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The Return of the Emancipated. An Essay Concerning Karl Marx's Question: How is the Transcendence and Realization of Philosophy Possible?

MURZBAN JAL

275, Princess Building, 1st Floor, Princess Street, Mumbai 400 002

Ah, I have studied philosophy,
Medicine, jurisprudence too,
And for my sorrows theology,
Over and over, through and through.

Goethe, *Faust.* Part One.

Reason has always existed, but not always in reasonable form.

Karl Marx. 'To Arnold Ruge, 1843.

Not only in its answers,
even in its questions there was a mystification.

Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideoloy.*

Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.

T.W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics.*

INTRODUCTION

Marx's question on the critique of the Hegelian dialectic in particular and the history of philosophy in general, which is summed in his statement on the transcendence and realization of philosophy (*Aufhebung und Verwirklichung der Philosophie*) is probably the most important question in Marx's philosophy. Unfortunately, not sufficiently analyzed. Unfortunately, because the neglect of critical Marxism led to the most spurious studies in Hegel and Marx. This

neglect played a pivotal part in the ideological struggles (following Lenin's death) which culminated in the counter-revolutionary coup against the Bolsheviks led by the Stalinist oligarchy in the late 1920s and the inability of either the left-opposition led by Trotsky or other revolutionary groups to deal with the Stalin question (especially the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union by the Stalinists), and the rise of fascism in Germany. The fall of the Soviet bloc was a mere necessary end result of a falsification of Marxism by a state-capitalist bureaucracy.

The Second International had stressed on the primacy of the political in the revolutionary desire to overthrow international capitalism. However, the question of the primacy of Marxist philosophy as the dialectical unity of theory and praxis was largely put on the back burner. In the fury of on the First Imperialist World War, Lenin was studiously involved in the studies of Hegel. In these notebooks known to history as the *Philosophical Notebooks*, Lenin insisted on the knowledge of Hegel (in fact, the complete *Science of Logic*) without which it was impossible to understand Marx's *Capital*, especially the first chapter. Consequently, Lenin mourned, that even after half a century after Marx, the Marxists have not understood Marx. Alas, how true were to be these words!

PRELUDE TO THE RETURN OF THE EMANCIPATED

Philosophy is essentially political. Political because it deals with the question: what is 'man'? The three Kantian questions followed by a fourth one added by Martin Heidegger: 'what is "man"' deals with this very philosophical question that is essentially political.

The twentieth century saw four unsurpassable horrors: the two imperialist World Wars, the rise of Stalinism, Nazism and the formation of the American 'empire'. Whilst Stalinism and fascism are (at least officially) dead and buried, the empire (though ought to have suffered a similar fate) is alive and having its spectral marchpast over the entire globe. In this context one asks: what relevance does Marxism have for the twenty-first century? And how can it deal with the very philosophical question that is essentially political: what is 'man'?

It is quite often said that philosophy in the telos of Western Reason emerged with the Greeks and philosophical reasoning from

the Greek *polis*. Philosophy as philosophy emerged not only with the inquiry of the Being of beings understood as the destiny of Being but also with the questions of democracy and liberty, as also the question: what is 'man'? Despite two thousand five hundred years after this question was asked we yet ponder: what is 'man'? Marx had raised two questions with regard to 'man': what are *Gattungswesen* (species being) and *das menschliche Wesen* (the human essence)? It is with these questions that we pose the most important question of our times: what is socialism and how is it possible?

Though philosophy emerged in the telos of Western Reason with Anaximander and Thales that provided a setting for the rise of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Sophists; there remained at the background of the politics of 'man', the telos of the 'Idea' which moved from the *Book of Moses—the* Judaic, Christian and Islamic accounts of creation—to Hegel. Now Marx the modem Sophist and Cynic had nothing to do with the 'Idea' except that he had everything to do with it, just as Freud had nothing to do with psychosis and yet had everything to do with it. The movement towards the 'Idea' would be a movement towards the history of philosophy along with the question: what is 'man'? And in this 'Idea' is posed not only the perfection of Western culture and civilization but its very imperfection. In this 'Idea', we have both reason and psychosis. The formation of the empire under the rather innocent name of globalization is the perfection of this 'Idea' as psychosis. It also implies the death of 'man'. And in this perfection and imperfection we pose the question: What is Marxist philosophy and what relevance does it have for the twenty-first century? With this in mind we begin the Marxist interrogation of philosophy.

This article bases Marx's *Aufhebung der Philosophie* in the following sites:

(1) The Being question. Herein is situated the forgetfulness and the remembrance of Being. The recurrence of Being is the return of the neurotic trauma facing global class societies. Philosophy is then considered as the eternal recurrence of the neurotic self-same. 'Being' as both 'Matter' and the 'Idea' are games played by philosophy's neurosis. Yet one must understand that this neurosis is rooted in actual reality. Marx does not think that philosophy's

neurosis can be wished away. In *Capital* he recalls the question of Being. There are three sites—'Being', 'being' and 'beings'. Now 'beings' (i.e., 'men' who are essentially political) are alienated and thus we have a positing of 'being' and 'Being'. Both 'being' and 'Being' are reifications, these awful 'things' that are given life. Now these animated 'things' with this alchemical magically bestowed powers are represented in philosophy as the story of 'being' and 'Being'. The story of 'Being' is the story of the double forgetfulness of 'man' and the politics of 'man'.

In *Capital*, 'being' is reified society, a reified relations between things; whilst 'Being' is the 'essence', 'substance' and 'groundwork' of 'being'. Now 'being' is a 'thing', whilst 'Being' (the Being of beings) implies the total loss, not only of all human characteristics, but also the loss of all materiality and concreteness. To borrow Marx's phrase: *existence as a material thing (sinnlichen Beschaffenheiten) is put out of sight (ausgelöscht).*[1] The story of philosophy is the consequent putting out of sight sensuousness. Philosophy is the story of blindness.

(2) Disembodiment and metamorphosis. There are a number of binaries governing the history of philosophy: Matter/Idea, body/soul, necessity/freedom, etc., and despite each philosopher attempting to offer solutions, it turns out that this is only the self-same problem returning again. The neurotic has returned. Plato's fundamental philosophical statement: to leave the cave of darkness and shadows, and behold the world of light is forgotten. We have returned to the cave, in fact descended deeper and deeper into this dark cave of eternal darkness.

When Marx said that 'existence as a material thing (*sinnlichen Beschaffenheiten*) is put out of sight (*ausgelöscht*)', he meant that that not only did philosophy (and theology, especially Christianity) but also class civilizations as its fundamental *point of departure*, imply this blindness. Why is this so? It is because class civilizations, in the production of commodities, necessarily *shed their character of materiality* (use values) to posit this ideal character of value and exchange value. Both class societies and philosophy shed this materiality. This process of disembodiment and metamorphosis forms the essential characteristic of both class societies and philosophy. Marx calls these processes, fetishized, irrational, magical and necromantic processes.[2]

Philosophy is this exemplaric forgetfulness of the *sinnlichen Beschaffenheiten.* The *Aufhebung* of philosophy is necessarily the war against this amnesia.

(3) Alienation-reification-fetishism. This triad forms the cell form and the backbone of the epistemic mechanisms of the blindness of philosophy. To explore this cell form is the categorical imperative.

(4) The question of 'man' that is essentially political. The remembrance of this story is the narrating of the story of the desiring human essence (*das menchliche Wesen*).

In this essay, Marxist philosophy is submitted to a double fold reasoning: the genealogy of estrangement and the hermeneutics of translations, where philosophy's 'Being', 'Consciousness', 'Truth', 'Essence', 'the Essence of Truth', etc., are translated into the question of 'man' that is essentially political. If Ludwig Feuerbach thought that the truth of theology is anthropology, then for Marx the truth of philosophy is 'man' who is essentially political.

Now arriving at the well-known site of understanding philosophy as class struggle, we explore another site—the site of estrangement. In understanding philosophy being registered in the dual sites of class struggle and estrangement, Karl Marx, the philosopher of practical reason (also the registrar of unpractical reason), registered not only a different type of a 'turn' in the history of philosophy, but a very radical subversion. Since this subversion philosophy ceased to be read in the texts of understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*)—as for instance the way Kant and Hegel read philosophy—but was inscribed in the dual flows: capital flows and psychosis. And it is in these sites that Marx raised the question: how is philosophy to be real and praxical, and thus how is one to transcend and realize philosophy?

Marx's historical materialist inscription: the economic base determines (*bestimmte*) the ideological superstructure redrafted as the reified economic base determines the philosophical superstructure brought forth the notion of the philosophical mind as the estranged mind. Now this philosophical-estranged mind is notified within the flows of being and consciousness—capital accumulation + psychosis. So what is so fundamental that has happened in these flows? That the philosopher Aristotle (the greatest mind of antiquity, as Marx thought him to be)[3] was seen as riding on the horse

of reason and barbarism both at the same time, and thus necessarily accompanied by his student, the schizoid Alexander 'the great', who is apparently also at the same time 'the accursed' (*guzastag*)[4]. Greatness and curses move hand in hand. It is this irony that not only devours philosophy but also the history of humanity. Great civilizations are almost always accompanied by great barbarisms. One recalls Walter Benjamin: 'There is no cultural document that is not at the same time a record of barbarism.'[5]

Thus, the ancient Heraclitean dictum: *everything flows* is transformed into the dictum: everything great flows in an accursed manner. We have this dual type of flows determining history—capital flows and psychosis that would interest this Marxist reading of philosophy. Now this is a very peculiar type of reading that Marx suggests. To read philosophy in the dual estranged flows of (1) capital flows, and (2) psychotic flows which is to read philosophy in the text of imagined madness. For when the young Marx suggested that one ought to read philosophy as the speech act of the estranged human essence,[6] he implied that this text had to be translated into the (psychoanalytic) text of repression. Philosophy not only represses, it also says exactly the opposite of what it represses. And to grasp the importance of philosophy is to grasp this very important point in the history of human repression.

There are two important points that Louis Althusser raised in *Lenin and Philosophy*: to understand philosophy as a lost path, as a *Holzweg*, and to understand Marxism as a different practice of philosophy that records these false paths.[7] Now one may ask: how is one to read philosophy as the story of human repression? Is this not taking matters a little to far? Is this combination: repression-philosophy, or even estrangement-philosophy (the classical young Marx repertoire) taking things onto the routes of a messianic Utopianism that no one would want to traverse? Why should wisdom, the privileged vantage position of philosophy, be aligned with madness? How far can one go? To which different realm must one go in order to free oneself from this imagined madness?

There are four important points emerging from the above observation on philosophy as the lost path (*Holzweg*): (1) To understand the aetiology of philosophy as estrangement-repression; (2) to locate the 'origins' of this estrangement-repression; (3) to study the 'origins' of philosophy; and (4) to seek the 'origins' of class civilizations. It is with these points that Marx the adventurer sought to walk on the paths of philosophy. But his walk was not to be a lonely one, for the German dialecticians, the Scottish political economists and the French socialists accompanied him. And knowing that the French were to be around, insurrection could not be far behind.

Now Marx, who insists on reading history as the history of class struggles and the history of philosophy as desiring human estrangement, claims that there are a number of layers constituted within the history of philosophy and (to borrow an idea of Marx's reading of Hegel) one has to discover the rational element that lies hidden behind the mystical shell of philosophical reasoning.[8] One has to be an archaeologist in order to understand philosophy. For, to philosophize, means for Marx (besides the recording of class struggle in the field of theory)[9] a rather peculiar act in which one is living a human estrangement (*Entfremdung*) and the history of violent and explosive distortions, as well as transgressing these estrangements and distortions. If one could—at least for temporal epistemic purposes—define Marxism, then one could call it the genealogy of estrangement and its critical-dialectical transcendence (*Aufhebung*). The history of philosophy is read in the continuously shifting sites of *Entfremdung* and anti-*Entfremdung*. To register this class struggle in the realm of theory and praxis is the leitmotiv of Marx's philosophical repertoire. And to signal the 'end of *Entfremdung*' is Marx's chief aim. Wisdom is born only when estrangement dies. In this very modern regime of this 'end', can the death of madness and the birth of authenticity and the desiring human essence be rendered possible. It is at this site that one poses and re-poses the question of Marx's philosophy. The special relevance of this question can be re-posed as: what relevance does Marxist philosophy have for the twenty-first century?

Now one knows that the question: 'What is Marxist philosophy?' is a question that cannot be posed and solved once and for all times. It is a spectre that has risen again and which haunts not only bourgeois Europe but also the whole world; and that despite the 'end of history and ideology' as also the 'death of Marxism' sung by the global bourgeoisie (after the death of Stalinist social

engineering), history, ideology and Marxism have emerged from these posthumous graves to haunt the world again. Earlier, we lived in the realms of reality. Now we are condemned to live our lives with spectres. Why is this so? Because we did not bury the dead properly. Also because Stalin, the ex-priest, refused to let go of the fetishes of the past. In fact, he insisted that all the spectres of the past (led by the commodity) were to incorporated into the present. Maybe the rites that we were to perform were not the proper rites. We thought that we should let the dead bury the dead, but now the dead have emerged from the graves and have gripped the living. 'We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. *Le mort saist le vif!*'[10]

And so the truth of Lenin's words rings out again: the Marxists have not understood Marx! Why is this so? Because the Marxists did not read Hegel, hence they could not understand the aetiology of idealism and the history of global specterology. If they could not understand this then how was one to exorcise the spectres of estrangement and imagined madness?

For Marx the adventurer, to philosophize means walking on paths that have been hitherto not been walked on. At these un-walked paths Marx arrives at the crossroads—the paths of idealism (Hegel) and philosophical anthropology (Feuerbach). It is on these crossroads that Marx, along with two friends, Scottish political economy and French socialism, writes the obituary of the spectres. But for that, Hegel has to be understood in particular, and the history of philosophy in general. There is a concrete observation that Marx makes on the very first moment on entering the *Holzweg* of philosophy: that reality appears as an object form (*Form des Objekts*)[11] and where alien objects litter the paths of philosophy.[12] The history of philosophy is dominated by the 'alien world of objects'.[13] So the form of philosophical reasoning is reasoning in 'estranged form' (*entfremdete Form*)[14] where this 'form of estrangement' (*From der Entfremdung*)[15] has beneath an 'estranged essence' (*fremden Wesen*).[16] Now the question: what is wrong with philosophy, added to the question: what is wrong with class civilizations is answered rather simply—that both are governed by an '*alien* reality' (*fremde Wirklichkeit*).[17] We live, thus, in an occupied territory.

Let us move now to the concrete Marxist question: what did Marx mean when he said that the economic base *determines* the

ideological superstructure? How do the concepts of alienation, reification and fetishism enter the scene of Marxist philosophy in such a way that historical materialism redrafts the base-superstructure problematic as: *the alienated political economy determines the reified mind*? How then does one understand the category of determination (*Bestimmung*) as *estranged determination*?

It is with this variation on a theme of historical materialism whereby we focus our attention on the neglected theme of the problematics of philosophy that the young Marx had raised in his 1843–44 critique of Hegel. In this essay, Marx mentions a revolution in philosophy with special reference to the issues of the reification of philosophical consciousness and the transcendence (*Aufhebung*) and realization (*Verwirklichung*) of philosophy. It is in this dialectical setting of transcendence and realization that one attempts to understand the nature of Marx's revolution. Marx relates the history of philosophy (especially the fundamental structural changes taking place as in the shifts from the Greek philosophers to Christian medievalism to the Enlightenment and the Renaissance, culminating in the philosophy of modernity and the international communist movement) not only with the history of class struggles but also to the question of human estrangement. What then is this uncanny relation between alienation and philosophy and can one prove such a relation? What does this relation imply?

The question on the nature of Marx's great revolution in thought remains unanswered. If philosophy is written in the text of repression and imagined madness, then in what manner would Marxism reveal itself as an alleged therapist model? Is Marxism a 'science', an 'ideology', or 'philosophy'? Or is it involved in the postmodern world of free-floating 'posties' that refuses to be defined? Or, in contrast to the postmodern discourse, does Marxism in its radical engagement-disengagement of the bourgeois life-world actually pose the question of a revolutionary mass philosophy—*of a theory that has become radical because it has been able to grip the masses*?[18] And how is this 'gripping of the masses' possible?

This article is divided into the following parts: (1) 'Dialectical Materialism and the problem of the Reified Mind' that highlights Marx's idea of the 'estrangement mind' and the conception of

philosophy as 'the alienation of the human essence'; (2) 'The Birth of the Spectre' that relates philosophy with the psychoanalytic conception of the uncanny (*das Unheimlich*) or the feeling of the arousal of dread and terror, followed by the outlining of Marx's idea of Hegelian philosophy as inverted consciousness and the consequent inversion of this reification; and (3) 'Subverting the Spectropoetics of Philosophy' that shows how Marx subverts the shadowy spectral ideological world that has from time immemorial been haunting humanity.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ESTRANGED MIND

In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx, along with his revolutionary compatriot Engels, said that communism 'abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality instead of constituting them on a new basis, it therefore acts in contradiction to all past experiences'.[19] And since then Marxism is understood as the discontinuation of traditional thinking involving a radical rupture (*das radikalste Brechen*)[20] with traditional ideologies and philosophies. It then became not only what Louis Althusser called a 'different practice of philosophy',[21] but also a different theory and praxis of philosophy constituted in a new continent of knowledge.[22]

So what is this new continent of knowledge? Marx answers: it is the unknown continent in which the even more unknown 'estranged mind' (*entfremdete Geist*)[23] has immigrated. Now one knows that this term estranged mind Marx had reserved for Hegel, the master deceiver and truth teller. But for Marx, Hegel is merely a symptom of an even bigger estranged mind, in this big game of the history of philosophy. Marx then asks: what should one do with this estranged mind that has immigrated into a far off continent? Marx answers: to make philosophy confess (even in the safe abode of the far off continent) that it is:

> nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e. another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the human essence (*Form und Daseinweise der Entfremdung des menschlichen Wesens*); hence equally to be condemned.[24]

Now Marx, the alleged registrar of impractical reason, says t hat there are some types of reservations constituted within the

continent of the estranged mind, and that is the reservations which have hidden the true people of this continent, the people of '*true materialism*' and a '*real science*' whereby flow freely the 'social relationship(s) of "human to human"' (*gesellshaftliche Verhältnis des Menschen zum Menschen*).[25]

And in these reservations of the colonized continent Marx openly declares the conscious negation of philosophy (*Negation der Philosophie*), of 'philosophy as philosophy'.[26] In fact, Marx is all out for the indigenous people of 'real and true humanity'.

Yet one must point out, Marxism in its now well thought out 'just war' on philosophy's cruel conquest of the continent is not a positivism which collapses all knowledge into a sort of imaginary and exemplary 'scientistically' defined natural scientific system. Marx thinks this to be an abuse of the natural sciences by the technological rationalists and the positivists—a collapse of knowledge, which like the German idealist philosopher Schelling produces a mystical philosophy of identity, and to borrow Hegel's phrase lives in a 'dark night where all cows are black'. Nor is Marxism a sort of a Heideggerean 'end of philosophy'. That philosophy remains essential for Marx, but not as traditional philosophy running from Anaxaminder, Thales and Plato to Hegel, but as a 'new' philosophy (a philosophy that confesses to its imagined madness), is evident from his statement that for the emancipation of humanity, the head of this emancipation is philosophy, whilst the heart is the democratic multitude, the proletariat—and thus philosophy finds its material weapons in the multitude, just as the multitude finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy.[27]

THE BIRTH OF THE SPECTRE

We shall now move into the realm of the ideological superstructure in order to understand Marx's reading of the history of philosophy in the unexplained continent of the estranged mind and the reservations of true materialism and real science. In these locations one asks: what is the speciality of Marx's theory of philosophy, and how should one reveal the aetiology of repression, estrangement and class struggle? What is the nature of causality between the economic base and the ideological superstructure, and how does one relate philosophy with the political economies

of estrangement and class struggle? We know that since Lukács and Bakhtin, the notion of mechanical causality was purged out from revolutionary Marxism, yet this uncanny mind refuses to leave the scene of history. Why is this so? One may answer that it is because the notion of *expressive-fetishized causality* is hidden so one cannot understand how an ideological-phantastic superstructure emerges from an economic base. Does this not remind one of magic and alchemy – to grow the tree of philosophy from the soil of economics?

Now in order to explicate Marx's alchemical and phantasmagorical reading of philosophy, we move initially into its margins—a document on revolutionary political praxis and a sketch on madness – in order to move into its core. We thus take two texts, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and E.T.A. Hoffmann's *The Sandman* in order to understand how the nature of the estranged mind immigrated to an unfortunate continent that it would mercilessly decimate; and then we proceed into Marx's understanding of Hegel.

In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx had pointed out that the motor force of hitherto existing history is the history of class struggles. That class struggles are directly related to the problem of alienation, reification and fetishism, was on the one hand accepted by thinkers like Georg Lukács, Raya Dunayevskaya, Theodor Adorno, Isaac Rubin, Roman Rosdolsky, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Fredrich Jameson, Jacques Derrida, Slavoj Žižek, etc., and on the other hand, ignord by the Stalinist dominated communist parties, or attacked as was the case with Althusser. The fact that it is linked to the idea of reification, especially with the reification of consciousness, is evident from the opening sentence of the *Manifesto* itself: 'A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism' (*Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa—das Gespenst des Kommunismus*).[28] And what does it mean? That the holy capitalist empire comprising the pope and the tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French radicals and German police-spies have declared that the anti-Christ, now in the form of communist revolutionaries, are to destroy all that is holy and eternal—private property, the family system and the state. Marx takes on the challenge of the holy capitalist empire—he seeks to tear down the spectre hurled onto the revolutionaries by saying that the communists should openly

declare themselves to the world by publishing their views and thus able to 'meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.'[29]

Now this question of 'nursery tales' is not a question of children's innocent comic books. It is well known that at that time these tales stood for stories of terror that aroused fear. In the times of Marx and Freud too, children's stories were those that brought in the feeling of dread. Freud immortalized his observations in *das Unheimlich* ('The Uncanny').[30] To understand Marx's idea of the *estranged mind* let us move to the question of the uncanny in psychoanalysis. Freud here mentions the story of E.T.A. Hoffmann's, *The Sandman*. In this story Hoffmann tells us about Nathaniel who is haunted by the trauma of a certain fictions 'sandman', whose footsteps he allegedly hears every night.[31] With regard to the question: who is the sandman?—he is told by his nurse that he is a wicked man who sprinkles sand in the eyes of children who do not sleep at night, and then flees to the moon, where he gives the eyes to his children who live in a nest. Nathaniel does not understand the metaphorical level of the story and associates both the steps that he hears at night, as well as this newfound fear of losing his eyes with some unforeseen event in reality. This fear grows and the fictious 'sandman' repeatedly appears in his imagination, initially in the form of a certain repulsive advocate called Coppelius (the transfiguration of the father image) whom he associates with an alchemist who helps his father in some strange experiments, which apparently kills his father; and later with a strange dealer of barometers, Coppola, who sells all sorts of glasses which Nathaniel mistakes for damaged eyes. ('Coppo', so Freud claims following Beate Rank, means, 'eye-socket').[32] Each time this image off and the sandman occurs, Nathaniel is struck by mental illness, only to recover, helped by the beautiful Clara. Later Nathaniel goes to university and forgets his beloved Clara only to fall in love with an automaton, a life-sized doll called Olympia who is made by his professor Splanzani and helped by a watchmaker, the nasty Coppola (a recurrence of the image of the sandman) who sets up her eyes. (Note the process of reification working here. For reification as 'thingification', *Verdinglichung* or *Versachlichung* implies, *life given to lifeless objects, and also a maddening love for this object*, a theory that

would interest Marx as well as Freud.) Now, due to an argument on the question of ownership of Olympia, and the consequent tussle between the two people who had made this doll, Olympia breaks into pieces in front of her shocked lover. The beloved lifeless object is broken! The eyes come out from the eye sockets! Nathaniel goes insane again, only to recover. One fine day when he is with the now reconciled Clara on the top of a tall tower, he sees a mysterious object moving below. He takes out his pocket-telescope given to him by Coppola, and he imagines that he sees the horrible image of the sandman in the form of the repulsive Coppelius. He is struck by madness again and tries to throw Clara below, only to fling himself to his death. So what is the moral of this story? That the estranged mind with its borrowed vision leads to death.

That this narrative of reification and horror is important for Freud is well known. That it ought to be important for Marx should also be obvious, since there is the theme of blindness, psychosis, violence and death running throughout the history of class societies. But for Marx, there is something more than the Freudian motif of individual mental illness, namely, the theme of the *reification of consciousness* and the consequent enslavement of the subject, the theme that is manifested as the *problem of ideology*—'ideology' implying not only 'political ideology' and the principle of domination but also the ontology of fetishism that erases the 'Real'. In *The German Ideology* Marx says that ideology is haunted with the history of ghosts (*Gespenstergeschichte*).[33] From henceforth, ideology aligns itself with philosophy and becomes 'ideology-philosophy' that speaks the language of the repressed unconscious. Now what happens is that philosophy the rather 'innocent' wisdom searching enterprise is aligned with the not so innocent discipline of ideology. In fact, no philosophy has ever been innocent, and no philosopher has lived the life of innocence.

Philosophy's questions: 'Being', 'Truth', etc., need to be hurled down from the ivory towers of the 'Idea' into the streets wherein dwells 'man' who is essentially political. The 'self-sufficient philosophy (*die selbständige Philosophie*)' with its 'empty phrases' should end; and where speculation ends (*aufhört*) there real life (*wirkliche Leben*) begins, and there also begins 'real, positive science' (*wirkliche positive Wissenschaften*).[34]

In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx pointed out to a leitmotiv in both the mechanisms of society and thought. The history of human civilizations is constituted in the dialectic of the 'estrangement of the human essence' (*Entfremdung des menschlichen Wesens*) and the 'transcendence of the estrangement' (*die Aufhebung der Entfremdung*), which is also understood as 'the appropriation of the human essence' (*die Aneignung des menschlichen Wesens*).[35] When Marx talked of the importance of understanding that we exist in the *Holzweg* of an imagined madness, he claimed that it was important to understand how a distorted-duplicated world produced by philosophy was so important to humanity. He thus asked why does this inverted consciousness (*verkehrtes Weltbewusstsein*) of an inverted world (*verkehrte Welt*) take so much attention of society?[36] Why has it taken such a dominant form? And Marx claims that if the emancipatory interests have to be the leitmotiv of any cognitive science, then it is imperative to understand this bewildering world standing on its head (*auf den Kopf stellen*).[37] And this strange idealized upside down world becomes 'the general theory of this world', 'its encyclopaedic compendium', 'its logic in popular form', 'its moral sanction' and 'universal basis of consolation and justification'.[38]

When philosophy is understood as the manifestation of the estranged mind and the reification of the life-world, then turning one's attention to it is of critical importance. For this, Hegel, the exemplary philosopher of estrangement who both spoke the truth and lied, enters the scene of the Marxist repertoire:

> Hegel's *Enzyklopädie*, beginning as it is with logic, with *pure speculative thought*, and ending with *absolute knowledge—with* the self-conscious, self-comprehending philosophic or absolute (i.e. superhuman) abstract mind (*abstrakten Geist*)—is in its entirety nothing but the *display*, the self-objectification, of the *essence* of the philosophic mind, and the philosophical mind is nothing but the estranged mind (*entfremdete Geist*), of the world thinking within its self-estrangement—i.e. comprehending itself abstractly.
>
> *Logic*—mind's *coin of the realm*, the speculative or *mental value* of humanity and nature—its essence which has grown totally indifferent to all real determinateness, and hence unreal essence (*unwirkliches Wesen*)—is *alienated thinking*, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and from real humanity: *abstract thinking* (*das abstrakte Denken*).[39]

The question remains: if Hegel is considered the essence of estranged thinking why not totally reject him, just as the positivists rejected Hegel with the entire continental tradition? What is so profound about Hegel, so that Marx, a philosopher who stressed on observation, could claim to be a student of one who was totally oblivious to observation? It is well known that Hegel's dissertation was on the planetary orbits; a problem that he thought could be solved by *a priori* pure reason. He thus tried to prove Plato's theory that there exist only seven planets. Specific mention should be made on Hegel's refusal to concede that any planet can exist between Mars and Jupiter. That he is wrong is evident, right from the date when Hegel published his thesis, when an asteroid named 'Ceres' was discovered, not to mention later discoveries of Neptune and Pluto.

So what is so important for Marx that one ought to read Hegel very carefully? Why did Marx talk of a double reading of Hegel—of being able to read a rational method that is engulfed in the phantasmagorical mist of mysticism?[40] Why did Marx talk of the discourse of 'the complete domination of dead matter over humanity'[41] as metaphysical?

Note the phantoms that plagued Hegel's mind, and also note what Marx the exorcist and 'pupil of that mighty of that mighty thinker' did with Hegel, the master deceiver and truth teller. We take two texts: firstly, the 1873 'Afterword to the Second German Edition' of *Capital*, Vol. I, and, secondly, the 1843 critique of Hegel's metaphysics of the state:

> My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite (*direketes Gegentiel*). To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject (*selbständiges Subjekt*), is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
>
> The mystifying side of the Hegelian dialectic I criticized nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working on the first volume of *Das Kapital*, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre *Epigonentum* who now talk large in cultured Germany,

> to treat Hegel in the same way as the brave Moses Mendelson in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i.e. as a 'dead dog'. I, therefore, openly avowed myself as the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head (*Sie steht bei ihm auf dem Kopf*). It must be turned right side up again (*umstülpen*), if you would discover (*entdecken*) the rational kernel within the mystical shell.
>
> In its mystical form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinal professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the negation of that state, of its necessary downfall (*notwendigen Untergangs*); because it regards every historical developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes to account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.[42]

After glimpsing at the text of the 'old' Marx—a Marx infatuated with political economy, and trying to reason with Hegel by making him, if not think correctly, at least making him stand properly, and then let him hear the dirge that he (Marx) has written to capitalism that lies in ruins (*Untergangs*)—let us look at the rather 'young' Marx, the Marx in his radical critique of Hegel's philosophy of schozid textuality:

> The real relationship is described by speculative philosophy as *appearance* (*Ersheinung*), as *phenomenon* (*Phänomen*) .... (and real action) takes place behind the scenes. Reality is not deemed to be itself but another reality instead. The ordinary empirical world is not governed by its own mind but by a mind alien to it...
>
> (Consequently the) Idea is subjectivized and the real relationship....is conceived as their *inner imaginary* activity ... (For) in speculative philosophy it is the reverse *(umgekehrt)*. When the Idea is subjectivized the real subjects—civil society, the family, 'circumstances, caprice, etc.',—are all transformed into *unreal*, objective moments of the Idea....
>
> (So we see that human beings) are indebted for their existence to a mind other than their own; they are not self-determining but are instead determined by another....

> (Thus) the condition is posited as the conditioned, the determinator as the determined, the producer as the product...
>
> (For Hegel) makes the Idea into the subject, whilst the genuine real subject....is turned into the predicate....[43]

For Marx the quest of the 'genuine' is the essence of his philosophical endeavour. And so becoming the 'genuine real subject' implies the movement from the cocoon of life lived as a form of alienation (*Form der Enfremdung*) and the strange, bizarre and estranged reality (*fremde Wirklichkeit*).[44] Criticism, thus, turns to this estranged reality. What Marx calls the *Bestimmung*, the determination, that joins the disjoint realms of the base and the superstructure, the body and the mind; becomes the bridge and the missing link in Marx's adventurous search for an authentic philosophy. *Bestimmung* becomes the bridge that joins the soulless body with the bodiless soul. To this great bridge of judgement we descend.

SUBVERTING THE SPECTROPOETICS OF PHILOSOPHY

Truth, submitted to this bridge of judgement, has become monstrous. And in this monstrous realm philosophy is born. It is born at the very place where humanity is slaughtered. Philosophy is the rites of wisdom. It claims to seek wisdom, but it lies. Why is this so? It is so because philosophy (like the flows of capital) speaks not the truth. And like capital flows (the Ur-moment that lays the foundational stone for all class societies) philosophy is the flight from the Real. Recalling the psychoanalytic metaphor: the Real is castrated to create the Imaginary and the Symbolic worlds of philosophy. Philosophy is the story of both the castration anxiety and its very celebration.

That is why Marx says that philosophy is the speculative narrative of the 'phantastic isolation and fixity' of 'man'.[45] So what does philosophical consciousness look like? This is what Marx says:

> From this moment onwards consciousness *can* really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it *really* represents something without representing something real, from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc.[46]

What then is wrong with philosophy? Engels had defined Kant as *impotence in action*.[47] Why is this so? Because philosophy (with its castration anxiety-celebration) falls down on its knees in front of the fetish found in the *Holzweg* of estrangement. 'Philosophy and the study of the actual world', so Marx says, 'have the same relation to one another as onanism and sexual love.'[48] Instead of embracing the Real, philosophy refuses to do so. Instead it pays homage to the fetish of estrangement and in front of this monstrous idol slaughters humanity. Philosophy is the death of the human essence (*das menschliche Wesen*). The human essence dies so that philosophy is born. That is why philosophy is nothing more than a ghost. Thus, we have to descend into the realm of spectres again.

To answer the question: why does philosophy as the estranged mind yet exist, then one must not analyse the 'mind' alone in abstraction but see the wild horse that the philosopher is riding. To borrow the metaphor from historical materialism, one must understand the base in order to understand the estranged superstructure that is erected on this base. Philosophy and economics become partners in this game of estrangement and are, henceforth, to be seen as concretely bound together. The metamorphosis of commodities is inexorably tied to the uncanny metamorphosis of 'man', and the consequent macabre dance involved in the production of the 'Idea'. This time the charges against communism (levelled by the pope and other members of the ruling classes), that it is an evil anti-Christian spectre, is reversed, when Marx calls capitalism (along with all class societies) a society that is *essentially* spectral—that its Ur-base, the base of all bases is this uncanny 'ghostly objectivity (*gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit*)[49]—a society that has 'only form without content'.[50]

Let us have a look at the economic base from which emerges the estranged philosophical mind. Philosophical binaries—'Matter'/'Idea', 'body'/'soul', etc., have an uncanny double in the form of capitalism's principle binary—use value/value. Whilst theology negates the earth and the mortal body to create the spectacular soul and the heavens, philosophy negates the world of 'man' that is essentially political to posit the psychotic world of the 'Idea', and capitalism (like theology and philosophy) negates the bodily form

(use values) to posit value (the 'soul' and the 'Idea' of capitalism). This 'soul' and 'Idea' are the Ur-substances of capitalism, theology and philosophy. They are the *gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit.*

Let us now have a look at the phenomenology of this *gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit* found in the dreaded capital flows. Now according to Marx, capitalism is a society that continuously sheds its concrete bodily forms (in the slaughter of 'man' and the politics of the human essence) in order to acquire the form of capital flows. It thus becomes a disembodied society (the negation of use values and the positing of values), where it develops a mind (value) without a body (use value). Now those who are aware of Marx's reading of capital flows know that it is decoded in the formula M-C-M^1, where M stands for money (the 'mind', 'soul' and the 'Idea') invested in the circuit of capital accumulation, whilst C is the commodity that comprises the means of production and labour power (the earthly basis), whilst M^1 is surplus value (the super mind) or value over and above the original investment (M). Marx claims this a fetishism or a specterology, an occult-like process where as if by magic, a fruit called an 'M^1' grows from a tree named 'M'. Marx also christens this a content-less form, a phantasmagorical form where all birth marks of its origin are erased. And this phantasmagorical erasure emerges because its very Ur-moment involves an abstraction from the 'material elements and shapes' of the human life-world, where 'existence as a material thing is put out of sight'.[51] Thus (in capitalism as in philosophy), we 'put out of sight' the 'concrete' and consequently get the metaphysical and theological worlds of 'idealization' (*Idealisierung*), the 'one' and the 'abstract'.[52] These theological worlds of estrangement and capitalism are also the worlds of the 'invisible', 'imaginary', and 'ideal'.[53] It is the world of 'metempsychosis' and 'transmigration'[54]—the world of ghosts, and like Hamlet, the philosophers and the capitalists are chasing spectres. So we have this uncanny similarity between theology and capitalism, wherein we have not only the destruction of the body to create the spectral mind, but also the desire for this spectral mental-world. That is why when Marx talks of a critique of the philosophical estranged mind, he insists on the critique of the alien base from which has sprouted the not so desirable tree of philosophy. So how should we sum up this entire process in one

sentence? The summary goes this way: *The accumulation of capital—capital flows—produces the reified mind in this phantasmagorical process of disembodiment.*

That is why Marx says that one ought not to turn one's back to philosophy by muttering angry phrases, but by actively negating philosophy,[55] which is itself based on an active protracted war against the base itself. That is also why when Marx proceeds into the basis, not only the basis of an empirical ideological superstructure, but the Ur-Base, the ontological base of almost everything if not the base of class histories, then he says that this base is very slippery and deceptive. Marx, however, insists that he has found this grand Ur-base in the graveyard of humanity and in the world of magical things endowed with life—which is the world of 'immense accumulation of commodities'. Now this immense accumulation of magic creates the 'automatic fetish',[56] this 'automatic creating thing'[57] which is also a 'queer thing abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties'.[58] The philosophical mind is transplanted in this automatic fetish where we have this queer metaphysician and theologian (posing as philosopher and theoretician) giving us sermons on the mount.

Philosophy that grows from the soil of this automatic fetish starts miming this terrible fetish. The philosopher now allies himself with estrangement and celebrates the *Holzweg* of estrangement, has (in involving the forgetfulness of 'man' who is essentially political, and the remembrance of the 'Idea') become like the process of the metamorphosis of the commodity: the schizophrenic with the disjoint lost body and acquired psychotic mind—a 'born leveller and cynic', a prostitute as well as a theologian, who as Marx informs us, 'is always ready to exchange not only soul, but body, with any or every other commodity, be the same more repulsive than Maritornes ("the puppet". My insertion, M.J.) herself' (*Geborner Leveller und Zyniker, steht sie daher stets auf dem Sprung, mit jeder andren Ware, sei selbe auch ausgestattet mit mehr Unannehmlichkeiten als Maritorne, nicht nur die Selle, sondern den Leib zu wechseln*).[59] As a prostitute that has lost its body philosophy, like the commodity, exists only to exchange itself with another prostituted commodity, preferably for the grand idealized sign: money (the 'Idea'), that the young Marx says, 'which confuses and confounds all things'.[60] So this uncanny combination—prostitution and theology (in the celebration of the death of

the body)—forms the basis of our thinking. Our hegemonic ideology industry seems to say that critical and revolutionary thinking is nonsense, it belongs to the anti-Christ communist; whilst the prostitute-theologian—the schizophrenic with the reified mind and the disembodied body—is both the essence of society as well as the ideal we all must strive for.

Let us now see how the philosophic mind is based on the not so philosophic body. From this metaphor one may understand how the mind (*Geist*) emerges not from thinking, but money (*Geld*)—from the occultation of capital (M-C-M^1). When Marx says that the base determines the consciousness, he means that M^1 signifies estranged consciousness. It is well known that Marx insisted that money and capital are the idealized essences of capitalism. They are the 'common whore(s) of mankind', as well as 'the real *brain(s)* of all things'.[61] And as the terrible as well as the beautiful signs they manifest themselves as spectral philosophical consciousness. When Marx is talking of the metamorphosis of commodities, where humanity is lost to posit the 'thing', the 'thing' is lost to posit the pure sign; he is talking of the metamorphosis of humanity itself—from human to thing to spectre. Capitalism is the society of the magician and the alchemist—it 'transform(s) paper into gold by the magic of its imprint' *(die Magie seines Stempels Papier in Gold zu verwandeln)*.[62] Capitalism is thus the process of magic and reification as much as it is the process of horror and terror—the horror of the loss of the self and the creation of the estranged fetishes, especially the fetishized magic of creating gold from fraudulent paper. The ideology of capitalism is also its madness. And now we get this terrible transfigured capitalist kitsch: *reification is psychosis (recall Freud's definition of psychosis as 'the withdrawal from reality'), ideology is madness, and capitalism is mental illness.* Philosophy is the summary, the last word and worldview of this psychosis-reification-capitalism. It is the nemesis of the spectre and the narrative of the process of disembodiment. Thus, when Marx claims that the proletariat as the democratic multitude need to be the gravediggers of capitalism, he means that one needs to bury this madness once and for all.

When Marx is advocating an anti-specterolgy, he implies a 'force of abstraction'[63] that is able to pry into the estranged ghostly object and reveal its notorious essence. When Marx mentions the deep

structure of class civilizations as the 'ghostly reality', he means that this spectre would be creating further illusions and deceptions, these being manifested as the ideological superstructure of the 'society of the spectacle' (as Guy Debord calls it), whether as political and legal delusions, or as philosophical fantasies of 'the falsest of false paths' (*der Holzweg der Holzwege*) littered as we saw with estranged fetishes. When we realize that the history of philosophy is written as the story of 'self-consciousness', 'apparitions', 'spectres', 'whimsies', etc.,[64] we need to realize that the history of this shadowy-metaphysics is bound up with a disembodied-metaphysical context of estranged society itself.

To free oneself from this phantom reality is the primary task to be undertaken. So Marx argues out in front of the tribunal of the human essence for a 'reform of consciousness'.[65] And what does this philosophical reform have to do? It has to exorcise the spectres of God-Capital-State and to stop its awful march-past on the globe. When it is claimed that Marxism is class struggle in the realm of theory constituted within the aetiology of estrangement-reification-fetishism, the rehabilitation of humanity is insisted on. Marx's humanism (the principle of the realization of the human essence) implies the struggle with the world of the thing (*Sache, Ding*) and with it, the dual flows: capital and psychotic flows. Thus, when we ask the philosophical question: 'what is 'man'?, this question is raised in contrast to the other half of the question: 'what is a thing?'.

Once 'man' breaks free from the cocoon of the thing and the spectre of God-Capital-State then alone is a reform of consciousness possible. In the 1843–44 critique of Hegel when Marx wrote the obituary of traditional philosophy in the variations on a theme of the *Aufhebung* and *Verwirklichung* of philosophy, he implied a restoration of the human essence from the altar that God-Capital-State had stolen and imprisoned.

That is why the young Marx in his 1843–44 critique of Hegel talked of the double tasks to be undertaken—the tasks of philosophy and history. The task of philosophy is to unmask self-estrangement and task of history is to establish the truth of this world.[66] Marxist philosophy has to deal with the problem of Ur-philosophy—the monstrous flight from the Real—which does not

involve wisdom, but the rites of 'man', not the birth of humanity, democracy and liberty, but their very death; not the celebration of the human essence, but the exile of humanity because philosophy has been monopolized by *Entfremdung*.

We need to ask: what constitutes the essence of philosophical discourse and what forms the master text of philosophy? Is it with Anaximander and Thales to Aristotle via Socrates and the foundation of the Greek *polis* or with the foundation of class civilizations and the birth of the Judaic account of creation? For does not philosophy (in its essential form) account for the story of the estranged guilt ridden 'man' (contra the guiltless and faultless 'God'), and is not the history of philosophy nothing but the hegemony of the story of this guilt-ridden estrangement 'man'? In this case, the Judaic rendering of creation found in the *Book of Moses* does not apply only to the Judaic, Christian and Islamic civilizations but is the crux of the hegemony of Western Reason and its account of 'fallen' men and women. This then forms the Ur-text of philosophy. What are its basic guidelines? Why have men and women fallen from grace and condemned to wander around the globe, guilt ridden and in pain, suffering and death? Because they chose two things: (1) to rebel and (2) to seek knowledge of good and evil. In this story (wherein is supposedly embodied not only the history of philosophy, but the history of men and women), the narcissistic egoist Lord God (the first capitalist and landlord) condemns humanity to labour, pain, guilt and death for daring to listen to Satan (the first rebel) and daring to seize a part of the surplus value and the Ideological State Apparatus (the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil). Now when one says that this forms the essence of philosophical discourse, that philosophy even after its secular revolutions (since the Greeks), have not been able to free themselves from this *essence*, then one can say that we are yet living this 'fall' into the *Holzweg* where the philosophical Ur-fetish ('Being' [*Sein*] or God *against* 'beings' or humanity) like the 'traditions of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living'.[67] And this tradition-fetish like the sandman-fetish and the commodity fetish, 'stands on its head', as Marx says (almost imitating the great truth teller and deceiver Hegel) 'and evolves out from its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more

wonderful than (the ghost evoking. [My insertion. M.J].) "table turning" ever was'.[68]

The question remains: what does philosophies now do, riding on the wild horse of this phantomatic-ghostly objectivity (*gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit*)? How would humanity react to these ghosts in this age of globalization? That this phantom-fetish of capital and psychotic flows would destroy all societies, and turn them in accordance with its own fetish-image, which even the great-wall of China could not resist, is noted in the *Manifesto*. That hundred and fifty years after the *Manifesto*, these same flows would tear open the iron curtain, making a mockery of Stalin's revisionist attempts on the taming of the capital flows.

The mind and the spirit of the revolution (*Geist dr Revolution*) are attacked again and again, the spectre (*Gespenst*) rises. That is why when Marx says that 'nursery tales' are manufactured, we should cease to believe them. And if those who oppose the originary spectre (God, capital and the state) are declared spectres, then *one must meet the nursery tale with a Manifesto of its own*. Thus Marx says: exorcise the spectres, refuse to abide by their philosophy of spectropoetics, and thus deny the *nursery tale of the spectre of communism* (*dem Märchen vom Gespenst des Kommunismus*). Consequently, one has to deny these 'imaginary flowers', and insist that we throw them out in order that we 'pluck the living flower'.[69] The movement from capitalist civilization to the communist one is the movement from death to real life.

> Clearly, the weapons of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons, and material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses, when it demonstrates *ad hominem* and it demonstrates *ad hominem* as soon as becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for humanity the root is the human itself.[70]

The question of 'man' has emerged again, 'man' who is direct confrontation with the 'thing', the *Sache* and the *Ding*, that is hostile and opposed to humanity. In this way, Marx lines up the human essence to wage war in the *Holzweg* of estrangement where humanity rises against the government of these estrangement fetishes. When Marx talked of an *Aufhebung* of philosophy he meant an insurrection against this estrangement government.

Therefore, one needs to find out what *Entfremdung* means and how alienation-reification-fetishism forms the background of our not so civilized thinking. *Entfremdung* is like the Buddhist notion of *Dukha* and we the children of both tradition and modernity are living in the black hole of *Entfremdung-Dukha*. The solution is simple: remove *Entfremdung-Dukha* and philosophy as the authentic quest for wisdom is possible. Thus, when one looks at the other side of *Entfremdung-Dukha*, one also sees the other side of capital and psychotic flows. For if there are two dominant flows that we live and experience: capital+psychosis, which not only determines thinking but terminates it, then there is also the great flush of history in which great futures await us, but only when the flush of history is able to wash away the *things* and *spectres* that have hitherto haunted us: 'All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and humanity is at last compelled to, face with sober senses, the real conditions of life, and the real relations with its kind'.[71]

It is with this sober sense that Marx decided to rewrite the history of philosophy.

Notes and References

1. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band (Dietz Verlag: Berlin, 1993), p. 52.
2. Ibid., pp. 85–98.
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7. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy. And Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York and London, 1971), pp. 30–1, 26, 32.
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9. See Louis Althusser, 'Reply to John Louis', in *Essays on Ideology* (London: Verso, 1984), p. 67.

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41. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 58.
42. Karl Marx, *Capital*, p. 29; *Das Kapital*, Erster Band (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1993), pp. 27–8. We have translated *notwendigen Untergangs* as 'necessary downfall' and not 'inevitable breakingup' as done by Moore and Aveling. The question is: what is the relation between 'necessity' and 'inevitability'? Why is the 'inevitable' (*unvermeidlich*) inserted in revolutionary Marxism? In the *Manifesto*, Marx does use the term *unvermeidlich*: 'What the bourgeois, therefore produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable (*unvermeidlich*).' This rendering of the inevitable is loaded with revolutionary meanings, a use that Trotsky would exemplify. On the revolutionary messianic use, one has to consider Walter Benjamin. In contrast is the un-dialectical use by Stalin who, like the right Mensheviks, operated in the phantasmagorical and fatalistic view of history, in which events are said to happen 'automatically'. The view of history as an automaton is critiqued by Marx as fetishism.
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66. Karl Marx, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction', p. 244.
67. Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in *Marx. Engels. Selected* Works, p. 96.
68. *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 76; *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, p. 85. What Moore and Aveling translate as 'far more wonderful than "table turning" ever was', is in the original German, '*viel wunderlicher, als wenn er aus freien Stücken zu tanzen begänne*'. The German edition has the following note by Marx, 'One may recall that China and the tables began to dance when the rest of the world appeared to be standing still—*pour engourager les autres*'. (*Mann erinnert sich, dass China und die Tische zu tanzen anfingen, als alle übrige Welt still zu stehn schien—pour encourager les autres*).
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Inequality in Aristotle's Political Theory: A Critique in the Context of the New World Order

DOROTHY NWANYINMA UCHEAGA

Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar,
Calabar Cross River State, Nigeria PMB 1115

ABSTRACT

Inequalities and social stratifications as well as the sundry performative actions deriving from them are not new to humanity. As far back as the fifth century BC, the Athenian philosopher, Plato had to create a tale he captioned the 'noble lie' in order to rationalize inequality as a natural phenomenon and thus encouraged the classes in the ideal state to co-exist in harmony. Centuries after Plato, the French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau distinguished between natural and artificial inequalities in his *Origin of Inequality*. While explaining natural inequality in terms of differences in intelligence, strength and agility, Rousseau attributed artificial inequalities to conventions which humans have introduced into society, namely different privileges arising from wealth and power. But what Rousseau did not tell us was whether the natural differences form the basis for social inequalities such as the master-slave relationship and other assorted types of unequal relationships. This point forms the main thrust of this article as it examines inequality in relation to Aristotle's political theory. The aim here is to examine the claims of Aristotle regarding the basis of social inequalities. This article pins down these inequalities to Artistotle's theory of master-slaves relationship, and his notion of citizenship as this pertains to women. Thereafter, I argue that the master-slave relationship and other sundry inequalities in society have social rather than biological basis. This article also debunks Aristotle's view that the master-slave relationship is to the advantage of the slave. Rather, I argue that this is ahistorical, for in all written history, it is the

dominant party (in this case the master) in any exploitative relationship that benefits. This paper affirms from facts gleaned from Aristotle's justification of inequalities in the state that:

1. Aristotle debases human dignity
2. His position contradicts the universal Declaration of Human Rights
3. He disempowers women

All this put together contravenes modern democratic norms as recognized in the new world order.

INTRODUCTION

An egalitarian society, a society in which all members are equal, there is no exploitation based on class, no suppression of the powerless by the powerful, no discrimination based on wealth, sex, religion, status or opinion and in which the human person enjoyed full dignity and right—has been an ever-enduring dream. It was the dream of the utopian socialists such as Thomas Moore, Saint Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen (Buzuer and Gorodnov, 12–14). It was also the dream of Karl Marx of the recent past via the classless society after a successful proletarian revolution. This dream is still alive today in the hearts of many. But it seems that this dream has loomed too large in the horizon. While some philosophies are adumbrated to justify actual inequalities, material conditions of individuals (both poverty and affluence) grease its wheels. The result is that inequalities appear to be an inescapable fact of human condition. They are manifest in living standards and in opportunities for health care, education and political participation.

Was Aristotle then right in adumbrating that social inequalities have a biological basis? This is the main focus of this article and in an attempt to address it and other related issues, the paper is divided into three sections. Section one highlights the master-slave relationship as this pertains to Aristotle. In section two, the paper examines the inequality embedded in Aristotle's notion of citizenship and how this affects women. Section three embodies the critique of Aristotle's views and the concluding remarks.

MASTER-SLAVE RELATIONSHIP

For Aristotle, a slave is a 'live tool' used by the master for purposes of 'life' and 'action' (Aristotle, 64). In Book 1 (iii) of *The Politics* Aristotle urges the view that slaves are pieces of property and so belong to others, the masters. This piece of property embodied in the slave is meant for action. It is a means to an end (master's end, of course) and not an end in itself. As Aristotle puts it:

> Any piece of property can be regarded as a tool enabling man to live, and his property is an assemblage of such tools; a slave is a sort of living piece of property; and like any other servant is a tool in charge of other tools (Aristotle, 64–65).

Who becomes a slave? How do people become slaves? Aristotle answers these two interrelated questions in the following terms:

> Any human being that by nature belongs not to himself but to another is by nature a slave; and a human being belongs to another whenever, in spite of being a man, he is a piece of property, i.e. a tool having a separate existence and meant for action (65).

This passage aptly highlights that to be a slave is tantamount to losing human dignity, rights and freedoms. It is a condition of inauthenticity by reason of which a person has become an artifice and can be disposed of as such. The slave is a tool meant for action, implying that he is an instrument used for the achievement of some specific end for the possessor or owner. This end can translate to creating leisure or wealth in whatever form.

Modern conventions' definitions of slavery relate somewhat to Aristotle's. For instance, the 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery thus: 'Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised' (Awake, Modern Slavery, 4). According to Mike Dottridge, the director of Antislavery International, 'Slavery is identified by an element of ownership or control over another's life (Awake, Modern Slavery, 4). Coercion and restriction of movement are the essential ingredients of slavery.

Aristotle makes the point that to be ruled is to the slave's advantage and to that extent, slavery is justified. He bases his argument on the assumption that humanity falls into two classes, namely the rational and the irrational and that the rational should rule over

the irrational. Be that as it may, T.A. Sinclair notes that it is arguable whether such a rule ought to be enforced or is, in fact, enforced (Aristotle, 67).

The Aristotelian slave is defined in terms of his physical characteristics and Aristotle is quick to paint the physical picture. According to him:

> Those whose condition is such that their function is the use of their bodies and nothing better can be expected of them, those I say are slaves by nature. It is better for them...to be ruled by a master (69).

Aristotle pins down the physical property to a strong body for that is the type that is naturally equipped to perform manual labour. According to him:

> The use made of slaves hardly differs at all from that of tamed animals; they both help with their bodies to supply our essential needs. It is then part of the nature's intention to make the bodies of free men to differ from those of slaves, the latter strong enough to be used for necessary tasks, the former erect and useless for the life of a citizen of a state (69).

Precisely, Aristotle's argument is that the slave is genetically or innately inferior to the master in terms of reason and this justifies the unequal relationship of master and slave. In similar terms, Aristotle justifies sexual inequality and uses it as a basis to disenfranchise women. This is embodied in his notion of citizenship.

ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF CITIZENSHIP

According to Aristotle:

> A citizen is in general one who has share in ruling and being ruled; but he will not be identical in every kind of constitution. So far as the best constitution is concerned, he is a man who is able and who chooses to rule and be ruled with a view to life that is in accordance with virtue (213).

The above quotation sufficiently exposes the qualifications of a citizen, those features which separate the citizen in the strict Aristotelian sense from non-citizens. Citizenship lies chiefly in the privilege to participate in the government of a city. For Aristotle, 'what effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgment and holding office' (169). Aristotle notes that even though this definition is best applied in democracy, it may also be applied in other constitutions.

A point in the contemporary notions of citizenship, which Aristotle emphasizes, is the capacity to influence politics. This involves active participation in the general political life in the region where one is residing. F.O. Eteng has noted in this connection that:

> Once an individual becomes a citizen of a state, the right to vote is automatically granted to him. This is to enable such an individual to determine the form of government and political leadership that can best serve the interest of the people (Ozumba, Eteng and Okom, 25).

This is somewhat similar to Aristotle's view that what distinguishes an ordinary citizen from all others is his participation in giving judgment and holding office. However, in Aristotle, the issue goes beyond mere voting.

Be that as it may, it is important to note at this point that Aristotle was no believer in equality. The class of citizens is an exclusive one. It is not open to all and sundry. Women, whether young or old, are not members of it. Manual labourers, mechanics and commercial traders do not belong to it. Why? Because they lack the mental infrastructure to participate in citizenship. A critical examination of Aristotle's views in this regard and slavery is the subject of section three.

A CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S VIEWS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

THE SLAVE INFERIORITY ARGUMENT

> All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in brotherhood (Breakthrough, 18).

Undoubtedly, Aristotle does not agree with this article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because rationality, as already gathered from his position, is not generously distributed to humanity. It has a class character and it appears to Aristotle that it is only the preserve of the master.

The slave inferiority argument as canvassed by Aristotle paints the picture of slave personality as parading irrationality. This assertion connotes inequality of the slave vis-á-vis the master. But one

major challenge confronting such inferiority arguments, Aristotle's inclusive, concerns how such theories were arrived at. Was it by empirical observation or through psychological tests?

The only empirical criterion that one gleans from Aristotle's *Politics* is that of bodily physique, namely, nature had intended that the body of the slave be strong enough to perform necessary tasks while that of the master be erect and useless for such. What this means is that one can tell who is a slave and thus irrational by looking at the physical appearance. Obviously, this sounds simplistic for the meaning or concept of personhood belies this.

While not counting Aristotle's physical property as worthwhile, Joel Feinberg enumerates the qualities that a person must possess in order to qualify as a person to include:

> Consciousness, possession of self-concept; self-awareness; the capacity to plan ahead, the capacity to act on one's plans and the capacity to feel pleasure and pain (Beauchamp and Walters, 87).

He argues that each of these eight properties is necessary but none of them is individually sufficient for personhood.

Aristotle argues that the slave is irrational. In other words, he lacks the capacity to reason and acquire understanding. He is a complete write off given the test for minimal intelligence as offered by Joseph Fletcher:

> Any individual of the species homo sapiens who falls below the I.Q 40 mark in a standard Stanford Binet test amplified if you like by other tests, is questionably a person; below the 20 mark, not a person. Homo is indeed sapiens in order to be homo (Beauchamp and Walters, 90).

This is a standard test for determining personhood. It is also used to measure the innate differences in ability between human groups, indeed, between master and slave of Aristotle's genre. This procedure involves giving a series of problems to the various groups to solve and their performance is used as an indicator of their ability. The French psychologist, Alfred Binet developed the first series of intelligence tests in 1905. However, Binet warned that 'his method could be meaningfully used to determine innate differences in ability if the persons or groups of persons to whom the tests are administered have similar culture, education and opportunities' (Oyebola, 63).

Aristotle's position, therefore, becomes difficult to defend in the light of the above statement. It is not enough to say that humanity is divided into two classes namely, the rational and irrational and so the rational and the wise (the master) should rule the irrational (the slave) without adducing any scientific basis for such an assertion. In any case, rationality is a heritage of humanity. It is not the preserve of a particular group of people. The range of mental groups is the same among all groups whether master or slave. Even where scientific tests, e.g. I.Q tests have been used to determine the difference in the level of intelligence, psychologists and scientist agree that the influence of environment is an important determining factor.

It is, therefore, not correct to assert—as Aristotle did—that the slave is by nature irrational. It is rather the social condition of the slave that degrades and dehumanizes him, while society canvasses the assumed biological difference as the basis for the exploitation of man by man as well as the legal, social and political discrimination attendant to it. Haralambos has noted in this connection that:

> Beliefs which state that systems of social stratification are based on the biological inequalities can be seen as rationalizations for those systems. Such beliefs serve to explain the system to its members: they make inequality appear rational and reasonable. They therefore, justify and legitimate the system by appeals to nature. In this way, a social contrivance appears to be founded on the natural order of things (929–30).

This was also true of Aristotle for he asserts that the relationship of master and slave conforms to a broad pattern found universally in nature: better/worse, male/female, man/beast, mind/body, rational/irrational, ruler/ruled (66).

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF ARISTOTLE'S THEORY

> Each person is at one and the same time a product of the social environment and an original and unique expression of this environment, of the general in life and in his or her social group (Berbeshikina, Yakovleva and Zerkin, 192).

The above view is further expressed somewhat differently in the principal postulate of historical materialism that the 'social being determines social consciousness'. Social being is organized around

the economic system of society including people's productive activity. Also central to it is the economic relations that people enter into in the process of production. Social consciousness rests on social being and denotes the views, ideas and theories (legal, political, philosophical and religious) which regulate people's behaviour (Berbeshikina, Yakovleva and Zerkin, 47–48). The import of this assertion is that the way a society organizes its productive activity colours the way people think in that particular society.

This paper affirms in the light of the foregoing that Aristotle was a product of his age and a true son of his environment. The Greek society of his day was dependent on slave labour for the prosperity of its economy. It, thus, appears that his theory was a rationalization of the prevailing system in the Greek society. If some form of slavery was not natural, how then would a philosopher of Aristotle's standing justify its practice in his society?

THE OBJECTIVE CONDITION OF THE SLAVE

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan once raised the following questions:

> Who can deny that we all seek lives free of fear, torture and discrimination?... When have you heard a free voice demand an end to freedom? Where have you heard a slave argue for slavery? (Awake, Modern Slavery, 2).

This quotation has become necessary in view of Aristotle's argument that slavery is to the advantage of the slave. This paper contends that Aristotle's postulation in this regard is ahistorical and not based on facts. The transatlantic slave trade and the dimensions that modern slavery has taken attest to the contrary. In both its ancient and modern forms, the condition of enslavement is synonymous with exploitation, coercion, loss of rights and freedom. Though spared the horrific picture of slave ships, brutality, human torture and auction sales that were the hallmark of the transatlantic slave trade, modern slavery does not offer a fascinating picture either. 'Forced labour, child labour and often prostitution are just some of the more pronounced contemporary forms of slavery' (Awake, Modern Slavery, 3).

Besides, slavery connotes unpaid and forced labour that is exploited free of charge by the master. The experience of black

Africans shipped to Portugal, Spain, America, Britain and France where they became domestic servants and production hands in the farms, mines and factories attests to this fact. Modern slavery also offers a similar testimony.

> Modern slaves are often children or women. They toil against their will making carpets, building roads, cutting sugarcane. Or even working as prostitutes. And they may be sold for as little as $10 (Awake, When all kinds of Slavery will end!, 3).

It is clear from the foregoing exegesis that the slave provides service that is appropriated by the master and such a relationship, contrary to Aristotle's claim, is exploitative and degrading. What Awake of 8 March 2000 records in the above connection will go a long way to buttress his point.

> When a fire broke out in a brothel on Phuket island, a resort in southern Thailand, five prostitutes burned to death. Why? Because their owners had chained them to their beds to keep them from escaping their bondage (5).

The question is, what advantage can be accrued to a slave prostitute chained to her bed? Only Aristotle, I think, is in a position to answer this question. Nevertheless, Sinclair seems to defend Aristotle. According to him:

> The fact that slavery is a dirty word nowadays should not trick us into believing that ancient Greek slavery was invariably harsh and, therefore, not expedient for slaves: much depended on the masters' attitudes, which in the nature of the case varied widely. The distinction between slave and free was much sharper in point of legal and political status than in social life and economics, where there was some overlap between the poorer free men and the better-off slaves (Aristotle, 67).

Sinclair appears to suggest in the above that slave masters of Aristotle's day were benevolent and that in terms of economic well being, the condition of poorer free men was not better than that of the better-off slaves. Does that then mean that slavery is to the advantage of the slave? If the condition of the poorer free men overlapped with that of the better-off slaves, what about the slaves that were not better off? Is the condition of poverty a matter to be celebrated? Sinclair's defence appears to suggest that it is unfair to

examine Aristotle's adumbration in light of the dynamics of modern slavery.

But his defence does not exonerate Aristotle, for slavery nowadays, as in Aristotle's day, connotes loss of rights (legal, social, political and human) and that debases the dignity of the victim in contradiction of article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that, 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights' (Breakthrough, 18).

Besides, the perception of the slave as an exploitable tool meant for the attainment of the end of the master violates the personhood of the slave. This runs contrary to Immanuel Kant's maxim that, states: 'act as to use humanity both in your person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means' (Omoregbe, 160). Kant's point is that the moral law forbids the use of a human being simply as an instrument to attain one's ends. One needs to add here that we should not use a human being as a means without a commensurate reward to the instrument so used. After all, doctors are used for curing illness, engineers are used for constructing bridges and policemen are used to protect us. But a human being should not be used as though he were just an instrument or an object. This is the practical imperative and it prohibits slavery since it denies a person the dignity he deserves.

WOMEN AND CITIZENSHIP

> As between male and female, the former is by nature superior and ruler, the latter inferior and subject. And this must hold good of mankind in general (Aristotle, 68).

This is assertion of sexual inequality, which is manifest in the exclusion of women from the class of citizens, as already noted in section two of this article. Specifically, Aristotle excluded women from a share in political activity or participation.

Political participation, as Folasade Ifamose has noted, could be described as:

> Taking part in both decision-making bodies (legislative, judicial and Executive) as well as non-decision-making ones such as membership in panels, boards, committees set up by the government, etc., and membership in pressure and interest groups (Ifamose, 404).

Political participation can take the form of winning electoral posts and occupying such elective posts or being appointed by the authorities into decision-making positions as well as non-decision-making ones (Ifamose, 404).

The import of Aristotle's conception of citizenship is that those who take part in policy decisions and participate politically in basic decisions that shape the patterns of society are the citizens. Others by definition, including women, are excluded from this class. Why? Because, for Aristotle, women are inferior to men and the natural differences between them make it just and expedient for the male to rule while the female remains subordinate. Precisely, Aristotle makes the point 'that the male are more suited to rule than the female, unless conditions are quite contrary to nature' (92).

In the new world order, Aristotle's position is tantamount to a denial of political rights (the right to vote and be voted for) to women. The assertion also connotes that women should not be part of the decision-making processes that shape the patterns of society in which they live. Precisely, they cannot be elected to the House of Representatives and to the Senate as well as be appointed to top-level administrative positions, to cabinets and so on. Indeed, according to Aristotle, it is an aberration and unnatural for the female to rule.

No doubt, Aristotle's prescriptions aim to undermine the great potentials of women. His philosophy is tantamount to a disempowerment of women, a denial of equal voice in shaping political affairs and decisions that affect their lives in the society. But, is it not a fact that where women are given the opportunity to prove themselves, they make their mark? Be it in politics or other spheres of human endeavour? D.N. Ucheaga has noted in this connection that:

> India which is the largest democracy in the world had a woman Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi for several years and India did not suffer any set back because a woman was in charge. Nor would one say that Britain under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher diminished in status in international circles as a great nation (Ozumba, Eteng & Okom, ed., 330).

This paper rejects Aristotle's adumbrations concerning sexual inequality. It also disagrees with the exclusion of women from the citizenship class. For this prescription denies a substantial part of

the population from participating in politics and exercising their franchise in contradiction of one of the fundamental principles of democracy. It also contradicts Article (21) (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 'every one has the right to take part in the government, of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives' (Breakthrough, 19).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper sets out to look into inequality as embodied in Aristotle's *Politics* as that which pertains to the relationship of master and slave and position of women. Having examined Aristotle's adumbrations concerning slavery, the paper argues that Aristotle's assumptions lacked scientific explanation and so could not justify the unequal relationship based on it. Rather, it was the position of the paper that inequality had a social instead of a biological basis.

This paper also tries to show that slavery in history has never been to the advantage of the slave, contrary to Aristotle's assertion. It has always thrived on exploitation and it is the dominant party in the relationship, the master or owner that benefits.

Furthermore, the paper highlights Aristotle's conception of citizenship and how that translates to inequality vis-á-vis women. It was clear that Aristotle's theory had no regard for women: he degraded and disenfranchized them. On the contrary, the paper submitted that there was nothing in the nature of women that makes them unsuitable to rule. Examples of women that had excelled in this respect were given.

From the results of the analysis of inequality in Aristotle's *Politics* as translated in the relationship of master and slave and the position of women, this paper avers that Aristotle's theory has no place in the new world order. For it is provincial, anachronistic, backward looking, denigrates human dignity and contradicts all democratic norms and standards.

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Feyerabend's Philosophy of Science and its Implications for National Development in Africa

CHRIS O. AKPAN

Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The thesis of this article is that Feyerabend's philosophy of science, hinged on his pillar of 'anarchism' and 'anything goes' can serve as a challenge for scientific and technological development in Africa. Africa has been largely tagged as 'underdeveloped' because she has failed to chart her own course of scientific development, and has somewhat felt satisfied playing the dependent role. But Feyerabend has said that knowledge (scientific) is a local commodity designed to solve local problems. The implication here is that every culture, certainly including Africa, can harness her own indigenous scientific categories and develop from her own local perspective; for modern science is not sacrosanct, nor its method or rationality the only path toward development. We have found out that Feyerabend's views, though challenging, are very congenial to our African experience. In fact, they have positive implications for the African struggle towards scientific and even technological development.

INTRODUCTION

Any discourse on African development, whether from the economic, political, religious, scientific or philosophical perspective, would always provide an exciting challenge and in fact an amazing curiosity. This becomes more evident when the discourse is in relation to 'philosophic-scientific' issues. But much as one strives to negotiate, understand and evaluate such a discourse, one would seem to find himself talking more about underdevelopment even

more than development. The implication here is that Africa is underdeveloped and, therefore, in need of development.

In this contemporary world, science and its application, technology, provide the most important index for distinguishing a developed society, country or continent from an underdeveloped one. Africa has been tagged 'a third world' continent because of her underdeveloped status in the sphere of science and technology. The reason is that Africa is mainly dependent on the 'first world' (Western or developed world) in its scientific and technological needs. The corollary here is that scientific categories of the West, in whatever shade and colour, whether it is congenial to the African world view or not—have been imposed or dumped on the Africans. The Africans, satisfied with their dependent status, have sat back and swallowed everything from the 'developed world' without harnessing their own path to development. Based on this demeaning situation, our developmental rate has often been tied to this dependent status.

The questions then arise: Can the Africans not harness their own mode of scientific development? Must we always follow the Western scientific paradigm? Can we not create alternative knowledge to modem science? Feyerabend's philosophy of science seems to offer some answers to these questions and many allied ones. Thus, in this article, I present Paul Feyerabend's philosophy of science: a philosophy of science which challenges the Africans to wake up, develop in their own ways without depending solely on the Western scientific paradigm. His philosophy of science anchored on his idea of 'anarchism' and 'anything goes' suggests that modem science and its method of rationality is not the one and only method for doing science nor the only route to development. The aim of this paper is to dig out those latent or hidden meanings which Feyerabend's philosophy of science has towards development in Africa.

AN EXPOSITION OF FEYERABEND'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Feyerabend's Background and Influences

It is often said that a philosopher's ideas are to a large extent the offshoot of his socio-cultural milieu and the intellectual ferment of his time. This appears to be true of Feyerabend, a former professor of philosophy at the University of California and a professor of

philosophy of science at the Federal Institute of Technology at Zurich.

Explaining the origin of his ideas, Feyerabend notes that the problem of knowledge and education in a free society struck him during his tenure of a state fellowship at the *Weiner Institute Zur Methdologiscen Erneuerung Des Deutschen Theaters* in 1946 (Science in 107). Here, he studied arts and theatre. After a year, he left for the University of Vienna where he studied history, physics and astronomy. He, along side his other colleagues, founded an organization called the 'Kraft circle' named after his class teacher, Victor Kraft, who incidentally became the chairman of the organization. The organization was basically a philosophy club engaged in debates and arguments. Occasionally, it had in attendance such eminent philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe, Von Wright, Hollistscher, Julos and many others. In such debates, Feyerabend would defend what looks like the 'absurd view' with great assurance.

Feyerabend notes that Felix Ehrenhaft, whom he called 'an excellent experimenter, unraveled the difficulties of 'scientific rationality' and profusely shaped his critical mind. Ehrenhaft, a teacher of 'theoretical physics', on his visit to Vienna, according to Feyerabend, opened his eyes and held members of the 'Kraft circle' spellbound. The 'Kraft circle' had heard so much about this critic of 'some scientific theories' and had conspired to criticize and 'expose' him for his criticism and rejection of the relativity and quantum theories as being idle speculation: for, this was the theory which the 'Kraft circle' held in absolute reverence and had always defended with all their critical might. But when Ehrenhaft visited the 'Kraft circle', he stunned them as he successfully tore apart, not only the relativity and quantum theories, but the Newtonian law of inertia and the electromagnetic theory. Feyerabend would claim that Eherenhaft's lesson would lateron provide him an excellent illustration of the nature and limitation of scientific rationality (111).

In Vienna, Feyerabend also came under the influence of some foremost Marxist intellectuals like Walter Hollister. Though he read Stalin's pamphlet on dialectical and historical materialism, he was more of 'a raving positivist' who favoured strict rules of research.

Afterwards, he converted to realism for, according to him, 'realism had fruits positivism had none' (133). Another influence on Feyerabend was Elizabeth Anscombe, a powerful British philosopher with whom Feyerabend claimed to have discussed Wittgenstein's manuscripts. Feyerabend actually was to become a student in Cambridge under Wittgenstain but the latter died before Feyerabend arrived in England. Karl Popper then became his supervisor and, according to Feyerabend, Popper had 'freedom of manners...joyful putting forth his ideas, unconcerned about the reaction of the professionals' (150). But he would later remark that the relatively unknown Popper whom he met in 1948 was very different from the 'established Sir Karl of later years'.

Feyerabend in his studies and research in quantum theory found out that scientists do not always follow their laid-down rules during research, and that falsification of the rationalists was not a solution to the problem of scientific methodologies. By this position the rationalist influence of Popper on him had started to wane. Feyerabend would note that it was Professor Von Weizsacker who had the prime responsibility for his change to anarchism. Weizsacker made Feyerabend to realize that no idea, knowledge or ideology should be imposed without regard to circumstances, for if this is done, it will be more of a hindrance than help. Influenced by Weizsacker's position, Feyerabend notes:

> ... a person trying to solve a problem whether in science or elsewhere must be given complete freedom and cannot be restricted by any demands, norms, however, plausible they may seem to the logician or the philosopher who has thought them in the privacy of his study (117).

The implication of what Feyerabend says here is that every problem has its concrete situation and that no general rule or law formulated by a scientist or logician, no matter how reasonable it may appear, should be generalized to cover problems outside its own universe of discourse.

Another event that prompted Feyerabend to turn his back against rationalism had to do with the manner in which social problems were solved. Those who call themselves 'intellectuals' (a version of the rationalists), or 'policy makers' (what some Nigerians would call leaders of thought), make policies concerning others as if they were their own private affairs. They simply take it for granted that

their ideas and those of their colleagues are the only important ones and that people have to adopt them (118). Feyerabend saw in such ideas what he would term as the tyranny of truth or reason.

Given this background, Feyerabend lost faith in the methodologies of science peddled by some of his contemporaries. He rather saw them as hindrances to the development of the individuals and the society at large. He would rather pin his faith in the idea of 'anarchism', which he believes could enhance free exchange of ideas and development.

FEYERABEND'S CRITIQUE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM, CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND KUHN'S HISTORICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF SCIENCE

Before presenting his anarchistic view of science, Feyerabend pointed out the loopholes inherent in other methodologies of science as put forward by the logical positivists, critical rationalists and Thomas Kuhn.

Taking on the logical positivists whose major tenet was the 'verification principle', Feyerabend contends that theories do not always follow from facts in the strict logical sense as held by them (logical positivists). They had held that propositions which cannot be verified are meaningless and should be thrown out from the corpus of knowledge. Their aim was to demarcate science from non-science, since according to them, non-scientific propositions could not be verified through observations. But Feyerabend explains in his 'Science without Experience' that observational knowledge is not the most reliable knowledge that human beings possess (794). In this vein, Feyerabend would say that science is just one tradition among many. It is closely related with other traditions and cannot be wholly separated from them, for it does profit from an admixture of unscientific ingredients (Against, 305). For him, the attempted separation of science from non-science is not only artificial but also detrimental to the achievement and growth of science.

Feyerabend's attack on Critical Rationalism as propounded by Karl Popper was also devastating and revealing. Critical rationalism was an offshoot of logical positivism. The aim of critical rationalism as, Uduigwomen explicitly states, was to 'provide the criteria for distinguishing critical and rational thinking, behaviour and actions

from uncritical and irrational thinking, behaviour and actions' (87). The method which Popper felt was good for this task was 'falsificationism'. In the falsificationist methodology, theories are made to undergo some test of reasoning and if they cannot stand up to the critical test, such theories are jettisoned. According to Popper, it is a method of 'trial and error—of conjectures and refutations' (46).

But Feyerabend holds that Popper's standard was too rigid and fixed, and that if it were to be strictly applied, then, science itself would be wiped out without any suitable replacement (Against, 176). To drive home his point, Feyerabend states that it is meaningless to give a negative criterion (conjectures and refutations or falsification) by saying that good theories are theories which can be refuted, but are not yet contradicted by any fact. In his words:

> A principle of falsification that removes theories because they do not fit the facts would have to remove the whole of science... facts alone are not strong enough for making us accept or reject scientific theories, the range they leave to thought is too wide. Logic and methodology eliminate too much ... (303).

By implication, what Feyerabend is saying is that knowledge of reality cannot be limited to observational facts and cannot be exactly measured by a given privileged method or standard. Rigid test by verification, logic or scientific rationality as reveled in by modern science and worshipped by the rationalists and positivists would, if strictly applied, mean that we may be unable to find anything that could live up to those standards.

For Imre Lakatos, whom Newton-Smith sees as 'the revisionary Popperian' (77). Feyerabend gave some little respect. According to Feyerabend, Lakatos does not stipulate methodological rules that direct the scientists to either retain or reject a theory. For Feyerabend, Lakatos' 'Scientific Research Programme' is more superior to Popper's and Kuhn's approaches of science. Lakatos, for him, 'only offers words which sound like elements of methodology but not methodology ...' (How to Defend, 161). For these reasons, Feyerabend sees Lakatos as a fellow anarchist. However, Lakatos could not entirely escape his critical sledgehammer. He criticizes Lakatos on the ground that he takes or upholds science against other disciplines as if modern science is superior to magic or myth.

He maintains that science is only one ideology among several others.

On Kuhn's Revolutionary method of science, Feyerabend says, 'Kuhn's ideas are interesting, but alas, they are much too vague to give rise to anything, but lots of hot air' (160). He sees Kuhn's notions of 'paradigm', 'normal science', 'crisis', 'revolution', etc., as boring and, in fact, connected with no ideas at all. Generally, Kuhn's ideas according to him were false, for there has never been such a period of normal science in history. He challenges anyone to prove the contrary (160).

The foregoing is a strong indication that Feyerabend did not favour any method of science that was couched in fixed and unchanging rules. Science, therefore, according to him, could only thrive through the anarchistic route. We shall then move to consider his anarchistic notion of science.

FEYERABEND'S ANARCHISTIC CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE

Feyerabend's view of how science should progress is based on the idea of 'Anarchism'. He opens the introductory chapter of his Against Method by stating that: 'Anarchism' though not 'the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent for epistemology and the philosophy of science' (17). His idea of anarchism is predicated on his rejection of the idea that science can, and should be run according to fixed universal rules. He was simply opposed to a certain method of science which involves firm, unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science; i.e. the idea of a fixed theory of rationality. He argues that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality rests on too naïve a view of man and his social surroundings (27). He rejects universalism because this would inhibit the liberty of man in leading a full and rewarding life, and may even inhibit man's ways of discovering the secrets of nature. For him, all the methodologies peddled by philosophers and scientists have their own limitations. He discovers that all important physical principles rested on methodological assumptions that are even violated by scientists in the course of research and propagation of theories. For him, the only rule that does not inhibit development is 'anything goes'. However, he is apt to warm us that by this principle he does not

recommend it as 'the one and only principle of a new methodology' (39). The principle of 'anything goes' implies that neither science is the only form of knowledge that has the sole right of interpreting realities nor its method of rationality the only route to knowledge. In view of this, he notes that science is not sacrosanct; nor is it possible and, in fact, necessary for it to be demarcated from myth, religion, voodooism, astrology, witchcraft and so on. Rather, science benefits from these categories in its interpretation and explanation of phenomena.

Feyerabend's idea of anarchism and his principle of 'anything goes' have been variously attacked by many scholars. For example, it has been argued that, in a society where 'anything goes', the principle that will be at work is 'everything stays'. Besides, his comparison of science with myth, voodoo, witchcraft, astrology and the like has been regarded as 'unholy' (Uduigwomen, 118). Again, it has been held that Feyerabend's anarchistic ideas (as a post-modern albatross) would imply that where 'anything goes, nothing goes, for anarchy and disorder would easily become the order of the day' (Ozumba, 51).

But it seems to me that these attacks on Feyerabend sometimes arise from the misconception of his usage of the term 'anarchism' and the phrase 'anything goes'. If we consider 'anarchism' from its etymology, '*anarchos*', meaning, 'without a chief or head' or 'without a top authority' (Sylvan, 218), we would see that Feyerabend's usage might have been in this sense. In this sense, anarchism implies decentralization. It does not revel in an arrangement structured with a controlling centre. Relating this to science, we would see why Feyerabend said that science should be dethroned from the top pinnacle and made to occupy the 'ordinary field' like every other forms of knowledge. And also that it should not be made to swallow other traditions up by presenting it and its paradigm of rationality as the absolute and universal standard of understanding realities. On the question of 'anything goes', Feyerabend, we believe, could not have used it to mean that even diabolical forms of knowledge, which possibly could lead to the extermination of humanity, should be expressly encouraged or allowed. Thus, when he states that 'knowledge is a local commodity designed to satisfy local needs and to solve local problems ...' (Farewell, 28), he

implies among other things that, each 'locality' has its own standard of justifying knowledge and perhaps the ability of developing itself. The idea here is that if any knowledge claim does not meet up to the standards of justification in the locality it springs from, and cannot satisfy nor solve the needs and problems, then it should not be taken seriously. If this is so, then it follows that not 'everything stays' even though 'anything is allowed to go' in order to prove how it can solve human problems.

Following his idea of anarchism and anything goes, is Feyerbend's idea of proliferation of theories or ideas. This was in opposition to the 'consistency principle' of science. Scientists have always held that any new hypothesis or discovery should cohere or be consistent with already established theories. But for Feyerabend, this is very unreasonable because this condition would always preserve the older theories and not a better one. It would bring about a uniformity of individuals. He, however, argues that scientists normally go against this principle, yet it has always been taken for granted. Having recognized the problem of 'consistency principle', he rather calls for proliferation of theories. For him, 'proliferation of theories is beneficial to science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual' (Against, 35). Feyerabend's call for proliferation of theories hits hard on Popper's recommendation of single theories as a unit of appraisal. His position is rather in line with Kuhn's. Kuhn accepts a situation where there are many competing theories struggling to win general acceptance during what he calls the pre-paradigm or crisis period of science.

On the idea of incommensurability, Feyerabend opposes the view of the rationalists. For them, a set of principles could be articulated for objective assessment of the relative merits of rival theories against a given background of evidence by way of comparing the theories. In other words, the rationalist's position is that theories can be compared through their respective content classes. But Feyerabend's contention is that the logical relations of inclusion and overlap, which are required for such a comparison, cannot always be established between the content classes of competing theories. Such theories are incommensurable, and between them, no rational choice is possible. Here, he gives an example that the Newtonian

mechanics is incommensurable with relativistic mechanics, on the grounds that the latter suspends a universal principle of the former, that shapes, masses, periods are changed only by physical interactions (271).

Feyerabend's position again appears to be similar to that of Kuhn. For Kuhn, during the revolutionary period of science, the new paradigm is usually incompatible and incommensurable with the old paradigm. The implication here is that any theory differs in meaning in respect of its epoch and what it sets out to prove. Feyerabend holds that the meaning of every term depends upon the theoretical context in which it occurs.

On the concept of rationality, Feyerabend observes that scientists and some philosophers have blurred the original meaning of the term. Though he accepted that it is good to be rational, he did not accept the kind of rationality peddled by the scientists and intellectuals of his day. The common idea was that rationality was a universal criterion which every form of knowledge or tradition has to pass through in order to be accepted as legitimate knowledge. It was this conviction that science is the only rational enterprise that drove Popper and the positivists to seek a demarcation criterion that would distinguish science from non-science.

Rationality is a word derived from reason. Thus, for a person to be said to be rational, he must be seen to be capable of making decisions and judgments based on reason rather than emotions. Aristotle professed the universality of rationality when he said that man is by nature rational. However, rationality came to achieve a more technical meaning when it was reduced to a system of some formal deductive and inductive rules. Aristotle, who had declared that 'all men are rational', became the first philosopher to systematize all forms of positive thinking which culminated in formal logic—the acclaimed cannon of science.

In reaction to this trend, Feyerabend talks of a 'new kind of knowledge' (rational) that arose in Greece and later on led to the sciences (Farewell, 73). Feyerabend here refers to rationality as theorized by those he calls 'the founders of Western Culture' namely, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton, Kant, Russell, Popper and Lakatos (Rationalism, 9). This form of rationality, which he regards as 'Naive' simply means acceptance of certain procedures (rules,

standards) together with the results of these procedures, rules and standards. He further notes that according to Western tradition, this idea of rationality does not mean 'acceptance of views except insofar as the views emerge from the application of the procedures, rules, standards' (8). In this regard, one becomes rational if and only if one's knowledge conforms to these general rules and standards.

Feyerabend is against this idea of universalism. For him, any 'rational' procedures or valid standards that run counter to sociological and psychological tendencies, and that do not belong to any traditions are hopeless (14). What Feyerabend is saying is that rationality is defined by tradition or society. Each tradition may have its own rationality. In this light, there cannot be one general or universal standard of rationality to which all other forms of life, culture or knowledge systems must conform. Hence, for him, 'there is not one rationality, there are many and it is up to us to choose the one we like best' (16).

Feyerabend's relativistic view here was probably a replay of Peter Winch's alternative criteria to the Western type of rationality. Winch states:

> The criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of ways of living or modes of social life as such ... science is one such mode and religion is another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself (100).

The point Winch is making is that there is no independent or absolute standard (rationality), which is compelling on all men, and which can, therefore, be used to measure different forms of life or knowledge systems.

If science deals with the explanation and prediction of phenomena, and the way the Africans conceive of, or reason about these realities are different from Western's conception, then it cannot be the case that, the logocentric (logic-centred) form of rationality (Western) would be compelling on the Africans. In such a situation, we can see reason with Feyerabend's conception of rationality, for it seems to point to the truth. Feyerabend's conception of rationality and his philosophy of science in general could give Africans the leverage to finding an alternative path for development, thus complementing the efforts of modem science.

Feyerabend yearns for a free society where all traditions, including science, can be made to have equal right and equal access to the centre of power (Science, 106). He wonders why there should be separation between state and religion, state and other forms of knowledge, but there is no separation between state and science. He notes that in America, for instance, a citizen can choose the religion he likes, yet he is not permitted to demand that his children learn magic, legend or astrology rather than science. He frowns at how the government spends more of its resources on the improvement of science without doing the same for other traditions. Science, he maintains, is just one ideology among many others in the society and should be treated as such.

IMPLICATIONS OF FEYERABEND'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

It is a fact that Africa is underdeveloped, hence in need of development. Underdevelopment here does not mean absence of development. This, according to Rodney, is because 'every people have developed in one way or another and to greater or lesser extent' (21). Underdevelopment is, therefore, understood when we compare the levels of development between societies, nations or continents.

At this point, we define development along with McGurk as 'the advancement or improvement over some primitive status' (28). Considering this definition, it is a fact that Africa cannot be said to have remained in her 'primitive status', Africa has actually gone through some levels of development. But when this is compared to the developmental strides in the Western world, especially in terms of science, technology and education, we certainly would agree that we are underdeveloped.

In her quest for development, Africa has seriously been influenced by the Western paradigm of development, which hinges on the purely rational/scientific outlook. Many have even argued that Africa can only develop if it discards her cultural and primitive scientific categories. For example, Wiredu in his *Philosophy and An African Culture* advocates the application of the method and result of modem science for the improvement of the condition of human life (43). This involves, according to him, the discarding of certain

superstitious beliefs and customs that inhibit scientific growth. In view of this he advocates an education blueprint where the 'rational, analytical and scientific orientation' is propagated (15). He opines:

> 'Our children should be initiated early in life into the discipline of formal and informal logic and into the methodology of rational thinking..., the kind of training that will produce minds ... capable of logical analysis and fully aware of the nature and value of exact measurement' (15–16).

We quite agree with Wiredu that modern science is an important agent for national development in Africa. We may also agree with Wiredu that certain traditional cultures may inhibit African development. But this is not enough reason to say that the logocentric, rational methodology of the West is the only paradigm of interpreting phenomena, nor is it the only route to harnessing the path of development.

Feyerabend, we have stated earlier, was against such imposition of the methodology of modern science (as Wiredu seems to do). This, according to Feyerabend, would blur or impair the free development of the indigenous outlook of the people. This is exactly what is happening to Africa. Before the advent of modern science and its application—technology, the Africans had ideas on how to: brew beer, distil local gin, preserve corpses, weave clothes, make pots of different shapes, colours and sizes, build houses, make astronomical observations, heal diseases of different types through herbs and roots, rear cattle and do so many other things. But what has happened to these indigenous scientific traditions today? Some of them have been lost because of the influence of 'Western scientific paradigm'. The result is that Africa has been derided as an underdeveloped continent because it has failed to build on those 'ancient civilizations' strides. It has, rather, caved in under the Western influence. Ivan Sertima, writing on the *Lost Sciences of Africa,* rues the African situation by stating that even though it has been discovered (in the past few years) that Africa had great scientific traditions, 'it is quite clear that the finest heart of the African world receded into the shadow while its broken bones were put on spectacular display' (26). The implication of this is that African glorious-scientific achievements of the past are not

recognized because its dependence and underdeveloped status have overwhelmed such achievements.

The implication of Feyerabend's philosophy of science for African development, following the above thinking, is that we should re-examine our attitudes towards such scientific traditions of the past and perhaps build from that to create indigenous scientific and technological traditions like the Chinese and Japanese have successfully done. This is why he challenges that 'primitive thinkers showed greater insight into the nature of knowledge than their enlightened philosophical (scientific) rivals. It is, therefore, necessary to re-examine our attitude towards... all those ideas which rationalists would like to see forever removed from the surface of the earth' (Against, 298–9). Professor Nyong'o in his lecture 'Technology, Culture and National Development in Africa' quoted Professor Bassey Andah as saying that our traditional and technological systems were and still remain viable on which we can build our future (19). This, according to him, means that these systems were compatible with local cultures.

Another implication of Feyerabend's philosophy of science is that it challenges Africa to develop alternatives to scientific knowledge of the West. Feyerabend repeatedly (in fact, in almost all his writings) says that neither science nor its method is the only form of, or paradigm to genuine knowledge. In his *Three Dialogues on Knowledge*, Feyerabend says that one has to find different methods to obtain different kinds of knowledge (57). The implication here is that there cannot be one fixed method for doing science. That is why he explains in his 'How to be a Good Empiricist' that, though empiricism has been taken as the core of the sciences (3), it will be futile to attempt to make it (empiricism) a universal basis of all our factual knowledge (8).

Feyerabend's position here lends credence to some trado-medical sciences in Africa. For example, K. Ojong tells us of traditional orthopaedics as practiced in Yala and Boki in the northern part of Cross River State of Nigeria. Here, they use both the metaphysical and empirical knowledge to treat fractured or broken bones. In treating a fractured bone, the traditional orthopaedic doctor would proceed by breaking the leg of a cockerel (if he is treating the fractured leg of a male patient) or the leg of a hen (if he is

treating the fractured leg of a female patient). As he 'sets' or treats the leg of the cockerel or hen, and as soon as it gets well, the male or female human patient would, correspondingly, become healed (174). The significant thing here is that the 'orthopaedic doctor' may not even get to touch the legs of the human patient involved. What he does is just to treat through a medium, which the traditional Africans call 'forces'.

The fact is that this type of medicine certainly defies explanation in Western logic and scientific rationality. The Western-minded scientist may be left to wonder about the relationship between the cockerel or hen and the human patients, or how the medication on the cockerel or hen is transmitted to the human beings without any visible contact. Meanwhile, we should note that Feyerabend seems to give credence to this type of medicine when he states that '... some forms of tribal medicine may have better ways of diagnosing and treating (mental and physical) illness than the scientific medicine of today' (Science, 9). It is true that such forms of traditional medicine abound in Africa. But the problem is that they are not carried out on such a large scale as to give Western medicine a serious challenge. However, it is also true that when measured against the logic of modem science, such traditional medicine would readily be seen to be fraught with some mysteries. Though we should encourage research into these types of medicine, it does not mean that the rationality of modern science or its method must be imposed on them. The major concern should be whether it can solve human problems without causing any nuisance. If it does, then such medicine and the like should be encouraged. We think it could provide alternatives to modern medical treatment such that everyone can make a choice where and what form of treatment he is to receive. Besides, the profession of the traditional healers would be boosted. This can then take care of the spiritual needs, social needs and even physical needs of the wider range of people in the continent.

Following the above viewpoint, we can point out another implication of Feyerabend's philosophy of science for African development. The implication is that the Government should be ready to provide funds for researches and development of 'ethnoscience' (local sciences). It is a known fact that most African

governments do not give the same helping hands to other 'local sciences' as they do to modern science. Feyerabend frowns at the situation where modern science and the state work closely together while other forms of knowledge are left alone to lick their wounds. He notes that while scientific subjects are compulsory subjects in schools, no interest is shown by government in such subjects as astrology, magic, legends, myths, etc. Yet, science benefits a great deal from these non-scientific subjects. In short, he would want these forms of knowledge to also have free and equal access to the seat of power (106).

Nevertheless, sound as Feyerabend's challenge above may appear, the problem in most African countries is whether the custodian of this 'ethno-science' will be willing to carry out, or aid such researches and at least make the result known to government and the public or not. The concomitant questions are: Will the traditional healer open up on his secrets? Will the bone setter (such as we mentioned above), let us know how his medication, for example, on the broken legs of a cockerel or hen lead to an effective cure of the human patient? Will the traditional rain-maker tell us the secrets of how he can send down the rain or stop it, or how he can relocate thunder to specific targets? (Alozie, 9). The above posers lead us into the problem of secrecy in ethno-science in Africa, a major problem that has demeaned local sciences. This is why Kwame Gyekye notes that the refusal of the custodians of the verities and secrets of nature to open up on how they achieve their feats has led to the demise of what could have passed for credible scientific knowledge on the death of such 'custodians'. According to him, this is why the development of science has stagnated (30).

Gyekye's observation is quite correct. Even in this cotemporary world, it is not uncommon to see an African traditional healer being so esoteric and personal about his knowledge claims, such that on his or her death, such knowledge would just evaporate into thin air. To stop this ugly trend, it is government's place to call the custodians of such knowledge and make provisions for these subjects to be taught in schools. In fact, the custodians of such ethno-sciences should even lead the charge for the sciences to be introduced in schools. After all, Feyerabend says in his *Science in a Free Society* that in any democratic society, the citizen has a say in

what should be taught in schools, whether folk-medicine, astrology or voodooism, etc. (86). The implication of this is that the citizens of such a society would have seen the usefulness of such forms of knowledge in the development of their spiritual and material well being. If this is done, we believe that such forms of knowledge will be properly projected. Thus, we will be talking about 'exotericization' of knowledge rather than 'esotericization'. This, of course, is one important implication of Feyerabend's philosophy of science for African development.

Apart from the above, another implication of Feyerabend's philosophy of science is that he encourages a shift from logocentricism to functionality. This means that the justification of science should no more be based on whether it conforms to the logic and rationality of modern science or not, but whether it can solve human problems. This is why he states in *Farewell to Reason* that knowledge (science) is a local commodity designed to satisfy local needs and to solve local problems (28). This means that Africans can build their own mode of scientific development instead of being over dependent on the paradigm of the Western world.

Furthermore, Feyerabend's philosophy of science poses a serious advice to African nations to be wary of the kind of technology and science they import into the continent. The fact is that not all scientific and technological knowledge is congenial to the African world view. It is a fact of life that some of these imported technological devices have more or less helped to erode or reduce our moral value to a near zero mark. The Africans, at least, in the traditional setting, are known to be highly superior in morals than their Western counterparts. But what are we seeing today? Some Africans have gone haywire in perpetrating acts of immoralities because of the influence of modern science and technology. This is why Feyerabend in his *Three Dialogues on Knowledge* explains that Western civilization (science) 'may have done some good here and there, for example, in the restriction of infections disease—but the blind assumption that Western ideas and technology are intrinsically good and can therefore be imposed without any consultation of local conditions was a disaster' (74).

Indeed, one can only be left to reflect on the moral disaster we have been plunged into by jumping into, or swallowing everything Western, as far as it is scientific and technological.

Apart from this, many African countries are involved in the attempt to develop through inappropriate and incongruous technology as a result of what Professor Nyong'o calls 'Apish imitation and misuse of resources'. He cites an example of where an American firm was contracted by the Kenyan Government to expand a sugar mill without giving adequate thought to its peculiar environment (physical, which also include social and cultural). Though the expansion has been carried out), 'not a single extra ton of cane had been processed through the factory' (20). Reason? 'The wheels of the tractors were so big that they could neither travel on the access roads in the farms nor could they fit on the bridges!' Today, according to him, 'The tractors and all other machines lay in the compound that now looked like a cemetery of abandoned metals' (20). This is the malady in many African countries. Blind imitation without adequate learning!

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion was an attempt to draw out the implications of Feyerabend's philosophy of science for African development. We have found out that Africa's over-dependence on the Western paradigm has to some extent impaired the Africans from developing through their own indigenous mode. This is not to say that modern science, as projected by the West, does not contribute to African development. It does, but it has its own loopholes when we place it side by side with the African view of the world. This is why we corroborate Kanu's position that Feyerabend's philosophy of science could provide a 'philosophical blueprint' for African development, since it challenges Africa to use its resources (as based on their own view of the world) to build her own scientific and technological empire instead of over-dependence on the West (6–9).

The important fact about Feyerabend's philosophy of science is that it is not an exclusivist philosophy, especially when compared with other philosophies of science. His philosophy of science takes into consideration a people's view of the world and their existential conditions to the extent of challenging them to develop from their own local perspectives. This challenge based on his philosophical pillars of 'anarchism', 'anything goes', 'proliferation of ideas', 'rationality' and many others mentioned in this work attest

the humanitarian, liberal and emancipatory nature of his philosophy of science.

In the light of this discussion, it is our thinking that Feyerabend's ideas are veritable pointers to the way Africa can develop by not being swallowed up by the Western paradigm, but in complementary effort with the achievements of modern science. Such a situation can lead to a greater rate of development in Africa.

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Possibility of Categorical Imperative and the Paradox of Radical Evil in Kant's Critical Philosophy

BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA

North Eastern Hill University, Shillong 793 022, India
E-mail: binodagarwala@rediffmail.com

'Kant's discussion of radical evil is deeply perplexing', according to Henry E. Allison.[1] Many of Kant's critics such as Schiller and Goethe find that the doctrine that mankind is radically evil or evil by nature is incompatible with the basic principles of his moral philosophy and hence dismiss Kant's whole account of evil as an unfortunate concession to Christian orthodoxy, thoroughly at odds with the 'critical' spirit of his moral philosophy. Henry E. Allison, in trying to make sense of Kant's discussion of radical evil, trivializes it. He himself realizes, '...Kant's doctrine of radical evil, which initially appeared so paradoxical, reduces in the end to the rather unremarkable claim that the human will is not capable of holiness. Accordingly, in attempting to make Kant's account of the universality of propensity to evil coherent, we have succeeded only in trivializing it. Or so it would seem.'[2] Henry E. Allison also finds it difficult to comprehend how Kant could have any room for the notion of moral weakness, or more generally, 'unintentional guilt' and why this weakness should count as *moral* evil.[3] He finds it very 'perplexing how Kant could maintain that even wickedness... is compatible with a good will.'[4]

It will be our endeavour to explain how the possibility of Categorical Imperative necessarily harbours the phenomenon of evil with its paradoxical character in Kant's Critical Philosophy.

SECTION I: THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE AND THE PARADOX OF EVIL

According to Kant, there are two states of nature, which he distinguishes as Juridical State of Nature and Ethical State of Nature.

Establishment of sovereignty of a human being overcomes only the juridical state of nature but by this we do not overcome the ethical state of nature. What is the ethical state of nature? Kant answers, 'Just as the Juridical state of nature is one of war of every man against every other, so too is the ethical state of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each man is continually attacked by the evil which is found in him and also in everyone else. Men ... mutually corrupt one another's moral predispositions despite the good will of each individual; yet, *because they lack a principle which unites them,* they recede, through their dissentions from the common goal of goodness, and just as though they were *instruments of evil,* expose one another to the risk of falling once again under sovereignty of the evil principle.'[5] Kant makes it clear, 'In an already existing political commonwealth all the political citizens, as such are in an *ethical state of nature...*'[6] The overcoming of ethical state of nature is the overcoming of absoluteness of power of the Prince is made clear by Kant when he quotes the *Bible,* 'We wrestle not against flesh and blood (the natural inclinations) but against principalities and powers—against evil powers.'[7] Kant quotes the Bible inaccurately. The correct version of the passage cited is: 'For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against rulers of darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.'[8] So, according to Kant, the real unity in society will be achieved only when we overcome the ethical state of nature by controlling the sovereign power of the Machiavellian political actor.

So for Kant, '... just as the state of a lawless external (brutish) freedom and independence from coercive laws is a state of injustice and of war, each against each, which men ought to leave in order to enter into a politico-civil state, so is the ethical state of nature one of open conflict between principle of virtue and a state of inner immorality which the natural man ought to bestir himself to leave as soon as possible.'[9] The Machiavellian political actor can be turned into a moral politician provided we overcome the ethical state of nature.

What is the nature of this state of inner immorality in man? According to Kant, 'Man is evil by Nature'.[10] Explaining this further he writes, 'He is evil by *nature,* means but this, that evil can be

predicated of man as a species; not that such a quality can be inferred from the concept of his species (that is, of man in general)—for then it would be necessary; but rather that from what we know of man through experience we cannot judge otherwise of him, or, that we may presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even to the best.'[11] The 'subjective' root or ground of the very possibility of all moral evil is termed 'radical evil' by Kant. 'Radical evil' for Kant does not mean any extremely perverse kind of evil. But this propensity to evil, according to Kant, is to be considered 'yet not as a natural predisposition but rather as something that can be imputed to man, and consequently it must consist in maxims of the will which are contrary to law.'[12]

Kant notices an inherent aporia in this state of inner evil in which man finds himself. 'This innate guilt (reatus), which is so denominated because it may be discerned in man as early as the first manifestations of the exercise of freedom, but which, none the less, must have originated in freedom and hence can be imputed...'[13] The state of inner immorality is both 'innate as well as acquired. According to Kant it is 'innate only in this sense, that it is posited as the ground antecedent to every use of freedom in experience (in earliest youth as far back as birth) and is thus conceived of as present in man at birth—though birth need not be the cause of it'.[14] It is acquired in the sense that 'this disposition itself must have been adopted by free choice, for otherwise it could not be imputed'.[15] According to Kant, we are evil by nature in the sense that the ultimate subjective ground of adoption of evil maxim is one, which has 'not been acquired in time', and which applies universally to the whole use of freedom'. Not only that, further 'we are unable to derive this disposition, or rather its ultimate ground, from any original act of the will in time' and hence it 'cannot be further known'. And lastly we are by nature evil 'not as the single individual ... but as the entire race.'[16] Yet for Kant, 'But this subjective ground, again, must itself always be an expression of freedom (for otherwise the use or abuse of man's power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called moral). Hence the source of evil cannot lie in an object determining the will through inclination, nor yet in a natural impulse; it can lie only in a rule made by the

will for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim.'[17] The aporia of evil is further elaborated by Kant, 'We are accountable, however, for the propensity to evil, which, as it affects the morality of the subject, is to be found in him as a free-acting being and for which it must be possible to hold him accountable as the offender—this, too, despite the fact that this propensity is so deeply rooted in the will that we are forced to say that it is to be found in man by nature.'[18]

According to Kant, 'We call a man evil, however, not because he performs actions that are evil (contrary to law) but because these actions are of such a nature that we may infer from them the presence in him of evil maxims.'[19] Since maxims cannot be observed in experience and hence the judgement that man is evil is not based on experience. 'In order, then, to call a man evil, it would have to be possible *a priori to* infer from several evil acts done with consciousness of their evil, or from one such act, an underlying evil maxim; and further, from this maxim to infer the presence in the agent of an underlying common ground, itself a maxim, of all particular morally-evil maxims.'[20]

Men are evil for Kant not because of 'the incentives which they adopt into their maxim (not in the content of the maxim)' but because of the relation of subordination among the incentives (the form of the maxim), i.e., 'which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other'. 'Consequently, man (even the best) is evil only in that he reverses the moral order of the incentives when he adopts them into his maxim.' According to Kant, a man is evil when 'He adopts, indeed, the moral law along with the law of self-love; yet when he becomes aware that they cannot remain on a par with each other but that one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentive of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law; whereas, on the contrary, the latter, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, ought to have been adopted into the universal maxim of the will as the sole incentive.'[21]

According to moral psychology of *Religion*, human nature is constituted by our free power of choice together with three original predispositions to good, i.e. (1) the predisposition to animality as living beings, which includes instincts of self preservation, for the propagation of the species, for the care of children, and for community with other human beings, also labelled as 'physical or *mechanical* self-love'; (2) the predisposition to humanity as living and rational beings, which includes desire for happiness and respect from others as superior, and the capacity to use reason in the service of inclination; and (3) the predisposition to personality as rational and reasonable being, which includes the capacity to understand and intelligently to apply the moral law and the capacity of moral feeling of respect this law as itself a sufficient motive for our free power of choice. It is because of this third power that we are responsible and accountable beings.

The three dispositions cannot determine us unless they are incorporated into our maxim by free power of choice. According to Kant, while we must take each of the three predispositions as given (we cannot alter or eradicate them), we can and must order them: in other words, we must decide through our power of choice the priority and weight these predisposition to have in our supremely regulative principles as shown in our deliberations and conduct. Whether we have a morally good or bad will depends on that ordering. Not only the basic features of the original predispositions establish a moral order of priority (*sittliche Ordnung*), such that it ranks the predisposition to personality as unconditionally prior to the other two, making these two subordinate to the former disposition, but also the ordering with such priority is appropriate to us as persons with a free power of choice as it is the principle that fully expresses our nature as autonomous. When we violate the moral order of the predispositions after they are incorporated in our maxims, our character is evil.

According to Kant, there are three successive stages (*Stufen*) in the realization of the original disposition to evil or 'evil heart'. The first stage is the 'weakness of the heart' or 'frailty' (*Gebrechlichkeit*) in the observance of maxims adopted in conforming to the correct moral order. This is alluded to in St. Paul's lamentation, 'What I would, that I do not!,'[22] according to Kant. So, what is objectively inexpugnable (*unüberwindliche*) incentive, i.e. the good, is subjectively or as an actual motivational force, weaker in comparison to inclinations. The second stage of radical evil is impurity or insincerity (*Unlauterkeit*). At this stage one does what morality requires but

only with external inducements. That is to say moral motivation is not a sufficient incentive at this stage. The third stage of radical evil is wickedness (*Bösartigkeit*). At this stage, one has the propensity to adopt evil maxims. In evil maxims, the order of incentives is reversed, i.e. moral incentives are neglected in favour of inclinations. According to Kant, in spite of reversing the order of incentives in the maxims one may continue to act in accordance with the law.

According to Kant, evil heart' 'may coexist with a will [*Willen*] which is in general [*im Allgemeinen*] good.'[23] The first two stages of evil are stages of 'unintentional' (*unvorsätzlich*) guilt but the third stage of evil is that of deliberate or intentional (*vorsätzliche*) guilt, yet at the third stage there is systematic self-deception which is its fundamental feature. One is morally satisfied if one is fortunate in avoiding those circumstances that would have led to actual immoral behaviour.

Kant also raises the all-important question of the origin of evil: How does evil arise? His answer is: 'In the search for the rational origin of evil actions, every such action must be regarded as though the individual had fallen into it directly from a state of innocence. For whatever his previous deportment may have been, whatever natural causes may have been influencing him, and whether these causes were to be found within him or outside him, his action is yet free and determined by none of these causes; hence it can and must always be judged as an original use of his will. He should have refrained from that action, whatever his temporal circumstances and entanglements; for through no cause in the world can he cease to be a freely acting being.'[24] And he further writes, 'But the rational origin of this perversion of our will whereby it makes lower incentives supreme among its maxims, that is, of the propensity to evil, remains inscrutable to us, because this propensity itself must be set down to our account and because, as a result, that ultimate ground of all maxims would in turn involve the adoption of an evil maxim [as its basis]. Evil could have sprung only from the morally evil (not from mere limitations in our nature); and yet the original predisposition (which no one other than man himself could have corrupted, if he is to be held responsible for this corruption) is a predisposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could originally have come.'[25] The

ground of evil is logically unknowable for Kant, because, 'The disposition, i.e. the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of maxims, can be one only and applies universally to the whole use of freedom. Yet this disposition itself must have been adopted by free choice, for otherwise it could not be imputed. But the subjective ground or cause of this adoption cannot be further known (though it is inevitable that we should inquire into it), since otherwise still another maxim would have to be adduced in which this disposition must have been incorporated, a maxim which itself in turn must have its ground. Since, therefore, we are unable to derive this disposition, or rather its ultimate ground, from any original act of will in time, we call it a property of the will which belong to it by nature (although actually the disposition is grounded in freedom).'[26]

How to make sense of aporia of evil—it is innate, i.e. not acquired in time, as well as acquired, due to nature as well as due to free will—as well as the inscrutability of origin of evil in Kant's critical philosophy? How can evil depend on the incorporation of incentives in maxims yet be unintentional in the first two stages? In the third stage, how can there be deliberate evil with systematic self-deception? How can radical evil be consistent with existence of good will in man?

But before we answer these questions, let us try to find out whether the doctrine of radical evil in man is compatible with basic principles of Kant's moral philosophy. Since the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* is generally taken as definitive of Kant's moral philosophy, let us try to find out if the doctrine of radical evil is compatible with the moral doctrines in this work of Kant. Near the end of the first chapter of the *Groundwork*, Kant claims that when the ordinary mind excludes all sensuous motives from its practical laws in the power of judgment, even though it begins to show what advantages it has in itself, yet it also becomes subtle 'in juggling with conscience or with other claims as to what is to be called right, or in trying to determine honestly for its own instruction the value of various actions'.[27] This chicanery with once own conscience in the ordinary man's mind is because, 'Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty presented to him by reason as so worthy of esteem—the counterweight of his needs

and inclinations, whose total satisfaction he grasps under the name of "happiness".'[28] This is because in the transformed understanding of morality 'reason, without promising anything to inclination, enjoins its commands relentlessly and, therefore, so to speak, with disregard and neglect of these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims (which refuse to be suppressed by any command)'.[29] So Kant concludes, 'From this there arises a *natural dialectic*—that is, a disposition to quibble with these strict laws of duty, to throw doubt on their validity or at least on their purity and strictness, and to make them, where possible, more adapted to our wishes and inclinations; that is, to pervert their very foundations and destroy their whole dignity—a result which in the end even ordinary human reason is unable to approve.'[30] Although Kant has introduced this as a possibility against which he wants to warn mankind, he has failed to realize that in the very beginning of this first chapter he has actually negated the claim of morality on us by turning it into a mere wish.

Kantian 'good will' is good even if it results in no action. 'Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.'[31] In the moral evaluation of Kantian good will not not only is the proposed end missing but so is the action. Kant will explicitly assert it, '... for when moral value is in question, we are concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with their inner principles, which we cannot see.'[32] There is a conceptual distinction between wishing and willing. According to Gadamer, 'Wishing is defined by the way it remains innocent of mediation with what is to be done. That is in truth what wishing is.'[33] But '...wishing is not willing; it is not practice. Practice consists of choosing, of deciding for something and against something else, and in doing this a practical reflection is effective, which is itself dialectical in the highest measure. When I will something, then a reflection intervenes by which I bring before my eyes by means of an analytical procedure what is attainable... To speak

with Aristotle, the conclusion of the practical syllogism and of practical deliberation is the resolve. This resolve, however, together with the whole path of reflection, from the willing of the objective to the thing to be done, is simultaneously a concretization of the willed objective itself.'[34] Even Kant himself writes, 'The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, and not in its object, it constitutes a *power of acting or not acting according to liking*. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of action to produce the object, it forms an act of choice (*Willkür*), if this consciousness is not conjoined with it, the activity is called a *wish*.'[35] Kant, making goodness of goodwill completely independent of any kind of action, so that goodwill is good due to its willing alone transforms goodwill into a good wish, which remains innocent of the action to be done, not withstanding his protestation that it is 'not, admittedly, ... a mere wish, but ... the straining of every means so far as they are in our control.'[36] Kant will later go on to claim that the moments in which we take the stance as disinterested observers 'declining to take the liveliest wish for goodness straight away as its realization', we become skeptical of genuine virtue.[37] In this argument Kant states that there is implicit an understanding of moral value, i.e. 'the liveliest wish for goodness' is 'straight away ... its realization'. Kantian decision 'to take the liveliest wish for goodness straight away as its realization' transforms goodwill into a good wish which remains innocent of the action to be done, not withstanding his protestation that it is 'not, admittedly, ... a mere wish, but ... the straining of every means so far as they are in our control.'[38] So he has already prepared ground for radical evil in man.

The reason for this is not far to seek. In his first *Critique*, Kant wrote that the concept of action (*Handlung*) is derived from the concept of causality (*Kausalität*), since an action consists in the exercise of causal power or force by an agent to effect some change or alteration (*Wechsel*) in the world.[39] Whether rational or not, any agent *is* an agent precisely by virtue of possessing the ability to exercise causal power.[40] The distinctive feature of all human action is that they are all goal-directed and it is the function of practical reasoning to identify and define the goal of acting. Some of Kant's

clearest and strongest statements about the goal-directed nature of practical reason in particular occur in *The Metaphysic of Morals*: 'No free action is possible unless the agent also intends an end (which is the matter of choice [*Willkür*]) [389] ... An *end* [*Zweck*] is an *object* of free choice [*wille*], the thought of which determines the power of choice [*Willkür*] to an action by which the object is produced [384] ... Every action, therefore, has its end [385; see 381] ... The power to set an end—any end whatsoever—is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from animality) [392]. [As a rational agent,] man has, in his reason, something more than [mere animals] and can set his own ends [434].'[41] Since all human action are goal-directed and hence there can be no specifically moral action, as these will have to be performed disregarding all ends. Hence, moral willing necessarily reduces to moral wishing leaving the field of human action open for encroachment from radical evil.

In the second chapter of his *Groundwork* Kant writes, 'But if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain impulsions) which do not always harmonize with the objective ones; if, in a word, the will is not in itself completely in accord with reason (as actually happens in the case of men); then actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are subjectively contingent and the determining of such a will in accordance with objective laws is necessitation.'[42] This necessitation is expressed by 'ought'. Here one gets the impression that insufficiency of reason to determine will is sufficient condition of the emergence of the idea of 'ought' but not necessary condition. But this is not the case. For Kant, insufficiency of reason to determine will is also a necessary condition of the emergence of the idea of 'ought'. By actions, which are subjectively contingent' Kant means actions, which are not such that the *Willkür* cannot but choose those actions. That is to say, subjectively, contingent action is that action, which the *Willkür* often fails to choose and even if *Willkür* chooses it, *Willkür* does so with the assistance of empirical impulsions as *reason* by itself is not sufficient to determine the *Willkür*, hence in such a situation *Willkür* can say 'I could have chosen otherwise'. So, for man, *Willkür* often fails to choose the action, which *reason* asks *Willkür* to choose. Hence

man always can say, 'I could have acted otherwise'. In such a situation the action, which *reason* asks *Willkür* to choose, appears to the latter as *necessitating* it. The reason for this is given by Kant, 'the relation of objective laws to a will not good through and through is conceived as one in which the will of a rational being, although it is determined by principles of reason, does not necessarily follow these principles in virtue of its own nature.'[43] When reason is sufficient to determine the will as it happens in divine will or holy will, there is no necessitation and hence no idea of 'ought'. So the will for which Kant is formulating categorical imperative is presupposed to be 'not good through and through' and this 'will' will easily turn into a will infected with radical evil. Reversal of incentive has already presupposed. Either the *Willkür* fails to choose the objectively necessary action in the face of contrary desire or, when it succeeds in choosing, he does so with the assistance of a consonant desire because reason by itself is not sufficient to make the agent chose the action. In both cases, the moral motive is subordinated to ends set by self-love. So the very structure of 'ought' is based on the radical evil in man. This stage of argument of Kant corresponds to the first stage in the ascent to evil heart. The first stage is the 'weakness of the heart' or 'frailty' (*Gebrechlichkeit*) in the observance of maxims adopted in conforming to the correct moral order. So what is objectively inexpugnable (*unüberwindliche*) incentive, i.e. the good, is subjectively or as an actual motivational force, weaker in comparison to inclinations and hence the only resistance that moral incentive can give to self-love is in the form of 'ought' which never translates into actual action by itself alone.

The second stage in the development of radical evil is impurity or insincerity (*Unlauterkeit*). Is there any insincerity built in Kant's conception of categorical imperative as explained in his *Groundwork*? Explaining the distinction between the hypothetical and categorical imperative, Kant claims, 'Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will)'[44] but 'A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end.'[45] Be it noted that a hypothetical imperative declares categorically of an action that it is necessary as a means to an end,

but a categorical imperative does not declare categorically of an action that it is objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end; rather a categorical imperative merely *represents* an action to be objectively necessary apart from any end. Is this difference only an oversight? Explaining further Kant writes, 'If the action would be good solely as a means *to something else*, the imperative is *hypothetical*; if the action is represented *as good in itself* and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is *categorical*.'[46] Here too in the context of hypothetical imperative, an action is introduced as categorically to be good as a means to an end by if clause, but in the context of categorical imperative an action is not introduced as categorically to be good in itself by the if clause; rather it is introduced merely as *represented* as good in itself by the if clause. As there is no action which is not performed for an end, according to Kant, he needs the theory of 'representation' *to represent an action to be moral which, in fact, it is not.* So the 'insincerity' is built in the categorical imperative by Kant. We have already seen that for Kant one does what morality requires but only with external inducements. That is to say, moral motivation is not a sufficient incentive.

Where is the third stage of radical evil, i.e. wickedness (*Bösartigkeit*) in categorical imperative in Kant's *Groundwork*? Be it noted at the third stage of development of evil heart one has propensity to adopt evil maxims which reverse the order of incentives, i.e. moral incentives are neglected in favour of inclinations. How does Kant build this stage of evil heart in his categorical imperative? Kant states one of the many formulation of the content of the categorical imperative in the following words: '*Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.*'[47] Be it noted that the injunction is to treat *humanity* as an end in itself and it does not ask us to treat *rationality* or *personality* as an end in itself. Kant himself makes this distinction in the beginning of the previous paragraph: 'Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, *exists* as an end in himself ...'[48] and for him to have rationality is to have personality. So, for Kant, there is distinction between personality and humanity. What does Kant mean

by the term 'humanity' as distinct from 'personality'? For Kant, 'humanity' can refer to nothing but *Willkür* only for it is simultaneously the capacity both to choose ends and to produce the ends chosen, and this capacity—Kant thinks—can be perfected not only to choose ends in conformity to *reason* but also to produce the end so chosen with technical efficiency. In the *Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, Kant used the term 'humanity' many times. In all the uses of the term 'humanity' there, Kant is referring to *Willkür* or free elective will. In Section VIII of the *Introduction* Kadt writes, 'The power of proposing to ourselves an end is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With the end of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found in man.' Since the power to choose ends is characteristic of humanity, it is nothing but *Willkür.* The most convincing confirmation comes from the *Religion Within The Limits Of Reason Alone.* There Kant makes a distinction between 'the predisposition to humanity in man, taken as a living and at the same time a rational being' and 'the predisposition to personality in man, taken as a rational and at the same time an accountable being'.[49] Here, on the latter disposition, Kant adds a footnote saying, 'We cannot regard this as included in the concept of the preceding, but necessarily must treat it as a special predisposition.'[50] Later, he explains, 'The predisposition to personality is the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will.'[51] This predisposition to personality refers to 'the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will', which is not included in the predisposition to humanity. So 'humanity' can refer to *Willkür* only, i.e. the capacity to choose and to achieve ends. By treating this capacity to choose and achieve all sorts of subjective ends as an end in itself, Kant has built within the categorical imperative a propensity to adopt evil maxims which reverses the order of incentives, i.e. moral incentives are neglected in favour of inclinations. The respect for the moral law is subordinated to choice and achievement of all sorts of ends of inclination.

This building of radical evil within the heart of morality is taking place in Kant's moral philosophy without his being fully aware of

it and hence involuntarily. His stated aim is to answer the moral skepticism which arose in the wakeup of new modern science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In his Preface to the Second Edition he writes, 'So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative reason, it is indeed *negative*; but since it thereby removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, nay threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a *positive* and very important use. At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary *practical* employment of pure reason—the *moral*—in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though [practical] reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself.'[52] That is to say, Kant is limiting the domain of speculative reason in the first critique so as to remove obstacle in the way of morality. He further explains, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* 'I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room *for faith*.'[53] After having written his *First Critique* in the *Groundwork*, Kant is trying to show whether there is such a thing as morality, given the foundations of science as developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, what shape morality can take consistent with foundations of modern science as developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. And in the *Second Critique*, Kant tries to prove the reality of so shaped morality. But Kant has failed to notice that in the transformation of morality to suit the foundations of modern science, he has built radical evil in the heart of morality. He realizes this in his *Religion Within The Limits Of Reason Alone* and declares that evil heart 'may coexist with a will [*Willen*] which is in general [*im Allgemeinen*] good'.[54] We can see the dialectic of 'unintentional' (*unvorsätzlich*) radical evil and intentional (*vorsätzliche*) and systematic self-deception played out in Kant's *Groundwork*, making it out as the fundamental feature of modern moral experience.

Paradox of evil becomes meaningful if we understand the origin of evil as the transition of man from non-homo-faber whose activity was of the nature of *doing* or *acting* in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense to homo-faber whose activity is of the nature of production in the Kantian sense. This transition took place due to collective constitution of subjectivity and *Willkür*. The homo faber acts with

free will and choice. Hence, he can always say while acting, 'I could have acted otherwise'. Due to this reason the act is attributed to him. The non-homo faber man when acts voluntarily says, 'I could not have acted otherwise'. So for him if a person while acting could say, 'I could have acted otherwise', then that person has not removed all his doubts and so is *acting in ignorance*. To act in ignorance of what is the possibility open to him in the situation is to act involuntarily. Man acts out of ignorance due to his nature as a subjective individual. Hence, an action done with free will is necessarily an action done involuntarily due to his nature. Also, there is no contradiction in saying that an action done involuntarily is also an action done with free will. Thus, the idea of original sin is not contradictory. It is perfectly consistent. The origin of evil is *inscrutable* because so long as we continue to act with free will and choice we are in the realm of *ignorance*. That is to say, unless we dismantle the subjectivity and *Willkür* of man we will remain in the realm of the involuntary in the classical sense. Hence, Kant is right when he says that freedom has already made itself not free, since freedom is involuntary. It will be shown that the constitution of subjectivity and *Willkür* is an involuntary act.

Kant himself is aware that two senses of action are involved here. He writes, 'Hence a propensity to evil can inhere only in the moral capacity of the will. But nothing is morally evil (i.e. capable of being imputed) but that which is our own act. On the other hand, by the concept of a propensity we understand a subjective determining ground of the will which precedes all acts and which, therefore, is itself not an act. Hence, in the concept of a simple propensity to evil, there would be a contradiction were it not possible to take the word "act" in two meanings, both of which are reconcilable with the concept of freedom. The term "act" can apply in general to that exercise of freedom whereby the supreme maxim (in harmony with the law or contrary to it) it is adopted by the will, but also to the exercise of freedom whereby the actions themselves (considered materially, i.e. with reference to the objects of volition) are performed in accordance with that maxim. The propensity to evil, then, is an act in the first sense (*peccatum originarium*), and at the same time the formal ground of all unlawful conduct in the second sense, which latter, considered materially,

violates the law and is termed vice (*peccatum derivatum*); and the first offense remains, even though the second (from incentives which do not subsist in the law itself) may be repeatedly avoided. The former is intelligible action, cognizable by means of pure reason alone, apart from every temporal condition; the latter is sensible action, empirical, given in time (*factum phenomenon*). The former, particularly when compared with the latter, is entitled a simple propensity and innate, [first] because it cannot be eradicated (since for such eradication the highest maxim would have to be that of the good—whereas in this propensity it already has been postulated as evil), but chiefly because we can no more assign a further cause for the corruption in us by evil of just this highest maxim, although this is our own action, then we can assign a cause for any fundamental attribute belonging to our nature.'[55] The former intelligible act which Kant identifies as 'a simple propensity and innate' is the involuntary *doing* (an action *done* out of ignorance) in Aristotelian-Thomistic sense and the latter sensible empirical act in time is of the nature of *making* done out of choice in Kantian sense.

To make man get out of evil, Kant will have to recover the notion of the *voluntary doing* in Aristotelian-Thomistic sense, which is the notion of action done with knowledge. Here the practical reason operative is *phronesis*, according to Aristotle. And *phronesis* is a reason of an essentially a social being. To recover the notion of a *voluntary action*, which necessarily is a *moral action*—since no one is evil voluntarily,—Kant has to make man social essentially rather than being together due to external force. That is to say, Kant needs to dismantle the subjectivity and *Willkür* of man which mankind has synthesized involuntarily through involuntary reflection. It must be kept in mind that the moral law itself inscribes the evil in itself by requiring the preservation and promotion of subjectivity of all and makes it impossible for any man to rise to the level where he can say 'I will' with respect to the law, he must always remain at the state where he can only say 'I ought' with respect to the law. It is impossible for the moral law to exist with the transformed content unless it is retransformed with the dismantling of the subjectivity. So it remains an impossible ideal.

Kant is not aware that the very argument through which he shows the possibility of categorical imperative is, in fact, leading

him to the paradox evil, i.e. evil with apparently dual aspects, which appear to be contradictory. It will be our endeavour to show the correctness of this contention in the following section.

SECTION II: THE POSSIBILITY OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND THE PARADOX OF EVIL

In paragraph 26 of second chapter of *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant raises the question 'How is the imperative *morality* possible?'[56] To answer this question, he has written the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. The problem here, according to Kant, is to establish how is the necessitation of *Willkür* possible while disregarding all reference to the end set by it. If we proceed empirically through examples then we will observe that each individual is pursuing his ends, be it actual or possible. So, even if we notice empirically that a man's action accords with moral law, yet we cannot be certain that his action accords with morality unconditionally, i.e. not motivated as a necessary means to the end he is actually pursuing. Hence, 'we must rather suspect that all imperatives which seem to be categorical may none the less be covertly hypothetical.' The problem is that due to the subject-object dichotomy established by the first critique the subject looking at society empirically, i.e. taking an objective attitude to society has reflected it out of existence and conceives himself as a nonsocial individual subject pursuing ends of his own choosing. So this individual can follow the principle 'Though shalt make no false promises' as a means to preserving his credit worthiness, which he as *an individual wants*. So he can follow this principle in the form, 'You ought not to make a lying promise lest, when this comes to light, you destroy your credit.' That is to say, he can follow this principle as a hypothetical imperatives only. An act of lying promise can be considered as bad in itself and the principle of prohibition is, therefore, categorical only for a will, which is essentially social. This is because the necessity of avoiding this kind of act, i.e. making of a false promise is no mere device for the avoidance of some further evil only for a will which can will to avoid it simply because it is objectively necessary, i.e. necessary on grounds valid for every rational being as such. This will, therefore, is an essentially social being. But the individual of Kantian philosophy is not an essentially

a social being so far. So, the real problem is to show how can the categorical principle of an essentially social being necessitate an essentially nonsocial individual subject without destroying his essentially nonsocial individualistic subjectivity. From the empirical example, all we can gather is only the hypotheticality or conditionality of the principle followed, and even if we notice no subjective end, we can never be certain of the categoricity or unconditionality of motivation. 'Even so, we cannot with any certainty show by an example that the will is determined here solely by the law without any further motive, although it may appear to be so; for it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also hidden dread of other risks, may unconsciously influence the will. Experience shows only that it is not perceived.'[57] If we seek the help of experience, 'the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to be categorical and unconditioned, would in fact be only a pragmatic prescription calling attention to our advantage and merely bidding us take this into account.'[58]

Be it noted that Kant is not seeking the possibility of categoricity or unconditionality of moral law, which has been found out in the first chapter itself. The problem is to establish the *necessitation* of *Willkür* involved in the categorical imperative, for that is not established in the first chapter. It must be kept in mind that the problem has come up because the *Willkür* is the will of a nonsocial individual subject but categoricity comes from pure *Wille*, or pure *gute Wille*, which is essentially a social will. So how can this categorical law be *necessitating* for *Willür*? On the face of it, the necessitation of *Willkür* by a categorical law appears to be contradictory? So the very *possibility* of this kind of *necessitation* has to be established. It must be kept in mind that the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* will establish only the *possibility* of categorical necessitation. The *actuality* of this kind of necessitation will be established only in the *Critique of Practical Reason* on the basis of the *sole fact of practical reason.*

In paragraphs 10 to 16 of the third chapter of the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant prepares the ground for showing how categorical imperative is possible. He lays the foundation for the possibility of the categorical imperative by introducing the distinction between intelligible world of noumena and the sensible world of phenomena. Then Kant shows the possibility of categorical imperative in the third chapter of the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* from paragraph 17 to 19. We will now proceed by way of understanding each of these paragraphs 10 to 19.

It is our speculation that in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, when Kant is speaking of phenomena, he is talking about the realm of objectivity, which is correlated to the subjectivity of man. That is to say, the objective nature constitutes the phenomena. But this subjectivity of man co-related with the objective nature, camouflages the more essential nature of man, i.e. man as a disinterested spectator or *Theoros*, and the objectivity of nature camouflages the manner of non-objective (and not subjective either) availability of nature to which he belongs primordially. So, the phenomenal world is the appearance behind which lies the primordial world of spectator to which the spectator himself belongs. Our conjecture is that this primordial world of spectator is the noumena of Kant. This noumenal world sustains the appearance, since without the synthesizing activity of the imagination of the spectator there can be no world of objectivity of nature co-related with the subjectivity of man, which is the appearance or the phenomenal world. The transcendental unity of apperception constituting the subjectivity of man provides the link between the two worlds, i.e. the world of noumena and the world of phenomena. The transcendental unity of apperception in its aspect of process of synthesizing activity belongs to the noumenal world, as it is the activity of the imagination of spectator. But in its aspect of product of synthesizing activity, i.e. in its aspect of unity of subjectivity it is the essential co-relate of the phenomenal world. So, for Kant, the transcendental ego or the subjectivity of man as the product aspect of transcendental unity of apperception has an ambiguous position. Sometimes he appears to identify it with noumenal self but sometimes he distinguishes the transcendental ego from the noumenal self. That the subjectivity of man has a dual aspect is made clear in the discussion of will. Will has intelligible aspect referring to the world of things in themselves and it has phenomenal aspect, i.e. power to initiate change in the world of appearance through its knowledge of phenomena. Regarding will Kant says, 'Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects*.[59]

Para 10: Now Kant is going to make the distinction between two standpoints for explaining the idea of necessitation. 'One shift, however, still remains open to us. We can enquire whether we do not take one standpoint when by means of freedom we conceive ourselves as causes acting *a priori*, and another standpoint when we contemplate ourselves with reference to our actions as effects which we see before our eyes.'[60]

It may be noted that evil also has a dual aspect, which appears to be contradictory. If it can be shown that evil has one aspect from one point of view and the opposite aspect from a different point of view then the paradox of evil vanishes. So the duality of standpoints is eminently suitable to solve the paradox of evil, provided we can link the two aspects of evil to two standpoints respectively.

Para 11: Which faculty comes into play to make the distinction between the two stand points? The hint of that faculty is given when Kant writes, 'One observation is possible without any need for subtle reflexion and, we may assume, can be made by the most ordinary intelligence—no doubt in its own fashion, through some obscure discrimination of the power of judgment known to it as "feeling".'[61] Mark the words 'some obscure discrimination of the power of judgment known to it as "feeling".' The faculty of judgment referred to is known as 'feeling' and this faculty of judgment is also the power of discrimination. Which faculty is being referred to here? Compare this description with the description of a faculty of judgement in the *Critique of Judgment*. 'To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or confused, is quite different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight. Here, the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is more to its feeling of life—under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure—and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind *(Gemüt)* is conscious in the feeling of its state.'[62] Because of the identity of the two descriptions of the faculty of discrimination, we can say the faculty of discrimination Kant is appealing to in making the distinction between two standpoints

is the faculty of aesthetic judgement, which belongs to the disinterested spectator. How can we say that the faculty of aesthetic judgement brings in the figure of disinterested spectator?

In the very first paragraph of the first chapter of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant writes, '... a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will...'[63] So it is only an impartial and rational *spectator* who *contemplates* a situation according to Kant. Since in judgement of beauty we are not 'concerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection),'[64] '... the judgment of taste is simply *contemplative*, i.e., it is a judgment which is indifferent as to existence of an object ...'[65] It follows that the very first rule of reflection on the beautiful is that it produces delight in the disinterested spectator. This delight is independent of the existence of the object of sense experience or object of will. It is only contemplative delight. The Introduction to the *Metaphysic of Morals* distinguishes pleasure which 'may be the cause or effect of desire' from 'pleasure, which is not necessarily connected with the desire of an object, which is at basis not a pleasure in the existence of the object of representation, but rather adheres to the representation alone [and which] can be called merely contemplative pleasure or passive *delight*'; and Kant then claims that 'the feeling of the latter kind of pleasure is called taste'.[66] So we can say that aesthetic judgement of taste is the judgement of the disinterested spectator.

Be it noted Kant has to bring in *apparently* a third point of view, i.e., the point of view of a disinterested spectator, to make a distinction between two standpoints, i.e. points of view of sensible and the intelligible world. But this third point of view is only *apparently* distinct from the other two. In fact it is the same as the point of view of the intelligible world. The argument to show the correctness of this contention will be given later.

Be it noted the faculty of discrimination belongs even to the most ordinary intelligence and hence the standpoint of the disinterested spectator belongs to even the most ordinary intelligence. What observation is being made by the exercise of this faculty of discrimination? 'The observation is this—that all ideas coming to us

apart from our own volition (as do those of the senses) enable us to know objects only as they affect ourselves: what they may be in themselves remains unknown. Consequently, ideas of this kind, even with the greatest effort of attention and clarification brought to bear by understanding, serve only for the knowledge of *appearances*, never of *things themselves*.[67] This faculty of discrimination of the disinterested spectator makes a distinction between the knowable *appearance* and unknowable *things in themselves*.

What exactly is the significance of denial of knowledge in this sphere of things in themselves? The objective knowledge based on subject/object dichotomy is of the nature of power. Hence, for the subjectivity of man, 'knowledge is power'. Since knowledge is knowledge of causality operating in substance of the object in space and time it gives power to the subjective man to manipulate the object by his own will. The man with 'will' can manipulate the object through knowledge of causality. Knowledge of causality is gained through science which, in turn, is the basics of technology. The subjectivity of man by its own will manipulates object through technology to give it a desired form to suit his own purpose. Now denial of knowledge is denial of power to manipulate. So, for Kant, the primordial things in themselves are beyond the power of manipulation. If that is manipulated through objective knowledge we will destroy the very basis of synthesizing activity on which the knowledge of phenomena is based. It may be noted the activity of synthesizing belongs to the ego as thing in itself. So Kant correctly observes, 'Once this distinction is made (it may be merely by noting the difference between ideas given to us from without, we ourselves being passive, and those which we produce entirely from ourselves, and so manifest our own activity), it follows of itself that behind appearances we must admit and assume something else which is not appearance—namely, things in themselves—although, since we can never be acquainted with these, but only with the way in which they affect us, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we can never get any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves.'[68] Kant writes as if unknowability of things in themselves is something regrettable, but it is precisely the unknowability of things in themselves which he needs given the force of denial of knowledge in this sphere.

Let us investigate this distinction as made by Kant to understand its real significance. 'This must yield us a distinction, however rough, between the *sensible world* and the *intelligible world*, the first of which can vary a great deal according to the differences of sensibility in sundry observers, while the second, which is its ground, always remains the same.'[69] As it was conjectured above, the intelligible world is the world of the disinterested spectators. As disinterested spectators, all have the same imagination as we take the stance of disinterested spectators by disregarding all the subjective differences. Hence, while the world of sensibility has differences for each subject, the intelligible world is the same for the disinterested spectator. We will establish this conjecture on the basis of the text of the *Groundwork* from the present and the following two passages. But first let us get on with the analysis of the present passage before we go to the next two passages. Now, for further clarification, Kant is going to apply this distinction to the self in the present passage. 'Even as regards himself—so far as man is acquainted with himself by inner sensation—he cannot claim to know what he is in himself. For since he does not, so to say, make himself, and since he acquires his concept of self not *a priori* but empirically, it is natural that even about himself he should get information through sense—that is, through inner sense—and consequently only through the mere appearance of his own nature and through the way in which his consciousness is effected'.[70] That is to say, the knowledge man has of himself through introspection is knowledge of the self as appearance or phenomenal self. 'Yet beyond this character of himself as a subject made up, as it is, of mere appearances he must suppose there to be something else which is its ground—namely, his Ego as this may be constituted in itself; and thus as regards mere perception and the capacity for receiving sensations he must count himself as belonging to the *sensible world*, but as regards whatever there may be in him of pure activity (whatever comes into consciousness, not through affection of the senses, but immediately) he must count himself as belonging to the *intellectual world*, of which, however, he knows nothing further.'[71] To the extent man has sensibility and capacity to receive sensation, he belongs to the sensible world. But to the extent that man has consciousness of the pure activity of the ego, which includes not only ruled-

governed play of faculties of representation but also free play of faculties of representations, he belongs to the intellectual world. It must be kept in mind that the play of faculties—be it free or rule-governed—is due to imagination of the disinterested spectator. So the Ego refers not to the identity and unity of the rule-governed functions of faculties of representation but to the spectator consciousness with free and rule-governed play of faculties, which is beyond individual identity as it is essentially in communication with others. So the Ego, which belongs to the intelligible world, is the disinterested spectator and the intelligible world is the world of disinterested spectator. Be it noted, to the extent that the consciousness of unity and identity of the rule (concept as the rule) governed play (function of synthesis) constitutes the ego it is transcendental ego and it is subjectivity. It may be remembered the rule-governed play of faculties is the activity of the spectator, but it is the consciousness of the unity and identity of the play, which constitutes the subjectivity. It is through this subjective ego the intelligible world is connected to the sensible world. Hence, subjectivity or transcendental ego has an ambiguous position in Kant's critical philosophy. Be it noted, *Willkür* as the correlate of the subjectivity also belongs to the intelligible world but as spontaneous independent causality it produces effects in the sensible world it belongs to the sensible world. Kant has elaborately argued out this dual character of the *Willkür* in the third antinomy of reason. So the sensible and intellectual worlds are related through subjectivity and *Willkür*.

Para 12: 'A conclusion of this kind must be reached by a thinking man about everything that may be presented to him.'[72] This distinction between the sensible or phenomenal world of senses and the intelligible world of disinterested spectators must be made with respect to every thing. That is to say, everything belongs to the sensible world and the intelligible world at the same time. 'It is presumably to be found even in the most ordinary intelligence, which, as is well known, is always very much disposed to look behind the objects of the senses for something further that is invisible and is spontaneously active; but it goes on to spoil this by immediately sensifying this invisible something in its turn—that is to say, it wants to make it an object of intuition, and so by this procedure it

does not become in any degree wiser.'[73] Since the power of discrimination, which is feeling and judgement, belongs to even the ordinary person, from the standpoint of the spectator he make the distinction between the intelligible world of spectator and the phenomenal world of the senses. But even when he finds active unknowable intelligible being behind every object of phenomenal appearance, he obscures that fact by his desire to know that being empirically.

Para 13: The power of judgement known to ordinary intelligence as 'feeling' is the power of imagination of the disinterested spectator and this power of imagination of the disinterested spectator which belongs to every person allows him to make a distinction between the unknowable intelligible world of the disinterested spectator and the knowable phenomenal world of senses. So we can say it is this power discrimination, i.e. the power of imagination of the disinterested spectator, which distinguishes man from everything known to him, including himself as a phenomenal being or as being affected by objects. 'Now man actually finds in himself a power which distinguishes him from all other things—and even from himself so far as he is affected by objects.'[74] Previously, this power was power of judgement known to ordinary intelligence as 'feeling' but now Kant declares, 'This power is *reason*.'[75] We should not be surprised at this, for Kant even reason and sensibility spring out as two stems from a common root, which we can identify as imagination.

It is imagination, which is in play in the power of judgement known to ordinary intelligence as 'feeling'. Kant here uses the word 'reason' in the technical sense, i.e. in distinction even from understanding. 'As pure spontaneity reason is elevated even above *understanding* in the following respect. Understanding—although it too is spontaneous activity and is not, like sense, confined to ideas which arise only when we are affected by things (and therefore are passive)—cannot produce by its own activity any concepts other than those whose sole service is *to bring sensuous ideas under rules* and so to unite them in one consciousness: without this employment of sensibility it would think nothing at all.'[76] The one consciousness in which understanding unites sensuous ideas by bringing them under rules of its own is the subjective consciousness. Understanding

produces subjective consciousness, which has ambiguous position of relating to world of sensibility and also intelligible world of pure activity as explained before. 'Reason, on the other hand—in what are called "Ideas"—shows a spontaneity so pure that it goes far beyond anything sensibility can offer: it manifests its highest function in distinguishing the sensible and intelligible worlds from one another and so in marking out limits for understanding itself.'[77] Reason manifests its highest function in distinguishing the sensible from the intelligible world, and hence it is the power of judgement known to ordinary intelligence as 'feeling' and, consequently, identifiable with the power of imagination of the disinterested spectator and it produces spontaneously pure 'Ideas'. No doubt the intelligible world of Kant is the classical conceptual world of *logos, nous, dianoia, theoria,* and *phronēsis.* The distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world refers to the opposition of the world of *aesthesis* and *noesis,* which goes back to Plato. With *phronēsis* of Greeks, *Wille* of Kant also belongs to this intelligible world and it is the correlate of the disinterested spectator as *Willkür* is the correlate of the subjectivity. It is also interesting to note that for Kant imaginationis the prime faculty of the disinterested spectator and it is nothing but Classical *nous.* It can be confirmed directly. According to Kant, '*Imagination* is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present.*'[78] Or again, 'Imagination (*Facultas imaginandi*) is a faculty of *perception* in the absence of an object.'[79] In Permenides' fragment-4 *nous* is that faculty 'through which you look steadfastly at things which are present though they are absent'[80] or through which you 'See securely ... things absent as though they were present.'[81] So we can conclude that Kantian faculty of imagination is the faculty called *nous* (*intellectus* and *intelligential*) by the Greeks.

According to Kant, 'Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.'[82] What is the nature of this intelligible being? Kant answers that the

I of 'I think', which represents the transcendental unity of apperception, is nothing but the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'.[83] The 'mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity *a priori,* if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act'.[84] Kant says in another place: 'That is intellectual whose concept is an action.'[85] According to Heidegger, 'This terse observation means that a mental being is one which *is* in the manner of action. The ego is an "I act" and as such it is intellectual. This peculiar usage of Kant's should be held firmly in mind. The ego as "I act" is intellectual, purely mental. Therefore, Kant also often calls the ego an intelligence. Intelligence, again, signifies, not a being that *has* intelligence, understanding, and reason, but a being that exists as intelligence. Persons are existing ends; they are intelligences. The realm of ends, the being-with-one-another of persons as free, is the intelligible realm of freedom. In another place, Kant says that the moral person is humanity. Being human is determined altogether intellectually, as intelligence. Intelligences, moral persons, are subjects whose being is acting. Acting is an existing in the sense of being extant.'[86] If being a moral person is acting and acting is being of a moral person then the existence of moral persons as ends in themselves signifies that acting is an end in itself. So Kant begins with Greek notion of moral action, which is an end in itself, and it is what the Greek thinkers like Aristotle took to be the subject-matter of *phronēsis.*

But Kant derecognizes this category of action, which is an end in itself. The reason is not far away. The Greek thinkers took the contemplation to be the act of disinterested spectator. But Kant took the contemplative philosophical activities like reflection, synthesis, etc., as end governed activities, i.e. he took philosophy to be interest-guided activity. The thesis of corelation of knowledge to interests or cognitive interests no doubt became popular with Jürgen Habermas, but this thesis originates with Kant himself. Jürgen Habermas took it over from Kant and elaborated it further. According to Kant, '... sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest....'[87] Kant further writes, 'Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher

is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.'[88] So Kant has taken what is an endless activity for Greeks, as an activity for an end. That is to say, if Kant is seen from the point of view of Greeks, then he is mistaken about the object of philosophical activity and hence when he is philosophizing, he is indulging in involuntary activity. So, Kantian reflection and synthesis are strictly speaking from the point of view of Greeks involuntary activities. Further, Kant constitutes subjectivity involuntarily when the consciousness of 'the identity of the function'[89] is turned into an identity of '*fixed and abiding self*'[90] which later in paralogism becomes substance, if not for theoretical reason then at least for practical reason.

Be it noted even though synthesis and reflection is involuntary, the entire mankind is implicated in this involuntary act. According to Kant, the aesthetic judgement of taste postulates the universal communicability of the 'quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally'.[91] For Kant, this postulate is necessary not only for aesthetic judgement of taste but also for the act of knowing. 'Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e. the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise.'[92] Habermas' idea of communicative rationality takes to wings only from this Kantian base. For Kant, why is this communication necessary? What conditions are presupposed in communication? In the quotation, it is clear that Kant requires universal communicability of cognitions and judgements together with their attendant conviction to avoid skepticism. And the content of communication of cognition are

twofold, i.e. the cognitions and judgements on the one hand and the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, on the other, must also admit of being universally communicated. Kant now relates this two-fold communication with synthesis. 'And this [twofold communication] is always what actually happens where a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts.'[93] And now Kant states why communication is necessary for synthesis and why it is related to common sense. 'But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. However, there must be one in which this internal ratio suitable for quickening (one faculty by the other) is best adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally; and this disposition can only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts). Since, now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense...'[94] Finally, Kant declares, '... but we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of skepticism.'[95] But what is this common sense, which is a presupposition of all knowledge and its communicability? Kant explains, 'However, by the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i.e. a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgment. This is accomplished by weighing the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction from

the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate.'[96] Be it noted that for Kant knowledge and synthesis involved in it is not a private subjective affair, since it depends upon and presupposes commonsense which is 'a public sense', and is like 'collective reason of mankind'. For Kant, subjective self-consciousness is constituted by collective reason of mankind involuntarily through communication, which is prior to subjectivity of man. No doubt, Kant is justified in claiming, that in the ethical state of nature 'Men ... mutually corrupt one another's moral predispositions despite the goodwill of each individual; yet, *because they lack a principle which unites them,* they recede, through their dissentions from the common goal of goodness, and just as though they were *instruments of evil,* expose one another to the risk of falling once again under sovereignty of the evil principle.'[97]

Now we are in a position to explain why Kant apparently thinks the standpoint of disinterested spectator to be a distinct standpoint yet, in fact, it is the same as the standpoint of the intelligible world. 'This is that intelligible to which taste ... extends its view.'[98] Taste being the point of view of the disinterested spectator, the point of view of disinterested spectator extends even to the intelligible world. Yet an apparent distinction of the two is maintained because the point of view of the disinterested spectator is strictly speaking the point of view of the region of voluntary action understood in the Aristotelian sense, but the point of view of the Kantian intelligible world is, strictly speaking, the point of view of actions done under ignorance of its object and hence point of view of region of involuntary actions. So, Kant is forced to make a distinction between the point of view of disinterested spectator and the point of view of the intelligible world without being aware of the real reason for the distinction.

Para 14: 'Because of this a rational being must regard himself *qua intelligence* (and accordingly not on the side of his lower faculties) as belonging to the intelligible world, not to the sensible one.'[99] Having reason, reason as distinguished from understanding, every man belongs to the intelligible world. 'He has therefore two points of view from which he can regard himself and from which he can know laws governing the employment of his powers and consequently governing all his actions.'[100] Be it noted it is the duality

of subject and object, former belonging to the intelligible world while later belonging to the sensible world, when applied to man, puts him in the state of nature. Hence, the dualism of sensible and intelligible world is eminently applicable to man in the state of nature, subjectivity and *Willkür* providing the link between the two. 'He can consider himself *first*—so far as he belongs to the sensible world–to be under laws of nature (heteronomy); and *secondly*—so far as he belongs to the intelligible world–to be under laws which, being independent of nature, are not empirical but have their ground in reason alone.'[101] The subject with an *Willkür* in the state of nature, to the extent that he with the help of technically practical reason produces ends of his choice by *Willkür,* belongs to the sensible world and he is under laws of nature for technically practical reason can operate only with the knowledge of laws of nature. Be it noted that man is under the heteronomy of the will not because he is motivated by empirical desire but because of the very nature of *Willkür.* Even when he is acting *from* the maxim certified by the *wille* to be fit to be universal law when the individual will be acting *according* to that maxim, he will be producing an end with the help of technically practical reason and thereby will be under laws of nature and will be governed by the heteronomy of the will. The subject with *Willkür* in the state of nature to the extent it belongs to the intelligible world comes to be under laws of *Wille,* which also is a correlate of the imagination of the disinterested spectator, which represents reason in its highest function.

Para 15: 'As a rational being, and consequently as belonging to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason must attribute to itself) is to be free.'[102] The meaning of the phrase 'under the Idea of freedom' needs to be understood properly. One who is under the Idea of freedom need not be free, but he is required to be free even when he is not free. That is to say, one who is under the Idea of freedom is necessitated to be free. As a rational being and, consequently, as belonging to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will, i.e. *Willkür* except as necessitated to be autonomous. The idea of the autonomy of the will requires the synthesis of the two faculties

themselves, i.e. *Willkür* and *Wille* which give rise to not only the idea of self legislation or self choosing of the law independent of nature influences but also *necessitation* of self choosing of the law, etc. Be it noted that *Willkür* is an individual's capacity of choice and production of ends, bound by the consciousness of the unity and identity of the function of reason, i.e. limited by the subjectivity of the individual. The *Wille* is the capacity to necessarily act from the law which is associated with spectator consciousness which is not bound by the identity and unity of function of reason, as it involves a free play of faculties of representation which is essentially in communication disregard of the limits of identity and unity of function. In a nutshell, *Wille* is essentially social which *Willkür* is not. So, when the synthesis of the *Willkür* and *Wille* takes place the necessity of acting from the law of *wille* undergoes three transformations: (1) the generality of *nomos* of *Wille* gets transformed into the universality of the maxim of *Willkür* (to retain the social aspect of *Wille*); (2) the intuition of *nomos* of *Wille* gets transformed into the *choice* or *making* of maxim by *Willkür* (to retain the choice aspect of the *Willkür*); and (3) capacity to *necessarily* act from the law, which *Wille* is, gets transformed into *necessitation* of *Willkür* by *Wille* to determine itself to produce ends in conformity to the universal law chosen (to make the social aspect of the *Wille* conform to the subjective and individualistic aspect of *Willkür*). So, belonging to the intelligible world man can never conceive the causality of his own will, i.e. *Willkür* except as *necessitated* by *Wille* to determine itself by the universal maxim (law) of its own making, independent of determination by causes in the sensible world. Hence 'To the Idea of freedom there is inseparably attached the concept of *autonomy*, and to this in turn the universal principle of morality—a principle which in *Idea* forms the ground for all the actions of *rational* beings, just as the law of nature does for all appearances.'[103]

Para 16: 'The suspicion which we raised above is now removed—namely, that there might be a hidden circle in our inference from freedom to autonomy and from autonomy to the moral law; that in effect we had perhaps assumed the Idea of freedom only because of the moral law in order subsequently to infer the moral law in its turn from freedom; and that consequently we had been able to

assign no ground at all for the moral law, but had merely assumed it by begging a principle which well-meaning souls could gladly concede us, but which we could never put forward as a demonstrable proposition.'[104] Here, Kant has mistaken the demonstration of the 'necessitation' or the 'ought' involved in morality to be the demonstrative removal of viciousness of the circle of movement of thought from moral law to autonomy and back from autonomy to moral law. The viciousness of the circle will be removed in the second critique. That Kant is demonstrating the necessitation or ought involved in the morality is made clear by what he says in the next sentence, 'We see now that when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will together with its consequence-morality; whereas when we think of ourselves as under obligation, we look upon ourselves as belonging to the sensible world and yet to the intelligible world at the same time.'[105] The account of necessitation given above explains what Kant is claiming here. Also, the above account explains necessitation or ought involved in the obligation as arising when a person being member of the intelligible world, synthesizes *Wille* with the ambiguous *Willkür*, which also represents man as belonging to the world of sensibility.

Para 17: As the section heading 'How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?'[106] makes it clear, Kant is trying to solve the question raised in paragraph 26 of the second chapter of the *Groundwork*. 'A rational being counts himself, *qua* intelligence, as belonging to the intelligible world, and solely *qua* efficient cause belonging to the intelligible world does he give to his causality the name of "*will*".'[107] The phrase '*qua* intelligence' here signifies that a rational being is member of the intelligible world with respect to reason in its highest function of discrimination. The causality of the rational being as an efficient cause belonging to the intelligible world, means that the causality of rational being independent of all influences alien to pure reason. Being independent of all influences alien to pure reason, this causality of rational being is independent of all influences due to sensibility. This spontaneous causality of a rational being is *Willkür*. But this spontaneous causality has dual character. Recall Kant's words, 'Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appear-

ance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects.*'[108] Hence, 'On the other side, however, he is conscious of himself as also a part of the sensible world, where his actions are encountered as mere appearances of this causality.'[109] It may be recalled that *Willkür* is the capacity to choose and produce ends. In its aspect of choice it is intelligible causality but in its aspect of production of ends chosen, it is sensible appearance of that causality. The act of production in its technical aspect of production cannot be understood by means of intelligible causality but has to be understood by means of natural causality. Hence, with respect to the act of production of ends chosen as the sensible appearance of intelligible causality of choice, Kant can write, 'Yet the possibility of these actions cannot be made intelligible by means of such causality, ... instead these actions, as belonging to the sensible world, have to be understood as determined by other appearances...'[110] But the reason given by Kant for denial of the role of intelligible causality in understanding the actions encountered as mere appearances of this causality, and the examples he gives of the other appearances, which as sensible causes can explain these actions as belonging to the sensible world, both throw us off balance and divert Kant from the real issue involved here. The reason he gives for denial of role of intelligible causality in understanding the actions encountered as mere appearances of this causality is that '*with this we have no direct* acquantance.'[111] This reason diverts our attention from the fact that the role of intelligible causality as part of the explanation of the action in sensible world is over once that action is shown to be the appearance of that causality, and it has no further role to play in the explanation. The reason given by Kant makes us feel as if the intelligible causality had some further role in explanation but failing to perform that role due to our lack of acquaintance with it. Similarly, the examples of the other appearances, which as sensible causes can explain these actions as belonging to the sensible world, given by Kant are '*desires* and *inclinations.*[112] These examples offer explanations of the choice itself, which is not the issue here. Kant is not required to give examples of the sensible appearances, which influences the *Willkür* in its intelligible aspect of choice. Rather, he is required to give the example of sensible appearances, which as causes explain the act of translation in the sensible world,

of the choice made in the intelligible world. So, Kant's attention is being diverted by the examples here from the real issue, i.e. the technical aspect of the sensible action to be performed.

In the discussion presented so far, two issues are involved. One is the issue of our membership of two worlds and another is the issue of linkage between the two worlds. Now Kant is going to disentangle them. First the issue of our membership of two worlds is taken up. 'Hence, if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would be in perfect conformity with the principle of the autonomy of a pure will; if I were solely a part of the sensible world, they would have to be taken as in complete conformity with the law of nature governing desires and inclinations—that is, with the heteronomy of nature.'[113] We are members of the intelligible world with respect to the reason in its highest function of discrimination, which we have as disinterested spectators. If we were solely members of the intelligible world, we would be mere disinterested spectators having *Wille,* which is the capacity to act necessarily from the idea of law itself, and hence we will be acting necessarily, because of our very nature, from the laws of morality. We are members of the sensible world with respect to our capacity of receiving sensations and knowing ourselves through the sensations received by inner sense. If we were solely members of the sensible world, we would be acting necessarily in conformity to the laws of nature, including natural laws, governing desires and inclinations which are sensations of the inner sense and, hence, we will be acting necessarily according to the laws of heteronomy of nature. It may be noted here that there will be no heteronomy of the will, as there will be no will at all if we were solely members of the sensible world. Similarly, there will be no rules of skill either as these also pertain to will. There will be the reign of natural laws with iron cast natural necessity. ('In the first case they would be grounded on the supreme principle of morality; in the second case on that of happiness.')[114] In the first case, i.e. if we were solely members of the intelligible world, all our actions would be grounded in the supreme principle of morality that is the idea of the law of *Wille.* In the second case, i.e. if we were solely members of the sensible world, all our actions would be grounded in happiness. The later will be the case because as there will be no reason to

muddle us through, nature with its instrumentality of inclination and desire would necessarily chart us through the course of happiness. Here Kant is referring to the teleology of nature introduced in the first chapter. But we are neither, i.e. we neither solely belong to the intelligible world nor solely belong to the sensible world. We belong to both. Now Kant shifts his focus to the link between the two worlds.

'*But the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and therefore also of its laws...*'[115] It must be noted at the outset that the previous sentence in the parenthesis gives the impression that Kant is talking about the ground of action here. But it is not so. He is talking about the ground of the world itself. The intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and its laws through especially understanding in its activity of *a priori* synthesis through pure categories as rules of synthesis, which is the rule-governed play of faculties of the disinterested spectators. 'Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular, we distinguish in a quite peculiar and especial way from all empirically conditioned powers. For it views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts.'[116] When understanding makes empirical use of its pure concepts, it constitutes the sensible world as known. So it is the subjectivity of man or the transcendental unity of apperception, which provides the link between the two worlds such that *the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and its laws through the subjectivity of the self* Related to subjectivity is the *Willkür*, which also provides a similar linkage between the two worlds. Recall Kant's words, 'Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects*.'[117] So, through *Willkür* also, the intelligible

world contains the ground of the sensible world. '... so in respect of my will, for which (as belonging entirely to the intelligible world) it gives laws immediately, it must also be conceived as containing such a ground.'[118] In respect of *Willkür* as belonging to the intelligible world, i.e. with respect to choice it (i.e. intelligible world) gives laws immediately (as *Wille*). Hence, with respect to choice also, the intelligible world while giving laws immediately (as *Wille*) must also be conceived as containing such a ground. Such a ground can be contained by containing subjectivity. And it follows that with respect to choice also the intelligible world while giving laws immediately (as *Wille*) must also be conceived as containing subjectivity. But when the *Wille* of the disinterested spectator, which is essentially in social communication and without the consciousness of unity and identity of its function, synthesized with the subjectivity of *Willkür* there arises the idea of necessitation as explained above in the analysis of passage 15. If the necessity remains a necessity and does not transform into necessitation, either it will destroy the subjectivity or it will destroy the spectator consciousness; both alternatives are fatal to the Kantian project. So, the idea of necessitation arises not because the choice is guided by empirical desires and inclinations but because it is the choice made by an individual subject. This explanation also ties in with the Kantian thesis that our *Willkür* is evil from the very origin, which he propounds in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.* For our explanation makes it clear that the law always remains an 'I ought' for us and never becomes 'I will' for us as we are subjects. And, hence, our *Willkür* is always evil in its choice. It must be kept in mind that evil is inscribed in the very principle of morality since the moral law enjoins us to preserve and promote subjectivity. This explains the argument of the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* for the paradox of evil. 'Hence, in spite of regarding myself from one point of view as a being that belongs to the sensible world, I shall have to recognize that, *qua* intelligence, I am subject to the law of the intelligible world—that is, to the reason which contains this law in the Idea of freedom, and so to the autonomy of the will—and therefore I must look on the laws of the intelligible world as imperatives for me and on the actions which conform to this principle as duties.'[119] As explained in the analysis of the passage 15 of this

chapter, the synthesis of *Willkür* and *Wille* also give rise to the synthetic Idea of autonomy of the will. So, to belong to the sensible world qua having capacity of receiving sensations and knowing ourselves through the sensations received by inner sense, we have to recognize ourselves, qua having reason in its highest function of discrimination, as also belong to the intelligible world, containing the ground of the sensible world and its laws through containing subjectivity, and hence we have to view ourselves necessitated by the laws of autonomy of the will. That is to say, to belong to the sensible world, we have to look on the law of autonomy of the will as the categorical imperative and actions conforming to it as duties.

Para 18: 'And in this way categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world.'[120] Categorical imperative is possible because the Idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world, but not solely a member of the intelligible world but member of the intelligible world containing the ground of the sensible world. 'This being so, if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions *would* invariably accord with the autonomy of the will; but because I intuit myself at the same time as a member of the sensible world, they *ought* so to accord.'[121] While belonging to the intelligible world, I intuit myself at the same time as a member of the sensible world because the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world. If I were solely the member of the intelligible world, there would be no ought as all my actions would invariably conform to the laws of the autonomy of the will. But as I intuit myself at the same time as belonging to the sensible world as the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world, all my actions *aught* to accord with the laws of the autonomy of the will. Be it noted that the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world, and it in its turn requires synthesis of *Willkür* and *Wille*, which gives rise to the idea of necessitation. But how does this necessitation get presented? Be it noted the intelligible world containing the ground of the sensible world give rise to the idea of necessitation of the *Willkür* by *Wille* on the one hand and the intuition of our belonging to the sensible world, and hence the intuition of our *Willkür* as affected by sensuous desires on the other hand. And hence the necessitation gets presented as the categorical 'ought' for the *Willkür* affected by sensuous desires. Hence Kant claims, 'This *categorical* "ought" presents us with a synthetic *a priori* proposition, since to my will as affected by sensuous desires there is added the Idea of the same will, viewed, however, as a pure will belonging to the intelligible world and active on its own account—a will which contains the supreme condition of the former will, so far as reason is concerned.'[122] Be it also noted that the 'ought' or the necessitation is *a priori* without requiring presence of any sensuous desire affecting the will but the condition, i.e. the intelligible world containing the ground of the sensible world, which give rise to the former also gives rise to the latter. 'This is roughly like the way in which concepts of the understanding, which by themselves signify nothing but the form of laws in general, are added to intuitions of the sensible world and so make synthetic *a priori* propositions possible on which all our knowledge of nature is based.'[123] This analogy is complete. The sensuous desires correspond to the sensible intuitions, the *Willkür and Wille* to two *a priori* intuitions, i.e. space and time, and the *a priori* categories of understanding as rules of synthesis correspond to Idea of autonomy of the will containing the categorical necessitation or 'ought'. If the categories of understanding signify the form of the laws of nature in general, the Idea of the autonomy of the will containing the categorical 'ought' signify the laws of morality or duty in general. If the categories of understanding are added to the intuitions of the sensible world and so make synthetic *a priori* propositions possible on which all our knowledge of nature is based, the Idea of the autonomy of the will containing the categorical 'ought' is added to the desires and inclinations of the sensible world and so make synthetic *a priori* practical propositions possible on which all our morality of the state of nature is based. This completes Kant's objective deduction of the Idea of the autonomy of the will. This also explains why in the state of nature we are able to take an interest in the law of autonomy of the will.

Para 19: 'The practical use of ordinary human reason confirms the rightness of this deduction.'[124] How does the reason of even the ordinary person confirm that one ought to act from the moral law? 'There is no one, not even the most hardened scoundrel—provided only he is accustomed to use reason in other ways—who,

when presented with examples of honesty in purpose, of faithfulness to good maxims, of sympathy, and of kindness towards all (even when these are bound up with great sacrifices of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he too might be a man of like spirit.'[125] Be it noted that adducibility of examples goes contrary, it appears, to Kant's claim in the passage 2 of the second chapter, 'In actual fact it is absolutely impossible for experience to establish with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of action in other respects right has rested solely on moral grounds and on the thought of one's duty.'[126] Kant had departed considerably from his earlier position that that there can be no examples in experience of having strictly followed the moral law, in the admission, 'examples serve us only for encouragement' in the passage 5 of the second chapter.[127] But now in the last chapter, it appears he is reversing his position completely. How can Kant make examples of morality available to the scoundrel if they are not available in experience? These examples are available to the disinterested spectator. It is for this reason that the proviso is added 'provided only he is accustomed to use reason in other ways'. Reason as the higher faculty is the faculty of the spectator. Another fact to be noticed is that the deduction of the categorical imperative proves its validity of such a nature that even if it is not followed it is valid. Hence, there can be scoundrels even when the categorical imperative is valid. It must be kept in mind that Kant needed a morality valid—in this manner of validity—in the state of nature, for the state of nature exists precisely because nobody is acting from the categorical imperative, if everyone is to act from the categorical imperative there would be no state of nature; rather they would be in the perfect kingdom of ends. It also must be kept in mind that Kant claims in the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* that in state of nature, man find himself with an innate yet imputable state of inner immorality and still finds moral law valid. This kind of validity of moral law is unknown to the classical world. The law is valid only if it is part of the tradition, i.e. it is followed by and large in general. How does the scoundrel react when the examples of morality are presented to him? He wishes if he were man of like spirit. Why is he not a man of like spirit? 'He is unable to realize such an aim in his own person—though only on account of his

desires and impulses; but yet at the same time he wishes to be free from these inclinations, which are a burdens to himself.'[128] The explanation of why the scoundrel is not following the moral law given by Kant on behalf of the scoundrel puts the blame on the existence of desires and inclinations of certain sort. But this, strictly speaking, is an incorrect explanation within Kant's framework. Existence of desire has nothing to do with immorality, for morality is a matter of inner determination of the will. But this incorrect explanation also shows the correctness of the deduction of categorical imperative. 'By such a wish he shows that having a will free from sensuous impulses he transfers himself in thought into an order of things quite different from that of his desires in the field of sensibility; for from the fulfilment of his wish he can expect no gratification of his sensuous desires and consequently no state which would satisfy any of his actual or even conceivable inclinations (since by such an expectation the very Idea which elicited the wish would be deprived of its superiority); all he can expect is a greater inner worth of his own person.'[129] In this comment of Kant, there is no mention of the ground of the sensible world being contained in the intelligible world, which is so crucial to the deduction. Why? Because it is the 'given' or the 'constant' of the explanation. It is just assumed. It merits no mention, as it has been such elaborately argued out in the first critique. Here Kant can just assume it without even mentioning it. What merits attention in the explanation is just the two standpoints involved in the deduction. The scoundrel with his desires is already in the sensible world with his desires, but his wish to be free from these desires transfers him to the standpoint of the intelligible world. 'This better person he believes himself to be when he transfers himself to the standpoint of a member of the intelligible world.'[130] So even the scoundrel proves the correctness of his deduction involving two standpoints according to Kant. But taking the ground of the sensible world as contained in the intelligible world as given constant which is not to be questioned, thereby taking attention away from it, Kant loses sight of the real explanation of the original evil in man and declares 'But the rational origin of this perversion of our will... that is, of the propensity to evil, remains inscrutable to us ... there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could origi-

nally have come.'[131] Having lost sight of the ground of the sensible world contained in the intelligible world, we have put a cover of forgetfulness on it, as the Greeks would say it. So, strictly speaking, we have become ignorant of our particular situation. And hence speaking in the Greek sense we are in the realm of involuntary. So when the scoundrel transfers himself to the standpoint of the intelligible world, it is an involuntary movement. 'He is involuntarily constrained to do so by the Idea of freedom—that is, of not being dependent on *determination* by causes in the sensible world; and from this standpoint he is conscious of possessing a goodwill which, on his own admission, constitutes the law for the bad will belonging to him as a member of the sensible world—a law of whose authority he is aware even in transgressing it.'[132] It is interesting to note that according to Aristotle, what makes our action involuntary is ignorance of the situation but not the ignorance of the general law. It must be kept in mind that the scoundrel is aware of the authority of the law because of this involuntary transfer to the standpoint of the intelligible world, but through this involuntary movement the scoundrel is aware of the law as an, 'I ought' because he is aware of its authority even when transgressing it. 'The moral "I ought" is thus an "I will" for man as a member of the intelligible world; and it is conceived by him as an "I ought" only in so far as he considers himself at the same time to be a member of the sensible world.'[133] Here also it may be noted the deduction of 'I ought' from 'I will' is presented in terms of the two standpoints without mentioning the ground of the sensible world being contained in the intelligible world, which is so crucial to the deduction. It is just assumed. It merits no mention, as it has been such elaborately argued out in the first critique. What merits attention in the explanation is just the two standpoints involved in the deduction. But taking the ground of the sensible world as contained in the intelligible world as given constant which is not to be questioned, thereby taking attention off from it, Kant loses sight of the real basis of the deduction. Having lost sight of the ground of the sensible world contained in the intelligible world, we have put a cover of forgetfulness on it, as the Greeks would say it. So, strictly speaking, we have become ignorant of our particular situation. And, hence, speaking in Greek sense, we are in the realm of involuntary. So the deduction of 'I

ought' from 'I will' is itself an involuntary movement. In fact, I will argue that the structuring of the free play of faculties of the spectator in a little corner of its own as rule-governed play of faculties is itself an involuntary act so that the containing of the ground of sensible world in the intelligible world is the involuntary act of mankind collectively. Recall Kant's words, 'Synthesis in general ... is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.'[134] That is to say, the subjectivity has been constituted involuntarily. It must be kept in mind that this involuntary activity is appealed to for establishing the *Willkür*. So, when we act from *Willkür*, we are strictly in the realm of the involuntary in the Greek sense of the term. And yet, when we act from *Willkür*, we are acting from will. So evil has the dual nature without any inconsistency in Kant's critical philosophy.

To recover the notion of a *voluntary action*, which necessarily is a *moral action*, since no one is evil voluntarily, Kant has to make man social essentially rather than being together due to external force. That is to say Kant needs to dismantle the subjectivity and *Willkür* of man which mankind has synthesized involuntarily through involuntary reflection. It must be kept in mind that the moral law itself inscribes the evil in itself by requiring the preservation and promotion of subjectivity of all and makes it impossible for any man to rise to the level where he can say 'I will' with respect to the law, he must always remain at the state where he can only say 'I ought' with respect to the law. It is impossible for the moral law to exist with the transformed content unless it is retransformed with the dismantling of the subjectivity. So it remains an impossible ideal. But let us see what kind of attempt is made by Kant to make it possible for man to follow the moral law in actual practice. For this, he tries to overcome the subjectivity of man by making him social.

SECTION III: KANTIAN WAY OF OVERCOMING EVIL AND THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE

How can it be done? Kant explains, 'Now we have a duty which is *sui generis*, not of men towards men, but of the human race towards itself. For the species of rational beings is objectively, in the idea of

reason, destined for a social goal, namely the promotion of the highest as a social good. But because the highest moral good cannot be achieved merely by the exertions of the single individual towards his own moral perfection, but requires rather a union of such individuals into a whole towards the same goal—into a system of well-disposed men, in which and through whose unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass—the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on laws of virtue, is an ideal completely distinguished from all moral laws (which concern what we know to lie in our power); since it involves working towards a whole regarding which we do not know whether as such, it lies in our power or not. Hence, this duty is distinguished from all others both in kind and in principle. We can already foresee that this duty will require the presupposition of another idea, namely, that of a higher moral Being through whose universal disposition the forces of separate individuals, insufficient in themselves, are united for common end.'[135] Kant is here declaring the aim of limiting absolute power of sovereign to be an idea of reason. He is, therefore, saying that it is impossible to realize it in experience through human effort only. Only God can help us here. Be it noted that the moral union we get into out of the ethical state of nature is different from the union of civil society into which we get after coming out of juridical state of nature. The former is based on commonality of goal while the latter is *not* based on commonality of goal; rather, each pursues his own goal independent of others.

But let us ask nevertheless in which direction does this unattainable solution take us if we as homo fabers still persist in attaining it. 'The sublime yet never wholly attainable Idea of an ethical commonwealth dwindles markedly under men's hands. It becomes an institution which, at best capable of representing only the pure form such a commonwealth, is, by the conditions of a sensuous human nature, greatly circumscribed in its means for establishing such a whole. How indeed can one expect something perfectly straight to be framed out of such crooked wood?'[136]

The crooked wood of men Kant is speaking about is the homo faber or the subject with a *Willkür* in the ethical state of nature grappling with the problem of social unity. For Kant, 'An ethical commonwealth under divine moral legislation is a *church* which, so

far as it is not an object of possible experience, is called the church invisible (a mere idea of the union of all the righteous under direct and moral divine world-government, an idea serving all the archetype of what is to be established by men). The visible church is the actual union of men into a whole which harmonizes with that ideal.'[137] So, 'The true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by men.'[138] According to Kant, *Pure religious faith* alone can found a universal church',[139] the argument for this being, 'pure religious faith is concerned only with what constitutes the essence of reverence for God, namely obedience, ensuing from moral disposition, to all duties as His commands'.[140] But this, as we have seen, is merely an idea of reason, which can never be an idea realizable in nature. So what the men succeed in establishing is 'a church... as the union of many men with such disposition into a moral commonwealth' requiring 'a *public* covenant, a certain ecclesiastical form dependent upon the conditions of experience'.[141] So, the constitution of every church originates always in some historically (Revealed) faith, which we can call Ecclesiastical faith, and this is best, founded on a holy scripture. And they are many.

To solve the problem of social unity to control political power, Kant needed the idea of one true religion, on which the one universal church is based, but he lands up with faith of several kinds with a multiplicity of churches. So the problem of social unity and the control of power still elude him. He has the problem of multiple organized churches at hand, which further accentuates the problem of control of power to protect the freedom of religion.

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Leibniz's Theory of Possible Worlds

C. A. TOMY

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur 208 016

This article aims to provide an exposition of Leibniz's system of possible worlds with reference to its metaphysical foundations. Recent decades have witnessed a renewed interest in the notion of possible worlds leading to the development of what is known as possible world semantics, a powerful tool for philosophical analysis. The notion of a possible world has proved useful in explicating a number of philosophical issues and problems. The first philosopher to employ the notion of possible worlds for clarifying philosophical concepts was Leibniz. He used it for a systematic treatment of modal notions such as necessity and contingency. In this paper I shall argue that Leibniz, unlike many contemporary modal logicians and philosophers, does not conceive of possible worlds as alternative *ways the actual concrete world might have been.* Instead, he considers them as 'pure possibilities' in the sense that they are the ways the *essences* of things, residing in the mind of God, could have been instantiated. The notion of possible worlds, in Leibniz, presupposes the reality of essences.

The article is divided into three sections. The first is devoted to clarifying the nature and status of Leibnizian possible worlds. I shall argue that, for Leibniz, possible worlds are collections of *compossible individual notions* bound by certain laws that are responsible for the order and regularity within each of them. In the second section, I shall explain how Leibniz uses the notion of possible worlds to explicate the modal notions of necessity and contingency. In the third section, I shall discuss how Leibniz postulates a *world of essences* in addition to possible worlds. Here I claim that, for Leibniz, the world of essences is logically and metaphysically prior to possible worlds because the conception of possible worlds as pure possibilities presupposes the reality of a world of essences.

THE NATURE AND ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS

In Leibniz's opinion, a world other than the one we inhabit could have been actualized and any world that could have been actualized is a possible world. There are infinitely many possible worlds. They are ideal entities subsisting in the mind of God. Out of them, this world—the world we inhabit—was brought into existence by actualizing the best. While possible worlds subsist in the mind of God, they are not His making. As Rescher puts it, 'God only *houses* the possibilities (so to speak) he does not *make them*'.[1] In other words, they are not dependent on His will for their subsistence.

Possible worlds are bound by certain laws and principles, and without them even God cannot conceive of a possible world. The laws effect the order and regularity in each of the possible worlds: 'in whatever manner God might have created the world, it would always have been regular and in a certain order'.[2] Thus, order and regularity are the hallmarks of a possible world, though the order and regularity specific to a given world could be different from that of another.

The world we inhabit was actualized because, at the point of creation, this was a world that could have been actualized. So the actual world is one among the possible worlds. Since the actual world is *one* of the possible worlds, from our knowledge about the nature and content of the actual world we can extrapolate a lot about the nature of other possible worlds. The way things are in other possible worlds could be different from the way they are in the actual world. Despite such differences, they resemble the actual world in many respects. Like the actual world, which is governed by a set of laws, other possible worlds too are regulated by certain laws. Among the various laws that hold in possible worlds, some logical and metaphysical laws are common to the actual and other possible worlds. This is because the actual and other possible worlds are both logically and metaphysically possible.

Leibniz maintains that the actual world is composed of individuals who make up the spatio-temporal universe that we inhabit. Though we may think of individuals as existing in space and time, for Leibniz they are neither spatial nor temporal. They do not have a beginning in time nor an end in time; hence they are eternal.

Space and time are understood as certain relations among the individuals belonging to the actual world. That space and time in the objective sense could be construed as relations among the individuals shows that individuals in the actual world are related among themselves. However, there are no causal relations among them. One individual does not causally affect another in the sense that something from one individual is transmitted to another. Even though Leibniz denies causal relations, he grants numerous other relations among them. Take two particular individuals of the actual world, say, Adam, the first man, and Cain, his eldest son. There are a number of relations that hold between these two individuals. For example, the asymmetric relations, 'being the father of' and 'being the offspring of', hold between Adam and Cain. In Leibniz's view, such relations among individuals hold, not on account of any causal connections among them, but because they have been preordained by God.

The other possible worlds are not yet actualized; so they cannot be considered as being made up of individuals. This is because, for Leibniz, the notion of an individual is the same as that of a substance with all their properties, including those which are generally regarded as contingent or accidental. A substance, by its very definition, is that which exists on its own. Therefore, it makes no sense to speak of a possible substance, and the term 'substance' can rightly be used only to designate individuals belonging to the actual world. In other words, other possible worlds do not contain individuals. Yet, Leibniz speaks of *possible individuals* and believes that possible worlds are made up of possible individuals. By a 'possible individual' Leibniz understands a 'complete individual notion'.[3] The idea of a complete individual notion may be clarified as follows: Given a particular individual, it is possible to conceive of a notion that would specify all the attributes that the individual has ever had and will ever possess, and such a notion is called the complete individual notion corresponding to that individual. Consider a particular individual, say, Adam, existing in the actual world. The complete individual notion of Adam specifies all the properties of Adam, including those unique ones such as his being the first man in the actual world, being the husband of Eve, being the father of Cain, etc. The notion of Pegasus could be conceived of

as another complete individual notion that includes the attributes of being a winged horse, being ridden by Bellarophon, and so on.

An important feature of a complete individual notion is that it describes a unique set of compossible attributes, i.e. the set of attributes which could be possessed by one individual without any contradiction, or the set of all attributes that could be instantiated together by one individual alone. As far as their status is concerned, there is a real difference between the two complete individual notions we considered above, namely, Adam and Pegasus. In the case of Pegasus, unlike that of Adam, there was never an actually existing individual corresponding to the complete individual notion. In this sense, Pegasus is a possible individual, and any possible individual is considered as a complete individual notion. In the case of Adam, on the other hand, there was an actually existing individual in the world. Prior to the actualization of this world, what subsisted in the mind of God was a set of complete individual notions as blueprints for the actualization of individuals in this world. Thus, possible worlds can be viewed as various collections of complete individual notions that are related to one another,[4] and which could be instantiated together.

Possible worlds, however, are not random collections of such complete individual notions. Each of the individual notions specifies all the attributes that an individual, if instantiated, would possess at its different stages of development. The attributes that an individual in a world would possess are compatible with the attributes the other individuals belonging to that world possess. Thus, the complete individual notion of Adam, for example, would state that he is the father of Cain, and the complete individual notion of Cain, on the other hand, would entail the attribute of being the son of Adam. Hence, the attributes of individuals belonging to a world are mutually complementary. A complete individual notion lays down the *principles of development* according to which a given individual unfolds in a world. Hence, in a given world, the history of the development of each individual is compatible with that of the other individuals.[5] The complete individual notions which would specify mutually compatible attributes or histories of the development for the individuals are considered to be compossible with one another. A possible world then is a collection of such compossible

complete individual notions. Because of its compatibility with others belonging to the same world, each complete individual is said to be conceptually related to all others of the same world. In the words of Rescher, the complete individual notions of 'each possible world are thus reciprocally adjusted to one another in a thorough going total way'.[6] Thus, we find that, for Leibniz, a possible world is a total interrelated system of complete individual notions.

Given such a total system of complete individual notions forming a world, it is not possible to add another complete individual notion that does not already belong to it. Nor can any individual notion belonging to it be taken away from it. So, possible worlds can be considered as maximal sets of compossible individual notions in the sense that every individual notion compossible with a given individual notion in the set is a member of the set. A minor change in the attributes specified by a given individual notion would lead to another complete individual notion belonging to another maximally compossible set of complete individual notions. That is, each individual notion belongs exactly to one world, and any manipulation of its attributes either by adding something to it, or by taking something away from it, will ultimately lead to quite another individual notion and to an entirely different possible world. Hence, Leibniz maintains that a given individual *cannot* inhabit two worlds. This means that he does not allow the identification of individuals *across* possible worlds, as some contemporary philosophers do. When we raise a hypothetical question with regard to a given individual or a state of affairs in the actual world, say, 'What would have been the history of the Roman Empire had Caesar not crossed the Rubicon?' We do not speak about Caesar but about someone who *resembles* Caesar in all respects except that he does not cross the Rubicon. So, for Leibniz, the individual that we refer to in a counterfactual context is not the actual individual but its *counterpart.*[7] Given an individual and his counterpart in another possible world, their complete individual notions would show them to share a number of properties. Yet there must be at least one property that is not common between them. Otherwise, we would not be able to distinguish between the actual and the possible individual which, in turn, would mean our inability to differentiate between actual and possible worlds. To put it differently, the complete in-

dividual notion of an individual existing in the actual and that of its counterpart belonging to a different possible world are not compossibles.

Compossibility may be conceived of as a binary relation that holds among the complete individual notions belonging to a world, understood as maximal sets of such notions. The relation of compossibility, in Benson Mates' opinion, is an equivalence relation on the set of all complete individual notions. A binary relation R on the set A is an *equivalence relation* if and only if it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Accordingly, the compossibility relation C on the set of all complete individual notions N is an equivalence relation if and only if C is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. That is to say, for every complete individual notion x, y, and z, x is compossible with x itself, and if x is compossible with y, then y is compossible with x, and finally if x is compossible with y, and y is compossible with z, then x is compossible with z. An equivalence relation on set A partitions the set into non-empty disjoints subsets of A called 'equivalence classes'. The union of all the equivalent classes generated by an equivalence relation on A *is* A itself. The relation of compossibility, being an equivalence relation, partitions the set N of all complete individual notions upon which this relation holds into mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive equivalence classes.[8] Since the compossibility relation divides the domain of complete individual notions into mutually exclusive classes or possible worlds, we may say that all possible individuals are not compossibles. A different argument that could show that all possibles are not compossibles is as follows: If all possible individuals were compossible, then in the processes of actualizing a few of them, all the possible individuals would have come into existence. But all possibilities are not actualized. Therefore, all possibles are not compossibles.

We saw that, for Leibniz, possible worlds are maximal sets of compossible individual notions. This led some Leibnizian scholars to the view that each possible world is informationally complete. For example, Rescher says: 'No matter what proposition p can be articulated with respect to such a world, it will have to turn out that either p or else not p (exactly one of them) obtains.'[9] Thus, given the proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', either this, or its opposite 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon', obtains in a given

world. On the basis of the informational completeness, one might maintain—as Benson Mates does—that propositions like 'Either Caesar crossed the Rubicon or he did not' is a necessary truth inasmuch as this will have to be true across all possible worlds.[10] But Leibniz does not seem to hold such a view. In his opinion, the truth of a proposition regarding an individual in a given world depends on the existence of the concerned individual in *that* world. So a proposition regarding an individual not instantiated in a world will be false relative to that world. If the proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon or he did not' is interpreted as a necessary proposition in the sense that it is true across all possible worlds, it would imply that Caesar exists in all possible worlds. Such an interpretation, however, would conflict with Leibniz's denial of trans-world identity of individuals. Moreover, we can easily conceive of a world where Caesar does not exist.

If the truth value of a proposition regarding an individual in a world depends on whether the individual exists in a world, it would follow that the proposition 'Either Caesar crossed the Rubicon or he did not' will be false of a world where Caesar does not exist, or the truth value of the proposition would remain indeterminate. This would, in either case, mean that possible worlds cannot be informationally complete in the absolute sense, as Rescher holds. The proposition about Caesar can be articulated only with respect to a world where Caesar exists. In the world where Caesar exists, the complete individual notion of Caesar would imply: 'Caesar exists, such that either he crossed the Rubicon or he did not'. This statement is always true relative to the actual world where Caesar exists. In a world where Caesar does not exist, it makes no sense to say either that Caesar crossed the Rubicon or that he did not. Both the propositions 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon or he did not' and 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' are restricted to this world, the universe in which Caesar exists. So, the conception of possible worlds as maximal sets of complete individual notions does not make a possible world informationally complete in the absolute sense.

LEIBNIZ'S ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY

Having explicated Leibniz's conception of the nature of possible worlds, we shall now proceed to examine how he employs this

notion for an understanding of the two key modal concepts, namely, necessity and contingency. Leibniz classifies propositions mainly into two kinds: *possible* and *impossible*. Impossible propositions are contradictory propositions, those which cannot be true or which are bound to be false, whereas possible propositions are not contradictory. As Leibniz puts it, a proposition 'which implies a contradiction or whose opposite is necessary, is called impossible. The rest are called possible.'[11] Possible propositions are further divided into two kinds: those which are bound to be true and those which are not. The former Leibniz calls absolutely necessary propositions or propositions of essences. They are the opposites of contradictory propositions. Those propositions which are neither bound to be true nor bound to be false are, for him, contingent propositions. The two kinds of propositions, necessary and contingent, are alternatively termed 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact', respectively.

With regard to absolutely necessary propositions, Leibniz maintains that they are eternally true: 'not only will they hold whilst the world remains, but they would have held even if God had created the world in another way'.[12] God could not have created a world where an absolutely necessary proposition does not hold. So, a necessary proposition is one which is true across all possible worlds. Contingent propositions are different from necessary propositions in the sense that the former are 'such as are true at a certain time'. That is, they are not eternally true. Their truth or falsity depends upon the context in which these propositions are articulated.

Necessary propositions, according to Leibniz, pertain to essences and, therefore, he alternatively calls them 'propositions of essence'. Theorems of geometry, for example, are propositions of essence. The proposition 'the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles' is an essential proposition. It says that if anything is a triangle, the sum of its three angles is equal to the sum of two right angles. The proposition is true whether or not a triangular entity exists in the actual or any other possible world. This is because the truth of an essential proposition lies in the relation between ideas or essences. Since its truth can be determined independently of things existing in any world, either actual or possible, an essential proposition is said to be absolutely necessary.

Unlike absolutely necessary propositions, which pertain to essences, contingent propositions are concerned with the existence

of things. Therefore, they are also called 'propositions of existence'. They could be about things that could exist in the actual world some time or other, or would exist in the actual world if certain conditions were fulfilled. Leibniz's characterization of contingent propositions as existential propositions does not, however, mean that they must always be about things that exist or could exist in the actual world. An existential or contingent proposition could speak about *possibly existing things* without any reference to the actual state of affairs. Leibniz says: 'These propositions [existential or contingent] are such as are true at a certain time; they express, not only what pertains to the possibility of things, but actually exists or would exist contingently if certain things were granted...'[13] So, when Leibniz says that a contingent proposition pertains to existence, he does not mean actual existence alone. He uses the term 'existence' in a broad sense, comprising both actual and possible existence. In other words, existential or contingent propositions pertain, not to the actual world alone, but also to other possible worlds.[14] The opposite of a necessary proposition, being contradictory, is impossible. Unlike the opposite of a necessary proposition, a contingent proposition is possible: 'Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Truths of *fact* are contingent, and their opposite is possible.'[15] That is to say, the opposite of a contingent proposition is true in some world or other. The proposition, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is a contingent proposition in the sense that there could be a world where Caesar existed but did not cross the Rubicon.[16]

Necessary and contingent propositions differ with regard to the way they are demonstrated to be true. An absolutely necessary proposition can be demonstrated to be true by analyzing it into simple ideas or propositions whose truth could be understood intuitively without any demonstration. It means that it has an *a priori* proof. Leibniz says: 'When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until we reach the primitive.'[17] We have this kind of proof in logic and mathematics. Logical and mathematical truths can be demonstrated to have been derived from axioms or postulates—the first principles which themselves do not require any proof. These propositions, which can be demonstrated to be true, are, according to

Leibniz, 'virtually identical, and so their opposite is impossible or virtually contradictory'. That is to say, they are of the form 'A is A'. Even if they do not appear to be of the form 'A is A', they are such as can be demonstrated to be so by analyzing them into their components, which are explicitly identical propositions whose opposites imply contradictions.[18] The geometrical as well as metaphysical propositions are of this kind. For this reason, Leibniz alternately calls the kind of necessity, characteristic of absolutely necessary propositions, 'metaphysical' or 'geometrical'.

If a contingent proposition is subjected to analysis, its terms can be resolved infinitely. So if there be a demonstrative proof for it, it must involve infinitely many steps and, according to Leibniz, it is not possible for any finite being to accomplish it. However, it does not mean that a contingent proposition does not have an *a priori* justification at all. It is possible for God to provide an *a priori* proof for it. God sees the reason for contingency, not because He sees the end of analysis—there is no such end at all—but because He sees everything in the series, as He knows the *principle* which combines the concept to be analyzed. 'In such cases it is only God, who comprehends the infinite at once, who can see how the one is in the other, and can understand *a priori* the perfect reason for contingency...'[19] But as far as we finite beings are concerned, justification for the truth of a contingent proposition can be given only *a posteriori*: 'in creatures, this is supplied *a posteriori* by experience'.[20] Thus, for knowing the truth of a contingent proposition, God does not have to go through infinity of steps, but only needs to grasp the principle behind this truth. This shows that, though He does not take infinitely many steps to arrive the truth a contingent proposition, His knowledge of contingent propositions is *a priori*. From an absolute or divine point of view, all propositions, whether contingent or necessary, are *a priori*. The source of the distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* is our epistemic finitude.

Leibniz, as we noted in the previous section, maintains that a complete individual notion corresponding to a particular individual details all its attributes. So, whenever such a notion functions as the subject of a proposition, an analysis of the subject concept leads to the predicate concept: 'the content of the subject must always include that of the predicate in such a way that if one understands perfectly the concept of the subject, he will know that the predicate appertains to it also'.[21] This principle is known as the *predicatium inest subjecto* thesis. The principle stipulates that in every true affirmative proposition, the subject concept contains the predicate concept. So, an analysis of the subject concept of the proposition, say, 'Man is rational', shows that the concept 'rational' is included in the concept 'man'. Thus, 'man' is a complex concept and 'rational' is one of its constituents. This means that, for Leibniz, all propositions, irrespective of whether they are necessary or contingent, are analytic: 'An affirmative truth is one whose predicate is in the subject: and so in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is some way contained in the notion of the subject, in such a way that if any one were to understand perfectly each of the two notions just as God understands it, he would by that very fact perceive that the predicate is in the subject.'[22] So if we were to follow the Kantian definitions of analyticity and syntheticity—an analytic proposition as one whose predicate is contained in the subject, and a synthetic proposition as one whose predicate adds some new information other than the one that is already contained in its subject—then Leibniz's *predicatium inest subjecto* thesis would imply that all affirmative propositions are analytic. Thus, if Leibniz were to consider the analytic-synthetic distinction, he would have maintained that there is no radical difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. The difference between them would be one of *degree* rather than kind. The basis of this distinction—as in the case of contingency/necessity distinction—is our epistemic finitude: it might appear to us that in a true affirmative proposition the predicate adds something new to the subject. But this appearance is due to our ignorance, or inability to understand how the predicate is contained in the subject. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, all true affirmative propositions are analytic in nature.[23]

A necessary proposition is analytic in the sense that it can, in a finite number of steps, be analyzed into simple truths that are evidently true. For the same reason, a necessary proposition is also *a priori*, i.e. its truth can be determined merely by analysis and not by any empirical inquiry. Thus, analyticity and a priority are two

essential features of necessary propositions. But we have seen that even contingent propositions possess the features of analyticity and apriority. This would mean that all true affirmative propositions are, strictly speaking, both analytic and *a priori* and, therefore, necessary as well.[24] If this is so, then the boundary between analytic and synthetic proposition would dissolve. Leibniz was aware of this difficulty and his way of resolving the problem consisted in showing that the distinction is basically epistemic in nature. That is, the justification for the truth of an absolutely necessary proposition involves only finite number of steps and can be known *a priori* by finite beings. But the reason for the truth of a contingent proposition can be known only by means of analysis involving an infinite number of steps. Going through innumerable number of steps or grasping an infinite number of reason is epistemically beyond us. This epistemic account, Leibniz says, disentangles the secret as to how 'the predicate could be in the subject, yet the proposition would not be a necessary one'.[25] Leibniz's analysis shows that he reduces analyticity to a priority. From an absolute point of view, analyticity and apriority are the marks of all true affirmative propositions, irrespective of whether contingent or necessary. So, analyticity or apriority cannot be the basis of the necessity/contingency distinction. Yet Leibniz maintains this distinction. How, then, can we make sense of the distinction within the Leibnizian framework?

It is in this context that Leibniz's analysis of the two key modal notions in terms of possible worlds becomes significant. Leibniz interprets necessity as truth across all possible worlds. The truth of a necessary proposition is absolute in the sense that it is true whether or not there exist states of affairs instantiating such truths. A true contingent affirmative proposition differs from a necessary truth in that it is true *relative* to a given series of things.[26] In other words, its truth depends upon the context of its use and, therefore, is not absolute. The relativity of the truth of a contingent proposition entails that each possible world has its own set of existential propositions pertaining to it.

The negation of an absolutely necessary proposition is a contradiction, which is not true in any possible world. But the denial of a contingent proposition does not result in contradiction. Consider the contingent proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'. This is

true only in relation to this world. Its opposite, 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon', is not a contradiction. Though this is not true in relation to the actual would, it could be true in a different world. We may, however, note that, strictly speaking, within the Leibnizian framework, the proposition 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon' is not about Caesar, because it is *not true* of Caesar. By saying that the proposition 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon' could be true what Leibniz means is that a person similar to Caesar in another possible world did not cross a river similar to the Rubicon under similar circumstances. From this it is clear that, by the possibility of the opposite of a contingent proposition, Leibniz means an entirely different proposition with a different subject and predicate, representing an altogether different state of affairs. This is because, as we have noted in the previous section, Leibniz does not grant identity of individuals across possible worlds, since the complete individual notions of particular individuals make them world-bound. The complete individual notion of Caesar specifies that he crosses the Rubicon at a given time in the history of the universe. Given the complete individual notion of Caesar, it is *necessary* that he crosses the Rubicon, but the proposition is not absolutely necessary like a geometrical truth. So we may conclude that though—from an absolute point of view—it is not possible for Leibniz to maintain the *a priori/a posteriori* and analytic/synthetic distinctions, he can still retain the necessity/contingency distinction without falling back on an argument from ignorance.

It should, however, be noted that Leibniz's understanding of necessity and contingency in terms of the epistemic or logical status of the concerned propositions does not conflict with his analysis of contingency and necessity in terms of possible worlds. For Leibniz, a necessary proposition which is true across all possible worlds must be analytic as well as *a priori*, whereas a contingent proposition whose truth can be determined only in relation to a given situation is *a posteriori* and synthetic from a human point of view. From the divine perspective, however, all propositions are *a priori*, and analytic, but all of them are not absolutely necessary propositions in the sense that they do not hold in all possible worlds. Some of them are world-relative propositions, which, for Leibniz, are contingent.

POSSIBLE WORLDS AND THE WORLD OF ESSENCES

We have seen that Leibniz construes existence in a broader sense, comprising both actual and possible existence. Hence, existential propositions are not just about things existing in the actual world, but they could also be about states of affairs belonging to other possible worlds. These propositions are true relative to some possible world or other, and their opposites are also equally possible. Leibniz, thus, postulates possible worlds in order to provide truth conditions for those propositions whose truth value cannot be determined with reference to the actual states of affairs.

A possible world, as we noted, is completely described by a unique maximally consistent set of propositions. Since necessary propositions are true across all possible worlds, they do not provide identity conditions for possible worlds. A possible world is identified, and distinguished from other possible worlds, on the basis of the contingent propositions that uniquely hold true in that world. A possible world described by a maximally consistent set of propositions may itself be considered as contingent, in the sense that there could be another maximally consistent set relative to which those propositions would be false.

Propositions of essences, or absolutely necessary propositions, do not depend upon any possible world for their truth-value. They pertain to essences and they are true in virtue of the way essences are related to one another. In what follows, I shall argue that, corresponding to propositions of essences, Leibniz postulates a world of essences in line with the Platonic world of ideas, and that, for Leibniz, the world of essences is both metaphysically and logically prior to the world of existences. It is because Leibniz grants the reality of the world of essences that he is able to conceive of possible worlds as pure possibilities.

In contrast to the worlds of existence or possible worlds, the world of essences may be defined as that world which could never have been otherwise than it is. It is the abode of essences which are more or less like Platonic Forms or Ideas. There are many propositions that are true solely in virtue of forms or ideas. These are necessary and eternal truths. There are certain metaphysical principles and logical laws that bind the forms or essences, and they make sure that the world of essences forms a coherent whole.

The world of essences contains forms or ideas of whatever we find in the actual world or would find in the other possible worlds. However, we cannot consider them to be reduplication of essences of things in the actual world for two reasons. First of all, the world of essences contains much more than the essences of whatever we have in the actual world. Secondly, the world of essences is logically and metaphysically prior to the actual world, though we become aware of the actual world before we think of the world of essences.

The world of essences is quite different in nature from possible worlds. We can articulate, with regard to a possible world, a set of propositions, which are some times true and some times false. It is always possible to have a discourse as to whether a given proposition is true or not. Hence, a possible world may be characterized as a *world of discourse.* Such discourses are not possible with regard to the world of essences. There are no contingent truths pertaining to the world of essences, because it is impossible for any of the truths regarding the world of essences to be false. Thus, in the world of eternal truths, there are no falsehoods, and consequently, with regard to it, the truth/falsity dichotomy renders itself meaningless. As bivalence does not hold in the world of essences, it is not a world of discourse like possible worlds.

Leibniz firmly believes that the world of essences is real. He says: '... neither these essences nor the so-called eternal truths about them are fictitious but exist in a certain region of ideas, if I may so call it, namely, in God himself, who is the source of all essence and of the existence of the rest.'[27] Leibniz, like Plato, is a realist with regard to the ontological status of essences and truths pertaining to them. He does not use the expression 'world of essences' to characterize the set of essences and the eternal truths pertaining to them. Instead, he refers to it as region of ideas and eternal truths. He acknowledges that by 'region of ideas and eternal truths' he means the same as what Plato means by 'world of ideas'. In a letter to Hansch, he says: 'Meanwhile many of the Platonic doctrines which you mention are most beautiful—that all things have single cause; that there is an intelligible world in the divine mind, which I also usually call the region of ideas...'[28]

Within the Leibnizian scheme of things, it is because of the reality of the world of essences that we can conceive and talk about

possible worlds. Possible worlds depend upon the world of essences or eternal truths for their very being and no world could be possible without it. Hence, we may say that the world of essences is logically prior to the world of existences. In the words of Leibniz: 'It is also true that the source not only of existences but also of essences is in God, insofar as these essences are real or insofar as there is something real in possibility. This is because the understanding of God is in the region of eternal truths or of the ideas upon which they depend and because without him there would be no reality in possibilities—not only nothing existent but also nothing possible.'[29] Thus, the conceivability of a possible world is dependent, logically and metaphysically, upon the reality of a world of essences and eternal truths.

It is the conception of the world of essences as the abode of the eternal principles and laws that enabled Leibniz to talk of possible worlds. It is not just that different possibilities can be contemplated without violating these eternal laws. On the contrary, the contemplation of the various possibilities requires them. These are the laws and principles—both formal and metaphysical—that hold their sway over all possible worlds. Anything that happens in a possible world takes place in accordance with the formal laws and metaphysical principles. This is true of the actual world, which is one of the possible worlds. Leibniz says: 'And we do, in fact, observe that everything in the world takes place in accordance with the laws of eternal truths and not merely geometric but also metaphysical laws; that is, not merely according to the material necessities but also according to formal reasons... it is true also when we descend to special cases and see the wonderful way in which metaphysical laws of cause, power, and action are present throughout all nature, and how they predominate over the purely geometric laws of matter themselves...'[30]

In addition to the formal and metaphysical laws common to all possible worlds, each possible world has its own set of laws. The set of laws specific to a world could vary from one possible world to another. Leibniz writes: 'For as there is an infinity of possible worlds, there is also an infinity of laws, some proper to one world, others to another; and each possible individual of any world includes in its notion the laws of its world.'[31] These varying sets of laws proper to each world are responsible for the worlds being the kinds of worlds that they are. These world-specific laws cannot be violated in a given world, and hence they are necessary relative to that world. But they are not absolutely necessary in that they need not hold in another possible world.

Since things taking place in a world are in accordance with the formal and metaphysical laws and principles, every possible world is said to contain certain essences. Each of these possible worlds tends to come into existence in proportion to the *quantity of essences* it contains, or the *degree of perfection* that belongs to it. Since perfection of a world consists in the quantity of essence it contains, Leibniz grants different degrees of reality to different possible worlds. The degree of reality that a possible world possesses depends on the amount of essences that it expresses. Greater the amount of essences it has, the more real it is. And it is the possible world with maximum amount of essence that is brought into existence.[32]

It is this line of thought which led Leibniz to the idea that the actual world—the world that is brought into existence—is the best of all possible worlds. It is the *best* because it has greater perfection than any other world. The best possible world is the most rational, harmonious and proportionate of all logically possible worlds. It is created in accordance with the *principle of the best.* Leibniz speaks of the principle of the best as follows: 'There is always a principle of determination in nature which must be sought by maxima and minima; namely, that a maximum effect should be achieved with a minimum outlay, so to speak.'[33] In Parkinson's opinion, in creating the world, the Leibnizian God behaves like a geometer who, while constructing a deductive system, adopts that axioms set which is the most economical and from which maximum number of theorems can be deduced.[34] In the actual world, the greatest number of essences is actualized with a minimum number of laws. In other words, the actual world inhabits the greatest variety of things in the most elegant manner with minimum possible laws. The other possible worlds may have too many essences, or proportionately less number of essences, or else they have more laws than those required or may have less of them. The actual world is the best of all possible worlds because it has the right proportion of laws and essences, which instantiates the maximum essences with minimum laws.

The region of eternal truths and ideas is a prerequisite for the reality of possible worlds. With reference to this, different possibilities can be contemplated or isolated. Any truth pertaining to a possible world ultimately depends on the world of essences, for different possible worlds are nothing but modes of the world of essences. In this sense, the created world is a copy of the world of essences. Using an alternative vocabulary, we may say that possible worlds 'mirror' the world of essences. Leibniz speaks of mirroring in his discussion of monads. Each of the monads, the basic constituents of the universe, is said to mirror the entire universe. So, there is no fundamental difference among various monads. They differ among themselves only with regard to the clarity with which they mirror the universe. Using this metaphor of mirroring, we may say that possible worlds mirror or reflect the world of essences. The actual world, being the best of all possible worlds, mirrors the world of essences with the greatest possible perfection. The other possible worlds, while reflecting the world of essences, fall short of the clarity with which the actual world mirrors the world of essences.

The thesis that Leibnizian possible worlds mirror the world of essences can tackle many difficulties encountered in interpreting Leibniz. As we discussed earlier, he does not permit a trans-world identity of individuals. However, many of his passages seem to suggest that he identifies attributes across the worlds. That is, given an attribute, it may characterize many individuals in the same world as well as individuals of other possible worlds. But each attribute belongs to some individual substance or the other in a particular world. For instance, the attribute of manhood belonging to Adam is particular to him and another man cannot possess it. If so, how could Leibniz say that a given attribute could characterize individuals across possible worlds? This difficulty can be easily tackled if the mirroring thesis is adopted. The essence of man in the region of ideas is mirrored in the actual and other possible human beings. Though they are the images of the same essence, the images themselves are not identical. Therefore, manhood varies from individual to individual. This justifies Benson Mates' observation that the Leibnizian position 'seems to imply that an attribute may characterize an individual, or belong to his concept without itself having an attribute of characterizing that individual or belonging to his concept'.[35] The attribute of manhood does not have the property of being involved in the individual notion of any particular man. If it were the case, as Mates points out, manhood would differ from world to world, which means that, strictly speaking, there would be no other men than the ones that actually exist.

CONCLUSION

For Leibniz, possible worlds are maximal sets of individual notions, and the modal notions of necessity and contingency are analyzed in terms of possible worlds. A necessary proposition is true across all possible worlds, whereas a contingent proposition is true relative to some particular world. Even the contingent propositions are in some sense necessary because, given a series, they necessarily follow. Yet they are not necessary from an absolute point of view. Besides this metaphysical account of the distinction between necessity and contingency, Leibniz employs the terms 'necessity' and 'contingency' from logical as well as epistemic points of view. In the logical sense, a necessary proposition is an identical proposition. The reason for its truth can be shown by an analysis involving a finite number of steps. On the contrary, a contingent proposition is one which does not have such a proof in that the demonstration of their truth would involve infinitely many steps. In the epistemic sense, the distinction between contingency and necessity depends on whether humans are capable of providing an *a priori* proof of the concerned proposition or not. Those propositions which have an *a priori* proof in finite number of steps are necessary in the epistemic sense because humans are capable of providing reasons for their truth. Correspondingly, those propositions which do not have proofs involving finite number reasons are contingent from an epistemic point of view. Though contingent truths necessarily follow within a given series, it is not possible for human beings to give *a priori* proof for their truth because humans, on account of their finitude, are unable to know infinite number of reasons. Though Leibniz adopts different criteria at different times for the distinction between necessity and contingency, such as metaphysical, logical and epistemic, he considers the metaphysical criterion to be primary. For the ultimate test as to whether a given proposition is necessary or not depends on whether a possible world where the proposition is false is conceivable.

Notes and References

1. Nicholas Rescher, *Leibniz: A Introduction to His Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), p. 15.
2. Leibniz, 'Discourse on Metaphysics,' no. 6, in *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld and Monadology*, ed. Eugene Freeman, trans. George R. Montegomery (La Salle: Open Court, 1968), p. 11.
3. Leibniz uses the Latin expression, *notio completa seu perfecta substantiae singularis*. Following Rescher, I use the term 'complete individual notion'. Cf. Rescher, *Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy*, p. 15. The individuals, which are not concrete particulars, and which are constituents of other possible worlds, are treated as notions only in the sense that they are not actualized.
4. Cf. Benson Mates, 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds', in *Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science III: Proceedings of the Third International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam 1967*, ed. B. Van Rootselaar and J.F. Staal (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 509–11.
5. Rescher, *Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy*, pp. 16–17.
6. Ibid., p. 17.
7. In this respect, Leibniz would be in agreement with David Lewis who denies trans-world identification of individuals, but would go against Kripke, Stalnaker and others according to whom in a counter factual situation, we speak about the very same individual that we refer to, in the actual world. (See David Lewis, 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' in Lewis, *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 27–29; Robert C. Stalnaker, 'Possible Worlds and Situations', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 15 (1986), pp. 109–23, and Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 18–53.
8. Cf. Benson Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 17 and also his 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds,' p. 512.
9. Rescher, *Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy*, p. 17.
10. Mates, 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds', p. 508.
11. Leibniz, 'Necessary and Contingent Truths' in *Leibniz: Philosophical Writings*, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, trans. Marry Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1984), pp. 96–7.
12. Ibid., pp. 97–8.
13. Ibid.
14. There are a few passages in Leibniz, which suggest that an essential proposition is about something abstractly possible. On the basis of such passages, commentators like Hide Ishiguro and Benson Mates think that propositions of essences are about the possible and the propositions of existence are about the actual. Cf. Hide Ishiguro, *Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 1972), pp. 130–33, and also Benson Mates, *Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language*, pp. 55–57.

    There are a host of different categories of propositions that do not have existential import. To characterize all of them as essential propositions will be doing injustice to Leibniz. For example, the essential proposition 'A is A' will be just like Caesar was defeated by Pompey. The latter proposition is existentially false. Yet it is quite repugnant to say that it is an essential proposition since it is a possible proposition.

    According to the interpretation pursued here, existential propositions are not just about the actual but about the other possibles as well. The contingent or existential propositions are world-relative. Though Leibniz very often speaks as if contingent truths pertain to the actual world, he seems to have made those statements from the point of view of the actual world. This explanation succeeds in distinguishing such propositions as 'A is A' from those like 'Caesar was defeated by Pompey'. Caesar could have been defeated by Pompey in another possible world.
15. Leibniz, *Monadology*, no. 33, p. 646.
16. Note that for Leibniz, Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is not the same Caesar who crossed the Rubicon in the actual world.
17. Leibniz, *Monadology*, in *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), no. 33, p. 646.
18. Leibniz, 'Necessary and Contingent Truths,' pp. 96–7.
19. Ibid., pp. 97–8.
20. Ibid., p. 98.
21. Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, no. 8, p. 13.
22. Leibniz, 'Necessary and Contingent Truths', p. 96.
23. In recent times, Quine maintained that analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be granted from an absolute point of view. One might maintain a distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, but such distinctions can be articulated only relative to a given system. There are no statements, which are true, come what may, independently of a given system of statements to which they belong. That is to say, from an absolute point of view, all propositions are synthetic (See W.V.O. Quine, 'Two dogmas of Empiricism', in Quine, *From A Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 20–46. Our discussion shows that Leibniz too would not grant

analytic-synthetic distinction. However, there is a fundamental difference in the positions of these two thinkers. For Leibniz, all true propositions are basically analytic, whereas Quine would hold that they are synthetic. It may be noted that, in either case, it makes no sense to uphold the distinction.

24. For Kant, apriority is the mark of necessity; so any proposition that is *a priori* has to be necessary even though it is not analytic. But he believed that a proposition can be *a priori* without being analytic. He granted synthetic *a priori* propositions. Being *a priori*, he considers such propositions to be necessary. The idea that a proposition can be necessary without being *a priori* is quite a recent one, propounded by Saul Kripke. See his *Naming and Necessity*.
25. Leibniz, 'Necessary and Contingent Truths,' p. 97.
26. An absolutely necessary proposition, according to Leibniz, is one whose opposite implies a contradiction. Suppose the proposition 'Man is an animal' is a necessary truth. Then its opposite implies a contradiction. For, if any thing is to be a man, then it must be an animal. This goes well with the idea that a necessary proposition pertain to essences. Any proposition regarding a species *qua* species is a proposition of essence. Leibniz says: 'The concept of species contains only necessary or eternal truths, whereas the concept of individual contains *sub ratione possibilitates* what exists.' Leibniz, *Die Philosophichen Schriften*, Vol. I, no. 33, ed. C.I. Gerhard (Hidesheim, 1965), quoted in Benson Mates, *Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language*, p. 592.
27. Leibniz, 'On the Radical Origination of Things' in *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), p. 488.
28. Leibniz, 'Letter to Hansch on the Platonic Philosophy or on Platonic Enthusiasm' in *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*, p. 592.
29. Leibniz, *Monadology*, no. 43, p. 647.
30. Leibniz, 'On the Radical Origination of Things', pp. 488–89.
31. Leibniz, 'Correspondence with Arnauld' in *Leibniz: Philosophical Writings*, pp. 53–54.
32. See Leibniz, 'On the Radical Origination of Things', pp. 486–91.
33. Ibid., p. 487.
34. See G.H.R. Parkinson, 'Introduction' to *Leibniz: Philosophical Writings*, pp. xii–xiii.
35. Benson Mates, 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds', p. 513.

Ultimate Moral Principles: A Proposal

PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

Department of Philosophy, University of Pune,
Pune 411 007

ABSTRACT

The author addresses himself in this article to the question as to what are to be counted as ultimate moral principles. The enquiry presupposes a framework according to which morality is essentially social; it is concerned with relations among human beings and where virtue ethics and the ethics of actions are complementary to each other. The context in which the author undertakes the enquiry is that of Indian moral thought, where moral principles are understood in terms of *sādhāraṇadharma, vrata, sīla, yama*, etc. The author tries to show that the ultimate moral principles are two: truthfulness and non-violence. Here truthfulness is understood as harmony between/among mind, body and speech and nonviolence is understood as one's harmonious relationship with other human beings. An attempt is made in this paper to show that: (1) These two are the only ultimate moral principles in the sense that they exhaust the realm of morality. (2) Neither of the two principles is reducible to the other such that the dualism of ultimate moral principles has to be maintained. Similarly, it is possible to attach importance to a single principle and to underestimate the other principle as a part of one's moral policy. But such a policy cannot be accepted as the objective judgement on the issue. Hence, moral conflict becomes a genuine theoretical and practical possibility. And (3) There are no other moral principles independent of or irreducible to one of these two or both. In fact, the principles like non-stealing and non-adultery can be regarded as moral principles because and insofar as they are reducible to truthfulness or nonviolence or both.

INTRODUCTION

My enquiry starts with A. Phillips Griffiths' article on ultimate moral principles included in Paul Edward's *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Here, Griffiths discusses the question of rational justification of ultimate moral principles. Griffiths concludes that such a justification is not available. His argument implies that if we consider the hierarchy of moral principles starting from less fundamental or general ones towards more and more fundamental or general ones, then we may say that a less general principle could be justified in terms of a more general one. In this way, we may reach the most general moral principle or principles which could be used for justifying the less general ones. But the justification of the most general or the ultimate moral principles or principles, according to him, remains a question. Here Griffiths takes recourse to a transcendental argument and tries to show that the ultimate principles of his choice are necessary if objective practical discourse is to be possible at all. The ultimate moral principles he chooses are three: justice, benevolence and liberty. Secondly, ultimate moral principles are necessary but not sufficient—according to him—for resolving moral disagreement.

I would like to agree broadly with Griffiths' view about the justification of the ultimate moral principles with some reservations on the question as to what are to be counted as ultimate moral principles after all. What I want to do in this article is to take up this last question in the context of Indian moral thought, propose an answer to it and discuss it at a more general level if possible.

I am making certain assumptions to start with, which will also clarify the boundaries of my enquiry.

1. I presume that morality is basically a social phenomenon. Some scholars have distinguished in Indian context between individual and social morality. But I hold the viewpoint that there is no individual morality as such. The so-called individual morality, if it is morality, then is social, and if it is only an individual phenomenon then it could be spirituality or something else but not morality. Of course, spirituality and morality could be related with each other but they can never be identified with each other. Similarly, some scholars in the West (notably Stuart Hampshire) have distinguished between private morality and public morality. But the so-called private morality, as they understand it, is not purely individualistic, it is concerned with one's relationship with close associates. But if one wants to talk about a strictly private life in which one has no interaction with others, can one talk about moral or immoral behaviour as a part of such a life? I hold here that such a purely private aspect of one's life has no moral relevance.
2. The second assumption I want to make is that morality is concerned with the relation between or amongst human beings and that it is not concerned primarily with non-human beings. Though certain moral considerations in a modified or extended way are applicable to the relationship of humans with animals and trees, a question can be asked whether these considerations can be regarded as moral or quasi-moral or somewhat similar to moral but not moral. I don't want to go into this question here. Hence, my deliberations would be restricted to the moral considerations applicable to interpersonal relations only.
3. The third assumption I am making is vis-à-vis the relationship between ethics of actions and virtue ethics. Here I am following the insight of William Frankena who does not accept any sharp contrast between the two kinds of ethics, but accepts their complementarity. He points out that principles without traits are impotent and traits without principles are blind. I feel that the question has another dimension as well. It is the dimension of moral development and moral perfection of a person. In an exigent moral situation, we are mainly concerned with the morality of actions. But this may not be satisfactory in the long run because a person who acts morally today may not do so tomorrow if he has not developed the tendency to act morally as a virtue. On the other hand, if someone has developed a moral virtue then we can have some kind of assurance that the person will act morally in future also. Going a step further, if a person

has achieved perfection in the practice of moral principles then we can even guarantee that he cannot simply act immorally.

I want to approach the issue of ultimate moral principles with these assumptions. Another limitation of my study in this paper is that here I have approached the problem mainly in the context of Indian moral thought, though occasionally I have also tried to relate it to the Western context.

One clarification is needed at this stage. Though I am discussing the issue primarily in the Indian moral context, I am not committing myself to any particular Indian system of morals while exploring the notion of ultimate moral principles. Though I am borrowing a number of insights and ideas from the Indian moral tradition while presenting and justifying my proposal, my proposal is not supposed to be a presentation or justification of any school of Indian moral thought. This is more a reconstruction than an understanding of the traditional thought. Let me come to the main issue now.

Many scholars of Indian moral thought have treated *dharma* as the central concept in Indian ethics. I have tried to show elsewhere[1] that *dharma* is not essentially or solely a moral concept and hence it would not be quite correct to identify *dharma* with morality. However, Indian moral philosophy can be made possible by restricting the notion of *dharma* to the concept of obligation and by taking the distinction between *sādhāraṇadharma* and *viśeṣadharma* seriously in such a manner that the former is regarded as central to morality.

Now *sādhāraṇadharmas* or common obligations, by their very nature, are universal principles. In Indian tradition, they are supposed to have a two-fold universality. As common obligations they have agent-universality, because they are expected to be practiced by all agents irrespective of class, caste or age. As principles of self-control (*yama*) or vows (*vrata*), they have object-universality, i.e. they are expected to be practiced with regard to all persons, i.e. moral objects impartially and indiscriminately. In the language of *Yogasūtra*, they are *jāti-deśa-kāla-samaya-anavacchinna* and *sārvabhauma*.

We come across different lists of moral principles in the name of *sādhāraṇadharma* or *vrata* or *śila* or *yama* in different Indian

philosophies of life. Most of these lists have three principles in common, viz. truth, non-violence and non-stealing. There are some principles which are seen in some lists though not in all, e.g. celibacy, control over senses, non-possession, cleanliness and avoiding intoxicating things.

Another point to be noted about these principles is that these principles are sometimes found mentioned as the principles necessary to be followed for social order (*dhāraṇā*) and sometimes as those necessary for mental purification and, consequently, emancipation of an individual. They are not found mentioned as moral principles in the sense in which morality is understood as an autonomous aspect of life. However, whether morality is autonomous is itself an open question.

This is a rough and brief account that I can give of classical Indian thought on moral principles. I would like to raise the problem of ultimate moral principles on this background as follows.

Given that there are many moral principles mentioned in various lists of them under various names, which of the principles can be regarded as ultimate?

The answer I propose to this question is apparently simple. It is that truth and non-violence can be accepted as the ultimate moral principles. What I want to do here onwards is to give an explanation and justification of this proposal.

I have started with the assumption that morality is basically a social phenomenon. Now I want to go a step further and say that being social is a part of the essence of morality. Just as Kant derived morality from man's rationality, I would like to derive it from his sociality. What is meant by saying that man is a social animal? A human being cannot be human without having communicative relation and sharing relation with others. Such a relation requires that human being has to have trust in others and also be trustworthy to others. Social-ness necessarily involves the relation of mutual trust and trustworthiness at least to some extent. I want to suggest here that the principles of morality are basically the principles of trustworthiness in interpersonal relations.

There are different kinds of values cherished by people, such as material wealth, sensuous pleasures, aesthetic pleasure, religious experience, knowledge and social harmony. Each one of them is

universalizable in principle, but each one of them does not constitute morality, except the last one, viz., social harmony. I am suggesting here that social harmony, which consists of mutual trustworthiness, is the core of morality.

This idea, I think, can help us in distinguishing non-moral principles from moral principles. Scholars of Western ethics, while commenting upon the universalizability criterion of a moral law in Kant's moral theory, cite examples of those universalizable maxims (for instance, that one should wear the right shoe first and then the left), which do not have a moral content. I will add here that these examples show that though universalizability is a necessary condition of morality, it is not the sufficient condition. By wearing the right shoe first regularly one does not become trustworthy, nor does it amount to the breach of trust if one wears the left shoe first at random. Hence, universalizability will not constitute morality unless it is qualified by the principle of trustworthiness. The converse also holds. Though trustworthiness is a necessary condition of morality, it does not constitute morality unless it is considered as a universal principle. A person may choose to try to be trustworthy to his fellow beings belonging to his own caste, class or nation but not so much to the persons outside the selected groups. Such a selective trustworthiness will not amount to morality proper. One's attitude to be trustworthy must be qualified by universality and impartiality in order that one is considered as a moral person in the true sense of the term.

Now we can ask the next question: what makes one trustworthy to others? I want to answer this question in terms of the two well-known principles, viz., truthfulness and non-violence. But let me make it clear as to what I mean by the terms truthfulness and non-violence.

Truthfulness: Though I have sometimes used the term truth in the sense of truthfulness for the sake of brevity in this article it is important to make a distinction between the two terms. The terms 'truth' (as a noun) or 'true' (as an adjective) are used to qualify a thing or a fact or even reality as a whole. The term 'true' also means genuine or real. In epistemology and logic, it is used to qualify cognitions and propositions, respectively. In this last context it means 'having correspondence with a fact' or 'coherent' or

'acceptable'. In the ethical context, however, the term truthfulness is more central than the terms 'true' and 'truth'. It applies to a person or his conduct. There is a difference between a statement being true and the act of making a statement being truthful. A person may be truthful in making a statement when the statement made by him may not be true. While judging whether a person or his act of making a statement is truthful, the main question is not whether the statement made by him is true to facts but the main question is whether the statement is true to his own belief.

This gives us a clue for understanding Gandhian philosophy of values. Gandhi attached utmost importance to truth and non-violence. But he did not mean by the term truth simply truthfulness but something much more than that. He identified the notion of truth even with God and Brahman. He also said that truth is the end and non-violence is the means. This suggests that Gandhian doctrine of truth and non-violence is not just moral but also metaphysical and religious. We will not dilate on this issue here. What I want to do here, however, is to go a little further with the idea of truthfulness.

Traditionally, truthfulness as a value is identified with 'not telling lies'. I want to suggest that truthfulness as a value need not be restricted to this idea. It can refer to a broader idea of the harmony among mind, speech and behaviour. There are some corroborative statements not in classical moral literature but in the literature of 'good sayings' (*subhāṣitas*) such as: '*Manasyanyad vacasyanyat karmaṇyanyad durātmanām/Manasyekaṁ vacasyekaṁ karmaṇyekaṁ mahātmanām/*' Or '*Citte vākye kriyāyāṁ ca sādhūnām ekarūpatā*'. The classical concept of truthfulness emphasizes harmony between mind and speech. But the broadened concept emphasizes the harmony between speech and action and, consequently, between mind and action as well. Truthfulness in this form not only implies abstention from telling lies but also keeping promises. Similarly, it also includes self-assertion rather than self-suppression in speech and behaviour. The Gandhian concept of *satyāgraha* refers to truthful conduct in this sense. *Satyāgraha* means insisting, in speech and conduct—though by non-violent means—on what one sincerely thinks to be true or just. Thus, a truthful person is a person with internal harmony or personal integrity.

Truthfulness has another dimension. I have suggested by distinguishing between truth and truthfulness that while judging the truthfulness of a person we are not concerned with the question whether the person knows the truth. In this sense, a truthful person need not necessarily be *āpta*. Although *āpta* means a reliable person and 'reliability' includes both honesty and knowledge, it is honesty and not knowledge which is necessary for making a person moral. Reliability in this sense is not the same as trustworthiness. However, although a person in order to be moral need not be knowledgeable, he should have at least an open mind towards objective knowledge. Although he need not be *āpta*, he should have regard and respect for the ideal of *āpta*-hood, which springs from his respect for objective knowledge of truths. Hence, truthfulness as a value also implies respect for objective knowledge of truths as a value.

Non-violence: This is all that I want to say at this stage about truthfulness as a moral principle. Now I will make a few clarifications about *ahiṁsa* or non-violence. *Ahiṁsā* has been understood traditionally as *prāṇātipātaviramaṇa* and is translated as abstention from killing. Here, however, I partly want to broaden the meaning of *ahiṁsā* and partly to narrow it down. Let me do the latter first. In Indian tradition, *ahiṁsa* as an ultimate principle of good conduct is supposed to be followed with respect to all living beings, including animals and plants. But as I have made clear in the beginning, I am taking, at least for this article, moral relations to be the relations between or among human beings. If the relations between humans and non-humans or even the relations between or among non-humans themselves could be called moral in some sense the ethics which may emerge from that could be called either extended ethics or deviant ethics on parallel lines with extended logic and deviant logic, but it will not be ethics in the classical sense. I will not argue for this here. It is sufficient for me even if this view is accepted for this paper provisionally. Now let me explain how I want to broaden the meaning of *ahiṁsā*. First, I want to broaden it in the way in which Jainas have done it by understanding *ahiṁsā* as *prāṇātipātaviramaṇa*, i.e. not harming *prāṇas* and by understanding *prāṇas* in a wider sense. Jainas understand *prāṇa* as the life force which exhibits itself in various forms. Accordingly, not only are breathing and life-span regarded as *prāṇas* but the five sense-organs and the three kinds of energies, viz., bodily, vocal and mental are also regarded as *prāṇas*. Hence, harming any of these *prāṇas* of others is *hiṁsā* and not harming any of them is *ahiṁsā*.

The second dimension in which I want to broaden the meaning of *ahiṁsā* is to incorporate a positive element in addition to the negative core of *ahiṁsā*. Hence, *ahiṁsā* not only includes not harming others but also doing good to others. Here I am understanding *ahiṁsā* as establishing and maintaining harmonious relationship with others in both ways by not harming and by doing good. My emphasis on the positive element here is prompted by the saint philosophers like Jnāneśvara who said, 'Know that the nature of *ahiṁsā* is acting for the happiness of the world through one's body, speech and mind' (Jñāneśvari 16.114) (*āṇi jagāciyā sukhoddeśe/ śarīravācāmānase/rāhaṭaṇe te ahiṁse/rūpa jaṇā//*).

With this understanding of non-violence with its positive and negative element and with the conception of truthfulness as articulated before, I want to take a step further by saying that these two principles are the ultimate moral principles. In other words:

1. Firstly, I want to say that these are the only ultimate moral principles in the sense that these two principles exhaust the domain of morality.
2. Secondly, I want to say that any single principle out of the two cannot be regarded as the only ultimate principle because none of the two is reducible to the other.
3. Lastly, these two principles are ultimate in the sense that they are more basic than other moral principles. Other moral principles may be reducible to them or conditioned by them but these two are not reducible to others, nor are they conditioned by others.

I am aware that these are tall claims. They seem to make the realm of morality rigid and restricted. I, however, feel that these claims have some substance. One can argue for them and such arguments can be appreciated at least as an intellectual exercise, though in final analysis one may very well like to reject them.

First of all, it seems analytical to me that the two principles should exhaust the realm of morality. Since the principles of morality are the principles of social harmony and social harmony is possible if and only if the members of a society have harmony within and without, i.e. they maintain harmony in their mind, speech and behaviour on the one hand and harmonious relation with others on the other; a person can be said to be in perfect moral order if he is truthful and non-violent with all, universally and indiscriminately and a society can be said to be in perfect moral order if all the members of the society are in perfect moral order.

The next question is whether both the principles are to be regarded as ultimate or only one of them can be regarded as so and the other one as subservient to it or reducible to it. In ancient literature, we find statements in favour of the singularity approach. There is a statement – '*na hi satyāt paro dharmaḥ*', i.e. 'There is no greater obligation than truth' which is in favour of *satya* and there is a statement '*ahiṁsā paramo dharmaḥ*', i.e. 'Non-violence is the greatest obligation' which is in favour of *ahiṁsā*. At the practical level too we find examples on both the sides. We find persons who try to discipline their life by way of adherence to truth and truthfulness but do not care so much for *ahiṁsā*. Such a person may have developed a certain understanding of truth based on faith or reason or both, where 'truth' is not restricted to empirical facts, but may have metaphysical and normative aspects along with empirical one. A person may try to live according to his understanding of truth in this sense, may try to advocate it, assert it and fight for it—he may even fight a violent battle for truth. It is possible, at least in principle, that in such a truth-affirming life, *ahiṁsā* as a principle may be subordinated or rejected or even made inapplicable.

For example, Kṛṣṇa's argument in the second chapter of the *Gītā* sounds like a plea for such a truth-affirming life where the notions of *hiṁsā* and *ahiṁsā* become insignificant. Kṛṣṇa here is an advocate of the metaphysical belief system of *ātman-anātman*-distinction and of the normative belief-system of *varṇa-āśrama* duties. He expects Arjuna to follow these belief-systems as true and, accordingly, lead his life in the light of them. Now suppose Arjuna does so because he has faith in Kṛṣṇa, then it follows that he has to fight in the battle as a part of his *Varṇa-āśrama* duty and has to

underestimate the danger of *hiṁsā* in the light of *ātman-anātman* distinction, because as explained by Kṛṣṇa in the second chapter of the *Gītā*, Arjuna cannot kill *ātman* which is imperishable, nor can he kill a body which is going to perish anyway. Here I am not trying to suggest that such a moral approach is justified. After all, this is a one-sided or fragmented moral approach. One can also say that it is self-inconsistent because the metaphysical framework that it presupposes not only renders *ahiṁsā* but the whole moral life insignificant. For the questions that Kṛṣṇa raises with regard to *ahiṁsa* on the grounds of *ātman-anātman* distinction can be raised with regard to moral life as a whole. One can ask, for instance, as to who can be an agent of moral actions? *Ātman* cannot, because *ātman* cannot undergo any change and hence he is a non-agent. Body cannot, because body is non-conscious. Hence, the case of the *Gītā* cannot be stretched too far. But I have discussed the instance of the *Gītā* only in order to indicate that we can conceive of the way of life in which adherence to truth is esteemed as the greatest value and *ahiṁsā* is underestimated. The example of Rāma of *Rāmāyaṇa* can also be cited as a case for truthfulness as the highest value and subordination of non-violence. But we need not go into the details of the example.

On the contrary, we can conceive of the way of life in which *ahiṁsā* is esteemed as the highest value and truthfulness is underestimated. We can consider the case of Jainism here. In Jainism, we find a tendency to undermine *satya* in comparison to *ahiṁsā*. This is visible in three different ways. Sometimes Jainas exhibit a conditionalist approach to truth in relation to *ahiṁsā*, sometimes a relativist approach and sometimes a reductionist approach. Let us consider these approaches one by one.

A. Conditionalist approach: We find in Jaina discussion of vows (*vratas*) that truthfulness has been described as a conditional vow, whereas *ahiṁsā* as an unconditional vow. For instance, truthfulness primarily means telling the truth and not telling lies. But are we allowed to use bitter language or harsh language while telling the truth? If we read the definition of truthfulness along with its transgressions (*aticāras*) carefully, then we realize that telling

a truth in harsh or bitter language is not regarded as truthfulness but a transgression of it. Not using harsh or bitter language is essentially a form of *ahiṁsā*. This is how *ahiṁsā* becomes one of the determiners of truthfulness, and truthfulness does not remain an independent principle.

B. Non-absolutist approach: The other way in which Jainas have tried to undermine *satya* is by emphasizing the relative character of all truths. They do this through their doctrines of *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*. *Anekāntavāda* refers to non-absoluteness of all truths, or, paradoxically enough, it implies that non-absoluteness of all truths is the only absolute truth. *Syādvāda* implies that all sentences as well as their negations can be accepted relative to some interpretation. Hence, we can approve of all assertions, even apparently contradictory assertions. In this way, Jainas treat *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda* as the ways of practicing intellectual non-violence. They think that the debates with rival philosophical views can be resolved by agreeing with them in a certain way or in a certain sense and at the same time pointing out their incompleteness. Hence, the absolutistic approach to truth should be relaxed according to them in order to practice non-violence at intellectual level.

C. Reductionist approach: The third way is the reductionist way. Here we find that Jainas, especially some later Jaina thinkers such as Amṛtacandra have tried to reduce all vows including the vow of truthfulness to *ahiṁsā*. Amṛtacandra, in his treatise *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, tries to achieve this goal by defining *ahiṁsā* in an unconventional way. Accordingly, rise of passions in the soul is *hiṁsā* and the passionless state of the soul is *ahiṁsā*. Since a person commits an act of untruthfulness under the spell of passions, untruthfulness is nothing but a kind of *hiṁsā*. On the other hand, a person free from passions is naturally prone to be honest and truthful. Hence, truthfulness is just a manifestation of *ahiṁsā* in this sense. In this way, Amṛtacandra tries to show that *ahiṁsā* is the only ultimate vow and all other vows are reducible to *ahiṁsā*.

The above three ways in which Jainas have tried to undermine truth in relation to non-violence are different and different responses are possible to them. Personally, I am of the view that truthfulness and non-violence are two non-identical ultimate principles and it is not possible to reduce any one to the other. Amṛtacandra has tried to reduce truthfulness and other vows to non-violence by understanding non-violence in an unconventional manner. *Ahiṁsa*, at the hands of Amṛtacandra, becomes a self-regarding, spiritual principle. But *ahiṁsā*, as I have understood here and as it is generally understood, is primarily other-regarding. It becomes self-regarding only indirectly or derivatively. *Ahiṁsā* primarily means not harming others. But human beings are self-conscious, which implies that they have a capacity to look at themselves as others. Hence, 'not harming others' in the human framework can cover 'not harming oneself'. But not harming oneself is not the primary meaning of *ahiṁsā*. Secondly, the notion of 'harming' includes mental, vocal and physical harming. Amṛtacandra, on the contrary, is concerned with only one form of harming, viz., the rise of passions in one's own mind. Hence, Amṛtacandra's attempt does not really show that truthfulness as a *moral* principle is reducible to non-violence as a *moral* principle.

Although reductionism fails in this way, the question remains whether we can still regard truthfulness as a subordinate principle in comparison to non-violence. Here, I am of the view that it is perfectly possible and morally permissible to evolve a policy of regarding *ahiṁsā* as the higher or unconditional principle and truthfulness as the lower or conditional principle. But it is also possible to evolve a converse type of policy or evolve a policy where our preferences can change from time to time and situation to situation. Hence, supremacy of *ahiṁsā* against *satya* is not the only acceptable moral attitude, it is just one among many. How the Jaina approach is not compelling can be seen from the following considerations.

We have seen that while going by the conditionalist way, Jainas are trying to define truthfulness in such a way that it becomes

conditioned by 'non-violence in speech'. But one can ask: Was it necessary for them to do so? For, while explaining *ahiṁsā*, Jainas do emphasize that it should be practiced at all the three levels—body, speech and mind. To say that *ahiṁsā* should be practiced in speech implies that one should not speak in the way that will hurt the mind of the other person. Why do Jainas repeat the idea while explaining truthfulness then? The implicit reason could be as follows. If we do not include the element of *ahiṁsā* in the notion of truthfulness itself, then non-violence and truthfulness will be independent principles and the possibility of conflict between the two will have to be permitted. In order to resolve such a conflict, we may have to evolve a super-principle that non-violence should prevail in the situation of conflict between truth and non-violence. But such a super-principle would need further justification. Jainas define truthfulness as conditioned by *ahiṁsā* probably in order to avoid this problem. Jainas, however, do this by prejudging the issue in favour of *ahiṁsā*.

The *syādvāda-anekāntavāda* way, which I have called the relativist approach to truth, is also not compelling. We have seen that Jainas, through this approach, admit rival positions under suitable interpretations and try to achieve the aim of intellectual non-violence. Suppose, for example, a Buddhist says that everything is impermanent. The Jaina response is that in a way (*kathañcit, syāt*) what the Buddhist says is true. This is how Jainas would try to establish harmony with the Buddhist at the intellectual level. But there is a problem here. For what the Jaina means by his relative admission of the Buddhist position is that though from the substance point of view (*dravya-naya*) the things are permanent, from the modal point of view (*paryāya-naya*) they are impermanent. A Buddhist is not likely to appreciate this explanation. For according to the Buddhist, the substance point of view is itself an erroneous view or if it is a right view then the things are impermanent even from that point of view. Hence, when a Jaina appears to admit the views of the other schools of philosophy through the channel of *syādvāda*, he is not actually resolving the conflict with the other schools, but only obscuring it in the garb of vague or relative language. The conflict can easily come to surface if the different stand-points from which the rival positions are being held are made explicit.

The conclusion of the above discussion seems to be that though Jainas have a right to give preference to *ahiṁsā* against *satya*, they cannot claim their choice to be the objective judgement on the issue. The Jainas are trying to dissolve the possibility of conflict between *satya* and *ahiṁsā* by pre-judging the issue in favour of *ahiṁsā* or by obscuring the intellectual differences in the garb of vague language. I feel on the contrary that the possibility of conflict between the two principles is a genuine moral problem, which may not and need not be resolved always in favour of *ahiṁsā*.

It seems to me that the relationship between *satya* and *ahiṁsā* is more complex than this. On the one hand, we have seen that none of the two principles can be reduced to the other. Hence, *satya* and *ahiṁsā* are conceptually distinct principles. But I do not mean to say that they are completely isolated or excluded from each other. *Satya* and *ahiṁsā* do overlap with each other or even depend upon each other in more than one ways. This again does not mean that they always operate coherently with each other. There can be tensions and conflicts between the two. Now we have to see how (1) they are interdependent and overlapping, and (2) they can conflict with each other.

1. OVERLAP AND INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN TRUTH AND NON-VIOLENCE

Let us start with truthfulness and try to arrive at non-violence. Truthfulness presupposes a communicative situation where we are supposed to avoid telling lies. Communicative situation presupposes the acceptance of another person with whom dialogue is possible. Acceptance of another person as a dialogue-partner is a basic form of non-violent relationship. In this way, truthfulness presupposes a form of non-violence. We can also say that truthfulness is generally conducive to non-violence because untruthfulness in the form of deception generally causes pain to the other, which we are avoiding when we are acting truthfully. Now let us start with non-violence and try to reach truthfulness. A person who is non-violent to others, naturally cares for others. Such a person will not generally be dishonest to others. Hence, it is natural for a non-violent person to be truthful to others. Ergo, we can say that truthfulness and non-violence presuppose each other to a certain

extent and also generally go together. But when I say, 'to a certain extent', I want to say, 'not to the full extent' and when I say 'generally go together', I want to say 'do not always go together'. Hence, a room is created for the possibility of conflict between the two principles.

2. THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN TRUTH AND NON-VIOLENCE

Examples of such a conflict are often cited and discussed in moral literature. An angry man with a sword in hand is running after a person to kill him. You are standing in the square and the angry man asks you about the direction in which the other person went. Is it proper for you to tell the truth? Or to tell a lie or to hide the truth and keep mum? It may be advisable from the moral point of view to avoid violence even by telling a lie. But suppose I tell the truth and try to persuade the person not to kill. Will it be immoral? It may not be morally wise, but it may not be immoral either. How to cut a balance between truth and non-violence in a given situation is a matter of moral skilfulness. But there are no fixed or ultimate standards in this field. A similar question is raised in the context of the doctor-patient relation, whether it is advisable for a doctor to tell the truth to a patient when the patient is going to die soon. Generally, it is advised that the doctor should not tell the truth. But if the patient is courageous to face the truth, then the knowledge of such a truth can help the patient to spend the remaining hours of life in a better way. These are certain situations of conflict where customarily the decision in favour of *ahiṁsā* is prescribed. But as I have suggested above, the decision in favour of truthfulness could also be defended in such situations under certain conditions. On the other hand, there could be situations of conflict where the decision in favour of truthfulness as against non-violence seems to be more reasonable. Take the case of freedom movement. Freedom fighters sincerely believed that the Indian land belonged to Indians and not to the British rulers. They proclaimed this truth, fought for it, even fought a bloody battle. Here the fight was for a moral cause and one could say that the violence caused to the rulers in such a fight was morally justified. Gandhiji, through his strategies, tried to minimize violence in the freedom

movement but he could not avoid it completely. But suppose one knows that violence is inevitable if one fights for the truth, should one refrain from such a fight? This is a moral question and an affirmative answer to the question does not seem to be obvious. My point here, however, is not to give solutions to practical moral issues but to put these questions in a framework. I am suggesting that the genuine moral issues or moral dilemmas arise in the framework of the two ultimate moral principles, namely truthfulness and non-violence. I don't mean to say here that every moral conflict must be a conflict between truthfulness and non-violence. Sometimes a conflict may arise between one form of truthfulness and another form of truthfulness, where one has to adhere to one of the truths but practically cannot adhere to both. (Though no two truths can conflict with each other logically, they can conflict with each other practically.) Sometimes a moral conflict may arise between two forms of violence, where one of the violences is inevitable. But a moral conflict does not exceed the framework of truth and non-violence.

Here I also want to distinguish between conflicts within morality and conflicts against morality. By 'conflicts against morality', I mean the conflicts between moral and immoral ways of life between truthfulness and untruthfulness or between violence and non-violence. The solutions to such conflicts from the moral point of view are obvious: that truthfulness is preferable to untruthfulness, non-violence is preferable to violence. But the conflicts within morality are of a different nature. They are the conflicts between one moral principle and another. They can be called genuine moral conflicts because solutions to them from the moral point of view are not obvious. What I am trying to suggest here is that since there are more ultimate moral principles than one, genuine moral conflict is a permanent theoretical and practical possibility. I am, of course, not suggesting that truthfulness and non-violence are essentially conflicting principles, because it is possible in principle that persons in a society lead a social life with internal as well as external harmony. It would be an ideal moral condition where every member of a society is living as an integrated personality and respects the integrity of all others. Truth and non-violence would go together in such a society without any conflict. In my opinion, such a society is conceivable though it is a very remote practical possibility.

So far I have tried to show that the two moral principles, viz., truthfulness and non-violence are not reducible to each other. Although they can go together, they can also conflict with each other in practice. We have also seen that these two principles are the principles of trustworthiness or those of social harmony and that they exhaust the realm of morality.

What I intend to do now is to confirm this last idea by examining a few other principles which are sometimes treated as distinct moral principles. I want to show that these allegedly distinct moral principles are not independent principles at all. They are moral principles, if at all they are so, insofar as they can be understood as different manifestations of truthfulness or non-violence or both.

We have seen that in Indian literature concerning *dharma* and *mokṣa*, we come across different lists of principles. Apart from *satya* and *ahiṁsā*, a few other principles are also included in these lists. For example, non-theft (*asteya*), celibacy (*brahmacarya*), non-possession (*aparigraha*), non-intoxication (*pramādasthānaviramaṇa*), purity (*śauca*) and straight-forwardness (*ārjava*). Examining them would be an elaborate task. Here I am going to examine only two principles as a sample. They are non-theft and celibacy.

Let me first consider non-theft. It is understood in Buddhist and Jaina literature as *adattādānaviramaṇa*, i.e. abstention from taking what is not given. *Steya* or theft is understood here as taking what is not given. This is a simple meaning of 'theft'. The term 'theft' assumes a more complex meaning in the context of economic transactions, e.g. exchange of goods, collection of taxes, taking and repaying debts. In this context, a theft is not simply taking what is not given. Theft occurs in this context even if we take something that is given, but if we do not reciprocate it by giving something of matching price. This idea is implied by the statement in the *Gītā*:

Iṣṭān bhogān hi vo devā dāsyante yajñabhāvitāḥ/
Tairdattān apradāyaibhyo yo bhuṅkte stena eva saḥ//

Now let us ask a question: What is wrong with theft? The answer will differ slightly in the case of simple theft and complex theft. When I commit a simple theft I take away something, which belongs to another person without the other person's permission and

start pretending that the thing is mine. The act is wrong because it is untruthful, i.e. because it is a kind of deception. In theft I am belying a conventional truth regarding ownership, that the change of ownership can take place if the first owner willingly surrenders his ownership and confers it on the other person. Complex stealing is also a kind of deception. Here, we are concerned with a more complex social norm, which is concerned with the reciprocal relation between giving and taking. In social relationship particularly economic relationship, when I take something from another person, which he does not give me avowedly as a gift, I am supposed to undertake implicitly or explicitly to give something adequately in return. If I don't give at all or give inadequately, then it is a breach of this undertaking. Hence it is a kind of deception, a kind of untruthfulness. In this way theft is an untruthfulness, which amounts to deviation from the conventional truths concerning ownership and concerning give and take relationship. But, as I have said, the truths presupposed by the notions of theft and non-theft are conventional truths, they are not necessarily ontological or ultimate truths. At ontological level, different theoretical understandings regarding ownership and give and take relationships are possible. Let us consider some of them.

There are theists who say that God has given this world, including plants and animals, to human beings for its utilization. A host of implications are drawn from this theistic presupposition validly or invalidly regarding ownership and give and take relationship. A few of them are as follows:

1. God has given all this to us as a debt (*Deva-ṛṇa*). We have to repay it by way of sacrifices.
2. We can utilize all this wealth keeping in mind that God has given it not only to me but to all, including future generations. Hence, not only utilization but also preservation of nature for the next generation is my responsibility.
3. The world has been given to humans, all right. But what should belong to men and what to women, what should belong to upper strata and what to lower strata of the society – the rules regarding these matters have been

made by God himself through the religious scriptures created by him directly or through the prophets.

4. Since human beings by themselves do not have any right to property, the problems or disputes which may arise concerning theft may be resolved by kings or priests, who are supposed to represent God, keeping in view the divine will operating at the background.

On the other hand, there are atheistic ontological views concerning ownership and give and take relationship again diverse in nature. For instance, the atheistic systems such as Jainism, Buddhism, Sāṅkhya and even Advaita Vedānta, which regard *Mokṣa* as the highest *puruṣārtha*, do not accept that the world of objects has been given to us by anybody, but they do emphasize the distinction between subject and object and regard the notion, of 'mine', i.e. that of ownership even with respect to body as a false notion. Most of them propagate the ideal of *Kaivalya*, a state of isolation from the world of objects and the state of disembodied-ness. Buddhists do not exactly propagate this ideal because they do not accept the existence of *ātman*. But even in the ideal state prescribed by them, the notions of I and mine become insignificant for the same reason. In fact, in these atheistic frameworks the concept of *asteya* will not make any sense because there is neither ownership nor giving or taking in ultimate sense. Probably, *aparigraha* could be treated as a greater value in this framework because it represents non-ownership, which is the ultimate truth for them.

The question of ownership needs a different treatment in Cārvāka framework. The question of ownership with regard to one's own body cannot be significantly raised in Cārvāka framework, because human beings are essentially embodied beings or, to be more precise, they are conscious bodies themselves. Although the question of ownership with regard to external objects can be raised significantly even in Cārvāka framework, Cārvākas do not raise this question because human beings according to them are essentially *artha-kāma*-oriented and not *mokṣa*-oriented. In *artha-kāma*-oriented approach, the idea of possession or ownership is natural. Now for *artha-kāma*-oriented beings, who are also social beings, the question of regulation of *artha* and *kāma* could be a genuine question, but the question

of cessation of *artha* and *kāma* or that of complete isolation from the world of objects would be a pseudo-question. I am inclined to think that genuine moral issues concerning *asteya* can be raised and discussed meaningfully if we start with Cārvāka framework, i.e. if we regard moral agents as essentially embodied beings who are naturally *artha-kāma* oriented as also social. As *artha-kāma* oriented beings they have natural inclination to possess and own something and as social beings they have to recognize similar inclinations of others. Whether the ownership in this framework would be an ontological truth or a conventional truth is a different question. But even if it is a conventional truth, regulation of ownership relations becomes a genuine moral issue because it is concerned with the question of social harmony. My owning something and another person owning the same thing or even a different thing can cause conflict and violence in the absence of regulation. The regulation of ownership relations through the rules concerning theft becomes necessary, therefore, in order to avoid violence in the society.[2] There are other atheistic frameworks concerning ownership relationship also. For instance, Marxists deny the notion of private ownership with regard to means of production and advocate ownership by the whole society. I feel that such a conception of common social ownership considered in the strict ontological sense is unnatural, rather artificial. It seems to replace the religious idea of divine ownership by another imaginary idea of social ownership. However, whether such a conception of ownership is acceptable or not, it certainly has implications to our conventions regarding theft. For instance, depriving a person of his private property by the government may not be regarded as a theft or a robbery or an unjust act in this framework, whereas in a, liberal framework such an act could be regarded as an unjust act.

The general point I want to make is this. The notion of ownership and give and take relation, which presupposes it are not essentially ontological truths but conventional truths, which have a loose relationship with ontology. Alternative conventions about the ownership relations are possible, which can give rise to different notions of theft. These conventions, however, are meant to bring about social harmony by controlling conflicts and violences on ownership relations. Hence, non-theft as a moral principle, on its

surface, is adherence to the conventional truths concerning ownership and give and take relation; it is adherence to non-violence at a deeper level. Broadly speaking, non-theft becomes a moral principle not in itself, but because it involves truthfulness and non-violence.

A similar analysis of celibacy is possible. Celibacy in its rigid form is not a moral principle at all, because it cannot be universalized as a principle necessary to be practiced for social harmony. If everybody follows strict celibacy, there will be no society after a hundred years. Celibacy could be a spiritual principle, which individuals may be allowed to pursue for their mental purification and spiritual upliftment. But there is nothing morally compelling about celibacy. Amṛtacandra, as a part of his reductionist programme, tried to reduce celibacy to non-injury, but in order to do so, Amṛtacandra did two things. One, he took recourse to the self-regarding concept of injury, viz., the rise of passions; secondly, he focused on the injury allegedly caused by sexual relation to microorganisms. He, however, did not take into account the violence and untruthfulness, which could be involved in suppressing one's own sexual passions and in making others suppress their sexual passions while following celibacy. Any way, although strict celibacy may not be a morally respectable idea, non-adultery, i.e. contentment with one's own life-partner[3] which Jainas regard as the small vow of celibacy, does have a moral dimension.

A question, however, can be raised here: Why is adultery wrong? What is immoral about it? The immediate answer that comes to my mind is that it is the breach of trust that one's life partner has in the other. It is a kind of dishonesty to one's own life partner. Hence, adultery is basically a kind of untruthfulness. Adultery can also cause breaking of a family or at least unrest in a related family or families. Hence, it may amount also to an injury. Thus, adultery is wrong because and insofar as it is an untruthful act and because it causes violence.

The issue, however, is more complex. Though adultery is generally regarded as immoral, still we can ask: is every extra-marital relation necessarily immoral? There are exceptional situations in which one may allow or even encourage one's spouse to have such a relation either to beget an offspring or for some other purpose

or even as a custom. Though such situations are often embarrassing to the concerned persons, sometimes mutual agreement may be possible so that an extra-marital relation may not involve untruthfulness or violence to the concerned persons. But the question can be dealt with at a more general level, in relation to the institution of marriage in general. While discussing this issue we generally presuppose the one-to-one system of marriage (monogamy). We also presuppose marital relation to be a rigidly binding relation. But there is neither logical nor moral compulsion that the institute of marriage should be understood in this way. It is possible to conceive of a marriage system which is of one to many type (polygyny) or many to one type (polyandry) or many-to-many type. Again, it is possible to conceive of the contractual form of marriage, which is not so rigid and which makes room for certain forms of extra-marital relations. Hence, whether an extra-marital relation amounts to a dishonesty or violence or both will depend upon the way in which the institution of marriage is constituted and how it is understood by the related parties. Now the question of morality can be shifted from extra-marital relation to the institution of marriage itself. Is a rigid system of marriage more conducive to morality or a loose one? A straight answer does not seem to be possible. A rigid system of marriage may necessitate greater control over passions and this may be considered as a merit of the system, but the same system presupposes human nature to be capable of stability, which it is usually not. Hence, such a system of marriage also puts constraints on free expression of the passionate aspect of human nature. It promotes self-suppression rather than self-assertion and consequently affects peace and harmony. Any marriage-system has to perform the double function of regulating sex-relations in the society as well as of allowing them. Excessive rigidness as well as excessive looseness of the system, therefore, may lead to disharmony in the society. The conclusion is that non-adultery is a moral principle, but not an ultimate moral principle, because its moral character ultimately is contingent upon more basic principles, viz., truthfulness and non-violence.

While concluding this paper I would like to come back to what A. Phillips Griffiths says in his article on the ultimate moral principles. I want to suggest that the proposal I have made can take

care of Griffiths' suggestions as well. Griffiths in his article advances arguments to establish three ultimate principles, viz., the principles of impartiality, rational benevolence and liberty. The last two out of these three can be understood as the two aspects, i.e. the positive aspect and the negative aspect of *ahiṁsā*. By 'rational benevolence' Griffiths means that one ought in action to consider the interest of all beings in the universe. This, I believe, is the positive aspect of *ahiṁsā*. Griffiths understands the principle of liberty as the principle that one ought not to interfere, without special justification, in the chosen course of any rational being or impose on any rational being conditions which will prevent him from pursuing his chosen course of action. This, I believe, is a negative aspect of *ahiṁsā*. The first principle stated by Griffiths, viz., impartiality, needs to be discussed further in the context of my dualistic thesis. The principle of impartiality is an important moral principle because it can be understood as the principle of distributive justice, which is a constituent of the principle of justice in general.

A question can naturally arise regarding the place of the principle of justice in my two-fold scheme of ultimate moral principles. A little explanation could show that 'justice' does find a place in the two-fold scheme. If we consider the principle of justice in general, then we immediately realize that truthfulness is an important element in the process of establishing justice. In fact, one of the mottos of justice is that truth should prevail. Secondly, one of the goals of judicial practice should be that harmful elements in the society should be eliminated or at least brought under control. Hence, although justice cannot be identified with truthfulness and non-violence, the latter ones form an integral part of the former. The other aspect of justice is distributive justice the essence of which is non-discriminate-ness or impartiality. Here I want to suggest that although non-discriminate-ness or impartiality is not an independent principle in my scheme, it can be accepted as a formal aspect of *satya* and *ahiṁsā* themselves. We have seen before that *satya and ahiṁsā* are not only *sādhāraṇadharmas*, i.e. the principles required to be practiced by all moral agents, they have also been described as *sārvabhauma*, and *jātideśakālasamaya-anavacchinna*, implying thereby that they are to be practiced universally and non-discriminately with respect to all the addressees of actions. Hence,

if non-violence in its negative as well as positive form is practiced universally and non-discriminately, it will cover distributive justice as well and, thus, justice will not have to be accepted as an independent principle.

Notes and References

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1. Gokhale, P.P., 'Re-understanding Indian Moral Thought', as included in Bhelke S.E., Gokhale P.P. (Ed.), *Indian Moral Philosophy; Problems, Concepts and Perspectives* (Pune: IPQ Publication, 2002).
2. A question can be raised here whether *asteya* can be reduced to *ahiṁsā* in the strict sense of the latter because *ahiṁsā* is harming someone's *prāṇas* but the wealth that one owns is not one's *prāṇa*. Amṛtacandra, the tenth-century Jaina philosopher, while facing this difficulty, extends the notion of *prāṇa* to what he calls external *prāṇa (bahiścara prāṇa)*. Wealth according to him can be called *bahiścara prāṇa*. Such an extension, I feel, was not needed, because although by taking away the wealth of another person I may not be harming the *prāṇas* directly, I am attacking the sense of ownership which the other person has towards his property. By doing this I am harming the mind-energy (*mono-bala*) of the other person which is one of his *prāṇas*. Theft can be regarded as an injury in the Jaina framework in this way.
3. Here I am presenting the small vow of celibacy (*brahmacarya-aṇuvrata*) in gender-neutral form, which the Jainas have defined as a male-specific vow. According to Jaina formulation, it is called *svadārasantoṣa-vrata* (the vow of contentment with one's own wife or wives).

Spirituality and Politics: Reflections on Radhakrishnan[1]

VASANTHI SRINIVASAN

Reader, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad 560 046, India

The dream of an 'alternative modernity', one that is less materialistic and individualist and more spiritual and communitarian, appears to be a cross-cultural phenomenon, albeit more intensely articulated in the so-called East. In India, Gandhi's example inspired many writers and activists to experiment with 'spiritual politics'—one that draws upon some existing religious and cultural symbols and practices in order to forge social and economic justice. Even those who shy away from 'essentialist' politics rooted in religion or nation appear to sympathize with the notion of the spiritual. While the term 'spiritual' is popular, little attention has been paid to the ways in which the notion has been clarified, grounded in philosophical or religious sources and rendered relevant for history and politics by different thinkers. In this regard, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, one of India's foremost philosophers and former president, continues to be one of the most provocative and challenging figures. Radhakrishnan argued that the essence of spirituality was experience, that 'spiritual experience' was the 'essence' of Hinduism and that it revealed, among other things, human participation in a 'supreme reality' that was both immanent and transcendent. In this article, I probe some of his writings, paying special attention to the role of *Vedanta* metaphysics in his elaboration of 'spiritual experience' or 'religious way of life'. I unpack the structure and content of spiritual experience as he articulates it and point to some abstract and totalizing tendencies. I argue that on the one hand, this experiential approach to the spiritual makes Radhakrishnan open to some aspects of modernity such as the experimental spirit of modern science, individual freedom and universal equality. On the other hand, the emphasis on extraordi-

nary experiences of oneness leads to eschatological expectations in history and politics. In interpreting symbols such as *brahmaloka* (realm of *Brahman*) in terms of a historical realization of the 'kingdom of spirit', Radhakrishnan succumbs to historicism. His utterances regarding 'cosmic evolution', the 'secret desire' of man to become 'superman' suggest that the kingdom of spirit ought to be the telos of history and politics. Coupled with his pride in *Vedanta* Hinduism and Indian saint-activists, his otherwise liberal philosophy opens the door to salvational projects.

SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE: WHOLENESS AND IMMEDIACY

Radhakrishnan, like many Hindu thinkers, celebrates the non-dogmatic and non-organized character of Hinduism. He claims that Hinduism emphasizes 'spiritual experience' rather than doctrine. Because of this experiential basis, Hinduism is said to be an 'eternal religion' (*sanātana dharma)* in the sense that it encompasses all the other religions in itself. Radhakrishnan asserts that Hinduism is the most appropriate religion for modern man because it exudes a 'scientific' spirit. Like other modern Hindu thinkers, Radhakrishnan glosses over the fact that Hinduism is not the only way of life in India and that it displays an empirical diversity that defies generalization. The apologetic side of his writing is undeniable and has been justly criticized (Halbfass, 1988, 380). Having said that, it is also necessary to attend to the philosophical breadth and subtlety that informs Radhakrishnan's interpretation of spiritual experience. In this way, we may balance the hermeneutics of suspicion with one of trust.

Even a cursory reading reveals the centrality of experience in his philosophy of religion. To give some examples, writing about the need for spiritual renewal, Radhakrishnan claims, 'the experience of the mysterious is the fundamental quality underlying all religion' (Radhakrishnan, 1995, 44). In the *Idealist View of Life,* he declares that 'if philosophy of religion is to become scientific, it must be empirical and found itself on religious experience' (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 66). At the outset, we must note that Radhakrishnan often uses the terms religion and spirituality interchangeably; when he distinguishes the two, he relates religion to dogma and creed and spirituality to the experience of the True or

Real. For him, 'genuine' religion is indistinguishable from and coeval with spirituality.[2] Exactly what did he mean by spiritual experience? In the spirit of *neti, neti* of the Upanishads, Radhakrishanan clarifies the character of spiritual experience by way of negation. It involves an element of feeling, especially a feeling of 'creaturely dependence' but is not just that. It involves a metaphysical view of the universe but is not reducible to philosophy. It may include a moral consciousness but cannot be assimilated to the latter for it is moved by a 'mystical element'. In his words:

> It is a type of experience which is not clearly differentiated into a subject-object state, an integral, undivided consciousness in which not merely this or that side of man's nature but his whole being seems to find itself. It is a condition of consciousness in which feelings are fused, ideas melt into one another, boundaries are broken and ordinary distinctions are transcended. Past and present fade away in a sense of timeless being. Consciousness and being are not different from each other. All being is consciousness and all consciousness, being... It does not look beyond itself for meaning and validity. It does not appeal to external standards of logic or metaphysics. It is its own cause and explanation... It is self-established (*svatasiddha*), self-evidencing (*svasamvedya*) and self-luminous (*svayamprakāsa*) (72).

By stressing the holistic nature of spiritual or religious experience, Radhakrishnan distances himself from empiricism which only focuses on the objective sense experience and romanticism which, again, only, grasps inchoate feelings.[3] He insists that the experience is 'integral' in the sense that it is the 'reaction of the whole man to the whole reality' (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 69). The transcendence of time categories suggests that spiritual experience is not about the gradual accumulation, trial and confirmation of knowledge and practices of a religious nature. Spiritual experience appears to be a sudden irruption into consciousness. Radhakrishnan foregrounds the blurring and 'falling away' of the boundaries of subject and object, inside and outside in a manner reminiscent of, though not identical to phenomenological accounts of 'pure experience'. While phenomenologists attempt to restore the pre-reflective experience of unity that accompanies all cognition, Radhakrishnan is concerned with reinstating the uniqueness and autonomy of religious experience. In his analysis, wholeness

and self-sufficiency emerge as hallmarks of spiritual experience (Krishna Sivaraman, 1989, 195). Further, phenomenology holds fast to ordinary experience while Radhakrishnan is alluding to extraordinary ones.

Such extraordinary experiences are rare and happen only to select saints and seers. Even the few saints who undergo the sublime experience cannot command or continue them at will. While the participant does not initiate or control this experiential event, he or she does not lose consciousness either; he or she experiences a different mode of awareness that Radhakrishnan describes as intuitive. He adds that 'intuitive awareness' is not an irrational or infra-rational process but one that completes the search for perfect knowledge. Intuition is not opposed to the intellect or discursive reason. Whereas intellectual knowledge is dependent upon concepts, intuition provides a direct, indubitable, synoptic vision of the whole. This is not a 'mystic process but the most direct and penetrating examination possible to the human mind' (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 115). He compares this moment of spiritual experience to the last step of Diotima's ladder in Plato's Symposium.

What is the content of spiritual experience? Radhakrishnan uses terms such as 'absolute reality, 'ineffable being' to indicate the content. Relying on the Upanisadic teaching of *tat tvam asi* (That art thou), he claims that spiritual experience discloses the identity between the cosmic principle (*brahman*) and the innermost essence of human beings (*atman*). This experience has both an immanent and a transcendent pole (83). From an immanent standpoint, it reveals the 'I' or Self (*atman*) as a 'that' rather than as a 'what'. The 'I' referred to here is not the empirical-historical self with a name and form but the immortal 'I' that subsists when all attributes and conditions have been transcended. As he puts it, 'this "I" is not the body ... for we do not say "I am the body" but only "I have a body"' (110). Radhakrishnan points to the primordial 'I' that accompanies all bodily and mental experience as the paradigm of self-knowledge. Spiritual experience is, at once, the realization and revelation of the Self as 'real being.'

Is this 'I' the empty, abstract, disembodied 'I' familiar from Cartesian philosophy? Unlike the Cartesian subject who stands before the world, the *atman* experience seems to be all encompassing and

absolute. In the latter, there is a transcendence of the body-mind dichotomy leading to an intuitive awareness of oneness with all that exists. For Radhakrishnan, Descartes' reliance on the thinking mind as the ground of certainty is problematic (110). Furthermore, the 'I' disclosed in spiritual experience is not an inferential foundation arrived at after bracketing out the world in a thought experiment but something that shows itself as a witness to the ground that is 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss'.

This brings us to the transcendental pole of spiritual experience which, according to Radhakrishnan, may either be symbolized as an impersonal absolute principle or a personal God. The difference between the two modes is one of standpoints and not essence (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 84). At this level, all symbols and myths are only indicative of the majesty of 'supreme reality' and should not be hypostatized into entities. Self-disclosure or ātman experience reveals and deepens our openness to and participation in the 'supreme reality'. By its very nature, this 'ultimate reality' can only be suggested by means of poetry and paradox. Citing the *Kena Upanishad*, Radhakrishnan writes, 'it (*atman-brahman*) is other than the known and above the unknown' (75).

As the symbol of the transcendental ground, *Brahman* must have been experienced at many levels since it has been articulated in diverse and conflicting ways in the sacred texts. For some, it is the 'sound expression' of truth or reality and the mysterious power of such verbal expressions. For others, it is the basic essence of the cosmos hinted at in the cosmogonic speculations, ritual formulas, esoteric correlations and paradoxical symbols of the Upanishads. In his account, Radhakrishnan identifies four facets of the One: (i) the transcendental universal being anterior to any concrete reality; (ii) the causal principle of all differentiation (*Isvara*); (iii) the innermost essence of the world (*hiranyagarbha* or world-soul); and (iv) the manifest world (*viraj*) (Radhakrishnan, 1994, 72). Among these, the first aspect of Being as an impersonal principle is also seen as the highest.

As a result, spiritual practices and experiences which do not stress the identity between the immanent aspect (*ātman*) and transcendental principle (*Brahman*) are set aside as less sophisticated. However, theistic sects which downplay impersonal *Brahman* in favour

of the personal god (*Isvara*) have been immensely popular and enduring; spiritual experience reveals the relationship between the devotee and the deity which may be one of dependence, separation, adoration and intimacy. Thus, the distance between the immanent and transcendental poles is bridged but not abolished. For Radhakrishna, image worship, offerings and pilgrimages pervasive in devotional cults are ultimately irrelevant. In another context, he explicitly states that these activities are fit for the 'uneducated', and are 'inferior', to contemplation (Radhakrishnan, 1995, 124).

Radhakrishnan's own insights and preferences do not spring from any major transforming experience. They are mediated by his philosophical tastes, mystical bent and distaste for rituals. He claims that ordinary human beings can affirm the possibility of extraordinary experiences through their own experiences of flashes of insight, ecstasy of poetry or romantic love (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 73). But then such experiences do not last; nor do they result in permanent change. The wise often warn us against delusions generated by expectations of the experience of oneness.

A deep suspicion of extraordinary experience pervades traditional schools of thought in India. As Halbfass has observed, the Vedas are not traditionally regarded as a record of spiritual experiences but as an 'eternal, impersonal structure of soteriologically meaningful discourse' (Halbfass, 1988, 388). While there is room for experiential recollection, the Vedas are neither founded upon nor proven exclusively through personal experiences. The search for the ultimate realization begins with a commitment to be guided by the Vedic revelation, by the teacher/preceptor and practices of spiritual discipline. Neither Sankara nor Ramanuja grounds his theology in personal experience. Instead, they argue using the resources of reason in favour of their respective readings of the Veda.

Arguably, Radhakrishnan is drawing upon selective Western sources such as Bradley and Bergson as well as Aurobindo in making his case for mystical empiricist spirituality (Halbfass, 385, 398). His monistic bias, coupled with the relative de-emphasis on traditional mediations in the form of theological debates upon scriptural statements, ritual practice and popular cults make his experiential spirituality somewhat abstract. Without transpersonal controls, any

experiential quest threatens to lapse into subjectivism. Fired by nationalist zeal and reformist passion, Radhakrishnan complains that the traditional 'mutts' or seminaries have become inert and redundant (Radhakrishnan, 1995, 119). But he forgets that transmission of the Vedas took place partly through such institutions. In the absence of some form of theological training, critical judgement required for identifying the genuine from spurious claims of experience would be lacking. After all, seers have to recall and articulate what they saw using the available repertoire of myths and symbols. Since the meanings of such symbols are not immediately transparent, judging certain aspects of spiritual experience may not be possible through unaided reason alone. In the face of the general problem of routinization, the author appears to devalue institutional mediation altogether in channeling spiritual instincts and intuitions. The prospects and problems intrinsic to this experiential philosophy surface when Radhakrishnan spells out its relevance for the modern world.

VEDANTA AND MODERNITY

On the surface, this rarefied experience of oneness which happens to a select few appears to have little relevance for the world. As Hegel had pointed out, we end up with 'spirit in a dream state' (Hegel, 1944, 140). Hegel had argued that the notion of the One or *brahman* was an 'undifferentiated, abstract, perennial solitude of self-consciousness, an intuition intuiting nothing' and that the lived world of the Hindu is a 'plethora of superstitions and immoral cult practices' (Hegel, 1995, 59 and 65). Of course, this had to be the case if Hegel's *Geist* was to wake up in the daylight of Greece and gain full self-consciousness in Germany. Radhakrishnan was conscious of this line of criticism both from the polemical missionary teachers and his own philosophical study. In response, he sets out to show that some fundamental notions such as *karma* and *maya* have been misunderstood.

Contrary to Hegel, Radhakrishnan maintains that the *Vedanta* symbol of *brahman* is not empty of content but illuminates the world as anchored in a transcendent reality. The participant experiences a freedom that is at once 'here and now' and timeless; *brahman* discloses our participation in a reality that moves human

reason but also transcends it. Radhakrishnan calls for a deepening of modern freedom in terms of openness to the realm of *brahman* (*brahmaloka*).[4] Also, contrary to other heirs of Hegel who accuse *Vedanta* of dismissing this world as 'illusion', Radhakrishnan argues for a nuanced understanding of the notion of *maya*. Departing from the standard view that *māyā* means illusion, he writes, 'the doctrine of *māyā* tells us that we fall away from our authentic being if we are lost in the world of empirical objects and earthly desires, turning our back on the reality which gives them value' (Radhakrishnan, 1940, 32). In a similar vein, he claims that *karma* is not fatalist but implies a set of predispositions based on past action; the individual is free to forge better and nobler actions in the present life and therein lies her freedom. Far from denying the world, *Vedanta* affirms the world and enjoins ethical action. But this affirmation proceeds from a commitment to enlightened consciousness as the final end. A good illustration of such affirmation from a transcendental and teleological standpoint may be found in Radhakrishnan's readings of modern science and history.

Radhakrishnan approaches modernity primarily via modern science, which he sees as expressive of the desire for truth and spirit of inquiry rather than the will to power (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 13). Epistemologically, he sees science as embodying the rational phase of human evolution. He often refers positively to the experimental spirit and the benefits of science. We frequently hear about the geographical unification of the world brought about by science. His optimism sounds naive given the threat of nuclear proliferation in his time. For him, science itself is neutral regarding the ends and the need of the hour was to fashion a new set of values that would use this tremendous power for human goods such as material welfare of all (1960: 93). However, he admits some epistemological limits of science. Echoing Bergson, Radhakrishnan argues that science is a system of notations and symbols that interpret some aspects of experience (177). Such interpretations are useful for specific purposes but cannot explain the structure of the universe as a whole. Commenting on modern evolutionary theories, he warns that the 'creative impulse' should not be reduced to simply life-preservation or physico-chemical causes. In his view, 'science cannot explain why matter should exist or life should occur at all' (196).

Despite these reservations, Radhakishnan discerns 'spiritual longings' in modern science like the desire for perfection, the search for origins and perpetual creativity best exemplified in evolutionary theories. But is science not opposed to religion? For Radhakrishnan, modern science only opposes dogmatic religion and superstitious and barbaric practices. He contends that the 'scientific spirit of inquiry' will eventually overcome the limits of conceptual thinking and affirm a 'rational faith'. He is careful enough to distinguish this 'rational faith' from humanistic religion or naturalism. Nor is 'rational faith' simply about elevating some 'respectable values' like universal welfare. In his view, 'the mystical cannot be reduced to the moral' because the former is attuned to a reality that is more comprehensive. Rational faith implies openness to the unseen and eternal core that transcends and nourishes human reason namely, *Brahman*. Radhakrishnan's optimism flows from his belief that the cosmos is evolving towards the final goal of universal enlightenment. As he puts it, 'In the cosmic evolution which has moved from matter to life, from life to animal mind, animal mind to human intelligence, the next step is the growth of human intelligence to spiritual freedom' (1960, 90). He adds that while at the subhuman levels, this evolution has been automatic or instinctive, it is now necessary to apply our reason and will to propel this process. The physical integration facilitated by the sciences has to be complemented by a spiritual integration both at an individual and collective levels.

This argument assumes that modern reason and science can accommodate the *Vedanta* ideal of oneness as the final end of knowledge. But then Radhakrishnan underestimates the metaphysical basis of modern reason which rejects any final cause. As Kant has clarified, self-determination is the essence of modern reason. In other words, even if modern science were to arrive at an impasse which calls for some new myth or God, Radhakrishnan still has to show that such a re-enchantment is feasible and desirable within the conception of reason as autonomous self-legislation. For the modern 'courage' to 'think for oneself' poses immense hurdles in the way of restoring openness to the whole that he discovers in spiritual experience. True, the autonomy of reason gets jettisoned in post-modern philosophy to include historical situatedness (as in

Hegel) or repressed forces (as in Nietzsche); however, these moves make modern reason open to intersubjective life-worlds or subconscious forces but not to a transcosmic ground symbolized by *brahman.*

THE END OF HISTORY

Although he did not consider the metaphysical hurdles in the above-mentioned terms, Radhakrishnan offers one way out. Instead of positing *Brahman* as a trans-historical ground, he interprets it as the end of history. For him, the 'end of history' is not simply a regulative ideal that inspires perpetual striving toward perfection as in Kant. In his words, 'but this view (of perpetual striving) ignores the solidarity between man and nature, values and reality. It cannot be a question of perpetual travelling. We should also arrive' (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 245). To quote him:

> Cosmic history is working towards its highest moment when the universal tendency towards spiritual life becomes realized in one and all, when the ethical experience of non-attainment yields to participation by the creatures in life eternal, when the powerful will of the individual yields in love to the spirit of the universe. As matter was delivered of life and life of mind, so is man to be delivered of the spirit. That is his destiny ...Human life is being prepared for this end (242).

Radhakrishnan sees nature as well as history as preparing for the ultimate triumph of the 'Universal Spirit'. And *Brahman* now describes the world-soul realizing itself in individuals and world history. The 'secret desire' of man to be 'superman' is likely to become a historical achievement. According to him, 'scientific theories suggest that man, as he is, need not be regarded as the crowning glory of evolution' (Radhakrishnan, 1995, 18&166). But what kind of evolution does he envisage? For him, evolution opens the individual to the 'mystery of being', the coming into being of something 'new' rather than an unfolding of what was already there. The cosmos is not simply moving toward a predetermined end because 'God works like a creative genius' and the 'end is not contained in the beginning but assumes definite shape through the characteristics of the parts of the process' (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 269). The symbol of *brahmaloka* or the realm of *Brahman* is rendered as the 'widest possible integration of cosmic experience, the farthest limit

of manifested being' (1994, 130). There would still be manifoldness but then individuals would not be bound to their ego-selves but function from the higher Self. It appears that this state of enlightenment would endure until the cosmic lord absorbs the world back into himself.

In making this move, Radhakrishnan definitively departs from traditional Indian approaches to history. As J.N. Mohanty has noted, while there is extensive speculation on time and history as a record of events, there is no conception of 'history as a significant process of achieving new values' (1993, 306). The Upanishads suggest that kingdoms, like nature, pass through glory and decay and do not achieve perfect transformation of human nature even under enlightened kings like Janaka. For after all, when Yajnavalkya instructs his pupil to take away the thousand cows tied with gold pieces that were meant for the wisest man, he has to contend with other learned men who challenge his wisdom.

Radhakrishnan is drawing upon some Western and Indian sources such as Hegel and Aurobindo here. The progressivist conception of history as culminating in a terrestrial paradise has been a pervasive feature of enlightenment thought. The philosophical sources and practical implications of this trait have been thoroughly analyzed by Eric Voegelin, among others. Using an experiential approach to the Christian symbol of the kingdom of Spirit, Voegelin reminds us about the trans-historical orientation of eschatological fulfilment. Such symbols do not refer to a historical telos nor to natural ends but to the soul's redemption through grace. In this connection, he notes that 'the course of history as a whole is no object of experience; history has no eidos, because the course of history extends into an unknown future' (1952, 120). The tendency to 'immanentize the eschaton' appears to arise periodically in the history of philosophy whenever the uncertainties of faith become intense and widespread. One of the problems with this attempt to make religious symbols relevant is that civilizational tasks are invested with salvational meaning and thus give rise to extravagant expectations.[5] The splendour of future perfection obscures the limits and possibilities of human nature and the present historical situation.

Prophet-souls and Eschatological Hope

Throughout Radhakrishnan's writings, the figure of a prophet who would actively work toward universal salvation through intramundane activity looms large. He frequently refers to the Buddha, Sankara and Gandhi as exemplifying such an activist sainthood. Although Radhakrishnan admitted that he was no prophet or seer, he avers, 'at some future point, there must be a victory over all objectification and alienation, a victory in which man ceases to be determined from without' (Radhakrishnan, 1952, 799). What could it mean for individuals to be determined totally from within? On the one hand, Radhakrishnan is referring to freedom from want which he identifies as the major cause for the success of communist ideology. On the other hand, he also envisions a spiritual transformation in individuals so that they not only rise above narrow selfish loyalties but become sages and seers themselves. He claims, 'there must come a time when all individuals will become sons of God and be received into immortality' (1937, 245). Radhakrishnan notes the *Bhagavad Gita*'s injunction that saints ought not to disturb the ignorant; but he is more sympathetic to the dictum that philosophers should not only interpret the world but also change it. Unlike the lineage gurus of established mutts who are indifferent to social justice, the 'new' prophets, 'who come from nowhere and represent no authority, demand a return to first principles' (Radhakrishnan, 1995, 119).

It would appear that the saints of the theistic traditions who often complain and quarrel with their Lord and suffer intensely the pangs of separation are still subject to 'external' determination; these cannot be the role models Radhakrishnan has in mind. Further, Indian myths and epics are full of unpredictable sages who accumulate *tapas* or heat, make impossible demands of ordinary people, curse and unleash destruction. The tension between a sage's forest life and ordinary life is frequently invoked in the epics and while there is interaction, there is also deliberate distancing and separation of the two worlds. Both gods and humans try to tame the hubristic tendencies of the sages through trickery, gifts and devotion so that the world may continue with all its diversity and tumult. True, there are saints who exemplify compassion; but there are also sages who exemplify hubris and a rage against the

world as it is. The immoderate, totalizing dreams of visionaries have been suspect since Plato first mooted the idea of philosopher kings. But Radhakrishnan's eschatological vision overlooks the rationale behind ordinary people's suspicion of seers and sages; it also blinds him to the totalizing visions that haunt saintly activism.

This totalizing tendency also infects Radhakrishnan's idea of the 'final end' of world history which is a 'world community' where we will regulate our relations, individual and national in terms of our membership in a 'spiritual commonwealth'. Just as there is an integral experience, so also there is an integrated individual and an integrated community. Ideally, this community would need no law or police or courts (Radhakrishnan, 1965, 64). Such a community would be like a family governed by love and voluntary sacrifice of the units to the larger whole. Like the saints, individuals and nations would have overcome pride of one's own. He concedes that international organizations such as the UN and affiliate bodies are a step in the right direction. Thus, it appears that some norms and institutions might be necessary for the time being.

What is noteworthy is Radhakrishnan's insistence that economic and physical integration of the world is already underway. Science and technology have contributed to the shrinking of the world and also facilitated physical integration. As Radhakrishnan writes:

> This oneness of humanity is more than a phrase, it is not a mere vision. It is becoming a historic fact. With the speeding up of communications, ideas and tools now belong to man as man. The necessities of the historical process are making the world into one. We stand on the threshold of a new society, a single society. Those who are awake to the problems of the future adopt the ideal of the oneness of mankind as the guiding principle of their thought and action (Radhakrishnan, 1969, 6).

Moved by the real threat of nuclear proliferation, this exhortation to work towards universal peace is understandable. The autor fulminates against nationalist idolatry based on race or language or religion that leads to adventurist politics. He calls for another kind of nationalism based on 'traditional values such as a sense of honour and respect for inviolable obligations' (11). Radhakrishnan, admits that nations are built on shared histories and cultural heritage and that even a 'world-spiritual commonwealth' will contain many nations and cultures. It appears that he wishes the metaphysical

incommensurability and historical tensions among such entities to disappear. He hopes that spiritual understanding and cultural integration will make room for a new humanism that rises above narrow pride of one's own.

The abstract nature of this universal outlook betrays its problematic character when we consider its roots in a sense of pride in Hindu/*Vedanta* ideals. Arguing in favour of 'spiritul values' in politics and society, he claims that India, especially the Hindu path, has a special role to play in forging spiritual politics. To quote Radhakrishnan:

> Hinduism is not limited in scope to the geographical area which is described as India. Its sway in the early days spread to Campa, Cambodia, Java and Bali. There is nothing which prevents it from extending to the uttermost parts of the earth. India is a tradition, a spirit, a light. Her physical and spiritual frontiers do not coincide (Radhakrishnan, 1995, 102).

As a spirit or light or frame of mind, India already has a unified and universal outlook which ought to be emulated by other nations of the world. Thus, *Vedanta* is not one among many religions but the essence of all religion (Robert Minor, 1989: 491). India and Hinduism have a special role to play in the spiritual regeneration of humankind. Paul Hacker has justly criticized this 'inclusivism' for its intolerance of genuine diversity.

Despite the fact that he explicitly rejects narrow nationalist idolatry, Radhakrishnan's teleological philosophy does leave room for some kinds of fundamentalist politics. For it shows no appreciation of the autonomy of politics as an agonal search for just ordering of human goods and hence as involving conflicting opinions and speeches about those opinions which admit no final resolution. For him, politics, at its best, signifies a few institutions and principles such as rule of law, police and courts which guarantee peace and security, and, at its worst signifies corruption and parochialism. The main tasks he assigns to a more substantive politics concern social justice, economic development and spiritual values such as universal peace and enlightened citizenship. Thus, politics is either about delivery of basic goods or about final goals such as universal enlightenment. Radhakrishnan hardly reflects upon the limits and possibilities of human nature, historical circumstances and competing conceptions of the good in linking politics and spiritual values.

True politics, like true religion, would be united at the 'root' and at 'summit' whereas the intermediary realm of social machinery, rites and customs and moral codes might be different (Radhakrishnan, 1960: 90). At root, it is concerned with basic needs and at the summit, it implies a spiritual realization of wholeness. But much of politics, as we know it, concerns this intermediary realm.

Instead, proceeding from the potential for spiritual realization of oneness by all, Radhakrishnan affirms individual liberty, democracy and secularism as valuable. It is with respect to secularism that the implications of this alternative grounding in spiritual experience have become most apparent. Radhakrishnan's own secularism is premised upon an experiential approach to religions in general, an approach that heavily draws upon his reading of *Vedanta*. The 'essence' of all religion is to articulate and guide the practitioners toward this non-dual experience of oneness. The dogmas and creeds are set aside as inessential. It would appear that the Indian Supreme Court has followed suit to the extent that it repeatedly deals with challenges to policy or law as violating religious freedom in terms of essential practices thereby arrogating to itself the right to define 'true' religion.

CONCLUSION

As the process of 'Hinduization' grows at an alarming pace, there is an urgent need to interrogate this development not only from historical, socio-economic and political angles but also from a philosophical perspective. Modern Indian thinkers such as Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo often figure in the 'Hindutva' literature. Their writings on spirituality resonate with large audiences consisting of modern Hindus who also appear to have an ambiguous relationship toward the 'Hindutva' project. In this context, it is useful to understand the philosophical attractiveness of the analysis of spiritual experience in these thinkers. At this level, Radhakrishnan cannot be faulted for mere apologetics. He transmits the 'integral experience' encrusted in Hindu religious symbols in a passionate and accessible language to urbanized, English-speaking Indians who, like their counterparts elsewhere, are struggling with the fragmentation of meaning in our time. The problem arises when

Radhakrishnan moves from an analysis of religious experience to politics and history. In his eagerness to counter the longstanding criticism that Hinduism is 'otherworldly', he ends up positing a concrete and complete realization of *Brahman* within history. And when he adds that such a 'kingdom of spirit' should be the goal of true politics and that it has to be mediated by saint-activists, he opens the door to salvational and totalizing projects.

Does all this mean that the spiritual be confined to the private life of individuals and not be allowed to contaminate the sphere of politics, as some liberals would maintain? No, for there is one critical lesson to be drawn from an experiential analysis of religious symbols which is that the human condition is one of being suspended in-between the immanent and transcendent poles of divine or absolute reality. When this insight informs and penetrates practical action, it may moderate our desire to achieve complete fulfilment and wholeness in politics. The challenge is to evolve a 'spiritual politics' that is open to the unfinished task of enlightenment and the inexhaustible dimension of 'absolute reality' so that individuals and communities can resist a politics of 'final solutions', be they of the leftist or rightist variety. To some extent, Gandhi's practice of *satyagraha* or truth force could be seen as an attempt to act politically in the light of the human search for the divine. It is the experience of searching/suffering self that underlies this variant rather than that of a realized being. As someone who was 'trying' to see God face to face, Gandhi showed that one can act spiritually in the world of politics, armed only with a limited knowledge of Truth and no special wisdom about the final end of history or the cosmos.

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2. Margaret Chatterjee has noted that although the term spiritual has no

exact equivalent in Indian languages, its wide usage points to a trans-cultural need to explore the trans-empirical that embodies and points to goodness. Chatterjee, 1989, 19.

3. Andrew Feenberg distinguishes between empirical, subjective-romantic, dialectical and phenomenological accounts of experience which I found useful in this context. Andrew Feenberg, 1999, 29–31.
4. Radhakrishnan contends that Hegel's dialectical account of concrete unity presupposes an intuitive insight that remains outside the System (Radhakrishnan, 1937, 135).
5. Fred Dallmayr has already noted Radhakrishnan's reliance on Hegel's teleology and criticized the metaphysical dualism and essentialism that mark his reading of Hindu ideas and symbols. While I agree with Dallmayr, I want to foreground the eschatological aspect and its disturbing political implications. Dallmayr, 1989, 238.

Substance: The Bane of Philosophy

DAYA KRISHNA

O-19A, 4th Floor, HDFC Enclave, Ashok Marg, C-Scheme,
Jaipur 302 001

Perhaps, no other concept has bedevilled philosophy as much as the notion of 'substance', from its very beginnings. The roots of the modem era in Western philosophy are said to lie in Descartes and Spinoza, who founded their philosophy on the very definition of 'substance' which, for them, was almost the same as 'reality', or rather that which was 'really real' as it had the ground of its being within itself. It was, thus, the notion of absolute 'non-dependence' which defined for them, as well as Leibniz; the idea which has played such a pivotal role in philosophy right from the Greeks in their notion of what has been called *causa sui,* and which has generally been designated as 'God' in that tradition.

The British thinkers, from Locke onwards, think of substance as a substratum or support of qualities, a position shared by most Indian thinkers who only added 'motion' or 'activity' which is also supposed to inhere in it, as it too needs a 'support' for it to be there. Hume, as is well known, questions the necessity—just as do the Buddhists—but does not see, like them, that even 'qualities' or 'actions' may have properties of their own, a possibility denied by the Nyāya thinkers in the Indian tradition by an arbitrary fiat of their own. There are adjectives and adverbs in every language and there is no philosophical reason why what they assert should be denied.

'Independence' and 'support' are, thus, the two characteristics which the idea of 'substance' is supposed to provide, and when these characteristics are 'absolutized', they give rise to the notion of that which is fully and ultimately 'real'. The rest is 'real' only to the extent that it displays these characteristics or approximates to them. This, however, creates a dilemma as it not only gives rise to the notion of 'degress of reality' but also to the idea of 'real-

unreal' which is supposed to be a continuum but has radical 'breaks' at the two poles giving rise to the notions of that which is 'absolutely real' and that which is 'completely unreal'. Yet, as the 'unreal' can not be, and as the notion of 'real-unreal' is a contradiction-in-terms, the philosopher is left with the notion of the 'absolutely real', the absolute substance which is completely independent, i.e. absolutely 'relationless' and which still has to provide support to everything else as it is in that that everything has to inhere or that to which everything has to 'belong'. The contradiction between the two criteria could not be resolved and, philosophy, since Plato, has hardly been able to decide which to choose or perpetually to swing between the two.

The 'support' criterion makes the possession of properties essential to the notion of substance as it is what they are supposed to 'inhere in'. Locke's description of substance as a 'know-not-what', therefore, could only have been because of a total misunderstanding of his own position. Kant, on the other hand, was clearer as, for him, it was the relation of 'inherence' that was primary and both 'substance' and 'quality' were the terms between which the relation was supposed to hold. In fact, it was only one of the categories under the heading of 'relation', the other two being 'cause-and-effect', and 'reciprocity'. These 'categories' of relation, as is well known, corresponded to the categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgment, respectively, in his Table of Judgments. Kant only forgot, as the Indians did not, that 'qualities' were not the only things that inhered in a substance and that the categorical judgement was not always affirmative. His own analysis of judgements under the heading of 'Quality' should have alerted him to this and made him ask what it was that the inhered in the substance if the judgement happened to be negative. There was, in that case, nothing to inhere as what was being asserted was an 'absence' or a denial which had no 'positive being' whatsoever, and which the Indians called *abhāva*. His valiant attempt to come to terms with this inconvenient fact, which only he seems to have recognized half-consciously in his postulation of the idea of an 'infinite judgement', scarcely does justice to it. The negation is treated as an affirmation and what is supposed to be affirmed is the whole universe of properties excluding only that which was earlier sought to

be denied in the negative judgement. But this was to fudge the issue as the problem was that of 'denial' and *not* of the implied, 'indirect affirmation' which, in any case, was meaningless as it included almost the entire universe in it. The move, though logically clever, was philosophically sterile, as is evidenced by the fact that neither he nor any of his successors could make any use of it. A straight acceptance of the reality of the 'predication of absence' might have opened a direction for Western thought which would have taken care of the type of objections that Quine was to offer later against the ontological postulation of negative entities or 'absences' occasioned by epistemological necessities.

But it is not only 'absences' that may be said to inhere in a 'substance' when they are seen as that which corresponds, or is a correlate of, a significant or meaningful or non-vacuous negative judgement, but also movement or motion which is the basis of all attribution of 'activity' or 'verb predicates' to anything. Motion also, as everybody knows, has to inhere in 'something' and can be 'self-caused' or 'dependent on something else'. Ultimately, therefore, substance is conceived of as that which is the source of all motion and that which has the ground of its being within itself and that which is that to which all properties, whether positive or negative, belong, or that in which they inhere.

But why is there the necessity for postulating such an idea? Why should properties—whether positive or negative—'inhere' or 'belong' to anything? And, why should one feel compelled to think that the 'real' can only be that which is not 'dependent' on anything else or anything whatsoever? The answer lies in what may be called ordinary day-to-day experience on the one hand and the so-called 'necessity' of thought on the other. But both are contingent in an essential sense and once their 'accidentality' is realized, one will be 'freed' from the compulsions of the age-old implications of this belief, even though one may still continue to use the 'concept' for purposes of convenience and even 'see' or 'experience' the world as one 'ordinarily' does, i.e. in terms of 'things' and 'qualities' and describe them in the language of 'subject and predicate', just as one still talks of sun as 'rising' and 'setting' and even 'see' it as such. The 'things' we know are generally complex in character, having qualities belonging to more than one sense, and of each

sense many more in number than one may reasonably enumerate. The 'qualities' thus are both quantitatively and qualitatively indefinitely multiple in number and the 'thing' is supposed to be a 'unity' of them all. The 'unification' may take many forms and the radical diversity and typology amongst 'things' as 'objects' is a resulting consequence of this. The way the elements are organized determines the type that the 'thing' is. Not only this, the way they 'belong' or the so-called 'belongingness' is a function of the way they are interrelated, inter-determining one another in a way that philosophical consciousness has not sufficiently appreciated as yet. Beyond these are the 'unities' superimposed by the purposes man pursues and the attitudes that consciousness takes towards the objects and the 'world of objects', both individually and collectively. The 'purposes' that are pursued may be either theoretical or practical, the former occurring primarily in the context of knowledge where theoretical entities are postulated to give a substantial and substantive unity to the proliferating diversity of knowledge. The practical pursuits of man are equally diverse and the attempts to provide some unity to them has proved even more difficult than that in the former. This is perhaps because the very idea of 'knowledge' presupposes or implies some kind of unity and seems to presuppose or demand it. The idea of 'good' or that of 'value' is too vacuous to fulfil that role, and the former collapses either into a formal property of willing or even 'intending', or into pleasure or happiness which every one is supposed to pursue in any case with the additional admonition that one should pursue it for 'others' also, as if one can do so. As for the notion of 'value' it, as everybody knows, collapses into such an inherent, intrinsic diversity that only the name seems to unite them. Hartmann's is the most well-known name in this connection, just as Kant, Mill and Sidgwick belong to those who have thought about the 'good'. Moore, who found the notion 'indefinable', opted for a relatively simplistic theory of values adumbrated in his chapter on the *Ideal* in the *Principia Ethica* which has not been seen in this way and almost totally ignored by all those who have written on this path-breaking work on ethics at the beginning of the twentieth century in modem times. The fact that Moore's treatment of values skirts the immense complexity and diversity of the notion becomes evident

only when seen against the phenomenological mapping of the realm of values by Nicolai Hartmann in the second volume of his pioneering work on 'Ethics' which, as far as I know, was not investigated further except perhaps by Scheler in his *Nature of Sympathy.*

The Indian attempt to unify all the seekings of man through the concept of *mokṣa* in its theory of *puruṣārthas* not only fails to resolve the unresolvable conflict between *dharma* and *mokṣa* but also ignores, in this context, the intrinsic diversity and conflict in the so-called *puruṣārtha* of *dharma* itself. Not only this, the theory cannot take into account in its threefold or fourfold classification all the seekings of man. Even such an obvious *puruṣārtha* as that of pursuit of knowledge cannot be accommodated in the scheme except by 'seeing' it as seeking pleasure directly or indirectly, a view supposed to have the sanction of the *śruti* itself in the famous statement of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī in the *Bṛhdāraṇayaka Upaniṣad.*

But whether superimposed through the notion of 'purpose' or 'end' in the context of action or through the idea of 'substance' in the context of knowledge at either the perceptual or the theoretical level, the unity that is sought for is itself never 'unified' as it is intrinsically diverse, even conflicting, and varied in nature. But the unity or 'unities' given by the idea of 'purpose' or 'end' in the practical domain clearly reveals that it need not be provided by the notion of 'substance' alone, as has been assumed by those who have thought about it. But, is the idea of substance necessary even in the 'cognitive' context where 'unity' is sought by thinking in order that it may understand what is 'given' or 'encountered' or 'found' by human beings at the sensory level? Are, in other words, the ideas of 'unity' and 'substance' so interrelated that the one cannot be thought without the other?

The idea of 'unity' presupposes the notion of 'identity' which does not seem to involve the notion of substance as the so-called properties themselves have to be granted some sort of identity in order to be treated as 'this' quality rather than that. Not only this, the qualities may, many a time, have properties ascribed to them as the presence of 'adjectives' in every language testifies in abundance. And, if one accepts the ascription of activity to a substance and its inherence in the latter as Indian thought does, then we would have to accept 'adverbs' also which qualify actions as much

as 'adjectives' do properties. Both 'actions' and 'qualities', thus, would have to be seen as themselves providing 'inherence' or 'support', the reasons for which the concept of 'substance' was invented by philosophers to lend a name to that which they thought was more 'real' than all that which 'appeared' in experience as it lay behind them and without which they could not even be thought to 'be', as one would not know where exactly to place or locate them.

The idea of 'motion', or 'activity', creates a problem for the notion of substance which has not been sufficiently appreciated either in the Indian or the Western tradition. It brings in not only the notion of 'time' into the heart of 'substance' or reality, but also that of 'force' or 'effective causality' which plays havoc with it. The source of 'activity'—if it has to be predicated of substance and thus has to inhere in it—would result in its being seen in dynamic rather than static terms as happens inevitably when it is seen as the substrate of properties alone. The problem of 'change' begins to occupy the centre stage of thought and all the problems that it engenders such as those of identity, potentiality and dependence, or, rather, interdependence. The related problems concerning the relation between the 'manifest' and the 'unmanifest' or between 'effect' and 'cause' or that which is posterior and that which is prior, take over and 'substance' begins to be seen as that from which everything flows with an inevitable necessity as, to thought, it is a manifest absurdity that something can ever arise or come into being or be manifested if it was not already there in *potentia* or, as the Greeks epitomized it in their saying, *ex nihilo nihil.* The Christian counter reply is equally epitomized in the famous saying of Tertullian, *Credo, quia absurdum,* which tells not so much about the Christian notion of creation, as has generally been thought, but about freedom which, to reason, is and will always remain unintelligible.

'Shall' then, the notion of 'substance' be understood as per Spinoza who thought everything followed from it *more geometrico,* or as God which creates 'freely' raising the question, how shall this 'freedom' be understood or whether it can be understood at all, a dilemma Kant epitomized so well in the history of Western thought. But both the alternatives seem unacceptable as 'arbitrariness', and

'irresponsibility' are as undesirable as inescapable determination, no matter if it follows from the nature of reason itself, conceived either in terms, of logic or causality as the case may be.

The dilemma may appear inescapable at first sight, but only because for some strange reason, philosophers have connvinced themselves that there can only be *one* substance when ontologically thought of, whether as the underlying substratum of properties or that from which everything emanates, as otherwise we will have the fallacy of infinite regress on our hands. But what is gained by this 'final stopping' except the spurious satisfaction of having embarked on an illusory journey for which there could have been no cognitive necessity in the first place as the 'stoppage' of the regress reveals to oneself? One could have stopped a little earlier or a little later, and it would have made no difference either to oneself or to others. In fact, as everyone knows, bringing in 'God' into any discussion, or inquiry or investigation does not help in any way whatsoever. The recourse to a 'unitary finality' is thus unavailing and solves no problem as philosophers seem to have thought uptil now.

The problem, in fact, is even worse as neither 'unity' nor 'finality' nor 'independence' is secured by this desperate recourse as the 'differences' between properties continue to exist and that which is supposed to follow from the nature of substance continues to proliferate and remains intrinsically 'unending', whether conceived of in a causal-temporal or logical way. Similarly, the 'independence' of that from which these are supposed to follow in either of the two ways can hardly be there in the sense desired as that which 'follows' is bound to affect that from which it follows, if it really follows from it as, then, it has to have a 'reality' of its own. This obvious conclusion does not seem to have been noticed because of two factors; one relating to the fact that the logical relation of implication, whether conceived of strictly in the technical sense or not, involves minimally a symmetry between that which is implied and that which implies it. The denial of the former necessarily implies the denial of the latter while, if the implication is strict, even the affirmation of the former implies a corresponding affirmation of the latter. All this is elementary, but one consequence of it has not been seen. In case the former obtains—as is generally the

case—there is no necessity that the theorems or the conclusion follow from the same postulates or axioms or premises as, in principle, they could be derived from some other set also. This is the reason why the fallacy of 'affirming the consequent' is considered as such. But if it is objected that if the same set of theorems or conclusions are derivable from two or more different sets of premises, then the difference between them is illusory as formally they cannot but be regarded as the same, then the fallacy will cease to be a fallacy. In fact, the objection, if taken seriously, would have far-reaching consequences as it would undermine the whole 'Truth-Tables' on which modern logic is based as the distinction between logical operators or logical connectives is based on it, and the difference between 'if p, then q' and 'q' 'if and only if p' is based on it.

On the other hand, if the relation is conceived of in causal-temporal terms, not only will the same problem have to be faced as the two are formally identical, but the 'effect' will have an 'existential reality' of its own, producing 'effects' in its own turn, and there is no reason why that which was its cause should be immune from it unless it has ceased to exist and so have become intrinsically incapable of being affected by that very fact, or the very production of the effect would have been the cause of its cessation or death, as has been argued by the Buddhists who have argued for the doctrine of 'momentariness' of reality.

The idea of 'independence' is, thus, as illusory as that of everything needing a 'support' or something to 'inhere' in, which itself does not need a support or anything else to inhere in. The two grounds for postulating the notion of 'substance' to save the 'world' from being 'ungrounded' do not seem to be 'well-grounded' themselves, resting, as they do, on the belief that the world needs to be 'saved' because of 'reasons' which only the philosopher can believe or appreciate.

That there is an intrinsic irreconcilable incompatibility between the 'reasons' which make the philosopher relently press his demand and the desire to 'save' the world comes clearly into the open in the advaitic tradition of Indian philosophizing which declared the world to be ontologically unreal and, hence, incapable of being 'saved' in any way whatsoever, except for pragmatic

reasons which, of course are anethema for every philosopher. The 'real' in order to be real, has to be without any attributes and thus the question of its being a 'support' of them cannot even arise. Nor can it be a source of causality or effectivity or anything else as it is what it is, self-complete, self-identical, self-fulfilled, eternally at rest within itself, wanting nothing, needing nothing. This is the *Brahman, the nirguṇa Brahman* of the pure Advaitins, for whom the world with its incessant change, plurality and difference is ultimately inexplicable, unintelligible, a mirage, a delusion born of some equally inexplicable primeval, beginningless *avidyā* or ignorance from which one would and should wake up like one does from a dream and not even remember that there was a dream or that one had dreamt anything at all.

The Advaitins' exposure of the fallacies involved in the thinking of those who want to conceive of 'substance' and its *relation* to the world in the way they do, poses the dilemma in as clearcut a fashion as possible for all those who care for the 'world' in which they live, have their 'being' and talk about its 'reality' and discuss it with 'others' and write about it. How to 'understand' all this and make sense of it, is the question that thought or 'thinking' has to ask itself, and also find what to do with reasons, or 'reasoning' which seems to compel one to reach the conclusions that the 'Substance-philosophers' or the thinking based on the primacy of the notion of 'substance' has done uptil now. There must be some fundamental mistake in the reasons if they lead to a denial of the reality of that very thinking which has led to that conclusion, for if the conclusion is false or unacceptable for some reason, there must be something wrong with the premises or the rules of derivation which have been accepted by the thinking concerned. The simple, time-honoured solution in such a situation—if one does not want the well-attested and well-tested rules and premises to be given up—is to impose a restriction, as is done in logic and mathematics, in order to avoid undesirable or unacceptable results. The restriction, however, in this case would apply to those very 'necessities' of thought which appear to have led inexorably to the postulation of the notion of substance, as explained earlier. But to give up those 'necessities' would be to give up thought itself, or to 'think' in a new way that is 'freed' from those necessities, 'To be independent'

then would not mean to live in a 'monadic' world, or a world where there is no 'other' or any 'relationship', including the one which one can have with oneself if one happens to be a self-conscious being. Similarly, the idea of 'support' or 'substratum' would have to be seen for what it is, an obvious substitute for the notion of a 'perceptual object' combining in itself multiple sense-qualities in a complex and variable manner and a convenient fiction or 'peg' in other contexts to provide some sort of a pseudo-quasi-referential identity to what one is talking about and reifying or 'christening' it by giving it a name. In the former case, there is a perceptual 'something' which is actually perceived and with the 'likes' of which the world we 'live' in is actually constituted, while in the case of the latter it is language that plays the trick and creates the illusion of their being an 'object' in the same sense as the perceptual object is supposed to be. But in either case, there is no such thing as 'substance' in the philosopher's sense of the term, an 'invisible', inapprehensible 'know-not-what'; a 'thing-in-itself' that is unknowable in principle. It is true that the last cannot, in the strict sense, be characterized as 'substance' in the Kantian framework, but that is only a terminological problem, as what Kant calls 'thing-in-itself' and what Locke calls 'know-not-what' are not only both 'unknowable' but function the same way in their systems, even though the grounds or the 'reasons' for them are different. Strangely, the difference in the 'reasons' derives from the difference in the way they conceive of 'knowledge'. For Locke, 'to know' is to 'know a property', while for Kant, 'to know', is to judge and judgement, as everybody knows, involved, for him, what he called the categories of understanding.

'Substance' of course, is a category for Kant, but not a category in isolation. Instead, it is seen as occurring in the context of a relation, the relation of inherence, whose other term is 'accidens' or property. But if it is so, it will have to be seen as a correlate of 'property', and not something on its own. In fact, it is true of all the other categories under 'relation' and, at another level perhaps about all the categories of the understanding as well, as they all occur in the context of a judgement, which necessarily has to be 'relational' in character. The only non-relational 'thing' in Kant is the 'thing-in-itself' but as it has to be necessarily postulated as an

'object-of-thought' in contrast to all that *is, or can* be, an object of knowledge, it has to be seen as that which is absolutely excluded from the sphere of that which he calls the 'phenomena', and distinguished from that which is termed, as is well-known, 'noumenon'. Fichte's attempt to deny the legitimacy of this distinction within the Kantian framework rests on his failure to see the distinction between 'thinking' and 'knowingly', a distinction Kant clearly draws in his *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics,* even if he did not do so in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

But even if Kant's distinction may be granted, it is not clear why the idea of the 'noumenon' has to be 'thought' except for the reason that the 'phenomenon' cannot be left 'hanging' by itself. The problem Kant is facing is the same as that which was faced by Berkeley, i.e. what to do with the 'objectivity' of the 'world' independent of all 'subjectivity' whatsoever. The 'givenness' of that which was presented or 'presentation' or what he called 'anschauung', had to be 'saved' and it could not be done so by 'God', as was earlier attempted both by Descartes and Berkeley in their different and conflicting ways. One reason for this was that 'God', in order to be God, had to be given 'attributes' and thus become the 'subject' in a judgement whose 'truth' will have to be established non-analytically, i.e. independently of the concept or the definition or that which the ontological argument in the hands of Descartes and others had tried to do. The noumenon or the 'thing-in-itself', on the other hand, was 'unknowable' by definition and hence statements about it had *only* a 'linguistic' reality and enjoyed thus a certitude and truth that was only analytic in nature. But as language could always be understood in terms of what it meant, what was said could be said to have been 'thought' and that is perhaps why Kant called the noumenon an 'object of thought', further suggesting by this phrase that it was a 'shadow' projected by the concept of the phenomenon which alone had a full-blooded reality for him. But then 'shadows' always have a reality of their own even if it be only a 'shadowy' reality, as someone might say. In fact, the distinction between the 'in-itself' and that which is 'known' is always there, involved as it is in the very act of knowing, and not as Kant thought, something that has to be postulated as the 'ultimate' or 'final' distinction without which 'knowledge' cannot make

sense. The distinction is necessary at every step as without it 'knowing' will not be an activity, ever on the move, whose 'resting places' are described as 'knowledge', or rather as 'claims to knowledge', terms which are misleading if they are seen as denying the dynamic, ever-developing nature of knowledge which is the result of the 'knowing-activity', or rather the same activity seen in another way. It is the linguistic statement in which the so-called 'knowledge' is embodied that generates the illusion, as would become evident the moment one looks beyond the linguistic formulation to that which is embodied in it.

But if it is so, the 'idea' of noumenon or 'thing-in-itself' would fall within 'experience' and not 'outside' it, as Fichte tried to point out, without however seeing its significance. The distinction is a function of self-consciousness, and hence is not only necessary but also relative in character. The 'in-itself' is not 'unknowable', as Kant thought, but that which beckons and challenges man to know further and not rest satisfied with what he thinks he has known. This is the situation of 'human knowledge' and to 'think' that one can have some other kind of 'knowledge' free from these limitations is to desire to lose self-consciousness and relapse into just being a conscious being, as the animals are supposed to be, or to attain some other type of consciousness which would be some sort of an analogue to that which Kant conceived of in the realm of morals as the 'Holy Will'. But in both the cases, it would involve giving up the human condition and falling into the illusion that there would be no 'problems' either in the realm of 'knowledge' or of 'action' at that level. The problems are bound to be there as they follow from the very nature of 'being conscious' only the 'specificities' will be different as they follow from the structural nature of the type of consciousness that there is and the variations that are permitted therein by that structure.

The misunderstanding of the idea of substance both as the support of properties and as the source of causal efficacy may, thus, be seen as resulting from that foundational mistake which man has suffered from the moment he started 'reflecting' on his situation and thinking that if he were some other kind of being, he would not suffer from the problems he finds himself suffering from, and from which he does not know how to find an escape with all the

ingenuity of reason which is both his pride and despair as that is the only thing he has at his disposal to solve his problem. But man is unable to solve the problems that reason itself raises as well as those that arise from the 'existential' conditions which define and constitute what 'being a human being' is.

The way out perhaps is not only to accept the human condition in its existential aspect with all the limitations that this entails, but also to see through the illusion and discover how it is generated and thus getting 'freed' from it to some extent so that it no longer has that obsessive, compulsive 'binding' power that it had when it was there and functioned unconsciously without one's knowing how one was determined the way one was determined.

At a deeper level still, perhaps, the problem is related to the problem as to how to 'see' the problem *qua* problem and to defuse or render it as harmless as one can, or even to immunize oneself to the extent that one can from its negative effects and yet enjoy it as it is the spice of life, for what would 'life' be if there were no problems in it. The 'giving up' of the troublesome idea of substance the way it has obsessed the philosophical consciousness over millennia and yet retaining it for day-to-day purposes of thinking may, hopefully, help in this and be the first step in 'freeing' man from the delusions that philosophy has saddled him with since its very beginning.

Causality, Determinism and Quantum Physics

AMIT KUMAR SEN

Reader and Head, Department of Philosophy, Katwa College,
Katwa, Burdwan 713 130

ABSTRACT

The concept of causality and determinism are the two basic philosophical roots of physics developed in the twentieth century. The traditional concept of causal relation presupposes a spatio-temporal framework of events and involves an element of determinism. But quantum physics rejects the idea of spatio-temporal framework within which causal relation holds good and introduces a probabilistic rather than a deterministic element in causal relation. This was not particularly entertaining to Albert Einstein who categorized quantum theory as incomplete. In recent years, Sir Roger Penrose also brought about the charge of incompleteness against it. Of course, their arguments are different. We have discussed their arguments and come to the conclusion that the bewildering proceedings of quantum theory may not mean victory for indeterminism over determinism.

Causal relation and determinism are the two fundamental philosophical roots of physics developed in the twentieth century. This paper mainly aims at determining whether micro-particles of quantum physics really enjoy any immunity from the causal laws, as is sometimes claimed. But while keeping this end in view, in this article I have thrown some light on the characteristics of causality as indicated in the definition of cause by J.S. Mill in section I. In section II, I have discussed how the traditional causal concept is modified by scientists like Heisenberg and others to make it fit for quantum physics. Modification of the traditional causal concept was not very entertaining to the classical physicists. Their reactions and my criticism to their reactions have been developed in section III. In section IV, I have expressed my view that the bewildering

proceedings of quantum physics may not mean victory for indeterminism over determinism. I think, philosophically, there is nothing wrong if the micro-particles are subject to a different kind of causal determinism. It is to be noted here that quantum physics does not entail a principle of chaos but only a rejection of causality as strict predictability and that too in the region of individual microphysical entities. It preserves, instead, destroying the principle of causality in the broad sense of the principle that 'nothing happens without sufficient cause', which is the basis of scientific knowledge. The logic behind quantum physics is that in classical mechanics, the dynamical quantities like position, momentum, energy, etc., from a commutative algebra and the dynamical properties, e.g. the property that the position lies in a specified range or the property that the momentum is greater than zero form a Boolean algebra where the law of excluded middle holds. The transition from classical to quantum mechanics involves the transition from a commutative algebra of dynamical quantities to a non-commutative algebra of the so-called observable. One way to understand the conceptual revolution from classical to quantum mechanics is in terms of a shift from the class of Boolean algebra to a class of non-Boolean algebra (where L.E.M. does not hold) as the appropriate relational structures for the dynamic properties of mechanical systems; hence, from a Boolean classical logic to a non-Boolean quantum logic as the logic applicable to the fundamental physical process of our universe.

I

J.S. Mill in his *A System Of Logic*[1] defines cause as the unconditional, invariable, antecedent. From this definition we may constitute the following points: (a) A cause must be an 'antecedent event' that occurs prior in time to the occurrence of the effect. (b) A cause must be an 'invariable antecedent', i.e. it must be a 'necessary condition' in the absence of which the effect cannot occur. (c) A cause must be an 'unconditional event', i.e. it must be a 'sufficient condition' in the presence of which alone the effect occurs. The invariability of the causal antecedent indicates the order in succession, while the unconditionality of the causal antecedent points to the fact that the order in the succession of the phenomena with which we are concerned cannot be explained by a

reference to anything else outside the phenomena. These three points entail the following: (d) The causal relation has a 'temporal character' in the sense that cause precedes the effect in point of time and also that it is 'continuous' with the effect. There is a causal chain connecting the causally related events, which are apparently separated by temporal intervals. (e) The causal relation has also a 'spatial character' in the sense that cause and effect are spatially contiguous. Suppose B, C, D, E and F are five phenomena that occur one after another and thus form a chain of cause like B causes C, C causes D, D causes E and E causes F. Now if we fix upon F as a phenomenon, B or C is the remote cause of F but E is the proximate cause of F in the sense that E and F occur approximately in the same spatial region. From (d) and (e), we may say that the causal relation presupposes a spatio-temporal framework of events, (f) The causal relation involves an element of determinism, which ensures our predictions for future repetitions. If the cause of an effect is an unconditional event, it is a sufficient condition of the effect and if cause is a sufficient condition of an effect then the causal relation involves the element of necessary connection and determinism.

II

In modern physics, basically under the influence of Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrodinger, the concept of traditional causal relation is modified to make it suitable for the framework of quantum mechanics. In the framework of quantum mechanics, the reference of space does not appear to be important. In macrophysics, which deals with the object of average size, the concept of space is necessary. But quantum physics reduces the object of macro-world to micro-particles and wants to give up the idea of space. Again, the idea of 'contiguity' was necessary only for the 'field theory' of macrophysics, which involves the notion of 'continuous medium' and of 'continuous action'. But it does not hold good in the quantum theory of microphysics, which involves the notion of a 'discontinuous form of action'. Thus, microphysicists drop the idea of space and contiguity from the concept of causal relation. The spatio-temporal framework within which the causal relation holds good has, thus, been cancelled as redundant in the

hands of microphysicists. In his *Foundations of Inference in Natural Science*,[2] Wisdom tells us of two types of causation, namely 'the horizontal causation' which is valid in the field of macrophysics and 'the vertical causation' which is valid in the field of microphysics. In the case of vertical causation that holds between subatomic entities, Wisdom thinks that we have to presuppose a new dimension of events where contiguity and succession do not work. Thus, the traditional notion of space and time do not work in case of causal relation applicable in subatomic entities.

Let us now consider the element of 'necessary connection' and 'determinism' in causal relation that ensures our prediction from cause to the effect. The 'necessary connection' view of causality asserts that an occurrence is causally determined if it can be predicted with certainty. Being the upholder of such a view, Mill believes that cause and effect are connected in such a way that from the occurrence of the former we can predict the necessary occurrence of the latter. Quantum mechanics, with the help of Heisenberg's celebrated uncertainty principle, has rejected this deterministic element of causal relation and reduced it to just a case of statistical probability. In the language of quantum mechanics, it is never possible to predict the occurrence of an event with certainty. In Max Planck's view, microphysics considers nature as being governed by the laws of statistics and the aim of microphysicists is to bring down all the laws of nature to a probability calculus. Planck's view has been strengthened by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Heisenberg has established that it is not possible to know exactly and simultaneously the position and the speed (more exactly, the movement quantity) of a micro particle. Let q be the coordinate determining the position of the particle and p the momentum (mass × speed). Both quantities are determined with certain inevitable errors: let Δq be the error for the position and Δp for the momentum. Heisenberg has proved that these two errors, Δp and Δq are not independent, but inversely proportional: the lesser is one error the greater is the other. He mathematically established the following relation, called 'relation of uncertainty', $\Delta p \,.\, \Delta q \geq h$, which shows that the product of the two errors Δp and Δq can never be less than the constant h of Planck.[3] In classical physics, the canonically conjugate variables, the position and the

momentum, are conceived as independent of one another. But with the help of his uncertainty principle, Heisenberg points out that the position and the momentum of an electron are related with each other that a 'sharply delimited spatial location is incomplete with a sharply delimited velocity for the particle'. E. Nagel, in his *The Structure of Science*[4], points out that though quantum mechanics cannot establish a unique correspondence between precise positions and momenta at one time, and precise positions and momenta at other times, it is capable of calculating the probability with which a particle has a specified momentum when it has a given position, and vice versa. Thus, in quantum physics, predictability is replaced by probability and there is no point in asserting the causal laws with absolute certainty. The subatomic world of micro-bodies has been claimed to be completely outside the operation of classical causal laws and determinism. According to quantum physics, since the microphysical entities with which the real picture of the world is made are essentially indeterminate, causal necessity and determinism no longer holds true in it and should be replaced by the indeterministic statistical type of causality where we have to talk about cause and effect without any reference to 'predictability' and any assumption of the classical spatio-temporal framework. In this way, in quantum physics, a crack in the wall of determinism becomes definitive and there is no way out of the situation. The quantum phenomena compelled the scientists to look for an explanation outside the ambit of thoroughgoing determinism. Mechanistic determinism is proved inapplicable to quantum mechanics dealing with micro-particles that behave in a qualitatively different manner. What is more disturbing is that the uncertainty and indeterminism that we find in the micro-world are thought to be inherent in nature and not merely the result of our ignorance or technological limitations in measuring of any two canonically conjugate variables, such as position and momentum or time and energy accurately. Heisenberg tells us that the popular model of the atom with electrons moving round the nucleus along the distinct orbits such as K, L, M, N, O, P, etc., can be useful in producing a certain picture in our mind, but it is a picture that has only a vague attachment to reality.

III

It is here that we see one of the most outstanding intellectual battles ever fought in the history of human race. Albert Einstein outright discarded the idea of inherent unpredictability and uncertainty anywhere in nature. He said, 'God does not play dice with the universe'. According to him, quantum mechanics is incomplete, though may be correct in so far as it goes. His view is that beneath the uncertainty of quantum particles, there might be a well-behaved deterministic world in which we live. Einstein categorically opposed the conception of indeterminism in whatever form it was proposed by saying that this idea is not merely nonsense, it is objectionable nonsense. He admits that our observations inevitably intrude into and disturb the world of micro-particles. But the difference between the micro-world and the macro-world is anything but ontological. Our observations do not create reality, they only disclose it. Atoms and particles continue to exist with their own attributes even when unobserved. The mathematical scheme of quantum theory seems to be a perfectly adequate description of the statistics of atomic phenomena. But even if the statements about the probability of atomic events are completely correct, this interpretation does not describe what actually happens independently of our observations. But something must happen; this we cannot doubt and this happening cannot be described or explained in terms of electrons or light or wave quanta. But unless we describe or explain it somehow, the task of physics is not complete. It cannot be admitted that it refers to the act of observation only. The physicist must postulate in his science that he is studying a world which he himself has not created and which would be present essentially unaltered, if he were not there. Thus, according to Einstein, Heisenberg's principle may not be ultimate, the indeterminacy may be only subjective and in future, with the development of scientific knowledge, we may be able to determine in absolute accuracy the position and momentum of an electron simultaneously. He also thought that in future, scientists would develop powers of perception, which would enable them to perceive the operation of causality in the finer particles of matter.

Now, this way of thinking is not uncommon among the layman also. Such a thought naturally comes when we try to escape some

result of science that upsets our philosophical scheme; we declare that this result is not ultimate but may be reformed or discarded one day, so we need not consider the philosophical consequences of it. But this way of thinking is dogmatic. It refuses to accept the facts of science that does not fit in one's scheme of thought and waits for the physical theories to change suitably. Of course, physical theories change, but so do philosophical theories and we should be changing the latter in the wake of the former rather than wait and hope for the former to change in order to fit a once formed philosophy. For science is nearer to the facts of nature than philosophy which has to take a speculative leap from the factual world and construct a systematic thought pattern that orders all facts or, in other words, that ontologizes science. If Einstein believes that with the advance of science one day we may be able to follow the movements of an electron more minutely and to establish causality again, it is his pious hope that does not claim serious attention from a philosopher who may reply that Einstein may wait for the glorious day but a philosopher cannot.

Friend and Fiebleman in their *What Science Really Means*[5] came forward to save the classical concept of causality. Causality, according to them, is a logical objective principle that works with absolute accuracy in the conceptual world and that can be verified only approximately in the actual world. The reason is that no particular thing can be an exact copy of an idea of it, no law can, by its very nature, be realized precisely in the concrete. They argued that since no measurement is absolutely accurate in physics, no law could be exactly verifiable. To keep these laws in the form of exact causal laws, and not just statistical ones, as the indeterminists would like to, the physicists substitute a new world in place of that given to us by the senses. This new world is the so-called conceptual world having merely an intellectual structure. In this conceptual world, where all the physical magnitudes are exact and well defined, causality works exactly. This conceptual world contains, besides such significant components as mass, position, velocity, etc., certain components which have no immediate meaning in the sensual world, e.g. ether waves, partial oscillation, reference coordinates. Now inaccuracy, which is always associated with verification of any law, is not due to the inaccuracy in the law itself but due to that

inherent in the translation of an event from the sensual world to the conceptual world and back from the latter to the former. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has only taught us to give up the concept of material point and instead of it, we have to substitute a narrow parcel of waves which obey causal laws. The uncertainty in forecasting events in the world is now seen due not to any uncertainty in the causal laws but to that with regard to the connection between the conceptual world and the sensual world.

Friend and Fiebleman's attempt to save causality is praiseworthy. So far as they advocate that every law is ideally true and cannot be accurately verified, they have my support. For a causal law shows a necessary connection between two chosen states and to demonstrate it, we always need an isolated system where these states are not affected by any external causes. Thus, a controlled experiment is necessary. Now, it is natural that such an isolated system cannot be obtained in practice and the control cannot be perfect in an actual experiment; external causes will somehow disturb the states. So slight errors always accompany any verification of a law which, therefore, must be conceived as valid only ideally. But Friend and Fiebleman stretch this consideration too far and apply it to the case of inaccuracy treated in Heisenberg's principle. They seem to confuse an inaccuracy due to external causes (which never disproves but rather proves accuracy in theory) with an inaccuracy, which disproves accuracy in theory, having arisen from the nature of objects themselves. Predictability, they admit, is the criterion of causality. But exact predictability, they add, is never practically possible. This I accept. But Heisenberg's principle denies even the theoretical accuracy of prediction. So, the previous consideration cannot apply to this case and the allowance for a slight discrepancy cannot be made on the ground of 'unavoidable experimental error'.

Sir Roger Penrose, a celebrated cosmologist of our time, also makes the charge of incompleteness of quantum theory. In an interview by *The Statesman* on December 1997 at Visva Bharati, Santiniketan, when queried on his belief that quantum mechanics was incomplete, Penrose said that the usual approach was to take standard quantum mechanics and try to modify Einstein's gravitational equations. 'My own view is different. Okay, space-time will have to be modified to put quantum mechanics in, but quantum

mechanics will have to be modified as well. It is not as if it can come out of the encounter unscathed.'[6] Let us see what Penrose suggested for the modification of quantum mechanics. In his *Shadows of the Mind*[7], he points out two separate mathematical ingredients of the quantum mechanics.[8] The first of these is the probability theory. Ordinarily, it is thought that quantum theory fundamentally depends on the laws of probability and for this it is a probabilistic rather than a deterministic theory. The second ingredient is the notion of a complex number. A complex number is a number of the form a + i b where $i = \sqrt{-1}$ and where a and b are real numbers. a is called the real part and b is called the imaginary part of the complex number a + i b.

Rejecting the ordinary view that quantum theory depends on the laws of probability, Penrose argued that it is the theory of complex numbers on which quantum theory depends and the laws of probability play their role in the bridge between the micro-level and the macro-level. Now the question is: what fundamental role do the complex numbers play at the quantum level? Let us think of a particle such as electron. In classical theory, an electron might have one location, say, A or it might have another location, say, B. However, according to quantum theory, not only might the electron have one or another particular location, but it might alternatively have any one of a number of possible states in which, in some sense, it occupies both the locations simultaneously. Penrose uses the notations $|A\rangle$ for the state in which the electron is at A and $|B\rangle$ for the state in which the electron is at B. According to the quantum theory, then, there are other possible states open to the electron, written as: $W\ |A\rangle + Z\ |B\rangle$ where the weighting factors W and Z are complex numbers (at least one of which must be taken to be non-zero). This means, if the weighting factor W and Z had been non-negative real numbers, then we might have thought of this combination as representing a probability-weighted expectation as to the location of the electron, where W and Z represent the relative probabilities of the electron being at A or at B, respectively. Then the ratio W:Z would give the ratio (probability of electron at A) : (probability of electron at B). Thus, if these were the only two possibilities open to the electron, we would have two expectations namely, W/(W+Z) for the electron to be at A,

and Z/(W+Z) for it to be at B. If W=0 then the electron would be certain to be at B and if Z=0, then it would be certain to be at A. If the state were just |A> + |B> then the electron's being at A or B is equi-probable. But the weighting factors W and Z, Penrose argued, are complex numbers and so the ratio of W and Z, are not ratios of probabilities since probabilities always have to be real numbers. So the above interpretation does not hold good at the quantum level. Thus, Penrose concludes that it is not the probability theory that operates at the quantum level, despite our familiar belief that quantum world is a probabilistic world. Instead, it is the theory of complex numbers that underlies a probability free deterministic description of the quantum world.

IV

We have seen that determinism is the doctrine that upholds the universal and objective nature of causality. It also holds that the natural cause of things—though admit of varieties—is subordinated to the laws of causal necessity. We have also seen that the development of microphysics in the hands of Heisenberg and others seem to compel a change in the traditional deterministic attitude of nature. In this concluding section, I want to say that it is true that the behaviour of micro-particles repel all attempts to mechanistic explanation. It is also true that micro-particles have some qualitative difference from the macro-bodies and seem to strike causality and determinism on their heads. The uncertainty principle was claimed to be a negation of causality, just as the dual nature of micro-particles, their wave and corpuscular nature, was claimed to be a negation of their essential materiality. But all these bewildering proceedings of quantum physics may not mean victory for indeterminism over determinism properly understood. What these proceedings really knock down is the eighteenth century rigid French materialism and reductivism. Eighteenth-century French materialists tried to reduce everything, including human consciousness, events relating to biological process and social phenomena to mere material and mechanical process.

Mechanistic determinism, proved almost inapplicable in the micro-world, may be just because of its characteristic difference from the macro-world from which we have gleaned our concepts of causality. The more intricate the inner structure of an object around us, the less amenable it is to rigid mechanical causal laws and the less predictable is its behaviour or reaction to external influence. Attempts to mechanically calculate the correlation between stimulus and sensation did not succeed in the way the rate of discharge of water through a sluice gate and the rate of rotation of the fans of a power generating station did. Nature is not under any obligation to submit to the materialist's proclivity to level down all variety and difference which emerge in course of evolution. Though the laws of classical mechanics are inapplicable in the micro-world, the micro-particles are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics. Fundamental particles like electron possess both corpuscular and wave properties. Their inter-convertibility, the decay of unstable particles, the transformation of particles and antiparticles into photons or energy, etc., prove the highly complicated structure. Owing to their mutual interactions and their exchange of influences with different fields, the elementary particles undergo uninterrupted inner transformation. Their properties are, it is said, statistically average in time. It is, therefore, no wonder that the micro-particles repulse every attempt of mechanical type of determinism to intrude into their territory. Philosophically, there is nothing wrong if they are subject to different kinds of causal determinism, say statistical determinism, just as human action are governed by a particular type of causal determinism called self-determinism. Causal laws, as I think, operating in qualitatively different fields must be different.

Notes and References

1. J.S. Mill, *A System of Logic* (London: John W. Parker, 1843).
2. J. Wisdom, *Foundations of Inference in Natural Science* (London: Methuen, 1952).
3. Value of h is equal to 6.62559×10^{-27} erg-second approx.
4. E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, N.Y., 1961), p. 295.
5. Friend and Fiebleman, *What Science Really Means* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), p. 179.
6. The interview published in *The Statesman*, December 17, 1997.
7. Roger Penrose, *Shadows of the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
8. Both these ingredients have been traced back to the sixteenth century Italian mathematician Gerolamo Cardano.

Wittgenstein on Understanding and Language

V. RAMAN

Reader, Department of Philosophy and Religion,
Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan

'Understanding' is a qualitative notion for the later Wittgenstein. It precedes the assertion of any proposition, anything which can be 'true' or 'false'. What is it that we understand when we understand a proposition, or anything for that matter? What we understand when we understand anything in language is really 'meaning'. It is meaning that is understood and that which is communicated. And this kind of understanding is possible only in language.

Language is the repository of the philosophical truth, that which can at all times be spoken. 'It is strange that science and mathematics make use of propositions, but have nothing to say about understanding those propositions.'[1] Thus, the understanding of sense or meaning precedes the edifice of our knowledge. Here understanding is a primitive and irreducible conception, something which is uniquely human. And it is carried on by the use of signs, or by means of them.

It may seem to us that understanding is an 'inner' process (a mysterious and queer one at that) and that the signs by which it is expressed as merely an outward garment. 'We regard understanding as the essential thing, and signs as something inessential.'[2] The signs here only function like a drug, to induce the same (inner) condition in others as my own. This 'inner' condition is one of understanding/meaning/thinking/interpreting, etc.[3] But if we had to say what is the life of the signs of language, it is the *use* to which words are put.[4]

It may seem to us that when we mean with our words, that there is something which accompanies them. It is as if the words connected with something within us. This 'inner' connection somehow seems more vital then mere words. But then, this parallel is quite

unnecessary; what we can have here is only another set of words. We think that we really experience our meaning and not merely utter them through apparently lifeless words. But this 'experience of meaning'[5] could only became available to us through the use of the signs of language. Here we only have words about words. To detect understanding of meaning could always be tricky as we can never really go outside of language.

Language as such cannot really be explained in language; we cannot get outside of it. Hence, language and meaning drop out of language. What a proposition means is told by another one and the meaning of a sentence is explained by another one. Understanding meaning is possible only in a familiar language. When we speak of language, we mean the language that we understand.

In a language that is familiar, we are led by conventions to a right kind of expectation.[6] And that is what understanding is. The existence of conventions presupposes the use of language. 'Conventions presuppose the applications of language, they do not talk about the applications of language.'[7] Meaning is internal to a language whose rules are enshrined in its grammar. The conventions which language embodies assume the use or applications of its words and sentences; they do not discourse about them. Even the Tractatus harps on the complexity of the tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language is based.[8] To talk of conventions, we have to use language and simply describe them; we also have to apply language. Thus, all transactions in and about language can only take place through signs, more words about words. 'In giving explanations I already have to use language full blown (not same sort of preparatory, provisional one): this by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.'[9] Hence, the conventional is not just conventional, that is all we got to go by.

One common way of regarding understanding is to look upon it as a picture, '... picture from which all the rules followed, or a picture that makes them all clear'.[10] But is not such a picture just another sign? It could alternatively be a calculus which explains the written signs to us. Understanding a calculus is an holistic notion, it could in certain contexts be like understanding a language. 'Understanding a language' is a conception we have of language, it is to conceive of a 'form of life.'[11]

Understanding is quite like translation from one medium to another, one set of signs or words into another, from one symbolism to another. When we conceive of understanding as a mysterious and inexplicable 'inner' process, we are separating it from its expression. We are thinking that understanding (meaning) is one thing and that its expression is another. The former seems something in word that is spiritual and impossible to express, even to describe. The expression of understanding is, therefore, always incomplete, it has something vital missing from it. It can never be more complete in expression than to be forever essentially inexpressible. 'The psychological processes which are found by experience to accompany sentences are of no interest of us. What does interest is the understanding that is embodied in an explanation of the sense of the sentences.'[12] The methodological impasse felt over here is overcome by focusing on how sense or meaning in language is understood from its expression.

We commonly conceive of understanding a sentence to be a precondition of being able to apply it. But must there be a prior mental act of understanding which precedes every use or manifestation of it? Suppose somebody obeys a verbal order—must an act of knowing it inwardly necessarily occur before the order is acted upon? Is knowing a must? Knowing cannot really help here as there has to be a transition to doing, a jump. The logical must pertaining to the mental act preceding every doing is actually grammatical, it is not empirical. 'You might as it were locate (look up) all of the connections in the grammar of the language.'[13] All necessary connections are available in the grammar of the language. 'What looks as if it *had* to exist, is part of the language.'[14] Language makes it appear as though something must necessarily exist because we are bewitched by its forms which are at bottom, our own ways of speaking. We are captives of our own pictures,[15] pictures which are traps and which appear as though language inevitably repeats to us.

Wittgenstein is thought by some of his commentators to be attacking a kind of Platonism about meaning/understanding wherein the meaning (intention) is taken be independent of its forms of expression in language. Meaning (understanding/intention) is said to be the real content of which the form of expression a mere

outward garment which is dispensable. The meaning-content is thought to really determine meaning or to fix it. But then the typical form in which meaning is expressed delimits what can be sensibly said in it. Linguistic forms can even provoke or bring into being experiences which otherwise would not have been present/had.

Platonism leads to hypostatization of an imaginary relation, even subliming the signs themselves.[16] It is brought in the first place to avoid the peril of an infinite regress of interpretations which would occur but for their being a final and unquestionable meaning. This final drop of meaning is supposed to be that unambiguous object which we, so to speak, mentally grasp. But then anything which is understood – whether it is an image, a picture or words – could still be ambiguous[17] and further the regress of interpretations.

Understanding a verbal order before obeying it could make sound sense only in a very ordinary context and normal or usual setting. Words fail at a metalogical level where they make no sense. 'Understanding' and 'Meaning' are not metalogical concepts and independent of human contexts.[18]

That elusive something which fills the gap between understanding/knowing and doing, between a verbal order/command and obedience to it may be claimed to be an interpretation. We, mentally as it were, add an interpretation and thereby complete our understanding or knowledge and then act upon it. Was the incomplete understanding so unambiguous that it was fulfilled only with this particular interpretation which we added to it?[19] In that case, our understanding was already unambiguous and did not need any further clarity. If, on the other hand, the interpretation that we add were arbitrary, then our understanding was only what we made of it. Anything may go here.

An interpretation is always one that takes its place as opposed to a different one and which runs differently in a different direction. If we still insist upon the need of an interpretation, then it means that no sentence of language could be understood without a rider.[20] If understanding requires an 'inner' process of interpretation every time it occurs and if one interpretation were the right one, then how is it different or something more than understanding, or in addition to it, a rider accompanying it? Interpretation has no

special identity over there; its presence is no better than its absence. So, no such subaltern process of interpretation need be present here. Philosophically, we can see so many problems if we accept the need of interpretation.

On the other hand, as said earlier, if the interpretation is arbitrarily foisted upon what is given, then what is understood is what is made up adhoc as it were.

There is such a thing as interpreting signs, but it does not happen each and every time that there is understanding (of the meaning) of a sign.

Understanding meaning is like perceiving a situation, a state of affairs one is in at any time. It can be assimilated to response to sensory stimuli, with this difference that the case of linguistic meaning can at times be very concrete. But a perceptual situation too can be very direct in a pinpointed way. 'Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think.'[21] Understanding (and recognizing) a musical theme can be quite specific. One who knows music well would not be able to tell why he produced just this variation in loudness and tempo. But he knows music all the same. If the same explanation is demanded, then he can only '—translate the musical picture into a picture in another medium and let one picture throw light on the other.'[42] But with meaning-in-language, even this becomes impossible. You cannot translate language into another medium in order to explain it. You can speak of language only in language; language as such has no explanation.

What then does understanding mean? In other words, what is the concept of understanding available to us? '"Understanding a word" may mean! *Knowing* how it is used, *being able* to apply it.'[23] It is practice that can settle anything of this kind, it is there that we can see the relationship between us and the world we live in clear terms. Otherwise, there could be epistemological difficultly about whether we know anything we do at any given time, i.e. whether we know it always. The way we use the word 'can' (which indicates possibility) will tell us what we really regard as the criterion on for knowing anything.

There is a great deal of linguistic haze surrounding the use of the word 'know'. We can attain clarity about this if we realize that

'knowing' has not the centralized unity we imagine it to have. To 'know' something may mean diverse things, i.e. different centeria are used for different cases of knowing. The word 'know' is used in different ways in practice. 'To "know" something is not one clear-cut psychical event—The ability, the knowledge how to play chess has no temporal structure; the game of chess has. But language misleads us into thinking that knowledge has duration like a toothache or a melody. But when we say we know something "all the time" this is a quite different sense. It is a hypothesis, and we can correlate it with a physiological process.'[24] A knowledge claim is at its best hypothetical. We can check a physiological process in case a doubt arises. But our claim to 'know' anything is not the sort of thing that can be checked in this way. If we claim that knowledge is a state, we must mean that it is a state of a body or of a physical model or in the sense used a psychology where there are models of mind in the form of unconsciousness.[25] But then we are moving to a different grammar here, 'conscious' knowing is totally different from an unconscious one.

Experience is a logical concept for Wittgenstein[26] as it cannot be differentiated from non-experience by way of predicates. There is an ambiguity about the use of the word 'understand', for example; of two spectators watching a game of chess one of whom knows the game while the other does not, the former definitely has a different experience from the latter who does not understand the game at all. We can say that it is the knowledge of the rules of chess that the first spectator has that makes the difference and thus it is what gives him the experience that he has. But his experience itself is not the knowledge at the rules.[27] Nevertheless, we call them both 'understanding'. Likewise, 'thought' may sometimes mean a particular mental process which accompanies the utterance of a sentence and sometimes the place of the sentence itself in the system of language of which it is a part. Then again, recognition (like memory) can be seen as a source of the concepts of the past and of identity, or as a way of checking what happened in the past, and on identity.[28]

Ambiguity, therefore, seems inherent in the use of language, its words. Understanding a sentence, especially in a philosophical context, can be in the sense in which it can be replaced by another

sentence which has the same meaning, or in the sense in which in cannot replaced by any other sentence. In the first case, the thought is common to both the sentences, while in the second it is something that only be expressed (uniquely) by just those words in these places.[29] The second case is one like in a poem or even a musical theme. Are we saying that the word 'understanding' has two different meanings here? No, what we are saying is that *our concept* of understanding comprises these two meanings, these two uses.

In language, first-hand experiences as well as non-experiences are expressed alike. There are no special predicates to differentiate and separate them. Thought too must fall into a kind of experience, and all experiences are a part of language.

A word is just a word, taken by itself. But its conception can contain several meanings. These several meanings could coalesce together to give rise to the conception, they may enable us to form it.

It is only when we try to conceive of something that its philosophically problematic aspects begin to show themselves. Ordinarily, any linguistic use is unproblematic as long as we do not think of it (philosophically); but when we do, we see that conceptions reveal something different.

Therefore, philosophical conceptions are on a plane quite different from the ordinary use of words.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN TEXTS

PG *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 1978).

BB *The Blue and Brown Books* by L. Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964).

PI *Philosophical Investigation*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).

LWL *Wittgenstein's Lectures*, Cambridge, 1930–32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

T *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* trans. P.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).

PR *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

Notes and References

1. PG, p. 39/1.
2. PG, p. 39/2.
3. BB, p. 3.
4. BB, p. 4.
5. Its content is not as easy to describe as the content of a mental image, PI, pp. 175–76.
6. LWL, p. 5.
7. LWL, p. 13.
8. T 4.002. 'The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated.
9. PI, 120.
10. PG, p. 40/2.
11. PI, p. 19.
12. PG, pp. 45/46.
13. PG, pp. 102, 149.
14. PI, p. 50.
15. PI, p. 115.
16. PI, p. 94.
17. PI, pp. 11, 54, 139, 191.
18. PG, pp. 46–8.
19. PG, pp. 47–9.
20. Ibid.
21. PI, p. 527.
22. PG, pp. 41–4.
23. PG, pp. 47/10, PI, p. 150.
24. LWL, p. 94.
25. PG, p. 48/10.
26. LWL, p. 60.
27. PG, p. 50/11.
28. PR, p. 62/19.
29. PI, pp. 531–2.

Discussion and Comments

A Reply to A. Kanthamani's 'Professor B.K. Agarwala's Lethal Hermeneutic Strategy'[1]

De nobis ipsis silemus
(Let us say nothing of ourselves)

Author: unknown

I am very grateful to Professor Kanthamani for penning down his philosophical comments paying critical attention to various essays of mine on Kant. This has helped me in gaining clarity about my own thoughts but without any alteration. No doubt I myself will like to see my own thoughts through his critical eyes and improve my reading of Kant in the line of valuable suggestions he has offered. But I must confess with Gadamer, 'And yet a line of thought that has matured over many years has its own stability. However much one tries to see through the critics' eyes, one's own generally pervasive viewpoint prevails.'[2]

Professor Kanthamani's criticism of my views is often mixed with his doubt regarding the credentials of my Kant scholarship which I have found hard to disentangle. For example:

1. 'I shall show why the hermeneutic strategy adopted by Professor Agarwala ... does not work, leaving the other issue as to what extent this would attest to his scholarship on Kant to others...',[3]
2. '...it confirms my original impression that the so-called Kant scholarship shoots but ends with a whimper',[4]
3. 'This is nothing but a paroxysm of labour with a quixotic adventurism',[5]
4. 'If you read between the lines, it is no hermeneutics but a *lethal attack* on the basic credentials of Kant as a philosopher using a brand of hermeneutics (the likeness of which is nowhere evident) as a launchpad',[6]
5. 'Such word-of-god doctrines smacks of plain lies having no parallel anywhere,'[7]

6. 'Honestly I feel he [Binod] should read the basics once again before advertising such hermeneutics.'[8]

In this reply I shall not defend myself. As far as possible, we should remain silent about ourselves as we are insignificant actors in the historical play of ideas. To the best of my capacity as far as it is possible to disentangle ideas and arguments, I shall discuss only the ideas and arguments as these are important. With this caution I shall like to make the following observations.

1. In an earlier essay 'A Reply to A. Kanthamani's Essay "On Flagging Kant" I had written,

> I still fail to understand which part of my essay under discussion gives rise to the impression that I am going to unravel the proof structure of transcendental deduction. The structure of transcendental deduction was not under discussion either in Professor Daya's paper or my comments on that paper. Yet if I have created the impression that I am going to lay bare the proof structure of transcendental deduction then it must be the fault of my presentation, which I must own up.
>
> But I have a hunch that Professor Kanthamani is confusing the structure of transcendental deduction with the structure of metaphysical deduction, since metaphysical deduction was the topic under discussion in Professor Daya's paper and my response to it.[9]

But in his fresh rejoinder without even bothering to comment on this passage, Professor Kanthamani continues to write,

> When I took up cudgels in his [Binod's] initial debut on Professor Daya, on the issue of transcendental deduction, his defense was not as straightforward as one wished it to be...[10]

I still fail to understand what is there to defend regarding transcendental deduction in my writing on Professor Daya when transcendental deduction was the theme neither of Professor Daya's essay nor my reply to it. I also fail to understand how Professor Kanthamani can take cudgels on the issue of transcendental deduction in our conversation on metaphysical deduction.

2. Professor Kanthamani finds my reading of Kant 'totally unwarranted' on the ground that 'this can serve no useful purpose for any one'.[11] This is a strange kind of theory of understanding of a text that Professor Kanthamani is advocating. The correctness of a reading of a text is decided by the text. A purported reading does not become correct because it serves anybody's purpose. Unfortunately, Professor Kanthamani gives no textual evidence to show the incorrectness of my reading of Kant's text. He does not bother to rebut any of the textual evidence I had brought forward.

3. The general strategy of Professor Kanthamani is to take an idea from one context in my essay and juxtapose it with another unrelated idea from another context in my essay and then claim that I have made an absurd claim. Had Professor Kanthamani paid slightly closer attention to the text and seen what is claimed in what context, he would not have made many of his comments. Let me give a few examples from his comments.

Example (i) He writes, 'When I charged him [Binod] with doing *Sutra-Bhasya*-style of hermeneutics..., he attacked me (he called it as "fantasizing"...) saying that Indian scholarship is worth the salt...'[12] The charge of 'fantasizing'[13] was labelled against him by way of comment on the following passage in the context of the discussion of *a priori* origin of the pure concepts of understanding,

> The clue is the three laws of Newtonian Mechanics (law of subsistence, inertia and reaction) that applies to matter. The synthesis would mean the interdependence of parts in nature as well as in community ... My point is that Binod hankers after the transcendental while he could very well move from empirical.[14]

The charge of 'fantasizing' was not labelled against him by way of comment on his claim that I am doing *Sutra-Bhasya*-style of hermeneutics. I agreed with him when he claimed that I am doing *Sutra-Bhasya*-style of hermeneutics.[15] Similarly, my general observation on the state of scholarship in some quarters in India was directed against his use of expression 'miasma of scholarship'[16] and not against his claim that I am doing *Sutra-Bhasya*-style of hermeneutics.

Example (ii) By way of comment on my essay 'Lying Foundations for Modern Technology: The Aim of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*'[17] Professor Kanthamani writes, 'On Agarwala's showing, since there is no obvious control of technology, Kant's critical philosophy is "unsystematic" (54–55).[18] Nowhere in my essay I had claimed that Kant's philosophy is unsystematic and so the question of grounding the unsystematic nature of Kant's philosophy in his failure to pro-

vide control for modern technology never arose in my essay. What had happened was that some questions emerged from my reading of Kant's first *Critique* and in the context of these questions I claimed, 'Kant has discussed the questions raised above in an unsystematic manner spread over his entire critical philosophy.'[19] This is not a declaration that Kant's critical philosophy is unsystematic. But with hindsight I must admit that my claim was not formulated in a very elegant way. Since Kant had not explicitly raised or answered the questions which emerged from my reading I should have claimed, 'Enough material is available in Kant's writing unsystematically spread over his entire critical corpus to answer these questions'.

Example (iii) Professor Kanthamani rightly attributing the claim, '... Kant is mistaken about the (very) object of philosophical activity and hence when he is philosophizing he is indulging in "involuntary activity"...which is "particular ignorance" in Aristotle's sense...'[20] to me goes on to comment 'Strange that Agarwala can bring in Greek authorities to prove ignorance of others'.[21] Strangeness arises because Professor Kanthamani is implicitly misreading my claim even after formulating it correctly. He is implicitly reading that I have invoked Aristotle's authority on Kant's ignorance. That is not correct. Aristotle's authority was invoked to fix the meaning of 'involuntay'[22] action for he was the first thinker to discuss the issue and all others have followed his suit. Greek authorities were not invoked—as they cannot be invoked—to prove ignorance on Kant's part as Greek authorities could not have known about Kant or what he knows or does not know. Ignorance about Kant was proved on the basis of what he claims regarding philosophical activity and its ends.

These are only some of the examples of how Professor Kanthamani takes correct ideas out of context to turn them into absurdities. We will encounter many more examples how he is not paying sufficient attention to the context of the ideas he has picked up for discussion.

4. Claiming correctly that I hold the view that Kant has 'laid the foundation to man's technological domination of the world' and also that 'Kant has destroyed the basis of (social) control of technology', Professor Kanthamani goes on to criticize, 'This is a spurious caricature of Kant in which what Kant gives as a 'foundation' with one hand but takes it back with the other'.[23] He neither discusses any of the textual evidence I had brought forward for the first claim[24] nor does he rebut any of my arguments to support the second claim.[25] So his charge that hermeneutic reading is a 'spurious caricature of Kant' is unsupported. Not only that, he has misunderstood the two claims when he construes them as 'what Kant gives as a "foundation" with one hand but takes it back with the the other'. In his reading, my two claims are contradictory. There was no contradiction in what I had claimed. Kant does provide theoretical foundation to man's technological domination of the world. The foundations were so strong that the technology built on these foundations gains independence from man and is not amenable to social control. Just one sentence after labeling the charge against me of making contradictory claims regarding Kant, Professor Kanthamani reads my position consistently and correctly without realizing that he is getting into incongruity himself. He claims, 'Agarwala's ultimate aim is to demonstrate that the so-called Kantian architectonic has created a techne with which it is not poised to have any moral control.'[26]

5. Professor Kanthamani observes hermeneutic reading of Kant's *Critiques* with askance incredulity. He argues:

> Agarwala's ultimate aim is to demonstrate that the so-called Kantian architectonic has created a techne with which it is not poised to have any moral control. His techne subscribes to *a priori* (rule abiding) marking the 'divine' in each of us (elsewhere he calls it as 'very strange and absurd', 21) and his Agere is Platonic and cannot recover the Aristotelian-Thomistic mode of action. By what stretch of imagination one may hold that only if the above things happen, his *First Critique* has the relevant justification, and that he would like it to be called hermeneutics?[27]

The reference 'elsewhere he calls it as "very strange and absurd",[21]' was not clear to me. The place where I had argued for the need of recovery of Aristotelian-Thomistic mode of action on the part of Kant I had never claimed that it is 'very strange and absurd'.

I had argued that according to Kant we have no knowledge of noumena and the transcendental ego. Now denial of knowledge is denial of power to manipulate. So, for Kant, the primordial nature of man as spectator and the world of nature to which he belongs are beyond the power of manipulation. If that is manipulated

through objective knowledge we will destroy the very basis of synthesizing activity on which the knowledge of phenomena is based. Further, it was argued that this denial itself is not an empirical knowledge, rather denial of knowledge of the noumena and transcendental ego is of the nature of self-binding rule for mankind in its development and use of modern technology.

Kant started making preparations for this task in the chapter on 'The Ideal of Pure Reason'. This preparation he makes because the self-binding rule to remain ignorant in the sense of not having empirical scientific knowledge of noumenal self or transcendental ego is necessary to belong to the noumenal world. For belonging to the noumenal world Kant also needs to recover the Greek notion of morally practical action (*agere, ποαττειν*). For this purpose, Kant introduces the conception of 'Ideal of Pure Reason'. In his words, 'we are... bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which... have *practical* power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain *actions*'.[28] What kind of actions does Kant have in mind when he is speaking of 'the possible perfection of certain *actions*'? He explains, 'As the idea gives the *rule*, so the ideal in such a case serves as the *archetype* for the complete determination of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not, therefore, to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and the defects of the incomplete.'[29] Since 'we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us' gives the clue to understand the nature of action he is speaking of. He has already explained, 'What to us is an ideal was in Plato's view an *idea of the divine understanding*, an individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being, and the archetype of all copies in the [field of] appearance.'[30] So the model of action Kant has in mind is the Platonic moral action

(*agree, πραττειν*). He is preparing grounds for the possibility of that kind of action and consequently of the belongingness of man to the noumenal world.[31]

Professor Kanthamani does not examine any of the above arguments or the textual evidence. I fail to understand how he can dismiss these as a 'stretch of imagination'.[32] Any way, Professor Kanthamani himself must ask and answer the questions: How does the passages on perfection of action quoted from the *First Critique* organically unite with the transcendental analytic in it if there is organic unity of thought in the whole of *First Critique*? Or is the *First Critique* just a disjointed inventory of power of so-called 'pure reason'?

I have explained the kind of understanding of text I practice in my essay 'A Prolegomenon to Hermeneia Indica: The *Sudarśana Cakra*'.[33] It is qualified by the term hermeneutic because it has a very strong affinity to contemporary German hermeneutics as advocated by Gadamer. It also helps me in distinguishing my kind of understanding of text, which does not look for authorial intention, from the kind of understanding, where the primary task is to find the intention of the author, as is the case with the most analytic thinkers' understanding of texts.

6. Professor Kanthamani finds the project of understanding a text for what it intends without looking for author's intention unacceptable. In his words, 'The "intentional and revealed meaning", of the text ... is as much a myth as the authorless *apauruseya* is, because he never succeeds to make anything coherent by this. Such word-of-god doctrines smacks of plain lies having no parallel anywhere. As far as I know, texts cannot have any intentional stance. What follows, therefore, is that the whole enterprise has a questionable intent.'[34] My reply this objection is as follows:

A *śāstra* presents us with the real task of *arthabodh* since tradition in the form of *sāstra* raises itself away from the particularity of the context of its production and recontextualizes universally as contemporaneous with every present. The alienation involved in raising from the particularity of the context of production has to be overcome in the recontextualization in the present age, by reading and understanding. That means we have to transform the text into a kind of speech for the present to grasp the object spoken about by the *śāstra*.

To grasp the object of the text is to stand in relationship to it and this relationship is not going back to the past but to have a present involvement in what is said. To understand a *śāstra* is not to reproduce what is past in speech but the sharing of the present meaning.

Since a *śāstra* (text) raises itself above the context of its production, there can be no aids like the tone of the voice, the tempo, the way of speaking or the circumstances in which it is spoken to determine its meaning. The meaning is fixed by writing alone. Hence, what is stated in the *śāstra* (text) gets detached from all contingent factors and attains ideality in which alone it has validity.

Therefore, *śāstra* (text) entirely detaches the sense of what is said from the person saying it; the *śāstra* makes the reader also the arbiter of its claim to truth and not the author alone. What the reader experiences in all its validity is what is addressed to him and what he understands. What he understands is not someone else's intentions but the possible truth of the text. So, what we understand in understanding a *śāstra* is not the intention of the author or the meaning understood by its reader at the time of production but the possible truth of it. Since it is not the subjectivity of the author that is fixed in *śāstra* it cannot define the limits of text's meaning.

To understand the *tātparya* of a *śāstra* (the meaning of a text) we have to express it in our own language. The significance of this point has to be realized. This is a dimension which has been completely neglected to the detriment of the realization of the significance of *śabda pramāna* in the modern context. Since the *śāstra* – which we have to understand – has been raised from the particularity of the context of production and has acquired the universality of contemporaneity with every present, there is an *ākānksā* (expectation) of *sannidhi* (joining) with another *yogya* (appropriate) text for revelation of its *tātparya*. This *yogya* (appropriate) is the text in the contemporary idiom, which expresses the meaning of the text we have understood. We can make the text to be understood speak only when we find the *yogya* text to express its meaning.

There cannot be only one *yogya* text. For every new present for the recontextualization of the given text to be understood, we must find a different *yogya* text that makes the text to be understood speak in the new present. And, hence, there cannot be one canonical interpretation of any given text. This is also one of the reasons why *tātparya* of the text to be understood cannot be identified with the *tātparya* (intention) of the author, since the latter is unique and not shifting and changing with every recontextualization of the text to be understood.

To say that there is no canonical or unique *tātparya* of the text does not mean that *śabdabodha* (understanding) is subjective and occasional. In *śabdabodha*, the meaning of the text to be understood is concretized. But this concretization of meaning is not a second *artha* (sense); rather this concretization of meaning is the concretization of the meaning of *the text to be understood*. Hence, meaning belongs to *the interpretative text* and not to the interpreting text. It is the interpreted text, which is thematic, and the interpreting text is not thematic; rather it vanishes in the revelation of the meaning of the interpreted text. So, *arthabodha* (understanding) involves and depends on the possibility of this kind of mediation of a disappearing text. Also, in the revelation of meaning the interpretation, the mediation and the interpreting text belong to the meaning itself. This disappearance of the interpreting text and interpretation in the revelation of the meaning of the interpreted text also detaches this emergence of meaning from the subjectivity of the reader. His intentions are also not relevant in the context of reading a text.

Śāstra is *pauruṣeya* only at the stage of *selection* for thematization for interpretation as interpretative text. But it is *apaurūṣeya* in the process of ascertainment of meaning as interpreting text. Even the *purusa* who is the *nimitta* of the emanating interpreting text cannot by his own authority or *āptatā* make the emanating interpreting text valid. Its validity or *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic. We select Kant's text for interpretation because he is author of these texts and, further, he is recognized by tradition as speaking authentically for modern tradition. But when it comes to ascertainment of what is being claimed in the text, Kant's authority cannot make it valid.

These sketchy remarks may not satisfy the uneasiness regarding denial of authorial intention as the primary object of ascertainment, and acceptance of text as *apaurūṣeya* in ascertainment of its

valid meaning in hermeneutics. Any one interested in further details can refer to my essay 'A Prolegomenon to Hermeneia Indica: The *Sudarśana Cakra*'.[35]

7. According to Professor Kanthamani, I have put a 'facade' of hermeneutics to 'pop up unwarranted questions' to straddle between 'a lethal critique' and interpretation.[36] The very title of his reply declares that my hermeneutics is 'lethal'. I take it as a complement that he finds my hermeneutic practice and the criticism emanating from it as 'lethal'. For the hermeneutic circle I practice is the reworked version of the *dhīcakra* or circle of thought, which is also *sucakra*, a well-undertaken circle, since it is the *sudarśana cakra*, i.e. a circle involved in the thought process of *darśana*, by which the power of darkness of ignorance, which surrounds the truth of text can be removed to reveal its truth. The 'lethality' of my reworked version of *dhīcakra* also explains why the classical popular myths turned the *sudarśana cakra* from a well-undertaken circle of thought to a potent weapon in the hands of a deity. But the picture he paints of hermeneutics that I practice is very unsatisfactory, but I cannot fault him for this as he has constructed the picture of hermeneutics I practice from stray incidental remarks here and there while interpreting Kant. In his view, the 'hermeneutic circle' advocates the following four rules of interpretation: (1) Force a discrepancy in the default text even if it is coherent; (2) Make an incision in the surgical mode to make an entry into the text; (3) Read it better than the author by rectifying it; and (4) Make the text coherent to reveal its intention as better the unification better is the text. This is very unsatisfactory formulation of rules of hermeneutics I practice.

The rules of hermeneutics as I practice are encapsulated in the following sutras from my *vāksutra*:[37]

Vāktātparyanirṇaye ākānkṣā yogyatā sannidhi/32/
Tattu nirdhāraṇāt/33/
Sattu aṣṭalingāt/34/
Upakramopasamhārobhyāsāpūrvatākarmārthavādopapattivyatirekā liṇgāni/35/

For ascertainment of *tātparya* (intention), according to Mīmāmsā, we have to establish *samanvaya* (harmonious unity) of the *śāstra* (text) according to six *sat lingas* (marks of truth), viz. (1) *upakarama upasamhāra ekavākyatā* (agreement in beginning and conclusion), (2) *abhyāsa* (repetition), (3) *apūrvatā* (unprecedentedness, uniqueness of the object of the text), (4) *phala* (fruit, result), (5) *arthavāda* (praise), and (6) *yukti* (reasoning, conjointness).

It appears that one more *linga* (mark) has to be recognized, i.e. (7) *vyatireka* (criticism, deconstruction). Since Mīmāmsā treats only *vidhivākya* (imperatives) from the Vedic texts, the practice of determination of *tātparya* (intention) by Mīmāmsā shows that without being conscious, *vyatireka* (deconstruction) is also included in the determination of purport of the text. Mīmāmsā treats only *vidhivākya* (imperatives) to be the core text with some related *arthavāda* (praise) *vākya* (sentences), which are given only secondary importance. Other *vākya* (sentences) of Veda are not treated at all.

Kane writes about *smṛtis*, '...they often differ so much from each other that even eminent authors and works like *Mītāksāra* had sometimes to give up in despair the idea of bringing order out of the welter of *smṛti* passages and in their effort at *samanvaya* had to say that certain *smṛtis* refer to former *kalpa* or *yuga*.'[38] *Vyatireka* refers to arguments of any kind to disregard some portion of the text in the determination of purport. Explanation of noticed recalcitrant discrepancy of any kind: inconsistency of text, incoherence of form and content, discrepancy in what is described and the description take place in this last stage. *Upakrama upasamhāra ekavākyatā* (agreement in beginning and conclusion) can happen only in an understanding of texts that is circular in nature and hence it requires hermeneutic circle. To avoid the viciousness of the circular understanding, the circle must be completed satisfying the other marks of truth mentioned above like *abhyāsa* (repetition), etc.

8. Professor Kanthamani finds it hard to accept that there can be a distinction between 'what is described by a philosopher/what a philosopher describes' and 'philosopher's description of it'.[39] In his view, I have identified this distinction with 'form' and 'content' distinction which is not only obscure but also does not correspond to the former distinction. In his understanding the passages from Kant I had relied on for the distinction mark only the distinction

between 'science as described by its founders' and the 'science as described by Kant's *vernunft*'. Professor Kanthamani has failed to apply the distinction to Kant's critical corpus itself. Kant's critical corpus itself is founding an enterprise whose description is his critical corpus. Naturally, our understanding, from a historical vantage point, of what his enterprise was will differ from his own description of it. And this difference will be available only via the distinction between the description and what is described. The discrepancy between 'form' and 'content' is a way of getting at the discrepancy between 'what is described by a philosopher/what a philosopher describes' and 'philosopher's description of it' and is not identical with it. For example, Kant's explicit statement is that synthesis is blind and hidden function of imagination of which we are not conscious, yet he goes on to give a vivid and detailed description of it. The way he describes (form) function of synthesis does not cohere with what he actually claims regarding it (content). Hence, naturally, I notice a distinction between what he describes and his description of it. Professor Kanthamani finds some kind of conflation in my argument which I have submerged. This means that there is no apparent conflation in my argument. The illusion of some kind of submerged conflation in my argument is arising in Professor Kanthamani's mind because he is not applying the distinction between the description of founders and the description from a vantage of historical distance to Kant's critical philosophy itself.

Professor Kanthamani has discussed at length this issue but much of it is beyond my understanding. But I am not in a position to decide yet whether it is due to my personal inability that I fail to understand his profound arguments or whether it is because there is nothing to understand as his so-called arguments are mere sterile verbal gymnastics and empty rhetoric. I leave it for the more discerning philosophers to decide.

9. According to Professor Kanthamani, 'He [Binod] suspects that there must be a hiatus in his [Kant's] *text* between the pure and practical reason, though it may be granted that he [Kant] has used it in the inclusive sense. His practical reason will turn out to be a tissue of lies if he is not able to provide one such [Aristotelian-Thomistic mode of action]. He cannot do so because his

philosophizing stops with the *First Critique*. If he stops, he cannot go beyond; if he goes beyond, he cannot get out of it. Kant is trapped in a philosophical vacuum. This is what he [Binod] means by taking in the larger context (Pure, Practical, Judgement level) only to pronounce a final verdict on Kant's alleged shortcoming. This is probably the gist with which I am not centrally concerned because this will raise questions about the relation between pure and practical reason upon which he [Binod] will harangue again.'[40] What Professor Kanthamani claims to be a gist of my view is, in fact, an insinuated but veiled criticism. So, even though he will not like me to speak on the issue of the relation between the theoretical and practical reason, I have to comment on it.

The hiatus between pure and practical reason is not a matter of suspicion on my part. Ever since Kant started dealing with morality after the inception of his critical philosophy he is explicitly worried about the dissonance between the two uses of reason. In his first writing on morality after the critical turn, i.e. the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* he explicitly claims, '... a critique of practical reason, if it is to be complete, requires, on my view, that we should be able at the same time to show the unity of practical and theoretical reason in a common principle, since in the end there can only be one and the same reason, which must be differentiated solely in its application. Here, however, I found myself as yet unable to bring my work to such completeness without introducing considerations of quite another sort and so confusing the reader.[41] If there is no apparent disunity, why bother to bring in the task of unification? The issue of unification and removal of apparent disunity is not simple, on his own admission. Kant was concerned with the issue even after having written his *Critique of Practical Reason*, in his *Critique of Judgment*,'[43] Kant makes a valiant attempt to recover the historical lineage of Greek thought to overcome the problem he is facing.[44]

10. I do not know how Professor Kanthamani succeeds in converting my claims in the essay 'Constitution of Subjectivity of Self and Objectivity of Nature: A Brief Hermeneutical Study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*'[45] into the following full blown argument which he calls a 'Camouflage Argument' and finds it a 'central argument' in that essay and attributes to me as 'Agarwala's argument':

1. Subject is camouflaged in transcendentality;
2. The object is camouflaged in noumena;
3. Both are noumena, or else there should be a link between phenomena and noumena (35); and
4. Hence both are unknowable like nature and freedom.[46]

Had Professor Kanthamani paid a close attention to the passage he is referring to, he would have noticed that he is reversing my claim. It is the subjectivity of man that camouflages the more essential nature of man, i.e. man as a disinterested spectator or *Theoros,* and the objectivity of nature camouflages the manner of non-objective (and not subjective either) availability of nature to which he belongs primordially. I do not deny the link between phenomena and noumena; rather, the 'will' of man with its dual nature provides the link. So, there is no question of drawing the conclusion he attributes to me. There is no claim on my part that nature is unknowable. Rather, what I claim is that there is a non-objective availability of nature too.

11. I still doubt whether Professor Kanthamani is able to appreciate the hermeneutic task that confronts any Kant scholar interested in Kant exegesis. Otherwise he could not have made such simplistic remark that '... the following argument stares us at our face: Kant has *Critique of Pure Reason.* Therefore, he does not have a critique of technical reason.'[47] This is obviously an invalid argument. Kant could have still written a critique of technical reason having written the *First Critique.* So, there was no need on my part to make any move or make a shift to meet the above argument.

Let me reiterate once again that Plato in the so-called epistemological excursus of the *Seventh Letter* had claimed that the thing we are interested in any investigation is always more than and beyond: (1) The name or word *(onoma);* (2) The explanation or conceptual determination *(logos);* (3) The appearance, illustrative image, example, figure *(eidòlon);* and (4) The knowledge or insight itself *(nous)* of the thing, yet the thing under investigation cannot be communicated except by means of these four. But these four, in the process of bringing the reality of the thing itself to disconcealment, also assert themselves as whatever particular thing they are instead of fading out of view, as they all have a reality

of their own besides the thing they are disclosing. Hence, there arises the danger that one may take any or all of these means of displaying a thing as the thing displayed through them, as they also suppress that, which is displayed in them.[48] Most of the commentators of Kantian corpus, in taking the help of the logos of Kant, got entrapped by it and lost sight of the reality and the idea he was trying to disclose through it. Professor Kanthamani, in his understanding of Kant, fails to appreciate the hermeneutic task of getting at the subject-matter designated by the term 'pure reason' as he is mesmerized by the term itself. Had he tried to look for what Kant is speaking of when he is talking of 'pure reason', he would have realized that it is the *a priori* constitution of 'technically practical reason' that he is talking about. Kant had given enough indication to this effect in his numerous writings which I put together in the essay 'Laying Foundations of Modern Technology'.

When I asked the question why did not Kant choose to lay down the foundations of metaphysics of art as a science instead of metaphysics of nature as a science, I was neither charging Kant of 'euphemism', explicitly or implicitly, nor indulging on any 'gloss' over his ideas. It was a serious effort to understand the nature of theoretical reason in Kant.

12. According to Professor Kanthamani, 'Even the discussion of the idea of Agere is quite inconsequential and hence useless for any student of Kant.'[49] One may find the discussion of the idea of Agere inconsequential in Kant because he may not be interested in the area of philosophy of Kant where this discussion is essential. But to declare in general that it is useless for any student of Kant is a hasty generalization. Kant explicitly discusses the idea of Agere in §43 of his *Critique of Judgment.* In his *Critique of Pure Reason,* when Kant is speaking of certain perfection of action, if we examine carefully, we will find that he is referring to only Agere mode of action. Why it is necessary to bring in the idea of *Agere* in the discussion of Kant's moral philosophy? I have argued at length in my essay 'Transformation of Phronēsis of Greek Ethics into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality: A Hermeneutic Study of Paragraphs 1-17 of the First Chapter of Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals'.[50] To declare that the discussion of Agere is useless for any student of Kant, one needs to take care of these

textual evidences and arguments. Professor Kanthamani no doubt takes note of the idea of Agere under the section entitled 'The Plot of Agere',[51] and states my position correctly except the following minor miss statement: 'For Aquinas, the distinction is between Agere (doing) that is not recognized by Kant and Facere (art) that is recognized by him ... Kant missed the bus because that is what is needed for his task. Kant does not know how to select his tools.'[52] My position is that Kant does recognize Agere as distinct from Facere, but he assigns it under nature as instinctive action-reaction and does not take it as a model of human action. Kant knows what he needs but his hands are tied by his commitment to the metaphysical position developed in the *First Critique* and he is trying his best to circumvent this hurdle. Anyway, Professor Kanthamani, even after stating my position more or less correctly, stares at it in panic: 'The lethality is not extirpated but exercised again ... Kant is finished.'[53] In all extreme panic states, the subject of panic starts coping with one's own panic state by disbelieving the object of panic, without trying to meet the real challenge. Professor Kanthamani's whole tenor of writing is that of complete disbelief at my reading of the position of the idea of Agere in Kant, but he fails to give any argument or counter evidence to rebut my reading of Kant.

Let me convince Professor Kanthamani that Kant has an assured place in the history of philosophy. No amount of criticism, let alone Agrwala's criticism, can finish him off. It is because he is a very important thinker that I have devoted a major chunk of my active academic life in understanding Kantian text to get at what is happening in them. So, Professor Kanthamani need not fear that Kant will be finished by my writing or that is what I aim at.

13. In his over zealous attempt to refute my reading of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* Professor Kanthamani questions the following construction of mine:

> That is to say he [Kant] is limiting the domain of speculative reason in the first critique so as to remove obstacle in the way of morality.[54]

From the following sentence of Kant

> 'So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative reason, it is indeed *negative;* but since it thereby removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, nay threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a *positive* and very important use. At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary *practical* employment of pure reason—the *moral*–in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though [practical] reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself.'[55]

Not only that he takes umbrage with my claim that Kant further explains, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* 'I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge,* in order to make room *for faith*'[56] and that although these claims are not wrong, yet these descriptions of aims do not adequately and properly describe what Kant is doing in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* And hence they cannot be taken as definitive of his aim.[57]

Professor Kanthamani writes regarding my construction above, 'There he conflates the idea of the impossibility of the practical reason and the possibility of it sensing no conflict.'[58] Then he quotes my construction given above and continues, 'How can Kant be supposed to "limit" so as to remove obstacle? If he wants to remove the "obstacle", he should call it positive and the limit itself is to be called as the negative that acts as a constraint. He [Binod] at once comments saying that knowledge thus should make room for faith quoting Kant. Knowledge is negative, and faith is positive. Can Kant agree or is it consistent? Is *CPR* a treatise on faith rather than knowledge?'[59] This is incoherent rambling on the part of Professor Kanthamani without being clear as to what he is criticizing: Kant's text or my reading of Kant. I had not used the expression 'negative' or 'positive' in finding Kant's aim. These expressions occur in Kant's text and not in my formulation of Kant's aims.

To look for an answer to the question, 'Is *CPR* a treatise on faith rather than knowledge?' one should ponder over the fact that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from the introduction to the end of the analytic where Kant has laid the *a priori* conditions of empirical knowledge, including both the edition versions in Norman Kemp Smith's translation only 256 pages are used while for the dialectic and the rest which deals with faith and restricting claims of knowledge in a single edition, 373 pages are devoted. Since most of us neither have the patience nor the tenacity to wade through the

lengthy difficult text of Kant from cover to cover, we generally make either at worst a second hand reading or at best a selective patchy reading of Kant's text. No doubt we get a lopsided and faulty picture of what Kant was up to in his *Critique of Pure Reason.*

Be it noted that Professor Kanthamani never explains where and how I have conflated the idea of the impossibility of the practical reason and the possibility of it sensing no conflict. He had begun his criticism with this accusation.

14. Professor Kanthamani asks, 'In what sense does he [Binod] read him [Kant] better?'[60] He answers himself, 'He [Binod] still thinks he can because he can read the relation between the *First* and *Second Critique* as depicting no conflict.'[61] Then he starts criticizing again, 'He conflates them [the two *Critiques*] throughout which is yet another major lacuna in his [Binod's] reading of Kant. He misreads.'[62] Unfortunately, Professor Kanthamani does not realize that he is contradicting himself. Earlier he had written, 'He [Binod] suspects that there must be a hiatus in his [Kant's] *text* between the pure and practical reason, though it may be granted that he [Kant] has used it in the inclusive sense.'[63] If I suspect a hiatus in Kant's conception of pure and practical reason, how can I read the relation between the *First* and *Second Critique* as depicting no conflict and conflate the two *Critiques*?

After accusing me of misreading Kant, Professor Kanthamani goes on to suggest, 'The best strategy for him is to look at the controversy between the priority between these critiques and plot his position. I have offered to give suggestion in my own way as to how to make sense of the proof structure in the light of some leading interpretations but he pooh-poohed that idea. Honestly I feel that he should read the basics once again before advertising such hermeneutics. Hermeneutics or not, Kant is Kant, whether one accepts or rejects him.'[64] This is an incoherent rhapsody. It is rhapsody because it is an emotional outburst. It is incoherent because of sudden jump from the discussion of relation of priority between the two critiques to the idea of proof structure of transcendental deduction without any reason or, rhyme. I hope Professor Kanthamani is not indulging in a stream of consciousness writing.

15. Commenting on my essay 'Laying Foundations of Modern Technology', Professor Kanthamani writes, 'The impetus for the paper is derived from the following question: Why should Kant, after all, be expected to lay the foundations of technological domination over the world when his project is limited to the foundations of science which embodies the scientific domination of nature? It could be extended to technology only when the proper warrant is attested to; that is, one argues that if this is applied to the extension of science (application to) technology, then such and such would be the result (Heideggerian). That might be the unintentional consequence of his work. Agarwala has been misled by the term "nature", which stands for the study of nature that is science, but he broadens its scope so as to cover science-technology nexus. What exactly is the hermeneutic gain in this? The very theme thus has a questionable intent and nobody can think that his strategy works.'[65]

It is not via the analysis, correct or incorrect, of the notion of 'nature' that I came to the conclusion that Kant is laying the foundations of modern technology in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* I came to this conclusion because of the following consideration. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is a text of philosophy. And 'Philosophy' for Kant 'is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason *(teleologia rationis humanae),* and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.'[66] The study of the essential ends of human reason revealed that the end with which the philosophy expounded in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is related is the development of skill of man through modern technology. The hermeneutic gain of this kind of study is that one can now judge how far Kant is successful in executing his project in his *Critique of Pure Reason* and what else he needs for completing his project.

Professor Kanthamani's discussion of my understanding of essential ends of reason, with which philosophy is related in Kant's critical philosophy, suffers from misreading of what I had said. He writes, 'Agarwala wonders whether the ultimate end of his quest is one or it has other subordinate ends doubting whether the ultimate connotes one, two ... or three..., ends mixing up the all the three *Critiques* ... So he avers that the talk of ultimate end is wrong...'[67]

I never claimed myself that Kant's talk of ultimate end is wrong. The sentence Professor Kanthamani refers to is part of a possible

objection to my understanding of essential ends of reason in Kant and this possible objection I countered. To quote in full, I had written, 'Since in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant has in mind two uses of reason, the ultimate end is aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing and it is the business of practical use of reason. One may argue that Kant also speaks about three ultimate aims of reason. The ultimate aim to which the speculation of reason in its transcendental employment is directed concerns three, objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.'[68] 'So talk of *the ultimate end* of reason in context of Kant's view is wrong.'[69] Regarding this possible objection I claimed, 'But this argument is not sound. For Kant there is only one ultimate end of reason. But that ultimate end pertains to the three objects mentioned in the sentence quoted above in the argument.'[70]

Similarly, it is wrong to claim that I am wondering 'whether the ultimate connotes one, two, ... or three...'[71] in Kant. I always claimed that there is only one 'ultimate end' of reason in Kant's philosophy. Where I had noticed and discussed the possibility of two highest ends in Kant I had claimed, 'Kant will unite the two in his conception of summum bonum, i.e. the supreme end. What exactly is the relation between these two parts of the supreme end and whether Kant succeeds in uniting these two into a single supreme end are issues beyond the scope of the present essay.'[72]

There was no mixing up of three *Critiques* of Kant. It is a standard practice in scholarship to collect what a philosopher had said on a particular topic in his various writing to construct what is the overall view of the philosopher on the topic under consideration. I was following the practice as it is required for *samanvaya* of the corpus of a thinker in my hermeneutics.

Anyway, Professor Kanthamani gives me benefit of doubt as far as discussion of ultimate end of reason in Kant is concerned, 'We can give him [Binod] the benefit of doubt in this.'[73] But he goes on to mount a fresh attack, 'But not when he raises bogeys as found in these queries: 'What is philosophical knowledge?' 'What is philosophy called?' only to claim that they remain unanswered (54) He is overtly lethal because if this is literally true then Kant is no philosopher.'[74] Here, Professor Kanthamani not only misunderstands my quest, but also misquotes my questions. The context

he is referring to is where I have claimed that for Kant philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason and essential ends are, therefore, either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are necessarily connected with the former as means and I have succeeded in showing that the philosophy which relates to the one ultimate end is moral philosophy. Now the question left for me to investigate is: what is *that* philosophy called by Kant which relates knowledge to the other kind of essential ends, i.e. many subordinate ends. It is in this context I had asked the following questions: 'What are the essential ends of the other kind, which Kant calls 'subordinate ends', which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end? Which reason (theoretical or practical) relates philosophical knowledge as science to these subordinate essential ends? What is *that* philosophy called?'[75] And my observation was: 'These questions are left unanswered in the passages'[76] under consideration. Rather immediately after the passage in which he distinguishes the two kinds of essential ends, Kant introduces the division of philosophical knowledge into two kinds. In his words, 'The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature, but also the moral law, presenting them at first in two distinct systems, but ultimately in one single philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all *that is,* the philosophy of morals with that which *ought to be.*'[77] If one kind of essential end of reason, i.e. the ultimate end is the business of one kind of philosophical knowledge, i.e. philosophy of morals, then should not the other kind of essential ends, i.e. 'subordinate ends', which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end be the business of other kind of philosophical knowledge, i.e. philosophy of nature?'[78] The last one was a rhetorical question requiring the obvious answer in the affirmative. As my explanation makes clear I was not dealing with a general question as claimed by Professor Kanthamani: 'What is philosophy called?' Rather, my question was 'What is *that* philosophy called?' Removal of the demonstrative pronoun 'that' from my question, as done by Professor Kanthamani, turns my question into a different query which I was not investigating in the context he is referring to. No doubt misquotation on the part of Professor Kanthamani results in misunderstanding my claims.

This misquotation and misunderstanding arises because of not paying sufficiently close attention to the text he is reading and commenting on.

Earlier, Professor Kanthamani, while giving me benefit of doubt, had attributed to me the view that the talk of ultimate end is wrong. But mounting a fresh attack on my views, he changes his position, 'The single ultimate end of man is identified as a noumenon',[79] contradicting himself. He goes on with his argument, 'Why should he [Binod] take for a hermeneutic task when this acknowledgeably an obscurity. We have no knowledge of noumena. He [Binod] skeptically poses the question on p.71: "what exactly is the significance of denial of knowledge in this sphere?"'[80] And then he avers 'Agarwala cannot pursue this...'[81] I have never equated 'denial knowledge' to be 'obscurity' in the sphere of noumena in Kant. When I raised the question he is referring to, it was not a skeptical question. Contrary to his claim that I cannot pursue it, I answered at length what is the significance of denial of knowledge in the sphere of noumena. My answer was: 'The objective knowledge based on subject/object dichotomy is of the nature of power. Hence, for the subjectivity of man "knowledge is power." Since knowledge is knowledge of causality operating in substance of the object in space and time it gives power to the subjective man to manipulate the object by his own will. The man with "will" can manipulate the object through knowledge of causality. Knowledge of causality is gained through science, which in turn is the basis of technology. The subjectivity of man by its own will manipulates objects through technology to give it a desired form to suit his own purpose. Now denial of knowledge is denial of power to manipulate. So, for Kant, the primordial nature of man as spectator and the world of nature to which he belongs are beyond the power of manipulation. If that is manipulated through objective knowledge we will destroy the very basis of synthesizing activity on which the knowledge of phenomena is based.'[82] Not only that, I also answered the question: What is the nature of this denial? My answer was that this denial of knowledge of the noumena and transcendental ego is of the nature of self-binding rule for mankind in its development and use of modern technology.[83] Professor Kanthamani had turned my question into a so-called skeptical question because of his hasty

cursory selective reading not paying close attention to the details of the text he is reading.

Notes and Referrences

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25. Argument was presented in Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', p. 62.
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28. CPR, A569, B597.
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37. 'A Prolegomenon to Hermeneia Indica', pp. 244–45.
38. *History of Dharmaśāstra,* vol. V, part II, p. 273.
39. Kanthamani, 'B.K. Agarwala's Lethal Hermeneutic Strategy', pp. 181–183.
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41. Kant, *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* [abbreviated as *Groundwork* hereinafter], translated by H.J. Paton, in *The Moral Law,* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1948), p. 57/391/xii. [The first page number refers to the *Moral Law* of H.J. Paton, the second and the third numbers refer to the page numbers of two German editions of Kant's original text, given in the margins of Paton's translation.]
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43. *JICPR,* Vol. XIX, No. 4, October–December 2002, pp. 65–102.
44. Agarwala, 'The Structure of Belongingness to Nation', pp. 93–94.
45. *JICPR,* Vol. XX, No. 4, October–December 2003, p. 35f.
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50. Deshpande, Sharad (ed.), *200 Years of Kant, Indian Philosophical Quarterly: Special Number,* January–October 2004, Vol. 31, Nos. 1–4, pp. 119–56.
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52. Ibid., p. 185.
53. Ibid., p. 186.
54. Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', p. 48.

55. CPR Bxxv, quoted in Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', p. 48.
56. Ibid.
57. Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', p. 48.
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63. Ibid., p. 178.
64. Ibid., pp. 183–84.
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66. CPR, A839, B867.
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72. Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', p. 54.
73. Kanthamani, 'B.K. Agarwala's Lethal Hermeneutic Strategy', p. 184.
74. Ibid.
75. Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', p. 54.
76. The passages under consideration are from 'Hitherto the concept of philosophy...' CPR, A838, B866 to '... of morals with that which *ought to be.*' CPR, A840, B868.
77. CPR, A840, B868.
78. Agarwala, 'Laying Foundations for Modern Technology', pp. 54–55.
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80. Kanthamani, 'B.K. Agarwala's Lethal Hermeneutic Strategy', p. 185.
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Department of Philosophy BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA
North-Eastern Hill University
Shillong 793 022

Is *Rasa* the Bane of Indian Aesthetics?

I have read Professor Daya Krishna's article entitled '*Rasa – The Bane of Indian Aesthetics*' published in JICPR, Vol. XXI, No. 3 with rapt attention. Professor Daya has raised serious questions and doubts about the whole tradition of Sanskrit Poetics and theories of art in Indian tradition. I agree with him on many points. Some of the students of Sanskrit poetics like me have been thinking along these lines but none of us dared to put issues in such straightforward manner as Professor Daya could do.

What I propose to write as a rejoinder to this very important and thought-provoking paper may appear to be a sort of defence of the tradition. But this I have to do in order to bring out certain aspects of the tradition that Professor Daya perhaps has overlooked, for his further considerations.

Meanwhile, I have also gone through two articles of by Professor Yashdev Shalya in Hindi. One of them, *'Kāvyalakṣaṇa'*, was presented in a seminar at Bharat Bhavan in Bhopal and the other one, entitled *'Kāvyaviṣayaka Saundarya Aur Sādhāraṇikaraṇa Kī Avadhāraṇāon Kī Samīkṣā' has* been published in *Bahuvacana,* Jl. of Mahatma Gandhi International University. Yashdev Shalya does not denounce *Rasa* in the terms Daya has used. Daya does not specifically propose an alternative theory. Towards the close of his brilliant article, however, he hints upon the possibility of an alternative to *rasa* which should imbibe a meditative consciousness. Like him, Shalyaji disagrees with the idea of *Rasa* and its various interpretations but he does propose an alternate theory. The stands taken by Daya and Yashdev Shalya, to some extent, supplement each other. Therefore, I may refer to Yashdev Shalya's views also while concerning myself with the issues raised by Daya.

To come back to Daya's position, his concluding remarks are: 'It is time to forget it (the *rasa* theory). It has already done great harm to India's thinking about arts, and the effects this has had on the creation of art-works in this country. Any insights that it may have given can and should be accommodated in the new thinking. But whatever the resistance, the cultural or otherwise, the arts and the thinking about the arts has to be rescued from the millennium-long *adhyāsa* superimposed on it by Bharata's authority and the unquestioning way it has been accepted till now.'

Has *Rasa*-centred aesthetics always been as harming for the growth of Sanskrit literature as Daya understands? Without *Rasa*-centred aesthetics, poets like Kālidāsa, Bhavabhùti, Bāṇabhaṭṭa and others would not have flourished, and some of the greatest classics which can be ranked amongst the best in the world literature would not have been written.

Authors like Kālidāsa, Viśākhadattasa Súdraka, Bhavabhúti, Rājaśékhara, etc., had mastered the text of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra. This is evidenced by a close study of their plays. They also transcended the norms laid down by Bharata with due regards to the great sage. The impact of the Nāṭyaśāstra on the structure and design of their plays is obvious. Did Bharatamuni cast such a devastating influence on the traditions of Sanskrit playwrights as Daya has presumed? On the other hand, I think that these great authors would not have written better plays if Bharata had not preceded them.

The Western Indologists who studied Sanskrit literature and literary criticism in Sanskrit from their own angle during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the culmination of all so-called schools of Alaṅkāraśāstra in *Rasa-dhvani* school and to them the development of the theories here has been through a linear movement. They understood the term *alaṅkāra* as a mere equivalent for the figures of speech. All such erroneous notions were followed by many of the modern scholars of Sanskrit also and they have deeply percolated in the minds of writers and critics in modern Indian languages, completely obliterating the correct perspective of *alaṅkāra.* The Acāryas of Alaṅkāraprasthāna have always understood *alaṅkāra as* synonomous of the complete beauty of in art or poetry.

Was *Rasa* accepted as unquestionably as Daya has supposed? In Bharata's *Nāṭyasāstra, Rasa* has been treated as a part of the structure of drama and theatre-performance. It is one of the eleven or thirteen fundamental elements of the digest of theatre (*Nāṭyasaṅgraha).* The other ten or twelve elements are: *Bhāva, Abhinaya, Dharmī, Vṛtti, Pravṛtti, Siddhi, Svara, Atōdya, Gāna* and *Raṅga* together with *Bhūmikā* and *Prakṛti* (these two added in the reading given in south Indian recension of Nāṭyaśāstra). Of these, *Dharmī, Vṛtti, Pravṛtti* envisage the situations, tendencies of human life and

behaviour as well as *modus operandi* and stylistics for their representation on the stage. Bharatamuni treated *Rasa* only in Chapter VI and with *Bhāva* in Chapter VII of his work, the remaining 34 or 35 chapters are devoted to other elements of Nāṭyasaṅgraha. When *rasa* is said to be the be-all and the end-all in theatre-practice *(na hi rasād ṛte kaścirdarthaḥ pravartate* as Bhatrata says), it is in the context of interconnections and interdependence of all the eleven or thirteen elements of theatre that the all-pervading equations of *rasa* are to be applied.

Daya is right to some extant when he says that '*Rasa* has been rooted in the reflection on Nāṭya, and was not suitable for other art-forms'. But it is not proper to hold that 'the whole subsequent tradition, with rare exceptions, accepted what he (Bharata) had said on the subject.' *Bhāmaha, Daṇḍī, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa* consider not only *rasa* as an *Alaṅkāra,* they include *Rīti-Guṇa, Sandhi, Sandhyaṅga, Vṛtti,* 36 *Lakṣaṇas* or components of literary art as defined by Bharata together with all other categories of *Kāvya* within its fold. The concept of *Alaṅkāra* in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra is entirely different, *Bhāmaha, Daṇḍī, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa* were following quite a different tradition when they established *alaṅkāra* as complete beauty in art. It is, therefore, again wrong to say that 'the idea of *alaṅkāra* developed in the context of reflection on Kāvya proved as inadequate as that of rasa...'. The theorists advocating *alaṅkāra* as the *summom bonum* for literary arts did not insist on its applicability to other arts, and they did not consider *alaṅkāra* as a 'mere craft'. They considered *rasa, bhāva,* etc., also as *Alaṅkāras. Alaṅkāra* to them was synonomous with complete aesthetics in literature. There are *Alaṅkāras* like *Bhāvika, Udātta Svabhāvōkti,* etc., which are related to human relationships, and they also have the view of nature which Daya complains is lacking in the theory of *rasa.*

If *rasa* is isolated from its counterparts in the *Nāṭyasaṅgraha,* then it certainly is quite insufficient as a criterion for evaluating a play. For proper evaluation of plays like *Mṛcchakaṭika* and *Mudrākṣasa,* the Rasa-theory as it is being understood and taught in the curricula now-a-days is reallly preposterous. Bharata's concept of *Itivṛtta* or plot and the tools of analysis for it (like *Sandhi, Sandhyaṅga,* etc.) are to be taken into account along with other

fundamentals like *Vṛtti, Pravṛtti Dharmī,* etc., for a proper evaluation of any Sanskrit play. Surely, this evaluation will be *rasa*-centred. But Vāmana and Kuntaka offer other criterion for evaluation of a literary piece, including a play. The former has brought out very subtle features of plays like *Mṛcchakaṭika* through his concept of *Guṇas* or poetic excellences. *Mṛcchakaṭika* is indicated as an example for *Slēṣa,* an *Arthaguṇa* in *Vāmana. Slēṣa* does not at all mean a pun or paronomasia here. Vāmana's *Slēṣa* as an *Arthaguṇa* comprises *Karma* (order), *Kauṭilya* (obliquity), *Anulbaṇatva* (resolution) and *Upapatti* (coherence). And these are canons for the measurement of the whole plot design and conception of a play like *Mṛcchakaṭika.* Vāmana's concept of *Samādhi,* an *Arthaguṇa,* reveals the insights into creative process and the concept of originality and genuineness in literature. *Vakrokti* presents a holistic analysis of literary art and aesthetics. K. Krishnamoorthy rightly presents Kuntaka's concept by interpreting Vakrokti as *Ramaṇīyatā* or beauty. In fact, the presumption that Kuntaka's theory is just an appendage to *dhvani* is totally wrong.

Both Professor Daya and Shalya have ignored the wonderful work of K. Krishnamoothy on Kuntaka. Kuntaka, in his treatment of *Prakaraṇavakratā* and *Prabandhavakratā,* has given excellent studies in classics like *Raghuvaṃśa* and *Uttararāmacarita.* Vāmana and Kuntaka hardly mention Bharatramuni anywhere (in *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti* and *Vakroktijīvita*); neither do they apply his concepts anywhere in their expositions.

Kuntaka did not consider *vakrokti* in any way subservient to rasa. It is also not proper to say that Kuntaka was a lone and unheard voice in Sanskrit literature, because again we find commentators of Sanskrit *Mahākāvyas* analyzing the texts on the basis of Kuntaka's paradigms, Maṅkha, in his *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* and Jōnarāja, himself a poet and commentator of *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita,* not only define *Vakrokti* on Kuntaka's lines, Jōnarāja also applies the concept of *vakrokti* to Maṅkha's poem.

Daya finds the unquestioned authority of Bharata a great drawback in Sanskrit literature and aesthetics. There has been a long tradition of authors who questioned Bharata's authority. Abhinavagupta called them *Nāstikadhuryopādhyāyas.* These non-believers in the authority of Bharata went to the extent of saying

that there has been no such person as Bharata. Udbhaṭa is often quoted by Abhinavagupta for his criticism of Bharatamuni and for demolishing some of the well-known precepts of Bharata.

Has the tradition been as much *rasa*-centred as presumed by Daya? To me, the whole paper by him appears to have been written with a sort of fobia against the *Rasa*-theory. 'India thinking about the arts has been centred to such an extent about what has been called rasa in the tradition that it has come almost to be completely identified with it', Daya says.

This claim is doubtful, considering the alternate system which Alaṅkāraprasthāna has offered. The commentators of Kālidāsa and three great epics (*Bṛhatrayī*), for example, talk more about the *Alaṅkāras* than rasa in the poem. Saṅkara a commentator of Abhijñānaśākuntala often refers to an *Alaṅkāra* called *Anyāpadéśa,* showing how it is pervaded in the plot structure of the play, revealing its symbolism and deep structures. The commentators also take into account the shades of *dhvani* and they even talk of *vakrokti* and its varieties. Prof. Daya also believes that the other concepts (like *dhvani* and *vakrokti)* were treated as subservient to *rasa.* This is not true. Technically, *rasa* is just one of the varieties of *dhvani* or *vakokti.* In Alaṅkāraprasthāna *rasa* is always treated as subservient to *alaṅkāra.* Both Daya and Shalya think that the concept of *alaṅkāra* is related only to the craft in poetry. This is absolutely wrong. The concept of *alaṅkāra* encompasses the form, the content and complete aesthetic experience. *Rasa,* therefore, is rightly treated in this Prasthāna as one of the Alaṅkāras and there are Alaṅkāras like Bhāvika, Udātta or Vakrōkti, each one of them having larger scope than rasa.

As both Dayaji and Shalyaji have failed to recognize the right perspective and importance of the systems related to the theory of Alaṅkāra, both of them have, therefore, wasted their great intellectual acumen to refute *Rasa*-theory, because to them it has been the only dominating and also a harmful force in Indian Aesthetics. Who put *rasa* in the forefront of Indian aesthetics? I think that upto eighteenth century, the situation is somewhat different. If Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha is writing *Rasagaṅgādhara,* his *magnum opus on* literary theory, Appaya Dīkṣita his senior contemporary and one of the greatest philosophers after Abhinavagupta, is writing

Citramīmāṃsā and *Kuvalayānanda* – both of which are texts on the theory and divisions of *Alaṅkāra.*

Secondly, who vitiated and polluted the *rasa*-centred aesthetics? Was it the theorists like Abhinavagupta or the second rate poets writing verses of no substance to titillate and please their patrons, the kings or feudal lords. Abhinavagupta established *Sāntarasa* as the *Mahārasa* which is designed to be the culmination and ultimate for all other *rasas. Tattvajñāna* is the *Sthāyī Bhāva* for this *Mahārasa.* Where are the works in Sanskrit that stand to this criteria of *Sāntarasa* as conceived by Abhinavagupta? The verses composed to please the patron or the description bordering on the Nāyika-Nāyikābheda, which just served the purpose of providing a superficial entertainment to so-called few *rasikas,* cannot lead to *Mahārasa* experience. *Rasa* became something despicable, cheap and vulgar not exactly in the theories as envisaged by the Acāryas from Bharata to Jagannatha, but in the compositions by the band of seudo poets or versifies or the authors who wrote texts on sex and Nāyikābhéda in order to please their patrons.

Daya has pointed out the following limitations or defects of *rasa*-theory as handed to us by Bharata and other thinkers: (i) it defines man as he is, and not as he aught to be, (ii) 'the actual story of human life which is lived, and which is sought to be represented, does not seek *rasa,* to be understood and defined in its terms, (iii) the idea of Sahṛdaya 'fails to take into account the cognitive-critical judgement involved in the creation of a work', (iv) the theory of *Rasābhāsa* was formed on the basis of moral appropriateness; it should have been based on indivudual's failure to realize *rasa.*

These objections, especially I to III, are valid if *Rasa* is considered in isolation to the idea of *Nāṭyasaṅgraha* as well as the other systems like *Alaṅkāra* and *vakrokti* that supplement it. It is in the treatment of the *vighnas* or obstacles of Rasapratīti that an individual's failure to realize *rasa* is explained, the concept of Rasābhāsa, on the other hand, accounts for the difference of experience when Rāma is depicted in a scene of lovemaking with Sītā, and when Rāvaṇa is expressing his infatuation for Sītā.

Daya has also raised certain objections on the treatment of *Rasa* by Bharata and his followers. Accordingly, Bharata fails to account for the relationship between whole and the parts of rasa; and 'even his definition of rasa – has not been reformulated.'

Regarding the first contention, Daya has not considered Bharata's concept of basic (Mūla) *Rasas* and subservient (*Gauṇa*) *Rasas.* This concept itself was not found very convenient by the later theorists, and Bhoja even vehemently criticized it. But in Bharata, *Śṛṇgāra, Vīra, Raudra* and *Bībhatsa* are basic *rasas* and out of each of these basic *rasas,* four subservient rasas in order are generated, they are – *Hāsya, Adbhuta, Karuṇa* and *Bhayānaka.* The validity of this division of *rasas* into two categories, each having four *rasas,* can be understood in terms of the fourfold classification of each of the *Abhinaysa, Vṛttis, Pravṛttis,* and *Nāyakas,* which ultimately has to be connected to the concept of four *Puruṣāparthas.* A dramatic performance as such leads to Puruṣārtha and invests the psyche of the *rasika* with *Saṃskāras,* so that when he finishes witnessing a dramatic performance, he has not seen simply a spectacle, he has undergone a through transformation, to become a better human being. Abhinavagupta terms the attainment of Puruṣārthadhīh as Pratyakṣasiddha—proven by direct experience. According to his interpretation, the *kavi* through his Anuvyāharaṇa (recreating), Naṭa through his Anukaraṇa (redoing) and the Sāmājika or connoisseur through his *Anudarśana* or *Anuvyavasāya* (revisualization)—all the three of them beget an understanding of *Puruṣārtha* in their own way. Abhinavagupta insists that even the actor will have *Paramapuruṣārthalābha* as he undergoes the concentration and the state of *Samādhi* through the performance.

Regarding Daya's second objection of Bharata's treatment of rasa, it is not clear which definition of Bharata is being referred by him. Whether it is the etymological definition—where *Rasa* is taken to be an object woven in the structure of a dramatic performance (*Rasa lti Kaḥ Padārthah-Ucyaté Asvādyatvāt*—that which is tasted is Rasa) or the formula on Rasaniṣpatti as given in Nāṭyaśāstra, i.e. *Vibhānubhāvavyabhicārīsaṃyōgād Rasaniṣpattiḥ*—is taken to be a definition (which obviously it is not). However, this Rasasūtra is quoted by Bharata from some earlier source and it is not his.

Professor Daya seems to misrepresent Bharata's idea of *anukīrtana or anukaraṇa.* He says, 'how can that which is *anukṛti* or *anukīrtana* ever be understood in its terms without distorting it completely and to see what it is not, a superimposition, and *adhyāsa,* from which not only thinking about Indian aesthetics has not been able to recover up till now...'

How can we associate *anukīrtana* with *adhyāsa* of any sort? *Anukīrtana* is neither distortion nor any kind of superimposition, it is creating again. Abhinavagupta has discussed the concept of anukīrtana and he has unequivocally reiterated his stand by holding that anukīrtana is not *adhyāsa* or superimposition.

Daya has not defined what he understands by *rasa;* he seems to take it as resultant of feelings and emotions only. Shalya also complains against *Rasa* in the similar way—the concept of *Rasa* to him does not accounts for the experience which is resultant of causes other than emotions or feelings. This again is a wrong notion of *Rasa* as conceived by Bharata and there is a lot of misunderstanding amongst the modern scholars owing to the misinterpretation of the term *Bhāva.* In Bharata, *Bhāva* means the intention of the poet (or the performer in case of a theatric representation), which need not be delimited by feelings or emotions only. There can be a *rasa* in completre disillusionment when an individual visualises himself or herself free from all emotions, as in the stanzas of Bhartṛhari in *Vairāgyaśataka.* The concept of *rasa* incorporates a broad spectrum, and there can be hardly any fixed definition of *rasa.* A flexibility leading to pluralism in interpretations was a mark of *rasa*-theory right from its inception and, therefore, neither Abhinavagupta nor Viśvanātha nor Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha can be said to have spoken the last word on *rasa.* Also, a secular approach to *rasa*-theory had always been there right from its inception in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra. Many of the Acāryas added new *rasas* to the list of eight or nine *rasas* from this point of view. Abhinavagupta himself has referred to the theory of *Laulya-rasa,* with *Gardha* (greed) as its *Sthāyin.* He does not altogether reject *Laulya-rasa.* He simply rules out the possibility of its independent existence. He says that the *Sthāyin* of this so-called *Laulya-rasa* can be incorporated either in *Hāsa* or in *Rati.* Bhoja also does not strictly adhere to the theory of eight or nine *rasas.* He suggests some new *rasas.* One of the new *rasas* proposed by Bhoja is *Udātta,* with Mati or wisdom as its *Sthāyi Bhāva.* If *Mati* is the prevailing mood, then again, there will be detachment and awareness in the experience of a poetic piece or a dramatic performance, rather than involvement or identification. The theory of *Laulya-rasa,* which some of the predecessors of Abhinavagupta had postulated, subsequently

comes back with a different name as *Māyārasa* which is discussed as *Pūrvapaksa* by Bhānudatta in his *Rasamañjarī* and by Viśvéśvara Pāṇḍe also in the late eighteenth century. The opponent argues that if *Sānta* with *Nivṛtti* as the dominating emotion can be accepted as *Rasa*, *Māyā* Rasa with *Pravṛtti* as the dominating force should also be accepted as a *rasa*. Some of the Acāryas propounded the theory of two-fold *rasa*. *Laukika* (this-worldly) and *Alaukika* (other-worldly). *Laukika-rasa* is *Svagata* (belonging to the character) and is *Alaukika-rasa* is *paragata* (belonging to the connoisseur). Bhaṭṭanāyaka had stood against the theory of *Svagata rasa*. But the other Acāryas continued to argue in favour of the other side of the *rasa*-theory.

Professor Daya has questioned the validity of *adbhuta* as *rasa*. Nārāyaṇa the grandfather of Viśvanātha (who authored *Sāhityadarpaṇa*) is said to have upheld *adbhuta* as a *Mahārasa*. Daya thinks that *Vismaya* is short-lived. He is perhaps understanding *Vismaya* in a limited sense. *Vismaya* involves curiosity on all levels, which enables a human being to see things as if he is seeing them for the first time. Then, Vismaya becomes a pre-condition for all art and also for all aesthetic thought.

Professor Daya has made interesting suggestions with regards to the applicability of *rasa* to other arts. He talks of shift of attention from *Nāṭya* to *Kāvya*. In Indian tradition, both were not looked as different genres as in modern times. If *Nāṭya* was to be represented by an actor, *Kāvya* too had to be represented by the poet before an audience, the former is *Dṛśya* and the latter is *Śravya*. But *Nāṭya* is also a variety of *Kāvya*. The word *Anukṛti* was not used in case of *Sravyakāvya*, *Anuvyāharaṇa* or *Anukīrtana* are more appropriate words. Daya has treated *Anukaraṇa* at par with *mimetic*. This also is not in accordance with Abhinavabupta's idea of *Anukaraṇa*.

Coming to the applicability of *rasa*-theory to other arts, Daya rightly says that music has freed itself from word-dependent forms, and 'singing in *Khyal* or rendering the *Alāpa* in *Dhrupada* leads to relaxation in comparison to the word-dominated forms like *bhajans* or *thumaris*'. Daya says that there is *rasa* in both. Here he himself is using the word *rasa* for the aesthetic experience generated by both (word-dominated and word-independent forms of music),

and he wants that it should not have been called by the same name of *rasa*.

It is also not quite correct to say that 'no attempt was made to reformulate the theory as per requirements in the realm of poetry, pictorial art and music'. There are discussions on relationships between words and *rasa*, and latter theorists propounded that there is a *Vācika Rasa* (as also there is a *Ahārya Rasa* and an *Aṅgika Rasa*). Relationship between *svaras* of music and *rasas* as well as the relationship between colours of painting and *rasa* have also been discussed. If *rasas* can be produced directly out of *svaras* or musical notes and depictions of different colours, then human situations need not intervene. The concept of *rasa* and *Bhāva* will also change in other arts. They will be more in the form of moods and feelings bordering on abstraction. Bhoja, therefore, terms the *rasa* generated out of a paining as *Citrarasa*, because it has to be different from *Nāṭyarasa*. Hence, it is also not quite true that the *rasa*-theory 'failed to consider the specificities of different arts and rested in generality'.

Daya agrees that *rasa*-theory catered to the popular element and functioned to make literature attractive to masses and to *rasikas* as well. But it also did much harm. 'The self conscious formulation of a temptation into a norm has played havoc not only with the 'thinking' but also the 'art-creations' in the Indian tradition which have had to try to come to terms with it, whether they liked it or not. The story of their struggle to throw off the burden bequeathed to them in the name of Bharata still has to be written. But what made the thing increasingly difficult was the half deliberate confusion by bringing in the *raso vai sah* of the *Upaniṣads* and treating the Ānanda produced by the *rasa* as *Brahmānandasahōdara*. Now one could indulge the temptation to one's heart's content and feel good about it, if one was as close as one could be to the highest ideal of spirituality propounded in one's culture.'

That one reaches the zenith of *Brahmānandasahōdara Ānanda* through *Kāvya* was the claim made by some of the Acāryas like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. Many did not agree with it. Bhaṭṭanāyaka says that the state of bliss, which the Yogins acquire in Samādhi, cannot equal the *rasa* which the essence of poetry generates. Kuntaka is also of the same view.

Daya has pointed out a very important aspect of *rasa* theory—its impact on Indian social and cultural life and the fact that it contributed to the growth of movements like Bhakti cult and Tantra cults like Vajrayāna. I think that more than Bhakti movement and Tantra, rasa-thought has led to the development of a whole system of Saiva philosophy where aesthetics has percolated to the deeper levels.

Daya wants to substitute *rasa*-theory by a theory which 'should lead to meditative consciousness, freed from all objectivity. Patañjali has showed the way for this. Then came the advocates of *rasa*-theory to harm his cause. Therefore, *rasa*-theory was harmful for the spiritual domain'.

If one wants to have spiritual experience like Patañjali, one should should follow Patañjali. The theorists of *rasa* would say why should we determine the experience in arts in terms of Patañjali's system? Shalya has given his own theory of art-experience as the experience of the subject as subject (*Viṣayī Kī Viṣayitāpratīti*). In fact, the theory of *Alaṅkāra* offers more insights in art experience and what both these philosophers of our times are trying to suggest is made explicit in the treatment of *Bhāvika Alaṅkāra,* a subtle analysis of which has been made by Acāryas like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍī, Ruyyaka, Appa Dīkṣita and Aśādhara Bhaṭṭa. *Bhāvika Alaṅkāra* manifests only in great epics and it is percolated in the deep structure of a discourse. A valid perception of past and future events, happenings and human situations leading to their Sākṣātkāra becomes the mark of *Bhāvika.* The word *Bhāva* in Bhāvika means consciousness in complete awareness.

Perhaps Daya has his own concept of meditative consciousness. He says that in actual life and in meditative consciousness, one cannot experience Bhayānaka, Raudra, Bībhatsa and Karuṇa rasas. His thesis has interesting similarity with the idea of *rasa* given of Srīvatsalāñchana Bhaṭṭācārya (sixteenth century AD) who wrote a commentary in refutation of Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa.* Bhaṭṭācārya says that *rasa* imbibes pleasure or *sukha* only, and the *rasas* like Bhayānaka, Raudra, Bībhatsa and Karuṇa are imbued with sorrow (*duhkha*); therefore, they must be discarded from theory of *rasa.* But this would be depriving literature or art from comprehensive approach of life and the world. Abhinavagupta, on the other hand, sees a direct link of these *rasas* to *Sānta* and, therefore, to meditative consciousness. The deep anguish experienced in *Bībhatsa rasa* would lead to disillusionments and thus ultimately to *Tattvajñāna.*

Department of Sanskrit
Dr. H.S. Gour University
Sagar (MP)

RADHAVALLABH TRIPATHI

Morality and Consequences

In his book, *The Argumentative Indian,* in the essay of the same title, Amartya Sen mentions the *Gita* as a contribution to India's argumentative tradition. He touches upon the moral conflict between Krishna and Arjuna. He presents Krishna as holding the view that, as a warrior, it was Arjuna's duty to fight in defence of justice, whatever the consequences. This was Arjuna's *varnadharma.* He presents Arjuna as being hesitant to fight, in view of the most terrible consequences which the war was bound to have. Krishna's position may be called absolutist, and Arjuna's consequentialist.

Sen makes another point. After some hesitation and queries, Arjuna ultimately submits to Krishna's view. At the end of the *Gita,* he says that all his doubts have been removed; and he would now fight. 'Kṛṣṇa, by Your grace my delusion has fled and wisdom has been gained by me. I stand shorn of all doubts. I will do your bidding.'[1] But, although this is so, Sen says, Arjuna's position is not really vanquished. On the other hand, looking at the utter desolation following the war, his position would seem to be vindicated. 'The case for doing what one sees as one's duty must be strong, but how can we be indifferent to the consequences that may follow from our doing what we take to be our duty."[2]

Now, as far as Sen's first point is concerned, I would like to ask the question: Is Krishna's injunction to Arjuna to perform his *varnadharma* really absolutist? We may indeed ask whether *varnadharma* in the *Gita,* of which Krishna's injunction is a part, is absolutist. In order to answer this question, we may have to look at the relation between *varnadharma,* on the one hand, and

naishkarmya and *lokasangraha*, on the other. If the relation is that of means and end, then Krishna's injunction would evidently be consequentialist, not absolutist. However, I have no desire to pursue this matter any further in this place. What I would like to do at present at some length relates to Sen's second point.

We are aware that an absolutist duty, or simply duty, as we may say, has an exclusive claim. That is, it calls for being performed, whatever the consequences, Kant said that much: duty has to be performed, even though the world came to an end as a result. However, we find that in the statement which I have quoted above from Sen, he reduces duty's exclusive claim to just a strong one; and he allows a role to consequences in the resolution of our moral conflict. Now, Sen is not justified in toning down duty's exclusive claim. For it makes this claim as a matter of definition. Further, it is also clear that, on the strength of this claim, all consequences have to be ignored; they cannot play any role whatsoever in the resolution of our moral conflict. But, although this is so, I cannot help, I am afraid, going back to the question of consequences. Sen has mentioned the example of moral conflict between Krishna and Arjuna in the *Gita*. Let me mention a couple of other examples. The first is a real example; and the second an old and much-cited one.

India has made a commitment to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, in order to determine whether Kashmir wanted to join India or Pakistan. However, there is a genuine apprehension that, if the plebiscite is held under the present conditions, then, in the course of holding it and in view of the result that may follow, there will take place a widespread and gruesome bloodshed, even considerably worse than what happened at the time of India's partition. Further, one has duty to always speak the truth. But there is a real danger of some innocent person losing his life and property, if the person whose protection he had sought told the robbers who had been pursuing him about his whereabouts. In both cases, there is apparently a moral conflict between duty and consequences.

Now, I do not wish to deny duty's exclusive claim, which it makes by definition. But, at the same time, I cannot help asserting that there are consequences following our performance of our duty, as in the above-mentioned three examples, such that ignoring them

leaves us in a state of *moral* disquiet. (Sen said that we cannot be indifferent to them.) The question which I face here is: how to combine or put together duty, with its exclusive claim, with this *moral* disquiet? I find that there are consequences following our performance of our duty, such that *not* ignoring them itself constitutes a duty. Thus, as in our above-mentioned third example, our *not* ignoring the danger to life and property of an innocent person, which would most likely follow his protector's telling the truth about his whereabouts, itself constitutes a duty. If that is the case, then the moral disquiet which we have in ignoring the said consequences is easily accounted for. We do what we should do in *not* ignoring them. Consequently, we do what we should not do in *ignoring* them. As a result, what we have at our disposal at present are not duty and consequences, which have to be ignored on account of the former's exclusive claim. What we have are two duties, each with its exclusive claim; and we have them in a state of conflict. Thus, in the first of the three given examples, we have one's *varnadharma* and one's duty to save the world from disastrous consequences; in the second, we have one's duty of keeping one's commitment and, again, one's duty to save the world from disastrous consequences; and, in the third, we have one's duty to always speak the truth and one's duty to protect the life and property of an innocent person. And, in each of these three cases, we have the duties concerned in a state of conflict.

As we know, when there is a conflict between two duties, then both of them cannot be performed at the same time; only one of them can be. We may not perform the one which we do not perform for one reason or another. Thus, for example, we may not perform it, because it has less obligatory force than the one which we perform. We may call it as an exception to the latter. The point of calling it as an exception is that, while both of them remain duties, there is a reason for leaving it out. I find that this idea of exception is rather significant from the point of view of moral progress. For as soon as we discover an exception to a given duty, we can say that we have made an advance beyond that duty. Thus, for example, as soon as we discover that telling a lie in order to protect the life and property of an innocent person is an exception

to the duty of always telling the truth, we can say that we have made an advance beyond that duty.[3]

Notes and References

1. *Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā*, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, chapter XVIII, verse 73, p. 732, by Jayadayal Goyandka.
2. Amartya Sen's *The Argumentative Indian*, Allen Lane, p. 5.
3. I have dealt at length with the idea of exceptions to duty, or what I call moral exceptions, in two of my papers: (i) Moral Exceptions, JICPR, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January-March 2001; and (ii) Exceptive Moral Laws, JICPR, Vol. XX, No. 2, April-June 2003.

ZB-5, Sah-Vikas
68, Patparganj
Delhi 110 092

R.K. Gupta

Agenda for Research

The radical transformation and articulation of logic associated with the name of Russell and Whitehead informed by the vision of deriving the whole of mathematics from logic is well known. So also is the attempt by Wittgenstein to develop a truth-functional logic in place of the traditional logic associated with the name of Aristotle, which is now designated as 'modern logic', and taught everywhere. But the relation between the two has not been explored, although both Wittgenstein and Russell and their early work together at Cambridge is well known.

Russell was already talking of 'material implication' which is nothing but the 'truth-table' version of the logical connective in sentential logic known as 'implication', and symbolized as∠. Russell also showed awareness of the paradox arising from this interpretation of the logical relation of implication and, for some strange reason, called it 'material implication', when it was nothing of that kind since there was nothing 'material' involved in it.

The fact that such a formal consequence of the new understanding of the notion of 'implication', so central to logical and philosophical thinking from ancient times, followed from the new understanding does not seem to have 'mattered' either to Russell or to Wittgenstein who were busy creating the edifice of modern logic. Both did not notice the fact that a false proposition 'implies' every other proposition and that a true proposition is implied by every other proposition makes 'thinking' practically impossible.

True, this absurd and paradoxical conclusion justfies and explains the traditional fallacy called 'affirming the consequent' and 'denying the antecedent' as they were grounded on it. It also destroyed any relation between 'logical thinking' and what that 'thinking was about as logic had nothing do with what 'if, then' is supposed to mean in empirical contexts. There has perhaps been no greater disruption of the relation of logic, that was essential to thinking, and empirical reality which the 'thinking' was supposed to 'think' about.

The far-reaching consequences of this development by Russell and Wittgenstein need to be further explored and the relation between them investigated with the consequences they had for philosophy after them.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Attention is drawn to *Sūkta* 164 of the first Maṇḍala attributed to Dīrghatamasa Aucathya. This *sūkta* consists of 52 mantras and although it is well known to Vedic scholars, it has not been paid as much attention as, say, the *Puruṣa Sūkta* 10.90 or the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* 10.129. The *Sūkta* 164 shows a more concrete awareness of the movement of time—yearly, seasonally, monthly and also the day-and-night cycle. The *Saṁvatsara Kāla Cakra*, which is understood in this way, seems to envelop the whole of reality.

Also, the *sūkta* shows the awareness of that which, though being the basis of the cycle, is also beyond it. In fact, it talks of the two birds sitting on one tree; one only looks on while the other tastes the fruit of the tree (Mantra 208). These lines are well known from the Upaniṣad, but that they originally occur in the *sūkta* is not so commonly known. But, surprisingly, the next mantra talks of a large number of birds sitting on the tree, singing together perhaps of that which is not there.

The transition becomes clearer when the *sūkta* distinguishes between the mortal and the immortal and suggests that both have a common origin.

Language, according to it, has four levels, three of which are hidden and only the fourth is heard in the speech of men which, surprisingly, is called *turīya* in the *sūkta*.

The fourfold distinction reminds one of Bhartṛhari's four levels of *Vāk*, that is, *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, the last being that which one hears when it is spoken (45).

The *sūkta* also relates *Vāk* to *Chanda* and explicates its relation even though it does not talk of *Nāda* (Brahmaṇ) there. The *sūkta* moves forward and suggests through its famous statement 'एक सद् विप्राः बहुधा वदन्ति', saying that Indra, Marut, Agni, etc., are 'names' of that which is called by different names (46).

In fact, important *sūktas* of the *Ṛgveda* dealing with philosophical subjects need to be brought together in a collection with a new

commentary on them so that *Rgvedic* thought becomes available to teachers and students of philosophy alike, as also to ordinary readers interested in the same.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

Reply to a Query on the meaning of 'Identity' or *Abheda* in JICPR, Vol. XIX, No. 3, July-September 2002.

The apt word connoting the idea of *Identity* in Sanskrit language is *Abheda* or tādātmya. *Abhinna* is the adjective form of the word *abheda.* Though here ends the precise answer of the query, the purpose of it will not be served until the answer is interpreted in terms of philosophy of language.

The notion of Identity or *Abheda* is highly significant in Advaita Vedānta. This is to be realized in a discriminative way with an undeterred outlook. Does this problem of Identity involve difference in itself which is nothing but presumed to be *Consciousness* alone? *Consciousness* does never imply *change* as the unchangeable infinite is the *Consciousness* or the Supreme Being. However, it is to be remembered here that all kinds of thinking, including philosophical speculation, are happening in the empirical world and, hence, they have empirical validity only. The *knowledge* resulting from the acts of the mind and senses together will no doubt arrive on empirical notions. In the same way, 'I am Brahman' is a *knowledge* when empirically conceived, inclusive of a 'change' brought about to the unchanging *Consciousness* in its false representation. This change is *Anirvacanīya* to Sri Sankara and '*Somehow*' to Kant. This is an extremely unique implication for the term 'Identity' or the so-called *Abhedabhava* (अभेदेन भवनीति अभेदभावः) in Advaita Vedanta. '*Abhedadarśana*' actually denotes '*tādātmya*', the knowledge that '*I am Brahman*' and not the complete Identity. In a subtler observation, this state represents a state of Identity-in-Difference, which differs from the inevitable Identity that is Brahman. Moreover, it is to be acknowledged that identity requires annihiliation of body-mind complex either in its gross form or in its essential subtlety. This '*Abhedadarśana*' results in the *Consciousness* that is deciphered in the sense of '*consciousness* of *something*' which actually it is not. This is properly defined as *Pratyagātman* by Sarvajñātman, the renowned scholar of Advaita Vedanta and author of *Samksepaśārīraka.* According to him, the failure to distinguish between the *Ādhāra*

(support) and *Adhisthāna* (substratum) in their true purport results in the false perception of *Adhāra* as *Adhiṣthana* and vice versa. *Adhāra* is described as *Pratyagātman,* the highest cognizable aspect of *Consciousness* and *Adhiṣthana* is the *Absolute Brahman* described in negative terms as *'Neti Neti'* in scriptures. Therefore, *Pratyagātman* is the *Abheda* experienced at the empirical level. Annulment of spatio-temporal differences in *Consciousness* and unification with it, without destroying the notion *of Consciousness of something* is, thus, implied in the *Abhedadarśana* or *tādātmya.* This is '*Brahmabhāva*' and not the true Identity.

An important contention in Advaita philosophy is that '*to know*' is *'to be'* itself which implies *tādātmya* in its utmost sense. It would be impossible to know or realize the *Absolute* in its true nature since there is nothing existing apart from it. The *knowledge* occurring through words is revelatory and, therefore, merely *indicative.* How can the ineffable and unconceivable *Reality* be revealed by thought? The appropriate way to gain real knowledge is by *indirect indications* such as 'not this, not this', as rightly pointed out by Sankara. The *Absolute* can never be known or conceptualized by any means prevalent in the empirical realm. Hence, the knowledge of oneness pertains solely to the highest cognizable being and not the *Absolute Brahman* beyond all descriptions.

The question of *'Simultaneity'* of Identity in *Tādātmyatā* is against the true Advaitic contention regarding *Reality. Simultaneity* requires annihilation of spatio-temporal relations in their natural sense. Whatever reality claimed in this type of knowledge is this sense of *tādātmyatā* where the spatio-temporal aspects are not annihilated. Therefore, this state is only *identity-in-difference* where the knowledge '*I am Brahman*' exists in a person of body-mind complex. In the true identified state with *Brahman,* the distinction of knower-known-knowledge relations do not persist because of the non-dual existence—*Prajñānaghanam.*

Thus, Identity rooted in *Consciousness* unmanifested but inclusive of all, is revealed to human mind in the form of *Pratyagātman* in its highest cognizable capacity. This alone is known to our comprehending level of mental mode or that which is posited to be the *tādātmya* with the Absolute implying *Identity-in-difference.* It can be concluded that Identity is at the *Consciousness* level which is never possible in the human level. One has to transcend this level where nothing else except *Brahman* exists to reveal the Identity. This is the reason why Indian philosophy requires its own method of interpretations and should not be diverted for discursive language or Westernization.

N. USHA DEVI

Nandanam House,
Kidangoor P.O.
Angamaly,
Ernakulam, Kerala

The Query raised by Professor Daya Krishna on the issue of *Turīya* in Bhartṛhari:

'May I draw your attention to the *Ṛgveda Sūkta* 1.164, *Mantra* 41 to 45 which deals with *Vāk* in *Mantra* 45, it is said that there are four levels of *Vāk,* out of which three are 'hidden' and only the fourth deals with that which human beings speak and it is called *Turīya.*

This reminds one of the four levels of *Vāk* in Bhartṛhari and needs to be paid attention to, as it would be interesting to find if Bhartṛhari got the idea from the *Ṛgveda* itself. According to Satvalekara, the first three are supposed to be located in *Mulādhāra,* the heart and *Buddhi,* respectively, while the fourth is called *Turīya.*

How did the transformation of the term *Turīya* occur in the tradition when in the text of the *Vākyapadīya,* it means something like *Parā* or that which is radically different from all the other three?'

Reply:

Bhartṛhari has quoted the Ṛgvedic verse (1/164/45) in his *Vṛtti* on the verse 1/142 of *Vākyapadīya.* The verse reads as follows *'Vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantyāścaitadadbhutam, Anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayyā vācaḥ paramam padam'.* The verse can be translated as follows: 'That it (*Vyākaraṇa*) is an excellent means or stairs of landing place of the three levels of speech—the *Vaikharī,* the *Madhyamā* and the *Paśyantī* residing in different places. Specifying the different levels

of speeches, the commentary *Ambākartrī* quotes a verse that reads, '*Parā vaṅ mūlacakrasthā paśyantī nābhi sansthitā, hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā vaikharī kaṇṭhadeśagā'*, according to which, *Parā*' is to be located in *Mūlacakra, Paśyantī* in the navel, the *madhyamā* is known to be residing in the heart and *Vaikharī* is to be located in the throat. Bhartṛhari, neither in the verse nor in his commentary of the verse, has mentioned about those specific seats of the levels of speech. In his commentary, Bhartṛhari has not accepted *Parā*, as a level of speech.

However, he has very clearly mentioned different kinds of *Vaikharī* (four kinds), *Madhyamā* (three kinds) and at least ten kinds of *Paśyantī*. He comments *(Saiṣā trayī vāk caitanyagranthi vivartavadanākhyeyaparimāṇā turīyeṇa manuśyeṣu pratyavabhāsate)* that these three levels of speech, like the consciousness that illumines in forms of all beings (deity, human and non-human beings), gets diversified in enumerable transformations and in the human beings. Only through the *Vaikharī*, the fourth of all the parts (*turīyeṇa*), they are illuminated. Even in the fourth part of speech, only some of it are in practice while others are transcendental or beyond our use. In the context of clarifying this issue, Bhartṛhari has quoted the *Ṛgvedic Mantra (Turīyam vāco manuyā vadanti* – (1/164/45).

Bhartṛhari does not accept the fourth level of *vāk* and he has not referred to *Parā* by the use of the term *Turīya. Turīya* means 'Fourth' of the third in the descending order from subtle to gross.

Satvalekara's interpretation of the Ṛgvedic verse (1/164/45) is not up to the mark but it is also not incorrect. The fourth, different from the first three, is called *Turīya,* the gross level and not the *Parā* level. *Turīya* formed by '*catur=catvār+cha*' the beginning letter of which is removed, stands for a quarter, a fourth part that, in Vedānta philosophy, is used to indicate the culminating state of the *Jīva,* in which it realizes one with supreme spirit or Brahman. In the uses like *Turīya varṇa,* it means a man belonging to the fourth caste or *śudra* and in the uses like *'Turīyam vāco mamuṣyā vadanti'*? (1/164/45), it stands for the quarter of the levels of which first three are subtle and imperceptible while the fourth quarter is the gross and perceptible *Vaikharī.*

There is controversy among the interpreters of Bhartṛhari on the issue of *Parā-vāk* as one of the levels of speech. According to

the philosophy of Tantra and Vedānta, *Parā* is the subtlest form of speech, even subtler than *paśyantī.* The commentator, Helārāja has not distinguished *Parā* from *paśyantī.* According to him, *paśyantī* itself, being pure unity and undivided consciousness, is called by the word *Parā.* Bhartṛhari has himself enumerated only three levels of speech—*paśyantī madhyamā* and *vaikharī.*

It is striking to note as to why Bhartṛhari, a philosopher well versed in the Vedic and Tāntrika traditions, has not enumerated *Parā* as one of the levels of speech. He might have observed some insoluble difficulties that may creep into the philosophy of grammar if *Parā* is taken as a level of speech. It would, perhaps, not be a necessary content of *Vyākaraṇa* or it would be a thing beyond the limit of cognition revealed by *madhyamā* in the mind to which our cognition and reflections are confined or there would be no use of it in the explanation of the world of communication, i.e. the world of words and their meanings. Following Sāyaṇa, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, while interpreting the quoted verse of *Ṛgveda* 'and with influence of *Tantrāgama,* accepts four levels of speech of which first three are hidden but he does not seem justified because there is no occasion for cognizing any such division in *Parā,* even by Yogins, it is not enumerated as a level of speech'. *(Yoginām tu tatrāpi prakṛtipratyayavibhāgāvagatirasti. Laghumanjuṣāvyākhyā kalā,* p. 182, Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, 46, see also *Mahābhāṣyaudyota Paspaśāhnika*). Kaiyaṭa takes *Nāma, Akhyāt, Upasarga* and *nipātas* by the term *catvāri.* Helārāja has not observed such a reason for considering *Parā* as a level of speech. He has identified *Parā* as one with *paśyantī.*

In my opinion, *Parā* beyond *paśyantī,* can't be distinguished as a level of speech. Levelling of speech in a consequential sequence of gross, subtle and subtlest is not applicable to *Parā* because that may logically lead to infinite regression. There is no logical need for explaining the substratum of different levels of speech as one of the levels also and even if it is accepted as a level of speech, it being untouched by words, may hardly be of any importance to the philosophy of grammar. It may be a subject of realization but then its existence cannot be justified cognitively and epistemologically.

Vaikharī is a perceived entity and *madhyamā* is cognized directly as revealed by itself after the manifestation of it through *vaikharī.*

Even *paśyantī*, in Bharṭrhari's philosophy, is accepted as that known by implication as the substratum of cognition revealed in the mind but there is no ground on the basis of which the existence of *Parā* may also be accepted by implication as the substratum of *paśyantī*. It will lead to infinite regress and, hence, unfounded logic. Implication of something by that which it is implicated is a miserable logic. Implication requires a veridical cognition as a base of it, if otherwise, it would be an imagination and might cause confusion if applied for the inference of some existence. These are, perhaps, the reason that Bharṭrhari has not enumerated *Parā* as one among the levels of speech. However, he in his vṛtti and his commentators have accepted parā as a kind of *Paśyantī* that is *Para paśyantī*.

The position of middle (*madhyamā*) might be justified only when three of the aforesaid levels are present. In case of a fourth, it will be difficult to decide the mid-one (*madhyamā*). It may be added that *vaikharī* as instrument of manifesting meaning-revealing-language, *madhyamā* as meaning-revealing unit revealed in the mind and *paśyantī* as known by implication (made on the basis of cognition of the meaning-revealing unit) as ontic substratum of Madhyamā are accepted reasonably as levels of speech. There is no need to accept the fourth (*Parā*) as a level of speech for the explanation of the world of cognition by language. Logically, middle is one that occupies a position in between a lower and a higher. *Madhyamā* is called so because it occupies the mid position. However, other reasons may also be given but it seems true to say that Bharṭrhari accepts only three levels of speech; he has not accepted *Parā* as a fourth level. But for consciousness, knowledge is not possible. *Paśyantī*, as consciousness itself, is a pre-requisite of cognition by language. Epistemologically, it is known by implication as the substratum of cognition revealed by language madhyamā in the mind in usual communication.

Conclusively, Bharṭrhari does not accept four levels of speech for the aforementioned reasons. However, he is influenced by the Vedic verse to an extant that he quotes the verse in his commentary and accepts the Vedic spirit of '*Turīyam vāco Manusyā vadanti*'. *Turīya* in all case, stands for a quarter part. In case of Vedāntic concept of *Svapna, Jāgrata, Suṣupti* and *Turīya*, it stands for the upward stage where the stage is one with *Parā*, the supreme and

in case of levels of speech, it stands for the down quarter part of gross level (*vaikhārī*) which is spoken, written and learnt by men.

D.N. TIWARI

H. No. 107, Upstair Hindustan Pharma,
Lalbagh, Darbhanga,
Bihar 846004

Book Reviews

WAYNE A. BORODY: *Bhoga Kārikā of Sadyojyoti with the Commentary of Aghora Śiva*: An Introduction and Translation, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, 2005, pp. 174, Rs. 395.

avidita-sukha-duhkham nirgunam vastu kim cit
jada-matir iha kaś cin mokṣa ity ācacakṣe
mama tu matam ananga-smera-tāruṇya-ghūrṇan-
mada-kala-madirākṣī-nīvi-mokṣo hi mokṣah

Final freedom is the state of no pain,
no pleasure, no qualities, nothing—
or so some idiot has said.

But when a ravishing young woman,
drunk on desire,
is free from her cloths—
that's freedom
for me.[1]

When I first saw the title of Borody's book, I have expected something like the above poem. In fact, after many months of working on *yoga* philosophy, I thought that time has indeed come for some *bhoga*. But Sadyojyoti's text along with Aghora Śiva's commentary, translated with annotations and introduction by Borody, is not exactly what I have anticipated. It is rather an Āgamic Śaiva text composed in the eighth century and commented upon in the twelfth century, focusing on *bhoga* as the technical term referring to the consciousness-state of those who are not (yet) liberated, i.e. who have not reached *mokṣa*. Sadyojyoti himself defines *bhoga* as *buddhi-vṛtti anurañjana*, translated by Borody as 'the desirous-attachment to the modifications of the mind'. In his introduction he explains, and rightly so, that the literal meaning of *anurañjana* is 'to be coloured by'. Hence, *bhoga* is a state in which the consciousness is coloured by the *buddhi-vṛttis*, i.e. a state in which it identifies with mind-activity instead of acknowledging its true transcendent

nature. Sadyojyoti's definition is stunning as it accurately corresponds with Patañjali's definition of *yoga* as *citta-vṛtti-nirodha.*[3] Borody's book is divided into three parts: Introduction, translation and, finally, the transliterated text of the *Bhoga Kārikā* with Āghora Śiva's commentary. I believe that as far as the reader's convenience is concerned, the optimal format of text and translation is one in which both the text and the translation are simultaneously open before his/her eyes. Patrick Olivelle's translation of the early *Upaniṣads*[4] is a marvelous example for such a format, presenting a page in Sanskrit next to the same in English translation. Another query about Borody's format would be why is this transliteration of the text rather than the text in Devanāgarī script?

The translator's introduction is very informative. He enlightens us about Sadyojyoti, Āghora Śiva and their works. The latter, we are told, is a Tamil, whereas it is unclear to which part of the subcontinent the former belonged. Borody touches on the notion of *bhoga* as expounded in this treatise, and argues that Sadyojyoti plays on the twofold sense of the term as 'mundane experience' and 'enjoyment'. While *bhoga* is a limiting factor in the human experience, it still constitutes a measure of enjoyment, or as he puts it: '*bhoga* is something the soul wants and enjoys in spite of the fact that *bhoga* is essentially "impure"(*mala*) condition'.[5] I would say that the same dichotomy is found in the Advaitic notion of *māyā*. The very term implies not merely 'illusion', 'sorcery' and 'magic', but even 'attraction' and 'charm'. J.N. Mohanty[6] mentions the *āvaraṇa* ('covering' or 'masking') element of *avidyā* in Śankara's thought. That is to say, that *avidyā* 'blocks' the Brahman-experience by showing us or inviting us into the charming, ever seductive *māyā*-picture. Borody further specifies that Sadyojyoti has written a 'companion-treatise' to his *Bhoga Kārikā*, titled *Mokṣa Kārikā*, which is dedicated to Śaiva soteriology or 'supra-mundane experience'; this text has been commentated upon by Rāmākaṇṭhā II of Kashmir in the ninth century. Sadyojyoti's works, we are told, have not captured the interest of further commentators after the twelfth century Āghora Śiva, yet he is still considered an authoritative representative of the Śaiva doctrine and is quoted for example in the fourteenth century *Mādhava Sarva Darśana Sangraha.* Borody further elaborates on the connection between the *Bhoga Kārikā* and the *Raurava Āgama*, attributed to Sage Ruru. In the second verse of the Sadyojyoti's text, he himself writes (and Borody translates): 'For the purpose of the adepts, I am briefly describing both mundane-experience (*bhoga*) and release (*mokṣa*) along with their means as they are propounded in the teachings of Ruru and as they are established through perfect logical argumentation'.[7] Another theme touched upon by Borody in his introduction is the crucial role of 'the grace (*anugraha*) of Śiva' in the soteriological path depicted by Sadyojyoti, i.e. the path of de-identification with *buddhi-vṛttis.* Let me add that throughout the text under discussion, the author and his commentator not merely present their own views on *bhoga* and *mokṣa*, but rather indulge in polemics with the Sānkhya, Nyāya and Cārvāka schools as well as with the Buddhists. And finally: Borody's work is thorough and precise. He deserves praise not merely for translating this intriguing treatise but, in fact, for bringing it to the readers' attention.

Notes and References

1. This short poem is from V.N. Rao and David Shulman, (eds and trans.), *A Poem at the Right Moment: Remembered Verses from Premodern South India,* University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1998.
2. Borody, W.A., *Bhoga Kārikā of Sadyojyoti with the Commentary of Aghora Śiva,* p. 25.
3. *Yogasūtra* 1.2.
4. Olivelle, Patrick, *The Early Upaniṣads,* Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998.
5. Borody, W.A., *Bhoga Kārikā of Sadyojyoti with the Commentary of Āghora Śiva,* p. 12.
6. Mohanty, J.N., 'Can the Self Become an Object? (Thoughts on Śankara's statement *nāyam ātmā ekāntena aviṣaya)*', in his very own *Essays on Indian Philosophy,* Oxford India Paperbacks, Delhi, 2002, pp. 72-73.
7. rurusiddhāntasamsiddhāu bhogamokṣau sasādhanau vacmi sādhakabodhāya leśato yuktisamskṛtau (Borody, W.A., *Bhoga Kārikā of Sadyojyoti with the Commentary of Āghora Śiva,* pp. 24 and 111).

Department of Philosophy DANIEL RAVEH
Tel Aviv University, Israel
E-mail: daniraveh@gmail.com

T.N. GANAPATHY: *The Yoga of Siddha Bōganathar*, Babaji's Kriya Yoga and Publications, Inc., Quebec, Canada. Pages Vol. I (xvii+353) and Vol. II (xv+523), 2003, 2004; Price Rs. 250 and Rs. 575 respectively.

The word *Siddha* poses some problems in translating into English. *Amarakośa* (I.1.11), the most authentic lexicon in Sanskrit, includes *siddha* among celestial beings. But the tradition speaks of different varieties of *siddhas* who take birth in this mortal world, though they are considered immortal. Lord Kṛṣna says in the *Gītā* (X. 26) that among *siddhas* he is Kapila. Śaṅkara, while commenting on this says that *siddhas* are those, who by birth itself have obtained excessive command over *dharma*, knowledge, wealth or miraculous powers. In Yogic literature also, the word *siddha* is used in many places. Patañjali says in his *Yogasūtra* (III. 32),

'*Mūrdhajyotiṣi siddha darśanam*'

[by meditating on the bright light in the hole of the skull, the vision of *siddhas* (takes place)]. Vyāsa, commenting on the word *siddha*, says that '*siddhas* move about in the inter-mediary space between the earth and the sky'.

The word *siddha* in its general parlance means 'an adept' or 'accomplished one'. In other words, it refers to one who has mastered himself and thereby has the command over various powers of Nature. The literature of *siddha* tradition, especially in Sanskrit and Tamil, talk of different *siddhas* and their contributions to the society. The number of *siddhas*, according to these literary sources, vary from eighteen primary ones to ten million.

Traditionally, Lord Śiva is supposed to be the first *siddha* and also to have given the *siddha* teachings for the emancipation of human beings. Texts on Haṭhayoga like *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* of Svātmārāma and *Haṭharatnāvalī* of Śrīnivāsa Yogīndra enumerate the names of some *siddhas*, which include Mīnanātha, Matsyendra, Jālandhara, Gorakṣa and many others about whom nothing else is known. One of the main problems with the mystics is that they do not supply us with any biographical details about themselves or their predecessors. Some of the names in the northern and Tamil traditions appear to be the same. It is difficult to give a correct biography of any *siddha*, since the lives of these *siddhas* are couched in mystery.

Many legends – most of them being not authentic but mere myth are attributed to these *siddhas*. Also, it is not an easy task to edit and publish the works of *siddhas*, since the language of the *siddhas* defy grammar or logic and often contain obscure passages which can be interpreted in many ways or some times beyond interpretation.

In this context, it is heartening to note that some scholars have attempted to read, understand and contribute with their exhaustive writings on the works of *siddhas*, especially those belonging to Tamil Nadu. The great saint Agastya is connected with Tamil *siddha* tradition which includes, among others, great mystics like Tirumūlar and Bhōgar (spelt as Bōgar throughout the two volumes under review).

Dr. T.N. Ganapathy, a distinguished professor of Philosophy for more than five decades, is no stranger to this subject. He was also a Senior Fellow of ICPR (1985–88) and his project on *The Philosophy of the Tamil Siddhas* was published by the ICPR in 1993.

The first volume under review consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, the author endeavours to give a brief summary of the term *siddha* and also some concepts regarding the precepts and practices of the *siddhas*. Though this chapter is informative and throws new light on *siddhas* and their works, there are certain avoidable errors. For example, in p. 13, the author says, 'In Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, sixty-eight *siddhis* are classified' and the footnote reference here guides us to see Chapter III regarding this view. But no such reference is found in the third chapter. While one may claim liberty to interpet some mystic terms, passages and names, it should be borne in mind that this should not lead him to fanciful interpretations. One such instance can be shown in p. 22, where the learned author interprets the name of the great saint Agattiyar (the Tamil version of Agastya) as, 'one who has kindled the inner fire in him (*agam*=inner; *tī*=fire), i.e. one who has roused the fire of *kundalinī* in him'. This view does not seem to be correct, either grammatically or etymologically. Similar is his translation of the term, '*vasudeiva kuṭumbakam* (it should be *vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam*), as, 'a family of lord Vāsudeva, the Almighty'.

The author discusses about the *cakras* and *nāḍīs* in Chapter II. It may be pointed out that in Vedic literature, like *Atharva Veda*

Samhitā and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Praśna* Upaniṣads, references are found on this topic. Further, there is no unanimous view among the *Upaniṣads*, and Yogic and Tantrik texts on the number of prinicipal *nāḍis*, their positions, functions and so on. The author gives an excellent exposition of *Kuṇḍalinī yoga* in Chapter II, where some hitherto unknown information is also provided.

Dr Ganapathy is at his best in Chapter III and IV where he exhibits his depth of knowledge and mastery over the *siddha* language and literature. The life and teachings of Bhōgar and poems written by him in original Tamil have been succinctly brought out with Roman transliteration, English translation, summary and commentary.

The second volume consists of the original Tamil text, Roman transliteration, English translation, summary and commentary of two of Bhōgar's works viz., *Upadeca Jñānam* consisting of 156 verses and *Jñānacārāmcam*, where 45 out of 100 verses have been taken up in this volume. The author gives a brief note on Yoga, with special reference to *siddhas* and also about *siddha* medicines. He also gives useful information regarding some Saivite principles and other literature like Purāṇas and Smṛtis in the six Appendix-notes.

While it should be mentioned that *siddhas* were not dependent on any text as their source-materials, there are many common ideas, precepts and practices of *siddhas* which are found in Yogic literature, especially in texts on Haṭhayoga. Some of Dr. Ganapathy's interpretations differ from the descriptions given in Yogic texts.

Dr. Ganapathy's statement, 'Rajayoga stands for the concentration of the mind through the control of vital air' (p. 194, Vol. I) also does not seem to be correct, according to Yogic texts in Sanskrit.

There are also many practices, technical terms, teachings, which are common to Haṭha and Nātha Yoga traditions. For example, Bhōgar says (p. 184, Vol. I) that *Prāṇayāma* is the first step in *Aṣṭāṅgayoga* leaving out *yama* and *niyama*. Authors like *Svātmārāma* in his *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* and *Gorakṣanātha* in his *Gorakṣasamhitā* do not give any importance to *yama* and *niyama*.

A few such remarks do not mar the importance of Dr. Ganapathy's contribution to this branch of study. Very little had been done to bring to light the greatness and the importance of Siddha Yoga in

the study of the Yogic tradition of India. The contribution of the author would definitely go a long way in helping the scholars and practioners of Yoga. His deep understanding and command over the technical subject is in deed laudable. It is hoped that he would shortly publish many other texts on Siddha Yoga for the benefit of all.

The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute K.S. BALASUBRAMANIAN
Mylapore
Chennai 600 004

Books Received

1. Md. Sirajul Islam: *Sufism and Bhakti*, The Council for Research on Values and Philosophy, USA, pp. 300.
2. Swami Shankarananda: *The Yoga of Kashmir Shaivism*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2006, pp. 350 Rs. 395.
3. J. Ouseparanmpil: *Bhartṛhaṛi's Vākyapadīya Kāṇda 1*, Indian Institute of Indology, Pune p. 274, Rs. 400.
4. Mohandas Moses: *Last Frontiers of the Mind: Challenges of the Digital Age*, Prentice Hall of Indian Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2005, p. 425, Rs. 395.
5. Sri Gopal Mahip: *Kanyā Dham Pragya Prakashan*, p. 128.
6. Sri Gopal Mahip: *Bhagwadgita ka Mantavya, Dham Pragya Prakashan*, U.P. 2001.
7. Afsar Abbas: *Philosophy of Science: A new Perspective*, Indian Institue of Advanced Study, Shimla, 2005, p. 96, Rs. 150.
8. Jonardon Ganeri: *Artha Meaning: Foundations of Philosophy in India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, p. 258, Rs. 575.
9. Tandra Patnaik: *Sūnya Puruṇa: Bauddha Vaisnavism of Orissa*, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd, New Delhi, 2005, p. 268, Rs. 500.
10. Aditya Kumar Mohanty: *Karma*, P.G. Department of Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneshwar, 2004, p. 161, Rs. 150.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ऐ ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Krishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḷ.
ൺ ṇ
ർ ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tilevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.