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ARTICLES

The Nature of Philosophizing: A Dialogical Critique

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This paper delves into the notion of philosophizing. Philosophizing *per se* involves the discourse of philosophical knowledge as well as the art of comprehending the philosophical. Talking about the philosophical may have varied interests as philosophy appears to be cosmopolitan in nature. Philosophy, being related to core philosophical subjects such as metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics and aesthetics, becomes associated with other disciplines of knowledge. In the process of philosophizing, philosophy transcends its disciplinary boundaries, initiates questions and dialogues, seeks clarifications and builds up perspectives of life. However, in doing so, philosophy does not lose its autonomy; rather, it acts like a critique. Critical analysis or critiquing is a reflective activity. It reflects on the *other* as well as on *itself*. Hence, philosophizing is *self illuminating*. In this respect, the *leit-motiv* of this paper is to explicate the nature of philosophizing *per se*. This paper is divided into four parts. The first part begins with Mohanty's notion of philosophizing as a reflection on experience. Reflective thinking initiates questions and subsequently gets into the dialogues and debates which is delved in the second section of the paper. The dialogical inquiry relating philosophy with other disciplines of knowledge engenders interdisciplinary activities and reflects upon the foundational character of philosophy, an aspect that has been developed in the third section. The fourth section deals with the problem of logicality of the dialogical character of philosophy that consequently brings out the concern regarding the notion of autonomy of philosophizing.

I

Philosophizing as a reflection on experience commences with one's own experience of life. These experiences mirror the various activities of life. The mirroring has double levels of performance: firstly, it provides grounds for epistemological discourses; secondly, it acts upon the very nature of epistemological activities. In this regard, experiencing as a reflective activity relates itself with 'the self to the other and to the world'[1]. Reflecting on the self, one reflects on experiencing *per se.* And while reflecting on the experiences of the other end of the world, it tries to comprehend the nature of reality and its modes of relationship where it has been meaningful to us. Nevertheless, reflection sometimes looks to altering the meaning by changing the modes of relationship. In other words, it does not take a belief as it is or it does not accept as the things appear, on their face value. Philosophical reflection, rather, doubts the historical relevance of a belief, suspending its authenticity and validating grounds in which the belief is recognized. Reflection, in this regard, is indeed a complex phenomenon that allows experiencing the meaning of the historical and supra-historical with reference to the factual conditions and conceptual analysis, respectively. As far as the factual understanding of the reality is concerned, science provides adequate explanation to the phenomena in which the experiential data are explained in physical terms. On the other hand, the conceptual analysis is based upon semantics of the logical analysis of thoughts that transcend the empirical conditions of belief. Philosophizing and philosophical knowledge, therefore, are aimed to have different goals. Philosophizing relates to a complex structure of existence in which the aesthetic, the moral and the religious contents of experience are valued along with its scientific and rational understanding of the reality. Hence, it substantiates the fact that philosophical reflection develops a comprehensive[2] viewpoint that helps in overcoming the limitation of science and any subjective interpretation of knowledge. Religious, moral and aesthetic viewpoints have roots in the subjective experience of the reality. Moreover, philosophical reflection on the subjective interpretation of the reality transcends the subjectivity. Philosophical reflection that emphasizes the transcendental feature of objectivity of knowledge ultimately reflects

upon its own rationality; its own mode of relationships, which subsequently helps philosophy in overcoming its subjectivity. Overcoming the subjectivity is embedded in the very process of philosophizing.

As philosophizing is rooted in experience, any of its point of views to analyze the relationship would refer to the subject's pre-reflective state of experience. According to Mohanty, 'A pre-scientific perceived world is one in which the natural and the human are blended together, in which things are not only natural but also valuational qualities, in which persons are the centres of their worlds.'[3] In the pre-scientific perception of the world, things are open to bring about various kinds of interpretation. For example, it could also be a state for the religious interpretation. Religious interpretations have subjective prejudices and religious ideas act like imperatives. They are hardly open to criticisms. As a result, it becomes a hindrance to realize the pragmatic value of life in connection with the moral and spiritual elements of religious experiences. Philosophizing facilitates in relating spirituality and morality to science and humanity. It objectifies the philosophical knowledge to create hopes and assurances. Though philosophical interpretation could also bear subjectivity, still the value of philosophical knowledge ultimately *frees* itself. It prepares its objective grounds while living in dialogical space.

The objectivity of philosophical knowledge unfolds its meaning, significance and certainty in life. Nevertheless, it also emphasizes the undeniable testimony of experience as an important element for positively establishing the truth.[4] Referring to experiences in life, philosophy solicits answers to the fundamental questions, accepts challenges from the other disciplines of knowledge like science and religion in order to build up comprehensive point of view.[5]

According to Mohanty, a comprehensive viewpoint indeed needs *radical reflection* which is not only critical to other's viewpoints but also advocates self-criticism. That involves a careful method of examining 'unsuspected interpretations and prejudices'.[6] There are two types of prejudices that limit the philosophical understanding, namely, the *theoretical prejudices* pertaining to foundational features of the discipline, and the *practical prejudices* involving unfair evaluating attitude. Radical reflection eliminates such limiting factors and looks forward with the unbounded optimism of the develop-

ment of the philosophical knowledge. Philosophizing need not halt just looking at the limiting conditions of a philosophical thought. Rather, as we have mentioned earlier, philosophizing lives in dialogical space; it must continue its exercise in a *dialectical*[7] process. The dialectical process not only helps in unfolding the concepts systematically but also assists in revealing the logical inconsistencies of the arguments and formulates conditions for knowing the reality. Logical consistency of the argument is one of the important aspects of dialogues and conversations. In the mode of dialogues and conversation, philosophizing enhances the intellectual activity. Philosophical knowledge proliferates in such a situation. Moreover, philosophizing, as an intellectual activity, helps in comprehending the *intuitive* experiences and relates it to the reality.[8] On the other hand, dialogues and debates facilitate in validating and communicating genuine insights; hence, they must also carry out a reflective mode of thinking as well. Philosophical knowledge, in this connection, goes through various layers of reflection such as knowing, interpreting and understanding. Each layer of reflection refers to a mode of thinking in which the self reveals its subjectivity—its mode of relating itself with the reality.

II

Reflection on experience further generates questions and subsequently gets into the dialogues. In other words, philosophizing involves a dialogical perspective which has its course with questioning. As Daya Krishna writes, 'To ask a new question is to disrupt the closed circle of accepted knowledge and to open up a new vista for thought. Asking a new question is, in a sense, an invitation to look at things anew.'[9] A new question might be critical in its interpretation, but it must have the potency to obtain new meaning by altering the accepted interpretation. The intricacy of questioning, therefore, is about the potency to elucidate a new outlook and disclose the significance of interpretation and justification. Initiating such an inquiry is an invitation to have dialogue with the supporters of established knowledge. Philosophical reflection, thereby, becomes critical not only in emphasizing the question but also extending it to debates and dialogues for clarification, simplification, elucidation, validation, justification, of philosophical terms and concepts.

Philosophical dialogues are both logical as well as intentional. The logicality of the dialogue aims at construing new knowledge with clarification, justification and validation, etc. For instance, the *dialogues of Plato* are construed in the dialogical order. They involve both inductive and deductive mode of reasoning in analyzing and clarifying abstract philosophical concepts. Moreover, the rationality underneath the dialogues aims to explicate the values of life which pertains to the intentional mode of dialogues. The intentional mode refers to the ontological form of the dialogues in which the engagement between *the self* and *its other* unfolds the *intentional* structure or the field of discourse. In other words, it's the intentionality which holds the relationship between the subjective *pole* of representation and the objective (or the intersubjective) *pole* of representation. Thus, in brief, the intentionality of representation constitutes the normative activity of the dialogues in which *the self* and its *other* are entangled in a logical space. The normative characteristics of the discourse must share the philosophical sensitivity not only to facilitate the dialogues but also to build up philosophical perspectives. Mutual reciprocity and cordiality among the participants are expected for having a meaningful discussion as well as for analyzing the deeper meaning of questions from various viewpoints. As the question framed would initiate a dialogue, discussants need to prejudge the question before making it public. Self-estimation is one of the prerequisites and helps in minimizing inconsistencies. Minimization of inconsistencies and clarification of concepts can be made toward the development of knowledge. As Daya Krishna rightly puts it, 'the dialogues may provide interesting take off point for exploring those possibilities of thought which have been so brusquely or causally rejected in the text. In a sense, the large philosophical texts provide a far greater opportunity for such an exercise.'[10] The discussants must be inclined to study the question or interpret the text and experience the evolution of a new meaning that emerges out of the whole exercise. Dialogue felicitates such possibilities to either explore new ideas or develop new philosophical knowledge.

The philosophy that evolves in the discourse is not free from the centrality of the *self* as well as the *other*. Since the dialogues live in the form of continuity appealing to interpretation and counter

interpretations, philosophizing and philosophy thereby grow in the dialogical order. Philosophizing and philosophy are distinct as well as complementary to each other. Philosophizing is an activity that refers to the way of pursuing philosophical inquiries, whereas philosophy means a discipline of knowledge. Philosophy is constituted of philosophical thoughts and ideas but philosophizing is also a tool of construing the philosophical ideas. Through philosophizing, philosophy maintains its interdisciplinary dialogues. For instance, philosophy of religion unfolds the significance of religious ideas by transcending the differences and distinctions embedded in various world religions and faiths, and study the fundamental worth of religious life. Furthermore, by philosophizing religion, the philosophical character of every religion gets unfolded. In this process, philosophy performs a second-order activity and acts like a critique. But it is important to note that philosophy, by performing a second-order activity, shows the edge of meeting-points of disciplinary boundaries which could be the cosmopolitan feature of philosophy. Philosophizing every discipline of knowledge develops the underlying unity among them and that is something special about philosophy which makes it one of the foundational disciplines.

Philosophy as a foundational discipline not only examines the different forms of intelligibility but also questions the basic form of intelligibility itself. For instance, though religion and science are regarded as foundational disciplines, their interpretation significantly varies because they accept different metaphysical presuppositions for making the explanation intelligible. The metaphysical is indeed conceived and explicated in the philosophical understanding of the reality. Philosophical thinking does not succumb to any presuppositions; rather, it is free from such presuppositions and open to critical evaluation. Philosophical reflection makes 'every implicit presuppositions explicit and subjects it to critical examination'.[11] The reflection on the pre-perceived nature of reality unfolds the beginning of pre-scientific existence of the man and the world. Men, being the centre of experience, critically evaluate various modes of intelligibility as well as different possible conditions of intelligibility. As Pradhan writes, 'Hence, philosophy is logical and not empirical in exploring the foundations of all cognitions, the theoretical constructions, above all, the web of beliefs, presuppositions and principles of cognitive endeavour itself. This makes philosophy a global, ascientific and critical enterprise continuous with all reflective attempts to understand the basic, the ultimate and most general features of the all existence.'[12] Critiquing as a part of philosophical discourse has helped to reflect upon itself as well as various other theoretical and practical problems of life. Critiquing its own nature, philosophizing discloses its transcendental character. It enables philosophy to suspend its empirical relationships with the *other* and, consequently, shows its own foundational character. The transcendental character of philosophizing, therefore, facilitates in building up the perspectives of life by developing a new outlook and relating itself with the empirical and the rational interpretations of the reality.

III

Philosophy maintains dialogical interaction with other foundational disciplines like science and religion. Though the interaction of these disciplines is often complementary, still their presuppositions and perspectives differ. Their sole attempt to address to fundamental questions and values of life becomes significant, because doing so endorses the discipline as a source of comfort. In this regard, whichever discipline succeeds in delving the issues and providing most appropriate answers is being considered the *source of comfort.* In the history of civilization, the shift from philosophy to religion and religion to science or any alternative shift shows the transition of the comfort zone. The source of comfort varies from time to time; for instance, as Russell mentions, the development of positivism has shown the shift from philosophy to science. Though scientific method dominated philosophy still it is significant to see its complementary results as it has helped philosophers to revise the subject of discourse.[13] The emergence of ordinary language philosophy has given a new direction to philosophical analysis. It has redefined the status of philosophy by relating the philosophical viewpoints to the scientific, religious and ethical perspectives of life. Philosophical worldview thus becomes cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan status of philosophy does not reduce the content of any other disciplines; rather, it engages them in fruitful dialogue and tries to resolve the issues.

However, the cosmopolitan perspective has often been questioned by some of the philosophers, because they feel that in such a perspective, philosophy ultimately loses its own identity. As Clark Glymour finds it, 'The general recognition that the task of philosophy was a foundation of science, morals and religion set philosophy apart from other enterprises of letters from philology or history or literature, for example. It gave philosophy a pretension, authority and scope not found so clearly in other disciplines; it makes philosophers experts of a kind deemed relevant in both scientific and moral enterprises.'[14] Glymour questions the foundational character of philosophy as it exercises its autonomy which would make philosophical activity a 'sagery'.[15] Philosophers like Glymour do not see the significance of the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline. Rather, they question its autonomy by showing the cosmopolitan relationship of philosophy with other disciplines. As the cosmopolitan outlook encourages interdisciplinary activities, philosophical activities are relative to other first-order activities.

The interdisciplinary activities are exciting and could be fruitful. It is exciting because one 'enters into a new terrain of knowledge'.[16] Nevertheless, the excitement does not last long if there are no conceptual commonalities shared by the two disciplines. The philosophical endeavour towards having interdisciplinary activities with science and other disciplines has been fruitful because philosophy has been acting as critique to all theoretical enterprises. A theoretical enterprise like science may some times overlook the critical viewpoints, as it is implicit in the process of theorization. But the external vigilance is important for the overall growth of cognitive culture. Philosophizing helps in making philosophical points of view comprehensive. They are compared, contrasted and integrated to substantiate a worldview and no science undermines the role of philosophy at that level. By performing this activity, philosophizing becomes a *creative* enterprise.[17] The creative spirit of philosophizing helps in relating new knowledge into various realms of the life. Its strategy is to integrate knowledge claims and show the possibility of a new direction to the growth of knowledge which would not only be self-critical but also self-illuminating. The *self-illumination*[18] strengthens the morale of cognitive cultures and value of knowledge; symbolizes the maintenance of self-discipline and self-sacrifice among the intellectuals.

A self-illuminating community can produce new knowledge, because they appreciate the value of knowledge than the individuals who are engaged in the exercises. It is because the value of knowledge would emancipate the humanity as a whole from the problems. In this regard, looking to the profession of philosophy, building up community is essential for nurturing philosophical ideas, i.e. consolidating on a philosophical idea for over a period of time, advocating ideas, finding innovating strategies for defending the ideas, developing and establishing *sampradāyas* or schools of thought.[19] The school aims at enhancing the efficiency of its members as well as the proliferation of the philosophical culture. A culture sustains with a collective endeavour. Hence, a philosopher of science or a logician, while delving more into the philosophical questions in science or cognitive science, is trying to beget scientific understanding of things. They contribute to the discourse of philosophy in general and philosophy of science or logic in particular. The contribution to philosophy is certainly a mark of progress for the *readers* of philosophy rather than for any other scientists. Some of the scientists and logicians, who have been addressing to the philosophical questions and problems, sometimes assert their identity as scientists and logicians, respectively. To this the respective communities have some stringent feelings of recognizing them. The practitioners of science might not feel like identifying themselves as philosophers of science, whatever theoretical work they might have been performing. This is so because the person expects that the contribution will be recognized primarily by his scientific community and that recognition may help others to read him seriously.[20] For instance, to my knowledge, Wittgenstein never claimed himself as a mathematician or a technocrat, though he was trained as both and practiced for some time. He is known as philosopher because of his profound contribution to philosophy and in his philosophical pursuits he succeeded in philosophizing the problems of mathematics, logic and language. I am doubtful whether he had ever identified himself as a mathematician, logician, or a linguist—the way the academic designation is given—but while staying within the academics and outside academics he only lived his life as a philosopher.

However, philosophizing scientific activities has been beneficial to philosophy as well as science. The discourse between scientific methods and philosophical analysis is mutually shared. New scientific discovery has succeeded in influencing the philosophical worldview. On the other hand, a new philosophical question invites a scientific explanation. As Rajendra Prasad rightly observes, 'a give and take between philosophy and science would be substantive only if it promotes, or is likely to promote, intellectual progresses, i.e. only if it enables both philosophy and science—or at least one of them—to make an advance which, in all likelihood, would not have been possible, or would have been extremely difficult had the two not participated in this commerce.'[21] It would be emancipatory to have mutual reciprocity between the two fundamental disciplines. The whole exercise becomes profitable in terms of scientific advancement as well as proliferation of philosophical ideas emancipating a new variety of knowledge. The profitability condition should not be translated in terms of gain and loss. Rather, one must see that the vibrant intellectual trade among the disciplines of knowledge is so effective that disciplines transgressing their boundaries with mutual concerns. That has eventually made the centrality of the philosophical invisible. Still, it is difficult to overlook the foundational character of philosophy, as it helps in visualizing the relationship with the *other*. In the interdisciplinary discourse, philosophical thinking may lessen the monopoly of science and techno culture. The worse type of monopoly, as Charles Taylor points out, is sign of irresponsible exercise of power. It not only causes hindrance for the interdisciplinary dialogue but also obstructs the fertility of knowledge.[22]

The invisibility of the philosophical in the intellectual discourse may be an impediment to return to the philosophizing *per se*. As philosophizing helps in relating the present with the past and speculates about the future, one of the challenging tasks of philosophy, therefore, is to reflect upon the value of new knowledge. In this regard, the mode of reflection endorses the sense of *return* in examining the value of knowledge. Joad mentions that such a *return* is possible in philosophy to meet the demand of objectivity of knowledge. He writes, 'Philosophy seeks to study the question impartially not desiring to arrive at results which are comfortable for flattering

to human conceit, not to construct universe which is comfortable with human wishes. On the contrary, it endeavours to maintain a modest attitude towards objective fact, and to discover truth without fear or favour.'[23] Truth and objectivity are the sole concern of all epistemological pursuits. Inherently, philosophizing helps in filtering out ambiguities and misconceptions and is, in a way, showing its cosmopolitan outlook of philosophy in the discourse of theory building. Assuming that such an endeavour does not require any extra vigilance from the philosophical community, one can freely advance the epistemological inquiry. It would imply that philosophizing is not necessarily philosophers' job; rather, it could be performed by any other disciplines as well. Of course, there is no strict criterion to be a philosopher. If philosophical sensitivity pertains to all other disciplines other than philosophy, then it does not delimit philosophy. Rather, the only apprehension is that it would lead to a paradoxical situation where a doctor starts treating his own illness.

As far as theorization is concerned, the paradox may seem to be significant. Theory building requires external evaluation. In every rational enterprise, carrying out such activities involves imparting training in various areas of study and research. For instance, mathematicians are trained in practicing mathematics, physicians to prescribe medicines, technocrats to develop new technology, economists to attempt at a better economy, etc. Their qualification and training are regarded as important features for their pursuits in their respective and specialized fields of knowledge. Similarly, philosophizing may take place quite implicitly in the general pursuit of every discipline of knowledge, but that is not sufficient for the proliferation of the philosophical knowledge. Philosophizing must bring about and enhance philosophical culture. Philosophical culture flourishes with the trained philosophical mind who has desire to pursue it. The philosophical culture develops tradition of doing philosophy—'with the originality to the intellectual taste'.[24] The intellectual taste must involve *critical* as well as *creative* thinking so as to facilitate the epistemological activities by inviting new questions, having debates and dialogues within and outside the community. The community contemplates upon the standards and values of knowledge aiming at the sustainable development of the growth of

knowledge. Thus, in a collective endeavour, philosophizing would take a new form by going beyond its subjective notion of creative thinking to a social form of creative thinking.[25]

IV

The dialogical mode of philosophizing has been effective in two directions; firstly, as a discipline of knowledge philosophy has been self-reflective which has implicitly developed the technique of *conceptual illumination*[26] for better understanding. Secondly, philosophy has been successfully relating itself with other disciplines of knowledge showing its practical relevance to humanity as a whole. Over and above, it provides a space for dialogue with the intellectuals to interpret and internalize the philosophical underpinning of life. The process of conceptual illumination and participation in the discourse of the other disciplines of knowledge give rise to a question, i.e. 'does the dialogical mode of philosophizing help in understanding the notion of philosophy as an autonomous activity?' According to Mohanty, as the dialogue logically presupposes *the other* and therefore in essence it is not *free* to be autonomous.[27] The dialogical mode maintains different levels of engagement whether making reflection on clarifying meaning of the concepts or delving into the issues of interdisciplinary activities. The notion of self-reflectivity acts as a coercive factor presupposing an 'imaginary other' in which dialogue is absent. Rather, the dialogue is sedimented in the presence of silence and active in the form of monologue. 'The monologue consists in appropriating and internalizing a possible dialogical situation'[28] is a reflection upon one's own conviction by evaluating arguments and challenging the tradition, etc. Thus, philosophizing transcends its own situation as well as tradition to examine the value of philosophical knowledge. As Mohanty puts it, 'I as a philosopher happen to be both (empirical as well as transcendental). My philosophical activity moves, alternatively, on both levels. Hence, it is apparently paradoxical nature and also the pathos of responsible and honest philosophizing.'[29] Honest philosophizing provides good reason for the subjective conviction in which one would able to relate the subjectivity or the subjective point of views to the world—to the pole of objectivity (or intersubjectivity). As the subjective point of views and the objectivity of knowledge are rooted in experience *per se*, there is no separate mode of validating the empirical and the transcendental. Rather, the intentionality of relating the subjective pole of experience with the objective pole is the intentionality of exercising *free-will* of the self. As far as the notion of transcendence is concerned, it is independent of the transcending *will* implies that the *will* transcends the empirical and the rational. For Mohanty, philosophical thinking only enables in 'overcoming all otherness, because it thinks itself and it is the *Geist* in the process of knowing itself'.[30] Probably, that makes philosophizing an autonomous activity. Beyond this, he is not fascinated by the idea that philosophizing in order to be autonomous needs to be a spiritual activity. Philosophical activity rather includes all aspects of doing philosophy; reading, writing, interpreting, explaining and understanding philosophical writings, including dialogues and conversations.[31]

However, what is left out could be philosophizing *per se*, i.e. the way the *self* is caught between duality of the spiritual (the transcendental/ideal) and the empirical (mundane). Hence, the question arises: 'Can philosophizing bracket out its own subjectivity?' Bracketing the subjective intentionality of philosophizing is to bracket its own reflexivity, which permanently suspends its knowledge from its own subjectivity. Though philosophical reflection on experience is not adequate unless it is self-reflective or self-conscious, still it does not disown *reflexivity*. Therefore, the duality persists in different form. Daya Krishna, in one of his recent papers has written, 'Freeing Philosophy from the "Prison-House" of "I-centricity" emphasizes that only the *Vedāntic* self-consciousness is non-reflexive involves the *feeling* of its one's own subjectivity. In the mode of *feeling*, the subject becomes the object for the *others* and object becomes subject to the *other*—transforming into a unique form of reality. He writes, 'The diverse relationship which consciousness has with the other would easily have revealed it, if reflected upon, for understanding the nature of the *other* or what Indians call, its *svarupa* or *svabhādva*.'[33] Philosophical thinking takes birth from *I-centricity* of the self-consciousness, and its *feeling* relationship which is *svabhāva* or *svarupa* of consciousness. He maintains that 'Self-consciousness is not identical with reflexivity'. And in that conscious philosophical thinking develops into an organized form of knowl-

edge; in the version of *sastras*, sciences, arts and literatures in which the self reflects upon a new perspective of life.

As far as attainment of the philosophical knowledge is concerned, the self is *free* to reflect and realize the very relationship between the knowledge and the originator of knowledge. It also transcends the form of duality. Having dialogues and counter dialogues either with oneself or with *others* would lead to 'plurality of subjectivities in intersubjective interaction'.[34] Since the dialogue is originating from the irreducible form of subjectivity, i.e. the philosophizing of philosopher; the subject must *free* from its subjectivity which is rooted in the ontology of freedom of the self. For Daya Krishna, self-reflection as the mode of 'beginning to feel its own feeling' transcends the *structural illusion* in which philosophizing takes place without assuming others' subjectivity. It transcends the *authorship* of the philosophical knowledge. As a result, philosophical knowledge not only remains in the discourse of philosophy but also provides scope for the realization of one's own philosophical ideas, substantiating indications to overcome the *transcendental illusion.* For Daya Krishna, it could be a metaphysical moment when 'the ontology of self has no relational properties and *free* from the I-centricity'. [35] It is the *Vedāntic* attempt to *feel* the *feeling* in which subjectivity is melting into the pot of *otherness* and vice versa. Experience of such knowledge liberates oneself from the bondage of the empirical and helps in attaining the supreme values of life—'it is time that philosophy *frees* itself and get liberated to achieve that for itself which it has been prescribing as the *summum bonum* or *parama pursusartha* for others',[36] writes Daya Krishna.

Mohanty, on the other hand, writes, 'I don't want to present a case for philosophy as whole to be an autonomous spiritual act. I think, on the contrary, that philosophy is multi-layered discipline, the inner most core of which is thinking as an internal monologue which I carried to a radical consequence lay down to claim to be an autonomous spiritual activity, needing no further justification or validation.'[37] In philosophy, it is problematic to overcome the structural dualism in its theoretical concern of knowledge building, due to its engagement in multi-disciplinary activities. The multidisciplinary activities of philosophy need multiple levels of reflective thinking to disclose the unity in spiritual thinking. Mohanty

deconstructs the classical understanding of philosophy which is sedimented with religious interpretation. Rather, he is interested in bringing out the spiritual content of philosophical thinking relating it to the experience of life. The content of spirituality embodies aesthetical as well as moral values. Philosophizing the experience would show the engagement of the self in the pursuit of striving for moral and aesthetic values of life which are 'intrinsically good and inherently satisfying'.[38] Striving to enrich the self with *goodness* and *happiness* is an ever-ending process of aspiring for the realization of ethical and aesthetic values of life. It is interesting to note that Mohanty's philosophical thinking got enriched profoundly 'in the absence of conventional religious beliefs and spiritual aspirations'.[39]

To conclude, philosophizing, thus, has been useful in exploring the nature of philosophical discourse, explicating its foundational as well as cosmopolitan outlooks. Philosophical points of views are not about showing different levels of philosophical activities; rather synthesizing the viewpoints of science, religion, ethics and aesthetics and showing that philosophical knowledge is unique in its approach to derive the meaning of life. The synthesis is not only an outcome of both reflective and dialogical mode of investigations which are critiquing in nature but also a *creative* exercise. In this regard, philosophizing has been making the entire cognitive culture intellectually rich and *illuminating* in its entire approach to life which has been the focal point of Daya Krishna and Mohanty. However, so far as the autonomy of philosophy is concerned, Mohanty remains in the dialogical scaffolding to deconstruct the traditional notion of philosophy which involves religious beliefs. Rather, his notion of *spirituality* upholds ethical and aesthetic feelings of the reality which can be shared in a rational discourse. Daya Krishna, on the other hand, though talks about philosophical dialogues and discourses, still emphasizes that philosophizing is a *creative* discourse, which could deconstruct the traditional understanding of philosophizing. The creative thinking helps in melting down the 'structural illusion or the transcendental illusion' of the rationality of the dialogical. Philosophizing, thus, succeeds in intervening into the realm of silence in which the rational self is ineffable about the knowledge and knowledge relations. In other worlds, philosophiz-

ing by renouncing them to the deep sea of silence; making itself *free* from everything. Daya Krishna and Mohanty have thus shown the divergence of philosophical thinking and have conceived philosophizing in a new key. Thus, philosophy proliferating in pluralities of philosophical thinking, accomplishing one another as well as facilitating in going beyond the aesthetic and moral experiences for realizing higher values of life; is a unique sense of making philosophy autonomous.[40]

Notes and References

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16. Daya Krishna, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
17. Ibid., p. 54.
18. Rajendra Prasad, '*Regularity, Normativity, and Rule of Language and other Essays in Philosophical Analysis*', (Pune: *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 1989), pp. 125-6.
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Transformation of Greek Phronēsis into Categorical Imperative: A Hermeneutic Study of the paragraphs 1–32 of the Second Chapter of Kant's *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, pp. 71/406/25–84/421/52[1]

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I: NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION OF GREEK PHRONĒSIS INTO CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Kant transforms Greek ethics into modern morality in his *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. We have already shown in an earlier essay[2] how Kant effects the transformation of Greek *phronēsis* into a supreme principle of modern morality in the first chapter of his *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* as a part of that project. In the Second Chapter pp. 71/406/25–84/421/52, Kant further transforms Greek *phronēsis* into the Categorical Imperative. It will be our endeavour in the present essay to show the correctness of this contention.

Kant transforms Greek *phronēsis* into the Supreme principle of modern morality announced in the first chapter of his *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* in the words:

> 'I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.'[3]

It is co-determination of both the particular and the universal involved in *phronēsis* which finds expression as the supreme principle of modern morality which requires particular determination of will by a maxim in a manner that it also amounts to a legislation of a universal law. In fact, in moral reasoning, the particular determination of will takes place by the maxim precisely because of its fitness to be willed as a universal law. For Kant also, in moral

reasoning, the particular determination of will and the universal determination of law take place simultaneously and one is involved in the other as it happens in Aristotelian *phronēsis*. Kant has transformed Aristotelian *phronēsis* in two ways. Unlike *phronēsis*, the supreme principle is independent of outward action as it is only a principle of inner determination of will. Secondly, in Aristotelian *phronēsis*, the *phronimos* will have to refrain from applying the full rigour of the law in a specific instance so that for him law is not strictly universal but only general. But this is not acceptable to Kant. To be a moral law, the maxim must be strictly universalizable. So equity, which plays no role in Kantian morality, is an essential element in Aristotelian understanding of law.

But this is not sufficient transformation of Greek *phronēsis* to suit the modern morality if it is to be consistent with the epistemic metaphysics of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, for there is another aspect of Greek *phronēsis* which needs to be taken care of. The classical Greek *phronimos* is essentially a social being in communication with others. In fact, *phronēsis* is a public exercise of practical reason in the public square to give reasons to arrive at a decision to act in dialogue with others. *Phronēsis* belongs to the common logos of the polis. But this is an aspect of *phronēsis* from which Kant has to abstract his supreme principle of morality to be consistent with the epistemic metaphysics of his *Critique of Pure Reason.*

According to the epistemic metaphysics of *Critique of Pure Reason*, the distinction between subject and object is central to cognitive experience. Only that experience has cognitive function where the distinction between subject and object is available, so that one can say that the subject is having experience of the object. If in context of an experience the distinction between subject and object is not available, then that particular experience has no cognitive role and is treated as a mere feeling. Hence, this distinction can be said to define, distinguish, and identify the cognitive experience from other experiences according to modernity.

When any member of the society takes the stance of the subject, i.e. conceives himself as a subject to get knowledge of society, i.e. conceives society as the object of knowledge, then he must reflect himself out of society, out of all social relations, since the transcendental condition of the epistemic relation as determined by

modernity requires that the duality of subject and object be maintained. To maintain the duality of subject and object, i.e. himself and society, the subject must conceive himself as a being outside the society. That is to say, when any member of society conceives himself as the subject of the experiential relation of which the object is society, he must reflect himself out of all social relations. In other words, he must conceive himself as an individual who can exist independently of society. This is the transcendental requirement of the subject-object dichotomy applied to experience of society. That is to say, if one looks at society from the perspective of the subject and wants an objective knowledge of society, then he must conceive of himself as an individual.

Any member who, by taking the stance of a subject, reflects himself out of all social relations and also when he conceives each member of society as a subject, reflects them each out of all social relations and hence conceives them all as individuals. So the logic of subject-object dichotomy inevitably leads to the collapse of society; the society is reflected out of existence since each member is conceived as an individual. This is the reason why modernity cannot admit the ontological autonomy of society and admits only the primacy of existence of individuals and thereby begets metaphysical individualism in philosophy. Together with society, by similar arguments, both tradition and history also get dissolved as no one belongs to tradition and history.

The concept of individuals standing in no social relations to each other, and also without tradition and history, is the concept of the state of nature of political philosophy generated by the analysis of cognitive experience of society by modernity. In other words, when the metaphysics of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is brought to bear upon society, then we are inevitably led to the idea of state of nature. That his *First Critique* has political consequences was clear to Kant and hence he introduced the idea of the ideal society that has to be established in the state of nature in the *First Critique* itself.[4]

Kant makes the moral value of good will independent of the moral feeling called 'reverence' for the law in the first chapter of the *Groundwork*. With the help of the idea of state of nature we can explain why Kant has to make moral value independent of moral

feeling. Moral feeling is 'especially distinguished' from other feelings, that of the beautiful included, 'by the *modality* of a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, which contain not a mere *claim*, but also a *command* of approval from everyone'.[5] In nature this is not possible as in the state of nature, 'each will have his own right to do *what seems right and good to him*, independently of the opinion of others'.[6]

In the state of nature without communion or dialogue with others, each has to legislate morally. This brings in a contradiction. If individuals are in a state of nature then moral determination of will must be possible for them in it. But the supreme principle of modern morality announced in the first chapter of Kant's *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* makes a person essentially social since the moral determination of will takes place—if it is determind by Kantian supreme principle morality—by fitness of the maxim of the will to be universal law. Judging the fitness of a maxim to be willed as universal law is a social phenomenon. In one of the formulations, supreme principle can be stated as: so act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of kingdoms of ends. Many individuals determining their wills by universal laws stand in a community. The Kantian principle becomes inconsistent with the idea of individuals in a state of nature, while he needs a conception of good will, which is good in all conditions, i.e. good irrespective of the condition. So, it must be possible to have good will even in a state of nature. Hence, to make the supreme principle applicable even in the state of nature, some further transformation of the Greek *phronēsis* is needed. Kant undertakes the task of transforming the Greek *phronēsis* through further abstraction of the supreme principle of morality by transcendental reflection.

Although Kant formulates the supreme principle of morality to suit the state of nature, yet in such a state, because of this very transformation of the supreme principle, man will remain permanently evil. This Kant realizes only in his *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. There he distinguishes two states of nature: the Juridical State and the Ethical State. Establishment of sovereignty of a human being overcomes only the juridical state of nature but by this we do not overcome the ethical state of nature. What is the ethical state of nature? Kant answers,

> 'Just as the Juridical state of nature is one of war of every man against every other, so too is the ethical state of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each man is continually attacked by the evil which is found in him and also in everyone else. Men ... mutually corrupt one another's moral predispositions despite the good will of each individual; yet, *because they lack a principle which unites them*, they recede, through their dissentions from the common of goal of goodness, and just as though they were *instruments of evil*, expose one another to the risk of falling once again under sovereignty of the evil principle.'[7]

We will not explore here why Kantian transformation of the supreme principle makes men evil in the state of nature as it is beyond the scope of this essay.[8] That is to say, we will neither explore how the good will is consistent with radical evil in man nor how Kantian understanding of the supreme principle of morality itself contributes to the presence of radical evil in man as these issues are also beyond the scope of this essay. We will explore only how Kant is transforming the supreme principle of morality into Categorical Imperative.

II: CHAPTER 2, PARAGRAPHS 1–32, PP. 71/406/25–84/421/52

In the first chapter, through analytic movement of thought, Kant, starting from the ordinary moral knowledge by abstraction, comparison and reflection, arrived at the philosophical knowledge of the principle of morality, i.e. the knowledge of moral law in relation to the essential end of reason, which is the production of the good will. In the present chapter, the analytic movement of thought is carried further, this time from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysical knowledge. It must be kept in mind that metaphysical knowledge is pure or *a priori* knowledge. In this chapter, the reflection involved is transcendental reflection. It may be recalled for Kant:

> '*Reflection (reflexio)* does not concern itself with objects themselves with a view to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge; and only by way of such consciousness can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another be rightly determined.'[9]

And Kant further explains,

> 'The act by which I confront the comparison of representations with the cognitive faculty to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other, I call *transcendental reflection.*'[10]

In the second chapter, through analytic movement of thought by way of transcendental reflection, Kant is going to arrive at the idea of pure autonomous will as the *basis and source* of the moral law. But before he completes this task, he first transforms Greek *phronēsis* into the Categorical Imperative.

Para 1: Kant has drawn the concept of duty through analysis of examples taken from the ordinary use of practical reason in the first chapter. Yet he is worried that maybe the readers will take him as deriving it from experience. Why? In *Critique of Pure Reason,* he maintained,

> '[The fact of] practical freedom can be proved through experience.'[11]

He writes further,

> '...we thus through experience know practical freedom to be one of the causes in nature, namely, to be a causality of reason in the determination of the will...'[12]

Not only that, he insisted,

> 'Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative employment, but in that practical employment which is also moral, principles of the *possibility of experience,* namely, *of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, might* be met within the *history* of mankind. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place.'[13]

So the fear is palpable that the readers will construe Kant's concept of duty as a concept derived from experience.

Here, in *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant is using the term 'practical' to cover both *skill* and *morality.* That Kant is using the term 'practical' in the context of practical freedom in a wide sense covering the technically practical in it and not in the narrow sense of merely morally practical is made clear.

> 'This practical point of view is either in reference to *skill* or in reference to *morality,* the former being concerned with optional and contingent ends, the latter with ends that are absolutely necessary. Once an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary.'[14]

The action Kant is talking about in these quotations is not moral action or moral will but only technically practical action, which is in mere accord with duty. Note the phrase '*of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts*' in the quotation above. In the field of experience, the only actions which can be met with are technically practical actions since that is the only kind of action consistent with the doctrines accepted in the first Critique. Of these actions we can at most know that they are consistent with or in mere accordance with the moral law but we can never be certain that they are done out of motive of duty. Motive of duty has to do with what Kant calls 'transcendental freedom' in *Critique of Pure Reason* and this freedom is not an object of experience. For Kant, practical freedom of will is based on the transcendental freedom of will.

> 'It should especially be noted that the practical concept of freedom is based on this *transcendental* idea.'[15]

Hence,

> 'The denial of transcendental freedom must, therefore, involve the elimination of all practical freedom. For practical freedom presupposes that although something has not happened, it *ought* to have happened, and that its cause [as found] in the [field of] appearance, is not therefore, so determining that it excludes a causality of our will—a causality which, independently of those natural causes, and even contrary to their force and influence, can produce something that is determined in the time-order in accordance with empirical laws, and which can, therefore, begin a series of events *entirely of itself.*'[16]

Since for Kant, transcendental freedom is the freedom of choice which is not available to experience, he can justifiably write in the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals,*

> 'On the contrary, when we pay attention to our experience of human conduct, we meet frequent and—as we ourselves admit—justified complaints that we can adduce no certain examples of the spirit which acts out of pure duty, and that, although much may be done *in accordance with* the commands of *duty,* it remains doubtful whether it really is done *for the sake of duty* and so has a moral value.'[17]

Since *motive of duty* is not an object of experience, 'at all times there have been philosophers who have absolutely denied the presence of this spirit in human actions.'[18] Since *self-love* is available in experience, these philosophers 'have ascribed everything to a more or less refined self-love.'[19] But as 'they have not cast doubt on the rightness of the concept of morality' these philosophers take morality merely as 'an Idea so worthy of reverence' which the human nature cannot follow due to its own 'frailty and impurity'.[20] Hence, for them, 'the reason which should serve it for making laws it uses only to look after the interest of inclinations, whether singly or—at the best—in their greatest mutual compatibility.'[21]

Para 2: In the analysis of the first chapter it was noticed that Kant is making the moral value of the good will not only independent of the consequences of action but also independent of the action itself.[22] Now Kant asserts it explicitly,

> '... for when moral value is in question, we are concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with their inner principles, which we cannot see.'[23]

We cannot see the inner principle of moral evaluation because, for Kant, the will involved in good will is not an object of experience. Hence it follows,

> 'In actual fact it is absolutely impossible for experience to establish with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of action in other respects right has rested solely on moral grounds and on the thought of one's duty.'[24]

It may be the case, sometimes, that through experience we find no motive strong enough to prompt us to an action without the help of moral motive of duty; yet it cannot be claimed with absolute certainty that further examination of experience will not disclose that some secret impulse of self-love has been the cause determining us to action in this case too. So we are condemned to epistemic opacity of moral worth of actions,

> '... in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get to the bottom of our secret impulsions...'[25]

This follows from the Kantian premises stated above.

Para 3: If it is assumed 'that the concept of duty must be drawn solely from experience' then morality is reduced to a mere figment of imagination.[26] For when we proceed empirically from experience then we find that every action is done out of self-love and the purpose of no action is based 'on the strict command of duty, which would often require self denial.'[27] It is undoubtedly true that most of the times any action of man done out of self-love accords with duty but not always as he is not prepared for self-denial. So, if we proceed empirically, we find no morality but only self-love instead. Similar was the fate of all other concepts in philosophy when philosophers, unable to undertake the arduous task of philosophizing, took it for granted that all of them are empirical in origin. Here Kant is referring to Hume, for Hume could find no causality or self when he looked for them empirically. For Hume, these turned out to be imaginary ideas born out of habit.

The moments in which we take the stance as disinterested observers 'declining to take the liveliest wish for goodness straight away as its realization', we become sceptical of genuine virtue.[28] Hume, as a dispassionate observer—declining to take the liveliest feeling of necessity of transition from one idea to another when they are regularly observed in that sequence... etc., straight away as the realization of necessity—became sceptical of genuine knowledge of causality. In this argument of Kant there is implicit an understanding of moral value i.e., 'the liveliest wish for goodness' is 'straight away... its realization.'[29] There is a conceptual distinction between wishing and willing. According to Gadamer,

> 'Wishing is defined by the way it remains innocent of mediation with what is to be done. That is in truth what wishing is.'[30]

But

> '...wishing is not willing; it is not practice. Practice consists of choosing, of deciding for something and against something else, and in doing this a practical reflection is effective, which is itself dialectical in the highest measure. When I will something, then a reflection intervenes by which I bring before my eyes by means of an analytical procedure what is attainable... To speak with Aristotle, the conclusion of the practical syllogism and of practical deliberation is the resolve. This resolve, however, together with the whole path of reflection, from the willing of the objective to the

> thing to be done, is simultaneously a concretization of the willed objective itself.'[31]

Even Kant himself accepts this distinction and writes,

> 'The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, and not in its object, it constitutes a *power of acting or not acting according to liking*. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of action to produce the object, it forms an act of choice (*Willkür*), if this consciousness is not conjoined with it, the activity is called a wish.'[32]

Hence, the Kantian decision 'to take the liveliest wish for goodness straight away as its realization' transforms good will into a good wish which remains innocent of the action to be done, not withstanding his protestation that it is 'not, admittedly, ...a mere wish, but... the straining of every means so far as they are in our control'.[33]

In such a situation, if our Idea of duty is not to fall away completely as chimerical or if we want to 'preserve in the soul a grounded reverence for its law', then we must appeal to the conviction 'that even if there never have been actions springing from such pure sources... reason by itself and independently of all appearances commands what ought to happen'.[34] Empirically, we can know only what happens, but in morality 'the question at issue... is not whether this or that has happened'; rather, we are interested in the question whether this or that ought to be done. So it may be possible that in morality, reason relentlessly commands 'actions of which the world has perhaps hitherto given no example—actions whose practicality might well be doubted by those who rest everything on experience'.[35]

What exactly is worrying Kant becomes transparent when we consider the instance he gives to explain his position:

> '... for instance, although up to now there may have existed no loyal friend, pure loyalty in friendship can no less required from every man, inasmuch as this duty, prior to all experience, is contained as duty in general in the Idea of a reason which determines the will by a *priori* grounds.'[36]

Mark the words 'duty in general'. Duty of loyalty in friendship is contained *a priori* as 'duty in general' in the Idea of reason. It is not a specific duty like promise keeping. Here, Kant is unmistakably

referring to the Greek experience, for in the modern context friendship has not bulked large in ethical discussion, not even in Kantian ethical corpus. Gadamer writes, 'Two extensive books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* deal with the subject—whereas in Kant's moral philosophy friendship merits only a single page!'[37] For Aristotle,

> 'It is not only that friendship is necessary to the good life, it is in itself a good and beautiful thing.'[38]

It is necessary to good life because good life needs *πράττειν* through *phronēsis*, and *phronimos* needs his self-awareness and confidence through the friendship to indulge in *phronēsis*. In the Plantonic-Aristotelian corpus, friendship is the general basis of common life of community, which is possible through *πράττειν*. Kant is referring to this aspect of friendship when he declares the duty of loyalty in friendship is contained *a priori* as 'duty in general' in the Idea of reason. This reference to Greek experience makes clear Kant's problem here. To Kant, *πράττειν* is not available in experience as human action due to the transcendental conditions of possibility of experience laid down in the first critique,[39] yet he wants to recover *phronēsis* as morally practical reason, which has necessary relation to *πράττειν*. So, the only recourse left is to declare that morally practical reason is not concerned with knowable action performed by man. Rather, it is concerned with unknowable inner determination of will. So that even if no action which can exemplify that inner determination of will can be adduced from experience yet the practical reason can demand *a priori* such inner determination of will if morality is to be possible for Kant. Hence, Kant can claim if morality is not a figment of imagination, even if there is no loyal friend available in experience, duty of loyalty in friendship can be demanded from every man as this duty 'is contained as duty in general in the Idea of a reason which determines the will by *a priori* gounds'.[40] So Kant is transforming Greek morality to suit the modern situation where *πράττειν* is not available as human action. Be it noted in the state of nature there can be no friends as it is a social phenomenon. Yet Kant needs to explicate a notion of moral principle binding even in state of nature, which includes 'loyalty in friendship' as 'duty in general'. What is this notion of bindingness?

Para 4: According to Greek thought, man is always confronted with *prohairesis* (preference). He finds himself in situations in which he has to prefer one course of action to others. Having to prefer one course of action over others requires knowledge of what is best. And that means knowing reasons why, knowing grounds, and using grounds to differentiate. But

> 'right thoughts about life and the idea of the right and just life—the highest thing that one could learn (*megiston mathēma*)– only become visible in general outlines "and not in regard to specifics (cf. Aristotle, EN 1098a21)"'.[41]

This general good is concretized through *phroneis* in the very doing of it that is in *prohairesis* or giving preference to one course of action over another. Greek philosophy understood the *necessity* involved in practical reason as closure of any other option due to removal of doubt through the uncovering (*alētheia*) of *nomos* and *aretē* in the situation. To retain the truth of morality, Kant has to turn the *megiston mathēma* of Greek thought into the *a priori* inner determinant of will. To transform the *megiston mathēma* of Greek thought into the *a priori* inner determinant of will, Kant first turns it into the highest principle of the modern morality with strict universality by reinterpreting the necessity involved in morality.

> 'It may be added that unless we wish to deny to the concept of morality all truth and all relation to a possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is of such widespread significance as to hold, not merely for men, but for all *rational beings* as such—not merely subject to contingent conditions and exceptions, but *with absolute necessity*.'[42]

Now with this transformed understanding of necessity, the law becomes a thing beyond the reach of experience.

> 'It is therefore clear that no experience can give us occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodeictic law.'[43]

The system of norms that Aristotle's ethics establishes makes plain that in Greek thinking norms are tied to empirical contingencies. According to Kant, we have no right to make 'what is perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity into an object of unlimited reverence as a universal precept for every rational nature'.[44] It is only because of Kantian transformation of the *megiston*

mathēma of Greek thought into the supreme principle of modern morality, that these laws are not empirical; rather they have their source completely *a priori* in pure but practical reason. Hence, the laws for determining our will are to be taken as laws for determining the will of a rational being as such—and only because of this for determining ours.

Para 5: Kantian transformation of moral laws turns them into what he calls *apodeictic*[45] laws. These laws are applied to particular cases by subsuming them under it like the subsumption of the particular under the universal. That is to say, the application of laws to particular cases has the structural correspondence with *apodeixis* (demonstration). But the original Greek way of making moral decision does not quite fit this schema. The right thing to do—which one arrives at through *phronēsis*—is not simply a case or instance of a rule. *Apodeixis* (demonstration) presupposes an independent being of the rule apart from the instantiations. But moral laws have their being only in the tradition of their application in which we already find ourselves 'under way' (*unterwegs*). The moral law is like the direction, which enables the *phronimos* to keep his aim fixed in the right direction so that he can set his sights on a specially targeted point instead of on a larger object. But it is not a rule that one could follow in order to 'hit' what is right in accordance with an art (*technē*). So the application of moral law requires knowledge of the examples of past application (precedent) so that one can proceed in the right direction to extend the line of (precedent) examples. The practice we start from is the repository of what is *homologoumenon* (agreed upon) as good to serve as examples. Hence, *phronēsis* is simultaneously a concretizing of general knowledge as well as generalizing of something concrete. Kant, in transforming the Greek notion of *nomos*, into the apodeictic moral laws transforms *phronēsis* into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration).

> 'What is more, we cannot do morality a worse service than by seeking to derive it from examples. Every example of it presented to me must first be judged by moral principles in order to decide if it is fit to serve as an original example—that is, as a model: it can in no way supply the prime source for the concept of morality.'[46]

So, for Kant, the law has being independent of the instance to which it is applied. Even the Holy One of the gospel to be so recognized needs *apodeixis* (demonstration), i.e. comparison with independent ideal of moral perfection, according to Kant. He cites scriptural authority to argue for his contention.

> 'He also says of himself: "Why callest thou (whom thou seest) good? There is none good (the archetype of the good) but one, that is, God (whom thou seest not)."'[47]

And then he argues for the independent availability of the law of morality.

> 'But where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the *Idea* of moral perfection, which reason traces *a priori* and conjoins inseparably with the concept of a free will.'[48]

In this argument for the independence of the *Idea* of moral perfection from that which exemplifies that perfection, commentators have seen the influence of Platonic *chōrismos* (separation) of *Idea* from that which has participation (*methexis*) in it. But the situation is the other way round. It is only when the 'idea' was interpreted as the 'natural law' by philosophers that Platonic *chōrismos* was interpreted as the postulation of the ideas apart by themselves and independent of the appearances which have participation (*methexis*) in them. Originally, in the Platonic corpus, 'the locution *chōrismos* was never intended to call into question the fact that what is encountered in appearances is always to be thought of in reference to what is invariant in it. The complete separation of world of the ideas from the world of appearances would be a crass absurdity.'[49]

According to Greek thought unlike the *technai*, both *phronēsis* and *aretē* are not teachable. Since *phronēsis* starts from within the traditional ethical and moral customs, *aretē* is based not on teaching and learning but on taking someone as an example and emulating (*mimēsis*) that example. Transformation of *aretē* and *nomos* into apodictic moral laws leads Kant to reject this model of learning morality.

> 'Imitation has no place in morality, and examples serve us only for encouragement—that is, they set beyond doubt the practicability of what the law commands; they make perceptible what the practical law expresses more generally; but they can never entitle us to set aside their true original, which resides in reason, and to model ourselves upon examples.'[50]

Be it noted that Kant has departed considerably from his earlier position that there can be no examples in experience of having strictly followed the moral law, in the admission, 'examples serve us only for encouragement'.[51] In *Critique of Judgment* Kant will completely rescind his earlier position.

> 'There is no employment of our powers, no matter how free, not even of reason itself (which must create all its judgements from the common *a priori* source), which, if each individual had always to start afresh with the crude equipment of his natural state, would not get itself involved in blundering attempts, did not those of others tie before it as a warning. Not that predecessors make those who follow in their steps mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking in themselves for the principles, and so of adopting their own, often better, course.'[52]

Be it also noted Kant makes a distinction between following a precedent and imitating a precedent. He explains,

> 'Following which as reference to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert upon other...'[53]

How can Kant make examples of morality available for following if they are not available in experience? These examples are available to the disinterested spectator; as we have already mentioned,[54] good will is available to the disinterested spectators. If following of examples is necessary for exercise of reason, then why is Kant worried about imitation at this stage of the argument? With the advent of sophists who recognized only techne as the model of knowledge and, as a consequence, only *ποιεῖν* as the model of human action, then choosing a paragon and following him no more suffices for morality since following a paragon then reduces to mere external imitation of his action as the traditional *aretē* get understood as conventions geared towards external appearance, i.e. external behaviour to be presented for the knowledge of others. Platonic-Aristotelian ethics responded to this by recovering *πράττειν* as a schema of human action and *phronēsis* as practical reasonableness. It is this fear that is also haunting Kant as after the first critique only *ποιεῖν* occupies the whole space of human action

and as there is no hope of recovering *πράττειν* as a schema of human action there is a danger now that if he allows any essential role to examples in morality at this stage of the argument then morality may become a mere external imitation of examples. But the way in which Kant blocks the possibility of imitation of examples in morality, transforms moral law into apodictic law and phronēsis into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration).

Para 6: Now, if there can be no principle of morality which is not such an apodeictic law, then it is unnecessary to raise the question whether *it is good* to set forth these apodeictic laws. In other words if it is not possible to have a moral law which is not grounded in pure reason alone, independently of all experience (independently of instances which fall under it) then it is pointless to raise the question whether *it is good* to state such laws in abstract, which hold *a priori*. In Kant's words,

> 'If there can be no genuine supreme principle of morality which is not grounded on pure reason alone independently of all experience, it should be unnecessary, I think, even to raise the question whether it is a good thing to set forth in general (*in abstracto*) these concepts which hold *a priori*, together with their corresponding principles, so far as our knowledge is to be distinguished from ordinary knowledge and described as philosophical.'[55]

Mark the words 'to set forth in general (*in abstracto*) these concepts'. What does it men to set forth concepts in general (*in abstracto*)? According to Kant, '...one should actually call abstract concepts abstracting concepts (*conceptus abstrahentes*), i.e. one in which several abstractions occur'.[56] *Conceptus reflectentes* is *pure apodeictic law of morality* when reflection brings into picture in advance the morally-practical interest of the subject to constitute phronēsis into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration) in the context of concept formation through reflection on morally practical judgements. Be it noted that *pure apodeictic law of morality* has already suffered many abstractions in the first chapter and is going to suffer many more in the second chapter.

Let us come back to Kant's unnecessary question on the face of the fact that there can be no moral principle which is not apodeictic: what good will it do to state these apodeictic laws in abstract?

According to Kant, 'Yet in our days, it may well be necessary to do so.'[57] It is necessary because there is a clamor for hotchpotch of popular practical philosophy as against 'pure rational knowledge detached from everything empirical—that is to say, a metaphysic of morals'.[58]

Para 7: One should try to popularize moral philosophy only after principles of morality have been established on the basis of pure reason. That it to say, only after grounding or establishing moral philosophy on metaphysic of morals should one try to gain acceptance for it by giving it a popular character. Enquiry involved in the establishment of correctness of moral principles should not try to be popular in the first instance. It is senseless to do so because

> 'It is not merely that such procedure can never lay claim to the extremely rare merit of a truly *philosophical popularity*, since we require no skill to make ourselves intelligible to the multitude once we renounce all profundity of thought: what it turns out is a disgusting hotchpotch of second-hand observations and semi-rational principles on which the empty-headed regale themselves, because this is something that can be used in the chit-chat of daily life.'[59]

This 'hotchpotch of second-hand observations and semi-rational principles' is confusing and dissatisfying for insightful men. But even these men cannot cure this hotchpotch. Now Kant laments,

> 'Yet philosophers, who can perfectly well see through this deception, get little hearing when they summon us for a time from this would-be popularity in order that they may win the right to be genuinely popular only after definite insight has been attained.'[60]

Para 8: According to Kant, when we have a look at the potpourri of popular moral philosophy dished out for popular consumption,

> 'What we shall encounter in an amazing medley is at one time the particular character of human nature (but along with this also the Idea of a rational nature as such), at another perfection, at another happiness; here moral feeling and there the fear of God; something of this and also something of that.'[61]

Advocates of popular moral philosophy did not realize that principles of morality could never be sought in human nature, which can be known only empirically. Since they did not realize that

'these principles are to be found completely *a priori* and free from empirical elements in the concepts of pure reason and absolutely no where else even to the slightest extent', they failed to separate this inquiry as pure practical philosophy or as a metaphysic of morals.[62] Because of this they also failed to complete it by itself by deferring the attempt to satisfy the public demand for popularity to a time after the successful completion of it.

Be it noted that in the footnote Kant explains what the application of the theoretical principles discovered by pure moral philosophy or metaphysic of morals will amount to. He distinguishes pure moral philosophy, i.e. metaphysics of morals from applied moral philosophy (i.e. applied to human nature) as pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics and pure logic is distinguished from applied logic. By these analogies, Kant wants to highlight the fact 'that moral principles are not grounded on the peculiarities of human nature, but must be established *a priori* by themselves', i.e. independent of their application to human nature to arrive at correct decisions, 'and yet that from such principles it must be possible to derive practical rules for human nature as well'.[63] What the application of theoretical generalities of practical philosophy amounts to, is also explained by Aristotle with the help of an analogy drawn from the field of archery.[64] Gadamer has explained the significance of this analogy given by Aristotle in the words:

> 'practical philosophy, he says, is useful in the way it is useful for an archer to pick out a definite point on the target at which to take aim. This way he will score a better hit. This can only mean that one is better able to keep one's aim fixed in the right direction when one can set one's sight on a specially targeted point instead of a larger object. Aristotle avails himself of this splendid image to say that the theoretical instruction that can be given in practical philosophy puts in one's hands no rules that one could follow in order to 'hit' what is right in accordance with an art (*technē*). After all, taking aim does not by any means constitute the whole of archery. One has to have learned how to handle the bow, and in the same way, whoever wishes to profit from practical philosophy must be trained for it in the right way. Only then is practical philosophy of use in decision-making. It assists our concrete, practical ability to size things up insofar as it makes it easier to recognize in what direction we must look and to what things we must pay attention. Plainly the illustration is intended to show that one does not rely on the theoretical generalities of practical philosophy in the way that one relies on a rule.'[65]

The question that Gadamer raises, starting from Aristotle, is concerned with the application of moral philosophy: What is the way in which the theoretical generalities of moral philosophy applied in decision-making? He is at pains to show that the models of application of the mathematics and logic are misplaced here.

> 'For the "being" of the rule or ethical principle is not like that of "triangularity", that is, not like the being of something that is always apart from its instantiations... On the contrary, rules in ethics have their reality only in the tradition of their applications, instantiations, or interpretations. And each of these, far from being a diminution of some ideal rule in itself apart from its instantiations, is thus to be viewed as an 'accretion of reality' (Gadamer: *Zuwachs an sein*) in the rule.... We do not know them as we know mathematical realities...in abstraction from situational contingencies. Rather, we know them in a limited way from within the tradition of their applications, in which we always already find ourselves "under way" (*unterwegs*). Consequently, the same measure of exactitude is not to be expected here as in the mathematical sciences... (Cf. *EN* 1094b24). Indeed, this kind of rigor would be disastrous: *summum ius summa injuria.* Phroēsis, understanding of moral principles, is thus anything but being a 'stickler' for the rules. It is judicious discretion that, in faithfulness to the tradition, adjusts to the particularities of the given case (Cf. Gadamer on Aristotle's *dikastē phronēsis* and *synesis* in *WM).*'[66]

Kant is, thus, transforming the prevailing Aristotelian notion of application of moral law here since, as explained in the introduction, not only is man transformed into a non-social individual subject but also tradition is reflected out of being under the doctrinal pressure of the first critique. His moral agent needs the transformed understanding of the moral law and its application. But it must be remembered that Kant will have to rehabilitate the Aristotelian understanding of application of moral law to make it applicable, in *Critique of Judgment.*[67]

Para 9: But right now Kant is transforming the Aristotelian *phronēsis* to suit the requirements of the individualistic subject. Hence

> 'Nevertheless such a completely isolated metaphysic of morals...is not only an indispensable substratum of all theoretical and precisely defined

knowledge of duties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the utmost importance for the actual execution of moral precepts.'[68]

Mark the words 'all theoretical and precisely defined knowledge of duties' which are reminiscent of Aristotelian theoretical generalities of practical philosophy. For Aristotle 'practical philosophy has the character of theory'.[69] According to Kant, the pure thought of duty by itself without any further incentive from empirical impulsions is capable of moving man to action. That is to say, moral law through practical use of reason is capable of exerting a greater influence on the will of man than the power of all the further empirical impulsions because

'in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master'.[70]

The popular moral philosophy, which mixes impulsions from feelings and inclinations and motives from rational concepts, makes man waver between various motives, as they cannot all be brought under a single principle. And hence it guides us 'only by mere accident to the good, and very often also to the evil.'[71]

In a footnote here Kant deals with an objection raised by Professor J.G. Sulzer (1720–79), translator of Hume's *Enquiry* into German (1755). Professor Sulzer asks him, 'What it is that makes moral instruction so ineffective, however convincing it may be in the eyes of reason?'[72] Kant finds no weakness in the capacity of reason to determine the will. For him, the cause of the failure of moral instructions lies in trying to strengthen the reason by bringing in alien empirical motives. He claims 'the most ordinary observation' shows that when a 'righteous act' is done 'in complete disregard of any advantage' and 'even under the greatest temptations of affliction or allurement' then 'it uplifts the soul and rouses a wish that we too could act in this way'.[73] According to Kant, even children are stirred in this way to moral action and 'duties should never be presented to them in any other way'.[74] But Kant himself will find practical reason inadequate in itself in its own function without extraneous considerations. In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant declares,

'Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good...'[75]

and

'The beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is represented as the *object of a universal* delight'.[76]

There, Kant will claim that reason succeeds in production good will or practical reason succeeds in determining the will not by itself alone but only via the aesthetic reflection and that the will produced has to be aesthetically pleasing to all.

Para 10: But from the Kantian premises admitted so far it follows,

'All moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely *a priori*, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason just as much as in the most highly speculative: they cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge'.[77]

Moral concepts are worthy of being supreme practical principles because they have their origin in pure practical reason. To the extent that empirical motives are mixed with moral concepts to influence the will of man to result in action, the moral worth of action is reduced. It is necessary due to practical considerations to determine the extent of pure practical knowledge, i.e. to determine the extent of whole power of pure practical reason as it was necessary due to theoretical considerations to determine the limits of pure speculative reason. In case of delimitation of power of pure practical reason, we have to be more careful for purity. In case of determination of limits of pure speculative reason, 'speculative philosophy does allow and even at times finds it necessary' 'to make principles depend on the special nature of human reason'.[78] For example, it is a fundamental assumption of speculative philosophy in its task:

'Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise *a priori*, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation'.[79]

But it holds good only for human reason and not for reason in general. In practical philosophy, while determining the whole power

of pure practical reason, we must 'never make principles depend on the special nature of human reason' and hence should not make use of assumption like the above, which highlight the special character of human reason alone.

> 'Since moral laws have to hold for every rational being as such, we ought rather to derive our principles from the general concept of a rational being as such'.[80]

That is to say, the whole ethics or pure practical philosophy or metaphysic of morals must be expounded on the basis of pure practical reason without any appeal to the special feature of human reason. The latter considerations should be appealed to at the stage of application of the pure supreme practical principles. Without such a metaphysic of morals it may be possible 'to determine accurately for speculative judgement the moral element of duty in all that accords with duty'.[81] But this speculative knowledge cannot help us in becoming moral; it can at most help us in external imitation of moral action without any genuine moral worth. That is to say, without such a metaphysic of morals, 'it is impossible, even in ordinary and practical usage, particularly in that of moral instruction, to base morals on their genuine principles and to bring about pure moral dispositions and engraft them on men's minds for the highest good of the world'.[82]

Para 11: The first natural step to make progress towards a metaphysic of morals has already been taken in the first chapter. There the analytic step from ordinary moral judgement to philosophical judgement has already been taken, i.e. the supreme principle of morality has already been discovered through the analysis of ordinary moral knowledge. But this supreme principle of morality needs to be grounded in pure practical reason for the metaphysic of morals to be possible. In the second chapter, Kant will take the next natural step to make further progress towards metaphysic of morals. The next natural step is from popular moral philosophy to metaphysic of morals. Since metaphysic of morals can 'no longer lets itself be held back by anything empirical' and 'must survey the complete totality' of pure practical knowledge, it must go 'to Ideas'; which can have no example in experience, we have to get beyond the popular philosophy 'which goes no further than it can get by fumbling about with the aid of examples'.[83]

In this step, 'the power of practical reason' and 'the general rules determining it' needs to be analyzed and followed 'right up to the point where there springs from it the concept of duty'.[84]

Para 12: The task, which Kant has to face now, is this: Kant has already arrived at the supreme principle of morality in the first chapter which can be stated in the form, 'I ought never to act except in such a way *that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law*',[85] but this he needs to ground in the Idea of pure practical reason. If we are to derive our principles form the general concept of a rational being as such, then moral laws have to hold for every rational being. Hence, anyone acting from this law will be a social being. But Kant needs to formulate this for man who is a nonsocial individual subject also. So, Kant needs to ground this law in the Idea of pure practical reason in such a manner that even while holding good for every rational being it holds good of every man in such a manner that he remains a nonsocial individual subject. This is what Kant has to achieve in the second step. This task Kant accomplishes by bringing in the concept of 'ought' and 'imperative'.

Kant starts his second step with the analysis of entire practical reason, which includes both technically practical reason as well as the morally practical reason.

The distinctive feature of a rational being is that he 'has the power to act *in accordance with his idea* of laws'.[86] Kant here identifies this power with *will.* Be it noted at this stage in the idea of will it is not told what the source of the idea of laws is.

> 'Since *reason* is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason.'[87]

Here Kant is identifying will with practical reason. Without being aware, Kant has implicitly altered the meaning of practical reason. Although he has started with wider meaning of practical reason, where practical reason includes both morality and skill, now by identifying practical reason with will Kant has narrowed the meaning of 'practical reason' to only morally practical reason. He will become aware of this only in his last critique. So, right now, Kant is operating with this confusion regarding the meaning of 'practical reason'.

Mark the words 'to derive actions from laws'. Kant here has in mind the model of practical syllogism of Aristotle where, in the words of Gadamer, 'the conclusion (*Schluss*) is not a proposition but a decision (*Entschluss*)'[88] to act. No doubt, according to Gadamer, 'Aristotle models his exposition of the exercise of practical reason entirely on the logic of the theoretical syllogism used in demonstration (*apodeixis*)'[89] but he restricts this model to the sphere of *techne* only for 'when Aristotle analyzes the exercise of this practical reason, he does not use decisions that are really practical or moral, but pragmatic, technical decisions instead'.[90] So, we can say Kant is making a reversal of categories here by taking Aristotelian model of exercise of practical reason in the sphere of *techne* for the exercise of practical reason in the sphere of morality or *phronēsis*.

In the very next sentence Kant says,

> 'If reason infallibly determines the will, then in a being of this kind the actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary—that is to say, the will is then a power to choose *only that* which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practically necessary, that is, to be good'.[91]

Mark the clause 'reason infallibly determines the will'. Here Kant is making a distinction between 'reason', i.e. practical reason and 'will' and so distinguished will is identified as 'the power to choose'.

Here Kant, without being fully aware, is making use of two ideas of will. The will identifies with 'the power to act *in accordance with his idea* of laws' is different from the will identified with 'the power to choose'. This distinction Kant will make in his latter writings.

> 'The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, and not in its object, it constitutes a *power of acting or not acting according to liking*. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of action to produce the object, it forms an act of choice (*Willkür*)... The faculty of desire, in so far as its inner principle of determination as the ground of its liking or predilection lies in the reason of the subject, constitutes the will (*Wille*). The will is therefore the faculty of active desire or appetency, viewed not so much in relation to action—which is the relation of the act of choice—as rather in relation to the principle that determines power of choice to the action. It has, in itself, properly no special principle of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary act of choice, it is the *practical reason* itself'.[92]

Be it noted that when will is *Wille*, it is identified with practical reason, thereby restricting the meaning to morally practical reason as it excludes skill, which pertains to *Willkür*. *Willkür* is the executive will, but *Wille* is the normative will. The former will comes from the sphere of *technē* which is involved in *poeisis* which is consistently designated by Kant in latter writings by the term *Willkür*. Kant succeeded in bringing in this *Willkür* here because of the reversal made above. But the reversal is quite natural as the free will Kant brings in the third antinomy is this *Willkür*. The will identified with 'the power to act *in accordance with his idea* of laws' comes from the sphere of *phronēsis*, which is involved in *praxis* (as excluding and distinguished from *technē*), which is consistently designated by Kant in latter writings by the term *Wille*. The *Wille* comes from the good will of first chapter of *Groundwork*. In Kantian corpus, good will is designated by the German words *gute Wille*.

Since Kant does not recognize *πράττειν* as human action, in place of it Kant substitutes implicitly the act of determination of *Willkür*. So 'the power to act *in accordance with his idea of* laws' becomes 'the power to determine *Willkür* in accordance with his idea of laws', so that *Wille* now becomes 'the power to determine *Willkur* in accordance with his Idea of laws'. So this *Wille* is the practical reason itself and it has to be a *gute Wille*. It can never be bad. Only *Willkür* can be bad if *Wille* does not determine it. In this analysis, this distinction of two kinds of will always be kept in mind and Kant's statements will be reformulated in light of this distinction even if Kant uses the word will without making the distinction, so as to make his position clear in light of the latter writings.

When *Wille* or practical reason completely determines *Willkür*, then it chooses '*only that* which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practically necessary, that is, to be good.' Be it noted here the practical necessity involves the closure of choice. For Kant, 'the actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary' are the actions dictated by *Wille* to the *Willkür* of all rational beings as the actions, which it has to choose. The actions 'are also subjectively necessary' when *Willkür* cannot but choose that action.

When the action is subjectively necessary the *Willkür* cannot say, 'I could have chosen otherwise' or 'I could have acted otherwise'.

> 'But if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain impulsions) which do not always harmonize with the objective ones; if, in a word, the will is not *in itself* completely in accord with reason (as actually happens in the case of men); then actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are subjectively contingent and the determining of such a will in accordance with objective laws is *necessitation*'.[93]

By the phrase 'reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will' Kant means that *Wille* by itself is not sufficient to determine the *Willkür*. This happens only when the *Willkür* is also under the influence of certain empirical impulsions, which are often contrary to the *Wille*. This is actually the case with men. By actions, which are 'subjectively contingent' Kant means actions, which are not such that the *Willkür* cannot but choose those actions. That is to say, subjectively contingent action is that action, which the *Willkür* often fails to choose and even if *Willkür* chooses it, *Willkür* does so with the assistance of empirical impulsions as *Wille* by itself is not sufficient to determine the *Willkür*, hence in such a situation *Willkür* can say 'I could have chosen otherwise'. So, for man, *Willkür* often fails to choose the action, which *Wille* asks *Willkür* to choose. Hence, man can always say, 'I could have acted otherwise'.

How can we say that for Kant *Wille* cannot say, 'I could have acted otherwise', while *Willkür* can say 'I could have acted otherwise?' In his *Introduction to Metaphysic of Morals*, where Kant introduces the distinction between *Wille* and *Willkür*, Kant further elaborates the distinction by saying that *Wille* is not characterized as free while *Willkür* is characterized as free. This explains the above contention. Kant writes:

> Laws arise from the will [*Wille*], viewed generally as practical reason; maxims spring from the activity of the will in the process of choice [*Willkür*]. The latter in man is what constitutes free-will. The will which refers to nothing else than mere law can neither be called free nor not free, because it does not relate to actions immediately, but to the giving of a law for the maxim of actions; it is therefore the practical reason itself. Hence as a faculty, it is absolutely necessary in itself, and is not subject to any external necessitation. It is, therefore, only the act of choice in the voluntary process that can be called free.[94]

Be it noted that Kant gives the impression that *Willkür* fails to choose according to dictate of *Wille* because of presence of empirical impulsions as he introduces this failure by a 'if clause', i.e. conditionally. Not only that, he refuses to define *Willkür*, which is capacity of choice, as involving choice contrary to law as suggested by Reinhold and gives elaborate argument against Reinhold. Kant writes:

> The freedom of the act of will, however, is not to be defined as a liberty of indifference (libertas indifferentae), that is, as a capacity of choosing to act for or against the law. The voluntary process, indeed, viewed as a phenomenal appearance, gives many examples of this choosing in experience; and some have accordingly so defined the free-will. For freedom, as it is first made knowable by the moral law, is known only as a negative property in us, as constituted by the fact of not being necessitated to act by sensible principles of determination. Regarded as a noumenal reality, however, in reference to man as a pure rational intelligence, the act of the will cannot be at all theoretically exhibited; nor can it therefore be explained how this power can act necessitatingly in relation to the sensible activity in the process of choice, or consequently in what the positive quality of freedom consists. Only thus much we can see into and comprehend, that although man, as a being belonging to the world of sense, exhibits—as experience shows—a capacity of choosing not only conformably to the law but also contrary to it, his freedom as a rational being belonging to the world of intelligence cannot be defined by reference merely to sensible appearances. For sensible phenomena cannot make a super-sensible object—such as free-will is—intelligible; nor can freedom ever be placed in the mere fact that the rational subject can make a choice in conflict with his own law-giving reason, although experience may prove that it happens often enough, notwithstanding our inability to conceive how it is possible. For it is one thing to admit a proposition as based on experience, and another thing to make it the defining principle and the universal differentiating mark of the act of free-will, in its distinction from the arbitrium brutum servum; because the empirical proposition does not assert that any particular characteristic necessarily belongs to the conception in question, but this is requisite in the process of definition. Freedom in relation to the internal legislation of reason can alone be properly called a power; the possibility of diverging from the law thus given is an incapacity or want of power. How then can the former be defined by the latter? It could only be by a definition which would add to the practical conception of the free-will, its exercise as shown by experience; but this

would be a hybrid definition which would exhibit the conception in a false light.[95]

Here too Kant takes *Willkür* as choosing contrary to law due to sensible causes and not inherently due to intelligible causes. Even though Kant tries valiantly to make room for the possibility of *Willkür* conforming to the dictat of *Wille* by definition, in reality he never succeeded in this. *Wille* is never sufficient to determine the *Willkür* by itself in his philosophy. By its very nature *Willkür,* being the faculty of choice, can always say 'I could have chosen otherwise', while *Wille* requires that choice be closed in a manner that one can say 'I could not have chosen otherwise'. Hence, there is inherent disagreement between *Wille* and *Willkür,* and *Wille* is never by itself sufficient to determine *Willkür.* This is why *Willkür* has permanent disposition to evil, as Kant realized in his *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,* where he terms this disposition of *Willkür* to evil as 'radical evil'.

In such a situation the action, which *Wille* asks *Willkür* to choose, appears to the latter as *necessitating* it. The reason for this is given by Kant, 'the relation of objective laws to a will not good through and through is conceived as one in which the will of a rational being, although it is determined by principles of reason, does not necessarily follow these principles in virtue of its own nature'.[96] That is to say, when *Wille* by itself is not sufficient to determine the *Willkür,* then although *Willkür* is determined by the law of *Wille,* it is so determined with the assistance of empirical motives, and it does not choose to follow the law by itself alone. *Willkür* is aware of that option which it could have chosen—to follow the law by itself without the assistance of empirical motives—but has not chosen which, therefore, appears as *necessitating* it. Hence the law of *Wille* appears to the *Willkür* as *necessitating* it.

Para 13: When a precept of *Wille* is necessitating for *Willkür* it does not mean that *Willkür* necessarily chooses according to the precept as *Wille* is not sufficient by itself to determine the *Willkür,* but it still feels some compulsion for its determination by the precept even when it chooses contrary to the precept. Hence,

> 'The conception of an objective principle so far as this principle is necessiting for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an *Imperative*'.[97]

The objective principle is the one laid down by *Wille* for the *Willkür,* which is valid for all rational beings. When the law *necessitates* the *Willkür,* it appears as a command of reason to the *Willkür.* Be it remembered *Wille* is the practical reason itself. When the command is formulated in words it is called an *Imperative.*

Para 14: According to Kant,

> 'All imperatives are expressed by an '*ought*' (*Sollen*). By this they mark the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective constitution (the relation of necessitation)'.[98]

Mark the words 'in virtue of its subjective constitution'. The subjective constitution of man takes place in the first critique of Kant. Due to subjective constitution of man, he finds himself as a nonsocial individual subject in the state of nature. The man, due to its subjective constitution, cannot necessarily choose to act from the idea of law of reason because due to subjective constitution man acts in order to achieve his subjective ends whatever that may be. And hence, the man, due to its subjective constitution, has a *Willkür,* which is not necessarily determined by the law of *Wille.* Hence, the nonsocial individual in the state of nature has a *Willkür,* which is not necessarily determined by the law of *Wille.* Hence it follows that the relation of an objective law of reason to the *Willkür* of man in the state of nature will be expressed by an 'ought'. He can say 'I *ought* to obey the law', he cannot say 'I will obey the law' for that will make him a social being that is not in the state of nature. So by transforming law of reason into an imperative by bringing in the idea of 'ought' to describe the relation of this law to 'a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective constitution', Kant, in a master stroke, has inscribed law in the perspective of the subjectivity of man without destroying his subjectivity. Had he inscribed the law as understood by Greek philosophy, it would have gone against the lessons of the first critique as that would have destroyed the subjectivity of man by making him essentially a social being. The 'ought' is merely a determination of *Willkür* as cognizant of the law of *Wille* as necessitating the former, but 'ought' is not such a determination of *Willkür* as to result in action without the assistance of some empirical motive. So, if *Willkür* has

to result in action to be in social relation to other's *Willkür*, it has to be determined externally through empirical motives over and above the determination of *Willkür* as 'ought', according to Kant.

All imperatives declare that some action would be good to do or to leave undone on the part of *Willkür*, but the addressee of all imperatives is the *Willkür* which does not always do a thing simply because it has been informed that this is a good thing to do, it relies on some other incentives as well to do so. These other incentives are the subjective ends given by empirical impulsions. That action is practically good which the *Willkür* chooses not with the assistance of influence of subjective causes but only by being determine objectively by the concepts of reason. In other words that action is practically good which the *Willkür* chooses 'on grounds valid for every rational being as such'. The practically good action is distinguished from the pleasant action. The pleasant action is one which the *Willkür* chooses not by being determined by a principle of reason valid for every one, 'but solely through the medium of sensation by purely subjective causes valid only for the senses of this person or that'.[99]

In the footnote here Kant tries to clarify the vocabulary of this moral psychology. This also throws some light on the process by which Kant transforms the Greek morality into modern morality. *Inclination* is 'the dependence of power of appetition on sensation'. Hence 'an inclination always indicates a *need*'. *Interest* is the dependence of will which is contingently determinable on principles of reason. For Kant,

> 'Hence an interest is found only where there is a dependent will which in itself is not always in accord with reason: to a divine will we cannot ascribe any interest'.[100]

This dependence of the will called interest can be of two types, captured by the two phrases 'to take an interest' and 'to act from interest'.

> 'But even the human will can *take an interest* in something without therefore *acting from interest*'.[101]

Be it noted here that the presence of the word 'even' in this distinction makes it clear that the distinction does not make the two mutually exclusive ideas even though it may happen that one

is present even though the other is absent. It is possible to *take an interest* in the action while *acting from interest*. With this distinction Kant makes an important observation,

> 'The first expression signifies *practical* interest in the action; the second, *pathological* interest in the object of the action... In the first case what interests me is the action; in the second case what interests me is the object of the action (so far as this object is pleasant to me)...in an action done for the sake of duty we must have regard, not to interest in the object, but to interest in the action itself...'[102]

Compare this with what Aristotle says,

> 'practical wisdom [*phronēsis*] cannot be ...art [*technē*] ...because action and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end'.[103]

In a way Kant appears to redescribe Aristotelian position. But there is an important and subtle difference, which has been introduced by Kant. For Aristotle, in practical wisdom [*phronēsis*], we take an interest directly in the action because the action has no end other that itself. But, according to Kant, there are no such actions. For him,

> 'An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which determine this will to an action by which the object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end...'[104]

For Kant, every action is performed for some end other than itself but duty asks us to take an interest in the action itself disregarding the end. So, Kant is transforming the Aristotelian morality to suit his position that *πράττειν* is not a form of human action as claimed before.

Para 15:

> 'A perfectly good will would thus stand quite as much under objective laws (laws of the good), but it could not this account be conceived as *necessitated* to act in conformity with law, since of itself, in accordance with its subjective constitution, it can be determined only by the concept of the good'.[105]

Mark the words 'in accordance with its subjective constitution' here too. According to Socratic-Platonic ethics, no one sins voluntarily or

voluntarily perpetrates any base or evil act. Greeks had no notion of will. Even though Aristotle elaborates the concepts of 'preference' (*προαίρεσις*), of deliberate choice, of rational desire, he does not elaborate the notion of freedom because for him all voluntary action need not involve *προαίρεσις*. The subjective constitution of man in the first critique of Kant has turned this element of voluntariness into *Wille*. Since no one does wrong voluntarily, a *Wille* is always *gute Wille* (good will). It is because of subjective constitution of *gute Wille* (good will) that Kant can make the above statement. So for good will by itself the law does not appear as a command or imperative, and hence there can be no place for 'ought' in good will by itself.

> 'Hence for the *divine* will, and in general for a *holy* will, there are no imperatives: "*I ought*" is here out of place, because "*I will*" is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law'.[106]

The divine will is also a kind of holly will. Holy will in general, whether divine or otherwise, is that will for which there is no *necessitation* by a moral law as by itself it necessarily acts in harmony with the law.

> 'Imperatives are in consequence only formulae for expressing the objective laws of willing to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being—for example, of the human will'.[107]

Imperatives are mere statement in words of the relation between the objective laws of *Wille* to the subjective imperfection of the *Willkür* of this or that rational being for example of the human *Willkür*.

Para 16: After introducing the idea of imperatives in general, Kant makes a distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The picture Kant is presenting here is similar to the one he presented with respect to will in the first chapter and the error here is similar too. In the first chapter the picture was that there is a neutral 'will' which can be either 'good' or 'bad' depending on how the 'will' is determined. But this is an incorrect picture. Although these two determinations of 'will' have an appearance of a predicating nature, the question of 'will' in general—that is, of the common root that would recomprehend the two concepts and

make them communicate—is denied consideration and being. The essence of 'will' is understood in terms of one of the determinations only, i.e. 'good will' which is equivalent to *Wille*. For Kant there is no single common source of the two forms of 'will'. And bad will is bad *Willkür* which is a faculty of bad choice. Similarly, although Kant places the hypothetical imperative and categorical imperative in a common genus of 'imperative' it is a wrong picture. The question of 'imperative' in general—that is, of the common root that would recomprehend the two concepts and make them communicate—is denied consideration and being. The essence of 'imperative' is understood in terms of one of the determinations only, i.e. 'categorical imperative'. The above discussion of 'imperative' in general is not applicable to hypothetical imperative as a hypothetical imperative does not mark out a relationship between *Wille* and *Willkür*, i.e. hypothetical imperative does not mark out a relationship between practical reason and faculty of choice at all; rather, it marks out a relationship between the theoretical reason and faculty of choice, i.e. *Willkür* as it will be shown later. The confusion is created in Kant's mind on this issue because, explicitly, he is taking the 'practical reason' in wide sense which includes both morally practical reason and technically practical reason, but implicitly he is operating with the narrower sense of 'practical reason' where it is restricted to morally practical reason only.

> 'Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will)'.[108]

Here 'practically necessary' means being necessary due to technically practical reason, which falls under theoretical reason. Be it noted here that Kantian hypothetical imperatives are concerned only with that Aristotelian category of actions which includes only *making* (*facere*, *ποιεῖν*), for only these actions have ends different from these activities themselves and these ends are produced by these actions as consequences as required by the idea of hypothetical imperatives.

> 'A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end'.[109]

Be it noted that Kant is here trying to get at the Aristotelian idea of *doing* or *acting* (*agere, πράττειν*) as distinguished from making (*facere, ποιεῖν*) 'For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end'.[110] As already mentioned for Kant, 'An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end...'.[111] For Kant, every action is of the nature of Aristotelian *making* (*facere, ποιεῖν*). For Kant, there is no human action, which is of the nature of Aristotelian *doing* or *acting* (*agere, πράττειν*). So, categorical imperative is also concerned only with those actions, which fall under Aristotelian category of action which includes only *making* (*facere, ποιεῖν*). But categorical imperative is concerned only with a sub category of *making* (*facere, ποιεῖν*). This subcategory is the category of *makings* each of which can be '*represented*' as an action 'objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end'. That is to say, categorical imperative is concerned with that *making* (*facere, ποιεῖν*) which can be '*represented*' as *doing* or *acting* (*agere, πράπειν*). It should not surprise us that the idea of representation plays such a crucial role in Kant's ethics. Ethical actions will belong to fine art for Kant.

It may be remembered Kant had declared *agere* as the activity of nature, nature as distinguished from art, as art is concerned only with *facere.*

> 'Art is distinguished from nature as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (*opus*) from operation (*effectus*)....By right it is only production through freedom, *i.e.* through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art, that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their creator that we ascribe it as art'.[112]

So, categorical imperative will involve the task of *representing art as nature.* Kant declares,

> 'art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature'.[113]

Categorical imperative will involve the idea of beautiful.

> 'Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good...'[114]

Kant also declares,

> 'Fine art is an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature'.[115]

This also confirms our interpretation that acting from categorical imperative will be a fine art for Kant.
For Kant

> 'All imperative command either *hypothetically* or *categorically*'.[116]

There is no third alternative. Mutual exclusiveness of making and acting of Aristotle's ethics becomes mutual exclusiveness of hypothetical and categorical imperative in Kant's morality. All imperatives command actions either as necessary as a means or as objectively necessary in itself.

Para 17: Hence it follows,

> 'Every practical law represents a possible action as good and therefore as necessary for a subject whose actions are determined by reason'.[117]

Mark the presence of the word 'represents' in the sentence. To represent an action as necessary is to represent it without choice. For a subject whose actions are determined by reason, there is no option of not choosing the action determined by reason as necessary. But a subject is one who has *Willkür,* which is the power to choose such that even after the action is on course it can say 'I could have acted otherwise'. To such a subject with a *Willkür* there can be no action without choice. An action without choice can at the best be 'represented' to it.

> 'Hence all imperatives are formulae for determining an action which is necessary in accordance with the principle of will in some sense good'.[118]

That is to say, all imperatives merely tell us, i.e. represent which actions are necessary in the sense above. It so represents the actions 'in accordance with the principle of will in *some sense good*'. If there

are two senses of necessary i.e. necessary as a means and objectively necessary there must be two senses of good in which will can be good, for Kant relates the two senses of necessity to 'the principle of will in *some sense good*'. But what do we hear?

> 'If the action would be good solely as a means *to something else*, the imperative is *hypothetical*; if the action is represented *as good in itself* and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is *categorical*'.[119]

Here Kant has distinguished the two senses of good in which action can be good, i.e. good as a means and good in itself. An action necessary as a means is good as a means. An action objectively necessary in itself is good in itself. But we are supposed to get information regarding the different senses of good in which 'will' can be good. We are not yet told what these two senses are. The phrase 'will which of itself accords with reason' cannot provide the required differentia for nowhere Kant has told us so far that 'a will which does not accord with reason by itself but accords with reason only for something else' can be good in some sense. In fact, according to *The Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* this is the mark of an evil will. So where are we to look for the differentia of two senses of good in which will can be good? The differentia must be looked for in the manner in which the if-clause introduces the good of the action. In the case of action good as a means the if-clause is presented as: 'If the action *would be* good ...' In the case of the action good in itself the if-clause is presented as: 'if the action is *represented* as good...'

We have already seen that in *Introduction to Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant exclusively identifies *Willkür* with faculty of choice.

> '... The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, in so far as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty *to do or to refrain from doing* as one pleases. In so far as it is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one's action it is called choice (*Willkür*)...'[120]

Be it noted that *Willkür* has a double aspect, i.e. it has inner aspect of choice and outer aspect of the ability to bring about its object. The act of choice is inner but the act of production is external. The solution that Kant offers to the third antinomy of reason also points in this direction.

> 'While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature'.[121]

That is to say, the action is imputed presuming free choice but it has effect according to the necessity of natural causes, i.e. it produces objects through the operation of law of natural causes.

> 'Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects*'.[122]

He further clarifies,

> 'No action begins *in* this active being itself; but we may yet quite correctly say that the active being *of itself* begins its effects in the sensible world. In so doing, we should not be asserting that the effects in the sensible world can begin of themselves; they are always predetermined through antecedent empirical conditions, though solely through their empirical character (which is no more than the appearance of the intelligible), and so are only possible as a continuation of the series of natural causes'.[123]

That is to say, self-determination of will is not an outward action, rather it is inner determination of choice, but it is also the power to act which brings in change in the empirical world according to laws of causality. Once again, Kant emphasizes the dual nature of man's will in *Critique of Pure Reason*,

> 'Thus, the will of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, so far as that causality exhibits, in its effects in the [field of] appearance, a rule from which we may gather what, in their kind and degrees, are the actions of reason and the grounds thereof, and so may form an estimate concerning the subjective principles of his will'.[124]

Be it noted that the way the dual character of will is emphasized, i.e., the causality of it to produce effect in the empirical world and the non-empirical inner capacity of choice makes it suitable for technically practical reason. Be it also noted here that will involved with morally practical reason necessarily has no such dual character.

> 'A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes—because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through

> its willing alone—that is good in itself... Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.'[125]

In the moral evaluation of Kantian good will not only is the proposed end missing but so is action. It is not an oversight. Rather moral will, which is *Wille*, is something different from faculty of choice, i.e. *Willkür*.

> 'The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject's reason is called the will (*Wille*). The will is therefore the faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action (as choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining the choice to action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; In so far as it can determine choice, it is instead practical reason itself.'[126]

When *Wille* or practical reason completely determines *Willkür* then it chooses '*only that* which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practically necessary, that is, to be good'.[127] Be it noted here that the practical necessity involves the closure of choice. For Kant, 'the actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary' are the actions dictated by *Wille* to the *Willkür* of all rational beings as the actions, which it has to choose. The actions 'are also subjectively necessary' when *Willkür* cannot but choose that action. When the action is subjectively necessary the *Willkür* cannot say, 'I could have chosen otherwise' or 'I could have acted otherwise'. But that is an act of *gute Wille*. But as a matter of fact, even if the *Willkür* has already exercised its choice it can always say 'I could have acted otherwise'. If it cannot say so then it ceases to be *Willkür*. So, as a matter of fact, the act of choice of *Wilkür* can never be good in itself and therefore can never be necessary. At most it can be *represented* (in conception)'as *good in itself* and therefore as necessary'.

In light of our discussion above, it can be concluded that if the action is *represented* as good in itself, then the act of choice of *Willkür* is represented as act of *gute Wille*. And if the action would be good as a means then the act production of ends of *Willkür*

would be act of *gute Willkür* as producer or maker, i.e. as achiever of ends. So the two senses of good involved are the sense of good when applied to *Wille* and that of good applied to *Willkür* as producer or maker, i.e. as achiever of ends. Former will be the sense of morally good and the latter will be the sense of technically good.

A hypothetical imperative is a formula for determining an action of production, which is necessary in accordance with a principle of *Willkür*, as a good producer. A categorical imperative is a formula for representation of an act of choice of *Willkür* as necessary in accordance with the principle of *gute Wille*. Hence, the two kinds of imperatives are fish from different cattle.

Para 18: This one sentence paragraph needs to be unpacked to understand what is being claimed by Kant.

> 'An imperative therefore tells me which of my possible actions would be good...'[128]

An imperative either tells me which act of production of mine will be good as a means for the object to be produced or tells me which act of choice of mine will be good in itself.

> '...it formulates a practical rule for a will that does not perform an action straight away because the action is good...'[129]

An imperative formulates a practical rule for a *Willkür* that either does not perform the act of production straight away which is goods as a means, or does not choose straight away what is good in itself.

> '...whether because the subject does not always know that it is good or because, even if he know this, he might still act on maxims contrary to the objective principle of practical reason.'[130]

It is most likely that a subject does not perform the act of production straight away, which is good as a means because he does not know that it is good as a means. A subject will not perform an act of production *ceteris paribus* even if he knows that it is good as a means to the object he intends to produce only if he is irrational. But reverse is the case with act of choice. Even the most ordinary reason has the knowledge of which choice is necessary or, which choice is good in itself. It is most likely that the subject does not choose straight away what is good in itself because his at of choice

is guided by the maxim contrary to the objective principle of practical reason, knowing fully well what the practical reason requires. He will lack this knowledge only if he is mad or irrational in the Kantian scheme of things.

Para 19: Kant introduces a distinction within the hypothetical imperatives. If a hypothetical imperative declares that an action is goods as a means for a *possible* purpose then it formulates a *problematic* practical principle. If a hypothetical imperative says that an action is good as a means for the *actual* purpose, then it formulates an *assertoric* practical principle. By actual purpose, Kant does not mean any of the possible purposes, which happens to be actual purpose of man, rather he singles out *happiness* as the *actual* purpose of all. It must be kept in mind that in Kantian framework introduced so far the position of happiness has become quite problematic. So he wants to separate out the issue of happiness altogether from the other issues.

Since a categorical imperative represents an act to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to some purpose, i.e. even without any further end, it formulates an apodeictic practical principle. An apodeictic practical principle is one which can be the basis of demonstration of objective necessity of an action in itself without reference to some purpose.

Para 20: For Kant,

> 'An end is an object of the free elective will [*Willkür*], the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced.'[131]

Hence it follows,

> 'Everything that is possible only through the efforts of some rational being can be conceived as a possible purpose of some will...'[132]

Since there are innumerably many possible ends, it follows

> 'there are...innumerable principles of action so far as action is thought necessary in order to achieve some possible purpose which can be effected by it.'[133]

According to Kant,

> 'All sciences have a practical part consisting of problems which suppose that some end is possible for us and of imperatives which tells us how it is to be attained. Hence the latter can in general be called imperatives of *skill*.'[134]

Imperatives of skill formulate technically practical principles. It is a very significant point that Kant is making. This point implicitly answers the question: Having declared in the preface to the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* that he plans to write a critique of *pure* practical reason, why did Kant give the title *Critique of Practical Reason*, when this work appeared? Why did Kant drop the adjective *pure* from the title of his second critique? According to Kant, the will can get its rule from concept of nature or from concept of freedom,

> 'Now, the question in respect of the practical faculty: whether, that is to say, the concept, by which the causality of the will gets its rule, is a concept of nature or of freedom, is here left quite open.'[135]

Kant explains the different bases of the rules and the consequent division of rules into distinct classes. If the rule of the will is based on concept of nature it is technically practical rule. If the rule of the will is based on the concept of freedom it is morally practical rule. The two kinds of rules belong to natural science and ethics, respectively.

> 'The latter distinction, however, is essential. For, let the concept determining the causality be a concept of nature, and then the principles are technically-practical; but, let it be a concept of freedom, and they are morally-practical. Now, in the division of a rational science the difference between objects that require different principles for their cognition is the difference on which everything turns. Hence technically-practical principles belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science), whereas those morally-practical alone form the second part, that is, practical philosophy (ethical science).'[136]

Now Kant makes it clear to which division of philosophy the imperatives of skill should belong. All technically practical rules or rules of skill belong to theoretical philosophy and not to practical philosophy.

> 'All technically-practical rules (i.e., those of art and skill generally, or even of prudence, as a skill in exercising an influence over men and their wills) must, so far as their principles rest upon concepts, be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they only touch the possibility

of things according to concepts of nature, and this embraces, not alone the means discoverable in nature for the purpose, but even the will itself (as a faculty of desire, and consequently a natural faculty), so far as it is determinable on these rules by natural motives. Still these practical rules are not called laws (like physical laws), but only precepts. This is due to the fact that the will does not stand simply under the natural concept, but also under the concept of freedom. In the latter connection its principles are called laws, and these principles, with the addition of what follows them, alone constitute the second at practical part of philosophy.'[137]

Why should the imperatives of skill not be part of practical philosophy? Since rules of skill are only corollaries of natural science, they cannot be placed under practical philosophy. Talking about these principles Kant says,

'For, between them all, the above contain nothing more than rules of skill, which are thus only technically practical—the skill being directed to producing an effect which is possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. As these concepts belong to theoretical philosophy, they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of theoretical philosophy (i.e., as corollaries of natural science), and so cannot claim any place in any special philosophy called practical.'[138]

But why should we not place these principles of skill separately from but co-ordinate with theoretical philosophy? Kant answers,

'Hence it is evident that a complex of practical precepts furnished by philosophy does not form a special part of philosophy co-ordinate with the theoretical, by reason of its precepts being practical—for that they might be, notwithstanding that their principles were derived wholly from the theoretical knowledge of nature (as technically-practical rules).'[139]

Since technically practical reason is in fact theoretical reason, hence practical reason co-ordinate with theoretical reason can be only so-called pure practical reason. Hence, 'pure' is redundant. Hence to determine possibility of pure practical reason is to determine *a priori* the possibility of practical reaon as distinguished from theoretical reason. Now it follows the critique of pure practical reason is nothing but critique of practical reason, practical reason as distinguished from theoretical reason. Hence, it is one of the reasons why Kant drops the adjective 'pure' from the title of his second critique.

Be it recollected that Kant began his *Groundwork* taking 'practical reason' in the wide sense which also included technically practical reason. But as soon as he identified 'practical reason' with will, he unawares implicitly narrowed the meaning of 'practical reason' to morally practical reason only. This implication became clear to him only in the last critique, as has been shown above.

Regarding imperatives of skill Kant claims:

'Here there is absolutely no question about the rationality or goodness of the end, but only about what must be done to achieve it. A prescription required by a doctor in order to cure his man completely and one required by a poisoner in order to make sure of killing him are of equal value so far as each serves to effect its purpose perfectly.'[140]

Be it noted here that Kant is completely separating the imperatives of skill from moral principles here. Kant has a well-settled history of this distinction to appeal to if he wants as explained before.

It was explained that art is concerned with making (*facere*, *ποιεἰν*) which results in modification of external matter, and morality has nothing to do with it, only the principles of evaluation of product are involved in it. Kant is following Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and also Aquinas on this point. But in the view of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, morality is concerned with acting or doing (*πράττειν*, *agere*). Since Kant does not recognize *πραττειν* or *agere* as a form of human action and recognizes only making (*facere*, *ποιεἰν*) as the form of human action, therefore, morality for him is concerned with act of choice of *Willkür* and hence morality indirectly relates to making (*facere*, *ποιεἰν*) through the act of choice of *Willkür*. Be it noted Aquinas notion of acting or doing (*πράττειν*, *agere*) which abides in the agent himself and requires rectitude of appetite unlike making, is more close to Kantian act of choice of *Willkür* and less close to the original notion accepted by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

No one knows 'what ends may present themselves' to a person in the course of his life. Hence it is necessary to have '*skill* the use of means to all sorts of *arbitrary* ends', which may possibly become one's ends even though one does not know which of them would become actual purpose. In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant writes,

'*Skill* is a culture that is certainly the principal subjective condition of the aptitude for the furthering of ends of all kinds...this is an essential factor, if an aptitude for ends is to have its full meaning.'[141]

But, unfortunately, parents take so much care in imparting *skill* (*technē*) to their children, Kant laments,

> 'that they commonly neglect on this account to form and correct the judgment of their children about the worth of the things which they might possibly adopt as ends.'[142]

But, with this lamentation, Kant is springing a surprise on us for so far he has not told us how to judge the possible ends, which one may adopt. He has so far told us only that morality declares some choice to be necessary or some action to be necessary *disregarding* the ends, which one may adopt. He has told us nothing in the first chapter or in the second chapter as to what can be the principle of judging the worth of the ends, which can be possible ends of man. From what he has told us so far about good will, duty, or moral law it does not follow that morality passes judgement on these ends. Be it noted that technically practical reason, i.e. theoretical reason passes no judgement on these ends; it merely tells us which action is necessary to achieve which end.

Para 21: As we have already remarked,[143] the position of happiness has become problematic in Kantian framework. For Greek thinkers, the *welfare* of man as well as *happiness* consists in this *life of reason in common*, which is possible when each agent (*phronimos*) through the reasoned state of capacity to act (*phronēsis*) is 'performing the functions of station' (*Το αύτον πράττειν*). For Kant, *πράττειν* or *agere* is the business of natural instinct as we have seen. So reason cannot achieve happiness.

> 'In actual fact too we find that the more a cultivated reason concerns itself with the aim of enjoying life and happiness, the farther does man get away from true contentment.'[144]

For Greeks, welfare and happiness is not a business of *technē* (art). For Kant, reason is involved only in art and this reason is technically practical reason or theoretical reason. This theoretical reason is unable to achieve happiness. Morally practical reason has nothing to do with consequence of action and happiness, as happiness is a consequence of action. So it generates hatred of reason in people who attempt to use reason to achieve happiness.

Hence, it calls for a separate treatment as *happiness* is not merely a purpose which human beings *can* have 'but which we can assume

with certainty that they all *do* have by a natural necessity'.[145] Since, for Kant, a hypothetical imperative that declares an action to be necessary as a means to an *actual* purpose formulates an *assertoric* practical principle, it follows, 'A hypothetical imperative which affirms the practical necessity of an action as a means to the furtherance of happiness is assertoric.'[146] Be it noted that for Kant, happiness is actual end of all human beings not because we know it through experience but because it is 'a purpose which we can presuppose *a priori* and with certainly to be present in every man because it belongs to his very being.'[147] For Kant, proficiency in the choice of means to one's own greatest well being can be called prudence in the narrowest sense.

Kant distinguishes this narrower sense of prudence in the footnote. The broad sense of prudence (*Klugheit*) includes two senses of prudence, i.e. 'worldly wisdom' (*Weltklugheit*) and 'personal wisdom' (*Privatklugheit*). Worldly wisdom consists in the proficiency in influencing others to use them for one's own ends. Personal wisdom 'is sagacity in combining all these ends' to one's 'own lasting advantage'.[148] Since the former is valuable to the extent it is in the service of the latter, a person who is worldly wise but not personally wise is not prudent on the whole. Hence, the broader and complete sense of prudence includes the latter sense of prudence, i.e. 'personal wisdom' (*Privatklugheit*) also. But a narrower sense of prudence is just the 'worldly wisdom' (*Weltklugheit*).

Be it noted that Kant's assertoric practical principle does not formulate the principle of sagacity in combining the subjective ends to one's own lasting advantage. It merely formulates the principle which declares which action is necessary as a means to achieve happiness once we have got an Idea of happiness making use of the principle of sagacity in combining the private ends. When Kant is speaking of a narrow sense of prudence, he is speaking only of proficiency in choosing actions as a means to happiness formulated through the exercise of 'personal wisdom' (*Privatklugheit*) without including the latter; hence, it will include only the principles of 'worldly wisdom' (*Weltklugheit*). Be it noted that for Kant assertoric practical principle is a principle of prudence only in the narrow sense of prudence. Hence, as to the latter, Kant will rename it as principle of 'self love'. Be it noted that assertoric practical prin-

ciple is formulated by a hypothetical imperative which commands an action 'not absolutely, but only as a means to a further end', hence it is an imperative of skill (*technē*).

> 'All technically-practical rules (i.e., those of art and skill generally, or even of prudence, as a skill in exercising an influence over men and their wills) must, so far as their principles rest upon concepts, be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy.'[149]

So the assertoric practical principles fall under theoretical reason, as it is an imperative of skill (*technē*).

Be it further noted that prudence as sagacity in combining the subjective ends to one's own lasting advantage can provide us some principle of judging the worth of these ends. But since neither theoretical reason nor practical reason can give principles of sagacity in combing the personal ends, is Kant implicitly pointing to the third aspect of higher faculty of reason, i.e. judgement which comes up for investigation in the third critique? Let us find out.

For this purpose, we have to understand the concept of world involved in the 'worldly wisdom' (*Weltklugheit*). Kant begins with defining the concept of world as that idea in which the absolute totality of those objects accessible in finite knowledge is represented *a priori*. World thus means 'the sum-total [Ingegriff] of all appearances',[150] or 'sum-total of all objects of experience'.[151] So he declares, 'I name all transcendental ideas, insofar as they concern absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances, concepts of world [*Weltbegriffe*].'[152] One is tempted to equate the concept of world with the concept of the whole of nature. But that is not the case with Kant, since those beings accessible to finite knowledge may be viewed ontologically with respect to both their whatness (*essentia*) and their 'existence' (*existentia*). Kant formulates this distinction using the words *mathematical* and *dynamical*, respectively. 'In the application of pure concepts of understanding to possible experience, the employment of their synthesis is either *mathematical* or *dynamical*; for they are concern partly with the mere *intuition* of an appearance in general, partly with its *existence*.'[153] Thus, for Kant, there results a division of the concept of world into mathematical and dynamic. The mathematical concepts of world are the concepts of world 'in their more restricted meaning', as distinguished from the dynamical concepts, which he also calls 'transcendent

concept of nature'.[154] Kant considers it 'quite fitting' to call these ideas 'as a whole' concepts of world, 'because by world we understand the sum total of all appearances, and our ideas too are directed only toward the unconditioned in appearances; in part also because the word world, understood transcendentally, means the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things, and we are directing our attention solely to the completeness of synthesis (albeit really only in regression to the conditions).'[155] This makes clear that the concept of world itself points towards what Kant calls the 'transcendental ideal'.[156] The world as an idea is indeed transcendent'; it *surpasses* appearances, and in such a way that as *their* totality it precisely *relates back* to them. Be it noted that for Kant 'world' is both *transcendent* when it is 'transcendent concept of nature' and transcendental 'when the word world, understood transcendentally, means the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things'. As transcendental 'world' belongs to experience as exceeding that, which is given *within it* as such, namely, the manifold of appearances. But as transcendent it means stepping *out* of experience as finite knowledge altogether and representing the possible whole of all things as the 'object' of an *intuitus originarious*. In such transcendence, there arises the transcendental ideal. So the concept of world stands, as it were, between the 'possibility of experience' and the 'transcendental ideal', and constitutes a *restriction* and becomes a term for finite, *human* knowledge in its totality. It is a totality of the finitude that is *human* in essence. Hence, this dynamical existential concept of world is different from the mathematical cosmological or natural concept of world in Kantian Critical philosophy. 'The most important object in the world, to which man can apply all progress in culture, is *man*, because he is his own ultimate end. To recognize him, therefore, in accordance with his species as an earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called *wordly knowledge*, even though he comprises only one part of the creatures of this earth.'[157] Knowledge of *man*, and indeed precisely with respect 'to what *he* makes, or can and ought to make of himself as a freely acting being', i.e. *precisely not* knowledge of man in a 'physiological' respect, which is a mere part of nature, is here termed knowledge of the *world*. Knowledge of the world is synonymous with prgmatic *antropology*

(knowledge of the human being). 'Such an antropology, considered...as *worldly knowledge*, is then not yet properly called *pragmatic* when it contains knowledge of *matters* in the world, e.g. of animals, plants, and minerals in various lands and climates, but when it contains knowledge of man as *citizen of the world*.'[158] For Kant, 'world' means precisely human existence in historical being with one another, and not the appearance of the human being in the nature as a species of living being, becomes especially clear from the turns of phrase that Kant has recourse to in clarifying this social concept of the world: 'knowing the world' and 'having class [world]'. Kant explains, 'for the first (the human being who knows the world) merely understands the game as a spectator, whereas the second has *played along with it*'.[159] Here, the world is a term for the social 'game' or play of human spectators. The figure of spectator Kant will introduce in his third critique. It is this second concept of the world that is meant when Kant is talking of the 'worldly wisdom'.

Since the position of happiness is becoming problematic in Kantian framework, ultimately, Kant will have to leave it to God to make man happy according to his worthiness to be happy. It may be remembered that 'that complete well-being and contentment with one's state which goes by the name of "*happiness*"', is included under *gifts of fortune* by Kant thereby indicating that it is not an achievement of human effort in the very first paragraph of the first chapter of the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*.[160]

Para 22: The third kind of imperative is one which presents an apodeictic practical principle. This kind of imperative 'without being based on, and conditioned by, any further purpose to be attained by a certain line of conduct, enjoins this conduct immediately.'[161] Kant calls it categorical imperative. This imperative is not concerned with the object of action or its presumed consequences; rather it is concerned with form of action and with the principle from which it follows. So it can be concluded, 'what is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition' involved in the action and not on its consequences whatever they may be.[162] What Kant is saying is that the goodness of the action depends on the inner act of choice of *Willkür* and the principle on which it is based and not on the external action in which this choice results

or the consequences which this external action produces. This imperative is the imperative of morality.

Para 23: Kant has already explained that an imperative formulates a principle of practical reason, which is necessitating for a *Willkür*. Since there are three kinds of imperatives, if follows that there are also three *dissimilar* ways of *necessitation* of the *Willkür*. To mark the three kinds of necessitation of *Willkür* involved in the three kinds of imperatives distinguished above he names them in the order in which they are explained, as *rules* of skill, *counsels* of prudence and *commands* (laws) of morality. According to Kant, 'only *law* carries with it the concept of an *unconditioned*, yet objective and so universally valid, necessity; and commands are law which must be obeyed, i.e. must be followed even against inclination.'[163] Both counsels of prudence and rules of skill carry *conditioned* necessity, i.e. 'necessity valid only under a subjective and contingent condition'. The counsels of prudence necessitate the *Willkür* under the condition that 'this or that man counts this or that as belonging to his happiness',[164] happiness as an Ideal of imagination, and not of reason.[165] Rules of skill necessitate the *Willkür* under the condition that this or that man has willed this or that as his subjective end. Be it noted that for Kant, 'All technically-practical rules (i.e. those of art and skill generally, or even of prudence, as a skill in exercising an influence over men and their wills) must, so far as their principles rest upon concepts, be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy.'[166] Hence, the conditioned necessity involved in both the counsels of prudence and rules of skill is *theoretical necessity*. As against this, the unconditioned necessity involved in the categorical necessity is absolute practical necessity.

Kant also designates these imperatives by other sets of names to clarify the sphere in which they apply.

> 'We could also call imperatives of the first kind *technical* (concerned with art); of the second kind *pragmatic* (concerned with well-being); of the third kind *moral* (concerned with free conduct as such—that is, with morals).'[167]

In the footnote to the above sentence, once again, Kant explains what the word 'pragmatic' means. For him pragmatic is that which results 'from *forethought* in regard to the general welfare'.

'*A history* is written pragmatically when it teaches *prudence*—that is, when it instructs the world of today how to provide for its own advantage better that, or at least as well as, the world of other times.'[168]

But it may be recalled the concept of history has become problematic in the framework of the first critique. The history will become actual only when the figure of the spectator will be introduced. This point will come up for discussion in another chapter. Be it noted here that the world is the dynamic existential world, which is the social 'game' or play of human spectators, as explained above. The idea of general interest will require the idea of a common lived world.

'The concept of world here means that concept which concerns what is necessarily of interest to everyone.'[169]

To introduce this concept of the world, Kant distinguishes 'worldly knowledge' in the sense of 'life-experience' from 'scholastic knowledge'.[170] Along the guideline of this distinction he then develops the concept of philosophy in accordance with its 'Scholastic concept' and its 'worldly concept'.[171] Philosophy in the Scholastic sense remains an affair of the mere 'artificer of reason'. Philosophy in accordance with its worldly concept is the concern of the 'teacher in the ideal', i.e. of the one who aims for the 'divine human being in us'.[172] The idea of divinity is needed for happiness and welfare as it has become problematic in the critical framework.

Para 24: Now arises the all-important question of Kantian critical enterprise:

'How are all these imperatives possible?'[173]

According to Kant's explanation, this question does not ask how a person is to perform the act required by an imperative. Rather the question means

'How we can conceive the necessitation of the will expressed by the imperative in setting us a task.'[174]

In Kant's view, the explanation of necessitation of will involved in technical imperatives is quite easy. In fact the explanation given also makes clear why the metaphysics of nature can serve the purpose of metaphysics of art?

'How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. So far as willing is concerned, this proposition is analytic: for in my willing of an object as an effect there is already conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause—that is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end. (Synthetic propositions are required in order to determine the means to a proposed end, but these are concerned, not with the reason for performing the act of will, but with the cause which produce the object).'[175]

Imperative of skill can be obtained from any given causal law of nature by merely adding the analytic proposition.

'If I fully will the effect, I also will the action required for it.'[176]

For example, it is a causal law of nature: The pressure exerted by a mass of gas increases, volume remaining the same, if the temperature increases. If we add the above analytic proposition to this we get the rule of skill: If I will to increase the pressure exerted by a mass of gas, volume remaining the same, then I will increase the temperature. For a *Willkür* not inclined towards the performance of the required action, i.e. to increase the temperature, even though it wills the end, i.e. to increase the pressure exerted by a mass of gas, volume remaining the same, the imperative says, 'you ought to increase the temperature, as you will to increase the pressure exerted by a mass of gas, volume remaining the same.' It will be illogical not to perform the required action if one wills the end and knows that it is the means to the end willed. So to have imperatives of skill what we need is just the causal laws of nature. So for modern technology to be possible what we need is not a separate science of metaphysic of art, rather science of metaphysic of nature. So Kant has to lay down the foundation of metaphysic of nature as a science and not metaphysic of art as a science. So he has to write a critique of pure speculative reason and not a separate critique of pure technical reason. It is the theoretical reason, which analytically transforms into technically practical reason according to Kant.

Para 25: What has been said, as an answer to the question how technically practical imperative is possible, will equally hold good

imperatives of prudence provided we 'find a determinate concept of happiness.'[177] In that case, the imperatives of prudence will turn into a kind of imperatives of skill and they will be necessitating for a will analytically for a will seeking happiness but refusing to perform the act necessary as a means to happiness will be illogical. The analytic principle will apply here too:

> 'Who wills the end, wills also (necessarily, if he accords with reason) the sole means which are in his power.'[178]

But, unfortunately, the concept of happiness is very indeterminate. Even though every one seeks happiness, no one will ever 'say definitely and in unison with himself what it really is that he wants and wills.'[179] What is the reason for not knowing what happiness consists in?

> 'The reason for this is that all the elements which belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical—that is, they must be borrowed from experience; but that none the less there is required for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present, and in every future, state.'[180]

Since happiness involves elements taken from experience, hence practical reason cannot take up query as to what happiness is. Since the Idea of happiness involves the Idea of an absolute whole theoretical reason is also powerless to know what happiness is, as it can only think of Idea of this kind of absolute whole but it cannot know them. So as we have been claiming the Idea of happiness has become problematic within the Kantian scheme of things.

> 'From this it follows that imperatives of prudence, speaking strictly, do not command at all—that is, cannot exhibit actions objectively as practically *necessary*; that they are rather to be taken as recommendations (*consilia*), than as commands (*praecepta*), of reason; that the problem of determining certainly and universally what action will promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble; and consequently that in regard to this there is no imperative possible which in the strict sense could command us to do what will make us happy, since happiness is an Ideal, not of reason, but of imagination—an Ideal resting merely on empirical grounds, of which it is vain to expect that they should determine an action by which we could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is in fact infinite.'[181]

So what is the way out? The problem is insoluble so long as we remain within the realm of the two uses of reason. Kant claims 'happiness is an Ideal, not of reason, but of Imagination'. What is imagination for Kant? '*Imagination* is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present.*'[182] Or again, 'Imagination (*Facultas imaginandi*) is a faculty of *perception* in the absence of an object'.[183] The faculty of imagination comes from the classical conceptual world of *logos, nous, dianoia, theoria,* and *phronesis.* It can be confirmed directly. In Permenides' fragment-4 *nous* is that faculty 'through which you look steadfastly at things which are present though they are absent'[184] or through which you 'See securely... things absent as though they were present.'[185] In fact, Kantian faculty of imagination is the faculty called *nous* by the Greeks. *Nous* is the highest faculty of the *Theoros.* No doubt Kant will have to rehabilitate genius, which can give intuition of imagination, and combine taste of spectator with genius. And only through combining taste of spectator with imagination of genius that Kant will finally succeed in combining the two uses of reason in teleology of nature to solve the problem of happiness. Hence Kant's claim, 'happiness is an Ideal, not of reason, but of Imagination', points to his third critique. For the time being we must remain content with Kant's claim,

> 'Nevertheless, if we assume that the means to happiness could be discovered with certainty, this imperative of prudence would be an analytic practical proposition; for it differs from the imperative of skill only in this—that in the latter the end is merely possible, while in the former the end is given.'[186]

So there is no difficulty here in explaining why the will is necessitated to perform the actions dictated by the imperatives of prudence. It will be illogical not to perform the action, which is a means to the end we have set for us.

Para 26: For Kant the question 'How is the imperative *morality* possible?' needs an answer for which he is writing the present work, i.e. the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals.* The problem here, according to Kant, is to establish how is the necessitation of *Willkür* possible disregarding all reference to the end set by it. If we proceed empirically, by way of examples, then we will observe that

each individual is pursuing his ends be it actual or possible. So even if we notice empirically that a man's action accords with moral law yet we can not be certain that his action accords with morality not because it is a necessary means to the end he is actually pursuing. Hence, 'we must rather suspect that all imperatives which seem to be categorical may none the less be covertly hypothetical.'[187] The problem is that due to the subject-object dichotomy established by the first critique, the subject looking at society empirically, i.e. taking an objective attitude to society has reflected it out of existence and conceives himself as a nonsocial individual subject pursuing ends of his own choosing. So this individual can follow the principle 'Though shalt make no false promises' as a means to preserving his credit worthiness, which he as an *individual wants*. So he can follow this principle in the form, 'You ought not to make a lying promise lest, when this comes to light, you destroy your credit.' That is to say, he can follow this principle as a hypothetical imperatives only. An act of lying promise can be considered as bad in itself and the principle of prohibition is therefore categorical only for a will, which is essentially social. This is because the necessity of avoiding this kind of act, i.e. making of false promise is no mere device for the avoidance of some further evil only for a will which can will to avoid it simply because it is objectively necessary, i.e. necessary on grounds valid for every rational being as such. This will, therefore, is an essentially social being. But the individual of Kantian philosophy is not an essentially a social being so far. So the real problem is to show how can the categorical principle of an essentially social being be necessitating for an essentially nonsocial individual subject without destroying his essentially nonsocial individualistic subjectivity. From empirical example, all we can gather is only the hypotheticality of the principle followed, and even if we notice no subjective end, we can never be certain of the categoricity of motivation.

> 'Even so, we cannot with any certainty show by an example that the will is determined here solely by the law without any further motive, although it may appear to be so; for it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also hidden dread of other risks, may unconsciously influence the will. Experience shows only that it is not perceived.'[188]

If we seek help of experience, 'the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to be categorical and unconditioned, would in fact be only a pragmatic prescription calling attention to our advantage and merely bidding us take this into accounts.'[189]

Be it noted that Kant is not seeking the possibility of categoricity of moral law, which has been found out in the first chapter itself. The problem is to establish the *necessitation* of *Willkür* involved in the categorical imperative, for that is not established in the first chapter. Mind you the problem has come up because the *Willkür* is the will of a nonsocial individual subject but categoricity comes from pure *Wille*, or pure *gute Wille*, which is essentially a socially will. So how can this categorical law be *necessitating* as 'ought' for *Willkür*? On the face of it, even the necessitation as 'ought' of *Willkür* by a categorical law appears to be contradictory? So the very *possibility* of this kind of *necessitation* has to be established. It must be kept in mind that the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* will establish only the *possibility* of categorical necessitation. The *actuality* of this kind of necessitation will be established only in the *Critique of Practical Reason* on the basis of the *sole fact of practical reason.*

Para 27: For Kant

> 'Not every kind of knowledge *a priori* should be called transcendental, but that only by which we know that—and how—certain representation (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely *a priori*. The term 'transcendental', that is to say, signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment.'[190]

Consistent with his conception of transcendental philosophy, Kant claims

> 'We shall thus have to investigate the possibility of a *categorical* imperative entirely *a priori*.'[191]

Mind you, the problem arises, 'Since here we do not enjoy the advantage of having its reality given in experience and so of being obliged merely to explain, and not to the establish, its possibility'[192] as it was the case with hypothetical imperative.

What has Kant achieved so far? The first chapter has established this much that if there is to be morality, there has to be good will; if there is to be a good will (*gute Wille*) then it is necessary that

Willkür be determined only on that maxim of its own willing, which conforms to the law of *Wille* disregarding all ends of *Willkür's* choice. Since *Willkür* is the capacity to pursue an end of one's own choice, to *Willkür* this kind of necessity of determination appears as categorical *necessitation.* So, if there is to be a good will (*gute Wille*), there has to be categorical necessitation of *Willkür.* Further, if morality is to be possible, the categorical necessitation of *Willkür must* be possible. If categorical necessitation of *Willkür must* be possible, it has to be shown *a priori* that categorical necessitation of *Willkür* is possible.

On the face of it, *categorical necessitation* of *Willkür* appears as contradictory, since *Willkür* comes from the first critique, it is the *Willkür* of an individualistic nonsocial subject, and the categorical necessitation by good will (*gute Wille*) comes from all the transformation of Greek *phronēsis* by an essentially social *phronimos.* In spite of the transformation of essentiality of *πράττειν* for Greek *phronēsis* by inner categorical necessitation of determination of *Willkür,* transforming the general *nomos* of Greeks into the apodeictic universal law the problem of essential sociality of *phronimos* is creating problem for Kant. The problem is: how can the essentially social good will (*gute Wille*) necessitate *Willkür* categorically? This problem is with respect to this necessitation of *Willkür* by *gute Wille.* The problem is how can the same person have social *gute Wille* and nonsocial individualistic *Willkür.* So Kant will ultimately solve this problem by distinguishing two standpoints, a solution appropriate in general for resolving a contradiction.

In case of hypothetical imperative, this problem is not encountered, because in that case the conditional necessitation of *Willkür* is by the willing of an end by the *Willkür* itself. The two adjectives 'hypothetical' and 'categorical' applied to necessitation distinguish whether the necessitation of *Willkür* is by *Willkür*'s own willing (of an end, as that is the way it can will), or whether the necessitation of *Willkür* is by *Wille*'s law, i.e. whether the necessitation of *Willkür* by the maxim of its own fit to be a universal law disregarding all the subjective ends of *Willkür,* for that that is the only way *Wille* can necessitate *Willkür.* The former necessitation, i.e. necessitation of *Willkür* by *Willkür*'s own willing is analytic. But, the latter necessitation, i.e. necessitation of *Willkür* by *Wille*'s law is synthetic. The analytic hypothetical necessitation is contingent for Kant since *Willkür* can escape this necessitation by not willing the end. But the synthetic categorical necessitation is not contingent since *Willkür* cannot escape this necessitation by itself.

Para 28: Since necessitation of *Willkür* by *Wille*'s law is synthetic, the possibility of this necessitation is difficult to comprehend. The necessitation of *Willkür* by *Wille*'s law is synthetic because *Willkür* and *Wille* are two distinct notions. The idea of *Willkür* does not contain the idea of *Wille* hence the latter cannot be drawn out from the former by analysis. The two will be connected synthetically in the last chapter. The proposition formulating the necessitation of the *Willkür* to act only on that maxim, which it can will to be a universal law disregarding all ends of *Willkür*'s choice, will be a synthetic *a priori* practical proposition. Be it noted that it was no easy task for Kant to show how synthetic *a priori* judgement is possible *a priori* in theoretical knowledge. So he expects the task of showing the *a priori* possibility of synthetic *a priori* practical proposition will be no less difficult.

The explanation, given above in terms of the distinction between *Willkür* and *Wille,* makes clear why the categorical imperative is a synthetic *a priori* practical proposition. Since Kant has not yet brought in the distinction between *Willkür* and *Wille,* his introduction of synthetic *a priori* practical proposition is quite abrupt without any preparation. The explanation given in the footnote is also quite inadequate to explain the idea of 'synthetic' involved here. The footnote explains,

> 'Without presupposing a condition taken from some inclination I connect an action with the will *a priori* and therefore necessarily (although only objectively so—that is, only subject to the Idea of a reason having full power over all subjective impulses to action). Here we have a practical proposition in which the willing of any action is not derived analytically from some other willing already presupposed (for we do not possess any such perfect will), but is on the contrary connected immediately with the concept of the will of a rational being as something which is not contained in this concept.'[193]

The explanation on the face of it appears to be quite inadequate. What Kant is claiming is that a categorical imperative connects an action *immediately,* i.e. without the mediation of willing

of an end—with the concept of a rational will. It is not clear how this immediacy of connection or absence of mediation of willing of an end in the connection can make it synthetic. The necessary distinctions to make the unconditional connection of action with a rational will synthetic are not yet available. So to be able to say that when unconditionally the action is connected to the will *a priori* and necessarily in the categorical imperative then the action is connected synthetically to the will one needs a distinction between the will to which the action is unconditionally connected *a priori* and necessarily in the categorical imperative, and the will which necessarily acts on that maxim which it can will to be a universal law. As we know, Kant makes the distinction between the two wills. To anticipate the *Willkür* will be the freely choosing will and when *Willkür* wills in conformity of *Wille*'s law it will be the autonomous will. To necessitate synthetically the freely choosing *Willkür* by the law of *Wille*, both *Willkür* and *Wille* must belong to the same person. But the problem is how can they belong to the same person. This possibility must be shown *a priori*. For this, Kant has to first formulate the categorical imperative in a way that he can come to the Idea of an autonomous will i.e. *Willkür* necessitated by *Wille*.

To solve this problem, Kant needs to separate out the issue of categoricity from the problem of necessitation. It was mentioned above that Kant is not seeking the possibility of categoricity of moral law, which has been found out in the first chapter itself. The problem is to establish the *necessitation* of *Willkür* involved in the categorical imperative, for that is not established in the first chapter. To solve the problem of the possibility of categorical necessitation Kant has to not only isolate the problem of the discovery of the content of categoricity from the problem of the possibility of necessitation by the discovered content of categoricity, but also put the discovered content of categoricity in a way so that it can be shown *a priori* how the discovered content of categoricity *necessitates*.

In paragraph 29, Kant separates out the issue of categoricity from the problem of the possibility of necessitation. Paragraphs 30 and 31 take up the issue of discovery of the content of categoricity. Rest of the second chapter is concerned with the issue of formulating the content of categoricity in a way that it can be shown a *priori* how the content of categoricity *necessitates*.

Para 29: In the sentence, which is the whole of paragraph 29—'In this task we wish first to enquire whether perhaps the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provide us with the formula containing the only proposition that can be a categorical imperative; for even when we know the purport of such an absolute command, the question of its possibility will still require a special and troublesome effort, which we postpone to the final chapter.'[194] Kant is separating out the issue of categoricity from the possibility of necessitation. The task Kant is speaking about is the task of showing the *a priori* possibility of categorical imperative. This task consists of two separate tasks. One task is the task of formulating the categorical imperative. The other task is the task of showing its possibility *a priori*. The task of formulating the categorical imperative is nothing but discovery of the categoricity of the categorical imperative. Be it noted when Kant will formulate the categorical imperative in the second chapter no where he will state it with the word 'ought' while he had clearly mentioned, 'All imperatives are expressed by an "ought" (*Sollen*)'[195] and also in the first chapter the moral law is stated with the words, 'I ought never to act...'[196] What is the explanation of this? In the first chapter, Kant is formulating the moral law, as the categorical imperative for a human will. But in the second chapter, he is not interested in formulating the categorical imperative as such but he is interested in isolating the content of categoricity without involving the necessitation in it. So the first task to be solved is the task of discovery of the content of categoricity by itself. The other task is postponed for the last chapter.

Para 30: As we know for Kant every judgement has a content and form.

> '*Form* and *matter* belong to every judgement, as basic constituents. The *matter* of a judgement consists in the given knowledge which is bound up with the unity of consciousness in judgement. The *form* of a judgement consists in determining how various representations as such [as various] belong to *one* consciousness.'[197]

Categorical imperative as a practical judgement also has a form and a content. The content of the categorical imperative is the categoricity or unconditionality involved in the moral law while the

form is the necessitation due to the necessary universality of application of moral law to all rational beings. Be it noted the matter or the content consists in the knowledge bound up unity of consciousness in judgement. It must be kept in mind that by definition for Kant

> 'judgement is the representation of the unity of consciousness of various representations.'[198]

What are the various representations combined here in one consciousness? The categorical imperative is a concept of pure reason. Pure concepts of reason are the concepts of reflection (*conceptus reflectentes*).

> 'All concepts in general, no matter from where they may take their matter [*Stoff*], are reflected representations, i.e. reflected into the logical relation of their applicability to the many. However, there are concepts whose whole meaning is to be capable of being subordinated, as one or the other reflection, to any representation that occurs. They can be called concepts of reflection (*conceptus reflectentes*). And because any kind of reflection occurs in judgement, these concepts will comprehend absolutely the mere activity of understanding, which in judgement applies to relation as the ground for the possibility of judging.'[199]

So in categorical imperative Kant is combining the mere activity of understanding, i.e. reason, and as the activity of reason is nothing but the activity of *Wille* and *Willkür*, Kant is combining in one consciousness the activity of *Wille* and *Willkür*. The combined faculty of *Wille* and *Willkür* is also termed *Wille* by Kant. So *Wille* has both a narrow and wide meaning in Kant. In the narrow sense, it refers to morally legislative will while in the wide sense, it refers to combined faculty of executive will and morally legislative will. Autonomy is property of this combined faculty of will. When the two are combined in one consciousness the content of consciousness is the categoricity or unconditionality of activity of willing. The activity of *Willkür*—which is nothing but pursuing ends of its own choosing—stands necessarily under the activity of *Wille*, which is nothing but guiding choice only on the basis of maxims which it can will to be a universal law disregard of any end. In case of hypothetical imperative, one cannot arrive at the content of the imperative by mere reflection as the condition is not given by reflection itself. But the very conception of the categorical imperative, i.e. the reflection which gives the categorical imperative also gives its content.

Before we proceed further in our reflection, it must be remembered that the *form* of a judgement consists in determining how various representations as such [as various] belong to *one* consciousness. This determination of how various representations as such [as various] belong to *one* consciousness is the business of synthesis of imagination. So the determination of how the activity of *Wille* and *Willkür* can be combined in one consciousness and hence the possibility of necessitation of the activity of *Willkür* by *Wille* will be taken up by Kant in the last chapter and there he will proceed synthetically, i.e. through synthesis of imagination.

Coming back to our reflection, we have seen that if we conceive of the categorical imperative, we know at once what its matter is.

> 'For since besides the law this imperative contains only the necessity that our maxim should conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition to limit it, there remains nothing over to which the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary.'[200]

The two elements, which Kant is combining in one consciousness, are the law with its universality without any condition to limit its universality, and the maxim; and in the one consciousness the maxim is under the necessity to conform to the law with its universality without any condition. In the footnote, Kant makes clear what a maxim is,

> 'A maxim is a subjective principle of action and must be distinguished from an *objective principle*—namely, a practical law. The former contains a practical rule determined by reason in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or again his inclinations): it is thus a principle on which the subject *acts*.'[201]

Maxim is the subjective principle of action on which the subject acts i.e. it is the actual principle on which the *Willkür* chooses to act.

> 'A law, on the other hand, is an objective principle valid for every rational being; it is a principle on which he *ought to act*—that is, an imperative.'[202]

An objective principle valid for every rational being is the maxim willed by *Willkür*, which is fit to be universal law as required by *Wille*. So, in the categorical imperative as the content, we have the unitary consciousness of the necessity of the maxim of activity of *Willkür* conforming to the universality of law of *Wille* without any condition.

Para 31: So the categorical imperative has the content if we disregard the form i.e. disregard the necessitation,

> 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'[203]

There is only one categorical imperative with this content. This is addressed to the unitary consciousness combining both *Wille* and *Willkür*. It, in fact, says to the unitary consciousness if we disregard the element of 'ought': Choose [which is act of *Willkür*] only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will [which is activity of *Wille*] that it should become a universal law. Mark the words 'through which you can at the same time' in the quotation above. So the content of the categorical imperative says: choose only by that maxim, which is such that it makes the act of choice, contain in itself the will that its maxim should become a universal law and precisely because of that willing the act of choice is to be determined by that maxim. Now we can see that for Kant the particular determination of will by a maxim is also a determination of a universal law. In fact the particular determination of will takes place by the maxim precisely because of its fitness to be willed as a universal law. So that for Kant also, in moral reasoning, the particular determination of will and the universal determination of law takes place simultaneously and one is involved in the other as it happens in Aristotelian *phronēsis*. So we can say Kant is very close to the essence of Aristotelian *phronēsis* in his announcement of the categorical imperative. But there is a difference too. Categorical imperative as *Conceptus reflectentes* presents a *pure apodeictic law of morality* as its content unlike *phronēsis*, because reflection brings into picture in advance the morally-practical interest of the subject to constitute *phronēsis* into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration) in the context of the formation of categorical imperative through reflection on morally practical judgements.

An ambiguity in the use of the word 'law' may be noted. For Kant, the categorical imperative itself is how the moral law appears to human beings. Since Kant does not stick to his distinction between the law and categorical imperative he will use the word law as equivalent to categorical imperative. So there can be only one moral law. But the word 'law' occurs within the formulation of the categorical imperative. So any maxim, which can be willed to be a universal law, is also a moral law. So there can be many moral laws.

Para 32: There is only one categorical imperative but it has many formulations. All imperatives of duty are derivable from this single categorical imperative as their principle. Mind you, here Kant is speaking of the content of the imperative of duty. Its possibility will be shown only when Kant has shown how its 'form', i.e. 'necessitation' is possible. So, without this task being completed, even though we know what the content of duty is, we do not know whether duty is possible at all. Since categorical imperative as *conceptus reflectentes* presents a *pure apodeictic law of morality* as its content unlike *phronēsis*, because reflection brings into picture in advance the morally-practical interest of the subject to constitute *phronēsis* into a kind of *apodeixis* (demonstration), Kant while giving different formulations of the categorical imperative, checks through examples whether he has succeeded in turning *phronēsis* into a kind of *apodeixes* (demonstration).

Notes and References

1. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* [abbreviated as *Groundwork* hereinafter], translated by H.J. Paton in his *The Moral Law*, (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1948). The first page number refers to the *Moral Law* of H.J. Paton, the second and the third page numbers refer to the page numbers of two German editions of Kant's original text, given in the margins of Paton's translation.
2. 'Transformation of Greek Phronēsis into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneutic Study of the Paragraphs 1–17, pp. 59/393/1–67/402/17 of the First Chapter of Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 31, Nos. 1–4 (2004) Special Number 200 Years of Kant, pp. 119–156.
3. *Groundwork*, 67/402/17.

4. *Transcendental Logic II, Dialectic, I, I: Of Ideas in General.*
5. *Critique of Judgment* [abbreviated as *CJ* hereinafter], §29, Tr. James Creed Meredith, from the 42nd volume of the series *Great Books of the Western World* on Kant entitled *The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason And Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgment*, The University of Chicago (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britanica Inc., 1952), The entire volume on Kant will be referred to as *42. Kant* hereinafter, p. 506.
6. *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss. Tr. H.B. Nibset (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 137.
7. *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Trs. Theodore M. Green and Hoyt H. Hudson (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1934), Book 2, div. II, p. 88. The first emphasis is added.
8. We will explore this issue in an essay entitled 'Possibility of Categorical Imperative Harbours the Paradox of Radical Evil in Kant's Critical Philosophy.'
9. *Critique of Pure Reason* [abbreviated as CPR hereinafter], tr. Norman Kemp Smith, A260, B316.
10. CPR, A261, B317.
11. CPR, A802, B830.
12. CPR, A803, B831.
13. CPR, A807, B835.
14. CPR, A823, B851.
15. CPR, A533, B561.
16. CPR, A534, B562.
17. *Groundwork*, 71/406/25.
18. *Groundwork*, 71/406/25.
19. *Groundwork*, 71/406/25.
20. *Groundwork*, 71/406/25.
21. *Groundwork*, 71/406/26.
22. Especially analysis of paragraph 3, see also analysis of paragraph 4 in my essay 'Transformation of Greek Phronēsis into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneuic Study of the Paragraphs 1-17, pp. 59/393/1-67/402/17 of the First Chapter of Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals'.
23. *Groundwork*, 72/407/26.
24. *Groundwork*, 71/407/26.
25. *Groundwork*, 72/407/26.
26. *Groundwork*, 72/407/27.
27. *Groundwork*, 72/407/27.
28. *Groundwork*, 72/407/27.
29. *Groundwork*, 72/407/27.

30. *Reason in the Age of Science*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, p. 81.
31. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 81.
32. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals, sec. I., 42. Kant.* p. 386.
33. *Groundwork*, 60/394/3.
34. *Groundwork*, 72/407f/27f.
35. *Groundwork*, 72/408/28.
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37. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven and London: (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 117. [In *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* under the general editorship of Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, the volume entitled *Practical Philosophy*, (tr.) Mary J. Gregor, (Cambridge University Press, 1996) (xxxiv+668 pages) has just little over three pages on friendship (pp. 584 to 588).]
38. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, book 8, ch. 1.
39. My essay 'Transformation of Greek Phronēsis into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneutic Study of the Paragraphs 1-17, pp. 59/393/1-67/402/17 of the First Chapter of Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals'.
40. *Groundwork*, 72/408/28.
41. Gadamer, Hans-georg. *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, tr. P. Christopher Smith (London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 121.
42. *Groundwork*, 72f/408/28.
43. *Groundwork*, 73/408/28.
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45. *Groundwork*, 73/408/28.
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47. *Groundwork*, 73/408/29.
48. *Groundwork*, 73/408f/29.
49. Gadamer, Hans-georg, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, tr. P. Christopher Smith (London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 16.
50. *Groundwork*, 73/409/29f.
51. *Groundwork*, 73/409/29f.
52. *CJ*, §32, *42.Kant*, p. 514.
53. *CJ*, §32, *42.Kant*, p. 514.
54. In my essay 'Transformation of Greek Phronēsis into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneutic Study of the Paragraphs 1-17, pp. 59/393/1-67/402-17 of the First Chapter of Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals'.

55. *Groundwork*, 73/409/30.
56. Ibid. *Logik*, §6, note 2. [Cassirer, VIII, 399].
57. *Groundwork*, 73/409/30.
58. *Groundwork*, 73f/409/30.
59. *Groundwork*, 74/409/31.
60. *Groundwork*, 74/409f/31.
61. *Groundwork*, 74/410/31f.
62. *Groundwork*, 74/410/32.
63. *Groundwork*, 74n/410n/32n.
64. *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1094a23.
65. Hans-Georg Gadamer's *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, pp. 163-4.
66. Hans-Georg Gadamer's *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, pp. 164-5, n. 2. added by the translator.
67. See the discussion above of paragraph 5 in this chapter for this point.
68. *Groundwork*, 75/410/32f.
69. Hans-Georg Gadamer's *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, p. 160.
70. *Groundwork*, 75/411/33.
71. *Groundwork*, 75/411/34.
72. *Groundwork*, 75n/411n/33n.
73. *Groundwork*, 75n/411n/34n.
74. *Groundwork*, 75n/411n/34n.
75. *CJ*, §59, *42.Kant* p. 547.
76. *CJ*, §6, *42.*Kant, p. 479.
77. *Groundwork*, 75/411/34.
78. *Groundwork*, 76/411/35.
79. CPR, A98f.
80. *Groundwork*, 76/412/35.
81. *Groundwork*, 76/412/35.
82. *Groundwork*, 76/412/35.
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86. *Groundwork*, 76/412/36.
87. *Groundwork*, 76/412/36.
88. Hans-Georg Gadamer's *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, p. 165.
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90. Hans-Georg Gadamer's *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, p. 165.

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93. *Groundwork*, 77/412f/37.
94. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals*, sec. IV, *42.Kant*, p. 393.
95. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals*, sec. IV, *42.Kant*, p. 393.
96. *Groundwork*, 77/413/37.
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98. *Groundwork*, 77/413/37.
99. *Groundwork*, 77/413/38.
100. *Groundwork*, 77/413/38, n.
101. *Groundwork*, 77/413/38, n.
102. *Groundwork*, 77/413/38, n.
103. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 6, Ch. 5.
104. Kant, *Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, Sec. III, *42.Kant*, p. 396.
105. *Groundwork*, 78/414/39.
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111. Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, Sec. III. *42. Kant*, p. 369.
112. *Critique of Judgment*, §43, *42.Kant*, p. 523.
113. *Critique of Judgment*, §45, *42.Kant*, p. 525.
114. *Critique of Judgment*, §59, *42.Kant*, p. 547.
115. *Critique of Judgment*, §45, *42.Kant*, p. 525.
116. *Groundwork*, 78/414/39.
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120. General Introduction to *The Metaphysic of Morals*, sec. I, *42.Kant*, p. 386.
121. CPR, A537, B565.
122. CPR, A538, B566.
123. CPR, A541, B569.
124. CPR, A549, B577.
125. *Groundwork*, p. 60/394/5.
126. *General Introduction to The Metaphysic of Morals*, sec. I, *42.Kant*, p. 386.
127. *Groundwork*, p. 77/412/36-37.
128. *Groundwork*, p. 78/414/40.
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131. Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, Sec. III, 42.*Kant*, p. 369.
132. *Groundwork*, p. 79/415/41.
133. *Groundwork*, p. 79/415/41.
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135. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy, 42.*Kant*, p. 463.
136. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy, 42.*Kant*, p. 463.
137. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy, 42.*Kant*, p. 463-64.
138. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy, 42.*Kant*, p. 464.
139. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, I. Division of Philosophy, 42.*Kant*, p. 464.
140. *Groundwork*, pp. 79/415/41.
141. *Critique of Judgment*, §83, 42.*Kant*, p. 586.
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143. In my essay 'Transformation of Greek Phronēsis into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneutic Study of the Paragraphs 1-17, pp. 59/393/1-67/402/17 of the First Chapter of Kant's *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*.
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148. *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, 79/415/42, n.
149. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction. Sec. I 42.*Kant*, p. 463.
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151. *Was heißt:sich im Denken orientieren?* (1786). *Werke* (Cassirer)IV, p. 355.
152. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A407f, B434.
153. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A160, B199.
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156. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A572, B600 (note).
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160. *Groundwork*, p. 59/393/1.
161. *Groundwork*, p. 80/416/43.
162. *Groundwork*, p. 80/416/43.
163. *Groundwork*, p. 80/416/43-44.
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169. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A480, B868 (note).
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A Study on the Ethical Implications on the Attitude of Corruption: A New Approach to Determine Ethical Crisis

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INTRODUCTION

The field of ethics is also known as moral philosophy, which involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behaviour. Of late, moral philosophers divide ethical theories into two branches, viz., Theoretical Ethics and Applied Ethics. Under theoretical ethics, there are two sub branches: (a) Meta ethics; and (b) Normative ethics. Meta ethics seeks to understand the nature of ethical evaluations such as: (i) What does it mean to say something is good? (ii) If at all, how do we know what is right or wrong? (iii) How do moral attitudes motivate action? (iv) Are there objective values? Normative ethics addresses questions such as 'what actions are good and bad? What should we do?' Thus, a theory of normative ethics will endorse some ethical evaluations. While *Meta ethics* deals with the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts, *Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the application of ethical theories to practical situations analyzing specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, and euthanasia.*[1]

In this chapter, a new methodology is proposed to conceptualize ethical crisis. With the use of the methodology, ethical crisis relating to corruption and corruptive behaviour has been analyzed with special reference to contexts.

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THE SCOPE OF CORRUPTION

Today, corruption has been termed most aptly as a global phenomenon. It is found almost in every society in one form or the other from times immemorial. One of the classic examples can be found in the history of Jesus Christ, wherein his own disciple betrayed him for a mere 30 silver coins. In ancient times, the judges received bribes in Egyptian, Babylonian and Hebrew societies. In Rome, bribe was a common feature in elections to public offices. In France, judicial offices were sold during the fifteenth century. England was described a 'sink-hole' of corruption in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century also, corruption was so rampant in Britain that Gibbon described it as the most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty.[2]

In India, Kautilya had referred in his *Arthasastra* to embezzlement by government servants out of the state revenue.[3] He had detailed about 40 types of embezzlement and corrupt practices adopted by government servants. During Ashoka's regime, corruption prevailed on a lesser scale. In medieval society, the scope for corruption was minimum because only a few authorities existed for collection of taxes. During the British rule, bribes were accepted not only by the Indian officials but by the highly placed British officials also. Robert Clive and Warren Hastings were found corrupt to such an extent that they were tried by a Parliamentary committee after their return to England. At present, India ranks as the seventh most corrupt country on the international scale.[4]

Perception about the consequences of corruption varies among thinkers. Moralists have long argued that corruption is harmful to societies and governments, impeding development and eroding legitimacy even of honest elites and well-run institutions.

CORRUPTIVE ATTITUDE—A LIMITED HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Shri Adi Sankaracharya in His timeless wisdom in the *Bhajagovindam* exclaims: 'Oh fool! Do not aspire for more wealth than what you already have and be satisfied with it.' All that one possess in this life is the product and result of one's OWN past actions (karma) in the previous life. Not aware of this aspect and developing the attitude to possess, acquire, and hoard will only result in disequilibria in the mind, thereby giving room for lust and greed.[5] Lala Carmerer also

agrees that greed is the another factor to be considered in the attitude of corruption.[6]

In the 11th chapter of *Mahabharata*, which is entitled *Talks on the dharma of a king*, King Yudhishtra asked his grandfather Bheeshma many great questions on morality and ethics. The following three questions are relevant for the subject matter here.[7]

Yudhishthira: Tell me, what is the source of sin? Where does it proceed from and what is the foundation on which it is built?

Bheeshma: Covetousness is the one root of all sin. It destroys all merits and all goodness. From it precedes the river of sin. It is from this single source that many of the sins flow. Covetousness is the eternal spring of cunningness and hypocrisy. Wrath is born of covetousness, lust is born of covetousness and several of the terrible maladies of the mind spring from covetousness: loss of judgement, deception, pride, arrogance, malice, vindictiveness, shamelessness, loss of virtue, anxiety and infamy. These are some of the children of covetousness. Let me recount to you the names of some others. Miserliness, cupidity, desire for every kind of improper behaviour, pride of birth, pride of learning, pride of beauty, pride of wealth, pitilessness, malevolence, insincerity, appropriation of another's wealth, harshness of speech, talking ill of others, gluttony, a love of falsehood, and a love of every kind of evil act. In life no man has ever been able to give up covetousness. Life may decay, but this will never wane in its power. Even men of great learning whose minds are the very treasury of all the scriptures, who have the intelligence to clear all the many doubts of others, are found to be incompetent to manage their own affairs. They are spineless and weak, and it is because they are slaves of this dread disease: covetousness:

Yudhishthira: Tell me about ignorance.

Bheeshma: Ignorance, my child, again, has its origin in this covetousness. As covetousness grows, ignorance grows

with it. The root of covetousness is but a loss of clear thinking, loss of judgement, and so ignorance is an inseparable companion of covetousness.

Yudhisthira: What duties should be preferred by others?

Bheeshma: The highest duty is self-restraint. Just as the great sin covetousness leads to all sins, self-restraint leads a man to the highest glory. It has a number of good qualities born of it: forgiveness, patience, abstaining from injuring others, impartiality, truth, sincerity, modesty, steadiness, liberality, freedom from wrath, contentment, sweetness of speech, benevolence and freedom from malice. A man who is self-restrained will never be a slave to the attachments of the earth. He attains emancipation. He is almost on the threshold of it when he becomes self-restrained.

The above narration explains the fact that covetousness makes a man practice corrupt behaviour in society. Conversely, self-restraint leads one to attain emancipation. In the two pairs of opposite, covetousness is important for the present study, which leads to corruptive behaviour.

THE CONCEPT OF ETHICAL CRISIS

James Fieser opines that two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an 'applied ethical issue'.

- First the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand.
- Secondly, the applied ethical issue must be distinctly a moral one.

James Fieser further states that moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory practices—such as our duty to avoid lying—and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social policy and morality overlap, as with murder, which is both socially prohibited and immoral. Furthermore, in theory, resolving a particular applied ethical issue should be easy. With the issue of abortion, for we would simply determine its morality by consulting act-utilitarianism. If a given

abortion produces greater benefit than dis-benefit, then according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable to undergo an abortion.

From the above hypothesis of James Fieser, the following inference can be drawn:

a. Ethical theory of *isms* can be used to examine ethical crisis to a given ethical issue at hand.
b. Considering the fact that various domains of intention are involved behind the act of abortion, is it sufficient that the theory of Utilitarianism alone can be used to arrive at a conclusion of abortion?

James Fieser answers this question as well; unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories prevents us from using a single decisive procedure to determine the morality of a specific issue. Then the usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight of the evidence lies.[8]

AN OVERVIEW OF ISMS

The word *ism* is generally used to denote religion, viz., Hinduism, Christianism, Muslimism, etc. However, *ism* is also used as a suffix to a terminology in philosophy to reflect a school of thought. These philosophical theories of *isms* are being used by common men in their ordinary parlance of life to denote certain acts or concepts. We often come across people calling themselves altruistic. What does it mean? It means that *I am living for others.* The concept of Altruism was developed by the French Positivist Philosopher Auguste Comte.

Philosophers would have either created these theories of '*isms*' or these theories were in existence from time immemorial and were accepted or adopted by the philosophers at a later point of time. For example, the term 'Stoicism' has been derived from the Greek word *stoa*, referring to a colonnade such as those built outside or inside temples, around dwelling-houses, gymnasia, and market-places. The school attracted many adherents, and

flourished for centuries, not only in Greece, but also in Rome where the most thoughtful writers such as Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and Epictetus branded themselves as followers of this school. We know little for certain as to what share particular Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus, had in the formation of the doctrines of this school. But after Chryssipus, the main lines of the doctrine were complete.[9] There are as many as 100 'isms' available in the annals of history of philosophy. For the sake of analysis, the isms that intersect within the scope of study of this paper are 'ABSOLUTISM, HEDONISM, HUMANISM, INDIVIDUALISM, MORAL SKEPTICISM, NIHILISM, PRAGMATISM, and UTILITARIANISM'. With the help of the above eight isms, the following table has been created. This table is denoted as 'Table of Contextualzation of ISMS'.

TABLE 1 CONTEXTUALIZATION OF ISMS

Name of the ism	Pragmatism	Absolutism	Humanism	Individualism	Utilitarianism	Hedonism	Moral Skepticism	Nihilism
Pragmatism	√	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
Absolutism	√	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
Humanism	√	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
Individualism	√	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
Utilitarianism	√	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
Hedonism	√	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
Moral Skepticism	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
Nihilism	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×

DESCRIPTION OF THE TABLE 1

Table 1 consists of the names of eight standardized isms which are the outcome of theories. As many as 64 conflicting contexts can be arrived from the above table. Linguists invented the term

contextualization in the twentieth century and used it as a technical term. However, 'Contextualization refers here to the recognition of various ethical contexts in which ethical crises arise. Also, contextualization denotes the legitimate implications of the ethical context of a given situation. The authors assume that when an individual either accepts or rejects any particular '*ISM*' in a given context or situation, there arise an ethical crisis in various domains of knowledge. An example has been explained in the methodology. Ethical clashes that arise within the table of contextualization are denoted by a tick mark('√') On the other hand, non-clashes are denoted by an ('x') mark.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

It is assumed that non-clashes would arise to a person who is either a nihilist or a moral skeptic and *the study of these two domains does not arise in this article. As it is a new area of endeavour, adequate literature is not readily available for the purpose of discussing the ways and means of arriving at moral contexts. This study calls for detailed analysis of contexts by permutation. The researcher, therefore, proposes to use the examples given below as methodologic heuristic to identify the ethical crisis at any given intersection wherein the axioms of behaviour are discussed, which form the central idea of this article. For our purpose, let us take up the energy issue.*

METHODOLOGY

Context of an Energy Economist

Energy economists were warning about the causes and effects of utilitarian(in its energy economic sense) in following context:

The ply of 50 Lakh vehicles in Chennai alone consumes by all ultra tentative conservative estimation, about 36,00,00,00,000 crore Rupees.[10]

As on 11/07/2004

Petrol per litre costs	=	Rs	40
Monthly average consumption by an individual is 15 litres, so 15 x 40	=	Rs	600
Per year per user 600 x 12 months	=	Rs	7,200
Hence, 50 Lakh Vehicles x Rs 7,200	=	Rs	36,00,00,00,000

The following questions can be raised with a view to understand the nature and complexity of the context:

(a) Can the emission of tonnes after tonnes of Carbon Monoxide (CO) be justified?
(b) What are the environmental effects in lieu of the above emission?
(c) Can the causes and effects of Ozone depletion on account of emission of pollutive residuals of automobiles be justified?
(d) Does society have a right to spend money for its utilitarian mobility?
(e) Can a developing country, like India, afford such a massive amount of money?
(f) Does the possession of an automobile display status (socio-economic perspective)?
(g) What does one mean by status?
(h) Against 'd' and 'e', can India be characterized as a developing country?

The boiled-down issues of the above expenditure raise the following conflicts:

(a) *Mobility* vs. *Luxury*
(b) *Polluting Mobility* vs. *Human Life*

The ethical crises that arise out of the above conflicts are:

(a) Should pollutive utilitarian consumption be justified and advocated?
(b) Should society continue with vivacious hedonistic and utilitarian axioms perpetually?
(c) Does society have a right to degrade the Mother Earth on account of its synchronic hedonistic perspective?

The above example, besides the ethical questions raised, illustrates that various domains of ethically related subject such as philosophy of economics, political philosophy and social philosophy, etc., converge, a fact that makes it possible for the emergence of different contexts and issues of various complexities. *Such conflicts between theories of ethics are known as contexts in this article.* The

contexts are numerous and display different conflicts. For instance, display of egoistic attitude, behaviour and conduct by nucleus members of a family, through meta ethical perspective, can also be analyzed in the perspective of normative ethics. Similarly, display of hedonistic context may intersect with another context, for instance, rationalistic context. In other words, permutability between and among various contexts is possible. Before arriving at number of ethical contexts, it is necessary to define the above eight isms so that ethical crisis that has been derived under the nomenclature of context in this paper can be better understood.

No.	Name of the *Ism*	Definition
1.	Absolutism	The view that certain kinds of actions are always wrong or are always obligatory, whatever the consequences. Typical candidates for such absolute principles would be that it is always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent human being and that one ought always to tell the truth or to keep one's promises.
2.	Hedonism	Plasure is the ultimate standard of morality. It is the highest good the supreme end of life. Psychological hedonism holds that pleasure is a natural and normal object of desire, that we always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Ethical hedonism holds that pleasure is the proper object of desire that we do not always seek pleasure but ought to do so.
3.	Humanism	Humanism is also associated with Renaissance, when it denoted a move away from God to man as the centre of interest. The term implies a greater interest in humans, their action and their potential than in God or religious or transcendental values.
4.	Individualism	In political theory, a view in which the individual takes precedence over the collective is the opposite of collectivism.
5.	Moral Skepticism	Moral skepticism is the claim that nobody ever has any justification for believing any substantive moral claim.
6.	Nihilism	Ethical Nihilism holds the view that there are no valid moral principles. J.L. Mackie's error theory is a version of this theory.

7. Pragmatism	Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that interprets truth in terms of the practical effects of what is believed and, in particular, the usefulness of these effects. William James applied the approach to ethical principles and religious beliefs, where the 'truth' of the principle or belief was measured by its utility in a person's life (in terms of comforts, happiness, and so on).
8. Utilitarianism	Utilitarianism is a theory in ethics outlined by Jeremy Bentham and developed by J.S. Mill. According to Utilitarianism, an action is morally right if it has consequences that lead to happiness, and wrong if it brings about the reverse. Thus, society should aim for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

1. CONTEXT OF CORRUPTION

Corruption can be defined as Machiavellian behaviour, i.e. the doctrine of Machiavellianism, which means doing what you have to do to get the job done. Another word that is often used for it is expediency. *This view denies the existence of morality.* Can a society exist without moral values? The following ethical questions can be raised:

- Is it a pursuit of Hedonism?
- Who is responsible for it the individual or the society?
- What is the role of the State?
- Can it be legalized?
- Why is Society indifferent?
- Is there a flaw in system governance?
- Is it Individualism?
- Is it easy money?
- Is it right as a value?
- Whether it is pursuit of teleological end or deontology?
- What values motivates an individual's action ?
- Is it an appropriate way to acquire wealth?

2. CONTEXT OF LYING

Pragmatism vs. *Absolutism*

A parent purports the medical reports intended for his child and tells a lie to save the child from mental agony. The individual who gave wrong information no doubt uttered a lie. This context can be brought under two isms, i.e. Pragmatism vs. Absolutism and the following ethical questions can be raised to conceptualize ethical crisis:

- Is it moral to utter a lie?
- Is it not condition precedent that an individual should speak the truth in the society?
- An act of lying from the utilitarian perspective might lead to the conclusion that it is the right thing to do under such a situation.
- Can the little good that might come from telling the truth or a good deal of suffering that might be avoided by uttering a lie be used to justify the claim that lying is right?
- Is the context or situation that is important or the absolute principle?

Critical Analysis

The parent in the given context is in a dilemma whether to give importance to the situation or to the absolute principle. The example or the context quoted above did not attach any sinful action to fix responsibility on the parent. In some cases, the scripture allows telling a lie for the benefit or welfare of others. Lord Krishna in the *Gita* says that the intention behind the action is important. If the intention is noble and for the benefit and welfare of the society, then killing the enemy also is not a sinful action.

3. CONTEXT OF BRIBING

Hedonism vs *Utilitaranism*

In the first context, we considered the intention of the parent as not sinful. However, if the same parent bribes to obtain a college seat for his child, his intention would cause harm to the society and a deserving candidate would be deprived of education. The sin starts from the parent's ill design and ends with the authority who received the money to do the favour. This context can be brought under the doctrine of Hedonism vs. Utilitarianism and the following ethical questions can be raised to prove the ethical crisis that arises in the converging ethical dilemma:

- Moral beliefs were seen as dispositions to act in certain ways. Is the behaviour exhibited by the parent in this context morally right?
- What is the virtue behind the parent's action?
- Is it possible (or necessary) to take the personal development of individual as a basis for making moral judgements and choices?

Critical Analysis

Does the above context reminds us the gross violation of ethical principle advocated by Kant? Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant also argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that Kant calls the 'categorical imperatives'. A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that one can have, for example, 'if one wants to get a good job, then one ought to go to college'. In contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal desires, such as 'You ought to do X'. Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat thyself and people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat ourselves and people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions towards someone reflects the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of that person. However, giving bribe to achieve a selfish end affecting other people's right is a negation of tenets of the principle of Kant.[11] The above context does give rise to ethical crisis and leads to synchronic ethical values in the society.

4. CONTEXT OF SABOTAGING

Utilitaranim vs. *Individualism*

Two sales people, viz., X and Y are both trying to win a desirable order for their business. Both are in the same situation in the sense

that their companies are struggling and to lose the business would certainly result in mass redundancies. Losing the business would have a very adverse effect on the lives of many people in their company. However, Mr X considers that bribery or sabotaging the competition might be acceptable under these circumstances. The above context intersects with Utilitarianism *vs* Individualism and gives rise to the following ethical questions that can be raised to conceptualize ethical crisis:

- Is Mr X's teleological approach justifiable?
- Is it important to make decisions based on deontological thinking?
- How important are rules and moral values in life?
- Is it not important to be flexible in adopting moral principles to suit particular situations?

Critical Analysis

Did Mr X carry out any of the duties prescribed by German philosopher Samuel Pufendrof who classified dozens of duties under three headings, i.e. (a) Duties to God; (b) Duties to oneself; and (c) Duties to others? Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendrof divides these between absolute duties which are universally binding on people and conditional duties which are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three types: (i) Avoid wronging others; (ii) Treat people as equals; and (iii) Promote the good of others.[12] A combined reading of these values would result in ethical crisis to the above context.

CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS

This article has sought to proceed from the concept of corruptive attitude and conceptualize ethical crisis. The numerous intricate intersections of these parameters of human behaviour with several mutually conflicting individual needs and wants, and the attempt of the body politic to contain them all within the framework of the rule of law have unfailingly raised profound questions of ethical import. However, in contemporary society, with the emphasis on the freedom of the individual, we find that liberal doctrines tend to ignore the issue of norms and standards for regulating behaviour.

The emphasis on tolerance of all styles of behaviour—in so far as they do not conflict with the freedom of others in society—has led to a sort of contradiction where all universals are rejected in the name of tolerance, which alone has the status of a universal. Under the circumstances, it may not be unfair to say that with the advent of modernity, and the separation of the church/temple/mosque and the state, the modern secular state has relegated morality to the conscience of the individual. The laws of the state alone matter, and these shall not be transgressed; the rest is only a matter of conscience.

One may assert that the phenomenon of modernity, manifested across a broad spectrum of secular nation-states, has unmistakably emphasized the distinct features of individuality and rationality. Ever-increasing individuality and rationality call for a system of socio-political order in a society that is always in a state of flux. It is this volatile, unstable configuration that has brought forth many diverse forms of behaviour, both individual and interpersonal. *In the process, it is very difficult to evaluate and to comprehend these forms of behaviour without reference to a classificatory framework of isms.* Such a framework serves the additional purpose of heuristics, in the sense that in the process of classification, it can also by way of permutation and combination, pre-figure, as it were, the many possible ethical dilemmas, crises and conflict situations, and serve the purpose of informed choice-making, though not in the sense of any ethics of internationality.

The ethics of internationality no doubt have the avowed scope and purpose of a prognostic of the consequences of a particular course of action under a set of given circumstances. Nevertheless, in the sense that it altogether avoids any attempt at making value-judgements, it cannot even tell us what course of action one may opt for. Value-free philosophy, thus, has an inherent infirmity, as it has little to say about informed choice-making. The present study, which addresses itself chiefly to ethical concerns has, therefore, sought to avoid the fact-value dichotomy debate and instead to go by the grid of isms which has doubtless normative implications.

In conclusion, it is believed that the endeavour in this article would provoke ethical debates in the ever-degrading factor of corruption and corruptive behaviour in the society. The methodology proposed would prove to be an useful tool to conceptualize ethical crisis in a given situation.

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Science-Religion Relationship: Searching Grounds for Dialogue

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Both science and religion are among the most powerful forces shaping social and human progress. Humankind needs both of these forces for its continued growth and well being; science for its material and intellectual advancement, and religion for its emotional, moral and spiritual development. Therefore, science and religion have to find ways to coexist with each other. One cannot undermine the other. But history is evidence that science and religion have not enjoyed a friendly relationship. 'Through the centuries, perhaps no two human activities have had a more problematic relationship than religion and science.'[1] The nature of this relationship continues to be under discussion in contemporary times. It has become an important subject-matter of philosophy of both science and religion. 'We need an adequate conception of the relation of religion and science as important human enterprises.'[2] Scholars and thinkers like Alfred North Whitehead[3] have prophesied that the future course of humanity will be chartered to a great extent by the way these two power sources interact with each other. Our effort in this article is to examine the nature of this interaction and search for a satisfactory ground for science-religion dialogue.

I. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE-RELIGION DIALOGUE

There are three basic questions around which philosophers generally discuss science-religion interaction: 'The respective objects, aims and methods of these disciplines.'[4] Based on such questions, philosophers have discussed various ways of relating science and religion. The famous physicist and theologian Ian Barbour[5] has synthesized them in four models—conflict, independence, dialogue

and integration. The conflict model sees the objects, aims and methods of religion and science as being the same. So, both present competing claims about the same domain. This opens the door for clash and rivalry between the two. Religious fundamentalists and scientific naturalists, who deny each other's truth-claims, fall under this category. The independence model sees the objects, aims and methods of science and religion as being vastly different. In this way, the two domains are totally compartmentalized. Neo-orthodox theology, existentialist philosophy, positivism and ordinary language philosophy advocate this model. The third model is dialogue, which advocates constructive interaction between science and religion. Barbour himself supports this model. He outlines three forms of dialogue. One form is a comparison of the methods of the two fields, which may exhibit similarities even when the differences are acknowledged. The second dialogue may arise when science raises at its boundaries certain limit questions that it cannot answer itself. A third form of dialogue occurs when concepts from science are used as analogies for talking about God's relation to the world. The last model is integration, which is sometimes called the 'mutual support' model. An expansion of the dialogue model, it seeks a much closer organic relationship between religion and science.

These four ways of relating science and religion present a comprehensive exposition of the issue. However, no one model should be viewed in isolation. Quite often, all four are present simultaneously within the relationship. Therefore, it is better to look at them as four aspects of science-religion relationship. There are points in the relationship where conflict between any two is inevitable. At other points, their domains are independent. There are yet other points where dialogue, negotiation, closer organic relationship, and mutual support are all possible. Thus, these four aspects constitute the relationship as a whole. Amongst these four models, dialogue can be taken as the most important aspect. It is dialogue which reveals that the other aspects are only partial truths. The totaliy of the relationship is not limited to any one aspect alone. However, in the evolutionary dynamics of their relationship, there are phases when one aspect acquires the dominant position. But at the moment let us continue our discussion around the question of dialogue.

Dialogue model generally looks for methodological parallels between science and religion. Ian Barbour has brilliantly highlighted the interfaces where science and religion are wedded into dialogue. Many thinkers, like John Polinghorne, Alister MaCgrath, Carl Sagan, Fritjof Capra have also contributed to the theme of science-religion dialogue in one form or another. However, this theme of dialogue needs further clarification and elucidation.

Science-religion dialogue is not like communication between individuals or groups or political parties or nations. This is not even a dialogue between two concrete identities. Rather, it is a dialogue between two world phenomena or human phenomena whose personalities can never be defined or fixed in definite terms. There cannot be any round table negotiation between such phenomena. Any artificial imposition of external compulsions for the dialogue is not possible. Dialogue will have to be the phenomenon itself. It should be a self-motivated natural process, without any external intellectual imposition. Finding interfaces for dialogue is important but that is only the first step. By itself, it cannot promote dialogue. Finding the interface is like building a bridge. But the bridge may remain empty, seeing the trains standing at its two ends. Who will pull the train across the bridge? The motive power for it should come mainly from self-introspection, self-inspiration and self-motivation of both the parties to the dialogue. As we shall argue latter, this self-motivation will arise because of the historical necessities of humankind's civilizational growth.

This self-motivated dialogue should be synergistic[6] in nature, rather than dialectical and dialogical.[7] The latter two modes of dialogue are helpful in bringing to light logical contradictions and possibilities for 'speaking across the boundaries', even of arriving at a mutual understanding. But by themselves they do not lead to cooperative working or to the much-needed resolve for working together in order to fulfil common goals. But it does not mean that they are to be denied. Our thesis is only that they should be part of a synergistic dialogue. The synergic aspect must take the leading position. After all, dialogue is not an end in itself. It is always meant to fulfil some cause. This is especially important for a dialogue between science and religion. It is needed to fulfil a vital need of humankind. Scientific developments have brought humanity to a

crossroad where it has to make crucial choices. Ecological disbalance, global warming, danger of nuclear holocaust, employed machine amidst unemployed men, dehumanization of the individual, degeneration of traditional values, destabilization of social cohesiveness are some of the major crises of the contemporary times. Faced with them, humanity is again looking towards religion for guidance. Religion has always taught the path of self-discipline, minimization of material needs, universal love and brotherhood, respect for nature and living in harmony with nature. It is only through a constructive dialogue between science and religion that the future of earth and of humanity can be secured. The two together can build a more humanistic, holistic and harmonious human society.

Synergistic dialogue is like making 1+1 = 11. In other words, two phenomena go to great lengths to negotiate such modes of collective functioning where, together, they achieve far greater results than what each one can achieve individually. The main target of such a dialogue is not only to find similarities and dissimilarities. Rather, it is to explore grounds for collective functioning to achieve and advance common goals more effectively. Such synergistic pursuit automatically achieves other targets as well, like making a bridge or using the strength of one to cover the weakness of the other. So our thesis regarding science-religion dialogue is that it must be a self-motivated synergistic dialogue.

Now the next question that arises is: what can be the ground for such a dialogue between science and religion? It is our observation that self-motivation takes place in its best spirit when there is a dynamism with a sense of futuristic orientation. Such an orientation means several things. Firstly, it means living in the present and not in the past—being cognizant of the problems of the present and anticipating those of the future. Secondly, it means a creative capacity to envision a better future, as well as a burning desire to achieve it. And lastly, it means confidence in the capacities of the participants to achieve common futuristic goals. Synergy takes place between two or more phenomena when they pursue a common goal with such futuristic orientation. One of the best examples of synergy can be seen in the Indian freedom struggle. The common goal was to free India from the British rule so as to create a more prosperous, just and humane social order. There were different

streams of freedom fighters, groups and parties. All of them had their individual goals and methods, which were often at loggerheads. But they subordinated these to the larger common goal. With this resolve, they didn't spend their energy in mutual fighting. Their mode of action naturally became synergistic. Freedom struggle would not have gained such immense power without synergy. Another broader example is that of the evolutionary Indian culture. It has maintained its character, integrity and continuity despite historical vicissitudes. One reason for this uniqueness is that it has always placed a common goal—that of spiritual advancement and fulfilment—as its highest goal. All aspects of life were subordinated to this common goal and were designed to provide complementary strength to move towards this common goal. The material, social, aesthetic, moral, religious and philosophical dimensions of the Indian culture are not separate and independent dimensions. Instead, they are all interdependent and have a kind of synergistic relationship amongst them. It is this network of synergistic interdependent relationships which provides it the strength of unity within diversity. So, futuristic orientation and common goal have such power in themselves that they naturally produce self-motivated synergistic relationship between different streams.

One may claim that the search for truth may be looked upon as the common goal of both science and religion. But although the word truth is common to these two pursuits, its meaning is very much different in the two contexts. For science, truth is error-free knowledge of physical phenomena which can be empirically apprehended. Scientific method of gaining knowledge is to establish factually correct descriptions and establish a lawful relationship between natural events. Its strength lies in its explanatory and predictive powers. Scientific truths are tentative in the sense that they can always be falsified and replaced by more accurate and more general laws. In fact, science progresses only in succession of falsification of scientific laws. Establishment of consensual criteria for falsifiability is also a part of scientific method. In contrast, religious and spiritual truths are either revealed truths and/or arrived at intuitively or metaphysically. They are generally considered absolute, unalterable and of divine origin. Furthermore, they command awe and reverence. Given these differences, the truths of science

and of religion are almost irreconcilable. There is little ground for a dialogue on the basis of truth claims of the two. Compromising on them will compromise the very identity of the dialogue partners. Furthermore, truth is too far and too abstract a goal to inspire self-motivation for a mutual dialogue between science and religion. What can such a goal be? To answer that question, we now turn to a historical perspective and seek guidance from history's wisdom.

II. CHANGING CENTRE-STAGE PHENOMENA IN HUMAN HISTORY

The question of relationship between science and religion is neither like metaphysical questions of religion, nor is it like naturalistic questions of science. Metaphysical and naturalistic questions do not have their historical and social genesis. They are considered disinterested pursuits for truth, and so, ends in themselves. But the questions of relationship between phenomena are generally of social nature. They have historical and social genesis. They are also targeted to fulfil some social end. So, in the investigation of such questions, historical reality has to be considered. This point has been well made by Karl Mannheim. In his words:

> 'The historical and social genesis of an idea would only be irrelevant to its ultimate validity if the temporal and social conditions of its emergence had no effect on its content and form. If this were the case, any two periods in the history of human knowledge would only be distinguished from one another by the fact that in the earlier period certain things were still unknown and certain errors still existed, which through latter knowledge were completely corrected. This simple relationship between an earlier incomplete and a later complete period of knowledge may to a large extent be appropriate for the exact sciences... For the history of the cultural sciences, however, the earlier stages are not quite so simply suspended by the later stages, and it is not so easily demonstrable that early errors have subsequently been corrected. Every epoch has its fundamentally new approach and its characteristic point of view, and consequently sees the "same" object from a new perspective... The very principles, in the light of which knowledge is to be criticized, are themselves found to be socially and historically conditioned.'[8]

In light of this view, science-religion relationship cannot be understood properly if historical phases and social effects are not taken into account. Historical perspective can give us a new insight in our search for satisfactory ground for a meaningful dialogue between the two. So we propose to discuss the whole issue in the light of a new perspective of philosophical age-division of human history, based on the concept of centre-stage force.

The history of mankind is full of countless phenomena and forces. But a centre-stage force at a particular space-time is characteristically distinct from other common forces. It may be called the predominant force, or the ruling ideology, or even the directing idea of the age. Such an idea captures the imagination and the intellectual temper of the age. In the words of Bury, 'all human emotions react to its influence, and human plans respond to its guidance. It becomes the criteria by which the idea of progress, and all other ideas are judged'.[9] It impacts almost all other phenomena and forces, which are then viewed through the paradigm of the particular centre-stage force. Each and every significant aspect of life seeks authenticity from it. Centre-stage forces of different societies at any particular time might be different in their exclusive considerations. But our concern here is with such centre-stage forces which affect humanity as a whole. Science-religion relationship is not a localized issue; it is universal in its appeal. So our concern is also with such centre-stage forces which are of universal appeal.

We propose to divide the history of humankind into four ages[10] on the basis of their centre-stage forces. These four phases are outlined below.

1. THE AGE OF PRIMITIVENESS

The early phase of human life is known as the primitive age. Its characteristic is that it had no single force, which can be called the centre-stage force. The very primitiveness of the age, together with non-specialized simplicity of everything may perhaps be called the centre-stage phenomenon of that age. Whether it be the tools of production, forms of beliefs and rituals, or social organization, everything was simple and primitive. So the centre-stage force was the tendency of primitiveness rather any particular phenomenon. This tendency was common to all primitive groups.

2. THE AGE OF ESTABLISHED RELIGION

The next age was the age of established religions. In this age, religion established itself in a more systematic and institutionalized form. It became the centre-stage force. All other phenomena and forces had to justify themselves on the criterion of religion's truth-claims. No segment of human life was exempt from it. Even the physical nature was interpreted on the basis of theological hypothesis. It enjoyed full-scale authority till the emergence of the modern science.

3. THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE

After religion, it was the turn of science to rise to the centre-stage position. It gained that position through its rapid, cumulative and rigorous growth in a matter of centuries. Its grand explanatory and predictive success, together with the material riches it made possible, captured human imagination. The mysterious and the non-verifiable were banished as false or irrelevant. Scientific outlook became so powerful that even religion started to adjust itself within the scientific paradigm.

4. THE AGE OF MARKET

In the present age, the most powerful force is that of the market. It is today's centre-stage phenomenon. Economic growth, profit and salability constitute the soul of this age. Society at the global level has become a big market place, and the human person a mere individual consumer. Demand, supply and consumption of goods and services comprise the key force. Science, religion and culture are all subject to market pressure and subordinate to it. In fact, their very justification is sought in terms of their usefulness to the market.[11] There is a hidden slogan in the air that everything is for economy and market.

Structuring history is a specialized technical matter. The historian may justifiably raise the question: how can such a classification of ages be justified? Our answer will be that sometimes such classification is needed as a philosophical necessity for the development of thought. Such necessity has the right to follow its own observation and, accordingly, develop hypotheses on the basis of such observations.

The structure of age classification proposed above is not based on any historical law. Rather, it is being hypothesized on the basis of commonsense observation of civilizational history of humankind. Some societies may not exhibit the sequencing of centre-stage forces mentioned here. But structuring of world history as a whole cannot be bounded by such exceptions. Today who can deny the fact that market is the most powerful force of contemporary time, affecting each and every corner of the globe, or that science-tech has occupied that position for the last three or four centuries? Similarly, the predominance of religion in the period before modern science is an universally accepted idea.

Let us now turn to exploring the interlink between these ages. The issue can also be examined by raising the question: was there a common cause for transition from one age to another, and if so, what was it? Our exploration of this common link between the transitions is based on the commonsensical principle of crisis. It is the inherent tendency of crisis that it tries to overcome itself. Any crisis naturally makes an effort to fill up its own gaps. This is the reason why the crisis of one age results in the affluence of the succeeding age. We see this happening repeatedly in the history of humankind. World Wars have produced the best geniuses; renaissance took place amidst a crisis; the crisis period of Indian National Movement gave birth to its great leaders. We see this taking place even in the history of ideas. When Sophists threatened the possibility of wisdom, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle responded to that threat with great genius. When the possibility of new knowledge of nature was threatened by tradition, Rene Descartes came up with his idea of universal doubt and philosophy of consciousness. When David Hume threatened the objective validity of physics and mathematics as sciences, Immanuel Kant responded with his transcendental philosophy. We can also find this principle functioning in the evolutionary paradigm of Karl Marx. It is the crisis of an age which motivates improvements in the means of production. And that improvement changes the age itself. There is a famous dictum that necessity is the mother of invention. So, the central crisis of one age has the power to give birth to the central power of the coming age. This principle is applicable in the case of the age transitions proposed in the present context.

The two most compelling crises of the primitive age were: (i) unsafe physical surroundings; and (ii) the ever-present feeling of awe and mystery about nature. This crisis situation prompted a belief system in which a supernatural power, which could be pleased through ritual worship, was brought in to act as man's protector. A related phenomenon was the recognition of different powers of nature as different gods. Both these phenomena collectively prepared the ground for the age of systematic religion. For centuries, religion provided guidance and solace to humankind in its travails. It provided explanations for everything and solutions for all the life's problems. But in due course, religion turned into an authoritarian force, demanding unquestioned submissions and obedience. It suppressed freedom of the mind and human urges to grow into newer directions. This crisis of human freedom became the central crisis in the age of established religions. Once again, the human spirit asserted its freedom to see life and world in new ways and to create new structures of thought, of social organization and of living. The great age of modern science took shape in this melieu. Science naturally produces technology. Technology is inherent in scientific development. This scientific-technology has suddenly increased the capability of production. Increased mass production necessitated large markets. The temporary phases of imperialism, World Wars, etc., took place; but ultimately the crisis overcame itself by making the globe a big market. Market has become the centre-stage phenomenon of the present age. The great force of globalization, which is basically a market and economy phenomenon, has established itself as a non-replaceable fact of the contemporary times. Thus, we see that the ages are interlinked. The central crisis of one age overcomes itself by actualizing in the form of central power of the next age.

Now let us examine the developing crisis of the modern age and the possibility of emergence of a new centre-stage phenomena for the next age.

III. VALUE CRISIS OF THE MODERN AGE AND THE POSSIBLE RISE OF A NEW CENTRE-STAGE PHENOMENA FOR THE COMING AGE

As noted in the previous section, the centre-stage force of the present age is undoubtedly the force of technology driven market.

All the intellectual, material and human resources of the entire humankind are being marshalled to promote the market at the global level. Different academic disciplines like engineering sciences, agricultural science, economic science, management science, etc., are being oriented to meet the rising challenges of the market. It is being claimed that the creative and productive capacities of the people must be freed from all governmental controls and restrictions. This new regime of liberalization and globalization, consisting of free trade and free movement of goods, ideas, information, money and skilled manpower, is being projected as the panacea for poverty, want, injustice, political regimentation; in short, for all the problems of socio-economic development.

The key philosophical factor responsible for the rapid growth of market as the centre-stage phenomena is the same one that propelled rapid growth of science in the previous centuries. That factor is the basic scientific view of separating questions of fact from questions of value. As Everett Hal[12] has brilliantly demonstrated, science could grow rapidly when it freed itself from value considerations and concentrated itself only with investigation of factual truths, i.e. by investigating only 'what is' with no concern for 'what ought to be'. The same philosophy of value-free thinking has been adopted, perhaps with greater penchant, by applied sciences closer to market—economics, engineering, technology, management, etc. They all try to maximize the techno-economic efficiency of their pursuit, without making any value judgement of the human and social goals which will be served by that efficiency. This value freedom has given unfettered boost to the central tendency of market, to commercialize every aspect of living and, thereby, to maximize profit. This phenomena represents the basic spirit of capitalism. This elevation of profit as the highest value or the end value has been sanctified by no less a person than the Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman. Rejecting all claims of social or moral responsibility he says, 'There is one and only one responsibility of business: to use its resources and energy in activities designed to increase its profits.'[13] Expanding economy and maximizing profit are thus seen by the market as the ultimate, the highest or the end values. Questioning this ideal is considered a sacrilege by this new centre-stage force.

Traditionally, economic and material growth have always been considered as means values, i.e. means for advancing higher-level civilizational goals. But the market inverts this value priority by elevating a means value to the status of an end value. We feel this inversion is the greatest value crisis of the modern times. It has resulted in everything else—nature, society, humans—being looked upon as merely means for advancing economy and profit. In Heideggar's view, 'technology (and market) treat nature as merely a standing reserve at the beck and call of man' (read market). Everything in it—minerals, water, soil, trees, animals—are merely resources for industrial production. The only other use of nature is as the ultimate dumping ground for all the wastes produced by the industrial society. Nature has no autonomy and no independent worth. This attitude essentially 'denatures' the nature.

This exploitative tendency of the market is carried over to its relationship with human beings. They are merely treated as resources for advancing technological and economic growths. The term, 'human resource' is an accepted and respected phrase in engineering, economics and management. Kant's assertion that humanity of the human persons should be treated as an end and never as merely a means is given a complete go by in the modern age. The human person is stripped of all humanizing and civilizing tendencies, sensitivities and values. He/she is looked upon as nothing but a complex electro-chemical machine with super-developed information-processing capacities. And that is the ultimate 'dehumanization' of the human person. Plato had said that the world exists so that virtue may have a theatre to play. Modern commercial age seems to be saying: nature, humans, society exist so that technology and economy can have a resource base to draw upon for their continued growth and expansion.

Thus, the central crisis of the modern age is the crisis of values, brought about by value-free sciences which denature the nature and dehumanize the human. All other crisis areas, for example those pertaining to environmental degradation, depletion of natural resources, inequitous distribution of wealth and opportunities, arms race, increasing violence, breaking up of traditional familial and social relationships, are different manifestations of this central crisis of values. The anguish caused by this crisis is shared by many

thinkers. Lewis Mumford remarks forcefully: 'The whole process of technical (and economic) development has become increasingly coercive, totalitarian, compulsive, grimly irrational and downright hostile to the more spontaneous manifestations of life.'[14] Peter Drucker, an influential and respected author in management science laments, '...the spiritual agonies and moral horrors; the tyranny and the brutal lust for power; the terror and cruelty; the naked cynicism that have engulfed the world since the west's descent into the first world war.'[15] In the words of Everett Hall,[16] 'all achievements of modernity, gained by its value freethinking have been very costly attainments indeed.'

This crisis situation has started evoking increasingly vigorous demands for its resolution in a number of diverse field. Let us take note of some of these and then examine the possibility of the emergence of a new centre-stage force to overcome the present crisis. Since the crisis is a crisis of values, the responses are also in the realm of values.

At the theoretical level, the great German philosopher of the twentieth century, Edmund Husserl[17] questions the value free claims of science. He shows brilliantly that science has its roots in the life-world, i.e. the pre-scientific world of our immediate and daily experience. Forgetting this root, science develops its own abstract idealizations to understand reality. It accepts its ideal constructs as reality in the strict sense of the word. Thus, science transcends the life-world in such a way that the connection between its hypothetical reality and the actual reality of the life-world is concealed and forgotten. The value-free paradigm of science is the result of such a concealment. The vast horizon of life-world is not a value-free world. How can science then be value free when its point of origin is the value-laden life-world? Thus, the value-free paradigm is only a self-created dogma of science. A self-critical science should be able to see the dogma for what it is.

Another idea asserting the centrality of values in human personality and human life is the philosophy of Personalism. Defining this philosophy, J.B. Coates writes: 'Personalism is the name given to a number of philosophies which correlate the conception of personality with value, which conceive of personality as a unique entity in every human being which has a movement towards value and is the source of our knowledge of value.'[18]

Coates mentions the names of Nicolas Bardyaev, Martin Buber, Lewis Mumford and James Burnham, whose philosophies contribute to the concept of personalism. A parallel and contributory movement towards values is the growth of humanistic psychology, heralded by psychologists like Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers and David Calhoun. This school affirms that human persons have inner capacities, strengths and values to guide them in their growth towards complete personhood. This personhood is defined in terms of values like love, benevolence, freedom, creativity, morality, etc. These are seen as inherent endowments of psychologically healthy persons. The philosophy of personalism and humanistic psychology together seem to provide a strong ground for supporting the centrality of human values in human life.

The question of values is important not only in the personality and behaviour of the individuals but equally so in the interrelationships between individuals in their personal, professional and social life. It is even more so in the relationships between individuals and the social institutions, and amongst different social institutions themselves. This orientation of values towards collective and organizational life leads to the imperative of working for the common good. In the increasingly complex and interdependent society of the modern times, the good of one is embedded in the good of all. The credit for the realization of this wisdom goes to the modern science of ecology. This science has established the principle of interdependence and harmony both in the operation of nature and in the human-nature relationship. It is now being recognized to be equally true of all human and social relations as well. This concept has been termed 'ecological wisdom'. It is yet another pointer to the movement towards social and collective morality for advancing the common good. Doing that is a universal human responsibility for all individuals, institutions and phenomena. In fact, the whole of humanity is confronted today with such problems that either we all collectively work together to make a 'good world' where everyone can lead a good life, or we collectively face a doom for all. As John Hick rightly remarks, 'The world today is such that if we do not unite in common life, we are too likely to find ourselves united in a common death.'[19] This realization is producing a unitive sense in every individual and institution that we all have to work within a framework of global ethics and global values.

In the past few decades, the field of ethics has witnessed the growth of new concepts to meet the new challenges of modern times. These are directed towards the moral problems of public life and professional life. A fast-emerging concept is that of ethics of responsibility in exercising economic, political or professional power in the public domain. Attempts are being made to officially adopt a universal declaration of human responsibilities along the lines of UNO's universal declaration of Human Rights. Another development is the rapid growth of sub-disciplines like Environmental Ethics, Bio-ethics, Engineering Ethics, Medical Ethics, Business Ethics, etc. These are being clubbed under the umbrella term of applied ethics. Their importance can be gauged by the large number of books being written on these themes. More than a dozen university centres on ethics and human values have been established in the USA alone. Most universities now teach courses in these fields.

All the above indicators show a rising concern for ethics and human values in the intellectual temperament of the modern times. This is in sharp contrast to the situation prevailing even two decades ago. A recent book[20] observes a distinct value-shift in the business world also. Corporations are now paying greater attention to the ethical values in the conduct of business. They find it makes better sense to be ethical rather than being otherwise. Earlier, business organizations were considered to be purely economic players. From the middle of the previous century, this limited understanding was enlarged to include social responsibility also as a distinct part of business. Corporations then advanced from the concept of being purely economic players to socio-economic players. Now they are being called upon to become 'moral players' as well. The author of this book reports an increasing acceptance of this change in the corporate world, though she laments that it has yet to become the mainstream concept in business thought.

This brief survey indicates that the concern for ethics and human values is steadily moving towards the centre-stage position in modern thought. Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to anticipate that it will become the centre-stage phenomena of the next age. We will then call the coming age the age of human values. At this stage, it is difficult to say when and how this

transition will occur. But we believe that this would occur sooner rather than later, and it will have a self-motivated futuristic orientation. We derive strength for this belief from a similar prophecy made by Everett Hall half a century ago. He had predicted that the shining star of value-free science in the intellectual heavens of the present age will someday sink, to be surmounted by another star. He asks 'What will that star be?' And answers, 'That there are values and that there is a way to find them.'

However, many more things will have to happen before human values become the centre-stage phenomena in the near future. One of these will be creation of systematic theory and philosophy of human values. At present they do not exist, though some tentative efforts are being made towards that end.[21] In a general way, human values constitute the collectivity of all the values which make human life enriched and valuable in all its dimensions—societal, personal, psychological, aesthetic, moral, and spiritual. It is the pursuit of this holistic view of human values which makes us truly and fully human. They go into making a 'good' humankind. A theory of that holistic concept of goodness would be a theory of human values.

IV. SCIENCE–RELIGION DIALOGUE UNDER THE DIRECTING LIGHT OF HUMAN VALUES

Having explored the historical process of the rise and fall of centre-stage phenomena, we now come back to our main theme of searching for an affective ground for science-religion dialogue. With the insight of the previous two sections, we can now hypothesize that such a ground would be provided by the rising cente-stage phenomena of human values. This new directing idea would have the commanding force to require both science and religion to enter into a synergistic dialogue. The aim of this dialogue would be firstly to resolve their differences; and secondly to join forces for advancing the overarching common civilizational goal of improving and enriching both the internal and the external quality of human life; as well as the collective life of humanity. This inspiration of human values will not be merely an anthropocentric force. It will also inspire human beings to learn to live with nature in a harmonious and interdependent fashion.

As noted earlier, science-religion dialogue would have to be a self-motivated dialogue. Such a motivation would emerge as an outcome of a process of gaining self-awareness through self-criticism. This process would be inspired by the force of the new centre-stage phenomena. It would call upon both science and religion to examine and evaluate afresh their beliefs, dogmas and values in the light of the paradigm of human values. This means that neither science nor religion can claim autonomy for their belief systems, truth claims and practices. All these would have to be justified in the light of human values. It is the nature and the prerogative of the centre-stage phenomena of an age to demand such accountability from all other phenomena and set the norms for that accountability. In other words, it would not be sufficient for religion and science to give an account of what they are or even what their ideals are. They would also be expected to deliberate on the question, what they ought to be.

The history of changing centre-stage phenomena has another lesson for us. The rise of a new idea to the centre-stage position does not mean the demise of the previous claimant of that position. For example, both religion and science continue to be very powerful forces affecting the quality of life, though the centre-stage position is now occupied by market. They will continue to be so even in the coming age of human values. However, their ranks would then be joined by market also. Therefore, they ought to learn to live together. The quality of this coexistence would be vastly improved by learning to respect one another. This respect must be in recognition of the positive contributions each one makes towards the fulfilment of the common objective of advancing social and human good. Technology and market take care of the material needs, science of the intellectual needs and religion of the spiritual needs of the humankind. Fulfilling these needs are admirable goals for these three powerful forces within their domain of operation. They should, however, be looked upon as only domain goals and not the overarching or the absolute goals. That higher goal should always be set by the human value concern of advancing social and human well-being in its totality. Each one of the three powerful players would have to be conscious that their domain goals are subservient to the higher collective goal. This would mean,

for example, that a scientist's dedication to objective, disinterested pursuit of establishing scientific truths, i.e. scientifically verified knowledge of laws of nature, is admirable within the domain of science. However, this scientific goal cannot be treated as the absolute or the highest. The worth of scientific truths so established would have to be judged in the light of the contribution it makes to the higher goal of advancing social and human well being. Our admiration for the grand scientific achievement of discovering interconvertibility of matter and energy must be tempered by the thought that the same principle has also contributed to the awesome threat of obliteration of life from the planet by a nuclear holocaust.

Similarly, religion asserts that its spiritual truths are revealed truths with divine origin. They are beyond intellectual questioning by the human mind, and must be accepted on faith. It defines its highest goal as seeking communion with the divine. This could be considered an admirable goal in religious life, but its validity and authenticity would now have to be established in the light of standards set by human values. All religious beliefs, dogmas, values will need to be examined in this new light. Similar comments are valid for the present centre-stage force of market also.

The process of dialogue would always produce urges for change. The dialogue partners should be ready to accept such changes. For example, science will have to give up its dogmatic view that the scientific method is the only way of gaining true knowledge about life and reality. It cannot summarily deny the authenticity of life-world phenomena of religious and spiritual experiences and the truths derived from such experiences. But once again, the worth of such truths would be judged by the norms of human values. Similarly, religion makes a dogmatic assertion that the good life of morality can be achieved only on the basis of faith. It maintains that God is not only the creator of this world, but also the author of its moral laws. Such assertions would be difficult to sustain when examined in the light of human values. These are only some of the examples of the possible fallout of science-religion dialogue carried out in the light of human values.

The much more important question to be resolved through the dialogue in the coming age would be: how to create synergy between science and religion for the efficient fulfilment of their overarching civilizational goal? That is too big a question to be explored within the confines of a single article. The objective here is only to search for a satisfactory ground for science-religion dialogue, not carrying out the dialogue itself. That would be a philosophical exercise of much larger dimensions. We hope that this article will make some contribution in this exercise.

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A Non-Materialistic View of A Person

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ABSTRACT

In this article, I have argued that persons are individual human beings capable of mental activities. In this sense, persons have not only physical properties, but also various forms of consciousness. I have mentioned that the relation between a person and his/her physical properties is contingent; not logical, but factual. I have also mentioned Descartes' view that a person is a combination of two separate entities—a body and a mind. Only the mind is conscious; the physical properties that the person possesses are properties of his/her body. It is conceivable that either should exist without the other. That is to say that the mind can exist without the aid of the body. I have provided a detailed summary of Strawson's theory because it goes against Williams's concept of person and gives an account of 'person', which in turn, removes many of the difficulties of the mind-body relation. Strawson concludes that a person is not identical with his/her body. Like Descartes, he gives primacy to the mental attributes of a person. Thus, the concept of a person is fundamental and metaphysical. This is the main theme of this article.

The concept of person is one of the most important concepts in the philosophy of mind. The present thesis' aim is to outline and explain the non-materialist theory of the mind and person. The fundamental question here is: what is a person? And what is its nature? It was Descartes who proposed a theory of mind and person according to which a person is not just a material body, but also a thinking self in total exclusion of the material body. According to Descartes, a person is a self, a self-conscious mind which thinks, feels, desires and so on. The materialists have, however, rejected the Cartesian theory of persons, and have argued that persons are just material bodies, though they are complex material systems with some sort of mental properties.

However, it is erroneous to say that mind is the brain or mind has only physical properties. Our brain has a particular size, shape and spatial location. In virtue of these qualities, our brain has a

particular look. Our brain can be variously experienced. The qualities of such experiences are related in some way to the material object. But if this is so, where do we situate the qualities of experience? A neuroscientist says that all these are neural activities. Now the question is: where are they? The answer is that they are located in our mind. This implies that the mind is distinct from the body. The problem of this essay is the question: are persons material bodies? Materialists have argued that persons are material bodies, albeit very complex material bodies. My aim is to refute person as a material entity and establish that person is a non-material entity.

I. WHAT IS A PERSON?

In this article, my intention is to argue for a non-materialistic view of person. That is to say, I intend to examine the nature of person from a non-materialist point of view. Before analysing this concept of person, we have to raise a few questions like what is a person, what is the nature of person, and so on. These questions are fundamental in the philosophy of mind. In fact, the English word 'person' is alleged to have been derived from the Latin 'persona', which was the mask worn by actors in dramatic performances. Neither in common usage nor in philosophy has there been a univocal concept of 'person'. In common usage, 'person' refers to any human being in a general way. The person is distinct from a thing or material object. It generally stands for a living conscious human being.

Moreover, Strawson's definition of person is different from that of Williams. Strawson defines 'person' as 'a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.'[2] Thus, for Strawson, persons are unique individuals who have both mental and physical attributes. Thus, persons are neither purely physical body, nor are they pure spiritual substances. However, while Strawsonian view of persons is purely non-material, whereas Williams' view of person is purely material, which opposes Strawson's view. This is because Williams' claim is that bodily continuity is a necessary condition for personal identity, because according to Williams, it is the body which identifies the persons, but not the

mind, and there is no mind at all; therefore, bodily criterion identify the persons.

Thus, it is clear that Strawson would certainly reject the contention that mental attributes are reducible to physical attributes because he admits that the concept of persons is non-material. But here the question arises: does Strawson wish to say that persons are bodies of a certain sort, namely, bodies which have mental attributes only?

Strawson holds that persons have bodily attributes too. But unlike ordinary bodies, persons are things, which have mental attributes as well. According to Strawson,[3] it is essential to persons that they be entities which necessarily have both mental and bodily attributes. In addition, are those mental things essentially different from physical things? They are different types of substance. Persons are radically different material bodies. Strawson's theory looks dualistic in holding that there are two different types of subjects, the physical bodies and persons.

Again, physical bodies necessarily have only one dimension, i.e. physical dimension. Persons necessarily have two dimensions, physical and mental. Persons, thus, have a dual nature. Now we have to look at the relation between the knowledge a person has of himself and the knowledge that others have of him. Moreover, if the unity of a person is necessarily connected with the continuance of his body through time, then it is impossible for a person to survive the death of his body. Secondly, if bodily identity is a necessary criterion of personal identity, then it could not be shown that some non-physical characteristics of a person continue after his bodily death. On the other hand, if bodily identity is not a necessary criterion of personal identity, perhaps bodily death is merely one major event in a person's history and not the end of his life. Finally, if the fundamental criterion of identity were memory, it would follow that a person might be known to have survived death because he continued to have memories in his disembodied state.

The most important fact about the person is the self. The self is sometimes used to mean the whole series of a person's inner mental states and sometimes the spiritual substance to which they belong. The self does not refer to the body but to the mental history of the person. This made the unity problem seem intractable, when the

mental images, feeling and the like are contrasted with the temporal persistence. In Strawson's theory, a person is a thing which necessarily has both mental and physical aspects. The person is primarily the subject of mental experience. Considering the Strawsonian theory of person, we cannot say that a person is a body, but we can say that a person is, in part, a body. If a person is a body, then it cannot be a conscious mind. One of the important questions is: can we even say that a person has a body? Shaffer supposes that Strawson would want to be able to say so. But what would it mean about the theory of the person? It means that persons have bodily attributes. Another question is: does it say anything about the relation between a person and a body? The body necessarily has bodily attributes and has nothing to do with a person's attributes. But Strawson's view is that persons have both bodily and mental attributes.

We recognize all human beings as persons. This is because we generally do not make distinction between persons and human beings. But we can hardly contemplate the existence of biologically very different persons inhabiting other planets; who are not human beings like us. However, the concept of person is in some way an ineliminable part of our conceptual scheme. In our conceptual scheme, person and human beings coincide.

Joseph Margolis[4] in his book *Persons and Minds* mentioned that persons are the particulars that have minds and nervous systems, sensation and brain processes. But this is not quite enough. A nervous system is not a person, nor is a psyche one. It is at once the subject of both neurological and psychological predicates. In other words, it is both a nervous system and a psychic entity. Persons are not meriologically complex entities nor any kind,[5] each of which contains parts, a non-physical basic subject and a purely corporeal object to which this subject is in some way attached. Such a claim would not allow us to ascribe psychological attributes or corporeal attributes to the person as a whole. It is because persons are more than their bodies and that they are not reducible to any kind of body, gross or subtle. The person-substance, as described above, is not taken to exclude the material properties as such. They only exclude the fact that persons are material bodies and nothing else. Persons are autonomous in so far as their description in terms of

bodies and mind is concerned. But it is not as if no reference to body and mind is to be retained at all. Thus, person's description have the attributic reference to body and mind.

From the above discussion, we can reiterate the Cartesian distinction between the mind and the body. They are opposed to each other because the essence of mind is thinking and the essence of body is extension. That is to say, the body is something spatial which is perishable. Moreover, the mind or person is something non-spatial. After death, only the body remains. This concept of the body becomes gruesomely explicit when we refer to it as 'the remains'.[6] However, it is this conception of the body which comes closest to that found in the person theory. In this theory, we find that the body is not a person, nor is it a part of a person. It is the person, insofar as he is thought of as the subject of bodily attributes. But it becomes a reality at death. We call it a corpse.

Therefore, one of the paradoxical implications of the person theory is that the body which a person has, cannot be conceived of as a physical object subject to the law of physical world. As we know from this theory, persons are conscious. Finally, from the above examination, we came to know that a person's body is not a physical thing.

II. PERSON, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS

As we have argued so far, a person is an entity that has both mental and physical attributes. Hence, we could say of a person that he is five feet tall, weigh one hundred kilograms, etc., But more importantly, we could say that he is thinking about his friends, feels a pang of happiness or is sad, or so on. We may, therefore, say that person has a mind, which is different from his body, because the subject of consciousness does not mean a body of a certain sort. But it still might turn out that whatever is a subject of consciousness is identical with a body of a certain sort.

However, Strawson rejects the view that the subject of a state of consciousness is wholly immaterial, non-physical, a thing to which nothing but states of consciousness can be ascribed. According to him, consciousness is not applicable to physical things, nor to purely immaterial substance which is applicable to person. But a fundamental question is: what is consciousness? Generally, consciousness

is described as something which distinguishes man from a good deal of the world around. Only a person possesses this consciousness, which is not by other material objects. Another question arises, what is this consciousness which a person certainly has, but rocks and other animate beings do not? As G.E. Moore writes, 'The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what distinctly it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us as mere emptiness when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were diaphanous.'[7] Of course, we know perfectly well that we are conscious of things around us, including other people, but we do not grasp consciousness itself.

However, it is this common feature, consciousness, which may be said to be the central element in the concept of mind. Shaffer points out that if we were asked to give a general characterization of the branch of philosophy called philosophy of the mind, we might say that it is that branch particularly concerned with the nature of consciousness. We will call them 'mental phenomena', to which only beings capable of consciousness are subject. Mental phenomena include ways of being conscious, i.e. hearing, imaging, etc.[8] A person as being minded,[9] has the capacity of doing the mental activities. Such activities include thinking, willing, feeling, understanding, speaking, communicating, and above all, remembering the past. Mental activities are such that they presuppose the fact that there is a thinker who is capable of these activities. The thinker is here a subject or 'I' who is or has the capacity of consciousness. Wherever we will find the concept of 'I', we will also find the existence of consciousness because it is a person who stands for the concept of 'I', have consciousness.

One of the most general views is that the philosophy of the mind is concerned with all mental phenomena which they themselves are concerned with consciousness. Philosophers from Descartes onwards have accepted consciousness as a fundamental metaphysical reality. I remain the same person if I am conscious of being so, even though my body should change drastically and become diminished through amputation. Logically, it is possible that I should remain the same person although I am altogether disembodied. Persons are indivisible, non-corporeal simple entities. It is because

it becomes difficult here to distinguish persons so construed from metaphysical selves, transcendental egos, spirits, mental substances, souls, and other similar immaterial substances. However, the concept of person does not fit into these entities because persons are, if anything, concrete beings in the world. One can ascribe consciousness to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience. In addition, one cannot identify other subjects if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, possessors of state of consciousness.[10] The latter must have concrete existence in the world.

If we are too obsessed with the 'inner' criteria, we shall be tempted to treat persons essentially as minds. However, admitting outer criteria does not mean that there are no states of consciousness. We should claim that some P-predicates refer to the occurrence of state of consciousness. The persons are uncertainly identifiable beings having a life of their own. They are not definitely Cartesian egos; rather they possess a mixed bag of M-predicates and P-predicates. Persons are in any case conscious individuals who can be ascribed a large number of P-predicates such as thinking, feeling, willing, deciding, etc. These conscious states, according to Searle,[11] are intentional, i.e. are of some thing. In other words, they are directed at something outside them. Thus, persons who have these conscious states are intentional and mental beings.

Again, only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentionality at all, and so every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious. This thesis has enormous consequence for the study of the mind. But there is a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality that has the consequence that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness. And our consciousness is consciousness of something. Thus, persons have the essential feature of consciousness. There is an interconnection between person, mind, and consciousness. Empirically, there is distinction among them. But transcendentally, they point in the same direction. It is right to say that a person is a mental being, and the essence of mind is consciousness. Therefore, the concept of the mind, the person, and the consciousness go together. Thus, consciousness is related to the mind, which also belongs to a person.

III. THE DUAL NATURE OF PERSON

The problem of a person has traditionally been raised in a dualist context. It has greatly influenced those who have discussed the picture of a person as composed of two entities—body and mind—which are contingently related to each other. However, the person-substances are not merely a set of properties, physical or mental, because they are not fully exhausted in their descriptions.[12] The descriptions of the persons as having such and such properties are complete, still presuppose the fact that there are persons as having those properties. According to Strawson,[13] the properties like 'being at such and such time and place', having such and such weight and colour, and so on are M-predicates. The other properties are psychological properties such as 'being in the state of happiness', or 'being in the state of pain', and so on are states of P-predicates. In this way, Strawson has rightly said, 'the concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of type of entity so that both predicates ascribe corporeal characteristics; a physical situation and consciousness are equally applicable to an individual entities of that type'.[14] What is significant about them, as Strawson has pointed out, is their co-applicability to the same person substance. The M-predicates cannot be ascribable independently because that prohibits them from being ascribable to the conscious beings; like M-predicates, the P-predicates cannot be ascribed to the material bodies. This is because of a combination of a distinct kind of substance that has both physical and mental properties without being reducible to each other.

The above argument shows that Strawson, accepts person as non-material and non-dual without rejecting Cartesian dualism. This is because Descartes held, that when we are on the concept of a person, we are really referring to one or both of two distinct substances of different types, each of which has its own appropriate types of states and properties, each of which also has its own appropriate types of states and properties, and none of the states belongs to both. That is to say, that states of consciousness belong to one of these substances or to the other. Descartes has given a sharp focus to this dualistic conception of person. It is not easy to get away from dualism because persons have both sorts of attributes such as mental and physical. According to dualistic conception, a person is something altogether distinct from the body. That is, person is not identical with his body. Some dualists, however, believe that a person is a composite entity, one part of which is its body and another part of which is something-immaterial, the spirit or soul. Thus, dualism essentially adheres to the mind-body distinction and persons as mental beings as distinguished from material bodies.

According to Descartes, the self of a person is something altogether distinct from its body. So the self is altogether non-physical, lacking in all physical characteristics whatever. On this interpretation, we can say that the person is an immaterial substance—a spirit or soul, which stands in some special relation to a certain physical body which is its body. Descartes thinks that a person is some sort of a combination of an immaterial soul and a physical body, which stand to one another in a rather mysterious relation of substantial union. However, Cartesian dualism does not maintain that a person is immaterial stuff. On the contrary, it maintains that a person is a combination of the body and mind. In fact, our bodies and we are utterly unlike one another in respect of the sorts of properties that we possess. Our bodies have spatial extension, and a location in physical space, whereas we have no such qualities. On the other hand, we have thoughts and feelings, states of consciousness, whereas our bodies are known to have qualities other than these.

But the question arises: should a person not simply be identified with a certain physical body, as Williams has argued? Strawson[15] answers the above question. He says, mental states, such as thoughts and feelings do not seem to be properly attributable to something like a body, but only to a person. One is inclined to urge that it is 'I' who thinks and feels, not my body, even if I need to have a body to be able to think and feel. However, if a person is composed of a body but not identical with it, then it seems that every part of the body must be a part of the person but not every part of the person can be part of the body. So, one of the plausible assumptions is that a person has parts, which are not parts of his body, and so it is not identical with the body. However, by saying this we are denying that a person is composed of body. All that is meant is that persons have both bodily and mental existence. Persons are nor purely disembodied spirits.

A. J. Ayer[16] says that the relation between consciousness and the subject to which is attributed is a contingent relation. According to him, a person is not a purely immaterial subject; rather it is an embodied person to which mental attributes are causally ascribable. He accepts a causal relation between the person and his body. Therefore, according to him, there is no contradiction in holding that a person's body would have been inhabited by another person. Strawson, however, rejects Ayer's view, which takes a person apart from the body. He rejects the idea of causal relation altogether. According to him, persons are more primitive than their mind and body. That is, persons are primary than whereas mind and body are secondary.[17]

IV. PERSONS AS INDIVIDUALS

P.F. Strawson has adopted the term 'person' for a philosophical use which comes rather closer to common usage than did Locke's usage of the form, while it raises philosophical problems of its own. Perhaps it is less disreputable to hold that the person is a primitive concept. This is because the Lockean view of the concept of person is a forensic concept, but the Strawsonian concept of person is a metaphysical concept like that of the self and, therefore, it is not merely a social or a forensic concept.[18] Pradhan[19] pointed out that it is metaphysical precisely because it shows how it can be used to describe the minded being as the unique substance which is not identical with the body, though it is necessarily linked with the body. That is to say, persons have material bodies and yet are not on the same levels as the physical bodies or organisms. Persons, therefore, are not physical things at all and this is because persons transcend their physical existence.

The transcendental qualities, however, show that persons are explainable from the first-person perspective. The first-person perspective are unique individual or an 'I' who experience, as Wittgenstein[20] points out, that even it is not 'name' which can substitute 'I'. Therefore, the first person is not the description of any human being, because it refers to third-person perspective, but it refers to the person himself or herself. This does not mean that person is distinct from this world, but the person is a part of this world. A Strawsonian person, to begin with, is to be understood as

distinct from a mere material body, which retains the contrast customarily observed between person and things.

According to Strawson, each of us distinguishes between himself and the states of himself on the one hand, and what is not himself or a state of himself on the other. Then the question is: what are the conditions of our making this distinction? In what way do we make it, and why do we make it in the way we do? Strawson[21] argues that in our conceptual scheme, material bodies are basic particulars. This means that material bodies could be identified without reference to another individual in particular, whereas the identification and re-identification of particulars of other categories rest ultimately on the identification of material bodies.

Then Strawson inquires whether we could make intelligible to ourselves a conceptual scheme in which material bodies are not basic. This leads him to the construction of a model no-space world, in which all the sensory items are auditory, but in which it did seem possible to find a place for the idea of a re-identifiable particulars by exploiting certain auditory analogues of the idea of spatial distance. However, the requirement was for a scheme in which a distinction was made between oneself and what is not one's self.

Let us now think of some ways in which we ordinarily talk of ourselves, certain things which we do, and which are ordinarily ascribed to ourselves. We ascribe to ourselves actions and intentions, sensations, thoughts and feelings, perceptions and memories. However, we ascribe to ourselves the location and altitude. Of course, not only do we ascribe ourselves temporary conditions, states, situations, but also enduring characteristics, including physical characteristics like height, shape and weight. That is to say, among the things that we ascribe to ourselves are those that we also ascribe to material bodies. But there are certain things and attributes that we ascribe to ourselves, but cannot dream of ascribing to material bodies.

Let us take a visual experience. First, there is a group of empirical facts of which the most familiar is that if the eyes of that body are closed, the person sees nothing. To this group belong all the facts known to the ophthalmic surgeon. Secondly, there is the fact that what falls within a person's field of vision at any moment depends in part on the orientation of his eyes, i.e. the direction his head is turned in and on the orientation of his eyeballs in their

sockets. Thirdly, there is the fact that where he sees from or what his possible field of vision at any moment is, depends on his body.

Strawson divides these facts into three groups to emphasize the following—the fact that visual experiences, in all three ways, depend on facts about some body or bodies. It is a contingent fact that it is the same body. Each person's body occupies a special position in relation to that person's perceptual experience. For each person, there is one body that occupies a certain causal position in relation to that person's perceptual experience.

For Strawson, a person's body occupies an important position in the person's experience so that he can answer the following questions satisfactorily:

(a) Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?

(b) Why are they ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics?[22]

For the Cartesians this question does not arise; it is only a linguistic illusion that both kinds of predicate are properly ascribed to one and the same thing, and that there is a common owner or subject. Descartes says that when we speak of a person, we refer to two distinct substances. The state of consciousness belongs to one of these substances and not to the other. Strawson says that he escapes one of our questions, but it does not escape the other—why is one's state of consciousness ascribed at all, to anything?

In order to overcome the above problems, Strawson used the concept of the person as a 'primitive concept.[23] Then, he said that the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation c. are equally applicable to a single type.[24] Now we can get answers to the above two questions. Strawson said that answers to these two questions are connected in this manner, '... that a necessary condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation and c. That is to say, states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, where as they were ascribed to persons, in the sense I have claimed for this world.'[25] The above Strawsonian view says that a necessary condition of a state of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to persons. The concept of a person is prior to that of an individual consciousness. A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person.

Again, Strawson points out that one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identity other subjects of experience. In addition, one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, of states of consciousness. He says, this way will lead to Cartesianism. We cannot but refer to the bodies of others. So states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they are ascribed to an individual person who has a body. So the pure individual person or consciousness, in the sense of the pure ego, is a concept that cannot exist. Strawson says it can exist only as a secondary, non-primitive concept, and can be analyzed in terms of the concept of person.

The pure individual consciousness cannot exist as a primary concept to be used in the explanation of the concept of a person, but it might have a logically secondary existence. From within our conceptual scheme, each of us can conceive of his or her individual survival of bodily death. One has to think of oneself as having thoughts and memories in a disembodied state. But this disembodied state is only a secondary concept, because one cannot but think of persons as embodied beings. According to Strawson, 'A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of individuality from having been a person.'[26] As we have seen, there are two kinds of predicates properly applied to individuals of this type. The first kind of predicates consist of those that are also properly applied to material bodies to which we do not ascribe states of consciousness, which he calls M-predicates. The second type consists of those predicates such as 'thinking hard', 'belief in God', etc., which he calls P-predicates. Therefore, Strawson says that the concept of person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and those ascribing

corporeal characteristics (M-predicates) are equally applicable to an individual entity.

Then, he said, '... the concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation and c. are equally applicable to an individual entity of that type.'[27] Strawson is not taking the concept of person as a secondary concept in relation to two primary kinds, a particular consciousness and a particular body (human). Then Strawson says that '... though not all P-predicates are what we should call "predicates ascribing states of consciousness" (e.g. "going for a walk" is not), they may be said to have this in common, that they imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed.'[28]

From the above standpoint, what Strawson want to say is that 'one ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour; and that behavioural-criteria one goes on are not just signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicates, but are criteria one goes on are not just signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicates, but are criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of the P-predicates.'[29] This claim shows that a person is immaterial because the states of consciousness is applicable to a person. This is because there are predicates which could be both self-ascribable and other-ascribable to the same individual. But there remain many cases in which one has an entirely adequate basis for ascribing a P-predicate to oneself, and yet, this basis is distinct from those on which one ascribes the predicates to another. In other words, these predicates have the same meaning and both ways of ascription is in one perfect individual. That is why P-predicates have certain characteristics such as 'I am in pain', 'I am depressed', and etc., and one should not ascribe to somebody from these observations because this leads to third-person perspective of the concept of person.

Moreover, the above explanation leads to an important question: 'How can one ascribe to oneself, not on the basis of observation, the very same thing that others may have, on the basis of observation, reason of a logically adequate kind for ascribing one, which might be phrased?'[30] Strawson says that the above question may be

observed in a wider one, which might be phrased. The questions are, 'how are P-predicates possible?' or 'how is the concept of a person possible?'[31] Strawson says that these two questions replace those two earlier questions, that are: why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? And why are they ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics? The answer to these two questions are inhereted in the primitiveness of the concept of person; this is because the unique character of P-predicates, because he or she, who is an individual possess the P-predicates. The attributes of P-predicates make a person as an individual. Persons are metaphysical beings claiming an ontological reality in the sense that they could not be what they are without a metaphysical essence.[32]

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Revaluating Saints and Heroes

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ABSTRACT

This article tries to find a pertinent answer to the problem of the nature of 'supererogation' being either non-deontic exceeding actions, says J.O. Urmson, or deontic benevolent action, says Mike W. Martin and thereby analyzes the sense in which the notion aptly contributes to an understanding of the conceptions of 'profession' and 'professionals as saints and heroes'. The double-layered analyzes are made possible in the light of the great Indian ethical ideas about this matter and environmental ethics.

This article is not about the numerous saints and heroes glorifying the world community. It is, on the other hand, and attempt to evaluate the conflicting claims of J.O. Urmson[1] and Mike W. Martin[2] about 'supererogation'. It is clear from the title of this article that the two excellent essays shall be evaluated because of some strong claims regarding supererogation.

In recent times, our growing interest in the field of Professional Ethics calls for greater attention about knowing properly what 'profession' and 'professional' mean apart from what is 'professionalism' and 'ethics talk in profession'. I view the essays of Urmson and Martin from this angle, i.e. from the angle of understanding in a better way and with more clarity whether or not 'supererogatory actions' constitutes the meaning of 'profession' apart from other important components like 'having a service-based ideal' and so on. This is to say, that I view both these essays as attempts to answer the squabble about whether or not a 'professional' is the one who, apart from other things, ought to undertake 'supererogatory' actions and if he or she ought to do so, what exactly do we mean by such actions. To make it more debatable we may ask, are

'supererogatory actions' genuine duties or are they actions excluding duties such that 'excluding' amounts to, 'has nothing to do with duties', they are, rather, optional?

II

Saints and heroes is not an ornamental part of the title of this article; it is a tribute to professor Urmson for presenting us a brilliant essay with this title, which has stimulated us (including Martin) to understand and evaluate the case of 'supererogation' in many ways. Let us start our discussion to properly understand Urmson's conception of 'profession' and 'professional' being saints and heroes. He says 'we sometimes call a person a saint, or an action saintly, using the word "saintly" in a purely moral sense, with no religious implications; also we call a person a hero or an action heroic... no formal argument is necessary to show that at least sometimes we use both words for moral evalution'.[3] To clarify the sense of 'a person' in this passage (because 'profession' or 'professional' has not been used here), he says 'a person may be called a saint if he does his duty regularly in the contexts in which inclinations, desires, or self-interest would lead most people not to do it, and does so as a result of exercizing abnormal self-control parallel to this person may be called a hero'.[4] Urmson is, therefore, not speaking about any person having an occupation (without a service-based ideal and other essentials like responsibility, duties, obligations for calling it a profession). He is here mentioning such saints and heroes who have been bestowed with 'duties' which ought to be performed without infatuation (as I see it) and also without 'fear and preservation', as says Urmson.[5] Urmson is, however, not satisfied with some such saints and heroes who painstakingly impose 'abnormal self control' because, in the true sense, a professional who performs duties in such an artificial atmosphere should not be called a saint or hero in the true sense of the term. Neither do we call a professional saint and hero when 'he does his duty... without effort'.[6] Hence, being in a habitual state of mind to do duties as has been laid down in a covenant, contract, or appointment mechanically do not make a professional saint and hero. No doubt, such people may be performing duties 'without a holiday' but in a lackluster manner. Therefore, Urmson would not accept

both the sense of 'profession' and 'professional' because the element of 'saintliness' (truly so-called) and 'heroism' (truly so-called) is lacking. Urmson thus concludes that 'we may call a person a saint if he does actions that are far beyond the limit of his duty, whether by control or contrary inclination and interest or without effort; parallel to this we may call a person a hero if he does actions that are far beyond the bounds of his duty, whether by control of natural fear or without effort. Such actions are saintly or heroic'.[7] Urmson now believes that he has properly analyzed the meaning of 'profession' and 'professional' with an addition of actions done 'far beyond the limits of duty'. Most interesting is to notice that for him 'beyond' has a unique sense, and though he knows that saintliness is not synonymous to heroism in this context, as there is a thin line of difference mentioned in 'without fear' to stand one's ground, he abruptly erases the difference by the use of 'saintly or heroic' in the last line of the above passage, perhaps owing to unnecessary complexity in discussion. Turning to 'beyond', Urmson says that a professional needs to be saintly or heroic but not a fool to 'go a second mile... On an infinite journey'.[8] Rather, 'it is possible to go beyond one's duty by being a little more generous, forbearing, helpful, or forgiving than fair dealing demands, or to go a very long way beyond basic code of duties with the saint or the hero'.[9] It is, therefore, that in plain language a professional (or a person having a profession) *means* apart from many other things, going beyond duties by being generous and so on or to coin a term, possessing the 'bundle of Urmsonian virtues' but not that having a profession is to have some more duties other than prescribed ones or that having more responsibilities or obligations. For simplicity, a person is truly a professional, i.e. a saint or a hero who possesses *non-deontic virtues* neither more nor less.

III

Mike W. Martin in his essay agrees broadly with Urmson in a different tonality to say that professionals are persons having 'role responsibilities' i.e. the basic minimum duties bestowed in them by entering a convent or contract or appointment. Going by the basic requirement of calling something a 'profession', Martin holds that professionals do have certain moral ideals as shaped in their pro-

fessional life as personal ideals, which includes 'service beyond minimal duties'.[10] Unlike Urmson, Martin clarifies 'beyond' duties in a cleat fashion as 'supererogatory commitments'[11] projecting its *deontic sense* in terms of desirable ones that 'exceeds role responsibilities and minimal responsibilities incumbent on all moral agent'.[12] Martin has thus avoided the vagueness of 'beyond' by counting some non-deontic virtues and replaced them by mentioning a more or less naïve 'exceeds' which we have to understand from his examples of *pro bono publico duties* of professional lawyers and teachers and that of Albert Schweitzer's 'acts of benevolence'. He, however, mentions the 'desirability' of such deontic exceeding acts and that they bind 'all moral agents', thereby clarifying the universal sense of 'persons are having professions i.e. in all cases, a profession should include apart from other things, *desirable deontic exceeding acts.* It is now clear that Martin does not agree with Urmson on two grounds for clarification of meaning of 'profession' and/or 'professional'. First, Martin interprets 'some supererogatory acts as 'genuine responsibilities' (the deontic sense)[13] and second, saints and heroes in the true sense of the terms in this context should be understood as those viewing their acts (exceeding ones) as morally required (the desirable sense). He does not agree with Urmson that professionals taking supererogatory acts, as 'duties' are either unwise or are 'excessively modest'. Nevertheless, Martin's 'exceeds' in place of Urmson's 'beyond' fails to do justice to meaning clarification as I view it here because stray examples of lawyers, teaches, Schweitzer's ('some' supererogatory acts of Martin), are as incomplete and unclear as Urmson's non-deontic bundle of virtues. It is, however, a matter of merit to remind Urmson that omitting the deontic and the desirable senses of 'supererogation' would be a matter of grave mistake. Notice here the circularity in Martin's view as well. Pressed upon why would Urmson commit such a grave mistake by speaking about non-deontic exceeding acts, Martin would call for 'some' cases, which do not do much apart from adding the element of 'benevolence', 'helping by going an extra mile', 'empathetic' (Christian ideal) not neurotically but most judicilously. Do these elements complete Urmsonian bundle? Alternatively, are they not virtuosity but duty, for either social organization or moral agents have imposed an element of 'must'? As Bradley mentions in

My Station and its Duties by citing example of wartime mothers bestowed with extra duty (must do) of caring for the orphans of war victims, or alternatively, those imposed by a moral agent himself (as Kant suggests by virtue of good will being autonomous and passing categorical imperatives). On the other hand, there are those duties imposed as strict orders of the practical wisdom of moral agents (as maintains Aristotle). In fact, what is missing in the squabble between Urmson and Martin is the clear sense of 'supererogatory duties' because there is an element of vagueness in clarifying both 'duty and 'saintly or heroic or supererogatory duty'. We are not satisfied qua meaning analysts for our condition is to know what 'profession' and/or 'professional' means by considering particularly the case of 'supererogation'. It is here that a revaluation of the moral opinions of Urmson and Martin about 'supererogation' is needed so that our conception of 'profession', 'professional' and 'professionalism' becomes unambiguous.

IV

Revaluation of Saints and Heroes would thus lead us to know that though 'supererogation' constitute one important aspect of calling someone having a profession in the true sense of the term such actions, nevertheless, cannot be reduced merely to non-deontic altruistic acts (as thinks Urmson) and deontic altruistic acts (as thinks Martin). However, both Urmson and Martin contribute positively in clarifying the ideas that a person having a profession should, as matter of bare minimum contribution towards the society, decide to do certain things which transcend the hackneyed limits of duties enforced by social agencies. Hence, the moot matter now is to clarify the different ways in which we can do certain things qua social responsible beings having different duties so that we stand as valuable as Saints and Heroes who 'transcend' or go much 'beyond' the fixity of deontic norms of agencies. Here it is important again to remember the truth that Urmson was grossly mistaken when he omitted the deontic sense in the 'supererogatory' actions, though it is equally important to remind Martin that not all duties imposed on us in the name of a covenant are to be taken as sacrosanct and imperative. Before we proceed further with our task, it is important to clarify that the deontic sense of

'supererogation' need not be necessarily understood as actions having value as end because I have strong reasons to show that almost all supererogatory actions have teleological value, i.e. they are valuable most as a means to achieve a higher intrinsically valuable end. Still, we have to remember that some unique supererogatory actions of professionals have intrinsic value as well because we might conceive of the realm of individual morality, which is related to but different from social morality wherein those unique actions are good in themselves, they do not have yet another higher valuable end to be achieved. This makes clear that a proper evaluation of deontic-supererogation (and to my mind, even non-deontic-supererogation), is possible if and only if morality of actions of people having professions is understood at two levels—the social and the individual. I would also like to accept at the outset that the broader way of looking at this matter enabling revaluation of Urmson's and Martin's position does not emerge from my fertile mind, for it I owe much to the ethical genius of the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gitā*, Vedānta, and Buddhism and Jainism. The gems of ethical conceptions found in these great philosophical trends about the ways in which people having a profession should be understood, have shaped my views. A conscious reader would thus find that even without a textual reference Urmson's and Martin's position should be revaluated, lest they do not have apathy to 'go back to the roots'. Interestingly, the analysis does not rely on a metaphysical or religious obsession, for it would be too odd to maintain that Saints and Heroes are so when some religious-metaphysical thesis has been taken as absolutely true. More interesting is to notice that barring a few ethical theses like the one of Cārvāka, divergences in metaphysical and religious views in India do not do much harm to our understanding of 'supererogation'.

Now take the following suggestions to re-understand Urmson and Martin. Both these thinkers tend to forget the truth that much value of our non-deontic and deontic acts are lost when such acts are done by us (the *so-called* professionals), who cling *necessarily and sufficiently to the good and bad fruits of such actions.* There is no doubt that intentional decision-making and performance of actions which are our prescribed duties laid down by the social agencies or those which we prescribe by virtue of our practical wisdom are goal directed because such performance leads us to achieve certain valuable ends in our societies. Equally true is the fact that performance of such actions bear certain fruits which are evaluated as good or bad if the social teleos, which is thought to be intrinsically valuable as higher *social ideal*, is itself absolutely good and not bad in any case. However, we have to remember that such intentional human actions most *desirably* need not necessarily and sufficiently cling to the good and bad fruits of actions. Take the case of Urmson's professional 'going a second mile' as often we go as teachers to educate some slum kids or household servants, or the case of Martin's basic public duty, the one of teachers, to complete the prescribed course well ahead of examinations. Whether we like it or not, they tend to bind us as they bear fruits, and we are often caught in the flux of doing them for the sake of pleasure, benefit, fun, profit, acclaim, praise, trustworthiness, goodwill and so many other good things for us in life. Or else, they tend to bind us as they bear fruits, and we are entrapped in the flux of doing them for the sake of befooling, maximizing gains at any cost, the diabolic cunning and so on for they are bad things, but we knowingly or unknowingly take them as good. Whatever the case may be, Urmson and Martin should have noticed that duties or not duties—our actions done only for the sake of good and bad results they produce or are expected to produce—do not make us professionals truly (not so-called), for the higher 'social ideal' and the 'personal ideal', the 'teleos' so to say, lose ethical significance. And with it, the paradigm of moral evaluation is lost. In fact, when intrinsicness of the 'teleos' is lost, the sense of performance of *duty for the sake of the teleos* is lost. This is an important point to notice for we have been long nurturing the misconception that performance of disinterested duties do not make any sense in the context of realization of an intrinsically valuable ethical teleos in life. This misconception is much due to isolated ethics of deontology and teleology touted as conflicting ideals in the moral realm. If we try to put aside confusions, we can easily understand that even by remaining *disinterested* towards all good and bad fruits of actions, we can still perform our actions as responsible social professionals for the sake of a higher 'teleos' in our *personal* moral life. The truth is that professionals' as performing supererogatory actions,

would not be enough to call them saintly or heroic or great men of character; they should perform such actions qua professionals 'disinterestedly'. It is only then that we truly go 'beyond' or 'transcend' ego satisfaction in doing something 'extra' for other men in society. It is thus possible to go 'beyond' or 'transcend' the dull area of mere performance of drab duties and to 'walk another mile' in the Hobbesian hegemony of pity and sympathy for other people like us.

Urmson and Martin should be reminded that 'supererogation', understood de novo, is not merely doing something more than we do or are expected to do as professionals; rather what we *should* do or what is *desirable* (not desired) for us to do as social beings having higher personal teleos. In this regard, another point of consideration is 'professionals' as different from 'amateurs' are heroes i.e. who stand their grounds without concern for good or bad consequence that benefit or harm them with great 'equanimity of the mind'. In this sense, a professional supererogation does not amount to acceptance of duties prescribed by agencies or authorities or self that *transgresses* the *training and temperament* of the professional concerned. If Urmson and Martin understood this, they would have been careful to notice that not everybody is expected to perform any supererogatory action 'amateurishly', for professionalism is not amateurism. It is not by birth or by chance or by force or by dictates that supererogatory professionals made the person they are; rather it is temperament and training of the person that has shaped him or her as a professional per se. In such a case is it not true that every teacher cannot and need not eke out a small pittance by dropping a penny to every poor he or she meets? That way, the teacher cannot be a great economic welfarist whose distributive justice stops with either pride or prejudice. Equally important is to notice that not all of us can become Schweitzer or, not every teacher can turn out to be basic educators in slums by virtue of empathy if one does not have the basic education of how to impart basic education to slum dwellers. However, the message is that if we have the temperament and training we should be 'fearless' as heroes of wars to stand our grounds to do duties for the intrinsic value of the higher 'teleos' in life.

Professionals' supererogation does not mean that sympathy and empathy is sufficient for us as social beings. Even if we take it to be true that transcending ego would be required of us as professionals, we could not neglect the importance of understanding what such transcendence amounts to. I must say that the deliberated decision-making and follow-up actions of professionals in our societies should be 'welfare' oriented, where welfarism are not the one of Aristotle or Mill or Marx or Rawls or Sen. There are reasons for such assertion as the welfare of professionals as we understand here are simply stated economical. However, there are glimpses in the writings of Mill in *Utilitarianism* in particular, and in the care for ecological sustenance or eco-sustainable development of thinkers of ethics and economics of recent times that 'welfare' should be better understood broadly. The genius ethical thinkers of ancient India and many of the modern times have repeatedly reminded us that a non-economical understanding of 'welfaristic' duties of professionals should be taken seriously, as well as an understanding of welfare of the 'ecological community' on the whole should be considered seriously. The recent popularity of holistic environmental welfarism is a testimony to this seriousness. If 'supererogation' of Urmson and Martin does not take care of such welfaristic actions of professionals in civil societies, it leaves out an important aspect of the matter. What I mean here by 'non-economically oriented welfaristic supererogation is the desirable and ethically justifiable distribution of rights, justice and care for both living and non-living entities or existentials, which is something in addition to the physical well-being of such existentials in the face of the need of people and creed for growth of human beings on earth. Again, such broad care for the whole existence for their well being is not possible without a *unitive experience* that enable us to realize 'oneness' and not merely importance of beings and things in nature. In fact, elements of sympathy and empathy are often transmuted in such an experience when we realize that even without a necessary metaphysical-spiritual import of 'oneness' raising many difficult problems of 'using existentials for our need, it should be taken as 'existing as a whole' most equitably, judiciously, harmoniously and ethically—almost like legs of tripod supporting each other. The sense of transcendence of a mere

economic well being of human beings as well as transcendence of 'judicious use' of natural beings and things for an individual and the human race on the whole is, thus, crucial in realizing what extra mile do we need to walk or what amounts to the performance of our duties qua professionals. If professional decision-making and actions are bereft of such concepts of supererogation, I am afraid we miss important points in its understanding. Obviously, Urmson and Martin have missed these points. It is important for us to realize that professionals live in an environment—natural and built—and both ought to be cared for or else, pity on poor or empathy for them does not make great sense.

Related to all these things, we now come to realize that professionals have moral concerns for self and others, and they live a life of individual and social morality. If we are ethically serious about natural things ad beings, our environment and the civil society in existence, and yet not serious about the higher 'teleos' of life (so important for me), we are really not wholly serious about the ethical way of life we are expected we live. The problem is whether or not there should be one such teleos in life. For long we have been advocating monistic teleos in this regard, many of them religiously and/or metaphysically tinged. I have reservations here, as it would be too odd to think that non-religious and non-metaphysicians are bereft of ethical ideal, that they do not have any conception of supererogation and are thus not professionals in the true sense of the term. Leaving out unnecessary tussle for the nirvāṇic, the theological and other non-nirvāṇic teleos in life, which are ethico-religious or ethico-spiritual no doubt, we can safely maintain that supererogation makes a complete sense for professionals when their individual ethical life steadily progresses without any holiday to the well being of the natural things and beings, where 'well being' is not merely economic well being; rather it has non-economic significance, which is advocated by many environmental ethicists of the past and the present.

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On Horwich's Explication of a Variety of Evidence in Bayesian Framework

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Philosophy of science has at least four viewpoints. In one view, it is a study of scientific methodology or a second-order criteriology. On this view a philosopher of science tries to answer such questions as: What conditions must be fulfilled by a scientific explanation to be correct? What criteria must be satisfied for a scientific theory's confirmation to be correct? When is a scientific theory or hypothesis better confirmed? The last question, broadly speaking, about the concept of confirmation has been answered in various ways. One of the ways is a well-known rule of scientific methodology: *a theory or a hypothesis is better confirmed by a variety of evidence than by a narrow range of evidence.* In other words, there is a methodological rule in science which says that diversity of evidence in favour of a hypothesis is always superior to narrowness of evidence in its favour. The philosophers of science wish to put this intuitive rule in a rigorous mathematical framework. For this purpose, they utilize a famous theorem of the calculus of probability called Bayes' theorem. The theorem was an invention of the eighteenth-century English mathematician, Thomas Bayes.[1] Paul Horwich[2] in his book *Probability and Evidence,* has claimed to have given both a formulation and a justification of the methodological rule within the Bayesian framework. The framework[3] is called Bayesian because crucial probabilities are calculated by using Bayes' theorem. However, Horwich considers only *one type* of case where the probability of a hypothesis given diverse evidence is greater than the probability of the hypothesis given narrow evidence. In section 2 of this article, I attempt to discuss Horwich's explanation of the methodological rule. In section 3, I shall try to highlight, in my view, two

separate but connected items as to the matter of variety of evidence and also to put forward my observation on Horwich's philosophical position. In the last and final section, my endeavour will be to provide an alternative explanation of the methodological rule in Bayesian framework and give a Popperian justification of the rule by considering the type of cases not considered by Horwich. This will show, I feel, that I am supplementing Horwich's position. He has confined himself to explain the methodogical rule to the case in which a number of mutually exclusive and jointly exhausive hypotheses are considered. But I shall try to argue the similar point—the formulation of the methodological rule in Bayesian terms even when a single hypothesis is under consideration, and also to provide a justification. However, I begin, in section 1, for our purpose with a part of the calculus of probability which will be formulated mathematically and explained non-mathematically.

SECTION 1

1.1. Probability calculus consists of a set of axioms and theorems. Here we put forward as a part of the calculus comprising the following axioms and theorems, where the quantities P(H) and P(H/E) are to be read, respectively, as the prior probability of H and the posterior probability of H relative to evidence E. Subscripts used in cases of A (Axioms) and T (Theorems), and of H and E refer to the items required. Further, in the following discussion we assume the background information or knowledge and the basics of the symbolic part of deductive logic.

1.2. A_1 : For every H, $O \leqslant P(H) \leqslant 1$.

A_2 : $P(H_1 v H_2) = P(H_1) + P(H_2)$, given H_1 and H_2 are two mutually exclusive hypotheses. (A_2 relates disjunction and addition.)

A_3 : $P(H_1 \& H_2) = P(H_1)P(H_2/H_1)$. ($A_3$ relates conjunction and multiplication.)

A_4 : $P(E/H) = 1$, given that H entails E.

1.3. When we have a disjunction of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses H_1, H_2, .., H_N, by using A_2 we get the following theorem:

T_1: $P(H_1 v H_2 v \ldots v H_N) = P(H_1) + (H_2) + \ldots + P(H_N)$.

T_1 states that the probability of the disjunction of H_1, H_2, ...,H_N is equal to the sum of $P(H_1)$ to $P(H_N)$.)

Now, from A_3 we have $P(H\&E) = P(H)P(E/H)$.
Since $P(H\&E) = P(E\&H)$, we have $(E\&H) = P(E)P(H/E)$
Further, since $P(E)P(H/E) = P(H)P(E/H)$, we get

$$T_2: P(H/E) = \frac{P(H)P(E/H)}{P(E)}$$

This is the simple form of Bayes' theorem which states that the probability of H on E is equal to the product of the prior probability of H and the posterior probability of E on H divided by the prior probability of E.

1.4. When we have just a single hypothesis H but two bodies of evidence—one is diverse evidence E_D and the other narrow evidence E_N—we get the following theorem which is a ratio form of and yielded by Bayes' theorem.

$$T_3: \frac{P(H/E_D)}{P(H/E_N)} = \frac{P(E_N)P(E_D/H)}{P(E_D)P(E_N/H)}$$

The proof of theorem is in the following:

$$\frac{P(H/E_D)}{P(H/E_N)} = \frac{\dfrac{P(H)P(E_D/H)}{P(E_D)}}{\dfrac{P(H)P(E_N/H}{P(E_N)}}$$

$$= \frac{P(H)P(E_D/H)}{P(E_D)} \times \frac{P(E_N)}{P(H)P(E_N/H)}$$

$$= \frac{P(E_N)P(E_D/H)}{P(E_D)P(E_N/H)} \quad \text{Q.E.D.}$$

T_3 states that the ratio of the probability of H given diverse evidence E_D and the probability of H given narrow evidence E_N is equal to the product of the prior probability of E_N and the posterior probability of diverse evidence $P(E_D/H)$—that is, the probability

of E_D given H—divided by the product of the prior probability of E_D and the posterior probability of narrow evidence $P(E_N/H)$—that is, the probability of E_N given H.

1.5. When we have a disjunction of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses H_K (where k=1, 2,...,N) and also evidence E, the Bayes' theorem takes the following form which we call T_4.

$$T_4: P(H_k/E)=\frac{P(H_k)P(E/H_k)}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} P(Hi)P(E/Hi)} \quad \text{(Where } k=1,2,\ldots,N.\text{)}$$

This theorem states that the probability of H_K given E is equal to the product of the prior probability of H_K and the probability of E on H_K divided by the summation of the product of the prior probability of Hi (where i is equal to 1 to N) and the probability of E given Hi.

Now, from T_4 we get the following formulation (where H_1, H_2,...,H_K are all mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive):

$$P(H_1/E)=\frac{P(H_1)P(E/H_1)}{P(H_1)P(E/H_1)+P(H_2)P(E/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E/H_k)}.$$

SECTION 2

In his *Probability and Evidence,* Horwich has spoken of the well-known truism of scientific methodology: a hypothesis is better confirmed by evidence collected from diverse circumstances rather than by evidence collected from narrow circumstances. In other words, a hypothesis is better confirmed by a variety of evidence than by a narrow range of evidence. Let us explain Horwich's position. We may take, as representative of science, a quantitative law or hypothesis having magnitudes or quantities. Such a hypothesis is better confirmed by varied numerical data, comprising both high and low values than by narrow data comprising only high values or only low values of the quantities related by the hypothesis. In order to explain the methodological rule, we take the example given by Horwich.[4] Let us suppose that our hypothesis consists of the universal proposition: 'All ravens are black.' It cannot be gainsaid that this hypothesis is best confirmed if the observed ravens are collected

from wide range of circumstances. What Horwich likes to do is in his words:

> 'I would like to offer a Bayesian justification for these truism—to provide a relatively clear explication of what it is for the evidence for a hypothesis to be diverse, and to demonstrate that such evidence increases the probability of the hypothesis by more than a uniform data set.'[5]

The clause 'I would like to offer a Bayesian justification (or rationale) for these truisms' from the above quoted passage seems to make it clear that Horwich has considered two separate but connected items—one is the methodological rule or truism and the other is the Bayesian justification of the rule. The formulation of the rule in Bayesian framework, he expects, is this:

$$P(H/E_D)>P(H/E_N).$$

In other words, the probability of the hypothesis H given diverse evidence E_D is greater than the probability of H given narrow evidence E_N. The question of justification arises in connection with the issue of why we prefer or demand variety of evidence but not narrow evidence. In fact, there are many aspects of the demand or preference. (We shall point out some of the aspects in the next section.) Horwich has explicated only one aspect of the demand. His explication is in the following.

Variety of evidence is preferred or demanded when we have some definite set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses between which we are to decide. In such a case, variety of evidence tends to eliminate false hypotheses which are initially most plausible, while initially very many plausible competitors are left in the fray by a arrow range of evidence, thereby providing little reason to decide. Horwich has said more exactly that the probability or likelihood of diverse evidence is significantly low with relation to many of the very plausible competitors or hypotheses. Then he proceeds to account all these in Bayesian framework. He begins with a form of Bayes' theorem (which is given at the end of our section 1):

$$P(H_1/E)=\frac{P(H_1)P(E/H_1)}{P(H_1)P(E/H_1)+P(H_2)P(E/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E/H_k)}$$

Here it is supposed that H_1, H_2,...,H_k are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses. One of these hypotheses is true but we do not know which one. However, Horwich supposes that *H_1 entails both E_D and E_N* (italics mine). Hence, by A_4 of our section 1, we have $P(E_D/H_1)= 1$ and $P(E_N/H_1)= 1$. Since each of the quantities $P(E_D/H_1)$ and $P(E_N/H_1)$ has the value 1, these quantities are left out of the following ratio form which is, says Horwich, yielded by Bayes' theorem:

$$\frac{P(H_1/E_D)}{P(H_1/E_N)} = \frac{P(H_1)+P(H_2)+P(E_N/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_N/H_k)}{P(H_1)+P(H_2)+P(E_D/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_D/H_k)}$$'[6].

Horwich has stated only this form of Bayes' theorem without providing any proof. We provide the proof in the following way by using T_3 given in section 1 of this article.

$$\frac{P(H_1/E_D)}{P(H_1/E_N)} = \frac{\dfrac{P(H_1)P(E_D/H_1)}{P(H_1)P(E_D/H_1)+P(H_2)P(E_D/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_D/H_k)}}{\dfrac{P(H_1)P(E_N/H_1)}{P(H_1)P(E_N/H_1)+P(H_2)P(E_N/H_1)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_N/H_k)}}$$

$$= \frac{P(H_1)P(E_D/H_1)}{P(H_1)P(E_D/H_1)+P(H_2)P(E_D/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_D/H_k)} \times$$

$$\frac{P(H_1)P(E_N/H_1)+P(H_2)P(E_N/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_N/H_k)}{P(H_1)P(E_N/H_1)}$$

$$= \frac{P(H_1)+P(H_2)+P(E_N/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_N/H_k)}{P(H_1)+P(H_2)+P(E_D/H_2)+\ldots+P(H_k)P(E_D/H_k)} \text{ Q.E.D.}$$

[$P(E_D/H_1)= 1$ and $P(E_N/H)= 1$; because we suppose with Horwich that both E_D and En are entailed by H_1 and here we have used A_4.]

Horwich says that since diverse evidence tends to eliminate initially plausible hypotheses, the probability of E_D is low and the probability of E_N is high in relation to those hypotheses. In other words, there are many initially plausible hypotheses Hj, such that

the probability of Hj is *substantial* and the probability of E_D given, Hj is less than the probability of E_N, given Hj. Therefore, Horwich's expectation that $P(H_1/E_D)>P(H_1/E_N)$ is fulfilled. Since the probability of H_1 given E_D is greater than the probability of H_1 given E_N—H_1 is better confirmed by variety or diversity of evidence E_D than by a narrow range of evidence E_N. This concludes my attempt to present Horwich's exposition.

SECTION 3

In this section, I put forward my observations on the matter of variety of evidence. In my view, two separate *items* are involved in the matter. *One* item is the methodological rule itself: a hypothesis is better confirmed by a variety of evidence than by a narrow piece of evidence. The *other* item concerns the rationale of the rule or the demand for the rule. Here arise questions such as: what is the rationale of the methodological rule? Or why do we prefer or demand variety of evidence?

We endeavour here to highlight the second item by pointing out that there are many aspects[7] or kinds of the demand for or rationale of the methodological rule.

In the first place, one aspect of the demand for or rationale of variety of evidence is in the following. When we have (already) a definite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses between which we are to decide one, a variety of evidence helps us more to *eliminate* the false hypotheses than does the narrow range of evidence.[8]

Secondly, it is unquestionably true that there are cases in which a variety of evidence is preferred to narrow evidence, because the former helps us eliminate those hypotheses which have high prior probability among a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. Horwich has argued this preference.

Again, the demand for variety of evidence, Glymour says, arises in certain cases where the falsehood of a theory is suspected and this is not without reasons. According to him, a variety of evidence proves the falsity of the theory. This type of demand for variety can be explained in Bayesian framework, he opines.

There is *still more* to variety of evidence, says Glymour. Let suppose that we have a complex theory consisting of a considerable

number of hypotheses, which are independent of one another. Further, let us suppose that we have some evidence providing support to some of the hypotheses but not to the other hypotheses of the theory. Now, a variety of evidence is demanded to see whether those other hypotheses are tested and confirmed. Glymour wishes that this aspect of the demand for variety of evidence may be explicated in Bayesian terms. In the final section, I shall try to explain and thereby to defend another aspect of the demand for variety of evidence.

Now, I come to my observation on Horwich's position stated in section 2. Horwich has given, as I see, an explication or justification in Bayesian framework of the second aspect of the demand for variety of evidence mentioned above. In other words, in resolving the issue of why we prefer a variety of evidence to a narrow piece of evidence, Horwich has considered only one aspect of the preference in Bayesian terms. 'I would like to offer a Bayesian justification for these truisms'—one of which is the methodological rule itself. In order to provide the justification for the rule or the explication (in our view) of one aspect of the demand for variety of evidence, Horwich has started with a form of Bayes' theorem which, he claims, is applicable in a case where we have a number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses H_1, H_2,...,H_K, one of which is true. (But we do not know which one is true.) Then he makes the supposition that H_1 entails both E_D and E_N. This supposition seems to lead us to another supposition that other hypotheses Hj may or may not entail E_D and E_N. However, in consonance with Horwich's argument, the possibility of other hypotheses Hj entailing E_D and E_N is entertained. But one conspicuous difference—it appears on analysis—between H_1 on the one hand and Hj on the other hand—of which Horwich has somewhat implicitly mentioned—is this: the prior probability of H_1 is low, but the prior probability of Hj is high. Therefore, the posterior probability of E_D on Hj is less than the posterior probability of E_N on Hj. From this it follows: $P(H_1/E_D)>P(H_1/E_N)$. Thus we find that with a view to explaining in Bayesian terms the rationale of or the demand for variety of evidence, Howrich's philosophical position is confined to the case of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses.

SECTION 4

I shall endeavour, in this final section, to explain and thereby to defend another aspect, indicated in section 3, of the demand for variety of evidence or the rationale of variety of evidence by adhering to the Popperian view, and then to formulate the methodological rule in Bayesian framework—that is, by using the simple form of Bayes' theorem (T_2 given in Section 1).

The kind of demand for a variety of evidence arises when we are concerned with the degree of testability or falsifiability of a single theory or hypothesis. A theory or hypothesis will be more testable or falsifiable and so, according to Karl Popper[9], more scientific, if it is tested in a wide range of case. Such a test is called a severe test, where a theory exposes itself to possible refutation. In other words, a theory or hypothesis is better confirmed (or corroborated) by a variety of evidence than by a narrow class of evidence, because diverse evidence tends to refute or falsify the theory more readily than does the narrow piece of evidence. For example, the hypothesis 'All ravens are black' will be better confirmed by black ravens observed in various parts of the world than by the black ravens observed in south Hongkong alone. This is because of the intuitive idea (which, we suggest, may not be ignored) that the more the number of black ravens observed in variety of cases, the greater will be the possibility of the hypothesis to be falsified; while the observed black ravens in narrow case will decrease the possibility of the hypothesis to be falsified.

Therefore, if it is asked: *why* do we feel inclined to accept the methodological rule—a hypothesis is better confirmed by diverse evidence than by narrow evidence—our answer will be in terms of the aspect of the demand for variety explained above in this section.

We now proceed to explicate the methodological rule in Bayesian framework. We start with the simple form (T_2) of Bayes' theorem:

$$P(H/E)=\frac{P(H)P(E/H)}{P(E)}$$

Note that we consider only the comparative confirmation of a single hypothesis H on two bodies of evidence—diverse evidence E_D and narrow evidence E_N in order to explicate the methodological rule. That in such a case a single hypothesis should be considered is clear from and underpinned by Horwich's example: 'All ravens are black' and also by C.G. Hempel's example as given in his book *Philosophy of Natural Science*.[10]

Next, with Horwich we suppose that both E_D and E_N are entailed by H. Then by using A_4 of section 1, we have $P(E_D/H)=1$ and $P(E_N/H)=1$. Further, using T_3 or the above simple form of Bayes' theorem, we have

$$\frac{P(H/E_D)}{P(H/E_N)} = \frac{\dfrac{P(H)P(E_D/H)}{P(E_D)}}{\dfrac{P(H)P(E_N/H)}{P(E_N)}}$$

$$= \frac{P(H)P(E_D/H)}{P(E_D)} \times \frac{P(E_N)}{P(H)P(E_N/H)}$$

$$= \frac{P(E_N)}{P(E_D)}.$$

Now, given the background information, the probability of E_N—that is, $P(E_N)$—is always greater than the probability of E_D—that is, $P(E_D)$; symbolically, $P(E_N)>P(E_D)$. This is a well-known phenomenon. Hence, we have

$$P(H/E_D) > P(H/E_N).$$

That is, H is better confirmed by diverse evidence E_D than by narrow evidence E_N. This completes our explication of the methodological rule in the Bayesian framework.

In concluding this article I would like to point out that the methodological rule regarding the superiority or diversity of evidence is valid not only for the type of cases considered by Horwich but also for the type of cases not considered by him. Horwich considers those type of cases where a large number of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive rival hypotheses—of which one is true—is involved. He does not consider those type of cases where only a single hypothesis is involved and there is no rival hypothesis. Even in such a case, we have tried to show that a diversity of evidence is superior to the narrowness of evidence. Here diversity of evidence represents what Popper calls severity of tests. The Bayesian framework used by Horwich is not applicable to the type of cases of comparative confirmation of only single hypothesis which I have tried to account for by using an alternative Bayesian framework.

In other words, Horwich states the methodological principle—$P(H_1/E_D)>P(H_1/E_N)$—in the Bayesian framework and provides answers to the reason why we prefer a variety of evidence to narrow evidence also in Bayesian terms by using the complex form of Bayes' theorem. Here, I have developed a view in which the use of the simple form of Bayes' theorem is necessary—the view developed consists of the comparative confirmation or support of a single hypothesis provided by two types of evidence: diverse evidence E_D and narrow evidence E_N. I have shown that the methodological principle—$P(H/E_D)>P(H/E_N)$—can be explicated by exploiting the simple form of Bayes' theorem. The explication is supported by adopting Popperian approach—that is to say, the rationale of the rule or, more specifically, the kind of the demand for variety of evidence explained at the beginning of this section is provided by adopting Popperian approach. My endeavour in this article in a nutshell is this: I have not intended to argue against Horwich's position but to supplement him.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Thomas Bayes proved the theorem in 1763.
2. Paul Horwich, *Probability and Evidence*, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 118-122.
3. J. Worrall, 'Philosophy and Natural Sciences' in A. C. Grayling (ed.) *Philosophy2* (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 214.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 118.
5. *Op. cit.*
6. *Op. cit.*
7. Clark Glymour, in his *Theory and Evidence* (Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 76-77 has pointed out some aspects.
8. Clark Glymour has noted in *Theory and Evidence* (p. 76) that Abner Shimony in his 'Scientific Inference' in R. Colodny, *The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories* (Pittsburgh University Press, 1970) has provided a Bayesian account of this aspect of the demand for variety of evidence.
9. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Third edition 1969), p. 256.
10. C.G. Hempel in his *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 34-35 has considered the dependence of the confirmation of a single hypothesis, that is, Snell's law, on the variety of evidence 'the greater the variety, the stronger the resulting support'.

Eros, Nomos and Logos

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Wherever life is, 'Eros' may be presumed to be there. Some may go as far as to say that it is at the very heart of creation as 'attraction' or 'differential responsiveness' seems to define the very notion of any 'thing' being that particular thing and not something else. The thing, however, is not 'alone' or 'isolated' or a 'windowless monad' as Leibnitz thought, or as many Indian thinkers have conceived it to be.

'Attraction' is matched by 'repulsion' or 'rejection' as is the case with some of the fundamental forces postulated by physics for understanding the world. Yet, though most of the particles discovered by physics seem to be either positively or negatively charged, or even 'neutral', the 'binding' or the 'strong inter-active' forces in the nucleus give that 'stability' which makes something 'persist' through time. Also, the so-called 'neutral' particles themselves may be seen as constituted by positively and negatively charged particles combined in such a way as to cancel the 'opposite' charges and thus make the particle 'neutral'.

'Eros', thus, need not be conceived as pure attraction, unmixed with any 'counter' or 'negative' impulse, and yet the 'positive' has to preponderate if the movement towards 'unity' or 'togetherness' is to take place. Freud had to postulate a principle opposed to 'Eros' in order to understand the 'negative' in the context of 'life', and he called it Thanatos, i.e. the 'will to die', or that which negates life altogether.

The 'negative' at the human level creates problems of a different kind as it appears in consciousness as something 'undesirable', something to be 'overcome', something to be 'transformed', challenging man's imagination and creativity to attempt its mitigation, if not elimination. The dream of 'immortality' and 'perpetual youth'

have been a result of this, just as the development of 'practical medication' to ward off bodily disorders. The transformative reflection on these gave rise to 'systems of medicine' where theory took precedence over 'practice' and even laid down directions in which the latter was to develop and declare, on seemingly substantive grounds, all deviations as 'superstition'.

The 'religious' and 'meta-physical' systems developed to deal with the 'negative' at all levels displayed the same arrogance, declaring everything that the theory 'proved' could not be, to be 'unreal' or, as in the case of the former, as 'heretical' or 'blasphemous'. The former did the same in theory what the latter did in practice, i.e. 'elimination' or 'denial' of what proclaimed its 'reality' by perpetually questioning what Faith or Reason certified to be 'The True'. But neither Faith nor Reason can deny the 'reality' of what man brings into being through 'imagination' and 'action', or 'experiences' through what he imagines and creates and tries to 'understand' and 'know' that which he has brought into 'being and also himself as the 'agent' or the 'creator' or the 'occasion' through which all this happens, or comes into being.

The 'activity' is itself paradoxical as it simultaneously involves, or presupposes, both 'freedom' and 'causality' which are united, as Kant saw, in the Teleological judgement which is unintelligible and, hence, unacceptable to Reason or Logos, as the Greeks named it, and thus renders man 'unintelligible' to himself. Faith does not care for the 'absurdity' as its 'life' is 'lived' in it, but it too has to come to terms with the question of man's relationship to God or the deity, and the issue whether he can be 'free' in relation to it, or what would it really mean if he were to 'think' about it and make it not only intelligible, but also 'acceptable' to oneself.

The notion of 'freedom', however, not only involves the notion of 'causality', as we said a little while ago, but also the idea of 'rule' or 'restriction' as without it nothing can be built or brought into being. Kant saw this in his notions of 'constitutive' and 'regulative' rules without which one cannot delimit or demarcate or 'get going', or get out of 'Pure Nothing' or 'Pure Being' which, as Hegel says, means the same thing, as 'nothing' can truly be said about it as there can be no 'real predication' except an infinitely extensive 'not this', 'not this' or '*neti neti*', as the Indians said aloof the *Nirguṇa*

Brahmana or that which is absolutely qualitiless. This, in a different language, is 'Pure Possibility' and if something is to be, there must be a 'restriction' on it and, as Whitehead said, God has to be seen as the 'First Restriction' on this, so that the 'world' *can be.*

Logos, thus, brings in the notion of 'law', a law that governs whatever happens, or in accordance with which it occurs, whether we know it or not. This is the 'revolutionary suspicion' which occurs to the self-consciousness of man and he tries to know it so that he may 'understand' all that is, and 'why' it is what it is. But all 'knowledge' raises the question 'what to do with it', and this opens the Pandora's Box as there can be no one settled answer to it, in principle. Whatever be the 'choice'—and the choice will vary with the person concerned—it will bring something into being whose 'effects' cannot be foretold either on oneself or on others. But once it has come into being, it begins to have a reality of its own, independent of the person or persons who brought it into being. It becomes, so to say, a part of the 'natural world order', even though it would not have come into being without the human being or beings who have been the occasion for it. This, however, results in its being seen as an 'object' among other 'objects' in the world demanding to be 'understood' both in terms of 'what it is' and 'what it can do to others'. It begins, thus, to have both a 'structure' and a 'causality' like everything else, except for the radical difference that its 'origin' lies in 'human choice' and thus has to be 'understood' in terms of something that has an essential 'indeterminacy' and 'plurality' in-built in it.

The 'natural world' that is presupposed by man as completely independent of him, may have had also been determined by an initial limiting condition which may be called 'God' or 'the Big Bang' or 'X' to avoid misleading associations, cannot have this 'plurality' or 'indeterminacy', or rather 'indeterminate pluralities' unless it is conceived on the analogy of what we find in the human world.

But once it is conceived of in this way, we will face the same problem, as we do in the case of the human world; something which seems to be at least *prima facie* suggested or supported by the way physics conceives of the evolution of 'matter' and the 'material universe' where 'plurality' and 'indeterminacy' do not deny

'causality', but make us see it only in a different way. In case it is accepted that what we call 'matter' has different 'forms' or 'levels' where each presupposes the 'other' but is not completely 'determined' by it, we would have to think of the idea of different types of 'causality' where the 'autonomy' of catch level or form of organization does not have its own 'freedom' compromized by the fact that it presupposes its being limited by the 'causality' of that which it presupposes, just as its autonomous way of functioning does not 'destroy'; the 'freedom' of that which presupposes it for its 'being' or'reality' or existence'.

The only alternative to this is to accept only one type of 'causality' where the absolute 'contingency' or 'freedom'determines everything else in the sense that it could *all* be predicted or foretold in its minutest detail by one who 'knows' the nature of that 'causality'. The second alternative between 'contingency' and 'freedom' postulated for the initial limiting condition would, thus, be seen to be illusory or only verbal in character as the so-called 'free' being or God or *Īśwara* is as helpless in respect of what follows as the so-called 'Big Bang' which the scientists are so fond of postulating these days.

The only other alternative is to give up the continuity between inanimate matter, or what physics, chemistry and the allied sciences study and the world of 'living beings' which itself is radically divided between 'plant life', 'animal life' and 'human life', or as we find man 'living' it now. The continuity between these three forms of 'life' and their 'dependence' on what is called 'matter' is obvious, but so also are the differences between them and the startling fact that each of the 'succeeding life form' depends on the previous one to an extent that is unthinkable and which has been brought to self-consciousness by recent studies in ecology, though even in ancient times man was aware of it and the moral dilemma it posed for him. Yet, it is equally a fact that man's relationship seems immediate and direct with the world of animals and plants, while his relation to the world of 'matter' is 'mediated' through them. The so-called 'biosphere' on which man depends was created by the plant and the animal world and their interaction with each other on the one hand, and what we call 'nature' on the other. The transformation of 'inorganic' matter into that

which is called 'organic' is the real mystery on which all 'life forms' flourish on this planet as we know it.

The story of these successive transformations which might have occurred even earlier in the evolution of matter from 'free particles, into stable nucleir resulting in the formation of what we call 'atoms' on the one hand and the basic 92 elements out of which the whole world is said to be made, is an evidence of this. But the creation or discovery of trans-uranium elements and states of matter beyond the solid, liquid and gaseous, which had been known to man earlier, has led not only to the question whether our traditional understanding of 'matter' was really correct, but also to the challenge of creating 'new' forms of matter that have never 'existed' before, because of the 'new' knowledge we have regarding its functioning. The idea of 'emergence' is slowly giving way to the idea of 'creation' through what may be called 'engineering' at all levels, including that of 'matter' or the physical universe.

But 'creation' is a strange 'thing', or rather an 'activity' whose nature is difficult to grasp, as what comes into being through it for whatever reasons, becomes independent in the sense of having a 'being' or 'nature' of its own which always consists in the impulse to 'self-maintenance', 'resistance to change' and the capacity and capability of becoming a 'creative' centre itself, giving rise to other beings that may be similar or dissimilar to itself, depending perhaps on the fact whether they originate from itself alone, or in combination with others.

The 'causality' that is involved in the notion of 'creativity' has seldom been reflected upon, just as the 'causality' of that which it has brought into being. The same is the case with the 'causality' of a plurality of beings in interactive interaction between themselves, resulting in the production of something which none of them could have brought about on their own. The usual thought in this regard has talked of 'plurality of causes' and 'inter-mixture of effects', but it has always been thought to be the result of a lack of sufficient analysis as the latter, if undertaken, would have revealed that each 'separate' cause has a 'separate' effect distinctly differentiable from others. The idea of a 'one-one' correlation between 'cause' and 'effect' has plagued thought since its beginning, without anyone ever having asked what was meant by 'one', and how

did this 'one' come into being, or how if it *was* 'one', it did become 'many'? In fact, that which is 'many' can become organized and function in a new unitary way and may be regarded as 'one', just as the 'one' may sub-divide into the 'many' which function 'relatively autonomously' in respect of it and are expected to do so, or just disintegrate into a 'multiplicity' where each is independent of the other, and also of that of which they earlier formed a part.

The problem of 'causality', thus, is far more complex than the simplistic way in which it has been thought of, as a category necessary for understanding any phenomenon. The relation between 'parts' and 'whole' where the parts contribute not only towards the maintenance of the 'whole', but also to its effective functioning as a 'unitary entity' in relation to other 'wholes' which are in such an inter-relationship that they *all* mutually influence one another. The perspective that is opened by this way of thinking may, and in fact, has led to the idea of conceiving the 'universe' or 'all that is' as one entity which has no other 'whole' besides itself to influence or be influenced and hence function as 'determining' or 'causing' or 'influencing' only the parts which constitute it as it is 'one' without a 'second' and the 'second' or 'others' that are there are only its 'parts'. This is the notion of a 'universal order' or *Ṛta* which governs everything and thus 'determines' whatever 'is' to be what it is.

But this is to forget that the so-called 'parts' are themselves not only 'whole' but 'active agents' in the maintenance and functioning of the so-called 'universe', which itself is not a completed whole as it is continuously interactive with its so-called 'parts' and 'influencing' and 'being influenced' by them and, in the process, 'changing' them and 'changing' itself. There are no 'wholes' which have no 'parts' with which it does not have this interactive relationship, implying that there is no such thing as 'parts' that are not 'whole', or 'wholes' which have no parts. These ideas have led human reason to believe that there are ultimate elements and that they together form an ultimate 'whole' which it understands as the 'universe', without seeing the contradiction involved in it. The 'elements' could surely have had different organizations and thus could result in different universes. It is bound to be objected that even though the possibility of alternative combinations cannot be denied, the fact is that the universe as we 'know' it at present is

the only universe we have and that we have to understand it. Its 'seeming contingency' arises from 'vacuous possibilities' and the postulation of a universal causal principle avoids this and shows its 'necessity' to be what it is.

But the 'necessity' of what 'is' also entails the 'necessity' of 'what will be' and thus render all human effort and action 'meaningless', just as the 'retrospective' necessity of all that was makes all history meaningless, rendering all the seers, saints, prophets, geniuses, i.e. those of whom we feel justly proud, as having been the victims of an illusion and, in the process, making us also succumb to it.

Reason or Logos, thus, has brought us to an 'absurdity' which is refuted every time anyone 'acts', whether he is a 'genius' or not. Man is the 'living' refutation and the constant 'questioner' of that which the Logos proclaims as 'Truth', truth with a capital 'L', as people are fond of saying it. The truth of 'Logos' is overcome or transcended or even negated by the 'truth' of 'freedom' self-consciously 'felt' and 'experienced' by every human being when he intends and wills and makes the physical and mental effort to act and, if this be an 'illusion' as Logos insists, then we can only say that it is an 'effective illusion', an 'effectivity' that is a sign of something being 'real' and not a nothing, or absolute non-Being which the Logos itself thinks of and characterises as such.

Traditional thought in India saw the dilemma and formulated the concept of *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* and called it *Māyā* i.e. something which could neither be characterized as 'being' or 'non-being' as it was 'unreal' to thought, but still 'causally effective' and through that creating a 'world' which was the source of joy and sorrow and thus leading one to ever renewed 'action' to get 'more' of the one and 'less' of the other, if one could not get rid of it altogether.

But if this is the way one looks at things, then one will have two opposed and conflicting 'ideals' or *puruṣārthas* to realize—the one immanent in the notion of Reason or Logos or knowledge, and the other immanent in will or action. The former will see the latter as based on a foundational illusion or ignorance or *avidyā* that believes or thinks that the 'Real' can never be other than what it is and has always been, something timeless and eternal and unchanging. The latter, which is also based on 'experience', cannot but take the notion of time with its distinctions of past, present and

future seriously along with the notion of 'freedom' which makes one feel and say not only that 'I am', as Fichte thought, or 'I think' as Descartes did, but that 'I can effect or change things or 'situations' as I have the power to do so and hence am responsible and accountable for what I do as it is mine and not anybody else's'.

The distinction between 'mine' and 'thine' thus brought into being is not a notion of 'possession as Kant thought in his *Science of Right*, but an 'ownership' of 'responsibility' for what one does with one's freedom. Mere talk of 'good will' will not help as even the 'good will' shall have to 'will' something and own responsibility for it. But what is this 'will' to will, or for what the 'freedom' is to be exercised or used for, is the central question which needs to be answered, as 'freedom' by itself does not mean anything. Freedom, whether it be 'freedom from' or 'freedom to do' or 'freedom to be', needs always the 'power' to bring something into being which is not there or maintain what is there it would change into something that is 'undesirable' for some reason or other.

But what is this exercise of 'freedom' and what is that which determines what is to be maintained and what is to be changed and, if so, how? If something is to be maintained or changed, it has to be there already and is thus presupposed as an *a priori* precondition of the 'exercise' of freedom that makes us feel and realize that we are free. But what is thus presupposed is itself in most cases a result of the exercise of freedom by others or oneself in the past. It is the 'result' of the exercise of freedom that one finds around one all the time and which one finds 'acceptable' or 'unacceptable', 'desirable' or 'undesirable'. Freedom, thus, confronts itself with its own 'creations' and finds itself 'bound' or 'freed' by them. The ambivalent paradox of the exercise of freedom, thus, is that it may restrict or enhance itself through this 'exercise' and find itself increasingly limited, constrained and enmeshed by what has created, like a spider caught in its own net. But the 'net' that one weaves may involve others and thus, inadvertently, one may become the cause or the occasion for the enhancement or restriction of the freedom of 'others' and not only of the freedom of oneself.

Freedom, thus, may be lessened or enhanced through its exercise just like all other capacities or skills and, if so, its 'exercise' has to be 'self-governed' by at least this consideration in which the

'affected others' are as important as oneself. This is the root of what the Greeks called *Nomos* and the Indians *dharma* in their respective traditions of thinking on the subject. The possibility of the 'negative' here is equal to, or even greater, than that of the positive, particularly as the self-consciousness from which action emanates is inevitably 'self-centred'. The 'other' is only at the periphery of consciousness if it ever is and, in most cases, is seen only in relation to one's own interests which naturally appear as 'centred' in oneself. The inculcation of 'the other-centred consciousness, in that which is structurally 'self-centric' or 'I-centric' has been the perennial problem for man and what is called *Nomos* or *dharma* is the name which man has given to this impossible enterprise, as without it man cannot became 'human' or be 'humanized' for he cannot be completely governed by, or be subject to, some natural order or *ṛta* to which all other beings are subject, as he alone is 'free' and 'feels' himself to be so and behaves as if it were so. How to bring into being something analogous to the 'natural order' which may yet preserve and enhance one's and everybody else's freedom has, thus, been the central problem to which humanity has perennially addressed itself.

The enlargement of freedom, paradoxically, presupposes the existence of an 'order' precedent to it, that is analogous and yet different from the 'causal order' in the universe which it also presupposes for its effective exercise. Unlike the latter, however, it has to be created and maintained by human beings through continuous repeated effort, for it would collapse if it were not done so. But as it is subject to this continuous maintenance on his part, it is also continuously changing because this is involved in the very idea of 'maintenance' as this is done by beings who are 'free' and hence may deviate marginally from what is required due to diverse factors, including the desire to get rid of the obvious deficiencies that have been found in its working, or even to improve it further. The 'human order' that thus comes into being through the continued effort of myriads of human beings is not only subject to continuous changes, but also the 'appearance' of being something analogous to 'nature' with an 'inevitability' of its own, about which human beings can do very little. This, of course, is an illusion as everyone continuously goes on trying to exercise his 'freedom' to

achieve what he wants to achieve, even though he 'knows' that it is unlikely to happen the way he wants it to happen.

The 'feeling' of freedom thus gives rise to its opposite and one feels 'unfree' rather than free which, if reflected upon, might provide a crucial clue to the dilemma structurally involved in the human situation which is defined by the fact that it cannot but be self-conscious of itself and of the 'other' in relation to this 'self-consciousness'.

The relation between the 'self' and the 'other' thus becomes central to the problem of 'freedom'. But the 'other' is not just an individual, personal 'other'; rather, it is a variegated, differentiated 'other' which includes everything, both in its totality, multiplicity and unity which is made possible by the fact of 'self-consciousness' itself. The sense of 'obligatoriness' that this brings into being lies at the heart of the 'moral consciousness' which the 'self-centred' feeling of freedom 'feels' as a 'restriction' on itself and thus as a bondage from which it wants to become 'free'.

The 'seeking' for 'freedom' may take different forms, ranging from those who renounce the 'world' with all the 'obligations' that it entails to the willful 'law-breakers' or 'criminal' who generally thinks he will be clever enough or lucky to escape detection or being found out, or somehow get around the net he has woven for himself. Both these extremes, and the many others lying between them, rest on the mistake or the illusion that this can enhance their 'freedom' or even free them in the minimal sense without the 'other' and its fulfilment of the complementary obligations that it has to one who thinks he can be 'freed' by denying or cheating or deceiving, as the case may be. The actual fact of 'dependence' on others is not annulled or lessened thereby. Rather, the 'unfreedom' increases or takes a different direction or even assumes a different form.

The problem, then, is how to 'turn' or 'change' or 'transform' the feeling of 'unfreedom' brought into 'self-consciousness' by the very structure of self-consciousness which necessarily involves an awareness of the 'other', the multiple others, and an obligation towards them not to hurt or harm or injure in any way whatsoever, if not help them to the extent one can, in becoming 'freer', better, more 'other-centered' and 'helpful' in the best way one

can. This perhaps is what the *Gītā* meant when it said *Parasparaṁ bhāvayantaḥ śreyaḥ, paramvāpsyatha.* The key terms used are *paraspara* and *śreyaḥ,* the former implying a relation of perfect equality between the self and the other, while the latter involves an element of 'universality' and 'objectivity' or at least 'inter-subjectivity' which does not deny the notion of that which is 'pleasing' or *preyasa* but overcomes its pure subjectivity and its centrality when it begins to take precedence over the '*preyasa*' of others.

The *Śreyasa* or the *Nomos,* like the *Logos,* involves a distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality', a 'suspicion' or 'apprehension' that the immediately 'sensible', whether in terms of perception or feeling, may be deceptive in terms of its promised relationship to the whole of which it may form an element or the causal relationship it may have to that which one 'wants' and looks forward to in the future, or both. They both question the illusory self-sufficiency of the present and tend to see it in the context of an 'order' which it presupposes but which is not exactly known to man and is unknowable in its completeness as even if it is implied in everything we 'experience' or do, its apprehension and articulation is an indefinitely extended, 'unending' activity of innumerable generations in time.

But even though this seems correct at first sight, there is a deep gulf or even a contradiction between the two presupposed 'orders' and raises the question of the relation between the two as each nullifies the other. The former, i.e. *dharma* or *Nomos,* depends entirely on man, while the latter, i.e. *Logos,* is supposed to be independent of him, and totally unaffected by what man does or does not do. From the viewpoint of the latter, the former is an illusion, though an effective illusion misleading mankind through the ages. On the other hand, if the former has any truth about it, the latter cannot be the case as man's freedom and its exercise increasingly become an integral part of 'reality' and makes it dependent on what he does or does not do.

Logos and *Nomos* are, thus, at odds with each other, and man is a victim of the conflict between the two, neither of which he can give up as one is required for 'knowledge' and the other for 'action. The primacy given to the one or the other determines the direction which the attempts at a solution take place within a culture

or even in an individual who is self-reflective and becomes aware of the problem. The conflict ultimately is between the 'True' and the 'Good', and as both are values, which is treated as primary and which as secondary, or which as subservient and instrumental to the other, becomes the central question both for individuals and cultures alike.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that both arise within a human context and because of the fact that one has become self-conscious for some reason and thus is aware of these two opposite values which, though 'given' in a certain sense, have to be 'sought' and realized within the human situation as 'lived' by one and 'known' or 'discovered' through this seeking. There is no such thing as the Truth or the Good, given and found for once and all and, what is perhaps even worse is that even among the 'known' or the 'discovered' at any time or place, there always are many 'truths' and many 'goods' pertaining to diverse fields, and that there is a conflict of opinion about them or difference about the importance or the primacy one should accord them. This, though disheartening to those who want certainty and finality of 'faith' in these realms is, however, the basis of that continuous exploration and experimentation that lies at the heart of human enterprise, both in the field of knowledge and action.

Exploration and experimentation, however, require some 'base' to start from which itself has to be incomplete and inadequate to permit, or even require, an 'open-ended' challenge for its further construction, correction, emendation, addition along with the enthusiasm, the energy, the elan and the thirst for novelty that creates the dissatisfaction with what is there or has been achieved and the 'impulse' that urges man to seek something else, whatever it be. It is, in other words, the 'youth' versus the 'old', the eternal *Eros* against both the *Logos* and the *Nomos*, a revolt and a rebellion which still has to assume 'something' to 'rebel' against and 'something' to 'stand' upon. Both are there in the *Logos* and the *Nomos*, the Realms of Order discovered or built by those who were 'youths' earlier and who themselves had rebelled, or gone though the cycle once before.

What is presupposed by human action, thus, is a preexistent order which still needs through his effort, individual and collective, development in new directions which appear more desirable and

meaningful than the one that existed before. The 'knowledge' that such an action presupposes is of such a varied kind, both in its certainty and completeness, that most thinking about action at the human level seems too simplistic to those who are actually engaged in action. This is generally the result of an almost total misunderstanding about the nature of that which human action presupposes and the type of 'causality' that operates therein and the end or 'purposes' that the action is supposed to bring about, and the 'knowledge' regarding these that one generally has and which one wants to increase or augment further. What human action is concerned with is other human beings and what it presupposes is what other human beings have created, including oneself, whose 'being' and 'causality' is totally different from the 'being' and 'causality' encountered in all other realms, including that of the 'living beings', excluding man and the world they have created and go on creating.

The incredible indeterminacy of the 'being' of man and the world that he creates and the absence of what have been called 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions in the context of 'causality' that pertains to this world renders all thinking based on the usual understanding of those concepts developed during man's interaction with the 'natural' world in which he has lived and which his biological being presupposes and which thus is also relevant to the 'life' he lives as do all other 'living beings', is not only irrelevant but harmful as it leads action in the wrong direction. The model for action in the human realm becomes increasingly patterned on what man does with the 'natural realm', and which is known by the general name of 'engineering'. The 'successes' in this regard have blinded man to the essential 'failure' that surrounds him all around. The 'Great Failures' of the twentieth century embodied in 'Reason gone Mad' in the Soviet and the Nazi 'experiments' and the one enacted now at the beginning of the twenty-first century represented by Bush, Rumsfeid and Company in the US with their openly declared Doctrine of Unilateral Intervention exemplified in their war on Iraq in open defiance of the UN and the world opinion is as telling an evidence of this as anything can be.

The 'reason' that has to deal with the human reality and action in respect of it has, then, to be different from the one embodied in the notion of Logos as understood by the Greeks and as embod-

ied in the formal-deductive notion of pure logical reason as exemplified by Aristotle. The developments of non-Euclidean Geonetries and the recourse to statistical notion of truth, or the development of different kinds of logic do not significantly affect the 'engineering' notion of 'applied reason', as is evident in the whole spectrum of technologies that have come into being after the so-called liquidation of the classical model of Reason given to us by Aristotle and Euclid in their works. And, if one were to judge by the results these changes in the notion of 'Logical Reason' have brought about, then the actions of the most advanced world-center of all these, i.e. the US, may be taken as almost conclusive evidence in this regard.

Human reality, thus, cannot be 'understood' in the usual sense of understanding, as neither the Aristotelian nor the Kantian categories are applicable to this realm, without such radical modification as would 'destroy' the categorial nature of the categories altogether. Hegel comes nearer as he sees 'reality' in terms of a process in which 'negation' rules supreme, for if there is 'change', and change is inevitable and intrinsic to the notion of 'process', then there has to be 'negation' in it. But he does not know how to accommodate the 'reality' of 'freedom' which is at the heart of human reality, nor the 'positive' which man always seeks through 'freedom'. The idea of 'dialectics' does give some insight, but it is too mechanically formulated with the inevitability of 'progressive synthesis' in-built into it. Kant had talked of Freedom as the fundamental presupposition and foundation of human action which has to be 'moral' if it is to be 'human', an insight which most thinkers who have thought about 'freedom' have forgotten as they tend to conceive of it as 'value-neutral' or confined in what Sartre called 'l'acte gratuit'. But Kant's notion of morality is too individual-centred, even though he tries to bring in 'universality' through the three well-known maxims that he formulates. The empty formalism of the 'good will' and its 'disconnection' with the maxims as the latter do not form an integral part of it, or 'follow' from it by any 'transcendental deduction' which is such an important feature of Kant's thinking, is sought to be remedied by him in his *Science of Right* where, through the notion of 'right', that is something as 'mine', the idea of a community of 'free beings' is developed where 'thine' is as important as 'mine' with a reciprocal

'obligation' of respect and even facilitating the realization and actualization of the 'right' of each by all the others becomes the 'content' of the 'good will' that follows from the ontological reality of freedom presupposed by human actions.

This aspect of Kant's thought has not been paid sufficient attention, nor its relation to the work on *Perpetual Peace* which perhaps was his last work. But Kant's thinking in the *Science of Right* is too confined to the notion of a legal system, and even these he does not see it in a historical context, changing due to its failure to concretize the 'good will' as Hegel perhaps might have done. The failure of subsequent thinkers to build on the Kantian insight and retreat into an anarchic-existential-value-neutral notion of freedom as in existentialist and post-modernist thought whose linkages may be seen in Nietzche, or even earlier, shows a total unawareness of the fact that whatever the 'will' chooses always has to have a value-dimension attached, no matter whether this be positive or negative. The will that chooses 'evil' chooses it because it is evil and if, like Satan, it says 'Let evil be my good', then it sees it as good. The only alternative to this is to forget or forego the notion of 'choice' that is rooted in freedom and relapse into a state where unconscious 'habit' rules everything and which is as close to the 'animal world' as a human being can get.

There is, of course, another ideal similar to this, but in spirit it is just the opposite. It is the ideal of the saint or what Kant called the 'Holy Will', or what in some Indian traditions has been called the *Sahaja*, i.e. a consciousness that has transcended the distinction between 'good' and 'evil', but which naturally does what is 'right' and, in a deeper sense, radiates 'value' through its very 'being' or the fact that it is.

The human world, however, is in between, and it is there that *Logos* and *Nomos* reign supreme as it is built on their basis, though it is rooted in *Eros* whose nature no one 'knows', though it is there all the time and is the *Prime Mover*, or the Force that does not let anyone rest ever.

The 'order' that men build and call the 'world' and the idea of which they superimpose on the 'non-human' world that, to them, appears as 'given' and which they try to capture through their attempts to 'know' it and which, in turn, they transfer to the 'world'

built by them, is the 'circle' in which man 'lives', trying to negotiate between the two 'orders' which, in very different ways, are each built by him. The 'House of Knowledge' has to be built by man as any other 'house', and has to be built the same way, by continued maintenance, modification, correction, addition and attempt at an 'appearance' of a coherent, finished, integrated aesthetic 'whole', which it can never be, though man hopes that some day it shall be so and it is this 'hope' or 'faith' that ever spurs and lures him on.

Paradoxically, one does not believe this in respect of 'knowledge', though has little hesitation in acknowledging that in other realms it is not so. The dream of a 'utopia' is always there, but no one believes that it already exists, as one does in the case of knowledge. Perhaps, the illusion in the case of the latter arises because of the fact that it is taught, and has to be taught, while in most other cases it has to be 'lived', and one knows its insufficiency, inadequacy and imperfection in a more personal, existential and deeper manner than in the case of 'knowledge' which somehow seems more 'external' and 'objective' to oneself, even when one finds that it is not what it claims to be.

The continuous questioning of both *Logos* and *Nomos* by oneself and others in each succeeding generation, results in that ever-continuing attempt to find a more satisfactory solution which has given rise to what we call 'civilizations' that define the distinctive 'being' of man as different from all other beings in the world.

Behind and beneath the building and construction of civilizations, there lies the dissatisfaction and the frustration that man feels in respect of whatver 'is' as, for his consciousness, it could always be thought of or imagined as different from what it is, and thus challenging him to change it, many a time just for the sake of 'change' or 'variety' or 'novelty', but also in the hope that it would be better for oneself and others, and that the world he lives in would be a better place to 'live' in.

Eros is the name for this, and has to be understood in this way, and not the way it has been in almost all the traditions of the world up till now. It is not *kāma*, or the 'pleasure-seeking' polymorphous, anarchic perversity as Freud saw it, or even the *vasana* or *trasṅā* as the *śramana* or the 'world-denying' traditions of India called it, but

pravṛtti or the ever-outward oriented, positive, valuational consciousness of man which is fascinated by the unending challenges posed to it by the incessant 'demand' and the resulting 'obligation' it feels for bringing the ideals vaguely apprehended into palpable 'living' reality and is prepared to endure with immense fortitude and patience the unbelievable effort that is involved in it.

This is the story of man and of the civilizations that he has built and, what is even stranger, is the fact that even those that have sought to deny it and argued for a different ideal, have been co-opted by the Eros underlying human reality and the ever-green and ever-revived creative impulse that it generates and cannot live without, as the myriad statutes of the Buddha loudly proclaim, visibly denying the so-called Truth that he proclaimed that 'Everything is suffering' or *Sabbam Dukkam*. The *Dharma* and the *Sangha* has to be created in this very world to give a lie, and to be the self-refutation of the Truth that Buddha is supposed to have proclaimed, just as the 'Living Body of the Church' was a refutation of the Christ on the Cross in Christianity.

Man cannot live 'with' or 'in', the 'denial' of the world, or of the desire to make it a little better, or to build anew, or make a fresh start, and to 'know' it a little more, to unravel its secret to the extent he can.

The source and the secret of this impulse in man which makes him accept 'suffering' as the price of this ceaseless endeavour is, however, conditional. The 'suffering' is acceptable only if it is 'necessary' for the realization of that which man accepts, and if it is not 'meaningless', and if it is not felt as a manifest injustice in the arrangement of men, and due to what man does to man and which seems so obviously 'avoidable' in the circumstances that obtain. Inequalities may be unavoidable, but not 'inhumanity'. Pain and suffering may have to be there, but not cruelty and disease and disability no one will be willing to accept, even if 'ageing' has to be accepted as a necessary part of life, and something to be 'lived' with.

The point is that there is nothing in 'suffering' that is to be glorified, nor is it the essence or 'truth' of life. That is the truth which the 'pleasure'-centred view of Eros contains, but it does not understand itself as it is only the half-truth of the world we live in,

and even there it is more concerned with the 'other', the concrete other rather than one-self.

The problem of the impersonal 'other' with which the idea of 'impersonal order' is concerned and which institutions embody in themselves, and which were collectively called *Nomos* in the Greek tradition and its relation to the concrete truth of 'interpersonally lived relationships', has been hardly paid any attention except perhaps in the thought of Confucius which, in any case, has hardly interested anybody as it lacks that transcendental dimension which seems so dear to man.

The secularization of the transcendental and the transformation of the 'sensuously given' into that miraculous something which is non-sensuous without losing its sensousness, and thus misleading the unwary observer into thinking that it is 'sensuous' still, is done through an infusion of 'values' and making it not only the symbol of something else, but also a halting step in a forward movement beyond itself because of the imperfection and incompleteness of both that was sought to be 'mirrored', and that which was sought to be realized.

This happens because the 'mirroring' and the 'realization' are mediated by an unending stream of consciousness in space and time, even though the individual 'self-consciousness' enclosed and imprisoned within itself thinks otherwise. The objective evidence makes no difference to the self-certitude of the 'I-centred' consciousness that suffers from the structural illusion that it always was, and will be what it is, forgetting the *Nomos* and the *Logos* which have formed and shaped it continually since it came into being in this world. A little self-reflection and an effort at imaginative identification with the underlying *Eros* of its own reality, in the sense in which we have used it, might help in mitigating or lessening the stranglehold of 'I-centricity' that seems to be the inevitable result of self-consciousness in man. It might also, hopefully, make men more aware of their 'indebtedness' to the past generations who had built what he has inherited and 'responsible' towards the future generations for whom he would leave the world just as others did before him, when he came into being.

Discussion and Comments

Comments on the Article Entitled 'Rasa—The Bane of Indian Aesthetics'

In the article 'Rasa—The Bane of Indian aesthetics' by Daya Krishna, it was as if the author put into words what I have been feeling about the subject all along.

I remember, way back perhaps in 1943 or 1944, I met a great musician and teacher, Ratnajankar. We were discussing emotion and music. Most emphatically, he said 'music has nothing to do with emotion. Emotion, any emotion, is a disturbed state of mind, and music begins with a quiet mind and ends with a still deeper tranquility of mind'. It took me many years to understand the significance of what he said. Music renders some sort of structure or form to silence. Silence has different forms, the silence of a deep well is diferent from the silence of a mountain top. Can one hear silence? Of course not—not with the physical senses with which you hear only sound. But one experiences silence. So is the case darkness, or even with light, for what one sees with physical eyes are only lit surface and not light. One experiences light and also darkness.

The bedrock of all experience is form and consciousness which supports the form. By 'form' one must not understand outline: the outline is only a *nām* or definition and at most a symbol. Though a symbol is much more than a form, as I will try to show later. A form is a filled in content shape in space, whether inner or outer. Thus, form changes with the content.

There are levels of knowledge. The most superficial one is what we learn in our schools, universities or through books. Deeper than that is understanding. Kant is right when he calls a person who bases his understanding on books immature. Deeper than understanding is experience. Deeper than experience is realization. And deeper than realization is, perhaps, Being. Then you do not only realize that knowledge but you ARE that knowledge. Buddha did not only realize peace, he was Peace himself. It is said of him that

wherever he moved, within a radius of fifty miles peace and harmony prevailed.

The development of experience is from gross to less gross to subtle to the more subtle. This includes the activity of both the intellect and the heart. Supress one and it becomes unbalanced. This perhaps is the bane of the modem so-called scientific thinking—a total ignoring of the demands of the heart. An interesting statement of Einstein is, 'As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain and as far as they are certain they do not refer to reality.'

With animals, senses are at one with nature. Not so with man. With man, unity with nature takes place through thought or imagination. This enables man to create art and philosophy and science. Though senses and thought are intertwined, yet it-onement with nature happens with man through thought and not senses. Both imagination and thought spring from the same source: the power of knowing.

Imagination takes two directions: one is fantasy which is self gratifying, and the other is the search for truth through images and symbols. So does thought take two directions: one is to meet practical necessities and the other is the pure search for truth by way of ideas and concepts. The culmination of imagination is in institution and inspiration, and the culmination of thought is in insight and understanding. Both are essentially the same. One is art, the other is philosophy. Art is skill and vision. Skill is learnt; it is what passes on to the disciple. Continuity of skill from generation to generation is tradition. Of course, all sorts of changes occur in skills, it can be simplified or become more and more complex; it can adapt one particular style, discard it and take on another, and so on and so forth. Each change of style evolves its own laws of composition, patterns, balance and measure. Vision, however, is another matter. One can't pass on or learn vision. It depends upon some unknown factor or factors. Call it inspiration or intuition or the urge to seek the essence which remains unknown. One can't invite an unknown guest. The guest may come suddenly or he may never come. All one can do is to keep one's house in order. In arts, acquiring the skills and constantly polishing them amounts to keeping the house in order.

Vision is always of something beyond, of the unknown which one has not experienced. It is a mystery that eludes. It should be clearly remembered that it has nothing to do with naïve agnostism, as those wedded to mental concepts might suppose. On the contrary, man has the deepest relationship with it. In short, it is transcendence.

Artists lacking vision fall back upon the known, be it a sentiment, an emotion, a feeling, a sensation or even a fact which nowadays passes under the name of Realism. They use the acquired skill in the service of the 'known'. And since it is known to both the artists and the connoisseurs (*Rasiks*), there is no dearth of such professional artists and professional *rasiks*. Anyway, it still has its utility, for example in painting decorations of walls and in other cases of entertainment.

SYMBOL

Primarily, symbol is the link between the gross and the subtle, the visible and invisible, between the form and the formless. Moreover, it acts both as a symbol as well as a manifestation of the reality behind the symbol. Further, one symbol may represent many archetypal realities or a combination of them, and one archetypal reality may manifest itself through many symbols. Art, when it attains the dignity of a symbol, becomes great art.

EXPRESSED AND THE UNEXPRESSED

Every art expresses something, and yet of the very thing expressed there remains a lot unexpressed which may be as important as that which is expressed. A great master somehow manages to integrate the unexpressed with the expressed. In visual arts through invisible lines and forms, in music and dance through significant pauses, in poetry and literature through words and their symbolic value. The integration of the expressed and unexpressed gives wholeness to art.

COMPOSITION, BALANCE, RHYTHM, PATTERN AND MEASURE

Balance, rhythm, pattern and measure can be observed in nature. With composition enters a mental element; here the creativity of the artist reaches its apex. Unity and harmony are most elusive as

well as most essential elements without which a work of art remains on merely superficial aesthetic level, or a craft.

UNITY AND HARMONY

Unity, the most mysterious element, is neither a thing nor a form nor a quality nor substance. Like the unknown guest it may come or it may elude. Perhaps intense devotion of the artist to his art or intense concentration on the central point (I would not call it an idea unless by 'ideal' we mean a point of vision) and then, and then alone, does the whole start reflecting in each part—which is harmony. One may describe harmony as the moving image of unity.

Around and within these reflections as a background, I am trying to see the arts—painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, literature, dance and music. A word about dance: Hellen Keller, that extraordinary woman, born blind, deaf and dumb, wanted to know what dance was. A well-known dancer offered to show her what it was, made some movements and with touch Hellen Keller tried to understand the movements. Then he asked her to dance with him. In no time she picked up the rhythm. After the dance was over she exclaimed 'Oh! It is like thought'. This remark of hers awakened an insight in me. Dance is not like thought, it actually is thought. Thought, using the body as a medium. Those who see only the graceful movements of the body in dance miss the point altogether. The body is merely a medium and the medium is certainly not the message.

The idea that dance is thought may become somewhat clear by looking at the bronze statue of Natraj, the dancing Shiva. After all, it is not a piece of metal before you which is moving or dancing. It is your thought or imagination which dances along with its lines and form. T.S. Eliot has expressed the same idea in poetry—'A Chinese jar still, moves perpetually in its stillness'.

In all arts, time and space—both inner and the outer—play an essential role. Shall deal with this aspect later.

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The Freedom of the Will and Agentive Behaviour: A Short Note

FREEDOM OF THE WILL

What is the freedom of the will? 'Free Will' is a philosophical term for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility.... On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire... The main perceived threats to our freedom of will are various alleged determinisms: physical/causal; psychological; biological; theological' (O'Connor 2005).

According to the Laplacian determinist, 'if an ideal observer knew the positions of all the particles at a given instant and knew all the laws governing their movements, he would be able to predict and retrodict the entire history of the universe'. According to Searle (1984), one is confronted by a characteristic philosophical conundrum, 'On the one hand, a set of very powerful arguments force us to the conclusion that free will has no place in the universe; on the other hand, a series of powerful arguments based on facts of our own experience inclines us to the conclusion that there must be some freedom of the Will because we all experience it all the time'. This forces Searle to admit that 'when it comes to a question of freedom and determinism I am unable to reconcile the two'.

According to Searle, 'in order for us to have radical freedom, it looks as if we would have to postulate that inside each of us was a self that was capable of interfering with the causal order of nature. Such a view is not consistent with what we know about how the world works from Physics. And there is not the slightest evidence to suppose that we would abandon physical theory in favour of such a view'.

The basic feeling we have while engaging in voluntary intentional human action is the conviction that we are making this happen, we are causing this to happen in contrast to the feeling that this is happening to us, we could have done something else if we had chosen to, if we had wanted to.

THE NATURAL WORLD AND THE ENGINEERED WORLD: DETERMINISM VS FREEDOM

'Most Americans inhabit a world of buildings, roads, vehicles, lawns, furniture, appliances, etc., which are clearly cultural products. We in the US—unlike the Bushmen, for example—live most of our lives in culturally manufactured, rather than natural, environments' (D'Andrade 1981).

'Historically and traditionally, it has been the task of the scientific disciplines to teach about natural things: how they are and how they work. It has been the task of engineering schools to teach about artificial things: how to make artifacts that have desired properties and how to design.... Schools of engineering, as well as schools of architecture, business, education, law, and medicine are all centrally concerned with the process of design' (Simon 1969).

What typically is the nature of the design process? Are we reaching in and interfering with the laws of nature that Physics is obsessed with? How much of the engineered world would a Laplacian determinist have predicted given the positions of all the physical particles and the laws governing their movements at some specified instant?

Searle asks, 'Why exactly is there no room for the freedom of the Will on the contemporary scientific view?' There is a fundamental confusion here between the **What** and the **How**. The impasse confronting Searle will continue as long as we keep searching for the freedom of the will in the how and not in the what—in the means rather than the ends. Far from there being no room for the freedom of the will in contemporary science, the **practice of science** is predicated on the availability of 'autonomous free agents. To appreciate this we have to start from the basics all over again.

STUDYING AGENTIVE BEHAVIOUR

Science and the study of agentive behaviour

Physical Sciences are concerned with the study of matter, i.e. objects: their occurrences, properties, interactions, transformations, and so on. Physical scientists conduct their study of matter by performing experiments. Performing experiments is the central aspect

of doing science. An experiment is a controlled interaction with a prepared environment. The carrying out of an experiment presupposes the availability of: (1) a language in which the specifications of the experiment can be given; and (2) an agent (observer, experimenter) who can interpret the specifications and carry out the experiment (i.e. manipulate, observe, analyse). In this context, an agent is characterized by the possession of a **repertoire of actions** using which the agent is able to explore, monitor, and manipulate the environment in various ways and, in particular, to achieve desired ends. An agent acts and, thus, is **active**, while matter is acted upon and, thus, is **passive**. In this sense, all biological organisms are agents. While physical sciences are concerned with the study of matter, as outlined above, **Behavioural Sciences** are concerned with the study of the agentive behaviour of agents.

The externally observable behaviour of an agent consists of a complex of actions it engages in. At the most primitive level, an agent engages in an action to bring about a desired-for-change in the state of the world (external or internal). The desired-for-change is the goal (objective, aim, purpose, intent) of the action. (Notice that the role of an agent in performing an experiment calls for the ability to engage in goal-directed actions of this sort.) The notion desired-for-change involves a valuation process. Goals would have to be ordered (ranked or weighted) on the basis of their value as evaluated by the agent. One must, hence, clearly predicate a value system as underlying the functioning of an agent.

Aids to studying agentive behaviour

Modelling agentive behaviour necessarily has to be based on information processing frameworks. Just as objects and object-related physical systems are modeled by classical mathematics and extensions thereof, agents and agent-related biological systems must be modeled at the behavioural level by information processing systems. The distinction is between 'propositional' and 'computational' frameworks for studying systems.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) methodology—i.e. Al as science as opposed to Al as technology—is indispensable for studying, i.e. theorizing about modelling, agentive aspects and agentive behaviour. Just as a physicist performs experiments involving matter in the

real world, AI is a laboratory for performing simulation experiments involving agentive states and agentive behaviour.

Some examples and critical open problems

(1) Consider the following scenario as an illustrative example to bring out the distinctions between objects and agents. A cat is sitting on a mat and there is also a ball on the mat. The ball and the mat can be completely characterized in terms of their physical attributes and relationships. This characterization would remain valid so long as the mat and the ball are not acted upon (i.e. manipulated) through external circumstances (i.e. through an external agency).

One can characterize the cat also in terms of physical attributes (e.g. colour, weight, size) and physical relationships (e.g. body posture). But these do not add up to a complete characterization of the cat. For, imagine now that the cat gets up and walks away (or, suddenly jumps at something and starts chasing it, or acts in some such manner). These are acts the cat engages in autonomously. To account for these acts, we would have to postulate—at the folk psychology level—agentive states (i.e. mental states such as intentionality, etc.) in addition to the physical states mentioned earlier.

At this stage, several fundamental issues arise in trying to model the agentive aspects of agents. Typically, one tries to differentiate 'mind' from 'brain' and assign the locus of agentive states to the 'mind'. 'Brain' is a physical object while 'mind' is a postulated theoretical entity. Does the 'Mind' have a physical basis? If yes, is it different from the brain? If so, what are the physical characteristics of its building blocks? If the 'mind' does not have a physical basis, what is the reality of the agentive states? Controversies continue to rage around these and related issues.

(2) 'Is the software virus an agent?' The answer is 'yes, it is'. Its behaviour consists merely of fixed-action routines triggered by releasers. Viral behaviour may be thought of as falling on the border-line between agents and objects. An agent does not have to be acting all the time. It is distinguished from objects **in having the potential to act**, and in having a repertoire of actions, which it can deploy to meet desired ends.

(3) The signal-symbol distinction: All the inputs from the world (the inner as well as the outer world) are available to an agent only at the signal level. Are signals converted into symbols before they are processed in the case of humans? If so, at what level does this conversion take place? And how? How are the symbols internally represented?

(4) What is the role of language behaviour in dealing with ideational (i.e. mental) states. Examples are: thinking, remembering, being conscious, wishing, wanting, expecting, understanding, hoping, recognizing, intending, etc.

(5) Can one talk about 'mind' in the absence of the language modality?

(6) In the absence of language, is thinking or thought possible?

(7) Memory: What is 'stored'?

(8) What is the role of brain chemistry in representation and control?

These and related issues have been discussed in greater detail in (Narasimhan 2004). I am convinced that understanding these issues is of fundamental importance to come to grips with the Brain-Mind problem. Minimally, these critical open problems teach us that trying to deal with issues such as determinism and free will purely at the philosophical level is unlikely to yield any returns.

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A Centenary Homage for 'On Denoting'

ABSTRACT

In this centenary year of Russell's 'On Denoting', that appeared in 1905, we shall pay homage for it by investigating why Russell felt it necessary to develop such a theory. Out point is that the ontological and epistemological backgrounds of Russell's philosophy along with his responsibility to protect logic in which law of excluded middle holds, prompted him to develop his 'On Denoting'. Russell's ontological and epistemological problems grow from his theory of meaning, which has two important features. These are: first, in order to be meaningful an expression must have an associated entity, which is the semantic value of the expression. Secondly, association between an expression and its corresponding entity is direct. From the first feature it follows that a meaningful singular term must have an appropriate kind of entity associated with it. But this leads to an inflated ontology. Russell's 'On Denoting' is needed to remove such an inflated ontology. From the second feature it follows that Russell imposed upon his theory of meaning, the principle of acquaintance that explains why Russell thought to remove descriptions and proper names from the category of genuine singular term. In 'On Denoting', he explains how to remove descriptions and proper names from the category of singular terms. Moreover, if a definite description like 'the present king of France' is taken as a genuine singular term, the sentence 'The present king of France is bald' can be expressed as 'a is B'. By the law of excluded middle, either 'a is B' is true or 'a is not B' is true. But if we make a list of all that are bald and make a list of all that are not bald, we would not find the king of France in either of the list. Here the law of excluded middle is threatened. In his 'On Denoting', Russell tried to save logic in which law of excluded middle holds.

In 1905, B. Russell published his 'On Denoting', a classic of twentieth century philosophy. It is often said to be a paradigm of all philosophical analysis. Here Russell provides a theory of how we are to understand the meaning of sentences containing definite descriptions, expressions of the form 'the so and so'. This theory

is called the theory of description. In this centenary year of this theory, we shall pay homage not by simply stating the theory and its standard criticism, but by investigating why Russell felt it needed to develop such a theory. Our point is that Russell's ontological and epistemological background actually prompted him to develop the theory. In addition to these backgrounds Russell also had the pressure to save the logic in which the law of excluded middle holds. The ontological and epistemological problems in Russell's philosophy sprung up from his theory of meaning. We shall start with a preliminary discussion of his theory of meaning in section I. In section II our concern is the ontological and epistemological background of the theory of description. In section III we shall see how the theory of description protects the logic in which the law of excluded middle holds.

I

In his *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell writes 'words all have meaning in the simple sense that they are symbols that stand for something other than themselves'.[1] Here Russell says that the meaning of an expression is the entity for which it stands. Again, in his *Analysis of Mind* Russell writes, 'When we ask what constitute meaning ....we are not asking who is the individual meant, but what is the relation of the word to the individual which makes the one mean the other'.[2] Here, Russell is emphasizing on the nature of the association between an expression and its entity.

From these two quotations from Russell, we may bring out two features of his theory of meaning. First, if the meaning of an expression is the entity for which it stands, it is a necessary condition of the meaningfulness of an expression that it has an associated entity. An expression which has no associated entity has no meaning. An entity associated with an expression may be called the 'semantic value' of the expression. Thus, the semantic value of a name is an object, of a predicate is a universal and of a sentence is truth or falsity. So we may say that Russell's theory of meaning is a semantic value dependence theory, according to which, of any given type of expression, it is a condition on the meaningfulness of sentences containing that expression that the expression's semantic value exists. In the case of singular terms, this means that for

sentences having genuine singular terms to be meaningful, the relevant object must exist. This takes an important place in his 'On denoting'. Secondly, Russell's theory of meaning concerns the nature of association between an expression and its corresponding entity. With regard to names, the association is described as direct. Understanding the meaning of a name, according to Russell, requires an unmediated contact with the object it denotes.

II

From these two features of Russell's theory of meaning, two different problems crop up: an ontological problem and an epistemological problem. In his theory of description, Russell tried to solve these problems. In section I we have seen that according to Russell, it is a condition of the meaningfulness of an expression that it has an appropriate kind of entity associated with it. So, a meaningful singular term must have an appropriate entity associated with it. But this leads to an extravagantly inflated ontology. The sentence 'The present king of France is bald' is meaningful because it has a truth-value. Again it appears to contain a singular term 'The present king of France'. If Russell's theory of meaning is correct then the term must have an entity, 'the king of France', associated with it. The theory of description is needed to remove this ontological extravagance by showing that the expression 'the present king of France' is not a genuine but an apparent singular term. To show that something is not a genuine singular term is to prove that in spite of its superficial ordinary linguistic grammatical role, its logical grammar reveals that it belongs to a different category of expression. The logical grammar of a term is the role it plays in determining the truth-value of sentences containing that term.

Russell's theory of description shows that occurrences of apparent singular terms can be analyzed into expressions containing only predicates and quantifiers (1) 'The present king of France is bald' can be express according to logical grammar as (2) $(\exists x)$ [{Fx & $(y)(Fy \supset y=x)$}& Bx], informal analysis of which is (3): (i) There is a king of France; (ii)There is only one king of France; and (iii) whoever is the king of France is bald. Here, as the occurrences of apparent singular terms can be analyzed into expressions

containing predicates, our need for the object corresponding to 'the king of France' in order to be meaningful of the sentence 'the present king of France is bald' lapses. The analysis of the sentence 'The present king of France is bald', as we have seen, needs predicates and to understand the meaning of predicates we need the existence of universals, not of objects. So, the object corresponding to the king of France will no longer be required as a condition of meaningfulness of the sentence. Thus, the ontological economy is achieved if universals (one and the same set of entities) is sufficient for giving the meaning of such expressions without any additional need of an ontological commitment to objects, like the king of France, that obviously do not exist. Prior to his theory of description, Russell accepted the ontological consequences of his theory of meaning. Following Meinong, he admitted the category of subsistence in which entities like the round square, the golden-mountain, the king of France, etc., were accommodated. The theory of description liberated him from this ontological silliness.

Although the ontological problem with his theory of meaning was the main reason why Russell needed the theory of descriptions, his development of the theory came from an epistemological constraint that he imposed upon his theory of meaning. It is this constraint—the principle of acquaintance—that explains why Russell thought to remove descriptions and proper names from the category of singular terms. In *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell writes: 'Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.'[3] Thus his principle of acquaintance is: understanding the meaning of an expression requires acquaintance with that entity which is its meaning. In the same book Russell writes again: 'I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself.'[4] For him, the range of entities with which we can be acquainted is extraordinarily small. Apart from universals, the only objects, according to Russell, we can be acquainted with are sense data. Consequently, he believes that the range of genuine singular terms is extraordinarily small. It comprises just those terms that are used to refer to sense data. From this it follows that there are only two genuine singular terms:

'this' and 'that'. As Russell understood acquaintance in this way, he held that ordinary proper names are not genuine singular terms, rather they are truncated descriptions. The meaning of a proper name (say, Rabindranath) is given by a definite description (say, the author of *Geetanjali*) and the meaning of the definite description is given by the theory of description according to which a definite description can be analyzed into predicate terms and quantifiers. It follows from this that in order to understand descriptions and, therefore, to understand proper names, all that is required is that we are to be acquainted with the universals associated with the relevant predicates. This means that in ordinary language, there is hardly any reference and reference occurs only when the expressions 'this' and 'that' are used to pick out sense data. So, Russell concludes that names, descriptions and apparent apparatus of reference of ordinary language will be subject to analysis by the theory of descriptions.

Although Russell's ontological and epistemological problems are different in nature and thus discussed in my paper separately, they are intimately connected problems. When we move from the logical analysis of unique reference to the epistemological question as to what conditions are to be fulfilled in order that the kind of unique reference whose logical structure is analyzed can be made, we face certain difficulties. The epistemological question is: How is the bearer of the descriptions, i.e. the referent of the subject term, identified so that descriptions can be predicated of it? Again, must it not be presupposed that actually there is something to be identified before we can talk about the means of identifying referents? Thus, the epistemological problem concerning the ways of knowing referents leads to the ontological problem as to what counts as a 'referent'.

Russell, a realist, considers it a necessary condition for the possibility of empirical knowledge that the object whose description is given be identifiable. A description or a denoting phrase 'is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most single words, have any significance on its own account'.[5] Therefore, unless the description is associated with some definite, identifiable referent, it cannot be understood simply because there would be no way of knowing what it is a description of. According to Russell, then

there are purely referential words which are called by him 'logically proper names, an example of which is the word 'this'. Thus, all statements about the world are reducible in the last analysis to the form 'this is that' where any description may be put for 'that' and 'this' is the subject of all such descriptions. Apart from the context in which the word 'this' occurs as a subject of descriptions, it has no meaning and its meaning is its denotation, which is to say that in a statement its function is to refer.

In his theory of knowledge, Russell provides an answer to the question as to how the referent of 'this' is known. According to him the referent of 'this' is the object of direct sense-experience, which are 'sense-data'. The statement 'the object of direct sense-experience is sense-data' either involves an ontological claim or is vacuous and at bottom circular. It is vacuous and circular if sense-data is taken to be nothing more or less than 'object of sense-experience' because if we ask, what kind of things are 'the object of sense experience', the only answer is 'sense-data'. But as soon as the object of sense experience is taken to be distinct from and something more than experiencing the object, the question is: what constitutes the object of sense experience and that is certainly an ontological question. In his *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, Russell points out that sense-data are 'ultimate particulars' which aren't to be identified with the experiencing of the particulars. This leads him to the view that there are extra-linguistic 'something' about which assertions are made in linguistic phrases and that is enough to commit him to the existence of something besides mere having experience.

W.V. Quine accepts Russell's theory of description but denies his theory of knowledge which, as we have seen, is one of the backgrounds that prompted him to develop the former. For Quine, the most important discovery of the theory of description is that we can talk meaningfully about what the world is *like* without need to speculate *what* it is. This accords with his view that besides descriptions of what the world is like, there is nothing that can be conveyed about the world by means of words. According to Quine, talk about 'extra-linguistic particulars' and their connection with the linguistic particulars is a kind of metaphysical assumption which can neither be proved nor disproved by what can actually be known. He, there-

fore, wants to show that Russell's theory of knowledge is not necessary for his theory of description.

III

In addition to the ontological and epistemological pressures that prompted Russell to develop his theory of description, he also had the pressure to protect the logic in which the law of excluded middle (LEM) holds. Let us explain the point. Contrary to Russell's analysis, let us suppose that 'the present king of France' is a genuine singular term, a genuine referring expression. In that case following logical grammar the sentence 'The present king of France is bald' can be expressed as 'a is B'. By LEM either 'a is B' is true or 'a is not B' is true. Yet if one enumerates all the things that are bald, and then the things that are not bald, one would not find the king of France in either list. That is the worry that LEM is threatened unless we consider the king of France as a subsistent entity or we develop a theory that shows that it is not a genuine singular term. Russell's informal analysis at (3) shows that the sentence at (1) is false because the first conjunct of (3)'there is a king of France' is false. His analysis shows that sentence (1) entails an existential claim and that claim is false and, therefore, so too is sentence (1). Here the LEM is preserved and we can also acknowledge the ontology where the king of France, the round-squares, and the golden-mountain are not subsistent entities. Now the point is if the LEM is preserved and the sentence (1) is false then its negation (4) 'The present king of France is not bald' must be true. But in Russell's analysis, it cannot be true on the same ground, i.e. here also the existential claim is not satisfied and so it is false. So how is the LEM saved? Russell will say that LEM is the principle that the disjunction of any significant statement with its negation is always true. Here 'negation' is taken as an external negation which is indicated by attaching prefatory 'it is not the case that' to an assertion as opposed to internal negation which is indicated by attaching the adverb 'not' into the assertion. So, in LEM, either a sentence or its contradictory is true. The sentence (4) is not the contradictory of the sentence (1) but only its contrary. As such the sentence (4) cannot be true if the sentence (1) is true, but they can both be false together. The fact that the king of France fails

to appear on the list of either bald things or not bald things shows that both sentence (1) and sentence (4) fail to be true. But as they are only contraries and not contradictories, LEM is not violated. If there is a bald king of France, the sentence (1) is true and if there is a hairy king of France, the sentence (4) is true. But if there is no king of France at all, both the sentences (1) and (4) are false. Russell differentiates between (5)'it is not the case that the present king of France is bald' and (4) the present king of France is not bald in terms of the different scope of the negation operator in each sentence and say that sentence (5) is contradictory to sentence (1). So as sentence (1) is false, sentence (5) is true and consequently the LEM is not threatened.

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Agenda for Research

The long tradition of the oral preservation of the Vedas gave rise to complex and intricate techniques for achieving this end. The *āgamic* traditions of India have also been oral and preserved it orally as the Vedic tradition. The same is the problem in respect of Vedic exagetics giving rise to *Nirukta, Vyākaraṇa* and *Śikṣā* included in the *Vedānga* around which all the later problems in respect of the tradition have revolved from the beginning and neither the *śikṣā* nor the *mīmaṁsā* procedures of interpretations have helped in the matter. The problems of interpretations of language in the āgamic tradition of India have not been much explored, but the diversity of 'schools' with their conflicting interpretations attest to the fact that the situation in respect of these could not be very different.

The problem is a wider one as language is everywhere but the interpretations and the intersubjectively 'lived' experience in terms of which it is interpretated are always in contexts that are independent of those that were implicitly presupposed in the understanding at the time when it was written.

The successive interpretations then may be seen as reflecting more the times when they were made than as attempting at an approximation to the truth of what the text is supposed to have said at the time when it was composed.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Attention is drawn to an outstanding study entitled *Myth as Argument: The Bṛhaddevatā as Cannonical Commentary* by Laurie I. Patton published by Walter D. Gruytern New York, 1996.

It is the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of this ancient text which tries to deal with all the problems relating to the *Ṛgveda* and focusses those which the tradition has tried to come to terms with what had arisen in respect of this most paradoxical and authoritative text in the orthodox tradition of India. The strategies adopted to explain that which seems, *prima facie*, inexplicable, deserve special notice as they provide a clue to the way India's orthodox tradition has tried to come to terms with and make sense of what, according to its own norms, was unacceptable.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

Reply to Profesor Daya Krishna's query published in the JICPR, Volume XXI, Number. 3

Traditionally, there was only one Veda, i.e. the body of eternal knowledge calculated to conduce to the welfare here and hereafter for the human beings. This was revealed by Lord Brahma and handed down since ages through a continuous series of teachers and students. Having noticed that the intellectual and spiritual faculties of the successive generations of the Vedic reciters by about the end of Dvāpara Age, after the end of the Mahābhārata War, were degenerating thousand years ago, Bhagavan Veda Vyāsa edited the Veda and classified the hymns into four *Saṃhitās*, called the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda*, and handed them down each to his four disciples, wherefrom the traditions of the four Vedic *Saṃhitas* commenced.

Due to the location and residence of the line of disciples of these traditions of the Vedic reciters, each of the *Saṃhitā* branched off into different recensions, called the *Śākhās*. Thus, during the times of Patañjali, the great commentator of the Paṇinian Grammar (about 350 BC), there were 11 *Śākhās* of the *Ṛgveda*, 100 *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, 1000 *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda*, and 9 *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda*. The *Śākhās* was generated due to the regional proclivities of the pronunciation of different reciters of different parts of our country.

Now, as per the traditional information, the five recent known *Śākhās* of the *Ṛgveda* were the *Śākala*, the *Bāṣkala*, the *Āśvalāyana*, the *Śāṅkhāyana*, and the *Māṇḍūkya*. The *Yajurveda* was handed down in two main recensions, viz., *Śukla* and *Kṛṣṇa*; the *Śākhās* of the former were the *Vājasaneyi Madhyandina* and the *Kāṇva*, while those of the latter were the *Kāṭhaka*, the *Maitrāyaṇī*, and the *Taitiriya*. The three *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda* were the *Kauthumi*, the *Jaiminīya*, and the *Rāṇāyaṇīya*. And, the two *Śākhās* of the *Atharvaveda* were the *Saunaka* and the *Paippalada*.

'However, at present only the following *Śākhās* of the respective Vedas are extant: *Śākala* of the *Ṛgveda*, the *Mādhyandina* of the *Yajurveda*, the *Kauthumī* of the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Śaunaka* of the *Atharvaveda*. And, the answer to your query is that these *Śākhās* of the respective *Saṃhitās* are known currently by the names of their respective Vedas.'

Furthermore, at present, there are only a very few Vedicists who recite the respective Veda orally, and even rarer are those who can perform the Vedic sacrifices!

1

Mantra

A *mantra* is an utterance of a Vedic seer supposed to have been heard by him in his state of trance, and protects him when he mediates on it (*Mananāt trāyate iti mantraḥ*). All the verses comprising the Vedas are called *mantras*, because they are believed to be the holy spiritual utterances, and are effective at both the material and astral levels. From the poetical or literary point of view a *mantra* is like a stanza. But, a *mantra* may be in prose or verse, while a stanza is invariably in verse, while in prose it would be called a paragraph. *Mantra* is, thus, the primary, basic and central unit in the Veda.

Sūkta

A *Sūkta* is defined as a group of the *Mantras* propounding some particular matter pertaining to the same *Devatā* (*Viśiṣṭaikārtha-pratipādake eka–devatyai veda-mantra-samudāye ca*). The word *sūkta* literally means well (*su*) said (*ukta*), and signifies an utterance of some good thought. Thus, the Ṛgvedic *sūktas* are generally devoted to the praise of a prayer of particular deity, viz., Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, Aśvinas, and others, or all of them in a single *sūkta*. It is equivalent to a sort of a poem comprising one or more stanzas.

Maṇḍala and Aṣṭaka in the Ṛgveda

The Ṛgveda is divided into ten *Maṇḍalas* containing 1028 (=1017+11) *Sūktas* (191 + 43 + 62 + 58 + 87 + 75 + 104 + 92 + 114

+ 191 (+ 11 *Vālakhilyas*), each *Maṇḍala* is further subdivided into *Anuvākas*, each containing several *Sūktas* and each *Sūkta* contains one or more *Mantras*. Of these the *Maṇḍalas*, the First and the Tenth contain the collection of the *sūktas* of several seers addressed to several deities, while the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and the Eighth are called the family books (*vaṃśa-maṇḍala*) and contain the several such *sūktas* seen, i.e. authored by a particular seer and his sons, viz., Grtsamada, Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Atri, Bharadvāja, Vasiṣṭha, Kaṇva/Aṅgiras, while the Ninth is a collection of the *Sūktas* of several seers devoted to Soma, the deified form of the creeper from which the intoxicating juice was extracted for the holy drink during the sacrifice. This division of the *Ṛgveda* into *Maṇḍalas* was effected by Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, alias Veda Vyāsa (about 3,500 BC), the traditionally celebrated author of the *Mahabhārata* and the *Purāṅas*. There is no special logic for this division into *Maṇḍalas*, except its being a very ancient tradition.

For the convenience of recitation aloud, and to that effect as an aid to the Vedic disciple committing the entire *Ṛgveda*, containing all the 1028 *Suktas*, to memory, the *Mantras*, irrespective of the *Suktas*, is divided into eight parts, each of which is called an *Aṣṭaka*, each of which contains eight *Adhyāyas*. Thus, the entire *Ṛgveda* is divided into 64 *Adhyāyas*, each containing several *Vargas*, i.e. groups of *Mantras*, although generally a *Varga* contains five to nine *Mantras*.

2

There is a definite relation between the successive *sūktas*, in so far as the hymns of the same seer are put together in the family books. It is surely neither haphazard nor accidental.

3

The arrangement of the hymns (*sūktas*) in the family books of the *Ṛgveda* is systematic in so far as the hymns in them authored by various seers follow definitely the same fixed order of the seers of the family book, perhaps chronological, of the seers who have visualized the hymns, rather than the deities to whom the hymns are addressed, such as Indra, Bṛhaspati, Ādityāh, Varuṇa, Viśvedevāh, Dyāvāpṛthivī, Rudra, Marut, Apāṃnapāt, and others. On this point

we can say that there is a collective unity (*eka-vākyatā*) among the family books, as also among the hymns contained in the *Maṇḍalas.*

4

Meter (*chandas*) is based on the numbers and the types of the syllables contained in a particular verse. For instance, the *Triṣṭubh* meter has three quarters comprising eight syllables each; *Anuṣṭubh* meter contains four quarters of eight syllables each. The *mantra* is the body of the person and the meter is, so to say, the dress in which he presents himself. Generally, the *mantras* in the same hymns are in the same meter, but occasionally they may be in more than one meter, as for instance in RV. VI. 75. One and the same idea could be presented in verses composed in different meters, just in the same way as one and the same song can be sung in different octaves and different musical sequences or melodies. A *mantra,* being in the form of a verse, is expressed in some meter of other, since it has to be invariably metrical. Ascription of a *chanda* to a mantra is meaningful in view of its comprising a particular number of syllables in a particular sequence.

5

The term *devatā* is defined as the deity to whom the hymn or the verse that is addressed (*yā tenocyate sā devatā*). They are clearly natural powers like the Sun (*sūrya*), Fire (*agni*), Wind (*vāyu*), or the brave persons or powerful kings like Indra, or the moral concepts like Mitra, Varuṇa, or highly helpful physicians like Aśvinas, or the rivers like Gaṅgā, Śutudrī, Paruṣṇī, and others, or even the forest (*araṇya*), of course personified. It is similar to our conception of God who is omnipresent, omniscient, luminescent, all pervading, and as yet personified as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and others personified in human form. Different *mantras* of the same hymn may have different deities to whom they are addressed. One can know from the name of the deity mentioned in that *mantra* as belonging to it.

In spite of the different deities addressed to in different *mantras* of the same *sūkta,* the 'unity' comprises in their being the prayer to, or eulogy of them, for in the whole of the *Ṛgveda* the central theme is the prayer to god (*devatā-stuti*). So there is really no problem at all. None of the Veda-pundits have so far faced such a problem pertaining to sequential unity in the Vedas.

6

The sequence of the *mantras,* as related to a particular seer (*ṛṣi*), is known from the printed text as edited by Pt. Shripad Damodar Satavalekar, Svadhyay-mandal, Pardi, and (Dist. Surat, South Gujarat), wherein the details regarding the seer and the meters of every hymn have been printed in black and white. Even in the case of a hymn containing the *mantras* of different seers and addressed to different deities and composed in different meters, the details are given at the outset before the hymn proper starts. So there is no problem at all. Without a seer there is nobody to visualize the *mantra.* As to the problem about the large number of seers *(ṛṣis)* whose individual proper name and 'family' or 'clan' remains the same, as for instance, Kaṇva, Viśāmitra, Vasiṣṭha, one can know that they belong to a particular seer mythical or historical, and the names Kāṇva, Vaiśvāmitrī, Vāsiṣṭhī, belong to their disciples, sons, or grandsons, about whom one can have some information from the well-known work titled '*Bhārata-varṣīya Prācīna Caritra-kośa*' by M.M. Siddheshwar Shastri Chitrav, published by Bharatya Charitrakish Mandal, Pune-4 (1964, reprinted). There is nothing like 'signature', as *bāī mirāṃ kahe* or *narasaiyo bhaṇe* in the devotional songs popular in Gujarat and elsewhere.

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1. What is the relation between *Śābdabodha* and *Śabda Pramāna*? Does the latter presuppose the former? Is the *pramāṇatva* of the two different and, if so, will doubts raised about the one affect the 'certainty' of the other?

2. The authority of the *Śruti* or the *āgama* is dependent on the way one understands its meaning. But there are disputes about the meaning of the Veda and the *āgamic* texts of the Buddhists and the Jain tradition and the understanding of those depends on some way of settling these disputes.

Besides these, there has also been the attempt to bring in the mythical context for the understanding of the puzzling portions of the Ṛgvedas, say, in the *Brheddavata.*

Did the same situation prevail in respect of the Buddhist and the Jain traditions and the development of hermeneutic strategies developed in these traditions to 'understand' the words of the Founders as had happened in the Vedic tradition? Is, in other words, the difference and the disputes between different schools of Buddhism and Jainism, based on their differing and divergent interpretations of their basic texts as, say, in the different schools of Vedānta in the Upaniṣadic traditions, including that of the *Brahma Sūtra* and the *Gītā*?

DAYA KRISHNA

Book Reviews

Edited by CHANDRAKALA PADIA, *Feminism, Tradition and Modernity*, Shimla, Indian Institute of Advance Studies, 2002, pp. 410, Rs. 600

India's recent contact with Europe, roughly from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present, has been marked by many crosscurrents of ideas and debates. But certain definite patterns in Europe's impact and India's response are clearly discernible. These patterns may be defined within a broader context of power relations in which Europe has been dominant and India subservient. Largely because of the colonization of India by the British, European or more broadly speaking, Western ideas have held sway over Indian minds. Even the exceptions to this rule have only served to accentuate this asymmetry. Once we grant that there is an intrinsic inequality built into this relationship, then other more sophisticated and finely calibrated facets of this relationship may be identified. For instance, one might argue that the influence was neither unidirectional nor uniform but was characterized by a wide degree of variation, both in time and space. We might also observe that the West was not always the teacher nor India always the disciple but that this relationship was reversed in some crucial areas and instances. We might further concede that India was not entirely colonized intellectually or that native traditions or knowledge systems were not entirely destroyed or supplanted. Finally, we might observe that inequality was not always the operative or even significant issue in this relationship. But, having ceded such concessions, the basic issue of a skewed power relationship does remain.

Similarly, we will have to concede another set of unequal power relations within Indian society. I refer to the inequality of the two sexes. Our has been a *purusha-pradhān* or male-dominated society for long. Both actual customs and social mores as well as texts and traditions seem to exemplify as well as reinforce this inequality. That the West was also a very unequal society is now not only clear but also accepted by the West itself. One of the internal inequali-

ties that the West has sought to redress is that between the sexes. Feminism, thus, has been one of the most vibrant and vital social, political, and intellectual movements in Western society. With its beginnings in the late eighteenth century, feminism redefined social relations in modern Western society in the second half of the twentieth century.

This book is, then, an attempt to come to terms with these two sets of inequalities without necessarily trying to reconcile them. Rather, the book itself shows this clash of inequalities playing themselves out in the collection. On the one hand, the editor and some of the contributors wish to 'resist' the dominance and hegemony of Western feminist theory and its uncritical application to the Indian context. On the other hand, many of them also wish to confront, address, and remedy the gender inequality in Indian society. This dual imperative, however laudable, is not even followed by the majority of the essays, which are nothing more than more or less conventional, i.e. Western-derived readings of literary texts. So, the collection has three kinds of essays: defences of Indian traditions from feminist charges; attempts at evolving an Indian feminism; and pedestrian readings of literary texts with some Western feminist references.

Of the three kinds of essays, the first are most impressive. These include two important essays by Kapil Kapoor and Arvind Sharma. Professor Kapoor's essay, one of the longest and most detailed in the book, is not only a vigorous defence of Indian society and traditions, but an exposé of the uses and abuses of Western oriented, self-denigrative thinking. He argues that Hindu women are the most vibrant and progressive component of Indian society precisely because Hindu society is intrinsically plural, open, and self-corrective. He refers to the long tradition of not just debate but reform in India, including discussions and activism in the sphere of the rights of women. Indian society, according to him, is built on the principle of reciprocal obligations, not of individual rights. So, to isolate any one agent or player—to exalt his or her special interests over that of all the others—will only distort the picture. Mutuality, interdependence and honour characterize the relationship between the gender, not hostility, conflict and suspicion. *Dharma,* which governs Indian society is, in turn, governed by the meta rule that it can never be static nor can it be oppressive or careless of the happiness of any one section of society. The non-dogmatic nature of Hindu thought makes it amenable to continuous self-criticism, reevaluation, and reform, something that is as true in the context of women's rights as in other realms.

Professor Arvind Sharma's essay is about how to read or, rather, how not to read Manu. He identifies five points or issues which need to be taken into account in understanding Manu. He argues that Manu the law-giver has been traditionally viewed quite differently from how he is viewed today. Instead of being seen as oppressive, retrogressive, or casteist, tradition has actually quoted and cited him, sometimes erroneously, as egalitarian, progressive, even reformative. In fact, there is more than just the Manu of the *Manusmriti*—there is the later or older (*Vrddha Manu*) and the larger (*Brhan Manu*). Placing Manu alongside other writers of *Dharmasastra,* identifying the template that operates in the text, considering the whole text rather than brief excerpts, and correlating the topics covered rather than reading them independently, shows Manu in a different light. According to Sharma, information out of context leads to alienation, as is the case here. As another contributor, Avadhesh Kumar Singh notes, 'Burn it if you wish but only after reading it. Sharma concludes by saying that read in this fashion, the controversy over Manu becomes of a nobler, intellectually more stimulating kind, than the polemics and politics of the contemporary critics of Manuvada.

Another essay on the status of women according to Manu is by the book's editor, Professor Chandrakala Padia. She actually mounts a vigorous rejoinder to all those feminists who have seen Manu as the root of gender inequality in Hindu society. Quoting chapter and verse, she tries to show that Manu is not only quoted selectively and out of context, but also distorted and abused for the sake of finding a convenient whipping boy. Actually, according to Padia, Manu enjoins us to honour and respect women. Even verses which disallow women to be independent may be read as defining the responsibilities of others towards them. A third essay on the *Dharmasastras* by Sati Chatterjee also attempts a re-reading and revision of the conventional position that they were uniformly 'anti-women'.

The other readings of traditional texts and practices include Indra Kaul's valuable essay on the *Theirgatha.* Here she shows how

the *Theirgatha* may be seen as a text of women's liberation, both from family, marriage, society and, more significantly, from the endless cycle of births and deaths. Similarly, Subha Chakraborty Dasgupta's reading of the *vrata* or the vows, fasts, and vigils supposedly imposed on women tries to show how these must have been empowering and bonding practices initially. Another well-referenced and scholarly paper—this time on nineteenth century Maharashtra instead of ancient India—is Vidyut Bhagwat's. Reading the work of major women reformers and leaders like Tarabai Shinde, Pandita Ramabai, and Anandi, she compares it with the more canonical of the conservative, middle class and upper caste male writers.

Avadhesh Kumar Singh's long ramble starts with traditional *Dharmasāstra* texts, but comes to modern literary ones, written mostly by women. He tries to show that what we have in India is a complex engagement with the issue of woman over the ages, with much hope in the future not only for hard-hitting critiques of the patriarchy, but for an Indian theory of feminism. Similarly, Malshri Lal's well-argued and thoughtful account of Indian responses to feminism raises several significant questions. Kavita Sharma's essay is a deeply thought out meditation on gender roles in India, including the status and influence of exalted exemplars like Sita and Radha. Kumkum Yadav brings in an interesting and contentious issue, that of the representation of 'tribal' women in literary texts. Most of the other papers are analyses of literary texts mostly from India, but sometimes from abroad.

Overall, this brave and not entirely successful collection must be applauded for what it seeks to accomplish rather than what it actually offers. The exigencies of transforming seminar papers into a book are evident here in ample measure. A certain lack of coherence or central vision in either the selection or the arrangement of the chapters is only one of the problems. The unevenness of quality and the lack of one central focus are the other obvious drawbacks. The usual copy editing problems crop up too. For instance, Sharma's essay has many more footnote markers than the nineteen endnotes that actually appear in the essay.

But despite these failings, the book emerges as an important new voice speaking up from greater intellectual autonomy and

selfhood in Indian feminist scholarship. In the wilderness of the more trendy Western-oriented scholarship on the subject, this book teaches us that in order taken to be seriously by another, we must first take ourselves seriously. Dismissing the vast resources of our intellectual traditions will, thus, only weaken us in the long run though more immediately it might give us the sense of belonging to a less burdened, more cosmopolitan modern space. Finally, stepping back from the immediate context of the book, it does seem as if the perennial *parampara* has finally found its instrument and spokeswoman in Professor Padia; the challenge to the dominance of Western feminism need not come from with in the space of Western feminism, but in fact from outside it too, from another knowledge-tradition, grounded in alternate founding principles and practices.

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SHRI DHARMAKIRTI: *MAHAYANA TANTRA: An Introduction,* Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2002, pp. ix+178, Rs 200

Sri Dharmakirti is not a professional philosopher or academician but an actual practitioner of Tantra who had an attractive career in biochemistry in the USA but, quitting the 'childish' lifestyle, ultimately found solace at the feet of his mentor His Holiness the Dalai Lama at Dharamshala. He does not himself claim to be a Guru but is the one who teaches meditation in the serene hills of Kullu. As a non-academician and an actual performer, his writing is devoid of verbosity, typical phraseology and has practical orientation.

The issues of Tibetan Buddhism have been both of academic as well as political orientation, more so since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1949 and thereafter the flight of the Nobel Laureate His Holiness the Dalai Lama to India and his settling down at the hill resort Dharamshala. In recent times, a number of books and ar-

ticles have been published on Tibetan Buddhism, dealing with its political and theoretical aspects. It is also pertinent to point out that Tantra, the core of Tibetan Buddhism, has attracted many to its fold owing to its medicinal value.

The first idea which strikes the reader, while going through this book is that one is enjoying the succinct summarization of Tantric principles of Vajrayana school of Mahayana Buddhism (Tibetan Buddhism). The book imbibes both the elements of *Sutra* and Tantra of Tibetan Buddhism as compared to other works which either deal with *Sutra* or Tantra. Its focus is on the Tantric *Sadhana* and ways to attain realization of Bodhisattvahood.

This book contains a brief introduction, six chapters, two appendixes, and a glossary of concepts. The principles and symbols of Tantra Buddhism have been authenticated by a good number of pictures. The introduction begins with the concept of Bodhisattva, the author's renunciation, his own initiation into Tibetan Buddhism by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, his retreat into the forest of Mcleodganj, and his translation of a *Prasangik Madhyamik* text. What is peculiar here is the revelation, not only of the fact that Tibetan Buddhism owes much to India than to Tibet, but also of the stronger claim that Tantra of Vajrayana Buddhism is through and through Indian in its form and practice. The author is mindful of people's disgust, suspicion and ill-will towards the Tantric way of life, Godmen, and also mentions the degeneration of Tantric practices. Notwithstanding these dissenting voices, the author is hopeful that the originalities of this tradition will be preserved for coming generations.

The first chapter, 'Tantric History' deals with the introduction and expression of Tantric practices in Buddhism. Generally, it is maintained that Buddha was against Tantra, rituals and idol worship. As against this, Sri Dharmakirti maintains: 'The Vajrayana, or the Tantric Path was taught by Buddha to the assemblies of those great Bodhisattva yogis who were well established on the path towards renunciation and Great Compassion' (p.2). Whether scholars agree with this contentious position or not, it is consistent with the Vajrayana's general position that the Buddha, in his subtle forms of Kalchakra and Sambhogakaya, consecutively taught Kalchakra Tantra and Guhyasamaja Tantra. Buddhist Tantra tradition regards

Guhyasamaja Tantra as the basic Tantra and the King Indrabodhi as the progenitor of most of the Tantric lineage of India and Tibet.

Further, contrary to the position that Tantric practices in Buddhism developed in Tibet, this book maintains that by the sixth century AD, Vajrayana had developed as a full-fledged tradition of Tantra in India itself as by that time Tantras were classified into Father Tantras and Mother Tantras. The distinction between these two Tantras is that whereas 'the Father Tantras comprise the *Guhyasamaja, Vajrabhairava* and *Yamari* cycles, and the Mother Tantras comprise the *Heruka Chakrasamvara, Hevajra* and *Vajra Yogini* cycles' (p. 5). Different Tantras have their own texts about the instructions on initiation and meditative practices. As the Barbarian attacks destroyed these developed Tantras in India, they found their 'safe-heaven' in Tibet. Shantarakshita, Padmasambhava and other Indian-Buddhists played important roles in its spread into Tibet.

While explicating the chief features of various schools of Tantra Buddhism such as Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya and Geluk, the author establishes the significance of the Guru the instructor. He does not fail to point out that although different schools of Tantra have their own distinct sets of initiations, yet, as all of them ultimately aim at performing the Highest Yoga Tantra, there is a family resemblance among them.

The second chapter 'The Tantric Practitioner' explains the physical, mental and spiritual states which lead to enlightenment. It maintains the obligation for the practitioner to obtain moral and ethical maturity. To obtain such a maturity, one has to undergo renunciation and reach the mental and spiritual level of perfection, i.e. Bodhichitta. It is only in this state that one can get the correct knowledge of *Shunyatā* (emptiness). In order to achieve such cognition, one has to realize the true nature of cyclic existence of every phenomenon in the world which is explained in the Buddhist theory of *Pratītyasamutpādavāda* (cause and effect relationship), which is the central focus of this chapter. So, it is rightly maintained here that the awareness of cyclic and causal existence leads to 'moral and ethical' maturity and ultimately to Bodhichitta and Bodhisattvahood. However, what is ambiguous here is that despite its many occurrences, there has been no attempt to ex-

plain the meaning of the term 'moral and ethical'. One can ask: aren't the terms 'ethical' and 'moral' tautologous? Sri Dharmakirti's off the book reply to this query is that 'morality' is the cause and 'ethical behaviour' is the result, so there is no tautology. I leave this issue for Buddhist scholars to argue for or against.

The basic presumption of the third chapter, 'Tantric World View', is mystical rather than rational, i.e. it avoids rational scrutiny. It is so because nothing can be obtained from the scientific investigation of Tantric entities such as 'deities', 'drops', channels', *mandalas* and *chakras*. This does not mean that Tantra is baseless. Rather, it shows the distinctive groundings of Tantra. Tantra does not concentrate on the rational justification of the existence of these entities but emphasizes on the outcome of the belief in them. Thus, His Holiness' conviction is significant that 'it does not matter whether these entities exist or not, as long as meditating on them produces the required effect' (p. 58).

The instructor or Guru, who is regarded as having divine and miraculous powers, is the foundation of Tantric realization. The Tantric *sadhana* consists of various preliminaries and initiations based on the instructions of the Tantric Guru of the particular school of Tibetan Buddhism. Moreover, written in the aphoristic style, Tantric texts contain subtle and difficult yogas which, without the help of the Guru, cannot be understood and practiced. The fourth chapter, 'The Tantric Guru' elaborates the instructor's role in the disciple's performance of the rituals and Tantric cognition. Tantra Buddhism regards Vajradhara as the chief Guru who is the source of all Tantric systems (*Mandalas*). Vajradhara has various forms. Its subtle form is Sambhogakaya, whereas its human form is Nirmankaya (as the Tantric Guru). Dharmakaya is another subtle form of Vajradhara with his consort—the female Buddha Vajradhateshwari—emanating from the Sambhogakaya. Whereas the Nirmanakaya is the physical form, the other two forms are spiritual. Thus, the chief Tantric Guru is regarded as a 'triple being'. Actually, a Guru is supposed to have attained the above 'triple being' of Vajradhara.

In a way, the entire book is a prelude to the fifth chapter, 'The Tantric Path'. It is the centrepoint around which the whole edifice revolves as the Tantric Path shows the way which leads to realization. It begins with the significance of the basic need of solitude for

the disciple undergoing Tantric meditation. It is pertinent to note that the right disposition of mind which is filled with three principles—renunciation, Bodhichitta, and the correct view of Emptiness —is the essential requisite to move on the Tantric Path of meditation. As per the nature of the disciple, there are different objects of meditation such as different kinds of deities, *mudras* of Buddha and environmental splendour.

The basic *sadhana* requires observance of celibacy. However, it is curious to note that on the one hand Sri Dharmakirti maintains that the recommendations of celibacy in the Tantric *sadhana* one not based on the presumption that sexual activity is wrong or sinful (p. 114); on the other hand he says that the desire for sensory pleasures such as sexual pleasures causes cyclic existence (p. 115). Now, as both of these positions are contrary to each other, they cannot stand together. The obvious question arises: isn't that which causes bondage morally wrong? Since after a little while on the same page author interprets Buddha as against sexual misconduct and as the one who recommends complete celibacy for monks, it seems much of a possibility that the Tantric Buddhism is closer to the usual moral code of conduct of Indians in general and Hinduism in particular. This is consistent with His Holiness the Dalai Lama's above-mentioned approach that the Tibetan Buddhism is through and through Indian in its spirit. However, Tibetan Buddhism recommends both celibate and non-celibate paths for realization—the former as safer, and the latter as dangerous since it requires greater control of observance of the *Sadhana*.

It is through various stages of realization and yoga that one reaches the completion stage. However, in the entire meditative practice, the roles of Chandali Yoga and various *chakras* have been emphasized in Tibetan Buddhism. Chandali Yoga describes various aspects of sexual copulation and partners such as described in the *Kamasutra* of Vatsyayana (p. 144). In the ultimate state of completion stage, one attains the Clear Light and overcomes the dualistic cognition of Emptiness. It is in this stage that one attains Pure Apparitional Body and becomes 'the Sambhogakaya of a fully Enlightened Buddha' (p. 152). This state of the disciple has seven characteristics: perfect form, perfect enjoyment, perfect bliss, perfect cognition, compassion, immortality, and perfect enlightened activity. After

the Enlightenment and before the dissolution of the physical body, each Bodhisattva ceaselessly works for the realization of each and every individual of the world.

As the book directly deals with Tantric practices, its conclusion shows the methods to harness the energies of death, anger, sexuality, and the true nature of reality in the constructive manner. It stresses that the energies of anger and sexuality have to be redirected in order to resolve the problems of death and the true nature of reality. Here, another basic point to note is that, as all kinds of Tantra deal with harnessing and constructive use of energy, the difference between Buddhist and non-Buddhist Tantra tradition of India is that the former emphasizes on the doctrine of Emptiness and the notion of Bodhichitta. It further emphasizes that for the attainment of realization, not intellectual knowledge but actual practice of Tantra, is required. For such a practice, Tantra prescribes 'Four Reliances' of which the first two concern the search for a Guru and the last two are related to the mode of the practice. The author has been at his best in describing this and the doctrine of *Shunyatā*. As a cap to the penultimate conclusion is His Holiness' admonition to all the seekers of Tantric realization that even if one could attain the power to fly through Tantric realization, one should never deviate from the goals of Bodhisattvahood, i.e. taking refuge in the 'Three Precious Jewels—the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha' (pp. 157-8).

Many queries, which had arisen in the book so far, are removed in the appendices as they delineate the basic presumptions of Tantra Buddhism. The appendices deal with 'Tantric view of the Historical Buddha' and 'Buddhist/Tantric Cosmology'. The first appendix distinguishes the position of Tantra Buddhism from that of Hinayana Buddhism regarding Buddha. As different from Hinayana Buddhism, Tantra Buddhism maintains that Buddha 'did not attain Enlightenment under the Bodhi tree; he merely made manifest the Enlightened state, which he had already attained many aeons earlier in the Akanishta Paradise, in the Realm of Pure Form' (p. 159). It further maintains that Buddha attained the state of complete Enlightenment through his union with 'the divine consort Devi Tilottama' (p. 160).

The second appendix elaborates the Tantric view about creation and development of the physical, spiritual, and moral world. Tantra believes that the present age is a 'Degenerated Era' (*Kali Yuga*), a term which can be traced in Hindu mythology as well. At the end of the extreme diverse conditions of *Kali Yuga*, according to Tantra Buddhism, Bodhisattva will appear and guide beings to the path of virtue. It is to be noted here that like Sankhya Yoga, Tibetan Buddhism believes in the cyclic evolution and dissolution of the world.

Enveloped in a soothing get up, the structure of the book is almost as flawless as one expects from a Penguin publication, with perhaps the only exception that its content forgets to earmark chapters with their number. The Glossary of technical words is an added advantage. However, those who have liked the book must have felt reminding the author that its second edition does not deprive them of an index of significant concepts.

It is delightful to go through this brief, succinct and introductory description which surveys every significant and minute details of the Tantric *sadhana* of Tibetan Buddhism. Here, although the basic technical concepts of Tibetan Buddhism have been explained in a lucid manner, its profundity can be revealed only through a very careful study—in this characteristic of the book, perhaps, the author resembles Wittgenstein who liked his writings to be read in a slow motion. This book is a necessity for all those who are beginners in Tibetan Buddhism as well as for those who wish to undergo actual Tantric realization.

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Stephen H. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya: *Gaṅgeśa on the Upādhi: The 'Inferential Undercutting Condition.' Introduction, Translation and Explanation,* New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2002, pp. 160.

Stephen H. Phillips teams up with N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, the former Vice-Chancellor of the Tirupati Sanskrit Vidyepeetha and one of India's most renowned Sankritists and Nyāya scholars, in this translation of the *upādhi-prakaraṇa* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tatvacintāmaṇi,* the monumental thirteenth-century work of the Brāhmanical school of New Logic. The section 'Examination of the Inferential Undercutting Condition' is just one excerpt out of Gaṅgeśa's voluminous chapter on valid methods of logical argument in the *Tatvacintāmaṇi,* but its explication helps greatly in clarifying a pivotal, and occasionally misunderstood, tool of invalidating fallacious arguments in Nyāya. To this end, Phillips and Tatacharya devote a translation of this Examination, made more accessible by the latter's editorial work, and a running commentary inspired by Tatacharya but told in Phillips' voice. The text and translation is preceded by an overview by Phillips of both the Nyāya basics of logical reasoning and a detailed elucidation of the role of *upādhi* in inference.

The notion of *upādhi* is crucial to the Nyāya theory of correct logical argument because of its role in undermining a putative, but false, pervasion. As is well known, in order for an inference in Nyāya to go through, a pervasion or invariant concomitance (*vyāpti*) must be demonstrated between a 'prover property' (*hetu*) and a 'probandum property' (*sādhya*) that shows both to be present in the given locus (*pakṣa*) of an argument. The stock example of inferring that fire is burning on a hill because there is smoke seen there depends on the invariant concomitance of fire with smoke. The *upādhi* plays the negative role, as Phillips and Tatacharya emphasize, of undermining the putative pervasion on which a proposed inference may rely (p. 27). Thus, though we know that where there is smoke there is fire, the inverse does not apply because of a certain *upādhi.* Being aware that fire is somewhere does not imply that there is smoke there, since we know of instances of fire, such as wet fuel, where no smoke is to be found, and such instances serve as the *upādhi* that deter the false implication. Therefore, for Phillips and Tatacharya, the notion of *upādhi* corresponds to the 'undercutting defeater' introduced into modem epistemology by John Pollock, for the *upādhi* (1) is not a directly perceptual counter-example, and (2) is not a 'rebutter' in the sense that it leads the knower to reject a state of affairs *in toto* but only a state of affairs in this instance. The *upādhi,* like Pollock's 'undercutting defeater', leads the knower, based on previously acquired and accumulated knowledge, to prevent a false extrapolation about the presence of certain properties together in the given instance (pp. 16-19). The exigency of laying down the right logical formulation of *upādhi* prompts Gaṅgeśa to dedicate close to half of the *vyāpti-vādā* section of his chapter on inference to that very project.

What immediately motivates Gaṅgeśa to write the *upādhi-prakaraṇa* are several objections to the standard definition of *upādhi* put into the mouth of the text's *pūrvapakṣin.* The objections make the case that the traditional definition of *upādhi* long accepted by the Naiyāyikas does not cover enough cases of fallible inference. This is demonstrated through what came to be a stock example, that of a woman, Mitrā, who has eaten a certain vegetable during her previous pregnancies and ended up with dark-complexioned children, but given the fact that she has not yet eaten this vegetable in her current pregnancy, it is presumed that her next child will not be dark complexioned. The fact, the *pūrvapakṣin* says, that the mother's eating of a certain vegetable does not pervade the birth of dark-skinned children ought to stop this inference according to the traditional definition, but it does not, since in this case the conjunction of Mitrā and her family of dark-skinned children with her eating of the vegetable have not been observed to deviate, the standard definition might allow the fallacious inference to pass. In effect, the *pūrvapakṣin*'s position is that the traditional manner of identifying an *upādhi* as vitiating a putative pervasion of a probandum by a prover does not exclude the possibility that, while a prover on its own might not pervade a probandum, a certain set of causally qualified provers might pervade the probandum. This creates the problem that the inference that, since Mitrā has eaten certain vegetables in previous pregnancies and ended up with dark-complexioned children, her failure to eat the vegetables during a present pregnancy may result in a lighter-skinned child, though

fallacious, may not be knocked down. This implication seems to jeopardize the logical status of the *upādhi*.

After a long discussion between Gaṅgeśa and the *pūrvapakṣin* over various other candidate definitions, Gaṅgeśa settles on a subtle but powerful generalization of the standard definition. The definition he settles on is one that explicitly states that, even if there were an invariant occurrence of a causally qualified prover and a probandum, so long as there is a set of provers which do not pervade the probandum, the putative inference will not be allowed. That is to say, so long as there are cases where the digestion of these notorious vegetables do not coincide with the production of dark-coloured objects, as in the case of dark pots, then there is simply not enough evidence to warrant an inference leading to the conclusion that Mitrā's next child will be dark-skinned. So long as there is doubt about pervasion, there is no certainty about pervasion, and failing such certainty, suggestions that the pervasion obtains in a given case cannot be established. This allows Gaṅgeśa to bypass the complications from which a causal model of *upādhi* would force us to modally distinguish between cases where digestion of vegetables led to the birth of dark-skinned offspring and cases where it does not. Gaṅgeśa wants to achieve a clear-cut vindication of 'the inferential undercutter', and through the presentation of their translation and comments, Phillips and Tatacharya submit that he successfully does so.

It is, however, difficult to escape the possibility that Gaṅgeśa desire for a clear-cut definition of *upādhi* may be a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater of a modal view of 'inferential undercutters'. The case of Mitrā and the vegetables notwithstanding, it is not impossible to conjure up possible cases where a modal functioning of *upādhi* might yield a more circumspect flexibility with regard to conclusions that ought to be left open to more investigation. An investigator in the process of discovery, for instance, would be making over hasty conclusions were they to follow Gaṅgeśa rule in judging matters such as whether the ingestion of certain foods during pregnancy will have or not have certain genetic effects on prospective mothers in various states of health. A modal treatment of the *upādhi* might yield a matrix of more complex ontological conclusions than the Naiyāyikas wished to make room for in their categorical ontology, but such complexity may

not so much undermine the validity of the 'undercutter' wholesale as it would offer a truer-to-the-facts picture of the world, a picture to which in principle the Logicians were committed.

Nonetheless, Phillips' and Tatacharya's translation and commentary make for a very useful contribution of Gaṅgeśa scholarship in the West. They provide an excellent supplement to previous translations of the *vyāpti-vādā* by Frauwallner and Goekoop. The team gives an outstanding and necessary discussion in the introduction of the differences between the ontological and epistemological conceptions of *upādhi* (pp. 22-30). The subtle and brilliant argumentation in the *upādhi-prakaraṇa* is a veritable showcase of Navya-Nyāya's unsurpassed accomplishments in the refinement of inference, which are not only a triumph of the tradition, but properly understood can shed light on current issues in logic. The translation, though at times difficult and wordy, and more so in the earlier parts of the *pūrvapakṣin* section is, on the whole, a very effective and helpful unpacking of the various positions and assumptions as well as the elliptical and dense disputation in Gaṅgeśa. For those both proficient and unversed in Sanskrit, the index of technical terms at the end of the book is an excellent resource. The commentaries provided on each of the passages are often necessary to catch the fully contextualized significance of the debate within Navya-Nyāya. This latter point is both a strength and a weakness of the book, for as the authors have chosen to set up the problems more or less thematically and, as Phillips immediately concedes, 'ahistorically', their method may require the reader who is unfamiliar with the scholastic debates on the *upādhi* to do lots of homework to grasp the full significance of the conclusions drawn. This could perhaps have been remedied by a few more pages on the general ramifications of those debates in the introduction. None of this at any rate detracts from the great merits of the translation and its explication by Phillips and Tatacharya for contemporary scholarship.

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Books Received

1. Margaret Chatterjee, *Lifeworlds Philosophy and India Today*, IIAS, Shimla, 2005, p. 72, Rs. 150

2. V.V.S. Saibaba, *Faith and Devotion in Theraveda Buddhism*, D.K. Printworld Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1947, p. 231, Rs. 480

3. V.V.S. Saibaba, *Theravada Buddhist Devotionalism in Ceylon, Burma and Thailand*, D.K. Printworld Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1947, p. 88, Rs. 200

4. Guiseppe Baroetto, *Mahamudra and Atiyoga*, D.K. Printworld Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1959, p. 186, Rs. 350

5. Santi Nath Chattopadhyay, *World Peace: Problems of Global Understanding and Prospect of Harmony*, Punthi Pustak, Booksellers, 136/4B, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata-700 004, 2005, p. 949, Rs. 1800

6. Sandhya Basu, *Justification Concepts and Theories*, Progressive Publishers, 37 A, College Street, Kolkata-700 073, 2003, p. 182, Rs. 250

7. Ajai R. Singh, *Medical Practice, Psychiatry and the Pharmaceutical Industry: And Ever the Trio Shall Meet*, Mens Sana Research Foundation, Mumbai, 2005, p. 90, Rs. 250

8. W.A. Borody, *Bhoga Kārikā of Sadyojyoti with the Commentary of Aghora Śiva*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2005, p. 174, Rs. 395

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,अे ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not lṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḻ
ൺ ṇ
ർ ṛ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Chola),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathuṟā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tilevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.