Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
is a quarterly journal published by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR). It is devoted to the publication of original papers of high standard in any branch of philosophy. One of the objectives of the ICPR is to encourage interdisciplinary research with direct philosophical relevance. Accordingly, contributions from scholars in other fields of knowledge, dealing with specific philosophical problems connected with their respective fields of specialization, would be highly welcome. However, good and original contributions pertaining to any branch of traditional philosophy would be equally welcome.

Each regular issue of the Journal will contain besides full-length papers, discussions and comments, notes on papers, book reviews, information on new books and other relevant academic information. Each issue will contain around 250 pages (Royal 8'vo).

Annual Subscriptions

	Inland	Foreign	
Institutions	Rs 450	US $ 40	(Surface mail)
Individuals	Rs 200	US $ 30	-do-
Students and retired teachers	Rs 100	US $ 15	-do-
Single Issue	Rs 100	–	–
Individuals	Rs 500	(for 3 years)	-do-
Life Membership	Rs 1500	US $ 200	-do-

Bonafide students and retired teachers are requested to ask for the special subscription form.

Air mail cost will be charged extra to those subscribers who want to get the Journal by air mail. Requests for air mail delivery must be made in writing.

For subscription and all other business enquiries (including advertisement in the *JICPR*) please contact directly:

Subscription Department
Central News Agency Private Limited
23/90 Connaught Circus, New Delhi 110 001, India

All subscriptions must be prepaid.

All contributions to the Journal, other editorial enquiries and books for review are to be sent to the **Editor, Indian Council of Philosophical Research**, Darshan Bhawan, 36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, Mehrauli-Badarpur Road, New Delhi 110 062, India.
Email: icpr@del2.vsnl.net.in Website: http://www.icpr.nic.in
Portal: http//www.consciousness-ind-phil.com

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research Vol. XXIII No. 2 April - June, 2006

ISSN 0970–7794

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor : DAYA KRISHNA
Executive Editor : GODABARISHA MISHRA

Volume XXIII Number 2
April - June
2006

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

JICPR welcomes contributions in all fields of Philosophy. However, it would like its contributors to focus on what they consider to be significantly new and important in what they have to say and to consider the counter arguments to what they are saying. This is to ensure that others may judge that what they are saying is on the whole more reasonable than the views opposed to their own. The historical preliminaries may be avoided unless they are absolutely necessary to the development of the argument, as it may be assumed that most of the readers of the *Journal* are already familiar with them. Reference and quotations are generally to be avoided except in an article that is specifically exegetical. Even in such cases the author is expected to give substantive reasons as to why he differs from the accepted interpretations. The article should, as far as possible, avoid jargon and the author's contention should be stated in as simple a language as possible.

The articles which use Sanskrit terms should use the standard diacritical marks, a specimen list of which is given at the end of the *Journal*.

Editorial correspondence, including manuscripts for submission should be sent to Professor Daya Krishna, Editor, *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, 0-19 A, 4th Floor, H.D.F.C. Enclave, Ashok Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur 302 001, or to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Articles should be between 3000 to 6000 words, two copies of which should be submitted. They should be typed on one side of the paper, **double spaced** with ample margins, and contain author(s)/contributor's name and his/her institutional affiliation along with the complete mailing address. An abstract of 150–200 words should be included. Notes and references should appear at the end of the articles as *Notes*. The authors should submit the hard copy alongwith the computer file, wherever possible, on a floppy disc or as an e-mail attachment (icpr@del2.vsnl.net.in).

Only papers which have not been published elsewhere will be considered.

Proofs will be sent to the authors if there is sufficient time to do so. They should be corrected and returned to the *Journal* at the Delhi address within ten days. Major alterations to the text cannot be accepted.

Authors will be sent twenty five off-prints of their articles free of charge. They may order more of the same by payment.

Articles in the *Journal* are indexed in the *Philosophers' Index*, USA.

STYLE SHEET
For the papers in English for the *Nirgrantha*
Transliteration Conventions

For the papers written in English, words from Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī and other Prakrits including the Apabhraṁśa, etc., will be diacriticised if rendered in Roman script. (Quotations can also be in the Nāgarī script). [Here we suggest those for the Sanskrit (classical), the Prakrit, the Apabhraṁśa, and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely, Arabic, Persian and the modern European languages, the current international conventions for transliteration for their rendering may be followed.]

Continued on back cover

JOURNAL OF INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH

Volume XXIII
Number 2
April–June 2006

Editor: Daya Krishna
Executive Editor: Godabarisha Mishra

Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Darshan Bhawan
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, Mehrauli-Badarpur Road,
New Delhi 110 062, India

Articles published in this Journal are indexed in the *Philosophers' Index*, USA.

ISSN - 0970-7794

Typeset by InoSoft Systems, Noida 201 301
Printed in India
at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd., Noida 201 301
and Published by Member-Secretary
for Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Darshan Bhawan
36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area
Mehrauli-Badarpur Road, New Delhi 110 062

Contents

ARTICLES

Ṛgveda: The *Mantra*, the *Sūkta* and the *Maṇḍala* or The *Ṛṣi*, the *Devatā*, the *Chanda:* The Structure of the Text and the Problems Regarding it

DAYA KRISHNA

The *Ṛgveda*, as everyone knows, is divided into ten *Maṇḍalas*, each having a large number of *Sūktas* which consist of separate, individual *Mantras*, both numbered serially. There seems no principle as to how many *Mantras* constitute a *Sūkta*, or how many *Sūktas* make a *Maṇḍala*. There are *Sūktas* with one *Mantra* only, and there are those which have more than fifty *Mantras* in them.

Each *Mantra* is supposed to have a meter and a *Devatā* to whom it is addressed by a *Ṛṣi* whose name is given just as that of the *Devatā* to whom it is addressed.

The 'unity' of the *Mantra* is, thus, a function of three independent variables, the *Devatā*, the *Ṛṣi* and the *Chanda*. But as, for some reason, the *Mantra* has to form a part of a *Sūkta* which usually consists of a sequence of *Mantras*, the unity of the *Sūkta* is supposed to be determined not by the 'meaningfulness' of the arrangement of the sequence in a particular order, but by the *Devatā* to whom it is addressed, the *Ṛṣi* who addresses and the *Chanda* in which it is composed. This, of course, would imply that the collection of the *Mantra* and their sequence makes no difference to them or, in other words, each *Mantra* is an isolated, atomic entity complete in itself, absolutely unaffected by anything outside itself even when it is supposed to be received or sung in conjunction with others.

Why should there be a *Sūkta* in such a situation, is difficult to understand. Would it not be better to 'free' the *Mantra* from the *Sūkta* and, thus, remove the misleading impression created by their being put together in a *Sūkta*, even though it does not make any difference to them at all?

This, if accepted, would solve the problem created by those innumerable *Sūktas* scattered over all the *Maṇḍalas* where the same

Sūkta has *Mantra* addressed to more than one *Devatā*, or by different *Ṛṣis*, or in different *Chandas*, or even all of these together. We would then have only the *Mantra*, and no *Sūkta* as at present, and thus have nothing to worry about.

The proposal, though tempting, runs against the serious difficulties created by, say, *Sūktas* such as the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* or the *Puruṣa Sūkta*, or even the *Sūkta* whose *Devatā* is denoted as 'KA', and a number of others of the same kind.

The problem created by the so-called 'Dialogue *Sūkta*' such as those of Pururavā and Urvaśī in *Sūkta* 10.95 and, Yama and Yamī in 10.10, is of a different order. Here, even the distinction between the *Ṛṣi* and the *Devatā* breaks altogether, as each is the *Ṛṣi* and the *Devatā* successively in the dialogue, but also no unitary meaning can emerge unless we keep in mind the successive stages of the dialogue as conveyed by the '*Mantra*-sequence'.

The *dāna-stutis*, the hymns in praise of the *Yajamāna*, the *Yajamāna-dampatti*, and the hymns in praise of the seer or the *Ṛṣi* or the *Ṛṣiksā* raise problems which seem even more intractable as it is difficult to see how one who is being praised becomes a *Devatā* just because he is being praised. Yet, to one's utter surprise, the text seems to indicate that it was so, and was accepted from the very beginning without any objection on the part of anybody. The extant texts of the *Nighaṇṭu*, the *Nirukta* and the *Bṛhaddevatā* amply confirm the same.

The list of the *Devatās* in the *Ṛgveda* is simply incredible and, if seriously reflected upon, will reveal the utter inadequacy of the idea of a *Devatā* or deity as we think of it these days. The Vedic idea must have been totally different, if it could accommodate all that it has called *Devatās* in that category without feeling any incongruity, or being uncomfortable about it.

The *devatās* whom Yāska classifies as 'terrestrial' are an example of this. Surely, if the Vedic *Ṛṣi* considered 'pestle and mortar', or 'bow and arrow', or the earth, the battlefield and the place where food is cooked as *devatās*, they could not be using the term *Devata* in the normal accepted sense of the term. And yet, if he so regarded them, it is time that we revise our idea of what the term meant to those who used them.

The fact, however, is that this just could not be done and the 'desperate' attempts from Yāska onwards to try to bring some 'sense' and 'order' in this 'chaotic–anarchic' world of the *Ṛgveda* is an evidence of the same. The recourse to etymology in order to find the meanings of the words 'naming' the *Devata* was an attempt in this direction. So also was the argument that the 'gods', even though having different 'Names', were the same if they had the same attributes, a strategy adopted later on by the author of the *Brahma Sūtra* to explain the divergent conceptions of Brahman in the *Upaniṣads*.

Yet another strategy was adopted to reduce the number of 'gods' to a manageable proportion, and that was to treat the different names as referring to different aspects of the same deity, as was obviously the case with Sūrya or the sun-god in the *Ṛgveda*. But, though this might reduce their number, it could hardly be applied to all cases as their number was too large and had, for some reason, gone on increasing so that we find the largest number of 'new' gods in the last, i.e., the tenth *Maṇḍala*.

Surprisingly, this *Maṇḍala* also has the largest number of 'new' *Ṛṣis*, thus raising the problem of the relation between the 'new' *Devatās* and the new *Ṛṣis* that are found in that *Maṇḍala*. The appelation 'new' in respect of the *Ṛṣi* only means that they do not belong to the lineage of those *Ṛṣis* who form the central nucleus around which the earliest *Sūktas* seem to have been collected and were given precedence over others. *Maṇḍalas* 2 to 7, as is well known, are organized around the lineage of Āngirasa/Bhārgava, Viśwāmitra, Gautama, Ātreya, Bharadwāja and Vasiṣṭha, respectively. It is not the case that the names of other *Ṛṣis* are not found in these *Maṇḍalas*, but they are few and far between and, in the case of sixth and seventh *Maṇḍala*, practically none at all.

The case of the Kāṇva lineage is strange as, though they have a prominent place in the first and the eighth *Maṇḍala*—some occurring even in the ninth—they were never given a separate *Maṇḍala* to themselves. Perhaps, they are late-comers and became prominent later, as is evidenced by the separate and independent *Saṁhitā* of the *Sūkta Yajurveda*, called after their name, the *Kāṇva Saṁhitā*. Professor Satavalekar, the eminent scholar of the Veda, has questioned the identity of these with those found in the *Ṛgveda*, but

there seems little reason to doubt that they belonged to the same lineage as those found in the *Ṛgveda*, particularly if one remembers the proliferation of the *Ṛṣis* belonging to this lineage in the eighth *Maṇḍala* and of some in the ninth *Maṇḍala* also.

In fact, the story is not confined to *Kāṇvas* only. The case of the Āngirasa is even more important as—though they had the second *Maṇḍala* to themselves sharing it with the Bhārgava—they come into their own only in the eighth, ninth and the tenth *Maṇḍalas* where there are a lot of other 'new' *Ṛṣis* also.

What is even more surprising is to find that even those *mantras* belonging to the other major lineages such as Viśwāmitra, Gautama, Ātreya, Bharadwāja and Vasiṣṭha occur in *Maṇḍalas* other than the ones in which they occupy a prominent, if not exclusive, place for themselves. This suggests not only that the successive generations belonging to the families of these Vedic *Ṛṣis* continued to add to the creation of the *Mantra/Sūkta* text of the *Ṛgveda*, but also that the *Maṇḍalas* in which they occur were incorporated in the standard text of the *Ṛgveda* later. This is generally accepted for the first and the tenth *Maṇḍala* by most of the scholars who have written on the subject. But the same has also to be done in respect of eighth and ninth *Maṇḍala* on the same grounds has, as far as I know, not been seriously considered inspite of the fact that the same considerations apply to them equally.

It is not that *Ṛṣis* different from the seven lineages whom we have designated as 'new' do not occur in the *Maṇḍalas* II, III, IV, V, VI and VII, but their number is far less than those that occur in the rest of the *Maṇḍalas*, i.e., I, VIII, IX and X. In fact, if we include the *Kāṇvas* amongst the 'new' *Ṛṣis*, the picture would change even more as they form a significantly large proportion of the *Ṛṣis* in *Maṇḍala* I and VIII. The total number of 'new' *Ṛṣis* in the lineage *Maṇḍala*, if we exclude the *Kāṇvas*, adds only to 23, 14 of which are found in fifth *Maṇḍala* which belongs to the Ātreya family. The II, IV, VI and VII *Maṇḍala* have only one, two and one *Ṛṣi*, respectively. The III *Maṇḍala* belonging to the Viśwāmaitra family has the second largest, i.e., five 'new' *Ṛṣis* in it.

The story of the *Devatās* in these 'Family *Maṇḍalas*' is not very different. They add up to 71, of whom 42 are found in the sixth and seventh *Maṇḍala*, 20 and 22, respectively. The II, III, IV and V have 6, 7, 10 and 6 'new' *Devatās* in them, adding to only 29.

As against these, *Maṇḍala* X alone has about 90 'new' *Devatās*. If we add to these the 'new' *Devatās* occurring in I, VIII and IX *Maṇḍala* also, the total number would be about 135 or a little more, depending how we treat the term *pavamāna* when added to Agni or Puṣā as in *Sūkta* 9.67. There are some differences in this regard between the Bṛhad *Devatā* and the extant text of the *Ṛgveda* that we have with us as, say, in IX.83. The problem of these differences, in fact, plagues every student of the *Ṛgveda* as there are not only significant differences between the standard texts on the subject, such as *Nighanṭu*, *Nirukta*, *Bṛahaddevtā* and *Sarvānukramaṇī*, but also different interpretations regarding the *Devatā* that is referred to in the *Mantra* on the part of well-known authorities such as Śākaṭāyana, Śākapūṇī, Gārgya, Gālava and others. The significance of these differences in the context of the construction of the text of the *Ṛgveda* seems to have hardly been appreciated, for if we cannot exactly determine in many cases who is the *Devatā* or the *Ṛṣi* of the *Mantra* concerned, how can we talk about it meaningfully if the exact determination of the *Ṛṣi*, the *Devatā* and the *Chanda* is considered essential to the construal of a *Mantra* as a *Mantra* in the *Ṛgveda*.

But whatever the problem created by the difference amongst the texts on the basis of which our present 'knowledge' about the *Ṛgveda* rests or the diversities of interpretation referred to by Yāska in his Nirukta itself, there can be little doubt that something significant was happening in the later Ṛgvedic period when new *Ṛṣis* brought with them not only new *Devatās*, but also a new ethos, a new way of wonder and thinking and feeling brought to the fore by the women *Ṛṣis* or *Ṛṣikās* on the one hand and those who composed the *Nāsadīya Sūkta*, the *Puruṣa Sūkta*, the *Kasmai Devāya Sūkta*, along with the *Sūktas* called Bhāvavṛttam, as if it too were a *Devatā* belonging to the Vedic Pantheon.

That there was some sort of a break from the earlier tradition which may be regarded as centering around the families and lineage of the *Ṛṣis* of the second to seventh *Maṇḍala*, i.e., the Āngirasa, Bhārgava, the Viśwāmitra, the Gautama, the Ātreya, the Bharadwāja and the Vasiṣṭha is shown by the fact that the first, eighth, ninth and tenth *Maṇḍala* breathe a different air. The *Kāṇvas*, who seem to be a latecomer, dominate the first and eighth *Maṇḍala*, while

the latter brings a whole new class of *Sūkta* called *dānastuti*, which though not entirely absent earlier as they are found in the sixth and seventh *Maṇḍala* also, predominate here, in the eighth *Maṇḍala*. As against one in the sixth *Maṇḍala* (6.27) and three in the seventh *Maṇḍala* (7.18, 7.41 and 7.49) there are thirteen in the eighth *Maṇḍala*. It seems that Bharadwāja and Vasiṣṭha had taken a step which broke the inhibitions and made the praise of the gift and the gift-giver equivalent to the praise of the *Devatā* who also were asked for gifts by the *Ṛṣis* and praised for the same.

Similar seems to be the story of the 'self-praise' of the seer or the *Ṛṣis* as if he/she were the *Devatā* of the *Sūkta* as the 'praise' was addressed to him or her. The tenth *Maṇḍala* abounds in these, though the tradition seems to have been well established as it is found in other *Maṇḍalas* also. The anomaly here seems greater as it is difficult to understand how the *Ṛṣi* could treat himself or herself as the *Devatā* as they could certainly not ask or expect 'gifts' from themselves.

Perhaps it was the 'praise-aspect' that made the collecters of the *Saṁhitā Sūkta* treat them as *Devatā*. But even this hypothesis breaks if we remind ourselves of the 'Dialogue-*Sūkta*' such as those of Purusravā and Urvaśī or Yama and Yamī which abound in the tenth *Maṇḍala* where each is alternatively treated as *Ṛṣis* or *Devatā*, depending upon who is addressing and who is being addressed.

But, is this then the 'real' meaning of being a *Ṛṣi* or a *Devatā* in the context of the *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā*? Unfortunately, this is not supported by the evidence if we take the *Sūkta* dealing with Duḥsvapna-nāśanam or Yakṣmānāśanam or Sapatnghnam (10.166) or Sapatnībādhanam (10.145) which, for some strange reason, is also called an *Upanisad*. The *Duḥsvpana-nāśanam* occurs in other *Maṇḍalas* also as, say, in 2.28, 5.82 and 1.120. The *Maṇḍala* 5.82 is mentioned only in *Bṛhāddevatā* and not, as the note there says, in Sarvānukramaṇī. These discrepancies raise important issues, which we will discuss later.

But it is not just these that raise disturbing questions regarding what is meant by a *Devatā* in the *Ṛgveda*. There are *Sūktas* relating to *Prāyaśacitta* as in 10.165 or 10.162 or *rājyābhiṣeka* 10.173 and 10.174 where the king is treated as a *Devatā*.

These and some others may be said to have been taken from *Atharvaveda* where they are said to be found in plenty and, thus, not belonging to the *Ṛgveda* proper. But what shall we say of those *Sūkta* where the *Devatā* is named as *bhāvavṛttam* or even something such as *Jñāna* as in 10.71?

Bhāvavṛttam is something special as it is found practically in the tenth *Maṇḍala* alone. There is reference to a *bhāvavṛttam* in *Bṛhaddevatā* to one as occurring in 6.47 but, according to the footnote given in the text, it is not found in *Sarvānukramaṇī*. There are at least six *bhāvavṛttam* in the tenth *Maṇḍala*, including the famous *Nāsadīya Sūkta* (10.129) of Prajapati Parmeṣṭhin. The *bhāvavṛttam Sūkta* where the *bhāvavṛttam* is explicitly mentioned as a *Devatā* are 10.85, 10.129, 10.130, 10.145, 10.154 and 10.190. All these, though listed in the *Bṛhaddevatā* as such, are not always treated or mentioned as such in the text available at present. The *bhāvavṛttam* referred to in 10.85, for example, is one such; another is 10.145 which is called an *Upaniṣad* in both and also describes by its subject-matter as Sapatnībādhanam. Indrāṇī is said to be the *Ṛṣi* or rather the *Ṛṣikā*, though she is not mentioned as such. She seems to have some problem with Indra as she also occurs in 10.86 where Vṛṣakapi plays some role and there is a strange dialogue between her and Indra. The present text gives Indra as the *Devatā* though, according to the conventions of the dialogue, one who is addressed is always the *Devatā* and one who addresses is the *Ṛṣi*, as in 10.10 and 10.95. Here, 10.154 and 10.190 are described as *bhāvavṛttam* in the present text as are 10.129 and 10.130.

What exactly is meant by a *bhāvavṛttam* is not clear. The *Sūkta* 10.129 suggests the emergence of a consciousness different from the one associated with the *Ṛṣis* of the *Ṛgveda* who are always addressing the gods, praising them and asking for something in return. The *Nāsadīya Sūkta* (10.129) reflects a 'questioning consciousness' that is concerned with the cosmos as a whole and wonder about its origin and coming into being. Even the *Sūkta* 10.130 contains this element in *Mantra* 3 where it asks 'कासीत्प्रभा प्रतिमा किं निदानभाज्यं किसासीत परिधिः क आसीत। छन्दः किमासीत्प्रउगं किमुक्थँ यदेदवा देवम मजन्त विश्वे।।'. But 10.154 does not seem to suppose this, though 10.190 takes us again to the cosmic question of the origins, but without questioning it.

These three *Sūktas*, in fact, have something in common with the other well-known *Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* and should, more properly, be classified with them. *Sūkta* 10.121 ascribed to Hiraṇyagarbha Prājāpatya asks 'कस्मैषा देवाय हविष विधेम' and answers in the last *Mantra* 10 that instead of worshipping so many gods, we might address only that which creates it all, i.e., Prajāpati. The question, in fact, is asked by Sunaḥśesṣ Ājīgarti in *Sūkta* 1.24 where it is asked whose auspicious name (चारू देवस्य नाम) shall we invoke and, successively, suggests Agni, Savitā or Bhaga and Varuṇa for consideration. Surprisingly Indra, for some reasons, is left out.

The *Puruṣa Sūkta* 10.90 deals with the same problem and answers 'पुरूष एवेदं सर्व यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यम्' and details at great length how the all-encompassing Being, though pervading all that has been, or will be, yet transcends it also. The *Nāsadīya Sūkta* 10.129 questions even this and raises the problem of there being 'non-being' or 'Being' at the beginning and suggests that the question is 'unanswerable' because of its very nature. The *Sūkta* 10.190 suggests that the answer may lie not in postulating some 'Being', whether personal or impersonal, but rather in seeing an 'order' which makes judgements claiming 'truth' or 'goodness' possible through providing a foundation for their 'actuality' and validation. *Ṛta* and *Satya* provide the cosmic foundation of the universe and may be apprehended by *tapasa* or disciplined 'seeking' or *sādhanā* and realized through them. The *Sūkta* 10.191, the last *Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda*, suggests that this is not, and cannot be, something on the part of an individual alone, but is rather the 'collective' enterprise of all 'humankind' and names the 'god' of this *Sūkta* 'Somjñānam' emphasizing the 'Togetherness' of all 'Being' and spelling it out as सं गच्छध्वं, सं वदध्वं, सं वो मनांसि जानताम्। देवा भागं यथा पूर्वे संजानना उपासते।।

This *upāsanā* is not the *upāsanā* of the *Upaniṣads*, which is done in loneliness for the attainment of 'Aloneness', but a 'togetherness' of 'mind' and 'heart', as the subsequent verses explicate.

These *Sūktas* which form the speculative core of the *Ṛgveda* have little to do with *yajña*, but are rather a reflection on problems with which man has been perennially concerned. They all occur mostly in the tenth *Maṇḍala* and are hardly concerned with any of the 'gods' of the Vedic Pantheon, or the 'reflections' of any of the *Ṛsis* belonging to the major lineages in the *Ṛgveda*, except Samvanana

Āngirasa to whom the last *Sūkta* is ascribed, and this perhaps is the only *Sūkta* with which he is associated.

All this suggests that something 'new' was occurring in the late Vedic period to which this *Maṇḍala* is generally assigned. The impression is further strengthened by the fact that women *Ṛṣis* came into their own in this *Maṇḍala* and speak with a voice which, though embarrassing to many, was distinctly their own. Surprisingly, when the male voice talks like this in a hundred allusions in the *Ṛgveda*, it does not seem to embarrass anyone, but when a Yamī (10.10) or Urvaśī (10.95) or a Romaśā (1.126) or Lopāmudrā or Indrāṇī (10.86) speaks out, most people do not like it. It is not that women *Ṛṣikās* always speak with one voice or are concerned only with expressing their viewpoint on the intimate aspects of their personal life. Like their male counterparts, they too have a wide-ranging cosmological reflection as in 10.125 where Vāgāmaorani sees herself as identical in essence with all the gods and everything else, leading to the puzzling question whether the *Devatā* of this *Sūkta* be considered as *Vāk* or *Ātmā* or the *Ṛṣikā* herself. Different editors of the *Ṛgveda* offer different opinions according to their own different predilections. The same situation obtains with Śraddhā Kāmāyanī who talks of *Śraddhā* as being the most fundamental thing in life, as without it life can have neither 'roots' nor 'meaning' (10.151). Sūryā Sāvitrī plays the same trick with her name and describes her marriage with a systematic ambiguity as if she is describing the marriage of Sūrya, the sun-god himself. It is not that the *Ṛṣikās* do not write *Sūktas* in honour of the usual gods addressed to in the *Ṛgveda*. Ghoṣā Kākṣīvaṭī, for example, addresses the Āśvinas in *Sūktas* 10.39 and 10.40.

The *Sūktas* ascribed to women *Ṛṣis* deserve an independent study on their own. But there can be little doubt that most of these occur in the tenth *Maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda*, and that they are generally not related to the *Ṛṣis* of the major lineages, though some do belong to them. The presence of Sarparājñī amongst the *Ṛṣikās* suggests that the tribals were being adopted into the Vedic fold, including the women, as belonging to them. *Sūkta* 10.175 seems to be attributed to a tribal *Ṛṣi* also called *sarpa* (Ūrdhvagrāvā Ārbudi) whose *Devatā* is said to be *grāvāṇaḥ* or *prastarḍikhanḍa*, that is a piece of stone.

It is not just the tribals or women who begin to play a more important part in the late Vedic period, but also those who belong to the various professions other than those who belonged to the priestly class. The case of *rathakāra* is well-known as he was given the right to perform the Vedic sacrifice along with Niṣadasthapati, the tribal chief, but the case of Dhānāka (10.35-36) or, say, Tvṣṭā Garbhakartā who occur in the tenth *Maṇḍala* (10.184) do not seem to have been paid sufficient attention in this regard. In fact, if one pays attention to *Sūkta* 9.112 where the *Ṛṣi*, Śiśu Āngirasa calls himself as a Kārū, i.e., a 'crafter' (*mantra* 3) or maker of verses (kārūrāhaṁ) just like others who pursue their craft and has his father who was a *bhiṣaja* or 'doctor' did, or his mother was *Upalaprakṣiṇī*, a profession which the translators do not find easy to understand. There is, in fact, a *Ṛṣi* who is called Āthavaṇa bhiṣaja in *Sūkta* 97 of the tenth *Maṇḍala* who has written *Mantras* in praise of medicinal plants or *auṣadhi samūha*, which is regarded as a *Devatā* for the *Sūkta*. The name seems to suggest that he was a *Ṛṣi* belonging primarily to the *Atharvaveda* and his inclusion here seems more a matter of courtesy than of right. In fact, the tenth *Maṇḍala* seems to have a number of *Sūktas*, which seem to belong to the Atharvavedic rather than the Ṛgvedic tradition. Such, for example, are those that deal with the healing or even the magical power of *Mantras* to achieve ends that one would not usually regard as good. The *Sūkta* 10.163 ascribed to Vivṛhā Kāśyapa deals with the curing of tuberculosis or Yakṣamā (यक्ष्मानाशने). *Sūkta* 10.161 also deals with *Rājayakṣamānāśanam* and the *Ṛṣi* to whom it is ascribed is called Yakṣmānāṣana Prājāpatya. While *Sūkta* 10.164 deals with getting rid of bad dreams (*duḥvapna nāśanaṁ*). *Sūkta* 10.166, ascribed to Ṛṣabha Vairāja or Ṛṣabha Śakcara, is supposed to be effective in dealing with co-wives who, presumably, are creating difficulties for one another. Strangely, *Sūkta* 10.145 deals with the same problem, *Saptnībādhama*, and is ascribed to Indrāṇī and is, strangely, also called an *Upaniṣad*. This obviously is a *Ṛṣikā* Indirānī different from the Vṛṣakapi *Sūkta* 10.86 where Indra, Vṛṣkapi Indra and Indrāṇī are said to be the *Ṛṣis* and the *Ṛṣikā* engaged in a dialogue with Indra as a *Devatā* of the *Sūkta*.

The notion of the *Ṛṣi* and the *Devatā* usually associated with the Vedic *Mantra* need a drastic revision as not only they can easily

interchange places as in this *Sūkta*, but also have nothing sacrosanct about them or an element of the transcendental or the sacred associated with them. The dialogue between Yama and Yamī in *Sūkta* 10.10 and Purnruvā-Urvaśi in *Sūkta* 10.95 are pre-eminent examples of this where each is successively mentioned as a *Ṛṣi* and a *Devatā*, depending upon the situation as the dialogue requires.

But while there may be some justification for such ascriptions in the dialogues as the *Devatā* is usually the one who is addressed and the *Ṛṣi* the one who addresses, there seems to be none in calling *duḥsvapna nāśanam* as *Devatā* (10.164) or *Yakṣmānāsnam* as in 10.163.

The same seems to be the situation in the Prāyaseitta *Sūkta* such as 10.162 and 10.165 where the *Devatā* is described as *garbhasrāva prāyaśacitta* (10.162) or *Kapotapachcha Prāyaścitta* (10.165).

It is not that such *Devatās* are not mentioned elsewhere. *Duḥsvapna nāśanam* occurs, for example, in 1.120 and 2.28 also. Similar is the case with, say, Mṛtuvimocinī 7.59 and Pāśavimocini 7.88, but there these so-called *Devatās* are embedded in the larger *Sūkta* devoted to some other regular *Devatā* such as Aśvini Kumara or Varuṇa. As for *mṛtunvimocanī*, it is embedded in a *Sūkta* dedicated to Maruta except for the last *mantra* (12), which is addressed to Rudra as *Trayambaka* and is known by this name. The same is true of *Pāśavimcanī* in 7.88 where, in a *Sūkta* addressed to Varuṇa, it is only the last *Mantra* No. 7, which seems to be concerned with this. This designation is found only in the text edited by Satavalekara from Pardi and is missing from the other text that we have that has been edited by K.L. Joshi, published by Choukhamba Press in 2000. Surprisingly, the *Bṛhaddevatā* does not mention either of these specific titles in the list of deities given in Appendix III, critically edited and translated by McDonnell in 1904 in the Harvard Oriental Series, though there is a reference to *Tryambaka* in it the context of which the term *mṛtuvimchanī* is used. There is even a problem with the ascription of *duḥsvapna nāśanam* in 1.120 where, in spite of the fact that this designation occurs in both the texts edited by Satvalekara, Joshi and the *Bṛhaddevatā*, the text does not sustain the specific description in it.

The problem with the *Ṛṣis* and the *Devatās* in the *Ṛgveda*, as mentioned in the text available with us at present are so many and so baffling, that it is surprising as to how could anyone have hon-

estly said that a Vedic *Mantra* cannot be a *Mantra* unless these two are exactly specified along with the *Chanda* or the meter in which it is composed.

If taken literally, the requirement will create a problem for all the *Sūktas* where the *Ṛṣi* or the *Devatā* or the *Chanda* cannot be unequivocally determined or is given with possible alternatives, or is just absent altogether. The whole of the second *Maṇḍala,* for example, is supposed to be ascribed to both Āngirasa and Bhārgava even though the two lineages are quite distinct in the *Ṛgveda* itself.[1] This, as everyone knows, is not an isolated case. The whole of the *Ṛgveda* is replete with similar examples. The situation is even more complicated as, too many a time, the *Ṛṣi* and the *Devatā* are the same as, according to the description given in the *Bṛhaddevatā,* the *Sūkta* is in 'self-praise' of the *Ṛṣi* and, hence, is addressed to oneself. There are also cases of alternative ascriptions where the same person is, alternatively, a *Ṛṣi* and a *Devatā,* depending upon who is being addressed and who is addressing. Urvaśi and Pururvā in *Sūkta* 10.95 and Yama and Yamī in *Sūkta* 10.10 are well-known examples, but there are others as well. Lopāmudrā and Ramaśā (1.179 and 1.126) are other examples found in the first *Maṇḍala,* suggesting that the Dialogue form was not confined to tenth *Maṇḍala* only.

The anomalous problem created by the alternative appellation of the term *Ṛṣi* and *Devatā* to the same person in the Dialogue *Suktas* of the *Ṛgveda* is further compounded by the *Sūkta* where the self-praise of the *Ṛṣi* results in his being treated as a *Devatā* of the *Sūkta* to whom the *Mantra* is being addressed. The practice abounds in the eighth and tenth *Maṇḍala,* but is sporadically found elsewhere also. Some of the women *Ṛṣis* of the tenth *Maṇḍala* such as Śacī Paulomī do the same (10.159).

As for *Chanda,* the third pillar on which the identity of a *mantra* is supposed to rest, the situation does not seem any better. If there is indecision about the *ṛṣi* or the *devatā* in so many of the *Sūktas* in the *Ṛgveda,* the same is also found in the case of *Chanda,* though not to the same extent. The *Sūkta* 4.10, for example, mentions in respect of *mantras* 4, 6 and 7 that these may be in the *Chanda* named पदंपंक्ति or प्रस्तिांक, while *mantras* 5 and 8 are clearly designated as महापंक्ति and प्रस्तिांक, respectively. The occurrence of different *Chandas*

in the same *Sūkta* is not supposed to affect the 'unity' of the *Sūkta,* just as the existence of different *ṛṣis* and the *devatās* is not supposed to do the same. Where from does the unity of a *Sūkta* come, then? That is the unanswered question in respect of this most basic text of the 'Indian civilization'.

The ambiguity in respect of what is meant by *ṛṣi* or *devatā* in the context of the *Ṛgveda* is endemic, as has been pointed out at length earlier. But, like the *Chanda,* perhaps more than that, they too abound in multiplicity and difference, as if the very idea of 'unity' did not make any 'sense' to those who 'authored' or 'collected' them.

The idea that the 'unity' to a vedic mantra or *Sūkta* is given by the *ṛṣi,* the *devatā* and the *chanda* is a superimposition on the text, a myth, an *adhyāsa* from which we need to 'free' ourselves so that we may 'look' at it with fresh eyes, unencumbered by the 'misguidance' of the past, enshrined in the texts written on the subject.

The same is true with respect to the *maṇḍala* arrangement at present which, however, convenient it might have been in the past, stands in the way of our understanding and appreciating it now.

Note and Reference

1. गृत्समद (आंगीरस शौनहोत्र पयचाढ़), भार्गव शौनकं।

On Concepts[1]

R.S. BHATNAGAR

10/558, Kaveripath, Mansoravar, Jaipur 302 020; E-mail: rajen5@gmail.com

A thought configuration, however complex or systematic, consists of a set of concepts and their inter-relations. What is the nature of these concepts? How they come to be? How do they acquire a meaningful role? How do they function? How they themselves become problematic and object of analysis or investigation? And how they are related with what lies yonder or beyond them, comprise some of the questions which are not centrally raised. In this brief paper, an attempt is being made to find answers to these questions.

To begin with, what is the nature of these questions? What are they? What is their stuff? These questions are as puzzling as is to ask what is consciousness? Or, what is the stuff of consciousness? These questions appear to be even more strange when it is realized that we are inquiring about something which is closer to us than any other thing—something we are experiencing all the time. And yet it is also evident that the answers to these questions have so far eluded us while thinkers have been busy with them from the ancient times. There is little unanimity amongst thinkers about the answers. In fact, the very warp and woof of the fabric of experience consists of concepts.

To have a concept is to be conscious of something, and to be conscious is to have some concept, though not always. The two—consciousness and concept—are intimately related, though they are not identical. It is possible to be conscious but have no concept, while it is not possible to have a concept and not be conscious of it. The question regarding the nature of the stuff of concepts or consciousness leads us to the controversy relating to the relationship between mind and brain. It is not convenient to enter into that debate here but it would be helpful to put before us the two major views relating to which the debate continues. One view is that there is nothing like consciousness as a separate entity

apart from the brain. The other is that consciousness cannot be reduced to a brain. These are, of course, extremely simplified positions.

The answers to the question as to what a concept would be is determined in the light of either of these positions. It might be some physiological function or it may be something which is largely independent of the physiological frame of explanation. Whatever position is taken, one thing appears to be clear. The terminology involved in the discussion of mind and mental phenomena will continue to be significantly used even when it is shown that the mind is completely reducible to the brain and all mental phenomena can be understood in terms of physiological functions. So, we shall proceed with the language that has been in use in this connection without assuming any of the positions concerning the mind-brain debate.

Functionally, a concept is something which allows some sort of multiplicity or complexity to be apprehended as a unity or totality. A concept may apprehend an object or an individual either as a whole or a whole with its parts, members, attributes or as a part of a bigger complex or whole whenever we entertain or think about some object as picked up from its environs at thought level and proceed with it into a sort of inquiry into its various aspects or relationship with other chunks of the environs.

It is interesting to notice that often the process of thinking goes on while the object of thought is not present physically. Thinking about something when it is not present to us physically, moves us into a higher level of journey into the realm of concepts. Concepts acquired as a result of the encounter with the world now assume a sort of independent status and now float about in various modes as objects of our awareness aided with our imaginative ability and some sort of purposive orientation. A word about the 'encounter with the world'. It is queer that we use this expression with great facility without being aware of the implication. It does not occur to us how can I or we *encounter* the world. For, in that case, I am assuming—of course, in an unconscious manner—that I am not *in* the world. The world is there outside me. Obviously, this is nonsense. Yet the locution is current. It presents the same kind of puzzle as does the notion of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge requires the subject to be in the place of object. As has been noted, that seems to be an impossibility. Yet the talk about self is fluent.

Besides the concepts that come to be formed as a result of the encounter with the world, we find many other kinds of concepts when we introspect. As is well-known, Descartes looked into the repository of mind and found three kinds of concepts—those which are acquired from the external objects, those which are result of imaginative activity, and finally, those which he called innate. While such an attempt draws our attention to what the mind possesses in the form of concepts and the fact that these concepts are not all the same type, yet Descartes' classification does not exhaust the variety of concepts. Moreover, the characterization of innate concepts having a privileged epistemic status and their nature has been contested. For example, the idea of infinite remains debatable since the times of Descartes regarding its source. So we need to go through the repository of concepts afresh.

Besides the concepts that are acquired as a result of the encounter with the world which may be called representational concepts, we find concepts which enable us to organize our experience. The vast input from outside requires the identity of items and that involves differentiation between various objects.[2] Recognition of an object as the same object necessitates the concept of identity on the one hand and requires the concept of difference on the other so as to avoid any confusion. Perceptual events are not stationary. In fact, nothing is stationary and yet, it is miraculous that we experience stability in relation to the various objects that we encounter. What happens is that the percepts follow each other in a constant stream. Kant distinguished between a reversible sequence of percepts and the irreversible sequence of percepts. He thought that the category of cause and effect enables us to comprehend the visible sequence of objetcs. His idea was that the category of cause and effect is something which our understanding contributes to the experience. He does not seem to have noticed that the distinction which he found between the reversible and irreversible sequences of percepts was embedded in the given or what we called the manifold itself and it was because of that very embeddedness that understanding could apply to the category of cause and effect.

The deeper thing that Kant's analysis draws our attention to is that the object itself or its percept does not carry the label of cause or effect. It is in this sense that the concepts of cause and effect and also those of identity and difference can be said to be the mind's contribution, though their source lies in the experience itself. The thing to note is that concepts like these are organizational concepts and they help us to make our experience intelligible. Spatial concepts such as 'left', 'right', 'up', 'down', 'centre', 'far', 'near', and 'central' belong to the same category. Perhaps this could also be applied to temporal concepts.

Events are not merely fixed in the grid of cause and effect; they are also given names such as 'revolution', 'big bang', etc. They are further specified and given more specific names such as 'Russian Revolution', 'Indian war of Independence' and so on. Thus, organizational concepts seem to form a hierarchy, a consideration of which would lead us into the nature of thinking itself. The formation of basic concepts or key concepts as belonging to a certain theory or discipline come from such a hierarchy. The investigation in a certain domain of inquiry moves around such concepts. These sentences may give the impression that such concepts or their application remain self-identical for good. However, as is well-known, Kuhn has pointed out that over a period concepts undergo drastic changes and the entire framework gets transformed. While Kuhn's idea pictures discontinuities in the history of cognitive enterprise, it shifts our attention from the subtle continuity which underlies such an enterprise. But this merely supports Kuhn's notion—his theory cannot be stable one.

Needs of survival sustaining the being of the organism and making it possible for it to exist in the collectivity of such organisms as also interact with each other generate concepts which lend orientation to our activities and also enrich our activities with a quality dimension. Concepts such as goodness, duty, utility, prudence, beauty, efficiency, comfort, freedom, all illustrate those concepts which give orientation to our actions. Some of these concepts and the likes also enable us to place things, events, acts and performances, artefacts and even concepts themselves in some sort of scheme. They may, therefore, be called evaluative concepts. In the epistemic contexts we have evaluative concepts like 'true', 'false', 'valid', 'invalid' and so on.

It seems to be a characteristic of understanding that it moves from plurality to unity, from multiplicity to totality. Total perspective is a unified perspective. Such a movement of understanding does not seem to rest till it arrives at a totality without a residual. Hegelian Absolute illustrates the point. Hegelian dialectic has for its culminating state an Absolute which has assimilated all the possible categories (so far as Hegel's understanding was concerned). Apart from the movement towards totality, understanding also moves towards the base, ground or cause which is ultimate in the sense that such a ground state is in itself baseless, groundless or causeless. The great thing bout Kantian insight is that we become aware of the contradictory demand of the understanding and, thereby, realize the futility of such a demand. Yet, many thinkers and the untutored common understanding go on seeking a baseless base or an exhaustive totality without at all being bothered about its impossibility. Such a quest generates concepts which are paradoxical. These concepts seem to knock at the limits of conceptuality, similar to the astronomic numbers they seem to be inconceivable in the sense of being unimaginable.

The attention to inconceivability is to take resort to imagination and call images from experience which would, in some way, be analogical or approximate to some consummating experience. Religious discourses, given any culture, would be found to be replete with such images. It is interesting to note that those who have pursued the ideas of the ultimate with a logical rigour were not satisfied with such approximations or analogies and conceived the ultimate without any sensous content and also without any possibility of predication. It does not matter how inconceivable such a concept may be.

There are some other concepts which do not have any apparent relation to sensuous content. They may be referred to as purely formal. Concepts which are normally dealt with in logic or mathematics illustrate such concepts. These concepts have an intrinsic organization. The various operations in logic can be distinguished from each other and can also be carried on within a formal structure without having any reference to empirical realm. So seems the case with mathematical concepts.

Before moving further we have to remind ourselves that whatever we have said so far about concepts has been possible because

we have the facility as well as an ability to use symbols to talk about concepts. Obviously, language makes thinking possible. The relation between a word and a concept is indeed very intimate. That we are using a language—moving through words while thinking—requires some effort to be conscious of this fact. The situation becomes more complex when language itself becomes an object of investigation. When we think of what we are trying to convey through a word or a sentence, we are obviously thinking of something which is prelinguistic or non-linguistic. This is quite clear when the distinction between a proposition and a sentence is discussed or the matter of translation is talked about. This paragraph had to be inserted here because the notion of meaning in terms of words and sentences cannot be voided in such an exercise.

While all concepts can be assimilated under one category or be considered as homogeneous, yet, as we have already noticed, they can be distinguished as falling in several domains according to their role and function in actual discourse. A major distinction can be introduced between representational concepts and the rest. Since most other concepts have for their subject the representational concepts, they cannot be completely dissociated from them. For example, what would the organizational concepts organize if they did not have representational concepts for organizing? This is not so clear so far as the orientational, regulative or valuational concepts are concerned.

An interesting point to be noted is the fact that orientational or valuational concepts primarily indicate a realm, which is non-existent. Here, 'ought' in contrast to 'is' indicates a supposed state of affair which is basically characterized by non-existence. 'Ought' directs our action. However, the action requires for its realm an existing state of affairs. A desired result cannot be attained in the absence of the knowledge of state of affairs and the dynamics involved in such a state. Moreover, the kind of desired state of affairs is notionally constructed out of those components which must be there.

This brings us to one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. What is the relationship between concept or thought and being or existence? It is well-known that philosophers have debated this issue from two different and opposed points of

view—thought is determined by being and being is determined by thought. There have been several shades in-between. The controversy raged between British empiricism and Continental idealism. Buddhist schools dealt with it centuries before it was discussed in the West. From the point of view of the beginning of the psychic life, it would appear that the so-called mental contents would be determined by the impact of the individual encounters in the world. However, the needs of survival and, consequently, adjustment with the surroundings lead to reactions to the world. Various abilities of the mind such as comprehension, memory, imagination and intelligence enable the individual to learn about the world outside and react to it. This process of action and reaction would generate both representational as well as organizational concepts. Questions regarding the relationship between epistemology and ontology are raised at a stage when our minds have already acquired a countless variety of concepts. Since the history of the genesis of concepts is cost in oblivion, we are tempted to think that whatever we know is mostly or completely a contribution of our mind.

It would be pointed out that the regulative or orientational concepts on the one hand and the evaluative concepts on the other cannot be contributed by the world there for they are meant to bring about what is not there, or being about the structures which do not exist. There is a sense in which this is true. As noted above, norms and values are not answered partially or fully in the world and so they inspire our actions to bring about the desired objects and situations. But there is another aspect is the matter which bears upon the relationship between what is there and what is not. Let us take an example. I find my room in complete disorder. Things are so placed in it that neither can I move about in it with ease nor can I find things when I need them. So I set about to bring about some order into the room. I place the items of furniture in such a way that movements is facilitated. I arrange things in such a way that when I need any of them I am able to find them. Obviously, this order did not exist when I first looked at my room. The needs of movement with ease and the availability of the things without difficulty determined how I would go about to set the room. These needs and the existing disorder determined the

Does that mean that there is a state of awareness which is devoid of all concepts? It is interesting to note that the discourse relating to 'Brahma' or *śūnya* does culminate in an indication to a conceptless awareness, which is sometimes shown as being one with the cosmic consciousness.

There are other concepts which are similar to the concepts of 'Brahma' or 'Śūnya', but different in the sense that they are not conceived as completely devoid of predication. Descartes' concept of infinite, or 'Substance' of Spinoza or 'the Absolute' of Hegel are concepts which point to what is real in a pre-eminent sense and admit predication in some way or the other. The notion of 'saguna brahma' is of a similar kind. As pointed out above, such concepts are made intelligible by calling to attention approximating experiences, which we human beings have actually gone through.

How do we come to have concepts such as these? Since they are not formed as a result of any impact of the external world, they must have their source within our mind or consciousness. They are innate or *a priori*. They are not conceived as conclusions of an inference. Being independent of experience on the one hand and being not a result of mental activity on the other, they are supposed to have an epistemically privileged status. Descartes thought of the idea of the infinite as innate and so endowed with a special status. Kant conceived the ideas of the existence of God and immortality of soul as postulates having a transcendental necessity.

Hegelian pan-rationalism has no place for any outside. Like Spinozist substance, the unfoldment of Absolute followed an inbuilt necessity. Being the only reality, Sankara's *brahma* was there all the time. Thus, these ideas were related to the real in a transcendental sense. They either had no place for the external world or reduced it to an unsubstantial status. This is a gross simplification, for each of the concept mentioned in this context has been dealt with in a complex way.

Whether concepts have a transcendental source apart from having empirical genesis will remain a debatable issue and the acceptance of a position in the debate would ultimately be motivated by an individual's approach to existence. A reference to the controversy regarding mind-brain duality is relevant. If the notion of mind is completely reduced to the brain and only physical causality is accepted, then the talk of concepts and their transcendental source would turn out to be at most a fiction. However, there is a great resistance to the reducibility of mind, for such a notion robs human individuals of all significance. Inspite of this resistance, the brain-view continues to gain strength because of the continuous advances into brain research.

Even if substantiality of the concept of mind is completely rejected, it does not seem likely that the language of the mind would ever fade away. Such a language, being closer to human experience and being a lot convenient, will continue to be significantly used. It may be noticed that while the language of scientific description is more exact, it is seldom used in the common day-to-day business of life. While it is true that morning means that the earth has completed a round on its axis and this is not true that Sun rises or sets, yet no one—including the scientists—would want to use a more exact language in normal dealing. The Sun would continue to rise as it is morning and it would set to announce the end of the day in the evening.

There are concepts which pose problem for conceivability; concepts which involve denial or negation, including contradiction and paradox, do not have the same kind of transparency as do the positive concepts. While it is possible to imagine something not being there or somebody being deprived of something or something undergoing a change and losing some attribute in such a process, it does not seem possible to imagine something which never existed or which is never likely to exist in the future. Making sense of nothing at all can only mean excluding whatever has the possibility of existing. Contradictions or impossibilities too seem to defy conceivability. Yet we cannot have critical language without having the particle 'not' on the one hand and the notion of 'contradiction' on the other. Son of a barren woman is inconceivable but we understand what the word 'son' means and what the expression 'barren woman' means. In illustrating a contradiction, we are only saying that these two expressions cannot be parts of the same sentence and also be significant.

We also talk of open concepts. To have an open concept is to have a concept which is not fully determined. Such a concept would require certain other concepts for it to be fully determined.

In non-scientific discourse, we often have concepts which require more concepts to become more exact. In fact, the process of thinking moves towards a closure of a concept. In this course, some concepts have to be added and some to be rejected. While a rejected concept may remain in our awareness, we do not do anything with it. It remains unused.

A life of concepts is characterized by numerous dimensions. They define ontology. They make experience intelligible. Of course, they make life blood of thinking. They get busy even with themselves.

Notes and References

1. It would be convenient to mention some allied words and notice the differences amongst them. These words are: idea, thought, form, category, notion, belief, fancy, image.
   The first thing to note is that in some sense these words, including concept, are used in opposition to and in contrast with words like object, real, thing, entity, actual and so on. In this sense, they seem to function as a form of abstraction. The second thing that comes to mind is the differences that these words have when contrasted with 'concept'. Concept seems to be amenable to a wider usage as compared to any of these others. 'Thought' is specific to thinking. As a noun, it is used for the object of thinking and also for the product of thinking. 'Notion' is used as an idea, view, belief, plan and so on. It has also been used in a specific sense by Berkeley. While he used 'idea' for the object of spirit or consciousness, he used 'notion' for the awareness of spirit or consciousness itself. 'Idea' has a prestigious heritage, as is well known. In platonic parlance, it served to point to a form as an instrument of intelligibility but more specifically as something real and having intrinsic worth yet not concrete or material. All these three—thought, notion and idea—also have a wider usage.
   Like idea and notion, 'category' has also been used in a specific sense by Aristotle as well as Kant. Both of them used the word differently, though Kant claimed to have acquired the term from Aristotle. To Aristotle, 'category' was a form of predication supported by Greek usage. It was also used as a class of predicates. Kant assigned 'category' a more specific function. It was used as a sort of cast which moulds the manifold or transforms it into something intelligible. It is interesting to note that at several places Kant used the term 'Begriff' (concept) for 'category', for example. The first book of' 'Transcendental Analytic' is called 'The Analytic of Concepts' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A66/981).

   The usage of 'belief' involves a sort of mental possession. For example, we generally say 'x has certain beliefs'. A belief is a cognitive counterpart of a linguistic-cum-logical form.
   Fancy is a free float while image helps individuation. The term 'concept' can be used and is used for any of these synonymously while the usage of any of these may help us to indicate the specific use of 'concept' that one may wish it to be put to.
2. Concepts like 'identity and difference' point to a whole class of concepts, which are dichotomous—one of the pair is parasitic for its meaning on the other. Such pairs are: being and non-being; beginning and end; cause and effect; real and apparent; necessary and contingent; good and bad; beautiful and ugly; true and false, and so on. Their relational character and consequential problematic has been classically dealt with by F.H. Bradley.

Understanding the Language: Towards Defence of Linguistic Normativism

SATRUGHNA BEHERA

Lecturer in Philosophy, UGC Academic Staff College, Sambalpur University, Jyoti Vihar 768 019, Burla, Orissa

An attempt is made in this article to defend linguistic normativism against verificationist and naturalist interpretation of understanding of the language with relation to a general theory of meaning constructed for a natural language. I shall attempt to show that verificationist's or naturalist's insight as an irremediable flow in the cases of semantic consideration has made our linguistic understanding unbased and falliable. Both verificationists and naturalists are deluded and their delusion rests on misconceptions regarding semantic concepts such as meaning, truth, understanding, etc., in reference to the relation of logic with language and, the relation of language with reality. It also rests on an exaggerated conception of the epistemic role of semantic conditions under which the very concept of understanding of the language and, therewith, a systematic theory of meaning would be considered as the matter of epistemological investigation. To argue against these misdirected conceptions, my strategy would not be different from the later Wittgenstein's descriptive mode of representation[1] and viewpoints. Rather, I will explicitly substantiate my arguments with the most illuminating insights and ideas of Wittgenstein in order to defend the thesis of linguistic normativism—a thesis according to which all semantic concepts could be elucidated in terms of our continuous involvement into uses of language what Wittgenstein calls 'language-games'. Since language in its ordinary sense of the term represents a system of linguistic activities, on account of the knowledge of normative nature of the semantic concepts here language-reference must be taken as only a pre-condition rather than any epistemological presupposition. We may put the matter

concretely in question form: If we concede the conception that none can use language without understanding why and how it can be used, could we then concede the conception that understanding of a language is knowing its meaning? Further more, Does knowing the meaning of a language presuppose any preoccupied cognitive condition(s)? A positive response to these questions obviously constitutes an impressive basis for semantics and linguistic theory. My purpose in this paper is to give a normative foundation for the basis, against some recent attempts to undermine it.[2]

I

It is very common to our philosophical awareness that the twentieth-century analytic philosophy has taken the study of language to be the highroad to the solution of philosophical problems. It, in fact, has exhibited an intense investigation into the nature of language and, more particularly, commitment to its investigation has been centred to the concept of meaning and understanding of the language in general. To this purpose, whatever the case may be, language has been commonly viewed as a means of communication and logic as foundation on which our linguistic theories rest, and to which linguistic learning and intelligibility must conform. One of the consequences of this view is that linguistic meaning and understanding are believed to be rationally justified if and only if they can be deductively subsumed under a universal ontological framework involving the appropriate logically relevant facts. Based on this view, the justificatory relationship between our specific linguistic expressions and linguistic conditions is a one-way-street, in the sense that our specific linguistic expressions are justified by appealing to logical facts. Logical facts are not, in turn, justified by any appeal to specific linguistic expressions.

Despite this deductive logical model of semantic consideration and its pre-eminence impact upon the contemporary philosophy of language, the semantic consideration that philosophers actually engage in bears a significant model for keeping language, logic and reality within a perspective of 'perspicuous representation'. One striking difference between the logical model and the perspicuous representational model is that whereas the former provides primacy to logic, the latter takes language as the pivotal one. This

difference vanishes as Wittgenstein tells us when we really have a 'grammatical investigation' into them and, to Wittgenstein, the 'grammatical investigation' (i.e. widely accepted as a normative critique) marks the point at which language, grammar and reality come together in a transparent manner. This transparency reveals in what we define the meaning of language and also in the way in which we understand it. Referring to semantic consideration, this conception implicity involves two fundamental questions: first, how does any word or expression in a learnable language become meaningful? And, second, how do we know (understand) the meaning of any word or expression in such a language? The 'grammatical investigation' shows us the conditions by means of which we can answer these questions in the correct manner. In other words, the 'grammatical investigation' discloses the conditions of semantic consideration and, in this sense, it justifies our linguistic knowledge or understanding. In practice, the way by which we arrive at this state of 'perspicuous representation' is relatively simple and straightforward. Of course, semantic consideration and justification obviously cannot occur in a vacuum. It needs a base or 'ground', which as Wittgenstein suggests, would be neither higher nor lower, but within the language itself. Thus, the most reasonable place to start the process is with the language itself. For it is the language in which we have the greatest confidence in so far as 'the language speaks for itself'. In this sense, what Wittgenstein really intends to assert is the autonomy of language because he believes the language is primitive and its primitiveness is reflected in our stream of life. He refers to 'forms of life' which constitute actual grammar of language in the sense of our 'modes of thinking and acting in actual situations with language'. He characterizes them as fundamental conditions in which our linguistic capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion.

Against this background or with least concern to it, however, philosophers on the one hand and theoretical linguists on the other have attempted to explain the nature of language and have engaged in the construction of a theory of meaning for a natural language on their own viewpoints along with specific presuppositions. Dummett, for example, in arguing against Frege's realism,[3] claims for a theory of meaning which, according to him, happens

to be a theory of understanding.[4] It is intended as an account to disown Frege's notion of sense of expressions as participating truth-conditions independently of the user's knowledge of those conditions; it also concentrates on the significance of a theory of reference which, to Dummett, must be counted as basic to the claim of the construction of a general theory of meaning. This attitude, in truth, matters with the sole claim as an account of what it is that someone knows when he knows a given language, and that, in turn, is taken to be knowing the meanings of the expressions and sentences of the language. To this claim, indeed, Dummett owes to Wittgenstein for his most influential verdict that 'meaning is use'. According to Dummett, truth-conditions are not enough to construct a general theory of meaning for the natural language, and it is the case that we must take account of contextual conditions under which a given linguistic expression can be asserted or denied. To him, these contextual conditions constitute asertibility conditions which necessarily determine the meaning of linguistic expressions so far as a speaker understands (knows) those conditions. These assertibility conditions are never verification-transcendent; rather, they constitute themselves as the verification-conditions by which the meaning of a statement is 'exhaustively determined'. Dummett's verificationist argument here is explicitly reflected in his 'The Reality of the Past'[5] and 'The Philosophical Basis of Intutionistic Logic'.[6] But any difference to this argument Dummett's famous paper on 'Truth' published earlier by the Aristotelian Society in 1959, has not really changed philosophers to a line of enquiry which has appeared both classical and new.[7] As a result of philosophical investigation, it compounds some of the most distinctive philosophical ideas such as Frege's analysis of sense, the reflection on meaning as used as in later Wittgenstein, intutionism in the philosophy of mathematics, and, especially, epistemological under current contact in semantics on the advancement of ordinary language philosophy.[8]

Dummett's plea for anti-realist domination in the semantic consideration for a natural language—as it seems—has increasingly influenced many contemporary philosophers. Crispin Wright, for example, attempts a critical observation of Dummett's anti-realism in his *Realism, Meaning and Truth*.[9] Wright explicitly expresses his

reaction on Dummett in saying that 'this kind of "anti-realism" is merely a (British) eccentricity, fuelled by archaic epistemology, bad philosophy of mind and native pre-Quinean thoughts about meaning, will be encouraged, I hope, to examine more fully than hither to what basis there may be for thinking so'.[10] Then Wright begins his observation dealing with the general conception of realism. According to him, realism in its general sense is based upon two fundamental presumptions, such as:

P(1) That human kind confronts an objective world, something almost entirely not of our making, possessing a host of occasional features which may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness and whose innermost nomological secrets may remain forever hidden from us.[11]

P(2) That we are, by and large and in favourable circumstances, capable of acquiring knowledge of the world and of understanding it.[12]

With reference to P(1) and P(2), there are two possible responses: idealism and scepticism. It is a open truth that 'anti-realism' is not a version of the latter and its relationship to idealism, on the other hand, is far from the open truth. For, as Wright claims, 'the focal point of the debate, over the past 25 years or so has been the thesis that our depictive powers may outstrip our cognitive capacities, that truth may intelligibly transcend evidence'.[13] This states a definite doctrine of realism which is epoched in Frege's formalism and it is which Dummett concerns himself with. Wright points out this matter as the realist holds that, 'some true statements which are fully intelligible to us, may nevertheless be... evidence-transcendent'.[14] If this is the statement of realism, then 'anti-realism' must, in some sense, deny that truth can be evidence-transcendent. And this is the form of 'anti-realism' which Wright intends to explore. Hence, the realist's view—as Wright contends—is that 'the availability of otherwise of evidence is no conceptual constraint on the capacity of a statement to be true'.[15] And for the anti-realist, on the contrary, epistemological conditions are built into the very concept of truth, the thrust of his arguments is that 'the truth of a statement requires that evidence be available of its truth'.[16]

Some problems, however, are involved in the above account. One may, here, ask: does realism, as Wright has generally characterized it, require that truth be conceived as potentially evidence-transcendent? Does it entail 'realism' in the specific Dummett-Wright sense? Of course, Wright himself shows some initial agnosticism on this point. In other words, as he says:

> 'On the face of it at least, there is no immediate route from denying that conviction (that truth is evidence-transcendent) to denial of what seems essential to realism, as characterized above. What seems essential is the conception of truth as constituted by fit between our beliefs, or statements, and the features of an independent, determinate reality'.[17]

Here, it is not clear that endorsing the idea of truth as 'fit' requires one to accept that truth is evidence-transcendent. This is so because it apparently leaves it open as a possibility that the reality which true statements fit in fact here—for reasons having nothing to do with the very concept of truth—transcends our possibilities of investigations. There may be much about it that someone neither knows nor will ever know, but nothing about it for which evidence is unavailable, which someone cannot know if he chooses to search for it.

This is, indeed, an initial possibility, but it does not match our common sense or scientific view of the world. We may take a naturalistic view, seeing ourselves as causal patients and agents within an encompassing causal order. But this naturalistic view inevitably carries the consequence that there are states of affairs which obtain but which we cannot obtain evidence for. To argue against it, we need philosophical grounds for holding that the availability of evidence is built into the very concept of truth. That then motivates some interpretation of commonsense or scientific naturalism designed to make it consistent with our philosophical account of the concept of truth.

Then we may ask: could any such interpretation remain realist in the sense of endorsing the idea that truth is fit? It, perhaps, could not. Rather, it necessarily brings idealism with it. Truth as fit is central to the notion of a factual statement. Factual statements are those which are true or false, according to whether they correspond to some fact, or to say, to an 'independent determinate reality'. 'Determinate' here means determinate independently of

the state of knowledge which it causes in the knowing subject. So, the idea of truth as fit already carries with it the conception of an interaction between knowing the subject and an independently determinate object. If, therefore, the central doctrine of 'anti-realism' concerns the concept of truth, and says it that it cannot outrun the availability of evidence, then the anti-realist is committed at some level to rejecting the notion of truth as fit with an independent determinate reality. The question of how, if at all, anti-realism can be distinguished from idealism must then arise.

This leads us to argue that Wright is perfectly accurate in saying that the debate of realism-anti-realism—as inspired by Dummett—has focussed on whether we can attain an evidence-transcendent notion of truth. But while this has been the focus, it has been so against the background of a larger debate regarding the notion of meaning. In this larger debate, realists like Frege and others in similar pursuation hold that our understanding of a sentence is given by a grasp of its truth-conditions, while anti-realists like Dummett and others in similar pursuation would hold that it does not. That is to say, the basic account given by an anti-realist is that understanding is grasping assertion-conditions. These assertion-conditions, as having been said so far, determine meaning.

What follows is that explaining the meaning of an assertion must, in general, consists in an explanation of its use. Dummett, as we have stated just now, contends in his paper on 'Truth' that this claim provides a way whereby we can abandon realism without falling into subjective idealism. On the other hand, it also seems that Dummett opines that understanding is given by grasping assertion-conditions which constitute an account of the 'epistemic conception of meaning' to be linked in some vital respect with the rejection of evidence-transcendent truth which entails the 'epistemic conception of truth'. Of course, it is important to notice that if we can save the epistemic conception of meaning without endorsing the epistemic conception of truth, then it is certainly far from obvious that our position is a form of idealism, or even that it deserves the title 'anti-realism'.

Dummett's basic arguments for the view that understanding is a matter of grasping assertion-conditions seem to move by the claim that we can secure no notion of evidence-transcendent truth. And,

consequently, the epistemic conception of meaning follows from the fact that truth must be equate with assertibility of some sort as we can secure no other concept of the truth. That is, since understanding of truth-conditions is not secured, understanding as the grasp of assertion-conditions is to be accepted. If we examine the statement at the end of Dummett's beliefs, i.e. 'an account of the use of a statement for an account of its truth-conditions as the general form of explanation of meaning.... We can abandon realism without falling into subjective idealism', we see that the basic assumption in it is that a statement cannot be true unless something makes it true. But 'what makes it true' is read as 'what warrants its assertion' and 'what warrants its assertion' is taken in an epistemic sense.[18] If this is the only way of getting to the epistemic view of meaning, and if the denial of evidence-transcendent truth is a form of idealism, then we can have no reason to hold that meaning is given by assertion conditions unless we hold to a form of idealism. But reading Dummett does not entail that it is the only way. Dummett himself has suggested that intuitionistic conception of mathematics is best argued for from the Wittgenstenian insight that meaning is use. Hence, his real view, as it seems, is that the two doctrines: (i) that understanding is grasp of assertion-conditions; and (ii) that truth cannot transcendent the availability of evidence, emerge as joint products of something more basic, namely, the thesis that the understanding or grasp of concepts is acquired and manifested in use. Dummett explains this thesis in holding the language mastery as a fundamentally recognitional ability and a non-classical view of truth.[19]

II

Theoretical representationalists, following Noam Chomsky,[20] have argued that learning a language or understanding a language involves constructing—on the basis of exposure to utterances—a grammatical theory for that language. Such a theory consists of a system of rules and elements, or in words of Professor. K. Sengupta 'a set of hypotheses framed in terms of certain innate universals'[21] to generate the sentences of the language. This theory involves a mental setup which is innately occupied by the speaker of the language. It is a fact that individuals in a speech community all

acquire essentially the same language, because they possess the same mental mechanism. So, it seems to follow that they all evolve the same theory of grammar. And that can only be explained on the assumption that they employ highly restrictive principles that regulate them in the construction of such a theory. Hence, it seems that we are both with innate knowledge of rules of a universal grammar as in Chomsky.[22] The rules of a universal grammar, as Chomsky suggests, are to be part of the biological endowment of the human beings, and have some 'mental representation'. By unconsciously employing these rules, the user of language constructs its grammatical theory. The theory so constructed is itself beyond the reach of consciousness or introspection. But possession of such a theory, including a well-defined syntax, is what knowing a language consists of.

The fact is that for theoretical representationalists, to know a language is to be in a certain mental state. Besides, to them the process of acquiring the knowledge of language or, to say, 'mastery of language' is 'very much akin to the way a scientist encounters his experimental data with a set of hypothesis as to the nature of the data'.[23] With this realization, Chomsky explains the nature of linguistic acquisition and suggests that 'knowledge of grammar, hence of language, develops in the child into the interplay of genetically determined principles and a course of experience'.[24] Such a state of knowing is a matter of having a certain mental structure consisting of 'genetically determined principles' that generate and relate the mental representation of form and meaning. This conception alone, Chomsky claims, can explain the fact that our linguistic utterances generally conform to various grammatical rules that preexisted in an user's mind. Thus, Chomsky suggests that 'I know of no proposed explanation for the fact that our judgements and behaviour accord with certain rule systems other than the assumption that computation involving such rules and the representations they provide takes place in the mind'.[25] Chomsky's theory, indeed, possesses startling new insights into the innate generative transformational structure of language.[26] These insights impress other linguists, for example J.J. Katz, to investigate the underlying structure of language which can be innately generated. This underlying structure of language, what Katz calls 'deep structure'[27], puts the

fact that it is a 'deep structure' of language so characterized for the reason that it is the internal source of the complexity of linguistic construction.

Moreover, Jerry Fodor, a famous theoretical linguist, also proposes a naturalistic theory of understanding by insisting on the fact that the brain is a meaning machine.[28] He recognizes that this view rests on the semantic correspondence thesis. According to him, the semantic correspondence thesis exclaims that 'the bedrock upon which the possibility of computational explanations of behaviour is founded is the (presumed) fact that the *causal* relations among the physiological states of the organism respect the semantic relations among formulate in the internal code'.[29] This suggests that the behaviour of the organism is explained by reference to states in its *neural centre* whose causal properties correspond with the semantical features which explain the behaviour. To Fodor, all that is needed to say that the nerve system is in a certain propositional attitude state is that it is 'wired' in such a way that its being in a certain relation to an internal formula is sufficient for its being in a certain propositional attitude state.

Fodor undertakes this naturalistic project to construct a model of semantic correspondence, as he thinks that this correspondence approach to semantics of language alone can possibly aim to have solution to the problem about knowledge of language in relation to physiological states that we have. This possibility is totally excluded from the normative description of the state of linguistic understanding. Fodor explains the correspondence between neural states and propositional attitude states by solving the problem how could they be wired in. To him, there is no reason to think that it cannot be wired in, because something analogous to this occurs in natural languages. In a public language, the connection between the formula and the relevant propositional attitude, and on the basis of that, the relevant meaning, is conventional, whereas in the case of the brain language it is wired in, or 'nomologically necessary'.[30]

But it makes no difference whether the principle is laid down by social convention or by nature. Hence, there is no principled objection to the semantic correspondence thesis. Fodor arrives at the conclusion that 'It is pertinent to finish by emphasizing that these views may all be wrong, but they are at least empirical'.[31]

Moreover, Fodor's claim for the coherence of mechanism is based on the alleged analogy between the nomological necessities in nature and the 'covnentions' which underlie the use of public language. He assumes that the meaning of expressions in natural languages are constituted in atomistic lines. As he says,

> 'It is. . .reasonable to suppose that a system rich enough to express the messages that natural languages convey will have ... a vocabulary [consisting in] a finite inventory of discrete, meaningful elementary items'.[32]

What is important to see in this connection is that similar to Katz, Fodor holds that understanding of a sentence (i.e., to say the meaning of a sentence) is a structured arrangement of atomic concepts.[33] The most basic assumption which underlies Fodor's notion of a meaning mechanism is that meaning is a compositional function out of atomic meaning particles.[34] This is a presupposition of the semantical correspondence thesis which, in turn, is a presupposition of the view that the brain is a *semantical engine.* If, so far the possibility of a linguistic holism is concerned, there are no elementary 'meaning particles', then there are no discrete meaning states which could 'correspond' with states of a machine. Fodor's argument that the semantic correspondence thesis is an empirical hypothesis simply assumes that these 'conventions' which underline public language are not holistic in nature. To put Fodor's argument in its most unflattering manner—his assumption that the conventions which underlie natural language are analogous to the nomological necessities in nature—it is nothing other than the assumption that natural language is a 'mechanical calculus'. If this argument is taken to be true, then there is no reason why there cannot be a meaning mechanism, though there are attempts which act as counter-arguments to defy such a realization.[35]

The basic tenets which are inherently presented by the naturalist projects of language—meaning and language—mastery, after all, may be summarized as the following:

T(1) A language consists of the relation of words and meaning over an infinite domain of sentences. Such a relation is determined by a grammatical theory consisting of rules and principles which generate the sentences of the language.

T(2) To understand a language is to be in a persistent mental state which has a mental structure consisting of such a system of rules and principles that generate and relate mental representations of various types.

T(3) To learn a language one must already know, cognize or possess a universal grammar which is an element of the 'genetype' that maps 'a course of experience' into a particular grammar.

T(4) To have learnt a language is to have constructed a grammatical theory of language. This theory of the language is 'internally represented' in the mind of speakers and, it is conjectured, also in the brain. It is, however, essentially unconscious, inaccessible to introspection and conscious knowledge.

T(5) Understanding a particular sentence involves, *inter alia*, unconsciously computing the meaning of the sentence on the basis of the tacitly known grammatical theory and syntax, together with a further rich array of rules and principles of semantic and pragmatics.

T(6) Natural language is atomistic in nature and is a 'mechanical calculus'.

III

Now, we may observe that naturalist tenets have some significant implications. Especially T(1) and T(2) make sense for there to be rules of language which are never, and in some cases cannot be, expressed in that language. T(3) and T(4) make sense to speak of people following rules which they do not and cannot understand. Hence, the matter may be possible to discover what rules people—unknown to themselves—are following in their daily linguistic transactions. Although these rules are alleged to have a mental or neural representation, this mode of representation is wholly unknown. Hence, the rules thus represented have no normative role in human activities of teaching, explaining, correcting, clarifying what they say and what their utterances mean. Despite this, T(5) and T(6), on this account, make sense for particular acts to be in accord with such unknown rules and each sentence in a language bears its own significance distinctively by certain mental representation having no relation with other sentences of that language, and each mental representation is made possible only through a

mechanical computation of the calculus. Finally, together they make sense for beings who have not yet learnt a language to construct theories about the grammar of the language to the utterances of which they are exposed.

However, following Wittgenstein's favourable insights, I may argue that none of these tenets—philosophically speaking—makes any significative claim. The naturalist and verificationist conceptions of a language, of knowledge, of mastery of a language, meaning-determination, of understanding and of speaking in accord with the rules of language are not, as a matter of fact, false. But these are self-defeating because they exploit the normative nature of our linguistic understanding and with it the normativeness of the natural language.

Now, presuming the normativeness of the natural language, any attempt to explain the nature of language and its conceptual structure must be correlated with certain central concepts such as meaning, explanation of meaning, understanding, truth, rules, etc. These concepts are linguistically not distinct but associative to each other being involved into a system of language. When meaning-talks seem to be more attractive, other concepts are no less persuasive in order to construct a general theory of meaning for the natural language. Any meaning-talk entails the explanation of meaning in reference to meaning of a word or an expression. Hence, the meaning of a word or an expression is what is depicted in explanations of its meaning. Equally, the meaning of an expression is what we understand when we actually comprehend the expression. However, verificationists who claim that meaning of a sentence is explained by its method of verification, and others who argue against this by claiming that it is given by specification of its truth-conditions or of its potential for performing speech-acts, none of these has wished to examine what, in our ordinary linguistic transactions, counts as an explanation of meaning. In concrete terms, we may say that they are in possession of what Professor Daya Krishna justly says 'a perennial fascination' or 'a philosophic abomination'.[36] In this sense their hopes for or attempts to semantic construction are half-way assessment or oppositionistic to the nature of natural language. Wittgenstein, with his refined motive, reverses the traditional direction of relation between meaning and understanding,

completely reorienting the role of explanation in an account of the nature of language and linguistic competence.

What follows from the above-mentioned thought is that a philosophical explication of meaning must be presented according to the conditions put not by the traditional preoccupied presuppositions but by a proper analysis of the logic of understanding, explanation and communication. Meaning is the correlate of understanding. Understanding of an expression, i.e., knowing what it means is not a mental state or event, e.g., of having an image or picture of an object or state of affairs, or of mysteriously apprehending an abstract entity like of the Fregean 'sense'. Nor is it a mental process or activity, e.g., of deriving the meaning of a sentence from the known meanings of its constituents and their mode of combination, as Chomsky and Chomskean generative grammarians have it. Rather, it is akin to an ability, to mastering a technique. So, a prior clarification of the concept of ability is a precondition to explicate the nature of understanding whether an ability is possessed. To what degree it is mastered and its basic nature is seen in and determined by its manifestations. The ways in which linguistic understanding manifests itself can be categorized into two viewpoints. First, whether a person understands an expression, and what he understands by it, can be seen from the way in which he used it and the manner in which he reacts to its use by others. The correctness or incorrectness of his use, the appropriateness or inappropriateness of his reactions to use, constitute grounds for attributing to him an understanding or lack of understanding of it. Secondly, understanding is manifested by correctly explaining the meaning of an expression. What a person understands by an expression is just what he explains in his explanations of its meaning.

Here, it can be said that there is a perfect fit between the meaning of an expression and *what we understand* when we understand the expression. Given this perfect fit, the expression 'what we understand' introduces an indirect question, not a relative expression standing for an abstract of mental object. Hence, if a person understands an expression then, in practice, he can answer the question 'what do you understand by it?' or 'what does it mean?' Understanding is internally related to the ability to explain. Thus, Wittgenstein very aptly remarks:

> 'The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of meaning, i.e., if you want to understand the use of the word "meaning", look for what are called "explanation of meaning.'[37]

Here, Wittgenstein urges us to think not of what meaning is all by itself, but what it is to explain the meaning of a word, to teach the meaning of a word to a learner, to know the meaning of a word. Of course, this simple truth has been obscured by philosophers subliming the notion of explanation of meaning. It is a philosopher's illusion from Plato to Frege and beyond, that nothing short of a definition specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of application will count as an explanation of word-meaning, or to say, that nothing short of specification of truth-conditions counts as an explanation of a sentence. In fact, our explanations of linguistic meaning are very diverse and are not judged by these conditions. We explain meanings ostensively, by samples, by examples, by exemplification, by contextual employment, by contrastive use, etc. Such explanations are not degenerate, defective or incomplete. They are not provisional standbys which we tolerate until better ones are discovered by philosophers, linguists or other scientists. The meaning of an expression does not transcend the explanations of its meaning 'what we give and recognize in our practices of explanation; rather, meaning is revealed in the explanations of meaning that we give to it. Consequently, explanations of word-meaning—as P.T. Geach and K.J. Shah rightly observe—are not awaiting discovery or any sort of unknown mysterious mental mechanism.[38] Humanity, having mastered the use of number-words in prehistory, does not have to wait until Frege to be hold what they mean or Chomsky to be hold how they can be conditioned by generated rules and principles in a mental setup. Whether a particular word or an utterance counts as meaningful and complete explanation of meaning depends not on its form, concept, intention or any mysterious entity but upon the role of that form of words in our linguistic practices which enmesh various forms of life. So Wittgenstein befittingly tells us:

> 'An expression has meaning only in the stream of life.'[39]

Indeed, our explanation of meaning presupposes our forms of life in order to understand any word or expression or the language as

a whole. And explanation of meaning provides a standard for correct use of an expression. This normative role depends upon the use to which the explanation is put. We accept certain explanations as correct or fit and reject others as faulty or incomplete. We appeal to explanations to criticize or justify a given use of an expression and we refer to explanations in order to guide us in our use of expressions. The normative role of explanations in our practices is central to Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, yet it is almost wholly neglected in competing contemporary philosophies as I have discussed some of these philosophies so far. Obsessed by the ideal of a calculus of meaning rules, a semantics for a natural language, an appeal to Cartesian dogma of dualism, indeed, these philosophies deprive their own 'specification of meaning' from any actual normative status.

IV

We may now ask: Is the notion of understanding a semantical concept? An affirmative reply to this question would impress us to say that when we reflect philosophically on the notion of understanding, barring all epistemic constraints, we must talk of understanding only in the sense of a semantical concept. As a semantical concept, understanding refers—as we have pointed out so far—to the linguistic competence expressed in our linguistic transactions. Understanding, as we have it for normative analysis is, for us, a grammatically articulated concept, since it is presented to us in the moulds of our language. Taking the clues from the later Wittgenstein use-centred explanation of meaning, Dummett explained the notion of understanding (as discussed in early section of this paper) in terms of linguistic competence in his verificationist framework.[40] For Dummett, a theory of understanding should proceed by characterizing that knowledge whose possession is constitutive of mastery of the language. Besides, understanding is held to be a behavioural matter. Dummett argues for these theses because his fundamental claim is that for every statement (in a theory of meaning) which specifies the interpretation of a sentence, a theory of understanding must provide a behavioural account of what it is to have implicit knowledge of that statement.[41] However, from the Wittgenstenian point of view, it can be argued that for Wittgenstein 'understanding' is not cognitive and 'mastery' is not behavioural. By claiming that understanding is cognitive and mastery is behavioural, Dummett imposes his reductionist requirement and because of this claim such a theory would semantically appear to be redundant to Wittgenstein's explanation. This problem occurs because Dummett tacitly locates the semantic gap throughout his analysis of the relation of understanding and understanding of a sentence along with the conditions in which our competence to understand is manifested. But Wittgenstein—if J.N. Mohanty would not be wrong to his account of 'Philosophical Description'[42]—does not see this semantic gap, though, as can be said, this gap ensures philosophical analysis as a conceptual activity against the onslaught of the scientifically minded philosophers who equate philosophical activity with naturalistic description of semantic concepts. For Wittgenstein, this semantic gap (if there any) is rather the subject-matter of grammar and not science. Therefore, our normative account of the notion of understanding which is placed within the semantic space, is the subject-matter of 'linguistic description' than of any 'naturalistic description'. As Wittgenstein aptly remarks:

> 'The understanding of a language, as of a game, seems like a background against which a particular sentence acquires meaning.'[43]

This statement puts before us a significative condition as an eye-opener. That is, it suggests that the mental-mechanism presupposition in a representational theory in no way helps to define meaning perspicuously; rather, it causes us to fall into the trap of senseless metaphysical prejudices by distracting our thinking and understanding. Besides, the meaning cannot be pictured. It cannot be correlated with the structure of a mental-mechanism, or to say, with a transformational deep structure as in Chomsky or as in others who belong to the Chomskean fold. But Wittgenstein's general conception of philosophy saves us from this distracting. As he says,

> 'Philosophy may in way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it can not give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.'[44]

This remark suggests that we should not require or impose our requirement on a causal or representational model of explaining

anything what is within our perspective of semantic consideration. This perspective perfectly belongs to grammar,[45] and it is grammar and, for that purpose, philosophy as an activity of elucidation which can alone study the nature of our understanding, and of the nature of meaning as a semantical concept. Hence, Wittgenstein insists: 'Our problem is not causal but a conceptual one'.[46] The same reflection may be realized in his *Tractatus,*[47] where Wittgenstein contends that 'philosophy is not one of the natural science'[48] and, therefore, the method of philosophy is significantly different from that of the natural sciences. This also explains why Wittgenstein has gone, in the *Tractatus,* to the extent of denying epistemology a place in the semantic space because he believes that epistemology comes under the subject-matter of psychology.[49] He believes that epistemology is concerned with the study of psycho-cognitive processes through scientific postulations operated on mental-mechanism. Though Dummett was aware of this fact, he committed to a reverse position by explicating linguistic acquisition as a matter of epistemic function with our behavioural patterns. On the grounds of Wittgenstein's most significative concept of 'use'—though Dummett dethrowns Frege's realism—and claims that the view of mastering and learning of language wherein meaning is a part of the general framework of understanding, in turn, he commits to a verificationist thesis. His verificationist thesis explaims the epistemic ground as sentences in a language are meaningful if and only if the speakers of the language determinately know the truth-conditions of such sentences.

However, the problem with Dummett is not with his reading of Wittgenstein; rather, it is with his apprehension on the very concept of understanding. He takes the notion of understanding as an epistemic concept which differs from Wittgenstein's intention in being completely semantic. Besides, Wittgenstein is concerned with the notion of understanding in the normative sense as much he talks about the cases of following a rule where the relation of our knowledge of language with our forms of life is obviously presupposed. As he explicitly points out:

> 'It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion in which a report was made, an order given, or understand; and so on. To obey a rule, to make a report, given an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).'[50]

The normative nature of the notion of understanding is too obvious in another passage in which Wittgenstein says:

> 'The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can" "is able to". But also closely related to that of "understands" (Mastery of a technique).'[51]

But, in this connection, what Wittgenstein prohibits us to conceive 'understanding' as a semantic concept is made clear by him in the following passage:

> 'Try not to think of understanding as a "mental process" at all. For *that* is the expression which confuses you. But yourself in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on", when, that is, the formula *has* occurred to me?
> In this sense where there are processes (including mental process) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process'[52] (italics original).

Thus, the question of the nature of understanding always remains as a matter of semantical relation of language to our contextual settings embedded in our forms of life. To this effect, Wittgenstein rejects the psychological processes as irrelevant to philosophical explanation of language, meaning and understanding. Cognition, for Wittgenstein, is virtually a grammatical remark upon our experience and experience is mere a grammatical requirement in the perspective of semantic consideration. In this connection by epistemology, if we mean linguistic epistemology in the present reflection, it does not necessarily mean the study of the psychology of knowledge as the traditional empiricists think, and may very well refer to grammatical analysis of knowledge, or in Kantian *noetics* sense of the term it is preferred to say as philosophy of knowledge. Wittgenstein accepts, as hopefully remarked by P.M.S. Hacker that 'epistemology in the latter sense and has reinstated it in the semantic space in the form of *grammatical investigation* of cognitive claims'.[53] Thus, if we concede this view, understanding of the language would presuppose, alone, the semantical analysis of the conditions of epistemic claims as they can be recorded in language. Though at first sight epistemic claims may lead us to presuppose any

cognitive (i.e., psychological) ground for analysis (or to construct certain theories) and thereby we may be deceived by the so-called psychologism; but in this crucial context what after John Wisdom,[54] Mrinal Miri[55] illuminatively suggests, 'psycho-analysis' in its philosophical sense may methodologically help us 'to cure certain mental cramps' preoccupied by metaphysical thinkers or philosophers who show indifference (due to their conceptual prejudices) at 'to get the matter aright'. Now the main points and focus of Wittgenstein's critique of understanding which follow from the above observation may be realized as important and stated as the following:

1. That there is no need of any mysterious mechanism or entity as 'intermediate case' to fill up the gap between my understanding something and my knowledge about it. For 'I understand that I know...' is a semantic demand. Thus, there is no distinction between my understanding of a sentence by 'S' and my knowing that I understand the sentence by 'S'.
2. That understanding, meaning, intending, etc., are not epistemic contents, i.e., matter of experience at all. Nor can those be defined or reduced to our observable behaviour-manifestations. All that follows is that the philosophical explanation of those concepts in form of self-knowledge and privileged access, is grammatically proved to be simply not unbased, but also redundant.
3. That semantic-knowledge requires a primitive state of understanding, but this can be explained by specifying semantic conditions that constitute the broad perspective of language as a organic whole in relation to our shared forms of life. In other words, a state of semantic knowledge presupposes linguistic holism, not linguistic atomism.
4. That a state of misunderstanding, like of a state of understanding, is in need of grammatical clarification instead of any scientific explanation with empirical data. This is so because all so-called scientific attempts are causal rather than conceptual, and they presuppose the gap between our state of understanding and the contents (both concept and object) of understanding. Thus, they fail to observe the logical relationship between the two. The fact is that this ensures sceptics

to defy the claim for logical necessity which is internal to our linguistic system. Indeed, to save linguistic normavism and with it the rationality of our linguistic knowledge, what we are concerned with as with any form of verificationism or naturalism or scepticism is our right to speak that we understand this or that—that we mean so and so—with our persistent philosophic pursuit for the clarification of philosophical prejudices and clearing up intellectual knots.

V

To conclude, thus, since philosophy always has an ongoing business with philosophical problems; the danger that it encounters is our obsession for treating philosophical problems as scientific and reducing philosophical descriptions to naturalist projects. But philosophical problems are not scientific problems. This realization has led many well-done linguistic thinkers to watch against the danger that linguisticization of philosophical problems has put provisions to reduce them to verbal issues which can well be answered by naturalistic projects. To them, these verbal issues characteristically concern with language and language use and these issues are, after all, philosophical problems and, as such, grammatical creations. A grammatical creation also breeds a grammatical illusion and our task is only to watch against this unnecessary breeding with sufficient awareness about the logic of language, linguistic representation, state of thinking and understanding in relation to the world in which we live and sustain.[56]

Notes and References

1. Wittgenstein's descriptive mode of representation in his later philosophy is distinctively marked after his major work *Philosophical Investigations* (hence after referred to as *PI*), trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). And his other later literatures also make such a mode of representation more substantive and significant.
2. My discussion shall be limited to the theses propounded by Dummett, Wright, Chomsky and Fodor, as for instances, in articulating the general trend of argument against my purpose.
3. Gottlob Frege, *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, trans. by P.T. Geach and M. Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952) and also R.C. Pradhan's *Philoso-*

phy of Meaning and Representation [New Delhi: D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1996] Chapt. 2, pp. 32–61.

4. M.A.E. Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 'Realism', 'Truth', etc. in *Truth and Other Enigmas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) 'What is a theory of Meaning? I', and 'What is a theory of Meaning? II' in *Truth and Meaning*, (Eds.) G. Evans and J. McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). For a comprehensive analysis of Dummett's conception of anti-realist account of semantics, see my 'Dummett on Semantic Anti-Realism: A Critique' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, 1, 1998, pp. 67–78, and for Frege-Dummett's debate in Semantics R.C. Pradhan's 'A Framework for a Truth-Conditional Theory of Meaning' in *Truth, Meaning and Understanding: Essays in Philosophical Semantics* (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 112–27.
5. Dummett, 'The Reality of the Past', in *Truth and Other Enigmas*, pp. 358–74.
6. Dummett, 'The Philosophical Basis of Intutionistic Logic' in *Truth and Other Enigmas*, pp. 215–48.
7. Dummett, 'Truth' in *Truth and Other Enigmas*, pp. 1–25.
8. R.C. Pradhan, *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy* (New Delhi: ICPR Publications, 2001), Chapts. IV, V and VI.
9. Crispin Wright, *Realism, Meaning and Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
10. Ibid., p.viii.
11. Ibid., p. 1.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 3.
14. Ibid., p. 2.
15. Ibid., p. 344.
16. Ibid., p. 31.
17. Ibid., p. 3.
18. Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Section 7 of 'postcripts', pp. 23–24.
19. S. Behera, 'Dummett on Semantic Anti-Realism: A Critique' in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, pp. 67–68.
20. Noam Chomsky, *Rules and Representations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) and also his early work *Reflections on Language* (Fontana, 1976).
21. Kalyan Sengupta, *Mentalistic Turn: A Critical Evaluation of Chomsky* (Kolkata: K.P. Bagchi & Company), Chapt. 3, p. 60.
22. Chomsky, *Rules and Representations*, p. 134.
23. Kalyan Sengupta, *Mentalistic Turn*, p. 59.
24. Chomsky, *Rules and Representations*, p. 134.

25. Ibid., p. 130.
26. Swapna Sengupta, *Language, Structure and Meaning* (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1977), Chapt. VI.
27. J.J. Katz, *Linguistic Philosophy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 51.
28. Jerry Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 78, 110, *Representations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 93–94.
29. Fodor, *The Language of Thought*, p. 159.
30. Ibid., p. 78.
31. Ibid., p. 156.
32. Ibid., p. 123.
33. J. Fodor and Jerrold Katz, 'The Structure of a Semantic Theory' in *The Structure of Language*, (Boston: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 496.
34. J. Fodor, *The Language of Thought*, p. 96.
35. For example, Bruce Goldberg, 'Mechanism and Meaning' in *Knowledge and Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 202–4.
36. Professor Daya Krishna's 'Logic and Ontology', pp. 3–21, and 'It Can't be Said—So What?', pp. 74–85 in his *The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze Over Three Decades* (New Delhi: ICPR Publications, 1989).
37. Wittgenstein, *PI*, Sect. 560.
38. *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology: 1946-47: Notes by P.T. Gech, K.J. Saha and A.C. Jackson*, (ed.) P.T. Geach (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988).
39. *Malcolm Memoir*, p. 93.
40. A verificationist framework may not be treated as different from an anti-realist framework since verificationism is just a species of anti-realism.
41. Dummett, 'What Does the Appeal to Use do for the Theory of Meaning' in *Meaning and Use*, (ed.) A. Margalit (Dordrecht: 1979), pp. 123–35.
42. For a detailed discussion about the various types of 'description' and how a 'linguistic description' is distinguished from 'naturalistic description', see J.N. Mohanty's illuminative essay 'Philosophical Description' in *Philosophical Papers* (ed.) Kalidas Bhattacharyya, (Santiniketan: Visva Bharati, 1969), pp. 1–18.
43. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar* (ed.) R. Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 50.
44. Wittgenstein, *PI*, Sect. 124.
45. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, Sect. 55.
46. Wittgenstein, *PI*, II, XI, p. 203.
47. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).

48. Ibid. 4.111.
49. Ibid. 4.1121.
50. Wittgenstein, *PI*, Sect. 199.
51. Ibid., Sect. 150.
52. Ibid., Sect. 154.
53. P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion* (London: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 34.
54. John Wisdom, *Philosophy and Psycho-analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).
55. Mrinal Miri, *Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1977), especially, Chapt. 2, pp. 13–28.
56. I would like to express my gratitude to the unknown referee for suggestions on the earlier draft of the paper which has enabled me to modify, and reformulate certain ideas of the paper.

Knowledge in Management Perspective

MOUSUMI SAMANTA[1] and BIMAL SAMANTA[2]

[1]Lecturer, Udaynarayanpur Madhabilata Mahavidyalaya, Howrah, W.B. [2]Lecturer, Asansol Polytechnic, Asansol, West Bengal

ABSTRACT

Knowledge is the ability of adaptation to changing conditions and is now regarded as a most valuable and critical resource for creating sustainable competitive advantage and building a unique core competency. Knowledge as well as management of knowledge plays an important role towards success in business. This article states and explains the definition, origin of knowledge, concept of knowledge management and its importance under changing conditions in a business environment. A comprehensive and unified model of Knowledge Management (KM) framework is the crying need to gains a competitive advantage in order to keep pace with the changing business environment.

INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly competitive business environment, there is an upsurge of interest in business community about the importance of managing knowledge. Knowledge is regarded as a most valuable and strategic resource to create a sustainable competitive advantage. It is considered to be the capability for effective action. Over the past few years, knowledge management (KM) has become one of the key areas of attention in the managerial circles. There has been a phenomenal growth in interest and activities about KM in the business community. The subject has occupied increasing space in technical press in the past decade. The myriad of KM-related books, articles, papers, authors and conferences recognizes that KM is a discipline which needs to be considered in any modern business operation as a crucial factor for competitive success.

In recent years, society is completing an evolutionary shift from the Industrial Age to a Knowledge Age. Peter Ducker (1993) describes that organizations move from productivity based on 'make and move' to one based on 'knowledge and service'. As a result, 75 per cent of the US labour force has been employed in service sectors, and this trend will perhaps continue. As per a statement by the IDC India also, KM was worth Rs. 27.7 crore in 2001-02 and it was anticipated to grow at 75 per cent annually to Rs. 152.7 crore by 2004–05.

Organizations are given the impression that they will not survive in the emergence of this 'knowledge era' unless they have the ability to manage and leverage commercial value and quality from their knowledge assets. Ducker also points out that 'the substitution of knowledge for manual effort as a productive resource in work is the greatest change in the history of work'. In the past, hammer and chisel were the tools of the manual worker. However, the situation has been changed. Now, computers and information systems are the tools of today's knowledge workers. Ducker also remarks that knowledge is the only meaningful economic resource. Again, all human work requires knowledge. Therefore, the success of an organization in this millennium's increasingly competitive market and knowledge economy depends almost entirely on how well it manages and deploys its knowledge of workforces rather than on the financial capital, equipment, raw materials, land and the traditional means of corporate assets. This is why we will take the philosophical questions centring round 'Knowledge' and 'Management' just to find out what is meant by knowledge in the management perspective. Philosophy, thus, may be considered as the discipline that 'keeps everyone honest' and 'critical as well'. Hence, we can account for the important role played by knowledge in management perspective.

KNOWLEDGE

Although the Knowledge Management (KM), as the term implies, has a concern in knowledge itself as its focus of interest, analysis, investigation and management, the contemporary literature on KM pays little attention to descriptions that most directly and searchingly examine and inform questions about knowledge and its origin and

nature. This hinders the proper methodological evaluation about knowledge and hampers potential conceptual developments, particularly in areas of concern that are central to the practice such as the nature of tacit knowledge and creativity, and how such 'knowhow' might be created, stored, shared and applied effectively for organizational learning, value addition, innovation and decision making. This is why, before we apply knowledge into management practice, it is necessary to enquire as to what is knowledge.

Definition of Knowledge

Different experts interpret knowledge differently. Philosophers interprets knowledge as certain or infallible, whereas from the scientists' view, all knowledge is accountable, fallible and experiments. In making an attempt to define 'knowledge', we are rather compelled to use such terms as 'consciousness', 'cognition', 'awareness', 'experience', etc., which have more or less the same sense as the former and we are also confronted with the same situation if we attempt to define any of these terms themselves. Though it is somewhat difficult to define 'knowledge', yet it is not impossible to characterize knowledge in such a way that we can understand what it is as a form of consciousness as distinguished from other forms such as opinions, beliefs, doubts, emotions, desires, volition, etc. Knowledge as a form of consciousness can be defined as a 'complete justified true belief'. To say that 'we know' is to say that: (a) what we are conscious of is true; (b) we believe that it is true; and (c) we have adequate evidence to believe that it is true and, obviously, the above three are the main constituents of knowledge.

Origin of Knowledge

The problem of the origin of knowledge is a fundamental question of epistemology. Thinkers are not unanimous in their views regarding the question how knowledge originates in the human mind. In the fields of knowledge, there are two main rival schools of philosophy—rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism regards reason as the source of eternal, self-evident, universal and real knowledge. Plato, Descartes, Wolf, Spinoza, and Leibnitz are all prominent rationalists. While empiricism regards sense-experience as the source of knowledge. Locke, Hume, Berkelly, Mill are typical exponents

of empiricism. Rationalism in its radical sense is diametrically opposed to empiricism and is satisfied like its rival with the opposite extreme of supposing that it is reason and its principles that are alone responsible for the origin and content of knowledge. It would not be an exaggeration if we remark that the history of philosophy is a history of this rivalry between rationalism and empiricism, between reason and experience, between *a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge.* According to rationalism, knowledge and universal truths lie innate in the mind or reason. It is prior to experience. Mind, with the help of the intellect or reason actively produces real and certain knowledge out of the innate ideas lying inherent within it. Mind does not remain altogether empty before experience; there are some self-evident and necessary fundamental ideas or concepts which lie ingrained in human mind before sense-experience. These ideas or concepts are innate; these are *a priori.* On the other hand, empiricists say that all our ideas and concepts spring from sensations and materials derived from sensation. The empiricists do not admit to the existence of any innate or *a priori* ideas; no ideas can exist in the mind prior to sense-experience. At birth, the human mind is empty, like a blank sheet of paper (*Tabula rasa*), void of all characters. The entire knowledge comes through the two doors of experience—sensation and reflection. It universality and necessity are regarded as the marks of knowledge taken in the strictest sense, then it must be constituted by certain concepts which originate not in perception but in reason. Empiricism, on the contrary, is justified when it asserts that only what is given to us in sensuous experience can obviously give us novelty and advancement of knowledge. Again, conflicting claims are put forward by rationalism and empiricism in connection with the use of the deductive or the inductive method. The rationalists adopt the deductive or mathematical method, while empiricists adopt the inductive method. Again, the rationalists hold that values are objective, but to the empiricists values are subjective.

So we may find a golden mean as to the origin of knowledge by reconciling the two diametrically opposed views of rationalism and empiricism and this is what has been done by Kant. Immanuel Kant has made an attempt to reconcile the above two extreme approaches in his criticism or critical theory. Kant argues that knowledge is

composed of two factors—matter and form. According to Kant, sense-experience furnishes new material to knowledge, and reason furnishes the universality and necessity of knowledge. The forms of knowledge are *a priori,* i.e., they are not derived from sense-experience. When reason applies the *a priori* form of knowledge to the discrete materials of sense impressions and organizes and interprets, then we have knowledge. So, according to Kant, knowledge is formed from the combination of both matter and form—matter supplied by sense-experience and form supplied by reason. Hence, credit goes to Kant for reconciling the views of rationalism and empiricism as to the origin of knowledge. Metaphorically, therefore, it may be said if rationalists are like spiders, empiricists are like ants, while Kant is like a bee (Samanta, 1975[2]; Samanta, 1995[3]).

DATA, INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE

Leaving behind the philosophical part of knowledge, most experts in KM literature agree in presuming that knowledge is something different from data and information. While the distinction between data and information may be clearcut, that between information and knowledge is often less obvious. This is partly due to the human habit of taking information, accepting it and treating it as knowledge. In order to effectively apply and to understand KM, it is important to distinguish between knowledge and information and think of how knowledge and information relate to each other.

There are three main schools of thought in defining knowledge. One group of researchers argues that data, information and knowledge focus on different parts of a value chain or hierarchical structure. The other focusses on the analysis of 'process' of knowing, through which the knowledge is created, processed and disseminated (Figure 1). The third group regards knowledge as 'thing' or 'object'. According to value chain, data comprise raw facts, figures or observation and information is data organized so that it has meaningful context, and knowledge is meaningfully organized accumulation of actionable information applicable to problem solving.[4–6]

According to the process viewpoint, knowledge can be identified with both justified belief in the mind (personalized information or the cognitive status of knowing) and commitment anchored to the

overall epistemological structure (Sveiby, 1998; Malhotra, 1997; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Data is uninterpreted material on which a decision is to be based; information is data interpreted in a given context. Knowledge is the cognitive ability to generate insight based on information and data.[5] Knowledge can also be considered as the end of the chain that begins with data as a commodity, while value is added to data when they are processed into information and, in turn, information gains further value when it is applied in meaning and context transforming into knowledge. Data are processed or organized for a meaningful analysis. Numeric data can be entered into spreadsheet (in a computer), and trend, chart, qualitative and quantitative analysis drawn. During the analysis phase, information is transformed into knowledge. This knowledge is now context specific, relevance and actionable for planning, scheduling and executing decision making, problem solving, machine prognosis/diagnosis, product development or service delivery, creativity and innovation (Figure 1). There is a significant positive correlation between the measure of knowledge and job performance for all levels of management. However, within the value chain approach, some researchers regard knowledge as a thing or object that we can manage, store and manipulate.[5]

There are two types of knowledge: tacit and explicit. This distinction between tacit and explicit is increasingly recognized by scholars as a subject of discussion and fundamental to the concept of KM. This important distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge with regard to forms of knowledge was introduced by the chemist-turned philosopher M. Polanyi and used by Nonaka to formulate a theory of organizational learning that focusses on the conversion/creation of knowledge between tacit and explicit forms. **Explicit knowledge or know-what** (sometimes referred to as formal knowledge) is explicit as also the most common type of knowledge. It is very often codified and stored in a written form as manuals, brochures, technical drawings, scientific formulae and patents, and readily communicated either in a symbolic form or in formal and systematic language and shared through print and electronic methods along with other formal means. It can be gained through education or structured study.



Figure 1. Data, Information, Knowledge and Decision making

Tacit knowledge (also **informal knowledge**), on the contrary, is primarily more tacit and hard to articulate with formal language. It is highly personal, and deeply rooted in an individual's experience, actions, understanding and involves personal belief, values, perspectives, insights and assumptions. It is highly contextual and culture bound. It involves both cognitive and technical elements and is non-transferable without direct personal interaction (either physical or virtual). Therefore, it is not found in manuals, books, documents or databases. Tacit dimensions of knowledge build up over time in peoples' heads, hands and relationships. People generally use stories, metaphors, analogies and demonstrations to convey their tacit knowledge to others. Polanyi (1967) encapsulates the meaning of tacit knowledge as 'we are more than we can tell', e.g., swimming, ride a bicycle. It is assumed that tacit knowledge has more value than explicit knowledge. According to Nonaka (1995), 'the key to knowledge creation lies in the mobilization and conversion of tacit knowledge'. However, knowledge is only valuable when it can be explicit. Even in philosophy this point is emphasized, since the question of knowledge arises when there is proposition and only a proposition can be true or false. Actually, both forms of knowledge are important for organizational effectiveness. The task of KM for organizational effectiveness is, therefore, to identify and facilitate the application of valuable tacit knowledge that is potentially useful when it becomes explicit.

Dimension of tacit knowledge is divided into two categories: technical and cognitive. Technical tacit knowledge (TTK) consists of informal personal skills or a craft, sometimes referred to as 'know-whow'. Cognitive tacit knowledge (CTK) encompasses implicit mental models, perceptions, beliefs and values.

Information becomes knowledge once it is processed in the peoples' mind (tacit knowledge as per Nonaka, Prusak) which then becomes information (explicit knowledge as per Nonaka) once it is articulated or communicated to others in the form of spoken or written words, text, computer output or other means. There are some definitions of knowledge as justified personal belief that increases an individual's capacity to take effective action (Alavi and Leidner). Davenport and Prusak (1997) describe knowledge as 'a fluid of framed experience, values, contextual information and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluation and incorporating new experiences and information'.

WHAT IS MANAGEMENT?

Philosophers are generally not interested in the discussion of what is meant by management. 'Management is a live philosophy.' 'Management' is basically the art and science of getting things done through and with other people in formally organized groups. So, managing as practice is an art while the body of the knowledge underlying it may be referred to as a science. Management is a process of directing the operations of an organization or the segment or causing people to coordinate with each other to achieve the specific objective with the available resources. Managers make decisions, allocate resources, direct activities of others in order to attain goals of an organization. The objectives of the management in any organization are to stay and prosper in business, to improve the share of the investor and also to increase profitability. The main characteristic of management is the integration and application of the knowledge. The knowledge that employees have can include their 'competencies, skills, talents, thoughts, ideas, intuitions, commitment, motivations and imaginations'. Knowledge makes people able to perform different business tasks. It relates to how well people do their jobs, how they interact with customers or clients, and how they monitor and adjust methods for getting the knowledge work done efficiently (doing things right) and effectively (doing right thing).

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

KM is concerned with two aspects, identifying and managing the knowledge that already exists in the organization and enhancing the ability to create new knowledge in order to meet business objectives. As yet, there is no clear, consensus and any universally accepted definition of KM. There are several working definitions of KM found at conferences, in print and on websites. Some of the best definitions of KM come from researchers who are widely consulted practitioners and specialists in their field. The following comprise a representative sample. Sveiby (1997) defines KM as 'art of creating value from an organization's intangible assets'. Ruggles (1998) describes KM as 'an approach to adding or creating value by more actively leveraging the knowhow, experience, and judgement resident within and, in many cases, outside of an organization'. KM is the 'process of collecting, organizing, classifying and disseminating information throughout an organization, so as to make it purposeful to those who need it' (Albert, 1998). KM deals with the process of creating value from an organization's intangible assets (Liebowitz, 1999).

Beckman (1997) defines KM as 'the formalization of and access to experience, knowledge, and expertise that create new capabilities, enable superior performance, encourage innovation, and enhance customer value.'[14] According to Yogesh Malhotra (1997), 'knowledge management caters to the critical issues of organizational adaption, survival and competence in the face of increasingly discontinuous environmental change. Essentially, it embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic combination of data and information processing capacity of information technologies, and the creative and innovative capacity of human beings'. Malhotra argues that this is a strategic view of KM that takes into account the synergy between technological and behaviour aspects as necessary for survival in 'wicked environments'. The need for synergy of technological and human capabilities is based on the distinction between the 'old world' of business and the 'new world' of business. Some have defined KM as getting the right information to

the right people at right time so that they can make the right decision. However, Malhotra advocates that in a world of radical discontinuous change, it is impossible for a system to predict in advance what the right information, right person or the right time will be at any given point in the future. KM focuses on 'doing the right thing' (effectiveness) instead of 'doing things right' (efficiency). KM is a framework within which the organization views all its processes as knowledge processes. So it is found that there have been several schools in the subject of KM till now. However, most gurus consider KM to be a process. This is based on understanding any organization as a KM system. With this view, KM can be defined as a specified business process through which organizations systematically and comprehensively identify, create, store, share, and apply their institutional or collective knowledge to improve overall organizational effectiveness (OOE).

ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

Heraclitus, an ancient Greek philosopher, remarks that 'there is nothing permanent except change'. Everything is becoming. Everything is flux. Business environment is no exception. The business environment has undergone and experienced a sea change. Turbulence is the hallmark of recent business environment. Malhotra (1997) indicates 'the key ideas that influence the current global business scenario is radical and discontinuous change'. In an increasingly complex environment, technology is changing at a breathtaking rate in recent decades, with no sign of slowing down in the foreseeable future. The knowledge—which today managers and engineers need—is more comprehensive and complex than before. Changing operational strategies, customer trends, economic trends, organizational systems, competitive products and services and changing societal expectation make the existing business models, business practice and value proposition obsolete. Knowledge is subject to natural decay. Management must adopt continuously and adopt the understanding that the only constant is, indeed, change itself. So the modem business needs to adapt to change in order to achieve benefit. Knowledge is the ability of adaptation to changing condition. Knowledge is a resource with a significant amount of potential status and power. In this context,

Nonaka (1991) states 'in an economy where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one sure source of lasting competitive advantage is knowledge. Successful companies are those that consistently create new knowledge, disseminate it widely throughout the organization, and quickly embody it in new technologies and products.' Knowledge today is the only meaningful economic resource for companies to become market driven or customer oriented. KM is necessary for facilitating continuous and ongoing processes of learning and unlearning in order to remain competitive in the radically changing needs of the business environment. According to Prusak (1997, 2001), globalization of the economy; the complexity and volume of global trade; the awareness of the value of specialized knowledge; the emerging trends of knowledge-centric view of the firm; the awareness of knowledge as a distinct factor in production; and cheap networked or ubiquitous computing are the main facets which are the driving forces behind this renewed interest in KM. In a traditional economy, knowledge is more academic and cognitive in nature. In contrast, in the knowledge economy, it is application oriented and value addition occurs through the continuous application of new knowledge to the improvement of the work process, product and services that have commercial implication. The following specific business factors are identified as to the reason why we need knowledge to manage.

During the last few decades, downsizing has been a popular strategy to reduce the size of workforce and increase profits. Knowledge is lost through outsourcing, downsizing, mergers and terminations. When an employee left, he or she took the knowledge that they had accumulated over the years. This loss of important knowledge led the management to undertake KM strategy. Again, reduction in staffing creates a need to replace informal knowledge with formal methods. What is necessary is product/service with fewer people but fewer people with higher technical knowledge. We are all action bound; we are forced to work, so we must know what action to perform. Knowledge is power; most of our work (99 per cent) is knowledge based. It has generated new products and services that have commercial implications. The amount of available time of employee to experience and acquire knowledge has diminished. Again, early retirement or VRS and

increasing mobility of workers lead to loss of knowledge. A management review survey also confirmed that KM as a strategy will offer a competitive advantage in the future. To summarize, managing knowledge represents the primary opportunity for achieving substantial saving, developing a new product/service, instigating change, identifying new markets, improving market shares, significant improvements in human and organization performance, and competitive advantage. Some times knowledge related to the field of business management also creates deception and discrimination between consumers who happen to be the citizens of one's own country as also those who belong to others. There is a notion that if something has been 'produced' it has to be 'sold' even if it should not be sold because it may harmful to those who consume it.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS SUCCESS

There are several frameworks for KM developed by scholars. KM frameworks (KMF) have been described differently by different authors. In characterizing the nature of KM phenomena, frameworks differ not only in their focus, but also in their breadth and depth. In their reviews, Holsapple and Joshi (1999) and Rubestein-Montano et al. (2001) discuss the components and assumptions in the existing frameworks for an organization context. After reviewing a broad range of KM framework described in literature it was found that there is no one single KMF and that each of these offers insights in its own way and in particular circumstances. There appears to be a consensus on the need for a more specific framework for business success. Even though the existing and the suggested frameworks recognize varying organizational contexts, they generally appear to ignore the differences in the operating environmental contexts. We have developed a KM framework after reviewing a broad range of literature (Figure 2). The working of a KM framework depends on individual knowledge capabilities (IC) or competencies, organizational knowledge capabilities (OC) and environmental influences (EI). The structure of the framework is as follows: first layer: Environmental influence; second layer: organizational and individual capabilities or competencies; third: KM process/life cycle and, finally, production/service process.

Environmental factors generally influence the KM process for an uncertain future through the employees and the organization. An environment can be viewed from different dimensions like socio-cultural, political, governmental, legal, economic, customer, supplier, competitors, product/market change, design complexity, technology, community, etc. **Individual knowledge capabilities** comprise individual skill, knowledge, value, norm, education, experience, time and motivation. A person working in or with an organization is the main actor of the KM process. On the other hand, **organizational knowledge capabilities** include organizational culture, structure and strategy, infrastructure and technology, particularly IT, human resource development, objectives, leadership, knowledge asset, etc. Successful organizations are those that consistently manage the continuous and ongoing **KM process** of identifying, creating, storing, distributing and applying their knowledge that define the 'core competency'. In fact, an organization requires knowledge for organizing and maintaining itself as a functioning enterprise. Organization and environment interact with one another, as a result of which information is absorbed and knowledge originates and action is taken on the basis of its combination with the experience, values and internal rules (Davenport and Prusak, 1998).

KM generally deals with a number of different core knowledge process activities. KM activities have also been described differently by different authors. From research and experience and reviewing a broad range of **KM process** described in literature, it has been found that the following five basic knowledge process activities are sufficient and appropriate: (1) **Identify**, (2) **Create**, (3) **Store**, (4) **Share**, and (5) **Apply**. These are called the knowledge life cycle. Though some approaches have additional activities, they are still included in our five basic activities.

Identify: The first phase of KM process is the **identification** of knowledge available within the organization. Every organization has some objectives. To reach any destination, we must know where we are. Similarly, to achieve the business objective, organizations need to identify what knowledge they possess and what they are lacking. It is necessary to continuously assess the 'best practices'. It includes an analysis of customers' requirements, organizational core capa-

bilities and knowledge requirements. In order to avoid the reuse of knowledge to reinvent the wheel, the identification steps should be done before creating new knowledge.

Create: The next phase is the **creation** of new knowledge to improve products, performance and sustainable competitive advantage. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), in their dynamic model of knowledge creation, suggest that knowledge is created and transferred through social interaction amongst individuals and organizations. Nonaka and Takeuchi also propose four different modes of knowledge conversion between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge in a matrix:

Socialization (from tacit to tacit): an individual acquires tacit knowledge directly from others through shared experience, imitation, observation, practice, on job training, brainstorming and becomes 'socialized' into a specific way of doing things.

Externalization (from tacit to explicit): It is a knowledge creation process. By its very nature, the conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is somewhat difficult. Tacit knowledge is converted into explicit form with the help of stories, metaphors, analogies, demonstrations, concepts, hypothesis or models, e.g., writing a report after attending a conference or workshop, dialogue among teams members.

Combination (from explicit to explicit): This combines discrete pieces of explicit knowledge into a new whole, e.g., compiling data from numerous source to write a report. The report is constituted by this new explicit knowledge.

Internalization (from explicit to tacit): It is a process of 'learning by doing' and a verbalization and documentation of experience. Individuals have to understand and internalize information which involves creating their own tacit knowledge so that they can act on it.

These processes do not occur in isolation, but work together in different combinations in typical business situations. Knowledge is shared, articulated, and made available to others when, as a result of the individuals' participation in these processes, organizational learning takes place. Creation of new knowledge takes place through the processes of combination and internalization. Socialization and externalization are complex and human-interactive processes.

Knowledge-creating activity requires human commitment, personal vision and will power. Knowledge is created through a process of inter-subjectivity, a type of connection or feedback mechanism between two or more minds. The fear of war and the pursuit of power have affected the creation of knowledge. Talent is fragile and needs to be handled with care. There were deep-rooted ideological, economic, power rivalry and political differences between the United States and Soviet Union before the Second World War. These differences intensified in the form of a cold war because of their mutual suspicious immediately after the Second World War. To create knowledge people need to possess the right to speech and trade freely throughout the world. After the Second World War capital movement, technology, economic power shifted from company to company instead of country to country. It is not just the pursuit of profit of the company but also creation of power. For creation of knowledge an open culture environment, i.e., free channels of two-way communication is required. 'Knowledge can be viewed as intrinsically relational to its surrounding world.' Creation of knowledge is a result of human mental acts that are dependent on various socio-cultural contexts. It creates a relationship between a subject and an object. It does not exist in an isolated state in the objective world, but resides within a variety of contextual factors.

Store: The next phase is the **storage** of the newly created knowledge in individual and organizational memory in order to build up knowledge assets for future benefit. This also includes storing it in the form of documents, databases and records.

Share: The purpose of this step is to **distribute** the new knowledge with the members of the organization. Knowledge is transferred and made accessible to workers throughout the organization by way of collaboration, training, coaching and workshops. In fact, if knowledge of any person is not shared by others, it will have only a limited organizational value. Again, unlike tangible assets, knowledge grows only when it is shared; after all, 'a candle loses nothing by lighting another candle'.

Apply: Knowledge becomes valuable if it is practically **applied** in the business processes. On the other hand, if it is not so used, the same purpose is defeated. In fact, the firm's ability to create and



Figure 2. KM framework for business success

sustain competitive advantage should be fundamentally based on integration and application of specified knowledge of the members of an organization. Valuable human and knowledge resources will be lost unless organizations make better use of their critical resources.

As Knowledge is context specific, it depends on a particular time and space. Much of what was learned a few years ago is no longer relevant in the workplace. In the fast-changing business environment, knowledge also becomes obsolete over time unless organizations make better use of their creative workers who desire to apply their knowledge for value addition. Use of knowledge, therefore, becomes an input for the knowledge identification phase. In this way, each KM process step paves the input for the next step and then again for the next and so on. Thus the cycle of knowledge is build upon itself; it becomes a knowledge spiral in the organization as described by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). However, an organization cannot create knowledge without individuals.

The output of such new knowledge will become the basis of all work done by the production systems. Managers and engineers are required to translate the output of putting knowledge in practice. Applying the knowledge within the value-adding processes of an organization, the products and service are innovated and developed, manufactured and delivered to the customers. Management effectiveness depends upon the interplay of many factors, including decision-making capability, the ability to deliver the desired service by individuals and by department, technical and managerial capability, etc. All the above factors depend to a significant degree on effective availability, creation, share and application of good knowledge and clear understanding and consequently, broad and systematic management of knowledge.

For machine diagnosis, a large amount of knowledge is also required, viz., knowledge of equipment and how it normally operates, knowledge about the failed equipment and its fault systems, etc. History, experience and a precise knowledge of how a system operates regulates and controls the eventual success of management strategy implementation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

KM is not new. It is an evolutionary development rather than a revolutionary one. Even before the term KM was coined in the early 1990s, many organizations had a well-established system to manage and generate knowledge in a variety of approaches for upgrading the knowledge base of their employees. Prusak (2001) looks at 'knowledge management like any system of thought that has value, is both old and new, and its combination of new ideas with ideas that everyone has known all along'.

However, under increasing competitive pressure, many companies have recognized KM as a strategic weapon in the market place for a business success either through knowledgeable people delivering tasks more effectively or through managing the intellectual capital wisely. Again, due to global competition and a turbulent business environment, there has been an increasing amount of interest shown to create, store, share and apply knowledge in all organizations. The objectives of KM is to capitalize on knowledge assets in order to achieve maximum attainable business goal. So, in the digital age, knowledge plays an important role. It is found that an essential part of KM is, of course, knowledge itself. The questions of origin and nature of knowledge has been explored from both the philosophical and KM perspective. Knowledge is something that resides in the head of a person rather than in computers and is revealed through the skill and ability to operate in certain conditions. Knowledge is something different from data and information. It is, however, more than information. There is a difference between two main types of knowledge: tacit and explicit knowledge. KM cannot be viewed as the implementation of technology alone; rather, it is a multidiscipline approach that integrates business strategy, cultures, value and work processes. Creation of KM requires the processes of social interaction. The unique configuration of individuals that make up the organization is, therefore, paramount to KM's long-term viability and its value to companies. So, organization environment should be one where workers readily transfer and share what they know, internalize it and apply it to create new knowledge for business success. In order to support production systems, it is first necessary to know what events are likely to occur. Knowledge of employees of the organization substantially influences the efficiency of its activity, the achievements of its goals and adaptation to complex changing conditions. In fact, if the employees of an organization have wide and deep knowledge, the organization works better and will have greater potentiality for work in the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors are grateful to Late Dr Sudhir Chandra Samanta, Ex-Reader, Department of Philosophy, Scottish Church College, Kolkata, for active cooperation and guidance at the time of initial preparation of this paper. We pay homage to Dr S.C. Samanta.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Ducker P., Post-Capitalist Society (Oxford, 1993).
2. Samanta, Mousumi, Knowledge and Certainty, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1995, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
3. Samanta, Sudhir C. The problem of *a priori* Knowledge: A critical survey, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1975, Calcutta University, Kolkata.
4. Joia, L.A. Measuring intangible corporate assets: linking business strategy with intellectual capital, *Journal of Intellectual Capital*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, pp. 68–84.
5. Sveiby, K.E. The New Organizational Wealth: Managing and Measuring Knowledge-Based Assets (San Francisco: Berrett Koehler, 1997).
6. Malhotra, Y. Knowledge management, knowledge organizations and knowledge workers: A View from the Front Lines. 1997, URL: http://www.brint.com/interview/maeil.htm
7. Nonaka, I., Takeuchi, I. The Knowledge-creating Company. How Japanese Companies create the dynamics of innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
8. Nonaka, I., The Knowledge-Creating Company, *Harvard Business Review*, 1991 November-December, 96–104.
9. Polanyi, M. The Tacit Dimension (Doubleday, 1967).
10. Prusak, L. Knowledge in Organizations (Butterworth-Heinemann, 1997).
11. Prusak, L. Where did knowledge management come from? *IBM Systems Journal*, Vol. 40, no. 4, 2001, pp. 1002–07.
12. Alavi, M., Leidner, D. Knowledge Management Systems: emerging views and practices from the field, In proceedings of the 32nd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Science, Los Alamitos, 1999, IEEE Computer Society.

13. Davenport, T.H. and Prusak, L. Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998).
14. Shuklal, M. Revisiting Knowledge Management: Integrating 'Knower' with the Knowledge Processes, 2003, from Internet.
15. Holsapple, C., Joshi, K. Description and analysis of existing knowledge management frameworks, In proceedings of the 32nd Annual Hawaili International Conference on System Science, Los Alamitos, 1999, IEEE Computer Society.
16. Rubenstein-Montano, B., Liebowitz, J., Buchwalter, J., McCaw, D., Newman, B., and Rebeck, K. and TKMM Team: A Systems thinking Framework for Knowledge Management, *Decision Support Systems*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2001, pp. 5–16.

An Alleged Anecdote Revisited: On Śaṅkara in the King's Body and the Notion of *Jñāna-niṣṭhā*

DANIEL RAVEH

Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
E-mail: daniraveh@gmail.com

QUEST

This short essay is a very late response to an article written by Daya Krishna in the *Quest* four decades ago. His article 'Reflections on an Alleged Anecdote in Śankara's Life' appeared in Volume 43 (October-December 1964) of the *Quest: A Quarterly of Inquiry, Criticism and Ideas* edited by Abu Sayeed Ayyub and Amlan Datta. The same volume consisted of articles such as Abu Sayeed Ayyub's 'Jawaharlal Nehru on Religion', M.K. Haldar's 'Nehru's Foreign Policy' and N.K. Devaraja's 'India and Western Scholars', as well as reportage on African socialism and a poetry section. In the following lines, I will revert to the famous anecdote from the traditional accounts of Śankara's life, reflecting on which Daya Krishna's article has been written. I will touch on the main points that he has raised, hence offering another hermeneutic angle to this old hagiographic chapter, taking it as a later-Advaitic *bhāṣya* of Śankara's own notion of *jñāna-niṣṭhā*.

ŚANKARA IN THE KING'S BODY

Before turning to the actual narrative, let me say that the episode we are dealing with is included in all the hagiographies (eight in number, composed in Sanskrit between the fourteenth and the eighteenth centuries A.D.[1]) scrutinized by Jonathan Bader in his intriguing book *Conquest of the Four Quarters: Traditional Accounts of the Life of Śankara* (Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, 2000). The fact that the episode is repeated in hagiography after hagiography in-

dicates—or at least this is my contention—that it adds more than just a large quantity of *masālā* to Śankara's life story. Through a fascinating anecdote (which consists of everything: sex, suspense, humour), the hagiographers highlight a philosophical notion par excellence, namely Śankara's notion of *jñāna–niṣṭhā*.

The relevant elements of the anecdote under discussion might be summarized as follows: Śankara and Maṇdana Miśra, the great Advaitin and the illustrious Mīmāmsāka, meet for a mighty philosophical debate. 'I am sure I will be victorious in the debate', Śankara begins by saying, 'but if however I am defeated, I shall cease to be a *samnyāsin*, abandon my ochre robe and assume the white dress'.[2] 'If I happen to be defeated in argument', replies Maṇdana, 'I shall take the life of *samnyāsa*'.[3] Hence, the debate starts, and as we are dealing with a story told and retold by the Advaita tradition it is no wonder that Śankara turns out to be the winner. But Ubhaya Bhārati,[4] wife of Maṇdana Miśra, incarnation of goddess Sarasvatī and the umpire of the debate so far, insists that Śankara's victory would not be complete until he defeats her too. The challenged Advaitin agrees and a new debate starts. Determined to overcome the *samnyāsin*, she takes the discussion to the realms of love and erotica which Śankara, a celibate from birth, knows nothing of. 'Discuss with me the science and art of love between the sexes. Enumerate its forms and expressions. What is its nature and what are its centres? How does it vary in the sexes during the bright and dark fortnights? What are its manifestations in man and woman?'[5] Śankara is indeed puzzled when asked to discuss the *kusumāstra-śāstra*. After all, what does a *brahmacarin* know about the flower-arrows of Lord Kāma (shot from a sugarcane bow, as we can visually see in perhaps the most famous relief of the eastern group of temples in Khajuraho)? Ignorant as he is about the new topic of discussion, Śankara asks for- and receives a month-long (and in some versions of the story six-month long) 'time-out' to prepare for such a debate. Surprisingly though, rather than using the time given to him to consult Vatsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra* or other relevant texts, Śankara decides to leave his body in a cave and enter—with his yogic powers—the body of a king called in most of the hagiographies as Amaruka, in order to acquire 'erotic-knowledge' by experience without breaking his *brahmacarya* vow.[6]

Bader points out[7] that on top of his 'practical training', Śankara's in the king's body has also composed—according to most of the hagiographers—a commentary to the *Kāmasūtra* or has at least authored the famous *Amaruka-śataka* ('The Hundred Love Poems of King Amaruka'). Absorbed in sensual pleasures, Śankara 'forgets himself' altogether and in due time fails to appear for the renewal of the debate. Worried for their master, as well as for themselves having been left without a *guru*, Sānkara's disciples show up at the king's court disguised as musicians. They sit at the king's feet and sing the Upaniṣadic *mahāvākya tat tvam asi*, using, in fact, Śankara's own pedagogic tool as a wake-up call for none other than him; and indeed, Śankara's identification with the king's body fades away; he realizes who he really is (the *ātman*, and on the 'phenomenal level' a renouncer and *guru*), returns to his body and defeats Ubhaya Bhārati in the debate.

AN ELEPHANT IN THE UNIVERSITY QUARTERS

Daya Krishna's reading of the anecdote can be summarized as follows:

(1) 'Knowledge of the ultimate reality does not necessarily give you knowledge of other things as well.'[8] Or, in other words, *ātma-jñāna* is not *sarva-jñāna*. Daya Krishna's emphasis is on the fact that the acquirement of 'metaphysical knowledge' does not make a person an expert in empirical issues too. Hence,

(2) In empirical matters one has to consult the senses, like Śankara's of the anecdote when it came to love and sex. 'Neither *śruti* nor authority of any kind nor yogic meditations nor the realization of *Brahman* is competent, either singly or collectively, to answer such [empirical] questions.'[9] The same argument is further developed by Daya Krishna in his later article 'Pitirim Sorokin and the Problem of Knowledge.'[10] Here he states, in response to Sorokin's idea of 'systems of truth'—each having its own system of validity—that 'There is a cross-cultural system of validity [of knowledge] and no alternative system of validity, at least in the empirical-rational sphere of truth' (p. 147). That is to say, that empirical knowledge

can be validated merely with empirical tools, rather than by way of supra-sensory and supra-rational means. Interestingly, Śankara himself (the philosopher, not the protagonist) agrees wholeheartedly with Daya Krishna. 'You cannot prove that fire is cold or that the sun does not give heat', he maintains, 'even by citing a hundred examples [from the *śruti*], for the facts would already be known to be otherwise through another *pramāṇa*. And one *pramāṇā* does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other *pramāṇa*.[11] Therefore,

(3) 'Realized souls' should not be considered as omniscient, nor treated as an authority in empirical matters. 'How can a saint', asks Daya Krishna sharply, 'even if he is a perfect saint, pronounce relevantly on the theory of relativity or the correctness of a fiscal policy or the morality of birth control or the comparative aesthetic excellence of the famous 'Khajuraho Kiss' and 'The Kiss' of Rodin?'[12] And if this attack against blind faith in *gurus* is not sufficient, Daya Krishna adds that 'if a Buddha were to say that 'there is an elephant in quarter No. C-6 of the university quarters in Jaipur on the 15th of April 1964 at 1000 A.M.', and if no one who is there at that time and is not blind does not see it, then the statement is false even if it is made by the Buddha'.[13]

Having presented Daya Krishna's reading of Śankara-in-the-king's-body anecdote, I would like to approach the story from another angle. Hence, the next lines will be dedicated to Śankara's notion of *jñāna–niṣṭhā*.

JÑANA-NIṢṬHĀ

The term *niṣṭhā* occurs in the *Bhagavadgītā* thrice. In *Bhagavadgītā* 3.3[14] it refers to the famous paths of knowledge and action (*jñāna-* and *karma-yoga* respectively) leading as per the *Gītā-kāra* to *mokṣa*; in BG 18.50[15] it refers again to the knowledge-path; and in BG 17.1[16] it refers to each of the three *guṇas*, as the basic approach behind, or the hidden motive for action. The term *niṣṭhā* is also used, and often so, in Śankara's different commentaries.[17] For him, as for the author of the *Bhagavadgītā* when the latter uses the term

in reference to the paths of action and knowledge, it means being deeply absorbed in something. In the Advaitin's case, it is usually used in the sense of 'being inside' *Brahma-jñāna*, i.e., *Brahman*-knowledge or 'the knowledge which is *Brahman*'.[18] In his *bhāṣya* of *Bhagavadgītā* 3.3, Śankara glosses the term *niṣṭhā* as '*sthitir anuṣṭheyatātparyam*', 'steadfastness, persistence in what is undertaken';[19] 'what is undertaken', we understand from the *Gītā*-text itself is either *jñāna* or *karma*-yoga. In his introduction to chapter 4 of the text, Śankara states that the yoga taught in the last two chapters is *jñānaniṣṭhālakṣaṇah sasamnyāsah*, 'characterized by *jñāna–niṣṭhā* and *samnyāsa*';[20] here the term *niṣṭhā* is not glossed but the centrality of *jñānna–niṣṭhā* in the message of the *Gītā* as read by Śankara is emphasized, as well as the interlacement between *jñāna–niṣṭhā* and *samnyāsa*, certain type of knowledge and a matching way of living. I will touch on this interlacement elaborately later. In *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya* 18.12,[21] the Advaitin claims that a *paramahamsa-privrājaka* is a *jñāna–niṣṭhā*; hence, again, the connection between renunciation and being 'inside knowledge' is reinforced. Śankara further claims that merely *samyag-darśana-niṣṭhā* destroys *avidyā* and other *samsāra* seeds. The same phrase, i.e., *samyag-darśana-niṣṭhā*, '*niṣṭhā* in right perception' also occurs in *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya* 8.24.[22] In his commentary of *Bhagavadgītā* 18.50, Śankara glosses the term *niṣṭhā* by saying that 'here *niṣṭhā* means culmination, a final stage. Of what? Of *Brahman*-knowledge'.[23] Implied are degrees of knowing the Brahman, of which *niṣṭhā* is the deepest. In his commentary of *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* 1.2.12, Śankara portrays the *Brahma-niṣṭha*, in the following manner:

> 'One who renounces all activities and remains absorbed in the non-dual *Brahman* only is a *Brahma-niṣṭha*, just as it is in the case of the words *japa-niṣṭha*, absorbed in self-repetition, and *tapo-niṣṭha*, absorbed in *tapas*. For one engrossed in action cannot have absorption in *Brahman*, *karma* and the knowledge of the *ātman* being contradictory.'[24]

In order to clarify the notion of *Brahma-niṣṭha*, Śankara draws on the more familiar notions of *japa-niṣṭha* (a person immersed in recitation of *mantra*) and *tapo-niṣṭha* (a person engaged in *tapas*). *Prima facie*, these two practitioners differ immensely from the *Brahma-niṣṭha*; if each of them is dedicated to his own practice, the latter—owing to Śankara's famous clear-cut distinction between

knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*karma*)—is not *doing* anything. Yet, my contention is that even though 'knowledge', in Śankara's sense of the word, has nothing to do with *practice*, nevertheless it refers to what we may call *praxis*. Like the *japa-niṣṭha* and the *tapasvin*, the knower of *Brahman* is not merely devoted to a certain path, but rather he cannot be divorced from it. He is not just a knower; he is 'inside knowledge'. Implied is again the link between one's knowledge (*jñāna*) and his 'way of living', encapsulated—I would like to suggest—in the very term *niṣṭhā*. Hence, according to Śankara, 'the knowledge which is *Brahman*' consists not merely of the obvious epistemological dimension (which makes it knowledge, *vidyā*, rather than subjective *anubhava*) but also of an existential-soteriological dimension. If one takes the anecdote about Śankara's life seriously (no, not as *itihāsa*, but rather as a narrative-illustration of a philosophical standpoint), then even the 'erotic-knowledge' for which the protagonist has entered the king's body is double-faceted, i.e., consists of epistemological as well as existential dimensions. And if such is the case, why not assume that every type of knowledge—profound or profane—has an implicit existential dimension in addition to its explicit epistemological character?

This existential dimension is further illustrated in the following passage from the Advaitin's *Bṛhadārayaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*:

> 'Because of the assertion "Desiring this world alone", we understand that those who seek the three external worlds are not entitled to wandering mendicancy, for a resident of the region of *Benaras* who wishes to reach *Haridwar* does not travel eastward.'[25]

In this short passage, which seems to be hiding yet another anecdote of Śankara's life (pilgrimage from Kāśī to *Gangā-dvāra*?), neither the term *jñāna–niṣṭhā* nor even *niṣṭhā* is mentioned, but the intimate liaison between knowledge and 'way of living' is intriguingly exemplified. The person wishing to reach Haridwar, explains Śankara,[26] is a *Brahmavid* (and may I add: but not yet a *Brahma-niṣṭha*) and *ātma-lokārthinah* (one who aims at the *'ātman*-world'). To achieve his aim, he must opt for *pārivrājya* (renunciation), rather than 'travel eastward' (i.e., outward). *Pārivrājya* (which I believe refers primarily to one's mental approach)[27] is depicted by Śankara as the matching way-of-living of 'the knowledge which is Brahman'. A certain way-of-living, then,

facilitates or even determines a certain type (or certain types) of knowledge, and might as well block the possibility of acquiring other knowledge-types (as Śankara's *samnyāsa* did not allow him to acquire 'erotic knowledge'). The anecdote about Śankara in the king's body further illustrates that it is not merely one's way-of-living determines that the knowledge available to him, but also *vice versa*. Otherwise, why would Śankara and Maṇdana announce at the very beginning of the debate, that if they are defeated, i.e., if the knowledge they stand for cannot be defended, they will adopt not merely their opponent's prevailing knowledge but also his way-of-living?

Knowledge, as depicted in the revisited anecdote (with constant reference to the philosophy of the Advaitin himself), consists then of epistemological and existential dimensions; the existential dimension is displayed in a way-of-living facilitating/facilitated by that very type of knowledge. Instead of epistemological and existential dimensions we may also speak, respectively, of theoretical and experiential aspects. Indeed Śankara enters the king's body to acquire 'knowledge by acquaintance', but the hagiographers insist that he has also written either a *Kāmasūtra-bhāṣya* or a collection of love poems. That is to say, that the very same knowledge should also be reflected upon, either philosophically or poetically. In an anecdote which is all about the experiential dimension, its theoretical counterpart is not forgotten.

The etymology of the terms *niṣṭhā* ('being in') and *jñāna–niṣṭhā* ('being in knowledge'), used by the Advaitin, is explicitly, even EXPLICITLY illustrated in the alleged anecdote under discussion. By entering the king's body, the protagonist, in fact, enters knowledge itself. I would like to suggest that it is a unique case of a literal, even physical *jñāna–niṣṭhā*, *jñāna* referring here to the 'erotic knowledge' that Śankara was seeking. The protagonist's forgetfulness of himself as anything besides (or rather 'outside of') being the *bhogin* king (hence his failure to reappear for the debate), illustrates—according to my reading—the difference between 'being in knowledge' and mere 'knowing'. When 'you are in', all the rest hardly exists, hardly matters, hardly makes any sense. Being in knowledge X as forgetfulness of everything which is not-X; this is further exemplified in an interview with Nikhil Banerjee, the

famous sitarist, in which he speaks of his illustrious *guru* Ustad Allahudin Khan Sahib:

> 'He [Khan Sahib] was such a person, suppose I would meet him on the train, on the road, on the bus, anywhere, immediately he would talk about music. *He actually wanted to live in music, always in music.* He would never talk about politics, nor talk about how far America is from Maihar. *He never knew all these things.* He would not talk. He would not listen.'[28]

In the context of our discussion Banerjee, in fact, discusses 'musical knowledge'. Music is depicted by him as nothing less than a way of living, *niṣṭhā* in Śankara's sense of the word. According to Banerjee, his *guru* was not merely interested in music alone, but rather he knew nothing about non-musical issues. Implied is the contention that when one is absorbed in whatever knowledge-type, there is no room for anything else. Allahudin Khan did not know how far America is from his home in Maihar since it is a meaningless question music-wise. If Śankara's *jñāna–niṣṭha* lives in an *ātma-loka,* then Khan Sahib—according to Banerjee—lived in a *samgīta-loka.* Knowledge, then, is not merely a way-of-living, but rather it constitutes a world; it determines what shall be put at the center and what should be shifted to the periphery; it excludes other knowledge-types if they do not 'belong' or fit in this world.

To conclude, I would like to raise two questions: First, what is the relation of *jñāna–niṣṭhā* as depicted above to the notion of openness? Second, what will happen to the *jñāna–niṣṭhā* notion if we think of knowledge in terms of change?

The first question is born of the feeling that the picture of *jñāna–niṣṭhā,* as portrayed above, whether embodied in Śankara's *Brahma–niṣṭha* who does not travel eastward or in Nikhil Banerjee's Allahudin Khan ('He never knew all these things; he would not talk; he would not listen') is too confined, isolated, limited. Deep, even infinitely deep as the worlds of music or the *Brahman* are, have I not depicted a picture of 'knowledge' as a cave in which the 'knower' encloses himself? Furthermore, is not openness an essential ingredient of 'knowledge'? The same question is frequently asked in the context of contemporary scientific work, wherein scholars become experts in very specific areas and acquire very precise knowledge-segments at the cost of panoramic or inter-disciplinary knowledge. The second question is born of yet another 'knowledge article' by Daya Krishna. In his recent article titled 'Knowledge: Whose is it, what is it, and why has it to be "true"?'[29], Daya Krishna reflects on new institutions, methods and technologies of knowledge which are perpetually created, invented, even commercially manufactured. Hence, he invites the reader to rethink knowledge in terms of change, plurality and the relationship between different knowledges. 'Knowledge', he writes, 'has an open-ended character and is subject to continuous revision, modification, extension and amendation. Therefore, the discussion [about knowledge] has to take a new turn as the discussion till now rests on the assumption that reality is there, finished and completed to be known, and that human action has nothing to do with it.'[30] Leaving aside Śankara's *Brahmavidyā* which is supposed to be *trikālābādhita,* and taking into account every other *vidyā,* can the picture of *jñāna–niṣṭhā* accommodate knowledge as a dynamic notion?

As for the first question—about *jñāna–niṣṭhā* and openness—I would like to suggest that a certain degree of openness is perhaps inherent in the very 'knowledge-cave' itself. In other words, my contention is that the *jñāna–niṣṭhā* is not merely a knower within a certain context, a specific field, a particular world; but rather that being a *niṣṭha* in one field he has decoded 'the DNA' of knowledge as such. Thus, he knows what it takes 'to enter a knowledge-body', knowledge which can be applied—as exemplified in the anecdote—to other types (possibly every type) of knowledge. Implied is a common ontological ground which underlies every knowledge-type. One of the bricks of such an ontological ground ('ontological' as opposed to the 'ontic knowledge' which differs from discipline to discipline) could be the interlacement between a certain type of knowledge and a matching way of living discussed above. Hence, an individual imbued with *jñāna–niṣṭhā* is 'well equipped' for entering/visiting other caves too, but what will motivate him to do so, to get out of 'his body', out of the cave? What will motivate an Allahudin Khan to listen to anything but music?

As for the second question—about *jñāna–niṣṭhā* if knowledge is thought of in terms of change, my initial response is that change is inherent in the very notion of *jñāna–niṣṭhā,* or rather that *jñāna–*

niṣṭhā is a perfect prism for watching knowledge as a dynamic notion. If the *niṣṭhā* of *jñāna–niṣṭhā* refers to the existential dimension of knowledge, and if the *jñāna* of *jñāna–niṣṭhā* is not an object but rather cannot be divorced from the knower and *vice versa*, then change is inevitable. Since I am constantly changing and 'my knowledge' is not closed in some file in the drawer, a computer or even in my consciousness, but rather goes with me to the market, eats dinner with me, etc.; since it is there in every moment, it is bound to change with me as I am changing with it; it is bound to be modified, extended, even reinvented. Why not?

Notes and References

1. Ananāgiri's *Śankaravijaya*, Cidvilāsa's *Śankaravijaya-vilāsa*, Vyāsācala's *Śankaravijaya*, Rājacūdāmaṇi-Dkṣita's *Śankarābhyudaya*, Govindanātha's *Śankarācāryacarita*, Tirumala-Dkṣita's *Śankarābhyudaya*, Lakṣmaṇa-Śāstrī's *Guruvamśa-kāvya* and, of course, Mādhava's *Śankaradigvijaya*.
2. Swāmī Tapasyānanda (trans.), *Śankara-Digvijaya* (Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1974), p. 88.
3. Ibid.
4. It was S.C. Pande who first drew my attention to the fact that the literal meaning of the name 'Ubhaya bhārati' is 'she who speaks for the two', namely for her husband and herself alike.
5. Swāmī Tapasyānanda (trans.), *Śankara-Digvijaya*, p. 112.
6. Interestingly, the *brahmacarya* vow is considered here as applying merely to Śankara's own body, not to Śankara in the king's body. According to this vow-per-body policy, if one is out of his body, he is released from his vow. Is it so merely with regard to the *brahmacarya* vow, or also other vows, perhaps every vow?
7. Bader, Jonathan, *Conquest of the Four Quarters: Traditional Accounts of the Life of Śankara*, p. 96.
8. Daya Krishna, 'Reflection on an Alleged Anecdote in Śankara's Life', p. 33.
9. Ibid.
10. 'Pitirim Sorokin and the Problem of Knowledge', in: Daya Krishna, *The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze Over Three Decades* (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1989), pp. 140-49.
11. *na hi agnih śīta ādityo na tapatîti vā dṛṣṭānta-śatenāpi pratipādayita śakyam pramāṇātareṇānyathādhigatatvād vastunah na ca pramāṇam pramāṇāntareṇa virudhyate pramāṇāntarāviṣayam eva hi pramāṇāntaram jñāpayati* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 2.1.20) [*Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śankarabhāṣya* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), p. 737].
12. Daya Krishna, 'Reflection on an Alleged Anecdote in Śankara's Life', p. 35.
13. Ibid.
14. BG 3.3: loke '*smin dvividhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayā*' *nagha jñāna yogena sāmkhyānām karmayogena yoginām.*
15. BG 18.50: *siddhim prāpto yathā brahma tathā 'pnoti nibodha me samāsenai' va kaunteya niṣṭhā jñānasya yā parā.*
16. BG 17.1: *ye śāstravidhim utsṛjya yajante śraddhayā 'nvitāh teṣām niṣṭhā tu kā kṛṣṇa sattvam āhu rajas tamah.*
17. Henceforth, I will focus on Śankara's *Bhagavadgitā-bhāṣya*, but see also *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 7.20.1 where he states that 'niṣṭhā is steadfastness in service, etc., of the teacher, for acquiring the Brahman-knowledge' (*niṣṭhā guru-śuśrūṣādi-tatparatvam brahmavijñānāya*) [*Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śankarabāṣya*, p. 560]. Here, the *niṣṭhā* (devotion, engagement, totality) is in the service of the *guru*, for the sake of *Brahmavijñāna*. Also see Śankara's *Praśna-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 1.1 [Ibid., p. 106]; here he explains that those mentioned in the Upaniṣadic text, are *brahmaparāh*, approaching the lower Brahman as the supreme one, and *brahma-niṣṭhāh*, engaged in practice (anuṣṭhāna-niṣṭhā), leading to its attainment. Finally, see the last sentence of Śankara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 2.1.15, where he states that all the *pramāṇas* culminate (*niṣṭhā*) in the Brahman [*Brahmasūtra Śankara Bhāṣyam* (Varanasi: Caukhambā Vidyābhavan, 1998, p. 202].
18. Here I draw on R. Balasubramanian (*Advaita Vedānta*, in: D.P. Chattopadhyaya [General Editor], *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, Volume II, Part 2 (New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2000). Balasubramanian explains that the *samāsa 'Brahma-vidyā'* or '*Brahma-jñāna*' can be analyzed as a '*tat puruṣa*' and translated as '*Brahman-knowledge*', or as a '*karmadhāraya*', hence translated as 'the-knowledge-which-is-Brahman'. The problem with the formulation '*Brahman*-knowledge' is that it objectifies the *Brahman* which, in fact, is neither an object, nor even a subject but rather transcends the subject-object dvandva (duality) altogether.
19. *Bhagavadgītā with Śankarabhāṣya* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), p. 45; The translation is Swāmī Gambhirānanda's; see his *Bhagavad-Gītā with the Commentary of Śankarācārya* (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1992), p. 135.
20. *Bhagavadgītā with Śankarabhāṣya*, p. 60; Swāmī Gambhrānanda (trans.), *Bhagavad-Gītā with the Commentary of Śankarācārya*, p. 175.

21. *Bhagavadgītā with Śankarabhāṣya*, p. 262.
22. Ibid., p. 134.
23. *niṣṭhā paryavasānam parisamāptirityetam kasya, brahmajñānasya yā parā* (Ibid., p. 279).
24. *hitvā sarva-karmāṇi kevale 'dvaye brahmaṇi niṣṭhā yasya so' yam brahma-niṣṭho japa-niṣṭhas tapo-niṣṭha iti yadvat na hi karmiṇo brahma-niṣṭhatā sambhavati karmātma-jñānayor virodhāt* (Swāmī Gambhrānanda [trans.], *Eight Upaniṣads with the Commentary of Śankarācārya* (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1998), Vol. II, p. 104.
25. *etam eva lokam icchanta ity avadhāraṇān na bāhya-loka-trayêpsūnām pārivrājye 'dhikāra iti gamyate na hi gangā-dvāram pratipitsuh kāśideśa-nivās pūrvâbhimukhah prati* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad bhāṣya* 4.4.22, in: *Swāmī Mādhavānanda* [trans.], *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad with the Commentary of Śankarācārya* (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1968), p. 525.
26. Ibid.
27. Defending the claim that Śankara's notion of renunciation refers primarily to one's mental approach and not necessarily (or at least secondarily) to an outer life-style is beyond the scope of my present endeavour. Nevertheless, the reader might be interested to check out, in this respect, Śankara's *bhāṣya of Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 2.23.1; here, the Advaitin refers to the *Brahma-samstha* ('the one established in Brahman'), using this 'twin-term' of *Brahma-niṣṭha*.
28. Ira Landgarten, interview with Nikhil Banerjee (New York, 9.11.1985), in a booklet accompanying Raga CD-207 (Purabi Kalyan).
29. Daya Krishna, 'Knowledge: Whose is it, what is it, and why has it to be "true"?', in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 179-87.
30. Ibid., p. 187.

No Art is an Art: Plato's Argument Against Poetry and Rhetoric

VIJAY TANKHA

St. Stephen's College, University of Delhi, Delhi

Plato's arguments against poetry have created a certain amount of consternation in the ranks of his admirers, not a few of whom have been poets. The fact that Plato had more than a passing interest in poetry is clear. From what is possibly his earliest dialogue (*Ion*) to what is certainly his last (*Laws*), poetry has been of continual concern for him. But Plato is not merely an important thinker perhaps prejudiced against literature; he himself was an artist and poet of no mean accomplishment.

Even a cursory look at Plato's work will reveal its literary qualities, its range, and its sensitivity to both poetry and drama. We know that Plato, under the influence of Socrates, burnt his early literary efforts. But in the dialogue-form Plato invented a literary method for philosophizing that has been frequently copied but never matched. Moreover, there is hardly a style of Greek writing that Plato does not attempt somewhere and show himself a master of. His imitations of predecessors and contemporaries are either indistinguishable from or better than the originals.[1] Surely, the author of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, the myth-making Plato, if anyone, would appreciate the themes and structures of epic and lyric poetry and would respond to the moral questions tackled by Attic Tragedy. It is this apparent lack of concern that Plato seems to have for all that we admire in Greek poetry and drama, that has been especially difficult to explain or accept. The rejection of poetry and the other arts would not be surprising, if it did not come from a philosopher who was also one of its finest exponents.

It is clear from a close reading of Plato that his rejection of poetry is part of a more complex design, but before this design can be discerned and due weight given to its different but complimen-

tary parts, it is important to try to expose—as clearly as possible—one or two lines of argument that Plato adopts in continuing the 'old quarrel between poetry and philosophy'. This paper is an attempt to demarcate some of these broad themes, to assimilate the critique of the poets and so the characterization of poetry as mimetic (and by extension art as mimetic), to a larger Platonic programme for the establishment of the scope and nature of philosophy. Naturally, the whole of this enterprise can only be signalled here: nor can I, within the ambit of this article, do more than show one line of argument Plato initially develops which both grounds his later epistemology as well provides a basis for rejecting other knowledge claims. This procedure is in keeping with the account, in the *Apology*, of Socrates' examination or questioning the claims to wisdom that some scholars have made. Of the poets he says, 'I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not'.[2] It is this claim to wisdom and authority that is the focus of Plato's account of poetry.

A THEORY OF ART?

While there is still some controversy about whether Plato has a theory of art, many deny that he does, others offer versions of such a theory, sometimes with apologies.[3] My own view is that he does not have a theory of art, but certainly does possess theory about the arts. His theory of Art,[4] as has been commonly understood, is initially a byproduct of other more central concerns, mainly, but not exclusively, in epistemology. I will elaborate upon this by explicating part of the vocabulary that forms Plato's understanding of the arts. Once this is done, we will be able to see that Plato's conception of art arises as a result of a general strategy that he employs in order to undermine a whole series of persons and practices, of which poetry and rhetoric were the most important. The arguments against the poets and rhetoricians draw new distinctions and demarcate the field of knowledge in a radically new way. Plato's conception of Art entails that the arts of poetry and rhetoric fail to qualify as Arts. The initial attack against the poets, narrowly based on epistemological distinctions, is in later dialogues broadened into a major campaign in which the older argument does not play a

major role, although its conclusions are at times assumed. New arguments against both poetry and sophistry are developed that do not depend on what has gone on before. This is especially true of the arguments of *Republic* Bk. 10, where the sentence of censorship of their poetry (first mooted in Bk. 3) is extended to the exile of poets. In this cluster of arguments that fly thickly together, there is a danger of missing the trees for the wood.

Plato's attack against individual exponents of the art of rhetoric (generically dubbed 'sophists') forms an integral part of his own systematic, ethical and political doctrines. The rejection of sophistic metaphysics and epistemology, consciously articulated or not by individual sophists themselves, is vigorously pursued through the Platonic corpus. The weapons designed against the poets are in many cases found suitable against the sophists: the attack is, thus, not only against verse but also prose writers. So it is not verse or poetry *per se* that is attacked by Plato but a more amorphous set of pratices. While we might—from the distance of two millennia—detect a community of interests that group together such thinkers as Prodicus and Hippias, Plato was clear that for all their diversity, the sophists fell into a single camp: his opponents. His attitude towards sophistry is encapsulated in the words he puts into Protagoras' mouth concerning the nature and extent of sophistic doctrine:

> 'Personally, I hold that the Sophist's art is an ancient one, but that those who put their hand to it in former times, fearing the odium which it brings, adopted a disguise and worked under cover. Some used Poetry as a screen, for instance, Homer and Hesiod and Simonides; others religious rites and prophecy, like Orpheus and Musaeus and their school...Music was used as a cover by your own Agathocles, a great sophist...'[5]

What Protagoras takes as reason for pride, Plato warns us of the invidiousness and depth of sophistry within the fabric of Greek society. For him, it is not simply one or more beliefs, but an entire outlook, that is responsible for fashioning both men and states. Sophistry as both a theory and practice is ultimately self-refuting, according to Plato. While the details and complexities of this claim cannot be gone into here, we need to note that Plato's first attack on the sophists is based on the conception of Art that he develops in his early works.[6]

Plato examines and rejects sophistic doctrine in a number of ways and at a variety of levels. For our purposes, it will be sufficient to mention three principal grounds on which Plato attacks sophistic doctrine: epistemological, psychological and political. His dismissal of poetry in particular and the arts in general follows similar lines, though differences between different arts merit different arguments.[7] The censorship of the poets is for political rather than artistic reasons. The early books of the *Republic* are entirely concerned with poetry as it influences one's character. There are no aesthetic reasons for censoring the poets, only moral ones. Ultimately, the poets are to be replaced by the philosophers as the real instructive force in the city.[8]

Each of these considerations forms the basis of Plato's identification and rejection of the sophists as well. These three strands in Plato's thinking about sophistry and art are interconnected and, as will be seen, mutually supporting. Here, I will look primarily at the epistemological basis for Plato's strictures, as his basic argument is conflated later by him with other arguments directed against the effects of poetry—indeed of speech in general—on the character and outlook of those charmed, and so formed by it.

An examination of the first of these, the epistemological critique will, I hope, make clear the non-paradoxical and non-self-contradictory nature of the title of this article. The argument claims that what constitutes the arts for us (for which we sometimes use the phrase 'fine arts') does not, for Plato, fulfil the conditions that any practice must in order to constitute Art in the proper sense. What we call 'arts' are not really Arts for him at all. This rejection of both poetry and rhetoric as Arts is explicit in Plato's writings. Further, we do not even expect arts in our sense of the term to fulfil the Platonic conditions for an Art and, hence, we should have little objection to many (though not all) the strictures that Plato lays on those who attempt to pass themselves off as practitioners or teachers of an Art in his sense of the term. If this is so then there is little or no convergence between what Plato wishes to attack and what we might wish to defend. We may restate this in another way: many of the functions that Plato thinks that the arts cannot and, therefore should not attempt to perform are not functions that we suppose the arts now attempt to perform. It is, however, true that

there are possibilities in them which we find important and worth preserving which, given Plato's attitude about individual freedom in general, he is less sympathetic towards. Even if we assume that these issues have to be looked at quite differently now rather than when Plato addressed them, it is important to note that the formal attack against the arts that Plato launches is based on a rather different conception of what it is for anything to be an Art. His relegation of those practices which we most commonly identify with the arts, to the class of 'imitative arts' is an express denial that these practices, poetry, painting, sculpture, some kinds of music, are indeed Arts at all.[9]

TECHNE AND KNOWLEDGE

We need to look closely at the term 'art' which I have placed at the centre of this controversy. The term 'art' is the frequent, if admittedly problematic, translation of the Greek term *techne* (pl. *technai*) that Plato, along with other late fifth- and early fourth-century thinkers, use to characterize an entire gamut of activities ranging from flute-playing to architecture, from shoe-making to astronomy.[10] The range of this term also explains why 'science' or 'craft' are also acceptable translations of it.[11] Such translations, however, are often made on the basis of our individual understanding or conception of the particular activity that Plato is describing. Thus, if he is discussing mathematics, translators will translate *techne* as 'science'; if he is talking about shoemaking as a 'craft' and when about painting as an 'art'. We may note, however, that for Plato there is no formal difference between the activities of, say, shoemaking and astronomy, which would warrant calling only one of them a *techne.* At the same time, we must not be led into supposing that each of these were somehow equally valuable for him. Both Plato and Aristotle are dismissive of manual work as ungentlemanly and degrading.[12] While 'craft' as a translation of *techne* suggests a low-level skill, it preserves, unlike 'art', an important practical element that all *technai* share. For *technai* are characterized as being goal-directed activities aiming at the production of specific and specifiable ends. Given a *techne,* we should be able to specify its subject or special area of expertise as well as the result or aim that it is designed to bring about. The successful deployment of a particular *techne* may

be judged by its ability to regularly bring about the result in question. A *techne,* in this sense, is contrasted with chance. Plato denies the status of *techne* and subsumes under chance all manners of empirical skills which use rules of thumb (for example, cooking). Plato privileges those skills which have a strong theoretical component as *technai* proper, denying this title to those that lack theoretical grounding. Such theoretical grounding need not, however, be formalized, for the cobbler's or the shepherd's art are regularly adduced as examples of *technai.*[13] The paradigm *techne* that Plato often alludes to is that of medicine, whose aim is health.[14] For this reason, phrases like 'professional skills'[15] are often used to bring out a contrast that Plato clearly intends between lay and specialist practice.[16] For every *techne,* there is an expert or *technikos* who, because of his special knowledge, is able to achieve the result that his *techne* aims at. Further, whether the *technai* are invented, or received as gifts from the gods (or in spite of them as the myth of Prometheus claims), they contribute to the well being of men. This emphasis on the practical and useful aspect of technical knowledge will become important for our understanding of some of the arguments that Plato generates against poets and rhetoricians.

We may now be able to accept the equation that Plato continually makes between *techne* and knowledge. Every *techne* is at once a branch of knowledge.[17] Much of the strategy of Plato's attack on rhetoricians and poets in the early dialogues is to draw out what he considers the implications of this identity.

Plato's term for knowledge, *episteme,* preserves the sense of practical efficiency which characterizes *techne.* Unlike modern philosophy's insistence and focus on propositional knowledge, *episteme* carries with it a sense which we would lead us to translate the term as 'systems of' or 'bodies of' knowledge rather than merely as items of knowledge. Thus, the word has a frequently employed plural with no equivalent in English. *Epistemai* are often conjoined with *technai* without implying any contrast between them. The term *epistemon* ('one who has knowledge'), for instance, 'has strong connotations of competence in performance, approximating to "skillful"'.[18]

So far all that has been shown is that the term *techne* is used by Plato to characterize specialist activities, which aim at specifiable

ends and constitute determinate bodies of knowledge. There are tests—both theoretical and practical—for determining whether a person is in possession of a *techne* or not. The 'theoretical' test is the ability of the person in question to be able to give 'an account' (definition or explanation) of what it is he claims to know.[19] The 'practical' test is the ability of the person to regularly produce the product that his Art aims to produce.[20] Only those who are experts in the sense given may be regarded as teachers of the *techne* in question.[21] Though Plato does not rule out self-discovery, for him a *techne* can be acquired only by learning it from someone else who already has the knowledge in question. *Technai* then are branches of knowledge which can be passed on from teacher to student. They are distinct subjects which are or can be systematized and which require time and effort to master.[22]

POETRY AND EDUCATION

Of the many routes into Platonic theory, one way is to start with a question that he himself raises often in the course of the early dialogues: what should be the content of education? What is worth learning? This question is connected with another: what do people actually learn? What are the sources, the form and content of their education? An investigation into the second question forms the basis for determining an answer to the first. That is, by examining the sources and nature of traditional Greek wisdom, and (significantly) showing it to be inadequate in an important sense, Plato lays the foundation for his own answer to the question of what the young should learn.[23]

That this is not a purely academic question for Plato is underlined by the urgency and frequency with which it is asked in the early dialogues. In the *Laches,* for instance—a dialogue concerned with a search for the definition of courage—the parents of two young Athenians express their uncertainty and concern for the welfare and success of their children.[24] At the end of the *Euthydemus,* Crito, in conversation with Socrates, wonders whether the sort of verbal pyrotechnics that the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have given a display of, and which they pass off as philosophy, would really be of benefit to his own sons.[25] The subject of education forms an important and consistent theme through Plato's work.

A very large section in the *Republic*, where his first explicit strictures against the poets are made, is concerned with the importance of primary education in shaping both individuals and the societies they constitute. Much of what Plato says about the arts occurs within the context of his discussion of this question.

Without here attempting to give even a summary account of the nature and forms of early education in classical Greece, we may note that both the poets and the sophists largely provided the content as well as the form in which Greek education took place. The poets and the sophists, in that order, were for Plato the chief source for the education of those who played the most important roles in the civic life of the city. The former provided the traditional wisdom hallowed by custom and usage, the latter the new and radical break with this tradition. Hence, an investigation into the nature of what they taught became the cornerstone of Plato's investigation of his own tradition. And his critique of them the basis for the overhaul of that tradition. Plato is not unaware that the content of what is taught—once it becomes a part of the social fabric—reinforces the teaching again, by legitimizing it. Homer himself is called a sophist who disguised his doctrines in poetic garb.[26]

Plato calls Homer the educator of all the Greeks.[27] Epic verse provides both the form as well as the content for orthodox pedagogy. The Homeric epics constituted Greek literary and religious tradition. Not only the nature of the gods but also the nature of man and the relation between them is demarcated in the epics. Plato was not, of course, the first to challenge either the anthropomorphic picture of the Homeric gods or the uses to which divinity can be put. But he launched the most comprehensive attack against such traditional worldviews in the Greek philosophical tradition.[28]

I say this because it may also be thought that the sophists themselves began the re-evaluation of values that Plato later continued. The sophists are sometimes seen as part of a new humanistic movement, introducing a liberal outlook in Greek thought.[29] Both the terms 'enlightenment' and 'liberal' picture the sophists as a positive and a welcome development in Greek thinking. The radical and revolutionary character of sophistic thought, its departure from the central pre-occupations of pre-Socratic natural philosophy, has been frequently remarked upon. The break with tradition is part of the creation of a new tradition. Greek political expansion during the late fifth and early fourth centuries on the one hand, and the form and functioning of the legal and democratic system on the other, has been seen as creating the context for the success of the sophists. There is an important element of truth in this, and from some points of view the sophists might be seen as representatives of an anti-conservative and skeptical tendency in Greek thought, and Plato's response to them as the reaction of conservative and aristocratic forces. But even as he attempts to re-invent the aristocracy, Plato himself refashions the Greek philosophical tradition, bringing into focus a new set of concerns wholly at odds with what has gone before. At the same time, Plato responds to and counters the claims of the sophists and their new wisdom. At the core of this response lies what we might call the implications of epistemology.

EDUCATION AND THE SOPHISTS

As teachers the sophists offered, quite simply, to teach a *techne*.[30] Admittedly, they claimed on behalf of their teaching more than one would expect from a simple craft or art or science. But in using, as they did the term *techne* to characterize the nature of what they offered instruction in, they appealed to a term that had already gained considerable currency as a commendatory term in Greece. Its use encapsulated the possibility of human endeavour and achievement, contrasting human worth with the sort of merit according to rank that formed the basis of the traditional aristocratic social order. One who had the right kind of knowledge could forge his own destiny, and need not depend on the accidents of birth or the favour of the gods to leave a mark upon his times. This sense of optimism is well captured, for instance, in Sophocles' hymn to mán in the *Antigone*, which catches the note both of personal endeavour as well as of successful progress that characterizes the new knowledge, which gives man control of his destiny. It is man's knowledge, his possession of a *techne*, that enables him to achieve his aims. Man, in this famous hymn, is described as a *technikos*; it is with his technical mastery over nature that he opens for himself the door of possibility. *There is nothing beyond his*

power. His subtlety meets all chance, conquers all danger. For every ill he has found its remedy, Save only death ...Clever beyond dreams, the inventive skill [to mechanoen technas] he has, sometimes to ill sometimes to good leads him.[31] *Techne* is here contrasted with *tuche*, chance or luck. As Plato says, one who has knowledge, or *techne*, has no need of luck.[32]

For the sophists too, the possession of a skill was a mark of human knowledge and the only sure way to success (both Protagoras and Gorgias were professed atheists). They used the term to signify not simply the possession of a skill, but a valuable life-saving skill of use both to individuals and society, which could safeguard them from the vagaries of chance or fortune. Plato acknowledges more than once the effect that the sophists had on the younger generation as well as their acknowledged popularity.[33]

But what was it that the sophists taught? While different fourth-century teachers taught different subjects, for Plato the aim of all sophistic teaching was the claim to teach *arete* (virtue). If, as we found, the translation 'art' is an inadequate and misleading translation of the term *techne*, the translations of this Greek word are even less representative of the range of its meanings. The term is usually translated into English as 'virtue'. With qualifications and explanations this may cover the philosophical and moral turn, which the word is given by Plato and Aristotle, but it entirely fails to answer the question of what the sophists, in claiming to teach *arete*, claimed they were teaching. For this reason, an alternative translation of *arete*, 'excellence', is sometimes preferred.[34] This sense of *arete* is brought out by the general disbelief that follows any claim to teach it. Can *arete* ever be taught? If we take it here to mean political wisdom, or 'savvy' we might agree with the common sentiment that Socrates expresses in response to Protagoras' claim. At both public and private levels, *arete* is not something that can simply be passed on. Pericles and other famous Athenians—Socrates attests—were not able to pass on their own *arete* to their sons who 'browse around on their own like sacred cattle, on the chance of picking up *arete* automatically'. And if they, acknowledged possessors of it, could not pass it on to their children, can any one? *Arete* is, in this rather unspecified sense, radically contrasted with *techne*, for while a *techne* is teachable, *arete* is never. Plato argues that in claiming to teach *arete*, the sophists lay claim to a skill (*techne*) that they do not, in fact, themselves have.[35]

We might say that the sophists, in offering to teach *arete*, offered minimally to teach men the art of success—success in the political life of the city of which they were citizens. The means whereby such success was to be achieved could vary from teacher to teacher, but its aim was success in a sense general enough to include its most conventional trappings: power, wealth, fame and, in consequence, the satisfaction of whatever desires a person happens to have. Prowess in battle like that of the lion on the warrior's tomb, is replaced in Greek democracies with a new kind of skill, because there is a new kind of contest (*agon*) in which he has now to take part. The sophists offered to their students the key to the competitions of corporate civic life. Some of them, like Gorgias, explicitly disclaimed that they prescribed goals to be pursued, i.e., they only taught a technique. What a person did with his newfound ability was up to him.[36] Plato thought otherwise; means and ends, form and content, determine each other. Rhetoric as persuasive speech brings with it its own standards, undermining truth and replacing reality by appearances.

PLATO'S ARGUMENT

Plato's strategy against the sophists and poets is quite simple and, at least in the early dialogues, practiced consistently. His argument against them relies on the following assumption: if the sophists claim that they possess a *techne* (whether of politics or virtue or whatever), then they must have knowledge of what they profess to teach. Plato attacks their claims to knowledge by setting up criteria for any episteme (and, hence, for any *techne*) and demonstrating that poetic and sophistic teaching fails to meet these criteria. He can then conclude that as they are not in possession of a *techne*, they have no knowledge and so cannot (really) teach at all. In order to instruct, one must have knowledge of a specific and specifiable subject-matter. This is the minimal claim that Plato thinks anyone who claims to instruct, must make. Plato uses this assumption to generate a series of arguments against both sophists and poets.

In rejecting poetic and sophistic claims to have a *techne*, Plato uses epistemological criteria abstracted from everyday examples of knowledge. In the *Ion*, one of Plato's earliest dialogues, he employs

a general notion of what it is to be a *techne* to undermine the rhapsode's claim to be a *technikos* (one in possession of a *techne*). He further offers an alternative explanation of both *rhapsodike* as well as *poetike* to explain how these purported *technai* 'work'. We will look later on at both the epistemological criteria that Plato employs as well as his arguments in the *Ion* against the art of the rhapsode.

THE USE OF POETRY

It may be appropriate at this point to introduce and answer a possible objection that could be made on behalf of the poets. Surely, it might be said, the poets are not instructors. To suppose they are is to misunderstand the function of poetry.[37] Further, poets did not claim, like the sophists, to teach *arete* at all, or even to have a *techne*.[38] These are aims and methods which Plato seems to foist on them, so that he can then show that they are not wise at all. For what the poet did claim, and was accorded, was the title of *sophos*.[39] But what precisely was their wisdom, is less clear.

For Plato, poetry had principally two functions: instruction and entertainment. These are complementary: all poetry instructs and entertains with varying degrees of success.[40] Plato is suspicious of the entertainment value of anything, conceptually linking it with pleasure: his criterion for acceptable pleasures is simplicity.[41] He is also dubious about the instructional value of poetry in general. The arguments in *Republic* Bk. 3 against the artists are related to his dismissal of the instructional value of art. But the arts may be thought broadly to instruct in two ways: firstly as providing some matter of knowledge simpliciter (note the ridicule poured over *Ion* about the poet knowing the art of war).[42]

This form of (mis)instruction is conceived as a one-to-one relationship between individuals (say, the poet and his listener). Poetic content in such contexts is seen as the transmission of information (knowledge) from the poet/performer to his listener. Plato dismantles the poet's claim to wisdom in such cases by pointing out the deficiencies in his knowledge claims. It may be of some importance to note that such a claim was never explicitly made by the poets.[43] Indeed, poetic knowledge and poetic wisdom are characterized in such general terms, that until the question, 'what is it that the poets know?' is asked, no answer is forthcoming.[44] It is

Plato who asks this question and then provides an answer on behalf of the poets. That poetry *per se* is not the real subject of Plato's inquiry is apparent as the arguments in the early dialogues against poetic *techne* are on par with those designed to show up other claimants to knowledge, including that of the sophists. Neither poetry nor sophistry, according to Plato, can provide technical instruction in the way that specialized crafts or trades do.[45]

The more important kind of instruction is what we might call moral instruction and it is here that poetry plays a crucial role. Here the poet is seen, not as passing on specific technical know-how (which he does not really have), but providing a broad cultural education such as we now associate with the study of the liberal arts.[46] Such education, Plato claims, creates paradigms for conduct. Much of the form of early education that Plato would have refashioned consisted in memorizing poetry and, thus, internalizing the value-system it was based on. This had, according to Plato, a profound effect on the shaping of the individual personality, especially where the real content was concealed.[47]

So far as the conception of poets as instructors in the second sense is concerned, if this is indeed a misconception of poetry, it is not merely Plato who is guilty of it, but the Greeks as a whole. This is why his arguments against the poets is taken as really an argument against literature in general. The Homeric epics were regarded as encyclopedias of wisdom.[48] Plato attempts to undermine poetic instruction in the second or general sense, by using epistemological arguments to show that the poet does not, in fact, have particular knowledge in the first sense, even though the two ways in which he attacks the poets and their works are disconnected.[49]

WISDOM IN GENERAL

It is not easy to summarize the nature of poetic wisdom. In Plato's time, the role of the poet had undergone major changes. Poetry too was in the process of reinventing itself. Although Plato assimilates tragic to epic poetry, the epic verse of Homer was part of the tradition, while the tragic poets or playwrights, as we call them, had a completely different role to play in the city state. While still under the patronage of the rich, the forms of such patronage had

changed, and with it the role that the poets undertook to play. While the archaic role of the poet was tied up closely with the values of the heroic age, in the democratic states of Plato's time, the tragic poets could themselves bring into question the values of the Homeric world. Plato, however, does not distinguish between his contemporaries and their predecessors, but assimilates them, somewhat hastily together.

One claim made often by the epic poets is taken as representative by Plato of poetic wisdom in general, and is contrasted by him with the new model of knowledge that he has inaugurated in his dialogues, for poetry had made on its behalf a claim to a sort of superhuman wisdom. The poet is said to know all things and possess some form of comprehensive knowledge.[50] But the poetic claim and the Platonic challenge are somewhat at odds, the former has no conception of the question that the latter asks.[51]

The sophists also thought that their teaching could provide comprehensive knowledge,[52] often as a single alternative to all other skills.[53] Plato counters both these claims by denying the possibility of such knowledge on the one hand and its usefulness on the other.[54] In so doing, Plato ignores the fact that these are, at best, entirely different claims made in entirely different contexts or, at worst, claims that he has made on behalf of his opponents.

Part of Plato's programme was inaugurated in the early dialogues to investigate and evaluate (in his terms, of course) the practice of different kinds of wisdom, each of which seeks to be a *techne* even if it is not so designated. Thus, in the *Ion*, it is the art of the Rhapsode (*rhapsodike techne*); in the *Euthyphro* that of the prophet (*mantike*); in the *Protagoras* it is the wisdom Protagoras defines as politics (*politike*); in the *Gorgias*, it is the art of rhetoric (*rhetorike*). On the basis of these so-called *technai*, their practitioners claim to possess knowledge of a very special kind as well as the authority that goes with it. The mantic or the seer, the rhapsode or the performing poet, the rhetorician and the political orator are those whose competing claims to wisdom Plato investigates and rejects. These are not *technai* or Arts at all, as they fail to satisfy the criteria that Arts must satisfy. Hence, their practitioners do not have the claim to either knowledge or authority. Plato, in what is regarded as one of his earliest dialogues, looks at the nature of

poetry through the practice of its performance by the rhapsode Ion. In the dialogue of that name, the issue of poetic knowledge is used to confuse and confute Ion, and the conclusion—poetry is not a form of knowledge—is established.

THE ION

In the *Ion* it is Homer who is also attacked, indirectly, through his rhapsode.[55] Plato here draws out some of the consequences of the assumption that the poet has some knowledge. Of course, the attack is at one level removed, just as in the famous simile of the transmission of inspiration, Ion is once removed from Homer, and the audience is twice removed.[56] Socrates, in his conversation with Ion, does on occasion refer to Homer, but largely directs the argument against Ion's claims to know the thoughts of Homer. The attack on Ion is an attack on his claim to have expert knowledge of Homer. In claiming to be an expert, Ion claims to be in possession of a *techne* (530c). However, in rejecting Ion's claim to be an expert in the art of poetry, Plato does more than merely undermine the pretensions of a single individual. Instead, he suggests that no such expertise is possible at all. His argument, thus, moves from an investigation of Ion's own personal claims, to a consideration of why it is not possible for anyone to gain the sort of knowledge that Ion claims to have. This move from particular to general is part of what Socrates claims knowledge is.[57] In a sense, then, knowledge is comprehensive, but not as being acquainted with many things ('many fine things' at 530d), or in remembering the words of the poet, but in knowing what makes each of those things what they are. This is just the demand that Socrates makes of Ion.[58]

In the first part of the dialogue (530–533d), Socrates examines Ion's claim to only know the thoughts of Homer. Socrates argues that in so far as Ion only knows the thoughts of Homer, he cannot be said to have a *techne* at all. In doing so, he relies on the notion that the subject of any form of knowledge must form a conceptual unity. If poetry is a whole—as Ion agrees it is—and as Ion must in order to claim to be a skilled expounder of it, then to can be said that in order to know poetry, Ion should have knowledge of all sorts of poetic compositions. The principles of the craft should

enable him to expound the thought of all poets.[59] Ion is making two (logically) unrelated claims: he claims to 'know' Homer in the sense of being able to remember (and be able to recite) Homeric verse. He also claims to be able to 'embellish' (*kosmein*) the poet, with many fine thoughts. This latter ability, which we might see as an expert discourse about poetry, Ion says, has given him more trouble than actually mastering the poems themselves (530c).[60] Ion is claiming to be some sort of literary critic. But in both cases, Ion wants to restrict his knowledge-claims to the poetry of Homer. What is really at issue here, in Platonic terms, is the semantic range of words like 'knowledge', which Ion either confuses with 'to remember', or with 'speaking well'. Speaking well, as we will see, is a claim made by the sophists on their behalf, but is only a sign, not its sum, for Plato, of knowledge.[61] But Ion can only speak about Homer. He uses a variety of terms in this connection to characterize what he does, 'speaking best' about Homer, 'No one has so many fine thoughts to offer about Homer', 'How well I have embellished Homer'.[62] In all this, I on does imply that what he is doing is important. His fame and the fact that he is the best of all rhapsodes, is emphasized continually.[63] And this is because it is the works of Homer that he is conversant with.

Socrates observes firstly, that where Homer and other poets share the same subject and agree about it, Ion should be able to explain or expound, what both say. Ion agrees with this. He needn't have done so. If all that he had claimed was an ability to recite Homer, then he would not need to claim to 'know' (remember) the work of other poets. In fact, Ion only remembers Homer's verse, and he is continually shown as eager to give demonstrations of this. But by 'knowing' a poet, Socrates has already indicated that he means something more than merely remembering his words.[64] Ion, in some way, is expected to know what Homer claims to know, just as Homer himself will be required to show that he has knowledge of what he writes if he is to claim to have a *techne.*

Secondly, Socrates says that where Homer and the other poets share the same subject but disagree about it, that is, say different things, Ion should be able to interpret what they both say, just as a *mantic* (one versed in the art of divination) would be able to interpret these poets when they speak of his art, both when they

agree and when they disagree. So far Socrates has emphasized that poets may agree and disagree about certain things. He has also suggested that where they do disagree or say something different from each other, there must be some expert who will be competent to judge which of them speaks well.[65]

Thirdly—and this rounds off the points made earlier—Socrates claims that, in fact, Homer and the other poets share the same subjects. This completes the argument against Ion. The poets have the same subject, and say things about it that are either in agreement or in disagreement. If Ion is skilled in the interpretation of one of them (Homer) he should be skilled in the interpretation of the others as well. Ion's attempt to suggest a difference between Homer and the other poets fails to point out a relevant characteristic that would justify his knowing only Homer. The fact, even if true, that Homer is better than all the others, in no way helps him. Better and worse with respect to one subject are to be judged by the same person, one who knows the subject in question. The general rule is formulated at 533e, but it should be noted that the question is not one of speaking well or badly, but of knowing what good and bad speaking are. An equivocation between speaking well (diction, voice, etc.) and speaking knowledgeably allows the argument to proceed. Only one who knows, Socrates claims, will know how to speak well and be able to distinguish good from bad speakers. Socrates has here undermined the basis of the praise and fame that Ion enjoys. For Ion has all along been claiming to speak well, but in this his judges—Socrates points out—are those who are in no position to know whether he speaks well or ill. Ion himself is like them in his relation to Homer, lacking knowledge of what Homer speaks; he is in no position to independently judge Homer's remarks. By pointing out that poets may, in fact, disagree with each other, Socrates has brought poetic wisdom in general into question. And by introducing the notion of expert knowledge, he has covertly undermined the notion of poetic authority. What is questionable is, of course, the way in which he has conceived of poetry, as if it were a (poor) compilation of technical knowhow, designed to inform its listeners.[66]

This is the epistemological critique of the poets: that they have no understanding of the whole that poetry must be in order for

such knowledge to form the basis of a *techne*. Knowledge that is not particular but general. Ion's failure to satisfy the condition of generality shows that he does not grasp the principles of a genuine branch of knowledge but relies upon something else. The poet who claims to speak well of many things has no real knowledge (*techne*),[67] but does so as a result of inspiration. Plato regards inspiration as the epitome of irrationality.

It should be noticed that in the *Ion*, while investigating the claim of the rhapsode and his source (Homer) and denying that they both constitute a body of knowledge—which conclusion is reiterated in the last line of the dialogue—Socrates continually makes reference to other arts (*technai*), from charioteering and medicine to those which we have called 'arts' (corresponding to our notion of 'fine arts'), which include poetry, sculpture, painting, music, etc.[68] These are the very ones that will be described as mimetic arts (which description is part of what is thought to be Plato's theory of art). In citing sculpture and painting as arts, while dismissing the claims of poetry to be a *techne*, Plato seems to be committed to the view that these are genuine *technai*. Elsewhere (e.g., *Republic* Bk. 10), he describes all these as ontologically defective. His indifference here to these other arts, is indicative, in my mind, of his indifference to providing a theoretical understanding of them as a whole.

RHETORICAL SPEECH

Before I outline the explanation of poetic success according to Plato, we may note that a similar complaint forms that basis of his attack against the sophists. Indeed, Gorgias is made to boast of this accomplishment. 'Rhetoric is the power to persuade by speech...in every gathering ...it [rhetoric] practically captures all powers and keeps them under its control...for there is nothing on which he wouldn't speak more persuasively than any other craftsman before a crowd of people.'[69] Hippias in the *Protagoras* is shown answering questions from diverse persons on different subjects. Later, in the same dialogue, Protagoras claims to be skilled in both long discourses as well as short ones.[70]

While the sophists claim to have comprehensive knowledge, other claimants are more modest. Thus Euthyphro, who is a mantic, knows

'more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods'.[71] But the ability to speak, and speak well about a variety of things is a result of the sophists' claims to be polymaths. The sophists made the claim that they, through the power of their art, could make the weaker argument stronger.[72]

Plato's argument against the poets accepts their claim to be in possession of a divine dispensation and, even if the notion of artistic inspiration is a Platonic construct, turns this against poetic claims to authoritative wisdom. Similarly, the sophists' claim to be able to persuade anyone about anything is used by Plato as further evidence that they do not have knowledge of what they speak. By drawing the distinction between appearance and truth, Plato can both find room for the sophists' claims, as well as discount them. For the rhetorician and his art, 'there is no need to know the truth of the actual matters, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who know...'[73]

The success of the rhetorician as well as that of the poet has to do more with the ignorance of those who are his judges rather than with the knowledge that the rhetorician has. Ultimately, the ability to speak well (true rhetoric) when accompanied by knowledge is, as Plato tells us at the end of the same dialogue, the only art that will care for the soul, which is, of course, the role that Socrates gave to philosophy.[74] Similarly, in the ideal state there will be room for acceptable forms of both poetry and divination.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

In the *Ion* Plato offers us an account of the success of the poet in terms of inspiration (*enthusiasmos*). This he likens to the possession that bacchantes undergo in the service of their god.[75] This alternative to a genuinely cognitive state enables Plato to derive from the view of the inspired poet the very reverse of what such inspiration was thought to be a sign of.[76] Inspiration is not knowledge. Nor indeed is inspiration a guarantee of truth, as might otherwise be supposed. The reason I think that Plato is not impressed with inspiration even if it guarantees the truth, is that it is a little like luck. For Plato there is more to knowledge than simply getting something (perhaps on occasion) right. What enables the

poet to claim to be inspired is, in fact, a deficiency in his psychological makeup and his ability to communicate his particular brand of inspiration to his audience is correlated with their own psychopathology. The argument is developed along with the psychological model that underpins it. In the bi- or tri-partite division of the soul, Plato finds a model of human make-up that enables him to explain the success that poetic and sophistic practices enjoy. He can do this while still denying that they are forms of knowledge.[77] Neither provides, or indeed can provide knowledge, and hence must fail even on pragmatic grounds. If every *techne* aims at a beneficial result, and can produce that result unerringly, then both poetry and rhetoric fail this final test, just as they fail other tests that ordinary forms of knowledge pass, for they do not lead to the well being of the individual, and hence whatever else they might be, they are not proper Arts at all.

Plato's moral psychology provides him with a model that explains the success that both poets and rhetoricians enjoy despite lacking a *techne.* This is an important adjunct to the epistemological argument.[78] For surely, it might be thought, sophists could dispense with the need for the name *techne* as long as they continued to produce results: swayed and cheering Assemblies, weeping stricken audiences would be all the testament that a sophist or a poet would need in order to continue to practice his craft. And indeed the fact that they are compelling and successful is something that they continually point to. The psychological model enables Plato to explain how they are successful as well as how limited and damaging such success might be for those who hope to achieve it.[79]

These alternative forms of wisdom, however, must find a place that will explain not only their occurrence but also their power. In the *Gorgias,* Plato devises a category of pseudo-skills to cover a whole range of practices, though he is mainly interested in categorizing rhetoric and sophistry. These skills copy genuine *technai.*[80] Plato here uses the term *eidola* (or image). This term is connected with the more familiar cluster of terms around the word mimesis or imitation. Mimesis is used by Plato, principally in the *Republic,* a dialogue dated to his middle period and in other post-*Republic* dialogues.[81] *Mimesis* might be a term that Plato adapted from the Pythagoreans.[82] The word itself, in its principal occurrences in the

early fifth century, involves the imitation of animate beings, human or animal, by the body or voice.[83] In later writings, this use is extended to include a representative image or replica of a person.[84] Democritus, who elsewhere uses the being/seeming distinction, does not suggest that contrast when using cognates of mimesis.[85] Xenophon, in the third chapter of his *Memorablia,* brings about the shift in meaning of the term that Plato was to develop.[86] In Plato, the contrast between real and its imitation, between an object and its (inferior) image, becomes central to both his epistemology and his metaphysics, in which the imitative arts are given a subordinate place on par with shadows and reflections.[87]

The *Republic* develops several strands of arguments that are found in the earlier *Gorgias.* The *pseudo-technai* of the *Gorgias* become the mimetic arts of the *Republic.*[88] While the arts of rhetoric and oratory aim at persuasion (as opposed to truth), they achieve this aim by means of gratification or pleasure.[89] Plato broadly identifies the aim of poetry as pleasure.[90] The general line of his argument against poetry turns on his conviction that not all pleasures are good.[91] The dualities of body and soul, goodness and pleasure, knowledge and opinion, Art and pseudo-Art, enables Plato to set up certain equivalences and oppositions which are developed in the arguments against the arts in the third and tenth book of the *Republic.* Further, in the developed psychology of the *Republic,* the soul, announced as the real subject of all education,[92] is bifurcated into a rational and an irrational part. The power of the imitative arts is their ability to affect the irrational or appetitive part of the soul, that which is more easily swayed by pleasure than by reason. Children, whose rational part is yet to be fully developed are, thus, to be shielded from the ill effects of the pleasures as well as the deceptions of poetry.[93] But—and this is true of *Republic* Bk. 3—this applies only where these effects are regarded as detrimental to the moral development of the child. Plato has, at least in this book, no quarrel with poetry because it is imitative. In Bk. 3, control over its products is based on the premise that its objects (and therefore its effects) are often debased. That it is not a branch of knowledge is, I think, for Plato a settled issue. In the *Republic,* he is not concerned with the teaching or practice of *technai,* but with the educational curricula of children. Indeed, for him, all the citizens are really

children and have to be told for their own good what to do. The initial censorship of the poets is to ensure that they provide the right models for the children-citizens. Not all imitations are ruled out. Thus, to his question: 'Do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not?' he can answer in the affirmative so long as there is a shift from mimicking to what is mimicked. '[he] will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly.'[94]

But is sophistry an imitative art as well? That is, do the psuedo-*technai* pass over, all of them into the mimetic *technai*? This question will not admit to a straightforward answer. Plato often makes and uses distinctions tailored to the problem at hand, and is notorious for leaving loose strands—both terminological and theoretical—which seem to come together, overlap, and often slip tantalizingly through the fingers of those who would like to see them neatly tied. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we can detect a clear thread running consistently through the early and late dialogues supporting the thesis that both poets and sophists are treated together;[95] that the pseudo-*technai* of the early dialogues are taken over by the *mimetike technai* of the *Republic* and post-*Republic* dialogues.

In the *Sophist*, a post-*Republic* dialogue, Plato initially divides all *technai* into productive and imitative (219a), after several sets of classificatory searches for an adequate account or definition of the sophist. Plato (or the stranger from Elea who is his mouthpiece), describes the sophist as a juggler and imitator. Indeed he is, in the course of the dialectical search that makes up the first part of the dialogue, compared to the painter 'who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things... to make imitations (*mimemata*) which have the same names as the real things...' The sophist too, bewitches the young with words, 'by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things'.[96]

In the *Sophist*, Plato's objective is not to show that sophistry is not a genuine art, which he now more or less takes for granted. Here his multiform task is more complex: to show how the sophist, who claims that there is no falsehood (or that all judgments are true, a claim usually associated with Protagoras), hides himself in appearances.[97] These issues are somewhat tangential to the matter at hand.

That Plato continues to treat poets, painters and sophists together, however, shows that he thought that all of them made similar claims, or in so far as they did, which could be demolished by the same arguments.

The point of taking Plato's arguments against both sophists and poets should be clear. Plato is not primarily or exclusively concerned with the arts alone. The doctrine of mimesis, for instance, is only one of several weapons that Plato fashions against those who occupied the centre of social and intellectual life of the city.[98] If Socrates 'hung around' the agora or marketplace it was, in fact, to make philosophy and philosophical practice central to the social fabric. In order to achieve this, the first step was to undermine all rival claims to wisdom. Both poets and sophists had laid claim to intellectual or political authority. For Plato such authority, itself a consequence of knowledge, belongs only to philosophers.

NOTES

1. Thus, for instance, the speech purporting to be from the pen of Lysias in the *Phaedrus*, the bombastic prose style of Gorgias in the *Gorgias* and the long sophistic displays of a Protagoras in the dialogue of that name, have often confused commentators. From poetic discourse, Plato appropriates the very form he rejects, mythical language, and puts it to his new philosophical use. Nearly every Platonic dialogue has at least one myth.
2. *Apology* 22c. All quotes from Plato are from the Loeb edition.
3. The literature on the subject is vast. See, for instance, Havelock (1963) p. 33 nt. 37 or the bibliography in Moravscik and Temko (1982).
4. I use, as the reader may have already noticed, 'art' to refer to what we include under the term 'fine arts', and 'Art' as an initial translation of the near technical term *techne*. Plato does have a theory of *Techne*, in relation to which we can understand his rejection of the arts.
5. *Protagoras*. 316d. Plato does not mean that the sophists belong to a long and honourable tradition. Rather, it is to the contrary; that sophistry is a recurrent tendency which goes by a variety of names. In a late dialogue in the *Sophist*, Plato again uses the metaphor of disguise, of appearances, by which the sophist screens himself and avoids detection, seeking cover under the impenetrable mantle of 'what is not'. The assimilation of poetry to sophistry in this passage is a sign of Plato's lack of interest in poetry *per se*, in the sense that he is not trying to theorize poetic production, in the way that, for instance, Aristotle will do in the *Poetics*.

6. By early works I mean those 'Socratic' dialogues that are principally characterized by a lack of central Platonic doctrine. These dialogues exhibit a community of features that distinguishes them from what are called the 'middle' and 'late' dialogues. I take the early dialogues to include *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Euthydemus, Ion, Protagoras, Gorgias* and *Republic*-1. The first part of the *Meno* also addresses problems that the early dialogues deal with.
7. Thus, though poetry and painting are assimilated as imitative arts, the rejection of painting in Bk. 10 of the *Republic* is based on an ontological argument, while the rejection of poetry in Bk. 3 is on a psychological one.
8. The *Republic* (607e) describes itself as a counter charm to poetry 'to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude'; cf. *Laws* 659d-e. *Laws* 811d, 'to teach the children these discourses of ours, and such as resemble and accord with these'. *Laws* 817e, 'if your utterances seem to be the same as ours or better, then we will grant you a chorus, but if not, my friends, we can never do so'. Plato's aim in these passages is to make philosophy the content of education.
9. There is an inherent non-symmetry to Plato's dismissal of poetry (epic or dramatic) and rhetoric on the one hand and other arts, like painting and sculpture, on the other. The arguments he uses against the former set do not always apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the others. Indeed, on occasion, he seems to concede that painters and musicians are practitioners of a specific art. Thus, Connus is mentioned as the teacher of Socrates (*Euthyphro* 272), Pheidias and Polycleitus are expert sculptors mentioned at *Meno* 91d and at *Protagoras* 311c. Zeuxippus the painter and Orthagoras the flautist are examples of experts in their respective fields (*Protagoras* 318d), each of whom teach that which they are skilled in. Each discipline has a specific subject-matter and is taught by those who have a grasp of that matter. Now Plato may be using a conception of Art here somewhat loosely and more specific arguments are marshalled against painters in *Republic* Bk.10 (and possibly by extension to sculptors as well). But principally, the attack seems to be against the poets and tragedians, who are also poets, rather than any of the other fine arts. Thus, the entire argument in Republic Bks. 2–3 is directed against the poets and the myth makers. Only at the very end of the section is state supervision extended to 'all other craftsmen' (401b) on the grounds that all products will have (some) effect on the soul. In Bk. 10, on the other hand, the chief opponents are the painters. Of these other arts, Plato could still be saying that their role in personal and civic life is suspect. Indeed, he does that. But in denying that they properly

constitute a *techne* Plato is undermining a part of their claim to authority. That this is not the whole of Plato's attack should be stressed. But that it is the first step in such an attack needs, however, to be emphasized.
10. In Homer and Hesiod, and even in its occurrences in Aeschylus and Euripides, *techne* has the sense of artifice, snare, or trick and is regularly uses clever devices adopted by animals for their safety. (cf. Vernant and Detienne, 1978, p. 23 nt.3). But workers, craftsmen (*tektona*) and singers are found unambiguously together in Homer as in *Odyssey* 17.381 ff. However, Homer does not speak of the activity of poets in terms of skill or craft; even the term poet, associated with making rather than with performing is, in general, alien to the archaic epic and lyric tradition. It is only when the idea of a poem as something made rather than as something performed comes to the fore that poetic activity can be assimilated, as Plato assimilates it, to the vocabulary of production. See in this context, Ford, 2002 p. 132ff. But in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, the term is found in the titles of prose treatises (often 'arts of oratory') written by an entire range of thinkers broadly associated with the sophistic movement. The term comes to be associated with a new kind of knowledge, often identified with oratory or public speaking.
11. J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics* (Oxford, 1963), in this study of the semantic field of the Platonic terms *techne, episteme, sophia,* etc. Lyons offers (p. 142) an incomplete list of 15 hyponyms of *techne,* each of which as feminine adjectives ending in *–ikos,* function as nouns in their own right. This list includes 'everything from shoemaking to astronomy, from flute playing to architecture'. Further, Lyons tells us, the list must remain incomplete, 'because for Plato the subsystem it constitutes is open-ended and, in the later dialogues at any rate, Plato creates fresh forms of *techne* freely.' While this is true, I am here concerned with what Plato will exclude from this field rather than what he so freely includes.
12. Such *technai* are called *banausoi,* a term applied 'to every kind of mechanical and illiberal practice' (Adam, nt. on Rep. 495e30). Regular crafts like farming, etc., are so-called because they do not involve *sophrosune* (*Alcibiades* 1 131b). Plato and Aristotle rationalized their contempt for the manual skills by noting that certain trades cause physical and moral injury to their practitioners (*Republic* 495d-e. Aristotle *Politics* 1337b8ff where Aristotle offers a definition). In *Republic* 522d, Plato uses the term to refer to all the *technai* except those having to do with number.
13. While Plato does this when it suits him, he is not really interested in these skills, as they have little or no political importance. Thus, in Rep.421 a, he can say that it will not make much difference to the city as a whole, if cobblers and farmers interchange their occupations.

14. The subject-matter of medicine is the human body. If we take sections of the *Ion* with that of the *Gorgias*, we might want to say that the subject-matter of (epic) verse are the doings of gods and heroes, while the aim of effect of this is the pleasure (or benefit) that is produced in the spectator.
15. The phrase 'professional skills' is adopted by Gulley, *The Philosophy of Socrates*, (London, 1968), p. 15 as a translation of *techne*.
16. As an example of this suggested contrast consider Socrates' observations at *Protagoras* 319b-c where he points out that the Athenian Assembly will accept advice on particular matters from relevant experts but not from anyone who is not a craftsman (*demiourgos*), 'and such is their procedure in matters which they consider professional'.
17. J. Lyons, 1963, p. 170.
18. Gosling, J.C.B., *Plato* (London 1973), p. 57.
19. To give an account (*logon dounai, logon didonai* or *logon labein*) is a Platonic formula familiar in the middle dialogues (*Phaedo*. 74b, 78d. *Symposium* 202a) though it occurs as late as the *Laws* (966b, 967a, 968c). In the early dialogues it is introduced as a general condition for *technai*. In the *Gorgias*, for instance, genuine and pseudo-*technai* are distinguished on the basis of the account that the former can and the latter cannot give, 'And I say that it is not a art, but a knack, because it has no rational account (*logos*) by which it applies the things it applies, to say what they are by nature, so that it cannot say what is the explanation of each thing; and I don't call anything an art (*techne*) which is unreasoning (*alogon*)' *Gorgias* 465a.
20. In the *Euthyphro* Socrates takes common examples of *technai*: medicine, building, military strategy and farming. All these, he says, produce or are concerned to produce some result: health, houses, victory and food. As we observe, '*ergon*' ('product' or 'effect') is used quite generally to refer to any determinable product, whether abstract or not. Nor is it necessary that there be only one product as long as there is one chief product. Thus Ion agrees with Socrates that communicating the thought of the poet to the spectators is the major effect (*pleiston ergon*) of his art (*Ion* 530c, which the Loeb translators render, mistakenly, as 'the most laborious part', as is shown by its mismatch with the sentence that follows).
21. The general principle is found in the *Gorgias* (460b): 'anyone who has learnt a certain art has the qualification acquired by his particular knowledge'.
22. Plato often depicts sophists as claiming to be able to quickly and effortlessly teach anyone their disputational techniques (e.g., *Euthydemus* 273d).
23. 'The one great thing... [is] education and upbringing ... to put it briefly

the overseers of the polis must cling to this, and see that education is not corrupted without their noticing it, and guard above all else that there should be no change in music and gymnastics... For poetry and music are not changed anywhere without change in the most important laws of the polis, as Damon affirms and I believe' (*Republic* 432–424c). The importance of both the form and content of poetry, as discussed in the third book of the *Republic*, lies in their effect on the impressionable. This is a topic that Aristotle takes up, for the same reasons, in *Politics* 7.8.

24. *Laches* 178–180.
25. *Euthydemus* 306d.
26. *Protagoras* 316d. As examples of a critique of poetic wisdom as representative of tradition: see how Simonides' remark 'one must help one's friends and harm one's enemies is overturned in book 1 of the *Republic*. There the initial definition of justice offered by Polemarchus is connected at once with the wisdom of the poets: 'You must have learnt that from Homer, who showed his predilection for Odysseus' grandfather Autolycus by remarking that he surpassed all men in cheating and perjury. Justice according to you and Homer and Simonides turns out to be a form of skill in cheating, provided it is to help a friend or harm an enemy' (334a). In the *Protagoras*, Socrates engages with the sophist Protagoras in a polemical interpretation of a poem of Simonides, completely reversing his (Simonides') meaning.
27. *Republic* 604. Despite his criticism of Homer, Plato repeatedly refers to him with respect, 'a certain love and reverence for Homer...would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy' *Republic* 595c. cf. 598e, 607a. Plato, in general, takes Homer as representative of the poetic tradition as a whole.
28. The fragments of both Xenophanes and Heraclitus preserve not only the recognition of the importance of the epic poets, but also an implicit rejection of some of their claims. Thus Xenophanes says, 'From the beginning all have learned according to Homer' (DK 21 B10). Heraclitus, 'Hesiod is the teacher of most men...' (DK 22 B57). Xenophanes continues (B11), 'Both Homer and Hesiod attributed to the gods all the things that are blameworthy and a reproach among men: Stealing, committing adultery, and deceiving one another.' Heraclitus is even more scathing, 'Homer should be thrown out of the competitions and beaten...' (DK B42).
29. Thus, Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* vol. III, subtitles his chapter on the sophists 'The fifth-century enlightenment'. E.A. Havelock's book on the subject is, in fact, titled 'The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics'.

30. Protagoras is said to have written an 'Art of Debating' (*Techne eristikos*), according to Diogenes.
31. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 360–61, 368–69.
32. But the *Antigone*, though it forms the third play in the Oedipus cycle was, in fact, the first of the plays of that cycle that Sophocles wrote. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the notion of human knowledge is taken up again. *Oedipus* lacks the optimism of the *Antigone*. Oedipus is the *technikos* who pits his skill successfully against that of the Sphinx, and saves the city. He reminds the assembled citizenry of this when Tiresias begins to warn him that things are not what they seem. Oedipus mocks the divinatory skill of the blind seer: '*What was your vaunted seercraft ever worth? ... Bird-lore and god-craft all were silent. Until I came—I, ignorant Oedipus came, and stopped the riddler's mouth guessing the truth, by mother wit, not bird lore.*' Oedipus' purely human skill and knowledge, which is continually emphasized in the course of the play, is pitted against and finally proves unequal to that older wisdom which is the preserve of the gods, and by association of the poets.
33. 'Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and many others ... make themselves so beloved for this wisdom that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders...'*Republic* 600d. 'Tragic poets too make a beeline for Athens, for the good ones are greatly honored there' (*Laches* 183a).
34. Other senses of the term abound. Consider the following sixth-century epitaph, 'Tell me, lion, what dead man's tomb are you guarding between your legs? Bull eater, who was worthy of your prowess?' (*Bouphage, tis tas sas axios en aretas*).
35. The issue is complicated by the fact that Socrates seems to think that *arete* can be taught (because he explicitly claims it to be knowledge). The difference between the sophists and Socrates is that they do not mean the same thing by *arete*.
36. *Meno* 95c 'I most admire Gorgias for this, O Socrates, that one never heard him promising this [i.e., to be a teacher of excellence], but he even laughs at others when he hears them so promising'.
37. Ion, for instance, presents himself as a performer and not as a teacher of his Art. But Ion, in so far as he uncritically transmits the thought of Homer, is really imparting education. The manner of this teaching is, however, different from the way in which a genuine *techne* is taught. In order to account for the powerful effect of his teaching, for its practical success despite the fact that it is not a genuine branch of knowledge, Plato has recourse to a psychological model that he develops in coordination with his rejection of poetry. Ion also, as we shall see, claims to interpret Homer: even there he is found not to have knowledge and, hence, not to be wise.
38. The poets may not claim to teach *arete* directly, but in praising those gods and heroes that they do, they give content to the notion of *arête* (excellence) and set up models of conduct.
39. The first attested instance of *sophia* claimed for poetry is in Solon 13.52; but the singer exercises wisdom in Hesiod, *Works and Days* 649. In Plato, the poets, like the sophists, are regularly presented as claiming wisdom as in the passage quoted above from the *Apology* (cf nt. 2 above). The sophist too, as his name implies, is 'one who has knowledge of wise matters' (*Protagoras* 312c).
40. 'For Plato, a poem has to be either useful for the care of the soul...or be there purely for pleasure. He does not allow for a third possibility, which is to say that in his conceptual scheme there is no room for a special capacity for aesthetic understanding and enjoyment, such as the one we mark in modern philosophic discourse by the expression 'taste'. This can be brought out by contrasting the views of Plato and Aristotle with the view embodied in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*' (Moravcsik 1982, p. 30).
41. *Republic* 357b. The pleasures provided by poetic representations are, however, complex: we view the sufferings of others with pleasure 'and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way' (*Republic* 605d).
42. *Ion* 541. The same point is made in the *Republic* (599ff) 'is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or council?' For democratic states the issue of Homer as a teacher of military strategy was important. Pericles, the Athenian statesmen is said to have said of Sophocles (who was elected a general) that he knew how to compose poetry but not how to command an army (cf Adam on *Republic* 598e, Ford, 2002, p. 203).
43. Hence, the search for instances of the assimilation of poetry to craft in literary texts before Plato is not likely to yield any clear or conclusive results. In any case, Plato is simply sweeping the whole literary tradition with the same broom, where modern commentators have noted the differences. '[A]rchaic and lyric singers describe themselves with verbs of performing rather than making: they sing, celebrate, hymn or provide festive music. Epithets for singers in Homer and Hesiod... stress the divine sponsorship of song rather than the singer's skill in language and when songs are praised, it is not for being well "made" or artfully constructed' (Ford, p. 113).

44. Poets, for instance, were said to know many things, or everything; but these claims are formulaic. Many pre-Socratic philosophers also made underspecified generalizations of this sort.
45. Nor, we might want to add, can philosophy. The very general sketch of higher education in the second half of the *Republic* glosses over the relationship, if any, between knowledge of dialectic and any of the practical sciences.
46. *Protagoras* 312b. Plato concedes that sophistic education, like music and sports, is also 'not with a view to becoming a professional, but for education as befits a private gentleman'. Note the use of poetic pronouncements in the first two books of the *Republic*, to depict moral attitudes. Both poets and prose writers, Adeimantus maintains, agree in claiming that virtue is painful. None of them praises virtue for what it really is. (Rep. 363ff).
47. 'If you are well informed as to what is good or bad among these wares, it will be safe for you to buy doctrines from Protagoras or from anyone else you please: but if not, take care... you are compelled, when you have handed over the price, to take the doctrine in your very soul by learning it, and so to depart either an injured or a benefited man' (*Protagoras* 314a-b).
48. Havelock, 1963, chapter 4, claims that Plato's statement (Rep. 598el), that according to popular estimate the poets 'possessed the of all techniques', is not far off the mark. But it is crucial to distinguish the place of poetry in the creation of culture and poetry as a technical resource, in the way that say medicine was.
49. Plato, however, seems to make no distinction between the epic poets Homer and Hesiod, the lyric poets (whom he quotes not infrequently) and the tragic poets (who are some times separately referred to and some times assimilated to the general class of poets). For Plato, the differences within poetry were irrelevant to the demands that he made of it.
50. This is given in a variety of traditional formulae: Thus, Chalcas in the Iliad (1.70), who is gifted in bird-lore, is said to know 'the things that were, are and will be.' Plato in *Republic* 392d makes this claim for the poets themselves, 'Is not everything that is said by myth makers and poets a narration of what was, is or will be?' The claim is repeated in Bk. 10 598d, where the poet, who claims to know all the crafts [Arts], is to be told that 'he is a simple fellow, who has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all wise because of his inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance and imitation'.

51. It is as if, in response to an astrologer's offer to answer 'all questions', someone were to ask him to name the capital of an obscure country.
52. Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*, 1, 9, 11 'For coming into the theatre of the Athenians he [Gorgias], had the boldness to say "suggest a subject,"... showing apparently that he knew everything and would trust to the moment to speak on any subject.' Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 447c.
53. Thus *Gorgias* 452e: 'By virtue of this power you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave; your moneygetter will turn out to be making money not for himself... but for you'. Protagoras (*Protagoras*, 318d-e), notes that sophists generally teach their students all sorts of *technai* 'arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music'. But that what he will teach will dispense with the need for all such learning. In the *Euthydemus* (278b), after the initial display of their new (logical) skill, Socrates remarks of the wisdom of the sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodoras, 'these things make a joke of learning...I call it a joke because even if you were to learn all such things, you would not learn anything whatever about the matter at hand.' Later, in the same dialogue (294dff), when the sophists insist that they have knowledge of everything, Socrates asks them, 'Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has and does Euthydemus know how many teeth you have?' In *Republic* Bk. 10 602b, in the intertwining argument about painters and poets, 'imitation is a form of play, not to be taken seriously'. Cf. *Phaedrus* 276d-e. In the *Sophist* 234a, where the claim again covers the production of painters and the class of imitators in general, Plato writes, 'When a man says he knows all things and can teach everything in a short time... shouldn't one think it only a joke (paidia)?'
54. There is here, it seems, a conflation of two distinct claims. Poetic wisdom was comprehensive in the sense that it could encompass large sections of time, bringing together the past and the future; or access large volumes of data that simply are not given to men to know (e.g., the catalogue of ships in the Iliad). The poets were witnesses to what lay beyond the ken of men; they were divine in this sense, because their wisdom was superhuman. Early pre-Socratic philosophers also laid claim to wisdom, and were said to know many things. Heraclitus (B 40 'Much learning does not give understanding or it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras and Xenophanes and Hecataeus as well') criticizes such polymathy as 'artful wisdom' (*kakotechne*, a coinage of Heraclitus, according to Kahn. *Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1979), p. 39 but, in fact, we find the noun, *kakotechnos* used in a similar sense at *Iliad* xv. 14). The sophists claim, instead, is to be in possession of a technique for argumentation/speaking, which would gives power over all other

forms of discourse. Plato conflates these two kinds of knowledge-claims (both concerned with speech, but the former in the service of memory, the latter of persuasion), into one: polymathy or much knowing. Plato rejects polymathy in his early dialogues, e.g., *Charmides* 174a, *Laches* 182d-e. In the *Euthydemus* (294c), polymathy appears as the ludicrous consequence of the denial of falsity. The rejection of polymathy is (weakly) implied by the *Republic's* emphasis on specialization. Plato can discount such all-knowing on the general grounds that one man can only do/know one thing really well. In the *Republic*, the term *polypragmasune*, usually understood as 'doing many things' is identified with injustice. But the word can also carry a sense of 'knowing many things' or, in a negative sense 'curious after knowledge' (LSJ s.v.2). Such sham learning (a man who knows all the crafts and everything else... and there is nothing which he does not know) is in seen as the inability to distinguish 'knowledge, ignorance and imitation'. *Republic* 598d. Even in a dialogue as late as the *Philebus* (19c), Plato is still suspicious of such learning, though he makes the grudging admission that a wide knowledge of specialist techniques might be practically useful to his philosopher. While in one of his earliest dialogues, the *Hippias Minor*, he praises, somewhat tongue in cheek, Hippias' boast that once when he came to the Olympian games, everything he wore had been made by himself, and in addition 'you said that you brought with you poems, both epics and tragedies and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts composed in prose' (368c).

55. 'Rhapsodes were professional reciters of poetry, particularly of Homer, but also of other poets. The name, which means "song-stitcher" is first attested in the fifth century' (Oxford Classical Dictionary s.v. rhapsode).
56. 'For ... this is not an art in you, whereby you speak well on Homer, but a divine power, which moves you like that in the stone which Euripides named a magnet ... For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a power whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone, and attract other rings...In the same manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then by means of these inspired persons the inspiration spreads to others, and holds them in a connected chain' (*Ion* 533d-e). This reminds us of *Republic* Bk. 10 where the imitations of the poet are twice removed from reality. But while the conclusions of both arguments are similar (the poet has no real knowledge), their premises are not.
57. The claim that every *techne* has a distinct subject-matter is the most important characteristic that Plato claims distinguishes genuine from non-genuine *technai*. This claim is seen also as the least controversial as it is not contested by any interlocutor in any dialogue. Kahn, 1983, p. 77 cites *Ion* 357d-358a as evidence for a doctrine which 'proposes a principle of individuation for *technai* based on a one-to-one mapping between an art or science and its subject-matter'.

58. 'When one has acquired any other art whatever as a whole, the same principle of inquiry holds throughout' (*Ion* 532c). The claim here prefigures, suggestively, the doctrine of natural kinds that Plato advances in his later dialogues. In the *Philebus* (18c-d) Theuth claims that you cannot know or learn only a part of what he demarcates as the 'science of grammar' (*grammatiken technen*). This is because the unity of the entire subject makes it impossible to learn only a part, as the part has no separate identity. This is not to suggest that someone could not learn only a part of what is a unified whole, only that this learning might be more like Ion's (by rote) than through the principles of a particular techne. This criterion has a role to play in Plato's conception of medicine as well. In the *Charmides* (156b-d), Socrates suggests that the art of medicine should not look at parts in isolation, but should, following the Thracian practice, look at both body and soul as parts of the same whole in order to cure defects in one or the other. The very general claim is that every (real) subject has only branch of knowledge that (genuinely) studies it. On this principle, as anticipating the *Republic*'s principle of specialization and the Ion as pre-figuring later Platonic doctrine, see Kahn, 1996, pp. 104–13.
59. It is for this reason that Plato says (*Symposium* 223) that if poetry is an Art then the same poet should be able to write comedies as well as tragedies. The implication, of course, is that since poets don't, they do not have an Art. But there can, in a subsidiary sense, be an art of poetry (the ability to write good poems) just as there can be a true art of rhetoric. In the *Phaedrus*, a dialogue usually dated after the *Republic* where Plato offers a limited defence of both poetry and rhetoric, he seems to admit the possibility of the art of Tragedy, which admits that there could be an art of composition which, once learned, would constitute the tragic art (268–269). But this, in any case, would not be poetic knowledge, but knowledge of poetry.
60. *Ion* 530c. Ford, 2002, p. 71 notes that this was a traditional practice may be inferred from the contemporaries Ion mentions and claims to be better than and cites Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 18–19, where a few sophists are reported as doing much the same thing.
61. Notice that speaking well is not identical with speaking truly: Truth or falsity is not, as yet, a criterion for knowledge. In the *Ion*, Plato is careful to avoid asking the question of whether Ion speaks truly about Homer,

and whether Homer speaks truly about his subjects. On those occasions when the truth of statements is at issue, it is always Socrates who claims to speak truly (*alethe*), e.g., 532d, 535a and Ion, when he does use the term, almost invariably does what Socrates has said (e.g., 531d. 535a, 538b, 539d). With regard to Homer's claims, and where those claims are to be judged by other experts, Plato uses various locutions, whether Homer speaks correctly or rightly (*orthos*), 537c, 538c; well or nobly (*kalos*), 538b, well (eu), 532b, 532e, 533c, 536e....the broad categories are better and worse (*arista/ameinon* and *kakia* 531d,e). What significance we are to attach to this is as yet unclear to me. Perhaps Plato wishes to show that Homeric language does not warrant the attribution of true and false.

62. Ion 530c(*kallista legein*), (*epein...pollas kai kalas dianoias peri Homerou*) at 530d4. (*eu kekosmeka ton Homeron*) at d8.
63. e.g., at 530d, 533c, 535d-e, 539e.
64. Notice that Ion is eager to recite to Homer and can be called upon to quote passages on request (537b). On one occasion Socrates chides Ion with 'not remembering' (539e) what he has just said.
65. In distinguishing the art of the rhapsode, that is, his knowledge, Ion does not appeal to the notion of truth (see nt. 61), in filling out what 'speaking well' consists in but to the notion of the fitting (*prepon*). This term encapsulates 'moral and aesthetic values' rather than epistemological ones. See Ford 2002, p. 20 and Plato, *Gorgias* 503e, 'craftsmen... each of them arranges everything according to a certain order, and forces one part to suit and fit [*prepon*] with another, until he has combined the whole into a regular and well ordered production.'
66. Bloom, 1983, p. 375 holds that Socrates here 'is testing the Greek understanding of things, particularly of the gods'. While Bloom is right in the importance of Homer as the real target of Socrates' attack, he reads more into Socrates' arguments than is perhaps there. Socrates' chief claim in the *Ion*, as I see it, is to demonstrate that both rhapsode and poet lack genuine knowledge.
67. In *Republic* Bk. 10 599ff, Socrates asks what Homer was good at; if he knew about medicine, did he cure any one, if warfare, did he command or counsel? What inventions are attributed to him? This lack of practical application is designed to show that neither Homer nor other poets have knowledge in the requisite sense. The view is encapsulated in Socrates' remarks in the Apology (21d): 'the poets say many fine things, but know nothing of that of which they speak'. Poetry is an art parasitic upon other arts. Homer 'speaks a good deal about arts in a good many places' (537a), but does this without knowledge.

68. Thus, Socrates refers to painting at *Ion* 532e (there is an art *techne* of painting as a whole); to sculpture (*andriantopoia*) at 533a; flute or harp-playing at 533b and even to rhapsody!
69. *Gorgias* 456a-c. As the initial section of this dialogue contends, sophistry is fine speaking which has no subject (544d).
70. *Protagoras* 315c, 336b. In the *Hippias Major* Hippias is famed 'as one who knows many things' (285e).
71. *Euthyphro* 13e.
72. This is explicitly stated as the charge against Socrates, assimilating him to the sophists: 'There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger' (*Apology* 18c).
73. *Gorgias* 459c.
74. '... while the other [rhetoric] is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizen's souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best; whether it prove more or less pleasant to one's hearers. But this is a rhetoric you never yet saw' (*Gorgias*, 503a).
75. Although Plato clubs them together in his discussion of poetry in the *Ion*, these are logically distinct claims: the first about the sources of poetic wisdom and the second about the epistemic condition of the poet. By connecting the two, Plato is essentially undermining the epistemological basis of poetic knowledge. Despite attempts to find examples of 'inspiration' as a source of poetry in writings before Plato, the only unambiguous citation is from Democritus DK·B 18: 'What the poet writes with inspiration (*enthusiasmos*) and the breath of the gods is very fine.' Murray, 1981, pp. 87–100, who concludes, 'It was Plato, who, so far as we know, first opposed the concepts of poetic inspiration and technique.' Havelock, 1961, p. 156 contends that the notion of poetic inspiration was an invention of the fifth-century philosophers, particularly Plato, to characterize poetry and not part of the self-imagery of poetry.
76. While the notion of inspiration may not have been traditional, it is connected with a group of ideas and practices which connects epic and choral poetry with divinity. In the *Ion* (536c, d, 542a) Plato describes poetry as a *theia moira* (a part or portion from the gods). This does not confer on it a special status in so far as knowledge is concerned, but is designed to provide an explanation of how poetry gains its authoritative position. At the end of the dialogue, Ion is content to accept this as an account of poetry. Inspiration is not replaced by mimesis in the *Republic* as Stern-Gillet, 2004, contends, for we find the account of poetic mad-

ness used to describe poetry in the *Phaedrus*. Though I am in agreement when she says (p. 173) 'The very manner in which Socrates is there made to draw the contrast between what is and what is not a techne, therefore, rules out the possibility that Plato might have conceived the Ion as a dialogue about what we call "the arts", or would have extended to what we call other art forms the claims that he makes about poetry.' That is, Plato does not have a theory of art.

77. *Republic* 605c–606d. Poetry/Rhetoric appeals to the appetitive or emotional part of the psyche which is unreasoning (*alogon*); socially likened to a beast that must be moved by charms and goads. Charms are just what sophistic speech claims to be able to effect. Both poets and sophists are assimilated to the *goes* (a wizard or sorcerer), *Gorgias* 483e–484a, *Symposium* 203a, *Laws* 909b.
78. These arguments also lead to what might be called a certain mismatch. The psychological model accounts for the power that these persuasive practices have while the epistemological arguments show them up as false. In the first two sets of arguments in *Republic* Bk. 10, the argument against the painters shows that such mimetic arts as representational painting is also ontologically deficient. Julia Annas, 1983, p. 20, argues 'that Plato is deeply split about art and especially about poetry. In the *Republic* he treats poetry inconsistently, as both trivial and dangerous because he is pulled both ways; he wants to tame poetry in the service of morality and to expel it from morality's concerns altogether.' But there is no reason why what is epistemologically trivial (i.e., false) could not be psychologically very dangerous. Nor is it the same kind of poetry that Plato wants (both) to tame and expel.
79. Body soul dualism is emphasized in the *Gorgias*, and there is a strong suggestion that the individual is to be identified with the soul. The body becomes the locus of pleasure, although it is the soul that is affected (for the worse) by bodily pleasures. Poetry as productive of pleasure was a traditional claim that Plato used as a weapon against it. On the conneition between poetry and pleasure see, for instance, G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (John Hopkins, 1979) p. 17ff.
80. 'Rhetoric is an image (*eidolon*) of a branch of politics' (*Gorgias* 463d). There are other pseudo-arts that are similar in the sense that they are images/ghosts of genuine arts: '...as self-adornment is to gymnastics, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice' (465c). Genuine and pseudo Arts are also classified according to whether they cater to the body or the soul. 'The most important element in the present passage is the distinction of principle which Plato draws between "scientific" and "unscientific" procedures. It is one

form of that distinction between being and seeming, inner reality and outward appearance, which runs through the whole of the dialogue from this point' (Dodds, 1959, p. 227). The *eidolon* or image recurs frequently in Plato with reference both to the sophists and the poets who are regularly described as 'image makers' (*eidolopoiikos*). For the poets see *Republic*, 605c (*eidolapoiountas*); for painters see *Sophist* 236c where the painters are classed among the image makers (*eidolopoiikes*); for the sophists, *Sophist* 260.

81. There are two occurrences of mimesis in the *Gorgias*, both of which have the sense of debased copying of persons (511a, 513b). In the *Cratylus* (423d, 427b), which is sometimes dated as pre-*Republic*, the term has its usual sense of the imitation of accents or voices. In the *Republic*, it would seem, Plato brings together a number of words like image (*eikon, eidolon*), likeness (*homoios*), phantasma, and links them with the term mimesis, in order to create a category to which he can relegate a number of otherwise distinct activities (see previous note).
82. Aristotle *Metaphysics*, 987b11-15 where Aristotle says that Plato simply changed the Pythagorean term *mimesis* into *methexis* (participation). Methexis, however, characterizes the form particular relationship in Plato, whereas *mimesis*, in both the third as well as the tenth book of the *Republic*, has a whole host of roles to play and not simply the imitation of forms by objects.
83. The most common forms are *mimos* and *mimesthai*; the latter seems to be earlier and occurs in the Delian hymn to Apollo, where the imitation is in the medium of song and dance, as in Aeschylus (*Choephori.* 564): 'We will both put forward a Parnassian accent, imitating, mimicking the sound of the Phocian dialect' the imitation involves mimicking the way people sound. Plato retains this sense (and objects to it) at *Republic* 396bff. Pindar uses *mimeisthai* three times, each time in a musical context but also with clear allusion to its mimetic effect (e.g., *Pythian.* 12.21. For details see Else, 1958).
84. Herodotus 2.78. At Egyptian banquets a realistic 'wooden image of a corpse carved and painted to look as much like the real thing as possible' was carried around as a reminder to the guests of their mortality.
85. Democritus B39 ('one must be either good or imitate a good man'), 79 ('It is a bad thing to imitate the bad and not even to wish to imitate the good'), 154 ('we are the pupils of the animals in the most important things ... by way of imitation'). Plato puts in the mouth of Protagoras, an account of early education where children 'are furnished with works of good poets (*poieton agathon poiemata*) ... and are made to learn them off by heart: here they meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and

praises and eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy may imitate them and yearn to become even as they.' *Protagoras* 326a.

86. Xenophon 3.10. 1–8 'He took *mimos* (mime as both a genre and an actor), *mimesthai* (to mimic), *mimema* (product of the action of mimicking), and *mimetes* (the one who mimics) and employed this set of terms—whose use is not attested before the fifth century and which in all likelihood belonged to the literary genre of the mime with its very specific values of mimicking, aping and pretending—in order to designate the work of painters and sculptors.' Vernant 1991, p. 165.
87. The generic term that Plato uses for this entire class is *eikasia* (a cognate of *eikon* or image, which bears a sense both of likeness as well as of likeliness, or probable).
88. Poetry and rhetoric have been identified in the *Gorgias,* 'Do you not think that the poets use rhetoric in the theatres?' (502dff). 'Do the rhetors seem to you to speak regarding what is best ... or are they like them (the poets) set on gratifying the citizens...' (502e). In *Republic* Bk. 10 poets are called imitators of images (*mimetas eidolon* 600e), Homer is a 'image-maker' (599d). The mimetic art (*mimetike at* 598b), is contrasted with all the genuine arts (*ton technon* 598c, 600a). Both painting and poetry are to be included as forms of *mimetike* (600b-c). The painter and the poet are counterparts of each other (605a).
89. Gorgias 464c. These pseudo-Arts 'care nothing for what is best but dangle what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly'. I use the word pseudos to signal the contrast between the genuine techne and those that are but images (*eidola*) of them. These spurious *technai* are dubbed by him as forms of flattery, based on principles of trial and error rather than knowledge, and aiming at deception rather than benefit.
90. *Republic.*3. 397d, 398b, and previous note.
91. The distinction is made in *Gorgias* 499b.
92. Plato explicitly qualifies the statement, 'gymnastics for the body and music for the soul' (376e), by saying 'he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician.' (412a).
93. Thus, following the argument of Bks 2-3, Plato says again in Bk 10 (605c), '... the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms (*eidola*) for removed from reality, and by currying favour with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less...'
94. *Republic* 394e, 396d.

95. *Republic* 596d where the artist 'who makes all things the all handicraftsmen (*cheirotechnes*) severally produce' (596c) is called a 'most marvellous sophist'. At 599a7 Plato calls mimesis a 'demiurgy of images' (eidolon demiourgia); in the *Sophist* (265b1): "Mimesis is something like a fabrication [poeisis] of images... and not of realities';
96. Sophist 234b and 234c.
97. In order to really get a grip on him, Plato has first to show how one can sensibly talk about non-being (the ontological correlate of false judgment).
98. So, while it may have become one later, so far as Plato was concerned, Mimesis was not a theory of art, but a rejection of art.

References

Adam, James. *Plato's Republic.* 2 Vols. (Cambridge, 1963).

Adkins, A.W.H. '*Arete,* Techne, Democracy and Sophists.'*Journal of Hellenic Studies,* 1973, 93: 3–12.

Annas, Julia. 'Plato on the Triviality of Literature.' In *Plato on the Arts.* Edited by J. Moravscik and P. Tempko (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 1–28.

———*An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

Bambrough, J.R. 'Plato's Political Analogies.' In Plato II (Vlastos 1978), pp. 187–205.

Bloom, H. 'An interpretation of Plato's Ion', In *The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten,* 1985.

Socratic Dialogues. Edited by T. Pangle, pp. 371–95 (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1985).

Brumbaugh, Robert S. 'Plato's Relation to the Arts and Crafts', In *Facets of Plato's Philosophy.* Edited by W.H. Werkmeister, (Assen, 1976), pp. 40–52.

Cornford, F.M. *Principium Sapientiae* (New York, 1965).

Dodds, E.R. *Plato's Gorgias, A revised text with commentary* (Oxford, 1959).

Ehrenberg, V. 'Polypragmasune: A Study in Greek Politics', *Journal of Hellenic Studies,* 1947, 67: 46–67.

Else, Gerald F. 'Imitation in the Fifth Century', *Classical Philology,* 1958, 53: 73–90.

Ford, Andrew. *The Origins of Criticism* (Princeton, 2002).

Havelock, E.A. *Preface to Plato* (New York, 1963).

Kahn, Charles H. *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue* (Cambridge, 1996).

———'Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias.' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,* 1983, 1: 75–121.

Keuls, Eva. 'Plato on Painting', *American Journal of Philology,* 1974, 95: 100–127.

Moravcsik, J. and P. Temko, eds., *Plato on Beauiy, Wisdom and the Arts* (New Jersey: Totowa, 1982).

———'Noetic Inspiration and Artistic Inspiration', in J. Moravcsik and P. Temko, 1982, pp. 29–46.
Murray, P., 'Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1981, 101: 87–100.
Pollitt, J.J. *The Ancient View of Greek Art* (Yale, 1974).
Stern-Gillet, S. 'On (mis)interpreting Plato's Ion', *Phronesis*, 2004, 69: 169–200.
Verdenius, W.J. 'Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation', In *Plato II*, Edited by G. Vlastos, pp. 259–73, 1978.
Vernant, J.P. and Detienne, M. *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society* (New Jersey, 1978).
Vernant, J.P. 'The Birth of Images', In *Collected Essays* (Princeton, 1991).
Vlastos, G., ed., *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, 2 vols. (Indiana, 1978).

Georg Lukács and the Problem of Romantic Aesthetics

MURZBAN JAL

275, Princess Building, 1st Floor, Princess Street, Mumbai 400 002

I cannot bear an inessential life.
Georg Lukács, 30 November, 1911.

ESTRANGEMENT AS THE HOUSE OF AESTHETICS

According to a certain line of thinking, it is not beauty and the sublime that form the leitmotiv of the work of art but estrangement. Estrangement (*Entfremdung*) is the House of Aesthetics. Or, if one is to believe Hegel, estrangement is the House of Existence itself. One has to understand this *estranged* character of existence in order to understand both aesthetics and the world. The line of thought of theoretical aesthetics which deliberates on the work of art from the variations on the Greco themes of *aesthēsis* (perception), *aisthanesthai* (to perceive) and *aisthētikos* (capable of perception) to A.G. Baumgarten's 'the science of sensory knowledge' and 'the science of sensory beauty' and culminating in Kant's analytics of the sublime and the beautiful falls in this purview of *Entfremdung*. Nothing escapes *Entfremdung*, not even beauty. In fact, beauty itself is estrangement. Or, to borrow a Sartrean metaphor, beauty is nausea because existence itself is nausea. One tries to run away from this nausea but one cannot. Each one of us is this nausea.

Whilst nausea formed the basis of Existentialist art, cultural alienation became a more definite form that became rooted in the Romantic genre of nineteenth and early twentieth century art. According to Hegel, the overcoming of alienation is important an overcoming that is possible in the domain of the Absolute Mind,[1] a domain that includes, besides art, revealed religion and philosophy. Aesthetics for the idealism of Hegel is not only the House of

Estrangement; it is also the House of Utopia. This leitmotiv that Hegel had stressed on is the inspiring moment of philosophy—the longing for Utopia. To long for Utopia is not only the motif of Western art; it is the essence of human existence itself. So, if one asks what is the essence of the work of art, one may answer: estrangement and the longing for Utopia. One has to experience this estrangement (in fact, suffer in this estrangement) as well as yearn for Utopia in order to produce a work of art.

There is a sharp conflict emerging in the history of humanity: the conflict between the void and fullness, estrangement and the longing for Utopia. This conflict is not only applicable to Western art, but to the entire world. Nothing escapes this conflict. The history of art is the history of this conflict. Take the case of the art of the Romans, Greeks and the Indians. The Romans had power inscribed in their art form; the Indians had the grace of timeless Time as their leitmotiv, whilst the Greeks who, of course, did not think that the Greco world stood at the level of estrangement, championed the epic form. The aesthetics life-world of the Greeks was the epic—that which understood life as fullness and not the void. Fullness is said to contradict estrangement. It is to this tension—fullness and the void, estrangement and life—that we will focus our attention in this article. We begin with our main proposition: the tension between estrangement and Utopia has been the driving force of the history of philosophical aesthetics. By the end of the nineteenth century, this storm and stress was reflected in European aesthetics, with the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács as the chief representative of this historical tension.

This essay is on Lukács' theory of the art form, a reflection that he began in early twentieth century as a Romantic championing Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and the German mystics, to his Hegelian-Marxist notion (or probably the Leninist notion, if one is to believe Slavoj Žižek)[2] of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history in *History and Class Consciousness*. There are three distinct phases that Lukács underwent (here we are mentioning only the texts that pertain to the question of Romanticism and culture): (1) the Romantic phase which includes *The Soul and the Forms* (1910), *Aesthetic Culture* (1910), *The History of the Development of Modern Drama* (1911), *The Poverty of Spirit* (1912), *Philosophy of Art* (1912–14), *The Theory of the Novel* (1916) and the unfinished *Heidelberg Aesthetics* (1916–18); (2) His magnum opus *History and Class Consciousness* (1919–1922), that is predated by his essays 'Bolshevism as a Moral Problem' (1918), 'Tactics and Ethics' (1919), 'Moral Mission of the Communist Party' (1919), and 'Old and New Culture' (1919), and his role as the Deputy Commissar of Public Education (1919) in the Hungarian Soviets; and (3) the later Lukács who (after the attacks of Karl Kautsky in *Die Gesellschaft* (June 1924), Deborin in *Arbieterliteratur*, Ladislaus Rudas, a one-time supporter of Lukács, in the *Arbieterliteratur* (1924), followed by the criticism of Bukharin and Zinoviev in the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International (June-July 1924) on *History and Class Consciousness* as bourgeois idealism and the consequent Stalinization of the Soviet revolution) decided to keep silent on his magnum opus—*History and Class Consciousness*. The third phase includes *The Historical Novel* (1937), *The Young Hegel* (1938), *Literature and Democracy* (1949), *The Specificity of the Aesthetic* (1962), *Essays on Thomas Mann* (1964), *Realism in Our Time* (1964), *Goethe and His Age* (1968) and *Studies in European Realism* (1972). Relating these three phases has been a problem. Regarding whether there is a sharp epistemological break or continuity, Istvàn Mèszàros and György and Màrkus (one-time students of Lukács) qualified these three phases in the Hegelian language of an *Aufhebung*, a dialectical supersession that is simultaneously a preservation of the previous stage at a higher level of complexity.[3] Whilst there is a distinct move from the first (Romantic) to the second stage (Hegelian-Marxist), the movement to the third stage (the dogma of Socialist-Realism and the capitulation to the Stalinist bureaucracy) cannot be termed as a move into a 'higher stage'. What concerns us here is the question of Romanticism based on the crisis of culture and the metaphysical tragedy of human existence in his early works and the synthesis of his earlier messianic concerns with Marx, coupled with Fichte and distinct echoes of the Young Hegelian Max Stirner and the consequent resignation in the face of Stalinism.

This brings us to the central question of this paper: the question of Romanticism in the arts. It is quite often said that Romanticism, unlike other aesthetic genres like Classicism, Realism, Naturalism, Symbolism and Impressionism, is a loose concept. In the words of

Victor Hugo, it is a 'vague and indefinable concept'. Sometimes it is used in a pejorative sense. Yet it is Romanticism that is probably the most important of the aesthetic genres, spanning a period from the French Revolution to late nineteenth century. It includes the European composers, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven and Wagner, and sometimes also includes the Baroque master, Johann Sebastian Bach. It also included the Russian composer Tchaikovsky, the French composers Bizet and Saint-Saëns, and it is quite possible that the period of Romanticism in European music terminates in early twentieth century with the rise of the Neo-Classical music of Igor Stravinsky and the two French Impressionists, Ravel and Claude Debussy. It is almost at this period that Lukács begins his career as a critique and essayist.

Aesthetically, whilst Romanticism emerged from Classicism (if not in opposition to it), the core of its philosophical ideology was its critique of industrial civilization. Tonality and chromaticism in music were its leitmotivs in its pastorale ode to pre-industrial cultures. Thus, whether it were the English poets, Keats, Byron and Shelly, or the music of Chopin and Schubert, the poetry and essays of Charles Baudelaire, or the short stories and works on music of E.T.A. Hoffmann, it is this critique of the age of the machine that defines the Romantic genre. Whilst Classicism was based on rigorous discipline and the seeking of harmony in form, Romanticism sought to destabilize this discipline. Classicism sought the great cities; Romanticism depicted the peasant. Classicism sought reason; Romanticism (if not celebrating irrationality as found in the works of Baudelaire and Hoffmann) would not be a slave to reason. Or if there was to be a 'reason' it had to be subservient to the model of aesthetics. For the Romantics it is art that can make people act according to the principle of reason. And since reason itself has betrayed reason, then it is left to the arts to rescue both reason and humanity. For early German Romanticism (*Frühromantic*), especially the thinkers surrounding August William Schlegel, his brother Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Schelling, Ernst Schleirmacher and Friedrich von Hardenberg, or Novalis as the world would know him, this relation between art and reason took place where art was given a privileged place. The arts henceforth were understood as the highest value bestowers in life. Cultural education as the revaluation of all values takes place in this aesthetic life-world.

From this Romantic idealization of the arts there are four central ideas developing: (1) the autonomy of the arts where art represents human freedom; (2) the grand synthesis of art, religion and politics; (3) the privileging of organic community (*Gemeinschaft*) against modern, individualist society (*Gesellschaft*); and (4) the moral mission of cultural *Bildung* according to the principle of the beautiful. For Lukács this cultural-aesthetic model was of great importance. And since the influence of early Romanticism was strong on him, a contradictory theme developed in his early works—the tendency of a 'high' art coupled with a spontaneous anarchist movement from below which would not only be involved in the cultural *Bildung* but which would dissolve all societal reifications. This is the central theme of Lukács as the cultural educationist. In a certain way he would be carrying on the traditions laid down by Fichte's *Lectures on the Vocation of a Scholar* (1793) and Schiller's *Lectures on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795). For Lukács, art is cultural education, and revolution is the realization of this aesthetic education. And this aesthetics would ponder over the question: why is there no more the world of Classicism which had found the 'full man' full of beauty and rationality; and why are we engulfed in the modern age's dilemma of 'transcendental homelessness'?

Though Romanticism in the arts, in the beginning of the twentieth century, was fading away to give way to the Modernist avant-garde, this transcendental homelessness would strike at the heart of Europe. It also struck the young Lukács. But with this striking the longing for Utopia would also begin. Utopia manages to create an important task: to create the 'hero' who destabilizes the reification of the mundane life-world. The Utopia in the works of Lukács is the seeking of a humanist homeland, similar to the Utopia of Goethe. What was prominent in the works of Lukács till 1928 was his refusal to compromise with reality. Though passionate about Hegel, the Hegelian theme of 'the reconciliation with reality' remained foreign to him. Now this theme of absolute unreconciliation was also a dominant trend in the ideology of Romanticism. It is the deed (the 'radical act') that comprises this irreconcilability of Romanticism. So, if there has to be a philosophy, it has to be a philosophy of the deed. Whilst the Young Hegelians

(Marx included, in his own way) were gripped with this philosophy of the deed, it was Goethe, who as the Romantic par excellence, gave poetic form to this question of the deed:

> Tis writ, 'In the beginning was the Word'
> I pause, to wonder what is here inferred.
> The Word I cannot set supremely high:
> A new translation I must try.
> I read, if by the spirit I am taught,
> This sense: 'In the beginning was the Thought',
> This opening I need to weigh again,
> Or else may suffer from a hasty pen.
> Does Thought create, and work, and rule the hour?
> T'were best: 'In the beginning was the Power.'
> Yet while the pen is urged with willing fingers,
> A sense of doubt and hesitancy lingers.
> The spirit comes to guide me in my need,
> I write: 'In the beginning was the Deed.[4]

But if the deed took central place in Romanticism, it could not escape Marx's hermeneutics of suspicion. In *Capital*, Vol. I, he says that this Faustian deed is the same as the deed of the commodity owners—they act before they think: 'In their difficulties our commodity-owners think like Faust: *Im Anfang war die Tat* (In the beginning was the deed). They, therefore, acted and transacted before they thought. Instinctively they conform to the laws imposed be the nature of commodities.'[5] Though the young Lukács concentrated on this question of the deed, the question of the commodity did not escape him. In *History and Class Consciousness*, he stated that the question of the commodity takes central place in not only economics, but in *every aspect of society*.[6] By 1919, the dialectics between the commodity and the deed took central place in his system. It was probably Theodor Adorno who took this Lukácsean concern of relating commodity production with culture (especially in his analysis of music). But unlike Lukács who stressed on the novel form, Adorno concentrated on the total work of art (*Gesamtkuntswerk*).

This essay is a consequent inquiry into two distinct sites: (1) the makings of the aesthetics of Romanticism, which focuses on the 'hero' of European art; and (2) the notion of the reification of

consciousness. For Lukács, the sketching of the hero is simultaneously a search for the revolutionary subject of history. The hero subverts all reifications. For Lukács (like the entire repertoire of what is known in Marxism as historicism and humanism, and unlike the structuralist 'history as a process without a subject') to constitute the subject is central to his philosophy. The subject is the hero of history. Decentring the subject (following the fashion of the French structuralists—most notably Louis Althusser and following this pattern of thinking, the post-structuralists and deconstructionists) is not only an epistemological error; it is reactionary metaphysics, which not only the bourgeoisie but also revolutionaries of the calibre of Engels succumbed to.[7]

There is one important point in order to understand Lukács' aesthetics, and that is to take note of culture and aesthetics (like history itself) as *a process with a subject*. Now this aesthetics of the hero-subject becomes at the same time political (critiquing the high Romantic [*Hochromantic*] trend of 'art for the sake of art' [*l'art pour l'art*]). And this theme of political art—or art as political and cultural education—manifested as revolution formed the core structure of twentieth century avant-garde art. It is this subject-based philosophy of aesthetics that becomes the epistemic basis for other seminal Marxists philosophers of art and culture, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Bertolt Brecht, Herbert Marcuse and Ernst Bloc. Reflection on Lukacs' concept of the 'reification of consciousness' (*Verdinglichung des Bewusstsein*) is not only a reflection on the 'dialectical image' (Benjamin), 'phantasmagoria' (Adorno), the 'one-dimensional man' (Marcuse) and the 'culture industry' (Horkheimer and Adorno); but also a reflection on the problems of our contemporary age. Three important themes follow: (1) the notion of estrangement in Lukács; (2) the search for the revolutionary subject and Lukács' reflection on the mystics, the anarchists and Marxism; and (3) the relation between the reification of consciousness and the spectacle of the culture industry which the Frankfurt School consequently developed. It is at this epistemic site that Lukács (and later Adorno) had posed the question: Can art be possible in the age of capitalism that is determined by the culture of the mechanical mode of production? What is the relation between a genuine work of art and this mechanics of the

culture industry? And finally: Does art have the possibility to destabilize this reified life-world? But most importantly, if art is possible, then is 'Life' possible?

According to this line of thinking that does not understand art for the sake of art, but links aesthetics to ethics and politics: we live in the age of late capitalism (or following Antonio Negri), the age of the empire—to be precise, empire-ism or the Americanization of the world—where the globalization of capital postulates the cultures of not only 'post-politics' and 'post-ideology', but also produces the culture industry and the Ideological State Apparatus which attempt to colonize almost every sector of cultural and political resistance. They have literally rendered unnecessary the process of thinking. Attention, thus, must turn to what Marx called the 'estranged mind' (*entfremdete Geist*)[8] and the traumatic dream worlds opened up with the colonization of the life-world.[9] Whilst for the early Lukács this colonization is brought forth by Western civilization, in *History and Class Consciousness*, it is the reification inherent in the capitalist mode of production that brings forth the practice of instrumental reason—the reason not to know, but to conquer. And it is this instrumental reason to the will to conquest that was soon to bring forth the entire globe in the jaws of the World War. Also, it is in the midst of the war did Lukács ask the most pertinent question: *Who will save us from Western civilization?*[10] Yet Lukács did not appeal to existentialism, as did other German thinkers like Karl Jaspers, Heidegger and Karl Löwith. For the young Lukács: the hero of history—the proletariat, would humble the nihilism of Western civilization.

The importance of Lukács is that by articulating the idea of the reification of consciousness based on the fetishism of the phantom commodity as the essence of Marxism, he could pose the question of the primacy of aesthetics, culture and politics that was in rigorous contrast to the hegemonic versions of Marxism of the Second International. According to this dogma, consciousness was to be understood as an 'emanation' of 'matter' and 'copies' (sometimes 'reflections') of economic situations. In this case, art becomes a mimesis of an underlying economy and, as such, has no validity of its own. Of course Marx never said anything like this. Engels, in his 1890 letter to Josef Bloc, protested against this vulgarization of

Marxism and its transfiguration into economism[11] and, in response to the economist view of history, said to Conrad Schmidt in 1890 that the economists wanted an 'excuse for not studying history. Just as Marx used to say, commenting on the French "Marxists" of the late seventies: "All I know is that I am not a Marxist".'[12]

According to Marx's historical materialism, when it is said that the economic base determines (*bestimmte*) the ideological superstructure, then this statement has to be read in a humanist discourse where: (1) the economy comprises the idea of the human essence (*das menschliche Wesen*); and (2) where determination (*Bestimmung*) is not to be understood as determinism but as formation (*Gestaltung*). Thus, the economic base determining the superstructure is read in the passion of the historical class struggles combined with the dread of estrangement and the longing for Utopia.

Lukács' contribution is that he was the first of the post-Marx-Marxists to combine the theory of class struggle with estrangement. Remember that Marx's Paris *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* that dealt explicitly with the human condition as the being-in-the-world-of-alienation would be known to the world only after *History and Class Consciousness* had already entered the scene of history. Till the late 1920s *Capital* would be misread as a positivist predetermination, a misreading that did not spare even the young Gramsci.[13]

In contrast to the positivist dogma of Kautsky and Plekhenov that reified Marxism into the doctrine of the march-past of objective laws independent of humanity, Lukács (like Gramsci and Karl Korsch) kept humanity (in the form of the proletariat as the identical subject-object) at the basis of history. In a Gramscian sense one had to 'put the "will" (which in the last analysis equals practical or political activity) at the base of philosophy'.[14] Gramsci continues: 'But it must be a rational, not an arbitrary, will, which is realized in so far as it corresponds to objective historical necessities, or in so far it is universal history itself in the moment of its progressive actualization'.[15]

When the First Imperialist World War broke out in 1914, the representatives of the Second International under the leadership of Plekhenov and Kautsky supported the respective bourgeois governments for the war. Lenin broke with the Second International

and continued his radical view of Marxism as the seizure of power that he had laid down in *What is to be Done?* (Remember, Plekhenov the dogmatic and doctrinal Marxist called Lenin a Nietzschean).[16] This breaking of the hegemony of bourgeois thinking meant a concrete study of dislodging class hegemony. The 'mind' that a certain form of ignorant Marxism had exiled as a reflection of 'matter' was brought in the forefront of revolutionary discourse. What Lukács (like Gramsci and Korsch) did was to lay the philosophical foundations of the study of the 'mind'. His study would be seminal in the Marxist theory of the mind and culture that would not only inspire the inner circle of the Frankfurt School, but also Wilhelm Reich, Eric Fromm, Lucien Goldmann, Jean Hyppolite, Fredrick Jameson, etc. Derrida's *Spectres of Marx* would also show the traces of Lukács, though Derrida did not explicitly demonstrate it.

By 1917 (primarily due to the Bolshevik revolution, an act that Herbert Marcuse would soon qualify as a 'radical act')[17] Lukács moved away from Kantianism into a messianic form of left-wing politics and, thus, moved beyond the problems of the soul and tragedy and embraced revolutionary Marxism. What Lukács gave to the world was *History and Class Consciousness* a text, if we are to believe Merleau-Ponty that formed the basis of a certain, 'Western Marxism'.[18] Marxism, at least from the peripheries, could be emancipated from the *cunning of (bourgeois) reason.* And with *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács would break from not only neo-Kantianism but also with the mysticism of Meister Eckehert, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, the thinkers that he had dabbled with in the times of his youth. The journey with Kant and Kierkegaard would end with Hegel's dialectic in full flow, bursting with the thunder of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The problem of the 'metaphysics of tragedy' (a problem that haunted him in his 1910 *The Soul and the Forms*)[19] would be overcome in the dialectics of revolution. Revolution (for Lukács) would be the solution to tragedy.

ESTRANGEMENT IN THE IRON CAGE OF OBJECTIVITY

To understand Lukács one has to understand both the originality of this thinker as well as his diverse (sometimes even contradictory) influences. Whilst his immediate peers were Max Weber, Dilthey,

Windelband, Rickert and Simmel, he did not stop at the neo-Kantianism of the Heidelberg Circle. The radicalism of Ervin Szabo (who would be the first Hungarian translator of Marx and Engels) as well as Endre Ady, the *energia* of Henri Bergson, the irony of Thomas Mann, the anarcho-syndicalism of Georg Sorrel and the mystical revolutionarism of Dostoevsky would form the core structure of his thought.

According to Lukács, capitalism is unliveable and inauthentic. It does not produce according to the laws of beauty, but essentially according to the dictates of the distasteful. *Entfremdung* itself is this distastefulness. It is the black-hole from which the 'intellectualized cultures' of modern, rationalized, industrialized civilizations (as against the 'aesthetic culture' of authenticity) have emerged.

To this nature of *Entfremdung* one must turn, for it influenced not only Hegel and Marx (in their radically different ways), but also the entire generation of the Romantics and Existentialists. So what is this *Entfremdung*, and how is one to understand the Romantic, Existentialist, Modernist and Marxist versions of it? Is it an Existential emptiness, or the Buddhist notion of *Dukha*? Is it the void from which sorrow emerges? Is this sorrow linked to the history of tragedy from the Greeks to Goethe's *The Sorrows of the Young Werther* and *Faust*? This is one part of the idea of estrangement and the work of art—an idea that the German poets of the nineteenth century perfected. But there is another idea of *Entfremdung*—frightening terror that Freud called 'the uncanny' (*das Unheimlich*). According to Freud, the work of art emerges from this *Unheimlich*.[20] So, if *Entfremdung* is the House of Aesthetics, then *das Unheimlich* comes marching into this house. But it does not break down this House; it cohabits with *Entfremdung*.

To understand young Lukács' aesthetics and the crisis of culture let us highlight three distinct sites of his operation: (1) the alienation of the human condition, (2) the equation of objectivity with estranged objectivity; and (3) the crisis of culture that is constituted within a Fichtean 'age of absolute sinfulness'[21] coupled with the Marxist genre of the decadence of class societies. In order to understand this crisis of culture, let us slightly shift from Lukács to Marx's analysis of the regression of thinking and feeling that is based on the theory of the accumulation of capital. Accumulation

of capital (for Marx as was later for Lukács) is simultaneously the accumulation of regressive thinking and feeling. According to the Frankfurt School's writings on aesthetics and culture (who would be developing from Lukács' idea of the reification of consciousness), the Ideological State Apparatus of late capitalism in the form of the culture industry 'pacifies rebellious desire',[22] as also cherishes as art 'shinning white teeth and freedom from body odour and emotions'.[23] Why does this happen? It happens (for Marx), not only because the culture industry wants to control human desire, but more importantly because the accumulation of capital is also the accumulation of the crisis of culture and also the accumulation of insanity. The notorious Monsieur Capital who along with Madam Rent, as Marx exclaims in *Capital*, Vol. III, does his *ghost walking as a social character and also as a mere thing*[24] is inherently insane and—contrary to the discourses of modernity—seeks not so much science and technology as it seeks magic and necromancy.[25] In *The Increase of Lunacy in Great Britain*, Marx said that increase of wealth is accompanied with an increase in lunacy.[26] Marx's *Capital* is not only the critique of capital accumulation, but also the critique of the culture industry and insanity. Why do we say so? We say because the great capitalist referent and sign—surplus value (M^1) has lost totally its human and material content—it is 'only form without content'.[27] It is an estrangement, which is simultaneously a disembodiment—a mind that is produced that is split from the body. It is, thus, the estranged mind, or what Lukács called 'the reification of consciousness'. Freud called this 'psychosis'—a withdrawal from reality. Lukács one must remember never took Freud seriously and unlike the surrealists did not experiment with the politics of the unconscious.

For the young Lukács, to deal with the modern industrial society is mainly to deal with a sense of the *Unheimlich*, a condition that is overcome sometimes in mythology, sometimes in revolution. Mythos for Lukács in the *The Soul and the Forms* is the world where the individual gets sense of the *heimlich*—a theme that he developed from Novalis. For Lukács, following Novalis philosophy is read as nostalgia where the 'impulse is to be everywhere at home in the world',[28] whilst the estranged individual as the stranger (*Fremdling*) is not totally lost in the world, but (as in Novalis' poem *Der Fremdling*

as in his philosophical work *Faith and Love*) one who carries the memories of a past golden age which he believes will return again. One has thus found a home in mythos. And for Lukács the pre-novel form of narrative (i.e., pre-capitalist narrative form) had developed a form of aesthetical perfection. The epic form (especially the Greek epic form) was an exemplar of this perfection. Whilst Marx did appreciate the Greek epics—in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*, Marx talked of how in the age of modernity one could experience the 'artistic pleasure' in the epic form of beauty that also becomes a 'norm' as well an 'unattainable model' of artistic excellence.[29] Yet there is a sharp difference in Lukács' (both the young and the Sovietized Lukács) and in Marx's rendering on the variation on the theme of aesthetics. For Marx, there can never be nostalgia for pre-capitalist worlds, whilst Lukács, following Novalis, indulges in Romantic nostalgia.

On the contrary for Marx, capitalism as the last of the great class systems is inherently an insane, psychotic system (Eric Fromm develops this Marxist thesis) involved, not in the process of rationality but in *metempsychosis* and *transmigration*.[30] This question of Marx's idea of the necessary insanity of (capitalist) culture is based on three of his observations of the death-wish of estrangement in *Capital*, Vol. I: (1) 'existence as a material thing is put out of sight'[31] thus involving a 'judicial blindness'—to fail to see what lies in front of one's nose;[32] (2) erasing the concrete life-world;[33] and (3) putting 'out of sight' the useful character of the life-world.[34] Thus, what we get is: (1) ontological blindness and the production of the commodity conceived as the *idealized and ghostly thing-in itself*, both of which forming the basis of the crisis of culture; (2) the dominance of this abstract and spectral life-world; and (3) the useless life-world. Life is, thus, inauthentic. But it is not merely inauthentic. It is 'ideal' and 'invisible'.[35] The crisis of culture, for Marx, is based on these three points.

To understand Lukács' emphasis on the cultural realm in concrete combination with the economic epoch, it is necessary to point out briefly Marx's examination of culture and the problem of capital accumulation. In *Capital*, Marx claims that the economic base of capitalism is a disembodied, psychotic base grounded on the accumulation of capital. Here Monsieur Capital appears in 'a form

quite distinct from his palpable bodily form'[36] and then marches into the political economy of the metempsychotic and transmigrated M-C-M[1] circuit where: (1) 'M' as the *primal idealized sign* is the original self of Monsieur Capital; (2) 'C' as *crypto-matter about to be idealized* is actually Monsieur Capital transfigured as means of production and labour power whilst; (3) 'M[1]' is the expanded self of Monsieur Capital, but now appearing as *the neurotic return of the pure idealized sign devoid of matter*, i.e., returning in this great spiritual form which is 'quite distinct from his palpable bodily form'. Now this rather strange voyage of Monsieur Capital necessitates an augmentation of himself as this disembodied and thingified fetish. Monsieur Capital, now appearing as surplus value, keeps on recurring in this disembodied form. For Marx this Monsieur is both neurotic as well as psychotic. Now Lukács, in both his early as well as late periods—like Benjamin's analysis of the *flâeneur*—grasped this point. In *History and Class Consciousness* he says that the problem of the thing-in-itself that cannot be changed, yet has to be, is the fundamental problem of bourgeois thought.[37] But what he grasps is that drama, as bourgeois drama, is the perfect realization of the fetishization of the capitalist life-world.

When the First Imperialist World War broke out it was a kind of 'the final stage', to borrow Adorno's phrase, 'of the dialectic of culture and barbarism'.[38] Rosa Luxemburg had demonstrated the unsurpassable antinomy of capitalism as the conflict between socialism and barbarism. For Marxism, unlike the metaphysicians of estrangement, we are not *condemned* to live this barbarism. Estrangement is not a state of permanence. Nor is it a Heideggerean *Dasein*, where humanity is 'thrown into the world'. Nor is it what the *History of the Development of Modern Drama* called *Bestehn*—the 'being-there' which is 'naked existence as force'. Instead, for Marx, the traumatic dream images of commodity fetishism are socially and historically constituted and have to be torn down along with its entire world-outlook. With Marx's revolution in thinking 'modern materialism' (to borrow Andre Breton's and Walter Benjamin's term) was born.[39]

Lukács would be ambivalent on this stand on modern materialism. In *History and Class Consciousness*, he affirms Rickert's claim that materialism is an 'inverted Platonism'.[40] Yet he agrees with modern materialism's proposition that one cannot theorize in the castles of

speculative abstractions, but in the anthropology of the life-world, what Marx called 'the ontological essence of human passion coming into being'.[41] To perceive, feel, hear and suffer is to wake up from the traumatic dream state. It is overcoming of reification.

What is important in Lukács' aesthetics is that he tears the works of art from the decorum of the bourgeois spectacle and centres it on the central problem of the modern epoch—that of ethics.[42] That is why Dostoevsky's characterization of Stavrogin (based on the portrayal of the nineteenth-century anarchist Sergi Nacheav) in the *Possessed* remained important for him. The radical act, for Lukács, had to be located in the problematics of ethics.[43] The communist revolution is the moral response of the proletariat to the amoralism and immorality of the capitalists. *History and Class Consciousness* too continues along this trajectory of thinking. Revolution does not happen due to some innate telos within history (the official Marxist line), but is the creation of the revolutionary will. The proletariat in 1919 became the embodiment of this will.

The revolution as will and idea would now form the basics of his ultra left-wing communism. In this case, the narrative of 'objective conditions' (a point that has always been stressed by all kinds of Marxism, following Marx himself) could be nothing but a myth. Objectification, so Lukács would claim (following not only Hegel, but also the ultra-idealist Fichte and the Young Hegelian Max Stirner), is alienation. Of course, Marx never said it, whilst Hegel did. For Marx *a non-objective being is a non-being. (Ein ungegenständliches Wesen ist ein Unwesen).*[44] That is because for Marx, contra-Hegel:

> A being (*Wesen*) which does not have its nature outside (*Ausser*) itself is not a *natural* being (*natürlichen Wesen*), and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object is not an objective being (*gegenständliches Wesen*). A being which is not itself an object for some other third being has no being for its object (*Gegenstand*); i.e., it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective.[45]

Whilst Marx makes a rigorous distinction between objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*) and alienation (*Entfremdung*), Lukács collapses objectivity into alienation and, to borrow Adorno's phrase, make 'any objectivity...a matter of indifference'.[46] The world (for the idealists) as revolution is, then, not a real revolution but a phantom revolution. That is why Lenin chided 'left-wing' communism (the

group of the ultra-leftists, Lukács included) as "infantile disorder".[47] Lukács becomes the Hamlet of the international proletariat revolution, and he was to know it.

PSEUDO-REBELLION: *GEMEINSCHAFT* AND THE RETURN OF PRIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The idea of pseudo-rebellion is Wilhelm Reich's. In the *Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Reich talked of how fascism used emotions to arouse the popular masses. Since Reich, the idea of pseudo-rebellion is used to analyze popular reactionary movements. Pseudo-rebellion has Romantic anti-capitalism as its ideological basis. It mobilizes an anti-capitalist tradition; however, of the reactionary, authoritarian type. What is important in Lukács, that almost a century after he began his career as a neo-Kantian and eighty years after *History and Class Consciousness*, one may say that he is almost a landmark in the history of philosophy is because even at the time of the 'crises in the European sciences' (to borrow a phrase from Husserl), if not the crisis of capitalist civilization, Lukács could articulate the question of the primacy of culture in Marxist theory (a fact till then highly ignored), as well as a necessity of comprehending *philosophy as philosophy* (especially the importance in understanding of Hegel in particular and classical German philosophy in general), thus, avoiding both the positivism of Soviet Marxism as well as the later post-modern post-philosophical thinking. The importance (in a reverse way) is also to understand the philosophy of not Marxism, but anarcho-syndicalism, a philosophy shared by the anti-colonial Gandhi, to the anti-American and anti-Russian Heidegger, the contemporary Heideggereans in Iran as also the late Michel Foucault. Lukács is the classical romantic revolutionary in a hurry—in Lenin's words, an 'infantile disorder'—but a disorder that recognizes the fallacies of not only the Marxism of Kautsky and Plekhevov, but also the fallacy of onto-theology. It is said that Lukács' revolution (like the entire anarchist tradition) is not only against the capitalists—like Dostoevsky it is against existence, i.e., existence as Existence itself.

Let us sum up Lukács' Romantic motifs: Lukács' fatal error is based on his attempt to 'out-Hegel Hegel', by equating objectivity *per se*, i.e., trans-historical objectivity with alienation. The second

error is retreating into the neo-Kantianism of the *Geisteswissenscaften* (human sciences)/*Naturwissenschaften* (natural sciences) opposition (which he learnt from the Heidelberg Circle), resulting in the condemnation of the natural sciences (and nature itself) as eternally alienating. What Lukács rejected was objectivity (recall how he emphasizes on the Fichtean 'so much the worse for facts') and nature. Real history then cannot be predicted on the 'dialectics of nature', but on the 'phenomenology of the *Geist*'. And, like the entire Neo-Platonic and romantic tradition, nature had to be condemned. Lukács was not only moving into the romanticism of the *Gemeinschaft* school, where he would share his aesthetics and politics with Coomaraswamy and Gandhi, but where the heroic proletariat as identical subject-object would move away from nature (in fact, declare war on nature), and go into the site of the interiors of the soul.

One knows how Lukács' pre-*History and Class Consciousness* works like the *History of the Development of Modern Drama*, *The Soul and the Forms* and *The Theory of the Novel* were concretely rooted in the site of the Romantic *Gemeinschaft* tradition. So did Lukács involve a rupture with his *gemeinschaftlich* past? Or did this *Gemeinschaft* tradition continue to haunt him? One knows that the German Romantics' aesthetics of feeling and emotion criticized the rationalization and mechanization of modern society. Yet there can be two main critiques of rationalization and the reification of the life-world, the one that Marx involved in his critique of capitalism and the ideology of Romanticism that Marx rubbished as 'reactionary socialism'. Both of these are rigorously distinct. Romanticism, as distinct from Cubism and Surrealism, besides being based on the Nietzschean aristocratic ethics, would be uncompromising about its critique of modernity. Though they would write apocalyptic critiques of industrial civilization, it would involve merely the act of:

> half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very heart's core; but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history....
> Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and

> poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is nothing but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.[48]

The Romantics upbraided capitalism for producing the proletariat, but forgot that the proletariat is not the subject that suffers and pleads for charity. On the contrary, it is the subject of history that demands the revolution.[49] The essential difference between Romanticism and the Modernist avant-garde was the difference in their respective ideas of history—German Romanticism stressed on mythology as redemption (the operas of Richard Wagner are a case in point) in contradistinction to the French ideologies of progress and development. Bertolt Brecht, in his *Die Essays von Georg Lukács*, said that 'There is no going back. It's not the matter of the good old, but the bad new. Not the dismantling of technology, but its build up. We will not be human again by leaving the masses, but only through going into them...but not in the sense that we were human earlier'.[50]

The Romantics, unlike the Modernists (especially the Saint-Simon type of Utopian Modernity), refused to embrace the idea of an immanent telos of progress and development in history. Lukács too echoed this theme and in *History and Class Consciousness* said that the greater the productive forces, the greater the reification experienced. Now Romanticism (especially that of Edmund Burke, Adam Muller and Nietzsche) tended to have ultra conservative ideas, especially in relation to the French Revolution and its ideas of equality and fraternity. According to Nietzsche, history is determined by genealogy and the forces of origin (*Ursprung*) and descent (*Herkunft*). The forces of earlier descent (according to him) are noble as against the later descents that are reactive and of a lower order. Lukács' Romanticism, however, combined both Nietzsche's reading as well as the ethics of Dostoevsky and the historical idealism of Hegel. Yet, it must be mentioned, Lukács has at least one text of extreme retrograde morality; although like Nietzsche, he is able to combine this absence of morality with an alleged 'higher morality'. In the *Poverty of Spirit*, he claimed that a sort of a perfection of the moral order was achieved by the ancient caste system, whereby duty and morality were synthesized. Such sort of an ethical perspective was shared not only with Novalis who in *Christianity and Europe* talked of the 'beautiful, magnificent times, when Europe was a Christian land...(and a) vast spiritual empire'[51], but also with Coomaraswamy who in *Sati: A Defence of Eastern Woman* supported the archaic practice of widow immolation as a higher ideal where man and woman were synthesized. Yet Romanticism, though retreating to a mediaeval pastoral ideal, did not opt for naturalism in the arts, but sought the 'Idea' that lay behind nature. If the city life was condemned to hell, so too was nature.

So where does the problem arise with Lukács? It is with not being 'concrete'. It lies with the idealist view of history. According to Marx, communism is not 'an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself'.[52] But for the early Lukács, the subjective situation (the Kierkegaardean 'truth is subjective') formed the corpus of his thought. In *Aesthetic Culture*, he recalls the Dostoevskyean theme—*anything is permissible*. According to Dostoevsky, the complete principle went thus: 'If God does not exist, then anything is permissible'. For Lukács:

> Anything is permissible when everybody is living in expectation of a great final accounting, which however never arrives; for on the day of the last judgement all things will in any case be found to be easy, and the communal feeling of tragedy will grant absolution for every frivolity.[53]

Anything is permissible, ontologically and politically speaking, yet why is not anything (the 'radical act') possible? It is because one is living in the living hell called 'second nature'—'a charnel house of long-dead interiorities' which can be only brought to life by a 'metaphysical awakening of the soul'.[54] According to Lukács:

> Estranged from nature (the first nature), the modern sentimental attitude to nature, is only a projection of man's experience of his self-created environment as a prison instead of a parental home.
> When the structures made by man for man are really adequate for man, they are his necessary and native home; and he does not know the nostalgia that posits and experiences nature as the object of its own seeking and finding. The first nature, nature as set of laws of pure cognition, nature as the bringer of comfort to pure feeling, is nothing other than historico-philosophical objectification of man's alienation from his own constructs.[55]

But this realm of living death does not propel him to seek the priest who sprinkles holy water to pacify rebellious desire. On the

contrary, the subjective spirit (the soul) is in war with the objective spirit (Church, State, Nature). Lukács has two models in his aesthetics: that of Stavrogin (Dostoevsky's analysis of the radical act) and, secondly, the Hegelian *Geist* in its overcoming of nature itself. Romanticism is, thus, caught in this double bind: to seek the radical act and the possibilities of the principle: anything is permissible; and secondly, to search for the medieval solution of the Catholic Church's representation of the 'Idea' that lies behind 'Nature'. These are the two souls dwelling in the breast of Romanticism, each, as Goethe remarked, 'going apart from the other'. The dominant trend is that of the world abandoned by God himself and left to the mechanics of the alienated worldview to take care of itself. In this sense, the second double binding of the Romantic tradition is like the biblical conflict (best represented by Žižek)—where on the one hand, God is shown as an omnipotent, but a perverse subject, who desires to see humanity suffer and then at the appropriate moment intervenes to claim that he is the 'hero' of history. On the other hand, God is not an omnipotent subject, but more like the hero of Greek tragedy who is also subordinated to a higher destiny.[56]

Now Lukács carried this metaphysical and existentialist conflict with him and, strangely, also seemed to share a particular motif of anti-Naturalism (i.e., seeking the 'Idea' behind 'Nature') with Indian aesthetics (Coomaraswamy especially) who had said that one should not even use the term 'aesthetics' since it signifies sensuality.[57] This type of Romantic anti-Naturalism does not even accept the art form of the 'body'. The body, as Coomaraswamy had said, is illusory.[58] One has to move into the realm of what Lukács in *The Soul and the Forms* called (after the German mystics) 'imagelessness of all images'.[59] But this going into a mystical, supra-Hegelian 'Idea' becomes not only phantasmagorical, where (as we said before) Monsieur Capital has left his 'palpable bodily form' and become 'ideal' and 'invisible'; but also where there is the operation of psychosis at work—*the compulsive desire to withdraw from reality.*

So, how does the early Lukács understand the radical act? Lukács states that humanity has to transcend 'laws' (i.e., 'laws' of nature) because laws hold people in chains.[60] Unfortunately, Lukács would tend to hold this same ontological position even in *History and Class*

Consciousness. Nature and objectivity (as we noted) are condemned as alienation. Nature is itself said to be deterministic and manipulable, in contrast to the 'inner' spiritual domain of 'man'. What does not involve 'man' is condemned to hell. Nature has forgotten 'man'. The revolution is, thus, against nature itself. Nature is then understood as (not only in the Kantian but also in the structuralist sense as a) *process without the subject.* Seems strange as to how two contrasting episteme: structuralism and historicism-humanism, and two conflicting philosophers: Althusser and Lukács meet in this site of estrangement. So, if 'nature' is considered as deterministic and manipulable that does not involve 'man', then there can be no praxis, no freedom. Nature thus excludes freedom. The paintings at Lukács' exhibition, which are supposed to be about the story of 'man', are actually about the souls and forms of 'man', 'man' that has actually died with the birth of urban civilizations.

And if nature is manipulative, so too are the natural sciences. We thus descend into the Kantian dualisms of pure reason/practical reason, science/ethics, nature/culture. We live in this, almost eternally defined dualisms, somewhat akin to the biblical conflict of God with Satan. But Lukács does not believe in the eternal, for the subject, as pure praxis, has to rebel. But this rebellion is against 'nature' and, thus, in a way against God himself. If Benjamin had talked of 'shattering the continuum of history',[61] then Lukács wants to shatter history itself.

The 'hero' thus enters the scene of aesthetic history. In a peculiar way, Lukács combines the hero of classical antiquity, reminding one of the ancient Iranian epic warrior-heroes Rustaum and Sohrab as depicted in the eleventh-century Persian epic *Shahenama,* with the Dostoevskyean hero. Just as the Iranian hero has the glory (*Khavernah*) bestowed on him, so too Dostoevsky's hero has the aura sketched around his character. The hero is the mystic, pure, honest and full of goodness (*Güte*). Goodness is grace, the aura bestowed by God himself. Micheal Löwy, in his excellent study of Lukács, has said that one cannot help comparing Lukács' dualism of grace and ordinary life with Weber's counter-position of 'charisma' (a Greek word implying 'gift of grace') and 'routine'.[62] In Iranian legend, grace is robbed and the 'fall' of humanity begins. In nineteenth-century Russian literature, the hero is sketched both

in the heroic Iranian-warrior form as well as the Christian form of love-seeking hero as found in Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*. So it is Christian love as well as Iranian form of smiting all evil that Lukács incorporates in his aesthetics. The nineteenth-century Russian novel incorporates both these aspects. In fact, the combination of these seemingly contradictory aspects forms the core structure of the Slavic personality. The Soviet State after Stalin's counter-revolutionary takeover after 1928 also incorporated this antinomy: smiting evil (i.e., the revolutionaries) as well as bestowing goodness and charity with the public distribution system. This urge towards a grand Slavic-socialism, combined with the mystical love of God, remained a core of nineteenth and twentieth century East European literature. There seemed to be no resolution to this aporia—in which terror and/or love is caught in the abyss between ordinary life and the radical act. Löwy notes (quoting Dostoevsky) how the ethical-literary gospel influenced Lukács:

> The moment he thought seriously about it, he was overcome by the conviction of the existence and immortality of God, and he quite naturally said to himself: 'I want to live for immortality, and I won't accept any compromise'. Similarly, if he had decided that there was no immortality and no God, he would at once have become an atheist and a Socialist, for Socialism is not only the labour question, or the question of the so-called fourth estate, but above all an atheistic question, the question of the modern integration of atheism, the question of the Tower of Babel which is deliberately being created without God, not for the sake of reaching heaven from earth, but for the sake of bringing heaven down to earth.[63]

If not the idealization effect of classical idealism then at least the Hegelian activist idealism of the pro-active *Geist* combined with the mysticism of the pre-Marxist militant bent towards heroic sacrifice to gain the great idealist end would return to haunt Lukács. The heroic subject is not the rational and pragmatic Lenin, but the mystic Jesus, the anointed one, tormented with the slings and arrows of the sufferings of mankind. After all, one knows that it is the estrangement from God which forms the motor force of the metaphysical dialectics of the mystic's alleged radical act. And it is this radical act that has so fascinated the history of world literature. In *Crime and Punishment*, Roskolnikov's alleged radicalism is said to lie in the murder of a frail old woman, a murder that has to be

committed because with the money robbed from the moneylender woman, humanity could be saved. After all, so Dostoevsky's character claims, that all world saviours shed rivers of blood.[64] Till *History and Class Consciousness* the strong influence of Dostoevsky is evident. But then the proletariat changes the course of action of the 'hero'. Or does it?

In *History and Class Consciousness*, the proletariat as *identical subject-object* enters the scene of world history to take on the role of the divine mystic and the messiah that saves the world soul from tragedy. Though revolutionaries in late antiquity and later (Jesus, Mazdak-I-Bambad and Mohammed) emphasized the will of the mystic and the sacrifices that they claimed formed the core of the radical act,[65] it ought to be remembered that for the Heidelberg Circle it was Russian mysticism and Russian literature that wielded them together and which provided a mode of rejecting Western capitalist civilization.[66]

But Lukács also knew that the dangerous zone that divides materialism from idealism had to be breached. If, for idealism, the mystic is the subject of history, materialism needs to find an empirical subject that is located in the concrete moment of the historical conjuncture of class struggles. The proletariat (for Marx) becomes the class that has reached the vantage moment in history because of its historical antagonism to the bourgeoisie, to the accumulation of capital and to class societies in general. The moralistic version of the pre-Marxist revolutionary corresponds to Christian suffering and charity in contrast to the militant proletariat. For Marx, in contrast to the Romantics:

> The proletariat, on the contrary (*umgekehrt*), is compelled as proletariat to abolish (*aufzuheben*) itself and thereby its opposite (*Gegensatz*), private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat. It is the negative side (*negative Seite*) of the anti-thesis (*Gegensatzes*), its restlessness (*Unruhe*) within its very self, dissolved (*aufgelöste*) and self-dissolving private property. The properties class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement (*menschliche Selbstentfremdung*). But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognises estrangement (*Entfremdung*) as its own power and has in it the *semblance* (*Schein*) of a human existence. The latter feels annihilated (*vernichtet*) in estrangement; it sees in its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence (*unmenschlichen Existenz*). It

> is, to use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the *indignation* at the abasement, as indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction (*Widerspruch*) between its human nature (*menschlichen Natur*) and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature (*Verneinung dieser Natur*).[67]

But, in contrast to Marx, it is not only the 'comprehensive negation of that nature (*Verneinung dieser Natur*)' but, principally, the negation of Nature itself that the Romantic seeks. The Romantic does not want to negate contradictions that comprise reality. He wants to negate 'Reality' itself. The Romantic is the mystic who is necessarily bound to the idea of pure identity—what the Sufis call *Fana* and the Iranians once remembered as *Kshnoom*. Lukács' hero (at least till 1918) was this mystic and the saviour—but the saviour that never comes. Like Goethe's Faust, the young Lukácsean hero is then dragged to hell. In that case, one will then have to wait for the absent saviour, whether the Zoroastrian *Soashant*, the return of Jesus, the Shiite imam, or even the tyrant and false prophet Generalissimo Stalin. Though the saviour never came, it is the spectres of the revolution and counter-revolution that now haunt us.

By 1928, one episode of the Romantic Utopia had come to an end. The Slavic Utopia in war with Western civilization was realized not in the worker's paradise, but in the Stalinist bureaucracy. The Soviet Union became the graveyard of international communism. Even Trotsky, the 'hero' who chided Romanticism's child 'fate' (saying, following Proudhon: 'Destiny—I laugh at it; and as for men, they are too ignorant, too enslaved for me to feel annoyed at them')[68], would be disarmed and sent to his grave. We now stand at the memorial of the Bolsheviks. Besides the names of Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamanev, Radek and the entire 1917 central committee of the Bolsheviks, along with countless revolutionaries, is also sketched the name of a certain Georg Lukács who remained silent. And along with the cacophony of this silence is also heard the voices of Hamlet and his spectral father:

> *Ghost.* Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.
> *Hamlet.* Murder!
> *Ghost.* Murder most foul, as in the best it is;
> But this most foul, strange, and unnatural.
> *Hamlet.* Haste me to know't, that I, with wings as swift
> As meditation or the thoughts of love,
> May sweep to my revenge....

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind. Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 293–97.
2. For the Leninism of Lukács, see Slavoj Žižek, 'Georg Lukács as the Philosopher of Leninism', Postface to Georg Lukács, *A Defence of History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Esther Leslie (London: Verso, 2000).
3. Istvàn Mészáros, *Lukács' Concept of Dialectic* (London: Merlin Press, 1972), p. 18; Györgry Màrkus, 'Life and Soul: the Young Lukács and the Problem of Culture', in *Lukács Revalued*, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
4. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Faust*, Part One, trans. Philip Wayne (London: Penguin Books, 1949), p. 71.
5. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 90.
6. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1983), p. 83.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), p. 129.
9. When Lukács talked of the reification of consciousness, he anticipated the young Marx's notion of estrangement, a concept known to the world in the early twentieth century more in Hegelian and biblical forms. The idea taken over by Georg Simmel, Lukács' one-time teacher was more in the temper of this idealism of ontological and metaphysical alienation. The rigour of the political economy of estrangement that Marx emphasized was, till the late 1920s, buried in the silence of orthodoxy. David Ryazanov, the great Marxologist (incidentally eliminated by Stalin), would reveal the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (both which centralized the notion of estrangement in the theories of capitalism and the modern state) only in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Between 1929 and 1931, Lukács worked with Ryazanov at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, where the latter showed him the drafts of the 1844 manuscripts before they were published.
10. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994), p. 11.

11. Fredrick Engels, 'Letter to Josef Bloc in Königsberg, London, September 21, 1890' in *Marx. Engels. Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 682.
12. Fredrick Engels, 'Letter to Conrad Schmidt in Berlin, London, August 5, 1890', in Ibid., p. 679.
13. Antonio Gramsci, 'The Revolution against "Capital"', in *Selections from Political Writings, 1910–1920,* trans. John Mathews, selected and edited by Quintin Hoare (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), pp. 34–37.
14. Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks,* trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 345.
15. Ibid.
16. Georgoi Plekhenov, 'Notes to Engels' Book *Ludwig Feuerbach*', in *Georgoi Plekhenov: Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. I* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 455.
17. Herbert Marcuse, 'Phenomenology of Historical Materialism' in *Telos,* 4, Fall, 1969.
18. Mauruce Merlau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic,* trans. Josef Bien (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 30–58. See also Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicate Action, Vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society,* trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1984) and Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979).
19. Georg Lukács, *The Soul and the Forms* (London: Merlin Press, 1971), pp. 152–74. Michel Löwy in *Georg Lukács—From Romanticism to Bolshevism* trans. Patrick Camiller (London: New Left Books, 1979), p. 103, relates tragedy to the 'trenchant dualism of two forms of life—living (*lebendige*) or "true" (*wahre*) life, and "unliving", "impure", or "ordinary" life. These two worlds should be "kept rigorously distinct" (*streng voneinander zu scheiden*), and the main character of the dialogue proclaims his deep aversion to the lower world: "I can no longer bear the unclarity and dishonesty of the everyday life."'
20. Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *The Penguin Freud Library. Vol. 14. Art and Literature,* trans. James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 335–76.
21. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel,* p. 18.
22. Herbert Marcuse, 'Affirmative Culture', in *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory,* trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 121.
23. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 167.
24. Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. III (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 830.

25. Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 80.
26. Karl Marx, 'The Increase of Lunacy in Great Britain' in *Marx. Engels. Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), pp. 602-6.
27. Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. III, p. 392.
28. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel.*
29. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse,* trans. Martin Nicholas (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 111.
30. Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. I, p. 199.
31. Ibid., p. 45.
32. Karl Marx, To Fredrick Engels in Manchester, London, 25 March 1868', in *Marx. Engels. Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 189.
33. Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. I, p. 46.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., pp. 98–9.
36. Ibid., p. 98.
37. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 150.
38. Theodor Adorno, *Prisms* trans. S. Weber (London, 1955), p. 34.
39. According to Erwin Szabo as noted in Andrew Arato and Paul Brienes in *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p. 9, Marx was not a philosophical materialist but a revolutionary materialist.
40. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 202.
41. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* p. 120.
42. Yet this breaking of the work of art as spectacle is different from the type exercised by the Marxist poet and playwright Bertolt Brecht.
43. Georg Lukács, 'The Moral Mission of the Communist Party', in *Political Writings 1919–1929* (London: New Left Books, 1972).
44. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* p. 137.
45. Ibid.
46. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 50.
47. V.I. Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism an Infantile Disorder* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).
48. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, 'The Manifesto of the Communist Party' in *Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels. Selected Works in One Volume* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), pp. 54–5.
49. Ibid., p. 54.
50. Eugene Lunn, *Marxism and Modernism: A Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 145.

51. Novalis, 'Christianity and Europe: A Fragment', in *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, ed. Fredrick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 61.
52. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 57.
53. Gyögry Márkus, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
54. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, p. 64.
55. Ibid.
56. Slavoj žižek, *The Fragile Absolute—or why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for?* (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 157–8.
57. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *Christian and Oriental View of Art* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1994), p. 46.
58. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *Essays in Indian Nationalism* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1981), p. 22.
59. Georg Lukács, *The Soul and the Forms*, p. 5.
60. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, p. 65.
61. Walter Benjamin, 'Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian', in *One-Way Street and Other Writings*, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London: New Left Books, 1979), p. 352.
62. Michael Löwy, *Georg Lukács—From Romanticism to Bolshevism*, p. 104.
63. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karmazov*. See Michael Löwy, p. 114.
64. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment* (Moscow: Ruduga Publishers, 1985), p. 280.
65. As the 'identical subject-object' the Lukácsian proletariat becomes a type of a mystic Sufi (the same for his once friend and colleague of the Heidelberg Circle, Ernst Bloc's *Principle of Hope* where the proletariat appears as the prophet) who has realized that the revolution-divine is not something objective, or some sort of an 'estranged other', but is to be found within the self's radical praxis—the praxis of revolution. Bloc saw the Russian Revolution as the installation of Christ as Emperor. See Michael Löwy, *Georg Lukács—From Romanticism to Bolshevism*, p. 53.
66. Ibid., p. 38. See also Georg Lukács, 'Stavrogin's Confession' and 'Dostoevsky: Novellas' in *Reviews and Articles from Die Rote Fahne*, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 183), pp. 44–51.
67. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The Holy Family* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 46.
68. Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (London: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 606.

Emergence of Consciousness Shows the Hardness of the Hard Problem of Consciousness

RAJAKISHORE NATH

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Powai, Mumbai 400076, India
E-mail: nath@his.iitb.ac.in

ABSTRACT

Emergentism is a non-computational and non-material theory of the mind, because this theory says that mind or consciousness emerges from material objects, but it will not be reduced to that matter. That is to say that the higher levels of quality emerge from a lower level of existence. It emerges therefrom, and does not belong to that level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existence with its special laws of behaviour. Thus, emergentism is an anti-reductionists' theory of the mind and has established the hardness of the problem of consciousness. The physicalistic theory of the mind in all its hues faces the question as to how we can account for the qualitative content of our consciousness. It cannot ultimately tell us how the subjective experience is possible and how consciousness can be real in the universe. The physicalistic view does not have any convincing answer to the question: how qualia are a necessary feature of consciousness?

I

Emergentism as a theory of the mind is compatible with the non-computational theory of the mind. According to emergentism, the higher-level quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that level, but gives rise to a new order of existence with special laws. Whereas Samuel Alexander says, 'the higher-level of quality emerges from the lower level of existence and have its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that

lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existence with its special laws of behaviour. The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the "natural piety" of the investigator. It admits no explanation'.[1] Here, emergence refers to the fact that in the course of evolution new things and events occur, with unexpected and unpredictable properties. Things and events are new in the sense in which a great work of art may be described as new. Every genuine emergence introduces novelty into the world. To say that an emergent characteristic is novel means that firstly, it is not simply a rearrangement of pre-existing elements, although such a rearrangement may be one of its determining conditions. Secondly, the characteristic is qualitatively—not just quantitatively—unlike anything that existed before in history. Thirdly, it is unpredictable not only on the basis of knowledge available prior to its emergence but also on the basis of an ideally complete knowledge of the state prior to its emergence. These points permit a distinction to be made between what is new in the sense of being a fresh combination of old factors and what is novel in the sense of being qualitatively unique and unpredictable.

II

In this article, we will find out how consciousness emerges from material properties, and how the emergent property of consciousness cannot be explained in a functional or computational way. Some philosophers argue that consciousness might be an emergent property, in the sense that it is still compatible with materialism. It is also often held that emergent properties are unpredictable from low-level properties. However, it can be argued that these properties are new in an ontological sense. What is interesting about these properties is that they are not obvious consequences of the low-level properties. But they are still causally supervenient on low-level facts.

Following the above argument, we can put forth the theory that the phenomenon of consciousness could rise only in the presence of some non-computational physical processes taking place in the

brain. As we know, living human brains are ultimately composed of the same material satisfying the same physical laws as are the inanimate objects of the universe.[2] There is the Cartesian view that consciousness arises only in humans, and that animals are inanimate automata; a view which is clearly pre-evolutionary. And we have reason to accept the view that there are lower and higher states of consciousness. Moreover, the most reasonable view seems to be that consciousness is an emergent property of animals arising under the pressure of natural selection. If this is so, then the question is: how does consciousness arise from antecedent conditions in the physical universe? This question still remains unanswered.

The observation of the behaviour of the amoeba created the strong impression that it is conscious. We can find symptoms of activity and initiative in its behaviour. Activity and behaviour is something different from what happens in the neurons. The human brain is estimated to have ten thousand million neurons, and there are also thousands of synaptic relations among neurons. But, the qualities which exist in consciousness are not found in the neuronal relations. There is a new emergent entity in consciousness which did not exist in the neurons, because the emergent properties of consciousness are ontologically new. The problem of emergence in this context starts with 'life' and it should be remembered that the 'brain' is not just a piece of inanimate matter, but a part of the 'living' body. As Daya Krishna remarks, 'it is not even clear whether those who want to deny the "reality" of consciousness want to deny the reality of "life" also. The "body" they talk about is a "living body"; the "brain" they are fond of is the brain that is "alive". Take "life" away and everything "dies", "ceases", at least as we "live" it and "feel" and "know" it.'[3] Here, Daya Krishna is trying to identify 'life' with 'consciousnesses'. Here, like consciousness, life also emerges from the human body and identifies itself (life) with consciousness. In fact, the problem of emergence of 'life' is a far wider one but here we are concerned with human 'life' only.

Now the question is: why is it that the phenomenon of consciousness appears to occur, as far as we know, only in 'living' beings, although we should not rule out the possibility that consciousness

might also be present in other appropriate physical systems? The second question is: how could it be that such a seemingly non-computational behaviour presumed to be inherent in the actions of all material things has so far entirely escaped the notice of physicists? The first question is related with the subtle and complex organization of the brain, but that alone could not provide a sufficient explanation. Penrose clearly writes, 'I am contending that the faculty of human understanding lies beyond any computational scheme what ever. If it is microtubules that control the activity of the brain, then there must be something within the action of microtubules that is different from mere computation.'[4] Here, Penrose says that this inanimate matter comprises microtubules that control the activity of the brain because there is life in it (brain). The action of microtubules is different from mere computation. He points out that such actions are non-computational actions wherein 'life' is related to consciousness.

The above statement leads to the question: is there any evidence that the phenomenon of consciousness is related to the action of microtubules in particular? It must also be the case that the detailed neural organization of the brain is fundamentally involved in governing what form the consciousness must take. For Penrose, if that organization were not important, then our livers would evoke as much consciousness as do our brains. He puts it thus, 'What the preceding arguments strongly suggest is that it is not just the neural organization of our brains that is important. The cytoskeletal underpinning of those very neurons seems to be essential for consciousness to be present.'[5] But it's not a cytoskeleton as such that is relevant, but some essential physical action that biology has so cleverly contrived to incorporate into the activity of its microtubules. Moreover, it may be pointed out that in our brain there is an enormous organization, and since consciousness appears to be a very global feature of our thinking, it seems that we must look to some kind of coherence on a much larger level than that of single microtubules or even single cytoskeletons. And there is some kind of useful non-computable action involved, which Penrose takes to be an essential part of consciousness. Secondly, we must expect that vestiges of such non-computability should also be present, at some indiscernible level, in inanimate matter. But as yet, the physics of ordinary matter seems to allow no room for such non-computable behaviour.

III

Jaegwon Kim, in his article on *Supervenience*, argued that there is a striking similarity between emergence and supervenience. According to Kim, 'higher-level properties notably consciousness and other mental properties, emerge when, and only when, an appropriate set of lower-level (basal conditions) are present, and this means that the occurrence of the higher properties is determined by, and dependent on, the instantiation of appropriate lower-level properties and relations. In spite of this, emergent properties were held to be "genuinely novel" characteristically irreducible to the lower level processes from which they emerge.'[6] Then, the concept of emergence combines the three components of supervenience delineated above, namely, property covariance, dependence, and non-reducibility. Thus, emergentism can be regarded as the first systematic formulation of non-reductive physicalism.

This thesis makes the mental life supervenient on its physical background. That is to say, according to this thesis, the mental states are not reducible to but are supervenient on the physical states in such a way that whatever changes take place in the physical states must make a difference to the mental states as well. No two things could differ in a mental respect unless they differed in some physical respect, i.e., imperceptibility with respect to physical properties entails indiscerniblity with respect to mental properties. That is the core idea of mind-body supervenience.

Thus, supervenience understood in the strong sense makes room for a nomological dependence of the mental on the physical in such a way that the physical states are necessarily responsible for the mental states. As Kim points out, one must notice that the mental is dependent on the physical but not vice versa, because the mental states are a direct consequence of the physical states. The mental states themselves do not determine the physical states. In that sense, the mental states remain nomologically dependent on the physical universe according to thesis of strong supervenience.

Kim, in his article on *The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Mental Causation*, mentions that the non-reductive physicalism consists of the following theses:

(i) All concrete particulars are physical.
(ii) Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
(iii) All mental properties are physically realized, i.e., whenever an organism, or system, instances a mental property M, there is a physical property P such that P realizes M in organisms of its kind.
(iv) Mental properties are real properties of objects and events; they are not merely useful aids in making predications or fictitious manners of speech.[7]

Therefore, we find that these four basic tenets bring non-reductive physicalism very close to 'emergentism'. In fact, non-reductive physicalism of this variety is best viewed as a form of emergentism. Emergentists in general accepted the purely materialist ontology of concrete physical objects and events. For example, Kim, following Samuel Alexander, one of the principal theoreticians of emergence school, argues that there are mental events over and above neural processes. Alexander says, 'We thus become aware, partly by experience, partly by reflection, that process with the distinctive quality of mind or consciousness is in the same place and time with a neural process, that is, with a highly differentiated and complex process of our living body. We are forced, therefore, to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with these neural processes and to identify them. There is but one process which, being of a specific complexity, has the quality of consciousness . . . It has then to be accepted as an empirical fact that a neural process of a certain level of development processes the quality of consciousness and is thereby mental processes; and, alternatively, a mental process is also a vital one of a certain order.'[8]

However, the emergentist doctrine that emergent properties are irreducible to the physical conditions out of which they emerge is familiar; this irreducibility claim is constitutive of the emergentists' metaphysical worldview. Although the emergentists' idea of reduction or reductive explanation diverges from the model of reduction implicit in current anti-reductionists' arguments, the philosophical significance of the denial of reducibility between two property levels is the same. The higher-level properties, being irreducible, are genuinely new addition to ontology of the world. For example,

Samuel Alexander says: 'Out of certain physiological conditions nature has framed a new quality mind, which is therefore not itself physiological though it lives and moves and has its being in physiological conditions. Hence it is that there can be and is an independent science of psychology... No physiological constellation explains to us why it should be mind.'[9]

The strong supervenience thesis does not bridge the gap between the mental and the physical because it fails to account for how the mental states with their qualitative content arise at all in a material environment. The gap between the physical and mental remains wide because it is not known how the mental world can be explained. Now the question is: Is it not possible that the mental life not be there even if the physical universe exists perfectly? That is to say, there are possible worlds in which all the physical states of the present universe are there but there is no conscious state at all. For example, robots behave like human beings but lack consciousness. The behaviour itself is not consciousness. And if consciousness is the same in all organisms, like material things, then there will be no qualitative difference between the human and non-human. Therefore, we cannot prove that consciousness is supervenient on the physical world.

John R. Searle[10] has offered an example, which will make the above thesis more legitimate. Suppose, we have a system S, and the elements of system are A, B, C,.... S might be a stone and the elements might be molecules. There will be features of S that are not, or not necessarily features of A, B, C... But there are some features which are 'causally emergent' system features. Solidity, liquidity and transparency are examples of causally emergent system features. In this connection, we should remind ourselves that 'life' is an 'emergent' property and if there were no 'life', there would be no consciousness either.[11] For example as we know water is the combination of two molecules pants of hydrogen and one postman molecule of oxygen. But there are qualitative differences between water on the one hand, and the hydrogen and oxygen on the other. The qualities which we find in the water, will not be found in the oxygen and hydrogen. In the same way, there is a difference between consciousness and matter because there is a qualitative difference between the two. The qualities which emerge from consciousness

will not make it possible to explain in the mechanical/functional way, but it needs a separate explanation, and its explanation is non-reductive explanation, that is, self-explanation.

The above definition shows that consciousness is a causally emergent property of systems. It is an emergent feature of creation of systems of neurons in the same way that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of the system of molecules. Thus, the existence of consciousness can be explained by the causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level, but consciousness itself cannot be deduced or calculated from the sheer physical structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causal relations between them.

Now the question is: Why is consciousness an irreducible feature of physical reality? There is a standard argument to show that consciousness is not reducible in the way that material qualities are. For example, I am now in a certain conscious state such as pain. Now the question is: What fact in the world corresponds to my statement, 'I am now in pain'? Here is the fact that I have now certain unpleasant conscious sensations, and I am experiencing these sensations from my experience. It is these sensations that are constitutive of my present pain. But the pain is also caused by certain underlying neurophysiologic processes consisting in a large part of patterns of neuron firing in my brain. If we reduce the first-person sensation of pain to the third-person pattern of neuron firing, then we try to say that the pain is really 'nothing but' the patterns of neuron firings.[12] If this is so, then we are leaving aside the essential features of pain. No description of the third-person type would convey the first-person character of pain because the first-person features are different from the third-person features. Nagel states this point by contrasting the objectivity of the third-person features with the what-it-is-like features of the subjective states of consciousness. As Nagel points out, 'Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it... no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism ... But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism.'[13] Thus, I know that I am in pain is a different sort of knowledge than my knowledge of you being in pain.

The feeling of pain indicates that there is a close relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. This is due to the emergence of self-consciousness out of consciousness and, thus, making it radically different from what is it, if it is at all human levels. But Daya Krishna[14] remarks that the development of robotics denies the reality of consciousness because of this 'self-consciousness' knowledge have 'self-determination' and deny the existence of mind or consciousness. This 'self-consciousness' has forgotten its dimension of 'knowing', 'feeling', and 'willing', the last resulting in the transformations through technology that has obsessed the modern mind to such an extent that it has gone to the extent of denying its own reality and considering the 'matter' alone as 'real'. But yet matter, though being resistant, is flexible, agreeable to change, which consciousness does not seem to be in the same sense. The denial of 'I-consciousness' is an inevitable accompaniment of self-consciousness. Thus, Daya Krishna remarks, 'The "real" causal role of consciousness, however, becomes clear when self-consciousness comes into its own and discovers that it can directly affect consciousness, and indirectly everything else through imaging, intending, thinking, attending, concentrating, reasoning and the other myriad activities which man has encountered in himself and developed through a long process....'[15]

IV

Therefore, from the above exploration, it follows that once consciousness emerges from physical properties, it will never be reduced to it. This shows that emergentism cannot support functionalism or computationalism, because a functionalist explains consciousness or mind in the reductive way, whereas an emergentist explains consciousness in a non-reductive way. Consciousness makes the mind-body problem really intractable. The reductionist shows that the mind-body problem is not a real problem. For them, there is no explanatory gap between mind and body. We have to find out why these arguments do not help us to understand the relation

between mind and body. Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be less interesting, but with consciousness it seems hopeless.

The tough problem of consciousness is that of experience, especially for a first-person character which cannot be explained within a scientific framework. Cognitive science can explain a system's functions in terms of its internal mechanism. But it is not possible to explain what it is to have subjective experiences, because it is not a problem about the performance of fractions. As Nagel argues, 'Conscious experience is wide spread phenomenon ... fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.'[16] In recent times, all sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific explanation, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted this explanation. Many philosophers and scientists have tried to explain it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Now the question is: Why is it so difficult to explain? According to Chalmers, cognitive science has not explained why there is conscious experience at all. When we think and perceive, there is a spate of information processing, but there are also subjective individual aspects of consciousness, which go beyond the information processing.

Chalmers writes, 'When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes this problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, not even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioural functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?'[17] According to him, even if all the functions of a system are well articulated, there is further question as to why there is any experience at all accompanying their function. Cognitive science fails to explain why there is any experience at all, even though it explains all the brain functions.

According to Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists in the 'why' questions regarding consciousness. But the questions remain: Why is the 'hard' problem so hard? And why are the easy

problems so easy? The easy problems are easy because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need a mechanism that can perform the function. The cognitive sciences offer this type of explanation and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness. On the other hand, the 'hard' problem is 'hard', because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained. Chalmers says, 'I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new non-physical feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is 'hard' to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.'[18]

The reductionists have not solved the 'hard' problem of consciousness because, as we have seen, they have explained consciousness only in terms of the 'easy' problem of consciousness. Easy problems are all concerned with how a cognitive or behavioural function is performed. These are questions about how the brain carries out the cognitive task, that is, how it discriminates stimuli, integrates information, and so on, whereas, the hard problem of consciousness goes beyond the problems about how functions are performed. If a scientific view of the mind tries to give a definite definition of consciousness then it leaves out the explanatory gap, that is, there is no explanatory gap between mind and body. Because there is no distinction between mind and body. The mind can be explained in terms of body, and there is nothing called the mind, since the mind itself is a part of the body. If this is so, then it leaves out subjective experience, and opts for the third-person perspective of consciousness.

Consciousness makes the mind-body problem really intractable. The reductionists deny that there is a mind-body problem at all. For them, there is no explanatory gap between mind and body.

Again, because there is no distinction between mind and body, the mind can be explained in terms of body, and there is nothing called the mind, since the mind itself is a part of the body. Therefore, for them, the mind is reductively explainable in terms of the body. On the other hand, many philosophers hold that mental states are not reducible to any physical state(s). That is, the mental states are not reductively explainable. Chalmers argues that no reductive explanation of consciousness can succeed, because there is subjective quality of experience. Therefore, he argues that this quality of consciousness makes it different from all other properties, including emergent biological properties such as life.[19]

The essence of the body is spatial extension, the essence of mind is thought. Thought is taken to be the defining attributes of mind which is an incorporeal substance, a substance that is non-spatial in nature. He writes, 'By the term "thought", I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it.'[20] What follows from Descartes' view is that consciousness is essentially a first-person, subjective phenomena, and conscious states cannot be reduced or eliminated into third-person. Therefore, it is consciousness, which makes the explanatory gap between the first-person and third-person perspective. According to the Cartesian concept of mind, we have access to the contents of our own minds in a way denied to us in respect to matter. There is something special about our own knowledge of our own minds that naturally goes with the Cartesian view.

Pradhan argues that the mental life, with its qualia, cannot be nomologically determined by the physical conditions of the universe. The following are the reasons for the thesis that the mental life is independent of the physical body, though they co-exist: '(A). The qualia of the mental states cannot be reproduced in an artificial machine like a robot or a machines table; they are unique to the person concerned. (B). The qualia are the essence of consciousness and so must be intrinsic to the conscious subjects.'[21] Thus Pradhan concludes that the intelligibility gap between the qualia and the physical world remains, as the qualia are understood widely as belonging to the conscious subjects.

Consciousness makes the gap between the mind and the body, and 'subjectivity' is its most troublesome feature. Self is the subject,

which encompasses our feelings, thinking, and perception. The qualitative character of experience is what it is like for its subject to have the experience. As Nagel puts it, 'Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it... no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism... But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism.'[22]

As we have seen, subjectivity cannot be explained reductively. Again, as Nagel argues, 'It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since they could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.'[23] There is a subjective feeling attached to our conscious experience because subjective feelings are the outcome of our conscious experience. That is, consciousness itself cannot be established simply on the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects. We cannot explain which property of the brain accounts for consciousness. Distinct cognitive properties, namely perception and introspection, necessarily mediate our relationships with the brain and with consciousness. We cannot understand how the subjective aspects of experience depend upon the brain that is really the problem.

Consciousness is essentially subjective because this is not a mechanical state, as many philosophers believe, but it is 'I' or 'subject' who experience consciousness. Some of these biological systems are conscious and that consciousness is essentially subjective. The term 'pain' is subjective as it is not accessible to any observer, because it is a first-person experience. For example, I have a pain in my leg. In this case, the statement is completely subjective. The 'pain' itself has a subjective mode of existence. As Searle puts it, 'Conscious states exist only when they are experienced by some human or animal subject. In that sense, they are essentially subjective. I used to treat subjectivity and qualitativeness as distinct features, but it now seems to me that properly understood, qualitativeness implies subjectivity, because in order for there to be a qualitative

feel to some event, there must be some subject that experiences the event. No subjectivity, no experience.'[24]

That is to say that the qualitative experience can exist only as experience some subjects. Because conscious states are subjective in this sense, it is legitimate to hold that there is first-person ontology, as opposed to the third-person ontology of mountains and molecules, which can exist even when there are no living creatures. Therefore, subjective conscious states have first-person ontology because they exist only when they are experienced by a subject as self. It is 'I' who has experience and in this sense, it has the subjective existence. This gap between the self and the body not only establishes an explanatory gap, but also gives the ontology of first-person subjectivity. Therefore, the 'subjectivity' or 'I' is the central problem of the explanatory gap. Cognitive science tries to explain how conscious experience arises from the electrical process of the brain. But it cannot show how and why conscious states belong to the 'subject' or 'I'. This qualitative feature of mental states brings the existence of qualia, which are the qualitative experiences of the human mind.[25]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My sincere thanks and regards to my supervisor Professor R.C. Pradhan for his constant guidance and for helping me to improve the philosophical quality of my article. All the errors, if any, are mine.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Alexander, S., 'Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. II' (London: Macmillan, 1920), quoted by Brian P. McLaughlin 'Emergentism', in *The MIT Encyclopedia of The Cognitive Science,* Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil (Eds), (Cambridge, Massachusetts.: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 267.
2. Penrose, Roger, *Shadows of the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 216.
3. Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective* (Revised & Enlarged Edition) (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, Indian Books Centre, 2006), pp. 435-37.
4. Penrose, Roger, *Shadows of the Mind,* p. 667.
5. Ibid., p. 371.

6. Kim, Jaegwon, 'Supervenience' in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.* Samuel Gutterplan (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000), pp. 576-77.
7. Kim, Jaegwon, 'The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Mental Causation' in *Mental Causation,* John Heil and Alfred Mele (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 198.
8. Alexander, S., 'Space, Time and Deity, Vol. II' (London: Macmillan, 1927), 2nd Edition, quoted by Jaegwon Kim, in his 'The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Mental Causation' in *Mental Causation,* John Heil and Alfred Mele (eds.), p. 198.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. Searle, John R., *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994), p. 111.
11. Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective* (Revised & Enlarged Edition), p. 493.
12. Searle, John R., *The Rediscovery of the Mind,* p. 117.
13. Nagel, Thomas, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat' in *The Nature of Consciousness,* Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guiven Guzeldere (eds.) (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 519.
14. Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective* (Revised & Enlarged Edition), p. 448.
15. Ibid., p. 462.
16. Nagel, Thomas, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat' in *The Nature of Consciousness,* Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Guiven Guzeldere (eds.), p. 519.
17. Chalmers, David J., 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness' in *Explaining Consciousness: The 'Hard Problem',* Jonathan Shear (ed.) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 12.
18. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
19. Chalmers, David J., *The Conscious Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 48.
20. Descartes, Rene, *The Philosophical Writing of Descartes,* Vol. I, Cottingham, John, Stoothoff, Robert, Murdoch, Dougald (ed. and trans.) (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 195.
21. Pradhan, R.C., 'Why Qualia Cannot be Quined' in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* Vol. XIX, No. 2, April-June 2002, p. 97.
22. Nagel, Thomas, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' in *The Nature of Consciousness,* Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Guiven Guzeldere (eds.), p. 519.
23. Ibid.
24. Searle, John R., *Consciousness and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 40.
25. I thank Professor Daya Krishna (Editor, JICPR) for his valuable suggestions and comments on my article.

Anirvacanīyatā: Recasting the Advaitic Assertion

N. USHA DEVI

Selection Grade Lecturer in Sanskrit (Vedanta), Sree Sankara College, Kalady-683 574, Ernakulam District, Kerala

ABSTRACT

The primary aim of this article is to explicate the concept of *anirvacanīyatā* that invariably represents the foundational receptive faculty of knowledge in its expressed as well as *a priori* modes according to Advaita Vedānta. In a more general context, *anirvacanīyatā* refers to 'indefinability'—*whatever can be said can be expressed, all else remain indefinable.* But, for Advaita Vedānta, *anirvacanīyatā* requires a clarification of its fundamental concepts that have been dealt with the imperative of 'in-determinability, indefinability or unknowability and indistinguishability' without puzzling on its non-dualistic coneptualization about the Reality. The paradox of *anirvacanīyatā* rests on the conceptions of truth and error in human mind. However, the common exegesis on this concept is applicable to the premise of *avidyā* (error, *mithyājñāna, avabhāsa* and illusion) that is an indefinable (as existent or non-existent) proposition. But a deeper penetration into the *anirvacanīyatā* necessarily brings in its correlates such as indeterminability, unknowability and indistinguishability into the arena of falsity in understanding the Reality.

To begin with, the basic unit of argument is cognition. According to Advaita, a cognition results in immediacy of knowledge and that is identity of *Ātman* with Brahman. The issue here is: how can a truth value be assigned to such a cognition? Given that truth value is independent of everything else, cognition must have a definitive subject. Here, Brahman is neither subject nor object, but is beyond that and this raises several problems—Indeterminability' of cognitive content; 'indefinability' of the relational aspect (cognitive content and cognition); and 'Indistin-

guishability' of error in truth. These three have different contextual connotations in Advaita Vedānta. Hence, there occurs a necessity of analyzing the above three premises in ontological, metaphysical and epistemological grounds. Ontology presupposes *a priori* and this cannot come under the constitution of subjectivity that is a necessary prerequisite for metaphysics as well the cognition. Here, *a priori* never falls under the category of determinacy, whereas its expression is the content of cognition. The difference between *jñāna* as expressed and *Cit* pure consciousness as *a priori* seemingly becomes inevitable in the philosophical discipline of Advaita Vedānta for a better explication of its non-dualistic conceptualizations. The imperative is that the *a priori* becomes expressed by/in a way through *Māyā*, the indefinable 'something' in the context of the indeterminable or unknowable *a priori*—Brahman. The epistemological emphasis on *avidyā* as disjunctive *something*, the causality, is a mental construct and as such cannot be squeezed into a straightforward definition of *anirvacanīyatā* that is a special concept aiming to rectify the falsity of notion on Reality and its causative function. But its dubious role in falsifying the knowledge cannot be unaccountable and this has relevance in the context of its *anirvacanīyatā*. In spite of all these critical resolutions, any disagreement on Advaitic non-dualism will become illegitimate, for, the principle of coherence will never allow bracketing normative validity claims on the Truth.

The present endeavour examines the deep-rooted problem of *anirvacanīyatā*, indicating the indefinability factor that has acquired greater prominence in the system of Advaita Vedānta with a view to establish the non-dual essence of all to which the whole perceived universe is reduced to in the final analysis. Metaphysics, presupposing the generally invisible criteria and their subsequent dispositions will, in turn, get justified only when it suits to the intellectual faculties of man within a framework of experience. Considering this basic necessity, Advaita bestows the element of 'experience' with prime concern in the rightful formulation and development of its peculiar metaphysics that penetrates into the depth of human existence. Hence, every division of experience is specifically treated here with their actual relevance for understanding the true impact it generates in man and its real mission.

The term *anirvacanīyatā* appears mainly in the contextual premise of *avidyā*. An inquiry concerning the domain of essential causative determination regarding the nature of *anirvacanīyatā* centres on the notion of its referent 'Brahman', the Absolute principle of existence. According to Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is Consciousness and also Non-dual. The world comes out of this and redeems into this Unity of Existence. The causal factor is *avidyā* that gets sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. The significance of the proposition lies in the fact that Consciousness is related to the world in a peculiar relation in the form of 'something' that is conceived as indeterminate. Neither does it conform to the subjective nor to the objective one. In the so-called phenomenalization of the Noumenon, *avidyā* as the causal factor gets accorded right precedence over other inquiries that reveal this transformation. But this attempt has to overcome some hitherto unattended paradoxes in *anirvacanīyatā*. These paradoxes are connected with the distinctions in the concepts of *Māyā* and *Avidyā*; the unmanifest consciousness and its manifest counterpart as well the distinction among the individuality and the universality. This article reflects on these three aspects to understand the implication of *anirvacanīyatā*.

The basic premise of argument on which *anirvacanīyatā* rests is the cognitive content. The identity of cognition and its content is a debatable issue as far as advaita metaphysics is concerned. The Ontological consideration must be given an appropriate place within the philosophical discipline of Advaita Vedānta so as to ensure its Non-dualistic approach to Reality. The author has given sufficient attention to this fact not to derecognize the advaita understanding but to clear certain doubts in this regard.

ANIRVACANĪYATĀ—ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS

The dogma that the Ultimate Reality is unknowable in its true sense is the main reason behind proposing the notion of *anirvacanīya*. The term in its true purport implies 'indeterminacy', 'unknowability' or 'inexpressibility' of something. The term is mainly used by Advaitins. However, the first clear exposition on *anirvacanīyatā* can be traced to Maṇḍana Miśra, a contemporary of Śri Śankara.[1] The term is used to explain the nature of manifestation of the world through *Māyā* (Illusion).

An investigation into the premise of *anirvacanīyatā* reveals that its distinguishing mark is not projected to make explicit the clear purport of the thing as this or that. It can either be one or both or even something distinct from these. The spontaneity of knowledge (as against sense-perceptibility) is a difficult proposition for which the term is actually proposed in philosophy. In this sense, it closes on to the notion of its essentiality (*a priori*). Though it cannot be fruitful in inquiring into the contextual basis of *anirvacanīyatā*, it is a methodological way of understanding the possibility of a real essence. In particular, it brings in all kinds of object-relatedness in a peculiar way. So, *anirvacanīyatā* applies to the constitution of the object from the subjective standpoint. This premise is, however, in a strict sense, occupied with the subjective element as that only is beyond the sense perception. The Upaniṣads and the Advaitins rightly call it *Māyā* or Illusion. From this viewpoint, it can be understood that terminologically, the transformative process of the subjective into the objective is *māyā* or, otherwise, *anirvacanīya.* But there is another context wherein the *anirvacanīyatā* is referred to for the Avidyā or false knowledge. In this context, the issue pertains to whether *avidyā* is existent or non-existent. The traditional thinking that the Subject is the Absolute and Infinitude makes it impossible to define. This is one ontological dimension of *anirvacanīyatā.* The premise of transformative process is another context. In this case, the real issue pertains to whether this *avidyā/māyā* that is the causal transformative agency is existent or not.

Viewed in this manner, the problem of *anirvacanīyatā* can be analyzed from three contextual premises:

(1) It refers to the expressibility or inexpressibility of *Avidyā* or *Māyā.*
(2) It refers to the identity or difference correlate with Brahman.
(3) It refers to the truth or falsity notion as seen from the epistemological dimension.

The problem assumes crucial importance with the recognition of the unconditioned Brahman as absolute and its distinction from the conditioned one as another entity of lesser Reality. While the Advaitins may contend that there is no difference whatsoever in these two, at least in the context of ontological premise of Consciousness, a difference has to be accepted, because 'knowledge' implies manifest consciousness. In case one does not recognize this distinction among the manifest and the unmanifest Brahman, one will have to find difference-in-identity in Brahman which it is not. But whatever factor one may choose to differentiate the two, that becomes difficult to be evidenced as there is nothing second to it. In this sense, what we may express as Brahman is the manifest or the Expressive form of that Absolute Unmanifest entity.

The theory of *anirvacanīyatā* is a sequitur to the Vijñānavādins' argument that Brahman as eternal knowledge, liberation requires no further knowledge to be produced and hence nothing like *avidyā* needs to be stopped. If *avidyā* is not the essence (*svabhāva*) of Brahman, then a second entity has to be admitted which does not fit into the scheme of advaitic non-dualism. Another question that is posed is: if *avidyā* is not distinct from Brahman, does it not have the same eternality as that of Brahman? In this case, *avidyā* cannot be stopped. Countering this argument, Maṇdana says that '*Avidyā* is not the essence of Brahman, nor is it another thing, not absolutely existent nor non-existent. It is for this reason that it is refered to as *anirvacanīya.*'[1] Again, to say that knowledge (Consciousness) appears as such one has to accept its object, for the reason that form of the thing known is only the external appearance. Further, if *avidyā* is non-existent, the knowledge cannot appear as external and any activity will be denied. In this sense, *avidyā* is *māyā* and is 'inexpressible'.

A distinctive feature of Maṇdana's theory is that at least in the ontological premise the notion of *anirvacanīyatā* stands for that which is neither completely real nor unreal. This is so because a real thing cannot be ended and that which is said to differentiate the real is only a false notion getting sublated when such a notion is removed. Such a logical necessity brings in the two-truth theory as proposed by the Advaita Vedānta—the absolute truth or the *Paramārtha* and the *Vyavahāra.* The Mahāyāna Buddhists also accept such a view. Therefore, the only alternative left for the existence of the world is to accept *avidyā* as *anirvacanīya.* Bhartṛhari uses this inexpressibility relation calling it *anākhyeya* (inexplicable), indicating the inexplicable as identical or different from the Self

(knowledge).[2] For Maṇḍana, it is '*tattvānyatvābhyām sattvāsattvābhyām anirvacanīya*'. Śankara points out that *avidyā* cannot be non-existent as it will become superior to Brahman. Its existence cannot be denied altogether as it is the causal factor. He uses it in the sense of *māyā*, a *śakti* (seminal power) of Brahman which he identifies as *nāma-rupa–prakrti*, a primordial substance of the world. This *śakti* is *avidyātmaka* (of the nature of *avidyā*) or *avidyākalpita* (emerged out of *avidyā*). The right term that can be used for this is 'unreal' rather than indescribable. The inexpressibility concept is also found in the doctrine of Śabdabrahman.[3] But it is important to note that while Maṇḍana and others use *anirvacanīyatā* in the metaphysical category, Śankara uses it in the cosmological context only. For this reason *avidyā* is distinguished from *māyā* by Śankara, though variants to this view become explicit in the latter advaita thinking. A deeper enquiry on Śankara's understanding of the problem of *anirvacanīyatā* brings forth his intention that even if the causality of relation between the real and the unreal is illusory, it cannot be negated altogether as the illusory objects exist as far as the illusion persists. What makes Śankara adhere to the principle of *anirvacanīyatā* of the transition of the real into the unreal is that there is no possible alternative to *avidyā* as in-definability, since all presumed alternatives will end in *infinite de regress* only. Maṇḍana has the same opinion—'while diversity of name and form cannot be said to be "formed" or based on *avidyā*',[4] but simply *avidyā*. Also, '*avidyā*, even though it is expressible, will not cease to be *avidyā* since it makes the form of one thing appear as belonging to another.'[5] But if one delves deeper into the difference in the doctrines of Śankara and Maṇḍana, it becomes clear that Śankara tries to assert the views of Advaitins prior to Maṇḍana who makes some bold attempts to explain the dogmatic problem of the transcendental nature of *avidyā* as distinct from the empirical one. The Advaitins had rather called the empirical *avidyā* as *vibhrama* and *avidyā* proper for the transcendental one. Maṇḍana finds no distinction between these two.[6] Śankara, however, subscribes to the transcendental nature (*bījaśakti*) that remains indistinguishable in the identity-in-non-difference (*abheda*). Applying the logic of '*tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīya*', the difference as indescribable comes only in the purview of the metaphysical category of thought and, hence, identity with or difference from something can be said

to be a mental construct rather than actuality of proposition. Again, difference as a mental construct is based on prior or beginningless mental constructions. If difference has a positive form, then only a thing can have difference; otherwise, it cannot exist in reality. But mental construction can make it appear. In the case of the Absolute, difference does not exist because oneness never allows such a difference. Therefore, *bheda* is *anirvacanīya* and is a result of *avidyā*. This does not imply that there exists a third truth apart from the *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra*.

Despite the claim by Śankara that the universality of *avidyā* is subjective to experience, its sublation leads to Brahman, the universal Consciousness. Critiques question Śankara's views about the source of *avidyā* in Brahman which, according to them, is alleged to be a duality of proposition (identity–in-difference). While acknowledging such a possibility, Śankara expresses it as an ontological determinability and it is not questionable in such a premise and he simply remains silent. The intention of this silence is nothing but in-determinability of analytic versions of such a complex proposition. The moot point here is that when one metamorphoses into Brahman, nothing else except Brahman remains and this dismantles the inexorability of *avidyā* automatically. So, *avidyā* in the ontological level is in-separably or indeterminably 'integral' to Brahman and, hence, it is inexplicable as whether existent or non-existent.

To explain the rational complexities involved in the notion of *anirvacanīyatā*, it is necessary to analyze the problem from the three premises—Ontological, Metaphysical and Epistemological. The first category is based on the centrality of *avidyā* as existent or non-existent. The second strand follows the identity or distinctness proposition of *avidyā* from the Brahman. The third one is centered on the empirical or epistemological necessity as *vibhrama*. A review of these contextual paradoxes of *anirvacanīyatā* agreeably based on the above three premises may possibly bring in some new directions to the problems of *anirvacanīyatā*.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATIONS IN THE NON-RELATIONAL REALITY

The issue of relationship between the non-physical, non-spatial, timeless one would never come at all within the realm of the

physical, spatial and time-determinate. Even any kind of metaphysical experience, claimed as absolute oneness with the Absolute or Brahman, cannot be the ultimate one, for any, experience is related to the 'appearing' or manifested being, not the un-manifest absolute. Given that experience of 'something' is had only in the physical, spatio-temporal 'another', how can there be absolute oneness? Also, in the case of *māyā* or *avidyā* lying within the premise of ontological category, it can be possible for the absolute only to stop the manifestation through the *māyā* or *avidyā*. This is what some of the later Advaitins tried to disclose through the two-fold nature of *avidyā—mūlāvidyā* and *tūlāvidyā*. The first one refers to the fundamental error or to be better called *Māyā* for it is the actual illusory or concealing power and this is difficult to understand. The second category is the projective power through which the world is created. This is also secondary to *mūlāvidyā*. In this perspective, it can be said that the 'appearance' of the reality becomes associated with this *tūlāvidyā* projecting the apparent world of multiplicity; the unmanifested being is untouched.

Now, to express the unmanifested Being is beyond the possibility. For, this unconditioned cannot be said as either existent or non-existent, neither one nor many, neither unity, because there is nothing except it, nor diversity (*vibhakta*) as it is non-dual, neither changing nor changeless, neither something nor nothing according to Bhartṛhari. The indecisiveness or unknowability of Brahman is expressed by Radhakrishnan as 'who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence was this created? The Gods came later than this creation, who then knows where it arose?.... He from whom the creation arose, whether He made it or did not make it, is the highest seer in the highest heaven, He forsooth, knows or does even He not know.[7] Further to review Wittgenstein, the contemporary philosopher of the West, the following words acquire significance: 'Not *how* the world is the mystical but *that it is.*'[8] This is the *anirvacanīyatā* of the ontological reality or Absolute. To analyze the purpose of realization, it exposes the illusoriness of the world appearance and thereby the knowledge of the reality. But what is presented is subjugated to the effects of *māyā* and never *māyā* itself. Māyā is inevitable; hence its *anirvacanīyatā* poses problems for the clear understanding of it, which means difficulty in understanding the absolute.

In the ontological resolution of 'limitations' of knowledge, the Advaitins' concern is about the 'possibility' of knowledge, i.e., 'what it appears' as in cognition. It is the subjective essence. The 'actuality' is still beyond any subjective proposition and never comes in the purview of cognition. But it cannot be denied even as denial will result in denial of this 'possibility' itself which must have a ground of existence. Consciousness, according to Advaitins is non-attributive and, therefore, remains empirically indeterminable; hence it is 'actuality'. Knowledge, as its subsistence depends on some extrinsic factor—the Mind (*vrtti* the mental mode), it is not independent. Consciousness, therefore, is the 'actuality' whereas knowledge is the 'possibility'. In this sense, what Wittgenstein proposes is that 'all that can be said about reality is "how reality is" and nothing can be said about "what reality is".'[9] Immanuel Kant also expresses the same view that Noumenon is unknowable.

Given the 'indeterminability' of the 'actuality', the account of indeterminability of *avidyā/māyā* has relevant certainty, for, there cannot be any knowledge of the unknowable. It can be said as 'however it comes into existence'. For Śankara, the 'what' of Reality is insignificant in the empirical realm or is outside the bound of cognitive knowledge, infinite and simply is 'Brahman' as inclusive of everything and included in all.

So, from the ontological perspective, what *anirvacanīyatā* implies is that it is the indeterminability of the infinite as this or that, existent or non-existent, either one or many. It can be said as only non–dual. There is a peculiar identity within this non-dual that is ever unknowable.

THE THEORY OF *ANADHIGATA*

The term *anadhigata* simply refers to that which comes in the purview of what is characterized by *ajñāna* and that which is positive in nature. This implies that *anadhigata* is the *a priori* of *ajñāna* that exists in the moment before the sense organ starts functioning. According to Brahmānanda Saraswati, the world is proved to be false (*mithyā*) on the ground that it is perceivable.[10] The two functions of *ajñāna*—one veiling the object and causing the notion that the object is not at all present (*asatvāpādaka*) and the other preventing the revelation of the object, thereby bringing the no-

tion that the object is unmanifest (*abhānāpādaka*).[11] In erroneous cognition, the prior existence of ajñāna creates the notion that the object itself does not exist. What then is the nature of *a priori ajñāna*? Such an *a priori ajñāna* is unknowable or indescribable (*anirvacanīya*).

From the Advaitic perspective, there is an identity posited between *ajñāna* or *avidyā* and Brahman in the absolute sense. If *ajñāna* is completely sublated in realization, where is the case or necessity of identity-in-difference in the identity-in-unity concept? This brings in the non-occurrence of *ajñāna* or *avidyā* in Brahman. Such a contextual issue leads to the fact that *ajñāna* has a ground of its existence that, nevertheless, is *māyā*. From the empirical premise, this seems more realistic. *Māyā* then becomes indefinable certitude like the Absolute.

Ajñāna then becomes a mental construct that will be sublated by *jñāna*.

THE METAPHYSICAL RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Knowability is dependent on a subjective enterprise. This necessarily brings in a connection between the subjective and the knowing category. This is where Advaitins find a distinction between knowledge, the knower and the known. What makes the subjective from the beyond subjective one is ascribed to nothing else than the *Māyā*—the indefinable something. It is the transcendental illusion—transcendental in the sense that it is indescribable. It is the self-manifestation of Brahman that makes the implicit as explicit. This transcendental illusion is distinct from the empirical in the sense that in the later case illusion completely disappears when the reality of objects is recognized. In the former case, illusion persists as impressions though it is claimed to be completely disposed of. Māyā in its true sense cannot be dispelled off but by Brahman.

Why metaphysics is preferred over ontology in Advaita Vedānta is a vexed problem. However, it can be argued that as ontology is purely the premise of the absolute non-dual; in the empirical context, it is of lesser requirement. Metaphysics, as it is concerned with the subjective enterprise or the so-called 'expressed reality', gives more perfection to sensual experience as unity of existence beyond the normal objective experience. Further, metaphysics deals

with the fullness or wholeness of the reality or the knowable principle. Cognizance gives the inner essence as identity with this being. It finds the relational aspect of this being with the world.

To go through the metaphysical perspective of Advaitins, it necessarily requires an entity that can be judged through cognition. This has brought down the Absolute to that of the 'appearing' (expressed) level. Does this mean that the absolute appears in its entirety? Surely, indeterminable is the nature of appearance. The obstacle is nothing other than the inevitable *māyā*. But it is characteristic of the Advaita metaphysics that through the cognition of a wholeness of the appearing reality, a peculiar kind of identity is had that requires no further efforts to the oneness with the Absolute. The only requirement is a continuity of persistence in that state of knowledge awaiting 'Non-Dualism' at the end of the cycle (dissolution) enjoying the supreme state of happiness. On this account, it can be said that this state represents the ground of preparation for the transcendental non-dualism. The unity of experience that cognition represents is entitled to the self-manifested entity that appears as 'Brahman', not the non-dual absolute that is the indeterminate proposition from any empirical means. Ontology, on the other hand, is directed towards the transcendental being, purely infinite, wholeness. The 'possibility of experience' is then, what gives subjective reality to the non-subjective or non-objective one, in cognition. In this sense, knowledge which is manifested in cognition is distinct from the Absolute that is Consciousness.

To link the indeterminate Consciousness to the determinate cognitive knowledge through the idea of identity can be thought of as a possibility not in the sense that it is the relation between illusory world and the cognitive reality but is in the metaphysical sense of expressed (manifested) reality and its *a priori* condition of un-manifest state. Regarding the cognitive reality, it can be said that it is the sufficient condition that justifies all unity in the form of knowledge that is meant for liberation. This calls for explanation with regard to the possibility of error (*avidyā*) in the cognitive reality as this *avidyā* has to be ascribed to some *a priori* content. In the metaphysical *a priori* deduction, it is indeterminate (*anirvacanīyā*), for, error cannot be said as belonging to such a

cognitive reality. Moreover, *avidyā* is a mental construct rather than a constitutive aspect of the reality. How *avidyā* is brought into play needs a metaphysical explanation. From the subjective standpoint, *avidyā* then becomes indeterminate in the sense that whether it exists or not whereas in the objective view it is only a mental construct that is characterized as illusory that brings in false notion about reality. Whatever may be the apprehension regarding the constitutive aspect of *avidyā*, it is produced through the inner or mental causes. Herein, the latter Advaitins' distinction between the *mūlāvidyā* and *tūlāvidyā* requires much attention as there is a clear difference observed between these two. This has to be judged in the sense that the latter is the metaphysical indeterminate proposition. What is relevant here is that *tūlāvidyā* is sublated when the cognitive knowledge is had, while *mūlāvidyā* cannot be.

Now, to re-examine the notion of causation it can be said that 'intentional causation' (will) is subjective rather the beyond implying that the metaphysical reality is the *a priori* of causation. Hence, in determining the constituent aspect of the causation, it is necessary to look into the correlate of *avidyā* which influences the causation. The conflicting opinions about the nature of *avidyā* as both known and unknown are solvable in the metaphysical context. The correlate that is the mental construct is knowable while the unknown category is the ontological premise and is indeterminate (*māyā*-illusion).

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL (CONTEXTUAL) ISSUE OF IN-DETERMINABILITY

The epistemological ground of Advaitic thought is centered on the concept of *Ātman*—the inner essence of all beings as non-different from the Brahman. The basis of truth lies in its immediate self-certainty that is devoid of all effectual causes. For this, Advaita proposes validity of knowledge gained through Vedic texts which alone can give a correct knowledge of the nature of Reality. As these texts are believed to be superhuman (*apauruṣeya*), revelations in the sense of extraordinarily experienced facets of the eternal principle of Reality, they are to be examined with a deeper concern of reasoning for the dispensation of false understanding regarding the universe as well as one's own self. An epistemological

inquiry begins with these already ascertained truths which form an integral part of experience. What Advaita means by the epistemological analysis is that the 'real' is brought to experience through an endeavour in which the approximation to the real is first claimed as a determinant of real, by the removal of the veil of ignorance on knowledge and then through that, the approximation becomes real by its own.

Now, to reconsider the uniqueness of perception in which truth and falsity, real and unreal, knowledge and ignorance are distinctively identified in inner experience, it requires an orientation towards the inner essence called *Ātman*—the pure subjectivity. The real stands for the unsublated (*abādhita*) and that which becomes sublated is non-real in perception. There is another category called unreal that is neither sublated nor non-sublated. It is to this unique category that *anirvacanīyatā* is applied. It is used in the sense of 'indeterminableness' of the erroneous apprehension (*mithyājñāna*). In *mithyājñāna*, something is apprehended as something else. It is for this *mithyājñāna* that the term *avidyā* is used by Śankara. According to this belief, illusory objects exist in the context of error and these get sublated when the error in knowledge gets sublated by the experience of reality in cognition. Erroneous apprehension, thus, becomes part of the mental *vrtti*, because *vrtti* conditions the knowledge. The criterion of sublatability is in-determinability; that means *mithyātva* is indeterminable. The crucial question then is: where from does this *avidyā* arise to get associated with the mental *vrtti*? Again, does there be many *avidyās*?

From an epistemic analysis of the error (*avidyā*), it can be said that as a mental *vrtti*, *avidyā* must be numerous as there are a number of souls. In this case, the ground of its existence must only be one; otherwise, the question of one world will become irrelevant. The fact that one *avidyā* becomes many points out to an indeterminacy of *avidyā*, for *avidyā* creates misapprehensions about further determinacy of *avidyā*.

Advaita Vedānta makes an important observation on the nature and the means of valid knowledge. The means of valid knowledge lead one to a state of reflection wherein there occurs a distinction in the form of the cognizer (*pramātā*), the cognition (*pramiti*) and the object of cognition (*prameya*). The mental *vrtti* is involved in

that reflection and it gives rise to the subjective condition of the reality, not the reality itself. This state is characteristically the premise of consciousness that has a relational content (manifest consciousness where distinction in the form of knowledge, knower and known persists). This is the *Sākṣin* of Advaita Vedānta. So a person becomes conscious of this subjective condition. It is the *Ātman.* The phenomenon that causes failure to discriminate the subjective from the beyond that is still indeterminable. But the Advaitic view is that '*Ātman* is Brahman' and, therefore, this identity brings in the necessary oneness with the Absolute. If the Absolute is indescribable or unknowable can the identity of *Ātman* with Brahman be claimed as complete? This identity is indescribable.

This marks another dimension of *anirvacanīyatā* called *anadhigatattva.* Any perspective on the rightness of knowledge requires a previous unknownness. In defining *Pramā* as '*anadhigatābādhitārtha viṣayaka jñānam,* Vedānta *paribhāṣā* makes it clear that it is of the nature of *jñāna* and has as its content something previously unknown or unsublatable. In this sense, the Vedas are authoritative as a source of knowledge event—*pramā* because they disclose that which is hitherto unknown. An important question is raised against this—when everything else than Brahman is made illusory or sublated, can their cognition be claimed to be valid? According to the Upaniṣadic text 'When, however, for him everything has become just one's own self, then whereby and whom would one see?'[12] Also 'Where there is duality of some kind, there one sees another.'[13] These two statements point out the fact that the cognition obtained in the phenomenal existence is not fully valid and in-determinability still persists. So, there is a necessity of persistent cognition to have the oneness with Brahman, the unknowable. In this peculiar way, the dilemma in Advaita Vedānta regarding *anirvacanīyatā* can be examined and explained.

CONCLUSION

It has been noticed that sufficient attention has not been accorded to the notion of *anirvacanīyatā* in Advaita Vedānta. A premise generally used is that 'whatever expressed is determinate'. *Anirvacanīyatā* corresponds to the condition of thought that fails to discriminate the real from the unreal which, in turn, makes the

thought proposition itself both real and unreal. In this essential condition of thought, all that can be said about Reality is 'how Reality is' and not 'what Reality is'. The latter comes under the category of indefinability from the ontological perspective. The Advaitic non-dualism rests on the condition that 'what Reality is', in the ontological premise is indeterminable but 'However' it comes into existence 'as it were' which then becomes the cognizable entity—the knowledge. Pure consciousness assertively is Absolute 'indefinable' in its essentiality. This point is, nevertheless, considered significant in Advaita Vedānta. The important question 'how' Reality comes into manifestation is to be sensibly viewed as *māyā* and not *avidyā.* The 'indeterminability' of this transformation as 'somehow' or *anirvacanīyatā* is not revealed, as no second entity apart from Brahman exists as an ontological witness. The Advaita metaphysics looks for an appropriate criterion to elaborate the constitution of the world relevant to the transformative state-of-affairs—the *avidyā* that is neither truly real nor unreal, neither truly existent nor completely non-existent. An analysis of the 'indescribability' of *avidyā* is more relevant for the 'as it were' rather than the Absolute. This 'as it were' is 'possibility' of cognition and not the 'actuality' that is evidenced by necessity of persistence of perception even after gaining the knowledge of Brahman. The function of *avidyā* as 'making one form appear as another' has an objective basis rather than subjective. From the metaphysical perspective, *avidyā* seems 'indefinable' in the imperative of the 'as it were' to be real (*avabhāsa*). It creates differences in the non-difference. The failure to discriminate the real from the unreal is again the illusory possibility. It is the structure of thought that falsity appears and this thought as objective construct becomes 'indeterminate'. The epistemological analysis is used to construe the indefinability of error as a 'mental construct'. The *pramāṇas,* being the sources of valid knowledge, become irrelevant in the metaphysical realm. In the explication of the criterion of having experience, the expression of Reality can only make it appropriate for cognition. What is meant here is that 'experience' requires a subjective background and this is particularly tied to the indefinable *avidyā* as a mental construct. When the mind becomes a subjective enterprise, *avidyā* becomes indefinable. Thus, in short,

there are three premises for *anirvacanīyatā*—ontological, metaphysical and epistemological—*māyā* on the metaphysical level, *avidyā* on the epistemological, and finally, Brahman itself as indefinable ontologically. However, Advaitins had unquestionably accepted the real as not only to be totally unaffected by the relational categories but that it must be so in the ontological realm for the reason that it is not for to look beyond than to link within; otherwise philosophical activities become irrelevant.

Notes and References

1. *Brahmasiddhi,* .I.2.
2. *Vrtti* to *Vākyapadīya,* I.1 and I. 4.
3. Kamalaśīla's commentary on *Vrtti,* V of *Tattvasamgraha* of *Śāntarakṣita.* (Ch.V. *Śabdabrahmaparīksā*).
4. *Brahmasiddhi,* V. 31.ab.
5. Ibid., V. 150.
6. Ibid., 60.7.
7. *Indian Philosophy,* Vol. I, pp. 100–101. Also, Panikkar Raimundo, *The Vedic Experience,* p. 58.
8. *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,* 6.44.
9. Ibid., 3.221.
10. *Laghucandrikā* commentary on Advaitasiddhi, Sec. 52–58.
11. *Pañcadaśī,* VII. 44, 45.
12. *Brhadāranyakopanisad,* V.5.15.
13. Ibid.

Discussion and Comments

Freeing Philosophy from the Prison-house of I-centricity: A Response to Daya Krishna's Article

The following is a response to Daya Krishna's article 'Freeing Philosophy from the Prison-house of I-centricity' (*JICPR,* Vol. XX, No. 3, July-September 2003). Daya Krishna (henceforth DK) criticizes the philosophical move which sees the 'cogito' as a 'leverage point' for achieving any type of certainty, at the cost of the inability to verify the independent existence of other things outside oneself. To highlight another angle of the same problem, I will draw on Luce Irigaray's theory of 'sexuate difference', with special reference to her notion of 'Being Two'. Irigaray attempts to establish our cognitive, ontological and psychological world on two rather than one as the 'basic atomic unit'. She has written extensively on relationships based on mutual respect to each other's subjectivity. I will show that even though DK and Irigaray come from different worlds and are motivated by different issues, they share a fundamental concern: both are determined to break down 'the prison-house of I-centricity'.

Daya Krishna

In his article, DK argues that philosophical thinking has generally been rooted in self-consciousness, having risen from a 'reflexive' activity of consciousness as in *cogito ergo sum.* Hence, it can only explain that which is directly related to self-consciousness. This has given rise to a fundamental problem which philosophical thinking has not been able to resolve till date. Since 'thinking' is reflexively centered in itself, it does not know how to 'think' of anything which is essentially 'independent' of it or 'unrelated' to it, because even then it will always remain an 'object' of 'though' or 'thinking'.[1] The dilemma is as well known as are the failed attempts to escape it. Descartes, for example, had to lean on the 'idea of God' in order to free himself from the 'prison-house of I-centricity' which he himself had created. DK further argues that objects are

not seen in terms of their true nature (*svabhāva*), which makes them 'resistant' to consciousness, both on the levels of knowledge and action. Hence, the 'resistance' displayed by an 'object' toward the 'subject' proclaims its 'independence'.[2] DK brings forward several examples of qualities of objects which reveal their independent nature, usually ignored by philosophers. A 'feeling relationship' is one such example. In such a relationship, one becomes aware of the freedom of the 'other' to relate or to withdraw. On the other hand, in a 'feeling relationship', one may feel that she or he is an 'object' of a 'subject', and this feeling of being alone and abandoned in itself can be a proof for the existence of other 'subjects'. These phenomena are so common that DK remarks that if philosophers need to be reminded of them, something must be wrong either with the philosophers or with philosophy itself.[3] Many of the 'objects' we encounter and apprehend daily have an 'immanent subjectivity' in them, which the philosophical discussion on the subject has deliberately chosen to ignore. In short, philosophers are imprisoning themselves in a 'prison-house of I-centricity' made by none other than they themselves. DK concludes with a plea for a turn in the philosophical thinking about 'me' and the 'other' which will break down the walls of this old unnecessary 'prison-house'.[4]

LUCE IRIGARAY

A philosopher and psychoanalyst working and living in France, Luce Irigaray is associated with a strand of feminist thinking called—mainly in the American discourse—'French feminism'. She attempts to describe and define non-power-based relationships, or rather, to pave the way for such relationships between the opposite sexes and humans at large. Referring to the experience of a non-power-based relationship, she writes:

> 'I contemplate the outside and the inside. I think without renouncing you, me, us. I love to you, I love in me. The breath comes and goes—life, affection, intention. In me. In two.'[5]

Let me try to explain what Irigaray means when she writes 'I Love *to* You', a phrase which is also the title of one of her books.[6]

> When I say 'I love you', the 'you' becomes the object of my love. The 'to' in 'I love to you' secures a space between 'me' and 'you'.

The 'to' ensures that we are two subjects, without reducing or sacrificing the one to the other. Being in a relationship, I must understand that I have no control over the person I love. The other is much more than me turning my attention toward him/her. I need the other to define my boundaries at all times, but also need to always respect and see those boundaries myself. In this sense, I am always together with the other person.

DAYA KRISHNA AND LUCE IRIGARAY

DK's article is a critique of a basic philosophical move, which places the 'I' in 'the prison-house of the cogito' without seeing the absurdity of it. How shall we break down the prison-house walls? By reverting to a 'common-sense philosophy' which is open enough to embrace feelings and emotions as a part of its foundational ground. In fact, DK suggests that if thinker after thinker went along a rational route until they reached a dead end, it is because they have neglected a readily available, simple and obvious avenue of inquiry, which must be incorporated in the way we live and *know*. We must recognize our dependence on others, and this dependence alone shows that the world does not exist solely in 'one's mind'. I am not a sole 'subject' and the existence of other 'objects' is not only at the mercy of my consciousness. In this inter-subjective world, I always depend on others. This is the connection to Irigaray's thought. She has arrived the very same conclusion, even if the problems she is trying to solve are altogether different. In her writings, Irigaray shows that throughout history, women are not perceived as different from men but rather as opposite to them. Man is plus and woman is minus; Man is black and woman is white; Man is strong and woman is weak; etc. Irigaray's criticism of Western philosophy concerns the forgetfulness of the existence of a subjectivity which is different from the masculine subjectivity: subjectivity in the feminine. In order to escape the traditional formulation, Irigaray sets out to establish an alternative, creating a culture of two subjects and a philosophy of 'sexuate difference'. In this context she speaks—as has already been said—of a different type of relationship based on the atomic unit of a pair, man and woman, instead of on the conventional model of one versus many. The proposed relationship presupposes not only the individuality

of each of the two but also their co-dependence. Irigaray tries to illustrate this new relationship through her unique style of writing. She uses first-person singular and addresses a 'you'. The 'I' in her writing always appears in the context of an appeal to others: an appeal to be a witness, to listen, to respond. This rhetorical construction highlights the open structure of the 'I' and the mutuality of the relationship with others who are not opposite but different. In 'sexuate difference' the other is one's own 'horizon'; the other is perceived and forms a reference for oneself, but cannot be contained or controlled. Irigaray sees love as an ethical relationship which transcends romantic love. It is a relationship between a person and another as well as between a person and herself, in which there is no erasure of the difference between, nor unification of the two:

> 'Recognizing you means or implies respecting you as the other, accepting that I stop before you as before something insurmountable, a mystery, a freedom that will never be mine, a subjectivity that will never be mine, a mine that will never be mine.'[7]

In other words, the emotional connection with the other forms the basis for Irigaray's philosophical standpoint. If DK brings in one's emotional dependence on others as a key for escaping the 'prison house of I-centricity', Irigaray's starting point is the two. Her initial move is all about leaving room for the other in my life. As a matter of fact, feminist philosophy cannot but start from the two. After all, when a woman brings a child into the world, from that moment onward the existence of a world outside her becomes absolutely clear; a separate person inhabits the world outside her, and yet the mother's entire happiness depends on the continued well being of her child. The threat to a mother's happiness is an indisputable proof for the existence of a world which is external but, nonetheless, can take away that which is most precious to her. This certainty, which is self-evident to a woman from the moment of giving birth, will not leave her all her life, nor allow her to question the reality of the outer-world. Hence, I assume that if women-philosophers would have shaped the philosophical picture of the last 2,500 years, we would not have entered 'the prison-house of I-centricity' in the first place.

Notes and References

1. Daya Krishna, 'Freeing Philosophy from the Prison-house of I-centricity', p. 135.
2. Ibid., p. 136.
3. Ibid., p. 137.
4. Ibid., p. 143.
5. Luce Irigaray, *To Be Two* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 118.
6. Luce Irigaray, *I Love to You* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
7. Luce Irigaray, Key Writings (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 5.

26501 Purissima Rd.
Los Altos Hills
CA 94022 USA
noa@reut-institute.org

Noa Eliasaf

Reply to 'Was Goldman (1979) an Internalist?' By Proyash Sarkar

I am grateful to my young friend and former colleague Proyash Sarkar for his thorough scrutiny of a part of my book *Justification: Concepts and Theories*, resulting in a critical review in his lucid paper. I am happy to note that Sarkar's careful reading of Goldman's paper has discovered some of my mistakes in interpreting Goldman's view. Unfortunately, however, there are some contexts where Sarkar has misunderstood me. A detailed discussion is needed. Let me try to clarify my position and correct my mistakes, wherever necessary.

Let me begin from the outset. It is true that Goldman has not restricted his justification-conferring processes to believing processes or states of belief. Here I do not have the slightest hesitation to go against Goldman, if that is needed. Of course, this does not justify my inclination to invite Goldman to accompany me. In any case, in my view it is beliefs and beliefs alone that can justify other beliefs. For to say that one is justified in believing that p is the same as to say that one is justified in believing that p is true. If this is the case, then a justification-conferring process/state must be a process/state which is capable of being either true or false. And what other than a belief with a prepositional content can be said to be the

bearer of truth and falsity? Here I am in agreement with Davidson as against Quine. (Please see p. 109 of my book for an elaborate argument for rejecting the candidature of sensory impression.) About thoughts being candidates for justifiers, what I would like to say is that here we are dealing with propositional beliefs; beliefs followed by a that-clause. If there are beliefs other than belief, then that we are not concerned with them. In other words, thinking that is our sole concern, though there may be other varieties of thought. And my question is: Is there any difference between thinking that and believing that? May be, a marginal difference exists in some cases.

Proyash Sarkar has rightly pointed out that Goldman would disown my type of internalism. But I do not understand why, as accused by Sarkar, my brand of internalism—wrongly ascribed to Goldman—makes me a supporter of 'current time-slice' theory? How have I given farewell to the personal cognitive history of the believer? If I have done so, let me confess that I do not intend it.

Sarkar has brought the charge of level-confusion against me and not against Goldman. Unfortunately, however, that does not make any difference. Any reader of Goldman's paper in question cannot fail to notice the introduction of meta-belief in the analysis (analysis 9). I am not sure if my explanation distorts what Goldman has said. Of course, Goldman himself refers to various difficulties that this definition invites and he is hard hit to retain it. Besides, this is not his final analysis. But if a *belief* about another belief is required for justification of the latter belief, why shall I not be allowed to speak of a meta-belief or second-order belief? Again, Goldman says that the processes *believed* to be reliable are regarded as justification-conferring processes. 'We note certain cognitive processes in the actual world, and form beliefs about which of these are reliable. The ones we *believe to be reliable* (my italics) are then regarded as justification-conferring process' (p. 17).[1] Two levels seem to be present here: I fail to understand my confusion of levels. Moreover, it is somewhat puzzling to me why Sarkar switches from level-confusion over to internalism. Terminal-phase reliabilism or Current time-slice theories are not Goldman's cup of tea. And it is a personal fact that I do not take tea at all. Jokes apart, I have no intention to ascribe to Goldman either current time-slice theory or

terminal-phase reliabilism in order to turn him to an internalist. I am somewhat familiar with Goldman's other writings also. But I cannot say in one fell-swoop that externalism runs in his system. And let us not forget that this is a paper written later than at least two of his papers where analysis of the concept of justification was not Goldman's main concern, or not a concern at all. If he was concerned there with 'justification' at all, I would prefer to say that Goldman had an internalist-cum-externalist stance. And can we not justifiably think that this 1979 paper is much more mature where Goldman is somewhat inclined to internalism?

I do not know what motivated Sarkar to take the example of a zebra and to drive home the point that there is a distinction between definition and identification. He seems to lack confidence in his readers. Beside, I am really unnerved when he uses definition and criterion as alternates of each other, specially in a context where any use in the loose senses of the terms is dangerous. We all know (if we have not sacrificed the tradition) that definion is that which is per genus et differentium. And a criterion is what enables us to recongnize or *identify* something, say, a star as a star. This is what we mean by identification. Goldman writes about *counting* some beliefs as justified and others as unjustified. Let us tell ourselves that counting and identifying are not the same. When we ask 'Why do we regard such and such beliefs as justified?' we are asking for a definition. When we ask 'How do we identify a bird/cuckoo as a cuckoo?' we are asking for a criterion. I am reminded of J.L. Austin's 'Other Minds'.[2] 'How do you know it's a goldfinch?' The reply may be 'From its behaviour', 'By its red head' etc. '..... I indicate, . . . those features of the situation which enable me to recognize it as one to be described in the way I did describe it.'[3]

In this connection let me add one small point. Sarkar writes '...when does one identify an animal as zebra?' This *when* might be misleading—one may think of the point of time. The appropriate expression here is 'how'. I know the philosopher in Sarkar so very well that I know he is the last person to mean anything temporal here. But since he is so very careful and acute in his writing, it is better not to leave any chance of misinterpretation.

One point about Goldman. What is highly satisfying is that Goldman provides us with a plethora of analyses of the concept of

justified belief. This is, undoubtedly, a sincere attempt of a serious philosopher who goes on telling his readers how he is trying to improve on his theory. He ends up with a vague analysis and says that 'our ordinary notion of justifiedness is vague'. There are some problems with analysis (10) which goes as follows. (10) If S's belief in *p* at t results from a reliable cognitive process, and there is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it been used by S in addition to the process actually used, would have resulted in S's not believing *p* at t, then S's belief in *p* at t is justified.[4]

Now the crucial question is: Does this analysis contain any element of internalism? The term 'available' is really tricky here. Can we say that a belief-forming process is available to someone when he is totally unaware of it? Perhaps we can. 'Available' means what one *can* avail of, not that one has actually availed of. Perhaps we cannot. If we cannot, then the process is accessible to him and consequently the possibility of its being internal cannot be ruled out. So I am inclined to classify Goldman's theory under 'Internalism', in a broad sense, though. This has not been clarified in my book. Thanks to Sarkar. But again, two terminal points. Goldman has rightly said that the cognizer/believer may lack privileged access to the justificational status of his beliefs at the time of believing. I have no quarrel with Goldman or Sarkar here. For I am not concerned with the *privileged access to the justificational status of beliefs*. What concerns me and others in this context is the accessibility of the justification-conferring processes. Surely, justificational status of a belief and justification-conferring factors of a belief are not one and the same. And I cannot concede to Sarkar's reading that Goldman is an externalist in his 1979 paper. It seems to me that he is more an internalist than an externalist. About Goldman's other writings—I am extremely interested in taking up the issue with Sarkar, if and when possible.

Notes and References

1. 'What is Justified Belief', *Justification and Knowledge,* G.S. Pappas, and D. Reidel (Eds) (Dordrecht, Holland: Publishing Company, 1979), p. 17.
2. In *Philosophical Papers* (Second edition), J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.), (Oxford University Press, 1970).

3. Ibid., p. 83.
4. 'What is Justified Belief?', *Justification and Knowledge,* G.S. Pappas and D. Reidel (Eds.) (Dordrecht, Holland: Publishing Company, 1979), p. 20.

Department of Philosophy SANDHYA BASU
Rabindra Bharati University
56A, Barrackpore Trunk Road
Kolkata 700 050

Understanding Corruption

In this article I shall attempt to show that corruption forms one major basis of institutional change in a society. The purpose here is not to condemn or to commend corruption. The idea is to focus on the role corruption plays as an instrument of social change and stability. That of corruption can be beneficial is contradictory to the intuitive idea of welfare that we all have at the level of common sense. My argument is that when production of the desired goods and services in a society is inhibited by structural social inefficiencies, corruption could serve as a means of attaining the desired outcome. This is an important point. If we keep morality aside for some time, then the implication is that legally unattainable desired goods can be possessed through a different, separate route, which is the non-legal, non-moral, corrupt way. Of course, this path need not be celebrated—should be lamented—but its existence cannot be ignored. When this route is frequently visited, it gets noticed and laws are changed. Does this mean that if there are no corrupt acts, no injustices done, then we have a society that will stagnate? Probably so. As Rawls, who borrowed circumstances of justice from Hume, also observed that justice makes sense only in a society that is subject to the circumstances of justice. They are the reasons, which compel a person to seek principle of justice. Rawls describes the circumstances of justice as 'the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary'.[1] There are objective and subjective circumstances. Objective circumstances refers to a situation of moderate scarcity. Subjective circumstances refer to the parties as rational who take no interest in one another's interest.

It is possible that the condition of moderate scarcity leads to corruption. The basic idea of scarcity is that the amount of some good is not sufficient to satisfy the desires of all those who want such a good. To say that something is scarce usually refers to its desirability. If people are deprived of what they value, there will be conflicts. Men will resort to unfair means to possess what they desire. Since everybody will prefer a larger to a lesser share, in the absence of benevolent impulses, corruption will creep in. Inequalities will stem from it and the situation thus engendered will not be fair.

Justice and injustice go hand in hand. If people were benevolent, and goods were in abundance, there would be no case of injustice and laws would not be required. As David Hume puts it that justice as a whole is founded on public interest. Just actions are recognized and acknowledged when there are unjust actions to contrast them with. Injustice can take place in a just and stable society. Corruption has been a part of our society since the ancient times. We've had treatises which seemed as guides to the kings to rule without bothering over morality. Kautilya's *Arthasastra* was meant to serve as prescriptons for the king to rule without being much concerned about morality and ethics. Reputed Indian historians show that for Kautilya, moral considerations have no place in politics[2] and that he approved of fraud and deception under certain conditions, and upheld the materialist values over morality and suggested that the ruler should prefer wealth to virtue.[3]

In the ancient India, Kautilya in his *Arthasastra,* a book on politics, administration, and economics, writes: 'Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up at least a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the government work cannot be caught while taking money for themselves'.[4] The important point here is that corruption comes naturally to a public servant or anybody who assumes office and power. Misuse or violation is a concept very close to the behaviour of human beings. Men deviate from the given code of conduct very easily if it goes in their favour and more as in the process they don't harm anybody. It is for this reason that bribery is a most popular form of corruption.

It is a normal process and both parties involved are satisfied and most of the times, it is not even made public at any point of time. The mischief remains a secret and if the game has not harmed anyone then the guilty conscience pricks no one.

Edward Van Roy[5] suggests three methodologies, one of them being functionalism, whereby corruption may be analyzed. Here practices like patronage, bribery, bossism are treated as fulfilling 'positive functions which are at the time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and structures'.[6] The emphasis here is on the positive role that corruption plays and also helps thereby in the development of a nation. These corrupt practices are indispensable since no other system can perform these functions. The same applies to bureaucratic corruption in the developing countries, which is said to play 'a role which is sufficiently important that if it was not played by this device must be played by another or the consequences might severely undermine the pace, but more importantly the character, of the development effect'.[7] The point to note is that both Bayley and Merton are highlighting the positive and growth-oriented characteristics of corruption. Its presence results in speedy work and its absence can affect the pace. It works as a catalyst in the society and provides an incentive to people to do their work. Not only does it participate in the development of a nation but it also speeds it up. A more general statement, more euphemistically phrased, asserts that 'institutions that are not part of the approved and acknowledged social milieu.... can be called "interstitial" institutions because they establish themselves in the interstices of the society and perform functions that are performed in no other way'.[8] After Durkheim's classic analysis of crime, a number of studies have argued that corruption itself, within the broader category of social deviance, performs certain essential functions in its very essence of being recognized as corrupt. This kind of reasoning calls corrupt behaviour as 'safety valve' institutions, sieving the harmful aspects of a social structure and using it for the benefit or development of the society.

These arguments give rise to one question: Are we trying to say that practices such as bribery, prostitution, etc., are contributing to the growth of a nation? It is not incorrect to say that corrupt practices play a positive role and they perform a function which no

other policy can perform. Along with all this, one must not overlook the corrosion of values, the moral decay and the disintegration of standards of proper behaviour, as the repercussions of corrupt practices. Corruption is a universal phenomena and it needs to be accepted with its positive as well as negative aspects. In fact, corruption can be taken as an informal political system. While party manifestos, general legislation and policy declarations are the formal ingredients of a political structure, corruption stands in sharp contrast to these features as an informal political system in its own right. This hidden structure is of great importance and is so decisive in the history of a nation that an analysis which ignored it would be not only be inaccurate but also misleading.

In different countries, corruption appears to have similar causes, patterns and consequences. Analyzing corruption on the pattern of political events, James C. Scott[9] suggests that patterns of corruption can be related to the character of the political system and to the nature and rate of socio-economic change in a way that suggests meaningful parallels between regimes that have long since disappeared and regimes that thrive today. One of the causes highlighted by James Scott[10] is the traditional gift-giving practice. In an attempt to re-distribute wealth, the rich used to give gifts to the poor and the worst off were often expected to make some kind of offerings to their leaders as a sign of their allegiance. These practices transformed into corruption. If, for example, a farmer won a court case, he was expected to come with a basket of fruits or something else, for the judge's family. Such practices have survived especially in the rural areas and it does account for the motives behind many petty acts of corruption.

S.C. Scott speaks of kinship ties and other parochial loyalties as a cause of corruption. A traditional man prioritizes his loyalties in this order, first comes family and then the society. These obligations are strong and they contribute to a large amount of corruption in the new nations. In India, it is common practice to appoint one's relatives to any post and preferring them over meritorious candidates. People often justify their corrupt acts by justifications like 'everybody else is doing it'. Lobbying for one's own brother or sister is common practice in India. Such lies and practices are present in developed nations too. Emotions play their role irrespective of the level of development of a nation. It is not very correct to argue that when one nation passes from an under-developed stage to a developed stage, these causes of corruption become ineffective. There might be new causes but the old ones do not become obsolete.

As an employer, the public sector in the new states of Africa and Asia represents the single most important source of status, wealth, prestige and security. It is the dream of virtually every family to place at least one of its sons in the public service.[11] Public service is in demand and there is a lot of corruption around the selection, appointment and even in matters of promotion. In India, in certain states civil servants demand more dowry from girls, parents and their demand is also met.

Mutual benefit is identified as another cause of corruption. Both the parties normally benefit from the act of corruption. Even if a person is paying to get a work done, which he otherwise is entitled to, the fact is that his work is getting done in his benefit. And of course, the other party is being paid for it. The negative impact of such acts may produce long-term disenchantment with the legal system and, thereby, harm the society. Any illegal transaction does not prove to be advantageous to one person only. In fact, the profit or the gains (whether in terms of money or satisfaction) are shared by many. The agreement would not be stable if there are changes in the balance of benefits between the sides. Thus, corruption can be explained in terms of 'mutual advantage'. Also, when it is beneficial to both the parties, they are equally interested in keeping it a secret. 'Mutual advantage' is the common point between corruption and justice when it is beneficial to both the parties, they are equally interested in keeping it a secret. This is the distinction between the explanation of corruption in terms of 'mutual advantage' and the version of 'justice as mutual advantage'. Such versions regarding justice can be found in Thrasymachus 'might is right' argument.[12]

It is interesting that two seemingly opposite concepts—'justice and corruption'—can both be discussed with reference to 'mutual advantage'. The difference between the two is that corruption brings in dissatisfaction and instability since here only a few people benefit from a particular transaction, whereas justice brings about

a long-term stability since in this case the majority get what they deserve. It is the beginningless cycle of inequalities, also unending, which makes people invest in a corrupt transaction. Rawls observes, 'The basic structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favour certain starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, they also affect men's initial chances in life. They cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notion of merit or descent. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice must apply'.[13] Rawls makes an attempt to eliminate these inequalities by introducing the difference principle. It states that inequalities are permissible if they are beneficial to everybody. Such inequalities play a big role in a person's life. Most of the inequalities stem from the circumstances in which one finds oneself. The kind of profession one joins not only reflects his preference for one type of work but also the abilities and aptitudes given to him by nature or shaped by his parents and environment. Rawls however believes that inequalities resulting out of such conditions cannot be justified by an appeal to merit. Eric Rakowski[14] points out that a theory of justice that treats people as equal autonomous, decision makers must take them as responsible for their tasks. If there is a higher price being paid for a work which does not have many volunteers, then they are entitled to higher wages. Because everyone is assumed to have the same abilities, whatever differences in holdings accrue can be traced only to differences in their preferences, and they alone must assume credit or blame for their desires.[15] Equality can only be preserved by allowing equally talented persons to reap what they sow. Equally gifted people should keep what they produce. We all come into the world naked and blank, apart from our genetic predispositions, and can hardly choose the person we are to be. But the fact that people do not create themselves does not absolve them of the responsibility for their actions and character once their reason, experience and capabilities cross certain threshold.

Also, it is not just the abilities with which people are born which effect people's initial successes, and are a source of inequality. Even in a society where resources were distributed as justice requires, it is difficult that equality will reign supreme. Although people can allow themselves to become lazy and lose sight of their aim, and also regret it later, it is also true that sometimes people simply cannot work as hard as they would like for in spite of their best attempt their attention lapses, distractions prevail, or their determination evaporates. All these factors lead to unequal success or failure among people and it would be wrong to 'redress' these inequalities. 'Leveling' inequalities could also be one of the reasons for corruption. If a person is not allowed his due and observes that others get more than what is due to them, he will feel unfairly treated. The whole process might kill his enthusiasm and he might resort to unfair means to get his share. 'The redress principle' might leave a lot many people unhappy and corrupt. 'Redress is the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowments are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for'.[16] Nozick argues that just because no one deserves their talents, parents and social advantages that are his at birth does not mean that he is not entitled to whatever benefits flow from there, without sharing his good fortune with those who are less lucky.

I think Rawls is wrong in contending that the undeserved inequalities of birth may warrant redress. While constructing a theory of justice, Rawls is uselessly challenging nature. The outcome of the natural and social lotteries might be 'arbitrary from a moral perspective'.[17] But these are inequalities Rawls can do nothing about. It is a benevolent thought that where all desire some good and no one possesses a superior claim to it, the only just course is to divide it or its fruits equally. This entire operation is resting on one basic assumption that such a division is possible. Natural abilities cannot be regarded as a 'common' on 'collective' asset, and talents cannot be pulled out from infant minds and limbs and reapportioned. It might be morally desirable that there is an even distribution of resources but people's material circumstances do not allow it. Hypothetically too, an even distribution is possible once. As men get hold of their resources and put their talent to

it, they will leave each other behind. Rawls cannot keep on redressing the differences.

Nature, Rawls contends, is an unfair lottery system. He goes overboard when he claims that people bear no responsibility for their diligence or their decision to work extra, since these choices reflect the chance influences of nature, parents and teachers. Hence, people do not deserve any part of what they achieve by virtue of their efforts or character, and the only intelligible notion of descent is that of a right secured by fulfilling some institutional requirement. 'Thus it is true that as persons and groups take part in just arrangements; they acquire claims on one another defined by the publicly recognized rules. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure and specify the duties and obligations of individuals do not mention moral descent, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it.'[18]

It is difficult to understand the Rawlsian preconditions of genuine responsibility. There are lots of 'gifts from God' which makes a person succeed or fail. The common sense view regarding merit is that a person's voluntary actions, including those that contributed to the formation of his productive powers, constitute legitimate foundation for merit, and characteristics which are beyond a person, such as their innate capacities and unwanted obsessions. If Rawls does not hold people responsible for their actions, then they will not deserve their rewards also. Also, a person who works harder deserves to be paid more. Since Rawls would take it as luck and not credit the person for it, this man will not get what he deserves. Rawls prepares a ground for injustice by not giving to people what they deserve. If a person does not deserve an increment because he has worked for it, then when does he deserve it? If no one is responsible for his character, then in the most just of possible worlds, everyone would receive an equal amount of money; no matter how hard one has worked, his lazy co-worker will get as much. In such a society where is the incentive for people to work more? It would be death for creative, restless people and the whole scene will be of unhappiness. People deserving more will vent out their frustration at the not so talented in other ways. It would be something similar to life after reservation. People who

avail of quotas can never be treated nor feel like the other meritorious ones. The normal category people will be annoyed with them and they could deliberatly not be given the best of posting. Their capability would always be questioned and they might feel that to come through reservation is not such a good idea after all.

The point I want to make is that most of policies which aim at levelling tend to make people unhappy (not the worst-off) and they look for other means to compensate for their loss. The quota people just might have to pay bribe to get plum postings. This can give rise to further injustices and corrupt practices. It is prudent to accept humanity with all its distinctiveness, as Bernard William says, in 'the idea of equality' that difference is the mark of humanity. To eliminate that difference is the death of humanity as competition brings out the best in people. Redressing would bring down the level of competition. Inequalities and injustices all lead to corruption. They present us with pressing and important social problems to deal with, they are a part of our lives and we learn to deal with them.

In this article I have argued about the role which corruption plays in institutional change in any society. I take corruption to be an integral yet dispensable part of a growing, changing society. It is an informal political system and performs certain important functions which no other policy can carry out. Participants of a corrupt act directly benefit from it and also raise social welfare by creating opportunities for production that otherwise are limited. Also, shortcomings of a particular law ensures amendments. These shortcomings come to light when men exploit them to their advantage excessively. Subsequently, a change is initiated.

Notes and References

1. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 126.
2. R.C. Majumdar, Kautilya, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VIII, Macmillan, 1968.
3. Narasingha Prasad Sil, *Kautila's Arthasastra: A Comparative Study*, P. Lang pp. (New York, 1989).
4. B. Venkatesppeih, 'Misuse of Office': *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, David L. Sills (Ed.) Vol. II (The Macmillan Company and the Free Press), p. 272.

5. Edward Van Roy, 'On The Theory of Corruption'. Economic Development and Culture Change, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 19 (1), October 1970, pp. 86–110.
6. Edward Van Roy cites Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Revised and Enlarged Edition), 1967, p. 72.
7. Edward Roy, *op. cit.* cites David H. Bayley, 'The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation', *Western Political Quarterly*, 19, No. 4, December 1966, p. 732.
8. Edward Roy, *op. cit.* cites Paul Bohannan, *Social Anthropology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 373.
9. James C. Scott, 'Corruption as a political event' in *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p. 3.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Plato, C380-367 BC. *Republic*, Trans, R. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). The classic Discussion of Justice Book I.
13. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 7.
14. *Equal Justice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
15. Ibid., p. 107.
16. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 100.
17. Ibid., p. 74.
18. Ibid., p. 311.

18/603, East End Apartments
Mayur Vihar Phase I Ext.
Delhi 110096

RASHMI BHARADWAJ

The Issue of War

It is indeed very timely that Professor Daya Krishna (hereinafter DK), the Editor of *JICPR*, has, under the column 'Focus' (Vol.XXI, No.4, October-December 2004), raised the question of the relevance or otherwise of war in the present world scenario. He, in this regard, draws the attention of his readers to the 'current context of systematically planned and organized terrorism in the different parts of the world...'. I, too, while concluding my Lecture given on November 2005 in an ICPR sponsored meeting of the Patna University Philosophy Department, had said, But then, what

is the present environment for man in general? Well, it is certainly the one besieged with perhaps the worst kind of terrorism. And it is definitely proving to be a very serious and dangerous challenge for the whole Modern World. Surely, this challenge cannot be met with any docile, or "pacifist" method. It can be met only "wisely", that is, only philosophically. Philosophy is not concerned merely with knowing but also with doing."

So, DK has really done a signal service to humanity by bringing the question of war under the focus of people's attention. And, while doing so, he has given too much kudos to Levinas for having brought to the notice of the people this issue of war through his book *Totality and Infinity* (Trans. by Alphonso Lingis, published by Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, 2002). DK, in his Focus, also points out that Levinas in his work, has denounced the importance and merit of morality while dealing with this issue of war. According to this thinker (as pointed out by DK), 'The state of war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives....' War is not only one of the ordeals greatest of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. So, it appears that Levinas is very much in favour of political expediency, and that even at the cost of morality. Maybe, Levinas is more 'Cānakyan' than Cānakya himself.

But then, I too, from my own side would like to evaluate this very provocative thinker. And, before I do so, I would like to say a few words about DK himself. The very first sentence with which DK begins his 'Focus' is 'The issue of war has *seldom* (italics mine) been a center of attention in philosophical thought *anywhere in the world* (italics mine), even though the *Gīta* in the Indian tradition starts with it and the problem it poses'. In this statement the two terms 'seldom' and 'anywhere in the world' have been, I think, used rather listlessly. If the former term is 'temporal', the latter is obviously 'spatial'. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* 'seldom' means 'not often'. But has the issue of war been discussed by thinkers only rarely? And then, the use of the phrase 'anywhere in the world' here is all the more deplorable. If, as DK himself admits, the *Gīta* did at least raise this question, then his use of 'anywhere in the world' is, to say the least, very careless.

Think of the Vedic God (*deva*) Indra (Vṛtraghna) who killed Vṛtra the demon (*dānava*). This god-demon tussle might be altogether mythological, but even then it indicates that Vedic people were agog with war-related ideas and activities. Maybe, there was some historical truth behind this Indra-Vṛtra war myth. Anyway, the phrase *devāsura saṅgrama* of the Vedic literature is much too significant in respect of the Vedic culture and civilization. And then, if we go down the memory lane, we can come across such war-heroes and war-sponsors as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa Cānakya, Sivājī Mahārāja, Rānā Pratāpa, quite a number of Sikh Gurus—the most prominent being Guru Govinda Singh—Tilaka, Netāji Subhāsh Chandra Bose, etc.

Now, if we turn to other countries we find that there, too, there have been persons or episodes who or which were either for or against war, viz., Moses, Christ, Prophet Muhammad, Zarathustra, Martin-Luther King, Tolstoy, Confucius, Nelson Mandela, Crusade, Jihād, Jewish Elimination, etc. So, I think, neither the use of 'seldom', nor of 'anywhere in the world' by DK is justified.

Now, let us come to Levinas who seems to have made a mockery of morality. But even then, it appears, he has been covertly applauded and praised by DK. But, what are Levinas's credentials? They are:

1. He himself says, 'Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality'. Well, this statement is, clearly enough, not only befooling all others, but is also a pre-judging of the entire issue of the role of the discipline of morality. Are we really duped by morality?
2. He further says, 'Moral values are questioned in life by everybody and those who try to be moral are considered fools by others who prosper by wilful denial of all values in their lives".

Now, before we somewhat critically investigate Levinas' views, we may just point out here the glaring self-contradiction in the statement quoted above. Well, when moral values are questioned by 'everybody', who are those who try to be moral? Are these latter fellows included in 'everybody'? If not, what does 'everybody' mean after all? Well, when Levinas does not give any importance to such simple logical requirement, importance a must be given to his arguments against the 'role of morality in life can easily be guessed.

Now, let us come to Levinas' statement that 'The state of war suspends morality...". Well, by making such a statement he 'undoes' what Mahatma Gandhi 'did', and 'did' rather successfully by means of a life-long struggle virtually on an international platform. We know the Mahatma established the principle of *ahimsā* or non-violence about which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said, 'Gandhiji applied this seemingly negative thing in an active way to mass problems in South Africa and India'. And this very 'seemingly negative thing' was 'the bond of union' between the Mahātmā and the great Russian Prophet, Leo Tolstoy.

Regarding non-violence the Mahatma had said, 'The non-violence of my conception is a more active and more real fighting against wickedness than violent relation whose very nature is to increase wickedness'. And, he did not go in for any violent war, for that implied suspending or ignoring of morality. And his reason virtually is that a war, in the final run, is nothing else but neglect of principles. Principles of behaviour, if they are genuine, must have to be universal, and where there is universality, there must have to be welfare, and where there is welfare, there cannot be any illegitimate bloodshed and killing.

Well, even if Levinas, as a thinker, has been guided above by the easy ideal of practical expediency, he has atleast been guided by an ideal of some sort. But then, once you are under the guidance of an ideal, whatever that ideal may after all be, you are under the grip of some sort of a principle. And if principles, then universality, and also (using the very title of Levinas' book) totality and infinity, and, ultimately, welfare. Are all these ingredients of a genuine principle very derisory of high moral values?

DK, however, in his 'Focus' does harp on, 'The work of Levinas focuses attention on this issue and suggests that nothing can be honest, if it does not take it [Levinas' book] into account'. And he also gives credence to Levinas' statement: 'Warfare questions almost all the values that a man strives to seek in order to make his life worth living.' Well, I wonder what sort of a worth Levinas'

'worth living' indicates! Anyway, let DK accept all these observations of Levinas without any mental reservation. But the question remains: How *should* one react to these observations of Levinas? Should others, too, discard morality, so that warfare may have an unbridled license for destroying the whole world at 'its sweet will'? This question does demand an immediate answer!

Dahua House
Shaheed Bhagar Singh Lane
Tikamanjli Bhagalpur 812 001

NITYANAND MISHRA

A Short Note on Non-Violence in Action

In Gandhi's *Ashram Observances in Action*, I find the notion of 'in action' significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it makes us aware of the limitations of a principle, whatever may be claimed to be its source, intuition, tradition, or something else. Secondly, it manifests its various dimensions, its rich content, not otherwise discernible. Thirdly, it presents a person with a test of his practical ingenuity. Let me mention here, as an illustration, some of the dimensions of non-violence which Gandhi discovers in the course of its application. When I do so, I should not be taken as writing an essay on his view of non-violence, but simply as exemplifying the significance of the notion of 'in action'.

I find that, in the course of his application of non-violence, Gandhi encounters various forms of violence. (1) There is a form of violence which is not immoral or, as one may say, which is morally pardonable or excusable. This includes: (a) violence, which is in self-interest, but which is unavoidable. Thus, we kill mosquitoes in the interest of our bodily comfort, and take vegetable life in the interest of nourishment; and (b) violence, which is resorted to as an alternative to cowardice, which Gandhi calls defensive violence, or violence of the brave, or violence which is almost non-violence. He would recommend manhandling of a person, who is out to harass a woman, rather than being a silent spectator in the name of non-violence. He would even recommend a woman to fight this person tooth and nail. (2) There is

a form of violence, which is morally justifiable, or which is non-violence. This includes violence, which is resorted to in the interest of others, but, again, which is unavoidable. Thus, we would kill a person, who goes about shooting down anyone who comes his way, and whom one has not been able to bring under control in any other way. Then there is the case of euthanasia. (3) There is form of violence, which is pure and simple violence, or which is immoral. This includes: (a) violence, which is resorted to whether in self-interest or not in self-interest, but which is avoidable, as when we deprive people in need the use of our superfluous possessions; and (b) violence, which is resorted to against the weak, as when America invaded Iraq with all its might. Gandhi calls this the violence of the coward.

After seeing some of the dimensions of non-violence, which Gandhi discovers in the course of his applying it, namely violence which is almost non-violence and violence which is non-violence, I would like to take up a case in connection with the idea of our practical ingenuity. It is not an uncommon case. Imagine two persons, A and B, who are fairly close to one another. However, a time comes when B is extremely unhappy with A, say, on account of some misunderstanding or because B thinks that A has done something which he should not have done. After this, A does one thing or another to sort things out. But every move which he makes is cold-shouldered by B. B even loses no opportunity to present A in a bad light. Now, under the conditions, A could adopt the attitude of not caring less. He could also allow his retaliatory instinct to assert itself. It should not be difficult to see that, in both these cases, A is doing something of a violent nature. In the former case, he is sort of counter-cold-shouldering B. In the latter case, he is being explicitly aggressive. I have wondered what would or could be a non-violent attitude which A could adopt under the circumstances. One possibility would be to adopt the attitude of waiting with an open mind. The idea of open mind would include: (i) not having any ill-feeling towards the other person; and (ii) always being prepared to make use of every opening which may be offered or may present itself to soften things. Kant distinguishes between pathological and practical love. The former one is what we have by nature, like maternal love. The latter one, which is also

called moral love, is what we are required, which it is our duty, to have, as Jesus' enjoining loving one's enemy. We can say that the idea of an open mind would include practical love, as far as our not being adversely inclined towards others is concerned.

R.K. GUPTA

ZB-5, Sah-Vikas
68, Patparganj
Delhi-110 092

Agenda for Research

Recent advances in computer technology and 'decoding' of the 'genetic code' raise fundamental questions about the nature of language, a subject on which philosophers have thought since almost the beginning of philosophy.

The translation of languages into a common symbolic code raises the question about 'universals' of language in a new setting.

As these codes are supposed to be applicable not only to actual languages but also to all possible languages, this should result in a reflection on the idea of language itself and what constitutes its essential feature and its relation to the structure of the sound-producing mechanism at the human level and the limits it poses on the production of sounds in which language is necessarily embedded.

Decoding of the genetic code also raises questions of a different sort as it extends the notion of 'language' to something in 'nature' itself; if 'genes' in a living organism are considered to be a part of 'nature'.

What will be the effect of all this on our understanding of the notion of language and meaning, specially as the 'genetic code', is said to 'determine' the maturation and growth of the biological organism with all its diverse qualities that appear, or 'get actualized' in temporal succession as per the 'instructions' that are 'encoded' there.

The larger question—whether everything in nature which is generally identified with what is usually called 'matter'—has something analogous to the 'genetic code' in its constitution, if asked, would result in a radical rethinking in our understanding of the concept of 'causality' as now it will have to be understood in terms of a 'determinate potentiality' which 'unfolds' itself in time and, hence, 'causality' could only be understood retrospectively by the unfoldment of the actualization that occurs.

This is not exactly a 'return' to Aristotelian teleology but time will also not be 'causality' the way science seems to have understood it after Galileo and Newton.

All this needs to be thought and worked on by all those interested in the nature of 'language' and 'causality' in the light of the 'new' work in these fields.

DAYA KRISHNA

Focus

The situation in knowledge is changing so fast that most philosophical thinking which was based on earlier understanding of such foundational areas as mathematics and physics is almost completely obsolete.

Two recent publications—one on mathematics and the other on physics—give evidence of this and, hence, should be of interest to philosophers whose thinking is based on their usual understanding of their fields of knowledge.

The first is *Recent Revolutions in Mathematics* by Albert Stwertka, Pub: Franklin Watts, New York, 1987.

The second is *The Constants of Nature* by John D. Barrow, Pub: Vintage Books, New York, 2003.

The commencement of the current understanding of the nature of mathematics arises not only from the acceptance of non-Eucledian geometries, but also of the idea of 'actuality' of infinity in arithmetic, as articulated in the work of control but—at a deeper level—in the increasing obliteration of the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical in these domains, particularly as geometry reveals the nature of 'formed space' with which all physical objects have to be identical to some extent and hence have its properties as their properties.

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

1. What exactly is meant by a *Śākhā* of the Veda? Has each *Śākhā* an equal authority, and if there is a conflict, how shall one decide between them?
2. What is the relation between different *Saṁhitās* of the same *Veda*?
3. The *Yajurveda* is supposed to have two main *Śākhās*, the *Śukla Yajurveda* and the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. But the *Śukla Yajurveda* also has two different *Śākhās* called *Vājasāneyī Mādhyandin Saṁhitā* and the *Kāṇva Saṁhitā*. The *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* has at least four *Śākhās* called the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, the *Maitreāyaṇī Śaṁhitā* and *Kaṭha Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā*.

What is the relation between these different *śākhā* texts to the *Ṛgveda*, of which we have only one *śākhā* text available with us at present?

What is the authority of the *Ṛgveda* for these other Vedas? The *Puruṣa Sūkta* (10.90), for example, is repeated in the other Vedas with addition and/or modifications. *Vājasneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Sūkla Yajurveda*, for example, has six more *mantras* added to the *Puruṣa Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* while the *Kāṇva Saṁhitā* has another thirty-two added to those of the *Vājasneyī śaṁhitā* in it.

The *Atharvaveda*, both in its *Saunśa* and *Paippalada Śākhās*, also has the *Puruṣa Sūktā*, but with some modification in it.

DAYA KRISHNA

Response to the Query Published in the JICPR, Vol. XXIII, No. 1

I. क्षण प्रतियोगि–

1. As per the Vārtikakāra (Vijñānabhikṣu) of *Yogabhāṣya*, प्रतियोगि means the opponent. As such क्षण प्रतियोगि means that which opposes

क्षण, i.e., which is uninterrupted even by a moment. The chain of changes, which is uninterrupted even by a moment, is called क्रम.

[क्षणप्रतियोगि–क्षणस्य अवसरस्य विरोधी क्षणेनाप्यनन्तरित इति यावत् ! एवं रूपोऽत्र क्रमः विवक्षितः न तु पौर्वापर्यमात्रम्]

2. As per Bhoja, क्षणप्रतियोगि means something other than क्षण [क्षण विलक्षणः]. The sequence lies on a chain of moments, and will be known after the last stage of *Parinama* [change]. Here the word प्रतियोगि can be interpreted as आधेय as per convention 'आधाराः अनुयोगिनः, आधेयाः प्रतियोगिनः'—Here the क्षण is आधार and the क्रम is आधेय—as such क्रम is प्रतियोगि of क्षण. It is to be noted here that the क्षण means not only one moment, but a group of moments [क्षण प्रचय].

If we observe the two different interpretations above, the Nyaya influence is on Bhoja, and later commentators.

II. There is no such restriction on number of अनुयोगि and प्रतियोगि —one अनुयोगि can have many प्रतियोगि and vice versa, for example,

या कुन्देन्दु तुषार हार धवला–
here कुन्द, इन्दु, तुषार, हार all are प्रतियोगिs and सरस्वती is अनुयोगि–

III. When two objects are cognized as related, with a connection element, then one will be called as प्रतियोगि and the other one will be called as अनुयोगि. In other words, one is निरूपक and the other one is आश्रय for that connecting element, for example, take सादृश्य (similarity). The *Upamāna* is प्रतियोगि and *Upameya* is अनुयोगि.

Sūtra-4-34 of the Yoga Sūtra

पुरुषार्थशून्यानाम् गुणानाम् प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यम्। कृतकर्तव्यतया अर्थात् कर्तव्यस्य निश्शेषतया पुरुषार्थशून्यतां प्राप्तानां कार्यकारणात्मकानां गुणानां सांख्यमतेन महदादि प्रकृतिविकृतीनां प्रतिप्रसवः यथाक्रमं अव्यक्ते विलयः ततश्च प्रकृतेः केवलत्वेनावस्थानं कैवल्यम्।

Due to accomplishing what is to be done, the instruments of the activity of *Prakṛti* are absorbed in one's own cause. Then *Prakṛti* is isolated. This isolation of *Pradhāna* is called कैवल्य।

As per the above description, the कैवल्यम् is not in *puruṣa*, but is in *prakṛti*. Then the question arises: what is the form of *Puruṣa* then?

The answer is 'स्वरूप प्रतिष्ठा चितिशक्तिः' The power of consciousness stay in its own form, due to lack of relation with बुद्धि. This is called कैवल्य of पुरूष.

In this sūtra, two types of कैवल्य are mentioned. One is related to प्रकृति and another one related to Puruṣa: the कैवल्य of प्रकृति remains isolated. The कैवल्य of पुरूष is the consciousness in its own form, due to non-relation with गुणाs or प्रकृति.

As per the above description, it is to be noted that the *Śakti* is *puruṣa* and not *Śakti* is in *puruṣa*. So, there is no clash with any other tradition.

There is another reading for this sūtra, i.e., स्वरूप प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तेः This reading is accepted by Bhoja. It is made clear that *puruṣa* is nothing than consciousness in its own form, which is called the कैवल्य.

K.V. RAMAKRISHNAMACHARYA
Vice-Chancellor
Rajasthan Sanskrit Universtiy
Madao P.O. Bhankrota
Jaipur 302 026

Book Reviews

EMOTION AND PEACE OF MIND: *From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation.* (The Gifford Lectures) by Richard Sorabji, Oxford University Press, 2000, in PB 2002, pp. 499.

The theme and issue about which Sorabji delivered the Gifford Lectures forming the content of this book have, obviously, great relevance to life and living and, consequently, of deep interest to any reader.

Sorabji has moved through the dense labyrinth of ideas dealing with emotions and control over them, from early Greeks, the great Greek Philosophers, Epicureans, Cynics, Sceptics, Stoics to early Christian saints and thinkers right up to Thomas Aquinas in medieval times. Not only the ancients and medievalists, Sorabji has also considered, discussed and reviewed some of the related modern research. Occasional reference to Yoga, Buddhists and Shaivism also occur.

There are exegetical issues relating to the reliability and authenticity of reports by some later thinkers on earlier ones such as that of Galen on Chrysippus and Posidonium—the Stoics, relating to the problem of relation of emotions to rational judgement which would be of interest to scholars engaged in the field. Also, let us note that it is not a field being furrowed by some lonely toiler alone; Sorabji's book opens a door to the vast research field relating to an aspect of human personality generally bypassed by most philosophers. I leave this aspect of the text for competent minds.

The central issues raised and questions dealt with in the text are: What are emotions? Are there basic or generic emotions? Does emotion involve stages in its manifestation. If so, how are these stages related to a better understanding of emotions and thereby help one to get rid of them? What relations do they have to reason? Does the structure of emotion involve rational component? Are all emotions undesirable and so need be eradicated? Or only some of them need be overcome? Is an emotion to be got rid of

completely or it needs to be kept within limits only? Do these emotions have any significant role in human personality?

Sorabji begins by saying that his book is 'about emotion in ancient philosophy, not about particular emotions, but about what emotion is in general and about how to cope with one's own emotions and establish peace of mind' (p. 1). He further remarks that sometimes 'we celebrate our emotions; sometimes we are upset by the emotive situations in life, and our emotions may then be unwanted or counter-productive' (p. 1). It is clear from these remarks that some emotions point to a state of mind which disturbs the peace of mind and at times lead to situations which are negative and destructive, while there are some emotional situations which it is desirable to cherish.

The enquiry begins with an analysis of the view of Chrysippus a Stoic in the third century BC. He believed that emotions are false value judgements. An emotion, according to him, involved two distinctive value judgements. 'One is that there is good or bad (benefit or harm) at hand, the other that it is appropriate to react', (p. 29). The latter covers two different types of reactions. 'In pleasure and distress, the reaction approved is internal, present and involuntary. It is internal contraction... or expansion...' (p. 30). It is mind that contracts or expands and 'the mind is a physical spirit for the Stoic materialists' (p. 31), informs Sorabji.

The second type of reaction is 'behavioral, voluntary and directed to future' (p. 31). This relates to fear and appetite. All these four—pleasure, distress, fear and appetite are called by Chrysippus as 'the generic emotions' (p. 30). The second and the outer reaction causes the inner one, but the distinction between the two is not drawn in precise terms.

The state of affair which leads to an emotional state of the mind is called appearance and it is to this appearance that one assents to, judging it good or bad and then reacts to it accordingly (pp. 41–42). Since the judgement involves assent it is called voluntary.

Stoic believed that everything in the end is indifferent—neither good nor bad—except character and rationality. Since there is nothing good or bad except character and rationality, it was wrong to judge appearance as good or bad and, consequently, it was wrong to react to them in either case. That is how emotions were

said to be false evaluative judgements and this realization could lead one to be free from them. It should be noted that the Stoic ideal was complete freedom from emotions, which they called *apatheia.* Sorabji contends that the theory of indifferents was not an essential part of Stoic therapy (p. 169). Chrysippus treated even those who did not accept Stoic beliefs. Complete freedom from emotions could characterize only a Stoic sage who could be only an ideal being.

For Stoics, life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, effective sense organs, wealth, reputation and their opposites—death, disease, pain, ugliness, frailty, disablement, poverty, low repute, and ignoble birth—were all indifferents. Yet the Stoics did not deny their being naturally preferred or dispreferred—as the case may be. They regarded the positive ones having some value and so accepting that they could be our objective of action provided circumstances permitted (p. 170).

Diogenes of Babylon advised a rational choice for that alone could guide 'living according to nature'. The interesting thing to note is that one should be concerned with *aiming* the right and not bother about the final *outcome* (p. 171).

One cannot but notice a close resemblance between the theory of indifference and also the significance of *aiming* in contrast to attaining, with the teachings of *Gita* and *Upanishads.* Whenever such ideals were put forth, room was also made for those less than a sage and in that space the doctrine of preferred indifferents and the recommendations for certain common desiderata such as life, health, strength, etc., as described above having some selective value were made. To select these was to live according to nature.

Against the Stoic view, Sorabji considers the complete eradication of emotions as undesirable. He says, 'we can learn from the stoics in treating unwanted emotions, without agreeing that none should be wanted' (p. 173).

Posidonius, another Stoic, believed that emotions are not necessarily judgemental and they can be there in the absence of any judgemental activity. They could be induced in animals, in humans by wordless music. They are also found when tears come out and they cannot be justified. Seneca, on the contrary, defending Chrysippus, thought that what Posidonius defended as emotions

were actually not emotions but the appearances or the first movements, which if assented to and later reacted against would be emotions (p. 72). The notion of the first movement is quite interesting for it has been used to account for certain immediate and involuntary reactions in emotional experience which, not being within the control of human effort and so being applicable to all human beings, are not culpable. Even sages cannot escape them (p. 69). In contrast to first movements, emotions are voluntary judgements and are amenable to therapy. Sorabji quotes Seneca in some detail and the passages quoted present an analysis of anger.

Seneca remarks that if anger 'comes to birth against our will, it will never succumb to reason. For all movements which are not brought by our will are beyond control and inevitable, like shivering when sprinkled with cold water ... At bad news our hair stands on end; at improper words a blush suffuses us, and vertigo follows when we look at a steep crop'. ... 'Anger is put to flight by precepts. For it is a voluntary vice of the mind, not something that comes out of some circumstance of the human lot, and so befalls even the wisest. Under that heading we must put that first shock of the mind which moves us after we believe there has been an injustice.' Theatrical sights or recital of some past deed may also excite anger in us. "Singing and quick rhythms and the martial sound of trumpets incite us. A grim painting or the sad spectacle of punishment, however just, moves the mind ... All those things are movements of minds unwilling to be moved, and not emotions, but a preliminary prelude to emotions ... So emotion is not being moved at the appearances presented by things, but is giving oneself up to them and following up this chance movement ... anger as impulse rushes out and it cannot do so unless it has "assent of the mind".' 'For it is impossible that revenge and punishment should be at stake without the mind's knowledge. Someone thinks himself injured. He wills revenge, but he settles down at once when some considerations dissuade him. I do not call this anger, this movement of the mind obedient to reason. That is anger which leapfrogs reason and drags reason with it ... So that first agitation of the mind which the appearance of injustice inflicts is no more anger than is the appearance of injustice itself. It is the subsequent impulse, which not only receives but approves the appearance of injustice, that is anger; the rousing of a mind 'that prosecutes vengeance with will and judgement ... In order that you may know how emotions (1) begin, or (2) grow, or (3) are carried away. (1) The first movement is involuntary, like a preparation for emotion and a kind of threat. (2) That second movement is accompanied by will not an obstinate one, to the effect that it is appropriate for me to be avenged since I am injured, or it is appropriate for him to be punished since he has committed a crime. (3) The third movement is by now uncontrolled and wills to be avenged, not if it is appropriate, but come what may and it has overthrown reason ... Reason cannot control ... though perhaps familiarity and constant attention may weaken them. The second movement which is born of judgement, is removed by judgement' (pp. 73–75). In other words, if reason judges the appearance and takes a rational approach, it is possible to control the first movement as culminating into the third.

Rational therapy would be based on this second movement and can take several forms. One may re-label the appearance, i.e., look at something or some happening which one confronts in a different way. Such an approach will take away the undesirable impact. One may refuse to consider it as significant and devalue it. Or one might shift one's attention or one may think of other things which may be more pressing.

Posidonius, under the influence of Plato, thought that emotions have to do with the non-rational capacities of soul. Plato had described two other parts of soul—irrational and appetitive besides the rational one. Posidonius, therefore, sought non-rational ways to counter emotions such as wordless music. He thought that because of the likeness between cause and effect and emotion being an aspect of irrational capacities of the soul had to be dealt with in the same sort of methods. The training of the non-rational capacity begins right at the pre-natal period. Habitation to proper diet supplemented by rhythm, gymnastics and wordless music affected the child having the seed of the mother (96–97). The sound of music produces movement in body which has its effect on emotion (pp. 258–59).

The approach adopted by Posidonius could take care of children and animals on the one hand and the physiological aspect on the

other. Galen had appreciated Posidonius; move for Galen thought mental states are effected by the blend of hot and cold, dry and fluids in the body (p. 253). Modern research also backs the physiological aspect of emotions and their training. Sorabji refers to William James and discusses the research of Le Doux who emphasized the role of Amygdala, a part in the mid-brain. However, he points out an exception to this view by quoting experiments on animals by David Ferrier. In the nineteenth century he had removed the amygdala and observed emotional behaviour in the animals. He came to the conclusion that the 'centres of emotional expression are ... situated below the centres of conscious activity and ideation' (p. 150).

So far we have noticed two approaches to emotions: (1) the approach which emphasizes the cognitive factor; and that (2) which has its accent on the physiological aspect. It seems that the modern brain research is on the side of Posidonius and Galen rather than Chrysippus.

The later part of Sorabji's text is concerned with the views of Christian Saints, especially with those of Origen, Evagrius, and Augustine besides several others. He shows how certain Stoic ideas continued to influence Christian thinkers. Stoics had pointed out that there is pre-passion or pre-emotional state, which is not under the control of human and, therefore, by itself it was not culpable. This idea of first movement gets transformed into the notion of 'bad thoughts' which led to the seven sins. Occurrence of negative thoughts is not up to us. But when they are allowed to linger on, we start taking pleasure out of them and proceed to act on them, then we are entrapped by sin (pp. 345–55). The Christian fathers believed that there are demons who tempted and incited men to commit sins. They analyzed these states of mind and investigated their inter-relationship. The recommended that when one bad thought occurs it should be countered by another one for certain pairs of these thoughts were anti-theistically related. Pride or vanity, for example, tended to oppose the rest of the negative thoughts.

Chapter 25 has been devoted to the issue whether emotions need to be eradicated completely or they need to be moderated only. This question was also connected with the question, whether all emotions are undesirable or only some of them were undesirable which were to be overcome.

Philo, a first-century Jewish philosopher believed that emotions are helpful to humans. Some pleasures, good and drink were necessary. But wise people should repent against sinfulness. Maimonides and Philo thought that one should be free from pride and anger. Gregory of Nyassa thought that when anger and appetite are put to good use they are not emotions (p. 386). Origen believed that before Christ was resurrected, the ideal of *apatheia* was not possible for humans. Besides other things, he thought that God's grace and a faith in Him were necessary to support our struggle with emotions.

Chrysippus talked of *apatheia.* His main argument was that we falsely judge things and events of the world and so react to them in an inappropriate way. Things are neither good nor bad. Obviously, such a view would lead to a state free from all emotions and would enable one to attaining tranquility. We should understand that pleasure seeking is futile, for pleasure is not unmixed with pain. Epictetus was against untutored love of family, for even such love eventually transforms into hate. Unless people valued character they would do anything (pp. 183ff), but Stoic vision did not imply suppression of emotion. It only required that they are understood for what they are and, thus, allowed them to be dispersed (p. 185).

As already noted above, the first movements, not being up to us, could not be eradicated. Obviously, this is not what the Stoics meant when they recommended *apatheia.* It is assent to and reaction to these movements which had to be avoided. Against this, some people would question the necessity of eradicating all emotions, for emotions seem to be an essential aspect of human personality and, in some cases, they are both desirable and necessary. As Sorabji points out, how can one question the resentment and distress when one thinks of Nazi atrocities (p. 190). Some people think it is hard to visualize what the state of emotionlessness could mean. Sorabji suggests that we should not think of strong, determined and intense motivation as emotions (p. 186). So, being free from emotions is not being free from strong motivation.

As Sorabji reports, Strawson argued that without emotions we would hardly be human and Sorabji agrees with him. He remarks that he would not prefer a life, which is not recognizable as human

(p. 189). Some church fathers held the opinion that *apatheia* may be an ideal to strive for but it could not be attained in one's present life. Clement and Origen believed that *apatheia* is not possible before the resurrection of Christ. Jerome thought that it is not possible for humans (p. 396). Against these thinkers, Augustine argued that emotions are useful too. We need them in battle, 'for fighting in the arena, for training animals, for self-defence, for ambition independence of spirit, dutifulness, law-abidingness, prudence, and ministering punishment or offering succour' (p. 191). 'At the same time, this is also true that excessive emotions are detrimental rather than useful. Aristotle would recommend moderation, though he considered some emotions intrinsically bad and hence as beyond any moderation.'

Augustine believed that if Stoic *apatheia* excluded love and gladness it was not desirable. If it excluded grief and fear it was neither attainable nor desirable. Thus, he recommended moderation rather than eradication. Against complete eradication of emotions, two main considerations emerge. Emotions have instrumental value while some belong to the substance of human life. In whatever context, if they were untutored or excessive they would be counterproductive.

In Chapter 16, Sorabji deals with the issue of emotions in the context of time and self. In what way do the tenses affect our understanding of emotions? Some time in the future, death would overcome life. Non-existence as a consequence of death in future can be a source of anxiety. It is interesting to note that one hardly bothers about the non-existence before birth. If non-existence were really significant and a source of worry then non-existence before birth should have been as much a source of worry as one thinks of the non-existence after death. Since we do not worry about the non-existence before birth, why should we consider life to be valuable then, remarks Sorabji, it does not matter to what segment of time—past, present or future, does life belong (p. 230). One may have anxiety thinking of some misfortune to occur in future. Stoics suggested that it is better to anticipate misfortune. They believe that it is the unexpected occurrence, which causes sorrow. One should live as if each day lived is the last. It is no good to pin one's hope on future. On the other hand, Cicero believed that anticipation of future misfortune allows one time for reflection and so for 'correcting one's judgement' (p. 237).

In contrast, Plato saw 'firm hope as pleasurable ... Aristotle also discusses the pleasures of hope ...' For Christians, hope has special significance. Seneca the Stoic too consoled Marcia that her son's soul will last in happiness though this did not match with general Stoic belief.

As regards the past, Seneca pointed out that it remains intact and is a secure possession. Plutarch recommends that we should weave our present with the past like a musician who would use different notes to create a harmonius whole so that harmony and appropriateness is brought into life. Perhaps the idea here is that whatever happened up to the present moment should be viewed in a positive and creative way in order to have a positive approach to life (p. 233).

Several approaches are found in relation to unpleasant experiences in the past. Aristotle and Seneca suggest that we should feel pleased that we have been able to come through those things in past. Augustine believed that one is 'glad to remember sorrow and sorry to remember gladness when they are over'. Some Jewish thinkers and Christians emphasized repentance and confession. Epicurus suggested we should shift our attention from the present evils and think of good things in the past (p. 233).

As regards the present, if it turns out to be painful, it could be so either because of the past or the future. For Aristippus, the past is gone and future is uncertain; hence, it is only present which is ours. So we should seek the pleasure of the moment. Marcus Aurelius considered present sufficient, past and future being indifferent. So he advised leave the past alone and entrust the future to providence (p. 239).

Some thought of happiness as outside time (Plotinus). But against Plato, Aristotle thought that being everlasting good would not become more good just as white would not be whiter if it ever lasted. It is said that time is a great healer since it allows the painful to fade out and permits hope.

Concept of Self or Soul too has great relevance for treating emotions. The idea that soul is distinct from the body led Epictetus to think that only his body could be encaged, his soul could not be

touched. Such a thought helps to overcome hostility, and becomes a source of tranquility (p. 245). He conceived soul as both shaper and shaped.

The idea that the self is discontinuous or undergoes change every moment led to the idea that there is no occasion to be afraid of death (Seneca and Plutarch). Sorabji conjectures that the idea of discontinuous self may have come from India. But he adds that, if it were so, it was not fully integrated in the system of Stoics (p. 247). On the contrary, Socrates or Plato found the concept of soul as everlasting soul being a source of peace (p. 249). 'Philosophical analysis of what the Self consists in had immediate practical implications for how the emotions are to be brought into order', holds Sorabji (p. 249). His discussion of the self in connection with emotion reminds us of the two extreme positions in Indian thinking—Advaita Vedanta and Buddhists, one propounding the doctrine of everlasting self as being the only real, and the other preaching the doctrine of non-self, self being considered as something constantly undergoing change. Both the positions had been rigorously argued for; it is further worth noting that both these doctrines were partly answers to the problem of misery in existence.

Several other ideas and themes have been discussed and analyzed in this book such as the notion of will, desire, catharsis, brain-research and physiology of emotion, suicide, etc. The career of the concept of will coming to its full content in Augustine is very interestingly sketched. All these discussions would surely excite the interest of readers and make rewarding exercise. Besides these, an important issue relating to the relation between theory and practice has also been discussed and can be briefly mentioned.

It has been a long-standing debate between philosophers whether philosophy has any relevance to practical concerns of human life and personality. To a great extent, the debate either assumes or leads to a view as to how philosophy itself is to be understood. In the present context, the question has been posed whether philosophy has any therapeutic relevance to emotional life. Sorabji has taken a positive view and has attempted to answer objections raised by Bernard Williams who holds 'diametrically opposed view'. Sorabji quotes Williams, '... can we really believe that philosophy properly understood in terms of rigorous argument, could be so directly

related to curing real human misery, the kind of suffering that priests and doctors and—indeed—therapists address?' Williams doubts if the ancient Epicureans, Sceptics and Stoics could at all be taken seriously as philosophical therapists. 'We are surely bound to find the Epicureans too rationalistic the Sceptics too procedurally self-obsessed, the Stoics ... too unyieldingly pompous for us to take entirely seriously not just their therapies, but the idea of them as philosophical therapists...' (pp. 159–60).

Sorabji writes in answer, '... the stoic analysis of emotion was more rigorous than similar modern analyses, and yet that it has therapeutic value. Here are four ways in which the philosophical analysis contributes to therapy' (p. 160). First, if emotions were a matter of involuntary contractions or physical reactions only, drug therapy may have been sufficient. But Stoics have shown that emotions are sort of judgements and so they can be dealt with in terms of judgements. Secondly, Stoics show that the judgements about things being good or bad and the judgements that it is appropriate or inappropriate to react to them, both indicate how one can get rid of the emotions. Thirdly, it is a great help to suggest that the physical indications in an emotional state are not causes of worry in order to attenuate emotional impact. This consideration is backed by William James' view about the relation of physical to mental when he showed that 'we are afraid because we tremble'. Fourthly, one has to act fast so that the initial appearance that things are good or bad and it is appropriate to act, are suitably countered (p. 160).

Thus Sorabji concludes, 'I could sum up my view by saying that in Stoicism analytic philosophy is married to philosophy as a way of life. But in describing as practical, I have not described it as applied ethics ... The philosophical analysis of what the emotions are is not even treated as belonging to separate branch of philosophy from the practical control of emotions. Both are classified as ethics. The connection between practice and theory is seamless' (pp. 167–68).

It seems that the issue relating to philosophy and practical concerns involves different views as philosophy itself is understood. Notice the phrase 'philosophy, properly understood in terms of rigorous argument' in the quote from Bernard Williams and the

phrase 'philosophy as a way of life' as it occurs in what Sorabji has said in reply to Williams.

In India, by and large, philosophical thinking has emerged out of the practical concerns to human life in a wide but deep sense. A few lines in respect of *Gita* would be relevant in the present context. As is well known, the first chapter of *Gita* is called *visadayoga*—an occasion of depression, one might say. Thinking of the devastating consequences of a war, Arjuna suddenly gets terrified and depressed and gives up his bow and settles down in the rear of the chariot with a sullen face. The description of what he is feeling and what is happening to his body is worth attending in the present context. Imagine a great warrior who has already won several battles, suddenly deciding not to fight when the two armies face each other and the trumpets of both the forces have already been blown.

Krishna is intrigued by Arjuna's behaviour and it is his attempt to restore his confidence, which is spelt out in the rest of the text. The text contains psychological analysis, practical considerations and interestingly a whole system of metaphysical beliefs. The relation between Arjuna's emotional state and the significance of the metaphysical discourse is evident by Arjuna's statement toward the end of the text, with 'your blessings my delusion has disappeared and I have gained understanding and now I am in a state free from doubt and shall act' (18.73).

Whether this relation between emotion and the philosophical analysis can be understood as a necessary one would remain a debatable issue but this much is clear that in one case it held. *Gita* belongs to a larger text, the *Mahabharata*. It is well known that towards the end of that text, Vyas has been reported as expressing his deep dismay on the fact that he wants people to listen to him about *dharma*, but no one seems to respond to his call. The idea is that the preaching of righteousness fell on deaf ears. The relationship between moral preaching and a positive response to them has mostly been tenuous. Thus, the relationship between philosophy and human action has been contingent. In fact, Sorabji has mentioned at one place that Chrysippus performed his therapy even on those people who would not accept stoic beliefs.

One last point about the theme of the book. The presentation involves an intimate connection between emotions and therapy.

This consideration by itself reduces emotions to a disease. It is clear from the text that Sorabji considers emotions having an essential place and role in human personality. If that is so, then emotions cannot, as such, be treated as a disease. From the point of view of survival emotions such as fear, distress and even anger have an important instrumental role to play. Their situational aspect can well illustrate this point as Sorabji has himself emphasized. In a situation of danger, fear and distress may serve as alarm and anger may just be a strategy to face the situation.

It is only in an excessive or perhaps inappropriate reactions that emotions turn out to be counter-productive and in that case their control and moderation is called for not complete eradication, as author has pointed out. Thus, it is Aristotelian *metriopatheia* which deserves recommendation rather than *apatheia* of Stoics.

10/558, Kaveri Path,
Mansarovar, Jaipur-302 020
E-mail: bhrajendra@yahoo.com

R.S. BHATNAGAR

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: *East and West—An Autobiography*, by J.N. Mohanty, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 134.

Better late than never, says the cliché. And so, I'm sitting to write a review on Mohanty's autobiography four years after its publication. I wonder what it is that drives people to write their life story. Do they write for others or for themselves? Or, as Nietzsche puts it, is it a book for all or none? In Mohanty's case, the question can be extended: if it is for others, 'for all', is it intended for his Indian friends and colleagues, for the Western ones or for both? Perhaps he wishes to share with his friends in India his 'Western world' and vice versa. When he speaks of the difficulties of an NRI visiting his native (or in his case, semi-native since he was born and raised in Orissa) Calcutta[1], I suppose that he aims at his Indian (possibly Bengali) readers. When writing of Durga, 'the beautiful goddess with ten arms, standing on a lion, and killing with a spear a green-bodied demon who was reportedly threatening all living beings on earth and even the gods in heaven' (p. 101), he must be aiming at his Western readers.

Mohanty's memoir is a detailed report on the different phases of his life, from his childhood in Orissa, via Calcutta and Göttingen to America. He has dedicated his life to the pursuit of knowledge in academic institutions; hence his story is about studying and, later on, teaching and lecturing in different universities. About each and every institution he offers an elaborated report: which particular thinkers have been there at the time, what he thinks of them and how they influenced him and his thoughts. About his studentship in different schools, he mentions with whom he had studied, and what are the current achievements of his then classmates, mentioning especially those who have become famous. In each case, he does not forget to mention that he was (always) the first student in the first class. Mohanty has gone a long way from Calcutta to America via Germany, and has worked in leading universities in three continents (Calcutta, Jadavpur and Burdwan, Göttingen, Freiburg and Oxford, Oklahoma, the New School and Temple). His report covers them all.

I especially enjoyed his description of Calcutta's philosophical circle in Mohanty's post-graduate years. I wish I could have been there with him and his friends, who simply lived in philosophy: breathing, eating, discussing and writing philosophy from morning to night. On Kalidas Bhattacharyya, for example, he writes: 'I believe he was the most inspiring teacher I have ever had, possibly with the exception of Josef König in Göttingen' (p. 24). Daya Krishna is depicted by him as 'a young and independent philosopher who came from outside Calcutta. I would go to his house on Janak Road near Ballyganj Lake on Sunday mornings to talk philosophy, and would stay on until lunch time, when Mrs Bhattacharrya would insist that I join them for lunch' (p. 25).

I believe that the two worlds indicated in the title of Mohanty's autobiography are Calcutta and Göttingen, with everything they represent: Śankara, Aurobindo, the Bhattacharyyas (K.C., Kalidas and Gopinath), Sanskrit and Navya-Nyāya Pandits vs. Edmund Husserl, German philosophers past (Hegel, Kant, Heidegger) and present (Mohanty's teachers and later on colleagues) and the American academia. Mohanty has been privileged enough to meet some of the best minds of his time; to receive a letter from Sri Aurobindo, clarifying that whereas Śankara's emphasis is on *māyā*, his own (Aurobindo's) is on *līlā*; to listen to Martin Buber, to dine with Martin Luther King, to have a close encounter with Hannah Arendt. In the background of his philosophical pursuit, modern India has taken shape, Gandhi and Vinoba have been of great inspiration, and Europe was dealing with the trauma of the Second World War, the occupation of the Nazi regime and the Jewish Holocaust.

On leaving Calcutta and its (at least then) celebrated university for the University of Oklahoma, known mostly for its football team, writes Mohanty: 'I thought, sincerely and honestly, that I would return to Calcutta after a few years of teaching and research in the United States, but that was never to be. You become a helpless victim of forces more powerful than your best intentions' (p. 78). Later on, in his epilogue (p. 127), he adds: 'Living outside India has been comfortable for my outer life, but hard for my inner one'.

In a chapter titled 'Keeping a Promise', Mohanty emerges as a modern version of Śankara, the protagonist of the famous *Śankaradigvijaya*. Despite the fact that like the famous Advaitin, he has left his home and renounced his previous life to become a 'wandering philosopher' a long distance away, he comes back to consign his mother's ashes to Ganga-Mā and perform the necessary rituals, thus keeping his promise to her. 'As my mother passed away', he confesses (p. 119), 'my need—whatever need I felt—for religion was over'.

Of special interest, at least for me, are the chapters titled 'Philosophical Journey, Roots and Religion' and 'Appendix: My Contribution to Philosophy'. Here, Mohanty lists the themes which caught his interest through the years: Gandhi vs. Marx (he opted for Gandhi), Sri Aurobindo vs. Śankara's *māyāvāda* (he preferred Aurobindo), Kantian epistemology (with Hegel as Kant's *pūrva-pakśin* or 'His Other', as Mohanty puts it), Husserl's phenomenology (and Heidegger as Husserl's Other), 'consciousness' vs. 'language' or Husserl vs. Wittgenstein (his inclination was toward the former), Platonism vs. anti-Platonism (he opted for Platonism). The 'Western themes' have been dealt by him vis-à-vis Indian philosophy: Buddhism, the Grammarians (especially Bhartṛhari), Advaita Vedānta and, of course, Navya-Nyāya. Mohanty mentions Sri Aurobindo as well as K.C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya as those who

have inspired his universal philosophical approach, according to which philosophy is 'one process' embracing different traditions of thought simultaneously. Finally, Mohanty mentions that he has 'a renewed sense of the importance of the ethical and the political. 'The Hindu concept of *dharma*, which I had so long expelled from my thinking, now occupies a central position' (pp. 115–16). Having expounded his fields and themes of interest, Mohanty moves on to touch on what he considers to be his own contribution to philosophy. If as a young lecturer in Calcutta University, he used to think that his life 'was worth nothing if I did not find for myself a path of thinking that was to be uniquely mine' (p. 62), then now, at the very end of his book, he depicts this very 'path of thinking'. He claims that he was initially interested and dealt with the problem of Platonism: Are there entities which are Platonic, ideal, abstract? He answers affirmatively, and has made an attempt at showing that nominalistic denials of such entities will not do. Is psychologistic reduction more viable than the nominalistic? And, if psychologism is rejected, how does the mind apprehend these entities? These questions, says Mohanty, still occupy his thought after nearly four decades. It is these questions, he adds, that connect—at least for him—Husserl and Frege, continental and analytic philosophy. As for his contribution to Indian philosophy, Mohanty mentions two of his major works: *Gangeśa's Theory of Truth* and *Reason and Tradition in Indian Philosophy*. The first book, dedicated to Gangeśa's concept of *prāmāṇya*, is an exposition of the doctrine of Navya-Nyāya 'in a manner that is faithful to the work and the method of the Pandit tradition'. The second book consists of 'new interpretations of old concepts and theories', and a plea for 'the recognition of the claims of memory, history and mathematics to be irreducible types of valid cognition'. Mohanty further lists his interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology and reformulation and defence of transcendental philosophy in the tradition of Kant, Hegel and Husserl, as belonging to what he previously referred to as his own 'path of thinking'. Finally, he spotlights his current dialogue with the post-modernists, from whom he has appropriated the reduction of identities to systems of differences. Hence, exemplifies Mohanty, 'I speak of layers-of-selfhood instead of a fixed identity' (p. 133).

In the epilogue of his autobiography, Mohanty summarizes his life story with the following words: 'It has been an exhilarating life, about which I have no complaints. I either did not do or did not succeed in doing everything that as a young man I had dreamt of. Amongst these dreams are: doing Gandhian village-level social work, political activism, practicing yoga. Instead, I have spent a life devoted to thinking' (p. 127). I would like to conclude by quoting a few lines from another autobiography, that of Sigmund Freud (or in effect of his psychoanalysis); lines which correspond, or at least this is my reading, with Mohanty's inspiring devotion to thinking:

> 'Looking back over the patchwork of my life's labours, I can say that I have made many beginnings and thrown out many suggestions. Something will come of them in the future, though I cannot myself tell whether it will be much or little. I can, however, express a hope that I have opened up a pathway for an important advance in our knowledge'.[2]

Notes and References

1. Intentionally I am writing Calcutta rather than Kolkata. Mohanty's love and longing are for a Calcutta which hardly exists any longer, a Calcutta with a British flavor, Calcutta of Pandits and philosophers, poets and prophets (if I may refer to Gandhi, Tagore and Sri Aurobindo as prophets).
2. Freud, Sigmund, *An Autobiographical Study*, Authorized translation by James Strachey, published by Leonard and Virginia Woolf (London: Hogarth Press, 1935).

Department of Philosophy DANIEL RAVEH
Tel-Aviv University
E-mail: daniraveh@gmail.com

A PHILOSOPHER LOOKS BACK: by T.M.P. Mahadevan Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, Mumbai, 1982, pp. 206.

Just recently, I have reviewed J.N. Mohanty's autobiography for the *JICPR* and then, on a random visit to Jaipur's annual book fair, came across another philosopher's autobiography, namely Mahadevan's. In between, let me add in brackets, I have again at random encountered and read D.P. Chattopadhyaya's 'A Short

Intellectual Autobiography', a chapter written by him as an appendix for a collection of articles presented in his honour.[1] Having shared with Daya Krishna the unexpected appetite I have developed for philosophers' autobiographies, he has asked me to transform it into yet another book review, on Mahadevan's *A Philosopher Looks Back.*

Mahadevan's autobiography reveals a deep dichotomy or, if you prefer, duality in the persona of this esteemed *Advaitin.* On the one hand, he is or at least portrays himself as a student, exponent, almost an embodiment of Advaita philosophy in theory but even more so in practice. Hence, for example, the book starts with the following passage:

> The 'segment' of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) which had appropriated this body made it see the light of day and touch the hard surface of the earth, after making it spend ten months in the prison-house of its mother's womb, on the 24th of August, 1911. . . According to the Indian calendar the birth took place in the year Virodhikṛt, month Āvaṇi, on the new moon day which was a Thursday, at 10.30 a.m.

Or take the concluding words of Mahadevan (in his 'postscript') as another example:

> This postscript is being written on 24th August, 1981, when I have completed seventy years of earthly existence. My only aim in writing the book is to help fellow travelers to the Ultimate Reality (p. 205).

In these passages and many others, Mahadevan depicts himself as totally unidentified with and detached from 'worldly matters'. Instead, he is (like each and every one of us in the Advaitic eye) the *ātman* in a temporary human form, and his autobiography is nothing but *seva* offered to 'fellow travelers to the Ultimate Reality'. Mahadevan's self-portrait is not merely of a dedicated Advaitin but also of a faithful devotee of figures such as Ramaṇa Mahāṛṣi, the Śankarācārya of Kāñcī, Mahāpuruṣaji Mahārāj of the Rāmakṛṣṇa order and other saints and sages. On the other hand, Mahadevan (a much worldlier Mahadevan) tells us in great detail of his numerous achievements. From a very young age he has taken part in different competitions (*Gītā* recitation, essay contests, etc.) and always, simply always, received the first prize, reluctant as he was to compete yet complying with the wish of his elders. Only once, believe it or not, he came second. It was in an essay contest organized by The New History Society, New York, in 1934, when he was 23 years of 'earthly' age. The first prize went to a Chinese woman, he recalls, but adds that 'on page 51 of the Volume [of the essays] the editor made the following observation: In previous competitions there had always been unanimity in regard to the first prize winners. In this one, however, there was no such unanimity'. Unbelievably, 47 years later, Mahadevan still remembers the online incident. The dichotomy between Mahadevan-profound and Mahadevan-profane can be rephrased as a conflict between 'Advaitism' and the very undertaking of writing an autobiography. Whereas the latter is a personal exercise of sharing one's life-memories with others; of inviting 'outsiders' to visit one's innermost 'private quarters'; Mahadevan's memoir is consciously written in an impersonal 'Advaitic' tone. This inner-contradiction finds a lucid expression in the narration of the touching story about Mahadevan's mother's immature death when he was just five years of age, followed by the departure of his father who 'left the household, went back to his people and eventually set up a [new] family' (p. 5). My own feeling is that somehow Advaita and autobiography writing are irreconcilable. The same dichotomy or inner-contradiction is further revealed—even though in a different context—in Mahadevan's address at the Golden Jubilee celebrations of the Department of Philosophy, Madras University, in 1977, quoted by him in a chapter titled 'Fifty years of philosophy'. Here he responds to a claim raised by his predecessor at the headship of the department, Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, according to which Śankara (unlike some of his disciples) did not recognize the continuity between the relative (*vyāvahārika*) and the absolute (*pāramārthika*). Mahadevan denies the claim altogether. According to him, 'one cannot speak of continuity or discontinuity of the rope with the snake. The relative world has no reality other than the absolute Self.' The 'true' Advaita is that who does not recognize duality between the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika,* and that is Śankara's. This, however, does not mean 'lordly indifference' to or 'neglect' of the affairs of the world. The life and works of Śankara are proof positive to show how ceaselessly the Master strove for the welfare of the world' (p. 94). My response to Mahadevan's position is twofold:

1. Interestingly, the contradiction is not merely in Mahadevan and his 'Advaitic autobiography' but even, as pointed out by Sastri, in the Master himself, i.e., Śankara. I am afraid that denial of the contradiction does not remove it.
2. If merely the *ātman* is real, why not opt for 'lordly indifference'? Mahadevan, like Śankara before him,[2] brings in the notion of *loka-samgraha.* Like the *Ādi* Master, or at least Śankara as depicted in the hagiographies dedicated to his life story, Mahadevan too lectured, talked, preached and expounded Advaita ceaselessly all his life. Later, I will expand on Mahadevan's notion of Advaita as well as on his 'Advaita ambassadorship' abroad.

Mahadevan studied philosophy at Pachaiyappa's College, Chennai, under Professor P.N. Srinivasachari, of whom he writes: 'Although he was a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and has written a sumptuous volume on the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, he was broad minded and wrote books on Advaita as well as on *Bhedābheda.* Making use of Kantian terms, he was fond of distinguishing three types of Advaita: Pure Advaita, Practical Advaita and Pure-Practical Advaita' (p. 41). Mahadevan's Ph.D. thesis has been written in Madras University under the head of the Department of Philosophy at the time, Professor Sastri. It was, of course, on Advaita philosophy, based primarily on the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-sangraha* and the *Pañcadaśī,* both composed according to him by Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya, Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya's predecessor on the Sringeri Pīṭha and not by the latter. His thesis titled 'The philosophy of Advaita with special reference to Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya' was examined by S. Radhakrishnan, A.B. Keith and F.W. Thomas. The second World War took place in the background of Mahadevan's academic and spiritual life and he tells us that 'during the very bad years of the war, the city of Madras was almost vacated. Offices were moved out and many citizens went to interior places. We, i.e., the Svāmī, my aunt and I, stayed for some time in a place near Bangalore' (p. 44). Still in his 30s, Mahadevan joined a pilgrimage tour to all the famous *tīrthas* of north India. Interestingly, Gandhi's Sabarmati Āśram and Nehru's house in Allahabad were included in the *tīrtha-yatra.* In Sabarmati,

the pilgrims met Kasturba Gandhi who told them *khadi pehno* and in Allahabad they were welcomed by Kamala Nehru who was working in the garden. Gandhiji was in London at the time; Nehru was serving a prison sentence. Between 1935 and 1937, Mahadevan was a lecturer in logic at the Rāja College in Pudukkottai, near Tiruchirappalli, yet his first lecture in the college was spontaneously titled 'Śankara as I know him'. Between 1937 and 1943, he was head of the Department of Philosophy, Pachaiyappa's College and later, as we all know, he was the head of the Department of Philosophy, Madras University (1943-1976). Mahadevan's Golden Jubilee address at the department, mentioned above, is in fact a summary of his philosophical standpoint. Here he states that for him, 'Advaita is relevant for the management of man's—even contemporary man's problems, ethical, social, political, etc.' (p. 96). He further reveals his Advaita-picture in the chapter dedicated to his voyage abroad in 1948-49. Mahadevan was invited to the US to teach Indian philosophy in Cornell University, and travelled via Sri Lanka and England. In Colombo, he delivered a lecture at the Rāmakṛṣṇa Mission, which started with the following words:

> The way India has shown the world is the way that was taught and followed by Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Śankara, Buddha, Rāmakṛṣṇa and Gandhi. That is the message of the East. The way is the path of the Spirit. As Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa says, if you add zeroes, one after the other, they will have no value at all. But if you add number one before them the value of the zeroes will increase with each addition. That number one is the Self (p. 105).

From London Mahadevan sent a recorded message which was published in a Madras paper, stating that

> It is amazing to note that there is colossal ignorance about our country abroad. India would need many of her sons and daughters to go out into the world to spread the message of her spiritual culture. In the era that is coming she can well play the role of a leader of nations to lasting peace (p. 109).

Hence Mahadevan emerges—like Vivekananda before him—as an 'Advaita ambassador', eager to spread the message of Advaita as a universal ground for a meaningful human life. During the long boat journey from Sri Lanka to England, Mahadevan delivered several talks to his fellow passengers, titled—as he recorded in his

diary—'Why Religion?', 'The quest after reality?', 'What are we?' and 'Whither do we go?'

Of his first days in Cornell, Mahadevan reports that he was extremely surprised by the informality in the campus, the diligence of the students, the fact that classes take place from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., the easy availability of vegetarian food, the fact that young male Indian students can cook and the inter-disciplinary character of the syllabus. He has delivered ten lectures in his first semester in America, titled: 'The climate of Indian thought', 'The sources of Indian philosophy', 'The avenues of knowledge', 'The real and the non-real', 'The quest for unity', 'The world and its becoming', 'Discovery of the soul', 'The roads to freedom', 'The end of man' and 'Summing up'. The story goes on: lectures, talks, conferences, visits to Rāmakṛṣṇa centers in different parts of the USA, sightseeing in the Niagara Falls, etc. In the Rāmakṛṣṇa center in Hollywood—of all places, Mahadevan spoke of the difference between Indian and Western Philosophy. 'How the former was not only theoretical but also practical; how it had maintained alliance with religion; how it analyses states of experience other than waking and how Indian philosophy is a philosophy of values' (p. 130). Such a picture can only be sketched by a person for whom Indian philosophy is (merely or at least primarily) Advaita, and Advaita is Truth with a capital T rather than a philosophical standpoint among others. Furthermore, such a picture does not take into account practical instances in Western philosophy from ancient Greece to the existential movement and, of course, the philosophical writings of Freud and others who have not written on *turīya* but, nevertheless, made a contribution in the study of dreams.

Mahadevan further writes about the many journeys (Thailand, Myanmar, Belgium, Austria, West Germany, Greece, Iran, Mauritius), meetings (Albert Schweitzer, Charles A. Moor, D.T. Suzuki, Sri J. Krishnamurti, Svāmī Śivānanda, Ānandamayī Mā and many others) and lectures (with titles such as 'Indian Philosophy: A Great Reconciler of Religion and Science').

Mahadevan's book is not easy to delve into because of the inner-contradiction between the personal and the impersonal discussed above. But once you are in, it is an interesting piece of history.

Notes and References

1. Daya Krishna and K. Satchidananda Murty (Eds.), *History, Culture and Truth: Essays presented to D.P. Chattopadhyaya,* (New Delhi: Kalki Prakashan, 1999), pp. 337-88.
2. See *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya* 3.20, 4.19 and 5.7.

Department of Philosophy Daniel Raveh
Tel-Aviv University
E-mail: daniraveh@gmail.com

Discourses in Buddhist Classics: Andhra University Philosophical Studies, No. 6, D.K. Printworld, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 166.

Theravāda Buddhist Devotionalism in Ceylon: by V.V.S. Saibaba *Burma and Thailand,* Emerging Perceptions in Buddhist Studies, No. 19, D.K. Printworld, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 88.

Faith and Devotion in Theravāda Buddhism: *Emerging Perceptions in Buddhist Studies,* No. 20, D.K. Printworld, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 231.

Dr V.V.S. Saibaba of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam is a very fruitful writer. In the following lines I will briefly scrutinize three of his recently published books.

I. *Discourses in Buddhist Classics* is an introductory book of Buddhist philosophy. It consists of six chapters:

1. Life and mission of Gautama Buddha
2. Origin and development of the Pāli language
3. The Tripiṭaka literature
4. Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism
5. Theravāda Buddhist classics (Dhammapada, Sutta-Nipāta)
6. Mahāyāna Buddhist classics (Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra, Saddharma-Pundarika-Sūtra)

Saibaba's second chapter, on the Pali language, is interesting. He refers to the etymology and origin of the word Pāli itself as well

as to the geographical regions where the language was in use. He further provides a list of modern scholars, eastern (especially far-east) and western, who have contributed to the study of Pāli, and finally, he elaborately explains why it is important to study and preserve the Pāli language. Having incidentally read in *The Times of India* just a few days ago that Sanskrit has been dropped from the syllabus of Cambridge University, I definitely share Saibaba's implied concern. In an era of money and technology, capitalism and instrumentalism, who will take care of or find interest in old treasures such as Sanskrit and Pāli, or even—as no other than Jacques Derrida has worriedly suggested[1]—in philosophy, 'the eyes of the university'?

Also intriguing is the section dedicated by Saibaba (in Chapter 6) to parables as an *upāya* for conveying the Buddhist teachings. He narrates five famous such parables. Here, the Buddha is depicted as a father, a physician (and once even as a physician-father) who has to seduce his children/patients to be cured/redeemed. Indeed, one is so habitual to perceiving the world and himself/herself within the world in a certain manner that it is difficult to persuade him/her that it is merely one's possible perspective, difficult as it is to break or broaden the borderlines of what she or he became accustomed to identify with as 'I'. The need, referred to by Saibaba, to seduce the blinded-by-*avidyā* student to cut through his mental formations reminds me of the role and place of the *Siddhis* in Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*. According to my reading, in order to be seduced into taking the *yoga-mārga* leading to *kaivalya*, the potential-yogin is promised a variety of magical powers, which as the *Yogasutra-kāra* himself admits,[2] are *siddhis* (achievements) merely on the 'outer' *vyutthāna-realm*. The point is that it does not really matter what brings you to the spiritual path; what matters is the transformation which the path might facilitate. The use of parables in itself is a 'seductive-act'. Are not these parables, in fact, attractive tales intended to pull the listeners out of their conditionings and show them something which so far they could not see?

II. *Theravāda Buddhist Devotionalism in Ceylon, Burma and Thailand* is a short monograph (75 pages, excluding bibliography and index) consisting of two parts. Part 1, entitled 'Historical perspective of Theravāda Buddhist and Devotionalism' is dedicated to Buddhist worship and devotional practices in Pāli and Avadāna literature. It is further divided into four chapters:

1. Cetiya and Thūpa (Sanskrit: *caitya* and *stūpa*) worship
2. Relic worship (hair, nails, teeth and ashes)
3. Symbol worship (Bodhi tree, wheel, bowl, staff, robe, crest, turban, shadows and footprints)
4. Image worship

Part 2, entitled 'Theravāda Buddhist Devotionalism in *Ceylon, Burma and Thailand*', is a 'fieldwork' where the author finds out how the theory expounded in the first part of his book is actually practiced in these three countries. We all know of ritualism—in fact elaborated ritualism—in Mahāyana Buddism. The novelty of this monograph is that it focusses on the ritualistic dimension of Theravāda Buddhism. The author does not deal with the *prima facie* contradiction between ritualism and devotionalism (*bhakti*) on the one hand and the famous intellectual dimension of the early Buddhist tradition on the other hand. His book is more descriptive than reflective, more about the relevant data than about analysis of the data and its philosophical implications. In the first, theoretical part of the book, Saibaba refers to the *Nikāya* texts which speak of *pūjā, vandanā, dāna* and *dakṣiṇā* as the householder's recipe for reaching not merely 'celestial mansions' but even *nibbāna*. When he writes of *stūpa* and relic worship, the author—following the Buddhist texts—mentions the benefits of such worship (rebirth as a *devatā* or a *preta* as per one's dedication or negligence in his/her worship, escaping bad destination 'even after thirty aeons', etc.). Having lately read Atīśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* and as I am currently working on Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, I find it disappointing that unless a *siddhi*, a precious *siddhi*, is promised to the yogin/devotee, they will not bother to step on the spiritual/devotional path. Interestingly, *nibbāna* or *kaivalya* are not appealing enough—at least in the initial phase—to attract potential devotees/yogins.

Referring to symbol worship, Saibaba writes (pp. 27–28) that during 480–180 BC, the Buddha was represented, hence worshipped, merely through symbols. I was surprised to learn that his renuncia-

tion was depicted by a horse without a rider and his enlightenment by a vacant seat under a Boddhi tree. Another interesting symbol of worship mentioned very briefly by Saibaba (p. 32), is the worship of the Buddha's shadows in the city of Nagarahāra as well as in caves at Kauśāmbī, Gayā and Nagara. Unfortunately, Saibaba hardly gives any details about the shadow worship. Taking the three symbols together—horse without a rider, empty seat and shadows—I would say that we are, in fact, facing a very intriguing type of worship: worship of an absence, of that which is not, of a negation. Is the famous notion of *śūnyatā* hidden in these three symbols of worship?

In the chapter on Ceylon, in Part 2 of the book, Saibaba asserts that 'there are great similarities in the modes of food offerings to the Buddha and to the statues of Viṣṇu or the deity Kataragama in the temples of Sri Lanka' (p. 53). He further describes the way Buddha statues are handled, cleaned and worshipped, and again states that 'there is little difference between all this and the way *pūjā* is offered to their idols by the Hindus' (p. 54). In the chapter on Burma we hear of a fish image representing the Buddha (p. 67) and worshipped as a rainmaker. Excluding the rain, Viṣṇu and his Matsya-avatāra immediately come to mind. Saibaba further writes about worship which takes place for the sake of gaining good health, better birth in the next life or immunity to spirits, *nats* and other supernatural powers. The question is: What has happened to *nibbāna*? Has it ceased to be the prime *puruṣārtha* of the Buddhists? Saibaba agrees with W.L. King who claims (in *A Thousand Lives Away: Buddhism in Contemporary Burma*) that nibbāna is considered by the majority of the Buddhist worshippers to be unapproachable by ordinary people. Hence, the author of the monograph, in effect, describes a Buddhist religion which shifts the *nibbāna*-centered Buddhist philosophy from centre to periphery. The chapter on Thailand is too short (two pages and four lines) and very general. In his epilogue (pp. 73–75), Saibaba finally offers an interesting argument. According to him, devotion and rituals have not crept into Buddhism or entered through the back door. Quite the contrary: Relying on the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of the Dīgha Nikāya, the *Petavatthu* of the Khuddhaka Nikāya and their commentaries, he argues that the Buddha himself gave relics for worship and

sanctioned the *stūpa*-worship. Hence *bhakti*, according to V.V.S. Saibaba, is an integral facet of Buddhism from the very beginning, or as he himself puts it in the very last lines of his book: 'What goes on today in *thūpa, pagodā* and *Wat* is not a distortion of Buddhism. Generations of the sincere and the pious in different countries, including learned men and common folk, could not have been untrue to the spirit of Buddhism' (p. 75). According to my understanding, Saibaba depicts a popular Buddhist religion (with deities, rituals, etc.) which existed (and still exists) alongside the far more demanding Buddhist philosophy, developed and nurtured by a limited intellectual circle. After all, what will 'the common man' do with notions such as *paṭicca samuppāda*, if even *nibbāna*—as Saibaba has shown—does not mean much for him? What will he do with the striking discovery that for the Buddha, just like for Nietzsche-Zarathustra two millennia after him, 'God is dead'?

III. In his preface to *Faith and Devotion in Theravada Buddhism*, Saibaba repeats the main argument of *Theravāda Buddhist Devotionalism in Ceylon, Burma and Thailand*, emphasizing the centrality of *bhakti* within the early Buddhist tradition. 'Although Theravāda Buddhism has the authentic tradition of philosophical discourses', he writes (p. xiii), 'it should not be misunderstood as a mere academic school... faith and devotion underlie the whole Buddhist tradition.' The present book is divided into three sections:

1. Theravāda Conception of gods and god
2. The Buddha in the Theravāda literature
3. *Saddhā* and *Bhatti* in Theravāda Buddhism

In the first section, Saibaba discusses the notion of *deva*, as well as the role and place of the different *devas* in Theravāda Buddhism. He describes the intricate Buddhist cosmology with its multiple heavens and hells, and compares several gods such as Brahmā, Sakka (Indra) and Yama, as portrayed in the Vedic and the Buddhist traditions. Saibaba's main point is that the devas in the Buddhist context are merely supplementary to the Buddha, hence they are not worshipped—but only 'remembered' (*devānussati*) and 'treated with goodwill, friendliness and love' (p.

38). Saibaba explains that the *devas*, from the *Mahā Brahmās* to the tree-gods (*rukkha-devatā*), wood-nymphs (*vana-devatā*) and water spirits (*samudda-devatā*) belong to the samsāric cyclel. Hence, none of them is a creator (nor The Creator), eternal (due to the principle of *annica*) or benevolent (since everything is *dukkha*). Rather, the gods are servants of the Buddha, and as Saibaba puts it, 'they are only superior personages of some kind when compared with human beings' (p. 11). That is to say that they live in bigger *Havelis* with nicer view and better neighbours. They eat tastier food and, in general, live a more pleasurable life, but in due time—just like us—they will continue to transmigrate according to their *karmas* and will be reborn elsewhere. Interestingly, the *devatās* enjoy themselves too much to have the desire to be liberated (p. 14). After all, liberation and *dukkha* are co-dependent; hence, a certain amount of suffering is needed to persuade a person to adopt the *dharma mārga*. The conclusion is, of course, that a human birth is the best as far as the chances of reaching *nirvāṇa* are concerned. Now the question is: Who needs the gods, if they are *samsārins* like us? The answer has been given by Saibaba above: 'Generations of the sincere and the pious in different countries'. Here he adds that 'a person who applies his mind to recollection of the *devas* becomes dear to them. He attains abundance of faith, virtue and other qualities... he is bound for a happy destiny... and his mind is purified... recollection of the *devas* is an indirect means to attain *nirvāṇa*' (pp. 41–42). My own response is twofold: First, the *devatās* are 'the opium of the people'. Without them the world will be boring, empty. They add the *namak* to our daily life. We love them, even if they are not essential (to say the least) as far as the Buddhist *nirvāna* is concerned. Second, I am reminded of Śankara's attitude toward *karma* and *bhakti*, especially in his *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya*. According to the famous (*pracchanna-bauddha*) Advaitin, *jñāna-niṣṭhā* alone results in *mokṣa*. Yet those who are not eligible or ready for 'the way of knowledge', like Arjuna of the *Gītā*, for example, should opt for the *karma* (including *bhakti*) *niṣṭhā* in order to obtain the *adhikāra* of the *jñāna-mārga*. Is this what Saibaba implies when he speaks of 'recollection of the *devas*' as indirect means to attain *nirvāna*? Is it merely preparation for the Buddhist *jñāna-niṣṭhā*, or rather total abandonment of the *nirvāṇa*-ideal for the sake of more

worldly ends such as 'abundance of faith', 'virtue and other qualities', 'happy destiny', etc.?

The second section of the book is dedicated to the figure of the Buddha in Theravāda Buddhism, and we are provided with a detailed description of the different types of knowledge that Saibaba has garnered (knowledge of the past, of heaven and hells, of others' mental and spiritual attainments). Here, a comparison with the different types of knowledge which the yogin obtains through *samyama*, as per the third chapter of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* would be interesting.[3] It would also be interesting to compare the omniscience of the Buddha (pp. 77–79) with other notions of *sarva-jñāna* such as, again, patanjali's, as depicted yet again in the *Vibhuti-Pāda* of the *Yogasūtra*.[4] The proposed comparison between Theravāda, Buddhism and Pātañjala-yoga can be extended even more to include the *siddhis* of the Buddha and of Patañjali's *yogin*. Check out, for example, the following passage from the *Samyutta Nikāya* (as translated by Rhys Davids and quoted by Saibaba in p. 88):

> (The Buddha:) I brethren, according as I desire, enjoy manifold mystic power: being one I become many, being many I become one. Here visible, there invisible [compare with Yogasūtra 3.21–22]; I go without let or hindrance through wall, rampart, hill as if through air; I dive into earth and up again as if in water; I travel seated cross-legged through air as if I were a bird upon the wing [compare with *YS* 3.40,43]; I can handle and stroke with the hand this moon and sun, mighty and powerful though they be... hear sounds both of *devas* and of men whether far or near [compare with *YS* 3.37] ... know in mind the mind of other beings [compare with *YS* 3.19]... and remember my diverse former births [compare with *YS* 3.18].

In the third and final section of the book, Saibaba writes of *saddhā* (*śraddhā*) and *bhatti* (*bhakti*) in Theravāda Buddhism. His basic contention is that Buddhist monks and nuns focus on the attainment of *nibbāna* through meditation, whereas the lay community concentrates on *bhakti*, or more specifically on Buddha-*pūjā*, *accanā*, *patthani*, *thava* and *thuti*. Saibaba, following the Buddhist texts, does not forget the list the benefits of such worship (pp.188—91): happiness, *deva* – rebirth, good name, longevity, etc. *Nirvāna*, we discover again, is merely for an elite minority. The rest of us are allowed to continue living happily in the realm of *duhkha* and *avidyā*, gods and worship, *mirch* and *namak*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Derrida, Jacques, *Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2,* translated by Jan Plug and Others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
2. *Yogasūtra* 3.38: *te samādhāv-upasargā vyutthāne siddhayah.*
3. *Yogasūtra* 3.16, 17, 18, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33.
4. *Yogasūtra* 3.34 and 3.50.

Department of Philosophy
Tel-Aviv University
E-mail: daniraveh@gmail.com

DANIEL RAVEH

Books Received

1. A. Raghuramaraju: *Debating Gandhi—A Reader,* Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 388, Rs. 595.
2. R.C. Shah: *Ancestral Voices: Reflections on Vedic, Classical and Bhakti Poetry,* Motilal Banarsidass, Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 2006, pp. 82, Rs. 195.
3. Sukhamoy Ghosh: *Truth: A Work of Nature in Man,* Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, pp. 152, Rs. 195.
4. Ambika Datta Sharma: *बौद्ध प्रमाण दर्शन,* Vishvavidyalaya Prakashan, Sagar, 2007, pp. 209, Rs. 350.
5. K.S. Balasubramanian and T.V. Vasudeva: *Darśanopaniṣad,* The Kuppuswami Shastri Research Institute, 2006, pp. 136, Rs. 70.
6. Norman Haughness: *Grandest Illusion: The Seductive Myth of Free Will,* Echo Park Press, 2006, pp. 500.
7. Richard Sorabji and David Rodin: *The Ethics of War,* Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, pp. 253.
8. Sauraupran Goswami: *Persons: A Strawsonian Study,* ANWESHA, 2006, pp. 224, Rs. 250.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,अे ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc.
etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ൽ ḷ
ഴ ḷ.
ൻ ṇ
ർ ṛ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa), Munnuṟṟuvamaṅgalam, Māraṇ etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it): next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ओ ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as r̄)

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc.
etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ன ṉ
ழ ḻ
ண ṇ
ற ṟ

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seūṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
coöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dägaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *vévе* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḻevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.