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Reason Under Attack*

S.K. OOKERJEE

121, Pushpak, 31 Altamont Road, Mumbai-400 026

This paper is about Richard Rorty, who, in spite of his disclaimers, is a foremost advocate of Postmodernism, a so-called 'philosophical' movement that has erupted during the second half of the twentieth century. Though it repudiates essences, its essence, nevertheless, is an attack on human reason.

Philosophy—for those who hold by it in its traditional sense—has always been, along with the natural sciences, a rational activity *par excellence.* Naturally, therefore, Rorty provides his own picture of philosophy. Philosophy is not for him what the philosophers of the past had foolishly believed—an attempt to understand the universe as a whole or something like that. It is simply one among several language games which, however, has pretensions that outreach its capabilities, for it tries to 'eternalize' what is really just a 'contemporary language game', which itself is likely to disappear or has already disappeared.[1] Being a game, it (along with science) invents 'stories' (a favourite word) which describe 'lots and lots of things in new ways'.[2] It is not even a nice game; it is, in fact, a 'cultural disease' which we have to be cured of.[3] Sometimes, in a more generous mood, Rorty thinks that philosophy, claiming to increase 'our understanding of how things are', actually gives only 'increasingly useful metaphors'[4] (another favourite word) and, instead of its vaunted method of rational dialogue, it is an 'exercise in imagination in providing novel scenarios', a 'conversational model of inquiry', 'talk in more creative ways', 'novel descriptions and vocabularies' (one more favourite word).[5] This philosophy is called edifying philosophy.

*Paper read at International Philosophy Day of I.I.T., Mumbai.

The declared aim of Rorty's book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, is 'to undermine the reader's confidence in... "knowledge" about which there ought to be a "theory" and has "foundations", and in "philosophy" as ... conceived since Kant'.[6] (Why only Kant? What about earlier philosophers?) Instead, he applauds the ways of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey, who have no '*alternative* theories of knowledge' but who simply 'set aside epistemology and metaphysics as possible disciplines'.[7] We must not, says Rorty, 'argue against' the older philosophers, because the 'vocabulary of philosophical reflection' is pointless.[8]

One is not quite clear as to what exactly Rorty is doing; nor is he. Is he giving an alternative method of philosophizing because he thinks that the earlier methods have failed to deliver? If so, he has to demonstrate the same; making disparaging statements about rational dialogue and pushing the 'conversational model' is not enough. Is he issuing a *fatwa* banning a more-than-two-millenia-old human activity? Or is he setting up a novel language game, which, like all games, can happily exist side by side with the old one which, then, is none the worse for it? This seems—I say 'seems'—to be his view. We are told that, according to Rorty, there are two traditions of philosophy: (1) that of a 'rational dialogue... in the quest for communicable truth'; and (2) that which thrives on 'paradox and style', using philosophy, not as a 'means of rational exchange', but something totally different, called a 'fighting ground' based on a 'rooted scepticism about ultimate truth'.[9] These two traditions, says C. Norris, are 'in perpetual rivalry', but then inconsistently adds that they 'can never properly confront one another', since 'their aims and idioms are so remote'.[10] The aims of the second so-called tradition exactly are never revealed. In any case, to see them as 'locked in dispute ... competing for the same objective, is according to Rorty [so says Norris] a misapprehension'.[11] In which case, of course, the philosophy of the first tradition—a rational quest for communicable truth—need not be at all bothered. But yet again, and more inconsistently, the second so-called tradition doesn't hesitate to carry out 'periodic raids ... into the "mainstream" philosophy', which it rejects.[12] How can it reject what it cannot confront? But, of course, it can, because it also rejects the notion of consistency, which is an integral part of the rational dialogue. That is quite consistent, isn't it?

What Rorty has to say against philosophy is also meant to apply to Reason itself and all that falls under 'rational argument' (of which philosophy is usually held to be a prime example). In the 'mainstream' philosophy, knowledge, truth and reason have always been seen to be intimately connected. Knowledge (to put it briefly) is made up of truths rationally connected within a system. Atomic, isolated truths (if there can be any) do not constitute knowledge proper. Some of Rorty's views on knowledge, truth and rationality are shared with those of the Postmoderns; others are peculiar to him. They are, indeed, also 'peculiar' in the more colloquial sense.

Rorty questions 'rationality' which all humans are supposed to share. This is the result of a refusal to accept universals, which are anathema to the Postmoderns. Rorty writes, 'Suppose we say that all that rationality amounts to ... is the ability to use language...'[13] How is that any less a universal? And he is willing to accept another universal, 'curiosity', which is 'the urge to expand one's horizon' which we all have.[14]

Only sentences, argues Rorty, are true or false. Sentences are made by humans; therefore, without humans there is no truth. From which a further leap tells us that there are no 'sentence-shaped chunks called facts'.[15] Again, 'our ways of speaking are historically determined', we don't speak of a past event (for example, the Eucharist, the Christian consecration of bread and wine) as people did 500 years ago. But this does not mean that we are today any closer than them to truth or reality. We do not use a different way of talking because the older way was not quite accurate. Oh no! we simply decide, one fine day, to speak in a different way, to play a new game. 'Change just happens',[16] says Rorty.

I take up the first contention about sentences and facts. Rorty's view here is, as often, a half-truth. Sentences as sounds or marks have no truth-value; it is their content, their meaning or what has been called a proposition, that is true or false. It is true that propositions would not exist unless humans believed them, performed a certain kind of activity. But they are not made in the way of tables or houses. And, of course, if you call the proposition or what is believed (*that* there is a table) a chunk called 'fact', then *this* 'fact' does not exist as things do. But it does not follow that none of our beliefs (expressed in sentences) get us any nearer to

truth or that the real world (including tables and houses, once they are made) does not exist but is some kind of mirage dependent on human beings. That thesis would require other arguments.

To answer Rorty's second point about changing our vocabularies from time to time, a deeper analysis is needed. This will be attempted in the next few pages.

If we cannot get at the truth, then, of course, we cannot have knowledge. We may perhaps have truths without knowledge, but not vice versa, because knowledge is made up of truths systematically connected. Such connecting is the work of Reason or argument in the sense of reasoning. Reasoning or arguing, as here used, is a case of solving problems, and for this language is used. Habermas thinks of the whole activity as 'cooperative problem-solving'. But Rorty never tires of telling us that language is simply a 'tool' whose function is not to help us to get at the truth, to connect truths or solve problems. Its function is 'aesthetic', 'original creation', 'to make new things, "to make something that never had been dreamed of before"', and this is done by dismissing the old notion of language and '"inventing a new language" that redescribes things in our "own terms"'.[17]

Against a position like this it is—as a commentator points out—'unreasonable and absurd to want to continue the discussion',[18] but this doesn't trouble Rorty, for, having extricated himself from the old ways of talking and disputing, he would blandly retort that discussion is unreasonable and absurd only for us, not for him, for his own terms (for whatever he is doing) are different from ours. This is an old trick. *He* uses *our* ways of discussing in order to convince us of what he is saying, but *we* are forbidden to use those same ways to criticize *his* position, because he rejects those ways of ours. This intellectual bullying has been exposed more than two thousand years ago. Here is a dialogue between Thrasymachus the sophist and Socrates:

Thrasymachus: Tell us what you think justice is.
And don't tell me it is duty, or
expediency, or advantage... I won't
put up with nonsense of that sort.

Socrates: You ask someone for a definition of twelve,
and add, 'and I don't want to be told that
it's twice six, or three times four, or six
times two... that sort of nonsense won't do.'
You know perfectly well that no one will
answer you on those terms.
(Plato, *Republic*, 336; tr. H.D.P. Lee)

If we abide by the old ways of talking in the old terms of argument and counter-argument, we have to, in one sense, admit defeat. If Rorty sincerely believes what he says (but what does that mean in his terms?) it is impossible to convince him that he is getting himself entangled in a circle, for he is using reason to denigrate reason. But though we cannot hope to convince *him*, it does not mean that he is talking sense or that there are no good reasons by which to show that he is talking nonsense. This can be done for those who are still willing to play the game, the reasoning game. 'Nobody can go out to break logic', McTaggart had said, 'but logic breaks him in the end.'

I will say in passing that Wittgenstein's notorious notion of language games has created immense havoc in philosophical thinking. Just because languages have a certain property which is similar to that which games have—the property of being different from each other and each having its own set of rules—it does not follow that languages must also have other properties which games possess. We may play one game or switch to another as the fancy takes us, but when talking of language games, Rorty is not saying that we may speak in English or, if we like, switch to French. A switch of language games, in the present context, is something quite different; it is a switch from one kind of activity, which non-Rortyians would call reasoning, to another kind of activity called 'conversation'. While reasoning has, like games, certain rules or, rather, laws, these laws are, unlike the rules of games, *not* made by us, and 'conversation' has no laws or even rules, but is a matter of 'paradox and style'.

The whole business of language games is a red herring to throw you off the scent in pursuing a consistent and rigorous argument. Though Rorty keeps talking of a change in our speaking, he is, in fact, talking of a change in our thinking or beliefs, for example,

about the Eucharist. What he means is that Christians today do not take the story literally as Christians did 500 years ago. Rorty also talks of changes in scientific theory which he calls 'revolutions', changes, for example, from the Ptolemic to the Copernican theory, from Creationism to Darwinism. These changes are not at all like changing from English to Marathi. Here, in science, it is a matter of understanding and truth, a question of one theory supplanting another because the former is now seen to be true and the latter is discarded as false, or of one theory considered to be closer to the facts than the other. The language of science is not the language of games.

Rorty uses several metaphors in addition to 'language games' in order to expound his views. 'Paradigms', 'conceptual schemes', 'discourses', 'diagrams', 'maps', 'conversations' and 'vocabularies' are all used with roughly the same meaning. They are all meant to suggest that scientific statements (in fact, all statements) have nothing to do with truth or falsity but with something else. That something else is practical convenience. Postmoderns are pragmatists, for whom truth is what is useful. In any sense where 'true' is not simply defined as 'useful', it is, of course, true that truth is very often useful, but not always. From which it does not follow that truth *is* that which is useful. Pragmatists, switching horse and cart, hold that a statement is true because it is useful, whereas the truth is that it is often useful because it is true. I do not intend to argue against Pragmatism here; it has been done in the past by many. When Rorty the pragmatist is asked what it is that scientific 'conversations' are useful for, there is no clear or unequivocal answer. Surely, anything that satisfies some need of ours cannot be called science. There must be some specific kind of need that science, as such, satisfies; and surely that need is the need for *intellectual* satisfaction which, in plain language, is truth. Scientific technology satisfies many of our other needs, but that is an incidental benefit (or otherwise) that science confers.

As for maps and diagrams, if they are interpreted as they are meant to be, they certainly have truth-value. If a map of Mumbai shows the IIT at Colaba, it is certainly false and if we followed it we wouldn't be here just now. The same is true of diagrams. Rorty's metaphors such as paradigms and schemes are meant to show two

features: (1) different paradigms are mutually incommensurable; and (2) from time to time, we change paradigms for no rhyme or reason. The paradigms are incommensurable means that what one paradigm indicates cannot be connected or compared with, or assessed in the light of, what another paradigm indicates. Of course, for Rorty, a paradigm does not indicate or say anything. For him, not only philosophers and moralists, but even scientists merely 'invent new vocabularies and tell new stories'[19] and one story is as good or bad as any other, because there are no 'rational' or 'objective' standards by which to decide between paradigms.[20] Old theories or paradigms are, like poor relations, simply dropped when fashions change and we are 'bored' with them.

Galileo, writes Rorty, was '*creating* the notion of "scientific value" as he went along'. Was Galileo being rational? asks Rorty and answers that this question is 'out of place', like Pilate asking 'What is truth?' and walking away. Change of paradigms is just a 'shift in cultural climate' which is 'not brought about by "rational agent" and 'notions of criteria and choice ... are no longer in point when it comes to changes from one language game to another'.[21] There is not even a non-rational choice. 'Europe', he says, 'lost the habit of using certain words and gradually acquired the habit of using others.'[22] A scientific discovery is a matter of 'having hit upon a tool which happened to work better'.[23] We may ask, what is meant by 'works' and 'better', in what way and how is better or worse judged? Our postmodern Sphinx would reply that all such questions are 'out of place'.

I will say, again in passing, that comparing languages and theories to tools is another piece of sophistry. Languages and theories, like tools, do serve a purpose but they are vastly different from one another and from tools. Languages, theories and tools can all be, in Rorty's words, 'obsolete and clumsy', but a theory can be obsolete in a way in which a language or a tool cannot be, that is by being shown to be false.

Any elementary book on science will show that Rorty's account of science and the way it progresses is a caricature that bears no resemblance to the original. It is a creature of his fertile imagination 'that never had been dreamed of before' and conceived in 'horror of finding oneself only a copy'.

In spite of all that Rorty says in favour of 'conversations' and paradigms, where questions of truth or rationality are 'out of place', he conveniently forgets all this gobbledygook when it comes to the question of justification. We can never get at the truth, but, says Rorty, we can and must seek justification or warranted assertibility if our opinions are to matter. Whatever be Rorty's eccentricities regarding truth and rational argument, he has to produce some semblance of argument in support of his views, because, obviously, he wants them to be accepted. Or is he writing so voluminously only to entertain himself? 'Rorty's own writings,' says a critic, 'articulate a number of claims which obviously add up to a substantial (if controversial) account of knowledge.'[24]

When Rorty considers the question of justification, we hear no more of 'conversation', metaphors or maps. He avoids talking of 'true' and 'false', but he does talk of justifying claims, which is a far cry from 'original creations' and 'conversations' which claim nothing. Now he speaks the common or garden language of the scientists and ordinary people in which they claim to be saying something which they believe to be true.

Rorty, agreeing with Sellars, holds that justification is a matter of social practice.[25] Referring to Kuhn and Feyerabend, with approval, he says that their views 'suggested that the only notions of "truth" and "reference" we really understood were those which were relativized to a "conceptual scheme"', and that there was no 'single observation language common to all alternative theories', and again, that the 'question of what was real or true was not to be settled independently of a given framework'.[26] A conceptual scheme is 'the collection of views which make up our present-day culture'.[27] Rorty further says that 'justification is relative to some particular audience'[28] and still further that 'there is no way to rise above the conversational moment in which one finds oneself...and make principled recommendations'.[29]

All this implies that what is true or justified for one framework, cultural scheme, culture or audience may not be so for another. A stronger theory says that it cannot be. There is a way of understanding these views which would pose no threat to the universality and absoluteness of truth, but the way in which Rorty and his friends want to push them does pose such a threat. What they urge is that

there is no possible relation between different schemes, between 'our own culture, theory, story or game' and another's. This is Cultural Relativism, which is dear to the heart of Postmodernism. Cultures are incommunicable and incommensurable. No grading is possible. One scheme cannot be judged to be in any way better or worse than another as far as its claims to truth or warrantability go. The Ptolemic scheme is no less true than the Copernican one, Darwinism is no truer than Creationism, the cult of the witch doctor is no inferior to modern medicine. Each is quite comfortable within its own boundary and questions of truth can be raised only from within. Each scheme is monadic but, unlike Leibnitz's monads, it doesn't even reflect the others. In other words, there is nothing like common human reason by which one could assess the truth-value of different schemes and there are no common principles of reason which cut across all schemes.

This short paper does not allow me to refute, in detail, this cultural relativism, even if I were competent to do so. I can only indicate lines along which a refutation is possible.

1. This kind of relativism is self-refuting. You cannot use Reason to show that Reason is 'out of place'. This is really so obvious that it is embarrassing to have to point it out.
2. A cultural relativist cannot, by using the principles of his culture, hope to substantiate his position before a critic who belongs to another culture. Why should such a critic care for the arguments (*arguments?*) which have weight, if any, only for the relativist within his own culture? The fact that he won't admit that he is entangled in a web of his own spinning doesn't mean that he is not so entangled.
3. What does one do when cultures clash? As a citizen of a democratic republic, I should welcome a uniform civil code but as a Parsee I am governed by certain special provisions regarding succession. Rorty would say that I should act as I prefer. But on what grounds do I prefer? Do I toss a coin?
4. One must accept as true or warranted what is accepted in one's culture. Which culture? How far down (or up) should one go? Do I consider Indian culture, Maharashtrian culture, the culture of *Bombay Times*, Parsee culture (eccentric

though it be), Rustom Baug culture (which is different from Kharaghat Colony culture), or the culture within my family?

5. It may be granted that one's culture has some influence on one's beliefs, but non-relativists maintain that human reason is such that it can reflect on those beliefs, accept them, modify them or even reject them. This is the basis of the distinction between education and indoctrination, reasoning and brainwashing. According to relativism, all of us are brainwashed, including the relativists themselves. Non-relativists hold the view that one can rise above one's culture, a Gorbachev can arise out of Soviet Russia.
6. Finally, Postmoderns refer to a mythical Archimedian Point from which non-relativists claim to be able to stand outside of all cultures and from where they are able to critique cultures.

But there is no such point, no neutral position. The relativists are quite right. There is no such point. But they are quite wrong in thinking that, for the non-relativists, there has got to be such a point. There is no need for one. A mathematician can show a tyro where the latter has gone wrong without having to step outside his own mathematical knowledge to compare it with the tyro's. The mathematician's knowledge comprehends the tyro's inadequate grasp of the subject and so he can be shown where he has gone wrong. The tyro cannot return the compliment and show the mathematician that he has gone wrong. Or if he could, he too would not have had to get to a neutral point—neutral between mathematics and inadequate mathematics. In the same way, a Galilean can show the shortcomings of the Ptolemic theory in accounting for certain facts (facts accepted by both theories) without going outside of his own theory. He can do it by using principles accepted by both himself and his adversary, provided the latter does not dismiss them summarily as 'out of place' and is prepared to go where the argument leads. Of course, if you dismiss rational argument itself, nobody can prove anything to anybody. The Archimedian-point idea is the result of an inappropriate analogy. Theories are not compared with each other by stepping back from

them; the true theory *includes* the false one within it in a corrected form.

Rorty advises us to give up the idea 'that intellectual... progress is rational, in any sense of "rational" which is neutral between vocabularies'.[30] Six pages later, however, he throws in the sponge. He writes, 'When I say "we should do this" or that "we cannot" do that, I am not, of course, speaking from a neutral standpoint.' He goes on, 'When I say that neutrality is not a desideratum, I am not saying it from a neutral philosophical perspective.'[31] That means that he is saying it from a philosophical perspective which (he seems to claim) is *superior* to all other perspectives and which he expects *everybody* to respect. This, of course, is the *rational* perspective, which every culture claims (even if not always consciously so) to have. It is not the perspective from an Archimedian point; it is the integral part of the culture of rationality which, in the words of the poet, is 'boundless, endless, and sublime'.

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15. Malachowski, A.R. (Ed.) *Reading Rorty* (Blackwell, 1990), p. 17 and Rorty, *Contingency* etc., p. 5.
16. Guignon, G. and Hiley, D.R. (Eds.) *Richard Rorty* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 15.

been especially hit hard by modern critiques of theodicy. It has responded by radically modifying or reconstructing itself. Most of these modern Christian theological appropriations of the problem of evil are guilty of the great sin of heterodoxy. The traditional Islamic approach that tackles the problem from a very different perspective which is not conditioned by the Hellenic–Christian–Nietzschean sense of the tragic element, although fully equipped to deal with the problem in its own ways, has, however not been fully brought into light. Modern Muslim theologians have paid very little attention to the problem. It is only Iqbal, among the great modern Muslim religious thinkers, who has tried to reckon with the problem in the contemporary idiom, albeit in a heterodoxical manner. The present paper attempts to evaluate Iqbal's approach to the problem of evil in the light of major modern criticisms of theism and theodicy. Perennialist philosophy will be kept in the background to evaluate Iqbal's position vis-à-vis evil.[2] Our focus will be primarily on Iqbal's major philosophical work, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, where alone has he systematically treated the problem of evil. However, major themes of his poetry that have a bearing on his approach to the problem of evil have not been ignored either.

Iqbal seems to uncritically accept classical Epicurean formulation of the problem of evil and then tries to answer it.[3] Epicurus' famous formulation of the problem as quoted by Hume runs as follows: Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?[4]

Iqbal has no illusion regarding the so-called illusion of evil. He considers it as hard and painfully hard fact. Evil, for him, isn't just privation of good, absence of good or a mere shadow. There is something terribly positive about it. He doesn't take the challenge to theism lightly.[5] He considers it a very serious problem. For him, this painful problem is really the crux of theism.[6] He quotes Nauman who so pithily puts the case of evil in relation to theism.[7] He then proceeds to reconcile 'the goodness and omnipotence of God with the immense volume of evil in His creation' without minimizing in any way the magnitude and severity of the problem. He doesn't hide the blemishes in God's creation, unlike many theologians to

exonerate God[8] or to refuse to see evil in all its horror.[9] He says 'The course of evolution, as revealed by modern science, involves almost universal suffering and wrongdoing. No doubt, wrongdoing is confined to man only. But the fact of pain is almost universal, though it is equally true that men can suffer and have suffered the most excruciating pain for the sake of what they believed to be good. Thus, the two facts of moral and physical evil stand out prominent in the life of Nature.[10] Iqbal doesn't ignore either physical, metaphysical or moral evil. However, it is with moral evil that he is most concerned. He even seems to reduce physical evil to moral evil.[11] Iqbal's response to the problem of moral evil has been usually understood in a very limited sense of his concept of *Iblis*. But the problem of moral evil is very complicated and has many dimensions. Concept of evil principle (Satan or *Iblis)* doesn't encompass the entire issue.

Iqbal rejects some proposed solutions and approaches to the problem of evil which include positing relativity of evil or its unreality. Thus, all *privatio boni* arguments are rejected by him as Jung rejects them in his *Answer to Job*. The *privatio boni* arguments posit evil as not something positive or different or independent principle and marginalize it as only an absence of good. The Buddhist approach is the exact opposite. Buddha lifts the existence of evil to the status of first noble truth and defines happiness (although this mayn't be equated with good) as cessation of pain which he sees as the norm, the first principle. However, this Buddhist approach is also rejected by Iqbal. He doesn't see sufficient warrant for Schopenhaurian pessimism (which, in a way, represents crude appropriation of Buddhist approach). Browning's optimistic faith is also seen as not fully warranted in the Iqbalian perspective. Iqbal also appears to reject what has been called as Means and Ends approach which advocates the presence of forces that tend to transmute it and thus be a source of consolation to us.[12] This functionalist approach seen in the writings of Richard Swinburne, John Hick and others is unacceptable to him on the grounds that it doesn't explain all evil. However, at other places in his third lecture 'The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer' and his fourth lecture 'The Human Ego—His Freedom and Immortality', he uses the same argument in his apology for hell and arguments for

immortality and ego's onward march and development as the supreme end for which all the obstructions involving pain and suffering are a means. For the heaven of immortal or permanent egohood, hell may be necessary as a 'corrective experience' or means. We need to say yes to all the attendant or accompanying ills and be patient 'under ills and hardships'[13] for accepting the supreme objective or end of 'trust of personality' or 'true manhood'.[14] Iqbal's interpretation of Adam's fall uses the same 'Means and End approach'. He says, 'The only way to correct this tendency (Faustian tendency of Adam for getting Occult knowledge) was to place him in an environment, which however painful, was better suited to the unfolding of his intellectual faculties'[15] and 'intellectual evil is an indispensable factor in the building up of experience'.[16] This is just one example of Iqbal's inconsistent logic that he uses while dealing with the problem of evil.

Iqbal also rejects the Christian conception of original sin and fall of Adam. Iqbal interprets the Biblical Fall as rise of Adam and birth of self consciousness. He sees man's first act of disobedience as 'the first act of free choice'.[17] Parodying the Christian conception he says, 'Nor does the *Quran* regard the earth as a torture hall where an elementally wicked humanity is imprisoned for an original act of sin'.[18] Although this rationalist humanist modernist understanding and critique of Christian doctrine by Iqbal could itself be challenged by traditionalist perennialist interpretation of religion, Christian theologians and many others, Iqbal's rejection of this possible solution problematizes his own solution as he can't opt for any traditional religious explanation, be that of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity or even Islam according to perennialist authors like Schuon. The Buddhist solution to the problem of evil that involves doctrine of no-self or dissolution of ego is completely rejected by Iqbal. Preservation and development of ego is the *raison de'tre* of Iqbal's whole philosophy despite tremendous difficulties on traditional religious or metaphysical, psychological and historical grounds (against this view) that Iqbal is obliged to surmount. The Sufi approach to the problem of evil that invokes similar Christian and Buddhist notions is also rejected by Iqbal.

Traditional Islamic approach as represented by Ghazzali that takes our fallen condition seriously and doesn't praise the world of matter

in Iqbalian (which is in almost secular theological perspective) manner and sees this world or world of matter as something evil due to its separation from God who alone is good, is also unacceptable to Iqbal. Classical theism, as represented by Ghazzali that conceives the supreme principle as Eternal consciousness, knowing but not including the world is rejected by Iqbal in favour of panentheism the conceives God as Eternal–Temporal consciousness, knowing but also including the world.[19] Classical theistic solution to the problem of evil encounters various difficulties as many philosophers of religion have argued with great force and it is perhaps for this reason that Iqbal is led to take recourse to panentheism. Iqbal doesn't accept the *Ash'arite* theological approach that overemphasizes Divine Will and its capricious character, and further leads to a kind of fatalism and denial of much of human freedom. Iqbal is willing to qualify divine omniscience and freedom in order to safeguard human freedom. But free will defence of theism as a response to the problem of evil has many limitations and Iqbal is susceptible to all those objections that have been raised against it.

Iqbal's own defence of theism against its detractors who base their criticism on the grounds of problem of evil assumes mainly two lines of argumentation: (1) 'We can't see all the picture' arguments; and (2) Free Will Defence. However, both of these strategies suffer from serious limitations, which will be discussed now.

'We can't see all the picture' argument has many contemporary defenders, prominent among them being Alston. Hamlet tells Haratio that 'there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy'. Though we might find it hard to see why there is evil in a world made by God, there might be a reason. Iqbal, invoking a similar line of argumentation, says, 'We can't understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc and at the same time sustain and amplify life' because 'our intellectual constitution is that we can take only a piecemeal view of things'.[20] Reducing the great and difficult problems of theodicy to just an issue between optimism and pessimism Iqbal proceeds to declare that it 'can't be finally decided at the present stage of our knowledge'.[21] William P. Alston argues that 'the mag-

nitude or complexity of the question is such that our powers, access to data, and so on are radically insufficient to provide sufficient warrant for accepting the thesis that God could have prevented many instances of evil without thereby losing some greater good'.[22] Alston argues that 'our cognition of the world, obtained by filtering raw data through such conceptual screens as we have available for the nonce, acquaint us with only some indeterminable fraction of what there is to know'[23] but this argument, like the argument of Iqbal, proves only a negative thesis that evil and good God aren't necessarily contradictory but what is needed in establishing a case for optimism or meliorism. Both are unable to do that and just hope for victory of good over evil in the future. However, Iqbal doesn't concern himself with the question how present evil could thus be negated or wiped out; how past pain could be obliterated. Future victory of good over evil, as Iqbal hopes for and believes in (and is unable to philosophically prove or argue), will still not do away with the existence of past unmerited suffering. Dostoevsky's Ivan in *The Brothers Karamazov* rebels against God precisely for this reason. He is unable to accept any scheme of things which requires putting innocent children to torture. This is also true of Camus in *The Plague*. Given the veracity of Iqbalian concept of ego and individual immortality, it is very difficult to conceive how our this-worldly record of pain and evil could be cancelled or annulled.

Most common theistic response to the problem of evil is what is commonly referred to as Free Will Defence, according to which even Omnipotent God can't ensure that free people act well and much evil is explicable in terms of God allowing for the possible consequences of freedom which in itself is a great good. While this argument has been advocated from many quarters in the past, a contemporary philosopher who argues forcefully along these lines is Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga develops this argument in many works, especially in his *The Nature Of Necessity* (Oxford, 1974). Iqbal justifies the Fall of Adam (along with its attendant or accompanying evils) on the grounds of exercise of free will. For him, goodness is only possible by the 'self's free surrender to the moral ideal and arises out of a willing cooperation of free egos. A being whose movements are wholly determined like a machine can't produce goodness'[24] but 'the freedom to choose good involves also the

freedom to choose what is the opposite of good'.[25] Freedom is the basic attribute of Iqbal's ego. Ego and his freedom are worth all the great cost of evil that may accompany them. God chose to limit His own freedom for the sake of human freedom. But free will defence could, at best, explain only moral evil—other kinds of evil are left unexplained. Although the Christian doctrine of original sin caters to even animal pain in the world, Iqbal has no explanation for evil in the non-human world. He doesn't extend the consequences of Adam's first act of disobedience to non-human world; sufferings of innocent children are also left unexplained by this way of argumentation. There is also the existence of physical pain that Iqbal's free will defence leaves uncatered for. It may also be argued that freedom isn't goodness; nor is it condition for it. Freedom is not such a great good in itself to be worth the world-pain.[26] How can we justify this freedom which necessitates an ocean of tears? Existentialist valuation of freedom that Iqbal seems to approve, produces many side effects. Ordinary man is too weak to be free and enjoy the heaven of freedom. He dreads it. He wants some escape in 'bad faith'. He is too weak to resist the temptations of *Mara*. Most men choose to be disbelievers paying no gratitude to God. The Satanic question mark on man's excellence and angelic irreverent scepticism (in the story of genesis in the *Quran*) seems to have been vindicated. Satan, concedes *Sura Sheba* (V.20), found his judgement about a rebellious humanity true. Impressive record of human vices, human folly, infidelity, waste and irresponsibility seems to vindicate the Satanic reservations about Adam and his descendents. Most people deserve hell due to their *Kufr* or ingratitude to God. Human history, from Cain onwards, is mostly bad news. A careful examination of moral record has, both in religious and secular perspectives, sometimes inspired unredeeming pessimism. Man has great capacity to resist grace and actively desires to thwart God's purpose. Attainment of virtuous destiny which requires patient struggle and hard climb (*Quran* 90:11) is very difficult for most men. There persists within human nature that inner, regrettably often dominant tendency to evil, the fruits of which are gathered in the *Quran*ic world of unheeded messengers and the sombre ruins of the subverted cities. All this shows the poor record of human freedom. Retrospectively, we can ask whether

this freedom was worth the great risk that God undertook in giving it to man. This freedom has produced more evil than goodness. It has also been argued that omnipotent and infinitely wise and good God could have created us as more or wholly predisposed to good rather than evil. He could have foreseen the consequences of giving man this great boon of freedom which has proved more often than not a bane rather than a boon (*amanah*). The *Quran* says that man foolishly accepted the trust of personality. But Iqbal forgets this qualifying clause of *Quran* in his interpretation of such verses.

Iqbal has taken a very precarious position with regard to the problem of evil. All traditional religions invoke such notions as sin, grace, fall, redemption or salvation. Iqbal has hardly any use for such notions. His demythologizing approach misses the profound significance of such religious notions and symbols. He takes the modern humanist rationalist project as essentially valid and argues for theism within this framework. This is the root cause of his problems. Modern man denies the reality of sin and fall; he feels no need of grace and salvation. He is anthropocentric rather than theocentric. He has too sanguine an estimate of man and his goodness. *Iblis* is a fiction for him. In his pride he may deny the reality of evil. And, paradoxically, it is God who needs to be exonerated and defended against evil rather than man who is required to take it seriously and win his salvation. The onus lies on God rather than on man vis-à-vis evil. This is the modern man's unpardonable sin, a perversion. Perennialist authors reject the entire modernist project as a great perversion, as a second fall, as a sin. Although this may be going too far and there is possible religious appropriation of Renaissance project, as Tillich and others argue, but the fact remains that it is very difficult to make sense of the problem of evil within that framework.

Without the crucial notions of Beyond Being and Impersonal Absolute and even 'rebirth' and *maya* it is very difficult to account for evil, as perennialist authors like Schuon argue. Buddhist insight into the nature of evil which aren't incompatible with monotheistic perspective of Islam, as Schuon in his *Treasures of Buddhism* and *Islam and the Perennial Philosophy* argues, also need to be appropriated for satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. Nietzsche too offers some brilliant insights into the nature of evil and there have

also been Buddhist attempts at appropriating them. Iqbal too offers some brilliant insight here and there which, if properly understood, could open new vistas for understanding evil. Iqbalian insight that there is no pleasure or pain-giving acts, only ego sustaining and ego destroying acts, is typical Nietzschean and even Buddhist in tone. Heaven and Hell aren't final resting places but both need to be transcended. The onward march of ego knows no destiny. Categories of thought and pleasure and pain don't apply to ego and our appreciative self. We aren't here to seek pleasure and avoid pain but must win our egohood or soul in this vale of soul making which appears a vale of tears only for obdurate pessimists. Buddha is triumphant over evil in this world. His practical approach to the problem of evil rather than speculating on its metaphysical significance is displayed by Iqbal also. Iqbal isn't a scholastic thinker or an advocate of God like Milton, who justifies the ways of God to men. Man's concern is to win immortality through his own efforts and this is emphasized by Iqbal as by all traditional religions.

Iqbal is led to profoundly differ from orthodox Islamic position vis-à-vis evil. He rejects any idea of redemption on, assumedly, *Quranic* grounds. This ignores Muslim conception of prophet as redeemer (*shafee*). There is a scope for grace within Islamic framework, yet Iqbal has no room for it. He has too much faith in man's independent and self-sufficient capacity for salvation. However, he knows this that ordinary mortals are incapable of sustaining a strong ego and only Superman is really capable of winning immortality. If man is only a candidate for immortality and very few people have strong egos (if we go by the tough criteria of Iqbal himself) then most men are denied individual immortality. Yet the *Quran* promises everyone immortality (although it does not grant heaven). Iqbal's hell and heaven are not traditional Islam's hell and heaven. Iqbal's heterodoxy in this context is attributable to his not cognizing or accepting the traditional Islamic approach to the Fall, Sin, *Iblis* and afterlife. Iqbal's heterodox appropriation of evil is also one of the factors responsible for his modernist interpretation of religion. The Ghazalian approach to the question of evil, which represents traditional Islam, is in sharp contrast to Iqbalian heterodox approach to evil. Yet Iqbal's approach is highly significant and cannot

be ignored for its originality and bold appropriation of modern science and philosophy of religion. Modern man, who has been conditioned by certain factors not fully appreciated by traditionalists, will find Iqbal worth reckoning.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This is precisely the motto behind Iqbal's *Reconstruction.* He tried to provide rational foundation for traditional Islamic thought and to justify the Islamic conception of God. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* Ed. and Annot. by Mohammad Saeed Sheikh (Adam Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 1997), p. 69.
2. The foremost exponent of perennialist traditionalist approach is the French mystic and mystical philosopher Frithjof Schuon. He presents in his writings like *Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, Dimensions of Islam, Christianity/Islam* the traditional Islamic approach to evil.
3. In this classical epicurean formulation, the problem is almost insoluble. Theodicy becomes almost impossible. Here lies the crucial error of modern philosophers of religion and theologians. To uncritically accept the unproblematic nature of this formulation shows one's ignorance of traditional metaphysics. Iqbal could justifiably be accused of indulging in what Schuon calls bad metaphysics and this is especially discernible in his approach to theodicy. Schuon's critique of epicurean reasoning and formulation may be quoted here: 'Epicurean reasoning is based on certain ambiguities concerning the very notion of "evil", "will" and "power".' In the first place, will and power are inherent in the Divine Nature, which is absoluteness and Infinitude; this means that God is neither capable nor desirous of what is contrary to His Nature on pain of contradiction and hence of absurdity. It is impossible, because it is absurd, that God should have the power to be other than God, to be neither absolute no infinite, to be altogether inexistent; and He cannot will that which, inasmuch as it is contrary to Being, is outside His Power. God is all powerful in relation to the world, His creation or His manifestation; but Omnipotence cannot act upon the Divine Being itself, given that this Being is the source of that Omnipotence and not the reverse. (*Islam and the Perennial Philosophy,* World of Islam Festival Publishing Company, 1976, p. 167). Epicurean reasoning is the almost classical example of a faultless operation of logic which lacks the data that its content requires; it discuses 'evil' but fails to realize that evil is by definition evil only in one respect and not in another, as is proved in advance by the fact that there is no absolute evil and that evil is never a substance; it discusses 'God' but fails to realize that God, being infinite, includes in His Nature the seed of an unfolding that necessarily involves an element of contradiction by the very fact of His Infinitude; and it discusses 'power' and 'will', but fails to recognize that the Divine Nature is the subject of these and not their object, which amounts to saying that these two faculties, although they are unlimited by virtue of Divine Limitlessness and when directed towards contingency, are nevertheless limited 'at the Summit' by Divine Absoluteness, which no will or power can modify. (*Islam and the Perennial Philosophy,* p. 168).
4. Hume, David, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.*
5. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* Ed. and Annot. by Mohammad Saeed Sheikh (Adam Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 1997), p. 64.
6. Ibid., p. 64.
7. Nuaman's following words have been quoted by Iqbal in *Reconstruction,* pp. 64–65, from his *Briefe uber Religion,* 'We possess a knowledge of world which teaches us a God of power and strength who sends out life and death as simultaneously as shadow and light, and a revelation, a faith as to salvation which declares the same God to be father. The following of the world God produces the morality of the struggle for the existence and the service of the father of Jesus Christ produces the morality of compassion and yet they are not two gods but one God. Somehow or the other their arms intertwine. Only, no mortal can say where and how this occurs.'
8. Iqbal's boldness is unique and unprecedented in the history of Muslim philosophy in this connection. His poem 'Dialogue between God and Man' in *Payam-i-Mashriq* (*Message from East*) is illustrative in this context. He has exalted man and belittled God in almost all his comparisons between God and man. In his earlier years he had found it more rational to believe in *Ahriman* than *Ahurmazd* (see his letter to Atiya Fayzee dated 17 July 1909 in this connection).
9. Iqbal doesn't fully recognize all the diverse manifestations of evil and dubs all of them under the general heads of suffering and wrongdoing. Moral evil isn't just subsumable under the head of wrongdoing. The dark reality of sin is left out of the picture, so poignantly portrayed by Christian theologians and writers such as Dostoevsky. Thousand kinds of suffering and pain that plague our human saga—enumerated by great tragedians of the world and great pessimist philosophers such as Schopenhauer and religious souls such as Buddha—get marginalized in Iqbalian account of the problem. Not all physical evils are reducible simply to pain. This is important, as McCloskey notes, for it means it is both inaccurate and positively misleading to speak of the problem of physical evil. Critics of theodicy such as McCloskey have argued that no

one 'solution' covers all these physical evils, and that physical evils create not one problem but a number of distinct problems for the theist. Also it needs to be pointed out that even without the discovery of evolution the problem of evil was problem. The horizon of the problem extends far wider than Iqbal thinks.

The terrible reality of Sin (or *Zulm* in *Quranic* vocabulary) so acutely and poignantly portrayed by the *Quran* in its description of hell's tortures—Iqbal appears to sidestep.

10. Iqbal, M., *Reconstruction*, p. 64.
11. Many theists have argued that the problem of physical evil is reducible to the problem of moral evil and even this has been conceded by such critics of theism as Mackie. Iqbal too appears to use this strategy. This tactic makes the next move possible in meeting the critics of theodicy and arrive at complete solution to the problem of evil, i.e., trying to argue for the compatibility of free will with absolute goodness. Iqbal's philosophy of ego and his valorization of struggle and fight against evil so that ego is strengthened and his claim that obstructing forces alone makes real moral good realizable in the world are attempts in this direction. Pain is a goad to action. Life moves on and ego ascends to perfection through the driving force of what he calls as world pain. It is physical evil that fuels the engine of evolution and leads ultimately to the emergence of higher egos. However, it is precisely this reduction of physical evil to moral evil that is problematic. McCloskey has forcefully argued against this reduction of physical evil to moral evil. He argues that physical evils create a number of distinct problems which aren't reducible to the problem of moral evil. Further, the proposed solution of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will (Iqbal also proposes it) renders the attempt to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to reduce the problem of evil to the problem of moral evil, completely untenable. See McCloskey's paper 'God and Evil' in *Philosophical Quarterly* (10), 1960 for a detailed treatment of this point.
12. Iqbal, M., *Reconstruction*, p. 64.
13. Ibid., p. 70.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 69.
17. Ibid., p. 68.
18. Ibid.
19. For a panentheistic appropriation/interpretation of Iqbal's thought see Reese and Harthshone's *Philosophers Speak of God* that has devoted a whole chapter to Iqbal. Authors have argued the panentheistic answer to problem of evil is more convincing than the classical theistic answer.
20. Iqbal, M., *Reconstruction*, p. 65.
21. Ibid.
22. Quoted by Brain Davies in his edited work, *Philosophy of Religion: Guide and Anthology* (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 576.
23. Ibid., p. 577.
24. Iqbal, M., *Reconstruction*, p. 68.
25. Ibid.
26. McCloskey, among others, has critiqued free will defence on this point. McTaggert in his Some *Dogmas of Religion* subjects free will defence to a searching critique on the same point.

The Controversy Regarding the Existence of 'Present Time' in Classical India

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ABSTRACT

In the present paper, I have tried to present the controversy regarding the existence of 'Present Time' between Naiyāyikas and some of their unidentified opponents. At a first glance it seems very puzzling to find that the existence of 'Present Time' had been denied because the present time is undeniable in nature. But in aphorism 2.1.39, Gautama had presented the position of the opponent who had denied the existence of 'Present Time' with an argument. His commentators had analyzed it in detail. Though Gautama and his commentator Vatsāyana had concentrated on the existence of 'Present Time' only, yet later on the commentator on Vatsayana, Uddyotkara, etc., had also discussed the existence of time. The discussion of the existence of 'Present Time' gains relevance only when time is proved to be existent. Later on, as the controversy progressed, it had been found that the denial of present time would bring a threat against the existence of time as well. The Naiyayikas had countered the argument of the opponent and at the same time provided positive arguments to establish 'Present Time'.

The above controversy had not only presented an unusual position regarding time but had also presented two different ways of determining time into past, present and future. Actually, though Naiyāyikas had succeeded in establishing 'Present Time' by refuting the position of the opponent, yet there remained a scope to cultivate the position of the opponent in detail. Moreover, it seemed that in the absence of 'Present Time', existence would also lose its significance.

'*Loke Bole Aj Ache Kal Nei, Ami Boli Kal Ache Aj Nei*'
Satyajit Ray, *Mahapurus*,

[People say: There is enough for today, but nothing for tomorrow.
I say: Time exists but not today.]
(In Bengali *Kal* means both tomorrow and time)

In this paper I would like to present a debate concerning the existence of present time, which was a live one during the classical period of Indian philosophy. It is astonishing to find that during that time, according to a position taken, there was no present time. Though it could not be ascertained who the advocates of such a position were, yet the existence of the position shows that the sceptics were very much present at that time and the orthodox system builders had great difficulty in refuting their position.

Gautama, the pioneer of Nyaya system, had taken up the above position as a challenge against his theory of inference and had composed aphorisms to refute the position. Vatsayana, the commentator on the aphorisms of Gautama, had stated after commenting on aphorism 38 of the second chapter of Gautama that an inference is possible about objects existing in the past, present and future.[1] In aphorism 38, Gautama had proved inference as a proof and after that in the very next aphorism he had stated an argument against the existence of the present time offered by some opponents.[2] In order to establish a link between aphorisms 38 and 39 Vatsayana, after providing his explanation on aphorism 38 and before presenting the aphorism 39, had stated that inference of past, present and future objects is possible. Thus, it becomes clear that according to Naiyāyikas the past, present and future times exist. At the same time, from aphorism 38, it is also clear that at the time of Gautama there existed certain opponents according to whom present time did not exist. As such a view existed, Gautama had felt the necessity of refuting the same and thereby to establish the existence of the present time. Though it is found that both Gautama and Vātsāyana had tried to establish the existence of present time, yet later the commentator of the *bhāṣya* of Vātsāyana. Uddyotkara had started the discussion of the present time after establishing the existence of time as such. Thus, in Uddyotkara's *Vārtika*, we come across the Nyāya view of time, which is more or less similar to that of the Vaisesikas.

In the present paper, I would like to discuss the arguments offered by Uddyotkāra, Vācaspati Misra as well as Udayanacarya to establish time as a separate substance.

Next, I would like to state the controversy regarding the existence of present time following Gautama, Vātsāyana, Uddyotkara, Vacaspati Misra and Udayanacarya.

SECTION 1

Though Gautama had initiated the debate regarding the existence of present time yet he had not discussed the existence of time. However, Uddyotkara had felt the necessity to prove the existence of time before taking up the controversy regarding the present time because the discussion of present time could not take place without establishing the existence of time. Here lies the development that has been done on Gautama's aphorisms and Vatsayana's *Bhasya* by Uddyotkara in his *Vartika.* In order to establish the existence of time, Uddyotkara has anticipated a position which denied the existence of time. Against this position, Uddyotkara had said that since the upholders of this position had not provided any proof to prove the non-existence of time, it could not be said that there is no time. In other words, there is no proof of the non-existence of time.[3]

The opponents might claim that the non-existence of time is to be proved by non-perception. Against such a claim it had been said that non-existence of time could not be proved by non-perception because there is *vyavicara.*[4] Non-perception is possible due to three reasons. Vacaspati Misra, in his *Tatparyatika,* had mentioned these three reasons of non-perception.[5] There is non-perception if one of the conditions of perception is non-functioning. If the perceptible object is not perceived then there is non-perception. If the object is absent, then also there is non-perception. After showing that there is no proof to prove the non-existence of time, Uddyotkara had set out to provide positive proofs to establish the existence of time.

The notions of priority, posteriority, etc., are put forward to prove the existence of time. Time had been claimed to be a cause of the notions of priority, posteriority, etc. Without the existence of time, these notions would remain unexplained. In other words,

effects cannot be known without the enumeration of their cause. In the present context, the notions of priority and posteriority are said to be the effects, whereas time had been claimed to be their cause. Thus, in order to have the notions of priority, posteriority, etc., the existence of time has to be admitted.

An objection had been raised against the singularity of time. Different notions cannot be explained by one, singular time. As there are differences among the notions of priority, posteriority, etc., being one in number, time cannot be the cause of the notions of priority, posteriority, etc. One single cause cannot bring about different effects.

In reply to this objection it had been said that one time could be the cause of different notions of priority, etc., by virtue of different conditions associated with it, as in the case of the notions of father, etc. As one man can be father, son, brother, etc., due to the association of different relations to him, just like that a singular time can be the cause of different notions of priority, posteriority, etc., on the basis of distinct causal relations. Thus, time is proved to be existent as one.

In the above analysis, Uddyotkara had referred to *paraparadipratyaya* to prove the existence of time, which indicates his reliance on *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, the most important treatise on Vaisesika system.[6] In interpreting the debate concerning the existence of present time as upheld by Gautama as well as Vatsayana, Uddyotkara first of all introduced the discussion of the existence of time and secondly he provided an argument from *Padarthadharmasamgraha* to prove its existence.[7] Uddyotkara's viewpoint shows that he used to give a great deal of importance to the authority of *Padārthadharmasamgraha.* He felt the necessity to establish the existence of time before going to prove present-hood, which is one of the characterizations of time. Before settling the issue that the present time exists, it is necessary to prove that time itself exists. Uddyotkara understood this necessity and as a consequence of this understanding he commenced the discussion with the existence of present time. From this attitude of Uddyotkāra, we can assume two consequences. First of all it could be possible that after Vātsāyana and before Uddyotkāra, some opponents might have raised some kind of objection regarding the discussion of the

status of present time without the discussion of the status of time. Thus, for Uddyotkāra, it might have become necessary to discuss the existence of time before the discussion of present time. Secondly, the discussion of the existence of time by Uddyotkāra indicates the development that had taken place after Vātsayana in Nyāya system.

The same attitude is found to be present in the *Tatparyatika* of Vācaspati Mishra too. That he had admitted the authority of *Padarthadharmasamgraha* is clear from his use of the term *padarthavit* in *Tātparyatika* (pp. 100).[8] By this term, he referred to Prasastapada, the author of *Padārthadharmasamgraha.* In the same book (pp. 356–358), he had discussed the existence of time with reference to *Padarthadharmasamgraha.*

Vacaspati Misra, in his *Tātparyatika,* had provided positive proof for the existence of time after showing that there is no negative proof for the existence of time.[9]

The notions of priority, posteriority, etc., are considered positive proofs for the existence of time. As Kanada in his aphorisms as well as Praśastapāda in his *Padarthadharmasamgraha* had used these notions as proofs for the existence of time for the first time. Vacaspati's usage is regarded as secondary in comparison to Kanada and Prasastapada. As both Uddyotkara as well as Vacaspati had treated at length the existence of time before going on to discuss the controversy regarding the existence of 'present time', in their writing we come across the interface between Nyaya and Vaisesika views regarding time.

Vacaspati Misra started the discussion regarding the existence of time by analyzing the situation in which the notion of being (temporally) far off (*viprakarsa*) is generated. The notion of being (temporally) far off as well as the notion of being (temporally) nearby (*sannikarsa*) are generated by taking a young and an old person, who sometimes exist in the same space while sometimes also exist in two different spaces into consideration.

How are these two concepts generated? Different conditions of bodies are responsible for the geneses of these two concepts. By taking the birth of a young person which is characterized by fewer number of actions like rising and setting of the sun as a limit the notion of being (temporally) far off is generated in an old person

whose birth had been characterized by many actions like rising and setting of the sun.[10]

On the basis of the notion of being (temporally) far off priority is generated in the old person as he is associated with that part of time which is characterized by greater numbers of rising and the setting of the sun.[11]

By taking an old person as the limit, the notion of being (temporally) nearby is generated in a young person. On this basis, posteriority is generated in the young person as he is associated with that part of time which is characterized by less number of risings and settings of the sun.

People, in the first instance, would not accept the perception of the above-mentioned association between time and an old or a young person. So it is to be inferred from the result of this association, namely, the notions of priority, etc. Thus, being a factor of this association time is inferred to be a cause of priority, etc. When from the greater or lesser number of actions like the rising and the setting of the sun and from an old or young person priority and posteriority are generated, what is the necessity of postulating another substance called time as the cause of these? Since the above-mentioned actions being inherent in the sun cannot be directly associated with the old or the young person, there is a necessity to postulate another substance, viz., time as the cause of priority and posteriority. The relation of conjoined inherence (*samjukta samavaya*) which holds between the action of the sun and the old or young person can exist only for time, which is ubiquitous in nature.

Neither *ākāśa* nor *ātmā* can perform the alleged role of time in spite of their ubiquitous nature.[12] Since priority and posteriority are different in kind, neither *ākāśa* nor *ātmā* can be taken as the cause of these. But a cause has to be postulated. The cause has to be different from the substances which precede *dik* and *kāla* in the taxonomy of Vaiśesika system. This cause, then, consists of *dik* and *kāla*.

The notions of simultaneity, succession, slowness, and quickness are also considered as grounds of time.[13] These are not capable of existing in the cases (*kāraka*) of verbs because of the contingency present in them. An objection had been raised against the causality

of time with respect to simultaneity, etc. Since time is eternal, how can it be the cause of contingent entities like simultaneity, etc.? If the action conjoined with that time which is qualified (*avacchinna*) by a single movement of the sun is grasped in the notion of simultaneity and the action conjoined with that time which is qualified by many movements of the sun is grasped in the notion of succession as well as the action conjoined with that time which is qualified by more movements of the sun is grasped within the notion of slowness and the action conjoined with that time which is qualified by less number of solar movements is grasped within the notion of quickness, then the movement of the sun is taken as the qualifier of time.[14] Thus, it is found that the movement of the sun can limit time and, thereby, the action associated with time.

The movement of the sun fails to limit an action directly. As there is no direct connection between an action and the movement of the sun, the latter cannot be taken as the qualifier of the former. This limitation is not possible by virtue of *ākāśa*, etc., which cannot be the cause of the notions like the simultaneity of actions discussed above because they do not have the special quality like that of the pot, for example.

The notions of simultaneity, etc., are not caused by space because the rule that reigns in the context of space is not maintained here. Thus, the relation of conjoined inherence between the movement of the sun and the movement of Devadatta, etc., is possible due to the ubiquitousness of time. The knowledge of the movement of Devadatta as qualified by the movement of the sun is possible due to time. But here time makes it possible without depending on any relation. In other words, the above-mentioned determinate knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of the relation. After having the determinate knowledge one comes to know that there is a relation between the determinandum (*viśesya*) and the determinant. This position is explained by the following example.

From the utterance of the word *dandi*, we have the notion of the man who is qualified by a *danda* or stick and later on we come to know that the two distinct objects, namely, stick and man are conjoined with each other. Similarly, in the case of the knowledge of priority, etc., time is inferred after there is the determinate knowl-

edge of the substance as qualified by time. At first we have the knowledge of priority, etc., and then there is the knowledge of the relation between time and the old or the young person from which we infer the existence of time. Thus, it is not the case that first there is the knowledge of time and later on there is the knowledge of priority, etc., but vice versa.

Since according to Vaiśeṣika, time cannot be perceived as a substance because it is not directly perceivable through sight, etc., it is inferred from the notions of priority, etc.

Priority and posteriority are the effects. The cause of the notions of these priority and posteriority is the association between time as qualified (*avacchinna*) by greater or less movements of the sun and the old or the young person. On this basis time is proved as one and the cause of the notions of priority and posteriority. Time is expressed by cases (*karaka*) through generating the qualities like priority, posteriority, etc.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that time is postulated as such an ubiquitous substance, that makes the notions of priority, etc., on the one hand and the notions of simultaneity, etc., on the other possible. In the former case, the association between the movement of the sun and the old or the young person is required. Time makes this indirect association possible, whereas in the latter case the association between the movement of the sun and an action of a substance is required. Here also time makes this association possible.

Both the sets of notions, namely, priority, etc., as well as simultaneity, etc., require the movement of the sun as a cause for their genesis. The genesis of the notions of priority, etc., is possible in an old person due to the association between the movement of the sun and the old person as compared with a young person. On the other hand, the notion of simultaneity arises due to the association between the movement of the sun and some kind of action of a person. Since the movement of the sun only inheres in the sun and nothing else, there cannot be any direct relation between the movement of the sun and any other substance. As a consequence, the presence of some other substance is required, which will make the association between the movement of the sun and some other substance or some other action possible. Time is that

required substance which makes the above-mentioned associations possible. Thus, though time is a ubiquitous substance yet having the potentiality to transfer the movement of the sun to some other substance or action it preserves its special character distinct from all other ubiquitous substances admitted in Vaiśesika ontology.

Udayanācārya in his *Parisuddhi* had analyzed and clarified some comments of Vācaspati Misra regarding the existence of time in the following way. In his *Tātparyatika*, Vācaspati Misra had said that it is a common belief that the association between time and the substance, namely, the old or young man is not perceptible.[15] In *Parisuddhi*, Udayana had made an analysis of the above statement of Vacaspati Misra. Udayana had anticipated the context in which Vācaspati Misra had made the above comment. There might be a position according to which time is perceptible. The upholders of such a position might claim that since due to the use of limiting adjumcts (*upādhi*), different time determinations like day, etc., are perceived, time is also perceived. Therefore, since time as well as the substance both are perceptible, so is the association between these two.[16] Common people do not accept this perceptible character for lack of proof.

Since the association between time and the above-mentioned substance is not perceptible it is inferred from the genesis of priority, posteriority, etc. In other words, as the genesis of priority, posteriority, etc., requires the above-mentioned association, the association has to be admitted and time is also proved to be existent as one of the associates of the association.

Though time had been postulated, yet the relation between the action inherent in the sun and the substance has to be identified. This relation is conjoined inherence.[17]

Since the undifferentiated *ākāsa* cannot establish two different types of priority and posteriority—which are spatial and temporal in nature—a separate substance has to be postulated which can establish the above-mentioned priority and posteriority. Apart from this reason also *ākāsa* or *ātmā* can not be admitted as the cause of the distinct priority and posteriority because it does not have the special quality required here.

If *ātmā* or the self were found to transfer that action, which inheres in a substance to another substance only by virtue of its own

nature as a relation, then such a transfer will occur everywhere. Thus, the self cannot perform this action of transfer.[18]

In *Kiraṇāvali*, a commentary on *Praśastapādabhāsya*, Udayana had provided the similar argument to show that self also does not have the power to transfer an attribute of a substance by virtue of its own nature without some other relation.[19]

In *Tatparyatīka* the notions of simultaneity, etc., are admitted as the grounds of time. Udayana, in his *Parisuddhi*, had said that in order to indicate that the above-mentioned notions are due to time and not due to space, the notions of simultaneity, etc., are admitted as the grounds of time.

Apparently, an objection such as the one discussed below could be raised here. Since time by nature cannot be used as a determinant (*avacchedaka*), the alleged cognition in which time were admitted to be the determinant is actually determined by the movement of the sun. If the inference of time is done from the above-mentioned cognition, there will be a difficulty. Previously, it had been stated that the knowledge of simultaneity, etc., are due to time. This knowledge of simultaneity had been analyzed in the following terms, namely, the knowledge of the form 'the movement of Devadatta as determined by the movement of the sun'. Later on, it had been said that time is inferred from this knowledge. So, there is the possibility of dependence on each other.

To answer this objection, Vācaspati Misra had said that time is independent of any relation. Udayana had interpreted this statement in the following manner. Time is independent of the knowledge of any relation. In order to show that time is independent of the knowledge of relation, Udayana had analyzed the statements of Vācaspati Misra in the following way. As the knowledge of the man as determined by a stick (*Dandi*) does not depend upon the knowledge of the conjunction between the stick and the man, the stick cannot determine the man by means of the knowledge of the relation of conjunction. Without any relation also it cannot determine the man. Thus conjunction is the relation which is admitted as the relation between the stick and the man. Thus, though there is actually a relation the between stick and the man, yet the man is known as determined by the stick without the knowledge of the above-mentioned relation. Therefore, it is found that

the knowledge of conjunction between the stick and the man does not precede the knowledge of the man as determined by the stick. Similarly, the knowledge of the relation between the movement of the sun and the movement of Devadatta also does not precede the knowledge of time.

Vacaspati Misra had refuted the perception of time because time, according to Vaiśesikas, was not a directly perceivable substance. Udayana had interpreted this absence of rupa, etc., as the absence of special qualities required for perception. Time does not have any specific quality necessary for any type of perception. As time cannot be seen, it cannot be the object of visual perception. Since it cannot be touched, it cannot be the object of tactual perception. Being a substance it can neither be smelled nor be tasted nor be heard. Not being a self, it also cannot be the object of mind.

After discussing Udayana's interpretation on Vācapati's *Tātparyatika* it is found that Udayana had clarified Vācaspati's position considerably. This shows the continuous development of Nyāya position regarding the existence of time from Gautama to Udayana.

SECTION 2

In *Nyāya-Vārtika* of Uddyotkāra, *Tātparyatika* of Vācaspati Misra and *Parisuddhi* of Udayanācārya, the discussions regarding the existence of time occur. After the existence of time was proved, the next issue, which is the existence of present time, has been considered.

The existence of present time is a controversial issue. Certain opponents denied such an existence whereas Gautama and his commentators supported its existence. In aphorism (2.1.39), Gautama had stated the objection against the existence of present time upheld by the opponents. According to the opponents there is no present time because only past and future time can be acknowledged by identifying them with the time when the falling object had already fallen and the time when it is going to fall. In other words, when a fruit is falling from a tree, at any point of the fall only the past and future time of its fall up to that point can be identified. Thus, the opponents' denial of the existence of present time is a result of their own mode of defining past, present and future time.

Vatsayana had interpreted this aphorism of Gautama in the following manner. The upper portion of a fruit which is moving towards the ground after getting dissociated from its stalk is regarded as that space though which it has fallen and the time associated with that space is past time. Again, the lower portion of the falling fruit is regarded as that space through which the fruit is going to fall and the time associated with it is future time. Since there is no third space—which is different from the above-mentioned upper and lower spaces—the associates of past and future time, present time in the form of 'is falling' cannot be grasped. Thus, in order to interpret the aphorism of Gautama, Vātsāyana had made the position of the opponents more cleat than that of Gautama.

First of all, from Vatsayana's interpretation, it becomes clear that the opponents had associated past and future time with those portions of space which were taken as the loci of the falling of an object. Secondly, further analysis would reveal that past and future times are grasped through those portions of space which are associated with past and future time. As past and future time can be grasped, their existence had been admitted. But as due to the absence of corresponding portion of space present time cannot be grasped, the existence of present time had been denied by the opponents.

Gautama had stated the position of the opponents to show that in order to establish the inference regarding the past, present and future objects, the Naiyāyikas would have to establish the existence of present time on the basis of arguments because there is a position which negates the existence of the present time.

In the aphorism, 2.1.40,[20] Gautama had stated the answer to the objection raised by the opponents against the existence of present time. If there is absence of the present time, then there will be absence of past and future time also because the past and future time depends on present time.

Vātsāyana in his commentary had interpreted the above-mentioned aphorism of Gautama in the following way. According to him, time is not expressed by space. It is expressed by an event. In other words, it is expressed by means of the event of the form 'is falling'. Thus, time is understood through event. The time in which

the event of falling gets restricted is regarded as past time. The time in which the event of falling gets started is regarded as future time. The time in which present event is grasped in a substance is regarded as present time. If the opponents do not admit the existence of present event of fall in the substance, then in the absence of the event they would also fail to explain the destruction or the genesis of the event. When we use 'the time in which something had fallen', the event of falling is past. When we use 'the time in which something is going to fall', the event of falling is future. In both these times, the substance under consideration is bereft of the event called falling. But, when we say 'Something is falling', the object under consideration is grasped as related with the event of falling. Thus, the opponents also are bound to admit the relation between the substance and the event in order to understand the above statement. As this relation can only be grasped in the present time, they also have to admit present time.

In *Vārtika* also, Uddyotakāra had explained the same reason offered by Vātsāyana to show that the opponents cannot negate the existence of present time. Here it is said that when a substance is known as related with action, the time as qualified by such determination is regarded as present. Past is that time when the association of action with substance gets over. Future is that time when the association of action with substance had not yet taken place. Thus, if present action is not proved, then how are pastness and futurity proved? We cannot ascribe past-ness or futurity to time or to the fruit since time is omnipresent and the fruit also becomes the object of different knowledge due to different actions which act as qualifications to the fruit. Thus, 'past' can be employed on action only. Thus, action is the cause for expressing different times. Space cannot be the cause for expressing time because space is associated with the fruit in which the action has not yet generated and is also associated with the fruit in which the action gets over. Thus, space fails to distinguish different time from each other.

In *Tātparyatika* also, Vācaspati Misra had commented upon the above explanation of Vārtika. According to him also the past-nees, etc., of time are expressed through event and not through different cases (*kārakas*) of time. When someone proves the existence of a fruit as qualified by the event of falling, he refers it by stating,

'This fruit falls'. Depending on this statement, the statements like, 'The fruit has fallen' and 'The fruit is going to fall' are understood. If there is no present, the event of falling gets negated and as a result, in the absence of an event, time cannot be expressed. As priority, posteriority, etc., also depend upon the notions of 'being far away' (temporally) and 'being nearby' (temporally), just like that past and future also depend upon the present.

Thus, from the above commentaries like *Vārtika* on *Vātsayana bhāṣya* and *Tātparyatika* on *Vartika*, it becomes clear that Naiyayikas had provided an alternative account of expressing different determinations of time like the past, present and future. They had correctly determined the present time as the locus of the association between the substance under consideration and the action. In other words, when the actual event takes place, there is association between the substance and the action. Thus, being the locus of the existence of actual event, the present time becomes the locus of the association between the substance and the action also. As present time makes the actual association between the substance and the action possible, in order to admit the existence of action in the substance the opponents are also bound to admit the existence of present time. Past and future time exist, depending on present time because if there be no action present, we cannot say about its genesis or destruction.

In the aphorism, 2.1.41,[21] Gautama had stated another reason to show that the absence of present time cannot be accepted. Since past and future cannot be proved by virtue of their mutual dependence, the existence of present time cannot be denied.

Vatsayana had interpreted the above aphorism in the following manner. If past and future were proved to be existent on the basis of their mutual dependence, then the refutation of present time might be admitted. But neither future is proved on the basis of the past and nor is the past proved on the basis of future. How something is said to be past or how the existence of future depends upon past or how something is said to be future—all these questions remain unanswered. Thus, without the presence of present time, it is not possible to explain either past or future.

If someone assumes that as short and long are proved on the basis of their mutual dependence or as high-land and low-land are proved on the basis of their mutual dependence, similarly, past

and future will also be proved on the basis of their mutual dependence, then he will be wrong because there is no ground (*hetu*) for establishing the past and future on the basis of their mutual dependence. Only attempts at unproved simulation through examples such as the above are not sufficient to prove the existence of past and future on the basis of their mutual dependence. On top of that, similar to such examples counter examples also exist. Vātsāyana had provided counter examples in the following way. As colour and touch are not proved on the basis of their mutual dependence and smell and taste are not proved on the basis of their mutual dependence, thus, past and future also cannot be proved on the basis of their mutual dependence. Thus, on the basis of mutual dependence, nothing can be proved to be existent because as the absence of one implies the absence of the other, there is absence of both. In other words, if the establishment of one entity requires the establishment of the other and vice versa, then there will be circularity of reasoning.

Uddyotkāra in his *Vārtika* had said that Gautama also had anticipated an argument that might be provided by the opponents in the following way. Opponents might claim that there is no present time because without the existence of present time also, past and future can be proved to be existent on the basis of their mutual dependence. In order to refute this argument of the opponents, Gautama had presented aphorism, 2.141. Just like Vatsayana, Uddyotkara had also said that in the absence of present time, past and future can also become inexpressible. Corresponding to present, past and future, there are the time of 'is falling', the time of 'has fallen' and the time of 'will fall'. If there is no present time, then the term 'is falling' becomes meaningless or vacuous. Thus, there must be present time.

In *Tātparyatika*, Vācaspati Misra had stated the same reason as provided by Vātsayana and Uddyotkara to refute the position of the opponents that there is no present time because past and future are proved to be existent on the basis of their mutual dependence. He had also mentioned the new argument that had been offered by Uddyotkara to refute the opponent's position.

Vātsāyana had provided a separate argument[22] in favour of the position that there is present time in the following way. Present

time is also expressed by the existence of objects. From usages like 'Substance exists', 'Quality exists' and 'Event exists', the knowledge of present time of substance, etc., takes place. Thus, by these usages also present time is said to exist as determined by the event of existence.

In *Tātparyatika,* Vācaspati Misra had interpreted the above-mentioned argument of Vātsāyana in the following terms. Present time is expressed not only by the events like falling, etc., but also by the existence of objects. When the existence of objects is interpreted as the event of existence, it is known as the *arthasadbhāva.* Time is expressed by it. The event of existence is pervasive of all present.

Udayana in his *Parisuddhi* had mentioned time as determined by objects. In other words, the existence of objects—which is taken as an event—determines time. Udayana had interpreted the statements of Vācaspati Misra in the following way. Vācaspati Misra had stated that the events like falling, etc., come and go in the present time. But the event of existence being all pervading in nature always exists in present time. Udayana had provided the reason for making such statements. If it is asked what is so special about the event of existence that distinguishes it from all other events like falling, etc., then to answer this question the above statements will be provided. In other words, being all pervading in nature the event of existence pervades the whole of present time. Thus, it is distinct from all other events that exist in present time.

We now discuss the arguments of opponents. Opponents can deny the existence of the present time as determined by the event of existence, because they may not recognize existence as an event.

In fact, Uddyotkāra in his *Vārtika* had said that the opponents can deny the existence of present time as determined by the event of existence. So, in order to convince those opponents, Gautama had presented another argument in the next aphorism 2.1.42.[23] Vācaspati Misra had also said in his *Tātparyatika* that if present as determined by the event of existence is denied, then another argument offered by Gautama in his next aphorism to prove the existence of present time becomes essential. The aphorism states that if there is absence of present time, then perception also cannot be there and due to the absence of perception nothing can be known.

Vātsayana had interpreted the above aphorism in the following way. Perception is generated from the relation between sense-organ and the corresponding object. That, which is non-existent (*avidyamāna*) cannot be related with a sens-organ. As the opponents do not admit existent, i.e. the present object, the proof of perception, the object of perception and the perceptual knowledge nothing is found to be existent. Since perception cannot be established, no other knowledge, namely, inferential knowledge as well as testimonial knowledge, can be established either. Due to the absence of all proofs, no object can be known.

After interpreting this aphorism of Gautama in the above way, Vātsāyana had stated different ways of knowing the present time. Present time is known in two ways. It can be known through the existence of objects and it can be known by the series of events. By the knowledge 'Substance exists' present time can be known. This is the first variety of knowing present time. In some other cases, present time is known by a series of actions.

A series of actions can be of two types. Different actions, which are performed for a single purpose, constitute a series of events. Again, repetition of the same action for many times constitutes a series of actions. An example of first type of series of actions is provided in the following way. By the statement 'is cooking' a series of actions is referred. This series is constituted by several actions, namely, 'putting plate on the stove', 'pouring water into it', 'placing rice into it', 'placing wood under the stove', 'setting the fire', 'moving rice with the help of a spoon', etc. Similarly, by the statement 'is cutting', the second type of series is referred. Here the same type of action is repeated again and again. This repetition of the same type of action constitutes the second type of series.

Due to the association with the event of existence, the objects of cooking as well as cutting are regarded as present objects. Thus, the above-mentioned series of actions determine present time. In other words, present time is known by means of the above-mentioned series of actions.

Uddyotkāra had provided a separate argument[24] to prove why in the absence of present time perception cannot be established. Perception is the content (*adhara*) of present time because it is an

effect. Whatever is an effect is the content of present time, as for example, pudding. Perception is an effect. Therefore, perception is the content of present time. If there is no present time, then perception has no support. The effect, which does not have any locus, is non-existent. Thus, perception also being an effect and being without support is non-existent. In the absence of perception all other proofs also cannot exist. In the absence of all proofs, nothing can be known. But, in fact, we have the knowledge of different objects. Therefore, we also perceive present time, which is the cause of the proof of perception, the object of perception and perceptual knowledge. Thus, present time is proved to be existent.

In the above argument, Uddyotkara is found to use the Reductio-Ad-Absurdum method. Vacaspati Misra had defended the argument offered by Uddyotkara to prove that in the absence of present time, the existence of perception also cannot be admitted.[25] He had articulated the context in which Uddyotkara had presented the above argument. Since all cases of perception are not about present objects, there are some cases of perception also that are about past and future objects as for example yogic perception. Thus, there might be a suspicion regarding the position that in the absence of present time there is also absence of perception because perception of past and future objects, which are other than present object, is also possible. By anticipating such a suspicion, Uddyotkāra had interpreted the above position in the following manner. Though all the objects of perception are not present objects, yet all types of perception take present time as their locus because being an effect perception has always to reside in present time. It can never reside in past or future times. Thus, in this sense, in the absence of present time all types of perception are without support and as a result these become non-existent.

After interpreting the position of Uddyotkāra in the above way, Vācaspati Misra had said that Vātsāyana had also the same intention as Uddyotkāra. But Pt. Phanibhusana Tarkavāgiśa has held that both Gautama and Vatsayana had tried to show that in the absence of present time ordinary perception can not be generated. Thus, they had not taken present time as the locus of all types of perception but only of ordinary perception. Hence, perhaps the argument

offered by Uddyotkara which embraced ordinary as well as extraordinary perception is a separate argument to prove the existence of present time.

Previously, Vātsāyana had stated that though the objects of two different series of actions are not present themselves, yet due to their association with the event of presence or existence, they are referred as present. In this context Gautama had stated his next aphorism, 2.1.43.[26] The aphorism states that in those objects which have the event of existence, past and future actions are proved to be existent. Thus, present time is known in both of these ways.

Vātsāyana had interpreted the above aphorism in the following way. An action series, which has not yet been performed but which one wants to perform, refers to future time. On the other hand, that action series, which has already been performed and the purpose for its performance has also been finished, refers to past time. An action series, which is being performed refers to present time. Among these different series that which has finished or is past is regarded as having *Kṛatatā* whereas that which one wants to perform is regarded as having *Kartavyatā* and that which is present is regarded as having *Kriyamānata.*

In the above-mentioned series, by the statement 'is cooking' or 'is being cooked', the present time is known. But the series consists of some actions, which have already finished and some actions which are going to be finished. Thus, *Kṛatatā* or past actions and *Kartavyatā* or future actions are also known within the knowledge of present time. Thus, present time is known in two ways, namely, as associated with past and future time and as dissociated from past and future time. When from the statement 'substance exists' present time is known, it is known as dissociated from past and future time, whereas when from the statement 'is cooking' present time is known, it is known as associated with past and future time.

In his *Vārtika,* Uddyotkāra had stated that present time is known from two types of actions. Either it can be known only by an action or it can be known by a series of actions. Again, action series can be of two types, namely, a series consisting of one type of action and a series consisting of different types of actions.

Furthermore, Uddyotkāra had said that present time is known in two different ways. Sometimes it is known in association with past

and future time while sometimes it is known as dissociated from past and future time. From the statement of the form 'substance exists', pure present is known whereas from the statements of the forms 'is cooking' and 'is cutting' present time is known in association with past or future time.

Vācaspati Misra and Udayana had also stated their view regarding the knowledge of present time in the same way.

From the entire discussion of the debate concerning the existence of present time according to Gautama, Vātsāyana, Uddyotkāra, Vācaspati Misra and Udayanācarya, we not only come to know that present time exists but also know that time exists in the form of a ubiquitous substance. Uddyotkāra, Vācaspati Misra and Udayana had discussed the existence of present time in detail in accordance with the view of Praśastapāda, the great Vaiśeṣika philosopher. Thus, here, we find an interface between the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśesika.

Later on, all the above-mentioned Naiyayikas had not only established the existence of present time by refuting their opponents who had negated the existence of present time but had also discussed in detail the different ways of knowing present time. It is found as a consequence from the discussion that present time is known through an action or an event.

By stating the different views of different commentators on Gautama and Vātsāyana, I have tried to show how, in classical India, a system had developed. This development includes not only interpretation of former positions but also includes the original views of the later commentators who had enriched the system.

From the above discussion, the main distinction between the views of Naiyāyikas and the opponents regarding the existence of present time can be identified in the following way. Naiyāyikas had used events as limiting adjuncts (*upadhis*) and the application of these to the one and ubiquitous time to differentiate among past, present and future. On the other hand, opponents use spatial attributes as limiting adjuncts to identify past, present and future time.

As the opponents had identified past and future times by the use of spatial limitors, there always exists a necessity to limit these spatial parts also. However, since Naiyāyikas had identified the past,

present and future times by the use of events as limitors which limit and differentiate the one and ubiquitous time, there is no necessity for further determination of anything. Thus, the position of Naiyayikas is simpler than that of the opponents.

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3. *Na hi Kalasatte Pramanamasti,* ed. Thakur, Anantalal, *Nyāyabhāsyavārtika of Bharadvāja Uddyotkāra* (New Delhi: ICPR, 1997), p. 239.
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11. *Tāmapeksya....*ibid.
12. *Api Cākāśatmanau na Paraparavyātikarakāranam....*, Thakur (1996), p. 357.
13. *Evam Yaugapadyacirakṣaprapratyaya Api Kālalingam,* ibid.
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Imaginary Dialogue of Bhartṛhari and Quine

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What follows is a conversation that I have imagined having taken place between Bhartṛhari and Quine.[1] Both these philosophers advocate holism in their respective theories of language and meaning. The following imaginary dialogue is intended to highlight the differences and similarities in their formulations of and arguments for their respective holistic thesis. Quine in his *Word and Object* (footnote on p. 9) refers to a paper of J. Borough where Borough discusses Bhartṛhari's holistic theory of meaning. Quine appreciates that an ancient Indian grammarian defends a holistic theory of meaning. B and Q are the abbreviations of Bhartṛhari and Quine respectively.

B. Thank you, Mr Quine, for referring to my work in your *Word and Object* (p. 9) while defending holism.
Q. Yes, it was a happy coincidence. I got to know from John Borough's paper that the theory I am proposing has actually been defended earlier by you in your *Vākyapadīya.*
B. But I must add a word of caution. Even if it is true that I defend holism of one variety, I must explain the way I have defended it. This will show where my holism differs from yours as well as the commonality in our spirit.
Q. Very well. Please go ahead. I wait eagerly to know your position in detail.
B. One could mention in total eight views that are in place with regard to sentence, word and meaning: (1) Sentence meaning is to be explained in terms of the verb (*ākhyāta*); (2) Collection of words (*padasaṃghāta)* is what constitutes sentence meaning; (3) The universal (*jāti*) residing in the collection of the words is what constitutes the sentence

meaning; (4) The indivisible *sphota* is what the sentence meaning is all about; (5) The order *(padakrama)* in the words is what the sentence meaning is all about; (6) The sentence meaning is that what we bring together through the order of the words in our mind; (7) The sentence meaning is manifest, in the first uttered word (*prathamoccāritapada*); and (8)The expectancy (*ākāṃkṣā*) inhering in the distinct words is what the sentence meaning is all about. Out of these eight views 3, 4 and 6 are known as indivisiblist (*akhandapakṣa*), while 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 are known as divisiblist (*khandapakṣa*). This divisiblism can again be said to consist of two groups, of which 2 and 5 are known as *abhihitānvayavāda.* 1, 7 and 8 are known as *anvitābhidhānavāda.*

Q. Your presentation of these different views of sentence meaning sounds pretty exhaustive. Could you please elaborate each of these views?

B. Yes. Since I would refute the divisiblists (who are also known as *padavādins*), let me first explain their views. That would lead me to present my arguments against them. Among the divisibilists, 2 and 5 are known as *abhihitānvayavādins.* Group 2 says that the sentence meaning consists of the collection or totality of the words (henceforth known as collectivists). According to this view, a sentence is a collection of words. But certainly, only words will not do. Words must have some relation between them. The collection of these related words expresses a related complete meaning. Words have their own meanings. When words appear in a sentence, they bring their own meanings to the sentential context. But when the words come together in a sentence, the individual words come to express an additional meaning. This additional meaning was not present in the words taken individually. It is the collection or assemblage of the words that is responsible for the rise of this additional meaning. So, it is the collection of words that gives rise to sentence meaning.

Those who give importance to the order (*krama*) of words think that the sentence meaning is to be found in the order of the words (henceforth known as successionists). This order or succession is

not expressible in words. Nor is this order audible. This order is a temporal property and we ascribe this order to the words. The sentence is nothing over and above this order. The sentence meaning resides in this order. Individual words alone would not suffice for sentence meaning. We have to get the sentence meaning in this order.

Both the collectivist and successionist claim that it is through the semantic power (*śakti*) of the word that the meaning is present and the collection of this present meaning gets floated in expectancy. The power (of the word) on the basis of which the collection of meanings gets floated in expectancy is known as *abhidhā.* So, first there are words. Then meanings are present through the semantic power of the words. Individual meanings are incomplete, so they expect other meanings. These expected meanings get joined together. This joining is possible only because of *abhidhā* power of the word. Thus, a sentence is explained in terms of the semantic power of the words. The sentence meaning is explained in terms of mutually expectant meanings. So it seems, according to *abhihitānvaya,* that when the words designate (*abhihita*) and as a result expectant meanings get conjoined, we get the sentence meaning. Thus, in the analysis of sentence, it is the words that get primacy. Hence, supporters of these views are known as atomists (*padavādins*).

Q. So, if I understand you correctly, these philosophers hold that first the words designate and then we form a unity. Hence, a sentence is composed of words that have their independent meanings. It is true, of course, that the collection produces an additional element that we call the sentence meaning. Successionists hold that it is the succession or order that produces the sentence meaning. In any case, it is interesting to note that at one point Frege advocates what is known as composition principle where he says that meaning of a sentence is composed of the meanings of the words. So words do have meaning and their meanings constitute the meaning of the sentence. The problem, of course, is that the same Frege defends context principle where it is claimed that words do not have meaning independent of their

occurrences in a sentence. I shall comment on this apparent opposition of the two views later.

B. So far I have only explained a part of the atomist theory. The other form of atomism is known as connected designation (*anvitābhidhāna*). This theory has three different forms, as mentioned earlier. People who think that the meaning of a sentence is embedded in the verb argue that on many occasions from the mere verb one can get the whole meaning of the sentence. Of course, the sentence does not merely consist of the verb. But since we can understand the nature and method of action from the mere verb, one could very well argue that the sentence meaning is inherent in the verb. The other words in a sentence are clarificatory of the action denoted by the verb. They perform an auxiliary role by specifying the method of action, performer, etc. The sentence meaning is to be found in the verb alone.

The second form of connected designation theory is the view that the sentence meaning is embedded in the very first uttered word. The first uttered word does not only denote its meaning, it also denotes the meaning of the whole sentence. Latter uttered words only clarify, explicate the meaning of the first uttered word. They do not add anything new.

The third form of connected designation is the view that words do exist independent of the sentences where they occur. But since a word expects another, the collection of these expectant words gives rise to the sentence meaning. All the words uttered at the beginning, in the middle and at the end have their own independent meanings. When these words occur in a sentence, then every word being related with other words manifests the sentence meaning.

Thus, all these three different forms of connected designation hold that the meaning of a word is always connected with the meaning of other words. And we get to know the meaning of the sentence from the meaning of a word as related to the meanings of other words. So, the meaning of a word is always related to the meaning of the other word and we understand the meaning of a sentence only through words as related to each other. This is true

of the verb, the first uttered word and mutually expectant words. This is why all these views are known as connected designation (*anvitābhidhāna*).

Q. So the connected designation view accepts that words do have meanings but concedes that the meaning of a word is always related to the meanings of other words through mutual expectancy. When we understand a word, we do not understand it in isolation; we understand it as related to other words. So, we understand a relational whole. Sentential unit is the primary focus of our understanding the meaning. One must, it seems to me, note the distinction between this connected designation view and holism. Connected designation view does not deny meaning to individual words, it only emphasizes the relational nature of word meaning in so far as our understanding the meanings of the words is concerned. Holism would deny words to be the unit of meaning. At least this is how I understand holism.

But one version of Frege's context principle comes close to the connected designation view. One might interpret the context principle saying that words do have meaning of their own, but we understand its meaning only in the context of a sentence. If we interpret the phrase 'understand its meaning only in the context of sentence' as that the sentential connection plays the clarificatory role with regard to the meaning of a word, then Frege's context principle (in this interpretation) would fit nicely with connected designation view. Of course, I do not deny the general philosophical frameworks of Frege and you to be divergent in many ways.

B. Thank you for your brief explanatory notes on my presentation. Yes, I certainly do carry a metaphysical baggage known as linguistic monism (*śabādvaitavāda*) which probably is absent in Frege. But if Frege could be interpreted (as Dummett has done) as the first philosopher in Western tradition who has attempted to develop a theory of meaning, then certainly a large part of my *Vākyapadīya* would fall in line with Fregean aim.

Let me now present my arguments against the atomistic views mentioned above. Using contemporary philosophical jargon, I put forward three arguments: (1) Logical Argument; (2) Epistemological Argument; and (3) Pragmatic Argument to refute atomism.

Logical Argument: We get to know the object only through the knowledge of the word and its meaning. In a sentence it is through adding the meanings of latter words to those of former words that we come to know the meaning of the sentence. Understanding the meaning of a sentence is a cumulative process. In this accumulation, former words shed their individual meanings. Unless we accept this individual meaning dropping off, the sentence meaning would not arise at all. But through this failing off, when we come to the last word of the sentence—since all the previous words have shed their meanings—we have to say that the sentence meaning is generated out of meaningless words. This is an absurd situation. The main point that I would like to make is that if one accepts that words do have meaning of their own, then in the cumulative process of grasping the meaning of a sentence, former words, by giving up their own meanings, add bit by bit to the totality of the sentence meaning. So it is by dropping off the meanings of the words that we get the sentence meaning. In this continuous process of letting drop or casting off their meanings, when we come to the last word, all the previous words have given up their own meanings. Consequently, the sentence meaning could be said to be produced by units that have dropped their meanings. Meaningless units give rise to sentence meaning—so it seems. This is surely something we cannot accept.

Epistemological Argument: Individual words do not have a constant meaning. In the word *rājapuruṣa* (royal man), *rāja* in this case means someone related to the royal family. But *rāja* could also be interpreted as a verb meaning to stay. Then *rājapuruṣa* could mean 'oh man, you stay'. But this is not what we mean by the word *rājapuruṣa* and nor is it the intended meaning. Had words been individually meaningful, this possibility would remain. Moreover, often we know the meaning of a compound word without knowing the meaning of the elements in it. In order to know the meaning of *aśvakarṇa*, one does not need to know the meaning of *aśva*; it is enough if one knows the tree named *aśvakarṇa*. The expression 'the tree which has leaves like the ears of horse' is only explanatory and knowledge of it is not a prerequisite to the knowledge of the meaning of *aśvakarṇa*. This can be generalized and further argued that it is only through our knowledge of the whole sentence that we come to the individual words and learn their meanings.

Pragmatic Argument: In order to attain the knowledge of the science of language, we have to read the relevant literature, i.e. grammar. Once through the knowledge of grammar we get to know the construction of word, individual words hardly play a role any more. Now this grammar can be of many kinds, Pāninian and others. And all these grammatical rules depend on sentences. Each of these different kinds of grammar depends for justification on their own rules of sentential analysis. It is through sentence and its meaning that we think of a word. Sentence and its meaning is central to grammatical analysis. Word and its meaning are only our construction.

Q. Very well. If I understand you correctly, there are three main points that come out of your discussion. First, understanding the meaning of a sentence is a temporal cumulative process. Second, often knowledge of the meaning of a word is not a necessary prerequisite to our knowing the meaning of a complex word or expression. Third, different grammars analyze grammatical nature of words in different ways and carry out their analysis with reference to sentential wholes. Since you are primarily a linguist, you have focussed on the intricacies of grammaticality of words and sentences and on our understanding them. I think, the grammarian analysis centres round the whole sentence, because our communication (*lokavayvahāra*) is possible only through a complete sentence, sometimes holophrastic ones. It is quite true that when we see a picture, we see different colours. But the knowledge that we have of the picture is one whole knowledge. One could, of course, talk of words and further division in words, but this is done only for teaching the science of language to the students. Hence the division of the whole sentence into words and further divisible units are artificial and derivative.

ith regard to your view that understanding the meaning
sentence is a temporal cumulative process, one could
lain your point by saying that a process involves certain
ves which are momentary. In order to know the whole
ocess, one does need to know all the moves involved. Thus,
the process of understanding the meaning, we have to
rasp the meaning of the whole sentence.

In the backdrop of your presentation of the arguments for holism, let me now put my perspective on this issue.[2] Since as a grammarian you are primarily interested in natural language, your arguments rest on the nuances of spoken language. I am primarily interested in the structure of a physical theory. While discussing such a structure I have talked about holism of a physical theory and that too in the context ation of a physical theory. I might call this confir- confirmation holism implies that the l sentence, rather a group aning holism.

interested in explaining how the meagre input on our sensory surface gives rise to torrential output in the form of a complicated theory of the external world, physical theory becomes my central concern. I have departed from my tradition, the result of which is my denial of analytic-synthetic distinction. However, since I believe in the parallelism of confirmation of a physical theory and our language learning mechanism, my confirmation holism spills over to meaning holism of natural language where I make the thought experiment of radical translation. My friend Donald Davidson has worked out meaning holism in detail to give us a theory of interpretation of natural language. Since Davidson is primarily interested in understanding natural language, he might be sympathetic to your approach. Since Davidson wants to have a theory of meaning that suffices for one's linguistic knowledge, he might share your concern for an explanation of our linguistic behaviour.

Against the backdrop of our discussion let me pose three questions that the different views mentioned by you are trying to respond to. I want to know your reaction to these questions in order to know more about your standpoint.

meaning only in the context of a sen-

nly by knowing the

tion is hardly tenable. Since I am concerned with language, where language is not an abstract system, rather a medium through which human beings communicate with each other, any account of language must be amenable to intersubjective evidence. When an expression has a meaning, it only means that the expression carries a certain semantic import with it in linguistic behaviour. Having meaning recedes into knowing meaning and knowing meaning gets manifest in linguistic behaviour. This is why my arguments for holism run into both having meaning and knowing meaning. Ontology and epistemology intermingle with each other, at least in the case of a philosophical account of language and meaning.

Q. I cannot agree with you more when you say that an account of language must rest on intersubjectively available evidence. This is what I wanted to say when at the beginning of my *Word and Object* I commented that language is a social art.

One could, of course, steer a middle path by arguing that both atomism and holism are important. Michael Dummett has made a distinction between *explanation* and *recognition* of meaning. Explanation is a theoretical endeavour to give a philosophical description of a practical ability, and in this context, the practical ability consists in understanding and communicating meaning through linguistic behaviour. Recognition implies our actual language learning mechanism that we all go through while learning a language. One is concerned with theory building, the other is concerned with practical ability. These two are undoubtedly related, but they need not necessarily have an isomorphic relation. We do not take a lesson on philosophy of language while learning a language. So Dummett's point is that may be when we are trying to do a philosophical theory about our knowledge of language, sentential unit becomes the primary focus of meaning. But in case of recognition or learning the meaning, through which we perform our practical ability of linguistic behaviour, perhaps meaning of individual words become important.

B. Yes, this is one way of looking at the issue. But then whether learning takes place atomistically is a question worth pondering over. Anyway, thank you Mr Quine for sharing some time with me in discussing philosophy. Your queries have given me the opportunity to explain my position and expose myself to Western philosophy.

Q. It was indeed nice to know your detail arguments for holism, which has enabled me to clearly see our agreements and divergences in our perspectives. Thank you.

1. The present paper is part of a series of lectures that I gave at North Bengal University. I thank everybody who participated in the discussion.
2. I have analyzed, in detail, Quine's arguments for holism in my *Pursuit of Meaning*, New Age, Kolkata, 2004.

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A Critique on Susan Wolf's Essay on 'Moral Saints'

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This article presents the essence of Susan Wolf's views on 'Moral Saints' and then analyzes it so as to evaluate the credibility of perfectionism as the criteria of moral sainthood.

The issue of *moral saints* is somewhat paid too much of attention in contemporary ethics of virtue. Among the write ups about it, Susan Wolf's essay on 'Moral Saints' attracts our attention and we cannot help reacting in a negative wav. So, in this paper, I propose to present Susan Wolf's view on moral saints, in a nutshell, and then analyze it so as to evaluate its credibility.

We cannot deny that there are not only different kinds of 'moral' virtues, but that there are many other aspects of human personality also, which one should ideally have, i.e. there are non-moral human excellences as well. Susan Wolf has argued that, if somebody, in the process of becoming a moral saint, went to the extent of strictly following the 'moral point of view', then the result is bound to be disastrous for him or her, as a human being or a companion, since he is bound to neglect the non-moral virtues which also contribute to his general well being. So the question comes up; what would be the perfect balance of these different kinds of virtues in the most perfect personality or a moral saint? Susan Wolf has specified that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, *constitute* a model of personal well-being, towards which it ood or desirable for a human being to strive.[1] If has put forward: (1) her con- ts as to why such a his para-

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The issue of *moral saints* is somewhat paid too much of attention in contemporary ethics of virtue. Among the write ups about it, Susan Wolf's essay on 'Moral Saints' attracts our attention and we cannot help reacting in a negative wav. So, in this paper, I propose to present Susan Wolf's view on moral saints, in a nutshell, and then analyze it so as to evaluate its credibility.

We cannot deny that there are not only different kinds of 'moral' virtues, but that there are many other aspects of human personality also, which one should ideally have, i.e. there are non-moral human excellences as well. Susan Wolf has argued that, if somebody, in the process of becoming a moral saint, went to the extent of strictly following the 'moral point of view', then the result is bound to be disastrous for him or her, as a human being or a companion, since he is bound to neglect the non-moral virtues which also contribute to his general well being. So the question comes up; what would be the perfect balance of these different kinds of virtues in the most perfect personality or a moral saint? Susan Wolf has specified that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, *does not constitute* a model of personal well-being, towards which it would be rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive.[1]

In the paper 'Moral Saints', Wolf has put forward: (1) her concept of 'moral saint'; (2) placed her arguments as to why such a saint is unattractive; and (3) raised some questions about this paradoxical personality. Wolf has pointed out that the necessary condition of moral sainthood would involve: (a) the tendency of

making effort for the welfare of others or for the society as a whole. The happiness of the moral saint would then lie in the happiness of others. (b) On the other hand, a moral saint might be someone who pays little or no attention to his own happiness in the light of the overriding importance he gives to the wider concerns of morality. Roughly, these two models may be distinguished according to whether one thinks of the moral saint as being a saint *out of love* or whether one thinks of the moral saint as being a saint *out of duty*. We may refer to the former as the model of Loving Saint; to the latter as the model of Rational Saint. The two models differ considerably with respect to the qualities of their motives, but this difference would hardly reflect in their public behaviour. For example, both are supposed to have those qualities which are apt to treat others as kindly as possible; both will be patient, considerate even-tempered and hospitable in thought as well as in deed.

But then the question rises—can we say that the moral virtues are relevant for the saints general well-being also? Wolf specifies that it is the very nature of the moral virtues to *drive out* the non-moral virtues as well as many of the interests and personal characteristics that we generally associate with a developed healthy character.

In other words, if the moral saint is devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick, then he is obviously neglecting his own personal interests and talents.

And such a life can easily be called as 'barren'. The essence of the problem is: how much of any single virtue or any single type of value we can stand. Thus, the life of a moral saint seems to be unacceptable because it seems to be an ideal life in which morality unduly dominates to such an extent that a person is converted to a sort of mechanical instrument for public service only. It is true that the moral saint may, by happy accident, find himself with non-moral virtues which he can utilize morally. But the point to note is that the existence of these skills or interests can be given at best, the status of happy accidents—they cannot be encouraged for their own sake as distinct independent aspects of human good.[2]

We must give credit to Susan Wolf for focusing on a fundamental problem in modern moral philosophy. On the one hand, we want to assert that morality is of supreme value—always taking precedence over other grounds of choice; on the other hand, if we

consider what it would be like to live with the supreme importance of morality, then the ideal of life is bound to seem unattractive. The Utilitarians and the Kantian moral theorists have tried to give replies to Susan Wolf's concept of moral sainthood. The utilitarian would not support moral sainthood as a universal ideal. A world in which majority of people achieved or even *strove to* achieve moral sainthood would probably contain less happiness than a world in which people realized various ideals involving various personal values. If the utilitarian wants to influence more people, to achieve more good, then he would naturally encourage them to pursue happiness-producing goals, that are more attractive. To adopt a phrase of Bernard Williams, the utilitarian's manner of valuing the not explicitly moral aspects of his life 'provides him with one thought too many'.[3] The Kantian believes that being morally worthy consists of acting from maxims that one could will to be universal law and doing this out of respect for the moral law as such. Or, in other words, the Kantian believes that moral action consists of treating other persons always as ends and never as means only. Though the Kantian saint may differ from the utilitarian saint as to *which* actions he is bound to perform and which actions he should refrain from performing, I suspect that the range of activities acceptable to the Kantian saint will remain restrictive. Moreover, the manner in which the Kantian saint must think about and justify his activities and character traits will strike us—as it did with the utilitarian saint—as containing 'one thought too many'. As the utilitarian could value his activities and character traits only in so far as they fall under the descriptions of 'contributions to the general happiness', the Kantian would have to value his character traits and activities in so far as they are manifestations of respect for the moral law. Thus both are dominated by a single, all important value, under which all other possible values must be subsumed. A moral theory that does not contain the seeds of an all-consuming ideal of moral sainthood, thus, seems to place false and unnatural limits on our opportunity to do moral good and our potential to deserve moral praise. Yet, in this paper, I want to stress that when such ideals are present they are not ideals to which it is reasonable or healthy for human beings, to aspire. So these claims, taken together, appear to be a dilemma.

The common charge against the above views is that it is too critical of the content of morality, which is most popular today. So why not form a third alternative which suggests that we revise our views about the content of morality? Such a change indicates the widening of contemporary intuitions about which character traits are moral virtues and which interests are moral interests. Given such an alteration of our conception of morality, the figures considered to be moral saints will soon lose their sainthood and will be seen as morally inferior to other more appealing models of individuals. In other words, no matter how flexible we make the label 'morality', no matter how rich we make the life in which perfect obedience to this guide would result, we will have reason to hope that a person does not rule his life by the abstract consideration that such a life would be morally good. That is, there seem to be important differences between the aspects which are now considered appropriate object of moral evaluation and the aspects that might be included under the altered conception of morality we are now considering. Moral evaluation now is focused primarily on features of a person's life over which the person has control. It is, in fact, largely restricted to aspects of his life which are likely to have a considerable effect on other people. The only way out is to somehow accent that moral ideals do not, and need not make the best personal ideals. It seems to be an ethical fact that we have unlimited potential to be morally good, and endless opportunities to promote moral interests. It is also equally true that we may choose not to devote ourselves to realizing this potential or to taking this opportunity.

My concern here in this paper is that sainthood receives its proper dues. The first thing I want to point out is that, *there are saints* like Mahatma Gandhi and Mother Teresa and they are quite different from what Wolf thinks about a moral saint. Wolf argues that moral saints will be 'unattractive', because they will be lacking in individuality and in the 'ability to enjoy the enjoyable in life', they are also bound to be humourless and bland.[4] But the real saints are not like that—saints are, of course, not bland. It is true that the saints may not enjoy the same things as other ordinary people, but they have the striking feature of exceptional capacity for joy! There are many joys which only saints can know. Saints are not at all unattractive,

though they often have been controversial—but their charisma has inspired many to leave everything else to follow them. Wolf may have conceived of moral sainthood purely in terms of moral ends and principles. But we must accept that there are other very important virtues which are supposed to be there in a saint, in addition to the moral virtues such as humility, courage, etc.

Let us now analyze Wolf's conception of moral sainthood. Wolf states three criteria of moral sainthood; and they are not equivalent. (1) 'By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is as morally good as possible'; (2) Immediately she adds 'a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be'.[5] These two statements amount to the same thing according to her. But to me, the first one expresses a very questionable test for the satisfaction of the second. The assumption that the perfection of a person depends on the maximization of virtue in every single action undertaken by him, is somewhat erroneous. The third criteria states (3) 'A necessary condition of moral sainthood would be that one's life be dominated by a commitment to work for the welfare of others or of society as a whole'.[6] Here again, the claim is doubtful. It is not necessary that we overlook our own interests completely, for promoting the benefit of others. We can always pay attention to the pursuit of our own perfection and at the same time take up the issue of doing good to others in various ways which are not opposed to the former.

This third criteria is obviously related to Wolf's conception of morality. Later, in her paper, she contrasts the 'moral point of view' with the point of view of 'individual perfection', which is 'the point of view from which we consider what kind of lives are good lives, and what kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and others to be'.[7] The moral view points out that one is just one person among others, equally real and deserving the good things in life—a fact that demands expression in one's actions and deliberations. And moral theories may be recognized as the most correct way to express this fact. This account of moral theory agrees with Wolf's third criteria of moral sainthood on one main point: morality is concerned with the good of other persons. One's own dignity or courage pose *moral* issues for Wolf, only to the extent that they serve the interests of other people. Otherwise they can be

evaluated from the point of view of individual perfection—but not from moral point of view. This is indeed an unwarranted limitation of the moral view point. Thus, Wolf's three criteria of moral sainthood seem to be separable. The second comes closest to expressing the intuitive idea of moral sainthood, in its most general form. But the other two seem to be her working criteria.

It would be erroneous to say that the lives of the actual saints, about whom I mentioned earlier, have been dominated by a commitment to improve the welfare of others or of society as a whole'. For we can say with conviction that sainthood is a religious phenomenon; and even so political a saint as Gandhiji considered his humanitarian concern in the context of a more comprehensive devotion to God. This explains why actual saints are so unlike Wolf's picture of a moral saint. Wolf's moral saint is supposed to utilize limited resources for fulfilling innumerable human needs and devotes wholly to satisfying them as fully as possible. This enormous task hardly gives the saint any time or energy for anything that *does not* have to be done. But the actual saints are not like this. Sainthood does not imply achieving a boundless task; on the contrary, sainthood implies goodness overflowing from a boundless source'.[8] Generally, they are not even trying to make their every *action* as good as possible and thus they disobey the first criteria of Wolf's moral sainthood. Saintliness does not imply perfectionism, though some saints have been perfectionist in various ways. We can undoubtedly say that there is a great degree of moral goodness in the moral saints, but we cannot evaluate their every action to see whether they could have been morally better. What makes us think of Gandhi as a moral saint is his definitely exceptional goodness and humility.

Often the critics quote the example of Albert Schweitzer, a twentieth-century saint who, on the one hand, intensely felt the tension between artistic and intellectual achievement and a higher claim of humanitarian activities on the other. Yet in spite of his busy schedule of humanitarian activities, he kept a piano and spent his valuable time playing it. Later he came to realize that this skill of playing the piano would help him raise money for fulfilling his ambition of helping the poor and healing the sick. He could have easily utilized the time used in playing the piano for some other

morally worthier issues, but this fact on no account disqualify Schweitzer from sainthood. We do not demand that a saint's every act has to be morally worthiest.

The religious character of sainthood also helps explaining the self-evasive dedication of the saints who, at the same time, takes interest in his own happiness also. In fact saints have been typically and frankly interested in their own condition, their own perfection and their own happiness. Without these interests they would not have succeeded in leading others, whom they guided towards attaining perfection and happiness.

Even if it could be shown that the life of a Gandhi or a Mother Teresa is happier and more attractive than Wolf claims that the life of a moral saint would be, we still face questions: would it be good if everyone were a saint? Should we all aspire to be saints?

Gandhi thought so in the affirmative and wrote: 'Whatever is possible for me is possible even for a child'.[9] We cannot agree with him fully. All are not equally equipped with the capabilities and vocation which Gandhiji had. But at the same time, we can also assume that there could be more Gandhis and Teresas than there are—and it would be a very good thing, if there were. Wolf might question whether there are human excellences which could not be realized by a Gandhi or even by someone who aspired to be one and whether it would not be good for some people to acquire these excellences, instead of trying for their kind of sainthood. My answer to these questions is, of course, positive. Given the limits of time and energy, it is very difficult to imagine saints like Gandhi and Martin Luther as a great painter or a musician, though they may be great masters of reading and writing. There may be many kinds of excellence which are not compatible with the sort of vocation they resorted to. Each saint may flourish in a particular fled, according to his inborn talent and potentiality and he or she should be paid due respect for that. It is not worth looking for the manifestation of all possible talents and virtues in one single human saint.

The dilemma on whether or not to acquire sainthood demands a clarification of the proper implication of the term 'saint'. The word 'saint' means 'holy', i.e. saints are those persons in whom the presence of the divine and holy can be seen. They are people who

surrender themselves to God—not only by loving him but also by letting His love work through them to other people. And God need not be conceived as what Wolf would call a 'moral fanatic'.[10] As the creator of all, God can easily be conceived as interested in many forms of human excellence—for their own sake and not for the sake *of moral* concerns only. Interpreted in this sense, Gandhi and Martin Luther can be classified as saints of a particular kind—while there might be other saints who have excelled in other fields of art or music.

Here Wolf might question: the forms of artistic and intellectual excellence are often too nice or too wholesome to be the only ones allowed to us. 'There are darker triumphs of human creativity that we also admire';[11] could a saint have produced them? My answer is—not all. Even then I do not think that this can be a point against the desires for sainthood. Who knows? Perhaps Renoir would have painted greater pictures if he had been a saint. There is, for example, Van Gogh's life which was not very desirable and, accordingly, his paintings often express terror or even madness. Yet I would hesitate to say that a saint could not have painted them. The saints are often exposed to pain and sadness and we have to accept that it is also one of the ways in which the holy can reveal Himself in human life.

I agree with Wolf in emphasizing the maximum devotion to the interests of morality—the only thing I want to stress is that, maximum devotion, like sainthood, is necessarily religious. Wolf is wrong in saying that 'morality itself does not seem to be a suitable object of passion'.[12] But maximal devotion is much more than passion. And morality, as Wolf conceives it, is too narrow to be a suitable object of maximal devotion. I must admit that there is a strong tendency amongst us to convert the status of morality into a substitute for religion. But such a devotion to morality—as Wolf conceives of it—would be a form of idolatry. 'Religion is richer than morality because its divinity is so rich'. On the other hand, the loss of the possibility of sainthood would be a great loss. Wolf says 'A moral theory that does not contain the seeds of an all-consuming ideal of moral sainthood, seems to place false and unnatural limits on our opportunity to do moral good and our potential to deserve moral praise'.[13] This seems to be right. But I do not agree that our capacities generate the all-consuming ideal. There are many aspects of human life which deserve praise but which need not adopt an all-consuming ideal. The truth is that many moral concepts are rooted in religion and it is difficult to separate them. In other words, it is not easy to have a consistent system of morality without referring to religion, i.e. without an appropriate object of maximal devotion.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the ideal of moral sainthood should not be held as a moral standard against which any other ideal must be judged or justified. It is misleading to claim that the goals, relationships, activities and interests of one's life are not maximally morally good. In other words, an individual may be *perfectly wonderful* without being *perfectly moral.* Contemporary moral philosophy has failed to recognize this. The Loving Saint, who combines his personal interests with that of morality—is a role model. Yet, I stress that we need not aspire to become this model. The moral point of view, is the point of view that one is just a person among others, equally deserving of the good things of life. Different moral theories offer alternative answers to the question of the most effective way. But it is evident that these interpretations of the 'moral point of view' do not exhaust the ways, in which our actions or characters can be comprehensively evaluated. From the moral point of view, the perfection of an individual life will have some, but limited value; because each individual remains just one person among others. As I have argued, the goodness of an individual's life does not vary proportionally with the degree to which it reflects moral goodness. The proper development of our character demands that morality play a very important role. Although it should not be a universal medium into which all other values must be translated, nor should it be an ever-present filter through which all other values must pass. In other words, our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top. But then, it is very natural to ask, 'when and how much to be moral?' There is always a tendency to seek a meta-ethical theory, that will give us principles, on the basis of which we can develop and evaluate more comprehensive personal ideals. 'Perhaps a theory that distinguishes among the various roles a person is expected to play within a life—as professional, as citizen, as friend and so on—might give us some rules

that would offer us a better framework in which to think about and discuss these questions.'[14]

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Some Epistemic Concepts in Kant*

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the present paper is to explicate some epistemic concepts used by Kant in his First Critique. The concepts analyzed here are the concepts of Opinion, Belief, Conviction, Persuasion, Certainty and Knowledge. The present author has raised a few questions here and tried to answer them. The first question is concerning the differences among these concepts. Are they qualitatively distinct or do they differ in degree only? A second question is about the similarity between Kant's definition of 'Knowledge' and the Classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief'. Third, does Kant subscribe to Correspondence theory or Coherence theory of truth? The interpretation that seemed to me to be most appropriate is that so far as the nature of truth is concerned, Kant is an advocate of the correspondence theory of truth, and coherence provides the criterion of truth. Fourth, is this definition doing justice to Kant's epistemological idealism, the first of its kind in the history of Western philosophy?

James Van Cleve begins his book *Problems From Kant* with a quotation from Robert Pirsig. I requote it thus: 'Kant is always superbly methodical, persistent, regular and meticulous as he scales that great snowy mountain of thought concerning what is in the mind

*One fine morning a couple of weeks back my close friend Professor Chhanda Gupta of Jadavpur University rang me. This was not a courtesy call. She was disturbed with the question what Kant's theory of error might be. With her innate modesty she told me—as she always does—that I was the most competent person to solve her problem. I could not answer her question right then over the telephone. I requested her to call me in the evening. She never called me back, but I got excited and that excitement has produced this paper, for good or ill.

and what is outside the mind. It is, for modern climbers, one of the highest peaks of all.'[1]

This mastermind, observers Rasvihary Das, '... is supposed to have founded a new science, viz., the science of knowledge or epistemology. Philosophers before Kant no doubt treated of knowledge in their systems but nobody formulated the problem of knowledge in the way in which Kant conceived the subject.'[2]

I

In 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method', Kant contends that the interests of reason are exhausted by the following three questions of which the first one is speculative and the other two practical. The first question is: What can I know? The second question is: What ought I to do? The third question is: What may I hope?[3] In the present paper, our sole interest is in 'What can I know?' And in order to answer this question, we need to know what knowledge is. I say this in spite of my clear awareness that the problem of 'the diallelus' or the problem of 'the wheel'[4] is our constant company. I am not scared just because I know that there are non-sceptical solutions to this problem.

So, let us concentrate on 'knowledge' which is supposed to be the central concept of epistemology. Kant says: '... when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is *knowledge*. The subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself), the objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for everyone).'[5]

What is this *thing* which is held to be true? It seems that in this context Kant means by 'thing' judgement. What is held to be true is a judgement.[6] Hence 'the holding of a thing to be true' means 'the holding of a judgement to be true'.

Granted that the above interpretation is correct, let us try to grasp the full import of the above-mentioned definition which requires, in its turn, a clear understanding of some concepts used in this definition and some related concepts, viz., opinion, belief, conviction, certainty and persuasion. Kant thinks of a difference of degrees between opining, believing, and knowing. *Opining*, on Kant's view, is holding a judgement which is consciously insufficient, both objectively and subjectively. Most probably, what Kant means here

is that the subject holding the judgement knows that the grounds of his opinion are objectively, i.e. factually insufficient and he himself realizes that they are insufficient. On the other hand, the subject having a *belief* thinks that the grounds of his belief (holding a judgement) are sufficient from his subjective point of view, but taken as insufficient from the objective point of view.

Philosophers generally use the term 'belief' to mean what Kant calls 'judgement'. I am not sure about this equation, for in Kant's philosophy, a judgement's being held to be true is present in all the different mental states we have taken up for explication. I get some support from Kant when he writes 'The holding of a thing to be true or the subjective validity of the judgement ... has the following three degrees: *opining, believing* and *knowingly*.'[7]

A third state called *conviction* is the holding of a judgement to be true when the judgement is based on objectively sufficient grounds and is universally valid for all rational beings. From the subjective point of view, *conviction* is not distinguishable from another state Kant calls *persuasion*. But *conviction* is contrasted with *persuasion* in the sense that in the latter case, the judgement held to be true has no non-subjective basis, though the basis is wrongly supposed to be objective. As opposed to *conviction, persuasion* is valid only for the particular individual in question and no communication with other individuals is possible.[8] Kant seems to use the term *persuasion* in a very special sense here. For ordinarily in the situation of *persuasion* there is a persuader and one or more persuades where the former tries to convince the latter about something which is false more often than not. To quote Kant: 'Persuasion I can hold on to my own account, if it so pleases me, but I cannot, and ought not, to profess to impose it as binding on anyone but myself'.[9] Kant rightly points out that persuasion has private and not public validity. True, but I may try to influence others by or induce in others what I hold to be true, though I may fail in my attempt. Of course, about persuasion Kant has simply said that '... the holding of it (judgement) to be true does not allow of being communicated.'[10] Perhaps this only means that communication is not permissible in this case. But the subject, I would like to add, may not pay any heed to this 'No Permission' notice and may try to communicate, unsuccessfully though. *Conviction*, which is a necessary condition of *assertion*, is

necessarily communicable and necessarily valid for everyone. Next comes *belief* or *believing*. If we hold a judgement to be true on the basis of grounds that are subjectively sufficient and considered to be objectively insufficient, then what occurs in the understanding is called believing.

What is *certainty? Certainty* is a state reached by us when we hold a judgement to be true on the basis of objectively sufficient grounds. Kant adds that this certainty is everyone's certainty. What does he mean by this? Is it not possible that what is certain for one subject at one time is not certain for another subject at that very time? I have reasons to believe that Kant will answer by saying 'Yes, it is possible'. So, the onus is on us to interpret Kant correctly. Most probably what Kant has in mind is that when one is certain of a judgement held to be true, he acquires the right to transmit his certainty to others for he has objectively sufficient grounds that everyone has access to. Hence, certainty is something public.

I have another problem here. In contrast to *certainty*, Kant holds that *conviction* is private or subjective (for myself) in the sense that the judgement is held to be true on subjectively sufficient grounds. Exactly this is how we commonly take *conviction*. We say: 'I am convinced for my part, you may take it or leave it.'[11] But in the opening paragraph of this section Kant writes: 'If the judgement is valid for everyone, provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is objectively sufficient, and the holding of it to be true is entitled *conviction*.'[12] How are we to reconcile these two apparently conflicting views? Does Kant have two senses of *conviction* in his mind? Or are we committing some mistake in reading Kant? Let us proceed with utmost care and caution. In the beginning Kant is of the view that conviction is public (valid for all rational beings) and objective (i.e., has objectively sufficient grounds). Later on, he categorically says that conviction is private and subjective. In this context, we may say that what Kant has called certainty seems to be equivalent to what he has earlier called conviction.

I am yet to solve this puzzle. So I leave it to my further reflections and to my readers and get back to *knowledge* which is our main subject matter. *Knowledge* is holding of a judgement[13] to be true on subjectively and objectively sufficient grounds. Rasvihary Das writes in this connection: 'Knowledge is a subjective experience with an objective reference, but there is nothing in the subjective experience itself which can guarantee the validity of the objective reference.'[14] This is no departure from Kant; rather it illuminates what Kant has said.

II

In Kant's definition of knowledge truth is one component, holding the judgement to be true is there,[15] the basing relation is there and adequacy (both subjective and objective) of the basis has its own place.

But a very important question is: What is truth? Kant's answer is: '... truth depends upon agreement with the object, and in respect of it the judgements of each and every understanding must *therefore* (italics mine) be in agreement with each other (...).'[16] As far as I understand this sentence, according to Kant, correspondence constitutes the nature of truth. And that is why or because of this correspondence there is coherence or agreement among judgements of different individuals. So it seems that correspondence is a precondition of coherence of judgements. In other words, coherence is possible because of correspondence. But how do we ascertain what is true and what is not? What is the criterion of truth? Let us listen to what Kant says: '... there is ... at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgements with each other, notwithstanding the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground, namely, upon the object, and that it is for this reason that they are all in agreement with the object—the truth of the judgement being thereby *proved* (italics mine).'[17]

Here Kant states—if I am not wrong—that coherence of judgements has an objective basis. We agree with one another, communicate with others because our judgements are rooted in reality. This does not mean that coherence makes correspondence possible. This only means that *that the judgement is true* is proved by coherence or agreement of judgements having an objective ground. The phrase 'it is for this reason that' in the above quotation is to be taken in the Davidsonian sense, viz., 'Coherence yields correspondence.' Had Davidson been amongst us now, I would have asked him if he was influenced by Kant when he was presenting his

coherence theory of truth. In any case, let us refer to Davidson's transcendental argument which is most relevant in this context. Had our beliefs not been true, i.e. had they not corresponded to reality, they would not have cohered with one another. Coherence is a fact which can be made intelligible only on the presumption that beliefs correspond to reality.[18] Reference to Rasvihary Das' interpretation of the Kantian argument is most relevant here.

The gist of the argument as presented by Das in his Bengali book on Kant is that we have a general cognitive power over and above our individual cognitive powers. This general power is common to all men and by virtue of this commonality we somehow communicate with one another. If your cognitive power were completely different from mine, I could never comprehend your speech, your arguments.[19]

III

After the long analytical exposition presented above, when we look back at the account of knowledge given by Kant, we notice a striking similarity between this account and the *Justified True Belief* account of knowledge as found in western epistemological tradition down the ages. This is nothing amazing for Kant is an important figure in this tradition. But one thing remains to be settled right at this point. In defining knowledge Kant never uses the term 'belief'; instead he speaks of judgement and conviction and certainty. In the classical definition, on the other hand, 'belief' is a part of the definiens, and this belief may vary in degrees. Though 'belief' has no room in Kant's definition of knowledge, Kant speaks of a state of believing which occurs when holding of the judgement is subjectively sufficient and 'is ... taken as being objectively insufficient'. This is not the ordinary conception of belief. Beliefs are ordinarily taken to be either true or false, but even when false we may be, and generally, are, unaware of their falsity, i.e. we do not necessarily think that they are held on objectively insufficient grounds. In the case of true beliefs, again, we may hold them on insufficient (objectively) grounds for truth does not guarantee objective sufficiency of grounds. And we may fail to take note of the fact that objective insufficiency prevails there. Truth and falsity of beliefs are subject-independent properties—we have no control over them.

But I have a hunch here. When Kant speaks of subjective sufficiency, he simply means that when one holds a judgement, one holds it to be true.[20] 'Holding a judgement' and 'holding it to be true' are equivalent. By the expression 'taken as being objectively insufficient', Kant probably means that the subject knows fully well that there is a gap between believing and being, between 'holding something to be true' and 'something being true'.

IV

I would like to add one more point here in connection with Kant's thesis that opining, believing and knowing differ in degree. We all know that this is a highly controversial thesis. Some students of philosophy, like me, have always been inclined to this Kantian thesis at least in the domain of empirical, contingent propositions. There are others who would offer an anti-Kantian thesis and uphold the view that belief and knowledge are generically different, and incompatible with each other, according to one group; and compatible, according to another group. This is not the occasion for detailed discussion of this point. But I cannot resist the temptation of referring to John Cook Wilson (early twentieth century) who, it appears, was largely influenced by Kant, both positively and negatively. Cook Wilson contrasts knowledge with both belief and opinion, both of which are, in a sense, dependent upon knowledge. He maintains without any reservation that no definition in the strict sense of the term can be given of knowledge, for knowing is the presupposition of all inquiries. He just describes knowledge when he says that knowledge is apprehension of fact, which apprehension is infallible by nature. Opinion, Cook Wilson says, is formed in the effort to get knowledge, and is necessarily fallible. When we find that there is some evidence in favour of something (may be, a proposition) and the evidence is known to be insufficient, we form an opinion about it. Cook Wilson considers believing to be a mental state which is akin to opining. [They belong to the same genus, but differ in degree only.] Like opinion, belief is fallible, but in the latter case we have stronger evidence than what we have in the former, and on its basis we have a high degree of confidence in what we believe. The question of the strength of evidence or of degrees of strength arises only in the case of opinion and belief

and never in the case of knowledge. For, the evidence that we have in a particular case of knowledge is always sufficient evidence, evidence that proves.[21] Like Kant, Cook Wilson maintains that in the field of *a priori* truths the question of opinion[22] does not make any sense. I quote Kant: '... it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; either we must know, or we must abstain from all acts of judgement.'[23]

V

One last point. In the paragraph that immediately follows Kant's discussion of opining, believing and knowing Kant remarks: 'I must never presume to *opine*, without *knowing at least something* by means of which the judgment, in itself merely problematic secures connection with truth, ... Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain.'[24] I am yet to understand the full import of this passage. But I have been very delighted to find something similar in Chisholm's theory of foundationalism. The basic principle of, or as Chisholm calls it, one feature of what is called 'foundationalism' is: 'If anything is probable for S then something is certain for S'. Chisholm calls it an anti-Pyrrhonian principle.[25]

In concluding this paper on some Kantian epistemic concepts, let me confess that once again (in addition to numerous occasions while teaching this first *Critque* over decades), I have been able to see why Kant is regarded as an epistemological idealist and a pioneer in this field in the entire history of Western philosophy.

Notes and References

1. *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.* The quotation is mentioned in James Van Cleve, *Problems From Kant* (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3.
2. Das, Rasvihary, *A Handbook to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* Progressive Publishers, Kolkata 12, p. xiv. I presume all students of Kant, like me, would agree with every word of what Das has observed here about my favourite philosopher.
3. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* Translated by N.K. Smith (New York: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), A 805, B 833, p. 635.
4. Chisholm, R.M., *The Problem of the Criterion* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973).
5. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* A 822, B 850, p. 646.

6. This reminds me of Davidson who speaks of beliefs or sentences held to be true by someone who understands them.
7. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* A 822, B 850, p. 646.
8. Both conviction and persuasion have their roots in (are caused by) the subject holding the judgement.
9. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* A 822, B 850, p. 646.
10. Ibid., A 820, B 848, p. 645.
11. This is from Austin who says: 'I am sure for my part, you can take it or leave it: accept it if you think I'm an acute and careful person, that's your responsibility in *Other Minds,* Philosophical Papers (Second edition), Eds. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 100.
12. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* A 820, B 848, p. 645.
13. In Kant's theory, nothing short of a judgement can be called knowledge.
14. Das, Rasvihary, *Philosophical Essays,* ed. Ramaprasad Das, University of Calcutta, Calcutta University Press), Chapter 5, p. 77.
15. I have no idea about the name which Kant could suggest as a name for this state. Can it be called entertaining or considering or directly apprehending? In any case, it is the precondition of all mental states discussed by Kant.
16. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* A 821, B 849, p. 645.
17. Ibid., A 821, B 849, p. 645.
18. A very common objection against the correspondence theory of truth is that we cannot know whether our beliefs correspond to facts, and so cannot know whether they are true. But this objection has long been answered by the argument that we need not take correspondence as a criterion of truth, as a theory which asks us to directly match our beliefs with facts. We can *know* and thus *prove* that our beliefs are true for they cohere with one another. A transcendental argument is required to establish the link between correspondence and coherence, the former being the nature of truth and the latter the test of truth.
19. *Kanter Darshan* (Dwitiya Samskaran), (Kolkata: Paschimbanga Pustak Parshad, 1984), p. 23.
20. Compare Chisholm. To say that S believes that p is the same thing as to say that S believes that p is true.
21. It has been held by many that justification is a condition of knowledge, and justification is given in terms of evidence and generally evidence is about a proposition which we know. If nothing is known, nothing constitutes evidence. So, it may be the case that the concept of knowledge is so fundamental that it cannot be defined in terms of concepts that do not involve the concept of knowledge itself.

22. I add that the same is true of belief as well.
23. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, A 823, B 851, p. 647.
24. Ibid., p. 646.
25. See Kant's *Theory of Knowledge*, Third edition (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, Private Limited, 1992), p. 14.

Gettier and the Analysis of Knowledge*

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ABSTRACT

This article argues that Edmund Gettier's attempt to question the traditional analysis of knowledge is based on a problematic conflation of the epistemological with the purely (or narrowly) logical. The contention is that we must distinguish relations obtained between propositions qua propositions from those obtained between beliefs or between propositions considered as expressions of beliefs. It is argued that if we make this distinction, it can be seen that Gettier's examples and the argument constructed around them do not constitute a genuine challenge to the traditional analysis.

Edmund Gettier's 1963 article 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' is too well known to need any elaborate introduction.[1] In this article, published in *Analysis*, Gettier attempts to show that the traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of truth, belief and justification is wrong and that these three conditions do not constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a knowledge claim. In other words, he argues that there can be cases where: a person S believes a proposition P, that proposition P is true and S is justified in believing that proposition to be true, and yet it would not be correct to say 'S knows that P'. In order to prove his claim, Gettier constructs two examples where this appears to be the case. Gettier's claim was so counterintuitive and yet the counterexamples to the traditional analysis he offered seemed so impeccable that the sheer shock value of his article provoked almost unprecedented response.

*I wish to acknowledge here my sincere debt to Professor David Cockburn of the University of Wales, Lampeter, for reading an earlier—and considerably less rigorous—draft of this paper and offering some valuable suggestions.

All this is not surprising. What is surprising is that even more than forty years after its publication, Gettier's claim is taken seriously as a valid challenge to the traditional analysis of knowledge. Even contemporary texts on epistemology devote space to Gettier's article and to the responses which took that article at face value, not as a matter of historical interest but as representing an active philosophical issue. I find this strange since Gettier's argument, for all its brilliance, is not, I think, strictly speaking, a valid philosophical argument. Or to put it more accurately, Gettier's argument consists of an attempt to deal with an epistemological problem by treating it as a purely logical issue. Surprising though it may seem, most philosophers have not paid attention to this aspect of Gettier's argument. Even philosophers such as Alvin Goldman, Robert Nozick, Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, who reject Gettier's claim, have treated it as based on epistemological grounds and offered epistemological arguments to counter it.[2] While these arguments themselves are of considerable general value and clarify many important points regarding such questions as the conditions of epistemic justification and so on, I am inclined to think that they are misdirected in terms of their intended target. What is required in the context of Gettier's challenge to the traditional analysis of knowledge, in my view, is not trying to counter his claim at the epistemological level but to point out how he conducts his argument purely at the logical level and assumes the conclusions reached through that argument to be of epistemological significance. Not many philosophers have made this point or have made it only tangentially.

One of the reasons for the extraordinary interest generated by Gettier's article, I think, is to do with the fact that not only is Gettier's claim strongly counterintuitive but the examples around which he weaves his argument have a certain air of ingenuity which evokes unease, and yet—in this I think lay the fascination of the issue—it looks impossible to pinpoint precisely what is objectionable about them. However, I think the examples offered by Gettier can be unpacked in such a way as to expose their structure and demonstrate the inadequacy of the arguments based on them. I believe this can be done through the rather simple manoeuvre of focusing on the distinction between the logical and the epistemological aspects of the problem.

If we look at Gettier's examples in the manner I have suggested above, we can see that what happens in these examples is, briefly stated, the following: S holds a certain proposition P expressing a true belief B to entertain which he has adequate justification. Then he subjects this proposition P to certain permissible logical operations and derives another proposition Q. Gettier maintains that the proposition Q fulfils all the three conditions and yet cannot be regarded as a case of knowledge, which is correct. However, the central question, which Gettier does not take into account, is this: while the proposition Q—qua proposition—may be derivable from the proposition P, can it be claimed that the belief expressed by Q is derivable from the belief expressed by P? My contention is that this is a crucial question since, properly speaking, knowledge does not concern propositions per se but beliefs. Since this is the main point I am trying to make in this article, allow me to elaborate on it a little more.

In formulating the conditions of knowledge, philosophers, striving to make the formulation logically neat, have given it a form that is misleading in certain respects. This is true about the formulations given by Ayer and Chisholm as well (which Gettier cites in his article as representative of the traditional account).

The formulation (broadly) states that S knows that P, if S believes that P, P is true and S is justified in believing that P—where S is a person and P is a proposition. This formulation makes the proposition P the centre of attention. But the fact is that what is at issue is not S's relation to a certain proposition P, but his relation to a certain belief B which is expressed in the form of the proposition P. Therefore, in my view, the formulation would be less misleading if it went like this:

S knows F (where F is a fact) if:

1. S holds a belief B about F,
2. B is true,
3. S is justified in holding the belief B.

If one is not comfortable with the idea of talking about true and false beliefs, one might say:

S knows F (where F is a fact) if:

1. S accepts a proposition P that expresses a belief B about F,
2. P is true,
3. S is justified in accepting P as expressive of B regarding F.

And if one feels uneasy with the notion of belief itself in this context, one can substitute 'judgement' for 'belief'.

It may be noted that these formulations do not deviate from the formula embodied in the traditional formulations in any essential respect. But they offer the significant advantage that they keep the issue at the epistemological level and help us remember that P is of interest only insofar as it is an expression or articulation of the belief B. This would help us realize that all the operations to which P might be subject may not be applicable to B.

Since Gettier does not offer his examples by way of illustrations of an argument pursued independently of them but uses them as the very basis of the argument, I will, as most critics have done, concentrate on the structure of the examples themselves. If the structure of the examples can be shown to be flawed, then the argument has no ground to stand on and must collapse automatically. It can be further contended that any other examples exhibiting a similar structure would be equally vulnerable to the kind of criticisms we are making here.

Before examining Gettier's examples, let me briefly dwell on an assertion he makes before he presents the examples. He says:

> I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of justified in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is, in fact, false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

Gettier is perfectly correct in saying that it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is actually false. However, I think it would be worthwhile to explicitly state that justification as understood here, by itself, testifies only to the *rationality* of the person in holding the belief in question and not to his *knowledge*. This is important in my opinion since the notion of justification, in certain contexts, has connotations which suggest a sort of internal relation between truth and justification, implying that truth must be one of the factors in justification. In such a case, 'justified' may be taken to mean 'correct' or 'valid'*. It can result in confusion if we forget to omit such a connotation from our use of the term 'justification' in the present context.

Gettier's second point is more central to his argument and in the rest of this article my effort will be to show that this point is problematic. My basic contention in this context, as I indicated above, is that Gettier's assertion is true at the logical level, as applied purely to propositions but not true at the epistemological level, as applied to beliefs, and that the flaw in Gettier's argument consists of conflating the two. Having said this, let me also say that I do not wish to overly stress the contrast between the 'logical' and the 'epistemological'. What I mean to communicate by this contrast is essentially the distinction between the relations obtained between propositions and those between beliefs—in short, the distinction between the logic of propositions (understood as expressions of possible states of affairs or in any such sense) and the logic of beliefs (understood as judgements entertained by a person) where it makes sense to ask whether a certain belief B implies a certain other belief C, or more accurately perhaps, whether a person's holding a belief B implies his holding another belief C.

In the light of these considerations, let me now analyze Gettier's two examples carefully. Let me begin with his first example:

CASE I

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

*It would, of course, be difficult to argue that using the term 'justification' in this sense is completely erroneous. As Davidson has pointed out, at a certain primary level of concepts, reductive analysis in the sense of elucidating, or defining one concept in terms of other, more primary concepts is highly problematic since at that level all the concepts are equally primary and are mutually interdependent. The concepts involved in the analysis of knowledge, for instance, are of this kind.[3] Further, as I have tried to point out elsewhere, concepts at that level, due to their interdependence, exhibit another characteristic: they appear to obey a sort of equivalent of the uncertainty principle such that when we try to define one of the concepts very precisely, the other concepts related to it get blurred to the same extent, in the sense that they require a proportionately more loose-textured definition.[4]

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would be selected in the end and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones' pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e) is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (*i*) (e) is true; (*ii*) Smith believes that (e) is true; and (*iii*) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not *know* that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones' pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get his job.'

Here, there are two propositions (d) and (e) whose mutual relation is crucial to the argument. They are:

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Gettier makes use of the fact that (d) entails (e).

Now, my point is this: although in strictly logical terms the entailment involved here may not be problematic, in the epistemological context of determining the conditions of knowledge, we must ask what kind of relation is obtained between (d) and (e) if we consider them not just as propositions or statements but as judgements [illegible] by S. If we look at the matter in this

light, we can see that the proposition (e) can be understood in two possible ways. Only one of them is, strictly speaking, the correct one in the present context.

(e) 'The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' *can be interpreted either as*

(e1) There is one particular person (who is specifically intended in this statement) who will get the job and who has ten coins in his pocket.

Or as

(e2) There is some one person (at least and at most one person, whosoever it might be) who will get the job and who has ten coins in his pocket.

The difference between the two propositions is as follows: (e1) has a specific referent. It implies reference to one definite individual whose identity can be pinned down in other ways. We can, for instance, add other facts that are true about Jones such as 'the name of the person in question begins with the letter J, his birthday falls on such and such a date, his father's name is so and so...' and so on without deviating from the referent. In other words, what is involved here is a definite description which converges towards one unique referent. To adopt another way of describing the same, it is a singular proposition that can, at some point, be replaced by what David Kaplan has called a 'directly referential' expression that unambiguously points to Jones.[5] (e2) on the other hand, has no definite referent, or if you prefer, it has an open referent: whoever satisfies the two conditions will just be the person implied in the proposition. It is like the announcement 'whoever has the lottery ticket with the number 34561 is the winner'.[6]

Now, the issue is not whether the proposition (e) as such can be interpreted in either or both of the two ways. It certainly can. The point, as I said above, is this: Taken as propositions in the sense of purely logical entities, (d) does entail both (e1) and (e2). But here we are not concerned with these assertions as propositions. We are interested in them as expressions of beliefs—entertained by a certain person at a certain time and place. This would demand that

we look at the meaning of the assertions in the sense of what S could have meant by them in the present context or what beliefs of S (at the time in question) do these assertions represent. Seen in these terms, it is only (el) which is entailed by (d), in the sense that at the level of belief, only (el) is implied by (d), or in other words, in the sense that when Smith, being convinced that it is entailed by his belief as expressed by (d), made the assertion (e), he unambiguously meant (el) and not (e2).

If I may be allowed to put the matter more graphically, when Smith says to himself 'Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket', he means Jones, the particular person who is his colleague. So also, when he says to himself 'The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket,' he has in mind not some vague, possible (but unique) person—a faceless human being in the form of a sort of silhouette with ten coins in his pocket and the appointment letter in his hand—but specifically the individual Jones.

Let us be clear on another point as well. Anxieties regarding the sort of problems that are supposed to be associated with discovering the meaning or intention of a person on the basis of his utterances are quite unwarranted here. We are not starting with a certain uncontexted proposition uttered by Smith and then trying to reach its intended meaning. Here the point of departure is a belief that is already identified, which gets expressed in certain statements. Smith begins with a belief about Jones as the person who will get the job and who has ten coins in his pocket. Then he constructs a proposition to express that particular belief. The question is whether the proposition he has constructed (and the other propositions he constructs derivatively from that initial proposition) unambiguously and adequately captures his belief.

Therefore, epistemologically—that is to say at the level of beliefs rather than that of propositions—what is entailed by (d) is not (e) in the sense of (e2), but (e) in the sense of (el). And for Gettier's argument to hold, interpreting (d) as entailing (e2) is essential.

Part of the reason why this aspect of Gettier's argument has been overlooked is the fact that—as I am trying to stress in this article—in most discussions, the logical concern tends to dominate, to the exclusion of the semantic, epistemological concerns. When

we are dealing with a proposition only as a unit of a formal argument, certain logical rules might suffice. But when we are dealing with propositions not as belonging to some abstract logical universe but as vehicles of intended meanings expressed by persons, we must recognize the obligation to take many other things into account. If we fail to do that, we risk ending up with logically flawless but philosophically (in this context epistemologically) unacceptable conclusions.

The second example given by Gettier involves a different logical operation but a basically similar conflation of two possible interpretations of a proposition (as representing a given belief) only one of which is valid.

Let us look at this example:

'CASE II

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

(f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-names quite at random, and constructs the following three propositions:

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h) and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h) and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is, therefore, completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does *not* own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (*i*) (h) is true, (*ii*) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (*iii*) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true."

In this case too the success of the argument depends on confining oneself to the purely logical level without taking into account the epistemological level. At the purely logical level, it does not matter which of the two components of a disjunctive proposition is true and which one is false, as long as one is true and the other is not. But if we distinguish—as I have been arguing we must—between the proposition itself and the belief expressed by the proposition, we can see that the situation is very different. Let me explain.

The three propositions (g), (h) and (*i*) attributed to Smith are, given the epistemological context, expressions of beliefs entertained by Smith. And, in order to understand the propositions in this sense, we must ask this question: What were the beliefs that Smith was seeking to state through these propositions? Or if you prefer, what precisely did Smith mean when he entertained these propositions? The answer to this question can only be as follows: Smith believed—confining ourselves to the proposition (h) for the sake of simplicity—that the first part of the proposition (which referred to Jones owning a Ford) is true and believed the second part of the proposition about Brown being in Barcelona to be false. He may further have been convinced that given these facts, the disjunctive proposition he had constructed *on that basis* was logically impeccable. But there could not have been any doubt in Smith's mind as to *what made the proposition true.* In other words, Smith did not believe that *either* of the two constituents of his proposition could be true. He did not even entertain the possibility of the first part of his propositions being false.

Let me expand this a little. When we look at the proposition (h) in its epistemological context after breaking it down into (h1) Jones owns a Ford, and (h2) Brown is in Barcelona, we find that there are two possible beliefs (A) and (B) here:

A:

(h1) is false,
(h2) is true,
therefore, (h) is true

and

B:

(h1) is true,
(h2) is false,
therefore, (h) is true.

At the level of propositions, A and B might be interchangeable. But at the level of beliefs (as epistemological units), A and B are not interchangeable. And while it is A which is true, what Smith holds is the belief B. Neither belief amounts to knowledge since neither satisfies all the three conditions: as for A, the question of a knowledge claim does not even arise since Smith does not hold the belief A; and as for B, it cannot constitute a knowledge claim since it is a false belief. To make this same point in the specific context of Gettier's argument, when he says,

'(*i*) (h) is true,
(*ii*) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and
(*iii*) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.'

(h) does not refer to the same belief in all the three assertions.

In (*i*) (h) refers to A
In (*ii*) (h) refers to B

And in (*iii*) (h) can only mean B since that is the belief held by Smith.

Given the fact that Smith does not hold the belief A, it does not meet what is referred to as the belief condition and is, consequently, out of reckoning. As for B, seeing that it is a false belief, Smith's holding it and his being justified (on whatever basis) in holding it, does not make it a case of knowledge. Hence, we can say that the

three conditions of truth, belief and justification are not fulfilled in the case of any of the propositions under consideration.

On this basis, it can be said that Gettier's examples and the arguments constructed around those examples do not constitute a philosophical challenge to the traditional analysis of knowledge.

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3. Davidson, Donald, 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 93, No. 6 (June, 1996), p. 264.
4. Sayeed, Syed A., 'A Perspective on the Analysis of Knowledge', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (No. 4, October 1999), pp. 503–14.
5. David, Kaplan, 'Demonstratives', in *Themes from Kaplan*, J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (Eds.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481–564.
6. The distinction I am using here is essentially the same as the one suggested by Donnellan in terms of 'attributive use' and 'referential use' of a definite description where, in the case of attributive use, a sentence of the form 'The *F* is *G*' is used to express a proposition equivalent to 'Whatever is uniquely *F* is *G*', and alternatively, on a *referential* use, a sentence of the form 'The *F* is *G*' is used to pick out a specific individual, *x*, and say of *x* that *x* is *G*.: K.S., Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions,' *Philosophical Review* 77, (1966): 281–304.

A Berkeleian Model of Memory[1]

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ABSTRACT

George Berkeley, in his *Principles* and *Dialogues*, admits that memory is an important source of knowledge. However, there is hardly any discussion, in these works, on the question of the possibility of memory knowledge. The issue becomes more complicated when we consider Berkeley's central doctrine *esse est percipi*, which rules out the revival of ideas perceived earlier. If this is the case, is there an avenue open for Berkeley to justify memory knowledge? It is this question that this paper addresses and attempts to answer. First, we will show how, given Berkeley's doctrine *esse est percipi*, memory cannot be accounted as the revival of ideas perceived earlier. Second, we shall develop a Berkeleian model of memory which does not assume that the ideas perceived and the ideas remembered are identical. According to this model, ideas remembered 'stand for' ideas perceived in the past without being replicas of the latter. Further, we argue that memory, for Berkeley, is a form of indirect perception. Finally, memorial ideas are distinguished from ideas of imagination on the basis of two features that the former essentially possess, namely, adequacy and truth.

INTRODUCTION

In the opening paragraph of *The Principles of the Human Knowledge*, Berkeley acknowledges that memory ideas constitute one of the objects of knowledge.[2] He writes: 'It is evident to anyone who takes

a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways'.[3] Memory is indeed an important source of knowledge for Berkeley. Without granting memory, it would not be possible for him to account for much of our empirical knowledge in so far as the senses provide us with knowledge of only what is immediately perceived.

In the *Dialogues*, we find Berkeley arguing as follows: Imagine two persons looking at a picture of Julius Caesar, of whom one knows that the picture is that of Julius Caesar and the other does not. The man who does not know that the picture depicts Julius Caesar would see nothing 'more than some colours and figures with certain symmetry and composition'. The person who knows that the picture is Julius Caesar's would also see the same colours and figures, but his thoughts would be directed to the Roman emperor. Now this cannot be because of the sensations or ideas that the latter possesses. Both of them have similar sensory ideas. In this respect, the man whose thoughts are about Julius Caesar has no advantage over the other. So there must be some other source from where the thoughts about Julius Caesar originate. In Berkeley's opinion, these thoughts 'proceed from reason and memory'.[4]

Though he grants memory as a source of knowledge, unlike Locke and Hume, Berkeley does not devote any discussion on this subject. More than the absence of any discourse on memory, the question that would bother a reader of Berkeley is whether there are adequate resources within his system to provide a satisfactory account of the possibility of memory knowledge. Memory ideas are those that represent past actions or events that are not directly accessible to us anymore. The question how the memory ideas represent the past is generally answered by construing memory as a mechanism that stores one's ideas perceived in the past and brings them back to one's immediate awareness at the time of remembering. The notion of storage presupposes that the ideas perceived in the past and the ideas remembered are identical.

However, if one were to assume that the ideas recollected and the ideas perceived earlier are the same, then it poses a problem for Berkeley, and it turns out that he would not be able to explain the possibility of revival of ideas perceived in the past. This is so because of the constraints on his system imposed by his famous doctrine, *esse est percipi*. The purpose of this paper is twofold: The first task is to show how, given Berkeley's doctrine *esse est percipi*, memory becomes a vexing problem. The second is to show that it is possible for Berkeley to outline a model of memory without assuming that ideas of memory are identical with ideas perceived earlier.

JOHN LOCKE ON MEMORY

To understand Berkeley's position on memory better, an account of Locke's position on the subject provides a good starting point. This, we believe, would facilitate a better appreciation of the problem that Berkeley faces and help us articulate a way for him to tackle the issue. For Locke, the ideas of memory are a subclass of the ideas of retention. By retention, Locke means the keeping of simple ideas received from sensation or reflection. Ideas of retention are of two kinds: contemplation and memory. Contemplation is nothing other than retaining ideas before the mind after it has been perceived. This may roughly be characterized in contemporary terminology as 'working memory', i.e. the items that are currently available to the mind upon which it performs various operations.

Ideas of memory, on the other hand, are those ideas that we have perceived once but are not currently available for contemplation. In order to operate upon such ideas, they must be revived and Locke believes that they *can* be revived. The possibility of reviving ideas perceived earlier implies that the mind has the necessary resources for retaining them while not being aware of them. This suggests that the faculty of memory could be understood as a storehouse of ideas and that, in the act of remembering, one retrieves them for one's immediate awareness. This model, it should be noted, would allow for the existence of unperceived or unconscious ideas. However, within the Lockean framework, the storehouse view of memory would not be philosophically sound for the following two reasons. One: being mental entities, our ideas are unextended and

they do not occupy any space the way physical objects do. So, memory cannot be understood as a storehouse of ideas in the literal sense of the term. Two: the very being of ideas consists in their being perceived and hence cannot be stored anywhere.

Locke, therefore, offers the following account of memory. Memory, for him, is the *power* to revive ideas that we have either sensed or reflected upon. He writes:

> But our *Ideas* being nothing, but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be anything, when there is no perception of them, this *laying up* of our *Ideas* in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our *Ideas* are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is, an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were to paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, others more obscurely.[5]

This passage clearly states that Locke accepts that the very being of ideas consists in their being perceived. The ideas are actual perceptions in the mind. So, when these ideas are not being perceived, they are not actually in the mind. But in remembering, we revive the very same ideas that we had perceived earlier. Now the question is: how we can be sure that we have revived the very same ideas that we had perceived earlier. That is to say, Locke must specify the identity conditions for the ideas that were perceived and the ideas that are recollected. To say that the ideas that are being revived now are the same ideas that were perceived earlier, two conditions will have to be fulfilled—one, epistemic, and the other, ontological. The epistemic condition is that one should be able to identify the ideas revived as the ones that were perceived before. The ontological condition, on the other hand, requires that the ideas must continue to exist while they are not being perceived.

Locke seeks to satisfy the epistemic condition by claiming that the ideas revived are always accompanied by the added perception that we have had them before. He brings out this characteristic of the occurent ideas of memory in the context of his discussion on innate ideas. He says:

> If there be any innate *Ideas*, any *Ideas*, in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on; they must be lodg'd in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by Remembrance; i.e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before; without this, whatever *Idea* comes into mind is new, and not remembered: This consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that, which distinguishes Remembering from all other ways of Thinking. Whatever *Idea* was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever *Idea* is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an *Idea* without memory, the *Idea* appears perfectly new and unknown before to the Understanding: Whenever the memory brings the *Idea* into actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly Stranger to the mind... without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever *Idea* comes into the mind without consciousness is not remembered, or comes out of memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there.[6]

So it is clear that it is a subjective feeling that the idea had been perceived earlier that accompanies the ideas of remembrance, and that distinguishes the latter from other ideas. It is because of this feature that we are able to identify the ideas of remembrance as ideas perceived earlier.

Locke tries to satisfy the ontological condition for the identity between ideas of remembrance and the ideas of the past sensations, i.e. that ideas of sensations continue to exist while they are not being perceived, by characterizing memory as a *power* or an ability 'to revive Perceptions'. This means that though the ideas perceived earlier are not actually present in the mind, they could potentially exist in the mind. The question now is: how shall we understand the potentiality or the power of the mind to revive ideas? In Vere Chappell's opinion, this power or ability could be understood as 'a disposition to do or suffer certain things under certain conditions, which, once acquired, is kept and possessed even at times when it is not being manifested'.[7] Thus, the ideas that are 'laid aside out

of Sight' may be understood as dispositional concepts, and such dispositional concepts are distinct from occurent concepts that are the actual perceptions. According to him, the passage on memory from Book II of the *Essay* clearly suggests that ideas of memory, which are not currently available to consciousness, reside in the mind more or less permanently and that these ideas are distinct from actual perceptions. It may, however, be noted that in Locke's opinion, these ideas that reside in the memory cannot be called ideas in the strict sense. So, he construes these ideas as powers to revive actual perceptions that have been had before. His use of the terms 'ability' and 'power' thus brings him close to the modern philosophers' understanding of dispositional concepts.[8]

On the Lockean model, an idea of remembrance must invariably be a complex idea comprising two components—the idea of sensation, which occurred to the mind earlier; and the added perception that the mind has had it before. So what is recollected is not exactly the same idea, but a combination of the idea that occurred earlier and the tag that it was perceived before. The idea perceived before occurs as a component of the occurent memorial idea and, in this sense, there is continuity between the ideas of perception and ideas of remembrance.

The most crucial issue for Locke, as pointed out above, is that of ascribing identity to ideas of earlier sensation and that part of the ideas of remembrance which is taken to be a revived component. That is, the component of the memorial ideas that we revive must be the same idea that we had perceived earlier. But under what conditions do we say that the ideas we recollect are identical to the ideas we had perceived earlier? Do Locke's epistemic and ontological criteria satisfactorily account for the identity? The ontological criterion, which is supposed to provide continuity between ideas perceived earlier and the ideas of remembrance, is not conclusive because even if one assumes that the memorial ideas are retained as certain dispositions capable of being revived again, he cannot be certain that the same ideas are being revived in remembrance, in so far as dispositions are not available to our consciousness. On the contrary, the dispositions are posited in order to explain identity and we do not make such a postulation unless we believe

that the ideas of earlier sensations and the ideas of remembrance are identical. Therefore, Locke will have to look elsewhere to satisfactorily ascribe identity to these ideas.

Locke's strategy is to say that the ideas revived through memory come along with an added perception that they had occurred on earlier occasions. This satisfies the epistemic condition. However, it does not account for memory, but—as it will soon become clear—presupposes memory. First of all, Locke must specify where the added perception that they had occurred earlier comes from. For him, this perception seems to be a function of the faculty of reflection or internal perception that is continuously monitoring the contents that are presented to the mind. But how does this internal perception identify some ideas as the ones that had occurred earlier? One could answer that the internal scanning mechanism can identify some ideas as recollected because the ideas perceived and the ideas recollected are available to it. Thus, by comparing them, it can identify whether they are the same or not. That is to say, the faculty of reflection must specify the criteria in terms of resemblance between the occurent memory ideas and the ideas that were perceived earlier. The ideas we recollect would be identical with the ideas we had perceived earlier if, and only if, they resemble each other.

However, the above strategy fails to provide us with a criterion for the identity of recollected and perceived ideas. This is because resemblance by itself does not guarantee identity. More importantly, the explanation of identity between the ideas of remembrance and the ideas perceived earlier in terms of resemblance begs the question: one cannot say that the ideas one has recollected resemble the ideas one had perceived earlier unless one has memory of the same. Here, we hardly find an explanation for memory. On the contrary, this either presupposes memory for the internal scanning mechanism or it shifts the burden of explanation one level higher. Thus, Locke's model results in either circularity or infinite regress.

BERKELEY AND THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY

Locke sought to provide continuity to ideas between the moment of perception and the moment of remembrance by construing memory as a power to revive ideas. He granted the possibility of

their revival by conceiving that the ideas perceived earlier exist in the mind as a potentiality. However, Berkeley would not be able to identify memorial ideas[9] with the sensory ideas of the past. This is because the central doctrine of his system rules out the possibility of the existence of unperceived ideas, whose existence is a requirement for a model such as that of Locke. Berkeley's doctrine, *esse est percipi*, clearly requires, that for any idea to exist, it must be perceived all the time, either by the individual, other finite spirits or by God. Accordingly, we do not have any unperceived ideas. Ideas exist only as long as they are being perceived. The direct implication of this doctrine for the issue with which we are concerned here is that the ideas of memory cannot exist in us unless they are being perceived continuously. As there is no continuity of ideas between the moment of perception and the moment of remembrance, Berkeley cannot grant that the recollected ideas and the ideas perceived earlier are the same. Thus, we find that the Berkeleian framework does not offer any resources for retention of ideas when they are not continuously perceived.

It seems that this problem can be resolved if Berkeley can somehow grant continuity to ideas when the subjects do not perceive them. He conceives of the objects of perceptions as collections of ideas whose continuous existence is secured by the fact that other finite spirits or God perceives them while they are not perceived by us. But, can Berkeley grant continued existence to the ideas of memory through a strategy analogous to the one he adopts in the case of objects of perception? This strategy, however, does not seem to work in the case of ideas of memory.

According to Berkeley, the continuous perception by God or other minds bestows upon the objects of perception the required objectivity and continuity. But, does it make any sense to say that while we did not perceive the ideas, they were being perceived by God, thereby granting them continued existence to be revived later as memorial ideas? Let us assume that God continues to perceive our ideas while we do not perceive them. But the question is whether God perceives these ideas just as we had perceived them, or whether God's perception is different from the way we perceived them in the past. For instance, in order for us to remember the table in a room, we must have perceived it sometime back,

and now the same idea must come back to the mind. For this to be possible, during this interval, the ideas of the table should have continued to exist just as we perceived them earlier. If these ideas were to exist in the same way as we experienced them earlier, God must perceive them just as we perceived so that they may be brought back to our immediate awareness at the time of remembering them. This means that while we do not perceive the table, God sees the colour of the table, say brown; he will have tactual perceptions of the table, etc.

However, there is something odd in saying that God has sensory ideas such as those mentioned above and Berkeley concedes the oddity here: 'But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by senses as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident such a being as this can suffer nothing nor be affected, with any painful sensation or indeed any sensation at all'.[10] So let us assume that God perceives the idea of the table differently from the way we do. If the existence of the ideas consists in their being perceived, then it follows that God's perceiving the ideas differently from the way we are perceiving it would entail that what God perceives is different from what we perceive. This means that the ideas we remember are not the same as the ideas that God continued to perceive while we did not perceive them. Ideas of memory are subjective and it makes no sense to say that they are being continuously perceived by God or other finite spirits while not being perceived by us. So, even by invoking God or the finite spirits, it is not possible for Berkeley to grant continued existence to one's ideas of memory that are not immediately available to one's awareness.

The ideas of memory, being subjective, always carry with them a certain element of *perspective*, i.e. the point of view of the person who had experienced the event that is being remembered now. This element of perspective cannot be set aside, for without this perspective, the ideas of memory would lose all their particular characteristics. One might say that God perceives ideas from an objective point of view, whereas my perception of ideas is from a particular vantage point and, hence, perspectival. It might be argued further that when we do not perceive the object, God

perceives it from the same vantage point from which we had perceived it earlier. Being omniscient, God knows the perspective that every individual had in the past, has at present, and will have in future. If God knows each and every perspective of each and every individual for all times, then it follows that these perspectives are eternal, as there is no past or future for God. This would mean, then, that each idea that we perceived earlier exists in the mind of God as a possibility to be revived in our remembering. However, there is a difficulty with this strategy. That is, if the ideas that we perceived in the past are had by God eternally, then these ideas as ideas in God's mind would no longer be particulars. But Berkeley explicitly claims that all sensible ideas are particular ideas.

God's 'ideas of perception', as we have already noted, can neither be perspectival nor be particular, whereas our ideas are both. So the ideas we perceived earlier cannot be granted continuity by appealing to God's perception. Hence, for the revival of ideas perceived earlier in the act of remembering, the continued existence of ideas has to be accounted for from within the perspective of the remembering subject. But, from the point of view of the remembering subject, there is no way to secure the continued existence of these ideas except by continuous perception. Obviously, we do not continue to perceive the ideas that we perceived in the past. Therefore, from the point of view of the remembering subject, it cannot be said that the ideas perceived previously and the ideas recollected are the same. If Berkeley has to give a satisfactory account of memory, he must do so without positing that ideas are stored or retained to be recollected later.

TOWARDS A BERKELEIAN ACCOUNT OF MEMORY

The ideas of memory are generally taken to be about the past. Our focus right now is on the question: how are the ideas of memory related to the past? Locke's response to this question, as we saw, would be along the following lines: The ideas of memory are about the past because, in remembering an idea that we perceived earlier, we are reviving the very same idea that we had perceived earlier along with the added perception that we have had them before. Two things ensue from this reasoning. First, for Locke, memorial ideas are complex ideas. Second, in such a complex

idea, there is a component that is the same as the idea perceived earlier. On this account, the ideas of memory are about the past because there is a component in the ideas of remembrance that is identical to the ideas that we experienced in the past. Thus, the possibility of recollecting ideas perceived earlier implies that the mind possesses the necessary resources for retaining them while we are not being continuously aware of them.

Berkeley, we have noted, cannot grant the storage or retention of ideas not being perceived. The impossibility of storage or retention of ideas while they are not perceived clearly shows that our current ideas of memory and the ideas of past perception are distinct and different. However, without making any compromise on his overall philosophical framework, Berkeley can agree with Locke that memorial ideas are complex ideas. But he would not grant that in the memorial idea there is a component that is revived from an earlier experience. For him, the memorial ideas and the ideas of perception are distinct. There is no component, therefore, that is common between the ideas of sense and the memorial ideas. One of the components of Berkeley's complex memorial idea is the one that is derived from the senses which could be described as a faint, or less vivid and strong copy of ideas presented to the sense. The other component would be what Locke called 'the added perception' that we have had them before. In other words, one of the components of the memorial idea is an idea of reflection and the other a faint copy of the idea perceived earlier. The component, which is a faint copy of the idea that occurred in the past, is similar to the original sensory idea but not identical with it. It is both numerically and qualitatively distinct.

Despite the distinction between the memorial ideas and the ideas of perception, Berkeley maintains that ideas of memory do represent the ideas that were perceived on an earlier occasion. If the memorial ideas and the ideas perceived in the past are not identical, how do memorial ideas represent the past? The key to understanding Berkeley's theory of memory lies in explicating the notion of *representation* that would be acceptable to him.

The notion of representation presupposes that the idea that represents and the idea that is represented are numerically distinct and that they can exist apart from each other. Ideas as

representations are generally understood to be copies of what are represented. Accordingly, the ideas that are representational represent because they resemble the things that they represent. It seems that Berkeley too accounts for representation in terms of similarity or correspondence between ideas of perception and the representational ideas such as ideas of imagination and the ideas of memory. For example, while discussing imagination in the *Principles*, he says that ideas of imagination copy what they represent: 'those [ideas] excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent.'[11]

Though Berkeley would consider memorial ideas as copies of ideas presented by the senses, the account of the representative power of memorial ideas in terms of their resemblance or correspondence with the ideas of perception would run into difficulties. This point can be elucidated with the help of Berkeley's critique of the representational account of knowledge in the case of sensory perception.

With regard to the ideas of sensation, he clearly maintains that one cannot come to know of the correspondence between the ideas and the mind-independent objects that they are supposed to represent. In his opinion, if there is a correspondence, there are only two ways by which we can come to know of it: either through the senses or through reason. However, we never obtain a sensory idea of correspondence because the senses provide us only with ideas of sensory qualities that are currently being presented. Hence, the only other way would be to say that we come to know of the correspondence through reason.

Berkeley would not grant that reason is capable of providing us with knowledge of the correspondence between our ideas and what is represented. Reason proceeds from one thing to another only if there is a necessary relationship between them. In order to infer the existence of represented entities from the representing ideas, there must be a necessary relationship between these two. But Berkeley assumes that what is represented and what represents are distinct and that one can exist without the other. So, there is no necessary relationship between them. Consequently, it is possible for us to have the same ideas without there being something that

the idea represents. If there is no necessary connection between the representing ideas and what is represented, we cannot infer the existence of what is represented from the occurrence of ideas.[12]

Moreover, even if we grant that there are things apart from the representing ideas, we cannot know whether these ideas correspond to or resemble them. To know whether or not there is a resemblance between the representing ideas and their representata—which they are supposed to be copies of—one would require another vantage point, and for the adjudication of which yet another, and so on *ad infinitum*.[13] Thus, Berkeley rejects the representational theory of knowledge, i.e. the theory that our epistemic states correspond to or resemble what is represented.[14]

On the basis of the above discussion, it becomes doubtful whether Berkeley can consistently account for the representational function of memorial ideas in terms of either resemblance or correspondence between the memorial ideas and sensory ideas received in the past. This is to say, strictly speaking, Berkeley cannot grant that we identify some of our ideas as memory ideas because they resemble the ideas perceived in the past. To say that they resemble or correspond with each other, they both must be compared and this requires that they both are present to the mind simultaneously. But such comparisons are not possible at all because the ideas perceived in the past—like the so-called external objects which the ideas of sense are supposed to be representations of—are not available to us anymore. What are available to us are only the memorial ideas and not the ideas perceived in the past.

It might be argued that comparisons between the memorial ideas and the ideas of sense perceived earlier can be made whenever there is either spatial or temporal contiguity between them. This may be clarified with the example of an after image. Suppose we focus our attention on a peacock dancing before us. And in closing our eyes immediately, we focus our attention on the afterimage received thereof. This after image of a dancing peacock could be considered as a memorial image that is temporally contiguous with the sensory image of the dancing peacock. Now, it may be claimed that the sensory idea of a dancing peacock can be compared with its memorial image and it can be seen that they resemble each other, though 'they differ markedly in distinctiveness, strength and

liveliness'.[15] However, it is doubtful whether such a comparison is possible at all. What was perceived, namely, the idea of a dancing peacock, is no more before us and what is before us is only the after image. If such a comparison is not possible, it is not clear how the conclusion follows that the ideas of memory are less vivid and lively than the ideas presented by the senses.

What has been argued is that our ideas of memory cannot be compared with the past sensory ideas. However, this does not rule out the possibility of comparing one's memorial ideas with one's current ideas of perception. In such comparisons, both the sets of ideas are simultaneously available to the mind. The possibility of such a comparison implies that one can make judgements regarding the resemblance between current sensory ideas and memorial ideas. From this, we may conclude that the ideas of sensory perception are more lively and stronger than the ideas presented by memory. The possibility of comparing our current memorial ideas with our current ideas of perception may mislead one into thinking that our current memorial ideas can be compared with the ideas perceived in the past. What we argue here is that Berkeley would not grant such comparisons.

Since it is impossible to compare the current memorial ideas with the ideas of past perception, Berkeley cannot accept ideas of memory as being those corresponding to ideas perceived in the past in terms of their resemblance. Moreover, even if both the sets of ideas are available to us, to judge whether our ideas of memory correspond to the ideas that we perceived earlier requires us to have a vantage point from which we can adjudicate that the current ideas of memory and the ideas perceived earlier resemble each other. The ideas resulting from this vantage point must again correspond to our ideas of memory on the one hand and the ideas perceived earlier on the other. This can be known only if we assume another vantage point and so on *ad infinitum*. In addition, we may also note that judging that memory ideas correspond to ideas of the past result in circularity. This is because in order to make such a judgement, the ideas of the past must be available to one at the time of judgement and their availability would presuppose memory. Thus, the construal of memory ideas as corresponding to ideas perceived earlier cannot provide a viable account of memory.

According to Berkeley, some of our ideas are representational and what they represent are other ideas. But if he cannot grant correspondence between memory ideas and ideas perceived in the past, in what sense could an idea be said to represent another idea? We shall argue that a suggestion worth considering—which is also consistent with the Berkeleian position—is that some of our ideas are representational because they *stand for* some other ideas. There are passages in the *Principles* that suggest that Berkeley uses the notion of representation in the sense of 'standing for'. In paragraph § 12 of the 'Introduction' to the *Principles*, he writes: '... I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular becomes general by being made to represent or *stand for* all other particular ideas of the same sort.[16] Similarly, in paragraph §15 of the 'Introduction', he himself provides an example to show how a particular idea attains the status of a general or universal idea by being made to stand for all other particulars of the same kind: 'But only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense *universal*.'[17]

In the same way, Berkeley can grant that a particular idea can stand for another particular idea. With regard to the question as to how we perceive distance, Berkeley argues that ideas such as certain visual sensations suggest to the mind the notion of distance, which has no similarity or relation with distance or things placed at a distance. However, these sensible marks or ideas 'stand for' distance because experience has taught us so: 'But by a connection taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them [distance and the things placed at a distance] to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for.'[18] Thus it is clear that, for Berkeley, the relation 'standing for' does not require either correspondence or resemblance between what is represented and what represents. It should also be noted that though representation in the sense of standing for does not require either correspondence or resemblance, it also does not rule out the possibility that what is represented and what represents correspond to or resemble each other. The point is that correspondence or resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation in the sense of 'standing for'.

Berkeley characterizes memory ideas as 'barely representing those originally perceived'.[19] This characterization suggests two things. First, the memorial ideas are mere representations, unlike the ideas of perception which, for Berkeley, are not essentially representational. Second, the ideas recollected are representations of the ideas initially perceived rather than the same ideas being presented again. Consequently, memory does not 'revive' ideas experienced in the past, but provides us with new ideas. We may say that, within the Berkeleian framework, the ideas of memory represent ideas that were originally perceived because they *stand for* the ideas of the past. The account of representation in terms of 'standing for' may be viewed as a minimalist theory of representation, and such an account in the case of memorial ideas is necessary for Berkeley. Otherwise, he would not be able to explain the possibility of the knowledge of the past.

How does an idea acquire its representative function? In other words, how does an idea come to stand for another idea? One could consider at least three possible ways in which an idea may be said to stand for another idea. First, an idea may stand for another because it is causally connected with whatever it represents. Locke, for example, believes that an idea represents because it has been caused by something that exists without the mind. An idea represents that which causes it. This may be clarified as follows: our visual experience of a tree is said to represent a tree because the tree that exists in the world caused our idea of the tree. This account is characterized as 'extenal-causal' account of the representative function of ideas.[20] Second, certain conventions that we adopt specify what idea would stand for what other ideas. That is to say, we stipulate that a certain idea stands for certain other ideas, in the way green light at a traffic point signifies the permission to move forward. Third, because of the consistency in the order and regularity of the ideas, the human mind may associate a certain idea with certain other ideas. For example, the dark clouds we see on the sky signify imminent rain.

However, within the Berkeleian framework, it must be noted that these three way in which a set of ideas stands for another set are not useful in characterizing how ideas of memory stand for ideas perceived in the past. An idea cannot stand for another idea

because the latter is not something that is causally related to the former. This is because, for Berkeley, the ideas are inert and causally inefficacious. An idea can be caused only by an active spirit and not by another idea.[21] Similarly, our ideas of memory do not stand for the ideas we perceived earlier because of conventions that we have adopted with respect to our ideas. Nor is it because of a constant conjunction that we have observed in the case of ideas perceived earlier and the ideas of memory. We do not have any ideas of such conjunctions. Moreover, if such conjunctions were to be possible, we should already have possessed ideas of the past, which would presuppose memory.

Since none of these avenues succeed in satisfactorily explaining how ideas of memory represent the past, what other option remains for Berkeley to explain how the ideas of memory stand for the ideas of the past? Apart from the extenal-causal account mentioned above, there seems to be another theory of representation in Locke, which is consistent with the Berkeleian position. According to this account, the representative function of an idea is imposed upon it by the mind to which the idea belongs. Ideas exist only in the mind of the perceiver and an idea represents another because the mind in which it exists refers or intends that idea to stand for an idea other than itself. This internalist account may be characterized as the 'mental-referential' account of representation.[22]

We may, however, note that even if this account is accepted to explain the representational function of the memorial ideas, there must be something about those ideas that stand for other ideas which prompts the mind to take the former to be referring to the latter. One way Berkeley could explain this mental-referential feature of the representational ideas is as follows: he could argue that the human mind has several faculties such as sensory perception, reflection, imagination, memory, etc., that are the sources of ideas. Each of these faculties produces these ideas with a stamp of their own. That is, each idea bears a mark as to which faculty has been responsible for the production of it. For example, if an idea is generated by sensory perception, it comes with the stamp, 'I see it' or 'I hear it', etc., depending upon what sense was active while we perceived the idea. The faculty of memory could be said to be subservient to other faculties in the sense that we can remember

Berkeley characterizes memory ideas as 'barely representing those originally perceived'.[19] This characterization suggests two things. First, the memorial ideas are mere representations, unlike the ideas of perception which, for Berkeley, are not essentially representational. Second, the ideas recollected are representations of the ideas initially perceived rather than the same ideas being presented again. Consequently, memory does not 'revive' ideas experienced in the past, but provides us with new ideas. We may say that, within the Berkeleian framework, the ideas of memory represent ideas that were originally perceived because they *stand for* the ideas of the past. The account of representation in terms of 'standing for' may be viewed as a minimalist theory of representation, and such an account in the case of memorial ideas is necessary for Berkeley. Otherwise, he would not be able to explain the possibility of the knowledge of the past.

How does an idea acquire its representative function? In other words, how does an idea come to stand for another idea? One could consider at least three possible ways in which an idea may be said to stand for another idea. First, an idea may stand for another because it is causally connected with whatever it represents. Locke, for example, believes that an idea represents because it has been caused by something that exists without the mind. An idea represents that which causes it. This may be clarified as follows: our visual experience of a tree is said to represent a tree because the tree that exists in the world caused our idea of the tree. This account is characterized as 'extenal-causal' account of the representative function of ideas.[20] Second, certain conventions that we adopt specify what idea would stand for what other ideas. That is to say, we stipulate that a certain idea stands for certain other ideas, in the way green light at a traffic point signifies the permission to move forward. Third, because of the consistency in the order and regularity of the ideas, the human mind may associate a certain idea with certain other ideas. For example, the dark clouds we see on the sky signify imminent rain.

However, within the Berkeleian framework, it must be noted that these three way in which a set of ideas stands for another set are not useful in characterizing how ideas of memory stand for ideas perceived in the past. An idea cannot stand for another idea

because the latter is not something that is causally related to the former. This is because, for Berkeley, the ideas are inert and causally inefficacious. An idea can be caused only by an active spirit and not by another idea.[21] Similarly, our ideas of memory do not stand for the ideas we perceived earlier because of conventions that we have adopted with respect to our ideas. Nor is it because of a constant conjunction that we have observed in the case of ideas perceived earlier and the ideas of memory. We do not have any ideas of such conjunctions. Moreover, if such conjunctions were to be possible, we should already have possessed ideas of the past, which would presuppose memory.

Since none of these avenues succeed in satisfactorily explaining how ideas of memory represent the past, what other option remains for Berkeley to explain how the ideas of memory stand for the ideas of the past? Apart from the extenal-causal account mentioned above, there seems to be another theory of representation in Locke, which is consistent with the Berkeleian position. According to this account, the representative function of an idea is imposed upon it by the mind to which the idea belongs. Ideas exist only in the mind of the perceiver and an idea represents another because the mind in which it exists refers or intends that idea to stand for an idea other than itself. This internalist account may be characterized as the 'mental-referential' account of representation.[22]

We may, however, note that even if this account is accepted to explain the representational function of the memorial ideas, there must be something about those ideas that stand for other ideas which prompts the mind to take the former to be referring to the latter. One way Berkeley could explain this mental-referential feature of the representational ideas is as follows: he could argue that the human mind has several faculties such as sensory perception, reflection, imagination, memory, etc., that are the sources of ideas. Each of these faculties produces these ideas with a stamp of their own. That is, each idea bears a mark as to which faculty has been responsible for the production of it. For example, if an idea is generated by sensory perception, it comes with the stamp, 'I see it' or 'I hear it', etc., depending upon what sense was active while we perceived the idea. The faculty of memory could be said to be subservient to other faculties in the sense that we can remember

only what we have perceived, imagined, willed, thought, etc. In other words, memory pertains to past activities of the mind. But, what ensures that the ideas that my current memory ideas stand for really occurred in the past?

Berkeley could answer by saying that the memorial ideas that are representational are considered by the mind as labels or marks for ideas that we have perceived in the past. The mind considers them as marks for the ideas that have been perceived earlier because God has ordained our ideas of memory to stand for ideas perceived earlier. Thus, among the various faculties, the faculty of memory is very special in the sense that it is designed to produce ideas that always stand for ideas produced by other faculties. Hence, ideas of memory are natural signs of their representata, namely, the ideas that occurred in the past. On the presentation of the memorial ideas, the mind would be led—without our being aware of it—from the memorial idea it perceives to the ideas of the past that once occurred. So, the question why ideas of memory represent the ideas perceived earlier can be answered by invoking a sort of pre-established harmony.[23] This means that memory, like perception, is a basic form of knowledge for which an absolutely non-circular justification is impossible.

This answer, however, would imply that the faculty of memory is infallible. Whatever our memory presents us with we should accept without questioning or doubting it. But we do doubt and question the veracity of the pronouncements of memory, as it often happens that we seek confirmation from various sources about the occurrence of a certain event. This is because of the possibility that we might think that an idea was produced in the mind sometime back when, in fact, no such idea was produced. The onus, therefore, would be on Berkeley to explain how we still go wrong in our recollections.

This question could be answered in the following manner. There cannot be any error in the ideas that are produced by each of these faculties. Their function is only to produce ideas and nothing else. An idea in itself is neither true nor false in the strict sense. An error could arise only when we make a judgement as to what is the case based on the ideas presented. Memory errors, we may say, consist in the wrong identification of the source of ideas: the

ideas of imagination are wrongly identified as ideas of memory. The correct identification of the various sources of ideas presupposes, on the one hand, the existence of various faculties that produce ideas, and, on the other, the faculty of reflection that monitors the operations of these faculties. Memory errors could be understood as resulting from a misperception or misjudgement of the source of ideas by this internal scanning mechanism. Thus, memory ideas are reliable but not infallible indicators of the ideas perceived earlier.

THE IDEAS OF MEMORY AND THE IDEAS OF IMAGINATION

This brings us to the problem of distinguishing between the ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination. In the passage quoted at the beginning of the paper, we find that Berkeley does not clearly distinguish between memory and imagination. Rather, he seems to club them. So we may ask if there is, for Berkeley, a way in which the ideas of imagination can be conclusively distinguished from the ideas of memory. For, in the absence of such a distinction, it would be impossible to justify claims regarding the past.

The distinction between the ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination would have been easy had they possessed two totally different set of features. However, this does not seem to be the case in the sense that we find that there is a good amount of overlap of their features. For Berkeley, ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination are undoubtedly alike in at least two respects. One, ideas of both memory and imagination presuppose that some ideas were perceived earlier through the external senses or through the internal sense. Thus, any talk of imagination or memory makes no sense if the ideas were not perceived in the past. Two, since the ideas of imagination and memory are related to the ideas perceived earlier, both of them seem to represent the ideas originally perceived. Ideas of both imagination and memory are mere representations unlike ideas of sensory perception. That the ideas of imagination and ideas of memory share the above-mentioned features seems to suggest that they are not exclusive of one another. If they are not exclusive of each other, then it would imply one of the following three possibilities: one, that the ideas of memory are a subclass of the ideas of imagination; two, that the

ideas of imagination form a subclass of the ideas of memory, and; three, though neither of them is a subclass of the other, there is an intersection between the two classes, which means that some ideas are common to both. In what follows, we shall argue that Berkeley would not accept any of these three possibilities and that, for him, ideas of memory and ideas of imagination are mutually exclusive.

Let us examine whether the first possibility—according to which the ideas of memory are a subclass of the ideas of imagination—would be acceptable to Berkeley. For him, ideas of imagination are dependent upon the will. That is to say, we can excite ideas in our minds at pleasure, obliterate them, and make way for others as and when we wish to.[24] From this point of view, the ideas of imagination are completely dependent on the will in the sense that the agent's volitions are both necessary and sufficient for their occurrence. He says 'they [the ideas formed by imagination] have ... an entire dependence on the will'.[25] This is a feature whereby Berkeley distinguishes the ideas of imagination from the ideas of sense. In addition to this, he argues that the ideas excited by the will are 'faint, weak, unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense', whereas ideas provided by sense 'have more *reality* in them than the former: by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them'.[26] If memory ideas are a species of the genus ideas of imagination, they would possess all the intrinsic properties of the ideas of imagination. Like the ideas of imagination, the memorial ideas too should be faint, less vivid and less strong than the ideas of sense. Similarly, they must be less regular, orderly and coherent. Memorial ideas too must be excited at the will of the agent.

Even though the ideas of memory are faint, less vivid and less strong, certain other features characteristic of the ideas of imagination cannot be attributed to them. This is so because the memorial ideas must be as coherent and orderly as the ideas of sense, because if they fail to be so, then they would cease to be memorial ideas because one of the important features of the memorial ideas is that they are true. Moreover, we cannot say that the memorial ideas are always excited by the will of the agent. The

dependence on the will of the agent is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the ideas of memory. So the memorial ideas cannot be considered as a subclass of the ideas of imagination.

Now let us consider the converse claim that the ideas of imagination are a subclass of the ideas of memory. This claim would be plausible only if all the features that the memorial ideas possess are present in the ideas of imagination as well. One of the important intrinsic features of the ideas of memory is that they have a certain measure of *deja vu* element, what Locke called the 'additional Perception' that one has had this idea before. Now we must note that this additional perception or *deja vu* feature is present in the ideas of imagination as well, though not to the same extent as it is present in the memorial ideas. Similar to the ideas of imagination, the ideas of memory are faint, less vivid and less strong than the ideas of sense. However, there is a major difference between the ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination in the sense that the ideas of memory possess two important features, namely, adequacy and truth, whereas the ideas of imagination may not do so.

By adequacy of the ideas of memory, we mean that they conform to the ideas we have perceived earlier. The ideas of memory are adequate in the sense that they perfectly represent those ideas of perception or reflection. Such ideas are supposed to be taken from the ideas of perception or reflection, which the mind intends them to stand for or refer to. They conform with the ideas perceived earlier. That is, they preserve the same order, and regularity. Ideas of imagination, on the other hand, need not have such conformity with the ideas that they stand for. They are less adequate in the sense that they are only partial and incomplete representations of the ideas perceived earlier. Still, they are representations of the ideas of sense or reflection because the raw materials for such ideas are derived from the ideas of sense or reflection originally presented. Though such ideas stand for ideas perceived earlier, they are not perfect representations because the objects which they represent do not exist or did not exist the way the ideas of imagination present them to us.

Ideas of memory are true if and only if the simple and complex ideas they represent actually occurred to us the way they are rep-

resented to us in memory. Strictly speaking, truth and falsity are exclusive characteristics of propositions or judgements. However, we often speak of truth or falsity of ideas in a very loose sense, wherein an idea is true if the thing it stands for is real, and in case such a thing is unreal, the idea is false. By truth and falsity of ideas, we mean here the truth and falsity of propositions as well as the truth and falsity of ideas in the loose sense of the term. This is so because memorial ideas may convey a proposition regarding the past or it may refer to an idea of sense that occurred in the past. In order to consider an idea as a memory idea, what it represents must have actually occurred the way memory presents it to us. So memory makes truth claims about the past. Thus, the function of memory is to represent or stand for ideas that actually occurred in the past and to represent the way it occurred in the past. But the same cannot be attributed to the ideas of imagination. What is represented by the complex idea of imagination need not have occurred the way imagination presents them to us and, hence, they may not be true. As such, the ideas of memory could be appropriately characterized as adequate and true whereas the ideas of imagination are less adequate and may not be true. Adequacy and truth may be considered as the essential features of the ideas of memory, but they are not essential to the ideas of imagination. So we cannot say that ideas of imagination constitute a subclass of the ideas of memory.

The kind of truth claims that we make with respect to the ideas of memory cannot be made in the case of ideas of imagination because the main function of the faculty of imagination, according to Berkeley, is either to compound or divide ideas. While talking about abstract ideas, Berkeley rejects a separate faculty for the production of abstract ideas. All that we have, he claims, is the faculty of imagination whose function it is to compound, divide and dissect ideas.[27] Abstraction is basically an attempt to consider or conceive one quality of a given object apart from its other qualities and it is done by the faculty of imagination.[28] So, all we arrive at through dividing or dissecting ideas is not an abstract idea as we generally understand it, but a particular quality isolated from others. Thus, it is clear that the function of imagination is basically to divide or compound ideas already perceived either through the

external senses or through the internal senses, and thereby to make new ideas. Imagination is concerned primarily with complex ideas in the sense that it either produces a complex idea from the simple or complex ideas already perceived, or cuts up a complex idea into simples or less complex ones. Hence, adequacy and truth cannot be the essential features of the ideas of imagination.

Undoubtedly, the ideas of imagination are dependent upon memory. The faculty of imagination receives its inputs from the faculty of memory and without these raw materials provided by the latter, it would not be possible to imagine anything. Clearly, those complex ideas and the simple ones—if there are any—that imagination receives from the faculty of memory would have the features of truth and adequacy. But these features cannot be attributed to those ideas that imagination creates by combining or dividing the ideas it receives from the faculty of memory.

Both ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination are essentially representational, unlike the ideas of senses. As ideas of representation, they stand for ideas other than themselves. However, of all the representational ideas that we have, memorial ideas possess the features of truth and adequacy essentially whereas the ideas of imagination do not. This, then, is the major difference between the ideas of imagination and the ideas of memory. This shows that ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination are exclusive of each other and that there are no common elements that both classes in their entirety share. The fact that there is a criterion to distinguish between the ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination shows that it would be possible for us to claim knowledge about the past.

MEMORY AS INDIRECT PERCEPTION

We saw that both ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination are representational and that, of these two, only the ideas of memory possess the features of adequacy and truth essentially. If adequacy and truth are not essential features of the ideas of imagination, then why do we consider them as representational ideas? An answer to this question would depend upon how we understand the representative function of ideas. There are two ways of talking about their representative function. We can think of representa-

tion either in relational terms or in non-relational terms. On the non-relational account of representation, the representational capacity of an idea would be an intrinsic property that some of our ideas possess solely in virtue of the fact that they belong to a mind. When we say that the fantastical idea of Santa Claus represents something, we conceive representation in the non-relational sense. Accordingly, we might say that the idea of Santa Claus represents something other than itself but that this something does not exist. It makes no sense to speak of adequacy and truth of representation when we consider representational ideas in non-relational terms. On the relational account of representation, on the other hand, whether an idea represents or not depends on the existence of things other than itself. An idea represents if and only if what it represents exists and ceases to be a representation when the thing it stands for passes out of existence. On this account, the ideas of imagination are not representational because there is nothing for them to represent. That is to say, a fantastical idea like that of Santa Claus does not represent anything because Santa Claus does not exist. The representational ideas possess adequacy and truth only when they are considered in relational terms.

Since the representative function of the ideas of memory is understood in relational terms, they must possess truth and adequacy. That is to say, if we remember seeing the Eiffel Tower then we must have seen the Eiffel Tower sometime in the past just as we remember it now. If the pronouncements of memory are true, then the ideas of memory standing for the ideas experienced in the past would presuppose the existence of the latter. The ideas of past, which the memorial ideas stand for, do not exist anymore as they are no more being perceived. If we grant that the past ideas exist, it would mean that they exist unperceived, a possibility that goes against the Berkeleian framework. This objection rests, we believe, on the mistaken assumption that Berkeley grants only direct perception. It is true that the scope of his doctrine, *esse est percipi,* is limited to sensible things, and as far as sensible things are concerned, their existence consists in their being perceived. And the acceptance of *esse est percipi* would make him commit to direct perception. The doctrine, *esse est percipi* and the consequent notion of immediate perception are true only in the case of sensible objects.

However, for Berkeley, sensible things do not exhaust all that exists. In addition to the sensible things, he grants existence to God and finite souls that are not perceived through our senses. Since God and soul are not sensible things, the doctrine, to be is to be perceived, does not apply in such cases. God and the finite spirits being active agents, their existence consists in either thinking or perceiving. But God or finite spirits are not perceived immediately. We come to know of the existence of God and soul, according to Berkeley, through mediate perception. Berkeley argues that in reading a book that deals with God, virtue, etc., we do not immediately perceive the notions of God and virtue. What we immediately perceive are the letters. These letters suggest to us notions of God, virtue, and truth. The letters are sensible things whereas the notions of God, virtue and truth are not. They are just signified by certain marks that are letters. These sensible marks suggest to the mind certain notions because they have an arbitrary connection with them.[29]

Ideas that occurred to us in the past do not exist right now; therefore, we cannot perceive them directly. Our memory ideas are the ones that we directly perceive and these ideas occur to us in the present. However, these ideas can stand for ideas perceived earlier. This means we perceive the past only indirectly, that is by perceiving the memory ideas that stand for the ideas perceived earlier. The truth claims of memory require that the ideas perceived earlier that our present ideas of memory stand for somehow exist. But we cannot directly perceive the past. If that is so, then in what sense can we say that the ideas of the past exist? Ideas that we once perceived were sensory ideas and their being consisted in their being perceived, and as sensory ideas they were directly perceived. However, there seems to be some inconsistency in saying that some sensory ideas exist that are not directly being perceived.

The apparent inconsistency is the result of the attempt to read Berkeley as a consistent subjective idealist. Within the framework of subjective idealism, the objects of perception are directly perceived and if they are not perceived they cease to exist. Accordingly, we cannot grant identity to ideas perceived at two different times. And we also cannot have knowledge of the past as we no more perceive the ideas that occurred to us in the past. So, the difficulty with the subjective idealist position is that it can neither grant

knowledge of the past nor can it give identity to objects across two temporal segments between which one does not perceive anything.

Berkeley, however, has a way out of this difficulty. He could argue that the ideas that we perceived earlier exist, thereby making claims of our memory true because, even though we do not perceive them, God, who does not have time past, time present and time future, perceives them continuously. So, the ideas that we perceived earlier exists and our memory ideas can stand for them.[30] Thus, our knowledge of the past is through memory that is a sort of indirect perception. Even though, for God, and for us as perceiving subjects, there is no indirect perception of sensible objects, in the case of memory we have only indirect perception. That is, we know of the past because the memory ideas that occur to us now stand for the ideas that occurred in the past, and which are being continuously perceived by God.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing sections, we saw that Berkeley's commitment to the doctrine, *esse est percipi*, does not allow him to grant existence to unperceived ideas. As a consequence, it is impossible to construe memory as a storehouse of ideas perceived previously. Given this constraint, one cannot establish the identity of ideas perceived earlier with the ideas remembered. So, within Berkeley's framework, each memory experience is new and this experience is distinct and independent of the ideas of perception that occurred earlier. Hence, there is no question of reviving the earlier perceptual experience in memory.

Though there is no identity between ideas perceived earlier and the ideas remembered, it is possible for Berkeley to offer an alternative model for the representational power of memory ideas. This model considers memory ideas as 'standing for' ideas perceived in the past. However, this relationship of standing for would make sense only if the reality and objectivity of the past is granted. In Berkeley's case, the past could acquire reality not because the remembering subject perceives it, but because God continues to perceive the ideas that occurred to the subject in the past. Thus, the things that my memory experience stands for are not certain other experiences with characteristic phenomenological features

of their own, but certain facts such as 'I had the experience of a pin pricking my thumb'. Since the ideas we perceived in the past are not available to us anymore, we cannot immediately perceive the past. Because the memory ideas stand for ideas we perceived earlier, by immediate perception of these memory ideas, we are able to perceive the past that is no more present. Thus, the perception of the past through memory is a mode of indirect perception in the sense that our present memory ideas stand for ideas perceived in the past. However, it would be difficult for Berkeley to explain how our memory ideas stand for ideas perceived previously. He can only say that memory is so constituted that its pronouncements are designed to represent or stand for ideas of the past. It further means that memory knowledge is so basic that it cannot have a non-circular justification.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. An earlier version of this paper was submitted to the Colin and Ailsa Turbayne International Berkeley Prize 2004, organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, New York. The comments of the judges have been of immense help in revising the paper.

   All references to Berkeley's writings are to the following: *The Works of George Berkeley*, Vols. I & II. Edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1949. For individual works, the following abbreviations have been used: PHK = *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, DHP = *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, PC = *Philosophical Commentaries*. Citations from PHK are provided with paragraph numbers, for DHP the page numbers from Vol. II and for PC the entry number.

   All references to John Locke's writings are to *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (hereafter E). Edited by Peter Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Specific citations are provided with the numbers of Book, Chapter, Section and then the page number. Thus, a reference to *Essay*, Book IV, Chapter iv, section 4, page number 563 is provided as E IV.iv. 4: 563.

2. This acknowledgement clearly indicates that Berkeley's concern is confined to 'personal memory'. He does not seem to extend the use of the term to cover types of memory such as skill-memory and factual memory. Therefore, in this paper, we are concerned only with personal memory and its possibility with the Berkeleian framework. Even factual memory, for him, would be reducible to a sort of personal memory.

3. PHK § 1.
4. DHP, Vol. II, 203–4.
5. E II.x.2: 150.
6. E I.iv.20: 96–97.
7. 'Locke's Theory of Ideas' in Vere Chappell, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 46.
8. Vere Chappell acknowledges that the modern philosophers' use of the term 'dispositional concepts' is wider and covers a larger domain than what Locke seems to allow. Locke mentions only the power of the mind to produce actual perceptions. That is to say, the ability to bring back a visual image before one's consciousness whereas a modern philosopher uses dispositional concepts to signify both 'verbal and perceptual capacities'. However, there are passages in Locke's *Essay* that seem to suggest that he too assigns different functions to ideas stored in the memory. See Chappell ibid., p. 47.
9. The term 'memorial idea' is used to refer to the occurent ideas of memory. In fact, unlike Locke for whom there are occurent ideas as well as potential ideas that are unperceived ideas, Berkeley can grant only occurent ideas.
10. DHP, Vol. II, 241.
11. PHK § 33.
12. PHK § 18.
13. PHK § 8.
14. In the *Philosophical Commentaries*, Berkeley writes: 'Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compared.' PC § 377.
15. This objection was raised by one of the anonymous referees of the Colin and Ailsa Turbayne Prize.
16. Emphasis added.
17. Emphasis as in the original.
18. PHK § 43.
19. PHK § 1.
20. See Chappell, op. cit., pp. 52–53.
21. PHK § 26.
22. Cf. Chappell, pp. 52–53.
23. This might seem too speculative for an empiricist. However, this speculative aspect is noted by scholars like Holland who writes: 'On Empiricist interpretation of what recollecting involves, its presence, or the presence of something like it is a sheer metaphysical necessity. It is an indispensable part of the machinery by which it is conveyed to us our knowledge of the past.' R.F. Holland, 'The Empiricist Theory of Memory' *Mind* 63 (1954): 464–86.

24. PHL § 28.
25. 3D 235. On this issue, i.e. whether ideas of imagination are dependent on the will for their production, there seems to be a significant difference between the views found in the *Principles* and the *Dialogues*. In the *Principles*, he writes: 'The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, coherence and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of the human wills *often* are, but in regular train or series...' § 28 (emphasis added). This passage seems to imply that dependence on the will is not a necessary condition for the production of the ideas of imagination. In the *Dialogues*, on the other hand, Berkeley adopts the view that the ideas of imagination have an 'entire' dependence on the will. We, in the present paper, adopt the position that is made available in *the Dialogues* for it is a later work. This perhaps presents Berkeley's considered opinion on the issue. We are thankful to one of the anonymous referees for bringing the differences between these passages to our attention.
26. PHK § 36.
27. PHK § 10.
28. PHK § 10.
29. Though, in the *Dialogues*, it is Hylas who says that the sensible marks have an arbitrary connection with the notions they stand for, this view is in perfect agreement with that of Berkeley. DHP, p. 174.
30. The objection that we have raised earlier against the God perceiving particulars is equally applicable here. My ideas of memory are particular ideas and the ideas that I perceived in the past are also particulars. If these ideas are being perceived by God continuously to secure their existence, they would lose all their particularity and as result what we perceived and what God perceives would be different. This would mean that our memory ideas stand for something we did not perceive. The consequence of this position is that we cannot know the past.

Thinking with Causality about 'Causality': Reflections on a 'concept' determining all Thought about Action and Knowledge

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If 'causality' is what it is thought to be, how can one 'think' about it? And, if one can think about it, it would not be what it has been thought to be.

'Thinking' is an 'activity' and if so, it must have a 'cause', and if it has a 'cause' then, on the usual understanding of 'causality', it could not be different from what it is. But if it could not be different from what it is, how could it be 'thinking'?

'Thinking', of course, may have, and generally does have, something *precedent* to it, but one need not necessarily be 'thinking' before this 'act' of thinking. In either case, whether thinking is preceded by some other 'act' of thinking or by something else, it need not necessarily be considered as having 'caused' it. To be an 'antecedent' to something is not to be the 'cause' of it. This has been known to be a fallacy, but it has seldom been reflected upon to find why it is a fallacy. 'Post hoc, ergo propter hoc', one reads it in old textbooks on Inductive Logic, but why, something to be considered a 'cause', should *precede* that of which it is said to be a cause? If one insists on this requirement, one would have to accept, however reluctantly, the extreme Buddhist position that there can be no such thing as a 'thing' to be studied or known as it cannot last for any length of time, each 'moment' being preceded and succeeded by some other moment.

The Buddhist, of course, assumed that the notion of 'moment' was intelligible. He could be excused for this, but not so the modern thinker, including the scientist, who may reasonably be expected to know the problems raised by the possibility of 'infinite divisibility' and the idea of a 'continuum', so common-place in modern

mathematics. The empirical scientist may not worry about this, just as the ordinary man does not, and the physicist may talk of the empirical fact that physical reality or matter consists in a 'quantized' form and that we can only accept it and say that it just happens to be so, and that he can do nothing about it.

But once the 'facticity' of anything is accepted in the sense of something 'given' in human experience, even if it does not fulfil the demand of 'rational intelligibility' as man encounters it in himself, the two would be seen in a different relationship than has been the case up till now.

In a sense, man had to satisfy himself with this in the realm of 'moral intelligibility' long ago, though even there he had to struggle with the problem of 'causality'. The distinction between the 'good' and the 'bad', like the distinction between the 'true' and the 'false' or between 'rational' and 'irrational', or between 'intelligible' and 'unintelligible' is as much a 'given' to human consciousness as any other. The 'given', therefore, is not of just one sort, or of one type, and not only this, it may even 'change' as one's experience changes.

'Causality' is no exception to this, and the 'demand' for intelligibility in 'causal terms' is only a 'demand' like other demands, which may either be fulfilled or not. The attempt to save it at all costs by treating it as an *a priori* constituent condition of 'understandability' as in Kant, or as a necessary methodological precondition of engaging in any cognitive inquiry or research would mean giving up the empirical–experiential foundation of the claim of knowledge to be 'scientific' in the most radical sense of the term. This is not a return to Humean scepticism, either overt or disguised, as it does not deny the possibility of finding an actual relation between a certain class of events which may be 'causal' in nature. It only says that it is not necessary that such a relation be always found, or that it is a necessary condition for the 'understandability' or 'intelligibility' of the event or events concerned. 'Causal relation', in other words, is as contingent as any other empirical relation, and thus may factually obtain or not as the case may be.

The attempt to articulate the 'necessity' supposed to be involved in the notion of 'causality' through its translation into the logical relations of 'implication' and 'equivalence' between propositions designating 'facts' is doubly deceptive as, literally, there is no relation

between the 'facts' supposed to be designated by 'sentence-variables', but only a spurious 'logical' relation which itself is a function of two independent variables, verbally designated by the terms 'truth-value' and 'truth operator'. The former is generally supposed to consist of 'true' and 'false' symbolized by 'T' and 'F', but this, though generally found in all text books, is systematically misleading as there is nothing in the notion to confine it to two values only, nor to what generally is understood by the terms 'truth' and 'falsity' in the semantic sense of the terms, except the requirement of total exclusion of each by the other, that is, if one obtains the 'other' cannot, by definition, obtain in principle.

The same is the case with the notion of 'truth operator' which is also called 'logical operator' or 'logical connective' or 'truth-functional operator'. Its distinctive character is that it is the result of a pure definition whose utter arbitrariness is masked by two deliberate attempts at camouflage to hide the covert maneuverings so that one may be totally lulled into a semi-hypnotic state where one may not raise any questions or entertain doubt about what is being done. The first step in this exercise is to admit the notion of a 'non-logical' sentential connective or operator, thus indirectly legitimizing the idea of a 'logical operator'. The second step is to arbitrarily prohibit any appeal to the actual 'use' of these so-called logical connectives in everyday discourse, thus rendering the whole exercise 'non-empirical *ab initio*'. The third, and the last step in this exercise is to turn around and say 'we are not really talking about the relations "if, then" or "either or" or "it is not the case that" or "and", but only of that which is conveyed by arbitrarily invented symbols such as the horse-shoe (⊃), or Vedge (V), or curve (~) or dot (.)'. One may, of course, use any other symbol, just as one may, if one so likes, and also do the same in respect of 'T' and 'F' as there is nothing sacrosanct about it.

The so-called 'truth-table' is a direct result of these two basic notions, i.e., of the 'truth-value' and the 'truth–operator'. But the usual 'Truth-Table' given in the textbooks not only has nothing to do with 'truth' or 'falsity' in the usual sense of the term, but also usually does not mention the fact that it not only confines itself to a 'two-valued' logic, but to a dyadic logical operator only, meaning thereby that not only it is concerned with only 'T' and 'F'

symbolized also as 'I' and 'O' when there is no intrinsic reason in the system to confine it to these only, but also to permit only those connectives which minimally require two sentences to hold between. But just as there can be a logic with any number of 'truth-values', so also there can be an 'n-adic' logic which may minimally require any number of sentences, just as one can have a truth-functional logic with a 'monadic-operator' only.

The purely formal relations exemplified in the 'Truth-Table' of the modern logician are, therefore, of little help in understanding the notion of 'causality', even though it too is formulated in 'if, then' terms, or 'if this, then this'. Kant was misled when he treated the 'cause-effect' relational category as a correlate of the hypothetical judgement in his table of judgements. Not just this, he even forgot that the hypothetical judgment cannot give us the 'cause-effect' relationship in its strict sense as it leaves open the possibility of the 'plurality of causes' which the usual understandings of the notion does not accept. But even the stricter modern formulation as 'if and only if' suffers from the same problem, as the weaker formulation 'if, then', for it is the empirically vacuous 'Truth-Table' which defines both in modern logic.

The 'ghosts' of 'necessity' and 'universality' that have troubled thinking about the notion of 'causality' may, thus, be finally laid to rest by the realization that they are a superimposition on 'experience' by logic in its 'purity' and 'formality'; the two characteristics which have nothing to do with it. And, once one 'sees' this, one also sees that the so-called 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions are as irrelevant and misleading, if they are considered as analogous to the formal conditions, or only another name for them.

In fact, neither the requirement of 'necessity' or 'universality', or of, what are called 'sufficient' and 'necessary' conditions seem to have been closely analyzed, though they have been with us for so long that it is difficult to imagine any discussion of causality without them. The two sets that define the two dimensions of the discussion are so different that they need to be separately considered on their own, though one may wonder 'how' or 'why' the two have been brought together in any discussion of this most enigmatic concept in the history of thought that has been bequeathed to us from ancient times.

The term 'necessity' or 'necessary'—though used in both the sets, for example—means entirely different things. 'Necessity' can only be something 'ontological', something *a priori*, something 'non-empirical' as it is never found in human experience which is shot through and through with 'contingency' and 'chance'. Today, even mathematics and logic have disowned it, as the contingency of the postulated conditionality of 'if' in the standard exemplification of it as 'if, then' is openly admitted by everybody. Whether the 'if' obtains or not is a contingent fact, and the so-called 'necessity' of the relationship is only the result of a definition. Yet, if it is so, there can be no argument or justification for the belief in the ontological reality of 'necessity' and it would become merely a matter of 'faith' about which there can be no argument. Nor could it be regarded even as something *a priori* on the Kantian model as, even for him, 'freedom' is as much an *a priori* requirement for 'understanding' human action as 'causality', the twin requirement, that the 'teleological judgement' combines in itself, a point so forcibly argued by him in the *Critique of Judgement*.

The notion of 'necessary condition' is even stranger, as it is defined negatively, i.e. as including all that has to be absent or not obtain if the so-called 'cause' is to produce an effect at all. But all these conditions can never be exhaustively specified in principle and, hence, whenever the so-called 'cause' is said to be there and the 'effect' happens to be absent, one can always save the situation by postulating the existence of some obstructive condition or another about which no one may happen to know anything at all.

In fact, there is a simpler way of 'saving' the situation and that is by taking recourse to the 'statistical causality' where the postulated causal relation itself allows, or even requires, that there actually be a sufficiently significant number of cases where the relationship fails to hold in experience. Statistics is such a 'respected' discipline and so many branches of knowledge thrive only on such kind of postulated relationships, that one may reasonably conclude that the generally held idea of the 'causal relation' being so 'universal' that even one single 'counter-instance' is sufficient to prove it wrong, is mistaken. It has to hold sometimes and, to be statistically significant, it has to hold in a larger number of instances than the ones where it does not hold. But this requirement, at least at the

theoretical level, is unfulfilable in principle as not only the 'unobserved' numbers are always larger than the 'observed' ones, but given the 'time-dimension' and the 'reality' of the 'future', the 'occurrences' that have not even occurred is bound to be larger than those that have occurred.

The requirement of 'universality', or 'space-time invariance', if taken literally, would render the claim to the 'truthfulness' of an asserted specific causal relationship unestblishable in principle. Neither the 'statistical' nor the 'non-statistical' versions are, or can be, immune from this. One may still try to save the situation by holding on to the 'belief' in the 'reality' of 'causal relationships' on the ground that life cannot be 'lived' or any 'action' done without presupposing it, and that even the 'search' for knowledge gets its dynamic momentum from this helpful 'heuristic' assumption as the history of science has shown up till now.

There can be little to dispute about all this, except that those who say so are not sincerely prepared to accept the implications that all this has for the notion of 'causality' in the form it was earlier being argued for by them.

What exactly, then, is the notion of this 'causality' without which 'human life', as we know it, cannot be 'lived'. 'Causality' in the context of 'human living' appears to be centered in relation to the body where, inexplicably, 'things' seem to happen just because there is an 'intending' that they happen. One is made to 'learn' this from the moment one is born and, in a sense, one continues to do this all one's life. This is 'known' to everybody, but there has hardly been any serious reflection on it. There are, for example, layers and layers of 'learning' where if one 'intends' and the 'intended' does not happen, this is not taken as a 'denial' of causality of the causality of 'intending'. There are bodily activities which are independent of 'intending', but the line separating them is fuzzy and unclear. There is the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' determination as, many a time, 'intending' is done to bring about something else through what is 'intended' by the 'intending'. There are also 'sequential chains' in the 'intending' process where each step in the sequence is governed by the 'intending act' itself. And, in any case, the 'intending' itself cannot be considered as 'causal' by anyone, unless one has already accepted that the idea

of an 'uncaused cause' is a contradiction-in-terms, i.e., assumed to be something impossible, by definition.

Bodily activity, however, is not the only thing that is 'intended'; one may 'intend' to 'think' as we are now trying to do about this notion, and it would be difficult to say if any 'causality' is involved in it, and even if it is, the question, what 'kind' of causality it is, is bound to arise. The simple fact is that this 'causality' has none of those characteristics which 'causes' are supposed to have. It is what may be called 'free causality', free in both senses of the term, i.e. 'free' in respect of its 'origins' about which not only nothing is 'known' but nothing can be known in principle, and 'free' in respect of what it wants to 'find' or 'bring about' through 'thinking' as it just does not know it and hence not even the 'causality', that could 'produce' it. In this, it is radically different from 'purposive' or teleological action which presupposes both 'freedom' and 'causality', the latter being subordinate to the former, being purely 'instrumental' in nature. There is just no 'causal knowledge' available to transform the 'activity' of 'thinking' into a 'purposive' activity of the usual kind as the moment it were to become such, it would cease to be 'thinking' at least in this sense of the term.

But it is not a 'purposeless' term. It is, to use a phrase by Kant, 'purposiveness without a purpose'. Kant used the paradoxical expression in the context of understanding the notion of the 'beautiful'. Creative activity in the arts comes closest to it, though he seems to have used it primarily in the context of nature. But in the case of 'art', there is the distinction between one who 'makes' or 'creates' and the one who 'sees' or 'hears' and finds it 'beautiful'. In the case of 'nature' there seems to be only the 'observer', and the idea of a 'creation' a superimposition that seems unnecessary. Yet, though there is an 'activity' involved in the former, it does not seem to be of a 'causal' kind, while in the case of 'nature', the imputation of 'causality' in the context of 'beauty' seems gratuitous.

Kant does not seem to have noticed this, or ostensibly addressed himself to this issue. He was more concerned with understanding the element of 'universality' involved in a judgement where the subjective feeling of 'pleasure' seemed a necessary element in its

apprehension. He wanted to underline the distinction between the judgement 'x is pleasant' and 'x is beautiful'. But Kant does bring in the notion of 'purposiveness' in the 'understanding' of biological nature, though he concedes the possibility of 'understanding' it purely in causal terms, even if it ostensibly does not seem to be so. He leaves the issue of the 'beautiful' untouched in this context though in his discussion of the sublime in nature, he seems to give up everything, causality, purposiveness and even pleasure.

But Kant, like everyone else, confines his discussion only to judgements where the 'predicate' is 'predicated' of something that can be considered as 'object', and not the 'subject' to which the whole 'judgement' is an 'object' and which is regarded as 'true' or 'false'. Surprisingly, while Kant does consider the predicates 'good' and 'beautiful', he does not seem to be concerned about 'truth' or 'being true' which is the heart of the epistemological issue to which he is supposed to have made the most revolutionary and fundamental contribution in the history of thought.

Kant does discuss the predicate 'pleasant' which, though 'subjective', is said to qualify the 'object', and 'freedom' about whose 'causality' he sees no problem and which, in any case, is identical, for him, with the 'intrinsically good' and constitutes the subjectivity? of the 'human subject', itself.

The human subject is, thus, outside the categorical scheme in Kant and hence cannot be the 'subject' of any 'judgement' whatsoever. It can have no predicates and thus can be articulated only as 'I am', a formulation that he does make in the First Critique which, later, became the pivotal starting point of Fichte's thought.

But if the 'subject' can have no predicates, what happens to all the 'virtues' about which Aristotle talked? And 'virtues' if there are any, can only be predicated of the 'subject' and not the 'object'. And, in case this is so, what is their relation to 'freedom' and 'causality' without which it will be difficult to understand them. This, however, is not the relationship that is involved in the notion of 'purposive action', or 'instrumental rationality', or even 'prudential morality', as Kant called it.

Virtues can be 'cultivated', even 'exemplified', but not 'taught' as everyone has to 'do' something himself or herself to be

'virtuous'. But this 'doing' is not the same as one does when one, say, 'lifts' one's arm or 'talks', that is, makes one's 'body' do something. It has little to do with one's body, and even in respect of what we call one's 'mind'; it is to try to achieve a 'dispositional' potentiality which gets actualized when the occasion arises, and that too in diverse ways. But, what is even more important, is that in spite of all that one 'does' one can never be sure that one has become 'virtuous' or not. Not just this, if one accepts Aristotle's notion of 'virtue' as a 'mean' between two 'extremes', one may never 'know' what the 'mean' is, particularly, because it is a 'valuational property' between the 'extremes' that themselves are regarded as 'disvaluationally qualitative' in character.

Aristotle's notion of virtue may be considered 'closer' to the notion of 'wisdom' and the 'extremes' may be regarded as two 'ends' of a continuum where one exemplifies the 'good', and the other the 'evil'. But whatever the way we conceive it, the problem in respect of the application of the concept of 'causality' in this context remains, as while we have some idea, and that too at the individual personal level, of what is to be done, we have little idea of the 'effect' it is intended to bring about, or whether it will ever be able to bring it about or not.

This anomalous situation becomes clearer when one reflects on 'meditative' practices where one is supposed to 'do' something to consciousness by consciousness itself so that it may stop functioning in the 'ordinary' way it usually functions.

One may, of course, deny that there is any such thing, but if one admits, one has to face the question 'what sort of "activity" or "doing"' this is, and what is the 'causality involved therein?' There is some sort of 'action' involved and some sort of 'result' achieved, but the relationship between the 'two' is so puzzling that those who have reflected on it have only said that the activity involved is a purely 'negative' activity, a 'removal' of something and not the 'bringing into being' of something else, which was not there before. The 'stopping' of the ordinary activity of consciousness only makes one aware of that which was already there, just as when one 'wakes' up one sees the 'world' which was already there before one woke up. Does any radically 'new' form of activity emerge after the cessation of the 'ordinarily known' levels of activity and what is

their 'causality', if we can talk of 'causality' in these contexts, is the 'unasked' question in relation to the 'meditative realm' as *samādhi* is supposed to be the 'Be-All' and 'End-All' of the activity, though the Buddhists have already talked of *prajñā* after *śīla* and *samādhi*. But this new realm of consciousness 'opened' by *samādhi* is, as far as I know, not described or discussed in the tradition.

But one need not go to these realms for understanding the problem as everyone knows—at least to some extent—what 'concentrating', or 'attending' or 'thinking' is. Even a cursory reflection on these would reveal that while one cannot 'deny' them the title of being some sort of 'activities' and having some sort of 'causality', it is not even remotely related to what is usually conveyed or 'understood' by these terms. There is a close parallel or analogue with what we 'do' when we 'intend' to 'produce' a bodily movement. But here what we want to do is something relating to 'mind' or 'consciousness' itself, and we hardly 'know' what we do, or whether it would 'produce' the 'result' we want, or even what the 'result' is that we 'intend' to bring about. If this be still called 'action' or 'causality', then it is a strange use of the terms indeed and we do so as we know nothing better.

But even where it is clear, as in the case of 'lifting' one's hand or 'walking' or 'doing' the hundred things one does 'with' or through one's body, one does not consider them to be much of an 'action', unless they form part of a 'causal nexus' or be 'meaningful' as conveying 'something' to 'somebody'. Even when it does form part of a 'causal nexus', it must have some end in view, or purpose to attain, the 'attainment' of which generally depends on the complementary, cooperative 'activity' of others who also, like oneself, 'intend' and 'do' something with their bodies in order that the 'action' may take place.

This 'cooperative complementarity' of diverse 'actors' with different skills and abilities is generally ignored and the discussion and reflection centers primarily on the 'individual' as if it were the sole centre of 'agentive causality' in relation to the 'action' which occurs or takes place, or is performed.

But if the 'causality' is the 'result' of 'cooperative' and 'complementary' causalities, then what sort of 'causality' is it? The problem is known in the discussion on the subject as 'Plurality of Causes' and 'Intermixture of Effects', though these do not exactly convey what we have been trying to point out. The usual discussion treats the 'causes' as individual and separate, and yet giving rise to the 'same' effect. What we are saying, however, is that there are no separate, individual causes, but a multiplicity of causes acting together in unison to bring about the effect which would not be there in the absence of cooperative complementarity. The 'effect', it should be remembered, cannot be decomposed into 'separate', 'individual' effects ascribable to each separate individual cause in the complex 'unity' created by the 'complementary' and 'cooperative' character of the 'causes' concerned. The atomistic, monadic one-one a correlation which is assumed by the analysis, would make the type of causality we are talking about impossible in principle. But those who have argued thus have not seen that this, if properly reflected upon, would make the 'occurrence' of causality impossible. What would count as an ultimate, not further analyzable, unrelated element to be considered a 'cause', or what an 'effect' will have to be settled and answered first. And, even if such a possibility were conceded in the 'empirically' establishable sense of the term, nothing would remain of causality except a mere 'succession' leaving all the problems involved, including the one relating to the distinguishability of 'effect' from 'cause', to time or temporality without which the notion of causality would become inconceivable even if the idea of 'simultaneous connection' is accepted in principle.

Leaving theoretical questions aside, what appears as an indubitable fact of 'experience' is that the 'effects' man wants to achieve are of such a strange kind that they are not only 'unrealizable' by any identifiable individual unit of causality, but that the 'effect' even when 'seemingly' achieved, does not seem to be what one 'really' wanted to achieve, for what one wanted to achieve was the realization of a 'value' which alone seems to give 'meaning' to human life. 'Values' are what one wants to achieve, and yet they are hardly the sort of things which can be specified as 'effects' achievable through 'causes' that one can effectuate individually or collectively.

What one 'really' encounters are the 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities, but what one really wants is the 'tertiary' qualities whose relation to the first two is so tenuous that it can hardly be under-

stood in 'causal' terms. The relation between 'qualities' that are sensorily apprehended and their 'quantitative' counterparts in physical nature are fairly well known, but the relations between the qualities belonging to each of the senses and the complex combinations that can be formed out of them, whether belonging to the same sense or the different senses, is so indefinitely varied, multiple and unpredictable in terms of its own emergent qualitative apprehension by consciousness, that it is difficult to think of it in 'causal' terms. The emergent complex quality, even when it is a purely sensuous quality—as in the case of taste—is not an additive quality but rather an inter-actional property that is essentially unpredictable from any 'knowledge' of all the secondary sensuous qualities, singly or in combination. Taste is not being 'tasty', and being 'tasty' is not being 'nutritious', and being physically nutritious may not be 'spiritually' so, as in the case of 'meat-eating' by some persons.

Food is a simple example, and 'cooking' an ordinary day-to-day activity of 'causally' producing something, but works of 'imagination' and 'thought' share the same problem, though at a subtler level. Art and philosophy may be taken as examples where something is brought into being through 'imagining' and 'thinking' which normally are not considered as 'activities' at all. The attempts at transforming consciousness, through 'spiritual exercises' such as yoga, are another example where something is sought to be brought into being by trying to 'stop' all activity, including that which is involved in 'imagining' or 'thinking' where some sort of bodily activity is generally involved.

These are all basically individual-centered, though the cooperation of others is also involved, specially in the arts, and what is sought to be achieved, as both are given to one by tradition which 'comes' to one through others. The question of 'beginnings' is always there, but nothing is solved by postulating an 'original originator' as what has 'come' to one is already 'mediated' by the incredible idiosyncracies of innumerable 'go-betweens', each of whom has been a 'selective filter' to suit his or her own taste and judgement.

But 'ends' can be collective and be collectively pursued where the tables are turned, and the individual seem only 'instrumentally' as 'contributing to the 'collective' good. Most political and social ends are like this and civilizations are built by 'seeing' individuals in this way, and this way alone which, of course, is 'immoral', but immoral in a different way. The individual, after all, does treat 'others' instrumentally in the course of his 'self-centered' pursuits and, if so, why should not the thinker, the artist and the saint be regarded as paradigmatic example of 'self-centeredness' and hence of immorality.

Kant did try to save the situation by adding the 'saving' clause 'not as a means only'. But he did not investigate the moral problems raised by this, even in the realm of individual inter-actional relationships outside formal, institutional frameworks in which private, personal morality is usually perceived. As for collective, impersonal ends for the realization of which 'action' of a different sort is required, involving 'carrying out orders' from an 'authority', authorized and recognized to do so. 'Discipline' is the key word here and the organization of the armed forces, the clearest example of it. Organizations, of course, may be of different types, but the problem in respect of 'morality' remains the same. The 'instrumental' use of the other or others for purposes 'other' than their own, is the heart of the matter and one can get out of the situation only by giving up the notion of the 'good will' and substituting for it the will that 'wills the good', be it at the individual or the collective level, and involving in it notions of 'mutuality', 'reciprocity' and 'inter-personal inter-dependence', without which the 'idea of good' is inconceivable.

But what is the realization of 'good' without which human reality cannot be understood, and 'causality', without which the very notion of 'human action' becomes unintelligible? The 'causality' of causal action that is expected to produce the 'good' is surely different from the 'causality' that is said to operate in 'nature' which is supposed to be indifferent to values or be 'value-neutral'. There has to be some sort of 'causality', a causality that reconciles not only the 'individual' good with the 'collective' good, but also the conflict within the 'goods' themselves, both at the individual and the collective level.

The problem of 'causality' in the context of collective human action has not been paid the attention it deserves, particularly as it involves the notion of a plurality of 'free' beings, each pursuing his

or her 'own' end, and yet helping in the realization of the 'end' of the collectivity through this very action. It effectively negates not only the idea of causality as consisting of separate, isolated, single 'chains' of unlimited sequences, but also of 'freedom' as conceived of in terms of 'independence' and 'unrelatedness' with others who are also 'free' like oneself. The relation with the 'other' cannot be 'causal' in the usual sense of the term, as it is not only mediated by 'norms' but also leaves an essential, irreducible margin of indeterminacy both because of the others' 'freedom' and the intrinsic unpredictability of the response made by them.

The situation is further aggravated by the factors which, if taken into account, would render the 'security' and 'safety' supposed to be provided by the notion of 'causality' impossible. The 'game' is generally 'competitive', and the 'actors' always 'changing' by the very nature of the case.

The realms of society, polity, culture and economy illustrate this to a pre-eminent extent. The history of civilizations, their genesis, growth, decline, degeneration and even disappearance remain a 'mystery', as no 'reasonable' causal explanation can 'explain' it. History, as everybody knows, is the 'graveyard' of causal explanations, the 'despair' of all those who want to 'understand' it in rational causal terms. Yet, human actions and events must have taken place in terms of a 'causal discourse', just as they do now. But, then, this 'discourse' could not be the one bequeathed to us by our studies in the natural sciences, particularly those that are concerned with what is generally regarded as 'inanimate' matter. The 'principle of indeterminacy' supposed to be a characteristic of matter at the ultra-microscopic level, is not even an analogue of what we are saying, for what we are talking about is 'action', human action, and not knowledge, or understanding which is a different thing. The closest analogue, if there is one, is not science but 'engineering' and, as everyone knows or should know, 'social engineering' is in shambles while informatics and space technology may justifiably congratulate themselves on the 'miracles' they have achieved.

Between these two extremes, and even within them, there are significant variations, resulting in the puzzling situation that while one has to use the concept of 'causality', one does not exactly 'know' what one means by it. In the realms of thought, morality,

spirituality, art and culture this is well known, but that it is also the same in 'education' which pervades all fields, has seldom been noticed. The same is the case where 'time' is integral, as in all theories of 'evolution' where, whatever may be said about the 'past', little can be said about the future. Besides 'time', 'consciousness' or 'awareness' disturbs the situation in a fundamental way as the 'desirability' or 'undesirability' of the extrapolated causal projection makes one intervene and introduce 'new' causal factors in the situation and attempt to change it in a direction it would not have taken before. As the notions of 'desirability' may be diverse and even 'conflicting', the 'interventions' can take many forms, something that may even be brought about by diversity in 'knowledge' on which the intervention is based, or the 'weightage' that is given to different factors in the 'same' knowledge. Nor is the knowledge of 'causal connections' so securely established in all fields as is generally assumed, specially in those which concern human beings, and which 'matter' most to him. And, even in fields where it is relatively more securely established, it is a function of changing 'knowledge', a 'change' which is 'in-built' in it if it is to deserve the name of knowledge.

Thus, the 'relevance' of the category to the field in which it is applied depends not so much on the 'abstract' nature of the category as the specific, particularity of the phenomena to which it is being applied. Kant tried to deal with this problem through his notion of 'schema' or 'schematism' of the 'categories', but did not see that the 'application' not only affected the nature of the category, but also revealed the inadequacies in its abstract formulation and the 'diversities' hidden in it.

This, of course, is true of all the categories, but the notion of 'causality', if wrongly understood, can play havoc with the human enterprise of 'understanding' or 'knowing', as it already seems to have done with all those who find it impossible to escape from the inevitability of 'universal determinism' which they see as an inescapable consequence of it. Kant's valiant attempt to find a place for 'freedom' in this impossible situation is an evidence of this.

'Freedom', however, is not a value for Kant, but rather an 'ontological' presupposition without which morality would be impossible. 'Freedom' has already to be there if 'morality' is to be 'under-

stood', but it is not a 'category' for him, an *a priori* presupposition for making 'sense' of the 'moral' phenomena that we encounter in 'experience', even though he did talk of 'categories of Freedom'. It is, thus, not an 'ideal' to be realized, either in individual or collective life.

The issue of 'causality' in the context of the realization of 'ideals' has seldom been discussed in philosophy. It involves 'determination' by such a large number of variables, many of which are not only disparate and conflicting in nature, but also some that are not 'actual' or 'real' by their very nature. They are even more troublesome than Ryle's ghosts in the machine as they are not only 'known' to be such, but are regarded as more 'real' than the 'machine', or that which is considered as the 'really actual' by the thinkers concerned. Ryle's 'ghost' still haunts all those who deny the 'reality' of consciousness or its 'causal efficacy' for any reasons whatsoever.

The problem of 'causality' thus, is manifold as a reflection on 'human action' would reveal. Once one accepts the 'reality' of imagination, the 'causal efficacy' of the apprehension of that which is 'not' but 'should be', the 'determination' of action by the sense of 'ought' and, at a deeper level, by language which symbolizes all that is man's continuing collective creation that after being 'created' shapes and determines him, one has accepted strange kinds of 'causality', a reflection on which would make one free from the false dilemma posed by 'freedom' and 'causality' in the context of 'human action' and its 'reality' that includes the attempt to stop all activity, including the mental one, at the conscious level.

To think about 'thinking' and ask the question about the 'causality' involved in thinking, is not only to 'see' the problem in a 'new' way, but also to 'free' oneself from the multifarious problems which 'philosophical' thinking' itself has raised about this issue. The 'philosophical worries' created by 'philosophical thinking' do sometimes affect, if only marginally, the way human beings 'live', but in the case of 'causality' the effects seem so far-reaching that their 'oppressive import' needs to be looked at a little more closely so that 'philosophical therapeutics' may help in mitigating, if not 'curing' the 'disease' it itself has created.

Discussion and Comments

Comments on the article: *Transformative Education: Śankara and Krishnamurti on the Encounter between Teacher and Student* by Daniel Raveh in *JICPR*, Vol. XXI, No 3.

In his article, Daniel Raveh has drawn parallelism between Śankara and Krishnamurti in their approaches towards communication (education) between a teacher and disciple.

At the outset, on parallelism can be drawn between the two, since Ādi Śankara lived in the eighth century, much before Krishnamurti, who belongs to the twentieth century. Ādi Śankara was an ascetic who founded a monastic order based on the teachings of Advaita Vedānta, which is the essence of the Upaniṣads, the Śruthi texts, which are the core of the Vedas. It was Śankara who systematized the teachings through his *bhāsyas* on the *Prasthānatrayi*, viz., the *Bhagavadgīta*, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Upaniṣads*. He repeatedly says in his *bhāṣyas* the knowing 'Ātman' or 'Brahman' liberates the man from the clutches of samsāra.[1] In his teachings, he says that emancipation (*Mokṣa*) is the *summum bonum* of life.[2] In his teachings, he closely follows the *Upaniṣads*, quoting them to illustrate that his teachings possess a lineage of illustrious teachers and his predecessors—notable among them the great Ācārya Gaudapāda, the celebrated author of *Gaudapāda Kārikas*, the gloss on *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*. He calls these predecessors, 'Sampradāyavidbhir-Ācāryaha', the knowers of the tradition of Aduaita Vedānta.[3] Following *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śankara gives importance to *śravaṇa* (hearing from the Guru, the teacher), *manana* (contemplation) and *nidhidhyāsana* (assimilation) following the great Yājnavalkya in *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.[4]

For a qualified student, *śravaṇa* (hearing the teacher explaining the Śruthi texts) the kindling spirit within is enough for self-realization. However, for the medium (*madhyama*) and lower (*mandha*) students, the other two requirements, *manana* (contemplation) and *nidhidhyāsana* (assimilation) are essential. For Śankara, śruthi

through the teacher has the potency to make the student realize the Self. No other rituals including meditation (*dhyāna*) are needed.

In his *ahhyāṣya bhāṣya,* Śankara stresses that the qualifications required for contemplation of the Brahman or Ātman entail six prerequisites, *śama* (tranquility), *dama* (control of the senses),[5] etc., which prepare the student for Brahmavidya. He emphatically condemns *karmakānda* (the portion of the vedas dealing with rituals) as a prerequistite for Brahmavidya. He says, just as darkness cannot dispel darkness, so also performance of karma cannot bring realization. In his teachings, Śankara reflects the essence of the *Upaniṣads,* that the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman (*Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati*). 'For Śankara, Brahman is ever existing (*nitya vastu svarupa*). Then why is it not realized by us? The beginningless nescience (*avidya*) conceals Brahman with its twin powers of covering (*āvaraṇa*) and agitation (*vikṣepa*). *Avidya* (nescience) is responsible for ignorance in its microscopic (*jivātman*) form. In its macroscopic form, it is called *Māya* (the power which creates the illusion for erroneous cognition of Brahman as the world). The word *Māya* means 'that which is not' (*yā mā sā māya*). This *Māya* is *anirvācaniya* (indeterminate).[7] In logic (Nyāya), it is not possible to determine whether *Māya* is real (*sat*) or unreal (*asat*). It is *sadasad vilakṣaṇa* (fuzzy nature—unable to determine whether it is real or unreal, yet not different from the above). It fails the explanation of logic. In ancient texts, *Māya* is considered as the power of creation. In logic, there are copious texts and arguments regarding the nature of *Māya.* This is called 'Theory of error' (*Khyāti Bādha*). It is a well-known fact in modern measurement, that there is always error in measurement.

J. Krishnamurti, who belongs to the Victorian age, started as a Theosophist, and was groomed by Annie Besant as the 'World Messaiah'. Later, he broke away from the Theosophical movement, declaring to liberate man from authority of teachers and scriptures. J. Krishnamurti lays emphasis on 'choiceless awareness'. This he sometimes calls as passive awareness. All thoughts spring from the memory. Thought is old, from the past. Thought is basically dead, whereas the present is alive, throbbing. Thought from the memory which is the past cannot meet the present. Therefore, there is agitation. On the other hand, 'I' ness or the self is created

by thought which is from the memory. Any effort involves the exercise of thought. The thinker entity is basically thought. Thinker is created by thought. Just as a dog hunts its tail, the thought feeds upon itself and gives the illusion of a permanent thinker. When one realizes that 'Thinker is Thought', thought comes to an end.

Another of J. Krishnamurti's favourite them is 'Observer is the observed'. He often quotes an illustration to introduce this theme in his conversation. For instance, when a mountain is observed, no thought intervenes. There is 'just looking'. But a short time later, thought intervenes to describe the scene such as 'How beautiful it is', etc. It becomes a subjective observation with memory and all the rest of it, whereas the 'looking' is purely an objective observation. Hence, the subjective observation creates the observed, which is coloured. Hence, to perceive actually, 'Observer is the observed'. Hence thought comes to an end.

An interesting discussion similar to this can be found is Śankara's *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya.* In discussing the *sūtra,* nābhāva upalabdhehe' in *Abhāvādhikaraṇa,* while examining the point of Kṣaṇika Vijnāna Vādin (the school of momentary awareness), Śankara brings into focus the viewpoint of the above. It is said in this school of Buddhism, for some disciples who are preconceived of the existence of the external reality (*bahyārtha*), the theory of *bāhyārthavāda* was conceived. But, this is not the view of the *Sugata* (Buddha). For him, *Vijnānaskandavāda* (the view that only the aggregate of conciousness) alone is true. In Vijnānavāda, embedded in conciousness are all the transactions of the evidence, object of evidence and the fruit (*pramāna, prameya, phala vyavahāra*) and created. The *Kṣaṇika Vijnānavādi* says, 'yadantarjneyarupamtadbahirvadavabhāsate' (that which exists internally as the seen appears as if external).

This is a famous statement of Dignāga, the famous Vijnānavādi Buddhist logician who lived in the sixth-seventh century. Disputing this Śankara says, how can it be said that the internal form exists 'as if external' (*bahirvad avabāsate*), if it is not real? Can it be said that a certain person called Viśṇumitra appears as a barren woman's son (*vandā putra*)?

We can see the similarity between Dignāga's view and J. Krishnamurti's statement 'Observer is the observed'. Further, in

Krishnamurti's view, thinker is a fictitious entity. If one realizes that 'thinker is thought', thought must end. But this does not happen in reality. Thought is fleeting. Unless one concedes the existence of a static 'I', one cannot discern thought. It would end in chaos.

In another point also, there is difference in the teachings of Śankara and the teachings of Krishnamurti. While Śankara takes the seeker step by step into the enquiry of Brahman, Krishnamurti during the course of his conversation ends the talk or conversation abruptly with a mysterious statement 'then only the unknown comes'. Thus, the student cannot communicate with the teacher as he is left high and dry.

In his *Adhyāsa bhāsya* section of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāsya*, Śankara explains how the *adhyāsa*, the superimposition of the self (the *Atman*) on the not-self (the *anātman*) and also the not-self (*anātman*) on the self (*Ātman*) takes place. 'Yusmadasmatpratyagocarayor-visayavisayinostamahprakaśavadvirudd hasvabhāvayorithare-tarabhāvanupapattau siddhāyām taddharmā-ṇamapi sutarāmitare-tarabhāvanupa-pattirityatoasmatpratyasyagocare viṣayiṇi cidātmake yusmatpratyayagocarasyavisayasya taddharmaṇam cādhyash, tadviparyayeṇa viṣayinastaddharmaṇām ca viṣayeadhyaso mithyeti bhavitum yuktam'.

'That which is known as "you" (objective) and as "I" (subjective) principles, which are the not-self (*anatman*) and the self (*atman*), which are like the darkness and like light, which are opposed to each other and which cannot be coexistent because of their opposing qualities, the superimposition of the objective qualities (*visaya dharma*) on the subjective "I" (*asmad*) principle (*pratyaya*) being cannot be superimposed. However, such being the case it can only be said to be false (*mithya*).'

'Tathāpyanyonyasminnanyonyātmakatammanyonyadharmascadhyāsyetareta ravivekena, atyantaviviktayordharmadharmiṇormithyajnānanimittah satyānrte mithunikṛtya, ahamidam mamedaniti naisargikoyam lokavyavaharāh.'

'Even so, this mutual superimposition of the "You" (objective) and "I" (subjective) principles connected to the self by non-discrimination (*aviveka*), they differing in their qualities (*dharma*), due to the false identification of the self in the not-self and also the false identification of the not-self in the self, this false identification

being mutually paired (*mithunikrtya*), yet, in the transactions of "I am this" (*ahamidam*) and "this is mine" (*mamaedam*) this has become natural (*naisargikoyam*). This false identification is at the basis of all world transactions.'

Thus, from the above discussion, it is seen that for Śankara the discrimination (*viveka*) of the not-self (*anātma*) from the self (*ātman*) leads to knowledge (*jnana*). But for Krishnamurti, it is diametrically opposite, being identification of the 'Observer with the observed'.

Notes and References

1. atatobrahmajijnāsa B.S. 1.1 niśeṣasamsāra bijavidyādanartha nibarhanāt tasmāt brahma vijijnāsitavyam
2. atovidyākalpita samsāranivartanena nityamuktātmasvarūpasamarpananna mokṣasyānityatva doṣah Bsb on Sūtra 4, tattu samanvayāt
3. tata ca sampradāyavido vadanti Bsb on B.S.1.iv.14
   atroktam vedāntasampradāya vidbhir acāryaih Bsb on B.S.II.1.9, G.K.I. 16
4. Śrotavyo mantavyo nidhidhyāsitavyah Br.U 2.4.5
5. Commentary on the sūtra:atato Brahmajijnāsa B.S. 1.1
6. Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati Mu.U. 3.2.9
7. tatvānyatvābhyamanirvacaniyenāmarupe avyākrte vyācikirsite iti brūmah Bsb on B.S 5-Ikṣaternaśabdam
8. nābhāva upalabdeh-abhāvadikaraṇam Bsb on B.S.II. 2.28
9. 'yadantarjneyarūpam tadbahirvad avabhāaste'—Ālambana parikṣa by the Kṣaṇika Vijnānavādin Dignāga published by Adyar Library. Author—Ayyaswami Sastry.

Abbreviations:

B.S.—Brahma Sūtra
Bsb—Brahmasūtra bhāṣya
G.K.—Gaudapāda kārikas
Mu.U—Mundaka Upaniṣad

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A Response to N. Srikanta's comments on my paper 'Transformative Education: Śankara and Krishnamurti on the Encounter between Teacher and Student'

(1) N. Srikanta opens his kind response with the straightforward declaration: 'At the outset, no parallelism can be drawn between the two (Śankara and Krishnamurti)'. I totally disagree with his statement. For me, Śankara and Krishnamurti are both *mokṣa*-centered thinkers and teachers, at least in the general sense that they both endeavour to extinguish ignorance (interestingly, for Krishnamurti, knowledge was the worst type of *avidyā*) and enable us to be free from bondage and suffering. Moreover, both believed that it can only happen through self-awareness. Therefore, having been engaged in 'the same business', and despite their different background and a thousand years between them, why not compare their teachings?

(2) My comparison focuses on one central theme: their attitude regarding the teacher-student transformative encounter. A comparison does not entail identity or lack of differences between the two. Srikanta rightly suggests that Śankara and Krishnamurti use different terminology; he further argues—and rightly so—that Śankara accepts the authority of the *Śruti* and belongs to a lineage of teachers, whereas Krishnamurti rejects authority of any type. Nevertheless, when I read both Krishnamurti and Śankara, especially Krishnamurti's talks on education and Śankara's first chapter in prose of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I was surprised to find striking similarities between the 'pedagogical approach' expounded by each of them. These similarities constitute the core of my paper.

(3) Srikanta claims: 'While Śankara takes the seeker step by step into the inquiry of Brahman, Krishnamurti, during the course of his conversation, ends the talk abruptly.... Thus the student cannot communicate with the teacher as he is left high and dry.' In this respect, he further mentions Śankara's use of the *Upaniṣadic* 'triple method' of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana* against Krishnamurti's 'no-method'.

My response: First, let us touch deeper on the place of the 'triple method' in Śankara's teaching. For him, the *pramāṇa* of

brahmavidyā is the *mahāvākya* '*tat tvam asi*'; I repeat: for Śankara, the whole of the *Śruti* is condensed within this single *Upaniṣadic* phrase; hence, this 'great utterance' alone is sufficient for gaining 'liberative knowledge' if one only knows how to use it, how to bring it into action. The method of 'using' *tat tvam asi* as a *pramāṇa* is *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*, borrowed from the famous *Upaniṣadic* dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī.[1] Wilhelm Halbfass maintains[2] that 'the triple method' is not as central in Śankara's philosophy as it is in the teaching of his successors. And indeed, in his *bhāṣya* to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5, Śankara merely remarks that *śravaṇa* means listening either to the teacher (*ācārya*) or to the scriptures (*āgama*). As far as I read Śankara, for him, *śravaṇa* is the focal component of the 'triple method'. It is only by listening to the utterance *tat tvam asi* that a person may be liberated. *Manana* and *nididhyāsana* are taken by him as complementary to *śravaṇa*. They might, at best, facilitate an effective *śravaṇa* to the *mahāvākya*. Regarding *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, one also has to remember Śankara's clear-cut distinction between 'knowledge' and 'action' (*jñāna* and *karma*); for him, *no* action, not even *manana* or *nididhyāsana*, can bring about *brahmavidyā*. Hence Śankara, just like Krishnamurti, does not prescribe a method which takes the student all the way to 'the goal', to *brahmavidyā*. Such a method does not exist; there is always a gap which the student will have to 'jump over'. The teacher can only repeat the *advaitic* alternative (to the conventional, dualistic perspective which the student has become all too accustomed to) in the form of *tat tvam asi*. From here onwards, it is up to the student 'to jump', or instead to keep grasping at his well-protected *samsāric* Weltanschauung. The metaphysical pursuit, as depicted by Śankara—if I may offer an illustration to clarify my understanding—is just like learning a new language. One must acquire the vocabulary and learn the grammar-rules, but vocabulary and grammar are not sufficient in order to start thinking (or dreaming...) in a new language. When does it happen? When do we start to think in a new language? It is hard to say. It might never happen despite huge efforts, but if it does happen, it always occurs spontaneously. One learns grammar and vocabulary, and then one day, all of a sudden, it happens. The same is—I would like to suggest—with Śankara's *brahmavidyā*. One has to

acquire the tools (linguistic and others) for 'handling' the utterance *tat tvam asi*. In this respect, *manana* or *nididhyāsana* might be useful, but the gap will always remain and a 'jump' will have to take place. In *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* 1.1.4, the *pūrva-pakṣin* claims that the sentence *tat tvam asi* is different from 'It is a rope, not snake!' (*rajjur iyam nâyam sarpa iti*). Since the latter sentence 'works': the minute we hear it our fear disappears. On the other hand, the former utterance is inefficient: 'For we observe that even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to be affected by pleasure, pain and the other qualities attaching to the *samsāric* condition'.[3] In other words, the *pūrva-pakśin* (or in the present context, the student) 'is left high and dry', if I may use N. Srikanta's terminology. He is frustrated; he has heard the utterance *tat tvam asi* and doesn't know what to do with it, how to 'functionalize' it. Śankara answers lengthily, maintaining that the Brahman cannot be the fruit of any action, nor an object to be obtained. The *pūrva-pakśin* does not give up and repeats his objection: 'a man, even after having heard about Brahman, continues to belong to this *samsāric* world'.[4] Replies Śankara:

> The man who has once comprehended *brahman* to be the *ātman* does not belong to the *samsāra* as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to the *samsāra* as before has not comprehended *brahman* to be the *ātman*.[5]

According to Śankara, then, the opponent is not situated in *samsāra* because the *mahāvākya* is not functioning; rather, it is the opposite. It is not functioning since he is still in *samsāra*, i.e. in a state of *avidyā*, trying 'to obtain the Brahman', unconsciously objectifying that which is not and cannot be an object. The *pūrva-pakśin* pleads for an existential remedy and complains that the medicine prescribed by Śankara (*tat tvam asi*) is not helping. But this is the only medicine Dr Śankara has in his medicine kit. It is the only medicine he knows of; hence he cannot but redirect his opponent again and again to the same *mahāvākya*.

(4) Srikanta claims (and this is, in fact, his central claim): For Śankara, it is the clear-cut distinction (*viveka*) between the *ātman* and everything which is not the *ātman* (i.e. between the *ātman* and the *anātman*), expounded in his *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* (i.e. in his introduction to the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*), which facilitates *brahmavidyā*,

'liberative knowledge'; whereas Krishnamurti's teaching is quite the opposite. For him, it is the very acknowledgment of the identity (rather then the *viveka)* between the observer and the observed which constitute 'liberative awareness'.

My response will draw on two articles by Daya Krishna: '*Adhyāsa*—a Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śankara's Vedānta' (in *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*, pp. 156–62) and 'Can the Analysis of *Adhyāsa* Ever Lead to an Advaitic Conclusion?' (in *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 150–63). Surprisingly, the notion of *adhyāsa* is the central theme of Śankara's introduction to the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*.

The surprise lies in the fact that one might have expected Śankara—who throughout his *magnum opus* functions as a *bhāṣyakāra* and as such is obliged, at least to a certain extent, to the *Brahmasūtras*—to dedicate his introduction, in which he is absolutely free to express his own views, to the famous *advaitic ātman–Brahman* identity. Why does he emphasize the *adhyāsa* notion? Referring to this very question, Daya Krishna suggests that he is not merely emphasizing *adhyāsa*, but in effect *adhyāsa* is the sense given to this term by the Sānkhyans. The Sānkhya metaphysics, as we all know, distinguishes between two altogether different entities, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Being essentially different, it is a mistake (*avidyā*)—or at least this is the Sānkhyan view—to superimpose (*adhyāsa*) the characteristics of the one on the other and vice versa. Why does Śankara dedicate his introduction, then, to the Sānkhyan notion of *adhyāsa*? He writes from a phenomenal point of view, suggests Daya Krishna. Unless the self identifies itself with the intellect, mind, senses, and the body, nothing can be said, known, felt or done. As long as these activities last, we can be safe and sure that we are in a state which, from a metaphysical point of view, is erroneous. When the error ends, so do these activities. That is to say that Śankara's move is a didactic one: he marks the 'borderline' of *avidyā* and touches on its 'mechanism' (*adhyāsa*), in order to point at that which is beyond *avidyā*, hence to reach the *advaitic* conclusion. Śankara would have been more coherent—suggests Daya Krishna—had he employed an *advaitic* point of view from the very beginning. He could have *advaitically* argued that without distinguishing himself from objects, one cannot say, know, feel or will anything, since all these activities presuppose a subject-object dis-

tinction, a distinction which is erroneous from an *advaitic* perspective; 'only this time, the error would be *advaitic* rather than Sānkhyan'.[6] Had Śankara put things in this way, concludes Daya Krishna, he would have shown more consistency. I would like to take issue with Daya*ji* on this point: I am not sure that in this case, 'consistency' would have served Śankara's didactic cause. First, let us remember that he has not yet introduced his *advaitic* premises; hence, he might have consciously chosen to start with terminology with which his readers would be well acquainted and which at the same time enable him to reach his *advaitic* conclusion. Sānkhyan terminology meets both these requirements. Second, let us not forget that the Sānkhyan duality comprises—as Daya Krishna himself acknowledges—the phenomenal, conventional, commonsensical perspective. Hence, perhaps it is not a Sānkhyan beginning to the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, but rather a 'commonsensical beginning' of an author who addresses his readers in a 'pre-*advaitic*' language. Moreover, Śankara presents—as those who have read him carefully know—an *advaitic* position merely in discussing metaphysical issues; whereas in his epistemological discussions he seems to be an absolute dualist.[7] It is this dichotomy in Śankara's thought which perhaps finds expression even here, in his introduction; and if that is the case, then it is not a 'Sānkhyan beginning' but, rather, an 'epistemological beginning', or shall we say, a 'philosophical beginning'. Be it' Sānkhyan beginning' or not, N. Srikanta—relying on Śankara's introduction—interestingly depicts him as an exponent of the Sānkhyan position, whereas J. Krishnamurti is seen by him as an *advaitin*. Does Śankara really, at the fundamental level, speak of *viveka*? After all, the Advaitic *māyā* is not the Sānkhyan *prakṛti*; it is not 'real' (nor does it have ontological substance); it is also not 'unreal' (but that is an altogether different story), beyond the scope of the present discussion. Now, the question is how *adhyāsa* can take place between something which is 'real' and something else which is 'less real'. Śankara himself raises this question from the mouth of the *pūrva-pakśin*: 'But how is it possible that on the interior self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes?'[8] He further presents not less than three perplexing answers to this question. Daya Krishna is not convinced by Śankara's triple-attempt to provide a 'good-enough' answer to the opponent's objection, and feels that the very act of *adhyāsa* presupposes two more-or-less 'equal' components as far as their 'reality' is concerned.[9] Śankara's *adhyāsa* indeed deserves further thought and discussion, but as far as N. Srikanta's queries are concerned, I believe that I have said enough.

(5) Recently I have become aware of Krishnamurti's strong emphasis on relationship as the focal point of reference within the teacher-student intimate 'transformative encounter'. As a 'late-appendix' to my paper, let me state the following:

As implied in the picture I have sketched of Krishnamurti's notion of transformation, for him, me and you, me and the other, cannot be divorced. 'The world', he says, 'is your relationship with another... *to be is to be related!*'[10] The world is the total sum of the relationships it consists of; so is society; so am even I. Hence, the focus of the 'work' in the educational encounter should be on relationships. Krishnamurti does not claim that one's inner work will affect the outer (society, world), nor that outer work will affect the inner world. Instead, he suggests that our attention be given to relationship as such, to the thread which connects the inner and the outer. To work on my relationships, he maintains, means to change both myself and the world. 'Society', he states, 'is the product of our relationships.'[11] Therefore, the key for any social transformation is a change on the relationship level. Furthermore, 'relationship, surely, is the mirror in which you discover yourself... To understand myself, I must understand relationship'.[12] Thus, relationships are also the key for change on the personal level. For Krishnamurti, to be in a relationship means to cooperate, to work together out of the understanding that you and I exist, really exist, merely in the totality of things. To the culmination of any type of relationship he calls 'love'; or as he puts it:

> Love exists only when there is self-forgetfulness, when there is complete communion, not between one or two, but communion with the highest; and that can only take place when the self is forgotten.[13]

Hence, true relationship is not really about me and you, separately or together; rather, it is about 'communion with the highest', with that which comes forth when you and I are no more. 'When you love', says Krishnamurti, 'there is neither one nor many; there is only love.'[14] Now, the teacher-student encounter is, in effect, a

'relationship-laboratory', a 'love-laboratory'; it is where both of them learn to live without authority, to forget themselves (their 'fragmented-self'), to love. Their encounter is about what Krishnamurti refers to as 'yoga', which he defines as 'skill in action'.[15] They do not merely talk of relationships but in fact, obtain the tools for any other (future or present) relationship in their lives. They do not merely verbalize about relationships, but rather they are in a relationship. They work from within a relationship, and in this sense they are changing the world!

I would like to suggest that a statement such as 'To be is to be related!' brings Krishnamurti close to the Buddhist thought; the notion of 'love' as employed by him is perhaps a modem/Western/Westernized version of the Buddhist term *maitri*. It will be interesting to think of Krishnamurti as a (Neo-) Buddhist or a *pracchanna-bauddha* (if I may use a term used by Śankara's thorniest *pūrva-pakśins* against him), and to read carefully through his talks with person as such as Walpola Rahula and Chōgyam Trungpa Rinpoche.[16] lt might also be fruitful to think of both Krishnamurti and Śankara as influenced by and as corresponding with Buddhist thought. After all, Śankara's proximity to Nāgārjuna, for example, is well-known.[17]

(6) And finally, my present response to N. Srikanta's thoughtful comments gives me the opportunity to mention G. Vedaparayana's intriguing paper 'The Conditioned and the Unconditioned Mind—J. Krishnamurti's Perspective' (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXX No. 4, 2003, pp. 525–52), on which I have drawn extensively in my paper, in sketching the picture of *consciousness* vs *Intelligence* in Krishnamurti's thought. The footnote acknowledging Vedaparayana's work has been mistakenly omitted, and I'm taking this opportunity to correct this unfortunate error.

Notes and References

1. *See Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5 and 4.5.6.
2. Halbfass, Wilhelm, *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992), p. 162.
3. *na tu nivartate śruta-brahmaṇo'pi yathā-pūrvam sukha-duhkhâdi-samsāri-dharma-darśanāt* (Thibaut, G., *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, Part I, p. 26; in: Max Müller (ed.), *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. 34 (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1994).

4. *nanu śruta-brahmano'pi yathā-pūrvam samsāritva-darśanān* (Ibid., p. 40).
5. *tasmān nâvagata-brahmâtma-bhāvasya yathā-pūrvam samsāritvam/ yasya tu yathā-pūrvam samsāritvam nâsāv avagata-brahmâtma-bhāva ity anavadyam* (Ibid., p. 43).
6. Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*, p. 162.
7. In this respect, check out Śankara's debate with the Yogācārins, as for example in *Brahmasūtra* Bhāṣya 2.2.28 and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 4.3.7.
8. *katham punah praryag-ātmany aviṣaye 'dhyāso viṣaya-tad-dharmāṇām* (Thibaut, G., *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, Part I, p. 5).
9. Daya Krishna, *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, p. 150.
10. Krishnamurti, J., *On Self-Knowledge*, Krishnamurti Foundation of America (Ojai, 1954), p. 40.
11. Krishnamurti, J., *The First and Last Freedom*, (Madras: Krishnamurti Foundation India, 1954), p. 25.
12. Krishnamurti, J., *On Self-Knowledge*, p. 102.
13. Krishnamurti, J., *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 163.
14. Ibid., p. 214.
15. Krishnamurti, J., *Beginnings of Learning*, (London: Phoenix, 2003) (first published in 1975), p. 37.
16. *Questioning Krishnamurti: J. Krishnamurti* in dialogue with leading twentieth century thinkers, (Chennai: Krishnamurti Foundation India, 2001) (first published in 1996).
17. Note, for instance, the notion of *māyā* and its 'technical use' in the philosophy of both the Śūnyavādin and the Advaitin.

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A Case for Animal Rights

We have at least and at long last begun to say that there are certain basic rights which all human beings have. In this short paper I wish to argue that the time has now come for us also to begin to say that there are certain basic rights which animals have as well, and for

exactly the same reason as men, or for a reason which has equal justification. I would indeed measure the further progress of mankind, among other things, by the fact that we recognize this to be the case.

What are our reasons for saying that there are certain basic rights which all human being have? These rights are generally said to include the right to live, not only the right to live but also the right to live well, the right to education, the right to freedom of thought and expression, the right to be treated as equal to one another as human beings, even the right to property, and so on. There may be said to be two reasons for the just-mentioned contention. Firstly, there are certain elements in human nature, like the element of life, the element of sense-perception, the element of sentience or feeling and the element, generally speaking, of rationality or, say, the capacity to see connections among things, which are worth-regarding for their own sake. As a result, human beings ought to have a right to their preservation and augmentation as also a right to the means which are necessary for their preservation and augmentation. Secondly, there is a certain basic value (or values), like the value of a human individual's self preservation or the value of the best possible preservation and development of human society as a whole, and human beings ought to have certain rights as means necessary to the realization of this value.

Now, it is quite evident that the first reason which leads us to say that there are certain basic rights which all human beings have must also lead us to say that there are certain basic rights for animals as well. Animal nature may not be as complex as human nature; it may not contain all those elements which are found in human nature and which are considered worth regarding for their own sake. But whichever of these elements whichever animals have, if human beings have rights in relation to these elements, then any animal which has any of these elements must quite evidently have a right in relation to that element. Thus, for example, all animals must have a right to live; all animals which have in their constitution not only the element of life but also the element of sentience or feeling must have a right against the infliction of pain upon them and to satisfying living; all animals which have in their constitution not only the element of sentience or feeling but also the element of a certain degree or kind of rationality must also have a right to education or training; and all animals must have a right to be treated as equal to one another as living beings.

Further, as far as the second reason regarding certain basic rights which all human beings have is concerned, I see no reason at all why the basic value (or values) in relation to which all human beings are said to have certain basic rights should be confined to something like a *human* individual's self-preservation and self-development or the best possible preservation and development of human society as a whole. One simply needs the push of a further moral intuition to be able to say that the basic value (or values) is something like the preservation and development of an animal individual or the best possible preservation and development of animal society as a whole. Kant said that we ought to treat all human beings, by virtue of their being rational, not only as means but also as ends. I think that it would be a gain in our moral insight if we said instead that we ought to treat all animals, even by virtue of their being *living* beings, not merely as means but also as ends. And if this contention is justified, that is, there is a justification for our taking as a basic value (or values) not only something like a human individual's self-preservation and self-development or the best possible preservation and development of human society as a whole, but also something like the preservation and development of an animal individual or the best possible preservation and development of animal society as a whole, then one can go on to argue without any difficulty that there must not only be certain basic human rights but also certain basic animal rights as means necessary to the realization of the given basic value (or values).

At this point, I am forced to say something about the much-discussed problem of the relationship between rights and duties.

(1) There is a view, according to which, (i) if the person or set of persons A has a certain right, say, the right to live, then the person or set of persons B has a certain duty in respect of this right; (ii) if B has a certain right, again, say, the right to live, then A has a certain duty in respect of this right; (iii) if A has a certain duty, say, the duty to be kind to B, then B has a certain right, in a strict or extended sense, in respect of this duty; and (iv) if B

has a certain duty, say, the duty to be kind to A, then A has a certain right, once more in a strict or extended sense, in respect of this duty.

(2) There is another view, according to which, (i) if A has a certain right, say, the right to live, then B has a certain duty in respect of this right; (ii) if B has a certain right, say, the right to live, then A has a certain duty in respect of this right; (iii) if A has a certain duty, say, the duty to be kind to B, then A may or may not have a certain right in respect of this duty; and (iv) if B has a certain duty, say, the duty to be kind to A, then A may or may not have a certain right in respect of this duty.

But if there must be animal rights as well, as I have argued above, then there has to be a third view about the relation between rights and duties. And it is as follows: (i) *Either* (1) *or* (2); (ii) if the animal or set of animals C has a certain right, say, the right to live, then A or B has a certain duty in respect of this right; and (iii) if A or B has a certain right again, say, the right to live, then C does not have any duty in respect of this right; for, as far as our present knowledge of animals goes, they are not moral beings, they are not capable of performing any moral action whatsoever, any action with a view to its being an action which they ought to perform.

In short, and perhaps a little more exactly, one may say that there is the first view, according to which all human rights and duties are correlative; there is the second view, according to which while all human rights have correlative human duties, all human duties do not have correlative human rights; and there is now the third view, according to which, while all human rights have correlative human duties and all human duties have or do not have correlative human rights, all animal rights have correlative human duties, but no human rights have correlative animal duties.

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Agenda for Research

The *Puruṣa Sūkta* is one of the most oft-quoted *Śūkta* from the *Ṛgveda.* Yet, it is little known that there are *other Puruṣa Sūktas* in the other Vedas deriving from it and further enlarging on it. Both the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandin Saṁhitā* and the *Kāṇva Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* also have the *Puruṣa Sūkta* which significantly adds and enlarges upon the *Puruṣa Sūkta* as given in the 90th *Sūkta* of the Tenth *Maṇdala* of the *Ṛgveda* ascribed to a ṛṣi called Nārāyaṇa who strangely is represented in the whole of the *Ṛgveda* by this *sūkta* only.

The *Adhyāya* 31 of the *Vājasaneyī Mādhyandin Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* has six more stanzas added to the original, while the *Kāṇva Saṁhita* adds another thirty-two to five in its *adhyāya* 35.

A study of these additions is urgently required to present a different picture of the *actual* relation obtaining between the different Vedas and that between the different *Śākhās* of the same Veda in the tradition.

The *Ṛgveda,* then, was *not* considered so sacrosanct that nothing could be altered or added to it. Nor was the text of a particular *śākhā* treated in a different way, as is shown by the *Kāṇvā Saṁhitā* in the manner in which it deals with the treatment of the *Puruṣa Sūkta* in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of its own Veda, i.e. the *Śukla Yajurveda.*

What is even more surprising is to find the same theme treated in the *ādhyāyas* 30 and 32 of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* and *ādhyāyas* 34 and 36 of the *Kānva Saṁhita.* Technically speaking, these are not considered to be *Puruṣa Śūkta* but as they are concerned with the same theme, they may be regarded as such and their treatment contrasted with that found in the original *Puruṣa Śūkta* of the *Ṛgveda.* In fact, the 30th Ādhyāya of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* concludes with *ābrāhmaṇā aśūdrāḥ prājāpatyāḥ* implying that no part of humanity could be excluded because of the fourfold *varṇa* system propounded in the Ṛgvedic *Puruṣa Sūkta,* perhaps because of a misunderstanding and ignoring the clear message conveyed in the very opening lines of the *Sūkta* which said

'पुरुष ऐवद् सर्वं यद् भूतम् यच्च भव्यम्

Surprisingly, the Atharva Veda also has *Puruṣa Sūkta* in it. The *Śaunaka* Saṁhitā of the Atharva Veda has this *Puruṣa Sūkta* as No: 6 in *adhyāya* XIX, while the *Paippālada Saṁhitā* has this a *Sūkta* 5 in its *adhyāya* IX and has two mantras less than the mantra in the Ṛgveda while the *Paipplāda Saṁhitā* has the same number as those in the Ṛgveda, that is, XVI.

A comparative study of the *Puruṣa Sūkta* in all these *Saṁhitās* needs to be undertaken and the question why this *sūkta* alone amongst the philosophical-cum-speculative *sūkta* of the Ṛgveda is found in practically all the *Saṁhitās* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* and the Atharva Veda that we have with us and not, say the *Nāsadīya Sūkta.*

It has to be further investigated whether this *sūkta* occurs in the *saṁhitās* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* that we have with us, i.e. the *Taittirīya* the *Maitrāyanī,* the *Kāthaka* and the *Khāṭaka-Kapiṣṭhala* and, if not, why not.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Arindam Chakravarti's lectures on Western Epistemology in Sanskrit given at Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati and published under the title आधुनिक प्रतीच्य प्रमाण मीमांसा are not only a pathbreaking exercise in this regard which should be of interest to all philosophers trained in the traditional Sanskritic traditions in this country, but also to all those who know Sanskrit and are interested in philosophy.

This work needs to be translated into English and other regional languages in order to become available to a wider audience in this country.

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Notes and Queries

1. Is *Vyāpti* a relation? In case it is so, what is its relation to *Samavāya* which is the only relation accepted in Nyāya?

   Would it have to be accepted as a new independent relation in the Nyāya scheme if it cannot be accommodated within *Samavāya*, the only relation accepted in Nyāya at present?

   How and in what way would this new relation, if accepted, affect the system?
2. Is *Vyāpti* a transitive relation? If there is a *Vyāpti saṁbandha* between, say, *dhūma* and *agni* and *agni* and *uṣṇatā*, would not then there be one between *dhūma* and *uṣṇatā*? This would entitle us to say यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र तत्र उष्णता which obviously is correct.

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Book Reviews

SHARAD DESHPANDE: *Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Special Number '200 Years of Kant'*, January-October 2004, Vol. 31, Nos. 1-4, pp. 446.

The volume contains 15 papers, a fairly elaborate introduction and an exhaustive bibliography.

As most of the papers of the journal are comparative and critical, and only a couple of them are descriptive, this special issue can be regarded as an anthology on post-Kantian developments. It covers a wide variety of post-Kantian responses in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, aesthetics, political thoughts, feminism, cinema, and post-modernism.

As different from Deshpande's classification of articles into two broad groups, viz., 'conventional' and 'non-conventional' (p. 1), these articles can be classified into three categories: (a) articles which deal with traditional themes of Kant's philosophy in a descriptive way; (b) articles whose methodology is comparative; and (c) articles which are critical in their analysis. This categorization of these articles is susceptible to be controversial as a comparative methodology is a kind of critical strategy and, therefore, (b) and (c) categories can be clubbed together. However, keeping in view the differences in a comparative critique and a critique solely based in Kantian tradition, the above classification of articles seems to help in understanding the structure of the journal. So, the contributions of Sabhajit Mishra and Deepa Nag belong to (a), the contributions of S.S. Antarkar, S.V. Bokil, Binod Kumar Agarwala, Michael McGhee, Kanchana Mahadevan, Ranjan Ghosh, Sanil V., R.P. Singh, S. Panneerselvam and William Sweet belong to (b), and the contributions of N.G. Kulkarni, K.K. Bagchi and Deepti Gangawane belong to (c). It is also to be noted here that many contributions of (b), even obliquely, do not prefer to show in the title of their paper that their methodology is comparative. For this, here again, Bagchi, Bokil, Mahadevan, Ghosh, Singh, Panneerselvam and Sweet have to be mentioned. In (a) Mishra explains Kant's

views on causes of 'transcendental illusion' and Nag concentrates her analysis on Kant's notion of 'sublime'. In (b) Antarkar compares Kant's first antinomy with the notion of 'world' in various schools of Indian Philosophy, Bokil tries to locate Kant's rejection of human soul in the tradition of rationalism and empiricism, Agarwala discusses Kant's transformation of Aristotelian notion of *Phronesis* in the context of the First Chapter of the *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals,* McGhee finds similarity between Kant's notion of sublime and Yeats' imaginary world of Byzantium, Mahadevan posits Kantian judgements of beauty along with the views of Gadamer, Manu and Mahasweta Devi's *Rudali,* Gosh discusses Kantian views on Fine Art and Creativity in the context of Tagore's views on theses issues, Sanil takes up Kantian notion of 'time' and deconstructs its role in cinema, Singh discusses Kant's notion of 'limit' with reference to Hegel, and post-modernists such as Rorty and Derrida, Panneerselvam analyzes Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics in reference to post-metaphysical thinkers such as Habermas, and Sweet builds up Kantian political philosophy on the issues of state, general will, individual will, as well as citizen's rights and compares it with the position of social contract theorists such as Locke, Rouseau, and Hobbes. In (c) Kulkarni rejects Kant's formulation of the first antinomy and Kant's critique of the Ontological Proof, and Gangawane denounces Kantian dichotomy between his moral philosophy and his views on women, and Kant's anti-women remarks.

The journal commences with Sabhjit Mishra's paper 'Nature and Source of Transcendental Illusion'. Of the three basic parts of the *CPR*—the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialetic—the journal virtually begins with the third and last portion of *CPR.* The reason as to why it didn't open with any other paper dealing with the issues of the first two 'transcendentals', seems to be that Mishra clearly maps out the structure of the *CPR.*

Mishra describes as to how Kant shows that the transcendental illusion arises because of reason's tendency to transcend experience and how it is different from empirical and logical illusions. Kant maintained that transcendental illusion is different from the other illusions in the sense that it cannot be prevented but can only be exposed so as to alert us from its deceiving our understanding. This paper is divided into three parts: (a) The Inevitability of Transcendental Illusion; (b) Seat of Transcendental Illusion; and (c) The Transcendental ideas: Their Use and Value.

It is relevant to clarify that here 'transcendental' stands for non-empirical ground of knowledge and 'transcendent' for all that which is beyond experience. The non-empirical ground of knowledge, for Kant, is *noumena* or things in itself as it causes the experience as well as existence in the phenomenon world. However, if reason tries to transcend the experience and reach the *noumena,* it crosses its limits and thereby gives arise to metaphysical illusions. Mishra finds Kant's notion of *noumena* and transcendental illusions quite satisfactory.

Mishra defends Kant from his critics and says, 'He has given us a basic insight regarding transcendental ground of all possible experience and at the same time he is careful enough to curb the pretensions of reason with regard to its transcendent use and thereby give us knowledge of metaphysical objects' (p. 35). Notwithstanding Mishra's sympathetic reading and sweeping appreciation of Kant, the fact remains, as Bertrand Russell points out, that there are inconsistencies in Kant's philosophical structure. Russell points out, '... things in themselves are regarded by Kant as causes of sensations, and free volitions are held by him to be causes of occurrences in space and time. This inconsistency is not an accidental oversight; it is an essential part of his system' (*History of Western Philosophy,* p. 681). Bertrand Russell maintains that the concept of *noumena* was so 'awkward' that Kant's immediate successors such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel abandoned it.

Deshpande aptly points out that Kant's view that when we apply space and time or categories to things beyond experience, we are faced with fallacious positions or antinomies or pair of contradictions, has been a vexed issue in Kantian philosophy as almost everything that can be said, in its for or against, has been said (p. 3). This is a caption for the next two contributions of Kulkarni and Antarkar.

N.G. Kulkarni's article 'Kant's Critique of Metaphysics' attempts to show that Kant's arguments for the first antinomy is not conclusive and Kant's rejection of the Ontological Proof hampers his own metaphysical structure as well as his moral philosophy. Kant refutes

both the thesis as well as antithesis of the first antinomy which establishes both the finitude as well as infinitude of the world in space and time. Kulkarni argues against this and supplements his arguments with that of C.D. Broad and Bertrand Russell. Anything finite has beginning as well as end, whereas an infinite thing is beginningless and endless in time. For Kulkarni, Kant 'is simply begging the question at issue' by way of his supposition of the denial of 'the conceivability of a history that has even a relative terminal point, but no beginning'. He tries to show that Kant's arguments in the first analogy are inconclusive. So, his conclusion is that, 'one can consistently take either of the two positions. One of the two, the thesis or the antithesis, is necessarily true. Or else we can say, both are logically consistent and neither is therefore necessarily true' (p. 44). Kulkarni agrees with St. Thomas Aquinas' view of the finitude of the world on the ground of Augustinean faith that 'the world and time were created together' (p. 44). Kulkarni also expresses his dissatisfaction on Kant's clubbing of arguments of space and time which have different features as finitude is more suitable in case of space, whereas relativity is more suitable in case of time. Here, as a reply to Kulkarni, it can be said that the reason as to why Kant had chosen to argue for space and time together is that, for him, both are *a priori* forms of intuition. Thus, the similarity in the forms of arguments for the existence of space and that of time were bound to be. For Kulkarni, 'finitism is much more plausible in the case of space than in the case of time' (p. 45). A response to this is that finitude in the case of space signifies 'beginning' and in the case of time signifies 'limit'. This is the interpretation with which Antarkar begins his paper.

Kulkarni's endorsement of Aquinasian finitude and Augustinean relativity, with regard to space and time, respectively, on the ground that 'otherwise we have to agree with Aristotle that there is passage of time even if there is no other change' (p. 45) is an attempt to provide sponsorship to logic from religious faith. That is, Kulkarni's conclusions are not based on his criticisms of Kant's arguments but rather on subjective preferences of workability based on religious faith. The question remains unanswered as to what is wrong with Aristotelian (and Kantian) viewpoint expressed in the quotation referred to, just above.

As is well known, Kant maintained that Ontological Proof of God's existence is the basis of Cosmological and Teleological Proofs and, therefore, with its demolition on the ground that existence is not a predicate, no proof can be sustained and, finally, thus the irrationality of traditional metaphysics can be exposed. According to Kulkarni, if Kant's critique of Ontological Proof has been accepted then 'we seem to be deprived of the very notion of a supreme being who is all in all; and a sort of atheism becomes necessary' (p. 48). Further Kulkarni alleges that Kant 'fails to realize that this has a bearing on his own moral theology and even the *noumenal* order which is integral to critical philosophy' (p. 48). Actually, there is no need of such worries because Kant never deprives anyone of his religious faith. All what he says is that there is no proof for God's existence as He belongs to the world of *noumena*. Kant's criticism of Ontological Proof does not reject the notion of God; it rejects the proof only. It is needless to say that there is a distinction between the rejection of the proof for the existence of God and the atheistic rejection of God itself.

Further, Kulkarni concentrates on the evaluation of Kant's formulation of the first antinomy and his critique of the Ontological Proof, although he touches many more issues such as other proofs for the existence of God, other antinomies, notion of causality and freedom, *phenomena* and *noumena*, and discusses Kant's position in relation with the metaphysical positions of Leibnitz, Aristotle, Gassendi, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Kulkarni's rejections of Kant's criticisms of the traditional metaphysics, on the one hand, seems to be much optimistic and less convincing, although refreshing, and, on the other hand, his 'touch and go' style, which tries to say so many things in a rather brief remark, leaves various ideas scattered for the reader to pick up the thread from so many places.

It is clear that Deshpande has done a good job of putting the articles of Mishra and Kulkarni side by side as the former is all faithful to Kant and the latter is too critical of his moral and metaphysical viewpoints.

S.S. Antarkar in his paper 'Kant's First Antinomy: A Critical Appraisal From the Classical Indian Perspectives' analyzes Kant's first antinomy from the perspectives of India's philosophical tradition. He reformulates Kant's statement and solution of the first

antinomy, but prefers to explore Indian responses to Kant with a comparative purpose.

Antarkar distinguishes between Indian and Kant's position on various issues. For him, as different from Kant, 'none of the systems of Indian philosophy regards space and time to be "human way of looking" at things. For Kant, since space and time belong to the human faculty of cognition, therefore they are applicable only to objects of experience, i.e. to things as they appear *(phenomena)*, but not to "things in themselves" *(noumena)*. Thus, in Kant's philosophy there is an epistemically unbridgeable gap between "what can be known" i.e. "things as appear". And "what is, in principle, unknowable", "things in themselves"' (pp. 64–65). For Antarkar, this 'epistemologically unbridgeable gap' does not exist in Vedanta. However, Antarkar's above-mentioned distinction between Vedanta and Kant on space and time as 'human ways of looking' as well as his 'epistemologically unbridgeable gap between *noumena* and *phenomena*' are issues which need further exploration as the similarity and even differences between the two systems are not as straightforward as have been presupposed in this article. If it is so, then perhaps one might find difficulty in agreeing with Antarkar's straightforward position that 'the classical Indian philosophers would find Kant's presuppositions, formulations, diagnosis and solution of the first antinomy not convincing or acceptable' (p. 66). One would like to add here that such conclusions which are based on superficial comparisons between Indian philosophy and Kant on certain issues could have been avoided. In other words, once Antarkar's reformulations on the distinction between Indian and Kantian position on the above issues have been admitted, then his above conclusion loses its weight.

Further, Antarkar's justification for the comparative methodology of his paper is worth consideration. In the justification of his comparison between Indian philosophy and Kant, he says, 'Such an attempt to reconstruct the views of the classical Indian philosophers with a view to see how they would have responded to the views of great Western philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Kant seems to be valuable for two reasons. Firstly, it overcomes the twin defects of (a) cultural solipsism and (b) cultural domination. The former makes genuine intercultural dialogue and discussion

impossible and thus promotes cultural isolation. It is based on the belief that "East is east and West is West and the two shall never meet". This attitude ignores the fact that problems faced by human beings are basically the same, though their formulations are culture-specific. The latter judges the validity or otherwise of the theories and views held in one culture by the yardstick of another culture, generally the dominant culture, and thus does injustice to the culture which is dominated. This cultural hegemony is quite often backed by political, economic and other powers. ... The discussion also shows that Kant's formulation, diagnosis and solution of the first antinomy is not universal but culture-specific' (pp. 73–74). Howsoever clear is Antarkar's conscience regarding debunking Western supremacy on culture argument, it seems he has lost his way somewhere while corroborating Indian position to that of Kant's, rather than the other way round. He might appear to be consistent with other critics of the Western supremacy such as Radhakrishnan, P.T. Raju, K.C. Bhattacharya and, recently, Amartya Sen, but actually such consistency is superficial. Unlike other critics, his attempt to glean an Indian response to the West actually defeats his own above-stated purpose. As such, any comparison is a very sensitive issue where peculiarities should not be compromised. This shows that Antarkar's above-mentioned second point is also vacuous.

Bagchi analyzes twelve different senses of Kant's 'critique of knowledge'. He begins with the denotation of 'critical' as that which is not dogmatic (i.e. which is not accepted uncritically) and culminates his description in his interpretation of Kant's epistemology as a kind of philosophy of science which is different from the current philosophy of science. It is so because "in current philosophy of science pre-suppositions (whatever they may be) are sought to be justified with reference to the given body of science (whatever that may be—physics, mathematics, statistics and so on). But in Kant's philosophy of science, the basic presupposition is the very concept of science: it is, as he would call it, 'transcendental presupposition" (p. 86).

Antarkar and Bagchi both deal with the first antinomy of Kant and both are critical of the Kantian position. However, whereas Antarkar prefers to do a comparative analysis between Kant's position and Indian responses to it, Bagchi takes the route of philosophy

of science. Antarkar's purpose is to expose the Western cultural domination through his comparative study by way of showing Kant-like analytical tools in various schools of Indian Philosophy. Bagchi holds that as Kant's epistemological treatment of knowledge cannot be taken as a treatment of current philosophy of science, therefore, 'it is strange that Kant proceeded to justify the very concept of science or the very transcendental presupposition of science' (p. 87).

Deshpande's observation in his introduction is that 'Bagchi's criticism of Kant is based on his observation that Kant is "forced to deduce" the *a priori* forms through the knowledge of the world because Kant "could not hold fast to the conception of transcendental knowledge as self-reflective or self-evident"' (p. 7). Bagchi does, in fact, admit so and criticizes Kant for his failure 'to hold fast the great idea he propounded' (p. 89). One would like to add to Deshpande's observations that the essences of basic points of Bagchi's and Antarkar's criticisms of Kant's first analogy seem to be the same as the latter also, like the former, highlights that in Kant, 'there is no higher, supra-sensuous, supra-intellectual way of knowing what is real' (p. 63). Further, quite like Antarkar's above-mentioned and debatable view that there remains no relevance of Kant in the Western philosophy, Bagchi holds; 'Kant of course dreamt of the architectonic unity of reason. He envisaged that he would "hand down to posterity the treasure of metaphysics, that was purified by the Critique...." This may indeed be a dream never to be fulfilled' (p. 94).

Bokil, in his article 'Kant's Rejection of The Substantiality of Soul', tries to establish Kant's views on soul in the background of the history of modern Western philosophy beginning with Descartes. Kant, as is well known—up to a certain stage in his philosophical development—followed Leibnitzean and Wolfian dogmatic rationalism. Bokil regards Kant's rationalism as different from the traditional rationalism and shows as to how his pre-critical stage prepares the background for his mature philosophizing of Criticism. Before coming to analyze the basic theme of his paper in its fourth and last section, Bokil delineates the views of Hume and Descartes and shows how are they different from Kant's position. He prefers to disagree with those who regard Hume's theory of mind as 'a

stream of consciousness' theory of mind (p. 110). However, finally, the difference between Hume and Descartes is that unlike Hume, 'Descartes drops subjectivity altogether through appeal to Divine Reason which will not allow even demons to deceive human beings' (p. 110). Bokil shows that Kant rejected the common presumption of both Rationalism as well as empiricism regarding the ontological reality of mind as such presumption is a transcendental illusion (pp. 111–12).

Here it is interesting to note that the title of Bokil's paper is somewhat restricted and, therefore, it does not provide the glimpse of various issues which have been discussed in it. Actually, Bokil is not only concerned with Kant's rejection of the rationalist's substantiality view of soul but also with the Kantian rejection of Humean standpoint of soul as nothing but 'a bundle of impressions'. Bokil says, 'In rejecting the substantiality of soul, Kant has not only subverted the traditional Rational Psychology but has seen the possibility of interpreting human knowledge in a way Hume could not see. Hume had also rejected the substantiality of soul but took the path which made knowledge impossible on empirical grounds which he had traversed. Kant's belief that human beings are essentially rational was not shaken at all by Hume's lowering down of reason as slave of passion' (p. 112). Whatsoever may be the case, Bokil quite clearly shows that Kant 'gives a truly human face to logic, mathematics and natural science.... Instead of indulging in the traditional questions regarding mind or soul, Kant rather spoke of human abilities and capacities, of what human beings can possibly but legitimately do in the different spheres of human life such as knowledge, morality, arts and religion, etc.' (p. 113).

For Bokil, Kant's interpretation of soul is based on his conviction that human mind can never know things beyond space and time and, therefore, it is futile to ask as to what is human mind as it can be seen only from its functional value: 'it is what it does'. Here, although one can agree with Bokil that Kant set a pattern for the views on the soul for the posterity, one can submit that the metaphysical thirst has never been completely quenched as Kant himself in his second *Critique* accepted the possibility of soul which is far away from its functional notion—a metaphysical soul based on practical reason. Therefore, notwithstanding being in agreement with

Bokil's position that 'after Kant, philosophy never took the form of what it was before' (p. 114), one cannot remain ignorant of history of the rejections of Metaphysics, which kept on going even after Kant, by Logical Positivists, etc.

In his paper 'Transformation of Phronesis of Greek Ethics into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality', Agarwala tries to show the Kantian transformation of Greek *phronesis* into supreme principle of modern morality in the first chapter of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Here, Agarwala uses 'transformation' in a Gadamerian sense. As different from the notion of 'change' in Kant in which substance remains static irrespective of change in attributes, in transformation the transformed thing is 'true being', i.e. in the case of transformation there is a thoroughgoing change.

In order to show as to how Kant transforms Greek ethics into modern morality, Agarwala proceeds with the Aristotelian distinction between *phronesis* (reasoned state of capacity to act) and *techne* (reasoned state of capacity to make). It is significant to note that Agarwala emphasizes on the point that Aristotle treats making and acting as mutually exclusive categories. And, 'Since *phronesis* is concerned with action where the good action itself is its end, it is not concerned with any action which has an end other than itself, and hence it is not involved in *techne*' (p. 123). Agarwala's analysis further shows that Ethics is concerned with *phronesis* (action), whereas art is concerned with *techne* (making). Once Agarwala demarcates the above dichotomy between acting and making in Aristotle, he moves to show that for Kant both these dichotomous elements are incorporated within the perspective of the subject.

This is the background on the basis of which Agarwala proceeds to show the way Kant related morality to making (production) in the first chapter of his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* as different from Aristotelian and Thomistic ascription of morality to *phronesis* (action). This diversion in the Kantian position from the Greek position, according to Agarwala, is the transformation of Greek Ethics into modern morality.

Now, here arises a problem: if one accepts Agarwala's interpretation, on the one hand that in Aristotle *phronesis* and *techne* are so exclusive that there is no acting in making (p. 123), and in Kant morality is exclusively related 'to a kind of action, which is action

of production to effect the transformation' (p. 126), on the other hand, then would not he face a question as to how Kantian position could be regarded as a transformation on Aristotelian position as in making the former seems to include acting? It seems safe to not to enter into the discussion on this issue as let everyone for himself interpret Agarwalian interpretation. Likewise, it would be sufficient to just point out Agarwala's high-sounding viewpoint: 'Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysic(s) of Morals* is by unanimous agreement one of the most profound works of moral philosophy. Yet, in spite of more than two centuries of scholarship, which has gone into study of this text, we are nowhere near in understanding what Kant was doing in this text' (p. 121).

Deepa Nag discusses some aspects of Kant's notions of imagination and sublime in her paper 'Imagination and the Sublime in Kant's Aesthetics'. She discusses two views about imagination prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: (a) that which accepted scientific view of truth, maintained that there is an unbridgeable dichotomy between imagination and truth as the former is personal and reliable while the latter is shareable and timeless; and (b) which is associated with the Romantic Movement, believed in the intuitive element of imagination. Kant viewed imagination as distinct from reason because the former receives sensuous experience.

Defending critics like Terry Eagleton's view on Kantian Aesthetics that, along with its central theme of imagination, it ultimately bows down to reason, Deepa says, 'Kant shows that the "free-play" between imagination and reason is really the interplay of imagination and the faculty of judgement' (p. 158). As different from scientific and ethical judgements, which are objective judgements, aesthetical judgements 'seem to be on the middle ground between the two extremes' (p. 159). For Deepa, the 'free-play' between imagination and understanding is the essential feature of Kantian Aesthetics. Further, imagination, for Kant, plays an important role in understanding both beautiful and sublime which are fundamental elements of reflective judgements of aesthetics.

Deepa presents a thorough analysis of Kantian notion of sublime and the differences between beauty and sublime. She constructs her analysis in this way in order to show, finally, as to how these notions of Kantian aesthetics are related to his moral philosophy:

"since moral and aesthetic judgements as well as experiences are both based on 'value' they can best be understood through imagination and the *process of imagining* that underpin all that is "normative"' (p. 175). Defending the notion of sublime from the accusation against it that it cannot be discussed since it is an indeterminate concept, Deepa shows that many indeterminate concepts such as 'good' are being analyzed and discussed. However, one may express disagreement with Deepa's interpretation of 'good' as having three aspects, viz., 'metaphysical', 'ethical' and 'useful', since here is a temptation to replace 'useful' with 'beautiful' which would represent its three aspects: metaphysical, ethical and aesthetical.

Michael McGhee in his paper '(Sailing to) Byzantium: The Kantian Sublime', tries to establish a parallelism between Kant's notion of sublime' and Y.B. Yeats' poetic imagination of Byzantium. The basic point of this comparative study are the issues: whether there is a 'beneficial effect on moral life of a developed aesthetic sensibility'?, and in the cases where there is a want of sublimity, the issue is: 'whether moral life can have an effect on aesthetic sensibility'? (p. 177).

For Deshpande 'McGhee, presents a rich understanding of Kant through the poems of Yeats and the poems of Yeats through the works of Kant' (p. 12). Deshpande's remark here is congruous with what McGhee calls his purpose in the paper: 'the poet and the philosopher can shed light on the meaning of each other's work' (p. 178). McGhee begins his exploration with the view that in Kant 'the relationship between moral life and aesthetic sensibility is reciprocal, in the sense that whereas we may need to be furnished with moral ideas to be moved by the sublime, this and poetry (or the arts more generally), turn out to be a means of extending our conception of what constitutes moral life' (p. 177).

Conclusion of such exploration can never transcend the scope of debate and discussion. It can be submitted that here the core issues are: whether moral and intellectual aspects of human personality interact mutually with each other? Is the development in one's intellectual orientations coterminous with the qualitative change in one's aesthetic taste and feeling, on the one hand, and moral life, on the other? Moreover, whether change in moral and aesthetic tastes in one's life also changes one's conception about

them? These are perennial questions ever since Socratic dictum: knowledge is virtue. Such questions are relevant to our occasional realizations: I'm the same person irrespective of the changes in the externalities of life. This may work as a background to Yeats' flight to Byzantium (the poetic and idealistic inhabitation), as contrast to R.K. Narayan's realistic *Malgudi Days,* which is generally regarded as an escape from the present and symbolizes old age nostalgia of transcending the blunted sensibilities and 'forces of flesh' of the present and enveloping 'the forces of soul'.

McGhee shows that sublimity, contained in the power of nature, forces human beings to realize their physical impotency. The other aspect of this is that one needs to have moral strength to realize the sublime. McGhee shows that there is no circularity here in Kantian notion of sublimity (p. 179) as 'not only does the experience of the sublime in nature disclose to us our own distinctively human sphere, but its disclosure is as an object of admiration, as something elevated, the apprehension of which makes other things dwindle in significance. Instead of the magnificence of the sublime in nature, we are converted to the magnificence of the sphere of our own freedom' (p. 185). Likewise, in Yeats, the flight to Byzantium is the result of realization of the sublimity of the Byzantium on the one hand, and to realize one's moral strength which enables one to transcend the trivialities of life, on the other.

Further, McGhee explores 'the conflict between the flesh and the spirit' envisaged in the notions of Kantian Sublime and Yeatsian Byzantium. For him, 'just as the experience of the sublime can awaken the faculty of thought that *estimates* nature in its totality as appearance, so the poetic representation can show us or otherwise put in touch with a moral or even spiritual estimate of our determined human nature and the way it conducts itself: an estimate that is unavailable unless this dimension is awakened' (pp. 191–92). Taking into account the comparative methodology here one can say that it is more Yeatsian interpretation of Kantian Sublime than Kantian interpretation of Yeatsian Byzantium—as McGhee himself admits that the poetic passion is absent in Kant—which causes the struggle between the forces of 'the flesh and spirit' (p. 196). This shows, in a way, McGhee's acceptance of the limitation of his comparative study between Sublime and Byzantium.

As such, anything and everything can be compared since there is bound to be some kind of similarity and dissimilarity between any two concepts. However, notions such as Yeats' 'Byzantium' and Kant's 'Sublime' seem to represent two different realms in such a way that their comparison, though refreshing, is always susceptible to be misled due to their conceptual peculiarities. However, it can be pointed out here that an addition of an account of dissimilarity between these notions to the McGheean account of their similarity could perhaps be a much elaborate and intense comparison. Till such an exhaustive comparison is available, one can treat McGhee's attempt as a beginning in the right direction. This is not to deny that McGhee had not realized the importance of this point as in the end he tries to glean the shuttle differences in the methodologies of Kant as 'possibilities of thought' and Yeats as 'knowledge derived from experience'.

Kanchana Mahadevan's paper 'Revisiting Kant's Reflective Judgments' deals with so many issues that it seems safe to say that its title somehow should have included Gadamer, Derrida, Mahashweta Devi's *Rudali*, Feminism, *phronesis* and *The Laws of Manu* as well as the term 'open-ended' because it is not bounded by any particular theme and talks freely at its will. Perhaps it would have synthesized an idea, had it reformulated itself in the light of its feminist approach to Kant, as in its latter part it keeps on coming to this subject. Kanchana begins her paper with the re-examination of Gadamerian critique of Kantian aesthetics according to which Kant subjectivates his aesthetics by severing it from knowledge and morality and adopting positivistic epistemology. As such, Kanchna does not criticize Gadamer's notion of non-subjective aesthetics but reacts to Gadamerian reading of Kant with the help of Hannah Arendtian interpretation of Kant. There is a multiplicity of such reactions and Kanchana finds herself amongst them. Quoting Bernstein she establishes that Kant's notion of 'subjective' is different from its understanding of Gadamer who took it to be 'arbitrariness': 'Subjective as the "free-play" between imagination and understanding is sharable and nonarbitrary in being devoid of interest in the object's existence. "Free-play" is not a private state, but sanctions public communications ... objectivity is not the discovery of a given, but the universality of subjective structures' (p. 206).

Till the first part of the paper discusses Gadamer's above-mentioned critique of Kant. The second part is full of various issues and there is no attempt to synthesize them as some of them have been mentioned in the beginning. The first section of the third and last part of the paper seems to have derailed as it just mentions *phronesis* a couple of times and that's all: no analysis, nothing. The second and third parts of the paper deal mostly with the *Rudali* and *The Laws of Manu* which only obliquely could be taken to be about Kant's reflective judgements on aesthetics. Though Deshpande's 'On Kant; Of Kant' tries to synthesize various issues scattered throughout the paper, one wonders as to what caused him to write an exceptionally long introduction of the paper (more than four pages)!

Ranjan K. Ghosh in his paper 'Fine Art, Creativity, and Kant: Some Philosophical Reflections' discusses Kant's views on fine art and creativity, and compares it with Tagore's aesthetical views. He begins with the clarification that for Kant 'works of art are not to be viewed as objects of utility, and that such works do not admit of any predetermined rules' (p. 229). This does not mean either that work of art are without utility or that they are devoid of any *rule*. To claim the latter is to admit that the art is 'a mere product of chance' and for Ghosh 'the rule that goes into making art is what nature gives through genius' (p. 231). He shows as to how for Kant art is different from science and nature. As for as utility and purpose of a work of art is concerned, they are different from the scientific and industrial utility and purpose as a work of art must be beautiful and must be able to induce thought in the viewer. In this context, the author also shows as to how Kant differentiates 'aesthetic satisfaction' from sensuous gratification, on the one hand, and aesthetic idea from a rational idea, on the other. There is a distinction between aesthetic idea and rational idea because the former is 'a synthesis of perception that cannot be subsumed under a concept; it cannot be stated in language, nor can it be taught as a concept can be' (p. 241).

In order to clarify the Kantian view on art and creativity, Ghosh brings out Tagore's interpretation on these issues and concludes: 'The closest approximation to Kant's view of creativity is perhaps to be found in Tagore's idea of 'rhythmic unity', whereby the artist feels overtaken by the tide of the creative process as though

inexorably moving towards an unknown terminal goal' (p. 249). Here let me point out that the very first statement of the article: 'The present essay does not claim to be a contribution in any manner to the Kant scholarship', is redundant, even though it expresses politeness on the part of the author.

While reviewing Sanil's paper 'The Language of Face: Wittgenstein on Cinema', which appeared in R.C. Pradhan's *Philosophy of Wittgenstein: Indian Responses*, I observed that the notion of language of cinema or language of face like the term 'body-language' commits a categorical mistake (*JICPR*, Vol. XX No. 4, pp. 236–37). Later on, Sanil showed me as to how the term 'language of face' and 'language of cinema' could be meaningful in the philosophy of cinema. Here, Sanil, in his paper 'Passing Time: Immanuel Kant Goes to Cinema' continues the same project of philosophy of cinema but this time it is not Wittgenstein but Kant who goes to cinema. It is a kind of philosophy which provides conceptual analysis of cinematic inventions and innovations.

The crux of Sanil's Kantian interpretation of cinema deals with placing cinema in Kant's 'industrial art' as described in the third *Critique* and analyzing it in terms of time as described in the first *Critique*. As described above in the context of the analysis of Gosh's paper, Kant differentiates between fine art and industrial art and treats the latter as an inferior category of aesthetic taste. For Kant cinema (entertainment) involves 'fleeting, unreflective and irresponsible pleasures.... It allows time to pass without us noticing its passage, without it affecting us' (p. 255). For Sanil, the question of cinema is a question of time because 'when we are bored, it is as if time does not pass or it passes so slowly as to make us feel and suffer every small step of its movement. Doing nothing tries us more than doing something. When we are entertained, time moves so fast that we do not perceive its passage. So leisure is not entertainment' (p. 256). Taking into account various cinemas and cinematic sequences, he concludes that it was Kant who discovered that time is the element which differentiates between reality and representation.

Unlike meta-ethics, for Sanil, it is not a meta-philosophy of cinema as 'here instead of subsuming the cinematic under philosophical concepts, we are led to acknowledge that filmmakers pursue

and extend concepts through the practices of film. Philosophy, takes cinema as a conceptual practice' (p. 253) Notwithstanding the above explanation, the question remains as to how could it not be a meta-linguistic study as the philosophico-lingustic study of cinematic language, which Sanil seems to subscribe, is a serious study and is different from an analysis of columns on films. So, it can be expected that in the third issue of his project on cinema he will reflect some light on this subject.

R.P. Singh's paper 'Transcendental Philosophy as a Theory of Limit' interprets the Kantian notion of 'limit' and shows *a priorism* as its source. The Kantian notion of limit puts a limit to human knowledge and confines it to *phenomena* and restricts its flight to *noumena*. Singh discusses various aspects of Kant's theory of limit and its interventions into post-Kantian philosophy such as into Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, post-modernism and post-structuralism. Kant's *Critiques* show various aspects of the theory of limit: 'Kant's transcendental philosophy has given rise to three "theories of limit" in the three *Critiques*. Pure reason can self-reflectively come to grasp the possibility, validity and limit of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Practical reason can self-reflectively come to autonomous free will in the maxims of universality; end in itself and kingdom of ends. And the Judgement can discern what is beautiful and the sublime' (p. 282). Singh claims that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were able to overcome the problem of 'limit' of human reason through their concept of pure-ego which demolished the Kantian dualism of *phenomena* and *noumena*. He explains that Hegel criticizes Kant as 'Kant's concept of reason fails to overcome the antinomies between finite and infinite, etc., i.e. the "theory of limit"' (p. 286). Thus, although there is a reference to the antinomies of reason here, the relationship between antinomies, which arise through the attempt to cross the limit of 'reason', and the 'limit' has not been elaborately discussed. It is here that one can gesticulate that a discussion on the issue as to how 'antinomies' and 'limit' could affect each other, have been omitted but then perhaps this is due to the author's prerogative about the scope and shape of the paper.

The first part of Singh's paper is purely Kantian analysis and second and third parts are Hegelian and Post-Modern responses to Kant's view on 'the theory of limit'. Particularly the third part

discusses certain fundamental ideas of post-modernism and can be beneficial to those who are just beginners in the field. Taking a clue from Kant's distinction between sense and understanding, Singh shows as to how Derrida and Rorty put an alternative point of view which exhibits 'the structure of all possible interpretation' (p. 298).

Although there is an element of truth in Deshpande's declaration that R. Panneerselvam in his paper 'De-Transcendentalisation of Kant' continues with the similar issue of post-modernist critique of Kant as started by R.P. Singh as both deal with post-Kantian issues; however, the differences in their approaches are far deeper.

Although both these scholars deal with the issues of 'knowledge' and the realm of knowledge, i.e. the transcendental philosophy of Kant, Singh provides a detailed analysis of Kant's metaphysical distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena* and Panneerselvam takes into account the post-metaphysical methodology to discuss whether 'dissolution of epistemology is necessary'. Moreover, whereas Singh discusses Kant in the light of Hegel, Rorty and Derrida, Panneerselvam takes the routes of Heidegger, Habermas, and Foucault. Further, whereas Singh concentrates on the dualism of *phenomena* and *noumena* in Kant, Panneerselvam deals with subject-object dualism in Kant.

The third and final part of Panneerselvam's paper deals with the basic issue here, i.e. the de-transcendentalization of Kant, where the first part explain Kant's 'transcendental idealism' and the second part deals with Heidegger's interpretation of Kant.

Here is a lucid presentation of the structure of the *CPR* which shows that the *CPR* responds to four questions about the possibilities of Mathematics, Pure Science of Nature, Metaphysics in general, and Metaphysics as a science (p. 305). The questions concerning the first three have been dealt in Transcendental Aesthetics, Transcendental Logic, Transcendental Dialectic, respectively, and Kant just mentions about the fourth in the *CPR* and deals elaborately it in the second *Critique* and the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. For Panneerselvam, 'Kant answers the fourth question by saying that metaphysics which exists as a human need and a natural disposition of reason is possible as a science of our necessary conceptual framework' (pp. 305–6). He shows as to how the methodology of

CPR is transcendental. It is to be noted that here 'transcendent' has been used in the sense of that which is 'beyond the limitations of experience'—a point which has already been analyzed in Mishra's paper. For Panneerselvam, 'Kant supported the transcendental philosophy and wanted to establish it for the main reason that it is through it one can justify the synthetic a priori principles of pure science' (pp. 308).

In the background of the above discussion on Kantian framework of transcendental philosophy, Panneerselvam discusses Heidegger's critique of Kant's transcendentalism and shows as to why the latter's transcendental subject *(Dasein)* does not face the problem of former's dualism of subject and object. Here one finds a succinct statement on a comparative study between Kant and Heidegger. For Panneerselvam, though both, Kant as well as Heidegger, are in favour of transcendental turn, the former endorses transcendental idealism whereas the latter rejects it (pp. 314–15).

Panneerselvam culminates his paper in the discussion on the de-transcendentalization of Kant by the post-metaphysical philosophers like Habermas and Foucault. The crux of this de-transcendentalization project is Habermas' concept of communicative reason or rationality. The communicative rationality stands as a response to Kantian transcendental rationality (p. 326). It is significant to note here that Panneerselvam is of the view that some thinkers—taking into account rational dimension of Habermas' understanding of communicative reason—charge his position as a kind of 'hyper-rationalism which is not valid' (p. 324). The discussion is lucid and to the point here. Its scope is limited to the de-transcendentalization of Kant through Habermas and to some extent through Foucault. One would rightly expect that the author provides a thorough analysis of this project taking into account other post-metaphysical thinkers.

William Sweet's paper 'Kant, Rights, and the General Will' can be divided into two sections for the purpose of our discussion; the first deals with Kant's view on the notion of state and its relation with the rights of its citizens, and the second explores Kant's view on human will in relation to the state. Deshpande's 'Of Kant; On Kant' does not give much significance to the first section. However,

it seems that the second section does not actually go beyond the basic discussion of the relationship between state and its citizens' freedom as dealt in the first section.

Though the researches on Kant's views on social and political views are lesser-known issues of his corpus, there is a renaissance of philosophical interests in these areas throughout the world. For William Sweet, Kant distinguishes rights into two classes: innate and acquired. The innate rights include moral and legal rights (p. 336) and the acquired rights require judicial act (p. 339). If this is so, then the obvious question arises as to how legal rights do not need judicial act? This question remains unanswered in Sweet's analysis. However, Sweet describes Kantian views on the freedom of human beings so long as it is lawful: 'one's innate or inherent right is not a right to do as one wishes or wills as such, but is a right to *lawful* liberty—a liberty that takes account of the right to freedom of others and that reflects one's own (rational) will' (p. 340).

In this context, first Sweet discusses Kantian views on the state and then on human will. The state is the result of one's innate as well as acquired rights. This point has been elaborated through four reasons showing the necessity of the existence of the state: for the arrangement of 'security to enjoy freedom', for 'articulating the conditions for rights', for ensuring 'moral and legal respect for law', and for confirming 'moral legitimacy of one's own freedom, and the moral obligation to respect the freedom of others' (pp. 341–43). Sweet seems to put Kant's views on the state as the most liberal and tries to interpret him as the thinker who tried to achieve balance between the powers of state and the rights of citizens. However, in order to safeguard himself from any undue criticism, he concedes: 'Kant's account of the state in relation to rights, freedom, and law is, understandably, a controversial one, and the preceding argument only sketch out briefly the grounds that underlie it' (p. 344).

As any discussion of state remains incomplete without the discussion on wills of its citizens, Sweet analyzes the issue in the context of Rousseau's notion of general will. For him, like Rousseau's conception of general will, Kant's notion of will provides sufficient scope for individual wills as well, i.e. 'the distinction between individualist theories that focus on the individual will, and theories that focus on a general will, is much less than some critics (e.g. W.H. Walsh) affirm' (p. 350).

Despite Sweet's arguably elaborate attempts to put Kant in the exact centre of individualism and collectivism, a query remains as to whether Kant was much inclined towards strengthening the power of the state or the freedom of the individual? This question is a viable one since there is no such thing as 'exact centre', at least in practice. It is this reason that Sweet's conclusion, where he places Kant's position between Lockean individualism and Hegelian collectivism, remains to be analyzed further.

Deepti Gangawane's paper 'Kant on Feminity' takes on Kant for his supposedly gender-biased and anti-women views. The crux of the discussion here is the ever-green issue which is vehemently refuted by the classical feminism as a non-issue. It is: whether men and women are different in their physical and mental capabilities? Deepti successfully shows that despite Kant's shuttle remarks on women, he is clearly of the view that women are subordinate to men. In order to prove that Kant was biased in his treatment of sexes, the author brings out various viewpoints. For example, according to the author, Kant's treatment of sublime as male and beautiful as female; his views on the distinctions in the male and female psyches; his distinction between 'noble sex' and 'fair sex'; his distinction between active and passive citizens; and his views on marriage, etc., show his inclination to provide men a superior role. Taking a note from Kant's concept of 'kingdom of ends' in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, where no one can treat other as a means to one's own end, Deepti shows that there is an inconsistency between Kant's moral (theoretical) and practical views, as in the latter women are virtually reduced to an object of use. Thus she tries to conclude that there is a 'gap between Kant's moral theory and his practical philosophy, for it is very difficult to accept both simultaneously' (p. 373). In order to arrive at this conclusion, the author does not confine her feminist onslaught to Kant's textual expressions but also goes further and tries to look into their implications which could be taken as a remark against women. So she says, 'Even though Kant does not explicitly calls it thus, he clearly implies it' (p. 369). Here one could append to Deepti's criticism of Kant that like Kant's metaphysical presuppo-

sitions—his rejection of traditional metaphysics and his acceptance of metaphysics on practical grounds—differ in different texts, his views on women need not be taken as creating any kind of cleavage in his philosophical and practical views. However, as the author outrightly rejects all the defenses of Kant and admits that she is 'aware of the possibilities of *using* (my italics), Kant's own theoretical ideas in such as way a to avoid inconsistencies that arise at a level of actual social practices', one is left with nothing but to wait for her such usage of Kant.

It is evident that all the fifteen articles deal with so diverse subjects in Kantian philosophy that it is virtually impossible to glean a couple of notions which is common in all of them.

Deshpande introduces the basic structure of all the papers in such a way that it is safe to recommend that if one wishes to formulate one's own point of view then before having a synoptic view of the journal in the introduction, one should go through the articles in detail. That is, the introduction 'On Kant; Of Kant' should be read last in order to avoid the influences and secure the originality and novelty of one's own viewpoints. Although, here, one would be disappointed if one looks for some critical evaluation of the papers, as it puts articles as they are, Deshpande's scholarship in visible in summing up of the articles. Before concluding my reflections, let me point out that throughout the journal there are quite a few errors of omission and commission:

(1) Panneerselvam has been wrongly mentioned in the 'content' as 'Paneerselvam', in the 'On Kant; Off Kant' (pp. 22–23) and on pp. 303–30 as 'Pannerselvam'. Moreover, 'S. Pannerselvam' has become 'R. Panneerselvam' inside the Journal (pp. 303–30).

(2) The title of Agarwala's paper has been mentioned in the content as 'Phronesis and Categorical Imperative' but inside the journal it is: 'Transformation of Phronesis of Greek Ethics into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality'. Here Agarwala discusses Kant's views on duty, goodwill and categorical imperative. Although this discussion can be subsumed under 'categorical imperative', however, since Agarwala often uses the term 'Supreme Principle of Modern Morality', it would have been better to retain the term in the title of the paper as mentioned in the content.

(3) Throughout Agarwala's paper the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* has been written as *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.*

(4) On p. 2 in the second paragraph's line no. 7, 'problematizes' has been printed as 'problemtalizes'.

(5) The lines '... takes up an interesting issue of the relationship between time and entertainment. Within the context of Kantian aesthetics, Sanil presents the issue by asking: can Cinema propose itself as something new to Kant?' (p. 11), has been cut and pasted on p. 16—an unnecessary repetition.

(6) In the second para of p. 11, the redundancy of the question mark (?) clearly shows a mistake in proofreading.

(7) In the second para of p. 123, in the line no. 4–5, 'which has an end other than itself 'has been written as 'which has end other then itself'.

(8) In the second line of the third para of p. 191 *phenomena* has been printed as *phainomena.*

(9) In the second quotation on p. 362, 'complacent' is wrongly quoted as 'complascent'.

The above list of the errors of omission and commission does not claim to be either exhaustive or final. It just shows that they could have been taken care of.

It is relevant here to supplement A.J. Ayer's remark in his editorial Foreward to Korner's *Kant* that 'by common consent Kant is one of the greatest philosophers that has ever lived, but be is one of the most difficult', with the view that one of the basic reasons for difficulties in comprehending works of great philosophers has been the lack of commentaries which are expository as well as critical in nature. The present volume of *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* on Kant is an attempt to provide a proper analysis of Kant's thoughts as well as to present an in-depth analysis of selected aspects of the post-Kantian Philosophy. As mentioned above, it can be divided into three parts: the first deals with Kant's philosophy, the second compares Kant with other thinkers, and the third presents a critical study of Kant's thoughts. Despite the fact that the volume deals

many important issues in very brief, keeping in view the limitations of such explorations, it can be regarded as an anthology on various aspects of Kantian scholarship which is quite relevant in the context of present-day philosophizing: a refreshing attempt to present Indian bouquet at the occasion of 200 years since Kant.

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SWAMI VENKATESANANDA (trans.), *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha: The Supreme Yoga*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, 2003, pp. 382, Rs. 250.

Let's start with the general data. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, consisting of almost 30,000 *ślokas*, has been probably composed in Kashmir around the eighth or ninth century AD. Several scholars have discussed the date and place of the text.[1] Swami Venkatesananda, the editor and translator of the book under discussion, is definitely not one of them. In his preface he writes:

> Scholars speculate about the author of this monumental scripture and such other academic matters: may God bless them with success. The *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha* is the greatest help to the spiritual awakening and the direct experience of the Truth. This is certain. If this is what you want, you are welcome to the *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha*.[2]

That is to say that for Venkatesananda, this Advaitic treatise is a transformative text, an useful equipment in one's spiritual journey, rather than an object of mere academic research. Venkatesananda's book has been first published in South Africa in 1976, and later translated into several languages (even Hebrew) and published worldwide. Now (2003), it finally appears in an Indian edition (better late than never, as the cliché says), hence becoming more accessible to English readers in India. Swami Venkatesananda has not only translated and abridged the original text, but also

arranged it in 366 pages (with a Christian date on top of every page: 1 January, 2 January, etc.), to make it suitable for daily reading. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, he believes, should be interwoven in one's daily life or daily *sādhana*, which for him are one and the same. Useful as this arrangement might be for the *yoga-sādhaka*, I have to admit that for me one of the greatest attractions of this intriguing text lies in its non-linear character. It consists of over fifty stories within stories, told by Vāsiṣṭha (and within the stories by other teachers) to Rāma (and within the stories to other characters), all of them emphasizing the illusory nature of the world 'out there' and intended to release the listener (be it Rāma or us) from the bonds of *māyā* and remind him that what appears before the eye is merely a perspective among many, and that the world in which we live is not given or 'readymade' but rather depends on the eye of the beholder. Reading or listening to the stories of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, I find myself getting lost—like the characters themselves—unable to figure out the beginning or the end, trapped in (and fascinated by) the textual labyrinth. The Advaitic conclusion of such an experience would be that the only way out of the labyrinth of *māyā* is to realize that it does not really exist; that I'm not really trapped; that it is merely magic, an act of jugglery, dream, illusion, *līlā*. Therefore I'm not sure that Venkatesananda's linear rearrangement of the text in a day-by-day (and date-by-date) format is compatible with the 'spider-web nature' of the original text. Yet, the Swami does not only rearrange the text in a page-per-day layout, but also quotes one *śloka* in the original Sanskrit at the top of every page and marks (with bold letters) the translation of this very verse within the entire text of the day. He does not explain this editorial decision: Scholarly wise, it could have been useful if the entire Sanskrit text had been presented together with its translation. But as we have already seen, the author's agenda is not academic, and the book is meant for 'the general reader'; hence it cannot be too long and voluminous. One *śloka* a page, then, is enough. Enough, as it brings along something of the original flavour and enables Venkatesananda to emphasize that which he sees as the core essence of the teaching, day after day. On 28 March, for example, he chose the following stanza:

abaddho baddha ity uktvā kim śocasi mudhaiva hi
anantasyā 'tmatattvasya kim katham kena badhyate

'You are ever free; why do you call yourself bound and then grieve? The self is infinite; why, how and by whom is it bound?'[3]
This *śloka* reminds me of *Sāmkhya-Kārikā* 62: *tasmān na badhyate 'ddhā na mucyate nā'pi samsarati kaścit...*

'No one therefore is bound, no one released, and no one transmigrates ...'[4]

Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is more radical than the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*-kāra, at least when we compare these two verses: both agree that bondage is merely the outcome of *avidyā*, but the former further concludes (and clearly argues) that if bondage is just a fiction, so is necessarily the release from it. Hence, for him, one is not truly bound, nor really released.

The Advaitic nature of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is explicitly reflected in a *śloka* such as the one spotlighted by Venkatesananda in his 5 May page:

brahma cid brahma ca mano brahma vijñānavastu ca
brahmārtho brahma śabdaś ca brahma cid brahma dhātavah

'Consciousness is *brahman*, the mind is *brahman;* the intellect is *brahman, brahman* alone is substance. Sound or word is *brahman* and *brahman* alone is the component of all substances.'[5]

Yoga today attracts plenty of attention worldwide. One of the results of this 'yoga fashion' is the publication of numerous books, including an unbelievable amount of translations (mostly to English) of texts related this way or the other to yoga practice. I will not be surprised if this sudden interest in yoga—paradoxically imported to contemporary India from America—has been the catalyst for the publication of Venkatesananda's book by Motilal Banarsidass. Nevertheless, within the jungle of yoga books, it is definitely a good deal. Not only it brings forward a captivating text often neglected (at least with compare to the two 'bestsellers', i.e. Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* and the *Bhagavadgītā),* but it is also edited and translated responsibly and with care. It is not very easy to find English versions (even abridged) of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha.* However, Venkatesananda's is not the only one. I have found two other books, intended just like the Swami's book, for the 'general

English-reader': The *Essence of the Yogavaasishtha* compiled by Sri Jnanananda Bharati and translated by Samvid (Samata Books, Chennai, 1985); and *Selected Stories from Yoga Vasishta Elixir of Self-knowledge* compiled and published by P.P. Bharata Iyer (Mumbai, 1982), based on the series of 'Stories from the Yoga Vasishta' which appeared in *The Mountain Path,* the quarterly journal of Sri Ramanasramam in Tiruvanamalai, from April 1974 onwards. Both these books contain the Sanskrit original as well as an English translation of a selection from the *Yogavāsiṣṭha.*

I'm a great believer in the power of stories to convey a philosophical point. To illustrate this power, which for me is the main feature of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha,* let us check out together—as a quick example—the story of King Lavaṇa *(Yogavāsiṣṭha,* 3.104–21).[6] As most of the readers will know, this famous story is about a king who has been visited by a magician who invited him to watch a marvelous trick. The magician waved a bunch of peacock feathers and a Sindhi cavalier lead a beautiful horse into the court. The king gazed at the horse, and then closed his eyes and sat motionless for some time. When he finally opened his eyes, he trembled and told his surprised ministers that during those seemingly few moments, when his eyes were shut, he had the experience of living many years as a *Caṇḍāla.* In fact, after closing his eyes—he further told them—he found himself riding that beautiful horse into a jungle, got lost, felt hungry and was fed by a dark *Caṇḍāla* girl after promising to marry her. She took him to her village, where they indeed got married and had children. 'Time rolled on and I became old', he continued his story. 'I began to trade in meat... my body had become black....' 'One day a famine arose together with enormous drought and forest fire. The *Caṇḍāla* who has forgotten that he was a king took his family and escaped to another forest. His youngest and most beloved son could not take the hunger any longer, and to save his life the former king decided to feed him with his own flesh. He made a pyre, entered the flames and suddenly woke up back on his throne. The next day, the king with his men set out to find the place where he had lived as a *Caṇḍāla.* He managed to find that village and even met an old woman who has been (in his dream? delusion? hallucination?) his mother-in-law. He asked her many questions, and she told him the story of his own experience but did not recognize him.

In many ways, this is a typical *Yogavāsiṣṭha* story, a story of transformation, even transformations, involving an inquiry about one's self-identity. The most intriguing part of the story is the part in which the king sets out to find (physically, geographically, ontologically) what he has previously experienced on what seemed to be mental or psychological level; and he does not merely search for this presumably inner-space outside but also finds it. What is the philosophical message hidden in-between the lines of the story and especially this part of it? One answer to this question is given in the text itself, when Vāsiṣṭha tells Rāma:

manovilāsah samsāra iti yasyām pratīyate
sarvaśaktter anantasya vilāso hi mano jagat

'From all this it is clear that this world-appearance is nothing but the play of the mind; the mind itself is but the play of the omnipotent infinite being.'[7] Sometimes I feel that Vāsiṣṭha's sermons (or direct teaching) do (does) not match the stories that he tells in profundity and depth, and this is just a single-example. The philosophical point conveyed by Vāsiṣṭha (or through Vāsiṣṭha) here is that our world-experience, whether in a state of wakefulness, dreaming, hallucination or any other state of consciousness, is nothing but *māyā*, whereas reality, true reality, belongs merely to *the brahman*. If the king in the story searches for—and even finds—his 'inner' experience 'outside', then Vāsiṣṭha explains that there is no essential difference between 'inner' and 'outer', hence trying to enable Rāma (and us) to remove the 'dual spectacles' through which he has become so used to see the world. Yet I believe that this is not the only possible reading of the story and its notion of *mokṣa* or freedom. In his article 'Possible Worlds' (*JICPR* Vol. XVII, No. 2, April-June 2001) writes Daya Krishna: 'A World, as Leibniz pointed out long ago, involves the notion of "compossibility", or in other words, the possibility of different possibilities being "possible" together'. If I may take Dayaji's sentence out of its immediate context and away from Leibnitz, and use it as a hermeneutic key for an alternative reading of King Lavaṇa's story, then freedom does not lie necessarily in the dismissal of every possibility (derogating 'inner' and 'outer' alike into mere 'not real enough' *māyā*), but might also be found in the wandering between them. One can wander between different possibilities without being bound,

attached to, or totally identified with any of them; one can hold the 'compossibility' of multiple possibilities, the 'comperspectivity' of different perspectives. Hence, freedom can be gained not merely *via negativa* but also positively, and the non-dual conclusion be reached not merely by annihilating the multiplicity of the world but also by holding together the totality of the multiple picture, or seeing the multiplicity as a holistic picture. The *brahman* in such a reading will cease to be an ontological entity transcending the world of phenomena; instead, it will refer to the meta-perspective which allows the possibility of every possibility.

To conclude, I would like to wholeheartedly recommend the readers to re-read the stories of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha,* and Swami Venkatesananda's book in a newly released Indian edition is a great occasion for doing so.

Final remark: Since the release of Swami Venkatesananda's book in 2003, three other related books have also been published:

1. Swami Venkatesananda (trans.), *The Supreme Yoga: A New Translation of the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha* (in two volumes), New Age Books, New Delhi, 2005, Rs. 450 (first published in South Africa in 1976).
2. Raghunandan, *The Wisdom of Laghu Yoga Vāsiṣṭha from a Seeker's Point of View,* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2004, pp. 524, Rs. 795.
3. Atreya, B.L., *The Vision and the Way of Vāsiṣṭha (Vāsiṣṭha-Darśanam),* translated from the original Sanskrit by Samvid, Samata Books, Chennai, 2005, pp. 586, Rs. 300 (first published by the Government Press, Allahabad, in 1936).

The first book (Venkatesananda's *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in two volumes) is in fact an earlier, enlarged version of the book which I have reviewed above. It is another recent Indian edition of a book released elsewhere (South Africa) three decades ago. In the second book (Raghunandan's), the author offers an annotated retelling of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha's* stories, with his own associations and links (such as to Carlos Castaneda's *Don Juan* book series). The third book is an intriguing reprint in English of the Sanskrit appendix of a thesis titled 'The Philosophy of Vāsiṣṭha as presented in the Yogavāsiṣṭha'

submitted to the Benares Hindu University in 1928 by B.L. Atreya for the Doctor of Letters degree. It includes a thorough introduction and three chapters titled 'The Qualities for (the attainment of) Knowledge' *(jñānādhikāra)*, 'The Knowledge of the True Principle' *(tattvajñānam)* and 'Liberation' *(mokṣa)*.

Notes and References

1. See for example Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, 'The *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*: It's Probable Date and Place of Inception', in: *Proceedings of the Third All-India Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924*, p. 545–53, Madras, 1925; Prahlad C. Divanji, 'Further Light on the Date of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*', *Poona Orientalist 3* (1938): 29–44; Atreya, B.L., *The Vision and the Way of Vāsiṣṭha (Vāsiṣṭha-Darśanam)*, pp. 6–11.
2. Venkatesananda, Swami, *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha: The Supreme Yoga*, p. xiii.
3. Ibid., p. 88.
4. Larson, Gerald James, *Classical Sāmkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979, p. 274.
5. Venkatesananda, Swami, *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha: The Supreme Yoga*, p. 126.
6. Ibid., pp. 89–105 (29 March to 14 April).
7. Ibid., p. 92 (1 April).

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K.P. Sahu: *A Common Man's Philosophy of Life*, Satyabhama Publications, Rourkela (Orissa), pp. 85, $10 (US).

The author, K.P. Sahu, intends in this book to deal with the answers to such questions that arise—as the author himself thinks in his remarks 'About the Book'—'in the heart of man' but 'remain unanswered for life and trouble him till death'. Sahu acknowledges that answers to such questions are already there but in a scattered manner with scholarly discourses appended to them. Thus, he realizes the need of a 'short and readable volume containing answers' to all such questions at one place 'for the busy man of today'.

As the title of the book '*A Common Man's Philosophy of Life*' suggests, the questions taken up by Sahu as well as the answers to those questions provided by him would cope with the common man's life, his interests and expectations, and his limited mode of ability to appreciate any intellectual subject matter; but in place of all this the reader finds in the book philosophical discussions introducing age-old metaphysical problems relating to the existence of God, 'Life after death' in the form of various doctrines concerning mind-body relation, theories of conduct, and problem of determinism versus human freedom and responsibility. All this constitutes most of the contents of the first two sections, named 'books' by author in an old-fashioned manner. In the last two sections, one is confronted with the popular introductory version of abstract metaphysical doctrines like *Advaita Vedānta and Advaita in Bhagavadgītā*, and a preliminary account of *Yoga darśana*.

Undoubtedly, the reader finds in the book—if he happens to be a student of Philosophy rather than a common man unfamiliar with philosophy—something 'short and readable' in which he may take interest and get thereby indulged further in philosophizing. Thus, the value of the book lies in provoking thinking in a philosophically sensitive reader. Moreover, the author seems to succeed—especially with his capacity to summarize—in making a beginner of Philosophy get acquainted with certain standard doctrines, arguments and counter arguments, therein pertaining to certain problems of Western Philosophy of Religion, including Philosophy of Mind (pp. 3–22) and Ethics (pp. 23–28, 31–43, 48–51). The same may be said in case of Indian systems of *Advaita Vedānta*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Yoga*. But the book most often does not concern with the common man, neither in its style of writing which is at par with other ordinarily written introductory philosophical discourses, nor in its subject matter. A common man, on perusing the concepts and doctrines of *Advaita Vedānta*, feels bewildered rather than gaining something having relevance and significance for his kind of life and understanding. Similarly, when he listens to the *Gita*'s concept of action without the desire to fruit, he may get rather lost thinking how to succeed in performing such a kind of action.

Thus, what Sahu attempts to propound in the name of *An Alternative Goal in Life* with the help of the doctrines of *Advaita Vedānta*

and the *Gītā* (pp. 53–60) seems to have no relevance to common man's interests and understanding. Nevertheless, Sahu, making a tall claim, says that *Advaita*'s doctrine of unity of all existence and existence is God Himself develops a sense of responsibility towards others as no religion does (p. 85). It is to be noted that Sahu does not even make an attempt to substantiate this claim.

Besides all this, there is a remarkable inconsistency in the book. After denying the existence of God, soul and responsibility in section I, when Sahu comes to II and III sections intending to propound an alternative to Conventional Theology that believes in existence of God, soul and man's responsibility, he subscribes to the doctrines of *Advaita Vedānta* and the *Gītā* for the alternative world-view, and thereby concedes all that which he has denied. It creates the impression that it is his overwhelming support for ancient Indian spiritual thought which makes him admit a position prima facie as philosophically troublesome.

Despite all the deficiencies, irrelevance and tall claims stated above, the author's insight seems to have grasped a significant principle deserving relevance for the interest and understanding of common man, namely the principle of 'helping other men in their development', which he attempts to elucidate as a master duty (pp. 33–39). If he had confined himself to elaborating this principle as a predominant task of the book without recourse to philosophical Jargon referring to different philosophical doctrines, he would have written the book really conforming with the spirit of the title of the book.

Sahu's scientific perspective, traceable all over in the book towards the various questions he considers such as mind-body relation, God-realization, supernormal powers, etc., and his conception of 'help to other men in their development' as the master duty, together constitute the point of potentiality implicitly present in the book.

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Books Received

1. Anang Pradyuman Kumar: *The Jaina Way of Life*, Research Books, B-5/263, Yamuna Vihar, Delhi 110 053, 2004, pp. 212, Rs. 350.

2. Chittra Madhavan: *History and Culture of Tamil Nadu*, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi 110 015, 2005, pp. 305, Rs. 620.

3. Dharmakirti: *Shri Dharmakirti Mahayana Tantra*, Penguin Books India (P) Ltd., 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Marg, New Delhi 110 017, 2002, pp. 171, Rs. 200.

4. K. Narain: *The Philosophy of the Vallabh School of Vedānta*, Indological Research Centre, B34/115, Sukulpura, Durgakund, Varanasi 221 010, 2004, pp. 465, Rs. 495.

5. K. Narain: *The Fundamentals of Advaita Vedānta*, Indological Research Centre, B 34/115, Sukulpura, Durgakund, Varanasi 221 010, 2003, pp. 311, Rs. 395.

6. Harsiddh M. Joshi: *Philosophical Papers of Prof. J.N. Chubb*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006, pp. 650, Rs. 650.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ओ ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ன ṉ
ழ ḻ
ண ṇ
ற ṟ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vēve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.