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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research Vol. XXIII No. 1 January - March, 2006

ISSN 0970–7794

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor : DAYA KRISHNA

Volume XXIII Number 1
January - March
2006

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For the papers written in English, words from Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī and other Prakrits including the Apabhraṁśa, etc., will be diacriticised if rendered in Roman script. (Quotations can also be in the Nāgarī script). [Here we suggest those for the Sanskrit (classical), the Prakrit, the Apabhraṁśa, and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely, Arabic, Persian and the modern European languages, the current international conventions for transliteration for their rendering may be followed.]

Continued on back cover

JOURNAL OF INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

Volume XXIII
Number 1
January-March 2006

Editor: Daya Krishna

Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Darshan Bhawan
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, Mehrauli-Badarpur Road,
New Delhi 110 062, India

Articles published in this Journal are indexed in the *Philosophers' Index*, USA.

ISSN - 0970-7794

Typeset by InoSoft Systems, Noida 201 301
Printed in India
at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd., Noida 201 301
and published by Member-Secretary
for Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Darshan Bhawan
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area
Mehrauli-Badarpur Road, New Delhi 110 062

Contents

ARTICLES

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

The Future of Philosophy in the Post-Modern World

RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH

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> When politics is just the pursuit of power and economics, just legitimate plunder, does it necessarily follow that philosophy must reduce itself to a compendium of rules to support this situation? Is Man not called upon to transcend his limitations by the very law of his being? but then if it is so, doesn't it follow that the primary task of philosophy is to endow man with the courage to believe in his innate capacity of transcending his limitations?
> Is the destitute state of Man today a consequence of the triumph of technology or of the acceptance of defeat by Philosophers? Can Man once again redeem Philosophy so that Philosophy may redeem Man?
>
> —S.H. Vatsyayan, *BHAVANTI* (Journal), p. 84

Pt. Vidyaniwas Misra, a great Sanskrit scholar and Hindi writer has observed in one of his essays: 'The toughest resistance to Europe was given by India; yet the most sympathetic understanding of the Western mind has come from Indians themselves.' If it is a true observation, one can't find a better exemplification of its truth than in the life and work of the Hindi writer quoted above. But why do we mention it at the very outset of grappling with the theme that concerns us here?

One reason is obvious: the internal evidence of literature has, of late, come to assume a special importance for the rejuvenation of philosophy itself. Thus, if we recall our reading experiences of modern classics like Dostoevsky's *Notes From The Underground*, Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* or of Virginia Woolf's *The Lighthouse*, aren't they fulfilling a philosophical or spiritual need of our so-called Age of Reason. When philosophy in England was trying to replace Consciousness with language, Literature was becoming more conscious of Consciousness. Just think of the 'Four Quartets' and

compare their quest for the meaning and purpose of life with the philosophical preoccupations of Bertrand Russell, whom T.S. Eliot himself had described as a 'public misfortune'. So we can say that the sins of arrogant Modernism somehow found a significant atonement in and through Literature. Here the reader may object that this is beside the point, that we are living in post-modernist and not modernist times; and that, therefore, the contribution of even the greatest modern writers is no longer relevant to the situation we are in now. One certainly does not want to underestimate the most disturbing manifestations of post-modernist doctrine; its cynical deconstruction of the very belief of literature in itself. But as an Indian commentator of Sankara's philosophy—equally at home in the two realms of literature and philosophy—has observed:

> With the arrogance of modernity to augment his ego, modern man may feel comfortable with himself; with the cynicism of post-modern age to support him, he may sleep over his existential angst. But how long can the comfort last and the oblivion sustain a mere nothing? Human imagination cannot visualize their indefinite continuity... Neither our knowledge of nature, nor our mastery of it, no the systems of social and economic relationships should make us forget where our life is and our purpose is .... we have to subdue this arrogance, restrain our desires and orient ourselves to simplicity to save ourselves from this bestiality which we have come to confuse with humanity. Being human has really become a nauseating phrase. How crudely it makes us forget that we are all disinherited beings! To regain our humanity, our openness to Being, our urge for transcendence, we must heed the call of the *sruti*, its call to hear the voice of the Word in its words.[1]

What is this call of the *sruti*—the call to hear the voice of the Word in its words? Isn't it the same thing that T.S. Eliot had hinted at in his *The Wasteland*: 'the Word within the word—unable to speak a word'? Let us not assume that there are no responsible voices in Western literature today which can challenge the post-modern rhetoric: there are several of them as responsive to human condition today as their modernist predecessors were to their own times. Here is one example of the famous Peruvian writer, Mario Vargas Llosa who has this to say about Derrida, the idol of most of the post-modernists and their Indian followers:

> Each time I've tackled Derrida's obscurantist prose and suffocating literary or philosophical analyses, I felt I was miserably wasting my time because if literature is what Derrida believes it is—a succession of isolated, impermeable texts that have no possible contact with outside reality and are therefore immune to all value judgements—then why bother to deconstruct them ...? There is something deeply incongruous about a critical work that begins by proclaiming the essential inability of literature to influence life (or be influenced by it) and to transmit any kind of truths related to the human dilemma and then turn so eagerly to the task of demolishing those monuments of useless words, often with unbearably pretentious, intellectual self congratulation—to dismantle verbal objects whose construction is at best considered a formal game, a wordy and narcissistically gratuitous action that teaches nothing about anything except itself and is devoid of moral sense—is to make literary criticism an exercise in masturbation.[2]

Demolition of what is and its replacement with a verbose unreality—is all that post-modernism seems to amount to. In another essay entitled 'The Hour of the Charlatans', Llosa sums it all up as follows:

> According to Foucault, man doesn't exist, but at least his inexistence has presence, occupying reality with its versatile void. Barthes believed that real substance could be found only in style. For Derrida, real life is the life of texts, a universe of self-sufficient forms that modify and refer back to one another without ever coming close to addressing inessential human experience, that remote and pallid shadow of the word. Baudrillard's sleight of hand is even more categorical. True reality doesn't exist any more; it has been replaced by virtual reality, the product of advertising and media.[3]

No one can deny that we are living in an era of large-scale representation of reality that makes it difficult to understand the real world. But isn't this the inevitable consequence and logical culmination of 'cogito ergo sum', of the commitment of Western civilizational adventure to rationality, to theory laden observation, to the conceptual control of the universe? How can we feel and generate a genuine concern for the future of philosophy if we lend credence to these theorists and grant, in effect, the same status to them as we have hitherto granted only to philosopher? 'Isn't it clear', asks Llosa, the writer of the 'The Hour of the Charlatans', that nothing, not even media mumbo-jumbo, has

muddied our understanding of what is really going on in the world more than certain intellectual theories, which, like the wise men from one of Borges's lovely fantasies, pretend to embed speculative play and the dreams of fiction in real life.'[4]

Poetry and Philosophy, both wordy affairs, are expressions of man's urge to overcome his finitude. Both are fed from the dark and hidden springs to which only great mystics and yogis can have direct access. But, although, there has been a mutually enriching relationship between the two vocations in the past, and even in recent times, neither of them can do credit to itself by masquerading as the other. It is one thing for Heidegger to make himself a very deep reader of Hölderline's poetry: it does help him to look into the origins of Western philosophy in a new way. But theorists like Derrida and Baudrillard, by their penchant 'for embedding speculative play and dreams of literary fiction in real life' can only succeed in confounding literature and philosophy and, thus, help destroy the meaning or value of both.

At this point, one is suddenly assailed by waves of self-doubt and self-diffidence. What, after all, is one driving at and on whose authority? Doesn't one have one's own intellectual or, worse still, sentimental axes to grind? Is one sure of the ground one stands on, as one's own ground and of the voice one speaks in as one's own voice and not someone else's? What is the background music to one's fascination-cum-exasperation with the modern West and to one's secret, inarticulate, and suppressed, yet, still growing conviction that, notwithstanding all the apish and modish and self-condemning manifestations of the present scenario at home, it is India and India alone, with its much-maligned spirituality and poetics, which still has the potential to cure philosophy (even as 'a Western enterprise') of its terminal cancer and, thus, open the possibility of a future for it?

And what about its self-styled physician's crying need to seek a proper diagnosis and treatment for his own sickness?

In a very thought-provoking book called *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Professor Daya Krishna has stressed the urgent need to rescue the philosophical tradition of India from its entanglements with the long and varied spiritual quest of India and, also to relate this serious reappraisal of India's philosophic past to

the active philosophic concerns of the contemporary philosophical situations in India and abroad. He rightly perceives that the past intellectual tradition of this culture (like other non-Western cultures of the world) has become a matter of mere historical curiosity—thanks to the colonial experience—and has little relationship with the live intellectual concerns of today. The problem, therefore, in his view, 'is how to break this attitude and re-establish a living continuity with India's philosophical past to make it relevant to the intellectual concerns of the present'.[5]

Now, this very real, very urgent problem of 're-establishing a living continuity with India's philosophical past' had been paramount for K.C. Bhattacharya as well—the one modern Indian philosopher, whom Daya Krishna considers sufficiently worth his strife to merit close and prolonged attention and contention in his book. As a layman, I don't have the competence either to involve myself in, or to seek to resolve the dispute between them (regarding the centrality or tangentiality of the concept of Moksa for Indian philosophical traditions). Here, one can only note a certain correspondence between their concerns. Thus, Bhattacharya too in his own day felt extremely concerned about the failure of his countrymen to assimilate Western culture in an open-eyed manner with their old-world Indian mindset. 'That Indian mind', he said, 'has simply lapsed in most cases for our educated men and has subsided below the conscious level of culture.'[6] The way Bhattacharya defines this problem deserves our attention in the present context. The greatest danger, in his view, was our blind subservience to the so-called universalism of reason or religion, which, being the result of a rootless education, stood more than anything else in the way of 'Swaraj in ideas'.[7] There was, of course, the other danger as well—the danger of national conceit and obscurantism; but it needed less emphasis because, to quote his own words, 'Our educated men are readier to accept others' judgements about us than to resent them'.[8]

According to KCB, 'There is cultural subjection only when one's traditional cast of ideas and sentiments is superseded without comparison or competition by a new cast representing an alien culture which possesses one like a ghost.' He exhorts his fellow countrymen to shake themselves free from it, for that is the only way to experience a rebirth, that is, 'Swaraj in ideas'.

One gets the feeling—even as a layman—that this 'rebirth' recommended by KCB of the native philosophical intelligence or creative mind is the pre-requisite—in fact, the very condition—of any meaningful participation in the global debate about the future of philosophy in post-modernist times, envisaged by his successor here. Perhaps, behind both Daya Krishna's demolition of the currently accepted picture of philosophizing in India as well as his promised counter sketch of the way he conceives the tradition of philosophizing in India to be, lies the same anxiety which had prompted KCB in his famous lecture to underline and define that state of cultural subjection where one's traditional cast of ideas is superseded without comparison or competition by a new cast from an alien culture which possesses one like a ghost. But apparently, Daya Krishna's priority is different: his accent falls differently: the 'possession', the 'ghost', in his project can no longer be ascribed to an alien force. The ghost, for him, belongs to the territory of the native mind itself. One has to loosen the stranglehold of the picture that holds us all in its grip—the picture of India's philosophic past which even scholars accept without any questioning. Now it is a layman's wonder—but a wonder nevertheless—whether Daya Krishna has given sufficient consideration to a philosophical colleague like the late Professor J.L. Mehta who, like himself, was led into the realm of Vedology after a lifetime's grappling with contemporary developments in philosophy. Likewise, one finds oneself wondering why a modern example of the same old compound of philosophy, yogic experiences and poetry like Aurobindo should fail to attract his attention, whereas Professor Mehta had not only not found him irrelevant, but had devoted close attention to him in a monograph. One wonders whether 'the comparison or competition' which Bhattacharya had implicitly recommended in his lecture as part of his project for achieving 'Swaraj in ideas' remains equally relevant to Daya Krishna; but, what about the other complaint of 'blind subservience to the so-called universalism of reason or religion?' Bhattacharya had attributed it to a rootless education. Is the state of education in India, seventy-five years later, any better than it was in his days? 'Western thought is rooted in its own past', says Daya Krishna in his preface, 'and this is as it should be'. But then that is exactly what Bhattacharya was concerned about—

ensuring that Indian thought as well should be rooted in its own past and not in 'the so-called universalism of reason or religion', which he had rightly pointed to as 'the greatest danger'. One finds oneself wondering whether Daya Krishna, so sceptical and so trenchantly critical of 'the myths about Indian philosophy' is equally sensitive to 'the so-called universalism of reason or religion' propagated and inflicted by the philosophical and theological West on the rest of the world.

How is it and why is it that most of us Indians are so attracted and impressed by literature of the West, while barring very rare instances, most of their philosophers and theologians—once we have satisfied our initial curiosity about them—leave us either cold or exasperated? Daya Krishna has mentioned Huxley as a Vedantic enthusiast but leaves out of account Huxley's disenchantment with what he, in his characteristically incisive manner, had described as 'theological imperialism'. Daya Krishna also mentions Max Mueller in the same context but without taking due cognizance of the logical and theological axes which even this Indian idol of Western scholarship had had to grind. Here I may be allowed to quote from one of his famous lectures:

> In Raja Ram Mohan Roy's translation of the Upanishads we can clearly see that in his view of the deity and of the relation between the human and the Divine, he had never yielded an inch of his old Hindu conviction though his practical religion was saturated with Christian sentiments. The same mixture of Hindu thought and Christian sentiment can be seen in all the reformers. They could not surrender that ineradicable belief in the substantial identity of the eternal element in God and in man. My conviction is that great opportunities were lost then for planting Christianity on the old and fertile soil of India.[9]

Incidentally, this exasperation of Max Mueller 'with the old Hindu conviction of the substantial identity of the eternal element in God and in man' reminds me of a passage in J.L. Mehta's essay on Aurobindo which may not be quite irrelevant even to our present theme of the future of philosophy in the post-modernist condition, one of whose positive fallouts may well be the displacement and dethronement not only of theological imperialism of the West, but also of what KCB had designated as the 'so-called universalism of reason or religion' and which may ultimately involve the Descartian

as well as the Hegelian viewpoints. Not only that, but also the Greek humanistic orientation to the 'Polis'. I would like to quote here a passage from *The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man* by Somraj Gupta, a work which, as its very title suggests, is primarily addressed to the Faustian West, but is also concerned with the non-Western cultures whom KCB had portrayed as 'culturally subject to and superseded without comparison or competition' by the dominant West. This work is sub-titled 'A translation and interpretation of the Prasthantrayi and Sankara's Bhasya for the participation of contemporary man'; and in its tone and temper very much partakes of 'the post-modern condition' as defined by its most intelligent and responsible spokesman, viz., Lyotard. The passage I mentioned runs thus:

> The Greeks we know, found man—a being that lived among others... The polis was the ontological place, the ground of man; beyond it lay the desert, the home not of man, but of beasts. The desert and the polis were opposites for the Greeks..... the Indians, on the contrary, interiorised the forest into the village or the city so thoroughly that the capital city extended to it. For the forest was not merely the home of birds and beasts but also of rsis, seers.... the civilization that, in a sense, disowns itself; it does not find itself pitted against nature; rather it extends itself into that nature.[10]

From this understanding of Indian civilization as *Nature's* extension, *Nature's* step towards the Divine through the human, let us go back to what this author has to say in his preface to the second volume: this is important and worth-pondering in the context of what KCB had said regarding our subservience to the so-called universalism of reason. Somraj says:

> Modern man finds no use in the seer that fuses the forest into civilization. For him a system embodying his rationality is enough. The loneliness of the helpless old man does not add new dimensions to it, neither the tragedy of the unsuccessful man nor of the madman.[11]

This comparative perspective becomes all the more compelling because the author is by no means oblivious of the fall and disgrace of the very civilization he has sought to evoke in its pristine purity and also in its living exemplars. He had already diagnosed its sickness thus:

> The forest-polis civilization met its decline when the Brahmin became arrogant, holy and privileged...the culture was ruined when caste was divorced from asram–the system embodying the various stages of life. Caste turns into evil when the guiding spirit of renunciation embodied in the asram ceases to inform it.[12]

One wonders how Professor Daya would react to this observation of Somraj Gupta. It is this guidance of renunciation or Moksa that the author has sought to re-interpret and reinstate through his startlingly fresh and post-modern reading of the texts embodying that particular spirit. Besides his existentially authentic hearing of the ancestral voices, he has another weapon in his arsenal that he wields with consummate skill—his ability to invoke and yoke the internal evidence of great literature to drive home his point. Justifying this rather unusual and unprecedented approach, he says something which even the post-modernist theorists like Derrida and Lyotard can't afford to ignore:

> Indeed if truth be told, the literary tradition of the west provides better analogues to the spirit of the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta than its philosophers. I have often invoked Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and poets like Rilke and Wordsworth to communicate at least a part of the meaning of the Upanisadic vision.[13]

Somraj Gupta, thus, acknowledges the vital role of literary creativity in our philosophically destitute times. One involuntarily recalls here the seriousness with which Heidegger read Rilke and Holderlin in his desperate search for a breakthrough, a new departure in philosophy, during his own day. Let us now listen to the worthiest and yet the most independent and very Indian disciple of Heidegger—J.L. Mehta—whom we have already mentioned above. Let us recall what Max Mueller has said about 'the old Hindu conviction'—'the ineradicable belief in the substantial identity of the eternal element in God and in man'. Simultaneously, let us also keep in mind what Daya Krishna has to say about philosophy being or not being an essential and inalienable preliminary to spiritual liberation. Having done that, let us try to connect both these beliefs with this observation by J.L. Mehta:

> Poetry and philosophy, both wordy affairs, are expressions of man's urge to overcome his finitude, but they never allow this distance between man

> and transcendent reality to lapse totally. India, however, discovered yoga, following hints in the Sruti, but radicalizing its theory and practice even beyond the interiorization process envisioned in the Upanisads, and thus, found a way of eliminating the distance mentioned above. It ran a parallel course, outside the central Vedic stream, but often with close interaction between the two. In Aurobindo, these two converge again in an integral Yoga, which takes up within itself the modern Western idea of an evolutionary quantum leap in human kind.[14]

Now Heidegger, as explicated by J.L. Mehta, speaks of the experience of thinking, of thinking as itself an experience, appropriating within thinking the precious element of immediacy in all mysticism. Doesn't it go well with the language of K.C. Bhattacharya, in which, as Daya Krishna tells us, 'It is philosophic reflection alone which makes us aware of certain possibilities which demand to be actualized, even though the process of actualization itself is not philosophical in nature'?[15]

While drawing our attention to the forest-polis civilization of India and distinguishing it from the Greek enterprise, Somraj Gupta—as we saw above—made a very pertinent point, viz., that here was the civilization that, in a sense, disowns itself. Something similar can be seen operating in the language and discourse of philosophical thinkers like Sankara also, as Somraj Gupta frequently has demonstrated in the course of his commentary. Professor Mehta had also drawn our attention to the inbuilt correctives that Indian philosophical discourse has developed against the representational or objectifying elements. 'Perhaps the uniqueness of Indian philosophy and religion', he says in his essay called 'Heidegger and Vedanta', 'lies in the simultaneous de-objectification of the objectified, in the iconoclastic moment which is never for long absent from its iconism.'[16] This is, by the way, quite consistent with the Hindu ritualistic observances, where images are built and worshipped and celebrated only to be consigned later to a lake or a river. It occurs to me just now that there cannot be a better and more meaningful way to conclude this rather rambling discussion than with the words of Professor Mehta himself—the words that form the 'conclusion' of his essay. What, after all, is Post-Modernism except a revolt against the establishment (the religious, the Western metaphysical)? And what, after all, is this philosopher doing

except pondering over the future of philosophy in full cognizance of this event? Why not let him speak to us directly!

In the world of today—in this one world of 'world civilization'—our relationship to tradition is an irreparably broken one and our thinking is determined by an unheard-of simultaneity of times and places, all equally remote, all equally close. If the bringing together of Heidegger and Vedanta is to have any sense, it can only lie in enabling us to see that there is more to Vedanta—something that is its very own and yet unfulfilled—than providing those who are in revolt against the establishment, and in flight from thinking, with a mystical alternative; that as a way or path of thinking, not so much as a doctrine, Vedanta may also have some relevance to that other task to which Heidegger points, the task of planetary thinking, in an age of homelessness and of coming together of East and West in the extremity of fate, in the task of overcoming this universal misery of lost home by staying on the path, in genuine need, and learning, without straying from the path, even though faltering, the craft of thinking.[17]

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Relations and Pluralism

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ABSTRACT

The first half provides an appropriate background. It looks at intersubjectivity, showing how Edmund Husserl struggled between two conflicting viewpoints: the reality of human relations and the strictly subjective stance. We quote a few fragments from his posthumous drafts to let the illustrious author speak for himself as also to demonstrate how uncertain his thoughts were on the subject. Husserl repeatedly used the term 'monad'. A few quotations from Leibniz's *Monadology* should make clear why. The second half of this work offers a 'Brief Discourse on Pluralism'. Its purpose is to highlight the categories of relation and multiplicity against the opposite concepts of term and unity. Such an emphasis merely acknowledges what has been taking place in various disciplines for some time, an attempt that today has a special urgency, given the many striking developments in the sciences that we cannot comprehend adequately—or even accept—without changes in our basic categories.

I. LEIBNIZ'S *MONADOLOGY*

1. *The Anaxagorian Component in Leibniz's* Monadology

At the dawn of human thought, Anaxagoras stated: 'Everything is in everything'. This saying counters our own inveterate tendency to conceive each thing as being neatly packed within a circumscribed confine, a view that is no more than a first approximation of a more complicated reality barely suggested by the statement quoted above.

In the fifteenth century, Nicholas of Cusa made this same statement the title of a chapter in his *of Learned Ignorance.* He approved

of the concept, elaborating it as follows: 'The universe is in each individual in such a way that each individual is in it, with the result that in each individual the universe is by contraction what the particular individual is; and every individual in the universe is the universe, though the universe is in each individual in a different way and each thing is in the universe in a different way.'[1] Similarly, 'without any conflict, therefore, all is in each, because one degree of being cannot exist without another; e.g., in the body one member helps another and all members are harmoniously united in the body.'[2] And again, 'The result is that any member through any other is immediately in man; and just as the whole is in its parts—through being in anyone it is in every other—so man, as a whole, is in every member through being in any one.'[3]

This conception is contradictory in the sense that the opposite ideas of 'here' and 'there' coalesce into an antinomic complex within which these two ideas have no absolute boundaries: every here is there, and every there is here. Such contradictoriness would not deter Nicholas of Cusa, given that one of his basic tenets was the 'coincidence of opposites'. He was a forerunner of the belief in the positive value of antinomicity. In the words of Armand A. Maurer: 'He criticized the Aristotelians for insisting on the principle of noncontradiction and stubbornly refusing to admit the compatibility of contradictions in reality.'[4]

If we now read the second half of Leibniz's *Monadology*, we encounter the following Anaxagorian assertions: 'The interconnection, relationship, or adaptation of all things to each particular one, and of each one to all the rest, brings it about that every simple substance has relations which express all the others and that it is consequently a perpetual living mirror of the universe.'[5] And '... every body responds to all that happens in the universe, so that he who saw all could read in each one what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what will happen. He can discover in the present what is distant both as regards space and as regards time.'[6] Moreover, '... each created monad represents the whole universe.... And as the body expresses all the universe through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body.'[7] Finally, '... in the minutest particle of matter ... we see that there is a world of created things....'[8]

2. *The Pythagorean Component in Leibniz's* Monadology

Although nothing written by Pythagoras himself exists today, he seems to have been the first to use the term 'monad' in the sense of a primary unity, a fundamental limit of reality.[9] Here is how the notion resurfaces in the first half of Leibniz's *Monadology*: 'The Monad is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, we mean without parts.'[10] Again, '... where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension nor form nor divisibility. These Monads are the true Atoms of nature, and, in fact, the Elements of things.'[11] Similarly, '... a simple substance ... cannot be formed by composition.'[12] In addition, 'the Monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out; ... neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a Monad.'[13]

After these initial statements, contradictions begin to mount. Despite monads being point-like unities without extension, they are subject to change. Furthermore, 'the natural changes of the monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence upon its inner being. Now, besides this principle of change, there must also be in the monad a manifoldness which changes.... This manifoldness must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple ... even though it has no parts. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called Perception.'[14] The monad, which apart from being a unity without extensions, has no windows and cannot itself receive anything from the outside world is, nevertheless, analyzable into perceptions. This is so even though point-like monads cannot possible be real, given that points are only mathematical abstractions without interior. There are no points in the real world, as everything real has extension.

3. *The Juxtaposition of Both Components*

The first half of the *Monadology* is in obvious conflict with the second half. How can point-like units without windows be interconnected to the rest of the monads, express them all, and be 'a perpetual living mirror of the universe'?[15]

Enter God. At the center of his *Monadology*, Leibniz's God appears as a sounding board of each and every one of the monads. He is the Necessary Being that connects those solitary monads. It is through God, therefore, that monads relate to one another, participate in one another and in the world as a whole. Leibniz's God performs the impossible conjugation of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras—a truly antinomic mixture: '...the influence which one monad has upon another ... can have its effect only through the mediation of God... It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging Him to adapt the other to it...'[16] Thus, in the end, monads are not so helplessly closed into themselves by their having no windows. It is an extraordinary speculative feat that Leibniz pulls off in his essay, this conjuring of two outrageously contradictory viewpoints that together lay down a foundation of the universe. Many who were impressed by Leibniz's boldness used his monads in some way or another in their own speculations, from Kant to Husserl. Let us now look at the latter's thinking.

II. HUSSERL'S MONADOLOGY

4. *Minds as Monads*

Intersubjectivity—the fact that we relate to other selves and experience at times with other minds—was very important for Husserl. Why did he find Leibniz's *Monadology* useful to describe such a phenomenon? It was certainly not the Pythagorean component, as he used 'unity' extensively as a primary category long before he began to use the word 'monad'. There is no question that it was the Anaxagorian component that attracted his attention, even though it is not by any means clear how he ultimately intended to use that component, either as merely transcendental or also as worldly. Actually, to go through the monumental amount of written material he left on the subject leaves the reader with the sense of having been on a seesaw. On the one hand, we encounter statements such as the following: 'In the world, human beings exert "spiritual influences" on one another, they enter into contact on the spiritual level, they act on one another, from self to self; ... I take the other's will on me, I enact it. What I do I do not do

simply by myself, but the other's will is realized in my acquiescence, in my action. Having compassion, rejoicing with the other, I do not suffer simply as a self, but it is the other's suffering that lives in my suffering, or, as well, inversely, I am absorbed in others and I live in another person's life; in particular, I suffer another person's suffering, ... or I can form with the other a unity of will.'[17] Moreover, '... among my lived acts I find myself the agent of outside experiences, as I am a monad in a position to apprehend with certainty external monads similar to my own.'[18] And '... each monad of a community of monads is in community with each other.'[19] In addition, '... monads have the windows of a reciprocal causality specifically monadic and forming a pure "world of monads" as a causal real unity in the totality,'[20] and 'The other possesses me as a constituent self.'[21] Husserl also talks about 'concrete monads', about 'everything being related to everything' in the monad, about 'co-persons', that is, co-subjects that emerge in the intricacies of a consciousness that flows in relation, and that allow us to see more than one side of a given reality, since each monad not only has its very own point of view but also other monads' points of view.

On the other hand, some of Husserl's statements veer to the edge of solipsism. Pythagoras use of the Greek word 'monas' to denote unity was in addition to its usual meanings of alone, solitary, unique. Here are some examples from Husserl in this Pythagorean direction: '... each monadic totality is solitary....'[22] '... an outside monad cannot effectively realize itself *originaliter* in my experience.'[23] 'The other is a modification of myself.'[24] 'The monad is a "simple" essence, not breakable into fragments.'[25] At the root of this ambivalence lies Husserl's profound attachment to intentionality and to the phenomenological reduction, notions that turn out to be strong barriers in addressing the mind 'to things themselves' regarding intersubjectivity. Let us explain.

According to Franz Brentano, every mental phenomenon is characterized by being intentional, meaning that every act of consciousness is always consciousness-of-something, of some object immanent to the mind.[26] Husserl adopted this notion but emphasized more on the movement from subject to object rather than on the object itself. He introduced the words 'noesis' and 'noema' to refer to the apprehending activity of the subject and to the object

that is thereby apprehended. The arc, the direction, the structure of the intention was the chief subject of most of his descriptions. In contrast to Brentano's position, not all mental processes, however, are characterized by intentionality. An example of these is the sensuous process (or hyle), '*which has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality*', being, rather, the 'stratum from which the concrete intentive mental process arises.'[27] (Emphasis in the original.) The gap in the applicability of intentionality was not extended in general to intersubjectivity, although we have already pointed out sections in his drafts that lend themselves to another interpretation.

Husserl's use of intentionality led him to distinguish between the natural and the phenomenological attitudes. The former is the addressing of an object in its worldly context, while the latter involves putting reality 'between parentheses' and concentrating on the subjective aspects of an act of consciousness—what Husserl called the phenomenological reduction, an approach that presumably severs from the mind the world and anything else considered as real entities. This conception, systematically used by Husserl, is behind his waverings and inconclusiveness in trying to come to grips with intersubjectivity, a conception in sharp contrast with Max Scheler's position. For the latter said unequivocally: 'Everyone can apprehend the experience of his fellow-men *just as directly (or indirectly)* as he can his own.'[28] (Emphasis in the original.) It is ironic that Husserl criticized Scheler for the latter's conception of intersubjectivity as innate, and for not using the intersubjective reduction at all as well as ignoring the intentional structure of consciousness,[29] a criticism blind to the fact that both intentionality and the phenomenological reduction are barriers to any effective understanding of how other minds are actually present in our own consciousness. It is equally ironic that Scheler criticized the use of 'relics inherited from religious and metaphysical systems of the past (e.g., the Leibnizian metaphysics of monadic and spiritual individualism),'[30] even though his own analyses are decidedly Anaxagorian.

Here is Alfred Schutz's opinion: '... it is more than ever my conviction that Husserl's phenomenology cannot solve the problem of intersubjectivity, especially that of transcendental phenomenology, and this is its undoing.'[31] In turn, Aron Gurwitsch says: '... there is no transcendental consciousness, but rather only a constitutive function of consciousness. That eliminates the problematic of transcendental intersubjectivity: I and thou are mundane phenomena and pose mundane problems.'[32] As for the reduction, Gurwitsch states: 'There is no place in the body of phenomenological doctrines for the pure or transcendental ego, since there is no function left which it might assume.... The hypothesis of the transcendental ego thus turns out to be quite useless. It is even prejudicial.'[33] This radical criticism by two devoted phenomenologists is not meant to bring down Husserl's achievements: phenomenology will indefinitely remain one of the most fascinating and productive intellectual endeavours of the twentieth century. The point is rather to return to things themselves and not promote a kind of Husserlian orthodoxy through a methodology rigidly applied.[34] The presence of other minds in my consciousness is primarily a direct participation, innate, ineradicable, without any need for a mediate mental constitution to begin to function either subjectively or objectively. In the case of my wife, for instance, I know what she feels intimately, *originaliter*, I enjoy and suffer with her from the inside in a kind of natural communion. She is far from being a noematic construct; she is not in herself an unreachable noumenon transcending any shadowy representation of her in my mind—she lives in me as I live in her, an expression not to be taken as a mere metaphor, if intersubjectivity is going to have any meaning at all.

III. THE PRIMACY OF RELATIONS

5. *A Few Examples from Mathematics and Physics*

Monads surface again in mathematical guise in Abraham Robinson's Nonstandard Analysis. The Euclidian line has every point in it associated with a real number—its coordinate. One needs a special axiom for the line to have no gaps, or, in other words, for the line to be continuous: the so-called 'axiom of completeness of the line'. Robinson dropped this axiom and fit many additional points into the Euclidian line. He called the collection of new points that are closer to the point with zero coordinate than any other standard point 'the monad of the infinitesimals'. The reason for the name

'monad' is that each infinitesimal point is associated with a reciprocal one that is infinitely far away from the zero point. Thus, the complex 'infinitesimal-plus-its-infinite-reciprocal' has: (i) a component infinitesimally close to the zero point and (ii) a second component infinitely far removed from it. This may sound very abstract, but Nonstandard Analysis has many applications to mathematics, to physics, and even to economics.[35]

However, despite its fruitfulness and the interesting relationship it establishes between monads and 'galaxies' of infinites, Nonstandard Analysis does not make any change to the concept of relation itself. Infinitesimals and infinites are constructed first, and only then are their relations looked at. This is just one example of the way relations are thought of in general: first, terms have to be given, for relations between them to come into the picture at all—that is, relations must relate previously present objects, objects without which relations vanish. This seemingly natural conception has a hidden ontological viewpoint of the world not in total agreement with the facts. Actually, there are very good reasons why the genetic order of term and relation should be inverted. To remain in mathematics, let us consider F. William Lawvere's Theory of Categories. Categories are broad collections of mathematical structures—all possible algebras of a given kind, for example—put together to permit investigation of universal properties of the structures in question. The theory is based on the two fundamental notions of 'correspondence' and 'object'. But in studying the category of all sets, Lawvere turned objects into special cases of correspondences. That is, there are only pure correspondences in this theory. Let us be clear: we are not talking about correspondences between specific kinds of objects—algebras, sets, etc.—but about absolute relations independent of any other entity, correspondences that operate in a vacuum, so to say, correspondences that make nothing correspond to nothing, to use a startling expression to bring the idea home. In this theory, terms are derived items.[36]

This is only abstract mathematics, one might think, but in physics the same genetic upheaval is taking place in the so-called 'String Theory'. For long, one of the objectives of physics was to find the ultimate constituents of nature—its 'atoms'—if they exist. Ever

smaller particles were discovered, but they all ended up being embedded in fields of force, fields that established strong relations between the particles. No particle is isolated, each is part of a vast community of particles rooted in a maze of fields, particles so intimately intertwined with one another and with the fields in which they are placed that it is impossible to separate absolutely any one from any of the others. Gradually, the question naturally emerged as to whether a field is the product of the particles or the particles an accident of the field. In other words, whether there is a primacy of matter or a primacy of relations in the world. Searching for a unification of all physical fields—electromagnetic, gravitational and the various types of quantum fields—mathematical physics found a solution in the assumption that particles of any size are not the ultimate components of the universe, but rather that it is vibrating strings of energy, some infinitesimally small, others infinitely large—the so-called 'cosmic strings'—that build up physical reality. This String Theory is still in need of empirical confirmation. However, the feat of unifying all the highly disparate fields of force known at the present is of such theoretical significance that, regardless of whatever modifications the theory should undergo in the future, the idea of a plurality of relational strings of energy vibrating and building the cosmos is not going to be superseded easily.[37]

Now, physical fields of force possess a dynamic structure that is important to emphasize: the overall distribution of forces of the whole field affects the dynamic condition of each circumscribed region of the field and vice versa, that is, the dynamics of each region affects that of the whole field—the global is local, and the local is global. We used the expression 'multiple location' years ago to refer to this characteristic, which is also in evidence in any living organism: the state of the whole organism affects that of each of its organs, just as the condition of each organ determines that of the entire organism. There would be no life without multiple location, no physiology. Life is Anaxagorian.[38]

We can call 'principle of multiple location' the conception that every actual entity has to a certain degree and in its own characteristic fashion presence and interaction throughout reality as a whole. A very significant confirmation of this principle in the physical world is the discovery that the universe is nonlocal; that is, that

entities—photons, for example—interact with one another instantaneously, and in principle throughout the entire cosmos. This was first concluded by a now-famous theorem of John Bell's that proved—to his surprise—that signals and energy transfers between separated regions of the world can occur at speeds greater than the speed of light, in fact, instantaneously. This was later verified by some experiments. There is no issue in physics today more momentous than this revelation from quantum mechanics of the fact that the constitution of the cosmos is actually pervaded by multiple location. We are very far removed now from the notion that there is anything absolute in the idea that actual entities can be locally confined. In the fabric of the universe, relations are the primary rule.[39]

IV. A BRIEF DISCOURSE ON PLURALISM

6. *Rewriting Leibniz and Husserl*

The previous examples are offered to give special weight to some of the statements that follow. In the light of current shifts of emphasis in the sciences, we must review *The Monadology*. The chief issue to settle is how to give unity a secondary place in favour of multiplicity. There is an almost religious reverence for unity, and thinkers often rest content with using the concept without any further explanation, unity providing a halting point in all kinds of descriptions. We can bring about countless examples of reasonings that stop when unity is invoked as an ultimate characteristic that possesses quasi-ontological explicative powers. Thus, for instance, we talk about 'a unitary act of consciousness', even when the mind is a cluster of conflicting functions and contradictory dispositions. We do not mean to say that unity is necessarily irrelevant or inadequate, merely that it works too often as a superficial cover, a patch of concealment we throw over a complex reality to dispose of it. There are, of course, practical reasons for using unity so often and placing it in such exalted position; among other things, it allows us to stop analyzing further and proceed with action.

For the sake of argument, let us ask: Would it be possible to discard the notion of unity altogether? In his dialogue *Parmenides*, Plato asked rhetorically: 'What if there is no "one" but only "many"?' He rejected, of course, such theoretical possibility on several

grounds, but a reason he did not mention is that the mind needs the play of opposite categories to proceed dialectically—in effect, to reason at all, not to mention the fact that we constantly perceive both unity and plurality everywhere in mind and world. Our point is to emphasize pluralism because the primacy of relations implies a primacy of plurality. There is no way we can give relations a primary role in the organization of world and mind and then arrive at a situation in which unity would be the end-all, the satisfactory universal explanation of conflicts after a soothing emasculation of multiplicity. Unity is not gone, but pluralism must prevail.

As a consequence, in attempting to review *The Monadology*, we must begin by changing the title. The Pythagorean component has to take a backseat; in fact, we do not need to use the word 'monad' in the Greek sense at all. Let us briefly draft here the beginnings of what we might better call 'A Discourse on Pluralism'.

1. In the beginning there were relations. Then relations divided themselves and overlapped, and the resulting networks of relations became known as objects, or terms.
2. Physical entities as well as psychological acts are always relations of relations. In point of truth, there are no terms. Terms are concrescences of complex relationships, the appearance assumed by a field in a finite neighbourhood.
3. From the beginning, relations came in droves. They were never splinters of a single universal relation: this would be a kind of monism akin to the monism of substance, a possibility just as unsound as the opposite one of a world made up only of multiplicities. To focus on one single relation—which we often do—is always an act of abstraction.

Now, how is composing constructed? What is its nature? It is a generalized mistake (repeated by Leibniz) that a composite must be constituted by simples. Not true: the evidence points so far increasingly in the opposite direction. A composite is constituted by other composites, even by composites more complex than the given one.

4. There exists no simple substance, no simple actual entity, no final atom. Every actual entity is a composite, and its parts may be more intricate than the entire entity. The complexity of the universe is bottomless.
5. But substances, actual entities, are not mere unified aggregates either. In other words, they are not multiplicities taken as unities: their plurality is unalterable and cannot be put down as background. Although we can and do take a multiplicity as a unit for practical purposes, it is an ontological abuse to stretch the glorification of unity to the point of disguising the fact that, for the most part, multiplicities are irreducible.
6. Speaking absolutely, the local does not exist. Relations keep spilling out of any circumscribed location. They flutter and pull away even when they take the appearance of being independent terms.

According to Leibniz, monads are not only 'the true Atoms of nature', but also spiritual atoms, sentient substances without extension and without parts—hence indivisible, like points. However, point-like atoms do not have interior; they cannot even abstractly be used to describe any real aspect of world or mind. Most significantly, just as it is the case with every physical entity, the mind also has extensions. Its space is not Euclidian as is that of the world: distance, areas and volumes are not so important mentally. As Kurt Lewin has described so aptly, consciousness' extension divides into regions constantly changing in relative configuration independent of size. What matters is their being either connected or separated, one included in the other or split into disconnected subregions, etc., the boundaries of these regions being always very flexible. The space of the mind responds to a geometry that allows stretchings and shrinkings: it is what is called a topological space.[40]

7. When networks of relations take the role of physical objects, they may become highly solid, very hard to break. By comparison, the mind, also a network of relations, appears soft, mercurial, transparent as a phantom. Yet the mind is as real as a stone; to think the opposite is the outcome of drawing an impassable cleavage between mind and world. The truth is that the space of the mind intersects the space of the world, disparate as these two spaces are. The mind has room not only for one's own ego, for the other egos that visit it, for moods and feelings, but also for physical sensations that incorporate the real world into one's own consciousness, for desires and volitions that transform themselves into physical action and, hence, alter the world in the process. There is an overlapping intersection of mind and world: consciousness partakes and injects itself into the reality of the rest of the universe at exactly the same level of actuality of any other real entity.

According to Leibniz again, each monad constitutes a point of view with regard to the world and is the whole world from a particular point of view.[41] Perspectivism is a natural consequence of making relationism absolute.

8. Every actual entity has more than one form. We like to think of things as being exactly as we perceive them; we tend to identify our own unified perspective with the entire object or situation we are contemplating, even though we know we are only apprehending an aspect. Now, perspectives are absolute as far as they go; they may actually include a complete whole from a given angle; they are not unreal. Yet the fact remains that each concrete entity has at least one other side—in effect, many other sides, as many as the number of potential points of view from which the entity can be seized. Only when we look at a sculpture from many angles in succession can we feel that we are getting closer to an adequate, multiform picture of it, a picture that is refractory to any attempt to unify it. From each angle we obtain a partial view of the whole, absolute in its own way, the concrete whole being the irreducible multiplicity of all the views it can offer.

We have already mentioned Leibniz's idea that monads are subject to change, that they possess an internal principle that causes natural changes in them. Descartes had spoken before of a continuous creation, and Henri Bergson, of course, upheld the concept of a 'creative evolution'. Indeed, creativity must be a dimension of pluralism.

9. Everything is in a state of transition, but at the same time preserves an identity. Everything is constantly coming into existence, being created and creating, being originated and retained—this, while changing other entities and being changed by them in turn. What we are tempted to call the 'inside' of things is always open, public, affected by everything else. Ultimately, there is really no inside, because everything real—the mind included—has windows: anything can present itself in the flesh with its own creative momentum, its new transforming power.

Our basic categories have a hidden way of framing our behaviour regardless of how abstract they are, of how far removed from concrete life they might seem to be. Fundamental concepts affect our thinking, our vision of the world, and our awareness in general, hence, inevitably, our conduct as well. As already mentioned, the notion of phenomenological reduction—especially the intersubjective reduction—erects a barrier between the reality of my self and that of others, making the latter, in fact, evanesce. This reduction ends up acting as a metaphysical divider that generates a form of atomism: every mind retreating unto itself. How would this conception not affect social behaviour if it were to be earnestly sustained? Yet the reduction is no more than a form of concentration, the exertion of the power of attention intensively applied in a given direction. Any attempt to effectively 'put reality between parentheses' cannot possibly succeed; other minds, especially, can never be put between parentheses: they are too alive inside, too real, and their noeses too active for us to be able to do anything more than temporarily forget them if we can.

10. Attitudes develop in accordance with our vision of the surrounding world, a vision that is unmistakably shaped by the primitive ideas with which we think. In turn, attitudes lead to specific forms of conduct; in so doing, they create reality. That is, ideas produce visions, which produce attitudes, which produce behaviour—a natural sequence showing that action is as perspectivistic as sight. Influenced by our chosen categories, we look at a given situation with a personal bent, we take the situation as being appropriately apprehended by the individual perspective; from this perspective, a special disposition develops, and then an action takes place. This mental operation, 'to take this as being that', is the most momentous noesis embedded in an attitude: to take a perceived crisis as an opportunity, a possible course of conduct as either beneficial or harmful, desirable or not, etc. 'To take as' is a seemingly minor subjective act, but it has major objective consequences. It establishes a close relation between two independent entities, characteristics, realms, etc., a relation that sets new objectives and moves us in their direction.

11. 'To take as' is not only a phenomenological operation, it is also a logical one. The mathematician Georg Cantor defined the now fundamental notion of set as 'a multiplicity taken as a unit'. This simple conceptual juxtaposition—this relation—created a new logical entity that turned out to have the widest possible applications. In general, to assume that something is taking the guise of also being something else often strikes us as a kind of mental revelation; in these cases, even if such an insight takes place in a flash, the fleeting epiphany forces the mind to pay attention and us to act accordingly whilst captured by the new view.
12. There is an essential continuity of mind and world, an internal relation that makes each one constitute the other. Attitudes—complex, often focused dispositions—are part of that relation. They change the world to a degree—an example of how the local controls the global. But just because attitudes involve the ego, one should not conclude that the origin of every form of conduct is centered

at the ego. There are states of mind without the self that also make us act in one way or another. Moods, for example, are not necessarily centered in an ego; nevertheless, they may direct our behaviour. An ego-less mood has neither noeses nor noemas, no intentionality at all: it just floods consciousness with a stream of sentience. The ego, then, far from being the engine of the mind, is just one of its deposits—one more evidence of the ultimate relational nature of consciousness. Indeed, before anything else, the mind is an extended field within which arrow-like acts of apprehension originate belatedly, as a crystallization of the field, an aftereffect. We begin our conscious life as a spreading mass of selfless awareness. Yet, to view relations as enacting the ego rather than the other way around, does not take anything away from the power, the characteristics, and the creativity of the ego; it only places things in their proper ontogenetic order. Whereas in an intentional act we tend to see the self as the origin of consciousness, during a selfless mood the mind exists in a state akin to the sense of coenesthesia in which sensations are not focused but comprehend extended regions of the body in toto. Our normal marginal consciousness—sensing beyond the threshold of clear-cut understanding—is nothing other than the spilling of that spreading sensibility functioning in mass.

13. We sense the presence of others in our own consciousness. We often think with other minds, perceive what they induce us to perceive, sense their feelings as our own. Not that we are necessarily crowded by the others—not usually—but we regularly live in an intersubjective world, not through a process of constituting a mental representation of other minds but by a direct presentification of the others that takes effect with various degrees of intensity and prominence. Our conscious life emerges in the midst of real intersubjective relations through a steady incorporation of their networks. As Goethe said: 'One is always indebted to others for what one is.'[42]

14. The presence of others in one's mind—partial as it may be—implies that several noeses act simultaneously within each consciousness. This is the case, for example, any time we adopt somebody else as a model. Even in solitude this social intercourse takes place. Yet we do not have to fear a loss of identity in the process. One's own idiosyncratic initiatives are not usually superseded by the fact that it is our natural fate to be with others, even after the others die. The intimate dialogue continues despite the others fading in importance with time—a normal signature of what it means to be human. We are a multitude, and we should look at this as a kind of sacred gift.

Alfred North Whitehead denounced 'the fallacy of simple location' as a conceptual barrier to grasping concreteness in the flesh. The fallacy consists in thinking that things are what they seem to be in the limited extension of space and time they apparently occupy at first approach. This view has to be abandoned entirely, he said, adding in true Anaxagorian and Cusanian fashion: 'Everything is everywhere at all times.'[43] The fallacy, though, is deeply rooted in tradition, which explains the difficulties even very sophisticated scientists have in coming to grips with the bizarre conclusions drawn from subatomic physics—such as non-locality, for example. The same cherished categories that have prevailed since Aristotle may also make the 'Brief Discourse on Pluralism' just barely outlined above difficult to reconcile with established conceptions. If so, we can only recommend Husserl's motto: 'To things themselves'!

Notes and References

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Court Publishing Co., 1962), p. 263. The idea appears also in Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics*, ibid., pp. 14, 15.

6. Ibid., pp. 264-65.
7. Ibid., p. 265.
8. Ibid., p. 266.
9. This on the authority of Hippolytus, *Philosophoumena*, 1, 2.
10. Leibniz, loc. cit., p. 251.
11. Ibid., p. 251.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 252.
14. Ibid., p. 253.
15. Ibid., p. 263.
16. Ibid., p. 262.
17. E. Husserl, *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, tr. Natalie Depraz (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), Vol. II, pp. 531, 532. Cf. E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*. I. Kern (ed.), The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1973, Vol. II, pp. 268-69. The German edition follows the strict chronological order of Husserl's drafts. The French edition organizes the material around a few main themes. Both editions are incomplete, both contain repetitions and contradictory statements, as Husserl kept returning repeatedly to the same subjects. The German version has the irreplaceable value of any original; the French one, with its methodical arrangements, is very useful for the student of such an inordinate amount of material.
18. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 539; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 358.
19. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 540; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 359.
20. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 541; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 360.
21. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 560; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 602.
22. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 529; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 267.
23. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 543; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 361.
24. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. I, pp. 127-130; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, pp. 523-25.
25. *Sur l'intersubjectivitée*, Vol. II, p. 484; *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, p. 35.
26. F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Oskar Kraus (ed.) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 88-89.

27. E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, First Book, tr. by F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 203. By 'sensuous' mental processes Husserl refers, for example, to 'color-Data, touch-Data, tone-Data, and the like' by themselves—that is, not as 'appearing moments of physical things'.
28. M. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, tr. by P. Heath, Hamden (CT: Archon Books, 1970), p. 256.
29. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Vol. II, pp. 335-36.
30. Scheler, loc. cit., p. 215.
31. *Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch*, R. Gradhoff (ed.), tr. by J.C. Evans (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 30.
32. Ibid., p. 238.
33. A. Gurwitsch, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 291.
34. Husserl's own restless mind is the chief enemy of any such possible orthodoxy. Eugen Fink pointed out that, 'According to Husserl's ideas in his very late manuscripts, there is a primal life which is neither one nor many, neither factual nor essential; rather, it is the ultimate ground of all these distinctions.' It is impossible to say how this stand would have interacted with the rest of his changing positions. Cf. A. Schutz, *Collected Papers* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), Vol. III, p. 86.
35. Robinson's construction can be iterated indefinitely and thus create a succession of monads within monads, and hence an associated succession of new, ever farther 'galaxies' of infinites (the word 'galaxy' being Robinson's own). See F.G. Asenjo, 'Generalized Reals', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, XI (1970), pp. 473-76.
36. Cf. F.W. Lawvere, *An Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets*, Chicago: Publications of the Mathematics Department of the University of Chicago, 1968. This work 'supports the thesis that even in set theory and elementary mathematics it is true what has long been felt in advanced algebra and topology, namely, that the substance of mathematics resides not in Substance (as it is made to seem when "set membership" is the irreducible predicate, with the accompanying necessity of defining all concepts in terms of a rigid elementhood relation) but in Form (as is clear when the guiding notion is defined by universal mapping properties),' 'mapping' being another word for relation, pp. 1-2.
37. Cf., for example, B. Zwiebach, *A First Course in String Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also B. Greene, *The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999).

38. There would be no intersubjectivity without multiple location, either. For an elaboration of this point, see my book, *In-Between: An Essay on Categories* (Washington, DC and London: University Press of America and Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, 1988).
39. Cf., for example, R. Nadeau and M. Kafatos, *The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters of the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
40. K. Lewin, *Principles of Topological Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).
41. G.W. Leibniz, loc. cit., p. 263.
42. Quoted by A. Schutz in *Philosophers in Exile*, loc. cit., p. 160.
43. A.N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 91. It is worth noting that Michael Faraday, who in 1844 introduced the term 'field of forces' into physics, claimed at that time that 'Matter is not only mutually penetrable, but each atom extends, so to say, throughout the whole of the solar system, yet always retaining its own center of force.' See John Tyndall's *Faraday as a Discoverer* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1870), pp. 151-52.

Mind, Consciousness and the World: Two Metaphysical Models

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What is attempted here is a study of two metaphysical models which deal with the relation between consciousness and the world. These two models are the well-known materialist and the non-materialist models that have attempted to unravel the mystery regarding the relation between the conscious mind on the one hand and the physical world on the other. The materialists have explained the relation in terms of the primacy of matter, while the non-materialists have emphasized the primacy of the conscious mind. For the former, consciousness has evolved from matter, while for the latter, matter itself is a projection of the conscious mind.

The main issue in this article is to examine if the claims of the materialists in their multifarious forms are logically valid, that is, whether the idea that matter is the primary stuff of the universe is logically consistent in the ultimate analysis. There have been philosophical attempts at proving that there could be an alternative model of explanation in which matter could be viewed as secondary to the primary reality of consciousness. It is to be noted that the non-materialist model could be found facing an uphill task in disproving something which has been accepted as paradigmatically true in science as also in commonsense.

My effort here is not to disprove the materialist account of consciousness and the world by any means, not least to show that materialism is not a successful philosophical doctrine, but to argue that non-materialism could have a point which the materialistically inclined philosophers might have missed. My modest suggestion is this: we could vary our way of understanding ourselves and the world by positioning the conscious mind at the centre and then viewing the entire universe, including other human beings, from

the first-person point of view. Maybe, we may get over some problems posed by modern physical sciences, including cognitive science, which take the conscious mind as nothing more than a complex machine. I wonder if there could there be a way out of the mechanistic explanation of the universe and the conscious mind which is so popular in contemporary times.

WHAT IS IT TO BE A CONSCIOUS BEING?

The most notable point, to begin with, is the fact of consciousness as manifest in human beings and other animals. The conscious phenomena which are otherwise known as mental phenomena are ubiquitous, though they vary in degree from species to species. While the human beings have higher degrees of consciousness, the sub-human animals have lower degrees. Thought and language are the basic parameters of consciousness so far as the consciousness of human beings is concerned. However, the most notable feature of human consciousness is its subjectivity.[1] It is this feature that brings in the concept of self-consciousness as distinguished from other-consciousness. The self is the first-person conscious being that can refer to himself or herself as the 'I' and the others as 'you', 'he', 'they', etc. These self-referring acts of the I or the self constitute the first-person[2] point of view which is underwritten by consciousness. In other words, the first-person point of view is precisely the view of the conscious mind which posits itself as the centre of the universe and, thus, views itself as the centre of consciousness. It does not, however, rule out the fact that other centers of consciousness are real and that it, thus, exists in a non-solipsistic universe.

However, what characterizes the first-person account of consciousness is its subjectivity and its being self-referring. To say that 'I am so and so' is to underline the fact that I am the subject that has awareness of myself and of whatever exists around me. This self-awareness is the basic feature of self-consciousness that cannot be alienated from myself; hence there has to be a distance between myself and the others. My self is the primary metaphysical reality so far as I am concerned, but that does not rule out the fact that every conscious being has its primary metaphysical reality from its own point of view. The self is the metaphysical reality that accounts for the fact that there is a relation between me and other

beings, and between me and other things in the universe. These relations are themselves part of consciousness because myself and my relations constitute my metaphysical reality which is my being as a conscious being.

The fact that I am not alone in the universe speaks for the fact that there are many centres of consciousness and all of us together have a common point of view. There is convergence in the points of view owing to the fact that there is a common universe which all of us inhabit. Consciousness is the meeting ground of all conscious human beings so that we forge a unifying bond of human consciousness. The non-human consciousness is itself a matter of our understanding so far as we view the other animals as conscious but quite differently. The hierarchy of consciousness within the animal world cannot be ruled out because human consciousness is found to be more evolved and more sophisticated because of the presence of language and thought. Animals lack both language and organized thought and so are placed in the lower rung of the evolutionary ladder. The evolutionists have a point in saying that consciousness evolves through a process of emergence[3] of new properties in constant interaction with the world.

SELF AND THE WORLD

The conscious being, we have been discussing so far, is the being that has a mind or has consciousness. It is otherwise called the self or the subject of consciousness. Traditionally, the self is taken to be the 'I' that has consciousness. It is identified as the knower, the thinker and the actor, all rolled into one because of the fact that the self is the subject to which we ascribe all our knowledge, thought and action. The knowing self is also the thinking self, the *cogito,* and the agent responsible for innumerable actions. Descartes[4] has made this thinking self, the *cogito,* the primary reality in his inquiry into the foundations of human knowledge. The thinking self is also the starting point of his inquiry into the nature of the world, though he admits that God is the creator of both the self and the world.

Within the Cartesian framework, it is necessary to assume that self and the world are the opposite poles which God has put together for the sake of the coherence of the plan of the universe. Neither the self nor the world or, for that matter, neither mind

nor matter can exist without the divinely arranged plan of mutual existence. The Western philosophy, science and culture presuppose this Cartesian mind-body dualism for the simplicity and also the coherence which it brings into our thinking about ourselves and the world. Self and the world are two distinct ontological entities which co-exist—in fact, mutually interact—according to this grand Cartesian plan. This has laid the foundations for the twentieth-century metaphysics and science. It is against this background that we have the problem of the relation between our consciousness on the one hand and the physical world on the other.

By 'world' we, of course, mean all that stands opposed to the self, that is, the not-self. It includes every thing and being other than the self. This is how the word world has been used in philosophy, though in science it exclusively means the physical world. In Wittgenstein's terminology, the world is the totality of facts[5] which includes the facts regarding the physical as well as the psychological phenomena. In this sense, the world includes not only the *physical world* but also the *mental world.* But if we take Wittgenstein's stand in the *Tractatus* seriously, we have to admit that self, in the transcendental but not the empirical sense, does not belong to the world and that it is the limit of the world.[6] From this point of view, the world cannot be taken as the totality of physical facts alone. It must include the mental facts also so far as they are matters of empirical investigation. Thus, consciousness in its empirical manifestations, must belong to the world. However, the self remains outside the realm of both physical as well as mental facts.

The dualism between the self and the world is the implicit presupposition of our understanding of ourselves and the world. Self is bound to be distinguished from the world for obvious metaphysical reasons. Even Wittgenstein, in spite of his anti-Cartesian leanings, has not been able to abolish this distinction, as he has tried to make the self the limit of the world and not an item in the world. Therefore, the self-world distinction remains a metaphysical presupposition of Wittgenstein's world-view. This underlines the fact that we cannot deny the reality of self in our understanding of ourselves and the world.

The world we are referring to is not a closed world, as it has not finally been given shape by an acosmic Creator. The world is a self-evolving system of objects and events, all concatenated into facts of the most understandable kind. This system has to be accepted as an open system given the fact that the world evolves new patterns of reality in its complex web of facts. Science studies this world in its multiplicity of aspects and in its unending complexity. The self that is presupposed by the world is the source of the ideas and concepts all scattered in language. These concepts apply to the world and become the instruments through we represent the world. Thus, the self has to be the transcendental presupposition of the world. Language and our conceptual schemes all necessitate the existence of a transcendental self—the self that cannot be assimilated into the vortex of the physical and the psychological facts in the world.

THE LIMITS OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

The Cartesian legacy in philosophy emphasizes the reality of a material world which is the object of investigation of the physical sciences. The physical world is so called because it includes only physical objects and the laws which govern them into a closed system. Modern science has been committed to the idea of a closed universe[7] for the simple reason that the physical laws are operative in this universe and that these laws discovered by the physical sciences can explain the universe. This assumption of finality of the physical laws is one of the hallmarks of the Newtonian-Eisteinian science which is based on the metaphysical belief that physics alone can explain the world.

However, the idea of a physical world is itself changing over the centuries. The Cartesian concept of matter as a substance has been a thing of the past. New ideas of matter have been introduced by philosophers and scientists alike keeping in view the changes in their world-views. The idea of matter of the quantum physicists, according to whom the physical universe does not have a determinate structure and so is governed by the principle of indeterminacy,[8] is new and innovative. The quantum world is supposed to have an open-ended structure not mapable by classical mechanics. This shows that the structure of matter as conceived in classical physics is no

more available. The new model of the physical universe has accepted many imponderables into the universe by excluding the classical determinate causal laws.[9]

From the new revolutions in the physical sciences, two important conclusions may be derived: first, that the universe appears less and less physical, the more deeply we understand it and second, we, the observers, that is, the thinkers are no more detachable from the universe in the old-fashioned Cartesian manner. In other words, the idea of an unbridgeable gulf between mind and matter is no more valid as it was in the seventeenth century. Now there is a free play between the observer's mind and the world. Besides, now there is something like the *mind-world*[10] rather than *mind and world.* All this shows that we can revise our definition of the physical universe and seriously take the idea that it is the mind that matters most in the universe rather than the universe itself without a mind. But this is not to suggest that the universe is not outside the mind and that everything is the mind's play.

Another bold suggestion which has come from philosophers like Kant and Putnam is that the classical empiricist model of the universe can be revised in view of the fact that we the observers have a lot to contribute to the structure of the universe, if not to its existence.[11] So far as the existence of the universe is concerned, there is no doubt that it exists even before we start thinking. But its structure has been a matter between us and the universe itself. That is, we draw the plan of the universe according to our categories which play a creative role in revealing what the universe basically is. As Putnam argues, there are no readymade[12] objects in the universe; all objects are infested with our categories. If we pursue this argument further, we can find that there is not much meaning in keeping the universe away from us, as if we are strangers to this universe. In fact, our relation with the universe could be much more than what our sense-experiences can reveal.

In view of the above beliefs, it can be said that the physical world has been slipping away further and further from the so-called physicalist net with the advance of our knowledge of the universe. We can, therefore, say that there is more to the universe than the physical sciences can reveal within any specific model. In other words, in a way there could be an unending series of models of the

universe shaped by the human mind. It is the mind that makes the universe, as Kant had declared long ago, and what is being emphasized by Putnam in our times.

'MIND MAKES NATURE': CAN MATERIALISM WORK?

If we assume, along with Kant and Putnam, that the mind makes the world in the limited sense articulated above, then we can further argue that materialism as a metaphysical theory cannot hold good because, for it, mind is inert, inactive and is at best a part of the material world. If mind belongs to the material world either as a consequence of matter or as an accidental feature of the complex organization of matter, then the question of its making the material world cannot arise. That is, if the mind is itself a part of the material world, then it cannot also be the maker of the world.

Materialism as a metaphysical theory has much to explain why the mind is a part of Nature and not its maker. So far as the argument that mind is a part of Nature goes, the classical as well as modern materialists believe that matter is the primary stuff of the universe and that the mind is itself possible because of a complex organization of matter.[13] What is buttressed as their main argument is that matter gives rise to what we call consciousness or the mental phenomena. That is, mind and consciousness are causally supervenient[14] on matter in such a way that whatever properties the former have cannot but be determined by the latter. The supervenience thesis is the tool with which modern materialists strengthen the epiphenomenalist theory of the mind for proving that matter is written large throughout the universe, thus, establishing complete causal determinism.

The theory of causal dependence or supervenience of mind on matter has to explain many things in order to prove its point. First of all, it has to explain how consciousness comes into being from the matrix of matter; and second, how the conscious mind can be an active agent in spite of its dependence on matter. The first question is the most crucial. The supervenience theorist argues that the mental phenomena are basically physical phenomena in a new garb. That is, they are called mental for the purpose of convenience; in essence they are physical. The mental and the physical are ontically identical though from the descriptive point of view

they are different. This position is called anomalous monism[15] in the words of Donald Davidson. One can see here the point made by the materialist that mind is identical with matter, even though we have to recognize the mental as something real in our conceptual framework. It is an anomalous position because we have no way to reduce the mental to the physical because there are no psychophysical laws, though we know that matter alone is ultimately real in the universe.

If reductionism is true, then we have no way to explain how the mind can be active in the universe and can intervene in its processes. Mind as an active causal agent[16] has a very significant role to play in initiating changes in the world. These changes are most often in the form of human actions which make a difference to the physical world. Physical changes like movements of objects and their transformations are due to human interventions in the world. Though the physical laws of the universe cannot be changed by the human actions, human beings can bring about new events in the world within the framework of the physical laws. Thus, mental causation of physical events is as real as the physical causation of the mental events. Mental events are a significant part of the universe just like the physical events.

Materialism denies that mental events have any causative power and that they have as much reality as the physical events. It holds that mental events are, in any case, supervenient to the physical events and that they have only a secondary or derivative reality. But this may not actually be the case. A non-materialist can argue that physical events, though real, do not rule out the reality of mental events and that the mental events need not be identical with the physical events.[17] The mind-body identity theorists have not convincingly argued why mental and the physical events are identical at all. They leave open the possibility that the mental events are characteristically different from the physical events, not only in language but also in reality. That mind assumes new properties, called emergent[18] properties, in the process of its evolution from matter cannot be denied.

If supervenience of mind on matter is the central doctrine of materialism, then there is scope for the argument that it has not finally clinched the issue in favour of materialism. Supervenience

is still inconclusive so far as the logical dependence of mind on matter is concerned. If newness of mental properties is admissible, then it is evident that mental properties are not strongly supervenient on the material properties. Even a weak form of supervenience can be doubted if there is strong evolutionary reason to argue that mind is *de facto* a new reality in the universe.[19] John Searle's neo-emergentist[20] argument in this regard can be taken as a serious challenge to materialism and its supervenience thesis.

THE 'HARD PROBLEM' OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The failure of materialism is further reinforced by the theory of the 'hard problem' of consciousness raised by David Chalmers.[21] This problem is called thus because it shows that there is no easy solution to the problem as to why there is consciousness in a physical universe. That is, even if we can provide a functional explanation of the conscious mental states, we cannot explain exactly why there are at all conscious mental states like the first-person experiences and their qualia.[22] The 'hard problem', thus, draws our attention to the fact that we have no standard scientific explanation of the presence of consciousness in the universe. This problem so formulated shows the limitations of the materialist explanation of conscious mental states. In fact, it shows that the standard physicalist and functionalist explanation of the mental states is inadequate, if not downright wrong.

Chalmers argument in this regard is worth serious discussion for two reasons. First, it draws our attention to the fact that the problems about consciousness are not all about its functional and mechanical operations, that is, about how it works in the human system, since cognitive science has more or less succeeded in showing the different mechanisms operative in the conscious human organisms. Second, it draws our attention to the important fact that the easy solutions provided by cognitive science are too easy to be able to show why there is conscious experience at all. Both the reasons are worth probing, though there could be argument that the so-called easy solutions are not at all easy.[23] Besides, it may be argued that the hard problem is raised as matter of intellectual curiosity and not as a serious scientific problem at all. But the fact remains that it is a serious philosophical problem and is worth

philosophical investigation. It at least shows that the materialist and the mechanist explanations are not enough.

If we take Chalmers argument seriously, we will find that we are on the side of those who do not denounce the dualism between mind and matter and those who reject reductionism as a serious philosophical option. In other words, we are inclined to believe that we cannot treat the mental phenomena as the mere transformations of the physical and that we have not so far discovered the physical laws which can also explain the mental phenomena without residue. The anti-redunctionist stance provides some scope for arguing that everything is not well with materialism.[24]

The materialist's attempt to do away with the first-person experiences, especially the qualia[25] does not succeeded, because these experiences are part of the phenomenological history of the individual selves. These experiences constitute the personal history of the conscious human beings. These cannot be reduced to the states of the brain or the physical states of the organism. The attempt at quining qualia[26] fails because of the fact that qualia are the key to the structure of the first-person experiences and that there can be no physical states equivalent to them in the human organism. Machines and other non-conscious entities like zombies can never be imagined to have qualia, because of the fact that they have no consciousness. The presence of consciousness entails the presence of qualia.

The most important fact to be noted in this connection is that the denial of materialism is not the denial of matter altogether, at least not the denial of the commonsensical fact that consciousness is manifested in the human organism. Without there being a human organism, there would have been no consciousness. But this does not entail that consciousness is nothing more than a state of the physical body of the organism. Consciousness is a real feature of the bodily organism without being identical with the bodily state. This explains the fact that there could be a body without consciousness; that is the body could have loss of consciousness as in the case of death or coma. Consciousness is a new feature in the body that needs a phenomenological explanation, and not a mere physical reduction.

BEYOND THE NATURALISTIC EXPLANATIONS

The physicalist explanations are inadequate because they attempt to reduce conscious experience to the physical states of the body, especially to the neurophysiological states of the brain. For these, to experience is to be in a certain brain state. That is why the conscious states are taken as a species of physical or neural states. Neurophysiology makes an attempt to reduce the conscious states to the neural states of the brain, as Churchland[27] has pointed out. The neurophysiological explanations most conspicuously offered by Churchland go only to a certain extent in explaining how consciousness arises, but they cannot go very far. They leave out the fact that the neural states themselves need to be experienced by a conscious mind. Therefore, consciousness always escapes the neurological net which attempts to capture consciousness within its reductive categories. Neurophysiology itself is in need of a phenomenology of consciousness that posits consciousness as an undeniable fact.

Another attempt to explain away consciousness is by Dennett[28] who believes that conscious experience is due more to the way the human organism functions with regard to the environment rather than to the inner structure of the conscious mind. The conscious mind is a myth, according to him, because the brain functions in certain modular way to project the conscious experiences. The conscious states are ascribable to the human system because of a certain intentional stance[29] which brings in the intentional states like belief and desire. The belief-desire psychology is imposed on the machine-like human brain and that explains why we can offer intentional explanations of human experience. Dennett's theory misses the main feature of the human experiences, that is, the intentionality of consciousness which is real and is embedded in the human consciousness. Dennett's physicalist explanations are a limiting case of the naturalistic explanations of consciousness much favoured by the naturalists like Fodor, Dretske and many others in recent philosophical psychology. The more we struggle with the naturalistic explanations of this sort, the more we realize that we are far from understanding consciousness.

The explanations belonging to the same genre as above are those of the functionalists who believe that human mind/brain is

like a digital computer. The early Putnam[30] is reputed to have floated this theory known as functionalism which modelled the human mind on the computer or the Turing Machine. Alan Turing[31] was the first to suggest that the human mind functions like a calculating machine which is designed to use algorithms to make complicated calculations. Following Turing, Putnam suggested that we can have an entire set of mapping functions in a computational table which can represent the functions of the brain. Thus, it became handy to explain the mental states as a variety of machine states which can be equally realized in multiple media like the human body, a computer or any such machine. This is called the muti-realizabilty[32] thesis which supposedly does away with the idea that mind is parochial to the human body. Nonetheless, it shows that mind is nothing more than a computing machine.

However, it can be seen that functionalism is another version of reductionism which made the human mind look like a machine with a finite capacity. The digital machine is no more than a finite body that is sufficiently manipulated to simulate mental functions. Therefore, Putnam realized later that human mental functions are deeper than those which the machine simulates. His advocacy of broad or wide contents of the human mental states goes towards liberating the human mind from the narrow contents of the mechanical mind.[33] Functionalism does not work because of its inherent commitment to physicalism and reductionism.

The fact that naturalism as a theory of explanation of consciousness has limitations cannot be denied. Though consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it cannot be denied that it is amenable to a non-naturalist framework of explanation provided by phenomenology.[34] This is obvious because of the fact that the natural sciences themselves have not resolved the mystery of consciousness. Since consciousness is a fundamental fact about us, we are in need of a fundamental science to probe deep into this fact, that science may be a metaphysics of some sort which takes a comprehensive view of the conscious phenomena in the universe.

NATURE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: RESOLVING THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Now the question arises: Could there be a final resolution of the mystery of consciousness? The fact that there is a mystery of some

sort regarding consciousness is acknowledged by many philosophers. But it is not a mystery in the sense that we can never study it with the help of the natural sciences. What is suggested by the mystery is that we cannot provide a final scientific solution of the problem. It remains an open-ended problem because it is the most fundamental—or to speak with Chalmers—the 'hard problem', so that the more we investigate into the nature of consciousness, the deeper structures of it we come to discover. It is not a hard problem just because we have not got the last scientific solution to it, as Chalmers[35] seems to suggest, but because we do not know how to explain consciousness which is the source of the mind itself which seeks all explanations. Consciousness is the primary reality that is the source of language, thought and all mental constructions. Hence, we cannot rest content with the idea that consciousness is just another natural phenomenon to be studied by the natural sciences.

The materialist model of explanation has been found to be inadequate to deal with the problem of consciousness. Hence, a variety of non-materialist explanations have come into existence. The most important among them is that of the dualists who do not allow the mental phenomena to be reduced to physical phenomena. It is the primacy of consciousness which they are keen to prove. Of course, this is not easy to prove given the materialist presuppositions of modem science. All that we can argue for is that there is still a level of understanding of consciousness which is not naturalistic and materialistic. That entails that we can ensure the intelligibility of consciousness even without appealing to the idea of digital computers or the mechanistic models provided by the physicals sciences. In short, we can look beyond the appeal to the contemporary models of cognitive science.[36]

The non-materialist alternative model available in metaphysics is of those who view mind and consciousness as metaphysically real. For them, consciousness is the primary reality which provides intelligibility to the universe itself. They raise the questions: Without the conscious mind how can we conceive of a universe? For whom will the universe be intelligible? The answer is: not the universe or Nature itself, but something other than it. That something other is the conscious mind—the mind that thinks, formulates ideas, testi-

fies them and so on. That mind cannot be part of Nature; it must be presupposed by Nature. This fact remains the Archemedian principle of all non-materialism which makes a valiant effort to posit the primacy of consciousness. From Berkeley to Hegel to Putnam, all have taken the conscious mind to be metaphysically fundamental and have taken the universe as having a form imposed on it by the conscious mind.

To conclude: the conscious mind needs a metaphysical study from the point of view of non-materialism so that we can see how the universe appears from this perspective. That may look slightly unconventional at present, but it is deeply laid in the mind of man that mind is the source of all that we take to be scientific, even materialistic. Hence mind has quite a deep metaphysical structure underlying it.[37]

Notes and References

1. See John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of Mind* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), Chapter 4.
2. See Llyod Morgan, *Emergent Evolution,* 2nd Edition (London: Williams and Norgate, 1927; First Edition, 1923).
3. Ibid., Chapter 5.
4. Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Other Writings,* trans. Arthur Wollaston (Penguin Books, 1960).
5. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 1.1.
6. Ibid., 5.632.
7. I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, *Order out of Chaos* (Toronto, New York and London: Bantom Books, 1984), Introduction.
8. F. Capra, 'The Tao of Physics' in Michel Cazenave (ed.) *Science and Consciousness: Two Views of the Universe* (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), Part 1.
9. Ibid.
10. David Bohm, 'The Enfolding-Unfolding Universe and Consciousness' in Michel Cazenave (ed.) *Science and Consciousness,* for the notion of 'the implicate world order' in which consciousness and reality are involved with each other.
11. Cf. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan Press, 1929; Reprinted in 1980). See also Hilary Putnam, 'Why there isn't a readymade world?' in *Realism and Reason* (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 205-28. Both accept that mind makes a difference to the world in terms of its categories.
12. Cf. Hilary Putnam, 'Why there isn't a readymade world?' in *Realism and Reason,* pp. 205-28.
13. J.J.C. Smart, 'Materialism' in *Essays Metaphysical and Moral* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 203-14. See also his 'The Revival Of Materialism' in *Essays Metaphysical and Moral,* pp. 240-45.
14. Terence Horgan, 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World' in *Supervenience* (ed.) J. Kim (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 113-44.
15. Cf. Donald Davidson, 'Mental Events' in *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 207-25.
16. See Tyler Burge, 'Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice' in *Mental Causation* (eds) J. Heil and A. Mele (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). See also Robert Audi, 'Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic' in *Mental Causation,* pp. 53-74.
17. For an account of the mind-body identity theory, J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes' in *Essays Metaphysical and Moral,* pp. 189-202.
18. Cf. John Searle, *The Rediscovery of Mind,* Chapter 4.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., Chapter 5. Also Llyod Morgan, *Emergent Evolution,* 2nd Edition (London: Williams and Norgate, 1927; First Edition, 1923).
21. David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of Fundamental Theory* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), Introduction, pp. xi-xvii. Also his 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness' in *Explaining Consciousness: "The Hard Problem"* (ed.) Jonathan Shear (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 9-30.
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25. Daniel Dennett, 'Quining Qualia' in *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates* (eds.), Owen Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).
26. Ibid. For a critique of Dennett's theory, see my 'Why Qualia Cannot be Quined' in *JICPR,* Vol. XIX, Number 2 (April-June 2002), pp. 85-102.
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28. Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Penguin Books, 1993; first published by Little, Brown and Company, 1991).
29. Ibid.
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32. Cf. Hilary Putnam, 'Mind and Machines' in *Mind, Language and Reality*, pp. 362-84.
33. See Hilary Putnam, *Representation and Reality* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988; second reprint, 1989) for a critique of his functionalist theory. See also his 'Why Functionalism Didn't Work' in *Words and Life* (ed.) James Conant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 441-59. In this connection, see Roger Penrose, *The Shadows of Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness* (Vintage, 1995; Oxford University Press, 1994) for a critique of the mechanistic theory of mind.
34. J.N. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendntal Philosophy* (Dordercht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), Essays 9-10.
35. Chalmers, op. cit.
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37. I am grateful to Professor Daya Krishna for his very insightful and helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.

Consciousness, Reason and Language in Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the concepts of 'consciousness' and 'reason', as they are discussed in the framework of Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics. Consciousness is widely understood as the hallmark of subjectivity. The concept of objective knowledge, the ultimate epistemological ideal of modernity, needs to be reconciled with such a principle of subjectivity, and this has been done with a nonpareil notion of reason. The subject is no longer locked inside an inner space, as reason enables it to come out whenever needed and wanted. The epistemological dual of subject and object is also reconciled with the universal principle of reason. But Gadamer rejects these features of rationality by emphasizing the linguisticality of our being, of consciousness and of reason. He substitutes reason with language when he deals with the Greek definition of man as a 'being with logos'.

But Gadamer never ridiculed reason as he says that reason is the deeper basis of dialogue. He stressed that it always operates within the context of tradition, appealing to different parts of it. Hence, he re-employs this concept with essential modifications in the light of his linguistic turn—as reason that is built within the conversational structure of language.

Gadamer contends that the element of tradition is an essential prerequisite for our being in the world. He takes insights from the thoughts of Husserl and Heidegger and argues that the notion of life-world is essentially the historical province which itself manifests in the fabric of a linguistic horizon. He eventually displays how language and the life-world intertwine with one another in order

to mutually constitute each other's structure. This is demonstrated by explicating the concept of tradition. According to him, all experience involve a confrontation between the old and the new. Here the old stands for all that are given to us—through language—our experiences, beliefs and all that constitute our being and our conceptual categories. The term tradition has been employed in order to denote this complex space.

Gadamer then analyzes the Heideggerian concept of fore-meanings in terms of a tradition. It then functions as a linguistic horizon and language will intervene all our actions, projects and interactions as a hermeneutic medium. It is this hermeneutic medium that makes every experience a confrontation, as it makes us confront everything with a set of assumptions or 'prejudices' understood before. Tradition, according to him, is always linguistic in essence and the linguistic horizon is at the same time a semantic horizon—a horizon of meanings. The phenomenon of consciousness is not a principle of individuation and subjectivity, as it always appears in a linguistic horizon that is public.

Gadamer categorically denies the supremacy of the enlightenment concept of rationality and its claim of 'superior knowledge'. He recognizes the role of prejudices and fore-meanings in understanding meaning. But understanding achieves its full potential, asserts Gadamer, only when the fore-meanings are not used arbitrarily. Here we need a concept of reason to check the arbitrary use of prejudices. With its claim for superior knowledge, the traditional concept of reason places us in an independent platform from where other things are being evaluated. In other words, reason enables us to 'look beyond' our individual conceptual horizons. Gadamer here stresses on two aspects of dialogic rationality; openness and tolerance and also on the flexible nature of linguistic horizons to assimilate new experiences by accommodating them and getting expanded in that process. In one sense, 'openness' and 'tolerance' are not qualities of the interpreter who is engaged in the process of textual understanding, but they constitute the very structure of every language. Every linguistic horizon involves these possibilities of keeping itself open—because it is essentially limited and is incapable of possessing final views about the experiences confronted—as well as exhibiting tolerance towards other linguistic horizons, since it functions with the logic of question and answer.

Moreover, accepting other different linguistic horizons amounts to the admission of limitation and ignorance. The very possibility of dialogic encounter presupposes such an admission. Gadamer further explicates the structure of dialogic rationality with the concept of the logic of question and answer.

The substitution of language for reason is, therefore, a substitution of universal and objective reason with the rationality that manifests within linguistic traditions owing to the essential conversational structure of language. While the former is believed to be granting objectivity, the latter ensured intersubjective agreement over truth. Gadamer, though undermines this notion of superior knowledge and the concept of universality, envisages the possibility of 'seeing beyond' the narrow boundaries of our horizons. But he never fails to assert that this seeing beyond is in no way 'moving out' of one's horizon and tradition. The ability to see beyond is built into the very structure of every tradition.

Finally, we can arrive at a new picture of human nature from this context. The being of man is not a being with reason, in the sense the term has been understood by the enlightenment thinkers. Man's being evolves out of language along with the latter's evolution which, in turn, is constituted by the self-making activities on the former.

INTRODUCTION

Gadamer says that he has learned from Heidegger the closeness of language and thinking. He replaces reason with language and announces that in Aristotle's definition of man as a 'being who has logos', the term logos is misunderstood as reason or thought. He rearticulates this statement and says that, in truth, the primary meaning of the word logos is language.[1] This interpretation amounts to a major deviation from some of the basic assumptions of traditional philosophical thinking in general and the enlightenment perspective in particular. Gadamer's thought can be seen as a reaction against the broad conceptual position held by the enlightenment thinkers and the philosophical perspective of modernity in

general. This paper tries to understand Gadamer's view and its consequences with a focus on the concepts of consciousness and reason, as these two concepts occupied fundamentally important positions in the scheme of modernity.

We find that the concept of reason is closely related with two other concepts: consciousness and knowledge. Consciousness is widely understood as the hallmark of subjectivity. It functions as the principle of individuation, a principle that makes each person's experience unique, making it his/her own experience. Moreover, with Descartes' placing consciousness in the cogito—whose existence is a matter of indubitable certainty—the role of the former in the acquisition of knowledge is reiterated. Now the concept of objective knowledge, the ultimate epistemological ideal of modernity, needs to be reconciled with such a principle of subjectivity. The universality of scientific knowledge demands a platform that is largely ubiquitous and not a closed inner one. This reconciliation was materialized with a nonpareil notion of reason. The subject is no longer locked inside an inner space, as reason enables it to come out whenever needed and wanted. The epistemological dual of subject and object is also conciliated with the universal principle of reason, so that their relationship fruitfully culminates in the generation of knowledge that is intersubjective in nature.

Gadamer's denial of this enlightenment conception of reason by means of his linguistic turn, therefore, needs to find solution for several conceptual riddles that we may encounter with the former losing its foundational status. In other words, he encounters the challenge of explaining the very possibility of objective knowledge. Before examining the outcome of this move, we shall see some crucial implications of this above linguistic turn. Gadamer's position amounts to defining man's being in terms of the latter's situatedness in a *particular* linguistic tradition. It categorically asserts the essential linguisticality of our being, a thesis that formed the basis for establishing the ontological significance of language. Language has been elucidated as housing and determining consciousness. It also interlaces the historically situated being—whose nature is defined in terms of its situatedness in linguistic tradition—with knowing. The element of tradition obviously makes cognition prejudicial and peculiar. Gadamer here faces the challenge of explaining the legitimacy of rational knowledge. So long as we remain subscribed to the enlightenment conception of rationality, we find it difficult to argue for rational knowledge, after recognizing the value of historically situated linguistic traditions in determining knowledge and understanding. Gadamer's peculiar conception of language, therefore, seems to be responding to this challenge by constituting a different form of rationality—relocating or discovering it in the conversational and dialogic structure of language—and showing how this can be held responsible for all knowledge and understanding. Reason, thus, functions with and reveals within the conversational as well as dialogic structure of language, ensures the possibility of bypassing the threat of relativism and ethnocentrism.

This paper analyses these two concepts of consciousness and reason, as they are discussed in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. But the main focus will be on the notion of reason that is built in within the conversational structure of language. This analysis also helps us comprehend the real nature of 'understanding meaning', a problem that occupies the center stage of discussion in contemporary philosophical thought. Along with replacing reason with language, Gadamer emplaces the former as well as consciousness within the tradition. The replacing of reason with language also places the latter in a special relationship with knowledge. This issue becomes relevant when we try to understand Gadamer's position vis-à-vis the enlightenment conception, where reason and knowledge were closely wedded. For the enlightenment thinkers, it was reason's privilege to decide what is 'correct' and 'true'. With the substitution of reason with language, and with a view that asserts the essential situatedness of being in *particular* linguistic traditions, the concept of knowledge also has to be redefined. This substitution explains the finite nature of our very being from a different perspective, as on the one hand it asserts our facticity and situatedness in linguistic traditions and thereby affirms the essential 'relatedness' of all our knowledge and understanding, and on the other hand, by underlining the conversational structure of language, it helps us bypass the narrow provincialism that may reduce all our understanding and knowledge into subjective contentions. Though Gadamer challenges the claims of

modernity with regard to a transcultural, universal perspective, he never favours the post-modern alternative which bids farewell to reason. Gadamer cautions that, though the entry of tradition in all understanding and knowledge acquisition was a truism, this was no way to uncritically accept one's own tradition, nor was it to advocate socio-political conservatism.[2]

To maintain a critical vision we need reason. It is reason that checks the blind and uncritical acceptance of tradition. Though Gadamer is a major critic of the enlightenment concept of reason, he has never ridiculed it, as he openly discloses in a conversation with Richard Palmer that, 'Reason I would never reject! Reason is the deeper basis of dialogue, but it always operates within the context of tradition, appealing to different parts of it.'[3] Hence, he re-employs this concept with essential modifications in the light of his linguistic turn. Therefore, the new concept of rationality, finding reason within the conversational structure of language, saves us from a blind acceptance of tradition. The conversational structure of language is, on the one hand dialogic in nature and on the other, it is self-critical. Reason becomes the deeper basis of dialogue owing to this critical aspect. But before we ponder upon this essential structure of language, we have to see how Gadamer explains the operation of reason and consciousness within the context of tradition.

TRADITION AND LANGUAGE

Gadamer's contention that the element of tradition is an essential prerequisite for our being in the world has its conceptual roots in the thoughts of Husserl and Heidegger. Gadamer reviews Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics to develop the notion of tradition. Husserl's notion of life, which explains his views of consciousness, subjectivity and intentionality, provides Gadamer with a conceptual platform from where he starts his analysis. According to Gadamer, nobody had ever realized the philosophical significance of language in its entirety until Husserl and Heidegger made it an important part of the life world.[4] For Gadamer, this relating of language with the life-world is crucial for understanding the philosophical purport of the latter. Both Husserl and Heidegger made it a central matter of concern. Husserl

wanted to do away with the psychologism in logic and for this it was essential to bring out the rules of logical thinking and language from the realm of subjectivity to a public realm. Heidegger, on the other hand, endeavoured to establish the facticity of being by placing the latter in the life-world and by means of it in language. But Gadamer relates language with the life-world in a different way and his position leads to different consequences. For him, the concept of life-world is essentially the historical province which itself manifests in the fabric of a linguistic horizon. He eventually displays how language and the life-world get interwoven with one another to mutually constitute each other's structure. This is demonstrated by explicating the concept of tradition.

Gadamer examines how Husserl develops the concept of the unity of intentional experience from the flow of experience in time, one after the other. He observes that according to Husserl, every experience has implicit horizons of before and after, and finally merges with the continuum of the experiences presenting the before and the after to form one flow of experience and this flow has the character of a universal 'horizon consciousness', out of which only particulars are truly given as experiences.[5] This horizon consciousness gains new dimension of meaning with Husserl's relating it with the life-world, which according to him is a pre-theoretical context where we inevitably find ourselves. Following Heidegger, who attempted to explain the ontological status of *dasein*, Gadamer develops a different understanding about the nature of the life-world and the horizon consciousness and understands the notion of tradition with a focus on the linguisticality of our being. This concept of linguistic tradition presents the idea of horizon in a new light. This is explained by means of analysing the process of 'experience'. According to him, all experience involves a confrontation between the old and the new.[6] Here the old stands for all that are given to us—through language—our experiences, beliefs and all that constitute our being and our conceptual categories. The term tradition has been employed in order to denote this complex space. The fact that language functions as the fundamental hermeneutic medium makes tradition also essentially linguistic in nature. In other words, the tradition given to us in language forms a linguistic horizon for us, which determines our conceptual

categories and actions. This inevitable presence of the tradition explains the ways in which we are historically situated. This is the manner in which Gadamer redefines the concept of historicity by means of linguisticality. With this emphasis on linguistic tradition, Gadamer could talk about consciousness operating outside the subjective inner space, where the traditional thought had located it. Gadamer acknowledges that Husserl himself has liberated consciousness from the subjective inner space by relating it with the outside world of essences through an act of intentionality by means of which it constitutes the world.

The structure of the linguistic horizon has been further probed, and here Gadamer closely follows the insights of Heidegger who contended that man's being was irretrievably being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, there exists a fundamental practical relationship between the being of man and the things in the world which, in turn, is characterized by a 'concern' where the use of entities we encounter in our life situations acquires prominence.[7] This will resist the possibility of viewing something that we encounter in our life situations as an independently existing phenomenon. The notion of fore-meanings has been developed from this context. Every encounter with the world and others is necessarily preceded by a projection of meanings by the self. Since all such projections and interactions are mediated through language, all our understanding of the world and all our experience presuppose that we have already oriented ourselves towards the world in particular ways by means of language. The 'as' structure is built into the very core of our relationship with the rest of the world and it exerts a normative power. Gadamer understands this concept of fore-meanings in terms of a tradition, a linguistic horizon, intervening as a hermeneutic medium. By mediating the various projections and interactions of our being, language functions as a 'hermeneutic medium'. It is this hermeneutic medium that makes every experience a confrontation, as it makes us confront everything with a set of preunderstood assumptions or 'prejudices'. This will also exhibit how, in the linguistic character of our access to the world, we are implanted in a tradition. Tradition is embodied in the prejudices that vigorously interfere in all our interactions with the rest of the world. But tradition, according to him, is always linguistic in essence. We are enclosed in the linguistic world and

are always at home in language, just as much as we are in the world, says Gadamer.

The phenomenon of consciousness is not a principle of individuation and subjectivity, as it always appears in a linguistic horizon which is public. Gadamer thus resolves the problem of subjectivism and bypasses the objective-subjective bipolarity. But, nonetheless, the possibility of different traditions, different linguistic horizons raising conflicting truth claims remains to be addressed. The enlightenment thinkers could evade this issue with their concept of reason which is indomitable. Modernism, by and large, conceives reason to be giving us a comprehensive view of the world by establishing its fundamental structure, a view that had invited wide criticism, particularly from the postmodernists. Though Gadamer doesn't agree with this post-modern undoing of reason, in general, he too has openly ridiculed such a concept of reason. For him, reason functions within a tradition which is essentially linguistic in nature. The limitations of a tradition are the limitations of reason as well. In other words, reason is not housed in an essential structure of human mind, but in the various linguistic horizons that historically exist, differing from each other and often conflicting with each other. But each language, while locating its unique conceptual province, simultaneously develops a rational ability that enables it to overcome its narrowness and open up to other alien historically located linguistic horizons. This is an opening up to the truth claims arising in other horizons.

REASON, TRADITION AND LINGUISTIC HORIZON

Parallel with this assertion of historicity and the inevitable role of tradition, Gadamer carries out a critique of the enlightenment conception of reason and explains how mistaken were the enlightenment thinkers in discrediting all other forms of authority, including tradition, after juxtaposing them with reason. Enlightenment made it imperative that knowledge, to be designated so, has to conform to the parameters of reason. The judgement seat of reason was so paramount and reason constitutes the ultimate source of all authority.[8] Gadamer categorically denies the supremacy of the enlightenment concept of rationality and its claim of 'superior knowledge'. He writes:

> The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the enlightenment, will prove to be itself a prejudice, the removal of which opens the way to an appropriate understanding of our finitude, which dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness.[9]

Gadamer here turns to the finitude of our being and its rootedness in a tradition that mediates through language. Owing to this essential situatedness, understanding must be comprehended in the sense of an existential act and is, therefore, a *thrown project*, and objectivism, which is an ideal for the enlightenment concept of rationality, asserts Gadamer, is an illusion.[10] He further attacks the enlightenment view with his project of rehabilitating prejudices. Any conscious attempts to shed one's own prejudices is unwarranted.

But the normative force of prejudices may erratically influence all cognition and comprehension, which may make all talk about truth irrelevant in the context of textual understanding. The rehabilitation of prejudices, thus, may result in cognitive anarchism. To prevent this, rehabilitation has to be perambulated by reason. Gadamer repeatedly warns about the arbitrary use of prejudices. Rehabilitation of prejudices by no means allows their unwarranted employment. In other words, it has to be shown that such rehabilitation is rational. He writes:

> Every textual interpretation must begin then with the interpreter's reflection on the preconceptions which result from the 'hermeneutical situation' in which he finds himself. He must legitimate them, that is, look for their origin and adequacy.[11]

Understanding achieves its full potential, asserts Gadamer, only when the fore-meanings are not used arbitrarily.[12] They have to be necessarily used, but definitely with a sense of self-criticism. Gadamer says that we have to be open to the meaning of the other person or of the text we encounter. Every experience presents an 'other' the 'alien' and this has to be confronted with the 'native' with tolerance and openness. He writes:

> Every interpretation must provide itself against the happenstance arbitration of baroque ideas and against the limitations caused by unconscious habits of thoughts. It is evident that in order to be authentic the inquiring gaze must be focused on the 'thing itself' and in such a manner that it may be grasped, as it were, 'in person'.[13]

Here we come across the nucleus of the notion of rationality that Gadamer intends to purport. He brings out the structure of this rationality by eliciting the essential conversational structure of language. This is unfolded with an analysis of the concepts of openness and tolerance and also by focusing on the logic of question and answer. Finally, the changes taking place to our linguistic horizon during the process of understanding meaning are investigated. This final point will ultimately explain how the dialogic rationality, which operates through the conversational structure of language, constitutes our very being, in such a way that the definition of man as a 'being who has logos'—for Gadamer language—has been warranted.

Two things happen when the linguistic horizon confronts new experiences. On the one hand, the new is approached with a set of 'old' assumptions, a system of meanings. Here the linguistic horizon actually functions as a semantic horizon. The alien meanings are confronted with a system of familiar meanings. The task at this stage is to make the confronted new experience 'reasonable', and this has to be done by making the alien familiar. So long as the alien remains so, no comprehension of meaning takes place. The essential function of the dialogic rationality at this stage is to assimilate the new experience to the existing framework of the linguistic-semantic horizon. Gadamer elucidates this process with the explanation of the 'logic of question and answer', which according to him constitutes the very structural framework of dialogic rationality.

Before we see this structure, we have to examine another crucial function of reason in the traditional thought. With its claim for superior knowledge, reason places us in an independent platform from where other things are being evaluated. In other words, reason enables us to 'look beyond' our individual conceptual horizons. But, according to Gadamer's account, understanding of new meanings is accomplished when the linguistic horizon of the interpreter, the realm of familiar meanings, assimilates the new to its inner space. But this assimilation in no way consists in the interpreter's

linguistic horizon imposing its own system of meanings upon the new experience. On the other hand, 'reason' will take care of the need of the interpreter to look beyond the inner space of his linguistic horizon. Gadamer assigns this task to rationality that is built within the conversational structure of language. This structure makes openness possible, both in the sense of the interpreter opening up to another alien horizon and in the sense of being open to others. It also sheds light to the nature of our linguistic horizons, which form the conceptual basis of our understanding, as it exposes the former as a flexible *point' d ap-pui* that assimilate new experiences by accommodating them and expanding in that process.

In one sense 'openness' and 'tolerance' are not qualities of the interpreter who is engaged in the process of textual understanding, but they constitute the very structure of every language. Every linguistic horizon involves these possibilities of keeping itself open—because it is essentially limited and is incapable of possessing final views about the experiences confronted—as well as exhibiting tolerance towards other linguistic horizons—since it functions with the logic of question and answer. Openness implicates an admission of facticity and limitation. Reason resists accepting anything, including one's own linguistic horizon as final authority. Gadamer asserts this by proclaiming the authority of tradition. Tradition accommodates a multitude of perspectives and frameworks, and hence resists the identification of any one of them as final. Moreover, since there are a manifold of traditions and linguistic horizons, any attempt to sanctify the truth claim of one of them is unwarranted. Since reason itself is housed in the conversational and dialogic structure of each linguistic horizon, it cannot adjudicate between conflicting truth claims by placing itself outside these horizons. It can resolve the problem by initiating the dialogic process with openness, which concludes in different perspectives giving rise to the evolution of a broader and comprehensive horizon. Accepting other different linguistic horizons, in other words, amounts to the admission of limitation and ignorance. The very possibility of dialogic encounter presupposes such an admission, which is not an easy task, because, in Gadamer's words,

> It is the power of opinion against which it is so hard to obtain admission of ignorance. It is opinion that suppresses questions. Opinion has a curious tendency to propagate itself.[14]

This is the juncture at which Gadamer finds the emergence of the 'question', a situation which we inevitably encounter when we are engaged in conversational practices. With the admission of ignorance, with an exhibition of openness to the text, the question emerges and this exposes another important dimension of the notion of reason that manifests in language. In the course of conversation, the question presses itself on us and we can no longer avoid it and persist in our accustomed opinion. In the words of Gadamer, to pose a query is to bring the object into openness. It is to proclaim one's own ignorance and make one's answer to the question unsettled and, therefore, indeterminate. Gadamer adds:

> The object has to be brought into this state of indeterminacy, so that there is an equilibrium between pro and contra. The sense of every question is realised in passing through this state of indeterminacy, in which it becomes an open question.[15]

This indeterminacy constitutes the inevitable aspect of openness and also envisages the possibility of seeing beyond. Owing to this indeterminacy, there is a chance for the various horizons that interact to present themselves as alternatives. Every conversation will deal with such alternatives, neither of them claiming any special relationship with truth.

The reaching of this indeterminacy is only the beginning of the process of opening up and, therefore, of the dialogic encounter. Again, this indeterminacy does not in any way make the dialogic process directionless. The openness is actually to the text's claim to truth and, hence the questions that can be raised should be essentially related to the text. Gadamer here proposes to view the text as an answer to a question. The logic of question and answer that lies implicit in any dialogic endeavour implies that, the text necessarily presents itself to the interpreter as an answer to a question. The understanding of the text, therefore, consists in understanding the question to which it is an answer. But then, no question can arise in isolation and will be necessarily presupposing a horizon. Hence, understanding the question to which the text is an answer

means acquiring the horizon of the question to which the text stands as a possible answer. The dialogic rationality, thus, enables one to go beyond one's own horizon.

But at the same time, this is not to go beyond our linguistic horizon and relocating ourselves in another linguistic horizon. Such a relocation is not only impossible but also unwarranted. It is impossible because our rootedness in tradition is final and conclusive. It is also unwarranted as no two linguistic horizons exist as watertight compartments, so that in order to understand the other one does not have to abandon one's own horizon and occupy the other. Gadamer says that every new experience adds something more to our existing views. Every confrontation of new experiences, therefore, enriches our perspectives and linguistic horizons. In other words, the linguistic horizon itself does not represent any fixed and solid state of affairs. Rather, it is something which evolves and expands. As Gadamer puts it, the I-lessness is an essential feature of the being of languages. He continues:

> .... speaking does not belong in the sphere of the 'I' but in the sphere of the 'we' ..... the spiritual reality of language is that of the *pneuma*, the spirit, which unifies I and Thou..... the actuality of speaking consists in the dialogue. But in every dialogue a spirit rules, a bad one or a good one, a spirit of obdurateness and hesitancy or a spirit of communication and of easy exchange between I and Thou.[16]

The structure of dialogic rationality also gets highlighted at this stage. It ultimately unites the 'I' and the 'thou' by uniting the different linguistic horizons in the process of their dialogic interaction. The conversational structure ensures this unity. Our linguistic horizon finds every new experience or text positing a question to it and, in this process of getting questioned, its system of meanings is placed in openness, just as the textual meaning was placed in openness by the horizon of the question to which it is related as a possible answer. This mutual questioning and reconstruction of the question, happens in a newly evolving common language. Such a common language will necessarily present a unique horizon as the process of questioning and getting questioned will essentially go beyond the respective horizons that come into play. Gadamer observes:

> Every conversation presupposes a common language, or, it creates a common language. Something is placed in the centre, as the Greeks said, which the partners to the dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one another. Hence agreement concerning the object, which it is the purpose of the conversation to bring about, necessarily means that a common language must first be worked out in the conversation.[17]

A form of dialogic rationality is housed in this common language, which will signify a more comprehensive linguistic horizon, as it will contain the perspectives of both the 'old' and the 'new' in a peculiar manner. The substitution of language for reason is, therefore, a substitution of reason with a notion of reason that is housed in particular languages and particular linguistic traditions which, nevertheless, are able to open up to each other owing to their essential conversational structures. Instead of the ideal of objectivity, the reason that functions with linguistic traditions ensures intersubjective agreement over truth.

Again, for the former, consciousness refers to that feature of being which defines its subjective existence. Epistemologically, it is a central notion, as the very possibility of knowledge relies on its cognitive abilities. On the other hand, reason is that universal element in us which helps us bypass the limitations imposed on us by our subjectivity and its conditions. Gadamer's substitution of reason with language nevertheless does not deny the presence of consciousness as determining the subjective features of being. But he demystifies it by placing it in the historically evolving and conditioned linguistic horizons and traditions. The uniqueness of consciousness, according to him, owes to the fact that it is situated historically. Since it finds its appearance in linguistic horizons, it is already removed from any subjective realm. But the appeal to reason grants more than just moving out of the subjective world. It raises a claim for 'superior knowledge' based on its unique ahistorical and universal status. Gadamer, though, undermines this notion of superior knowledge and the concept of universality, envisages the possibility of 'seeing beyond' the narrow boundaries of our horizons. But he never fails to assert that this seeing beyond is in no way 'moving out' of one's horizon and tradition. In other words, it is being within in a different way. The ability to see beyond is built

into the very structure of every tradition. Gadamer here would agree with Habermas who says that, '...the first grammar that we learn to master already puts us in a position to step out of it and to interpret what is foreign, to make comprehensible what is incomprehensible, to assimilate in our own words what at first escapes them'.[18]

Finally, it has to be accepted that reason has been so coveted a phenomenon, as it was taken to be the defining characteristic feature of our very being. Now Gadamer has to justify his substitution of the notion of 'rational being' with the concept of 'being who has language'. Gadamer does this by emphasizing the essential historicity of man and showing how this situatedness in history is a situatedness in language and linguistic traditions. The being of man, according to Gadamer, evolves out of language along with the latter's evolution, which in turn is constituted by the self-making activities of the former. Language evolves out of the self-making activities of the historically situated and conditioned man, which are materialized in his dialogic interactions and the two processes are fundamentally identical.[19] The reason in language will not take us out of our linguistic tradition to provide us an emancipatory experience and existence, but it may enable us to reposition our existence by readjusting our linguistic horizons by means of conversational exercises. Every linguistic horizon as well as tradition is subjected to such readjustments as they emerge, evolve and exist in languages which are structurally conversational in nature.

Notes and References

1. Cf. Gadamer, Hans, Georg: *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, (hereafter *PH*), tr. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 59.
2. Cf. Gadamer, Hans Georg: 'The Problem of Historical Consciousness' (hereafter *PHC*) in Sullivan, William M. (translated and edited): *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 108.
3. Cf. Palmer, Richard E.: 'How Hans-Georg Gadamer Offers Openings to a Postmodern Perspective', available at: http://www.mac.edu/faculty/richardpalmer/POSTMODERN/openings.htm
4. Cf. Palmer, Richard E.: 'Gadamer's Recent Work on Language and Philosophy', *Continental Philosophy Review* 33 (2000), p. 381.

5. Cf. Gadamer, Hans Georg: *Truth and Method* (hereafter *TM*), (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), p. 216.
6. Cf. Ibid., p. 108.
7. Cf. Heidegger, Martin: *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). The Chapter VI of *Being and Time* introduces this concept to characterize the being-in-the-world of the *Dasein*.
8. Cf. Gadamer, Hans Georg: *TM*, p. 241.
9. Ibid., p. 244.
10. Gadamer, Hans Georg: *PHC*., p. 145.
11. Ibid., p. 150.
12. Gadamer, Hans Georg: *TM*, p. 237.
13. Gadamer, Hans Georg: *PHC*., p. 149.
14. Gadamer, H.G.: *TM*., p. 329.
15. Ibid., pp. 326–27.
16. Gadamer, H.G.: *PH*., pp. 65–66.
17. Ibid., p. 341.
18. Habermas, Jurgen: 'The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality', in Gayle L, Ormistom and Alan D. Schrift (Eds): *The Hermeneutic Tradition, From Ast to Ricoeur* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 93.
19. I have elaborately discussed this idea elsewhere. Cf. Sreekumar, N.: 'Language and the Evolution of the Self', in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XXIX, Nos. 2 & 3, April–July 2002.

Chomsky on Innateness

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I

In this paper, I shall give a brief account of Chomsky's famous Innateness hypothesis followed by an assessment of how far this Innateness hypothesis is tenable. Incidentally, the general direction of my argument will be towards the social and interpersonal.

According to Chomsky, for a child to acquire knowledge of its language, it must innately know the principles and categories of universal grammar. Now, innate knowledge, if there be such, will be knowledge that the child possesses independently of its relations with other speakers. This is because it is knowledge possessed prior to such relations.[1] If Chomsky's Innateness hypothesis is accepted, then it follows that at least some linguistic knowledge is 'a-social'. Once it is conceded that some such knowledge is 'a-social', it is unclear as to why we should resist the conclusion that knowledge of one's language at large is something that might be obtained independently of communal participation. Hence it is important—if the general direction of our argument towards the social and interpersonal is to be sustained—to examine and challenge Chomsky's innateness hypothesis.

This hypothesis is not, of course, an incidental aspect of Chomsky's overall position. On the contrary, it plays a vital role in his explanation of how linguistic competence is possible. We shall now take up this very question. One may very reasonably wonder how a child or a native speaker comes to possess complicated knowledge of his language with ease, whether this knowledge (competence) is entirely acquired through experience, or whether it is partly an innate possession. Chomsky, in his account of competence, takes note of such questions, and the way he tackles them leads—as just noted before—to innateness hypothesis, i.e. to the thesis that knowledge

of the rules of a language which constitutes the competence of a child or a native speaker is ultimately derived from some innately possessed organizing principles of the mind.

II

We may, however, ponder as to what is so conspicuous in the nature of competence or in the process of language acquisition that may lead Chomsky to postulate the innateness hypothesis. Chomsky would respond to this in the following manner. We cannot doubt that the rules a child internalizes (and thereby becomes a competent speaker in its language) are not taught explicitly, and it is extremely doubtful whether it is at all possible to teach a child all these rules. Nor can we say that the child internalizes on the basis of abstraction and generalization from the observable features spoken by the adults of its community. Then what is the plausible alternative? According to Chomsky, it is to admit that the child itself constructs the rules. But how can it do it? In reply to this question, Chomsky holds that we must keep in mind the complexity of the structure of language that a child has to master. He draws our attention to the fact that the complexity of the structure of any language points to the complexity of the underlying system of rules. Now he holds that a child can normally acquire mastery of his language; and the ease with which it acquires its mastery indicates that it does not find these rules complex and difficult to learn. Therefore, a theory of language-acquisition should explain how a child can have mastery or competence over the rules of its language so easily inspite of the complexity of rules. Chomsky claims that it can be explained adequately by recognizing the innate language acquisition device which is equipped with the universal principles of language or linguistic universals. This explains why the child can itself construct the rules. It can do so since it is innately endowed with the universal principles of language. Hence, Chomsky observes:

> 'We must .... develop as rich a hypothesis concerning linguistic universals as can be supported by available evidence. This specification can then be attributed to the system AD as an intrinsic property.'[2]

It follows from the above belief that linguistic universals, for Chomsky, are innate. This implies that innateness is, for him, the

best explanation of linguistic universals. Let us now elaborate how Chomsky argues for it. We may try to substantiate his contention by considering one example of linguistic universals, viz., that rules are structure dependent (needless to say, this will apply to all cases of linguistic universals). Chomsky[3] tells us to imagine a Martian scientist, John M., who wants to know about human language. Observing the speakers of Spanish, he discovers that they utter sentences like:

(1) a. El hombre esta en la casa.
The man is in the house.
b. El hombre esta contento
The man is happy.
(2) El hombre, que esta contento, esta en la casa.
The man, who is happy, is in the house.

He further discovers that they form interrogative sentences corresponding to (1) by placing the verb in front of the sentence such as:

(3) a. Esta el hombre en la casa?
Is the man in the house?
b. Esta el hombre contento?
Is the man happy?

Let us call this rule R which consists in moving 'the first occurrence of the verbal form esta (or others like it)' 'to the front of the sentence'. Now suppose John M. thinks that R will apply to all cases of interrogative formation. He would then follow R in the case of (3), viz.,

(4) Esta el hombre, que contento, esta en la casa?
Is the man, who happy, is at home?

But he would soon find that this sentence is not approved of in Spanish or in English. Actually, the correct form is:

(5) Esta el hombre, que esta contento, en la casa?
Is the man, who is happy, at home?

Let us call this correct rule R–Q which is the structure-dependent rule.

Again, the Martian scientist, if a serious one, will discover that R–Q is more complex than the simple linear rule R that he has discarded, and that even a child employs R–Q, though it is more complex than R. So we may reasonably ask: why is it the case that the child makes use of the more complex rule instead of the simple one? One of the possible explanations may be that the child has been taught to do so by its parents. Then the explanation will amount to this. Children proceed inductively, just like John M. From the observation of examples like (1) and (3), they pick up the simple linear rule R as the operative rule. This prompts them to (4). But when they are told by their parents that they should say not (4) but (5), they at last learn the rule R–Q. In this way, learning to employ R–Q is ultimately a matter of instruction and correction. But Chomsky does not accept this. According to him, children never make mistakes about the formation of proper interrogative sentences like a Martian scientist, and 'not receive corrections or instructions about them'. Chomsky observes: 'It is certainly absurd to argue that the children are trained to use the structure-dependent rule. In fact, the problem never arises in language learning. A person may go through a considerable part of his life without ever facing relevant evidence, but he will have no hesitation in using the structure-dependent rule'.[4] If an explanation of a child's devising the structure-dependent rule in terms of training, instruction or correction is wholly redundant, then the innatist explanation begins to look very promising. We may say with emphasis and confidence that the child possesses this linguistic universal (or others like it) innately.

To recapitulate, in the words of Chomsky:

> The child learning Spanish or any other human language knows, in advance of experience, that the rules will be structure dependent. The child does not consider the simple linear rule R, then discards it in favour of more complex rule R–Q, in the manner of the rational scientist enquiring into language. Rather, the child knows without experience or instruction that the linear rule R is not a candidate and that the structure-dependent rule R–Q is the only possibility. This knowledge is part of the child's biological endowment, part of the structure of language faculty.[5]

Thus, as we can see now, all human languages (not only Spanish but also English or any other language) employ some basic rules, structure-dependent rules, for example. It is employment of these basic rules or linguistic universals that contributes to the basic similarity of all languages inspite of their surface differences. The best way to explain these linguistic universals, according to Chomsky, is to say that we possess them innately from our very birth. This also explains why the child can acquire competence in any language, depending on the linguistic community to which it belongs.

Chomsky's famous argument for the innateness hypothesis is the argument from poverty of stimulus. We shall now try to develop this point in some detail. The poverty of the stimulus argument, as Ramsey and Stich point out,[6] admits of three versions. The first version is what they would call 'The Argument for Minimal Nativism'. According to this version, a child is 'exposed to only a very impoverished sample of often misleading linguistic data'. This poverty of the stimulus appears from the following facts: (a) The limited data which a child encounters from its linguistic community are rather messy. They often involve idiosyncratic, ungrammatical sentences, incomplete sentences, false starts, change of plan in mid-course, and so on. (b) Further, the child does not know many things about language that a linguist knows. It does not know, like a richly informed linguist, that certain sentences are grammatical, or that certain sentences are paraphrases of certain others, etc. Hence, it has not access to many kinds of linguistic data to decide between competing grammars.

Yet, out of the limited and messy data, the child can very well internalize a language or grammar which a video tape-recorder or a puppy is unable to do, even if it is exposed to the primary linguistic data. This gap between input and output can be bridged only by ascribing to the child a learning mechanism which it innately possesses before the acquisition begins. The reason why a video tape-recorder cannot have any internally represented grammar is that it lacks the sophisticated innate learning mechanism or the cognitive system which a child has. In the words of Chomsky:

> ...it is clear that the language each person acquires is a rich and complex construction hopelessly under-determined by the fragmentary evidence available ... this fact can be explained only on the assumption that these

individuals employ highly restrictive principles that guide the construction of grammar.[7]

The crucial point that this version of poverty of the stimulus argument highlights is that the child's innate learning mechanism or sophisticated cognitive system, to do its job, must have a 'strong bias' for acquiring certain grammar as against others. For the data from which the child has acquired its grammar can also, at the same time, be taken care of by an indefinitely large class of grammars, many of which the child will reject at the time of attaining its grammars. In other words, the acquisition mechanism must be able to pick up the grammar that is approved of by its community vis-à-vis the other grammars that are equally compatible with the data. Thus, the thesis of Minimal Nativism simply emphasizes this bias in favour of a certain grammar and against others—the bias that is entertained by the language acquisition of the child with an innate learning mechanism.

We know that a significant aspect of Chomsky is his departure from the empiricist conception of mind. And we may think that he has succeeded in undermining the empiricist conception of mind with his accent on strongly biased innate learning mechanism. But this is not true. For even the rigid empiricist will not deny that learning involves sophisticated innate mechanisms and biases. Even an empiricist, as Quine observes, 'is knowingly and cheerfully up to his neck in innate mechanisms of learning readiness'.[8] If Chomsky is willing to counter empiricist accounts of the mind—that is one of his significant objectives—he must have to say something more about the nature of these innate mechanisms and biases.

This leads to the second version of the poverty of the stimulus argument which Ramsey and Stich call 'The Argument against Empiricism'. Let us try to develop this argument. *Prima facie*, it may appear that argument against all empiricist accounts of mind is not possible. For even if Chomsky can effectively demonstrate that one or another specific empiricist theory cannot explain how the mind produces the right grammar on the basis of the primary linguistic data, he cannot prevent the 'resourceful empiricist' from developing another theory in keeping with empiricist principles which can accomplish the task. Chomsky, however, has a powerful strategy to combat all empiricist theories. This strategy may be called 'the

Competent Scientist Gambit'. The basic point of this gambit is this. We can think of a learning mechanism which is the most powerful that an empiricist can dream of, and then can show that such a learning mechanism fails to do what the child is capable of. If we can do this, we can have final say against all kinds of empiricism. The learning mechanism Chomsky speaks of refers to a very competent scientist.

Let us see whether a scientist can do what a child can—whether he can discover the right grammar from limited and inadequate data. How will he go on? He will collect data, give sophisticated data analysis, formulate imaginative hypotheses on the basis of the data available to him. He will utilize the methodological resource 'typically employed in empirical theory construction and selection'. Yet he will not be able to learn the language or find the right grammar from the given linguistic data. Surely, he is intelligent and creative: he can definitely think up a large variety of grammars. But he cannot select the right or correct grammar from them as a child does. To show this, let us imagine a pair of grammars with the following characteristics.

(i) Both these grammars make essentially the same judgements about linguistic phenomena that 'show up' in the primary linguistic data.
(ii) Both of them are intuitively simple.

Confronted with these two different grammars, the scientist cannot do what the child can. He cannot choose between the grammars as the child does so easily. He fails because of the following reasons. Since both the two grammars are equally compatible with the data, the data themselves cannot help him rule one out and choose the correct grammar. Again, since both of them are intuitively simple, methodological consideration too does not show him the way out. If this is the case, then the empiricist conception of mind is too poor to account for language learning or acquiring the right grammar. Now clearly this anti-empiricist claim works negatively about language learning. So this must be supplemented by a positive thesis.

This is well attended to by the third or final version of the poverty of the stimulus argument, which Ramsey and Stich call

'The Argument of Rationalism'. We shall now consider this final version. If the empiricist account of the mind is of no avail regarding language learning, what is the theory of mind to which we can hopefully look? If we address this question, we must first recall exactly where the empiricist fails. Strictly speaking, the problem for the component scientist qua empiricist is not that he cannot think up the right grammar. Indeed, he can do so, being clever, creative and resourceful as he really is. The real problem is much deeper. It is that he can also think up other grammars which are equally simple and equally compatible with the primary linguistic data; and he has no clue how to choose between the alternative grammars. On the face of it, we can take the following promising step to resolve this problem. Let us suppose that all the humanly learnable languages which can be mentally represented have certain properties in common. Now, if the scientist is already enlightened about the universal features of all languages or grammars, it will help him greatly and narrow down 'the search space'. Then he will be able to rule out those grammars which do not share the features—the features that impose constraint on all human languages or grammars. This is actually what the child does. He is endowed with a richly innate information about language, with genetically coded principles that put a limit to all human languages. These principles are triggered by environment, however impoverished it may be. And, consequently, the child is able to choose the right grammar or acquire competence, i.e. knowledge of language.

This contention of Chomsky obviously goes beyond what any empiricist theory of mind can endorse. As Searle puts it: 'Chomsky is arguing not simply that the child must have "leaming readiness", "bias" and "dispositions", but that he must have a specific set of linguistic mechanisms at work'.[9]

The final version of the poverty of the stimulus argument draws our attention to the crucial point that a child is unable to discover the right grammar by eliminating other equally compatible grammars without going on with the task with a rich set of innate constraints. The fact that innate learning mechanism contains such constraints is the conclusion to be derived from the final version.

To conclude, we shall try to draw the various threads together to sum up the fundamental points of Chomsky's innateness hypothesis. Chomsky gives an innatist explanation of linguistic universals which, as he says, are programmed into the child's brain and account for its competence or knowledge of language. This innatist claim draws upon the following points: (a) the child's ability to master a very complex language with ease and within a short period; and (b) his ability to have this mastery inspite of the poverty of the data.

But the story is not complete if we do not take into account the recent modularity thesis of Chomsky and Fodor which provides a powerful defence of innateness hypothesis.[10] According to this thesis, mind is 'modular', i.e. 'compartmentalized', in the words of Neil Smith, 'in such a way that different tasks are subserved by different mechanism'.[11] Sight and smell, taste and touch, language are all distinct from each other. In other words, language faculty is a separate module, a 'dedicated input system' (according to Fodor) like all other modules—sight smell, hearing, etc. Like all other modules, language too is specialized for a particular domain; it is 'hard wired' with a particular part of the brain dedicated to it, its structure and function are largely innately determined. Chomsky, however, does not share all the ideas of Fodorian modularity. First, language, according to him, is not only an input system in the way vision, for example, is; it is also an output system 'geared to the expression and communication of thought'. And a part or subsystem of our brain or central system is dedicated to language with these two correlated systems. Secondly, he does not think, like Fodor, that the central system is essentially unstructured and nonmodular. On the contrary, it is, he thinks, intricately structured and also modular in the sense that many of our abilities going beyond purely sensory perception are independent of one another. For example, we have separate mechanisms not only underlying language acquisition and production but also 'underlying', in the words of Neil Smith, 'our ability to recognize faces, to provide moral judgements and to evaluate social relations'.[12] Not only is there an innate basis of language, but virtually all human activities like face recognition, analysis of personality and the like appear to have an innate basis.

It is not perhaps out of place to consider very briefly how Chomsky's innateness hypothesis is developed by Fodor. Fodor not only argues that language learning and processing faculty are in-

nate, but also that the human representational system or cognitive mechanism is tied to an innate language of thought. Hence, all concepts are innate due to the representational power of the language of thought. And, to learn a language, you need this representational system rich enough to enable you to match Mentalese predicates with the predicates of language you learn. To give an example: [Bear (x)] is true (in English) iff G(x) where G is a Mentalese predicate. The child has learned 'bear' when he adopts the correct truth rule, when 'bear' has the same extension with 'G'. Obviously, he learns the meaning of 'bear' only in terms of 'G' which is a predicate in the repertoire of his Mentalese. Hence, any predicate that he learns is only a matter of translation from an innate Mentalese counterpart. As Fodor puts it: '... one cannot learn a first language unless one already has a system capable of representing the predicates in that language and their extensions. And on the basis of circularity, that system cannot be the language that is learned. Hence, at least some cognitive operations are carried out in languages other than natural languages' (p. 64). My view is that you can't learn a language unless you've already learned one ... 'the language of thought is known .... but not learned. That is, it is innate' (p. 65).[13]

III

We shall now critically look at the above position of Chomsky. First, we shall consider whether the innatist explanation of linguistic universals is the only explanation. Of course, Chomsky would think so. He would insist that it is only on the assumption that there are innate linguistic principles that 'one can explain phenomena that must otherwise be regarded as accidental'.[14] Strictly speaking, no other assumption about linguistic phenomena, according to Chomsky, can have any explanatory value. He argues in the following manner. All human languages have certain basic similarities, and this is a strong evidence in favour of the existence of innate linguistic universals. But he overlooks the fact that this evidence is not conclusive. He assumes that since there are linguistic universals or a common core in all natural languages, we can conclude that these linguistic universals are innately inherent in human minds. But this conclusion of Chomsky is highly dubious. There is nothing

in the linguistic universals themselves which can show that these universals are innate. Chomsky may retort that he takes up basic similarities as evidence of innate linguistic universals, because no other plausible explanation is available to explain these basic similarities. If this is Chomsky's position, we may, following Putnam or Copper,[15] devise alternative theses of linguistic universals without invoking any innateness hypothesis.

We may try to show with Putnam that human languages have basic similarities among them because they have descended from a common origin. This suggestion seems plausible in view of the general belief that the human race has resulted from a single evolutionary leap, and that initially the human race was confined to an extremely small group from which it spread gradually. It goes without saying that if this is the picture of the evolution of human society, then all natural languages may be thought of as coming from a common parent language. To quote Putnam at length:

> .... it is overwhelmingly likely that all human languages are descended from a single original language, and that the existence today of what are called "unrelated" languages is accounted for by the great lapse of time and by countless historical changes. This is, indeed, likely ... since the human race itself is now generally believed to have resulted from a single evolutionary "leap", and since the human population was extremely small and concentrated for millenia, and only gradually spread from Asia to other continents. Thus, even if language–using was learned or invented rather than "built in", or even if only some general dispositions in the direction of language using are "built in", it is likely that some one group of humans first developed language as we know it, and then spread this through conquest or imitation to the rest of the human population. Indeed, we do know that this is just how *alphabetic* writing spread. In any case, I repeat, this hypothesis—a single origin for human language—is certainly required by the I.H., but much weaker than the I.H.[16]

Against Putnam, Chomsky remarks that there is no evidence for a common origin. But this does not seem to have any point. This appeal to common origin is what we consider most authentic and reasonable when we find that a number of languages have similarities among them and form a significant group. There is no reason why this should not be extended from some languages to all languages; why we should not think that all languages having similarities

among them have not come from a common origin. Chomsky may retort that basic similarities cannot be explained in this way. We cannot account for the basic similarities merely by saying that the structure of any natural language is 'simply an accidental consequence of common descent'.[17] His point is that any explanation in terms of common decent is ad hoc, for there is no necessary connection between the fact of common descent and the existence of linguistic universals. Is it not possible that languages have a common origin, and yet they do not have any significant similarity? If Chomsky takes this stance, this goes against his position as well. The thesis of common descent will be affected not by the possibility of languages having a common origin, and yet not having basic similarities, but only if such languages do actually exist. Now if there are really such languages which lack basic similarity, then it will disprove not only the thesis of common origin but also Chomsky's innateness hypothesis.

In addition, Cooper makes a list of cases of linguistic universals[18] which do not invite innatist explanation. We may deal with only some of them in order to emphasize that when one considers the communicative purposes and uses to which language is put, then it ceases to be surprising that all languages should display some similar features. These features are there, not because of some alleged innate biological wiring, but because they are natural devices for enabling certain communicative purposes. If the pragmatic dimension of language really does matter, then we can select from Cooper the following alternatives to the innalist explanation of linguistic universals: (a) All or nearly all languages have a preference for suffixing over prefixing; and (b) All languages have sentences of both active and passive forms.

(a) Why this preference in all languages for suffixing over prefixing? One of the reasons is that it serves a great pragmatic role: it facilitates our learning. To explain further, we can refer with Cooper to Osgood who has amply demonstrated that learning is helped in 'convergent' cases where varied stimuli elicit functionally identical responses; whereas learning is hampered in 'divergent' cases where similar stimuli can give rise to different response. Now there is some analogy between 'convergent' cases and stem-suffix. For example, various stimuli with the suffic-er, painter, baker, driver,

engineer, etc., are taken as denoting chiefly the agent or doer of a thing. On the other hand, the prefix–stem has some correspondence with 'divergent' cases. For example, similar stimuli with the prefix–a are taken in different senses: abed, abroad, ashore in the sense of on or in; while arise, awake or alright in the sense of out, or from. Now if the prefix–stem corresponds to 'divergent' cases, and stem–suffix to 'convergent' cases, it is no wonder that languages should have preference for suffix over prefix in the interest of learning. Besides—what is equally crucial—there are also communicative reasons. We know that the stem has greater communicative force and hence will tend to be positional first. Thus, if in a telegram the affixes are left out, we can understand the message in some way. But the task will be hopeless if the stem is left out in the telegram. Similarly, in the more technical language of information theory, there is greater stress on stem to decode the message. This is because the stem eliminates the possibility of varied responses. It is just on this ground that we can argue for our preferring suffix to prefix.

(b) This is also derived from the general inclination that people have while engaging in discourse. When we talk about things, we usually want to highlight one thing over another according to what we consider urgent. Given this general human propensity or inclination, it is not surprising that languages should have active and passive forms. If we are concerned with or interested in the agent who has carried out an action, we use an active form, e.g., John opens the door. But if we are more concerned with or interested in the object that is performed by an agent, the device for encoding this preference is the passive form, e.g., the door is opened by John. In other words, given communicative purposes shouldn't we expect, that we would have different ways of saying the same thing in the active or the passive—according to what object we are directing the hearer's attention?

(c) An even a more important example, perhaps, is the following. According to Chomsky, all languages—at least at the deep level—have a subject-predicate structure, which he puts down to innate wiring, because it is derived from the universal grammar that one innately possesses. We might have raised here the problem, whether universal grammar or some basic structural principles

that accommodate only the rigid or bound NP–VP form or subject predicate form will not fail to explain language like Latin or Sanskrit containing free word–order. In fact, Chomsky himself was aware of this problem. In his conversations with Mitson Ronat under the title, *Language and Responsibility*,[19] he holds that Ken Hale has studied Walbiri language and has found that this language consists of a relatively free word–order. But he leaves this problem unresolved. We should not, however, press this problem further, for our fundamental aim is to show that subject predicate form which Chomsky puts down to innate wiring can be explained otherwise. This is what Strawson has pointed out in his *Individuals* and *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar*. He has argued, plausibly, that any language which can efficiently perform the central task of language—that of making claims about things, of describing how things are—is bound to favour something like the subject-predicate form. To take one example,[20] in describing a situation, say, the disorder of a room, and how things are there, we use subject-predicate sentences like, A chair was overturned; A bottle was lying on the floor; A picture was broken. Now in the subject–position, we have certain concrete particulars which can be identified, re-identified as items of our experience. No doubt, 'chair', 'bottle' or 'picture' are kind identifying terms. Yet we can identify, re-identify spatio-temporal instances of them. The verb phrases in the predicate in all the above sentences are neither kind identifying, nor individually identifying terms; they state the conditions the concrete particulars are in. In this way, we capture things and how they are in the subject-predicate form.

Two points are involved in (a) to (c): (i) there may be perfectly plausible explanations of linguistic universals other than in terms of innate language–specific mechanisms; and (ii) those explanations are in terms of the pragmatic aspects of language—the use of language to conduct our inter-personal communicative purposes.

The credentials of innatist explanation of linguistic universals are also suspect on another ground. We have already considered structure-dependent rule, and how Chomsky gives it an innatist flavour. He holds that if a child speaks English, this does not mean that the child knows its grammar innately. For if it did, it would have great problem in speaking Spanish, if its parents moved to

Spain during its very early age. In fact, the child can speak any language—whether English or Spanish—because it knows and innately employs those principles and categories (structure–dependence, for example) from which all the languages—English, Spanish, etc., are derived. Or, to put the same thing in a different way, all the speakers of the world are involved in fundamentally similar activities (employing rules, etc.) which belong to men's innate equipment. But we do not understand why we should agree with Chomsky on this point. It may be admitted that when we form interrogatives from indicative sentences, there is structure-dependent rule behind it. But it is unclear as to why this structure-dependent rule should call forth deeper innatist explanation. Strictly speaking, all that a structure-dependent rule shows is what we normally and naturally do. When we transform the indicative, e.g., 'The old woman is happy' into the interrogative. 'Is the old woman happy?' We keep intact 'the old woman'. And this is most natural. We want to retain the phrase referring to what we are interested in (the old woman), no matter whether we say something about her or ask about her. There is nothing surprising in it to compel any innatist explanation.

We can doubt any innatist explanation from another consideration also. A little probe will reveal that there can be alternative grammars of a language. Each grammar can pick up certain features, and can claim that these characterize the grammars of all languages. Consequently, we have alternative linguistic universals. Now which of them we accept will not be determined objectively; it will depend on what grammar we opt for. Suppose, we accept Chomsky's transformational grammar of English. Then our paradigm will be subject, defined as left most NP in the underlying structure, and we shall try to incorporate subject in all languages. We shall not be hemmed in even if we do not discover subjects in a language. We shall try to emphasize, they have just been deleted in the surface level, but they are in the deep level. On the other hand, if we accept Fillmore's case grammar of English where the verb occupies the pivotal position, we shall not regard as basic the subject–predicate construction. We shall focus on case relations, e.g., between Agentives and Locatives, with categories like subject being treated as derivative.

If the foregoing argument is true, then the moral is against the prospect of an innatist explanation. For what will count as linguistic universals will be a matter of our choice, what grammar we prefer. This implies that linguistic universals cannot be innate. For what is innate cannot depend on our choice.

From the above analysis, we arrive at a closely related point to argue, with Devitt and Sterelny, against Chomsky: '... the common features may be artifacts of the method theorists use to construct grammars, rather than indications of what is common to the grammars actually internalised by speakers'.[21] We think that this observation of Devitt and Sterelny highlights two important points: (a) linguistic universals may be artifacts of linguistic theory. In other words, from the fact that a linguist may employ the same categories, principles, etc., in his descriptions of all languages, it won't follow that these languages are really governed by such principles, i.e., that speakers of all those languages have internalized just those principles. (After all, one might describe bee behaviour in terms of game theory; but it hardly follows that bees know the principles of game theory). (b) There is really something question–begging in Chomsky's account. One of his reasons for holding there is innate knowledge of X, Y, etc., is that X, Y, etc., are universal features of language. But in order to establish that these are genuinely universal features, and not theorists' artifacts, he needs to assume that they are part of our innate equipment. Now what could justify that assumption? Only perhaps the claim that all speakers internalize the principles, etc., of the best, simplest linguistic theory, as propounded by TG grammar of Chomsky. But why make this claim? Does it not sound dogmatic just like the theological claim that the world must act in accordance with the simplest, ideal physical theory as sponsored by it?

IV

Let us now return to the main arguments that Chomsky gives to support his innateness hypothesis—the ones from complexity and poverty of stimuli. First, let us deal with his complexity argument. We have already pointed out that Chomsky stresses the complexity of language in order to argue for innate learning mechanism of the child. But complexity is, after all, a function of how something

is described. Let us, for example, take the sentence, 'He rode his bicycle along the road'. Now if we like, we can give it a very complicated paraphrase. 'He moved the muscles of his legs in such a way that he propelled a machine with the following properties ... in such a way as to maintain equilibrium between gravitational forces and ... etc. ...' Hence, whether anything will look enormously complex will depend on how we prefer to describe it. Similarly, the ability to, say, convert an active sentence into a passive one can be made to sound a very complicated business—if we prefer to describe it in terms of technical linguistics. Then we shall have to say the following. The element passive (optional) is generated by the PS rules lying at the base. The element passive, however, triggers off obligatory and phonemic rules to give shape to the final sentence. Thus, NP_1 + Aux + NP_2 + by + passive → NP_2 + Aux + be + en + V + en + by + NP_1: The boy has been seen by the man. Obviously, to turn an active sentence into a passive one will sound like a remarkably complex operation, if we describe it in the terms of technical linguistics (Chomsky's TG grammar). But described, simply, as turning an active sentence into a passive one it does not sound like a complex operation. Of course, if we equate knowing how to convert the sentence with unconscious proposational knowledge of some very complicated rule, then we guarantee that the capacity to make the conversion is very complex one. But if arguments against unconscious knowledge are right,[22] it is illegitimate to make that equation. In other words, Chomsky can only claim that our linguistic understanding is something highly complex if we already accept his account of understanding in terms of propositional grasp of rules. This is what we do not accept.

Next, let us look at Chomsky's poverty of the stimulus argument. Chomsky treats the data available to the child in a very restricted way—as mere sounds from which the child must infer to the system of rules of the language he is learning. This is questionable for at least two reasons:

(a) If we take lessons from Wiggins, McDowell and Heidegger,[23] it is implausible to suppose that we go through a process (ordinarily) of inferring meanings from raw acoustic data. This is like supposing we recognize people's moods from the raw data of facial movements, etc. Wiggins, McDowell or Heidegger want to empha-

size that we directly experience or perceive meaning, structure, etc., in people's speech, which is a 'social object'. We hear someone describing something, not just producing sounds. We may substantiate it with reference to Heidegger. Heidegger's model is a description of hearinig:

> What we 'first hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle..... It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The fact that motorcycles and wagons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as being-in-the-world, already dwells amidst what is available within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell primarily amidst 'sensations'.[24]

If we apply it to language, it will mean that we do not hear only meaningless sounds, only 'acoustic blasts', and then posit mental rules and representations to interpret them. As Heidegger puts it:

> When we are explicitly hearing the telling of another, we immediately understand what is said, or—to put it more exactly we are already with him, in advance, among the entities which the telling is about .... what we primarily do not hear is the pronounciation of sounds.[25]

The point made by Heidegger is that phenomenologically, language is used in a shared context, and as long as we dwell in a community's practices, we hear words as already meaningful, and not as mere sounds. We perceive and experience words as already 'supplied with significations'.[26] Therefore, if we unduly restrict what can be said to be perceptually and experimentally available to a person, it is easy to make it appear as if this is much too impoverished a basis from which to infer what sentences mean, etc., so that we then need to bring in something like innate understanding to bridge the gap. But may be the problem is with that restriction.

(b) It follows from the above argument that when Chomsky discusses the situation of the child learner, he makes it sound, wrongly, as if the child has nothing to go on except mere noises which might, as it were, issue from a tape recorder. In fact, the child learns from other people in actual situation, where the context enables the learning process. The child observes the linguistic behaviour going on around it, and the corresponding response pattern of the elders. Thus, when the child hears someone saying,

'Bring the cow', he notices the response of the individual to whom the sentence is addressed. Again, he hears the sentence, 'Bind the cow' and notices the corresponding action of his elders. In this way, the child's learning a language in interpersonal context goes on. What we are trying to insist on is that once we take into account the whole of what is impinging on the learner—not just the mere noises showering on him—it is unclear why we should speak of the poverty of the stimuli available to him. Once again, it seems, Chomsky's account suffers from ignoring or playing down the role of the social or interpersonal in language learning.

A similar way to substantiate the contention that language acquisition is a part of socialization is this. If we abide by the dictate of modulary thesis of language, then there is the following consequence. The processes which are responsible for the acquisition, understanding and production of language are quite independent of the processes that are responsible for general cognition and learning. A certain level of cognitive ability is, indeed, essential for playing chess, for example. But we all learn a language and this does not involve cognitive ability of the sort required to learn how to play chess. That is why everyone can learn his native language, while everyone does not solve puzzles or prove theorems. 'But', as Putnam has significantly pointed out, 'everyone does learn pattern recognition, automobile driving, and everyone in fact can solve many problems that no computer can solve.'[27] So why should one assume that the principles underlying the acquisition of language are likely to be special to the domain of language? Does it not sound more plausible that we acquire language by general learning principles of the sort that enable us to learn automobile driving, solve problems, play chess or something like that? This point, incidentally, is also made by connectionists like Elman and his colleagues when they say, 'a domain-general pattern recognition device would suffice',[28] i.e. language acquisition can be taken care of by an undifferentiated neural network that suffices for everything, including vision, face recognition and the like. Being a part of general learning strategy learning of language needs some extra-linguistic information. This is provided for the learner by the appropriate behaviour, practices of his linguistic community in the context of a form of life shared by the community.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Strictly speaking, the mere fact that my knowledge of X is innate does not entail that it wasn't learned or taught to me by others. For may be, as Plato suggested in Meno, it is knowledge I acquired in a previous life. Clearly, though, this is not a possibility that Chomsky contenances.
2. Noam Chomsky, 'Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar'. From T.A. Sebeok (ed.), *Current Trends in Linguistics*, Vol. III (The Hague: Moutan, 1966), p. 11.
3. Noam Chomsky, *Language and Problems of Knowledge*, pp. 41–45.
4. Noam Chomsky, *Reflections on Language*, p. 32.
5. Noam Chomsky, *Language and Problems of Knowledge*, p. 45.
6. William Ramsey and Stephen Stich, 'Connectionism and Three Levels of Nativism', Synthese 82, (1990), p. 181. In this connection, we should note that we owe much to this paper in explaining the three versions of the poverty of the stimulus argument (pp. 177–205).
7. Noam Chomsky, *Rules and Representation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 134.
8. Quoted from J.R. Searle, 'Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics', in Gilbert Harman (ed.), *Noam Chomsky: Critical Essay* (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 22.
9. J.R. Searle, op.cit., p. 22.
10. Cf. Noam Chomsky, *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Neil Smith, *Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
11. Neil Smith, *Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals*, p. 17; In dealing with modularity thesis of Chomsky and Fodor, I depend heavily on this book.
12. Ibid., p. 20.
13. J. Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (New York: Crowell, 1975).
14. Cf. Noam Chomsky, 'Some General Properties of Phonological Rules', Language, 43 (1967), pp. 102–28.
15. Cf. H. Putnam, 'The Innateness Hypothesis: Explanatory Models in Linguistics', in J.R. Searle (ed.), *Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971): D.E. Cooper, *Knowledge of Language* (London: Prism Press, 1975).
16. Putnam, op.cit., p. 136.
17. Noam Chomsky, 'Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas' in J.R. Searle (ed.), op.cit., p. 125.
18. D.E. Cooper, op.cit., pp. 162–82. We have extensively used Cooper's ideas about linguistic universals.
19. Noam Chomsky, *Language and Responsibility* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

20. Cf. P.F. Strawson, *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar* (London: Methuen, 1974), p. 106.
21. M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, *Language and Reality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 154.
22. Cf. my paper, 'Chomsky on Knowledge of Language: A Critical Probe', in *Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy* (1999).
23. Cf. Wiggins, 'Languages as Social Objects', Philosophy 72 (1997): John McDowell, 'Wittgenstein on following a rule', Synthese 58 (1984) (pp. 325–63); Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
24. Taken from H.L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (Cambridge: MIT, 1995), p. 218.
25. Ibid., p. 219.
26. Ibid.
27. H. Putnam, 'The Innateness Hypothesis and Explanatory Models in Linguistics', in J.R. Searle (ed.), *The Philosophy of Language*, p. 138.
28. Cf. J. Elman, E. Bates, M. Johnson and others, *Rethinking Innateness: A Connectionist Perspective on Development* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

Hermeneutics—Beyond Methodology

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ABSTRACT

The aspirations to attain an autonomous status for the human sciences as hermeneutically grounded fraught with the strong positivistic attitude is the obvious conflict that underlies the perennial methodological debate between the natural-physical sciences and human-historical sciences. I examine this age-old debate against the backdrop of the theory of hermeneutics. Central to this theory is the idea of the 'text' which is being enlarged to include the entire symbolically constituted human-historical reality so as to justify the methodology of hermeneutics for the field of the human sciences. But the idea of 'text-analogue' threatens the actual ontological foundation of these sciences in pursuit of the methodological independence in a scientific spirit. Thus, there is a need to reiterate the epistemological-existential integrality which is the very essence of the concept of hermeneutics to check any attempt in the direction of Cartesian exorcism. Can science uphold the idea of methodological emancipation is the question that also demands attention in this regard. For it is due to the heightened enthusiasm towards scientism that the human sciences think of transcending their existential-historical rootedness. The unconventional thoughts of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper are very pertinent here in questioning the undeterred supremacy science has so far claimed over the other discourses. A radically different account of science also helps pick up certain loosely ingrained hermeneutic threads in the fabric of science and thereby assert the universality claim of hermeneutics. Not only this, the roots of hermeneutics go even deeper when the existential concerns are being noticed in the scientific claims as well which endorse the cognitive-

existential intertwining and strengthen the fundamentality of hermeneutics. Thus, in the paper, I will conclude that hermeneutics reconciles the two discourses on the same onto-existential plane and asserts its role beyond methodology.

As a major point of concern for philosophers who are naturally required to deal with the epistemological-methodological problems of philosophy, the notion of 'interpretative understanding', the basis of the theory of hermeneutics, has drawn wide attention in the contemporary philosophical world. A particularly appropriate context in which this concept has gained a great importance is the methodological debate between the two sciences, viz., the *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. In the paper I shall examine this age-old debate in the light of the theory of hermeneutics which contributes significantly to this perennial debate in its methodological-existential profile.

The genesis of the debate is attributable to the fact that the line of demarcation between the two epistemic fields has often been overlooked in the heightened enthusiasm of professing the idea of 'unified knowledge' under the aegis of positivism. And the controversy takes a sharp turn when it comes to make the difficult choice between the adoption of the methodological attitude or preserving the ontological reality of the human sciences. Both the standpoints, i.e. the submission to the 'unity of method' and accounting for a methodological autonomy in the field of the human-historical sciences witness equal defence in this regard. However, the issue of the methodological separation has been taken up very seriously by philosophers who argue quite forcefully and innovatively that while our knowledge about 'meaningless' natural phenomena is sought to be acquired by virtue of causal explanation, we must adopt the method or approach of 'understanding' if we are to gain proper knowledge of meaningful human phenomena. The need for a separate 'rational' method of inquiry motivated the desire for a methodological self-sufficiency for the human sciences and *hermeneutics* in its methodological capacity is being fully trusted for this purpose. Central to the theory of hermeneutics, is the idea of 'textuality' which has been enlarged to subsume everything under the paradigm of *written*. The entire history of mankind, in fact, is being perceived as a 'grand cultural narrative' and appropriateness of the hermeneutic reading is, hence, justified.

The Euro-American philosophical arena abounds with the echoes of such hermeneutic tones. We find that Paul Ricoeur argues for the narrative construal of the historical reality and Charles Taylor regards human agency (which defies subordination to rules) an important interpretive determinant in understanding the historical existence. But, beyond this naïve hermeneutic characterization of human reality, an unflinching faith in hermeneutic theory is seen in Wilhelm Dilthey which, according to him, can fetch an autonomous and objective status to the human-historical sciences comparable to that of the natural-physical sciences. To him the human expressions, manifesting the 'inner', are the non-contingent 'objectifications of the mind' and in this sense they are similar to a text. The homogeneity between a text and the expressions of mind is seen in the fact that both are the results of the creativity of the mind and enjoy a considerable amount of objectivity or permanence. Nevertheless, Dilthey's programme has been shown to be fraught with inconsistencies by his follower Gadamer. The discordance in Dilthey's thoughts, according to Gadamer, is due to the conflicting aspirations of attributing scientific or quasi-scientific character to the human sciences as well as retaining their peculiar interpretative account. This puts him in a paradoxical situation to retain both human subjectivity and the scientific objectivity at once. Perhaps hermeneutics has been unjustifiably exploited for the incongruent ideals.

Does the hermeneutic methodology really constitute a solid epistemic foundation for the human-historical sciences is the question that I take up in the paper. My explorations also delve into understanding the nature and dynamics of the scientific enterprise; for, the fact is that in attempting to attain the high scientific ideals most other non-scientific discourses tend to threaten their autonomy. And the same fate is meted out to human sciences when they adopt the hermeneutic methodology in a scientific spirit. In section I of the article, I argue that the foundation hermeneutics constitutes for the human-historical sciences is *ontological* in nature—a fact which gets overshadowed in rigorous epistemological-methodological pursuits. In section II, I extrapolate the thoughts of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper whose unconventional and radical accounts offer an alternative picture of science than our usual

understanding of it. One may notice, through their perspectives, that the currents of *interpretability* run through the fabric of science and strongly shake its undeterred supremacy it enjoys over other discourses. And not only this, a claim towards the universality of hermeneutics gets built up. The hermeneutic encompassing of the two domains asserts its fundamentality in a more pertinent manner when the pragmatic concerns of the two fields of knowledge reveal the cognitive-existential essence of hermeneutics. In section III, I examine this essential feature of hermeneutics displayed in the existential-practical undercurrents of the two disciplines which reduces the methodological antagonism between them and reconciles them onto the same platform. The hermeneutic foundation attacks the supremacy of science and gives a new meaning to this methodological debate.

I

As a method of inquiry, hermeneutics is legitimately employed; for, what is sought after is social reality which is identified as a meaning impregnated collective expression of the human mind. And grasping its meaning depends upon understanding the 'intentional repertoire' both of the agent and the society at large which underlie and animate that reality into a historically circumscribed reality. Since the workings of the mind are purposive (unlike those of blind causality), free (at least within limits) of trammels of necessity and genuinely creative, the human world cannot be understood as a deterministic causal order of necessary uniformities such as natural sciences have constructed to describe and explain the physical world. The symbolically constituted world can only be interpretatively grasped.

The extension of the hermeneutic methodology to the entire field of the human-historical sciences is conceived on the idea that the entire historical reality displays a text-like character. The intended meaning inherently embedded in human actions and cultural expressions needs to be deciphered precisely as we read a text. The analogy of text in recent hermeneutic tradition is given for urging that text is a mediation, a detour through which one arrives at one's own understanding. It is to stress upon the 'otherness', the 'alienation' dialectically ingrained in the process of

appropriation or homecoming. But Dilthey conceptualizes it for giving the symbolic reality some objectivity. And for this he has been criticized by Gadamer because the idea of text-analogue turns the concrete, contingent history into an abstract finished product. With the analogy of text Dilthey attempts to posit hemeneutics as a well-established method for the human sciences vis-à-vis the scientific methodology of *erklaren*. In a way, like his master Schleiermacher's program to develop a general hermeneutics, he attempts to put forth a methodology applicable to all human phenomena. The respectable measure of methodological independence that he wishes for in the field of the human sciences is, however, the same time, tested on the scientific parameters of objectivity and certainty. For him the human expressions are grounded in lived-experiences and certainty (in the sense of infallible immediacy in the inner realm of consciousness) is as much a feature of them as it is of the scientific explanation through controlled means. Secondly, he argues that the desired objectivity in human matters can be maintained; for, the manifold of social-cultural phenomena are the 'objectified' inner mind and a hermeneutic inquiry can always transcend the subjective nuances.

Although the philosophical characterization of the human sciences through the epistemology of interpretative understanding is the significant contribution of Dilthey, he has been criticized for harbouring the mistaken belief that the method of understanding can attain objective certainty in the human matters. His critique of historical reason expresses the inability to exorcise the Cartesian obsession with a firm and solid foundation upon which the edifice of the knowledge of human nature is to be built. Gadamer points out that Dilthey's invulnerable faith in science, accompanied by an irrefutable need for Cartesian foundation, betrays his own appreciation that understanding of human-social reality is essentially historical. Since historicity so delimits and saturates both the interpreter and the interpreted situation, it frustrates any expectation of epistemic transparency. The historico-hermeneutic conditioning of understanding is all pervasive and such that it resists total methodization. The 'truth' the human sciences aspire for cannot be captured by methodological means. Truth, rather, is a 'happening', an 'event', a 'phenomenological disclosure' encountered in

and through interpretative understanding. So, although Dilthey begins with the aim of placing the human sciences in lived-experiences and historical consciousness, he fails, on the other hand, to detach himself from the desire to achieve methodological certainty of a kind that is alien to historical reason. Such a pursuit overshadows the inner ontological spirit of hermeneutics which alone can assign the human-historical sciences the desired autonomy.

Thus, we find that hermeneutics is not only been inconsistently juxtaposed with achieving the scientific ideals but it is also being robbed of its essential ontological character. The desire for the Enlightenment ideal overlooks the fact of the historicity of human existence—the fact about our being situated in an already historically defined and interpreted world. At this juncture, I draw attention to Paul Ricoeur's observation that hermeneutics, is only a 'mode of knowing', an effort to achieve epistemic certainty, unless it is affiliated to making the ontological claims. He writes, 'hermeneutics is not a reflection on the human sciences, but an explication of the ontological ground upon which these sciences can be construed.... hermeneutics thus construed "contains the root of what can be called *hermeneutic*" only in a derivative sense: the methodology of the human sciences'.[1] What Ricoeur wants to highlight is that the cognitive-methodological attribute of hermeneutics is a derivative idea but its fundamentality essentially lies in constituting the foundation for the human sciences. The genesis of this significant remark by Ricoeur can be traced to Heidegger who not only assigns an existential characterization to understanding but also considers that the interpretation of the authentically historical beings as regards their historicity is more important than the concept formation of historiography.[2] Ricoeur endorses this point that the distinctiveness of the human sciences lies in addressing to the question of historicity and not in the function of solely explicating the 'objectifications of the mind', as Dilthey thinks.[3]

As the disclosure of the meaning of our historical existence is considered to be the essence of the human sciences, it has been seen by Ricoeur as constitutive of understanding itself. Following the Fregean distinction between the sense (the ideal object—proposition intended) and reference (the truth-value), he claims that understanding is two-dimensional. Ricoeur explains this by contending that a textual interpretation embodies two elements—sense and reference. The text structured in a particular syntactical order emanates the sense through the circularity of the parts and whole. But the structural sense is complemented with the semantic-referential dimension, i.e. how the text relates itself to the reality question through the hermeneutic reading. The text or any hermeneutic object, for that matter, unfolds 'possibilities' having existential bearings—the confrontation with them opens up new 'horizons of expectation' for the reader. The broadening of one's horizon may cause ego-transformation or giving up one's narcissistic ego, leading to one's enhanced projective understanding. In short, all understanding amounts to self-understanding. Ricoeur extends the existential-semantic dimension even to the action. In his words, 'human action, no less than literary texts, displays a sense as well as a reference; it possesses an internal structure as well as a possible world, a potential mode of human existence which can be unfolded through the process of interpretation'.[4]

The point that Ricoeur drives home is that the question of the meaning of being or existence is what gives the epistemology of interpretation its due. But he also admits that there is no royal road to the ontology of being and one must take a 'long and ardous route' of interpreting the semantically constituted historical reality. Likewise, he points out that the human sciences sabotage their own hermeneutic essentiality in aspiring for the scientific detached character. The desire for the methodological emancipation contaminates the essential ontological nature of the hermeneutic enterprises.

II

This section examines the nature of the scientific practice from the perspectives of Kuhn and Popper. Although these two famous thinkers of the twentieth century are well known for their contrasting positions, my contention of bringing them together is to make use of their unprecedented standpoints so as to question the privileged status of science vis-à-vis other non-scientific discourses of knowledge. Both the thinkers seriously challenge the conventional manner in which the history of science has so far been read. And, in their radical thoughts, one may pick up the loosely connected hermeneutic threads framed in the fabric of science.

A value-laden question of what is *privileged* and what is not in the field of epistemology customarily rests on the line of demarcation between what is science and what is not. The scientific discourse enjoys a privileged status because the scientific claims—above all the characteristic—are considered true, certain and objective. The other discourses, in their peculiarities, fail to meet these standards and are thereby underestimated. But the revolutionary ideas of Kuhn and Popper give a tremendous blow to this uncritical mindset.

The commonplace assumption that the practice of science is non-vulnerable to ideological influences is what Kuhn strongly reacts to. He, instead, argues that science is essentially historically conditioned. A scientist always works within a historical context, a paradigm that he finds himself situated in. Although a scientist exercises his freedom to manipulate the world according to his wishes, his creative individuality is ultimately sanctioned by the norms defined within the prevailing scientific community. He is constantly guided by the existing corpus of knowledge at every stage of his research, whether it is the concept formation of hypothesis, experimentation, corroboration of hypothesis with facts or arriving at the law. Kuhn writes: 'scientists never learn concepts, laws and theories in the abstract by themselves. Instead, these intellectual tools are from the start encountered in a historically and pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and through their application.'[5] He calls this prior rootedness a 'paradigm' which, according to him, is never missing at any point of time—be it a normal course of events (where a scientist generally extends his predecessors' works, mainly correcting the theoretical and technical flaws in the system) or an abnormal course—a breakthrough which compels a shift only to enter into another paradigm. And given a new paradigm, a completely new, radical perspective science is governed by.

The concept of 'paradigm' lays focus on the institutional character of science. Being paradigm-centric, science is a highly directed activity. Not only the nature of researches but even the conversion of scientific endeavours into a theory requires to be endorsed by the scientific community. The decisive role played by the scientific community makes science perspectival. It alludes to the hermeneutic feature of 'as-understanding' or 'as-characterization', i.e., there is a point of view, a perspective all cognition essentially employs.

It is because of this intrinsic interpretive element, attributable to different paradigms, that we find Priestley and Lavoisier offering different observational accounts of oxygen. Similarly, Aristotle and Galileo differ in their interpretations of pendulum. The conflicting interpretations let the incommensurability enter into the scientific discourse as well. Thus, we find that science being contextually embedded is engulfed by the limiting and contrasting interpretative stances and, hence, the very idea of transparent objective knowledge comes under a threat.

Like Kuhn, Popper also presents an unconventional account of science. He is perhaps best known for repudiating the classical observationalist-inductivist account of science by arguing that it is the *falsifiability* rather than verifiability which is the criterion of the scientific method. To him the scientific laws are testable but not provable, i.e., they cannot be proved conclusively but certainly can be refuted on rigorous parameters. So, instead of verifying the scientific laws, it is possible to know their worth by critically rejecting them. Although the principle of falsification (which provides a novel solution to the problem of induction) faces the charges of circularity, it certainly highlights the element of progressiveness within science, without which it would have been stagnant.

This principle also reveals another important point that there is no firm and secure foundation that the edifice of scientific knowledge rests upon. All knowledge is essentially provisional. Even though a theory is considered true, it is only in the sense of being more 'fit', that is, more applicable to the problem situation than the other theories. A law or theory is always open to revision and liable to lose its credibility as soon as another theory stakes its claim. Popper thus condemns the popular belief that science is a body of established laws. He, instead, argues that science is changing all the time and only in having a critical fervor (that of progressing through refuting existing laws) can it be called a rational inquiry. He makes an important distinction between 'truth' and 'certainty'. Although he is strongly defensive of scientific knowledge as the most important kind of knowledge having positive influences on society, he maintains that knowledge is the search—for truth and not for certainty. And by truth he means 'what is accepted; or what is put forward by society; or by the majority; or by my interest group; or

perhaps by television'.[6] Thus, he opines that since we cannot be certain about anything, it is worth searching for truth rather than certainty.

Another crucial point in Popper is that he is critical of the view that science progresses on account of 'pure observation'. He, rather, argues that observation is never pure, a-historical and objective. Every observation is selective; it chooses an object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. In his words, 'observations and even more so observation-statements and statements of experimental results, are always *interpretations* of the facts observed; that they are *interpretations in the light of theories.*[7] The point is that since observations are theory dependent, there is no trans-historical 'pure' capturing of factual reality that science can obtain.

If we now concentrate on the three seminal points that have emerged from Popper's account of science, namely, the falsification principle, the denial of science being a body of established laws and the interpretative essence of all observation, we embark upon an important claim that science evades finality. There is a constant slippage in reaching secure foundations though it is true that the critical refutation makes scientific knowledge a rational inquiry. In such a situation when features like interpretability, contextuality, openendedness, etc., are shown to be the integral part of the scientific discourse, doubts loom large over the unassailant privileged position of science. Science, devoid of the traits like universality, objectivity and certainty is certainly a disqualifier for any non-ideological supreme position over other epistemic discourses.

Both Kuhn and Popper, in their revolutionary thoughts, have paved a way to challenge the untainted supremacy of science reigning over other disciplines. The scientific and non-scientific demarcation looks insignificant in the light of the 'features' being noticed in the fabric of science which are generally considered to be definitive of the human-historical sciences. Now that the special status of the natural sciences comes under a serious attack, there is a strong need to liberate the human sciences from the overwhelming positivistic grips. Their aspirations to attain objective knowledge through the strict methodological means appear meaningless in the wake of the boundary lines being fizzled out between

the two domains (which obviously does not mean tempering with their epistemological-methodological peculiarities). As a matter of fact, the presumed unbridgeable gap between them, which positions science over them, further narrows down when certain affinities, having pragmatic orientations, are being noticed in their concerns. In what follows, I argue that the 'hermeneutic turn' which situates both the discourses onto the existential plane asserts its fundamentality in a much more meaningful way and gives a new direction to this ongoing methodological debate.

III

The methodological distinctness respects the disciplinary boundaries. If hermeneutics is employed as a method or approach to understand human historical phenomena, its appropriateness is never questioned for the destined task. What is under dispute, however, is whether it is capable of attaining scientific certitude. In other words, the objectification or scientific characterization of hermeneutics has become a point of discussion. In the light of the fact that scientific standards themselves face severe criticisms *from within*, the question of hermeneutics producing objective results for the realm of 'interpretable' does not arise at all. Moreover, the epistemological task of interpretative understanding itself rests on an onto-existential basis which not only assigns individuality to the hermeneutic-historical sciences but also disallows the extreme objectivity to enter in. This cognitive-existential bonding which is distinctively noticed in the hermeneutic discourses underlies all episteme. The scientific discourse too is not alienated from the existential claims. One paradigm in which this existential affiliation is profoundly manifested is the paradigm of pragmatics. All talks concerning practicality, utility, etc., make their sense from the standpoint of human existence. It is the pragmatic concerns that establish an existential linkage with a cognitive enterprise. And both the human and scientific domains reconcile on this existential platform. Thus, the earlier attempt of placing them both under the positivistic umbrella is now being taken over by the existential-pragmatic pervasiveness.

The point of intersection between the two epistemological fields is marked by the idea of 'praxis', the practical side of the conjec-

tural theorization. As a matter of fact, the positivistic sciences are in a strong position insofar as the practical application is the issue. This is so because technology or technological advancement is a pragmatic extension of the scientific discourse. Complemented with technology, science comes down from its thematic standards to the operative function at all levels. Technology, thus, supplies a bridge between the theoretical inquiries and the substantive issues of the human existence. The human-historical sciences, on the other hand, make a lesser claim as to having any practical utility. And the present highly technology savvy environment makes it all the more difficult for them to assert their utility. However, the bridging link that technology provides between science and human existence can be ascertained in the nature of the 'hermeneutic experience'.

The pragmatic orientations, however, are not to be taken in the sense of 'techne', which means instrumentality of things for a definite goal. But the basic idea of purposiveness or pragmatic value ingrained in the meaning of 'praxis' is still found in a hermeneutic experience. Gadamer attempts to show this dimension of interpretative understanding through the concept of 'application' which he constructs upon the Aristotelian idea of *phronesis*. By *phronesis* or practical moral reasoning, Aristotle intends to show that moral decisions require interpretation of the moral laws within the particular problematic situation and do not mean strict adherence to the established codes. The interpretability suggests the practical approach towards the situation. It is an ability to see the right thing and the right action is conducive to the good. In this sense, every act of moral reasoning is immanently purposive. Gadamer explains the notion of 'application' with a special reference to the legal hermeneutics but strongly holds that it is an integral constitutive element of a hermeneutic experience along with 'understanding' and 'interpretation'. A hermeneutic experience is more than the procedural activity of decoding the sense of the hermeneutic object. There is never a complete distanciation from the hermeneutic object; rather, the distanciation itself works as a dialectic counterpart in appropriating the meaning. Just as the pure objectivity is an impossibility in the hermeneutic situation, so is the case with the idea of the dominant subjectivity. The dialectic within the dialogical nexus between the subject and object rather results into a

significant moment of self-appraisal or self-criticism. It is a moment of confronting one's enlarged self laid open by the text, or any hermeneutic object for that matter. The 'critique' within the hermeneutic experience points out that the interpreter's own enhanced understanding is what all understanding leads to. And insofar as all understanding culminates into self-understanding, all hermeneutic efforts do make pragmatic claims. If every hermeneutic situation yields semantic-existential 'possibilities' and thereby broadens one's horizon of meaning, then certainly the pragmatic import of the projective dimension of understanding cannot be ignored, though its value defies estimation in tangible results.

The idea of 'hermeneutics of existence' which becomes a pragmatic denominator and constitutes the foundation for the hermeneutic-historical sciences also underlies the scientific discourse. The natural-physical sciences, even in their so-called 'disembodied gaze', cannot still remain neutral to the question of the meaning of human existence. And this reflective attitude towards the human-social existence becomes all the more pressing and pertinent when harmful consequences rather than the remarkable contributions of scientific researches and technological advancements draw alarming attentions. Considering the pace at which science is progressing, it is often contemplated that the human-social sciences need to accelerate their pace so that issues like peaceful existence, a socio-cultural order win over many mindless races such as that of the nuclear possession which poses a serious threat to the existence of the human species itself. The epistemic pursuits cannot ignore their intimate relationship with the socio-historical conditions. Highlighting this fact of intimacy between the sciences and life (irrespective of the use of the scientific methods), Karl Popper says, 'Since scientific research in social problems must itself influence social life, it is impossible for the social scientist who is aware of this influence to retain the proper scientific attitude of disinterested objectivity. But there is nothing peculiar to social science in this situation. A physicist or a physical engineer is in the same position. Without being a social scientist he can realize that the invention of a new aircraft or rocket may have a tremendous influence on society.'[8]

Given the existential implications of human and scientific knowledge and the responsibilities associated with them, it can be concluded that all epistemic pursuits display an inherent *referentiality*, a directedness towards the socio-historical reality. The cognitive-existential intertwining lies at the core of all discourses which is exhibited in their distinctive ways of manifesting and shaping the reality. The interpretative understanding spells out this feature prominently, for there is a close tie between the interpreter and the hermeneutically constituted world but the scientific paradigm is also not at apogee from the socio-historical reality. The technological empowerment that science has earned offers a 'point of view', a 'form of life', a 'world-view'. And, in so doing, the meaning of life is given a new perspective. Heidegger has rightly pointed out that man's relation with the world, even in a manipulative attitude, is a meaningful way of understanding the 'totality of things'. Technology is the primordial and foremost expression of our comportment with the world. It provides a hermeneutic linkage between its thematic counterpart science and the human-historical existence. Thus, hermeneutics, in its fundamentality, synthesizes the 'empirical' and 'rational' discourses onto the ontological-existential plane and asserts its claim beyond methodology.

Notes and References

1. Ricoeur, Paul, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. & trans. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 55.
2. Heidegger addresses the deeper issue of the ontological foundation rather than the epistemological grounding of the human sciences. For him, hermeneutics is not a reflection on the human sciences, but an explication of the ontological grounds upon which these sciences can be constructed. Hermeneutics is a methodology of the human sciences only in the derivative sense.
3. By the 'objectifications of the mind', Dilthey means certain expressions which reflect the inter-subjective or participative nature of mankind which establish a link between the individual psyche and socially acceptable behaviour. The objectifications of mind include individual gestures, words and actions as well as social institutions, customs, languages, states, churches, legal systems, tools, books, works of art and so on.
4. Ricoeur, Paul, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. & trans. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 16.

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6. Popper, Karl, *In Search of a Better World* (Routledge, 1994), p. 5.
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An Understanding of Tribal Epistemology

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This article attempts to argue for the idea that tribal knowledge patterns have some distinct features so that it is not traditional epistemology but a tribal epistemology that can bring justice to an exploration into tribal ways of knowing. The four parts of this article are directed to this end. First, I begin with an exposition of the general understanding of the concept of 'tribe', second, there is an explanation of how the concept of 'knowledge' in tribal culture is distinguished from that in modernity; third, I have elucidated on the role of myth in the tribal way of knowing and fourth, by way of conclusion, I try to highlight the distinctive features of tribal epistemology.

I

What is a 'tribe'? D.N. Majumdar's definition of 'tribe' points out the collectiveness of a group of tribe, a tribe's uniqueness under one common name, the relative territorial rigidity, the common language, taboos, and mutual obligations among the people of a particular tribe. Moreover, Majumdar recognizes that a tribe is also 'a political unit in the sense that the tribal society owns a political organization'.[1] It is a group of people belonging to the same race, with the same customs, language, moral and religious precepts, etc., often led by a chief. The members of a particular tribe may have strong affinity with each other, not only being members of the same socio-cultural order, but more so due to the same biological ancestry which also brings forth an intertwined social bond for them.

The concept of 'primitive' is closely associated with the concept of 'tribe'. We need not consider 'primitive' in its derogative sense,

though the colonial masters sometimes use the term 'tribe' to mean the primitive qua barbarous communities. Evans Pritchard's opinion about the word 'primitive' is worth quoting: 'the word "primitive", in the sense in which it has become established in anthropological literature, does not mean that the societies it qualifies are either earlier in time or inferior to other kinds of societies'.[2] He further observes, 'As far as we know, primitive societies have just as long a history as our own, and while they are less developed than our society in some respects, they are often more developed in others'.[3] His opinion about the continuance of the term, though undesirable, is this. '.... The word was perhaps an unfortunate choice, but it has now been too widely accepted as technical term to be avoided.'[4]

Many of the so-called primitive communities do carry out manifold varieties of social organizational behaviour and cultural patterns. When we think of the term 'primitive', we are inclined to mean a less advanced community. Of course, it is true in some respects like, for instance, it is true of reading and writing and of technological progress. But in many respects, the cultures of those whom we call primitive is more highly developed than the civilized or advanced cultures.

The idea of static is also largely associated with the concept of primitive. It is believed that the primitive societies and the cultures are almost in a state of equilibrium. In other words, the changes in primitive societies are the least and those in civilized societies the most. Needless to say, change is ubiquitous in all human societies. Subject to the environmental conditions and psycho-social orientations, the rate of change found in communities isolated from the main stream is slower than that in those communities which are exposed to the cultural inter-change with other people. The habitat also sets certain limits beyond which it is not possible for the culture to develop unless radical changes are introduced from outside.

One of the consequences of considering tribes as primitive is the failure to think that they are capable of achievements. In the new strategy for understanding tribal thought, it is appropriate to look critically at the term 'primitive' to consider both its meaning and its implications. The relevance of critical examination of the term

'primitive' in the changing context of tribal societies is twofold. On the one hand, the misconception which arises out of ortholinear view has to be wiped out and on the other, once the correct meaning of the term is found out, then it becomes easier to evolve suitable strategies for understanding the tribal knowledge system.

II

The traditional approaches to knowledge run after truth. Moreover, a subject is not counted to have a knowledge of something unless he is justified in believing that particular something. Underneath the requirement of justification reigns a sense of rationality or reason, although it is expressed in differently. The different expression is that knowledge cannot be distinguished from mere beliefs if justification is not demanded as a necessary condition of knowledge. As a matter of fact, the requirement of justification is nothing but the requirement of confirming the possession of an acceptable valid base, evidence, rationality, or reason for one's belief so that the possession of that belief can amount to knowledge. The main stream approaches to knowledge or modernity claims that no genuine knowledge defies reason. They are of the view that only this kind of knowledge can lead us to the truth. Thus, for them, knowledge rooted in any source other than reason is spurious or irrational. Sujata Miri opines that this is the main reason as to why tribal communities are considered primitive or pagan and also barbarous. 'The misplaced confidence in the Western type of theoretical knowledge as the one and only type of knowledge has left a very limited space to other systems of thought which could be termed rational. The ideal rational understanding is one that moves on the pattern set by the Western civilization. This I feel is the primary fact which has led to the evaluation of tribal communities as backward, as pagan and also barbarous.'[5] She questions the veracity of this claim, and opines that we need not refer to Western modernity in order to understand tribal thought and practice. From the perspective of modernity, tribal thought is bound to be unscientific, irrational and, therefore, not to be accepted as true source of knowledge. However, this view needs to be contested, which requires a thorough philosophical debate on the conceptual framework associated with tribal studies.

To understand tribal thought and tribal rationality, we need to account the complexities of the entire framework of tribal culture(s). The complexities of the framework are mainly made out from the legends, myths, symbols, folklores, poetry, etc., that are taken for the vital constituents of a tribal culture.

What I am anxious to stress here, however, is that human beings today, in contrast to the so-called primitive man, are mostly seen as an essentially rational species, purposively and reasonably playing in political and social contexts. Those contexts, which we usually class under the general term of 'modern civilization', are thought of as being fundamentally rooted in a sound basis of reason, knowledge and science. Modern civilization has devoted itself to rationalism. It insists on keeping its distance from myths, ritual,[6] or any other 'tribal practices' which are, rather assigned to some savage people, cultures, and eras far below the modern horizon. Commonly, our civilization deals with those cultures in terms of picturesque and somehow dubious ethnographic research.

Evolutionary interpretations[7] of the tribal mind may be summarized in such epithetic terms as prelogical, prescientific, irrational, savage mind. A more sympathetic interpretation would allow a logical but not scientific understanding of the 'Savage'. For instance, the Khasi (a tribe from Meghalaya, from North East India) method of finding out the cause of sickness by cock-sacrificing ritual may be considered logical but unscientific. Such considerations have led many a scholar to conclude that 'the savages are natural philosophers',[8] that 'the savage mind puts the philosophy of the finite into practice',[9] or that the savages too are 'rational creatures but their mode of rationality is different from our mode of rationality'.[10] An intellectual construct of knowledge, of course, has not been given a place in tribal culture. However, modern scientific thinking—rational, logical, conceptual and abstract thinking—as cognitive part of man cannot decrease the space of the unknown, the infinite, for man's faculty is limited and regressive. The only tool of grasping the unknowable, which is available to man, is the ritual. Hence, the Khasi[11] cock-sacrificing ritual is not only logical but also the most perfect way of knowing the unknowable cause of sickness. The only language in which the unthinkable, and the unknowable, can only be thought and spoken of, even partly, is the symbolic language of

the sacred myth. In the tribal thought structure, myth is more intelligible and acceptable than any other mode of knowing and understanding reality.

III

Oral tradition is a means by which people transmit cultural knowledge. Culture is generally transmitted from generation to generation by way of stories, myths, and reenactments of rituals and ceremonies. A common form of oral tradition is narrating 'the' story. Story telling is an art passed down from one generation to another. On of the main purpose of these stories is to reflect upon 'traditional' values of the past in order to make sense of the moral changes of the present. A significant part of the oral tradition comprises origin myths. Here the relationship between epistemological implications has been outlined. Roughly speaking, the creation stories have a bearing on the ways individual aspires for knowledge. In this regard, the importance of tribal myths and stories has been emphasized.

Bronislaw Malinowski and Franz Boas in *Magic, Science and Religion* argue that preliterate cultures need not be classified in a demeaning way.[12] Malinowski suggested that myth, like religion, fulfils a universal human need for unraveling the unexplainable phenomena. A myth is a mode of thought essential for supplementing the scientific way of thinking. Eventually, with advances in science, the role of myth gets restricted to validating or legitimizing cultural beliefs and practices, rather than explaining the natural phenomena. Myth is closely related to religious faith and continues to be an indispensable part of modern civilized life itself. Boas, unlike Malinowski, maintains that myths have an explanatory function. In his view, myths should be taken seriously because they deal with the most fundamental aspect of 'native' life, such as their beliefs as to the nature and origin of their world.

Claude Levi-Strauss, particularly noted for his structural analysis of mythology, considered myth as both historically specific and ahistorical. This is so because, myth is almost always set in some time frame 'long ago', and, at the same time, the narrative is 'timeless'. Levi-Strauss brushed aside the individuality of the text of myths in favour of looking at patterns, systems and structures con-

tained therein. He emphasized the idea that structures are universal and, hence, timeless. This paradigm fitted in neatly with what the 'traditional' people believed: that the events described in their myths took place at the dawn of creation. They viewed the world as a unified creation whose characteristic patterns did not vary through time. In other words, mythic thought does not recognize a continuing process of change over a period of time. Their real time is projected into mythic time, and the world's recurring patterns—changes in the seasons, changing genealogies of clans, and birth and death—are all considered part of a grand plan lay out at the time of creation itself.

Myth narrates in the form of a story, the nature of an experience or awareness of God. Thus, it is said that mythologies are the early teachers of humanity. By analyzing myth, we are now beginning to understand its significance in the studies of tribal societies. In the tribal societies, myth happens to be the foundation of social and cultural life. Early men viewed happenings as action and explained them in the forms of narratives; in other words, the ancients narrated stories instead of presenting it by an analysis. For instance, when due to certain atmospheric changes rain came and broke a drought, the Babylonians would explain it a bird *imduged*, who intervened and rescued them from drought. It covered the sky black storm clouds of its wings and devoured the Bull of heaven, whose hot breath had scorched the crops.[13]

For Mircea Eliade, myth deals with a time altogether different from the times of our experience in the epics, the myth functions as an educational tool held in the highest esteem by a society. We find the themes of myth to be innumerable. The characters are often gods and goddesses, sometimes animals, plants, mountains, or rivers. It also tells us about the birth, mating, disease and death, climate and ecological changes. In each case, the myth, directly or by implication, barks its striving presentation of events to an altogether different time and thereby posits its authority. Myth always narrates something as having really happened—whether it deals with the creation of the world or of the most significant animal, vegetable species, or of any institution. That is why it is an exemplary model for human behaviour concerned with the realities. 'A myth becomes a model for the whole world (which is how one

thinks of the society one belongs to) and a model for eternity (because it came to pass in *illo tempore* and does not participate in the temporal).'[14] Myth does not describe what ought to be done; it expresses what must be done. For Victor Turner 'Myths are liminal phenomena, they are frequently told at a time in a site that is betwixt and between.'[15] The word 'liminal' comes from the Latin term *Limen*, signifying threshold. For Turner, liminallity is a cultural manifestation of a community. He believed that the recital of the mythical narratives transmits cultural knowledge. Hence, myth has a liminal character. It is recited only at a specific time and place with most of the myth having ritual, genetic and critical references.

Mythical narratives, like folk stories, generally travel easily from one group of people to another. In the process, myth may change within the same group as well as it is told and retold. A well-known example of the mobility of myth is the 'Great Flood' motif that occurs all over the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean including Greece, as well as South-East Asia, and the Americas. Throughout Africa, the 'Semitic' or Biblical motifs of the 'Tower of Babel' and the 'Parting of the waters' of the Red sea by a royal leader occur in numerous local versions. Thus, 'creative play' is the essence of myth making. Although myth changes and develops, it somehow never loses touch with its roots because the experience is about the interconnection between all aspects of life—visible and invisible, terrestrial and celestial, human, animal, vegetable and mineral. Therefore, myth is all embracing, and cosmic in its range.

Because myth is a narrative, many attempts to understand it have focused on its linguistic structure. The most famous proponent of myth as an example of the historical development of language is Friedrich Max Müeller. He believed that in the Vedic texts of ancient India, the gods and their actions do not represent real beings or events; rather, they are products of a confusion of human language, of an attempt, through sensual and visual images, to give expression to natural phenomena.

Of more recent vintage is the structural linguistic model that concentrates on the total meaning of language as an internal logical system. In particular, myth examine the relation between two levels of language: the words and content that are actually spoken;

and the underlying systematic structure—the grammar, syntax, and other rules of the language. For Claude Levi-Strauss, myth represented a special case of linguistic usage, a third level beyond surface narrative and underlying structure. In myth, he discovered certain clusters of relationships that, although expressed in the narrative and dramatic content, obey the contended that the same logical form is at work in all languages and cultures, in scientific works and tribal myths alike.

The fact that the thought comes from the unthought is borne by the tribal cosmogonic myths. The unmanifest remains unnamed, unqualified, expressed only symbolically in terms of primeval ocean, darkness, or the self-effulgent light. From the water comes the lotus, the symbol of the manifest. The manifest is named and qualified. Hence, all named gods, spirits, men and animals are creatures and creators of the second order. In the tribal perception, none of them is omniscient and omnipotent. The first principle of the universe is: One-and-many. Hence, the tribesmen think of non-duality at all levels of existence. A Sherdukpen tale[16] describes how a woman gave birth to a human child, and then to snake, monkey, tiger, cow and dog. Monkeys in a Nocte story[17] were originally men. In a Hrusso tale,[18] a woman turned into an animal to avoid incest with her brother to whom she had been forcibly married. A man turns into a tiger, a woman gives birth to twins, of whom one is human and the other a tiger.[19] There is a Minyong story[20] of two brothers, one of whom turns into a cat and the other into a tiger. A Wancho story[21] describes how man and tigers exchange their teeth. Animals talk and also often behave like men.[22] Indeed, in those early days, there does not seem to have been any real distinction between men, animal and spirit. This is contrary to the modern anthropological interpretation of human understanding in terms of binary opposition.[23]

For the tribesman, man is not unique even in the possession of knowledge. Primordial knowledge came to him from birds and animals. In a Hill Miri story,[24] god sends two birds to the first man and woman (who were innocent of any knowledge about the facts of life) to people in the world. There is an excellent Singpho story[25] describing how the first man learnt to make the pillars of a house from the legs of an elephant, the poles from the body of a

snake, the roof from the skeleton of the buffalo, and the thatch from a fish's scales. Another tribal myth[26] describes how at a time when all men lived naked, the growing of cotton and the art of weaving was taught to men by the gods, in a dream. The Singpho story[27] tells how from the spider, a girl learnt how to weave. According to the Wanchos,[28] from the first rat who fell down from the sky, man learnt how to cultivate. The Singphos[29] believe that man's knowledge of iron is a gift from goddess Lepchan. Men got fire from various animals.[30] A bird brings water to mankind.[31] Men learnt from birds how to weep.[32]

Like men, the gods and spirits are also not unique; the myths about them follow the same pattern. As stated, from the union of an elderly man and a hideous creature were born the god of death, the god of water, the god of rain, the god of lightning, and the god of earthquake. At first there was only one man in the whole world. He united with the god Yang's daughter; from her many children were born. Of the two brothers, one became the ancestor of men and the other the ancestor of the spirits. Following a fight between the two brothers, the sphere of influence of men and spirit was divided. When the land was divided between man and the spirits, the fathers of mankind got the best land from the ancestors of the spirits.[33] The Khasis[34] believe that in the beginning, god was walking hand in hand with man. At that time there was a tree, which served as a ladder to the original sixteen families of human beings for their communication between heaven and earth.

The statement that neither man nor god is unique implies that every creature is an organic part of the cosmos. Nobody reigns supreme; one is only different from the other. Every creature performs the same paradigmatic act of (a) creation; (b) preservations; and (c) destruction. The cosmic order is maintained by the harmonious functioning of each one of them.

IV

What are the ways of knowing? By this we do not mean just the content of traditional[35] knowledge, but rather how knowledge is theorized and constructed, encoded, and passed on to the next generation. My concern in this section, therefore, is not with what

anthropologies/sociologists have said, interpreted or constructed regarding tribal cultures and traditional knowledge systems. Instead, I am concerned with how the tribes use native epistemologies to construct and theorize knowledge. Although much has been published about tribal knowledge systems, nothing specifically about epistemology has been done other than the recording or reconstructing or reinterpreting of culture, knowledge, and so forth.

As Moser, Mulder, and Trout have argued, 'knowledge, of course, is not the same as a theory of knowledge, just as a mind is not the same as a theory of the mind, a psychology'.[36] Recording an account or interpreting some aspect of a culture is not the same as examining a people's epistemology. The epistemological question, rather, is how is that body of knowledge that people call traditional knowledge put together? How is it theorized? More generally, how is knowledge of any kind theorized, created, reformulated, and encoded through a people's epistemology.

Social epistemologists such as Steve Fuller[37] and feminist epistemologists such as Lynn Nelson[38] recognize, along with the sociologists of knowledge, that epistemological agents are communities rather than individuals. In other words, communities—epistemological communities—rather than collections of independently knowing individuals construct knowledge, and that 'such communities are epistemologically prior to individuals who know'.[39]

When outside researchers, including anthropologists, write ethnographic accounts of other people's knowledge(s), or construct theories of another people's cultures, they certainly constitute an epistemological community. But it is not the epistemological community that created the knowledge that they are retheorizing. In other words, anthropological theories of other people's cultures are not indigenous theories of those cultures even though they may be based on interviews with and observations of indigenous communities, individuals and societies. All of the foregoing activities, while they draw on indigenous cultural knowledge, are imagined, conceptualized, and carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of Western forms of research, reasoning and interpreting.

The concept of tribal epistemology distinguishes between these outsider theories and accounts of other people's knowledge, on

the one hand, and cultural insiders' ways of theorizing knowledge, on the other.

By tribal epistemology, social scientists mean a cultural group's, ways of thinking and creating, reformulating, and theorizing about knowledge via traditional discourses and media of communication, anchoring the truth of the discourse in culture.[40] From the tribal standpoint, the ways of creating knowledge are parts of the mosaic of cultural knowledge that includes the whole person, family, kin, group and society. As a concept, tribal epistemology focuses on the process through which knowledge is constructed and validated by a cultural group, and the role of that process in shaping the thoughts and actions. It assumes all epistemological systems to be socially constructed and informed through socio-political, economic, and historical context and processes. It also recognizes that culture is variable, an ongoing conversation embodying conflict and change, shaped by the dialectic of structure and agency,[41] inherently ideological, and prone to manipulation and distortion by powerful interests.[42]

What is the relationship between culture and tribal epistemology? From an indigenous perspective, culture embraces culture, tradition, norms and modes of behaviour; ways of thinking, doing, and creating and, of course, as discussed in stories and myths. Anything born of the land and passed from generation to generation is a part of the culture I will not go into this issue in detail here, as it has already been the subject of a great deal of debate.

In the tribal world, all knowledge is subjective knowledge. There can be no detachment of the knower from the known, as in mainstream epistemology. To the tribals, communities of knowledge-makers socially construct knowledge. In the past, when they spent time at the 'girls' dormitory', women occupied much of their discussing, (re)constructing, and sharing knowledge, and men did the same in the *morung* 'men's house'. Today, as in the past, village meetings and teaching, counselling' sessions are areas where knowledge communities meet and carry out their epistemological work.

Based on the findings of second-generation cognitive science and their previous work on metaphor, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) have argued—as did Maurice Merleau-Ponty

(1964)—for the primacy of perception: that is, human beings know the world primarily through their bodily senses. This use of the body to know the world is an epistemological universal. It is not surprising; therefore, that sensory information is privileged among the sources of information from which the tribes construct knowledge. People often question the reliability of their and others' senses in making truth claims. While sensory information is a universal, however, the interpretations of what such information conveys tend to vary across epistemological communities.

The tribals regard the whole body as knowing and as an organ of knowledge creation, similar to Merleau-Ponty's notion of the embodiment of perception.[43] The embodied senses are: see, hear, touch, smell, taste and feel in the body. There are five kinds of seeing: physical seeing with the eyes; seeing with the mind (e.g., spirits, foresight); seeing the unseen or invisible (e.g., spirits), a gift or ability that extends the physical and temporal boundaries of physical seeing; seeing a person walk by in a flash that no one else sees, as a communication of something to happen; and seeing in a dream.

Another kind of seeing involves seeing something (e.g., the nature of an illness, the outcome of an event, the image or shadow of a person) through a medium. For instance, the Khasis[44] make a divine consultation through the medium of an egg, or a fowl, or any other animal, judging the divine response from the signs that a Khasi asks for like, the sacrifice for a sick person is done with a cock-sacrificing ritual. After ripping open the intestines to find the answer, the performer asks the god to give the cause of sickness.[45] From the position of the intestine the signs are read and the cause is found. This having been done, god's grace for the recovery of the patient is asked and a word of satisfaction from god comes forth. This kind of seeing is known to traditional healers.

Oral tradition not only transmits cultural knowledge, it is also a source from which new knowledge can be created through expansion or deletion, because it is received knowledge that has been tested through everyday life or trial-and-error experimentation, and is capable of further improvement. Usually, the improvement or expansion is context-bound, that is, tied to the immediate circumstances of changed conditions in such a way that further

experimentation is required. The rate of expansion in many areas of oral tradition has increased today due to the need to invent solutions as tribal towns experience rapid environmental decline because of logging, overpopulation, and other ecological processes, forcing rapid adjustment in forms of house-building, cooking, planting, and the like.

Two other sources of knowledge in tribal epistemology include direct communication from the ancestors and signs. The ancestors (counting backward in time from one's grandparents) may communicate in dreams, trance, or unexpected phenomena interpreted as messages from them. For example, psychic dreaming: this predicts a future reality and may come from an ancestral spirit or a recently dead relative.

Signs can be from an ancestor or a recent dead relative, but they generally come from unspecified sources, such as nature or an unknown spirit. Signs can be created or events caused by living people who have 'intrinsic power, efficacy' within themselves, which allows them to make things happen separately from sorcery. Interestingly, even the converted (to Christianity) tribals receive the signs of the Christian God, although if so, the tribals do not regard them as involved in the construction of knowledge via tribal epistemology. They are careful to keep distinct what comes from Christianity or God and what come from their indigenous culture.

Areas where much of the justified truth process takes place are village meetings, including those that deal with disputes or constitute themselves as village courts; ordinary information social gatherings such as marriage feasts and wakes/funerals. The questions posed include, where did you hear it? Who did you hear it from? Did you see it with your own eyes/touch it/taste it/eat it/sniff it, etc.? Did you try it (to see if it worked, to ascertain its nature, etc.)? Does this make sense in terms of everyday life experiences including our oral tradition? Other groups' knowledge may also be given as evidence, as in 'In village X, people have done this and their experience has been Z'; or 'they (specified) have been doing this for a long time and we are just arriving at it now'. With regard to forms of body feeling, signs, and intuitions, the consistency in similar instances increases the confidence with which one uses these more subtle forms of evidence to justify an interpretation or construction.

To understand how the tribals perceived knowledge and its function, it is necessary to understand their concept of the world in which they lived. This is a fundamental consideration due to the fact that primary facets of the universe, as perceived by tribals, establish this cultural group in diametric opposition to the culture of the mainstream, i.e. the Westerners. For the tribals, all of reality, including the physical and spiritual realms are connected and act purposefully to guide each other in the path of life. From ancient times they learned that living things, including the animals, the plants and all of the elements that brought forth life, were infused with a spirit and constituted gifts from the creator. Indeed, this holistic existence extended beyond the known physical world and the spiritual and physical realities are so intermeshed that living things transcend the boundary. In this network of life, all were to live in harmony and nothing existed by chance. To respect and balance each life was not an easy task but required the rigorous work of passing on to each succeeding generation valuable lessons about how to be a guardian of the world that they, in time, would pass on to others. The tribal people are deeply spiritual and through visions, dreams, and prayers tribal people learn that the creator provides life-giving lessons. For tribal people knowledge is never questioned and life's experiences affirm and compound ancient teachings and the propositions about how to lead a good life.[47] The tribal people believe that life is not by chance, and it may best represent this philosophy through their perception of the creator, the provider of life, and the world in which they reside within the model of the tribal world. It is believed that the creator could be our mother, or our grandfather or grandmother. The creator could be our friend too. The creator helps us along the journey of life and is not bound by any physical form. The creator can take the form of any animal in order to become a helper. Clearly, the world the tribal people have come to know is widely different from that conceived by the mainstream cultures.

In formulating tribal epistemology, I have tried to outline certain fundamental features of tribal epistemology. Let me put forth the salient features of tribal epistemology in the following manner:

1. In tribal culture, knowledge is not produced, but it 'comes' to the subject by tradition from the ancestors. Knowledge acquisition is a purely social matter, a matter of teaching, of being told (by living, dead or spiritual voices) only. In other words, traditional or ancestral knowledge weighs higher than the so-called scientific knowledge.
2. To tribals, knowledge is only relevant if it is directly about yourself, about today's vitality, today's concrete problems. The future is unreal. You just wait for it to become present and then you act. There is no 'pure curiosity'. Any step in satisfying pure curiosity is a step to the unreal. The possible and the future are not (yet) reality, hence irrelevant. Thus, in tribal epistemology, it is not necessary that true knowledge gives rise to true predictions.
3. One might well, in theory, imagine tribals trying, say, their different medicines on people or animals by way of a test. But there is no belief that causes can be sense in void of meaning. You can have the experience, but that is not associated with the formally controlled comparison of similar events that you have gone through. Causal knowledge or knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is more informal than formal in tribal epistemology.
4. Togetherness is the highest value. This entails agreement on what is and how it works. Such an agreement is required. It is not done to challenge the consensus. Everybody always agrees with everybody. Togetherness and respect to the elders is a characteristic feature of tribal life and this is placed over truth and justification, whereas, a foundationalistic stance on truth and justification is not changed by the verdict of many or more powerful. In tribal epistemology, there is no objective truth or justification, at least, in the sense that no such objectivity is more valuable than the words of the elders and anything that keeps all the subjects together.
5. There is no need for inter-community pooling of knowledge. Every tribe has its own ancestors with the knowledge relevant to their particular tribe. Tribes have become

different in procreation, as has their knowledge. Knowledge is not considered generally human, but community specific. Western knowledge has largely been a prerogative of philosophers who analyze phenomena through the hypothetical-deductive method, whereas social scientists, in contrast, deal with a subjective world, with obvious differences in the way they create knowledge. If we go by this argument, then formal knowledge could be viewed as that obtained through a hypothetical-deductive process, whilst the traditional knowledge—though it has a strong element of the formal—is largely derived through societal experiences and perceptions accumulated by different traditional societies during their interaction with nature and natural resources. Whilst the 'formal' emphasizes upon a certain degree of universality of the knowledge, created by a given methodology, traditional knowledge has a certain degree of location-specificity, with a strong human element attached to the same, with emphasis on social emancipation. Thus, in tribal epistemology, knowledge is local rather than universal.

6. With respect to social and interpersonal matters, the notion of truth plays little, if any role in tribal culture. The concept that fills the socio-epistemic space, akin to truth in Western epistemology, is validation. Whether in narrative dialogues or in conversations and greetings, there occurs an ongoing process of ratification or validation of what is being said. Validation is important for reasons of social cohesion. Differences of opinion can be quickly disruptive and, for the tribal, the 'truth' of the interpersonal relationship takes precedence over the propositional truth of the party's statements. In other words, arbitrariness is countered by validation based on social cohesion rather than by any objective truth.
7. For tribals, the issues of truth don't arise in the same metaphysical way they do in the West. For indigenous peoples, truth (or the multifaceted faces of reality) is revealed—the world from time to time reveals yet another of its many dimensions. Reality is also masked, and is revealed in the masked, ceremonial worlds of indigenous cultures. In contrast to modernism, the indigenous view is that humans are epistemologically limited not so much by error or by the world's inaccessibility to direct inspection as by the fact that reality is so multifaceted that we are limited only in our imaginative (rather than metaphysical) ability to tap the multifaceted reality that surrounds us.
8. All knowledge is subjective knowledge. There can be detachment of the knower from the known, as in mainstream epistemology. To the tribals, knowledge is socially constructed by communities of knowledge-makers.

The general rule of tribal life is always to agree with everybody most emphatically with respect to authorities. In the clan context, the elder's opinion is the truth. All force, all truth comes up from the roots of the family tree, the dead ancestors to the trunk, the elders, and passes up to parents and children, the branches, leafs and flowers. This casts a light on the Western strategy to convince with arguments. From the tribal point of view, arguments are a sign of weakness of lack of power and vitality. A good, forceful truth does not need arguments. Arguments are crutches that only invalid opinions need. And truth is felt as a force coming from the speaker.

A strong man has strong truths. As far as truth is concerned, strength is not measured in muscles but in age and wisdom. Wisdom does not exist in stockpiles of arguments. It consists of a wider and deeper understanding of the universe. Wisdom is felt as a force.

There is also no subject-object distinction in an act of knowing. The modern epistemologist's formulation of existence is based on his personal aspirations and interest in the temporal world; for them that alone is real, the ultimate. The tribal man's vision of existence and well-being is based on a much wider horizon, the transcendence, where his true and complete identity is undifferentiated from the other beings.

Thus, special attention may be drawn in this connection to the following two basic features: (i) Justification is not a necessary con-

dition of knowledge in the tribal world view; and (ii) The notion of objectivity is not a criterion of valid knowledge in tribal epistemology, as all knowledge is subjective knowledge, socially constructed by the members of the community who are the knowledge makers.

To sum up: by tribal epistemology we mean a cultural group's ways of thinking and creating, reformulating, and theorizing about knowledge via traditional discourses and media communication, anchoring the truth of the discourse in culture.[48] From the tribal standpoint, indigenous ways of creating are part of mosaic of cultural knowledge that includes the complete person, family, kin group and society. As a concept, tribal epistemology focuses on the process through which knowledge is constructed and validated by a cultural group, and the role of that process in shaping, thinking and behaviour.

For sure, we cannot consider the tribal ways of knowing and believing as nonsense even if the ways are not in conformation with the available epistemological systems or theories. On the other hand, by changing our very ways of thinking, we should accommodate the tribal ways of knowing and believing into models different from the available models about them. No available model proves the non-existence of anything that the model fails to accommodate. The truth is that our adherence to a model moulds the way we think and prevents us from thinking of anything that the model cannot account for. In most cultures, knowledge is seen as belonging to a group rather than being result of individual effort. Thus, claims for private ownership of knowledge omit a culture's achievement over the course of history. Such genealogy of knowledge is most foreign to information age societies, where legal concerns about copyrights and corporate ownership constitute a revenue source of equal magnitude compared with the revenues obtained from the marketing of knowledge. Also, philosophical reflection owes a debt to the historical process in the formation of theories about the function and role of humans in the overall enigma of existence. In all cultures, including Western traditions, the importance of merging transcendental insights with subtle perceptions of reality is recognized as an undisputed fact. This knowledge stands in direct opposition to the use of reductionist methodologies for empirical testing of scientific hypotheses. The diversity of human cultures

reflects the diversity of the ways how humans have learned. It is not true that there is only one kind of reason or truth or knowledge, they claim. There is a diversity of truth, knowledge and ways of arguing about things.

(I am grateful to Professor Sujåta Miri and Dr Laxminarayanan Lenka for their valuable suggestions rendered.)

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The Issue of Moral Dilemma in Virtue Ethics

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There exist many versions of ethics. Virtue ethics is one among them which has increasingly become the centre of attention amongst those who think about the problem of morals these days. The root of virtue ethics is generally traced back in the Aristotle's view of morality. But to say so does not mean that virtue ethics is absent in Indian philosophy. Virtue ethics is certainly not absent in Indian philosophy. There are many versions of virtue ethics in Indian philosophy and each version differs from one another in certain respects because of the different intellectual views and interpretations held by the Indian thinkers on what constitutes virtues and vices. The Buddhist version of virtue ethics is different from the Jain version of it and the Jain version of virtue ethics is different from that of the Hindu one. The Buddhist version of virtue ethics is embodied in the concepts of *Tathāgata* and *Śila* and other *Bodhisattva* ideas. The Jain version of virtue ethics is embodied in the concept of *Vratas* (vows). The Hindu version of virtue ethics is embodied in the concept of *Dharma.* But all these different Indian versions of virtue ethics are associated with the spiritual and religious idea of liberation called *nirvāna, kaivalya* or *mokṣa.* Liberation constitutes the ultimate goal of a virtuous life in Indian virtue ethics. It is rested on the metaphysical postulate of the self. This is a unique feature of Indian virtue ethics. Nonetheless, both Indian and Western versions of virtue ethics propose certain exemplars of moral virtues which, in turn, give rise to the formulation of the rules of moral conduct. These moral virtues quite often conflict in certain particular moral situations and the only way to resolve the issue of the conflict of moral virtues, in the view of virtue ethics, is to follow the conduct of virtuous people. It is said that the conduct of virtuous people guides us about what ought to

be done and what ought not to be done in a concrete moral situation. The idea of being a virtuous person in Indian virtue ethics is embodied in the idea of *Mahajana*. The *Mahajana* model in virtue ethics constitutes a criterion not only for making ethical choices and judgments but also for evaluating human conduct and character within its conceptual framework. The *Mahajana* model clearly points out that virtue ethics does not impose moral virtues on human individuals. It only proposes moral virtues and says that they ought to be earned and cultivated continuously throughout in life to build up a virtuous character. When we face a moral dilemma, the conduct of virtuous people, says virtue ethics, is an answer to it because it guides us as to what ought to be chosen and what ought not to be chosen under such conditions. Virtue ethics does not justify the rightness of an action by referring to any particular moral rule or principle derived either from God or human nature or any other metaphysical postulate. It justifies the rightness of an action by referring to the conduct of virtuous people. From this point of view, one can very well say that virtue ethics is characteristically different from the deontological and act-utilitarian views of morality. The deontological view of morality connects the idea of right action with the ideas of moral rule and universal rationality. The act-utilitarian view of morality connects the idea of right action with the idea of the best consequences and the idea of best consequences with the idea of general happiness. Virtue ethics propounds none of these views of morality. It connects the idea of right action with the idea of the conduct of virtuous person, the one who exercises virtues in practice. But then the question here arises: does virtue ethics really resolve the issue of the conflict of moral virtues by the model of the conduct of virtuous persons (*Mahajanas*) and the problem arising from the pluralistic character of virtuous persons? The answer, to my mind, seems to be is in the negative. Virtue ethics does not resolve, nor can it resolve, the issue of the conflict of moral virtues and the problem of the pluralistic character of *Mahajanas* which are built into its conceptual framework. To establish these points, let me first begin with the theses of virtue ethics.

Virtue ethics propounds the following three theses:

Thesis 1
An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances.
Thesis 2
A virtuous person is one who exercises virtues or acts virtuously.
Thesis 3
A virtue is a character trait a human being needs in order to flourish or live well.

When we reflect critically upon the thesis (1), we find that virtue ethics does not associate the idea of right action with any particular moral rule or principle derived either from God or human nature or any other metaphysical postulate. It also does not associate the idea of right action with any rule of social convention or individual's conscience. It associates the idea of right action with the conduct of virtuous person. It says that an action is right if and only if it conforms with the conduct of the virtuous person. What it means by the idea of 'virtuous person', it defines in the thesis (2). The thesis (2) says that a virtuous person is one who is disposed to act virtuously or has dispositions to right action or exercises virtues. This view of virtue ethics is open to the following two interpretations:

(a) Virtue ethics derives the rightness of an action from the conduct of a virtuous person and the conduct of a virtuous person from the disposition to right action. In other words, virtue ethics defines the rightness of an action in terms of the conduct of a virtuous person and the conduct of a virtuous person in terms of the dispositions to right action which is trivial since it is a circular.

(b) Virtue ethics does not define the rightness of an action in terms of the conduct of a virtuous person and the conduct of a virtuous person in terms of the dispositions to right action. It defines the rightness of an action in terms of virtues. The virtuous conduct of a person is nothing but a mere specification of virtues. In other words, virtue ethics does not logically rest the idea of right action on the idea of the conduct of a virtuous

person. It logically rests the idea of right action on the idea of virtue to which the idea of the conduct of a virtuous person is conceptually linked and the idea of virtue comes logically prior to the idea of the conduct of a virtuous person and what comes logically prior to cannot be said to be grounded on it. When we possess a virtuous character, we do so, according to virtue ethics, because we exercise and cultivate virtues or do actions in accordance with virtues continuously throughout in our life whenever and wherever the occasion demands on us for doing so. We do not become virtuous in day or two, nor do we acquire it once and for all. And to say this does not tantamount to mean saying that the conduct of a virtuous person makes an action right or virtuous. No action becomes virtuous just by the mere doings of a virtuous person. The reason why it does not become virtuous is that because there always exists a logical gap between a virtuous person's doing of an action and an action's being virtuous in nature. If the coincidence between the two exists, it exists not as a matter of logic but as a matter of fact. The idea of the conduct of a virtuous person is conceptually different from the idea of virtuous conduct. The idea of the conduct of a virtuous person is conceptually linked with the idea of the doing of action and actions could be either virtuous or vicious, while the idea of virtuous conduct is not merely linked with the idea of the doing of any action. It is linked with the idea of the doing of action in conformity with virtues. A conduct acquires its virtuous character only when it is done in accordance with virtues, and not otherwise. It is for this reason that when we talk about virtuous conduct, we always talk with reference to certain virtues. Furthermore, to be a virtuous person means to have a virtuous character and the idea of virtuous character is conceptually different from that of the idea of a person's conduct being virtuous and both the things should not be muddled. But to say this does not mean that character is not connected with conduct. Character

and conduct are essentially connected, and yet are conceptually quite different. Character is related to conduct in the same way as conduct is related to action.

Between the interpretations of (a) and (b), the interpretation of (b) seems to me as more reasonable because when we take the theses (1) and (2) along with the thesis (3), we find that virtue ethics does not define the idea of right action in terms of the conduct of a virtuous person, nor does it derive from it. It associates the idea of right action with the idea of virtue to which the idea of the conduct of virtuous person and the idea of character trait are conceptually linked. The idea of character trait is conceptually different from the idea of the conduct of a virtuous person because the idea of character trait, on the account of virtue ethics, is not merely a disposition to right action. It is also a disposition to right knowledge, right thinking, right wisdom, right feeling and right reaction, which are essentially required in order to live well in the sphere of one's private and public life. In other words, the idea of character trait in virtue ethics is associated with the idea of practical wisdom called *prajna* in Indian virtue ethics and the idea of practical wisdom is conceptually different from the idea of the conduct of a virtuous person. The idea of the conduct of a virtuous person is not an epistemic idea. It is a deontic idea, while the idea of practical wisdom is not. The idea of practical wisdom is an epistemic idea. It is called an intellectual virtue and intellectual virtues are characteristically different from moral virtues. But to say this is not to say that practical wisdom is not an essential component to cultivate moral virtues. Practical wisdom is an essential component to cultivate moral virtues according to virtue ethics but it does not, by itself, constitute a sufficient condition for making an action virtuous.

In fact, virtue ethics does not make any claim that the right conduct necessarily leads to right wisdom, nor does it claim that a character trait emerges from the mere theoretical knowledge of virtues. It only says that for doing virtuous actions, practical wisdom is essentially required. If this be so, then from this it is quite clear that virtues are not genetic constitutive ingredients of human nature. Virtues are not human essences. Virtues are contingent

qualities which human individuals acquire over time by doing virtuous actions. It is not something which human individuals possess essentially by virtue of their being humans. A virtuous character emerges over a period of time by doing actions in accordance with virtues. But it is not a static human quality because it does get changed or modified by one's own or others conduct. In other words, a character trait is dynamic in nature. If virtues were genetic constitutive ingredients of human nature or human essences, human individuals would have had them since the birth without any disposition to right action; it would have possible for human individuals to acquire virtues once for all. But this is not so simply because virtues are not human genetic or racial qualities. We do not own them by virtue of our being human. They are always earned, cultivated and developed by the human individuals throughout in life through the continuous exercise of virtuous actions whenever the occasion demands. If this is what virtue ethics says, then from this it is quite clear that virtuous or vicious character traits are not genetic or hereditary character traits which, we can say, pass from one individual's life to another within human species without any disposition to right action.

But when we talk of virtues, we must keep in our mind a distinction between virtue as a value and virtue as a character trait. The idea of virtue as a value in virtue ethics is conceptually quite different from the idea of virtue as a character trait. A virtue as a value is an instruction. It enjoins upon us certain kinds of action. It tells us what ought to be done in the actual circumstance, while a virtue as a character trait is not an instruction. It does not enjoin upon us any action. It is only a habit of doing virtuous actions in the actual circumstances. The character trait is a characteristic feature of the human individual. It is not a characteristic feature of value. It emerges from the continuous dispositions to right action; it is always build up; it is never owned. Virtue as a character trait is, thus, conceptually quite different from that of virtue as a value. But to say that they are different does not mean that they are unrelated. They are essentially related because when we characterize any character as virtuous, we do it only on the basis of the embodiment of the ideals of virtue. What virtue ought to be chosen and what not in the value sense of the term in any particular given moral

situation solely depends upon the practical wisdom of the virtuous agent, according to virtue ethics. It is in this context that virtue ethics refers to the conduct of *Mahājanas* and says that one is to follow the *Mahājanas*, that is, the conduct of virtuous people. The conjunction of the theses of (1), (2) and (3), thus, makes it quite clear that virtue ethics does associate the idea of right action not only with the idea of the conduct of virtuous person and the idea of character trait but also with the idea of the value of virtue and that the idea of the value of virtue comes logically prior to them in moral considerations. The idea of the value of virtue constitutes the logical foundation not only for evaluating, determining and assessing the conducts but also for judging the character of persons. So, when virtue ethics says that an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances, it says on this ground because it logically assumes that a virtuous person always acts in accordance with the ideals of virtue and the ideals of virtue do make our actions virtuous or right. It is based on this assumption that virtue ethics talks of the *Mahājana* model of moral reasoning as a guideline to make moral choices between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done when the two moral values of virtue conflict in any given particular moral situation. It does not appeal to any principle of the kind which utilitarianism and deontology enunciate in order to settle the conflict. It appeals to the conduct of virtuous people, whom it thinks are the experts on morality.

Now, when we critically examine the *Mahājana* model of moral reasoning, we find that it does not enable us in resolving the practical issue of the conflict of virtue-values. The *Mahājana* model of moral reasoning, undoubtedly, does enable us how to make ethical choices but only in those cases where we have exemplars of the virtuous conduct. It does not enable us in those cases where we do not have exemplars of the virtuous conduct. It also does not enable us in those cases where exemplars of the virtuous conduct of different people contradict themselves. We cannot settle the issue of the conflict of virtue-values just on the basis of merely thinking, 'What a virtuous person would do or would have done if he were in my circumstance' because what I think a virtuous person would do or would have done in my circumstance that may or may not

actually be done by a virtuous person. This is logically quite possible because there always exits a logical gap between the two, that is, what I think a virtuous person would do or would have done in my circumstances and what actually a virtuous person would do or would have done in my circumstances. Above all, to find an answer to the question, 'what shall I do?' is not a matter of selecting one's favoured person as a virtuous person, and then thinking what he would do or would have done if he were in my situation. It is a matter of selecting an ideal virtuous person, a person who always acts virtuously or is disposed to act in accordance with virtue-values, and to locate such a character is not an easy task because it involves the knowledge of which particular character traits are more virtuous. Moreover, the idea of a virtuous person (the one who always acts virtuously or exercises virtue-values) is merely a theoretical idea or logical possibility. There may not be any instantiation of it because to have an instantiation of the ideal virtuous person amounts to admitting that there exists a morally perfect human being who always acts or acted virtuously. It is not possible to simply admit because no human beings given by their nature could be morally perfect. Human beings do suffer from moral weaknesses. God is the only being who is considered as a morally perfect being and none else and God's existence itself is open to question. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there exist some human individuals who possessed or possess virtuous character in a very high degree, even then we may not know which character is really more virtuous. When we go through the history of human civilization, we do come across different exemplars of virtuous people whom we think are an embodiment of the ideals of virtue like Lord Buddha, Mahavira, Jesus Christ, Guru Nanak, Yudhishthira, Bhishma Pitamah, Rama, Krishna, Mohammad Prophet, etc. But when we examine their characters, we find variations. They all are not graded at par. Not only this, their intellectual views and interpretations also differ from one another in many respects on what constitutes virtues and vices. But when I say it, it should not be taken to mean that they were not great virtuous people. They were great virtuous people. They do inspire us to do virtuous deeds. There is no doubt about it. They practiced virtues which they entertained and advocated in high degrees. But to say all this does

not tantamount to mean saying that they were all morally perfect human beings who always acted virtuously in all circumstances. People who follow a particular religion, no doubt, do take the leader of their religion as the most morally perfect being because of their religious affinity and sentiments. But to consider one's own religious leader as the most morally perfect being is one thing and to find him as the most morally perfect being is another thing and both the things should not be muddled. If they were really morally perfect beings, there would have been no variations in their conduct and character; they not only would have shared the same views on what constitutes virtues and vices but also would have acted in the same way in all concrete circumstances, which they did not. We do find contradictions in their conducts and thoughts. But when I say that their intellectual views and interpretations differ on what constitutes virtues and vices, it should not be taken to mean that they did not share any thought on what constitutes virtues and vices. It only means that they all entertained different conceptions of virtue and vice. They proposed different exemplars of virtues and vices according to their own conceptual framework of values and disvalues. Some exemplars of virtues and vices among them are common while some are not. This fact we cannot simply deny. But since the very fact that their accounts differ on what constitutes virtues and vices clearly shows that the concepts of virtue and vice are mere human constructions. They do not exist in the objective world. But my task here is not, however, to establish it nor to articulate, compare and contrast the different exemplars of virtues and vices propounded in both Eastern and Western traditional thoughts. My task here is only to examine the issue whether virtue ethics provides or can provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of the conflict of virtues and vices, irrespective of what intellectual views and interpretations one may hold on them. And when we examine virtue ethics from this point of view, we find that it does not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of moral dilemma.

The problem we cannot resolve by digging out the concepts because there is nothing in the nature of the concepts of virtue and vice on the basis of which one can judge it to be moral or non-moral. A virtue can be moral, religious, intellectual or conventional.

It all depends upon its use. Prudence, humility, modesty, diligence, integrity, sincerity, punctuality, obedience, dutifulness, law abidingness, accountability, courage, purity, wisdom, justice, temperance, honesty, generosity, truthfulness, compassion (*karunā*), tolerance, self-dignity, self-respect, discipline, hospitality, self-sacrifice, benevolence, confidence, idlelessness, self esteem, friendliness (*mettā*), joy (*muditā*), non-violence (*ahimsā*), celibacy, gratitude, commitment, etc., are generally considered as moral virtue-values. In Hinduism, these values are called *sādhāranadharma* or *sāmānyadharma.* These moral virtue-values are exemplified in all cultures and we also continue to do so even now in spite of our cultural and religious variations, different intellectual views and interpretations on them. Among them, some moral virtues we consider are primarily private in origin and influence (for example, diligence and self-dignity) but most of them are not (for example, generosity and self-sacrifice). Take, for example, generosity. Generosity is not a private virtue because no one exercises and cultivates this virtue in relation to itself. It is a public virtue. It is exercised and cultivated by living within a society in relation to others. But its range of applicability is not restricted to the specificities of any particular individual, culture, race or religion, etc. It is a cross-cultural, cross-racial and cross-religious moral virtue. From this point of view, one can very well say that generosity is a universal moral virtue. It is praised and prescribed in all cultures, races and religions simply because it preserves, protects and nourishes human relationships and their well beings regardless of their specific physical characteristics, culture, religion, race, caste, gender, region, etc. But to say so does not mean that generosity is a human essence. It only means that it is a universal moral virtue-value. It generates instruction to act with generosity. Its range of applicability is not restricted to the specificities of any particular individual, culture, religion or race. And when we say this, it does not mean that it is an essence of human beinghood. What holds in the case of generosity virtue also holds in the case of other virtues as well in this respect. All virtues as value generate positive instructions. But they are not descriptions of the human essences or the contents of human character. If virtue-values were human essences or intrinsic qualities of human nature, every human being would have had

them just by virtue of their being human; human individuals would have inherited them from their forefathers without any disposition to right action; they would have simply owned them which is not the case. And the reason why it is not so is that because virtue-values are man made; they are always acquired by continuous and conscious efforts throughout in life. A virtuous character is a contingent quality which human individuals do not possess once for all because it undergoes changes and modifications due to one's and others' conduct.

Now, if it is true that virtues as a value are positive instructions that, in turn, give rise to the rules of action, then what one ought to do or not to do within the conceptual framework of a virtue ethics is not just a matter of selecting some individual as a virtuous person and then asking oneself, 'What would he do or would have done in my circumstance?' It is a matter of selecting the most appropriate virtue that has a greater value and there is nothing in the nature of virtue on the basis of which one can make a selection between the two virtues when they conflict. We all know what constitute virtues and vices in abstraction. They are embodied in every culture. But when the question comes as to which virtue between the two is to be selected and which one not, when they conflict in a particular circumstance, we face a lot of philosophical difficulties. Virtue ethics proposes practical wisdom as a solution to the problem but practical wisdom itself may go wrong. Since what is virtuous in one situation may or may not be so in another situation, so we cannot settle the matter by codifying virtues. We cannot predict in advance which virtue would prevail over which one because moral situations themselves are indeterminate. What follows from this? It follows that to know what virtues are is one thing and to apply them in concrete circumstances is another and it is in the context of the application of virtues that a virtuous agent requires a practical moral wisdom according to virtue ethics but this wisdom does not emerge in a day. It also does not emerge from the mere knowledge of the conducts of virtuous people, nor does it emerge from merely asking ourselves, 'What the virtuous persons would do or would have done in our circumstances?' It emerges from practical experiences over a period of time. It involves the exercise of one's own intellect and the capacity of intellect differs

from case to case. What one considers practical wisdom may or may not be a practical wisdom at all in the view of others. Moreover, the *Mahājana* model of moral reasoning always requires a selection of the most appropriate virtuous person who really possesses a relatively higher character than others. To decide such character is not to take one's favoured candidate who, in his view, possesses a relatively higher virtuous character because the quality of being virtuous in the actual course of human life is measured by the degree to which virtuous life of a person tends to approximate the image of perfection. And this is possible only when we do have a standard of measurement for judging the degrees of the different virtuous characters of people, which virtue ethics fails to provide.

A virtuous character emerges from the embodiment of the ideals of virtue but the ideals of virtue do not get reduced to it. To what extent a particular person actually embodies the ideals of virtue requires measurement and we cannot measure without the scale of measurement which we do not have in virtue ethics. Every culture embodies an idealized image of a virtuous person whose conduct does have an effect on the way we act and build up our character, but it does not justify—nor can it justify—the rightness of an action. No virtue judgment can be justified by deducing it from the fact of the character of a virtuous person whatsoever because there always remains a logical gap between the two. No doubt, human beings do possess a virtuous character, but the virtuous character of a person is not identical with the ideals of virtue. The values of virtue do not form the contents of personal embodiment. The personal embodiment of the ideals of virtue constitutes only the virtuous character of a person but the virtuous character of a person is conceptually different from that of the ideals of virtue or virtue-values. In other words, virtue-values are not the contents of human character. The character of a trustworthy person does not constitute the criterion of virtuous actions no matter how he is reliable. It is the ideals of virtue which constitute the criterion of virtuous actions. And to say this does not mean that the conducts of virtuous people do not have any effect on the way we act and build up our character. They do have but still remain different. In fact, virtue ethics also, to my mind, does not define the rightness of an action in terms of the virtuous character of a person. It defines the rightness of an action in terms of the values of virtue, the personal embodiment of which turns into a virtuous character which virtue ethics says enable us to make ethical choices.

What holds in the case of the concepts of moral virtue also holds in the case of the concepts of moral vice. The difference that lies between them consists only in this fact that the concepts of moral virtue are the concepts of value, while the concepts of moral vice are the concepts of disvalue, but nonetheless, are instructions. Moral virtues are positive instructions, while moral vices are negative, that is, prohibitions. They forbid actions. Like virtues, some vices are primarily private but most are not either in origin or influence. Cruelty, killing, cheating, bribing, corruption, stealing, adultery, false speech, backbiting, dishonesty, insincerity, disobedience, jealously (*irsā*), maddening drinks, exploitation, hatred and enmity, discrimination, etc., are considered clear examples of public moral vices. These moral vices, says virtue ethics, cause havoc to our social life when we practice them. Attachment (*āsakti*), anger (*krodha*), greed (*lobha*), craving (*trisnā*), pride (*māna*), delusions (*māyā*), cowardice, etc., are considered clear examples of private vices. These vices cause havoc mostly to our private life. But no virtues and vices are purely private or public because all virtues and vices do have some causal impact, directly or indirectly, not only on our private life but also on our public life, and hence do matter morally. We all bother about virtues and vices in our interpersonal life simply because they affect our life. As virtues conflict, so do vices. Not only this, virtues and vices themselves conflict in certain moral situations. And there is nothing in the nature of the concepts of virtue and vice on the basis of which one can settle whether a proposed action falls under a virtue or vice. Where there exists a conflict between virtues and vices, it does not pose much philosophical problem because one can choose virtues over vices. But where there exists a conflict between the two virtues, it generates a lot of philosophical problems in making the selection of one virtue over the other. For example, to tell someone that his wife is being unfaithful to him would surely be an honest act, but it would be kinder to keep quite about it. Between these two, which one should I do in the conflicting situation? The *Mahājana* model of reasoning does not help us decide it.

Virtue ethics proposes the *Mahājana* model of reasoning to resolve the issue of the conflict of virtues but it doesn't help because the conduct of *Mahājana* itself varies from one context to another. Not only this, it also differs from one *Mahājana* to another. This happens primarily because of the different intellectual views and interpretations which they hold on what constitutes virtues and vices. Their intellectual views and interpretations vary due to the different conceptions which they entertain about human nature, good life and moral world-view. The cultural settings of *Mahājanas* also determine to a large extent their moral conceptual framework of thinking. In other words, the views of *Mahājanas* on what constitutes virtues and vices are themselves coloured by their cultural-settings. And we do not have any common standard within the conceptual framework of virtue ethics by referring to which one can settle the issue of the plurality nature of the conduct of *Mahājanas*. Virtue ethics mentions only certain exemplars of virtue, but does not make any attempt to organize them in a hierarchal order. To organize virtues in a hierarchal order means to account for the preference of one over the other. And that is possible only when there exists some principle of organization which we do not find within the conceptual framework of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics talks about cardinal virtues, but does not organize them in a hierarchal order. So, when two cardinal virtues conflict in a concrete particular situation and we are required to choose one between the two, we fail to choose it.

There is no doubt in the fact that all virtue-values are valuable. But to say this does not mean that they are all equally valuable. And if it is true that two virtues are not equally valuable, then does it not require that there must be some criterion by means of which one can decide which virtue between the two is more valuable and which one is not when they conflict in a particular situation? Unfortunately, we do not find any such criterion within the conceptual framework of virtue ethics. If there were any, virtue ethics would not have pronounced the criterion of *Mahājana* model which it does. And the criterion of *Mahājana* model does not provide nor can it provide any conclusive solution to the problem of the conflict of moral virtues. In fact, the *Mahājana* model of reasoning is only an idealized way of thinking and thinking does not make any

action right or wrong. Moreover, all virtuous people (*Mahājanas*) themselves do not possess the same degree of virtuous character. Their degree of virtuous character varies. And when it varies, the question naturally arises in the mind of a virtuous agent: which model of *Mahājanas* should he choose to decide upon virtuous actions and virtues? In reply to this question, virtue ethics cannot say, 'The one who is more acceptable to him', because choosing of virtuous actions and virtues is not a personal matter of the virtuous agent's selecting of one's preferred candidate as a relatively more virtuous over the others. It is a matter of selecting an ideal virtuous person who really embodies the ideals of virtue relatively more in degrees over the others, which is not an easy task for the virtuous agent to decide in the context of action when he faces a moral dilemma. The *Mahājana* model is not being designed in virtue ethics to show how selection should be made between the two virtuous people. It is being designed only to show how should one think in choosing a right action in any given particular situation and thinking is not the ground of the right action.

One might make an attempt to refute the arguments mentioned above by referring to the idea of practical wisdom on which virtue ethics rely most in the *Mahājana* model of reasoning. But to my mind this line of thought also doesn't work, in spite of this fact that the acting of virtuous action essentially calls for it. The reason why it doesn't work is that because the idea of right action does not essentially spring from the idea of the individual's practical wisdom. It springs from the idea of virtue-value. In other words, there is no doubt about it that the individual's practical wisdom is essentially required for making moral deliberations and choices, but it doesn't constitute the grounds of right action. Practical wisdom is only an intellectual skill which enables a moral agent to make up his mind about what ought to be chosen and what ought not to be chosen as a virtuous action, but it doesn't constitute the grounds of a virtuous action. Practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue and intellectual virtues are characteristically different from moral virtues, the values which generate the rules of virtuous action. If this be so, then practical wisdom does not, and cannot, constitute the grounds of right action. It lies only in choosing of the most morally appropriate virtue-value in the actual circumstance. Also, to choose

the most morally appropriate virtue-value means to make its selection and selection always requires the application of some rule different from those to which it is applied. And it is in the context of the application of the rules of action practical wisdom is essentially required. But to say that it is essentially required is not to say that it constitutes the ground of the rules of action.

Above all, no individuals acquire practical wisdom in a day or two, nor does it emerge from mere theoretical knowledge of what is virtue and what constitutes vice. It emerges over a period of time from the exercise of one's intellect and experiences which differ in degrees from person to person. Practical wisdom is also not something which could be said that individuals acquire once for all. Moreover, what would constitute a practical wisdom and what would not cannot be determined in advance outside the context of the application of the rules of action and situation. Besides, our intellectual views and interpretations also differ on what constitutes practical wisdom. What one thinks is a practical wisdom for him in doing of certain action in a particular context may or may not be considered a practical wisdom in carrying out that particular action in that specific context by others. All this is perfectly possible. For example, telling a hurtful truth to someone whose wife is unfaithful may be considered a practical wisdom by us, but that may or may not be considered a practical wisdom by others who assign a greater value to the virtue of kindness. What to say of this, even the same individual who considers something as a practical wisdom in one particular context may or may not consider the same thing as a practical wisdom in another context. All this is quite possible simply because the idea of practical wisdom is relative to the application of the rules of action and the situation in which they are applied. That is the reason why what would constitute a practical wisdom and what would not depend solely upon the application of the rules of action and the situation. The problem of the conflict of moral virtues, thus, cannot be resolved by referring to the practical wisdom of the virtuous agent. Also, this cannot be resolved just by discarding the genuineness of the conflict of moral virtues and plurality nature of the character of virtuous people because to deny their genuineness would amount to mean the denial of the concrete moral reality which any theory of virtue ethics cannot

afford to deny. The problems are genuine because they emerge from the ground reality which virtuous agents face, and hence demand for a philosophical solution which does not come from the idea of practical wisdom on which virtue ethics relies most for the reasons mentioned above.

There is another idea which could be put forward as a solution to the problem of the conflict of moral virtues, that is, the idea of good life or well-being to which virtue ethics links its idea of a virtuous life. And this view of virtue ethics, one can say, is quite evident from the thesis (3) itself. Thesis (3) clearly says that the idea of virtuous life is conceptually linked with the idea of good life which consists, in the view of virtue ethics, in the attainment of happiness or bliss. It is said that a virtuous life is a good life and a good life is a happy life. But this line of argument, to my mind, also does not help us because when we examine the idea of a good life, we find that it itself is an obscure idea. It means different things to different people in different contexts. And there is no way to determine what is truly good in human life. Those who interpret moral virtues in deontological sense hold one particular view on human goodness and those who interpret moral virtues in teleological sense hold another view on human goodness. Those who believe in spirituality connect moral virtues with the idea of liberation called *moksa, nirvana* or *kaivalya.* For them, the goodness of human life consists in the attainment of liberation. All these views clearly indicate that the idea of good in human life is very vague. It means different things to different people. Even if we agree on what constitutes good in human life and go by the principle of over-ridingness and admit that the moral permissibility of any virtue is determined not by the practical wisdom of the virtuous agent but by its relative strength, then it requires weighing of the virtues which conflict in a particular situation in terms of their relative possible human goodness which they would be yielding, if followed in practice both positively and negatively, and that is not possible to measure qualitatively and quantitatively. The personal goodness of a person, that is, the individual's happiness or bliss cannot constitute the grounds of moral goodness in terms of which we can measure the relative strength of the two conflicting virtues. Its reason is simple because the idea of moral good does not logically

rest on the idea of personal good. It rests on the idea of good of all the people concerned. This is quite evident from the idea of morality itself because morality is a network of the human interpersonal relationships. It eliminates interpersonal conflicts and makes their life better. That is why the cultivation of moral virtues is not purely a matter of the goodness of the individual's life. It is a matter of the goodness of all the people concerned. If what I have said is true, then from this it is quite evident that the goal of the individual's happiness does not, and cannot, become the moral goal of a virtuous life. A virtuous person may or may not be a happy person because there is no logical connection between the two. If it exists, it exists merely as a matter of fact and not as a matter of logic. The idea of moral goodness is an idea whose attainment always requires an epistemic ideality which only an omniscient being, that is, God (if at all there is any) can satisfy it in practice and none else. Not only this, the idea of moral goodness itself differs from case to case and context to context because of the variations found in human beings and their social situations. As a result, the feature of over-ridingness of any virtue cannot be said to be a static and permanent feature. It is bound to undergo change from one context to another. So, one virtue which overrides another virtue in one particular situation may or may not override that in another situation. All this is possible because of the very nature of the feature of over-ridingness itself. If my view is correct, then no virtue can be called a fundamental virtue in the sense of over-ridingness by referring to which one can settle the issue of the conflict of virtues for all the times in all situations. It can be settled within the context in which the problem arises by following the principle of over-ridingness. There is no doubt about it that acting on the principle of over-ridingness means acting on better reasons and acting on better reasons means acting on what is relatively more appropriate and reasonable in the given context. But which virtue is more reasonable and which one is not does not depend upon the moral agent's mere selection of it because the act of moral agent's selection does not by itself render that the selected virtue really possesses relatively more weightage in terms of the moral goodness over the unselected one no matter how wise he is because the weightage of any virtue does not logically depend upon it. It depends upon the

nature of the contents of virtues and the situation, and not on the virtuous agent's thinking, 'what the virtuous people would do or would have done in my circumstance'. It also does not depend upon the individual's practical wisdom because the individual's practical wisdom does not constitute the content of moral virtues in spite of this fact that it is involved in the process of weighing and making selection of moral virtues.

In view of the above discussion we can, thus, conclude that the *Mahājana* model, that is, the model of the conduct of virtuous people proposed by virtue ethics does not, and cannot, provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of the conflict of moral virtues within its conceptual framework. It does not matter how we interpret virtues whether deontological or teleological; it always generates some genuine philosophical issues relating to the problem of the conflicts of moral virtues. The issue also does not get resolved even if we combine certain elements of both deontological and teleological views of morality under virtue ethics because of theirs own inherent problems. Instead of resolving the issue, it somewhat increases it.

Law, Logic and Ethics: Issues at the Heart of Society and Polity

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Law or, rather, the legal system concretizes logic and ethics and, in doing so, 'constitutes' both society and polity in a way that provides a radical break from the manner in which they existed and functioned before man's self-consciousness either created or brought it into being. The sense of justice or what Kant has called 'right', that is, the justified distinction between 'mine' and 'thine', to use his terms were, of course, present implicitly before, as was the sense of values in general or 'right' and 'wrong', or the 'correctness' and 'incorrectness' in arguments that people continuously gave regarding the matters they discussed. Thus, the self-consciousness of norms implicit in these judgements regarding thinking and action and their explicit formulation raised the problem of their actualization and of the 'coherence' amongst the 'rules' that this attempt at actualization inevitably entailed.

The differentiation and segregation of the political functions which we have discussed in an earlier paper, and which introduced the radical distinction between those who ruled and those who were ruled, necessitated a division in law between that which constituted the polity and spelled out the criteria, functions, powers, privileges and duties of those who could rule or qualify for ruling and others which centered round what Kant has called the notion of 'possession' which is distinct and different from the fact of 'physical' possession as the former has no limits of space or time intrinsically inbuilt in it. Not only this, the notion of legal or juridical possession, as Kant pointed out, brings a civil society into being where the 'right' of each entails an 'obligatory duty' on all the others to respect, foster and help in its maintenance and active functioning just as it imposes on oneself the duty to do the same in respect of

all the others. This is the category of 'reciprocity' lying at the foundation of a civil society and constituting it ideally in terms of which alone it can define itself.

But this constitutes only a 'society', and not a 'polity', and that too only 'ideally' as, at the purely transcendental level at which Kant's thinking is functioning, 'mankind' would have to be constituted as a 'whole' without the limitations of space and time, that is, 'seen' as a unity without reference to past, present or future. Kant, of course, does not see this implication of what he has said, nor does he realize the strange transition in his thought from the 'transcendental' to the 'transcendent' at this point as the notion of 'mine' or that of 'possession' becomes a 'possessio noumenon' which alone provides the foundation for the 'possessio phenomenon' that we actually find in what he calls a juridical or civil society.

The deeper problem with the concept of 'right' or 'possession' in terms of which he understands it, is that neither its relation to the 'moral good'—as conceived of in his system—is very clear nor is its relation to the 'freedom' of the 'other' which it necessarily presupposes as the 'thine' and 'mine' are equally, reciprocally, balanced in his system as the 'thine' is somebody else's 'mine', just as 'mine' happens to be his or her 'thine'. But 'freedom' in this case cannot be conceived as the 'good will' or the 'will to do good', but only as one's duty *not* to deprive the other of that which he or she 'rightfully' possesses, that is, only negatively.

But what exactly is meant by 'rightful' possession is not made clear, nor is the issue raised as to how the dispute or difference about it is to be settled, and the 'decision' made effective, and that this all has also to be 'accepted' by everybody, and that this 'acceptance' has to be an *a priori* transcendental condition of a civil society, that is, of being a 'human community' in the complete sense of the term.

The problems raised by the necessary postulation of a plurality of centres of freedom to make the moral realm intelligible, comes to the fore when the world of human interactions begins to be expressly grounded in 'rules' that are deemed to be necessary for the stability and predictability of those interactions so that 'action' may take a 'form' and a 'shape' visible and intelligible to the actors

involved. Action based on 'freedom' is neither anarchic nor chaotic nor random, and never disjointed or atomic, as most notions of 'freedom' seem to imply and which, strangely, seem to result from 'morality' itself as each imposes restrictions and limits its exercise in ways that are not 'liked' by it. The demand for 'universality', 'objectivity' and 'equality' seem so self-evident and unquestionable when theoretically formulated that one easily forgets the impossibility of their realization because of the self-contradiction involved in each and all of them. The impossibility and the contradiction get quickly revealed the moment one tries to actualize or realize them, as any study of the functioning of law and its history in different countries, contexts, climates and civilizations would attest. The so-called 'universality' is never really 'universal' and cannot be so in principle as there is no universal society or polity within which it may even aspire to be so. As for 'objectivity' and 'equality', we are acutely aware when they are absent or being violated or ignored, but how they are to be understood in positive terms and what would it actually mean for them to be completely realized, is difficult to say. Perhaps, they are like 'values' whose 'negatives' are known so poignantly and yet about whose 'positive' we can only be fitfully aware and, even then, be in half-doubt whether this was the 'real' thing meant by them. The shoe, as they say, goes on pinching, only sometimes more, sometimes less, and sometimes even making us forget for a little that it is there because one's mind, for the moment, has gone elsewhere.

But the unbelievable 'truth' is that minds can go elsewhere, that consciousness is not bound to senses in such a way that it is their 'bonded slave' for ever. Nor is it so 'self-centered' as not to be able to move 'out' of itself and be concerned with 'others', their good and their welfare. Yet, the moral consciousness in which this is generally achieved is centered too deeply in the modality of its own motivation symbolized in the notion of 'conscience', or 'the good will' or 'duty for duty's sake' that the 'other' vanishes for it or becomes irrelevant as it is only a contingent symbolic necessity, something to hold on to in thought, something so general as to have no specificity about it, or what Hegel would have called 'nothing', a vacuous variable to be filled in by anyone, whoever he or she may be, as 'who it is' does not matter.

Law has to remedy this and make the realization of the 'good' 'situation-specific' without giving up the demand for 'universality' which it interprets in terms of 'rationality', not as it is used in the context of 'knowledge' but that of action. Reason, as it functions in the realm of morals, is not the same as 'instrumental rationality' or what Kant called 'prudential morality' and the latter is not the same as is found in that which is called the 'seeking of truth' or knowledge in the context of man.

Law has a dimension to it which defies the notion of reason or 'rationality' as generally understood in the context of knowledge on the one hand and action, whether seen intrinsically or instrumentally, on the other. It is, and has to be, interested in the specificity and particularity of what it has to deal with, and this not in the interest of some 'universal' whose instance it happens to be or for some theoretical generalization for the grasping of which it functions as a 'contingent accident', but rather for itself in its 'absoluteness', even though it has to 'classify' the specific or the particular, just as one does in art or history. It differs, however, from these two in a radical manner, for against the former its interest is cognitive through and through while against the latter, it is not interested in 'relating' what happened or 'was the case' to the whole host of earlier events in which it is embedded and in terms of which it is supposed to become intelligible.

History is known for its perennial problem of finding what 'actually happened' and how it is related to the 'evidence' from which it is constructed. Law encounters the same problem, but in a different manner as the 'Law of Evidence' on which the legal structure may be said to rest, attests. It also encounters the problem of 'classification' which has been at the center of the cognitive enterprise of man, even though it is at present maligned. But its 'classification' has simultaneously a cognitive and a value-dimension in it which is usually 'hidden' in the disciplines that consider themselves purely cognitive and, hence, 'value neutral'. The valuational aspect of the classification has an in-built imperative for action which all 'values' implicitly possess, and thus create the real dillemma for cognitive classification which generally remains suppressed or hidden in the cognitive disciplines where the successive changes in the classification criteria over a period of time would reveal the

forces determining the changes in the criteria and hence in the 'naming' and 'understanding' of the object concerned with implicit suggestion of 'what to do with it' or 'how to deal with it'.

Law has another aspect which it shares with other domains, but in its own peculiar way. It also seeks 'coherence' on the widest possible front as it has to take into account not only the whole realm of values with its internal conflicts, but also their 'feasibility' and 'practicality' in the changing context of knowledge in all domains and the applications thereof through not only the technologies based on them, but the institutions built around it.

Coherence that is sought in other fields is limited and partial as one can afford to ignore what is happening elsewhere, as is so glaringly evident in what is called 'knowledge' where one discipline hardly knows what is happening in other disciplines. The so-called search for 'unification' is a myth propagated and believed to preserve the idea that all knowledge is of a piece and that there are no radical differences and divisions in it, and that it always remains the same, with neither change nor growth in it.

The realms of action and feeling are even more impervious to this demand for coherence, though there is one realm which cannot escape to meet the demand, even if it wishes to do so, and that is the domain of politics. Politics, like Law, has to keep everything 'together' and, hence, has to take everything into consideration, through their interests may be different. Law has to assume the 'givenness' of the realm of the political as its 'effectivity' and 'actuality' depend on it. But once the idea of constituting a 'polity' though 'written' rules comes into being, the relations between law and polity become more complex and cease to be one-sided.

The introduction of a 'written' constitution involves a radical break in the history of the polity as the differentiation and institutionalization of the political function had done earlier to society, and the invention of 'writing' had done to societies based on and constituted by the preservation of orally transmitted traditions which alone gave them 'identity' through the continuity of 'transmitted memory'. The distinction between the ruler and the ruled, and between the literate and the non-literate now got another added dimension to it as it gave those who were 'literate' a power to judge whether the 'written' rules for the structuring and func-

tioning of the polity were being observed or not, something that gave rise to what we know today as 'Constitutional Law' and the importance we attach to it in the proper functioning of the polity, and thus giving 'law' a function in relation to the polity it never had before.

Law relating to the functioning of the political system now differs radically from those that apply to other domains. They now make 'visible' the over-riding authority of the political system as it not only formulates or legislates what is considered as 'law' having the explicit power to regulate and even change what is considered as 'common law' or the implicitly or half-explicitly formulated rules operating in the behaviour of the social system at its various levels. It generally has 'rules' or even explicitly formulated laws that are supposed to 'govern' its own functioning and, many a time, provides the legitimate procedures for changes in them, if the need so arises. But in either case, it itself has thus to provide a super-adjudicatory role to itself, which is what is meant by the emergence not of a 'civil society', but of what we may call a 'civil polity' where the 'arbitrariness' and the possibility of tyranny is restricted, not by customs usually observed, but by the 'ruling' class itself *after* the political functioning has been differentiated, segregated and institutionalized in a society where it might have been already functioning implicitly as a part of the social system. The explicit acceptance of a separately adjudicating function which must also have been there in an implicit form earlier, assumes a 'visibility' which was not there before. But this very fact not only introduces a 'new' distinction between 'lawful' and 'unlawful' or 'legal' and 'illegal' besides those between 'right' and 'wrong' or 'good' and 'bad' which already had been there, but also the one between the 'constitutional' and the 'unconstitutional'.

The distinction between the 'legal' and the 'moral' and the possible conflict between them now comes into the open and creates a new problem for the moral consciousness, or what is called 'conscience', exemplified so vividly in the historically documented and 'lived' life of Socrates and Gandhi, and in a differed sense by the life of Christ whose crucifixion was the 'result' of a conflict between the 'common law' prevalent in the Jewish community of those times and whose practice seemed to have been allowed by

the acceptance of the practices of various religious communities living in the Roman Empire. Strangely, this simple question has not been faced by those who have written on the subject, nor has it been clarified whether the actual crucifixion was executed by the Roman authorities on the basis of the 'common law' judgement passed by the Jewish community to which Jesus belonged. The story of Barabas, and one other whose name is not known, complicates the issue as these two are supposed to have been 'hanged' along with Christ whose 'hanging' alone has been called 'crucifixtion'.

The idea of 'Natural Law' transcending the varied and conflicting 'common laws' prevalent in various 'social groups' and religions, thus, naturally arose whose explicit formulation and recognition is usually ascribed to Roman thinking on law called 'jurisprudence'. Even earlier, the idea of a *sādhāraṇa dharma,* is said to be there in the Indian tradition, but it is not clear whether the latter related more to the individual's moral behaviour or *dharma* as it is called, or to the legal realm as prescribed in the *Vyavahāra Śāstras* and actually enforced by kings who ruled in those times.

The problem of 'universality' is endemic to all disciplines, including not only 'knowledge' but also morals and aesthetics where, however, it is generally implicit in the judgement that claims 'it is so'. In law, however, it becomes explicit as it not only 'claims' but demands 'enforcement' through all the means at its disposal, including that of force. The claim to universality that is immanent in all 'rational' discourse, thus, becomes explicit here, though it has seldom been recognized as such. Mathematics has been taken as the paradigmatic example of rationality or 'reason' in the Western tradition, and even its classical self-conscious formulations in the form of 'logic' in Aristotle, or in modern times, have been patterned practically on the same model. In law, however, 'reason' is seen in an essentially different form as it not only permits, but *requires* an argument and counter-argument, dispute about classification and interpretation along with the 'weight' that is to be given to 'evidence' which itself has to be established by procedures explicitly stated in this regard, along with the 'need' for an actual, empirical judicial authority that can give a 'final' decision in the matter.

This is 'reason', concretely exemplified in the 'human reality' as it is actually 'lived', and even those who thought and proclaimed

they had 'left' it as the so-called 'renouncers' do and did in the past, have to 'accept' it, particularly if they build institutions to propagate, maintain and proselytize their 'truth' as they all have to 'own' property, establish some 'rules' and 'procedures' for 'succession' which are almost always in dispute.

This aspect of 'reason' was explicitly recognized perhaps only in the Indian tradition where the inclusion of *vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* in the very first *sūtra* of the *Nyāya Sūtra,* the basic text on Indian *pramāṇa śāstra* or logic, can make 'sense' only in this sense. Not only this, the idea of a *pūrvapakṣa* is treated as integral to the 'thinking enterprise' as 'doubt' or *saṁśaya* is the essential precondition for engaging in the activity of justification through the offering of a *pramāṇa* or ground for the resolution of the doubt in one's mind by one's own thinking or the objections raised by someone else to what one has said. The former is generally considered to be more important as not only thinking, particularly 'philosophical thinking', was supposed to contain it necessarily in itself but also, if one was a really good thinker, one was expected to 'imagine' or think of possible counter-objections to the 'objection' to show its untenability and still 'prove', even more 'strongly', what one had set out to prove to resolve the doubt.

This, however, occurred only in the highly formalized debate between disputants with strict rules explicitly formulated and agreed upon before an expert audience where there had to be a judge or judges who gave the verdict as to who has won or lost and thus won the prize and the reputation, or lost it. In some cases that have been reported for recent times, specially between Baccā Jhā and the foremost Naiyayika of Benaras those days, is said to have resulted in a 'draw', though the students and admirers of Baccā Jhā claim otherwise. The other famous case is that of Dayanand Saraswati, where the founder of the *ārya Samj* is said to have debated with the 'orthodox Pandits' of Benaras regarding his interpretation of the Vedas and a 'memorial' built to commemorate the occasion. Both parties, however, are said to have claimed 'victory' on the occasion.

The Indian tradition seems to 'mirror' better the 'actual' cognitive enterprise of men based both on 'reason' and 'experience', including both the 'inner' and the 'outer', and that which arises

from 'action' that aims at the transformation of both in the light of 'imagination' that makes one aware of 'possibilities' and 'ideals' at the same time. There, however, is an 'unending' characteristic to the enterprise because of this which seems to have been missed by both the 'Indian' and the 'Western' tradition, but for different reasons. The latter got stuck by its reflection on the peculiar nature of mathematical knowledge which seems to have generated the 'illusion' of 'finality', 'universality' and 'necessity' of 'real' knowledge by treating it as the paradigm for all knowledge, epitomized in Euclid's formulation of the 'geometrical' knowledge of his times. The idea of strict formal derivation from the 'truth' of axioms that appeared self-evident and 'self-certifying' and, thus, 'ensuring' the 'truth' of 'everything' that could be formally derived from them has been at the root of the truth. This gave rise to the notion of 'implication' which Aristotle had formulated in his famous theory of 'syllogistic-proof' where the notion of 'formal truth' was explicitly and clearly formulated for the first time. The premises 'implied' the 'conclusion' derived from it, if it was formally correct.

Euclid, however, had formally axiomatized the geometrical knowledge of his times, but not 'arithmetic' which had to wait long for the attempt at its 'axiomatization', starting from the work of Peano and ending with the work of Russell and Whitehead in *Principia Mathematic* which also showed the limits of the enterprise. Descartes had already paved the way for this through the creation of 'Analytical Geometry' where he had shown the possibility of correlating 'geometry' to 'arithmetic' by the ingenious way of finding a relation between 'points' on a line with 'rational numbers' which gave rise to the problem of the mathematical notion of a 'continuum' in which the 'irrational' and 'imaginary' numbers had to be accommodated. The 'finite' line not only became infinitely divisible but also had to have other 'infinities' created by 'numbers' that could not be expressed in terms of a 'ratio' between natural numbers on the one hand and the 'roots' of the 'negative' numbers which had given rise to problems of its own because of the strange fact that they could not be regarded as either 'positive' or 'negative' because of the 'law' that two negative numbers multiplied by themselves could not give a 'negative number' which, if accepted,

would lead to results that could not be mathematically accepted. The notion of 'diverse infinities' where each was 'greater' than the other as they could not have 'one-one correlation' between them in terms of which the notion of 'equality' between two sets had been defined for the reason that 'counting' which involved 'discreteness' could not be achieved even in respect of the 'fractions' or 'ratios' which were naturally generated by the operation of 'division' which could be carried on indefinitely, giving rise to the paradoxical fact that the notion of a number which was 'immediately next' could make no sense as there would always be another 'fraction' or 'ratio' between them, in principle. This gave rise to Cantor's famous 'invention' or 'discovery' of 'Transfinite Numbers' which gave rise to the yet more paradoxical result where the 'Number of "numbers"' in the 'odd' series of natural numbers is the same as the series of 'even numbers', even though it would 'appear' absurd to common sense as 'half' of the numbers have been taken out of the series and yet the 'Number of these numbers' remains the same.

The development of Non-Euclidean geometries earlier had already effectively questioned the so-called 'axioms' of Euclidean geometry, and Gödel's later proof that the 'completeness' and 'consistency' cannot be 'proved' in respect of any 'complex' system from which 'mathematics' could be 'derived', dealt a 'death blow' to the idea of the 'finality' of mathematical knowledge, and yet the 'faith' rooted in the 'ancient' Greek thinking about it seems to be totally unaffected by all this.

Both Non-Euclidean geometries and Gödel's proof, however, had only questioned the 'formal' 'finality' of any 'given' system at any time, but had not given up the idea that it was both 'necessary' and 'universal in respect of it, though they were now seen as only 'formal' and 'relative' within the context of 'postulates' or 'assumptions' that had to be not only 'formal' in character, but 'powerful' enough to generate 'mathematically significant conclusions' which had to be completely 'independent' of any empirical 'experience' and have no 'necessary' relation to it. The necessary assumption of 'the axiom of infinity' for the 'derivation' of any mathematical system shown earlier by Russell and the dispute about its being purely 'logical' or 'formal' in nature, however, had

already put a 'question mark' about it, though the 'empirical' fact of the 'progress' and 'developments' in mathematics should already have been a 'sufficient' evidence *against* the assumptions and the attitude regarding its 'finality'.

The Indian 'illusion' regarding 'finality' arose not from any reflection on any particular branch of knowledge, but reflection on 'human life' as 'existentially' lived by man in all the three dimensions of 'knowing', 'feeling' and 'willing' or action at the level of self-consciousness. The 'facts' that struck it at all these levels, included the one that had to be there because of 'birth', 'ageing' and 'death' as inevitably a part of it. The fact of 'suffering' and 'meaninglessness' was writ large on it, just as the fact of 'incessant change' in whatever 'is' or may be done by man to 'rectify' the situation in the direction of the 'better'. This two-fold analysis gave rise to the idea of an 'ideal state' of consciousness from which the very possibility of suffering was removed and in which there could be no 'change' as it had to be either ever-lasting or not in time. The Buddhists appear to have explicitly accepted only the first alternative. As for the second, the Buddha seems to have been silent. The non-Buddhist traditions, excluding the *Lokāyata* or the *Cārvāka*, as they are generally known in the Indian tradition, have generally accepted both. It is a surprising fact that the *Cārvākas* have *always* been accepted and accorded an established position as an independent philosophical 'school', even though they denied both the 'reality' of anything except the body and the ideal of *mokṣa* or 'liberation' which is supposed to be so central to Indian philosophy and culture. They, of course, accepted the ideal in terms of 'pleasure' conceived in purely sensual terms whose paradigmatic example was seen in terms of the 'sexual experience' which is 'known' to everybody and hankered after by 'all'. Their profound influence on Indian culture, including art, literature and 'spirituality' has been totally ignored, even though 'left-hand *Tantrism*' has never been 'excluded' from the so-called 'spiritual sādhanās' so vividly described by Haribhadra Suri in his work *Śaḍadarśana Samuccaya* and visually represented on walls of Indian temples from the earliest times. The later 'practices' of *Tantra* celebrate it and pursue it as an 'ideal' through all the means at its disposal and called it the 'experience' of that 'ultimate union'

which everybody was supposed to 'strive for', whether in Advaitic or non-Advaitic terms.

The concept of 'pleasure' or 'bliss' epitomized in what is called *rasa* and *ānanda* in the Upaniṣads and elsewhere and the centrality of Śṛngāra in both *Bhakti* and *Nāṭya* are vivid illustrations of this. 'Unalloyed' and 'unending', 'eternal' pleasure is the proclaimed ideal, except in *Nyāya* which Udayana, in his *Ātmatattva Viveka,* claims to be the last stage of 'spiritual realization' ahead of that of *Advaita Vedānta* which, according to him, is only one step *inferior* to it. Strangely, he puts both *Cārvāka* and *Mīmāṁsā* together in the *lowest* category as they both place 'sensual pleasure' as the highest ideal, differentiated only by the fact that the latter calls it *swarga* conceived of in purely physical terms, while *cārvāka* prescribes it as attainable even in this life if one follows the *mārga* prescribed by it.

There are differences in the conception of the ultimate ideal state of 'being' which one may aspire for and attain through the way of *praxis* prescribed for it called *sādhanā* or *yoga* which differ due to the way the ideal is conceived and may be understood as 'transcendental praxis' which means, the transformation of one's 'being' as it 'is' at the 'human level' into that which is 'really' its 'true' nature but which, for some unknown reason, is hidden from it due to 'ignorance' or 'forgetting' of its own 'true' nature that has been called *avidyā,* or *ajñāna,* or even *Māyā* in different contexts. The 'truth' here is *not* about any specific 'object' or even 'object in general', but rather about the self or the 'subject' which 'appears' as involved in the activities of 'knowing', 'feeling' and 'willing' the 'object' in different ways which alone it considers as 'real'. The fact that it is not so is revealed by the constant frustration and the feeling of 'nonfulfilment' that accompanies all these activities as they are pursued in the 'normal' way by all human beings and considered by them to be 'real'.

The 'truth', however, is considered to be as 'final' and 'unchanging' as in the Western tradition. Only, this time it is alout the 'subject' that tries to 'know', 'feel' and 'will', and not about the 'object' that is 'known' or 'felt' and 'willed' through these activities. What is surprising, however, is that the Western tradition has confined itself to the activity of 'knowing' only and not extended it to that of 'feeling' and 'willing' in which it is more intimately involved.

The term 'knowledge' in the Western tradition, therefore, is confined only to the 'cognition' of that which is 'seen' as 'object' and is always considered 'true' by definition as that which is 'false', in any sense of the term, cannot be considered as 'knowledge'. Kant did try to come to terms with the element of 'universality' in the judgement '"×" is morally good', or "×" is beautiful'. But even he refused to grant them the status of 'knowledge' as they could not be cognized through the categories of the understanding because of the fact that they were essentially non-cognitive in nature.

What is even stranger is that the entire Western discussion about 'knowledge' does not seem to be aware of the issues regarding the ontological status of that which 'appears' as true but is later found to be 'false', a question that is at the centre of almost all 'thinking' about the true nature of the 'subject' that is present in all activities of consciousness.

Both 'reason' and 'value-apprehension' function at all levels due to the essential 'subject-object' relation inherent in the fact of 'self-consciousness' at the human level. The search for 'objectivity' emanates from 'reason' while the 'value-dimension' emerges from the 'subjectivity' involved in it. The value of 'truth' emerges as the 'highest' from the search for 'objectivity' which means 'inter-subjectivity' based on the desire for communication on one's part and the possibility of 'communicability' of that which is apprehended and felt at the level of consciousness and self-consciousness, as the latter presupposes the former. There is an element in 'experience' which eludes 'objectification' in terms of concepts which have a 'universality' inbuilt in them. It can, however, be indirectly communicated through similes and metaphors as in literature, or through variations in speech based on modulation, accent and intonation which become clear in music where all these occur in their purified form as it is primarily concerned with 'notes' or what is called *svara* in the Indian tradition and their innumerable combinations that are 'known' to all those who carefully 'listen' to it. Even 'pure form' can convey it as in painting and architecture, and sometimes in painting when it is 'freed' from 'representation' just through the magic of colours, with 'their subtle variation in texture, modulation and complex combination' where each is merged, submerged and fused with the other and one another. The 'body-

language' does the rest, as in a dance where the accompanying effect of music and 'emotionally expressive' poetry, or even story or narrative add yet another dimension to it.

But effective as all these are in expressing the 'inexpressible', they pale into insignificance before the apprehension of 'moral values' that demand their realization in the actual 'inter-living' in the life of man in family, society and 'polity', as nothing else can be pursued or even apprehended without the effective functioning of these in the actual day-to-day living of man in mutual inter-relationship that vary infinitely from culture to culture, and individual to individual. Yet, however, diverse the apprehension of these values may be, their effective realization in society and polity require some objective formulation for its actualization and realization at the public level, and this is what the 'legal system' actually does. It makes 'value', publicly visible and concretizes 'reason' by making it available for adjudicating disputes regarding conflicting claims. Both 'reason' and 'values' are far, far wider than those exhibited therein, but that which is embodied in the legal system is the 'minimum' required for the effective functioning of society on the one hand and the fulfilment of those basic necessities which are publicly recognized at that time in that society. Reason has to ensure 'objectivity' and 'fairness' in settling disputes between rival and competing claims in the service of 'values' that are minimally accepted by the social consensus regarding them at that time. Law, thus, mediates and connects reason and values in such a way that the settlement of disputes may be seen as fair and reasonable not only by disputants themselves but also by the public at large who is interested in them.

The apprehension of reason, rationality and reasonableness, however, is always changing as also that of values and the minimum social needs recognized at that time. Law is, thus, dynamic and changing, though it may not appear to be so to those who are actively involved in it. To them, it appears as 'given' and 'static' as they have to treat it as such at a given time. But as it always is a 'compromise', it seldom seems to satisfy anyone. At another level, each of these dimensions is seen as inadequate by those who are interested in the larger realms for their own sake and not as 'limited' and 'constrained' by the practical considerations as they appear

in them. To reason, it does not seem 'rational' enough even by the standards accepted at that time. To the moral consciousness of the ethical thinker it appears neither 'moral' or 'valuational' in its aims, purposes and functions. As for the minimum social necessities, nobody is ever satisfied by what the social system is trying to achieve. The whole field of what may be called 'Legal Reality' created by the Legal System is almost totally ignored by thinkers primarily interested in them, and generally treated as if the realm itself did not exist.

The practice of law, thus, deserves the attention of thinkers in all social science disciplines and the humanities, both in its theoretical and practical aspects and the changes in it over a period of time, as it 'mirrors' the subject-matter of almost all disciplines in its own 'reality' which constitutes at a concrete level a human reality, both in its social and individual aspects. Philosophers, in particular, have to pay special attention to it as it involves reason, both in its formal and informal aspects, and deals with both first-order and second-order values which are sought to be realized by man at all levels of his existence. It also involves the problem of 'interpretation' of both 'declarative' and 'imperative' sentences in their syntastic, semantic, pragmatic and contextual aspects. It also contains the basic distinction between 'constitutional law' and all other laws which generally deal with the 'civil' and 'criminal' aspects of 'social reality'. The division reveals something fundamental and basic in the way human reality has generally been seen, though, seldom paid attention by thinkers concerned with the subject. It also raises the problem as to when the explicit distinction between 'constitutional' and 'non-constitutional' on the one hand and the 'civil' and 'criminal' on the other was recognized and what 'effect' the making of this had on the 'reality' and 'polity' of a particular country and civilization.

The implicit distinction between the former was already there when the political function was differentiated and institutionalized, as 'polity' created the distinction between 'ruler' and 'ruled', and thus raising the question of 'legitimacy' of the former and the distinction that resulted from it.

The question of 'legitimacy' has been raised in the earliest discussion of the subject in *Arthaśāstra* texts of the Indian tradition

and the distinction between the political, social and legal aspects of human reality was reflected in the texts dealing with them known as the *Dharma Śāstras, Arthaśāstra* and *Vyavahāra Śāstra* in the tradition.

The explicit formulation of the distinction between the 'constitutional law' and the rest, however, seems to have first appeared in Greece which is described in *The Athenian Constitution* ascribed to Aristotle and dealing with more than two hundred years of the history of the changes in it during that period which comes to an end by the conquests of the 'city-state' by the father of Alexander, King Philip of Macedonia. The work explicitly formulates the basic problem raised by the distinction between the 'constitutional' and other laws, and that it relates to defining the notion of 'citizenship' and the 'participation' of those in the 'political' function of the polity, along with the problem of 'representation' raised by it.

Aristotle also seems to be aware of and concerned with the problem raised by a multiplicity of such states and there is a comparative study of these in the work ascribed to him, but whose authenticity is not established, or the text edited and published.

The explicit formulation of laws relating to the constitution of the polity, thus, introduces a radically new distinction between those foundational laws that constitute the polity itself and all other laws as the changes in the former, permitted by the constitution itself through a process prescribed therein, and those that occur in the latter, reflect the problems relating to polity and society in different ways. A study of these changes over a period of time will reveal the concrete difficulties faced in the actual functioning of 'polity' and 'society', even though they both concern the realization of values through them. The problems relate to the 'realization' of values and, thus, reveal indirectly the limitations of the abstract formulation of them by 'thinkers' who are supposed to think and write about them. The field of law may, therefore, be seen as the 'testing ground' of the theoretical and conceptual formulations, with which the thinkers are primarily concerned. But, as it is not seen in this way, the 'testing' in the field of 'practice' has generally no effect on the theoretical thinkers who continue to discuss as before with practically no regard for the fact that its inadequacies have already been revealed by the attempt to 'realize' and 'actualize' them. This is facilitated by two assumptions that seem to be intrinsic to thinking about values by most thinkers concerned with thinking about them. The first relates to the axiomatic assumption that 'values' are concerned with 'ideals' which remain unaffected by the fact that they cannot be realized or actualized as they provide only the direction in which man's activities have to move as they can only be realized asymptotically and, hence, never fully by man. The identification of the 'valuational' with the 'really real', from Plato onwards, has helped in this as that which 'appears' can never be 'real', almost by the very definition of these terms. The analogical relation with the one obtaining between mathematics and empirical reality, which is one of the foundations of almost all Western thinking, has further provided support unconsciously to this, forgetting that 'values' are essentially qualitative and not quantitative in nature and that the terms 'greater' and 'lesser' or 'higher' and 'lower' cannot be interpreted or understood in a quantitative way. Plato's mistake and confusion seems to have been 'blindly' repeated by thinker after thinker in the Western tradition and the analogy with the relation between the 'theoretical' and 'observational' in science completely ignored by it.

The other factor that has contributed to this seems to lie in the assumption that values are always in harmony with one another, and that there is no conflict or competition between them. The mapping of the field of values and the possible interrelations between them has generally not been attempted except in the work of Nicolai Hartmann and perhaps of Edward Spranger who have had hardly any influence on it.

Besides these two presuppositions, what stands in the way of understanding the realm of law is the way reason is understood by thinkers who have thought about it, as they see it paradigmatically in mathematics and logic on the one hand, and the cognitive enterprise of science, on the other. Reason, as embodied in these realms, has a formal deductive character, and an inductive nature exemplified in the hypothetico-deductive-verificational method ascribed to science. Reason as it functions in the realm of law does not seem to be either of these and, hence, as exemplified in it has not been a subject of attention by thinkers. In fact, even the moral and aesthetic realms have been treated as if they had no

'immanent reason in them in spite of the fact that Kant had shown that there was an element of *a priori* universality in both the moral and aesthetic judgement. The problem an immanent Reason in other realms has hardly been even raised. But reason in law is present in an unambiguous and clear manner and hence it is surprising that it has not been paid any attention, as it should have been. The very fact that reason here is concerned with the settlement of a dispute regarding which there are two sides based on diverse interpretations of the law concerned and the evidence related to it demanding a 'final' decision in the matter. Should have drawn attention to it. The fact that 'reasoning' should be involved in this whole exercise is obvious, but it is reasoning of a different kind. It is not what we are accustomed to call 'reason' which we think is exemplied in mathematics and the natural sciences. It is reasoning about a 'disputed' matter where both sides claim to have the 'right' on their side and demand justice as each party is convinced that the other side is 'wrong' and, what is more important, accepts that the disagreement and the dispute ought not to be settled by 'force' or the sheer superiority in terms of the physical, 'coercive power' at one's command.

The 'reasoning' here is thus neither deductive, nor inductive, as it is not concerned with establishing a universal generalization on the basis of the empirical evidence it has, or in purely formal deduction from something assumed or taken for granted. Nor is it concerned exclusively with the establishment of 'truth' alone as it sees it primarily in the context of other values and in ensuring 'justice' which is always a complex 'relationship' between 'values' themselves and the relative 'weight' that is given to that which may vary from occasion to occasion. It is concerned with the individual case in its concreteness, but not in the context of finding what 'actually' happened, as in history or even in 'situating' it in the causal nexus *in* which it happened, but rather 'seeing' it as a 'complex conjunction' or meeting point of diverse and complicating values where the resultant judgement is, and has to be, 'valuational' in character, fraught with 'irrevocable' responsibility at the highest level, as it has 'decisive' consequences for the parties concerned, determining their 'future' as perhaps nothing else does.

But, in spite of this, there are important differences resulting from the fact that a 'decision' has to be reached and implemented

and executed within a limited time, a 'limitation' that is not there in other fields as there is no need for 'finality' in them. The cognitive enterprises of mankind have been pursued without this limitation as there, whatever is reached through some sort of 'consensus' on the part of those who are supposed to be actively engaged in it, is always 'open' to challenge on grounds that themselves have to be acceptable to the community of those who are engaged in a 'serious' pursuit of 'knowledge' and 'truth' in those fields. The fact that this is so implies and even ensures that the 'critics' and the 'disputants' are always potentially there as without them there can be no further movement in the enterprise itself. The 'right to appeal' is also present there, but only in an analogous form. The decisions reached are always tentative in character as there is no need for 'finality' there. But, as everyone knows, the 'right to appeal' in the legal domain results in inordinate delay which frustrates the attainment of that which the parties sought. 'Justice delayed is justice denied' embodies this, even though the 'right' itself was required to give a 'fair' chance to those who think the 'decision' has been 'unjust' to them. The 'right', therefore, to appeal is inherent in the idea of 'fairness' and 'justice' to all the parties concerned and yet the 'right' itself leads to the strange paradoxical situation of the feeling that justice is being denied by this very 'right', even when it is not indefinitely extended or granted.

But, in a sense, even the idea of 'fairness' itself has resulted in the same situation as the evidence is always conflicting, seldom conclusive, and capable of diverse interpretations which the competing lawers 'fully' exploit to their own advantage and *not* to the cause which the whole system was created to subserve.

At a deeper level, however, the problem arises because of the apprehension of 'new' values, or the old values understood in a new way, and the shifting emphasis on the priorities to be accorded to the values themselves. The changes in these emanating from the socio-politio-cultural reality outside and those that arise because of the changes in 'knowledge' and technology whose pace has increased in modern times to such an extent that nothing seems to stand still even for a moment now.

At yet another level, the extension of the notion of the 'individual' and the crisis associated with the non-acceptance of the

idea of 'sovereignty' in relation to the 'Nation-States' has resulted in a situation where 'states' themselves can be held 'guilty', even if there be no effective means to punish them for this. The idea of international sanctions has arisen in this context, but then it is the powerful nations which have 'wielded' this against others, and not let it be used against them, even if the whole international community is convinced to the contrary. The recent case of Iraq exemplifies this, just as the case of Israel does on the other hand.

At another level, the abandonment of the notion of 'reciprocity' of mutual 'obligatoriness' implicit in the idea of morality and extending it to cover 'one-sided' obligation, as in the case of 'animal rights' has led to one of the most anomalous situation in the recent discussion about it, where the 'understanding' of the notion of 'right' has resulted not in the demand for refraining from cruelty to them, but also ensuring on one's part that they are left 'free' to lead a 'life of their own', uninterfered by human beings in any sense of the term.

The conflicting and contradictory demands on the socio-political system are reflected in the field of law as they could be nowhere else, and yet the thinkers concerned with 'morals' in particular and values in general have hardly paid any attention to them. Besides this, the legal system affects and is affected by the changing notions of 'reason', 'rationality' and 'responsibility' accepted in a society, just as the 'findings' in the sciences dealing with man do so, though at a different level.

Law is, thus, always a compromise between ethics and Reason, and should be seen as such. 'Logic' here represents not just logic in the narrow sense, but rather the whole epistemological field of which logic forms an important sub-class only. This leads to the puzzling and perplexing question regarding the ontological status of this realm created by man for purposes of human living and, thus, shows distinctive differences from the world of art which also man has 'created' but which is explicitly known and recognized as such. The concepts of 'time', 'causality', 'identity', 'truth' and 'responsibility' undergo a radical transformation as they concern human actions which demand concepts and categories different form those that have to be applied in the 'understanding' of art and nature which alone have been the subject of attention by those

who have struggled with the problem of 'knowledge' and 'truth' about these realms and the ontological status of this 'reality' that is their subject-matter. This 'lived' dimension of human action, a purely philosophical analysis generally misses. It also raises the question whether human action can be conceived of in purely naturalistic terms, and if not, then is it the technological element that should prevail and get primacy, or the deontological one which is reflected in the logic of imperatives? Is the imperative to be conceived of only in conditional terms as in the *Mīmāṁsā*, or unconditionally as in Kant. But whatever the alternative chosen, it is obvious that 'reason' cannot function in it as it does in the formal deductive sciences, or be 'inductive' in character as in the non-formal disciplines. Yet, there are well-laid principles and procedures which have to be taken into account and followed if the settlement of difference and dispute has to be seen and judged as 'fair' to all the parties concerned and also by those who are not directly involved in it.

The principles and procedures explicitly formulated and followed are not entirely different from those that are there in all other fields in order to attain an inter-subjective 'objectivity' through the application of 'reason' in that domain. The primacy of the *vidhi-niṣedha-vākyas*, that is, of imperative sentences over descriptive, implies the logical and epistemological primacy of the former over the latter. The relation between knowledge and action thus gets a sea-change as the former gets meaning and significance *only* in the context of the latter. This is not pragmatism as the realm of human action to which that knowledge is to be applied is itself constructed by 'rules' that have hardly any intrinsic relation to the realm of knowledge which has become subservient to it. Prabhākara's radical views in this regard thus go beyond what is known as 'operationalism' now in the sciences and also on the related question about the status and meaning of purely theoretical terms in a cognitive discourse, as many of them, many a time, function only as ancillary to the discourse, and do not 'refer' to anything outside it. Here, there is a total subordination of knowledge to that which is realizable through action, that is the theory of *puruṣārtha*.

Law, thus, is the meeting ground of so many disciplines raising philosophical problems of its own which, if seriously considered,

would affect thinking in those fields as it is carried on these days. It also would bring to the fore the practical difficulties in the realization of values which are generally ignored by those who 'talk' about them. It will also draw attention to the question regarding the actual use of 'reason' in the field of inter-subjective, inter-actional behaviour of men and the attempt to make it 'rational' as far as possible. What men actually do with this awareness is another question, but that is always there with all the realms he creates and 'lives' in, something that perhaps reveals more about him than anything else.

Anekāntavāda and Pramāṇas: Limits of Synthesis in Jaina Logic

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ABSTRACT

Professor Daya Krishna has raised the following questions in the context of Pramāṇas in relation to Anekāntavāda in a recent personal communication to me;

> 'May I ask how a Jaina thinker would establish his Anekāntavāda if there is no *pramāṇa* for it? On the other hand, if there is a *pramāṇa,* how could it be independent of it?'

My response to the first question is as follows:

1. Anekāntavāda or *Vastuśabalavāda* is established in Jaina system through inference or scriptural authority or both. Its knowledge or its expression is based on words of reliable persons. Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda may be treated as instances of *śrutajñāna.* There are valid sources of knowledge for Anekāntavāda and, hence, we cannot say that there are no *pramāṇas* for it. We have to distinguish between *pramāṇa* as an organ of valid knowledge and *pramāṇa* as an *instance of* valid knowledge. Pramāṇa means both the instrument of valid cognition as well as valid cognition itself.

With a view to understand in depth the theoretical structure of the Jaina system, I have here highlighted *the two interrelated sets of the Jaina arguments.* I have shown here that the first set of the arguments for the versatile nature of reality provides the grounds for the second set of arguments that generate a Jaina critique of one-sided non-Jaina theories. The Jaina thinkers specify the many-sided nature of things and on the basis of it, they then argue for the partial truths of the *non-Jaina* one-sided theories. The Jaina thinkers include the thing having many aspects as an *object* of pramāṇas

in their general definition of pramāṇa itself. They then argue that given that the object of a pramāṇas is a many-sided reality, any pramāṇa in the sense of an instrument of the valid knowledge of a thing, grasps its many-sided nature. From this, it follows that exclusively one-sided non-Jaina *theories of* things are not valid. The arguments at the second stage move from the knowledge of many-sidedness of *things* to the assessment of the validity of the non-Jaina *theories.* If reality is many-sided and if valid knowledge consists in correspondence between cognition and such a reality, then any theory *not* taking into account the nature of reality (specified by the Jaina thinkers) is invariably one-sided. If any such non-Jaina theory is true, it would only be partially true. As the Jaina theory is a theory of many-sided reality, it is itself by definition *not* a one-sided theory. Logically, it has to be an absolutist theory in order to provide a legitimate critique of non-Jaina partial theories. If you say that even a theory about the many-sided reality is one-sided, then the distinction between the Jaina and the non-Jaina theories would be pointless in respect of the claims of synthesis made in respect of Anekāntavāda.

Daya Krishna's second question is as follows:

2. How could Anekāntavāda, even if established by the right sources of knowledge, be independent of such sources of knowledge? I find that the point of this question is that if the Jaina theory of sources of knowledge is true *per se,* then non-absolutism of Anekāntavāda would be undermined and if Anekāntavāda is itself applied to the theory of knowledge, it would block the absolute validity of the Jaina theory of knowledge itself. Firstly, I believe that we must clarify that Jainism is an ontological realism about *objects.* What is known through the means of right knowledge is also independent of those means of knowledge. *Secondly,* as a realism, it is an *absolute theory,* but *as a theory,* it is not independent of any knowers. Theories are conceptual/linguistic human productions established as structured knowledges through observation, or studies and reflection. Though it would not make much sense to say that theories are independent of their knowers like physical objects, they can still be objectively assessed.

For Jainism, it would make no sense to say that their realism is true from a certain standpoint and not true from a certain other standpoint. They completely reject all idealistic theories. There is no question of compromise or synthesis here. These are the final limits of the synthesis generated by Anekāntavāda. The fact that reality is many-sided is *not* an open question. Similarly, that there is a *kevala-jñāna* is *not* an open question. The nature of reality and the nature of a certain type of an all-comprehensive final *unrevisable* knowledge of reality show the limits of synthesis claimed by Anekāntavāda. Reality is *absolutely* non-one-sided and omniscience is *absolute* knowledge and we cannot employ the logic of standpoints. If a Jaina omniscient being knows all things according to the Jaina system only, then the concept of an omniscient being is to be treated not as a universal concept, but as a Jaina-specific concept of omniscience. I have not discussed here the implications of the concept of system-specific all-knowing persons.

Synthesis is out of question in some of the areas of the *substantive* Jaina theories. Synthesis *per se* is not necessarily linked to non-absolutism. In Western thought, for example, synthesis claimed by Kant between his own empirical realism and his own transcendental idealism operates within Kant's basic theory of the essential unknowability of reality. Against Kant, Hegelian synthesis is grounded in the Absolute Reality. Jaina thinkers have to prove separately that synthesis is possible only when reality is fully knowable as many-sided. Interestingly, Jaina *non-absolutism* does not cover all the Jaina doctrines. For example, it would be confusing to say that the means of right knowledge themselves are many-sided. Even when the non-absolutism is applied to some themes of the theory of the means of knowledge, it still does not undermine the claim to the truth of the theory of the sources of the valid knowledge which has an independent status in Jainism.

In Indian logic, pramāṇas are usually treated as the sources of valid knowledge of *things.* The many-sided nature of *things* is known through the means of right knowledge. This claim links the theory of pramāṇas to the theory of Anekāntavāda through the distinctions between right one-sided view, wrong one-sided view and all-comprehensive view.

ANEKĀNTAVĀDA—AS A SUBSTANTIVE ONTOLOGICAL JAINA THEORY AND AS A META-THEORY FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-JAINA THEORIES

1. A set of arguments establishing the many-sided nature of reality constitutes a *substantive Jaina ontology* of things.
2. From this set, a further set of arguments is derived constituting a Jaina *meta-theory* of evaluating all *non-Jaina* theories as one-sided and, therefore, inadequate. Thus, there is a transition from a substantive theory of *anekāntātmaka vastu* to a meta-theory of *anekāntavāda.*
3. Substantive ontological theory of the many-sidedness of *things* serves as a foundation for refuting the unacceptable claims of the non-Jaina theories as also for retaining the *acceptable* parts of such theories. If the many-sided nature of things is not established by arguments, then evaluating the non-Jaina theories as one-sided theories would be pointless. Thus, if the basic substantive theory of *things* is undermined, then so would be the meta-theory about the partial validity of non-Jaina *theories.*
4. In Jainism, we have to distinguish between arguments establishing the *many-sided* nature of *reality* from the arguments establishing the wrongly one-*sided* nature of *non-Jaina theories.*
5. Now, if reality is many-sided and if one-sided theories are therefore inadequate, then the Jaina conceptual structure should comprise a theory of valid partial knowledge (Nayavāda) and a theory of fully comprehensive valid knowledge (Syādvāda), both of which correspond in different senses to the many-sided nature of reality. Theories of *Nayas* and *Syādvāda* are such *intervening processing structures* which link the non-Jaina *incomplete* theories to *complete* substantive Jaina theory of the many-sidedness of reality. There is no suggestion in Jaina thought that the theory of non-one-sided reality is open to revision and is only relatively true from a certain standpoint.
6. Nayavāda and Syādvāda (as a totality of *nayas*) are not included at all in the Jaina list of recognized pramāṇas.

So, they are not recognized as usual *means of* valid knowledge over and above perception, inference, etc. In a sense, they are established through recognized pramāṇas as *instances of valid knowledge* or *proper objects* of such knowledge. For example, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Hemacandra and others have argued on *the basis of the criterion of causal efficiency* that the reality has to be of the nature of substance as well as modes. Then, on the basis of the inferences about the many-sided nature of reality, they have argued that no non-Jaina theories are *fully* acceptable, because all of them emphasize *only* certain aspects of reality. My claim here is that the inadequacy of such *one-sided theories* follows from the substantive theory of the many-sidedness of reality. Nayavāda and Syādvāda have been established through *inference.* Even an appeal to the scriptures or the authentic texts has been used as means of valid knowledge of Syādvāda and Nayavāda. This means that Nayavāda and Syādvāda are established through the means of valid knowledge. They are themselves not the organs or the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇas) in the usual sense. All the definitions of pramāṇas refer to objects in the sense of ontologically recognized objects like material things, souls, etc. Through pramāṇas we grasp the many sides of such real substances. In this sense, a pramāṇa is distinguished from nayas. And yet we are also told that the knowledge of the true nature of real things is due to nayas as well as pramāṇa.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE MANY-SIDED NATURE OF THINGS

A. Akalaṅka's Arguments in *Aṣṭaśati: a Commentary on Āptamīmāṃsā*

1. Everything that is real is many-sided because it is capable of performing a function or a practical activity.
2. Nothing one-sided is real (*vastutattva*); because causal efficiency or practical activity is impossible for any such entity.

3. One-sidedness cannot be a real nature of anything; because such a nature will conflict with all generated processes and practical functions (*sarvavyāpāravirodhaprasaṅgāt*) (Akalaṅka on Samantabhadra's Verse 109, *Āptamīmāṃsā*).
4. Where no *arthakriyā* is possible for a thing, that thing is not real (Akalaṅka on Samantabhadra's Verse 109, *Āptamīmāṃsā*).

B. Hemacandra's Arguments in *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (Shah, N. 2002; pp. 126-128)

1. The object of the organ of knowledge is real when it is of the nature of substance-cum-mode (*dravyaparyāyātmaka vastu*) (1, 30). This is because the object has a capacity to generate practical consequences [*arthakriyāsāmarthyāt*] (1, 31). He also cites Umāsvāti's well-known proposition that 'the real is that which is endowed with origin, cessation and persistence' (1, 30, 118).
2. Reality, which is exclusively of the nature of substance or of the nature of absolute mode, is not capable of causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) (1-32; 123-127; Shah, 2002, pp. 129-134). Hemacandra also quotes Akalaṅka's argument to the effect that causal efficiency is not compatible with absolute momentariness or absolute eternity (1, 15, 53).
3. Hemacandra argues that reality is made up of the nature of being and non-being. It has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the nature of another thing. This is true of perceptual and non-perceptual cognition (1, 12, 39; Shah, 2002, pp. 75-76).
4. It is not true to say that a reality which has such a dual nature is incapable of exercising causal efficiency, because such a causal efficiency by a *dravya-paryāyātmka vastu* is possible by its susceptibility to changes. Such changes involve continuity together with surrender of the antecedent and appropriation of the consequent determinations, respectively, of the things concerned. Thus, *arthakriyā* is true only of reality having the nature of substance-cum mode (1, 33; 132).
5. A real entity is neither of the nature of substance, nor of the nature of mode. It is also *not* a combination of both. In fact, it is a *sui generis* multiform entity. It comprises the moments of continuity, origination and cessation. According to the relevant auxiliary factors, such an entity executes its causal operations simultaneously or successively (1, 33; 133; Shah, 2002, p. 141).

ARGUMENTS FOR THE INADEQUACY OF ONE-SIDED THEORIES

Granted that reality is many-sided, it is claimed that the non-Jaina theories are one-sided and hence inadequate. Jaina thinkers then synthesize the various one-sided theories, through Anekāntavāda [Kulkarni, in Shah (Ed.), 2000, pp. 61-66].

A. Samantabhadra (*Āptamīmāṃsā*)

Samantabhadra rejects the doctrines of both absolute oneness and absolute separateness as one-sided theories (Verses; 24-27). He points out that the phenomenon of causation as well as the phenomenon of inferential cognition will be rendered impossible by the doctrine of absolute oneness because both involve real duality. Oneness and separateness, treated as unrelated to each other, are fictitious. He also rejects the one-sided doctrines of absolute permanence and absolute momentariness (Verses; 37-40). He balances the substantive and the meta-theoretical levels of Anekāntavāda.

Samantabhadra, thus, has contributed to the critical assessment of the one-sided non-Jaina positions through the further clarification of the many-sided nature of reality. He attributed the name *naya* to each of the seven judgements and the totality of all the seven *bhaṅgas* is called Syādvāda by him. In fact, Samantabhadra has highlighted the importance of Anekāntavāda as 'the central criterion for evaluating the contemporary non-Jaina philosophical systems' (Shah, 1999, Introduction, p. 11).

B. Hemacandra (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*)

For Hemacandra, the claims that reality is a substance only or is a mode only or is a combination of both only are all one-sided and

partial and, hence, all such *positions* are defective. Given the many sided nature of reality specified by the arguments, it follows that all the *positions* emphasizing only one of the aspects of realty would be defective. He criticizes the one-sided theories fully in the context of his criterion of reality, i.e., causal efficiency (1, 32; 124-131; Shah, 2002). Hemacandra offers his statement about the *sui generis* nature of reality and in the same passage moves from a theory of objects to a meta-theory of evaluation of other one-sided theories of object of knowledge (1, 33; 133)

PRAMĀṆAS, NAYAVĀDA AND SYĀDAVĀDA

A. Pramāṇas and Nayas

Akalaṅka states that cognition of the numerous aspects of an object of knowledge is a pramāṇa and the cognition of only a part of the object of knowledge is a naya. For him, the valid cognition of the non-one-sided nature of a thing is a pramāṇa; and the valid cognition of only one aspect of such a thing is naya. (Akalaṅka on *Āptamīmāṃsā*; Verse 106, Shah, 1999, p. 92).

There is thus a distinction between naya and pramāṇa. Any partial but true knowledge of only one of the many aspects of reality is called Naya. Naya is only a part of pramāṇa. Pramāṇa grasps the *entire* whole while naya grasps only one of its many aspects. Both are valid. Hemacandra keeps pramāṇa and nayas as separate. He quotes a statement by Umāsvāti, claiming that the acquisition (of the knowledge of ultimate truth) is *by means of* pramāṇa *and* nayas (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*; Aphorism, 1; 6). In this context, naya is treated as a part of pramāṇa and, in this sense, naya is also treated as a source of valid knowledge *different from* the recognized pramāṇas. Whether a theory can have concepts which function as pramāṇas (in the sense of the instruments of knowledge) without being listed as independent pramāṇas is a question for further consideration. If, by a *naya* we mean an instance of valid cognition, then there is no problem.

All nayas are included under two basic nayas—*dravyārthika naya* and *paryāyārthika naya*—the standpoint of substance and the standpoint of modes. Nayavāda and Syādvāda both are different from *pramāṇavāda* (as a theory of the means of valid knowledge). If, however, by pramāṇa we mean valid knowledge *itself* or the objects

of valid knowledge, then naya is valid as an *instance* of partial knowledge and Syādavāda is valid as the comprehensive knowledge of things [Atsushi, Uno; In, Shah (Ed.), 2000, chapter 3).

Nyayavijayaji states that 'since naya operates upon Reality which has already been revealed by a *pramāṇa*, naya follows pramāṇa,... pramāṇa reveals the whole truth, while naya reveals only the part of the whole truth' (Shah, 1998, p. 364). *Pramāṇa* precedes nayas. Naya is not an independent pramāṇa, nor is it a no-pramāṇa. This is a peculiar epistemological status of a naya. Nyayavijayaji refers to the distinction between *naya-vākya* and *pramāṇa-vākya*, i.e., statement of the partial truth and the statement of the whole truth. Naya-vākya is non-comprehensive truth (*vikalādeśa*) and pramāṇa-vākya is a totally comprehensive truth (*Sakalādeśa*) (Shah, 1998, p. 384).

If you say 'It is existent', it is a naya-vākya, expressing partial truth. If you say, 'It is *only* existent' (*sad eva*), it expresses a pseudo-viewpoint (*durnaya*). *Durnaya* is dogmatic and absolutely one-sided and hence a wrong assertion. It excludes all other partially valid standpoints. You may not use the paricle *syāt* and yet your statement can be a valid *naya*, if you also do not use the definitive particle *eva* there. For example, you can say that 'the pot is impermanent' or you can say that 'the pot *certainly* is impermanent *from a certain standpoint*'. Both are valid naya-expressions (*eva* can be used with *syāt* to generate *naya-vākyas*, e.g., *syād sad eva*).

Siddhsena Divākara states that every naya is correct in its own sphere, but if a naya disregards the rival nayas then it becomes exclusive and, hence, wrong. If all nayas arrange themselves in a proper way and supplement each other, then alone they are worthy of being termed as 'the whole truth'. A necklace comprises jewels arranged in a certain order and joined through a string. A single jewel is not a necklace. Similarly, a single naya is not the whole truth (Chapter 1; Verses 22-25, Tr. Gopani, 2000, p. 19). Samantabhadra also says that a naya, *as such*, is not false; it is false only when it stands aloof from the rest of the nayas (*Āptamīmāṃsā*; Verse 108).

Naya means the *right*, one-sided view. *Durnaya* is wrong, one-sided view. It, therefore, follows that all one-sided views are *not* wrong one-sided views. It then also follows that the non-Jaina views

are wrong *only if* they generate invalid naya-statements like, 'reality is eternal only'. It means that one-sidedness *per se* is not a problem for the Jaina thinkers, but it becomes a problem only when one-sided view is treated as the *whole* truth. Given the structure of the ordinary human cognition and the nature of time itself, it is obvious that if you exclude all one-sided statements as false, then you cannot distinguish between *naya* and *durnaya* and then the many-sided nature of reality cannot be clarified successively. Falsity lies in claiming that a *partially true view* is wholly true; it does not lie in claiming that there can be a wholly true view. Unless something is wholly true, it makes no sense to say that something not corresponding to it is partially true.

B. Pramāṇa and Syādavāda

1. Nyayavijayaji clarifies the relation between Pramāṇa and Syādavāda as under:

> The comprehensive knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is expressed in the statements like, 'It is existent from a certain standpoint' (*syāt sat*) or 'It is certainly existent from a certain standpoint' (*syāt sad eva*). Therein, the employment of the particle *syāt* (meaning 'from a certain standpoint') is to suggest other attributes from other standpoints. When modified by the particle *syāt*, the statement becomes Syādavāda (non-one-sided). This is the statement of the whole truth (Shah, 1998, p. 385).

As Shah has rightly pointed out, the scheme of seven-fold judgment is applicable to each of the infinite *dharmas* of a thing and, hence, there are infinite *saptabhaṅgī-vākyas* (1999, p. 8). There are infinite things and each thing has infinite *dharmas*. It means that practically, we can know only an *anekadharmātaka vastu* rather than *ananatadharmātmaka vastu*. It then follows that if a thing has infinite modes and if each of it is grasped through seven-fold judgement, then nothing can be knowable fully by a finite series of a seven-fold judgement.

If this is so, not only Nayavāda but Syādvāda and even pramānas also cannot grasp the entire nature of things all-comprehensively. If Syādvāda and pramāṇa both grasp the thing entirely, then what is the difference between them? Jaina thinkers have recognized many *pramāṇas*. It has been frequently said that *pramāṇas* grasp the whole object, but it has not been clarified how if a thing has

infinite aspects, each of the means of knowledge grasps even its particular limited object in its entire form. At least, at the level of ordinary perception, a thing is revealed in a series of appearances to the consciousness of a knower simultaneously in some cases or successively in some other cases. A thing, at any time, naturally *exceeds* its perception of it by any knower, because it has profiles not given to the knower when a thing is given to him in perception. This is the essence of ontological realism. In this context, further thought must be given to the claim that a thing is grasped entirely by the means of valid knowledge. Realism requires that reality exceeds its cognition by human knowers.

2. Samantabhadra distinguishes between Syādavāda and Pramaṇas as under:

> As a thing has infinite aspects, knowledge pertaining to an entity which cognizes *all* its aspects in one sweep is called pramāṇa, while knowledge which takes cognizance of all the aspects *successively* is called Syādavāda and Naya (*Āptamīmāṃsā*; Verse 101). Endorsement of Syādavāda amounts to a rejection of one-sided final views (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, Verse 104). Samantabhadra also maintains that knowledge in the form of Syādavāda and the knowledge in the form of omniscient personage both reveal all things under *all* their aspects [*syādavāda kevalajñāne sarvatattva prakaśane* (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, Verse 105)]. However, Syādavāda is an *indirect* knowledge, whereas the knowledge of an omniscient person is *direct* (Verse 105).

Pramāṇa generally means any ordinary valid cognition. Here it stands for the all-comprehensive cognition of an *all-knowing* person. Similarly, Syādavāda here stands for such all-comprehensive but *indirect and successive* cognition of all the aspects of a thing. Shah claims that such a distinction is without any practical importance (English Tr; Shah, 1999, p. 95). I agree with him, but I also believe that such a distinction between Pramāṇa and Syādavāda removes both of them *even theoretically* from their involvement in normal cognition. Such a distinction cancels the difference between normal operations of *pramāṇas* and Syādavāda. The difference between an ordinary knower and an omniscient being (if such a being is possible) is important, but the distinctions between Syādavāda and Pramāṇa in relation to the ordinary persons and in relation to the persons having absolute cognition are not very clear. Samantabhadra's way of distinguishing between Syādavāda and

Pramāṇa in relation to absolute knowledge is not at all fruitful. The relation between Syādavāda and Pramāṇas becomes complicated due to the controversial concept of an omniscient being. From the claim that reality has infinite modes, it does not follow that there exists or there should exist some omniscient person who knows all the modes of all the substances successively or simultaneously.

Mallişeṇa and Haribhadra treat Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda as identical, though generally Syādvāda is a term specially used for the scheme of seven-fold predication (a set of seven formulae-*saptabhaṅgī*). How theories (*vādas*) are known perhaps is not usually highlighted in any discussion of Indian theories. How we grasp a *theory* of things through pramāṇa is also perhaps not discussed in details in Indian thought. Knowledge of things should be distinguished from the knowledge of a theory of things. Jaina thinkers make a distinction between *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna. Śrutajñāna* is knowledge obtained from what is heard from others. Knowledge generated through writings of reliable persons is also *śrutajñāna.* Such knowledge, generated through words, is verbal knowledge (Shah, 1998, p. 183). So, Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda may be treated as instances of *śrutajñāna.* Syādvāda is concerned with statements or propositions. It thus, corresponds to *śrutajñāna* as understood by the Jainas (Gokhale, In, Shah, 2000, p. 75).

I suggest that the cognition of vādas is made possible by finding out about the nature of reality endorsed by the system concerned. If reality is considered as eternal in any system, then 'eternalism' is the name of that theory. The same is true of 'non-eternalism'. Theories are named according to the nature of the objects of knowledge they specify in the Indian systems. Theories of reality or knowledge or morality comprise an inter-related set of statements regarding the nature of the themes under consideration. Theories as *objects* of knowledge are different from *things* as objects of knowledge. Theories are known through *śrutajñāna* when they are identified and labelled by authoritative texts of the tradition concerned.

Of course, for realism, *things* surely exist independently of knowledge, but it makes no sense to say that *theories* exist independently of the knowledge of them by the thinkers concerned.

Anekāntavāda is basically applied to *things.* Sometimes, Anekāntavāda is also applied to the *Pramāṇa* theory. For example,

it is said that from the standpoint of substance, continuous cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) is not a pramāṇa, but from the standpoint of modes, such knowledge is a pramāṇa. Here there is a synthesis due to Anekāntavāda. Similarly, it has been claimed that an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is necessary only in the inference-for-others, while it can be used in the case of inference-for-oneself only when the cognizer concerned needs a reminder because he has forgotten the *vyāpti.* This is some kind of synthesis, but I am not sure whether such a synthesis is due to Anekāntavāda itself. There can be comprehensive Jaina and non-Jaina theories which include and also transcend some other viewpoints, but all kinds of synthesis in all such theories may not be due to the validity of Anekāntavāda. Synthesis *not* grounded in Anekāntavāda, is also possible.

Akalaṅka treats *kevala-jñāna* as absolute, but he also points out that no empirical cognition is absolutely valid or absolutely invalid. Shah has suggested that the realization that the powers of sense-organs are limited might have led Akalaṅka to formulate such a view (Shah, 1967, p. 190). Now here I doubt whether such a compromise or synthesis by Akalaṅka and others is always logically required by the Jaina thinkers. There may be theories within Jaina system independent of Anekāntavāda. If the thinkers are synthesizing other different theories in order to do justice to the many sided nature of things, then there is definitely some point to such a synthesis. But from the fact that the powers of human cognition are limited, if Akalaṅka has maintained that no empirical cognition is absolutely valid or invalid, then his claim could as well be taken as a straightforward empirical or even a skeptical position. The Jaina thinkers have escaped from such simple empiricism or skepticism only with the help of the concept of *kevala*-jñāna and the concept of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the particular kind of knowledge-obscuring karmas. This leads us to the consideration of the following two themes in relation to Anekāntavāda.

CAN ANEKĀNTAVĀDA ITSELF BE VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ANEKĀNTAVĀDA?

Samantabhadra states that even non-one-sided view is not *absolutely non-one-sided.* From the standpoint of pramāṇa, it is non-one-sided, but when it is an object of *naya,* it is one-sided. (Shah, 1998,

p. 386). Though one-sided, any right *naya* is validated by this clarification. Thus, even *anekānta* (as non-absolutism) is subject to *anekānta* (non-absolutism). He distinguishes between false absolutism and true absolutism [(*samyag ekānta*); Shah, 2000, p. 36].

'If non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal, since there is one real which is absolute. If it is not a non-absolute it is not an absolute and universal fact.' Ramjee Singh has presented this dilemma and has also pointed out that unconditonality in the statement 'all statements are conditional' is quite different from the normal conditionality (Shah, 2000, p. 132). Conditionality and unconditionally can be reconciled, says Singh, if it is accepted that everything is conditional at the level of *thought* but not at the level of *existence.* Reason always leads to alternative pictures of reality, but one can avoid this situation by committing oneself to one's own cultural system or tradition. Ramjee Singh's suggestion can be understood as an endorsement of a certain type of existentialist or a pragmatic-practical commitment in the absence of final theoretical grounds for a set of beliefs. I do think, however, that we require a solution to such dilemmas at the theoretical level itself.

If anekānta may sometimes become *ekānta,* it also means that Anekāntavāda itself can terminate in a one-sided view at some stage. But that also means that 'even *anekānta* itself is *anekānta*' [Shah, 1967, p. 190]. It thus includes both *ekānta* and *anekānta.* This only shows that Anekāntavāda has limited scope.

DOES ANEKĀNTA ALSO ASSUME THE FORM OF EKĀNTA?

Siddhsena Divākara is quite clear in his response to this question. 'Anekānta sometimes assumes the form of ekānta, if it does not go against the right view of things' (*Sanmati Tarka*; Verses 27-28).

'If a single point of view is in keeping with *the true nature of things,* then even Anekānta may sometimes become ekānta' [*Sanmati Tarka,* Tr. Gopani, p. 101, *Emphasis added*]. This is a bit confusing. It would be proper if it were said that the Jaina theory of the many-sided nature of reality is true without *conditions,* instead of saying that it is a valid one-sided theory. By exempting *kevala-jñāna* from the sphere of non-absolutism, the Jainas can claim to maintain both absolutism in relation to omniscience and non-absolutism in relation to empirical knowledge. They can also further claim that their

non-absolutism itself sometimes sanctions absolutism and sometimes endorses non-absolutism. They can, thus, protect their position in all circumstances. The position here is not that *kevala*-jñāna is absolute from one standpoint and non-absolute from different standpoint. *Kevala*-jñāna cannot be denied as absolute by the Jainas at any stage of their position. If that is not so, then there is no point in assessing other theories as partially true.

The Jaina thinkers can claim that the spirit of *Anekāntavāda* is not violated by *sometimes* presenting absolute theories in some areas of knowledge and reality.

This simply means that *Anekāntavāda* is to be given up at some stage. To say that Anekāntavāda can accommodate valid ekānta is to confess that there are areas of Jaina theory legitimately exempted from the operations of Anekāntavāda. The scope of Anekāntavāda cannot be absolute. For example, it is not applicable to omniscience. Such a knowledge has to be absolute by definition. Similarly, there is no question of applying Anekāntavāda to a special type of the Jaina atheism or its pluralistic realism or the Jaina theory of *Karma.* You may say that from a certain standpoint, reality is eternal or that from a certain standpoint, it is non-eternal, but you cannot say that from a certain standpoint, reality is many-sided and from a certain standpoint, it is *not* many-sided. You also cannot say that there are neither any substances nor any modes. There are limits to the operation and scope of the logic of Anekāntavāda within Jainism itself.

Many-sidedness of reality is not to be further subjected to Anekāntavāda. To that extent, Anekāntavāda is bound to be 'one-sided' about the many-sidedness of things. It could be characterized as an *ekāntavāda* about the *anekānta* nature of things. In fact, it would be less confusing if we drop any reference to aspects or sides when we are explaining or discussing the Jaina position on things. Jainism cannot include one-sidedness as the *true* and final nature of things from *any* standpoint. It means that there is *valid absolute* knowledge and invalid absolute knowledge, just as we have a right one-sided view, and a wrong one-sided view. In fact, Anekāntavāda can be claimed to be a *collective or cumulative theory* of truth rather than a relative and a skeptical theory of knowledge.

LIMITS OF SYNTHESIS

Matilal (1999, p. 134) observes that, 'Jainism openly admits an absolute notion of truth that lies in the total integration of all partial and conditionally arrived at truths and is revealed to the vision of an omniscient being such as Mahāvīra'.

Matilal, however, clarifies that except for such an omniscient person, all *humanly* constructed positions are partial and limited. This implies that if the Jaina system is established by an omniscient person, it has to be absolutely true. If, however, it is also a humanly constructed position in some sense, like other positions, then it cannot establish the concept of absolute knowledge. I do not think that ordinary persons cannot understand the concept of an all-knowing being. If that is the case, such a concept can be included in a set of concepts in any humanly constructed position. In such a case, there would be at least one absolute concept not open to variation due to standpoints.

I believe that Matilal's clarification also implies that if someone rejects the very concept of omniscient being, or the Jaina concept of *Karma*, then his 'humanly constructed' position cannot be even partially true for the Jaina philosophers and it cannot be taken up and synthesized in Jainism. If the defender says that omniscience is not possible from the standpoint of ordinary human beings, but it is possible from the standpoint of realized souls, the opponent can again say that there are no such realized souls and, hence, there are no omniscient persons in the required Jaina sense.

Siddhasena Divākara has suggested that the six dogmas of rival schools about soul come in the way of spiritual progress, and they can be discarded and replaced by the six counter-positions about the nature of soul as *samyak* theories, which are true because they help the person's spiritual development (*Sanmati Tarka*, chapter 3, Verses 54, p. 55). This is a change of criterion. Logic is, thus, replaced by faith in spiritual progress under a certain philosophical scheme.

Thus, somewhere, there are limits to the types of synthesis permissible even under Anekāntavāda. There are *two* absolute theories in Jainism—the theory of many-sided nature of cognition-independent reality and the theory of *kevala*-jñāna. There are no variable standpoints here. These doctrines are true *per se*. These are the

final limits of the synthesis generated by Anekāntavāda. The Jainas cannot accommodate all the non-Jaina theories in the name of synthesis.

That reality is many-sided is *not* an open question. Similarly, that there is a *kevala*-jñāna also is *not* an open question. These ideas are not due to practical choices or working tentative hypotheses. They are finally true. The many-sided nature of cognition-independent reality and the nature of certain type of all-comprehensive knowledge of reality show the limits of synthesis claimed by Anekāntavāda. Reality is *absolutely* non-one-sided and omniscience is *absolute* knowledge and there you cannot employ the logic of relative standpoints. The play of standpoints terminates in many-sidedness of reality on the one hand and its all-comprehensive knowledge in an omniscient being on the other. The seemingly endless play of standpoints is rendered limited to an indefinite field of ordinary cognitive operations of pramāṇas *in relation to causally efficient many-sided realty.*

There are, thus, some propositions that are absolutely true in Jaina theory. Some of them are stated below:

1. Reality is many-sided. It is independent of anybody's perception of it.
2. The preachings of a Jaina omniscient person are supreme (*Sanmati Tarka*, Introduction, Tr. Gopani, p. 57).
3. Jaina scriptures are absolutely infallible and reliable. No non-Jaina Śāstra has any valid authority (*Sanmati Tarka*, Introduction, Tr. Gopani, p. 59).
4. There is no God in the sense of the creator of the universe.
5. Śāstras are neither eternal nor created by God. Svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda, Śabdanityatvavāda, etc., are *totally* false doctrines. Any theory showing the impossibility of there being an omniscient person is also totally and finally false (*Sanmati Tarka*, Introduction, p. 119).
6. The distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva* is not open to revision due to a standpoint or conditionality.

Bhāsarvajña, a Naiyayika, has pointed out in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* that *anekāntadṛṣṭi* cannot be applied everywhere. If you apply

Anekāntavāda everywhere, then you will have to say that the Tirthaṅakara's view is true from a certain standpoint and not true from a certain other standpoint. The demarcating line between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa would be eliminated in such a position (Joshi, L., In, Shah, 2000, p. 107). No Jaina thinker would accept such a view.

Thus, even Anekāntavāda does not make the Jaina theory itself entirely non-absolutist. There are limits to the synthesis (generated by Anekāntavāda) of the partial truths of the incompatible non-Jaina theories in relation to things. There are certain Jaina truths which are independent of any synthesis of various non-Jaina theories. Some non-Jaina theories have to be totally rejected. If omniscience, which is a part of the theory of pramāṇas, is not subject to Anekāntavāda, then there are areas to which Anekāntavāda, is *not* applicable. If that is the case, the basic Jaina theory is not a non-Absolutist theory. Instead of saying that even absolutism is accommodated in Anekāntavāda, it would be better to say that there are limits to the synthesis claimed in the context of Anekāntavāda.

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Discussion and Comments

The Calling of Practical Spirituality[1]

Today we are so impressed with the progress of the physical sciences—originally derived from metaphysics—that we return the complement and derive our metaphysics from natural sciences. But the scientific world-view has its own metaphysical presuppositions[2] which originated in ancient Greece in the way of looking at the world that came to fruition in Plato and especially Aristotle. This dualistic view stands almost in dramatic opposition to a world-view based on the non-duality of the seer and the seen.

—David Loy (1988), *Non-duality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*, p. 12

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the artists have increasingly become the spiritual leaders of our time. Artists are sometimes among the few who take time to reflect on the deeper meaning of life and to search for ways to express both the turmoil of their search and the tentative insights that they have gained. They usually have more questions than answers, yet their work celebrates wholeness and coherence as well as bewilderness and mystery.

—Robert Wuthnow (2001), *Creative Spirituality: The Way of the Artist*, p. 266

God calls on us to be his partners to work for a new kind of society where people count; where people matter more than things, more than possessions; where human life is not just respected but positively revered; where people will be secure and not suffer from the fear of hunger, from ignorance, from disease; where there will be more gentleness, more caring, more sharing, more compassion, more laughter; where there is peace and not war.

—Desmond Tutu (2004), *God Has a Dream*, p. 62

Introduction and Invitation

Practical spirituality involves a transformation of both science and religion. In the field of religion, practical spirituality emereges in numerous transformative movements and seekings in self, culture

and society which interrogate the existing structures of domination and strive for a new mode of self-realization, God-realization and world-realization. Practical spirituality seeks to transform religion in the direction of creative practice, everyday life and struggle for justice and dignity. Practice here is not just practice in the conventional sense, for example in traditions of American pragmatism (cf. Aboulafia and Kemp, 2002) or the anthropological conception of practice as offered by Clifford Geertz (1973), Pierre Bourdieu (1971) and Jurgen Habermas (1971). These conceptions suffer from an entrechend dualism such as theory and practice, immanence and transcendence and work with a notion of subject which is predominantly 'techno-practitioner'[3] and cut off from its inescapable and integral links with transcedence. But practice in practical spirituality is simultaneously immanent and transcendent[4] and the actor here is simultaneously a 'technopractitioner' and 'transcendentally real self'. Practical spirituality embodies immanent transcendence as, for example, in music[5] or in the experience of transcendence in our various moments of everyday life—love, meditations, scientific engagements and other activities of life and in society (cf. Bhaskar, 2002).

Practical spirituality emphasizes experience and realization—self, God and world—in and through practice but at the same time nurtures the humility not to reduce these only to practice. In its emphasis upon experience and realization, practical spirituality has close kinship with the spirit of science which embodies, in the words of Albert Einstein, a holy spirit of inquiry. In its emphasis upon practice, practical spirituality stresses that without taking part in practice we cannot realize truth—religious or otherwise. Practical spirituality involves manifold experiments with Truth as well as truths where truth is not a thing but a landscape of meaning, experience and co-realization.

Practical spirituality also emphasizes on transformative practice which leads to self-transformation, cultural transformation and world transformation. For example, poverty, inequality and oppression have been challenges with humanity for long and here practical spirituality has generated varieties of transformative movements in its struggle against oppression and domination. There are movements of practical spirituality from different religions of the world

as well as from traditions of emancipatory struggles such as revolt against slavery, workers' movements, women's movements, ecological movements and varieties of other transformative struggles in discourse, society and history. Liberation theology in Islam, Buddhism and Christianity is a recent example of practical spirituality.[6] In Indian traditions, practical spirituality has manifested itself in the Upanishads, the vision and practice of seekers such as Buddha, Bhakti movements, Swami Vivekananda's vision of practical Vedanta, Sri Aurobindo's strivings for *Life Divine* and Gandhi's experiments with Truth and struggles for liberation.[7] Movements such as Bhakti movements have involved struggles against caste and gender domination with new songs of self and social liberation. They have also embodied efforts to go beyond the denominational concepts of truth and religion. They have involved not only struggles for justice but also embodied border-crossing dialogues. We see this, for example, in the Sant tradition of India which, like Sufism and Sikhism, is a product of transformative dialogue between Hinduism and Islam (Das, 1982; Uberoi, 1996). Thus, practical spirituality involves both struggles for dignity as well as new initiatives in transformative dialogues across borders.

PATHWAYS OF PRACTICAL SPIRITUALITY

In fact, practical spirituality involves both practical struggles for a better world as well as practical discourses for spiritual realization going beyond denominational fixation—not only in terms of boundaries among religions but also in terms of boundaries between science and religion, material and spiritual.[8] Practicial spirituality urges us to realize that it is through undertaking concrete activities to ameliorate suffering that we can realize God. From the Christian tradition, theologian Johannes B. Metz (1981) urges us to realize that the Christian goal of unity of faith or what is called ecumenicism cannot be solved at the level of doctrines alone. It can only be solved by undertaking concrete activities in addressing practical problems of life and society with the 'Son of Man'.

Habitat for Humanity is a movement from within contemporary Christianity which tries to worship God by building houses with and for people. It is built on the foundations of 'Economics of Jesus' and 'Theology of the Hammer' (Giri, 2002). We see a similar

emphasis upon devotional labour and sharing in Swadhyaya, a socio-spiritual movement in contemporary India which can be looked at as an instance of practical spiritually from within contemporary Hinduism (Giri, 2006a). Both Habitat and Swadhyaya, despite their limitations to always hold up their own ideals, urge us to be more dialogical as compared to their fundamentalist counterparts in Christianity and Hinduism. But the dialogical dimension of practical spirituality is multi-dimensional: it embodies not only dialogue between religions but also between religion and science, and also between the material and the transcendental. Swami Vivekananda has captured a bit of this sensibility in his vision of practical vedanta which has both a dimension of struggle for justice as well as hints towards dialogue.[9] Practical spirituality, for Swami Vivekananda (1991: 354), urges us to realize that 'the highest idea of morality and unselfishness goes hand in hand with the highest idea of metaphysical conception'. This highest conception pertains to the realization that man himself is God: 'You are that Impersonal Being: that God for whom you have been searching all over the time is yourself—yourself not in the personal sense but in the impersonal' (Vivekananda, 1991: 332). The task of practical spirituality begins with this realization but does not end there: its objective is to transform the world. The same Swami Vivekananda thus challenges: 'The watchword of all well-being of all moral good is not "I" but "thou". Who cares whether there is a heaven or a hell, who cares if there is an unchangeable or not? Here is the world and it is full of misery. Go out into it as Buddha did, and struggle to lessen it or die in the attempt' (Vivekananda, 1991: 353). What practical spirituality stresses is that the knowledge that one is Divine, one is part of a Universal Being, facilitates this mode of relationship with the world. This knowledge is, however, not for the acquisition of power over the other; rather, it is to worship her as God. In the words of Vivekananda: 'Human knowledge is not antagonistic to human well-being. On the contrary, it is knowledge alone that will save us in every department of life, in knowledge as worship' (Vivekananda, 1991: 353).

Practical spirituality emphasizes upon continued practice, not only on euphoric movement of realization, enthusiasm and miraculous experience. As Robert Wuthnow tells us, drawing on his work with the spiritual quest of the artists: 'Many artists speak of their work as a form of meditation. For some the sheer rhythm of the daily routine brings them closer to the essence of their being. Writing all morning or practicing for the next musical performance requires mental and emotional toughness [...] For spiritual dabbers the insight that these artists provide is that persistence and hard work may still be the best way to attain spiritual growth' (Wuthnow, 2001: 10).

Practical spirituality accepts the brokenness of the world and does not want to assert any totalizing unity or totalitarian absorption.[10] At the same time, practical spirituality is a striving for wholeness in the midst of our inescapable brokenness and fragmentation of this world. This wholeness is emergent as it is manifested in the work of artists. Artists strive to paint landscapes of emergent wholeness in the midst of fragmentation and brokenness. Artists incorporate 'artists experimental approach into one's spiritual quest' (Wuthnow 2001: 276).

An artist is a bricoleur creating beauty and images of emergent coherence out of many fragments. 'The creative scientist is also a bricoleur' (Bhaskar, 2002: 394). There is artistic dimension to scientific quest as there is to spiritual quest. Inspiration of art in creative spirituality creates transformative bridges between science and spirituality.

Practical spirituality involves a transformation in the conceptualization and realization of God. It submits that in order to be spiritual one need not believe in God nor be religious.[11] But for the believers God in practical spirituality is not only in heaven but here on earth; she[12] is a presence in our heart and in everything we see. In fact, Swami Vivekananda speaks about a practical God: 'Where is there a more practical God than He whom I see before me—A God omnipresent in every being, more real than our senses?' (Vivekananda, 1991: 305). In this context, Bhaskar's following proposals about God in his *From Science to Emancipation* deserves our careful consideration:

(i) Ontological realism about God, a belief in the reality or experience of God, is quite consistent with epistemological relativism;

(ii) Ontological immanence, that is the view that God is immanent within a being, is consistent with episteme transcendence either in the sense of being unknown—God could be real even if we do not know it—or in the sense of being knowable in a way which is susceptible to the normal canons of our discursive intellect:

(iii) [Ontological ingredience] if God is truly a kind of envelope which sustains and binds everything, then God in a certain way must be an ingredient within us;

(iv) The proof of God's existence can only be experimental and practical. No one can prove to you that God exists. This can only come from your experience and practice;

(v) [In this context man's role is to increase the presence of the Divine in one's life, society and cosmos—I am here paraphrasing the subsequent thoughts of Bhaskar on this] (Bhaskar, 2002: 35).

The above proposals help us rethink God and realize her in a new way. God, in practical spirituality, is not only a moral God, omnipotent, God with capital G. God here is God with small g.[13] God in practical spirituality is also not anthropocentric.[14]

Practical spirituality involves a transformation of our conceptions of sin and evil. In practical spirituality, evil is not the absence or the abandoned house of the divine but a lesser manifestation of it. We find such a foundational rethinking of sin and evil in many different religious, spiritual and philosophical movements of the world. For Swami Vivekananda: 'Sins are very low degrees of self-manifestation (Vivekananda, 1991: 300). For him, 'Vedanta recognizes no sin, it only recognizes error and the greatest error says that the Vedanta is to say that you are weak, that you are a sinner' (ibid). From a Christian perspective, Giani Vattimo (1999) redefines sin as failure in love. For Vattimo, we have all sinned not because we have fallen in love but have failed in love. Love is not a conditional exchange but unconditional and from this point of view, we all can always be more unconditional in our loves, overcoming our integral original sin of not being quite up to mark in our practices of love. God is unconditional love.[15] From the point of view of unconditional love, we fail in on our lives of love as realization of

unconditional love is always a journey. Given our human limitations, no matter what we do, our love is always in need of much more intimate non-dual realization and this becomes our condition of the original sin. Thus, our task is to overcome this through more love and grace and continue our strivings with gratitude and not simply for fear of punishment from a God conceived as a moral law commanding us not to do evil.[16] Similarly, from the shores of contemporary critical philosophy, Georgio Agamben (1993) redefines evil as deficit of human existence and anything that blocks the realization of a fuller potential, including the potential of fuller God-realization and world-realization as evil.[17] Here, Bhaskar (2002) also speaks about structural sin and ill-being referring to such fields as contemporary capitalism which leads to exploitation and blocks universal self-realization.

Both Swami Vivekananda and Roy Bhaskar urge us to go beyond a facile dualism of good and evil. According to Swami Vivekananda: 'The real genesis of evil is unselfishness [...] A man who murders another is, perhaps, moved to do so by the love of his own child. His love has become limited to that one little baby to the exclusion of millions of other human beings in the universe. Yet, limited or unlimited, it is the same love' (Vivekananda, 1991: 354). Roy Bhaskar also writes: 'Once we begin to access our higher selves, we can begin to see that really the problem is not so much of evil. [...] For there is also, at least, philosophically a problem of good [...] love, goodness, nobility, courage those are displayed everywhere in the perpetuation of social ills' (Bhaskar, 2002: 46).

NON-DUAL REALIZATIONS AND PRACTICAL SPIRITUALITY: TRANSFORMATIONAL CHALLENGES BEFORE SCIENCE AND RELIGION

The interrogation and transformation of the dualism of good and evil in practical spirituality, accompanied by a transformational conception of God, points to non-dual realization as an important challenge in human life—science, religion as well as spirituality. In fact, transcendence in science and spirituality involves critique of available dualism such as the sacred and profane, subject and object. The dualism between subject and object has been at the cornerstone of modern science but recent developments in

science such as quantum physics and system theory of pioneers such as Humberto Maturana challenge us to understand the limitation of a spectational perspective in science and the dualism of subject and object. 'In the words of a biologist, if you want to really understand about a tumor you have got to be a tumor' (Knor-Cetina, 2001: 520).

The dualism between subject and object in modern science finds a parallel in the dualism between ontology and epistemology. Modern science, as a part of the agenda of modernity, has been primarily epistemic and procedural and has neglected the ontological issues of nature of self and quality of self-involvement practices of knowing. Moreover, there is a profound revolution in varieties of scientific engagements now—from biology to anthropology to philosophy of science—where 'to know is not only to know of' but 'knowing with' (Sundara Rajan, 1998). Knowing with involves both subject and object, epistemology and ontology, embodying what may be called an ontological epistemology of participation (cf. Giri, 2005). This embodies transformations in epistemology such as virtue epistemology which points to the quality of the knowing subject and in ontology—practical ontology—which moves from a preoccupation with fixed and essentialized subject to practical labour of love and learning. It also involves 'weak ontology' characterized by humility (cf. Dallmayr, 1991; Vattimo, 1999).

Ontological epistemology of participation embodies a multi-valued logic in place of the dualistic logic of modern science. As J.N. Mohanty (2000) aruges: 'In multi-valued logic, every point of view is partly true, partly false and partly undecidable'. This helps one not to be trapped in closure and be in engaged in science and spirituality as a continued journey. Multi-valued logic draws inspiration from multiple traditions of science, philosophy and spirituality such as the Jaina tradition of *Anekantavada* (many paths to truth), Gandhian experiment with truth and non-violence and Husserl's phenomenology of overlapping contents. Multi-valued logic builds on non-injury in our modes of thinking and non-violence in our modes of relationships. Multi-valued logic, as an integral part of an ontological epistemology of participation, is also an aspect of the transformational dimensions of science and spirituality.

Non-duality is an important part of ontological epistemology of participation in science and spirituality. Yoga helps us in overcoming our dualism and realize non-duality. As David Loy writes: 'We may see the three traditional yogas as types of spiritual practice that work to transform different dualistic modes of experience onto their respective non-dual mode. Jnana yoga transforms or "purifies" the dualistic intellect, karma yoga the dualistic physical body and bhakti yoga dualistic emotions' (Loy 1988: 27).[18]

The multi-valued logic of practical spirituality transforms not only sciences but also religions: it helps sciences not to be dismissive about what it does not know and religions to be more exploratory, experimental and less assertive. It urges religions to be more dialogical—to recognize and know more about each other, and also mutually intererrogate each other with a smile.

PRACTICAL SPIRITUALITY, PRACTICAL DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS

Practical spirituality has implications for various domains and discourse of our lives such as secularism and democracy. It offers a new realization of secularism which embodies spiritual cultivation for mutual tolerance, learning and criticism going beyond the confrontation between science and religion which has characterized the first stage of modernistic secularism (Annaim, 1995; Giri, 2005b). The dialogical dimension of practical spirituality is a helpful companion in reliving secularism in our turbulent world.

Practical spirituality also involves a radical reformulation of the logic of power and transformation of democracy. In their struggles for justice and dignity, movements of practical spirituality confront and interrogate power. But they are not just preoccupied with capturing power as an instrument of domination but to have power as a covenant to realize the common good, as Hannah Arendt would put it (cf. Cohen & Arato, 1995). These movements do not embody the logic of soveregnity of self and state in modernity which has an inherent propensity to mastery; rather, they embody the aspiration and struggle for what Dallmayr (2005), reflecting on the struggle of Jesus, calls 'sacred non-soveregnity'. While logic of sovereignty, including the so-called democratic sovereignty in modernity has a propensity to make us bare (cf. Agamben, 1995) and

denude us of our dignity and mutuality, practical spirituality as a struggle for 'sacred non-soveregnity' embodies a new ethics, ethics and politics of servanthood in place of the politics of mastery.[19]

Practical spirituality as a struggle for dignity embodies a multi-dimensional partnership between God and man. This struggle challenges us to widen and deepen our vision and practice of democracy; democracy not only as a political mechanism but also as a spiritual struggle. Democracy as public participation and public reasoning in the public sphere needs to be supplemented with practices of self-cultivation and cultivation of generosity of being going beyond the dualism of private and public. As Ramashroy Roy challenges us in his *Beyond Ego's Domain*:

> '[Public order is threatened by the split between] man's concern for his own good and that for the good of others. But can this threat to the public order be mitigated, if not completely eliminated, by the installation of the Polis? [...] For Aristotle, transcendence of self-interest is consequent upon participation in public affairs [but] the shortcomings associated with personal character cannot be expected to be rectified by the public realm, if it lacks necessary support from individuals reborn as citizens. To be reborn as a person who, rising above his self-interest, becomes attentive to and actively seeks to pursue collective good is, then, to willingly accept a life dedicated to the cultivation of *dharma*' (Roy, 1999: 5).

Democracy as public reasoning and deliberation embodying what Habermas (1990) calls practical discourse where actors are engaged in moral argumentation about the nature of self and society is crucial for transforming spiritual traditions of India which, in their structural organizations, have been mostly authoritarian. While there has to be a transformative dialogue between practical discourse and practical spirituality, it must be emphasized that practical discourse in Habermas does not bow down before authority in a slavish manner and discovers moral insights from deliberation among participants. Such a public deliberation and democratic decision-making seems to be missing in varieties of socio-spiritual mobilizations of India and here democratic paricipation for value formation can be helpful (cf. Dreze and Sen, 2002).

Swadhyaya, a socio-spiritual movement in contemporary India, is now riven by a power struggle involving crucial issues of sole control of resources and doctrinal authority. After the passing away of its founder, the control of the organization fell on his daughter, and this succession was not very different from the entrenched culture of dynastic succession in Indian religion and politics. The integral education movement in Orissa embodies aspirations of a practical spirituality as it works with children, parents and society for a more joyful and integral learning, drawing inspiration from Sri Aurobindo and the Mother. But it also faces the challenge of generating spaces of public deliberation where people in management with power and money can sit together with the teachers who join this movement out of devotion but are mostly without adequate resources (cf. Das, 2001; Giri, 2004).

Along with transforming secularism, democracy and authoritarianism, practical spirituality also draws our attention to the spiritual significance of food, and makes us realize the link between food and freedom (cf. Sen, 1999). It draws inspiration from texts such as *Taittereya Upanishad* where it is written, *Annam Brahmeti Vijanama*—know food as *Brahma*. But what is the quality of food available in varieties of so-called spiritual places in our world? Outside the dining hall of Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, I once read a pamphlet. 'Oh children of the Divine, wake up! See the quality of food that is given to you.' Practical spirituality challenges us to understand the link between food and freedom and realize the violation of the human and the divine when there is inadequate nourishment for us. It also challenges us to realize the significance of a body and realize that the aesthetics of spirituality is not confined to places of worship only but also touches our bathrooms, overcoming the dualism between the temple and the toilet. In my field work with Swadhyaya, I found that while in Swadhyaya orchards there is a separate special room for the leader which is rarely used, the common bathrooms used by 'devotee workers' is mostly dirty without even cleaning soaps. This is a problem not only in the rural projects such as *Brukhamandir* (tree temple) but also in Swadhyaya-run schools, as a senior Swadhyayee once told me in a conversation.

In his recent reflections on religion, Jacques Derrida (1998) tells us that one who claims authority in the name of religion speaks Latin today. Those of us who valorize spirituality also need to ask ourselves whether we are claiming authority in the name of spiri-

tuality. We need not close our eyes to the fact that there is a problem of entrenched authoritarianism in spirituality as well, and practical spirituality has to transform this authoritarianism by taking part simultaneously in political, moral and spiritual struggle in a new poetics and politics of transformation. *Bhakti* movements in medieval India were bound by a feudal order but practical spirituality now calls for a new *Bhakti* movement which embodies both democratic participation and a multi-dimensional generosity of being.

This multi-dimensional struggle for transformation—food and freedom, universal self-realization, transformation of existing institutions and creation of new institutions—calls for embodiment of values such as voluntary poverty and voluntary optimism (cf. Das, 2005). Voluntary poverty is an important calling of both science and spirituality. Developments in science and spirituality have been facilitated by those who have chosen to remain poor, enjoying the creative beauty of simplicity, unencumbered by many outward temptations of money and power, and resisted the pressure for conformity by the priests, merchants and the kings. Similarly, voluntary optimism is an important aspect of both science and spirituality which points to the aspiration and the fact that despite all obstacles, we are not going to give up on our persistent efforts and struggles to learn, to be, to grow and create a more beautiful and dignified world for us all.[20] But this hope does not fall from the sky; it emerges from varieties of our experiments in and struggles for love and learning we engage ourselves in science and spirituality.[21]

NOTES

1. Revised version of a paper first presented at the International Seminar, 'Science and Religion in Modern India', New Delhi, January 2006.
2. Considering that our dialogue here is simultaneously with science and religion, it is helpful to note that modern science has not only its metaphysical presuppositions but it also has its superstitions. As Swami Vivekananda (1991: 28) tells us: 'For practical purposes let us talk in the language of modern science. But I must ask you to bear in mind that as there is religious superstition so also there is a superstition in the matter of science.' Tolstoy also writes in another context: 'These new justifications are termed scientific. But by the term "scientific" is understood just what was formerly understood by the term "religious": just as formerly everything called "religious" was held to be unquestionable simply because it was called religious, so now all that is called "scientific" is held to be unquestionable' (1997: 23).
3. This is how James Faubion (1995) characterizes the notion of subject in contemporary European social theory. For a critical discussion see Giri (2005a).
4. For an outline of such a notion of practice in the field of development please see Quarles von Ufford and Giri (2003) and Giri and Quarles von Ufford (2004).
5. Consider here the following lines of Luc Ferry: '[...] When I hear a musical passage, it does not reduce to a series of related notes with no connection between them (actual immanence). On the contrary, it contributes—in an immanent way, apart from any rational operation—a certain structure that transcends this actual immanence, without being imposed on me from the outside like an argument from authority. This "immanent transcendence" contains within itself, par excellence, the ultimate significance of lived experiences' (Ferry, 2002: 26).
6. Liberation theology from Latin America is more widely known but less known are movements of liberation theology in Islam and social engagement in Buddhism. Helpful here are the works of Farid Esack (1997), Abdullahi An-Naim (1995), Fred Dallmayr (2001) and Sulak Sivaraksha (2006).
7. This is not an exhaustive list but only a pointer.
8. As E.H. Cousins (1985: 7) tells us in his *Global Spirituality*: 'People of faith now rediscover the material dimensions of existence and their spiritual significance'.
9. Though the dialogical dimension in Vivekananda's practical vedanta seems to be imprisoned in fundamentalist interpretation of his work, who would like to see his work only from a Hindu point of view?
10. Even Swami Vivekananda (1991: 382) writes in his *Practical Vedanta*: 'Pefect balance would be our destruction. Suppose the amount of heat in this room, the tendency of which is towards equal and perfect diffusion, gets that kind of diffusion, then for all practical purposes that heat will cease to be. What makes motion possible in this universe? Lost balance [...] It is this difference, this differentation, this losing of the balance between us, which is the very soul of our progress, the soul of all our thought.' This has a profound implication for many domains of our lives including thinking about the relationship between God and Man. This helps us to acknowledge the significance of disjunction and antimonies in our life in general and spiritual quest in particular. From a different point of view sociologist Robert Bellah also helps us understand this in his *Beyond Belief*: 'For me the search for wholeness from

then on had to be made without totalism. A critical stance towards every society, ideology and religion was henceforth essential' (Bellah, 1970: xx).

11. Here let us not forget Buddhism which is silent about God and many atheists who do not believe in God.
12. In their work on critical realism and transcendence, Archer et al. (2004) prefer to use He is talking about God. The use of she here is an invitation and it draws inspiration from traditions such as India's where God is thought of as *Brahma* which is neutral gender.
13. Sulak Sivaraksha speaks about Buddhism with a small 'b': 'There is a need to practice Buddhism with a small 'b' (Engaged Buddhism). This means concentrating on the meaning of the Buddha's teaching (*nibbana* or freedom) and being less concerned with myth, culture and ceremony' (Sivaraksha, 2006: 1). Dallmayr (2005) urges us to understand the political and spiritual significance of moving from the big God and inviting 'small' to our lives.
14. For Swami Vivekananda, 'A God who is partial to his children called men, and cruel to his children called brute beasts, is worse than a demon' (Vivekananda, 1991: 297).
15. Swami Vivekananda writes about it poetically: '[...] where the husband kisses the wife, He is there in the kiss; when the mother kisses the child, He is there in the kiss; where friends clasp hands, the Lord is present as the God of Love. When a great man loves and wishes to help mankind, He is there giving freely His bounty out of His love to mankind' (Vivekananda, 1991: 394). For Tolstoy: '[...] but one thing only is needful; the knowledge of the simple and clear truth which finds place in every soul that is not stupefied by religious and scientific superstitions—the truth that for our life one law is valid—the law of love, which brings the highest happiness to every individual as well as to all mankind' (1997: 29). And Bhaskar (2002: 134) writes: 'The ultimate is not freedom. The desideratum is freedom, the ultimate is unconditional love.'
16. Creative theologian I.U. Dalferth (2006: 18-19) also helps us with a new hermeneutics of evil:

    The problem is rather to construe God's will as law, and God's law in moral terms as a set of divine commandments as to what humans ought or ought not to do. The result is a misleading *moral sense* of evil: If evil is that which is contrary to God's will, God's will as identified with God's law, God's law reduced to moral instructions of what humans ought or ought not to do, then doing evil is equated with trespassing God's commandments and evil is *everything that God prohibits us to do*. But this is a misleading way of stating the point of the Torah, the gospel, and arguably also the Koran. They are not a set of divine prescriptions, commandments and prohibitions which humans must obey in order not to do evil. At least in the case of the Torah and the gospel, they are better understood in terms of God's gift of a blueprint of a good and just human life in community with God and one another, the presentation of what God has done for his people and all humankind, and the unfolding or unpacking of its implications for human life at its best—as it could and should and ought to be. They outline a way of life that responds in gratitude to the goods received from God rather than to a set of arbitrary divine commandments and prohibitions that are to be obeyed on pain of punishment.

17. In the words of Agamben (1993: 44):

    'The recognition of evil is older and more original than any blameworthy act; it rests solely on the fact that being and having to be only its possibility or potentiality, humankind fails itself in a certain sense and has to appropriate this failing—it has to *exist* as *potentiality*. [The only ethical experience is] the experience of being (one's own potentiality). The only evil consists, instead, in the decision to remain in a deficit of existence, to appropriate the power to not-be as a substance and a foundation beyond existence; or rather (and this is the destiny of morality), to regard potentiality itself, which is the most proper mode of human existence as a fault that must always be repressed.'
18. Bocchi and Ceruti also help us understand the significance of non-duality in our spiritual quest: 'The dialogical and dynergic cosmology symbolized by the union of Shiva and Shakti and maifested in yoga has given rise to many philosophical systems of the two great spiritual traditions of classical India: Hinduism and Buddhism. Beyond all their differences and disagreements, they express a principle of "duality within the non-duality". The ultimate reality of the universe, the "noumenon", is defined precisely as "non-dual": *a-dvaita* (a Hindu term) or *a-dvaya* (a Buddhist term), (Bocchi and Ceruti, 2002: 47).
19. In our forthcoming edited book, *The Modern Prince and Modern Sage: Transforming Power and Freedom*, I and several of our co-collaborators are exploring this (Giri, 2006b).
20. As Sri Aurobindo (1950) urges us to sing in his *Savitri*:

    A lonely freedom cannot satisfy
    A heart that has grown one with every other heart
    I am a deputy of the aspiring world
    My spirit's liberty I ask for all

21. It is helpful here to remember the lines from a novelist and a theologian. Imre Kertestz (2002: 12) writes in his *Kaddish for a Child Not Born*: 'Yes, my existence in the context of your potentiality [...] Now I no longer have doubts—it is in the clouds where I make my bed. And this question—my life in the context of the potentiality of your existence—proved to be a good guide.' And for the theologian I.U. Dalferth: 'In religious and in particular Christian contexts "hope" has a strong meaning. It is not merely a wish but a way of "seeing" the future, and one's role in it, in a particular light' (2006: 15).

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Was Goldman (1979)[1] an Internalist?

ABSTRACT

Goldman is generally regarded as an externalist. Sandhya Basu, however, in her book *Justification: Concepts and Theories,*[2] has interpreted his position as a form of internalism, which she calls 'Ground Internalism'.[3] I concede that Goldman's position in this article has several internalist elements in it, which can lead to such a characterization. An externalist reading, however, seems to be more in tune with his general position. In this discussion note I will argue that Goldman was developing an externalist theory of justification in spite of its seeming semblance with the internalist theories of justification.

Let us begin with an analysis of the contexts in which Basu claims to have found internalist elements in Goldman's theory. For her, internalism holds that 'justification of a belief consists in something that is internal to the subject from an epistemic point of view'.[4] Following K. Kim,[5] she further points out that not everything that is internal to the cognizer in some sense is to be regarded as internal from the epistemic point of view. The neuro-physiological processes are excluded. X is internal to the cognitive agent, S, in the relevant sense 'if and only if X is something that happens within the cognitive system of S'.[6] And a 'cognitive system of S at *t*' is defined as 'a system of the acts and processes of cognition (thought-related) that happen to S at *t*'.[7] What are the states that happen within the cognitive system of the agent? Basu initially mentions three types of states as candidates for being justification-conferring internal states, viz., beliefs, sensory impressions and thoughts. Later on, however, she seems to have reduced it to one. As she writes, 'nothing short of a belief can justify another belief'.[8] Let us see whether this characterization of internalism and justification-conferring procedures will suit Goldman. I think, Goldman would concede that the theories, which maintain that justification-conferring factors were internal to the cognizer *from the epistemic point of view in the relevant sense,* are internalist theories. Goldman (1979) writes about his causal reliabilism, which he also calls 'an *historical or genetic*'[9] theory:

> Clearly, the causal ancestry of beliefs often includes events outside the organism. Are such events to be included among the 'inputs' of belief-forming processes? Or should we restrict the extent of belief-forming processes to 'cognitive' events, i.e., events within the organism's nervous system? I shall choose the later course, though with some hesitation.... Justifiedness seems to be a function of how a cognizer deals with his environmental input, i.e., with the goodness or badness of the operations that register and transform the stimulations that reaches him. ('Deal with'

> of course, does not mean *purposeful* action; nor is it restricted to *conscious* activity.) A justified belief is, roughly speaking, one that results from cognitive operations that are, generally speaking, good or successful. But *cognitive* operations are most plausibly construed as operations of the cognitive faculties, i.e. 'information-processing' equipment *internal* to the organism.[10]

Goldman (1979) thus concedes that the belief-forming processes that contribute to the justification of the beliefs formed by them are *internal* to the organism. This is one of the places where Basu seems to have found internalist elements in Goldman (1979)'s thesis. It should, however, be noted that Goldman (1979)'s 'belief-forming processes' and Basu's 'cognitive system' are quite different, though they are internal to the cognizers in their respective senses. In Goldman's system, belief-forming processes play a crucial role in conferring justification produced by them. He further restricts the extent of belief-forming processes to the *cognitive* events[11] internal to the organism. According to Basu's characterization, internalism is the thesis that confines the factors that confer justification to a belief to ones cognitive system. In spite of this similarity of Goldman (1979) with Basu's brand of internalism (at least the type of internalism she is advocating here), there are crucial differences. As we have already mentioned, Basu seems to have confined the factors that confer justification to one's belief to other doxastic states. I think, Goldman (1979) would hardly agree with this. For him, the '*cognitive* operations are...operations of the cognitive faculties, i.e., 'information-processing' equipments *internal* to the organism'.[12] It is noticeable that Goldman says that the information-processing equipments are *internal* to the organism vis-à-vis the cognizer. This is so because they are often 'events within the organism's nervous system'.[13] It becomes evident when we consider the type of processes that he counts as justification-conferring belief-forming processes. Four types of processes are enumerated as justification-conferring belief-forming processes, viz., reasoning processes, functional procedures, memory processes, and perceptual processes.[14] In case of the first and the third, the belief states of the cognizer may be regarded as the only input. In case of the second, apart from the belief states 'desires, hopes, or emotional states of various sorts'[15] are included. In case of perceptual processes, however, the inputs include those 'within or on the surface of the organism, e.g., receptor stimulations'.[16] Arguably, Goldman includes in the list of inputs not only the psychological states of the cognizer, but also the physiological states like stimulation, nerve-impulse transmission, etc. These are the things, which are clearly not to be characterized as 'internal' in Basu's sense or in any other *epistemologically relevant* sense; and it seems to be that Basu would concede the same.[17]

The type of internalism Basu ascribes to Goldman (1979) seems to go very close to what Goldman calls after Nozick *current-time-slice* theory, according to which the justificational status of a belief is a function of the present internal states of the cognizer. On the contrary, Goldman's *historical reliabilism* makes the justificatory status of a cognizer's belief the function of the personal cognitive history of the cognizer.

Basu further points out another important feature[18] of internalism. A theory of justification is internalist if and only if it holds that the justification-conferring internal factor is 'graspable by introspection' by the cognizer; and a theory is external if and only if it is not, thus, introspectible. Goldman (1979) calls this 'privileged access'.[19] Perhaps Basu takes it as the criterion for a theory's being characterized as internal. As she writes, 'Facts of the world are external to the epistemic subject because they are not introspectible by him'.[20] This shows that if a theory advocates absence of 'introspectibility' or 'privileged access', then it is externalism. Since Goldman (1979) confines the extent of belief-forming processes that contribute to justifying the beliefs formed by them to internal cognitive events, it might have appeared to Basu as internally accessible to the cognizer. Goldman, however, rejects this possibility as he writes, 'There are many facts about a cognizer to which he lacks 'privileged access', and I regard the justificational status of his belief as one of those things'.[21] What instigates Basu to think that the cognizer has privileged access to the justification conferring factors of her beliefs? Basu quotes a long passage from Goldman to establish her point:

> What we really want is an explanation of why we count, or would count, certain beliefs as justified and others as unjustified. Such an explanation must refer to our beliefs about reliability, not to the actual facts. The

> reason we count beliefs as justified is that they are formed by what we believe to be reliable belief-forming processes. Our beliefs about which belief-forming processes are reliable may be erroneous, but that does not affect the adequacy of the explanation. Since we believe that wishful thinking is an unreliable belief-forming process, we regard beliefs formed by wishful thinking as unjustified. What matters, then, is what we believe about wishful thinking, not what is true (in the long run) about wishful thinking.[22]

Perhaps the following definition given by Goldman (1979), which he ultimately accepts with some modification,[23] can also give the cue.

> If S's belief in *p* at *t* is caused by a reliable cognitive process, and S believes at *t* that his *p*-belief is so caused, and this meta-belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process, then S's belief in *p* at *t* is justified.[24]

It seems to be that in this context, Goldman (1979) accepts privileged access. Here he speaks about two levels of cognitive processes. The second level or the meta-level process has access to the first level process and it is required for a belief to be justified that the processes through which the belief is formed must be *believed* to be reliable. Basu writes,

> Justification-conferring processes, on Goldman's view, are cognitively accessible and thus internal. But Goldman is an internalist also in the stronger sense that processes *believed* by us to be reliable, no matter whether they are actually reliable or not, are the processes that contribute to justification.[25]

I think this explanation involves a number of level confusions. The important point is that the first-level cognitive process alone cannot confer justification upon the belief produced by it. Goldman (1979) repeatedly mentions this when he says that justifiedness of a belief is not just a function of the *terminal phase reliabilism*; 'it is not enough that the final phase of the process that leads to his belief in *p* be sound. It is also necessary that some entire history of the process be sound (i.e. reliable or conditionally reliable).'[26] So, even if the final phase of the process were internally accessible, it would not amount to internalism. For, justification is a function of the entire history of the genesis of a belief, and the entire history of the formation of a belief is not necessarily accessible to the cognizer, according to

Goldman (1979). He writes, 'There are many facts about a cognizer to which he lacks 'privileged assess', and I regard the justificational status of his beliefs as one of those things.'[27]

Secondly, Goldman (1979) provided us with two levels of explanation. First he gave a 'conceptual analysis' of the concept of epistemic justification as it is understood, according to him, in its ordinary employment. Then, by raising the 'wishful thinking' objection, he goes on to explaining why we count certain beliefs as justified and others as unjustified. We should not confuse between these two levels. Which animal is a zebra? One may say that a horse-like animal with white stripes on black is a zebra. This can serve as a quite good definition/criterion of zebra for all commonsense purposes. But if one asks such questions as when does one identify an animal as zebra? The answer would in this case refer to beliefs. One typical answer would be that if the person *believes* that the animal is horse-like and that it has white stripes on black then she would identify the animal as a zebra. This is the level of identification. The former was the level of definition/criterion. It is quite misleading to confuse the two by saying that something is a zebra if someone *believes* it to have white stripes on black. A person who commits this mistake may be said to have committed a *level confusion.* There is no bar for a realist about the colour of a zebra to hold that an animal is a zebra only if it has white stripes on black, and, at the same time, that one *identifies* something as a zebra only if she believes it to have, among other things, white stripes on black. Goldman (1979) seems to have made such a distinction between the level of conceptual analysis and the application of the concept. We can ask two questions about justifiedness of a belief:

(a) What is justified belief?
and
(b) When do we consider a belief to be justified?

Goldman's (1979) answer to the first question seems to be that a belief having a reliable causal ancestry is a justified belief. And his answer to the second question is that we consider a belief to be justified if we *believe* it to have a reliable causal ancestry. On this interpretation Goldman's (1979) position is not internalism. For, on this interpretation, he does not maintain that for a belief to be

justified the justification-conferring factors must be internally accessible to the cognizer, though for the *ascription of justification*, they must be known or reliably believed to be so by the cognizer.

At places Goldman's position seems to be neutral about the internalism/externalism debate. Among the initial remarks made by Goldman on the nature of the theory of epistemic justification is the following:

> I leave it an open question whether, when a belief *is* justified, the believer *knows* it is justified. I also leave it an open question whether, when a belief is justified, the believer can *state* or *give* a Justification for it.[28]

Here we may recall our characterization of internalism and externalism about epistemic justification. The internalist typically maintains that the conditions that provide justification to our beliefs *must be known*, or, at least, *internally accessible* to the believer such that if and whenever she wants, she can be aware of them. The externalist, on the other hand, denies this. For her, the conditions that confer justification to one's belief may be inaccessible to the believer. So, the above question may be interpreted as a neutral position between internalism and externalism. Clearly, it is not internalism, yet, at the same time, it appears not to be an externalist position either. For, instead of settling the issue in favour of externalism, it leaves it as 'an open question'.

We shall, however, see that the passage can also be interpreted in another way, in accordance with the externalist approach. It may be urged that Goldman makes this comment not to say that he leaves it an open question whether the justificatory status of beliefs is always internally accessible or not; to this his answer is a categorical 'no'. What he means is that he leaves it an open question whether on a particular occasion the justificatory status of a cognizer's belief is *known*, or, at least, *internally accessible* to her. An externalist can admit from within the purview of her theory accessibility of the justificatory status on a particular occasion. What she must deny is that it is *necessarily* the case, that is, one must have this privileged access or knowledge in order to have a justified belief. Goldman writes,

> Current time-slice theories characteristically assume that the justificational status of a belief is something which the cognizer is able to know or determine at the time of belief.... The historical theory I endorse makes no such assumption. There are many facts about the cognizer to which he lacks 'privileged access', and I regard the justificational status of his beliefs as one of those things. This is not to say that a cognizer is necessarily ignorant, at any given moment, of the justificational status of his current beliefs. It is only to deny that he necessarily has, or can get, knowledge or true belief about this status. Just as a person can know without knowing that he knows, so he can have justified belief without knowing that it is justified (or believing justifiably that it is justified).[29]

We have seen in this paper that in spite of the seeming support that the internalist interpretation of Goldman (1979) has in its favour, it involves a level confusion and also that an externalist interpretation can combine the different strands of his thought more coherently. Afraid of making things more complicated, I have not referred to any other writing of Goldman. Another reason why I have not discussed his other writings is that Basu also does not maintain that he advocated internalism in his other writings. The externalist interpretation is, I think, in tune with his overall position.[30]

Notes and References

1. Goldman, A., 'What is Justified Belief?' in George Pappas edited *Justification and Knowledge* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979) reprinted in Linda Alcoff edited *Big Questions: Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). In the following endnotes all references to this article are according to this later edition.
2. Basu, S., *Justification: Concepts and Theories* (Kolkata: Progressive Publishers, 2003).
3. Ibid., p. 156.
4. Ibid., p. 154.
5. Kim K., 'Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1993.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 156
9. Goldman, A., 1979, p. 101.
10. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
11. Ibid., p. 99.
12. Ibid., p. 100.

13. Ibid., p. 99.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 155.
18. I think this is the most important feature of internalism. However, that is not very important in the present context. What is important is that Basu also accepts it as an important feature, perhaps, one of the defining features.
19. Ibid., p. 101.
20. Ibid., p. 155.
21. Ibid., p. 101.
22. Ibid., p. 104.
23. For simplicity's sake I didn't mention the modified versions of this definition. This, I think, would not affect our present discussion.
24. Ibid., p. 105.
25. Ibid., p. 159.
26. Ibid., p. 102.
27. Ibid., p. 101.
28. Ibid., p. 91.
29. Ibid., p. 101.
30. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Shefali Moitra, Professor Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay, Professor Amita Chatterjee, Dr. Saumitra Basu, Dr. Sadhan Chakraborti, Dr. Lopamudra Choudhury, Dr. Jhuma Chakraborty, Dr. Sashinungla, Smt. Mausumi Guha, Dr. Smita Sirkar and Smt. Rubai Saha—all members of the Senior Seminar of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, where it was first presented, for raising valuable questions. Professor Amita Chatterjee, who has always been a constant source of encouragement for me, and who happens to be the very first reader of every bit of writing produced by me, deserves special mention as she had gone through an earlier draft of the paper and suggested some stylistic improvements.

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Does Affirming the Consequent Make the Hypothetical Arguments Invalid?

'Does Affirming the Consequent make the Hypothetical Arguments invalid?' was written by Shashi Bhardwaj and has appeared in the JICPR (January–March 2005).

It is commonly said that Affirming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent are two invalid argument forms. But the author has taken counterexamples showing that this is not the case, i.e. even if the arguments have the invalid forms, still the conclusion validly follows from the premises and, therefore, one is compelled to say that 'these arguments do not have the logical form of hypothetical arguments and, therefore, the fallacy of Affirming the Consequent or the Denying of the Antecedent are not applicable to them. Or if one goes by the apparent logical form of the arguments, then the arguments must be said to be logically fallacious. But .... they are perfectly valid from the logical point of view' (p. 144).

I would like to draw your attention to the important distinction, which I.M. Copi has made in *Symbolic Logic* (fifth edition).

The distinction is between an argument form and the specific argument form. Copi says, 'We define *the specific form* of a given argument as that argument form from which the argument results by substituting a different simple statement for each distinct statement variable' (p. 21). And Copi further says, 'We define *an argument form* to be an array of symbols that contains statement variables—the same statement being substituted for every occurrence of the same statement variable throughout—the result is an argument' (p. 20).

This subtle distinction has been introduced by Copi to underline the point that 'although a valid argument form has only valid arguments as substitution instances, an invalid argument form can have both valid and invalid substitution instances' (p. 25). 'If we symbolize the simple statement 'The United Nations will become more responsible' as U, and the simple statement 'There will be a third world war' as W then the Disjunctive Syllogism.

The United Nations will become more responsible or there will be third world war. The United Nations will not become more

responsible. Therefore, there will be a third world war,' can be symbolized as

U V W
~U /∴W (1)

It has the form

P v q
~P /∴q (2)

from which it results by substituting the statements U and W for the statement variables p and q, respectively.

The same argument is obtained by substituting the statements U V W, ~U and W for the statement variables p, q, r, respectively, in the argument form

p
q
r (pp. 20-21)"

We have seen that the argument U V W

~U /∴W

can be regarded to be a substitution instance of either:

p v q (1)
~p /∴q

or

p
q /∴r (2)

The second form is obviously invalid but it still has an argument, which is perfectly valid, as a substitution instance.

I think the same is the case with the argument forms and the substitution instances the author is taking for consideration.

p ⊃ q
q /∴p

is an invalid argument form of which the argument which is taken as an instance, i.e.

(A ∨ B) ⊃ (A . B)
(A . B) /∴(A ∨ B)

is a valid one.

Now, instead of substituting compound statements in place of the statement variables p, q, if we substitute simple statements, then we will get an argument which is obviously invalid. For instance:

If Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal
Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.

Symbolically (Taking S for 'Socrates is a man', and M for 'Socrates is mortal')

S ⊃ M
M /∴S

This has the argument form

p ⊃ q
q /∴p

This is invalid.

The same reasoning is applicable to the other fallacy, that is, Denying the Antecedent.

The example that the author has taken is:

(A V B) ⊃ (A . B)
~(A V B) /∴~(A . B)

It has the form

p ⊃ q
~p /∴~q

Now, if we substitute simple statements instead of compound ones, we get an argument, which is obviously invalid. Using the same abbreviations, we can symbolize the argument

If Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is not a man.
Therefore, Socrates is not mortal.

As

S ⊃ M
~S /∴ ~M

And by constructing the truth table one can easily prove its invalidity.

In both the cases, the author has considered the argument forms and not the specific argument forms and, therefore, he was compelled to say that, 'one, that the so-called logical form alone cannot be effectively used as a reliable guide for determining the validity or invalidity of hypothetical arguments; and two, that the dogma of logical form of hypothetical arguments,—is indefensible in that it leads to consequences which are inconsistent from the logical point of view and thus cannot be rationally accepted.'

The points that I would like to emphasize (which Copi has clearly stated) are:

(1) It is perfectly correct to say that the validity and invalidity are purely formal characteristics.
(2) We must make a distinction between an argument form and the specific argument form.
(3) We must underline the fact that an invalid argument form can have both valid and invalid arguments as substitution instances.

So the 'observations' need not be drawn; rather, it will be incorrect to say that the logical form is not a reliable guide for determining the validity or invalidity of any arguments (why specifically hypothetical ones?).

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Agenda for Research

'Language' has been the centre of philosophical reflection in recent philosophy, both Anglo-American and Continental. Yet the two approaches have been so different that it is difficult to believe whether they are 'talking' about the same thing. Carnap and Heidegger are two 'extremes' but Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* perhaps represent the same contrast coexisting in the same individual.

The 'language of physics' and the 'language of Poetry' are again, perhaps, two extremes. But then, where shall one place the 'language of mathematics' or the 'language or languages of Art' which communicate without words?

Furthermore, what about the 'language of philosophy'? Is Derrida, or any other post-modernist, 'writing' the same way as, say, Russell or Quine or Ryle or Austin or Moore? Are philosophers 'doing' what literary writers did earlier; A Joyce or A Kafka; the author of *Finhegan'a Wake or THE TRIAL*

And, what has been the centre of attention, 'parole' or 'langue', the 'spoken' or the 'written' word?

The Hermeneutic approach to 'language' is different from all of these and deserves to be contrasted, compared and understood in relation to them.

Does 'language' have a 'hidden' dimension? And does its 'reality' appear in 'conversation', as Rorty and some others have said? Or in 'Dialogue', as perhaps Buber might have said? Or in 'discussion' as Plato might have said?

The Indian 'thinking' on the subject is so vast that it is time to bring the different strands of contemporary thinkers in relation to one another and the 'thinking' that was the done in India on in sine Yāska and Pāṇini from the earliest times.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

Saptaṛṣis are well known in the Indian tradition. Yet, their 'story' and the dispute as to who is to be counted and who should be excluded, is hardly known to anybody.

Traditions of the Seven Ṛṣis by John Michiner 2000, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, does just this. The tradition, as the book argues, is not one, but many and, at times, even conflicting.

The earliest mention of the seven ṛṣis occurs in the *Ṛgveda* 9.107 and 10.137. But the manner in which they develop in the *Śrauta Sūtras*, the *Brāhmaṇa* texts, the Epics, the *Purānas* and the *Smṛti* texts is little known, or even suspected.

The above book does all this and brings material to light that will surprise even a well-read scholar on the subject. Who would imagine, for example, that there was a persistent and deliberate attempt to bring Bhṛgu, Āngirasa and Agastya into the group? What is even more surprising is to find a tribal ṛṣi named Gungu being brought into the group, if the evidence of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* (1.2.8) is to be believed.

A different picture of the Vedic period, the ṛṣis and the inter-relationships between them will emerge after a study of this book rather than the one that has been commonly accepted up till now.

The crucial question whether the *saptaṛṣis* are *individuals* or just family lineages, seems not even to have been raised, let alone answered. The problem occurs in the very first formulation in the *Ṛgveda*. The *sūkta* 9.107 gives the name of individual ṛṣis, the *sūkta* 10.137 gives just the family name, forgetting how *all* the members of a family known by that name could belong to the group of seven ṛṣis.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

1. Yoga-sūtra 4.33 uses the term, 'क्षणप्रतियोगी' and seems to say that 'क्रमः' is the 'प्रतियोगी' of 'क्षण'.
   What does this exactly mean?
   The use of the term 'प्रतियोगी' reminds one of Nyāya and, if it is used in the technical sense, it would mean that the '*anuyogī-pratīyougī*' mode of analysis of verbal cognition is much 'older' than is generally accepted. The date of the *Yoga-Sūtra* is much, much earlier than Udayana with whom *Navya Nyāya* is now said to begin.
2. Can a '*anuyogī*' have many '*pratiyogī*' and, conversely, can a '*pratiyogī*' have many '*anuyogī*'?
3. Can anything function as a '*pratiyogī*' of everything or there are limits? And, if that is the case, what are the reasons or the criteria on the basis of which 'limits' one imposed. Also, what is the epistemological and ontological significance of this?
4. Conversely, can a '*pratiyogin*' have anything as an '*anuyogin*'? And in case this is not so, what bearing would it have on the Navya Nyāya mode of analysis of sentential meaning or *Śābda-bodha*?

II

Sūtra 4.34, the last of the *Yoga-Sūtra* gives two alternative meanings of 'कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति'. This *destroys* the very foundation of *Sāṁkhya* as the pure *puruṣa* would have to be accepted as having *śakti* in it, something which may be akin to Kashmir śaivism, but not to *Sāṁkhya* or *Advaita Vedānta*?

DAYA KRISHNA

Discussion on Vyāpti and Sāmānādhikaraṇya

I clearly remember your question about *Vyāpti* when I met you at Jaipur. It was about the means of apprehending *Vyāpti*. I also

remember that I explained you the *Nyaya* position. The *Nyaya* holds that it is the non-apprehension of *Vyabhicara* (irregularity of the connection between the *sadhya* and the *hetu*) associated with the apprehension of co-existence of the two terms. Vishwanatha states: 'व्यभिचारस्याग्रहोऽथ सहचारग्रहस्तथा। हेतुर्व्याप्तिग्रहे ...'

In case, the doubt about the *Vyabhicara* continues to haunt then *Tarka* would help the person to ascertain the *Vyāpti*:

... तर्कः व्कचित् शङाक्निवर्तकः। —*Muktavali Kā - 137*

With regard to *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* of the terms, the *Nyaya* is of the view that it should be there, invariably. The final definition of *Vyāpti,* formulated by Gangesa includes *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* in the body of the definition of *Vyāpti.*

'प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयत्समानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नं यत्र भवति तेन समं तस्य *सामानाधिकरण्यं* व्याप्तिः।'

However, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Dvaita Vedanta school of Sri Madhva does not include सामानाधिकरण्य in the definition of *Vyāpti.* It contends that the two terms, though not existing in a common locus, can have the relation of *Vyāpti.* Accordingly, it defines *Vyāpti* differently so as to cover ever व्यधिकरण terms.

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Some Notes on Vyāpti and Anekāntavāda

The question raised is: What is the status of Vyāpti, given the theory of Anekāntavāda? I have the following comments on the question:

1. I find that the Jaina theory of inference, similar to some other Jaina theories of knowledge, is an *independent* theory, not subject to the scrutiny of Anekāntavāda. This is because inference is a *pramāṇa* and all *pramāṇas* deal with the right knowledge of a many-sided thing. [*Pramāṇas* are distinguished from *nayas*] Many-sidedness has already been included in the definition of *Pramāṇa* and, hence, there is no need for a further reference to it in any Jaina theory of perception, inference, tarka, etc.

2. Inference is the knowledge of *Sādhya* through the instrumentality of *Sādhana.* The *vyāpti* is a necessary and universal relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya.* In the absence of *Sādhya* (fire, for example), there is an absence of *Sādhana* (smoke, for example). The non-existence of smoke in the absence of fire is a *necessary* universal relation of *inseparability,* i.e. invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*). *Vyāpti* is a universal necessary relation. It expresses a necessity in the sense of 'must'. Hemacandra defines Vyāpti as universal concomitance consisting in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. [It is interesting to note that such propositions relating to definitions of means of knowledge are never prefixed by the word *syāt.*] Vyāpti is not acquired by either inference or perception. It is acquired with the help of tarka. In discussing the nature of Vyāpti, Anekāntavāda is not applied by the Jaina logicians to assess the rival positions.

3. Dharmakīrti recognizes only two types of necessary Vyāpti-relations—causality and essential identity. The Nyāya thinkers regard necessary connections as innumerable and inexhaustible. For example, the rise of the sun on the following morning is necessarily inferred on the basis of its rise on the previous day. [Hume would have been amused by this view.] There are many invariable sequences *not* founded on causality and many relations of simultaneity *not* founded on essential identity. (See Nagin Shah, *Akalanka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy,* 1967.)

4. According to Nagin Shah, the Jaina logicians recognize the following four types of relations in a Vyāpti:

a. Relations of simultaneity based on essential identity.
b. Relations of simultaneity which is necessary without any apparent reason.
c. Relations of sequence based on causality.

d. Relations of sequence which is necessary without any apparent reason. The Jaina view against the the Buddhist view is that there can be *non-causal* necessity.

5. In a study of Syādvāda, the term *eva is used in some of the formulae* (e.g., *syād asti eva ghataḥ*). If you say, The 'the shell is only white' the indicator eva here shows that the shell is *invariably* possessed of whiteness. It is similar to Anvaya Vyāpti of Nyāya system. The class of shell is pervaded by the class of things white. [See Nagin Shah; Ed. *Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth*, Delhi, 2000, Chapter 3.]

6. Any Indian theory of necessity is always expressed in ontological proposition. Intuition, *tarka*, etc., are treated as cognitive sources of *real necessity* expressed in Vyāpti. The Nyāya and the Jaina thinkers have a wider view of real necessity compared to the Buddhists, who restrict Vyāpti to causality or essential identity.

7. For Dharmakīrti, necessary relations are *apriori*. They are due to the mind (*vikalpa-buddhi*). It is not that external things are necessarily related. Only their concepts are related thus.

8. *I find that the difficulties related to Vyāpti are not due to Syādavāda, but due to the Humean problem of Induction.* Indians had their own justification of induction *in the absence of a formal theory of deductive validity and also in the absence of a statistical theory of probability.* Rational justification of Vyāpti in the absence of causality or essential identity is a difficult problem, both for the Nyāya thinkers as well for the Jaina thinkers. Some Nyāya thinkers as also some Jaina thinkers posit some extraordinary experiences in order to grasp necessary connections.

9. Jainas believe that Vyāpti is not the result of *anumāna*, but it is established through *tarka*—hypothetical reasoning—which is a valid means of knowledge. If it is false that 'wherever there is smoke there is fire', then it follows that 'there are places where there may be smoke without fire'. This means that there can be effect without cause. If there can be effect without cause, then why should any person who desires smoke seek fire?

10. I distinguish between the *first-order* substantive many-sided Jaina theories and the *second-order* Jaina *meta*-theories. B.K. Matilal

considers such a meta-theory as a meta-metaphysical theory. I would include Anekāntavāda and Nayavāda, in one sense, as the *meta*-theories applicable *only* to non-Jaina theories. Of course, they are also substantive ontological Jaina theories of *things* when it is claimed that a thing has infinite qualities-aspects and the scheme of seven-fold judgement can be applied to each of these infinite attributes. For example, to say that a thing (a jar) exists with reference to itself or that it does not exist with reference to other things and so on, reveals that all the one-sided claims about the *thing* concerned are inadequate, but the total truth about the things is possible through the famous seven-fold judgments. This is not *relativism* but *collectivism* regarding the truth.

11. Anekāntavāda and Nayavāda, thus, have a *dual* nature. For example, when you apply Syādvāda to things (e.g., a pot exits from a standpoint x) and say that a *thing is many-sided*, then that claim is a *substantive ontological theory of things.* But if you say that a particular *theory* of causality is true from a certain standpoint, then you have a *theory about theory—a meta-theory.* Kālavāda, Niyativāda, Swabhavavāda, Adṛstavāda and Puruṣavāda are false, if all of the five are taken singly (*Sanmati Tarka*, Chapter 3, Verse 53). They attain perfection only when they *are accommodated, adjusted and arranged* on common grounds of synthesis. (Gopani, Tr. *Sanmati Tarka*, 2000, Chapter 3, p. 126). Again, it has been claimed that when Sadvāda and Asadvāda are *adjusted* according to Anekānta, the *result* is *Samyag-Darśhana* (*Sanmati Tarka*, Chapter 3, Verse 51).

12. I believe on the basis of such claims that that mostly Anekāntavāda and Nayavāda function as Jaina second-level cognitive-*processing structures* which transform the *inputs* in the form of the first-level *non-Jaina one-sided substantive theories* into *outputs* in the from of *Jaina many-sided substantive theories.* The output then does not require any *further* processing because it is many-sided and versatile. Anekāntavāda is a criterion of evaluating non-Jaina theories. It is a synthesis of partial truths. The whole point of processing was to reject the one-sided theories about the *ontological nature of things. Once the ontological nature of things is specified as many-sided, the processing is over.* All *other* Jaina theories regarding perception, *inference*, Vyāpti, Varbal Authority, etc., are straightforward first-order

substantive theories applicable within the scope of a many-sided reality. There is no need to say that from a certain standpoint this is Vyāpti comprising necessary connection and from another standpoint that this is not so. There is no relativity here. There is also no skepticism or agnosticism, or any doubt or uncertainty. So long as Vyāpti operates within ontology of many-sided things, it is valid. No Jaina means of valid knowledge require the scrutiny by the Anekāntavāda so long as they corresponds to the many-sided nature of things.

13. In Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka*, and Abhayadev's commentary on it (as well as in Samantbhadra's *Āptamimāṃsā*), we find many non-Jaina theories listed as one-sided. I refer only to three theories of causation as an example from *Sanmati Tarka*; (1) *Ārambhavāda;* (2) *Pariṇāmavāda;* and (3) Negation of all causality by the absolute monists. These *non-Jaina Ekanta (partially true) theories* are processed through the *meta*-theories of *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda* and the *resultant substantial* Jaina theory then says that from a certain standpoint, the effect is definitely pre-existent in its cause and from a certain standpoint the effect is certainly new creation. As per the Jaina many-sided view, Kapila's philosophy is a representation of *Drvyāstika Naya* (viewpoint of substance) and the Buddhist philosophy is an exposition of *paryāyāstika naya* (the viewpoint of modes) [*Nayas* are the limited ways of looking at the things.] This type of *intervening meta-theoretical processing* leading to *synthesis* is a standard Jaina procedure of converting some of the *pre-Jaina one-sided theories into particular many-sided Jaina theories.* In such a case, they do not require any further application of Anekāntavāda. The Jaina theories themselves need not be further processed through Anekānta, because their own *Samyak* theories are not vitiated by one-sidedness. The Jaina theory of Vyāpti [or inference or perception] is, therefore, not undermined by its theory of many-sidedness. The Jaina theory of omniscience is not a relative theory at all. There is *a neutral cognitive free-space within Jainism* for a number of theories *autonomous of syādvāda.* The theory of Vyāpti is one of them.

14. I believe that Anekāntavāda as a *meta-metaphysical* theory is appealed to only when some partial truths of the rival theories have to be accommodated. A theory of the *knowledge* of objects is different from a theory of the *nature* of objects. It has been claimed that non-Jaina theories of the nature of things or the nature of causation are partly true because a thing is *always* many-sided. 'The province of Anekāntavāda is to examine the fundamental nature of things, ... the doctrine is mainly directed toward discussing the nature of things and towards bringing out the fundamental characteristics of things' [*Sanmati Tarka,* Tr. Gopani, pp. 114-15). Hemacandra defines *pramāṇa* in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* as that which is the instrument of authentic cognition—*samyag arthanirnayaḥ pramāṇam.* He does not even refer to Anekāntavāda in his discussion of perception or inference in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃasā.* He discusses other non-Jaina definitions of Parmāṇa, but he does not refute them with the help of Anekāntavāda. Hemacandra says, '*pramānasya viṣayo dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu.*' Now here the many-sided nature of reality (*dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu*) as an object of knowledge is stated clearly and that is the end of the mater. In any further analysis of the nature of knowledge, Hemacandra does not bring in Anekāntavāda at all. *It would, therefore, imply that the Jaina thinkers are not bound to bring in Anekāntavāda all the time as a method of evaluating all the non-Jaina theories.* Initially, therefore, I would like to maintain that *there is a scope in Jainism for independent Jaina theories which do not have to synthesize partial truths of other systems through Anekāntavāda.* It would be too much to claim that all these theories have some truth in it. A non-Jaina theory of non-many-sided reality, for example, would be totally false. A non-Jaina theory denying omniscience or Jaina *karmavāda* or accepting a traditional creator God cannot be true from a certain viewpoint and false from a certain other viewpoint. Jainas have to reject any such theories totally. Anekāntavāda, thus, operates *only* when we are considering whether Realty is one or many, eternal or non-eternal, general or particular, etc.

There are, thus, two methods of dealing with non-Jaina theories:

A. Accommodate partly true viewpoints of non-Jaina theories of things *through the application of Anekāntavāda.*
B. Present the specific Jaina theories and *refute in normal manner* those theories which are not even partially true. Jaina theory of necessary connection in Vyāpti is, therefore, not

threatened by Anekāntavāda because the theory of Vyāpti is not a theory of the nature of things but of the nature of relation between things.

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Book Reviews

MD. SIRAJUL ISLAM: *Sufism and Bhakti*: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP), Cardinal Station, Washington DC 20064, pp. 282, 2004, price: $17.54 (in Europe and North America), and $4 (for Afro-Asian countries).

The book under review is South Asia Volume 7th, Series III of the Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, a project of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Cardinal Station, Washington DC 20064. The book is foreworded by G.F. Melean, a distinguished scholar and a retired professor of the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, USA. It is a scholarly presentation of Sufism and Bhakti with an obvious view that these two movements, having sprung out of love for humanity with a linking idea of unity in diversity that instrumented socio-cultural revolution, were highly useful in uplifting the socio-cultural life of medieval India and remain useful, even in the present socio-cultural crisis in India. The deliberation of the author is based on a view that a comparative study of those movements is useful in national integration and is highly relevant in uprooting the present socio-cultural crisis in India. The author has made an effort to point out mystical, ethical and humanistic theories and practices of Sufism and Bhakti movements in India with the intention to bring out the social relevance of the common, rather, assimilating the ideas that have become the part of Indian culture. The author is always seen to be conscious of bringing out the common points concerning harmony in social communities of the two movements without giving importance to regional and linguistic differences and religious bigotries of the two communities. The author has mainly discussed the practical aspect of the two traditions and is not involved seriously with the controversial issue concerning the determination of the two movements as the forms of mysticism or spiritualism. Though he has not furnished adequate arguments warranted for accepting the two traditions as spiritualistic, his leaning towards making them

spiritualistic theories cannot be denied. However, the book concentrates chiefly on an analysis of the ethico-religious theories and practices of the two mystical movements, particularly in the Indian perspective.

The author is a knowledgeable person. Several traces show that he has sincerely moved his presentation with the quotations from the original as well as secondary sources in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Sanskrit, Hindi, Bengali and other languages of the two traditions.

The presentation of a comparative account of Sufism and Bhakti, symmetrically arranged in the four chapters of the book with a conclusion, is distinctly scholarly.

Chapter one is critical in nature. The author has scrutinized the findings of established scholars and critics of the field on the issue of the determination of the meaning of the term 'Sufi' and has discussed Greek, Christian and Indian influences on the concern. In Chapters two, the author has presented the origin of the Sufi *silsilahs* in a historical perspective. The author views that real Sufis do not deviate from the Shariah and those who deviate will not be true Sufis. These chapters are informative and present an account of Sufism in India with difference of theories and practices of different branches of Sufism, which are very important in identifying those offshoots in a determinate way.

Chapter three is a brief survey of Bhakti movement, particularly in medieval India. This chapter and the second part of the chapter four comprise the chief tenets of the philosophy of Sankara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhava, Ramdas, Kabir, Nanak, Caitanya, Bauls and Dadu. The chapter concludes with the position of mind and faith of those saints.

Chapter four deals with the central concepts of Sufism and the Bhakti movement and attempts to point out the socio-cultural role and relevance of those concepts in upliftment of social living, harmony and peace. The author views affinity between the two movements. As per the author's observation in the book, their theory and practice—despite regional and lingual differences—were the same; both of the movements have the goal of preserving moral and human values needed for the upliftment of social living which they did through preaches, writings and philanthropic activities, qualifying for brotherhood and harmony without sectarian bigotries.

In the conclusion, the author has intensely analyzed the interaction, assimilation and fusion in literary and socio-cultural activities of Sufism and Bhakti movement and has expressed the idea that literature, comprising the infused thoughts, may serve as a device for social harmony and brotherhood even in the present multicultural Indian society.

The book presents an extensive critical survey of the historical chapters concerning the contribution of both of the movements that have been significant in molding the mind of the then society with a recommendation that pushing for those ideas and practices may be highly appreciable for the present scenario of national integration and communal harmony.

It is a good reference book on the subject. The thoughts in the book are expressed in a very understandable manner and in simple straightforward language. However, diacritical marks are not used appropriately in the scheme of transliteration of the text in different languages. The print and the getup of the book are quite attractive.

The book is useful for scholars as well as for the laymen who want to be acquainted with the chief tenets of Sufism and Bhakti and the present relevance of the two traditions comprehensively in a simple style of presentation. I hope, the scholars and students of philosophy, religion, ethics and indology will value it earnestly as a good piece of work and the book will also draw the attention of the specialists on the subject.

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BHARATI PURI: *Engaged Buddhism: The Dalai Lama's World-view*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 255.

The present Dalai Lama is many things: a political leader, a symbol, a thinker, a spiritual teacher and, of course, a Buddhist monk. He is also a figure loved by many: Bollywood stars mention him as a

role-model in shallow interviews that they give to film magazines. For the Tibetans he is nothing less than a living god or at least a living *Bodhisattva*. And in the West, he is a huge celebrity: thousands of westerners flock every year to shake his hand in the public audiences given by him every now and then in his official residence in Dharamsala, India and fill out auditoriums to see and hear him in New York, Sydney, even Tel Aviv. The Dalai Lama has published many books (some of which are protocols of the lectures given by him in different occasions), including two autobiographies, *My Land, My People* (1974) and *Freedom in Exile* (1989). The latter was released when the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace prize. Here, he does not merely write about the years which have passed since the publication of his prior book but, in fact, speaks in a different tone, the tone of an esteemed, well-recognized Nobel prize winner, attempting to be more diplomatic, universalistic, mature. Personally, I must admit that I have always preferred the first, less ripe autobiography.

In her newly released book, Bharati Puri endeavours to seriously take the Dalai Lama as a thinker, and to present what she refers to as his 'world-view'. Her book consists of five chapters:

1. Introduction: Engaged Buddhist Ethic—Theory, Praxis and the Dalai Lama's *Weltanschauung*
2. Bodhisattva and Satyagrahi: Evolving Dynamics in the Dalai Lama's Formulation of Non-violence.
3. Universal Responsibility: the Dalai Lama's World-view
4. 'A clean environment is a human right like any other': Interlinking Eco Justice, Social Justice and Environmental Protection
5. The Dalai Lama on Religion and Humanism

Following the five chapters, there are six appendixes:

1. Interview with His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso at his private office, Mcleod Ganj, Dharamsala, on 27 August 2001.
2. The Nobel Peace prize acceptance speech, Oslo, Norway, 10 December 1989.

3. Five-point Peace Plan for Tibet, Strausburg Proposal, 15 June 1998.
4. Nobel Peace Laureate Joint Declaration, 6 November 1998.
5. Table of the 14 Dalai Lamas.
6. Universal declaration of human rights adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (iii) of 10 December 1948.

Also included is a comprehensive bibliography of books by and on the Dalai Lama.

The second chapter (Bodhisattva and Satyagrahi) is worthy of note as it consists of a comparative study of the Dalai Lama and Mahatma Gandhi. Here, Puri touches on the similarities and the differences between the notion of *ahimsā* as seen and practiced by these two political leaders and spiritual teachers. I would say that in effect, she compares a modern Buddhist approach (with Gandhian influence, as the Dalai Lama himself declares many a time[1]) and a modern Jaina attitude (with a Christian touch a la Tolstoy, whose influence on Gandhi is well known). Let me add that non-violent resistance is not the only 'meeting-point' of Gandhi and the Dalai Lama; another is their autobiographical writing. Both are 'unbearably' honest, and in the name of truth they willingly reveal intimate, sometimes even embarrassing inner as well as outer episodes. This feature is weaker, as already hinted, in the Dalai Lama's second autobiography. Another junction where Gandhi and Tenzin Gyatso meet is, of course, the junction of intertwining the *prima facie* opposing fields of ethics and politics.

An interesting point, well developed by Puri in her book, is the emphasis given by the Dalai Lama to ecology and environmental awareness. According to him, it is a central domain, often neglected, for applying the *ahimsā* approach. At the end of a long chapter devoted to ecology, Puri quotes (pp. 107) the following excerpt from a poem written by the Dalai Lama:

> Under a tree was the great sage Buddha born
> Under a tree he overcame passion
> And attained enlightenment
> Under two trees did he pass in Nirvana
> Verily, the Buddha held the trees in great esteem

Let me add that Gandhi too was interested in environment and ecology, even though he has not used these terms. His campaign for tree protection is just an example.

The interview with the Dalai Lama (Appendix 1) is intriguing as it gives the reader an opportunity to actually meet the man and his great sense of humour. When Puri asks him about 'engaged Buddhism', considered by her to be the gist of his teaching (hence, the title of her book) and of himself as an 'engaged Buddhist' (pp. 166–7), he gives a typical Upaniṣadic answer in refusing to adopt her initial postulations:

First he says that as a Buddhist practitioner he always wanted to enter a three-year retreat, a wish that has not yet materialized. For him, then, solitary meditation (he uses the terms *samādhi* and *vipassana*), i.e. 'disengaged Buddhism' is as important as outer activity in the world, on the political, social and ecological realms. Second, he says that he prefers to speak of 'engaged religion' rather than 'engaged Buddhism', and mentions the fruitful activity of Catholic priests in Latin America.[2] So, for him, it is not necessarily 'engaged' nor indispensably 'Buddhism'. Finally, he adds (p. 169) that being a Dalai Lama, you are simply bound, even destined, to be 'engaged', or as he puts it: 'You have the opportunity and the responsibility to be active'. When Puri asks the Dalai Lama about the relevance of Buddhism for non-violence today, he naturally speaks of *karunā* as 'the basis or the root of non-violence' (p. 170). Puri herself, in explaining his vision of *ahimsā*, gives us the usual story of non-violence being altogether different from passivity (p. 26). She further confronts the Dalai Lama with the view of those who think that *ahimsā* is not practical, especially with regard to the Tibetan issue (p. 175). The Dalai Lama answers with a story about a friend of his, a monk who spent 18 years in a Chinese *gulag*, and later claimed that the greatest danger of losing his compassion toward the Chinese. According to the Dalai Lama, violence always brings about more violence; hence he sees it as necessarily futile and fruitless. I would like to suggest that the real philosophical question about *ahimsā* is whether it is really a universal principle, applicable in every circumstance. For the Dalai Lama as well as for Gandhi, the answer is clearly in the affirmative. The question is not whether non-violence brings about the desired results

in Tibet or elsewhere, but whether it should be practiced in principle, whatever the results are. In an intriguing correspondence between Gandhiji and two prominent Jewish thinkers, Martin Buber and Judah L. Magnes, which took place in the late 1930s[3], the latter two challenge the universality of *ahimsā*. Buber admits that it is indeed a preferable method, but further argues that in certain cases, against uniquely demonic powers such as Nazi Germany, the use of *himsā* is necessary, even *dharmic*. Pure evil, he proclaims, must be uprooted. Magnes claims that *ahimsātmaka satyāgraha* cannot be regarded as a universal value as it is not suited for everyone: it demands a certain equanimity towards death and dying, such as the one exemplified by Gandhi himself in treating plague patients and, of course, in his numerous fasts to death. In the Jewish tradition, explains Magnes, the sanctity of life is the supreme value; hence *satyāgraha* cannot be efficiently employed by the Jews. Both Buber and Magnes were responding to a statement given by Gandhi regarding the condition of the Jews in Europe under the Nazi regime and the establishment of a Jewish settlement in Palestina (which later developed into the modern state of Israel).

These lines are written in Tel Aviv, when just an hour drive from my home, a bloody war takes place. I'm not sure that there is great novelty in the Dalai Lama's message of *ahimsā*, but in his very presence he embodies the (unfortunately, not too popular) option of non-violence. In a violent era such as ours, when violence has become an integral part of our daily life and a necessary ingredient of the television and internet content that we so willingly consume; in an era in which most of our so-called leaders are either corrupted or maneuvered by tycoons who are merely interested in their own wealth and power, it is good to have figures such as the Dalai Lama of Tibet. As shown in the book under discussion, the recipe prescribed by him for the benefit of every sentient being consists of minimum materialism and maximum consideration for the other, born of the understanding that you and I are essentially interconnected. This is his 'living interpretation' of *pratītya samutpāda*.

Bharati Puri has extensively read the Dalai Lama and plenty of material on him. Respectively, she quotes him at length and, as promised, draws a clear and often fascinating picture of his *Weltanschauung*.

Notes and References

1. See, for example, his Nobel Peace prize acceptance speech (Appendix 2, pp. 177): 'I accept the prize as a tribute to the man who founded the modern tradition of non-violent action for change—Mahatma Gandhi—whose life taught and inspired me'.
2. In this respect, see John Chathanatt, S.J., *Gandhi and Gutiérrez: Two Paradigms of Liberative Transformation*, Decent Books, New Delhi, 2004. Chathanatt offers a comparison between Gandhiji and Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Christian activist 'in the oppressed and exploited land of Latin America'. His contention is that Gutiérrez and Gandhi are both standard bearers of what he refers to as 'Liberative Transformation', consisting of spiritual as well as economic and socio-political dimensions. Somehow I see a connection between Chathanatt's 'Liberative Transformation' and Puri's 'Engaged Buddhism'.
3. See Arvind Sharma's *Modern Hindu Thought: the Essential Texts*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002. The letters sent by Buber and Magnes to Gandhi (which he never answered, and perhaps never received) are attached to the chapter dedicated to M.K. Gandhi as an appendix.

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P. George Victor and V.V.S. Saibaba (eds.), *Studies in Vedānta: Essays in Honour of Professor S.S. Rama Rao Pappu*, Andhra University Philosophical Studies No. 5, D.K. Printworld, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 330.

It is a great pleasure to review a volume dedicated to someone you personally know. Professor Rama Rao Pappu teaches philosophy at Miami University in Ohio, USA and is the founder as well as the driving force behind 'The International Congress of Vedānta', promoting research in field of *Vedānta*, as well as in Indian and comparative philosophy at large. I have met Professor Pappu last year in Hawai'i. We chatted throughout a long sightseeing tour organized by our hosts at the East-West Center. He has not merely discussed Vedānta issues with me but also amused me by finding

the 'Indian angle' of every place we visited. 'Hanumān Bay', he announced, for example, as we reached the famous Hawai'ian Hanumān Bay. I'm taking this opportunity to wish him many more years of fruitful research.

The volume under discussion consists of twenty-four articles. Most of them have been presented in the Fifteenth International Congress of Vedānta, held at Andhra University in Visakhapatnam, in January 2005. The essays have been arranged in six sections, covering the areas of:

1. Vedānta Metaphysics
2. Vedānta Epistemology and Ethics
3. Schools of Vedānta and other Systems
4. Global Parallels
5. Vedānta and the Contemporary World

As is usually the case in collections of articles such as this one, the quality of the articles varies. In the following lines I will focus on five of them:

1. 'Śankara Vedānta on Śruti, Tarka and Adhyāsa' by Bijayananda Kar (Utkal University)
2. '*Tat tvam asi*: Understanding in the tradition of Śankara' by Godabarisha Mishra (University of Madras)
3. 'The Echo of Vedānta in Tyāgarāja's Musical Compositions' by Prabala Janaki (musician, actor, play-director)
4. 'The Three Ākāśas of the Yogavāsiṣṭha as interpreted by Sri Satya Saibaba' by Klaus Witz (University of Illinois)
5. 'Householders and Renouncers: The Holistic Combination in Indian thought' by Pankaj Jain (University of Iowa)

Bijayananda Kar's article on Śankara's philosophy is a refreshing one. He avoids the conventional reading of Śankara, repeated in book after book, which draws more on the post-Śankara Advaita tradition than on his own writings. Instead he acknowledges, and rightly so, that 'Śankara never denies the actuality of the world phenomena with all its diversities and multiplicities. It is very much real on its own account. *Paramārtha* is to be understood in a philo-

sophic and technical sense, not denouncing the world as illusion as popularly treated' (p. 62). I totally agree with Kar, and Śankara's debate with the Yogācārin supports his claim about Śankara being a monist on the metaphysical level, a dualist on the phenomenal *vyavahāric* level. Check out, for example, Śankara's following 'philosophical attack' on his Buddhist *pūrva-pakśin*:

> The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious connot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man who, while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction, avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?[1]

Here, Śankara attacks the Yogācārain in the name of commonsense: since we perceive an 'outer world', he maintains, how can someone claim that this world does not exist? In 'defining' the world as *māyā*, then, Śankara does not mean to say that it does not exist. He accuses the Buddhist in hypocrisy: denying the existence of an outer world (which, by the way, I do not think is really the Yogācārin's position) is like eating and enjoying, yet denying the fact that one, in fact, eats. In this *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* (4.3.7.), the Advaitin futher claims that without admitting the existence of the outer world one cannot use language. If outer objects are merely an illusion, a projection of one's consciousness and nothing more, i.e. if they do not exist, then using a language of multiplicity (*ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, etc.) would become meaningless. And since the Yogācārin uses language, argues Śankara he, in fact, contradicts his own 'mind-only' argument (or at least Śankara's understanding of his argument).

Godabarisha Mishra in his '*Tat tvam asi*' article focuses on later Advaitic interpretations of the famous *mahāvākya*, in order to elucidate Śankara's use of it. He starts (p. 68) by criticizing Julius Lipner for isolating Śankara from his tradition with regard to the great *vākya* in an article written by him on the issue ('The Self of Being and the Being of Self: Śankara on *Tat Tvam Asi*'). I'm not sure that a traditionalistic reading is indeed more fruitful. It can be counter argued that many a time, certain commentators totally change the meaning/direction/agenda of the text to which they refer. A typical example for such a 'deviating commentator' is, of course, Śankara himself, in his *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya*, for instance. Nevertheless, Mishra's findings in Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*, Sarvajñātman in his *Samkṣepa-Śarīraka* (with regard to '*Aham Brahmāsmi*') and Dharmarāja in his *Vedānta-Pratibhāṣa* are certainly interesting.

In her article on Vedāntic flavour in Tyāgarāja's devotional songs, Prabala Janaki finds *ślokas* from Bhakti texts such as the *Ātma-bodha*, ascribed by the tradition to Śankara (even if they could not have been written, or at least this is my contention, by the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya-kāra*), in Tyāgarāja's compositions. These Sanskrit *ślokas* are, of course, translated or 'trans-created' in Telugu, his mother tongue. It is always a pleasure to read/hear a few lines by this famous eighteenth-century 'Carnatic Music Saint', presented here in the original Telugu with English translation.

Klaus Witz's article on the three Ākāśas and Satya Saibaba's interpretation is intriguing since not much has been written on the Saibaba's thought. Most writers have focused on him as a *guru*, healer, even miracle-man. The Saibaba's exposition of the three *Ākāśas* and what he refers to as 'the Divine Principle' beyond all of them is interesting. According to him (p. 282), they are, in effect, the manifestations of different degress of subtlety. The *bhūta-ākāśa* is reflected in the *citta-ākāśa*, and the latter is again reflected or imprinted in the *cid-ākāśa*. From here, he goes on to suggest that the seeker should strive to ascend from one *ākāśa* to the next, from *sthūla* to *sūkṣma*, towards the 'supreme light'. I would like to argue, or at least to add to the Saibaba's picture of the *ākāśas* as presented by Witz, that according to my reading of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, it is not merely that the *bhūta-ākāśa* is reflected in the *citta-ākāśa*, but also vice versa, as indicated, for example, in the story of King Lavaṇa (*Yogavāsiṣṭha* 3.104–21). In fact, each *ākāśa* is imprinted in and interlaced with the other two.

And finally: Pankaj Jain's 'Householders and Renouncers: The Holistic Combination in Indian Thought' is full of problems, or at least this is my observation. The very title is alarming: Holistic com-

bination between the householder and the renouncer? Where has the famous tension between them disappeared? What happened to the ambivalence of the former towards the latter, to the natural snake-mongoose hostility? A lot has been written about Indian renunciation, asserts Jain. The renouncer has captured the imagination of certain scholars as an individual (Jain must be referring to Louis Dumont), whereas the householder seems to be 'a poor creature living one's routine life according to the caste rules' (p. 166). Jain's contention is that such a picture is merely a Western one. For the westerner, he writes, renunciation equals spirituality, mysticism and exoticism. This Western picture, he suggests, is a clear example of Orientalism. Furthermore, suggests Jain, it has produced a second picture, as distorted as the first, according to which 'the East' is mystical whereas 'the West' is logical and scientific. To refute the first picture, hence—he believes—also the second, he offers a long non-samnyāsic (almost anti-samnyāsic) report, which includes the *Vedas, Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads,* the *Dharmaśāstras* with special reference to *Manu-Smṛti,* the great epics including the *Bhagavadgītā* and Patañjali's *Yogasūtra.* He emphasizes the role and place of the householder in each of these texts, thus silencing, hiding, ignoring, undermining or simply not seeing the place and role of the renouncer. Let's see if I can refute his findings one by one, or at least elucidate 'the other side of the coin':

1. The Veda is depicted by Jain as the treatise of 'Ārian society dominated by active householders' (p. 167). The Vedic yajñas are presented by him as driven by socio-political motives, and he further emphasizes the fact that the *yajamāna* had to be married. He finds a flavour of asceticism in the fact that the latter had to restrict himself dietwise as a part of the ritual (p. 168). Well, Jain is of course right, but somehow his picture does not include the *muni* or *keśin* of *Ṛgveda* 10.136; we do not know much of the 'Other', referred to here as 'silent' and 'long-haired'. The Vedic texts have been composed by householders who, like Jain, did not think much of these 'renouncers'. Therefore, I believe that their brief mentions in the Veda are significant, perhaps like the not very flattering mentions of the sophists in the writings of the mahā-philosopher Plato. In this respect one is also reminded of J.C. Heesterman

article 'Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer' (in *The Inner Conflict of Tradition,* p. 26–44), where he attempts to trace the source of Indian renunciation within the Vedic Yajña itself, spotlighting the figure of the fourth, silent Brahmin.

2. Yājñavalkya, the great Upaniṣadic sage, claims Jain, was not a celibate renouncer but instead—as we all know—had two wives (pp. 168–9). Interestingly, in Śankara's eyes Yājñavalkya is *The* paradigm of renunciation, of inner, true renunciation, which for him means realization of the fact that being the *ātman,* one cannot really commit any deed as far as the Vyavahāric level is concerned. As for the *vyavahāric* level—well, action on this plane does not affect the motionless, ever-silent ātmanhood in each and every one of us. Hence, Śankara says of Yājñavalkya (in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 3.4.9):

> Scripture moreover shows that Yājñavalkya and others who knew *Brahman did not take their stand on works.*[2]

3. The *Puruṣārtha* scheme, writes Jain (p. 169), consists of both *pravṛtti* (*dharma, kāma, artha*) and *nivṛtti* (*mokṣa*). For him, this is 'the holistic combination in Indian thought'. I would like to counterclaim that the 'aims of man' theory was composed by householders in order to grant legitimacy, hence to neutralize the radical consequences of *mokṣa.* A lot has been written on the question: How can these two contradictory (or primafacie contradictory) notions of dharma and *mokṣa* 'live together under the same roof'? Daya Krishna, for example, writes:

> As for *mokṣa,* it occupies an anomalous position among the *puruṣārthas,* for it is never clear whether this transcendence should be understood as a negation or fulfilment of the other *puruārthas.*[3]

Elsewhere he is more radical in maintaining that

> The addition of *mokṣa* as the fourth and final end of human seeking was not a fulfilment of the original three, but ultimately their denial or negation.[4]

4. According to Jain (p. 170), the Buddhist and Jain challenge has produced the Āśrama system which, for him, is none but a paradigm of harmony between the householder's life and the ideal of renunciation. For me the Āśrama system, just like the *puruṣārtha* theory, indicates a so-called legitimatization of *mokṣa* and *samnyāsa,*

intended merely to neutralize these two notions for the convenience of the householder. Hence, it is not at all a paradigm of harmony, but rather an act against renunciation as concept and phenomenon.

5. Jain draws on Patrick Olivelle's article 'Contributions to the Semantic History of Samnyāsa', in which he shows that the term *samnyāsa* rarely occurs in early Indic texts, and implies (p. 171) that if the term is not a central one, we must conclude that the phenomenon to which it refers (i.e. renunciation) has been at most marginal. A close reading of Olivelle's article reveals a totally different picture: indeed, the term *samnyāsa* as a generic term referring to different types of renunciation has not been common, according to him, before Manu. Nevertheless, specific terms referring to particular forms of renunciation have definitely been in use in the texts scrutinized by him. In this respect, he mentions the terms *yati, bhikṣu, muni, pārivrājaka, śranaṇa, tapas* and *nivṛtti*, as referring to the renouncer and to renunciation in different contexts.

6. Even though the *Upaniṣads* speak of *mokṣa*, writes Jain (pp. 172, 178), they introduce figures such as kings Janaka and Ajātaśatru, who acknowledge the importance of *mokṣa*, yet remain active in the world rather then opting for some form of asceticism or world-negation. Jain implies then that renunciation is not at all necessary for the attainment of *mokṣa*. In this case, I can merely repeat my previous claim (drawing on Śankara) that renunciation is not merely about leaving the world in a physical/visual sense, nor about entering a certain *āśrama*; instead, it is about a certain attitude toward the world and oneself in the world.

7. Epics: in both the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, claims Jain (p. 173), renunciation is not a central theme. The only 'renouncers' are the celibate Bhīṣma and Hanumān who are at the same time great warriors and very much engaged in the world. Well, in this case, I'm afraid that Jain missed an important point: the real 'renouncers' in the two epics are, of course, the Pāndavas and Rāma. In both cases, the departure to the forest, i.e., to the 'renunciation abode', functioning here and elsewhere as a 'transformation-zone', was necessary for the heroes in order to fulfil their destiny. Again, it is not renunciation as a social *āśrama*, but rather—in this case—as an indispensable training.

8. Bhagavadgīta: Jain quotes verses which indicate the supremacy of *karma-yoga* over *samnyāsa* (3.8, 5.2); I will briefly tell him that according to my reading, the Gīta is all about 'renunciation-in-the-world', about finding a middle-path between 'renunciation-outside-the-world' and living a householder's life. Hence, it is a picture of compromise, rather than of the householder's triumph as depicted by Jain.

9. Yogasūtra: Jain quotes scholars such as Ian Whicher, David Carpenter and Christopher Chapple who depict Patañjali's famous treatise as a 'world-affirming' rather than world-denying text. I'm not saying that such a depiction is not plausible (though I myself read the text as speaking of transcendence or 'jumping' into the abyss of the unknown). But even according to Whicher-Carpenter-Chapple's reading, it is again a picture of renunciation-in-the-world, renunciation in the sense of changing one's approach radically.

10. According to Jain (pp. 175–6), 'the triumph of Hinduism in India' (over the Buddhist tradition) is, in fact, the triumph of the householder over the renouncer. It is a very schematic and generalizing claim. Daya Krishna, for example, challenges the conventional view (expressed here by Jain), according to which, Buddhism was defeated, internalized or even 'swallowed' by certain Hindu schools and, therefore, disappeared on the Indian outer surface. According to Dayaji ('was Ācārya Śamkara responsible for the disappearance of Buddhist Philosophy in India?' in *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 164–8), it was the destruction of *Nālandā* by the Muslims in the twelfth century which has caused the disappearance of Buddhism from India.

11. Jain suggests (p. 176) that Rāmānuja and the Bhakti movement overshadow Śankara and the movement of renunciation if one looks if one looks at the 'Indian Picture' Panoramically. I agree with him that Śankara's huge impact in India, philosophically and even culturally, resulted, at least scholarly wise, in paying not enough attention to other views and schools of thought, both pre-and post-Śankara. But Jain opts for the other extreme, putting every emphasis on Dvaita and Bhakti schools, underestimating Śankara's Advaita. In between, he maintains (p. 177) that 'the new Bhakti movements supported the existing social hierarchy'. I believe that it was quite the opposite: the fact that every person had now the *adhikāra*

for liberation, whatever caste or gender he or she belongs to, presented the social hierarchy as ultimately meaningless.

12. Kabir: Jain quotes (pp. 177-8) a beautiful song from Kabir in English translation. He takes it, and rightly so, as a critique of renouncers. 'Oh brother', writes Kabir cynically, if holding back your seed earned you a place in paradise, eunuchs would be the first to arrive'. As far as my own understanding is concerned, Kabir criticizes the outer, merely physical/visual renunciation, and preaches instead for renunciation in a deeper sense, transcending outer appearances. I do not share Jain's view that by criticizing the renouncers (in my reading, the 'outer-renouncers') Kabir, in fact, praises the householder's life.

13. Dumont: According to Jain (p. 179), 'Many Vedānta interpretations, Tāntrism, Śāktism and many folk traditions are not renunciatory as already noted by Louis Dumont in his article 'World Renunciation in Indian Religions' (1960). Well, this is not accurate. In Tāntrism, one finds on the one hand *bhoga* (including everything which is conventionally considered as taboo, such as consummation of meat, alcohol and 'extra sexuality'), the but on he other hand, as emphasized by Dumont (pp. 52–56 in this article) a yoga-aspect: liberation in the sense of going beyond *dvandvas* (including *bhoga/yoga*). Hence, the Tāntric tradition has directly adopted certain samnyāsic values (*mokṣa*, transcendence); but even Tāntrism as *bhoga* is depicted by Dumont as reaction and response to asceticism. Any type of reaction, he elucidates, is necessarily based on deep absorption of that against which it is directed, and in our case, absorption of the renouncer-tradition.

14. Conclusion: Jain believes that the illustrations given by him (and questioned by me) indicate the 'holistic combination between householder and renouncer in Indian thought'. He further maintains that since the householders have always been at the centre (despite 'Western attempts' to show otherwise), one is to infer that 'India has always been an advanced civilization not only in the realms of spirituality and religion'. This leads him to another far-reaching conclusion, according to which, 'India as poverty stricken society is a result of British Colonization rather than due to world-denying ideologies from its religious traditions' (p. 179). My response is the following:

Mokṣa is and has always been a frightening thing; as I have already suggested, it is about 'jumping to the unknown'. Hence, the traditionalist will do everything he simply can to hold onto the know and the familiar. The *mokṣa*-centered renouncer is the householder's Other, rejected by him and simultaneously internalized to ensure his 'disappearance.' In many ways, the West today is India's Other, rejected/internalized by many Indians, including Pankaj Jain. Despite the obvious misdeeds committed by the Britishers in India, I wonder if one can earnestly posit as Capital sweeping accusations as Jain's, more than fifty years after the dismissal of the British Raj? Jain further condemns the Orientalistic approach, and rightly so, but paradoxically the formula India = nostalgia, West = Utopia has been adopted by quite a few Indians who truly believe that the future is in the west or at least in 'Western values'. Like Jain, I too believe that Orientalism is shallow and should be abandoned. Yet, I do not find Orientalism (despite perhaps a sense of romanticism) in taking seriously India's renouncer-tradition. I believe that Western scholars have keenly adopted the Advaita School because the very notion of *advaita* sounded familiar to their 'monotheistic ear'. Yet again, it is surprisingly the Indian's who insist on reading their own tradition again and again through Śankara's *bhāṣyas*. Time has indeed come to change direction and to spotlight other schools of thought, not in way of undermining Śankara's legacy, but rather in order to create a multifarious picture of Indian philosophy and culture.

Notes and References

1. BSBh 2.2.28: *na khalv abhāvo bāhyārthasyārthasyādhyavasātum śakyate kasmāt upalabdheh upalabhyate hi prati-pratyayam bāhyo 'rthah stambhah kudyam ghaṭah paṭa iti na capalabhyamānasyāivābhāvo bhavitum arhati yathā hi kaścid bhuñjāno bhuji-sādhyāyām tṛptau savyam anubhūyamānāyām evam brūyān nāham bhuñje na vā tṛpyāmīti tadvad indriya-samnikarṣeṇa svayam upalabhamāna eva bāhyam artham nāham upalabhe na ca so 'stīti bruvan katham upādeya-vacanah syāt*
   (Thibaut, G., *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, Part I, pp. 420–21).
2. Yājñvalkyādīnām api brahmavidām akarma-niṣṭhatvam dṛśyate (Thibaut, G., *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, Part II, pp. 291-92).

3. Daya Krishna, 'The Myth of the *Puruṣārthas*' in: *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*, p. 195.
4. Daya Krishna, 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy', in: *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*, p. 7.

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MOHANDAS MOSES: *Last Frontiers of the Mind: Challenges of the Digital Age* (Prentice-Hall of India, M-39, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110001, 2005), pp. 485, Rs. 395.

The book *Last Frontiers of the Mind*, deals with the different theories of mind that have evolved over time and claims that the developments in artificial intelligence will, ultimately, make the human mind obsolete.

There is an impressive and detailed review of the different theories of the mind. Drawing from a plethora of literature available in the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science, the book presents most major theories and concepts in a readable manner. It is a good introduction to the debates and discoveries in cognitive sciences that have taken place in the past few decades.

Moses examines the older philosophers and looks at the mind and body relation from the point of view of different fields—computer science, neuroscience, philosophy, physics, etc., and draws upon the work done by leading scientists and philosophers. However, along with the literature survey, a grossly misinformed concept beings taking shape—the possibility of machines dominating the human mind.

The idea of machines dominating the mind mainly comes from the incorrect belief that the mind works like the modern-day computer. Alan Turing, a British mathematician, had proposed universal Turing machines which are conceptual machines that can emulate any other machine. Modern-day computers are only a realization of those Turing machines, and minds, as claimed, are also realizations of the universal Turing machines—but that doesn't equate a PC to a mind! Moreover, the aim of artificial intelligence, and the Turing

test has been to develop and test *any* form of intelligence and consciousness and not just human intelligence. It is completely unjustifiable that the author has based his thesis on a concept whose origins are given a very modest review in the book.

Besides failing to investigate the work of Turing, the book also holds no serious investigation of hybrid systems. Artificial Intelligence can be approached in a bottom-up or top-down manner. The bottom-up manner (loosely) involving the neural networks and the top-down manner is usually the formal symbolic AI approach which works on the belief that the brain works in an algorithmic manner. However, there is also a third—a hybrid view—which attempts to absorb the advantages of the bottom up and top down views. In fact, there is a great deal of research being conducted to bring the best of the both approaches in the hybrid view. Unfortunately, this has been largely ignored in the book.

A certain amount of lack of clarity in the author's claims and proposals also comes across. The book draws on lots of theories and research being done in the fields of cognitive science and artificial intelligence and some work has been presented in a very biased fashion—to lend support to the weak claim that the human mind is indeed endangered by the attempts to artificial intelligence to create a replica. The research conducted by others has been pulled together, sometime out of context, by a less-qualified writer.

Careful reading brings to light the only saving grace of the book, which remains the breadth of the subject material it covers. It is most certainly an excellent resource for referring to the work being done in this field. There is a detailed survey of the available literature, drawing on works of philosophers and scientists from Plato and Aristotle to Penrose and Searle.

Ultimately, the book ends with the reader convinced at least of the wonder of the human mind—and the mystery it holds, fueling the need to investigate it more closely and ultimately replicate it.

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Books Received

1. Jayanti Jagdeb: *A Study in Biomedical Ethics,* S.A.P. in Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneshwar, 2003, pp. 73, Rs. 150.
2. Lloyd I. Rudolf and John Kurt Jacobsen: *Experiencing the State,* Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 380, Rs. 675.
3. Lloyd I. Rudolf and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph: *Post-modern Gandhi and other Essays,* Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 252, Rs. 575.
4. T.N. Ganapathy and K.R. Arumugam: *The Yoga of Siddha Tirumular: Essays on the Tirumandiram,* Babaji's Kriya Yoga and Publications. Inc. Street Etienne de Bolton, Quebec, Canada, 2005, pp. 533.
5. Bharati Puri: *Engaged Buddhism: The Dalai Lama's World-view,* Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 253, Rs. 456.
6. P. George Victor and V.V.S. Saibaba: *Studies in Vedānta: Essays in Honour of Prof. S.S. Rama Rao Pappu,* D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 2005, pp. 330, Rs. 550.
7. V.V.S. Saibaba: *Discourse in Buddhist Classics,* D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 2006, pp. 166, Rs. 320.
8. D.P. Chattopadhyaya: *Religion, Philosophy and Science—A Sketch of Global View,* IIAS, Shimla, 2006, pp. 258, Rs. 500.
9. Sanjay Kumar Shukla: *Revolution in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl,* Satyam Publishing House, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 312, Rs. 700.
10. Nirbhai Singh: *The Sikh Vision of Heroic Life and Death,* Singh Brothers, Bazar Mai Sewan, Amritsar 143 006, 2006, pp. 288, Rs. 595.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ऐ ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ऋ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ॡ ḷṛ and not lṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha,* (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḷ.
ൻ ṇ
ർ ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seũṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for *laghu-guru* of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.