *Rūpaka, Atiśayokti*, etc.[7] Similarly, in the examples of *Anumāna* given by Vāgbhaṭa, there is *Saṅkara* with *Utprekṣā*. How could a pure case of *Anumāna* be seen in an illustration given by Appayya Dīkṣita.[8]

In all the cases of the *alaṅkāras* in this chapter, the first criterion is poetic charm and since the *Nyāya*-content has been introduced into the structure of these *alaṅkāras*, they are called *Nyāya*-based *alaṅkāras*. This is rightly made out by the scholar.

The fifth chapter is devoted to the theory of *Anumāna* in Sanskrit Poetics. The *Anumāna* School in Sanskrit Poetics has the sole exponent in Mahimabhaṭṭa with the support of one predecessor called Śaṅkuka

who adopted the theory of *Anumāna* in his interpretation of Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra* and argued that *Rasa* was *anumeya*. The scholar has given a succinct exposition of the *Anumāna* theory according to Mahimabhaṭṭa, who made a scholarly attempt to show how all varieties of *Dhvani* could be included in *Anumāna*. The scholar has given an exposition of five out of about thirty illustrations of *Dhvani* analyzed by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his *Vyaktiviveka* and shown how Mahimabhaṭṭa attempted to explain the suggested meaning in them as inferred (pp. 150–4). The *Ālaṅkārikas* such as Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Kavikarṇapūra, etc., have followed the *Nyāya* method in refuting the views of Mahimabhaṭṭa. What I feel here is that instead of showing the untenability of the *Sādhya-Sādhana* relation between the expressed meaning and the suggested meaning in all the instances analyzed by Mahimabhaṭṭa, they expend much of their energy and scholarly acumen in showing that the *hetus* pointed out by Mahimabhaṭṭa are vitiated by the fallacies such as *Anaikāntika*, *Viruddha*, *Asiddha*, etc., admitting thereby indirectly *Sādhya-Sādhana-bhāva* in those instances of *Dhvani*. The *Naiyāyikas* would enjoy seeing the *Ālaṅkārikas* engaged in such a negative *Nyāya* exercise. Mammaṭa's final and positive attempt to show that the indefiniteness of the suggested sense proved the difference between *Anumāna* and *Vyañjanā*, is the one which I appreciate most.

In the sixth chapter, dealing with *Nyāya* Methodology and Sanskrit Poetics, the scholar has pointed out how some *Ālaṅkārikas* such as Śobhākara, Viśvanāthadeva, Appayya Dīkṣita, Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita, Jagannātha, Viśveśvara Paṇḍita, Devaśaṅkara Purohita, etc., came under the impact of *Navya-nyāya* methodology in their argumentation in their works. I would rather agree with P. Ramachandrudu (p. 193) who, with reference to Jagannātha's indulgence in the *śābdabodha* in his *Upamā* section, says: 'This *śāstra* has gained nothing by the introduction of this *prakriyā*.' The intellectual exercise in the form of dialectical argumentation is often the enemy of poetic pleasure.

The seventh chapter gives a study of the impact of Buddhist Logic on Sanskrit Poetics. This study is very ably carried out. The scholar refers to the view of Mool Chand Shastri recognizing two traditions in Sanskrit Poetics, viz., Brahmanic tradition and Buddhist tradition, and putting Bhāmaha, Silāmeghavarman, Saṅgharakṣita, actually in the block

of Buddhist tradition. Following K. Krishnamoorthy's arguments, she further establishes that Bhāmaha was a Buddhist. All the arguments go in favour of that view. But one point is against it. Bhāmaha is opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of *Apoha* and Śāntarakṣita answers at length Bhāmaha's refutation of *Apohavāda* (p. 203). I refer here to the 7th argument summarized from K. Krishnamoorthy's work: Referring to Buddhists as *anātmavādins*, it is said: 'Bhāmaha, like Buddhists, does not accept poetic elements.' *I cannot understand what it means.* Śaṅkuka's leanings towards Buddhist Logic is quite clear in his *Anumitivāda* on Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra* (pp. 204–5). This is well illustrated by Śaṅkuka's reference to the *Citraturaganyāya*.

The division of Sanskrit Poetics on the lines of Brahmanic tradition and Buddhist tradition is not only unwarranted but also immature. The traditions in Sanskrit Poetics could be on the lines of *Rasa* School, *Alaṅkāra* School, *Rīti-Guṇa* School, *Dhvani* School, *Vakrokti* School, *Anumāna* School, etc. Whether Bhāmaha was a *Bauddha* or not, he is held in great esteem by all the later *Ālaṅkārikas*, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa, Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka, etc. Merely because two or three writers belonged to Buddhism should not be the criterion to make a division like that. Hemacandra was a Jaina. One or two more writers in Sanskrit Poetics might be Jainas. That should not become the ground to create a Jaina tradition in Sanskrit Poetics.

The eighth chapter, the conclusion, brings out the salient points of all the earlier seven chapters.

In conclusion, I have to say that this work is a remarkable attempt by Dr Sweta Prajapati, whose scholarship in both the fields of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* and *Nyāya* is quite extensive. This work is an excellent contribution to the field of *Alaṅkāraśāstra*. It can be a model for other scholars to study the influence of other *Śāstras* (*Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā*, *Vedānta*, etc.) on Sanskrit Poetics.

In the end, I have yet to say that a large number of spelling mistakes have remained in the book. This is not desirable in a work of standard. I do not know whether the publishers get the proofs corrected by the author or not (some publishers have their own proofreaders). In any case, some mistakes are glaring because they result in a meaning which is opposed to the intended meaning: for instance, on p. 104: इयं नायिका

... यत्र यत्र उपचारवचनादिप्रयोगः तत्र तत्र कोपाभावः ...। The word underlined should be कोपभावः। The *Vyāpti* intended is: Whether there are formal ways of addressing, etc., there is a state of anger. कोपाभावः means 'absence of anger'.

Again on p. 151: गोदावरीतीरं भीरुभ्रमणयोग्यम्, दृप्तसिंहत्वात् ...। The word underlined should be भीरुभ्रमणायोग्यम्। भीरुभ्रमणयोग्यम् means 'fit for a timid person to move about.' But the intended meaning is the opposite of that (not fit for ...). भीरुभ्रमणायोग्यम् is the word required.

There are some errors in sentence construction: (1) on p. 37 and 143: use of 'in case of' in stead of 'in the case of' (2) on p. 41: '... the exact meaning signify which ...' in stead of '... the exact meaning to signify which ...' Some sentences are not clear due to some missing portion: (a) p. 97 '... similarly, poeticians also hold the view imply in their propositions ...' (b) p. 149: 'He laughs at the idea that poets propose to solve the satisfactory solution at the hands of the most learned logicians.' Lastly, the translations of some of the technical terms give other meanings. For instance, on p. 137 (last line): 'person reproduced' for *anukārya* (person imitated or represented); on p. 138 (first line): 'reproducing actor' for *anukartṛ* (actor who imitates or represents); 'realisation' for *anusandhāna* (attunement or becoming one with). There are many instances with unsatisfactory translation. Since they give the meaning of the technical term, I have not pointed them out. Some sentences need improvement, for instance on p. 136: 'The theory of *Rasa* constitutes one of the most important features of Sanskrit Poetics'. *Rasa* is not one of the features of Sanskrit Poetics, but the central, fundamental or innermost point of charm in Sanskrit poetry (*Kavya*).

Notes and References

1. यो वाचकः प्रत्यायकः स शब्दो यो वाच्यश्चाभिधेयः सोऽर्थ इति। ननु च द्योतकव्यञ्जकावपि शब्दौ सम्भवतः, तदसङ्ग्रहात्राव्याप्तिः, यस्मादर्थप्रतीतिकारित्वसामान्यादुपचारात्तावपि वाचकावेव। एवं द्योत्यव्यङ्ग्ययोरप्यर्थयोः प्रत्येयत्वसामान्यादुपचाराद्वाच्यत्वमेव। (*Vakroktijīvita, vṛtti* under 1. 8).
2. अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते।
संयोगाद्यैरवाच्यार्थधीकृद्व्यापृतिरञ्जनम्।। (*Kāvyaprakāśa*, II. 19)
(संयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता।
अर्थः प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य सन्निधिः।।
सामर्थ्यमौचिती देशः कालो व्यक्तिः स्वरादयः।
शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः।।)
3. यदत्र प्रकृताप्रकृतश्लेषोदाहरणे शब्दशक्तिमूलध्वनिमिच्छन्ति प्राञ्चः तत् प्रकृताप्रकृताभिधानमूलकस्य उपमादेरलङ्कारस्य व्यङ्ग्यत्वाभिप्रायं न तु अप्रकृतार्थस्यैव व्यङ्ग्यत्वाभिप्रायम्। अप्रकृतार्थस्यापि शक्त्या प्रतिपाद्यस्य अभिधेयत्वावश्यंभावेन व्यक्तयनपेक्षणात्। = (*Kuvalayānanda*, Nirnaya Sagar edn., 1912, pp. 75–6).
तस्मात्रानार्थस्याप्राकरणिकेऽर्थे व्यञ्जनेति प्राचां सिद्धान्तः शिथिल एव। (*Rasagaṅgādhara*, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Vidyabhavan, 1969), Part-II, p. 32).
4. अत्र केचिन्मन्यते – यत एतेषां शब्दानां पूर्वमर्थान्तरेऽभिधान्तरं दृष्टं ततस्तथाविधेऽर्थान्तरे दृष्टतदभिधाशक्तेरेव प्रतिपत्तुः नियन्त्रिताभिधाशक्तिकेभ्यः एतेभ्यः प्रतिपत्तिः ध्वननव्यापारादेवेति शब्दशक्तिमूलत्वं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं चेत्यविरुद्धम्। (*Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka*, (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Vidyabhavan, 1992), p. 260).
5. आक्षिप्त एवालङ्कारः शब्दशक्त्या प्रकाशते।
यस्मिन्नुक्तः शब्देन शब्दशक्त्युद्भवो हि सः।। (*Dhvanyāloka*, II. 21)
यस्मादलङ्कारो न वस्तुमात्रं यस्मिन् काव्ये शब्दशक्त्या प्रकाशते स शब्दशक्त्युद्भवो ध्वनिरित्यस्माकं विवक्षितम (*Vrtti* under it)
6. एषूदाहरणेषु शब्दशक्त्या प्रकाशमाने सत्यप्राकरणिकेऽर्थान्तरे वाक्यस्य असम्बद्धार्थाभिधायकत्वं मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदित्यप्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकार्थयोः उपमानोपमेयभावः प्रकल्पयितव्यः ...। (*Dhvanyāloka*, (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Vidyabhavan, 1992), p. 263).
7. पूर्वं रूपकसङ्कीर्णमिदमतिशयोक्तिसङ्कीर्णमिति भेदः। (*Kuvalayānanda*, p. 173).
8. शुद्धानुगानं यथा–
विलीयमानैर्विहगैर्निमीलन्भिश्च पङ्कजैः।
विकसन्त्या च मालत्या गतोऽस्तं ज्ञायते रविः।। (*Kuvalayānanda*, p. 174)

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C.V. Williams: *Jiddu Krishnamurti: World Philosopher (1895–1986)—His Life and Thoughts*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, 2004, pp. 581, Rs. 495

Nowadays, biographies are extremely popular. In Amazon.com, the famous cyber bookshop, I found not less than sixty thousand biographies (and over twenty-four thousand autobiographies!). Perhaps if the reader knows that she reads a real story, or at least a story based on real facts, it becomes easier for her to identify with characters and events. Another

option is that we just love to peep into other people's lives, especially if they are famous. There is no doubt that Jiddu Krishnamurti (henceforth K) has lived an extraordinary life, leaving us with a fascinating teaching and several schools worldwide, attempting to this very day to offer an alternative in the field of education, based (or inspired) by his teaching. It is not surprising then that more than one biography has been dedicated to his life story. Interestingly, K himself started to write his autobiography in 1915 (at the age of 20), and noted his reminiscences up to 1911. Williams' book follows the more famous biographies written by Mary Lutyens[1] and Pupul Jayakar.[2] Lutyens, K's official biographer, has been close to K most of his life. He is the one who has encouraged her to write, and he has read (or listened to) her manuscripts prior to publication. Jayakar has also been close to K, and writes primarily of her own experiences with him. 'I first met Krishnamurti in 1948', she begins her story, and the best parts of her book, at least for me, are the detailed recollections of conversations she and others have had with him. Unlike these two, Williams is a professional biographer and this is her second biography; the first has been dedicated to the story of the Australian novelist Christina Stead. The fact that Williams is an 'outer' biographer is both an advantage and a disadvantage.

Disadvantage, since her book is based on other people's testimony, each of them having her or his own impression and sometimes even agenda. Advantage, as she is free to touch any issue, fragile as it may be, without being required to depict K as necessarily 'enlightened' or liberated. Williams indeed emphasizes several themes which were previously somehow neglected (I will exemplify later), but I'm afraid that something lacks in her book. K is more than the total sum of his life events, which Williams laboriously depicts. There was something about him which created immediate response in his listeners, and that *something* is not to be found in the book. Furthermore, I believe that K cannot be divorced from his teaching, nor his teaching from him, whereas Williams makes a clear distinction between the two and endeavours to focus on the man, not the teaching. This editorial decision (the man, not the teaching) turns K's life, at least as sketched in the book, into a soap opera: everybody falls in love with everybody, and it's all about personal relationships, ego-clashes, influence, money and

popularity. Well, it isn't, or at least that's what K has been trying to tell us in his numerous talks, as well as in his diaries. Williams' distance from K is symbolically expressed in the photographs she has chosen to attach to her book. It is not uncommon that biographies contain photographs of the persona to which they are dedicated. After all, as the cliché says, one photo equals a thousand words. Indeed, in Lutyens' books, for example, one finds remarkable photos of K in different stages of his life, along with family and friends; especially remarkable is the photo of K in the very act of dismissing 'The Order of the Star in the East' at the Ommen camp in August 1929. Williams' book contains only one photo of young K on its cover. Inside, the readers will find another eight photographs, all of buildings which are somehow related to K (Rishi Valley School in Andhra Pradesh, Mrs Besant's quarters in Adyar, etc.); just buildings, not people, not K himself. Symbolically, I would say that the whole book in about 'buildings', rather than about what actually took place in them. Somehow, Williams and her readers are left outside, speculating from a distance about the inside occurrences. She is not asking the difficult questions. For example: Can K's famous claim that 'truth is a pathless land' and his firm persistence on the importance of offering an alternative educational path be reconciled? Has K's repulsion about hierarchy and authority ('To me an authority is terrible, destructive. The quality of authority, outward or inward, is tyrannical'[3]) simply not been a psychological reaction to the indoctrination he has gone through in Theosophical Society's headquarters as a youth? Has K, in his talks, not been too authoritative for a person who rejects authority as much as he claimed he did? In fact, as I have already said, Williams is not really interested in K's message. Instead, she prefers to focus extensively on two main issues: K's relationship with Charles Leadbeater and what I will later on refer to as 'the triangle', i.e. the triangular relationship between K, D. Rajagopal and the latter's wife, Rosalind.

Let's start with the first issue. Leadbeater is the one who has 'discovered' K (as well as several other boys including, by the way, D. Rajagopal) and saw the 'messiah' in him. Yet, as Williams explicitly writes, he was a homosexual and a pedophile. Referring to his relationship with young K and his brother Nitya, Mary Lutyens says

that 'considering Leadbeater's homosexual tendencies it must be emphasized that it could not have been Krishna's (K's) outward appearance that attracted him. Krishna, apart from his wonderful eyes, looked far from prepossessing at that time. He was scrawny, undernourished, covered in mosquito bites, with lice even in his eyebrows, crooked teeth and his hair shaved to the crown and falling in a pigtail at the back'[4]. I don't believe that Lutyens has ever discussed the matter with K. Otherwise she could have simply written that K does not recall any sexual relationship with Leadbeater. Instead, she probably prefers to think that such a horrible scenario could not have happened. Williams, on the other hand, cannot exclude such a possibility. How important is it for the understanding of K and his message? Well, psychologically speaking, if it did happen it must have left a deep scar, and it is perhaps connected to the great difficulties which K has later on experienced in the course of what he referred to as 'the process'. During the extensive occult training that K has gone through under the tutoring of Leadbeater, a book called *At the Feet of the Master* has been composed. Williams dedicates a detailed discussion to this thin book, allegedly written by K in 1909, at the age of 14, shortly after being 'discovered'. It is supposedly the summary of teaching he has received from the immortal Kashmiri *brāhmin* Master Kuthumi (or Koot Hoomi) residing in Tibet, whom he has visited every night in his astral body together with Leadbeater. Of the notes he has written every morning, after his night journeys out of his body, the book has been compiled, or at least this is the official version of the Theosophists. Williams questions this version, claiming that K could barely write in English at the time and suggesting that it was Leadbeater who has dictated the notes to him. Doubts about K's authorship have already been raised by Pupul Jayakar and others. The book, easily available in bookshops world- (and cyber-world) wide even today, is an interesting document for the understanding not so much of K and his teaching but rather of Theosophy and the Theosophists of the time. Annie Besant (whose story, by the way, is not less interesting than K's), in her preface to the book, writes: 'The privilege is given to me, as an elder, to pen a word of introduction to this little book, the first written by a younger Brother, young in body verily, but not in Soul. The teachings

contained in it were given to him by his Master in preparing him for Initiation, and were written down by him from memory, slowly and laboriously, for his English last year was far less fluent than it is now ...' The book, beginning with the dedication 'to those who knock', is divided into four chapters, each dealing with one of four qualities required from the student who wishes to walk on 'the path', namely discrimination, desirelessness, good conduct and love. The first, i.e. discrimination between the real and the unreal, is very common in Advaitic texts. Check for example Śankara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.1.; here he lists the qualities required from a *śiṣya* wishing to embark on the inquiry toward the *brahman*, claiming that he should be *nityānitya-vastu-vivekah*, 'endowed with clear distinction between the eternal and the transitory'. The second requirement of *At the Feet of the Master*, desirelessness, echoes the message of the *Bhagavadgītā*; 'You must work for the sake of the work', says to young K the Master (or Leadbeater), 'not in the hope of seeing the result'. The fourth requirement blends the *Gītā*'s *bhakti* with Christian love: 'Of all the qualifications', says the Master, 'Love is the most important. It is the will to be one with God. Because He is Love (all the Capitals are in the original), you if you would become one with Him, must be filled with perfect unselfishness and love also'. Years later, K denied any memory of writing the book. Williams even quotes someone who has heard him saying to his father in his native language Telugu (which later on he has altogether forgotten!) that he is not the author of the book. Written by him or not, young Alcyone (K's Theosophical name) had a long journey ahead of him until he was to become a full-fledged 'world-teacher', the task originally intended for him by the Theosophists. 'The most remarkable thing about Krishnamurti's life', writes and justly so Mary Lutyens, 'was that the prophecies made about him in his youth were fulfilled, yet in a very different way from what had been expected'[5]. If the later K used to say that 'listening to the story of *what is* brings about its own liberation'[6], thus rejecting 'the story of *what should be* told by religious traditions, leaders, *gurus*, politicians, etc.—then *At the Feet of the Master* is nothing less than a paradigm of that very story which he has later on left behind'.

The second issue dealt by C.V. Williams at length is 'the triangle'. In other words, she is extremely preoccupied with the triangular relationship between three figures: K, D. Rajagopal, the editor and actually the compiler of many of K's books, all based on the protocols of talks given by him, and his secretary/assistant/tour-manager/producer/right-hand, and Rosalind Rajagopal, the latter's wife and K's lover for many years. Adopting a journalist's perspective, as she often does, Williams (having read *Lives in the Shadow with J. Krishnamurti* by Radha Rajagopal Sloss, Rajagopal and Rosalind's daughter) sees the classical romantic triangle: K having a love affair with Rosalind, wife of his loyal servant Rajagopal, later on dismissing both of them after having caused a split between them. She even brings in a 'scoop': in the early months of 1936 Rosalind was pregnant from K, but later on miscarried. One cannot argue with facts, but their interpretation, as another cliché says, is in the eyes of the beholder. In between Williams' own lines, hides a slightly different story than the one she tells. According to this story, if I may offer my own interpretation, the 'real couple' is not K and Rosalind nor Rosalind and Rajagopal, but rather K and Rajagopal. Two men who have been close to each other and in a sense depended on each other for many years. Young Rajagopal, who has been promised by Leadbeater that in a future life he would be 'the next Buddha on the planet of Mercury', has to settle in this life for being a helper of the 'messiah-to-be' on Earth, watching K receiving every privilege and all the attention. Later on, they were both sent to England, where Rajagopal, unlike K, has been accepted to Cambridge and studied European and English history and law, until he was asked to join K and his younger brother Nitya in Ojai, California, hence becoming a 'family member'. K and Rajagopal have travelled the world together, spending years 'on the road', while Rosalind and Radha, her and Rajagopal's daughter, stayed back in America. Personally, I believe that only when he released himself from his deep dependence on the Rajagopals, practically (Rajagopal) as well as emotionally (Rosalind), which has taken him years and became possible only when he developed a base of support in India which included Pupul Jayakar, her sister Nandini Mehta (who was very close to K to the extent that many believed, as Williams herself does, that she too had an affair with him)

and several others—only then was K able to experience a new type of freedom, freedom not only on a sublime metaphysical level, but also on the daily level, in the small things, which after all comprise a large portion of our human existence. K's dependence on Rajagopal and Rosalind (to whom he has written unbelievable amount of letters from his different journeys, often everyday) has replaced, as shown by Williams, his previous dependence on Nitya, which continued until the latter's premature death at the age of 27 (K was 30 at the time), an event which has affected K tremendously. To sum up the discussion of 'the triangle', I would like to say first, that things (as I have tried to show) are much more multi-faceted than they seem to be on a first glance, and second that in a way it is reassuring (and not at all disappointing) to find out that K has all along been as human as us; a person who had to overcome numerous difficulties to bring freedom into his life, rather than a semi-god as the Theosophists and later on some of his disciples (though he rejected the term and its connotations) have preferred to see him.

I would like to further touch on three themes, which I have learned about from Williams' book:

First is the fact that K and Nitya have been actually kidnapped from their father Narianiah. When the latter—who at first cooperated with Leadbeater and Besant—being a devoted Theosophist himself, realized that they were determined to separate his sons from him, he applied for legal aid; but when the court case was going on, the boys have been travelling Europe, accommodated (and hidden) by supporters of the Theosophical Society, and pressurized to take a stand against their father. Having first lost the case in India, Mrs Besant managed to change the verdict back home in England, where she still had enough influence to do so. Hence, the boys could stay on in Europe rather than being sent back home. That the brothers didn't want to go back to poverty and to what the now considered as 'backwardness' is understandable, yet the story of two boys literally stolen from a father who has all along been deliberately mislead (a story which has been 'softened' by Lutyens and Jayakar) is unbelievable. Second is the striking fact that after dismissing 'The Order of the Star' in his famous speech at the Ommen camp, Holland, in 1929, nothing much has changed: K

continued to give talks to Theosophical audiences as before, travelled between the same old places, has been funded by the same old Theosophists, had as warm relationship with Annie Besant as before, and even kept on conducting annual camps at Ommen (even if under a different name). K himself, as shown by Williams, was yearning for an outer change to match his inner transformation, but as she further shows, he had to wait.

The third theme concerns K's healing powers. According to Williams, K has cured several people from deafness, leprosy and even cancer. Surprisingly, he used to refer to his physical healing powers as *siddhis*, claiming that they were 'a deviation for a person interested in meditation and liberation'. It is an interesting claim as it coincides with *Yogasūtra* 3.37, where Patañjali's maintains that the *siddhis* elucidated in this very chapter 'are obstacles in the way to *samādhi* but attainments when the mind is outward-turned'.[7] Has K read the *Yogasūtra*? Has he been influenced by this text? Williams says that Nitya has read it. Should we consider K as a *yogī* then, on top of being an educator, which I believe was the only 'title' later-K has ever been willing to identify with, at least to a certain extent? And does it all have anything to do with the fact that K has dedicated a daily session for more than thirty years to *āsanas* and *prāṇāyāmā* which he learned from B.K.S. Iyengar and T.K.V. Desikachar, two highly esteemed *yogācāryas*?

Reading through Williams' book, I have been thinking (or actually rethinking) about the novelty of K's message. Has he said anything new, if we compare him to other *mokṣa*-orientated thinkers, belonging to the Upaniśadic, Buddhist, Yoga and Advaita traditions? My very own impression is that K's novelty lies not in the *what* but rather in the *how* of what he has said and stood for. Using modern language and science-friendly terminology, and being a 'citizen of the world', he managed to earn the listening ear of new audiences: western, westernized, middle and upper class people and in the Seventies even the 'flower' or 'hippie' generation. In a sense, K has fulfilled the Theosophical vision by becoming (even if reluctantly) a 'living bridge' between India and the West.

I would like to close with two quotations, the first from Sri Aurobindo and the second from Sigmund Freud. Says the former to his biographers:

'I see that you have persisted in giving a biography—is it really necessary or useful? The attempt is bound to be a failure, because neither you nor anyone else knows anything at all of my life; it has not been on the surface for men to see'.[8] The latter concludes his autobiography saying the following: 'Looking back, then, over the patchwork of my life's labours, I can say that I have made many beginnings and thrown out many suggestions. Something will come of them in the future, though I cannot myself tell whether it will be much or little. I can, however, express a hope that I have opened up a pathway for an important advance in our knowledge'.[9] I believe that both Sri Aurobindo's remark and Freud's final words can be applied to K too: First, we shouldn't forget that the unknown is greater than the known in any human life, and even more so in an extraordinary life such as K's. And second, for me it is K's message of freedom which counts, not the gossip trail which follows him. The question is what are we to do with the seeds of change that he has left us. Are we going to pick up his open invitation to decrease our human suffering and give room to love, creativity, sensitivity and clarity in our own lives as well as the life of others? Are we?

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LUIS S.R. VAS: *J. Krishnamurti: Great Liberator or Failed Messiah*, Motilal Banarsidass Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2004, pp. 191, Rs 195, paperback

The title of the book itself suggests that this book is an effort to evaluate Krishnamurti's life and works. Krishnamurti is mainly known for two things. First, he is known for his selection as the world teacher (i.e. Buddha of the East and the Christ of the West) a mission of Theosophical Society and eventually his refusal of being Messiah or world teacher in terms of Theosophical Society and dissolution of Order of the star. Secondly, he is known for his revolutionary thoughts and teaching about religion, tradition, disciplines, memory, knowledge, etc., and also for the inaccessibility of his teachings. Krishnamurti's teachings can be evaluated on the basis of reason without referring to the mission and can also be done in terms of success and failure of the mission. I think Krishnamurti should be evaluated on the basis of reason without giving any reference of the mission and his so-called prophecy. But the major portion of the book taken in to review tries to evaluate Krishnamurti in terms of success and failure of the mission.

The book provides a brief introduction with the subject and discusses various aspects of Krishnamurti in subsequent four chapters followed again by a very brief conclusion. First chapter 'Legacy' starts with an article, published in *Express* Magazine (March 16, 1986) a month after Krishnamurti's death, portrays the personality of Krishnamurti and tries to present the important teachings, the problem of in accessibility of his teachings, the mystical process of his transformation and about foundation and schools. The article concludes that there is no legacy in terms of tradition and authority left by Krishnamurti as in the

emptiness only there can be creation. Further the author mentions about rich and vast literary legacy of Krishnamurti including all his writings, discourse and dialogues with thinkers. Then author presents some excerpts of Krishnamurti's books, like commentaries on living, Krishnamurti's note book and a rare dialogue with Dr Ruben Feldman-Gonzalez. The dialogue suggests that how and in which order one should read Krishnamurti's books. A very important finding comes through this dialogue when Dr Ruben enquires Krishnamurti about something 'External' that comes to us (or to Krishnamurti) in certain specific circumstances. Krishnamurti replied that, 'It may come now when two or more meet to discuss seriously, which means no wish for money and success and letting all the masks that protect us drop off.' Here, an important thing gets expressed that there is no need of any external authority (which is always mystical in tradition) for total transformation but only an authentic seriousness.

One can easily notice a gap between the statements 'There is no legacy' and literal legacy of Krishnamurti. I think, to fill this gap, the author should have discussed here why the literal legacy of Krishnamurti will not be converted into an authority which is considered by Krishnamurti as an obstacle to liberation.

The second chapter 'Recollections and Assessments' begins with David Frawley's objection against Krishnamurti's thoughts about tradition. Krishnamurti considers that tradition and knowledge provide material to ignorance, thus becoming the cause of psychological suffering. David objects and claims that the real knowledge always has a tradition and authority, e.g. cultural tradition prompts spirituality and creativity. Here, the author just presents Frawley's views in a single page and does not analyze it in depth. Title and beginning of this chapter suggests that the author has reflected all controversial topics and presented them in order to discuss them conceptually. However, the author only presents different assessments of Krishnamurti by various thinkers.

The rendezvous with Dr S. Balasundaram, Principle of Rishi Vally School, describes Krishnamurti's habit of reading detective stories but being well informed about the happenings of the world. Once Krishnamurti expresses his anxiety over the poor performance of India

in Olympics and suggested that 'True religious feeling is the mother of all creativity. This country has let it go'. In other occasion, Krishnamurti questions S. Balasundaram about a school student and some teachers. He asked, 'Balasundaram, have you produced one boy who is different, who is in an otherworldly direction? And is their one teacher who is?' After three days, Krishnamurti enquires if his questions hurt him and Balasundaram replied in affirmative. Then Krishnamurti dug his hand into Balasundaram's chest and said 'Old boy, remember, if you are hurt, something is wrong with you.' He repeated this sentence thrice. In Balasundaram's view, Krishnamurti was such a great teacher that he taught not only through his talks but also through his discussions and various other means as well.

The next recollection is this chapter is of Professor Krishna. Once he enquired Krishnamurti about spirits and occult phenomenon that whether all these are hallucinations. Krishnamurti replied, 'No those things exist but it is another form of power. It has nothing to do with goodness, therefore I am not interested in it.' This shows why Krishnamurti always opposed occult practices and believed that they are not related to well being of people and their liberation. Krishna recollects that Krishnamurti was opposed to his lectures being reduced to a form of knowledge but wanted them to be an experience of seeing with him. That is why he has repeatedly stressed that 'This is not something that I am trying to pass on to you—some informations that you don't have. We are looking at life, together like two friends.' Krishna further notices that every time when some one asked Krishnamurti a question, he looked at it afresh, without bringing definitions or conclusions from previous inquiries. There was a quality of enquiry never holding on to the past because it is important to see the truth through cognition, rather than as memory. I think this is the reason why Krishnamurti's words not work as knowledge and memory. Further in this chapter, Krishna recollects two more important things. Krishnamurti surprisingly asked Krishna about the definition of Brahmin. After telling a story, Krishnamurti suggested that Brahmin is some one who could not be bought and never works for rewards. Once Krishnamurti told Krishna that the uniqueness of this country is that

here the poor man can still smile. This cannot be witnessed in other part of the world.

The next recollection of Nadesan Satyendra, a writer from Sri Lanka, is being presented in this chapter. N. Satyendra importantly recollected a finding that moves on, from Krishnamurti's statement, 'Reality is an interval between two thoughts.' Descartes, father of modern philosophy, on the contrary concluded that, 'I think, therefore I am'. Satyendra refers in this regard Peter Seller's dialogue in film *Party* where he plays a role of an Indian and proclaims, 'In India we do not think, we know who we are!' Lastly, in this long chapter, the author recollects Krishnamurti's mystical transformation process. There have been extensive debates on the meaning and implication of the process that afflicted Krishnamurti since 1922. M. Brandford and P. Hayne of the Institute of consciousness research argue that the phenomenon represents the rising of *Kundalini*. They base their arguments on the testimony of Gopi Krishna who claimed to have experienced the rising of the *Kundalinī* in his own person. Gopi Krishna gives details of those characteristics, which he believes possible only by *Kundalinī Jāgaraṇa*. These characteristics are psychic gifts, personal magnetism, expanded consciousness, sense of immorality, mystical perception, etc. These characteristics are given in brief in this chapter. P. Hayne and M. Brandford research found that these characteristics are also present in Krishnamurti therefore they conclude that the 'Process' of Krishnamurti is *Kundalinī Jāgaraṇa*. The author, at last, rather than discussing the things about process and *Kundalinī* Jāgaraṇa condemns this work as 'Product of thought' on the basis of pretext that how Krishnamurti would have reacted on this analysis.

In this context, I think one very obvious factor of his life always remains ignored by people that Krishnamurti was not ultimately liberated from suffering by so-called mystical process whom Gopi Krishna dubs as *Kundalinī Jagaraṇa*. Krishnamurti was ultimately enlightened by becoming aware of the very process of sorrow itself at the time of Nitya's death whom he loved very much. That's why, after this realization he has always opposed all methods of meditation and occult phenomenon.

The next chapter of the book is Krishnamurti and Theosophical Society: Full Circle? This chapter is an effort to examine relationship between Krishnamurti and Theosophy. The relation between Krishnamurti and Theosophical Society has undergone in a circular development from adulation of Krishnamurti by Theosophy, to its rejection by Krishnamurti and finally an apparent mutual accommodation by both. The chapter presents three views of theosophist regarding Krishnamurti. The view of Aryel Sanet who has interpreted Krishnamurti's teachings in traditional terms of Theosophy. The view of Hodson who has extremely criticized and condemned Krishnamurti's teachings because it is an obvious factor that they go against the Theosophical Society. The third view of J.J. Van der Leeuw analyzes the questions brought to the fore by Krishnamurti's critiques of Theosophical Society.

Sanat believes that Krishnamurti's teachings are a continuation of Perennial philosophy represented by Theosophical Society. He represented it very intelligently in his book 'The Inner Life of Krishnamurti'. But I think if we interpret thoughts of Krishnamurti in terms of Perennial philosophy, what about 'Authorities', which is already accepted in Perennial philosophy. Sanat himself is aware of this fact and tries to solve it. According to him, authority concerns with conditioned mind, which accept or rejects according to its prejudices therefore, it creates arbitrarily the notion of superior and inferior. But really speaking, such kind of distinction has no meaning. Sanat rightly analyzes the concept of authority but could not break the wall of authority, which stands between perennial philosophy and Krishnamurti's teachings. Further, we will see that in analyzing concept of revelation and realization, Van der Leeuw imparts some better insights about authority, Theosophical Society and Krishnamurti.

Noted Theosophist Geoffrey Hodson has criticized the way that Krishnamurti condemns traditional religions and its founders like Christ and Buddha. According to him, they should not be condemned. He gave his personal example and confessed that the Church had influenced his life positively. Secondly, he criticizes Krishnamurti's views on organization. Then maximum part of his critique expresses incomprehensibility of Krishnamurti's teachings. Hodosan said that he had

listened to Krishnamurti's talks for several years but he has not grasped what Krishnamurti is trying to convey. He also said that one Beethovan's symphony does more for him in an hour than his seven years' study of Krishnamurti's teachings. Further he warns that philosophy, happiness, beauty and usefulness of our religions cannot be bargained for occasional illuminating insights one gets while studying Krishnamurti and it can lead to sterility, misery and a darkened life.

A leading Dutch Theosophist J.J. Van der Leeuw analyses some questions brought to the fore by Krishnamurti's critiques of Theosophical Society. The most important thing about Van der Leeuw's analysis is that it is not based upon personalities, which according to him, do not matter. It is a conflict between two different point of views of life. He defines these as the conflict between *revelation* and *realization*. Theosophical Society is based on revelation; on the other hand realization is emphasized by Krishnamurti as the way of life. A system of revelation is only possible when there is one oracle or channel of revelation, i.e. the authority, which is not to be questioned. In 1925, it was announced on the behalf of Masters that the world teacher would have twelve apostles and when Krishnamurti himself denied having any apostles or disciples at all, it was inevitable that members should ask whether this revelation as well as previous ones were to be trusted or not. In Krishnamurti's name and on his authority, people of Theosophical Society and 'Order of the Star' think that they are doing teachers' work. But when Krishnamurti began his teachings and denied the value of ceremonials, calling it an obstacle to liberation, again there were many who asked themselves how could this contradiction be explained. Many and ingenious were the explanations put forward, but the fact remains that the faith in revelation had been shaken forever.

Van der Leeuw analyzes that the Theosophical Society, as criticized by Krishnamurti, was born in the Victorian era and is based on duality—duality of matter and spirit, duality of good and bad, duality of God and Saturn, etc. Therefore, he believed that the Theosophical Society should have changed itself now.

Further, the author presents Govert Schuller's study, 'Krishnamurti and the World Teacher Project' in this chapter. He believes that perhaps it is the most comprehensive assessment of Krishnamurti from

Theosophy's point of view. Schuller said that as there exist a wide variety of Theosophy's ideas about the person Krishnamurti and his teachings, he limited the scope of his analysis to the perception of Krishnamurti, which is primarily concerned with the metaphysical status of Krishnamurti. He examined the question that whether the project was perceived as genuine, i.e. having its origin in transcendental source of supreme intelligence and whether the project was a success or failure. Here again, the term success means project was perceived as having fulfilled the original intentions of the transcendental source of intelligence. Schuller analyzes all four possibilities about the World Teacher Project. The project was perceived as genuine and successful, perceived as genuine but failed; perceived as not genuine and failed (of course) and perceived as not genuine, but succeeded. Finally, Schuller concludes that final judgement cannot be possible in this regard.

The next chapter of the book is 'Accessing Krishnamurti's Insights.' This chapter presents the work of Richard Bandler and John Grinder. This work is an effort to develop certain approaches to access Krishnamurti's teachings practically. This effort should be appreciated because many feels that Krishnamurti's teachings are inaccessible. Richard Bandler and John Grinder designed Neuro-linguistic Programmings to access Krishnamurti's insights practically. They called it NLP. NLP is developed from teachings of Krishnamurti which show the new interpretation of self and its function. An important concept in NLP is associated and dissociated memories. Associated means going back and reliving the experience seeing it from your own eyes. Dissociated means looking at the memory from you own eyes as if you were someone else watching a movie of yourself.

Grinder and Bandler believed that by the approach of NLP one can deal with any unpleasant state of mind. Many different mental exercises, based on NLP, have been presented in this chapter.

The most important question about transformation is that when the process of conditioning itself is a unconscious process, how can one consciously try to liberate from it? Bandler and Grinder suggest that for any unconscious conditioning one has to ask the right question, i.e. who is the 'you' that wants to change? By asking this unanswerable question, one can change that mental state unconsciously. Some

examples are also presented in this chapter which show how one can ask the right question in order to deal with a difficult mental state.

In the last chapter (conclusion), the author has confessed that a debate on Krishnamurti could be endless. He further confessed that because the debate is itself in the field of thought and hence irrelevant from Krishnamurti's point of view as are the questions, whether he is the genuine world teacher and whether the process represents the rising of the *Kundalini*.

Obviously, the book is mainly concerned with Krishnamurti's world teacher project and in this perspective it tries to discuss the question that whether Krishnamurti was a great liberator or he was a failed Messiah. As I suggested in the beginning that this question could be asked in different perspective too, i.e. his controverisal teachings. If this question is discussed in this field I think that would be more fruitful and relevant. Most Krishnamurtians believe that thought corrupts things. That is why the author has only compiled various articles and dialogues on Krishnamurti's status as a World Teacher and escapes from thoughtful analysis to remain uncorrupted. But I think that in this type of pure intellectual work one cannot and should not keep thought and reason aside.

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LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: *Culture and Value*, edited by G.H. von Wright, translated in English by Peter Winch, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., second revised edition, 1998, translated in Hindi कल्चर एंड वैल्यू by Ashok Vohra, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1998, pp. xlvi+137, Rs. 400

1. In the contemporary Western Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is regarded as the precursor of analysis and Analytical trends. It is also generally maintained that twentieth century Western Philosophy belongs to Wittgenstein. Although he is known for his contributions in the Philosophy of Mind and Language, Linguistics,

and Analytic Philosophy, his direct comments in the field of Ethics, Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics are also significant.

2. This is the only book in which Wittgenstein directly deals with these issues consisting of his fragmented remarks which he habitually noted down during his entire journey of philosophical exploration (i.e. 1914 to 1951). Apart from this book his lectures and remarks which contain these applied aspects of his philosophy are 'Lectures and Conversations on Aestheties Psychology and Religious Belief', 'Lectures on Ethics', and 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough'. And some of the concluding pages of *Tractatus* and *Notebooks—1914–16*, also contain remarks on value, criterion of happy life, death, religion and morality, etc. It is notable here that Wittgenstein did not write much on these issues as he believed that these subjects belong to the realm of *showable* (that which cannot be said but can be shown only) and does not belong to the realm of *sayable* (that which can be said). Thus, what is so special about this book is that it understands these themes to be on such a fundamental level that they cannot be spoken of at the same level as the other themes of the book. But they are indeed mentioned and dealt with directly. The same thing applies to the simultaneously written *Geheime Tagebücher* (published in 1991).

3. Wittgenstein neither wrote the *Culture and Value* in a book form nor did he wish to publish it. In fact, he did not allow publication of his works. Apart from *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's one review, one dictionary, one article and one letter were published during his lifetime which are: *Review of Coffey's The science of logic* (1913), *Wörterbuch für Volksschulen* (1926), *Some remarks on logical form* (1929), and *Letter to the editor* (1933) (in the journal *Mind*). He did not publish his works because he was not sure of the arrangement of the material. His works, published after his death, include *Philosophical Remarks, Philosophical Investigations, On Certainty, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophical Grammar*, and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*.

4. This Hindi translation is bilingual. The Hindi translation of the book contains 38 pages of the translator's note (अनुवादकीय निवेदन). Instead of providing such a large biographical note of Wittgenstein, perhaps it would have been more useful to introduce certain basic themes of the

book. Moreover, it is an irony that this introductory note which one expects to be about the book, in fact mentions almost all the books and articles of Wittgenstein except *Culture and Value*!

5. However, the translator's note contains elements of Ray Monk's *The Duty of Genius* (Vintage: 1991) and Norman Malcolm's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford: 1984), the two best biographies on Wittgenstein. Therefore, until these biographies are translated into Hindi, a Hindi medium student of Wittgenstein will benefit from the translator's note.

6. There have been some erroneous and vague presentation of biographical facts about Wittgenstein in the above-described note such as

(i) उनके जीवन काल में तो ट्रैक्टेटस लॉजिको फिलोसोफिकस नामक पुस्तक, और 'लैक्चर ऑन इथिक्स' 'सम रिमार्क्स ऑन लॉजिकल फार्म' नामक लेखों को छोड़कर उनके लेखन का कोई भी अंश नहीं छपा (p. ix)। This is factually incorrect as the 'Lecture on Ethics' was not published during Wittgenstein's lifetime.

(ii) अपनी टिप्पणियों को प्रकाशित न करने का विट्गेन्स्टाइन का एक अन्य कारण यह भी था कि वे अपने लेखन से पाठकों को स्वयं चिन्तन करने की प्रेरणा देना चाहते थे। Here it is not clear as to how one can inspire one's reader by way of his unpublished thoughts! (pp. xi and xxiii).

7. The translator's note is unnecessarily drowned in the details of *Tractatus* and ignores even to mention many important themes of *Philosophical Investigations* around which the philosophy of later Wittgenstein revolves.

8. Now, let us focus on the quality of the translation of the book. It is essential to keep in view that this is not a translation from the original German. Wittgenstein didn't write the *Culture and Value* in the form of a book. It was von Wright who, at a much later stage, while editing the entire *Nachlass*, found bits and pieces that he liked so much (because they contained so many valuable insights, offered interesting opinions on political and cultural matters, etc.) that he decided to collect them and publish them. von Wright interestingly says in the preface that the remarks have nothing to do with philosophy. This claim is rather astonishing. (I mean, it has sadly been one of the results of von Wright's job as editor of *Nachlass* that valuable comments by

Wittgenstein on such matters have either been withdrawn from the 'official' publication or simply declared as not being philosophy.)

For the first time, this book was published in 1977 in German under the title *Vermischte Bemerkungen*. Its English translation by Peter Winch was published in 1980. Its revised second edition (1998) rearranged the entire thought of the book as they occurred to Wittgenstein during 1914 and 1951. The new thing was that this version included the work done by Alois Pichler (from WAB), which consisted in the tracing down of the exact date of all the remarks in the book. The list of all the dates were first published in the *Working Papers from The Wittgenstein Archives*, in 1991 (when Alois was only 25!). And most of the work was also done in collaboration with von Wright in Helsinki. Vohra translates this edition of the *Culture and Value* into Hindi. As it is a translation of a translation, errors were bound to crop up.

9. Keeping such errors of omission and commission, Peter Winch cautions the reader. He says, 'Sometimes, Wittgenstein's variant readings can be captured more or less satisfactorily; but by no means always. This is because the relative values of words which are roughly synonymous in German are not mirrored in the English counterparts of these words. In these cases there is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein would have wished to present anything like the same variant readings had he been writing in English. It is important for the reader to bear this in mind' (p. lx). When this mirroring gap between English and Hindi languages is also taken into account, the gap between German and Hindi languages becomes even broader. Some examples of such gaps, which at times appear as blunders, could be cited here:

(i) 'George Henrich von Wright' has been translated as जॉर्ज हेन्रिक फॉन रिट् (German pronunciation: Ricchtˡ)। (p. liih)

(ii) On p. 3 'shortsighted' has been translated as कमजोर नजर वाला।

(iii) 'Supernatural' has been translated as ईश्वर। (p. 5)

(iv) On p. 5, the words 'improved', 'improvements' and 'development' all have been translated as सुधार।

(v) On p. 7, 'sending then off to sleep' has been translated as निश्चेष्ट।

(vi) On p. 8, the word 'things' have not been used to mean physical things but it actually stands for 'affairs' in Wittgensteinian terminology. Therefore, its translation as वस्तुएं misses the point।

(vii) On p. 13, 'the person that offended you' has been translated as आपके द्वारा आहत व्यक्ति।

(viii) On p. 16, 'confession' has been translated as स्वीकारोक्ति।

(ix) On p. 23, the sense of the word 'established' is taken as विवाद रहित वस्तु which seems to be irrelevant.

(x) There are too many uses of the word 'तो' on p. 40 in the line ईर्ष्या तो सतही होती है—यानी : ईर्ष्या के लक्षण तो गहरे नहीं पैठते – और गहरे पैठने पर तो मनोभावों के लक्षण बदल जाते हैं।

(xi) Take into consideration the following remark on p. 42:

'People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc., to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach them*; this never occurs to them.' This has been translated as: आजकल लोग सोचते हैं कि वैज्ञानिकों का काम उन्हें दिशा–निर्देश देना है और कवि तथा संगीतज्ञों का काम उन्हें आनन्द प्रदान करना है। ये लोग उन्हें कुछ सिखा भी सकते हैं; यह तो उन्हें सूझता ही नहीं। Here the word *latter* points out that it does not occur to people that poets and musicians can teach them. But, the Hindi translation completely fails to distinguish between scientists on the one hand, and on the other hand, poets and musicians.

(xii) On p. 44, 'Try to be loved and not admired' has been translated as प्रशंसा–रहित प्रेम की आकांक्षा रखो।

(xiii) On p. 86, the sentence 'Tradition is not something that anyone can pick up' has been translated as परम्परा सीखी नहीं जाती।

(xiv) On p. 87, 'Schizophrenic' has been translated as विभाजित व्यक्ति।

10. Moreover, it is indicated in the editorial note of the English version of the book that English translation contains certain symbols such as <"> for expanded remarks, i.e. remarks which are not of Wittgenstein but are the expanded version of the thoughts of Wittgenstein added by the editor, i.e. George Henrich von Wright. As these remarks have not been incorporated into Hindi translation, it lets down Hindi medium scholarship of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Whatever bit it contributes to Hindi medium studies of Wittgenstein, it is essential

Errata

Contents: JICPR Volume XXI Number 4, October–December 2004

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,अे ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc.
etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḷ.
ൻ ṇ
ർ ṛ.

Examples

Ilaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tilevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.